Considering others in need on altruism, empathy and perspective taking

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Author: Lidewij Welmoed Niezink.

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Considering Others in Need

On Altruism, Empathy and Perspective Taking

Cover Design:

Judith Grob

Cover Layout:

Taco de Jong

Printing:

Offsetdrukkerij Ridderprint B.V., Ridderkerk

RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

CONSIDERING OTHERS IN NEED On Altruism, Empathy and Perspective Taking

Proefschrift ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de Gedrags- en Maatschappijwetenschappen aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, dr. F. Zwarts, in het openbaar te verdedigen op donderdag 27 maart 2008 om 16.15 uur

door

Lidewij Welmoed Niezink geboren op 27 januari 1979 te Schildwolde

Promotor:

Prof. dr. A.P. Buunk

Copromotor:

Dr. F.W. Siero

Boordelingscommissie:

Prof. dr. S.M. Lindenberg Prof. dr. T. Postmes Prof. dr. H.W. Bierhoff

ISBN: 978-90-367-3352-6

Preface Altruism does not only encompass the sole motive to increase the benefit of someone else, it also encompasses action. A question which I did not explore in this dissertation, but which keeps haunting me lately, is this: When an action is altruistically motivated and carried out, does it have to be effective (in terms of the goal of benefiting) to be labeled altruistic? Sometimes I think yes, because otherwise, what is the point of the altruistic motive if there is no actual benefit for the person suffering? Then again, if the altruistic intention was there and the action was taken, there is no subsequent personal control over the consequences resulting from it. If the action turns out unbeneficial, we could term it an altruistic mistake, yet no less altruistic. But if altruism results from compassion, as I state in the discussion section of this dissertation, understanding the suffering of others is inherent to compassion and therefore to altruism too. Then, if one understands the suffering and intends to eliminate its root causes, altruistic action is inherently beneficial for the other. I have been very fortunate to work on such a fascinating and challenging topic. Writing this dissertation has brought me many things for which I am grateful, one of which is a certain dose of modesty. While this dissertation was taking shape, my opinion on whether altruism exists has progressively shifted 180 degrees. When I started this project I remember fierce discussions with my advisor Prof. dr. Bram Buunk. He told me I was a pessimist, being so convinced that all human action is eventually egotistically motivated. Indeed, now I think that this conviction underestimates our human capacities and might even serve as “an easy way out”. Nevertheless, although as a person, I now do believe in altruism, as a scientist I have not even been close to proving it exists. It won’t be very surprising that, working on empathy, sympathy, perspective taking and altruism, I have many people to thank. I will not be able to thank you all in person in these few words, but I do thank you all for your wonderful support which has helped me to finish what I have started. I wish to dedicate any merit produced by this dissertation to your altruistic choices and happy life. Especially I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. dr. Bram Buunk. Not only did you provide me with this opportunity to become a graduate student, you also taught me

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Preface

valuable lessons. Lessons on how to write, what choices to make and what perspectives to take. I want to thank you for this special start of my scientific career. Frans Siero, ook jij was cruciaal. Omdat je me aanmoedigde en het me niet in de schoot wierp. Omdat je me vaak de juiste vragen wist te stellen, moeiteloos om vissenkoppen wist te lachen en omdat je me leerde consolideren. Voor mij ben je een held. I have to thank all my colleagues from both S&O as well as DPMG who have been inspiring and with whom I had so many laughs. Justin Park, thank you for our very pleasant contact and for working with me on chapter 3 of this dissertation. Diederik Stapel, thank you for the inspiring discussions I enjoyed so much and your generous support and hospitality. Nynke, Jacomien, Saskia, Arne, Anna, Marcus, Carla, Sarah, Janneke, Rink, Ilse, Mark, José, Hanny en Kina. Thank you all. Also a special thanks to Judith Grob. Not only did you provide me with the beautiful cover for this dissertation, you have also been a wonderful friend. Being around you has been very often like creating a cocoon where we could play joyfully as if suffering does not exist at all. My paranimfen, Jacomijn Hofstra and Jurjen Niezink. You have been there at the moment I needed you most, when times got rough for me. I am convinced you will be there to pull me through the last bits of it. I feel honored to have you two beside me. My family, the whole bunch. Happily, Sinterklaas keeps us distracted only nine months a year ;-). My dissertation says it might be due to our beliefs about mutual reciprocity that we have such frequent prosocial interactions. Indeed, I moved houses six times during my graduate period; you helped me out every single time. I think it is a choice. One we keep making. Finally, Michel, my best friend and Love, who was there all the way. You were able to highlight my best qualities and you were able to stand my worst habits. It is because of you that I have been able to finish this work. We’re finished now, time to move on ;-).

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Contents

Contents Chapter 1 Chapter 2

General Introduction

9

When Your Suffering Becomes Mine: The Influence of

19

Social Comparison Orientation on Affect Resulting in a Willingness to Help Others

Chapter 3

Study 2.1

21

Study 2.2

26

Psychological Motivators of Altruism Among Kin and

33

Friends

Chapter 4

Study 3.1

35

Study 3.2

40

What Happened to Pandora’s Box: Reconsidering the

45

Measurement of State Empathy Defining Empathy within Psychology

46

Review Factor Analysis

49

Nine Factor Analyses based on new data

54

The Discriminatory Power of the newly appeared

61

scales of Sympathy and Tenderheartedness Conclusion Chapter 5

67

Summary and Discussion

71

Summary

72

Relations with other Research

74

Altruism, from inclination to choice

78

Limitations and Ruminations

82

Conclusion References

85

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

103 vii

CHAPTER 1


Few of us have a clear idea of the process that takes place within our mind when we encounter someone in need of help. Why would we anyway; situations in which someone is in need usually require immediate action. In such situations, what matters is to provide adequate help, not to ponder on why we help. Science, on the contrary, has placed this question of why we help in the center of a long philosophical and empirical inquiry. The debate has been especially concerned with whether human beings are ever, to any degree, capable of helping which transcends the bounds of self-benefit, and which is based solely on the genuine concern for the welfare of another. This basic question about our human nature is often referred to as “The Altruism Question”. In the scientific literature, the question why people do and don’t act prosocially has been asked for two different reasons (Batson, 1998): either to reach the practical goal of encouraging prosocial behaviour, or to challenge currently dominant theories of social motivation, which are firmly founded on assumptions of universal egoism (Mansbridge, 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). The terms “helping behaviour”, “prosocial behaviour” and “altruism” are frequently used interchangeably. However, they can be distinguished for analytical purposes (Bierhoff, 2002). Helping is the broadest term, including all forms of interpersonal support such as the customer service of a salesperson. Prosocial behaviour is narrower, in that it covers all actions intended to benefit one or more people other than oneself (Batson, 1998), excluding all paid activities in the service sector (Bierhoff, 2002). When a certain act is beneficial to another and is also intended, we call it prosocial. Yet, prosocial behaviour can be either altruistically or egoistically motivated. It can be motivated by internal or external rewards, by the wish to reduce aversive arousal, or by the ultimate goal to try to increase the other’s welfare. In this last case, according to most psychologists, the helping is altruistically motivated. Thus, altruism is even narrower than prosocial behaviour, in that it implies the primary and ultimate motive to increase another person’s welfare. Altruism as a psychological concept is quite different from altruism as a biological concept. Evolutionary biology does not take motives into account, and defines altruism

Chapter 1

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entirely in terms of survival and reproduction. A behaviour is altruistic when it increases the fitness of others and decreases the fitness of the actor (Sober & Wilson, 1998). A shift from biology, where altruism is deduced from behaviour, to psychology, where altruism is viewed in terms of motives, implies a shift from the behavioural products of evolution to the proximate mechanisms which direct these behaviours. These mechanisms are to be found in the human mind. In general, models on helping and altruism assume either an egoistic or an altruistic motivation behind helping. Egoistic Motivation In egoistically motivated helping behaviour, the helper aspires to fulfill the ultimate goal of increasing his own welfare. In other words, egoistically motivated helping uses the instrumental goal of relieving the other’s suffering to reach the ultimate goal of receiving self-benefits. One model which explains helping in terms of egoistic motives is the negative state relief model. Negative State Relief Model. According to Cialdini, Baumann and Kenrick (1981) is prosocial behaviour motivated by the desire to reduce uncomfortable negative emotions and thus improve one’s own emotional state. This is known as the negative state relief model. It does not matter whether these negative emotions are already present or whether they are aroused by the encounter with an emergency situation. Either way, one engages in prosocial behaviour to make oneself feel better (Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988). Thus, theories based on egoism maintain that the only ultimate goals an individual has are selfdirected. Theories based on altruism do not make such a universal claim. Research in this tradition claims that some people, at least some times, have the welfare of others as ends in themselves. Although this seems a very modest claim, it is precisely what advocates of psychological egoism deny, and therefore central to research on the altruism question. Empathy and Altruistic Motivation Empathy is an emotional state which is thought to evoke altruistic motivation. Research on empathy has a long tradition in philosophy and since the beginning of the twentieth century also in psychology. Within psychology, the term empathy was first coined by Titchener (1909) as a translation of the German word “Einfühlung”. Titchener (1915) referred to empathy either as the subject’s awareness in imagination of the emotions of another person as well as a kind of social-cognitive bonding. Within a clinical context, empathy was initially viewed as a cognitive process referring to accurately and


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dispassionately understanding the client’s point of view concerning his or her situation (Dymond, 1949) or trying to “live the attitudes of the other” (Rogers 1951, p.29) Eventually, definitions shifted from cognition-based to emotion-based (Stotland, 1969; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Coke, Batson & McDavis, 1978; Hoffman, 1987). Empathy became understood as an emotional response referring to either feeling a vicarious emotion, feeling the same emotion as another person feels or feeling a vicarious emotion that is congruent with but not necessarily identical to the emotion of another (Stotland, 1969; Krebs, 1975; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Batson & Coke, 1981). The major explanation of prosocial behaviour in terms of empathy leading to an altruistic motive is the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, at least some prosocial behaviour is motivated entirely by the unselfish desire to help someone who needs help (Batson & Oleson, 1991). This motivation can be even at the expense of oneself or of the group as a whole (Batson, et al. 1995a). The experience of empathy provides information that the helper values the welfare of another person and therefore must want to provide help (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995b). Empathy can be elicited by taking the perspective of the person in need. Thus, contemporary psychology defines two main and interconnected mechanisms for altruistic behaviour; a cognitive mechanism: taking the other’s perspective, and an emotional mechanism: feeling empathy or sympathy. In the present thesis, I will elaborate on both these mechanisms. Specifically, I will investigate how one’s perspective on a person in need, and one’s inclination to compare oneself with others, affect feelings of empathy and distress for that person. I will also determine whether perspective taking has different emotional consequences when the person in need is either a friend or a family member. Eventually, I will turn to the empathy mechanism itself1. I will review how empathy is differentially defined and used within psychology and I will suggest that the empathic response consists of at least two distinct dimensions, i.e. sympathy, and tenderheartedness.

In the first two empirical chapters of this dissertation, state empathy is defined and measured in line with the existing tradition within social psychology, as Batson (1991) explains. In chapter 4 and 5 of this dissertation, I redefine empathy in such a way that it opposes the definition as used in the previous chapters. What I label sympathy in those chapters is what I label empathy in chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation. This difference in definitions is maintained to respect the chronological order in which we carried out the research. 1

Chapter 1

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Cognitive mechanism: Perspective Taking A first prerequisite for helping is that the potential helper perceives the need of another person. Our perception of the need of someone else is to an important degree influenced by the perspective from which we consider this need. There are several perspectives from which individuals can approach the situation of another person. I will discuss a number of these perspectives. First, people can imagine how the other perceives the situation and how that person feels as a result (imagine other-perspective). Second, they can imagine how we would perceive the situation ourselves and how they would feel as a result (imagine self-perspective). Third, individuals can try to stay objective, paying attention to the situation itself without focusing on the resulting feelings (objective perspective). In his pioneering research on empathy, Stotland (1969) found that the two ‘imagine’ perspectives led to more physiological arousal and self-reported emotion than the objective perspective. He also found that the physiological and self-report effects were not the same for the two imagine-perspectives. Indeed, recent functional MRI research has shown that, when witnessing another person in pain, the two imagine perspectives lead to different activation in the parietal cortex, with the self-perspective eliciting higher levels of activity in the left parietal cortex, whereas the other-perspective elicited more activity in the right parietal cortex (Lamm, Batson & Decety, 2007). The inferior parietal cortex is a multisensory integration area that is ideally suited to detect distinctions between selfgenerated and external signals. Further neuroimaging results show that the right parietal cortex plays not only a role in imagining a situation from different perspectives, but also in distinguishing actions executed by oneself or actions performed by others (Jackson & Decety, 2004; Blakemore & Frith, 2003), even when the behaviour is only mentally simulated (Ruby & Decety, 2004). Although we now know that different perspectives predominantly activate different brain regions, this research does not inform us about the different emotional consequences of the perspectives. Within psychology, the differences between the two ‘imagine’ perspectives have long been neglected. Researchers seemed to assume that the emotions evoked by the two perspectives were essentially the same (cf. Lerner, 1980; Davis, 1994). This changed when Batson, Early and Salvarani (1997a) showed that the two perspectives led to differences in the amount of empathy and personal distress participants reported in reaction to a person in need. Empathy is defined as an emotional response, elicited by and congruent with, but not necessarily identical to, the perceived welfare of someone else (Batson 1991). Personal distress is a self-focused negative emotional arousal in reaction to the perceived distress of


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the other, which involves feeling alarmed, upset, disturbed and distressed (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). Batson et al. (1997) argued that because imagining how a person feels leads to relatively pure empathy this perspective should also lead to relatively pure altruistic motivation. On the contrary, imagining your own feelings in a needy person’s situation should lead to a mix of altruistic and egoistic motivation because it evokes a mix of empathy and personal distress (Batson et al., 1997). In such a situation, individuals tend to focus primarily on their own imagined distress in the other’s situation, and look for ways to escape or relieve this distress (Cialdini et al., 1987; Batson et al., 1997). Perspective Taking and Social Comparison Some people will experience more distress in response to the situation of the person in need than others. Apparently, individual differences play also a role in such a context. One individual difference of particualar interest is social comparison orientation (SCO). In the first part of this dissertation I examine the interplay between taking different perspectives and SCO. People high in SCO have a disposition to compare themselves with others (Gibbons & Buunk; 1999). One of the strongest correlates of SCO is interpersonal orientation, a construct that includes an interest in what makes people tick, as well as a tendency to be influenced by the moods and criticisms of others, and an interest in mutual self-disclosure (Buunk & Gibbons, 2005). Also, SCO is correlated moderately with communal orientation, i.e., a desire to give benefits in response to the perceived needs of others (Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Millberg, 1987). At the very least, these correlates suggest that people high in SCO have a strong interest in the experiences and feelings of others surrounding them. Although little is known about the relationship between SCO and prosocial behaviour, a number of studies have shown that for people high in SCO, particularly downward comparisons (comparisons with people who are doing worse) evoke negative affect (Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons & Ipenburg 2001; Buunk, van der Zee & van Yperen, 2001). This negative affect can be interpreted in two different ways. One might conclude that people high in SCO actually experience negativity after downward comparison, That is, because people high in SCO relate the need of the other to themselves, the situation evokes personal distress which is expressed in negative affect. But this negative affect can also be interpreted as an expression of empathy. Because people high in SCO have a strong interest in the experience of others (as manifest from their interpersonal orientation and communal orientation) they may feel touched by the need of the other which is expressed in their empathy for this person. Thus far, this second explanation has not been

Chapter 1

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tested; there has not been research offering people high in SCO the opportunity to express empathy after downward comparisons. When relating these ideas to the research on perspective taking mentioned above, it seems likely that empathy should be especially apparent when people high in SCO imagine how this person must feel. Thus, in the present dissertation the hypothesis is tested that people high in SCO, who are induced to take an other perspective (instead of their usual imagine-self perspective), will experience more empathy –and not distress– for a person in need, and will be more willing to help that person than people who are induced to stay objective or people low in SCO. Different Perspectives for Friends and Family In the second part of the dissertation I shift my attention from characteristics of the helper to characteristics of the relationship with the person being in need. Specifically, I examine whether friends in need evoke different emotional responses than family in need and whether these responses have different consequences for helping. Kin selection theory offers an explanation for greater altruism between closer genetic relatives (Hamilton, 1964). According to this theory, individuals behave to maximize their inclusive fitness rather than only their individual fitness by increasing the production of successful offspring by both themselves and their relatives (Hamilton, 1964). To an evolutionist, fitness means reproductive success. While kin selection theory may explain altruism between kin, reciprocal altruism theory offers an explanation for altruism between unrelated individuals (Trivers, 1971). Essentially, reciprocal altruism theory predicts a tendency to act more altruistically toward past or potential benefactors. Indeed, research has found that expected reciprocity is a strong predictor of prosocial behaviour (Kruger, 2003). Much of the psychological research on helping has not been informed by evolutionary theories of altruism; it has remained unclear which of the psychological motives are relevant for which altruistic contexts. Greater biological relatedness is associated with higher levels of altruism (Stewart Williams, 2007). This relationship between the degree of relatedness and helping behaviour is mediated by psychological mechanisms that rely on various kinship cues such as familiarity and similarity (Park & Schaller, 2005; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981). In fact, the actual psychological motivator of helping kin is often thought to be empathy (Hoffman, 1981; Krebs, 1987; Schaller, 2003). Research shows that empathy is indeed experienced most powerful for members of one’s own immediate family (e.g. Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). At the same time, other researchers have identified other psychological processes that also appear to underlie altruism between genetic kin.


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For instance, one study found that reciprocal exchange—which would appear to be relevant primarily to altruism between nonkin—occurs between siblings as frequently as between unrelated friends (Stewart-Williams, 2007) Also, people expect more assistance from close kin than from friends (Bar-tal, Bar-Zohar, Greenberg, & Hermon, 1977), and feel more responsibility to provide assistance to family than to non-kin (Miller & Bersoff, 1998). These findings indicate that reciprocity might play a more important role between family members than has been assumed so far. For friends, reciprocity has been assumed to be the the main psychological motivator of helping. Having a long-term friendship with another person provides a powerful cue that someone will reciprocate in the future (Maner & Gailliott, 2007). Tooby and Cosmides (1996) have argued that friendships cannot be explained by either kin selection theory or reciprocal altruism theory. Rather, friendships involve situations in which people attempt to become irreplaceable to others and align themselves with those who indeed find them irreplaceable. Thus, helping friends may be motivated more by empathy than by expectations about reciprocity. Indeed, close friends are characterized by very high levels of familiarity, similarity and empathy (e.g. Shearn, Spellman, Straley, Meirick & Stryker, 1999). I will test these contradicting hypotheses against each other. Reconsidering the Concept of Empathy Finally, I take a closer look at the concept of empathy itself. Although empathy has been extensively researched, little agreement exists on what being empathic precisely consists off, and how this differs from being sympathetic or compassionate. However, virtually all empathy researchers agree that empathy requires making a link between the self and other without confusing the self and other. At a phenomenological level of description, empathy denotes a sense of similarity between the feelings we experience and those expressed by others, without losing sight of whose feelings belong to whom (Decety & Hodges, 2005). Batson (1991 for a review) describes empathy as “an emotional response, elicited by and congruent with, but not necessarily identical to, the perceived welfare of someone else”. The term congruence as used by Batson refers only to a congruence in valence (a positive emotion when the other is in a positive state; a negative emotion when the other is in a negative state), not to a matching of emotions. One can argue that there is no need to further narrow down the definition of empathy, for it is a complex emotional and cognitive response which can manifest itself in different ways. However, the consequence of keeping the theoretical definition, and with it also the operational definition, too general is that we mistakenly assume that we study the

Chapter 1

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same process. This hampers the empirical research on altruism. A review of the psychological literature on empathy of the past five decades, combined with nine new datasets collected over the past four years sheds a new light on the theoretical and operational definitions of the concept of empathy. On the basis of factor analyses in these datasets, I propose to split the operational definitions of empathy as proposed by Batson and colleagues (see Batson, 1991 for a review) in two different scales: a sympathy and a tenderheartedness scale. Overview of the present dissertation Chapter 2 In Chapter 2, the combined influence of perspective taking and social comparison orientation on empathy and distress as well as the willingness to help a person in need is investigated. Study 2.1 introduces a new research paradigm in the form of an interview. This paradigm is based on the earlier paradigm of ‘Katie Banks’ introduced by Batson and colleagues (1997). The Dutch version of this paradigm translates the American need situation (a young woman losing her parents without life-insurance) to a situation more common in Dutch daily life’s (a young woman having a bicycle accident and consequential physical injuries and mental trauma). The combined effects of taking an other-perspective or taking an objective-perspective and social comparison orientation are studied. In Study 2.2, the mediating role of identification is studied by measuring feelings of oneness with the person in need (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992). I also introduce a third perspective: the close-other perspective to experimentally induce feelings of identification. Chapter 3 In Chapter 3, I test the unique effects of empathy and expected reciprocity as psychological motivators for the willingness to help in different relationship contexts. Competing hypotheses are tested against each other. In Study 3.1, I compare contexts in which the recipient is imagined to be either a close friend or kin. Because Study 3.1 uses university students as subjects—who may have particularly strong friendships and few opportunities to assist kin—we repeat the study with older adults in the community in Study 3.2.


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Chapter 4 Chapter 4 focuses entirely on both the theoretical as well as the operational definitions of empathy. First, the definitions of empathy within the existing literature are reviewed, specifically with regard to the use of state empathy within psychology over the past five decades. I will describe how the most commonly used measure of state empathy proposed by Batson has come into existence, what it consists of and how it is used or what its status is within -mainly social- psychological research. Then, I review the operational definitions and measurement of empathy, discussing factor analyses reported in the existing literature. Nine factor analyses conducted on my own datasets are subsequently reported. This results in two new scales measuring sympathy and tenderheartedness. Next, I determine the discriminatory power of the sympathy and tenderheartedness scales to see if they behave differently. Finally, I consider implications and limitations for future research. Chapter 5 In this final chapter, the results of all studies are summarized and further discussed. An integration of the findings is offered and a new theoretical model of altruism, distinguishing empathy, sympathy, tenderheartedness and compassion is introduced. Furthermore, implications for research on altruism are discussed.

Chapter 2

When Your Suffering Becomes Mine: The Influence of Social Comparison Orientation on Affect Resulting in a Willingness to Help Others

Just like other primates, humans need the help of others to survive. Because receiving help from others also requires a willingness to help others in return, it is not surprising that people are often affected by the suffering of others. Yet, people differ in the way in which this suffering affects them. This chapter argues that these individual differences are not only strongly dependent on the perspective from which one views the suffering of the other, but are also dependent on the degree in which one compares oneself with the person in need. Depending on the perspective one takes, observing someone in need will have different affective implications for the observer (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1997a). For instance, one can imagine how the other must perceive the situation, and consequently, which affect that situation will arouse in the other (other perspective1). One can also try to stay objective and not to get involved in the suffering of the person in need (objective perspective). Research has repeatedly shown that imagining how the other person must feel leads to higher levels of empathy (an other-oriented emotion) and distress (a self-oriented emotion) than trying to stay objective, and that these emotions in turn predict helping the other (Batson et al. 1997a; Batson et al. 1997b; Cialdini et al., 1987). Yet, not everyone who takes a certain perspective will experience the same emotions. Obviously, besides the perspective one takes, other factors come also into play. One of these factors is the extent to which one compares oneself with others. The desire to learn about the self through comparison with others is assumed to be a universal characteristic of humans (Buunk & Gibbons, 2005). Yet, many individuals are reluctant to admit engaging in social comparison (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993). This reluctance can be partly explained by the fact that people differ in

1We fully agree with Maner, et al. (2002) that referring to this perspective as ‘empathy manipulation’ may be misleading since this perspective evokes more than just empathy (i.e. sadness and distress).

Chapter 2

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their disposition to compare themselves with others (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; Hemphill and Lehman, 1991). To capture these differences, Gibbons and Buunk (1999) developed a scale that assesses individual differences in what they labelled social comparison orientation (SCO; the disposition to compare oneself with others). A variety of studies have shown a quite clear pattern of behaviour of individuals high in SCO. According to Buunk and Gibbons (2005), the “typical” comparer is characterized by features such as: a chronic activation of the self, a strong interest in what others feel, and a moderate negative affectivity. One of the strongest correlates of SCO is interpersonal orientation, i.e., the need to have close interpersonal relationships (r = .45, p < .001; Buunk & Gibbons, 2005). Also, SCO is correlated moderately (r = .31, p < .001) with communal orientation, i.e., a desire to give benefits in response to the perceived needs of others (Clark et al., 1987). At the very least, these correlates suggest that people high in SCO have a strong interest in the experiences and feelings of others surrounding them. But what does this interest do with the resulting affect felt for these persons? More specifically, when confronted with a person in need, do people high in SCO respond with a different affect than people low in SCO? Surprisingly little research is conducted on the influence of social comparison with a victim on the willingness to help that person. Yet, studies on the relationship between SCO and affect felt for downward comparison targets (people who are worse off) provide us with some clues which may be applicable to person in need situations. A number of studies have shown that for people high in SCO, particularly downward comparisons evoke negative affect. For instance, Buunk et al. (2001) asked sociotherapists high in SCO to read a bogus interview about someone involved in the same profession being very unsuccessful. The higher the level of burnout of the sociotherapists, the more negative affect was evoked by the description of the downward comparison target, but only among individuals high in SCO. In a similar study, a sample of nurses was exposed to either a downward or an upward target. The higher individuals were in SCO, the more negative affect they reported following exposure to the downward comparison target (Buunk et al., 2001). Although these studies provide us with some insights in the affective reactions of people high in SCO, the need of the comparison targets in these situations was not very strong (compared to the need of a victim). Yet, these findings suggest that people high in SCO may be more sensitive to the suffering of others than people low in SCO and that this sensitivity results in higher levels of negative affect. This seems to occur because people high in SCO relate the situation of that person to themselves, which makes them particularly inclined to imagine how that person must feel.

When Your Suffering Becomes Mine

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Although it seems clear that exposure to others who are relatively worse-off tends to evoke negative affect especially in those high in SCO, the precise nature of this affect is not completely clear. This reported negative affect can be an expression of peoples’ own distress in reaction to the need of the other as well as an expression of their empathy for the suffering of the other. The studies above did not provide their participants the opportunity to specify if this felt negative affect was a consequence of their empathic concern. Nevertheless, both the sensitivity for the suffering of the other, as well as the correlations of SCO with interpersonal orientation and communal orientation suggests that this negative affect might be an expression of empathy. And, when relating these findings to the research on perspective taking mentioned above, it seems likely that this empathy should be especially apparent when people high in SCO imagine how this person must feel. In sum, we expect that people who are induced to take an other perspective will experience more empathy –and not distress– for a person in need, and will be more willing to help that person than people who are induced to stay objective. This effect of perspective taking should be especially strong for people high in SCO and should also extend to their willingness to help this person. In Study 2.1, university students were presented with a person in need and were randomly assigned to take the perspective of this person or to stay objective. SCO, their willingness to help—as well as a number of putative predictors of helping—were assessed. Study 2.2 was designed to replicate findings of Study 2.1 and provide an answer to some of the questions that Study 2.1 raised. Study 2.1 Method Participants Sixty-one female psychology students (mean age 20 years, SD 3.2 years, ranging from 18 to 37 years old) at the University of Groningen participated in exchange for course credits. Participants were randomly divided over two perspective-conditions: trying to stay objective (objective-condition) and imagining how the person described must feel (other-condition). Procedure The study was presented as a study on “personality and close relationships.” Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in individual cubicles. They were told

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that the research would consist of two unrelated parts, a short questionnaire and a study concerning a new practicum for first year psychology students. The practicum would teach students how to cope with stigmatized others by means of going out with them to develop new activities in their daily lives. The aim of the current study would be to gather students’ opinions on such a practicum, which would be taken into account by the university in the final make-up of the practicum. Participants read on their computer screens a story that gave them a global idea of the practicum. They also read an introduction on Leonie, a student who had a major bicycle accident and consequently ended up with serious facial damage, a shattered foot, and social stigma. She would tell in an interview about her experiences. Before listening to the interview, the experimental manipulation was introduced to the participants following Batson et al. (1997a): Those randomly assigned to the objective condition read the following: “Try, while listening to the interview, to be as objective as possible about what has happened to the person interviewed and how it has affected her life. To stay objective, it’s important not to imagine what this person has been through and how this has influenced her life. Just try to remain as objective as possible.” Those assigned to the other condition read: “Try, while listening to the interview, to imagine how the person being interviewed feels about what happened and how it has affected her life. Try not to concern yourself with attending to all the information presented. Just try to imagine how the person interviewed feels and concentrate on this.” The instruction stayed on the participants’ screen while listening to the interview. In the interview, Leonie told about her experiences in the hospital, how she felt when she saw herself again for the first time, how she has been recovering, and how she is feeling when people stare at her. She ended her story saying that she would like to meet some new people who would be willing to do something ‘nice’ with her. Participants then completed a set of questionnaires (described below); upon completion, participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their participation. Measures Social Comparison Orientation. Social Comparison Orientation was measured with the Iowa-Netherlands comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). This 11-item scale was developed on the basis of a larger item pool, and has been tested in over 25 studies. The measure consists of statements reflecting social comparison


23

activities and interests. The items were measured on a 5-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Cronbach’s alpha was .77, M = 3.61, SD = .52. Manipulation checks. As part of the practicum evaluation form, two questions were designed to measure the effectiveness of the perspective-manipulation: “To what extent did you concentrate, while listening to the interview, on being objective?” and “To what extent did you concentrate, while listening to the interview, on the feelings of Leonie?”; 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Empathy. Target-specific state empathy was measured with the adjectives sympathetic and compassionate (r = .75, p = .001). These two items are often included among the list of adjectives used to tap empathy in research on prosocial behaviour (see Batson, 1991, for a review). On 7-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), participants indicated the extent to which they felt these emotions. Distress. Feelings of distress were measured with adjectives distressed, disturbed, and alarmed (alpha = .76). Participants provided responses on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Willingness to help. Willingness to help was part of a broader questionnaire titled “Practicum Evaluation form” which asked some questions covering the cover story of the study. To measure helping intention, participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (absolutely not) to 5 (definitely yes) whether they were willing to help Leonie in a practicum such as described previously. Results and Discussion The manipulation appeared successful. Participants in the objective condition reported more concentration on being objective (M = 6.39, SD = 1.33) than participants in the other condition (M = 4.73, SD = 1.41; F(1,59) = 22.12, p = .001). Also, participants in the other condition reported more concentration on the feelings of Leonie (M = 7.47, SD = .94) than participants in the objective condition (M = 5.74, SD = 1.6; F(1,59) = 24.91, p = .001). Table 2.1 shows the mean levels of all measures in the objective condition and the other condition. As expected, participants experienced greater feelings of empathy in the other than in the objective condition, t(59) = 1.82, p = .036 one sided. Means on the remaining measures did not differ between the two conditions.

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Table 2.1 Mean levels of Empathy, Distress, and Willingness to Help in Objective and Other Conditions Empathy

Distress

Willingness to help

5.44 a

3.26 a

4.23 a

Other 5.88 b 3.46 a (n = 30) Note. Means with different superscripts differ at least at p < .05.

4.30 a

Objective (n = 31)

Of particular conceptual interest was whether SCO would be differently related to the dependent variables within the other condition in comparison with the objective condition. Correlations among these variables revealed some very clear differences between both conditions. The correlations are reported in Table 2.2. Table 2.2 Correlations among All Measures in Objective and Other Conditions Objective condition

1. SCO 2. Empathy 3. Distress

Other condition

2

3

4

2

3

4

.08

.11

.13

.42*

.26

.37*

.48**

.07

.36*

.49**

.31

.27

4. Willingness to help Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

In the objective condition, SCO was unrelated to any of the other measures, whereas in the other condition, SCO was related to both empathy and participants’ willingness to help. There was no relationship between SCO and distress in either of the conditions. As expected, these correlations suggest a model in which people high in SCO experience more empathy than people low in SCO, especially when they take an otherperspective. Because several of these predictors were correlated with each other (in both objective and other conditions), in order to test the independent effects of SCO, empathy and distress on willingness to help, we conducted two regression analyses, separately for the objective and other conditions. The results are reported in Table 2.3.


25

Table 2.3 Results of Regression Analyses in Objective and Other Conditions in which Willingness to Help was the Dependent Variable Objective condition

Other condition

Beta

t

p*

Beta

t

p*

Empathy

-.10

-.50

.31

.38

2.00

.028

Distress

.35

1.68

.051

.08

.43

.34

SCO

.10

.56

.29

.19

1.03

.15

R-square = .11

R-square = .28

Note. *Reported one sided.

The results of the regression analyses showed that in the objective condition, people high in distress were more willing to help than people low in distress (β = .35, p = .051 one sided). When the other variables were controlled for, no other predictor exerted a significant effect. On the other hand, in the other condition, when people imagined how the recipient must have felt, empathy was the only substantive predictor of willingness to help (β = .38, p = .028 one sided). Although the correlation in Table 2.2 suggested a relationship between SCO and willingness to help in the other condition, these regressions show that the effect of SCO on willingness to help was due to the shared variance between SCO and empathy. In sum, when all putative predictors were pitted against each other, distress predicted willingness to help when the helper concentrated on being objective, whereas empathy predicted willingness to help when the helper imagined how the recipient must have felt. This study shows us that not only one’s perspective on a situation, but also the extent to which one is inclined to compare with others determines the affect felt for a person in need. More specifically, when people take an objective perspective on the situation, no relationship exists between SCO and distress, and willingness to help seems to be predicted only by the amount of distress one experiences. On the other hand, when people try to imagine how the recipient must feel, SCO is related to both empathy and willingness to help. Empathy in turn, is the main predictor of willingness to help, indicating a mediating role between SCO and willingness to help. Clearly, only within the other perspective, people high in SCO experience more empathy than people low in SCO. But the question remains why this is the case. We would like to suggest that this higher empathy occurs because people high in SCO identify more easily with the other. As Buunk and Gibbons (2005) pointed out, people high in SCO tend to see the fate of the other as their own possible fate and they can

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recognize themselves in the other. To test this explanation we conducted a second study in which we added a measure of identification as well as a ‘close-other’ perspective. In this perspective, participants were to imagine the victim to be a person close to them. Identification was measured in terms of the amount of oneness (Aron et al., 1992) people experienced with the victim. Expected was that in the close-other condition, people would experience more oneness with the victim than in the other two perspectives. If the explanation of identification for people high in SCO holds true, people high in SCO should experience more feelings of oneness in the other condition than people low in SCO. This moderating role of SCO is not expected in the close-other condition since all people should identify with the victim in that condition. Neither is it expected in the objective condition because people –both high and low in SCO– are actively trying not to identify with the victim when asked to stay objective. Study 2.2 Method Participants Hundred twenty-nine female students (mean age 21.02 years, SD 1.60 years, ranging from 18 to 26 years old) participated in exchange for the chance to win a DVD player. Procedure and Measures The experiment was conducted in the same way as that of Study 2.1, except for a few modifications. This time, participants were led to believe that the research was conducted to test an advertisement campaign for an existing Dutch institution called ‘Victim Care’. This institution’s main focus is providing psychological support to people who have been recently the victim of some sort of trauma. The results of this study would be helping ‘Victim Care’ in determining how to conduct a follow-up national research. The experimental manipulation was identical to that of Study 2.1, except that a third perspective was added: a close-other perspective. Participants in the close-other condition first got the instruction to think of someone who was important to them and describe five characteristics of this person. While listening to the interview they had the same instruction as people in the other condition except that they had to imagine how it would be for the person they just described. Again, Leonie was described as having had serious facial damage, a shattered foot, and social stigma. SCO (alpha = .80, M = 3.33, SD = .39), empathy (r = .75, p = .001)


27

and distress (alpha = .79) were measured in the same manner as in Study 2.1. To assess identification with the recipient, oneness was measured using the Inclusion of Others in Self Scale (IOS; Aron et al., 1992). The IOS exists of seven drawings of two gradually more overlapping circles. To measure actual helping behaviour instead of willingness to help, the questionnaire ended with a letter of authority. On this letter, participants could indicate whether they would support ‘Victim Care’ by either, donating money, becoming a volunteer or becoming a collector for ‘Victim Care’2. Results and Discussion Analyses showed significant differences between the conditions for all three dependent variables: empathy, F (2,126) = 4,22, p = .017; distress, F (2,126) = 8,58, p = .001 and oneness, F (2,126) = 24,96, p = .001. Table 2.4 shows the mean levels of all measures in the three conditions. Table 2.4 Mean levels of Empathy, Distress, and Oneness in Objective and Other Conditions Empathy

Distress

Oneness

Objective (n = 42)

5.31 a

2.98 a

2.76 a

Other (n = 44)

5.80 b

3.23 a

4.07 b

Close-other 5.90 b 4.00 b (n = 43) Note. Means with different superscripts differ at least at p < .05.

4.72 c

Contrasts revealed that participants experienced more empathy when taking an other-perspective (as in Study 2.1) and also when taking a close-other perspective than when staying objective. Also as expected, feelings of oneness differed significantly between all three conditions with participants experiencing more oneness in the close other condition as compared to the other- and objective conditions. Moreover, participants experienced higher levels of distress in the close-other condition than in either of the other conditions. Apparently, the close other condition was effective since it lead to the highest amount of felt oneness with the victim. In this condition both feelings Due to the large amount of answering categories (divided over the three forms of helping, 13 in sum) and the few amount of people who answered positively to the letter of authority (less than 13%), it was impossible to do any meaningful analysis on this data. We have therefore chosen not to consider this helping measure in the following of the article 2

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of empathy and distress also raised substantially. But what was the role of SCO in relation to these dependent variables? To provide an answer to this question we took a closer look at the correlations (reported in Table 2.5). Table 2.5 Correlations among All Measures in Objective, Other and Close-Other Conditions Objective condition 2 .21

1. SCO

3 .43**

2. Empathy 3. Distress

.22

4 -.03 .36* .16

Other condition

Close-Other condition

2

3

4

2

3

4

.32*

.09

.34*

.37*

.26

-.11

.24

.56**

.29

.09

.46**

.27

4. Oneness Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

Oneness We expected only an effect of SCO on feelings of oneness within the other perspective, with people high in SCO experiencing more oneness than people low in SCO. A moderated multiple regression analysis (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003, pp. 375-378) with oneness as the dependent variable and both the main effects of the perspectives and SCO as well as the interactions between the perspectives and SCO as predictors revealed an overall model with R² = .32, F (5,126) = 11.39, p = .001. This model showed a main effect of the other condition versus the objective condition (b = 1.34, t(84) = 4.79, p = .001) as well as a main effect of the close-other condition versus the objective condition (b = 1.94, t(83) = 7.0, p = .001). There was no main effect of SCO (b < -.03 ns.). The main effect of the other versus objective perspective was qualified by a trend towards an interaction between the perspectives and SCO (b = .45, t(83) = 1,63, p = .106). Although this interaction effect did not reach statistical significance, simple effect analysis within the perspectives showed once more a very clear pattern. Within the other perspective, people high in SCO experienced more oneness than people low in SCO (b = 1,06, t(42) = 2.32, p = .025). No significant raise in oneness as a function of SCO was found in one of the other conditions b’s < -.42 ns. Figure 2.1 clarifies the combined effects of both the perspectives as well as SCO on these feelings of oneness.


29

Figure 2.1 Effects of SCO on feelings of oneness in Objective, Other and Close-Other Conditions

Oneness

5,5

Objective Other Close Other

4,5

3,5

2,5 -1 SD

+1 SD

Social Comparion Orientation

The results described above and visualised in Figure 2.1 clearly show that participants experienced more oneness when they were induced to imagine that the victim was a close-other. Yet, only within the other perspective there was a substantial relationship between SCO and oneness, with people high in SCO experiencing more oneness than people low in SCO. This moderating role of SCO was not expected in the close-other condition since all people should identify with the victim in that condition. Indeed, no relationship between SCO and oneness was found in the close-other condition. These findings are entirely in line with our expectations and seem to confirm that for people high in SCO a natural process of identification with the victim takes place. Empathy Just like in Study 2.1, SCO was also related to empathy in both other conditions but not in the objective condition. The findings indicate once more that people high in SCO experience more empathy when they imagine how the recipient must feel -indifferent of whether this person is a stranger or known to them- but not when they try to stay objective. Distress In Study 2.1 no correlation was found between SCO and distress in either of the conditions. In this study however, a substantial correlation was found between SCO and distress in the objective condition, with people high in SCO experiencing more distress than people low in SCO. It is important to interpret this finding with some caution since it was not found in Study 2.1. Yet, it seems likely that this correlation reflects the often reported higher levels of negative affect of people high in SCO when confronted with a downward comparison target (Buunk & Gibbons, 2005). Apparently, when people high in SCO do not actively focus their attention on the other, they

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experience higher levels of personal negative affect. Yet, when their direction of attention is clearly focused on the other person –i.e. by means of perspective taking– people high in SCO express a raise in empathy rather than a raise in self related negative affect. Remarkably, no correlations were found between empathy or distress and feelings of oneness in the close-other condition. Scatter plots revealed that this lack of relationship was most likely due to the strength of the manipulation in this condition. Although there was considerable variance in empathy and distress within the close-other condition, feelings of oneness were high regardless of this variance, and this has most likely suppressed the correlations. The results of this second study show some remarkable consistencies with those of Study 2.1. In general, people high in SCO tend to experience more empathy for a person in need when they shift their focus of attention to the recipient. Study 2.2 confirms that this raise in empathy is related to a process of identification with this person. People high in SCO experience more feelings of oneness with the recipient than people low in SCO, regardless whether they know the recipient or not. General Discussion These studies were conducted to investigate whether SCO plays a significant role in the effects of perspective taking on empathy and helping. They also shed a new light on the fact that people high in social comparison orientation repeatedly experience more negative affect when confronted with others who are worse off than themselves (Buunk & Gibbons, 2005; Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk, & Bos, 1998). We hypothesized that this reported negative affect might be an expression of their sensitivity towards, and sympathy with the suffering of others. Our findings suggest that this is indeed the process at hand, but only when people focus their attention on that other person. Study 2.1 revealed that people high in SCO who imagine how a person in need must feel experience more empathy for this person than people low in SCO or people who try to stay objective. Study 2.2 not only replicated this result, but additionally showed that a process of identification with the victim takes place. People high in SCO naturally experience feelings of oneness when focusing their attention on the victim, whereas people low in SCO only experience oneness when experimentally induced to imagine the other close to them. Moreover, the empathy felt by people high in SCO was strongly related to the extent to which they experienced feelings of oneness with the victim. Some interesting puzzles arise from these studies that need further investigation. Now that we know that people high in SCO might be potential helpers by nature, the


31

question rises to what extent these people are naturally inclined to take the perspective of someone else. According to the studies that have shown that people high in SCO report higher levels of negative affect, one might expect they are not. Yet, these studies did not measure empathy in the first place. The reported negative affect might have been simply the result of their incapability to express their empathy for the victim. Also, the relationship between SCO and helping needs further investigation. Due to measurement issues, Study 2.2 did in part not replicate the findings in Study 2.1. Is there a direct link between SCO and willingness to help? Or is this relationship entirely mediated by feelings of empathy? The line of research on motivations to help others in need is known for its controversial outcomes and fierce discussions. Is it possible, as Batson (1991) states, that help can be motivated by an altruistic tendency? Or is it rather an egoistic motive like relieving one’s own negative affect that leads people to help others (Cialdini et al., 1987). The close-other perspective as well as the oneness measure have been extensively used before in research attempting to clarify that although motivations for helping might appear altruistic, those motivations may be ultimately egoistic in nature (Maner et al., 2002; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). With the current research we did not intend to tap into this debate over the existence of ‘true’ altruism. We merely tried to determine whether the relationship between SCO and empathy was due to the underlying process of oneness (identification). Whether oneness is an egotistic motivation for helping is another question, which first needs further specification of its concepts. Obviously, the concept of ‘oneness’ and the concept of ‘empathy’ are interrelated under some circumstances. For those people who are naturally inclined to compare themselves with others this seems to be especially true. These findings complement and extend previous research, both on the effects of perspective taking in a person in need situation, as well as on ‘mapping’ the differences between people high and low in SCO. Complementing the work by Buunk and Gibbons (2005), these findings clarify the nature of the negative affect that is has repeatedly been found among people high in SCO in response to downward comparisons. First, this negative affect might stem from a process of identification with the other in need. Second, and more importantly, when their attention is channelled in a perspective on the other, this negative affect seems to be primarily an expression of sympathy for the person in need. People high in SCO are obviously more sensitive to the suffering of others than people low in SCO. This involvement can be channelled in such a way that it leads to a raise in empathy. To conclude, the present research underlines again that empathy is an

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Chapter 2

important predictor of peoples’ helping intentions, and is the first to demonstrate that this empathy results in part from a social comparison process.

CHAPTER 3

Psychological Motivators of Altruism Among Kin and Friends

Why do people help others? For evolutionary theorists, answering this question depends on whom “others” refer to and on the evolutionary processes that operated in the context of that specific social relationship. Kin selection theory offers an explanation for greater altruism between closer genetic relatives (Hamilton, 1964), reciprocal altruism theory offers an explanation for altruism between unrelated individuals who engage in reciprocal exchange (Trivers, 1971), and group selection theories offer an explanation for altruism between individuals who may never interact directly with each other (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). For psychologists, answering the same question typically invokes some cognitive and/or emotional states that actually motivate altruistic behaviour. After all, it’s one thing to know that genetic relatedness, reciprocity, or group selection explains human altruism; it’s another thing to understand the actual operation of the proximate psychological mechanisms. Researchers have identified several psychological states—such as empathy, personal distress, feelings of oneness, perceived similarity—that appear to underlie altruism (e.g., Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004; Cialdini et al., 1997; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). However, much of the psychological research on helping has not been informed by evolutionary theories of altruism; it has thus remained unclear which of the psychological motives are relevant for which altruistic contexts. Some have speculated that empathy—an emotional experience that motivates largely unconditional altruism—serves as a psychological mediator of kin-directed altruism (Hoffman, 1981; Krebs, 1987; Schaller, 2003). There is some evidence consistent with this conjecture. Perception of kinship tends to arouse feelings of emotional closeness or social bonding, and altruistic behaviour is mediated in part by this subjective experience (e.g., Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001; Neyer & Lang, 2003). Other studies have found that empathy predicts helping ingroup members more strongly than helping outgroup members (Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005; Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem,

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2006). Narrowing down the role of empathy even further, one recent study found that empathy predicts helping kin more strongly than strangers even after controlling for other motives such as negative affect and oneness (Maner & Gailliot, 2007). Thus, there are good reasons to suppose that empathy is indeed a key psychological motive underlying altruism between kin. At the same time, other researchers have identified other psychological processes that also appear to underlie altruism between genetic kin. For instance, one study found that reciprocal exchange—which would appear to be relevant primarily to altruism between nonkin—occurs between siblings as frequently as between unrelated friends (Stewart-Williams, 2007); another study found that expectations about reciprocity (but not empathy) partially mediate intentions to help kin (Kruger, 2003). In addition, people indicate greater obligations to help kin than nonkin (Kruger, 2001; Miller & Bersoff, 1998), and people expect more assistance from kin than from friends (Bar-Tal et al., 1977; Mancini & Simon, 1984). In short, the specific proximate mechanisms underlying kin altruism are complex, comprising not only empathy but also reciprocity and norms about helping. Altruism between friends Now, consider a more specific question: Why do people help friends? Or, even more fundamentally, what is friendship? Theories of human relationships (such as those that distinguish between communal and exchange relationships; Clark, 1984; Fiske, 1992) have tended to place kinship and friendship in the same category (for instance, people are believed to have communal relationships with both kin and friends). Do the evolutionary theories of altruism clarify the picture? One might suggest that altruism between friends (who are not genetically related) is a manifestation of reciprocal altruism and thus governed by norms of social exchange; but this would contradict the psychological evidence (Clark, 1984). One might also suggest that friends might sometimes be treated as though they were kin, simply because of the way in which kin recognition operates. Given that close friends tend to be characterized by very high levels of similarity, familiarity, and empathy—which may be the very cues used to identify kin (Park & Schaller, 2005)—it’s possible that psychological responses that evolved for kin relations sometimes extend to friendships (Ackerman, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2007). Tooby and Cosmides (1996) have argued that friendships cannot be explained by either kin selection theory or reciprocal altruism theory. Rather, friendships involve situations in which people attempt to become irreplaceable to others and align themselves


35

with those who indeed find them irreplaceable. Arguing that friendships are distinct from exchange relationships, they noted, “explicit contingent exchange and turntaking reciprocation are the forms of altruism that exist when trust is low and friendship is weak or absent, and treating others in such a fashion is commonly interpreted as a communication to that effect” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996, p. 139). This line of reasoning implies that helping friends may be motivated more by empathy than by expectations about reciprocity. Tooby and Cosmides have pointed this out as well: “Dyads who are able to communicate well with each other, and who intuitively can understand each other’s thoughts and intentions will derive considerably more from cooperative relationships than those who lack such rapport” (p. 137). Thus, although kin and friends are biologically distinct, empathy may underlie helping friends at least as much as helping kin. Overview of the present research To the extent that altruism among kin and friends are distinct phenomena, an important task for psychologists is to sift out the key psychological motives in these two relationship contexts. Although the results of Maner and Gailliot (2007) suggests that empathy is a key motivator underlying kin-directed altruism, they did not control for another important motive—expectations about reciprocity; moreover, their study did not address friendship at all. In the studies described below, we presented participants with either a scenario involving helping a kin member or a friend, measured willingness to help, and measured several key putative motivators of helping—empathy, perceived reciprocal support, oneness, and distress. We were thus able to test the independent effect of each motive while controlling for the other motives and to make direct comparisons between kin and friend. Study 3.1 was conducted with a sample of university students. Study 3.2 was conducted with a sample of adults in the community. Study 3.1: University Student Sample Method Participants and procedure Eighty-seven students (28 men, 59 women; mean age = 21.49, SD = 2.36, range = 17-27) at the University of Groningen participated in exchange for €5.

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Participants completed the study sessions in separate cubicles. After completing a questionnaire for demographic information, participants read a description indicating that the present research was being conducted for an institution that seeks to unite volunteers with disabled people in order to develop new activities in the disabled people’s lives. Then the experimental manipulation was introduced: Participants randomly assigned to the kin condition were asked to think about a kin member close to themselves in age; participants assigned to the friend condition were asked to think about a friend whom they felt close to and whom they have known for a couple of years. Participants were asked to indicate the name, gender1, and age of the kin member or friend. They were also asked to indicate how frequently they met this person per month and the degree to which they experienced feelings of oneness with this person (measure described below). Participants were informed that they would be reading an article about a disabled person who is part of the volunteer program. They were also informed that, in order to appreciate the circumstances of this person, they should imagine that the events described in the article occurred to the female kin member or friend that they had named. Participants then read a newspaper article describing events that occurred to the disabled person, which was accompanied by a picture of the person. The article described the story of Leonie, a student who had a major bicycle accident and ended up with serious facial damage, a shattered foot, and social stigma. In the article, Leonie relates her experiences in the hospital, how she felt when she saw herself again for the first time, how she has been recovering, and how she feels when people stare at her. She ends her story by saying that she would like to go for a “walk” now and then, but that this is very difficult because she is in a wheelchair. Right after reading the article, and before turning the page, participants were asked once more to imagine how this would influence the life of the kin member or friend that they had named before. Participants then completed a set of questionnaires (described below). Measures Oneness with the family member or friend was measured using the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron et al., 1992). This scale assesses feelings of closeness by asking participants to choose one of a pair of seven gradually overlapping circles indicating the overlap between themselves and the other.

We omitted 27 additional participants from this study because they compared a male friend or family member to the female target as presented in the newspaper article. 1


37

Willingness to help was measured by asking participants to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = absolutely not; 7 = definitely yes) whether they were willing to help Leonie by offering her a sympathetic ear and by taking her out now and then. Responses to these two questions were highly correlated (r = .77, p = .001); they were combined to create a measure of participants’ willingness to help. Empathy was measured with the adjectives sympathetic and compassionate (r = .72, p = .001). These two items have been used to measure empathy in previous research (Batson, 1991). On a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), participants indicated the extent to which they felt these emotions. Distress was measured with adjectives distressed, disturbed, and alarmed (alpha = .70). Participants provided responses on 7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Finally, to assess participants’ expectations about being able to receive help in a similar situation, we asked them two questions: (1) “Suppose you are in the same situation as Leonie. Do you think that others would help you by offering you a sympathetic ear?” and (2) “Do you think that others would help you by taking you out now and then?” Participants indicated their answers to these two questions on a 7-point scale (1 = absolutely not; 7 = definitely yes). We combined the two items to create a construct that we termed perceived reciprocal support (r = .63, p = .001). It should be noted that these items do not measure expectations about reciprocity in a dyadic, tit-for-tat manner, but rather expectations about reciprocity in a broader social context. This method was used because, given the scenario, it would have been unrealistic to ask participants whether they expected Leonie to reciprocate in kind. We discuss the implications of this methodology below. Results and discussion In the friend condition, the mean age of the friend was 21.24 (SD = 2.34 range = 17-27); the mean contact frequency was 9 times per month (SD = 7.71). In the kin condition, the mean age of the kin member was 21.76 (SD = 2.38, range = 10-28); the mean contact frequency was 6 times per month (SD = 8.11). Because there was no influence of contact frequency or participant gender on willingness to help, these variables were not included in any of the remaining analyses. Table 3.1 shows the mean levels of all measures in the kin condition and the friend condition. Participants experienced greater feelings of oneness with friends than with kin, t85 = 4.04, p = .001, suggesting that they perceived friends to be psychologically more

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close than family members. Means on the remaining measures (including willingness to help) did not differ between the two conditions. Table 3.1 Mean levels (and SD’s) of Oneness, Empathy, Distress, Perceived Reciprocal Support, and Willingness to Help in Kin and Friend Conditions Perceived Willingness to Oneness Empathy Distress reciprocal help support Kin (n = 42) 3.79 (1.54) 5.48 (.92) 3.03 (1.25) 4.98 (1.17) 4.48 (1.38) Friend (n = 45)

5.04 (1.36)

5.36 (.96)

2.87 (1.27)

4.99 (1.33)

4.71 (1.47)

Which psychological motives predicted willingness to help? Correlations among these variables revealed an interesting difference between the kin and friend conditions (see Table 3.2). Table 3.2 Correlations among All Measures in Kin and Friend Conditions Kin condition

1. Oneness 2. Empathy 3. Distress 4. Perceived reciprocal support

Friend condition

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

-.11

.09

-.05

-.05

.37*

.12

.20

.08

.40**

.17

.24

.41**

.45**

.39**

.05

.22

-.16

.21

.40**

.22


In the kin condition, willingness to help was predicted especially by perceived reciprocal support, whereas in the friend condition, willingness to help was predicted especially by empathy. To test the independent effects of the motives on willingness to help, we conducted two regression analyses, separately for the kin and friend conditions (see Table 3.3). The results showed that, in the kin condition, willingness to help was predicted by perceived reciprocal support (β = .45, p = .015) after controlling for the other variables; no other predictor exerted a significant effect. In the friend condition, willingness to help was predicted by empathy (β = .34, p = .099) after controlling for


39

other variables, although the effect was marginally significant; no other predictor exerted a significant effect. Table 3.3 Results of Regression Analyses in Kin and Friend Conditions in which Willingness to Help was the Dependent Variable Kin condition

Friend condition

β

t

p

β

t

p

Empathy

.11

.65

.52

.34

1.69

.099

Distress

.18

1.00

.33

.11

.54

.60

Oneness

-.01

-.22

.83

-.01

-.49

.63

Perceived reciprocal support

.45

2.54

.015

.11

.56

.58

R-square = .21

R-square = .17

In sum, when empathy and perceived reciprocal support were pitted against each other, perceived reciprocal support predicted willingness to help when the recipient was imagined to be kin, whereas empathy predicted willingness to help when the recipient was imagined to be a friend. These findings might appear to contradict the findings of Maner and Gailliot (2007) whose results showed that empathy predicted helping when the recipient was kin (but not when the recipient was a stranger). However, Maner and Gailliot did not measure perceived reciprocal support, and so their study did not simultaneously assess the effects of empathy and perceived reciprocal support. Interestingly, even when we repeated the same analyses excluding perceived reciprocal support (in an attempt to replicate Maner and Gailliot’s analysis), none of the predictors exerted a significant effect in the kin condition (all βs ≤ .24, ps ≥ .33) and only empathy exerted a significant effect in the friend condition (β = .40, p = .022). Thus, these results indicate that empathy is an important motive underlying altruism between friends. Somewhat surprisingly, these results also indicate that perceived reciprocal support—but not empathy—has a particularly strong predictive effect on helping kin. Because Study 3.1 was conducted with university students—who may have particularly strong friendships and few opportunities to assist kin—we repeated the study with older adults in the community in Study 2. Also, in Study 3.1, we had constrained the choice of kin by asking participants to imagine someone around their age (which would exclude younger kin whom people might actually assist more frequently). In Study 3.2, this constraint was removed.

Chapter 3

40

Study 3.2: Community Sample Method Participants and procedure Forty-four adults (15 men, 29 women, mean age = 38.91, SD = 10.08, range = 2359) working in various businesses in Groningen, the Netherlands participated voluntarily. Participants completed the questionnaires at their place of business. The methods of Study 3.2 were identical to those of Study 3.1, except for two differences. First, participants in the kin condition were asked to think of a family member whom they felt close to and were asked to indicate what their relationship towards this family member was. Second, the picture that accompanied the article about Leonie was of a woman whose age could be estimated to be between 30 and 40 years old. Oneness, willingness to help (r = .89, p = .001), empathy (r = .66, p = .001), distress (alpha = .75), and perceived reciprocal support (r = .68, p = .001) were measured in the same manner as in Study 3.1. Results and Discussion In the friend condition, the mean age of the friend was 38.91 (SD = 11.42, range = 23-59); the mean contact frequency was 8 times per month (SD = 8.59). In the kin condition, the mean age of the kin member was 38.90 (SD = 8.65, range = 25-54); the mean contact frequency was 7 times per month (SD = 9.96). The family members named by the participants were children (2), parents (5), siblings (7), cousins (3), and other family members (4). Table 3.4 Mean levels (and SDs) of Oneness, Empathy, Distress, Perceived Reciprocal Support, and Willingness to Help in Kin and Friend Conditions Perceived Willingness Oneness Empathy Distress reciprocal to help support Kin 3.45 (1.73) 5.19 (1.26) 2.22 (.88) 5.52 (1.17) 3.64 (2.21) (n = 21) Friend (n = 23)

4.52 (1.50)

5.16 (.90)

2.61 (1.24)

4.93 (1.67)

3.78 (1.99)

Table 3.4 shows the mean levels of all measures in the kin condition and the friend condition. Again, participants experienced greater feelings of oneness with friends than


41

with kin members, t41 = 2.17, p = .036. Means on the remaining measures did not differ between the two conditions. Table 3.5 Correlations among All Measures in Kin and Friend Conditions Kin condition

1. Oneness 2. Empathy 3. Distress 4. Perceived reciprocal support

Friend condition

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

.30

-.25

.38

.48*

-.06

.22

-.02

.12

.19

.24

.52*

-.41

.06

.39

-.08

.22

.18

-.02

.59**

-.11


The correlations among the variables showed a somewhat different pattern of relationships than Study 1 (see Table 3.5). Participants’ willingness to help in the kin condition was predicted not only by perceived reciprocal support, but also by empathy and oneness. In the friend condition, willingness to help was predicted only by empathy (r = .39, p = .070). To test the independent effects of the motives on willingness to help, we again conducted two regression analyses, separately for the kin and friend conditions. The results fell in line with those of Study 3.1 (see Table 3.6). In the kin condition, perceived reciprocal support emerged as the only predictor of willingness to help (β = .49, p = .020). In the friend condition, empathy emerged as the only predictor of helping (β = .49, p = .062).

Chapter 3

42

Table 3.6 Results of Regression Analyses in Kin and Friend Conditions in which Willingness to Help was the Dependent Variable Kin condition

Friend condition

β

t

p

β

t

p

Empathy

.21

1.13

.28

.49

2.01

.062

Distress

.25

1.42

.18

.19

.77

.46

Oneness

.30

1.55

.14

.12

.52

.61

Perceived reciprocal support

.49

2.60

.020

-.21

-.92

.37

R-square = .59

R-square = .24

The results of Study 3.2 indicate that the strong predictive effect of empathy on helping friends cannot be attributed to the potentially stronger friendships among university students. Also, the effect of perceived reciprocal support on helping kin does not appear to be due to the fact that the kin imagined were around the same age. However, the number of participants in the kin condition was too small to draw any clear conclusions regarding the age of kin. The findings do indicate once more that perceived reciprocal support is an important predictor of helping kin, whereas empathy is an important predictor of helping friends. General Discussion In two studies, we examined the impact of psychological motivators of helping within two specific close-relationship contexts: when the recipient was perceived to be either a kin member or a friend. In both studies (conducted with different samples of participants), we found that helping kin is driven primarily by perceived reciprocal support and helping friends is driven primarily by feelings of empathy. This research complements and extends previous research. First, the results showed that people feel more oneness with friends than family; thus, at a psychological level, the lack of a genetic relation between friends does not appear to translate into a weaker bond. In addition to any effects of genetic relatedness, there does appear to be a strong bond between friends that is driven by a distinct process (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). Second, corroborating the research by Kruger (2003) and Stewart-Williams (2007), the present results showed that perceived reciprocal support predicted willingness to help, especially when the recipient was imagined to be kin. These findings shed light on an


43

under-explored issue: the degree to which perceived reciprocal support matters within kin relationships. Kin selection theory and its implications may lead researchers to overlook the importance of other processes underlying altruism between kin; surprisingly, perceived reciprocal support may be more fundamental between kin than between friends, when other psychological motivators (such as empathy) are held constant. We should note, however, that our measure of expectations about reciprocity did not pertain to dyadic, tit-for-tat reciprocity. Rather, it measured people’s expectations about receiving assistance from someone. Is this a limitation of the study? On the one hand, our measure may have better captured actual reciprocal altruistic tendencies among humans; evidence shows that reciprocal altruism often goes beyond the dyadic, tit-for-tat level—a phenomenon termed generalized reciprocity (Das & Teng, 2002). On the other hand, one could still make the argument that our measure of perceived reciprocal support had nothing to do with actual reciprocity; rather, it may have measured people’s perceptions about obligations and norms regarding helping. Of course, because people feel more obligated to help kin (Kruger, 2001; Miller & Bersoff, 1998) and expect more assistance from kin (Bar-Tal et al., 1977; Mancini & Simon, 1984), the results could be interpreted as indicating that such obligations and norms underlie altruism among kin more strongly than altruism among friends, and that empathy-induced helping between friends exists over and above obligations and norms regarding helping. A more straightforward limitation of the present studies is that they did not rigorously test situations in which the recipients of altruism are one’s own children (or other, lower-generation kin). As Stewart-Williams (2007) noted, “Unreciprocated kin altruism is most common in relationships in which there is an asymmetry in the neediness and/or reproductive value of the parties involved. Consider the parent–offspring relationship. Young offspring have a greater need for help than their parents, and older offspring generally have greater reproductive value than their parents. As such, it makes good evolutionary sense that altruism would tend to flow down through the generations, from parent to offspring, more than it would do the reverse. In contrast, siblings and cousins are usually similar in age and therefore usually have similar needs and reproductive values. Under such circumstances, there may be little call for unreciprocated altruism—little reason that help would flow in one direction rather than the other. Thus, siblings and cousins may instead form reciprocal alliances.” (p. 197) Thus, future research on the effects of different psychological motives underlying kin altruism must attend to the specific relationship that exists between the helper and

44

Chapter 3

recipient. Categorizing different family relationships simply as “kin” may overlook interesting patterns of psychological motives that underlie helping within different relationships.

CHAPTER 4

What happened to Pandora’s Box: Reconsidering the Measurement of State Empathy

Research on empathy has a long tradition in psychology, and has been closely linked with research on altruism. However, already twenty-five years ago, Batson and Coke (1981) mentioned that even raising the question of altruism opens a Pandora’s Box of complex issues and conceptual traps. A major issue of debate has been whether ‘true’ altruism does indeed exist that is in the end not driven by self-interest. According to a number of authors, humans are capable of empathy that stems from a real concern for the fate of the other, and this constitutes the basis of ‘true’ altruism. Hoffman (1981) was one of the first psychologists to propose that empathy, defined as “an affective response appropriate to someone else’s situation rather than one’s own” (p. 44), is the basis for an altruistic motive that is independent of egoistic motives. In line with this, Daniel Batson (1991) proposed the empathy-altruism hypothesis, stating that “empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation” (p. 14). According to Batson (1991), adopting another person’s perspective leads to a unique internal response: a feeling of empathy. This feeling of empathy evokes altruistic motivation directed toward the ultimate goal of reducing the needy person’s suffering. Although this hypothesis may seem initially quite simple, demonstrating it empirically appeared rather complex (see Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1997, Batson et al., 1997b and Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce, & Sagarin, 1997 for a full discussion). One of the reasons for this is that the theoretical- and operational definitions of empathy vary widely across studies. In this paper we argue that a closer look at the concept of empathy in terms of both its theoretical basis as well as its operational content is important to better understand the link between the empathic response and helping. More specifically, we propose to make a clear distinction between two affective components within the original measure of empathy (Batson, 1991) i.e. sympathy and tenderheartedness. First, we will review the definitions of empathy within the existing literature. Specifically, we will focus on the use of state empathy within psychology over the past four decades. We will describe how the most commonly used measure of state empathy

Chapter 4

46

proposed by Coke et al. (1978) has come into existence, what it consists of and how it is used within mainly social psychological research. Secondly, we will review the status of empathy measurement, discussing factor analyses reported in the existing literature. Thirdly, we will report nine factor analysis conducted on our own datasets. Fourthly, we will determine the discriminatory power of the sympathy and tenderheartedness scales to see if they are differently related to other variables. Finally, we will consider limitations and implications for future research. Defining Empathy within Psychology The term empathy was first coined by Titchener (1909) as a translation of the German word “Einfühlung”. The concept of empathy grew out of earlier works on aesthetics, most importantly by Lipps (1903), who introduced this term to refer to the tendency of perceivers to project themselves into the objects of perception (Wispe, 1986). Titchener (1915) considered empathy either as the subject’s awareness in imagination of the emotions of another person as well as a kind of social-cognitive bonding. Within a clinical context, empathy was initially viewed as a cognitive process referring to accurately and dispassionately understanding the client’s point of view concerning his or her situation (Dymond, 1949). Rogers (1951, p.29) referred to empathy as the focus of the therapist to try to “live the attitudes of the other”. Eventually, definitions of empathy, and with it the empathy measures, shifted from cognition-based to emotion-based (Stotland, 1969; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Coke et al. 1978; Hoffman 1987). That is, empathy was increasingly viewed as an emotional response including either feeling a vicarious emotion, feeling the same emotion as another person feels, or feeling a vicarious emotion that is congruent with but not necessarily identical to the emotion of another (Stotland, 1969; Krebs, 1975; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Batson & Coke, 1981). In the late sixties and beginning seventies of the twentieth century, several researchers began to empirically explore the motivational and behavioural consequences of empathy, specifically its relation with the willingness to help others in need. Yet, there did not exist an agreement on how empathy should be defined. Amongst others, Clark (1980) in his discussion of empathy noted that “the literature does neglect a clear definition and a comprehensive theoretical approach” (p. 187). The concepts of empathy, sympathy and compassion were used interchangeably, indicating more or less the same construct. This confusion in the interchangeable use of the terms was noted by several psychologists in the eighties (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Olinick, 1984). To tackle this problem, Wispé (1986) gave an extensive explanation of the differences between empathy

What Happened to Pandora’s Box

47

and sympathy, stressing that they are two different psychological processes which shouldn’t be called by the same word. According to Wispé (1986), “in empathy, the empathizer “reaches out” for the other person. In sympathy, the sympathizer is “moved by” the other person” (p.318). Although a number of psychologists agree with this point of view (Batson et al., 1987; Eisenberg, 2000; Bierhoff, 2002), since Wispé’s review, these concepts are still used interchangeably in the literature. Within the social psychological debate on “true” altruism, state empathy is defined and measured as an instant emotional response when confronted with the suffering of someone else. Batson (1991) describes empathy as “an emotional response, elicited by and congruent with, but not necessarily identical to, the perceived welfare of someone else” (p. 86). The term congruence as used by Batson refers only to a congruence in valence (a positive emotion when the other is in a positive state; a negative emotion when the other is in a negative state), not to a matching of emotions. Most researchers in social psychology now use more specific definitions of state empathy (Bierhoff, 2002). These definitions have in common that they contain a recapitulation of the adjectives used in those studies to measure empathy. For example, Sturmer et al. (2006) describe empathy as “an emotional reaction including feelings of compassion, concern and tenderness”, Fincham Paleari and Regalia (2002) refer for a definition to Batson and Shaw (1991) and add that “empathy includes concepts such as sympathy, compassion, tenderness and caring”. Emotional Response Questionnaire The most widely used measure for state empathy is the Emotional Response Questionnaire (ERQ) developed by Coke et al. (1978). According to Batson, Darley & Coke (1978), emotions caused by awareness of another’s distress fall into two conceptually different categories: empathy and personal distress. Personal distress is a self-focused negative emotional response (Batson et al., 1987) an its experience leads to the motivation to have it reduced (Batson, 1991, p.78). The magnitude of this arousalreduction motivation is a direct function of the magnitude of the distress (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977; Piliavin et al., 1981). In other words, whereas empathy was thought to direct one to reduce the other person’s distress, feelings of personal distress directed one to reduce the own distress (Batson, Cowles, & Coke, 1979). The first ERQ consisted of 23 adjectives and was developed in an earlier study (Batson, McDavis, Felix, Goering, & Goldman, unpublished document) to assess both empathic concern as well as personal distress. The adjectives in the Emotional Response Questionnaire were chosen for their apparent face validity. When conducting factor

Chapter 4

48

analyses, the criterion was set that to be included, an adjective had to load highly (>.60) on the relevant factor in both the earlier study and the current one (Coke et al., 1978). The empathy adjectives used were moved, softhearted, sorrowed, touched, empathic, warm, concerned and compassionate. Of these, only moved, sorrowed and touched did not meet the criterion. The distress adjectives were alarmed, perturbed, disconcerted, bothered, irritated, disturbed, worried, uneasy, distressed, troubled, upset, anxious and grieved. Only three of these, i.e., alarmed, troubled and upset, did indeed meet the criterion set by Coke et al. (1978). Two filler adjectives also used in the list were intent and intrigued. Since then, this initial Emotional Response Questionnaire has been used and tested extensively by many researchers to assess state empathy and distress. This has been done within four different research paradigms1. In the first paradigm, participants listen to a radiobroadcast where a student explains the difficulties of finding participants for her master research (Coke et al. 1978; Archer, Diaz-Loving, Gollwitzer, Davis, & Foushee, 1981; Fultz et al., 1988; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990), or where a student misses a lot of classes due to a car accident and has to stop introductory psychology if she can’t find anyone to go over the lecture notes with her (Toi & Batson, 1982; Cialdini et al., 1987 study 2; Fultz, et al. 1988). Besides this, researchers developed a second paradigm, i.e. the story of Katie Banks, a senior at university who recently lost her parents and a sister in a car accident. Because her parents did not have a life insurance, Katie was struggling to take care of her surviving younger brother and sister as well as finishing her last year of college (Coke et al., 1978; Batson et al., 1991; Batson et al., 1997a; Mikulincer et al., 2001). In the third paradigm participants watch another participant (actually a video) performing a sequence of 2 minute digit-recall trials while receiving mild electric shocks after wrong recalls or at random intervals, showing obvious signs of discomfort (Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas & Isen, 1983; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Fultz et al. 1988; Batson et al. 1996; Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004). The fourth paradigm consists of either a video or a letter with a student expressing loneliness in his or her life as a student and pressure by the father to perform well (Fultz et al. 1988; Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989; Batson et al., 1991 Study 2). After almost a decade of research, Batson et al. (1987) proposed six adjectives to measure empathic concern (sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm and softhearted) on the basis of six studies (Batson et al., 1979; Batson et al., 1983; Coke, 1 To keep an overview of these paradigms in the rest of this chapter we’ve been categorizing them as described in the introduction: a) a radiobroadcast where a student tries to find participants for her master research or to find anyone to go over the lecture notes with her. b) The Katie Banks type of scenario. c) a video type paradigm, receiving mild electric shocks after wrong recalls or at random intervals d) a video or letter type paradigm of a student expressing loneliness in his/her student life and pressure by the father to perform well.


49

1980; Coke et al., 1978; Fultz, 1982; Toi & Batson, 1982). In these studies, the empathy component received high loadings (> .60) of ‘moved’, ‘compassionate’, ‘warm’ and ‘softhearted’ in all six studies and of’ sympathetic’ and ‘tender’ in four out of five studies (Batson et al., 1987). Since then, several published studies using the paradigms described above have presented factor analyses. These additional studies provide an opportunity to examine whether the two dimensions proposed by Coke et al. (1978) and refined by Batson et al. (1987) are robust and stable. In the next section, we discuss the studies reporting factor analyses on the empathy and distress scales. Review of Factor Analyses Since its development, over fifty-five studies have been using the Emotional Response Questionnaire. Only twenty of these studies examined the factorial structure of the adjectives used and applied one of the the four research paradigms described above2. Table 1 provides a schematic overview of these studies and their factor analytical reports. All studies used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation. PCA is an exploratory factor analytic technique. This implies that decisions have to be made about the number of factors to extract, the type of rotation to use, the criteria for acceptable loadings of items on a factor, and the labeling of the factors. Therefore, we examined the various studies asking the following questions: Which adjectives were used in the factor analyses? Do the studies report whether the conducted analysis included all adjectives measured in the questionnaires? Was the criterion for the amount of factors to extract mentioned in the article? What criterion was used for rotation of the factors? Do the studies find only the two factors for empathy and distress or were there more factors found? Some essential properties of the studies made comparison between these studies possible: all studies have been conducted among students; all studies, except one, used (among others) the eight distress and six empathy adjectives originally proposed by Batson and colleagues (1987); most studies used 7-point scales to measure the adjectives; all studies asked the question whether empathy is separable from distress and, crucially, all studies reported their factor analytical data to answer this question. Adjectives included in PCA and selected for further analyses. Comparing the first studies of Batson and colleagues with all other studies in Table 4.1 reveals a wide diversity of Four other articles also reported factor analysis on the adjectives used but have not been included in this overview because they used completely different research paradigms (Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 1994; Mc Cullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997) and only five of the initial 23 adjectives (Fincham et al., 2002; Paleari, Regalia, & Fincham, 2003).

2

50

Chapter 4

choices with regard to the adjectives included in the factor analyses as well as outcomes of adjectives disclosed by these analyses. Many studies do not provide any information on the content of the adjectives which were included in the questionnaires. Half of the studies used in their factor analyses the same six empathy adjectives proposed by Batson et al. (1987; see table 4.1B). Only four of these reported the same pattern of loadings as Batson et al. (1987) did (Toi & Batson, 1982; Dovidio et al., 1990; Batson, et al, 1991, study 1 and 2). Moreover, five studies did not construct their scales on the basis of the outcomes of their factor analysis; three studies used a criterion of loadings higher than .40 instead of .60, as Batson et al. (1987) did; three studies either did not report which empathy adjectives were used in the factor analysis or did not report how high the loadings of these adjectives were. Finally, only six out of these 20 studies actually used in their final empathy scale the specific six adjectives proposed by Batson and colleagues (see Table 4.1B). Of course, the choices about the number and content of adjectives included will have affected the results of the factor analysis.

Table 4.1 (Part A) Nineteen studies reporting factor analyses on the Emotional Response Questionnaire Authors

Characteristics and

Alpha

Number of

Number of

Number of

Empathy

Adjectives in

Adjectives in Factor

Participants

Scale

Study

Analysis

Number of Factors

Paradigm

extracted

used in Study

Batson et al., 1976

48 F S

unknown

23

23

4

a)

Coke et al. 1978 study 2

33 F S

unknown

23

23

unknown

a)

123 F S

0,82

22

22

3

a)

84 F S 88 F/M S

0,82 0,79

28 28

14 unknown

2 minimal 2

a) c)

Batson et al. 1986

60 F S

0,82

28

14

2

c)

Cialdini et al. 1987, study 2

35 F S

0,92

20

unknown

minimal 2

a)

Fultz et al. 1988, study 1

91 F S

0,88

24

24

3

c)


91 F S

0,88

24

24

3

a)


91 F S

0,88

24

24

3

d) d)

Smith et al. 1989

64 F/M S

0,86

24

unknown

## 2

Dovidio et al. 1990

96 F 96 M S

0,89

29

unknown

minimal 2

a)

Batson et al. 1991 study 1

72 F S

0,93

24

18

2 (*)

b)

Batson et al. 1991 study 2 Batson et al. 1991 study 3

72 F S 54 F 54 M S

0,91 unknown

28 24

18 18

4 3 (*)

d) b)

Batson et al. 1996 study 1

24 F 24 M S

0,92

24

14

# 2 forced

c)

30 F 30 M S

0,85

26

14

3 (*)

b)

44 F 25 M S

0,94

14

14

2

b)

Mikulincer et al, 2001, study 5

66 F 84 M S

0,86

unknown

8

2

b)

Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004 59 F S 0,69 21 21 3 Note. F=female, M=male, S=student, (*)= one-factor solution fits better according to a scree test. All studies used 7-point scales except # = 9-point scale and ## = 6 cm line.

c) 51

Batson et al. 1997a Mikulincer et al, 2001, study 1


Archer et al. 1981 Toi & Batson, 1982 Batson et al, 1983

52

Table 4.1 (Part B) Twenty studies reporting factor analyses on the Emotional Response Questionnaire Authors

Empathy Sympathetic

Batson et al., 1976a

Softhearted #*x #*x #*x #* # #*x

Tender

Warm #*x #*x #*x #* # #*x

Moved #* # #* #*x #*x #x x #*x #*x #*x # ** x #*x #*x #*x #*x #*x #x # ** x

Touched #* # #*

Empathic #*x #*x

Kind

Concerned #*x #*x #*x

Coke et al. 1978 Archer et al. 1981 Toi & Batson, 1982 #*x #* Batson et al. 1983 #*x # Batson et al. 1986 #*x #*x Cialdini et al. 1987, study 2 x Fultz et al., 1988, study 1 #x #*x #*x #*x #*x # Fultz et al., 1988, study 1 #*x #*x #*x #*x #*x #* Fultz et al., 1988, study 1 #*x #*x #*x #*x #*x #* Smith et al. 1989 # ** x # ** x # ** x # ** x # ** x # ** x Dovidio et al 1990 #*x #*x #*x #*x Batson et al. 1991 study 1 #*x #*x #*x #*x Batson et al. 1991 study 2 #*x #*x #*x #*x Batson et al. 1991 study 3 #*x #*x # # Batson et al. 1996 study 1 #x #*x #*x #*x Batson et al. 1997a #x #x #x # Mikulincer et al, 2001, study 1 # ** x # ** x # ** x # ** x Mikulincer et al, 2001, study 5 # ** x # ** x # ** x Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004 *x *x *x Note. # = Adjectives included in factor analyses *= adjectives loading on Empathy factor with loading >.60 and no split loadings. **= adjectives loading on Empathy factor with loading > .40. x= adjectives used in Empathy index. Studies without * do not report all adjectives loading on the Empathy factor. a One more adjective was used in this study which loaded >.60 on the Empathy factor: intent. Because this adjective was not used in any of the other studies we did not add it to table 4.1.

Chapter 4

Compassionate #*x #*x #*x #*x #*x #*x x #*x #*x #*x # ** x #*x #*x #*x #*x #*x #x # ** x # ** x


53

Number of Factors. A second conclusion based on Table 4.1A is that the choice for a two factor solution might not have been the most optimal choice because in many studies more than two factors were found. Nevertheless, most studies provide clear support for the claim that empathy and personal distress are two different latent variables. That is, in all studies, two factors were found that represented these two variables. Batson and colleagues (1978, 1987) compared a one component factor solution with a two component factor solution, with the aim of separating empathy from distress. This approach was adopted by subsequent researchers. Yet, Table 4.1A indicates a lack of consistency between the number of factors extracted, and the number of factors discussed in the articles. Many of these factor analyses reported more than two factors (i.e. 4 factors in Batson, et al 1991, study 2; 3 factors in Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004). This is a logical result if the other adjectives did indeed measure another latent variable than empathic concern or personal distress. Although two studies purposely included additional items to measure a sadness factor, most of the articles did not mention whether they included items to measure another factor (i.e. sadness). Because the additional adjectives were not discussed in the factor analyses, it is difficult to assess whether a two factor solution was most optimal. It stays unclear how many of the adjectives were intended to measure empathy and personal distress and how many adjectives were intended to measure other concepts. Also, we do not know whether the empathy- and distress adjectives resulted indeed in two factors, or whether the additional factors that were reported showed a pattern of loadings in which the adjectives intended to measure empathy and distress were split up between more factors. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon comes from the fact that the debate within these studies turned around explicitly distinguishing empathy from distress. By focusing on this distinction of two empirically different constructs (empathy and personal distress), little attention was paid to the operational definitions that were chosen within these two constructs. The consequent search for a two factor solution trying to differentiate empathy from distress might have been obscuring other, more optimally fitting, factor solutions. Comparing the alpha’s reported in Table 4.1A, we have to conclude that, apparently, all studies have reliably measured their constructs. Yet, these constructs were not the same because they were built on different adjectives. For instance, while Batson et al. (1983) measured empathy with compassionate, sympathetic and moved, Bierhoff and Rohmann (2004) measured empathy with softhearted, warm and tender. As a consequence of the lack of consensus on the operational definitions of empathy, the use of different adjectives to measure empathy became widely accepted. Although researchers agreed that a certain set of adjectives was supposed to measure empathy and another set of adjectives

Chapter 4

54

was supposed to measure distress, there was often no clear rationale for the choice of these precise items. References to early articles by Batson and colleagues (Batson et al., 1981; Batson & Coke, 1981; Batson et al., 1987) did not guarantee the use of exactly the same adjectives as described in these articles. Of course, it was not an easy task for any researcher to construct a measure of empathy given the lack of agreement on the theoretical construct. The Emotional Response Questionnaire was used by many different scholars, adding or subtracting adjectives according to their own considerations of validity and reliability. These results and issues raise questions about the comparability within this set of studies of the construct called ‘empathy’. How sure are we that in general, the adjectives used to measure empathy indeed reflect one coherent latent variable? The diversity of loadings in the factor analyses in table 4.1B suggests that these adjectives could be measuring conceptually very different variables. To provide an answer to these new questions we have reanalyzed nine datasets of studies which we conducted over the past three years. Nine Factor Analyses Based on New Data We have conducted nine different studies3 measuring empathy and distress. We will now examine these studies looking at both a 2-factor structure as well as a factor structure reporting all factors with eigenvalues greater than one. Characteristics of the nine datasets All nine datasets used the same research scenario, based on the Katie Banks paradigm used by Batson and colleagues. The scenario described the story of Leonie, a female student who had a major bicycle accident and consequently ended up with serious facial damage, a shattered foot, and social stigma. In an interview, Leonie tells about her experiences in the hospital, how she felt when she saw herself again for the first time, how she has been recovering, and how she feels when people are staring at her. In study 1, 2 and 4, participants listened to an interview with Leonie, in the other studies participants read the interview in the form of an article accompanied by a picture

3 Study 1 and 4 are the studies used in chapter 2 of this dissertation. The number of participants in study 1 has increased in comparison to study 2.1 because we added all participants of an additional experimental condition which we did not consider in chapter 2. Study 5 consists of both studies described in chapter 3 of this dissertation. The number of participants in this sample has increased with 27 participants in comparison to study 3.1 because we added all participants who thought of a male friend or family member. We’ve chosen to combine these two studies in one dataset for this chapter because the measures in these two studies as well as the experimental manipulations were the same. The other six datasets are not used in other chapters of this dissertation.


55

of Leonie. After listening to- or reading the interview with Leonie, participants indicated on 7-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), the extent to which they experienced a number of emotions. All studies used the fourteen adjectives proposed by Batson and colleagues (1987). Study 1, 2 and 4 used additional items (in sum respectively 22, 32 and 26 items) to measure other constructs such as sadness and relief. The 14 adjectives consisted of the eight distress adjectives (alarmed, grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, perturbed, distressed and troubled) and six empathy adjectives (sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm and soft-hearted; Batson et al. 1987). Because the Dutch translations of ‘disturbed’ (‘verward’) and ‘perturbed’ (‘in verwarring’) resemble each other literally, ‘perturbed’ was omitted in seven of the nine studies. Study 9 was conducted in English amongst foreign students, and included the 14 adjectives proposed by Batson et al. (1987). Two principle component analyses with Varimax rotation were performed on the 13 (omitting perturbed) or 14 adjectives intended to measure empathic concern and personal distress. Table 4.2 provides a schematic overview of the loadings of the analysis extracting two components.

56

Table 4.2 Varimax-Rotated Principal -Components 2-Factor Structure of Self -Reported Emotional Responses to Witnessing Another in Need (Nine studies) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Study

9

D

E

D

E

D

E

D

E

D

E

D

E

D

E

D

E

D

E

alarmed

.70*

.20

.73*

.16

.79*

.16

.75*

.21

.72*

.01

.79*

.22

.49

.54

.81*

.01

.31

.54

grieved

.56

.48

.78*

.23

.69*

.25

.67*

.35

.69*

.01

.75*

.11

.52

.34

.73*

.12

.80*

.14

upset

.76*

.14

.78*

.18

.69*

.17

.71*

.24

.58

-.35

.79*

.13

.67*

.37

.74*

-.01

.58

.32

worried

.46

.62*

-

-

.57

.38

.60*

.32

.69*

-.10

.71*

.27

.45

.55

.83*

.01

.31

.72*

disturbed

.78*

.13

.69*

.01

.69*

.01

.82*

.01

.49

.58

.26

.63*

.19

.36

.58

.01

.67*

-.12

perturbed

.79*

.01

-

-

-

-

.74*

.01

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Distressed

.79*

.17

.79*

.01

.69*

.12

.79*

.01

.62*

.16

.55

.31

.32

.62*

.59

.46

.69*

.21

troubled

.59

.39

-

-

.62*

.45

.74*

.24

.67*

.01

.57

.60

.35

.61*

.80*

-.01

.34

.48

sympathetic

.38

.66*

.59

.54

.26

.69*

.37

.62*

.67*

-.44

.59

.35

.88*

.01

.68*

.26

.11

.77*

moved

.36

.63*

.42

.60*

.43

.51

.49

.39

.67*

-.21

.80*

.32

.72*

.16

.67*

.31

.66*

.24

compassionate

.31

.61*

.51

.54

.33

.68*

.25

.68*

.67*

-.46

.70*

.25

.85*

.01

.67*

.21

.52

.40

tender

.01

.76*

.01

.71*

.29

.73*

.13

.66*

.62*

.47

.24

.84*

.01

.78*

.01

.98*

.28

.62*

warm

.01

.70*

.01

.80*

.01

.67*

.01

.71*

.50

.50

.11

.75*

.13

.51

.59

-.01

-.21

.50

.71*

.01

.74*

.01

.80*

.01

.76*

.50

.23

.23

.71*

.01

.70*

-.01

.98*

.15

.76*

Distress Adj.

softhearted .01 * Denotes loading above .60

Chapter 4

Empathy Adj.


57

Factor analysis with Varimax rotation on two factors Results of the two component solution in each study differed in important ways from the studies reported by Batson et al. (1987). In general, the distress adjectives did load consistently on the first factor that we labeled distress. However, the empathy adjectives showed a very diverse pattern of loadings (see Table 4.2). Of all six empathy adjectives, the loadings of ‘tender’ and ‘softhearted’ were most consistent, both loading in eight of the nine studies on the factor we labeled empathy. ‘Warm’ loaded in five studies on the empathy factor and had four split loadings (although two of these were above >.50 on the empathy factor). Yet, ‘sympathetic’, ‘moved’ and ‘compassionate’ showed very different loadings over the nine studies. In four of the nine studies, they loaded with the distress adjectives on the distress factor, a pattern reported at least three times before (Batson et al., 1989, 1991, 1997a). Batson and colleagues concluded that the distress felt in this paradigm was mostly a distress for Katie, and therefore a form of empathy (Batson et al. 1988). Three studies showed loadings similar to those reported by Batson et al. (1987). The two remaining studies showed split loadings on both the empathy and the distress factors. To conclude, the 2-factor solutions found in our studies do consistently not support the assumption that ‘sympathetic’, ‘compassionate’ and ‘moved’ should be taken together with ‘warm’, ‘softhearted’ and ‘tender’ in one scale labeled empathy. These studies rather suggest that another division of the adjectives might be more appropriate. We therefore conducted another factor analysis. This time, the criterion for the number of factors to be varimax rotated, was all eigenvalues greater than 1 without indicating beforehand how many factors should be rotated. Table 4.3A and 4.3B depict the loadings of the adjectives in this analysis. Factor analysis with Varimax rotation with an unspecified number of factors As can be seen in Table 4.3A and Table 4.3B, seven of the nine studies reported three orthogonal factors in the analysis and two studies reported four factors. In these two studies, the adjectives ‘grieved’, ‘distressed’ and ‘disturbed’ loaded on another factor then the rest of the eight distress adjectives. Generally, a different and more stable pattern of results appears from these analyses, confirming the split we expected between the six empathy adjectives. There appears a clear division between a sympathy-cluster and a tenderheartedness-cluster. ‘Sympathetic’ and ‘compassionate’ loaded respectively in nine

Chapter 4

58

and eight out of nine analyses on the factor that we labeled sympathy4. ‘Moved’ had a very unreliable pattern of loadings but turned out to have mostly (five times) split loadings on all factors. Strikingly, ‘tender’, ‘warm’ and ‘softhearted’ did not load on the sympathy factor but loaded most consistently on the third factor, which we labeled tenderheartedness. These factor analyses confirm the idea that the six empathy adjectives originally proposed by Batson and colleagues fit better into a two-scale model. Taking these two clusters separately, one striking difference stands out: sympathetic and compassionate are two emotions that can only be felt in relationship with someone else. One feels sympathetic and compassionate towards the other, not towards oneself. On the other hand, tender, warm and softhearted describe a state of mind which the subject experiences without referring explicitly to his context. In other words, these three emotions might be elicited by, but are not necessarily felt for the person in need. Also, referring back to Batson’s definition of empathy, these three emotions are surely not congruent with the need of the target. After all, when the target is in a negative state, feelings of warmth, tenderness and softheartedness are not negative themselves. They reflect rather a personality based set of feelings which will probably be more strongly related to dispositional measures of empathy than the sympathy cluster. To test the stability of these findings, we once more conducted a factor analysis taking all nine datasets together (see Table 4.3: Overall). This final analysis resulted in three orthogonal factors, which we labeled ‘distress’, ‘sympathy’ and ‘tenderheartedness’. Overall, the results revealed the same patterns as found in the separate analyses. Nevertheless, this analysis added some new information on the content of the personal distress factor. The adjectives ‘grieved’ and ‘worried’ showed split loadings on the different factors, indicating a partial overlap between the sympathy- and personal distress factors. ‘Grieved’ also loaded twice on a fourth factor when we conducted the factor analyses separately for all studies (see Table 4.3A and B). Apparently, these adjectives did not consistently represent either personal distress or sympathy. On the basis of this analysis we suggest to omit these adjectives from the personal distress scale in order to minimize the overlap between the concepts of distress, sympathy and tenderheartedness. In sum, this factor analytical model differentiates between distress-related emotions, which are only oriented towards ourselves; sympathy-related emotions, which are clearly and only oriented towards the other in need; and tenderheartedness-related emotions which might be elicited by the other person’s need but seem to not explicitly relate to the state of the person in need. 4 The choice for the labels ‘sympathy’ and ‘tenderheartedness’ will be explained in the discussion section of this chapter.

Table 4.3 (Part A) Varimax-Rotated Principal -Components Factor Structure of Self -Reported Emotional Responses to Witnessing Another in Need (Nine studies) Study

1

2

3

4

5

D

S

T

D

S

T

D

S

T

D

S

T

D1

D2

E

T

alarmed

.66*

.28

.11

.54

.51

.01

.78*

.19

.11

.73*

.23

.14

.73*

.29

.16

.14

grieved

.41

.64*

.18

.44

.73*

.01

.62*

.43

.01

.61*

.43

.15

.16

.76*

.28

.16

Distress Adj.

.66*

.41

.01

.58

.55

.01

.64*

.33

.01

.64*

.44

.01

.69*

.27

.25

-.22

worried

.45

.35

.55

-

-

-

.56

.25

.33

.56

.33

.20

.63*

.01

.35

.31

disturbed

.81*

.12

.16

.82*

.01

.11

.72*

.01

.15

.87*

-.10

.01

.31

.59

-.37

.36

perturbed

.82*

.01

.01

-

-

-

-

-

-

.79*

.01

.14

-

-

-

-

Distressed

.81*

.17

.16

.83*

.21

.01

.70*

.12

.11

.77*

.19

.01

.16

.76*

.28

.16

troubled

.47

.51

.16

-

-

-

.64*

.20

.45

.69*

.34

.01

.72*

.13

.15

.25

.17

.83*

.25

.15

.83*

.28

.13

.77*

.52

.21

.88*

.14

.33

.18

.75*

.15

Empathy Adj. sympathetic moved

.24

.58

.39

.28

.41

.55

.31

.71*

.14

.45

.36

.25

.23

.63*

.45

.01

compassionate

.01

.81*

.19

.01

.82*

.27

.19

.84*

.26

.01

.86*

.22

.28

.22

.78*

.13

tender

.14

.19

.80*

.20

.01

.82*

.33

.16

.79*

.21

.01

.83*

.19

.25

.11

.79*

warm

.01

.23

.70*

-.20

.29

.72*

.01

.15

.72*

.01

.15

.77*

.43

.18

-.20

.56

softhearted

.01

.11

.80*

.01

.15

.77*

.01

.27

.80*

.01

.26

.77*

.01

.01

.43

.77*


upset

* Denotes loading above .60. D = Distress. S = Sympathy. T = Tenderheartedness . 59

60

Table 4.3 (Part B) Varimax-Rotated Principal -Components Factor Structure of Self -Reported Emotional Responses to Witnessing Another in Need (Nine studies) Study

6

7

8

9

Overall (N = 1104)

D

S

T

D1

D2

S

T

D

S

T

D

S

T

D

S

T

alarmed

.67*

.45

.17

.53

.60

.23

.01

.65*

.49

-.01

.12

.79*

.01

.70*

.24

.18

grieved

.70*

.36

.01

.10

.73*

.28

.01

.70*

.33

.12

.84*

.01

.17

.54

.49

.24

upset

.66*

.47

.01

.21

.56

.50

.11

.56

.48

-.01

.48

.49

.01

.63*

.45

-.08

worried

.44

.60

.21

.78*

.01

.36

.12

.49

.70*

-.01

.23

.63*

.42

.52

.35

.33

disturbed

.49

.01

.62*

-.16

.78*

.01

.19

.79*

-.01

-.01

.69*

-.01

-.01

.85*

.01

.10

perturbed

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.80*

-.03

.05

distressed

.82*

.01

.29

.33

.74*

.01

.16

.59

.25

.47

.64*

.31

.01

.78*

.19

-.02

troubled

.39

.48

.56

.84*

.16

.21

.01

.55

.59

-.01

.18

.71*

.01

.60*

.38

.22

sympathetic

.12

.77*

.29

.16

.20

.87*

.01

.13

.88*

.17

.01

.63*

.46

.18

.86*

.19

moved

.60

.56

.26

.17

.15

.73*

.15

.54

.43

.29

.65*

.23

.18

.38

.43

.35

compassionate

.19

.85*

.18

.11

.01

.90*

.01

.13

.87*

.12

.46

.42

.21

.08

.86*

.18

tender

.18

.24

.82*

.34

.16

.01

.79*

-.01

.01

.98*

.36

.16

.72*

.18

.06

.85*

warm

.01

.15

.74*

.01

.14

.25

.83*

.66*

.15

-.01

-.11

-.01

.71*

.01

.16

.78*

softhearted

.01

.34

.68*

.58

.01

.01

.51

-.01

.01

.98*

.16

.38

.70*

.06

.22

.76*

Distress Adj.

* Denotes loading above .60. D = Distress. S = Sympathy. T = Tenderheartedness.

Chapter 4

Empathy Adj.


61

The Discriminatory Power of the newly appeared scales of Sympathy and Tenderheartedness Splitting up Batson’s original empathy measure in two different but related measures of sympathy and tenderheartedness is only justified when these scales show clear differences in means and in their relationship with other variables. We therefore examined the extent to which people react differently to the person in need in terms of sympathy and tenderheartedness, whether there are any gender differences in sympathy and tenderheartedness and whether different perspective taking instructions lead to different levels of sympathy and tenderheartedness. Differences in means The means of reported sympathy and tenderheartedness differ considerably and consistently from each other in all nine datasets. Table 4.4 gives all means and standard deviations of empathy5 (measured with Batson’s six adjectives; Cronbach’s α6 = .82), distress (measured with alarmed, upset, disturbed, troubled and distressed; Cronbach’s α = .83), sympathy (measured with sympathetic and compassionate; Pearson’s r = .74) and tenderheartedness (measured with warm, tender and softhearted; Cronbach’s α = .78) within the nine datasets. Clearly, subjects’ emotional reactions were very consistent both between as well as within studies. Subjects responded with strong sympathy (means ranging from 5.13 to 5.83 on 7-point scales, overall M = 5.63) but with neutral tenderheartedness (means ranging from 3.10 to 4.49, overall M = 3.95). Paired-sample t-tests on the means of sympathy and tenderheartedness showed that this difference in means was significant in all nine datasets, t’s > 9,15, p’s < .001. These differences in means show us that this need-situation elicited far more sympathy than tenderheartedness. This substantial difference does not come entirely as a surprise. Recall that in all studies, the person in need was an unknown female of about the same age as the subjects. One can imagine that differences in the relationship with this target can be of influence, i.e. feeling more tenderheartedness for loved ones than for strangers. These differences in means provide an additional justification for the split between sympathy and tenderheartedness.

In the remainder of this chapter, when referring to empathy, we refer to the measure of empathy as proposed by Batson (1991). 6 All Cronbach’s alpha’s are based on the overall dataset. 5

62

Table 4.4 Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Empathy, Distress, Sympathy and Tenderheartedness (Nine studies) Study

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

(N=90)

(N=141)

(N=452)

(N=129)

(N=158)

(N=66)

(N=55)

(N=93)

(N=89)

M

M

M

M

M

SD

SD

SD

SD

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

4.94

.80

4.78

.88

5.03

.81

4.37

.92

4.30

.88

4.08

.98

4.12

.87

3.73

1.06

4.63

.78

Sympathy

5.79

.89

5.82

.88

5.83

.77

5.67

1.02

5.35

.93

5.29

1.07

5.36

1.08

4.85

1.25

5.13

.90

Tenderheartedness

4.49

.89

4.17

1.05

4.38

1.09

3.60

1.19

3.49

1.12

3.17

1.16

3.10

1.17

2.92

1.27

4.16

1.00

Distress

3.51

1.21

3.11

1.16

3.31

1.18

3.41

1.25

2.92

1.17

2.48

1.07

2.91

1.19

2.27

1.04

4.03

1.01

Table 4.5 Differences in reported Empathy, Sympathy and Tenderheartedness for Men and Women: Diff (F -M) (Six studies) Study

3

5 T

7

8

9

E

S

E

S

E

S

T

E

S

T

E

S

T

E

S

T

Diff (F-M)

.23

.39

.12

.25

.43

.15

-.08

.30

-.36

.07

.50

-.29

.15

.38

-.04

.25

.18

.30

SDp

.80

.76

1.07

.88

.91

1.12

.99

1.07

1.16

.88

1.06

1.17

1.06

1.24

1.27

.78

.90

.99

F

6,47

21.09

.97

3.22

8.95

.69

1.00

1.33

1.63

1.00

2.99

.80

.46

2.13

.02

2.33

.86

1.99

df

1,415

1,415

1,417

1,156

1,156

1,156

1,64

1,64

1,64

1,53

1,53

1,53

1,90

1,91

1,90

1,86

1,87

1,87

.011

.001

.324

.075

.003

.408

.756

.253

.206

.758

.090

.375

.500

.148

.879

.131

.357

.162

p

T

6

Note. E = Empathy (ERQ). S = Sympathy. T = Tenderheartedness. Diff (F-M)= difference scores in means: women minus men. SDp = pooled variance. All tests reported two -sided

Chapter 4

Empathy


63

Gender differences Self-reports of empathy show a very consistent gender difference with women reporting more empathy than men (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987). Lennon and Eisenberg (1987) stress that the reasons for these findings are unclear, especially given the lack of such a large gender difference for other measures of empathy, i.e. facial measures and physiological measures. Lennon and Eisenberg indicate that these results might be either due to actual differences in empathy or to biases in self-reports. Because females are – according to their role patterns– expected to be more concerned for others, they may report higher levels of concern. Remarkably, considering the consistency in self reports, Lennon and Eisenberg (1987) also indicate that when these measures are applied in simulated emotional situations, i.e. experimental situations designed to elicit emotional reactions, the overall pattern of findings is mixed. Six of the studies we conducted had both female and male participants. Table 4.5 shows the gender differences for empathy, sympathy and tenderheartedness. We included empathy in these tests to see whether the two new scales report more precise findings than the original empathy scale, and whether possible effects of gender on empathy might be due to either sympathy or tenderheartedness. These studies confirm the mixed pattern of findings which Lennon and Eisenberg (1987) reported. While study three and five show a significant difference in sympathy between men and women, and study seven shows a marginally significant difference, studies six, eight and nine do not show any difference in sympathy between men and women. Yet, when there was a gender difference, it was consistently in the same direction, with females showing more sympathy than males. Moreover, in not a single study did men and women differ in tenderheartedness. Study 3 found a significant difference on empathy too, but having a closer look at the other two scales this effect clearly came from the significant difference in

sympathy

and

not

tenderheartedness.

Although

a

gender

difference

in

tenderheartedness would not be surprising according to popular culture and gender stereotypes, the lack of it in our datasets pinpoints once more the empirical difference between sympathy and tenderheartedness. Apparently, women do not report higher levels of tenderheartedness than men. In sum, although gender differences were, consistent with the literature, mixed in nature, a clear trend appears showing that women experience more sympathy for the person in need but not more tenderheartedness.

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Effects of perspective taking Several social psychological experiments using a person in need paradigm gave perspective taking instructions to induce empathy (e.g. Batson et al., 1997a). Three of the datasets reported here also used these perspective manipulations. Study 1 and 2 asked participants either to try to stay objective (objective condition), to try to imagine how the person in need must feel (other condition) or to try to imagine how they would feel themselves if they would be in the same situation as the person in need (self condition). Study 4 used the objective and the other condition and added a condition in which participants described someone they knew and felt close to. Subsequently, they were asked to imagine how that person they just described would feel in such a situation (closeother condition).

Table 4.6 Means and standard deviations for Empathy, Sympathy and Tenderheartedness within different perspective taking conditions Study

1

Condition

E M

2

S SD

M

T SD

M

E SD

M

4

S SD

M

T SD

M

E SD

M

S SD

M

T SD

M

SD

4.75a .93

5.44a 1.09

4.45 a .83

4.53 a .96

5.53 a 1.00

3.94a 1.16

3.92a .96

5.31 a 1.09

3.13 a 1.24

Other

5.02a .70

5.88a .81

4.57 a .79

5.04 b .77

6.00 b .71

4.42a 1.05

4.49b .76

5.80 a .96

3.66 a 1.06

Self

5.06a .75

6.08b .58

4.47 a 1.06

4.79 a .82

5.93 b .87

4.16a .91

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4.67b

.89

5.90 b

.93

4.00 b

1.13

Close-other

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

ab

Note. E = Empathy. S = Sympathy. T = Tenderheartedness. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Difference in superscripts = means differ significantly between conditions, all p’s < .02.


Objective

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These three studies give us a chance to see whether the perspective taking instructions lead to different levels of sympathy and tenderheartedness. Table 4.6 gives the means and standard deviations of the three scales within the different conditions. As expected, the differences in means between conditions articulated once more the differences in reported sympathy and tenderheartedness. Study 1 showed that although participants in the other- and self conditions reported slightly more empathy than did participants in the objective condition, this difference in empathy was not significant, F(2,87) = 1.32, ns. Having a closer look at the split of empathy in sympathy and tenderheartedness, the reason for this finding became apparent. No difference in tenderheartedness appeared, F(2,87) = .14 ns., but a significant difference in reported sympathy was indeed present, F(2,87) = 4.57, p = .013. Study 2 did show a significant difference in levels of reported empathy between the three conditions, F(2,138) = 4.18, p = .017. Nevertheless, a closer look at the sympathy and tenderheartedness scales replicated the pattern found in Study 1: there was no significant difference in tenderheartedness, F(2,138) = 2.44 ns, but there was again a significant difference in sympathy, F(2,138) = 3.96, p = .021. Study 4 demonstrated yet another set of findings. The reported empathy in the other- and close-other conditions differed significantly from the objective condition, F(2,126) = 8.80, p = .001. Sympathy in the close-other condition differed significantly from the other and the objective conditions, F(2,126) = 4.22, p = .017. Finally, tenderheartedness in the close-other condition also differed significantly from the other and objective conditions, F(2,126) = 6.15, p = .003. In sum, participants showed more sympathy but not more tenderheartedness, when taking an other-perspective or a selfperspective than when trying to stay objective. Yet, when imagining the person in need to be a person close to themselves (close-other perspective), they reported significantly more tenderheartedness than they did in the other- or objective perspectives. More research is needed to confirm and substantiate these findings. Nevertheless the results clearly show that the consequences of perspective taking on the empathic response to a person in need are more subtle than what we’ve been assuming so far. The effects of both gender as well as perspective taking instructions on sympathy and tenderheartedness provide the first proof that the scales do indeed show good discriminatory power. This justifies the proposed split up of the original questionnaire by Batson and colleagues.


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Conclusion Empathy is a key concept within the study of prosocial behaviour and its motives. This line of research has a long history in psychology in general and in social psychology in particular. However, there has been a decline in research on traditional aspects of dyadic helping (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). Part of this decline might be due to some seemingly “insolvable” issues such as finding empirical evidence for inherently altruistic motives. The existing confusion regarding the concept of empathy is also handicapping the progress of research within this research paradigm. Refining the theoretical basis and the measurement of concepts such as empathy and sympathy may contribute to the necessary fine-tuning within this complex field of research. The research conducted within psychology in the past 50 years, shows that both operational definitions as well as theoretical definitions of empathy vary widely across studies and show considerable inconsistencies. In this chapter, we first reviewed the definition of empathy within the existing literature. The concept of empathy has both a cognitive- as well as an emotion-based definition. Within the debate over “true” altruism the emphasis is on the emotional response (state empathy), but the label for this response has varied, and included empathy, sympathy and even compassion. Even more so, different adjectives have been used to measure seemingly same concepts. We then reviewed the status of empathy measured with the Emotional Response Questionnaire (Coke et al., 1978), and noted that many studies found in addition to empathy and personal distress other factors in their analyses. Although we often do not know whether these other factors reflected additional constructs, they do suggest that there might be a more optimal, detailed, factor solution than the classic two-factor solution that differentiates empathy from personal distress. By using nine of our own datasets we tried to explore other factor solutions. These datasets revealed that a three factor solution in which the original empathy measure was split up in sympathy and tenderheartedness lead to a more stable pattern of results. The choice for the label “sympathy” is based on several considerations. Differentiating sympathy from empathy requires a subtle understanding of the difference between both concepts. Wispé (1986) stated this difference as follows: “In empathy the self is the vehicle for understanding, and it never loses its own identity. (…) By contrast, sympathy is concerned with communion rather than accuracy, and self-awareness is reduced rather than augmented. In empathy the empathizer “reaches out” for the other person. In sympathy, the sympathizer is “moved by” the other person. In empathy, we substitute ourselves for the others. In sympathy we substitute others for ourselves (p. 318).”

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Recent research on brain imaging provides a new understanding of the concept which Wispé (1986) called empathy. A handful of fMRI studies have indicated that the observation of pain in others is mediated by several brain areas that are also active in processing the affective and motivational aspects of ones own pain (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson, Meltzhoff & Decety, 2005). Singer et al. (2004) have shown that both the experience of pain to oneself and the knowledge that a loved partner is experiencing pain activates the same affective pain circuits in the brain. Her research also showed that activity in the empathy-related pain-sensitive areas show individual variation and that these differences covary with interindividual differences in (trait) empathy questionnaires such as the Empathic Concern Scale (IRI) by Davis (1980) and the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) from Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) and Mehrabian (1997; Singer, 2006). Thus, these brain areas are thought to be part of the underlying neuronal mechanisms of empathy. According to Decety & Jackson (2006), agency (i.e. the awareness of oneself as an agent who is the initiator of actions, desires, thoughts and feelings; Decety & Grèzes, 2005) is another crucial aspect of empathy. Decety & Jackson (2006) state that there is now strong evidence from fMRI studies that a certain brain area –the right temporo-parietal junction– plays a critical role in self-agency. Linking these findings to Wispé’s description of empathy above, Agency is the process by which the self does not lose its own identity in the experience of empathy. In other words, Agency enables us to differentiate the self from the other and thus the emotional experience of the self from that of the other in need. In developmental psychology, Eisenberg and colleagues (e.g. Eisenberg et al. 1994) defined empathy as ‘an affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition and is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel’ (pp. 776). According to this definition, empathy is not other-oriented. Yet, further cognitive processing an empathic response can subsequently turn into sympathy. Eisenberg (2000) defines sympathy as ‘an emotional response stemming from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, which is not the same as what the other person is feeling (or is expected to feel) but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for the other’ (pp. 672). Combining the ideas of Wispé (1986) and Eisenberg (2000) with the outcomes of our factor analyses would suggest that the content of the adjectives ‘sympathetic’ and ‘compassionate’ may be closer to their definition of sympathy than that of empathy. Feelings of sympathy and compassion are clearly directed at the other in need and express some concern for this need. These emotions express that one is moved by the situation of the other person. It is for these reasons that we labeled our construct sympathy instead of empathy.


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Tenderheartedness on the other hand, appears a construct evoked by, but not necessarily aimed at, the other in need. Although the person in need is the one triggering these emotions, the emotions in themselves are not explicitly felt for the person. It may be that tenderheartedness is triggered more easily when the target is a baby, an elderly or even an animal. Further research is needed to map these differences more precisely according to their context. The division of the original empathy scale in sympathy and tenderheartedness was supported by several findings. Subjects in our nine datasets responded with strong sympathy but with neutral tenderheartedness to the person in need. Also, women reported more sympathy but not more tenderheartedness than men. Differentiating these scales might help to solve the mixed pattern of results (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987) when assessing responses to simulated emotional situations. Finally, participants reported more sympathy when taking an other-perspective or a self-perspective than when trying to stay objective. Tenderheartedness was only more prevalent when participants imagined the person to be someone close to themselves. All these findings are preliminary and would need to be replicated and extended in future research. Nevertheless, they do confirm the empirical difference between sympathy and tenderheartedness. Creating the two indexes of sympathy and tenderheartedness will enlarge the discriminatory power of the scales and will stimulate a more precise use of adjectives and of one scale or the other depending on the context in which prosocial reactions and motives need to be assessed. Moreover, it will enable us to further discriminate several related but different theoretical constructs without confusing their operational definitions. One of the interesting questions about sympathy and empathy is what the sympathizer or empathizer feels when he or she is doing it. Neuroimaging research might in time be able to distinguish differential neurological processes which are involved in the subjective experience of empathy, sympathy and tenderheartedness. The studies presented in this paper shed a more detailed light on the first person experiences themselves. Apparently, feeling sympathetic differs from feeling tenderhearted. We hypothesize that these feelings will have different motivational consequences for subsequent helping intentions, depending on the context which evokes them. Because sympathy is now entirely other oriented, we expect this to be the strongest predictor of other-oriented behaviour. In the long run, we expect that the discrimination between sympathy, distress and tenderheartedness will lead to more univocal results which will allow a consistent and precise comparison. When such a relevant field of research brings a Pandora’s Box of issues along, lifting its lid every now and then might bring both new insights as well as new inspiration.

CHAPTER 5


Although many people agree that behaving in altruistic ways is morally right and even desirable, it does not seem to be part of their daily repertoire of behaviours. Although most people tend to admire those who behave altruistically, they also recognize that much of their own behaviours are mainly motivated by obtaining personal gain. Yet, for most people striving for personal gain is eventually not the most satisfactory way of living. Even for those for whom personal gain is the primary goal in their life, others are more important than they may admit as the value of their accomplishments depends for a large part on comparisons with others. Although people often don’t realize, this dependence on others is a core fact of our existence. The self only exist in recognition of others as distinct entities. And one’s view on the world is coloured by both. Much psychological research on altruism has approached altruism in terms of whether it exists or not. According to the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991), altruism arises when a person experiences empathy for another in need. Empathy expresses the valence of the welfare of the other person in need to the potential helper (Batson et al., 1995b). Altruistic behaviour then, is the behaviour that has this welfare of the person in need as the ultimate motive for the help given. The first two empirical chapters in this dissertation were based on this line of thinking, and showed how different perspectives in combination with characteristics of the helper and the person in need of help form our perception of the need of others. The third empirical chapter examined both previous research as well as new data on the nature of the affective reaction that is often called empathy. In this chapter I will focus on how to get people, given a certain context, to act in altruistic ways. To do this, I will further distinguish empathy and sympathy from other theoretical concepts such as emotional contagion and compassion and relate them to the concept of altruism. I emphasize the crucial role of perspective taking in eliciting a motivation to help others in need. Finally, I will propose altruism as a choice, attainable by taking different perspectives within a certain context and responding with compassion to the emotional and cognitive consequences of these perspectives. First I will give a summary of the main empirical findings of the present thesis.

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Summary of Main Findings Chapter 2 In this first empirical chapter, I investigated how the combination of social comparison orientation (SCO) and taking different perspectives influenced the affective response to a person in need. The first two studies were designed to examine the hypothesis that the negative affect often expressed by people high in SCO after downwards comparison is an expression of their empathic concern for the person who is worse off than themselves. Study 2.1 revealed that SCO moderates the role of perspective taking on empathy. People high in SCO who imagined how a person in need must feel (imagine-other perspective) experienced more empathy for this person than people low in SCO or people who tried to stay objective (objective perspective). Study 2.2 not only replicated this result, but additionally showed that a process of identification with the victim took place. People high in SCO automatically experienced feelings of oneness when focusing their attention on the victim, whereas people low in SCO only experienced oneness when asked to imagine the other close to them (close-other perspective). Moreover, these feelings of oneness with the victim mediated the relationship between SCO and empathy when taking an imagine-other perspective. Taken together, the results of these two studies suggest that the negative affect often reported by people high in SCO after downward comparisons (Buunk et al., 2001; Buunk & Gibbons, 2005) actually reflects sympathy and care for those people worse off when people high in SCO imagine how a victim in need must feel (other-perspective). The experienced sympathy thus seems to stem from a process of identification. In other words, how the dispositional inclination to compare oneself with others (SCO) influences ones affective response to these other people is determined by the perspective from which one sees their situation. Chapter 3 In this chapter I switched my attention from the influence of characteristics of the helper to those of the person in need. I examined whether friends in need evoked different emotional responses than family in need and whether these responses had different consequences for the willingness to help. Specifically I looked at the role of two important predictors of helping: empathy and perceived reciprocity and tested these against alternative predictors of helping such as feelings of distress or oneness. Because


73

previous research has typically placed family and friend relationships within the same category (e.g., communal relationship; Clark, 1984), comparing situations in which the recipient was imagined to be kin versus friend afforded a new assessment of which psychological motivators of helping were particularly relevant for this typical set of closerelationships. Study 3.1 demonstrated that empathy predicted willingness to help when the victim was imagined to be a friend whereas perceived reciprocal support predicted willingness to help when the victim was imagined to be a family member. Study 3.2 replicated these findings in an older community sample, ruling out the possibility that these findings were due to the young age, and the specific relationships that go with it, of the participants in the first sample. These studies shed light on an under-explored issue: the degree to which perceived reciprocal support matters within kin relationships. Based on the principles of kin selection, research on prosocial behaviour has typically focused on the extent to which kin are more likely to be assisted than nonkin (e.g., Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994), with reciprocity as a main predictor of non-kin helping. I show consistently that reciprocity also plays an important role in helping kin, probably due to the perceived security of help offered within families. The studies further show that future research on prosocial behaviour must attend to type of relationship between helper and recipient. Chapter 4 In this last empirical chapter I focused entirely on the construct of empathy itself. I first reviewed the definitions of empathy within the existing literature, showing how definitions moved from cognition-based to emotion-based. Next, I focused specifically on the use of state empathy within psychology over the past five decades. I described how the most commonly used measure of state empathy (Emotional Response Questionnaire; ERQ) proposed by Coke, Batson and Davis (1978) came into existence, what it consists of and how it is used within –mainly social– psychological research. In the following section I reviewed the status of contemporary empathy measurement, discussing 20 factor analyses reported in the existing literature. I showed how these factor analyses report a wide diversity of findings and choices in which the questions asked have clearly shaped the answers given. Specifically, I concluded that the choice for a two factor solution seems inappropriate and not sufficiently based on the outcomes of the factor analyses reported in the literature so far. I then reported nine new factor analysis conducted on our own datasets. I considered both two factor solutions as well as three factor solutions and I proposed to split up the original empathy measure in two separate

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scales: sympathy and tenderheartedness. Finally, I determined the discriminatory power of the sympathy and tender-heartedness scales. The division of the original empathy scale in sympathy and tenderheartedness was supported by several findings. I first showed that participants in the experiments experienced significantly less tenderheartedness than sympathy in that specific need situation. I also showed that a gender difference existed for sympathy but not for tenderheartedness. Women reported more sympathy but not more tenderheartedness than men. Finally, with regard to perspective taking, I showed that participants reported more sympathy when taking an other-perspective or a selfperspective than when trying to stay objective, but not more tenderheartedness. Yet, when imagining the person in need to be a person close to themselves, they did report significantly more tenderheartedness than they did in the other- or objective perspectives. I therefore concluded that the creation of the two indexes will likely contribute to a more precise use of the adjectives. Also, depending on the context in which the affective reactions and motives are measured, sympathy and tenderheartedness will likely contribute differently to altruistic behaviour. In this last empirical chapter I described the confusion existing within psychological research about both the theoretical as well as the operational definitions of empathy. This confusion is importantly handicapping the progress of research on prosocial behaviour and altruism. I believe (and so do others; Wispé, 1986; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Vignemont & Singer, 2006) that refining the theoretical basis and the measurement of concepts such as empathy and sympathy contributes to the necessary fine-tuning within this complex field of research. I took a first step towards this refinement by empirically distinguishing empathy from sympathy and tenderheartedness. I will now try to distinguish them theoretically from related concepts such as emotional contagion and compassion. Relations with Other Research Defining the Empathic Response: what’s going on in our minds? With the term “empathic response” I refer to the whole set of cognitions and affect that can be elicited when we see others suffering. In chapter 4 I focused on the empirical difference between empathy, sympathy and tenderheartedness. In this chapter I will go even further, putting empathy and related concepts under a magnifying glass. In trying to map this empathic response I need to describe how empathy is similar to– as


75

well as different from related concepts. Subsequently, I will try to place relationships between these concepts in an overall model. Recent work with functional magnetic resonance (fmri) techniques has added a new dimension to our understanding of empathy. According to the Peception Action Model (PAM; Preston & de Waal, 2002), the perception of emotions activates the neural mechanisms that are responsible for the generation of emotions. Indeed, a growing body of neuroscientific research shows that witnessing someone else’s suffering leads to similar neuronal activation in both the person suffering and the observer of this suffering (Preston & de Waal, 2002; Decety & Jackson, 2006; Lamm et al., 2007; Singer et al., 2004). Therefore, within social neuroscience, Singer (2006) defines empathy as ‘the capacity to understand emotions of others by sharing their affective states’. This definition is close to earlier definitions in developmental psychology, where empathy is defined by Eisenberg and colleagues (e.g. Eisenberg et al. 1994) as: “an affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition and is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel.” Note that according to this definition of empathy, it is not guaranteed that the affective response accurately reflects the feelings of the other. One can feel sad for a person in need because one perceives the person to be suffering while this person’s own emotional reaction might be anger or distress. Empathy thus becomes (a) an affective response to (b) the perception of the affective state of someone else, in which (c) one knows that the other person is the source of one’s own affective state and which (d) encompasses at least partly the sharing of affective states with the other. Although this definition is not extensive, and alternative definitions are possible too, choosing this particular definition makes it possible to explicitly compare empathy with other concepts. Empathy is not emotional contagion In the experience of empathy, individuals must be able to disentangle themselves from others (e.g. Hoffman, 1981). Emotional contagion is defined as “the tendency to ‘catch’ (experience / express) another person’s emotions (his or her emotional appraisals, subjective feelings, expressions, patterned physiological processes, action tendencies, and instrumental behaviours; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1992, p. 153)”. Importantly, there is no differentiation between self and other in emotional contagion. It is a nonconscious process of somatic mimicry, i.e. the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions and movements with those of another person, and consequentially to converge emotionally (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993). Recent

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fMRI studies on empathy and perspective taking show that in contrast to emotional contagion, there are neuronal differences between the self- and the other-perspective. According to this research, agency (i.e. the awareness of oneself as an agent who is the initiator of actions, desires, thoughts, and feelings; Decety & Grèzes, 2006) is a crucial aspect of empathy to successfully navigate the representations which are shared by self and other (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Decety, 2005). FMRI studies and lesion studies in neurological patients show that the right temporo-parietal junction plays a critical role for self-agency (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). Also, adopting the perspective of another person to imagine his or her emotional reactions (Ruby & Decety, 2004) or his or her pain (Jackson, Bunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006) is associated with an increase in certain specific brain areas (the posterior cingulated and precuneus, and the right temporoparietal junction, TPJ). The right TPJ is specifically involved when participants imagine how another person would feel in everyday-life situations that elicit social norms (Ruby & Decety, 2004), or in painful experiences, but not when they imagine these situations for themselves (Jackson et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007). In short, whereas agency is absent in emotional contagion, it is thought to be a crucial aspect of empathy, represented on a neurological level in the brain. Empathy is not sympathy Whereas empathy is elicited by- and possibly partly identical to the affective state of another person, it is not yet other-oriented. Further cognitive processing an empathic response can subsequently turn into sympathy. Eisenberg (2000) defines sympathy as “an emotional response stemming from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition, which is not the same as what the other person is feeling (or is expected to feel) but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for the other” (p. 672). According to Eisenberg, a sympathetic reaction is often based on either empathic sadness, on cognitive perspective taking, or on encoded cognitive information relevant to another’s situation accessed from memory. In chapter 2 of this dissertation is demonstrated how taking an other-perspective or a closeother perspective increases ones sympathy for a person in need. In sum, empathy is the expression of an affective response to the perception of another person’s need, but it takes further cognitive processing to turn this affective response into an other-oriented affective response, which is sympathy.


77

Empathy is not tenderheartedness or distress Sympathy is only one of the affective responses which can result from empathy. Many other affective expressions can also play a role, either simultaneously with- or instead of sympathy. Tenderheartedness and personal distress are two of these emotional responses. In chapter 4 I showed that perspective taking influences tenderheartedness differently than it influences sympathy. Tenderheartedness is elicited by taking a perspective of someone close to oneself but not by taking an other-perspective (which elicits sympathy) or an objective-perspective (which elicits neither sympathy nor tenderheartedness). Also, tenderheartedness can be felt in response to a person’s need but it is not necessarily an emotion felt for that person. Separating tenderheartedness from empathy and sympathy leaves us new questions about whether tenderheartedness plays a role in altruistic behaviour at all, whether this role is different from that of sympathy, and whether tenderheartedness is felt to the same extent for all people (and other animals) in need. These questions are empirical in nature and need to be addressed in future research. Research on personal distress has gone hand in hand with research on empathy in psychology. Personal distress is a self oriented aversive emotional response. It taps into more direct feelings of discomfort evoked by witnessing the plight of the other (Batson, 1987). Many researchers have distinguished personal distress from empathy (see chapter 4 of this dissertation). Personal distress is said to result from empathic over-arousal (Hoffman, 1981) and a complete overlapping between self and other (Decety & Jackson, 2006). It evokes the egoistic motivation to relieve one’s own distress (Cialdini et al., 1997; Batson, 1991). Eisenberg (1986, 2002) emphasizes that personal distress is a self-centered response, related to anxiety, worry, shame or guilt rather then sympathy and empathy. It can interfere with empathic care-giving (Eisenberg, 2002), yet under some circumstances, it can also drive helping behaviour through the desire to enhance one’s own emotional state (Piliavin et al., 1981) or to relief one’s own negative state (Cialdini et al., 1987). Thus while sympathy and personal distress have been extensively differentiated from each other and linked empirically to prosocial behaviour, tenderheartedness has not yet been differentiated from sympathy or empathy before. Its motivational role in prosocial behaviour needs to be further investigated.

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Altruism, from inclination to choice The research approaches which investigate whether, and to what extent, human beings are (or can be) altruistically inclined have given us many insights in which mechanisms stimulate helping behaviour. Given the social importance of these behaviours a next interesting step would be to investigate how altruistic behaviour can be promoted in daily life. In the remainder of this discussion, I will combine the large empirical body of research in psychology with other approaches now emerging in this area of research, and propose a model of altruism in which the individual, at several moments in time, has the choice to act altruistically. In this model, the concept of compassion plays a crucial role in the translation of affective reactions into altruistic behaviour. Compassion is a concept which is as complex and comprehensive as empathy and relatively long neglected by Western science. Eastern traditions have viewed compassion as central to liberating the mind from the power of destructive emotions such as fear, anger, envy and vengeance (Goleman, 2003). Compassion involves being open to the suffering of self and others, in a non-defensive and non-judgemental way. It also involves the desire to relieve that suffering, cognitions related to understanding the causes of that suffering, and behaviours – acting with compassion (Gilbert, 2005). Thus, compassion involves the combination of motives, emotions, thoughts and behaviours. This is very different from feeling ‘compassionate’ (which is part of our sympathy measure). Feeling compassionate is a spontaneous emotion felt for particular people in need. It is not nonjudgemental, it does not necessarily imply a motivation to relieve the need, it does not require a real understanding of the suffering and it does not encompass behaviour. Due to its comprehensive nature, research on compassion is bound to encounter the same definition-related problems as research on empathy has. Indeed, the first scientific books on compassion and its possible functionality in the human mind (e.g. Gilbert, 2005) show a wide variety of definitions by different researchers. Nevertheless, some differences between compassion and empathy can be distinguished. Differentiating Compassion from Empathy First, compassion is not thought of as an emotion but rather as a state of mind in which cognition and emotion are inseparable. This is built on the assumption that our thoughts give rise to- and underlie our emotions (Ladner, 2004). For example, when we are angry, we believe that others are inherently unpleasant and causing our unhappiness.


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In other words, anger relies on our attribution, which is a cognitive process. Second, compassion is not an instantaneous reaction which evolves in something else. It requires effort and cognitive control to evoke and maintain a compassionate state of mind. Thus, both empathy and compassion are comprehensive theoretical concepts and therefore prone to be interpreted in a wide variety of ways. The most clear difference between these two concepts involves the automaticity of the generation of empathy and compassion: whereas empathy is thought of as an automatic process, elicited by the perception of suffering and concern for the welfare of another person, compassion is a more effortful cognitive state of mind, elicited to control one’s own emotional states and involving the desire to eliminate the causes of the perceived suffering. Compassion as a key for altruistic behaviour Although the complexity of compassion makes it difficult to translate in empirical research, it has several benefits which make it interesting to try. First, compassion requires a good understanding of the cause(s) of the suffering of others. None of the emotional reactions researched thus far (empathy, sympathy, tenderheartedness, distress) requires an accurate understanding of the need of the person suffering. Secondly, compassion involves the intention to relieve these causes of the perceived suffering. Thus, compassion involves directing any of the emotional reactions in the observer which are elicited by a certain need situation, at the intention to relieve the person who is actually suffering in that situation. Third, compassion requires action to relieve that suffering. The mental practice of compassion can be seen as a bridge between self and other. It starts at recognizing the own perception and emotion. Subsequently, it aims at analyzing the suffering of the other and invokes the intention to relieve it. Finally, it entails action to stop that suffering by removing the causes giving rise to the suffering. Of course, one can argue that such a comprehensive concept could better be split up in several parts, especially when it comes to training or measuring compassion. Before turning towards these pitfalls I will first introduce the Altruistic Choice Model. This model is depicted in figure 5.1.

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Figure 5.1: The Altruistic Choice Model when Meeting the Suffering of Others

Sympathy

Perspective Taking

Empathy

Personal Distress

Compassion

Altruism Chapter 5

Tenderheartedness

Altruistic Choice Opportunity

Altruistic Choice Opportunity


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An example may help clarify the different stages in this model. Imagine you walk home from work when all of a sudden you see a man lying face down in front of you on the road. Once (and if) you perceive the man to be suffering, you automatically experience empathy for this person (Preston & de Waal, 2002). And, while perceiving this suffering, you immediately have a first moment of choice. This is the choice of the perspective from which you subsequently encounter his suffering. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I showed that explicitly taking different perspectives leads to different affective consequences. Thus, by practicing to view this man’s situation from different perspectives, you can develop a first level of control over your affective reactions, fostering sympathy and trying to control personal distress. For instance, when you imagine how you would feel lying face down on the road, you will likely not only develop sympathy for the man but you will also develop feelings of personal distress. Yet, when imagining how the man must feel, and thus not focusing on your own feelings, you will develop sympathy for the man’s situation but you won’t develop substantial personal distress. In chapter 3 I showed the importance of the type of relationship – friend vs. family member - with a person in need. Type of relationship served as an unconscious perspective-taking manipulation in these studies. Yet, by imagining what you would do if this man would be a good friend or a close family member, you can also actively seek to increase your sympathy for this person. A second moment of choice appears when you try to put these affective reactions into compassionate action. According to this model, all emotional reactions to the suffering of others can be the basis for an altruistic motive, because all these emotions can evoke the desire to renounce the man’s suffering. Compassion is the mental state beyond emotional reactions, in which one cognizes the causes of suffering and desires to eliminate the suffering and its causes. In the case of the man lying on the floor, you need to cognize what the cause is of his uncomfortable position. Immediately acting upon your own personal distress or sympathy might motivate you to turn the man around, or move him to the nearby pavement. But what if the man has a broken neck? Moving him might be altruistically motivated but ineffective in terms of ending his suffering. Moreover, the man could die when you turn him around, you would contribute to his suffering instead of ending it. Yet, when you cognize the causes of the man’s suffering, you might see the awkward position of the neck. You might also see that the man’s arms and legs look relatively unharmed. This could lead you to conclude that if the man would have wanted to turn around, he should probably be able to do it himself. If you do not know how to physically help someone with a broken neck, your compassionate action will be not to touch the man at all. Instead, you can clear the road, call an ambulance, and stay with the

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man until the ambulance arrives. These actions contribute to relieving the suffering of this man, both at the level of the expression of the suffering as well as at the level of its causes. Your choice of behaviour is psychologically altruistic because your ultimate goal is to relieve the man’s suffering. Undoubtedly, this course of action has positive consequences for you yourself as well. You might feel better about yourself; you might gain satisfaction from helping the man. These unintended consequences are interesting to remember for they can provide you the determination to follow a same cognitive course of action the next time you perceive others to suffer. Limitations and Ruminations The Altruistic Choice Model (ACM) which I propose in this last chapter is the fruit of four years of mental and empirical research. Although a large body of literature now exists to confirm the first half of the model, I want to stress that the second half of it needs training and thorough empirical testing. In this last section I will discuss both limitations as well as ruminations concerning this dissertation and the resulting model. There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature and definition of the phenomenon empathy. My choice concerning the definition of empathy in this discussion as an automatic affective response is based on recent work in the fields of social neuroscience and developmental psychology (e.g. Singer, 2006; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Eisenberg, 2000). Whereas the fields of philosophy and psychology have a long tradition of conceptualizing and studying empathy, social neuroscience is just starting to pick up on this literature, providing concrete data on which brain areas are involved in perspective taking (see Decety & Jackson, 2004 for a review), mind reading and empathy (see Singer, 2006 for a review). The new information from this scientific tradition regarding the brain processes involved in empathy, in combination with a thorough reading of the literature so far has led me to this specific definition. I think that disagreement on definitions need not be a problem as long as we recognize the differences between the different phenomenon’s labeled ‘empathy’ (see also Batson, in press). By being explicit about what is called empathy, we create room to discuss and interpret empirical differences. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I showed that explicitly taking different perspectives, in combination with individual differences (in this case social comparison orientation) leads to different affective consequences. This is only a small contribution to large body of research on the effects of perspective taking that has emerged since Batson et al.’s work in 1997. Also, because I did not take these experimental studies to other,


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more applied settings, it is difficult to determine the ecological validity of this work. One of the many questions which remain, is whether a person can learn to alternate between different perspectives. Determining the efficacy of practicing with different perspectives is crucial to the model I propose. Indeed, which choice are we left with if we have no means to switch between perspectives? Research on empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1997) and mindfulness training (Kabat-Zinn, 1994) could give us the necessary background to develop new interventions in this direction. The possible practical role of compassion in choosing altruistic behaviour is still very speculative. Nevertheless, recent research on compassion provides indications that it could be a crucial tool for self-control. Western science has begun to think about compassion as a process for healing both oneself and others (Gilbert, 2005). When directed at oneself, compassion involves being open to one’s own suffering, not avoiding or disconnecting from it, generating the desire to alleviate one’s suffering and to heal oneself. It also involves offering nonjudgmental understanding to one’s pain, inadequacies and failures, so that one’s experience is seen as part of the larger human experience (Neff, 2003a; Neff, 2003b). Increased self-compassion has been found to predict enhanced psychological health over time (Gilbert and Procter, 2006; Neff, Kirkpatrick & Rude, 2007), and to explain lessened stress following participation in a widely implemented stress-reduction program (Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction; Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, & Cordova, 2005). Also, approaching painful feelings with self-compassion is linked to a happier, more optimistic mindset, and appears to facilitate the ability to grow, explore, and wisely understand oneself and others (Neff, Rude, & Kirkpatrick, 2007). If compassion can be a tool to relieve ones own experienced stress, it might also, when applied to the suffering of others, prove to be an effective mindset with which one can relieve the stress of a person in need. Einstein put it this way: “A human being is a part of the whole called by us universe, a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feeling as something separated from the rest, a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty.” (Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955) How to develop compassion is relatively new terrain for western science. Yet, eastern philosophical and psychological traditions (especially Buddhism) provide us with many techniques which can be further developed for application to western societies. Research is now starting to focus on developing methods to train compassion, both for the self (Gilbert and Proctor, in press), as well as others (see for instance Tulku Rinpoche & Mullen, 2005, Adler, 2004). This is essential to the ACM, because it teaches us how to

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turn the automatic affective responses that stem from perspective taking into deliberate compassion. Conclusion By investigating the role of perspective taking on empathy for- and willingness to help a person in need and by investigating the way in which empathy has been operationalized in psychological research, I hope to have contributed with this dissertation to a more complete and thorough understanding of the field of prosocial behaviour. Together, the studies and the model described in this dissertation show that to some extent a predetermined inclination for altruism may exist, but that there is also opportunity to take control over ones own altruistic actions. If there is a will to increase the frequency of altruistic behaviour, the altruistic choice model might be a first step toward finding a way to realize this goal.

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Olinick, S. (1984). A critique of empathy and sympathy. In J. Lichtenberg, M. Bornstein, & D. Silver (Eds.), Empathy (pp. 137-166). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Paleari, F. G., Regalia, C., & Fincham, F. D. (2003). Adolescents’ willingness to forgive their parents: An empirical model. Parenting: Science and Practice, 3, 155-174. Park, J. H., Schaller, M. (2005). Does attitude similarity serve as a heuristic cue for kinship? Evidence of an implicit cognitive association. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26(2), 158-170. Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: Multilevel perspectives. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 365–392. Piliavin, J. A., Dovidio, J. E, Gaertner, S. L., & Clark, R. D. (1981). Emergency intervention. New York: Academic Press. Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 25, 1–72. Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Rinpoche, Ringu Tulku, Mullen, K. (2005). The Buddhist use of compassionate imagery in mind healing. In: Gilbert, Paul, Compassion: Conceptualisations, research and use in psychotherapy. (pp. 218-238). New York, NY, US: Routledge, Rogers, C. (1951). Client-centered therapy. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2004). How would you feel versus how do you think she would feel? A neuroimaging study of perspective taking with social emotions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 988–999. Salmon, C. A., Daly, M. (1996). On the importance of kin relations to Canadian women and men. Ethology & Sociobiology, 17(5), 289-297.

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Appendix 1

101

Appendix 1 – Experimental Manipulation: Newspaper Article Leonie

Leven met een handicap Leonie Opdam, geboren in Friesland,

is

tweedejaars

studente in Leiden. Drie jaar geleden kreeg Leonie, toen 19 jaar, een ongeluk. Ze had gewerkt voor een uitzendbureau en fietste naar huis. Ze kwam van een provinciale weg af en wilde het fietspad oprijden. Ze had de aankomende brommer niet gezien. De brommer reed veel te hard en bleek later ook opgevoerd te zijn. Volgens een ooggetuige vloog ze met fiets en al vier meter door de lucht. Het ambulancepersoneel dacht eerst aan een schedelbasisfractuur, maar uiteindelijk bleek ze haar kaak en dijbeen te hebben gebroken en bleek haar voet verbrijzeld.

tijdelijk aan de morfine gezet. De dag

In het ziekenhuis hebben ze

daarna is ze geopereerd. Die operatie

geprobeerd haar been te zetten. Vijf

duurde negen uur. Haar tanden werden

doktoren hebben zich ermee bemoeid,

met een soort traliewerk aan elkaar

maar het lukte niet. Daarom werd ze

Appendix 1

102

gebonden. Ze kon zes weken lang alleen maar vloeibaar voedsel gebruiken.

Mijn voet, dat vind ik echt verschrikkelijk. Daar is namelijk niks meer aan te doen. Die blijft voorgoed stuk. Het doet zo verschrikkelijk zeer

Wat Leonie vertelt “Ja, na de eerste vijf dagen kreeg ik

een

enorme

terugval.

Ineens

realiseerde ik me wat er eigenlijk echt

wanneer ik gewicht op die voet moet zetten! Ik zal er nooit meer op kunnen lopen.

gebeurd was. Mijn kaak was gebroken

Op straat word ik door de

dus ik kon alleen maar communiceren

mensen echt aangestaard. Mijn gezicht

via pen en papier. Op een gegeven

is ook nog, nou ja, erg lelijk. Ik heb heel

moment schreef ik of ik misschien een

veel littekenweefsel, dat ziet er echt

spiegel mocht, en mijn vader die zei nog

afschuwelijk uit. Ja, ik hoop dat daar

van ‘zou je dat nou wel doen’, maar ik

met plastische chirurgie nog wat aan te

wilde het gewoon zien, zien wat er met

doen valt. Verder hangt mijn kaak nog

me gebeurd was! En op het moment dat

scheef en ik heb net gehoord dat ze

ik mezelf dan werkelijk zag, ja… toen

alles weer moeten breken om dat wat

liepen de tranen echt over mijn wangen.

rechter te zetten.

De hele linkerkant van mijn gezicht was echt

helemaal

Spieren,

vrolijk te blijven, en te doen alsof ik niet

doorgescheurd,

zie dat mensen me vreemd vinden, maar

mijn huid zag er echt verschrikkelijk,

soms, soms hou je dat gewoon niet vol.

afschuwelijk uit. Ja, en dan ga je je

Dan lukt het gewoon niet en dan zou ik

zenuwbanen

kapot!

Ondanks alles probeer ik wel

waren

gewoon echt afvragen van… komt dit

willen dat ik naar buiten kon! Ik zou

ooit nog goed?

graag af en toe gaan wandelen. Voor

Ook de breuk in mijn been wilde

mijn ongeluk vond ik het altijd heerlijk

maar niet helen. Ik heb een jaar lang

om wat te wandelen als ik de dingen op

echt ontzettend veel pijn gehad en

een rijtje moest zetten. Het is alleen zo

ontzèttend veel pijnstillers geslikt. Ik

lastig om er even uit te gaan, vanwege

ben in totaal vier keer geopereerd aan

die rolstoel.”

mijn dijbeen maar ik zit nog steeds in een rolstoel. Het is allemaal nogal ingewikkeld

met

zenuwbanen

en

prikkels enzo. Maar er is nog steeds hoop dat het ze misschien wel gaat lukken.

Samenvatting

103

Samenvatting Summary in Dutch

“De beste manier om je eigen lot te verbeteren, is je boven alles het lot van anderen aan te trekken.” -Matthieu RicardWat gebeurt er in ons hoofd wanneer wij ons het lot van anderen aantrekken? Waarop zijn onze keuzes om anderen te helpen gebaseerd? In dit proefschrift hou ik mij bezig met deze en aanverwante vragen. Waarom we anderen helpen is het wetenschappelijk middelpunt van een lang filosofisch en empirisch debat. Het debat draait vooral om de vraag of de mens ooit, in enige mate, in staat is om hulp te bieden die de grenzen van eigenbelang overstijgt, en die geheel en alleen is gebaseerd op de oprechte interesse in het welzijn van de ander. Deze basale vraag over onze menselijke natuur wordt ook wel “De Altruïsme Vraag” genoemd. In de psychologische literatuur wordt empathie gezien als een emotionele reactie die de altruïstische motivatie om een ander te helpen opwekt (voor een overzicht, zie Batson, 1991). Empathie wordt gedefinieerd als een emotionele respons, veroorzaakt door en congruent met, maar niet noodzakelijk identiek aan, het waargenomen welzijn van een ander. Empathie als reactie op het leed van een ander wordt versterkt door te proberen het perspectief van die ander in te nemen. Perspectief innemen en empathie zijn de hoofdingrediënten van deze dissertatie. In de verschillende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift diep ik uit hoe, en in welke mate, deze twee sleutelconcepten zijn gerelateerd aan de motivatie anderen te helpen. Overzicht van dit proefschrift Naast een uitgebreide introductie van het concept altruïsme en egoïsme, wordt in hoofdstuk 1 verder uitgediept hoe empathie en perspectief innemen worden gedefinieerd en wat hun rol is in hulpgedrag. De moderne psychologie ziet deze twee concepten als twee onderling verbonden mechanismen voor altruïstisch gedrag. Het ervaren van empathie is een emotioneel mechanisme, terwijl perspectief innemen een cognitief mechanisme is. Er zijn verschillende perspectieven van waaruit iemand het leed van een ander kan benaderen. Mensen kunnen zich bijvoorbeeld voorstellen hoe die ander de

104

Samenvatting

situatie waarneemt en hoe hij of zij zich vervolgens voelt (ander-perspectief). Mensen kunnen zich ook voorstellen hoe zij de situatie van die ander zouden waarnemen, en wat hun eigen resulterend gevoel zou zijn (zelf-perspectief). Ten slotte kunnen mensen proberen objectief te blijven door hun aandacht op de situatie zelf te richten en niet op de resulterende gevoelens (objectief-perspectief). Hoe deze perspectieven, in interactie met persoons- en situationele kenmerken, leiden tot empathie en de bereidheid te helpen is onderwerp van de eerste twee empirische hoofdstukken van deze dissertatie. Het derde empirische hoofdstuk onderzoekt hoe empathie is gemeten in binnen de psychologie in de afgelopen vijf decennia en in hoeverre er een meer optimale meting mogelijk is. Het concluderende hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie integreert deze bevindingen in de wetenschappelijke literatuur en stelt een nieuw model voor waarin altruïstisch gedrag het gevolg is van een aantal keuzes tijdens het waarnemen van andermans leed. Sociale vergelijking en perspectief innemen De behoefte om onszelf met anderen te vergelijken kan variëren van situatie tot situatie en van persoon tot persoon. Gibbons en Buunk (1999) ontwierpen een schaal die individuele verschillen meet in wat zij sociale vergelijkingsoriëntatie (SVO; de neiging om zich met anderen te vergelijken) noemen. In hoofdstuk 2 van deze dissertatie wordt de vraag gesteld of mensen die sterk geneigd zijn zich met anderen te vergelijken anders worden beïnvloed door een noodsituatie dan mensen die zich weinig vergelijken. Eerder onderzoek laat zien dat mensen hoog in SVO doorgaans met negatief affect reageren op een neerwaartse vergelijkingsander (iemand die slechter af is dan zijzelf; Buunk et al., 2001; Buunk & Gibbons, 2005). Echter, niet eerder was onderzocht of dit negatieve affect een expressie is van de verontrusting die de ander opwekt voor het zelf, of dat dit een expressie is van de empathie die ervaren wordt voor de ander. Verwacht werd dat het negatieve affect dat regelmatig wordt gerapporteerd door mensen hoog in SVO na een neerwaartse vergelijking, een expressie is van hun empathische betrokkenheid bij de persoon die slechter af is dan zijzelf. Studie 2.1 laat zien dat SVO de relatie tussen perspectief innemen en empathie modereert. Mensen hoog in SVO, die zich voorstellen hoe een persoon in nood zich moest voelen (ander-perspectief), ervaren meer empathie voor die persoon dan mensen laag in SVO, of mensen die objectief proberen te blijven (objectief-perspectief). Studie 2.2 repliceert dit resultaat en laat bovendien zien dat een proces van identificatie met de persoon in nood plaatsvindt. Mensen hoog in SVO ervaren automatisch gevoelens van eenzijn (oneness) met het slachtoffer wanneer ze hun aandacht op het slachtoffer vestigen, terwijl mensen laag in SVO alleen gevoelens van

Samenvatting

105

eenzijn ervaren wanneer ze zich inbeelden dat die ander iemand is die ze nabij staat (nabije-ander-perspectief). Deze gevoelens van eenzijn lijken de relatie tussen SVO en empathie te medieëren waneer een ander-perspectief wordt ingenomen. De resultaten van deze twee studies suggereren dus dat, wanneer mensen hoog in SVO zich indenken hoe het slachtoffer zich moet voelen (ander-perspectief), het negatief affect dat vaak door mensen hoog in SVO wordt gerapporteerd na een neerwaartse vergelijking eigenlijk een expressie is van empathie en betrokkenheid bij het slachtoffer. Deze ervaren empathie lijkt voort te komen uit een proces van identificatie met het slachtoffer. Met andere woorden, hoe de dispositionele geneigdheid om zich met anderen te vergelijken (SVO) de emotionele respons jegens deze anderen beïnvloedt, wordt bepaald door het perspectief van waaruit men de situatie van de ander bekijkt. Psychologische motieven voor altruïsme onder familie en vrienden In het derde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift wordt de aandacht verlegd van karakteristieken van de helper naar karakteristieken van de relatie tussen helper en slachtoffer. Meer specifiek wordt gekeken of vrienden in nood een verschillende emotionele response opwekken dan familie in nood en of deze emotionele reacties verschillende consequenties hebben voor hulpgedrag. Empathie wordt vaak genoemd als het psychologische motief om familie te helpen (Hoffman, 1981; Schaller, 2003). Echter, onderzoekers hebben ook andere psychologische processen gevonden die de basis vormen voor altruïsme onder familieleden. Wederkerigheid biedt volgens de reciprocal altruism theory (Trivers, 1971) de verklaring voor altruïstisch gedrag tussen genetisch ongerelateerde individuen. Het blijkt echter even vaak voor te komen tussen broers en zussen als tussen vrienden (Stewart-Williams, 2007). Bovendien verwachten mensen meer hulp van naaste familie dan van vrienden (Bar-tal et al., 1977), en voelt men meer verantwoordelijkheid om hulp te bieden aan familie dan aan genetisch ongerelateerde anderen (Miller & Bersoff, 1998). Met ander woorden, wederkerigheid zou een sterkere rol kunnen spelen tussen familieleden dan dat men tot op heden aanneemt. Voor vrienden wordt wederkerigheid veelal gezien als het primaire psychologische motief dat ten grondslag ligt aan hulpgedrag. Echter, vriendschappen betreffen situaties waarin mensen onvervangbaar proberen te worden voor anderen, en waarin mensen zichzelf aansluiten bij anderen die hen inderdaad onvervangbaar vinden (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). Het helpen van vrienden zou dus meer gemotiveerd kunnen worden door empathie dan door verwachtingen over wederkerigheid. Inderdaad, intieme vrienden worden gekarakteriseerd door zeer hoge niveaus van vertrouwdheid, gelijkheid en

106

Samenvatting

empathie (Shearn et al., 1999). In hoofdstuk 3 worden deze contrasterende hypothesen tegen elkaar afgezet en getest. Studie 3.1 laat zien dat empathie de bereidheid tot helpen voorspelt wanneer het slachtoffer wordt gezien als een vriend, terwijl de verwachting over wederkerigheid de bereidheid tot helpen voorspelt wanneer het slachtoffer wordt voorgesteld als een familielid. Studie 3.2 repliceert deze bevindingen in een steekproef van oudere mensen (niet-studenten). Hiermee wordt de optie uitgesloten dat deze bevindingen te maken hebben met de jonge leeftijd van de proefpersonen, en het specifieke type relatie wat daarmee samengaat. Deze studies betreffen een tot op heden onderbelichte kwestie: de mate waarin reciprociteit van belang is in relaties tussen familieleden. Ze laten een consistent beeld zien waarin empathie een belangrijke rol speelt in het helpen van vrienden en reciprociteit een belangrijke rol speelt in het helpen van familie. Dit laatste is mogelijk gebaseerd op de perceptie van zekerheid dat hulp door familieleden altijd geboden zal worden. Deze studies laten ook zien dat toekomstig onderzoek naar prosociaal gedrag aandacht moet schenken aan het type relatie tussen helper en ontvanger. Empathie, geschiedenis, conceptualisatie en meting Onderzoek naar empathie heeft een lange traditie in de psychologie, en is nauw verbonden met altruïsme. Het laatste empirische hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie richt zich volledig op het construct empathie zelf. Hoofdstuk 4.1 beschrijft een terugblik op de definities van empathie in de bestaande literatuur. Het laat zien hoe vroege definities op cognitie waren gebaseerd en hoe ze langzaam verschoven naar definities gebaseerd op emotie. Er bestaat nog steeds weinig overeenstemming over wat empathie precies is en de concepten empathie, sympathie en compassie worden gemakkelijk voor elkaar ingewisseld, waarbij ze min of meer hetzelfde construct aanduiden. Ook het specifieke gebruik van toestandsempathie (onderscheiden van empathie als een persoonskenmerk) binnen de psychologie in de laatste vijf decennia wordt in hoofdstuk 4.1 beschreven. Het laat zien hoe de meest gebruikte maat voor empathie –de Emotionele Response Vragenlijst; ERQ– zoals voorgesteld door Coke, Batson en Davis (1978) is ontstaan, waar het uit bestaat, en hoe het is gebruikt in voornamelijk sociaalpsychologisch onderzoek. Hoofdstuk 4.2 behandelt de status van moderne empathiemetingen. Twintig factor analyses die zijn gerapporteerd in de bestaande literatuur worden bediscussieerd. Deze factoranalyses rapporteren een wijd scala aan bevindingen en keuzes waaruit duidelijk

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blijkt hoe de antwoorden werden gevormd door de vragen. Geconcludeerd wordt dat de keuze voor een twee-factor oplossing (empathie en persoonlijke verontrusting) niet adequaat lijkt en dat deze keuze niet in voldoende mate is gebaseerd op de uitkomsten van de factoranalyses die tot dusver gerapporteerd waren. Hoofdstuk 4.3 biedt een nieuwe kijk op dit probleem door negen nieuwe factoranalyses te behandelen die uitgevoerd konden worden op eigen datasets. Zowel twee-factor oplossingen als drie-factor oplossingen worden overwogen en bestudeerd. Voorgesteld wordt om de originele empathiemaat op te splitsen in twee afzonderlijke schalen: sympathie en teerhartigheid. Ten slotte wordt in hoofdstuk 4.4 gekeken naar het discriminerend vermogen van de sympathie en teerhartigheid schalen. De opdeling van de originele empathiemaat wordt ondersteund door een aantal bevindingen. Ten eerste ervaren participanten in de bediscussieerde experimenten aanzienlijk minder teerhartigheid dan sympathie in de specifieke noodsituatie die ze voor ogen kregen. Ten tweede blijkt er een sekse verschil te bestaan voor sympathie maar niet voor teerhartigheid. Vrouwen rapporteren meer sympathie, maar niet meer teerhartigheid, dan mannen. Ten slotte rapporteren onderzoeksdeelnemers meer sympathie wanneer ze het ander-perspectief of het zelfperspectief innemen dan wanneer ze objectief proberen te blijven; maar niet meer teerhartigheid. Echter, wanneer men zich voorstelt dat het slachtoffer iemand is die ze na aan het hart ligt (nabije-ander-perspectief), rapporteert men wel significant meer teerhartigheid dan in het ander- of objectieve perspectief. Gebaseerd op deze verschillen in bevindingen voor beide schalen wordt geconcludeerd dat het opsplitsen van de empathieschaal in sympathie en teerhartigheid waarschijnlijk zal bijdragen aan preciezer gebruik van de adjectiva. Bovendien, afhankelijk van de context waarin affectieve reacties en motieven gemeten worden, zullen sympathie en teerhartigheid waarschijnlijk op verschillende wijze bijdragen altruïstisch gedrag. De empathische respons onder een vergrootglas Waar hoofdstuk 4 de verwarring beschrijft over zowel het theoretische concept als de operationalisaties van empathie, wordt in hoofdstuk 5 gepoogd om empathie theoretisch te onderscheiden van gerelateerde concepten zoals sympathie en compassie. Een nieuwe definitie van empathie ontstaat uit een combinatie van psychologische en neuronwetenschappelijke inzichten. Deze definitie stelt dat empathie een (a) affectieve reactie is op (b) de perceptie van de emotionele toestand van een ander, waarin (c) men weet dat de ander de bron is van de eigen affectieve toestand en welke (d) op zijn minst

108

Samenvatting

gedeeltelijk het delen van de affectieve toestand met de ander bevat. Empathie wordt vervolgens onderscheiden van emotionele besmetting –een onbewust proces van somatische nabootsing (Hatfield et al., 1993); van sympathie –een ander georiënteerde respons die ontstaat uit de elaboratie van empathie (Eisenberg, 2000); van teerhartigheid – een emotionele respons welke ontstaat uit de perceptie van andermans leed maar welke niet noodzakelijkerwijs op die ander gericht is–; van persoonlijke verontrusting –een op zichzelf georiënteerde en aversieve emotionele respons (Batson, 1991) en van compassie –een cognitieve gemoedstoestand welke inspanning vereist, is gericht op het controleren van de eigen emotionele toestand en welke ook de intentie omvat om de waargenomen oorzaken van het lijden te elimineren. Altruïsme, van geneigdheid tot keuze Ten slotte wordt in hoofdstuk 5 een nieuw model voorgesteld waarin gesteld wordt dat altruïsme beschouwd kan worden als een keuze. Dit model beschrijft dat er tijdens de perceptie van het leed van een ander verschillende keuzemomenten zijn waarop men zich door middel van handelen richting altruïstisch gedrag kan bewegen. Een eerste keuzemoment treed op na de initiële automatische empathische reactie. Men kan kiezen het leed van de ander vanuit een bepaald perspectief te benaderen, waarbij het anderperspectief meer sympathie opwekt terwijl het zelf-perspectief meer persoonlijke verontrusting opwekt. Een tweede keuzemoment ontstaat wanneer men besluit de eigen affectieve reactie in compassie om te zetten. Omdat compassie een goed begrip van de oorzaken van andermans lijden vereist en actie omvat om deze oorzaken op te heffen sluit het direct aan op altruïstisch gedrag. Implicaties en beperkingen van het onderhavige onderzoek en model werden besproken. Geconcludeerd wordt dat de besproken studies en het altruïstisch keuzemodel in de dissertatie laten zien dat er tot op zekere hoogte een voorbeschikte geneigdheid tot altruïsme zou kunnen bestaan, maar dat er ook een mogelijkheid is om de eigen altruïstische gedragingen te controleren. Als er een wil bestaat om de frequentie van eigen altruïstische gedragingen te verhogen, zou het altruïstisch keuzemodel een eerste stap kunnen zijn in de richting van het zoeken van een weg om dit doel te realiseren.

The Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series

109

The “Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series” started in 1997. Since 2006 the following dissertations have been published: 2006-1:

Maria Dijkstra: Workplace Conflict and Individual Well-Being

2006-2:

Ruud Custers: On the underlying mechanisms of nonconscious goal pursuit

2006-3:

Ellen Dreezens: The missing link: the relationship between values and attitudes

2006-4:

Jacquelien van Stekelenburg: Promoting or preventing social change. Instrumentality, identity, ideology and groupbased anger as motives of protest participation

2006-5:

Huadong Yang: Siding in a conflict in China and in the Netherlands

2006-6:

Tomas Ståhl: Determinants of Fairness-based and Favorability-based Reactions to Authorities' Decisions

2006-7:

Astrid Homan: Harvesting the value in diversity: Examining the effects of diversity beliefs, cross-categorization, and superordinate identities on the functioning of diverse work groups

2006-8: 2006-9:

Saskia Schwinghammer: The Self in Social Comparison Carmen Carmona Rodríguez: Inferior or Superior: Social Comparison in Dutch and Spanish Organizations

2006-10:

Martijn van Zomeren: Social-psychological paths to protest: An integrative perspective

2007-1:

Nils Jostmann: When the going gets tough… How action versus state orientation moderates the impact of situational demands on cognition, affect, and behavior

2007-2:

Belle Derks: Social identity threat and performance motivation: The interplay between ingroup and outgroup domains

2007-3: 2007-4:

Helma van den Berg: Feeling and Thinking in Attitudes Karin C.A. Bongers: You can't always get what you want! Consequences of success and failure to attain unconscious goals

2007-5:

Lotte Scholten: Motivation matters: Motivated information processing in group and individual decision-making

2007-6:

Debra Trampe: Social influence: Social comparison, construal, and persuasion processes

2007-7:

Clemens Wenneker: Processes underlying biased language use

2007-8:

Yaël de Liver: Ambivalence: on the how and when of attitudinal conflict

2007-9:

Erik de Kwaadsteniet: Uncertainty in social dilemmas

2007-10:

Hugo Alberts: Processes of self-control and ego depletion

2007-11:

Loran Nordgren: Thinking about Feeling: The Nature and Significance of the Hot/Cold Empathy Gap

2007-12:

Stefan Thomas Mol: Crossing Borders with Personnel Selection from expatriates to multicultural teams

The Kurt Lewin Institute Dissertation Series

110

2007-13:

Hilbrand Oldenhuis: I know what they think about us: Metaperceptions and intergroup relations

2007-14:

Arnaud Wisman: New Directions in Terror Management Theory

2007-15:

Gert Homsma: Making Errors Worthwhile: Determinants of Constructive Error Handling

2007-16:

Elianne van Steenbergen: Work-Family Facilitation: A Positive Psychological Perspective on Role Combination

2007-17:

Unna Danner: By Force of Habit: On the Formation and Maintenance of Goal-Directed Habits

2007-18:

Maureen Tumewu: The Social Psychology of Gender Differences and Procedural Justice in Close Relationships

2007-19:

Wokje Abrahamse: Energy conservation through behavioral change: Examining the effectiveness of a tailor-made approach

2008-1:

Marijke van Putten: Dealing with missed opportunities. The causes and boundary conditions of inaction inertia

2008-2:

Marjolein Maas: Experiential Social Justice Judgment Processes

2008-3:

Lonneke de Meijer: Ethnicity effects in police officer selection: Applicant, assessor, and selection-method factors

2008-4:

Frederike Zwenk: Voice by Representation

2008-5:

Margreet Reitsma: The Impact of Linguistically Biased Messages on Involved Receivers

2008-6:

Marcus Maringer: Feeling one thing, seeing another: Emotion comparison effects in person judgments

2008-7:

Hanneke Heinsman: The competency concept revealed: Its nature, relevance, and practice

2008-8:

Joris Lammers: Toward a more social social psychology of power

2008-9:

Daniël Fockenberg: Between Good and Evil: Affective Priming in Dynamic Context

2008-10:

Arne van den Bos: Why we stereotype influences how we stereotype: self-enhancement and comprehension effects on social perception

2008-11:

Lidewij Niezink: Considering Others in Need, On Altruism, Empathy and Perspective Taking

Considering others in need on altruism, empathy and perspective taking

Political altruism?: solidarity movements in international perspective

Altruism

Empathy

Empathy

Empathy

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Our Need for Others and Its Roots in Infancy

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Altruism in Humans

On the Problem of Empathy

Empathy in Mental Illness

Considering Kate

Altruism and beyond

Considering Kate

Reality and Empathy

Empathy and the Novel

Taking on Tabytha

Taking on Tabytha

Considering Kate

Origins of Altruism and Cooperation

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Considering Kate

Considering Kate

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Empathy in Education: Engagement, values and achievement

Considering others in need on altruism, empathy and perspective taking

Political altruism?: solidarity movements in international perspective

Altruism

Empathy

Empathy

Empathy

Empathy

Our Need for Others and Its Roots in Infancy

Empathy

Altruism in Humans

On the Problem of Empathy

Empathy in Mental Illness

Considering Kate

Altruism and beyond

Considering Kate

Reality and Empathy

Empathy and the Novel

Taking on Tabytha

Taking on Tabytha

Considering Kate

Origins of Altruism and Cooperation

Considering Kate

Considering Kate

Considering Kate

Street-Empathy

Considering Kate

Considering Kate

Considering Kate

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Empathy in Education: Engagement, values and achievement

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