On the Problem of Empathy

The CollectedWorks of EDITH STEIN Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross DiscalcedCarmelite Volume Three

ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Third Revised Edition

Translated by Waltraut Stein,Ph.D.

ICS Publications Washington, D.C. I 989

O W a s h i n g t o n P r o v i n c e o f D i s c a l c e dC a r m c l i t e s , l n c . 1 9 8 9

ICS Publicatiorrs 2 l 3 l L i n c o l n R o a d ,N . E . WashingtonD , .C.20002 'lypeset

CONTENTS Forsu,ord to the Third Edition

a n d P r o d u c e c li n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e so f A m c r i t a

Prefaceto the Third Edition Prefaceto the First and SecondEditions

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xii xul

Translator'sIntroduction l,{oteson the Translation . . . Couerphoto: Edith Stein at home in Breslau, 1921. Courtesl of CologneCarmel.

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ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Forruord Chapter11.The Essence of Acts of Empathy l. l'he Method of the Investigarion 2. Description of Empathy in Comparison with Other Acts .

Library

of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

S t e i n .E d i t h . l 8 9 l - 1 9 4 2 . On the Problem of Empathv. (The collected s'orks of Edith Stein : v. 3) 'l'ranslation of: Zum Problem der Einliihlung. Includes index. l Enrpathl'. 2. Phenomenologicalpsvchokrgl'. -Iitle. I I . S e r i e s :S t e i n .E d i t h , l 8 9 l - 1 9 4 2 . W o r k s . E n g l i s h .1 9 8 6 r v . 3 . I, 8 3 3 3 2 . 5 6 7 2 8 5 . { l g 8 6 r o l . 3 1 9 3s [ 1 2 8 ' . 3 ] 8 9 - 1 9 4 9 l s B N 0 - 9 3 5 2 1 6 - ll - l

(a) Outer Perceptionand Empathy (b) Primordiali\ and l,lon-primordialitl . . (c) Memory, Expectation, Fantasy, and Empathy . . . . 3. Discussionin Terms of Other I)escriptior.rsof Empathy-Especially f'hat of Lipps-and Continuation of the Anall'sis (a) Points of Agreement (b) The Tendenclto Full Experiencing (c) Empathl and Fellow Feeling (d) l,tregatiueEnpathy (e) Empathy and a Feelingof Oneness (f1 Reiterationof Empathy-Refexiue Sypathy . . . . .

II

t2 t2 t4 l5

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Contents

-I'he 4. Controversy Between the View of Idea and 'I'hat of Actuality

l8

5. Discussionin Terms of Genetic Theories of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness. . . . . . (a) On theRelationshipof Phenornenology to Psycholog (b) The Theory of Imitation (c) The Theory of Association (d) The Theory of Inference by Analogl

2l 2l 22 24 26

6. Discussionin Terms of Scheler'sTheory of the Comprehension of Foreign Consciousness . ' ' 7. Mtinsterberg's Theory of the Experience of Foreign Consciousrress

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ChapterIII. The Constitution of the Psycho-Physical Individual I

The Pure "1" . .

2 . The Stream of Consciousness .). The Soul 4 . "1" and Living Bodr, . (a) The Giuennessof the Living Body . (b) The Liaing Body and Feelings Causality . . (c) Soul and Liuing Body,Psycho-Physical (d) The Phenomenonof Expression (e) Will and Liaing Body . . 5. Transition to the Foreign Individual (a) The Fields of Sensationof the Foreign Liaing Bodl (b) The Conditionsof the Possibilityof SensualEmpathv (c) The Consequence of SensualEmpathyand itsAbsence in the Literature on Empat@ [Jnder Discussion. . . (d) The Foreign Liuing Bodl as the Center of Orientation of the Spatial \\'orld @ fhe Foreign World Image as the Modifcation of Our Oun World Image . (f) Empathy as the Condition of the PossibilityoJ Constituting Our Own Indiaidual (g) The Constitutionof the Real Outer W'orld in I ntersubjectiae Experience

(h) The Foreign Lizting Body as the Bearer of Voluntarl Mouement (i) The Phenomenaof Lxfe (h) Causality in the Structure of the Ind.iaidual (l) The Foreign Living Bodl ai the Bearer of P henomenaof Expre ssion (m) The Correction of Empathic Acts (n) The Constitution of the psychicIndiaidual and Its Signifcance for the Correction of Empathy . .. (o) Deceptionsof Empathy (p) The Signifcance of the Foreign Indiuidual's Constitutionfor the Constitutionof Our Own PsychicIndiaidual

38 38 39 40 4l 48 49 5l

54 56 DI

58 60 6l 62

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66 68 ll

ID

84 86 86

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Chapter114Empathy as the Understanding of Spiritual persons -Ihe l. Concept of the Spirit and of the Cultural Sciences[Geisteswissenschaften] 9l 2. The Spiritual Subject 96 3. The Constitution of the person in Emotional Experiences 9g 4. The Givennessof the Foreign person l0g 5. Soul and Person l0g -Ihe 6. Exisrenceof the Spirit . ll2 7. Discussionin Terms of Dilthey I 13 (a) The Being and Value of the person I 13 (b) Personal Typesand the Conditions of the Possibilityof Empathy With persons. . . . . tt4 8. T'he Significanceof Empathy for the Constitution of Our Owr.rperson I 16 9. The Question of the Spirit Being Based on thePhysicalBody. ......

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PersonalBiography

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l{otes Index

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ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY Foreu)ord to the Third Edition ranslatiorris alwaysa difficult task. It calls for a high order of intellectual virtue, demanding expertise in languages and in the art of interpretation. Dr. Waltraut Stein gives evidence in this n'ork of these competenciesand especiallyof the ability to penetrate and transmit empathically the text of her great-aunt's rvork OrztheProblemof Empathy(Zum Problemder Einfuhlurzg).This statementis no mere play on words but is meant rather to express the translator's human understanding and rapport u'ith Edith Stein'sthought. This is the first reason why I was huppy to learn that a third edition of the translation lvas projected and u'hv I readily agreed to write a brief preface. In my research and writing on E. Stein'sphilosophy, I have used the secondedition extensivelv and regretted that the book r.r'asnot available to many others becauseit rvasout of print. Another reason u'hy I welcome the new edition is the important place that this work occupiesin E. Stein's philosophy and in the development of phenomenology. Anyone who r,r,'ishes to penett'ateher thought should begin with this early $'ork. It skerches tl.tebroad outlines of her philosophy of the human person, details rit rvhich she frlls in in subsequent investigations. For her, the a\\'arenessthat empathy is and of what it is are linked essentially IX

Foreuord to the Third Edition

l,,,n.n. undersrandi ,r,rlno.u.!r,:t;:;..,"",anda wayor understanding person is through descriptive analysesof empathy. By means of the latter, she gives what may be called a first draft of the psycho-physical-spiritualnature of person, one which is not superficialbut n'hich raisesmany quesrionsto be addressedin her future n'orks. It was E. Stein's conviction that phenomenology was the most appropriate approach to the investigation of the structure of the human person, and she gave it her best efforts t h r o u g h o u t h e r s c h o l a r l yc a r e e r . This work, which was her Ph.D. dissertation, reveals both in method and content the breadth, depth, and precision of her philosophizing even at the beginning of her career. It revealsalso something of the enthusiasm and excitement which she, one of Edmund Husserl's most brilliant pupils, experienced in the la_ borious researchand writing that was required. Even at this time, in preparing a dissertation which had to win the ,.Master's', ap_ proval, Edith displaysan originality and independenceof thought that anticipated later existential developments in pheno-meqo.logy.Not only does she differ from Husserl-albeit diplomatically-in some respects,birt she also takes issuewith some theo_ ries of Scheler, T. Lipps, Miinsterberg, and others of her contemporaries, in the processof formulating her own theory. I n a d d i t i o n r o t h e r r a n s l a t i o no f t h e r e x t a n d t h e v a l u a b l ef o o t notes, the translator has supplied an introduction which gives r e a d e r sa n e x c e l l e n l e n t r 6 e i n t o r h e t h o u g h t r t o r l d o f t h e p h e _ n o m e n o l o g i s t so f t h e t i m e . W i t h i n r h e s p a i e o f a f e u . p a g e s .s h e gives a helpful introduction into the Husserlian viewpoini which i n f l u e n c e dE . S r e i n a n d i n t t . rt h e o r g a n i z a t i o na n d s i g n i f i c a n c eo f t h e v a r i o u s s e c t i o n so f t h e t e x t . I n t h e f i n a l s e c t i o no f h e r i n t r o duction, she raisesa question regarding whether E. Stein holds an unjustifiable assumprionconcerning the type of rationality which values and feelings have. This is an example of an issue which seems to me to be elucidated later in the Beitriige zur philosophischenBegrilndung der Psychologieund d,er Geisduissenschaften fContributions to the Philosophical Grounding of pslchotogy and the cultural scienceslpublished in 1922. It is a questi"" tt-rii may be legitimately raised on rhe basisof this first work. Finally, it should be noted rhat rhe book has the porential to be

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useful to scholarsin psychology.E. Stein's own srudiesin psychology befbre concentrating on phenomenology appear to have been of'great value to her in this and later works, in which the analysesof'human experiences are a springboard to an underof'the nature of the human person. statrdir.rg Mary Catharine Baseheart,S.C.N. M.A., Ph.D. Spalding University Louisville, Kentucky S e p t e m b e r ,1 9 8 8

Prtfoce to the Third Edition hen the Institute of Carmelite Studies asked me to pre/ Y Y pare a new edition of my translation of Edith Stein's doctoral dissertation for their series of her collected works in English, I was delighted to do so, becausea wider audience will now have the opportunity to examine a young scholar'srigorous and technical work in the light of her later reputation as a powerful and revered spiritual giant. At this time, about thirty years afrer presenting this translation as my thesisfor the degree of Masrer of Philosophy,I find myself again drawn to my great-aunt'swork, this time as a guide to living the Christian life fully and deepll'. I am srruck by the fact that she returned to scholarly work in a new way after her conversion to Christianity and continued in this work for the remainder of her lif'e.This teachesme thar God expectsme to use all of my gifts in His service and challengesme to find a way ro do so rather than withdrawing from the exigenciesof this earthli life. I rvant to thank Sr. Mary Catharine Baseheartfor her encouragement and her thoughtful foreword and Reverend John Sullivan for his generous help in preparing this neu,edition. \

Waltraut Stein,Ph.D. Atlanta, Georgia October, 1988

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Prtfoce to the Firs t and SecondEditiofls he translation of Zurn Problem d,er Einfi,-hlung presented here is a translation of the doctoral diss.z:rtation of'Edith Stein, done under Edmund Husserl. -I'he degre 4 \\'as awarded tn l9l6 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgiu, and the disserta-I-he title of the tion in this form n'aspublished in ig t 7 at U'alte. t treatise originalll' rvasDas Einfi)htungsproblemin seiner historischen Entuichlung und in phiinomenologisiei Betrachtu.ag [The Empathy Problemas It Dneloped Historicail and.ConsideyTd Phlttomenologicallyl.'I'he first historical chapter u'asomitred i1 . publication and seemsno longer to be extant. This work is a description of the narure of errr pathy within the f r a n t e r + ' o r ko f H u s s e r l ' sp h e n o m e n o l o g l a s p r e . e n t e d n r a i r t l yi n Volume I of ldeas' As Husserl's assistanl,Edith Frad the opportunity to become intimately acquainted with his 1 rinking. In fact, she edited Volume ll of ldeas (cf. Husserliar La IY, Martinus N1ihotr, 1952) which deals to a large exrenr u,it]-, the same problems as her own work on empathy. -lhough she c aims not to have seen Volume II before completing herlwn wr:rk (see Au.thor's Foreword),she had evidently been iollowing Hu...serl very closely as he was at that time r.r,orkingout his ideas.-Thu: her dissertation clearly shorvshow she has develol>eclher inter'i)retation rlf the " - \ . p r p e rl r r r k r t . p r i r r l , r f t h r I l : r l l c r , < l i ro l r u . : r ,r r u b l i . h r t l \ r ' r l : r g , r l N l i i n t h e ni r r l 9 X 0 i l r l i r h _ S r c i r r _ K a r n rI ri .i h l irrgt I' roblemder Linfihlung).

1'1 ( icrharrl.KrffLr r ' I - ?l l l h \ t r t r t ' Z u m

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Edith Stein

later presented in problem of empathy in terms of u'hat Husserl ihis '^'ih.*ork left unpublished bv him' presented n::t ^I: ,lg.tifi.ar,.. of the work by E' Stein in relation to Maurice becomes evident when considered de la perceptiozi'rSince influen tial Ph'enom'enologie U".f.^"-p"nty's unpublished manuscript of Merlear'r-Pontvhad accessto the same important and irltere.stVolume Il of ideas,a number of his most t o t h o s eo t L ' s t e l r l ' i n g f o r m u l a t i o n st a k e o n a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y 'Ihis lived or living body is particularly true of the coricept of the (Le '" CorPs a1cu or Leib)' completiono{ E' Stein'swork on empathy' t;; i."rs after the (1931)' hts Caitesian Med'i'tationsin French H;;;'p..r.,',t.d In 1960)' Nijhoff' (Martinus which is now also availablein English different a somewhat this work, however, Husserl is eirphasizing possibili'tvof the problem of t*pati'y t the !h" lltt ;;p:;t;i of this other' Thus rather than the phenomenolo[ical description with his earlier concepCartesian Meditattons is more in contrast meansthat E' Stein'su'ork on tiotrs tharl similar to them' This also Meditations' However' both empathy is in contrast with Cartesian works to the necessityfor n. 3t.irl'u.ta Husserl adhere in all these Therefore' a ohenomenological reduction to Pure consciousness' in the strict rvorks oi phenomenology ;; ioiria.,ta ;ti.;.;; Husserlian sense. -fhe "The Essenceof Acts of last third of E. Stein's chapter on Scheler'sconceptron oI of Empathy" consistsof a careful critique (1913)' Sympathiegefuhle of presented in his first edition .*i".ni referred he that pertinent so Scheler considered Steirr'sar-ralysis this work (1923)'2 to it three times in the second edition of fits. into the EinJi)hlun-g der This, then, is how Zum Problem other hand' the On history of the phenomenological movement' has made E' Stein that fact the reader must not out'loik that some original contributions to the phenomenological.description contributions' as the o{' the nature of empathy' Some tf th"tt in the following considered tle translator understands them, will introduction to the work' Dr' At this time I want to acknowledge my indebtlqlttt- 1o. UntverOhto at thesis of my master'-s James Shericlan' director was made' It is he sitt', in connection with rvhich ihis translution

Pr{ace to the First and SecondEditions

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,vho first led me ro an understanding of the phenomenological and the contents of E. Stein's rvork. Also Alfred Schuetz, ,rosirion 'H".b.tt Spiegelberg,William Earle' as well as my fellow graduate most helpful by ,tud.r.,tt ai Northwestern University, have been However,.,I encouragement' corrections, and their suggestiot.ts, may still errors that any for mvself u.tu-" full responsibility r " i r r a i ni n t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n . Waltraut Stein, Ph.D. l 964

Translator's I ntroduction

Translator' s I ntro duction he radical viewpoint of phenomenology is presented by .I'his viewpoint seemsquite Edmund Husserl inhis ldeas.:' simple at first, but becomes exceedingly complex and involves intricate distinctions when attempts are made to apply it to actual problems. Therefbre, it may be well to attempt a short statement of this position in order to note the general problems with which it is dealing as well as the method of solution which it proposes.I shall emphasize the elements of phenomenology which seem most relevant to E. Stein's work. Husserl deals with two traditional philosophical questions,and in answerin€ithem, develops the method of phenomenological -fhese reduction which he maintains is the basis of all science. questionsare, "What is it that can be known without doubt?" and "How is this knowledge possiblein the most general sense?" as the area to In the tradition of idealism he takesconsciousness be investigated. He posits nothing about the natural world. He puts it in "brackets," as a portion of an algebraic formula is put in brackets,and makes no use of the material within these brackets. 'I'his does not mean that the "real" world does not exist, he says emphatically; it only means that this existenceis a presupposition which must be suspendedto achieve pure description. It should be noted that the existenceof most essencesas well as that of things or facts is suspended in this bracketing. Clear knowledge of'the existenceof the idea of a thing transcendent to consciousnessisjust as impossibleas clear knowledge of the existence of natural objects, Husserl maintains.'' But what can pclssiblyremain when things and essenceshave been suspended?Husserl saysthat a realm of'transcendentalconxvl

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remains, a consciousness which is in contrast with indisciousness in the natural consciousness world. This transcendentalor vidual includes a subject, an consciousness act, and an object. Huspure that consciousness is emphasizes always active and always ierl d i r e c r e d t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g .T h i s a c t i v e d i r e c t e d n e s sh e c a l l s j n tentionality.The subject of consciousnessis what wills, perceives, 'fhe act is the willing, remembers, knows, evaluates,fantasizes. p e r c e i v i n g .e t c . T h e o b j e c t , c a l l e d " i n t e n r i o n a l o b j e c t " o r ' . p h i n ( ) m e n o n , i s w h a t i s w i l l e d , p e r c e i v e d .l n o r d e r t o t a l k i n t h i s r n a y ,i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r yt o s t a t e t h a t t h e p h e n o m e n o ne x i s t sa n y _ where but in consciousness.Furthermore, Husserl intends the designation"transcendental" to indicate that this consciousness is fundamental to any natural scientific effort because it prescribes what knowledge of the narural world must include. It is intersub_ jective in the same sensethat natural scienceis. In other words, the phenomenologist's description of consciousnessis verifiable by other people who are employing his method. Husserl clearly is referring to Descartes'"Cogito, ergo sum,' in stating that pure consciousness is what is known indubitably. -I.he area of'certain knowledge is that of consciousness. It now becomesimportant not to confuse Husserl's,,phenomenon" with the usual designation of phenomena as appearancesor rellections from objects. Husserl has no such intentions. pure consciousness is concerned with a realm of objects which are the sameobjects existing in the natural world. It only hasa different "standpoint" in regard ro them. Answering the question of frow knon,ledge is possiblein the most general sense,Husserl maintains that a reduction to phe_ nomena in an orderly manner is necessary.phenomenologists must intuit the field of investigation so that the exact nature of the radical change from the nitural standpoint and of the limits of'the descriptive undertaking may become perf'ectly clear. Husserl callsthis a methodological necessityand ihus thereduction is called the phenomenological reduction. When this reduction has Decn made, the phenomenologist is in a position to intuit the esse_lce or eidos of phenomena. Husserl calls this specialkind of act Wesenschauung (intuition of essence). E. Stein in the dissertation here presented takes the phenom_

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Edith Stein

enological standpoint. She claims that the description o{'emPathy of the existenceof emafier the suspensior.r withiri cor-rsciousness with the problem pathy must be the basis{or any other dealings 'I'he description she ty psy.hologists, sociologists,or biologists' as phenomenou n-rakesis a description of the pure transcel)dental It is above' described it is observed from the special standpoint esserlce filr the imp p h y s i c ai nl d i v i d u a l i s

Translator's Introduction

xix

constituted within consciousnessas sensed, living body and as 'fhis constitutior) is unified by orrtu'ardlyperceived physicalbody. 'fhe soul, an experience which is the rhe phenomenon of fusion. basicbearer of'all experiences,is founded on the body, and soul and body together form the psycho-physicalindividual. Irr developing this conception of the psycho-physicalindividual, the author notes that sensationsare among the real constitu-I'hese are absoents of consciousnessand cannot be bracketed.s lLrtelygiven just asjudging, willing, and perceiving. But there is a difl-erencebetween sensationsand these other acts.Sensationsdo llot issue from the pure "l" and never take on the form of the cogitotn which the "1" turns toward an object,{}i.e.,they are never -fhey are spatially localizedsomewhere at a au'areof themselves. from the "I" and these locationsare alwayssomeplacein clistarrce the living body. On the contrary, the pure "I" cannot be localized. Nevertheless,my living body surrounds a "zero point of orientation" to u'hich I relate my body and everything outside of it. Whatever ref'ersto the "I" is given as at no distance from the zero point and everything given at a distancefrom the zero point is also given at a distance fiom the "L" Arr external thing can contact not me, btrt my physical body. Then its distance from my physical body 'fhus but not from me becomeszero. the living body as a whole is at the zer() point while all physical bodies are outside of it. 'l'his indicates that bodily' space(of which the zero point is the "1") and ()uter space (of which the zero point is the living body) are very different. For instance, it cannot be said that the stone t h a t I h o l d i n m y h a n d i s t h e s a m e d i s t a n c eo r o n l y a t i n y b i t tarthcr fl'r>mthe zero poinr of orientation (i.e., from me) than the hand itself. In this case, the living body itself is rhe cenrer of orientation and the stone is at a distance from it. T'his means that the distance of the parts of my living body from me is completely trtcomparablewith the distance of'foreign physical bodies from me.lo

Let us consider for a moment the lrroblem that this notion of a zero point of' t h e e x c l u s i o no r r e d u c t i o n .

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Edith Stein

W h a t t a n b e l e l i i f t h e w h o l e w o r l d a n d e v e r tt h e s u b j e c te x p e r i eDcing ir are cancelled?In fact, there remains an infinite Iield o1' pure i.vestigation. For let us consider what this exclusiot'tmeatts. i can doubr whether what I see befbre me exjsts' Deception is p o s s i b l e .J ' h e r e f b r e , I m u s t e x c l u d e a n d m a k e n o u s e o f t h e p . , s i t i n g o l e x i s t e n c e .B u t r ' r ' h a tI c a n n o t e x c l u d e . w h a t i s n o t iubject to doubt, is my experience of the th"!pg (the perception' *"-,r.y, or other kind

we shall be able ro see empharic acts best in their individuality if u,e confront rhem u'ith othenect! olprc-eqlllllglsl9s'(our field of considerarion afrer making the describedreduction)..I e*t us take an example to illustrate the nature of the act qf gmpalhy' A friend?ell, -J that hi hai lbst his brcithei and I become aware of his pain. What kind of an arvarenessis this?I anr not concerned here with going into the basison which I infer the pain' Perhaps his face is"pale and disturbed, his voice toneless and strained' Perhaps he also expresseshis pain in words' Naturally, these things can all be investigatecl,but they are not mv concern here'.I *ot,id like to kr-row,not horv I arrive at this awareness'but rvhat it itself is. (a) Outer PercePtionand EmPathl Needlessto sav,I have no outer perception of the pain' Outer perception is a term for acts in u'hich spatio-temporal conctete t.ir-tg'and occurring come to me in embodied givenness'This beini has the quality of being there itself righl now; it turns this to-nib ii embodied in a or tliat ffied with sidescocomparison in It is specific sense. liri6-oi-cli{$xhere averted. perceived but -I'he pain is not a thing ar.rdis not given to me-4sa thigg' even ';in" the pained countenance'I perceive u,hen I am alvare of it this countenanceout$'ardl1'and the pain is given "at one".rvith it' There is a close,yet very loose,parallel between empathlc acts and the averted sides of rvhat is seen, because ln Progresslve

The Essenceof Actsof Empathy

7

perception !.a14-Uaysnrors-ne.wsidesofrheLhhg-to-,nri-u.ordial givenness. Each side can, in principle, assume this primordial giviiiness I select. I can consider the expression of pain, more a c c u r a t e l y t. h e c h a n g eo f f a c e I e m p a t h i c a l l yg r a s p a s a n e x p r e s sion of pain, from as many sides as I desire. yet, in p.rincipl", i .ur., never get an "orientation" where the pain irself is primordiall.y glven. Thgs empathy doesnot have the character of outer perceptign, though it does have something in common with outer perception: In both casesthe objeq_q itself is present here and now. We have c o m e t o r e c o g n i z eo u t e r p e r c e p t i o na s a n a c r g i v e n p r i m o r d i a l l y . B u t . t h o u g h e m p a t h ) i s n o t o u r e r p e r c e p t i o n .t h i s i s n o t r o i u y that it does not have this "primordialitv."

(b) Primordialitl and \Von-primordiality Tl:r: are things other than rhe ourer world given to us pri_ rnordially; for insrance,there is ideation rvhich ls the intuiiive c tc o n d u c h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o ni n p u i e generality, sticking ro the caseof the psycho-physicatindi'idual a.nd to "symbolic givenness," but we can still generalize in part the conclLrsionshe reaches. (a) Points of Agreement

I2>

, L.ipps depicts emparhy as an fljnnef parricipation" in foreign Drubrless, this is eq,ivalent to our highest le'el"ol' yre.xperiences. / the consurnrnationof empathy-where we are ..at" the foreign s u b j e c ta n d t u r n e d w i t h i t t o i t s o b j e c t . H e s t r e s s e tsh e o b i e c t i v i t v .r the "demanding" characrer of'empathy ar.rdthus .ip..rr", w h a t w e . n r e a n b y d e s i g n a t i n gi t a s a k i n d o f a c t u n d e r g o n e . Further, he indicateshow errrpathy,is akin to memor),.and e-xpec_ tation. But this brings us directly to a point where.r.r, *uy, pu.,. (b) The Tendencyto Full Experiencing Lipps speak.sof the f-actrhat .ever) experience about which I kn'u', including those remembered and expected as well as those e m p a t h i z e d ," r e n d s " t o b e f ' u l l v e x p e r i e n c e d .A ' d i t i s f u l l y e x p e r i e n c e di f n o t h i n g i r . rm e o p p o s e si t . A t r h e s a m e t i m e t h e , , I , , , a n o b j e c t u n t i l n o w , i s e x p e r i e n c e d '.f h i s i s s o w h e t h e r t h e , . I , , i s p a s t c i r f u t u r e , m y ( ) w n o r r h e f o r e i g . " I . " H e a l s o c a l l st h i s f u l l e x p e r i e n . i . g . f f r r r e i g ne x p c r i e r r c e m p a t h y .I n d e e d ,h e f i r s r s e e s f u l l e m p a t h l h e r e , t h e o t h e r b e i n g a n i n c o n r p l e t e ,p r e l i m i n a r y levelol empathv. -I'hat t h e s ' b j e c t o f ' t h e r e m e r n b e r e d e, x p e c t e d ,r > re n r p a t h i z e d e x p e r i e n c ei n t h i s s e c o n df < r r m . o f ' m e m o r ye,x p e c t a t i o r ro, r e m p a _ t h y 'i s n o t p r o p e r l v a n o b j e c ri s i n a g r e e m e n tw i t h o u r c o n c e p r i ; n . But we dr .'t agree that there is a c.mplete c.'i.cidence *iih tne

The Essenceof Actsof Empathy

l3 ,.1,', renrembered, expected, empathized that they become -or o n e . L i p p s c o n f u s e st h e f o l l o w i n g t w o a c t s :( l ) b e i n g drawn into r h e e x p e r i c n c ea r f i r s r g i ' e n o b j e c r i v e r ya n d f r r t f i i l i n gi i s i m p r i e d tendencieswith (2) the transition from non-primoraiil to p.i-,rrdial experience. A memory .is entirely lulfilred and identified when o.e has lirllowed out all its terrdenciesto exprication anrr estabrished the experie'tial continuity to the prese.ri. But this does no, -ut .-,rr. remembered experience primorQia-|.The present viewpoint of rlre remembere. stare.f affairs is comptetely independen, of rn. remembered viewpoint. I can remember a perception and now be ct>n'inced that I u'as formerry under a derusion. I .emember my discomfort in an embarrassirrgsituation and now think it *u, u..y f u n n y . I n t h i s c a s et h e m e m ( ) r y i s ' o m o r e i n c o m p r e t e ttun if t again take the former viewpoint. We agree that a shift from remembered, expected or empa_ thized to primordial experience is possible.But we ao r that, when this tendency has been Iulfilled, memory, "", "gi." expectation, or empathy is still present. Let us consider the case further. I actively bring to mind a j f t r r m e r j o y , f o r e x a m p l e , o [ a p a s s e de x a m i n a i i o n . I r r a n s f e rm v _ self into it, i.e., I rurn,ro the joyful evenr and depict i, ,; ;yr.iiT, a l l i t s j o y f u l n e s sS . u d d e n l yI n r i t i c et h a t I , t h i s p r i m o r d i u l , ,'._.__ bering "1," am full ofjoy. I rqmembql the joyful ar.d.tuk. primordial .foy in the rernemtrer,edevent. rio*"u.., "uent ,r," -.-".i . l f ) ' a n d t h e m e m o r y " I " h a v e v a n i s h e do r , a r m o s t , p e r s i s tb e s i d e t n e . p r r m o r d r a l . . ; oayn d t h e p r i m o r d i a l . , I . " N a t u r a l l y , t h i sp r i m o r _ dialjoy over past events can also occur directly. .Ihis *ould b" mere representation of the event without my remembering " the former joy or making a transition from the remembered to the primordial evenr. Fin?!y, I may be primordially;"yfuf ou., rh. past.foy,making the difference r r r r c r c I r L cbetween u c t w e e n lth n e s e t w o a c t se s p e c i a l l y prm e . N o w I i n t u i t i v e l y h a v e b e f o r e m e w h a t t h e y f e e l . It comes to life in my feeling, and from the "I" and "you" arisqs the "ryel' as a subrjectof'a higher level.?E And it is also possible fbr us to bejoyful over the same event, though not filled with exactly the same joy. Joyfulness may be more richly accessibleto the others, which difference I compre-

lg

hend empathically.I empathicalryarrive at the "sides" of'joyfurnessobstructed in my own joy. 'fhis ignites my.ioy, ar,d oniv now is there complete coincidence with what is empathized. If the same thing happens to the others, we empathiially enrich our {eelingso that "we" now f'eela different joy from ..I,i' ..you,', and " h e " i n i s o l a t i o n .B u t " I , " , . y o u , " a . d . , h e ; ' are retainei in .,we.,, A "we," nor an "I," is the subject of the empathizin€i. Ne_t through the feeling of'oneness,but through empathizing, dot; experienceothers. 'I'he fbeling of orrenessind the enrichment of our own experience become possiblethrough empathy.



The Essenceof Acts of EmPathY

Edith Stein

(fl Reiterationof Empathy-Refexiue Sympathy I would like t' call attentic-rnto.iust one more concept from Lipps'description: that which he designatesas .,reflexive sympa_ thl'" and which I wourcr rike ro calr tte ireiterarion of empathyf m o r e e x a c t l y ,a p a r t i c u l a r c a s eO f ' r e i t e r a t i < t n . has this attribute ir.rcommr>nwirh many kinds of'acts. _.Empathy fhcre is not only reflection, but also reflecrion on reflection, etr.. as.anideal possibility ad infnitum. simirarry, there is a wiiling of willing, a liking of liking, itc. ln fact, all represenrarions can be rerterated. [ can remember a memory, expect an expectation, ranrasya fanrasy' And ro I can arso emparhize rhe enipathized, u-ong the acts of anorher that I comprehend empathically l:.., lhere can be empathic acts i. *,hich the oth., .o-pr.h..d, or,_ 'rther's acts.This "other" can be a third person o. -. myself. In the second casewe have "reflexive mpathJ " where my originar . . x p e r i e n c e r e t u r l ) s . . , ' . , . , . 7 , u , . ' @s) ,n..:rn..i/.ln.in.. this pheromenon in the give ur-rdtok. be*veen i.diviitrars does '"fr o t . e e d t o c o n c e r n u s h e r e b e c a u s ew e a r e o n r l ' d e a l i n gw i t h t h e {eneral essenceof'empathy and not u,ith its effect. 4. The Controversy Between the View of Idea and That of Actuality from the viewpoint of our description of empathic ,,_._t..nupr 'r'rts' we ca' find access to the much-cliscussedquestir>n 'f \''herher empathy has the character of an ipea lvorsteirungl tl i n k e d w i r h tntuition but fused u'ith it. Of course, this is r-rota genetic explanation but only a description of the empathic experience. Later we

The Essenceof Ats of Empathy

Edith Stein

26

this viewpoint clarishall return to this phenomenotl and see that This clarificafies the origin of certain empathic experiences':r8 the explanation" "e*utt oi tion is certainly far tiom the t

fr.r-tirhuy-.u"-. "ri@1 thesepercepti,r,t,

t11',lp^E]::j:

phytl:il the present caseas fbllowsi-I-kf,'5$'Th€T6'ffgt, 1Y::: and,lts modlncabody physical own my I know its modifications;

of the latter are tions. Further, I know thai the modifications likewise given' conditions and implications of my experiences' physical appearal:-es Now, becausein this casethe succession l l e - c t . ' l h i s w o u l d b e a r e a l t h i n g , a p h y s t c a lb o d y , w h o s e m o t i \ *1re. I successiveappearancesexhibit striking gaps. It would withl-r, lld its rear side with more stubbornness thart the moon and ir-. vit e me continually to consider it from new sides.Yet as soon as I -rm about to carry out its invitation, it hides these sidesfrom me. 'l-.r b ,e sure, things that withdrar.r'from the glance are accessibleto t t ' u g h . B u t p r e c i s e l l ' t h e r e l a t i o n s h i pb e t u ' e e ns e e i n ga n d t o u c h ir -. q i s different here than anywhere else.Everything else I seesays tt ' n: e, "'fouch me. I am really what I seem to be, am tangible, arrd n o t a p h a n t o m . " A n d w h a t I t o u c h c a l l st o m e , " O p e n y o u r c\ es and 1ou will seeme ." The tactile and visual senses(asone can sl-.,ea < of sense in the pure sphere) call each other as witnesses, tl- ou gh they clo not shift the responsibility on olle another. I'hris unique defect fthe outu'ardly perceived physical bdyis in co ntrast with another peculiarity. I can apprntakes us a long way in constituting the foreign i n d i v i d u a l ,f o r b y m e a n so f i t t h e " l " o f t h e s e n s i n g ,l i v i n g b o l y empathizes the whole fullness of ourer perception in which the spatial world is essenriallyconstituted. A sensing subject has be_ c o m e o n e w h i c h c a r r i e so u t a c t s . A n d s o a l l d e s i g n a t i o n sr e s u l t i n g from the immanent essential examination of perceptual con-sciusness apply to it.83 This also makes statements about the essentiallypossible various modalities of the accomplishment of a c t s a n d a b o u t t h e a c t u a l i t y a n d n o n - a c t u a l i t yo f p e r c e p t u a la c t s and r l dg i v e n i n e m p t y p r e s e n r a r i o n s .T h i s i s s o b e c a u s eo f m y a c t l r a l ,I i f b - l o n gh a b i t so f i n t u i t i n g a n d t h i n k i n g . B u r t h e s ee m p r y presentationsancl the lack of intuitive fulfillment are given to me. 'fo a still greater extent this applies to a pers()n lacking a sense w h o e n . r p a t h i z ewsi t h a p e r s ( ) nh a v i n g a l l h i s s e n s e sH . ere emerges the possibilityof enriching ()ur ow,n world in.ragethror-rghanorh-

Our () l:nPathy as the Condition of the Possibilitlof Constituting Oun Indiuidual ir-t lrom the viewpoint of the zero point of orientation p;ained 7.ero as the poitlt zero owll my consider no lt>llger I cllpathy, must clnly u.,i,,t,b|-,tas a spatial pdint arnong many. By this rneans,ar.rd like body a physical as body my living see I learlt t() irv thi, means, i s i t g i ven e x p e r i e n c e i n p r i m o r d i a l o n l y s a m e t i m e , A t the ,,ih"... l n c ( )mm e a s a n t o i t i s g i v e n M o r e o v e r , b o d y . a l i v i n g to llrc as all from as different and in perception outer Uoay plctc physical p h y s i cal t h i s i n t e r p r e t " r e i t e r a t e d I a g a i n e m p a t h y " ' l ' l I t otheri.'i a as myself to first given is I am so it that living body, and a as boclv b e i t t g o f l ' h e t h c t s e n s e ' f u l l i n i n c l i v i d u a l t h e psrcl.rphl'sical fbr psvchothis is now col'rstitutive body on a physical ii,uncled -fhis reiteratedempathy is at the sametime p h l ' s i c a li n d i v i d u a l . t h e c o n d i t i r > nm a k i n g p o s s i b l et h a t m i r r o r - i m a g e - l i k e g i v e n n e s s o{ myself in mernory artd f'antasyon rvhich u'e have touched Probably it alscomprehelrd the "bad mood" empathically.Now, lve may not infer the causalsequence from the data obtained, but also exoerience it emnathicallv. For e x a r n p l e ,w e c o m p r e h e r r di n t e r p s y i h i cc a u s a l i t ys i m i l a r l y ' l r , h e n we observethe processo{'contagionof f'eelingsin others while we ourselvesare immune trsays,"You cal) hear nothing but sobbing and women u'eeping," rve perceive a suppressedsob in all parts of'the atrdi-

;l:;,T wirh"p;in,';;rl":::.f j'iT[':t"ffi|,'.11,[:i:,:1STJ o',n. bodily injyrl sucha,su brok,"

ar rhis ,,srare,,in the

t toot canalso*"],l:',1 .,',fu,r'i.projection. :l :lll:l:l.i.''-y'"rii" otherando::"9-T^:^glltli""",

'.rl of singletraitsin the whole The attentiv-e t"tt "?::il:t ' '.'."'l from the fleeringglance. picture which reml l,"i,,ta.n disease This is *h";;:lr.n""'.1'r,-.*"

hasover the lay of the physician

pe rson, ^ ::ffi :lll,illHlJ'.'"",I H$::l;':;: lonser-"d::'*iqi Thus in question' the cause

tTI^::l-p'1,''::;;f this "clinical picture" ir an ,1'".' r;': 5v yellow' sunken cheeks' or he .ur.ln,',,'u he thinks h; -",. unnatural gleamof the eyes. 1 ,, , ^,-,.rts.rnd ,.., t,.,b...,

Bu,,his.,'i.Tlriftffi H#;i:h:31:?,f :*;*::'1f, s n w h i c h3 ] ' " o ' " t y p e so I i l l n e s s e o



;;1'13 niil :; p;;;;'., uyr,i,tur" il:Sf 3l;3:l;:'ru:.:*ff phenomena::i

level, ?I]::1ni.",)r,. "t thehrstintroductory course'thtt:111'-1]i":ll' the phvsiAnd .,1orhe illco.dition, notproceeclrng'toProJecttorr :;;. with nhose welfare he is enc i a n ' sr e l a t i o n s h i pt o h i s p ; t : " ' '

71

72

2>

Edith Stein

ence. And, projecting ourselves into this soul-stirring spirit, lr'ebecome seized by the mood portrayed. In this wa1' we get an inrage of the causalpr()cessbeing ertacted. Finally, we als 1 - s Natural iy, rheserelar:."1;;I;;;rntio,,, let .rs onie rlore Ir11[. t . ' J . , t mere "bec l e t a i l . r rlrt r t e r m s o f r h t s o l i . g i ' e r r n e s sf r o m t h e ').,,iri.'..irsiderecl t clear what distinguishr so far..\\re seethat rve ' l l , , L " r . l u r otl i r t g - c o - g i v r . n "o f r r h a t i t . l isoursardly perceir'ed tlte " ( ( ) p e r c e i r e c l " . 1. ,1 1 t ' x p e r i e r t c ct h i s p r o c e t ' ( , " ] : ; ; fr.m rrhar \\as e lcvel ol' ernpathic pr(),('( c r > n s i c l e r e da r l i t . r . ( 1 ) l ' r > l],,rri,r* in the cases tht' first lt'vel. This r",,t tl." f.ront^sc|1.rn r " a d o e sn o l p r , r c e e d I l r c a p p e . r r a r r c eo l l : ( ' l l \ r " r p r t l c e e d sl r o n r h a p p i r l s s s(. ) t t 1 1 1 1 ' a tiotrs in the u'a1 11'tu1 l;tttf',,, irr..if'.all1 different fiotr1 a t:attsal i. ,,thcr hanrl. rlre yrroct-.r'(ill:i;;. 1 1 . , . , . .i , a d i f f e r e r r t r e l a t i o r r : h i 1 r seqtlence' As wt' sairl t'Jt,,.,r'tf-r^" bet.rveenexerti()ll and-bltrs[betueettshame ,rd lrl,'tt' a n n o u n c e di n t h e l i l r n r 1 ; 1 u,l r l r g .\ \ ' l r i l t ' r ' a u s arle l a ri . r l r ' " ' r " " r " " r .

84

96>

Edith Stein

if . . . then, so that the givennessof one occurrence (be it psychic o r p h y s i c a l )m o t i v a t e sa p r o g r e s s i < . tron t h e g i v e n n e s so f ' t h e o t h e r one, here the proceeding clf one experience fiom another is ( ' x p e r i e n c e di n p u r e s t i m m a l t e r r c ew i t h o u t t h e d e t o u r o v e r t h e object sphere. We want to call this experienced proceeding "motivation." All t h a t i s u s u a l l yd e s i g n a t e da s " m o t i v a t i o n " i s a s p e c i a lc a s eo f t h i s m o t i v a t i o n : m o t i v a t i o n < > fc o n d u c t b y t h e w i l l , o f t h e w i l l b y a l'eelirrg.But the proceeding of expression {iom experience is a specialcaseol'this motivati()n, too. Artd we also understand motiv a t i o r ri n p e r c e p t i o n ( t h e g o i n g o v e r l r o m o n e g i v e n n e s so f t h e o b j e c t t ( ) a n o t h e r ) , o f ' w h i c h H u s s e r ls p e a k s , r r i2n t h i s w a y . V a r i ous attempts have been made to set forth motivation as the cause -I'his interpretation is untenable fbr, as we sa\{', of r.r'hatis psvchic. there is also psychic causality that is clearly distinp;trishedfiom motivatioll. On the contrary, motivation belongs essentiallyto 'I-here i s n o o t h e r s u c h c o n n e c t i o n .W e t h e e x p e r i e n t i a ls p h e r e . *'ould like to designate the motivational relationship as intelligible or meaningful in contrast with the causalone. Tb be intelligib l e n r e a n sn o t h i n s m ( ) r e t h a n t o e x p e r i e n c et h e t r a n s i t i o n f i o m ()ne part to another within an experiential rvhole (n()t, to have objectively), and every objective, all ob.jectivemeaning, resides o n l v i n e x p e r i e n c e so { ' t h i sk i n d . A n a c t i o n i s a u n i t y o f i n t e l l i g i b i l ity or of meaning because its component experiences have an c x p e r i e n te a b l e r ' < l n n t ' ri 'ot n . And experience and expression {irrm an intelligible rvhole in the same sense.I understand an expression, n'hile I can merely bring a sensationto givenness.This leads me through the phen ( ) m e n ( ) no f ' e x p r e s s i o n i n t o t h e m e a n i n p ic o l r t e x t s o f w h a t i s psychic and at the same time gives Ine an imp()rtant means clf ( ( ) r r ( . c itl r g e m P a lh i ( a c ts . (m) The Correctionof Empathic Acts 'fhe

basisfbr what would suspendthe unity of a meaning must b e a c l e c e p t i o n .W h e n I e m p a t h i z e t h e p a i n o f ' t h e i n j u r e d i n kroking at a u'ound, I tend t

Edith Stein

objecti{ication is necessarilylbrthcoming if we want to say some'fhese objectitying acts are, again, thing about the attributes. giving acts (considering them as acts of perceiving or as merely i n d i c a t i n g )a n d i n t h e m t h e r e a r i s e st h e c o m p l e t e c o i n c i d e n c eo f t h e e x p e r i e n c e da n d t h e p e r c e i v e d" I . " In order to arrive at a cornplete picture, we would have to go -fhis can take place only sugthrough every kind of'experience. gestively here. Sensationsresult in nothing fbr the experienced " 1 . " ' I ' h e p r e s s r r r er,v a r m t h , ( ) r a t t r a c t i o n t r >l i g h t t h a t I s e n s ea r e nothing in which I experience mvself, in no way issue from my "1." On the c()ntrary, if they are made into an object, they "an-Ihe n o u n c e " " s e n s i t i v i t y "t o m e a s a p e r s i s t e n tp s y c h i ca t t r i b l r t e . so-called "sensations of f'eeling" or "sensory I'eelings," such as pleasureilr a tactile impressionor sens()rypain, already reach into the sphere of the "I." I experience pleasure and pain on the s u r fa c eo f m y " 1 . " A t t h e s a n e t i m e I a l s oe x p e r i e n c em y " s e n s o r y receptiveness"as the topmost or outerm()st layer of my' "1." tuo There are, t.hen,feelings which are "self-experiencing" in a special sense:general feelings and moods. I distinguish general feelings fiom moods because general f'eelings "are bound to the living body," which should not be drawn in here. Ger-reralfeelings and moods occupy a special place in the realm of'consciousness, for they are not giving acts but only visible as "colorings" of 'fherefore, giving acts. at the same time they are different becausethey have no definite locality in the "I," are neither experienced ()n the surface of the "1" uor in its depths and expose no l e v e l so f ' t h e " l . " R a t h e r , t h e y i n u n d a t e a n d f i l l i t e n t i r e l v . ' f h e y -I'hey penetrate, or certainly can penetrate, all levels. have somet h i n g o f t h e o m n i p r e s e n c eo f l i g h t . F o r e x a m p l e ,c h e e r f u l n e s so f character is not an experienced attribute, either, that is localized in the "l" in any way but is poured over it entirely like a bright l u s t e r . A n d e v e r y a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c eh a s i n i t s o m e t h i n g o f t h i s " t o t a l i l l u m i n a t i ( ) n , "i s b a t h e d i n i t . Now we come t() feelings in the pregnant sense.As said earlier, these feelings are alwaysl-eelingsof'something. Every time I f-eel, I arn turnecl toward an otrject, something of an object is giverr to me, and I see a level of'the ob-ject.But, in ()rder to see a level of the object, I must first have it. lt ntust be given to me in theoreri-

Empathy as the [Jnderstandingof Spiritual Persons

l0l

'I'hus, the structure of all leelings requires theoretical ctl acts. over a g it. And this even takes place during complete immersion in felt value. Anger over the loss of'a piece of -jewelry comes fiom a nrore superficiallevel or does not.penetrate as deeply as losing the s;rme object as the souvenir of a loved one. Furthermore, pain over the ltlss of this person himself rvould be evell deeper' This clisclosesessentialrelationships among the hierarchy oI felt values,r:7 the depth classificatiol'rof value feelings, and the level classificationof' the person exposed in t.hesef'eelings. Accordirrgly, every time lr'e advance in the value realm, we also make acquisitionsin the realn.rof our own Personality.This c v a l u e i s n o t t h a r h e d o e s g o < t d ,e v e n i f h e p e r h a p sc o m e s t o l i g h t f o r t h i s r e a s o n . R a t h e r , h e h i m s e l f i s v a l u a b l ea n d w e l o v e h i m " f < r rh i s o w n s a k e . "A n d t h e a b i l i t y t o l o v e ,e v i d e n ti n o u r l o v i n g , is rooted in another depth fiom the ability ro value morally, 'fhere e x p e r i e n c e di n t h e v a l u e so f d e e d s . a r e e s s e n l i a rl e l a t i o n s h i p sa r n o n g t h e v a l u e f e e l i n g a n d t h e f ' e e l i n eo f ' t h e v a l u e o f i t s r e a l i t y ( f b r t h e r e a l i t l , o f a v a l u e i s i t s e l f ' av a l u e ) ,a n d i t s " I " d e p t h . The depth of'a f eeling of value derermirresthe clepth of a f-eeling based on the cornprehension of the existence of this value. 'fhis seconclf'eeling,holvever, is not of the same depth. pain over the lossof a loved one is not as deep as the love for this person, if the krssmeans that this person ceasesto exist. As the personal value o u t l a s r sh i s e x i s t e n c ea n d t h e l o v e < l u t l a s t st h e j o i ' o v e r t h e l ( ) v e d o n e ' se x i s t e n c es, o t h e p e r s o n a lv a l r r ei s a l s oh i g h e r t h a n t h e v a l u e of his reality, and this former feeling r>f value is rnore deeply r o o t e d . r 2 sB u t s h o u l d " l o s s o f ' t h e p e r s o n " m e a n s u s p e n d i n gt h e person and his value so that possiblvthis empirical person c()nt.inues t() exist, such as in a casewhere "one has been deceived bt,a person," then pain over the lossis synonymouswith suspensionof love and is rooted in the same depth. 'I-he c o m p r e h e n s i o no f ' v a l u e si s i t s e l f a p o s i t i v e v a l u e . B u t t o become aware of tl-risvalue, one must be directed toward this c o n t p r e h e n s i o n .I n t u r n i n g t o t h e v a l u e , t h e f ' e e l i n go f v a l u e i s c e r t a i n l y t h e r e , b u t i t i s n o t a n o b j e c t . F o r i t s , a l u e l o b e f ' e l t ,i t must first be made into an object. In such a f'eelingr>fr.'aluer>fthe feeling of value (oy over my joy) I become aware of myself in a d o u b l e m a n n e r a s s u b . j e cat n d a s o b - j e c rA . gain, the original and the reflected I'eeling of'r'alue rvill take hold in different depths. -I'hus I can enjol' a work o1'arr and at rhe sametime enj,ry my 'I'he e n j o v m e n tc l f i t . e n j o l , m e n to f ' t h e n , o r k < t f a r t w i l l . , r e a s o n ably" be the deeperr.e. we call the "irversi.n" of'this relati.n-l'his ship "perversion." d r > e sn o t m e a n t h a t t h e u n r e f l e c t c dl - e e l i n g m u s t a l w a y sb e t h e d e e p e r o n e . I c a n f ' e e la s l i g h t m a l i r . i o u s . j o y < I I 5 > a t a n o t h e r ' s m i s f o r r u n ea r r d c a r rs u f f e r d e e p l y i n t h i s s l i g h t m a r i -

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cious.joy.This is rightly so. Depth classificationdoes not directly depend on the antithesisof reflected-non-reflected, but, again, on the hierarchy of felt values.To value a positive value positively is lessvaluable than the positive value itself. To value a negative value positively is lessvaluable than the negative value itsell-.lb prefer the positive valuing over the positive value is thus axiologically unreasonable. To put the un-justifiedpositive value behind the negative or.reis axiologicallv reasonable. According to this, the value of our own person seemsto be only reflexive and not constituted in the immediate directedness of experience. We need yet another investigation to decide this. Not only comprehending, but also realizing, a value is a value. We \{'ant to consider this realizing in more detail, not as u'illing and acting, but only its emotional components. In realizing a value, this value to be realized is before me, and this feeling of value plays the role in constituting personality that we have already attributed to it. But, simultaneously with this f-eelingof value, there is an entirely naive and unreflected joy in "creation." In this joy the creation is felt to be a value. At the same time I experience my creative strength in this creation ancl myself as the person who is provided with this strength. I experience creativity as valuable in itself.'fhe strength l experience in creation and its simultaneous power, or the very power of being able tcl create itself, are autonomous personal values and, above all, entirely indeoendent o1'the value to be realized. The naive "feeling of self value" of this creative strength is further shown irr realizing, and in the experience of being able to realize, a ne€Jativevalue. Then, to be sure, values compete; and the pr>sitivevalue of'nry o\\'n strength can be absorbed in the negative average value of it. Nevertheless,we have an example here of unreflected "self emotiorls" in which the person experiences himself as valuable. Before we go over into the domain of experiencesof the rvill, rvhosethreshold we have already stood upon, \\'e must pr-rrsuestill another "dimerrsion" of the significanceof f'eelingsfbr the con- < I l6> 'fhey stitution of personality. not only have the peculiarit,v of' being rooted in a certain depth of the "I" but also of'filling it out t() more or lessof an extent. Moods have already shown us r,r'hat

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this means. We can say that every feeling has a certain mood component that causesthe feeling to be spread throughout the "I" from the feeling's place of origin and fill it up. Starting from a peripheral level, a slight resentment can fill me "entirely," but it can also happen upon a deep joy that prevents it fiom pushing further forward to the center. Nolv, in turn, this joy progresses victoriously from the center to the periphery and lills out all the layers above it. In terms of our previous metaphor, feelings are like different sources of light on whose position and luminosity the resulting illumination depends. The metaphor of light and color can illustrate the relationship between feelings and moods for us in still another respect. Emotions can have mood components essentiallyand occasionallyjust as colors have a specificbrightnessover and above their higher or lower degrees of brightness. So there is a serious and a cheerful .joy. Apart from this, however, joy has specificallya "luminous" character. On the other hand, we can still further elucidate the nature of moods from these relationships between moods and feelings. I can not only experience a mood and myself in it, but also its penetration into me. For example, I can experience it as resulting frnrational lan's, lrou' alreacl\'r'ariouslvclemonstrated,is clearlv disti nguished from the soul's subordinatir irrational. According to Pfdnder, willing is ahvays"I" centered in contrast u'ith striving.r3r \4/e agree with him rr'hen we translate this into 'f our interpretation. he volitional decision is alwayscarried out in the form of the "cogito." As rve already kr-rou',this savslrothing about the u'ill as "self'experiencinp;." According to Pfiinder: If it is to be a genuine volitiolt, then our orvn "I" m u s t n ( ) t r t n l y b e t h o u g h t b u t b e i m m e d i a t e l yc < l m -

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prehended itself and be made into an objective sub.jectof the practical intentions. Thus volition, but not \'oliti

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teristic:sto be dependent on all kinds ol circumstancesthat could be influenced by one another as u'ell as by the states and the character of the living body. Finally, we found it incorporated 'l'he indiviclinto the whole order of'physical ancl psychic reality. u a l w i t h a l l h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c sd e v e l o p su n d e r t h e c o n s t a n t i m pressi r c e r t a i r t a c t i o n s l t o t c o t t f c > r n l i r l tgo a r l y t l r i g i r i a l p e r -

Empat@ as the Understanding of SpirituaL Persons

III

sonal attribute, so that it can be removed by other "influences." An instance is authoritative moral education. If he who has been educated in "moral principles" and who behaves according to them looks "into himself." he will oerceive rvith satisfaction a "virtuous" man. This is true until one day, in an action bursting fbrth from deep inside of him, he experienceshimself as someone o{'an entirely different nature from the person he thought him- self to be until then. One can only speak of a person developing under the influence of the circumstancesof lif-eor of a "signilicance of the milieu for the character," as Dilthey also says,r32 inso[ar as the real environment is the object of'his value experiencir.rgand determines which levelsare exposed and which possible actions become actual. So the psycho-physicalernpirical person can be a more or less complete realization of the spiritual one. It is conceivable for a man's life to be a complete processof his personality'sunfolding; but it is also possible that psycho-physicaldevelopment does not permit a complete unfolding, and, in fact, in different n'ays. He rvho dies in childhood or falls victim of a paralysiscannot unfold " h i m s e l f ' c o m p l c t e l y . A n e m p i r i c a lc o n t i n g e n t i vt.h e r v e a k n e sosl the organism, destroys the meaning of life (if we seethe meaning of'life to be this r-rnfoldingof the person). On the other hand, a stronger orp;anismcontinues to support life when its nreaning is already fulfilled and the person has completely developed himself. The incompletenessis here similar to the fragmentan'character of a rvork of art of which a part is finished and only the raw material for the rest is preserved. A def'ectiveunfolding is also possible in a sound organism. He rvho never meets a person worthy of love or hate can never experience the depths in which -I-o lclve and hate are rooted. him who has never seen a work of art nor gone beyond the rvallsof the city may perhaps fbrever be closed the enjoyment of nature and art together u'ith his susceptibility for this enjovment. Such an "incomplete" person is similar to an unfinished sketch. Finally, it is also cor.rceivable{or the personality not to unfold at all. He u'ho does not feel values himself but acquires all feelings onlv through contagiort from others, cannot erperience "himself." He can become, not a personality, but at most a phantom ol'one.

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Empathyas the Understanding of Spiritual Persons

Only in the last casecan we say that there is no spiritual person present. In all other casesr+'emust not put the person's nonunfblding on a par with his non-existence. Rather, the spiritual person also exists even if he is not unfolded. As the realization of the spiritual person, the psycho-physicalindividual can be called the "empirical person." As "nature" he is subject to the laws of causality,as "spirit" to the lal's of meaning. Also that meaningful context of psychic attributes of $'hich we spoke earlier, by virtue of which the comprehensior-rof one attribute reasonably motivates progress to the other, is his only as a personal one. Finest sensitivity to ethical values and a u'ill leaving them completely unheeded and only allowing itself to be guided by sensualmotives do not go together in the unity of a meaning, are unintelligible. And so an action also bids for understanding. It is not merely to be carried out empathically as a single experience, but experienced as proceeding meaningfully from the total structure of the person.l33

IDasein),and I may not deliver it as a factual statement. But the mere fhctual statement alone is even less"true historically." The most exact statement of'all that Frederick the Great did from the day of his birth up to his last breath does not give us a glimmer of the spirit which, transfbrming,reached into the history of Europe. Yet the understanding glance may seize upon this in a 'fhe chance remark in a short letter. mere concatenation of f'acts m a k e sa m e a n i n g f u l o c c u r r e n c ei n t o a b l i n d o c c u r r e n c ec a u s a l l y ruled. It neglects the world of the spirit that is no less real or knowable than the natural world. Becauseman belongs to both realms,the history of'mankind must take both into consideration. I t s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n dt h e { i r r m s o f t h e s p i r i t a n d o f s p i r i t u a l l i l - e and ascertain how much has become reality. And it can call on natural science to help explain what did not happen and what h a p p e n e dd i f f e r e n t l y t h a n t h e l a w s o f t h e s p i r i t d e m a n d e d . r 3 {

6. The Existence of the Spirit

(a) The Being and llalue of the Person

Simmel has said that the intelligibility of charactersvouchesfbr t h e i r o b j e c t i v i t y ,t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s" h i s t o r i c a lt r u t h . " T o b e s u r e , he does n()t distinguish this truth from poetic truth. A creature of the free imap;inationcan also be an intelligible person. Moreover, h i s t r > r i c aol b j e c t sm u s t b e r e a l . S o m e k i n d o f p o i n t o f d e p i r r t u r e , such as a trait of the historical character, must be given to me itr order to demonstratc the meaninp;context the object reveals to me as an historical {act. But rf I get possessionr>f it, in whatever fflanner, I have an existil.rgproduct attcl not a merely thntasized o n e . I n e m p a t h i cc o m p r e h e n s i o no f ' t h e f o r e i g n s p i r i t u a l i n d i v i d ual, I also have the possibilrtyof bringing his unverified behavior . uch action is det < l g i v e n n e s su n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s S nranded bv his pers

As we saw,Dilthey I'urther cotttends that personalitieshave an experier.rtialstructure of a typical character. We also agree with h i m i n t h i s . B e c a u s eo [ t h e c < t r r e l a t i o na m o n g v a l u e s ,t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g o f v a l u e ,a n d t h e l e v e l so f t h e p e r s o n ,a l l p o s s i b l et y p e so f personscan be establisheda priori from the standpoint of'a universal recognitiorr of worth. Empirical personsare realizationsof t h e s en p e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , e v e r y e m p a t h i c c o m p r e h e n s i o n 'E y e a n s t h e a c q r . r i s i t i oonf s t r c ha t y p e . r o f a p e r s < l n a l i tm Now, in Dilthey and others we find the view that the intelligibili t y o f f o r e i g n i n d i v i d u a l i t yi s b o u n d t o o u r o w n i n d i v i d u a l i t y ,t h a t our experiential structr.rrelimits the range t>l'$'hatis ltrr us intellig i b l e . O n a h i g h e r l e v c l ,t h i s i s t h e r e p e t i t i o r lo f p o s s i b l ee m p a t h i c deception that we have shwnin the constitution o{'the psychophysicalindividual. However, we have not demonstrated that this b e l o n g s t o t h e e s s e n c eo f e m p a t h v o r s a i d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e ri s m a d e t h e b a s i sf o r e x p e r i e n c i r . r ality. Once having penetrated into this labyrinth, \.\'efound our w a y b y t h e g u i d e l i n eo f " r n e a n i n g , " b u t w e h a v e s o f a r n o t f o u n d ar.ryother entrance than the one we used, the sensuallyperceiva b l e e x p r e s s i o ni n t o u n t e n a n c e s .e t c . o r i n a c t i o n s . I s i t e s s e n t i a l l ' y ' n e c e s s atrhya t s p i r i t c a n o n l y e n t e r i n t o e x c h a n g e w i t h s p i r i t t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m o f c o r p o r e a l i t y ?l , a s psycho-physicalindividual, actually obtain information about the s p i r i t u a l l i { ' e o f o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l si n n o o t h e r w a y . O f ' c o u r s e , I k n o w o [ m a n y i n d i v i d u a l s ,l i v i n g a n d d e a d , w h o m I h a v e n e v e r seen. But I know this from others whom I see or through the medium of their works which I sensuallyperceive and which they have pr

Edith Stein

taken so literally.) Who can say whether there is genuine experience present here or whether there is that unclearnessabout our own motives rvhich u'e found in considering the "idols of self knowledge"? But is not the essentialpossibilityof genuine experience in this area already given with the delusionsof such experience?Nevertheless,the study of religious consciousness seemsto m e t o b e t h e m o s t a p p r o p r i a t em e a n so f a n s u ' e r i n go u r q u e s t i o n , just as, on the other hand, its answer is of most interest for the domain of religion. However, I leave the answering of this question to f urther investigation and satisfymyself here u'ith a "non liquet." "lt is not clear."

PersonalBiography E d i t h S t e i n , r t , a sb o r n o n O c t o b e r 1 2 , l 8 9 l i n B r e s l a u ,t h e f I, daughter of the deceasedmerchant Siegfried Stein and his wif'e Auguste, n6e Courant. I am a Prussian citizen and Jewish. Frorr.rOctober 1897 to Easter 1906 I lvent ro the \riktoriaschule (municipal lyceum) in Breslau, and from Easter 1908 to Easter l9ll to the Breslau Girls' Secondarv School [Studienanstalt reaLgymnasiaLer Richtungl affiliated wirh it. Here I passed my s c h o o l c e r t i f i c a t ee x a m i n a t i o n . I n O c r o b e r l 9 l 5 I o b t a i n e d t h e leaving certificate of a humanistic gymnasium by taking a supplementary examination in Greek at Johannes Gymnasium in Breslau. From Easrer l9l I to Easter l9 t 3 I studied philosophy,psychology, history and German philology ar rhe University of Breslau, then for fbur more semestersat the University rrf Gcittingen. In pro farultate doiendi in January l9l5 I passed the Staatsexamen philosophical propaedeutics,historf, and German. At the end of this semester, I interrupted my studies and was for a time engaged in the serviceof the Red Cross. From February to October l9l6 I replaced an indisposed secondary school reacher ar tl-re above mentioned Girls' Secondary School in Breslau. 'fhen I moved to Freiburg in Br. in order to work as ProfessorFlusserl's assistant. At this time I would to extend my sincere thzrnksto all those who have offered me stimulatiorr and challenge during my srudent days, but above all, to those of'my teachersand student associatesthrough whom an approach to phenomenologicalphilosophy was opened to me: to Professor Husserl, Dr. Reinach, and the Gdttingen PhilosophicaS l ocietv. I l9

Notes l. English translation: Phenomenologl of Perception, trans. by Colin 'fhe Smith (Nen'York: Humanities Press, 1962). 2. English translation: The Nature of Sympathy,trans. by Peter Heath (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954). 3. Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenologl, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson (second edition; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952). References in brackets are to the sectionsin this edition to which E. Stein seemsto be referring. 1. Cf. Ideas, op. cit., Section 60. 5. Cf. p. 23 of the original; p. 22 this ed. 6. Cf. p. l0 of the original; p. I I this ed. 7. cf. p. l0 of the original;p. 10 this ed. 8. Cf. p. 46 of the original; p. 44 this ed. 9. Cf. p. 46 of the original; p. 42 this ed. 10. Cf. p.47 of the original;p. 43 this ed. I l. Cf. p. 44 of the original; p. 40 this ed. 12. Cf . p. 46 of the original; p. 43 this ed. 13. Loc. cit. 14. Cf. p. 48 of the original; p. 44 this ed. 15. Cf. p. 7l of the original;p. 63 this ed. 16. Cf. p. 95 of the original; p. 84 this ed. 1 7 . C f . p . 1 0 8 o f t h e o r i g i n a l ;p . 9 7 t h i s e d . 18. Cf. p. 83 of the original;p. 73 this ed. 19. Cf. note 3. 20. I cannot hope in a fen'short words to make the goal and method of phenomenology completely clear to anyone who is not familiar n'ith it, but must refer all questions arising to Husserl's basic work, the Ideen. 'I'he use of the term "primordiality" for the act side of experience 21. may attract attention. I employ it becauseI believe that it has the same character as one attributes to its correlate. I intentionally suppressmy usual expression, "actual experience," because I need it fbr another

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phenomenon and wish to avoid equivocation. (This othcr phenomenott is "act" in the specific sense of experience in the fr>rm of "cogito," of "bein g-turned-torvard. ") 22. Of course, going over past expericnces usually is an "abr-6g6" of the original course of experience.(In a feu'minutcs I can recapitulatethe vears.) This phenomerron itself merits an investigation of its "t :::;tt 23. On the concept o[ neutralization, ci. Husserl's Ideen, p. 222ff. [Section109] 24. It has been stressedrepeatedlv that the "objectification" of the ernpathizedexperience, in contrast rvith my