Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items: The lexicalisation of communication concepts in English, German and Dutch (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

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Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items

Pragmatics & Beyond New Series (P&BNS) Pragmatics & Beyond New Series is a continuation of Pragmatics & Beyond and its Companion Series. The New Series offers a selection of high quality work covering the full richness of Pragmatics as an interdisciplinary field, within language sciences.

Editor Andreas H. Jucker

University of Zurich, English Department Plattenstrasse 47, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected]

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University of Southern Denmark

Herman Parret

Jef Verschueren

Susan C. Herring

Emanuel A. Schegloff

Belgian National Science Foundation, Universities of Louvain and Antwerp

Belgian National Science Foundation, University of Antwerp

Editorial Board Shoshana Blum-Kulka Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Jean Caron

Université de Poitiers

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University of California at Los Angeles

Deborah Schiffrin

David Holdcroft

Georgetown University

Sachiko Ide

Kobe City University of Foreign Studies

Catherine KerbratOrecchioni

Sandra A. Thompson

Thorstein Fretheim John C. Heritage

Claudia de Lemos

Teun A. van Dijk

Marina Sbisà

Richard J. Watts

Robyn Carston

University College London

Bruce Fraser

Boston University University of Trondheim University of California at Los Angeles

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Paul Osamu Takahara

University of California at Santa Barbara Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona University of Berne

Volume 168 Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items. The lexicalisation of communication concepts in English, German and Dutch by Kristel Proost

Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items The lexicalisation of communication concepts in English, German and Dutch

Kristel Proost Institut für Deutsche Sprache, Mannheim

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia

8

TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Inaugural dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Mannheim. Thesis supervisors: Prof. Dr. Rosemarie Tracy, Prof. Dr. Gisela Harras. Dean: Prof. Dr. Johannes Paulmann. Date of oral examination: February 17, 2005.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Proost, Kristel. Conceptual structure in lexical items : the lexicalisation of communication concepts in English, German, and Dutch / Kristel Proost. p. cm. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series, issn 0922-842X ; v. 168) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Lexicology. 2. Communication--Language. 3. Speech acts (Linguistics) 4. Grammar, Comparative and general--Verb. I. Title. P326.P726 2007 413'.028--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 5412 2 (Hb; alk. paper)

2007033949

© 2007 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

Table of contents

Acknowledgements Abbreviations and typographical conventions chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Objectives 1 1.2 Some basic terminology 7 1.2.1 Concepts of communication 7 1.2.2 Speech act verbs and verbs of communication 8 1.3 Structural outline 9 chapter 2 Ordering systems for concepts of communication 2.1 Introduction 11 2.2 A review of ordering systems for concepts of communication 13 2.2.1 Traditional speech act taxonomies 13 2.2.1.1 Austin’s lexicalist approach 14 2.2.1.2 Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts 17 2.2.1.3 The applicability of Searle’s taxonomy to a study of lexical gaps 22 2.2.2 Baumgärtner’s ordering system for directive and commissive speech acts 33 2.2.2.1 Categorial aspects of the meaning of performatives 33 2.2.2.2 Lexical systems 35 2.2.2.3 Lexicalised and non-lexicalised concepts of communication 37 2.2.3 Edmondson’s ordering system for directives, commissives and expressives 40 2.2.3.1 The structure of Edmonson’s ordering system 40 2.2.3.2 Discussion of Edmondson’s ordering system 43 2.2.3.3 Lexicalisation tendencies 55

ix xi

1

11

vi


2.2.3.4 A cross-linguistic comparison of lexicalisation tendencies 56 2.2.3.5 Potential explanations for the occurrence of lexical gaps 58 2.2.3.6 Lexical gaps and idiomatic speech act expressions 62 2.2.3.7 A comparison of Edmondson’s and Baumgärtner’s ordering systems 65 2.2.4 Harras’ ordering system for concepts of communication 65 2.2.4.1 The common semantic core of speech act verbs and verbs of communication 65 2.2.4.2 Special resource situation types 66 2.2.4.3 An inventory of categorial aspects, attributes and values 75 2.2.4.4 Speech acts versus speech act verbs 79 2.2.4.5 Lexical gaps 82 2.3 Conclusion 86 chapter 3 Lexical gaps 3.1 Introduction 89 3.2 Why study lexical gaps? 90 3.3 Previous accounts of lexical gaps 96 3.3.1 Chomsky (1965) 96 3.3.2 Lehrer (1974) 98 3.3.3 Lyons (1977) 105 3.3.4 Verschueren (1985) 107 3.3.5 Fellbaum (1996) 109 3.3.6 Allan (2001) 112 3.3.7 Cruse (2004) 113 3.4 Defining lexical gaps 114 3.5 Detecting lexical gaps 115 3.5.1 Finding gaps at the conceptual level of meaning 116 3.5.2 Finding gaps at the lexical level of meaning 118 3.6 Lexical gaps in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication 119 3.6.1 Gaps in the fields of representatives 119 3.6.1.1 Gaps in the fields of assertives 119 3.6.1.2 Gaps in the fields of information verbs 123 3.6.2 Gaps in the fields of directives 128 3.6.3 Gaps in the fields of commissives 134 3.6.4 Gaps in the fields of expressives 141

89

Table of contents vii

3.6.4.1 Gaps in the fields of judgement verbs 141 3.6.4.2 Gaps in the fields of verbs expressing a positive or negative evaluation 141 3.6.4.3 Gaps in the fields of verbs expressing emotions 149 3.6.5 Gaps in the fields of verbs of communication 151 3.7 Conclusion: Explanations for the occurrence of lexical gaps 153 chapter 4 159 Concepts of communication lexicalised by idioms and collocations 4.1 Introduction 159 4.2 The lexical status of complex lexicalisations 162 4.3 The lexicalisation properties of idioms and collocations: An empirical investigation 165 4.4 Idioms and collocations with one-word synonyms 169 4.4.1 Idioms and collocations as synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication 169 4.4.2 Idioms vs. collocations 171 4.4.3 Proportion of idioms and collocations in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication 174 4.4.4 Proportion of idioms and collocations in the main classes of speech act verbs 176 4.4.5 Idioms and collocations as fillers of gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication 184 4.5 Idioms and collocations lacking one-word synonyms 186 4.5.1 Complex lexicalisations expanding the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication 187 4.5.2 Complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid classes of communicative expressions 194 4.5.3 Complex lexicalisations constituting separate classes of communicative expressions 203 4.6 Complex communicative expressions in English, German and Dutch 207 4.7 Conclusion 209 chapter 5 Conclusion

213

Bibliography

217

viii Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items

appendix i English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish speech act verbs Matrix A: English/German/Dutch 225 Matrix B: French/Russian/Turkish 236

223

appendix ii German idioms and collocations

249

Subject/author index Index of verbs and phrasemes discussed

297 299

Acknowledgements

The present study was submitted as my doctoral thesis at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Mannheim. It originated within the framework of the project “Tendenzen der Lexikalisierung kommunikativer Konzepte”, which was carried out at the Institut für Deutsche Sprache (IDS) in Mannheim and was financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, whose assistance is hereby kindly acknowledged. I would like to thank the project leader, Gisela Harras (IDS), for her willingness to discuss any type of linguistic or other scientific issue at almost any time of day. I am deeply indebted to her for her guidance, advice and encouragement in every stage of my work on this study. I am also grateful to Rosemarie Tracy (University of Mannheim) for supervising my thesis and, perhaps even more importantly, for having raised my interest in linguistics in the first place. The present study has benefited greatly from what I have learned during my work on the IDS-project Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben. I thank all the members of the DFG-project as well as those of the IDS-project, Gisela Harras, Edeltraud Winkler, Daniel Glatz and Sabine Erb, for extensive discussions on diverse linguistic topics. Special thanks go to our student assistants Kerstin Nieradt and Ilona Link, who helped me to set up a corpus of German idioms and collocations used to refer to linguistic actions. Together with Anastasia Novikova, Kerstin Nieradt also helped me with the typing of the data in the Appendix. In setting up a comparable list of English idioms and collocations, I have had much help from Joyce Thompson. Her efforts to find English equivalents for German idioms and collocations not only took much work off my hands but also made me more fully aware of cross-linguistic differences. My cross-linguistic study of lexicalisation patterns would not have been nearly as interesting as it eventually turned out to be without the French, Russian and Turkish data gathered for me by Eva Burkhardt and Jacqueline Kubczak (for French), by Anastasia Novikova and Dmitrij Dobrolvol’skij (for Russian) and by Nilgün Yavuz and Julia Gür (for Turkish). I have also profited greatly from intensive discussions with our research partners Christiane Fellbaum (Princeton University), Dmitrij Dobrovol’skij (Moscow State University) and Jef Verschueren (University of Antwerp). Finally, I thank Raymond Lamos for his careful proofreading of several versions of the manuscript.

Abbreviations and typographical conventions

Abbreviations S H RS DS SRS (or RS speaker) HRS (or RS hearer) SDS (or DS speaker) HDS (or DS hearer) P P’ Utt(P) Att(S,P) I(S) Pres(S) Q R I SI COLL E. G. D.

Speaker Hearer Resource Situation Discourse Situation Resource Situation Speaker Resource Situation Hearer Discourse Situation Speaker Discourse Situation Hearer Propositional Content (used whenever the propositional content is not a question) Propositional Content – Question (used when the propositional content is a question) Utterance with – in the prototypical case – a propositional content Propositional attitude of the speaker Speaker Intention Presupposition(s) of the speaker an institutional fact (An institutional fact is created by a speaker performing a declarative speech act.) a reaction (e.g. the answer a speaker expects from a hearer to his/her question/questions) Idiom, i.e. fully idiomatic expression Semi-idiom, i.e. semi-idiomatic expression Collocation English German Dutch

xii Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items

Abbreviations used in examples sb. sth. jmd. etw. iem.

somebody something jemand (‘somebody’) etwas (‘something’) iemand (‘somebody’)

Typographical conventions and symbols CAPITALS italics ‘single quotation marks’ “double quotation marks” underscore * asterisk ? question mark # hedge ∅

represent concepts or speech acts (e.g. PROMISE) represent linguistic expressions (e.g. promise); also used for emphasis in text represent meaning paraphrases indicate quotations from other authors used for emphasis within examples indicates that a linguistic expression is formally ill-formed indicates that a linguistic expression is semantically ill-formed indicates that the linguistic expression in question has a reading different from the one intended indicates the absence of an appropriate lexicalisation for a given concept

Corpora used For English For German For Dutch

The British National Corpus The corpora of the IDS (Institut für Deutsche Sprache) – Mannheim The corpora of the INL (Instituut voor Nederlandse Lexikologie) – Leiden

chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

Objectives

This study compares patterns in the lexicalisation of concepts of verbal communication in English, German and Dutch. The term “verbal communication” will henceforth be used to refer to any kind of situation in which a speaker (S) utters something (Utt) to a hearer (H). In most cases, the speaker’s utterance contains a proposition (P). Concepts of verbal communication get lexicalised by verbs such as promise, claim, request, praise, declare, whisper, phone and say, which may be classified as either speech act verbs or verbs of communication. The former differ from the latter in that they lexicalise combinations of speaker attitudes such as the speaker’s attitude towards the proposition of his utterance, the speaker’s intention and so on. Of the verbs mentioned above, promise, claim, request, praise and declare are speech act verbs. Verbs of communication do not lexicalise particular speaker attitudes but rather express the way in which something is uttered (whisper), the medium by which something is uttered (phone) or the very fact of uttering something (say). Speech act verbs and verbs of communication make up the inventory of single-word expressions of the category ‘verb’, which are used to refer to acts of verbal communication. Concepts of verbal communication may also be expressed by complex lexicalisations such as VP (Verb Phrase)-idioms and -collocations. Complex communicative expressions may but need not express speaker attitudes. For example, a collocation like make a (phone)call makes reference to a particular communication medium and an idiom like cut someone short to conversational structure, but neither of them expresses particular speaker attitudes. By contrast, an idiom like blow one’s own trumpet or a collocation like tell a lie do lexicalise speaker attitudes (an evaluative attitude and one of not taking something to be true respectively). Single verbs (speech act verbs and verbs of communication) as well as VP-idioms and -collocations are part of the lexicalisation domain of concepts of verbal communication. Apart from these actually existing lexicalisations, the lexicalisation domain of communication concepts also comprises lexicalisations which are possible in principle but do not actually exist. Instances of such are commonly referred to as “lexical gaps.” This study primarily deals with the occurrence of


lexical gaps in the inventory of communicative expressions. Its central aim is to find out whether certain types of communication concepts get lexicalised more readily than others and whether the lexicalisation of communication concepts is governed by certain principles. Adopting a distinction made in two-levels semantics, the present study regards the meaning of lexical items as comprising a conceptual as well as a lexical component. The conceptual part of the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication is taken to include all aspects of the meaning of these verbs which determine which situation types they are used to refer to. All other aspects of the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication belong to the lexical part of the meaning of these verbs. The distinction between the conceptual and the lexical part of word meanings parallels the distinction drawn in two-levels semantics between conceptual structure and semantic form (cf. Bierwisch & Lang 1989; Bierwisch & Schreuder 1992; Lang 1994). Verbs which are identical with respect to the conceptual part of their meaning constitute a lexical field. For example, lie and fib belong to the same lexical field, because they lexicalise the same concept (NOT TO TELL THE TRUTH). Verbs belonging to the same lexical field may differ from each other with respect to the lexical part of their meaning. For example, lie and fib differ from each other regarding the degree of strength lexicalised: fib (German schwindeln and flunkern; Dutch jokken) is used to refer to acts of lying which are regarded as being rather more innocent and/or not having serious consequences. The difference in the degree of strength lexicalised by lie and fib is not an element of the situation referred to by these verbs, and hence it is not an aspect of the conceptual part of their meaning. Rather, the use of one of these verbs is a matter of how the speech act performed by a particular speaker is interpreted by a second speaker reporting on the speech act performed by the first one. The degree of strength lexicalised by verbs like lie and fib is an element of the lexical component of the meaning of these verbs. The distinction between the conceptual and the lexical part of the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication is most obvious in cases where the two parts of meaning comprise opposite features. A case in point is the meaning of boast, which is used to refer to the speech act of a speaker expressing a positive evaluation of one of his own actions or qualities. This positive evaluation is an aspect of the conceptual part of the meaning of boast. However, the meaning of boast contains more than only a positive evaluation. boast also lexicalises an evaluation by a speaker reporting on the act of self-praise of the first speaker. By using a descriptive verb like boast, the reporting speaker indicates that he or she considers the other speaker’s positive evaluation to be exaggerated. The evaluation of the first speaker’s act of self-praise as being exaggerated is a negative evaluation.

Chapter 1. Introduction

Figure 1. Evaluations lexicalised by boast

The negative evaluation expressed by the speaker of the reporting situation is an aspect of the lexical part of the meaning of boast. This means that boast lexicalises two different evaluations: a positive one by the speaker of the reported situation and a negative one by the speaker of the reporting situation. The former is an element of the conceptual part of the meaning of boast, while the latter is an element of the lexical part of the meaning of this verb (cf. Figure 1). Gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication may relate to either the conceptual or the lexical part of word meaning. Examples of lexical gaps concerning the conceptual level of word meaning may be found in the fields constituted by so-called “reactive predicates”, which are used to refer to speech acts which are themselves reactions to another speaker’s utterance. They lexicalise the feature [+REACTIVE] as opposed to predicates which are not exclusively used to refer to a reactive stage. The latter group of predicates lexicalises the feature [–REACTIVE]. Though reactive predicates occur within the classes of representatives (e.g. confirm and deny) and commissives (e.g. agree, consent, refuse and decline), there are no expressive predicates lexicalising a reactive stage in the interaction of S and H. Directives lexicalising the feature [+REACTIVE] exist in German (zurückfragen, nachfragen) and Dutch (navragen), but not in English. (The English verb query is not used exclusively to refer to a reactive stage.) Figures 2 and 3 represent the lexicalisation of the feature [±REACTIVE] by representative, commissive, directive and expressive speech act verbs. The lack of specific predicates lexicalising the concept of a reactive directive or a reactive expressive speech act illustrates the occurrence of gaps relating to the conceptual part of word meaning. Other gaps concern the lexical part of word meaning. Such gaps present themselves as non-occupied positions in the struc-


Figure 2. Representatives and commissives lexicalising the feature [±REACTIVE]

Figure 3. Directives and expressives lexicalising the feature [±REACTIVE]

ture of a lexical field. An example is the lack of verbs lexicalising a degree of intensity higher than that expressed by lie. As has been pointed out above, fib is used to refer to acts of lying which are regarded as being of a rather more innocent or facetious nature. However, there is no verb in either English, German or Dutch lexicalising a reporting speaker’s opinion that the act of lying referred to is likely to have serious consequences. The lack of such verbs is an instance of a gap relating to the lexical part of word meaning. This study concentrates on lexical gaps relating to the conceptual part of the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of


communication. Gaps relating to the lexical part of word meaning will be dealt with when the function of complex lexicalisations is discussed. Having established a catalogue of lexical gaps, their occurrence will be explained wherever they appear to build patterns. Adequate explanations may be provided by pragmatic and cognitive principles as well as by principles of communication ethics and principles of lexical categorisation. To the extent that a principled account of the occurrence of lexical gaps is indeed possible, lexical gaps may reveal more about the lexicalisation of communication concepts than we are able to learn from existing expressions alone. The occurrence of gaps will be studied mainly with respect to English, German and Dutch with occasional reference to French, Russian and Turkish. If some concepts of communication fail to get lexicalised by verbs, they may be lexicalised by complex communicative expressions such as VP-idioms and -collocations. Hence, the second question dealt with in this study is whether complex communicative expressions fill gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Given that the lexicon of English, German and Dutch comprises both single- and multi-word expressions to lexicalise a specific concept, it is not clear whether these two types of expression lexicalise the same or different concepts. On the one hand, some idioms and collocations seem to add little or nothing to the conceptual content of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. This seems to be true especially of verb-collocation pairs like promise – give/make someone a promise and offer – make someone an offer, where the verb and the collocation do not seem to differ significantly with respect to the concept lexicalised. Even true idioms like blow one’s own trumpet and jemandem einen Bären aufbinden (German; literally ‘bind a bear onto somebody’, meaning ‘lie’) often seem to merely duplicate what is lexicalised by boast and lügen (lie) respectively. On the other hand, many fixed multi-word expressions lack single-word counterparts. English lacks a verb, for example, to express the concept lexicalised by the idiom promise someone the moon (‘to make a promise which is impossible to keep’). This example shows that some communication concepts are only lexicalised by idioms. This being the case, the question is whether this phenomenon applies to any concept randomly or only to concepts of certain types. One of the central aims of this study is to find out whether there is a systematic relationship between the type of concept lexicalised and the type of lexical expression by which it is lexicalised. One possibility which has often been suggested is that complex lexicalisations, especially idioms, typically lexicalise concepts of speaker attitudes (cf. Černyševa 1984: 18; Kühn 1985: 42–44; Černyševa 1989: 44–45; Dobrovol’skij 1988: 39–43; Schindler 1993: 101–103; Nunberg, Sag & Wasow 1994: 493 and Burger 1998: 185–186). However, in the light of the fact that this is precisely what


speech act verbs do too, this claim about the meaning of idioms does not help much to differentiate between the function of speech act verbs on the one hand and speech act idioms on the other. The question of how the meaning of complex lexicalisations differs from that of simple ones will be pursued from a cross-linguistic perspective, comparing the meaning of complex lexicalisations in English, German and Dutch. A cross-linguistic study of the meaning of idioms and collocations is likely to help provide answers to the following questions: 1. If complex lexicalisations appear to lexicalise only specific types of communication concepts in one language, does this finding also hold for the other languages under consideration? 2. If complex lexicalisations turn out to lexicalise specific types of communication concepts and if they also do so in different languages, are there any crosslinguistic similarities among the concepts they lexicalise? 3. If individual languages differ considerably with respect to what is lexicalised by complex lexical expressions, can these differences (or some of them) be explained systematically, e.g. typologically? Summarising, the lexicalisation domain of communication concepts comprises actually existing expressions including simple and complex ones as well as such which are possible in principle but do not actually exist (cf. Figure 4).

Figure 4. The lexicalisation domain of communication concepts


The aim of this study is to answer the following two questions: 1. May the occurrence of lexical gaps be accounted for in a systematic fashion? 2. Do complex lexicalisations (idioms and collocations) lexicalise communication concepts different from those lexicalised by simple ones? Since this study is not only concerned with the actually existing communicative expressions of a particular language but also deals with lexical gaps, it cannot be based on the total set of actually existing communicative expressions such as may be found in conventional dictionaries. In what follows, the occurrence of gaps in the lexical domain of speech act verbs and verbs of communication will be studied against the background of a conceptual system representing communication concepts as combinations of conceptual components. These are then combined in many different ways to yield representations of communication concepts irrespective of whether these are lexicalised or not. Combinations of conceptual components which are not lexicalised represent lexical gaps. The conceptual system used to investigate the occurrence of gaps will also be employed to find out whether complex communicative expressions lexicalise concepts different from those lexicalised by simple ones.

1.2

Some basic terminology

1.2.1

Concepts of communication

Throughout this study, the term “concepts of communication” will be used to refer to concepts of verbal actions such as TO PROMISE, TO CLAIM, TO REQUEST, TO PRAISE, TO DECLARE, TO SAY, TO WHISPER, etc. Concepts of communication other than those of verbal actions will not be taken into account. Concepts of properties such as those expressed by adjectives like talkative and taciturn and such of abstract entities like those lexicalised by nouns such as promise and threat may also be regarded as concepts of communication, but these concepts will not be considered. Because of its concentration on verbal actions, this study deals with single and complex lexicalisations of the category ‘verb’ only. Communicative acts which do not involve the use of language such as those performed by means of signs, gestures or facial expressions will not be taken into account.


Speech act verbs and verbs of communication

1.2.2

Speech act verbs typically lexicalise clusters of speaker attitudes, including a speaker intention and a speaker’s propositional attitude, i.e. the attitude of a speaker towards the proposition of his/her utterance. For example, a verb like lie is used to refer to situations where a speaker (S) does not take the proposition of his/her utterance (P) to be true. At the same time, a speaker who is said to be lying wishes the hearer (H) to recognise that he or she (i.e. S) takes P to be true. This means that lie, as well as its German and Dutch equivalents lügen and liegen, lexicalises the following combination of speaker attitudes:

Speaker attitudes lexicalised by lie/lügen/liegen

 

Propositional attitude of S – Att(S,P): Speaker intention – I(S):

¬ take to be true (S,P) want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P)))))

 

The speaker attitudes lexicalised by a verb like praise are of course different from those lexicalised by lie. A speaker who praises a hearer for something he/she has done prior to the time of S’s speaking evaluates P positively, his intention being that H recognise this. praise, as well as its German and Dutch equivalents loben and loven, lexicalise the following combination of speaker attitudes:

 

Speaker attitudes lexicalised by praise/loben/loven

Propositional attitude of S – Att(S,P): Speaker intention – I(S):

consider good (S,P) want (S (recognise (H (Att(S,P)))))

 

What has been illustrated for lie and praise is true of most speech act verbs in most if not all Indo-European languages: Speech act verbs characteristically lexicalise speaker attitudes of different types (cf. for English Ballmer & Brennenstuhl 1981; Wierzbicka 1987; for German Harras et al. 2004; for Dutch Verschueren 1980 and 1985; for a comparison of English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish speech act verbs, cf. Section 2.2.3.4 this volume, cf. also for speech acts Vanderveken 1990). The various types of speaker attitudes lexicalised by these verbs will be discussed in considerable detail in Chapter 2, which deals with ordering systems for concepts of communication. This chapter will also introduce other aspects of the meaning of speech act verbs, such as properties of the proposition and the speaker’s presuppositions. Verbs of communication differ from speech act verbs in that they do not lexicalise speaker attitudes, at least not such which concern the situation these verbs


are used to refer to. Rather, they express the way in which something is uttered (e.g. scream, stutter and whisper), the medium by which an utterance is brought about (e.g. phone and mail) or the very fact of uttering something (as is true of verbs like say, speak and utter). Though an utterance containing a verb of communication may certainly express speaker attitudes, these are not part of the meaning of the verb itself. For example, the speaker attitudes expressed by the utterances in (1) and (2) may only be inferred from the contents of the utterance (the proposition P) and not from the meaning of the verb itself: (1) “Leave me alone!” she screamed. (BNC/John Cairney: Worlds apart. Edingburgh, 1991) (2) They argue that Mrs Aquino can heal old wounds by allowing the former dictator to come home, at the same time disarming his supporters who scream that he is being done an injustice. (BNC/The Independent 1989)

In (1), the speaker’s propositional attitude is one of wanting (S wants: P), while it is the speaker’s intention that H do P (S wants: H do P). In (2), the speakers’ propositional attitude consists in their taking P to be true (S takes to be true: P), their intention being that H recognise this (S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P). As the examples in (1) and (2) show, the speaker attitudes expressed by the utterances in (1) and (2) differ along with the varying contents of the utterance. This would not be possible if speaker attitudes were part of the meaning of the verb itself. This means that a verb like scream is not specified with respect to speaker attitudes; like its German and Dutch equivalents schreien and schreeuwen, it only lexicalises the manner in which the utterance is performed:

Speaker attitudes lexicalised by scream/schreien/schreeuwen

 

Propositional attitude of S – Att(S,P): Speaker intention – I(S): Manner of speaking

1.3

None None Sound intensity

 

Structural outline

In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I shall discuss several ordering systems which may be used to represent lexicalised as well as non-lexicalised concepts of communication. In Chapter 3, one of these will be used as the basis for a systematic investigation of the occurrence of lexical gaps. Explanations for the occurrence of gaps will be considered wherever these appear to build patterns. To check the plausibility of possible explanations, I shall compare the occurrence of gaps in the main classes of speech act verbs and verbs of communication in English, German

10


and Dutch. Chapter 4 starts out from the question of whether VP-idioms and -collocations lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by speech act verbs and verbs of communication. If this turns out to be the case, they may be said to fill lexical gaps. The lexicalisation properties of complex communicative expressions in English, German and Dutch will be compared to show whether the types of communication concepts lexicalised by these expressions are similar in different languages. The sixth and last chapter summarises what the occurrence of lexical gaps and the lexicalisation properties of complex communicative expressions tell us about the principles underlying the lexicalisation of concepts of communication. That chapter also addresses the question of whether these principles are hierarchically ordered and, if so, whether this hierarchy of principles is similar in English, German and Dutch.

chapter 2

Ordering systems for concepts of communication

2.1

Introduction

Lexical gaps occur in many different areas of the vocabulary. Speakers usually become aware of them when they fail to come up with a second-language equivalent to a lexicalisation of their native language. In such cases, bilingual dictionaries either offer paraphrases or list lexical alternatives whose meanings overlap at least partially with that of the lexicalisation of the source language but seldom fully satisfy the dictionary user. For example, the concept TO LIKE TO EAT SOMETHING is lexicalised in Dutch by the verb lusten, but the same concept can only be expressed in German and English by verbs such as mögen and like respectively, which are used to refer to the state of being fond of anything, not particularly of food. In the German expression etwas schmeckt jemandem (meaning ‘someone likes to eat something’), the position occupied by etwas (‘something’) must be filled with a nominal expression referring to some piece of food. However, the verb schmecken does not mean ‘like to eat something’ when used in isolation, i.e. in free combinations of words. English lacks multiword expressions as well as verbs to lexicalise the relevant concept. Though lexical gaps frequently manifest themselves in situations involving the use of more than one language, their occurrence is by no means restricted to such situations. Speakers may also lack a specialised lexicalisation to express a certain concept in their native language. This may be the case when they happen to be looking for an antonym of a particular word and fail to find one which completely fits the concept to be lexicalised. When, for example, we are looking for an antonym of the verb stammer to express the concept TO SPEAK FLUENTLY, we may realise that English lacks a specialised word or other lexical expression to lexicalise this concept. In cases like this, speakers usually resort to paraphrases to fill the gaps in question. Paraphrases also serve to fill the gaps in the lexicon of English, German and Dutch relating to the concept FATHER OR MOTHER OF SOMEBODY’S FATHER OR MOTHER. These three languages provide their speakers with nouns like grandfather and grandmother to refer to somebody’s grandparents, but these

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two words, as well as their German and Dutch equivalents, are not specified with respect to the distinction between the side of somebody’s father and that of his or her mother. In this case too, the gap can only be filled by paraphrases such as the father of his father or the father of his mother, i.e. there is no specialised lexical expression to express the corresponding concept. A specialised lexicalisation is available, however, to speakers of Swedish, who may use the words farfar and farmor to refer to the father and mother respectively of somebody’s father as well as the words morfar and mormor, meaning ‘the father of somebody’s mother’ and ‘the mother of somebody’s mother’ respectively. This means that Swedish lexicalises a conceptual distinction which is not reflected in the lexicon of other Germanic languages such as English, German and Dutch. The last two examples of lexical gaps involve a relation of opposition between concepts as well as between lexical items. Fellbaum (1996) mentions examples of lexical gaps which concern a hierarchical relation among word meanings as well as among concepts. On the basis of the English data represented in WordNet, she claims that lexical gaps frequently occur towards the top of a hierarchy. For example, English lacks lexical expressions to refer to the class of vehicles on wheels or to the category of bad persons. WordNet, a lexical data base representing the structure of the English lexicon, operates with so-called “pseudo-words” like wheeled vehicle or bad person to solve this problem. These represent connecting nodes in the relations among “real” words. In the absence of such “pseudowords”, the relations among “real” words would be interrupted. Fellbaum argues that “pseudo-words” are indispensable to a representation of the lexicon as a semantic network. Fellbaum (1996) also shows that the use of “pseudo-words” may help to explain the syntactic behaviour of certain groups of words. Creation verbs, for example, do not behave like a homogeneous group with respect to the argument alternation called the “material/product alternation” (cf. Levin 1993: 56). As examples (1)–(4) show, the syntactic behaviour of verbs like fabricate and compose does not mirror that of verbs like weave and mold in spite of the fact that all these verbs are verbs of creation. (Examples (1)–(4) are Fellbaum’s; cf. Fellbaum 1996: 224.) (1) a. She wove a rug from the black sheep’s wool. b. She wove the black sheep’s wool into a rug. (2) a. They molded a head from the clay. b. They molded the clay into a head. (3) a. The reporter fabricated a story out of the girl’s account. b. *The reporter fabricated the girl’s account into a story.

Chapter 2. Ordering systems for concepts of communication

(4) a. She composed a quartet out of the old folk song. b. *She composed the old folk song into a quartet.

According to Fellbaum, these data suggest that verbs of creation fall into either of two subclasses: verbs of mental creation including fabricate and compose or verbs of creation from raw material like weave and mold. Though concepts like MENTAL CREATION and CREATION FROM RAW MATERIAL are not lexicalised in English or German, their presence in speakers’ minds is nevertheless reflected by the different syntactic behaviour of the corresponding verbs. These observations suggest that words which behave similarly from a syntactic point of view may constitute a conceptual category of their own, even if the lexicon of a particular language lacks a label to refer to it. The syntactic behaviour of these words thus serves as a justification for assuming the presence of lexical gaps as well as for the use of a “pseudo-word” to fill this gap in a semantic network. All of the monolingual examples mentioned in this section involve relations among word meanings as well as among concepts. They show that lexical gaps are part of the lexicalisation domain of concepts of a particular kind. Lexical gaps can be observed most easily against the background of a network representing relations among concepts. A conceptual network represents the meanings of real words as well as of “pseudo-words” and enables us to locate lexical gaps in a specific section of the vocabulary. Clearly, the nature of the conceptual network, especially the parameters on which it is based, depends on the lexical field to be investigated. The conceptual network also has to be sufficiently fine-grained if all lexical gaps are to be included. To achieve this latter end, all parameters relevant to the semantics of the lexical expressions in question have to be taken into account. In the next sections, I shall present several types of ordering systems for concepts of communication. For each of these, I shall discuss whether it really allows us to capture not only all relevant lexicalisations but also all relevant lexical gaps which are part of the lexicalisation domain of concepts of communication. One of the ordering systems proposed will then be selected as the basis of this study.

2.2

A review of ordering systems for concepts of communication

2.2.1

Traditional speech act taxonomies

As we have seen in Chapter 1, speech acts are represented in speakers’ minds as a particular type of concepts of communication. For this reason, traditional speech act taxonomies may be regarded as ordering systems for concepts of communication. This section introduces the speech act taxonomies proposed by Searle and

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Austin and then discusses whether these may be used for the purpose of this study. I shall focus on the question of whether these speech act taxonomies may be used to cover the entire lexicalisation domain of communication concepts, i.e. the whole range of lexicalised as well as non-lexicalised concepts.

2.2.1.1 Austin’s lexicalist approach Any attempt to classify speech acts raises a variety of questions such as the following: How do illocutionary acts differ from each other? Which are the basic categories of speech acts and – perhaps the most basic question – how should we proceed if we want to establish an inventory of illocutionary acts? Austin answered the latter question by claiming that illocutionary acts are accessible via the lexicon. He proposed to set up “a list of verbs of the order of the third power of 10” by going through a dictionary and applying the test of the first person singular present indicative active form (e.g. I (hereby) promise …, I (hereby) request …etc.) (cf. Austin 1962: 150). According to Austin, this procedure yields a list of “verbs which make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance, or what illocutionary act it is that we are performing in issuing that utterance” (ibid.). One objection against this procedure is that it captures only performative verbs. However, Austin intended to establish a list of illocutionary forces. Since these are expressed by any type of illocutionary verb, Austin would actually have needed a list of all illocutionary verbs instead of one including only performative predicates. Performative verbs do not describe anything but are used by a speaker to perform a particular speech act. For example, a speaker may make a promise by uttering a sentence like I promise you to visit you tomorrow or warn somebody by saying I warn you: This dog is dangerous! Uttering a sentence containing a performative verb like promise or warn suffices to perform the corresponding speech acts of PROMISING or WARNING (cf. Harras 2004: 126–129). Austin’s performativity test excludes verbs like boast, flatter and lie: (5) ?I (hereby) boast … (6) ?I (hereby) flatter you … (7) ?I (hereby) lie to you …

Clearly, purely descriptive verbs like boast, flatter and lie do not stand the performativity test and hence are not performative verbs. The use of verbs like these is restricted to discourse situations. A discourse situation is a situation in which a speaker, the so-called Discourse Situation Speaker (SDS), refers to a speech act performed by another speaker. Following Barwise & Perry, the situation referred to will henceforth be called the “resource situation” (RS), while the report-


Figure 1. The inventory of situational roles of the discourse and the resource situation (from Harras et al. 2004: 10)

ing situation will be termed the “discourse situation” (DS) (cf. Barwise & Perry 1983: 32–39). Both types of situations have the same inventory of situational roles: a speaker, a hearer and an utterance containing a proposition (cf. Figure 1; SDS = discourse situation speaker; SRS = resource situation speaker; PDS = proposition uttered by SDS; PRS = proposition uttered by SRS; HDS = discourse situation hearer; HRS = resource situation hearer). In cases where an illocutionary predicate is used performatively, the DS and the RS coincide, hence in such cases the speakers, the hearers and the propositions of the DS and the RS are identical (cf. Harras 1998: 8–9). Since Austin introduced the term “performative utterances” in the early 1960s (cf. Austin 1962), there has been much controversy over the question of what enables some illocutionary verbs to be used performatively while others may not be used in that way. Whether a given illocutionary verb may be used performatively or not may in principle be due to a variety of factors including the meaning of the verb in question, properties of the corresponding act, or social facts and institutions. The question of what enables or blocks the performative use of a given verb will be dealt with extensively in Section 2.2.1.3. Though verbs like lie, boast and flatter may not be used performatively, they do refer to speech acts, and their semantic properties lay bare some of the crucial aspects of the acts they are used to refer to. Austin’s claim that speech act verbs are

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a good guide to illocutionary acts holds true for all illocutionary verbs, not just for performatives. It seems reasonable to assume, as Austin does, that the meaning of speech act verbs mirrors much of what is relevant to the nature of the corresponding speech acts. This assumption seems to reflect the more general assumption that individual languages provide their speakers with lexical expressions for whatever the speakers of that language consider to be important (cf. Ballmer & Brennenstuhl 1981: 3; Leech 1983: 198; Ulkan 1992: 10). On a cognitive account, the presence of a vocabulary item to refer to a particular concept counts as evidence that the concept in question is considered a salient one within a particular speech community. The presence of an illocutionary verb to refer to a particular concept of communication is only a special instance of this more general pattern: Though conceptualizations do not lend themselves to direct observation, they can be studied indirectly via language, as there is a close relationship between linguistic and conceptual structure. … The reason for taking lexical items as a point of departure is warranted by the fact that languages tend to lexicalize those concepts that are deemed important in a particular linguistic community. Words reflect well-entrenched conceptualizations. Since illocutions are acts, the most (Vanparys 1996: 91–92) natural items to turn to are illocutionary verbs.

The idea that there is a close relationship between conceptual and linguistic structure to the extent that concepts which are considered important tend to be lexicalised rather than such which are deemed less important or even not important at all is of special relevance to a study of lexical gaps. However, even if this assumption proves to be correct, it does not explain much, but rather gives rise to a new question: what remains to be clarified is why it is that some concepts are deemed important whereas others are not. As far as concepts of communication are concerned, this question may be answered either from a pragmatic or from a cognitive point of view. A pragmatic explanation may make reference to principles such as the Cooperative Principle (cf. Grice 1975), the Tact Maxim (cf. . As Harras points out, Austin’s performativity test is not reliable anyway, because some verbs which are not performative or not unambiguously performative stand the test too. Examples are regret and quote, which may both be used in utterances with the performative formula I hereby .... However, verbs like regret and quote, for example, differ from verbs like promise and warn in that they are not only used to perform a certain speech act, but also describe an emotional attitude (in the case of regret) or a future action (as is true of quote). A speaker cannot quote something merely by virtue of uttering a sentence like I hereby quote the opening passage from Pride and Prejudice, i.e. the speaker has to actually quote the corresponding passage before he can be claimed to be quoting. Apart from that, hereby in this case functions as a cataphoric element, not as one indicating performativity (cf. Harras2004: 128–129).


Leech 1977) and principles of communication ethics, while a cognitive account may offer an explanation in terms of Cognitive Salience (cf. Verschueren 1985) or Relevance (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986). This study does not in any way proceed from the assumption that lexical expressions reveal whatever is important or relevant to the speakers of a certain linguistic community, no matter how plausible this assumption may seem to be. The procedure followed here to identify lexical gaps is independent from any preconceived notion about how linguistic and conceptual structure relate to each other. The conceptual network used will reveal which concepts are lexicalised as opposed to such which are not. Having established a list of lexical gaps, we shall proceed to find explanations for their occurrence. If indeed it is true that the cognitive or social importance of concepts correlates with their tendency to be lexicalised, this should become clear from the lexicalisation patterns observed. Though the lexicon may certainly provide us with a clue to illocutionary acts, it is evidently not likely to be of much help in the search for lexical gaps. If lexical gaps are to be captured systematically, we certainly need more than an inventory of actually existing lexicalisations. I shall therefore turn to an alternative to the lexicalist approach next.

2.2.1.2 Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts Searle (1975) criticised Austin’s classification for several reasons, one of these being that Austin classified English illocutionary verbs rather than illocutionary acts. Searle considers differences in illocutionary verbs “a good guide but by no means a sure guide to differences in illocutionary acts” because of the following two reasons: 1. It is not true that wherever we are dealing with two non-synonymous illocutionary verbs, these must necessarily mark two different kinds of illocutionary acts. 2. An illocution which is lexicalised in one particular language need not necessarily be lexicalised in any other language as well. Searle & Vanderveken (1985) also criticise Austin’s lexicalist approach because of the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between illocutionary verbs and illocutionary forces: Because there is no one-to-one correspondence between illocutionary verbs and illocutionary forces it is essential to make a clear distinction between them. Illocutionary forces are, so to speak, natural kinds of uses of language, but we can no more expect the vernacular expressions to correspond exactly to the natural

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illocutionary kinds than we can expect vernacular names of plants and animals to correspond exactly to the natural biological kinds. (Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 179)

Searle and Vanderveken list four cases where illocutionary verbs do not correspond exactly to illocutionary acts. Firstly, many possible illocutionary forces do not have a corresponding verb in a particular language. Verschueren lists examples of speech acts which cannot be referred to by a specialised descriptive lexicalisation. An utterance like (8), for example, can be referred to by descriptions (8a) and (8b): (8) I am truly grateful for your hospitality. a. S said/ stated/ claimed that he/she was grateful for H’s hospitality. b. S thanked H for his/her hospitality.

However, a speaker reporting on a speech act like the one in (9) can only use (9a) or (9b). There is no specialised lexical expression analogous to the one in (8b) by which (9) may be appropriately described (cf. Verschueren 1985: 188–189). (9) I am surprised that you came. a. S said/ stated/ claimed that he/she was surprised that H came. b. S expressed his/her surprise at H’s coming.

This example shows that a particular language – here English – sometimes lacks a special illocutionary verb to refer to a specific speech act. Secondly, some verbs of communication do not name any illocutionary force at all, because they do not express any particular illocutionary point but rather refer to the manner in which an illocutionary act is performed. Verbs like mutter, grumble and shout, for example, do not name a particular illocutionary force, because any type of illocutionary force can be muttered, grumbled or shouted. Instead, these verbs refer to features of the utterance act, such as manner of articulation, manner of intonation and sound intensity. Searle & Vanderveken call these verbs “speech act verbs”, but since these verbs do not lexicalise any particular type of speech act at all, this does not seem to be the appropriate label for this class. Because of this, I shall refer to these verbs as “verbs of communication”, as I have pointed out in Chapter 1. Other verbs like, for example, interject and interpose do not refer to a particular illocutionary force either, but rather make reference to conversational structure. Thirdly, different non-synonymous illocutionary verbs may be used to name one and the same illocutionary force. This is true of verbs like, for example, claim, deny and insist, which all name the assertive illocutionary force but differ with respect to how the utterance referred to relates to the rest of the discourse. Claim


is used to refer to initial assertions, i.e. assertions which do not require some preceding speech act. As opposed to claim, deny is used to refer to a speaker’s reaction to another speaker’s claim and is therefore called a “reactive” predicate. Assertives like insist mark a second stage of reaction, i.e. a reaction of a speaker to a denial of his or her own initial request. (Apart from the assertive reading, insist also has a directive reading. The directive insist means ‘make a strong demand, urge’.) Fourthly, some illocutionary verbs are systematically ambiguous between different illocutionary points. Searle and Vanderveken mention the verbs advise and warn which are both systematically ambiguous between the illocutionary point of a directive and that of an assertive; a case of advising or warning can either be a case of telling the hearer that something is the case, leaving it to the hearer what he/she will do, or it can be one of telling him or her to do something because something is the case (cf. Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 179–181). Since Searle considers the lexicon a treacherous guide to illocutionary acts, he proposes a different procedure to classify illocutions. He suggests a set of classification criteria to distinguish one kind of illocutionary act from another. As Searle points out, illocutionary acts may differ from one another in different respects. He lists twelve dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts may differ from one another (cf. Searle 1975: 344–350). These are: 1. Differences in illocutionary point, i.e. the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act. 2. Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world. Requests, commands, vows, promises etc. have the world-to-word direction of fit, because their purpose is to make the world match the words. Other illocutions such as statements, descriptions and explanations, which are performed to make the words match the world, have the word-to-world direction of fit. 3. Differences in expressed psychological states. The psychological state expressed by a statement, an assertion or a remark is BELIEF. DESIRE or WANT is expressed by requests, orders, commands etc. PLEASURE is expressed by such speech acts like congratulations and welcomes, while promises, vows and threats express INTENTION. 4. Differences in the degree of strength with which the illocutionary point is presented. Acts like SUGGESTING and INSISTING, for example, have the same illocutionary point but differ in degree of strength. 5. Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer as these bear on the illocutionary force of the utterance. A speaker can, for example, only command or order a hearer to do something if he occupies the appropriate position to do so. If this is not the case, the directive speech act will be classified as a suggestion, a proposal or a request.

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20 Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items

6. Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and hearer. Promises differ from requests, for example, to the extent that whatever is promised is supposed to be in the interest of the hearer, whereas what is requested is typically thought of as being in the interest of the speaker. 7. Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse. What is meant here is the difference mentioned above between acts of REQUESTING, ALLOWING and INSISTING, which are initial, reactive and re-reactive in the way defined above. A similar difference may be observed by comparing acts like CLAIMING, CONFIRMING and ARGUING. 8. Differences in propositional content that are determined by illocutionary force indicating devices. What Searle has in mind here are differences between acts like PROMISING, where a speaker commits him- or herself to the performance of a future action, and acts like CRITICISING, which are always related to past actions. 9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can, but need not be performed as speech acts. Searle mentions the act of CLASSIFYING to illustrate this point. One may classify things by saying “I classify this as an A and this as a B”, but one need not say anything at all in order to be classifying. One may simply throw all the As in the A box and all the Bs in the B box. 10. Differences between those acts that require extra-linguistic institutions for their performance and those that do not. CHRISTENING and EXCOMMUNICATING are examples of speech acts which require an extra-linguistic institution, often also a special position by the speaker and hearer within that institution, in order for these speech acts to be performed. 11. Differences between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where it does not. Though many illocutionary verbs like, for example, promise, state, request and inform have performative uses, not all illocutionary verbs are performative verbs. Acts of boasting or threatening, for example, cannot be performed by uttering sentences such as ?I hereby boast ... or ?I hereby threaten ... 12. Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary act. As Searle points out, the difference between, for example, acts like ANNOUNCING and CONFIDING need not involve any difference in illocutionary point or propositional content but only in the style of performance of the illocutionary act. After having introduced these twelve criteria, Searle selects the first three of them, namely illocutionary point, direction of fit and the psychological state expressed, as the basis of his classification. Searle himself calls the last two “corollaries” of the first. This means that Searle’s classification is essentially based on the criterion


of illocutionary point. In such a classification, Searle argues, “other features – the role of authority, discourse relations, etc. – will fall into their appropriate places” (Searle 1975: 354). Insofar as Searle’s classification is constructed on the basis of a consistent principle, he avoids one of the main weaknesses of Austin’s. Searle selected the criterion of illocutionary point as the basis of his taxonomy, because it is related to the essential condition for the successful and nondefective performance of illocutionary acts. The essential condition distinguishes an illocutionary act of a particular type from other kinds of illocutionary acts. For example, the essential condition which has to be fulfilled for a promise to be successfully and non-defectively performed is that a speaker have the intention to perform a certain act. Having this intention is a necessary condition for making a promise: If we can show that a speaker did not have the intention of performing a certain future act in performing a certain speech act, we may safely conclude that this speech act was not a promise (cf. Searle 1969: 60). Similarly, the essential feature of a request is that a speaker has the intention to get a hearer to perform a certain act. The essential condition being the one which has to be fulfilled if the speech act is to be what it is claimed to be, it is more basic than the other conditions necessary for the successful and non-defective performance of a particular speech act. Searle claims that other conditions such as the sincerity, the preparatory and the propositional content condition are functions of the essential condition (cf. Searle 1969: 69). For example, since the essential condition of a request is that a speaker intends to get a hearer to perform a certain act, the propositional content condition to be fulfilled by a successful and non-defective request is that in a request a future act must be predicated of a hearer. The sincerity condition characterising a request is that a speaker requesting something of a hearer must actually want whatever he requires the hearer to do. According to Searle, both the propositional content and the sincerity condition follow from the essential condition. From this primacy of the essential condition Searle concludes that “… Ultimately … essential conditions form the best basis for a taxonomy, …” (Searle 1975: 345) and thereby justifies his choice of illocutionary point as the basic criterion underlying his speech act taxonomy. All other criteria serve to make subclassifications within each of the five main classes of illocutionary acts. Criticism of Searle’s taxonomy has centred mainly around the notion of illocutionary point, which, according to several authors, has never been clearly defined (cf. Ballmer & Brennenstuhl 1981: 58; Vanparys 1996: 31). This is not surprising given the fact that the notion of illocutionary point is derived from the essential condition for the felicitous performance of a particular speech act. After all, the essential condition itself has never been clearly defined either. The way in which the essential condition and hence the notion of illocutionary point is

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defined turns out to be different for different types of speech acts. Far from being the consistent classification principle which Searle claims it to be, the notion of illocutionary point seems to be derived from different conditions and combinations of these. If ‘illocutionary point’ is a term subsuming a mixture of different conditions and if direction of fit and psychological state are indeed corollaries of illocutionary point, Searle’s classification does not seem to be based on any classification principle at all. Leaving aside other points of criticism of Searle’s taxonomy, I shall now concentrate on what would turn out to be problematic if Searle’s taxonomy were to be used for a systematic study of the occurrence of lexical gaps.

2.2.1.3 The applicability of Searle’s taxonomy to a study of lexical gaps Any attempt to apply Searle’s taxonomy to a study of lexical gaps runs into a number of difficulties. The first concerns the number of the classification criteria needed: How many criteria does a complete coverage of the lexicalisation domain of concepts of communication require? The second question, more basic than the first, concerns the nature of the criteria required. Searle’s criteria apply to illocutionary acts, not necessarily to illocutionary verbs: not everything which is relevant to illocutionary acts is also part of the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Some of Searle’s classification criteria are irrelevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. This is true, for example, of the direction of fit between words and the world and the phenomenon of performativity. 1. Direction of fit The direction of fit between words and the world is not a component of the meaning of illocutionary verbs. The fact that requests and promises, for example, have the world-to-word and assertions the word-to-world direction of fit is a consequence of the illocutionary point of requests and promises on the one hand and assertions on the other. The illocutionary point of a certain act is, of course, relevant to the lexical meaning of the corresponding illocutionary verb. A speaker requesting something of a hearer intends to get that hearer to perform a certain kind of action. This is the point or purpose of a request, and it is also part of the meaning of the corresponding verb request. The fact that a speaker requesting something of a hearer also causes the world to match his words is a consequence of the point or purpose of the act of requesting. It is an extra-linguistic consequence of the nature of requesting acts, and, unlike the illocutionary point itself, does not directly relate to the semantics of the corresponding verb request.


2. Performativity Whether performativity is related to the semantic structure of illocutionary verbs has been a matter of much controversy. The discussion was initiated by McCawley, who argued that the meaning of a verb completely determines whether it can be used performatively (McCawley 1979: 151). McCawley distinguished seven classes of performative verbs, four of which – verdictives, commissives, behabitives and expositives – were already included in Austin’s classification (cf. Austin 1962: 151). The remaining three include operatives, imperatives and advisories, which are all subclasses of Austin’s exercitives. Operatives had already been set apart from other types of exercitives by Vendler (cf. Vendler 1972: 20–23). In Vendler’s classification, operatives are verbs referring to speech acts by which the speaker causes something to be the case. Examples of operatives include annul, appoint, baptise, decree etc. McCawley himself subdivided Vendler’s exercitives into imperatives and advisories. Verbs like demand, direct, entreat, insist, etc. are examples of imperatives, while such like advise, advocate, counsel and propose are classified as advisories (cf. McCawley 1979: 153–154). According to McCawley, behabitives (apologise, applaud, approve, curse, …) and expositives (affirm, admit, correct, answer, interpose, …) behave differently from the other classes of performative verbs, because they have a different semantic structure. Specifically, McCawley claims that verdictives, operatives, imperatives, advisories and commisives are all causatives, because they refer to a linguistic act and something which comes about as part of that act. A verdictive like diagnose, for example, has a semantic structure along the lines of ‘I sayw that it comesw about that it is on the record that I believe that S.’ In much the same way, the semantic structure of I promise to mow your lawn on Saturday would be along the lines of ‘I sayw that it comesw about that I owe you mowing your lawn on Saturday.’ However, most expositives and most behabitives are not causatives but rather refer to acts of “saying that S” (cf. McCawley 1979: 164). McCawley regards the characteristics of causativity and reference to acts of saying that S as the only bearers of performativity. However, Harras has shown that the properties of causativity and reference to acts of saying that S are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for performativity. She lists German illocutionary verbs whose English equivalents do not feature on McCawley’s list although they may be used performatively. Harras’ counterexamples to McCawley’s claim include the following (cf. Harras 2001: 25): – beleidigen (insult) and überzeugen (convince) are causative verbs, but they cannot be used performatively. – lügen (lie) is a verb referring to an act of saying that S, but in spite of what McCawley claims, it cannot be used performatively.

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– Verbs like mitteilen (inform) and benachrichtigen (notify) may be used performatively although they do not necessarily have to be analysed as causative verbs. These observations seriously challenge the view that the possibility of using a verb performatively is directly related to the semantic structure of the verb in question. Verschueren also argues that performativity is a property of verbs. He defines performativity in terms of a descriptive model for the analysis of metapragmatic terms, i.e. natural language terms such as speech act verbs, which describe verbal behaviour (cf. Verschueren 1995; Verschueren 1999: 207–216). Verschueren’s model involves two types of linguistic actions: A decribing act (D) and an act to be described (A). These two types of speech acts are comparable to the two types of situations which are essential to Harras’ account of performativity (see Section 2.2.1.1). What is called the “describing act” by Verschueren corresponds to Harras’ Discourse Situation, while Verschueren’s “act to be described” is called the “Resource Situation” in Harras’ account. Verschueren argues that a non-circular description of linguistic action verbs should specify the conditions (C) under which a verb can be appropriately used in a description D of a linguistic action A. According to Verschueren, those conditions can be formulated as conditions on or properties of the act to be described (A-conditions) and sometimes in terms of conditions on or properties of the describing act (D-conditions). Conditions or properties may be attached to the speakers and hearers of both linguistic actions (A and D), to their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. as well as to aspects of the physical and social context, the communicative intentions and the linguistic choices made to achieve a particular communicative effect. One of the choices made in D is the choice of a verb V which describes A as a form of verbal behaviour (cf. Verschueren 1995: 311–312; Verschueren 1999: 210). Verschueren claims that most D-conditions bear on such beliefs or assumptions of the utterer of D which simply reflect A-conditions. A case in point is the verb promise. The appropriateness of the use of the verb promise in a description of A is governed not only by the A-condition that the speaker of A intends to carry out the action specified in the propositional content of his/her utterance, but also by the D-condition that the speaker of act D must believe that the speaker of act A had this intention when performing act A. This D-condition simply reflects an A-condition. The meaning of the verb promise may be accounted for by making reference to D-conditions which reflect A-conditions. Other verbs require for the analysis of their meaning that reference be made not only to D-conditions which are reflections of A-conditions, but also to such conditions which concern only D (cf. Verschueren 1995: 312; Verschueren 1999: 210–212). An example is


the verb boast. A description of the meaning of boast involves at least the following A-condition: – The speaker of A (the act to be described) evaluates one of his/her own past actions positively. Additionally, boast may be used appropriately only if the following D-condition is satisfied: – The speaker of D (the describing act) evaluates the positive evaluation by the speaker of A as being exaggerated, i.e. too positive. The D-condition required for a description of the meaning of boast does not reflect properties of A but can only be formulated with reference to D. Verschueren explains performativity in terms of complete self-reference in speech act verbs. Complete self-reference may be achieved only if A and D coincide. Speech act verbs like promise, which do not require D-conditions other than those which reflect A-conditions for an adequate description of their meaning, can in principle be used performatively. As soon as explicit D-conditions are required (as in the case of boast), there is a conceptual distance between A and D which makes it impossible to interpret an utterance in which V would occur selfreferentially (cf. Verschueren 1995: 312–313; Verschueren 1999: 212). Accounts like Verschueren’s and Harras’, which explain performativity by making reference to a desribing act as well as to an act to be described, have much in common with Vendler’s explanation of what blocks the performative use of some illocutionary verbs. Vendler did not distinguish between two types of situations or linguistic actions, but he explained the fact that verbs like lie, hint and boast cannot be used performatively by assuming that to use them performatively would amount to committing what he called “illocutionary suicide.” Illocutionary suicide is the result of speech acts the illocutionary aim of which is frustrated by some kind of “spoiling factor”, a feature undermining the illocutionary aim. For example, the illocutionary aim of a speaker who is lying is to make his/her audience believe that P. The factor spoiling the performative use of lie is that use of the verb implies that the speaker who uses it indicates that the liar knew P to be false (cf. Vendler 1976: 140). Vendler concludes that one cannot lie in saying “I lie …”, because doing so would be claiming credence for something explicitly labelled as false. In other words, if lie were to be used performatively, the spoiling of the speech act would be done by the verb itself (cf. Vendler 1976: 144). Vendler argues that spoiling factors like the one which would be involved in the performative use of lie are part of the meaning of some illocutionary verbs. Illocutionary verbs whose meaning contains a spoiling factor which clashes with

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the illocutionary aim of the corresponding act cannot be used performatively. Using such illocutionary verbs performatively would lead to illocutionary suicide. Vendler’s examples include boast, brag, hint, insinuate, scold, etc. Verschueren’s explanation is essentially the same as Vendler’s. Verschueren adds the distinction between the describing act and the act to be described to Vendler’s account. He also recognises four types of conceptual distance between these two types of linguistic actions. The correctness of Verschueren’s account critically hinges on whether a conceptual distance may indeed be shown to be part of the meaning of the verbs in question. The following cases especially seem to pose problems to Verschueren’s account: (i) (to) lie Verschueren claims that lie may not be used performatively, because it requires an interpretive as well as an evaluative distance between A and D for an adequate description of its meaning. According to Verschueren, a description of the meaning of lie involves an interpretive distance between A and D, because acts of lying are not meant to be recognised by the hearer of A (Ha). Verschueren also claims that a semantic analysis of lie additionally requires an evaluative distance between A and D, since the speaker of D (Sd) evaluates Sa’s act negatively. I object to Verschueren’s claim that an evaluative distance between A and D is a necessary component of the meaning of lie. Verschueren states that an adequate description of the meaning of lie requires a negative value judgement of A by Sd: … a negative value judgement is always associated with the use of the verb lie, as emerges from the fact that whenever there are attenuating circumstances in Sd’s mind, use of the verb will be avoided as much as possible. (Verschueren 1995: 312)

As the following examples show, the assumption that the use of lie (or lügen or liegen) is avoided whenever attenuating circumstances are involved is not correct: (10) a.

Der Psychologin Dory Hollander zufolge verschaffen sich Männer durch Lügen “ein unangreifbares Äußeres”. ... Ganz anders Frauen: Sie lügen gefühlvoll. Weibliche Unehrlichkeit dient dazu, “Beziehungen und die Gefühle anderer zu schützen”, ... (Berliner Zeitung 05.06.1998; S. II) [According to the psychologist Dory Hollander, men attain “an unassailable exterior” by lying ... Women instead lie with feeling. Female dishonesty serves the purpose of “protecting the relationships and feelings of others”, ... Translation K.P.]


b.

Der Test am Lügendetektor gehört zu den finalen Spielen. “Es gibt nichts. weswegen Sie beunruhigt sein müssten”, lügt der massige Detective Braxton..., als er John Walter Wayland verdrahtet. [The test with the lie detector is one of the last games. “There is nothing for you to be concerned about”, lies the thickset Dectective Braxton while wiring up John Walter Wayland. Translation K.P.]

In these examples, use of lie to refer to the corresponding speech act does not necessarily imply that the DS speaker evaluates the speech act of the RS speaker negatively. These examples show that a negative evaluation by Sd is not a necessary component of the meaning of lie, though a negative evaluation is frequently associated with the use of that verb. As soon as a negative evaluation by Sd is excluded from the meaning of lie, the claim that the meaning of lie involves an evaluative distance between A and D is no longer justifiable. This also means that Verschueren’s model offers an adequate explanation for the fact that lie cannot be used performatively only if we do not differentiate between meaning and use, and preferred interpretations or patterns of usage are taken to be part of the lexical meaning of a word. One may of course object that, even if we draw a distinction between meaning and use and reject the notion of an evaluative distance between A and D to account for the meaning of lie, there is still the interpretive distance to account for. Following Coleman & Kay, Verschueren claims that use of lie in its prototypical sense involves at least the following A-conditions (cf. Coleman & Kay 1981: 43; Verschueren 1995: 312): – falsity of belief – intended deception – factual falsity In the study carried out by Coleman & Kay, falsity of belief turned out to be the most important element of the prototype of lie, intended deception the next most important element, and factual falsity the least important (cf. Coleman & Kay 1981: 43). The second of the three elements, intended deception, implies that acts of lying are not meant to be recognised by Ha. However, if non-overtness or intention to mislead is an element associated with the use of lie in its prototypical sense, this does not necessarily mean that it is a component of the meaning of lie. What is part of the meaning of lie, though, are the following two characteristics: Propositional Attitude of S: S does not take to be true: P Speaker Intention: S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P

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Non-overtness or intention to mislead is more likely to be a pragmatic inference which follows from the combination of the values for the speaker’s propositional attitude and the speaker’s intention. My analysis of lie differs from Verschueren’s in that I do not take intention to mislead to be part of the meaning of lie. Insofar as I exclude intended deception (or actual falsity, for that matter) from the meaning of lie, my analysis of lie is similar to Sweetser’s. Sweetser formulates two ICMs (Idealised Cognitive Models) to account for the meaning of lie. Referring to the three conditions listed by Coleman & Kay, she argues that in her ICMs, falsity entails both lack of belief and intention to deceive. What remains is a definition of a lie as a false statement. The other properties of lying follow as consequences of that definition. Sweetser concludes that the definition of lie does not need to list all three attributes (cf. Sweetser 1987; for a discussion of Coleman & Kay and Sweetser, see also Lakoff 1990: 71–74). On my account, lie means nothing else than ‘not to tell the truth’, while non-overtness and intention to deceive follow as pragmatic inferences from the meaning of the verb. Having excluded both intended deception and a negative evaluation from the meaning (though not, of course, from the use) of lie, we can no longer maintain the claim that the meaning of lie involves a distance between the describing act and the act to be described. (ii) (to) boast Verschueren argues that performativity is blocked in the case of boast, because the use of boast involves an interpretive as well as an evaluative distance between A and D. I agree with Verschueren’s claim that the notion of an evaluative distance between A and D is required for an adequate analysis of the meaning of boast. I also agree that this is the reason why boast cannot be used performatively. What causes an evaluative distance between A and D in the case of boast is the “internal antonymy”, i.e. the opposite value judgements assigned by Sa and Sd, which is part of the meaning of boast. In an act of boasting, Sa evaluates one of his own past actions positively, while Sd believes Sa’s act of self-praise to be exaggerated. Sd’s judgement of Sa’s act of self-praise as being exaggerated is a negative evaluation. The opposite value judgements expressed by Sa and Sd are essential to acts of boasting, and they are also part of the meaning of the verb boast. They prevent that A and D coincide, thereby causing a distance between A and D which blocks the use of boast in performative utterances. Though an evaluative distance between A and D is certainly part of the meaning of boast, I do not believe that the distance involved in the meaning of boast is also interpretive in nature. Assuming an interpretive distance between A and D amounts to saying, as Verschueren does, that acts of boasting are not meant to be recognised by Ha. I do not believe that this is the case. Instead I argue that


non-overtness is simply not relevant to acts of boasting. Acts of boasting involve a speaker in the A-situation who presents his/her action positively and a speaker in the D-situation who considers Sa’s self-praise to be exaggerated. Whether Ha also recognises Sa’s self-praise as an act of boasting, i.e. as being exaggerated, is not a requirement for the relevant speech act to be labelled an act of boasting. What matters is that the speaker of the describing act judges Sa’s speech act to be an act of boasting, i.e. of exaggerated self-praise. A notion like non-overtness is simply irrelevant both to acts of boasting and to the meaning of the verb boast. Use of the verb boast implies nothing at all with respect to what Ha does or what he/she does not recognise. (iii) (to) curse / (to) swear Verbs like protest may be used performatively, but such like curse and its synonym swear may not. Verschueren explains the difference between protest on the one hand and swear and curse on the other by claiming that the latter require an evaluative distance between A and D for an adequate description of their meaning, while a semantic analysis of the former does not involve any type of distance between A and D. Contrary to what Verschueren claims, I argue that a negative evaluation is lexicalised by all three of these verbs and that this evaluation is related to the act described (A) rather than to the describing act (D). A speaker protesting against some action or state of affairs expresses that he evaluates P negatively. Likewise, the verb protest lexicalises a negative evaluation of P by Sa. The same is true of swear and curse, but these verbs additionally lexicalise Sa’s anger because of P. If the speaker of D uses a verb like swear or curse to refer to A, he expresses that Sa both evaluates P negatively and feels anger because of P. If the speaker of D, however, describes A as an act of protesting, he or she merely expresses that the spea ker of A evaluates P negatively. Thus, the difference between swear and curse on the one hand and protest on the other is that the meaning of the former involves an emotive component (anger) which is not part of that of the latter. Like the evaluative component lexicalised by all three of these verbs, the emotive component of the meaning of swear and curse is an element of the act described and not, as Verschueren claims, of the describing act. In other words, the D-conditions required for the semantic analysis of all of these verbs are merely of the “reflective” type: They merely reflect A-conditions. Excluding a negative evaluation by Sd from the meaning of swear and curse means that there is no reason to assume an interpretive distance to be involved in the meaning of those verbs. If an interpretive distance is excluded from the meaning of swear and curse, Verschueren’s model does not provide us with an adequate explanation of why these two verbs cannot be used performatively. (An

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alternative account of why curse and swear cannot be used performatively will be discussed below.) (iv) (to) convince / (to) persuade / (to) amuse / (to) annoy Verschueren attributes the fact that verbs like convince, persuade, amuse and annoy cannot be used performatively to a temporal distance between A and D which he claims to be involved in the meaning of these verbs. According to Verschueren, the communicative effect of A must already have taken place before A may be described as an act of convincing, persuading, amusing or annoying. A and D cannot coincide if they must be consecutive. The corresponding D-condition is Sd’s assessment of the communicative effect of A (cf. Verschueren 1995: 314). Though verbs like convince, persuade, etc. do indeed differ from other types of speech act verbs in that they lexicalise a result, it is not clear how this creates a temporal distance between A and D which is irrelevant to the meaning of other speech act verbs. After all, A and D must always be consecutive. A temporal distance between A and D follows from the very fact that D is a description of A. Temporal distance between A and D must therefore be relevant to the meaning of all speech act verbs, including such which may be used performatively. If temporal distance between A and D is not something which distinguishes resultative verbs from other types of speech act verbs, it does not explain why these verbs may not be used performatively. (Below, I shall discuss an alternative explanation of why it is not possible for these verbs to be used performatively.) The observations in (i)–(iv) suggest that an account of performativity in terms of a conceptual distance between A and D does not offer an overall explanation of why some verbs may and others may not be used performatively. It does explain, however, why the following verbs may not be used performatively: – boast, brag and show off may not be used performatively, because their meaning involves an evaluative distance between A and D. What causes the evaluative distance in these cases is the assignment of opposite value judgements by Sa and Sd. – whitewash and slander may not be used performatively, and this is likely to be due, as Verschueren claims, to the fact that these verbs require an evaluative distance between A and D for an adequate description of their meaning. Specifically, a negative evaluation of A by Sd is an essential element of the meaning of these verbs. – The notion of an interpretive distance turned out to be problematic in the case of lie and boast, but it is relevant, as Verschueren argues, to the meaning of verbs like hint, allude to, insinuate and intimate. Verschueren points out that the mode of delivery of the acts referred to by these verbs is implicitness. The


meaning which is hinted at, insinuated, intimated or alluded to is fundamentally constructed by Sd. The D-condition involved is Sd’s interpretation which leads him/her to believe that more is meant in A than is actually said. Though interpretation is an active process in other cases as well, the interpretive process is completely foregrounded by decribing A as an instance of hinting or insinuating. Such a description is not possible without creating a distance between A and D (cf. Verschueren 1995: 313). As Verschueren claims, the interpretive distance between A and D which is part of the meaning of verbs like hint, insinuate, etc. is what blocks the use of these verbs in performative utterances. The examples discussed so far suggest that performativity is not generally related to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Only in a few cases may it be said to be directly related to the meaning of the corresponding verbs. Thus, components of the meaning of boast, brag, whitewash, hint, insinuate, allude to, etc. are indeed the reason why these verbs may not be used in performative utterances. In all other cases, the possibility or impossibility for a verb to be used in a performative utterance depends on factors irrelevant to the meaning of the verbs in question. In many cases, performativity is blocked because of extra-linguistic reasons. This is also essentially what Searle claims (cf. Searle 1989). Searle does not deny that some verbs require for their semantic analysis a feature which implies non-performativity. Searle’s examples are hint, insinuate and boast. According to Searle, these verbs cannot be used performatively, because “… they imply that the act was performed in a way that was not explicit and overt …” (Searle 1989: 554). Verschueren’s model offers a more precise account of what blocks performativity in these cases. In the case of hint and insinuate, performativity is blocked because of an interpretive distance between A and D, while performative use of boast is blocked by an evaluative distance between A and D. As I have argued before, I do not believe an interpretive distance to be additionally involved in the meaning of boast. In Searle’s account, cases like boast, hint and insinuate are treated as exceptions. Searle claims that generally there is no semantic property which attaches to verbs and thereby enables them to be used performatively. Instead, he argues that the limitation on performatives is provided by the fact that only a small number of changes can be brought about in the world solely by saying that one is making those changes by that very utterance. Searle distinguishes between two types of changes which may be brought about only by saying that one is making them by means of that very utterance: Performative utterances either create purely linguistic or extra-linguistic institutional facts. For example, an utterance like I hereby promise to come and see you creates a promise, which is a purely linguistic fact, while utterances like I pronounce you husband and wife or The meeting is

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adjourned create extra-linguistic institutional facts. The fact that these utterances may function to create the state of affairs represented in the propositional content of the utterance is due to human conventions, rules and social institutions. It is due to facts of nature that performatives are restricted to those verbs which name actions where the manifestation of the intention is constitutive of the actions, and those verbs are confined to linguistic and institutional declarations. Thus, the fact that an utterance like I hereby amuse you … does not work as a performative is due to the fact that one cannot simply amuse someone only by saying that one is actually doing so. The latter is a fact of nature which has nothing to do with the meaning of the verb amuse (cf. Searle 1989: 554–555). Insofar as Searle takes social facts to be the decisive factor determining whether a given illocutionary verb may or may not be used performatively, his view of performativity has much in common with Austin’s. As early as 1961, Austin claimed that the social habits of a society may considerably affect the question of which performative verbs are evolved and which are not. Thus, he argued that we have evolved formula like I reprimand you or I censure you, because apparently society approves of censuring or reprimanding. We have, however, not evolved a simple formula like I insult you. According to Austin, the reason why we have not developed such a formula is that society does not approve of the corresponding acts (cf. Austin 1961: 245). If Austin’s account of performativity is correct, it provides an adequate explanation of why verbs like lie, swear and curse may not be used performatively. On Austin’s account, we have simply not developed performative formula containing these verbs, because society does not approve of the acts in question. Austin and Searle both attribute the possibility or impossibility of using a given illocutionary verb performatively to social factors. Such an account of performativity is more powerful than one along the lines of Verschueren, because it provides an explanation for many more cases. Verschueren’s model only offers an explanation for some exceptional cases. Having discussed linguistic as well as social explanations of the phenomenon of performativity, I conclude that performativity is not generally related to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. It is therefore not a category relevant to an ordering system which serves to represent concepts of communication. While some of the classification criteria proposed by Searle are not relevant to the semantics of illocutionary verbs, Searle also occasionally ignores such criteria which are crucial both to the nature of illocutionary acts and to the semantics of the corresponding verbs. The illocutionary point of the act of blaming, for example, is to express a negative evaluation by a speaker of some past action performed by a hearer. This negative evaluation is, of course, part of the meaning of the verb blame, but the same holds true of the speaker’s presupposition that P (the past


action which the hearer is actually blamed for) is the case. This presupposition of the speaker is an essential property not only of the act of blaming, but also of the meaning of the corresponding verb blame. The latter is reflected by the fact that the presupposition ‘P is the case’ survives under negation, showing that it is a real lexical presupposition, or that, to put it differently, blame is a factive verb. Searle mentions elsewhere that speaker presuppositions are part of the preparatory conditions for the successful performance of a particular illocutionary act (cf. Searle 1969: 58–60). It is therefore surprising that speaker presuppositions like those lexicalised by blame do not figure on Searle’s list of criteria for the classification of speech acts. On Searle’s list, speaker presuppositions such as those concerning the interests of speakers and hearers are mentioned as possible classification criteria, but lexical presuppositions like ‘P is the case’ are not (cf. Searle 1975: 344–350). In this section, I have explored the possibility of applying Searle’s and Austin’s taxonomies, the two main paradigms of traditional speech act theory, to a systematic investigation of lexical gaps. Austin’s lexicalist approach turned out to be inadequate for obvious reasons: taking only illocutionary verbs as a starting point even excludes the possibility of detecting lexical gaps. However, the advantage of a lexicon-based approach is that it ensures that the classification criteria selected are relevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. The irrelevance of some of Searle’s classification criteria to the meaning of illocutionary verbs appeared to be the main reason why his speech act taxonomy cannot be used for a study of the occurrence of lexical gaps. The kind of ordering system needed for the purpose of this study requires that its parameters or criteria be relevant to the semantics of existing lexical expressions. If lexical gaps are to be included systematically, we need to represent more than just the meaning of actually existing expressions. In what follows, I propose an ordering system operating with parameters based on the semantics of illocutionary verbs. Within this framework, concepts of communication are represented as combinations of parameter values which may but need not be lexicalised. This kind of ordering system was first proposed by Baumgärtner in 1977. Baumgärtner’s ordering system will be dealt with in the next section.

2.2.2

Baumgärtner’s ordering system for directive and commissive speech acts

2.2.2.1 Categorial aspects of the meaning of performatives One of the earliest examples of an ordering system for concepts of communication is the ordering system for directive and commissive predicates proposed by Baumgärtner in 1977. Baumgärtner shows that these and other performative

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predicates enter into relationships which may be described as combinations of components of these predicates’ meanings. According to Baumgärtner, performative predicates represent “lexical systems” and behave in a systematic way with respect to certain aspects of their meaning. The systematic behaviour of these predicates enables us to make theoretical predictions about actually existing as well as possible but non-existing performative predicates. Possible performative predicates, whether these be lexicalised or not, can be read off immediately from Baumgärtner’s matrix. At the same time, Baumgärtner’s ordering system allows us to recognise which predicates are not possible in principle and also gives us a clue as to what prevents their existence in the lexicon of a particular language. Baumgärtner starts from the assumption that there is no such thing as a natural taxonomy of performative verbs. The existence of such a taxonomy would presuppose that social reality itself were structured, independently of any illocutionary verbs, by means of unambiguous forms of social interaction (cf. Baumgärtner 1977: 259). Though speech acts may of course exist independently of the corresponding illocutionary verbs, the latter help us to elucidate exactly what kind of speech act a certain speaker performs and how far as well as in what way it commits him/her, etc. If, for example, a speaker utters an imperative sentence like Please, shut the door, context alone often does not suffice to distinguish unambiguously whether this speaker was requesting, ordering, begging or beseeching a hearer to close the door. Illocutionary verbs certainly help us very much in distinguishing between different but related speech acts. To that extent, speech act expressions may be said to structure and thereby also constitute social reality. Since there is no natural taxonomy of performative verbs, Baumgärtner’s ordering system is based on an indirect and inductive analysis of (German) performatives. Such an analysis requires that performative verbs be non-distinct and at the same time differ al least minimally with respect to certain categorial aspects. The following examples show that this is indeed the case: (11) a. I (hereby) criticise the Prime Minister for having ratified the treaty./ I (hereby) criticise the Prime Minister, because he has ratified the treaty. b. I do not criticise the Prime Minister for having ratified the treaty./ I do not criticise the Prime Minister, because he has ratified the treaty. c. I (hereby) praise the Prime Minister for having ratified the treaty./ I (hereby) praise the Prime Minister, because he has ratified the treaty. d. *I (hereby) criticise the Prime Minister for my having ratified the treaty./ *I (hereby) criticise the Prime Minister, because I have ratified the treaty. e.

#I

(hereby) criticise the Prime Minister, because he will ratify the treaty.


The well- or ill-formedness of these examples suggests what are essential properties of the meaning of criticise: – criticise is a factive verb: the proposition expressed in the complement clause is presupposed (11a). It is the case that the Prime Minister ratified the treaty, irrespective of whether S criticised him for that or not. – criticise lexicalises a negative (and praise a positive) evaluation of P by S (11a & 11c). – The subject of the complement clause must not refer to the speaker (11d). Instead, the referent of the subject of the complement must be the hearer or some third person. – The verb of the complement clause must not carry future reference (11e). (11e) can only be considered well-formed under the assumption that criticise refers to an intention of the hearer – here the Prime Minister – which precedes the act of criticising. (“#” in front of 11e indicates that the sentence does not have the intended, i.e. the performative reading.) These properties relate the verb criticise to the verb praise: they illustrate where these verbs differ and in what respects they are identical. Such relations among predicates become clearer if these properties are represented as variables with a fixed number of values. For example, the property – or variable – ‘evaluation of P’ is assigned one of two values: ‘positive’ (for praise) and ‘negative’ (for criticise). A variable like ‘temporal reference of P’ may in principle be assigned one of three values: ‘past’, ‘present’ or ‘future’. criticise and praise are both assigned the value ‘past’ for this variable. This analysis of criticise shows which are the relevant aspects of the situations in which this predicate is used. Following Baumgärtner, these aspects will henceforth be called “categorial aspects”. In Baumgärtner’s framework, categorial aspects are aspects of the meaning of performative illocutionary verbs determining in what kinds of situations these predicates may be used. Individual predicates show similarities as well as minimal differences regarding these categorial aspects. Figure 2 below shows which categorial aspects determine the use of criticise.

2.2.2.2 Lexical systems Having established these categorial aspects, we can now compare the meaning of criticise with that of other predicates like praise and repent: – praise: Positive instead of negative evaluation of P. – repent: The subject of the event expressed in the complement clause refers to the speaker.

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Figure 2. Categorial aspects determining the use of criticise

The three categorial aspects mentioned above suffice to discover where the predicates of the set {criticise, praise, repent} are identical and in what respects they differ. No additional categorial aspects are needed to differentiate the situations in which these predicates are used. The members of this set differ with respect to the values attributed to the categorial aspects ‘subject reference of the complement’ and ‘evaluation of P’ but are identical regarding the categorial aspect ‘temporal reference of P’, which is ‘past’ in all cases. For this reason, the predicates of this set may be said to constitute the lexical system of presupposing performatives with past reference of the complement clause. If the set S1 {criticise, praise, repent} is expanded to include other predicates like promise or request, additional categorial aspects become necessary to show where the predicates of this larger set S2 {criticise, praise, repent, promise, request} coincide and where they differ. An analysis similar to the one in (11a)–(11e) is necessary to find out what these additional categorial aspects are: (12)

a. b. c. d. e. f.

I request that you give me some money. *I request that I give you some money. *I request that you gave me some money. I (hereby) promise that I will give you some money. #I (hereby) promise that you will give me some money. #I (hereby) promise that I gave you some money.

(12a)–(12f) show which categorial aspects are relevant to the use of request and promise (Figure 3). These categorial aspects, together with the ones relevant to the set S1, determine in which kinds of situations the predicates of the larger set S2 may be used.


Figure 3. Categorial aspects determining the use of request and promise

2.2.2.3 Lexicalised and non-lexicalised concepts of communication Baumgärtner’s analysis covers all “simple” and “complex” directive and commissive predicates of German. In Baumgärtner’s terms, “simple” performatives differ from “complex” ones in that they do not presuppose a preceding context. For example, allow is considered a complex predicate, because S’s act of allowing P is always preceded by H’s act of asking S’s permission to do P; request is a simple predicate, because it does not presuppose a preceding speech act by either S or H. For reasons of brevity, I shall only deal with Baumgärtner’s account of simple performatives. The use of simple directive and commissive predicates is determined by the categorial aspects below, which can all be assigned one of two values (cf. Baumgärtner 1977: 269–271): – P: S’s attitude towards p (S says that he is in favour of or against p.) – P’: Expectability of P (In the normal course of events, P is either expectable or not.) – Sbj: Subject reference of the complement (The proposition expressed in the complement clause refers to S or H.) – IS: I(S, P): P is in the interest of S or not – IH: I(H, P): P is in the interest of H or not – I’S: P’ is in the interest of S or not – I’H: P’ is in the interest of H or not Each performative is assigned a truth-value for each of these categorial aspects. A predicate lexicalising the existence of certain conditions of use (represented by the categorial aspects), is assigned the value ‘true’ for the corresponding aspects. A performative which lexicalises the absence of certain conditions of use is assigned the value ‘false’. Each performative is completely determined by the combinations of truth-values for each of the categorial aspects. Figure 4 shows some examples of

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Figure 4. Categorial aspects determining the use of simple directive and commissive predicates (from Baumgärtner 1977) (‘Ø (sad)’ and ‘Ø (mad)’ indicate the lack of verbs which would refer to sadistic or masochistic speech acts)

combinations of truth-values. (The dots in the matrix above indicate cases where a given predicate cannot be assigned a truth-value for a certain categorial aspect. The question-mark preceding some of the predicates indicates non-illocutionary predicates whose meaning approximates the corresponding combination of truth-values. The symbol ‘∅’ stands for combinations which cannot be lexicalised by either illocutionary or non-illocutionary verbs.) Figure 4 shows different types of combinations of truth-values: 1. Combinations of truth-values which are lexicalised (at least in English, German and Dutch) by illocutionary verbs like warn (G.: warnen/ D.: waar schuwen) and request (G.: auffordern/ D.: vragen) (lines 1 & 2 in the matrix). 2. Combinations of truth-values whose lexicalisation is blocked by logical principles. Examples are all combinations comprising the following pairs of values: (1)  P: t     P’: t 

→ ∅


(2)  P: f     P’: f 

→ ∅

Neither of these combinations would make sense from a logical point of view. The former would correspond to a situation where S says that he is in favour of some P which would take place anyway in the normal course of events (lines 3 & 4 in the matrix). An example would be a situation where a speaker requests a hearer to perform some kind of action which S knew H would have done anyway, P therefore being expectable. The second combination represents a situation where S says that he/she is against some P which H would not have done anyway. In this case, P is not expectable (lines 5 & 6). An example would be a situation where a speaker forbids a hearer to do something which he (S) knew H would not have done anyway. 3. Combinations of truth-values whose lexicalisation is blocked, because they represent speech acts which deviate from patterns of common human practice. In this case, logical principles do not prevent these combinations from being lexicalised. An example is the following combination: (1)  P: f   P’: t   IH: f 

Such a combination would correspond to a situation where S says that he is against some P which is not expectable and not in the interest of H (line 7). Such ‘sadistic’ speaker attitudes can only be lexicalised by verbs like threaten (G.: drohen; D.: dreigen), which may be used as illocutionary verbs but cannot be used performatively. An example of the same type is the combination below:

(2)  P: f   P’: t   I’S: f 

→ ∅

→ ∅

This combination represents a situation where S says that he is against some P which is expectable and also in S’s own interest (line 8). Such a combination would require a “masochistic” predicate for its lexicalisation. The reverse is true of a combination representing a situation with a speaker saying that he/she is against some P which is expectable and also in H’s interest (line 9). Only “sadistic” predicates are possible lexicalisations for such combinations of truth-values.

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Cases 1–3 are examples of combinations of truth-values which are not lexicalised in either English, German or Dutch. To the extent that we can imagine situations matching these combinations, combinations like these are possible in principle and are not ruled out by logical principles. However, combinations representing sadistic or masochistic communicative behaviour may fail to get lexicalised because of principles of communication ethics: The corresponding patterns of behaviour would go beyond what is esteemed an appropriate distance between a speaker and a hearer. 4. Combinations which are not lexicalised, although their lexicalisation would be allowed by logical principles as well as by principles of communication ethics. For example, the combination in line (10)

 P: f   P’: w  → ?avoid / vermeiden / vermijden  I’S: f 

lacks a corresponding lexicalisation by a speech act verb, though a non-illocutionary verb like avoid (G.: vermeiden; D.: vermijden) does seem to be an appropriate lexicalisation. Why should this be the case? Are lexical gaps like those represented in lines (10) and (11) merely due to coincidence or is there anything systematic about their occurrence? Obviously, we need more examples of this type to answer this question. Comprehensive sampling is also needed to investigate whether the lexicalisation patterns observed by Baumgärtner apply to the whole area of speech act verbs. In the next section, I shall present and discuss another type of ordering system covering a wider variety of illocutionary verbs.

2.2.3

Edmondson’s ordering system for directives, commissives and expressives

2.2.3.1 The structure of Edmondson’s ordering system The ordering system proposed by Edmondson (cf. Edmondson 1981) covers more types of speech acts and speech act verbs than Baumgärtner’s. Edmondson claims that his analytic system includes any type of illocutionary verb except declaratives, verbs denoting the relationship between one speech act and another (reply, answer and accept) and a category called “neutral representatives” under which he subsumes a variety of verbs such as inform and predict, but also observe, say and tell, the latter of which I would not treat as speech act verbs but rather as verbs of communication in the sense outlined in Chapter 1. Apart from that, I would not call representatives like inform and predict “neutral”. I shall return to these


verbs in my discussion of Edmondson’s classification system below. Edmondson excludes these “neutral representatives”, because he does not regard them as being distinctive. He argues that an utterance which may be described as a statement or reply may refer to practically any state of affairs (cf. Edmondson 1981: 492). Edmondson accounts for the relationships between illocutionary verbs, illocutionary acts and segments of conversational behaviour on the basis of a systematic classification of types of “external events”. These are the events and states of affairs referred to by the utterance of a RS speaker. For example, a RS speaker promising a hearer to do something refers to an action which he considers to be beneficial to the hearer and which he will carry out at some point in time subsequent to the performance of the promising act. In this case, the “external event” would be defined as “a future action A carried out by S, where A is in the interest of H”. Edmondson then asks which illocutionary verbs are available in English for describing the speech act of the RS speaker and uses the distribution of illocutionary terms to postulate what types of rule or convention govern our conceptualisation of conversational behaviour. Edmondson’s aim is to set up several social maxims which have explanatory force both for the lexical field covered by a particular set of illocutionary terms and for the empirical analysis of conversational behaviour (cf. Edmondson 1981: 491–492). The procedure employed by Edmondson also covers such cases where concepts are not lexicalised at all. Clearly, such cases have to be accounted for as well. The events and states of affairs categorised are necessarily events and states of affairs as subjectively perceived by a speaker. Edmondson argues that this is so, because features like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ are part of the analytic system used. Edmondson orders events and states of affairs according to the following five features (cf. Edmondson 1981: 492–495): 1. [± NON-FUTURE]: The event or state of affairs A external to an utterance which may refer to it is located in time subsequently to the utterance described by the illocutionary term, or it is not. (Edmondson’s addition ‘external to the utterance which may refer to it’ serves to exclude the case of explicit performatives from his purely descriptivist analysis.) 2. SPEAKER VS. HEARER INVOLVEMENT IN A 3. [± RESPONSIBLE]: The involvement of S or H in A may be active or passive. The critical issue here is whether or not the person S or H involved in the event A is to be held responsible for A’s being or potentially being the case, given his potential control over some events and the potentially controllable nature of some events. 4. A is perceived as having CONSEQUENCES OR EFFECTS which are good or bad.

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5. The consequences or effects of A are considered to be desirable or undesirable for either S or H. These features are represented in the matrix below in the form of the following binary code: (i) A is/was the case (+) or will be the case (–). (ii) Involved in A is either S (+) or H (–). (iii) The involvement of the party concerned (S or H) is such that he/she is to be held responsible for A (+), or he/she is not to be held responsible (–). (iv) A is viewed as having consequences which are desirable (+) or undesirable (–). (v) The consequences of A are considered desirable or undesirable for either S (+) or H (–). External events are represented as combinations of values for each of the features (i)–(v). This procedure yields a matrix with 32 feature constellations (cf. Figure 5). Each of these represents a particular event or state of affairs which a RS speaker refers to by the use of a particular utterance. For most of the feature constellations, there is a corresponding set of descriptive illocutionary terms. The slots opposite the different feature constellations are filled with illocutionary terms which may be used by a DS speaker describing the act performed by the RS speaker. Edmondson claims to have assigned these descriptive illocutionary terms to the different feature combinations on the basis of an intuitive procedure. Where Edmondson’s intuitions were not firm ones, this is indicated by a question-mark. A slash separating different illocutionary verbs is intended to suggest that there is a radical difference in meaning between the items so separated. According to Edmondson, the distribution of illocutionary terms across the 32 category types shows certain regularities. Edmondson formulates these in terms of a lexicalisation tendency to the effect that hearer-supportive behaviour tends to be lexicalised, while speaker-supportive behaviour does not. More precisely, Edmondson claims that the distribution of illocutionary terms across the spectrum of event categories (cf. Figure 5) may be explained in terms of the social maxims listed in Figure 6 (cf. Edmondson 1981: 497). According to Edmondson, there is a clear link between such maxims on the one hand and the notion of politeness and Leech’s Tact Maxim on the other (cf. Leech 1977: 19–21).


Figure 5. Edmondson’s ordering system (from Edmondson 1981: 494)

Figure 6. Social maxims underlying the lexicalisation of concepts of communication

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2.2.3.2 Discussion of Edmondson’s ordering system Though pragmatic principles such as costs and benefits of speakers and hearers may certainly be relevant to the way in which concepts of communication are lexicalised, I doubt whether any consistent cost/benefit-pattern may be discerned in Edmondson’s data. My objections concern the following three points: 1. the distribution of illocutionary terms in Edmondson’s matrix 2. Edmondson’s notion of costs and benefits 3. the difference between events involving a responsible agent and such for which neither S nor H may be taken to be responsible. 1. The distribution of illocutionary terms Edmondson himself comments on three points concerning the distribution of illocutionary terms listed opposite categories (1)–(32). I list Edmondson’s comments in (i)–(iii) below and add my own remarks to each of them. (i) The number of distinctive terms suggested may be reduced. For example, Edmondson claims that the feature ‘costs/benefits’ (feature iv) “… leads only to a difference in polarity between the illocutionary terms available …” (Edmondson 1981: 495). Thus, the concept represented in line (25) (H involved in future state or event – H responsible – desirable consequences for S) differs from that in (27) (H involved in future event or state – H responsible – undesirable consequences for S) only with respect to the cost/benefit feature, but whereas the feature constellation in (25) may be lexicalised by a wide variety of directive illocutionary terms, Edmondson claims that the one in (27) may only be expressed by the negation of these (request not to, etc.). I object to the latter observation because of two reasons. Firstly, expressions of the type [NEG + V] are free combinations of words, not lexicalised expressions. These expressions are not lexicalised and hence bear no relevance to an investigation of lexicalisation patterns. As opposed to Edmondson, I would exclude any such expression from the matrix. With respect to line (27), this would amount to saying that the corresponding concept is not lexicalised at all. However – and this is my second objection – in spite of what Edmondson claims, prohibit does seem to match the feature constellation in line (27). In Edmondson’s matrix, prohibit only figures as a lexicalisation matching the feature constellation in line (28) (H involved in future state or event – H responsible – undesirable consequences for H), though this verb matches the feature combination in (27) much better than that in (28). A speaker telling a hearer not to perform some kind of action, because he considers this particular action to have undesirable consequences for the


hearer (category (28)), may properly be referred to as dissuading that hearer from doing A rather than prohibiting him to do A. Like the feature constellations in (25) and (27), those in lines (17) and (19) also differ only regarding the cost/benefit feature. Edmondson proposes resolve and undertake as relevant lexicalisations for category (17). However, undertake does not fit the constellation in (17) (S involved in future state or event – S responsible – desirable consequences for S), but should be listed in line (18) (S involved in future state or event – S responsible – desirable consequences for H), where indeed it figures together with verbs like promise. I also argue that resolve does not fit the constellation in (17) either, because it is not an illocutionary verb. resolve means ‘decide to do something’ and hence denotes a mental attitude, not the expression of it. What is missing is a lexicalisation expressing the concept SAY (RESOLVE) or PROMISE ONESELF TO DO SOMETHING. Yet, when speakers promise themselves to do something, they do not normally use language to perform the corresponding act. It would not make much sense to include cases where people talk to themselves. Any speech act can be performed in a situation where the speaker and the hearer are identical, but I do not consider such cases instances of communicative situations in the sense outlined in Chapter 1. Having excluded both undertake and resolve, I suggest renounce as a possible lexicalisation for the feature combination in line 17: renounce is used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she refrains from performing a future action which he/she considers to have desirable consequences for him- or herself. renounce is a hybrid verb: it may be used to refer to a particular mental state as well as the expression of that state. There is no appropriate lexicalisation matching the feature combination in line 19 (S involved in future state or event – S responsible – undesirable consequences for S). The slot in line 19 would have to be filled by an illocutionary equivalent of sacrifice oneself. Such speech act verbs are lacking from the lexicon of English. (ii) Categories (5)–(8), (13)–(16), (21)–(24) and (29)–(32) are relatively unproductive in calling for a distinctive term. This observation concerns such cases where the feature [± RESPONSIBLE] (feature iii) is assigned a negative value. All constellations containing a negative value for the feature [± RESPONSIBLE] represent events and states of affairs where the involvement of S or H is such that S or H is not to be held responsible for that event or state of affairs. As Edmondson observes, the total amount of English illocutionary terms to refer to situations where a RS speaker addresses such events or states of affairs turns out to be limited. I agree with Edmondson as far as this general tendency is concerned but object to some of the illocutionary terms he proposes as appropriate lexicalisations for the corresponding concepts. My objections concern the following sets of categories:

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– LINES (5)–(8) (S involved in past or present events/states of affairs for which he is not to be held responsible). The only lexicalisations which Edmondson seems to have been sure of are those matching category (8) (sympathise and commiserate). complain and curse are first suggested as lexicalisations matching the constellation in line (7) (past or present event/state – S involved – undesirable consequences for S), but complain is then rejected, because Edmondson “suspects” that complaints are directed at a responsible agent. As the following examples show, this assumption is not correct: (13) This is unusual as with most other diets slimmers often complain of ‘losing it from the parts I want to keep’; … (BNC/Rosemary Conley: Rosemary Conley’s hip and thigh diet. London: Arrow Books Ltd. 1989) (14) What I wish to propose is that for this poor and hungry population many of the physiological symptoms of which they complain are also symptoms of chronic hunger. (BNC/New Internationalist; n.d.)

Opposite category 6 (S involved in past or present event/state – S not responsible – desirable consequences for H) we find only question-marks along with a suggestion that boast might be a relevant lexicalisation. This verb is only seldom used to refer to states and events for which the speaker is not to be held responsible. In the vast majority of cases, boast is used by a DS speaker to refer to the way in which a RS speaker represents his or her own past actions. In those cases where boast is used to refer to states and events for which the RS speaker cannot be held responsible, these states and events typically concern aspects of that speaker’s character, his/her physical appearance, his/her health or his/her possessions (see example (15)). (15) And there he was boasting about his age … (BNC/15 conversations with ‘Clarence’, 1992)

Such states and events do not affect any hearer at all, but relate only to the speaker himself. For this reason, I argue that boast is not an appropriate descriptive term for the behaviour of a RS speaker referring to an event of category (6), which involves desirable consequences for H. For category (5) too (S involved in past or present state or event – S not responsible – desirable consequences for S), it is difficult to find appropriate lexicalisations. I reject congratulate oneself and praise oneself, because these are free combinations of words and not lexicalised expressions. Since no hearer is involved in the kind of situation represented by this feature combination, boast fits in much better here than it does opposite category (6). This category covers such cases where a speaker boasts about his possessions or physical appearance.


– LINES (13)–(16) (H involved in past or present events or states of affairs – H not responsible). sympathise and commiserate opposite category 16 are unproblematic as is congratulate in line 14. compliment is listed along with congratulate but is preceded by a question-mark, although the following example shows that compliment may safely be listed opposite category 14 (H involved in past/present state or event – H not to be held responsible – desirable consequences for H): (16) The governor immediately raised his glass in Flavia Sherman’s direction and complimented her elaborately on her French ancestry and the “astonishing combination” of her beauty and her two fine sons. (BNC/Anthony Grey: Saigon. London: Pan Books, 1983)

In line (13), welcome is preceded by two question-marks, indicating that Edmondson doubted whether this verb properly belongs here. The problem with welcome is that it is used to refer to speech acts of a RS speaker addressing past actions rather than past events. Because of this, I argue that welcome should not be listed opposite category (13). Instead, it properly belongs in block (9), where it should be listed along with thank and praise. Edmondson does not list any lexicalisations at all opposite category (15). I suggest lament and complain as relevant lexicalisations. These verbs may be used by a DS speaker describing the act performed by a RS speaker expressing his/her regret at the undesirable consequences resulting for him- or herself from an event or state of affairs for which H cannot be held responsible. – LINES (21)–(24) (S involved in future events or states of affairs – S not responsible). Edmondson lists boast, though preceded by a question-mark, opposite feature constellation (21). I argue that boast does not properly belong here, because the event or state of affairs referred to by a RS speaker who is said to be boasting must have begun at some point of time prior to the act of boasting. Even in such cases where a RS speaker is boasting about the riches he/she will once inherit, some state of affairs giving him or her reason to believe that this beneficial event will come into being must have been in existence some time before the RS speaker can start boasting about the beneficial consequences of this event. I object to sympathise opposite category (24) (S involved in future event/state – S not responsible – undesirable consequences for H). It is difficult to imagine a situation where a RS speaker sympathises with a hearer because of the undesirable consequences of an event which is situated entirely in the future. A RS speaker may of course sympathise with a hearer because of some event which he/she supposes

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to affect the hearer negatively at some point of time in the future. However, in such cases, the RS speaker must already have some reason to believe that such an event will actually take place when he/she expresses his or her sympathy. This means that the event in question necessarily begins prior to the RS speaker’s act of expressing his or her sympathy. I also disagree with warn in line (24), because warn is used to refer to such states and events in which H rather than S is involved and which are regarded as having undesirable consequences for H. This means that warn properly belongs opposite category (32), where indeed it is correctly listed. Having excluded sympathise as well as warn, lexicalisations for categories (21), (22), (23) and (24) are lacking altogether. Whether we treat these cases as instances of lexical gaps depends on whether or not we are willing to include predict, prophesy, foretell and announce. Edmondson excludes these verbs, because they belong to the class he calls “neutral representatives.” Though it is true that predict, prophesy, foretell and announce are not specified regarding the way in which the consequences of a particular state or event are evaluated, I argue that these verbs should be included, because they are specified with respect to at least one of the features (i)–(v). The use of these verbs is restricted to future events. What person is involved in A, whether S or H is responsible for A or whether A is considered to have desirable or undesirable consequences is irrelevant to the way in which these verbs are used. Both verbs therefore belong to all the categories relating to future actions or events. They should not be listed, though, opposite categories (17)–(20), because they are not likely to be used to refer to the speech act of a RS speaker addressing one of his own future actions (represented by categories (17)– (20)). To refer to such speech acts, a verb like announce is likely to be used instead of one like prophesy. A speaker saying that he will perform some kind of action in the future will be taken to be responsible for whether that action will ultimately take place or not. However, use of a verb like prophesy implies that the RS speaker has no control over the future action in question. Thus, a sentence like John prophesied that he would visit his parents is somehow anomalous. If verbs like prophesy, predict and foretell are used to refer to actions, the agent of these actions is likely to be H rather than S himself. If prophesy, predict and foretell are included, the matrix in Figure 5 contains considerably fewer gaps than Edmondson assumes. – LINES (29)–(32) (H involved in future events or states of affairs for which he/she may not be held responsible). The verb warn properly belongs opposite category (32), where it is correctly listed. Edmondson mentions no lexicalisations covering constellations (29)–(31). For the reasons mentioned above, I suggest predict, prophesy, foretell and announce as illocutionary terms lexicalising the concepts represented in lines 29–32.


(iii) In some cases, more than one significantly distinctive illocutionary term or set of illocutionary terms is assigned to one category of events. This applies to category (11) (H involved in past or present event or state of affairs – H responsible – undesirable consequences for S), opposite which verbs like complain and criticise are listed along with forgive and pardon. These two sets of verbs differ regarding the attitude of the speaker towards the hearer. In an act of excusing or forgiving, S overlooks his/her own costs, but in an act of complaining or criticising he/she does not. Significantly different illocutionary terms may also be assigned to category (18) (S involved in future event or state of affairs – S responsible – desirable consequences for H), where the difference between OFFER and PROMISE may be stated in terms of the absence or presence of a speaker’s belief that the hearer wishes that S do A. Where the speaker does not know of any such previous wish by the hearer, he can only offer the hearer to do something (cf. Edmondson 1981: 496; cf. also Baumgärtner 1977: 268). Apart from the amendments I have proposed for the categories already mentioned, I suggest the following additional changes: – The verb warn does not match category (20) (S involved in future state or event – S responsible – undesirable consequences for H). Where warn is used by a RS speaker to refer to a situation corresponding to this feature constellation, the RS speaker may be said to perform an act of threatening, not one of warning. warn is typically used by a RS speaker addressing a future event/ state in which the hearer rather than the speaker himself is involved. threaten is correctly listed opposite category (20). – The nouns self-commiseration and self-criticism, both preceded by a questionmark, should be deleted from line (3), because they denote the result of the acts of commiserating with oneself and criticising oneself respectively and do not refer to speech acts. Lexical expressions for the corresponding acts do not exist (*self-commiserate, *self-criticise). I suggest verbs like regret and repent as relevant lexicalisations matching category (3) (S involved in present/past state or event – S responsible – undesirable consequences for S). regret – but not repent – may also be listed along with apologise opposite category (4) (S involved in past/present state or event – S responsible – undesirable consequences for H). Taking into account all the alternatives and corrections I have proposed so far, a revised version of Edmondson’s matrix would turn out to contain many lexicalisations different from those originally suggested. Since the lexicalisation principles formulated by Edmondson were based on the distribution of illocutionary terms

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across the different event types, these principles may need to be revised if the distribution of illocutionary terms proves to be different. In Figure 7, I represent my own version of Edmondson’s matrix. I shall then examine whether this revised version of Edmondson’s matrix supports or falsifies the lexicalisation tendency proposed. Below, I shall explain which patterns of behaviour I count as hearer- or spea ker-supportive. Assuming for the moment that my considerations about the hearer- or speaker-supportiveness of communicative behaviour are correct, the revised version of the matrix yields 12 cases which confirm the alleged lexicalisation tendency (H-supportive behaviour which is lexicalised) and 9 which contradict it (S-supportive behaviour which is lexicalised). There are 8 cases which cannot be

Figure 7. Revised version of Edmondson’s ordering system


used to confirm or contradict the tendency proposed either because the type of communicative behaviour referred to is neither speaker- nor hearer-supportive or because lexicalisations are lacking for practical reasons. Categories (3), (11) and (32) do not allow any predictions to be made either, because some of the verbs corresponding to these categories lexicalise speaker-supportive behaviour while others support hearer-supportive behaviour. On the whole, these results do not support the lexicalisation tendencies proposed: It is not the case that hearersupportive behaviour tends to be lexicalised while speaker-supportive behaviour tends not to, at least not if speaker- and hearer supportive behaviour is defined in Edmondson’s terms. Neither does there seem to be a correlation between the hearer- or speaker-supportiveness of communicative behaviour and the degree of semantic specificity of a given lexical item or between hearer- or speaker-supportiveness and the richness of a given lexical field. I shall come back to correlations of this type in the next chapter. 2. The notion of costs and benefits Although the distinction between hearer- and speaker-supportive communicative behaviour is central to the lexicalisation tendency proposed, Edmondson does not explain which patterns of communicative behaviour count as speakeror hearer-supportive and why. Only a small number of the speech acts represented in Figure 6 may unambiguously be classified as being either hearer- or speaker-supportive. Instances of communicative behaviour which are clearly hearer-supportive are represented by categories (10), (14), (18) and (26). These share the value ‘+’ for feature (iv) (i.e. ‘desirable consequences’) and the value ‘–’ for feature (v) (i.e. ‘hearer’). Speakersupportive speech acts are represented by categories (1), (5), (13), (21) and (25), which all share the value ‘+’ for features (iv) and (v) (i.e. desirable consequences for S). This does not mean, though, that all lexical expressions listed opposite categories characterised by these combinations of values should automatically be taken to lexicalise speaker- or hearer-supportive behaviour. Examples are boast opposite category (2) and thank opposite category (9). Acts of boasting are spea ker-supportive regardless of whether S or H benefits from the consequences of the event or state of affairs involved. Where benefits to H accrue (category (2)), S still emphasises his or her own merit in bringing this beneficial event or state of affairs . Speaker-supportive behaviour which is lexicalised is represented by blocks 1, 2, 5, 7, 15, 21, 25, 27 and 29. Block 13 represents speaker-supportive behaviour which is not lexicalised. Hearer-supportive behaviour is captured by blocks 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 26, 28, and 30. Categories 3, 6, 11, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 31 and 32 neither support not contradict the tendency proposed.

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into being. Thus, even in such cases where benefits accrue to H, the act of boasting is speaker-supportive. Conversely, acts of thanking are always hearer-supportive. In an act of thanking (category (9)), the RS speaker refers to a situation which is or was beneficial to him- or herself, but S acknowledges H’s executional costs in bringing A into being. This means that, ultimately, acts of thanking are always hearer-supportive. The lexicalisations in blocks (2) and (9) show that we cannot simply rely on the characterisation of the category types when we have to decide whether the behaviour lexicalised by the corresponding lexical expressions is hearer- or speaker-supportive. Some other speech acts are speaker- or hearer-supportive in a rather more indirect way. This is true of some of those acts where the event referred to by the RS speaker involves undesirable consequences for either S or H. In an act of apologising (category (4)), for example, a RS speaker refers to an event or state of affairs involving undesirable consequences for H, but the behaviour of a RS speaker expressing his/her sorrow for a hearer negatively affected by the consequences of some state or event may be considered “indirectly hearer-supportive”. Communicative behaviour which is hearer-supportive in this way is represented by categories (4), (8), (12), (16), (28), (32) and the excusatory acts represented by category (11). Conversely, acts of prohibiting (category (27)) involve an event which the speaker considers to have undesirable consequences for him- or herself. By prohibiting H to bring this event into being, S intends to prevent him- or herself from being affected by these undesirable effects. S’s behaviour may therefore be said to be speaker-supportive. The act of prohibiting is the only act which is speaker-supportive in this way. For some acts, it is altogether difficult to determine whether they represent instances of speaker- or hearer-supportive behaviour. Category (3), for example, represents a situation involving undesirable consequences for S. Should the behaviour of a speaker expressing his/her regret at the negative consequences of his or her own past action be classified as being “speaker-supportive”? If we treat this case as we treated acts of apologising (category (4)), this would be the proper way to deal with this category. In much the same way, the behaviour of a RS speaker referring to an event of categories (7) and (15) may be said to represent S-supportive behaviour (category (7): S involved in present or past event or state of affairs – S not responsible – undesirable consequences for S; category (15): H involved in present or past state or event – H not responsible – undesirable consequences for H)). A similar problem arises where a RS speaker’s utterance refers to a future event for which neither S nor H may be held responsible. Should such speech acts be classified as speaker-supportive wherever the future event referred to is considered to have desirable consequences for S and hearer-supportive wherever it involves desirable consequences for H? Assuming that they should, hearer-


supportive behaviour is captured in lines (18), (22), (26) and (30), while categories (21), (25) and (29) represent speaker-supportive behaviour. It is not clear how Edmondson treats patterns of communicative behaviour which support neither S nor H but have undesirable consequences for one of them. Acts of threatening, for example, are altogether undesirable for H, but not necessarily desirable or undesirable for S. All we can say about such acts is that they are certainly not H-supportive. The same is true of acts where a RS speaker addresses a future event which the RS speaker believes to have undesirable consequences for either S or H. The behaviour of a RS speaker referring to a future event with undesirable consequences for S or H is neither speaker- nor hearer-supportive. Edmondson’s claims make no predictions about how such behaviour is lexicalised nor does he explain how these cases influence the patterns he observed. Finally, to such cases where lexicalisations are lacking because of practical reasons, the labels “speaker-” or “hearer-supportive” are simply irrelevant. Although Edmondson does not explain what he means by “speaker- or hearer-supportive conversational behaviour”, he does comment on the most prominent counterexamples to his claims. He recognises, for example, that cases (2) and (6) represent instances of speaker-supportive behaviour but claims that appropriate lexicalisations for these acts are lacking altogether. As I have argued above, relevant lexicalisations for category (6) (S involved in past or present event or state – S not responsible – desirable consequences for H) are indeed lacking. However, boast properly lexicalises the concept of a speech act where a RS speaker refers to an event of category (2) (S involved in past or present state or event – S responsible – desirable consequences for H). Since case (2) represents patterns of conversational behaviour which is S-supportive, the presence of boast opposite this category contradicts Edmondson’s claims. Edmondson also calls the presence of the non-excusatory items for category (11) (H involved in past or present event or state of affairs – H responsible – undesirable consequences for S) and the items for category (25) (H involved in future event or state of affairs – H responsible – undesirable consequences for S) “manifestly inconsistent with an alleged H-supportive maxim.” He justifies the presence of the relevant items for these categories as follows: … without such activities as ‘Requesting’ and ‘Complaining’ the possibility of social co-operation or social retribution would scarcely exist. There is always a tension in any social encounter between the impulse towards contact with others and the impulse towards the defense of self: this tension is, in very simplistic terms, at the basis of the complex rituals we develop in conversational behaviour and elsewhere. It is for this reason that two different “values” are found appropriate to category 11, and also for category 18, as an act A of type 18 although clearly H-supportive is nonetheless a potential infringement on H’s territory – “costs” in

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terms of privacy, self-determination and so on are implicit in the notion of doing something on somebody else’s behalf. (Edmondson 1981: 497)

To justify the presence of lexicalisations for S-supportive speech acts, Edmondson points to the rich variety of terms available for referring to the S-supportive acts of categories (11) and (25) (COMPLAIN, REQUEST etc.). He attributes the lexical richness of these paradigms to the “potential indirectness of execution” of the corresponding acts, arguing that S-supportive acts like COMPLAIN and REQUEST are characterised by a “potential indirectness of execution” in a way that H-supportive acts like APOLOGISE and THANK are not. Edmondson also claims that lexical richness and indirectness of execution apply to verbs like offer, but not to verbs like promise although these two sets of verbs are both listed opposite category (18). According to Edmondson, this difference may be accounted for if we assume that a speaker promising a hearer to do something knows or believes that H is in favour of S’s doing A. For this reason, indirectness is unwarranted in the case of promising acts (cf. Edmondson 1981: 498). Granted that there may be a link between indirectness and lexical richness, it is not true that there are always more verbs for referring to acts which allow for negotiations between S and H. Acts of dissuading (category (28)), for example, are clearly H-supportive, but they also involve a potential infringement on H’s territory. This makes acts of dissuading good candidates for indirectness. Yet, only one verb (dissuade) is available for referring to the corresponding act. Additionally, these cases where S-supportive behaviour is lexicalised do not necessarily involve indirectness. This is true of acts of boasting, for example, which do not leave much room for negotiations between S and H. If the counterexamples discussed by Edmondson were the only exceptions to his claims, they would not seriously challenge the plausibility of the maxims he proposes to explain the lexicalisation of communication concepts. However, even if we accept Edmondson’s list of illocutionary verbs as well as the way he distributes these across the 32 category types, there are many more counterexamples to his claims than he himself mentions. As I have pointed out above, there are almost as many cases where S-supportive behaviour is lexicalised as such where H-supportive behaviour is lexicalised. I cannot think of any way how those cases where S-supportive behaviour is lexicalised may be made to fit in with Edmondson’s explanation of the lexicalisation of communication concepts. 3. The difference between actions and events The cost-benefit explanation as it is applied by Edmondson does not always properly account for the difference between events for which S or H may be held responsible and such where he/she may not. In both types of events, costs or ben-


efits are relevant only where the person involved in a particular event may also be held responsible for bringing that event into being. For this reason, I object to treating categories (2) and (6) as well as categories (9) and (13) similarly. The event type represented by the feature constellation in line (13) (H involved in past or present state or event – H not responsible – desirable consequences for S), for example, resembles that represented by category (9) (H involved in past or present state or event – H responsible – desirable consequences for S) in that both event types are beneficial to S. In spite of this, the behaviour of a speaker referring to an event of category (9) is hearer-supportive, because S acknowledges H’s executional costs in bringing this event into being. Edmondson claims that case (13) may be handled similarly. I disagree with this claim, because in this case H is not responsible for bringing A into being. For this reason, H does not have any executional costs. This difference also applies to categories (2) and (6), which differ with respect to whether or not S is responsible for a past or present state or event he/she is involved in and which has desirable consequences for H. In what follows, I shall refer to events for which S or H may be held responsible as “actions”; events or states of affairs for which neither S nor H can be held responsible will be subsumed under the label “events”.

2.2.3.3 Lexicalisation tendencies Though the data in the revised version of the matrix do not support Edmondson’s claims, the distribution of illocutionary verbs across the 32 event types is not completely random. The following patterns may be discerned: – The meaning of directives and commissives is more highly specified than that of other illocutionary verbs. Directives occur opposite categories 25–28, commissives opposite categories 17–20. Each of these predicates occurs in only one slot. This means that they may be used to describe only one type of speech act. Some other verbs such as welcome and apologise are also semantically highly specified, but these are exceptions within the class of expressives. In the case of directives and commissives, the high degree of semantic specificity is a property of the whole class, not just of some of its members. – The paradigms of directive and commissive predicates are lexically richer than those of other illocutionary verbs; they include a larger number of nonsynonymous verbs. – The meaning of representatives with future reference is less specific than that of other illocutionary verbs. This is reflected by the fact that the verbs predict, prophesy, foretell and announce may be used to describe the speech act performed by a speaker referring to a future event of any type. These verbs may be inserted into any slot opposite categories 17–32.

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Figure 8. Tendencies in the lexicalisation of conversational behaviour

On the basis of these observations, I suggest that the tendencies listed in Figure 8 above are relevant to the lexicalisation of conversational behaviour (cf. Proost 2001: 111). These lexicalisation principles are likely to be culture-specific. In modern Western societies, future actions, especially such which are to the interest of either S or H, are highly relevant to the interactions of speakers and hearers. It is therefore not surprising that speakers need a sufficiently large number of highly specialised expressions to describe that and how some speaker S binds himself or the hearer to the performance of some future action. Future events for which neither S nor H may be held responsible are not equally relevant to the way in which speakers and hearers cooperate. Since neither S nor H is able to foresee such future events and neither S nor H plays an active role in bringing these events into being, it does not make sense for S or H to negotiate about them. Obviously, an explanation in terms of social relevance need not hold for all types of society. In a society where magic is assigned a high cultural value, future events for which neither S nor H may be held responsible may be highly relevant. If my explanation is correct, the lexicon of the language spoken in such a society would contain many highly specialised expressions for the description of future events. Possibly, these languages would also have fewer expressions to refer to future actions. In the light of these observations, we would certainly expect the pattern found for English illocutionary verbs to be repeated in the lexicon of German and Dutch and of that of other languages. In the next section, the results obtained for English will be compared with the distribution of German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish illocutionary terms across the 32 categories of Edmondson’s matrix.

2.2.3.4 A cross-linguistic comparison of lexicalisation tendencies All lexicalisation tendencies observed so far for English can also be found in the lexicon of German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish (the data for these languages are included in part I of the Appendix):


1. Directives and commissives are the most specific and representatives with future reference the least specific predicates in each of the six languages. 2. Concepts which are not lexicalised in one language are generally not lexicalised in any of the other languages either. None of the three languages possesses lexical expressions to fill blocks 19 and 6. The absence of lexical items opposite category 6 (past event or state of affairs; S not responsible; desirable consequences for H) is likely to be a matrix product. The combination of features in this slot may hardly be taken to represent a concept: it is difficult to imagine a situation where a speaker boasts of the benefits of some past or present event, if it is clear that S is not responsible for bringing about the benefits resulting from that event. Lexicalisations in block 6 are blocked because of logical principles. The gap in block 19 (future event or state of affairs; S responsible; undesirable consequences for S) is more difficult to explain. Speech act equivalents of expressions like sacrifice oneself are missing from the lexicon of English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish. This gap may possibly be explained in terms of the social maxims formulated by Edmondson. A RS speaker referring to the negative consequences of one of his or her own future actions would violate the first of the concomitant maxims, which states that speakers should suppress their own costs and benefits. Under this explanation, lexicalisation in block 19 would be blocked because of principles of communication ethics. English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish differ slightly with respect to the distribution of other lexical gaps. Examples are speech acts whereby a speaker expresses a positive or negative evaluation of a future event or state of affairs. Future events or states which a speaker evaluates as having undesirable consequences may be referred to by special illocutionary terms in German (unken), Russian (karkat) and Turkish (kötümsemek), but such verbs are lacking from the lexicon of English, Dutch and French. Unlike the other five languages, Turkish possesses special illocutionary terms to refer to speech acts whereby a speaker expresses a positive evaluation of a future event or state of affairs: the complex expression ağazını hayra açmak means ‘prophesy a beneficial event’ while the verb müjdelemek lexicalises not only the desirable consequences of a future event, but also the beneficiary of these desirable consequences (H). The person affected by the undesirable consequences of a future action or event does not get lexicalised in either German, Russian or Turkish. English, Dutch and French speech act verbs do not differentiate between positive and negative evaluations of a future action or event. Taken together, the results for the six languages indicate that individual languages may vary considerably in the lexicalisation of concepts of representative speech acts whose propositional content is a future event: positive evalua-

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tions do not get lexicalised in any of the Indo-European languages examined, but negative evaluations are lexicalised in some of them. In Turkish, positive evaluations are lexicalised as well as negative ones. These findings indicate that the lexicalisation of speech act evaluations may be culture-specific. 3. Idioms and collocations show the same pattern of occurrence in each of the six languages. Collocations almost always occur as synonyms of verbs, while idioms occur only seldom. Cases of concepts which are lexicalised by a verb and a collocation in one language and by an idiom in another are rare. In Turkish, concepts are often lexicalised by collocations instead of verbs. Consequently, collocations are much more frequent in the Turkish data than they are in those of any of the other languages.

2.2.3.5 Potential explanations for the occurrence of lexical gaps The distribution of English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish illocutionary terms across the 32 categories of Edmonson’s matrix yields three types of lexical gaps. Some of these seem to be part of larger patterns: 1. Descriptive illocutionary expressions referring to the speech act of a RS speaker addressing a future action of S with undesirable consequences for S are lacking altogether (block 19). There are no illocutionary equivalents of expressions like English sacrifice oneself (German sich aufopfern; Dutch zich opofferen). 2. Illocutionary terms referring to representative speech acts whose propositional content is a future action or event which is regarded as having desirable consequences for either S or H exist only in Turkish (blocks 17/18, 21/22, 25/26, 29/30). In the other languages, the relevant speech acts are referred to by more general expressions such as English predict (German vorhersagen; Dutch voorspellen). 3. Illocutionary terms lexicalising representative speech acts whose propositional content is a future action or event with undesirable consequences for either S or H are lacking in English, Dutch and French. In German, Russian and Turkish, these speech acts are lexicalised by simple as well as complex illocutionary expressions (blocks 19/20, 23/24, 17/18, 31/32). Case 1 concerns the lexicalisation of concepts of commissive speech acts, which correspond to the feature combinations in 17–20. There are no lexicalisations for commissive speech acts involving undesirable consequences for S (block 19). Commissives involving undesirable consequences for H may only be referred to by threaten. Though a speaker threatening a hearer does indeed refer to an event with undesirable consequences for H, threaten is used to refer to situations in


Figure 9a. Commissive speech acts: Lexicalisation of costs and benefits

which a speaker expresses his intention to perform the intended action only if the hearer is not willing to fulfil a certain condition C. Since the feature combination opposite threaten in Edmondson’s matrix does not make reference to any such condition, it does not provide an adequate description of the meaning of this verb. There is also only one verb (renounce) which may be used to refer to commissive speech acts whose propositional content (an action to be performed by S) is in the interest of (and may therefore be considered to be desirable to) the speaker himself. Commissive speech acts whose propositional content is in the interest of (and hence desirable to) the hearer may be referred to by a large variety of predicates such as promise, vow, guarantee, etc. If undesirable consequences of P are taken to be “costs” and desirable consequences of P “benefits”, the lexicalisation pattern of concepts of commissive speech acts may be represented as in Figure 9a. Directive speech acts correspond to the feature combinations in (25)–(28). There are only two verbs (prohibit and forbid) which may be used to refer to undesirable consequences arising from H’s performing A. Though a speaker forbidding (or prohibiting) a hearer to do something does indeed refer to a future action of H which has undesirable consequences for himself, acts of forbidding (or prohibiting) someone to do something may also be seen as having desirable consequences resulting to S from H’s not performing A. What proves to be problematic at this point is that Edmondsons’s ordering system is in fact a classification of event types referred to by speech act verbs rather than a classification of speech acts: The event type referred to by a speaker forbidding or prohibiting a hearer to do something involves undesirable consequences to S, while the act of forbidding (or prohibiting) involves benefits arising to S from H’s not performing A. The same is true of dissuade. On the one hand, a speaker dissuading a hearer to do something refers

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Figure 9b. Directive speech acts: Lexicalisation of costs and benefits

Figure 10. Tendencies in the lexicalisation of directive and commissive speech act concepts

to an event type he considers to have undesirable consequences for H. On the other hand, the act of dissuading involves benefits arising to H from his not doing A. Desirable consequences arising from directive speech acts to S or H may be referred to by a large variety of predicates such as request (desirable consequences for S) or advise (desirable consequences for H). If undesirable consequences of P are taken to be “costs” and desirable consequences of P “benefits”, the lexicalisation of concepts of directive speech acts shows the pattern as in Figure 9b. Given that commissive and directive speech acts involve two types of costs, namely S’s or H’s costs of performing an action A as well as costs resulting from S’s or H’s performing A, the lexicalisation of directive and commissive speech act concepts may be governed by the lexicalisation tendencies represented in Figure 10 above.


Explanation Directive speech acts always involve H’s costs of performing an action A as well as benefits arising to S from H’s performing A. The concept of a balance of costs and benefits to S and H is lexicalised by a large range of predicates such as request, demand, order, beg and beseech. Directives like advise also lexicalise the concept of a balance of costs and benefits: they are used to refer to H’s costs of performing A as well as the benefits arising to H from his/her performing A. By contrast, verbs like prohibit, forbid and dissuade only refer to costs: prohibit and forbid are used to refer to H’s costs of performing A as well as the costs accruing to S from H’s performing A; speech acts referred to by dissuade involve not only H’s costs in performing A but also costs accruing to H from his doing A. Commissive speech acts always involve S’s costs of performing A as well as the benefits arising to H from S’s performing A. The concept of a balance of costs and benefits of S and H is lexicalised by a large variety of commissive predicates such as promise, vow and guarantee. The verb renounce also lexicalises the concept of a balance of costs and benefits: It is used to refer to S’s costs of not performing A as well as the benefits that would arise to S if he did perform A. By contrast, threaten only refers to costs (S’s costs in performing A as well as the costs accruing to H from S’s doing A). Similarly, speech act equivalents of sacrifice oneself would refer not only to S’s costs in performing A but also to the negative consequences which arise to S from his/her doing A. Costs and benefits of speakers and hearers do not provide an appropriate explanation for the gaps in the paradigm of representatives with future reference (cases 2 and 3). The data gathered from the six languages compared in the matrix show that Indo-European languages differ with respect to the lexicalisation of concepts of representative speech acts whose propositional content is a future action, event or state of affairs which is considered to have desirable or undesirable consequences for either S or H. English, Dutch and French representatives with future reference do not differentiate between positive and negative evaluations of P. When such evaluations do get lexicalised, the corresponding verbs express negative rather than positive evaluations. Why should this be the case? Possibly, future actions, events and states of affairs which are considered to be disadvantageous have a higher relevance value than those which are supposed to be advantageous. Particularly, they may be more important from a practical point of view: a speaker may want to inform H of such an event, because he or she may think that H should be prepared for it (even if its undesirable consequences concern S) or that H might want to do something to prevent it from happening. This may be the reason why speakers need to talk of them more often than of future actions, events or states of affairs involving desirable consequences. The necessity of talking about these events may explain why languages possess lexi-

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cal items to refer to them. Future actions or events which are considered to have desirable consequences do not have the same practical relevance. What counts as relevant may be culture-specific or specific to a particular speech community. For speakers of Turkish, future actions, events or states of affairs with desirable consequences and those which are considered to have undesirable consequences may be equally relevant. To speakers of English, Dutch or French, the distinction between positive and negative evaluations associated with future actions or events may be irrelevant. Alternatively, the lexicalisation pattern observed may be explained in terms of markedness. For speakers of languages like Russian and German, expressing a negative evaluation of a future action, event or state of affairs may be a pattern of communicative behaviour which counts as marked. By contrast, expressing a positive evaluation of a future action, event or state of affairs may be the normal or expected pattern of behaviour for speakers of these languages and may therefore be regarded as being unmarked. Possibly, languages possess more lexical items for speech acts which count as marked than for such which are regarded as being unmarked. The plausibility of a Principle of Markedness as a more general lexicalisation principle will be discussed in Chapter 3. So far, costs and benefits of speakers and hearers, relevance and markedness have been suggested as factors which may prove to govern the lexicalisation of concepts of communication. Cognitive principles too could turn out to be relevant if a larger set of data were taken into account. Any ordering system for concepts of communication should provide many more slots than those provided by Edmondson’s matrix. In Edmondson’s ordering system, verbs like dissuade and allow all occur in the same slot, because they may all be used to refer to the speech act of a RS speaker addressing a future action of H with undesirable consequences for H. Yet, these verbs are used to refer to different situations. Additional categories are required to differentiate their meanings. An ordering system based on a larger number of conceptual categories would also contain a larger number of gaps, some of which may call for a cognitive explanation rather than for an explanation in terms of pragmatic principles.

2.2.3.6 Lexical gaps and idiomatic speech act expressions To conclude this section, I return to the question of whether Edmondson’s ordering system may be used for the purposes of this study. Given that it is the aim of this study to cover the entire lexicalisation domain of concepts of communication, I argue that Edmondson’s analytical system does not provide us with an adequate means to answer any of the crucial questions. First and foremost, it does not even cover all actually existing illocutionary verbs. The following types of


verbs provide examples of cases which are left unaccounted for by Edmondson’s ordering system: (i) Representatives such as lie, claim and deny, which lexicalise the attitude of a speaker taking the proposition of his utterance to be true (or false). The only representatives whose meanings may be described by features (i)–(v) are such which are used for reference to future events. It is therefore surprising that Edmondson excludes these predicates, arguing that they are “neutral”. I disagree with this view, because these predicates are specified with respect to at least three parameters: temporal reference, S’s propositional attitude (‘S knows: P’) and the speaker’s intention (‘S wants: H know P’). Edmondson’s view of “neutral” representatives applies to verbs like say, tell and observe (though I would certainly not classify these as representatives), but not to verbs like predict, foretell and announce, which are true representatives. (ii) Reactive or re-reactive predicates. In Edmondson’s system, the position which a given utterance occupies within a sequence of utterances cannot be taken into account. Yet, the position of an utterance is part of a speaker’s presuppositions about the nature of the resource situation. Speaker presuppositions cannot be accounted for by Edmondson’s classification. The position of the utterance referred to is one of the factors distinguishing the meaning of predicates like request on the one hand and allow or forbid on the other. In Edmondson’s matrix, these verbs are distinguished on the basis of feature (iv) (positive vs. negative consequences of A), but differences in terms of position cannot be accounted for. (iii) Predicates lexicalising the presupposition of S that P is expectable or not expectable. In Edmondson’s matrix, warn and recommend are correctly differentiated on the basis of feature (iv) (positive vs. negative consequences of a future event A), but the expectability of P is a further factor distinguishing these two predicates. warn is used to refer to situations where P is to be expected, while recommend is used to describe the speech act of a speaker trying to get H to perform some action P which H would not have done in the normal course of events, i.e. P is not to be expected. Edmondson’s ordering system ignores differences in the expectability of P. (iv) Directives like ask (in the sense of ‘ask for information’). In spite of the fact that features (i)–(v) suffice to cover the meaning of many directive predicates, directives like ask (in the sense of ‘ask for information’) cannot be captured. This is due to the fact that the epistemic attitude of the hearer as perceived by the speaker (‘H knows: P’) is an essential element of the meaning of ask (in the intended

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sense). The epistemic attitude of the hearer is not part of the features constituting Edmondson’s ordering system. On the whole, we can conclude that Edmondson’s system captures only predicates whose meaning contains some kind of evaluative component. For this reason, most directive, commissive and expressive predicates may be included. However, even in these cases more features are required to account for the more fine-grained differences between single predicates of each of these groups. Edmondson’s approach proves to be entirely unsatisfactory for verbs which do not contain any such evaluative component as a part of their meaning. The system is altogether insensitive to the meaning of representative predicates. Any study operating with this type of ordering system will therefore necessarily yield results which are relevant to the classes of directive, commissive and expressive predicates only. Edmondson’s system does not allow any predictions to be made with respect to representative illocutionary verbs. Additionally, the meaning of verbs of communication cannot be described at all. Given that many of the parameters relevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs are lacking from Edmondson’s system, the system cannot be an adequate means to cover all of the relevant lexical gaps. Apart from that, only a very small number of idiomatic speech act expressions can be inserted into the slots opposite categories (1)–(32) of Edmondsons’s matrix. Those which can be inserted into these slots are synonymous with the illocutionary verbs listed. Yet, the large majority of English idiomatic speech act expressions does not fit into the slots opposite categories (1)–(32). This finding suggests that the meaning of idiomatic speech act expressions differs substantially from that of speech act verbs. In spite of my objections to Edmondson’s procedure, the idea that the costs and benefits of speakers and hearers are relevant to the way in which concepts of communication are lexicalised seems plausible. Costs and benefits are likely to be relevant wherever verb meanings involve an evaluative component. They are most likely to play a role in the lexicalisation of concepts of communication relating to directive and commissive speech acts. Such speech acts contain evaluations which are part of the speaker’s presuppositions and may therefore be called “implicit” evaluations (cf. Harras 2006: 99–102). Since these implicit evaluations are of the form ‘P in the interest of S or H’, they can be related to the costs and benefits of S and H in a straightforward way. The evaluations lexicalised by expressive predicates are explicit. Explicit evaluations are of the form ‘S considers: P good/bad’. Such evaluations are supposed instead of presupposed. As we have seen before, the cost/benefit-analysis does not apply to expressives as it does to directives and commissives. To representatives it does not apply at all. On the whole, Edmondson’s


analysis shows that different lexicalisation principles are likely to be relevant to different classes of illocutionary verbs.

2.2.3.7 A comparison of Edmondson’s and Baumgärtner’s ordering systems Compared to Baumgärtner’s ordering system, the one proposed by Edmondson covers a larger number of illocutionary verb classes as well as a larger number of illocutionary verbs. Yet, Baumgärtner’s system, which is restricted to directives and commissives, covers a larger number of verbs within each of these two classes and draws more fine-grained distinctions between the meaning of individual predicates. This is due to the fact that Baumgärtner includes many more parameters relevant to the meaning of directives and commissives than Edmondson does for the four classes of illocutionary verbs dealt with in his study. Consequently, Baumgärtner’s system provides a much more reliable basis for a systematic study of lexical gaps. A comparison of the ordering systems discussed so far suggests that the purposes of this study require an ordering system along the lines of Baumgärtner’s proposal. Since Baumgärtner’s system only captures the meaning of directive and commissive predicates, the number of the parameters included will have to be considerably increased if the whole lexicalisation domain of communication concepts is to be covered. In the next section I shall discuss which parameters are required if all illocutionary verbs are to be included and in what way these may be used to capture the meaning of actually existing as well as possible but non-existing illocutionary verbs. 2.2.4

Harras’ ordering system for concepts of communication

2.2.4.1 The common semantic core of speech act verbs and verbs of communication The conceptual system discussed in this section was developed by Harras. It serves as the conceptual basis of the classification of speech act verbs and verbs of communication presented in the Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben (cf. Harras et al. 2004). (Extensive discussions of this ordering system may be found in Harras 1994; Harras & Winkler 1994; Harras 1995; Winkler 1996; Harras 1998; Winkler 2001; Proost 2004: 295–299 and Proost 2006b: 651–652). The conceptual ordering system used in the Handbuch is based on the so-called “general resource situation type”. This is a situation type which involves the use of language and is characterised by the presence of four situation roles: a speaker, a hearer, a complex communicative attitude of the speaker and an utterance which – in the prototypical case – contains a proposition (cf. Figure 11 below).

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Figure 11. The elements of the general resource situation type

These four elements are part of any situation referred to by speech act verbs and constitute the unifying feature of the meaning of these verbs (cf. Verschueren 1980: 51–57 & 1985: 39–40; Wierzbicka 1986: 17–19; Harras et al. 2004: 9–22). Special types of situations referred to by speech act verbs are called “special resource situation types”.

2.2.4.2 Special resource situation types Special resource situation types constitute the framework for the classification of different types of speech act verbs. They are built up from specifications of the role of the utterance and of that of the speaker attitudes, which are both elements of the general resource situation type. I distinguish among three types of specifications: categorial aspects, attributes, and attribute values. Categorial aspects are specifications of the role of the utterance and of that of the speaker attitudes. The role of the speaker attitudes may be specified by the categorial aspects of the speaker’s propositional attitude, the speaker’s intention and the speaker’s presuppositions, while the role of the utterance is specified by the categorial aspect of the propositional content. The categorial aspects of the speaker’s propositional attitude may be further specified by attributes such as ‘epistemic’, ‘evaluative’ and ‘emotive’. Possible values for these attitudes are ‘S knows: P’ and ‘S takes to be true: P’ (for the attribute ‘epistemic’), ‘S considers: P good/bad’ (for the attribute ‘evaluative’) and ‘S feels joy/anger/sorrow because of P’ (for the attribute ‘emotive’). Specifications of the speaker’s intention include attributes such as ‘epistemic attitude of H’ (which may be further specified by values like ‘S wants: H know: P’, ‘S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P’) and ‘reference to action of H’ (which may be assigned values such as ‘S wants: H do: P’ and ‘S wants: H not do: P’). Examples of specifications of the categorial aspect of the speaker’s presuppositions are the attribute of the utterance position (with the possible values ‘initial’, ‘reactive’ and ‘re-reactive’), the attribute of the expectability of P (which may be assigned values like ‘P expectable’ or ‘P not expectable’) and the attribute of the interests of S and


H (which may be specified by values such as ‘not in the interest of H: P’ and ‘in the interest of S: P’). The categorial aspect of the propositional content, which specifies the role of the utterance, may be further specified by the attributes of the event type of P (which may be assigned the values ‘action’, ‘event’ or ‘state of affairs’), the temporal reference of P (with the possible values ‘[+Past]’ and ‘[–Past]’), and – in the case that P is an action – the attribute of the agent of P (which may be assigned values such as ‘S’, ‘H’, ‘Third Person’, ‘H or Third Person’, etc.). Different combinations of specifications of the different kinds of speaker attitudes and of the utterance constitute special resource situation types, which are referred to by distinct types of speech act verbs. Figures (12a)–(12c) below represent the combinations of the specifications lexicalised by inform, forbid and criticise. The categorial aspects used to specify the role of the utterance and that of the speaker’s communicative attitude resemble those forming the basis of Baumgärtner’s ordering system in many respects (see Section 2.2.2; cf. Baumgärtner 1977). They are aspects of the meaning of speech act verbs which determine what kinds of situations these predicates may be used to refer to. They also result from the same type of analysis which Baumgärtner applied to directive and commissive predicates. Yet, if the lexicalisation domain of communication concepts is to be covered completely, the set of categorial aspects proposed by Baumgärtner has to be considerably expanded. To find out which categorial aspects are relevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs in general, a set of well- and ill-formed sentences each containing a speech act verb of a specific class is construed. If all classes of illocutionary verbs are to be covered, the set of sentences has to include examples containing at least one example of each class. This procedure is illustrated by the

Figure 12a. Specifications lexicalised by inform

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Figure 12b. Specifications lexicalised by forbid

Figure 12c. Specifications lexicalised by criticise

set of sentences in (17a)–(17h) below. For the sake of brevity, this set of sentences only includes examples of representative, directive and commissive speech act verbs. Consequently, the categorial aspects resulting from the analysis applied to these sentences are relevant to the meaning of representative, directive and commissive predicates only. (17) a. John claims that Mary has read much. b. John claims that the Euro will soon become the official currency of Great Britain. c. John claims that Mary is younger than Bill.


d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n.

Tony denied that the Euro would soon become the official currency of Great Britain. John requested Maryi to PROi leave early/ that shei leave early. Johni promised Mary PROi to leave early/ that hei would leave early. *Johni requested Mary to PROi leave early/ that hei leave early. *John promised Maryi PROi to leave early/ that shei would leave early. #John requested Mary that it may snow. #John promised Mary that it would snow. John predicted that Mary would go abroad soon. John predicted that Mary would be willing to go abroad soon. John predicted that the Euro would soon become the official currency of Great Britain. *John predicted that Mary has already left.

Each of the sentences in (17a)–(17n) may be used to refer to situations involving the four elements of the general resource situation type: a speaker having a particular communicative attitude, a hearer, and an utterance containing a proposition expressed in the complement clause of each of these sentences. As the illformedness of some of the sentences in (17a)–(17n) shows, it is not the case that any verb may be combined with any type of complement clause. The restrictions on the compatibility of verb and complement clause are not due to the syntactic form of the latter. request and promise, for example, both subcategorise an infinitival complement clause and a finite complement clause introduced by the complementiser that. Yet the combination of these verbs with finite and infinitival complement clauses is acceptable only if certain co-reference requirements are fulfilled. The grammaticality of sentence (17e) and the ungrammaticality of that in (17g) shows that in a sentence containing the verb request the subject of the complement clause must be co-referent with the object of the main clause. A sentence containing the verb promise is grammatical only if the subject of the complement clause is coreferent with the subject of the main clause (cf. examples (17f) and (17h)). The co-reference restrictions observed in examples (17e)–(17h) may be explained in terms of control: request is an object-control predicate, while a predicate like promise is a subject-control predicate. Whether a given predicate allows the subject of the complement clause to be controlled by the subject or the object of the main clause depends on the meaning of the verb in question. request requires that the type of event expressed in the complement clause be an action whose agent is the hearer (i.e. the referent of the object of the main clause), while promise requires the event type of the propositional content P to be an action whose agent is S (the referent of the subject of the main clause).

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The other examples may be dealt with in a similar way. For example, the previous analysis of promise and request may be extended to include sentences like (17i) and (17j). Since both verbs subcategorise a finite clause complement introduced by that, it is not the form of the complement clause which makes these sentences ill-formed in the intended reading. (The reading intended here is one where the event type is an event for which no agent may be held responsible.) Rather, the ill-formedness of these sentences is due to the type of event expressed. Verbs like promise and request require that the event type expressed in the complement clause be an action. However, the event type expressed in (17i) and (17j) is that of an event for which no agent may be held responsible. Sentences (17i) and (17j) are well-formed only under the assumption that S and H are able to carry out some kind of action which causes some kind of surface to be covered with snow. Even in such cases, some kind of action by S or H would still be implied. Furthermore, the action expressed in the complement clause of verbs like promise and request temporally follows the speech act of promising or requesting. This means that the attribute ‘temporal reference’ of the categorial aspect ‘propositional content’ is assigned the value ‘future’ for each of these verbs. promise and request share the same value for the attribute assigned to the categorial aspect of the speaker’s propositional attitude. In both cases, the speaker’s propositional attitude is one of wanting: In the case of promise, the speaker’s propositional attitude is assigned the value ‘S wants: do P’; request lexicalises the value ‘S wants: P’. promise and request differ with respect to the type of speaker intention lexicalised. In speech acts referred to by request, the speaker’s intention is that S wants H to do P (‘S wants: H do P’). promise lexicalises S’s intention that H recognise that S wants to do P (‘S wants: H recognise: S wants: do P’). Both verbs also lexicalise the speaker’s presupposition that P would not have happened in the normal course of events (‘P not expectable’) as well as the speaker’s presuppositions about the interests of S and H. In the case of promise, S supposes P to be in the interest of H, while request is assigned the value ‘in the interest of S.’ Apart from these speaker presuppositions about the interests of S and H, both verbs also lexicalise the value ‘not specified’ assigned to the attribute ‘utterance position’: both request and promise may be used to refer to initial, reactive or re-reactive speech acts. So far, our analysis of request and promise has shown which categorial aspects are relevant to the meaning of these two predicates and which attributes may . As opposed to request, promise may take a complement clause expressing an action which temporally precedes the act expressed in the main clause. An example is a sentence like I promise that I returned the book to the library. However, in such cases, the act referred to by promise is not one of promising but rather one of assuring somebody that something was the case at some point of time in the past.


be assigned to each of these. The analysis has also illustrated where individual predicates overlap and where they differ in meaning. The results of the analysis of promise and request are summarised in Figures 13a and 13b below. Figures 13a and 13b represent those aspects of the meaning of promise and request which relate to the special resource situation type these verbs may be used to refer to. These aspects are also relevant to all other verbs of the same lexical field. For example, a verb like invite (sb. to do sth.) would be classified as belonging to the same lexical field as request, because it is used to refer to the same special resource situation type. This means that all values assigned to request may also be assigned to invite. The differences in meaning between these two verbs are not related to the special resource situation type these two verbs may be used to refer to. The values assigned to the attributes of the special resource situation type make up the conceptual part of the meaning of these verbs (see Chapter 1), while the difference in degree of strength by which request and invite (sb. to do sth.) may be differentiated is a component of the lexical part of their meaning. Having accounted for the conceptual component of the meaning of the verbs request and promise, we may now extend our analysis and turn to sentences (17a)– (17d). As opposed to verbs like request and promise, such like claim and deny allow for more than one option with respect to the attribute ‘event type.’ The event

Figure 13a. Conceptual part of the meaning of promise

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Figure 13b. Conceptual part of the meaning of request

expressed in the complement clause of claim and deny may be an action (17a), an event (17b & 17d) or a state of affairs (17c). Each of these may either temporally precede, follow or coincide with the act of claiming or denying. In those cases where the event expressed is of the action type, the agent of the action may be S, H or some other person. Since claim and deny allow all options for the attributes ‘event type (P)’, ‘temporal reference (P)’ and ‘agent (P)’, each of these is assigned the value ‘not specified’. Like request and promise, claim and deny are specified with respect to the type of propositional content required. Since neither of these verbs allows the propositional content type to be a question, these verbs all share the value ‘information content’ for the attribute ‘propositional content type’. Claim and deny also differ from request and promise regarding the speaker’s propositional attitude and the speaker intention lexicalised. claim and deny share the attribute ‘epistemic’ for the categorial aspects of the speaker’s propositional attitude and the speaker’s intention, but the attribute ‘epistemic’ is assigned a different value for each of these verbs. In the case of claim, the attribute ‘epistemic’ is assigned the value ‘S takes to be true: P’, while the same attribute is assigned the value ‘S takes to be true: not P’ in the case of deny. While the propositional attitude lexicalised by deny may be represented as ‘S takes to be true: not P’, the propositional attitude expressed by lie would have to be described as ‘S does not take to be true: P’. These representations show that the difference in the propositional attitude lexicalised by each of these verbs is due to a difference in the scope


of negation. In the case of lie, the scope of negation is the attitude ‘take to be true’, while the scope of negation is the propositional content (P) in the case of deny. This difference in the scope of negation also reflects the different positions which the speech acts referred to by these verbs occupy in a sequence of speech acts. deny is used to refer to speech acts which are a reaction to a preceding act and is therefore assigned the value ’reactive’ for the attribute ‘utterance position’. As opposed to deny, lie may be used to refer to initial, reactive and re-reactive speech acts. This means that P is introduced together with the act of lying. Because of this, negation may not have scope over P. Instead it has scope over the speaker’s propositional attitude. In the case of deny, P has already been introduced by a preceding speech act. Negation may therefore affect P directly. The attribute ‘epistemic’ of the categorial aspect of the speaker’s intention is assigned the value ‘S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P’ in the case of claim and the value ‘S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: not P’ in the case of deny. claim and deny also differ with respect to the speaker’s presuppositions about the interaction of S and H: deny lexicalises S’s presupposition that H takes P to be true, while claim does not lexicalise any such presupposition. The conceptual component of the meaning of claim and deny is represented in Figures 14a and 14b below. Having described the conceptual part of the meaning of promise, request, claim and deny, we may now extend the analysis of the categorial aspects of illocution-

Figure 14a. Conceptual part of the meaning of claim

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Figure 14b. Conceptual part of the meaning of deny

Figure 15. Conceptual part of the meaning of predict

ary verbs to include the last examples of the set in (17). As examples (17k)–(17m) show, the event type expressed in the complement clause of a verb like predict may be an action, an event or a state of affairs. If the event type expressed in the comple-


ment clause is an action, the agent of the action may be S, H, S & H or some other person. The ill-formedness of (17n) shows that predict differs from claim and deny in that it requires the action, event or state expressed in the complement clause to follow the act of predicting in time. This means that the attribute ‘temporal reference’ is assigned the value ‘future’ while the attribute ‘event type’ allows all possible options. The attributes ‘event type’ and ‘agent’ are therefore both assigned the value ‘not specified’. predict also differs from all other illocutionary verbs in the examples (17a)–(17j) in that it lexicalises the propositional attitude ‘S takes P to be likely’ and the speaker intention that H recognise this. Additionally, predict lexicalises the speaker’s presupposition that H does not know P as well as the value ‘not specified’ for the attribute of the utterance position. Figure 15 above shows the elements which make up the conceptual component of the meaning of predict. As opposed to all illocutionary verbs discussed so far, verbs of communication are not specified regarding the values assigned to the attributes of the categorial aspects. Instead they lexicalise the manner in which something is communicated (as is true of verbs like stutter and yell), the medium by which an utterance is brought about (e.g. fax and mail), a particular kind of conversational structure (e.g. answer, interrupt), the very fact of uttering something (e.g. say, tell, utter) or some other aspect of meaning which does not relate to the categorial aspects mentioned above. Figure 16 represents the conceptual component of the meaning of mumble.

Figure 16. Conceptual part of the meaning of mumble

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2.2.4.3 An inventory of categorial aspects, attributes and values The predicates mentioned above lexicalise only some of the values for the attributes of the categorial aspects which are possible in principle. To complete the picture, all possible values for the attributes of each of the categorial aspects are listed below. The rightmost column of each of these lists contains examples of predicates lexicalising the value in question. Categorial Aspect

Attributes

Propositional Content Type (P) Content (P)

Values

Information Content Question Content Not Specified Event Type (P) State of Affairs Action Event Action/State of Affairs Action/Event State of Affairs/Event Not Specified Agent (P) (relevant only S where P is an action) H S and H 3rd Person S/3rd Person H/3rd Person S/H Not Specified Temporal Reference (P) Past Present Future Past/Present Past/Future Present/Future Not Specified Propositional Epistemic take to be true (S,P) Attitude (S) take to be true (S, ¬ P) Att(S,P) ¬ take to be true (S,P) ¬ take to be true (S, ¬ P) know (S,P) ¬ know (S,P) Attitude of Wanting want (S,P) want (S, ¬ P)

Examples inform, praise ask whisper baptise promise, request --boast, flatter ----claim, whisper promise, boast request, flatter propose slander --agree, criticise --claim, whisper boast --promise, request praise ----claim, whisper claim deny lie --inform ask request prohibit


(continued) ¬ want (S,P) ¬ want (S, ¬ P) Attitude of Grading consider x (S,P) ¬ consider x (S,P) Evaluative Attitude consider good (S,P) consider bad (S,P) Emotive Attitude feel joy (S,P) feel anger (S,P) feel sorrow (S,P) Speaker Reference to action (H) want (S(do(H,P))) Intention I(S) want (S(¬ do(H,P))) want (S(do(H,R))) Epistemic Attitude (H) want (S(recognise (H (Att(S,P))))) want(S(¬ recognise (H(Att (S, P))))) want (S(know (H,P))) want (S(¬ know (H,P))) Declarative Attitude want (S,Q)

warn --judge --praise criticise congratulate scold lament request prohibit/forbid ask confirm/promise --inform --baptise

The attributes assigned to the categorial aspect of the speaker’s presuppositions fall into one of two groups. Some of them relate to the speaker’s presuppositions about the ‘world of interaction’, particularly about H and P. Others concern the speaker’s presuppositions about other elements of the resource situation such as the social domain or the institutional setting in which the interaction of S and H takes place. Possible values for the attribute ‘social domain’ are ‘private’, ‘official’, ‘public’ and ‘institutional’. The attribute ‘institutional setting’ may be assigned a whole range of values relating to the different kinds of institutions existing within a given speech community. Speaker presuppositions of this kind cannot be described as systematically as the other categorial aspects, because they depend to a high degree on the social and institutional organisation of a particular linguistic community. The attribute ‘utterance position’ also relates to this group of speaker presuppositions. The two types of speaker presuppositions and the attributes assigned to each of these are listed below. Here again, the rightmost column of each table lists predicates lexicalising the relevant value for a particular attribute.

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Categorial Aspect

Attributes

Values

Examples

warn insist (that sb. do something) ¬ expectable (P) request ¬ expectable (¬ P) forbid, prohibit Interests of S & H inter of S (P) request inter of S (¬ P) --¬ inter of S (P) --¬ inter of S (¬ P) --inter of H (P) promise inter of H (¬ P) dissuade ¬ inter of H (P) warn, threaten ¬ inter of H (¬ P) --Epistemic Attitude (H) take to be true (H,P) deny take to be true (H, ¬ P) concede, admit ¬ take to be true (H,P) insist (that sth. is the case), maintain ¬ take to be true (H, ¬ P) --know (H,P) --¬ know (H,P) inform Presuppositions Utterance Position initial ask of S about the reactive deny situation re-reactive insist sequential argue Social Domain informal inform private entrust, confide institutional command Institutional Setting Church baptise Law condemn Army command • • • •

Presuppositions Expectability (P) of S about the ‘world of interaction’

expectable (P) expectable (¬ P)

The inventory of categorial aspects, attributes and values is used in the Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben (Harras et al. 2004 & 2007) to account for the conceptual part of the meaning of German speech act verbs. Since most German speech act verbs have equivalents in most other Indo-European languages, the categories used to describe the conceptual component of the meaning of German speech act verbs may also be considered to be relevant to the equivalents of these German verbs in other Indo-European languages.


Although the ordering system presented in this section captures the conceptual part of the meaning of most illocutionary verbs in many Indo-European languages, it is important to keep in mind that the ordering system as such is not completely independent of any individual language. As the inventory listed above shows, the attribute values are listed systematically and irrespective of whether they are lexicalised in a particular language or not. As opposed to the attribute values, the categorial aspects are the result of an analysis of the illocutionary verbs of a particular language. The attributes assigned to the categorial aspects occupy a position in between: Some of them result from an analysis of the meaning of illocutionary verbs, others may be listed systematically. For example, the attributes of the categorial aspect of the speaker’s intention are the result of a semantic analysis of speech act verbs, while those specifying temporal reference include only a very limited number of possibilities ([+Past] and [–Past]) which may be listed systematically. This means that the conceptual ordering system presented in this section is only partially language-independent.

2.2.4.4 Speech acts versus speech act verbs As Harras has pointed out, the categorial aspects used to specify the roles of the speaker and that of the utterance bear some resemblance to the components of illocutionary forces mentioned by Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 12–20) and Vanderveken (1990: 103–136) (cf. Harras 2001: 26–31). Vanderveken lists the following components, some of which were already introduced by Searle as conditions for the successful performance of a particular illocutionary act by means of an explicit performative utterance (cf. Searle 1969: 57–61): (1) Illocutionary point (2) Mode of Achievement of an Illocutionary Point (3) Propositional Content (4) Preparatory Conditions (5) Sincerity Conditions (6) Degree of Strength Concerning (1), Searle and Vanderveken (1985) and Vanderveken (1990) distinguish between five types of illocutionary point (quoted here from Vanderveken 1990: 105): (i) the assertive point which consists in representing as actual a state of affairs (ii) the commissive point which consists in committing the speaker to a future course of action (iii) the directive point which consists in making an attempt to get the hearer to do something

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(iv) the declarative point which consists in performing an action which brings into existence a state of affairs by representing oneself as performing that action (v) the expressive point which consists in expressing propositional attitudes of the speaker about a state of affairs At first sight, none of these five types of illocutionary point seems to have much in common with any of the categorial aspects resulting from an analysis of the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Yet Vanderveken’s definitions of each of the illocutionary points make reference to notions such as representing as actual, committing oneself, get somebody to do something, perform an action with a certain result and expressing some kind of propositional attitude. These are all intentional predicates which are predicated of a speaker. Consequently, the illocutionary point of a particular speech act may be said to correspond to the categorial aspect of the speaker’s intention which is part of the meaning of illocutionary verbs (cf. Harras 2001: 29). The mode of achievement of an illocutionary point serves to differentiate speech acts with the same illocutionary point. For example, acts of requesting differ from acts of commanding, because the latter – but not the former – involve some kind of authority position of the speaker over the hearer. Likewise, acts of confiding differ from such of informing in that they require the additional condition of a specific social domain (‘confidential’). Such features, which distinguish REQUEST from COMMAND and CONFIDE from INFORM, are part of the mode of achievement of the illocutionary point of these speech acts. This component of the illocutionary force of a particular speech act corresponds to some of the speaker’s presuppositions about the situation in which the interaction of S and H takes place. These are subsumed under the categorial aspect of the speaker’s presuppositions which are part of the meaning of illocutionary verbs. The propositional content condition may be directly related to the categorial aspect of the propositional content. The preparatory conditions of a particular speech act are defined in illocutionary logic as the conditions which are necessary for the successful and non-defective performance of that speech act. They are determined by the illocutionary force of a particular speech act: each illocutionary force has a component which determines which propositions the speaker must presuppose when he performs an illocutionary act with that force (cf. Vanderveken 1990: 114). For example, a speaker praising a hearer for something that he has done presupposes that it is good to do such a thing. As this example shows, the preparatory conditions of illocutionary acts correspond to the presuppositions of a speaker about the world of interaction. These are subsumed under the categorial aspect of the speaker’s presuppositions which is a component of the meaning of illocutionary verbs.


Vanderveken defines the sincerity conditions of a particular speech act in terms of propositional attitudes: By performing an illocutionary act, the speaker also expresses (or manifests) mental states of certain psychological modes about the state of affairs represented by the propositional content. For example, a speaker who promises something expresses an intention to do what he promises, and a speaker who requests a hearer to do something expresses a desire that he do it. Such mental states are propositional attitudes of the form m(P), where m is a psychological mode such as, for example, desire, regret, or hope, and P is a proposition. … The performance of an illocutionary act is sincere when the speaker has the mental states that he expresses in the performance of that act, and it is insincere otherwise. (Vanderveken 1990: 117)

If the sincerity conditions of a given speech act are defined in this way, they may be directly related to the categorial aspect of the speaker’s propositional attitude which is lexicalised by speech act verbs. A speaker’s mental state about the state of affairs represented by the propositional content of a particular speech act may be expressed with different degrees of strength (cf. Vanderveken 1990: 177). For example, an act of beseeching somebody to do something involves a higher degree of strength than one of asking somebody to do something. Degree of strength is a feature which may be observed only by comparing different illocutionary verbs belonging to the same lexical field. It does not correspond to any of the categorial aspects which are part of the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Degree of strength is a feature which is part of the lexical component of the meaning of some speech act verbs. As such, it cannot be captured by any of the categorial aspects mentioned above, which represent the conceptual component of verb meaning. The comparison of the components of the illocutionary forces of speech acts with the categorial aspects of the meaning of speech act verbs has shown that all but one of the components of illocutionary forces correspond to the categorial aspects of the meaning of speech act verbs. Degree of strength is the only component which cannot be mapped onto any of the categorial aspects of verb meaning. The correspondences between illocutionary acts and illocutionary verbs are summarised in Figure 17 below. In spite of the correspondences between the components of illocutionary forces of speech acts and the categorial aspects of the meaning of speech act verbs, the correspondence between illocutionary acts and illocutionary verbs is not perfect. As we have seen in Section 2.2.1, not all aspects which are relevant to the nature of illocutionary acts are also part of the meaning of speech act verbs.

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Figure 17. Correspondences between speech acts and speech act verbs

2.2.4.5 Lexical gaps As we have seen before, the categorial aspects which are part of the ordering system presented in this chapter are the result of an analysis of sentences containing illocutionary verbs. By combining these verbs with complement clauses expressing different event types, different types of propositional attitude, different speaker presuppositions, etc. we have been able to identify the elements which make up the conceptual part of the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Following Baumgärtner, these aspects of the meaning of illocutionary verbs have been called “categorial aspects”. They are aspects of the meaning of these verbs which determine what kinds of situations these verbs may be used to refer to. In the preceding section, the type of analysis used to identify the relevant categorial aspects has been applied to all classes of speech act verbs as well as verbs of communication. This has led to the establishment of a complete inventory of categories which are relevant to all illocutionary verbs and verbs of communication. Since all relevant categories are included, this inventory provides a reliable basis for the study of lexical gaps. The examples mentioned above show that the conceptual part of the meaning of illocutionary verbs like promise, request, claim, deny, etc. may adequately


be described by combinations of values for parameters specifying the speaker’s attitude and the propositional content of an utterance. For example, a combination like the one in (i) is lexicalised by all directives, while one like (ii) captures all commissives. (i)  Att(S,P):  I(S):  Pres(S):  

want (S, P) want (S (do (H,P))) in the interest of S (P) not expectable (P) able to do P (H)

    

(ii)  Att(S):  I(S):  Pres(S):  

want (S (do,P)) want (S (recognise (H, Att (S,P)))) in the interest of H (P) not expectable (P) able to do P (S)

    

However, not all possible combinations of parameter values are lexicalised by illocutionary verbs or verbs of communication. Some of those which are not do not represent concepts of communication but merely result from combining parameter values in a particular way. I shall refer to such combinations of values as “matrix products”. Matrix products are combinations of parameter values which do not make sense from a communicative point of view and may therefore not be considered to represent concepts of communication. A case in point is the combination of the values ‘S knows: P’ for the categorial aspect of the speaker’s propositional attitude, ‘S wants: H know: P’ for the aspect of the speaker’s intention and ‘H knows: P’ for the aspect of the speaker’s presuppositions: (iii)

 Att (S,P):

 

I (S): Pres (S):

know (S, P) want (S (know (H,P))) H knows: P



 

The combination in (iii) represents a speech act whereby a speaker informs a hearer of something he assumes to be known by H. Such combinations of values do not make sense from a communicative point of view. They cannot be taken to represent concepts of communication and are mere matrix products. Other combinations of parameter values which are not lexicalised do make sense from a communicative point of view. These combinations may be said to represent concepts of communication. Concepts of communication which are not lexicalised correspond to lexical gaps. An example is the lack of specialised English, German and Dutch predicates lexicalising the values ‘Event’ or ‘Event or State’ for the attribute of the event type of P. Declaratives like baptise lexicalise the

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value ‘State’; the value ‘Action’ is lexicalised by all directive and commissive predicates. Predicates like claim, deny and predict are assigned the value ‘not specified’ (i.e. ‘State/Event/Action’) for the attribute ‘Event Type’. This means that languages like English, German and Dutch only distinguish between the value ‘Action’, ‘State’ and ‘Not specified’ as far as the lexicalisation of communication concepts is concerned; there are no specialised predicates in these languages which lexicalise the value ‘Event’ or ‘State or Event’. Other examples of lexical gaps may be found in the classes of representative and commissive predicates. While reactive representatives and commissives are specified regarding the distinction between ‘P’ and ‘¬P’, representatives and commissives which either are not specified with respect to the position of the utterance referred to (claim, promise) or are used to refer to a re-reactive stage (maintain, insist) fail to lexicalise this distinction. Consequently, the classes of these representative and commissive predicates contain a considerable number of gaps (cf. Figures 18a and 18b). Since reactive as well as re-reactive directives are not specified regarding the distinction between ‘P’ and ‘¬P’, gaps are even more frequent in the classes of these verbs (cf. Figure 18c). As I have pointed out in Chapter 1, expressives are not specified with respect to the position of the utterance they are used to refer to. (In Figures 18a–18c below, lexicalisations of the distinction between ‘P’ and ‘¬P’ are listed for English, German and Dutch.) The relevant lexical gaps within the classes of representative, directive and commissive speech act verbs may be described in terms of combinations of values which are not lexicalised in English, German or Dutch. For example, the lack of re-reactive representatives lexicalising the distinction between ‘P’ and ‘¬P’ (third column of Table 18a) may be described by combinations of parameter values like those in (iv) and (v) below.

Figure 18a. Lexicalisation of ‘P’ and ‘¬P’: Representatives


Figure 18b. Lexicalisation of ‘P’ and ‘¬P’: Commissives

Figure 18c. Lexicalisation of ‘P’ and ‘¬P’: Directives

(iv)  Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P)  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P)))))   Pres(S): not take to be true (H,P)  Position (Utt): re-reactive ⇓ Ø

    

(v)  Att(S,P): take to be true (S, ¬P)  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S, ¬P)))))   Pres(S): not take to be true (H, ¬P)  Position (Utt): re-reactive ⇓ Ø

    

Possible explanations for the lack of specialised predicates lexicalising the distinction between ‘P’ and ‘¬P’ will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 3).

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2.3

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that lexical gaps may adequately be described against the background of a conceptual system. Several ordering systems for concepts of communication were introduced and discussed. Traditional speech act taxonomies were first suggested as possible ordering systems for concepts of communication. Searle’s classification was rejected mainly because some of its classification criteria are not relevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. A lexicon-based approach like Austin’s has obvious advantages for the purposes of this study, because its classification criteria are necessarily relevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Yet Austin’s lexicalist approach excludes the possibility of capturing lexical gaps (see Section 2.2.1). For this reason, it was ultimately rejected as well. If lexical gaps are to be included systematically, we need a conceptual system which allows us to represent the meaning of lexicalised as well as non-lexicalised concepts of communication. Baumgärtner’s ordering system proved to meet the essential requirements for a systematic study of lexical gaps. Though its parameters are based on the meaning of illocutionary verbs, it also covers communication concepts which are not lexicalised. Within Baumgärtner’s ordering system, concepts of communication are represented as combinations of parameter values which may but need not be lexicalised. Combinations of values which are not lexicalised represent lexical gaps if the combination in question is not ruled out by logical principles. The parameters on which Baumgärtner’s ordering system is based cover all relevant aspects of the meaning of directive and commissive predicates, but they are partly irrelevant to the meaning of other types of illocutionary verbs. Other types of illocutionary verbs call for the inclusion of different parameters. Though Edmondson’s ordering system was designed to cover representatives, directives, commissives and expressives, we noticed that it properly captures only directives and commissives. This is due to the fact that this ordering system was developed to explain lexicalisation tendencies in terms of costs and benefits for speaker and hearer. As we have seen, the notion of costs and benefits cannot easily be applied to representatives and expressives and would have to be modified considerably if it were to be applied to these two classes of speech act verbs. In addition, Edmondson’s ordering system ignores many aspects which are highly relevant to the meaning of the illocutionary verbs included in his study. Harras’ ordering system is based on parameters which result from a semantic analysis of sentences containing illocutionary verbs of all classes. This procedure ensures that the parameters on which this system is based are relevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Since this kind of analysis may be applied to a large number of speech act verbs of all types as well as to verbs of communica-


tion, the inventory of categories proposed by Harras fully encompasses the entire lexical domain. This makes Harras’ ordering system an adequate instrument for a systematic study of lexical gaps. In Chapter 3, this ordering system will therefore be used as the basis for a study of lexical gaps.

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chapter 3

Lexical gaps

3.1

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have selected Harras’ ordering system for communication concepts as the most suitable system for detecting gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. In this chapter, I shall use this system to set up a list of communication concepts which are not lexicalised in English, German or Dutch and offer possible explanations for why these concepts fail to get lexicalised. Before turning to the issue of non-lexicalised communication concepts, Section 3.2 will first be concerned with the relevance of studying lexical gaps. Section 3.3 presents an overview of earlier accounts of lexical gaps. Missing lexicalisations were first defined from a structuralist point of view, i.e. as empty slots in a lexical field whose structure was usually represented as a matrix or chart. I shall discuss several such structuralist approaches, arguing in particular that matrix gaps may not automatically be assigned the status of lexical gaps. Rather, matrix gaps must fulfil certain requirements if they are to be assigned the status of lexical gaps. In Section 3.4, these requirements will be used as the basis of my own definition of lexical gaps. Section 3.5 will be concerned with different ways of finding lexical gaps. Different procedures will be proposed to trace different types of gaps. Gaps occurring at the conceptual level of meaning will be traced by the method of combining possible values for the attributes of the categorial aspects as illustrated in Chapter 2. Gaps occurring on the lexical level of meaning require a different searching strategy. Section 3.6, which is the central part of this chapter, deals with gaps in the main classes of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. I shall list different types of gaps in each of these verb fields and offer some preliminary explanations for their occurrence. In the final section of this chapter, the various explanations suggested in Section 3.6 will be reduced to a much smaller number of lexicalisation principles.


3.2

Why study lexical gaps?

A study of lexical gaps is essential to a cross-linguistic comparison of lexicalisation patterns for at least three reasons. Firstly, missing lexicalisations may make us aware of patterns in the distribution of existing lexicalisations which would have escaped our attention if lexical gaps had not been taken into account. Missing lexicalisations are likely to be overlooked especially when a concept fails to get lexicalised in any of the languages under investigation. Even if a large number of typologically distinct languages is taken into account, there may still be concepts which are not lexicalised in any of these and are therefore likely to go unnoticed. Secondly, the availability or non-availability of a word or other lexical item to express a certain concept is important, because words and other lexical items have a status different from that of free combinations of words. Though all concepts may be expressed in principle, only some of them may be expressed by lexical items. Concepts which may not be expressed by lexical items must be expressed by paraphrases. These are free combinations of words, i.e. phrases, clauses or sentences. Lexical items differ from paraphrases in that they are prefabricated items ready for use: They may be selected from the mental lexicon as wholes and do not have to be composed from smaller units each time they are produced. While this may be obvious with respect to words, it is also true of lexical expressions consisting of more than one word. Multiword lexicalisations are not built up from their components each time they are produced nor are they broken down into their constituents each time a hearer (or reader) is presented with them. As early as 1975, Bolinger argued that our language contains many more prefabricated items (or “prefabs” as he calls them) than is commonly assumed: ... our language does not expect us to build everything starting with lumber, nails and blueprint, but provides us with an incredibly large number of prefabs, which have the magical property of persisting even when we knock some of them apart (Bolinger 1975: 1) and put them together in unpredictable ways.

Bolinger explains the abundance of prefabs in language as an effect of memory. Some words are learned in combination with certain other words, and speakers never hear them being used otherwise. As a result, speakers have a memory of certain combinations which prevents them from replacing the usual parts of the combination by others. The effect of memory accounts, for example, for the fact that native speakers of English do not produce phrases like *an extended time ago or *sometime else although they do generate phrases like a lifetime ago and somewhere else. Native speakers of English do not produce the former two phrases, because they simply have no memory of them (cf. Bolinger 1975: 4). Arguing that word combinations like a lifetime ago and somewhere else are idiom-like connec-

Chapter 3. Lexical gaps

tions, Bolinger calls the phenomenon of the habitual co-occurrence of words “idiomaticity”. According to Bolinger, idiomaticity is a pervasive phenomenon whose effects are not limited to idioms and other habitual co-occurrences of words but also extend up to the level of syntax (cf. ibid.: 3). The phenomenon of idiomaticity accounts for why the status of lexical items is different from that of free combinations of words. Even if idiomaticity extends up to the level of syntax, free combinations of words are not stored in memory as units in the way lexical items are. As opposed to lexical items, they cannot be recalled from memory as ready-made units. Because of this, the use of paraphrases to express certain concepts is less economical than the use of lexical items. This means that it does indeed matter a great deal whether we have words (or other lexical items) to express certain concepts: Concepts which are lexicalised can be expressed more economically than such which are not. A third reason why lexical gaps are worth studying is that thought and language are often claimed to be related. Language being a manifestation of culture, the latter has often been claimed to affect, through language, the way we speak. The assumption that culture influences thought through language is commonly referred to as “linguistic relativity” or “linguistic determinism”. The original idea, which goes back to Humboldt, may be summarised as follows (cf. Humboldt 1835; here represented in Slobin’s formulation, cf. Slobin 1996: 70): “Languages differ from one another; thought and language are related; each speech community embodies a distinct world view.” The notion of linguistic relativism was taken up in the first half of the 20th century by Boas, Sapir and Whorf and is best-known in the version formulated by Whorf: From this fact proceeds what I have called the “linguistic relativity principle”, which means, in informal terms, that users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers, but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world. (Whorf 1940: 221)

From the 1960s onward, the ideas connected with the notion of linguistic relativity were regarded with a considerable amount of scepticism (cf. Kandler’s criticism of Trier’s and Weisgerber’s theory of language in Kandler 1973). According to Gumperz and Levinson, this was due to the rise of the cognitive sciences which emphasised the common properties of human cognition as well as its basis in human genetic endowment (cf. Gumperz & Levinson 1996: 2). Gumperz and Levinson point out that scepticism towards the concept of linguistic relativism persisted into the second half of the 20th century and did not abate until the 1990s, when attention was redirected towards linguistic and cultural diversity. However,

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they emphasise that recent accounts of linguistic relativism no longer adhere to the version proposed by Whorf but rather view diversity within the context of our knowledge of universals and thereby occupy a position in between Whorf ’s and that of the cognitive sciences (cf. Gumperz & Levinson 1996: 3). One such more recent and more moderate version of the notion of linguistic relativity is the “thinking for speaking” framework proposed by Slobin. Rather than relating thought or world view to language, Slobin relates the dynamic entities of thinking and speaking. By “thinking for speaking”, Slobin means the kind of thinking which is carried out online in the process of speaking. The thinking for speaking framework presupposes that events cannot be fully represented in language and that linguistic expression therefore requires some sort of schematisation. According to Slobin, every utterance represents a selection of event characteristics, leaving it to the receiver to fill in details on the basis of ongoing context and background knowledge. A speaker or listener has to attend to those semantic features which are encoded in the grammatical and lexical elements of a particular language in order to learn and use that language: “’Thinking for speaking’ involves picking those characteristics of objects and events which (a) fit some conceptualization of the event and (b) are readily codable in language” (cf. Slobin 1996: 76). The notion of codability plays a crucial role in thinking for speaking research. As I shall argue below, it is also essential to a study of lexical gaps. Slobin defines “codability” as the ease of expression of the relevant categories. According to Slobin, “a more codable expression is more accessible in psycholinguistic terms – that is, it is short and/or of high frequency, and generally part of a small set of options in a paradigm or small set of items” (cf. Slobin 2003: 161). In this passage, Slobin first presents codability as a property of event characteristics or categories and then as a property of expressions. It is therefore not clear what is actually supposed to be codable. However, Slobin’s use of “codable” in the next passage suggests that it is actually concepts rather than expressions which may be more or less codable, the type of expression by which a concept is encoded being an indication of the codability of that concept: “A concept expressed by a single word is more codable than one expressed by a phrase or clause (e.g. run versus while running)” (cf. ibid.: 161). The notion of codability as defined by Slobin is relevant to a study of lexical gaps. If it is true that concepts expressed by words are more codable than those expressed by phrases or sentences, the presence or absence of a word or other lexical item for a particular concept is an indication of the status of that concept. Particularly, the availability of a lexical item for a certain concept tells us that that concept is rather highly codable. Slobin presents evidence from psycholinguistic experiments, spontaneous conversation, written and oral narrative, language acquisition, innovative uses


of language and reports of mental imagery which shows that speakers are more sensitive to dimensions which are highly codable in their language than to such which are less codable (cf. Slobin 2003: 164–176). Slobin’s example is the category of manner of motion. Manner of motion is highly codable in English, as indicated by the fact that it is a feature carried by the main verb. Since manner of motion is expressed in English as a feature carried by the main verb, it may be more economically expressed in English than in languages such as French or Spanish where manner of motion has to be expressed as an adjunct. French bondir, for example, does not distinguish between the manners of motion encoded in English by jump, leap, bound, spring, skip and gambol. Likewise, Spanish escabullirse can be translated as creep, glide, slide, skip and slither (cf. Slobin 2003: 163). Slobin mentions a study by Jovanović & Kentfield, who found only 79 French counterparts (many of which were of low frequency) for 115 English manner-of-motion verbs (cf. Jovanović & Kentfield 1998; quoted in Slobin 2003: 163). Manner has also been shown to be a feature typically lexicalised by German verbs of motion. Examples include gehen, laufen, rennen, hinken, schleichen, hüpfen, bummeln and staksen (cf. Olsen 1996: 314). While French and Spanish counterparts of these German verbs are hard to find, French and Spanish verbs of motion frequently lexicalise a path of motion which often fails to get lexicalised by verbs of motion in German. For example, the path of motion expressed by French entrer, sortir, monter and descendre and by Spanish entrar, salir, subir and bajar is expressed in German by prefixed forms of gehen (hineingehen, hinausgehen, hinaufgehen and hinuntergehen) rather than by separate lexical items (cf. Olsen 1996: 314; cf. also Talmy 1985 for a comparison of English and Spanish motion verbs). This means that the category of manner of motion is less codable in French and Spanish than in English and German, while the category of path is less codable in these languages than in French and Spanish. Slobin claims that speakers of English make widespread use of the category of manner of motion, while speakers of French do not mention it unless it is at issue. As a result, speakers of French are less sensitive to this dimension than speakers of English. According to Slobin, habitual online attention to categories which are linguistically encoded, especially to such which are highly codable, has the effect of making these categories “salient and conceptually articulated” in speakers’ minds. Since manner of motion is a highly codable category for speakers of English, it is an inherent component of motion for these speakers, and the semantic domain of manner of motion is highly differentiated in English (cf. Slobin 2003: 161–164). For speakers of English, manner of motion is a salient conceptual field. In Slobin’s framework, a salient conceptual field is a field of concepts on which speakers focus their attention while thinking for speaking.

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The claim that highly codable catgories (such as manner of motion in English) are cognitively salient provides additional justification for a study of lexical gaps. If it is true that highly codable categories are cognitively salient, and if it is also true that categories expressed by lexical items are more codable than such which can only be expressed by phrases or sentences, the availability or non-availability of lexical items for certain categories may serve as an indication of the degree of salience of a particular category. The idea that some concepts are more codable and therefore possibly also more salient than others may also be applied to a study of the lexicalisation of concepts of communication. As I have shown in Chapter 2, some communication concepts are more codable in some languages than in others. This is true, for example, of the concept expressed by German unken, Russian karkat and Turkish kötümsemek, which are all used to refer to situations in which a speaker predicts an event which he considers to have negative consequences. As I have pointed out before, the corresponding concept is not lexicalised in English, Dutch or French. If Slobin’s assumptions are correct, this means that the corresponding concept is highly codable in Russian, German and Turkish but less codable in English, Dutch and French. If highly codable concepts are indeed cognitively salient, the concept of an act of predicting an event with negative consequences is cognitively salient for speakers of Turkish, Russian or German but not for those of English, Dutch or French. Recapitulating what has been said so far, lexical gaps deserve our attention, because (a) when being systematically studied, they may help us to notice patterns in the distribution of existing lexicalisations, (b) where concepts may not be expressed by lexical items, they have to be expressed by less economical means (i.e. by phrases, clauses or sentences), and (c) the availability or non-availability of a word or other lexical item to express a certain concept may serve as an indication of the status of that concept (esp. of its degree of codability and/or salience). Apart from these three reasons, which illustrate the relevance of studying lexical gaps in any part of the vocabulary, there are two more reasons why gaps in the vocabulary of communicative expressions deserve special attention. Firstly, the use of communicative expressions constitutes social reality. A speaker uttering a sentence such as I will help you tomorrow to a hearer may be said to have “promised” to help that hearer. If the speaker does not do what he has told the hearer he would do, the hearer may try to pin him down on a particular course of action by uttering a sentence containing the verb promise (e.g. But you promised to help me!). If there were no such verbs as promise to refer to specific kinds of utterances, promising (and other speech acts) would not exist as a social institution (though sentences like I will help you tomorrow would of course still be uttered). Where special verbs for certain utterances are missing, these utterances have not acquired the status of speech acts and hence they have not developed


into social institutions. A systematic study of gaps in the vocabulary of communicative expressions may therefore show which types of utterances have and which have not come to be speech acts and have therefore evolved as social institutions. Secondly, gaps in the vocabulary of communicative expressions deserve special attention, because communicative expressions are indicators of metapragmatic awareness (cf. Verschueren 1999: 187–198; Verschueren 2000). Underlying the notion of metapragmatic awareness is the idea that not everything which happens in linguistic behaviour occupies the same place in consciousness. According to Verschueren, any kind of verbal activity is always the product of automatic processing on the one hand and of conscious effort on the other. Making the main verb in a sentence agree with the subject of that sentence and following the basic SVO word order, for example, are matters of automatic processing for anybody having a reasonable degree of proficiency in English. By contrast, word choice and the development of argumentational structure are products of conscious effort. Using Verschueren’s terminology, we may call the latter “highly salient activities” (cf. Verschueren 2000: 444). Thus, all linguistic choice-making implies some degree of consciousness (or salience or awareness). Though metapragmatic awareness is not measurable, Verschueren points out that it leaves identifiable linguistic traces such as the use of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. These are lexicalised metapragmatic descriptions of verbal activity and reflect the way in which linguistic behaviour is conceptualised by those who participate in it (cf. ibid.: 446). If word choice is a highly salient activity (as suggested by Verschueren), consciousness of what is not lexicalised at all may be expected to be low. The absence of a verb like promise in the Philippine language Ilongot, for example, has been taken to indicate that the activity of committing oneself verbally to a future course of action is not a salient form of behaviour in Ilongot-speaking communities. Such a conclusion has been claimed to be justified by the results of anthropological research (cf. Rosaldo 1982; Verschueren 1999: 196). Having shown that lexical gaps are worth being systematically studied, I shall now present a chronological overview of previous accounts of lexical gaps. The overview focuses on different definitions of the phenomenon of lexical gaps. Having compared different definitions, I shall suggest an alternative definition of my own.

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3.3

Previous accounts of lexical gaps

3.3.1

Chomsky (1965)

Comparing phonological and syntactic redundancy rules, Chomsky wonders whether the distinction between accidental and systematic gaps, which exists on the phonological level, also exists on the syntactic level. The distinction between accidental and systematic gaps was originally used to distinguish between sequences which are and such which are not phonologically admissible. The nonoccurrence of a phonologically admissible sequence (such as /blik/ in English) was referred to as an “accidental gap”, while the absence of a phonologically nonadmissible sequence (such as /bnik/ in English) was called a “systematic gap” (cf. Chomsky 1965: 169). Chomsky argues that phonological and syntactic redundancy rules provide general constraints on lexical entries, thereby distinguishing possible from impossible lexical entries. However, not all possible lexical entries will be actually realised in the lexicon of a particular language. This means that there is in fact a threefold distinction between occurring lexical entries, non-occurring but possible lexical entries and impossible lexical entries. What must be shown according to Chomsky is that possible but non-occurring lexical entries have the status of accidental semantic gaps “… in the sense that they correspond to lexical items that the language does not provide for specifically but could in principle incorporate with no alteration of the general semantic system within which it functions” (cf. ibid.: 170). One of Chomsky’s examples of accidental semantic gaps is the absence of a special verb meaning ‘to raise an animal’. As Chomsky points out, raise is not restricted to co-occurring with nominal expressions designating animals but may also take as a complement an NP designating a plant. The more special verb grow may be used instead of raise if the complement position within the VP is occupied by a nominal expression designating a plant but not if the NP in the complement position designates an animal or a human being (cf. He grows corn vs. ?He grows a dog and ?They have grown two children). Likewise, the special verb rear means ‘to raise a human being’ and is not used with reference to either plants or animals. Since there are special verbs meaning ‘to raise a plant’ and ‘to raise a human being’, the occurrence of another special verb meaning ‘to raise an animal’ seems possible in principle. The lack of such a verb is an example of what Chomsky calls an “accidental semantic gap” (cf. ibid.: 232). Lehrer suggests that the gap in question may be filled by the verb breed (cf. Lehrer 1974: 108). However, breed means ‘to raise an animal or plant’ and does not apply specifically to animals (cf. Collins English Dictionary 1986; Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2000). Though breed may be used to refer to the action of raising animals, a special English verb


Figure 1. Actualised and potential hyponyms of raise

meaning ‘to raise an animal’ is still lacking. The lexical field constituted by raise and its actualised and potential hyponyms shows the same pattern in German, where a special verb meaning ‘to raise an animal’ is also lacking (though there is a special German verb – anbauen – which may only be used to refer to the action of growing plants). However, there is a special Dutch verb, namely fokken, which has precisely this meaning and may not be used with reference to either human beings or plants. (The Dutch verb kweken is normally used with reference to plants; when it is used in conjunction with animals it means ‘to raise animals which are meant to be kept as pets’.) More general verbs such as raise are lacking in German as well as in Dutch. Figure 1 represents the structure of the lexical field containing raise and its actualised and potential hyponyms in English, German and Dutch. (Missing lexicalisations are indicated by the symbol ‘∅’.) Chomsky’s distinction between accidental and systematic gaps has much in common with the distinction I have drawn between lexical gaps and matrix products (cf. Section 2.2.4.5). What I have called “matrix products” corresponds to Chomsky’s systematic gaps. These are gaps which would have to be filled by impossible lexical entries and can therefore not be filled in principle. Matrix products as I have defined them are also gaps which cannot be filled in principle, because they would have to be filled by lexical items which do not correspond to concepts. Specifically, I have defined matrix products as combinations of parameter values which do not have a conceptual counterpart. Chomsky’s accidental semantic gaps correspond to what I understand by “lexical gaps”. Accidental semantic gaps are defined by Chomsky as empty slots in the vocabulary which could be but are not filled by possible lexical entries. I have defined the notion of lexical gaps in much the same way, suggesting in particular that lexical gaps are empty slots in the vocabulary which correspond to concepts in speakers’ minds. On both accounts, lexical (or accidental semantic) gaps are defined in terms of the non-occurrence of possible lexical items.

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The fact that it is necessary to draw a distinction between matrix products and genuine lexical gaps suggests that not any empty slot in a matrix may be regarded as a gap in the lexicon of a particular language. Rather, a matrix gap has to meet certain requirements in order to be assigned the status of a lexical gap. In the course of this section, I shall propose several such requirements and formulate them in the form of constraints on lexical gaps. Constraint I below captures the distinction between matrix gaps and lexical gaps:

CONSTRAINT I

A matrix gap may be regarded as a lexical gap only if it may be filled in principle, i.e. if it may be filled by a possible lexical item.

This constraint obviously raises the question of what is and what is not a possible lexical item. As I have pointed out before, this question may be answered formally (e.g. from a syntactic or phonological point of view) and/or in terms of what is conceptually conceivable. In the next section, Constraint I will be extended to include a specification of what I shall consider to be a possible lexical item.

3.3.2

Lehrer (1974)

Like Chomsky, Lehrer argues that there is no question of postulating lexical gaps (Chomsky’s “accidental semantic gaps”) in cases where gaps would have to be filled by impossible lexical items. The difference between possible and impossible lexical items is determined by cross-linguistic principles as well as by such which apply internally to a specific language. Lehrer quotes the following general restrictions on possible lexical items suggested by Morgan (cf. Morgan 1968: 4, quoted in Lehrer 1974: 102–103; examples are Morgan’s): a. A possible lexical item must have a semantic structure that corresponds to the semantic structure of grammatical constituents. (This constraint rules out a verb such as sneep replacing saw and hippie in a sentence like John [saw] Mary laying a wreath at the grave of the unknown [hippie], because saw and hippie do not form a constituent (hence the ungrammaticality of *John sneeped Mary laying a wreath at the grave of the unknown.) b. A whole sentence cannot be replaced by a single word. c. Verbs cannot incorporate referential indices. Because of this constraint, it is impossible for there to be a verb such as dechocotate meaning ‘to cut off the head of a specific cat called Choco’. By contrast, the verb decapitate (meaning ‘to cut off somebody’s head’) is not


ruled out by c, because it does not incorporate a word referring to a single individual. As Lehrer points out, examples like Let’s deNixon the White House suggest that restriction c may be too strong. While restrictions a–c determine what is and what is not a possible lexical item in general, the distinction between possible and impossible lexical items also depends on the structure of the lexicon of a particular language. Lehrer claims that what is a possible lexical item in a particular language depends on the lexical items which exist in that language and on the kinds of components they incorporate. Lehrer uses English kinship terms to illustrate this point. Since child is a cover term for son and daughter, and parent is a cover term for mother and father, Lehrer argues that the lack of a term superordinate to aunt and uncle, or to niece and nephew constitutes lexical gaps in English. By contrast, Lehrer claims that the lack of a lexical item meaning ‘elder brother or sister’ does not count as a lexical gap in English, because the parameter ‘age of sibling relative to ego’ is not lexicalised in English. If a new word such as *elbrosis (example Lehrer’s) meaning ‘someone’s elder brother’ were to become part of the English lexicon so that it would be normal to say My elbrosis came to visit today, a new parameter ‘age of sibling relative to ego’ would be established, and a new lexical gap, namely the lack of a word meaning ‘younger sibling’, would emerge (cf. Lehrer 1974: 103–104). Another example quoted by Lehrer is oyako, a Japanese kinship term meaning ‘parent and child’ (cf. McCawley 1970, quoted in Lehrer 1974: 103). Lehrer argues that the lack of a word meaning ‘parent and child’ does not constitute a lexical gap in English, because English kinship terms do not lexicalise a parameter such as ‘relatives of different generations’ (except for highly general terms such as ancestor and descendent). These examples show that what counts as a possible lexical item and consequently as a lexical gap in Lehrer’s view depends on the parameters lexicalised by the items pertaining to a particular lexical field in a particular language. Where a certain parameter fails to get lexicalised, lexical gaps may not be postulated. Lehrer was of course right in claiming that what counts as a lexical gap in a particular language depends on the structure of the relevant lexical field and that the structure of a lexical field is determined by the kinds of components lexicalised by the items pertaining to that field. What is not correct, though, is Lehrer’s claim that lexical gaps may not be postulated where a particular parameter fails to get lexicalised. Lehrer argues that the lack of a word meaning ‘parent and child’ does not constitute a lexical gap in English, because a parameter such as ‘relatives of different generations’ is not lexicalised by English kinship terms. Though it is true that no such parameter is relevant to the meaning of English kinship terms, speakers of English and other similar languages certainly do dispose of the con-

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cept PARENT AND CHILD. Claiming that the lack of a word for that concept may not be regarded as an instance of a lexical gap in English amounts to saying that the concept PARENT AND CHILD does not exist in the minds of speakers of English (though it does of course exist in the minds of speakers of Japanese). The problem with Lehrer’s view on lexical gaps is that it does not take into account what does or what does not exist as concepts in speakers’ minds. Lehrer defines gaps as instances of the non-occurrence of a lexical item in a particular slot in the structure of a lexical field. Though any definition of lexical gaps must necessarily make reference to the structure of a lexical field, the phenomenon of lexical gaps also always involves a conceptual dimension. I shall come back to this issue in my discussion of Lyons’ view on lexical gaps in the next section. At this point, it suffices to say that Lehrer’s claim that lexical gaps cannot exist where a particular parameter fails to get lexicalised must be rejected as soon as the phenomenon of lexical gaps is regarded as being related not only to the structure of a lexical field but also to concepts in speakers’ minds. Additionally, excluding lexical gaps where a specific parameter is not lexicalised is also problematic from a cross-linguistic perspective. The lexicon of a particular language is likely to reflect what is of special relevance to a particular speech community. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that a cross-linguistic comparison of lexical gaps will shed light on culture-specific differences among languages. If lexical gaps are excluded where a specific parameter is not lexicalised in a particular language, a cross-linguistic comparison of lexical gaps becomes impossible in principle. For example, if the lack of a word meaning ‘parent and child’ does not count as a lexical gap in English, English and Japanese kinship terms cannot be compared at all. It makes more sense to say that the lack of an English counterpart for oyako (‘parent and child’) constitutes a gap in the vocabulary of English as compared to that of Japanese. If lexical gaps are excluded where a parameter is not lexicalised, culture-specific differences in the vocabularies of individual languages may no longer be observed and lexical gaps can be studied with respect to one language only. Having defined lexical gaps as gaps which may be filled by possible lexical items, Lehrer argues that not all possible lexical items for which there is no term are instances of lexical gaps. She claims that additional requirements must be met for an instance of a missing but possible lexical item to have the status of a lexical gap. To capture these, Lehrer proposes the following additional constraints (cf. Lehrer 1974: 104–105): a. There are no gaps for “lexically impossible concepts”. This constraint rules out postulating gaps for combinations of parameter values representing impossible concepts such as CASTRATED WOMAN or ROUND SQUARE. These cases are similar to some of the examples I have

Chapter 3. Lexical gaps 101

mentioned in my discussion of Baumgärtner’s ordering system. In Section 2.2.2.3, I have mentioned combinations of truth-values which do not represent concepts. Examples of such combinations include the following:

– –

a combination of truth values which would correspond to the concept of a speech act performed by a speaker requesting a hearer to do something which he knew the hearer would have done anyway. a combination of truth-values which would correspond to the concept of a speech act performed by a speaker who forbids a hearer to do something which he knew the hearer would not have done anyway.

Such combinations of speaker attitudes may not be lexicalised in principle, i.e. by a possible lexical item. What is and what is not a possible lexical item depends on what may and what may not exist as a concept in speakers’ minds: What does not exist as a concept is not a possible lexical item. b. There are no lexical gaps for non-existent objects, situations etc. (Lehrer admits that this constraint is too strong as it stands and suggests that it should be stated relative to a possible world of things, facts and beliefs.) Excluding lexical gaps for non-existent objects, facts, situations, etc. makes sense, because entities which do not exist within a particular speech community are not known by the speakers of that community. It seems obvious that speakers do not have concepts for entities which they do not know. c. In order for there to be a lexical gap, there must be at least one member in each row or column of the matrix of parameters. (According to Lehrer, this constraint excludes the lack of a word for GREEN BOTTLE as an instance of a lexical gap, because ‘colour’ is not a parameter lexicalised by container words.) The fact that each row or column in the matrices in Lehrer’s examples contains at least one lexical item is by itself related to the issue of constraints on lexical gaps. It results from Lehrer’s requirement that a particular parameter be lexicalised in a particular language in order for there to be a lexical gap. Empty rows or columns in a matrix may only occur where a particular parameter is not lexicalised at all. ‘Age of sibling relative to ego’, for example, is a parameter not lexicalised in English (cf. Lehrer’s hypothetical word *elbrosis). Because of that, the relevant row or column in a matrix of English kinship terms would be empty. However, such cases are excluded by Lehrer’s requirement that a parameter be lexicalised in a particular language in order for there to be a lexical gap. When lexical gaps are studied relative to one language only, empty rows or columns in a matrix may in fact not occur at all. A matrix representing the structure of a lexical field is always built on the basis of the lexical items exis-


tent in a particular language. Specifically, the parameters of such a matrix are derived from the meanings of existent words. As a consequence, parameters which are not lexicalised in the language under investigation will not turn up in the matrix. Hence, the matrix will not contain any empty rows or columns. These may only occur when other languages are taken into account which have words lexicalising completely different parameters. Theoretically, a parameter like ‘colour’ could be lexicalised by container words in languages other than English. Likewise, the possibility that a parameter such as ‘age of sibling relative to ego’ is relevant to the meaning of kinship terms in certain languages cannot be excluded beforehand. A matrix built on parameters from different languages is much more likely to contain empty rows or columns than one whose parameters derive from one language only. d. A component must appear in at least one word in a field in order to be used in postulating a gap. For example, there is no word in the container field which lexicalises the component [+colour: green] (though a container may be green), and therefore the lack of a lexical item meaning ‘a green container made of wood, for the purpose of storing seaweed’ cannot be regarded as an instance of a lexical gap. Though this observation is correct when lexical gaps are studied relative to one language only, the constraint turns out to be problematic from a crosslinguistic point of view: A component which is not lexicalised by any lexical item in one language may still be part of the meaning of one or more lexical items in another. A gap involving a component not lexicalised by any lexical item in a particular language has the status of a lexical gap as long as it corresponds to a concept. e. The components relevant to postulating gaps are limited to the basic words in a lexical field; the components found in peripheral words are not relevant in postulating gaps. Lehrer distinguishes between basic and peripheral words on the basis of the criteria proposed by Berlin & Kay (cf. Berlin & Kay 1970). According to these criteria, basic words show the following characteristics (cf. Lehrer 1974: 10–11):

– – – – –

They are monolexemic. Their application is not restricted to a narrow class of objects. (According to this criterion, auburn is not a basic word, because it can only be applied to hair.) They are psychologically salient. Doubtful forms should have the same distributional potential as the basic ones. Recent foreign loan words are unlikely to be basic words.


The most peripheral words will fail to meet the criteria proposed above: They are likely to be morphologically complex, restricted in their application and distribution, recent loan words, and unknown to many speakers of the language (cf. ibid.: 11). Lehrer mentions bake, boil and fry as examples of basic words in the field of cooking words, while scald, carmelise and clarify are peripheral according to the criteria of Berlin & Kay (cf. ibid.: 17–18). A distinction between basic and peripheral speech act verbs and verbs of communication is much more difficult to draw. Since all of these verbs are both well-known and widely used, there is no reason why some of them should be excluded from a study of lexical gaps. The assumption that polylexemic expressions are peripheral is not without difficulties either. If morphologically complex words are considered to be peripheral, idioms and collocations may be expected to be so to an even higher degree. If idioms and collocations are indeed highly peripheral, this means that there are almost as many basic as peripheral communicative expressions. In German, for example, there are 715 simple and 676 complex communicative expressions (polysemous expressions being counted as often as they have different senses) (cf. Section 4.3.1). On the whole, my criticism of Lehrer’s constraints may be summarised as follows: –

–

Lehrer correctly defines lexical gaps as empty slots in the structure of a lexical field, but her definition does not make reference to the notion of concepts. As opposed to Lehrer, I argue that a proper definition of lexical gaps must make reference not only to the structure of a lexical field but also to the notion of concepts. Though many of the constraints proposed by Lehrer may be relevant to a study of gaps in the lexicon of a particular language, most of them do not apply when lexical gaps are studied cross-linguistically. A cross-linguistic study of lexical gaps even becomes impossible as a consequence of Lehrer’s constraints.

Of the constraints proposed by Lehrer, those which are useful to a cross-linguistic study of lexical gaps are covered by Constraint I mentioned above, which may now be stated somewhat more elaborately as follows: CONSTRAINT I (Lexical gaps) A gap in the structure of a lexical field is a lexical gap only if it may be filled by a possible lexical item (i.e. a lexical item which corresponds to a concept).

Though I have shown by now which requirements must be met by matrix gaps in order to have the status of lexical gaps, not all instances of matrix gaps which correspond to concepts may be regarded as lexical gaps. For matrix gaps to be


instances of lexical gaps, the following requirement must be met apart from the requirement that they correspond to concepts: CONSTRAINT II (Lexical gaps) An instance of a missing (but possible) lexical item may be regarded as a lexical gap only if it corresponds to an event, action or state of affairs which is practically conceivable.

With respect to the lexicalisation of communication concepts, Constraint II implies that an instance of a missing but possible lexical item qualifies as a lexical gap only if it corresponds to a combination of parameter values representing a pattern of what is regarded common human practice. In my discussion of Baumgärtner’s ordering system (Section 2.2.2.3), I have mentioned several combinations of parameter values which would be ruled out as lexical gaps by this constraint. Examples include the following: –

–

a combination of parameter values representing the concept of a speech act performed by a speaker who says that he is against some P which is both expectable and to the speaker’s own interest (Such a combination would have to be lexicalised by a “masochistic” predicate.) a combination of parameter values representing the concept of a speech act performed by a speaker saying that he is against some P which is both expectable and to the hearer’s interest. As I have pointed out in Section 2.2.2.3, only “sadistic” predicates are possible lexicalisations for such combinations of parameter values.

The concepts represented by these combinations of parameter values are possible in principle, i.e. they are not ruled out by logical principles. Hence, the corresponding gaps in the lexical field may be filled in principle, i.e. by possible lexical items. This means that the lexicalisation of these combinations is not prevented by Constraint I on lexical gaps. Rather, these combinations may fail to get lexicalised because the speech acts to which they correspond would go beyond what is esteemed to be an appropriate distance between a speaker and a hearer. Lexicalisations for such combinations of parameter values may be ruled out for reasons of common human practice, especially because of principles of communication ethics. Though Lehrer does not mention practical feasibility as a constraint on gaps, some of her examples from the field of cooking terms actually illustrate this point. Lehrer points out, for example, that there is no term for cooking in fat under a broiler. Though the performance of such an action is not altogether a logical impossibility, cooking in fat under a broiler is not a sensible cooking method,


because the fat is likely to catch on fire (cf. Lehrer 1974: 101). Thus, a lexical item for this kind of cooking method is lacking because of practical reasons, though the existence of such a term is not principally impossible.

3.3.3

Lyons (1977)

Lyons’ discussion of lexical gaps is concerned only with what Lehrer calls “matrix gaps” (cf. Lehrer 1974: 97). Following Lehrer, Lyons defines matrix gaps as empty slots in the structure of a lexical field. By restricting his discussion of lexical gaps to instances of matrix gaps, Lyons excludes cases of missing lexicalisations denoting objects which do not exist in a particular speech community as well as such which would encapsulate the senses of contradictory syntagmatic modifiers (e.g. ‘married bachelor’ or ‘square circle’). As I have pointed out in the previous section, excluding missing lexicalisations like these makes sense, because they do not correspond to concepts in speakers’ minds. For one thing, speakers cannot have mental representations of objects they do not know. Apart from that, senses like ‘married bachelor’ or ‘square circle’ may safely be discarded as being nonsensical. Speakers may of course find some kind of interpretation for phrases such as a married bachelor or a square circle (e.g. ‘a married man behaving as if he were a bachelor’ or ‘a badly drawn circle’), but concepts like AN UNMARRIED MAN WHO IS MARRIED or A CIRCLE WITH FOUR STRAIGHT EQUAL SIDES AND FOUR ANGLES OF 90° are excluded by logical principles. Lyons discusses matrix gaps with respect to hierarchical structure. He is concerned specifically with two kinds of lexical gaps: missing hyperonyms of existing co-hyponyms and missing hyponyms of existing hyperonyms. In English, as in many other languages, labels for superordinate categories are often missing. Lyons’ examples include the absence of immediate superordinate terms for pairs of opposites such as go-come; teacher-pupil and buy-sell (cf. ibid.: 302). Examples of missing hyponyms are also frequent. One of Lyons’ examples is the absence of an antipodal opposite in French for the adjective profond. While there are opposites for adjectives like haut (‘high’) and long (‘long’), viz. bas and court respectively, there is no lexicalised expression in French meaning ‘not deep’ or ‘deep to a small degree’. Since speakers of English may use the adjective shallow to express the concept DEEP TO A SMALL DEGREE, there is no gap in the corresponding slot in the vocabulary of English. Lyons argues that the absence of a lexical expression meaning ‘deep to a small degree’ in French presents a clear case of a lexical gap because of the existence of adjectives such as bas and court, which are antipodal opposites of haut and long respectively. According to Lyons, the absence of an adjective meaning ‘deep to a small degree’ could not be considered an in-


stance of a lexical gap if French lacked expressions like bas and court and regularly made use of expressions like peu haut (or pas haut) and peu long (or pas long) (cf. ibid.: 305). Lyons’ argument sheds light on what he understands by “lexical gaps”: Whether a matrix gap counts as a lexical gap in a particular language depends on the types of distinctions lexicalised in that language. Thus, the absence of a lexical item meaning ‘deep to a small degree’ in French is a case of a lexical gap, because lexical items (here adjectives) are regularly used in French to describe antipodal opposites in spatial extension or location. Lyons’ view on lexical gaps is identical to that expressed by Lehrer. On both accounts, what counts as a lexical gap depends on the parameters lexicalised in a particular language. Lyons and Lehrer both exclude lexical gaps where specific parameters or distinctions fail to get lexicalised. From a purely structuralist point of view, it does make sense to exclude from the inventory of lexical gaps non-existing expressions which would lexicalise distinctions not lexicalised in a particular language. However, as I have argued in my discussion of Lehrer’s constraints, such a position may be maintained only when we are concerned solely with the internal structure of a particular language; it becomes untenable as soon as more than one language is taken into account. Additionally, a purely structuralist view on lexical gaps ignores the conceptual dimension essential to the phenomenon of lexical gaps. Stating that non-existent expressions which would lexicalise distinctions not lexicalised in a particular language are not instances of lexical gaps amounts to saying that these non-existent expressions do not correspond to concepts in speakers’ minds. Such a conclusion would prove to be problematic in a large number of cases. Even if there were no such adjectives such as bas and court in French, this could not be taken to imply that speakers of French do not have concepts such as DEEP (or HIGH or LONG) TO A SMALL DEGREE. Lyons’ discussion of the absence of a French expression meaning ‘deep to a small degree’ shows that the notion of lexical gaps cannot be defined in structuralist terms alone. The phenomenon of lexical gaps essentially concerns the relation between concepts and lexical items. Any definition of lexical gaps must therefore make reference to the structure of a lexical field on the one hand and to concepts on the other. According to such a definition, there would be three gaps instead of none at all if a particular language had no adjectives such as high, low and deep to describe spatial extension or location.

3.3.4

Verschueren (1985)

Verschueren (Verschueren 1985: Chapter 6) was concerned with the occurrence of gaps in the domain of English and Dutch “linguistic action verbials”. The term


“linguistic action verbials” covers simple as well as complex lexicalisations used to refer to speech acts. Verschueren proposes two lexicalisation principles to account for the distribution of gaps in the domain of linguistic action verbials: a hearer-oriented principle and a so-called “Principle of Harmony of Interaction”. The hearer-oriented principle is used to explain patterns in the occurrence of gaps in the domain of expressives. It states that emotions and attitudes important to the hearer get lexicalised rather than such which are less important to the relationship of speaker and hearer. Not each of the utterances in (1a)–(1c), for example, may be referred to by a special linguistic action verbial (examples are Verschueren’s): (1) a. I am glad that I have got the fellowship. b. I am glad that you have got the fellowship. c. (I am) glad/pleased to meet you.

While the utterances in (1b) and (1c) may be referred to by the verbs congratulate (German gratulieren, Dutch gelukwensen) and greet (German grüßen, Dutch groeten) respectively, there is no special linguistic action verbial in either English, German or Dutch which may be used to describe the utterance in (1a). According to Verschueren, this is due to the importance of the expressed psychological state to the hearer. An utterance like I am glad that I have got the fellowship is not important for the relationship between speaker and hearer, and hence its degree of cognitive salience is low. As a result, it tends to be “forgotten” in the lexicalisation process. By contrast, a speaker uttering (1b) or (1c) expresses a psychological state which is of crucial importance to the hearer. The relevance of the psychological state expressed to the relationship of speaker and hearer increases its cognitive salience to the effect that its conceptualisation and lexicalisation become inevitable (cf. Verschueren 1985: 188–195). Verschueren’s second principle, the Principle of Harmony of Interaction, applies to linguistic action verbials used to refer to responses to different kinds of speech acts. According to this principle, there are no special linguistic action verbials for responses which preserve the harmony of the interaction between spea ker and hearer. Where a positive answer is expected (as in example (2) below), a negative one is cognitively more salient: (2) a. Come here, Michael. b. Okay c. No, I won’t.

The positive response in (2b) is the harmonious reaction expected to the order in (2a). Since the answer in (2b) preserves the harmony of the interaction between


speaker and hearer, its degree of cognitive salience is low. As a result, responses like these are “forgotten” in the lexicalisation process. Since the response in (2c) disrupts the harmony of interaction, it is cognitively more salient than that in (2a) and hence there is a special linguistic action verbial (refuse, German sich weigern, Dutch weigeren) to refer to it (cf. Verchueren 1985: 195–200). Verschueren also uses the Principle of Harmony of Interaction to explain the lack of descriptive verbials for routine responses of a fixed formulaic nature. There are no linguistic action verbials at all, for example, to describe the responses in (3b)–(3f) to the utterance in (3a): (3)

a. b. c. d. e. f.

I am sorry for having been so rude to you. No harm done. Never mind. That’s quite all right. Please, don’t worry. Forget it.

Verschueren attributes the lack of descriptive verbials for the responses in (3b)– (3f) to the high degree of automaticity involved in their performance. He argues that utterances like that in (3a) are not complete unless an appropriate routine response follows. The responses in (3b)–(3f) are part of the act and tend to escape our attention as separate speech acts. Since the degree of automaticity involved in the performance of (3b)–(3f) is high, the degree of cognitive salience of these responses is low and hence they fail to get lexicalised (cf. ibid.: 200–203). According to Verschueren, the hearer-oriented principle and the Principle of Harmony of Interaction are both manifestations of a superordinate Principle of Cognitive Salience. The Principle of Cognitive Salience states that linguistic actions which have a high degree of cognitive salience get lexicalised rather than such which are cognitively less salient (cf. ibid.: 204). What may be explained in terms of cognitive salience may possibly also be explained in terms of markedness. In Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3.5), I have argued that marked patterns of behaviour get lexicalised rather than such which are considered to be “normal” or unmarked. Thus, there is a remarkable parallelism between what would be stated by a Principle of Markedness and what is stated by Verschueren’s Principle of Cognitive Salience. The only difference between the two principles is that the former applies to the level of social interaction while the latter concerns the cognitive level. So far it is not clear what may be gained by explaining in terms of cognitive principles what may also (and perhaps more easily) be explained in terms of principles of social interaction. Cognitive principles will have to be called for, however, if some of the lexicalisation patterns observed prove to hold for a large number of typologically distinct languages: what counts as a marked pattern of


behaviour is likely to be culture-specific. In Section 3.6, I shall explore whether cognitive principles may explain anything which cannot be explained in terms of pragmatic principles alone.

3.3.5

Fellbaum (1996)

In her comments on the structure of WordNet, Fellbaum claims that the use of “pseudo-words” is indispensable to the representation of the lexicon as a semantic network (cf. Section 2.1). “Pseudo-words” represent connecting nodes in the relations among “real”, i.e. existent, words in cases where “real words” for these nodes are lacking. In the absence of such “pseudo-words”, the relations among existent words would be interrupted (cf. Fellbaum 1996: 223). Fellbaum concludes that the question of whether there is anything systematic about the distribution of lexical gaps remains undecided. Given that Fellbaum’s observations on lexical gaps were based on some sporadic examples from different sections of the vocabulary, such a conclusion does not come as a surprise. If the occurrence of lexical gaps may be explained at all, it may be explained only with reference to a conceptual system. Since each section of the vocabulary requires a conceptual system of its own, regularities in the occurrence of lexical gaps are likely to go unnoticed in a study based on a few sporadic examples from different sections of the lexicon. Fellbaum did notice, though, that lexical gaps tend to occur towards the top of a hierarchy (cf. ibid.: 224). There are no words in English, for example, for the superordinate categories referred to by the “pseudo-words” wheeled vehicle and bad person. The claim that words for superordinate categories are often missing also applies to the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. There are no general verbs, for example, which may be used to refer to different kinds of situations in which a speaker utters one or more utterances with a propositional content P (henceforth: Utt(P)) with a specific rhythmic pattern. Hyponyms of this non-lexicalised superordinate category are verbs like stutter and stammer (German stottern and stammeln; Dutch stotteren and stamelen), reel off (German (he)runterleiern; Dutch afraffelen), rattle off (German (he)runterrasseln; Dutch aframmelen) and chant (German skandieren; Dutch scanderen) (cf. Figure 2 below). Though general verbs are sometimes missing in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, more specific verbs do not always occur where they may be expected either. An example is the field containing representatives like inform, communicate, impart, etc., which may be used to refer to many different types of situations in which a speaker informs a hearer of an action, event or state of affairs P. Some types of speech acts referred to by inform sometimes


Figure 2. Verbs of communication expressing rhythm (English, German and Dutch)

involve a particular speaker (or group of speakers), a particular hearer (or group of hearers) or a particular communication medium. However, there are no special verbs to refer to these particular acts of informing. In German and Dutch, special acts of informing somebody of something may be referred to by modifications of collocations such as eine Mitteilung machen (German) and een mededeling doen (Dutch). A specific hearer (or group of hearers) is lexicalised by expressions such as eine Pressemitteilung machen (German) and een mededeling doen aan de pers (Dutch), which both mean ‘to inform the press’, while expressions like eine Regierungsmitteilung machen (German) and een mededeling in naam van de regering doen (Dutch) (both meaning ‘to inform sb. (usually the public) on behalf of the government’) lexicalise a specific speaker (or group of speakers). Though collocations are also elements of the lexicon, their lexical status is by no means comparable to that of words. Since the degree of compositionality of collocations is much higher than that of words, they belong to the periphery of the lexicon. Because of this, collocations may hardly be regarded as fillers of gaps in the word inventory. The issue of the lexical status of words, idioms and collocations will be dealt with in Section 4.2. (The English translation inform sb. on behalf of the government is a free combination of words.) Similarly, acts of informing sb. of sth. by means of a particular communication medium (e.g. the phone, a written or spoken message etc.) may not be referred to by verbs but have to be expressed by collocations such as eine mündliche/schriftliche/telefonische Mitteilung machen (German) and een mondelinge/schriftelijke/telefonische mededeling doen (Dutch), which may only be translated into English by free combinations of words such as give sb. a piece of oral/written information. On the whole, the field containing representatives like inform, communicate, impart, etc. shows a large number of gaps at the bottom of the hierarchy (cf. Figure 3).


Figure 3. Lack of verbs for special acts of informing somebody of something

The lack of representatives for special acts of informing somebody of something contradicts Fellbaum’s claim that lexical gaps tend to occur towards the top of a hierarchy. Rather, the distribution of gaps in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication shows that gaps occur at the lower as well as the higher levels. Harras (cf. Harras 1998) has suggested that this pattern may be an effect of the Basic Level Principle proposed by Rosch et al. (cf. Rosch et al. 1976). According to these authors, the basic level is the highest level at which a composite mental image can be formed. It contains words such as dog, shirt, tree, book, flower etc. Hyponyms of these (e.g. daffodil, rose, tulip, oak, acorn, fir, beech, etc.) are semantically more specific than basic level words. If lexical fields are represented as hierarchical structures with the most general items occurring at the top and the most specific at the bottom, the basic level is the intermediate level in the hierarchy. If the basic level is indeed the most salient one from a cognitive point of view as well as the one which is most easily accessible (as Rosch et al. claim), it should not be surprising that lexical gaps cluster at the highest and lowest levels while most lexical items occur at the level in between. However, such an explanation has yet to be tested by psycholinguistic experiments. The Basic Level Principle was originally introduced as a psycholinguistic principle and was subsequently used to explain the organisation of lexical fields, especially such containing concrete nouns such as words for artefacts and natural kind terms. It is therefore not clear whether this principle may also be used to explain some of the regularities observed in the lexical fields of abstract words such as speech act verbs and verbs of communication. The discussion of Fellbaum’s claims has shown that lexical gaps in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication tend to occur on the highest and lowest levels of a hierarchy rather than on the level in between. This means that the distribution of lexical gaps across this section of the vocabulary does indeed

111


show certain regularities and that some of these may be explained in terms of principles of lexical organisation. The discussion of the Basic Level Principle as a principle governing the lexicalisation of communication concepts shows that, apart from the two constraints already mentioned, there is an additional requirement which matrix gaps have to fulfil if they are to be assigned the status of lexical gaps. This constraint concerns the level of specificity of lexical items and may be formulated as follows: CONSTRAINT III A matrix gap may be regarded as a lexical gap only if there is no special lexical item to fill it.

Constraint III states that matrix gaps count as lexical gaps even if there is a more general term (i.e. one with a lower degree of specificity) which may be used to fill it. As a consequence, the lack of a special English verb for a concept such as TO INFORM THE PRESS counts as a lexical gap even though the corresponding speech act may be referred to by representatives like inform, communicate etc.

3.3.6

Allan (2001)

In his discussion of meronymy, Allan mentions the absence of an English word for the limb dubbed *arm-hand as an example of a lexical gap in the meronymic hierarchy including finger, hand, arm and body (cf. Allan 2001: 265): finger’ (x) → x is part of a hand  hand’ (y) → y is part of an *arm-hand   hand’ (y) → y is part of a body ∀ w, x, y, z  arm’ (z) → z is part of an *arm-hand  arm’ (z) → z is part of a body  *arm-hand → w is part of a body

     

The hand and the arm are distinct parts of the body: to cut one’s hand is not to cut one’s arm nor vice versa. However, if one loses one’s arm, one also loses the hand attached to it. The missing word *arm-hand would be used to refer to the part of the body including the hand and the arm. Allan points out that in this case meronymy is logically transitive: a finger is part of a hand, an arm-hand and a body (cf. ibid.: 265). Allan defines lexical gaps in terms of concepts which are part of a conceptual field: A LEXICAL GAP exists when there is no listeme in the language for a concept within a conceptual field in which adjacent concepts are named. (Allan 2001: 265)


(In Allan’s terminology, a listeme is a language expression whose meaning is not determinable from the meanings (if any) of its constituent forms; cf. ibid.: 6). Insofar as Allan’s definition of a lexical gap presupposes the existence of a concept, it is similar to what I have formulated as Constraint I (“A gap in the structure of a lexical field is a lexical gap only if it may be filled by a possible lexical item, i.e. a lexical item corresponding to a concept”).

3.3.7

Cruse (2004)

Cruse distinguishes between lexical gaps occurring in taxonomic hierarchies and such which can be found in meronymic ones (cf. Cruse 2004: 176–183). He defines taxonomic hierarchies as classificatory systems reflecting the way speakers of a language categorise the world of experience (cf. ibid.: 176). Like Fellbaum, Cruse points out that in such hierarchies lexical gaps frequently occur in levels above the basic level. As an example he mentions the absence of a superordinate term in English for the set of verbs meaning ‘going under one’s own steam on land’ (for an animal or human). Hyponyms of this missing superordinate term would include crawl, walk, run, hop, etc. The absence of a verb for the more general notion of ‘going under one’s own steam’, whose hyponyms would be the missing verb meaning ‘going under one’s own steam on land’ as well as verbs like swim and fly, provides a further example of a gap in a taxonomic hierarchy (cf. ibid.: 178). Meronymic hierarchies are defined as lexical hierarchies, “... in which the relation of dominance is (the converse of) meronymy, and the relation of differentiation is co-meronymy” (cf. ibid.: 180). Cruse mentions the absence of a word for the part of a fork to which the prongs are attached as well as the non-existence of a word for the part of the hand to which the fingers are attached, and of which the palm and the back are parts, as examples of lexical gaps in meronymic hierarchies (cf. ibid.: 181–182). Essential to Cruse’s notion of lexical gaps is the existence of a concept: We speak of a lexical gap when there is intuitive or other evidence of the existence of a well-established concept corresponding to the point in the structure where (Cruse 2004: 178) the gap occurs.

In cases where a point in a structure does not correspond to a concept, there is a conceptual gap, not a lexical one. Cruse’s requirement that lexical gaps correspond to concepts is identical with what I have captured by Constraint I. According to Cruse, the absence of an English equivalent for the French word pommette (‘rounded part of the cheek over the cheekbone’) is likely to be an instance of a conceptual gap: English speakers feel no need to single out this area of the cheek


(cf. Cruse 2004: 183). As Cruse points out, the distinction between a lexical gap and a conceptual one is by no means easy to make. It is not clear, for example, whether the absence of an English equivalent for the Turkish word ense (‘back of the neck’) should be regarded as an example of a lexical or a conceptual gap. The concept BACK OF THE NECK is easy to grasp for speakers of English, but so are the concepts RIGHT SIDE OF THE HEAD and UNDERSIDE OF THE TONGUE. Though all these concepts can be construed by English speakers when necessary, they “... would not be felt to be salient enough to merit lexical recognition” (ibid.: 183). Cruse’s intuition is that ense, like pommette, does not lexicalise a viable concept, i.e. a concept waiting for a name, for speakers of English. This means that Cruse’s notion of lexical gaps essentially presupposes the existence if a viable concept, i.e. a concept waiting for a name, which is salient enough in order to be lexicalised. Insofar as Cruse’s definition makes reference to conceptual salience, his approach is similar to Verschueren’s.

3.4

Defining lexical gaps

The discussion of earlier accounts of lexical gaps in the previous section has shown that lexical gaps may be defined as empty slots in the structure of a lexical field. What counts as a lexical gap depends on the structure of the field in question. The structure of a lexical field is determined by the number and type of the semantic features lexicalised by the expressions pertaining to that field. The meaning of lexical items may be described in terms of combinations of semantic features. Not every possible combination of features corresponds to one or more lexical items; some of them fail to get lexicalised. However, not every combination of features which is not lexicalised may be regarded as a lexical gap. A combination of semantic features which is not lexicalised counts as a lexical gap if: –

–

it corresponds to a concept; (Combinations of features which are logically inconceivable do not correspond to concepts. Gaps resulting from such combinations may not be filled in principle, i.e. by possible lexical items. Such combinations of features do not have the status of lexical gaps but are mere matrix products.) it represents a pattern of behaviour which is compatible with what is considered to be common human practice; (Combinations of features representing patterns of behaviour which deviate from common human practice may not be lexicalised in principle, even if they are conceptually conceivable.)


there is no special lexical item whose meaning covers all of the relevant semantic features. (A less specific lexical item does not fill a gap caused by the absence of a more specific one.)

–

According to Harras (cf. Harras 1998: 6), lexicalisation is a three-place predicate: An expression x lexicalises a concept y in a conceptual system z. If lexicalisation is a three-place predicate, non-lexicalisation is a three-place predicate too: A lexical gap is an instance of the non-occurrence of a particular lexical item x for a particular concept y in a conceptual system z. A conceptual ordering system structures a particular lexical domain. For example, the ordering system for communication concepts outlined in Section 2.2.4 structures the lexical domain of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Given that lexicalisation (or nonlexicalisation) is a three-place predicate and taking into account constraints I–III, lexical gaps may be defined as follows: LEXICAL GAPS: DEFINITION A lexical gap is an empty slot in the structure of a lexical field resulting from the absence of a special lexical item x for a concept y which is part of a conceptual system z and corresponds to an event, action or state of affairs which is practically conceivable.

This definition incorporates constraints I–III as well as the idea that lexicalisation is a three-place predicate.

3.5

Detecting lexical gaps

There are basically two ways in which the occurrence of lexical gaps in the domain of speech act verbs and verbs of communication may be detected. Gaps appearing at the conceptual level of meaning and such which occur at the lexical level of meaning each require their own searching strategy.

3.5.1

Finding gaps at the conceptual level of meaning

Gaps appearing at the conceptual level of meaning may be detected by combining all possible values for the attributes of the categorial aspects ‘propositional content’, ‘propositional attitude of S’, ‘speaker intention’ and ‘speaker presuppositions’ so as to reveal all possible (i.e. actualised as well as potential) lexicalisations. The procedure of detecting lexical gaps by combining possible values for the attributes of the categorial aspects was introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.4). Combinations corresponding to speech acts which are not logically conceivable have to


Figure 4a. Levels of specificity lexicalised by directives

be excluded. Since such combinations do not represent concepts, they are mere matrix products and not instances of lexical gaps. Combinations representing patterns of behaviour which deviate from common human practice have to be excluded too. As I have pointed out before, such combinations cannot be lexicalised in principle, even if they do correspond to concepts. In Section 2.2.4, the procedure of combining values for the attributes of the categorial aspects has been explained in much detail. I shall therefore not go into it now. The procedure will be amply illustrated in the next section, where it will be used to trace gaps in each of the main classes of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. One issue which is relevant to an empirical study of lexical gaps is the degree of specificity of the analysis applied. Obviously, the degree of specificity of the semantic analysis increases with the number of features taken into account. An analysis including a large number of semantic features is more specific and is


Figure 4b. Levels of specificity lexicalised by commissives

therefore likely to yield a larger number of gaps than one incorporating only a small number of features. This point may be illustrated by a comparison of the semantic fields constituted by directives and commissives. The number of gaps observed in these fields depends on the number of semantic features taken into account. If only the speaker’s propositional attitude, the speaker’s intention and his/her presuppositions are taken into account, no gaps may be observed in either field. If, by contrast, a specification of P as the speaker’s or hearer’s going to or leaving a specific location is additionally taken into account, commissives lexicalising a specific location turn out to be missing (cf. Figure 4b above). By contrast, a specification of P as the speaker’s or hearer’s going to or leaving a specific location is lexicalised by many different directives in English, German and Dutch (cf. Figure 4a above). The corresponding gaps in the semantic field constituted by commissive predicates may only be observed if, in addition to the speaker attitudes lexicalised by these verbs, specifications of P are also taken into account.


3.5.2

Finding gaps at the lexical level of meaning

Gaps appearing at the lexical level of meaning may not be discovered by checking which combinations of values for the attributes of the categorial aspects are lexicalised and which are not. Rather, gaps occurring at the lexical level of meaning may only be traced by a systematic search for hyponyms, hyperonyms and antonyms of single verbs belonging to a particular lexical field. A search for hyponyms of the more general representative inform, for example, has shown that verbs for special acts of informing are lacking (cf. Figure 3). Antonyms too are missing in many lexical fields. There are no antonyms for verbs like boast and brag, for example. Since these verbs lexicalise a negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker as well as a positive one by a discourse situation speaker, an tonyms of these verbs should lexicalise a negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker and a positive one by a discourse situation speaker. There are no verbs in either English, German or Dutch which lexicalise such a combination of evaluations. (hide one’s light under a bushel – German sein Licht unter den Scheffel stellen, Dutch zijn licht onder de korenmaat stellen – may not be rgarded as an antonym of boast, because it neither lexicalises a negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker nor a positive one by a discourse situation speaker.) In the next section, I shall list examples of lexical gaps occurring in each of the main classes of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Gaps in the classes of declarative verbs will not be taken into account. Gaps occurring in these verb classes differ from those which appear in other verb classes in that the explanation for their occurrence is self-evident: What is and what is not lexicalised by declarative verbs merely depends on whether the relevant institutional procedure exists within a particular speech community. The non-occurrence of other types of speech act verbs is much less obvious and potentially requires many different types of lexicalisation principles to be explained. Since missing declaratives are not likely to give us a clue as to which principles govern the lexicalisation of communication concepts, the next section deals with gaps occurring in the classes of representatives, directives, commissives and expressives as well as with those occurring in the classes of verbs of communication.


3.6

Lexical gaps in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication

3.6.1

Gaps in the fields of representatives

In this section, I shall distinguish two main types of representatives: assertives and information verbs. Gaps in each of these verb classes will be dealt with separately.

3.6.1.1 Gaps in the fields of assertives Assertives are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she takes (or does not take) something to be true (or not true). Examples of assertives include claim, state and say (German behaupten and sagen, Dutch beweren and zeggen), aver, swear, and assure, ... (German beteuern, bekräftigen, versichern; Dutch zweren, bekrachtigen, ...), revoke, take back (German widerrufen, zurücknehmen, ...; Dutch herroepen, terugnemen), assent and confirm (German zustimmen and bestätigen; Dutch instemmen and bevestigen) and insist (that sth. is true), maintain (German beharren auf, bestehen auf; Dutch blijven bij (zijn mening), vasthouden (aan iets). All these verbs lexicalise combinations of epistemic speaker attitudes. Verbs like claim, state and say, for example, lexicalise the following combinations of values for the attributes of the aspects ‘propositional attitude of S’ (Att(S,P)), ‘speaker intention’ (I(S)) and ‘speaker presuppositions’ (Pres(S)): (4)  Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P)  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P)))))  Pres(S): ¬ know (H,P) ⇓ claim, state, say

  

Assertives fail to lexicalise different types of specifications of P. Existing predicates do not express a specification of P as either P or ¬P, nor do they specify P as being an event of a particular type (an action, event or state of affairs) which precedes, coincides with or follows the time of utterance (speech act time). I shall treat each of these cases separately. 1. Specifications of P as either P or ¬P fail to get lexicalised, even in cases where such specifications are conceptually conceivable. This observation holds for reactive and re-reactive predicates as well as for predicates which are not specified with respect to the position of the utterance referred to. Initial predicates such as claim or state are used to refer to situations in which a speaker claims P to be true as well as to such in which S claims ¬P to be true. Insofar


as there are no special verbs meaning ‘to claim that P’ or ‘to claim that ¬P’, the inventory of assertives contains the following gaps:

(5) a.  Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P)  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P)))))  Pres(S): ¬ know (H,P) ⇓ ∅ (claim: ‘to claim that P’)

  

(5) b.  Att(S,P): take to be true (S, ¬P)  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S, ¬P)))))  Pres(S): ¬ know (H, ¬P) ⇓ ∅ (claim: ‘to claim that ¬P’)

  

Similarly, reactive predicates such as deny are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he takes ¬P to be true as well as to such in which a speaker expresses that he does not take ¬P to be true. There are no special verbs meaning ‘to deny that P’ or ‘to deny that ¬P’. The meanings of hypothetical predicates expressing concepts such as TO DENY THAT P and TO DENY THAT ¬P are represented by the combinations in (6a) and (6b) respectively: (6) a. Att(S,P): take to be true (S, ¬P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S, ¬P))))) Pres(S): take to be true (H,P) Utterance: reactive (H: true P; S: true ¬P) ⇓ ∅ (deny: ‘to deny that P’)

  

(6) b. Att(S,P): ¬take to be true (S, ¬P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (¬take to be true (S, ¬P))))) Pres(S): take to be true (H, ¬P) Utterance: reactive (H: true ¬P; S: not true ¬P) ⇓ ∅ (deny: ‘to deny that ¬P’)

  

     

Re-reactive predicates such as insist (that sth. is the case) and maintain are not specified either with respect to the distinction between P and ¬P. These verbs are used to refer to situations in which a speaker claims that P (or ¬P) is true as a reaction to H’s reactive statement that P (or ¬P) is not true, H’s statement being a reaction to S’s initial claim that P (or ¬P) is true. Since there are no


special verbs meaning ‘to insist that P’ or ‘to insist that ¬P’, the corresponding field of re-reactive assertives contains the following gaps: (7) a. Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P))))) Pres(S): take to be true (H, ¬P) Utterance: reactive (S: true P; H: true ¬P; S: true yet P) ⇓ ∅ (insist: ‘to insist that P’)

  

(7) b. Att(S,P): take to be true (S, ¬P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S, ¬P))))) Pres(S): ¬take to be true (H, ¬P) Utterance: reactive (S: true not-P; H: true ¬(¬P); S: true yet ¬P) ⇓ ∅ (insist: ‘to insist that ¬P’)

  

     

2. There are no special assertives lexicalising a particular event type of P. Existing assertives fail to lexicalise the distinction between actions on the one hand and events and states of affairs on the other. (As Harras has shown, speech act predicates generally do not differentiate between the values ‘event’ and ‘state of affairs’ for the attribute ‘event type of P’; such distinctions are lexicalised only by a small number of declarative predicates. Cf. Harras 1998: 14). The non-availability of special verbs lexicalising combinations of speaker attitudes including specifications of P as an action vs. an event or state of affairs reveals gaps in the inventory of assertive predicates, some of which are represented in (8) and (9) below. The gap represented in (8a) would have to be filled by an assertive meaning ‘to claim that somebody has performed/will perform an action A’, while that in (8b) requires the existence of a predicate meaning ‘to claim that something has happened/will happen’ in order to be filled. Similarly, the gaps in (9a) and (9b) would have to be filled by assertives meaning ‘to assure somebody that somebody has done something/will do something’ and ‘to assure somebody that something has happened/will happen’ respectively. (8) a. Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P))))) Pres(S): ¬know (H,P) Event Type (P): Action ⇓ ∅ (claim: ‘to claim that sb. has done/will do sth.’)

  

  


(8) b. Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P))))) Pres(S): ¬know (H,P) Event Type (P): Event/State of Affairs ⇓ ∅ (claim: ‘to claim that sth. has happened/will happen’)

  

(9) a. Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P))))) Pres(S): ¬take to be true (H,P) Event Type (P): Action ⇓ ∅ (assure: ‘to assure that sb. has done/will do sth.’)

  

(9) b. Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P))))) Pres(S): ¬take to be true (H,P) Event Type (P): Event/State of Affairs ⇓ ∅ (assure: ‘to assure sb. that sth. has happened/will happen’)

  

        

3. Special assertives lexicalising a particular temporal reference of P are also missing. Existing predicates do not lexicalise specifications of P as an action, event or state of affairs which precedes, coincides with or follows the point of time at which the speech act is performed (speech act time). Yet combinations of speaker attitudes including such specifications are not logically inconceivable: A speaker may assert the truth of something which has happened already as well as of something which will happen at some point of time in the future. Thus, utterances such as John went to see Mary yesterday and Tomorrow the sun will be shining all day may both be described as being acts of claiming something to be true. The combinations in (10a) and (10b) include specifications of P as either [+FUTURE] or [–FUTURE] (i.e. ‘past or present’). Special verbs corresponding to these combinations are missing; the resulting gaps would have to be filled by assertives meaning ‘to claim a past or present action/event/state of affairs to be true’ (10a) and ‘to claim a future action/event/state of affairs to be true’ (10b). (10) a. Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P))))) Pres(S): ¬know (H,P) Temp. Ref. (P): [–FUTURE] ⇓ ∅ (claim: ‘to claim a past/present action/event/state of affairs to be true’)

  

  


(10) b. Att(S,P): take to be true (S,P) I(S): want (S (recognise (H (take to be true (S,P))))) Pres(S): ¬know (H,P) Temp. Ref. (P): [+FUTURE] ⇓ ∅ (claim: ‘to claim a future action/event/state of affairs to be true’)

  

  

While the gaps represented by the combinations in (5a)–(10b) all concern the conceptual level of meaning, gaps may also be observed at the lexical level of meaning. Since assertives all cluster at the same level of specificity, there are no assertives which may be regarded as either hyperonyms or hyponyms of other assertives. This means that there are no assertives at the levels of specificity below and above the basic level. On the whole, assertives are highly underspecified with respect to what is asserted (or denied, revoked, maintained etc.). By contrast, speakers dispose of a large variety of verbs to refer to the fact of somebody’s claiming, denying, revoking, maintaining etc. that P is true (or not true). Along with the fact of a speaker’s asserting something, assertives lexicalise different reactive stages in the interaction of S and H (i.e. whether S’s claim was the first to be uttered in the interaction of S and H, whether it was a reaction to an initial statement of H or a reaction to a reaction of H). This observation holds for English, German and Dutch.

3.6.1.2 Gaps in the fields of information verbs Information verbs are representatives used to refer to situations in which a speaker who knows P and presupposes that the hearer does not know P utters one or more Utt(P) with the intention that the hearer know P. Typical examples of information verbs include inform (German informieren, Dutch informeren), communicate and impart (German mitteilen, Dutch meedelen and inlichten), tell and say (German sagen, Dutch zeggen), etc. These verbs all lexicalise the following combination of speaker attitudes: (11)  Att(S,P): know (S,P)   I(S): want (S (know (H,P)))   Pres(S): ¬ know (H,P)  ⇓ inform, communicate, tell, impart, etc.

The values for the attributes of the aspects of the speaker’s propositional attitude, the speaker’s intention and the speaker’s presuppositions may be combined in various ways so as to cover the meaning of different types of information verbs. However, not all combinations which are possible in principle are also lexicalised


by information verbs. The following combinations of values may be but are not lexicalised by information verbs: 1. Information verbs do not lexicalise specifications of P as either P or ¬P. This may be seen from the fact that there are no information verbs in either English, German or Dutch meaning ‘to inform somebody that something is the case’ or ‘to inform somebody that something is not the case’. Existing predicates are all used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer that P as well as to such in which a speaker informs a hearer that ¬P is the case. 2. Information verbs do not lexicalise specifications of P as an event of a particular type (i.e. as an action, event or state of affairs). Exceptions are verbs like confess and its synonyms admit and acknowledge (German bekennen, gestehen and eingestehen; Dutch bekennen and toegeven) as well as warn (German warnen; Dutch waarschuwen). Verbs like confess are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he wants the hearer to recognise that he is frank and sincere about one of his/her own past actions or about his/her attitude towards a past action performed by a third person or a state of affairs. This means that verbs like confess differ from other information verbs in that they are specified with respect to the event type of P. While confess and its synonyms admit and acknowledge are used to refer to a past action of S, warn is used to refer to a future action of H which the speaker expects to have negative consequences for H. Insofar as the meaning of warn also implicates a directive component (i.e. the speaker’s wish that H do something to prevent P from happening), warn is not a prototypical representative. (The meaning of warn as a verb lexicalising properties of representatives as well as directives will be discussed in Chapter 4). Apart from verbs like confess, admit, acknowledge and warn, there are no information verbs lexicalising a specification of P as an action, event or state of affairs. There are no verbs, for example, meaning ‘to inform a hearer of a state of affairs’ or ‘to announce a future action’. 3. Combinations of speaker attitudes including a speaker’s presupposition that H knows P (or ¬P) are not lexicalised: (12) a.  Att(S,P): know (S,P)  I(S): want (S (know (H,P)))  Pres(S): know (H,P) ⇓ ∅

  


(12) b.  Att(S,P): know (S, ¬P)  I(S): want (S (know (H, ¬P)))  Pres(S): know (H, ¬P) ⇓ ∅

  

On the one hand, combinations like those in (12a) and (12b) may be argued to represent patterns of behaviour deviating from rational communicative behaviour. The combinations in (12a) and (12b) represent speech acts whereby a speaker informs a hearer of something which he presupposes to be known by that hearer. The performance of such speech acts would involve the simultaneous violation of three of Grice’s conversational maxims, i.e. the maxims of quantity, relation and modality (cf. Grice 1975). To the extent that the speech acts represented by the combinations in (12a) and (12b) deviate from established patterns of communicative practice, these combinations may not be lexicalised in principle. Because of that, the corresponding gaps may be considered to be matrix products rather than genuine lexical gaps. On the other hand, the combinations in (12a) and (12b) may be taken to represent a speech act performed by a speaker who wants to make sure that he and the hearer share the same amount of knowledge with respect to P. 4. Though information verbs are not specified with respect to the event type of P (action vs. event vs. state of affairs), they often lexicalise other types of specifications of P. Thus, verbs like German zutragen and hinterbringen, which lack exact counterparts in English and Dutch, lexicalise a specification of P as something which is not meant to be known by H, verbs like betray and divulge (German enthüllen and verraten; Dutch onthullen and verraden) lexicalise a specification of P as a piece of secret information, such like confide (German anvertrauen; Dutch toevertrouwen) express a specification of P as something meant to be known by nobody but H etc. While such specifications are part of the meaning of information verbs used to refer to past events, information verbs used to refer to future events do not lexicalise any such specifications of P. There are no verbs meaning ‘to announce something which is meant to be known by nobody but H’, ‘to announce a secret’ etc. As I have pointed out in Chapter 2, information verbs with future reference do not lexicalise specifications of P as an event with positive or negative consequences either. While German unken may be used to refer to situations in which a speaker predicts an event which he/she considers to have negative consequences, German lacks positive counterparts of unken. Special verbs meaning ‘to predict a joyful event’ or ‘to predict harm’ are lacking altogether in English and in Dutch. On the whole, information verbs lexicalising past reference of P are more highly


specified with respect to the kind of information conveyed than information verbs used to refer to future events. 5. While information verbs lexicalise many different specifications of P, they do not lexicalise any type of specification which is possible in principle. Examples of specifications of P which are possible in principle but are not lexicalised by information verbs have already been mentioned in my discussion of Fellbaum’s account of lexical gaps (cf. Section 3.3.5). The examples in Section 3.3.5 include the lack of lexical items for concepts such as TO INFORM THE PRESS and GIVE SOMEBODY A PIECE OF ORAL/WRITTEN INFORMATION. I have also mentioned in Section 3.3.5 that, while these concepts are lexicalised by collocations in German and in Dutch, they are not lexicalised at all in English. Verbs expressing these concepts are missing not only in English, but also in German and Dutch. 6. Information verbs do not lexicalise a specific mode of saying. Yet situations where a speaker informs a hearer of something in a specific way, say urgently or tactfully, are not hard to imagine. It is therefore not clear why there are no special verbs meaning ‘to urgently inform somebody of something’ or ‘to tactfully inform somebody of something’. 7. Verbs like lie are used to refer to situations in which a speaker who does not take P to be true utters one or more Utt(P) with the intention that H recognise that he takes P to be true. However, there are no verbs to refer to situations in which a speaker who takes P to be true utters one or more Utt(P) with the intention that H recognise that he takes P to be true. The corresponding gaps would have to be filled by (non-existent) antonyms of lie. The observations concerning the distribution of gaps in the fields of representatives (i.e. assertives and information verbs) may be summarised as follows: – Information verbs lexicalise many different specifications of P, especially such which concern a message’s distribution. Thus, verbs like confide lexicalise a specification of P as something which is meant to be known by nobody but H, such like divulge and disclose express a specification of P as secret information, and verbs like spread and distribute are used to refer to situations in which a speaker makes something publicly known. Assertives do not lexicalise any specifications of P, but they do lexicalise different stages in the interaction of S and H (e.g. whether S’s utterance was the first to be uttered in the interaction of S and H, whether it was a reaction to an initial utterance of H or whether it was a reaction to a reaction of H). The abundance of special assertives lexicalising different stages in the interaction of S and H reflects the structure of the process of argumentation. The truth of a proposition is very much a matter of negotiation among speakers. Speakers may discuss whether a proposition is


true, not true, likely to be true, etc. It is therefore not surprising that there are many different verbs to refer to speech acts whereby speakers assert the truth of a proposition, challenge another speaker’s assertion that something is true, etc. By contrast, knowing P or not knowing P is not a matter of negotiation among speakers. A speaker either knows or does not know P. The fact that a speaker knows P (or does not know P) is not open to discussion in the way a speaker’s assertion that something is true is. Consequently, information verbs lexicalising different stages in the interaction of S and H are lacking. Since a speaker’s knowing P or not knowing P is not a matter of discussion, there simply is no need for information verbs lexicalising different stages in the interaction of S and H. On the whole, the distribution of gaps in the fields of assertives and information verbs indicates which aspects of the corresponding acts seem to be relevant to speakers: While the type of information conveyed (esp. its distribution) seems to be highly relevant to acts of informing somebody of something, the content of a speaker’s assertion seems to be less important than the very fact of somebody’s asserting something, challenging somebody else’s assertion etc. This means that the structure of argumentation is highly differentiated in the lexicon. – With the exception of German unken, representatives used to refer to future events do not lexicalise specifications of P. This may be due to the fact that we do not know nearly as much about future events as about such which precede or coincide with the time at which S’s speech act is performed. It is possible, though, that there are culture-specific reasons for the scarcity of English, German and Dutch representatives used for future reference. Socie ties in which magic plays a significant role may well have developed lexicons which are highly differentiated with respect to the possibilities of future reference. This means that the scarcity of special representatives with future reference in English, German and Dutch is likely to be a consequence of the fact that future events themselves are not considered to be of much significance in English-, German- and Dutch-speaking communities. – While the distribution of gaps in the fields of assertives and information verbs largely shows the same patterns in English, German and Dutch, these languages occasionally differ with respect to concepts which are and such which are not lexicalised. There are no one-word English or Dutch equivalents, for example, of German zutragen and hinterbringen. Though the English idiom to tell tales (about someone) and the Dutch verb overbrieven both have meanings similar to that of German zutragen and hinterbringen, the use of to tell tales and overbrieven is restricted to situations in which a child informs someone (mostly an adult) of some kind of mischief done by another child. This means that to tell tales and overbrieven are equivalents of German petzen rather than


of zutragen and hinterbringen. The last two are much less restricted than petzen with respect to the situations they may be sued to refer to. Both verbs mean ‘to inform somebody of something which is not meant to be known by that person’ and are used to refer to situations which are characterised by the following combinations of speaker attitudes: (13) Att(S,P): know (S,P) I(S): want (S (know (H,P))) Pres(S): 1. ¬know (H,P) 2. P is not meant to be known by H 3. to the interest of H: knowing P ⇓ zutragen, hinterbringen (English: ∅ (to tell tales), Dutch: ∅ (overbrieven))

  

  

The absence of English and Dutch equivalents of German zutragen and hinter bringen constitutes a gap in the inventory of English and Dutch information verbs. Gaps obviously also occur in the lexicon of German. One such gap becomes apparent from the lack of German equivalents of the English verb leak, which means ‘to give secret information to the public’. The situations referred to by leak combine characteristics of the situations referred to by verbs like disclose as well as properties of the situations referred to by verbs like distribute and spread, cf. (14): (14) Att(S,P): know (S,P) I(S): want (S (know (H,P))) Pres(S): 1. ¬know (H,P) 2. P is considered to be a secret Utterance: addressed to several hearers/the general public ⇓ leak (German: ?; Dutch: ?)

  

  

Though the situations represented in (14) may be referred to in German and Dutch by multiword expressions such as etwas durchsickern lassen (German) and iets laten uitlekken (Dutch), there are no German or Dutch speech act verbs to refer to the situation represented by the combination of values in (14). The multiword expressions etwas durschsickern lassen and iets laten uitlekken may therefore be considered to fill gaps in the inventory of German and Dutch speech act verbs.

3.6.2

Gaps in the fields of directives

Directives are speech act verbs used to refer to the following types of situations:


1. situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants a hearer to do something 2. situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants a hearer not to do something 3. situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she does not want a hearer not to do something 4. situations in which a speaker asks a question/questions Since each of these situations may be referred to by special directives, there are also four major types of directives. Examples of directives used to refer to situations 1–4 include: 1. request, require, ask (somebody to do something), beg, beseech, ... (German ersuchen, fordern, auffordern, bitten, flehen, ...; Dutch verzoeken, vorderen, eisen, verlangen, vragen, smeken, ... ) 2. forbid, prohibit, ... (German verbieten, untersagen, ...; Dutch verbieden, ...) 3. allow, grant, .... (German erlauben, ...; Dutch toestaan, ...) 4. ask, question, inquire, interrogate, ... (German fragen, befragen, sich erkundigen, verhören, ...; Dutch vragen, ondervragen, inlichtingen inwinnen, verhoren, ...) The verbs of types 1–3 lexicalise the propositional attitude of a speaker who wants or does not want P as well as a speaker’s intention that H do P or that H abstain from doing P. For example, verbs of type 1 (require, request, beg, beseech, etc.) all lexicalise the following combination of speaker attitudes:  (15)  Att(S,P): want (S,P)   I(S): want (S (do (H,P)))  ⇓ request, require, beg, beseech, etc.

Verbs like ask, question etc. (type 4) lexicalise a speaker’s propositional attitude that S takes to be true that P’ may be complemented by P as well as a speaker’s intention that H do R, i.e. that the hearer give a competent answer to S’s question: (16)  Att(S,P): take to be true (S (P’ may be complemented by P))  I(S): want (S (do (H,P))) ⇓ ask, question, ...

  

Some combinations of values which are possible in principle turn out not to get lexicalised by directive predicates. Examples of combinations which fail to get lexicalised by directives are listed in 1–2 below.


1. There are no special directives which lexicalise a specification of P as either P or ¬P. Directives which are not specified with respect to the position of the utterance referred to do not lexicalise the distinction between P and ¬P. Existing predicates (require, request, ask, beg, etc.) are used for both cases. Verbs like forbid or prohibit may not be used to fill the relevant gaps: These verbs lexicalise a speaker’s presupposition that H may not be expected not to do P, while such like ask and request lexicalise a speaker’s presupposition that P is not to be expected. Specifications of P as either P or ¬P are not lexicalised by re-reactive directives either. Verbs like insist (that somebody do something) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants a hearer to do P (or ¬P) as a reaction to H’s refusal to comply with S’s initial request that he do P (or ¬P). There are no special re-reactive verbs meaning ‘to insist on doing P’ or ‘to insist on doing ¬P’. Reactive directives with the meaning ‘request’ which lexicalise a distinction between P and ¬P are in fact not possible in principle. Such predicates would lexicalise combinations of values such as the following:

(17) a.  Att(S,P): want (S,P)  I(S): want (S (do (H,P)))  Utterance: Reactive ⇓ ?

  

(17) b.  Att(S,P): want (S, ¬P)  I(S): want (S (not do (H,P)))  Utterance: Reactive ⇓ ?

  

Situations matching these descriptions are hard to imagine. Verbs like allow, which may appear to fit the description in (17a), do not express the appropriate speaker attitudes. allow lexicalises the propositional attitude of a speaker who does not want ¬P as well as a speaker’s intention that the hearer recognise that he does not want H not to do P. Hence, allow may not be used to refer to situations which match the description in (17a). Though verbs like forbid and prohibit do lexicalise the speaker attitudes represented in (17b), these verbs additionally express a speaker’s presupposition that H may not be expected not to do P. Since this presupposition is not part of the situation represented in (17b), forbid and prohibit do not fill the gap resulting from the absence of special reactive directives matching the combination in (17b). If the combinations in (17a) and (17b) do not represent acts of allowing some-


one to do something he/she has asked for or acts of prohibiting someone to do something he/she has asked to do, it is hard to imagine situations which do match these descriptions. Situations like those represented by the combinations in (17a) and (17b) seem to be logically inconceivable. If this is true, this may be the reason why reactive directives do not exist: combinations of values which do not correspond to concepts may not be lexicalised in principle. 2. Directives such as request, require, beg, etc. lexicalise a speaker’s presupposition that P is in his own interest (cf. (18a) below). The speaker’s assumption that P is in his own interest is implicit in the speaker’s propositional attitude of wanting P: It would not make sense for a speaker to want something which is not in his or her own interest. (18) a.  Att(S,P): want (S,P)   I(S): want (S (do (H,P)))   Pres(S): in the interest of S (P)  ⇓ request, require, ask, beg, beseech, etc.

Combinations of a speaker’s propositional attitude of wanting P, a speaker’s intention that H do P and values other than ‘in the interest of S: P’ for the speaker’s presuppositions about the interests of S and H are not lexicalised. The combination in (18b), for example, represents the speech act of a speaker telling a hearer to do something which he/she presupposes not to be in his/ her own interest. (18) b.  Att(S,P): want (S,P)   I(S): want (S (do (H,P)))   Pres(S): ¬ in the interest of S (P)  ⇓ ∅

Since the performance of such a speech act would certainly be evaluated as being masochistic (i.e. as being deviant from patterns of common human practice), the resulting gap may well be a matrix gap rather than a genuine lexical gap. By contrast, the combination in (18c) represents a speech act which is perfectly compatible with patterns of common human practice: (18) c.  Att(S,P): want (S,P)  I(S): want (S (do (H,P)))  Pres(S): in the interest of H (P) ⇓ ∅

  


The combination describes a situation in which a speaker tells a hearer to do something which he/she considers to be in the interest of H. Verbs like allow, instruct and recommend, which do lexicalise the speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of H, do not really match this combination. As I have argued above, allow lexicalises the propositional attitude of a speaker who does not want ¬P rather than the propositional attitude of a speaker who wants P (as in (18c)). Verbs like instruct do not match the combination in (18c), because they lexicalise speaker attitudes altogether different from those represented in (18c). Particularly, they lexicalise a speaker’s propositional attitude that he knows the correct way of doing P as well as the speaker’s intention that H do P correctly. Verbs like recommend and advice appropriately characterise the situation represented in (18c) only if the latter is expanded to include a speaker’s presupposition that H needs advice on a particular subject. A speaker assuming that H needs advice also has the propositional attitude that he or she considers P to be in the interest of H as well as the intention that H recognise that. Here again, these attitudes are different from those represented in (18c). Finally, a combination of the propositional attitude and the speaker intention lexicalised by verbs like ask, request, require etc. with the speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H is lexicalised only by German zumuten. This verb is used not only as a speech act verb but also as a verb referring to a mental state. In Dutch, the combination in (18d) below is lexicalised only by an idiom (een last op iemands schouders leggen). As I have shown in Chapter 2, verbs like German zumuten are exceptions from a crosslinguistic perspective. (18) d.  Att(S,P): want (S,P)   I(S): want (S (do (H,P)))   Pres(S): ¬ in the interest of H (P)  ⇓ ∅ (German zumuten; Dutch een last op iemands schouders leggen)

Verbs like forbid and prohibit do not lexicalise the speaker attitudes represented in (18a) but rather those in (19a): (19) a. Att(S,P): want (S, ¬P)  I(S): want (S (not do (H,P)))  Pres(S): 1. want (do (H,P)  2. ¬ in the interest of S (P) ⇓ forbid, prohibit

  


Combinations of the speaker attitudes lexicalised by forbid and prohibit with values other than ‘¬ in the interest of S (P)’ for the attribute of the speaker’s presuppositions about the interests of S and H are not lexicalised. The combination of values in (19b), for example, represents the speech act of a speaker who tells a hearer not to do something which is in his/her own interest: (19) b. Att(S,P): want (S, not-P)  I(S): want (S (not do (H,P)))  Pres(S): 1. want (do (H,P)  2. in the interest of S (P) ⇓ ∅

(19b) would describe a situation where a speaker tells a hearer that he/she renounces a favour which H has offered to do him/her. A speaker performing a speech act of this kind is likely to be regarded as being exceedingly generous or even as behaving masochistically. The combination in (19c) includes a speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of H: (19) c. Att(S,P): want (S, ¬P)  I(S): want (S (not do (H,P)))  Pres(S): 1. want (do (H,P)  2. in the interest of H (P) ⇓ ?forbid, ?prohibit

  

  

Such a combination seems to be identical with that in (19a): S’s presupposition that P is to the interest of H seems to be implicit in S’s presupposition that H wants to do P. (It would be irrational for H to want to do something which is not in his or her own interest.) Finally, the combination in (19d), which includes a speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H, describes an act whereby a speaker emphatically advises a hearer not to do P: (19) d. Att(S,P): want (S, ¬P)  I(S): want (S (not do (H,P)))    Pres(S): 1. want (do (H,P)  2. ¬in the interest of H (P)  ⇓ ∅

The observations concerning the distribution of lexical gaps in the fields of directive predicates have shown that directives lexicalise a certain balance of costs and


benefits. Verbs like request, demand, ask (to do something), etc. lexicalise the costs accruing to H from his doing P as well as the benefits arising to S from H’s doing P. Verbs used to refer to situations where a speaker expresses that he does not want H to do P (forbid, prohibit, etc. ...) lexicalise H’s costs accruing from his not doing something he/she wants to do as well as the benefits resulting to S from H’s not doing P. Other directives are used to refer to situations involving costs and benefits only for H. Examples are German abraten and Dutch afraden (both meaning ‘to advise somebody not to do something’) as well as allow (German erlauben, Dutch toestaan). German abraten and Dutch afraden lexicalise the costs accruing to H from his/her not doing P as well as the benefits resulting to H from his/her not doing P. The situations referred to by allow involve costs arising to H from his or her doing P as well as benefits resulting to H from being able to do what he/she wanted to do. The regularities concerning the distribution of gaps in the fields of directive predicates may be summarised as follows: Only concepts of speech acts involving costs as well as benefits (either for S and H or only for H) get lexicalised. Situations involving only costs may not be referred to by directive predicates. The only exception is German zumuten, which is also an exception from a cross-linguistic point of view. Examples of situations involving only costs are those represented in (18b), (18d) and (19d). Directives are also lacking where these would be used to refer to sadistic, masochistic or egoistic patterns of behaviour, i.e. patterns of behaviour which deviate from common communicative practice.

3.6.3

Gaps in the fields of commissives

Commissives are verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants to carry out some kind of action. Examples of commissives include promise (German versprechen, Dutch beloven), refuse (German verweigern, Dutch weigeren), vow (German geloben), guarantee (German garantieren, Dutch garanderen), threaten (German drohen, Dutch dreigen), etc. Commissives lexicalise a speaker’s propositional attitude that he/she wants to do something (P) as well as his/her intention that H recognise this: (20)  Att(S,P): want (S (do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (do, P)))))) ⇓ promise, vow, guarantee, threaten, etc.

  

Not every combination of values for the aspects of the speaker’s propositional attitude, the speaker’s intention and the speaker’s presuppositions which is possible


in principle is also lexicalised by commissives. Cases of gaps in the fields of commissives include the following: 1. Commissives do not lexicalise specifications of P as either ‘to do something’ or ‘not to do something’. This is true of re-reactive commissives as well as such which are not specified with respect to the position of the utterance referred to. The latter (e.g. promise) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that he intends to do something (P) as well as to such in which a speaker tells a hearer that he intends not to do P. This means that there are no special commissives meaning ‘to promise to do P’ or ‘to promise not to do P’:

(21) a.  Att(S,P): want (S (do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (do, P))))))  Pres(S): in the interest of H: P ⇓ ∅ (promise: ‘to promise that P’)

  

(21) b.  Att(S,P): want (S (not do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (not do, P))))))  Pres(S): in the interest of H: not P ⇓ ∅ (promise: ‘to promise not to do P’)

  

Re-reactive predicates such as insist (on doing something) do not lexicalise specifications of P as ‘to do something’ or ‘not to do something’. There are no special verbs meaning ‘to insist on doing P’ or ‘to insist on not doing P’: (22) a. Att(S,P): want (S (do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (do, P))))))  Pres(S): in the interest of H (P)  Utterance: re-reactive ⇓ ∅ (insist (on doing sth.))

  

(22) b. Att(S,P): want (S (not do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (not do, P))))))    Pres(S): in the interest of H (¬P)   Utterance: re-reactive ⇓ ∅ (insist (on not doing sth.))

Though specifications of P as ‘to do something’ or ‘not to do something’ are not lexicalised by either re-reactive commissives or such which are not speci-


fied with respect to the position of the utterance referred to, reactive commissives do lexicalise this distinction. A positive reaction of a speaker to a request to do something may be referred to by special verbs such as agree (to do something) and consent (to do something) (German zusagen and einwilligen, Dutch toezeggen and inwilligen). Negative reactions are also referred to by special verbs such as refuse (to do something) and decline (to do something) (German verweigern and zurückweisen, Dutch weigeren and afwijzen): (23) a. Att(S,P): want (S (do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (do, P))))))  Pres(S): in the interest of H (P)  Utterance: reactive ⇓ agree, consent (23) b. Att(S,P): want (S (not do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (not do, P))))))  Pres(S): in the interest of H (¬P)  Utterance: reactive ⇓ refuse, decline

  

  

Since re-reactive commissives like insist and such like promise do not differentiate between a specification of P as ‘to do something’ and a specification of P as ‘not to do something’, these verb classes contain gaps whereas the class of reactive predicates does not. 2. While commissives typically lexicalise a speaker’s presupposition that P (or ¬P) is to the interest of H, other values for the attribute of the interests of S and H do not get lexicalised. Thus, the speaker attitudes represented in (24) get lexicalised only when they are combined with a speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of H. This particular presupposition is represented in (24a); the other possibilities of P being in the interest or not in the interest of S or H are listed in (24b)–(24d):

(24)  Att(S,P): want (S (do, P))  I(S): want (S (recognise (H (want (S (do, P)))))) ⇓ promise, vow, pledge, guarantee, etc.

  

(24) a. Pres(S): in the interest of H (P) → promise, vow, pledge, guarantee, etc. b. Pres(S): ¬ in the interest of H (P) → ∅


A combination of the speaker attitudes in (24) with the speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H would have to be lexicalised by what Baumgärtner called “sadistic” predicates (cf. Section 2.2.2.3). The lack of such predicates is likely to be due to the irrationality of the corresponding pattern of behaviour. A person intending to do something which he presupposes not to be in the interest of somebody else is not likely to express his/her intention. By expressing his/her intention to harm someone, a speaker would only betray his/her intention and thereby make him- or herself unable to perform the intended action. The irrationality of betraying one’s intention to harm someone is likely to be the reason why there are no lexical items to refer to this pattern of behaviour. To the extent that the behaviour of a speaker expressing his/her intention to do something which is not in the interest of somebody else is irrational (i.e. not in accordance with patterns of common human practice), the lack of a lexical item to refer to this pattern of behaviour may be an instance of a matrix gap. (Though threaten also lexicalises a speaker’s intention to do something which is not in the interest of H, threaten is used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his intention to perform the intended action only if the hearer is not willing to fulfil a condition C. Since the combination in (24) does not include a reference to any such condition, threaten does not match the combination of the speaker attitudes in (24) or the speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H.) (24) c. Pres(S): in the interest of S (P) → ∅

A combination of the speaker attitudes represented in (24) and the speaker’s presupposition that P is in his/her own interest are not lexicalised. Such combinations would have to be lexicalised by “egoistic” predicates. The reason why such predicates do not exist may be that the behaviour of a speaker expressing his/her intention to do something to his/her own benefit is considered to go beyond what is esteemed to be an appropriate distance between speaker and hearer. The corresponding gap may therefore be considered to be a matrix gap. (24) d. ¬ in the interest of S (P) → ∅

Situations where a speaker expresses that he intends to do something which is not in his or her own interest would have to be referred to by what Baumgärtner called “masochistic” predicates (cf. Section 2.2.2.3). As I have pointed out before, illocutionary counterparts of expressions such as sacrifice oneself do not exist.


The combination in (25) below differs from that in (24) in that it represents the attitude of a speaker telling a hearer that he/she will not do P. The speaker attitudes represented in (25) may also be combined with different values for the attributes of the interests of S and H. (25a)–(25b) represent the possibilities of P being in the interest (or not in the interest) of S or H: (25)

  

Att(S,P): I(S):

a. Pres(S):

in the interest of H (P) → ∅

¬ in the interest of H (P) → ∅

Combinations of a speaker’s intention not to do P and a speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H are lexicalised only by verbs such as renounce (German verzichten, Dutch afstand van iets doen). However, verbs like renounce lexicalise a speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H as well as a speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of S. This means that verbs like renounce do not match the combination of the speaker attitudes in (25) and the presupposition in (25b). (25) c. Pres(S):

  

The combination of the speaker attitudes represented in (25) and the speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of H describes the speech act performed by a speaker telling a hearer that he will not do P although he considers P to be in the interest of the hearer. Though a speaker performing such a speech act may be described as being disobedient, there are no special illocutionary verbs to refer to speech acts whereby a speaker expresses his/her disobedience. Only reactive predicates (e.g. refuse, decline) lexicalise a combination of a speaker’s intention not to do P and a speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of H. (25) b. Pres(S):

want (S (not do, P)) want (S (recognise (H (want (S (not do, P))))))

in the interest of S (P) → ∅

There are no commissives lexicalising a combination of a speaker’s intention not to do P and a speaker’s presupposition that P is in his own interest. Though verbs like renounce do lexicalise a speaker’s presupposition that P is in his own interest, these verbs also express a speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H. Since verbs like renounce lexicalise a complex presupposition which is not part of the meaning of verbs like promise, they do not match a combination of the speaker attitudes in (25) and the presupposition in (25c). (25) d. Pres(S):

¬ in the interest of S (P)


There are no special commissives lexicalising a combination of the speaker attitudes in (25) and the speaker’s presupposition in (25d). Such a combination would represent the behaviour of a speaker telling a hearer that he/she will not do P, because he/she considers P not to be in his/her own interest. The reason why there are no special commissives to refer to such speech acts may well be that this pattern of behaviour is self-evident: People normally do not do what they expect to have negative consequences for themselves. The corresponding behaviour may in fact be so much self-evident that people do not even talk about it. For this reason, speakers do not need special illocutionary verbs to refer to it. 3. Commissives fail to lexicalise different specifications of P which do get lexicalised by directives. Examples of specifications of P which are not but could be lexicalised by commissives include:

Specifications of P as a place where S intends to go to/which S intends to leave. Such Specifications are part of the meaning of directives such as turn away, call forward, call away, expel, etc. – Specifications of P as S’s visiting H, a joint activity of S and H, S and H’s joint participation in an event (a concert, a film etc.). Specifications of this type are lexicalised by directive predicates like invite. – Specifications of P as something which is considered to be of high moral value or in the interest of the general public. Directives lexicalising such specifications of P are call upon somebody (to do something) and appeal. – Specifications of P as something which belongs to S’s area of responsibil ity. Specifications of P as something which is part of H’s area of responsi bility are lexicalised by directives such as order, charge, entrust, etc. –

There is no obvious reason why there are no commissives lexicalising S’s intention to go to or leave a specific place, to visit H, to do something which is regarded as being of high moral value, to carry out an order etc.

Comparing the distribution of gaps in the fields of directives and commissives, we may conclude that there are many more directives than commissives. Existing directives are also more highly specified than commissives with respect to the concepts they lexicalise. However, directives and commissives also show an interesting parallelism with respect to the lexicalisation of the speaker’s presuppositions about the interests of S and H. Like directives, existing commissives prove to lexicalise a balance between costs and benefits of speakers and hearers. Specifically, they lexicalise the costs accruing to S from his/her doing (or not doing) P as well as the benefits arising to H from S’s doing (or not doing) P. The lack of special commissives for cases (24b)–(25d) suggests that speech acts involving


only costs (either to S and H or only to S) do not get lexicalised. To the extent that threaten lexicalises only costs (to S as well as to H), this verb may appear to be an exception to the generalisation mentioned above. However, threaten lexicalises S’s intention to do something which is not in the interest of H only if H fails to do what S requires him/her to do. Other commissives do not lexicalise any such condition. Since threaten lexicalises components different from those which are part of other commissives, it is not a real exception to the general observation that commissives lexicalise S’s costs of doing P as well as the benefits arising to H from S’s doing P. This lexicalisation tendency mirrors that which has turned out to be relevant to the lexicalisation of directive speech acts: Directives lexicalise the costs accruing to H from his doing (or not doing) P as well as the benefits arising to S (or H) from H’s doing (or not doing) P. Commissives lexicalise S’s costs of doing (or not doing) P as well as the benefits resulting to H from S’s doing (or not doing) P. The relevance of costs and benefits to the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts is captured by the following lexicalisation principle: Principle of Costs and Benefits Concepts of directive and commissive speech acts get lexicalised only when they involve a balance of costs and benefits for S and H.

The principle of Costs and Benefits governs the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commisssive speech acts in English, German and Dutch. While the distribution of gaps in the fields of directives and commissives shows the same overall pattern in English, German and Dutch, not every concept which gets lexicalised in one of these languages gets lexicalised in each of the other languages as well. An example is the concept expressed by German abraten and Dutch afraden. These two verbs are used to refer to situations in which a speaker who expects H to do P tells H that he/she considers P not to be in the interest of H. This situation may only be referred to in English by expressions such as advise somebody not to do something or advise somebody against something, which are both free combinations of words. There is no verb such as *disadvise in English to express the concept lexicalised by German abraten and Dutch afraden. dissuade does not fill the gap resulting from the absence of a verb like *disadvise: Though dissuade lexicalises a speaker’s presupposition that H may be expected to do P, it does not lexicalise the speaker’s opinion that P is not in the interest of H. Additionally, dissuade is a perlocutionary verb, i.e. it lexicalises a result (‘H abstains from doing P’) which is not part of the meaning of German abraten or Dutch afraden. This means that dissuade is an antonym of persuade rather than of advise or recommend.

3.6.4


Gaps in the fields of expressives

Expressives are verbs lexicalising a speaker’s judgement of P, a speaker’s positive or negative evaluation of P or a speaker’s emotive attitude (joy, anger or sorrow) towards P. Examples of verbs expressing a speaker’s judgement of P are judge, estimate, classify, evaluate and grade (German (be)urteilen, einschätzen, klassifizieren, (be)werten and einordnen; Dutch (be)oordelen, schatten, classificeren, evalueren and rangschikken). Verbs like praise, extol and enthuse (German loben, preisen and schwärmen; Dutch loven, prijzen and dwepen) express a speaker’s positive evaluation of P, while such like criticise, admonish and grumble (German kritisieren, tadeln and meckern; Dutch kritiseren, berispen and mopperen) lexicalise a speaker’s negative evaluation of P. Some verbs expressing a positive or negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker (SRS) additionally lexicalise an evaluation by a discourse situation speaker (SDS). I have already mentioned boast and its synonyms brag and show off as examples of verbs lexicalising two different and even opposite evaluations. It is important to bear in mind that these verbs are used to refer to patterns of behaviour which are evaluated negatively (namely as deviations of social norms), even though they express a positive evaluation by a resource situation speaker. Examples of verbs lexicalising a speaker’s emotive attitude towards P are rejoice (German jubeln, Dutch juichen), scold (German schimpfen; Dutch schelden) and complain (German (be)klagen, Dutch klagen). Gaps occurring in each of these three major lexical fields will be listed and discussed separately.

3.6.4.1 Gaps in the fields of judgement verbs There are no special verbs either in English, German or Dutch lexicalising a speaker’s judgement of an action, event or state of affairs. Existing predicates expressing a speaker’s judgement of P are not specified with respect to the event type of P (i.e. action vs. event or state of affairs). There are no special verbs meaning ‘to express one ‘s judgement of an action’ or ‘to express one judgement of an event or state of affairs’. 3.6.4.2 Gaps in the fields of verbs expressing a positive or negative evaluation There are many more verbs expressing negative evaluations than such which lexicalise positive ones. This may be seen from the following observations: Firstly, there are many more paradigms containing verbs expressing negative evaluations than such comprising verbs which lexicalise positive evaluations. Secondly, the paradigms constituted by verbs lexicalising negative evaluations are more diversified than those containing verbs which lexicalise positive evaluations. Consequently, the former contain a larger number of verbs than the latter.


There are only three lexical fields containing expressives which lexicalise a positive evaluation by a resource situation speaker and do not at the same time lexicalise a negative evaluation by a discourse situation speaker. Verbs representing each of these three classes are welcome, (German begrüßen, Dutch begroeten), enthuse (German schwärmen, Dutch dwepen) and commend (German loben, Dutch loven). Verbs like commend differ from such like welcome in that they are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses a positive evaluation of a past action by a hearer or third person. Verbs like welcome are not specified with respect to the event type lexicalised. Rather, these verbs are used to describe the speech act of a speaker who expresses a positive evaluation of a past action, event or state of affairs. Verbs like enthuse or its synonym rave (German schwärmen, Dutch dwepen) differ from such like commend as well as from such like welcome in that they are used to refer to situations in which a speaker rapturously expresses his positive evaluation of a past action, event or state of affairs. A specification of the mode of speaking as “rapturous” is not lexicalised by verbs like commend nor by such like welcome. Figure 5 presents an overview of the different types of expressives which lexicalise a positive evaluation by a resource situation speaker but do not at the same time lexicalise a negative evaluation by a discourse situation speaker. While there are only three paradigms containing verbs expressing positive evaluations, there are five lexical fields comprising expressives which lexicalise a negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker but do not express an additional evaluation by a discourse situation speaker. Examples of verbs belonging to each of these lexical fields are blame (German tadeln, Dutch berispen), reproach (German vorwerfen, Dutch verwijten), grumble (German meckern, Dutch mopperen), discredit (German diskreditieren, Dutch belasteren) and mock (German spotten, Dutch spotten). Since these verbs are all used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she evaluates some past P negatively, they all lexicalise the following combination of speaker attitudes (verbs like mock lexicalise a specification of S’s negative evaluation as “ridiculous”): (26)

  

Att(S,P): I(S): Pres(S): Temp. Ref. (P):

consider bad (S,P) want (S (recognise (H (consider bad (S,P))))) P is the case [–FUTURE]

  

Verbs like blame and such like reproach are both used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his/her negative evaluation of a past action, but blame lexicalises the value ‘hearer or third person’ for the attribute of the agent of P, while reproach lexicalises the value ‘hearer only’ for that attribute. Verbs such as reproach also differ from such like blame in that they lexicalise a specification


Figure 5. Expressives lexicalising a positive evaluation by SRS

of the mode of speaking as “emphatically”, a specification which is not part of the meaning of verbs like blame. As opposed to verbs like blame and such like reproach, expressives such as grumble do not lexicalise a specification of P as an event of a particular type (i.e. as an action vs. an event or state of affairs). Thus, grumble is not specified with respect to the attribute of the event type of P. Verbs like discredit and its synonyms defame and discriminate are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his negative evaluation of a third person’s past action or quality with the intention of diminishing that person’s social prestige. This means that discredit, defame and discriminate lexicalise a result which is not part of the meaning of other types of expressives lexicalising a negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker. Finally, verbs such as mock lexicalise the propositional attitude of a speaker who considers P to be ridiculous as well as that speaker’s intention that H recognise this. Thus, mock and other synonymous verbs lexicalise a special kind of negative evaluation. Figure 6 shows the similari-


Figure 6. Expressives lexicalising a negative evaluation by SRS

ties and differences among the different types of expressives lexicalising a negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker. A comparison of the inventory of expressives lexicalising negative evaluations and that of verbs expressing positive evaluations shows that there are no expressives which lexicalise both a positive evaluation and a result or both a positive evaluation and a specification of that positive evaluation. Due to the lack of such verbs, the number of lexical fields constituted by expressives lexicalising a positive evaluation is smaller than the number of paradigms constituted by verbs which lexicalise a negative evaluation. So far, I have only discussed verbs expressing a positive or negative evaluation by a resource situation speaker (RS speaker). Apart from these, there are other verbs which lexicalise a positive evaluation by a RS speaker as well as a negative


one by a discourse situation speaker (DS speaker). Examples are boast (German angeben, Dutch opscheppen), whitewash (German beschönigen, Dutch vergoei lijken), glorify (German verherrlichen, Dutch verheerlijken) and flatter (German schmeicheln, Dutch vleien). These verbs are all used to refer to situations in which a RS speaker expresses a positive evaluation of some past P (an action and/or an event or state of affairs and/or a quality of H). In addition to this positive evaluation by a RS speaker, each of these verbs lexicalises a negative evaluation by a DS speaker. Particularly, boast and glorify lexicalise a DS speaker’s evaluation of the RS speaker’s positive representation of P as being exaggerated, i.e. as being too positive. A speaker using the verb whitewash to refer to a RS speaker’s positive representation of P thereby expresses his or her evaluation of the RS speaker’s positive representation of P as being inadequate. flatter lexicalises a DS speaker’s opinion that the RS speaker wants to gain benefits for him- or herself by representing P (here a past action or a quality of H) positively. This means that a DS speaker using the verb flatter to refer to a RS speaker’s positive representation of a hearer’s past action or quality thereby indicates that he/she considers the RS speaker’s linguistic behaviour to be strategic. Figure 7 below presents an overview of the different types of evaluations by a DS speaker which are part of the meaning of boast, glorify, whitewash and flatter and their German and Dutch equivalents. Figure 7 shows that there are four paradigms of verbs expressing a positive evaluation by a RS speaker as well as a negative one by a DS speaker. Though there are no verbs which lexicalise a negative evaluation by a RS speaker and a positive one by a DS speaker, such combinations are neither logically inconceivable nor incompatible with patterns of common human practice. It is not difficult, for example, to imagine a situation in which a DS speaker expresses that he/she considers a RS speaker’s negative evaluation of some past P to be fully justified. Since situations involving a DS speaker’s positive evaluation of a RS speaker’s negative representation of P are neither logically inconceivable nor incompatible with patterns of common human practice, it is not clear why there are no special verbs to refer to such situations. Taking into account verbs which express a negative evaluation by a RS spea ker as well as such which lexicalise a negative evaluation by a DS speaker, there are nine paradigms of expressives lexicalising negative evaluations. Given that there are only three paradigms of verbs lexicalising positive evaluations, the number of lexical fields constituted by expressives lexicalising positive evaluations is much smaller than the number of paradigms constituted by expressives which lexicalise negative evaluations. The fact that negative evaluations get lexicalised more often than positive ones may also be observed from the number of verbs belonging to the relevant lexical fields. The list below compares the diversity of the lexical fields containing


Figure 7. Expressives lexicalising a positive evaluation by SRS and a negative one by SDS

expressives lexicalising negative evaluations and of those comprising expressives lexicalising positive evaluations:

Verbs lexicalising a positive evaluation by a resource situation speaker

TYPE “WELCOME” English: welcome, assent, affirm, support, approve, praise German: begrüßen, bejahen, befürworten, gutheißen, anerkennen


Dutch: begroeten, toejuichen, (akkoord gaan met iets), goedkeuren TYPE “COMMEND” English: commend, laud, honour German: loben, huldigen, ehren, würdigen, honorieren Dutch: loven, huldigen, eren TYPE “ENTHUSE” English: enthuse, rave, extol, eulogise German: schwärmen, preisen, lobpreisen, würdigen Dutch: dwepen, prijzen

Verbs lexicalising a negative evaluation by a discourse situation speaker

TYPE “BLAME” English: blame, criticise, object (to sth.), censure, disapprove, condemn, denounce German: tadeln, rüffeln, kritisieren, beanstanden, bemängeln, monieren, missbilligen, verurteilen, anprangern Dutch: kritiseren, bevitten, laken, afkeuren, veroordelen TYPE “REPROACH” English: reproach, rebuke, reprimand German: vorwerfen, vorhalten, zurechtweisen Dutch: verwijten, terechtwijzen, berispen


TYPE “GRUMBLE” English: grumble, grouse, carp, nag, cavil (at sth.), quibble German: meckern, mosern, motzen, nörgeln, mäkeln, granteln Dutch: mopperen, kankeren, vitten, bedillen TYPE “DISCREDIT” English: defame, discredit, disparage, calumniate, traduce, slander, blacken, discriminate, belittle, demean, degrade, insult, compromise, disgrace German: diffamieren, diskreditieren, verunglimpfen, verleumden, schmähen, anschwärzen, diskriminieren, herabwürdigen, herabsetzen, beleidigen, kompromittieren, bloßstellen, blamieren Dutch: belasteren, diskrediteren, kwaadspreken (van iem.), smaden, zwart maken, discrimineren, kleineren, degraderen, vernederen, beledigen, compromitteren, blameren TYPE “MOCK” English: laugh at, deride, ridicule, chaff, tease, mock, scoff, sneer, jeer, jibe, taunt, deride German: spotten, verspotten, hänseln, veräppeln, veralbern, necken, jmdn. aufziehen (mit etw.), höhnen, verhöhnen Dutch: spotten, bespotten, plagen, honen

The diversity of the lexical fields constituted by expressives lexicalising negative evaluations as compared to those constituted by expressives lexicalising positive evaluations lends additional support to the observation made with respect to the number of lexical fields: Patterns of linguistic behaviour which are evaluated negatively (either by RS speaker or by a DS speaker) get lexicalised more often than such which are evaluated positively.


3.6.4.3 Gaps in the fields of verbs expressing emotions Like expressives lexicalising positive or negative evaluations, such which lexicalise emotions abound in some verb fields while being scarce in others. Particularly, there is a large variety of verbs which may be used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his anger or sorrow because of P. As compared to these, there are only few verbs which may be used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his/her joy because of P. Verbs like rejoice, such like congratulate and such like thank all lexicalise a speaker’s joy because of P and hence lexicalise the following combination of speaker attitudes: (27)

 Att(S,P):  I(S):  Pres(S):

feels joy because of P (S) want (S (recognise (H (feels joy because of P (S))))) P is the case

  

In addition to the speaker attitudes in (27), verbs like rejoice lexicalise a specification of the mode of speaking as “emphatic”. Other verbs expressing this particular mode of speaking are exult, German jubilieren, frohlocken and jauchzen as well as Dutch jubeln and juichen. congratulate (German gratulieren/beglückwünschen, Dutch feliciteren/gelukwensen) is used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his/her joy because of a past action of H or a state which concerns H. There are no other verbs than congratulate to refer to situations of this type. Finally, thank (German (be)danken, Dutch (be)danken) lexicalises a speaker’s joy because of a past action which H has performed to the benefit of S. Here again, thank is the only verb which lexicalises a specification of P as a past action of H beneficial to S. The number of verbs used to refer to a speaker’s expression of anger is considerably larger than that of verbs used to refer to a speaker’s expression of joy. Verbs used to refer to a speaker’s expression of anger lexicalise the following combination of speaker attitudes: (28)


feels anger because of P (S) want (S (recognise (H (feels anger because of P (S))))) P is the case

  

There are two types of verbs which lexicalise a speaker’s anger because of P. Verbs like scold (German schimpfen, Dutch schelden) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his anger because of a past action, event or state of affairs while such like upbraid (German beschimpfen and Dutch beschimpen) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that he/she is angry because of something that the hearer has done. Verbs belonging to the first group are swear, curse, storm, thunder (German poltern, schelten, fluchen, verfluchen, wettern, gei fern and giften; Dutch bulderen, razen, tieren, tekeergaan, vloeken, vervloeken and


verwensen). The second group includes verbs such as spit, snarl, snap, bawl out (German anfauchen, angeifern, angiften, anherrschen, anscheißen, anschnauzen, ausschelten; Dutch uitvallen (tegen iemand), uitvaren (tegen iemand), toesnauwen, uitkafferen, afbekken, uitmaken). As these examples show, there are considerably more verbs which lexicalise a speaker’s anger because of P than such which express a speaker’s joy about P. A speaker describing a situation in which another speaker expresses his or her sorrow because of P may also choose from a large variety of verbs. The range of options includes complain, mourn, lament, deplore, regret, bewail, bemoan, (German klagen, (sich) beklagen, sich beschweren, bedauern, jammern and lamentieren; Dutch klagen, beklagen, betreuren, reclameren, jammeren and lamenteren). Why should it be the case that there are more verbs to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his anger because of P than such which may be used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his joy because of P? I suggest that the asymmetry is due to the fact that the expression of joy counts as a socially accepted pattern of linguistic behaviour, while the expression of anger, worry, anxiety and possibly also sorrow, is not. In English-, German- and Dutchspeaking communities, the expression of joy conforms to what is considered to be “normal” social behaviour and is therefore regarded as being inconspicuous or unmarked by the speakers of these communities. By contrast, the linguistic behaviour of a speaker expressing his anger, worry, anxiety or sorrow is regarded as being a deviation from generally accepted norms. Far from being inconspicuous, these patterns of behaviour count as being salient or marked by speakers of English, German and Dutch (and other similar languages). The diversity of the different lexical fields constituted by expressives lexicalising emotions indicates that patterns of behaviour which count as salient or marked get lexicalised more often than such which are regarded as being inconspicuous, i.e. unmarked, within a particular speech community. Like the expression of anger, worry, anxiety and sorrow, the expression of negative evaluations counts as a marked pattern of social behaviour in English-, German- and Dutch-speaking communities. A DS speaker referring to the linguistic behaviour of a RS speaker expressing a negative evaluation of P may choose from a wide range of options. However, there are not nearly as many verbs which may be used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses a positive evaluation of P. This means that there is a strong parallelism between the observations made with respect to expressives lexicalising positive or negative evaluations and such which lexicalise emotions. The stability of the patterns observed suggests that the markedness of patterns of linguistic behaviour is highly relevant to the lexicalisation of evaluations and emotions. The effects of markedness on the lexicalisation


of concepts of expressive speech acts are captured by the following lexicalisation principle: Principle of Markedness Patterns of behaviour which count as marked within a particular speech community get lexicalised more often than such which count as unmarked for the speakers of that community.

The Principle of Markedness has much in common with the Principle of Cognitive Salience suggested by Verschueren (cf. Verschueren 1985). What I have called “marked” patterns of behaviour may indeed correspond to concepts termed as “salient” by Verschueren. However, the Principle of Markedness differs from Verschueren’s Principle of Cognitive Salience in that it assumes that markedness (or salience) is a property of patterns of social behaviour. In Verschueren’s framework, salience is a property of concepts. So far, the Principle of Markedness has proven to be relevant to the lexicalisation of evaluations and emotions. It does not seem to affect the organisation of the lexical fields constituted by speech act verbs other than expressives. In the next section, I shall explore whether the Principle of Markedness may also be claimed to affect the organisation of the lexical fields constituted by verbs of communication.

3.6.5

Gaps in the fields of verbs of communication

The idea that marked patterns of behaviour get lexicalised more often than such which count as “normal” or unmarked also seems to be relevant to the lexicalisation of the concept of different ways of speaking. A speaker’s manner of saying something may be judged positively or negatively, i.e. as being agreeable or not, eloquent or not, clear or not, fluent or not etc. Acts of talking fluently, eloquently, agreeably, clearly etc. may be regarded as being “normal” or unmarked patterns of linguistic behaviour. By contrast, acts of talking in an unclear, non-fluent, noneloquent or disagreeable manner may be considered to be marked patterns of linguistic behaviour. . Markedness is also sometimes regarded as a property of lexical items. According to Klamer, for example, lexical items may be semantically and/or structurally marked (cf. Klamer 2002). Semantic markedness is defined as semantic complexity: “… a semantically marked word is a conceptually complex word, which has, in addition to basic semantic features, one or more evaluative, subjective, and/or descriptive semantic feature(s)” (ibid.: 259). Structural markedness is defined in terms of the relative violation of structural constraints on the wellformedness of lexical items: a more constrained item is less structurally complex, because it violates fewer constraints (cf. ibid.: 260).


An examination of the inventory of verbs lexicalising an evaluation of a particular mode of speaking indicates that verbs lexicalising a positive evaluation by a DS speaker of a RS speaker’s manner of saying something are rare or even nonexistent. However, verbs lexicalising a negative evaluation of a speaker’s mode of saying something abound in almost every paradigm. Examples of such verbs include those in (29a)–(32b): Verbs expressing a particular degree of sound intensity (29) a. E.: bawl G.: grölen D.: joelen (Meaning: ‘to speak loudly and discordantly’) b.

E.: shrill G.: kreischen D.: krijsen (Meaning: ‘to speak loudly and in a shrill voice’)

Verbs expressing a particular manner of articulation (30) a. E.: murmur G.: murmeln D.: mompelen (Meaning: ‘to speak unclearly and in a low voice’) b.

E.: mumble G.: nuscheln D.: ∅ (Meaning: ‘to speak unclearly’)

Verbs expressing a particular kind of timbre (31) a. E.: caw G.: krächzen D.: krassen (‘to speak in a hoarse voice’) b. (32)

E.: croak G.: quäken D.: ∅ (Meaning: ‘to speak in a high and choked voice’)

Verbs expressing a particular rhythm E.: stutter/stammer G.: stottern/stammeln D.: stotteren/stamelen (Meaning: ‘to talk with an uneven rhythm’)


The absence of verbs meaning ‘to speak clearly’, ‘to speak with an even rhythm’, ‘to talk in a warm voice’, ‘to talk loudly and clearly’ etc. indicates that verbs expressing positive evaluations of a speaker’s mode of saying something are rare or even nonexistent. Assuming that positive evaluations correspond to unmarked patterns of linguistic behaviour and negative evaluations to marked patterns, the abundance of verbs lexicalising negative evaluations of a mode of speaking and the scarcity of such lexicalising positive evaluations of a manner of speaking support the assumption that the Principle of Markedness is highly relevant to the lexicalisation of evaluations of the way in which a speaker utters something. This finding is confirmed by two examples of gaps mentioned in Brdar & Brdar-Szabó’s study of gaps in the fields of verbs expressing a particular manner of speaking (cf. Brdar & Brdar-Szabó 2004). Comparing the meanings of Hungarian, Croatian, English and German verbs, these authors observe that some aspects of manner of speaking such as the perspectivisation of the speech act content, the speech act’s intended effect and various physical aspects of speaking may be referred to cross-linguistically by a large number of specific expressions, while others may not be referred to by lexical expressions (verbs) at all. As examples of the latter, Brdar & Brdar-Szabó mention the lack of verbs to refer to situations in which a speaker is concrete about something or to such in which a speaker talks clearly about something (cf. ibid.: 145). If being concrete about something or speaking clearly are indeed unmarked patterns of linguistic behaviour, these examples show that the markedness of the situation referred to is relevant to the way in which concepts of modes of speaking get lexicalised cross-linguistically.

3.7

Conclusion: Explanations for the occurrence of lexical gaps

The investigation of the distribution of gaps across the lexical fields constituted by different types of speech act verbs and verbs of communication has shown that a considerable number of gaps fall into one of the following patterns: 1. Speech act verbs tend to cluster at a middle or basic level of specificity. Consequently, lexical gaps tend to occur on the levels of specificity below and above the basic level. This means that hyponyms as well as hyperonyms of basic level items are often missing. 2. Specifications of P as either P or ¬P often fail to get lexicalised. Gaps resulting from the non-lexicalisation of P as either P or ¬P occur in each of the main classes of speech act verbs. 3. Concepts of speech acts whereby a speaker informs a hearer of some past action, event or state of affairs get lexicalised more often than concepts of


4.

5.

6.

7.

speech acts by which a speaker informs a hearer of a future action, event or state of affairs. The two main types of representatives (assertives and information verbs) lexicalise different conceptual components. On the one hand, assertives lexicalise different stages in the interaction of S and H which are not part of the meaning of information verbs. On the other hand, information verbs lexicalise many different specifications of P which do not get lexicalised by assertives. Concepts of directive and commissive speech acts get lexicalised when they involve a balance of costs and benefits. Directives lexicalise the costs accruing to H from his doing (or not doing) P as well as the benefits arising to S (or occasionally to H, cf. allow) from H’s doing (or not doing) P. Commissives lexicalise S’s costs of doing (or not doing) P as well as the benefits resulting to H from S’s doing (or not doing) P. Since this pattern has proven to hold for almost all directives and commissives in English, German and Dutch, it may be considered to be a particularly stable one. The inventory of commissives contains many more gaps than that of directives. This is due to the fact that directives lexicalise many different specifications of P which do not get lexicalised by commissives. Speech acts which are regarded as instances of marked linguistic behaviour get lexicalised more often than such which conform to social norms and are therefore considered to be “normal” or unmarked patterns of linguistic behaviour. The following speech acts count as examples of marked linguistic behaviour: – – –

Speech acts involving the expression of a negative evaluation (either a RS speaker’s negative evaluation of a past action, event or state of affairs or a DS speaker’s negative evaluation of a RS speaker’s mode of speaking). Speech acts whereby a speaker expresses his anger, worry or grief because of P. Speech acts performed by a speaker who does not take P to be true but wants that H recognise that he takes P to be true.

By contrast, the following speech acts are considered to conform to social norms and are therefore regarded as being “normal” or unmarked:

– – –

Speech acts involving the expression of a positive evaluation (either a RS speaker’s positive evaluation of an action, event or state of affairs or a DS speaker’s positive evaluation of a RS speaker’s mode of speaking). Speech acts whereby a speaker expresses his/her joy because of P. Speech acts performed by a speaker who takes P to be true and also wants the hearer to recognise that he/she takes P to be true.


Patterns 1–7 appear to be stable cross-linguistically: They apply to English, German and Dutch. Differences in the lexicalisation of communication concepts among these languages are of a rather more coincidental nature. Examples of such differences are the absence of an English equivalent of German abraten and Dutch afraden as well as the absence of English and Dutch equivalents of German zutragen. For some of the patterns in 1–7, there are obvious explanations. The abundance of assertives lexicalising different stages in the interaction of S and H, for example, is evidently related to the fact that the process of argumentation itself involves several such stages. A speaker may make an initial claim that something is true (or not true), confirm or deny that somebody else’s claim is true, insist on the truth of his or her own initial claim etc. Reactive stages being essential to the process of argumentation, it is not surprising that speakers need special words to refer to them. The abundance of assertives lexicalising different stages in the interaction of S and H obviously reflects the structure of argumentation itself. Other patterns may hardly be explained at all. It is not at all clear, for example, why specifications of P as either P or ¬P do not get lexicalised by special illocutionary verbs. Obviously, the use of more general verbs covering acts of saying that P as well as such of saying that ¬P is an effect of a principle of lexical economy. But why should lexical economy be called for with respect to the lexicalisation of P as P or ¬P, while the lexicon is in fact highly diversified with respect to other types of specification of P? If lexical economy (or its opposite, lexical diversity) reflects what is considered to be relevant within a specific speech community, why should the specification of P as P or ¬P be considered irrelevant (or less highly relevant) while other types of specification of P seem to be highly relevant? Obviously, principles of lexical economy or relevance alone do not answer the question of why there are no special illocutionary verbs to refer to acts of saying that P or to such of saying that ¬P. It seems that the question may hardly be answered at all. While some patterns in the distribution of lexical gaps are obviously related to properties of corresponding speech acts, and others may not plausibly be explained at all, there is a third category of patterns which may be explained in terms of culture-specific, cognitive or pragmatic principles. To account for patterns 1, 3, 5 and 7, I have suggested the following explanations: 1. The scarcity of representatives with future reference in English, German and Dutch is likely to be due to the fact that future events themselves are not attributed much significance in English-, German- and Dutch-speaking communities. This may be different in speech communities which attach great importance to magic. Such communities may have developed vocabularies which are highly differentiated with respect to the possibilities of future refer-


ence. This means that the scarcity of representatives with future reference in English, German and Dutch may be due to culture-specific reasons. 2. If the basic level is indeed the most salient level of specificity from a cognitive point of view and if it is also the one which is most easily accessible as Rosch et al. claim (cf. Rosch et al. 1976), this may be the reason why hyponyms as well as hyperonyms of basic level verbs are often missing. Insofar as the Basic Level Principle is a cognitive principle, the occurrence of gaps on the levels of specificity below and above the basic level may have to be accounted for by cognitive principles. 3. As I have pointed out above, the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts seems to be governed by what may be called a “Principle of Costs and Benefits”. Costs and benefits were already claimed to be relevant to the lexicalisation of concepts of communication by Edmondson (cf. Section 2.2.3). Though Edmondson was right in assuming that costs and benefits affect the way in which concepts of communication get lexicalised (in English), his explanation of how costs and benefits affect lexicalisation was wrong. While Edmondson concluded that hearer-supportive behaviour tends to get lexicalised and speaker-supportive behaviour tends not to, costs and benefits turn out to affect lexicalisation in a completely different way. What is relevant to lexicalisation is not what is hearer- and what is speaker-supportive. Rather, costs and benefits affect lexicalisation to the extent that only speech act concepts involving costs as well as benefits get lexicalised. Directive and commissive speech acts involving only costs do not get lexicalised. The Principle of Costs and Benefits is a pragmatic principle. 4. Markedness effects have been observed within the classes of expressives, representatives like lie and verbs of communication lexicalising a particular mode of speaking. Like the Principle of Costs and Benefits, the Principle of Markedness is a pragmatic principle. The Principle of Markedness affects all types of expressives, representatives like lie and verbs of communication lexicalising a particular mode of speaking. The Principle of Costs and Benefits is relevant to all types of directives and commissives. To the extent that either of these principles affects a large number of verbs in many different verb classes, they are the most important principles governing the lexicalisation of concepts of communication. However, a comparison of these principles presents us with a serious problem: Speech acts involving a balance of costs and benefits may reasonably be argued to conform to social rules and may therefore be regarded as being unmarked. If this is true, only unmarked patterns of behaviour get lexicalised by directive and commissive predicates. This conclusion perfectly contradicts my earlier claim that marked patterns of behaviour


get lexicalised more often than such which are regarded as being unmarked. The Principle of Costs and Benefits and that of Markedness are in fact mutually incompatible. One consequence of the incompatibility of the Principle of Costs and Benefits with that of Markedness is that the two principles may not be ordered hierarchically. Since the two principles contradict each other, neither of them may be superordinate (or subordinate) to the other. Neither can there be a third principle superordinate to both. This also implies that the Principle of Cognitive Salience suggested by Verschueren does not offer a general explanation for why some concepts of communication get lexicalised while others do not. It simply makes the wrong predictions with respect to the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts. While the Principle of Markedness is not relevant to the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts, the Principle of Costs and Benefits does not affect the lexicalisation of concepts of expressive speech acts. As I have mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, different types of expressions require different conceptual systems for the description of their lexicalisation properties. Given that different types of speech act verbs correspond to different types of concepts, it is not surprising that the lexicalisation of different types of communication concepts is governed by different lexicalisation principles. The mutual incompatibility of the principles governing the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts on the one hand and concepts of expressive speech acts on the other shows that these two types of concepts are in fact completely different in nature.

chapter 4

Concepts of communication lexicalised by idioms and collocations

4.1

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have been concerned with gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. The fact that some concepts of communication are not lexicalised by verbs does not necessarily imply that these concepts are not lexicalised at all. It is possible in principle, for example, that concepts of communication not lexicalised by verbs are lexicalised by lexical items other than words. Specifically, some concepts of communication which are not lexicalised by verbs may be lexicalised by idioms and collocations of the category ‘VP’. If this were indeed the case, idioms and collocations would function as fillers of gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. This chapter deals with the lexicalisation properties of idioms and collocations used to refer to linguistic actions. Particularly, it will be concerned with the question of whether these complex communicative expressions lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs. Since the meaning of complex lexicalisations will be compared to that of simple ones, i.e. verbs, I shall only take into account idioms and collocations of the category ‘VP’. Complex lexicalisations, especially idiomatic expressions, have frequently been claimed to express speaker attitudes often also including an evaluation by the speaker using these expressions to describe a particular situation (cf. Černyševa 1984: 18; Dobrovol’skij 1988: 38–42; Kühn 1985: 42–44; Černyševa 1989: 44–45; Schindler 1993: 101–103; Nunberg, Sag & Wasow 1994: 493; Burger 1998: 185– 186; Pabst 2004: 81). However, the expression of speaker attitudes and evaluations is not an exclusive characteristic of idiomatic expressions: most speech act verbs lexicalise configurations of speaker attitudes, often also including an evaluation of the propositional content by the resource situation speaker, and many of them additionally express an evaluation by the discourse situation speaker. On the whole, speech act verbs may lexicalise one of the following four types of evaluations (cf. Harras & Proost 2005):


– Explicit evaluations by a resource situation speaker: Such evaluations are typically lexicalised by expressives. For example, verbs like praise (German loben, Dutch loven) lexicalise a positive and such like blame (German tadeln, Dutch berispen) a negative evaluation of P by a resource situation speaker. – Explicit evalutions by a discourse situation speaker: Examples are the evaluations lexicalised by verbs like boast (German angeben, Dutch opscheppen) and fib (German schwindeln, Dutch jokken). As I have shown in Chapter 1, boast lexicalises a positive evaluation by a resource situation speaker as well as a negative one by a discourse situation speaker. Specifically, a speaker choosing a verb like boast to describe an act of self-praise of a resource situation speaker indicates that he/she considers the resource situation speaker’s positive evaluation of P to be exaggerated. By contrast, a discourse situation speaker using a verb like fib to refer to an act of lying of a resource situation speaker indicates that he/she considers the resource situation speaker’s act of lying to be rather more innocent. – Implicit evaluations which have the status of lexical presuppositions: An example is the speaker’s presupposition lexicalised by warn (German warnen, Dutch waarschuwen) that P is not in the interest of H. Evaluations like this differ from those lexicalised by expressives like praise and criticise in that they are presupposed rather than supposed by a resource situation speaker. Because of this, I shall refer to them as “implicit” evaluations. The fact that evaluations like that lexicalised by warn survive under negation indicates that they have the status of genuine lexical presuppositions. – Implicit evaluations which do not have the status of lexical presuppositions: Such evaluations are lexicalised by verbs like request (German auffordern, Dutch vorderen) and promise (German versprechen, Dutch beloven). These verbs lexicalise the speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of S (request) or the speaker’s presupposition that P is in the interest of H (promise). Since these evaluations are presupposed rather than supposed by a resource situation speaker, they are implicit evaluations. Unlike the evaluation lexicalised by warn, the evaluations lexicalised by request and promise do not have the status of lexical presuppositions. Figure 1 shows the different types of evaluations which may be lexicalised by speech act verbs. Since simple as well as complex communicative expressions lexicalise evaluations, it is not clear whether there are any differences between the evaluations lexicalised by complex communicative expressions and those lexicalised by simple ones. I shall therefore also explore the question of whether the evaluations lexicalised by idioms, and possibly also collocations, differ from those lexicalised by verbs.

Chapter 4. Idioms and collocations 161

Figure 1. Types of evaluations lexicalised by speech act verbs (from Harras & Proost 2005: 324)

The application of Edmondson’s ordering system has shown so far that the two main types of complex lexicalisations, idioms and collocations, differ considerably with respect to the concepts they lexicalise. Edmondson’s ordering system represents situations referred to in directive, commissive, expressive and some representative acts by means of 32 combinations of values for five binary parameters (cf. Section 2.2.3). Though it fails to cover many speech act predicates (such as representatives), it also allows the classification of many other speech act verbs as well as collocations which may be used as synonyms of these. However, most idioms fail to be covered. In Chapter 2, I have interpreted this observation as an indication of the lexicalisation properties which distinguish idioms from collocations: idioms lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs, while collocations and verbs generally lexicalise identical concepts. Similar results have been obtained by the application of Harras’ ordering system for concepts of communication which was presented in Section 2.2.4. This ordering system was used in the Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben to represent the meaning of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication. In the Handbuch, German speech act verbs and verbs of communication are classified as belonging to paradigms of synonymous verbs. The Handbuch covers 696 German speech act verbs and verbs of communication (the different senses of a


verb having been counted separately). In its dictionary volume, complex lexicalisations do not occur as headwords but are listed as synonyms of verbs. Since most German collocations referring to linguistic actions may be used as synonyms (on the conceptual level of meaning) of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, they are classified as belonging to the semantic fields constituted by these verbs. However, there is a large number of German idioms whose meaning cannot be described by means of the conceptual system used. The combinations of values lexicalised by verbs do not cover the conceptual component of the meaning of many idioms. This result confirms that obtained by the application of Edmondson’s ordering system: many idioms lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs. If idioms lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs, what types of concepts do they lexicalise? Do idioms really lexicalise concepts which are more complex than those lexicalised by single words as Fellbaum suggests (cf. Fellbaum 1998: 56–57), or do they lexicalise different types of concepts, the level of complexity of these being the same? The concepts lexicalised by idioms may consist, for example, of components entirely different from those which are part of the concepts lexicalised by verbs. Alternatively, they may consist of different combinations of the same conceptual components. Differences like these would not necessarily affect the level of complexity of these concepts. Before answering these questions, I shall deal with another more basic one: if idioms, and possibly also a small number of collocations, lexicalise concepts different from those lexicalised by verbs, may these idioms and collocations be regarded as fillers of lexical gaps? Obviously, idioms and collocations may be regarded as fillers of gaps in the word inventory only if their lexical status, the position they occupy as elements of the lexicon, is more or less comparable to that of words. This means that the lexicalisation properties of idioms and collocations may only be dealt with if it is clear that these word combinations are indeed elements of the lexicon and how their lexical status differs from that of words.

4.2

The lexical status of complex lexicalisations

Communicative expressions like blow one’s own trumpet and give/make someone a promise are combinations of words commonly referred to as “phraseological units” (cf. Weinreich 1969), “fixed expressions” (cf. Alexander 1987), “word combinations” (cf. Cowie 1998), “multiword expressions” (cf. Fernando 1996), “phrasal lexemes” (cf. Moon 2001) or “phrasemes” (cf. Mel’čuk 2001). I prefer the terms “phraseological units”, “phrasal lexemes” and “phrasemes” over “fixed expressions”, “multiword expressions” and “word combinations”: the term “fixed


expressions” does not express that the expressions in question consist of more than one word, while “multiword expressions” and “word combinations” do not reflect the fact that the expressions referred to are elements of the lexicon. In what follows, I shall use the term “phrasemes” as a cover term referring to all types of lexical units which consist of more than one word. My usage of the term “phrasemes” parallels that of the German term “Phraseologismen”, which is now being widely used in German literature on phraseology as a general term referring to phraseological units of different types (cf. Gläser 1986; Fleischer 1997; Burger 1998). Following Verschueren, I shall also sometimes use the term “complex lexicalisations” to set phrasemes explicitly apart from “simple lexicalisations”, i.e. words (cf. Verschueren 1985: 30–31). Phrasemes are commonly defined as word combinations whose morpho-syntactic and lexical structure may be varied only within definable limits (Burger 1998: 22–23; Dobrovol’skij 1995: 38–39; Fernando 1996: 43–45; Cowie, Mackin & McCaig 1996: xxii–xxiii; Gläser 1986: 20; Cowie 1998: 674). Free combinations of words (phrases, clauses and sentences) differ from phrasemes in that they allow any structural changes as long as these do not violate the rules of grammar. Word combinations whose structure may be varied in accordance with grammatical rules are referred to as being “compositional”. Such whose structural variability is subject not only to grammatical rules but also to additional, specifically phraseological constraints are called “structurally stable” or “non-compositional”. Structural stability is characteristic of all phrasemes. Idioms as well as collocations are word combinations whose morpho-syntactic and lexical structure is more or less invariable. Idioms differ from collocations in that they are non-compositional not only with respect to their morpho-syntactic and lexical structure but also regarding their meaning (cf. Dobrovol’skij 1995: 19–20). Since idioms are both formally and semantically non-compositional, their degree of non-compositionality or stability is higher than that of collocations, which are formally but not semantically non-compositional. Idioms are not all equally idiomatic. Some contain components which preserve their lexical meaning, namely the meaning they have when they occur in isolation. Idioms containing such components are often referred to as “semi-literal idioms” or “semi-idioms” (cf. Fernando 1996: 70; Burger 1998: 37–38). Examples are promise the moon and lie through/in one’s teeth. Word combinations like cry one’s eyes out and scare the daylights out of somebody, which Jackendoff considers to be idiomatic specialisations of the resultative construction (cf. Jackendoff 1995: 153–156), may also be regarded as semi-idioms. Their degree of idiomaticity is comparable to that of phrasemes like (as) cool as a cucumber, promise the moon and lie through/in one’s teeth (cf. Figure 2 below). Idioms which do not contain components which preserve their lexical meaning are referred to as being “fully


Figure 2. Degree of non-compositionality (stability) of words, idioms, collocations and free combinations of words

idiomatic” (cf. Fleischer 1997: 68–69) or “non-literal” (cf. Fernando 1996: 32). Alternatively, they are simply called “idioms” (cf. Burger 1998: 38). Examples of fully idiomatic idioms include spill the beans and kick the bucket. Semi-idioms differ from idioms which are fully idiomatic in that they contain at least one component whose lexical meaning contributes to the meaning of the idiom as a whole. Because of this, semi-idioms are always compositional to a certain degree. They are less idiomatic than fully idiomatic idioms. Fully idiomatic idioms which are decomposable may also be considered to be compositional. Idioms are decomposable (and hence compositional) if their meaning may be described by a paraphrase in which parts of the idiom’s lexical structure correspond to parts of its meaning (cf. Nunberg, Sag & Wasow 1994; Dobrovol’skij 2000). Fully idiomatic idioms like spill the beans and let the cat out of the bag are decomposable while such like kick the bucket, chew the fat and bite the dust are not. Since the degree of compositionality of decomposable idioms is higher than that of non-decomposable idioms, the former are slightly less idio matic than the latter (cf. Figure 2). Unlike phrasemes, words may be compositional only with respect to their morphological structure. They may be regarded as being compositional when they are morphologically complex. However, words are neither syntactically nor lexically variable. Syntactic operations such as passivisation and topicalisation apply to sentences but not internally to words. They do not break up the internal structure of words as they break up that of sentences. Words are the most stable units of the lexicon. On the scale of non-compositionality, they occupy a position opposite that of free combinations of words. Phrasemes are more stable than free combinations of words but less stable than words. On the scale of non-


compositionality, they are therefore situated in between the former and the latter. Collocations occupy a position close to free combinations of words, while idioms are situated in between collocations and words. Figure 2 shows the degree of non-compositionality or stability of words, phrasemes and free combinations of words. In this section, I have shown that different types of phrasemes differ with respect to their degree of non-compositionality. The degree of structural and/or semantic non-compositionality of a phraseme determines the lexical status of that phraseme. The lexical status of phrasemes is relevant to the question of whether these expressions may fill gaps in the inventory of words. Clearly, phrasemes may be considered to fill such gaps only if their lexical status is similar to that of words. Since the degree of non-compositionality of idioms is higher than that of collocations, idioms are more akin to words than collocations with respect to their lexical status. Because of this, idioms rather than collocations may be regarded as fillers of gaps in the word inventory. The next section will be concerned with the differences in meaning between simple and complex communicative expressions. I shall first focus on the question of whether idioms, and possibly also collocations, fill gaps on the conceptual and/or lexical level of the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication.

4.3

The lexicalisation properties of idioms and collocations: An empirical investigation

To investigate the lexicalisation properties of complex communicative expressions, I used the German data I gathered as a part of my work on the project “Tendenzen der Lexikalisierung kommunikativer Konzepte”. Within the framework of this project, I carried out a systematic study of the semantic differences between simple and complex communicative expressions. The study focused on the question of whether idioms and collocations lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs. As I have shown in Section 2.2.4, the conceptual level of the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication may be represented by means of combinations of values for the attributes of the aspects ‘propositional content’, ‘propositional attitude’, ‘speaker intention’ and ‘speaker presuppositions’. Verbs which lexicalise the same combinations of values constitute a lexical field. Where speech act-related idioms and collocations could be classified as elements of the fields constituted by verbs, I concluded that the relevant phrasemes, being synyonyms of verbs, lexicalise the same concepts as these. Where idioms and collocations proved to lack one-word synonyms and hence could not be classified as belonging to verb fields, I expanded the concep-


tual system used to describe the meaning of verbs by those parameters necessary to describe that of complex communicative expressions. These parameters served as an indication of the types of communication concepts which get lexicalised by idioms and collocations rather than by verbs. When analysed in this way, German idioms and collocations lacking one-word synonyms appeared to constitute three idiom-specific lexical fields corresponding to three basic types of concepts (cf. Proost 2006a: 67–86). In the remainder of this chapter, I shall be concerned with the question of whether complex communicative expressions lexicalise the same basic types of concepts in English and in Dutch. As the empirical basis of my study, I used a corpus comprising 676 German idioms and collocations used to refer to communicative acts. These are listed in Appendix II of this study. The relevant idioms and collocations were taken from the Duden idiom dictionary (Duden 11: Duden Redewendungen und sprichwörtliche Redensarten). Where complex lexicalisations turned out to be missing from this dictionary, I added some which I encountered elsewhere, not taking into account the following types of expressions: – Expressions which are becoming outdated. Examples are jemanden in den Himmel heben (‘to heave somebody into heaven’, meaning: ‘to excessively praise somebody’) and (mit jemandem) (über etwas) zu Rate sitzen (‘to sit at council (with somebody) (on something)’, meaning ‘to confer (on/upon something) (with somebody)’). – Expressions which are not used primarily to refer to communicative acts. Examples include ein Gewese von etwas machen (the German equivalent of make a fuss about something), jemanden vom rechten Weg abbringen (‘bring somebody off the right track’, meaning ‘to lead somebody astray from the straight and narrow’), ins Fettnäpfchen treten (‘to step into the grease pot’, corresponding to English put one’s foot in it). ein Gewese von etwas machen is used at the same time to refer to a particular psychological state (‘consider something to be very important’) and the linguistic expression of that state. The idiom jemanden vom rechten Weg abbringen is used to describe a whole chain of linguistic as well as non-linguistic actions, and ins Fettnäpchen treten lexicalises the result of any type of linguistic action. Expressions like these are not specified with respect to the type of linguistic action they are used to refer to. – Idioms and collocations expressing a disposition. Examples are auswärts reden/sprechen (‘talk ouside’, meaning ‘talk a foreign language fluently’) and eine große Klappe haben (‘have a big trap’, meaning ‘have a big mouth/be a bigmouth’). These idioms do not refer to linguistic actions but to aspects of a person’s character which manifest themselves in that person’s linguistic actions.


The phrasemes which were part of the corpus were classified as being collocations, idioms or semi-idioms on the basis of the criteria introduced in Section 4.2. The presence or absence of unique elements was used as an additional criterion to distinguish idioms from collocations. Since unique elements occur only as parts of phrasemes, their meaning is always bound to that of the phraseme of which they are a part. Unique elements do not have a lexical meaning of their own, because they do not occur in isolation. Consequently, the meaning of phrasemes containing unique elements is not composed of the lexical meanings of these phrasemes’ components. They contain at least one component (the unique element) which does not contribute with its lexical meaning to the meaning of the whole. The presence of unique elements increases the degree of semantic non-compositionality (or idiomaticity) of a phraseme. Examples of German phrasemes containing unique elements are jemanden in die Irre führen/leiten (‘lead somebody onto the wrong track’, meaning ‘lead somebody astray’) and jemanden in Verruf bringen (‘bring somebody into discredit’, meaning ‘discredit somebody’). The nouns Irre and Verruf are unique elements, because their occurrence is restricted to these and a few other phrasemes. Since these nouns increase the degree of idiomaticity of the phrasemes of which they are a part, jmdn. in die Irre führen/leiten and jmdn. in Verruf bringen were classified as idioms rather than as collocations. In the corpus, phrasemes with lexicalised variants were counted as only one phraseme. Thus, jemanden auf den Zahn/Puls fühlen (‘feel somebody on the tooth/ pulse’, meaning either ‘to pump’ or ‘to examine’ in the sense of ‘test somebody’s knowledge or skill’) was regarded as only one (polysemous) idiom rather than as two different ones. Likewise, jemandem zureden wie einem lahmen Gaul/einem kranken Schimmel/einem kranken Pferd/einem kranken Ross/einem kranken Kind (‘to talk to somebody as to a lame nag/a sick white horse/a sick horse/a sick steed/ a sick child’ meaning ‘to beg (somebody) (to do something)’) was counted as one idiom rather than as five different ones. Complex lexicalisations with more than one speech act related sense were counted as often as they had different senses. The idiom jemandem auf den Zahn/ Puls fühlen, for example, was counted twice, because it may be used not only as a directive of the type ‘pump’ but also as a directive of the type ‘examine’. The corpus of German idioms and collocations contains 17 expressions with two speech act related senses and one (eine Verpflichtung eingehen) with three such senses. eine Verpflichtung eingehen (‘enter into an obligation’), may be used as a synonym of promise, guarantee and vow, which are three different types of commissive verbs. 639 expressions were either monosemous or had only one speech act related sense. Since expressions with two or three readings were counted twice or thrice, the corpus contains a total number of 676 complex lexicalisations. Of these, 474 are idioms; the remaining 202 are collocations. Of the total number of the 474 idioms


Figure 3. Corpus of German phrasemes: Proportion of fully idiomatic expressions, semi-idioms and collocations

considered, 402 are fully idiomatic expressions, while 72 are semi-idioms. This means that collocations represented 29.9%, fully idiomatic expressions 59.5% and semi-idioms 10.6% of the 676 complex lexicalisations considered (cf. Figure 3). In my study of the meaning of complex vs. simple lexicalisations, I consider mainly German data. This is due to the fact that the meaning of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication has already systematically been described in the Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben. In the Handbuch, the meaning of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication is described against the background of a system showing the relations among concepts of communication as well as those between concepts and verbs. Since the Handbuch includes a close to exhaustive inventory of verb-concept relations, it provides an ideal basis for a comparison of the meaning of complex and simple lexicalisations. A similar representation of the relations between communicative expressions and concepts of communication was not at my disposal for either English or Dutch. Existing publications dealing with the meaning of English and/or Dutch speech act verbs and verbs of communication are either not concerned with verb-concept relations (e.g. Ballmer & Brennenstuhl 1981; Vanderveken 1990) or do not represent a complete list of these (e.g. Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976; Verschueren 1980). For this reason, a systematic comparison of the meaning of complex and simple lexicalisations could be achieved more easily for German than for English or Dutch. In the next section, I shall first show to what extent German idioms and collocations may be classified as belonging to the fields of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Where I discuss single lexical fields of German, I shall compare these with the corresponding lexical fields in English and Dutch.


4.4

Idioms and collocations with one-word synonyms

4.4.1

Idioms and collocations as synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication

Of the 676 complex lexicalisations which were part of the corpus, 441 (i.e. 65.2%) have one-word synonyms. These complex lexicalisations could be classified as belonging to the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. This means that 65.2% of the complex lexicalisations considered may be used as synonyms of simple lexicalisations. Most of the complex lexicalisations which could be classified as belonging to the fields of speech act verbs or verbs of communication are synonyms of these on the conceptual as well as the lexical level of meaning. This is true, for example, of the idioms and collocations in (1), which may be used as synonyms of verbs like mitteilen (Engl. communicate), informieren (Engl. inform) and sagen (Engl. say or tell in the relevant sense of ‘inform’). (In the examples below, ‘COLL’ stands for ‘collocation’, ‘I’ for ‘fully idiomatic expressions’, ‘SI’ for ‘semi-idiom’ and ‘Utt(P)’ for ‘utterance with propositional content P’.) (1) Synonyms of mitteilen, informieren, sagen etc. (meaning: ‘to utter one or more Utt(P) to make H know P’) – (jmdm.) Bescheid sagen (COLL) – jmdn. über etwas ins Bild setzen (I) – jmdn. von etwas in Kenntnis setzen (COLL) – jmdm. etwas zur Kenntnis bringen (COLL) – jmdm. ein Licht aufstecken (I) – jmdn. schlau machen (I) – jmdn. etwas wissen lassen (COLL)

Representatives like mitteilen are used to refer to situations in which a speaker who knows P and assumes that H does not know P makes an utterance with the intention of making H know P. Since these speaker attitudes are part of the situation referred to by verbs like mitteilen, they are also elements of the conceptual part of the meaning of these verbs. The same type of situation may also be referred to by the complex lexicalisations in (1). Figure 4 below represents the conceptual part of the meaning of verbs like inform/informieren/meedelen and their simple and complex synonyms in English, German and Dutch. VP-phrasemes may also be used as synonyms of verbs like versprechen (Engl.: promise), schwören (Engl.: swear) and geloben (Engl. vow, pledge), cf. examples (2)–(4):


Figure 4. Conceptual part of the meaning of inform/informieren/meedelen

(2) Synonyms of versprechen (meaning: ‘to utter one or more Utt(P) in order to make H recognise that S intends to do P; P is in the interest of H’): – (jmdm.) ein Versprechen geben (COLL) – (jmdm.) sein Wort/Ehrenwort geben (COLL) – jmdm. etwas in Aussicht stellen (COLL) – eine Verpflichtung eingehen (COLL) – eine Zusicherung machen/geben (COLL) (3) Synonyms of schwören (meaning: ‘to emphatically utter one or more Utt(P) in order to make H recognise that S intends to do P; P is in the interest of H’): – (jmdm.) etwas hoch und heilig versprechen (SI) (4) Synonyms of geloben (meaning: ‘to make one or more binding Utt(P) in order to make H recognise that S intends to do P; P is in the interest of H’): – ein Gelöbnis ablegen (COLL)

Both simple lexicalisations like versprechen, schwören and geloben and their simple and complex synonyms in German, English and Dutch are used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that he intends to do something which he considers to be in the interest of that hearer. The situation referred to by verbs like promise may be represented as follows:



want (S (do, P)) want (S (recognise (H (Att (S,P))))) in the interest of H (P)

  

This combination of speaker attitudes represents the common core of the conceptual part of the meaning of versprechen, schwören and geloben and their simple and complex synonyms. However, the simple and complex lexicalisations of the promise-field differ with respect to the conceptual and lexical level of their meaning. German schwören and jmdm. etwas hoch und heilig versprechen, English swear and Dutch zweren, een dure eed zweren and iets op zijn erewoord verzekeren lexicalise a higher degree of intensity than promise. Whether a speaker promising a hearer to do something (P) has a stronger or weaker intention to do P is a matter of interpretation by the discourse situation speaker; there is no element of the resource situation which enables us to judge an act of promising as being more or less intense. I therefore consider the higher degree of intensity expressed by expressions like swear to be an element of the lexical part of the meaning of these verbs. German geloben and ein Gelöbnis ablegen, English vow and pledge and Dutch een gelofte afleggen are used to refer to situations in which a speaker makes a binding promise within an institutional setting. Since the latter is part of the situation referred to (the resource situation), it is an element of the conceptual part of the meaning of expressions like vow and pledge. By contrast, the assessment of a promise as being binding or not is a matter of interpretation. It is an element of the discourse situation and hence belongs to the lexical part of the meaning of verbs like vow and pledge. Figure 5 below shows the similarities and differences among the simple and complex lexicalisations of the promise-field. The complex lexicalisations which may be used as synonyms of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication are not distributed evenly across all verb fields. Rather, they occur much more frequently in some fields than in others. Idioms and collocations also differ considerably with respect to their frequency of occurrence in the fields of simple lexicalisations. These differences will be discussed in the next sections.

4.4.2

Idioms vs. collocations

A total of 183 collocations have one-word synonyms and could therefore be classified as belonging to the fields of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication. They represent 90.6% of the total number of 202 collocations which were taken into account. By contrast, only 54.4% (258 out of 474) of the total number of idioms (fully idiomatic expressions and semi-idioms) appeared to be classifiable as belonging to verb fields. Semi-idioms occurred even less frequently


Figure 5. Conceptual and lexical part of the meaning of promise/versprechen/beloven

as synonyms of verbs than did fully idiomatic expressions: Only 27.8% of them (20 out of 72) could be classified as belonging to verb fields, while 59.2% of the fully idiomatic expressions (238 out of 402) could be classified in that way. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the different types of complex lexicalisations across the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication.


Figure 6. Distribution of different types of complex lexicalisations within and outside the fields of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication

The distribution of collocations and idioms across the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication shows the following pattern: Lexicalisation Pattern I (Idioms vs. Collocations) Collocations mostly lexicalise the same concepts of communication as speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Idioms often lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs.

The fact that collocations basically lexicalise the same concepts of communication as verbs does not necessarily imply that collocations and their corresponding verbs are semantic duplicates. Collocations often differ from their corresponding verbs not only with respect to their event-structural properties (cf. Glatz 2006) but also in that they often allow alternations of number and/or passivisation (cf. Pabst 2004). The distribution of collocations across the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication merely indicates that the semantic differences between collocations and their corresponding verbs do not concern the concepts lexicalised by these expressions. My comparison of the much smaller set of German, English and Dutch data presented in Chapter 2 suggests that lexicalisation pattern I also holds for English and Dutch.

4.4.3

Proportion of idioms and collocations in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication

Different lexical fields show different proportions of idioms and collocations. While the proportion of idioms and collocations is more or less balanced in the fields of verbs of communication (47.1% collocations vs. 52.9% idioms), the fields


of speech act verbs contain more idioms than collocations (40.4% collocations vs. 59.6% idioms). Thus, the proportion of idioms is higher in the fields of verbs which lexicalise speaker attitudes than in those of verbs which are not specified with respect to speaker attitudes. Since the fields of verbs of communication contain fewer complex lexicalisations than those of speech act verbs (70 and 371 respectively), the absolute number of idioms and collocations belonging to the fields of verbs of communication is relatively small: The corpus of German idioms and collocations contains 37 idioms (fully idiomatic expressions as well as semi-idioms) and 33 collocations which are part of the fields of verbs of communication. This means that idioms do not necessarily lexicalise speaker attitudes, although they often do. This finding is at odds with the wide-spread assumption that idioms typically express speaker attitudes (Černyševa 1984: 18; Kühn 1985: 42–44; Dobrovol’skij 1988: 39–43; Černyševa 1989: 44–45; Schindler 1993: 101–103; Nunberg, Sag & Wasow 1994: 493 and Burger 1998: 185–186). Examples of idioms and collocations which are synonyms of verbs of communication are those listed in (5a)–(9a) below. These German idioms and collocations lexicalise the same concepts of communication as do their one-word synonyms erwähnen (English mention), hervorheben (English emphasise), unterbrechen (English interrupt), telefonieren (English phone) and anrufen (English phone up). Apart from lexicalising the same concepts as their one-word counterparts, these idioms and collocations are identical with their one-word synonyms on the lexical level of meaning. Consequently, the idioms and collocations in (5a)–(9a) are synonyms of their one-word counterparts on the conceptual as well as the lexical level of meaning. erwähnen, hervorheben and unterbrechen lexicalise specific aspects of conversational structure, while telefonieren and anrufen lexicalise a particular means of communication. (5) a.

Synonyms of erwähnen (English mention) – die Sprache auf etwas bringen (I) – etwas ins Feld führen (I) – etwas in den Raum stellen (I) – etwas zur Sprache bringen (I) – etwas aufs Tapet/Trapez bringen (I) – etwas einfließen lassen (COLL)

(6) a. Synonyms of hervorheben (English stress, emphasise) – etwas ins Blickfeld rücken (I) – einer Sache Nachdruck verleihen (COLL) (7) a. Synonyms of unterbrechen (English interrupt) – jmdm. über den Mund fahren (I)


– jmdm. ins Wort/in die Rede fallen (I) – jmdm. das Wort/die Rede abschneiden (I)

(8) a.

Synonyms of telefonieren (English phone) – an der Strippe hängen (I) – am Telefon hängen (SI) – jmdn. an der Strippe haben (I)

(9) a. Synonyms of anrufen (English phone up) – sich an die Strippe hängen (I) – sich ans Telefon hängen (TI)

Like German idioms, idioms in English and Dutch may but need not lexicalise speaker attitudes. The German idioms in (5a)–(9a) all have English and Dutch equivalents. These are listed in (5b)–(9b) and in (5c)–(9c) below. (5) b. Synonyms of mention – make mention of sth. (COLL) – make reference to sth. (COLL) (6) b. Synonyms of emphasise – to put/lay/place emphasis/stress on sth. (COLL) (7) b. Synonyms of interrupt – cut sb. short (I) (8) b. Synonyms of phone – be hanging on the line (I) (9) b. Synonyms of phone up – give sb. a ring/tinkle (COLL) – make a call (COLL) (5) c.

Synonyms of vermelden (English mention) – gewag van iets maken (I) – iets ter sprake/te berde brengen (I) – iets op het tapijt brengen (I) – iets in het midden brengen (I) – melding van iets maken (COLL)

(6) c. (7) c.

Synonyms of benadrukken (English emphasise) – de nadruk/klemtoon op iets leggen (COLL) Synonyms of onderbreken (English interrupt) – iem. in de rede vallen (I)

(8) c. Synonyms of telefoneren (English phone) – iem. aan de lijn hebben (I) – aan de telefoon hangen (I)


(9) c. Synonyms of opbellen (English phone up) – iem. een telefoontje geven (COLL)

4.4.4

Proportion of idioms and collocations in the main classes of speech act verbs

The distribution of idioms and collocations across the fields of German speech act verbs has also shown that the proportion of idioms and collocations is different in the five main classes of speech act verbs (representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives). Declaratives The classes of declarative predicates show the most salient disproportion of idioms and collocations. Thirty out of the 34 complex lexicalisations which could be classified as belonging to these classes are collocations. Collocations represent 88.2% and idioms only 11.8% of the complex lexicalisations occurring inside the fields of declarative verbs. The disproportion of idioms and collocations in these fields may be due to properties of the situations referred to by declarative verbs. Declaratives are used to refer to situations in which a particular institutional fact is brought about by a speaker who has the authority to do so, because he is a representative of a particular institution. This type of situation does not involve any particular speaker attitudes, except of course the speaker’s intention to bring about a particular institutional fact. The observation that idioms are only rarely used to refer to this kind of situation appears to confirm the view that they typically express speaker attitudes. However, as I have shown in the previous section, this wide-spread view about the meaning of idioms is not confirmed by the pattern of occurrence of complex lexicalisations in the fields of verbs of communication, which contain many more idioms than collocations. This suggests that idioms do not necessarily express speaker attitudes, even if many of them do. I shall come back to this issue below. Directives & commissives The classes of directive verbs also contain many more collocations than idioms, but the disproportion between them is not as salient as it is in the classes of declarative verbs. 69 of the complex lexicalisations which may be classified as belonging to these classes are collocations. They represent 72.6% of the 95 complex lexicalisations occurring in the fields of directive speech act verbs. The remaining 26 expressions are all fully idiomatic expressions and represent 27.4% of the total number of complex lexicalisations occurring in these fields. The corpus contained


no semi-idioms which might have been classified as belonging to the classes of directive speech act verbs. The idioms and collocations occurring in the different classes of directive speech act verbs are distributed homogeneously across these verb classes. In none of these were they either under- or over-represented. Idioms and collocations are relatively rare in the classes of commissive verbs. The proportion of idioms and collocations is balanced in these fields. Idioms and collocations each represent exactly 50% of the 44 complex lexicalisations occurring in these fields. On the whole, the pattern of occurrence of idioms and collocations in the fields of directive and commissive verbs suggests that speaker attitudes concerning a future action of H are more often lexicalised by collocations than by idioms, while speaker attitudes concerning a future action of S are lexicalised by collocations as often as by idioms. Representatives Seventy of the complex lexicalisations which were part of the German corpus could be classified as belonging to the classes of representative speech act verbs. Only 19 of these (27.1%) are collocations. The remaining 72.9% are either fully idiomatic expressions or semi-idioms. Additionally, idioms are not distributed homogeneously across the different classes of representative verbs. They are particularly frequent in the field containing verbs like lügen (English lie), flunkern and schwindeln (both corresponding to English fib). These verbs are used to refer to situations in which a speaker who does not take P to be true and assumes that H does not know P utters one or more Utt(P) with the intention that H take P to be true. Situations like these may be referred to not only by verbs like lügen, flunkern and schwindeln, but also by a large number of fully idiomatic or semi-idiomatic expressions, many of which lexicalise a higher degree of insincerity than lügen, cf. examples (10a)–(11a): (10) a.

Synonyms of lügen: – jmdm. einen Bären aufbinden (I) – jmdn. über den Löffel barbieren/balbieren (I) – jmdm. blauen Dunst/ein X für ein U vormachen (I) – einen vom Pferd/vom Wald erzählen (I) – einen Türken bauen (I)

(11) a.

lügen + Intensification: – das Blaue vom Himmel lügen (SI) – jmdm. die Hucke/Jacke voll lügen (SI) – lügen, dass sich die Balken biegen (SI) – lügen wie gedruckt (SI)


Idioms which may be used as synonyms of (to) lie also exist in English and in Dutch, but there are not so many of them in these languages as in German. This suggests that the abundance of idioms used as synonyms of lie may well be a peculiarity of German. The English and Dutch counterparts of the expressions in (10a) and (11a) are listed in (10b)–(11c) below: (10) b. Synonyms of lie: ∅ (tell sb. a lie is a collocation) (11) b. lie + Intensification: – lie one’s head off (I) (10) c. Synonyms of liegen (English lie): – iem. iets op de mouw spelden (I) (11) c. liegen + Intensification: – liegen alsof het gedrukt staat (SI) – liegen dat men barst/dat men het zelf gelooft/dat men zwart ziet (SI)

Expressives The classes of expressive speech act verbs contain even more idioms and consequently also less collocations than those of representative verbs. Idioms represent 92.2% of the total number of 128 complex lexicalisations which may be used as synonyms (on the conceptual level of meaning) of expressive speech act verbs. Only 10 of them (7.8%) are collocations. The distribution of idioms in these fields is also highly irregular, with idioms clustering mainly in a few classes of expressives lexicalising negative evaluations. The class of expressions containing verbs like vorwerfen, vorhalten (both English reproach) and zurechtweisen (English reprimand), for example, includes 49 idioms and 2 collocations. Verbs like vorwerfen, vorhalten and zurechtweisen are used to refer to situations in which a speaker evaluates a past action of a hearer negatively. These situations may also be referred to by the idioms in (12a) which were selected from the 49 idioms occurring in these fields: (12) a.

Synonyms of vorwerfen, vorhalten and zurechtweisen: – jmdm. etw. aufs Brot/Butterbrot schmieren/streichen (I) – jmdn. zur Brust nehmen (I) – jmdm. auf die Finger klopfen (I) – jmdm. die Flötentöne beibringen (I) – jmdm. eine Gardinenpredigt/Standpauke halten (I) – jmdn. ins Gebet nehmen (I) – jmdm. etw. an den Kopf werfen (I) – jmdm. den Kopf waschen (I)


– jmdm. etw. unter die Nase reiben (I) – jmdm. ein paar Takte sagen/erzählen (I) …

Idioms also cluster in the fields of resultative verbs expressing a negative evaluation. These verbs are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses a negative evaluation of a past action or quality of the hearer in order to damage that hearer’s social prestige. In German, such situations may be referred to not only by verbs such as diffamieren (English defame), diskreditieren (English discredit) and verunglimpfen (English slander), but also by the idioms in (13a): (13) a.

Synonyms of diffamieren, diskreditieren etc.: – jmdn. ins Gerede/in Misskredit/Verruf bringen (I) – jmdn./etw. in den Kot/Dreck ziehen/treten (I) – jmdn. mit Kot/Dreck/Schmutz bewerfen/besudeln (I) – jmdn. schlecht/madig machen (I) – jmdn./etw. durch die Scheiße/den Staub ziehen/zerren (I) – jmdn. /etw. in den Schmutz/Staub zerren/ziehen/treten (I) – jmdm. etw. ans Zeug flicken (I)

Idioms finally cluster in the class of verbs like angeben (English boast), which lexicalise both a positive evaluation by a resource situation speaker and a negative one by a discourse situation speaker (cf. Chapter 1). Such a combination of evaluations is lexicalised not only by angeben and its synonyms prahlen, protzen and aufschneiden, but also by the idioms in (14a): (14) a.

Synonyms of angeben, prahlen, protzen, aufschneiden: – sich in die Brust werfen (I) – angeben wie ein Wald voll Affen/eine Tüte Mücken (SI) – (sich) (mit etw.) dick(e) tun/sich (mit etw.) dick(e) machen (I) – kräftig/mächtig ins Horn stoßen (I) – (kräftig) in die Trompete stoßen (I) – dicke/große Töne reden/sprechen/spucken (I) – große Sprüche machen/klopfen (I) – große Reden schwingen/führen (I) – den Mund (zu) voll nehmen (I) – eine Stange angeben (SI)

On the whole, the large majority of the idioms occurring inside the fields of expressive speech act verbs (79 out of 118, i.e. 66.9%) cluster in the fields of expressives like vorwerfen (reproach), in those of resultative expressives like diffamieren (defame) and in those of expressives like angeben (boast). The remaining 39 idioms


are distributed more or less evenly across the fields of other expressives lexicalising a negative evaluation (e.g. meckern and tadeln; English grumble and reprimand respectively), those of expressives lexicalising a positive evaluation (e.g. loben and befürworten; English praise and advocate respectively) and those of expressives lexicalising emotions such as anger (e.g. schimpfen; English scold) or sorrow (e.g. klagen; English complain). Each of these fields contain only a few idioms. Idioms which may be used as synonyms of vorwerfen, diffamieren and angeben are less frequent in English and Dutch than in German. This suggests that the abundance of idioms in the lexical fields containing these verbs may well be typical of German when compared to the other two languages. The English and Dutch counterparts of vorwerfen, diffamieren and angeben are listed in (12b)–(14c): (12) b.

Synonyms of reproach, tell off etc. – give sb. the (rough) edge of one’s tongue (I) – give sb. a piece of one’s mind (I) – haul sb. over the coals (I) – take sb. to task (I) – give sb. a talking-to/telling-off/dressing-down (COLL)

(13) b.

Synonyms of defame, discredit, slander – drag sb./sb’s name through the mud/the muck/the mire (I) – sling/throw/fling mud/dirt at sb. (I) – blacken sb’s name/character (I) – bring sb. into discredit/disrepute (COLL)

(14) b. Synonyms of boast/brag/show off – blow one’s own trumpet (I) – give oneself airs (I) (12) c.

Synonyms of verwijten, terechtwijzen etc. (English reproach, tell off) – iem. op zijn flikker/mieter/donder geven (I) – iem. een (flinke) uitbrander geven (I) – iem. onder handen nemen (I) – iem. hard vallen over iets (I) – iem. iets naar het hoofd slingeren (I) – iem op zijn kop/lazer geven (I) – iem de les spellen (I) – iem. de wetten lezen (I) – iem. zijn vet geven (I) – iem. op de vingers tikken (I) – het vingertje opheffen tegen iem. (I) – iem. iets voor de voeten werpen (I) – een hartig/ernstig/stevig woordje met iem. spreken (I)


– iem. iets onder de neus wrijven (I) – iem. op zijn nummer zetten (I) – iem. de oren wassen (I) – iem. tot de orde roepen (I)

(13) c.

Synonyms of belasteren, kwaadspreken (English defame, slander) – iem. in een kwaad daglicht stellen (I) – met modder/rotte eieren/vuil gooien (I) – iem./iemands naam door de modder sleuren (I) – iem./iemands naam door het slijk halen (I)

(14) c.

Synonyms of opscheppen etc. (English boast) – een hoge borst opzetten (I) – de borst hoogdragen (I) – zich op de borts slaan/kloppen (I) – dik/duur doen (I)

Idioms do not occur at all in the lexical fields containing expressives like gratulieren (English congratulate) and danken (English thank). These are used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his joy about a state of affairs or event concerning H (gratulieren) or about something which H has done for S (danken) in order to be socially regarded as someone who is glad of the positive effects arising from P to H (gratulieren) or S (danken). In doing so, S complies with a social convention or obligation. Idioms are also lacking from the lexical field containing the verb kondolieren (English condole) and from that containing the verbs grüßen and begrüßen (English greet and welcome respectively). kondolieren is used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his regret about P in order to be socially regarded as someone who sympathises with H. In doing so, S fulfils a social obligation. grüßen and begrüßen are used to refer to a social ritual in which a speaker utters to a hearer that he takes notice of and socially acknowledges that hearer’s presence. On the whole, idioms are completely lacking from the fields of verbs which are used to refer to social conventions or rituals. Figure 7 below summarises the patterns of occurrence of idioms and collocations in the lexical fields of the main types of speech act verbs. The distribution of idioms and collocations within the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication shows that some of the common views about the meaning of these expressions have to be modified: – The pattern of occurrence of idioms and collocations in the fields of the five main types of speech act verbs confirms the view that idioms typically lexicalise speaker attitudes. Obviously, idioms which may be used as synonyms of speech act verbs lexicalise the same speaker attitudes as their one-word syn-


Figure 7. Distribution of idioms and collocations in the fields of the five main types of German speech act verbs

onyms. Idioms rarely occur in the fields of declaratives and those of expressives like greet, congratulate, thank and condole. Collocations are much more frequent than idioms in these fields. Declaratives do not lexicalise speaker attitudes other than the speaker’s intention to bring about a particular institutional fact. Expressives like greet, congratulate, condole and thank are used to refer to the utterance of a speaker expressing joy or sorrow about P in order to comply with a social convention and not necessarily because he/she actually feels joy or sorrow because of P. Neither declaratives nor expressives like greet, congratulate, thank and condole lexicalise speaker attitudes in the way other speech act verbs do. The fact that idioms are almost absent from these fields supports the view that the lexicalisation of speaker attitudes is a prominent characteristic of the meaning of idioms. However, the occurrence of idioms in the fields of verbs of communication contradicts the view that speaker attitudes are a necessary element of their meaning. The idioms occurring in the fields of verbs of communication do not express speaker attitudes any more than their one-word synonyms do. – Idioms referring to speech acts lexicalise the same types of evaluations as speech act verbs. Explicit evaluations by a resource situation speaker are lexicalised by idioms like take sb. to task and give sb. a piece of one’s mind. These idioms lexicalise a negative evaluation of P by a resource situation speaker, an evaluation also lexicalised by verbs like reproach and tell off. Explicit evaluations by a discourse situation speaker are part of the meaning of idioms like blow one’s own trumpet and give onself airs, which may be used as synonyms (on the conceptual level of meaning) of verbs like boast, brag and show off. Implicit evaluations which have the status of lexical presuppositions are lexicalised by the German idiom Alarm schlagen and the Dutch idioms alarm slaan and


de noodklok luiden (‘sound the alarm bell’), which may be used as synonyms of warn. The correponding English expression sound the alarm is a free combination of words, because the verb sound (in the sense of ‘give sb. a warning’) may be combined with a wide range of nominal expressions synonymous with warning (e.g. sound the alarm/a note of caution/the death knell etc.). Implicit evaluations which do not have the status of lexical presuppositions are part of the meaning of idioms like give sb. one’s word, which may be used as a synonym of promise. Like promise, give sb. one’s word lexicalises the presupposition of a resource situation speaker that P is in the interest of H. – Though many idioms lexicalise speaker attitudes, they do not lexicalise any type of speaker attitude. The abundance of (German) idioms in the fields of verbs like vorwerfen (reproach), diffamieren (defame) and angeben (boast) shows that they often express either a negative evaluation of a past action or a quality of H or a combination of a positive evaluation by a resource situation speaker and a negative one by a discourse situation speaker. Collocations only rarely lexicalise such evaluations. Additionally, the scarcity of idioms in the fields of directive speech act verbs shows that idioms only rarely lexicalise speaker attitudes which concern a future action of H. These speaker attitudes are lexicalised by collocations rather than idioms. These observations seem to confirm the view that idioms tend to lexicalise negative rather than positive evaluations (cf. Fleischer 1997: 179; Burger 1998: 79; Pabst 2004: 81). However, the overall pattern of occurrence of idioms in the fields of speech act verbs does not provide conclusive evidence to support such a view. Firstly, idioms do not lexicalise any type of negative evaluation. They occur much less frequently, for example, in the fields of verbs like tadeln (reprimand), meckern (grumble) and beschönigen (whitewash) than in those of vorwerfen (reproach), diffamieren (defame) and angeben (boast). Secondly, the negative evaluations lexicalised by idioms are also lexicalised by verbs (e.g. zurechtweisen, vorwerfen, vorhalten, diffamieren, verleumden, angeben, prahlen, protzen). The idioms which may be used as synonyms of these verbs do not lexicalise any type of negative evaluation which may not also be lexicalised by verbs. This means that the lexicalisation of negative evaluations is not an idiom-specific property. Thirdly, there are not only more idioms but also more verbs lexicalising negative evaluations than such lexicalising positive evaluations. Thus, the frequency of idioms in the fields of expressions lexicalising negative evaluations merely reflects a tendency which concerns communicative expressions in general. The abundance of expressions lexicalising negative evaluations may be due to the fact that these expressions are used to refer to patterns of behaviour which deviate from social norms. Such patterns of behaviour are evaluated negatively and are therefore regarded as being marked. Those which conform to social norms


are evaluated positively and are hence regarded as being unmarked. Concepts of marked behaviour appear to get lexicalised by a wider variety of expressions than such of unmarked behaviour. I have been concerned so far with idioms which are synonymous with speech act verbs or verbs of communication with respect to the lexical as well as the conceptual level of their meaning. Apart from idioms like these, the fields of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication contain a few idioms which do not have one-word counterparts. These idioms are used to refer to the same kind of resource situation referred to by the verbs belonging to the same lexical field. They are synonyms of these verbs with respect to the conceptual level but not regarding the lexical level of their meaning. Insofar as these idioms do not possess one-word counterparts, they may be regarded as fillers of gaps in the word inventory.

4.4.5

Idioms and collocations as fillers of gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication

The following (semi-)idioms have no one-word counterparts in German and may therefore be regarded as fillers of gaps: (15) den Faden verlieren (I) vom Hölzchen aufs Stöckchen/vom Hundertsten ins Tausendste kommen (I) sich ins Uferlose/Weite verlieren (I) (16) sich (gegenseitig) die Bälle zuwerfen/zuspielen (I) (17) eine feuchte Aussprache haben (SI) (18) sich an/bei etwas die Zunge abbrechen/zerbrechen (I)

The idioms in (15) (den Faden verlieren, vom Hölzchen aufs Stöckchen/vom Hundersten ins Tausendste kommen and sich ins Uferlose/Weite verlieren) may be classified as belonging to the field of verbs of communication used to refer to situations in which a speaker utters something (P) and thereby causes a change in the structure of the conversation. Though such situations may also be referred to by verbs like andeuten (hint), erwähnen (mention), aufgreifen (take up), anmerken (remark), hervorheben (emphasise) etc. and their complex synonyms, verbs with the same meaning as the idioms in (15) are absent. The idioms in (15) all mean ‘to depart more and more from a topic currently under discussion’. abschweifen (digress) is only a near-synonym of these idioms, because it means ‘to utter something which is not directly related to the topic being discussed’ and thus lacks the component ‘more and more’ which is an essential part of the meaning of the


idioms in (15). Insofar as there are no German verbs having the same meaning as the idioms in (15), these may be considered to be fillers of lexical gaps. The idiom sich (gegenseitig) die Bälle zuwerfen/zuspielen in (16) means ‘to make one or more utterances fitting another person’s utterances in order to turn the conversation to one’s own advantage and to the advantage of that other person’. It belongs to the group of communicative expressions used to refer to situations in which one or more speakers talk to one or more hearers. The same class of expressions also comprises verbs like besprechen (discuss), debattieren (debate), sich streiten (argue) and sich unterhalten (converse) as well as the simple and complex synonyms of these. Since none of these simple and complex lexicalisations have the same meaning as sich die Bälle (gegenseitig) zuwerfen/zuspielen, this idiom fills a gap in the inventory of German speech act verbs. The idioms in (17) and (18) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker talks with a particular articulation: eine feuchte Aussprache haben means ‘to inadvertently spit while speaking’ and sich an/bei etwas die Zunge abbrechen ‘to have difficulty in pronouncing something’. Verbs like lispeln (lisp), murmeln (mutter), näseln (speak through one’s nose), nuscheln (mumble) and zischen (hiss) are also used to refer to a particular manner of articulation, but none of these have the same meaning as the idioms in (17) and (18). For this reason, eine feuchte Aussprache haben and sich an/bei etwas die Zunge abbrechen may be regarded as fillers of gaps in the inventory of German verbs of communication. Intensifying expressions like those in (19)–(21) may also be regarded as fillers of gaps in the inventory of German speech act verbs, because they lexicalise a degree of strength not lexicalised by verbs: (19)

das Blaue vom Himmel lügen (SI) jmdm. die Hucke/Jacke voll lügen (SI) lügen, dass sich die Balken biegen (SI) lügen wie gedruckt (SI)

(20) jmdn. über den grünen Klee loben (SI) sich in Lobreden ergehen (SI) jmdn./etwas in den höchsten Tönen loben (SI) (21) aus voller Lunge schreien (SI) schreien wie am Spieß/wie ein gestochenes Schwein/wie eine angestochene Sau (SI)

Like the verbs lie and fib and the collocations tell a lie and tell a fib, the expressions in (19) are used to refer to situations in which a speaker who does not take P to be true and assumes that H does not know P, utters one or more Utt(P) with the intention that H take P to be true. A discourse situation speaker choosing one of


the semi-idioms in (19) rather than a verb or collocation to refer to this particular type of situation indicates that he considers the resource situation speaker to be particularly insincere. The idioms in (19) lack one-word counterparts. The same is true of the semi-idioms in (20) and (21) which mean ‘to emphatically praise somebody’ and ‘to scream very loudly’ respectively. The corpus of German idioms and collocations comprises only 25 phrasemes which fill gaps in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Since these represent only 3.7% of the 676 complex lexicalisations which were part of the German corpus, the question of whether complex lexicalisations may be regarded as fillers of lexical gaps may now provisionally be answered as follows: Lexicalisation Pattern II (Complex Lexicalisations as fillers of gaps in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication): Complex lexicalisations only rarely fill gaps in the fields of speech act verbs or verbs of communication.

The fact that some of the collocations and many of the idioms which were part of the German corpus could not be classified as belonging to any of the classes of speech act verbs and verbs of communication suggests that there is still a considerable number of phrasemes which do indeed lexicalise concepts of communication not lexicalised by verbs. These fill gaps on the conceptual level of meaning. In the present study, communication concepts have been defined in terms of a situation which may or may not be referred to by verbs. Those verbs used to refer to the same type of resource situation have been considered to constitute a lexical field. Gaps on the conceptual level of meaning would therefore not appear as gaps within verb fields. In the next section, I shall deal with complex lexicalisations which appear outside the lexical fields constituted by verbs.

4.5

Idioms and collocations lacking one-word synonyms

A total of 235 of the complex lexicalisations which were part of the German corpus have no one-word synonyms. These complex lexicalisations represent 34.8% of the total number of complex lexicalisations considered. 164 of them (69.9%) are fully idiomatic expressions, 52 are semi-idioms (22.1%) and 19 of them (8.0%) are collocations. Figure 8 below illustrates the proportion of fully idiomatic expressions, semi-idioms and collocations occurring outside the fields of German speech act verbs and verbs of communication. These percentages indicate that there is a considerable number of complex lexicalisations whose meaning cannot or only partly be described by the conceptual system discussed in Chapter 2. This is true especially of idioms, whereas


Figure 8. Proportion of fully idiomatic expressions, semi-idioms and collocations lacking one-word synonyms

collocations mostly have a one-word counterpart and hence their meaning may be described in the same way as that of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Complex lexicalisations which do not have one-word synonyms belong to one of the following three types: complex lexicalisations which expand the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, such which constitute hybrid fields of communicative expressions and such which establish lexical fields of their own. These will be dealt with separately in the next three sections.

4.5.1

Complex lexicalisations expanding the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication

Some complex lexicalisations have meanings which comprise the conceptual content of the meaning of a corresponding verb as well as additional conceptual or lexical components. Since these additional components are not part of the meaning of the corresponding verbs, phrasemes lexicalising such components expand the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. The expressions in (22)–(24) are examples of such phrasemes: (22) jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen (I) jmdm. den Mund wässrig machen (I) jmdm. den Zahn ziehen (I) (23) seinem Herzen Luft machen (I) jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben (I) die alte Platte laufen lassen/spielen (I)


die alte/die gleiche/dieselbe Walze auflegen/spielen (I) immer (wieder) dasselbe Lied singen (I) (24) jmdm. etw. auf den Kopf zusagen (I) etw. auf den Tisch des Hauses legen (I)

Though the meaning of the idioms in (22)–(24) contains elements which are also part of the meaning of mitteilen (communicate), the meaning of these idioms is more complex than that of verbs like mitteilen. The meaning of the idioms in (22)–(24) contains components not included in the meaning of verbs like mitteilen, inform and tell. The idioms in (22) are used to refer to a speech act in which a speaker informs a hearer of something (P) thereby bringing about a certain psychological effect on the hearer. Specifically, jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen and jmdm. den Mund wässrig machen are used to refer to speech acts in which a speaker informs a hearer of P and thereby causes the hearer to have a particular wish. Apart from lexicalising a particular result (a wish of the hearer), the idiom jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen also lexicalises an evaluation of that result by the discourse situation speaker. A discourse situation speaker describing the utterance of a resource situation speaker by means of the idiom jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen indicates that he/she considers the wish of the hearer brought about by the utterance of the resource situation speaker to be impossible to fulfil. By contrast, jmdm. den Mund wässrig machen does not lexicalise any such evaluation, and jmdm. den Zahn ziehen is used to refer to acts in which a speaker informs a hearer about P and thereby causes that hearer to be disillusioned. Though the idioms in (22) lexicalise the same speaker attitudes as those lexicalised by verbs like mitteilen, they also lexicalise a particular result which is not part of the meaning of mitteilen. Because of that, they expand the meaning of verbs like mitteilen. The result lexicalised by the idioms in (22) and the evaluation lexicalised by jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen are not part of the resource situation. Because of that, they are elements of the lexical rather than the conceptual level of meaning. Like the idioms in (22), those in (23) lexicalise all the speaker attitudes which are also part of the meaning of verbs like mitteilen, but they differ from those in (22) in that they additionally lexicalise a specific propositional content rather than a particular result. seinem Herz Luft machen is used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer of something which depresses him. The idioms die alte Platte laufen lassen/spielen, die alte/die gleiche/dieselbe Walze auflegen/ spielen and immer (wieder) dasselbe Lied singen lexicalise a propositional content specified as something well-known. jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben is used to refer to speech acts in which a speaker informs a hearer of something disagreeable to that hearer. In addition to the speaker attitudes lexicalised by verbs like mitteilen, the idioms in (23) all lexicalise a specific propositional content. The


idioms seinem Herzen Luft machen, die alte Platte laufen lassen/spielen and die alte/die gleiche/dieselbe Walze auflegen/spielen, differ from jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben in that they may only be used to refer to speech acts consisting of several utterances. immer (wieder) dasselbe Lied singen additionally lexicalises the aspectual property ‘iterative’. Since verbs like mitteilen do not lexicalise specifications of the propositional content or components like [+several utterances] or [+iterative], the idioms in (23) expand the meaning of these verbs. The components [+specification (P)], [+several utterances] and [+iterative] are elements of the resource situation and hence elements of the conceptual part of the meaning of the idioms in (23). jmdm. etwas auf den Kopf zusagen means ‘tell sb. sth. in a direct way’, and etwas auf den Tisch des Hauses legen means ‘to formally inform sb.’ In addition to the speaker attitudes lexicalised by verbs like mitteilen, both idioms lexicalise a particular manner of informing somebody of something. Since verbs like mitteilen do not lexicalise a particular mode of informing somebody of something, the meaning of the idioms in (24) goes beyond that of verbs like mitteilen. The component [+Manner] lexicalised by the idioms in (24) is an element of the conceptual level of meaning. Idioms expanding the meaning of verbs like mitteilen do exist not only in German but also in English and Dutch. In addition to the speaker attitudes lexicalised by inform, the English idiom put ideas into somebody’s head lexicalises the result of H having a particular wish as well as an evaluation by a discourse situation speaker who considers H’s wish to be impossible to fulfil. The idiom sing/play the same old tune is used to refer to situations in which a speaker repeatedly informs a hearer of something the latter already knows. Thus, put ideas into somebody’s head and sing/play the same old tune expand the meaning of verbs like inform. Dutch altijd/steeds hetzelfde liedje zingen means the same as English sing/play the same old tune and German immer wieder dasselbe Lied singen, and zijn hart luchten/uitstorten has the same meaning as German seinem Herzen Luft machen. Both Dutch idioms expand the meaning of verbs like meedelen. Figure 9 below shows how the meaning of verbs like informieren, inform and meedelen may be expanded by German, English and Dutch idioms respectively. Of the 235 complex lexicalisations which cannot be classified as belonging to the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, 189 (80.4%) fulfil the function of expanding the meaning of verbs. Of these, 173 (91.5%) are either fully idiomatic expressions or semi-idioms, with only 16 (8.5%) of them being collocations. Idioms and collocations expanding the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication may be regarded as fillers of gaps either on the conceptual or on the lexical level of meaning. Evidently, complex lexicalisations which expand the meaning of verbs are semantically more complex than the verbs whose


Figure 9. Idioms expanding the meaning of mitteilen/inform/meedelen

meaning they expand. This does not mean, though, that the concepts lexicalised by these idioms and collocations are generally more complex than those lexicalised by verbs. There are also many verbs which expand the meaning of other verbs in much the same way as the idioms in (22)–(24) expand the meaning of mitteilen. It is therefore doubtful whether the lexicalisation of complex concepts is indeed one of the functions of idioms as suggested by Fellbaum:


Some idioms pose formal, syntactic problems and express complex concepts that are not expressible by means of the standard lexical and syntactic categories, including those represented in WordNet. Other idioms are formally unremarkable but express concepts that cannot easily be connected to any of the concepts in the semantic network. Perhaps one function of idioms (and one reason for their frequency and their persistence over time) is to provide for the pre-coded lexicalized expression of complex concepts and ideas that do not exist as units in the language and would have to be composed by speakers. (Fellbaum 1998: 56–57)

Examples of verbs expanding the meaning of other verbs are berichten (report) and benachrichtigen (notify), which belong to the same lexical field as mitteilen (inform). Both lexicalise the same speaker attitudes as do verbs like mitteilen, but they differ from these in that they lexicalise additional conceptual components. berichten may only be used to refer to speech acts consisting of several utterances, while benachrichtigen lexicalises the speaker’s presupposition that knowing P is in the interest of H. Since these components are not part of the meaning of verbs like mitteilen, both berichten and benachrichtigen expand the meaning of verbs like mitteilen in much the same way as the idioms in (22)–(24) do. The concepts lexicalised by berichten and benachrichtigen are neither more nor less complex than those lexicalised by idioms like jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben and etwas auf den Tisch des Hauses legen. berichten and benachrichtigen as well as jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben and etwas auf den Tisch des Hauses legen lexicalise exactly one conceptual component not included in the meaning of mitteilen. Idioms like die alte Platte laufen lassen/spielen are more complex than berichten, benachrichtigen, jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben or etwas auf den Tisch des Hauses legen, because they add more than one component to the meaning of mitteilen. These examples show that idioms and collocations which expand the meaning of verbs do not necessarily lexicalise concepts which are more complex than those lexicalised by verbs. Rather, the concepts they lexicalise are more complex than those lexicalised by those verbs whose meaning they expand. Figure 10 below illustrates the level of complexity of the concepts lexicalised by English report and notify, German berichten and benachrichtigen, and Dutch berichten and verwittigen. These verbs expand the meaning of verbs like inform, mitteilen and meedelen respectively. The meaning of the English expressions delineate and give particulars of sth. is more complex than that of either report or notify. Both delineate and give particulars of sth. lexicalise a specification of P as detailed information which is not part of the meaning of verbs like report, relate and describe, whose meaning they expand (cf. Figure 10). Speech act verbs such as berichten and benachrichtigen (and their English and Dutch counterparts) expand the meaning of mitteilen in much the same way as the idioms in (22)–(24) do. The only difference between verbs like berichten


Figure 10. Verbs and idioms expanding the meaning of report/berichten (G.)/ berichten (D.)

and benachrichtigen on the one hand and idioms like jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben on the other is that they add different components to the meaning of mitteilen. Yet, verbs and idioms do not differ with respect to the way in


which they expand the meaning of verbs. The components added to the meaning of verbs all fall into one of the following categories: [Specification of P], [Manner], [Result], [Iterativity], [Several Utt(P)] and [Evaluation]. Since these components may be added to the meaning of verbs by idioms as well as by other verbs, they are not characteristic of the meaning of idioms only. Idioms typically lexicalise specific combinations of the meaning of certain verbs and certain additional conceptual or lexical components. There is no German verb, for example which lexicalises a combination of the meaning of mitteilen and a component like [+Result: H disillusioned]. This combination is lexicalised only by the idiom jmdm. den Zahn ziehen. The idioms in (22) (jmdm. den Mund wässrig machen, jmdm. den Zahn ziehen and jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen) lexicalise lexical components which are not part of the meaning of verbs like mitteilen. Since these idioms have no one-word synonyms, they fill gaps on the lexical level of meaning. The idioms in (23) (jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben etc.) and those in (24) (jmdm. etwas auf den Kopf zusagen etc.) lexicalise conceptual components which are not part of the meaning of verbs like mitteilen. Insofar as these idioms lexicalise concepts which are not lexicalised by verbs, they may be regarded as fillers of gaps on the conceptual level of meaning. These idioms are used to refer to situations which are more complex than those referred to by the verbs whose meaning they expand. Specifically, the situations referred to by the idioms in (23) and (24) are more complex than those referred to by verbs like mitteilen. However, the situations referred to by idioms like these are not generally more complex than those referred to by speech act verbs or verbs of communication. Neither do complex lexicalisations which expand the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication necessarily lexicalise evaluations. If they do, the evaluations lexicalised are not of a different type than those which are part of the meaning of verbs. Particularly, the evaluations lexicalised by complex lexicalisations expanding the meaning of verbs are either explicit evaluations by a discourse situation speaker (jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen) or implicit evaluations by a resource situation speaker (jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben).

4.5.2

Complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid classes of communicative expressions

Only 20 (i.e. 8.5%) of the 235 complex lexicalisations which do not have one-word synonyms lexicalise speaker attitudes which are part of different resource situation types. These complex lexicalisations constitute hybrid classes of communicative expressions, whose members combine semantic features of different types of speech act verbs or verbs of communication. Of the complex lexicalisations which


constitute hybrid classes, 18 are fully idiomatic expressions, one is a semi-idiom and one is a collocation. The following German idioms are examples of complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid classes of communicative expressions: (25) ein/sein Garn spinnen (I) (26) sich mit fremden Federn schmücken (I) (27) die Werbetrommel schlagen/rühren (I)

The idiom ein/sein Garn spinnen (literally ‘spin a/one’s yarn’) in (25) is the German equivalent of the English idiom spin a yarn and the Dutch idiom fabeltjes/ sprookjes vertellen (literally ‘tell fairy tales’). Its meaning may be paraphrased as ‘to tell fanciful stories’. Like its English and Dutch counterparts, the German idiom ein/sein Garn spinnen lexicalises speaker attitudes which are part of the meaning of verbs like schwindeln (English fib, Dutch jokken) as well as such which are lexicalised by verbs like erzählen (English tell, Dutch vertellen). ein/sein Garn spinnen and its English and Dutch equivalents are used to refer to situations in which a speaker who does not take P to be true and assumes that H does not know P, utters several Utt(P) to make H recognise that S takes P to be true. The propositional attitude and the speaker’s intention lexicalised by these German, English and Dutch expressions are also part of the meaning of verbs like schwindeln (fib, jokken). The meaning of idioms like ein/sein Garn spinnen differs from that of verbs like schwindeln in that it lexicalises the feature [+several Utt(P)], a component also lexicalised by verbs like erzählen (tell, vertellen), cf. Figure 11 below. The German idiom sich mit fremden Federn schmücken (literally ‘decorate oneself with other people’s feathers’) in (26) is used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses a positive evaluation of a past action or a personal quality which he represents as being his own merit, while it is in fact someone else’s. Situations like these may also be referred to by the Dutch idioms pronken/zich tooien met andermans veren and met geleende veren pronken. In English, they would have to be referred to by a verb phrase containing the idiom borrowed plumes such as dress oneself in borrowed plumes or deck oneself out in borrowed plumes. Idioms like that in (26) lexicalise speaker attitudes which are part of the meaning of verbs like boast (German angeben, Dutch opscheppen) as well as such which are lexicalised by verbs like lie (German lügen, Dutch liegen). Specifically, these idioms lexicalise a speaker’s propositional attitude, a speaker’s intention and a speaker’s presupposition which are part of the meaning of verbs like boast. In the case that P is an action, they also lexicalise the value ‘Speaker’ for the categorial aspect ‘Agent of P’, a value also lexicalised by verbs like boast. In addition, the idiom in (26) lexicalises a speaker’s propositional attitude and a speaker’s intention which is part of verbs like lie. Specifically, these idioms are used to refer to


Figure 11. Conceptual part of the meaning of (s)ein Garn spinnen, spin a yarn and fabeltjes/sprookjes vertellen

situations in which a speaker who knows that the Agent of P is not S, wants H to recognise that the Agent of P is S. The conceptual components lexicalised by sich mit fremden Federn schmücken, pronken/zich tooien met andermans veren and met geleende veren pronken are represented in Figure 12 below. The idiom die Werbetrommel (für etwas) schlagen/rühren in (27) is the German equivalent of the English idiom bang/beat the drum (for sth.). Both idioms mean ‘to express one’s support of something with the intention of gaining further support for it from other people’. The Dutch idioms de trom slaan/roeren (literally ‘beat the drum’) and veel tamtam maken (literally ‘make a lot of tamtam’) do not have the same meaning as the German or English idioms but rather mean ‘to make a great fuss’. The German and English idioms die Werbetrommel schlagen/ rühren and bang/beat the drum have to be translated into Dutch by a free combination of words (e.g. reclame/propaganda maken (voor iets)). Idioms like that in (27) lexicalise speaker attitudes which are part of verbs like spread (German verbreiten, Dutch verbreiden, verspreiden) as well as such which are lexicalised by verbs like extol (German preisen, Dutch prijzen). Specifically, they lexicalise the propositional attitude, the speaker’s intention, and the speaker’s presupposition which are part of the meaning of verbs like extol as well as the speaker’s presuppo-


Figure 12. Conceptual part of the meaning of sich mit fremden Federn schmücken, sich tooien/pronken met andermans veren and met geleende veren pronken

sition lexicalised by verbs like spread. Additionally, they lexicalise the feature ‘addressed to several hearers’, which distinguishes the meaning of spread from that of inform and the feature [Manner: Emphatically] lexicalised by verbs like extol. Figure 13 below represents the speaker attitudes lexicalised by die Werbetrommel (für etwas) schlagen/rühren and beat/bang the drum (for sth.). Since only 20 (2.9%) of the 676 complex communicative expressions considered lexicalise speaker attitudes which are part of different resource situation types, the lexicalisation of these combinations of speaker attitudes cannot be regarded as one of the prominent functions of complex communicative expressions. Neither is the lexicalisation of speaker attitudes belonging to different resource situation types an idiom-specific function. There are also a few verbs which seem to lexicalise similar combinations of speaker attitudes. Examples are warn (German warnen, Dutch waarschuwen), threaten (German drohen, Dutch dreigen), advise (German raten, Dutch aanraden) and German unken, a synonym of the idiom schwarzmalen, which has no exact equivalents in either English or Dutch).


Figure 13. Conceptual part of the meaning of die Werbetrommel schlagen/rühren and beat/bang the drum

a. (to) warn The meaning of warn seems to include elements of representative as well as directive predicates. This verb may therefore not unambiguously be classified as being either a representative or a directive predicate. Searle and Vanderveken, for example, distinguish two uses of warn which are not independent: When I warn you that something is the case I am normally warning you that it is the case with a view to getting you to do something about it. Thus if I warn you (assertive) that the bull is about to charge, the aim of issuing a warning would normally be to get you to take some evasive action (directive). ... On the other hand, when I warn you to do something, I would normally be asking you to do it (directive) while implying that if you do not do it, it would be bad for you (asser(Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 202–203) tive), ...

Unlike Searle & Vanderveken, Verschueren accounts for the ambiguity of warn by placing it on a continuum of representatives, directives and commissives. On this continuum, warn occupies a position in between that of representatives such as announce and inform and that of directives such as command and request; threaten


Figure 14. Position of warn and threaten on the continuum of representatives, directives and commissives (from Verschueren 1980: 36)

is positioned in between directive and commissive predicates (cf. Verschueren 1980: 35–36), cf. Figure 14. Harras explains the linking of warn to representatives on the one hand and directives on the other on the basis of the Maxim of Helpfulness (‘People intend to help one another’) and the ICMs (“Idealised Cognitive Models”) of Ordinary Communication and of Justified Belief proposed by Sweetser (cf. Sweetser, quoted in Lakoff 1990: 71–74). According to Harras, the directive illocutionary point lexicalised by warn is derived step by step from the representative illocationary point in the following way: (1) If a speaker says that P and thereby adheres to the Maxim of Helpfulness, then he also wants the hearer to adopt his belief that P. (He at least does not under take anything to prevent the hearer from doing so.) (2) If a speaker wants the hearer to believe that P, then he also wants the hearer to act in accordance with this belief. (He at least does not undertake anything to prevent the hearer from doing so.) Hence: (3) If a speaker says that P, and P is something negative such as a danger to the hearer, then the speaker wants the hearer to act in accordance to this belief, i.e. he wants the hearer to prevent the negative consequences of P from occur ring. (He at least does not undertake anything to prevent the hearer from doing so.) Hence: (4) If a speaker says that P, and P is negative to the hearer, the speaker requests the hearer to do something to prevent P or the negative consequences of P from occurring. (Harras 1993: 84–85; translation K.P.)

Since the directive illocutionary point is derived from the representative illocutionary point, it is not part of the lexical meaning of warn. The assumption that


the representative but not the directive illocutionary point is part of the lexical meaning of warn is plausible if a distincton is made between what is said and what is meant or implicated (cf. Grice 1975). The verb warn is used to refer to situations in which a speaker says that he/she evaluates the consequences of a future P as being negative to the hearer. Thus, a speaker who warns a hearer makes a special kind of announcement. The speaker’s request to the hearer to do something to prevent P (or its negative consequences) from occurring, results from the speaker’s announcement of P. This means that the request was not actually uttered. Rather, it was implicated by the announcement of some P evaluated as being negative to the hearer. Consequently, the speaker’s intention that the hearer adopt the speaker’s belief that an action, event or state of affairs with negative consequences for H will take place in the future is part of the lexical meaning of warn, but the speaker’s intention that the hearer do something to prevent P from happening is not. Rather, the latter has the status of a generalised conversational implicature as defined by Levinson (cf. Levinson 2001). Hence, warn is not a polysemous verb as is implied by Searle & Vanderveken, who distinguish two uses of warn. Rather, warn is a representative speech act verb, because it lexicalises only a representative illocutionary point. Its meaning implicates rather than lexicalises a directive illocutionary point. This conclusion is supported by the fact that warn (or warnen) is often used in German sentences like Ich habe Dich jedenfalls gewarnt. By using sentences like this, a speaker indicates that he has informed H of a future P and that he/she will not assume responsibility for the case that H does not do anything to prevent P from happening. If warn implicates rather than lexicalises a directive illocutionary point, it does not lexicalise a combination of speaker attitudes which are part of different resource situation types. warn solely lexicalises speaker attitudes typical of representative predicates. Its lexical meaning does not include elements which are part of the meaning of other types of speech act verbs. b. (to) advise Searle & Vanderveken treat advise in exactly the same way as warn, namely as a predicate which may either be classified as a representative or as a directive: ... if I advise you (assertive) that the train will be late the aim of issuing the advice would normally be to get you to take some appropriate action (directive). ... When I advise you to do something, I would normally be suggesting that you do it (directive) while implying that it would be good for you (assertive). (Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 202–203)

According to Searle & Vanderveken, the difference between warning and advising is that if a speaker warns a hearer, he warns him about a state of affairs which


he presupposes not to be in the interest of the hearer, while a speaker advising a hearer advises that hearer to do something which he presupposes to be in the interest of the hearer (cf. Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 203). Verschueren assigns advise the same position as warn on his continuum of representatives, directives and commissives (cf. Figure 14 above). Though advise may be classified both as a representative and a directive predicate, the German and Dutch counterparts of advise cannot be classified in that way. The representative and directive uses of advise have to be translated into German and Dutch by different verbs. German benachrichtigen and Dutch verwittigen correspond to the representative use of advise, while German raten and Dutch aanraden correspond to the directive use of advise. In addition to the speaker attitudes lexicalised by verbs like inform, verbs like German benachrichtigen, Dutch verwittigen and the representative advise all lexicalise the speaker’s presupposition that knowing P is in the interest of H. A speaker informing a hearer of something which he considers to be important for that hearer to know (such as an accident which happened to one of the hearer’s relatives) expects the latter to take some appropriate action (in this case, for example, to go to the accident site). The speaker’s intention that H do something is derived from the speaker’s intention that H know P. This means that the speaker’s intention that H do something is not part of the lexical meaning of benachrichtigen, verwittigen or the representative advise. Rather, it is a generalised conversational implicature resulting from the speaker’s intention that H know P together with the speaker’s presupposition that knowing P is in the interest of H. The representative use of advise has much in common with warn. The difference between warn and advise is not only that warn lexicalises a speaker’s presupposition that P is not in the interest of H, while advise lexicalises a speaker’s presupposition that knowing P is in the interest of H, but also that advise has a directive reading which warn does not possess. The directive reading of advise corresponds to German raten and Dutch aanraden. If the representative advise implicates rather than lexicalises the speaker’s intention that H perform some kind of action, it does not lexicalise a combination of speaker attitudes belonging to different resource situation types. The different speaker intentions lexicalised by advise belong to different senses of advise. This amounts to saying that there are two verbs advise, a representative one (advise1) and a directive one (advise2), neither of which lexicalises combinations of speaker attitudes belonging to different resource situation types. c. (to) threaten The meaning of threaten includes elements which are part of the meaning of commissives as well as such which are part of the meaning of directives. On Verschueren’s continuum, threaten occupies a place in between directives like request


and command and commissives like promise and pledge (cf. Figure 14 above). threaten, like its German and Dutch equivalents drohen and dreigen, is used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that he/she intends to do something (P) if H fails to fulfil a certain condition C, the speaker’s presupposition being that P is not in the interest of H. Verbs like threaten, drohen and dreigen on the one hand lexicalise a propositional attitude ‘S wants to do: P’ and a speaker intention ‘S wants H to recognise: S wants to do: P’ typically lexicalised by commissive predicates. On the other hand, they also express a speaker’s requirement that H do something: a speaker threatening a hearer intends to do P if H fails to do what S requires him or her to do. A speaker’s requirement that H do something is typically lexicalised by directive predicates. This means that threaten (as well as German drohen and Dutch dreigen) differs from warn and advise in that it lexicalises speaker attitudes which are part of the meaning of different types of speech act verbs. threaten lexicalises speaker attitudes belonging to different resource situation types in much the same way as idioms like spin a yarn and beat/bang the drum (for sth.) do. This observation suggests that the lexicalisation of such combinations of speaker attitudes is not a function fulfilled solely by idioms. d. German unken (English ∅; Dutch ∅) German unken is used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer of a future action or event which he/she considers to have negative consequences for H. As I have shown in Chapter 2, unken has no exact equivalents in either English or Dutch. The situations referred to by German unken have to be referred to in English and Dutch by verbs like prophesy and foretell, whose meaning includes neither a positive nor a negative evaluation. Like threaten, German unken lexicalises speaker attitudes which are part of the meaning of verbs like vorhersagen (English foretell, Dutch voorspellen) as well as such which are lexicalised by verbs like meckern (English grumble, Dutch mopperen). Specifically, unken lexicalises the propositional attitude and the speaker intention expressed by vorhersagen (‘S considers P to be likely’ and ‘S wants H to recognise that he/she considers P to be likely’) as well as the propositional attitude and the speaker intention which are part of the meaning of meckern (‘S considers P to be bad’ and ‘S wants H to recognise that he/she considers P to be bad’). Additionally, unken lexicalises the value ‘future’ for the categorial aspect ‘temporal reference (P)’, a value which is also part of the meaning of verbs like vorhersagen, cf. Figure 15 below. In this section, I have shown that a small number of idioms lexicalise speaker attitudes which are part of the meaning of different types of speech act verbs. Idioms lexicalising such combinations of speaker attitudes constitute hybrid fields of communicative expressions. However, the creation of hybrid lexical fields is not a function fulfilled solely by idioms. English threaten and its German and Dutch


Figure 15. Conceptual part of the meaning of unken

counterparts drohen and dreigen as well as German unken also lexicalise speaker attitudes which are elements of different resource situation types. Since only 20 of the 676 complex lexicalisations considered and only two verbs constitute hybrid lexical fields, the constitution of such fields is not altogether a prominent function of either simple or complex lexicalisations. Complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid lexical fields lexicalise concepts which are not lexicalised by speech act verbs and verbs of communication and may therefore be considered to be fillers of lexical gaps. However, idioms constituting hybrid fields of communicative expressions do not fill gaps in the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication but rather such which correspond to combinations of speaker attitudes which are elements of different resource situation types. Hence idioms constituting hybrid lexical fields fill gaps on the conceptual rather than the lexical level of the meaning of communicative expressions. Complex lexicalisations which constitute hybrid lexical fields do not lexicalise speaker attitudes different from those lexicalised by verbs. Rather, these complex communicative expressions lexicalise combinations of speaker attitudes not lexicalised by verbs. The idioms discussed in this section (sich mit fremden Federn schmücken, beat/bang the drum (for sth.), die Werbetrommel (für etwas) schlagen/


rühren etc.) are of course semantically more complex than the verbs of whose semantic components their meanings are built up. Yet some verbs also lexicalise more than one value for one of the attributes of the categorial aspects. Examples are representatives like convince and such like betray. Verbs like convince lexicalise two values (‘S wants H to recognise that he takes P to be true’ and ‘S wants that H take P to be true’) for the categorial aspect of the speaker intention in addition to the features [+ Sequence of Utt(P)] and [+Result]; such like betray even lexicalise three values (‘H does not know P’, ‘H is not supposed to know P’ and ‘knowing P is in the interest of H’) for the categorial aspect of the speaker’s presuppositions. These examples show that verbs as well as idioms may lexicalise more than one value for some of the attributes of the categorial aspects. In this sense, the concepts lexicalised by idioms constituting hybrid lexical fields are not on the whole more complex than those lexicalised by verbs. Neither do complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid lexical fields necessarily lexicalise evaluations. If they do, they lexicalise the same evaluations as the verbs of whose semantic components their meanings are built up.

4.5.3

Complex lexicalisations constituting separate classes of communicative expressions

Of the 235 German idioms and collocations which do not have one-word counterparts, 26 constitute independent fields of communicative expressions. These idioms and collocations represent 11.0% of the complex lexicalisations which lack one-word synonyms and 3.8% of the 676 complex lexicalisations which were part of the German corpus. Twenty of them are fully idiomatic expressions, four are semi-idioms and two are collocations. Insofar as these idioms and collocations lexicalise values for one or more of the attributes of the categorial aspects not lexicalised by verbs, they constitute lexical fields of their own. The idioms in (28a)(34a), for example, establish a lexical field which has much in common with those constituted by representatives like inform: (28) a. Farbe bekennen (I) (29) a. Flagge zeigen (I) (30) a. die/seine Karten aufdecken/offen auf den Tisch legen (I) (31) a. Tacheles/Fraktur reden (I) (32) a. Klartext reden/sprechen (I) (33) a. Stellung zu etwas nehmen/beziehen (SI)


(34) a. jmdm. zeigen, was eine Harke ist (I) (35) a. eine deutliche Sprache sprechen (I)

The idioms in (28a)–(35a) all mean ‘to express one’s opinion openly and emphatically’. They all lexicalise the propositional attitude ‘S knows P’ and the speaker intention ‘S wants H to know P’, which are typically lexicalised by representatives like inform. However, the idioms in (28a)–(35a) differ from representatives like inform in that they also lexicalise a specification of the propositional content not lexicalised by verbs like inform. They are used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer of his or her opinion on a particular subject. A specification of P as the speaker’s opinion on a particular subject is not lexicalised by any kind of speech act verb or verb of communication nor is it part of the meaning of any other complex communicative expression. Because of this, the idioms in (28a)–(35a) constitute a separate field of representative expressions. Like the idioms in (28a)–(35a), those in (36)–(39) lexicalise a specification of the propositional content not lexicalised by other communicative expressions, whether these be simple or complex: (36) jmdm. aus dem Herzen sprechen (SI) (37) ins gleiche Horn stoßen/tuten/blasen (I) (38) in dieselbe/die gleiche Kerbe hauen/schlagen (I) (39) jmdm. aus der Seele sprechen (SI)

These idioms are used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer of his opinion which happens to be identical to the hearer’s. A specification of P as an opinion of the speaker which is identical to that of the hearer is not part of the meaning of any type of speech act verb or verb of communication nor is it lexicalised by any other complex communicative expression. Because of this, the idioms in (36)–(39) constitute a lexical field of their own. Specifically, they establish a special class of representative expressions. Finally, the idioms in (40) and (41) constitute a lexical field which has much in common with those containing evaluative expressives such as classify, grade, judge and evaluate: (40) jmdn. in eine Reihe mit jmdm. stellen (SI) (41) jmdn./etwas auf eine/die gleiche Stufe (mit jmdm./etwas) stellen (I)

These idioms lexicalise the same propositional attitude and the same speaker intention as verbs like classify, grade, etc. Like these verbs, they are used to refer to situations in which a speaker classifies P according to a certain norm. Yet the


idioms in (40) and (41) differ from verbs like classify, grade and judge in that they also lexicalise a specification of the speaker’s evaluation. They are used to refer to situations in which a speaker evaluates x as being equivalent to y and also wants the hearer to recognise that. Verbs like classify, grade, judge etc. do not lexicalise any such specification of the speaker’s evaluation nor is such a specification of the speaker’s evaluation lexicalised by any other complex communicative expression. Since such a specification of S’s evaluation is not part of the meaning of other communicative expressions, the idioms in (40) and (41) constitute a lexical field of their own. Complex communicative expressions constituting lexical fields of their own do not necessarily lexicalise evaluations. If they do, the evaluation lexicalised is an explicit one by a resource situation speaker. None of the German idioms constituting lexical fields of their own lexicalise other types of evaluations. Explicit evaluations by a resource situation speaker are also lexicalised by the idioms in (40) and (41). Though an evaluation of x as being equivalent to y is not part of the meaning of any speech act verb, the type of evaluation lexicalised by the idioms in (40) and (41), an explicit evaluation by a resource situation speaker, is lexicalised by simple and complex lexicalisations alike. Idioms like those discussed in this section also exist in English and in Dutch. The idioms in (28b)–(32c), for example, are English and Dutch equivalents of German idioms such as Flagge zeigen, Farbe bekennen, Tacheles/Frakur reden etc. (28) b. show/fly the flag (I) (29) b. put/lay one’s cards on the table (I) (30) b. speak one’s mind (I) (28) c. open kaart spelen (I) (29) c. zijn kaarten op tafel leggen (I) (30) c. kleur bekennen (I) (31) c. zijn stem laten horen (I) (32) c. stelling nemen (SI)

Insofar as these English and Dutch idioms lexicalise a concept not lexicalised by verbs, they also fill a gap in the inventory of English and Dutch communicative expressions. The same is true of the Dutch idiom iemand/iets op één lijn stellen met iemand/iets, which has the same meaning as the German idioms jmdn. in eine Reihe mit jmdm. stellen and jmdn./etwas auf eine/die gleiche Stufe (mit jmdm./etwas) stellen (examples (40) and (41)). An English idiom meaning ‘put something or someone on a par with something or someone else’ seems to be lacking alto-


gether. The phrase put someone/something on a par with something/someone else is a free combination of words consisting of the verb put and the idiom on a par with, the verb put not being part of the idiom. The German idioms in (36)–(39) (in die gleiche Kerbe hauen, in das gleiche Horn tuten/stoßen/blasen etc.) do not have a simple or complex counterpart in either English or Dutch. This means that the concept of expressing an opinion which happens to be indentical with the addressee’s appears not to be lexicalised in English or in Dutch. Since only 3.8% of the 680 complex lexicalisations considered, constitute lexical fields of their own, the constitution of such fields cannot altogether be regarded as a prominent function of complex communicative expressions. Yet the constitution of independent fields of communicative expressions is a function fulfilled solely by complex lexicalisations. Complex communicative expressions like those dicussed in this section lexicalise values for one of the attributes of a categorial aspect which are not lexicalised by verbs. Most of the complex lexicalisations constituting lexical fields of their own are idioms; collocations only rarely fulfil this function. The fact that most of the German idioms discussed in this section have English and Dutch counterparts suggests that complex communicative expressions fulfil the same functions in these languages as they do in German. German, English and Dutch idioms and collocations which cannot be used as synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication fulfil one of the following three functions: they expand the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, they constitute hybrid classes of communicative expressions, or they constitute independent classes of communicative expressions. This does not mean, though, that any complex communicative expression of one language has its equivalent in either of the other languages. I have already shown that the German idioms jmdm. aus der Seele sprechen, in die gleiche Kerbe hauen, etc. lack a counterpart in English and Dutch. Likewise, the German idiom sich mit fremden Federn schmü cken has a counterpart in Dutch but not in English. Since I have used German idioms and collocations as the basis of my cross-linguistic comparison, it is not surprising that in this part of this study missing counterparts have been detected only in English and Dutch. Missing German counterparts of English and Dutch phrasemes may best be found using a comprehensive collection of idioms and collocations for each of the two languages. To complement my observations on the semantic peculiarities of phrasemes, I shall briefly discuss some English and Dutch idioms which have no equivalents in either of the other languages.


4.6

Complex communicative expressions in English, German and Dutch

As I have mentioned before, some idioms lexicalise a degree of strength different from that lexicalised by their synonymous verbs. For example, the German idiom lügen wie gedruckt and its English and Dutch counterparts lie one’s head off and liegen alsof het gedrukt staat lexicalise a higher degree of insincerity than lie. However, not every intensifying or attenuating expression of one language has a counterpart in any other language. For example, the Dutch idiom steen en been klagen (literally ‘complain stone and bone’), which differs from complain only in that it expresses an intensification of the speaker’s negative evaluation of P, has no counterparts in English or German. The absence of English and German lexicalisations for the concept COMPLAIN VERY MUCH reveals a gap in the classes of English and German expressives lexicalising a speaker’s negative evaluation of P. Like German ones, English and Dutch complex communicative expressions often fulfil the function of expanding the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Idioms and collocations expanding the meaning of these not only lexicalise all the speaker attitudes lexicalised by a corresponding verb but also additional conceptual or lexical components which are not part of the meaning of that verb. The additional components lexicalised by German, English and Dutch idioms and collocations all fall into one of the following categories: [Specification of P], [Manner], [Result], [Iterativity], [Aim] and [Evaluation]. Though idioms and collocations lexicalise the same types of meaning components in English, German and Dutch, they may also lexicalise different values for each of these components in these three languages. The idioms in (42) and (43), for example, lexicalise a combination of a set of speaker attitudes and a specific type of specification of P not lexicalised in each of the other two languages. (The meaning of the idioms below is first described by a paraphrase and then represented as a combination of the speaker attitudes lexicalised by a verb and an additional conceptual or lexical component. Underneath these semantic descriptions, German, English or Dutch equivalents are listed if there are any.) (42)

talk business (I) meaning: ‘discuss business affairs’ discuss + Specification (P): P = business affairs (German: ∅; Dutch: ∅)

(43)

talk shop (I) meaning: ‘discuss matters connected with one’s profession’ discuss + Specification (P): P = matters connected with one’s profession (German: fachsimpeln; Dutch: ∅)


Likewise, English, German and Dutch idioms and collocations may also expand the meaning of a speech act verb or verb of communication by lexicalising a particular manner or evaluation not included in the meaning of that verb. Though English, German and Dutch idioms and collocations all lexicalise components of the categories [Manner] and [Evaluation], they often differ with respect to the particular kind of manner or evaluation lexicalised. For example, the Dutch idiom in (44) lexicalises a combination of a set of speaker attitudes and a specific manner not lexicalised in English or German. (44)

iets in geuren en kleuren vertellen (SI) meaning: ‘describe something in much detail’ describe + manner: in much detail (English: ∅; German: ∅)

The English and Dutch examples in (42)–(44) show that there are in fact many more concepts of communication than those lexicalised by the German idioms and collocations discussed in this chapter. Insofar as there are no German verbs, idioms or collocations for the concepts lexicalised by most of the English and Dutch expressions in (42)–(44), these reveal gaps in the vocabulary of German communicative expressions. These gaps would not have come to light if complex lexicalisations in languages other than German had not been taken into account. Complex lexicalisations fulfil the same functions in English, German and Dutch, but English, German an Dutch idioms and collocations occasionally show some more fine-grained differences. Particularly, they often differ with respect to the way in which they expand the meaning of speech act verbs and of verbs of communication. In addition to the speaker attitudes lexicalised by a corresponding verb, they all lexicalise the same conceptual or lexical categories (specification of P, manner, result, iterativity, aim and evaluation) but often differ with respect to the particular type of specification of P, manner, result, etc. lexicalised.

4.7

Conclusion

The study of the lexicalisation properties of German idioms and collocations has shown that the majority of the complex communicative expressions considered have one-word synonyms. Like their one-word counterparts, these complex communicative expressions may be classified as belonging to the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. However, this statement needs to be modified in the light of the fact that the lexicalisation properties of idioms differ significantly from those of collocations. Of the collocations which were part of the German corpus, 90.6% could be classified as being synonyms of verbs, while only 54.4%


of the idioms considered could be classified in that way. In Section 4.4.2, these observations have been summarised as “Lexicalisation Pattern I”: Lexicalisation Pattern I (Idioms and collocations as synonyms of speech act verbs or verbs of communication): Collocations mostly lexicalise the same concepts of communication as speech verbs and verbs of communication. Idioms often lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs.

The fact that about half of the idioms considered may not be used as synonyms of speech act verbs or verbs of communication shows that many idioms do indeed fill gaps in the vocabulary of communicative expressions. Most of the complex lexicalisations which cannot be used as synonyms of speech act verbs or verbs of communication expand the meaning of these. Idioms (and collocations) expanding the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication not only lexicalise the same speaker attitudes as a corresponding verb but also conceptual or lexical components which are not part of the meaning of that verb. These phrasemes fill gaps on the lexical or conceptual level of meaning. Almost all phrasemes expanding the meaning of speech act verbs or verbs of communication are idioms. Collocations only rarely fulfil this function. A small number of the complex lexicalisations which lack one-word counterparts lexicalise concepts of communication composed of elements of different resource situation types. These complex lexicalisations constitute hybrid fields of communicative expressions. Almost all of the complex lexicalisations fulfilling this function are idioms; collocations only rarely constitute hybrid lexical fields. Since complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid lexical fields lexicalise concepts different from those lexicalised by verbs, they fill gaps on the conceptual level of meaning. A small number of the complex lexicalisations which cannot be used as synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication lexicalise conceptual components entirely different from those lexicalised by verbs. Particularly, these complex communicative expressions lexicalise other values than verbs for one of the attributes of a categorial aspect. Idioms (and collocations) lexicalising such values constitute new fields of communicative expressions. Almost all of the complex lexicalisations constituting such lexical fields are idioms; collocations only rarely fulfil this function. Since complex communicative expressions constituting lexical fields of their own lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by verbs, they fill gaps on the conceptual level of meaning. An equally small number of complex lexicalisations lacking one-word synonyms may still be classified as belonging to the fields of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, because they lexicalise the same concepts as those lexi-


calised by verbs. Since these complex lexicalisations differ from the verbs of the same lexical fields with respect to the lexical part of their meaning, they fill gaps on the lexical level of meaning. The observations on the functions fulfilled by complex lexicalisations lacking one-word synonyms are summarised in “Lexicalisations Patterns IIa–c”, which also answer the question of whether complex lexicalisations may be regarded as fillers of lexical gaps: Lexicalisation Patterns IIa–c (Complex lexicalisations lacking one-word synonyms): a. Complex lexicalisations which may be classified as belonging to the fields of speech act verbs or verbs of communication and do not expand the meaning of these fill gaps on the lexical level of meaning. b. Complex lexicalisations which expand the meaning of speech act verbs or verbs of communication fill gaps on the lexical or conceptual level of meaning (depending on whether they add conceptual or lexical compo nents to the meaning of a corresponding verb.). c. Complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid lexical fields or lexical fields of their own fill gaps on the conceptual level of meaning.

A comparison of the lexicalisation properties of German idioms and collocations with those of English and Dutch idioms and collocations has shown that complex lexicalisations fulfil the same functions in English, German and Dutch. However, English, German an Dutch idioms and collocations often differ with respect to the way in which they expand the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. Specifically, English, German and Dutch idioms and collocations often differ with respect to the particular type of specification of P, manner, result etc. lexicalised. These observations may be summarised by Lexicalisation Pattern III: Lexicalisation Tendency III (Complex lexicalisations in English, German and Dutch): Complex communicative expressions lexicalise concepts of the same type in English, German and Dutch.

The study of the distribution of simple and complex lexicalisations in the lexicalisation domain of concepts of communication has shown that the concepts lexicalised by complex communicative expressions are neither more nor less complex than those lexicalised by verbs. Though the concepts lexicalised by phrasemes expanding the meaning of verbs are more complex than those lexicalised by the verbs whose meanings these phrasemes expand, the concepts lexicalised by this type of phrasemes are not generally more complex than those lexicalised by verbs. As I have shown in Section 4.5.1, some verbs lexicalise concepts which are as


complex as those lexicalised by idioms and collocations expanding the meaning of verbs. The concepts lexicalised by complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid lexical fields are obviously more complex than each of those whose components contribute to the meaning of these complex lexicalisations. Yet some concepts lexicalised by verbs contain as many components as those lexicalised by complex lexicalisations constituting hybrid lexical fields. The concepts lexicalised by complex lexicalisations constituting lexical fields of their own are not more complex than those lexicalised by verbs for obvious reasons: these idioms and collocations lexicalise other but not more values for one of the attributes of a given categorial aspect. On the whole, the observations on the complexity of the concepts lexicalised by complex communicative expressions do not support the idea that the concepts lexicalised by idioms are more complex than those lexicalised by verbs. Neither do the results of this study support the wide-spread belief that idioms characteristically lexicalise speaker attitudes and/or evaluations. Though idioms do indeed rarely occur as synonyms of speech act verbs which do not lexicalise any specific speaker attitudes, they may also be used as synonyms of verbs of communication. As I have explained in Chapter 1, these differ from genuine speech act verbs in that they do not lexicalise any specific speaker attitudes. Additionally, the evaluations lexicalised by idioms and collocations are of the same type as those lexicalised by speech act verbs. Like the evaluations lexicalised by verbs, those lexicalised by idioms and collocations are either explicit evaluations by a resource or discourse situation speaker or implicit ones (i.e. evalutions which have the status of presuppositions of a resource situation speaker). On the whole, the comparison of the lexicalisation properties of speech act verbs on the one hand and idioms and collocations on the other has not revealed any differences between simple and complex lexicalisations with respect to the type of speaker attitudes and/or evaluations lexicalised. The results of this study are relevant only to the vocabulary of communicative expressions. Whether lexicalisation patterns I–III also hold for other sections of the vocabulary will have to be clarified by systematic studies of the distribution of simple and complex lexicalisations in these sections of the vocabulary. Any such comparison requires that a conceptual system be designed which may serve as the background against which the lexicalisation properties of simple and complex lexicalisations can be compared. Each section of the vocabulary requires it own conceptual system. Generalisations may therefore only be made by comparing the results of the studies of different sections of the vocabulary.

chapter 5

Conclusion

In this study, I have dealt with two special aspects of the lexicalisation of concepts of communication: the distribution of lexical gaps and the lexicalisation properties of complex as opposed to simple communicative expressions. The questions to be answered were the following: 1. Does the distribution of lexical gaps across the different lexical fields constituted by speech act verbs and verbs of communication show certain regularities or patterns? If so, may these be explained in a principled way, i.e. by making reference to lexicalisation principles? If an explanation in terms of lexicalisation principles is indeed possible, may these (or at least some of these) be subsumed under a single more general principle or are the different lexicalisation principles completely independent of one another? 2. Do complex communicative expressions (i.e. idioms and collocations used to refer to linguistic actions) lexicalise concepts of communication different from those lexicalised by simple ones? If this were indeed the case, the obvious conclusion would be that complex communicative expressions are fillers of gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. As I have explained in Chapter 2, these questions can only be answered against the background of an ordering system for communication concepts. Several speech act-theoretical approaches were discussed as possible candidates for conceptual systems. However, they were ultimately rejected in favour of the ordering system used to describe the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication in the Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben (cf. Harras et al. 2004 & 2007). For one thing, this system is based on parameters resulting from a semantic analysis of sentences containing illocutionary verbs. As a consequence, the system’s parameters are necessarily relevant to a description of the meaning of illocationary verbs. This is one advantage which the ordering system used in this study has over traditional speech act taxonomies such as Searle’s: some of Searle’s criteria for the classification of speech acts are simply irrelevant to the meaning of illocutionary verbs. Furthermore, the conceptual system used in this study, in spite of being based on the meaning of existing illocutionary verbs, covers more than only existing predicates; it also covers many cases of communication concepts which


fail to get lexicalised. The coverage of non-lexicalised concepts is another decisive advantage of the conceptual system used as compared to other approaches, e.g. Austin’s lexicalist approach, which covers only existing predicates. Insofar as the conceptual system used in this study covers all types of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, it also allows a complete coverage of the lexicalisation domain of communication concepts. Incompleteness was the main problem associated with ordering systems such as Baumgärtner’s and Edmondson’s. The conceptual system used as the basis of this study includes parameters, or “categorial aspects”, whose attributes may be assigned different values. As I have shown in Chapter 3, not all combinations of values which are possible in principle get lexicalised by special illocutionary verbs. Combinations of values which do not get lexicalised represent instances of lexical gaps. While some instances of lexical gaps appear to be isolated cases, a large number of them fall into certain patterns. Some of these may plausibly be explained in terms of lexicalisation principles. This is true especially of the gaps occurring in the fields constituted by directives, commisssives and expressives. The patterns in the occurrence of gaps in the classes of directives and commissives have shown that the costs and benefits involved in directive and commissive speech acts are highly relevant to the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts: only concepts of speech acts involving a balance of costs and benefits to S and H get lexicalised. On the basis of this observation, I have proposed a Principle of Costs and Benefits to account for why some concepts of directive and commissive speech acts get lexicalised while others do not. The lexicalisation of concepts of expressive speech acts has been shown to be governed by the Principle of Markedness: Patterns of linguistic behaviour which count as marked get lexicalised rather than such which conform to social norms and may therefore be regarded as being “normal” or unmarked. Since the Principle of Costs and Benefits and that of Markedness each account for the lexicalisation (or non-lexicalisation) of a large number of communication concepts, they are the most important principles governing the lexicalisation of communication concepts. While the Principle of Costs and Benefits affects all types of directive and commissive speech act concepts, the Principle of Markedness governs the lexicalisation of all speech act concepts involving the expression of evaluations and emotions. Both principles also apply to the lexicalisation of communication concepts in each of the three languages studied (i.e. in English, German and Dutch). To the extent that speech acts involving a balance of costs and benefits to S and H represent instances of linguistic behaviour which count as “normal” or unmarked within English-, German- and Dutch-speaking communities, the Principle of Costs and Benefits and that of Markedness are mutually incompatible. According to the Principle of Costs and Benefits, concepts of directive and commissive

Chapter 5. Conclusion 215

speech acts get lexicalised only when the relevant speech acts conform to social norms, i.e. when they involve a balance of costs and benefits. The Principle of Markedness states that patterns of linguistic behaviour which count as marked get lexicalised more readily than such which count as “normal” or unmarked. The incompatibility of the Principle of Costs and Benefits with that of Markedness implies that these two lexicalisation principles my not be subsumed under another more general principle. Rather, lexicalisation principles seem to hold for different types of communication concepts separately. The concepts of costs and benefits and that of markedness have already been put forward as factors bearing on the lexicalisation of communication concepts. Edmondson, for example, claimed that concepts of speech acts involving benefits to H (“hearer-supportive behaviour”) get lexicalised rather than such involving benefits to S (“speaker-supportive behaviour”). While Edmondson was right in assuming that costs and benefits affect the lexicalisation of communication concepts, I have shown that costs and benefits affect the lexicalisation of these concepts in a completely different way. What bears on lexicalisation is a balance of costs and benefits to S and H rather than the hearer- or speaker-supportiveness of patterns of linguistic behaviour. Edmondson also appeared to be wrong in claiming that costs and benefits affect the lexicalisation of all communication concepts. As I have shown, the principle of costs and benefits has explanatory power only if its application is restricted to the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts. As a principle accounting for the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts only, the Principle of Costs and Benefits makes the correct predictions with respect to concepts which are and such which are not lexicalised. Markedness too has been claimed to be relevant to lexicalisation. At least, the Principle of Cognitive Salience suggested by Verschueren has much in common with what I have termed the “Principle of Markedness”. According to both principles, patterns of linguistic behaviour which deviate from expected routine behaviour get lexicalised rather than such which conform to conventional ways of speaking. As I have shown, effects of markedness (or salience) may not be observed with respect to the lexicalisation of concepts of directive and commissive speech acts. On the whole, my approach differs from Edmondson’s as well as from Verschueren’s in that it incorporates two principles of restricted applicability rather than only one which is generally applicable. Though an approach incorporating two lexicalisation principles is certainly less economical than one which comprises only one principle, the former does not run into the problems associated with the latter. As I have shown, different types of communication concepts call for different types of lexicalisation principles. To account for the distribution of


gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, we need at least two different lexicalisation principles with restricted applicability. The Principle of Costs and Benefits and that of Markedness do not lose their validity when complex communicative expressions are taken into account. This is due to the fact that complex communicative expressions do not fill the gaps which become apparent from the procedure whereby the values for the attributes of the categorial aspects are combined in many different ways. Given that 65.2% of the total number of the complex lexicalisations considered are synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, filling lexical gaps does not appear to be the single most important function of complex lexicalisations. In spite of the large number of complex lexicalisations occurring as synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication, 34.8% of the total number of idioms and collocations considered lack one-word synonyms. These complex communicative expressions may also be regarded as fillers of gaps in the inventory of speech act verbs and verbs of communication. However, they do not fill gaps of the kind represented by non-lexicalised combinations of values for the attributes of the categorial aspects but rather such which result from expansions of the meaning of existing verbs. The large majority (80.4%) of the idioms and collocations which do not have one-word synonyms in fact expand the meaning of corresponding verbs. Of the remaining 19.6%, 8.5% constitute hybrid fields and 11.1% independent fields of communicative expressions. These results show that, as opposed to some widespread ideas about the meaning of idioms, the function of idioms (and collocations) is not restricted to the lexicalisation of speaker attitudes and evaluations or of complex concepts and ideas. The fact that the large majority of the complex communicative expressions considered either occur as synonyms of simple communicative expressions or expand the meaning of these may in fact be taken to support the basic correctness of Searle’s speech act classification. Only idioms and collocations which constitute hybrid or completely new fields of communicative expressions do not fit into Searle’s classes. Even if Searle had taken complex communicative expressions into account, he would not have arrived at a speech act classification substantially different from the one he actually proposed.

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appendix i

English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish speech act verbs Appendix to Chapter 2: Ordering systems for concepts of communication

The English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish data below are ordered according to the categories of Edmondsons’s ordering system (cf. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3.1). The data from the six languages are presented in two matrices. The first of these comprises the English, German and Dutch data; the second lists illocutionary terms from French, Russian and Turkish. The matrices below differ from Edmondsons’s matrix (and the revised version of it) presented in Chapter 2 in two ways: – Firstly, complex lexicalisations of the category ‘verb’ are included in addition to verbs. Edmondson considered only simple lexicalisations. Yet it is possible in principle that gaps in the word inventory may be filled by complex lexicalisations such as idioms and collocations. For this reason, complex lexicalisations should be taken into account in addition to simple ones. – The second amendment concerns the order in which the data are presented. Edmondson basically distinguished between past or present events and states of affairs on the one hand and future events and states of affairs on the other. All other classification criteria are subordinate to the past/present vs. future distinction. The question of whether the involvement of S or H in the event or state of affairs is active or passive comes third in Edmondson’s hierarchy of classification criteria. I argue that the data may be arranged more clearly if the [±RESPONSIBLE] criterion is applied prior to all other classification criteria. Applying the [±RESPONSIBLE] criterion first enables us to separate cases where S or H is to be held responsible for the event or state of affairs from such where he/she is not. In what follows, I shall refer to the former as “actions” and to the latter as “events”. The distinction between actions and events will be the basis of the matrices containing the data from English, German, Dutch, French, Russian and Turkish. All other classification criteria will


be subordinate to the distinction between actions and events. The matrices below are based on the following hierarchy of classification criteria:

(i) [±RESPONSIBLE], i.e. actions vs. events: [+RESPONSIBLE] charac terises actions, while events carry the feature [–RESPONSIBLE]. (ii) SPEAKER VS. HEARER INVOLVEMENT IN A (iii) [±FUTURE]: The event or state of affairs A is located in time sub sequently to the utterance described by the illocutionary term or it is not. (iv) A is perceived as having CONSEQUENCES or EFFECTS which are good or bad (v) for either S or H.

Figure 1 shows the structure underlying the matrices. In the matrices below, verbs and multiword expressions occurring only once appear in italics.

Figure 1. Classification of actions and events

Appendix I. Speech act verbs 225

Matrix A: English/German/Dutch PAST ACTIONS OF S 1. Past Actions of S; desirable consequences for S English boast brag show off

German angeben prahlen protzen aufschneiden

Dutch opscheppen bluffen opsnijden snoeven

praise (oneself)

(sich selbst) rühmen/loben

zichzelf loven/prijzen

blow one’s own trumpet

den Mund (zu) voll nehmen

2. Past Actions of S; desirable consequences for H English boast brag show off



praise (oneself)


(zichzelf) loven/prijzen



3. Past Actions of S; undesirable consequences for S English deplore (HYBRID)

German Dutch (etwas) bedauern (HYBRID) betreuren (HYBRID) bereuen (HYBRID) berouw tonen

accuse (oneself) blame (oneself)

(sich selbst) beschuldigen (zichzelf) beschuldigen (sich selbst) bezichtigen (sich selbst) die Schuld geben


4. Past Actions by S; undesirable consequences for H English apologise ask for forgiveness make one’s apologies/excuses

German (sich) entschuldigen um Entschuldigung/ Vergebung/Verzeihung bitten eine Entschuldigung aussprechen

Dutch zich verontschuldigen iemand om vergeving vragen zijn verontschuldigingen/ excuses aanbieden

FUTURE ACTIONS OF S 5. Future Action of S; desirable consequences for S English renounce

German verzichten

Dutch afstand van iets doen

6. Future Action of S; desirable consequences for H English promise make/give a promise

German versprechen ein Versprechen geben

Dutch beloven een belofte doen

propose make a proposal offer make an offer

vorschlagen einen Vorschlag machen anbieten ein Angebot machen/ unterbreiten

voorstellen een voorstel doen aanbieden een aanbod doen

7. Future Actions of S; undesirable consequences for S English ∅

German ∅

Dutch ∅

8. Future Actions of S; undesirable consequences for H English threaten menace utter a threat against somebody

German drohen/androhen/bedrohen Drohungen ausstoßen

Dutch dreigen/bedreigen bedreigingen uiten


PAST ACTIONS OF H 9. Past Actions of H; desirable consequences for S English thank

German danken seinen Dank aussprechen

Dutch danken/ bedanken

welcome

begrüßen

begroeten

praise sing somebody’s praises

loben preisen ein Loblied auf jmdn. anstimmen/ singen jemandes Lob singen jmdm. ein Lob erteilen

loven prijzen iemand een pluim geven iemands lof zingen/ verkondigen

10. Past Actions of H; desirable consequences for H English praise sing somebody’s praises

German loben preisen ein Loblied auf jmdn. anstimmen/singen jemandes Lob singen jmdm. ein Lob erteilen

Dutch loven prijzen iemands lof zingen/ verkondigen iemand een pluim geven

congratulate compliment pay somebody a compliment

gratulieren beglückwünschen jmdm. ein Kompliment machen

feliciteren gelukwensen iemand een Kompliment maken


11. Past actions of H; undesirable consequences for S English complain lament bewail bemoan

German sich beklagen sein Leid klagen Klage führen ein Klaglied über jmdn. anstimmen jammern lamentieren sich beschweren etwas bedauern

Dutch zich beklagen zijn beklag doen jammeren betreuren

curse damn execrate

jmdn. verfluchen einen Fluch über jmdn. aussprechen/verhängen jmdn. verdammen jmdn. verwünschen

iem. vervloeken een vervloeking uitspreken

pardon forgive excuse

jmdn. verzeihen jmdn. entschuldigen

accuse blame

jmdn. beschuldigen jmdn. bezichtigen jmdm. die Schuld geben

iem. beschuldigen beschuldigingen tegen iem. inbrengen aantijgen betichten

criticise reprimand admonish rebuke reprove

kritsieren tadeln rügen missbilligen vorwerfen jmdm. einen Vorwurf machen

kritiseren berispen laken afkeuren hekelen verwijten iem. ergens een verwijt van maken

condemn

verurteilen

veroordelen


12. Past actions of H; undesirable consequences for H English sympathise (HYBRID) commiserate (HYBRID)

German Dutch jmdn. bedauern (HYBRID) zijn sympathie betuigen jmdn. bemitleiden (HYBRID) zijn medelijden betuigen jmdn. beweinen jmdn. beklagen

FUTURE ACTIONS OF H 13. Future Actions of H; desirable consequences for S English request demand require

German auffordern verlangen fordern

Dutch eisen verlangen vergen vorderen

ask (to do sth.) beg

bitten flehen anflehen

vragen (iets te doen) smeken verzoeken

prophesy predict foretell

prophezeien vorhersagen voraussagen

profeteren voorspellen

14. Future Actions of H; desirable consequences for H English advise give advice propose suggest make a suggestion

German raten jmdm. einen Rat geben vorschlagen jmdm. einen Vorschlag machen

Dutch aanraden raad geven adviseren voorstellen iem. een voorstel doen

recommend

empfehlen

aanbevelen





15. Future Actions of H; undesirable consequences for S English forbid prohibit

German verbieten untersagen

Dutch verbieden ontzeggen

allow permit

erlauben zulassen (HYBRID)

toestaan toelaten




schwarzmalen unken heraufbeschwören den Teufel an die Wand malen

16. Future Actions of H; undesirable consequences for H English ∅

German Dutch zumuten ∅ aufbürden jmdm. etw. aufs Auge drücken een last op iemands schouders leggen

∅ dissuade discourage talk sb. out of sth.

abraten ausreden jmdn. von etw. abbringen

afraden iem. iets uit het hoofd praten iem. ergens van afbrengen

erlauben zulassen (HYBRID)

toestaan toelaten



allow permit prophesy predict foretell



PAST EVENTS WITH SPEAKER INVOLVEMENT 17. Past event; S involved; desirable consequences for S English boast brag show off



praise (oneself)


zichzelf loven/prijzen



18. Past event; S involved; desirable consequences for H English ∅

German ∅

Dutch ∅

19. Past event; S involved; undesirable consequences for S English curse (something)

German (etwas) verfluchen über etwas fluchen das Schicksal verfluchen

Dutch (iets) vervloeken

complain utter complaints lament bewail (oneself) bemoan (oneself)

über etwas klagen Klage führen ein Klagelied über etwas anstimmen sein Leid klagen jammern lamentieren wehklagen sich selbst bedauern (HYBRID) sich selbst beweinen sich selbst bemitleiden (HYBRID)

zich beklagen zijn beklag doen jammeren weeklagen


20. Past event; S involved; undesirable consequences for H English commiserate (with sb.) (HYBRID) sympathise (with sb.) (HYBRID) bemoan (sb.) bewail (sb.)

German Dutch jmdn. bemitleiden (HYBRID) zijn sympathie betuigen jmdn. bedauern (HYBRID) jmdn. beweinen jmdn. beklagen

FUTURE EVENTS WITH SPEAKER INVOLVEMENT 21. Future events; S involved; desirable consequences for S English prophesy predict foretell

German prophezeien vorhersagen voraussagen

Dutch profeteren voorspellen

22. Future events; S involved; desirable consequences for H English prophesy predict foretell



23. Future events; S involved; undesirable consequences for S English prophesy predict foretell

German prophezeien vorhersagen voraussagen schwarzmalen unken heraufbeschwören den Teufel an die Wand malen



24. Future events; S involved; undesirable consequences for H English prophesy predict foretell




PAST EVENTS WITH HEARER INVOLVEMENT 25. Past events; H involved; desirable consequences for S English ∅

German ∅

Dutch ∅

26. Past events; H involved; desirable consequences for H English congratulate

German gratulieren beglückwünschen

Dutch feliciteren gelukwensen

compliment pay somebody a compliment

jmdm. ein Kompliment machen

iem. een kompliment maken


27. Past events; H involved; undesirable consequences for S English curse (something)

German (etwas) verfluchen über etwas fluchen das Schicksal verfluchen

Dutch (iets) vervloeken

complain utter complaints lament bewail (oneself) bemoan (oneself)

über etwas klagen Klage führen ein Klagelied über etwas anstimmen sein Leid klagen jammern lamentieren wehklagen sich selbst bedauern (HYBRID) sich selbst beweinen (HYBRID) sich selbst bemitleiden (HYBRID)

zich beklagen zijn beklag doen jammeren weeklagen

28. Past events; H involved; undesirable consequences for H English commiserate (with sb.) (HYBRID) sympathise (with sb.) (HYBRID) bemoan (sb.) bewail (sb.)

German Dutch jmdn. bemitleiden (HYBRID) zijn sympathie betuigen jmdn. bedauern (HYBRID) jmdn. beweinen (HYBRID) jmdn. beklagen

FUTURE EVENTS WITH HEARER INVOLVEMENT 29. Future events; H involved; desirable consequences for S English prophesy predict foretell




30. Future events; H involved; desirable consequences for H English prophesy predict foretell



31. Future events; H involved; undesirable consequences for S English prophesy predict foretell




32. Future events; H involved; undesirable consequences for H English prophesy predict foretell



schwarzmalen unken heraufbeschwören den Teufel an die Wand malen warn

warnen

waarschuwen


Matrix B: French/Russian/Turkish PAST ACTIONS OF S 1. Past Actions of S; desirable consequences for S French se vanter crâner afficher

Russian chvastat’sja zadavat’sja kičit’sja zagibat’ (UMG.)

Turkish ağız satmak avurt etmek/satmak/şişirmek ağzı ile aslan tuttuğunu söylemek atıp tutmak

se féliciter de glorifier ses actes

chvalit’sja

övünmek

faire le fanfaron faire étalage de

bachvalit’sja

palavra atmak

2. Past Actions of S; desirable consequences for H French se vanter crâner afficher

Russian chvastat’sja zadavat’sja kičit’sja zagibat’ (UMG.)



chvalit’sja

övünmek


bachvalit’sja

palavra atmak


3. Past Actions of S; undesirable consequences for S French regretter (HYBRID) déplorer (HYBRID)

Russian sožalet’ (HYBRID) žalet’ (HYBRID)

Turkish üzgün olmak (HYBRID) pişman olmak (HYBRID)

s’accuser se culpabiliser s’imputer la faute

obvinjat’ sebja uličat’ sebja vinit’ samogo sebja

kendini suçlamak suçu kendine vermek

4. Past Actions by S; undesirable consequences for H French regretter déplorer

Russian izvinjats’ja prosit’ izvinenija/proščenija

Turkish özür dilemek af dilemek

s’excuser faire/donner ses excuses demander/implorer pardon se culpabiliser

prinosit’ (svoi) izvinenija

dereden tepeden su getirmek

FUTURE ACTIONS OF S 5. Future Action of S; desirable consequences for S French renoncer

Russian otkazyvat’sja

Turkish vazgeçmek

6. Future Action of S; desirable consequences for H French promettre donner une/sa promesse

Russian obeščat’ davat’ obeščanija

Turkish söz vermek vaat etmek

proposer offrir

predlagat’ delat’/vnosit’ predloženije

önermek öneri yapmak teklif etmek bir teklifte bulunmak


7. Future Actions of S; undesirable consequences for S French ∅

Russian ∅

Turkish ∅

8. Future Actions of S; undesirable consequences for H French menacer jurer vengeance

Russian grozit’/prigrozit’/ugrožat’

Turkish tehdit etmek

PAST ACTIONS OF H 9. Past Actions of H; desirable consequences for S French remercier exprimer sa reconnaissance

louer louanger chanter les louages de qn. exprimer ses louanges glorifier célébrer féliciter vanter qn. rendre hommage à qn. donner des coups d’encensoir

Russian Turkish blagodarit’ teşekkür etmek vyražat’/prinosit’ blagodarnost’ privetstvovat’

memnuniyet ile karşılamak (HYBRID)

chvalit’ voshvaljat’ prevosnosit’ pet’ difiramby

övmek methetmek

raschvalivat’ rastočat’ pochvaly otmečat’ zaslugi

(biri hakkında) iyi söylemek

(birinden) takdirle bahsetmek


10. Past Actions of H; desirable consequences for H French louer louanger chanter les louages de qn. exprimer ses louanges glorifier célébrer féliciter vanter qn. donner des coups d’encensoir

Russian chvalit’ voshvaljat’ prevosnosit’ pet’ difiramby

Turkish övmek methetmek

féliciter rendre hommage à qn. faire un compliment/des compliments à qn. complimenter qn.

raschvalivat’ rastočat’ pochvaly otmečat’ zaslugi

(birinden) takdirle bahsetmek (biri hakkında) iyi söylemek

pozdravljat’

tebrik etmek kutlamak kompliman yapmak

delat’ kompliment


11. Past actions of H; undesirable consequences for S French se plaindre râler rouspéter faire des jérémiades

Russian žalovat’sja žalovat’sja na svoi stradanija podavat’ žalobu

Turkish şikayet etmek dert dökmek

golosit’ pričitat’ vyražat’ nedovolstvo (so)žalet’

birisi için ağlamak inleyip sızlamak (bir şeyden dolayı) yakınıp durmak şikayet etmek pişman olmak (HYBRID)

maudire

proklinat’ prizyvat’ prokljat’je na čju-to golovu

beddua etmek bela okumak kahretmek lanet okumak

pardonner

proščat’ kogo-libo izvinjat’ kogo-libo

birini affetmek mazur görmek

accuser

obvinjat’ kogo-libo uličat’ kogo-libo vinit’ kogo-libo

birini suçlamak

critiquer

kritikovat’ rugat’ branit’

eleştirmek azarlamak kınamak tasvip etmek

réprimander désapprouver réprouver reprocher faire des reproches à qn.

poricat’ ne odobrjat’ delat’ komu-libo uprjok

kusur bulmak yargılamak

condamner

osuždat’

hakkını helal etmek

birine suç vermek


12. Past actions of H; undesirable consequences for H French plaindre qn. (HYBRID) complatir qn. (HYBRID) témoigner sa pitié/ compassion

Russian žalet’ kogo-libo (HYBRID) sočuvstvovat’ komu-libo (HYBRID) oplakivat’ kogo-libo

Turkish birisıne acımak merhamet etmek/göstermek birine ağlamak birine ağlamak

zloradstvovat’

FUTURE ACTIONS OF H 13. Future Actions of H; desirable consequences for S French demander exiger oronner

Russian prizyvat’ k čemu-libo trebovat’

Turkish davet etmek istemek talep etmek

prier

prosit’

supplier

molit’ umoljat’

rica etmek arzu etmek yalvarmak

prophétiser prédire

proročit’ predskazyvat’

tefeül etmek peygamberlik etmek tahmin yapmak

14. Future Actions of H; desirable consequences for H French conseiller

Russian sovetovat’ davat’ komu-libo sovet

Turkish önermek fikir vermek nasihat vermek

proposer

predlagat’ delat’ predloženije

teklif etmek bir teklifde bulunmak

recommender

rekomendovat’

tavsiye etmek



peygamberlik etmek tefeül etmek tahmin yapmak


15. Future Actions of H; undesirable consequences for S French défendre interdire

Russian zapreščat’ vospreščat’

müsade etmek kabul etmek

dissuader prophétiser prédire

Turkish yasak etmek yasaklamak


tahmin yapmak

karkat’ naklikivat’ bedu/opasnost’

kötümsemek

16. Future Actions of H; undesirable consequences for H French mettre qc. sur le dos de qn.

Russian vzvalivat’ vozlagat’ (vzvalivat’) čto-to komu-to na pleči navjazyvat’

déconseiller

otsovetovat’

dissuader

otgovarivat’ uderjivat’ kogo-libo ot čegolibo



tahmin yapmak


kötümsemek

Turkish (birinin) sırtına birşey yüklemek

tavsiye etmemek birini birseyden caydırmak vazgeçirmek müsade etmek


PAST EVENTS WITH SPEAKER INVOLVEMENT 17. Past event; S involved; desirable consequences for S French se vanter crâner afficher

Russian chvastat’sja zadavat’sja kičit’sja zagibat’ (UMG)



chvalit’sja

övünmek


bachvalit’sja

palavra atmak

18. Past event; S involved; desirable consequences for H French ∅

Russian ∅

Turkish (hakkını) helal etmek

19. Past event; S involved; undesirable consequences for S French maudire

Russian proklinat’ kljast’ sud’bu

Turkish lanetlemek lanet etmek

se plaindre (de)/(auprès de qn.)

žalovat’sja podavat’ žalobu

şikayet etmek birşey için ağlamak

déplorer confier sa douleur se lamenter sur son sort se répandre en lamentations faire des jérémiades s’appitoyer sur soi-même (HYBRID)

žalovat’sja na svoi stradanija golosit’ pričitat’ setovat’ žalet’ sebja (HYBRID) oplakivat’ sebja (HYBRID)

dert dökmek inleyip sızlamak (bir şeyden dolayı) yakınıp durmak ah etmek kendine ağlamak kendine acımak (HYBRID)


20. Past event; S involved; undesirable consequences for H French s’appitoyer (HYBRID) plaindre (qn.) (HYBRID) déplorer (qn.) (HYBRID) faire des jérémiades

Russian žalet’ kogo-libo (HYBRID) sočuvstvovat’ komu-libo (HYBRID) oplakivat’ kogo-libo

Turkish birine acımak merhamet etmek birine ağlamak

FUTURE EVENTS WITH SPEAKER INVOLVEMENT 21. Future events; S involved; desirable consequences for S French prophétiser prédire

Russian proročit’ predskazyvat’

Turkish peygamberlik etmek tahmin yapmak tefeül etmek hayra yormak

22. Future events; S involved; desirable consequences for H French prophétiser prédire



23. Future events; S involved; undesirable consequences for S French prophétiser prédire


Turkish peygamberlik etmek tahmin yapmak


kötümsemek


24. Future events; S involved; undesirable consequences for H French prophétiser prédire




kötümsemek

PAST EVENTS WITH HEARER INVOLVEMENT 25. Past events; H involved; desirable consequences for S German ∅

Russian ∅

Turkish ∅

26. Past events; H involved; desirable consequences for H French féliciter présenter ses félicitations

Russian pozdravljat’

Turkish tebrik etmek kutlamak

faire un compliment/des compliments à qn. complimenter qn.

delat’ kompliment

kompliman yapmak methetmek


27. Past events; H involved; undesirable consequences for S French maudire

Russian proklinat’ proklinat’ sudbu

Turkish lanetlemek lanet etmek

se plaindre (de)/(auprès de qn.)

žalovat’sja podavat’ žalobu

şikayet etmek birşey için ağlamak

déplorer confier sa douleur se lamenter sur son sort se répandre en lamentations faire des jérémiades

žalovat’sja na svoi strdanija golosit’ pričitat’ setovat’ žalet’ sebja (HYBRID)

dert dökmek inleyip sızlamak (bir şeyden dolayı) yakınıp durmak ah etmek

s’appitoyer sur soi-même (HYBRID)

oplakivat’ sebja (HYBRID)

kendine ağlamak kendine acımak (HYBRID)

28. Past events; H involved; undesirable consequences for H French s’appitoyer (sur qn.) (HYBRID) déplorer qn. (HYBRID) plaindre qn. (HYBRID) compatir qn. (HYBRID) témoigner sa compassion

Russian žalet’ kogo-libo (HYBRID) sočuvstvovat’ komu-libo (HYBRID) oplakivat’ kogo-libo (HYBRID)

Turkish birisine acımak merhamet etmek birine ağlamak

FUTURE EVENTS WITH HEARER INVOLVEMENT 29. Future events; H involved; desirable consequences for S French prophétiser prédire

Russin proročit’ predskazyvat’



30. Future events; H involved; desirable consequences for H French prophétiser prédire



31. Future events; H involved; undesirable consequences for S French prophétiser prédire




kötümsemek

32. Future events; H involved; undesirable consequences for H French prophétiser prédire

avertir prévenir




kötümsemek

predosteregat’ predupreždat’

uyarmak

appendix ii

German idioms and collocations Appendix to Chapter 4: Concepts of communication lexicalised by idioms and collocations

This part of the appendix lists the German idioms and collocations whose lexicalisation properties are discussed in Chapter 4. The criteria used for selecting particular idioms and collocations to be included in the corpus are explained in Section 4.3. The corpus comprises 676 German idioms and collocations used to refer to linguistic actions. Expressions with more than one sense as a communicative expression were counted as often as they had different senses. The corpus comprises 18 such polysemous expressions. 17 of these had two different speech act-related readings; only one of them turned out to have three such readings. Polysemous idioms and collocations are marked by a number (1, 2 or 3) following the expression in question. These numbers refer to the relevant sense of the expression. The idioms and collocations listed in this part of the appendix have been classified according to their function. Hence, three different kinds of idioms and collocations have been listed:

I. Complex communicative expressions used as synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication and such which expand the meaning of these. II. Idioms and collocations constituting hybrid fields of communicative expressions. III. Idioms and collocations constituting independent lexical fields. In Appendix I, idioms and collocations are classified as belonging to or expanding a particular verb field. These verb fields have been assigned names. For example, commissives like einwilligen (agree (to do something)) are grouped together in a field called ‘COMMISSIVES/REACTIVE/POSITIVE’ and expressives like danken (thank) are part of a field called ‘EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY/THANK’. The names of the lexical fields listed are the same as those used to label verb fields in the dictionary volume of the Handbuch deutscher Kommunikationsverben. Underneath the names of the different lexical fields is a short description of the kind of verbs belonging to each of them. For example, the field named ‘COM-


MISSIVES/REACTIVE/POSITIVE’ is characterised as containing verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a demand or a preceding utterance by expressing that he/she wants to do P. The field named ‘EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY/THANK’ is described as comprising verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she is grateful for something the hearer has done to him/her. Underneath these characterisations is a list of idioms and collocations which may be used as synonyms of the verbs belonging to a particular field. These idioms and collocations are followed by complex lexicalisations which expand the meaning of the verbs belonging to that field. These idioms and collocations are listed under headings such as ‘DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/GENERAL + X’ (where “X” stands for the part of the meaning of an idiom or collocation which goes beyond the meaning of a corresponding verb). Idioms and collocations expanding the meaning of verbs have been grouped according to the way in which they expand the meaning of these verbs (e.g. ‘DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ GENERAL + MODALITY’, ‘DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/GENERAL + SPECIFICATION of P’ etc.). Each of the complex communicative expressions listed is followed by a characterisation of its lexical status. This means that each expression has been classified as being a collocation (abbreviated as “COLL”), a fully idiomatic expression (abbreviated as “I”) or a semi-idiomatic expression (abbreviated as “SI”). The figures following the idiom list illustrate the relative importance of the functions which idioms and collocations fulfil in the lexicalisation domain of communicative expressions. I. Idioms as synonyms of speech act verbs and verbs of communication/idioms expanding the meaning of speech act verbs and verbs of communication GENERAL VERBS OF SAYING Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker utters something to a hearer sagen, sprechen, sich äußern (‘say’, ‘speak’, ‘utter’) einer Sache Ausdruck geben/ verleihen – COLL; etw. zum Ausdruck bringen – COLL; etw. laut werden lassen – COLL; etw. vom Stapel lassen – I; etw. in Worte kleiden – I GENERAL VERBS OF SAYING + X X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: somebody’s favourite theme: seinem/ dem Affen Zucker geben – I P: something which oppresses S: Luft ablassen – I P: many trivial Utt (P):

Appendix II. German idioms and collocations 251

das Blaue vom Himmel (herunter) reden – SI; (leere) Phrasen dreschen – I; leeres Stroh dreschen – I P: a delicate issue: in ein Wespennest greifen/ stechen – I P: something which somebody else was about to say: jmdm. das Wort aus dem Mund(e)/ von der Zunge nehmen - I X: MODALITY Modality: directly jmdm. etw. ins Gesicht sagen – SI Modality: laboriously: einen langen Salm machen – I; mit (den) Händen und Füßen reden – SI Modality: boldly, pertly: den Mund/ das Maul/ die Klappe aufreißen – I; die Schnauze/ den Schnabel aufmachen – I; eine (dicke/ große) Lippe riskieren – I Modality: correctly and truly: den Nagel auf den Kopf treffen – I Modality: accurately: etw. auf den Punkt bringen – I Modality: incessantly: ohne Punkt und Komma reden – SI; reden wie ein Buch/ ein Wasserfall – SI Modality: not clearly: in Rätseln reden/sprechen – SI Modality: frankly: reden, wie einem der Schnabel gewachsen ist – SI; frei/ frisch von der Leber weg reden/ sprechen – SI Modality: briefly: sich kurz fassen – I Modality: incoherently: einen Stiefel (zusammen)reden – SI Modality: energetically: auf den Tisch hauen/ schlagen – I Modality: improperly: sich im Ton vergreifen – I Modality: inaccurately: ins unreine sprechen – SI Modality: eloquently: mit tausend Zungen reden – SI; mit Engelszungen reden – SI X: RESULT Result: without effect: sich den Mund fusselig reden – SI Result: without effect (+ many Utt(P)): tauben Ohren predigen – I; gegen eine Wand/ Mauer reden – I; in den Wind reden – I


General verbs of saying Total: 36 Inside lexical fields: 5 Collocations: 3 Non-literal Idioms: 2 Semi-literal idioms: 0 Expansions of lexical fields: 31 Collocations: 0 Non-literal idioms: 18 Semi-literal idioms: 13 _________________________________________________________________________ REPRESENTATIVES 1. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/CLAIM Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker claims something to be true behaupten (‘claim’) den Beweis für etw. antreten – SI; etw. zu bedenken geben – COLL; ein Urteil fällen 1 – COLL cf. DECLARATIVES/JUDICIARY REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/CLAIM + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: S innocent: seine Hände in Unschuld waschen – I P: S is witness to something: jmdn. als Zeugen anrufen – COLL 2. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/FESTSTELLEN Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker wants to draw attention to something which is self-evident feststellen, konstatieren (English: ‘state’) eine Feststellung treffen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/FESTSTELLEN + X: 0 3. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/H RESPONSIBLE FOR P Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she thinks that the hearer is responsible for P; P is considered to be bad beschuldigen, bezichtigen (‘accuse’): jmdm. Schuld (an etw.) geben – COLL


REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/H RESPONSIBLE FOR P+ X: X: EVALUATION Evaluation by SDS: HRS is unjustly accused: jmdm. etw. in die Schuhe schieben – I; jmdm. die Schuld an etw. in die Schuhe schieben – SI 4. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/LIE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker wants a hearer to recognise that he/she (i.e. S) takes P to be true, while he/she (i.e. S) does not take P to be true lügen (‘lie’) jmdm. einen Bären aufbinden – I; jmdn. über den Löffel barbieren/balbieren (lügen) – I; jmdm. blauen Dunst vormachen – I; das Blaue von Himmel herunter lügen/ schwindeln – SI; jmdm. die Hucke/die Jacke voll lügen – SI; lügen, dass sich die Balken biegen – SI; lügen wie gedruckt – SI; einem vom Pferd/ vom Wald erzählen – I irreführen (‘mislead’) jmdn. in die Irre führen/ leiten/ locken – I; jmdn. auf die falsche Fährte locken – I; jmdn. auf Glatteis führen – I; jmdn. auf den Leim führen/ locken – I täuschen (‘deceive’) jmdn. hinters Licht führen – I; jmdn. zum Narren halten – I; jmdn. an der Nase herumführen – I; jmdm. Sand in die Augen streuen – I; sein Spiel mit jmdm. treiben – I; einen Türken bauen – I; jmdm. ein X für ein U vormachen – I REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/LIE + X: X: MODALITY Modality: directly: jmdm. ins Gesicht lügen – SI Modality: ambigously: mit gespaltener Zunge reden – I 5. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/NOT P Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she no longer takes something to be true or valid widerrufen, zurücknehmen, zurückziehen, dementieren (‘revoke’, ‘deny’) REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/NOT P + X: 0 6. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/INTENSIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker emphatically expresses that he/she takes something to be true beteuern, bekräftigen, versichern, beschwören (‘assure’, ‘affirm’, ‘aver’, ‘swear’) seine/ die Hand für jmdn./ etw. ins Feuer legen – I; Stein und Bein schwören – SI


REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/INTENSIVE + X: 0 7. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REACTIVE/YES Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a hearer’s statement by expressing that he/she takes P to be true beipflichten, zustimmen (‘agree’, ‘concur’, ‘consent’) jmdm. recht geben – COLL; seine Zustimmung geben/ erteilen 1 – COLL, Cf. DIRECTIVES/ REQUEST/PERMIT REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REACTIVE/YES + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: the opinion of the majority: mit dem Strom schwimmen – I X: MODALITY Modality: completely: jedes Wort unterschreiben – I 8. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REACTIVE/DOUBT: P Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a hearer’s statement by expressing his/her doubts anzweifeln, bezweifeln (‘doubt’) etw. in Zweifel ziehen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REACTIVE/DOUBT+ X: 0 9. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REACTIVE/NO Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a hearer’s statement by expressing that he/she takes P not to be true abstreiten, bestreiten, dementieren, kontern (‘dispute’, ‘contest’, ‘deny’) etw. in Abrede stellen – I; etw. in Frage stellen (bestreiten) – I; schweres/ grobes Geschütz auffahren – I; Kontra geben – I; jmdm./ etw. Paroli bieten – I; wider den Stachel lecken/ löcken – I; jmdm./ einer Sache die Stirn bieten – I; jmdm. Unrecht geben – COLL; etw. von sich weisen – I REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REACTIVE/NO + X X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: reproach: – sich seiner Haut wehren – I P: the opinion of the majority: – gegen/ wider den Strom schwimmen – I


10. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REREACTIVE/ YET P Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a reactive statement of a hearer by expressing that he/she still takes P to be true bestehen auf, beharren auf, pochen auf (‘insist (on something being the case)’) REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REREACTIVE/YET P + X X: MODALITY Modality: emphatically: auf sein Recht pochen 1 – COLL, cf. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/DEMAND/REACTIVE 11. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REREACTIVE/RATHER NOT P Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a reactive statement of a hearer by expressing that he/she takes not P to be true einlenken, einräumen, nachgeben, entgegenkommen (‘give in’, ‘yield’) einen Kompromiss eingehen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVE/REREACTIVE/RATHER NOT P + X: X: MODALITY Modality: humbly: klein beigeben – I Modality: reciprocally: sich auf halbem Weg(e) treffen – I; jmdm. auf halbem Weg(e) entgegenkommen – I 12. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/SEQUENCE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker utters several Utt(P) to express that he/she takes something to be true argumentieren (‘argue’) Argumente vorführen/ anführen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/SEQUENCE + X: 0 13. REPRESENTATIVES/ASERTIVES/RESULT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker presents several arguments to make a hearer believe something to be true überzeugen (‘convince’) jmdm. etw. glauben machen – I; jmdm. ein Kind in den Bauch reden – I; jmdm. etw. in die Ohren blasen – I; jmdm. etw. in den Mund legen – I; jmdn. auf seine Seite bringen/ ziehen – I; jmdn. zur Einsicht bringen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/RESULT + X: 0


14. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/INFORMATION Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer of something (P) mitteilen (‘inform’) jmdm. Bescheid sagen (jmdn. benachrichtigen) – COLL; jmdn. über etw. ins Bild setzen (informieren) – I; (etw.) von sich hören lassen – I; jmdn. von etw. in Kenntnis setzen – COLL; jmdm. etw. zur Kenntnis bringen – COLL; jmdm. ein Licht aufstecken – I; etw. an den Mann bringen – I; jmdn. schlau machen – I; jmdn. etw. wissen lassen – COLL berichten (‘report’) Bericht geben/ erstatten – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/INFORMATION + X X: RESULT Result: without effect: sich um den (um seinen) Hals/ Kopf und Kragen reden – SI Result: H annoyed: jmdm. die Ohren voll blasen/ schwätzen – I Result: H has a wish which cannot be fulfilled: jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen – I Result: H wishes something: jmdm. den Mund wässrig machen – I Result: H disillusioned: jmdm. den Zahn ziehen – I X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: something which oppresses S: seinem Herzen Luft machen – I P: something disagreeable: jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben – I P: something which is already well-known: die alte Platte laufen lassen/ spielen – I; die alte/die gleiche/dieselbe Walze auflegen/ spielen – I P: a justification or reason for S’s action: jmdm. über etw. Rechenschaft geben/ ablegen – COLL P: the truth about a certain state of affairs: jmdm. reinen/ klaren Wein einschenken – I X: SPECIFICATION (P) + RESULT P: something which is not supposed to be known by H: jmdm. etw. auf die Nase binden – I X: MODALITY Modality: directly: jmdm. etw. auf den Kopf zusagen – I Modality: laboriously: auf/ über die Dörfer gehen – I


Modality: elaborately: Romane/ einen ganzen Roman erzählen – SI Modality: formally: etw. auf den Tisch des Hauses legen – I X: ASPECT Aspect: iterative jmdn. auf dem laufenden halten – I 15. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/MENTION Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker gives information on a certain topic REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/MENTION + X: 0 16. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/REMIND Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reminds a hearer of something (P) REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/REMIND + X: 0 17. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/ZUTRAGEN Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer of something which is not supposed to be known by that hearer; knowing P is to the interest of H hinterbringen (English: ∅) REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/ZUTRAGEN + X: 0 18. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/REVEAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something which is secret and not to be made public enthüllen, preisgeben, verraten, aufdecken (‘reveal’, ‘uncover’, ‘disclose’, ‘divulge’, ‘betray’) die Hosen runterlassen – I; die Katze aus dem Sack lassen – I; aus dem Nähkästchen plau dern – I; den Schleier (des Geheimnisses) lüften – I; etw. an den Tag bringen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/REVEAL + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: the internal affairs of a specific soial group: aus der Schule plaudern – I X: MODALITY Modality: directly:


das Kind beim (rechten/ richtigen) Namen nennen – I; die Dinge beim Namen nennen – I; Ross und Reiter nennen – SI X: EVALUATION schmutzige Wäsche waschen – I (negative evaluation of P) 19. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/CONFIDENTIAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs a hearer about something which is meant to be known by nobody but that hearer anvertrauen (‘entrust’, ‘confide’) jmdn. ins Vertrauen ziehen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/CONFIDENTIAL + X X: SPECIFICATION (P) + RESULT P: Something which oppresses S + Result: something which concerns S: jmdm. sein Herz ausschütten – I; sich etw. vom Herzen reden – I 20. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/FUTURE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that something will be the case in the future ankündigen, vorhersagen (‘announce’, ‘predict’) REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/FUTURE + X:0 21. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/FUTURE/WARN Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she does not want a hearer to do something which he/she expects to have negative consequences for that hearer warnen (‘warn’) Alarm schlagen – SI; – eine Warnung aussprechen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/FUTURE/WARN + X: 0 22. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/PUBLIC Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker informs several hearers of something (P) bekanntmachen, verbreiten (‘spread’, ‘circulate’, ‘disseminate’, ‘propagate’) etw. an die große Glocke hängen – I; etw. ans Licht bringen/ ziehen/ zerren – I; eine Mitteilung machen – COLL; etw. unter die Leute/ unters Volk bringen – I; etw. in Umlauf bringen – I


REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/PUBLIC + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: unreliable information: etw. in die Welt setzen – I (unreliable: negative evaluation by SDS) 23. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SUGGEST Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker indirectly informs a hearer of something (P) suggerieren, insinuieren (‘suggest’, ‘insinuate’) REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SUGGEST + X: 0 24. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/TRANSMIT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker provides a hearer with information he/she has obtained from a third person übermitteln, überbringen, ausrichten, bestellen (‘transmit’, ‘convey’) REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/TRANSMIT + X: 0 25. REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker utters several Utt(P) to explain something exactly erklären, klarmachen, darlegen, verdeutlichen, nahe bringen (‘explain’, ‘clarify’, ‘elucidate’, ‘expound’) jmdm. etw. schmackhaft machen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: something which is not clear: etw. ins reine bringen – I; klar Schiff machen – I P: the truth about a state of affairs about which H was wrongly informed: jmdm. die Binde von den Augen reißen/ nehmen – I Representatives Total: 112 70 Inside lexical fields: Collocations: 19 Non-literal idioms: 44 Semi- literal idioms: 7


Expansions of lexical fields: 42 Collocations: 3 Non-literal idioms: 34 Semi-literal idioms: 5 _________________________________________________________________________ DIRECTIVES 1. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/GENERAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants a hearer to do something auffordern, ersuchen (‘request’, ‘ask (someone to do something)’), mahnen1, ermahnen1 (‘exhort’, ‘urge’) jmdm. auf den Fuß (die Füße)/ die Hühneraugen treten – I, cf. XPR.VAL.NEG.RESULT DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/GENERAL + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: H must leave: jmdm. jmdn. auf den Hals hetzen/ schicken – I + Pres(S): X does not want to meet H; jmdn. auf den Mond schießen – I; jmdm. die Tür weisen – I; jmdn. zur Tür hinaus befördern – I; jmdn. vor die Tür setzen – I P: H is to go voting: jmdn. zu den Urnen rufen – I P: something which has negative conseqeunces for H: jmdm. etw. aufs Auge drücken – I; jmdm. etw. ans Bein binden – I; jmdm. etw. unter die Weste jubeln/ schieben – I P: H is to show discipline: jmdn. zur Ordnung rufen – COLL X: MODALITY Modality: fast: jmdm. in den Hintern/ den Arsch treten – I; jmdm. Feuer unter dem Hintern/ Arsch/ Schwanz/ Frack machen – I; jmdm. Pfeffer in den Arsch blasen – I; jmdm. (lange) Beine machen – I; jmdm. Dampf machen – I; jmdn. auf Draht/ auf Trab/ auf Zack bringen – I; jmdm. auf den Sack treten 1 – I (Modality: fast + stylistic register ‘rude’) cf. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/REPROACH 2. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/DEMAND Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker emphatically expresses that he/she wants a hearer to do something fordern, einfordern, anfordern (‘demand’, ‘require’, ‘claim’) seinen Anspruch/ Ansprüche geltend machen/ erheben – COLL; Forderungen stellen – COLL; jmdm. ein Rechnung aufmachen – I


DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/DEMAND + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: justification for H’s action: von jmdm. Rechenschaft über etw. fordern/ verlangen – COLL; jmdn. zur Rede stellen – I 3. DIRECTIVES/ASK/NEUTRAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker politely expresses that he/she wants a hearer to do something bitten, ersuchen, nachsuchen, sich ausbitten (‘ask (someone to do something)’, ‘seek’, ‘solicit’) in/ wegen einer Sache bei jmdm. vorstellig werden – I; sich wegen/ in einer Sache an jmdn. wenden – COLL; ein Gesuch einreichen – COLL; eine Bitte äußern – COLL DIRECTIVES/ASK/NEUTRAL + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: H should listen: um Gehör bitten – SI P: marriage proposal: um jmds. Hand anhalten – I; jmdm. um die Hand seiner Tochter bitten – SI P: S should say something: ums Wort bitten – I 4. DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker politely expresses that he/she is anxious for H to do something flehen, betteln (‘implore’, ‘entreat’, ‘beseech’) bitten und betteln (inständig bitten) – COLL; jmdm. zu Füßen fallen (bitten) – I; jmdm. in den Ohren liegen – I; jmdm. auf der Seele knien – I; jmdm. die Tür einlaufen/ einrennen – I; jmdm. zureden wie einem lahmen Gaul/ einem kranken Schimmel/ einem kranken Pferd/ einem kranken Ross/ einem kranken Kind – I DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENT + X: X: RESULT Result: S obtains something: jmdm. etw. aus dem Kreuz leiern – I 5. DIRECTIVES/ADMONISH Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants a hearer to do something; S may reasonably expect H to do P mahnen2, ermahnen2 (‘admonish’) eine Mahnung aussprechen – COLL


DIRECTIVES/ADMONISH + X: 0 6. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/FORBID Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she does not want a hearer to do something abschlagen, abweisen (‘decline’, ‘reject’) jmdm. eine Abfuhr erteilen (abschlagen, verweigern) – I; jmdn. abschlägig bescheiden – I unterbinden, untersagen, verbieten (‘forbid’, ‘prohibit’) einer Sache Einhalt gebieten – I; einer Sache einen Riegel vorschieben – I; jmdm. einen Strich durch die Rechnung machen – I; ein Verbot aussprechen – COLL; jmdm. /etw. Einhalt ge bieten – COLL; jmdm. einen Schuss vor den Bug geben – I DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/FORBID + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: enter the house: jmdm. das Haus verbieten – SI P: express one’s opinion: jmdm. den/ einen Maulkorb anlegen – I; jmdm. den Mund/ das Maul verbieten – SI; jmdm. das Maul stopfen – I P: H should talk: jmdm. das Wort entziehen – I X: PRESUPPOSITION(S) Presupposition (S): H is not authorized to do P or not capable of doing P jmdn. in die Schranken weisen – I 7. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/PERMIT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she does not want a hearer not to do something bewilligen, billigen, erlauben (‘permit’, ‘allow’, ‘sanction’) jmdm. etw. zuteil werden lassen – I; jmdm. einen Freibrief für etw. geben/ ausstellen – I; grünes Licht geben – I; seine Zustimmung geben/ erteilen – COLL cf. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REACTIVE/YES; jmdm. die/ seine Einwilligung/ Erlaubnis/ Genehmigung geben/ erteilen – COLL zubilligen, zugestehen (‘grant’, ‘concede’) Zugeständnisse machen – COLL; jmdm. eine Gunst erweisen – COLL DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/PERMIT + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: H is free to speak: jmdm. das Wort geben/ erteilen – I


P: a wish of H: einem Wunsch entsprechen – COLL P: a request of H: einer Forderung entsprechen – COLL P: a polite request of H: einer Bitte stattgeben/ entsprechen – COLL P: something which has been applied for: einem Antrag entsprechen – COLL 8. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/DEMAND/REACTIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she insists that a hearer do P bestehen auf, pochen auf (‘insist (that someone do something)’) DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/DEMAND/REACTIVE + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) auf sein Recht pochen – COLL cf. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVES/REREACTIVE 9. DIRECTIVES/ADVISE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer that he/she thinks that it would be good for him/her to perform a certain action raten, vorschlagen, empfehlen (‘advise’, ‘recommend’, ‘propose’) jmdm. jmdn./ etw. ans Herz legen – I; jmdm. etw. mit auf den Weg geben – I; jmdm. einen Rat geben/ erteilen – COLL; jmdm. einen Ratschlag erteilen – COLL; jmdm. einen Vorschlag machen/ unterbreiten – COLL; jmdm. eine Empfehlung geben – COLL DIRECTIVES/ADVISE + X: 0 10. DIRECTIVES/INVITE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that a hearer should do something together with S einladen, laden zu, bitten zu (‘invite (someone to do something)’) eine Einladung aussprechen – COLL DIRECTIVES/INVITE + X:0 11. DIRECTIVES/APPEAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker emphatically expresses that several hearers should do something which is morally good or of general interest


appellieren, aufrufen (‘appeal’) einen Appell an jmdn. richten – COLL DIRECTIVES/APPEAL + X: 0 12. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/INTRODUCE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker wants to make sure that a hearer performs a certain action correctly by giving H instructions as to how he/she should perform that action anleiten (‘guide’, ‘introduce’) Anleitungen geben – COLL; jmdn. mit etw. vertraut machen – COLL instruieren (‘instruct’) Anweisungen geben/ erteilen 1 – COLL, cf. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ASSIGN; Unterricht geben/ erteilen – COLL DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/INTRODUCE + X: 0 13. DIRECTIVES/APPLY Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker applies for something beantragen, ersuchen (‘apply’) einen Antrag stellen – COLL; ein Gesuch einreichen – COLL DIRECTIVES/APPLY + X: 0 14. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/CHARGE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that a hearer should to something for which H is responsible. aufgeben, auftragen, beauftragen (‘charge’, ‘commission’) etw. (bei jmdm.) in Auftrag geben – COLL; jmdm. einen Auftrag erteilen/ geben – COLL; jmdm. eine Aufgabe stellen/ geben – COLL; Aufgaben verteilen – COLL bestellen (‘order’, ‘reserve’, ‘book’) eine Bestellung aufgeben – COLL; sich das Anrecht auf etw. sichern – COLL bevollmächtigen, berechtigen (‘empower’, ‘authorise’) jmdm. eine Vollmacht erteilen – COLL; jmdm. die Berechtigung verleihen/ geben – COLL; jmdm. die Befugnis geben/ erteilen – COLL DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/CHARGE + X X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: a difficult task:


jmdm. eine harte Nuss zu knacken geben – I P: the creation of a particular product: etw. in Arbeit geben – SI X: MODALITY Modality: urgently: jmdm. etw. auf die Seele binden – I 15. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ORDER Verbs used to refer to situations in which an authorised speaker expresses that a hearer should do P befehlen (‘order’) jmdm. einen Befehl geben/ erteilen – COLL; jmdm. Order geben/ erteilen 1 – COLL, cf. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ASSIGN einberufen (‘convoke’, ‘convene’) jmdn. zu den Waffen/ Fahnen rufen – I kommandieren (‘command’) ein Kommando erteilen – COLL DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ORDER + X: 0 16. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ASSIGN Verbs used to refer to situations in which an authorised speaker utters one or more Utt(P) within the framework of an institutionally settled procedure to express that he/she wants a hearer to do P anordnen, anweisen (‘decree’, ‘direct’) eine Anordnung treffen/ jmdm. eine Anordnung erteilen – COLL; eine Verordnung erlassen COLL; jmdm. Order geben/ erteilen 2 – COLL; cf. DIRECTIVES/ REQUEST/ORDER; – Auf lagen erteilen – COLL; Anweisungen geben/ erteilen 2 – COLL, cf. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ INTRODUCE; eine Verfügung treffen/ erlassen – COLL; etw. in die Wege leiten – I DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/ASSIGN + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: dictate + Specification of P; P: a pattern of behaviour: jmdn. am Gängelband haben/ führen/ halten – I 17. DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/RESULT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker utters several Utt(P) to make a hearer do P überreden (‘persuade’)


DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/RESULT + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: a particulat pattern of behaviour: jmdn. zur Räson bringen – I P: H is not to give up: jmdn. bei der Stange halten – I

18. DIRECTIVES/ASK/GENERAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker asks a hearer a question sich erkundigen, fragen, sich informieren, befragen, erfragen (‘ask’, ‘inquire’, ‘inform oneself ’) etw. in Erfahrung bringen (ermitteln) – COLL; eine Frage/ Fragen stellen/ vorbringen/ an jmdn. richten – COLL; um Auskunft bitten – COLL; Auskünfte/ Informationen einholen – COLL; um Auskunft nachsuchen – COLL; Informationen erbitten – COLL; bei jmdm. um Information nachsuchen – COLL; Erkundigungen einziehen – COLL; eine Frage/ Fragen aufwerfen – COLL; um Aufschluss bitten – COLL; eine Anfrage an jmdn. richten – COLL DIRECTIVES/ASK/GENERAL + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: additional questions: Zusatzfragen stellen – COLL X: MODALITY Modality: exhaustively: etw. auf den Grund gehen – I 19. DIRECTIVES/ASK/REACTIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a preceding utterance by posing a question nachfragen, zurückfragen (English: ∅) eine Gegenfrage stellen – COLL DIRECTIVES/ASK/REACTIVE + X: 0 20. DIRECTIVES/ASK/PERSISTENTLY Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker persistently asks a hearer several questions ausfragen, ausquetschen, bedrängen, bestürmen, bohren, ... (‘pump’) jmdn. mit Fragen überhäufen/ bestürmen/ überschütten – COLL DIRECTIVES/ASK/PERSISTENTLY + X: X: RESULT Result: H annoyed:


jmdm. ein Loch/ Löcher in den Bauch/ den Arsch fragen – SI; jmdm. die Seele aus den Leib fragen – SI 21. DIRECTIVES/ASK/QUESTION Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker asks a hearer several questions ausforschen, aushorchen, ausfragen, ausloten, ergründen, erkunden, abklopfen, nachforschen (‘question’, ‘investigate’) auf den Busch klopfen – I; jmdm. auf den Zahn/ Puls fühlen 2 – I, cf. DIRECTIVES/ ASK/ TEST; Ermittlungen/ Nachforschungen/ Recherchen anstellen – COLL entlocken (‘elicit’, ‘worm (something out of someone)’) jmdm. jedes Wort (einzeln) aus der Nase ziehen – I; jmdm. die Würmer (einzeln) aus der Nase ziehen – I DIRECTIVES/ASK/QUESTION + X: 0 22. DIRECTIVES/ASK/MASS Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker asks several hearers several questions rumfragen (English: ∅) eine Umfrage durchführen/ machen – COLL DIRECTIVES/ASK/MASS + X: 0 23. DIRECTIVES/ASK/TEST Verbs used to refer to situations in which an examiner asks an examinee questions abfragen, examinieren, prüfen (‘test’, ‘examine’) jmdm. auf den Zahn/ Puls fühlen 2 – I, cf. DIRECTIVES/ASK/QUESTION; jmdn. einer Prüfung/ einem Examen unterziehen – COLL; eine Prüfung/ ein Examen abnehmen – COLL DIRECTIVES/ASK/TEST + X: 0 24. DIRECTIVES/ASK/INTERVIEW Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker asks a hearer several questions; S or H is an authorised or competent person interviewen, befragen, fragen (‘interview’, ‘ask’) ein Interview führen – COLL


verhören, befragen, vernehmen (‘interrogate’) jmdn. ins Verhör nehmen – COLL; ein Verhör/ eine Vernehmung durchführen – COLL; jmdn. einem Verhör/ einer Vernehmung unterziehen – COLL; eine Befragung durchführen – COLL konsultieren (‘consult’) jmdn. zu Rate ziehen – COLL; jmdn. um Rat fragen – COLL DIRECTIVES/ASK/INTERROGATE + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: questions concerning a particular person: jmdn. zur Person befragen/ vernehmen – COLL (P: Fragen zur Person) Directives: Total: 142 95 Inside lexical fields: Collocations: 69 Non-literal idioms: 26 Semi-literal idioms: 0 Expansions of lexical fields: 47 Collocations: 9 Non-literal idioms: 31 Semi-literal idioms: 7 _________________________________________________________________________ COMMISSIVES 1. COMMISSIVES/PROMISE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants to do something which is to the hearer’s interest versprechen, sich verpflichten, versichern, zusichern (‘promise’, ‘bind oneself ’, ‘commit oneself ’, ‘assure’) ein Versprechen geben/ machen – COLL; sein Wort/ Ehrenwort geben – I; jmdm. etw. in Aussicht stellen – COLL; eine Verpflichtung eingehen1 – COLL, cf. COMMISSIVES/ GUARANTEE & COMMISSIVES/PROMISE/VOW; jmdm. Brief und Segel geben – I; eine Zusicherung machen – COLL schwören (‘swear’) jmdm. etw. hoch und heilig versprechen – SI (versprechen + Intensivierung) geloben (‘vow’, ‘pledge’) ein Gelöbnis ablegen 1- COLL, cf. COMMISSIVES/PROMISE/VOW


COMMISSIVES/PROMISE + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: promises which are impossible to keep: jmdm. goldene Berge versprechen – SI; jmdm. das Blaue vom Himmel (herunter) versprechen – SI; jmdm. den Himmel auf Erden versprechen – SI X: MODALITY Modality: by shaking hands: jmdm. etw. mit Handschlag versprechen – SI 2. COMMISSIVES/REACTIVE/POSITIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a demand or a preceding utterance by expressing that he/she wants to do P einwilligen, zusagen (‘agree (to do something)’) eine Zusage machen/ erteilen – COLL COMMISSIVES/REACTIVE/POSITIVE + X: 0 3. COMMISSIVES/REACTIVE/NEGATIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker reacts to a demand by expressing that he/ she does not want to do P ablehnen, verweigern (‘refuse’) jmdm. eine Abfuhr erteilen 1 – I, vgl. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/ REPROACH protestieren (‘protest’) auf die Barrikaden gehen/steigen – I; mit der Faust auf den Tisch hauen – I; gegen jmdn. zu Felde ziehen – I; Front gegen jmdn./ etw. machen – I; sich zur Wehr setzen – I; jmdm. die Zähne zeigen – I; gegen etw. Sturm laufen – I COMMISSIVES/REACTIVE/NEGATIVE + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: a proposal/ an offer/ an invitation: jmdm. einen Korb geben – I 4. COMMISSIVES/PROMISE/RENOUNCE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she definitely does not/no longer want(s) to do P; P is to the interest of S verzichten, entsagen (‘renounce’) von etw. Abstand nehmen – I; seinen Verzicht erklären – COLL; Verzicht leisten – COLL


5. COMMISSIVES/OFFER Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses without committing him-/herself that he/she wants to do something anbieten, sich erbieten (‘offer’) jmdm. ein Angebot machen/ unterbreiten – COLL; jmdm. eine Offerte machen – COLL sich erbieten (‘volunteer’) sich anheischig machen – I; sich zu etw. bereit erklären – COLL; sich zur Verfügung stellen – COLL COMMISSIVES/OFFER + X: 0 6. COMMISSIVES/ARRANGE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker and a hearer express that they want to do something together vereinbaren, abmachen, absprechen, sich zu/ auf etwas verständigen, übereinkommen (‘agree’, ‘arrange’) ein Übereinkommen/ eine Vereinbarung/ eine Absprache/ eine Abmachung treffen – COLL COMMISSIVES/ARRANGE + X: 0 7. COMMISSIVES/GUARANTEE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she will definitely do P or will make sure that P will come about versichern, garantieren, bürgen, sich verpflichten (‘guarantee’, ‘commit oneself ’, ‘vouch (for something)’, ‘answer (for something)’) die Garantie/ Bürgschaft geben/ übernehmen – COLL; Sicherheit/ Gewähr leisten – COLL; eine Verpflichtung eingehen2 – COLL, cf. COMMISSIVES/PROMISE/VOW & COMMISSIVES/PROMISE COMMISSIVES/GUARANTEE + X: 0 8. COMMISSIVES/PROMISE/VOW Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses within the framework of an institutionally settled procedure that he/she definitely wants to do P schwören (‘swear’) einen Eid/ Schwur ablegen/ leisten – COLL; etwas an Eides statt erklären – I geloben (‘vow’, ‘pledge’) ein Gelöbnis ablegen 2 – COLL, cf. COMMISSIVES/PROMISE


sich verpflichten (‘commit oneself ’) eine Verpflichtung eingehen3 – COLL, cf. COMMISSIVES/PROMISE & COMMISSIVES/ GUARANTEE COMMISSIVES/PROMISE/VOW + X: 0 9. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants to do something which is not to the hearer’s interest, unless the hearer meets certain conditions drohen/ bedrohen, androhen (‘threaten’) jmdm. angst [und bange] machen – COLL jmdm. Daumenschrauben anlegen/ aufsetzen 1 – I, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/ THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdn. unter Druck setzen 1 – SI, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdm. die Pistole auf die Brust setzen 1 – I, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdm. die Hölle heiß machen 1 – I, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdm. das Messer an die Kehle setzen 1 – I, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdn. in die Mangel nehmen 1 – I, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdn. durch die Mangel/ den Wolf drehen 1 – I, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdn. in die Enge treiben 1 – I, cf. Idioms Type II COMMISSIVES/THREATEN & DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY Drohungen ausstoßen – COLL Druck/ Zwang ausüben – COLL COMMISSIVES/THREATEN + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: a conflict: mit dem Säbel rasseln – I Commissives: Total: 50 44 Inside lexical fields: Collocations: 22 Non-literal idioms: 20 Semi-literal idioms: 2 Expansions of lexical fields: 6 Collocations: 0 Non-literal idioms: 2 Semi-literal idioms: 4 _________________________________________________________________________


EXPRESSIVES 1. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker classifies a subject/issue relative to a certain norm einstufen, einschätzen (‘judge’, ‘assess’, ‘estimate’) EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE + X: X: MODALITY Modality: not competently: wie ein blinder von der Farbe reden – I X: SPECIFICATION (P) + MODALITY P: performances/qualities of S + Modality: too negatively: sein Licht unter den Scheffel stellen – I 2. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/ACCLAIM Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she evaluates something (P) positively; S considers P to have consequences for future actions or dispositions of S, H or a third person gutheißen (‘approve’) sein Amen/ seinen Segen/ seine Zustimmung zu etw. geben – I; etw. für richtig/ angebracht erklären – COLL; etw. für gut befinden – I befürworten (‘advocate’) einer Sache das Wort reden – I; sich für etw. stark machen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/ACCLAIM + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: sth. which is already advocated: offene Türen einrennen – I 3. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/PRAISE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she has a positive opinion of P; P is a past action/achievement of a hearer or a third person huldigen, loben, würdigen (‘praise’, ‘honour’) jmdn. über den grünen Klee loben – SI (Intensifying); sich in Lobreden ergehen – SI (Intensifying); jmdn./ etw. in den höchsten Tönen loben – SI (Intensifying) EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/PRAISE + X: 0


4. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/EXTOL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker exuberantly expresses that he/she has a positive opinion of P preisen/lobpreisen, rühmen, schwärmen (‘extol’, ‘exalt’, ‘eulogise’, ‘enthuse’, ‘laud’) EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/EXTOL + X: X: GOAL Goal: to canvass support for someone: für jmdn./ etw. Stimmung machen – I 5. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/WHITEWASH Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker represents an action of S, a hearer or a third person or the result of such an action as being positive beschönigen, schönreden, schönfärben (‘whitewash’) einer Sache ein Mäntelchen umhängen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/WHITEWASH + X: 0 6. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/BOAST Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker represents his/her own achievements, knowledge or qualities very positively angeben (‘boast’) sich in die Brust werfen – I; angeben wie ein Wald voll Affen/ wie eine Tüte Mücken – SI; (sich) (mit etw.) dick(e) tun/ sich (mit etw. dick(e) machen – I; kräftig/ mächtig ins Horn stoßen – I; die große Klappe schwingen – I; den Mund (zu) voll nehmen – I; einen großen Rand riskieren – I; große Reden schwingen/ führen – I; sich mit einem Glorienschein umgeben – I; Schaum schlagen – I; große Sprüche machen/ kloppen – I; eine Stange angeben – SI; dicke/ große Töne reden/ spucken – I; (kräftig) in die Trompete stoßen – I; Wind machen – I; das große Wort führen – I; große Worte machen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/BOAST + X: 0 7. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/FLATTER Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker wants to gain benefits for him-/herself by expressing a positive opinion of P, P being a past action or a quality of a hearer schmeicheln (‘flatter’) jmdm. Honig/ Brei um den Bart/ ums Maul/ um den Mund schmieren – I; Süßholz raspeln – I


EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/BOAST + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: something which H wants to hear + Goal: to gain the favour of H: jmdm. nach dem Mund reden – I; jmdm. schöne Worte machen – I 8. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/REPRIMAND Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she evaluates P negatively; P is a past action of a hearer or a third person verurteilen (condemn) über jmdn. Gericht halten – I; über jmdn. zu Gericht sitzen – I; den Stab über jmdn. brechen – I kritisieren (criticise) jmdn./ etw. aufs Korn nehmen – I; – kein gutes Haar an jmdm. lassen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/REPRIMAND + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: the weak or sore point: den Finger auf die brennende Wunde legen – I X: MODALITY Modality: publicly and harshly: jmdn. unter Beschuss nehmen – I Modality: publicly: jmdn. an den Pranger stellen – I 9. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/REPROACH Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker emphatically expresses that he/she evaluates P negatively; P is a past action of H vorwerfen (‘reproach’, ‘rebuke’) jmdm. etw. aufs Brot/ Butterbrot schmieren/ streichen – I; jmdm. etw. an den Kopf werfen – I; jmdm. etw. unter die Nase reiben – I zurechtweisen (‘reprimand’, ‘admonish’) mit jmdm. ins Gericht gehen – I; jmdm. sein(en) Teil geben – I; jmdm. an den Wagen/ an den Karren fahren – I; jmdm. einen Tadel/ Rüge erteilen – COLL; jmdm. eine Abfuhr erteilen 1 – I, cf. COMMISSIVES/REACTIVE/NEGATIVE; jmdm. Bescheid sagen/ stoßen – I; (sich) jmdn. zur Brust nehmen – I; jmdm. aufs Dach steigen – I; jmdm. eins/etw. aufs Dach geben – I; jmdm eins auf den Deckel geben – I; jmdm einen/ eins draufgeben (Stilregister: locker) – I; jmdm. auf die Finger klopfen – I; jmdm. die Flötentöne beibringen – I; jmdm etw. flüstern – I; jmdm. eine Gardinenpredigt/ eine Standpauke halten – I; es jmdm. geben (jmdn. scharf zurechtweisen) – I; jmdn. ins Gebet nehmen – I; jmdm. ins Gewissen reden – I; jmdn. bei/ an den Hammelbeinen nehmen/ kriegen – I; jmdm. die Hammelbeine lang ziehen – I; mit jmdm. ein Hühnchen rup-


fen – I; jmdm. eins auf den Hut geben – I; mit jmdm. Karussell fahren – I; jmdn. am/ beim Kragen nehmen/ packen – I; jmdm. zeigen, wo’s langgeht – I; jmdm. die Leviten lesen – I; jmdm. den Marsch blasen – I; jmdm. die/ seine Meinung geigen/ sagen – I; bei jmdm. die Möbel geraderücken – I; jmdm. Moral predigen – I; jmdn. Mores lehren – I; jmdn. kalt rasieren – I; jmdm. eines anderen/ eines Besseren belehren – COLL; jmdm. den Kopf waschen – I; jmdm. den Kopf zurechtsetzen/ zurechtrücken – I; jmdm. eins auf die Nase geben – I ; jmdm. die Ohren langziehen – I; jmdn. in die Pfanne hauen – I; jmdm. auf die Pfoten klopfen/ eins auf die Pfoten geben – I; jmdm. den Rost runtermachen – I; jmdm. eins auf die Rübe geben/ hauen – I; jmdm. auf den Sack treten 2 – I, cf. DIRECTIVES/ REQUEST/ GENERAL; jmdn. zur Schnecke machen – I; jmdm. ein paar Takte sagen/ erzählen – I; jmdm. am/ beim Wickel packen/ kriegen/ haben/ nehmen – I; jmdm. eine Zigarre verpassen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/REPROACH + X: X: MODALITY Modality: clearly: jmdm. den Spiegel vorhalten/ vor das Gesicht halten – I 10. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/GRUMBLE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she evaluates a past action or event negatively meckern (‘grumble’, ‘grouse’, ‘nag’) EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/GRUMBLE + X: X: GOAL Goal: to spread information about someone which reflects negatively on that person: gegen jmdn./ etw. Stimmung machen – I 11. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/SLANDER Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a third person that he/she evaluates a past action of H or an event concerning H negatively lästern (‘slander’) sich über jmdn. das Maul zerreißen – I; seinen Schnabel an jmdm. wetzen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/SLANDER + X: 0 12. EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/RESULT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses his/her negative evaluation of a past action or a property of H and thereby diminishes H’s social prestige verletzen, kränken, brüskieren, verleumden (‚defame’, ‚disgrace’, ‚calumniate’) jmdm. auf die Ferse/ den Schlips/ den Schwanz/ die Zehen treten – I; jmdm. auf den Fuß (die Füße)/ die Hühneraugen treten 2 – I, cf. DIRECTIVES/ REQUEST/ GENERAL; jmdm. zu


nahe treten – I; jmdm. einen Stich ins Herz geben – I; jmdn. vor den Kopf stoßen – I; jmdn. ins Gerede bringen – I; jmdn./ etw. in den Kot/ Dreck ziehen/ treten – I; jmdn. mit Kot/ Dreck/ Schmutz bewerfen/ besudeln – I; jmdn. madig/schlecht machen – I; jmdn. in Misskredit bringen – I; jmdn./ etw. durch die Scheiße ziehen – I ; jmdn./ etw. in den Schmutz zerren/ ziehen/ treten – I; jmdn./ etw. in den Staub/ durch den Staub ziehen/ zerren – I; jmdn. in Verruf bringen – I; jmdm. etw. ans Zeug flicken – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/RESULT + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: a social group of which S is a member: das eigene/ sein eigenes Nest beschmutzen – I 13. EXPRESSIVES/MOCK Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she considers P to be ridiculous necken, veralbern, veräppeln (‘tease’) jmdn. auf den Arm/ die Schippe nehmen – I; jmdn. auf den Besen laden – I; sich über jmdn. lustig machen – I; jmdn. durch den Kakao ziehen – I spotten, höhnen (‘mock’, ‘ridicule’) jmdn. zum Gespött machen – COLL; jmdn. lächerlich machen – COLL; seinen Spaß (seine Späße)/ seinen Scherz (seine Scherze) (mit jmdm.) treiben – SI EXPRESSIVES/MOCK + X: 0 14. EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker emphatically expresses that he/she feels joy because of P jubeln, jubilieren, frohlocken, jauchzen (‘rejoice’, ‘exult, ‘cheer’) EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY + X: 0 15. EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY/CONGRATULATE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she is happy about something which concerns the hearer gratulieren, beglückwünschen (‘congratulate’) EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY/CONGRATULATE + X: 0


16. EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY/THANK Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she is grateful for something the hearer has done for him danken, sich bedanken (‘thank’) seinen Dank aussprechen – COLL EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/JOY/THANK + X: 0 17. EXPRESSIVES/JOKE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker humorously expresses that he/she thinks P to be funny scherzen (‘joke’, ‘jest’) einen Scherz/ Witz machen – COLL EXPRESSIVES/JOKE + X: 0 18. Expressive/emotiv/Ärger (EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/ANGER) Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker emphatically expresses that he/she is angry because of P schimpfen (‘scold’) Dampf ablassen – I; sein Gift verspritzen – I; Gift und Galle spucken – I; vom Leder ziehen – I; schimpfen wie ein Rohrspatz – SI; toben wie zehn nackte Wilde im Schnee – I fluchen, verwünschen (‘curse’, ‘damn’) Ausdrücke gebrauchen/ im Munde führen/ an sich haben (schimpfen) – I; fluchen wie ein Bierkutscher – SI; jmdn. zur Hölle wünschen – I EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/ANGER + X: 0 X: RESULT Result: S relieved: seinem Ärger Luft machen – I X: ASPECT Aspect: sudden onset of a state (ingressive): aus dem Anzug gehen – I 19. EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/ANGER/SCOLD Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she is angry because of a past action of a hearer


beschimpfen, anschimpfen, ausschimpfen (English: ∅) jmdm. den Arsch bis zum Stehkragen aufreißen (stylistic register ‘rude’) – I; jmdm. ins Gesicht springen – I; jmdm. Zunder geben – I EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/ANGER/SCOLD + X: X: RESULT Result: H insulted: jmdn. zur Minna machen – I; jmdn. zur Sau machen – I 20. EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/SORROW Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she is suffering because of P jammern, klagen (‘complain’, ‘lament’, ‘moan’, ‘bemoan’) ach und weh schreien – SI; ein Klagelied über jmdn. anstimmen – I; jmdm. sein Leid klagen – COLL; seinem Kummer Luft machen – SI EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/SORROW + X X: RESULT Result: H annoyed: jmdm. die Ohren voll jammern – SI 21. EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/SORROW/CONDOLE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she is sorry because of the hearer’s grief over the death of a person who was close to H kondolieren (‘condole’) sein Beileid aussprechen – COLL EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/SORROW/CONDOLE + X: 0 22. EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/SORROW/EXCUSE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she is sorry because of P; P is a past action of S sich entschuldigen (‘apologise’) Abbitte leisten/ tun – I; jmdn. um Verzeihung bitten – COLL; um gut(es)/ schön(es) Wetter bitten – I EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/SORROW/EXCUSE + X: 0


23. EXPRESSIVES/GREET Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she takes notice of H’s presence and that he/she acknowledges H socially grüßen, begrüßen (‘greet’) EXPRESSIVES/GREET + X: 0 Expressives: Total: 144 128 Inside lexical fields: Collocations: 10 Non-literal idioms: 110 Semi-literal idioms: 8 Expansions of lexical fields: 16 Collocations: 0 Non-literal idioms: 15 Semi-literal idioms: 1 _________________________________________________________________________ DECLARATIVES 1. DECLARATIVES/GENERAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which an authorised speaker brings about a certain institutional fact entlassen, freilassen (‘free’, ‘release’) jmdn. auf freien Fuß setzen – I; jmdn. in Freiheit setzen – COLL erklären (‘declare’) eine Erklärung abgeben – COLL feststellen (‘state (that)’) eine Feststellung machen – COLL anberaumen (‘fix’, ‘appoint’, ‘settle’) einen Termin festlegen – COLL kündigen (‘terminate’) etw. für beendet erklären – COLL taufen, einweihen (‘baptise’, ‘inaugurate’) etw. der Öffentlichkeit übergeben – COLL; etw. aus der Taufe heben – COLL DECLARATIVES/GENERAL + X: 0


2. DECLARATIVES/PROFESSION-1 Verbs used to refer to situations in which an authorised speaker causes a change in the hearer’s professional career jmdn. kündigen (‘dismiss’, ‘give notice (to quit)’) jmdn. von seinem Amt/ seiner Funktion suspendieren – COLL; jmdn. seines Postens/ Amtes entheben – COLL; jmdm. das Amt entziehen – COLL; jmdn. aus seinem Amt entfernen – COLL; jmdn. auf die Straße/ an die frische Luft/ vor die Tür setzen – I berufen, ernennen (‘appoint’, ‘nominate’) jmdn. mit einem Amt betrauen – COLL; jmdn. in ein Amt einsetzen – COLL beurlauben (‘grant/give leave’) jmdm. Urlaub geben/ gewähren – COLL DECLARATIVES/PROFESSION1 + X: 0 3. DECLARATIVES/PROFESSION-2 Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker changes his/her professional career abdanken, zurücktreten, kündigen (‘resign’, ‘retire’) sein Amt niederlegen/ zur Verfügung stellen – COLL; seinen Rücktritt erklären – COLL; seinen Hut nehmen – I DECLARATIVES/PROFESSION2 + X: 0 4. DECLARATIVES/JUDICIARY Verbs used to refer to the beginning of legal procedures anklagen, verklagen (‘accuse’) jmdn. unter Anklage stellen – SI; Klage/ Anklage erheben – COLL anzeigen (‘report’) Anzeige erstatten – COLL; etw. zur Anzeige bringen – COLL klagen (‘sue’) Klage erheben/ einreichen – COLL; Klage führen – COLL DECLARATIVES/JUDICIARY + X: 0 5. DECLARATIVES/VERDICT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a legal procedure is brought to an end


freisprechen (‘aquit’) jmdn. für unschuldig erklären – COLL verurteilen (‘condemn’) ein Urteil fällen 2 – COLL, cf. REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERT/CLAIM; jmdn. für schuldig erklären – COLL; jmdn. schuldig sprechen – COLL DECLARATIVES/VERDICT + X: 0 6. DECLARATIVES/CHURCH Verbs used to refer to religious ceremonies bekennen1 (‘profess’) Zeugnis/ Bekenntnis ablegen – COLL lossprechen (‘absolve’) jmdn. von seiner Schuld befreien – COLL; jmdm. Absolution erteilen – COLL taufen (‘baptise’) die Taufe vollziehen – COLL; jmdm. die Taufe geben – COLL DECLARATIVES/CHURCH + X: 0 Declaratives: Total: 34 34 Inside lexical fields: Collocations: 30 Non-literal idioms: 3 Semi-literal idioms: 1 Expansions of lexical fields: 0 Collocations: 0 Non-literal idioms: 0 Semi-literal idioms: 0 _________________________________________________________________________ 7. STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/THEME Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker’s utterance affects the course of conversation or the way in which the topic of conversation is being treated. andeuten (‘allude’) etw. anklingen lassen (andeuten) – COLL; etw. durchblicken lassen – COLL; eine Andeutung machen – COLL


erwähnen, etwas ansprechen (‘mention’) die Sprache auf etw. bringen – I; etw. einfließen lassen – COLL; etw. ins Feld führen – I; etw. in den Raum stellen – I; etw. zur Sprache bringen – I; etw. aufs Tapet/ aufs Trapez bringen – I aufgreifen (English: ∅; only phrasal verb: take up) sich auf etw. beziehen – COLL; Bezug auf etw. nehmen – COLL differenzieren (‘differentiate’) einen Unterschied machen – COLL anmerken (‘remark’, ‘observe’) eine Anmerkung machen – COLL resümieren (‘recapitulate’) die Bilanz/ das Fazit/ (aus etw.) ziehen – COLL; etw. als Resümee/ Fazit festhalten – COLL hervorheben (‘stress’, ‘emphasise’) etw. ins Blickfeld rücken – I; einer Sache Nachdruck verleihen – COLL abschweifen (‘digress’, ‘deviate’) vom Thema abkommen/ abweichen – COLL ∅ den Faden verlieren – I; vom Hölzchen aufs Stöckchen/ vom Hundertsten ins Tausendste kommen – I; sich ins Uferlose/ ins Weite verlieren – I kommentieren (‘comment’) einen Kommentar abgeben – COLL unterbrechen (‘interrupt’) jmdm. über den Mund fahren – I; jmdm. ins Wort/ in die Rede fallen – I; jmdm. das Wort/ die Rede abschneiden – I STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/THEME + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: poor excuses: Fisimatenten machen – I P: excuses + Modality: not frankly: Ausflüchte machen – COLL P: something far-fetched: etw. an/ bei den Haaren herbeiziehen – I P: an impropriety: einen Korken abschießen/ steigen lassen – I P: a clear comment: mit dem Laternenpfahl/ Zaunpfahl winken – I P: another theme: eine andere Platte auflegen – I


P: a particular person/ theme: auf jmdn./ auf etw. zu sprechen kommen – SI P: several P: etw. Revue passieren lassen – I P: something which may be useful to H: jmdm. einen Wink/ einen Hinweis geben – I X: MODALITY Modality: laboriously: bei Adam und Eva anfangen – SI Modality: suddenly, without introduction: mit der Tür ins Haus fallen – I Modality: exaggerating the importance of something: aus einer Mücke einen Elefanten machen – I Modality: frequently P: mit etw. um sich werfen/ schmeißen – I Modality: laboriously & not frankly: um den heißen Brei herumreden (nur sprachlich) – SI Modality: not frankly: herumgehen/ herumschleichen wie die Katze um den heißen Brei (hybrid) – I 40 STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/THEME – Total: STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/THEME: 25 COLL: 13 I: 12 SI: 0 STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/THEME + X: 15 COLL: 1 I: 11 SI: 3 _________________________________________________________________________ STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/REACTIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker refers to contributions by the other participants in the conversation antworten (‘answer’) Antwort geben – COLL einwerfen, einschieben, dazwischenrufen (‘interpolate’) einen Einwurf machen – COLL; jmdm. in die Parade fahren – I STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/REACTIVE + X: X: MODALITY Modality: unnecessarily: seinen Senf dazu geben – I


X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: past inconveniences + Result: additional inconveniences: alte Wunden (wieder) aufreißen – I P: a justification: jmdm. Rede und Antwort stehen – I 6 STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/REACTIVE – Total: STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/REACTIVE: 3 COLL: 2 I: 1 SI: 0 STRUCTURE/CONVERSATION/REACTIVE + X: 3 COLL: 0 I: 3 SI: 0 _________________________________________________________________________ DISCOURSE/SEQUENCE Verbs used to refer to situations in which several speakers talk to several hearers ∅ sich (gegenseitig) die Bälle zuwerfen/ zuspielen – I ∅ sich streiten (‘argue’) in Streit liegen – COLL; sich in den Haaren liegen – I; einen Strauß mit jmdm. ausfechten – I; sich mit jmdm. in der Wolle liegen/ haben – I; Streit/ Zank haben – COLL besprechen, sich beratschlagen (‘discuss’, ‘debate’) die Köpfe zusammenstecken – I; mit jmdm. Rücksprache halten/ nehmen – I; eine Besprechung abhalten – COLL sich unterhalten (‘converse’) ein Gespräch/ eine Unterhaltung führen – COLL; einen Plausch/ ein Schwätzchen halten – COLL; Konversation machen/ betreiben – COLL DISCOURSE/SEQUENCE + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: something trivial and/or superfluous: streiten um des Kaisers Bart – SI X: MODALITY Modality: confidential: (mit jmdm.) Zwiesprache halten/ führen – I


X: RESULT Result: S tired of talking: sich die Köpfe heiß reden – SI X: ASPECT Aspect: ingressive (onset of a state or action): einen Streit vom Zaun brechen – I; mit jmdm. in die Wolle geraten – I; mit jmdm. in Streit ge raten – COLL; sich in die Wolle/ in die Haare kriegen – I; das Kriegsbeil ausgraben – I Apect: end of a state: das Kriegsbeil begraben – I 21 DISCOURSE/SEQUENCE – Total: DISCOURSE/SEQUENCE: 12 COLL: 6 I: 6 SI: 0 DISCOURSE/SEQUENCE + X: 9 COLL: 1 I: 6 SI: 2 _________________________________________________________________________ VERBS OF COMMUNICATION (MANNER OF COMMUNICATION) 1. Verbs of Communication/MANNER/SOUND INTENSITY Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something with a certain sound intensity brüllen, schreien (‘scream’, ‘shout’) brüllen wie am Spieß/ wie ein Stier – SI; aus voller Lunge schreien – SI; schreien wie am Spieß/ wie ein gestochenes Schwein/ wie eine angestochene Sau – SI SOUND INTENSITY + X X: RESULT Result: S hoarse: sich die Kehle/ die Lunge aus dem Hals/ dem Leib schreien – SI; sich die Kehle/ die Lunge/ den Hals ausschreien – SI; sich die Seele aus dem Leib schreien/ rufen – SI Result: H alarmed: Zeter und Mordio schreien – SI 2. Verbs of Communication/MANNER/SOUND INTENSITY Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something with a particular articulation


∅ eine feuchte Aussprache haben – SI ∅ sich an/ bei etw. die Zunge abbrechen/ zerbrechen – I SOUND INTENSITY + X: 0 3. Verbs of Communication/MANNER/INTONATION Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something with a particular intonation brabbeln, brummen (‘mutter’) INTONATION+ X: 0 4. Verbs of Communication/MANNER/VOCAL QUALITY Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something with a particular timbre krächzen, quäken (‘croak’) VOCAL QUALITY + X: 0 5. Verbs of Communication/MANNER/RHYTHM Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something with a certain rhythm sttottern (‘stutter’) in Raten sprechen – I RHYTHM + X: 0 6. Verbs of Communication/MANNER/ITERATIVE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker tells a hearer several successive Utt(P) plappern, schnattern (‘chatter’, ‘prattle’) ITERATIVE + X: 0 Verbs of communications (Manner) Total: 10 Inside lexical fields: Collocations:

6 0


Non-literal idioms: 2 Semi-literal idioms: 4 Expansions of lexical fields: 4 Collocations: 0 Non-literal idioms: 0 Semi-literal idioms: 4 _________________________________________________________________________

VERBS OF COMMUNICATION (COMMUNICATION MEDIUM) 1. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/ORAL Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker orally reproduces a written text to a hearer – either by heart and/or in an artistic manner vortragen, rezitieren (‘recite’, ‘declaim’) etw. zum Besten geben – I; etw. zu Gehör bringen – I MEDIUM/ORAL+ X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: something which is expected of S: sein Sprüchlein hersagen/ aufsagen – I 2. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/WRITTEN Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something by writing aufschreiben (English: ∅; only phrasal verb: write down) etw. zu Papier bringen – I korrespondieren (‘correspond’) mit jmdm. in Korrespondenz stehen – COLL MEDIUM/WRITTEN + X: X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: someone’s signature: seinen Friedrich Wilhelm unter etw. setzen – I; etw. ins unreine schreiben – SI; eine Unterschrift leisten – SI X: MODALITÄT Modality: fast: etw. aufs Papier werfen – I Modality: neatly: etw. ins reine schreiben – SI Modality: in much detail: einen ganzen Roman schreiben – SI Modality: badly: einen Stiefel (zusammen)schreiben – SI


X: SPECIFICATION (MEDIUM) Medium: record: etw. zu Protokoll geben/ bringen – COLL (des schriftlichen Mediums) X: RESULT Result: S relieved: sich etw. von der Seele schreiben – SI X: ASPECT Aspect: ingressive (beginning of an activity): zur Feder greifen – I 3. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/CONVERT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something by converting a written text into an oral one or vice versa diktieren, vorlesen (‘dictate’; ‘vorlesen’ → English: ∅; only phrasal verb: read out) MEDIUM/CONVERT + X: 0 4. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/ADVERTISEMENT Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something in a written advertisement with the aim of getting H to know P annoncieren, inserieren (‘advertise’) eine Annonce/ eine Anzeige/ ein Inserat aufgeben – COLL MEDIUM/ADVERTISEMENT + X: 0 5. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/CODE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something by using a special code known by the hearer funken (‘transmit’) einen Funkspruch durchgeben – COLL stenografieren (English: ∅; only: write shorthand) ein Stenogramm aufnehmen – COLL telegrafieren (‘telegraph’) ein Telegramm schicken/ senden/ aufgeben – COLL MEDIUM/CODE + X: 0


6. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/INTERNET Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something by using the internet (e)mailen (‘email’) eine E-Mail schicken/ senden – COLL simsen eine SMS schicken/ senden – COLL MEDIUM/INTERNET + X: 0 7. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/TELEFAX Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something by means of a fax (tele)faxen (‘fax’) ein Fax schicken – COLL MEDIUM/TELEFAX + X: 0 8. Verbs of Communication/MEDIUM/TELEPHONE Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses something by using the telephone telefonieren (‘telephone’, ‘phone’) an der Strippe hängen – I; am Telefon hängen – SI; jmdn. an der Strippe haben – I anrufen (English: ∅; only phrasal verbs: call up, ring up) sich an die Strippe hängen – I; sich ans Telefon hängen – SI MEDIUM/TELEPHONE + X: 0 Verbs of Communication (Means of Communication) Total: 28 16 Inside lexical fields: Collocations: 8 Non-literal idioms: 6 Semi-literal idioms: 2 Expansions of lexical fields: 12 Collocations: 1 Non-literal idioms: 4 Semi-literal idioms: 7 _________________________________________________________________________


12. CONVERSATION/BEGINNING Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker gets into contact with someone. kontaktieren, jmdn. ansprechen (‘contact’, ‘address’) sich mit jmdm. ins Benehmen setzen – I; das Wort an jmdn. richten – I; ein Gespräch beginnen – COLL CONVERSATION/BEGINNING + X X: SPECIFICATION (P) P: a theme to be discussed: etw. zur Debatte/ zur Diskussion stellen – COLL X: MODALITY Modality: obtrusively: jmdn. (dumm) von der Seite anquatschen – SI (aufdringlich) X: ASPECT: Aspect: ingressive (beginning of activity): mit der Sprache herausrücken – I; das Wort ergreifen/ nehmen – I 7 CONVERSATION/BEGINNING – Total: CONVERSATION/BEGINNING: 3 COLL: 1 I: 2 SI: 0 CONVERSATION/BEGINNING + X: 4 COLL: 1 I: 2 SI: 1 _________________________________________________________________________ CONVERSATION/END Verbs used to refer to situations in which a speaker expresses that he/she wants to put an end to the conversation. sich verabschieden (English: ∅; only: idiom: take leave) CONVERSATION/END + X: 0 0 CONVERSATION/END – Total: CONVERSATION/END: 0 COLL: 0 I: 0 SI: 0 CONVERSATION/END + X: 0 COLL: 0 I: 0 SI: 0 _________________________________________________________________________


II. Idioms constituting hybrid fields of communicative expressions REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM – DECLARATIVES jmdn. (für etw.) zur Rechenschaft/ zur Verantwortung ziehen – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM Att (S, P): S knows: P has negative consequences for H Intention (S): S wants: H recognise: P has negative consequences for H DECLARATIVES Bound to a particular institution H subordinate to S Presupposition (S): P has negative consequences for the institution; H has done P REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE – REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVE/LIE ein/sein Garn spinnen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE Att (S,P): S knows P I (S): S wants: H know: P Utterance: several P REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVE/LIE Att (S,P): S does not take to be true: P I (S): S wants: H take to be true: P REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE – REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/CONFIDENTIAL Licht in etw. bringen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE Att (S,P): S knows P I (S): S wants: H know: P Utterance: several P REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/CONFIDENTIAL Presupposition (S): H is not supposed to know P REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE – EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/ BOAST jmdn./ etw. ins rechte Licht rücken/ setzen/ stellen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/SEQUENCE Att (S,P): S knows P I (S): S wants: H know: P Utterance: several P EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/BOAST Att (S,P): S considers: P good I (S): S wants: H recognise: S considers: P good/S wants: H considers: P good REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/PUBLIC – EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/EXTOL die Werbetrommel (für etw.) rühren/ schlagen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/PUBLIC


Att (S,P): S knows P I (S): S wants: H know: P Utterance: addressed to several H/the general public EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/EXTOL Att (S,P): S considers: P good I (S): S wants: H recognise: S considers: P good

REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/FUTURE – EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/ GRUMBLE den Teufel an die Wand malen – I; schwarzmalen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM/FUTURE Att (S,P): S knows P I (S): S wants: S know P P: a future action, event or state of affairs EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/NEGATIVE/GRUMBLE Att (S,P): S considers: P bad I (S): S wants: H recognise: S considers: P bad DIRECTIVES/ASK/NEUTRAL – EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/PRAISE ein gutes Wort für jmdn. einlegen – I DIRECTIVES/ASK FOR/NEUTRAL Att (S,P): S wants: P I (S): S wants: H do P Modality: politely Not exprectable: P EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/PRAISE Att (S,P): S consider: P good I (S): S wants: H recognise: S consider: P good P: a quality of a third person/an activity performed by a third person COMMISSIVES/THREATEN – DIRECTIVES/ASK/URGENTLY jmdm. Daumenschrauben anlegen/ aufsetzen 2 – I cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN jmdn. unter Druck setzen 2 – SI cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN jmdm. die Pistole auf die Brust setzen 2 – I cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN jmdn. in die Enge treiben 2 – I cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN jmdm. die Hölle heiß machen 2 – I cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN jmdn. durch die Mangel/ den Wolf drehen 2 – I cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN jmdm. das Messer an die Kehle setzen 2 – I cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN jmdn. in die Zange nehmen – I jmdn. in die Mangel nehmen 2 – I


cf. COMMISSIVES/THREATEN COMMISSIVES/THREATEN Att (S,P): S wants: do P if not C C: Condition to be met by H I (S): S wants: H recognise: S wants: do P if not C Presuppositions (S): not to the interest of H: P/not expectable: P DIRECTIVES/ASK FOR/PERSISTENTLY Att (S,P): S wants urgently: P I (S): S wants: H do P Modality: persistently

EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/BOAST – REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVE/LIE sich mit fremden Federn schmücken – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/BOAST Att (S,P): S consider: P good I (S): S wants: H recognise: S consider: P good/S wants: H considers: P good P: Action of S REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVE/LIE Att (S,P): S does not take to be true: Agent of P = S I (S): S wants: H recognise: S takes to be true: P = S Agent (P): Third person REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVE/LIE – EXPRESSIVES/MOCK jmdn. zum Narren halten – I REPRESENTATIVES/ASSERTIVE/LIE Att (S,P): S does not take to be true: P I (S): S takes to be true: P EXPRESSIVES/MOCK Att (S,P): considers: P ridiculous I (S): S wants: H recognise: S considers: P ridiculous DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/GENERAL – EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/ANGER jmdm. zum Teufel jagen/ schicken – I DIRECTIVES/REQUEST/GENERAL Att (S,P): S wants: P I (S): S wants: H do P P: H leave EXPRESSIVES/EMOTIVE/ANGER Att (S,P): S feels: anger because of P I (S): S wants: H recognise: S feels: anger because of P HYBRID FIELDS: Total: 20 COLL: 1 I: 18 SI: 1 _________________________________________________________________________


III. Idioms constituting idiom-specific fields CONVERSATION/COURSE mit jmdm. im Gespräch bleiben – COLL REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM with P: S’s opinion on a particualar state of affairs Farbe bekennen – I, Flagge zeigen – I, die/ seine Karten aufdecken/ offen auf den Tisch legen – I, Tacheles/ Fraktur reden – I, Klartext reden/ sprechen – I, Stellung zu etw. nehmen/ beziehen – SI, jmdm. zeigen, was eine Harke ist – I, eine deutliche Sprache sprechen – I REPRESENTATIVES/INFORM with P: S’s opinion idientical with H’s jmdm. aus dem Herzen sprechen – SI, ins gleiche Horn stoßen/ tuten/ blasen – I, in dieselbe/die gleiche Kerbe hauen/schlagen – I, jmdm. aus der Seele sprechen – SI DIRECTIVES/ASK/TEST with Utt(P): only one utterance eine Prüfungsfrage stellen – COLL EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE with Att(S, P): S considers: x and y equal jmdn. in eine Reihe mit jmdm. stellen – I, jmdn. / etw. auf eine / die gleiche Stufe (mit jmdm./ mit etw.) stellen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE with Att(S, P): S considers: x not important etw. vom Tisch wischen/ fegen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/ACCLAIM with P: a third person’s opinion für jmdn. eine Lanze brechen/ einlegen – I, auf jmds. Seite treten – I, jmdm. zur Seite springen/ treten – I, sich auf jmds. Seite schlagen/ stellen – I EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/PRAISE with Agent (P): only H jmdm. ein Lob erteilen/ spenden/ zollen – COLL, jmdn. mit Lob überhäufen/ überschütten – SI EXPRESSIVES/EVALUATIVE/POSITIVE/PRAISE with Agent (P): only third person ein Loblied auf jmdn. anstimmen/ singen – I, von jmdm./ etw. in den höchsten Tönen reden/ sprechen – I, jmdn. mit einem Glorienschein umgeben - I COMMISSIVES/THREATEN (no condition C) jmdm./ etw. den Kampf ansagen – I IDIOM-SPECIFIC FIELDS: Total: 26 COLL: 2 I: 20 SI: 4 _________________________________________________________________________


RESULTS (COMPLEX LEXICALISATIONS GERMAN) COMPLEX LEXICALISATIONS (ALL TYPES) TOTAL: 676 Collocations: 202 Non-literal idioms: 402 Semi-literal idioms: 72 WITHIN VERB FIELDS TOTAL: 441 Collocations: 183 Non-literal idioms: 238 Semi-literal idioms: 20 EXPANSIONS OF VERB FIELDS TOTAL: 189 Collocations: 16 Non-literal idioms: 126 Semi-literal idioms: 47 HYBRID FIELDS TOTAL: 20 Collocations: 1 Non-literal idioms: 18 Semi-literal idioms: 1 IDIOM-SPECIFIC FIELDS TOTAL: 26 Collocations: 2 Non-literal idioms: 20 Semi-literal idioms: 4 SPEECH ACT EXPRESSIONS (ALL TYPES) 482 TOTAL: Inside lexical fields: 371 Collocations: 150 Non-literal idioms: 207 Semi-literal idioms: 14 Expansions of lexical fields: 111 Collocations: 12 Non-literal idioms: 82 Semi-literal idioms: 17


COMMUNICATIVE EXPRESSIONS (ALL TYPES) TOTAL: 148 Inside lexical fields: 70 Collocations: 33 Non-literal idioms: 31 Semi-literal idioms: 6 Expansions of lexical fields: 78 Collocations: 4 Non-literal idioms: 44 Semi-literal idioms: 30

Subject/author index

A accidental vs. systematic gaps 96–97 A-Conditions vs. D-Conditions 24 B Barwise & Perry 14–15 Basic Level Principle (see also Rosch et al.) 111–112 Bolinger 90–91 C categorial aspects 35, 66–67 codability 92–94 cognitive salience (see also Principle of Cognitive Salience, conceptual salience and salience) 107–108 Coleman & Kay 27–28 components of illocutionary force (see also illocutionary force) 79–82 compositionality of phrasemes (see structural variability of phrasemes) 163–165 conceptual salience (see also Principle of Cognitive Salience, cognitive salience and salience) 114 conceptual vs. lexical level of word meaning 3 constraints on lexical gaps 98, 101 Cooperative Principle 16 costs and benefits (see also Principle of Costs and Benefits) 51–55, 59–61, 64, 74, 139–140, 156, 214–215 creation verbs (see verbs of creation)

D D-conditions vs. A-conditions 24 degree of (non-) compositionality of phrasemes (see structural stability and structural variability of phrasemes) direction of fit 19, 20, 22 discourse situation vs. resource situation (see also reported vs. reporting situation) 14– 15 diversity (see lexical diversity) E “egoistic” predicates 137 economy (see lexical economy) essential condition 21 evaluations (see explicit vs. implicit evaluations) explicit vs. implicit evaluations 64, 160–161, 193, 211 G general resource situation type 65–66 generalised conversational implicature 199–200 Grice 16, 125, 199 Gumperz & Levinson 91–92 H hearer-supportive vs. speakersupportive communicative behaviour 50–55, 215 hybrid verbs 45 hybridity (see hybrid verbs)

I Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs) 28, 198 idiomaticity (see also Bolinger) 91, 163–165, 167 illocutionary force(s) (see also components of illocutionary force) 17–20 illocutionary point 19–22, 79–80 illocutionary suicide 25–26 Ilongot 95 implicit vs. explicit evaluations 64, 160–161, 193, 211 K kinship terms 11–12, 99 L Leech 16–17 level(s) of specificity (see specificity) Levin 12 Levinson 199 lexical diversity 155 lexical economy 155 lexical field 2, 71, 111 lexical vs. conceptual level of word meaning 3 linguistic action verbials 106– 108 linguistic determinism (see linguistic relativism) linguistic relativism 91–92 linguistic relativity (see linguistic relativism) M “masochistic” predicates 137 manner of motion 93–94 manner of speaking 152–153


markedness (see also Principle of Markedness) 62, 108, 150–151, 153, 215 material/product alternation 12 matrix products 83, 97–98, 114, 116, 125 McCawley 23, 99 meronymic vs. taxonomic hierarchies 113 meronymy 112–113 metapragmatic awareness 95 mode of achievement of illocutionary point (see also illocutionary point) 80 N non-compositionality of phrasemes (see structural stability of phrasemes) P path of motion 93 performative verbs 14, 20, 23, 32 performativity 16, 23–33 performativity test 14–16 position of utterance (see also reactive predicates and re–reactive predicates) 3, 63, 84, 119–120, 130, 135–136 possible lexical items 97, 98–104 prefabs/prefabricated items (see also Bolinger) 90 preparatory condition 33, 80 Principle of Cognitive Salience (see also cognitive salience, conceptual salience and salience) 108, 151, 157, 215 Principle of Costs and Benefits 140, 156–157, 214–216

Principle of Harmony of Interaction 107–108 Principle of Markedness (see also markedness) 62, 108, 151, 153, 156, 157, 214–215 “pseudo-words” (see also WordNet) 12–13, 109 R reactive predicates (see also position of utterance) 3, 63, 84–85, 119–120, 136, 138 Relevance 17 reported vs. reporting situation (see also resource vs. discourse situation) 2–3 re-reactive predicates (see also position of utterance) 63, 84–85, 119 resource situation vs. discourse situation (see also Barwise & Perry and reported vs. reporting situation) 14–15 Rosch et al. 111, 156 S “sadistic” predicates 39, 104, 137 salience (see also Principle of Cognitive Salience, cognitive salience and conceptual salience) 94, 95, 107–108, 151, 215 self-reference (in speech acts) 25 semi-idioms 163–164, 167–168 semi-literal idioms (see semiidioms) situation roles 65 Slobin 91–94 speaker-supportive vs. hearersupportive communicative behaviour 50–55, 215

special resource situation types(s) 66–75 specification(s) of P 117, 119, 124, 125, 126, 130, 136, 143, 149, 155, 191, 204, 208, 210 specificity 55, 112, 116–117, 153, 156 Sperber & Wilson 17 stability of phrasemes (see structural stability of phrasemes) structural stability of phrasemes (see also structural variability of phrasemes) 163–165 structural variability of phrasemes (see also structural stability of phrasemes) 163 Sweetser 28, 198 systematic vs. accidental gaps 96–97 T Tact Maxim 16 taxonomic vs. meronymic hierarchies 113 thinking for speaking (see also Slobin) 92–93 two-levels semantics 2 U unique elements 167 V variability of phrasemes (see structural variability of phrasemes) Vendler 23, 25–26 verbs of creation 12–13 W Whorf 91–92 WordNet (see also “pseudo– words”) 12, 109, 191

Index of verbs and phrasemes discussed

German, Dutch, Russian and Turkish expressions are followed by “G.”, “D.”, “R.” and “T.” respectively. Phrasemes are listed alphabetically under their first noun. Phrasemes without a noun are mentioned under their first other content word. Content words under which phrasemes are listed are printed in bold-face. A aanraden (D.) 200 abschweifen (G.) 184 acknowledge 124 admit 124 advise 19, 60–61, 199–200 afraden (D.) 134, 140 afstand van iets doen (D.) 138 afwijzen (D.) 136 agree 136 give oneself airs 180 Alarm schlagen (G.) 182 alarm slaan (D.) 182 allow 37, 62–63, 130, 132, 134 allude to 30–31 amuse 30–32 angeben (G.) 145 announce 48 annoy 30–33 anrufen (G.) 174 anvertrauen (G.) 125 ask 63, 119, 131, 134 auffordern (G.) 160 (jmdm.) etwas in Aussicht stellen (G.) 170 eine feuchte Aussprache haben (G.) 184, 185 B lügen, dass sich die Balken biegen (G.) 177, 185 zich (gegenseitig) die Bälle zuwerfen/zuspielen (G.) 184, 185

jmdm. einen Bären aufbinden (G.) 5, 177 bawl 152 bawl out 150 spill the beans 164 beglückwünschen (G.) 149 begrüßen (G.) 181 belasteren (D.) 142 beloven (D.) 160, 172 benachrichtigen (G.) 24, 191, 192, 200 iets te berde/ter sprake brengen (D.) 175 berichten (D.) 191–192 berichten (G.) 192 berispen (D.) 141, 142, 160 (jmdm.) Bescheid sagen (G.) 169 beschimpen (D.) 149 beschimpfen (G.) 149 beschönigen (G.) 145 betray 125, 203 jmdn. über etwas ins Bild setzen (G.) 169 blame 32–33, 142–143, 160 das Blaue vom Himmel (herunter) lügen (G.) 177, 185 etw. ins Blickfeld rücken (G.) 174 boast 2–3, 14–15, 20, 25–26, 28–29, 30, 31, 46–47, 118, 146, 160, 182, 183, 194 de borst hoogdragen (D.) 181

een hoge borst opzetten (D.) 181 zich op de borst slaan/kloppen (D.) 181 brag 26, 30–31, 118, 141, 182 jmdm. etw. aufs Brot/Butterbrot schmieren (G.) 178 jmdn. zur Brust nehmen (G.) 178 sich in die Brust werfen (G.) 179 talk business 207 C make a call 175 put/lay one’s cards on the table 205 let the cat out of the bag 164 caw 152 blacken one’s name/character 180 claim 18–19, 63, 71–73, 84, 119 classify 204–205 haul sb. over the coals 180 commend 142, 147 communicate 109–110, 112, 123 complain 46–47, 49 condole 182 confess 124 confide 125, 126 consent 136 convince 23, 30, 203 criticise 34–36, 49, 68, 141, 147 croak 152


curse 29–30, 32 cut sb. short 175 D iem. in een kwaad daglicht stellen (D.) 181 decline 136 defame 143, 148 delineate 191 demand 134 deny 18, 19, 63, 71–75, 82–84, 120 sich (mit etw.) dick(e) tun/sich (mit etw.) dick(e) machen (G.) 179 digress 184–185 dik/duur doen (D.) 181 sling/throw/fling dirt/mud at sb. 180 disclose 126 discredit 143, 148 bring sb. into discredit/ disrepute 180 discriminate 143, 148 discuss 185 diskreditieren (G.) 142, 148 dissuade 54, 59–61, 62, 140 distribute 136 divulge 125, 126 iem. op zijn donder/flicker/ mieter geven (D.) 180 jmdn./etw. in den Dreck/Kot ziehen/treten (G.) 179 jmdn. mit Dreck/Kot/Schmutz bewerfen/besudeln (G.) 180 give sb. a dressing-down/ talking-to/telling-off 180 beat/bang the drum (for sth.) 196–197, 202–203 jmdn. blauen Dunst/ein X für ein U vormachen (G.) 177 etw. durchsickern lassen (G.) 128 duur/dik doen (D.) 181 dwepen (D.) 141, 142, 147 E give sb. the (rough) edge of one’s tongue 180

een dure eed zweren (D.) 171 jmdm. sein Ehrenwort/Wort geben (G.) 170 met rotte eieren/modder/vuil gooien (D.) 181 etw. einfließen lassen (G.) 174 einwilligen (G.) 136 lay/put/place emphasis/stress on sth. 175 enthüllen (G.) 125 enthuse 142, 147 erlauben (G.) 134 erwähnen (G.) 184 erzählen (G.) 194–195 extol 147, 195–197 F fabeltjes/sprookjes vertellen (D.) 194–195 den Faden verlieren (G.) 184 Farbe bekennen (G.) 203 sich mit fremden Federn schmücken (G.) 194–196 etw. ins Feld führen (G.) 174 feliciteren (D.) 149 fib 2, 4, 160, 177, 194–195 jmdm. auf die Finger klopfen (G.) 178 show/fly the flag 205 Flagge zeigen (G.) 203 flatter 14–15, 145 iem. op zijn flikker/mieter/ donder geven (D.) 180 jmdm. einen Floh ins Ohr setzen (G.) 187–188, 193 jmdm. die Flötentöne beibringen (G.) 178 flunkern (G.) 2, 177 forbid 59–61, 63, 67–68, 130, 132, 134 foretell 48, 55, 201–202 Fraktur/Tacheles redden (G.) 203 G (jmdm.) eine Gardinenpredigt/ Standpauke halten (G.) 178 ein/sein Garn spinnen (G.) 194

jmdn. ins Gebet nehmen (G.) 178 geloben (G.) 134, 170–171 ein Gelöbnis ablegen (G.) 170–171 een gelofte afleggen (D.) 170– 171 iets in geuren en kleuren vertellen (D.) 208 gewag van iets maken (D.) 175 glorify 145 grade 204–205 gratulieren (G.) 149, 181 greet 181, 182 grölen (G.) 152 grumble 18, 141, 142–143, 148 grüßen (G.) 142, 146, 181 guarantee 61, 134, 136 H iem. onder handen nemen (D.) 180 iem. hard vallen over iets (D.) 180 jmdm. zeigen, was eine Harke ist (G.) 204 zijn hart luchten/uitstorten (D.) 189–190 lie one’s head off 178 hervorheben (G.) 174, 184 seinem Herzen Luft machen (G.) 187, 188–189 jmdm. aus dem Herzen sprechen (G.) 204 hint 25–26, 30–31 hinterbringen (G.) 125, 127–128 hiss 185 (jmdm.) etw. hoch und heilig versprechen (G.) 170–171 vom Hölzchen aufs Stöckchen/ Hundertsten ins Tausendste kommen (G.) 184 iem. iets naar het hoofd slingeren (D.) 180 ins gleiche Horn stoßen/tuten/ blasen (G.) 204 kräftig/mächtig ins Horn stoßen (G.) 179 jmdm. die Hucke/Jacke voll lügen (G.) 177, 185

vom Hundertsten ins Tausendste/Hölzchen aufs Stöckchen kommen (G.) 184 I put ideas into sb’s head 189 impart 109–110, 123 inform 24, 67, 109–111, 123, 169–170 informeren (D.) 123 informieren (G.) 123, 169–170 insinuate 30–31 insist 18–19, 84–85, 120–121, 135 instruct 132 intimate 30–31 inwilligen (D.) 136 J jmdm. die Jacke/Hucke voll lügen (G.) 177, 185 joelen (D.) 152 jokken (D.) 2, 160, 194–195 judge 205 K open kaart spelen (D.) 205 zijn kaarten op tafel leggen (D.) 205 karkat (R.) 57, 94 die/seine Karten aufdecken/ offen auf den Tisch legen (G.) 203 etw. zur Kenntnis bringen (G.) 169 jmdn. von etw. in Kenntnis setzen (G.) 169 in dieselbe/die gleiche Kerbe hauen/schlagen (G.) 204 Klartext reden/sprechen (G.) 203 jmdn. über den grünen Klee loben (G.) 185 de klemtoon/nadruk op iets leggen (D.) 175 kleur bekennen (D.) 205 iem. op zijn kop/lazer geven (D.) 180

Index of verbs and phrasemes 301

jmdm. den Kopf waschen (G.) 178 jmdm. etw. an den Kopf werfen (G.) 178 jmdm. etw. auf den Kopf zusagen (G.) 188 jmdn. mit Kot/Dreck/Schmutz bewerfen/besudeln (G.) 188 jmdn./etw. in den Kot/Dreck ziehen/treten (G.) 179 kötümsemek (T.) 57, 94 krächzen (G.) 152 krassen (D.) 152 kreischen (G.) 152 krijsen (D.) 152 kwaadspreken (D.) 148 L een last op iemands schouders leggen (D.) 132 iem. op zijn lazer/kop geven (D.) 180 leak 128 iem. de les spellen (D.) 180 jmdm. ein Licht aufstecken (G.) 169 lie 2, 8, 14–15, 25, 26–28, 32, 126 tell sb. a lie 178 immer (wieder) dasselbe Lied singen (G.) 188–189 altijd/steeds hetzelfde liedje zingen (D.) 189 liegen (D.) 8, 26–28 liegen alsof het gedrukt staat (D.) 178, 207 liegen dat men barst/dat men zwart ziet/dat men het zelf gelooft (D.) 178 iem. aan de lijn hebben (D.) 175 iem./iets op één lijn stellen met iem./iets (D.) 205 be hanging on the line 175 lisp 183 lispeln (G.) 183 loben (G.) 8, 146–147, 160 sich in Lobreden ergehen (G.) 185

jmdn. über den Löffel barbieren/balbieren (G.) 177 loven (D.) 8, 146–147, 160 lügen (G.) 8, 26–28 lügen wie gedruckt (G.) 177, 185, 207 aus voller Lunge schreien (G.) 185 M jmdn. madig/schlecht machen (G.) 179 maintain 84, 120 meckern (G.) 148 meedelen (D.) 123, 169–170 melding van iets maken (D.) 175 make mention of sth. 175 iets in het midden brengen (D.) 175 iem. op zijn mieter/flikker/ donder geven (D.) 180 speak one’s mind 205 mitteilen (G.) 24, 123, 169–170 mock 142–143, 148 met modder/rotte eieren/vuil gooien (D.) 181 mompelen (D.) 152 mopperen (D.) 148 iem. iets op de mouw spelden (D.) 178 sling/throw/fling mud/dirt at sb. 180 müjdelemek (T.) 57 mumble 75, 152 den Mund (zu) voll nehmen (G.) 179 jmdm. den Mund wässrig machen (G.) 187–188, 193 jmdm. über den Mund fahren (G.) 174 murmeln (G.) 152 murmur 152 N iem./iemands naam door de modder/het slijk sleuren/ halen (D.) 181


de nadruk/klemtoon op iets leggen (D.) 175 blacken sb’s name/character 180 drag sb’s name through the mud/muck/mire 180 jmdm. etw. unter die Nase reiben (G.) 179 näseln (G.) 185 iem. iets onder de neus wrijven (D.) 181 de noodklok luiden (D.) 182– 183 notify 24, 191 iem. op zijn nummer zetten (D.) 181 nuscheln (G.) 152 O onthullen (D.) 125 opscheppen (D.) 160 iem. tot de orde roepen (D.) 181 iem. de oren wassen (D.) 181 overbrieven (D.) 127–128 P give particulars of sth. 191–192 persuade 30 einen vom Pferd/Wald erzählen (G.) 177 give sb. a piece of one’s mind 180, 182 jmdm. eine bittere Pille zu schlucken geben (G.) 193 die alte Platte laufen lassen/ spielen (G.) 187–191 pledge 136, 171 praise 8, 35–36, 146, 160 predict 48, 55, 58, 74–75 preisen (G.) 147, 195–196 prijzen (D.) 147, 195–196 prohibit 44, 59–61, 130, 131, 132 promise 24–25, 37, 59–61, 69–72, 94–95, 134, 136, 160, 170–172 make/give a promise 5 prophesy 48, 55, 201

Q quäken (G.) 152 R raten (G.) 200 rave 142, 147 recommend 63, 132 iem. in de rede vallen (D.) 175 jmdm. die Rede/das Wort abschneiden (G.) 175 jmdm. in die Rede/ins Wort fallen (G.) 175 große Reden führen/schwingen (G.) 179 make reference to sth. 175 refuse 3, 136 jmdn. in eine Reihe mit jmdm. stellen (G.) 204 remark 184 renounce 45, 59, 138 report 191–192 reprimand 147 reproach 142–143, 147 request 22, 36, 69–72, 129, 131, 160 require 129, 131 give a ring/tinkle 175 S einer Sache Nachdruck verleihen (G.) 174 sagen (G.) 123 say 75, 119, 123 schreien wie eine angestochene Sau/wie am Spieß/wie ein gestochenes Schwein (G.) 185 jmdn./etw. durch die Scheiße/ den Staub ziehen/zerren (G.) 179 schelden (D.) 149 schimpfen (G.) 149 jmdn. schlau machen (G.) 169 jmdn. schlecht/madig machen (G.) 179 schmeicheln (G.) 145 jmdn./etw. in den Schmutz/ Staub zerren/ziehen/treten (G.) 179

jmdn. mit Schmutz/Kot/Dreck bewerfen/besudeln (G.) 188 schwärmen (G.) 142, 147 schreien wie ein gestochenes Schwein/ eine angestochene Sau/wie am Spieß (G.) 185 schwindeln (G.) 2, 160, 177, 194–195 schwören (G.) 171 scold 149 jmdm. aus der Seele sprechen (G.) 204, 206 talk shop 207 show off 30 shrill 152 slander 30, 148 schreien wie am Spieß/ein gestochenes Schwein/eine angestochene Sau (G.) 185 spotten (D.) 148 spotten (G.) 148 eine deutliche Sprache sprechen (G.) 204 iets ter sprake/te berde brengen (D.) 175 spread 195–197 sprookjes/fabeltjes vertellen (D.) 194–195 große Sprüche machen/klopfen (G.) 179 stamelen (D.) 152 stammeln (G.) 152 stammer 11, 152 jmdm. eine Standpauke/ Gardinenpredigt halten (G.) 178 eine Stange angeben (G.) 179 jmdn./etw. durch den Staub/die Scheiße ziehen/zerren (G.) 179 jmdn./etw. in den Staub/ Schmutz zerren/ziehen/treten (G.) 179 steen en been klagen (D.) 207 stelling nemen (D.) 205 zijn stem laten horen (D.) 205 stotteren (D.) 109, 152 stottern (G.) 109, 152 to put/lay/place stress/emphasis on sth. 175 an der Strippe hängen (G.) 175

jmdn. an der Strippe haben (G.) 175 sich an die Strippe hängen (G.) 175 jmdn./etw. auf eine/die gleiche Stufe (mit jmdm./etw.) stellen (G.) 204 stutter 9, 75 swear 29–30, 32, 149, 171 sympathise 47–48 T Tacheles/Fraktur reden (G.) 203 tadeln (G.) 142–143, 147, 160 jmdm. ein paar Takte sagen/ erzählen (G.) 179 tell tales 127–128 give sb. a talking-to/telling-off/ dressing-down 180 veel tamtam maken (D.) 193– 194 etw. aufs Tapet/Trapez bringen (G.) 174 iets op het tapijt brengen (D.) 175 take sb. to task 180, 182 lie through/in one’s teeth 163 am Telefon hängen (G.) 175 sich ans Telefon hängen (G.) 175 aan de telefoon hangen (D.) 175 iem. een telefoontje geven (D.) 176 tell 75, 123, 194–195 give sb. a telling-off/talking-to/ dressing-down 180 thank 51–52, 149, 182 threaten 20, 39, 58–59, 61, 134, 137, 140, 196–198, 200–201 give a tinkle/ring 175 etw. auf den Tisch des Hauses legen (G.) 188–191 toestaan (D.) 134 toevertrouwen (D.) 125 dicke/große Töne reden/ sprechen/spucken (G.) 179 jmdn./etw. in den höchsten Tönen loben (G.) 185

Index of verbs and phrasemes 303

etw. aufs Trapez/Tapet bringen (G.) 174 de trom slaan/roeren (D.) 195– 197 kräftig in die Trompete stoßen (G.) 179 blow one’s own trumpet 5, 180 sing/play the same old tune 189–190 einen Türken bauen (G.) 177 angeben wie eine Tüte Mücken/ ein Wald voll Affen (G.) 179 U sich ins Uferlose/Weite verlieren (G.) 184 iem. een flinke uitbrander geven (D.) 180 iets laten uitlekken (D.) 128 unken (G.) 94, 125, 196, 201–202 upbraid 149 V verbreiden (D.) 195–197 verbreiten (G.) 195–197 met geleende veren pronken (D.) 194–196 pronken/zich tooien met andermans veren (D.) 194–196 vergoeilijken (D.) 145 verheerlijken (D.) 145 verherrlichen (G.) 145 eine Verpflichtung eingehen (G.) 167, 170 verraden (D.) 125 verraten (G.) 125 versprechen (G.) 134, 160, 171–172 (jmdm.) ein Versprechen geben (G.) 170 verspreiden (D.) 195–197 vertellen (D.) 194–195 verweigern (G.) 134, 136 verwensen (D.) 149–150 verwijten (D.) 142, 147 verwittigen (D.) 191, 200 verzichten (G.) 138

iem. zijn vet geven (D.) 180 iem. op de vingers tikken (D.) 180 het vingertje opheffen tegen iem. (D.) 180 vleien (D.) 145–146 vloeken (D.) 149 iem. iets voor de voeten werpen (D.) 180 vorderen (D.) 160 vorhersagen (G.) 58, 201–202 vorwerfen (G.) 142, 147, 178 vow 134, 136, 171–172 met vuil/modder/rotte eieren gooien (D.) 181 W waarschuwen (D.) 160, 196–199 angeben wie ein Wald voll Affen/eine Tüte Mücken 179 einen vom Wald/Pferd erzählen (G.) 177 die alte/die gleiche/dieselbe Walze auflegen/spielen (G.) 188–190 warn 16, 19, 48, 49, 63, 124, 160 warnen (G.) 196, 197–199, 200–201 weigeren (D.) 136 sich ins Weite/Uferlose verlieren (G.) 184 welcome 47, 142, 146, 181 die Werbetrommel schlagen/ rühren (G.) 194–197 iem. de wetten lezen (D.) 180 whitewash 30, 31, 145 (jmdm.) etw. wissen lassen (G.) 169 een hartig/ernstig/stevig woordje met iem. spreken (D.) 180 give sb. one’s word/word of honour 183 (jmdm.) sein Wort/Ehrenwort geben (G.) 170 jmdm. das Wort/die Rede abschneiden (G.) 175


jmdm. ins Wort/in die Rede fallen (G.) 175 X jmdn. blauen Dunst/ein X für ein U vormachen (G.) 177 Y spin a yarn 194–195

Z jmdm. den Zahn ziehen (G.) 187–188, 192–193 jmdm. etw. ans Zeug flicken (G.) 179 zumuten (G.) 132, 134 sich an/bei etw. die Zunge abbrechen/zerbrechen (G.) 184, 185

zurückweisen (G.) 136 zusagen (G.) 136 eine Zusicherung machen (G.) 170 zutragen (G.) 125–126, 127–128, 195

Pragmatics & Beyond New Series A complete list of titles in this series can be found on the publishers’ website, www.benjamins.com 171 Félix-Brasdefer, J. César: Politeness in Mexico and the United States. A contrastive study of the realization and perception of refusals. xiv, 190 pp. + index. Expected January 2008 170 Oakley, Todd and Anders Hougaard (eds.): Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction. vi, 256 pp. + index. Expected January 2008 169 Connor, Ulla, Edwin R. Nagelhout and William V. Rozycki (eds.): Contrastive Rhetoric. Reaching to intercultural rhetoric. viii, 319 pp. + index. Expected December 2007 168 Proost, Kristel: Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items. The lexicalisation of communication concepts in English, German and Dutch. 2007. xii, 304 pp. 167 Bousfield, Derek: Impoliteness in Interaction. xiii, 281 pp. Expected December 2007 166 Nakane, Ikuko: Silence in Intercultural Communication. Perceptions and performance. xii, 233 pp. + index. Expected November 2007 165 Bublitz, Wolfram and Axel Hübler (eds.): Metapragmatics in Use. vi, 290 pp. + index. Expected December 2007 164 Englebretson, Robert (ed.): Stancetaking in Discourse. Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction. 2007. viii, 323 pp. 163 Lytra, Vally: Play Frames and Social Identities. Contact encounters in a Greek primary school. xi, 291 pp. + index. Expected November 2007 162 Fetzer, Anita (ed.): Context and Appropriateness. Micro meets macro. 2007. vi, 265 pp. 161 Celle, Agnès and Ruth Huart (eds.): Connectives as Discourse Landmarks. 2007. viii, 212 pp. 160 Fetzer, Anita and Gerda Eva Lauerbach (eds.): Political Discourse in the Media. Cross-cultural perspectives. 2007. viii, 379 pp. 159 Maynard, Senko K.: Linguistic Creativity in Japanese Discourse. Exploring the multiplicity of self, perspective, and voice. 2007. xvi, 356 pp. 158 Walker, Terry: Thou and You in Early Modern English Dialogues. Trials, Depositions, and Drama Comedy. 2007. xx, 339 pp. 157 Crawford Camiciottoli, Belinda: The Language of Business Studies Lectures. A corpus-assisted analysis. 2007. xvi, 236 pp. 156 Vega Moreno, Rosa E.: Creativity and Convention. The pragmatics of everyday figurative speech. 2007. xii, 249 pp. 155 Hedberg, Nancy and Ron Zacharski (eds.): The Grammar–Pragmatics Interface. Essays in honor of Jeanette K. Gundel. 2007. viii, 345 pp. 154 Hübler, Axel: The Nonverbal Shift in Early Modern English Conversation. 2007. x, 281 pp. 153 Arnovick, Leslie K.: Written Reliquaries. The resonance of orality in medieval English texts. 2006. xii, 292 pp. 152 Warren, Martin: Features of Naturalness in Conversation. 2006. x, 272 pp. 151 Suzuki, Satoko (ed.): Emotive Communication in Japanese. 2006. x, 234 pp. 150 Busse, Beatrix: Vocative Constructions in the Language of Shakespeare. 2006. xviii, 525 pp. 149 Locher, Miriam A.: Advice Online. Advice-giving in an American Internet health column. 2006. xvi, 277 pp. 148 Fløttum, Kjersti, Trine Dahl and Torodd Kinn: Academic Voices. Across languages and disciplines. 2006. x, 309 pp. 147 Hinrichs, Lars: Codeswitching on the Web. English and Jamaican Creole in e-mail communication. 2006. x, 302 pp. 146 Tanskanen, Sanna-Kaisa: Collaborating towards Coherence. Lexical cohesion in English discourse. 2006. ix, 192 pp. 145 Kurhila, Salla: Second Language Interaction. 2006. vii, 257 pp. 144 Bührig, Kristin and Jan D. ten Thije (eds.): Beyond Misunderstanding. Linguistic analyses of intercultural communication. 2006. vi, 339 pp. 143 Baker, Carolyn, Michael Emmison and Alan Firth (eds.): Calling for Help. Language and social interaction in telephone helplines. 2005. xviii, 352 pp. 142 Sidnell, Jack: Talk and Practical Epistemology. The social life of knowledge in a Caribbean community. 2005. xvi, 255 pp.

141 Zhu, Yunxia: Written Communication across Cultures. A sociocognitive perspective on business genres. 2005. xviii, 216 pp. 140 Butler, Christopher S., María de los Ángeles Gómez-González and Susana M. Doval-Suárez (eds.): The Dynamics of Language Use. Functional and contrastive perspectives. 2005. xvi, 413 pp. 139 Lakoff, Robin T. and Sachiko Ide (eds.): Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness. 2005. xii, 342 pp. 138 Müller, Simone: Discourse Markers in Native and Non-native English Discourse. 2005. xviii, 290 pp. 137 Morita, Emi: Negotiation of Contingent Talk. The Japanese interactional particles ne and sa. 2005. xvi, 240 pp. 136 Sassen, Claudia: Linguistic Dimensions of Crisis Talk. Formalising structures in a controlled language. 2005. ix, 230 pp. 135 Archer, Dawn: Questions and Answers in the English Courtroom (1640–1760). A sociopragmatic analysis. 2005. xiv, 374 pp. 134 Skaffari, Janne, Matti Peikola, Ruth Carroll, Risto Hiltunen and Brita Wårvik (eds.): Opening Windows on Texts and Discourses of the Past. 2005. x, 418 pp. 133 Marnette, Sophie: Speech and Thought Presentation in French. Concepts and strategies. 2005. xiv, 379 pp. 132 Onodera, Noriko O.: Japanese Discourse Markers. Synchronic and diachronic discourse analysis. 2004. xiv, 253 pp. 131 Janoschka, Anja: Web Advertising. New forms of communication on the Internet. 2004. xiv, 230 pp. 130 Halmari, Helena and Tuija Virtanen (eds.): Persuasion Across Genres. A linguistic approach. 2005. x, 257 pp. 129 Taboada, María Teresa: Building Coherence and Cohesion. Task-oriented dialogue in English and Spanish. 2004. xvii, 264 pp. 128 Cordella, Marisa: The Dynamic Consultation. A discourse analytical study of doctor–patient communication. 2004. xvi, 254 pp. 127 Brisard, Frank, Michael Meeuwis and Bart Vandenabeele (eds.): Seduction, Community, Speech. A Festschrift for Herman Parret. 2004. vi, 202 pp. 126 Wu, Yi’an: Spatial Demonstratives in English and Chinese. Text and Cognition. 2004. xviii, 236 pp. 125 Lerner, Gene H. (ed.): Conversation Analysis. Studies from the first generation. 2004. x, 302 pp. 124 Vine, Bernadette: Getting Things Done at Work. The discourse of power in workplace interaction. 2004. x, 278 pp. 123 Márquez Reiter, Rosina and María Elena Placencia (eds.): Current Trends in the Pragmatics of Spanish. 2004. xvi, 383 pp. 122 González, Montserrat: Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative. The case of English and Catalan. 2004. xvi, 410 pp. 121 Fetzer, Anita: Recontextualizing Context. Grammaticality meets appropriateness. 2004. x, 272 pp. 120 Aijmer, Karin and Anna-Brita Stenström (eds.): Discourse Patterns in Spoken and Written Corpora. 2004. viii, 279 pp. 119 Hiltunen, Risto and Janne Skaffari (eds.): Discourse Perspectives on English. Medieval to modern. 2003. viii, 243 pp. 118 Cheng, Winnie: Intercultural Conversation. 2003. xii, 279 pp. 117 Wu, Ruey-Jiuan Regina: Stance in Talk. A conversation analysis of Mandarin final particles. 2004. xvi, 260 pp. 116 Grant, Colin B. (ed.): Rethinking Communicative Interaction. New interdisciplinary horizons. 2003. viii, 330 pp. 115 Kärkkäinen, Elise: Epistemic Stance in English Conversation. A description of its interactional functions, with a focus on I think. 2003. xii, 213 pp. 114 Kühnlein, Peter, Hannes Rieser and Henk Zeevat (eds.): Perspectives on Dialogue in the New Millennium. 2003. xii, 400 pp. 113 Panther, Klaus-Uwe and Linda L. Thornburg (eds.): Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing. 2003. xii, 285 pp. 112 Lenz, Friedrich (ed.): Deictic Conceptualisation of Space, Time and Person. 2003. xiv, 279 pp. 111 Ensink, Titus and Christoph Sauer (eds.): Framing and Perspectivising in Discourse. 2003. viii, 227 pp.

110 Androutsopoulos, Jannis K. and Alexandra Georgakopoulou (eds.): Discourse Constructions of Youth Identities. 2003. viii, 343 pp. 109 Mayes, Patricia: Language, Social Structure, and Culture. A genre analysis of cooking classes in Japan and America. 2003. xiv, 228 pp. 108 Barron, Anne: Acquisition in Interlanguage Pragmatics. Learning how to do things with words in a study abroad context. 2003. xviii, 403 pp. 107 Taavitsainen, Irma and Andreas H. Jucker (eds.): Diachronic Perspectives on Address Term Systems. 2003. viii, 446 pp. 106 Busse, Ulrich: Linguistic Variation in the Shakespeare Corpus. Morpho-syntactic variability of second person pronouns. 2002. xiv, 344 pp. 105 Blackwell, Sarah E.: Implicatures in Discourse. The case of Spanish NP anaphora. 2003. xvi, 303 pp. 104 Beeching, Kate: Gender, Politeness and Pragmatic Particles in French. 2002. x, 251 pp. 103 Fetzer, Anita and Christiane Meierkord (eds.): Rethinking Sequentiality. Linguistics meets conversational interaction. 2002. vi, 300 pp. 102 Leafgren, John: Degrees of Explicitness. Information structure and the packaging of Bulgarian subjects and objects. 2002. xii, 252 pp. 101 Luke, K. K. and Theodossia-Soula Pavlidou (eds.): Telephone Calls. Unity and diversity in conversational structure across languages and cultures. 2002. x, 295 pp. 100 Jaszczolt, Katarzyna M. and Ken Turner (eds.): Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 2. 2003. viii, 496 pp. 99 Jaszczolt, Katarzyna M. and Ken Turner (eds.): Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 1. 2003. xii, 388 pp. 98 Duszak, Anna (ed.): Us and Others. Social identities across languages, discourses and cultures. 2002. viii, 522 pp. 97 Maynard, Senko K.: Linguistic Emotivity. Centrality of place, the topic-comment dynamic, and an ideology of pathos in Japanese discourse. 2002. xiv, 481 pp. 96 Haverkate, Henk: The Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics of Spanish Mood. 2002. vi, 241 pp. 95 Fitzmaurice, Susan M.: The Familiar Letter in Early Modern English. A pragmatic approach. 2002. viii, 263 pp. 94 McIlvenny, Paul (ed.): Talking Gender and Sexuality. 2002. x, 332 pp. 93 Baron, Bettina and Helga Kotthoff (eds.): Gender in Interaction. Perspectives on femininity and masculinity in ethnography and discourse. 2002. xxiv, 357 pp. 92 Gardner, Rod: When Listeners Talk. Response tokens and listener stance. 2001. xxii, 281 pp. 91 Gross, Joan: Speaking in Other Voices. An ethnography of Walloon puppet theaters. 2001. xxviii, 341 pp. 90 Kenesei, István and Robert M. Harnish (eds.): Perspectives on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Discourse. A Festschrift for Ferenc Kiefer. 2001. xxii, 352 pp. 89 Itakura, Hiroko: Conversational Dominance and Gender. A study of Japanese speakers in first and second language contexts. 2001. xviii, 231 pp. 88 Bayraktaroğlu, Arın and Maria Sifianou (eds.): Linguistic Politeness Across Boundaries. The case of Greek and Turkish. 2001. xiv, 439 pp. 87 Mushin, Ilana: Evidentiality and Epistemological Stance. Narrative Retelling. 2001. xviii, 244 pp. 86 Ifantidou, Elly: Evidentials and Relevance. 2001. xii, 225 pp. 85 Collins, Daniel E.: Reanimated Voices. Speech reporting in a historical-pragmatic perspective. 2001. xx, 384 pp. 84 Andersen, Gisle: Pragmatic Markers and Sociolinguistic Variation. A relevance-theoretic approach to the language of adolescents. 2001. ix, 352 pp. 83 Márquez Reiter, Rosina: Linguistic Politeness in Britain and Uruguay. A contrastive study of requests and apologies. 2000. xviii, 225 pp. 82 Khalil, Esam N.: Grounding in English and Arabic News Discourse. 2000. x, 274 pp. 81 Di Luzio, Aldo, Susanne Günthner and Franca Orletti (eds.): Culture in Communication. Analyses of intercultural situations. 2001. xvi, 341 pp. 80 Ungerer, Friedrich (ed.): English Media Texts – Past and Present. Language and textual structure. 2000. xiv, 286 pp. 79 Andersen, Gisle and Thorstein Fretheim (eds.): Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude. 2000. viii, 273 pp.

78 77 76 75 74 73 72 71 70 69 68 67 66 65 64 63

62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42

Sell, Roger D.: Literature as Communication. The foundations of mediating criticism. 2000. xiv, 348 pp. Vanderveken, Daniel and Susumu Kubo (eds.): Essays in Speech Act Theory. 2002. vi, 328 pp. Matsui, Tomoko: Bridging and Relevance. 2000. xii, 251 pp. Pilkington, Adrian: Poetic Effects. A relevance theory perspective. 2000. xiv, 214 pp. Trosborg, Anna (ed.): Analysing Professional Genres. 2000. xvi, 256 pp. Hester, Stephen K. and David Francis (eds.): Local Educational Order. Ethnomethodological studies of knowledge in action. 2000. viii, 326 pp. Marmaridou, Sophia S.A.: Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition. 2000. xii, 322 pp. Gómez-González, María de los Ángeles: The Theme–Topic Interface. Evidence from English. 2001. xxiv, 438 pp. Sorjonen, Marja-Leena: Responding in Conversation. A study of response particles in Finnish. 2001. x, 330 pp. Noh, Eun-Ju: Metarepresentation. A relevance-theory approach. 2000. xii, 242 pp. Arnovick, Leslie K.: Diachronic Pragmatics. Seven case studies in English illocutionary development. 2000. xii, 196 pp. Taavitsainen, Irma, Gunnel Melchers and Päivi Pahta (eds.): Writing in Nonstandard English. 2000. viii, 404 pp. Jucker, Andreas H., Gerd Fritz and Franz Lebsanft (eds.): Historical Dialogue Analysis. 1999. viii, 478 pp. Cooren, François: The Organizing Property of Communication. 2000. xvi, 272 pp. Svennevig, Jan: Getting Acquainted in Conversation. A study of initial interactions. 2000. x, 384 pp. Bublitz, Wolfram, Uta Lenk and Eija Ventola (eds.): Coherence in Spoken and Written Discourse. How to create it and how to describe it. Selected papers from the International Workshop on Coherence, Augsburg, 24-27 April 1997. 1999. xiv, 300 pp. Tzanne, Angeliki: Talking at Cross-Purposes. The dynamics of miscommunication. 2000. xiv, 263 pp. Mills, Margaret H. (ed.): Slavic Gender Linguistics. 1999. xviii, 251 pp. Jacobs, Geert: Preformulating the News. An analysis of the metapragmatics of press releases. 1999. xviii, 428 pp. Kamio, Akio and Ken-ichi Takami (eds.): Function and Structure. In honor of Susumu Kuno. 1999. x, 398 pp. Rouchota, Villy and Andreas H. Jucker (eds.): Current Issues in Relevance Theory. 1998. xii, 368 pp. Jucker, Andreas H. and Yael Ziv (eds.): Discourse Markers. Descriptions and theory. 1998. x, 363 pp. Tanaka, Hiroko: Turn-Taking in Japanese Conversation. A Study in Grammar and Interaction. 2000. xiv, 242 pp. Allwood, Jens and Peter Gärdenfors (eds.): Cognitive Semantics. Meaning and cognition. 1999. x, 201 pp. Hyland, Ken: Hedging in Scientific Research Articles. 1998. x, 308 pp. Mosegaard Hansen, Maj-Britt: The Function of Discourse Particles. A study with special reference to spoken standard French. 1998. xii, 418 pp. Gillis, Steven and Annick De Houwer (eds.): The Acquisition of Dutch. With a Preface by Catherine E. Snow. 1998. xvi, 444 pp. Boulima, Jamila: Negotiated Interaction in Target Language Classroom Discourse. 1999. xiv, 338 pp. Grenoble, Lenore A.: Deixis and Information Packaging in Russian Discourse. 1998. xviii, 338 pp. Kurzon, Dennis: Discourse of Silence. 1998. vi, 162 pp. Kamio, Akio: Territory of Information. 1997. xiv, 227 pp. Chesterman, Andrew: Contrastive Functional Analysis. 1998. viii, 230 pp. Georgakopoulou, Alexandra: Narrative Performances. A study of Modern Greek storytelling. 1997. xvii, 282 pp. Paltridge, Brian: Genre, Frames and Writing in Research Settings. 1997. x, 192 pp. Bargiela-Chiappini, Francesca and Sandra J. Harris: Managing Language. The discourse of corporate meetings. 1997. ix, 295 pp. Janssen, Theo and Wim van der Wurff (eds.): Reported Speech. Forms and functions of the verb. 1996. x, 312 pp. Kotthoff, Helga and Ruth Wodak (eds.): Communicating Gender in Context. 1997. xxvi, 424 pp.

Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items: The lexicalisation of communication concepts in English, German and Dutch (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Collaborating towards Coherence: Lexical cohesion in English discourse (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative: The Case of English and Catalan (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Function and Structure: In Honor of Susumu Kuno (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Impoliteness in Interaction (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Humor in Interaction (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Style Shifting in Japanese (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Youngspeak in a Multilingual Perspective (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Constraints in Discourse (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series, 172)

Constraints in Discourse 2 (Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series)

Metapragmatics in Use (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Spatial Demonstratives In English And Chinese: Text And Cognition (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Silence in Intercultural Communication: Perceptions and performance (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series, Volume 166)

Silence in Intercultural Communication: Perceptions and performance (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series, Volume 166)

The Grammar-Pragmatics Interface: Essays in Honor of Jeanette K. Gundel (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Web Advertising: New Forms Of Communication On The Internet (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Discourse Markers in Native And Non-native English Discourse (Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series)

Transfer of movables in German, French, English and Dutch law

Beyond Misunderstanding: Linguistic Analyses of Intercultural Communication (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Cognitive Semantics: Meaning and Cognition (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Instructional Writing in English: Studies in honour of Risto Hiltunen (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Codeswitching on the Web: English and Jamaican Creole in E-mail Communication (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series, Volume 147)

Creativity and Convention: The pragmatics of everyday figurative speech (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Social Roles and Language Practices in Late Modern English (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Interactive Dialogue Sequences in Middle English Drama (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Hedging in Scientific Research Articles (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Essays in Speech Act Theory (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Speech and Thought Presentation in French: Concepts and Strategies (Pragmatics & Beyond New)

Speech and Thought Presentation in French: Concepts and Strategies (Pragmatics & Beyond New)

South Slavic Discourse Particles (Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series)

Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items: The lexicalisation of communication concepts in English, German and Dutch (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Collaborating towards Coherence: Lexical cohesion in English discourse (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative: The Case of English and Catalan (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Function and Structure: In Honor of Susumu Kuno (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Impoliteness in Interaction (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Humor in Interaction (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Style Shifting in Japanese (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Youngspeak in a Multilingual Perspective (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Constraints in Discourse (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series, 172)

Constraints in Discourse 2 (Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series)

Metapragmatics in Use (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Spatial Demonstratives In English And Chinese: Text And Cognition (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Silence in Intercultural Communication: Perceptions and performance (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series, Volume 166)

Silence in Intercultural Communication: Perceptions and performance (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series, Volume 166)

The Grammar-Pragmatics Interface: Essays in Honor of Jeanette K. Gundel (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Web Advertising: New Forms Of Communication On The Internet (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Discourse Markers in Native And Non-native English Discourse (Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series)

Transfer of movables in German, French, English and Dutch law

Beyond Misunderstanding: Linguistic Analyses of Intercultural Communication (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Cognitive Semantics: Meaning and Cognition (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Instructional Writing in English: Studies in honour of Risto Hiltunen (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Codeswitching on the Web: English and Jamaican Creole in E-mail Communication (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series, Volume 147)

Creativity and Convention: The pragmatics of everyday figurative speech (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Social Roles and Language Practices in Late Modern English (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Interactive Dialogue Sequences in Middle English Drama (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

Hedging in Scientific Research Articles (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Essays in Speech Act Theory (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series)

Speech and Thought Presentation in French: Concepts and Strategies (Pragmatics & Beyond New)

Speech and Thought Presentation in French: Concepts and Strategies (Pragmatics & Beyond New)

South Slavic Discourse Particles (Pragmatics and Beyond. New Series)

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