Metapragmatics in Use (Pragmatics and Beyond New Series)

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Metapragmatics in Use

Pragmatics & Beyond New Series (P&BNS) Pragmatics & Beyond New Series is a continuation of Pragmatics & Beyond and its Companion Series. The New Series offers a selection of high quality work covering the full richness of Pragmatics as an interdisciplinary field, within language sciences.

Editor Andreas H. Jucker

University of Zurich, English Department Plattenstrasse 47, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected]

Associate Editors Jacob L. Mey

University of Southern Denmark

Herman Parret

Jef Verschueren

Susan C. Herring

Emanuel A. Schegloff

Belgian National Science Foundation, Universities of Louvain and Antwerp

Belgian National Science Foundation, University of Antwerp

Editorial Board Shoshana Blum-Kulka Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Jean Caron

Université de Poitiers

Indiana University

Masako K. Hiraga

St.Paul’s (Rikkyo) University

University of California at Los Angeles

Deborah Schiffrin

David Holdcroft

Georgetown University

Sachiko Ide

Kobe City University of Foreign Studies

Sandra A. Thompson

Thorstein Fretheim

Catherine KerbratOrecchioni

John C. Heritage

Claudia de Lemos

Teun A. van Dijk

Marina Sbisà

Richard J. Watts

Robyn Carston

University College London

Bruce Fraser

Boston University University of Trondheim University of California at Los Angeles

University of Leeds Japan Women’s University

University of Lyon 2 University of Campinas, Brazil University of Trieste

Volume 165 Metapragmatics in Use. Edited by Wolfram Bublitz and Axel Hübler

Paul Osamu Takahara

University of California at Santa Barbara Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona University of Berne

Metapragmatics in Use Edited by

Wolfram Bublitz Universität Augsburg

Axel Hübler Universität Jena

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia

8

TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Metapragmatics in use / edited by Wolfram Bublitz, Axel Hübler. p. cm. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series, issn 0922-842X ; v. 165) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Pragmatics. 2. Metalanguage. I. Bublitz, Wolfram. II. Hübler, Axel. P99.4.P72M462 2007 306.44--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 5409 2 (Hb; alk. paper)

2007028072

© 2007 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

Table of contents

Acknowledgements Introducing metapragmatics in use Axel Hübler and Wolfram Bublitz

vii 1

Part A. Metapragmatics in everyday use “Don’t blame me for criticizing you ...”: A study of metapragmatic comments in Thai Krisadawan Hongladarom

29

Facework and multiple selves in apologetic metapragmatic comments in Japanese Barbara Pizziconi

49

Metapragmatic function of quotative markers in Japanese Satoko Suzuki

73

Metapragmatic utterances in computer-mediated interaction Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen

87

On the metapragmatics of gestures Axel Hübler

107

Language shift in conversation as a metapragmatic comment Hartmut Haberland

129

Part B. Metapragmatics in educational use Metapragmatic comments in institutional talk: A comparative analysis across settings Anna Ciliberti and Laurie Anderson

143

Metapragmatic expressions in physics lectures: Integrating representations, 167 guiding processing, and assigning participant roles Sara W. Smith and Xiaoping Liang

vi

Table of contents

The acquisition of metapragmatic abilities in preschool children Juliane Stude

199

Part C. Metapragmatics in specialized use ‘So your story now is that ...’: Metapragmatic framing strategies in courtroom interrogation Richard W. Janney A metapragmatic examination of therapist reformulations Peter Muntigl

223 235

Building common ground through metapragmatic comments in international project work Hermine Penz

263

Author index Subject index

293 297

Acknowledgements

We wish to acknowledge with gratitude the invaluable assistance of Julia Reif and Elisabeth Fritz in preparing the manuscript of this volume. Special thanks are also due to Gudrun Nelle for helping us with the proofreading.

Introducing metapragmatics in use Axel Hübler and Wolfram Bublitz

1.

Approaching metapragmatics

This volume examines the concept of metapragmatics from a new perspective in that it focusses on the pragmatics of metacommmunicative utterances in use. Rather than reflecting on how metalanguage is used as a means of topicalizing, theorizing or simply talking about language (as system or in use), we investigate how interactants actually employ meta-utterances to intervene in ongoing discourse. Accordingly, we are interested in the pragmatics of meta-utterances being put to communicative practice, or, in short, in metapragmatics in use. While metalanguage is a long-standing and concordantly used notion in linguistics, metapragmatics is a fairly new term, which still allows for a number of variant readings. Any attempt at disentangling even the most prevalent of these readings in order to arrive at our understanding of metapragmatics has to be preceded by a brief look at its constitutive elements (meta and pragmatics) and at some conceptualizations of metalanguage. Being polysemous itself, the affix meta invites different readings of the concepts it premodifies. However, of its etymologically licensed meanings, only about or dealing with is regularly used to determine general concepts like language and communication or linguistic notions like pragmatics and semantics or message and utterance. The most prominent of these notions is, of course, metalanguage (as opposed to object language), on whose origins and accounts in logic and (language) philosophy we do not have to dwell because it is an indispensable part of any

. Among them after, later than or beyond (as in Aristotle’s Metaphysics), transformed, changed or transcending (as in ‘metamorphosis’, ‘metaphor’) and among, originally from the Greek preposition meaning among, with, after.

Axel Hübler and Wolfram Bublitz

linguist’s knowledge. There are, however, three aspects that we need to discuss because they help to clarify our use of metapragmatics: they concern Jakobson’s understanding of metalingual use, Bateson’s reading of metacommunicative use and Lucy’s very broad concept of reflexivity.

1.1

Metalanguage

Jakobson was the first linguist to recognize the importance of metalanguage (vs. object language) in human communication and hence the necessity to incorporate it into any theory of language description. Discourse or text is to an amazingly high extent interspersed with (what he calls) ‘metalingual’ means and acts referring to all kinds of linguistic aspects. The capacity of detaching oneself from the object use of language (i.e., from using it for purposes other than those that are related to itself) and instead focus on language by talking about it, referring to it or, indeed, reflecting upon it (cf. Lucy below) is genuinely human and demands our, the linguists’, attention. Consequently, Jakobson complemented Karl Bühler’s Organonmodell der Sprache (with its referential, expressive and appellative functions) by adding (inter alia) a metalingual function. However, the metalingual function is not just another function on a par with the other five functions in Jakobson’s framework; it is much more than that. Placed on a higher level of communication, it is a function of a different kind in that it is not used to communicate propositional meaning but to explain, gloss, comment on, predicate about or refer to such propositional meaning. It is thus indispensable because it enables or at least helps the interlocutor to understand how what is said is meant. Habermas, though referring to propositional content and illocutionary function as a special case, speaks of the ‘dual structure’ (Doppelstruktur) of talk (i.e., language in use): [Es gibt eine] Doppelstruktur der Rede, d.h. [eine] Trennung von zwei kommunikativen Ebenen, auf denen sich Sprecher und Hörer gleichzeitig verständigen

. For overviews both in logic and mathematics as well as in (language) philosophy cf. van Eijk (1994) and Allan (2006), Mertz and Yovel (2000), and Lucy (1993), who writes: “In many traditional linguistic and philosophical accounts, ordinary language is conceived of as referring, in the first instance, to a world of nonlinguistic objects. The use of language to refer to language itself is seen, then, as a higher order or iterative use worthy of special attention. Language referring to language in this way is called metalanguage and the ordinary language referred to is called object language. [...] there can be higher order metalanguages about a first order metalanguage [...]. Reichenbach [...] and others differentiate several levels within metalanguage depending on the aspect of object language to which they refer” (Lucy 1993: 12).

Introducing metapragmatics in use

müssen [...]. [...] sie müssen die Kommunikation eines Inhalts mit der Metakommunikation über den Verwendungssinn des kommunizierten Inhalts vereinigen. (Habermas 1984: 404ff.) [Talk has a dual structure, i.e., there is a division between two communicative levels, on which speaker and hearer have to reach an understanding simultaneously […]. […] they have to combine the communication of a content with the metacommunication about how to use the communicated content.]

Jakobson’s reading of metalanguage appears to be related to use and ‘practice’ in a very direct way, at least at first sight. His claim that “we practice metalanguage” [our emphasis] (1960: 356) suggests that he places metalanguage in the hands of the language user as a means of actively referring to linguistic forms, structures and functions. However, Jakobson’s description of the metalingual function as “a glossing function” which is “focused on the code” (1960: 356) makes it very clear that he prefers a system-related to an instance-related view of metalanguage. Thus, he is neither interested in metalanguage as a means used by linguists to talk about or reflect on language as an object of scientific study in a theoretical and detached way, nor in metalanguage as an instrument actually used by interactants in a particular speech event to refer to ongoing discourse (e.g., by querying meanings, clarifying functions, (re-)structuring clauses). Instead, he looks upon metalanguage as a kind of virtual tool geared towards the systematics of object language, i.e., as a potential at the language user’s disposal. But even though its significance is out of the question, this is just one side of the coin. In this volume, we are interested in the other, the practical side. Our interest is geared towards metalinguistic means as manifestations of such virtuality, i.e. towards metalanguage when it is actually applied as a means to an end. Our focus is not only on the what but also on the how of the speakers’ doings. For instance, how they use metalanguage to frame their own or their interlocutors’ utterances as true or false, precise or vague, cooperative or uncooperative, straightforward or misleading and so on, to secure or change the direction of the current talk, to create or maintain expedient social relationships. From the recipient’s point of view, to understand such metalingual usage, is, of course, of vital importance, because it carries information (on the meta level) about how to understand what is said and meant (on the object level). Hence,

. For his use of the concept code cf. Jakobson (1960 and 1980), where he argues for four different types of about-relations between messages and codes. . Echoing such needs is the language user’s metalinguistic awareness, which has been the focus of some investigation by, e.g., Mertz and Yovel (2000) and Verschueren (2000) (who attributes the notion to Bakhtin).


one can say that we view metalanguage as a practical means of referring to current discourse or text, rather than as a code to the code (in Jakobson’s sense).

1.2 Metacommunication and ‘reflexive language’ Different conceptualizations breed different terminologies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the last three or four decades have seen a modestly extensive growth of studies on readings, facets and variants of metalanguage, among them Bateson’s, Silverstein’s and Lucy’s accounts. Immediately related to our topic is Bateson’s (1972: 178) distinction between metalinguistic messages (which are about language) and metacommunicative messages (which are geared towards the speaker-addressee relationship by, e.g., relating what is said to the current communicative or interactional frame). Related to the interpersonal level of communication, his concept comprises more than the verbal medium and includes the vocal and kinesic mode. Silverstein’s somewhat narrower, language related, position holds that metalinguistic operations are essentially metapragmatic, dealing with the appropriateness of language use. Metapragmatic acts, inter alia, assign (either explicitly or implicitly) particular pragmatic functions to speech acts or discourse types. Equally relevant for our concern is Lucy’s (1993) very wide concept of reflexive language. Using language reflexively means “to speak about speech, that is, to use language to communicate about the activity of using language” (1993: 9): speech [he argues] is permeated by reflexive activity as speakers remark on language, report utterances, index and describe aspects of the speech event, invoke conventional names, and guide listeners in the proper interpretation of their utterances. This reflexivity is so pervasive and essential that we can say that lan(Lucy 1993: 11) guage is, by nature, fundamentally reflexive.

Of the numerous functions and types of reflexive language discussed by Lucy, several overlap with those we ascribe to meta-utterances in this volume (e.g., reference to “general regularities in the structure or functioning of language use (e.g., [...] ‘One shouldn’t say ‘damn it’ in front of children’)” Lucy 1993: 10), while others are far removed from our catalogue of functions and types, especially those that are about general characteristics of human languages (e.g., “Many languages signal gender differences in their pronouns”, 1993: 10) or those that include selfreferring forms (as in “dog is monosyllabic”, 1993: 11) and all kinds of deictics. He . The focus of such metacommunicative framing was later extended from discourse types or speech activities proper (such as jokes, discussions, chats, interrogations etc.) to social activities in general by Goffman and other sociologists, as Lucy (1993: 15) points out.


understands reflexive language in a very broad way as embracing the entire immensely rich and variant range of metalinguistic means and strategies that interactants may choose from when referring to, making evaluative judgments about or commenting on any kind of system- or use-related phenomenon of language. Following this view, we can say that the means and functions of metapragmatics that we focus on in this volume, are a sub-category of reflexive language. But even though reflexive language is described as such a very wide concept, it has its limits and is by no means all-inclusive: Explicit reflexive statements, whether about the code structure, rules of use, specific speech events, or particular utterances, all tend to be limited by the formal devices available to speakers to engage in such explicit discourse and by the sorts of formal and functional aspects of speech which are readily recognized. Only a few aspects of speech may receive formal recognition whereas others may remain unlabeled. [...] Regularly occurring patterns are more likely to be labelable whereas the specific one-time pragmatic effects of utterances will not (perhaps cannot) receive standard terminological form. (Lucy 1993: 29)

Such limitations are of little avail for our view of metapragmatics, which is not confined to explicit or standardized forms but embraces a broad variety of verbal, prosodic and kinesic forms (as will become clear in Section 2 below).

1.3

Metapragmatics – virtual scopes and actual focus

1.3.1 Pragmatics Before we explore various alternative ways of defining metapragmatics, we have to briefly explain what we mean by linguistic pragmatics. Even though pragmatics seems to invite various readings, we believe that most of them fall into two types only. There is a wide reading, according to which pragmatics is best regarded as a general theory of (any kind of) language use. Pragmatics in this sense deals with each and every linguistic phenomenon from the perspective of use. Such a broad approach lacks methodological homogeneity and controllability and is in danger of producing impressionistic and ad-hoc-descriptions only (epitomizing the pragmatist as an artist rather than a scientist). We therefore prefer the narrow reading, which views pragmatics as dealing with those types of language function, . Ultimately, this goes back to Charles Sanders Peirce and was later adopted both by Charles Morris, who defines pragmatics as “the science of the relation of signs to their interpreters” (1938: 108), and by Rudolf Carnap, who writes: “If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or to put it in more general terms, to the user of the language, then we assign [...] [the investigation] to the field of pragmatics” (Carnap 1942: 9).


patterns of speech action (cf. Greek prãgma = ‘act’), kinds of presupposition and other implied and inferred meanings, and communicative principles that connect meanings with actual contexts and enable participants to interact successfully in actual social encounters. In order to explain function-in-context and meaningin-context (as induced by verbal and non-verbal means), pragmatics relates them to the participants’ (shared) frames of knowledge and mind. Keeping this reading of pragmatics in mind, we can now investigate the somewhat enigmatic notion of metapragmatics with its various facets. (In fact, the vagueness of the notion and the diversity of its characteristics, which are a challenge to any linguist, were originally among the driving forces behind our interest in metapragmatics.) We will especially focus on metapragmatics as the pragmatics of actually performed meta-utterances that serve as means of commenting on and interfering with ongoing discourse or text.

1.3.2 Caffi’s three senses of metapragmatics For a survey of the virtual scopes and actual focuses of metapragmatics, we take Caffi’s distinction between “three senses” (1994: 2461) as a starting point. The first sense of metapragmatics is “the theoretical debate on pragmatics and its central concerns, its epistemological foundations, and the definition of its relevant object and scope”. Core questions to be asked are ‘what is pragmatics about?’, ‘what are its objects?’, ‘what are its methods and basic assumptions and how can their validity and consistency be assessed?’, ‘which terminology is (or should be) used, what are its predominant metaphors?’. When we explain pragmatics to students of linguistics, we are doing metapragmatics. Text books on pragmatics are exercises in metapragmatics. Thus, metapragmatics in this generic sense is not a “pragmatic reflection on pragmatics” (Givón, in Caffi 1984: 435), but an approach to the theoretical and methodological ways of describing pragmatics. We are not interested in a discussion of metapragmatics in this sense. And the same holds for Caffi’s second sense of metapragmatics, which “highlights” and explicates “the conditions which make speakers’ use of language possible and effective” (1994: 2461). In this sense, metapragmatics it not only “related to the problem of the universals of human communication” in a general way, but focuses also more specifically on “the possibility and felicity conditions of communication” (1994: 2462) and related topics (which makes it difficult to distinguish it from pragmatics).

. In this reading, metapragmatics as a methodological reflection on pragmatics is analogous to approaches like metaphonology, metasyntax or metasemantics, of which the first two appear not to exist but are readily imaginable.


The third sense of metapragmatics concerns the actual “management of discourse” (Caffi 1994: 2464). Key tasks are “the investigation of that area of speakers’ competence which reflects the judgments of appropriateness on one’s own and other people’s communicative behavior” and the exploration of “the ‘know how’ regarding the control and planning of, as well as feedback on, the ongoing interaction” (1994: 2461). Taking this general assortment of issues as a springboard, we suggest a distinction between system- and competence-related aspects, on the one hand, and instance- and performance-related aspects, on the other. And it is the latter applied and data-based reading which puts the stamp on the general theoretical alignment of this book and the specific orientation of each contribution. The papers in the present volume can all be attributed to this reading. Nonetheless, all papers are tinted with references to those general principles of reflexivity and reflection (underlying metapragmatic acts of monitoring and control) that are grounded in the systematics of the language and the language users’ knowledge thereof, i.e. their competence. Linguists are, of course, well aware of the remarkable fact that language, as a self-reflexive and self-referential system, can monitor, control, edit and refer to itself and that speakers act accordingly. As has been pointed out repeatedly (especially by Lucy, cf. above), such reflexive management of ongoing discourse is manifest in a large number of means, strategies and acts, among them contextualization cues, retrospective reference to and labelling of previous speech (acts) or prospective acts of structuring and comprehension securing. While the principle of reflexivity itself, i.e., the systematic aspects of reflexivity, belonging to the theoretical rather than the applied side of metapragmatics, as we understand it, is not in their focus, some contributions to this volume discuss how manifestations of reflexivity are actually used. They then function as means of explaining and modifying, exemplifying and glossing, repairing and evaluating, which, inter alia, help to infer entailed, presupposed and implicated meaning, handle the current discourse topic, secure functional (illocutionary as well as perlocutionary) uptake and establish a net of cohesive connections (and thus suggest coherence).

1.3.3 Attending from vs. attending to communication We put the emphasis on aspects of use, i.e., on actual, concrete meta-utterances as discourse data, which are used for various communicative purposes. Furthermore, our focus is mostly on those meta-utterances that evoke some kind of communicative disturbance. To explain this restriction, we can turn to Anton’s (1998) useful distinction between ‘attending to speech’ and ‘attending from speech’: . For contextualization cues cf. Gumperz (1989) and for matters of reflexivity the reader by Lucy (1993).


[...] we routinely and commonly attend not to speech, but simply from it. That is, when we listen with one another in our everyday encounters, we routinely listen from our speech to the thought so intended. Inversely, when a foreign tongue is used, a language we are unable to transcend, we explicitly attend to the speech itself. [...] Speech, then, is routinely an absent body, an intentional arc which disappears for the sake of the meaning so intended. (Anton 1998: 199)

Language users attend to speech itself only “in moments of communicative breakdown or dysfunction” (Anton 1998: 202). And this, we believe, is where meta-utterances come in. Induced by such discernable (or possibly only assumed) communicative disturbances, they attend to them by topicalizing them (why are you getting so aggressive all of a sudden?; why do you say that?; that’s not an answer; you shouldn’t use the f-word in front of the children). These meta-utterances indicate a deviation from the speaker’s expectation (but normally also from what one would routinely expect). Such utterances are used as metapragmatic means when the speaker is no longer holding but breaking the line, as it were. Not in the sense that the linear order is not respected and kept, but in the sense that there is, e.g., a shift from one plane of action to another (e.g., from narration to debate), from a coherent to a less coherent text (e.g., by announcing and thus topicalizing coherence-breaks with you may not like to hear this but ...; this may come as a surprise ...), from a neutral to an evaluatively laden mode (e.g., by making a reproachful comment like no need to become rude). Such meta-utterances reflect a hitch or an obstruction in the smooth flow of discourse.

2.

Forms of practice of metapragmatics

Our focus on the pragmatics of actual meta-utterances as discourse data leads to two lines of investigation, which are partly connected. On the one hand, we consider utterances that are reflexively used (in an automatic way, without actually reflecting on their use), and on the other hand utterances that are used in a goal-oriented way for practical purposes. Further specifications, however, have to be made. Section 2.1 to 2.4 will identify the appropriate parameters, which will help to further define the scope of the present volume.

. Or when reading a novel “simply attending from the sentences to the story”, except when hitting upon a misspelt or unfamiliar word, which is then attending to. Accordingly, an activity such as proofreading “exemplifies the attempt to ride back-and-forth between attending from the words and attending to them” (Anton 1998: 199).


2.1 Metapragmatics as topic and as performance Example (1) illustrates a discoursal practice in which metapragmatics forms the topic.

(1) Among the expressions of indescribability adjectival forms such as ‘indescribable’ and ‘unspeakable’ seem to be the simplest realizations. Their literal meaning consists in the negation of the possibility to verbalize what is due for description. Seen grammatically, this class of adjectives is somewhat anomalous. According to Zimmer (1964) they have to be characterized as derivations from contrary positive adjectives together with which they form complementary pairs. Their positive counterpart, however, shows highly restrictive conditions of use, because it is only […] in contexts where the describability of an object or state of affairs contrasts with the indescribability of another object or state of affairs, that their application is fully acceptable. (Hübler 1981: 52)

Example (2) shows that metapragmatics can also be performed in actu, as a strategy of discourse. (2) And as he stood there desolate and nobody was with him nor near him, there his soul was enraptured, inside his body and outside his body, there he saw and heard what is unspeakable for every tongue. (Seuse, quoted from Schüttler 1968: 40, own translation)

In both examples, expressibility is at issue. It is, actually, one of the basic tenets of pragmatics; Searle (1969: 88) speaks of a ‘principle of expressibility’ which says “Whatever can be meant can be said.” A reflection about that or its negation constitute, consequently, a metapragmatic act. While (1) provides an illustration of how such metapragmatic acts of expressing inexpressibility can become subject to topicalization, (2) represents the metapragmatic acting out the inexpressibility. Both examples are taken from the context of mysticism and esoterics, but the experience of lacking words for talking about some extraordinary experience is certainly something we all are familiar with. That this is not a unique case can easily be proven by a second set of examples, this time centering around a text-pragmatic issue, which is less elementary but still vital for any text as text: How to begin and how to end. The task of beginning and ending may become a problem for writers of everyday texts (and public speakers) with little practice, but even for poets and novelists. (3) Wenn Calvinos Roman Erzählungen präsentiert, die kein Ende haben, so liegt das daran, daß sie im Grunde keinen Anfang haben. […] Im Geflecht

10


eines Menschenlebens oder im Strom der Ereignisse, die eine kollektive Geschichte ausmachen, wäre es künstlich, einen Anfangs- oder Endpunkt herauslösen zu wollen. Der herkömmliche Roman, der aus dem Fluß des Werdens eine geschlossene Folge herausschneidet, maßt sich an, seine Helden bis zum Abschluß ihrer Abenteuer zu begleiten. […] Der Erzählung, die nicht endet, weil sie sich nicht zu Ende führen lässt, steht die Erzählung gegenüber, die nicht endet, weil das Geschichtenerzählen nicht aufhören wird. Zwei Vorstellungen von Ende, zwei Seiten des Nicht-Beendbaren: die verweigerte Vollendung, der abgebrochene Vorgang, die enttäuschte Erwartung auf der einen Seite, auf der anderen Seite die Unmöglichkeit zu schließen, die nicht endende Bewegung, die Unendlichkeit der Wiederholung. (Moses 1990: 118–121) [The reason why Calvino’s novel presents stories that have no ending is that they basically have no beginning either. […] In the complexity of man’s life, in the flow of events that constitute a collective whole, it would be artificial to try to single out an initial or an end point. The conventional novel, which extracts a coherent and complete unit from the flow of life, presumes to accompany its heroes until the completion of their adventures. […] The narrative that does not end because it cannot be brought to an end is in contrast to the narrative that does not end because storytelling itself will not terminate. Two conceptions of an ending, two sides of the unfinishable: the rejected completion, the unfinished process and the disappointed expectation on the one hand, the impossibility to conclude, the never-ending movement and the infinity of repetition on the other.] (4) So that when I stretched out my hand, I caught hold of the fille de chambre’s END (Lawrence Sterne, Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy10)

Example (3) tackles the literary problem in the form of a poetological reflection; beginning and ending are the metapragmatic topic of a discourse that as such does not deploy metapragmatic strategies; let us call this the topic type. Example (4), however, represents (at least in some respects) a metapragmatic case in actu, consisting of the aposiopesis of the final sentence together with the subsequent explicit metanarrative ending (qua literally announcing the end).11 It seems that the topicalization of metapragmatic aspects is limited to specialized discourse, which is not metapragmatic itself. The act type is more pervasive. Of the two forms of

10. Cf. Gutbrodt (1990: 84). 11. For a second, additional reading, see Gutbrodt (1990).


metapragmatic practice, only the act type will be further pursued at length.12 We thus arrive at the focal length indicated by the book’s title: Metapragmatics in use.

2.2 Explicit vs. implicit mode of execution of metapragmatic acts Metapragmatics in use has two modes of execution: an explicit and an implicit mode. The pertinent examples so far given ((2) and (4)) represent just one, viz. the explicit mode; here is another example of this sort. (5) Mind-essence does not belong to any individualized conception of phenomena or non-phenomena […] It has no particularizing consciousness, it does not belong to any kind of describable nature. (Ashvagosha, quoted from Stace 1961: 108)

The following two, however, show a different, viz. the implicit mode: (6) He is separate from everything and yet not separate […] He has form to maintain the universe, and yet has no form, because he does not exist. (Idra, quoted from Scholem 1977: 40; own translation) (7) Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore (from Italo Calvino’s novel of the same title) [If on a winter’s night a traveller]

The motifs are familiar: the problem of expressibility and the problem of beginning. In (6), the problem is expressed by means of a paradox, which can be schematically described as ‘A is not A’. In (7), which is actually the title of the first narrative and, simultaneously, the first part of the novel’s summary resulting from concatenating the titles of the various narratives, it is the conditional sentence that points to the problem by rendering the beginning in a merely hypothetical key, an echo of the fable of a possible but never written novel;13 in fact, Calvino’s work turns out to consist of a series of narrative fragments. Comparing (6) and (7) with (2), (4) and (5), the modal difference is obvious: while the latter three are explicitly metapragmatic, (6) and (7) are only implicitly so. We know this type of differentiation from ordinary speech act theory. A warning, for example, can be performed in explicit or implicit terms by version (8) or (9) respectively.

12. The topical variant is briefly taken into account, though, in Hübler’s contribution to the present volume. 13. Cf. Moses (1990: 119).

11

12


(8) I warn you, the bridge may be icy. (Paraphrase of the corresponding roadsign.) (9) Bridge may be icy! (Roadsign)

Just as (8) and (9) are performative (in a general, though not in Austin’s restricted sense), so are (2), (4) and (5) as well as (6) and (7). They are used to explicitly or implicitly perform a metapragmatic act. Explicit metapragmatic acts seem to be the preferred because easier and more readily available option. It may not be by chance, after all, that the implicit examples given are all from up-scale literature. The examples of the (explicit and implicit) metapragmatic performative type so far considered share one particular functional characteristic. They perform simultaneously what they state as problem, i.e., they describe the obviously undescribable and begin or end what apparently defies a beginning or ending. In one way or another, they articulate a difficulty and in doing so overcome it. They serve the actual, current communicative purpose, viz. expressing something in words and starting or ending a narrative or, more generally, a text.

2.3 Off-line vs. on-line metapragmatic acts Aligning with the ongoing communication is just one way of contextualizing a metapragmatic act. There is an alternative, which we have already briefly mentioned: the metapragmatic act of intervening in the ongoing communication in such a way that it effects a clear interruption, a break, a discontinuity, even a halt, i.e., a deviation from the line. Here is a fabricated example. (10) A (agitated): You would be a fool if you didn’t do it. Really, you have to. Think of –

B: Calm down, for God’s sake! – Why are you so involved? Here, the problem triggering the metapragmatic act does no longer concern the ongoing activity itself, but consists in something extraneous, though linked to it. Instead of continuing the discussion about the best line of action to be taken, B addresses the way in which A tries to persuade him into taking action. We may call this the off-line type and contrast it with the on-line type encountered previously. Combining the two alternatives systematically results in four options: a) The implicit on-line type is represented by Haberland’s article (this volume) on code choice and change, b) the explicit on-line variant by Hübler’s study (this volume) of the use of nonverbal adaptors for structuring purposes.


c) While the implicit off-line type is not represented at all, d) the explicit off-line type is the topic of the majority of contributions to the present volume. Type (c) may not even exist or at least be hardly observable. Type (d) is the type, actually, which formed the focus of the panel on metapragmatics at the 9th International Pragmatics Conference in Riva 2005. In the panel description and call for papers we encouraged “the discussion of meta-linguistic comments on the interactional (not cognitive) frame into which a given utterance is embedded.” And we mentioned ‘evaluative parentheses’ which are “coherence-disturbing in that they change (temporarily) the direction of the conversation, whose different streaks […] had been in total syntony until then. Metapragmatic use of language in this sense is not simply talking about but changing the direction of and thus creating new discourse”, that is to say, a new discourse of limited extension. Data of this sort abound. Metapragmatic acts of the explicit off-line type, it seems, are ubiquitously in use. Though some contexts may be more prone to it than others, such metapragmatic acts can occur at any point in communication of whatever type, for all sorts of reasons or purposes. An attempt at a rough systematisation will be outlined in Section 3.

2.4 Occasional vs. regular metapragmatic acts Most commonly, speakers engage in metapragmatic acts only occasionally, in an unpredictable (though often not uncharacteristic) manner; the host of articles in the present volume analyse this type. At times, however, speakers use such metapragmatic acts regularly and in such a way that patterns result from it which turn out to be constitutive for the interactional genre to which they belong. The prototype is the so-called Socratean dialogue in the Platonic tradition. (11) Socrates: Meno: Socrates: Meno: Socrates: Meno: Socrates:

Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the desire and ability for good?

Yes, I was. One part of the statement – the desire – belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another? Apparently. But it is plain that if one man is not better than another in this, he must be superior in ability. Certainly. Then virtue, it seems by your account, is ability to produce goods.

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Meno: I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter. Socrates: Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect; for very likely you may be right. You say virtue is the ability to procure goods? Meno: I do. Socrates: And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth? Meno: Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honours and offices. (Plato, Meno, 1990: 191–192)

Socratean dialogues can be read, in their historical and social context, in two keys: (a) as contributing to the interlocutors’ endeavour to find the truth (Sokrates’ maeutic art) and (b) as destroying the opinio communis (Socrates as ‘depravor of the youth’). This volume’s two articles by Janney and Muntigl cover such a patterned use (and abuse) for the genres of forensic and therapeutic discourse respectively.

3.

A systematics of metapragmatic functions

The object of our inquiry into the pragmatics of metalinguistic utterances is the metapragmatic act which is directed at various communicative practices and inter-participant relations and which is performed by the interactants for a particular purpose and at a particular time in ongoing discourse. Accordingly, a systematic overview has to take into account the issues at stake (what is the focus of the act), the relevant frame conditions (who is acting and when) and the functions and forms (by which means and why, i.e., to what end is the act performed). We will briefly deal with these components in the order given.

3.1

Issues at stake

The metapragmatic act is aimed at a variety of issues that concern general principles of communication, particular communicative acts and accompanying nonlinguistic bodily behavior. Firstly, speakers use their meta-utterances to refer to the general principles, norms and maxims of the type described by Grice. We thus encounter meta-utterances related to the maxim of quality (Are you telling the truth?), the maxim of quantity (But you haven’t told us the whole story!), the maxim of relevance (That’s


beside the point! Would you focus please!) and the maxim of manner (Finish your sentences! Would you mind starting at the beginning?). Others explicitly spell out what one should do and what one should not do and are frequently concerned with socio-cultural norms, among them those of politeness (You shouldn’t use an f-word in front of the children! Don’t patronize! Be polite!). Metapragmatic acts which comment on cooperative principles of communication in a generic way have to be kept apart from those referring to an individual violation of one such principle or norm; the latter can be face-threatening and lead to grave and undesirable consequences (cf. One should stick to the truth vs. You should stick to the truth!). Finally, such meta-utterances can be other-directed (cf. Janney’s contribution to this volume) or self-directed (cf. the articles by Pizziconi and Tanskanen). Secondly, meta-utterances can refer to particular speech acts, their formal and structural make-up, their contextual infrastructure. For instance, in reported speech complete speech acts or parts thereof are taken up (You said that ...?), illocutionary functions are commented on (Is that a complaint?), acts of predication or reference queried (Who are you talking about?) and matters of organization and placement raised (Why mention it now?). Thirdly, nonverbal means of communication, i.e., gestures as well as prosodic behavior, can be the target of meta-utterances (You don’t have to touch me when you want something from me! Could you speak up a bit?).

3.2 Frame conditions In principle, of course, metapragmatic acting is reciprocal and egalitarian, i.e., each participant involved is entitled to act metapragmatically at any time. However, this general principle finds its limits in the distinctive conditions of the current discourse type or interactive frame (to use Goffman’s term). While, e.g., in everyday conversations the right to act metapragmatically is usually symmetrically distributed between persons of equal status, other discourse types such as courtroom interrogation (cf. Janney, this volume) or instructional discourse (cf. Ciliberti and Anderson, Smith and Liang, Stude, this volume) are asymmetrical in this respect, with one party being privileged.14 Furthermore, the right of choice of a speech act pattern is likewise unequally distributed in asymmetrical discourse types: it is, for example, the prosecuting attorney’s privilege to resort to questions as metacomments, while the defendant reacts with statements as answers

14. Metacomments as a characteristic feature of teacher-talk in the “radically asymmetrical” (Stubbs 1983: 53) situation of classroom interaction have been the topic of several discourse analytic studies, among them Stubbs (1983) and (1974).

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(unless it serves clarification). In a like manner, we find unequal distribution of the right to perform disruptive or intervening meta-acts (which plays a central role in metapragmatic behavior as discussed in this volume) in these and related discourse types. To select a few: the right to initiate and accomplish a change of current discourse topic, a topic closure or a digression from the topic, in order to (retrospectively) repair or (prospectively) preempt structural or functional mismanagement, or to openly assess the appropriateness of one’s own or one’s fellowspeaker’s contributions. Of course, there is a plethora of metapragmatic acts that are equally distributed, among them acts of disclaiming and accounting (‘Excuse me for saying this in such a XX way’; ‘Forgive me for putting it XX-ly, but ...’, cf. Pizziconi and also Ciliberti and Anderson, Hongladarom, Penz, Tanskanen in this volume), which can be used like wildcards almost by anyone and at any time in ongoing discourse. Another restriction of the right to act metapragmatically has to do with the distinction between self or other as target. Normally, speakers are at total liberty to direct a metapragmatic act (like commenting or criticizing) at themselves, while targeting other’s behavior in the same way can be face-threatening and thus precarious and risky. Of course, such behavior is group- and culture-specific and depends on the societal and ethical norms effectual in the given speech community. As we have repeatedly pointed out, one of the main reasons for using metapragmatic utterances is the need to attend to some disturbance in the flow of communication. Ways of meeting this need are either wilfully evoking (or even provoking) side-sequences or prospectively preventing or renouncing them. As a result, a shift is effected from one interactional frame to another (That’s not part of the story, stop digressing and tell us what happened next!), from the descriptive to the interpersonal level (No need to become aggressive all of a sudden!), from the propositional to the evaluative mode (That’s bullshit!). Furthermore, interactants employ metapragmatic utterances whenever the need arises to negotiate and establish common ground (cf. Ciliberti and Anderson, Penz, this volume) and coherence (Tanskanen, this volume).

3.3 Pragmatic functions – linguistic costs Whatever of an ongoing verbal interaction may be made subject to a metapragmatic act, the performance of the act itself requires linguistic means and is equipped with an illocutionary force. Both aspects will be tackled in reverse order. The illocutionary force answers to the question for what purpose a speaker commits such a metapragmatic act, at the expense of disturbing the ongoing interaction. What probably comes to mind first is the function of monitoring, espe-


cially where the metapragmatic act has the form of an assertion and thus renders itself ready for being interpreted as comment. (12) I have only talked about my own, personal experience and left out all factual details.

Such comments can be message-oriented, as in the preceding example, or function-oriented as in (13); they can be provided, as in examples (12) and (13), or requested, as in (14). (13) This was an order. (14) Was this a promise or a threat? – Is that an assumption?

In many cases, monitoring is certainly an important or even the central purpose. In other cases, it may be the common denominator of a wide array of more specific functions that could be explicated, where required or desired.15As case in point may serve the following example. (15) You are repeating yourself.

This is a metapragmatic utterance by someone who has followed a (immediately preceding) longish discourse by the addressee; referring to this discourse, the speaker comments on it by characterizing it as repetitive. The basic function is certainly monitoring. But in addition it can exert other more specific functions, depending on the context: (a) The utterance may express the speaker’s negative attitude: the repetitiveness bores him. (b) It could be deliberately face threatening, provocative and thus show a conflictual intention. (c) The utterance could count as the speaker’s attempt at gaining the floor or inducing a topic change. (d) The speaker may want to subscribe to a (culture-specific) norm of brevity and conciseness, which he or she thereby reinforces. (e) Through the utterance the speaker may profile him- or herself as a critical, assertive person with a social status that entitles him or her to utter things of that sort. Corresponding to these readings are the following communicative functions: (a) evaluative, (b) conflictual (or face-threatening), (c) organizing (turn taking, topic 15. Analogously to Austin’s (1975: 3) ‘descriptive fallacy’, we could speak of a ‘monitoring fallacy’, where the interpretation as monitoring is applied too often.

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management, coherence), (d) defending communicative norms, (e) creating and modifying identity. They, in turn, can be lumped together and assigned to three main groups with various other subfunctions, not associable with example (15): (1) evaluative (cf. (a)) (2) communication oriented (inter)personal conflictual (face-threatening) (cf. (b)) affiliative expressive means-related organizing (cf. (c)) negotiating linguistic meaning establishing best code, deciding on the best expression (3) instrumentalized for reinforcing a communicative norm (cf. (d)) for constructing identity (cf. (e)). This functional taxonomy of metapragmatic acts is certainly not exhaustive, but it should account for a wide range of possibilities, including those highlighted by the papers of the present volume. Metapragmatic utterances may exert the more specific functions also independently, not only on the basis of monitoring comments. A few examples shall illustrate this point. They also provide the opportunity to give some prominence to a rather interesting mode of metapragmatic activity, which in the present volume is taken into account by only two articles (Suzuki and Muntigl), i.e., the use of quotative speech. Quotative speech as such is exempt of any comment (though it can be linked up with a commenting element by framing the quotation with an attitudinally biased verb phrase such as he claimed) and is thus not monitoring. (16) illustrates the evaluative use of quoting, (17) the interpersonally provocative use, (18) the consensual use, and (19) the identity constructing use. The examples delineate, at the same time, various possibilities of whose words are quoted; in (16), it is the addressee (you), in (17) a third person, absent, in (18), we find mutual quotations, and in (19) self-quotation. (16) Nick: George:

Nick: George: Nick: George

I try not to …

Get involved. Um? Isn’t that right? Yes … that’s right. I’d imagine not. I find it … embarrassing (sarcastic): Oh, you do, hunh?


Nick: George

Yes. Really. Quite. (Mimicking him): Yes. Really. Quite. (Then aloud, but to himself:) It’s Disgusting! (Albee, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? p. 90)

(17) George:

[…] But why in God’s name are they coming over here now?

Martha George Martha: George: Martha:

(In a so-there voice): Because Daddy said we should be nice to them, that’s why. (Defeated): Oh, Lord. May I have my drink, please? Daddy said we should be nice to them. Thank you. But why now? It’s after two o’clock in the morning, and … Because Daddy said we should be nice to them! (Albee, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? p.10)

(18) Stella: Harry:

[…] But it’s never happened before.

Stella: Harry: Stella: Harry: (19) George Nick:

George: Martha:

What hasn’t? Well, that my husband has suddenly dreamed up such a fantastic story, for no reason at all. That’s what I said it was. I said it was a fantastic story. It is. That’s what I said and that’s what Bill says. We both think it’s a fantastic story. (Pinter, The Collection, p. 36) (To Nick): I wouldn’t be surprised if you did take over the History Department one of these days.

The Biology Department. The Biology Department … of course. I seem preoccupied with history. Oh! What a remark! (He strikes a pose, his hand over his heart, his head raised, his voice stentorian) “I am preoccupied with history.” (As Honey and Nick chuckle) Ha, ha, ha, HA! (Albee, Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? p. 49 f.)

Let us come to our last question: How can we metapragmatically treat a given pragmatic issue of the ongoing interaction (the what?-aspect) in pursuance of some pragmatic goal beyond or in addition to the ongoing one (the what for-aspect)? The means vary considerably. Principally speaking, it is the verbal medium that takes the functional lead. The nonverbal (prosody and gestures) is unlikely to play a central role here except in a few cases (which have been identified and tackled by Hübler, this volume.) Such an assessment, however, does not hold true where the nonverbal is co-expressive with the verbal and thus supports it, an illustration being example (16) and even (19). This field still awaits investigation.

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20 Axel Hübler and Wolfram Bublitz

All verbal means concerned share the characteristic that they are bound to the sentence level; a simple lexematic (metalinguistic) reference, in other words, will not do, except as one-word utterance (e.g., A: I’ll come and see you tomorrow. B: Promise?). The metapragmatic utterance is typically explicit in that it deploys at least one metalinguistic expression. (The borderline case in which the metapragmatic act is implicitly performed, has been pointed out above where we discussed mode options.) In correspondence with Lucy’s (1993: 29) classification of reflexive language, we may distinguish between labelling, set strategies, and spontaneous forms. Labelling appears to be rare; a ‘safe’ example are special morphemes such as the quotation morphemes which Suzuki (this volume) investigates; one could also mention quotation marks were it not for the fact that they are graphic, nonlinguistic in nature. The most readily available illustration for a set strategy are set phrases of retrospective or prospective character (of the type Was that a promise? or Sorry to say so, but…); it is also the preferred metapragmatic material treated in this volume. Other strategies include certain types of affirmation (That was aptly said) and negation (No, it’s not sympathy, it’s compassion). Spontaneous forms, finally, withstand by nature a systematic characterization and are difficult to illustrate. The following anecdote, however, may serve as example. The famous 17th century catholic preacher Abraham a Sancta Clara is said to have boasted about his gift to improvise a talk on whatever he was asked for. People, therefore, would hand in a topic written on a piece of paper, and he would immediately launch into a discourse on it. One day, however, he was given a paper on which nothing was written.16 The availability of the standardized forms referred to as labelling and set strategies cannot generally be taken for granted. Their availability is a matter of recognition and of regular re-occurrence in a speech community. In other words, there is a socio-cultural basis for metapragmatics in use. And there may be communities in which metapragmatic acts are less frequently performed and, consequently, standardized strategies less common. However, where we do find the full range of linguistic options, a choice has to be made, and this choice then becomes pragmatically meaningful. It has a direct impact on the extension of the resulting metapragmatic phrase, which disrupts, intervenes or even stops the ongoing flow of discourse. And this reflects the importance speakers want to assign to their metapragmatic acts. The higher the significance assigned to their metapragmatic intervention, the more will they prefer ‘costlier’ forms. The choice of form thus reflects the interventionists’ intentions; 16. Sancta Clara’s reaction implies a metapragmatic reasoning as well: He gave a talk on Christian humility. In fact, it could be categorized as implicit on-line type of metapragmatic act (cf. Section 2).


the actual outcome, however, a quick return to the first level communication or a prolonged delay, will, of course, also depend on the other interactant(s).

4.

Preview of papers

This book originated in a conference panel on Metapragmatics at the 9th International Pragmatics Conference in Riva del Garda, Italy, in July 2005. Except for those by Hübler and Muntigl, the twelve contributions are revised versions of the papers delivered on that occasion. The collection of articles as it stands provides a welcome first stocktaking of the uses of metapragmatic comments. To our knowledge, the only book which appears to compete thematically with ours is the volume edited by Jaworski et al. (2004). However, its aims and set-up are quite different. The key objective is to “enliven sociolinguistic debate about metalanguage and build bridges between this concept […] and a wide range of broadly sociolinguistic research perspectives” (2004: 4).17 Our volume has obviously a more modest (though no less valid) aim. It offers for a variety of interactional frames a series of pragmatic microanalyses of metalinguistic comments (based on natural data), which show how people actually use them and what they serve for. Of course, the collection is far from fully covering the possible pragmatic scope of such comments. In the preceding outline of the main aspects at issue we have tried to indicate, where the assorted papers make their contribution, and what the main gaps are that the collection still leaves open. In accordance with our perspective, we have grouped the articles into three parts dedicated to three principle domains of meta-utterances: Part A deals with ‘Metapragmatics in everyday use’, part B with ‘Metapragmatics in educational use’, and part C with ‘Metapragmatics in specialized use’.

(A) ‘Metapragmatics in everyday use’ The first four papers focus on the various ways in which metapragmatic means are used to establish and secure agreeable interpersonal relations by building rapport in Thai (Hongladarom), by respecting face needs and conveying affect in Japanese (Pizziconi, Suzuki), and by empathetically taking the recipients’ place in 17. Correspondingly, the three parts of the volume following the theoretical foundation are built around sociological and sociopsychological notions, i.e., ideological construction, social evaluation and stylisation. And the volume’s articles together pursue the ambitious aim “to debate what range of ‘meta’ processes need to be recognised and theorised in sociolinguistics, how we should view them in relation to each other, and how we can approach these dimensions methodologically in different social contexts of language use” (Jaworski et al. 2004: 5).

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computer mediated communication (Tanskanen). The two remaining articles in this first part augment the purely verbal mode of the preceding papers by introducing gestures (Hübler) and language shift in mid-communication (Haberland) as metapragmatic means. Hongladarom sets out to investigate the nature of metapragmatic awareness in Thai through an analysis of indirect criticism. She discusses two types of metapragmatic utterances: explicit ones using formulaic expressions and implicit ones using a wide array of linguistic devices ranging from pronouns, discourse markers to non-formulaic expressions. She reveals that the way Thais employ these utterances is tied to an aspect of Thai culture that stresses rapport, long-term relationship and avoidance of conflicts. This cultural dimension is embedded in the indigenous principle of kreNcai or consideration for other people. Her study also discloses the kind of conflict humans in general face in communication: the desire to express opinions and the fear that relationship will break down. Taking the observation that an individual’s objective may introduce tension into his or her relationship with the community as a whole as a springboard, Pizziconi investigates relational work as a means of negotiating ensuing problematic stances, roles, identities. She takes Japanese as an example and focusses on apologetic expressions that feature metalinguistic comments such as ~i/na hanashi de mooshiwake arimasen, roughly translatable as: “forgive me for saying this so and so…”. Such comments, she argues, are best regarded as devices of self-presentation or face-regulation, which are aimed at ‘realigning’ problematic stances. Suzuki starts from the fact that a Japanese speaker may repeat what the addressee has said and mark it with the quotative expression tte. Attaching tte to a statement may be akin to saying “what you just said is not appropriate”. It is then used metapragmatically to problematize the original speaker’s communicative intent or assumption. Even when tte is not used to echo what the addressee has said and is used as a full-fledged topic marker, tte retains this metapragmatic nature. Emotive effects of utterance-final quotative expressions can also be analysed in terms of their metapragmatic character. By using expressions that are associated with the problematizing function, the speaker communicates a sense of detachment, which may be interpreted as a manifestation of affect. Tanskanen discusses metapragmatic utterances related to dialogue management in computer mediated discussions. They are regularly used to elucidate the users’ assessment of the appropriateness of their own and their fellow communicators’ contributions to the ongoing discussion, or clarify their contributions in case of evident or potential misunderstanding. The collaborative purpose behind such empathetic use turns out to be the participants’ desire to avoid misinterpretation or even to have their contributions construed as flaming.


Hübler surveys some of the most salient forms in which gestural behavior relates to the topic of metapragmatics. He shows that gestures, besides providing a ready topic for verbal metacommunication, can also serve as a metacommunicative means, just like language. In other words, gestures can be used as a medium for topicalizing verbal aspects of communication (i.e. language use) as well as gestural aspects (i.e. gesture use). The analyses reveal a particularly rich metapragmatic potential of gestures with respect to verbal behaviors; they are used (a) for subjecting a verbal utterance to irony, (b) for mastering the problem of finding the ‘right’ word, and (c) as a metanarrative device to structure a conversational narrative. Haberland explores cases where bilingual speakers shift language within a conversation. He points out that traditionally, language alternation is analysed as either bound to a change in embedding activity, topic or interlocutor, or as carrying some ‘surplus meaning’ effect. In his examples, though, neither explanation is satisfactory. Rather it seems that shifting into a different language within the interlocutors’ repertoire functions as a metapragmatic comment. The special character of this comment is that it does not label just any precedent (or subsequent) action by the interlocutor, but rather comments on one particular (always preceding) action, viz. the choice of language. It is part of a negotiation or reappraisal of the choice of a linguistic medium.

(B) ‘Metapragmatics in educational use’ A common characteristic of the types of educational discourse analysed by Ciliberti and Anderson, Smith and Liang, and Stude is the asymmetry of knowledge between the participants involved, which typically leads to an abundance of metapragmatics uses. While the first two papers look at means that metapragmatically help to structure educational talk or writing, Stude focusses on the mechanisms of metapragmatic development in kindergarten kids. Starting from the observation that metapragmatic comments assist in defining current contexts in everyday face-to-face speech, Ciliberti and Anderson investigate the contribution of such comments to the establishment and categorization of contexts in educational (as well as in media) discourse. They ascribe the abundance of metapragmatic comments in their data to a common characteristic of all the interactions examined: an asymmetry of (real or supposed) knowledge between participants. Smith and Liang analyse the functions of metapragmatic language in physics lectures to elite university students in China. They distinguish three types of extensively used expressions, which help students learn to think like physicists: Meta-representational language, which is used to introduce different forms of concept representations (definitions, diagrams, examples, etc.), meta-processing

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language, which is used to guide students’ attention, memory and reasoning, and meta-participation language, which is used to construct frameworks in which students become co-participants in the lectures. Based on spontaneous speech data recorded in a German kindergarten, Stude investigates the underlying mechanisms of metapragmatic development. Her findings show that teacher-initiated metapragmatic utterances are mostly embedded in a form of disciplinary talk that primarily serves the aim of improving the child’s pragmatic skills. In contrast, within peer interaction the child’s use of metapragmatic utterances seems to be a favored device for demonstrating special linguistic competence (e.g. by imitating forms of adults’ speech) and thus steering the ongoing discourse. From this perspective, adopting adults’ conversational roles and speech may provide models for the initial employment of metalinguistic terms and thus provide an effective context for the emergence of metalinguistic awareness.

(C) ‘Metapragmatics in specialized use’ Metapragmatic framing strategies in courtroom interrogation (Janney), reformulations in therapeutic sessions (Muntigl) and common ground building comments in intercultural communication (Penz) are the specialized uses of metapragmatic devices that constitute the topic of the last part of this book. Janney analyses a prosecutor’s interrogation techniques in courtroom testimony, focusing on metapragmatic comments implicitly framing the defendant’s testimony as vague, misleading, evasive, uncooperative, or deceptive. In this metapragmatic game, the prosecutor’s strategically feigned inability to elicit adequate answers becomes evidence of the defendant’s evasiveness. The essence of the game is that the manipulative co-text of the interrogation itself becomes part of the context in which the defendant’s credibility is later judged by the jury. Muntigl shows that reformulations are an important meaning making resource that therapists regularly deploy in realizing therapeutic practices. He claims that at a local interactional level reformulations work to transform the couples’ construal of experience. At a more global level, however, reformulations are constitutive of ‘larger’ therapeutic activities such as constructing problems. He concludes that by examining reformulations, we not only gain insight into how client meanings become transformed but also begin to better understand the ‘theory’ that guides a therapist’s social practices. Penz shows that metapragmatic comments serve as an important means of building common ground in intercultural communication. Her analysis is based on a group discussion of an international project in the area of language education. She distinguishes between two kinds of metapragmatic uses: message-related uses provide descriptions, summaries, clarifications, reformulations of past


speech activities and projections of future activities and thus provide a common understanding of the content of the interaction; procedure-related uses help to establish a common understanding of how a speech activity is to be accomplished, including aspects of sequencing and turn taking.

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Moses, S. 1990. “Italo Calvino: Die Kunst nicht zu enden.” In Die Kunst zu enden, 111–124. J. Söring (ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Searle, J.R. 1969. Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Silverstein, M. 1976. “Shifters, linguistic categories, and cultural descriptions.” In Meaning in Anthropology, 11–55. K.H. Basso and H.A. Selby (eds). Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Silverstein, M. 1993. “Metapragmatic discourse and metapragmatic function.” In J.A. Lucy (ed.), 33–58. Stubbs, M. 1974. “Keeping in touch: some functions of teacher-talk.” In Explorations in Classroom Observation, 151–172. M. Stubbs and S. Delamont (eds). London: Wiley. Stubbs, M. 1983. Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell. Verschueren, J. 2000. “Notes on the role of metapragmatic awareness in language use.” Pragmatics 10: 439–456.

Data sources Albee, E. 1966. Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? New York: Pocket Books. Calvino, Italo 1996. Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore. Milano: Mondadori. Hübler, A. 1981. “Towards a description of the indescribable, or: On some limitations of the descriptive function of language.” In Forms and Functions. Papers in General, English, and Applied Linguistics; Presented to Vilém Fried on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, J. Esser and A. Hübler (eds), 49–60. Tübingen: Narr. Moses, S. 1990. “Italo Calvino: Die Kunst nicht zu enden.” In Die Kunst zu enden, 111–124. J. Söring (ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Pinter, H. 1963. The Collection and The Lover. London: Methuen. Plato 1990. In Twelve Volumes. 2: Lano, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, transl. by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Stace, W.T. 1961. Mysticism and philosophy. London: Macmillan. Scholem, G. 1977. Von der mystischen Gestalt der Gottheit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Schüttler, G. 1968. Das mystisch-ekstatische Erlebnis. Diss. med. University of Bonn. Sterne, L. 1986. A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy. London: Penguin.

part a

Metapragmatics in everyday use

“Don’t blame me for criticizing you ...”: A study of metapragmatic comments in Thai* Krisadawan Hongladarom

1.

Introduction

Thais usually say things indirectly when they refuse or request something of someone, break bad news, criticize their interlocutors or simply disagree with them. Of all these acts, indirect criticism is worth investigating in more detail, as it is one of the most striking characteristics of Thai culture. Yet, it has not drawn much attention especially from the metapragmatic dimension. Previous studies on Thai pragmatics mention criticizing only in passing. For example, Srinarawat (2005) states that criticizing, or what she calls “giving opinions,” is an act that needs to be redressed and is often performed vaguely. Many Thais, even in academic circles, neither appreciate proffered criticism nor want to criticize other people. They often show reluctance when they are asked to give opinions in public spheres. Criticizing can be particularly devastating when it is done in a blunt and direct way. It is even more so when the target of criticism has a higher status than the critic, such as when the former is a senior * I thank the Thailand Research Fund for their ongoing support of all my research since 1996. I thank Wolfram Bublitz and Axel Hübler for encouraging me to submit this paper to the present volume and for their editorial assistance and helpful comments. My appreciation also goes to the anonymous reviewers of this paper. I am grateful to Sachiko Ide, whose ideas of pragmatics have shaped my understanding of Asian language and culture. Last but not least, I thank Soraj Hongladarom and Donald Sandage for suggestions and corrections that improved the quality of this paper. . Focusing on the relationship between indirectness and politeness, Srinarawat (2005) mentions that giving opinions (i.e., indirect criticism) is one of the functions of indirect speech as used in Thai. Other functions include irony, giving hints, sensing others’ ideas, and self-defense.

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university professor and the latter a junior one. This is why it is not uncommon that expressions of criticism are often presented in a playful frame: disguised in the form of an epithet, conversational joke or gossip (Hongladarom and Hongladarom 2005; Phakdeephasook 2003; Panpothong 2004). From an interactional perspective, we see that speakers resort to various kinds of linguistic devices in order to lessen the degree of strength of the illocutionary force of criticizing. These devices also serve as a replacement for remedial work that is sometimes necessary to perform soon after the criticizing act is over. One of the most common of such devices are “disclaimers” (Hewitt and Stokes 1975) or “formulaic disclaimers” (Overstreet and Yule 2001; 2002). The equivalent in Thai would be ya$a ha&a waâ waâ li na@ ‘don’t blame me for criticizing you,’ or ya$a kro$ot na@ thaâ ca$ bk waâ ‘don’t be upset with me if I tell you.’ These disclaimers can be regarded as overt markings of metapragmatic awareness. When they are used, the addressee typically anticipates that a negative statement will soon follow. According to Overstreet and Yule (2001: 45), disclaimers “are shown to have a powerful metapragmatic function that allows conversational participants, conventionally and prospectively, to create constraints on the social interpretation of their expression of problematic action.” However, there are also cases of no overt disclaimers. In these cases the criticizing voice is in disguise. Utterances of this type are highly reflexive and dialogical (Bakhtin 1981). They cannot be interpreted simply at the pragmatic level by ignoring the embedded criticizing perspective. The linguistic devices that occur

. Thai society is built around hierarchical relations. Age and social status are among the most important factors that people consider when they engage in conversations. . Addressing the politeness phenomenon in computer-mediated communication in Thai, Hongladarom and Hongladarom (2005) found that the norms governing Thai speech behavior were imported onto cyberspace without much loss. These include norms for politeness. Members of the Thai cyberspace tend to care for one another and adhere to the politeness principle (i.e., positive politeness) in that they attempt to avoid confrontation and make the hearer feel that he or she is part of the community. One of the strategies in doing this is joking, which is realized by saying funny things, being playfully ironic, and using funny pseudonyms. . Examples of such a remedial work include verbal or non-verbal apologies, or the combination of both. The most common form of non-verbal apology in Thai is to waî, a polite act of joining the palms of one’s hands together. . Transcription is based on Standard Thai. /c/ and /ch/ are pronounced as // and /t/. Diacritic marks indicate tonal variations: / / low tone, / @/ high tone, / ^/ falling tone and / &/ rising tone. The mid tone is left unmarked.

A study of metapragmatic comments in Thai

in this type of metapragmatic comment include pronouns, hedges, and discourse markers that reflect the speaker’s or the writer’s evaluative stance. This paper focuses on these two types of metapragmatic comments in Thai – those with and those without overt disclaimers. It aims to understand how they are used and what they reveal to us about the nature of metapragmatic awareness and the notion of criticism from the Thai viewpoint. It will be argued that the way Thais employ these comments is tied to an aspect of Thai culture that stresses rapport, long-term relationship, consideration for others and avoidance of conflict and confrontation. Thus, a study of metapragmatic comments not only sheds light on what we do when we communicate but also on what we value and on what kind of person we are. The data for this paper are drawn mainly from written sources that use a spoken style, such as dialogs in novels and letters, gossip, and editorials in newspapers. A few examples from natural conversations collected by myself are also discussed.

2.

Defining metapragmatics

In her seminal article, Caffi (1993) discusses three senses of the term metapragmatics. The first is the theoretical debate on pragmatics as a discipline. The second

. Hedges are linguistic expressions that qualify the truth or certainty of the utterance (G. Lakoff 1973). According to R. Lakoff (1975: 53), they are “words that convey the sense that the speaker is uncertain about what he (or she) is saying, or cannot vouch for the accuracy of the statement.” Among the most well-known hedges in English are included sort of, kind of, actually, and perhaps. Parenthetical expressions like You know and I think are also regarded as hedging device (Holmes 1986). Discourse markers are traditionally known as “connectives” or “pragmatic particles” referring to “a class of lexical expressions drawn primarily from the syntactic classes of conjunctions, adverbs, and prepositional phrases” (Fraser 1996). They are, for example, conjunctions (e.g., but), interjections (e.g., oh), pause fillers (e.g., well) as well as parentheticals which may be used as hedges (e.g., I think, you know). Discourse markers in Thai also include so-called “sentencefinal particles” and “polite particles”. A main characteristic of discourse markers is that they are thought not to affect the propositional content of utterances in which they occur (Fraser 1996; Schiffrin 1987; Schourup 1999). According to Schiffrin (1987), they are said to be deictic and to index utterances to preceding and/or following text and to the speaker and/or hearer. They locate the current utterance in various “planes of talk,” namely ideational structure (mark contrasting ideas for the case of the discourse marker but), action structure (mark contrastive speech acts), exchange structure (continue a turn), participation framework (mark shifts in speaker attitude or orientation toward the discourse/speaker-hearer relations) and information state (mark interaction between the speaker and the hearer).

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is the reflection on pragmatic conditions. The third sense, which is the focus of this paper, deals with “the investigation of that area of the speaker’s competence which reflects the judgments of appropriateness on one’s own and other people’s communicative behavior” (Caffi 1993: 2461). That is, it refers to the phenomenon that speakers or writers quote or comment on their own, someone else’s, or the speech community’s use of language. Metapragmatics, in this sense, is more dynamic and more relevant to everyday use of language than the other two senses. As Caffi (1993: 2464) remarks, it “concerns not only language as social (culturally and historically determined) behavior, but also our ‘being in the world.’” The paper also draws insight from the translinguistic approach, which emphasizes the role of heteroglossia (Bakhtin 1981). In this framework, a metapragmatic comment can be interpreted as a “locus of voices” interacting beyond the concrete level of communication. A related view is given in Tyler (1978) stressing the interplay between what is said and how it is said. As Tyler (1978: 408) states: “The conceptual content of the message – what is said – is subordinated to what is evoked, revealed, or expressed in the manner of saying.” Although Tyler’s definition indicates that there are two levels of language use, that is, one focusing on the message or the content and another on the metamessage or the manner in which the content is evoked, the boundary between the two is often blurred. This can be seen quite clearly from the examples of implicit metapragmatic comments discussed below. Furthermore, if we accept the view that metapragmatics is a crucial force in language use (Caffi 1993; Verschueren 2000), we could argue that all instances of communication have metapragmatic functions. In other words, every message carries a metamessage (Bateson 1972). This, along with the Bakhtinian view that utterances are inherently addressive is the position that guides the direction of this paper.

3.

Thai conception of criticism

Thai exhibits a high degree of diglossia. This is done in such a subtle manner that most Thai speakers are not aware of it. Educated Thais speak and write with high vocabulary, which consists of a large number of loan and coin words from Pali, Sanskrit and Khmer. This vocabulary is also a main feature of the honorific register used with and by Thai royalty, whereas generally speaking low vocabulary, comprising mainly native Thai words, is used. This is, however, considered to be less sophisticated. The high vocabulary word for ‘criticize’ in Thai is wicaan. According to the Thai Dictionary of the Royal Academy (1999: 1072f.), this verb means: (1) Give judgments of beauty and aesthetic quality, as well as, point out weaknesses to


works of fine arts or literature by creditable experts; and (2) criticize and compliment. The second sense is what concerns us here. Although it has a dual meaning, most people only perceive the negative aspect when using the word. For example, university students often remark that they are afraid of being criticized (using the word wicaan) when they present papers at seminars or conferences. In the low vocabulary, the sense of criticizing is expressed through the verb waâ. But the verb has a stronger negative connotation than its counterpart in the high vocabulary. It is related to the following compound verbs: dwaâ ‘scold’, waâ klaâw ‘monitor’ and klaâwha&a ‘blame’. In some contexts, it is used in the sense of complaining. When the speaker uses the word waâ, these other negative senses can also be evoked. The research presented here looks at expressions of criticism from the perspective of these two verbs, with the main focus being on the use waâ, which is more commonly used and appears outside academic or formal contexts. Specifically, attention is given to those utterances that express opinions that may threaten the hearer’s face or sense of worth. Such opinions have the hearer or a third party as targets. The latter is, for example, the case of the press’s criticizing political figures, particularly those working in the government. As newspaper readers have diverse interests and some are politicians themselves, the press takes precautions against direct criticism of the government. That is why they need to use metapragmatic comments, which contain hedges, to disclaim their criticism or to downgrade the illocutionary force of the utterance. In Thai culture criticism is a mild form of monitor and may lead to quarrels and fights. It is important to note that Thais interact with one another based on the cultural principle of krengcai, which states that one must be considerate and respectful of others and should not cause discomfort or inconvenience to others (Komin 1990; Richards and Sukwiwat 1982; Ukosakul 2005). This principle can be said to underlie all kinds of communicative actions in Thai society. As Ukosakul states (2005: 122): “The attitude of krengcai helps a person not to take advantage of another, or take another for granted. It also helps to maintain smooth and harmonious relationships and to avoid conflicts.” Rooted in this tradition, Thais are reluctant to offer criticism or even to express their opinion outside the circle of family and friends. According to Holmes and Tangtongtavy (1995), Thais often show reluctance towards expressing disagreement with their seniors in classroom and work-related training sessions. Unlike in Western culture, in Thai culture a person does not think that expressing one’s opinions is one’s right, duty and con-

. A more common word in Thai for complaining is bon. Note that waâ also functions as a complementizer, but the latter is beyond the scope of this paper.

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tribution to others. To express opinion can upset the hearer if the opinion is understood as criticism. Given that Thais value long-term relationships and avoidance of conflict, inherent in the principle of krengcai, it is interesting to see, through an investigation of metapragmatic comments, how Thai speakers regard criticizing and what kinds of linguistic devices they use in order to soften its force and to avoid a virtual offense that could disrupt the ongoing flow of communication, or worse, that could discontinue a harmonious relationship.

4.

Disclaimers as a metapragmatic device

Languages have various ways, both linguistic and paralinguistic, to express metapragmatic awareness. One of the most salient devices is the disclaimer. Disclaimers range from a simple statement to a complex one linked with ‘but’. Illustrations of how such an awareness can be expressed in English are as follows (Tyler 1978: 408). (1)

I’m only joking. This is serious. I’m speaking to you as a friend. When I say X, I mean Y. This is only gossip, but ...

Similarly, Overstreet and Yule (2002: 46) cite the following utterances which function as disclaimers and remark that they share a basic structural formula not X or anything, but Y (for the sake of structural clarity, the Y part of each utterance is not cited here): (2) I don’t mean to sound like your mother or anything, but ... I wasn’t trying to be nosey or anything, but ... We don’t mean to cause a fuss or anything, but ...

Hewitt and Stokes (1975: 3) define a disclaimer as “a verbal device employed to ward off and defeat in advance doubts and negative typifications.” Each disclaimer functions more than creating a linguistic tie; it manages the flow of meaning in situations and negotiates a social order in which people can treat one another’s acts with discretion, with good judgment and with deserved goodwill. Disclaimers can be classified into four types: hedging, signaling the speaker’s minimal commitment or the utterance’s validity; credentialing, establishing for the actor credentials that permit him or her to engage in the act; cognitive disclaimers, indicating the speaker’s anticipation of a misconstrual or misinterpretation as being


irrational or lacking sense; and appeals for the suspension of judgment, reflecting the speaker’s awareness that what they say or do may be offensive, angering or dismaying to those with whom they interact. Under such circumstances, they appeal to their interlocutors to suspend judgment until the full meaning is understood. Type I: Hedging (4) I could be wrong on my facts, but I think … I really haven’t thought this through very well, but …

Type II: Credentialing (5) I’m not prejudiced but … Don’t get me wrong, I like your work but … Type III: Cognitive disclaimers (6) This may seem strange to you but … Don’t react right away to what I’m going to say. Type IV: Appealing for the suspension of judgment (7) I don’t want to make you angry. Don’t get me wrong, but …

As will be shown in the paper, disclaimers of Type IV are most common in Thai discourse. This can be argued as related to the fact that Thais value friendship, do not like conflict, and often try to avoid it. All these attributes are part of the cultural principle krengcai discussed earlier. In addition, it is obvious that disclaimers of this type are oriented towards pathos or emotional appeal. In Beebe, Takahashi and Uliss-Weltz (1990), it is reported that positive remarks such as “That’s a good question but ...” (in a reply to a question the speaker may not have an answer for) or “That’s very nice of you but …” (in a negative reply to an invitation or an offer) are key to the communicative success in English. When non-native speakers do not use them before a refusal or an offense, negative attitudes and misinterpretations can occur. In my view, these remarks may be viewed as a sub-type of disclaimers. They share similar syntactic structures marked by the adversative ‘but,’ linking the metapragmatic segment to the ensuing text or message. Moreover, they seem to have common properties concerned with the speaker’s judgment of appropriateness of the utterance and hence the need to achieve a double goal of both “discourse management” (Caffi 1993) as well as “impression management” (Goffman 1959). As disclaimers help achieve interactional goals and reduce the speaker’s obligation in blaming or criticizing the addressee, they function in a similar way to what Caffi (1999, 2007) calls “mitigation” referring to a set of strategies rooted in a metapragmatic awareness. Caffi classifies mitigation into two types: those with

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and without explicit operators. The former is expressed by explicit morphological means, such as diminutive suffixes, vocatives and address terms. The latter are conveyed by such constructions as if-clauses and pre-sequences. Although there is a similarity between the notions disclaimers and mitigators, they are not exactly the same. Disclaimers ward off doubts and negative typifications, whereas mitigators downgrade or soften the illocutionary force of the utterance. Both index metapragmatic awareness but in many cases their forms seem to overlap.

5.

Thai disclaimers

Before any criticism is made, Thais usually say something to warn the addressee of a negative remark that will immediately follow. We will not pay attention to the content of the remark but to the disclaimer or the preface reflecting the speaker’s metapragmatic awareness. We will focus on those utterances indicating interpersonal meaning. In this section linguistic devices expressing explicit metapragmatic awareness in Thai are presented. In the next section we will discuss their various uses, with an emphasis on why the speaker chooses to use them. Metapragmatic comments that are used when criticizing in Thai are mostly prohibitive statements: the speaker asks the hearer not to criticize the speaker, or asks the hearer not to get upset with the speaker. There are also non-prohibitive statements. Here the speaker uses an optimistic strategy by indicating that the speaker thinks that the hearer will not mind the criticism and emphasizing that the speaker means well. Another type of non-prohibitive statement is the assertion that the hearer would criticize the speaker or the expression that the speaker thinks the hearer will not blame the speaker (see Section 5.2).

5.1

Prohibitive statements

Most explicit metapragmatic comments in Thai are formulaic prohibitive statements. They may be accompanied by other meta-utterances, some of which are not formulaic. a. Prohibitive structure consisting of the following elements: prohibitive marker ya$a + verbs of thinking/blaming (e.g., khi@t ‘think’; ha&a ‘blame’) + complementizer waâ + verb of criticizing/imposing (e.g., waâ ‘criticize’; sn ‘teach’; yu^N ‘impose’) + attitudinal particles (e.g., li, na@ or combination of these particles) + (polite particle).


(8) ya$a ha&a waâ waâ li na@ ‘don’t blame (me) for criticizing (you)’ ya$a ha&a waâ sn li na@ ‘don’t blame (me) for teaching (you)’ ya$a ha&a waâ yu^N li na@ ‘don’t blame (me) for imposing (on you)’ ya$a ha&a waâ mEÊ yu^N maî kha^w r aN li ‘don’t blame mother for imposing (on you) with no reason’ ya$a ha&a waâ ninthaa kha&w k lE@Ew kan ‘don’t blame (me) for gossiping with her’

In colloquial speech the verb of blaming ha&a is omitted giving the structure: prohibitive marker + complementizer + criticizing verb + particles. In this case, the complementizer is reanalyzed as a verb meaning ‘criticize’ and the second occurrence of waâ becomes a complementizer, hence, ya$a waâ waâ li na@ ‘don’t criticize (me)’. b. Prohibitive and If-clause structure prohibitive marker ya$a + (attitudinal particles) + (polite particle) + verb of criticizing waâ or verbs of negative emotions (e.g., kro$ot or upset) + conditional conjunction thaâ. (9)

ya$a wa$a thaâ cha&n ca$ phuût tro#N tro#N ‘don’t criticize (me) if I speak frankly’ yaâ kro$ot li na@ thaâ ca$ bk waâ ‘don’t be upset (with me) if (I) tell (you) the following’

In English most formulaic disclaimers are self-oriented but the Thai data indicate the opposite. They are geared towards the addressee’s reaction. This may explain why the majority of disclaimers are prohibitive statements whose illocutionary force is to request, rather than to prohibit the hearer from doing something.

5.2 Non-prohibitive statements Common non-prohibitive statements that are used in the act of criticizing consist of the following elements. a. Temporal marker + future marker + verb of blaming + complementizer + verb of criticizing or imposition (10) di&ew ca$ ha&a waâ waâ ‘(you) may blame (me) for criticizing (you)’ b. (1st pronoun) + verb of thinking + complimentizer + (2nd pronoun) + negative marker + verb of criticizing (11) khi@t waâ khun khoN maî waâ arai ‘(I) think you won’t blame me’

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6.

“Don’t blame me for criticizing you …”

In this section we will look at various examples that illustrate how the metamessage is conveyed in Thai and how it interacts with the message itself. Although the devices listed in Section 5 are generally formulaic, it is important to note that metapragmatic awareness is, in most cases, expressed through the combination of these utterances with those indicating the speaker’s concern for the hearer. Instances of explicit metapragmatic utterances are presented in boldface. (12) di$cha&n ya$ak phuût arai fa$ak waî sa@k ya$aN nakha@, ya$a ki$t waâ sn li, phiaN tE$E pen hu$aN, phra@o th N khu#n sN khon ca$ mii pra$so$pkaan pha$an maa khon la maî maâk k no@i, khun k yaN de$k yu$u rk, baâN thiî khun a$at ca$ maî khaô cai khwa#m waâ kaan tE$EN Naan sa@k tha^w rai k daî... I want to say something for your sake. Don’t feel that I’m instructing you. I’m only concerned. Even though both of you have had considerable experiences, you are still young. Perhaps you may not know the meaning of the word ‘marriage’. (Poonpidthong, p. 429)

The speaker is an older woman who is giving advice to her colleagues. They are boyfriend and girlfriend. They refuse to get married but live together as a couple. This practice is hardly acceptable in Thai culture. The speaker is not one of their close relatives. Her advice can be interpreted as criticism. This is why she mentions that she is not instructing them and that she has good intention, that she cares about them. The speaker’s opinion is presented through the following three overt metapragmatic comments: (13) di$cha&n ya$ak phuût arai fa$ak waî sa@k ya$aN nakha want say what keep leave around one (CLF) I (F) PCL (F) ‘I want to say something to you.’ (14) ya$a ki$t waâ sn li PROH think COMP teach PCL ‘Don’t think that (I) teach (you).’ (15) phiaNtE$E pen hu$aN only be worry, concern ‘(I)’m only concerned.’ . Abbreviations used in this paper: CLF classifer, COMP complementizer, F female, PCL particle (referring to the so-called ‘sentence-final particles’ as well as polite particles which vary according to the gender of the speaker), PROH prohibitive marker.


Utterance (13) comprises the expression of the speaker’s intention to say something for the hearers’ sake. Note the use of the serial verb fa$ak waî, which means to leave something (in this case, the speaker’s idea) for the hearer to remember. This is followed by (14), the prohibitive statement in which the speaker asks the hearers not to think that she is instructing them. In (15) the speaker frankly admits her concern. Although these utterances are not part of the content of the message the speaker intends to convey, they constitute an important part of this communicative act. Thai speakers cannot function without them when they encounter situations that may lead to conflict or dissatisfaction on the part of the hearer, as is the case in this particular example. (16) A: B: A: B: A: B: A: B:

yaN la^w maî co$p li ca$ lu@k pay na&y ya$aN ni@i k na&N kha$at mo$t sa$nu$k li k nu&u la^w r a N nu&u ka$p r a N anchalee haî phiî faN mo$t lE@Ew Nai r a N wani@daa yaN maî la^w li nu&u maî ja$ak la^w raN kha&w di&ew ha&a waâ ninthaa la@p la&N You haven’t finished the story. Why are you leaving like this? If you won’t finish it, it will be the end of the fun. I’ve told you all of my story and Anchalee’s. But you haven’t told me about Wanida. I don’t want to talk about her. You would criticize me for gossiping behind her back. (Dichan maichai sopheni, p. 72)

(17) phiî ya$ak ru@u ciN ciN r  ... aô la^w k la^w, ya$a ha&a waâ ninthaa kha&w k lE@Ew kan, pra$wa$t yaaj khon ni@i maî baw, maa plE$Ek kwa$a phan Do you really want to know (about her)? ... OK I can tell (the story). Don’t criticize me for gossiping about her. Her story is not bad and more interesting than other people’s stories. (Dichan maichai sopheni, p. 73)

Examples (16) and (17) are drawn from a novel titled Dichan Maichai Sopheni (I Am Not Prostitute). The speaker is asked by her friend to tell a story about Wanida, their mutual friend. At first, the speaker refuses by saying that she does not want to talk about Wanida behind her back (as indicated in (16)) but when the addressee persists, she gives in. Before telling the story, in (17) she asks the addressee not to criticize her for gossiping about this third person. Interestingly, she regards her act as gossip (i.e., criticism of this person). In (17) two pronouns are used to refer to the third person being talked about: kha&w and yaay khon ni@i. Zero anaphora is usually the norm in Thai discourse. But here there are two instances of explicit pronouns occurring in the same utterance. The first, a general pronoun used for third person singular. It is neutral in gender and attitude.

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40 Krisadawan Hongladarom

The second is used only when referring to a woman and it indicates the speaker’s negative stance. The following example is taken from a letter by an anonymous reader to the editor of Dichan, a popular woman magazine in Thailand. The reader wants to complain that in recent issues of the magazine there have been too many pictures and not enough content. This is the whole point of her letter. She opens the letter by telling the editor that she has had a chance to eat lunch in a restaurant on the Thai King’s birthday where she witnesses an impressive scene: several families were celebrating this special occasion by giving gifts to their father (on behalf of the King, whom Thais consider their national and spiritual father) and by toasting to the King. The story, a way to build rapport with the editor, occupies the first three paragraphs. In the fourth paragraph, the writer mentions that the year has come to an end and a new year is about to begin. Hence, she takes this opportunity to make the following remark: (18) na@ ookaat ni@i kh di$cha&n daî phuût khui kap khunyi&N nai khwaam ki@t he&n thiî ya$ak phuût maa naan lE@Ew, khi@t waâ khunyi&N khoN maî waâ arai, tha^w thiî sa&Nke$t mii khwaam ru@us k waâ... With this opportunity I request to chat with you about the opinion I have long wished to express, I believe (lit. think) you won’t criticize me. As far as I can observe, I have a feeling that ... (Dichan, p. 550)

At the end of the letter the writer performs a remedial act by apologizing to the editor for having talked too much. When a Thai speaker apologizes, it does not mean that the person has committed a serious offense. It can simply be a minor offense. Or the apology functions as a mitigator – a way to lessen the degree of the illocutionary force of one’s speech act, which, in this case, is criticism. In Thai, apology also serves as a politeness strategy and a way to express respect for the addressee. But more importantly, I want to argue here that apology is part of the metapragmatic comment. This is similar to what Pizziconi (this volume) discovers for Japanese. As she states: “Metalinguistic comments appear generally as indirect speech acts (e.g. hints) used as prefaces followed by an explicit apology involves a metarepresention of discourse as something that the author feels to be unacceptable or inappropriate, and which demands some sort of redress or at least disambiguation” (pers. com.). Returning to the text above, the question may arise: Why does the reader in (18) have to express her hope that the editor would not criticize her before she expresses her opinion? Evidently she perceives it as criticism. As a reader, she has every right to criticize the magazine. Furthermore, the content of the criticism is not serious. She need not be concerned about the editor’s feeling because she has no personal relationship with her. Most of the people who send letters to this col-


umn use pseudonyms. But judging from the choice of address term and the way she expresses herself, it can be concluded that she has a considerable amount of respect for the editor. First of all, she uses the honorific term of address khunyi&N ‘lady,’ a title given by the King to a woman who has done outstanding work for the nation. Although the editor indeed holds such a position, there are other possible alternatives that could have been used, such as bannathi@kaan ‘editor,’ emphasizing her duty and work relationship. The reader also tries to build up a rapport with the editor by writing about feelings and experiences she thinks the editor might want to hear. Other than asking a conversational interlocutor not to take offense, a speaker may directly request an interlocutor not to get upset with the speaker. (19) o@ot ya$a kro$ot raw na, raw ce$tana di t o@ot ciN ciN, o@ot klap maa naan lE@Ew Naan kaan k yaN maî he&n tham, raw ru@us k ramkhaan thEEn, wi@chaa khwaamru@u khN o@ot k mii, thammai maî thamNaan ya$aN khon  n kha&w. “Oot, don’t get upset with me. I really have good intention toward you. You have returned (from your study abroad) for quite some time but you don’t seem to do any work. I felt annoyed on your behalf. You have knowledge. Why don’t you work like other people?” (Siiphaendin, p. 620)

Example (19) is taken from a classic novel Siiphanendin (Four Reigns). The speaker is An, who is the addressee (Oot)’s elder brother. In the excerpt presented here An criticized his brother for not working, even though Oot has already finished schooling. To preface his negative comments, he asked Oot not to get upset with him and he emphasized that he had good intentions. That is, his criticism should be taken as advice. There is another interesting use of the structure ya$a ha&a waâ in the following example. (20) ya$a ha&a waâ mEÊ yu^N maî kha^w r a N li An, ploy phuût k tua tE$E mEÊ ya$ak ru@u waâ ph  n khN luûk pen khrai baâN “Don’t criticize me for being nosey for no reason, An,” Ploy made an excuse. “But I only want to know who are your friends.” (Siiphaendin, p. 631)

Ploy, the main character, who represents a traditional Thai woman, notices that one of her sons, An, has been socializing with people whom she feels are untrustworthy. She wants to check on this but is afraid that An, who has studied abroad and values modern and Western thoughts may be offended. So, before asking him, she begs him not to criticize her for being nosey. This example is interesting because it contains the use of the discourse marker tE$E ‘but,’ which clearly marks

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the boundary between the metamessage and the message. However, in most examples of metapragmatic utterances in Thai, there is never an explicit boundary marker like this one. It could be that the writer, who had been educated abroad, was influenced by the structure in English. In Section 7 we look at another type of metapragmatic comment. They are harder to distinguish because the metapragmatic perspective is embedded in the utterances themselves. Moreover, multifunctional markers indicating stance, such as pronouns, sentence adverbs, and discourse markers, often convey them. This is the type labeled earlier as “implicit metapragmatic comments.” Though we could identify linguistic devices that mark these comments, they are not as obvious as those discussed earlier. This may be because the kind of criticism conveyed by these comments is not confrontational: it is not geared towards the hearer but towards a third party. Although most of the examples discussed are from written sources, this does not mean that they cannot occur in spoken language.

7.

Criticizing voice in disguise

Other metapragmatic comments that do not use the prohibitive structure include statements in which the speaker/writer emphasizes the fact that they are concerned about the hearer’s feelings. What these statements share with those in Section 5 is that Thais are concerned about the addressee’s feelings and they want to warn them of the ensuing negative statement. The speaker presents themselves as being in a dilemma – torn between telling the addressee something the speaker has to say and hesitating to do so for fear that it may upset the addressee. By stating these metapragmatic utterances, the speaker hopes that no ill feelings will occur because the hearer has already been forewarned. (21) i$ik r  N n N thiî pho&m kh ri#an wa@i duâi khwa#am he&nca#i prakp kaan athibaai waa thammai phEÊt yu@k ni@i mii cit cai maî mu&an yu@k kn lE@ thammai tN thamNaan brikaan na$k maâk One more thing I would like to address to you with sympathy, which can help explain things, is why doctors of the present period are not the same as those in the past and why they have to work hard for service. (Chiivajit 16 March 2003: 55)

Example (21) is an excerpt from an article, written by a psychiatrist, in a column entitled “Psychiatrist Clinic” which appears in Chiivajit, a leading alternative health magazine. The topic of the article is presented in the first few lines: “Thai society in the past viewed doctors like heroes. But why have they now become villains? Is this


true?” The writer begins the article by mentioning that there has been a lot of press coverage of several murders committed by doctors. This provokes the question of whether doctors’ ethical standards have become lower or not. The writer cites several negative comments about doctors that he has heard. For example: they keep patients waiting; they do not smile at patients or their relatives; they do not speak nicely to them; they sometimes scold them or look down on them; and they think their profession is better than others. In this article, the writer tries to explain why doctors are not as good as in the past. He explains that one of the reasons is that there are not enough doctors in the country. The article ends with a question he poses at the beginning of the text: “When you have read this, do you think doctors are still heroes, or have they already become villains?” Even though the question seems to be identical to the one previously posed, it reflects the writer’s perspective (presented throughout the text) that doctors are not that bad. Thus, this can be considered another view of metapragmatic comment. Although this particular example does not concern criticism, it does ask the reader to change their negative perception. It contains a similar pattern we have observed previously. The writer anticipates that the reader may not like what he is going to say. So, before performing a virtual offense, he needs to say certain things which he believes will prepare the reader and thus form common ground. This is N n N thiî pho&m kh done using the following metapragmatic comment: i$ik r  ri#an wa@i duâi khwa#am he&nta#i pra$kp kaan athbaai waâ ‘one more thing I would like to address to you with sympathy, which can help explain things’. Let us examine another example involving a conversation between a student and a professor that took place in a university. Metapragmatic awareness in this example is conveyed by the single morpheme k. The student tells the professor that she has gone to visit another lecturer in another faculty at the same university. She wants to tell the professor about this meeting and the comment the latter makes of the professor’s research work. She quotes a dialogue between her and the lecturer in which the lecturer states that she is familiar with the professor’s research work. So the student asks her what she thinks about it. Example (22) is the reported speech. (22) k ph N pho@p waâ raw mii khwaam khi@t he&n thiî ta$ang kan maâk maâk Well, I just discovered that our opinions are very different.

In this example we see traces of the narrator’s voice through the use of the discourse marker k. In Thai linguistic scholarship, the function of k has been examined only from a pragmatic point of view. It is used when the speaker is not certain about the validity of the utterance. That is, it functions as a hedge. But I want to emphasize that there is a metapragmatic dimension of this morpheme,

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and we need to go beyond the pragmatic level in order to provide a full account of its use. The morpheme indexes the speaker’s concern towards the hearer’s feelings. Perhaps the student thinks that the professor may feel upset upon hearing that the person whom they talk about (i.e., the lecturer) does not like her work. Moreover, as a student, she does not dare to convey the criticism to the professor directly. That is why she redresses her utterance. It may be assumed that were the student the one to criticize the professor, she may have to resort to the structure discussed in Section 5. The more confrontational the criticizing act is, the more explicit the speaker’s metapragmatic utterance becomes. The last example to be discussed in this paper is different from the other examples in that the marker of metapragmatic awareness comes at the end of the criticism (i.e., postposing comment). This is in fact not rare, but it often goes unnoticed when we think about linguistic expressions which function as metapragmatic devices. (23) kaan haî amnaât phuûwaâkaan sii ii oo ta$tsi&ncai khon diaw a$at ca$ maî st khlN ka$p khwaam tNkaan thiî thE@EciN khN pra$chachon, rabo$p tru$at sp kaan cha@i ca$ay ma^y ha^y ruâ la&y kha^w krapa&w khai k yaN khlum khla, praden ni@i maê-luûk-can he&n duây ka$p fa$ay kha@an i$ik lE@Ew yoom. Giving full authority to the CEO-style provincial governors alone may not coincide with the people’s true wants? It is still obscure how the expenses are monitored so that the fund does not flow into somebody’s pocket. On this issue “Maelookchan” also agrees with the opposition party, yoom. (Thai Rath, 22 April 2005)

This example is taken from Thai Rath, a most popular newspaper in Thailand. The excerpt is written by a famous columnist named Mae Luk Chan. The column summarizes news highlights and presents gossips about politicians. What concerns us here is the use of the second personal pronoun yoom. Monks and nuns generally use this pronoun when they talk to a lay audience. But in (18) it is employed by Mae Luk chan, who is neither a monk nor a nun. Mae Luk Chan criticizes the government for giving money and authority to the CEO governor (Chief Executive Officer). At the end of the criticism, he used this pronoun which not only mimics the monk’s speech style in giving advice (hence asserting the utterance’s authority) but softens his criticism by framing it as playful speech. However, when it comes to the criticizing of a third party, the metapragmatic function of the comment is not as clear-cut and it shows an overlapping boundary between implicit metapragmatic devices, disclaimers as well as mitigators.

8.


Conclusion

In this paper two types of metapragmatic comments in Thai involving the presence or absence of disclaimers have been discussed. In many cases, metapragmatic devices are hard to identify because they operate simultaneously at both pragmatic and metapragmatic levels (i.e., no overt disclaimers). I have shown that the concept of metapragmatics could expand to include these less evident expressions that also indicate the speaker’s or the writer’s evaluative stance. What both types of comments have in common is that they reflect the fact that Thais are concerned about interpersonal relationships. All the examples discussed in the paper illustrate that Thais value friendship and solidarity, even though they may not know the persons they communicate with well or have never met them face-to-face. This is in fact similar to the findings in a previous work on politeness in computer-mediated communication (Hongladarom and Hongladarom 2005). The way Thais use language to chat with one another in a chatroom reflects the values they deem important, namely solidarity and avoidance of conflict, which are characteristics of positive politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987). These values are binding even though the people are engaged in a loosely constructed virtual relationship. Several pragmatic analyses of Asian languages reveal ways of speaking that are strikingly different from those found in Western societies. For example, Ide (1989) has shown that Japanese people abide by such a principle, wakimae or discernment, rather than the kind of politeness built around individual rationality as proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987). In her recent work, Ide (2005) presents the case of Japanese as a high context culture in which speakers obligatorily pay attention to the contextual factors in the speech event. In a similar manner, Thais maintain a distinctive way of speaking that reflects the indigenous notion of kreNcai or consideration for others. This way of speaking is based on close kin relations: people in the speech community are considered part of one’s extended family. Metapragmatic comments reveal a great deal of insight into what we do when we use language. We are not only concerned with the message of the utterance, but most of the time we interact with the message itself. An analysis of disclaimers and other linguistic devices serving a metapragmatic function enable us to see kinds of constraints conversational participants have while they move through interaction. As they are common devices and are readily recognized because of formulaic structure, their use indicates accepted norms and expected convention, as well as a reaffirmation of the group’s cultural values.

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References Beebe, L.M., Takahashi, T. and Uliss-Weltz, R. 1990. “Pragmatic transfer in ESL refusal.” In Developing Communicative Competence in a Second Language, R.C. Scarcella, E. Anderson and S.C. Krashen (eds), 55–73. New York: Newbury House. Bakhtin, M. 1981. The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays. Austin, TX: Texas University Press. Bateson, G. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine. Brown, P. and Levinson, S. 1987. Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Caffi, C. 1993. “Metapragmatics.” Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics 2461–2466. Oxford: Pergamon. Caffi, C. 1999. “On mitigation.” Journal of Pragmatics 31: 881–909. Caffi, C. 2007. Mitigation. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Fraser, B. 1990. “An approach to discourse markers.” Journal of Pragmatics 14: 383–395. Fraser, B. 1996. “Pragmatic markers.” Pragmatics 6: 167–190. Goffman, E. 1956. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday. Hewitt, J. and Stokes, R. 1975. “Disclaimers.” American Sociological Review 40 (February): 1–11. Holmes, H. and Tangtongtavy, S. 1995. Working with the Thais. Bangkok: White Lotus. Holmes, J. 1986. “Functions of you know in women’s and men’s speech.” Language in Society 15: 1–22. Hongladarom, K. and Hongladarom, S. 2005. “Politeness in computer-mediated communication in Thai.” In Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness, R. Lakoff and S. Ide (eds), 145–162. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Ide, S. 1989. “Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of universals of linguistic politeness.” Multilingua 8 (2): 223–271. Ide, R. 1998. “‘Sorry for your kindness’: Japanese interactional ritual in public discourse.” Journal of Pragmatics 29 (5): 509–529. Ide, S. 2005. “How and why honorifics can signify dignity and elegance: The indexicality and reflexivity of linguistic rituals.” In Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness, R. Lakoff and S. Ide (eds), 45–64. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Komin, S. 1990. Psychology of the Thai People: Values and Behavioral Patterns. Bangkok: NIDA. Lakoff, G. 1973. “Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts.” Journal of Philosophical Logics 2: 458–508. Lakoff, R. 1975. Language and Women’s Place. New York: Harper Colophon. Overstreet, M. and Yule, G. 2002. “The metapragmatics of and everything.” Journal of Pragmatics 34 (6): 785–794. Overstreet, M. and Yule, Y. 2001. “Formulaic disclaimers.” Pragmatics 33 (1): 45–60. Panpothong, N. 2004. Cateriya Gossips: Content and Linguistic Strategies. Research report, Center for Thai Language and Culture, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University. Phakdeephasook, S. 2003. “Epithets as speech play in Thai political journalistic discourses.” Paper presented at the 14th Annual Conference of Southeast Asian Linguistic Society (SEALS 14), 19–21 May 2003. Bangkok. Pizziconi, B. This volume. “Facework and multiple selves in apologetic metapragmatic comments in Japanese.”


Richards, J. and Sukwiwat, M. 1982. “Language transfer and conversational competence.” Applied Linguistics 4.2: 113–125. Schiffrin, D. 1987. Discourse Markers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schourup, Lawrence. 1999. “Discourse markers: Tutorial overview.” Lingua 107: 227–265. Srinarawat, D. 2005. “Indirectness as a politeness strategy of Thai speakers.” In Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness, R. Lakoff and S. Ide (eds), 175–193. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Tanskanen, S.-K. 2001. “Avoiding conflict in computer-mediated discussions, or, fear of flaming.” In English in Zigs and Zags [Anglicana Turkuensia 23], R. Hiltunen et al. (eds), 227– 242. Turku: University of Turku. Tyler, S. 1978. The Said and the Unsaid: Mind, Meaning and Culture. New York: Academic Press. Ukosakul, M. 2005. “The significance of ‘face’ and politeness in social interaction as revealed through Thai ‘face’ idioms.” In Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness, R. Lakoff and S. Ide (eds), 117–125. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Verschueren, J. 2000. “Notes on the role of metapragmatic awareness in language use.” Pragmatics 10 (4): 439–456. Verschueren, J. 1999. Understanding Pragmatics. London: Arnold.

Written Data Sources Magazines: Cheewajit, Dichan. Novels: Krisana Asoksin. 2001. Poonpidthong (Gold Covered with Cement). 8th Printing. Bangkok: Double Nine Press. Kukrit Pramot. Siiphaendin (Four Reigns). Preecha, Phakamas. n.d. Dichan maichai sophenii (I’m Not a Prostitute).

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Facework and multiple selves in apologetic metapragmatic comments in Japanese* Barbara Pizziconi

Smooth social interaction requires that individuals engage in continuous negotiations with other individuals, in order to avoid or minimize social predicaments of various sort. Apologies are common, typical instances of remedial actions aimed at fixing intersubjective conflicts. We apologise for stepping on someone’s toes or for being late, but also for verbal acts that have insulted or offended. All apologies admit the violation of some social commandment and signal a speaker’s moral commitment to such commandment – or at least their awareness of its social importance. But intersubjective conflict is not the only relevant conflict surfacing in an apology. Apologies proffered prior to the violation, for example, are relatively transparent signs of an intrasubjective conflict, that the utterer of an apology is attempting to reconcile. In the utterance: “forgive me for being blunt, but…”, the apology is used prolectically; it is oriented to the projected, or anticipated, effects of an interactional faux pas which has not yet been committed (which is why apologies of this sort can be seen as a type of ‘disclaimer’, cf. Hewitt and Stokes 1975; Bell et al. 1984), and it admits a dissonance between two conflicting intentions: the intention to be blunt (for some contextually variable reasons) and the intention to abide by the social norm whereby bluntness is dispreferred. Far from appearing merely as a dysfunctional incoherence (Hermans 2002: 153) or a blatant contradiction that calls into questions the sincerity or credibility of the apology (Benoit 1995: 30), apologies like this are accepted as legitimate currency in daily social exchanges. What makes this possible, I claim in this paper, is * Jim O’Driscoll read part of an early draft of this paper and made some very pertinent comments; Nicholas Tranter kindly advised on my translations from Japanese. I thank both very much. None other than me is responsible for the final product. . See Goffman (1971) for an illustration of the multifarious ways in which speakers articulate apologies: explanations, excuses, pretexts (“excuses provided before or during the questionable act”, 113) etc.; cf. also Benoit (1995).

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the model of the self that language users seem to uphold: one in which multiple and inconsistent ‘agents’ constituting the self cause some sort of intrasubjective tension. The self as a “heterogenous society” of multiple “I-positions” (Hermans 2002) permeates personal narratives (Ochs and Capps 1996; Nair 2003) and is responsible for some very specific linguistic structures (Pang 2006). The linguistic expression discussed in this paper provides further support to the claim that such architecture of the self is the principal functional explanation for a great deal of self-reflective and ‘meta’ discourse (Pang 2006: iii). In spite of the analytical distinction between language and metalanguage, it is generally accepted that no instance of language use would make sense without the assumption of some sort of ‘meta’ competence, including a metalinguistic, but also more generally a metasemiotic, competence (Cameron 2004). Given the ‘commonsensical’ nature of some aspects of such competence – persistent frames of interpretation of social meanings and social activities – the interest of an exploration of the mechanisms of metacommunication lies in the possibility to uncover the ideologies we all take for granted in everyday discourse (Verschueren 2004: 65ff.). This paper aims to illustrate this point by looking at the use of an apologetic formula in Japanese, which includes metalinguistic and evaluative comments. To the extent that such metalinguistic comments presuppose the speaker’s awareness of the effects of language use and refer to canons of appropriateness (Lucy 1993: 17), they are fundamentally metapragmatic (Verschueren 2004: 55, 58), and this is how I will refer to these expressions throughout. Such apologetic metapragmatic comments (AMC henceforth) exemplify one way in which speakers routinely deal with problematic talk: by embedding the voices of multiple selves in the apology, they can abjure problematic stances and orient themselves towards, and negotiate, normative social behaviour in everyday contexts. Selves can be ‘fragmented’ along different dimensions: past and present; male and female; id, ego and superego; good and evil, public and private (Ochs and Capps 1996: 22); the tension between public and private traits of the self will be seen as the particular aspect foregrounded by AMC.

1.

Apologetic metapragmatic comments as aligning acts

Although remedial action is at first sight other-directed (in terms of its symbolism of compensation), given the potential damage to the self-image and the consequent social sanctions caused by the violation of accepted norms of conduct, it is clear that it is also, importantly, an instance of ‘self-image restoration’ (Benoit 1995), or a face-regulating tool enabling speakers to protect identities from the harm of such misalignements. Since AMC forestall potential negative typifica-

Facework and multiple selves in apologetic metapragmatic comments in Japanese

tions of one’s action (Hewitt and Stokes 1975: 2), they must be regarded as ‘alignment talk’ (Bell et al. 1984). Goffman (1971) notes that apologies involve two different processes: a substantive (or restitutive) one, in which the offender offers some sort of compensation, and a more ritual one, in which the offender is predominantly concerned with demonstrating that he is willing to disavow the offending self – and hence be again an acceptable member of the community (1971: 116). Perceptively capturing their metasemiotic nature, he claims that apologies “represent a splitting of the self into a blameworthy part and a part that stands back and sympathises with the blame giving, and, by implication, is worthy of being brought back into the fold” (1971: 113). In order to explore how this ‘realignement’ is achieved and to account more accurately for the subtle mechanisms operating in the use of AMC, I will first of all recall here two Goffmanian constructs that I will utilize in the analysis of Japanese apologies: the well known notions of face, and multiple speaker roles. In Goffmanian terms (cf. Bargiela 2003), face has to do with the presentation of a desirable, commendable, acceptable public persona. It is “the positive social value an individual claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (Goffman 1967: 7). An individual’s face is crucially a product of a ‘social grant’, to obtain which one has to work by adopting socially approved ‘lines’, or patterns of behaviour. How and to what extent facework is required depends on a number of factors, ranging from an individual’s degree of commitment to canonical norms of the group to his/her relationship with other members of the group, but to the extent that community membership requires some sort of alignment, interaction requires active facework. A recent discussion on metalanguage by Coupland and Jaworski (2004: 22) significantly points to Goffman and his emphasis on the “dramaturgical element of every day encounters”, in which speakers are ‘actors’ and talk is ‘performance’, and hence ‘face’ is akin to a ‘stage mask’ “that people carefully select and “wear” to conjure up specific images and effects”. Goffman explains the dynamism characterizing this performance as something that is possible thanks to the multiple roles in which we participate in talk. Thus he deconstructs the monolithic notion of speaker into three main roles: the author, the animator, and the principal (1981: 144). Various combinations of such roles allow us to discriminate between . Note however that the ‘positive’ in Goffman’s “positive social value” stands for ‘socially sanctioned’ (rather than a fixed, pancultural value) and ‘socially desirable’ (rather than a value somewhere above the middle of the self-evaluation spectrum). This is a necessary qualification in view of culturally (or community) variable conceptions of ‘self ’ (Heine et al. 1999) and culturally (or community) variable canons of desirability, or appropriateness.

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different types of participation formats. Whereas the animator refers to the ‘utterer’ and the author to the person ‘designing’ the ideas, feelings, or text expressed, the principal refers to the particular social role or social identity whose hat one wears at one time. Our ability to express, and detect, multiple ‘voices’ in this way, allows patterns of participation to move their deictic anchorage, to be projected to other times, spaces or settings. When quoting somebody else’s words directly, I am the animator of the words but not the author. When I report what somebody said without quoting them literally (i.e. indirect speech), I am both animator and author. When I switch from a formal to an informal tone during a public lecture I continue to be both author and animator of my words, but this switch highlights the different capacity – the different ‘principal’ – which carries out those roles. When I say: “I’m speechless” while I clearly am not, I am foregrounding a “me” (an animator) different from the one animating the behaviour to which the comment putatively refers. This is obviously a theatrical description of a “me” that I don’t fully expect others to believe (1981: 148), but which contributes to the interaction in some other, ‘higher’, removed, or more simply ‘meta’, role. For Goffman, such embedding of roles (which he calls figures) is the device which allows us to manipulate the footing: “the alignment we take up to ourselves and others present as expressed in the way we manage the production and reception of an utterance” (1981: 128), in order to navigate the ‘traffic of interaction’, participate skilfully in social encounters and so manage perilous temporary misalignments. We can try to tease these roles out by taking a second look at our ‘bluntness’ case: “forgive me for being blunt, but I think you are wrong”. We could say that the speaker is the animator of both the apologetic preface and the main statement; he is also the author of both, but acts as if the author of the preface is ‘hedging’ the statement (about to be) made by the author of the main clause; this leads us to think that the speaker is acting in two capacities: an ‘innocent’ principal (responsible for the main statement “you are wrong”) and a ‘meta’ principal (the one responsible for the hedging). The ‘meta’ principal, unlike the ‘innocent’ one, ostensibly upholds the interlocutor’s perspective; this denotes a striving towards convergence and legitimizes group membership; the display of metapragmatic awareness enables the principal to make an implicit claim of collaborativeness

. ‘Innocent’ is a term I borrow from Coupland and Jaworsky, referring to an idealised language devoid of any metalinguistic dimension, a language in which meanings would straightforwardly be embodied in linguistic forms, and be “uncontroversial, uncontested and ‘innocent’” (2004: 15) – a language whose existence the authors decisively deny. Here I use the term to indicate the ‘naiveté’ attributed by one aspect of the self to another aspect of the self, a strategic device to rescue socially problematic stances.


(put at risk by the bold remark) and social skilfulness, an obvious ‘self-image restoration’ device. The participation format, following the Goffmanian framework, could be sketched out as follows: meta narrative innocent narrative Author self in the observed world (me) self in the observing world (I) self who says something Animator self who says X about saying X Principal social status X social status Y Thus the ‘splitting’ and ‘repudiating’ of embedded selves is an ingenious rhetorical device that effectively allows speakers to smuggle potentially problematic moves into an exchange, while ostensibly upholding the community’s norms.

2.

Japanese AMC

Like all speech acts, apologies are culturally specific in form, content, and frequency of use. A vast anecdotal and empirical literature maintains that apologies are a pervasive feature of the Japanese language communicative style. Cases of pragmatic interference into and from Japanese involving apologetic remarks reveal language-specific conventions (Coulmas 1981: 89ff.; Ide 1998) and a predilection for explicit marking of apologies in Japanese. This is customarily explained in terms of preferred ethics: a strong concern with “acknowledging moral indebtedness” (Coulmas 1981: 88), or “being an imposition on others” (Heine et al. 1999: 779). Such sensitivity is further demonstrated by the considerable overlap of thanks and apologies: even receiving a benefit is likely to be coded as regretful indebtedness rather than straightforward gratitude (Coulmas 1981; Ide 1998), hence Japanese speakers can utter ‘sorry’ in situations where English or Italian speakers use ‘thanks’. Comparative studies of remedial expressions find that while American speakers tend to give “priority to settlement of matters, [the] Japanese work towards sustaining reciprocal face-support between the interlocutors” (Kumagai 1993, quoted in Ide 1998: 511), and that, together with a number of common strategies, Japanese female speakers apologise more than British English female speakers on behalf of husbands and children – a fact taken to demonstrate again a sociocentric, rather than egocentric orientation (Okumura and Wei 2000).

. Coulmas’s paper argues that the two speech acts border, rather than contrast, with each other cross-linguistically. Japanese displays a relatively larger degree of overlap.

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Table 1. The structure of an apologetic metalinguistic comment in Japanese (xx)na/i hanashi ADJ

de

talk, story, manner of speech COPULA

mooshiwake arimasen (ga…) sumimasen (ga…) unforgivable CONJUNCTION

Given the cultural significance of this speech act it is not surprising that, besides a large range of idiomatic expressions, Japanese also possesses a highly productive formulaic structure for AMC, broadly translatable as: “Excuse me for saying this in such a XX way / Forgive me for putting it XX-ly, but…”. This works like a template that speakers fill in with the contextually relevant qualification (see Table 1). The left part of the formula contains the phrase [ADJ + hanashi] and represents a metalinguistic comment, in that hanashi (lit. speech, talk) refers to the stretch of discourse in which the formula itself is embedded, preceded by a qualifying adjective. Thanks to this explicit evaluative element, speakers are able to orient the apology to the specific quality of the offending discourse. An important consequence of this explicit labeling is the extrication and objectification of speakers’ moral, aesthetic, affective take on norms, values and beliefs (i.e. their framing of such norms); such labeling also distils iconised modes of appropriate verbal interaction (cf. Coupland and Jaworski 2004: 36), and so plays an important role in processes of enculturation and the perpetuation of normative discourse. For the analyst, this can shed light on culturally sensitive lines of behaviour, and ideologies of linguistic conduct. Such underlying ideologies will be illustrated in the final part of this paper (see Section 5) by looking at some of the collocations found within apologetic expressions. Before proceeding to a discussion of the actual data, I would like to note the work of the Japanese linguist Seiju Sugito on sets of formulaic, routinely employed, metalinguistic Japanese expressions, which he labels chuushaku hyoogen (or ‘commentary expressions’; Sugito 1983, 1999, 2001). He notes that although . The latter part of the string, containing the apology, is in fact optional. Metalinguistic comments are obviously possible which do not include explicit apologies, and correspond to ‘disclaimers’ (Hewitt and Stokes 1975). However I maintain that even disclaimers are ‘remedial’ in some sense, even if that sense is only cognitive. Hedges of this type can, for example, redress problems of relevance, when they introduce a text which the author perceives as ‘marked’ (here possibly flouting a maxim of relevance): [final utterance in a message in a discussion forum (machizukuri29) on urban planning. The reply discusses general theoretical issues, and then adds]: yobunna hanashi desu ga, machi zukuri de yuumeina XXmachi wa, mata aratana hisaku wo ADJ talk COP ADV nette iru nodesuka. Incidentally (lit: ‘talk in excess’), is that city of XX, that everybody knows for its urban development, still working at secret plans?


they target a variety of components of the speech event, they all operate on the basis of the same mechanism. A speaker can, for example, make a remark on the topic of the talk (ex. (1) below), the channel used (ex. (2)), its timing (ex. (3)), etc., but by operating such selection and evaluation s/he generates implications of an interactional nature whose dominant functional orientation is invariably politeness-related. Thus Sugito takes this commentary on an aspect of the speech event to be instrumental to the ultimate goal of displaying concern, regard for, or deference to, the speaker’s interlocutor. (1) Konna koto wo iu beki ka dou ka wakarimasen ga, … I don’t know if I should say this or not but… (2) Konna kantanna memo dewa shitsurei desunode, aratamete seishiki no bunshoo ni itashimasu. This quick note is inadequate, so I shall rewrite it properly for you. (3) Yabun osore irimasuga, … Sorry for calling this late at night but…

The metalinguistic comments discussed by Sugito appear generally as prefaces, and many crucially include an explicit apology with the structure illustrated in Table 1 – the particular subgroup that this paper investigates. My analysis is in line with Sugito’s in taking this particular string to encode some “pattern of interactional concern” (1999: August), but departs from it in considering deference, or politeness, to be at best only by-products of the interactional work. Sugito’s analysis emphasises the effects on the hearer; mine, the effects on the speaker. Sugito claims that the hesitation shown in a sentence like 1 grows out of a concern not to look presumptuous in the face of an ‘honourable’ other: hence the metamessage the speaker wants the other to recognise is ‘deference’. My claim is that the metamessage is first and foremost a statement about the self; deference is incidental.

3.

Japanese AMC in computer-mediated communication: sources, method, data

Although impression management is a pervasive concern not limited to the specific domain of computer-mediated communication, AMC are not equally dis-

. In doing so, I follow Watts (2003) in regarding politeness as behaviour “in excess” of what is expected from and directed to others and hence not a constant or necessary ‘condition’ of all interaction; impression management (that is, facework), on the other hand, is (Goffman 1967: 12).

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tributed among genres. In contexts of oral, face-to-face, even public interaction, the use of the AMC of the kind discussed here is relatively spare. In contrast, the relatively liberal use of such expressions in computer-mediated communication – asynchronous and displaced interaction – is perhaps not surprising in light of the increased need to make one’s stance more explicit. The features of computer-based communication formats (e-mail, bulletin boards, discussion forums, support rooms etc.) are recognised to display huge variability which defies sweeping generalizations (Crystal 2001). But despite the presumed ‘terseness’ of Netspeak (language on the Net is not as contrived, elaborate or rich in formal salutations as in more traditional forms of written language), there is evidence that the importance of facework is not totally obliterated in virtual communication. The well known phenomenon of ‘flaming’ (or online disinhibition effect) has been linked to a number of psychological factors, among which: dissociative anonymity (you don’t know me); invisibility (you can’t see me); asynchronicity (no immediate feedback available to constrain emotional displays); solipsistic introjection (it’s all in my head) and minimizing authority (no regulating figure) (Suler 2004). This highlights the regulating role of visual input and immediate interactional feedback, consciousness of the other and authoritative parameters – all necessary elements of face-related considerations. Face-conscious users trying not to project false impressions during virtual encounters are forced to more explicit facework: indices of affective content such as emoticons are one such example; AMC another. Significantly, these devices appear to reinstate . Data consistent with those gathered from computer-mediated communication also emerged from spontaneous dialogic interactions in TV documentaries. Although these data have not been reported here due to their paucity (see note 8) at the current stage, they support the hypothesis that unplanned but natural, spontaneous discourse, as opposed to discourse in timeconstrained interview conditions, is a possible context for the use of expressions of this kind. . In addition to the question of explicit signalling discussed later in the section, the following points should also be noted with regards to the paucity of such uses in oral, public, face-to-face interaction. Despite some evidence in the first phase of the survey, as well native speakers intuition, that expressions of this kind ought to be numerous in public contexts of use, an extended search in talk shows, topical debates, celebrity interviews, etc. yielded surprisingly few occurrences. Perhaps changes in language use in media and society may have made these rhetorical devices obsolete; or the analyst’s idealised representations may have been no more than ideologically biased models of how Japanese ought to be spoken (in fact, many of the expressions discussed by Sugito are also classic entries on letter writing manuals, politeness manuals etc., typical examples of normative and prescriptive language use). Alternatively, this notable absence from spoken language could also be linked to processing: planned vs. unplanned speech. This would explain the wider availability of such forms in written, as opposed to oral, interactions, and loose dialogic contexts as opposed to fast-tempo interviews. Data was indeed not difficult to find in the domain of computer-mediated communication.


elements lost in the virtual environment: visual input (emoticons are mostly ‘faces’ coded with ever increasing complexity), or signals of self-positioning vis-à-vis significant others and significant authorities10 (the multiple selves instantiated in AMC are mobilised to provide such mappings). The data for this study were collected from message boards (otherwise known as BBS, forums, web boards, discussion boards), or group support mailings on the web, with no pre-established restriction on topic, size, or participants’ roles, but limited to threaded discussions11 (personal homepages were excluded12). The length of the messages was extremely varied, ranging from contributions of one or two lines to those many pages long. All contributions in a threaded discussion are embedded in a sequence and are by definition cross-referential, though not in any linear format. Typically, AMC work prospectively, i.e. they precede the text they refer to (acting as introductions), but (less frequently) they are also used retrospectively (referring to a stretch of discourse uttered before). dear XX, nice to meet you.13 …. I advise you to back up your data as soon as you can. Assume it [the hard disk] . See the rather elaborate ‘faces’ ( and ) and the rendering of a genuflecting posture () in the following example, which also includes an AMC: naruhodo (^_^) 

sankusu desu (^_^)/  mada ikutsuka oshiete kudasai. PC tsukau tokini iroiro betsuno kikai wo PC ni tsunaidari to ka shite imasuka? Shitsumon bakari de sumimasen. m(__)m.  I see (^_^)  Thanks (^_^)/  Let me ask you something else: when you use a PC do you connect a lot of other devices to it? Sorry to ask so many questions. m(__)m.  [k14:04810]

10. To the extent that the participants to the forums that I present here share interests, purposes, perhaps sensibilities, language, resources and environment, albeit a virtual one, and are engaged in a joint enterprise which mutually binds them, they are likely to constitute a bona fide community of practice (Wenger 1998). 11. A threaded discussion is a set of interconnected electronic messages posted (asynchronously), archived, and accessible on a web site. 12. I have included one mailing from a support group affiliated to a shop, hence a format closer to a homepage, as this allowed me to discuss institutional social identities (see Section 4.1 ‘cyclists’). The discussion is not threaded but there is reference to previous e-mails in the message discussed. 13. 「XXさん、初めまして。 …. いつ壊れてもいいように（不吉な話で申し訳ありません）、大事なデータは早めにバックアップされることをお勧めします。

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could break down at any time (forgive me, I hope this doesn’t tempt fate; lit.: forgive me for the inauspicious mention). I don’t know if this is relevant for you, but there is a summary of hard disk [issues] at the following link. ….

With regards to the position within the larger unit of text in which they appear, they are frequent in openings but not unusual in closings, and they can also appear in any other position within a text – wherever and for whatever reason need arises for a ‘realignment’. More than 100 occurrences were collected by conducting a Google search14 of the string presented in Table 1: “~i/~na hanashi de sumimasen/mooshiwake arimasen” (“forgive me for speaking ~ly”). Many of the adjectives included in the string occurred repeatedly, and a list of these ‘qualifications’ is presented in Table 2 in Section 5. I will now return to the main argument introduced in Section 1 and illustrate, with the three excerpts that follow, how speakers strategically exploit the multiple ‘voices’ of the self to project acceptable lines in spite of what could be regarded as substantial misalignments.

4.

AMC in context

4.1

Cyclists15

I would like to begin with a case where the interactional work seems fairly straightforward. The text is from a discussion page managed by a customer support team 参考になるかどうか分かりませんが、ハードディスクノイズについて山本さんがまとめておられますのでリンクしておきます。」

http://bbs.powerbook.org/qanda003/BBS_MSG_010621112046.html 14. See Pang 2006: 11 for references on the debate on the use of Google as a corpus. Google only allows a literal lexemes search, which was acceptable for my purpose. 15. 「ようやく入荷となりました今話題沸のロードレーサー、FELTF55なのですが。入荷済、若干在庫あり、と当方Webサイトでご案内したところ、特に先週末は沢山のお問い合わせをいただき、うれしい悲鳴です。在庫確認、価格などの返答メールならすぐに可能で、原則通販お断りをお伝えすると、それっきりとなってしまう方も多いのですが。それでもなおダメ元で再度ご連絡いただける方には、詳細な個別の対応が必要な場合もあり、少し返答が滞りがちな昨日今日です。個別の対応とはいえ、ある程度の傾向があるようで、これから問い合わせをしようとお考えの方にも参考になればと、皆様への返信を一部掲載いたします。【どうしても来店は不可能、でも自分で整備できるので大丈夫、というお客様に対して】不具合といえば、輸送中の破損のリスクも大きなものです。実際、輸送することとなれば、リスクを小さくする意味でも一部分解した状態で梱包したい


and displays what appears to be a very customer-friendly message, a sort of reply to a FAQ (‘frequently asked question’). After a brief introduction in which the author announces the arrival of new bikes, he describes circumstances which present, for him, an interpersonal conundrum. The bike shop strongly recommends that customers who have asked for the bike to be disassembled for shipping verify with the staff at the shop, beforehand, that they are able to reassemble it. The author then commits a potential faux pas by suggesting that some customers may overestimate their ability to reassemble the bike by themselves, and he strongly encourages even such customers to consult with the shop. (The original text of the excerpt can be found in the notes.) “The FELT F55, the road-racer everybody is talking about has just been shipped. We had a few in stock and announced it on the web. We are over the moon for the flood of enquiries we received, especially last weekend. Answering queries about availability or prices was easy, but many of you stopped writing when we announced that as a rule we don’t take mail orders. If you are still interested, please note that since many require a detailed answer we are lagging a bit behind with individual queries these days. We are then reporting here one section of our response for the sake of future enquirers on an issue of general interest. [For customers who are unable to come to the shop but are confident about the maintenance] Damage during shipment is a common risk and a cause of inconvenience. We would like to minimize the risks by disassembling the bike before shipping it, but we recommend that you visit us so we can ensure you are familiar with the assemblage procedures – just the basics we would like you to know not only to deal with this mail order but also as sport cyclists. Even experienced users are not always necessarily accurate. And even with the right knowledge and the right methods, the job is not always skilfully executed. Please forgive my presumptuous remarks (lit: Forgive me for this offensive statement =shitsureina hanashi). This is difficult to verify on the phone or by mail. “ [http://www.biking.jp/page375.html]

We could see this AMC as a ‘redressive action’ in Brown and Levinson’s sense of a polite verbal strategy aimed at compensating for the preceding, impersonalised but not too veiled, criticism. This is after all an apology, intended to restore the (psychological) distance that the author has immodestly and dangerously reduced のですが、これに伴う再組み立ての要領を一度お会いして確認したいところです。通販に限らず、スポーツ車のオーナーとしては、ぜひ覚えておいていただきたい程度の作業でもありますが。作業に関して、経験があっても正確にできているとは限りません。正しい方法を知識として知っていても、上手にできているとは限りません。失礼な話で申し訳ありません。これを確認するには、電話やメールのやり取りでは困難です。」

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between him/herself and the customers. But apart from the difficulty of assessing the face threatening act at sentence level, I would like to claim that what has been directly threatened is not the customer’s entitlement to deference (in which case we would of course be dealing with a politeness issue), but rather his entitlement to being (positively) seen as competent. Of course, the fact that competence may impinge on attributed status is obvious to us as it is to the author, who qualifies his own action as offensive (shitsureina). That is, however, no more than a side effect, a by-product of this utterance’s departure from the expected behaviour of a shop clerk. By stepping into the domain of criticism (indirect as it may be) the author has stepped into a role which the addressee(s) may well be unwilling to ratify, and that needs to be promptly ‘realigned’. Note that in this case the author simply tries to reassure the customers that his insistence is after all in their interest: the change of footing enacted by the AMC attempts to say that one may be ‘pushy’ or ‘bold’ but does not intend to be subversive; in other words, by referring to a shitsurei (offensive act), and hence implying knowledge of the social parameters whereby those acts could be construed as impolite, the AMC ‘hedges’ or constrains the interpretation of that act so that one can acknowledge ‘impertinence’ but not indifference or challenge to the social order. Author Animator Principal

innocent narrative (observed) clerk/writer says X social role unclear (because misaligned)

meta narrative (observing) clerk/writer declares X to be offensive social role of clerk (aligned).

The additional figure embedded in the meta narrative is that of a second animator, who, by means of a realigning move (an apology), repairs the principal’s role (compromised by virtue of the inappropriate criticism) and repositions it along the approved line. The principal can now claim to be acting appropriately, which importantly entails that the role of other participants is not challenged. Note that this does not require an ‘objective’, or shared, notion of what is expected. This very change of footing provides evidence for the audience that this author (the one in the ‘meta’ narrative) is capable and willing of framing (Goffman 1974: 10) the situation in the terms whereby clerks are not allowed to criticise customers. The audience may find this redundant, for example if they assume that the remark is driven by a professional concern (or if they did not perceive its potential criticism). But the AMC foregrounds the alignment to a publicly validated line: the criticism seems to be presented as the impulsive act of a ‘naïve’ self, while the hedging displays a heightened awareness of the public dimension. The balancing


act (in fact a double-act) of warning incompetent customers and maintaining social credibility works thanks to the ‘voicing’ of two contrasting ‘I-positions’. But that not all AMC necessarily impinge on politeness will become clearer when we analyse cases which involve comments of a less ‘moral’ nature, and in which the roles are not as definite institutionally as in the first one.

4.2 Concerts16 > Contributor A introduces the topic of ‘winter, the concert season’ in a discussion board of musical interest. She talks about a violinist who has lost his sight. She comments that despite the lack of virtuosism the sound has a warm and healing quality. She then describes in detail some of the songs performed, and adds some comments on a specific CD. Finally, she writes: Yesterday Mr. Kawabata said: “there are a lot of people in the world who would like to, but cannot attend concerts. Thus I am grateful for being able to perform here today, and that you are here to listen”. I too felt blessed to be able to hear the good music of this world. > Contributor B Re: concert season Coming to think of it, this is the concert season, isn’t it? So far I have no plans... Uhm.. I’d love to hear something! Mr. Kawabata is a violinist I too wanted to hear♪. Some pianists and violinists may have lost their sight, but their sensitiveness for sounds is impressive, isn’t it? I am also always told by my teacher: “close your eyes when you play” (^^;). What it means is that you can hear well how off-key your sound is. Sorry for this low-level considerations (teireberuna hanashi). (Silly me! :-) ) Which concert shall I attend next year... ♪. For now I just want to enjoy this season’s musicians! [http://www16.cds.ne.jp/~n_hanga/yybbs/yybbs.cgi?mode=past]

16. 「… > 昨日、川畠さんが、「コンサートに行きたくても行けない人が世界には大勢います。こうして今日、この場で演奏ができること、そして聴いてくださる皆さんがいるという環境に感謝しています。」と言っていましたが、私たちは世界中の良い音楽に触れることができて本当に恵まれているなあ・・・と感じました。 > そういえばコンサートシーズンなのかしらん？私は全然予定無し〜。えーん、なにか聞きにいきたいですう。川畠成道さん、わたしもいちど聴きたいと思っていたバイオリニストです♪視力のない演奏家の方、ピアニストもバイオリニストもいらっしゃいますが、やっぱり音に対する感性がすごいですよね〜〜。私もよく先生に「目をつぶって弾け」と言われます。(^^;)つまり、目をつぶって聞けば自分の音はずれてるのよくわかるって話です。低レベルな話で申し訳ありませんが・・・。（爆）来年は何聴きにいこうかな♪ 今が旬の演奏家の音楽、うんと楽しみたいですね。」

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The translation attempts to render the striking stylistic gap between the two interrelated messages; contribution A is in a high register, phrased in syntactically complete units and informative in content; contribution B displays several lexical and syntactical colloquialisms, the rather emphatic tone is rendered graphically (note the emoticon and the musical notes as exclamation marks); moreover while A contributed with a comment of general interest, B barges in with several statements about herself and her wishes (and similarly ends her contribution). Although antecedent contributions also contained a mix of styles, and hence it is difficult to state unequivocally what is appropriate and what is not to this topic or context, the author of this latter contribution seems to indicate that she has become aware of some kind of ‘dissonance’. What is she doing when she suddenly qualifies her behaviour as ‘low-level’ and apologises for it? I think we could explain it along these lines: she has entered the scene with a self-referenced and self-oriented commentary. Although she is clearly doing that for an audience (as the addressee-oriented formal verb endings -masu/-desu, or the tag question in sugoi desu yo ne [impressive, isn’t it?] demonstrate) her talk sounds very much like a soliloquy in that she happily gives vent to her own fancies and opinions without giving much thought as to whether they have any relevance for the audience. Moreover, it is possible that not only the content of her contribution but also her tone could be construed as thematically inappropriate: ‘sober’ language, rather than vernacular or emphatic language, is more commonly associated with classical music. She seems at this point to have stepped out of the ‘line’ (or one of the accepted lines) that such a context permitted or demanded. This entails the possibility that her talk may be received as unsophisticated but – more importantly – she risks being also judged as socially clumsy.17 So she now makes an attempt to recover an alignment to an expected line, but she cannot cancel the whole import of her contribution (unless she decided not to post it on the web, that is, or to recast it). She decides to go ahead with part of it (her message continues more or less in the same vein even after the AMC), but to attempt a partial rescue. Here however, there is no institutionally established social role to construe, and we are dealing with a case of self-image conceived in terms of the general attributes commonly associated with members of this par17. Appropriateness is not measured only on broad social notions of status or deference (as in the previous example), but is context-specific. Here, contextual appropriateness refers to interrelated, holistic ideas about the type of people, their language, topics, clothing that revolve around the theme of classical music; in other words, it is based on entire schema acquired through socialization. Conforming to such stereotypical schemas ‘aligns’ speakers to the social expectations; non-conforming produces dissonance, which may trigger inferences of an interactional kind about the social persona of the speaker (or author). AMC thus address and try to stop those inferences.


ticular community of practice.18 Since the author goes ahead with a similar tone after the AMC we can only understand the remark as her being aware of and being prepared to bear responsibility for at least part of the misalignment – this is not a ‘true’ or ‘naïve’ faux pas. The actual message of the ‘meta’ animator is something along these lines: “I am aware you may think I am being simple – and I may indeed be. But the reason I know that you may think this of me is because I do know what is de rigueur; I am indeed aware of what is proper and what is not and hence I am not socially incompetent”. The apology is not substantial, of course, but instrumental to the positive claim to a certain self-image. However, this selfimage (this “I”) is not unitary. On the one hand we have individual psychological attributes, including innate talents and skills (what we may call private traits), on the other individual social attributes, including innate or learned talents and skills (what we may call public traits). So there seems to be an aspect of the self for which the author apologises (the private self which is “low-level”) and one that is claimed by means of that very apology (the public self, which has communicative savvy). We can observe this in the participation framework: Author Animator Principal

innocent narrative (observed) forum participant says X a novice contributor

meta narrative (observing) forum participant declares X to be banal a connoisseur.

This speaker attempts to claim a line not by indiscriminately adhering to the putative expected behaviour, but rather demonstrating that she (or at least one part of her self) is conversant with the parameters defining expected behaviour (by rhetorically referring to them). Ratification is again a prerogative of other participants, but the point is that the speaker strategically deploys the very metapragmatic awareness of the possible negative typification of his/her actions as a social skill with an interactional value. Moreover, unlike simple disclaimers (something along the lines of: “I know you may think this is low-level, but …”) or ‘sin licences’ (“I realise you might think this is against the rules, but …”, Hewitt and Stokes 1975: 5) AMC may indicate that stepping out of the expected lines is construed

18. It is the very AMC which provides evidence of the ideal attributes of a member of this community: the apology explicates the behavioural norm from which this speaker departed. According to Wenger (1998: 81) participation to a community of practice is not just a “statement of purpose”, but gives rise to “relations of mutual accountability” among those involved, which include “what matters and what does not…what to do and do not…what to justify and what to take for granted…”.

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as a source of mutual, rather than personal, embarrassment.19 That an apology is deemed an appropriate strategy to deal with such misalignments bears the implication that positive self-image, the face that one claims by such realigning moves, is not uniquely construed as self-enhancement but also as self-criticism (Heine et al. 1999). This is in line with social psychological work on Japanese specific aspects of self and the critique of an ethnocentric conception of the notion of ‘positive self-regard’ (ibid, for a review). I will return to a general discussion of the issue of self criticism in Section 5; the next and final example offers further evidence of possible objects of self-criticism: acts and words deemed to bear little relevance for the interlocutor.

4.3 Friendship20 > Contributor A recounts how a person she met and befriended one year before ended up calling her every single day and with little regard for the circumstances which the call interrupted; moreover, the caller allegedly feels free to interrupt the call abruptly to take other incoming calls. A nevertheless declares to like the caller, declares to feel bad for being unable to sympathize and asks fellow contributors advice on whether trying to speak to the caller might be the right thing to do.

19. “When an incident occurs, the reality sponsored by the performers is threatened” (Goffman 1959: 206, my italics). 20. 「今後どうしたいのかシンディさん今後、友人の方とどういった付き合いをしたいのか（もっと深い付き合い、距離を置いた付き合い）がわからないので、適切な返答ではないことを了承願います。一般論として、自分の都合のいいときだけ相手と付き合って、自分の都合の悪いときは電話もしない（させない）というのは、あまり好ましいものではないように思います。相手のいいところも悪いところも、お互いに認め合わないと、友人関係はうまくいかないように思います。逆に言うと、それができないようであれば、距離を置いた付き合いをした方がよいように思います。誠に勝手な話で申し訳ありませんが、「キャッチホンcall waiting で切られた側の心情を説明する。」「それを実際にやってみる。」「時間を決めて（大まかでも可）、電話で話す。」といったことを提案します。勝手なことばかりですみません。私（男性）にも友人（男性）がいました。電話が毎日ということではないのですが、似たような経験をした時期もありました。しかし、彼にはそれを上回る魅力がありました。現在は１０００ｋｍ以上離れたところにいますが、まだ友人関係が続いています。２０年以上です。」


> Contributor B Re: what do you want to do next? Dear Sindi Please understand that this may not be the reply you wanted, as I don’t know what kind of relationship you would like to have with your friend from now on (would you like to have a deeper relationship? have more distance?). In general, I think it is not acceptable to call only at one’s convenience, or not to call at all (or not allow others to call) when it is not. If one is not ready to acknowledge the good as well the bad sides of the other there can be no friendship. As a matter of fact, if you are not ready to do that, it is better to maintain a certain distance. Forgive me for making a presumptuous (=katte) suggestion but I propose that: – you explain the feelings of someone who is cut off by an incoming call – you try to do that [i.e. the same, cut the call at your convenience, bp] – you talk only for a set amount of time (roughly defined) I am sorry again for these parochial (=katte) remarks. I too (a man) have a friend (a man). We don’t talk every day, but there has been a time when something similar happened. But he had some qualities which were more important than this. We are now more than 1000 km apart but we are still friends, after 20 years. [http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/komachi/reader/200111/2001111200003.htm]

The AMC in this exchange may at first seem rather puzzling. The contribution in question is a direct reply to A’s query ad request for advice. So what is B apologizing about and why is he qualifying his contribution as selfish/parochial/presumptuous? The interactional framework could be described as something like this: innocent narrative Author (observed) forum participant Animator says X Principal is self-referenced naïve contributor

meta narrative (observing) forum participant declares X to be self-referenced is other-referenced considerate counsellor.

Like in the previous excerpts, the aspect of face that the AMC attempts to constitute is an acceptable public face. Katte means doing as one pleases; something that suits one’s convenience only; it qualifies a talk as self-referenced, and a person as selfish and wayward. These are qualities which tend to carry social stigma, as socio-psychological and ethnographic literature on Japan rather consistently illustrates. The suggestions made by the contributor are potentially face threatening once face is understood as a mutual, interrelated concept which is damaged when this interpersonal link is severed. Personal opinions are one such way in which individual agency rather than co-operative action is potentially foregrounded. This is not to say that expressing personal opinions in Japanese is a behaviour

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that is invariably stigmatized, but rather that this particular speaker is alerted to the possibility (to a certain extent conventional and socially recognisable) that his suggestions are negatively construed as subjective and applicable only to his circumstances, rather than meaningful for the community. His metapragmatic condemnation of his act as self-referenced is only possible if one can recognise the relevant social value that is thereby endangered, in this case that of mutual cooperativeness and collective relevance. While face as a social trait is bound to be threatened by indifference to mutual and interrelated aspects of the self whatever the culture one treads in, these examples seem to point to the salience of alterorientation and role-consideration in the construction of acceptable stances in Japanese discourse. Moreover, taking care of the interpersonal dimension entails demonstrating a shifting and inclusive perspective; excuses for inadequate or inappropriate private traits take the shape of requests for indulgence and tolerance rather than self-enhancing justifications or denials.

5.

Some further remarks on Japanese face

Social theory has rightly come to distrust assumptions of cultural homogeneity and unquestioning consensus. Similarly, it has been pointed out that facework theory has wrongly assumed that people are invariably concerned with appearing likable, or claim positive face (Tracy 1990). People do not always attempt to adhere to stereotypical identities: AMC hint at ideal identities and roles that are systematically unmatched. In this sense they evidence the tension perceived by the self between his/her experience as an individual and as a member of a community (Mageo 2002: 358), and the attempt to reconcile that gap. Individuals may be more or less indifferent to social approval or normative behaviour (and no culture-wide generalization is therefore possible), but those who are not will try to ensure that individual inclinations do not cause irreparable damage to their public self-image. AMC allow distancing from such inclinations by means of the ostensive display of a wider, supra-individual perspective that intends to make amends. The mechanism behind such operation appears to be a folk notion of self as an aggregate of innocent private traits and metapragmatically competent public traits. It has been pointed out that self-supportive moves in Japanese do not necessarily involve across-the-board self-enhancement but can make strategic use of self-criticism and self-depreciation (Heine et al. 1999). A further look at the evaluative comments contained in the AMC shows some interesting conceptualizations of socially reproachable stances (see Table 2).


Table 2. Qualifiers in top hundred occurrences of the apologetic metalinguistic comments ‘~i/na hanashi de mooshiwake arimasen’; (the categories proposed are by no means exclusive or exhaustive, but just suggestive; also, note that some expressions may be nonstandard [e.g. kooshi kondoona]: but quoted as they appear in the data). ETHICAL/SOCIAL

AESTHETIC/ CONFIGURATIONAL

grading, ranking shohotekina elementary tanjunna simple teijigenna rudimentary teireberuna low-level gehinna vulgar sasaina trivial related to social taboos exhaustiveness/orderliness seiritekina physiological oomakana unspecific fukitsuna inauspicious oozappana approximate biroona indecorous chuutohampana incomplete henna weird aimaina vague matomarinai confused related to self jiko chuushintekina self-centered sophistication kattena selfish hironritekina atheoretical watakushitekina one’s own kankakutekina impressionistic kojintekina personal ranboo coarse rookaruna local kooshi kondoona mixed personal complexity & public mendoona complicated muzukashii difficult keikentekina experiential marena singular timing/mode of delivery kyuuna sudden toototsuna abrupt awatadashii hectic overt infringement of norms of conduct shitsureina offensive, rude bushitsukena ill-mannered fukinshinna indiscreet hazukashii embarrassing akarasamana frank

EMOTIONAL/ AFFECTIVE charged/uncharged maniakkuna maniacal oyabakana doting parent -like karakuchina critical bussoona alarming majimena serious katai dry, formal di-puna deep (grave) positive/negative hikantekina pessimistic

The range of the possible AMC, being contextually variable, is clearly open; contextual interpretation is cued by the specific qualification employed. Some qualifiers refer to the cognitive burden imposed on language processing (e.g. ‘vague’, ‘abrupt’, etc.); some refer to some contextually relevant problems (‘atheoretical’, ‘low-level’); some explicitly refer to some shared evaluation of the transgression (i.e. ‘offensive’, ‘inauspicious’, etc.); others are less explicit, and interesting from a socio-psychological point of view: AMC that refer to notions of self seem to point to the importance of mutual consideration and a condemnation of self-

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orientedness and insularity (‘self-centered’, ‘personal’, ‘local’). Implicit as they are, AMC qualified in this way indicate the “hypercognized” relevance of intragroup care (or amae: Mageo 2002: 349, referring to the work of Doi 1981). Morisaki and Gudykunst, discussing Japanese (sociocentric) conceptualizations of face, argue that although Goffman’s face is socially negotiated it is not an interdependent, but an independent face (Morisaki and Gudykunst 1994). In contrast, they argue, what can ‘gain and give face’ in a Japanese discursive context are likely to be acts of recognition of mutual interconnection between individuals, above and beyond the individual traits of the self that can come into play. Whether any self (Goffmanian, Anglo-Saxon or ‘western’) can be truly ‘independent’ is arguable (Rosenberger 1989: 89), but the concern for mutual relational acknowledgement is a well-documented dominant orientation in Japanese discourse practices.21 AMC seem to be one of the ways in which such concern is manifested – and perpetuated – linguistically. The analysis of AMC as self-presentation devices should not be taken to imply the speaker’s indifference to the face of others. The interlocutor’s face is always targeted in self-repairs, since self-positioning is always an act of altercasting. Our shop clerk in 5.1 had challenged a social dogma whereby customers are not to be criticised, doing which he had (re)framed the customer/clerk relationship as some other relationship; he then pays homage to the customers’ face when he recasts himself in his role of shop clerk. The exuberant contribution of the music lover in 5.2 had called into question the other participants’ persona by breaking the rules of that ‘game’ (its appropriate style, register, etc.). With the AMC, she restores the original, appropriate roles – the same mechanism applies, although institutional roles demonstrate this more clearly than non-institutional ones.

21. Senko K. Maynard (1997), discussing Japanese discourse styles and a Japanese level of ‘social comfort’, claims that “Japanese people normally try to achieve a comfortable level of interaction by physically and emotionally accommodating others, by giving gifts, by repeatedly expressing gratitude, by making others feel important and appreciated, by humbling and often blaming themselves in order not to upset others and so on”. Similar views are presented in Kitayama et al. (1997) on the role of criticism. Needless to say, these are to be understood as socially disputed practices as any other one, and there is no doubt that social research needs to concern itself with how different subjectivities negotiate hegemonic values. See also Kasulis (1998) and the papers presented there. Note that speaking of self-presentation techniques rather than selfrepresentations of selves allows us to avoid the pitfalls of essentialist and stereotypical conceptualizations of selves (cf. Spiro 1993).

6.


Summary and conclusions

This paper has maintained that evaluative metapragmatic comments are interventions which hedge, amend or constrain past or future inferences involving dispreferred typifications of conduct. Evaluative metapragmatic comments are therefore ‘corrective’; apologies are remedial. The syncretism of these two strategies produces the conventional routine analyzed here, whose interactional goal has been posited to be the realignment of self-images, reputations, identities, disrupted by some previous or looming faux pas. It is true, as claimed by Sugito, that metapragmatic comments can trigger considerations of politeness, to the extent that they display the speaker’s regard for the hearer. However, the examples discussed here show that politeness is only one of several possible meanings emerging from facework. Facework is seen as the primary raison d’être of such operations. Since adult speakers are held responsible for their (verbal) behaviour, to the extent that they want to sustain socially integrated identities they must either avoid misaligned behaviour or they must provide credible justifications for any misalignement. Tension or clear mismatches between one’s natural inclinations, desires, abilities, and the socially approved – or prestigious – line of behaviour need to be justified. Speakers are not always able or willing to avoid such mismatches, and so AMC constitute a strategy to get on with one’s manner of operation while apparently conceding ill-doing and asking forbearance. Thanks to the multiple ‘voicing’ (Silverstein 1993: 35; Coupland and Jaworski 2004: 27) – and the underlying composite architecture of the self – speakers are able to ask dispensations for parts of selves, which are likely to trigger unwanted typifications. Socially savvy selves can ask indulgence for privately inadequate selves.22 The workings of this corrective mechanism (with its underlying notion of a heterogeneous self) may not fall within a speaker’s awareness. However, the mechanism denotes a certain degree of reflexivity (Verschueren 2004: 55), or at least suggests that the normative identities that the speaker aims to project fall indeed within the sphere of objectifiable phenomena. Moreover, AMC constitute one way to further objectify parameters of ‘face’, because they target the behavioural lines that instantiate face, lift them from the realm of ‘innocent’ behav-

22. The validity of the metaphor ‘self is a society of mind’ would appear to be confirmed by a further correspondence in the mapping: that between the power differential (evidenced by the pragmatic judgement) attributed to two contrasting positions in the self, and the power differentials exhibited by different individuals in societies (Hermans 2002: 148). However I prefer to subscribe to Pang’s partitioned-narrative model, which treats the multiplicity of the self as real (Pang 2006: 6).

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iour and bring them to the front stage, where they can be accepted or challenged. AMC represent linguistic traces of a constantly ongoing self-monitoring activity (Verschueren 2004: 61) which is, at the same time, self-constitutive, and the evaluative metapragmatic comments we have observed carry out such self-monitoring, and self-constitution, in the arena of morality. Negative typifications can be prevented with disclaimers. Complementing the disclaimer with an apology is the signal of a specific morality: a preference for communicative modes that ostensibly display modesty and self-criticism.

References Bargiela-Chiappini, F. 2003. “Face and politeness: New (insights) for old (concepts).” Journal of Pragmatics 35 (10–11): 1453–1469. Bell, R.A., Zahn C. and Hopper, R. 1984. “Disclaiming: A test of two competing views.” Communication Quarterly 32 (1): 28–36. Benoit, W.L. 1995. Accounts, Excuses and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Discourse. Albany: State University of New York Press. Cameron, D. 2004. “Out of the bottle: The social life of metalanguage.” In Metalanguage, A. Jaworski, N. Coupland and D. Galasinski (eds), 311–321. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Coulmas, F. 1981. ““Poison to your soul” – thanks and apologies contrastively viewed.” In Conversational Routine, F. Coulmas (ed.). The Hague: Mouton. Coupland, N. and Jaworski, A. 2004. “Sociolinguistic perspectives on metalanguage: Reflexivity, evaluation and ideology.” In Metalanguage – Social and Ideological Perspectives, A. Jaworski, N. Coupland, and D. Galasinski (eds). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Crystal, D. 2001. Language and the Internet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doi, T. 1981. The Anatomy of Dependence. Tokyo: Kodansha International. Goffman, E. 1959. The presentation of self in everyday life. London: Penguin. Goffman, E. 1967. Interaction Ritual. Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior. London: Allen Lane. Goffman, E. 1971. Relations in Public: Microstructure of the Public Order. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Goffman, E. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Harmondsworth: Peregrine. Goffman, E. 1981. Forms of Talk. Oxford: Blackwell. Heine, S.J., Lehman, D.R., Markus, H.R. and Kitayama, S. 1999. “Is there a universal need for positive self-regard?” Psychological Review 106 (4): 766–794. Heisler, T., Vincent, D. and Bergeron, A. 2003. “Evaluative metadiscursive comments and facework in conversational discourse.” Journal of Pragmatics 35: 1613–1631. Hermans, H.J.M. 2002. “The dialogical self as a society of mind: Introduction.” Theory and Psychology 12 (2): 147–160. Hewitt, J.P. and Stokes, R. 1975. “Disclaimers.” American Sociological Review 40 (1): 1–11. Ide, R. 1998. “‘Sorry for your kindness’: Japanese interactional ritual in public discourse.” Journal of Pragmatics 29: 509–529.


Jaworski, A., N. Coupland and D. Galasinski (eds), Metalanguage. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Kasulis, T.P. 1998. “Introduction to part four: Self as image in Japanese theory and practice.” In Self as Image in Asian Theory and Practice, R.T. Ames, with T.P. Kasulis and W. Dissanayake (eds). Albany: State University of New York Press. Kitayama, S., Markus, H.R., Matsumoto, H. and Norasakkunkit, V. 1997. “Individual and collective processes of self-esteem management: Self-enhancement in the US and self-depreciation in Japan.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72: 1245–1267. Kumagai, T. 1993. “Remedial interactions as face-management: The case of Japanese and Americans.” In In Honor of Tokuichiro Matsuda, 278–300. Tokyo: Iwasaki Linguistic Circle. Lucy, J.A. 1993. “Reflexive language and the human disciplines.” In Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics, J.A. Lucy (ed.), 9–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mageo, J.M. 2002. “Toward a multidimensional model of the self.” Journal of Anthropological Research 58/3: 339–365. Maynard, S.K. 1997. Japanese Communication – Language and Thought in Context. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Markus, H.R. and Kitayama, S. 1991. “Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion & motivation”. Psychological Review 98 (2): 224–253. Morisaki, S. and Gudykunst, W. 1994. “Face in Japan and the United States.” In The Challenge of Facework, S. Ting-Toomey (ed.), 47–94. Albany: State University of New York Press. Nair, Bhaya Nair 2002. Narrative Gravity: Conversation, Cognition and Culture. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Ochs, E. and Capps, L. 1996. “Narrating the self.” Annual Review of Anthropology 25: 19–43. Okumura Keiko and Wei Lee 2000. “The concept of self and apology strategies in two cultures.” Journal of Asian Pacific Communication 10 (1): 1–24. Pang Kam-yiu S. 2006. A Partitioned-Narrative Model of the Self: Its linguistic manifestations, entailments, and ramifications, Doctoral dissertation. University of Otago, New Zealand. Rosenberger, N.R. 1989. “Dialectic balance in the polar model of self: The Japan case.” Ethos 17 (1): 88–113. Silverstein, M. 1993. “Metapragmatic discourse and metapragmatic function.” In Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics, J.A. Lucy (ed.), 33–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Spiro, M.E. 1993. “Is the Western conception of the self “peculiar” within the context of the world cultures?” Ethos 21/2: 107–153. Sugito, S. 1983. Taiguu hyoogen toshite no gengo koodoo: chuuskaku toshite no shiten [The verbal behaviour of politeness: from the viewpoint of commentaries], Nihongogaku 2 (7). Sugito, S. 1999. Tsutaekata no taiyoosei [Variety in communication], Eigo kyooiku (April to September). Sugito, S. 2001. Taiguu hyoogen koodoo no wakugumi Danwa no Poraitonesu – Seventh International Symposium, National Language Research Institute, Tokyo, National Language Research Institute. Suler, J. 2004. The Psychology of Cyberspace. Tracy, K. 1990. “The many faces of facework.” In Handbook of Social Psychology, H. Giles and P. Robinson (eds), 209–226. Chichester: John Wiley.

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Verschueren, J. 2004. “Notes on the role of metapragmatic awareness in language use.” In Metalanguage, A. Jaworski, N. Coupland and D. Galasinski (eds), 53–74. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Watts, R.J. 2003. Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wenger, E. 1998. Communities of Practice. Learning Meaning and Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Metapragmatic function of quotative markers in Japanese* Satoko Suzuki

1.

Introduction

Various utterance-final quotative expressions in Japanese are known to provide evaluative or emotive commentary to the preceding utterance. For example, datte (a copula da plus a quotative particle tte) and dato (da plus another quotative particle to) have been described as a marker of sarcasm (Adachi 1996) and a marker of defiance (Okamoto 1995), respectively. Toka itte (lit. ‘saying something like’) functions to invalidate the preceding utterance and produces the tone of selfmockery much like ‘just kidding’ in English (Suzuki 2002). The quotative particle tte in an utterance-final position signals a wide range of emotive effects such as surprise and disbelief (Itani 1994), emphasis and hesitation (Maynard 1997), and playfulness (Suzuki 1998). This is compatible with Ono and Suzuki’s (1992) observation that Japanese morphemes that express pragmatic meanings tend to occur clause-finally. Even in a clause-medial position, however, certain pragmatic meanings may be expressed. The tte particle in (1) marks what the addressee has just said and is followed by a metapragmatic commentary about it. (1) A: Hito ga ii n da kara, okaasan wa. person sbj good nmlz cop since mother top

‘You are (lit. mother is) such a good person.’ * I would like to thank the editors, Axel Hübler and Wolfram Bublitz, for inviting me to contribute to this volume and for providing encouragement and suggestions. I am also grateful to the external reviewers for their positive and constructive feedback. . Note the abbreviations used in the literal glosses: adv (adverbial marker), com (complementizer), cop (copula), gen (genitive maker), ip (interactional particle), nmlz (nominalizer),

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B: Hito ga ii tte, fuufu de, hito ga ii mo person sbj good quot couple cop person sbj good also warui mo aru mon desu ka. bad also exist thing cop ip ‘A good person [marked with tte]!? There is no such thing as being a good or bad person between a married couple.’ (Niwa 1994: 107) Speaker B does not think it is appropriate to use the phrase hito ga ii ‘being a good person’ in that particular context and makes a comment on it. It is akin to saying “What you just said is not appropriate”. By repeating back the addressee’s words, the speaker signals that there are some problems with them. This problematizing function is “metapragmatic” in that the commentary is not about the truth of the propositional content but about its communicative appropriateness. I am using the term “metapragmatic” rather than “metalinguistic”. Although the function is metalinguistic in that the wording of the topic phrase is repeated, what is really called into question is the original speaker’s communicative intent in uttering the phrase in question or background assumptions on which the uttering of the phrase is based. In example (1) speaker B questions speaker A’s assumption that being a good person is relevant in that particular context. In this paper I hope to demonstrate that quotative particles retain this metapragmatic nature even when they are not used to echo somebody else’s utterance. I will argue that various communicative effects that have been associated with the clause-medial as well as the clause-final quotative expressions can be analyzed in terms of the metapragmatic function. The overall structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the use of tte which is used to repeat the addressee’s previous utterance. Section 3 examines tte which marks the topic of a sentence. Section 4 looks at the various evaluative and emotive effects of tte found at the end of an utterance and other utterance-final quotative expressions. Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the argument and suggesting that the strong correlation found between affect and metapragmatics may deserve further study. The data for this study come from both written and spoken discourses. References are given at the end of the examples that are taken from written discourse or from other researchers’ work. All the non-referenced examples are taken from conversational data. Conversations of twelve Japanese undergraduate students who were enrolled in a Japanese university were recorded. The students were either from Tokyo or areas around Tokyo. The conversations between two students obj (direct object marker), quot (quotation marker), sbj (subject marker), tag (tag-like expression), top (topic marker).

Metapragmatic function of quotative markers in Japanese

at a time were recorded for about thirty minutes without the presence of an observer in order to enhance the naturalness of conversations.

2.

Echoic tte

I will call the use of tte in contexts such as (1) the echoic tte as the speaker is repeating/echoing (part of) the addressee’s previous utterance. Let us look at more instances of this kind of tte. (2) A: Sore ga doo-shita no yo. that sbj how-did nmlz ip ‘So what?’ B: Sore ga dooshita tte, yoku iu wa nee, hito ga anta o that sbj how-did quot well say ip ip I sbj you obj nagusameyootoshite hanashi o shite-iru noni. trying.to.comfort talk obj am-doing though ‘So what [marked with tte]! How dare you say that when I am talking to you in order to comfort you.’ (Kanai 1995: 111) (3) A: Nan da to omou, watashi-tachi. what cop qp think we ‘What do you think we are?’ B: Saa. dunno ‘Dunno.’ A: Saa tte, wakaru desho. well quot know tag ‘Dunno [marked with tte]! You know what we are, don’t you?’ (Niwa 1994: 108) (4) A: Mai-nen itte-ru desho. Every-year are-going tag ‘You go (to the camp that this club annually organizes) every year, don’t you?’ B: Mai-nen tte datte kyo-nen haitta bakari da kara sa. every-year quot but last-year entered just cop because ip ‘Every year [marked with tte]!? But I only joined (this club) last year.’

In all of these examples what the addressee has said in the immediately preceding utterance is repeated and marked with tte. What follows the tte-marked phrase is a metapragmatic commentary. It comments on the inappropriateness of the phrase. Example (2) is slightly different from the rest of the examples in that the

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topic (sore ga dooshita tte ‘so what’) is the complement of the verb of saying iu. By saying “So what! How dare you say that”, speaker A explicitly points out the inappropriateness of speaker B’s previous utterance and her communicative intent. Sore ga dooshita ‘So what?’ is associated with belittling. In the context in which speaker A is trying to comfort speaker B, speaker A feels that speaker B’s communicative intent of belittling what speaker A said is ungrateful and thus inappropriate. Even when there are no verbs of saying as in (3) or (4), “What you just said is inappropriate” is the metamessage associated with the echoic tte. In (3) speaker A problematizes speaker B’s noncommittal answer saa ‘dunno’ to her question (i.e., what is problematized is the speaker’s refusal to commit himself). In (4) speaker B points out that speaker A used mainen ‘every year’ inappropriately. Since he joined the club that annually organizes the camp in question only last year, he could not have gone to the camp more than once. Speaker A assumes speaker B has belonged to the club longer than a year and has gone at least twice to the camp that the club organizes. Speaker B calls this assumption, which is behind the use of mainen ‘every year’, into question. The notion of (in-) appropriateness relates to relevance, (cultural) expectation, or accuracy. In (1) the repeated phrase is considered irrelevant in that particular context. In (2) and (3) the original speaker’s communicative intent behind the use of the repeated phrase is considered to be counter to one’s expectation. For example, one does not expect a belittling attitude from someone whom s/he is trying to comfort. Gratitude is what is culturally expected and thus considered to be appropriate. In (4) the accuracy of the background assumption behind the marked phrase is problematized. Let me now turn to the grammatical function of the echoic tte. Another usage tte is as a complementizer which marks a quote as in (5). (5)

Ima wa katsuji yori eezoo no jidai na n da tte

now top letter than image gen era cop nmlz cop quot/comp aitsu tsune ni itte-ru shi he always adv is-saying and ‘He is always saying, “This is the age of visual image rather than that of printed letters”.’ [The quote is marked with tte.]

While tte in (5) is a complementizer (a quotation marker), what is the grammatical function of tte in (1)–(4)? In terms of form, it looks like a topic marker. Similar to topic-markers, it marks an utterance-initial phrase, and the rest of the sentence is a commentary about the phrase. However, it is different from a prototypical topic marker. For example, wa in Chichi wa ashi ga nagai “My father has long


legs (lit. My father, [his] legs are long)” is a topic marker since it marks the topic chichi ‘my father’ with which the rest of the sentence, ashi ga nagai ‘[his]legs are long’, is concerned. In a sentence with a prototypical topic marker, the comment part of the sentence is concerned with the topic entity itself. However, in sentences (1)–(4) the comment part of the sentence is concerned, not with the topic entity per se, but with the appropriateness of the linguistic expression of the topic entity and the communicative intent and/or assumption behind the expression. Aoki (2001: 87) states that this kind of tte is in “the transition from [a marker of] direct quotation to a topic introducer”. Maynard (2002: 171) also states that the metapragmatic tte “fills in the space somewhere between quotation and topic presentation, illustrating the transitional process”. The echoic tte should be differentiated from a straightforward quotation marker such as (5) because it typically evokes emotive effects. As the use of exclamation and question marks in the English translation in (1)–(4) conveys, the speaker of these utterances (strongly or mildly) shows their emotion. The effect is often negative. Niwa (1994: 107) states that meanings of hanbaku ‘rebuttal’ and gyakusetsu ‘contradiction’ are expressed with the echoic tte. Reproach and/or disapproval can also be expressed. In (2) speaker B explicitly objects to speaker A’s belittling attitude behind her statement, Sore ga dooshita no yo ‘So what?’ In (3) speaker A is clearly irritated by speaker B’s use of the non-committal saa ‘dunno’. In (1) and (4) the emotive effects are not as negative, but the speaker’s mild annoyance can be detected. This kind of emotive effect is closely related to the act of repetition. As Sperber and Wilson (1981) argue, echoic mention of other people’s words can be tied to the expression of sarcasm. The speaker repeats somebody else’s words, and by repetition, draws attention to their inappropriateness. As the translation of (1)–(4) shows, in these contexts English seems to accomplish communicating the inappropriateness of the addressee’s words by simply repeating the words (probably accompanied by heightened tone, imitating intonation and/or facial expressions such as raised eyebrows). Japanese can do the same, but the effect is conventionalized with the use of tte. Rather than (and sometimes in addition to) using an exaggerated tone of voice or raised eyebrows, the Japanese speaker makes sure that the addressee understands the utterance as metapragmatic by attaching a quotative particle tte to the linguistic expression which is echoed. In this process the speaker signals to the addressee that s/he is problematizing the expression and the communicative intent/assumption behind it. The echoic tte’s function is in this sense conflictive.

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3.

Topic marking tte

In the previous section I mentioned that the echoic tte is a quasi topic marker. In this section I would like to demonstrate that the metapragmatic nature of tte remains even when tte is used as a full-fledged topic marker. That is, the topic marking use of tte shares the problematizing function with the echoic use. There are roughly three kinds of contexts in which the topic marking tte is used. In the first context the topic is a phrase that has just been uttered by the addressee. In other words, this tte is echoic and topic-marking at the same time. The addressee’s phrase is repeated either because the speaker does not know the referent of the phrase as in (6) or the semantic content of the phrase as in (7). (6) A: Kinoo Nori to okonomiyaki tabete-tee, yesterday with was-eating “Yesterday I was eating okonomiyaki with Nori,” B: Nori tte ano kite-ru hito? top that is-coming person ‘Nori [marked with tte], is she the person who is (often) coming (here)?’ (7) A: “Mama” no tokoro ni ike-ba ii janai. mama gen place to if-go good tag ‘He can go to see “mama,” you know?’ B: Mama tte aijin? mama top mistress ‘Mama [marked with tte], do you mean a mistress?’ (Saito and Hisada 1999: 138)

In these sentences the speaker tells the addressee that there are some problems with the assumption of the addressee with regard to the linguistic expression. Contrary to the addressee’s (i.e., the original speaker’s) expectation, the speaker does not know the referent or semantic content of the expression. It is easy to see that the problematizing function is present in this context since the topic marking tte is also echoic (i.e., the addressee’s phrase is repeated). In the second kind of context the topic marking tte does not repeat the addressee’s words. Even in this usage, the speaker achieves communicating the problematizing function by using tte, which is metapragmatic in nature. Examples (8) and (9) illustrate the second usage. (8) Hee! Nani, Yamashita tte kekkoo sori-ga-awanai no, ja. really what top well not-get-along nmlz then ‘Really! What, Yamashita [marked with tte] doesn’t get along well (with Kobayashi), then.’


(9) Kodomo tte kihonteki ni, sugoku kooriteki desu yo. Children top basic adv very calculating cop ip ‘Children [marked with tte], they are basically very calculating.’ (Saito and Hisada 1999: 19)

In both (8) and (9) tte is used to mark a topic which is redefined from a new (or rediscovered) perspective. (8) is taken from conversational data in which a sophomore and a first year student who belong to the same club in a college are talking. The speaker is the sophomore, who does not like certain first year students in the club, including a student named Kobayashi, who he thinks are not deferential enough to sophomores. Prior to the part reproduced, the speaker thought the topic referent Yamashita, also a freshman, got along with Kobayashi. After having found out that Yamashita in fact does not get along with Kobayashi, which is surprising to him, he utters (8). With Hee! ‘really!’ and ja ‘then’ the speaker marks his discovery. It is as if the speaker is looking at the topic entity Yamashita from a new standpoint. Because of a presumed good relationship with Kobayashi, Yamashita had also been thought of in a negative way. Now Yamashita will be re-categorized in the speaker’s mind as a different (better) kind of first year student. In this way the topic entity is redefined from a new perspective. (9) is uttered by a psychiatrist who has seen many children from dysfunctional families. From this position of authority, he tells the addressee, who is a lay person in the topic, that contrary to conventional ideas about children (i.e., they are innocent and naïve), they are egoistic. The speaker assumes that this is something new to the addressee, and marks the topic with tte. How is the redefining of the topic related to the problematizing function of tte? In the echoic use, what is questioned is the addressee’s communicative intent or assumptions in using the topic phrase in the original utterance. In the redefining use, what is challenged is a previously held idea about the topic entity. By using tte, which is associated with the metapragmatic and thus problematizing function, the speaker draws attention to the topic and communicates that there are some problems associated with the topic entity, more specifically, with the speaker’s or addressee’s formerly held ideas about the entity. In (8) the speaker’s own preconceptions about the topic entity (that Yamashita got along with Kobayashi) are corrected. In (9) the conventional idea about the topic (that children are innocent and naïve), which the speaker assumes the addressee has, is challenged. The third type of the topic marking tte may be characterized as the marker of the speaker’s psychological distance towards the topic entity. . Such hierarchical relationships among older and younger students are not uncommon in Japanese colleges.

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(10) Kodomo tte yappari kawaii? children top as.they.say adorable ‘Children [marked with tte], are they adorable as people say?’ (Kanai 1995: 302) (11)

Izen, aru josei ga, jibun wa shigoto ga suki da kara before certain woman sbj self top work obj like cop because kekkonshite kara mo baribari hataraku tte itte-ta n marry after also hard work quot/comp was-saying nmlz desu. Sore wa ii n da kedo, shigoto ni tenukishi-taku-nai cop that top good nmlz cop but work in not-want-o.imperfectly kara, kaseifusan o yatou tte iu n desu yo. Sore because housekeeper obj hire quot/comp say nmlz cop ip that tte, otagai ga tsuuchoo ni okane furikonderu dake de top each.other sbj bank.record into money put only cop kekkon no imi ga nai n janai ka na. marriage gen meaning sbj not-exist nmlz tag ip ip Once a woman was saying that because she likes working, she plans to work hard even after she gets married. That [marked with wa] is fine, but she says that because she does not want to do the work imperfectly, she will hire a housekeeper. That [marked with tte] means that (marriage comes down to) only a husband and a wife putting money in the bank and that there is no meaning in being married. (Sato 1995: 182)

(10) is uttered by somebody who does not have children, while the addressee, her sister, does. The speaker assumes that the addressee has more familiarity and affinity with the topic kodomo ‘children’ and thus feels distanced from it. (11) is an example in which tte marks a topic towards which the speaker feels distance because s/he disapproves of it. Sore ‘that’, which is followed by tte in the third sentence of (11), refers to what is expressed in the previous sentence: the fact that a female acquaintance of the speaker plans to hire a housekeeper. It is clear from the content of the third sentence and the rest of the discourse that the speaker is critical of this idea. Note that in the second sentence of (11) the same word sore ‘that’ is followed by a more generic topic marker, wa. In this case sore refers to the fact that the woman plans to work after getting married. The speaker is not especially critical of this idea, which he conveys by stating “that is fine”. In the same discourse the speaker is differentiating the use of topic markers to reflect his attitude. How is this expression of psychological distance related to the metapragmatic function? In the original echoic use, tte calls attention to the words that the addressee used. By repeating back the addressee’s words and attaching a quotative particle to them, the speaker accentuates the idea that the words belong to the


addressee and that the speaker is dissociated from them. This sense of belonging to others is underscored with the use of tte and that leads to the expression of psychological distance. The emotive effect of tte-marked sentences such as the third sentence in (11) is also similar to that of the original echoic tte sentences. As mentioned earlier, emotive effects such as reproach, disapproval, and annoyance could be expressed with the echoic tte. Similarly, by using tte rather than wa, which is a more general topic marker, the speaker of (11) signals that s/he is critical of the topic in the third sentence. In the echoic use, the speaker communicates that s/he is displeased with the communicative intent or assumption behind the wording of the topic. By using the originally quotative particle tte, the speaker accentuates the idea that the phrase has been repeated (i.e., quoted) and that there are some problems with it. In the topical use, by using the same quotative tte, the speaker communicates that s/he is displeased with the topic. His/her discontent is now not with the communicative intent or assumption behind the wording of the topic, but with the content of the topic itself. This third topic-marking use is thus an extended use of the echoic use. The original quotative function is lost, but by association, the problematizing meaning is retained.

4.

Utterance-final tte and other quotative expressions

In the above discussion we saw that the metapragmatic nature of the quotative particle tte is retained even when the particle is used as a full-fledged topic marker and is not repeating the words of the addressee. I would like to argue that the same can be said about tte as an utterance-final expression as well as other utterance-final quotative expressions (datte, dato, and toka itte). As mentioned in the introduction, various evaluative and emotive effects have been associated with utterance-final quotative expressions. Some representative examples and the emotive effects assigned by researchers are given below. In all of the examples the scope of the utterance-final expression is the preceding utterance in its entirety, not just the immediately preceding phrase. (12)

Scorn and disbelief Mary wa kashikoi tte. top smart quot ‘Mary is smart!?’

(Itani 1994: 383)

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(13)

Hesitation Atashi de hontoo ni ii no ka naa tte. me cop real adv good nmlz ip ip quot ‘(I think) is he really all right with me?’

(Maynard 1997: 34)

(14) Playfulness (Suzuki 1998: 448) A: Kubininatta hito ga iru yoo na nyuansu de... got.fired person sbj exit appear cop nuance with ‘(He was talking) with the nuance that there was somebody who got fired.’ B: Sore wa anata desu tte. that top you cop quot ‘That’s you [said in a playful tone].’ (15)

Emphasis Daijoobu!! Zettai modoreru tte!! sure absolute can.return quot ‘That’s for sure!! Absolutely, you can return!!’

(Maynard 1997: 31)

(16)

Sarcasm (Adachi 1996: 12) Watashi wa ii mono shika kawa-nai kara, datte. I top good thing only not-buy because quot ‘I buy only good quality things, she says.’

(17)

Defiance Nan dato. Tsumaranai dato. what quot boring quot ‘What?! Boring (did you say)?!’

(18)

Mockery Benkyoo, toka itte [laughter]. study something.like saying ‘Studying, just kidding [laughter].’

(Okamoto 1995)

(Suzuki 2002: 170)

I would argue that these emotive and evaluative overtones (scorn, disbelief, hesitation, playfulness, emphasis, sarcasm, defiance, and mockery) derive from the metapragmatic nature of the linguistic expressions, which in turn is derived from their originally quotative function. When you quote somebody’s words, you call attention to them. By doing so, you signal that there are some problems with them. As we saw in the last section, the dissatisfaction with the wording may be transferred to the displeasure with the content. This explains the emotive effects of scorn, disbelief, playfulness, sarcasm, defiance, and mockery. For example, in (12) the speaker does not believe in and takes a scornful attitude towards the statement Mary wa kashikoi ‘Mary is smart’. The speaker expresses his/her distaste of and detachment from the statement. By attaching tte,


the speaker accentuates the idea that the statement belongs to others (the statement could come from the addressee or represent general consensus about Mary), and not to himself/herself. Even when the speaker is quoting himself/herself as in (14) and (18), the speaker achieves communicating his/her detachment from the statement by using the originally quotative particle tte. The statement occurring before tte in (14), Sore wa anata desu “That’s you (who got fired)” is a potentially face-threatening statement. By attaching tte, the speaker successfully places some distance between the statement and himself/herself and evokes a joking tone. When the speaker actually believes in the content of the statement as in (13), s/he can still signal detachment by using a quotative expression and thus express lack of commitment (i.e., hesitation). The emphatic tone in (15) seems contradictory in this regard. However, emphasis is only necessary when some insecurities are involved. As Lakoff (1980: 45) observes, “In general, people do not flaunt, or swagger, or brag, unless they have reason to believe their claims may be doubted.” Thus, the expression of emphasis is tied to the lack of confidence in the credibility of the statement. This lack of confidence is linguistically expressed by the same means (i.e., by quotative expressions) as the representation of lack of commitment.

5.

Concluding remarks

In the above discussion I have argued that various communicative effects associated with quotative expressions in both utterance-medial and utterance-final positions can be attributed to the metapragmatic nature of quotative expressions. The strong correlation between affect and metapragmatics is intriguing and perhaps should be further explored in future studies. For example, in this particular study, metapragmatic expressions are all tied to more or less conflictive effects. Do metapragmatic expressions or utterances in general have the conflictive nature? In their introduction to this volume, Axel Hübler and Wolfram Bublitz write: [Metapragmatic utterances are used] when the speaker is no longer holding but breaking the line, as it were. Not in the sense that the linear order is not respected and kept, but in the sense that there is, e.g., a shift from one plane of action to another (e.g., from narration to debate), from a coherent to a less coherent text (e.g., by announcing and thus topicalizing coherence-breaks with you may not . Lakoff (1980: 45) further observes: “If I must explicitly state that x is so, that is grounds to suspect that x is not so, or that I am not sure that it is so. [...] anything that requires explicit statement is ipso facto open to doubt, and the more strongly that explicit statement must be made, the more uncertain its claimant.” Maynard (1996) relates this observation to certain selfquotative expressions in Japanese.

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like to hear this but ...; this may come as a surprise ...), from a neutral to an evaluatively laden mode (e.g., by making a reproachful comment like no need to become rude). Such meta-utterances reflect a hitch or an obstruction in the smooth flow of discourse. (Hübler and Bublitz: this volume)

Thus, metapragmatic utterances and expressions in general can be characterized as “conflictive” in the sense that they disturb smooth, expected flow of conversation. If this is the case, it makes sense that metapragmatic utterances and expressions may be tied to a manifestation of affect. As Caffi and Janney (1994: 349) observe, emotive communication is often achieved when elements of surprising divergence occur in the discourse. This matter awaits further investigation.

References Adachi, T. 1996. “Sarcasm in Japanese.” Studies in Language 20 (1): 1–36. Aoki, K. 2001. “Historical analysis of the colloquial quotative marker tte.” Journal CAJLE 4: 75–91. Caffi, C. and Janney, R.W. 1994. “Towards a pragmatics of emotive communication.” Journal of Pragmatics 22: 325–373. Hübler, A. and Bublitz, W. This volume. “Introducing metapragmatics in use.” Itani, R. 1994. “A relevance-based analysis of hearsay particles: Japanese utterance-final tte.” University College London Working Papers in Linguistics 6: 379–400. Lakoff, R. 1980. “How to look as if you aren’t doing anything with words: Speech act qualification.” In Versus 2, U. Eco et al., 29–47. Milan: Bompiani. Maynard, S.K. 1996. “Multivoicedness in speech and thought representation: The case of selfquotation in Japanese.” Journal of Pragmatics 25: 207–226. Maynard, S.K. 1997. “Meta-quotation: The thematic and interactional significance of tte in Japanese comics.” Functions of Language 4 (1): 23–46. Maynard, S.K. 2002. Linguistic Emotivity: Centrality of Place, the Topic-Comment Dynamic, and an Ideology of Pathos in Japanese Discourse. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Niwa, T. 1994. “Shudai teiji no tte to inyoo.” Jinbun Kenkyuu: Osaka Shiritsu Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyoo 46 (2): 27–57. Okamoto, S. 1995. “Pragmaticization of meaning in some sentence-final particles in Japanese.” In Essays in Semantics and Pragmatics, M. Shibatani and S.A. Thompson (eds), 219–246. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Ono, T. and Suzuki, R. 1992. “The development of a marker of speaker’s attitude: The pragmatic use of the Japanese grammaticized verb shimau in conversation.” In Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, L.A. Buszard-Welcher, L. Wee and W. Weigel (eds), 204–213. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society. Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 1981. “Irony and the use-mention distinction.” In Radical Pragmatics, P. Cole (ed.), 295–318. New York: Academic Press. Suzuki, S. 1998. “Tte and nante: Markers of psychological distance in Japanese conversation.” Journal of Pragmatics 29: 429–462.


Suzuki, S. 2000. “Surprise and animosity: The use of the copula da in quotative sentences in Japanese.” In Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude, T. Fretheim and G. Andersen (eds), 239–253. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Suzuki, S. 2002. “Self-mockery in Japanese.” Linguistics: An Interdisciplinary Journal of the Language Sciences 40 (1): 163–189.

Data references Kanai, M. 1995. Ren’ai taiheiki, vol. 1. Tokyo: Shuueisha. Saitoo, S. and Hisada, M. 1999. Kowakare ressun. Tokyo: Gakuyoo Shoboo. Satoo, M. 1995. “Otoko nitsuite no jooshiki no uso: Kekkon hen.” More, September: 177–184.

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Metapragmatic utterances in computer-mediated interaction*

Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen

1.

Scope and aims

The internet is profoundly changing the manner in which people interact with each other: it provides new communication channels which both enable and require new linguistic practices. For instance, various electronic discussion groups offer forums for communicators to air their opinions with relative ease and freedom. For participants in a computer-mediated discussion, however, the communicative setting can be a challenge: messages are written and are thus more permanent than speech, although the spontaneity of the latter may nevertheless be one of the participants’ aims. Furthermore, the interaction does not take place in a physical space but a virtual one, without auditory or visual contact between the participants. Such constraints do not automatically entail communicative difficulties, as Avgerinakou (2003) points out. However, early studies of computer-mediated interaction identified an increased tendency for communicative failure in electronic discussions. For instance, in comparison to face-to-face conversations electronic conversations showed a greater frequency of argument (Baron 1984) and greater difficulty experienced by the participants in reaching agreement (Adrianson and Hjelmquist 1991; Hiltz et al. 1986). Instances of disrupted communication, occasionally culminating in the conduct known as flaming (i.e., aggressive behaviour towards other participants), have been widely discussed in subsequent research (cf. for example Avgerinakou 2003; Kolko and Reid 1998). * The writing of this article was supported by the Academy of Finland (project number 106398). I would like to thank Wolfram Bublitz, Axel Hübler and Marjut Johansson for valuable comments and suggestions.

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Researchers have also noted that participants in electronic discussions seem to be aware of the problems potentially caused by this new medium and that they may use various strategies designed to facilitate interaction and avoid communicative failure. This holds true for both synchronous forms of communication (chat, instant messaging) and asynchronous ones (e-mail, discussion forums). In order to ensure effective communication, participants in asynchronous electronic discussions have been shown to adapt their conversational style to the demands of the medium, for instance by repeating (parts of) previous messages (DuBartell 1995; McCarthy et al. 1992; Tanskanen 2001) or by using several politeness strategies to mitigate a face-threatening act (Harrison 2000). Investigating synchronous electronic discussions, Hancock and Dunham (2001) note an increased use of metacommunicative signals (e.g. still there?, questions?) to help avoid breakdown in communication, while Garcia and Jacobs (1999) report on how participants manage the (in their words) “differently-abled” turn-taking system of synchronous communication to create an organised exchange out of seemingly disorganised contributions. The present paper contributes to this line of research by concentrating on metapragmatic utterances in asynchronous computer-mediated discussions, i.e., utterances which are not concerned with the topic of discussion but comment on the communicative act itself. The research questions of the paper can be formulated as follows: how and for what purposes do participants use metapragmatic utterances in the challenging communicative setting of computer-mediated interaction? More specifically, the paper looks at how participants comment on their own as well as their fellow participants’ contributions to the discussion, thereby offering information as to how they would like their contributions to be interpreted and what they perceive as appropriate or inappropriate use of language. Of special interest are also cases in which metapragmatic comments give rise to a sequence of such utterances, i.e., instances in which participants join to create a metapragmatic discussion, carried out parallel with or in addition to the original discussion. The paper suggests that there is a collaborative purpose (see e.g. Linell 1998: 207) behind the use of metapragmatic utterances: by anticipating potential problems, communicators adopt the perspective of their fellow communicators and construct their messages in a manner which contributes to a successful communicative exchange.

2.

Metapragmatic utterances in computer-mediated interaction

Material and methods

The material of the present study comes from a corpus of computer-mediated discussions collected by the author.1The subcorpus used for this paper consists of a selection of mailing-list (Linguist List and Women’s Studies List) and message-board discussions (Dachsie’s Bulletin Board and Yahoo! Message Boards). The material analysed thus represents asynchronous computer-mediated interaction. Compared to synchronous interaction, the participants of asynchronous discussions can operate under less severe temporal constraints: they have more time for producing, editing and interpreting messages. It follows that they may also have better opportunities to reflect and comment on their own and their fellow participants’ contributions than participants in real-time discussions; this is a factor to be kept in mind during the analysis and discussion of the findings. Before moving on to the analysis of the material, a few words are in order as to the definition of metapragmatics and metapragmatic utterances in the present paper. The reflexive capacity of language has been the object of active study from several different viewpoints, and a wealth of research exists on metalanguage (cf. e.g. Lucy 1993: 10), metadiscourse (cf. e.g. Hyland 1998, 2005; Ifantidou 2005) and metacommunication (cf. e.g. Verschueren 1995). There is overlap between the use of the terms, and when metapragmatics enters the picture the situation becomes slightly more complex. For instance, for some researchers (Silverstein 1993; Verschueren 1995) metacommunication already involves consideration of the use and interpretation of messages, while the role left for metapragmatics is that of an umbrella term, covering all reflexive activity present in language use. While recognising that such a broad definition of metapragmatics can be valuable and workable in some studies, in the present paper, and in line with the purposes of the present volume as a whole, a more clearly defined and more operational reading of metapragmatics is needed. For this we turn to Caffi (1998; cf. also Overstreet and Yule 2002, and Hübler and Bublitz in the introduction to this

1. As the internet presents a relatively new source of material for research, the ethical implications of using material collected from the internet are still being debated (see for instance the American Association for the Advancement of Science report on ethical and legal aspects of human subject research in cyberspace: http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/intres/main. htm). Mailing lists with public archives, such as the ones used in this study, are generally regarded as unproblematic in this respect. Similarly, message-board discussions that are available without registration or joining a group are commonly considered “public”. Finally, the relatively easy availability of electronic material should not lead us to assume that it is fully representative: it is important to keep in mind that globally it still mainly represents language produced by the educated and privileged living in developed countries.

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volume), who provides three definitions of metapragmatics, one of which is the focus of the present paper.2 It refers to “the management of discourse”, or that area of the speakers’ competence which reflects the judgments of appropriateness on one’s own and other people’s communicative behavior [… and] deals with the “know-how” regarding the control and planning of, as well as feedback on, the ongoing interaction. (Caffi 1998: 581)

According to Caffi (1998), in discourse there are “utterances whose role it is to ensure dialogue management in terms of communicative effectiveness”, and it is such concrete metapragmatic utterances within interaction that are the focus in the present paper. With these metapragmatic utterances, communicators can make visible their assessment of the appropriateness of their own and their follow communicators’ contributions to the ongoing discussion, and can clarify and rephrase their contributions in case of evident or potential misunderstanding. In the following sections, we look at how and for what purposes such utterances are utilised by communicators in online interaction.

3.

Metapragmatic utterances in online interaction

3.1

How are metapragmatic utterances used in computer-mediated interaction?

In this section the focus is on the first part of the research question of the paper, namely how metapragmatic utterances are used in computer-mediated interaction. The aspects considered here include their formal properties, i.e., the positioning of metapragmatic utterances in messages, the initiation (self or other) of metapragmatic utterances, and whether the utterances are intratextual or intertextual. The discussion in this section is intended to be mainly descriptive and to serve as a basis for the following discussion; the possible functions of the utterances are therefore only very briefly referred to. More detailed considerations of the functions of metapragmatic utterances will follow in Section 3.2, which is devoted to the second part of the research question. In the mailing-list and message-board discussions analysed in the paper, metapragmatic utterances fall into two distinct formal categories: single metaprag-

2. The two senses of metapragmatics which are not discussed in the present paper are “the theoretical debate on pragmatics and its central concerns” and “highlighting the conditions which make speakers’ use of language possible and effective” (Caffi 1998: 581).


matic utterances and metapragmatic sequences. The former are much more frequent in the material than the latter, and we will start by analysing these utterances.

3.1.1 Position of metapragmatic utterance: retrospective, mid-message and prospective Let us start by looking at how metapragmatic utterances are positioned (with respect to what they comment on) in the messages analysed. It should be noted that all examples are unedited and may thus include typos and misspellings; some examples include additional context, in which case the metapragmatic element is italicised. Unfortunately, due to the length of most of the messages analysed it is not possible to reproduce them here in their entirety; however, a couple of complete messages are given in the appendix. First of all, metapragmatic utterances can be used retrospectively, as in the following examples: (1) … Sorry – a very long response to a short question! I hope I’ve answered it. (LL) (2) … I don’t mean to sound antagonistic – I’m really asking. (WMST-L) (3) To reply to Harriet, I would say that I think that my comments were somewhat misunderstood. … (WMST-L)

Examples (1) and (2) come from the end of the messages they comment on; in other words, the writers considered it necessary to add a metapragmatic utterance at the end of their contribution. An alternative retrospective strategy is displayed in example (3), where a writer wants to comment on an earlier message after a message from a fellow communicator has revealed a potential misunderstanding. Metapragmatic utterances can also be used in the middle of a message or even in the middle of a sentence: (4) [in the middle of a lengthy message] … Maybe you’re bored with details, but they will still be there after this whole episode is erased from public memory. … (LL) (5) … Take a look at the world around you. A pretty bang-up job the more capable whites have done, isn’t it? (That was meant to be sarcastic.) … [message continues] (YAHOO) (6) … On the other hand (I know this is inflammatory, but it is indeed a fact) Hitler believed that science always served a particular group’s agenda. … (WMST-L)

In (4) and (5) the writers have decided to include a metapragmatic utterance in the middle of the message, while in (6) the writer has inserted one within a sen-

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tence. Compared to retrospective utterances, which comment on the entire message, mid-message and mid-sentence utterances comment on a particular part of a message. Thirdly, metapragmatic utterances can be prospective, i.e., they can be used as disclaimers at the beginning of a message, as in examples (7) and (8). These utterances also comment on the entire message. (7) I am loathe to add yet another message to what has been an extremely long thread, but… . (WMST-L) (8) Regarding David’s recent query, I have a few thoughts. Hope I don’t get flamed for them…! (WMST-L)

Finally, there are messages which include several metapragmatic utterances in various combinations of the above types: (9) As the sender of the original post, I do want to clarify that I did not intend to suggest that… … Just wanted to clarify. (WMST-L; entire message as example A in the Appendix)

In (9) the writer comments on her earlier message at the beginning of the current message and repeats the comment at the end of the message, thus combining a prospective and a retrospective utterance.

3.1.2 Initiation of utterance: Self or other Let us next examine metapragmatic utterances from the perspective of who initiates them, i.e., whether communicators decide to use a metapragmatic utterance on their own initiative or whether a contribution by another communicator prompts them, for instance by making them realise that their message has been misinterpreted or judged inappropriate. Examples (10) and (11) are instances of self-initiated utterances. (10) … I am sorry; I could do a better job explaining myself, but I’ve been up all night and can hardly think. (YAHOO) (11) Okay, I know that replying to one’s own message is sort of tacky, but I feel bad that my morning questioning rant about service learning and student activism was so devil’s advocate-y and, uh, negative. … (WMST-L)

Example (10) illustrates a metapragmatic utterance which can only be self-initiated; it refers to the current message, which no-one else but the writer has had the chance to read yet. The writer is concerned about the clarity of her message


and finds it necessary to add a metapragmatic utterance. The utterance in example (11), on the other hand, might have been prompted by a comment by another participant, since an earlier message is referred to, but in this case the writer makes the utterance on her own initiative to tell her coparticipants that she now considers her earlier message partly inappropriate. (12) [after a quotation from an earlier message] I apologize if my post sounded somewhat condescending, because that was not the intent. Rather, I tried to input some witty (lol) humor. … (YAHOO; the entire message is shown as example B in the appendix) (13) [after a quotation from an earlier message] I apologize if I sounded this way, I don’t for one second believe that young women are apathetic and clueless. … (WMST-L)

Examples (12) and (13) illustrate other-initiated utterances. In (12), a message by a fellow participant has prompted the writer to reconsider and apologise for his earlier message, which he realises may have been considered condescending. In (13), after quoting from a message by another participant indicating a misinterpretation (that the writer was seen as criticising young women), the writer likewise apologises for her earlier message. It is worth noting that the coparticipants’ messages prompting these utterances do not actually state that the writers would be considered condescending or too critical, i.e., they do not include metapragmatic utterances; the writers have deduced from the message content that a misinterpretation has occurred. However, there are instances in the material where we can find a sequence of metapragmatic utterances; these will be tackled in Section 3.1.4.

3.1.3 Intratextual and intertextual utterances The third perspective from which metapragmatic utterances are discussed in this section has to do with whether they are intratextual or intertextual, i.e., whether they comment on the current message or an earlier one. Intertextual utterances can further be divided into those directed to an earlier message by the same writer and those directed to messages written by other participants. Examples (14) and (15) are instances of intratextual utterances, i.e., ones which comment on the current message, at the beginning of the message in (14) and at the end of the message in (15): (14) I am going to sound like the bad guy here – sorry in advance. … (YAHOO) (15) … Sorry for the ramble but I’ve been mulling this over for a few days and had to get in my 2 cents. (WMST-L)

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Intertextual utterances are illustrated in (16) and (17). In (16), a message from a fellow communicator has made the writer realise that her earlier message has been misinterpreted, while in (17), after quoting from a previous message, the writer offers a comment on the message. (16) To all who will take a look back at the previous postings between me and cbbtrcytl, I would like to explain myself and make myself very clear because obviously she didn’t get it or I’m either not explaining it right. … (YAHOO) (17) [after a quotation from an earlier message] Perhaps Daphne may sound a bit harsh here but she has valid points. (WMST-L)

We have now discussed the positioning, initiation and intratextuality versus intertextuality of metapragmatic utterances. Although the three aspects have been considered separately, they are of course complementary. To conclude this section, let us draw the three perspectives together and reconsider some of the above examples. (18) I am sorry; I could do a better job explaining myself, but I’ve been up all night and can hardly think. (YAHOO) (10) (19) To reply to Harriet, I would say that I think that my comments were somewhat misunderstood. (WMST-L) (3) (20) Regarding David’s recent query, I have a few thoughts. Hope I don’t get flamed for them…! (WMST-L) (8)

Example (10) is repeated above as example (18); it illustrates a retrospective intratextual self-initiated metapragmatic utterance, i.e., it comes from the end of the message that it comments on and the writer has decided to use it on her own initiative. Example (19), which was already discussed as (3), is a retrospective intertextual other-initiated metapragmatic utterance: having been prompted by a message from another participant, the writer comments on her earlier message. Finally, to reconsider example (8) as (20), we can see that here the writer anticipates that her message may be judged inappropriate and adds a comment; this example is therefore an instance of a prospective intratextual self-initiated metapragmatic utterance.

3.1.4 Metapragmatic sequences The preceding sections have focused on single metapragmatic utterances. There are, however, further instances of metapragmatic utterances in the material, which differ from those presented in the previous sections in that they involve several participants. We saw above how a message written by a coparticipant can act as a prompt to a metapragmatic utterance; in this section, we consider in-


stances which start with a metapragmatic utterance by a participant, prompting another participant to continue with a related utterance. I will call such instances metapragmatic sequences. Let us start by considering the following sequence from a mailing list: (21) a. b.

This list has changed a bit since I last logged on, as I didn’t think we were supposed to have discussions like this, but I will add that ... At the risk of adding further to the list’s exceptionally heavy mail volume, I think I should try to explain why I think this discussion is appropriate for WMST-L. … (WMST-L)

In (21a), the writer comments on the ongoing discussion on the list and finds it inappropriate, which prompts the writer of (21b) to respond and explain why she disagrees. The writer of (21b) is the moderator of the list; thus it is not surprising that she offers such an explanation, but it is interesting to note that she starts her message with an apologetic utterance. Metapragmatic sequences can also be created jointly by more than two participants, as in the following sequence from a message-board discussion: (22) a. i don’t want to get in an argument on this board. ... but ... as an ecologist, I just don’t feel that humans going out and killing what they have purposely brought into this world (i.e. double dapples) is survival of the fittest. … b. I really don’t see an “argument” here . . . that is, unless someone makes it one. I see people telling how things are, how things ought to be and how they would like them to be. It is an emotional topic for many. ... c. I dont really think this is a arguement i think its more of seeing both sides of the fence. ... d. *i just wanted to also remind you im not trying to argue just having a friendly debate/discussion* (DBB)

In (22a), before commenting on the ongoing discussion on the board, the writer offers a prospective self-initiated intratextual utterance, i.e. a disclaimer, fearing that the comment may otherwise be misinterpreted. In (22b) and (22c), other participants reassure the writer of (22a) that there is no need for anxiety. Example (22d) follows a while later: it actually comes from the end of another message by the writer of (22a), and shows that she still has similar concerns. What happens with the first metapragmatic utterance (22a) is that it changes the direction of the existing discussion and creates a new one, which is then carried out parallel with the original discussion. The topic of the “new” discussion is the appropriateness of the messages, assessed by the writers themselves or fel-

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low participants. Such metapragmatic sequences may be seen as disturbing the coherence of the original discussion, because they add a new topic to the ongoing discussion. At the same time, however, they can be claimed to create coherence at a higher level; they reflect the participants’ wish to maintain a successful communicative relationship with their fellow participants.

3.2 For what purposes are metapragmatic utterances used in computer- mediated interaction? This section tackles the second part of the research question of the paper, the purposes for which metapragmatic utterances are used in computer-mediated interaction. The perspective thus moves from the properties of metapragmatic utterances to the communicators and their management of the interaction in which they are taking part, as we explore how participants in online discussions make use of metapragmatic utterances. Since the definition of metapragmatics in this paper comes from Caffi (1998; see Section 2 above), it is only fitting that the discussion of the functions of metapragmatic utterances be structured according to her ideas of what their purposes in interaction might be. The following discussion therefore starts by considering how metapragmatic utterances function as judgments of appropriateness of communicative behaviour, after which I turn to their role in the control and planning of, as well as feedback on, the ongoing discussion.

3.2.1 Judgments of appropriateness According to Caffi (1998: 581), communicators’ use of metapragmatic utterances is a reflection of their judgment of the appropriateness of their own and their fellow communicators’ contributions. The examples we have discussed above, albeit from different perspectives, have no doubt already provided some illustration of how participants in online discussions can signal their assessment of the appropriateness of their own and fellow participants’ messages. In this section we explore the issue in more detail. Although it might well be expected that communicators in online interaction comment on their fellow communicators’ messages, this practice is surprisingly rare in the material analysed for the present study. This is true for both positive and negative evaluations of other writers’ contributions. In fact, it is quite difficult to find more examples of positive metapragmatic utterances in addition to (17) above, where a writer offers support to the writer of an earlier message. Negative evaluations are equally rare, but one such instance is illustrated in (23):


(23) … Every time you respond as you just did, you just make my heart sink a bit more (occasional friendship notwithstanding). (WMST-L)

In (23), the current writer criticises an earlier message by another writer, telling her that she considers the message inappropriate, also suggesting that she views this to be a recurrent problem in the earlier writer’s communicative behaviour. The majority of metapragmatic utterances are thus directed by communicators to their own messages and their own communicative behaviour. In fact, with the exception of (17) and (23) all the examples discussed so far are participants’ comments on their own current or earlier messages. In the following, let us explore what types of messages are assessed by writers as problematic, prompting them to add a metapragmatic utterance. In the material studied, metapragmatic utterances enter the picture if and when writers are concerned that their messages might lead to an undesired response, i.e., that their fellow communicators might misinterpret them or consider them inappropriate. In some cases, such unwanted communicative outcome may be evident in that a message has already led to a negative assessment by another communicator. In such situations, writers can use retrospective other-initiated utterances in order to show their fellow communicators that they are trying to clarify their meaning and retrospectively make their earlier message more appropriate. Examples (3), (9), (12) and (13) above, as well as (24) below, illustrate writers’ reactions to an evident problem in their earlier messages. (24) … Hope this helps to clarify what I meant. (WMST-L)

It is tempting to postulate that such other-initiated retrospective utterances might be related to what conversation analysts call “third position repair” (see e.g. Schegloff 1992: 1301), in which a speaker can try to repair a misunderstanding after an interlocutor’s response “has revealed trouble in understanding an earlier turn”. The sequentiality of written dialogue cannot of course be directly compared to that of spoken dialogue, but the strategies appear similar enough: a speaker/writer’s turn is followed by a turn by a fellow communicator expressing a misunderstanding, followed by a third turn in which the original speaker/writer tries to repair the trouble in communication. It is more common, however, for metapragmatic utterances to be prompted by the writers’ own assessment of their messages as potentially inappropriate. These self-initiated utterances are in fact so frequent that they can be considered in four separate categories below, dealing with the length, style or mere existence of a message and with the writer’s qualifications as a participant. The material contains several metapragmatic utterances commenting on the length of the message. Writers anticipate that a long message may be viewed as

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an imposition by the other communicators, and apologise even before an actual problem is reported. This is what happens, for instance, in (1), (4) and (15) above, as well as in (25) below. (25) … I provide some of my thoughts below. Sorry for the length, but the issue is complex. (WMST-L)

A number of metapragmatic utterances comment on the style of the message; again, writers anticipate that their messages might be interpreted as inappropriate and add a comment in order to avoid this. In (2), (6) and (14) above the writers are concerned that their messages might be interpreted as offensive, while in (5) the writer wants to make sure that her fellow communicators catch the tone of the message. The writer of (26) below has likewise observed that his message may show stylistic shortcomings. (26) … I apologise for the tortured prose, but I can’t stop to fix it now. … (LL)

An intriguing category of metapragmatic utterances consists of comments concerned with the mere existence of a message. In other words, writers anticipate that the very existence of their message in an interaction may be regarded as an imposition. Thus for instance in (7) the writer expresses her concern that her message might be the one which makes the ongoing discussion too long and is consequently an imposition. Similar sentiments are shared by the writer of (27): (27) I’m sorry to add another message to everyone’s already packed list. … (WMST-L)

The final category is an interesting one as well. The metapragmatic utterances discussed here show that writers may have reservations as to their qualifications as participants in the discussion: (28) … I do not purport to be an expert, but I felt the need to add my two cents on a subject I take very seriously. (WMST-L) (29) … Maybe I’m just an unsophisticated little grad student, but this argument just doesn’t follow. (WMST-L) (30) … Re-stating the obvious, as always (WMST-L; entire message as example C in the Appendix)

In (28) and (29) the writers show that they do not consider themselves to be fully qualified to contribute on the topic, while the writer of (30) feels that he has not perhaps added anything to the discussion. Rather than not contributing their messages to the discussion, the writers have decided to send them with a


metapragmatic utterance that anticipates a potential negative assessment in an effort to avoid it. Other-initiated metapragmatic utterances, used when a misunderstanding has been made evident, were compared above to third-position repair. In a similar vein, we could compare self-initiated utterances, used in case of an anticipated or potential problem, with self-repair. Schegloff et al. (1977: 377) point out that “the organization of repair in conversation provides centrally for self-correction”, and although repair can be either self-initiated or other-initiated, self-initiated selfrepair is clearly more frequent. This is exactly what seems to be happening with metapragmatic utterances as well. A clear majority are self-initiated; furthermore, they are frequently used when a communicator is merely anticipating trouble in communication, before any problem is actually pointed out by a fellow communicator. In her study on Japanese conversation, Mori (1999: 453) notes that such self-repair (she terms it “self-qualification”) is used by the speaker to “pre-empt a possible source of disagreement”. Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2005: 284), who call the strategy “Concessive Repair”, further point out that the strategy shows a preference for next position, unlike ‘classic’ repair, which favours same-turn correction. They continue that this makes the strategy “highly interactional”, because a speaker uses it “to respond to actual, foreshadowed or imagined challenges by an interlocutor to what they have said or implied”. Rather than correction, concessive repair could therefore be considered to be more closely related to the negotiation of affiliation (ibid.). This is where the differences between spoken and written dialogue become evident, but I think it is nevertheless possible to see concessive repair and self-initiated metapragmatic utterances as similar strategies. Keeping in mind that written dialogue can only approximate the sequential organisation of conversation, we should perhaps not be too surprised that in online discussions the utterance is a part of the message it qualifies, i.e., that it occurs in the same turn. Contributing a turn to an online discussion is usually slower than contributing a turn to a face-to-face conversation, and it is also likely that writers may read and edit their messages before sending them. Thus they have time to react to a potential problem in their message and if necessary add a metapragmatic utterance in order to avoid communicative failure. Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson’s idea of the nature of concessive repair, as an indication of the negotiation of affiliation rather than correction, is interesting and could be extended to cover self-initiated metapragmatic utterances as well: the negotiation takes place in the mind of the writers, as they anticipate how their fellow communicators will interpret their messages.

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3.2.2 Control and planning of interaction It is important to note here that the functions of metapragmatic utterances we are discussing are not mutually exclusive. It could very well be argued that the utterances analysed above also have to do with controlling the discussion, as writers anticipate and attempt to influence their fellow communicators’ interpretation of their messages (or that the utterances to be discussed below also have to do with appropriateness). The focus in this section, however, is on utterances which seem to be overtly aimed at controlling or planning the interaction. The utterances for instance encourage others to continue the discussion by inviting more contributions on the topic; or alternatively they discourage other writers and can thus be considered as attempts to end the discussion. In (31), for instance, the writer explicitly asks others to contribute their thoughts on the topic, while in (32) the writer assures the other participants that his message is not intended as the last word on the issue; thus the comment can also be regarded as an invitation to continue the discussion. (31) … Sorry for the rant, but I’d like to hear what others think about this. (WMST-L) (32) … I think I left plenty of room for argument. (LL)

An opposite strategy is illustrated in examples (33) and (34): (33) Well, you’ve certainly ended this discussion effectively. All that’s left to say is “I rest my case.” (YAHOO) (34) Maybe I’m just an unsophisticated little grad student, but this argument just doesn’t follow. Flames may be sent directly to my killfile. (WMST-L)

The writer of (33) is attempting to end the discussion, by telling a fellow communicator that it is pointless to continue the discussion because her message has apparently proved the writer’s earlier points. The strategy, incidentally, was not successful and the discussion continued for some time. In (34), the writer is telling her fellow communicators that she realises that her message may lead to further (heated) discussion, but that she is not going to read such contributions. In this case too the discussion continued, but without flames; thus the strategy can be considered at least a partial success. Finally, let us consider example (35), which shows yet another strategy for controlling or planning the discussion: (35) Incidentally, my post was only a brief response to the original poster… (WMST-L)

Metapragmatic utterances in computer-mediated interaction 101

In (35), the writer apparently feels that her message and its position in the interaction may have been misinterpreted, and she consequently tells her fellow communicators how it should have been read.

3.2.3 Feedback on ongoing interaction The third function of metapragmatic utterances to be discussed has to do with feedback on the ongoing interaction. In other words, here we look at those utterances, positive and negative, which comment on the entire discussion. Let us start with the more negative ones; these may also be regarded as partial attempts to end the discussion, although they differ from the utterances discussed above in that the writers themselves actually then continue the discussion. In (36), the writer suggests that the discussion may not be very fruitful, based on his experience with similar earlier discussions. Likewise the writer of (37) does not find the discussion useful, but still wants to contribute her thoughts. (36) … we seem to be spiraling down into a general discussion of “How can proponents of theory X ever show that it is right/wrong/nonvacuous etc.” Over the years such discussions on the List have not been very fruitful, in my opinion. (LL) (37) Well, this is probably not a very useful discussion to continue, but Rosie’s comments suggest we need some redefinitions… (WMST-L)

Turning next to more positive utterances, we note that there are several instances in the material where writers begin their messages with a positive comment regarding the entire discussion so far. Examples (38), (39) and (40) illustrate this strategy. (38) Such a wonderful discussion is being held here!!! (DBB) (39) I am absolutely loving this dialogue! (WMST-L) (40) Interesting and valuable discussion! (WMST-L)

Perhaps we might see this strategy as an indication of the conversational game the participants are playing: by expressing their enthusiasm they provide a reason for wanting to continue the discussion and at the same time tell their fellow communicators that their messages should not be considered as impositions.

3.3 Summary In the above, metapragmatic utterances in computer-mediated interaction were approached from two perspectives: first through a description of their formal


properties (i.e., their position in the message, whether they are self-initiated or other-initiated, intratextual or intertextual), followed by a discussion of their functions in interaction (i.e., whether they function as judgments of appropriateness, attempts at controlling and planning the discussion, or feedback). Drawing together the two perspectives and summarising the main findings of the analysis, we find that the majority of the metapragmatic utterances are self-initiated and intratextual, and that their most typical function is to act as judgments of appropriateness. The other two functions are represented in the material as well: we discussed examples in which writers wished to comment on the entire discussion, as well as utterances which can be regarded as attempts to control the discussion. However, as was pointed out above, many of the utterances used for a commenting or controlling purpose seem to involve the current message as well: with these utterances, the writers appear to be evaluating their own messages and negotiating a suitable frame for them in the ongoing interaction. The analysis clearly revealed that the communicators seem quite reluctant to comment on their fellow communicators’ contributions. Of all the intertextual metapragmatic utterances discussed above, only a few are directed to messages written by other communicators. While the material shows the writers evaluating and commenting on their own messages, such a strategy is rarely applied to messages by other writers. This may well be due to the potentially conflictual nature of such behaviour, which means that the writers may want to avoid it. Messages written by other communicators, however, are evaluated in relation to the communicator’s own message(s); we considered examples of other-initiated utterances, where a message by a fellow communicator has prompted a writer, for instance to clarify an earlier message. In such cases a misunderstanding has been made evident, and the writer of the original problematic message wants to repair the trouble in interaction. Other-initiated utterances, however, are far less frequent than self-initiated ones. What is more, the majority of all the examples considered above represent a single type of metapragmatic utterance, namely an intratextual self-initiated utterance which functions as a judgment of appropriateness. In other words, in the material analysed the writers seem to be eager to monitor their messages and preempt potential misunderstandings by adding a metapragmatic utterance. Such anticipation shows that the writers are sensitive to the reactions of their fellow communicators in the interest of successful communication.

4.


Conclusion

Let us start by considering certain limitations of the present paper. I have dealt only with asynchronous or delayed communication; thus the possible effects of other degrees of temporal constraints could not be tackled. It would no doubt be interesting to study real-time electronic interaction (chat or instant messaging) in order to find out if, how and for what purposes communicators in a synchronic setting make use of metapragmatic utterances. It is likely that differences in temporal constraints lead to different uses of metapragmatic utterances as well. However, the present paper has hopefully illustrated the various ways in which participants in asynchronous online discussions use metapragmatic utterances. These utterances are clearly communication-oriented in that their role is to help participants manage the interaction in which they are engaged. The examples illustrated how communicators reflect and comment on their own and their fellow communicators’ messages, signalling how they would like their messages to be interpreted as well as what they perceive as appropriate or inappropriate use of language. What is intriguing about the utterances we have discussed is the fact that the metapragmatic utterances made by the participants are mainly aimed at their own contributions. Furthermore, the majority of the utterances are self-initiated, and are uttered by communicators before any trouble in communication has actually been made evident; in other words, they are intratextual. Participants in online discussion thus seem to be anticipating potential problems in the interpretation of their messages rather than reacting to actual ones. In her discussion of metapragmatics, Caffi (1998) states that “the ‘meta-’ determines that space in which the other’s perspective can be accepted” (see also Clark 1996; Verschueren 2000). Linell (1998: 42) further writes: …a communicative exchange is built upon some kind of reciprocity of perspectives; the listener has to try to take the speaker’s perspective, and the speaker must monitor his utterances on the premises of the listener (emphasis original).

I would like to conclude by suggesting that behind the reflexive activity displayed by the participants in online discussions there is a collaborative purpose. The participants self-monitor their utterances and in their minds negotiate with and adopt the perspective of their fellow communicators. In metapragmatic sequences we can see overt collaboration, as several participants jointly construct them, while single metapragmatic utterances show more covert collaboration. All of them, however, show how participants in online discussions, operating under


the constraints of the medium, are able to adopt the perspective of the other participants and construct their utterances accordingly, to ensure they will not be misinterpreted, judged inappropriate, or – in the worst-case scenario – construed as flaming.

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Ifantidou, E. 2005. “The semantics and pragmatics of metadiscourse.” Journal of Pragmatics 37 (9): 1325–1353. Kolko, B. and Reid, E. 1998. “Dissolution and fragmentation: problems in on-line communities.” In Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting Computer-Mediated Communication and Community, S.G. Jones (ed.), 212–229. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Linell, P. 1998. Approaching Dialogue: Talk, Interaction and Contexts in Dialogical Perspectives. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Lucy, J.A. 1993. “Reflexive language and the human disciplines.” In Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics, J.A. Lucy (ed.), 9–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McCarthy, J.C., Wright, P.C. and Monk, A.F. 1992. “Coherence in text-based electronic conferencing: coupling text and context.” Journal of Language and Social Psychology 11 (4): 267–277. Mori, J. 1999. “‘Well I may be exaggerating but …’: self-qualifying clauses in negotiating of opinions among Japanese speakers.” Human Studies 22: 447–473. Overstreet, M. and Yule, G. 2001. “Formulaic disclaimers.” Journal of Pragmatics 33 (1): 45‑60. Overstreet, M. and Yule, G. 2002. “The metapragmatics of and everything.” Journal of Pragmatics 34 (6): 785–794. Schegloff, E.A. 1992. “Repair after next turn: the last structurally provided defense of intersubjectivity in conversation.” American Journal of Sociology 97 (5): 1295–1345. Schegloff, E.A., Jefferson, G. and Sacks, H. 1977. “The preference for self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation.” Language 53 (2): 361–382. Silverstein, M. 1993. “Metapragmatic discourse and metapragmatic function.” In Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics, J.A. Lucy (ed.), 33–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tanskanen, S.-K. 2001. “Avoiding conflict in computer-mediated discussions, or, fear of flaming.” In English in Zigs and Zags (Anglicana Turkuensia 23), R. Hiltunen et al. (eds), 227– 242. Turku: University of Turku. Verschueren, J. 1995. “Metapragmatics.” Handbook of Pragmatics Manual. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Verschueren, J. 2000. “Notes on the role of metapragmatic awareness in language use.” Pragmatics 10 (4): 439–456.

Appendix A. → As the sender of the original post, I do want to clarify that I did not intend to suggest that there are no brain differences between men and women, or that these differences may not be important, or that feminists simply respond to science (instead of doing science themselves). I am trying to gather information to help a group of students plan a well rounded research project. The student who proposed the research used a local news anchor as her primary source of information, and this person referred her to neuroscientific research on brain differences between the sexes. From what I have gatherered from the proposal and the sources listed, the news anchor and my student are assuming that they can link all gender differences to these research articles.


→ B.

→

I don’t want my students to downplay difference; I want them to think hard about the ways in which we interpret and analyze difference. In short, I am trying very hard to keep my students from being reductive. Just wanted to clarify – (WMST-L)

I apologize if my post sounded somewhat condescending, because that was not the intent. Rather, I tried to input some witty (lol) humor. Seriously, you must consider that some of AFOP’s customers may have non-disclosure agreements, because they wish to take AFOP components, package with other contractor’s components, and then call the resulting ‘collage’ their own making. But there were some choice little ‘nuggets’ disclosed on the last conference call (e.g., about percentage of primary supplier, the increasing gross margins, products destined for the ‘leadership position’, etc.) that are there for the discerning ear. (YAHOO)

C. > Just wondering, about this post: has the Chronicle ever sponsored > “Cautionary Tales” about “The Strange World” of Physics, of > Mathematics, of Marketing, etc., etc.?

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So far as I can tell, every subject area, discipline, etc. has its own special, characteristic strangeness – and the Chronicle often offers articles, essays and fora that are relevant. (Some participants revel in their discipline’s own special strangeness.) No doubt, some will find these to be attacks on a discipline – whether or not it is, or is so intended. So I don’t think that Wmst is being “singled out” by the Chronicle. If administrators who make funding decisions about Wmst programs are inclined to make decisions based mainly on what they learn through the Chronicle then it might be best either to “educate” the administrators or to get new administrators with a clearer sense of how academic standards ought to play a role in funding decisions. Typically, I think, the “education” route is most available. And pursuing it is frequently a royal pain that eats precious time. So far as I can tell, Wmst is not always at its best, whatever the criteria for excellence are, and in that respect it differs not at all from every other discipline. P. and others do describe cases in which it is not at its best (and may also describe cases in which it’s doing just fine, but they think otherwise). What I’ve never seen from anyone are data on the prevalence of the non-optimal situations. So I have no good reason to think that Wmst is different from any other discipline in how often it’s less than its best. But, of course, there might be some such difference anyway. (WMST-L) Re-stating the obvious, as always, David.

On the metapragmatics of gestures Axel Hübler

1.

Introduction

The expectations which the title raises are at first sight limited. We expect gestures to be tackled as topic of metacommunicative comments, which, in turn, serve some farther reaching purpose. Seen from this perspective, gestures are no more than another important aspect of human communication that can be subjected to topicalization, similar to the use of, say, imperatives, paraphrases, or interruptions, or rules of interaction. Valid as this expectation is – and the following treatment will take it into account – it is somewhat language biased in that it tacitly presumes language to be the only means of metacommunication. But gestures can also serve as instrument. Paying tribute to this fact opens up an additional, completely different dimension. The following table illustrates this clearly, the emboldened print representing the ‘new’ dimension. Table: A simple systematics of metacommunication

1. language as medium → for topicalizing aspects of communication a. language use as topic b. gesture use as topic 2. gesture as medium → for topicalizing aspects of communication a. language use as topic b. gesture use as topic

Such a scheme may appear theoretically appropriate, but nonetheless raise doubts as to its realism. Reflexiveness and abstractness associated with metacommunication (cf. Lucy 1993) hardly seems to be a property of gestures. To test and challenge such a view is the main purpose of the present article. It will, in other words, center around the topicalization of selected aspects of communication by means of gestures and provide a differentiated picture of the possibilities that actually exist.

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The approach presupposes, a priori, the availability of an appropriate expressive means of metacommunication. This is consistent with the policy pursued throughout this volume as far as the language means are concerned. However, the availability of nonverbal means cannot be so easily taken for granted. The gestural repertoire is not as highly codified as language and, consequently, less apparent. For this reason, increased attention will be given to the individual gesture in terms of its function and form. The present articles will survey all three areas of the above schema in which gestures play a role. Section 2 will focus briefly on verbal metacommunication about gestural behavior and present an historical example with a somewhat unusual metapragmatic purpose. Section 3 will cover the (admittedly) rare systematic case in which gestural behavior is topicalized by means of gestures. The main emphasis, however, will lie on the rich potential of gestures operating metapragmatically on verbal behaviors. Section 4 will treat three such possibilities: (a) the deployment of gestures for subjecting a verbal utterance to irony, (b) the deployment of gestures in face of the problem of finding the ‘right’ word, and (c) their deployment as a metanarrative device to structure an extended verbal utterance – in this case, a conversational narrative.

2.

Gestures as subject to topicalization

Gestures and other speech related forms of bodily behavior are part of communication, which may be seen as trimodal in nature, with prosody being the third constituent, in addition to language and gesture. Speaking about gestures in use (and other speech-related bodily behavior) is a metacommunicative activity. Consequently, a pragmatic approach to communication would assign a metapragmatic status to the discussion of gestures and seek a pragmatic explanation for doing so. Illustrations that readily fit the paradigm under investigation in this volume are critical remarks or admonitions in conversation, which concern “the ‘know how’, the control and planning of, as well as feed back on, the ongoing interac. A diachronical exploration of the meta-lexicon would be useful in establishing the history of metacommunicative awareness while also advancing our knowledge in the field of historical pragmatics (cf. Hübler 2007 on lexical expressions pertaining to prosodic behavior). . The term gesture is used here in the widest sense of application, comprising, first of all, those which are co-expressive with language (iconics, metaphorics, deictics, beats, cf. McNeill 1992) and, in addition, emblems, affect displays (as expressions of propositional attitudes), regulators and adaptors (in as far as they co-occur with speech); cf. McNeill 1992 and Ekman and Friesen 1969.

On the metapragmatics of gestures 109

tion” (Caffi 1998: 581). No matter what pragmatic purpose they serve, they are grounded in norms and are thus, like the norms themselves, culture- and timedependent. The following 17th century passage reads like a collection of admonitions with which a mother may have punctuated her discourse with her hyper-active child. (1) Thou ought’st not to make a face, or use any other action of undecency with thy mouth, eyes, or thy hands, to expresse what though wouldest deliver; neither ought’st thou to hold thy hand behind thy back, either clasped, ar acrosse; for that savoureth of ones preheminence […]. When thou talkest, be circumspect how thou carriest thy bodie. Shake not thy head, nor move thy hands much, and hold thy feet still. (Hawkins 1646/1980: 34)

Unlike most of the examples of metacommunication in this volume, the tone of this extract is both generic and prescriptive. The same holds true for the subsequent two quotations, the first of which reads rather like an abstract of the preceding one. (2)

So gouerne thy gesture of body, foote and hande, Of countenaunce, eyne and mouth with fayre semblance, That who thee beholdeth, may see and understande Thine inward behauour by ouward countenaunce (Barclay 1570/1967: 80)

More evaluative is the following passage: (3) […] but this mimicke and apish action keepes small concurrence with the Postures of a Gentleman, whose Speech as it should be free, native and generous; so should the action of his bodie admit of no phantasticke imitation or servile affectation, which expresseth little, save a degenerate qualitie or disposition. (Braithwait 1630/1994: 87)

The passages quoted formulate an ideology of bodily comportment aimed at containment and reduction (rather than elaboration) of speech-related gestural comportment. This 16th and 17th century emphasis has been well documented and minutely codified in the courtesy literature, to which the quotations belong. In contrast to a scientific discourse on metapragmatic aspects of conversation (cf. the introductory chapter to this volume), this genre is norm-bound and practiceoriented in that it identifies (possible) aspects of misbehavior and suggests acceptable alternatives. Significantly, this genre of writing is not intended as a guide for the parvenu on how to become a member of the ruling class; were this the case it would lack the element of reflexivity necessary for an interpretation in metapragmatic terms. But the addressee is the ruling class itself, making the genre both

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reflexive and open to metapragmatic interpretation. The metapragmatic purpose of these texts was to re-affirm for one’s own aristocratic life the acknowledged norms of (communicative) behavior and thus to help reconstitute the aristocratic identity always and ever anew (cf. Linke 1996 and Whigham 1984).

3.

Gestural comments on gestural behavior

The systematic possibility of commenting gesturally on gestural behavior cannot be dealt with in any comprehensive way, due to the fact that the data base is much too small. The two examples I have procured are only useful for preliminary identification purposes and incomplete pieces of evidence in themselves. My corpus of conversational narratives provides merely one example, which is also not ideal. A secretary gives a very vivid account of how she once gave her boss a piece of her mind (the entire transcription is reproduced later as example (14)). In the passage currently of interest she tells the addressee how she “did a Miss Piggy and just flipped [her] hair back” illustrating this with large iconic gestures (cf. picture (1) below). She concludes the account almost defiantly “I mean and that’s ah that’s it, isn’t it?” adding, however, – without any prosodic prominence – that she “j’st walked out,” whereupon she bursts into laughter (cf. picture (2) below). (4) [… and just flipped my hair back]1… and j’st walked out [ ]2 [1]

[2]

(T 17 Wood 00:30)

(T 17 Wood 00:34)

. The video data used throughout are taken from the JenaVideoCorpus (JeViCo), a collection of some 65 conversational narratives. They are all excerpts from British TV programs. . The following notational conventions are observed, here as elsewhere: the verbal elements set in square brackets indicate the stroke phase of the gesture. Where more than one gesture occur, they are numbered. The gesture itself is either depicted or verbally described (in italics).

On the metapragmatics of gestures

The question arises as to what she is laughing about. If her laughter has to do with the report of her dramatic, theatrical exit (i.e., flipping her hair back and walking out), then it could indeed count as an instance of a metacommunicative comment on a (re-enacted) nonverbal action. And if this is effected as self-irony – which I am inclined to assume – then the metapragmatic purpose could be to provide a sort of emotional release, or else to signal a distance from the way she behaved and thus perform some kind of facial redress. The other, really good example is not taken from the corpus, but derives from an informal situation during a one-week block seminar on narrating. The person in the two pictures below was asked to retell a rather complicated story (in German). Since one of the preceding sessions had focussed on gesturing in narratives, the speaker was prompted to reflect on his own gesticulation. Picture (1) documents the natural gesture used for illustrating the act of boxing, picture (2) its metacommunicative reflexion. (5) die Zwillinge auf seinem Arm, und die [boxen]1 so ... [ ]2 [1]

[2]

(S 1 Volker 01:48)

(S 1 Volker 01:50)

The metacommunicative reflexion occurs immediately after the narrative stretch with the gestures of boxing, which thus interrupts the narrative flow. The metagesture is articulated in three parts, i.e., a slightly varied replication of the original gesture followed by a deictic gaze into the direction of that gesture and an amused smile. Its metapragmatic purpose is likely to be self-ironic in the sense that the narrator creates a distance from his spontaneous gestural behavior by displaying an awareness of his own gestural expressivity. It is as though he has suddenly caught himself in the act of gesticulating and has now to overcome his (slight) embarrassment.

111

112 Axel Hübler

4.

Gestural comments on selected aspects of an utterance

This systematic constellation has the richest possible array of variants. Three types have been found, but there may, of course, be more. I will touch briefly on the first type, while the other two will be examined in more depth.

4.1 Concerning speech acts The only extract that was found to fit this metacommunicative type relates, again, to a kind of irony. While we have so far come across instances in which self-irony was involved, it is this time irony ‘proper’, i.e., the target is not the speaker him- or herself but some other person or some state of affairs. In contrast to the rhetorical tradition, which defines irony as meaning the opposite of what is said, I share the view which holds that the speaker simply means something different, thereby discrediting as fictive what he or she actually says. Using a stage metaphor, Haiman (1990) denotes the devices which mark a text in this way as ‘stage separators,’ because they convey a “metamessage which may be paraphrased as ‘I’m not serious’” (1990: 181). Among the suitable devices are gestures (mimics included). The corpus provides only one example. The speaker talks about how her husband was hypnotized in a show and was then asked to impersonate a ballerina performing leaps and pirouettes. “He was absolutely marvelous,” she says. The fact that she is not serious is signaled by her facial expression. (6) he was absolutely marvelous [doing it]

(T 34 Fennell 00:25) In passing, I would like to point out that one seldom encounters instances within this class that are not ironic. Non-ironic gestural signs would function in one way or another as propositional attitudes and thus be part of the message itself.


4.2 Concerning the act of predication Searle’s speech act formula F(R,P) – where F stands for illocutionary force – reinterprets the propositional part of a speech act as consisting, in turn, of two (partial) acts, the (independent) act of reference R and the (relational) act of predication P. The question of whether a predication P with respect to a reference R is appropriate amounts, first of all, to questioning whether the resulting propositional state makes sense or not. But it also embraces the appropriateness of the specific linguistic expression chosen (or about to be chosen) for realizing the predication over the reference. This aspect is illustrated when a speaker has difficulties in finding the ‘right word’.

4.2.1 Gestures of searching The difficulty of retrieving the right concept or finding a suitable expression for what one has in mind is often made ‘public’ – either verbally or nonverbally. Phrases such as ‘The word escaped me’, ‘I just can’t think of the right word’, ‘I have it on the tip of my tongue’, or ‘how do you say’ (prototypically preceded by some sounds of hesitation) serve this purpose and thus are metapragmatic. But gestures may do the job just as well. They are of the type sometimes called Butterworth gestures. The term was introduced by McNeill to honor Brian Butterworth, “a scholar in Britain who has argued that many gestures arise in response to speech failures” (McNeill 1992: 77). McNeill describes them briefly in the following terms: “A prototypical instance of a Butterworth is a hand grasping or plucking in the air while the speaker is trying to recall a word” (1992: 77). In contrast to McNeill – who assigns to them language-like features, because they do not co-occur with language – I interpret them basically as metaphorics (with some minor share in adaptive behavior). The (abstract) experience of struggling for an appropriate idea and/or its appropriate expression is gesturally expressed in concrete terms as trying to get hold of an object (the idea and/or word). Butterworths are certainly not co-expressive with linguistic concepts, as is usually the case with gestures, metaphorics included, but they are co-expressive with the difficulties of verbalization, manifesting themselves in hesitation phenomena. Though McNeill . This is analogous to Huddleston and Pullum’s distinction (2002) between ordinary and metalinguistic negation: “In uttering [She didn’t have lunch with your ‘old man’: she had lunch with your father] I am not disputing the truth of what you said but rejecting the formulation you used: I am objecting to your referring to your father as your ‘old man’” (p. 790). . McNeill seems to have mainly the labelling aspect of the predicational act in mind, though he is not explicit about it. This potential restriction, however, may not be central; it may be due, rather, to the kind of data he used; they consist of re-narratives (from cartoon stories).

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expressly acknowledges their occurrence – at least in narratives – “as part of an effort to recall a word and/or find an appropriate sentence structure” (ibid., my italics), he does not take them as a metacommunicative phenomenon – which they are! Butterworths bring about a shift, not just a (creative) pause; it is a shift away from narrating proper toward topicalizing or emphasizing the difficulties of meeting a preliminary condition of narrating, i.e., finding appropriate concepts and words. Examples (7) and (8) show variants that come close to McNeill’s characterization. In example (7) the male speaker combines a Butterworth with a regulative gaze to his girlfriend inviting her to step in for him – which she does by saying ‘Yeah, he bought me…’. In (8) the speaker finds the way out on her own, with the help of a dummy (all this). (7) we was in a shop in Manchester [in ahm ]– right hand, palm up, winking

(T 25 Hartley 00:15-00:18)

(8) I’d also in bet(w)[ – in – I]n between all this (elbows set on armrest, both hands up) fingers of right hand, palm down, perform a groping movement (T 23 Juniors 00:22-00:25)

My data, however, provide other kinesic expressions as well. (9) the circumstances of that meeting were that I – ah – [(pause) had been in]vited to a little party folded hands move back and forth (out of the wrist, in a semi-circle) as if trying to cast ideas into words (T 62 Baddiley 00:24) (10) talking about – ahm (p[aus]e) artificial isotopes pressing both lips, turned inside, together

(T 63 Clarke 00:34-00:36)

Like the prototype, they are basically metaphorical and fully motivated by the situation in which they occur. In (9), the repetitive movement represents the attempt and effort, the rounded form of the folded hands and the movements signaling the (verbal) container for the ideas to pour into. In (10), the pressing of the lips stands for the effort of ‘coming into words’ where the act of expressing is endangered; the imagery ties up with a common motif, i.e., expressing in words as an act of pressing something out which is hidden in an interior space (cf. Hübler 1990). A more notionally biased variant is provided by example (11).

. Also adaptive smack!


(11) I met Hazel – the day Germany walked into Poland – nineteenthir – [–] – tynine gaze left upward (T 62 Baddiley 00:01-00:07)

The narrator here is struggling not for an appropriate verbal expression, but for a concept, i.e., the right year. The co-occurring gesture, correspondingly, has the characteristic format of metaphorizing an unavailable concept; it consists in a gaze that locates the concept somewhere floating in the air. Such an example reinforces the above interpretation of ‘real’ Butterworths as metapragmatic in that they are concerned with aspects of communication. In as far as the kinesic imagery of the Butterworths reflects – in one way or another – the act of speaking in a situation where the narrative process runs into difficulties and expresses the search for a solution, Butterworths can justly be said to be a metapragmatic device.

4.2.2 Gestures of finding Unless a narrator breaks off or develops a new approach, she or he finds the solution to such expressive difficulties in an appropriate word or construction; such a word – as a word – gains a particular prominence. A narrator may, therefore, preface its articulation with a signal highlighting the verbal expression found. Verbally, she or he may do so with phrases such as ‘I’ve got it’ or ‘Oh yes’. But she or he could resort to gestures instead. (12) I’d also in bet(w)[ – in – ]1 [in between]2 all this [1] (elbows set on armrest of chair, both hands up) fingers of right hand, palm down, perform a groping movement [2] pointing gesture with index and middle finger of right hand, linked to an iconic of both hands, co-expressive with ‘between’ (T 23 Juniors 00:22-00:25)

Since no term is readily available, I would like to call these ‘ecco’-gestures, a vivid Italian response signal to something looked for and finally found. As illustrated by example (12), a deictic gesture can do the job well, because it draws attention to something, in the particular context, to the successful retrieval of an appropriate verbal expression. A beat would be an alternative. “The typical beat is a simple flick of the hand or the fingers up and down, or back and forth” (McNeill 1992: 15). In the following example it has the shape of a nod. (13) I met Hazel – the day Germany walked into Poland – nineteenthir – [–]1 – ty[nine]2 [1] gaze left upward [2] head nod (T 62 Baddiley 00:01-00:07)

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The beat marks something as standing out from the ‘rest’, i.e., the surrounding elements. In the case given, it is the retrieval of the ‘right’ year, not the year 1939 as such. As complements to Butterworths, deictics or beats are metapragmatic. Outside such a context, however, they have different values; they function as devices for individuating content items (objects) in a real or imaginative space, or signaling an information focus; they no longer serve as a metapragmatic act, though they are reflexive in the sense of Lucy, and their use testifies to a reflexive activity.

4.3 Concerning narrative structuring: Topicalizing the boundaries The phenomenon to be tackled is, of course, not restricted to narratives, but relates to any type of lengthy spoken text. Choosing the data from conversational narratives was simply a matter of what was readily available. At the center of attention will be a few kinesic adaptors, or gestures in a wider sense – with lip adaptor as best examples – for which I will ‘extract’ a metapragmatic function. The subtlety of the phenomenon to be investigated requires a careful course of action. For this reason, I will first outline some basic linguistic notions and describe some corresponding semiotic features (cf. section 4.3.1), before turning to the gestures proper. Section 4.3.2 will provide a detailed description of the adaptors and a careful interpretation of their metapragmatic functioning, on the basis of a very few examples. Section 4.3.3 then will widen the scope and try to establish for the lip adaptor in particular a more general profile.

4.3.1 Foundations: components and structures, boundaries and their marking Ordinary everyday narratives as integral parts of (face-to-face) conversations (Norrick 2000) are often surprisingly well structured. For personal narratives – which consist in “a report of a sequence of events that have entered into the bio graphy of the speaker by a sequence of clauses that correspond to the order of the original event” (Labov 1997: 398) – Labov (1972) has identified six typical main components. 1. Abstract 2. Orientation

. Beats and deictics partly merge; a beat can be reinterpreted as a deictic gesture pointing to an immediate textual ‘here’.


3. 4. 5. 6.

Complicating action Evaluation Result or resolution Coda.

While complicating action and evaluation are obligatory, the others are optional. Except for evaluation which may permeate the narrative throughout, the other components tend to form separate text units, compact or divided up in chunks. The complicating action itself consists of a sequence of single actions or happenings that can, in turn, be considered individually as phases or subunits. The components listed are primarily content-based; it is the content that defines the boundary between one stretch of speech and another in that there is less content coherence between these stretches. A linguistic marking of the different content units (or the boundaries between them) is not absolutely necessary (though certainly desirable and in real life performances usually given). The following text version (14) is a transcript of a TV narrative and can well illustrate this point. (14) My boss asked me to – or us as a team to work the weekend again. And we’d already worked every night late for about three months. We worked lots of weekends, and we were kna- – knackered, we was just so tired, and we knew also that it was a bit of a fruitless project, but you know, you can never say that to management, you just have to do it. And ahm he made it very clear that we were working the weekend and he wasn’t. And at that point I completely flipped. And I just banged my head on the desk in front of him and said, “I’m not fucking doing that again.” And then I walked out and did a Miss Piggy and just flipped my hair back. I mean and that’s ah that’s it, isn’t it. And just walked out. He never referred to it again, he never spoke of it again. (T17 Wood)

The structure here rests (almost entirely) on content. The narrative opens with an orientation phase (My boss asked me … fruitless project), followed by an evaluation (but you know … to management). Then we have – as the complicating action part – a concrete situation with an action (he made it very clear…) which, in turn, leads to another action-phase (At that point I completely flipped…) – the climax – rounded off by yet another action-phase, i.e., her ‘strong’ exit. The last sentence, finally, reports on the result, which consists in the fact that her comportment had no negative consequences, and possibly even a positive effect (i.e., her never being asked again by her boss).

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A minimal (graphic) form of marking the boundaries between the narrative components of the text could be achieved by introducing paragraphs: (15) My boss asked me to – or us as a team to work the weekend again. And we’d already worked every night late for about three months. We worked lots of weekends, and we were kna- – knackered, we was just so tired, and we knew also that it was a bit of a fruitless project. (But you know, you can never say that to management, you just have to do it.) And ahm he made it very clear that we were working the weekend and he wasn’t. And at that point I completely flipped. And I just banged my head on the desk in front of him and said, “I’m not fucking doing that again.” And then I walked out and did a Miss Piggy and just flipped my hair back. I mean and that’s ah that’s it, isn’t it. And just walked out. He never referred to it again, he never spoke of it again.

In spoken form, an equivalent minimal marking is achieved by pauses between the single parts. (16) records the pauses actually occurring in the original document. (16) My boss asked me to – or us as a team to work the weekend again. And we’d already worked every night late for about three months. We worked lots of weekends, and we were kna- – knackered, we was just so tired, and we knew also that it was a bit of a fruitless project, but you know, you can never say that to management, you just have to do it. (1.04 sec.) And ahm he made it very clear that we were working the weekend and he wasn’t. And at that point I completely flipped. And I just banged my head on the desk in front of him and said, “I’m not fucking doing that again.” And then I walked out and did a Miss Piggy and just flipped my hair back. I mean and that’s ah that’s it, isn’t it. And just walked out. (1.72 sec.) He never referred to it again, he never spoke of it again.

Only the main structural units are actually marked; it would, theoretically speaking, have of course been possible also to mark, say, the three (successive) subunits that make up the central narrative part, i.e., his remark – her flipping out – her walking out – though it would have had, in this instance, a certain minimalist effect. The variants in (15) and (16) realize gaps – visually or orally. These gaps re present – in themselves – an absence or a suspense of linguistic information, based on speech productive activity. They cause discontinuity in the narrative process. Their (resulting) structuring function relies on conversational reasoning . They are different from pauses connected with speech production and planning.


on the basis of cooperation principles. But there is no meta-quality about them. Nor is there any about those signs which often complement such gaps contextually: prosodic and/or kinesic signs marking a closing of the preceding narrative phase or an opening of the following one. In most instances, these signs can be categorized as metaphorics in that they express an abstract meaning in concrete nonverbal terms. In example (17), the end of a narrative phase is indicated prosodically, in (18) kinesically. (17) to this very day// prosody: markedly low pitch configuration; markedly low intensity configuration (T 09 Thomas 01:10) (18) and a multicoloured [jacket] (0.76) the weekends we played kinesics: active arm/hand is put down on the arm rest of his chair where he sits in (T 13 Phillips 00:32)

In (19), we find a combined, prosodic and kinesic marking at the beginning of the new phase. (19) in Miss Kilpatrick’s class (0.46) [[and]1 it has led]2 me to believe (1) kinesics: change of head position (2) prosodics: high pitch configuration, high intensity configuration, high tempo configuration10 (T 61 Puttnam 01:19/20)

A special, and therefore particularly interesting, case of a gap or suspense is encountered in the following example: (20) of a haircut she wanted (1.23) and it was Helena Christensen hand gesture freeze and lip freeze (T 08 Oli 00:04)

The gap here is ‘articulated’ exhaustively in three modes; verbally and articulatorily there is a zero-signal, and kinesically we have a freeze within bodily movements which implies zero movement as well.

4.3.2 Beyond marking: the metapragmatic use of (lip) adaptors Such gaps, however, are also in themselves accessible to certain forms of redress. They reinforce the function as a gap- and discontinuity marker, and, at the same time, fill the gaps by contributing some substance which is different from the narrative. This redress effects an explicit structural marking; and one explicit marking of narrative structures will be shown to be metapragmatic (which is not necessarily tantamount to metanarrative – cf. below). Among the material fit for filling 10. Wennerstrom (2001) treats these signals under the term ‘paratone’.

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such gaps are not only metalinguistic lexemes and phrases (e.g., so much for that, now comes the best) – as expected – but also nonverbal means, i.e., (selected) vocal alternants (e.g., smacking) and kinesic adaptors. These kinesic adaptors with their structuring function in narratives will henceforth receive our exclusive attention.11 Adaptors certainly form part of ‘the repertoire of nonverbal behavior’, as the title to a classic by Ekman and Friesen (1969) reads, but are not normally categorized as gestures. The term rather refers to kinesic behavior meant to meet certain physical or emotional needs, for instance the reduction of inner tension. They consist in the manipulation of a body part of one’s own (self-adaptor) or of somebody else (alter-directed adaptor), or with an object (object adaptor). They are produced “with little awareness and no intention to transmit a message” (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 86) and, thus, prototypically occur independently of speech. Someone listening to music, for example, may run their hand through their hair or press their nose. Where they co-occur with language they are similar to affect displays, with which, in fact, they tend to merge in these instances. (21) and th[is was September (1.35)]1 [first of September (0.37) war I think was declared on the third]2 of September [1] changes sitting position inside the armchair [2] folded hands move a bit up and down (wiggling) (T 62 Baddiley 00:09-00:15)

Very often, and especially in interview situations, adaptors of the sort as in (21) are indicative of tension or nervousness; they serve as a vehicle for adapting to the uneasy situation of talking in front of the TV camera. But adaptors may acquire more speech-related significance: They can function as structuring signals. This happens when they occur in between stretches of narrative speech, filling the pauses arising. In this function, they can be regularly observed in the auto-biographical narratives of the TV interviews, which form the data base for this investigation. But what substance do they add while reinforcing the gap and its narrative discontinuity? And how may their structuring be distinguished from simple pauses? Adaptors in speech are, I contend, withdrawals from speaking; in narratives, in particular, the speaker withdraws from narrating and returns to him- or herself. 11. A metapragmatic function for (nonverbal) adaptors is not something normally associated with them. McNeill did not even take them into consideration. They did not pop up in his data, though they consisted of narratives (stimulated, however, by the famous comic-series about Tweety Bird and Sylvester); and they were outside his theoretical focus, which centered around gestures co-expressive with speech.


This is an act of Selbstbehauptung (self-assertion), which – to this high degree – is possible only in oral, face-to-face narratives. It is an act, however, that – in weakened form – marks one end of a cline on which any narrative can be located. Literary theory offers various notions to define the two opposites on this cline.12 Doležel (1967), for example, introduces, as typological notions, ‘text with speaker’ and ‘text without speaker’, where “the notion of speaker is to be understood in the structural, immanent sense” (p. 544), corresponding with certain linguistic features. Whatever the stance is that the narrator assumes in a face-to-face situation, she or he has the opportunity to define her or his presence physically.13 Besides deictic gestures, gaze behavior and affect displays, adaptors offer much scope for this definition.14 At the moment in which a speaker/narrator deploys an adaptor, any narrative will become – at least for that moment – a ‘text with speaker’ – literally, but also structurally. In structure-motivated pauses they acquire their structural ‘dignity’ and significance through a substantial lengthening of the break. The pause is filled with a reflection, so to speak, on the precondition of any narrative, namely the existence of the narrator. “Don’t forget it is I who is telling the story. I have just finished one part of my story and will start the next when I have finished my grooming.” – this might serve as an appropriate paraphrase for the metapragmatic meaning of such adaptors. The function of reinforcing the narrator’s (physical) presence (and his or her structuring skill) could in theory be fulfilled by any auto-adaptor, of any physical format. The data, however, show a preference for a few variants. The examples which occur clearly reinforce the current interpretation. The first kind to mention is rather unobstrusive. It consists, basically, in the speaker’s returning to a (significant) ground position during structuring pauses, while the preceding (and sometimes also following) narrative phase shows vivid kinesic activities. By ‘significant’ I mean the assumption of a defined, composed, individual position; the most common significant position is sitting, relaxed but controlled, with hands together. A more marked variation is the ground position taken by the narrator of T 19.

12. For a survey, cf. Titunik 1977. 13. Linguistic means of establishing the narrator’s presence are those usually associated with the authorial stance in narratives, cf. Stanzel 1964. 14. In addition, there are certain iconic gestures, i.e., iconic gestures which show an observer’s point of view (as opposed to participant’s point of view); cf. McNeill 1992: 118–125.

122 Axel Hübler

(22)

(T 19 Guignard 00:52-00:53)

To this ground position (as such already an impressive token of physical presence!) the narrator returns on two subsequent occasions when he inserts structuring pauses into his narrative. (23) and [Nicholas got caught up in that]1 ([1.48]2) because he had leaned a[cross it to activate ah]3 [one of the ahm]4 oper[ation switches (1.08]5) n’that’s an activity which is strictly prohibited [1] illustrating with both hands iconically the notion of being caught up [2] crossing the arms over his chest [3] moving hand and arm as if pressing a button [4] moving index and middle finger quickly up and down to express multitude of switches [5] crossing the arms over his chest and re-adjusting this position anew (T 19 Guignard 00:50-01:07)

The pauses mark, in each instance, the boundary between two different phases, one that contributes to the story and one that provides important explanations for a better understanding. In this case, it should not be forgotten that the self adaptor (gesture 2) prefaces a phase in which the narrator – through his explanation (because…) – profiles himself anyway. But there are other examples that do not fit this pattern. While this first kind of metapragmatic adaptor highlights the role of the narrator by topicalizing the narrator as individual, the other two variants highlight the speaking activity, by topicalizing the act of locution in negative terms. In each case, a significant role is played by the lips.


(24) I started to look at him differently ([1.18]) and then he said to my husband licks her lips briefly

(T 58 Reibnitz 00:25 – 00:31) (25) there were only one way … or it would gonna roll me up against this wall ([0.96]) so I started waving me arms (standing) brings his left hand (and arm) up to his lips, scratching the upper lip briefly with his digital finger

(T 44 Clegg 00:42-00:46)

In (24), pause and adaptor separate two narrative content phases, in (25) they separate an orientation phase from a narrative content phase. Both narrators engage in the respective adaptor as a second means of structuring; the significance of the gesture consists in demonstrating that the lips are not used at this moment as an instrument for speaking purposes. But the adaptors signify more than a pause in a talk. They attract, in addition, (subliminal) attention to themselves for their own sake. In (25), the narrator may – rather mundanely – try to relieve an itchy sensation. In (24), it seems as if a self-congratulating element were present, expressing through the lip licking a possible satisfaction about – well, possibly the narrative performance delivered so far. A paraphrase such as ‘So far so good’ might be appropriate here. The metapragmatic use of adaptors within structural pauses has, in itself, an interruptive effect.

124 Axel Hübler

Though simple pauses seem to suffice, something ‘weightier’ may definitely be preferable after such a ‘digression’, when the narrator wants to return to the story proper. Example (26), which is actually the continuation of (25), illustrates this well. Prosodically, we find a paratone (cf. Wennerstrom 2001), and kinesically, a very vivid and large-scaled iconic gesture where the speaker switches from an orientation phase back to the actual narrative event sequence (in the sense of Labov 1997). (26) there were only one way … or it would gonna roll me up against this wall (1.07) [[so I]1 started waving me arms]2 [1] prosodic: highly marked intensity15 [2] kinesic: large iconic gesture of waving with both hands (T 44 Clegg 00:42-00:46)

The gesture performed by the speaker not only serves the proposition; it also marks a switch in speaker roles (and thus a structural boundary) by showing the speaker as being back on stage as narrator after a brief suspense. This demonstrative, almost ostentatious overtone may be seen as carrying some metapragmatic trace as well.16

4.3.3 Generalizations The lip adaptor under review appears specialized so that one might arguably question whether it has much general significance. Five questions have been formulated which specifically address this concern. (a) Is the metapragmatic use of the adaptors observed merely idiosyncratic to the three narrators quoted? The data at my disposal clearly show that it has a wider scope. A lip-adaptor is also used by the male speaker in example (27), and the one in (28) deploys a variant of the arms-across-chest adaptor as a structuring device. (27) Tried to think of a different scenario instead of just jumping on ([0.71]) so a cowboy hat licks his lips at the right corner (T 53 Roberts 00:00-00:04)

15. Marked intensity is defined as higher than average. The values in this case are above mean value + standard deviation. 16. A mere prominent kinesic marker together with a prosodic paratone (cf. Wennerstrom 2001) at the beginning of the next narrative unit may be a viable alternative to also deploying a metapragmatic adaptor inside the pause.


(28) we’ve always talked about how much we love to set up business together ([0.56]) and after a while we said to ourselves fingertips of both hands joining in front of chest (T 32 Reed 00:06-00:11)

(b) Do the three variants introduced show any functional difference? Due to their more explicit relationship to the activity of speaking and not-speaking, the two lip variants, in my view, are more reflexive than the arms-across-chest variant and thus show more metapragmaticness. (c) Do they show gender-specific differences? It seems very tempting to associate the pure-lip adaptor with a female speaker, (24) being the ideal illustration. But there are also males who deploy it, as the following example (29) shows. (29) we went to see a brilliant film called Laura ([1.03]) and we went and sat up in the circle licks his lips (T 04 Moss 00:48-00:53)

We also encounter a lip adaptor with the male speaker in (23) whose arms-acrosschest gesture may easily be considered as a manly expression – he is, by the way, a retired army officer. (30) … simply creeping from side to side ([2.06]1) and he obviously elected an amplifier control unit ([1.57]2) unfortunately the amplifier control unit was not … (1)/(2) presses briefly lips together – each time with a low smacking sound (T 19 Guignard 00:10-00:20)

Remarkably enough, though, he does not wet the lips, but presses them together. Despite the subtle difference, the metapragmatic interpretation remains the same. The female speaker in T 63 (Patricia Clarke) also uses both smacking and lip pressing, but separately (00:42 and 01:06 respectively) and not in combination. These few examples already prove that gender differences – should they exist – manifest themselves only at quite subtle levels. (d) What about socio-cultural differences? Adaptive kinesic behavior in general may be sensitive to class – just as any other type. Here, however, we are confronted with a routinized form in a well defined functional context.17 And as such, they may be more likely to feature irrespective of social groups. But a qualitative difference in the use of these adaptive markers may nonetheless exist. The quality referred to is physicality, and the physicality inherent to different degrees in the various structuring markers may well turn out to be a distinctive social feature. The notion of physicality refers to the body’s participation in a communicative 17. It may even be worth questioning whether we should still speak of adaptors here.

126 Axel Hübler

act – beyond the parts that form the speech instrument, with lips and tongue as visible parts – and embraces the articulator (the body part that performs a kinesic movement) and the kinesic movement itself. Defining physicality in terms of size (both with respect to articulator-organ and movement), the hand-to-lip adaptor in example (25) will appear most physical because it comprises certainly the largest movement of all, whereas the pure lip adaptors in examples (24) or (29) are the smallest and thus the least physical.18 The data at my disposal do not provide a clear-cut picture as to the social distribution. The various types of adaptors are represented across social classes; only the size (and style of performance) may have a distinctive value. Narrators at the lower end of the social spectrum seem to prefer grosser forms of adaptors. (e) Apart from their metapragmatic function (in narratives), is there anything else ‘meta-ish’ about the adaptors under consideration? With respect to the two (interrelated) aspects I can think of, the answer is in both cases negative. First, while the linguistic means which exercise a metapragmatic function are certainly metalinguistic (cf. the introductory chapter to the volume), the kinesic (adaptive) means that were shown to do something similar, at least in narratives, are not metakinesic. Second, the metapragmatic use of adaptive gestures in narratives is not tantamount to a metanarrative function of these gestures, at least not in the central sense attached to the term by McNeill; while the use of metalanguage in narratives results in such metanarrative events. Not only do narrators tell the story plot line, but they may also make explicit references to the structure of the story as they build it up. Clauses representing the story about the story are interwoven with the narrative level and constitute the metanarrative level. […] Any reference to metanarrative events requires the ability to manipulate the story as a unit and to objectify it, and to comment on the story as an event in itself. (McNeill 1992: 186)

The adaptors tackled can have a metapragmatic function in narratives, but never exercise a metanarrative function.

5.

Conclusion

Acknowledging the significance of gestures for communication is no longer restricted to paying lip service; more and more research is geared toward describing and explaining the central role of gesturing for speaking and thinking. The 18. The social value attributed to an articulator may also influence physicality. Accordingly, lip adaptors – and in particular those involving the tongue (wetting the lips) – convey an air of sensuality that may increase the physicality of the kinesic unit.


tacit question which the article has tried to provide a preliminary answer to was: Can gestures contribute to the topic of metapragmatics? The assumption was, of course, positive, and the results, I think, confirm the assumption. Firstly, it was shown that gestural behavior as a topic for metapragmatic comments is a valid subject for investigation and could even precipitate into an historical assessment of fashions and norms of conversing. Secondly, gestures could be shown to serve as metapragmatic acts. Three contexts were identified in which they serve this function, i.e., speech act function, predication, and structuring. Whether other contexts exist, is a question which is presently hard to assess.

References Caffi, C. 1998. “Metapragmatics.” In Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics, J.L. Mey (ed.), 581– 586. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Doležel, L. 1967. “The typology of the narrator: point of view in fiction.” In To Honor Roman Jakobson, 541–552. The Hague: Mouton. Ekman, P. and Friesen, W.V. 1969. “The repertoire of nonverbal behavior: Categories, origins, usage, and coding.” Semiotica 1: 49–98. Haiman, J. 1990. “Sarcasm as theatre.” Cognitive Linguistics 1–2. 181–205. Huddleston, R. and Pullum, G.K. 2002. The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hübler, A. 1990. “‘Express’ and conduit metaphor.” In English Past and Present. Papers Read at the First National Conference of History of English, J. Aitchison, T. Frank and N. Pantaleo (eds), 149–157. Fasano: Schena. Hübler, A. 2007. The Nonverbal Shift in Early Modern English Conversation. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Labov, W. 1972. “The transformation of experience in narrative syntax.” In Language in the Inner City. Studies in the Black English Vernacular, W. Labov (ed.), 354–396. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Labov, W. 1997. “Some further steps in narrative analysis.” The Journal of Narrative and Life History. Also: http://www.ling.upenn.edu/~wlabov/sfs.html Linke, A. 1996. Sprachkultur und Bürgertum. Zur Mentalitätsgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart: Metzler. Lucy, J.A. 1993. Reflexive Language. Reported Speech and Metapragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McNeill, D. 1995. Hand and Mind. What Gestures Reveal about Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Norrick, N. 2000. Conversational Narrative. Storytelling in Everyday Talk. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Searle, J. 1969. Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. London: Cambridge University Press. Stanzel, F.K. 1964. Typische Formen des Romans. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Rupprecht.

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Titunik, I.R. 1977. “Das Problem des skaz.” In Erzählforschung 2. Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik, Wolfgang Haubrichs (ed.), Beiheft 6, 114–140. Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht. Wennerstrom, A. 2001. The Music of Everyday Speech. Prosody and Discourse Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Whigham, F. 1984. Ambition and Priviledge. The Social Tropes of Elizabethan Courtesy Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sources Barclay, A. 1570. The Mirrour of Good Maners Conteining the Foure Cardinal Vertues, Compiled in Latin by Dominike Mancin. New York: Franklin. [1967] Braithwait, R. 1630. The English Gentleman. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. [1994] Hawkins, F. 1646. Youth Behaviour or Decencie in Conversation Amongst Men. Fourth edition, London: Lee. University Microfilms International. Ann Arbor, Mich. [1980]

Language shift in conversation as a metapragmatic comment* Hartmut Haberland

1. Language alternation in multilingual communities Most of us do not just speak one language; far from being the norm, the monolingual language user is rather the exception on a global scale. Since one cannot be a speaker of more than one language without sometimes speaking in one language and sometimes in another, language alternation must be a quite common phenomenon. There is a vast literature about different kinds of language alternation. One strain of research has focused on language choices appropriate to a given situation. One of the points made about these language choices is that in stable multilingual communities, competent speakers usually agree which language is appropriate in a given situation. They make their choices spontaneously and without much or any negotiation. Language shift happens between speech situations and at the beginning of an encounter, and for the individual speaker, it often follows long stretches of silence. The concept of domain (Werlen 2004, but critically Haberland 2005) tries to capture the relevant conditions for this type of language choice. If language shift occurs within one conversation, but still in the framework of one stable multilingual community, one has traditionally talked about codeswitching, with a crucial distinction between two sub-kinds: situational codeswitching and metaphorical code-switching. * Thanks to Bodil Folke Frederiksen, Lina Konstantinou, Wangeshi Makridis, Soula Pavlidou, Gitte Rasmussen and Noriko Takeuchi for help with data, and to Lina Konstantinou for endless discussions about language alternation. 1. Cf. Blom and Gumperz 1972. This contribution has been theoretically important, although the authors hardly understood their data, i.e., the language situation in Hemnesberget, properly, cf. Mæhlum (1996).

130 Hartmut Haberland

The idea of situational code-switching can best be understood as a projection of the domain concept into one and the same speech situation. In a stable bilingual community, each domain has associated a dominant language; choosing this language is the most appropriate choice for this domain. If a language choice is revised within a situation, it must mean that the situation has been reinterpreted as a different one, hence the code switch. This is different from metaphorical code-switching, where one of the speakers exploits the surplus meaning potential in the shared codes to express additional meanings to those contained in the propositional content of the utterances. This has probably been described best by Fishman: The fact that co-members of the same speech networks or speech communities also change from one variety to another without signaling any change in situation, is also indicative of the categorizing in which native members so frequently and effortlessly engage. When variety switching is fleeting and non-reciprocal it (Fishman 1972: 6) is commonly called metaphorical in nature.

Fishman points out that this code switching for purposes of “emphasis or contrast, rather than as an indication of situational discontinuity” (1972: 6) is risky. To take Fishman’s example: switching to a dialect might be considered in bad taste by some people in some situations. Metaphorical switching is a luxury that can be afforded only by those that comfortably share not only the same set of situational norms but also the same view as to their inviolability. (Fishman 1972: 6)

If metaphorical code-switching is floating and non-reciprocal, then by implication situational code-switching is stable and reciprocal, i.e., it is assumed that all participants usually categorize the situation as requiring the same language to be chosen. All these cases of language alternation take place within multilingual communities. If speakers from different language communities meet, they often have the possibilities of choosing between several languages for their encounter: e.g. the dominant language of either community, the local language and some lingua franca. But unlike within a multilingual community, where knowledge of appropriateness of language choice is part of the communicative competence of its members, disagreement about which language to use is more likely in these cases. . Coulmas’ (1997: 100) Local Language Maxim. . As Gafaranga and Torras (2002) have pointed out, in multilingual communities (which are much more common than monolingual ones) even language alternation itself as the medium can be the appropriate choice.

Language shift in conversation as a metapragmatic comment 131

If such disagreement arises, it can be made explicit by a metapragmatic act with an appropriate propositional content (like “Why don’t we speak English?”). In my paper, I want to focus on a different option: one of the speakers initiates a language shift. I suggest analyzing this type of language shift as a metapragmatic act.

2. Language shift as an act Before I proceed any further, I would like to comment on the problem how a language shift can be an act. We are all aware of the fact that we can do things not only with words, but also with silence. But calling silence a speech act is awkward: where is the speech? If an act is something you can be held responsible for – popularly speaking, you can get in jail for –, then remaining silent is obviously an act as well, since you have to take on a responsibility for it. And when the defendant is informed about his or her right to remain silent, this only underlines the fact that silence is an act you not always are entitled to perform. One awkwardness remains: if an act of silence is a speech act, it is a speech act without propositional content. Thus it gets close to Malinowski’s phatic communion, which he defined as a form of bonding by language without communication, i.e., by utterances without content, or at least without content that matters. Language shift as well is an act without any propositional content. Again: many examples of banned language use show that choosing a language is something we can be held responsible for, hence it must be an act, but again, a linguistic act without any propositional content. Admittedly, one cannot shift language with or under silence. If I want to shift languages within a conversation (say, from English to German), I have to utter at least one utterance in German. This utterance would normally carry a propositional content, but the propositional content of this utterance would be prima facie independent of the language shift itself. The act of shifting into another language carries a meaning, but this is a surplus meaning of the communicative act, independent of the core meaning communicated in this act, which is its propositional content. This does not mean that language shift cannot be accompanied by another metacommunicative act which explicitly thematizes language choice. In one of the dialogs reported by Coulmas (1987), this seems to be the case.

. Mey (2001: 222) discusses silence as a pragmatic act in this sense (with further references).


(1) (from Coulmas 1987: 96f.) 1 C Manēkādo de rokujūman en sika torihikenai node kōza tsūchō-o motte kimashita desu. Kore de hyakuman en-o torihite kudasai. ‘With my cash card I can only withdraw 600,000 Yen at a time. So I brought my bankbook. Please withdraw 1,000,000 Yen for me.’ 2 N Hai, shōshō o-machi kudasai. ‘Yes, just a moment please.’ 3 (hands C a form)

→ 4 N 5 C 6 N 7 C → 8 N

Puriize sain. Hai? ‘Yes?’ yua neme, here Sumimasen ga, ima eigo-o shabetteru no wa naze desu ka? ‘Excuse me, why are you speaking English now.’ ah, o-kyakusama wa nihongo jōzu desu ne. ‘Oh, the customer speaks Japanese very well.’

In this dialogue, turn 8 (‘The customer speaks Japanese very well’) is definitely a metapragmatic comment. But also turn 4, a shift into not fully adequate English (‘Please sign’), can be interpreted as a metapragmatic comment. We will come back to the question what this comment is supposed to mean. A more complex case is the following, reported by Parkin (1974). The setting is a market in Nairobi, where a Kikuyu stallholder (K) has an exchange with her Luo (L) customer. (2) (from Parkin 1974: 194) 1 K [luo] Omera, nadi! ‘How are you, brother!’ 2 L [luo] Maber. ‘Fine.’ → 3 K [kikuyu] Ati –– [swahili] nini? ‘What what?’ → 4 L [swahili] Ya nini kusema lugha ambao huelewi mama? ‘Why (try) to speak a language you don’t know, mum?’ 5 K [english] I know – [hybrid] kijaluo – [english] very well. ‘I know Luo very well’ 6 L [swahili] Wapi! – [english] You do not know it at all. – . In this paper, examples taken from the literature are reproduced with some normalization (turn counting, use of the → marker, usually not present in the original). Glossing is usually paraphrastic.


7 K

[swahili]

Wacha haya, nipe mayai mbili.

‘Go on! You don’t know it at all. Anyway, let’s leave the matter, and give me two eggs.’

Unataka mayai – [luo] ariyo, omera – [swahili] haya ni – [luo] tongolo – [swahili] tatu. ‘You wish eggs, brother? O.K., that will be three ten-cents.’ [swahili]

The stallholder starts the conversation in Luo, but after a less than perfect uptake of the customer’s Luo in turn 3, the Luo customer shifts to Swahili (interspersed with English) from turn 4 on, which he seems to consider a viable lingua franca in this particular language encounter. There are explicit metapragmatic acts in this conversation. This starts already in turn 3, where K asks for repetition or clarification (probably meaning ‘I didn’t get this’), but continues in turn 4 (‘Why speak a language you don’t know?’) and turn 5 (‘I know Luo very well’), countered by a final metapragmatic act in turn 6, ‘You don’t know it at all’. So whatever the metapragmatic content of the language shifts is, it is here less prominent compared to the explicit metapragmatic comments accompanying the language choice. Finally there are cases where language shift is similar to situational codeswitching, but where two speakers do not so much adjust to the topic of conversation, but accommodate to each others’ mutual repertoires. This does not even require a multilingual community which follows rules for language choice in these cases. Simple common sense is sufficient in this case. It helps, though, if the interlocutors share and remember a past communicative history, like apparently in the following example taken from Rasmussen and Wagner (2002). (3) (from Rasmussen and Wagner 2002: 117) 1 ((telephone rings)) 2 A Automatic bonjour? Good afternoon 3 (0.6) 4 C: ja hallo hier ist Belin:da von Automatic, yes hello this is Belinda from Automatic, 5 (.) .h Gilles Durand bitte: Gilles Durand please? 6 (0.2) → 7 A: ein: moment bitte? one moment please? 8 C: ºvieln dankº thank you


A shifts into German in turn 7 (after a pause of 0.2 sec), since she realizes that this is the language C has chosen in turn 4. This is a ratification of C’s choice. That A shifts language as compared with her own turn 2, is totally conditioned by C’s choice of language in turn 4. C’s choice, on the other hand, can not really be considered a language shift. It is C’s first turn and she does therefore not shift in relationship to a prior utterance of her own. Very literally taken, C shifts language vis-à-vis A’s first turn 2, “Automatic bonjour?”, but this is not to be taken as a language shift since A certainly has German as one of her linguistic options and just waits for the customer to choose a language.

3. The metapragmatic content of language shifts Data for the phenomenon I want to discuss here are not easily obtained. Since it is not easy to predict when and where they might occur, planned sampling is difficult. Therefore, the two following examples I base my discussion on are reconstructions of conversations from memory. I do not have to stress the problematic status of these data, but I think they suffice to point out a potentially interesting area for further research. It is especially a disadvantage that it is impossible to reconstruct the length of pauses, especially in (6), where they would be relevant. (4) C calling a ryokan in Tokyo 1 (telephone rings) 2 A hai, sawanoya ryokan de gozaimasu ‘yes, it’s Sawanoya Ryokan’ 3 C ano, kochira rosukirude no daigaku no NN desu. ‘uh, this is NN from Roskilde University’ Denmaaku kara denwa o kakete … yakusoku ‘I’m calling from Denmark … I’d like to make shitai n desu ga … a reservation’ […] 20 A: hai. kekkoo desu. Doo mo arigatoo gozaimasu. ‘yes. It’s fine. Thank you very much.’ 21 C: doo mo arigatoo ‘thank you very much’ 22 A: e: ima fax mo gozaimasu ga … ‘uh, we have also a fax now …’ 23 C: soo desu ne. ano, fax no bangoo wa nangoo desu ka ‘really? Well, what is the fax number?


→ 24 A: 25 C: 26 A: 27 C:

hai, bangoo wa zero three, three eight two two, ‘yes, the number is zero three, three eight two two two two five two two two five two.’ hai, rei san, san hachi ni ni, ni ni go ni deshita. ‘yes, it was zero three three eight two two two two five’ doo mo arigatoo gozaimashita ‘thank you very much’ sayonara ‘good bye’

What happens in this dialogue is roughly the following. C initiates a phone call whose purpose is to book a room in a Japanese-style inn in Tokyo. The manager (A) identifies himself in Japanese, and the customer (C) replies in Japanese, identifying himself and the purpose of his call. This is followed by a longish (16 turns) successful exchange in Japanese, during which the booking is made. In turns 20 and 21, the participants ratify the end of the exchange. Instead of calling off, in turn 22 the manager brings up a new topic: the hotel has recently got a fax machine. In turn 23, the customer asks for the fax number. The manager starts his next turn by saying ‘Well, the number is …’ in Japanese and switches into English for giving the actual number. The customer takes up the information, but not the language shift, and repeats the number just given to him in Japanese. After this, the usual finalizing exchanges are made (in Japanese by both participants) and the phone call is closed. The important point is the shift into English in turn 24. It is unlikely that the manager, who just has negotiated a not totally trivial room reservation with the foreign customer in Japanese, involving figures for room rates and numbers for dates, accommodates to the linguistic repertoire of the customer assuming that understanding numbers in Japanese is beyond the linguistic capacities of the customer. We can also exclude both situational and metaphorical code-switching. As to situational code-switching, we can assume that telephone numbers are not associated with a particular domain for any of the interlocutors. Since the language shift is non-reciprocal (i.e., not ratified by the customer), metaphorical . One of my students in Roskilde, Tuva Løkse (personal communication), who is Norwegian, told me that she usually speaks Norwegian with Danes (who then answer in Danish, a quite common communicative pattern in Scandinavia), with one exception though: she would always switch into Danish for addresses (in Copenhagen), especially street names. Danes would accept and understand Norwegian gate [ˇ:a:tә] for Danish gade [':˚ε:ðә or ':˚ε:ð], but not as part ' of a street name like Vestergade.


code-switching looks like a slightly better candidate, but it is neither obvious why giving a phone number in English would add a particular social or contextual meaning to the utterance, which would make this a case of metaphorical codeswitching, and what that added meaning would be. Most important, both situational and metaphorical code-switching are supposed to be part of the linguistic resources of a stable speech network or speech community. Customer and manager do not belong to the same speech community, and not even to a speech network, since the customer only occasionally performs room bookings by phone with Japanese inns, and it can also be assumed that the manager does not often negotiate bookings in Japanese with foreign customers in Japanese. Monica Heller suggests that the concept of situational and metaphorical code-switching (which originally were only discussed “with respect to homogeneous groups who share the same experiences of the two languages or … varieties”, 1988: 6) could be extended to inter-group communication, and mentions the following example: If an English-speaking Quebecer is used to speaking French with French-speaking colleagues at work, he or she might feel put at a distance – put out of the group – if one of those French-speaking colleagues suddenly started speaking English with him or her. (Heller 1988: 6)

Refusal to use the ‘we’-code is a device to position a person outside a group. But this still presupposes regular group contact, not occasional individual contacts across language borders, as not only in this example, but also in the following ones, (5) and (6). The foreigner is quite trivially outside the group of the local speaker und does not have to be positioned outside this group. Thus, our conclusion is that the manager intended to perform a metapragmatic comment or metapragmatic act with his language shift. The question is of course: what is the content of the comment, or what is the purpose of the act? Before we continue this discussion, let us have a look at two final, connected exchanges. (5) The customer C calls at a hotel in Athens. The hotel clerk H is at the reception desk. Early evening 1 C καλησπέρα, το όνομα μου είναι Χ ‘good evening, my name is X’ 2 H Good afternoon


3 C 4 H 5 C 6 H → 7 C 8 H

Έκανα τηλέφωνο από τη Δανία τώρα και μια εβδομάδα και έκλεισα ένα δωμάτιο, μονόκλινο χωρίς μπάνιο, για τρείς νύχτες ... ‘I called from Denmark a week ago and booked a room, single without bath, for three nights’ yes, very well … θα φύγω στη Παρασκευή ‘I’m leaving on Friday’ yes, leaving on Friday. Here’s your key What is the room number Eighteen

(6) Much later, after midnight, the same evening. H has opened the front door for the customer returning late. They are together in the elevator. 1 C It’s getting cold now. Quite chilly in the evenings, almost like in Denmark right now 2 (long pause) 3 H ναι ‘yes‘ 4 (long pause) → 5 C Κάνει κρύο στις νύχτες και στην Ελλάδα .... σχεδόν σαν στην Δανία. ‘it’s cold during the nights also in Greece, almost like in Denmark’ 6 H Βέβαια. Πέρασε το καλοκαίρι και σε ένα μήνα θα’ναι χειμώνας ‘right. Summer is gone and in a month’s time it will be winter‘

The structure in these two exchanges (5) and (6) is more complex than in (4). In turn 5–8 of the first exchange, a struggle for dominance is fought: who has the right to define the common language of the exchange? C obviously prefers Greek, H prefers English. In turn 7, C gives in and switches into English. In the second exchange, C starts a conversation in English, the language he assumed H preferred, and that he had accepted as common language at the end of the earlier exchange. But H barely acknowledges C’s contribution, after a long pause, with just one word, and in Greek (turn 3). In turn 5, C reverses the language shift and reverts to Greek, which is taken up by H in turn 6. I would say that both the silence (turn 2) and the shift to Greek by both speakers in turn 3 and 4 have a metapragmatic impact. In turn 2, C obviously had selected H as the next speaker, so the long pause signals missing uptake of turn 1 by H, and the single-word answer in Greek (ναι) in turn 3 is hardly more than a phatic signal to the effect that the channel is still open.


Silence is only a metapragmatic indicator, not a purposeful act. H may just be uncomfortable with speaking English in this situation and at this time of the night. But it takes C a while to accept the reversal of the language choice. The renewed silence in turn 4 does not unambiguously belong to him; but since he contributes the next turn 5, he does obviously not consider the exchange finished. Why it takes him so long to contribute 5, we can only guess. His long silence could indicate a reluctance to revert to his original language preference, be it out of a stubborn childishness, or for reasons of face preservation. At any rate, the pause prepares his linguistically manifest, audible move in turn 5, by which he shifts to Greek. Apparently, C’s English is better than his Greek, but his wish to speak Greek in spite of this is due to the desire of authenticity. The worst possible interpretation of H’s insisting on speaking English is for C that H challenges C’s desire for authenticity as being a self-delusion.

4. The need for metapragmatic acts in multilingual inter-community communication We can make the basic assumption that multilingualism is a resource both for the language community and the individual. I emphatically disagree with Mackey who writes: A self-sufficient linguistic community has no reason to remain bilingual, since a closed community in which everybody is fluent in two languages could get along just as well with one language. (Mackey 2000: 26)

The critical point is ‘just as well’. As long as there is a functional differentiation between the two languages there are obvious reasons for a community not to abandon its multilingualism. Since in a number of instances of code-switching the direction of the switch is immaterial, and the only matter that counts is the alternation, multilingualism may not even require a functional differentiation between languages or codes in order to be functional in itself. Now sociolinguists seem to agree that language alternation in multilingual communities is self-regulatory. Participants have a clear idea of what is the unmarked language choice, or the unmarked pattern of language alternation, in a given situation. There is not much need for metapragmatic acts which display the participants’ knowledge of

. Silence often indicates that something has gone wrong; it also can be followed by a topic change (thanks to Lina Konstantinou for pointing this out to me). . What in German is called sich in die eigene Tasche lügen.


how to control and monitor ongoing interaction (Caffi 1998: 585), because much of the language choices follows established and mutually agreed upon rules that do not have to be negotiated anew in new encounters. Metapragmatic acts offer “a labeling of preceding actions … or subsequent ones” (Caffi 1998: 585), like ‘This was a question’. But when people know which language to speak when to whom, there is not often need for such metapragmatic regulatory interventions, like ‘This was the wrong language’. This picture changes when multilingual persons from different language communities meet. Here common rules for language choice and language alternation are usually lacking. Speakers try to follow the rules they know or the rules they expect their interlocutors to prefer – the mutual understanding of the rules thus followed is not always clear. Even who counts as a competent speaker of a language (and therefore has the right to enter certain exchanges or not) can be doubtful and negotiable. Non-standardized situations require ad-hoc solutions. The participants do not follow a pre-established order of language alternation, but make it up as they go along. This interactional bricolage gives ample room for metapragmatic comments. In this paper, I have directed attention to a particular type of metapragmatic comment which does not have a propositional content, but only consists in a revised language choice or language alternation. Since there is no propositional content, the purport of these acts is open to even more interpretation – guesswork, if one prefers so – than that of indirect speech acts. Different explanations can be offered for the hotel manager’s temporary language shift in (4) and for the clerk’s imposture of English on the customer in (5), which he afterwards revises. What is clear though, is that these language alternations are not arbitrary and the manifestation of the participants’ wish to control conversation and to let it develop on the lines they themselves are most comfortable with. Our understanding of the world is often underdetermined, so we cannot always be sure what actually is going on. I still would maintain that we are dealing with metapragmatic acts in the examples discussed.

References Blom, J.P. and Gumperz, J.J. 1972. “Social meaning in linguistic structure.” In Directions in Sociolinguistics, J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds), 407–434. New York: Academic Press. Caffi, C. 1998. “Metapragmatics.” In Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics, J.L. Mey (ed.), 581– 586. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Coulmas, F. 1987. “Why speak English?” In Analyzing Intercultural Communication, K. Knapp, W. Enninger and A. Knapp-Potthoff (eds), 95–107. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.


Fishman, J. 1972. “The sociology of language.” In Language in Sociocultural Change, A.S. Dil (ed.), 1–15. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. Gafaranga, J. and Torras, M.-C. 2002. “Interactional otherness: Towards a redefinition of codeswitching.” The International Journal of Bilingualism 6(1): 1–22. Haberland, H. 2005. “Domains and domain loss.” In The Consequences of Mobility: Linguistic and Sociocultural Contact Zones, Bent Preisler et al. (eds), Roskilde: Roskilde University Heller, M. 1988. Introduction. In Codeswitching. Anthropological and Sociolinguistic Perspectives, M. Heller (ed.). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Mackey, W.F. 2000. “The description of bilingualism.” In The Bilingualism Reader, L. Wei (ed.), 26–54. London: Routledge. Mey, J. 2001. Pragmatics: An Introduction. (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. Mæhlum, B. 1996. “Codeswitching in Hemnesberget – myth or reality?” Journal of Pragmatics 25: 749–761. Parkin, D. 1974. “Language switching in Nairobi.” In Language in Kenya, W.H. Whiteley (ed.), 189–216. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. Rasmussen, G. and Wagner, J. 2002. “Language choice in international telephone conversations.” In Telephone Calls: Unity and Diversity in Conversational Structure Across Languages and Cultures, K.K. Luke and Th.-S. Pavlidou (eds), 111–131. Amsterdam: Benjamins (Pragmatics and Beyond N.S. 101). Werlen, I. 2004. “Domäne/Domain.” In Sociolinguistics / Soziolinguistik. An International Handbook of the Science of Language and Society / Ein internationales Handbuch zur Wissenschaft von Sprache und Gesellschaft (HSK 3.1; 2nd ed.), U. Ammon, N. Dittmar, K. Mattheier and P. Trudgill (eds), 335–341. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

part b

Metapragmatics in educational use

Metapragmatic comments in institutional talk: A comparative analysis across settings Anna Ciliberti and Laurie Anderson

1.

Introduction: A definition of metapragmatic comments (MPCs) and aims of this paper

Work in the area of pragmatics has increasingly recognized in recent years that speakers’ explicit or implicit evaluation of language use permeates all human communication. One generally accepted definition of evaluation considers it as “the expression of the speaker or writer’s attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about” (Thompson and Hunston 1999: 5), a formulation that stresses its ideational and expressive functions. However, given that in oral interaction evaluation of language use is oriented also towards the talk of others and towards the relationships that through language use interlocutors establish amongst themselves, it also contributes to defining the context in which communication takes place. It is on this interactional role of evaluation that we will concentrate in this contribution. As has been frequently observed, evaluation may be either implicit or explicit. On the one hand, it may consist in drawing attention to a particular portion of talk by ‘marking’ it internally. Such marking is implicit and can draw on any level of linguistic structure: sentential, phrasal, lexical, phonological, paralinguistic etc. Labov (1972: 370–375) terms this mode of evaluation ‘internal’, Polanyi (1989: 24) ‘contential’. Evaluation can also appear, however, as a distinct, explicit structural component that interrupts the forward flow of talk. Labov (1972: 371) refers to this mode of evaluation as ‘external’, Polanyi (1989: 24) as ‘deictic’, defining it as the “evalu. The close analogies between this concept and Gumperz’s (1982) notion of ‘contextualization cues’ will be evident.

144 Anna Ciliberti and Laurie Anderson

ation of information encoded in one clause by devices realized in other clauses”. Explicit evaluation can either precede or follow the discourse to which it refers, assuming, in other words, a prospective or retrospective value. In line with the interactionalist perspective taken in this volume, we will focus in our contribution on explicit metapragmatic evaluations in actually-occurring contexts of use, on what we will term “metapragmatic comments”, or MPCs. Instances of MPCs taken from various corpora of spoken interaction collected in different institutional settings will be discussed in order to identify the contextual parameters that tend to favour their occurrence. Our aim is to investigate in what ways MPCs and the functions they accomplish can contribute to the categorisation of the contexts themselves. To do so, it will be necessary to consider who produces MPCs, what they refer to and where they tend to occur sequentially in talk. Our analysis, in other words, will focus on MPCs as situated phenomena, taking into account their participatory, referential and sequential characteristics. In this paper, the contexts we will consider have been categorized for heuristic purposes into two macro groups, which we will refer to broadly as: 1. ‘educational’ contexts 2. ‘media’ contexts. The distinction is designed to highlight the different social purposes that are pursued in these contexts. With the term ‘educational contexts’ we mean all those contexts in which the purpose of verbal activity is the transmission and development of knowledge, procedural competencies, rules of conduct. This category contains not just formal instructional settings but also those in which the primary aim of verbal activity is to socialise one or more participants to community/societal rules and norms of behaviour. The data from ‘educational contexts’ we will consider here include interactions between parents (or similar figures) and their children; interactions in instructional settings, from elementary schools to universities (Ciliberti and Anderson 1999; Ciliberti, Pugliese and Anderson 2003; Anderson 2004); therapeutic encounters with couples (Anderson 2000). The age and scholastic level of those

. ‘Comment’ is intended here, deliberately, as a minimalist concept (analogous to the pragmatic ‘superfunction’ of ‘stating’ or ‘describing’) which, depending of the type of interaction, may embrace a variety of more specific functions. . The fact that the data examined come from different cultural settings (Italy, Great Britain, U.S.A.) is secondary here, both because the cultures involved are relatively closely related and because the primary aim of this study is to identify macro categories which cut across discourse genres.

Metapragmatic comments in institutional talk 145

being ‘educated’ – we are using this term in a broad sense – obviously considerably affect the relationships between the interlocutors. With the term ‘media contexts’, we are referring to all those multiparty contexts in which the range of reception roles is complicated by the existence of participants who for various reasons cannot intervene in the interaction – or, at any rate, cannot intervene as full participants. The contexts we have included in this macro category are characterised by the existence of a dual communicative axis: internal and external. They include not only contexts such as talk shows, political debates (Anderson 2004) and theatrical performances, in which the presence of an audience is presupposed, but also – for reasons that will be clarified subsequently – ethnographic research contexts (Ciliberti 2007).

2.

‘Educational’ contexts: Principal functions of MPCs

Educational contexts are characterised by an abundance of MPCs with instructional and socialising functions. However, within this macro category, some distinctions need to be made on the basis of age, with higher-level instructional contexts and interactions with older offspring and adults being characterised by increasing symmetrical relationships between ‘educators’ and those being educated and consequently, as we will see, by a less pervasive use of MPCs.

2.1 MPCs in formal instructional contexts In examining the use of MPCs in formal instructional contexts, as we have anticipated above, it is useful to compare data coming from early and late stages of institutional teaching/learning: respectively, primary schools and higher education. In primary school classrooms, in order to successfully participate in the series of ‘classroom activities’ of which a lesson is composed, pupils and teachers need to . Levinson (1988) distinguishes the various reception roles hearers may assume as interlocutor, target, intermediary and audience; Clark (1982, 1993) distinguishes between addressees and side participants (further subdivided into overhearers, bystanders and eavesdroppers). Bell’s (1984) audience design framework is similar in various respects to Clark’s approach: he distinguishes between second-person (addressee) and third-person roles (auditor, overhearer, eavesdropper) and envisions these as both spatially arranged in concentric circles around the speaker and as implicationally ordered with respect to the speaker’s intentions and knowledge state. This latter model is, in our opinion, particularly suggestive for the analysis of the sorts of ‘media’ contexts we have in mind, as it provides a way of describing the differential access to information (and to the possibility of actual interaction) on the part of various types of participants.


share a common understanding of the activity they are engaged in. Metapragmatic discourse in this context serves to establish, maintain and modify the disciplinary, participatory, instructional and intertextual frames on which this understanding is based (Ciliberti et al. 2004: 161). As illustrated in examples 1 and 2, MPCs, as they are deployed in the management of classroom activities, serve to structure the participation and socialisation of pupils. Those used by teachers in this context are highly directive; they are also often comparative in nature, a characteristic that extends to the MPCs produced by the pupils themselves: . The excerpts we present in this contribution are drawn from research projects carried out over a 15-year period. The level of delicacy of the transcriptions (from relatively broad to narrow) varies according to the aims of the original research project. The following conventions are used for temporal and prosodic features of the talk, unless otherwise noted:

+

short pause (less than one second)

(n)

long pause (n = length in seconds)

=

latched to the preceding turn in the transcript

▼ text◄

spoken in overlap with next ▲text◄

▼ ▼ text◄◄

spoken in overlap with next ▲▲text◄◄

text

stressed syllable or in loud voice

text:

lengthening of previous sound or syllable

text-

syllable cut short

text -

tone group interrupted

>text<

faster tempo

slower tempo

°text °

low volume

[note]

comments (paralinguistic and extralinguistic features)

(text)

tape unclear: tentative transcription

(nsyll)

tape untranscribable: n = approximate number of syllables spoken

(??)

tape untranscribable

.

low fall intonation

,

fall-rise intonation

?

low rise intonation

!

rise-fall intonation


(1) primary school classroom (Italy) teacher Le vogliamo ripetere? Allora ripetiamole un po’ le stagioni visto che Elisa non se le ricorda. pupil Autunno. teacher Allora, insieme, anche Andrea. pupil Io. whole class [scandito] Autunno, inverno , primavera, estate. teacher Allora, aveva sbagliato Elisa che ha detto – pupil Però Wen-Jang ha detto autuno. teacher Bè, non l’ha pronunciato bene ma Jang intendeva English translation: teacher pupil teacher pupil whole class teacher pupil teacher

Shall we repeat them? Well then, let’s repeat the seasons a bit since Elisa doesn’t remember them. Autumn. So, all together, Andrea too. Me. [deliberately] Autumn [‘autunno’], winter, spring, summer. So, Elisa had made a mistake in saying – But Wen Jang said autuno (the pupil focuses on an error in Wen Jang’s pronunciation) Well, he didn’t pronounce it well, but Jang intended-

(2) primary school classroom (same class as example (1)) pupils (the row to the right of the teacher’s desk repeats the poem) teacher Allora, io devo fare i complimenti a Wen Jang perché mentre prima si rifiutava di + ripassare la poesia, anzi di imparare la poesia con Ida, adesso è stato molto attento, ha provato a ripetere la poesia con noi, senza averla letta. [alza la voce per rimproverare un alunno] Michael! [tono di voce normale] Quindi è stato bravo, adesso più la ripetiamo e più la impara Wen-Jang. English translation: pupils teacher

(the row to the right of the teacher’s desk repeats the poem) Well then, I must compliment Wen Jang because whereas before he refused to + go over the poem, or rather to learn the poem with Ida, now he has been very attentive, he’s tried to repeat the poem with us, without having read it. [raising her voice to reprimand a pupil] Michael! [normal tone of voice] So he’s been good, now the more we repeat it and the more Wen Jang will learn it.

Notice how the teacher’s comments on the pupils’ behaviour in these two examples are both prospective (first turn in example 1) and retrospective (the other MPCs


indicated in bold type); the former serve to organise upcoming talk; the latter, to socialise and integrate students with difficulties into the class as a learning community. Given the age and cognitive development of the children involved, teachers’ MPCs in this context tend to occur in clusters and refer to concrete actions, often through a reconstruction of the details of classroom life. In university seminar discussions, MPCs mainly serve instead to position participants’ contributions in terms of relative agreement/disagreement on a particular issue. This role of MPCs is illustrated in example (3), which comes from a doctoral seminar: in her first turn, Helena, who is making a presentation, hedges her statement by saying “I don’t know whether everyone would agree”, while later in the extract the professor retrospectively defines his own verbal behaviour by saying “I’m not disagreeing with you, but it’s just a caveat”: (3) doctoral seminar in political science (European University Institute, Florence, Italy) Helena, a Polish student, is making a presentation. Helena […] the distribution of organised interests across issue areas, from soft to hard areas, + is very unequal and this is (???) are very unequally distributed and we have unequal access to the European institutions. + And we can see here I’ve tried to (draw) a line here, I don’t know whether everyone would agree that trade unions ++ whether to place trade unions as a narrow or broad eh type of interest eh association, but you can have them above or below the- the line but anyhow you see that the frequencies are a lot greater. ▼on this lower side, this-◄ professor ▲you are missing◄ you’re missing the number on the (services) that is three hundred and something rather than just thirty one Helena >yeah yeah yeah< + I think like that but I’m not sure + professor mhmhmh. [laughs] Helena anyway ehm so-so business is the- the absolutely- is absolutely the strongest eh functional eh interest to be represented at the European level. + and ▼eh,◄ professor ▲I’m not◄ disagreeing with you but it’s just a caveat. Helena mm. professor in all political systems there are more business associations than trade unions. + Helena mm.

In university settings, positive evaluation of a student’s contribution on the professor’s part often coincides with agreeing with the student’s position; negative evaluation (as illustrated above) coincides instead with disagreement. This over-


lapping of evaluative and argumentative functions is made possible by the more symmetrical intellectual relationship between the two parties which allows for a collaborative form of knowledge construction. In addition to positioning participants’ contributions to the discussion, MPCs in university seminars also have the function of organising the upcoming talk. This is illustrated in example (4): after John concludes his presentation, the professor intervenes to say “I think we’ll have some discussion now”: (4) undergraduate seminar in history (G.B.) End of student presentation; transition to class discussion. John [...] So an earl would have a lot a lot of power over his peasants that lived on his land + because they had they had to do exactly what he wanted, or else he could quite easily get them killed for um allegedly being witches. + And that’s it. professor + I think we’ll have some discussion now, some questions now, else otherwise the points will fade in your in your consciousness. Against this background of the devil’s music that playing around. John =hh, professor =ahm let’s consider some of these points that have been made. + Have you got some questions or some points you’d like to make yourself?

Like organisational MPCs by professors, MPCS by students are usually prospectively-oriented; these, however, very often take the form of requests for the floor. This is particularly true in our Italian data, where students often preface their contributions with a preparatory turn rather than intervening directly, a practice suggesting a dispreference for self-selection. This function of MPCs is illustrated in example 5, in which the student intervenes with “Scusi io vorrei dire una cosa” (Excuse me, I’d like to say something): (5) undergraduate seminar in literature (Italy) Transition from one student presentation to another. professor [...] E allora c’è quello che da fuori vede dentro, quello che da dentro vede fuori, sono soluzioni cinematografiche apposta per darci tutto il quadro di questo di questo movimento, che saranno ancora meglio sviluppate nel racconto successivo. + nome racconto. Che tocca alla + student [tossisce] professor nome prossimo studente/relatore? Lei c’ha fatto prendere uno bello spaghetto eh. Hh. students =[ridono]


student professor student professor

[turno sovrapposto con rumori di passi che si avvicinano] Scusi io vorrei dire una cosa perché, =Sì. (Lei dice) (??) c’ha codesto (??). Ma io ho trovato qui, [indica un foglio che ha in mano] cioè vivono in un modo ottimistico insomma, (??) Ottimistico. Direi non tragico. [segue]

English translation: professor student professor students student professor student professor

[...] And so the one who’s outside is looking in, the one who’s inside is looking out, these are specific cinematographic solutions aimed at giving us the whole view of this of this movement, which will be better developed in the following short story. + title of short story. Now the floor goes to + [coughs] name of next student-presenter. You gave us quite a scare. Hh. =[laughter] [turn overlapped with sound of approaching footsteps] Excuse me I’d like to say something ‘cos, =Yes.. (You say) (??) You have this (??). But I found here, [indicates a sheet of paper in his hand] that is, they live in a optimistic way, anyway, (??) Optimistic. I would say not tragic. [continues]

Comparing examples (4) and (5), typical of other occurrences in the data, one can note how the scope of prospective MPCs by professors and students tends to differ: professors have the right to take the floor in order to organise a complex, extended portion of upcoming talk (in example (4), by labelling what is about to ensue as a ‘discussion’); students ask for the floor in order to express their opinion on a given aspect of the topic at hand.

2.2 MPCs in parent-child interaction In parent-child interaction, the socialising function – that is, the regulation of behaviour and of conversational participation – is, as might be expected, dominant. MPCs by adults function both as prescriptions (when used prospectively) and as evaluative comments (when used retrospectively). Example (6), taken from a dinner table conversation, contains MPCs with both of these functions. Just before this segment, one of the children, Johnny, had started to describe the preparation for an outing during which the family’s bicycles had been put on the top of the car. During this description, his sister, Silvia, had interrupted him brusquely:


(6) dinner table conversation (parent-child interaction; bilingual family, Italy) A family friend – herself the mother of two grown children – uses MPCs to remind Silvia (age 9) and Johnny (age 7) of what constitutes ‘correct’ conversational behaviour. mother An’ we had the big grey one there will gonna- Silvia, could you sit down? (??) Silvia you want some apple? Silvia [Silvia shakes her head.] mother Okay, put away that one! Silvia Lo sai quale colore è? [Silvia stands up again] adult friend Guarda che la mamma ti ha detto di sedere! Mettilo qua e poi mi racconti quello che mi vuoi raccontare. mother Cos’altro vuoi raccontare Silvia? adult friend Ah ora tocca a Johnny, mi voleva dire qualcosa, che cosa mi volevi dire con la bicicletta, poi dopo la Silvia t’ha interrotto? Johnny Eh la bicicletta rossa l’abbiamo comprato a- dove il babbo ha sistemato la sua bicicletta perché questa volta siamo andati con la macchina della mamma, e la bicicletta del babbo era sopra alla macchina e poi è caduta sulla strada. adult friend Oh! Vuol dire che ▼(??)► Johnny ▲siamo andati sul freeway◄siamo andati sul free: way. adult friend Addirittura! E là è caduta la bicicletta! English translation: mother An’ we had the big grey one there will gonna- Silvia, could you sit down? (??) Silvia you want some apple? Silvia [Silvia shakes her head.] mother Okay, put away that one! Silvia [from here onwards, the interaction is in Italian] You know what color that is? [Silvia stands up again] adult friend Look, your mom said to sit down! Put that down and then tell me what you want to tell me. mother What else do you want to tell about, Silvia? adult friend Ah now it’s Johnny’s turn, he wanted to tell me something, what did you want to tell me about the bicycle, when Silvia interrupted you? Johnny Eh the red bicycle, we bought it at- where Dad had his bicycle fixed, because this time we went with Mom’s car, and Dad’s bicycle was on top of the car and then it fell onto the road. adult friend Oh! You mean that ▼(??)►


Johnny ▲we went on the [in English] freeway◄[in Italian] we went on the [in English] free: way. adult friend [in Italian] You’re kidding! And the bicycle fell off there!

In the above example, the family friend – ignoring the mother’s invitation addressed to Silvia – asks Johnny what he wanted to tell her earlier before being interrupted by his sister. Her comment focuses explicitly on the conversational norm that one should not interrupt others; it has, therefore, a clearly socialising function. Paradoxically, by intervening at this point in the conversation she is breaching the very norm she is invoking, given that it is Silvia who should, by all accounts, be the next projected speaker.

2.3 MPCs in therapeutic contexts Let us now turn to one final ‘educational’ context, that of marital therapy. In such contexts MPCs are normally produced by therapists in response to verbal behaviour by clients. From a sequential point of view, they tend to be retrospective: for professional reasons the therapist must not manifest personal opinions that are not supported by what has been implicitly expressed by the client. In other words, although they are personal interpretations, therapist MPCs are phrased as reformulations of something that was implicit, presupposed or not clearly stated by the client. They aim to develop self-awareness and autonomy on the client’s part: (7) marital therapy session (U.S.A.) wife [tearfully] And I can’t live with your anxiety. [begins to cry] I’m anxious enough myself. therapist (3) °Sally, what you really are saying to him is that when he gets anxious, you fall apart° […] (8) marital therapy session (U.S.A.) husband [talks in low key, somewhat unclear] °I’m struggling, I’m struggling to get [laughs] (??) debt paid the way I can. [volume drops] You know. I can do without having to worry about the hundred, whatever it is, hundred twenty-five, you know, I have to pay here this month.° [volume continues to drop] Certainly it’s worth it° [sigh]. therapist Well, wait a minute. ++ There was almost a question mark in your statement. husband No question mark [extends check].

In the above two examples, the function of the therapist’s MPCs is to draw the clients’ attention to the importance of explicitly communicating emotional states


to one’s interlocutor rather than merely ‘hinting’ at such states through contextualization cues (Gumperz 1982) such as crying (example (7)) or prosodic signals such as drops in volume or sighing (example (8)). In conjoint therapeutic contexts, one also finds MPCs with a socialising function which are more directive in nature. Example (9) contains two instances of this second type of MPC; in both cases, the therapist invites the wife to explain her point of view more clearly to her spouse: (9) marital therapy session (same session as example (8)) The couple is discussing their different reactions to having Sunday afternoon guests. husband If you’re having people in on Sunday, damn it, you planned it, plan it in this way and you cook a roast or you make a casserole, or whatever it is, so that you can pop it in the oven on Saturday afternoon at 4 o’clock and you can serve dinner at 5. Now what’s the big deal? therapist He’s saying it’s no big deal and that there must be some other reasons. He’s implying you don’t want company, Sally. [coughs] I don’t hear this from you. So what…can you explain to him what the difference is to you? (57 seconds of silence) … …… wife […] But my life is to be run for the convenience of you and everybody else…You “pop a casserole in the oven,” huh? And nothing else? You don’t see anything else? therapist Well tell him what else there is. Maybe he’s shortsighted. wife The preparation that goes into a casserole. I had a roast! You don’t just eat meat. You eat other things, too. You set the table, you get things ready. You feed three children who want to eat, plus a fourth… And you serve hors d’oeuvres and you take care of people and tell them where things are when your husband starting drinking too much and can’t navigate for himself and suddenly gets lost. […]

As in examples (7) and (8), the therapist’s primary aim here seems to be to teach clients to positively relate to others by suggesting appropriate discourse behaviour. Before leaving what we have broadly termed ‘educational’ contexts, it may be worth drawing attention to a difference which cuts across the instructional/noninstructional divide: when children are involved, whether in classroom or family settings, MPCs are more oriented towards normative, procedural aspects of social life; when adults are involved, in both instructional and therapeutic settings, the accent seems to be placed instead on relational aspects of behaviour.


3.

‘Media’ contexts: Principal functions of MPCs

With the expression ‘media contexts’, we mean – as already indicated – those contexts in which the range of reception roles is complicated by the existence of target participants who are not addressees (Levinson 1988). These are, furthermore, contexts in which communication takes place on a dual axis: internal and external. The basic function of MPCs in these contexts is to provide an explanatory or interpretative key to what is going on, to guide the listener(s) towards a certain reading of the talk-in-progress and to make it acceptable. Often these MPCs also carry out a function of ‘targeting’, that is, of designating recipiency. Let us now look at some of these contexts.

3.1

MPCs in political talk shows

Political talk shows based on a discussion format have mainly persuasive and informative purposes. In this context the principal function of MPCs is to indicate an interpretative frame for a group of listeners consisting not only of panel participants, but also of the (present) studio audience and the (absent) home audience. These latter two types of public have the reception role of ‘indirect target’, characterised by the dimension of ‘recipiency’ but not (except in exceptional cases) that of ‘addressee’ (Levinson 1988: 166, 67). A primary function of metacommunication in such cases is to summarise or define the point, argument, position made by oneself or by one’s interlocutors. In example (10), the panel member’s MPC both summarizes the audience member’s turn and indicates the argumentative status of his own contribution, i.e. that he agrees with what has been said: (10) political talk show (G.B.) moderator [turning to a new audience member] Are you from Wales sir? audience member Me? Yes I am. Um. I’d like to ask you Mr. Dewar um + why not use the existing institutions of local government, decentralize by passing power to the local authorities that exist, no new layers of government, no new extra costs, just eh government closer to the people and more reactive ▼(??)◄ moderator ▲And are you◄thinking specifically of Wales in this ▼case◄?

. In certain talk show formats, provision is made at certain points for participation by members of the studio audience. At such moments, an audience member may temporarily assume addressee status (cf. examples 11 and 12). Formats such as those in which moderators take phone calls from viewers at home constitute another interesting example of a shift from this default participation framework.


audience member ▲I’m◄thinking about the whole of the United Kingdom treated treated evenhandedly for good or for ill. panel member Well I certainly agree with you that we want to do something about reviving local government. And I want to stress to you that um eh the Welsh assemply or the Scottish parliament or any regional structure that emerges in England, is about taking power from the centre, from Westminster, and in Welsh Wales in particular from unelected (2 syll) […]

In this way metacommunication provides a basis for continuation of talk by specifying “what one has understood at the current point in talk”, thereby making explicit the presuppositions upon which upcoming contributions are to be based. In example (11), instead, the moderator’s MPC – aimed at soliciting a declaration concerning his political affiliation from an audience member who has intervened in the discussion – provides an interpretative key for the target listeners: the audience in the studio and at home: (11) political talk show (G.B.) moderator [pointing to M7] Yes the man in his- in the blue shirt there, yes ▼you.◄ audience member ▲Right.◄ + Wh- what I’d like to say as a local counselor [clears throat] that what you’ve done your budget is a con trick. You’re taking money away from the local councils, you’re capping them. Of course you don’t worry much now because you haven’t got many councils to take care of. studio audience [laugh] ▼[laugh] ◄ audience member ▲(??) ◄ ▼ (??) ◄ moderator ▲Wh- wh- do you want to declare your which party ◄ which party are you? audience member I’m a Liberal Democrat. audience + [applause] ▼[applause] ◄

Example (12) illustrates instead how retrospective MPCs produced by interviewees and panel members can serve to categorise, even rather polemically, contributions by other interlocutors: (12) political talk show (G.B.) discussion between studio audience and Martin McGuinness, representative of Sinn Fein. The topic is the Manchester Docklands bombing, widely attributed to the IRA.


audience member ▲What what◄ does it achieve? What I want to know is what do you think ▼bombing two thousand people out of work has achieved.◄ McGuinness ▲Well that’s a matter for the for the – that’s a matter◄ that’s a matter for the people who have done that to explain what they’ve achieved. ▼It’s not my job.◄ audience member ▲You under◄ stand these people. You go and talk to them. We don’t get the ▼chance◄ to talk to them. ▼▼You talk to them. What are they attempting to achieve?◄◄ McGuinness ▲Yeah.◄ McGuinness ▲▲But it’s not my job, I don’t see it as my job to justify◄◄that. It’s not my job to justify that, and I am not going to attempt ▼to justify that.◄

Political debates reveal characteristics similar to those of political talk shows, as shown by the following example taken from the final debate between Bush and Kerry during the 2004 presidential elections. In that occasion, the moderator posed questions to the candidates, assigning them turns at talk and indicating the maximum time allowed for the response. Before moving on to the next question, the other participant was then allowed an opportunity to briefly comment on his opponent’s response. An analysis of the data collected in this context suggests that in political debates MPCs serve not so much to clarify the other candidate’s preceding contribution as to qualify it negatively, thereby furnishing a reading favourable to the speaker’s own position. The following example contains two instances of MPCs which function in this way (for reasons of space, parts of the exchange have been summarised): (13) final debate, U.S. presidential elections, 2004 [Kerry has just finished answering a question about how he would contain public debt. The moderator gives the floor to Bush to comment.] moderator Bush

Mr. President? Well, his rhetoric doesn’t match his record. He’s been a senator for 20 years. He voted to increase taxes 98 times. When they tried to reduce taxes, he voted against that 127 times. He talks about being a fiscal conservative, or fiscally sound, but he voted over – he voted 277 times to waive the budget caps, which would have cost the taxpayers $4.2 trillion.

[Bush continues along these lines, then highlights his own budget program. The moderator next poses a question to Bush concerning the loss of American jobs overseas, to which Bush responds by focusing on the idea of retraining the workforce for more qualified jobs. It is then Kerry’s turn to intervene.]


moderator Kerry audience

Senator Kerry? I want you to notice how the president switched away from jobs and started talking about education principally. Let me come back in one moment to that, but I want to speak for a second, if I can, to what the president said about fiscal responsibility. Being lectured by the president on fiscal responsibility is a bit like Tony Soprano talking to me about law and order in this country. [laughter]

In all of the examples considered in this section, the MPCs are ultimately oriented towards the indirect target of the talk (the studio and, above all, the home audience) and aim to provide a convincing interpretative frame which compensates, to some extent, for the lack of direct participation.

3.2 MPCs in theatrical texts As in the other ‘media contexts’ considered here, the primary purpose of explicit MPCs in theatrical texts is to help spectators ‘correctly’ interpret what is happening on stage. In this case as well, the communicative axis is a dual one: a first axis of internal (and ‘virtual’) communication is constructed amongst the characters in the play, while a second external (and ‘hidden’) one is constructed between the author (as indexed by the characters) and the audience, the ‘real’ recipient of the communication. Due to the impossibility of rendering this second communicative axis interactive, here MPCs with explanatory or interpretative functions are also frequent. Observe the following examples, all taken from The Tempest, in which Prospero, the principal figure in the drama, the magician responsible for its development and resolution, defines – with a sort of preamble – the type of discourse act that he is about to carry out (example (14): I should inform thee); comments approvingly on a question posed by his daughter Miranda (example (15): Well demanded, wench: / My tale provokes that question); frames what he is about to say to his interlocutor Ariel as a well-known story – even if it is, in actual fact, completely new to the spectator (example (16): I must / Once in a month recount what thou hast been); evaluates the monologue that has just been pronounced as inappropriate to the occasion (example (17): not Befitting this first meeting.): (14) Shakespeare, The Tempest [Act I, Scene II, The Island. Before Prospero’s Cell. Prospero and Miranda, 22 fll]


Mira. More to know Did never meddle with my thoughts. Pros . ‘Tis time I should inform thee further. Lend thy hand, And pluck my magic garment from me. -So: (15) Shakespeare, The Tempest [Prosperous and Miranda, 137 fll] Mira. Wherefore did they not, That hour, destroy us? Pros. Well demanded, wench: My tale provokes that question. (16) Shakespeare, The Tempest [Prosperto and Ariel, 260 fll] Pros. I must Once in a month recount what thou hast been, Which thou forget’st. This damn’d witch Sycorax, For mischiefs manifold, and sorceries terrible To enter human hearing, from Argier, Thou know’st, was banished: one for thing she did They would not take her life. Is not this true? (17) Shakespeare, The Tempest s. 21 [Act V, 153 fll] Pros I perceive, these lords At this encounter do so much admire, That they devour their reason, and scarce think Their eyes do offices of truth, their words Are natural breath: but, howsoe’er you have Been justled from your senses, know for certain That I am Prospero, and that very duke Which was thrust forth of Milan; who most strangely Upon this shore, where you were wrack’d, was landed, To be the lord on’t. No more yet of this; For ‘tis a chronicle of day by day, Not a relation for a breakfast, nor Befitting this first meeting.


As is evident in the above examples, the overarching function of MPCs in theatrical texts is to provide an interpretative key to what is happening on stage. Such keying is carried out both by labelling segments of talk as particular types of contributions and by passing judgments on the appropriateness – or lack of appropriateness – of the speaker’s own or other characters’ contributions.

3.3 MPCs in ethnographic research contexts Among the contexts that unfold along a dual communicative axis, we would also venture to include ethnographic research contexts, in which a researcher interacts with one or more informants in situations of everyday life. These contexts in fact share some of the characteristics of theatrical performances, in the sense that the informant is at the same time both ‘interlocutor’ and ‘character’. In our data, consisting of encounters with three-generational families of Italian origin living in Australia, the immigrant, in as much as he/she is the researcher’s interlocutor, tends to construct a ‘discourse story’ in a way that allows him/her to attribute a positive value to him/herself and to his/her representation of life. The addressee in this case is the researcher, while the indirect target is whoever may happen to hear or read the researcher’s words. It must not be forgotten, in fact, that the encounter is being video-recorded and that the family members know that the data collected in their home will be analysed in a search for indicators of linguistic and/or psycho-sociological categories (linguistic repertoires, identity, self-referentiality etc.) for the benefit of a ‘community of practice’ to which the researcher belongs. In this case MPCs have the function of assuring – as in theatrical texts, talk shows and political debates – a certain reading of one’s narrative: they have the function, in other words, of orienting and persuading. In example (18), Mrs. B, a first generation Italian immigrant who has been living in Australia for the last 50 years, addresses one of the researchers visiting her family, giving vent to her nostalgia for her old native village and for the kind of life she had experienced there as a young woman. An explicit and prospective MPC (“educazione” – good manners) is followed by a little scene performed in direct discourse; this performance serves to support her claim that the Italians from her native village are well-mannered and hospitable. This example is particularly interesting because of the co-occurrence of an explicit and prospectively-oriented MPC (“[the villagers have] good manners”) and an exemplification of this comment, in which contextualization cues are used to convey the same evaluative meaning (in fact, the prosody of the reported utterance – high pitch, increased


volume and vowel lengthening – ‘comments’ on it by signalling positive assessment): (18) Ethnographic research (Australia) MB Mrs B (first-generation immigrant) B Mr B, her husband (first-generation immigrant) A a female researcher A più amichevole [eh? (dice)] ((guardando la signora B)) friendlier [eh? (you mean)] ((looking at Mrs. B)) MB [se. ] ((annuisce guardando A)) [yes.] ((nods, looking at A)) B

se:: se se se::. ((guarda la moglie)) (0.2) noi siamo stati o’ p:aese no::stro, .hhh che lei yes:: yes yes:: ((looking at his wife)) (0.2) we have been to our village, hhh you deve credere of this ^function.\ is called infinity (PL1, 727-730) • it ^can be expressed as omega,- (PL1, 983) • so this ^term,- just ^contains,- înformation of this coefficient.\ (PL1, 424-426) • ^now,\ this little,_<points to term in formula> can be êxpressed as pi over t?/ (PL1, 758-760) • it ^can be expressed as omega,_ ..just ^looks like that. \ (PL1, 984) • …because for the periodic function.\ it âlways can be expressed,\ as sinusoidal.\ (PL1, 129-133) • …what you got is this one.\ …(0.14) right?/ (PL1, 995-996)

• today we’ll talk about,\ (PL1, 571) • ^this is the,_ exact,_ definition.\ of the,_ Fourier’s coefficient ^right?/ (PL1, 735-739) • so we call this square pulse.\ (PL1, 924-925)

Selected examples from lectures 1 and 2: Fourier’s decomposition of waves (lines 0-1177, time = 40 minutes)

Table 1. Basic functions of metapragmatic language in lectures 1 and 2

Metapragmatic expressions in physics lectures 173

Wrapping up a procedure or explanation

Showing implications of representation

Expanding/Transforming representations

Linking: Example and Definition Comparing and contrasting representations

Linking: Example from the physical world with Figure

Linking: Figure to Formula

Table 1 (continued) • it ^looks like that.\ n êquals zero,_ and then?/ ( PL1, 985-987) • it ^decreases as a parabola?/ right?/ (PL1, 1019-1020) • ^heart ^beating,-of an <XX>.\ it looks like ^that.\ …(0.5) right?/ (PL1, 857-861) • …^very,_ ^simple,\ ^configuration.\ you just pluck <makes plucking gesture on diagram> (PL1, 162-165) • Î’ve given you,_ an êxample of this.\ for just a square pulse,\ (PL1, 1152-1154) • it ^can be expressed as omega,_ ..just ^looks like that. \ (PL1, 984) • ..ît’s a ,_ bit ^different .\ ^from the harmonics that contribute .\ to this ah ^square sequence like this,_ îts not this one .\ (PL1, 972-976) • ^we can construct,\ a ^parallel function.\ ..^right?/and then.\we can êxtend it.\ (PL1, 239-243) • ^that’s just a transformation right?/ (PL1, 769) • so we can just ^re-express t as omega over pi.\ ^that’s just a transformation right?/ (PL1, 768-769) • you ûnderstand this derivation.\ right?/ (PL1, 1000-1001) • I try to transform it.\ into a ^particular function.\ (PL1, 722-724) • …(0.5) so you ^find,\ the ^first one’s solution.\ and then,_ ..later the row..^less and less.\ (PL1, 987-990) • if alpha is zero,\ that means the omega is one.\ right?/ (PL1, 1003-1004) • so we can just write this as delta omega.\ (PL1, 1043) • you ûnderstand this derivation.\ right?/ (PL1, 1001) • what about for the general case.\ âny type of function.\ âny type of pulse.\ … (0.6) we understand the êxact answer to this question,\ that depends on the ^shape of the pulse.\ (PL1, 1162-1163)

174 Sara W. Smith and Xiaoping Liang

META-PROCESSING LANGUAGE: guidance regarding how to process representations • I’ve ^chosen one function.\ my focus is you pay âttention.\ cause this happens really Attentional strategies: Direct advice quick.\ (PL1, 481-483) • what I want you to understand is ^this.\ ..you want to pa- pay attention to this.\ (PL1, 970-971) Attentional strategies: Indicating the importance of • so this is very împortant.\ (PL1, 816) concept/procedure • we ^don’t care.\ about this or ^that or this.\ okay?/ (PL1, 262-264) General processing requirements: Indicating ease of • of ^course that’s,_ ,\ you get this one,\ ..right? (PL1, 427-430) • before we do this, the ^limitation.\ okay?/would ^seem obvious.\ (PL1,731-734) understanding (easy or hard) • that’s a ^Fourier’s transformation.\ …it’s uh,-pretty complicated.\ (PL1, 41-43) Memory: Reminding (retrospective memory) • I just mentioned.\ right?\ (PL1, 740-741) • …remember that?/ (PL1, 981) Memory: Advice to remember (prospective • …okay I hope that you keep this ^fresh in your mind.\ I’ll go over this again.\ and then just a little bit later.\ you’ll understand ^why.\ (PL1, 561-564) memory) • we will meet it over and over again.\ (PL1, 1084) Reasoning strategies: Relation to earlier reasoning • ^so,\ ^same,\ ^reasoning, we got this now.\ (PL1-431-434) • that example îs,_ a little bit different.| from the ^function.\ ^you have learned.\ în,_ûh,\ or procedure math ^matics lectures.\ (PL1. 442-448) • but ^now,\ the ônly difference is,_ (PL1, 751-752) Reasoning strategies: Generalizing • remember^ this,_and we ûse this phenomenon,-we ûse this fact.\ to generalize,-some other things.\some ôther things like this. (PL1, 248-254) • …now.\ we try to generalize to a pulse.\ we not deal with a periodic function now we are talking about a ^single pulse.\ (PL1, 1144-1146) Clarification, Confirmation • you ûnderstand this derivation.\right?/ (PL1, 1000-1001) • you understand pulse, right.\ (PL1, 599)

Table 1 (continued)


• ..for engineers,\ we ^like to call this,_ ..^frequency spectrum,\ or sometimes we call it â,_ spectrum of frequency.\ okay?/ (PL1, 810-815) • aperiodical.\ it got to be so long a word.\ in English.\ okay?\ (PL1,681-684)

• what I want you to understand is ^this one.\ (PL1, 970) • ..Î have given you enough.\ êxamples.\ (PL1, 1060-1061) • I’ll tell you one thing.\ (PL1, 624) Student Aligned With Instructor (We): In discovery • so of course we ûnderstand it must be comes from here.\ (PL1, 1011) • …(0.4) ^so,\ if ^we understand.\ a ^pulse,\ right.\ a single ^pulse,- ..can be,_ ^regarded,\ or in carrying out procedure as a ^periodical function.\ ^just as we said.\ (PL1, 664-672) • we understand. that in the physical world… (PL1, 577-578) • for the ^square sequence,_ we got the frequency contribution (PL1, 976-977) • how can we make it.\ look like a periodical function.\ (PL1, 622-623) Student as Experiencer (You) of explanation • you ûnderstand this derivation.\right?/ (PL1, 1000-1001) • you understand pulse, right.\ (PL1, 599) Student as Agent (You) of discovery or carrying out • what you ^got is this one.\ …(0.14) right? (PL1, 995-996) • you just got this ^sine of t equals zero.\ right?/ (PL1, 1026-1027) procedure • you got it?/ (PL1, 649)

META-PARTICIPATION LANGUAGE: assignment of role to students Instructor as Expert; Student as Learner (I-You)

Use Of Language/Naming

Table 1 (continued)


Adds Statement 2 [on slide]

Formula 2 [on slide]

Points to Formula 1.

Writes Formula 3 [on chalkboard].

Labels Formula segments on axes

2

3

4

5

6

Moves Representation Referred To 1 Refers to Statement 1 & Formula 1 [on slide already on screen, with 4 segments equating terms]

Transcript (Lecture 2, Lines 966-1046) 966. I’m not going to say anything about the calculation 967. otherwise I insult you 968. ((adds to slide)) 969. so its like this 969. what I want you to understand is ^this one .\ 971. ..you want to pa- pay attention to this.\ 972. ..ît’s a ,_ 973. bit ^different .\ 974.^from the harmonics that contribute .\ 975. to this ah ^square sequence like this,_ 976. îts not this one .\ 977. for the ^square sequence,_ 978. we got the ^frequency contribution,979. <ERASES BOARD AND WRITES> 980. ...(0.6) is this a ^f omega,_ 981. and for the ^n the value equals to two n plus one.\ 982. ..remember ^that?/ 983. and,_ 984. it ^can be expressed as omega,-

Table 2. Transcript and analysis of 3 ½ minute segment of lecture on square pulses

Metarepresentation.

Metarepresentation & Metaprocessing Metaparticipation Metaprocessing

Metarepresentation. Metaprocessing & Metaparticipation Metaprocessing & Metaparticipation Metarepresentation & Metaprocessing

Type of Language Metarepresentation Metaparticipation


Applies formula (ll. 986-992). Figure 2 (draws on board)

Points to Formula 1.Points to Segments of Formula 1

8 9

10

Gestures to each vertical line on graph.

Moves Representation Referred To 7 Draws Figure 1 (on board).F(w)

Table 2 (continued)

1000. right?/ 1001. you ûnderstand this derivation.\ 1002. right?/ 1003. ..so sine of alpha over alpha.\ 1004. if alpha is zero.\ 1005. that means the omega is one.\ 1006. right?/

Transcript (Lecture 2, Lines 966-1046) 985. ..just ^looks like that.\ 986. n êquals zero,_ 987. and then./ 988. ...(0.5) so you ^find,\ 989. the ^first one’s solution.\ 990. and then,_ 991. ..later the row .. ^less and less.\ 992. ..right?/ 993. but ^here?/ 994. just for â square pulse,- 995. <ERASES BOARD, DRAWS ON BOARD> 996. ...what you ^got is this one.\ 997. ...(0.14) right?/ 998. when ômega is zero,_ 999. ..it finds the ^sine of the t <X of all its harmonics X>.\ Metarepresentation & Metaparticipation Metarepresentation

Metaparticipation

Type of Language Metarepresentation Metaparticipation Metarepresentation


12 13

Points to Segments of Figure 2C.

Points to Formula 1. Elaborates Figure 2 to Figure 2C.

Points to segments of Figure 2B.

Moves Representation Referred To 11 Elaborates Figure 2 to Figure 2B.

Table 2 (continued) Transcript (Lecture 2, Lines 966-1046) 1007. so you find in ^this position.\ 1008. ..<X the ^range X> is low.\ 1009. ...(0.5) but,\ 1010. what is the ^most important contributions,_ 1011. in this ^region.\ 1012. so of course we ûnderstand it must be comes from here.\ 1013. comes from ^this region right?/ 1014. that’s ^because,\ 1015. âll this frequency ,_ 1016. that’s based on ^most important <X harmonics X>.\ 1017. (0) ^comes from this,- 1018. .the ^value from this is higher than- 1019. it ^decrease,- 1020. it ^decreases as a parabola?/ 1021. ...right?/ 1022. its ^just like this.\ 1023. you find it it goes something like ^this.\ 1024. ...(0.5) so ^what is the <X range X> of this.\ 1025. even.\ 1026. you just got this ^sine of t equals zero.\ 1027. right?/ 1028. so the ^sine of t equal zero you’ll find the values,\ 1029. but for this ^definite point we understand,_ Metarepresentation Metarepresentation & Metaparticipation Metaparticipation Metarepresentation & Metaparticipation Metaprocessing & Metaparticipation

Type of Language Metaparticipation Metaprocessing Metaprocessing & Metaparticipation


16

15

Transcript (Lecture 2, Lines 966-1046) 1030. that omega t ^should be equal to pi.\ 1031. right?/ 1032. and this ômega okay.\ 1033. <SV I just put this omega should be omega prime SV>.\ 1034. so ômega prime,1035. <WRITES ON BOARD> Elaborates Figure 2 to Figure 2D. By integrating symbol from formula with 1036. ..and ûh,- segment of figure 1037. okay.\ 1038. ..you do it like ^this.\ 1039. ^this is ah omega prime.\ 1040. and this ^region,- 1041. this omega prime,\ 1042. just ^represents the region of the omega that’s been included.\ 1043. so we can just ^write this as delta omega 1044. delta ômega t.\ Applies formula 1045. t is ^half of the width of this pulse.\ 1046. ^right,/

Moves Representation Referred To 14 Applies Formula

Table 2 (continued)

Metarepresentation & Metaparticipation Metarepresentation Metarepresentation & Metaparticipation

Type of Language



pulses. Table 2 gives the transcript and analysis of the 3 ½ minute segment (transcription conventions follow DuBois (1991) and are given in Appendix A).

3.2 Data representation and analysis The lectures were built around four basic types of representations. They were introduced with a verbal statement giving definitions and/or statements of general principles. Three other forms of representation were typically presented, though not in any given order. Mathematical representations were presented as formula and their various transformations. Various types of diagrams or figures – some quite abstract and others in the form of readouts from measuring instruments – provided visuo-spatial representations. The instructor also typically gave examples of real-world physical phenomena that illustrated the concepts, such as different types of sounds that produce different types of pulses. We wanted to portray the different forms of representation and the ways in which the instructor connected them, and we wanted to contrast a model of his actual lecture with a simplistic model of how such instruction would occur if the instructor’s goal was simply to present the basic information in an efficient way. Thus we developed a system in which we drew a circle for each type of representation used and directional paths that indicate movement between these types of representation. We defined a move as an event in which the instructor connected one form of representation with another; put more abstractly, a move refers to an attempt by the instructor to coordinate two forms of representation. Figure 1 shows the model of a hypothetical minimalist lecture, in which the instructor introduces students to each of the four types of representation of a concept and discusses them one at a time. Each time the instructor moves from one type of representation to another, we denote that with a path, and we number the move at its origin. Thus, in this hypothetical lecture, the instructor states a definition or principle, provides a formula representing the concept, draws a figure portraying it in some way, and provides an example of it. This order is arbitrary in the figure, however; the point is that each form of representation, while it may

Figure 1. Representational moves in hypothetical minimalist lecture (order of moves is arbitrary)


Figure 2. Representational moves in 20-minute lecture on square pulses

be discussed in some depth, is connected only once in each direction to another form of representation. We think of this as a linear model of a lecture. Figure 2 portrays the moves in the actual lecture on square pulses. Here we see that the instructor used all four forms of representation and that he referenced them multiple times, forming an elaborate network of connections. He began, as usual, with a slide giving a statement of the title and a definition of the topic; the decomposition of pulses. He introduced it explicitly with (1)

571 572 573 574

,,,today we’ll talk about,\ ûh, ^Fourier’s decomposition,\ of the ^pulse.\

In the first move, he drew a figure on the chalkboard to illustrate the concept. He then introduced the figure implicitly with a question: (2) 576 …^what is a pulse is a ^single pulse,\

In the second move, he went back to the definition to clarify it. In the third move he referred back to the figure to illustrate the point, then he returned to the statement of the topic before presenting the formula to describe how a pulse is mathematically represented. In this 20-minute lecture, the instructor introduced a large variety of different representations of concepts discussed. This included 2 statements giving basic principles or definitions, 7 formulae or formula segments, 6 figures, and 2 examples. We think of these as 17 different forms of representation. (For the


Figure 3. Representational moves in 3 1/2-minute segment of lecture on square pulses

figure, we have not distinguished between different definitions, formulae, figures, or examples.) Some representations are used more than once, with a total of 32 moves. We think of this as a network model of a lecture designed to be intentionally redundant. It contrasts with the linear model shown in Figure 1. To look more closely at the moves and the language used to introduce them, we choose a 3 ½ minute segment on the decomposition of square pulses. This segment is portrayed in Figure 3 (it is the same segment as moves 16–28 in Figure 2, except that here we also distinguish moves to different formulae). Here the instructor integrated a formula with a set of figures. He first made 3 moves that related the formula to the statement of the principle involved, then he made 3 moves that integrated different versions of the formulae with each other, and finally he made 10 moves that integrated the formulae with a set of increasingly complex figures and figure segments. Thus in just 3 ½ minutes he made 16 moves, using 3 different forms of representation. Because understanding the formula is critical to understanding the model under discussion, the instructor devoted considerable attention to connecting the formula and its terms to another form of representation that students might find easier to understand. He sketched a figure and then increasingly elaborated it to match the formula, tying together the formula and figures at each stage. While some of these connections were made implicitly, with gestures or elliptical phrases, many of them were made explicitly through the use of metapragmatic expressions.


4.

Findings

4.1

Using metapragmatic expressions to integrate representations

In both the full lecture and the selected segment, the instructor apparently sacrificed efficiency in covering content in order to form an elaborate network of interconnections between representations. Even in a segment as short as the 3 ½ minutes shown in Table 2, we found that metapragmatic expressions were quite prevalent and that they played several roles. We identified several ways in which they were used to introduce different forms of representations and to guide the moves between them. (Unless indicated otherwise, the examples used are taken from Table 2.)

4.1.1 Introducing new topics and new representations Explicit metapragmatic expressions were frequently used to introduce new representations, as in the introductions to a statement (3) and a formula (4) that were central to the lecture. (3) 969 so it’s like this 970 what I want you to understand is ^this one.\ (4) 984 it ^can be expressed as omega, 985 ..just ^looks like that.\

While it might seem obvious that metadiscourse would be used to serve this function, we note that not all introductions were so explicit. Many were introduced implicitly, with gestures or elliptical language. The explicit language apparently served other functions as well, as will be seen below.

4.1.2 Making connections explicit An important role for these expressions was to indicate connections between representations that might not be obvious, or to make obvious ones more salient. For example, when pointing to a figure, the instructor made explicit the point that a given part of the figure represented a given mathematical term. (5) 1038 and this ^region, 1039 this omega prime,\ 1040 just ^represents the region of the omega that’s been included.\

In contrast, a connection was presented implicitly when, in another part of the lecture (example (6)), he combined figure, gesture, and implicit expressions to illustrate the pulse that results from plucking the string of an instrument. As


the basic principles had already been well established, an implicit introduction seemed adequate: (6)

162 163 164 165

very simple configuration you just pluck

4.1.3 Avoiding confusion between representations Another function was to note the relation between representations that might be confused. In example (7), he anticipated a potential problem and made explicit the need to keep two formulae separate. (7)

972 it’s a 973 bit different … 976 it’s not this one

More often, he directed students to note and understand the equivalence between different representational formats, as in (8), when he linked a mathematical symbol with a segment in a figure. (8) 984 it ^can be expressed as omega,_ 985 ..just ^looks like that. \

4.1.4 Transforming or expanding representations An important function of mathematical formulations is to demonstrate that a given phenomenon can be decomposed in ways that look different but are formally equivalent. In some cases the instructor explicitly referred to the transformation of one formula into another, as in example (9) taken from an earlier part of the lecture. (9) 768 so we can just ^re-express t as omega over pi.\ 769 ^that’s just a transformation right?/

In other cases, as in (10) below, he went quickly through the expansion of a formula and then commented more elliptically: (10) 1000 you ûnderstand this derivation.\ 1001 right?/


4.1.5 Advancing the explanation/drawing implications Another important function was to help students learn to draw implications from a representation. This will be a critical element in using models, both immediately and in the future. After presenting a formula, the instructor would often spell out its implication, as in (11) and (12). (11) 996 what you got is this one.\ 997 right?/ (12) 1005 that means the omega is one

4.1.6 Wrapping up explanations and procedures During the development of a topic, the instructor often used implicit means to signal connections and implications. However, at the end of the topic, he was more likely to use explicit metapragmatic expressions, as in (13). This language may help signal the wrapping up of an explanation and thus serve a structural function as well as a coherence function. (13) 1043 so we can just write this as

4.1.7 Summary Metapragmatic expressions were used throughout the lecture to introduce different forms of representation and to explicate the connections between them. In addition, they were used for dealing with potentially problematic representations, to show the transformation or implications of a representation, and for wrapping up topics. We believe the metapragmatic expressions helped students understand the representations and their roles in scientific thinking. We also note that, as shown earlier in Figures 2 and 3, the instructor was intentionally redundant. He used metapragmatic expressions to help create a complex network interweaving different representations with each other. These expressions help make the different representations form a coherent whole. Finally, we note that metapragmatic expressions were quite pervasive in the lectures. For example, in the segment on the decomposition of square pulses, as seen in Table 3, there were 80 utterances. Fifteen of those, or 19%, contained explicit expressions dealing with the nature and role of the representations used in models, that is, metarepresentational expressions. While this segment was certainly more dense than most, we note that such expressions were found throughout all phases and subtopics of the lectures.


4.2 Using metapragmatic expressions to guide processing strategies Along with presenting the content of models, the instructor often gave advice about how to process it. We think of these expressions as metaprocessing expressions, as they are focused on students’ cognitive processing rather than on the content of the material. We believe that the instructor works from a tacit assumption that students have limited resources for the processes involved in attention, memory, and reasoning, and that the instructor may help them process the material more effectively by providing some guidance about how these resources should be allocated. We will be interested in how the instructor provides advice for long-term as well as for immediate use of the concepts. In the lecture as a whole, we found a variety of strategies which we will illustrate below (see also Table 1). We also note that even in the short section on square pulses (see Table 2), several of these uses appear.

4.2.1 Attention/importance Some expressions were used to direct students’ focus or, in metacognitive terms, to provide advice on how they should allocate attentional resources. In some cases, as in (14), the language was explicit: (14) 970 what I want you to understand is this one 971 you want to pa- pay special attention to this,\

In many cases, however, the instructor implied the need to pay attention by pointing out the importance of the concepts, as in (15): (15) 816 so this is very împortant.\

In a few cases the instructor noted material they could treat as background: (16) 262 we ^don’t care.\ 263 about this or ^that or this.\ 264 okay?/

4.2.2 Ease or difficulty of processing A number of expressions reassured students, as in (17). Presumably they can be confident of their level of understanding and can turn their attention elsewhere. (17)

427 428 429 430

of ^course that’s,_ ,\ you get this one,\ ..right?


Other times, as in (18), they were used to warn students of potential difficulty. (18) 41 that’s a ^Fourier’s transformation.\ 42 …it’s uh, 43 pretty complicated.\

This presumably prompted them to devote extra effort to understanding the explanation.

4.2.3 Memory Another set of expressions gave advice relevant to memory processes. In some cases, as in (19), it was used to remind students of relevant material they had learned earlier, i.e., to cue retrospective memory. (19) 981 and for the ^n the value equals to two n plus one.\ 982 …remember ^that?

Such reminders also serve as warnings of what is expected. Other expressions, as in (20) provided cues for prospective memory, that is, what the student should attempt to remember for future use. Again, they functioned both as cues and as warnings. (20)

561 562 563 564

…okay I hope that you keep this ^fresh in your mind .\ I’ll go over this again.\ and then just a little bit later.\ you’ll understand ^why.\

4.2.4 Reasoning – Integration of knowledge To build a coherent body of knowledge, students must learn to integrate new knowledge with old and to apply reasoning strategies they have previously learned, as appropriate. Sometimes the instructor directly cued them, as in (21). (21) 431 ^so,\ 432 ^same,\ 433 ^reasoning, we got this now.\

In other cases, he noted that representations that appear to be similar may have important differences, formally. In example (22), he warned about the different assumptions behind different mathematical representations of series. (22) 442 that example îs,_ 443 a little bit different.| 444 from the ^function.\


445 446 447 448

^you have learned.\ în,_ ûh,\ math ^matics lectures.\

4.2.5 Reasoning – Generalization Another important aspect of scientific thinking is understanding when and how to generalize. The instructor sometimes gave explicit guidance, as in (23): (23) 252 we ûse this fact.\ 253 to generalize,-some other things.\ 254 some ôther things like this.\

4.2.6 Confirmation/clarification After presenting a concept or procedure, the instructor often sought confirmation of the students’ understanding and, at the same time, offered the opportunity for clarification. In sections with intricate procedures, he frequently followed each content utterance with a confirmation tag. This in itself is a cue to students that each step of the procedure or connection is important. In example (24), after a quick application of a formula, he sought confirmation both explicitly (using an indirect question in the form of a statement), and implicitly (with confirmation tags sandwiching the explicit statement). (24) 1000 right?/ 1001 you understand this derivation.\ 1002 right?/

Again, the expression was multifunctional – it also served as a warning. Furthermore, it clearly demonstrated the instructor’s ongoing attention to the cognitive status of these concepts for students. Sometimes, as in (25), the instructor seemed to minimize or downgrade the difficulty of a procedure along with confirming students’ understanding of it. In this case, the discourse marker ‘of course’ reinforces the downgrading. This presumably tells students of the instructor’s expectation, that they should understand this thoroughly. (25) 1012 so of course we understand it must be comes from here.\

4.2.7 Use of specialized terminology Finally, a number of expressions dealt with the use of the terminology of physics. Some of these reflected the particular context, that the instructor intended to improve students’ understanding of English along with physics. In example


(26) he introduced an explanation of the term ‘aperiodical’ with a comment about English morphological structure, before going on for several lines to explain the function of the prefix ‘a.’ (26)

681 682 683 684

aperiodical.\ it got to be so long a word.\ in English.\ okay?\

Other expressions dealt with terminology that would be new to most native speakers. In example (27) he noted a general phenomenon, that a given concept may be called by different names in different professions. (27)

810 811 812 813 814 815

for engineers,\ we ^like to call this, _ ..^frequency spectrum,\ or sometimes we call it â,_ spectrum of frequency.\ okay?/

4.2.8 Summary As the instructor introduced, connected, and applied the various representations, he also provided guidance to students about the type of processing he believed would be helpful. Presumably these prompts assist students in juggling the various demanding cognitive activities required to understand this material and to integrate it with prior knowledge. We believe that, at another level, these expressions play yet another very important role. The instructor’s use of them reflects and demonstrates his attention to the current status of student’s cognitive states. – their attentional processes, their knowledge base and their ability to access it, and the ways in which they reason about what they are learning. It is as though he is tracking the status of their understanding at each stage of the lecture and preparing to adjust accordingly. We thus take the use of these expressions as evidence of the role of intersubjectivity or perspective-taking in language use (cf. Tanskanen this volume). Further, we believe that students respond to this evidence of sensitivity to their perspectives, as well as to the specific guidance included in the metapragmatic expressions. Finally, we note that some of the guidance seemed designed for students’ future use of models. Advice about generalization and reasoning seem to apply more generally rather than just to an immediate case. Similarly, some of the advice about attention and memory seemed to be more general in its application rather than limited to the case at hand.


Metapragmatic expressions guiding processing were used throughout the lectures. In the 80-utterance segment in Table 2, there were 8 utterances, or 10%, in which the instructor used explicit expressions. In addition, if we count confirmation tags in this category, as implicit devices for inviting clarification, the total would be 17 utterances, or 21% of utterances that include advice about processing content rather than about content itself.

4.3 Using metapragmatic expressions to assign participant roles to students Despite the constraints of the lecture format, there were a variety of means by which the instructor made his presentation dialogic, for example, as seen above (examples (24) and (25)), he used various devices to monitor the audience’s comprehension of the lecture. But what was most striking was the way in which he used language to assign participant roles to students. The most obvious markers were personal pronouns, I (in conjunction with you), you, and we. But in addition, the verbs used also seemed to help assign these roles to the students. These expressions were not separate utterances but rather were regularly embedded in the language used to convey content, especially procedures. The examples quoted below are taken from the 3 ½-minute segment on square pulses, except as noted.

4.3.1 Instructor as expert and students as learners During the introduction to the analysis of square pulses, the instructor used personal pronouns and verbs that indicated the expected roles for himself as expert and for students as learners, as in (28): (28) 970 what I want you to understand is ^this one

As one might expect, he often used you during these analyses, along with experiencer verbs indicating student cognitive experiences. These seemed to convey his confidence that the students were indeed performing their role as learners successfully. These often occurred at the ends of procedures, as in (29): (29) 1001 you understand this derivation.\ 1002 right?/

4.3.2 Students aligned with instructor During the explanation of a topic, he frequently aligned the students with himself, as in (30), to convey the sense that the analyses were a joint project. (30) 978 we got the frequency contribution


4.3.3 Students as agents of procedures or discoveries But it is especially intriguing to note that when he came to a concluding section, as in examples (31)–(33) below), he often made the students the agent of the solution: (31) 988 …(0.5) so you ^find,\ 989 the first one’s solution (32) 996 …what you ^get is this one,\ 997 …(0.14) right?/ (33) 1021 you find it it goes something like ^this

Notice that the verbs were those that convey the accomplishment of actions, not verbs that convey student roles of learning, understanding, etc. That is, he assigned students the role as agents of the discovery or conclusion, when obviously this was not literally true. In one telling utterance (example (34), from an earlier section of the lecture), there was a striking example of his construction of students’ role in the lecture. (34) 672 just as we said.\

Of course, the students had not literally spoken. Rather he was referring to the role he had constructed for them, as co-participants in the lecture-dialogue.

4.3.4 Summary Along with presenting scientific content, the instructor used metapragmatic expressions to construct various roles for the students. We think of these as metaparticipation expressions, as they assign participant roles to students. Sometime the roles were presented literally, with students as learners. However, students were often aligned with the instructor in applying models and drawing conclusions. It was especially interesting to see how he sometimes constructed the students’ role as agents of discovery. This can be seen as a device for scaffolding students’ entry into the role of scientist. The instructor provided linguistic support for a role students could not yet play by themselves. We believe this strategy plays a critical role in his ability to engage students and to attract them to his discipline. In addition, we believe that these metapragmatic expressions convey the instructor’s sensitivity to student perspectives and that this in itself conveys a message to students. The instructor is constantly aware of them as active participants in the lecture and he projects their roles into the future. Like metaprocessing expressions, these provide an example of the role of intersubjectivity in language use.


We were surprised by the ubiquity of these expressions. Of the 80 utterances in the segment shown in Table 2, 14 (i.e., 18%) included identifiable expressions assigning participant roles.

5.

General discussion

Metapragmatic expressions were used throughout the lectures to such an extent that it is hard to imagine them without such language. Just as Ifantidou (2005) argued that the metadiscourse she studied was essential to understanding academic texts, we believe it was equally important in the academic lectures we studied, though in different ways. We identified three basic functions: to present and connect the different forms of representation used in physics, to guide students’ immediate and future cognitive processing of the material, and to create participation frameworks for the lectures. For the 80-utterance segment given in Table 2, a total of 27 (i.e., 34%) utterances had one or more explicit metapragmatic elements. If we also count confirmation tags as implicit metapragmatic expressions, this gives a total of 36 (i.e., 45%) of the expressions that contained at least one of these three types of expressions. These expressions appeared to be central to the lectures, embedded with the content, rather than peripheral in form or function. In addition, they seemed to be focused primarily on uses of the concepts or roles students might play, rather than on misunderstandings as such. The use of these metapragmatic expressions seemed to be exquisitely tailored to the goals of the class and the instructor’s assumptions about the students. First, a variety of expressions were designed to help students meet one of the major challenges of learning to do science, that is, to integrate different forms of representation. Students originally struggle to understand each form of representation on its own, but then they must integrate them in order to fully understand the models in the field. Since research has shown that students have difficulty doing this on their own or even with computer assistance, we believe that the instructor’s language plays a critical role. As can be seen in the network model of the lecture, the instructor makes multiple connections between representations, accompanying many of them with explicit metapragmatic expressions. The use of these expressions in itself signals to students the need to pay attention to representations and the connections between them. The explicitness of the expressions provided a cue as to the relative importance of concepts and to the structure the explanations. And of course the metapragmatic expressions in themselves also provide more specific advice about the relations between representations.


Second, we found many expressions designed to help students understand and use the content more effectively. The instructor also sought confirmation of their understanding, especially during critical parts of the lecture. At one level, these metapragmatic expressions are important because they may help in specific ways in comprehension – what to focus on, how to reason, etc. But they may function at other levels as well. They convey the message that doing physics is hard work and you need to be prepared to carry out a variety of strategies for processing material and monitoring your understanding of it. In addition, they demonstrate the instructor’s sensitivity to the student’s cognitive states, or intersubjectivity. We believe this is one way in which the instructor engages the students, making them feel connected both to the instructor and to the field. And finally, the instructor’s orientation toward their future use of concepts conveys his belief that they will indeed do so, that their learning is not just a matter of memorizing material for an exam. It sends the message that they are expected to start thinking about how they will use these concepts in the future. In doing this, he is helping introduce them to their future role as scientists. Third, metapragmatic expressions created an interactional framework for the classroom. In utterances that at first appeared to merely convey content about procedures and conclusions, the instructor used both personal pronouns and selected verbs to assign students to participant roles. In contrast to the literal roles of teacher and student and the literal setting, in which the instructor did virtually all of the speaking, the metapragmatic expressions assigned students an active role in carrying out procedures and drawing conclusions. At one level, this cued students to follow closely at critical points. At another level it also conveyed the instructor’s expectations that students can and should start playing an active role in deriving and applying models. Further, it sent the message that students are to start playing the role of scientist. Of course the present study has several limitations inherent in the situation studied and methodology used. As the categories are somewhat subjective and are not mutually exclusive, it is impossible to say exactly what proportion of the language is metapragmatic in nature. Also, we cannot know to what extent our findings are specific to this particular instructor, to the use of English in instruction, or even to the use of English in teaching non-native speakers. While the lectures seem to us similar to those in a native-speaker context, that can only be determined with future research. We hope that this study will help lead to further research in this area, as many questions remain. We believe there are other types of metapragmatic expressions in academic lectures that we have not identified, for example in teaching the humanities or social sciences. It will be interesting to see how instructors vary the use of these expressions as they perceive either different goals for the class or different


needs of the students. One group of students of special interest, given today’s international academic culture, are students taught in a second language, either at home or abroad. Learning to teach non-native speakers is itself an important new educational challenge, and metapragmatic expressions may play an important role. In addition, there are a set of questions about the relations among the instructor’s goals, his or her use of metapragmatic expressions, and student engagement in the class and the field. And of course the critical question will be to study the relation between the use of metapragmatic expressions in instruction and student achievement, as measured in both the short term and the long term. While no one would want to take (or teach) a class devoid of all metapragmatic expressions, it might be possible to study the covariation between amounts and types of metapragmatic expressions and the patterns of performance of students. Or specific lectures could be designed to systematically vary the amount and types of expressions, to study their impact. We began with the plan to study one seemingly narrow context and one specific type of metapragmatic expressions, those used to introduce and coordinate forms of representation in physics lectures. Yet in analyzing them we could not help discovering more roles for these expressions than we knew to expect. In addition, we discovered that other types of metapragmatic functions were built into these lectures that we believe are critical to their success, guidance on processing content and the assignment of participant roles. These findings argue strongly for the premise of the present volume, that much can be learned by studying how speakers actually employ metapragmatic utterances, by how these utterances are put to communicative practice. In addition, the editors raise the question of how the costs of metapragmatic interventions are justified, in terms of the loss of efficiency in conveying content. While we have not tried to measure the costs of these expressions, we have tried to identify their contributions. We hope we have demonstrated that the use of these metapragmatic expressions both reflect and display the instructor’s goals for the students and that they play a significant role in helping achieve them.

References Bakhtin, M.M. 1981. The Dialogic Imagination. Austin: University of Texas Press. Bodemer, D. and Faust, U. 2006. “External and mental referencing of multiple representations.” Computers in Human Behavior 22 (1): 27–42. Bublitz, W. and Lenk, U. 1999. “Disturbed coherence: ‘Fill me in.’” In Coherence in Spoken and Written Discourse, W. Bublitz, U. Lenk and E. Ventola (eds), 153–174. Amsterdam: Benjamins.


Bunton, D. 1999. “The use of higher level metatext in Ph.D. theses.” English for Specific Purposes 18 (1): 541–556. Cheng, P. C.-H. 2002. “Electrifying diagrams for learning: Principles for complex representational systems.” Cognitive Science 24 (6): 685–736. Dahl, T. 2004. “Textual metadiscourse in research articles: A marker of national culture or of academic discipline?” Journal of Pragmatics 36: 1807–1825. Du Bois, J. 1991. “Transcription design principles for spoken discourse research.” Pragmatics 1 (1): 71–106. Edelson, D.C. and Gordia, D. 1998. “Visualization for learners: A framework for adapting scientists’ tools.” Computers & Geosciences 24 (7): 607–616. Goffman, E. 1981. Forms of Talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hyland, K. 1999. “Talking to students: Metadiscourse in introductory textbooks.” English for Specific Purposes 18 (1): 3–26. Ifantidou, E. 2005. “The semantics and pragmatics of metadiscourse.” Journal of Pragmatics 37: 1325–1353. Kamio, A. 1997. Territory of Information. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Kozma, R. 2003. “The material features of multiple representations and their cognitive and social affordances for science understanding.” Learning and Instruction 13 (2): 205–226. Le, E. 2004. “Active participation within written argumentation: Metadiscourse and editorialist’s authority.” Journal of Pragmatics 36: 687–714. Mayer, R.E. and Jackson, J. 2005. “The case for coherence in scientific explanations: Quantitative details can hurt qualitative understanding.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. 11 (1): 13–18. Miller, K. 2000. “Representational tools and conceptual change: The young scientists’ tool kit.” Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology. 21(1): 21–25. Mishra, P. and Brewer, W. 2003. “Theories as forms of mental representations and their role in the recall of text information.” Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (3): 277–303. Seufert, T. 2003. “Supporting coherence formation in learning from multiple representations.” Learning and Instruction 13 (2): 227–237. Smith, F.L. 1993. “The pulpit and women’s place: Gender and the framing of the ‘exegetical self ’ in sermon performances.” In Framing in Discourse, D. Tannen (ed.), 146–175. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 146–175. Tannen, D. (ed.). 1993. Framing in Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tanskanen, S.-K. This volume. “Metapragmatic utterances in computer-mediated interaction.”

Appendix A Transcription conventions based on DuBois (1991). UNITS Intonation unit Truncated intonation unit Truncated word Primary stress

{carriage return} – ^


SPEAKERS Speech overlap

[]

TRANSITIONAL CONTINUITY Final Continuing Rise of pitch Fall of pitch Level pitch Appeal

. , / \ _ ?

Lengthening

=

Long Medium Short Latching

...(N) ... .. (0)

Vocal voices Inhalation Exhalation Glottal stop Laughter

() (H) (Hx) % @

Laugh quality Quotation quality Sotto voce Loud Whisper Multiple quality features

<SV SV> <WH WH>

LENGTHENING PAUSE

VOCAL NOISES

QUALITY

TRANSCRIBER’S PERSPECTIVE Researcher’s comment Uncertain hearing Indecipherable syllable

<X X> X

The acquisition of metapragmatic abilities in preschool children Juliane Stude

1.

Introduction

As displayed in the present volume, linguistic and communicative competence do not solely consist in the ability to produce and comprehend language. An additional dimension involves the ability to focus on language and communication itself. This meta-dimension appears to be an especially relevant aspect of human communication, since language use for humans is not merely an instrument of communication comparable to signaling systems in non-humans, but rather a means of reflection. Based on a corpus study using a sub-set of the British National Corpus (BNC), Anderson et al. (2004) found that people indeed resort to meta-language quite frequently in natural conversations: “A total of fifty-nine files containing 138,017 sentences from the BNC were examined. Of these, 15,832 lines (11.47%) were identified as containing meta-language” (p. 2). Similar results are reported by Aukrust (2004), who examined adult-child interaction during mealtime in American and Norwegian families revealing that “on average as much as every tenth utterance commented on talk” (p. 189). Consequently, insight into the early acquisition of the ability to comment on language and its use should shed light on the specific nature of human lin. Categories included by Anderson et al. (2004) are 1) interchanges used to establish, track and move between dialog states; 2) interchanges used to establish communicative intention or speaker meaning; 3) discussions about clarifications of items in the language itself; 4) interchanges used to establish or monitor the match between language and the world; and 5) discussions of or references to speech acts per se. . Aukrust (2004) examined three subtypes of talk-focused talk: talk about language per se, discourse management and reported speech.

200 Juliane Stude

guistic and pragmatic competence. In spite of the high explanatory potential of metalinguistics, research on first language acquisition has paid scant attention to children’s participation in naturally occurring metalinguistic discourses (for exceptions see Becker 1988; Blum-Kulka 1997; Aukrust 2001, 2004; Ely et al. 2001). In particular, we are just beginning to explain how children acquire the ability to comment on language and its use. Metalinguistic activities may concern any aspect of language, whether phonological, syntactic, semantic or pragmatic (see Gombert 1992). We can differentiate two subtypes of metalinguistic activities: 1) talk about language per se (i.e., talk about formal aspects of language including metaphonological, metasemantic and metasyntactic talk) and 2) metapragmatic talk (i.e., talk about the use of language). Metapragmatic talk comprises comments on one’s own and on other people’s communicative behaviour, e.g., comments “related to ways of talking, conversational norms, politeness markers and turn negotiation” (Aukrust 2001: 62; for a more detailed discussion of this term see Caffi 1998; Silverstein 1993, Hübler and Bublitz, this volume). Whereas some researchers are of the opinion that metapragmatic activities should be excluded from metalinguistic activities (e.g. van Kleeck 1984), in the present study, metapragmatic activities are considered as a particular metalinguistic activity (see also Hickman 1985). This is in accordance with Gombert’s statement: If we accept that metalinguistic activity covers the totality of activities which suppose a reflection on and/or intentional control over language, then metapragmatic activities seem to us to correspond naturally to those metalinguistic activities which bear on the pragmatic aspects of language. (Gombert 1992: 12)

This study focuses on the underlying mechanisms of metalinguistic development and specifically addresses the acquisitional role of interactive patterns in me tapragmatic talk. It is argued that metapragmatic talk can be considered to prepare young children for “more reflexive ways of talking” (Aukrust 2001: 80) and, thus, may offer a basis for the development of later metalinguistic abilities related to deliberate reflection on language and its use. Primarily, I want to pursue the question if and in what way metapragmatic talk between teachers and children as well as metapragmatic talk among peers at preschool age can be seen as relevant acquisitional contexts for metalinguistic development. I am thus adopting the view that not only dyadic adult-child interaction, but also forms of multiparty discourse and talk among children in particular function as powerful contexts for promoting children’s language development (e.g. Nicolopoulou 2002; BlumKulka and Snow 2004).

The acquisition of metapragmatic abilities in preschool children 201

2.

Setting the scene

2.1

Children’s metapragmatic development

Though there is still little known about the link between conversational competencies and the acquisition of meta-language, it can be assumed that metapragmatic development is closely linked to the child’s pragmatic skills. In research on pragmatic development several authors have pointed out the importance of parental input (e.g. Gleason, Perlmann and Greif 1984; Becker 1994). The predominant forms of input reported are prompting and modeling in the case of the child’s failure at or omission of pragmatic behaviour, reinforcing children for appropriate behaviour and explaining or discussing pragmatic conventions. Overall, in commenting explicitly on the (in)appropriateness of pragmatic behaviour, parents take on a strikingly active and direct role in mediating pragmatics in comparison with other domains in first language acquisition (e.g. syntactical, phonological or narrative skills) (see also Becker 1994: 132). Given the amount of explicitness in pragmatic input, it is highly plausible that children’s attention to talk and language use can be observed quite early in childhood. Bates (1976) locates the onset of explicit metapragmatic comments at two years of age (p. 133ff.). Along the same lines studies on family interactions have shown that preschoolers can display “quite sophisticated metapragmatic knowledge” in commenting explicitly on “a wide variety of pragmatic rules and behaviors” (Becker 1988: 465). Observing six families with preschoolers in unstructured conversational interactions for about one year, Becker (1988: 460ff.) distinguished five categories of metapragmatic comments: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Comments about other people’s pragmatic errors, comments and questions about pragmatic rules, comments to regulate and maintain the conversation, self-promptings of pragmatic behaviors and accounts for pragmatic errors by reference to conflicting pragmatic rules.

Not only the occurrence of child-initiated questions about pragmatic rules (see category 2 above), but also the amazing variety of metapragmatic comments reveal that children do not rely on adults’ input alone, but take an active role themselves in learning about pragmatics (see also Becker 1994: 144ff.). Children’s role . It should be noted that the comments Becker (1988) observed in naturally occurring discourses of preschoolers and their parents reflect more sophisticated pragmatic knowledge than laboratory studies have revealed (e.g. Baroni and Axia 1989; Conti and Camras 1984; Leonard and Reid 1979).

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as active participants has also been stressed in studies on culture-specific communicative styles, which reveal that the metapragmatic discourse through which children acquire preferred styles of politeness varies across cultures (e.g. BlumKulka and Sheffer 1993). In this context, we can build on the work of Aukrust (2001, 2004) and assume that children may come to treat language reflexively through culturally moulded types of talk-focused talk. In this sense talk-focused talk is construed as a literate type of everyday talk that not only acquaints children with cultural-specific pragmatic conventions, but may also prepare them for literacy (see also Pellegrini, Galda and Chara 1997; Snow, Burns and Griffin 1998). However, the question whether and how children’s participation in metalinguistic discourse is related to conscious processes and the presence of so called metalinguistic awareness is a controversial matter (for a conceptual overview see Gombert 1992; Tumner, Pratt and Herriman 1984). While some researchers have cautioned against a rash interpretation of unconscious metaprocedures as indices of awareness and attributed the emergence of metalinguistic awareness to the late preschool years and school years (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 1986), others assume a much earlier existence of metalinguistic awareness (e.g. Clark 1978; Levy 1999). Presumably, no solution is to be expected in the awareness debate as long as the concept of metalinguistic awareness itself remains diffuse. But still, research on first language acquisition is challenged to explain the relationship between early metalinguistic activities (e.g., preschoolers’ spontaneous metapragmatic talk) and those of older children being able to reflect and comment on language upon request (e.g., talk about language per se within experimental tasks). The present contribution addresses this issue by examining whether and how the interactive use of metapragmatic utterances in the preschool classroom might provide children with a basis for first access to some metalinguistic vocabulary that can be considered a prerequisite for later metalinguistic abilities. Before we turn to the findings of the study, the following section will identify some of the essential points that underpin the relevance of social interaction to the process of language acquisition.

2.2 The perspective of the investigation: Social interaction as a crucial acquisitional mechanism Numerous studies have argued that social interaction is a fundamental process for language development, due to the assistance unintentionally offered by a more competent partner in a dialogue (e.g. Bruner 1985; Garton 1992; Quasthoff 1995). The developmental significance of dyadic adult-child interaction is insofar obvious as “the more knowledgeable and capable adult takes on the role of instruct-


ing, guiding, correcting, and/or “scaffolding” the efforts of the less capable child” (Nicolopoulou 2002: 117). Of particular importance in this process is the sensitivity to the child’s current abilities, which allows the adult to work within the child’s zone of proximal development by offering age- and capacity-specific help (see Dickinson 1991: 261; Hausendorf and Quasthoff 1992: 305). Accordingly, it can be expected and has already been shown that children’s interactive experiences in talking to parents plays an important role in early metalinguistic development, as well (e.g. Blum-Kulka 1997; Ely et al. 2001, Aukrust 2004). This study hypothesizes that metalinguistic abilities also emerge from supportive patterns in multiparty discourses and interactions among preschoolers, in particular. In this way it follows the recent attempt to broaden the conception of the “social context” of development by investigating more closely the power of multiparty discourse, including talk among children, rather than limiting the focus of analysis to dyadic adult-child interaction (see also Blum-Kulka and Snow 2002; Blum-Kulka and Snow 2004). This perspective has several implications. In order to show in what way participation in multiparty discourse can offer children unique opportunities to learn about language and its use, it is, firstly, important to take into account the specifics inherent in this kind of encounter. Secondly, particular attention must be paid to the institutional setting of the data collected. Thus the question is: which different interactive demands do participants have to meet in the classroom in contrast to dyadic adult-child interaction in familial settings? With respect to the last question, it has been shown that preschool classroom interactions are to an extremely high degree connected with institutional constraints (see Corsaro 1979; Dickinson 1991; Dickinson and Smith 1991). One of the concomitant manifestations is, e.g., the amount of control directed discourse and thus the adult’s use of a controlling interactive style (see Corsaro 1979: 384). Furthermore, the adult’s controlling behaviour is mostly addressed to several children at the same time which makes it almost impossible to offer age- and capacity-specific talk in each case as it is naturally provided in dyadic interactions (see above). Additionally, preschool teachers rarely engage children in extended dialogues, which Dickinson (1991: 286ff., 291ff.) attributes to control and management issues in the teacher’s agenda. Therefore, in the following analysis it is important to keep in mind that one of the reasons why the supportive mechanisms found in dyadic adult-child interaction can not simply be transferred to multiparty teacher-child interaction lies in its institutional embedding. On the other hand, preschool teachers professionally carry out the pedagogical and social task of educating children to full-fledged members of society, which includes teaching them current cultural norms. For this reason we may expect teacher-

204 Juliane Stude

child interaction to be rich in explicit comments on politeness norms and conversational rules. With respect to the first point concerning the particularities inherent in multiparty discourse and talk among children, one may first ask why peer interaction as a form of multiparty discourse may especially contribute to language development. This question is well motivated insofar as prima facie child-child interaction does not provide any kind of “scaffolding” due to the absence of a more knowledgeable adult. However, the present contribution argues to the contrary that especially in situations where adults are absent children may feel obliged to organize discourse by themselves in order to fulfil necessary discourse-organizational tasks. The challenges to be taken up on their own include establishing participation roles, negotiation of taking a turn, retaining the conversational initiative, dealing with interruptions, considering politeness norms etc. It is therefore argued that children gain experiences in the production of conversationally relevant devices and forms in such peer interactions (see also Blum-Kulka and Snow 2002: 4ff.). Given the young age and the associated inexperience of preschoolers in these discursive skills, a high frequency of failed or conflict-filled discourses as well as violations of conversational rules and politeness norms may be expected in peer interaction. One purpose of the following analysis is therefore to examine to what extent and under which interactive functions preschoolers comment on their own or on other people’s communicative (in)appropriateness and how far classroom interaction can thus be seen as a rich acquisitional context for metalinguistic development. Thus, this paper can be read as a contribution to the desideratum formulated by Aukrust (2004: 199): “We need to develop further understanding of how children may come to experience themselves as linguistic agents while learning to reflect upon language and talk.”

3.

Data and leading research questions

The investigation is based on recordings from a larger study in which 20 preschool children and three preschool teachers of a German kindergarten took part. The children were between 3;6 and 6;11 years of age. Over a period of one year interactional routines were audiotaped in teacher-child interactions as well as in child-child interactions during play time, at mealtimes (breakfast and lunch) and during activities on the playground. Classroom data were supplemented by data that were audiotaped during a three day trip to a youth hostel. The latter data allowed observation of the participants in a less institutional, more casual atmosphere. Altogether the corpus comprises recordings of 40 hours and 50 minutes of spontaneous speech, which provide an insight into the extent to which


children participate in metalinguistic discourses in their everyday life. Data were transcribed according to the conventions of GAT and analysed by conversation analysis methods. The analyses reported in this contribution deal with two main questions: In what way can teacher-child interaction and thus teachers’ conversational activities be reconstructed as part of the explanation of children’s acquisition of metalinguistic abilities? And to what extent can peer interaction be considered as an important acquisitional context for such abilities? In order to answer these questions I will present different types of metapragmatic utterances that can be observed in preschool classroom interaction and define the interactive functions they perform. In the final section, it will be asked how the child’s early use of metapragmatic utterances may contribute to the development of later forms of metalinguistic abilities.

4.

Findings and assessments

Metapragmatic utterances occur in the data in a great variety of conversational contexts. In the following two sections they will be categorized and described according to the child vs. adult utterance distinction and primarily analysed with respect to their interactive functions in discourse.

4.1

Adult-initiated metapragmatic utterances

The metapragmatic utterances produced by the preschool teachers are especially observed in the context of negotiating classroom rules as well as in cases of admonishing violations of those rules. Thus, the adult’s behaviour corresponds not only to the institutional task of caring for preschoolers, but also to educating and preparing them for social life. Accordingly, most of the metapragmatic discourses between the children and the teachers can be interpreted as a variety of disciplinary talk. In addition to other aspects of language use, these talks predominantly concern 1) turn negotiation, 2) politeness and other conversational norms and 3) pragmatic (in)appropriateness of special linguistic forms (mostly concerning invectives). The following three extracts taken from conversations at lunchtime (examples (1) and (2)) – which can be regarded as “a potentially rich time for language” (Dickinson 1991: 265) – and at playtime (example (3)) provide examples of each.

. GAT = “Gesprächsanalytisches Transkriptionssystem” (see Selting et al. 1998)

206 Juliane Stude

(1) Turn negotiation Filename: 80_S8 Speakers: teacher (T), children together (KK), Sandra 6;8 (S), Paul 4;6 (P) →

(conversation about a planned trip to the woods) 01 T: wir sUchen uns dann mal einen WEG aus (we will choose one way then) 02 und gehn ALle zusAmmen okay? (and walk altogether okay) 03 (--) gut? ((--) is this ok) 04 KK: ja:: (Ye::s) 05 S: (wer ) ((who )) 06 P: ja und ICH weiß wElchen;= (yeah and I know which one) 07 T: =EInen moment (.) EInen moment (one moment (.) one moment) 08 die sAndra hat etwas geFRAGT, (Sandra has asked something) 09 da MÜSSen wir auch mal zUhören; (now we have to listen) 10 S: (.) und wenn einer PIpi muss? ((.) and if someone needs to go a wee-wee) 11 P: dann mUss er ins geBÜSCH pinkeln. (then he has to pee into the bushes)

(2) Politeness and other conversational norms

Filename: 80_S5 Speakers: trainee Fabian (F), Timo 5;7 (Ti), children together (KK), teacher (T), Ben 5;7 (B)

01 F: ((kommt herein)) HALlo; (((comes in)) hello) 02 Ti: hEy FABian; (hi Fabian) 03 F: dAnke; (thanks) 04 KK: FA:bi: [A:::N (Fa:bi:a::n) 05 F: [gUten appetit; (enjoy your meal)


→

06 T: der fAbian hat guten appetIt gesagt (Fabian has said enjoy your meal) 07 da sagt man ↑DANke; (so you should say thank you) 08 KK: DANke::; (thank you::) 09 (2.0) (2.0) 10 B: der HÄTT uns bessere manIE:rn beibringen können; (he should have taught us better manners)

(3) Pragmatic (in)appropriateness of linguistic forms

Filename: 83_S1 Speakers: Karsten 5;1 (K), teacher (T), Paul 4;6 (P)

01 K: FRAUke, weißt du da hat jemand KAcke gesagt; (Frauke, do you know someone has said poo-poo) 02 T: wer, (who) 03 K: der; (him) 04 T: Pau:l (1.5) Pau:l, (Paul Paul) → 05 es wär sehr schön wenn du mal ANdere wörter nehmen würdest; (it would be very nice if you could use other words) 06 P: (--) die sagen das ständig ´ÀU:CH; (but they say it all the time, too) 07 T: dann auch ihr ALle kinder; (so all of you, kids)

All of these examples are characterised by the adult’s controlling behaviour concerning particular conversational rules (here, e.g., to let someone finish what he or she is saying, to thank someone, if reasonable and to avoid the use of invectives in classroom interaction). This observation is in line with the above-mentioned research results which show that teachers’ behaviour in the classroom is dominated by control-related concerns (see Corsaro 1979; Dickinson 1991). It is characteristic of the data that the teachers mostly use metapragmatic utterances to establish a dominant role in the classroom in terms of being the person authorised to monitor the classroom rules. In this way, the asymmetric role allocation inherent in teacher-child interaction is continuously reproduced by the participants’ be-

208 Juliane Stude

haviour. Furthermore, the teachers mostly use directive utterances which hardly give children the opportunity to take an active part in metapragmatic discourses. Therefore, it can be assumed that the teacher primarily aims to improve the child’s pragmatic skills, rather than to contribute to the process by which preschoolers may acquire metapragmatic abilities in terms of productive speech abilities. This is why, from the perspective of acquisition, teacher-child interaction cannot be reconstructed as a rich context for gaining experience in the production of metapragmatic utterances. Nevertheless, the teachers’ metapragmatic activities may be taken by the children as a model and may thus have an indirect acquisitional effect on their metapragmatic development. In the next chapter we will see how children make use of these models when they are among peers.

4.2 Child-initiated metapragmatic utterances Child-initiated metapragmatic utterances occur predominantly in peer conversation and less often in adult-child interaction, which suggests that these utterances perform a function which is otherwise fulfilled by the adult. This is illustrated in the following fragment recorded at a lunch table, while the teacher was involved in a different conversation and not paying attention to the children who were being recorded. (4) Conversational norms

Filename: 80_S4 Speakers: André 4;0 (A), Paul 4;6 (P), Philipp 5;6 (Ph), Ben 5;7 (B)

01 A: vOn dagobert [DUCK; (from dagobert [duck) 02 P: [wOhnt der etwa neben DEIner wohnung? ([does he really live next to your flat) 03 Ph: ö:h; (e:h) 04 A: ö:h; (e:h) 05 B: AUa, (ouch) 06 Ph: wEr guckt wer guckt nummer SIEben auf dAgo bert, (who does watch who does watch number seven with dagobert)


→

07 A: (1.0) mh::::m; ((1.0) mh:::m) 08 Ph: mit vOllem mund ´`REdet man nicht;> () 09 B: [( ),= (who has a [( )) 10 A: [do:ch; ([I can) 11 B: =wer hat powerrangers gesehen (who has watched powerrangers) 12 wie die (.) wie die se endlich? (how they how they at last) ((...))

In contrast to the previous examples, in this extract it is the child (Ph) who explicates the conversational rule (here: not to talk when your mouth is full). Given the formulaic and prosodically highlighted character of the rule reproduced in the child’s German utterance, it is unlikely that the child has generated this wording. In fact, it can be assumed that he is repeating an utterance heard many times before and thus makes use of a linguistic form made available by adults. In other words, in situations of the adult’s absence some children tend to adopt the adult’s role and mark their role definition by using adult devices and adult forms. Interestingly, most of the children (especially the older ones) underline their adopted role by prosodic means that establish a superior and triumphant – in some cases almost ironic – overtone, from which we can conclude that the function of using adult forms at this age goes beyond resorting to models due to difficulties in phrasing. Moreover, an important function can be seen in achieving a dominant role in multiparty discourse. However, the data also contain examples in which the children do not succeed in applying adult forms to their speech. As an illustration consider the following extract. (5) (Un)successful formulae

Filename: 83_S7 Speakers: Philipp 5;6 (Ph), David 6;9 (D)

. For a more detailed account of the differentiation between the analysis dimensions DEVICEs and FORMs see Hausendorf and Quasthoff (1992).

210 Juliane Stude

→

01 Ph: DAS gehört mIr. (that is mine) 02 hattest du nicht gesagt, (didn´t you say) 03 ( ) (( )) 04 so (weißte was,) (so (do you know something)) 05 da bring ich GAR keine mehr für dIch. (then I will bring no more for you) 06 D: DAS IST ER!PRESS!ung; (that´s blackmail) 07 (3.0) ((3.0)) 08 u:nd erprEssung SAGT man nIcht. (and you don´t say blackmail)

In this example the child (D) connects two adult formulae (That is blackmail!; you don’t say …) without recognizing that in German ‘blackmail’ is an expression that is normally not combined with the verb ‘to say’. Such examples can be regarded as evidence that children adopt forms of adult speech even though they do not completely comprehend their meaning. At any rate, even in these linguistically unsuccessful cases, the child’s metapragmatic utterance does not fail as a means of social control and exerting power as it signals to the first child (Ph) that his threat (see line 5) is regarded as unacceptable. In contrast to adult-child compounds, which are inherently asymmetrical (see Aronsson and Evaldsson 1993), the need to negotiate the participants’ roles seems to be crucial in multiparty peer interaction and entails that “young children need to “work hard” conversationally to ensure their speaking roles” (Blum-Kulka and Snow 2002: 8). Therefore, it seems to be worthwhile to examine in more detail to what extend children apply metapragmatic activities in order to achieve a leading role within peer group discourse. For this purpose I will present two more examples taken from the different contexts discourse organisation within conversational narratives (example (6)) and verbal games (example (7)). The first of these examples illustrates how children organize discourse in the context of conversational narratives about personal experiences. Of special interest are the strategies applied by the children to obtain the turn and to hold the floor. The extract begins while the children are discussing who is allowed to join a planned game before starting a sequence of narratives.


(6) Discourse organisation

Filename: 16_S1 Speakers: Hannah 4;6 (H), Sandra 6;11 (S), Annika 5;8 (A)

01 H: und wer STRÄHNchen hat, (and someone with highlights) 02 der [darf AUch nicht. (is not allowed either) 03 S: [ja (yes) 04 ja du hast AUCH strähnchen; (yes you have highlights, too) 05 und wer TATtoo hat, (and someone with a tattoo) 06 der darf AU nicht; =ne? (is not allowed either, right?) 07 H: do::ch (yes, he is) 08 S: ICH hab AUch-= (I have one, too) 09 =aber das sIEht man nich; (but you can’t see it) 10 weil ich das schon (.) ei:n länger hE:r hatte; (because I got it a long time ago) 11 (1.0) aufm bAUch hab ich das (aber) nicht, (but I dont’t have it on my belly) 12 (namely) 13 (-) aufm arm; (on my arm) 14 der hat mit der mit ner !SPRIT!ze, =ne, (he did with this with an injection, you know?) 15 (1.0) mit der mit ner spritze nAchgemalt, =ne, (traced with this with an injection, you know?) 16 der is SO durchgegangen (is der) (he traced like this) → 17 H: ist doch eGA:L (so what?) 18 ich hatte !SO! ne große sprItze; (I got an injection big like this)

212 Juliane Stude

19 (2.0) hIEr sIEhste? (look, can you see it?) 20 guck mal (.) hier (look at this) 21 S: da hat deine (.) schwEster SUsi das gemacht (this was made by your sister Susi) 22 dIE (.) dich gekratzt; =ne, (she scratched you, didn’t she?) 23 (2.0) und dAnn und das und dAs hier, (and then and this and this) 24 hast DU so gemAcht; (was made by you) 25 guck, (look) 26 guck mal [da ne? (look this one, right?) 27 H: [da guck mal (look at this) 28 hier (.) hat meine schwEster SUsi mich ge-krAtzt; (here my sister Susi scratched me) → 29 S: IST doch egal (so what?) 30 H: da=hab ich geBLUTet, (no, I bled) 31 ich hab ich hab ge!WEINT!.= (I I cried) 32 A: =weißt du was ich hab mich schon [mal an KOPF, (do you know something once my head) 33 S: [annika (ich bin wirklich nicht mehr deine Freundin ne?) (Annika, I am really not your friend any longer) 34 A: ich hab nämlich schon mal an kOpf verbrannt und überall,= (namely, I have burnt my head and everywhere else) 35 =dann hab ich ganz doll geBLUTet. (then I bled so much) 36 S: [weißte was ich (yes, but me, do you know what I) 37 A: [ (and I)


38 S: [NEIN weißte was? (no, do you know something?) 39 H: [

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