Cognitive processes in the perception of art

COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE PERCEPTION OF ART

ADVANCES

IN PSYCHOLOGY 19 Editors G . E. STELMACH

P. A. VROON

NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM .NEW YORK 'OXFORD

COGNITIVE PROCESSES INTHE PERCEPTION OF ART Edited by

W. Ray CROZIER School of Psychology Preston Polytechnic and

AntlonyJ. CHAPMAN Department of Psychology University of Leeds

1684 NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK . OXFORD

"Elsevier Science Pub1ishersB.V.. 1984 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN: 0 444 87501 8

Publishers: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS B.V. P.O. Box 1991 1000 BZ Amsterdam The Netherlands

Sole distributors for the U . S .A. and Canada: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. 52 Vanderbilt Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

V

PREFACE

This book is based on a snall group of the 150 or so papers presented at the International Conference on Psychology and the Arts -- a 5-day conference held in September 1983 under the auspices of The British Psychological Society. Symposia and individual papers were designed to advance psychological approaches to the creation, performance, consumption, and appreciation of works of art. A range of art-forms was in evidence, including architecture, dance, literature, music, painting and drawing, photography, and sculpture; and continuing debates within experimental aesthetics were pursued -- the effects of familiarity upon liking, the determinants of preference for simple forms, and relationships between levels of arousal and judgments of pleasingness. The full assembly of papers can be seen in abstract form in the Bulletin of The British Psychological Society (1983, Volume 36, pp. A113A140), and some of the papers are available in full in special issues of Leonard0 (1983, Volume 16, pp. 161-256), Visual Arts Research (1984, in press), and Music Perception (in preparation). The clear message from the Conference was that, while the vitality of established approaches (such as psychoanalysis and experimental aesthetics) is still maintained by the advocates of those approaches, there has in recent years been a marked shift in emphasis towards the investigation of cognitive processes. Just as cognitive psychology has achieved some dominance within experimental psychology, so its concepts and methods are now being applied with growing success to the study of the arts. And just as every shift in emphasis within a scientific discipline brings fresh problems to the fore and allows one to regard old problems in new ways, so too this approach has focused psychologists' attention in new ways: for example, attention is now focused upon developmental aspects of the production of and sensitivity to the arts, upon the perception of representational pictures, and upon music perception and memory. This volume is intended to reflect and advance these trends within the psychology of art. Selected conference speakers were asked to rewrite their contributions. In particular they were invited to explore the theoretical rationale for their cognitive approach and to relate their own research to its context. Taken together, the chapters circumscribe an important new area of application of cognitive psychology, and they make a significant advance in o u r understanding of the processes underlying the perception of works of art. They have been grouped in six sections for ease of reference, but not too much should be made of these divisions: one of the characteristics of the cognitive approach has been a move away from sharp distinctions between theoretical and empirical advances and between different art forms or media. Hence, for example, Kose draws upon empirical studies of the development of children's symbol use to illuminate his analysis of Cassirer's and Goodman's

vi

Preface

philosophical approaches, while Bartlett applies the 'event perception' hypothesis to the study of photographical material and melodies. At the start of Section I, o u r introduction argues that twentieth-century trends within the arts strongly suggest that the simplification strategy adopted generally by psychologists has failed to do justice to the complexity of artistic phenomena. We propose that cognitive psychology is in a good position to remedy that failure: (1) by reflecting and offering a study of the important part that cognition plays in aesthetic appreciation; and ( 2 ) by providing a firm foundation for experimental aesthetics through identifying the processes involved in the perception of works of art. In Section I1 four chapters discuss symbols and meanings in the arts. Traditionally the psychological approach to symbolism and to meaning in the arts has been most clearly identified with psychoanalysis and its emphasis upon unconscious processes and latent meanings. The chapters in this volume take a broader view: Kose and Smythe review a range of philosophical and psychological perspectives on symbols; Hudson is critical of the psychologists' neglect of the meanings of art-works and recommends the adoption of a hermeneutic approach: and Konedni provides an empirical investigation of the 'success' of art-works in communicating their creators' intentions. In Section I11 four chapters take a developmental perspective on the arts. Both Pratt and Willats examine children's drawing abilities and they consider relationships between looking and drawing: the differences in their models of the drawing process demonstrate the complexity of this much studied yet still mysterious set of skills. The chapter by Blank, Massey, Gardner, and Winner provides an empirical study of children's sensitivity to expression in paintings. Dowling's longitudinal investigation traces the development of the spontaneous singing of two preschool children, and he reports experiments on the recall and recognition of sorips. Sections IV and V consider the application of models and concepts from cognitive psychology to the study of the perception of visual arts and music respectively. In Section IV Hock investigates the perception of information about relative location in photographs; Purcell examines his aesthetic preference model through an experiment using photographs of houses,and he analyses relationships among judgments of preference, attractiveness, interest, and goodness-of-example; while Walk describes an experimental investigation of dance and the perception of emotion. In Section V, Bartlett outlines an event-perception hypothesis of memory and applies it to the recognition of visual scenes and the recognition of melody. Deutsch takes two approaches to the notion of 'musical space': a review of attempts to arrive at musical analogues of visual perception phenomena,and a discussion of the illusions which occur when several streams of music are organized. McAdams, too, is concerned with musical organization. His chapter introduces the concept of 'auditory image' as a metaphor for research on auditory organization, and a thorough review of such research is provided. The chapters by Vikis-Freibergs and by Pressing offer complementary approaches to an important but neglected phenomenon within the arts, viz improvisation. Vikis-Freibergs draws upon computer technology to give an account of relationships between spontaneity and tradition in Latvian folk-song; while Pressing attempts to isolate common properties of improvisation in different art-forms and, in outline, he presents a psychological model of the cognitive processes underlying them.

vii

Preface

Section VI deals with issues in experimental aesthetics and reflects the growing realization within this field of the importance of cognitive processes. Boselie and Leeuwenberg draw upon the concept of 'cognitive representation' as part of a model designed to improve upon the formulae proposed by Birkhoff and by Eysenck for relationships between beauty and stimulus properties of order and complexity. Temme argues that cognitive set and task expectations play significant roles in mediating the effects of familiarity upon preference. Apter is critical of the notion of 'optimal level of arousal' which is central to contemporary theories in experimental aesthetics. He points to its failure to show why people should seek out arousal-increasing experiences and proposes an alternative account in terms of pairs of meta-motivational modes rather than one underlying motivational dimension. He uses these to relate a variety of artistic phenomena to theoretical concepts of cognitive synergy and paratelic and negativistic modes. Finally, Marks provides a review of synesthesia in the arts and discusses relevant aspects of his extensive research into cross-modal associations in children. The chapters in this volume indicate the variety of topics in the arts which can be illuminated by the systematic examination of cognitive processes. The perception of musical and pictorial material can be investigated in depth without the problem of making assumptions about artistic value which have dogged past research in the arts. In these pages there are studies focusing on children's singing, copying, looking at photographs and abstract paintings; the appreciation of music (including jazz and rock music as well as classical); folk-song and dance; poems and literary passages; houses; and photographs. The range of methods adopted is also broad: there are intensive studies of individuals, experimental manipulations of variables, multivariate analyses of large sets of judgments, analyses of the writings of artists, composers, performers, and critics, and the recording of a culture's traditions. These chapters suggest something of the renewed vigour which has recently characterized the psychology of art, and they should stimulate further advances in the understanding of underlying cognitive processes. In organizing the Conference Programme we were assisted by an Advisory Group: B.Beit-Hallahmi (Israel), D.Deutsch (USA), W.J. Dowling (USA), G.Eckblad (Norway), H J Eysenck (UK) , R. Frances (France) , H Gardner ( USA) , M. A, Hagen ( USA) , L Halasz ( Hungary), L Hudson ( UK) , J M. Kennedy ( Canada ) , V. KoneEni ( USA), M.S.Lindauer ( U S A ) , P.Machotka (USA), R.Nicki (Canada), D.O'Hare (New Zealand), W. Sluckin (UK) and J.F.Uohlwil1 (USA). As well as gratefully acknowledging the assistance of members of that Group, we thank friends and colleagues who helped in diverse ways. In particular, we should like to identify Sandra Crozier, Paul Greenhalgh, Hugh Harrison, Julia Hawkins, H. Gwynne Jones, Dave Miiller, and Dave Oborne; and our Conference Stewards Dave Morrison, Julia Hawkins, Greg Bolton, Jim Brooks, Richard Dzadiek, Jacqui Eastlake, Nina Edge, Lincoln Grove, Luke Shepherd, and Wendy Sherrat. The major contribution made by Wendy Sheehy is available for all to see: she typed the cameraready copy for this book; and Siriol David, Bill Sollitt and Mavis Walton were also invaluable at various stages in the production of the book. We offer our thanks to all these people.

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W. Ray Crozier Preston Polytechnic Antony J. Chapman University of Leeds

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January 1984

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CONTRIBUTORS

Department o f Psychology, U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e C a r d i f f , Wales, UK.

APTER, M.J.,

BARTLETT, J . C . , Program i n Psychology and Human Development, U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas a t D a l l a s , Richardson, Texas, USA. BLANK, P . , Boston C o l l e g e , and Harvard P r o j e c t Zero, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s , USA.

BOSELIE, F . , P s y c h o l o g i c a l L a b o r a t o r y , U n i v e r s i t y of Nijmegen, The N e t h e r l a n d s , CHAPMAN, A . J . ,

Department o f Psychology, U n i v e r s i t y of Leeds, England, U K .

C R O Z I E R , W.R.,

School o f Psychology, P r e s t o n P o l y t e c h n i c , England, U K .

DEUTSCH, D . , Department of Psychology, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , San Diego, La J o l l a , C a l i f o r n i a , USA. DOWLING, W.J., Program i n Human Development and Communication S c i e n c e s , U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas a t Dallas, Richardson, Texas, USA. GARDNER, H . , Harvard P r o j e c t Zero, and Boston Veterans A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Medical C e n t e r , Boston, Massachusetts, USA. HOCK, H.S., Department o f Psychology, F l o r i d a A t l a n t i c U n i v e r s i t y , Boca Raton, F l o r i d a , USA.

HUDSON, L . , UK

.

Department o f Psychology, Brunel U n i v e r s i t y , Uxbridge, England,

K O N E C N I , V . J . , Department o f Psychology, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l . i f o r n i a , San Diego, L a J o l l a , C a l i f o r n i a , USA.

KOSE, G . , I n s t i t u t e f o r C o g n i t i v e S t u d i e s , Rutgers U n i v e r s i t y , Newark, New J e r s e y , USA. LEEUWENBERG, E . , Netherlands.

P s y c h o l o g i c a l L a b o r a t o r y , U n i v e r s i t y o f Nijmegen, The

MARKS, L . E . , John B. P i e r c e L a b o r a t o r y , Yale U n i v e r s i t y , New Haven, C o n n e c t i c u t , USA. MASSEY, C . , Boston C o l l e g e and Harvard P r o j e c t Zero, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s , USA.

X

Contributors

MCADAMS, S.,Institut de Recherche et Coordination Acoustique/Musique, Centre Georges-Pornpidou, Paris, France. PRATT, F., Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, Scotland, UK. PRESSING, J., Department of Music, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Australia. PURCELL, A.T., Department of Architecture, Sydney University, New South Wales, Australia. SMYTHE, W.E., Department o f Psychology, University o f Toronto, Canada. TEMME, J.E., Institute of Social Psychology, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands. VIKIS-FREIBERGS, V., Department of Psychology, University of Montreal, Canada. WALK, R.D., Department of Psychology, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA. WILLATS, J., Faculty of Art and Design, North East London Polytechnic, London, England. WINNER, E., Boston College, and Harvard Project Zero, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

xi

CONTENTS

V

Preface

ix

Contributors

I

INTRODUCTION The perception of art: the cognitive approach and its context W.R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman

I1

3

SYMBOLS AND MEANINGS IN THE ARTS The psychological investigation of art: methodological implications G. Kose

Theoretical and 2'7

Psychology and the traditions of symbolization W.E. Smythe

45

Texts, signs, artefacts L. Hudson

65

Elusive effects of artists' 'messages' V.J. KoneEni

71

I11 THE ARTS AND DEVELOPMENT

A theoretical framework for thinking about depiction F. Pratt

97

Getting the drawing to look right as well as to be right J. Willats

111

Perceiving what paintings express P. Blank, C. Massey, H. Gardner, and E. Winner

127

Development of musical schemata in children's spontaneous singing W.J. Dowling

145

xii IV

V

VI

PERCEPTION OF THE VISUAL ARTS Christina's World: imaginary perspectives and the encoding of spatial alignment relations H.S. Hock

167

The aesthetic experience and mundane reality A.T. Purcell

189

Event perception, perceptual organization and emotion R.D. Walk

211

PERCEPTION OF MUSIC Cognition of complex events: visual scenes and music J.C. Bartlett

225

Musical space D. Deutsch

253

The auditory image: A metaphor for musical and psychological research on auditory organization S. McAdams

289

Creativity and tradition in oral folklore, or the balance of innovation and repetition in the oral poet's art V. Vikis-Freibergs

325

Cognitive processes in improvisation J. Pressing

345

ISSUES IN EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS A general notionof beauty used to quantify the aesthetic

attractivity of geometric forms F. Boselie and E. Leeuwenberg

367

Effects of mere exposure, cognitive set, and task expectations on aesthetic appreciation J.E. Temme

389

Reversal theory, cognitive synergy and the arts M.J. Apter

411

Synesthesia and the arts L.E. Marks

427

Section I

IN TRODUCTION

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Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art W.R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1984

THE PERCEPTION OF ART:

3

THE COGNITIVE APPROACH AND ITS CONTEXT

W. Ray Crozier and Antony J. Chapman Preston Polytechnic University of Leeds

'Aesthetic phenomena are certainly among the most complex of all those with which the behavioral sciences have to deal.' (Berlyne 1971) THE COMPLEXITY OF AESTHETIC PHENOMENA Aesthetic experience was one of the earliest topics to be incorporated in the discipline of experimental psychology as it began to emerge in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century. A substantial literature on aesthetics has developed in the intervening years; and a variety of psychological approaches has been brought to bear on questions concerning the production and appreciation of works of art. Two generalizations may be made with some confidence about the corpus of research which has accumulated. The first is that there is considerable pessimism about the heuristic value of the work. Munro (1963), for example, doubted that the scientific methods of psychology were appropriate for the study of many of the processes that are important in the perception of art; and Child (1969)suggested more assertively that the 'coarse categorizations' and the 'vigorous and broad sweep of the scientific approach' are not adequate for the study of art. Not only has psychology seemed to contribute rather little to the understanding of the processes which underlie artistic creation and reactions to art-works, but within psychology the study of art has seldom been regarded as a distinctive area. Partly because of the uncertain status of artistic phenomena within the discipline, textbooks and courses in psychology have paid scant regard to such phenomena. Psychology's neglect of aesthetics generally is unfortunate for various reasons: for example, because of the persistence and ubiquity of art through time and across cultures, its significance in the lives of individuals, the esteem with which the arts are held in society, and so on. The second point to be made is that since 1876, when Fechner initiated the empirical approach to art through his book 'Vorschule der Aesthetik' psychology has been characterized by different 'schools'; there has been continual dispute about the proper subject-matter of the discipline and about the theories and methods which should be applied to it. In many cases, the various approaches -- such as Behaviourism, Gestalt Theory, Psychoanalysis, Humanistic Psychology, Information Theory, and Cognitive Psychology -- have made distinctive contributions to the arts. One consequence has been that particular artistic phenomena have been selectively examined and then assimilated to preferred theories and methods of working, and hence these phenomena have escaped broad and systematic investigation as distinctive phenomena in their own right. Approaches to the arts have often been superficial and fragmentary and, as Kose points out in his

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W R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman

chapter, traditional approaches to the study of art often reveal more about the workings of psychological investigations than they do about art. Fechner's research programme advocated the strategy of studying aesthetics 'from below'. The proposed focus of study was to be the impact upon the perceiver of the elements of aesthetic stimuli (such as lines, shapes and colours). When confronted with complex phenomena, it was seen as a useful scientific strategy to begin with some simplification. It was assumed that synthesis might subsequently be possible and that the study of reactions to simple stimuli could help u s comprehend responses to actual works of art. The results emanating from this approach have been disappointing, and this we now illustrate by considering that approach within the context of artistic 'behaviour' since the time of Fechner's seminal publication. We begin by taking painting as an example of developments in the arts. Fechner's investigation of lawful relationships between the 'formal' elements of artworks and the spectator's response to those elements was undertaken i n late-nineteenth century Germany. In that society at that time the visual arts were characterized by academicism, with art schools and academies comprising the centres of artistic activity; and painting was held to serve educational purposes and the 'elevation' of society. Some idea of the role of tradition may be gleaned by considering the example of a notable and (for the period) original artist, Hans von Marees (1837-1887). He was then painting landscapes which were based on his study of Italian Renaissance art and on his memories of the Roman countryside. However, at the same time, developments were taking place in France which were to usher in the 'modern movement', a century of continual change in the arts. While there is debate as to the origins of these changes -- for example, many would consider the key work to have been Courbet's painting, 'The Painter's Studio',which was exhibited.in Paris in 1855 -- we may note here that Monet's painting 'Impression: Sunrise' (1872), which gave rise to the name of the Impressionist movement, is almost contemporaneous with Fechner's publication. The Impressionist paintings of artists such as Monet and Manet must be some of the most popular paintings in the world (and possibly the last school with which people in general feel comfortable); and they are now regarded as national treasures and centre-pieces of the galleries which exhibit them. Yet, as is well known, the reaction at the time was strikingly different: the loose handling of paint so admired today resulted in the pictures being described as incomplete, and paintings were greeted with indignation. Rosetti is quoted as having said in 1864, 'the new French school is simply putrescence and decomposition'. The group of artists who in 1916 founded the Cabaret Voltaire in Switzerland questioned the value of art through a series of Dadaist or anti-art works which were intended to outrage and which instigated a theme in artistic practice which is still current. The twentieth century has been a period of unprecedentea change in the arts which has been rapid and often bewildering. The bewilderment may be detected, for example, in the titles of some of the books which have chronicled or commentated upon such change -- 'the shock of the new', 'art at the edge' and 'the anxious object'. This has been a century of 'modern art' although by now many of the products which typify that term and which are thought 'modern' and difficult are some sixty to eighty years old. In the visual arts,movements followed one another in quick succession -- surrealism, analytic cubism, synthetic cubism, futurism abstract expressionism, hard-edge conceptual art, happenings, performance art, earth art, op, pop, photorealism, and so on. SO frequent

....

....

The cognitive approach

5

have been the developments that the psychologist observing artistic behaviour might be forgiven for facetiously describing the task facing the psychologyof-art as being less one of accounting for lawful relationships between aesthetic experience and the elementsof line, form and colour, and more one of explaining preferences for novelty or the unexpected. A corresponding state of affairs is to be found when, instead of painting, one considers sculpture, music, architecture, dance, drama or poetry. Many such trends in the arts provide a serious challenge to the researcher who seeks to provide an explanation for artistic behaviour. One such trend is the dominant position within the 'artworld' of the 'avant-garde' and the promotion of avant-garde art as 'official art' (as Brighton, 1977, terms it). (Official art is supported by an elite group of art historians, dealers, critics, artists, and museum staff, who confer status upon it while withholding status from other artistic products). 'Originality' end 'artistic creativity' are now synonymous in ways that may seem natural or obvious to u s , but which have not been seen as such in previous periods and in other cultures. Thus, in this volume Vikis-Freibergs, in a chapter which offers a detailed discussion of the nature of tradition within Latvian oral literature, writes as follows: 'The folk poet differs from the modern poet in several ways. First, she or he had a functional role to play in everyday occurrences and did not cater to a selected elite of the population. In this role, they were expected to exhibit a high degree of skill in performance, but there were no demands from society that they be original or necessarily different from other singers'.

A second trend is the artist's mistrust of the 'pleasing' or the 'beautiful' or the 'tasteful', and an embracing of materials and techniques which strenuously avoid such labels. Hence some of the hallmarks of contemporary art are strident colour relationships, dissonant and unmelodic structures in music and poetry, and the preference for accident and the primitive over the crafted and the sophisticated. Cubist painters like Braque and Picasso incorporated various materials in their pictures, such as pieces of newspaper and wallpaper, matchboxes, cardboard and sand, and now it is not out of the ordinary to find a wide range of materials and textures incorporated into painting and sculpture, and 'non-musical' sounds like coughs, sneezes or even silence included in pieces of music.

There has, too, been a blurring of distinctions between art forms: performance art and happenings draw upon music, drama, dance and the visual arts; poetry can become 'concrete'; and painters embrace the threedimensional. To take a particular example, the Dadaist artist, Schwitters, produced sound-poems, where poetry became an increasingly formal arrangement of pure, meaningless sounds suggested by musical forms (Rubin, 1969). There is also an intense consciousness of the status of the work of art, a consciousness perhaps most strikingly exemplified by the artist Duchamp signing a urinal and displaying it in an exhibition, but also widespread in such practices as land art or conceptual art, or the delight in objects trouvgs, impermanent works of art, art outside museums, and so on. More often than not these works are incomprehensible or greeted with anger or ridicule by members of the public. All these trends point to the difficulties facing any psychologist who attempts to frame explanations for artistic phenomena; and it seems, as Arnheim (1966) has argued, that psychologists have tended to cling to

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W.R Oozier and A. J. Chapmari

conventional notions about art instead of tackling these difficulties. Machotka (1983) has made the point that much of psychological research into pictorial perception has in fact addressed questions which have been of only marginal interest to picture-makers since the seventeenth century. There are yet further problems. The study of the perception of art is already the subject matter of disciplines, such as art history or art criticism, which utilize psychological concepts and terminology in their accounts; and, to the extent that their practitioners are often trained in art o r are members of the 'artworld', these disciplines are closer to art than is psychology. Psychology has to establish its relationship with these disciplines and if it is not to be restricted to empirical investigations of a mundane kind, it will need to develop theory and methodology adequate for the complexity of artistic phenomena. Neither psychology nor the arts exist in a social or cultural vacuum; and the one can influence the other. The impact of psychoanalysis upon art movements, individual artists, and art criticism has been considerable (see, for example, the review provided by Spector, 1974); and many of the trends identified above had their origins in Freudian work -- in artists' discoveries of 'sexuality' and the 'unconscious'. Gestalt psychology has influenced theory and practice in painting and architecture (cf. Lang, 1984). Vitz (1979)has detected a large number of what he terms 'parallels' between twentieth-century developments in the study of perception and in visual art: there are sometimes similarities between scientific diagrams and images in painting; and techniques for incorporating randomness into visual displays are common to artistic and scientific investigations. Vitz explains these parallel developments in terms of a shared attitude of analytical reductionism which has, it is asserted, characterized thinking in the modern period, Potter et a1 (in press) discuss both literature and social psychology as constructions of language-users in society, and they argue that neither has a privileged perspective on the other. From these lines of argument, it is clear that psychology must not adopt a stance which purports to view the arts 'from outside' as static or predictable relationships between a stimulus (however complex) and responses. The psychological study of the arts can influence and provide a fresh stimulus for the arts; and both the arts and their psychological study are responsive to broader trends within society. Psychology should not be seduced by 'artworld' claims about the appeal of artifacts and of artistic perception. One point is clear: the audience for the arts (i,e,, for painting, sculpture, classical music, opera, ballet and theatre) is a minority of the population. A second point is that in broad terms the composition of this audience is to a marked extent predictable, particularly in terms of social stratification: Dimaggio and Useem (1978), for example, reviewed over 200 American studies and were able to conclude that the 'rate of consumption of the high arts in the United States varies significantly by social class'. Studies have consistently demonstrated that the ranks of those who attend museums and theatres, opera, symphony concerts and ballet performances are dominated by the well-educated and wealthy: most attenders are professional people. Blue-collar workers and those with little education are virtually absent. By contrast the 'popular' arts such as jazz, rock music and the cinema are consumed at more comparable rates by members of all social classes. But if exposure to the high arts is both limited and socially stratified, the audience for pictures (still and moving), for music, for drama and for literature has surely never been larger. To illustrate this point, let us examine some statistics on television viewing in Britain (with its population of some 55 million inhabitants). On an average evening, 38 million people

The cognitive approach

I

will view television, while 5 million will view video-cassettes. Only 0.5% to 2% of the adult population watch visual arts programmes on television; but, while such programmes are therefore placed towards the bottom of the viewing lists, their audiences are larger by a factor of 10 than the recordbreaking 6-week attendances at London's Tate Gallery (Read, 1983). Under the pressures of commercial competition advertisers invest in graphic design which, as Caudle (1983) has shown, uses devices common to art such as visual incongruity and metaphorical symbolism; and of course, additionally, well-known works of art are sometimes incorporated into advertisements. Contemporary Western society is immersed in visual images and KoneEni (1982) has made much the same point with regard to music. Music is no longer restricted to elite groups or to special occasions: it has penetrated into every corner of people's lives -- their homes, cars, factories, supermarkets, and public places -- and it accompanies many activities and social encounters. As KoneEni (p. 499) points out, this has implications for the study of the perception of the arts: 'what seems needed is a broader perspective on music appreciation, one that transcends the narrow, elitist, and arbitrary definitions of what constitutes good and serious music and also takes into account the reality of music appreciation in our time'. In similar vein, Crozier and Chapman (1981) argued that, in selecting stimuli for experimental studies, an exclusive reliance upon 'artworld' definitions and standards gives rise to a small and unrepresentative sample of stimuli; in their everyday lives the subjects in studies would generally draw upon a far broader range of stimuli for their aesthetic experiences. We conclude this section by reiterating the view that the arts are complex, multi-levelled phenomena which will continue to defy simple generalizations. It is improbable that any one psychological explanation will ever suffice. Psychological theory will need to treat the arts in their complexity. In our view it will not be found sufficient to adopt conventional notions about the nature of artistic perception, and nor will it prove possible to assimilate the arts to a simple form of psychological model. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE ARTS The psychological schools that have made the most substantial contributions to the understanding of the perception of art have been psychoanalysis, Gestalt theory and experimental psychology (including behaviourism). Each is associated with a large body of research, and each has attempted to explain the perception of art in terms of more general psychological processes (cf. Arnheim, 1956; Berlyne, 1971; Hogg, 1963; Kreitler and Kreitler, 1972; Spector, 1974). In fact each provides only a partial account of the psychological processes underlying the perception of works of art, and in particular cognitive processes have been neglected until recently. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are briefly outlined in the following sub-sections. Psyclioanalysis Psychoanalysis is the psychological theory which has had the most impact on artistic practice and criticism. Its influence has been evident since the early experiments of the Surrealists into automatic writing and the recording of dream images; and it remains evident today, for example, in literary theory (Eagleton, 1983). Its impact may be thought surprising to the extent that Freud himself never wrote extensively or developed systematic theory on the arts; he had little interest in the art of his

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W.R. Crozier and A. J. Chapman

c o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d was d i s p a r a g i n g about a r t i s t s ' a t t e m p t s t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e unconscious ( S p e c t o r , 1 9 7 4 ) . Also. h i s major r e t r o s p e c t i v e a c c o u n t o f t h e psychology of t h e a r t i s t Leonard0 seems s e r i o u s l y flawed: a p a r t from a m i s t r a n s l a t i o n which undermines t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Leonardo's c h i l d h o o d memory ( F a r r e l l , 1 9 6 3 ) , i t is h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e i n s p e c i f y i n g which a s p e c t s o f t h e a r t i s t ' s work might be c o n s i d e r e d o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . For example, t h e p o r t r a y a l o f S t Anne i s h e l d t o b e o f p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e because t h e d e p i c t i o n o f t h e S a i n t as a young woman i s deemed t o be u n u s u a l , y e t t h i s d i s r e g a r d s t h e f a c t t h a t by Leonardo's time t h e r e had been a l o n g s t a n d i n g c u l t o f S t Anne, and i t was one which tended t o d e p i c t s a i n t s as y o u t h f u l . A d d i t i o n a l l y , Freud i g n o r e s many o f t h e d e t a i l s o f composition which a r e p e c u l i a r t o t h e a r t i s t . H i s a c c o u n t o f t h e p e r c e p t i o n of a r t s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e s o u r c e s o f t h e p l e a s u r e which t h e s p e c t a t o r o b t a i n s are i n t h e unconscious; a r t p r o v i d e s f o r t h e s p e c t a t o r a n ' i n c e n t i v e bonus' i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t a l l o w s enjoyment o f m a t e r i a l which would o t h e r w i s e t h r e a t e n t h e e g o , and he o r s h e is unaware o f t h e s o u r c e s o f t h e p l e a s u r e o b t a i n e d from c o n t e m p l a t i n g a work o f a r t . F r e u d ' s t h e o r y o f a r t has been s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d , n o t t h e l e a s t because i t was concerned o n l y with t h e c o n t e n t or l a t e n t c o n t e n t o f t h e work, and p a i d no a t t e n t i o n t o q u e s t i o n s o f form: t h e o b j e c t i v e a s p e c t s o f t h e work were n e g l e c t e d , such t h a t t h e r e was no d i s c u s s i o n a b o u t a e s t h e t i c m a t t e r s o f l i n e , c o l o u r o r form i n p a i n t i n g . L i t t l e a t t e n t i o n was p a i d t o t h e medium i n v o l v e d ; so t h a t , f o r example, t h e r e was no mention o f t h e s p e c i f i c q u a l i t i e s o f p a i n t i n g o r s c u l p t u r e . The enjoyment o f a work o f a r t was n o t s e e n as rewarding i n i t s e l f , b u t o n l y a s a means t o a ? o t h e r end. No d o u b t t h e s e weaknesses can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t Freud n e v e r s t u d i e d a r t i s t i c phenomena o r t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f works o f a r t i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Works o f a r t were s e l e c t e d f o r d i s c u s s i o n because t h e y were i n t e r e s t i n g from a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c p o i n t o f view, and from t h a t p e r s p e c t i v e a minor work l i k e J e n s e n ' s ' G r a d i v a ' was as r i c h i n meaning as a m a s t e r p i e c e by Dostoyevsky. The d i s t i n c t i o n s which Freud f a i l e d t o make are p r e c i s e l y t h o s e which a r e c e n t r a l t o a r t i s t i c criticism and t o t h e psychology o f t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f a r t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Freud d i d f o c u s a t t e n t i o n on unconscious p r o c e s s e s i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f a r t , and he p r o v i d e d f r e s h c o n s t r u c t s f o r d i s c u s s i n g symbolism i n t h e a r t s . H i s approach i n s t i g a t e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e l i t e r a t u r e on p s y c h o a n a l y s i s and t h e a r t s , a n d v i g o r o u s d e b a t e s c o n t i n u e : h e n c e , f o r example, a number of p a p e r s a t t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Psychology and t h e Arts ( C a r d i f f , 1983) p r e s e n t e d r e s e a r c h w i t h i n t h e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l framework. A l s o Freud h a s p r o v i d e d c o n c e p t s which have been o f v a l u e f o r more e m p i r i c a l approaches t o t h e a r t s ; f o r example, M a r t i n d a l e h a s made u s e o f t h e concept o f 'primary p r o c e s s ' i n h i s t h e o r y o f h i s t o r i c a l change i n t h e a r t s , i n c l u d i n g p a i n t i n g , p o e t r y , and music ( M a r t i n d a l e , 1975; M a r t i n d a l e and Uemura, 1 9 8 3 ) .

Gestalt Theory

Gestalt psychology, t o o , h a s i n f l u e n c e d a r t i s t i c p r a c t i c e and d i s c u s s i o n : f o r example, Gestalt p r i n c i p l e s were t a u g h t a t t h e B a u h a u s s c h o o l o f a r t and d e s i g n i n Germany under G r o p i u s , and t h a t s c h o o l has had a key r o l e i n t h e development o f modern a r t and a r c h i t e c t u r e . One of t h e most n o t a b l e c o n t r i b u t o r s t o t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f a r t , Rudolf Arnheim, h a s drawn h e a v i l y upon Gestalt t h e o r y ( e . g . , Arnheim, 1956, 1966). Then a g a i n , one o f t h e p o i n t s o r i g i n a l l y made by von E h r e n f e l s i n f a v o u r of 'whole' p e r c e p t i o n ( a s opposed t o a s s o c i a t i o n i s m ) r e f e r r e d t o t h e example o f t h e melody, and t h i s i s a g e s t a l t because i t i s more t h a n t h e sum o f i t s

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elements and i t can be transposed. From Gestalt psychology have emerged two principal notions in discussions of art: the 'good gestalt' and the theory of expression. The first refers to the organizational principle of the tendency towards a good form -- that is, the simplest form possible -- and its reflection in the compositional balance of works of art. Arnheim (1956) and Kreitler and Kreitler (1972)have applied the concept of 'good gestalt' to the perception of formal qualities in works of art, such as balance and rhythm, line colour and shape. The presence of organizational factors like similarity, proximity and good continuation in the structure of individual works may be discussed in these terms; or generalizations can be made about the predominance of simple forms in primitive stages of artistic development. The Gestalt theory of expression asserts that the perception of expressiveness in a work of art is direct a n d unmediated; to perceive a colour at all, for example, demands perception of its expressiveness -- the warmth or liveliness of the colour. The Gestalt approachdisputes the view that this is due to learnt associations: perception is not derived from experience and is not culturally variable. Instead expression is explained in terms of the principle of isomorphism: 'processes which take place in different media may be nevertheless similar in their structural organization'(Arnheim,1966). The principal weakness of this view is that the theory of the organization of the brain, upon which the principles of good gestalt and isomorphism rest, has not received empirical support; and within the psychology of perception, Gestalt theory is better known for its demonstration of organizational factors than for its explanation of those factors. Also, from eye movement studies we know that visual perception results from a series of discrete samples of the stimulus, and this casts doubt on the principles of isomorphism as an explanation of expressiveness. Nevertheless Gestalt psychology has proved fruitful for the discussion of the perception of art. Arnehim has drawn attention to formal aspects of works of art which have been neglected in otherapproaches and he has attempted to relate the perception of art to more general principles of perception. The question of the expressiveness of art-works has not been sufficiently studied within psychology, but some recent research has suggested that it does not depend on past experience (Lindauer,l984): physiognomic properties appear to be 'in' the stimulus, even if the stimulus is a'nonsense' figure -- they do not seem to be imposed by the perceiver from memory. In summary the Gestalt account is a partial one and, in concentrating on questions of form, it ignores issues to do with the content of works of art(such as meaning and symbolism). Experimental Psychology Fechner's original studies have given rise to a considerable literature upon aesthetic preferences, and several of the questions which Fechner addressed remain topics for inquiry today. For example, a substantial body of research has addressed the psychological status of the 'golden section' -- the belief that rectangular figures are more pleasing if the ratio of the longer side to the shorter side approaches 1:0.62 (cf. McManus, 1980). One recurring ambition has been to discover lawful relationships between aesthetic preferences and properties of simple geometric forms, a project instigated largely by Birkhoff's (1932) formulation of the relationship between beauty (M), order ( 0 ) and complexity (C). Birkhoff claimed that the amount of pleasure obtained from a figure was best represented by the equation M = O / C . Eysenck (1942) provided data to support the view that the equation M = 0 x C provides a better fit and, in the present volume, Boselie and Leeuwenberg now present a formula which they argue provides a still better fit to aesthetic

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judgments. More significantly, Boselie and Leeuwenberg move away from considering order and complexity as properties of the stimulus: rather, they emphasize what they describe as the subject's 'cognitive representation of two qualities which, according to the knowledge embedded in the representation system, are incompatible', They conclude that preference data will require an explanation in terms of cognitive processes rather than any stimulus-response regularities. Experimental aesthetics has placed relatively little emphasis on theory constructions: instead the emphasis has been upon data collection and the search for regularities within preferences. The research orientation has incorporated a number of assumptions: for instance,that the origins of aesthetic preferences are biological, and that artistic behaviour serves adaptive functions. Eysenck (1961) proposed that there is 'some property of the central nervous system which determines aesthetic judgments, a property which is biologically derived, and which covers the whole field of visual art'; and Humphrey argued as follows: 'considered as a biological phenomenon, aesthetic preferences stem from a predisposition among animals and men to seek out experiences through which they may learn to cZassify the objects in the world about them. Beautiful 'structures' in nature o r in art are those which facilitate the task of classification by presenting evidence of the "taxonomic" relations between things in a way which is informative and easy to grasp'. (1973, p. 432) The most sustained attempt to place art within a biological perspective has been the 'new experimental aesthetics' of Berlyne (1971, 1974), which linked aesthetic behaviour to exploration. The pervasiveness of artistic activity and its presence in varied cultures throughout the world led Berlyne to propose that artistic activity grows out of some fundamental characteristic of the human nervous system. His account emphasized the psychophysiological concept of 'arousal'. The level of arousal in the nervous system could be increased by external stimulus patterns, including the collative variables of novelty, complexity, surprisingness, and puzzlingness ('collative' in the sense that information from two or more sources is being compared). Berlyne proposed that the characteristics on which the pleasingness (or hedonic value) of a stimulus depended were also the ones which determine the level of arousal, and he formulated relationships among hedonic value and arousal potential: 'a work of art is regarded as a stimulus pattern whose collative properties, and possibly other properties as well, give it a positive hedonic value'.(Berlyne, 1974, p. 8 ) Berlyne's theory stimulated a considerable amount of research (see, for example, Day, 1981) which has in recent years given a fresh impetus to the psychological investigation of art. From studies of specially prepared simple stimuli there has been substantial support for the theory's predictions; and, to their credit, researchers in the Berlyne tradition have gone beyond subjective statements of preference and ratings of pleasingness to introduce a range of response measures into experimental aesthetics. However, Francks (1976) has questioned the generalizability and universality of the equations between collative variables and judgments of pleasingness and interest. By obtaining different patterns of results for students and manual workers of the same age in France and in Hungary, he has shown that the form of relationships is not independent of socio-cultural factors; and

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he has recently suggested that the mediating variable is differential exposure to the norms and values of the 'artworld' (Franc&, 1983). Research with works of art has been less convincing and has not received as much attention as that with specially constructed stimuli. In part this balance of attention may be due to Berlyne's conviction that the scientific approach should begin with the simplest phenomena and only gradually work its way up to the more complex. Another reason is the problems posed to the Berlyne approach by art-works. Works of art are over-determined: even the simplest is replete with meanings, and it is a moot point whether they can be considered as the sum of their elements or described or constructed along Berlyne's dimensions. The research that has been carried out with works of art (typically reproductions), such as multivariate analyses of judgments to detect factors (e.g., complexity) underlying judgments (e.g., Berlyne, 1974) is generally consldered 'suggestive',but it does not show that art-works directly affect the nervous system in the kinds of ways proposed by the theory. Indeed discussion of the arousal-increasing or moderating qualities of art-works -- for example,abstract paintings -- is often highly speculative (cf. Berlyne, 1971). Also, insufficient attention is paid to individual differences in reactions to works of art and a great deal of necessary research has yet to be conducted. Some of Berlyne's observations have yet to be tested: for example, he suggested that through increased exposure one can 'learn the redundancies and transitional probabilities that characterize particular art forms, styles, and cultural traditions' (Berlyne, 1971). One recent debate within this paradigm has concerned the effects of the familiarity of a stimulus upon its pleasingness. Berlyne proposed an inverted-U function relating familiarity and affect, and explained this function in terms of the relationship between hedonic value and arousal potential which, as we have already noted, is held to be dependent on collative variables such as novelty and familiarity. This account has been disputed by Zajonc (e.g., Zajonc et al, 1974) whose 'mere exposure' hypothesis holds that pleasingness is enhanced by increasing familiarity rather than being diminished by exposure as predicted by Berlyne. In this volume Temme presents data from several experiments to test these rival predictions. His results suggest the relevance for the effects of exposure of a distinction between two cognitive sets adopted by subjects: an 'aesthetic' set (where subjects approach the task as one involving aesthetic appreciation); and a'meaning' set (where they see the task as involving guessing meanings). The chapter by Temme indicates the importance of cognitive set and task expectations in mediating the effects of mere exposure, and it suggests that some of the findings in this area may be due to experimental artefacts.

A theory advanced by Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) again focuses on the pleasure afforded by works of art. Pleasure is interpreted within a homeostatic model of motivation: it is associated with a rise in tension followed by a reduction in tension. The authors discuss why people should seek out and persist in enjoying tension increasing (and hence presumably displeasing) encounters with art-works, and hence they face up to the problem posed by a tension-reduction model through incorporating a number of modifications. Their first modification is as follows: 'a major motivation for art is tensions which exist in the spectator of art prior to his exposure to the work of art. The work of art mediates the relief of the preexisting tensions by generating new tensions which are specific'.(l972, p. 1 6 )

W R. Crozier uiirl A.J. Chapmati That is, a spectator seeks out art-works which increase tension (which effects are mitigated, however, by the anticipation of tension reduction) and which serve as a cue for the reduction of the more diffuse, cue-less arousal which exists prior to the spectator's encounter with the work. The adoption of this view (which is akin to the Hebbian notion of a stimulus acting as both an elicitor of arousal and as a cue for action to reduce arousal upon which it draws) is intended to resolve the apparent contradictions of deriving pleasure from an arousal-increasing stimulus. Kreitler and Kreitler emphasize that pleasure is not the whole of art experience, and they note that much discussion of the arts has concerned what they term the 'more' in art. That is to say, works of art do more than evoke emotional experiences: they have varied functions in promoting ethical, political, religious, spiritual and other goals of society; works of art have 'meaning'. To account for these pervasive aspects of art they propose the concept of 'cognitive orientation': 'the theory of cognitive orientation shows that a stimulus turns into a cue only after it is subjected to a series of processes designed to determine its meaning and the relations of this meaning to the meanings of otherconcomitant stimuli,external and internal'. (1972, p. 23) They assert that cognition is as important as arousal for determiningaesthetic experience; spectators are clearly concerned with establishing the meanings of art-works, while an important motive for seeking out such works is the opportunity to extend one's cognitive orientation and to test its dimensions. In this regard Kreitler and Kreitler may seem to resemble Berlyne, but the Kreitlers argue against an interpretation of exploration in terms of some optimal level of arousal or complexity: they maintain that this issubservient to the motive of extending cognitive orientation. Their 1972 book is an important work in which they demonstrate a profound grasp of the arts as basic psychological principles are applied to a range of phenomena (from the elements of colour, line, form, harmony, melody, and rhythm) to a range of art forms (including music, dance, painting,sculpture and literature). However the many significant points which they make do not disguise an uneasiness invoked by a tension-reduction model (however modified1;and an appeal to some pre-existing diffuse tension within the individual seems hardly to account for the enormous amount of 'work' that i s invested by the individual as a spectator of art. One of the most persistent critics of theories which emphasize optimal levels of' arousal has been Apter (e.g., 1982). In his contribution to this volume he outlines his reveral theory of motivation and applies it to the arts. He substitutes the notion of a single dimension of arousal with that of pairs of metamotivational modes. Also, he distinguishes the telic and paratelic modes: in the telic mode the goal of behaviour is primary; and in the paratelic mode the focus is upon the activity itself rather than the goal. In the telic mode high arousal tends to lead to anxiety, and arousal reduction gives pleasure or relaxation; whereas in the paratelic mode high arousal is actively sought by the individual, and low arousal leads to boredom. With this distinction Apter is able to meet the problem faced by Kreitler and Kreitler, viz that people, in the apparent pursuit of pleasure, seek out increases in arousal; and in the present book Apter interprets many artistic phenomena in terms of the paratelic mode. He argues that the arts utilize a number of devices (such as providing special locations) to ensure that the paratelic rather than the telic mode is induced: failure would render

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increases in arousal threatening and aversive (rather than desirable). Apter applies his theory to explain how it might be that the arts produce enjoyable experiences. COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE PERCEPTION OF ART

As indicated already, the approach which is broadly described as 'experimental aesthetics' has shifted its emphasis from stimulus properties to cognitive issues -- such as cognitive representations, cognitive set, and cognitive orientation. The::e developments parallel trends within psychology more generally where cognitive psychology has achieved a dominant position. It is not appropriate to consider 'cognitive psychology' as a new school within psychology which is opposed to previous experimental approaches. Rather it is indicative of changes in emphases -- new concepts have been introduced and there is increased methodological sophistication. At first sight, this might not seem R productive paradigm for the study of artistic phenomena: two of its principal roots might be considered unsympathetic to the kinds of creativity that distinguish the production and appreciation of works of art. First, cognitive psychology is a rather sophisticated variant of a mechanistic view of man: it is sophisticated in the sense that developments in the computer and in information technology have permitted a relatively elaborate mechanistic metaphor; also, the bias within cognitive psychology has been towards the use of verbal material and linguistic performance and away from pictorial and non-language sound stimuli. Second, cognitive psychology has in part developed out of a European structuralist tradition. In particular Piaget focused :attention on cognitive development and he advanced concepts which have been central in contemporary thinking about cognition. But, as Gardner and others have pointed out, the French intellectual tradition within which structuralism has developed has been associated with 'the denigration of humanistic philosophy and the arts, accompanied by the exaltation of logical-mathematical thought and geometrical reasoning' (Gardner, 1981, p.17). Heuristic models of man as machine or man as scientist might seem to offer little to the psychology of art. However, on the evidence of the papers presented at the International Conference on Psychology and the Arts and the chapters in this volume this is clearly a pessimistic if not totally unwarranted viewpoint. Partly because of the new inputs from cognitive psychology the arts are now being analysed with unprecedented vigour by psychologists. Various reasons are to be found i n the biases of cognitive psychology: for example, there is a concern with people's representations of the world; there is a related concern with the role of symbols in thought; perceptual processes are seen as extended in time; and there is an emphasis on human skills, viewed as complex sequences of behaviour. We now examine each of these examples, briefly in turn, and we refer to chapters in this volume to illustrate their value for understanding the perception of art. Cognitive psychology is largely the analysis of how people construct and manipulate mental representations of the external world. This perspective has given rise t o core concepts like the 'schema' or the 'mental image' which have been fruitful for the psychological investigation of art. Schemata are pre-existing conceptual frameworks; organized predispositions through which individuals respond to the external world in characteristic ways. They are 'frames' for the individual to attribute meaning to events, objects and people. They are not fixed o r static: through processes of 'accommodation' and 'assimilation', as Piaget terms them (cf. Flavell, 1 9 6 3 ) , the schemata are modified and become elaborated during the person's transactions with the

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environment. In the process of assimilation the individual interprets and behaves towards the environment in terms of his or her existent cognitive system; in accommodation the schema is modified to adapt to the environment. Schemata originate in action, and the construct has proved useful to cognitive psychologists in relating perception to action. F o r example, Neisser describes schemata as 'cognitive structures that prepare the perceiver to accept certain kinds of information rather than others and thus control the activity of looking' (1976, p. 20); 'the schema accepts information as it becomes available at sensory surfaces and is changed by that information: it directs movements and exploratory activities that make more information available, by which it is further modified' (1976, p. 54). Several of our authors rely on the concept of schema as outlined above. For example, Pratt studies the copying of line drawings, and he monitors looking (recording eye movements) and drawing (hand movements). His data have led him to abandon any thoughts of a simple dichotomy between knowing and seeing, of the kind that has featured in analyses of drawing. Instead he postulates a concept of knowledge-guided-looking, similar to Neisser's concept of schemata and perceptual cycles. Pratt writes, 'We came to see knowledge-guided-looking as providing a means of control; both over visual input from the model (to be copied) and over what aspect of that input is utilized in acts of drawing: we came to see this process of control in terms of a perceptual which not only involves the possibility of modifying cycle what aspects of the model are attended to, but also the possibility of modifying the knowledge base of drawing acts'.

...

Willats provides an alternative account of the relationship between looking and drawing. It is one that emphasizes a distinction between those drawing systems which are based on projective geometry and those based on a broader class ofdenotationsystems which say what the marks in a picture stand for. Willats argues that the developmental process, at least in its early stages, involves an interaction between the production of drawings (which make sense according to some denotation system) and the child's dissatisfaction with these products. There is dissatisfaction because they do not meet additional criteria: they can not be derived from the object by projective geometry, or they do not depict the object from a sufficiently general direction of view. A similar kind of knowledgebase to that proposed by Pratt is postulated by Dowling in his longitudinal study of the spontaneous singing of two children. He holds that the most parsimonious account of the course of development is provided by the development and elaboration of schemata, defined as 'systematic patterns in the abstract knowledge listeners have about musical structure' and 'the knowledge the child has at a given stage of development concerning how a song should be constructed'. Dowling speculates about whether the same o r similar schemata function in both music production and music perception. '

Purcell, too, draws upon the concept of schema in discussing aesthetic reactions to environmental stimuli. He has developed a model of aesthetic reactions which is couched in terms of the arousal or tension consequent upon a conflict between the current stimulus and what has been expected. This model is similar to accounts by Berlyne and by Lasher et a1 (1983), but Purcell stresses the prominent part played by mental organizations, or schemata. He argues that a current stimulus is not compared with some fixed

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list of attributes, in order to test for some discrepancy; but rather the stimulus is compared with schemata, characterized by a hierarchical structure and by prototypes rather than lists of attributes. In his chapter Purcell tests predictions of his model by analysing ratings of attractiveness,interest and preference when stimuli depart in varying ways from some prototype. The application of the concept of schemata in perception and memory is not without its critics. A notable critic is Gibson (1979). He denies that in perception there is any part played by mental events such as memories, or unconscious inferences, or schemata. In Gibson's theory information is available in the environment which is both necessary and sufficient for perception; in particular there are available those characteristics of the stimulus array which remain invariant across change and which are 'picked-up' directly by the perceiver without the need for any further 'information' processing. In the present volume Bartlett outlines a theory of memory expressed in Gibsonian terms. It is a theory which is antithetical to accounts of memory in terms of schemata, and Bartlett applies it to questions concerning recognition memory for photographic sequences and for melodies. The theory has three major postulates: ( 1 ) the event perception hypothesis, that sequences of stimuli extended in time can function as units in memory; ( 2 ) the basis of memory is the pick-up of invariants over time, and these invariants also specify alternative stimuli to those presented; and ( 3 ) memory is essentially veridical -- that is to say, then, that the notion of assimilation is rejected. Bartlett shows how these postulates might be applied to memory for music. For example, atonal melodies are more difficult to remember than tonal melodies, and this might be explained in terms of schemata and assimilation: memory for atonal melodies is distorted in the direction of tonality. However, Bartlett presents evidence for an alternative explanation: melodies are perceived as events, and this allows for the extraction of invariants which contribute to their coherence as events and which specify other melodies which were not presented. Atonal melodies will have a greater range of optional others, and hence will be more difficult to remember. Walk, in his chapter, also considers event perception, and he describes an experiment which uses points of light to depict emotion and dance.

A further focus on the study of mental representations has been upon mental imagery and this, too, is reflected in the present volume. Deutsch provides an extensive review of visuo-spatial analogues for musical processing, drawing upon historical sources, the writings of composers, and much current research in music cognition. She poses such questions as: can transformations be performed in 'musical space' which are analogous to those in vision? The composer Schoenberg (1951)answered this question in the affirmative: 'Just as o u r mind always recognizes, f o r instance, a knife, a bottle or a watch, regardless of its position and can reproduce it in the imagination in every possible position, even so a musical creator's mind can operate subconsciously with a row of tones, regardless of their direction, regardless of the way in which a mirror might show the mutual relations, which remain a given quantity'. Deutsch places in historical context the goal of abstract geometrical representation of musical structure, and she discusses research into representations of pitch structures, relationships between keys, and timbre.

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Analogies between visual and musical percepts are addressed also by Marks in a chapter which reviews research on synesthesia. There he notes the ambitions of composers who have been influenced by Newton's analogy between the colours of the spectrum and the notes of the diatonic scale, and he discusses artists who showed evidence of strong synesthesia. McAdams, in his chapter on auditory organization, addresses questions such as how far, when listening to a recording of an orchestra, one can separate out the sounds of instruments, and so 'parse' the single source into multiple 'virtual source images'; or how one can similarly separate out melodies and chords, and group textures. He argues that research into auditory organization is aided by utilizing the metaphor of the 'auditory image', defined as a 'psychological representation of a sound entity exhibiting a coherence in its acoustic behaviour'. He shows that the adoption of this metaphor allows for a multi-levelled approach to auditory orgnization and that it can illuminate studies of sequential and simultaneous organization and interactions between them. Adopting the metaphor also has benefits for communication between musicians and psychologists in that it offers a common language for discussions of a range of musical phenomena. As Lasher et a1 (1983)have pointed out, cognitive psychology is likely to offer insights into aesthetic behaviour because of the central role which it ascribes to the representation of the external world through abstract symbols and because of the traditional conception of art as a symbolic representation of the world. Within the psychology of art, current research into symbols has been considerably influenced by the philosopher Nelson Goodman (cf. Perkins and Leondar, 1977). While the term 'symbol' has frequently featured in art criticism and has figured prominently in psychoanalytic accounts of the arts, Goodman's seminal work, 'Languages of Art' ( 1 9 6 8 ) , has clarified the meaning of the term. That work has also stimulated a large number of empirical enquiries, particularly into the development of symbol use in the arts. Goodman showed that symbolism is not restricted to representational art-works: abstract or formal painting or sculpture, performance works, and musical compositions can also be said to be symbolic, in that they exemplify some of their properties, and that to exemplify could properly be said to symbolize; also an art-work which is non-representational may have expressive properties and hence can again be said to symbolize an emotion or idea.

In 1966 Goodman founded a research group, Harvard Project Zero, which has carried out a sustained programme of research into the development of artistic production and sensitivity. It has emphasized the development of abilities to use and understand symbols in art, and one of its explicit goals has been 'to analyze and classify the types of symbol systems and symbolic reference characteristics of different art forms (and) to identify and study experimentally the skills and abilities required for the understanding and manipulation of art symbols' (Howard, 1971, p. 64). The work of this group is represented here in a chapter by Blank, Massey, Gardner and Winner, which considers the ability of five- to ten-year-olds to perceive expression in paintings. The children were asked to point to the painting which was best described by a given mood term, or to match paintings according to mood; and through careful experimentation, the Project Zero researchers were able to show that even children of pre-school age are sensitive to expressive properties in works of art. Three further chapters consider conceptual issues in the study of symbols. Smythe critically reviews three kinds of symbol systems current in psychology -- conventional, mythopoetic,and physical. In the first system

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the relationship between the symbol and what it stands for is determined by convention; the second system, mythopoetic, is most closely associated with psychoanalytic theory and characterizes symbols as having deep or hidden significance; and the physical system refers to 'a machine that produces through time an evolving collection of symbol structures' (Newell and Simon, 1976, p. 116) -- a small and well-defined set of operators, as in a computer program, is sufficient to compose any arbitrary calculation. Smythe suggests that it is a 'central dogma' of contemporary cognitive psychology that physical symbol systems can be used to explain people's use of both conventional and mythopoetic systems. He goes on to argue that this central dogma is severely flawed; and he concludes that human symbolic activity is not to be reduced to one system, but that a number of such systems need to be identified and studied. Hudson, too, in his chapter is critical of the current dominant approaches within psychology. He argues that hermeneutics is a more productive approach to the arts, and it is one which he believes will avoidthe trivializing of complex phenomena: he sees other approaches as trivializing in that way. Hermeneutics is the interpretation of meanings: it involves the sifting and evaluation of various 'readings' of 'texts' -- the term 'text' being extended to incorporate paintings, photographs, and other artefacts. Such 'readings' require detailed attention to the art-object, a knowledge of its history,and appreciation of the context within which the reading takes place. Clearly hermeneutics is in direct opposition to more traditional approaches in experimental aesthetics (with their reliance upon simple response measures and brief presentations of large numbers of stimuli). Hudson's own work (e.g., Hudson, 1982) provides one of the few applications of this approach in the psychological literature. Kose contrasts Nelson Goodman's and Ernst Cassirer's approaches to the study of symbols in art. They share an aversion to reductive explanations of art, and they both focus on the concept of symbol. Nevertheless they differ in how they see the relationship between a work of art and its meaning. Kose summarizes the differences in this way: 'artistic meaning, for Goodman, is determined by convention and by the characteristics of a particular symbol system. While for Cassirer, meaning in art, or its "symbolicpregnance" is mutually determined by the interweaving of a ' I . . perceptive phenomenon, the given here and now, to a characteristic total meaning . . . ' I significance of art is in the particular way in which the intention to do art is carried out'.

....

That is to say, for Cassirer symbols do not have an independent conventional meaning that can be easily transmitted; rather, symbolic meaning is mutually determined by the relationship between the total intention behind the work and the specific embodiment of that intention in forms and materials. Kose also considers the implications of these two theories for empirical enquiries into symbol use in the arts. He briefly reviews some of the findings of the Harvard Project Zero group; and he suggests that Some of the results about individual differences in the acquisition of symbol systems, and the many factors which influence such acquisition, call into question the validity of Goodman's analysis of the organization of symbolic meaning. Kose also outlines his own research into children's understanding of the meanings of drawings and photographs, and he suggests how these illustrate the complexity of pictures and the problem of generalizing about competence in pictorial symbol systems across different kinds of pictures.

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Chapman

KoneEni adopts an empirical approach to the 'meaning' of art-works, in that his studies investigate the success of claims made by artists about the messages communicated to the spectator by their art-works. His approach is to take artists' statements or 'manifestoes' and to examine whether the meanings which are claimed therein are detected by groups of subjects. Typically the subjects are college students with no specialized knowledge of the arts. Five separate experiments provide little evidence of successful communication. KoneEni has written a provocative chapter: many artists and commentators on the arts would dispute that works should be expected to 'communicate' in the sense that he has in mind, and many artists are known to be averse to any discussion about their work, other than perhaps elusive or indirect discussion. Nevertheless there is an important point here: artworks do have meanings and these require some shared symbol system of the kinds discussed by Smythe and Kose. But, as we have argued above, works of art are produced and appreciated within a context, and their interpretation requires shared values and expectations. There are many illustrations of this. Let us consider one (well-publicized) example: to display a neat arrayofhousehold bricks in a prestigious gallery is to many people 'meaningless', and any interest or pleasure that they might potentially derive from this array is overwhelmed by this sense of meaninglessness; that kind of reaction may sometimes be the goal of an artist, but, more generally, it may be a straightforward reflection of a gulf between the norms and values of an 'artworld' and those o f public. Whether the gulf is relatively wider at some times or in some cultures is a matter for discussion. What KoneEni has shown is that, contrary to the claims that many artists might make f o r the universal significance of their work, spectators must bring something to the work of art in order to appreciate it. Psychologists have yet to tackle in any depth the question of what that 'something' is (Crozier and Chapman, 1981). Another aspect of cognitive psychology, mentioned earlier, has been its emphasis on considering the process of perceiving as extended in time. Cognitive psychologists postulate that a number of information processing stages intervene between the presentation of a stimulus and an overt response. Our subjective impression when looking atapicture, for example, might be that we take it in 'at a glance' or that o u r eyes sweep across it in a 'glance curve' (Gordon, 1981), but it is clear now that such impressions are not correct. Eye-movement analysis shows that o u r perceptions are actually constructed from integrating many discrete samples of the picture, and the fact that visual attention is biased towards certain 'informative' parts of the pictures. is indicative of processes of inference and of guidance of fixations. In models of information processing these processes have been specified through the postulation of a sequence of stages between 'input' and 'output' and these models have recently been applied to the perception of works of art. Marschalek (1983), f o r example, has discussed developmental changes in aesthetic responses in terms of stages of attention, perceptual memory, short-term memory, and processing capacity. Hock's chapter discusses the factors which influence the precision with which people can remember the spatial location o f objects in a picture. He considers a number of factors including short-term memory for location information and the effects of perceptual grouping on the spatial resolution of the visual system. Research is cited which shows that following a fixation there is a rapid decrease in the precision of information about location that is necessary to make sense of a complex scene. Also,the perceptual grouping which is required for a spectator to establish thematic relationships in the picture tends to decrease the accuracy with which the

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The cognitive approach

spectator retrieves information about location. Usually a viewer's main concern when inspecting a picture is to determine its content rather than make judgments about the precise location of objects in it. Hock proposes a model for retrieving information about location in terms of the viewer constructing 'imaginary perspectives' -- imagining what the scene would look like from different perspectives, and using these to encode location information. His chapter represents much of what is distinctive about the cognitive approach to the perception of pictures: it emphasizes stages of processing, processing-capacity limitations, and the evolution of 'strategies' or 'heuristics' to simplify the spectator's task and bring it within capacity

.

Improvisation has been a favoured artistic technique for centuries across different art forms, and when it is performed in 'real-time' (as for example in jazz music) it can involve remarkable performance skills. In the chapter by Pressing the point is made that 'fluent musical improvisers can produce unbroken complex and coherent melodic strings of notes of nearly arbitrary length at speeds up to circa 10 notes/second. This is close to the limited reported values of kinesthetic reaction time '

...

.

Pressing provides an overview of improvisation in many art forms. He compares performers' accounts and critics' accounts in an effort to extract elements which seem common to the different media. Then he considers these common elements in terms of research into cognitive processes, particularly research into the distribution of attention across tasks, information processing capacity limits, memory processes, and skills. Skilled performance itself involves a chain of mechanisms leading from input to output: for example, the coding of incoming data, the evaluation of possible responses, the choice of response, and its execution and timing. Questions are raised about the role of automaticity in skill, the concurrent running of processing stages, and the role of feedback and feedforward loops in the maintenance of skilled performance. Improvisation is a set of skills fundamental to many psychological tasks but, as Pressing reminds us, research on high levels of skilled performance has not been much studied by psychologists; arid much of the information on improvised performance has been embedded within a specialized literature on the arts. Pressing is able to bring the expertize and sensitivity of a cognitive psychologist and a musician to illuminate the complexity of improvisation. Cognitive psychology offers sophisticated analysis of skilled performance; but, as research is onlybeginningto examine perceptual processes in the performance of art, so we await the instigation of the corresponding investigation into the perception and enjoyment of improvisation. CONCLUSIONS Returning here to o u r opening quotation, it is impossible not to concur with Berlyne that the arts are highly complex phenomena with many dimensions. We would expect that a variety of approaches will be required to elucidate the psychological processes underlying the perception of art. Within experimental psychology the dominant tradition has been experimental aesthetics. This has generated a large number of empirical studies into relationships between aesthetic responses and stimulus properties, and it has encouraged some theory development, most notably Berlyne's contributions. However, the strategy of 'aesthetics from below' has resulted in insufficient

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Crozier and A.J. Chapman

attention being paid to works of art, and conclusions derived from the study of specially contrived stimuli have not been applied successfully to the perception of art works. Often, indeed, as Hardiman and Zernich (1977) have concluded, the direct study of responses to works of art has tended to result in a series of isolated investigations which has not been sufficient to develop theory or even to build up a coherent knowledge base. The examination of cognitive processes seems to us to be potentially fruitful for a number of reasons: (1) As researchers have attempted to forge theories within experimental aesthetics they have necessarily attributed importance to cognitive processes. (2) Such processes have been 1.argely neglected by the major theories of aesthetic reactions -- like psychoanalysis, or approaches which rely upon the concept of arousal -- as these have focused on an interpretation of the pleasure afforded by art in terms of drive-reduction, whether sublimated or not. Yet one could hardly deny that cognition is important in the appreciation of art -- the enjoyment is often derived from exploring works of art, from detecting patterns and rhythms, from comparing works by the same or different artists, from solving puzzles etc. -- and here the concept of 'cognitive orientation' is illuminating (cf. Kreitler and Kreitler, 1972). ( 3 ) A full understanding of aesthetic responses will require an analysis of how artworks are perceived, and a sound foundation for experimental aesthetics can emerge from cognitive psychologists applying their models and methodologies to the investigation of the perception of pictures and the perception of music. At the very least, they can provide some direct evidence on the parts allegedly played in the perception of art by processes such as isomorphism or glance curves. (4)Cognitive psychology introduces a broader set of dependent variables into experimental aesthetics: it breaks away from an over-reliance on measures of preference and liking, and judgments of pleasingness and interest. It is not obvious from an examination of art criticism or from artists' discussions that these traditional measures reflect the most salient constructs with which spectators confront art-works. ( 5 ) In the past an erroneous assumption has been salient, to the effect that in order to pursue the psychological study of art rigorously one is obliged to forego the analysis of responses to actual art-works and to adopt a research strategy like 'aesthetics froin below'. The chapters in this volume demonstrate that pictures, drawings, songs, and pieces of music can be studied directly with methodological rigour and sophistication. Finally, we would say that the study of cognitive processes should help to break down a compartmentalization in the investigation of art. Previously, emotional responses have been studied separately from cognitive aspects, and social psychological perspectives have been virtually disregarded. Now recent research within mainstream psychology -- research into cognition and affect, and into social cognition -- promises possibilities for more integrated theories of the perception of art. That is the hope for the future. Meanwhile this volume demonstrates progress thus far in the new field of the cognitive psychology of art. REFERENCES Apter, M.J. (1982). The Experience of Motivation: The Theory of Psychological Reversals. London: Academic Press. Arnheim, R. (1956). Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye. London: Faber and Faber.

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Arnheim, R. (1966). Towards a Psychology of Art: Faber and Faber.

Collected Essays.

London:

Berlyne, D.E. (1971). Aesthetics and Psychobiology. New Y o r k : AppletonCentury-Crofts. Berlyne, D.E. (1974). Studies in the New Experimental Aesthetics. Wiley. Birkhoff, G.D. (1932). Aesthetic Measure. University Press.

New York:

Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard

Brighton, A. (1977). Official art and the Tate Gallery. 193, 41-44.

Studio International,

Caudle, F.M. (1983). Psychological aspects of art in American magazine advertising. Paper presented at the British Psychological Society, Welsh Branch, International Conference on Psychology and the Arts, Cardiff. Child, I.L. (1969). Aesthetics. In: G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology. Volume 3. London: Addison-Wesley. Crozier, W.R. and Chapman, A.J. (1981). Aesthetic preferences, prestige and social class. In: D. O'Hare (Ed.) Psychology and the Arts. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester. Day, H.I. (1981). Advances in Intrinsic Motivation and Aesthetics. Plenum.

New Y o r k :

Dimaggio, P. and Useem, M. (1978). Social class and arts consumption: the origins and consequences of class differences in exposure to the arts in America. Theory and Society, 5, 141-161. Eagleton, T. (1983). Literary Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Eysenck, H.J. (1942). The experimental study of the 'Good Gestalt': a new approach. Psychological Review, 49, 344-364. Eysenck, H.J. (1961). Sense and Nonsense in Psychology. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Farrell, B. (1963). Introduction to S. Freud, Leonardo. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Fechner, G.T. (1876). Vorschule der Aesthetik. Leipzig: Breitkopf and Haertel. Flavell, J.H. (1963). The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. Van Nostrand Reinhold.

New Y o r k :

Franc&, R. (1976). Comparative effects of six collative variables on interest and preference in adults of different educational levels. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 62-79. Franc&, R. (1963). Perceptual interest and aesthetic preference, or switching of hedonic power based on educational background. Paper presented at the

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British Psychological Society, Welsh Branch, International Conference on Psychology and the Arts, Cardiff. Gardner, H. (1981). The Quest for Mind. Press.

Chicago, Illinois: Chicago University

Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton-Mifflin. Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of Art.

London: Oxford University Press.

Gordon, I. (1981). Left and Right in Art. In: D. O'Hare (Ed.) Psychology and the Arts. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester. Hardiman, G.W. and Zernich, T. (1977). Preferences for the visual arts: review of recent studies. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 44, 455-463. H o g , J. (1969). Psychology and the Visual Arts. Penguin.

A

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Howard, V.A. (1971). Harvard Project Zero: A fresh look at art education. Journal o f Aesthetic Education, 5 , 61-73. Hudson, L. (1982). Bodies of Knowledge.

London: Weidenfeld.

Humphrey, N.K. (1973). The illusion of beauty.

Perception, 2, 429-439.

KoneEni, V.J. (1982). Social interaction and musical preference. In: D. Deutsch (Ed.) The Psychology of Music. New York: Academic Press. Kreitler, H. and Kreitler, S. (1972). Psychology and the Arts. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. Lang, J. (1984). Formal aesthetics and visual perception, and questions architects ask. Visual Arts Research, in press. Lasher, M.D., Carroll, J.M., and Bever, T.G. (1983). The cognitive basis of aesthetic experience. Leonardo, 16, 196-199. Lindauer, M.S. (1984). Physiognomy and art: approaches from above, below and sideways. Visual Arts Research, in press. Machotka, P. (1983). Perception, psychology and the study of art. Paper presented at the British Psychological Society, Welsh Branch, International Conference on Psychology and the Arts, Cardiff. Marschalek, D. (1983). A review of basic cognitive processes and their relevance to understanding responses to works of art. Visual Arts Research, 9, 23-33. hlartindale, C. (1975). Romantic Progression: The Psychology of Literary History. Washington, DC: Hemisphere. Martindale, C. and Uemura, A. (1983). Stylistic evolution in European music. Leonardo, 16, 225-228.

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McManus, I.C. (1980). The aesthetics of simple figures. British Journal of Psychology, 71, 505-524. Munro, T. (1963). The psychology of art: past, present, future. of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 21, 264-282.

Journal

Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and Reality. San Francisco, California: Freeman. Newell, A. and Simon, H.A. (1976). Computer science as empirical inquiry: symbols and search. Communications of the ACM, 19, 113-126. Perkins, D. and Leondar, B. (1977). The Arts and Cognition. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Potter, J., Stringer, P. and Wetherell, M. (in press). Social Texts and Context: Literature and Social Psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Read, J. (1983). 'I don't know why you bother'. August. Rubin, W.S. (1969). Dada and Surrealist Art. Schoenberg, A. (1951). Style and Idea.

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Spector, J. (1974). The Aesthetics of Freud: Art. Washington, DC: McGraw-Hill.

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Vitz, P.C. (1979). Visual sciences and modernist art: historical parallels. In: C.F. Nodine and D.F. Fisher(Eds.) Perception and Pictorial Representation. New York: Praeger. Zajonc, R.B., Crandall, R., Kail, R.V. and Swap, W. (1974). Effect of extreme exposure frequencies on different affective ratings of stimuli. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 38, 667-678.

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Section 2

SYMBOLS AND MEANINGS IN THE ARTS

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Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art W.R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1984

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF ART: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS~ Gary Kose Rutgers University

The psychological study of art is not new. Psychological investigations have maintained a continual but nonetheless distant intrigue with so formidable a task as explaining art and the activities that surround it. Consideration of a psychology of art may be traced to philosophic investigations of aesthetics (see Munro, 1951 for review); and is clearly located in the early work of Fechner (18761, which served as a point of departure for European and American investigations (Ogden, 1938; Munro, 1948; Morgan, 1951). Art is among the most pervasive of human activities and the continual interest is certainly justified. 'However, it is also among the most complex of activities and has been approached with caution. It seems that art as a topic of study defies definition as a theoretical object and easily evades any one methodological attempt to study its workings. Traditional approaches to the study of art often reveal more about the workings of psychological investigations than they do about art. Arnheim (1966). for example, takes as an agenda for the psychology of art the concept of equilibration drawn from such varied sources as the principle of entropy in physics, homeostasis in physiology, and the law of simplicity in Gestalt Psychology' (p. 21). Arnheim defines his interest in art in terms of the physical presence of its objects and the way they are perceived. His method of study involves examining the Gestalt principles concerning the perception of depth, figure-ground relationships, closure and sequencing principles as they apply to visual arts. Arnheim has argued the varied ways in which these principles work. His theoretical explication proposes the way in which perception organizes patterns within the work of art (Arnheim, 1969). Perceptual organization, in his theory, is directly related to the physical structure of a specific work. Arnheim's psychological account of art seems to be most directly concerned with art as physical objects, and the way in which they are perceived.

'...

...

Experimental aesthetics, characterized by the work of Berlyne (1971, 1974), defines its interest in art in terms of psychological reactions. Berlyne used the term 'psychobiological aesthetics' to describe this interest. The methods of study are in the tradition of Fechner, stressing experimental rigour in measuring preferences and correlative physiological reactions to works of art. Theory within this approach is axiomatic, derived from information theory. Berlyne describes how complexity and conflict in a stimulus gives rise to 'hedonic' responses, such as preference, degree of pleasure, and curiosity. A psychological explanation of art derived from 'psychobiological aesthetics' would primarily concern the art of perceiving art.

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(2 Kose

Within t h e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t r a d i t i o n , t h e r e is a fundamental i n t e r e s t i n t h e working o u t o f a complex o f p h y s i c a l n e e d s and d r i v e s , which s t r i v e f o r s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n . Such e x p r e s s i o n s a r e o f t e n m a n i f e s t i n works o f a r t . From t h i s a p p r o a c h t h e method of s t u d y i n g a r t i n v o l v e s a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of a work or c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o b i o g r a p h i c i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e c r e a t o r ' s l i f e o r from t h e i n d i v i d u a l who i s r e s p o n d i n g t o i t ( e . g . , F r e u d , 1 9 6 4 ; Wolheim, 1 9 7 4 a ) . A common c r i t i c i s m is t h a t b o t h t h e d e f i n e d i n t e r e s t a n d method o f s t u d y a r e v a g u e ; however, t h i s a p p r o a c h u n d e r s c o r e s t h e a s p e c t s o f e x p r e s s i o n and s u b j e c t i v i t y t h a t a r e n o t e a s i l y d i s c u s s e d i n t h e o t h e r a p p r o a c h e s . From t h e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a p p r o a c h a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f a r t would t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e c r e a t i o n or p r o j e c t i o n o f o n e ' s s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a r t and i t s b a s i s i n a f f e c t i v e c o m p l e x e s , w h e t h e r as artist or a u d i e n c e . While e a c h a p p r o a c h h a s d e f i n e d a f o c u s o f i n t e r e s t t h a t t o u c h e s on a f u n d a m e n t a l a s p e c t o f a r t , i t seems t h a t no one a p p r o a c h a d d r e s s e s t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f a r t qua art. A l l t h r e e a p p r o a c h e s a r e more p u r p o s e l y o r i e n t e d towards t h e psychological p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t motivates t h e i r i n t e r e s r a t h e r than being o r i e n t e d towards understanding t h e d i s t i n c t i v e n a t u r e of a r t and a r t i s t i c a c t i v i t y . M e t h o d o l o g i e s and t h e i m p o r t o f f i n d i n g s a r e r e l a t i v e t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t d i r e c t s e a c h a p p r o a c h , and t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f a r t is i n t h i s s e n s e a s u b s i d i a r y i n t e r e s t t h a t i l l u m i n a t e s t h e range of psychological p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n a p p r o a c h i n g t h e s t u d y o f a r t r e f l e c t s , t o some d e g r e e , a c e r t a i n p o s i t i v i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n t h a t h a s s e r v e d h i s t o r i c a l l y a s a model Such a n a s s u m p t i o n i s f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s a n d methods.' r e d u c t i o n i s t i c i n s e e k i n g an e m p i r i c a l or p h y s i c a l b a s i s o f e x p l a n a t i o n and m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n two g e n e r a l t e n d e n c i e s . The f i r s t i s r e v e a l e d i n t h e a t t e m p t s t o s e g r e g a t e or c l a s s i f y e s s e n t i a l c o m p o n e n t s , be t h e y l a w s of p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , p a t t e r n s o f s e n s o r y p i c k - u p or a f f e c t i v e c o m p l e x e s t h e second can b e se e n i n a t t e m p t s t o i d e n t i f y s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e o r e t i c a l components and t h e phenomena of s t u d y , which o f t e n p r o m i s e s c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . 3 T h i s a s s u m p t i o n and i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s seem r e s t r i c t i v e when a t t e m p t i n g t o a c c o u n t f o r a r t . An a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h would have t o m a i n t a i n a p u r p o s e f u l o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d s a r t and a r t i s t i c meaning i t s e l f , w h i l e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e v a r i e t y o f p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i t s o b j e c t s , t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n . Such a n a l t e r n a t i v e i s a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o t h i s f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t must b e met i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h a t h e o r e t i c a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e f o r t h e psychological study of art. This c h a p t e r examines an a p p r o a c h t o t h e s t u d y o f a r t t h a t is r e p r e s e n t e d b t h e p h i l o s o p h i c w o r k s o f Goodman and C a s s i r e r , and c o n s i d e r s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s a p p r o a c h for p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Both Goodman and C a s s i r e r u s e t h e c o n c e p t o f symbol f o r d i s c u s s i n g t h e n a t u r e o f human a c t i v i t y . Symbol, i n t h e b r o a d e s t s e n s e , is a r e l a t i o n a l term t h a t a l l o w s f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a symbol and i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e or meaning. An a p p r o a c h t o t h e s t u d y o f a r t i n t e r m s o f symbols t a k e s a s i t s p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t t h e r e l a t i o n s i p b e t w e e n a work a n d i t d i s t i n c t i v e meaning. T h i s a p p r o a c h , a l t h o u g h v a g u e , c a n s e r v e a s a c h e c k a g a i n s t a n y form of a p o s i t i v i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n and r e d u c t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s . 4 Both Goodman a n d C a s s i r e r s h a r e t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n b u t d i f f e r i n t h e i r a c c o u n t s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a symbol and i t s meaning. C o n s i d e r a t i o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n s can s e r v e i n d e l i m i t i n g p a r amet ers i n a d o p t i n g t h i s approach f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s .

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The shrdy o,f'artand psychological explanation

ART AS COMMUNICATION Goodman's work is i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f A n a l y t i c Philosophy, i n which he d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i m s e l f as a Nominalist. For Goodman, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n means a d o p t i n g a method o f d e s c r i b i n g t h e world r a t h e r than r e d u c i n g i t t o This method i s a k i n t o essential properties or classes of relationships. t h a t of s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s . The b a s i c terms used i n such d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e r e f e r r e d t o a s ' i n d i v i d u a l s ' (1972, p . 1 5 5 ) . An ' i n d i v i d u a l ' i s purposely d e f i n e d a s an a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t can refer t o whatever i s i r r e d u c i b l e i n a g i v e n system. T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n a l l o w s a r a n g e o f c h o i c e s i n what can be c o n s i d e r e d as an ' i n d i v i d u a l ' . By d e f i n i t i o n an ' i n d i v i d u a l ' c a n n o t be c o n c r e t e i n any way and f o r b i d s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of I allegedly o c c u l t e n t i t i e s a s p r o p e r t i e s o r c l a s s e s ' (Goodman, 1965, p . 3 3 ) . T h i s t y p e o f nominalism p r o v i d e s a way of d e s c r i b i n g t h e world i n terms o f d i s t i n c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t i e s t h a t come t o form e q u a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e s y s t e m s ; and a v o i d s r e d u c t i o n i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n s . I t is from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t Goodman's d i s c u s s i o n o f a r t and symbols i s b e s t understood ( s e e Black, 1971).

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I n Languages of Art ( 1 9 6 8 ) , Goodman s t a t e s , 'The o b j e c t i v e ( o f t h i s work) is an approach t o a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f symbols. Symbol is used h e r e a s a v e r y g e n e r a l and c o l o r l e s s term. I t c o v e r s l e t t e r s , words, t e x t s , p i c t u r e s , diagrams, maps, models and more b u t c a r r i e s no i m p l i c a t i o n of t h e o b l i q u e o r t h e o c c u l t ' ( p . x i ) . T h i s work can be s e e n as Goodman's e x t e n s i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s t o non v e r b a l systems o f meaning and p r o v i d e s an e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e v a r i e t i e s and f u n c t i o n s of symbols. Goodman a c h i e v e s t h i s g o a l through h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e way v a r i o u s a r t i s t i c symbols e s t a b l i s h semantic r e f e r e n c e and o p e r a t e i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . However, Goodman does n o t u s e a r t en passant. The problems t h a t a r i s e and h e l p f o r m u l a t e h i s argument a r e c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o problems o f a r t i t s e l f . Goodman's work i s as much concerned with a r t as i t is with a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f symbols. Goodman develops an i n t r i c a t e argument t h a t i s d i f f i c u l t t o summarize i n i t s nuance and with t h e a r r a y o f t o p i c s t h a t i t i n c o r p o r a t e s ( e . g . , s e e r e v i e w s by S a v i l e , 1971; Wollheim, 197413; Margolis, 1 9 7 0 ) . An a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h i s t h e o r y c a n be g a r n e r e d by c o n s i d e r i n g h i s t r e a t m e n t of t h r e e i s s u e s : r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , e x p r e s s i o n and a u t h e n t i c i t y i n a r t . Goodman b e g i n s by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e way i n which p i c t u r e s can r e p r e s e n t o b j e c t s and e v e n t s . H i s argument, i n l i n e with h i s g e n e r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t any p o s i t i o n t h a t would m a i n t a i n t h a t a p i c t u r e r e p r e s e n t s because i t s h a r e s c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s o r resembles some o b j e c t or e v e n t . T h i s argument is based on t h e d i f f i c u l t y of d e f i n i n g a c r i t e r i o n f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g resemblance o f any k i n d . Goodman q u i c k l y e l i m i n a t e s t h e t h e o r y t h a t a p i c t u r e i s a copy or i m i t a t i o n o f o b j e c t s i n t h e world. Such a t h e o r y does n o t , n o r c o u l d n o t , p r e c i s e l y d e t a i l what i n f o r m a t i o n is needed i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e a successful picture. Goodman a l s o d i s m i s s e s t h e use o f t h e laws o f p e r s p e c t i v e as a way of e x p l a i n i n g how a p i c t u r e represent^.^ Goodman n o t e s t h e u n l i k e l i n e s s of a c t u a l l y s e e i n g a p i c t u r e i n e x a c t a c c o r d w i t h t h e laws of perspective. P i c t u r e s a r e normally viewed a g a i n s t a background by a p e r s o n f r e e t o walk about and t o move h i s e y e s . To p a i n t a p i c t u r e t h a t w i l l under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s d e l i v e r t h e same l i g h t r a y s as t h e o b j e c t viewed under any c o n d i t i o n , would be p o i n t l e s s even i f i t were possible. Rather t h e a r t i s t ' s task i n representing an object b e f o r e him i s t o d e c i d e what l i g h t r a y s , under g a l l e r y c o n d i t i o n s , w i l l succeed i n r e n d e r i n g what he sees. T h i s i s n o t a m a t t e r o f

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copying but of conveying. (1968, p. 13) Goodman's position on the issue of pictorial representation is concise and directly opposed to such realist explanations. The plain fact is that a picture, to represent an object, must be a symbol for it, must stand for it, refer to it; and that no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite relationships of reference. N o r is resemblance necessary for reference; almost anything can stand for anything else. A picture that represents -- like a passage that describes -- an object refers to and, more particularly denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation and is independent of resemblance. (1968, p. 5) This argument proposes that pictorial representations, which ostensibly have an inherently natural relationship with what they represent, are. ultimately symbols as are linguistic descriptions. The fundamental semantic relationship between a symbol and what it represents is one of denotation. Goodman accomplishes two objectives with this argument. First, he has brought together linguistic symbols with pictorial symbols, both being a function of a denotational relationship; and in so doing he justifies the utility of proposing a general theory of symbols. Secondly, in characterizing denotation in contrast to realist theories of representation, Goodman has stressed the conventionality of symbolic meaning. These two objectives serve as the distinguishing characteristics of Goodman's discussion of art and symbols. Pictures, and more generally artistic symbols, do not just represent; they also can be expressive. A second issue that Goodman considers is an attempt to account for expression within his general theory of symbols. Goodman's treatment of expression begins by accepting the tentative distinction ' that representation is of objects o r events while expression is of feelings or other properties' (1968, p. 46). He also notes that it appears that what is expressed is directly tied to the properties of the symbolic medium and can be directly perceived in contrast to representation that depends on convention. However, despite these apparent distinctions Goodman argues that expression depends on the same conventional semantic relationship as representation. He rejects the possibility that expressions can be directly perceived. A symbol cannot literally copy a feeling or emotion, and often an expression is remote from the symbol itself, for example, a painting expressing heat. Expression is not essentially different from representation, both are a matter of denotation, established by convention. In support of this argument Goodman notes the way in which expressions of feelings must be acquired and practiced for drama, as well as variations in the expression of feelings in different cultures. Goodman concludes,

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With representation and expression alike, certain relationships become firmly fixed for certain people by habit; but in neither case are these relationships absolute, universal or immutable representation and expression are both species of denotation. (1968, p. 50)

... .

While Goodman demonstrates the usefulness of a general theory of symbols based on convention, his treatment of expression also indicates that

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symbols can function in different ways. Representation functions in being understood as a literal reference to objects and events, expression is understood as a possession of feelings and emotions. This difference is not an essential difference; the understanding of a symbol in either representational or expressive terms must be acquired in accord with conventional standards. Symbolic meaning, for Goodman, is then relative to a particular cultural context or symbolic system. This implication necessitates that symbolic meaning, in all its possible complexity, must be communicative

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Art, however, seems to run contrary to such a stipulation. In a classic sense, a work of art can be thought of as having essential qualities that are unique to that work and whose value is not exclusively defined in a relative sense, nor is it easily communicable. Artistic symbols can be distinguished in terms of their identity. Goodman considers the distinctiveness of artistic symbols in his discussion of authenticity and the identification of forgeries in painting. Goodman begins by questioning the purpose of distinguishing a perfect or near perfect forgery As in his discussions of representation and expression, he fails to find a criterion based on physical properties or distinctive features that justifies a search for or guarantees the authenticity of a painting. The distinction of authenticity is conventional. The historical context of a particular painting makes it a member of a particular group of authentic paintings, which ultimately defines its authenticity. My chance of learning to make this discrimination correctly -- of discovering projectible characteristics that differentiates Rembrandts from non-Rembrandts -- depends heavily upon the set of examples available as a basis. Thus the fact that the given pictures belong to one or the other is important for me to know in learning how to tell Rembrandt paintings from others (p. 110). Goodman notes,however, that the discussion of authenticity is only pertinent for some art forms, such as painting but not for others, such as music. Again Goodman has maintained his argument for a general theory of symbols but is forced to make another functional distinction in the way symbols function in communicating their meaning. Similar to the distinction between representation and expression, Goodman distinguishes between autographic works of art, where there is no decisive test for identifying a work and its authenticity is defined by historical context, and allographic works of art, where there is no question of its identity or authenticity because of the notational characteristics of the symbols. Unlike the replete non-notational symbols in autographic art, notational symbol systems have clearly defined syntactic and semantic requirements. Notational systems are composed of distinct characters within the system. Semantically the characters must have specified referents, a minimum of redundancy and a means for signifying variations in meaning. The number system, the alphabet and music are typical examples. In general, notational systems are the pinnacle of articulation and unambiguous symbolization. The distinctive identity and meaning of notational symbols are in their structure or spelling. The distinction between notational and non-notational systems is an extremely practical aspect of Goodman's theory. This distinction provides a continuum for evaluating the communicative capacities and kinds of understandings that are possible in various symbol systems.

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Goodman's t h e o r y o f symbols h a s demonstrated a method o f a n a l y s i s t h a t a v o i d s any form o f a p o s i t i v i s t i c assumption and e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t r e d u c e s i t s t o p i c of study t o p r o p e r t i e s o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o things o t h e r than itself. Goodman's d i s c u s s i o n o f a r t i n terms 'of a general t h e o r y o f symbols is n o t r e d u c t i v e because t h e b a s i c term o f t h e t h e o r y d o e s n o t c a r r y any i m p l i c a t i o n s with i t ; it i s d e f i n e d i n a b s t r a c t i o n , devoid o f any i m p l i c a t i o n s or c o n t e n t . And d e s p i t e t h i s f o r m a l i z a t i o n , i t s u g g e s t s a f l e x i b l e and p r a c t i c a l way o f a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b i n g v a r i o u s systems o f meaning.' A v i v i d i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e workings o f t h i s t h e o r y can be s e e n i n a r a t h e r s i m p l e example. Goodman r e p r o d u c e s a s q u a r e , whose p e r i m e t e r is marked o f f with h a r s h marks. Within t h e s q u a r e a r e s e v e n curved l i n e s t h a t a r e interwoven with one a n o t h e r . Each l i n e is d i s t i n g u i s h e d by c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s , f o r example, one i s composed o f d o t s w h i l e a n o t h e r i s a continuous l i n e ; t h e h e i g h t o f t h e c u r v e s ; and a numeral a s s o c i a t e d with each l i n e ( p . 97). I n a l l , a complex p a t t e r n emerges. However, Goodman r e n d e r s e v e r y f e a t u r e r e a d a b l e by r e v e a l i n g t h a t t h e p a t t e r n i s a s p e c t o g r a p h i c a n a l y s i s of v a r i o u s g r e e n pigments mixed w i t h a chemical t h a t c u a s e s changes i n t h e r e f l e c t a n t c o l o u r . When p r o v i d e d with t h e key t h e p a t t e r n is comprehensible i n a l l i t s d e t a i l . The l i n e s from r i g h t t o l e f t i n d i c a t e wave l e n g t h . From t o p t o bottom t h e h e i g h t o f t h e c u r v e s i n d i c a t e t h e p e r c e n t r e f l e c t a n c e . And e a c h l i n e , i d e n t i f i e d by i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g number, is g i v e n a l a b e l . Symbolic meaning i s understood i n terms o f what t h e p a t t e r n d e n o t e s . The p a t t e r n r e p r e s e n t s a c e r t a i n e v e n t and e x p r e s s e s c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f t h a t e v e n t ; b o t h what i s r e p r e s e n t e d and what i s e x p r e s s e d a r e determined by d e n o t a t i o n . These f u n c t i o n s are c a r r i e d o u t by b o t h r e p l e t e , n o n - n o t a t i o n a l symbols, f o r example, t h e numbers. E x p l a i n i n g t h i s p a t t e r n and i t s complex meaning is n o t dependent on any one e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t y or r e l a t i o n s h i p . Understanding t h e p a t t e r n r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e i n n e r workings o f t h e components o f t h e pattern itself. The n e a t f o r m a l i z a t i o n and u t i l i t y of Goodman's t h e o r y i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e workings o f symbolic meaning i n v i t e s an i m p o r t a n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n . Is Goodman's t h e o r y a unique p r o d u c t o f h i s method o f a n a l y s i s or is i t an a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e ways symbols are a c t u a l l y produced, p e r c e i v e d and understood? Responding t o such a q u e s t i o n r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f how t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s t h a t d e f i n e symbolic meaning a r e communicated and a c q u i r e d , The example g i v e n above d o e s n o t a l l o w c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e s e i s s u e s . The key t o t h e p a t t e r n i s merely g i v e n by Goodman. How symbols are e s t a b l i s h e d by c o n v e n t i o n is n o t a d d r e s s e d i n h i s t h e o r y . I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h i s q u e s t i o n i s independent from and second t o h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s . While it may be t h a t an answer c a n b e s t b e p r o v i d e d by p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , t h i s q u e s t i o n p o s e s a more s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o Goodman's assumption c o n c e r n i n g t h e independent e x i s t e n c e o f c o h e r e n t systems o f symbolic meaning. Is i t p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r e o f symbols i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e way i n which t h e y are produced and t r a n s m i t t e d ? I n c o n t r a s t , Cassirer b e g i n s h i s s t u d y o f symbols by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i r d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o human a c t i v i t y and u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Such an approach h a s consequences t h a t a r e markedly d i f f e r e n t from Goodman's d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n s o f symbols. ART AS ACTION I n d e a l i n g with no l e s s a problem t h a n t h e ' c r i s i s o f man's knowledge of h i m s e l f ' , t h a t i s t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f e x i s t e n c e i n t o v a r i o u s modes o f t h o u g h t and c u l t u r e ; C a s s i r e r d e f i n e s man as an ' a n i m a l symbolicum',

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suggesting that symbols provide an identity and a sense of unity to various kinds of experience (1944, p. 28). In contrast to Goodman's abstract and 'colorless' definition of symbol, Cassirer relates his notion of symbol directly to the nature of action and understanding. The most important aspect of symbols for Cassirer is that they are not ' passive images created by the intellect itself' of something given . . . I but are ' (1955, p. 75). What the mind can know depends on the symbols it can create. Symbols do not enter into thinking and direct understanding, rather they are part of thought and constitute precisely what is known.

...

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Cassirer's most striking example of what he means by symbol can be seen in his discussion of a simple plotted line, a Linenzug (Cassirer, 1957, pp. 200-202). First he considers the line as a perceptual event. The expressiveness of the line's properties are revealed, 'as we immerse ourselves in the design and construct it for ourselves, we become aware of a distinct physiognomic character in it. A peculiar mood is expressed in purely spatial determination . .' (p. 200). Next he considers the lines as a mathematical symbol, ' it becomes a graphic representation of a trignometric function'. Third, Cassirer discusses the line as a mythic symbol in which it embraces the sacred and profane. Here Cassirer makes an important note, 'Yet here it (the line) does not merely act as a sign, a mark by which the sacred is recognized, but proposes also a factually inherent, magical compelling and repelling power' (p. 201). Finally, he views the line as an ornament. In this sense what is appreciated is very distinct from either the mathematical or mythic discussions. The line can be discussed in an aesthetic sense, 'Here again the experience of spatial form is completed only through its relation to a total horizon which reveals to us through a certain atmosphere in which it not merely 'is', but in which, as it were, it lives and breathes' (p. 201).

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Symbols, for Cassirer, do not have an independent and coherent conventional meaning that can be easily transmitted. Rather, symbols as symbolic forms are ways of conceptualizing the relationship between a certain direction of thought and the objects thought about. In his example, assuming a direction of thought such as the logic of mathematics, the mythical or the aesthetic will determine the properties of the line that will be brought to the fore and incorporated into symbolic meaning; these same properties are instrumental in influencing the further direction of a particular mode of thought. Symbolic meaning, in this sense, is mutually determined. Cassirer refers to this mutual determination as 'symbolic pregnance' and is defined as follows:

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the way in which a perception as a sensory experience contains at the same time a certain non-intuitive meaning which immediately we are not dealing with bare and concretely represents Rather, it is the perception itself which by perceptive data virtue of its own immanent organization, takes on a kind of spiritual articulation - which being ordered itself, also belongs It is this ideal interwovenness, to a determinate order of meaning this relatedness of the single perceptive phenomenon, given here and now, to a characteristic total meaning that the term 'pregnance' is meant to designate. ($3. 2 0 2 !

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It is this notion of mutual determination, this 'symbolic pregnance', which is the foundation for understanding Cassirer's discussions of the various forms of symbolic meaning such as language, myth, science and art.

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Cassirer never completed a major work on art; however, it is clear that it was an important topic for his understanding of symbols. His writings are replete with references to the arts. It is believed that he intended to complete a volume on art. While preparing a summary of his major philosophic work he stated in a letter, 'Already in the first sketch of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms a particular volume on art was considered but the disfavor of the time postponed its working out again and again' (see Verene, 1977, p. 25). His actual writings on art are scant. Cassirer's relevance to understanding art has been maintained through the work of Langer (1953). Cassirer first makes reference to art in a paper entitled, Mythic Aesthetics and TkeoreticaZ Space (1969), and his most significant statement can be found in his summary work ' A n Essay on Man' (1944). Cassirer begins his discussion of art by considering traditional arguments that view art as either an imitation of nature or an outpouring of emotions. Cassirer rejects both views since they imply that art passively reflects physical properties or an emotional inner life. In this way Cassirer, like Goodman, avoids any form of a positivistic assumption and reductive explanation. However, the fundamental difference between Goodman and Cassirer is in the way in which they describe what constitutes the symbols of art. Artistic meaning for Goodman is determined by convention and by the characteristics of a particular symbol system. While for Cassirer, meaning in art, or its 'symbolic pregnance', is mutually determined by the interweaving of a ' perceptive phenomenon, given here and now, to a characteristic total meaning ' This is not accomplished nor understood, in one instance of organization but rather in what Cassirer refers to as the 'formative process'.

...

...

Art is indeed expressive, but it cannot be expressive without being formative. And this formative process is carried out in a certain sensuous medium for a great painter, a great musician, or a great poet, the colors, the lines, rhythms, and words are not merely part of his technical apparatus; they are necessary moments All of this is not simply of the productive process itself expression: it is also representation and interpretation. (pp. 141-142)

...

...

The significance of art is in the particular way in which the intention to do art is carried out. It is the interweaving of specific material and instances with this total intention that constitutes the 'symbolic pregnance' of a work of art. And it is an appreciation of this interweaving that is most important for both artist and audience alike in understanding art. Not even the spectator is left to merely a passive role. We cannot understand a work of art without, to a certain degree, repeating and reconstructing the creative process by which it has come into being. By the nature of this creative process the passions are turned into actions (p. 149). As a result of his emphasis on the formative process in characterizing

symbolic meaning in art, Cassirer cannot make the same functional distinctions that Goodman makes in his theory of symbols. Cassirer cannot specify and differentiate a symbol and what it represents from what it expresses. In the act of constructing an art symbol, the artistic intention influences what will be represented and expressed; while concomitantly the particular characteristics of the material at hand direct the intention in representing and expressing a certain meaning. The art symbol, its referent and what it expresses are constituted in the formative process of

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its creation. Consequently, identifying and distinguishing between art works is not a matter of considering just the historical context of the work, n o r is it just a matter of reading the structural characteristics in the notations in the work. An art work is distinguished by the particular process of its construction. The formative process, for Cassirer, constitutes the products of art. The artist must not only feel the inward meaning of things and their moral life, he must externalize his feelings. The highest and most characteristic power of artistic imagination appears in this latter act. Externalization means the visible or tangible embodiment not merely in a particular material medium -- in clay, bronze or marble -- but insensuous forms,in rhythm, color patterns, in lines and designs and in plastic shapes These formal elements are not merely external or technical means to reproduce a given intention; they are part and parcel of the artistic intention itself. (1944,pp. 154-155)

...

In Cassirer's discussion of art, symbolic meaning is not described as existing in an independently coherent system or language, as it is by Goodman. Rather, meaning in art is characterized as a particular form of 'symbolic pregnance', in which a particular intention or direction of thought is interwoven with the material at hand that achieves some type of externalization. It is this formative process that is at the core of meaning in art, and the particular course of this formative process is what distinguishes art from other symbolic forms. Art may be defined as a symbolic language. But this leaves us only with a common genus, not the specific difference There is, however, an unmistakable difference between the symbols of art and the linguistic terms of ordinary speech or writing. These two activites agree neither in character nor in purpose; they do not employ the same means, nor do they tend towards the same ends. Neither language nor art give us mere imitations of things or actions; both are representations. But a representation of sensuous forms differs widely from verbal or conceptual representations. (1044, p . 168)

...

an example of how the distinctive fxmative process in art achieves symbolic form, Cassirer considers the difference between an artist and a scientist attempting to describe a landscape. If the artist is a painter then both his aim and his methods will differ from a geologist's description of a landscape. However, if the artist is a poet he will be using a linguistic medium, which is also of primary importance to any scientific description. Yet Cassirer maintains that the poet's direction and use of language will remain distinct from that of the geologist. The geologist's aim is empirical fact, achieved by using language in observation, comparison and induction. The poet, on the other hand will concern himself with the rhyme and rhythm of the language which constitutes the 'sensuous forms' of his art. Cassirer has provided an approach in which art is characterized, not as an independently coherent system of meaning, but rather, as a form of activity that is distinguished from other such activities by its direction and methods. This distinctiveness is fundamental to understanding the kind of meaning that art can reveal. As

G. Kose

SYMBOL AND PSYCHOLOGY

In considering the psychological investigation of art, this chapter has suggested that art is a difficult topic to define, let alone study and understand. Traditional approaches, while discussing important aspects of art, seem restrictive with regard to the array of topics that could be discussed. It was suggested that this restrictiveness is not specific to any one theoretical enterprise but reflects a fundamental theoretical assumption and method characteristic of psychological studies. Psychological investigations tend to reduce art to empirical or physical properties, and fundamental relations. Consequently, art is then discussed in positivistic terms, neglecting the distinctiveness of the activities and objects of art. In noting this difficulty, the study of art cannot be seen as just another interesting topic, but rather is a topic that raises metatheoretical questions about systems of psychological explanation. The notion of symbol is often associated with discussions of art, and while it is vague and varies in the way it is used, it can be seen as a caution against positivism and reductionistic explanations. The juxtaposition of Goodman's and Cassirer's positions was intended to highlight aspects of this notion of symbol using it as a heuristic for asking questions about art. There are two important general issues that resonate in both positions. In discussing art, both Goodman and Cassirer struggle to describe the coherent organization of symbolic meaning, while simultaneously trying to account for the multiplicity of meanings that are possible of any symbol. The different way in which Goodman and Cassirer maintain consideration of these two seemingly contradictory issues marks the distinctiveness of their positions. In Goodman's theory of symbols these two issues are clearly distant and kept separate. The coherent organization of meaning is the subject of Goodman's anatomization of symbol systems. In his explanation specific functions are differentiated (representation and expression), and distinctions in the structure of various systems are described (notational and non-notational) which allow for the evaluation of symbols in terms of their intelligibility. Goodman's discussion of the organization of symbolic meanings serves in providing clear distinctions as well as suggesting a criterion for evaluation in psychological studies of art. His focus on organization is not without a price. The origins of various symbol systems, how they change and vary in meaning are never addressed in any detail. These issues that concern the multiplicity of symbolic meaning, are described as being determined by conventional standards. This explanation serves in maintaining Goodman's allegedly occult entities such as Nominalist orientation, denying properties or classes'; however, it is silent with regard to how conventional standards are acquired and how they operate in the processes of producing and interpreting symbols. It is in this regard that psychological studies of art could Jomplement Goodman's theory of symbols.

...

The work of Howard Gardner and Project Zero is already well known (See the chapter by Blank, Gardner and Winner, this volume). Taking their impetus from Goodman, this team of researchers have formulated and addressed a number of problems derived from Goodman's analysis of the organization of symbolic meaning. In a recent work Gardner (1982) has provided samples of these investigations. Following Goodman, symbol systems are defined by their unique structures. There are a variety of symbol systems, determined by convention, requiring conformity and a specific set of skills in order to produce or read meaning within a particular system. The visual arts,

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literature and music are typical examples. Gardner's most important contribution to Goodman's theory of symbols is in his stressing that the acquisition of symbol systems must be understood in relation to the overall pattern of human development. Acquiring proficiency in a symbol system is not simply a case of socialization or learning. Developments in cognitive capacities are an important determinant in gaining access to the conventional standards of a symbol system. Understanding the functions and structures of a symbol system is described as the result of an interaction between developing intellectual capacities and the rules and restrictions of the various systems within a culture. An example can be seen in Gardner's description of the development of artistry in children (1982,pp. 86-91). Having investigated children's drawing ability and their use of literary l a n g ~ a g e , Gardner ~ notes that despite differences between these two domains there is a common course of development. In both drawing and the use of metaphor, young children display a precocious disposition for novelty in their productions that is often aesthetically pleasing and is similar to more accomplished artistic productions. Around seven or eight years of age this disposition declines and children become obsessed with realism. Gardner refers to this period as the 'literal stage'. In an interesting series of studies Gardner suggests that children's precocious productions cannot be equated with more accomplished productions. These early productions are a result of the vast amount of experimenting that is characteristic of preschool children's intellectual capacity. They are not a result of mastery but are a reflection of the children's first encounters with the symbol systems of their culture. Gardner refers to this as a 'first draft of artistry'. The apparent decline is believed to be a result of children entering school and becoming aware of the conventional standards of symbol systems. The fact that younger children's productions are appreciated for having aesthetic value is itself a result of contemporary artistic conventions. Gardner's explanation stresses both the general disposition of the children and the way they come to terms with the conventionality of symbol systems. An individual child developing competency within a specific symbolic system should follow a similar course of development. Gardner has already begun to closely examine the way individual children develop competency within various symbol systems (1982, pp. 110-126). In an ongoing longitudinal study, Gardner and his associates have been observing preschool children using a variety of symbolic media, such as story telling, drawing, block play and sculpture Preliminary findings reveal certain developmental trends that cut across media with regard to the children's planfulness, their ability to follow instructions and their seriousness of purpose. An outstanding finding is the predominance of consistent individual differences inthe children's activities. Dichotomies have been proposed to characterize some of their individual styles, for example, verbalizersvisualizers, object-centred/person-centred, self-starters/completers. The children also express their individuality in the use of consistent themes in their various productions. An additional complication in assessing the children's symbolic competence was that their performance often varied depending on the particular task at hand, for example, directly copying a standard was most anxiety provoking and challenging, while freely producing or completing a project that was already started was most liberating and accessed more of the children's personal concerns. These task effects cut across various symbolic media.

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While these findings are not conclusive, they are seen as providing a starting point for understanding productions within various symbolic media. Generally, children's work can be categorized according to their level of competence. The children's work can also be distinguished within an array of typical styles; such as visualizer, person-centred, etc. And, finally, early productions need to be characterized in terms of individual stylistic differences that stem from several factors, such as the child's general command of symbolization, the child's typical style, particular task demands within the media, recent events and consistent traits and motivations that characterize the child's life. Gardner and his colleagues suggest that understanding the productions and competencies within symbol systems necessitates thinking in terms of the interaction of multiple factors. This work has profited from Goodman's discussion of the organization of symbolic meaning by the way in which it defines where to begin psychological investigation. On the other hand, this study appears to complement Goodman's theory of symbols by suggesting the way in which symbol systems are acquired and how meaning within the systems vary and change. However,in considering the myriad of factors that influence performance within symbol systems, this study brings into question the accuracy of Goodman's neat dissection of the organization of symbolic meaning. It seems from these preliminary findings that a clear distinction of symbol systems and the assessment of various levels of competency within a particular system cannot be made without being qualified by mentioning individual differences in style, specific task demands or life situations. And,moreover, any explanation in terms of the interrelatedness of these multiple factors would be merely descriptive and virtually meaningless, unless appropriate weights and vectors were assigned to these factors that specify their direction and importance within a symbol system. But even if such an explanation was provided, it would still run the risk of becoming what William James referred to as the 'psychologist fallacy', that is, to assume that such hypothetical constructs as level of competence, individual style, traits and motivation have fixed and distinguishable properties, possessing powers of their own. More importantly supporting such a fallacy violates the nominalist orientation that initiates and is a context for Goodman's theory of symbols. This orientation explicitly forbids consideration of such 'allegedly occult symbol systems and his way of accounting for changes and variations in symbolic meaning is so great that any psychological attempt to shorten the distance is antithetical to the very nature of the theory itself. Goodman has provided an explanation that details the external functions and structures of symbols but this explanation excludes a means for understanding the varying ways in which symbols take on psychological significance. In Cassirer's discussion of art and symbols, his description of the organization of meaning and his account of variations and changes in meaning are indistinguishable. A symbolic form is mutually determined. Noninituitive direction or intention provides the basis for continuity and organization, for example, as in the form of language, myth, science and art. The perceptive phenomena or materials at hand are the source of variation and change. 'Symbolic pregnance' is achieved by the interweaving of nonintuitive intention with the materials at hand. Neither his description of organization, nor the mechanism of change is clearly distinguished: they are circularly defined in terms of one another. The meaning of this close reciprocal relationship between permanent organization and change can only be understood in its 'formative process', that is, in the act of its construction. Symbolic meaning within this approach does not have an end point or level of completion; characterizing meaning in terms of the

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'formative p r o c e s s ' a l l o w s f o r an e n d l e s s t u r n i n g back t o c r e a t e new v a r i a t i o n s i n meaning. C a s s i r e r q u o t e s Goethe who d e s c r i b e s t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h i s kind o f symbolic a c t i o n : And t h u s began t h e b e n t o f mind from which I could n o t d e v i a t e my whole l i f e t h r o u g h ; n a m e l y , t h a t o f t u r n i n g i n t o an image, i n t o a poem, e v e r y t h i n g t h a t d e l i g h t e d o r t r o u b l e d me, or o t h e r w i s e occupied my a t t e n t i o n , and o f coming t o some c e r t a i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n myself t h e r e upon, as w e l l t o r e c t i f y my c o n c e p t i o n s o f e x t e r n a l t h i n g s , as t o s e t my mind a t r e s t about them. The f a c u l t y o f d o i n g t h i s was n e c e s s a r y t o no one more t h a n t o m e , f o r my n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n w h i r l e d me c o n s t a n t l y from one extreme t o t h e o t h e r . A l l t h e works t h e r e f o r e t h a t have been p u b l i s h e d by m e a r e o n l y fragments o f one g r e a t c o n f e s s i o n (Cassirer, 1979, pp. 209-210).

Cassirer b r i n g s back t h e mystery t o symbols t h a t Goodman's a n a l y s i s t r i e d t o remove. However, w h i l e h i s d e s c r i p t i o n may c a p t u r e t h e e x p e r i e n c e and s i g n i f i c a n c e i n s y m b o l i z a t i o n , i t is d i f f i c u l t t o adopt Cassirer's approach f o r psychological investigation. Some r e c e n t s t u d i e s o f c h i l d r e n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p i c t o r i a l symbols i n d i c a t e t h e importance o f c o n s i d e r i n g t h e f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s b u t a l s o s u g g e s t t h e d i f f i c u l t y i n adopting t h i s position.' D e s p i t e t h e very e a r l y a b i l i t y t o p e r c e i v e and r e c o g n i z e o b j e c t s and e v e n t s d e p i c t e d i n p i c t u r e s , c h i l d r e n ' s f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e meaning o f p i c t u r e s i s a more complex achievement. I n one s t u d y (Kose e t a l , 1983) c h i l d r e n between t h e ages o f t h r e e - and s i x y e a r s were asked t o imitate v a r i o u s a c t i o n s . The a c t i o n s were p r e s e n t e d by a l i v e model and i n one of t h r e e symbolic media: by way of a d o l l modelling t h e a c t i o n s , i n l i n e drawings, and i n b l a c k and white photographs d e p i c t i n g c h i l d r e n performing t h e a c t i o n s . A l l o f t h e c h i l d r e n c o u l d a c c u r a t e l y i m i t a t e t h e l i v e model. Also, a l l o f t h e c h i l d r e n could i m i t a t e t h e d o l l modelling t h e a c t i o n s . However, t h e three-year-old c h i l d r e n were o f t e n i n a c c u r a t e when i m i t a t i n g t h e a c t i o n s d e p i c t e d i n l i n e drawings, and a s i g n i f i c a n t number o f t h r e e - and four-year-olds would n o t imitate t h e a c t i o n s when t h e y were d e p i c t e d i n t h e photographs. I n s t e a d , many o f t h e s e c h i l d r e n would d e s c r i b e what was d e p i c t e d b u t would n o t u s e t h e photographs t o d i r e c t t h e i r own a c t i o n . One p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e s e f i n d i n g s is t h a t p l a y i n g with d o l l s and drawing are familiar r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s , and t h e c h i l d r e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t c o u l d e x i s t between a d o l l o r a drawing and t h e a c t i o n i t r e f e r s t o . While photographs are more r e a l i s t i c and p r o b a b l y j u s t as a v a i l a b l e a s d o l l s and drawing, t h e c h i l d r e n a r e n o t familiar with t h e p r o c e s s o f producing photographs and do n o t f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e way i n which t h e y may r e p r e s e n t a c t i o n s . I n a second s t u d y (O'Connor e t a l , 1981) six-year-old c h i l d r e n were p r e s e n t e d with a problem and i t s s o l u t i o n u s i n g a c t u a l materials. The c h i l d r e n were a l s o shown a series o f p h o t o g r a p h i c s l i d e s d e p i c t i n g t h e same problem b u t ending i n an i l l o g i c a l outcome. The o r d e r o f p r e s e n t i n g e i t h e r t h e a c t u a l m a t e r i a l o r t h e s l i d e s was c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d f o r e q u a l numbers o f c h i l d r e n . After s e e i n g both p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h e c h i l d r e n were asked t o compare t h e two endings and e x p l a i n t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between them. I t was found t h a t i f t h e c h i l d r e n were shown t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c s l i d e s b e f o r e t h e a c t u a l problem t h e y were most l i k e l y t o argue t h a t t h e i l l o g i c a l s l i d e s were c o r r e c t . T h i s same procedure was followed i n a n o t h e r c o n d i t i o n i n which i l l o g i c a l drawings were used i n s t e a d o f p h o t o g r a p h i c s l i d e s . I n t h i s c o n d i t i o n no primacy effect was found. The c h i l d r e n r e a d i l y p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e was a mistake i n t h e

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drawings. I t seems t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n assume a d e g r e e o f f i d e l i t y i n photographs while t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f drawings i n c l u d e s an awareness o f t h e c h i r o g r a p h i c p r o c e s s and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f m i s t a k e s . I n a t h i r d s t u d y (Seidman and B e i l i n , i n p r e s s ) four- and six-year-old c h i l d r e n and a d u l t s were given t h e t a s k o f c r e a t i n g a s e r i e s o f drawings o r photographs. The s u b j e c t s were asked t o t a l k a b o u t what t h e y were doing and t h i n k i n g as they produced t h e i r p i c t u r e s . The f i n d i n g s showed a p r o g r e s s i o n with age from viewing photography as a simple r e f l e c t i o n o f r e a l i t y among t h e youngest c h i l d r e n , t o viewing photography as a medium which a l l o w s f o r c o n t r o l and a l t e r a t i o n o f r e a l i t y . I n t h e drawing t a s k a l l t h r e e age groups d i s p l a y e d knowledge o f t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l t h e medium. I n a f i n a l s t u d y (Kose, 1983) f i v e - , e i g h t - and eleven-year-old c h i l d r e n were asked t o produce e i t h e r drawings o r photographs o f o b j e c t s i n v a r i o u s s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The c h i l d r e n were brought t o an a r e a i n which two l a r g e c o n t a i n e r s were d i s p l a y e d . I n one c o n d i t i o n t h e c h i l d r e n were p r e s e n t e d w i t h drawings o f t h e c o n t a i n e r s i n d i f f e r e n t s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s : i n t h e f i r s t , one c o n t a i n e r p a r t i a l l y occluded t h e o t h e r ; i n t h e second, one c o n t a i n e r was e n c l o s e d by t h e o t h e r ; a n d , i n t h e t h i r d , t h e two c o n t a i n e r s were d e p i c t e d i n l i n e a r p e r s p e c t i v e . The c h i l d r e n were then a s k e d t o reproduce t h e drawings. I n a second c o n d i t i o n t h e same procedure was followed e x c e p t t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n were shown photographs o f t h e t h r e e s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and were asked t o reproduce them u s i n g a P o l a r o i d camera, The f i n d i n g s showed t h a t i n t h e drawing c o n d i t i o n t h e younger c h i l d r e n could a c c u r a t e l y reproduce t h e p a r t i a l l y occluded and e n c l o s e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s b u t had d i f f i c u l t y representing perspective. I n t h e photography c o n d i t i o n t h e f i n d i n g s were r e v e r s e d . The four-year-olds had d i f f i c u l t y r e p r o d u c i n g a l l t h r e e r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and among t h e e i g h t - y e a r - o l d s r e p r o d u c i n g t h e p a r t i a l l y occluded and e n c l o s e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s were t h e most d i f f i c u l t , w h i l e reproducing t h e c o n t a i n e r s i n p e r s p e c t i v e was e a s i e s t . The a c t i v i t i e s o f drawing and photography a r e very d i f f e r e n t d e s p i t e t h e i r b o t h b e i n g p i c t o r i a l symbols. The kind o f c o n t r o l t h a t i s imminent i n drawing makes r e p r e s e n t i n g c e r t a i n s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s e a s i e r than o t h e r s . One i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t may be t h a t i n drawing t h e r e is no r e q u i r e m e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a f i x e d s t a t i o n p o i n t . I n photography g a i n i n g c o n t r o l o v e r t h e medium i s more d i f f i c u l t i n c e r t a i n ways, and e s t a b l i s h i n g a f i x e d s t a t i o n p o i n t is e s s e n t i a l t o t a k i n g any photography. I t a p p e a r s t h a t s u c h d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f c o n s t r u c t i n g p i c t u r e s are r e f l e c t e d i n t h e k i n d s o f p i c t u r e s t h a t a r e produced. These s t u d i e s demonstrate t h e complexity o f p i c t u r e s and t h e k i n d s o f i n f o r m a t i o n they may i n v o l v e . A l l o f t h e s e s t u d i e s b r i n g i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e s e g r e g a t i o n o f symbol systems i n t e r m s o f t h e way i n which t h e y o r g a n i z e and p r e s e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . The f i n d i n g s o f t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e troublesome f o r any a t t e m p t a t a g e n e r i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n terms o f p i c t o r i a l symbols. I n a l l o f t h e s t u d i e s t h e c h i l d r e n ' s r e s p o n s e s t o drawing were markedly d i f f e r e n t from t h e i r r e s p o n s e s t o photography. C l a s s i f y i n g both drawing and photography as two t y p e s o f p i c t o r i a l symbols c o u l d n o t a c c o u n t f o r t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r e is no c l e a r c r i t e r i o n f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g drawing and photography as two d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f symbols. Both are two-dimensional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Ana w n i l e drawing and photography do d i f f e r i n t h e k i n d o f d e t a i l and realism t h e y p r e s e n t , t h i s i s n o t a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e . Any drawing may be more o r l e s s d e t a i l e d o r r e a l i s t i c , and t h e same is t r u e of any photograph. The o n l y fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between t h e s e two p i c t o r i a l forms i s t h e f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s involved i n t h e i r c o n s t r u c t i o n . The p r o c e s s o f drawing is d i s t i n c t from t h e p r o c e s s o f t a k i n g a photograph, and t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i m p o r t a n t , n o t o n l y

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when producing s u c h p i c t u r e s b u t a l s o when i n t e r p r e t i n g and u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i r meaning. These s t u d i e s a l s o demonstrate t h e complexity o f t h e ways c h i l d r e n can r e l a t e t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s e n t e d i n p i c t u r e s . These s t u d i e s b r i n g i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f symbolic competence a s a way o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r changes and v a r i a t i o n s i n symbolic meaning. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o understand the v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e c h i l d r e n ' s responses t o e i t h e r t h e drawing o r photography t a s k s i n terms of d i f f e r e n c e s i n l e v e l s o f symbolic competence. The c h i l d r e n ' s competence w i t h p i c t o r i a l symbols v a r i e d n o t o n l y between t h e i r u s e o f drawings and photographs b u t a l s o a c r o s s t h e d i f f e r e n t t a s k s t h a t were used i n t h e v a r i o u s s t u d i e s . C h i l d r e n ' s competence with photography, f o r example, depends on what t a s k is b e i n g performed. While v e r y young c h i l d r e n can e a s i l y r e c o g n i z e and d e s c r i b e what i s d e p i c t e d i n a photograph, t h r e e - and four-year-olds have d i f f i c u l t y i m i t a t i n g a c t i o n s d e p i c t e d i n photographs. And while six-year-old c h i l d r e n can a c c u r a t e l y i m i t a t e a c t i o n s d e p i c t e d i n photographs, t h e y have d i f f i c u l t y e v a l u a t i n g t h e accuracy and t r u t h f u l n e s s o f i n f o r m a t i o n d e p i c t e d i n p h o t o g r a p h s , S p e c i f i c t a s k demands are c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o t h e k i n d s o f symbolic competence t h a t can be a c c e s s e d . However, t h e s e s t u d i e s have a l s o demonstrated t h a t t a s k d i f f i c u l t y i s p a r t l y determined by t h e symbolic media i n which i t is p r e s e n t e d . The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e c h i l d r e n ' s symbolic competence and t h e i r a b i l i t y t o perform c e r t a i n t a s k s is a t b e s t vague and hard t o d e f i n e making i t v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o make a c l e a r s t a t e m e n t about a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s l e v e l o f symbolic competence. I t a p p e a r s t h a t competence with symbols must be d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f t h e s p e c i f i c p r o c e s s e s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and production within a p a r t i c u l a r context. While t h e s e s t u d i e s s u p p o r t an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f symbols i n terms o f C a s s i r e r ' s n o t i o n o f ' f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s e s ' , such an approach is i n e s s e n c e n e g a t i v e , r e j e c t i n g c l e a r l y d e f i n e d o r g a n i z a t i o n o f meaning and t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f competence with r e g a r d t o symbols. I t a p p e a r s t h a t Cassirer's n o t i o n is b e s t d e f i n e d by t h e remoteness o f its i n t e r e s t and r e p r e s e n t s a n e s o t e r i c t o p i c o f concern. However, t h e d i f f i c u l t y i n a d o p t i n g C a s s i r e r ' s approach f o r t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t u d y o f symbols and a r t may be n o t i n t h e remoteness o f i t s i n t e r e s t b u t r a t h e r i n i t s remoteness from c u r r e n t methods and t h e o r e t i c a l languages. Methods and t h e o r i e s a r e o f t e n b e s t s u i t e d t o e x p l a i n t o p i c s o f i n t e r e s t t h a t can be d i s c u s s e d i n terms o f c l e a r l y d e f i n e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s , with s e g r e g a t e d components and s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between o r g a n i z a t i o n and s o u r c e s o f v a r i a t i o n and change i m p l i e d i n Cassirer's ' f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s ' does n o t a l l o w f o r e x p l a n a t i o n s i n s u c h terms. The most i m p o r t a n t impact o f C a s s i r e r ' s approach t o symbols and art is n o t i n it s u g g e s t i n g a new s e t o f t o p i c s and q u e s t i o n s b u t i n s u g g e s t i n g a d i f f e r e n t way o f a s k i n g t h e same q u e s t i o n s . H i s approach is n o t concerned with a s k i n g how s e g r e g a t e d systems come t o g e t h e r , t h e q u e s t i o n s concern i n s t e a d , how from t h e r i c h n e s s o f e x p e r i e n c e and a c t i o n , do systems o f meaning become s e g r e g a t e d and y e t m a i n t a i n a c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e s i m p l e s t a c t i o n . Rather t h a n anatomizing t h e symbol systems t h a t c o n s t i t u t e a r t , Cassirer's approach a s k s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t what makes such systems emerge as d i s t i n c t forms o f e x p e r i e n c e i n c u l t u r e . T h i s l i n e o f q u e s t i o n i n g i s concerned more w i t h a t t a i n i n g t h e intimate understanding of o r i g i n s r a t h e r than t h e d i s t a n t explanation of organization.10 Adopting t h i s l i n e o f q u e s t i o n i n g s u g g e s t s d i r e c t i o n s f o r s t u d y i n g symbols and a r t . C a s s i r e r ' s a c c o u n t of t h e mutual d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f symbols r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e way t h e i n t e n t i o n t o engage i n a form o f a c t i v i t y i n c o r p o r a t e s and i n t e r w e a v e s s p e c i f i c materials i n t h e c o u r s e o f c r e a t i n g o r

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i n t e r p r e t i n g a d i s t i n c t symbolic form. Few p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s have examined t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e i n t e n t i o n t o c r e a t e or i n t e r p r e t a r t . Under what c o n d i t i o n s do such i n t e n t i o n s a r i s e and how do t h e y i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n and t h e use of m a t e r i a l s a t hand? Most i m p o r t a n t l y f o r C a s s i r e r ' s p o s i t i o n , t h i s mutual d e t e r m i n a t i o n must be s t u d i e d w i t h i n t h e ' f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s ' . Symbolic meaning and t h e competence t o r e l a t e t o t h a t meaning must b e unders t o o d i n t h e c o u r s e o f s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s , as symbols a r e c o n s t r u c t e d and t r a nsformed o v e r time towards a d i s t i n c t e x t e r n a l i z e d form. These s u g g e s t i o n s require f u r t h e r evaluation. A s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r beginning s e r i o u s considera t i o n of t h e s e s u g g e s t i o n s is i n r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t they c a r r y with them a c h a l l e n g e t o e x i s t i n g methodologies and t h e o r e t i c a l languages. Meeting t h i s c h a l l e n g e w i l l depend on a n openness t o r e f l e c t on t e c h n i q u e s and ways o f t h i n k i n g t h a t have l o n g been a s a c r e d p a r t o f t h e h i s t o r y o f psychology. REFERENCE NOTES 1.

2.

The completion o f t h i s paper w a s s u p p o r t e d by g r a n t 2-02089 from t h e Research Council of R u t g e r s U n i v e r s i t y . I thank P r o f e s s o r s Melvin F e f f e r and Adrienne Harris, and P a t r i c i a Heindel and Leah Weich f o r t h e i r v e r y h e l p f u l comments. See J . Fodor, The Language of Thought ( C r o w e l l , New York, 1975, pp. 92 5 ) , f o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f p o s i t i v i s t i c p h i l o s o p h i e s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l

e x p l a n a t i o n . P o s i t i v i s m is used h e r e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e g e n e r a l t h e s i s t h a t a l l o f t h e e v e n t s d i s c u s s e d by t h e v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s are c o n s i d e r e d t o be physical events. 3.

See J . Fodor,ibid., f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o s i t i v i s t i c assumptions and r e d u c t i o n i s m . Also E . G e l l n e r , i n Legitimation of Relief (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , London, 1974, pp. 32-70), p r o v i d e s a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r o o t s o f such s t r a t e g i e s i n E m p i r i c i s t t h o u g h t t h a t have remained a s e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f s c i e n t i f i c t h o u g h t ( p p . 152-167). F i n a l l y , S. Toulmin, i n Human Understanding: The collective use and evolution o f concepts ( P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , New J e r s e y , 1 9 7 2 ) , d e s c r i b e s how similar s t r a t e g i e s have become a normative a s p e c t o f r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t .

4.

Although i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t , t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e is s u g g e s t e d by F. de S a u s s u r e i n h i s Course in Genera2 Linguistics (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1 9 6 6 ) . T h i s approach can also be s e e n i n t h e work o f C . Levi S t r a u s s ( e . g . , see S t r u c t u r a l A n a l y s i s i n L i n g u i s t i c s and Anthropology, i n : Structural Anthropology, B a s i c Books, New York, 1963, pp. 31-54) and J. P i a g e t ( s e e Structuralism, Harper Tourchbooks, 1 9 7 0 ) .

5.

This p a r t o f Goodman's argument is d i r e c t e d towards t h e p o s i t i o n s o f E . Gombrich (Art and Illusion: A study in the psychology o f pictorial representation, P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , New J e r s e y , 1961) and J.J. Gibson (see The i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n p i c t u r e s , Leonardo, 4 , 1971, 37-53)

.

6.

Most r e c e n t l y t h i s method h a s been e l a b o r a t e d i n Ways o f World Making (Hackett Publishing C o . , 1978).

7.

G a r d n e r ' s s t u d i e s of drawing are e l a b o r a t e d i n ArtfuZ Scribbles ( B a s i c Books, New York, 1 9 8 0 ) ; and a review o f work on c h i l d r e n ' s f i g u r a t i v e language can b e found i n t h e development o f f i g u r a t i v e language, w i t h E. Winner, R . Bechofer and D. Wolf, i n K. Nelson (Ed.) Children's Language:

43

The study of art and psychological explanation

Vol 1 (Gardner P r e s s , N e w York, 1978). The work t h a t i s p r e s e n t e d is i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n with D. Wolf and A. Smith. An e a r l i e r p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s material can b e found i n , S t y l e s of achievement i n e a r l y symbol u s e , with J.M. S h o t w e l l and D. Wolf, i n M.L. F o s t e r and S.H. Brandes ( E d s . ) Symbol a s Sense (Academic Press, New York, 1980!. Thjs work Wac conducted under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f Harry B e i l i n a t t h e Graduate School and u n i v e r s i t y C e n t e r o f t h e C i t y U n i v e r s i t y of New York. A more e x t e n s i v e review can he found i n H. B e i l i n , DeveZopment of Photographic Comprehension, A r t Education. S p e c i a l I s s u e : A r t and Mind, 1983.

10. This argument was r e c e n t l y made by J . Glock i n a d i s c u s s i o n o f W e r n e r ' s Organismic Theory. See P i a g e t , Vygotsky and Werner, i n S. Wapner, and B. Kaplan ( E d s . ) HoZistic Developmental Psychology (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., New J e r s e y , i n p r e s s ) . REFERENCES Arnheim, R . (1966 California Press. Arnheim, R . Press.

(1969

. Towards . Visual

a psychology o f a r t .

Thinking.

California: University of

California: University of California

Berlyne, D.E. ( 1 9 7 1 ) . A e s t h e t i c s and Psychobiology. Century-Crofts.

New York: Appleton-

Berlyne, D.E. ( 1 9 7 4 ) . S t u d i e s i n t h e new e x p e r i m e n t a l a e s t h e t i c s : S t e p s towards an o b j e c t i v e psychology o f a e s t h e t i c a p p r e c i a t i o n . N e w York: Wiley. Black, M. ( 1 9 7 1 ) . Review a r t i c l e : L i n g u i s t i c I n q u i r y , 2 , 515-538.

The s t r u c t u r e o f symbol systems.

Cassirer, E . ( 1 9 4 4 ) . An Essay on Man. University Press.

N e w Haven, C o n n e c t i c u t : Yale

Cassirer, E . ( 1 9 5 5 ) . The Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms. Haven, C o n n e c t i c u t : Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press.

Volume 1.

New

C a s s i r e r , E . ( 1 9 5 7 ) . The Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms. Volume 3 . Haven, C o n n e c t i c u t : Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press.

New

Cassirer, E . ( 1 9 6 9 ) . Mythic a e s t h e t i c s and t h e o r e t i c a l space. 2 , 3-17.

Man and World,

Cassirer, E . ( 1 9 7 9 ) . The e d u c a t i o n a l v a l u e of a r t . I n : D.P. Verene ( E d . ) , Symbol, Myth and C u l t u r e : Essays and L e c t u r e s o f E r n s t Cassirer 1935-1945. N e w Haven, Connecticut: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s . Fechner, G.T.

( 1 8 7 6 ) . Vorschule d e r A s t h e t i k .

L e i p z i g : B r e i t k o p f and Hartel.

Freud, S. ( 1 9 6 4 ) . Leonard0 da Vinci and a memory o f h i s childhood. York: Norton P u b l i s h i n g .

New

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Gardner, H. (1982). Art, Mind and Brain: New York: Basic Books.

A Cognitive Approach to Creativity.

Goodman, N. (1965). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Bobbs-Merrill. Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of Art.

Indianapolis, Indiana:

Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill.

Goodman, N. (1972). A world of individuals. In: N. Goodman (Ed.) Problems and Projects. Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill. Kose, G. (1983). Children's conceptions of spatial relationships in drawings and photographs. Paper presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meetings, Montreal, Canada. Kose, H., Beilin, H., and O'Connor, J. (1983). Chiljren's comprehension of actions depicted in photographs. Developmental Psychology, 19, 636-643. Langer, S . (1953). Feeling and Form.

New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Margolis, J. (1970). Numerical identity and reference in the arts. Journal of Aesthetics, 10, 138-146.

British

Morgan, D.N. (1951). Psychology and art today: A summary and critique. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Critjcism, 9, 181-196. Munro, T. (1948). Aesthetics as science: Its development in America. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 6, 225-235. Munro, T. (1951). Methods in the psychology of art. and Art Criticism, 9, 161-207.

Journal of Aesthetics

O'Connor, J., Beilin, H. and Kose, G. (1981). Children's belief in photographic fidelity. Developmental Psychology, 17, 859-865. Ogden, R.M. (1938). The Psychology of Art. Sons.

New York: Charles Scribner's

Savile, A. (1971). Nelson Goodman's 'Languages of Art': A study. British Journal of Aesthetics, '2, 3-27. Seidman, S. and Beilin, H. (in press). Effects of media on picturing by children and adults. Developmental Psychology. Verene, D.P. (1979). Symbol, Myth and Culture: Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer, 1935-1945. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Wollheim, R . (1974a). Freud and the understanding of art. In: R . Wollheim (Ed.) Art and Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Wollheim, R. (1974b). Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art. In: R. Ldollheim (Ed.) Art and Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art W.R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1984

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE TRADITIONS

45

OF SYMBOLIZATION

William E. Smythe University of Toronto

The phenomenon of symbolization has been a matter of persistent concern for the student of aesthetics. A proper understanding of the nature and function of sylnbirls would obviously be of great benefit for aesthetic inquiry in general and for pSyCholOgiCal aesthetics in particular. However the notion of symbol has a much broader significance for psychology than this. Indeed there has long been a close relation between psychological theories and theories of symbols. Such diverse traditions as behaviourism, psychoanalysis, and modern computational or information processing psychology can each be seen to adopt or endorse a particular view of symbolization. Early behaviourism, for example, readily accepted the idea of grounding all of symbolic behaviour on the notions of 'sign' and ' s gnalling' system, as developed in the then fledgling science of semiotics. A notable instance o f this is Pavlov's (1927) description of language as a second signalling system'. Many early semioticians for their own part, in particular Morris (1938,1 9 4 6 ) , had a distinct interest in the psychological theories of the behaviourists as a way of grounding their own enterprise. Psychoanalysis borrowed from a quite different tradition in the study of symbols. This tradition, emphasizing mythological and metaphoric aspects of symbolization, has enjoyed a long history in the study of artistic, literary, and religiou-, symbolism. It well suited the psychoanalyst's task of attempting to capture the latent, psychodynamic forms of symbolization so characteristic of mental life. Finally, modern computational psychology has inheritied its notion of symbol from a much more recent source. This notion, which construes symbolization purely formal1.y in terms of rules for the manipulation of meaningless tokens, has received great impetus from the profound developments in the study of formal logic and the theory of computation that have taken place mostly within the present century. In this way, modern computational models of mental processes owe a substantial debt to the work of mathematicians and logicians such as Church and Turing. Throughout all of this work, i t has become evident that the concerns of psychological theory and of the theory of symbolization have never been far apart. These three views of the psychology of symbols -- the behaviourist, the psychoanalytic, and the computational -- would be of little more than historical interest were it not the case that each one is still very much alive, if often in modified form, in contemporary psychology. Their mutual and harmonious coexistence is by no means a foregone conclusion however. In this chapter, the prospects for such a coexistence are examined in light of the statements of some prominent exemplars of each view in modern psychology. An inquiry of this kind should help to assess the existing prospects for a unified psychology of the symbol, a matter of no small importance for

psychological aesthetics in particular, and for psychological theory in general. THREE KINDS OF SYMBOL SYSTEM Each of the views of symbolization here examined is associated with a particular notion of symbol system now current in the psychological literature. The three have been called 'conventional','physical',and 'mythopoetic' symbol systems. Before proceeding to examine each one in turn, it will be useful to identify the basic topic of this discussion in a very general way. The term 'symbol' may be taken very broadly to mean anything that refers, represents, or otherwise expresses or embodies meaning. Despite a considerable divergence of opinion on just what reference, representation, expression, and indeed meaning amount to, this definition may be taken to be generally accepted. Particular approaches to symbolization begin to diverge from one another only after some further qualification or constraint upon this definition is ventured. F o r example, a contrast commonly drawn in earlier writings on the topic

distinguishes symbols from signs as kinds of referring object (Cassirer, 1944; Langer, 1942) or, taking 'sign' as the more generic term, contrasted 'symbolic signs' with 'indexical signs' (Morris, 1938; Peirce, 1955). This contrast was seldom consistently drawn among different authors, although generally it was supposed that signs or indices were highly particular, being related to their referents either casually, materially, or automatically -- in a word, they were 'concretized',as opposed to symbols which were more arbitrary, deliberative, or conventional -- in a word, 'systematized'. A sign or index such as a deer track, for instance, obviously signifies the passing of a particular animal in a very different way than the linguistic symbol 'deer' refers to it. However the distinction breaks down once it is appreciated that neither systematization nor concretization can ever be wholly absent from any form of signification. For example, some system presumably underlies the experienced tracker's command of his craft; whereas, conversely, linguistic symbols can be derivative from more 'concretized' modes of signification, as etymological studies often show. More recent terminological practice is consistent with taking 'symbol' rather than 'sign' as the more generic term and, rather than classifying different kinds of signifying objects into disjoint categories, identifies instead the different (frequently overlapping) functions that symbols may subserve, such as indicating, naming, classifying, and so on. An important initial observation is that no object is itself intrinsically a sign or symbol of anything. Rather, symbolization or signification is always relative to some principle of interpretation, the form of a fixed relation, as in the case of more 'indexical' symbols, or as an arbitrary rule in the case of more 'conventionalized' symbols, this third element is truly omnipresent in symbolic situations. Conventional Symbol Systems The study of symbolic phenomena from the point of view of conventional symbol systems, takes interpretants to be expressible as conventionally agreed upon rules. On this approach, symbol or sign is to be defined, as in the account of the modern semiotician Eco (1976), as everything that, on thegroundsof a previously established social convention, can be taken as something standing f o r something alse' (p.16). On this view, there are, then, no perfectly solitary, isolated acts of symbolization; in using

Traditionsof symbolization

41

symbols one always has some potential recipient of a message in mind with whom one is linked by means of some system of shared conventions, even if this recipient is only oneself on a later occasion, and the 'shared' conventions a mere mnemonic device. Thus an isolated Robinson Crusoe who finds the world in a grain of sand is not, on this view, behaving symbolically unless he has worked out some code by means of which to transmit his vision to another. Neither would symbolization, in this sense, be implicated in the recent case of another man who reportedly converses with a stone in hope of communing with eternity (Powell, 1982) for, as Eco insists, 'a single use of the stone is not culture' (p.24). It is not necessary in this account that there be an actual recipient of a message, only that a means be provided, through the device of a code, for its possible receipt. Thus symbolic communication, or at least the receipt of codes, is held to be a methodological rather than empirical condition on the existence of symbolization or signification (Eco, 1976). The methodological strictures of this program, with all its emphasis on the consensually observable and conventionally codable, have much in common with those of radical behaviourism so it is not surprising to find historical connections between the two as earlier noted in the writings of Pavlov and Morris. More recently psychologists have turned to the study of conventional symbolization for quite different reasons. The work of Bates, a developmental psychologist and cognitive theorist, is particularly exemplary of some recent trends. Bates (1979) and her colleagues have taken up the study of the development of conventional symbolization in children; and the notions of intention and convention figure prominently in her research programme, as in the work of semioticians. It will be recalled that Eco's definition of significance required not just that a symbol be governed by convention, but that it be 'taken' (i.e., intentionally) as such. Bates defines conventions as 'sounds or gestures whose form and function are agreed upon and recognized' (p.36) by some community and a symbol as an object 'that is related to its referent only through the conventions agreed upon by a community of users' (p.48). Intentional communication is then defined as 'signalling behavior in which the sender is aware a priori of the effect that a signal will have on his listener' (p.36). Intentional signalling of this conventionalized sort constitutes what Bates calls the 'first moment' in the development of human symbolic capabilities. The second moment is described as 'the emergence of symbols and the discovery that things have names' (p.33). This is said to involve some means for 'objectification' of the symbol-referent relation, such that symbols can now be considered apart from their pragmatic role in communicating intentions and desires. The child at this stage might be said to have some grasp of what it means, abstractly and independently of any practical aim, for one thing to 'stand for' another; and this, for Bates, involves the child 'realizing that the vehicle (i.e., the symbol) can be substituted for its referent for certain purposes, at the same time realizing that the symbol is not the same thing as its referent' (p.38). A classic instance of the dawn of this second moment of symbolic awareness was noted by Helen Keller's teacher Mrs. Sullivan when she reported that 'Helen has taken the second great step in her education. She has learned that everything has a name, and t h a t t h e alphabet i s t h e key t o everything she wants t o know' (Keller, 1904, p. 315).

...

In describing and accounting for the process of objectification that mediates

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ME. Smythe

the traversal from the first to the second moments of symbolic competence Bates does not, however, fully subscribe to Eco's methodological condition on symbolization for, in her view: Symbolic activity includes symbolic communication. However, symbolic activity may also include some private and often idiosyncratic behaviors A complete situation of symbol use involves not two but four parts: the objpctive, observable vehicle and its real world referent, and the subjective, psychological vehicle and its mental referent.(pp. 43-46)

...

As an example, Bates cites the case of a child representing a spoon by means

of his own stirring action. In this case, the objective symbolic value is taken as the conventionally recognized stirring motion that the child's own action the subjective vehicle -- aims to imitate; and the objective referent is an instance from the conventional category of objects called 'spoons', for which 'the entire complex of potential interactions with spoons in the child's repertoire, the "action package'' that comprises the child's knowledge of spoons' (p.55) is the subjective referent. To acquire a symbol system, on this vie, , is to make the appropriate match of one's subjective symbolic vehicleb and referents with their objective counterparts.

--

Bates' (1979) approach, like the research programs of Werner and Kaplan (1963) and Piaget (1962) which were its precursors, leads one to search for various patterns of family resemblance among processes such as vocalizing, gesturing, imitation, tool use, and manipulative play. Each of these may be said to involve in its own way a certain degree of communicative intention and convention, Indeed various specific relationships in the ontological development of each kind of the acquisition of the capacity for manipulating conventional symbols can be separated out from more general factors like overall intellectual development. Conventional symbolization in this way stands out as a distinct psychological phenomenon. Physical Symbol Systems A notion that at first seem to have much in common with the idea of

conventional symbol systems, but is actually quite distinct from it, is the concept of 'physical symbol systems'. The term comes from the work of Newell and Simon (cf. Newell, 1980; Newell and Simon, 19761, who summarize the notion in the following way: A physical symbol system consists of a set of entities, called symbols, which are physical patterns that can occur as components of another type of entity called an expression (or symbol structure) A physical symbol system is a machine that produces through time an evolving collection of symbol structures.(Newell and Simon, 1976, p.116)

...

The paradigmatic instance of such a machine in contemporary culture is, of course, the digital computer. Digital computers are sometimes described as 'universal machines', in recognition of their capacity to simulate any well defined input/output function. One outcome of the profound modern developments in formal logic and the theory of computation as realized in the work of Church, Turing and others, is an exact mathematical account of what universality, in this sense, amounts to. In more pragmatic terms, it entails the theoretical sufficiency of a small and well defined set of basic operations to compose any arbitrary calculation. Typically included are

49

Traditioris of symbolization

those operations, familiar from computer programming, such as assigning a symbol to an expression; copying an expression; writing it onto or reading it from some storage medium; controlling the sequence o f operations conditionally, as with expressions in the form 'IF THEN . . . I ; quoting an expression so that it may be treated as data, and so on.

...

Newell (1980)goes on to make the strong claim that Symbol Systems a r e u n i versal machines (p.154). He explains what he means by this assertion in the following way: We do not have an independent notion of a symbol system that is precise enough to counterpoise to a universal machine, and thus subsequently prove their equivalence. Instead, we have discovered that universal machines always contain within them a particular notion of symbol and symbolic behavior, and that this notion provides u s for the first time with an adequate abstract characterization of what a symbol system should be. Thus, tautologically, the notion of symbol system, which we have here called physicaZ symboZ systems is universal. (P. 155) However, even lacking an independent characterization of symbol systems at the level of precision that Newell demands, a number of important differences between physical and conventional symbol systems are readily apparent. As an example, consider how reference might be thought to be secured for the symbols of a physical symbol system. Newell (1980) accounts for it as a kind of composite of a more primitive relation called 'designation', that is defined as follows: Designation: An entity X designates an entity Y relative to a process P, if, when P takes X as input, its behavior depends on Y.(p.156) It is further proposed that designation be transitive, such that 'if X designates Y and Y designates 2 , then X designates 2 ' (p.157). Moreover, any symbol that aims to designate something in the environment external to the machine must do so by means of designating, in the right way, an 'interface' operation such as imputing a datum or commanding an action. Thus the designation of an external object -- 'external designation', as it might be called -- is typically a two-step process in which a symbol designates one or more of a limited set of interface operators which then directly designate the object in question. External designation may thus be said to presuppose and derive from 'internal designation' -- the designation of one symbol or expression by another; for as Newell would have it, 'the prototype symbolic relation is that of access from a symbol to an expression, not that of naming an external object' (p.169). It is important to note, however, that external designation is entirely constrained by the machine's intrinsic capabilities for receiving signals from and acting upon its environment. One is here reminded of Bates' (1979) 'potential spoon interactions', the subjective component of the child's reference to the class of spoons. For, just as the child's immediate knowledge of spoons is for Bates constituted by the total 'action package' of spoon-related behaviours in the child's repertoire, so does a physical symbol system have 'action packages' fixed by the behavioural possibilities of its set of interface operators. Moreover, this is as far as any physical symbol system can penetrate a field of reference; Bates' distinction between objective and subjective reference cannot even be formulated in the terminology of physical symbol

W.E. Smythe

systems. For all its emphasis on explicitness and physical realizability this notion of symbol systems turns out to be remarkably solopsistic. Another definition that is central to the description of physical symbol systems concerns the notion of 'interpretation'. 'Interpretation': The act of accepting as input an expression that designates a process and then performing that process. (Newell, 1980, p. 158) Again, a special role is reserved for symbols that designate 'operators' -symbols that, in Newell's description, 'have an external semantics wired into them' (p. 159). These would include, in addition to the interface operators earlier mentioned, all of the directly physically realized operations internal to the system itself. It is proposed that the interpretation of any symbolic expression is then an iterative process that finally converges on a set of symbols designating such operators; in this way, it is suggested, we 'finally solve Tolman's problem of how his rats, lost in thought in their cognitive maps, could ever behave' ( p . 159). So in the same way that the physical symbol system notion of designation eliminates this distinction between objective and subjective reference, this concept of interpretation obviates the need for notions like intention and convention. For 'interpretation', rather than being specified in the usual way in terms of the shared practices of some community of intentional agents, now becomes the description of a formally-defined process. Bates' distinction between the objective and subjective components of symbolization, along with the accompanying notions of convention and intention, at least call attention to one sense in which symbolization may be said to be an achievement of mind. It is an achievement to the extent that it requires of an individual the acquisition, by some means o r other, of a set of cultural objects conventionally taken as standing for something else. From the standpoint of physical symbol systems, symbolization is rather a 'given' of mind. It is not, that is to say, 'acquired' in any way, but is rather the prerequisite of a certain kind of system being able to exhibit any significant behaviour whatsoever. A physical symbol system, as a machine, has its symbols in virtue of its structure as a machine, and not because of any membership in a larger community of intentional agents. It rather comprises, from the outset, an 'unintentional community' unto itself. Mythopoetic Symbol Systems Yet a third conception of symbol system is familiar to psychologists from psychoanalytic (and particularly Jungian) theory; and has, apart from its influence in psychology, enjoyed a long tradition in the study of cultures, myths, and art forms. On this conception, as Howard (1980)characterizes it, symbolism is viewed as having to do exclusively with 'the metaphorical and allegorical, the esoteric, hidden, latent, deeper, more general, o r recondite significance of things' (p. 503). A symbol, that is to say, is whatever bears some sort of 'mysterious' relation to its meaning, as if the basic relation between any referring object and its referent were not already mysterious enough. Whatever else may be concluded about the status of this notion of symbol system in contemporary psychology, it is the only one of the three here surveyed to have, in any significant way, captured the popular imagination. It is also the most difficult of them to define. Kaplan (1979), among the most recent of contemporary psychologists to have written from this perspective, makes the following attempt at a

Traditions of symbolization

51

definition:

I would like to urge that we take symbolization as referring principally to the attempts to use some medium to represent something -- some experiential content -- that is not tangible or visible to the subject. I am suggesting, then, that the prime form of symbolization occurs when abstract intangible s t a t e s of affairs are realized in a concrete medium. (p 220

.

The symbolic attitude engendered by such attempts is dubbed, by Kaplan, the 'mythopoetic' attitude. An example of what Kaplan here intends is the kind of symbolic play we engage in when pondering such 'nonsense' questions as: 'If Emerson were a kind of plant, what kind would he be?' The question is literally nonsense, although its literal reading may only be the surface manifestation of a deeper inquiry. This same sense of surface incongruity together with a deeper significance pervades talk of what is called mental and spiritual life. How else are we to take such literally puzzling expressions as 'grasping an idea', 'being struck by an impulse', the 'unity in trinity' of Christianity, or, from Zen Buddhism, 'the sound of one hand clapping'? These examples help to illustrate just how the mythopoetic conception of symbolization differs from the other two conceptions. It cannot be said, in respect of any of these expressions, that they are simply labels or descriptions for what is otherwise readily and independently available through other designatory means. They are in this way fundamentally distinct from Bates' conventional symbols, which are just labels for what is available through pre-formed action-packages like 'potential spoon interactions', and from Newell's physical symbols which refer by designating fixed interface operators. Rather one woiil6 say that what is 'meant' in mythopoetic contexts is part and parcel of its symbolic expression, and not an independently ascertainable, specifiable 'somethinq else'. As Kaplan puts it, 'there is no clear indication of a 'something else' but rather an embodiment or incarnation of certain intangibilia in material form' (p.225). On the mythopoetic conception, symbols may be characterized in one way as 'Janus-faced', as mediators 'between the domains of the spiritual or mental and the physical or corporeal' (Kaplan, 1979, p.226), or as another account would have it, 'between objective and subjective realities' (Chebat, 1974, p.37). The basic idea is that symbols constitute a medium of exchange between the tangible and sensible on one hand and the intangible or insensible on the other. Yet it is not lack of tangibility or sensibility per se that makes sensible qualities become as opaque to representation when considered apart from the entrenched vocabularies of symbols normally used to describe or depict them. Consider, for example, how one would undertake to describe the visual quality of 'redness' apart from the usual vocabulary of colour names or depict it in an uncoloured pictorial medium. Here is a situation ripe for the process of 'symbol formation' (Werner and Kaplan, 1963) -- the free or unconstrained invention of new ways of symbolizing or the novel usages of old ways. This is an aspect of symbolic behaviour that contemporary cognitive psychology has almost completely ignored. As Kolers and Smythe (in press) note, in surveying a number of recent cognitive proposals about mental representation, cognitive psychologists have pervasively confused the notion of representation with that of coding or categorizing. A cognitive 'theory' of representation

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W.E Smyrhe

typically begins by laying out some pre-formed domain of represented object or event-types and then considers various ways of coding or sorting them (cf. Anderson, 1976, 1978; Palmer, 1978). However, the question of how the objects or events are known in the first place, of how they are first symbolized, is never addressed. Symbol formation, then, is at the heart of mythopoetic symbolization. The essence of the mythopoetic attitude would seem to lie just in this attempt to exceed the bounds of habitual or conventional symbolization. If mastery of a conventional symbol system involves careful compliance with a previously established set of constraints, mythopoetic mastery must be said to involve their selective violation. In this way mythopoetic symbol systems presuppose but are not determined by conventional symbol systems; indeed the propriety of even speaking of a 'system' in respect to mythopoetic symbolization is open to question. Kaplan (1979) attempts to capture mythopoetic phenomena, not by appeal to any kind of system but, like Bates (1979), in terms of their principal 'moments' in psychological development. Kaplan refers to three such distinct moments as 'the embodiment of meanings in objects, the imaginative transformation of objects, (and) the externalization of thoughts and feelings at a remove from the pragmatic-utilitarian world of everyday occurrence' (p.224). The first of these moments -- 'the embodiment of meanings' -- would presumably coincide with the child's general apprehension of significance in objects and events around him, without his yet making a distinction between the 'pragmatic-utilitarian' significance of things and their 'mythological' significance; the second moment -- 'imaginative transformation' would be achieved once the child has access to such a distinction, and some ability to selectively shift his attention from one to the other side of it; the third moment -- 'externalization' -- implies some degree of freedom in making imaginative transformation, such that both the pragmatic and mythological significance of a thing are concurrently available to the child, even when only one aspect is being actively entertained. The dawning of the first of these moments is obviously quite early in development, if not largely present at birth. Achievement of the second but not the third moment would, for example, be implicated in the frequently noted cases of children who, after summoning up some phantom from their own imagination, then have difficulty making it disappear. The third moment would be characteristic of ordinary adult competence in the mythopoetic sphere. The contrast between the mythopoetic and pragmatic-utilitarian stances, each taken phenomenologically as a form of 'being in the world', is then central to Kaplan's account. The principal aim of a theory of symbolization on this view, would be to account for the emergence of the former against the background of the latter. For Kaplan, this is to be understood, not in terms of rules and coded conventions, but as a form of 'dynamic schematizing activity' which is manifest in the body of the symbolizer, not in terms of an overt action observable to another, but as an 'internal gesture' experienced by the symbolizer himself. TOWARI? A UNIFIED APPROACH TO SYMBOLIZATION In the notions of conventional, physical, and mythopoetic symbol system we have, then, three quite distinct proposals about the nature of symbolization. A unified theory of symbols of sufficient breadth of scope would do well to incorporate features of all three, showing how they all interrelate. How is this to be achieved?

Traditions of symbolization

53

The 'Central Dogma' of the Cognitive Sciences There is an implicit dogma at work in much of the contemporary study of cognition that presumes at least a sketch of an answer. The dogma is in two parts. The first part supposes that physical symbol systems in some sense underlie or explain people's use of conventional symbol systems. Newell (1980)puts this supposition in the form of an explicit hypothesis when, in speaking of physical symbols, he asserts: It is a hypothesis that these symbols are in fact the same symbols that we humans have and use everyday of our lives. Stated another way, the hypothesis is that humans are instances of physical symbol systems, and, by virtue of this, mind enters into the physical universe (p. 136). The analogy between this 'physical symbol system hypothesis', as it is called, and Crick's'central dogma of modern biology' is, for Newell, quite intentional. He goes on to say that: this hypothesis sets the terms on which we search for a scientific theory of mind the physical symbol system is to o u r enterprise what the theory of evolution is to all biology, the cell doctrine to cellular biology, the notion of germs to the scientific concept of disease, the notion of tectonic plates to structural geology (p. 136).

...

The physical symbol system hypothesis would appear to enjoy wide, if largely tacit, acceptance among modern cognitive psychologists. Bates (1979) gives her own endorsement of it in declaring, as her main task, the discovery of 'some s o r t of software package, a "ProPam" than an i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d or a d u l t "has", which p e r m i t s generation of be!iaviors t h a t a r e e x t e r n a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e a s " l i n g u i s t i c " , " c o g n i t i v e " , or " s o c i a l " ' ( p . 6). For example, a child's subjective symbolic vehicles and reference with respect to spoons would be taken as the surface expression of an underlying 'spoon program' (p. 55). If the first part of the central dogma thus constitutes a kind of working hypothesis for psychologists in the modern cognitive tradition, the second part may be seen to have much the same function in anthropological and linguistic studies in the semiotic tradition. This part of the dogma supposes that mythopoetic symbolization can be fully accounted for as the rule-governed meta-symbolic use of conventional symbols -- that is, in terms of rules that govern symbols that refer to other symbols. Suppose for example that, in response to the 'nonsense query' earlier posed about Emerson, I was to say that I find Emerson like an ivy plant. This might be taken to mean that I find Emerson rambling but enduring and majestic, or something of the sort. One way of describing this sample of symbolic behaviour is as making use of a linguistic symbol ( S ) denotingan object, in this case an ivy plant, that itself taken as a symbol ( S ) , expresses certain qualities like, for instance, excursivity, durability and majesty. This, in any case, is the kind of account that Howard (1980), following the approach of Goodman (1968, 1978), would recommend. Howard makes his case with the aid of a number of other less idiosyncratic examples. The central dogma takes this approach one step further in supposing that these meta-symbolic expressions can be fully encompassed by a closed system of rules. As Sperber (1975)characterizes this claim, it is 'to assert

s i m p l y t h a t t o e a c h ( m y t h o p o e t i c ) symbol c o r r e s p o n d s a f i x e d s e t o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , t h a t t o e a c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s a f i x e d s e t of symbols o r , i n o t h e r t e r m s , t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r o c c u r r e n c e o f a symbol s e l e c t s c e r t a i n p a i r s ( s y m b o l , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) among a s e t d e f i n e d i n t h e v e r y s t r u c t u r e o f s y m b o l i s m ' ( p . 1 5 ) . Thus, f o r e x a m p l e , o n e would b e l e d t o p o s t u l a t e a g e n e r a t i v e s y s t e m o f r u l e s o u t o f which my m e t a p h o r from w i t h i n a g i v e n c u l t u r a l or l i n g u i s t i c community, c o u l d b e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e r i v e d . Note how w e l l t h i s s e c o n d p a r t of t h e dogma s q u a r e s w i t h t h e f i r s t p a r t . M e t a - s y m b o l i z a t i o n i s n o t o n l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m s b u t , g i v e n t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f o n e symbol by a n o t h e r a s t h e p r i m a r y s y m b o l i c r e l a t i o n i n s u c h s y s t e m s , must e v e n b e viewed as a b a s i c f u n c t i o n o f them. A p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m a c c o u n t of phenomena l i k e m e t a p h o r would t h e n be p r e d i c t e d on t h e s i m p l e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s y m b o l s , l i k e a n y o t h e r k i n d r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n a p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m , are a m e n a b l e t o t h e p e r v a s i v e o p e r a t i o n of q u o t a t i o n . P r o b l e m s w i t h t h e C e n t r a l Dogma The c e n t r a l dogma o f t h e c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e s i s , t h e n , a c o m p e l l i n g and i n f l u e n t i a l o n e . I t i s i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p a r e n t , h o w e v e r , t h a t i t may a l s o be fundamentally mistaken. The dogma is a s s e v e r e l y f l a w e d i n b o t h i t s a s p e c t s . We t u r n f i r s t t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m h y p o t h e s i s , t h e view t h a t t h e f u l l r a n g e of human s y m b o l i c phenomena c a n b e accommodated w i t h i n a n d e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m s . As a n i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p a l w e a k n e s s e s of t h i s p r o g r a m , w e r e t u r n t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m a c c o u n t o f s y m b o l i c r e f e r e n c e . As p o i n t e d o u t e a r l i e r , r e f e r e n c e is t h o u g h t t o be s e c u r e d f o r t h e symbols o f a p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m by means o f e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n , where a t o k e n o r symbol i n s t a n c e s o d e s i g n a t e s a n e x t e r n a l o b j e c t r e l a t i v e t o some p r o c e s s i f , g i v e n t h e t o k e n , t h e p r o c e s s t h e n b e h a v e s i n a way t h a t d e p e n d s on t h e o b j e c t , I t h a s a l s o b e e n n o t e d t h a t e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n , f i x e d as i t is by t h e c a u s a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a g i v e n machine, l a c k s a l l t h e p u b l i c , consensual a s p e c t s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e u s e o f c o n v e n t i o n a l symbol s y s t e m s . More p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t c a n be shown t h a t e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n i s n e i t h e r a n e c e s s a r y n o r a s u f f i c i e n t condition of symbolic r e f e r e n c e i n t h e ordinary sense. E x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n or r e f e r e n c e , b e c a u s e t h e r e a r e many ways i n which i t s d e f i n i n g c o n d i t i o n s c a n b e s a t i s f i e d w i t h o u t i m p l i c a t i n g r e f e r e n c e a s n o r m a l l y u n d e r s t o o d . Someone t u r n s t h e t h e r m o s t a t down i n a room, f o r i n s t a n c e , a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y my t e e t h b e g i n t o c h a t t e r . One c o u l d presumably c h a r t t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l e v e n t s u n d e r l y i n g t h i s p r o c e s s a l l t h e way from t h e i m m e d i a t e r e s p o n s e o f t e m p e r a t u r e s e n s i t i v e c e l l s i n t h e s k i n t o t h e f i n a l e x e c u t i o n o f t h e r e s p o n s e o f t e e t h c h a t t e r i n g i n t h e mouth. The a c t i v i t y of t h e t e m p e r a t u r e s e n s i t i v e c e l l s c o u l d t h e n b e viewed as a k i n d o f ' t o k e n ' a c t i v a t i n g b e h a v i o u r , i n t h e form of t e e t h c h a t t e r i n g , t h a t is c l e a r l y d e p e n d e n t upon t h e a m b i e n t t e m p e r a t u r e . Yet, f o r a l l t h i s , t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e s e c e l l s d o e s n o t r e f e r nor d o e s i t h a v e d e m a n t i c p r o p e r t i e s i n a n y t h i n g l i k e t h e way t h a t my u t t e r a n c e ' I t i s c o l d i n h e r e ! ' d o e s . I do n o t , i n v i r t u e o f a r e f l e x l i k e c h a t t e r i n g t e e t h i n response t o c o l d , r e f e r t o anything. External designation is also n o t s t r i c t l y necessary f o r reference. I am c o n f i d e n t , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t my u s e of t h e name ' G e n g h i s Khan' r e f e r s t o a n a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l t h o u g h , t h a n k f u l l y , I am i n no p o s i t i o n t o h a v e my b e h a v i o u r depend ( i n a n y d i r e c t way) upon him. T h e r e a r e ways of amending t h o d e f i n i t i o n o f e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n t o f o r g e

Traditions of synibolizurion

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a better correspondence with the requirements of reference. However none of these bodes well f o r the physical symbol system hypothesis. For instance it might seem that external designation could be made a sufficient condition of reference if construed not only relative to a process, but to an entire physical symbol system. In this way one might insist that not all but only certaln causal contingencies among events, namely those constitutive of the functioning of the system in question, are constitutive also of designation; examples like the teeth chattering reflex might be thought to be excluded as symbolic behaviour therapy. The difficulty is in specifying just what these certain kinds of contingencies are. All of the formal apparatus of the theory of universal machines is of surprisingly little help in this regard; for the notion of a universal or Turing machine is so encompassing and non-specific as to include all sorts of perfectly ordinary (non-symbol using) systems under, of course, an appropriate description. F o r example, the physiological details underlying the teeth chattering reflex are probably complex enough, at some level of description, to have some sort of structural correspondence with a Turing machine, even if the chattering of teeth turns out to be a rather uninteresting computation in such a system. Indeed, any suitably complex system may have any number of alternative mappings onto formally distinct universal machines. Proponents of computational theories characteristically require that cognitive behaviour be understood uniquely in terms of rules and representations (cf. Chomsky, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1980). This sort of account cannot be based merely on the possibility of establishing an arbitrary mapping relation between the nervous system and some universal machine, however. Rather, such an account already presupposes the propriety Of One such mapping, moreover an interpreted one; for with any suitably complex system, it is entirely possible that mappings may be found onto distinct universal machines embodying mutually contradictory sets of rules. To speak of 'rules'and'representations' in such a situation is to preferentially select one of the these mappings to the exclusion of the others, What is characteristically missing from computational theories of mental processes is the guiding principle for this selection; and if this can be supplied in terms of the intrinsic structure of the system being modelled, then it must be a matter of the extrinsic attribution of significance to it. This, at least, is the conclusion of two recent authors who have pondered the semantics of computational theories in some detail. Heil (1981) makes his case by citing, as a general principle, the impossibility of any formal system containing within its intrinsic structure, no matter how detailed, its own rules of interpretation. At the outset of this chapter, it was pointed out that no object is intrinsically a symbol for something else. Indeed an essential feature of the notion of symbol on any view is that anything can be used to refer to anything else. If this feature is a truly general one, it would mean that any symbol instance, considered only with respect to its own intrinsic structure is, qua symbol, essentially ambiguous; and this is just what Heil's principle affirms. One can imagine various ways of augmenting the intrinsic structure of a symbol token with elements that encode rules of interpretation, but these latter must still themselves be interpreted, and so the essential ambiguity from structure to interpretation remains. Neither, as Heil goes on to show, can 'structural isomorphism' be appealed to as an independent representational principle. Rather, he concludes that interpretation 'is obtained only when the structure is used by some agent against a suitable linguistic background' (p. 333).

Smith ( 1 9 8 2 ) t a k e s t h i s argument a s t e p f u r t h e r i n s u g g e s t i n g t h a t such e x t r i n s i c s e m a n t i c a t t r i b u t i o n is e s s e n t i a l t o t h e v e r y n o t i o n of c o m p u t a t i o n i t s e l f . S m i t h s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of a d e v i c e a s a computer is a l r e a d y i n t h e domain o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o f u n i n t e r p r e t e d m e c h a n i c a l p r o c e s s e s . If c o m p u t a t i o n a l d e v i c e s were t o b e d e s c r i b e d j u s t as complex r u l e - g o v e r n e d a r t i f a c t s , t h e r e would b e n o p r i n c i p l e by means of which t o d i s t i n g u i s h them from t h i n g s l i k e steam e n g i n e s and food p r o c e s s o r s . However a f o o d p r o c e s s o r , e v e n o n e w i t h a micro-programmed c h i p , i s s t i l l j u s t a d e v i c e f o r t r a n s f o r m i n g e d i b l e m a t e r i a l ; w h e r e a s a c o m p u t e r i s n o t , i n t h e same way, j u s t a d e v i c e f o r transforming e l e c t r i c a l impulses. To s p e a k of a d e v i c e a s a 'number c r u n c h e r ' , a 'word p r o c e s s o r ' or, more g e n e r a l l y , as a ' f o r m a l symbol m a n i p u l a t o r ' , is t o i m p u t e t o i t o p e r a t i o n s d e f i n e d o n a l r e a d y i n t e r p r e t e d e n t i t i e s , t h a t is t o s a y on ' n u m b e r s ' , ' w o r d s ' , and ' s y m b o l s ' . T h i s view of c o m p u t a t i o n h a s l e d S m i t h t o r e c o n s t r u c t , w i t h n o t a b l e s u c c e s s , a s p e c t s o f modern c o m p u t e r programming p r a c t i c e w i t h t h e a i d of t h e same t h e o r e t i c a l framework as u s e d t o a n a l y z e t h e s e m a n t i c s of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s . The s u g g e s t i o n is t h u s c l e a r t h a t , f a r from e x p l a i n i n g t h e f e a t u r e s o f i n t e n t i o n and c o n v e n t i o n i n o r d i n a r y s y m b o l i c p r a c t i c e , a r e s o r t t o c o m p u t a t i o n a l t h e o r i e s a c t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e s them. O t h e r k i n d s o f m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e n o t i o n o f e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n q u i c k l y For e x a m p l e , o n e way of a t t e m p t i n g t o make l e a d t o similar r e s u l t s . e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n s t r i c t l y n e c e s s a r y f o r r e f e r e n c e would b e t o s u p p o s e t h a t a p e r s o n ' s p h y s i c a l symbols c a n i n h e r i t t h e i r d e s i g n a t i o n from t h o s e o f o t h e r p e o p l e , and i n t h i s way, s e c u r e r e f e r e n c e t o t h a t which ( l i k e long deceased h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s ) cannot be d i r e c t l y c a u s a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s f o r t h e s y m b o l i z e r . T h i s amounts t o a s i m p l e e x t e n s i o n of t h e t r a n s i t i v i t y p r o p e r t y o f d e s i g n a t i o n o u t s i d e t h e bounds o f a p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m . Thus, f o r e x a m p l e , t h o u g h G e n g h i s Khan c a n h a v e no d i r e c t c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e upon me, t h e r e is p r e s u m a b l y some l o n g a n d c i r c u i t o u s c a u s a l c h a i n t h a t c o n n e c t s my u s e o f t h e name, t h r o u g h a s e r i e s o f p a s s i n g o f t o k e n s of i t from o n e i n d i v i d u a l t o a n o t h e r , t o t h e man h i m s e l f , A g a i n , h o w e v e r , a n y a r b i t r a r y c h a i n o f t h i s k i n d c a n n o t b e s a i d t o s e c u r e r e f e r e n c e ; f o r e x a m p l e , t h e r e m i g h t a l s o e x i s t some l o n g c i r c u i t o u s c h a i n of g r u n t s and g r o a n s , p a s s e d from o n e i n d i v i d u a l t o a n o t h e r , t h a t s i m i l a r l y c o n n e c t s me w i t h Genghis K h a n ' s c h i e f m a n i c u r i s t , though I have n e v e r i n v i r t u e o f t h i s r e f e r r e d t o any s u c h p e r s o n . S e m a n t i c t h e o r i s t s who h a v e r e c e n t l y s p e c u l a t e d a b o u t r e f e r e n t i a l c h a i n s of t h i s s o r t agree t h a t t h e l i n k s of s u c h c h a i n s are n o t j u s t c a u s a l b u t i n t e n t i o n a l . D o n n e l l a n ( 1 9 7 7 b ) , f o r example, s p e a k s o f ' h i s t o r i c a l ' r a t h e r t h a n o f m e r e l y ' c a u s a l ' r e f e r e n t i a l c h a i n s as a way o f i n c l u d i n g m o t i v e s , i n t e n t i o n s , and t h e l i k e as e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t s . K r i p k e ( 1 9 8 0 ) g o e s on t o p r o p o s e t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l t o u s e a symbol w i t h t h e same r e f e r e n c e as t h e p e r s o n ( s ) who p a s s e d i t t o him i s a n e c e s s a r y though n o t s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r e a c h l i n k i n s u c h a c h a i n . S o , a g a i n , p h y s i c a l symbol s y s t e m a c c o u n t s of s y m b o l i c b e h a v i o u r e n d up r e q u i r i n g , r a t h e r t h a n e x p l a i n i n g , i n t e n t i o n and c o n v e n t i o n . The s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e c e n t r a l dogma -- t h a t can be r e d u c e d t o c o n v e n tio n a l sy m b o liz a tio n problematic. Since these d e f i c i e n c i e s bear p s y c h o l o g i c a l i s s u e s , t h e y a r e examined h e r e a g a i n s t t h e s e m i o t i c a c c o u n t o f r i t u a l , myth b e e n p u t f o r w a r d i n a r e c e n t book by S p e r b e r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e t o make a number of

mythopoetic symbolization -- i s a t l e a s t e q u a l l y less d i r e c t l y on o n l y b r i e f l y . An e x t e n s i v e c a s e and m e t a p h o r h a s , h o w e v e r , (1975). Sperber uses mostly p o i n t s , one bei ng t h a t

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mythopoetic symbols cannot be in any way replaced or translated by their linguistic interpretations. If, for example, all that I mean by the metaphoric comparison of Emerson with an ivy plant was to attribute certain definite, nameable features such as 'excursivity','durability', and so on, one might wonder why I did not simply name them in the first place. Yet the linguistic reading remains, in itself, somehow less compelling and interesting than the actual metaphor (or the metaphor taken in conjunction with its linguistic reading). As Sperber notes, if the symbols underlying myth, metaphor and legend carry meaning only in this linguistically eliminable sense, then 'what they mean is almost always banal. The existence of spirits and the luxuriance of symbols are more fascinating than are their feeble messages about the weather' (p. 6). Sperber argues against the reduction of mythopoetic symbolization to a semiotic system by pointing out that the interpretation of such symbols, rather than being fixed, must be seen as variable and context dependent. Moreover, the 'rules' that assign interpretations to the symbols must themselves be mythopoetically interpreted. For example, Freudian phallic symbolism is not a matter of the constant association of sexual significance with a particular kind of object, it is a way of taking objects that is malleable according to circumstance and (purportedly unconscious) motivation. Furthermore it would be very difficult to explain any rules governing this kind of symbolism, if they could even be formulated, to someone who had not already grasped its central idea. So in this way the symbolism is not 'explained' by rules, but is rather an essential condition on their application. Finally, mythopoetic symbol systems differ from conventional systems like languages in having neither a fixed alphabet of symbols or any fixed media for their instantiation (as in speech), nor any 'grammatical' connection with a particular language; mythopoetic signification is, it is argued, 'encyclopedic' rather than lexical or linguistic. For Jung, in particular, the study of this form of symbolization was one route to the discovery of the universals of mental life. All of these features together make a very definite case against a wholly semiotic or conventional treatment of mythopoetic symbolization. Beyond the Central Dogma:

Extensional and Personal Symbols

That the central dogma has problems, even severe ones, is no sure indication that it will be readily abandoned by students of cognition in the near future. The rejection of a dogma is always more palatable when something equally specific and systematic is available to take its place; and a precise alternative to this dogma is not yet clearly in view. However some recent developments in semantic theory and the theory of symbolization constitute significant departures from the central dogma and suggest new avenues for future inquiry. It will be appropriate to conclude this chapter with a brief overview of some of these developments. The idea of conventional symbolization has figured prominently in what has been said to this point. The modern semiotic tradition is quite explicit in its commitment to conventional symbol systems; and, as argued above, the contemporary computational tradition in psychology quite thoroughly presupposes them. These two traditions have together had a profound influence on much of current thinking about cognition and symbolization. The acme of conventional symbolization is the development of a 'notation' a symbol system that meets some rather exacting requirements on

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communicability. These requirements, as developed in Goodman's (1968) seminal work, bear on both the syntactic domain of the symbol instances themselves, and the correlated semantic domdin of their reference. The syntactic requirements call for a collection of symbols so arranged that any symbol instance is considered to be an instance of just one symbol, and no symbol instance is indeterminate with respect to its belonging to one as opposed to another of the symbols. It is natural to describe the syntactic domain of a notation as formed of a collection of patterns or templates which specify objects in a non-overlapping way, and are each copiable or repeatable within some fixed and finite range of measurable variation. Similar requirements hold for the semantic domain of a notation. In particular, the referents of symbols must be categorized by them in a non-overlapping and determinable way. The semantic domain of a notation is most naturally conceived of as a set of classes each of which is specified by a finite list of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining any ohject to be in its membership. Though notationality is an ideal rarely realized exactly in practice, it is a useful yardstick for assessing the efficiency of a symbol system when precision of communication is at issue. It may be convenient to think of a notation as a kind of well-specified 'game'. Games like chess, that involve the rule-governed manipulation of a specified set of elements are, for example, naturally described in notational terms. The 'syntax' of chess may be seen as comprised from the different kinds of pieces and the rules governing their movement on the board, both of which are patterns that may be endlessly repeated or copied; and the 'semantics' of the game might be described in terms of all necessary and sufficient conditions of winning. The reduction of all of human symbolic activity to a 'game' of this sort, involving the purely formal manipulation of a specified set of elements, is widely taken to be the principal goal of theory of cognition and symbolization. The underlying assumption must be that notationality is, at some level, coextensive with all of symbolization. However, recent theory in semantics and symbolization does not at all support this assumption.

Extensional symbols. One notable trend is in recent semantic theory, which under the seminal Influence of authors like Kripke (1977, 1980), Putnam (1975) and Donellan (1977a,b) is beginning to consider semantic domains that are comprised on the basis of particulars rather than classes. Whereas classes are governed by specified membership conditions, particulars have properties or distinguishing features that are, for some reason, not all specifiable. One case of special interest is what Goodman (1968) calls 'semantic density'. This feature is said to characterize any semantic domain so ordered that between any two referents, a third is possible. For example, height, conceived of as a physical continuum, would be characterized as a dense domain because no finite set of measurements could, in principle, determine an object to be 'exactly six feet tall'. The height of a person, conceived of in this way, for instance, is an utterly particular fact about that person. Another kind of particular has unspecifiable properties, not by virtue o f a theoretical or mathematical indeterminacy, but because it is considered to be constituted by natural law rather than by prior stipulation. These are the 'natural kinds' spoken of by Putnam and Kripke, of which physical and chemical substances are the commonly preferred examples. While a term denoting a class, for example 'the set of all odd numerals' has its application fixed by a specified condition (e.g., non-integral divisibility by two), a term denoting a natural kind is said to refer to something whose essential properties are not yet

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a r t i c u l a t e d , and which may r e q u i r e an i n d e f i n i t e amount o f e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o f u l l y s p e c i f y . Though any of t h e f e a t u r e s of a p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t a n c e , f o r example, may be open t o q u e s t i o n as e s s e n t i a l , y e t one and t h e same s u b s t a n c e i s i n t e n d e d as t h e r e f e r e n t o f each u s e o f t h e c o r r e s ponding s u b s t a n c e term, and does n o t change a s t h e l i s t o f c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d f e a t u r e s or t r a i t s is modified. 'Gold' and ' W a t e r ' , f o r i n s t a n c e may be c o n s i d e r e d t o r e f e r t o t h e same s u b s t a n c e s now a s b e f o r e t h e i r chemical and atomic formulae were found, and t o c o n t i n u e t o do s o even i f t h e s e formulae s h o u l d r e q u i r e m o d i f i c a t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e . In c l a s s i c a l terminology one might s a y t h a t , whereas for c l a s s terms i n t e n s i o n ( r o u g h l y t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n of a term) d e t e r m i n e s e x t e n s i o n ( t h e r e f e r e n c e o f t h e t e r m ) , i n t h e c a s e o f n a t u r a l k i n d terms it i s more n e a r l y t h e c a s e t h a t e x t e n s i o n d e t e r m i n e s i n t e n s i o n (Schwartz, 1 9 7 7 ) . A t h i r d k i n d of p a r t i c u l a r is c o n s i d e r e d t o have no e s s e n t i a l o r d e f i n i n g p r o p e r t i e s These a r e what G h i s e l i n (1981) c a l l s ' i n d i v i whatever, known o r unknown. d u a l s ' ; where an i n d i v i d u a l i s d e s c r i b e d as ' a s i n g l e t h i n g , d e f i n i t e l y l o c a t e d i n space and time' ( p . 271). T h i s i n c l u d e s n o t o n l y i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t s , p e o p l e , and s o o n , b u t f u n c t i o n a l a g g r e g a t i o n s l i k e p l a n e t a r y s y s t e m s , c u l t u r a l groups and even, on one way o f t a k i n g t h e term, biological species. D e s p i t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , symbols d e n o t i n g p a r t i c u l a r s , whether t h e y be s e m a n t i c a l l y dense symbols, n a t u r a l kind terms, o r t h e 'names' o f i n d i v i d u a l s , have i n common t h a t , r a t h e r t h a n s e c u r i n g r e f e r e n c e on t h e b a s i s o f a s p e c i f i e d s e t o f d e t e r m i n i n g f e a t u r e s t h e y come t o mean what t h e y refer t o . These are symbols t h a t we t a k e from t h e o u t s e t as ' d e s i g n a t i n g a "something I am n o t s u r e what"' ( G h i s e l i n , 1981, p. 2 7 1 ) . For t h i s r e a s o n , we may ref e r t o them a l l as ' e x t e n s i o n a l s y m b o l s ' , as a way of c o n t r a s t i n g them w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l symbols which may be c o n s i d e r e d t o r e f e r , i n p r i n c i p l e , notationally. Symbols may a l s o b e e x t e n s i o n a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d i n t h e s y n t a c t i c domain. This is an a s p e c t o f s y m b o l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e work o f Goodman h a s a g a i n s h e d c o n s i d e r a b l e l i g h t on. Goodman ( 1 9 6 8 ) , f o r example, draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between a l l o g r a p h i c and a u t o g r a p h i c a r t s . Whereas t h e symbols o f an a l l o g r a p h i c a r t a r e e x a c t l y c o p i a b l e or r e p e a t a b l e , a s n o v e l s o r musical s c o r e s a r e , f o r example, t h e symbols o f an a u t o g r a p h i c a r t , l i k e p a i n t i n g o r s c u l p t u r e , are unique and n o t e x a c t l y c o p i a b l e ; t h e y i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t of f o r g e r y , f o r example. Autographic symbols, l i k e o t h e r k i n d s o f e x t e n s i o n a l symbols, are based on p a r t i c u l a r s , though t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s now t h e symbol i t s e l f r a t h e r than i t s r e f e r e n t . Some such symbols are p a r t i c u l a r p r i m a r i l y i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g dense; rough s k e t c h e s i n which any a r b i t r a r y s p a t i a l f e a t u r e s may be s i g n i f y i n g would be examples. O t h e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t s , are more n a t u r a l l y t h o u g h t o f a s i n d i v i d u a l s , t h a t is as o b j e c t s with unique h i s t o r i e s , t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e f e a t u r e s o f which are n o t f u l l y s p e c i f i e d . T h i s k i n d o f symbol c a n n o t be accommodated i n t h e terminology o f t y p e / t o k e n r a t i o s as w r i t e r s i n t h e s e m i o t i c t r a d i t i o n a r e s o m e t i m e s i n c l i n e d t o s u g g e s t ( c f . Eco, 1976, pp. 183-184), f o r a u t o g r a p h i c symbols a r e , a s p a r t i c u l a r s , o b j e c t s f o r which no such d i s t i n c t i o n between t y p e and t o k e n , o r ' t e m p l a t e ' and ' c o p y ' can even be drawn. E x t e n s i o n a l symbols, whether i n t h e s e m a n t i c or s y n t a c t i c domain, a r e r e l a t i v e t o a l i n g u i s t i c community o f u n s p e c i f i a b l e membership. T h i s is a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t i n which t h e y d i f f e r from c o n v e n t i o n a l symbols, The community o f users of a c o n v e n t i o n a l symbol system may have a r b i t r a r y bounds on its membership, b u t t h e s e may i n any c a s e be s p e c i f i e d t o any r e q u i r e d d e g r e e . For example, t h e r e may be some d i s p u t e a b o u t what e x t e n t

of a person's command of the rules of the game qualifies him for membership in the community of 'chess-players', but the rules themselves remain fixed. In contrast, the qualifications that enable a person to make pronouncements on the use of scientific substance or species terms, on the exploits of historical individuals, or on the origin of autographic aesthetic objects, are not clearly specified in advance, for genuine discoveries on any of these matters may come from hitherto unexpected quarters, Whereas the membership criteria for a community of conventional symbol users are fixed, though arbitrary in application, those for a community of extensional symbol users are essentially indeterminate and open-ended. The importance of extensional symbols for psychology is evident in the attention they have recently attracted in studies of categorization. Modern approaches to this phenomenon have come recently to reject the notion that categorization is wholly conventional and to give serious attention to categories as determined by the 'natural structure' of the perceived world (Rosch, 1978) or as clustered around instances (Brooks, 1978).

Persona2 symbo2s. One last kind of symbolic particular is beyond the scope of either conventional or extensional symbolic practices. These are the symbolic particulars directly realized as the experiences and performances of a person -- 'personal symbols', as they have been elsewhere designated (Kolers and Smythe, in press). This type of symbol subsumes a rather diverse collection of phenomena: on the experiental side are included all of the referential phenomenal events such as mental images, associations, perceptual experiences, thought episodes, and the like (as distinct from non-referring phenomenal events like pains, afterimages and sensory phantasms); on the performative side are all of the significant acts a person may perform like indicating, judging, carrying out a plan or intention, and so on. Despite this considerable diversity, all personal symbols have in common that they are particulars that are personally constituted. They are par.ticular-s in as much as they are never exactly repeatable; they are inevitably the experiences and performances of a person in a particular situation no two of which can exist, even for that person, in any common space where they can be matched or mapped one to another. An experience or performance is what it is at its own moment in time and does not properly exist at any other. Such symbols are, moreover, personally constituted in that they are always activated by an individual person and have no status apart from this activation. They are, for this reason, relative finally to a symbol-using community of one -- the individual whose activies are essential to their occurrence. They are personal, not in the way that the private mnemonic devices spoken of by semioticians are for, while any such device may be communicated to another on request, the experiences or performances of one person are uniquely his or her own and cannot, in the Same way, become those of another. Devices like private mnemonics are, to use a term of (Kolers and Smythe, in press). merely 'adventitiously private'; whereas personal symbols must be considered, in virtue of their mode of constitution, as 'intrinsically private'. The study of the phenomenon of symbolization must, for the psychologist, begin with a consideration of personal symbols, for in the domain of symbolic cognition, experience and performance provide the essential data. As brought out more fully elsewhere, the study of symbolic cognition, so grounded, would take on a very different character than it now has under the dominance of the central dogma of the cognitive sciences (Kolers, 1980; Kolers and Smythe, in press; Smythe, 1981, in press).

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CGNCLUSION The scope of human symbolic activity is considerable by any reckoning. The symbol is a truly pervasive aspect of human experience. Whether in our intellectual lives, in scientific or aesthetic environments, or in the practical affairs of daily life, we are unavoidably surrounded and immersed in a world of symbols. The central dogma of the cognitive sciences would have us believe that all of this great diversity can be captured, finally, in terms of purely formal, notational symbol manipulation. The discussion in the latter part of this chapter has suggested an alternative. The picture that is beginning to emerge is that human symbolic activity, rather than deriving from a single type of symbol system, involves the manipulation of a number of fundamentally distinct kinds of symbol. The distinctions among 'conventional','extensional', and 'personal' symbols only begin to map out this territory. However, these distinctions are already an improvement on the conventional/physical/mythopoetic symbol system trichotomy, because they are based on a common principle. The principle is that different modes of symbolization are constituted by the functioning of symbol-using communities of varying scope. Further inquiry into the principles governing such communities and the activities of people within them may be the best way to advance the study of symbolic cognition. REFERENCES Anderson, J.R. (1976). Language, Memory and Thought. Jersey: Erlbaum.

Hillsdale, New

Anderson, J.R. (1978). Arguments concerning representation for mental imagery. Psychological Review, 85, 249-277. Bates, E. (1979). The Emergence of Symbols. New York: Academic Press. Brooks, L. (1978). Nonanalytic concept formation and memory for instances. In: E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd (Eds.) Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. Cassirer, E. (1944). An Essay on Man. University Press.

New Haven, Connecticut: Yale

Chebat, J. (1974). Symbol: Towards a definition. International Journal of Symbology, 5, 31-39. Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules arid representations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 1-61. Donnellan, K.S. (1977a). Reference and definite descriptions. In: S.P. Schwartz (Ed.) Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Donnellan, K.S. (1977b). Speaking of nothing. In: S.P. Schwartz (Ed.) Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Eco, U. (1976). A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Ghiselin, M.T. (1981). Categories, life and thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 269-313. Goodman, N. (1968). Languages of Art. Merrill.

Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-

Goodman, N. (1978). Ways of Worldmaking.

Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett.

Heil, J. (1981). Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? 321-342.

Mind, XC,

Howard, V.A. (1980). Theory of representation: Three questions. In: P.A. Kolers, M.E. Wrolstad and H. Bouma (Eds.) Processing of Visible Language 2. New York: Plenum. Kaplan, B. (1979). Symbolism: From the body to the soul. In: N.R. Smith, and M.B. Franklin (Eds.) Symbolic Functioning in Childhood. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. Keller, H. (1904).

The Story of My Life.

New York: Grosset and Dunlap.

Kolers, P.A. (1980). Confusions of symbolization in mental representation. In: Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 2. Kolers, P.A. and Smythe, W.E. (In press). Symbol manipulation: Alternatives to the computational view of mind. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior. Kripke, S.A. (1977). Identity and necessity. In: S.P. Schwartz (Ed.) Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Kripke, S.A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.

Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Langer, S.K. (1942). Philosophy in a New Key. Harvard University Press.

Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Morris, C.W. (1938). Foundations of the theory of signs. In: International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Volume 1. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Morris, C.W. (1946). Signs, Language and Behavior.

New York: Prentice-Hall.

Newell, A. (1980). Physical symbol systems. Cognitive Science, 4, 135-183. Newell, A. and Simon, H.A. (1978). Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search, Communications of the ACM, 19, 113-126. Palmer, S.E. (1978). Fundamental aspects of cognitive representation. In: E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd (Eds.) Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. Pavlov, I.P. (1927).Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex. London: Oxford University Press.

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Peirce, C.S. (1955). Logic as semiotic: The theory of signs. In: J. Buchler (Ed.) Philosophical Writings of Peirce. New York: Dover. Piaget, J. (1962). Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. G. Gattegno and F.M. Hodgson, translation. New York: Norton. Powell, J.N. (1982). The Tao of Symbols. New York: Quill. Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of "meaning". In: K. Gunderson (Ed.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. ?ylyshyn, Z.W. (1980). Cognitive representation and the process-architecture distinction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 , 154-160. Rosch, E. (1972). Principles of categorization. In: E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd (Eds.) Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum. Schwartz, S.P. (1977). Introductioi). In: S.P. Schwartz (Ed.) Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Smith, B.C. (1982). Semantic Attribution and the Formality Condition. Paper presented at the eighth annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, University of Western Ontario, May. Smythe, W.E. (1981). Personal symbol systems. Paper presented at the seventh annual meeting of the Society f o r Philosophy and Psychology, University of Chicago, April. Smythe, W.E. (In press). Mental imagery as a personal symbol system. In:

A. Ahsen, A.T. Dolan and C.S. Jordan (Eds.) Handbook of Imagery Research and Practice. New York: Brandon House. Sperber, D. (1975). Rethinking Symbolism. A.L. Mortan (Ed. and translator). London: Cambridge University Press. Werner, H. and Kaplan, B. (1963). Symbol Formation. New York: Wiley.

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Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art W.R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman (editors)

0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.(North-Holland), 1984

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TEXTS, SIGNS, ARTEFACTS Liam Hudson Brunel University

Psychology, it seems to me, is in an interesting state of transition, and I want to take stock. In particular, I want to look at those aspects of psychology that have come to be called 'soft'; to acknowledge certain disappointments and shortcomings, but at the same time to point to developments that hold the potential for excitement. I say something too about 'hard' psychology, the laboratory tradition, but this only in passing. It is the 'soft' and what might become of it that is my chief concern. In the late 1960's, a great deal changed. A number of psychologists, myself among them, wrote books saying that the application of conventionally 'scientific' methods of research to the more complex o r subtle aspects of human experience had proved barren: that the evidence of such research was trivial, trivializing, and the vehicle, often, for prejudices that were as unattractive as they were naive (Hudson, 1972). Such work was bad science, and a mockery of scholarly values. By the mid-l970's, people were saying ' A l l well and good, but where are the examples of something better?' What they sought were not sermons about the shortcomings of behaviourism but instances, exemplifications, of something that fell less short. I recall being shouted at f o r two hours to this effect by one of the great philosophers of science. My claim was that psychologists were well advised to think about their research before they did it. His counter-claim, thundering around the walls of my room in the Princeton Institute, was that I and my kind should get on with the doing. The forms of 'soft' or 'alternative' psychology then taking shape were three. In retrospect, each has seemed to make a characteristic claim. The first, was that psychologists should abandon all thought of becoming scientists, and concern themselves with 'human relations'. The second was that, more or less by definition, human thought and action is 'socially constructed'. The third was that psychology should properly be conducted in the form of a 'critique'. Of these, the 'human relations' option seemed at the timeworryingly mushy. While stressing human potentiality, a noble theme, it did so in ways which threatened continually to remove it from the world of dispassionate knowledge to that of wise thoughts. Eastern religions, drug-induced states of heightened awareness, primalscreams: these were not activities, it seemed, from which a patient accumulation ofknowledge about the mind could easily be won. And so it has proved. There has been excitement, intuitive self-awareness in abundance; but,unless I am mistaken, the excitement has waned, the sense of heightened self-awareness has begun to fade.

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I.. Hudsoii

The ' s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n ' o p t i o n h a s a b o u t i t a g r i t t i e r f e e l , Books h a v e b e e n w r i t t e n , a c a d e m i c c a r e e r s b u i l t . H e r e , t o o , t h o u g h , one h a s a s e n s e o f misgiving. The p r o b l e m is s i m p l e : t h i s i s a n a p p r o a c h t h a t t u r n s p s y c h o l o g y i n t o a n o u t h o u s e of s o c i o l o g y . Instead of taking prior influences - w h e t h e r b i o l o g i c a l , p h y s i c a l or s o c i a l - a s r e a d , and a t t e m p t i n g t o make s e n s e o f t h e mind and i t s p r o d u c t s a s t h e y now p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s , t h e ' s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n ' o p t i o n l e a d s t o a n a l y s e s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h o s e pursued i n t h e department o f sociology.

An a n a l o g o u s o b j e c t i o n f a c e s t h e a r g u m e n t , o f t e n f o r c e f u l l y a d v a n c e d , t h a t p s y c h o l o g y must t a k e s h a p e as a ' c r i t i q u e ' . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s v i e w , human e x p e r i e n c e c a n o n l y b e s t u d i e d i f t h e i n q u i r y i s i n f o r m e d by t h e o r e t i c a l b e l i e f s t h a t a r e t h e m s e l v e s i n v e s t e d w i t h some s p e c i a l p o l i t i c a l , moral or h i s t o r i c a l a u t h o r i t y : M a r x i s t , f e m i n i s t , F r e u d i a n , or what you w i l l . Such c r i t i q u e s c a n b e i l l u m i n a t i v e and some a r e p u r s u e d i n a s p i r i t o f considerable i n t e l l e c t u a l r i g o u r ; b u t , a g a i n , they t u r n psychology i n t o something e l s e - sometimes i n t o p o l i t i c s , sometimes i n t o philosophy o r exegetics. My p o i n t i n c r i t i c i z i n g t h e s e t h r e e s t r a n d s i n ' s o f t ' p s y c h o l o g y i s n o t i n t h e l e a s t t o d e n i g r a t e neighbouring a c t i v i t i e s , whether therapy, sociology, p o l i t i c s , p h i l o s o p h y or e x i g e t i c s - or, o n t h e o t h e r s i d e , p h y s i o l o g y , g e n e t i c s or c y b e r n e t i c s . I want s i m p l y t o c l a i m b a c k from t h e s e n e i g h b o u r s t e r r i t o r y t h a t is our own: t o b e a b l e t o s a y ' t h i s i s p s y c h o l o g y ' and ' t h i s i s how i t is d o n e ' . I f t h e 'human r e l a t i o n s ' , ' s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n ' and ' c r i t i c a l ' o p t i o n s do n o t f i t t h e b i l l , which w i l l ? My own a n s w e r l e a d s back t o a v e i n o f t h o u g h t r e f e r r e d t o q u i t e o f t e n i n t h e r e c e n t p a s t -- among o t h e r s , a g a i n , by m y s e l f -- b u t n o t w h o l l y g r a s p e d : t o w i t ,

hermeneutics. Compared w i t h t h e d i g n i t y o f e m p i r i c i s m a n d i t s o r i g i n s , u n f l a g g i n g l y b u t n o t e n t i r e l y c o n v i n c i n g l y r e h e a r s e d , i n t h e t h o u g h t p r o c e s s e s o f Locke, B e r k e l e y and Hume, t h e r o o t s o f t h e h e r m e n e u t i c t r a d i t i o n a r e t e n u o u s . They a r e a l s o T e u t o n i c . F o r i t was on t h e C o n t i n e n t o f E u r o p e r a t h e r t h a n i n t h e B r i t i s h I s l e s t h a t t h e c o n c e p tu a l problems o f t h e h i s t o r i a n and, t h e n o f t h e human as opposed t o p h y s i c a l s c i e n t i s t , were f i r s t t a k e n s e r i o u s l y . In s e a r c h o f p r e c e d e n t s one i s f o r c e d t o g e s t u r e t o w a r d s shadowy f i g u r e s - William D i l t h e y , f o r example; and t o do so u n e a s i l y because one has r e a d t h e i r works o n l y i n t r a n s l a t i o n and i n s c r a p s ( s e e , f o r e x a m p l e , D i l t h e y 1972).

Behind D i l t h e y , o n e l e a r n s , s t o o d S c h l e i e r m a c h e r ; and b e h i n d b o t h s t o o d g e n e r a t i o n s of s c h o l a r s c o m m i t t e d t o s e a r c h f o r t h e b e s t , t h e m o s t d e f e n s i b l e , r e a d i n g o f o b s c u r e or c o r r u p t e d B i b l i c a l t e x t s . The l i n k s between t h e s u p p o s e d l y ' s o f t ' p s y c h o l o g i s t i n t h e l a t e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y and t h e German Biblical scholar i n the nineteenth century a r e these. B o t h are e n g a g e d i n a n a c t i v i t y t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r p r e t a t i v e . Both a r e c o n c e r n e d t o make s e n s e . And b o t h h a v e , a s t h e i r s e l f - i m p o s e d d i s c i p l i n e , t h e t a s k o f s i f t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e r e a d i n g s , w e i g h i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e merits i n t h e l i g h t I n i t s e l f , t h e hermeneutic approach is l i t t l e o f what is g i v e n : t h e ' t e x t ' . more t h a n a s l o g a n , c e r t a i n l y less t h a n a r e c i p e . I t d o e s have s p e c i a l a t t r a c t i o n s , t h o u g h : and c h i e f among them is p r e c i s e l y i t s c o n c e n t r a t i o n on a t e x t ; on what i s t a n g i b l y , i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l y there. The t e x t i s g i v e n i n j u s t t h e down-to-earth and r e a s s u r i n g s e n s e t h a t s c i e n t i f i c a p p a r a t u s o r experimental data a r e . A s with laboratory research, t h e hermeneutic f o r m u l a t i o n combines a r e s p e c t f o r what i s g i v e n w i t h a n u r g e t o w a r d s t h e g r e a t e s t d e g r e e of o r d e r t h a t t h i s r e s p e c t f o r t h e g i v e n p e r m i t s .

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So f a r , s o g o o d , What i t h a s t a k e n l o n g e r t o s e e i s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n f o r what one a c t u a l l y d o e s . I n my own c a s e , t h e l e s s o n h a s t a k e n t h e b e s t p a r t o f a d e c a d e t o s i n k i n . Once g r a s p e d , however, t h e a r g u m e n t i s a l m o s t e m b a r r a s s i n g l y s i m p l e . I n my book Bodies of Knowzedge I t a k e t h e h e r m e n e u t i c n o t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g y t o h e a r t ( c f . Hudson, 1 9 8 2 ) . I t i s a book t h a t a d o p t s a p o i n t o f v i e w : t h e b e l i e f t h a t i n i n t i m a t e m a t t e r s a n d e s p e c i a l l y i n o u r p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e human b o d y , we a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ambivalent. I t then explores t h i s claim i n terms o f ' t e x t s ' ; t h a t is t o s a y , p a i n t i n g s , s c u l p t u r e s , p h o t o g r a p h s o f t h e body e a c h memorable i n i t s own r i g h t , and e a c h o f which c a n be shown t o e x p l o r e and e x p l o i t o u r a m b i v a l e n c e s t o w a r d s t h e body i n a s k i l l e d and f a s t i d i o u s way. In practice, t h i s meant t a k i n g s p e c i f i c images -- a p a r t i c u l a r T i t i a n , M a n e t ' s OZympia c e r t a i n D e g a s ' , a pin-up from t h e P i r e l l i C a l e n d a r -- a n d u n p a c k i n g t h e meanings w i t h which t h e y are f r e i g h t e d . These a n a l y s e s a r e n o t f l i g h t s of f a n t a s y a n y more t h a n good a r c h a e o l o g y o r g J o d d e t e c t i v e work is. R a t h e r , a p a i n s t a k i n g e f f o r t t o s a y how i t i s t h a t t h e s e images a c h i e v e t h e i r e f f e c t s . I n t h e c o u r s e of s u c h a n a n a l y s i s , o n e must l e a r n some a r t h i s t o r y , j u s t 13s t h e s t u d y of t h e v i s u a l s y s t e m f o r c e d o n e t o l e a r n some p h y s i o l o g y and c h e m i s t r y . You must know t h a t t h e T i t i a n you a r e d i s c u s s i n g was d r o p p e d by N a p o l e o n ' s army i n t o a r i v e r a n d e x t e n s i v e l y p a t c h e d u p b e f o r e i t was r e t u r n e d . A t t i m e s you even seem t o t r e s p a s s . But t h e a n a l y s i s i t s e l f , t h e e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h e c a r e f u l l y p o i s e d a m b i g u i t i e s of which s u c h works of a r t c o n s i s t , r e m a i n s p s y c h o l o g i c a l : i t d e a l s w i t h what we s e e , what we t h i n k , what we t h i n k we s e e .

Out o f t h i s f i r s t p r o j e c t h a s grown a s e c o n d : a book, a l m o s t f i n i s h e d , b u i l t on C h a r l e s D a r w i n ' s c l a i m ( R y c r o f t , 1 9 7 9 ) t h a t dreams a r e a form of i n v o l u n t a r y p o e t r y . Our s l e e p i n g t h o u g h t i s i n v o l u n t a r y , i n v e n t i v e a n d ambiguous; and c e r t a i n o f o u r waking t h o u g h t s -- n o t a b l y t h o s e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n o f works o f a r t -- show t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s too. The a n a l o g i e s between s l e e p i n g and waking t h o u g h t a r e e x p l o r e d b y means o f a s c r u t i n y of c e r t a i n poems, p a s s a g e s i n n o v e l s , d e t a i l s i n films, p h o t o g r a p h s . A g a i n , t h e r e i s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o work w i t h t e x t s , s i g n s , t o u s e what i s u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h e r e . What e m e r g e s is n e i t h e r s c i e n c e nor e n t e r t a i n m e n t . One d e a l s n e i t h e r w i t h phenomena t h a t a r e i n p r i n c i p l e c l e a r a n d u n e q u i v o c a l , as t h e s c i e n t i s t h o p e s t o , n o r w i t h t h e random. I n s t e a d , w i t h a r r a n g e m e n t s t h a t s t e e r t h e mind i n o n e d i r e c t i o n o r a n o t h e r , much a s t h e p l a n o f a l a n d s c a p e g a r d e n m i g h t . The a n a l y s i s d o e s n o t remove d o u b t o r a m b i g u i t y ; r a t h e r , i t s p e c i f i e s a s d i s p a s s i o n a t e l y as p o s s i b l e , how d o u b t and a m b i g u i t y a r i s e . The raw m a t e r i a l s a r e , t o u s e Gass's p h r a s e , ' c o n t a i n e r s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' a n d t h e s u r p r i s e s w i t h which t h e s e a r e p a c k e d . Having l a u n c h e d a l o n g t h i s p a t h a n d f o u n d i t a t l e a s t a s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d a s r e s e a r c h w i t h m e n t a l t e s t s , s a y , o r w i t h t h e o u t p u t from a s l e e p l a b o r a t o r y , what now i n t e r e s t s me i s t h e way i n which c e r t a i n s i m p l e p r e j u d i c e s h a v e r u l e d b o t h t h i s a n d r e l a t e d i n q u i r i e s o u t o f a c c o u n t . The s i m p l e s t p r e j u d i c e o f a l l , t h e b a s i c c u r r e n c y o f judgment i n t h e academy a t l a r g e , is t h e d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h which I b e g a n : t h a t b e t w e e n t h e ' h a r d ' and t h e ' s o f t ' ( H u d s o n , 1 9 6 7 ) . E i t h e r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n s a y s , we a r e t r y i n g t o d o s c i e n c e o r we a r e e n g a g e d i n s o m e t h i n g q u i t e d i f f e r e n t : p o l i t i c s , t h e r a p y , journalism, self-expression. The a r t s i n p a r t i c u l a r a r e s e e n a s p e r i p h e r a l , o r -- e v e n worse -- as ' f u n ' ; t h a t i s t o s a y , as a s i m p l e e m o t i o n a l r e l e a s e t h a t r e c e i v e s l i t t l e p r o f e s s i o n a l l y academic a t t e n t i o n because i t deserves none. Yet t h e b r i e f e s t g l a n c e shows t h a t poems, n o v e l s , p a i n t i n g s , p h o t o g r a p h s , p l a y s , films o r any q u a l i t y a r e r a r e l y f u n , e i t h e r f o r a r t i s t

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or f o r s p e c t a t o r ; what is more, t h a t t h e y are a t l e a s t as c a r e f u l l y p o i s e d , as s u b t l y c a l c u l a t e d i n t h e i r e f f e c t s , a s any o t h e r g e n r e o f i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y . Many t a k e months, y e a r s , t o p u t t o g e t h e r , and a t l e a s t as long t o a s s i m i l a t e i n any b u t a s u p e r f i c i a l way. J u s t a s t h e dichotomy between hard and s o f t has l e d t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of t h e a r t s from t h e a r e n a , i t h a s l e d u s t o i g n o r e t h r e e f u r t h e r a s p e c t s o f everyday l i f e : t o i g n o r e t h e world o f b r a n d s , l o g o s and l o y a l t i e s o u t o f which much o f our environment is f a s h i o n e d ; t o i g n o r e t h e a c t i v i t y o f design, t h a t s p r a w l i n g empire i n which, i n a dozen ways, t h e m a t e r i a l and t h e i m a g i n a t i v e are married t o one a n o t h e r : a n d , perhaps most s i g n i f i c a n t o f a l l , i g n o r e t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e machines on which w e depend - t h e ones which s e r v e our r e g a l p u r p o s e s , b u t , a t t h e same t i m e , invade and r e s h a p e our s e n s e of what t h o s e purposes might be (Hudson, 1983). If a r t is ' f u n ' and t h e r e f o r e i g n o r a b l e , a d v e r t i s i n g i s ' i m m o r a l ' , d e s i g n i s ' c o s m e t i c ' and technology is a ' b o r e ' . They can a l l b e i g n o r e d t o g e t h e r . Compared with t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l r e f i n e m e n t , t h e h e r o i c c h a l l e n g e , o f t h e s t u d y o f short-term memory, s a y , e a c h o f t h e f a c e t s o f everyday l i f e i s made t o seem evanescent. I t is no p a r t of my i n t e n t i o n t o c r i t i c i z e t h e l a b o r a t o r y t r a d i t i o n i n psychology. I t a k e i t as r e a d , t o o , t h a t none o f u s i s i n f a v o u r o f s l o v e n l y argument or hand-waving. But I do want t o emphasize t h e g r a v i t y and scope o f t h e s e o m i s s i o n s ; and t o p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e y no l o n g e r seem n a t u r a l i f you adopt as a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e , n o t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between h a r d and s o f t , b u t t h e s c r u t i n y o f what is u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h e r e i n t h e form o f t e x t s , s i g n s and a r t e f a c t s - what i s t h e r e , moreover, n o t i n s i m p l i f i e d form, b u t i n i t s f u l l complexity.

Such t e x t s , s i g n s and a r t e f a c t s pose t h r e e s o r t s o f q u e s t i o n s , o n l y one o f The s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d q u e s t i o n is t h e one o f f a c t : which is s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d .

How, as a matter of f a c t , are t h e t e x t s , signs and a r t e f a c t s a l l around us used, construed? I n a d d i t i o n , though, t h e r e are two f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s less obvious:

What m s t we grasp i n order t o e x p l a i n t h e i r presence?;and Given t h e i r presence, what are t h e i r psychological zmpLications? Let me e x p l a i n , by means o f examples. Among p s y c h o l o g i s t s , t h e f i r s t i s s u e c a u s e s no s t r a i n . There a r e a dozen t e c h n i q u e s a v a i l a b l e t o u s w i t h which t o e s t a b l i s h t h e ways i n which t e x t s , s i g n s and a r t i f a c t s are c o n s t r u e d ; systems o f meaning i n which they are enmeshed. I f , i n t h e c o u r s e o f such i n q u i r i e s , we encounter s u r p r i s e s -- p e o p l e t r e a t e d a s though t h e y were a r t e f a c t s , a r t e f a c t s t r e a t e d as though t h e y were p e o p l e -- they a r e a t l e a s t s u r p r i s e s o f a kind t h a t i s i n p r i n c i p l e familiar. The argument, however, is more f a r - r e a c h i n g than such p r e c e d e n t s imply: i t r e a c h e s i n t o o u r c o l l e c t i v e p a s t s and i n t o our c o l l e c t i v e f u t u r e s t o o . Two thousand y e a r s ago, t h e Greeks c r e a t e d an o b j e c t which, when e x c a v a t e d and c l o s e l y examined, proved t o be a system o f d i f f e r e n t i a l gears, c a r e f u l l y tuned t o t h e movements o f t h e heavenly b o d i e s : i n a s e n s e , a work o f a r t , i n a s e n s e a p i e c e o f t e c h n o l o g y , a n immensely e l a b o r a t e t o y . So t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l g e a r was i n v e n t e d e a r l i e r r a t h e r t h a n l a t e r , one might s a y , b u t what f o l l o w s ? I n t h e e v e n t , a g r e a t d e a l . I have watched Zeeman (1982) demonstrate t h a t , l o o k i n g back, d e d u c t i v e l y , one c a n e s t a b l i s h what

Texts. signs, artefacts

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mathematics the Greeks must have possessed in order to bring this artefact into being. He reconstructed the calculations the Greeks would have had to perform in order to design it. The history of mathematics is thus written by peering back 'through' the artefact in question. Without his scholarly curiosity and vision, it would have been left as an ancient remnant, of prime interest only to the museum in which it happened to be lodged. We can peer 'through' too, using texts that are written, painted, photographed. We can examine Manet's Olympia, unpacking it in search of those aspects of its construction that, a hundred years ago, so successfully moved the Paris public to outrage. If Manet set many hundreds of thousands of teeth on edge, and did so with an image that now seems so innocuous, we must ask 'how'? Such analyses, almost always a matter of nuance and innuendo, are rewarding in their own right. Our capacity as a species to be moved by inanimate objects like paintings and books is, after all, one of our few redeeming features. It would be a mistake, though, to be too restrictedly historical or aesthetic. As it happens the shock of Manet's Olympia had a great deal to do with the camera; and the camera, in its turn, is an eloquent instrument rather than a merely useful one. It invades and alters our imaginative lives. And in that there is an important clue. Our subject-matter in future may be concerned more with such invasions -- with the marriage, the miscegenation, of the imagination and the machine. Traditionally, ergonomics has come to be seen as the most tedious of all psychology's branches, but only, I think, because we have addressed this extraordinary relationship of man to machine as though it must be mechanical on both sides. The assumption is absurd. As Marxists have reminded u s , shifts in technology trigger irreversible shifts in consciousness, in sensibility. Critics like Berger (1972) have addressed such issues, but without quite grasping, it seems to me, what must be grasped; the comprehensiveness of psychological changes that technology triggers. For those interested, I would point as example to Mailer's (1979) remarkable book The Executioner's Song, about the death of Gary Gilmore, and the mounting sense of the bizarre with which this execution was surrounded. Without camera, tape-recorder, radio and television set these strange goings on could not have occurred. They embroil their participants,increasingly helpless, in their dream-like world of a 'media-event'. Actions of ordinary people take on significance, more and more, as raw material for the eventual screenplay. Around Gilmore, commonsense melts away and we are left, in the end, in a space more closely akin to that of the hallucination than the flat-footed A great deal of everyday experiempiricist in each of u s cares to admit. ence, I would seek to suggest, now has this hallucinatory character to a more limited extent; an extent that may prove to grow as our dependence on the machines of communication itself grows. All this, it might be said, is sweepingly innovatory, but spuriously s o . In practice laboratory scientists clearly address themselves to a text and to its interpretation; in their care, a data-base - what people, animals or things can be seen to do. Far from disputing this connection, I would like to admit and capitalize upon it; to say that where the laboratory tradition in psychology has flourished, it has done so because those concerned have articulated for themselves an orderly sense of what their evidence means. They have created an interpretative core which gives their experimental studies point, rather than allowing one fact to breed from another. I would suggest that the shortcoming of the psychology that has been pursued outside the laboratory lies in our failure to transpose

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j u s t t h i s r e l a t i o n o f t e x t t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e more s u b t l e p r o b l e m s of meaning t h a t t h e complex a s p e c t s o f human a c t i v i t y p o s e . One o f t h e r e w a r d s of a d d r e s s i n g o u r s e l v e s t o t h e a r t s i n f u l l s e r i o u s n e s s , and t o a d j a c e n t f i e l d s l i k e t h a t of d e s i g n , is t h a t t h e i r very n a t u r e f o s t e r s t h i s transposition. When b a f f l e d o r i n d i s a g r e e m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n d r i f t i n g o f f i n t o t h e o r y , we a r e drawn b a c k , n a t u r a l l y , t o a s c r u t i n y o f what s u c h w o r k s s a y . If d i s p o s e d t o l i s t e n , we f i n d t h a t t h e y a n s w e r u s b a c k w i t h t h e same stubborn r e s o l u t i o n t h a t d a t a bases o f f e r t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y i n c l i n e d . I t i s on t h i s t e n s e and a t t i m e s m y s t e r i o u s l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n o f t e x t t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t t h e v i t a l i t y of p s y c h o l o g y -- b o t h s u p p o s e d l y ' s o f t ' a n d r e p u t e d l y I h a r d ' -- s e e m s t o be t o d e p e n d . REFERENCES Berger, J. Dilthey, W. Gass, W.

( 1 9 7 2 ) . Ways o f S e e i n g .

BBC.

Harmondsworth: P e n g u i n .

N e w L i t e r a r y H i s t o r y , 3 , 229.

( 1 9 7 2 ) . The R i s e o f H e r m e n e u t i c s .

(No d a t e ) . On Being B l u e .

Godine.

Hudson, L.

( 1 9 6 7 ) . The s t e r e o t y p i c a l s c i e n t i s t .

Hudson, L.

( 1 9 7 2 ) . The C u l t o f t h e F a c t .

Hudson, L .

( 1 9 8 2 ) . B o d i e s o f Knowledge.

Nature,

213, 2 2 8 .

London: Cape. New York: W e i d e n f e l d .

Hudson, L. ( 1 9 8 3 ) . The G r e a t M i s c e g e n a t i o n - or t h e J o y o u s Union o f t h e I m a g i n a t i o n and t h e Machine. SIAD/Maurice H i l l e L e c t u r e , t h e S o c i e t y of I n d u s t r i a l Artists and D e s i g n e r s . M a i l e r , N. Rycroft, C.

( 1 9 7 9 ) . The E x e c u t i o n e r ' s Song. ( 1 9 7 9 ) . The I n n o c e n c e o f Dreams.

London: H u t c h i n s o n . London: H o g a r t h .

Zeeman, C. ( 1 9 8 2 ) . D i f f e r e n t i a l Gears from t h e A n c i e n t G r e e k s . l e c t u r e , Brunel University,

Unpublished

Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art

W.R.Crozier and A.J. Chapinan (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1984

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ELUSIVE EFFECTS OF ARTISTS' 'MESSAGES'

Vladimir J . KoneEni U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a a t San Diego

Analyses o f work o f a r t , b r o a d l y d e f i n e d , imply a d i s c u s s i o n o f i t s components or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and i t s i n t e n d e d impact on t h e v i e w e r , l i s t e n e r , or r e a d e r . Such a n a l y s e s of a r t i s t i c s t y l e s and i n d i v i d u a l works a r e c l e a r l y one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n s o f a r t h i s t o r y and c r i t i c i s m . Also, a l t h o u g h some a r t i s t s have been r e l u c t a n t t o d i s c u s s p u b l i c l y t h e i r works and i n t e n t i o n s , many have been e a g e r t o write about t h e i r a r t , f o r i n s t a n c e , i n t h e s o - c a l l e d ' m a n i f e s t o e s ' ( w r i t i n g s by Klee, Kandinsky, Boccioni, Delaunay, Mondrian -- and c o u n t l e s s o t h e r s i n t h e v i s u a l a r t s a l o n e -- a r e examples o f t h i s ; e . g . , Hoffman, 1954; Long and Washton, 1980; Orbourne, 1979; Rosenberg, 1966, 1 9 7 5 ) . Moreover, even i n t h e absence of v e r b a l a n a l y s e s , a r t i s t s i m p l i c i t l y g i v e i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e i r b e l i e f s a b o u t t h e way i n which t h e work o f a r t a f f e c t s or s h o u l d a f f e c t t h e a u d i e n c e . The s i m p l e s t d e c i s i o n , s u c h a s t o hang a p a i n t i n g i n a c e r t a i n o r i e n t a t i o n , p r e s e n t t h e p a r t s o f a musical p i e c e i n a c e r t a i n s e q u e n c e , u s e s h o r t or l o n g p a r a g r a p h s , o r p l a c e t h e a c t o r s i n a s c e n e i n o n e , a s opposed t o a n o t h e r , p l a c e on t h e s t a g e , r e f l e c t t h e p a i n t e r ' s , c o m p o s e r ' s , writer's, and d i r e c t o r ' s , r e s p e c t i v e l y , b e l i e f a b o u t t h e i r work's o p t i m a l impact. Even i n t h e extreme c a s e , when a work o f a r t c o n s i s t s o f random e v e n t s (some compositions by John Cage a r e examples o f t h i s ) , t h e r e a r e good r e a s o n s t o conclude t h a t t h e artist b e l i e v e s t h a t e i t h e r t h e v e r y randomness o f t h e w o r k ' s components, or t h e p a r t i c u l a r method o f producing t h e random e v e n t s , o r b o t h , w i l l have a n impact on t h e audience. I n s h o r t , t h e r e i s a l a r g e body o f w r i t i n g by a r t h i s t o r i a n s , c r i t i c s , and a r t i s t s themselves a b o u t t h e s p e c i f i c components o f works o f a r t and t h e i r supposed p e r c e p t u a l , c o g n i t i v e , and emotional impact; such w r i t i n g s a r e n o t t o b e confused with t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l , o r p o l i t i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s about t h e a l l e g e d r e a l or d e s i r a b l e ' s o c i a l functions' of art.

For many r e a s o n s , some of t h e v e r b a l a n a l y s e s o f works o f a r t a r e o f o n l y l i t e r a r y or h i s t o r i c a l value. However, many s t a t e m e n t s a r e more p r e c i s e and e x p l i c i t about t h e r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l components t o t h e work's o v e r a l l a l l e g e d impact about t h e a r t i s t ' s i n t e n d e d 'message' ( i n t h e b r o a d e s t p o s s i b l e s e n s e ) , and about t h e ways i n which t h e work was c o n s t r u c t e d i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d e f f e c t . Such s t a t e m e n t s can o f t e n be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e psychology o f a r t and music i s i n p a r t concerned with t h e p e r c e p t u a l , c o g n i t i v e , and emotional e f f e c t s o f works o f a r t on a p p r e c i a t o r s , and t h a t i t h a s t h e r e q u i s i t e methodological and e x p e r i m e n t a l t o o l s , i t would seem t h a t i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s c o u l d p r o v i d e an i m p o r t a n t s e r v i c e t o t h e a r t i s t s by informing them o f t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e i n t e n d e d message is a c t u a l l y ' g e t t i n g t h r o u g h ' to t h e audience. I n o t h e r words, is

72

V.J. Koric?ni

the audience perceptually, cognitively, and emotionally responding in the way that the artist (or critic) expects? Do certain parts of a work of art and its overall structure have the intended effects? It can, of course, be argued that art is a completely spontaneous activity, that artists 'have to' create a work in a certain way, that artists neither consciously nor unconsciously show or should show any regard for the effect of the work on the audience and finally, that art is an entirely private activity. There is perhaps some truth to some such claims for some artists some of the time, but the very fact that artists do talk about the intended impact of their works and the components of these works, that at least some do hope for public, critical and social approval and acclaim (and that many apply for public funds or private support), and that art historians and critics do claim that they can discern the artists' intentions concerning the work's 'message' and the way that message is constructed, all suggest that much if not most art is meant to be presented, that it is more than an entirely private activity, and that it is therefore reasonable to submit artists' and critics' claims about the impact of works of art on the audience to psycho-aesthetic scrutiny. In the remainder of this chapter, I present the results of 5 studies each of which attempted to evaluate empirically an explicit or implicit claim made by an artist, critic, or art historian about the intended perceptual, cognitive and emotional impact of an overall work of art o r some of its components. In the different studies, paintings, literary works, dramatic performances, and musical pieces (classical and rock 'n' roll) were used asstimull, and with a variety of audiences. All studies had the same format. First, an explicit or implicit claim by an artist, art historian o r art critic about the impact, effect, or purpose of a work of art, that could be clearly translated into a testable form, was isolated. Next, original and modified (control) versions of the work were presented to subjects. Finally, the subjects rated the various versions' pleasingness, interestingness, emotional impact, and related characteristics or dimensions. STUDY 1: ORIENTATION OF PAINTINGS The decision to present a painting for viewing in a particular orientation is clearly one of the most basic statements an artist can make; it obviously reflects the artist's beliefs regarding the optimal impact of that painting on viewers. In representational art, of course, orientation is almost never at issue, In abstract art, however, a 'natural' orientation is often not obvious from the content of the painting; instead, the artist defines the proper orientation by hanging the painting in a certain way. This decision can be thought of as a fundamental part of the artist's 'message'. Would that message be lost, or become weaker or distorted, if the unsuspecting viewers were to be presented with abstract paintings rotated goo or 180° from the 'correct' orientation? Would such a rude intervention in the communication between the artist and the viewers -- an intervention which fundamentally alters the balance of a painting in terms of form and colour on the horizontal and vertical dimensions (Western paintings are very seldom symmetrical) reduce the pleasingness and interestingness of paintings?

A related issue, and one not limited to abstract art, is the lateral (leftright) organization of paintings. Gordon (1981) and others credit Wolfflin (1941) for suggesting that paintings are typically scanned from left to

73

Artists' 'messages'

r i g h t ( f o r whatever r e a s o n , such as hemispheric dominance o r t h e r e a d i n g s e q u e n c e ) , and t h a t t h e l e f t - r i g h t s c a n n i n g p a t t e r n is r e s p o n s i b l e b o t h f o r t h e widespread l a t e r a l asymmetry i n Western p a i n t i n g and t h e s u b j e c t i v e impression o f a pronounced change i n t h e appearance of p a i n t i n g s f o l l o w i n g the right-left mirror reversal. Subsequently W o f f l i n ' s i d e a s were r e f i n e d c o n s i d e r a b l y by Gaffron (1950, 1962) who proposed t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a 'glance-curve' -- a t y p i c a l s c a n t h a t b e g i n s a t t h e bottom l e f t and proceeds t o t h e t o p r i g h t and i n t o t h e t h r e e dimensional space p o r t r a y e d i n t h e p a i n t i n g . The g l a n c e c u r v e would e x p l a i n , a c c o r d i n g t o G a f f r o n , a l l t h e v a r i o u s changes t h a t o c c u r when a painting is mirror-reversed. I n a n o u t s t a n d i n g paper on t h e l e f t - r i g h t o r g a n i z a t i o n o f p a i n t i n g s , Gordon (1981) e x t r a c t s no l e s s t h a n e i g h t e e n t e s t a b l e c l a i m s t h a t have been made by G a f f r o n , Arnheim (19561, and o t h e r s r e g a r d i n g t h e l e f t - r i g h t d i f f e r e n c e s i n p a i n t i n g s , t h e most i m p o r t a n t o f which is t h a t ' p i c t u r e s c a n n o t b e m i r r o r r e v e r s e d without l o s i n g much o f t h e i r a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t y when r e v e r s e d , t h e y a p p e a r less b a l a n c e d , less w e l l composed' (Gordon, 1981, p. 2 2 4 ) .

...

However, a f t e r r e v i e w i n g 8 r e l e v a n t experiments, which have used a wide v a r i e t y o f s u b j e c t s and p a i n t i n g s , Gordon (1981, p. 233) concluded: ' O v e r a l l , d e t e c t i o n o f o r i g i n a l o r i e n t a t i o n s i s poor Even when above c h a n c e , t h e Original mean d e t e c t i o n r a t e is t y p i c a l l y o n l y a b o u t 53 p e r c e n t o r i e n t a t i o n s a r e n o t overwhelmingly p r e f e r r e d ' .

...

...

The p r e s e n t s t u d y is a r e p l i c a t i o n and e x t e n s i o n o f t h e work o f Lindauer ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Swartz and H e w i t t ( 1 9 7 0 ) , and Gordon and Gardner ( 1 9 7 4 ) . Within a s i n g l e s t u d y , t h e e f f e c t s o f m i r r o r r e v e r s a l o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l works, and o f m i r r o r r e v e r s a l and 9 0 ° - r o t a t i o n s and 1 8 0 ° - r o t a t i o n s o f a b s t r a c t works, were comprehensively examined. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e s t u d y examined t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e knowledge of a p a i n t i . n g ' s t i t l e ( a c t u a l or f i c t i t i o u s ) on v a r i o u s dimensions o f p r e f e r e n c e . Method The s u b j e c t s were 120 u n d e r g r a d u a t e s ( 6 0 women, 60 men) from t h e U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a a t San Diego and t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a a t Los Angeles. Demographic and a r t - r e l a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n was o b t a i n e d from a l l s u b j e c t s . T h i r t y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l and 30 a b s t r a c t works were used as s t i m u l i ( s e e Table l), a l l p a i n t e d i n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ( t o e n s u r e a e s t h e t i c c o n s i s t e n c y and o v e r l a p of a r t i s t s ) . I n t h e c o r r e c t o r i e n t a t i o n , a l l 60 p a i n t i n g s c o n t a i n e d a l e f t - r i g h t asymmetry i n terms o f form and c o l o u r . The terms ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l ' ( A ) and ' a b s t r a c t ' ( A ) a r e h e r e used l o o s e l y . P a i n t i n g s i n t h e R group c o n t a i n e d a v a r i e t y o f a b s t r a c t i o n s and d i s t o r t i o n s common i n t h e movements r e p r e s e n t e d (cubism, fauvism, metaphysicism, e x p r e s s i o n i s m , ' d i e - B r u c k e ' , 'Blaue Aeiter' and s u r r e a l i s m ) . A l l R-group p a i n t i n g s , however, were s u f f i c i e n t l y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h a t t h e c o r r e c t p o s i t i o n ( i n terms o f top-bottom o r i e n t a t i o n ) was i n no doubt whatsoever. I n c o n t r a s t , A-group p a i n t i n g s were e n t i r e l y ambiguous i n t h i s s e n s e ; t h e r e was n o t h i n g i n t h e s e p a i n t i n g s t h a t r e v e a l e d o r d i c t a t e d t h e c o r r e c t topbottom o r i e n t a t i o n ( o t h e r than t h e a r t i s t ' s d e c i s i o n ) . P a i n t i n g s i n t h e A-group, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e t h a t are commonly c l a s s i f i e d as a b s t r a c t i n t h e narrow s e n s e , i n c l u d e d many s u r r e a l i s t , f a u v i s t , c u b i s t , f u t u r i s t , 'Blaue R e i t e r ' and D a d a i s t works.

14

V.J. Konefni

TABLE 1

R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l works used i n Study 1 De Chirico The d i s q u i e t i n g Muses (1917) Kandinsky The b l u e horseman ( 1 9 0 3 ) Beach c a b i n s i n Holland ( 1 9 0 4 ) Kandinsky Kandinsky Russian b e a u t y i n a l a n d s c a p e (1905) A s t r e e t i n Murnau ( 1 9 0 8 ) Kandinsky I n t h e mine (1913) Klee With t h e e a g l e (1918) Klee Klee Landscape with y e l l o w b i r d s (1923) Old man H i r s c h ( 1 9 0 7 ) Kokoschka Marseilles (1925) Kokoschka The mechanic (1920) L6ger LCger The dancer with keys (1930) LCger Four c y c l i s t s (1943-48) The g r e a t p a r a d e (1954) Le'ger Discovery (1927) Magri t t e B a t h e r between l i g h t and d a r k n e s s ( 1 9 3 5 ) Magri t t e Personal valuables (1952) Magr i t t e Euclidean walks (1955) Magri t t e B a t h e r s by a r i v e r (1916-17) Matisse Matisse I n t e r i o r a t Nice (1921) Pink nude (1935) Matisse Ma ti ss e The b i g r e d i n t e r i o r (1948) V i l l a g e s t r e e t i n E l g e r s b u r g (1905) Munch Weeping woman (1906-7) Munch Death o f Marat (1907) Munch The o l d g u i t a r i s t (1903) Picasso Mother and c h i l d (1921) Picasso Three musicians ( 1 9 2 1 ) Picasso The r o o s t e r and t h e k n i f e ( 1 9 4 7 ) Picasso Young people on t h e beach (1903-04) Munch

Boccioni Duchamp Ernst Kandinsky Kandinsky Kandinsky Kandinsky Kandinsky Klee Klee Klee Klee Kupka Kupka Lgger Lkger Magri t t e Malevich Matisse Matisse

Mir6 M i d

Mir6

A b s t r a c t works used i n Study 1 E l a s t i c i t y (1912) The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a v i r g i n i n t o a b r i d e ( 1 9 1 2 ) Mother and c h i l d r e n on p l a n e t E a r t h (1953) I m p r o v i s a t i o n 30 (1913) I m p r o v i s a t i o n ' K l a m m ' (1914) I n t h e b l a c k c i r c l e (1923) Q u i e t (1924) Several c i r c l e s (1926) To t h e s t a r s (1923) I n d i v i d u a l a l t i m e t r y of l a y e r s (1930) Drunkenness (1939) The s a i l o r (1940) V e r t i c a l p l a n e s , b l u e and r e d (1913) Philosophical architecture Composition (1918) B u t t e r f l i e s and f l o w e r s ( 1 9 3 7 ) The f a l s e m i r r o r (1928) S u p r e m a t i s t composition (1915-16) The k i n g ' s s a d n e s s (1952) The s n a i l (1953) C a t a l o n l a n d s c a p e , t h e h u n t e r (1923-24) Night b i r d ( 1 9 3 9 ) The w h i t e l a d y ( 1 9 5 0 )

Artists' 'messages'

Miro' Mondrian Mondrian Mondrian Villon Villon Villon

The violet color of the moon (1951) Oval composition (1914) Composition red-yellow-blue in a square (1926) Broadway boogie-woogie (1942-43) Joy (1932) Toward Chimaera (1947) Icarus (1956)

Subjects, in groups averaging 10 people, saw all 60 slides for 60 seconds each. Each single subject saw a painting only once, in either the correct or mirror-reversed orientation for R-paintings, and either the correct, or goo-rotated, 180° -rotated, or mirror-reversed orientation for A-paintings. When a new slide came on, the experimenter read either its correct title or a fictitious, unrelated, but not ridiculous title (e.g., 'Mother Nature' for Matisse's 'Pink nude'; 'Rocks 111' for Klee's 'Individual altimetry of layers'), or no title at all. In other words, the R versus A (type of painting) factor was examined on a within-subjects basis; the orientation factor (2 levels for R-paintings, 4 levels for A-paintings) and the title information factor ( 3 levels) were between-subjects. While viewing a slide, subjects rated the painting's pleasingness, interestingness, balance, emotional impact, appropriateness of title and willingness to buy a reproduction on 20 cm scales. These scales have been successfully used in prior work and their correlations are known (e.g., KoneEni and Sargent-Pollock, 1977; Sargent-Pollack and KoneEni, 1977). In addition, following the pleasingness, interestingness, emotional impact, and balance questions, the subjects indicated, in a multiple choice format, what made a painting pleasing, interesting, and so on (colour, composition, movement, subject, contrast and humour were among the options). Results When their effects were compared (in correct orientations), it was found that representational paintings were significantly (p .01, unless otherwise stated) more pleasing (M = 1 0 . 6 ) , more desirable to own (M = 8.3), more balanced ( M = 7.9, p . 0 5 ) , and had a greater emotional impact (M = 8.2) than did the abstract works (the respective means for A-paintings were 7.8, 6.8, 6.9 and 7.0). The two groups did not differ in terms of interestingness (Ms for R- and A-paintings were 11.2 and 11.0 respectively). The absence of effects of orientation for both groups of paintings and all rating dimensions was quite striking. In terms of pleasingness, mirror reversal changed the means quite negligibly, for R-paintings to 10.4 (from 10.6 in the correct orientation) and for A-paintings to 7.9 (from 7.8). Mirror reversal had similarly weak effects on other dimensions of judgment for both groups of paintings. The experimental analogue of hanging an abstract painting upside down (rotating it by 180') similarily had no effect on any of the dimensions of judgment (M for pleasin ness, for example, was 7.5). Only when an abstract % painting was rotated 90 was there a decrease, albeit very small (p . 0 5 ) . c o n d i t i o n was n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from chance

(F'

(x'

H.S. Hock

Discussion The r e s u l t s o f t h e experiment i n d i c a t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s encoded l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n with s u f f i c i e n t p r e c i s i o n t o d i s c r i m i n a t e among t h e 5 d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s of t h e b a r n , b u t o n l y when t h e y i n t e n t i o n a l l y t r i e d t o remember t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e main o b j e c t s i n t h e p a i n t i n g . A s i n Experiment 1, t h e r e s u l t s provided evidence t h a t t h e encoding o f r e l a t i o n a l l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n d i d n o t proceed i n a p u r e l y a u t o m a t i c manner. Otherwise, s u b j e c t s would have encoded t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e barn i n both t h e I n t e n t i o n a l and I n c i d e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s . The r e s u l t s t h e r e f o r e s u p p o r t e d t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t i n t h e absence o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t e l i c i t s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of imaginary p e r s p e c t i v e s , i n t e n t i o n is n e c e s s a r y t o a c t i v a t e mechanisms t h a t encode r e l a t i o n a l l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h e o b j e c t s i n a s c e n e . CONCLUSIONS The r e s u l t s o f t h e two e x p e r i m e n t s r e p o r t e d i n t h i s s t u d y i n d i c a t e d t h a t r e l a t i o n a l l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n f o r o b j e c t s i n a scene i s n o t encoded i n a completely a u t o m a t i c f a s h i o n . If t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r d e p i c t e d i n t h e s c e n e e l i c i t s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f imaginary p e r s p e c t i v e s , mechanisms i n v o l v e d i n If, coding r e l a t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n a r e a c t i v a t e d , a p p a r e n t l y a u t o m a t i c a l l y . however, t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r d e p i c t e d i n t h e s c e n e does n o t e l i c i t imaginary p e r s p e c t i v e s , t h e s t r a t e g i c i n t e n t i o n t o encode r e l a t i o n a l l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d . An examination o f p r e v i o u s l y r e p o r t e d developmental d a t a i n d i c a t e s t h a t young c h i l d r e n seem a u t o m a t i c a l l y t o encode t h e l o c a t i o n o f o b j e c t s i n r e l a t i o n t o p r o j e c t i v e r e f e r e n c e frames. However t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f n o n e g o c e n t r i c p e r s p e c t i v e s is n o t something t h a t young c h i l d r e n do w e l l , a t l e a s t when they must do s o s t r a t e g i c a l l y . C u r r e n t l y under i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s whether young c h i l d r e n who o t h e r w i s e have d i f f i c u l t y c o n s t r u c t i n g n o n e g o c e n t r i c p e r s p e c t i v e s can do s o with C h r i s t i n a ' s W o r l d , a s t i m u l u s which f o r a d u l t s seems t o e l i c i t such a c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o u t strategic intent. Reviewing i n my own mind t h e i s s u e s t h a t have been d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r , i t seems t o be t h a t t h e key to a l l e l s e is t h a t t h e predominant concern o f t h e p e r c e i v e r is t o determine t h e t h e m a t i c c o n t e n t o f a s c e n e . T h i s r e s u l t s i n t h e a c t i v a t i o n ( p r o b a b l y a u t o m a t i c a l l y ) o f mechanisms concerned with t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e v i s u a l f i e l d i n t o a h i e r a r c h y o f p e r c e p t u a l groups f o r t h e purposes o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e formal q u a l i t i e s o f o b j e c t s and encoding t h e m a t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t r e l a t i o n s among o b j e c t s . The e f f e c t o f p e r c e p t u a l g r o u p i n g , I have argued, i s t h e f o r m a t i o n of two-component p r o j e c t i v e l o c a t i o n codes for t h e e l e m e n t s composing t h e group: a c e n t r e - o f - g r a v i t y component based on a l l t h e e l e m e n t s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e g r o u p , and a d e v i a t i o n code s p e c i f i c t o i n d i v i d u a l e l e m e n t s . I then went on t o a r g u e t h a t 50 msec a f t e r moving o n e ' s f i x a t i o n t o a new p o i n t i n a s c e n e , i t becomes d i f f i c u l t t o r e t r i e v e both t h e c e n t r e - o f - g r a v i t y and d e v i a t i o n components o f t h e p r o j e c t i v e l o c a t i o n codes f o r t h e p r e v i o u s l y sampled i n f o r m a t i o n . Hence, t h e r e i s very q u i c k l y a s h a r p d e c r e a s e i n t h e p r e c i s i o n o f p r o j e c t i v e l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e p e r c e i v e r needs i n o r d e r t o make s e n s e o f a complex s c e n e . T h i s may be why our g a z e must c o n t i n u a l l y r e t u r n t o p o i n t s o f high t h e m a t i c importance i n sampling i n f o r m a t i o n from a s c e n e (Yarbus, 1 9 6 7 ) . The c o s t o f t h i s b i a s e d sampling is t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e v i s u a l f i e l d may never be processed by high r e s o l u t i o n mechanisms i n v o l v i n g f o v e a l v i s i o n , r e d u c i n g t h e p r e c i s i o n of p r o j e c t i v e l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e s e r e g i o n s . This c o s t may be f u r t h e r magnified by s h r i n k a g e i n t h e e f f e c t i v e f u n c t i o n a l f i e l d o f view ( i . e . , t u n n e l v i s i o n ) when t h e demands on f o v e a l v i s i o n are complex ( I k e d a and Takeuchi, 1 9 7 5 ) .

Imaginary perspectives

185

How then do we r e c o v e r from t h e s e l o s s e s i n p r o j e c t i v e l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n ? I n most c a s e s w e probably do n o t . Thematic c o n t e n t i s a l m o s t always more i m p o r t a n t t o u s t h a n t h e s p e c i f i c l o c a t i o n o f o b j e c t s . However, on o c c a s i o n s when we do concern o u r s e l v e s with t h e l o c a t i o n o f o b j e c t s i n a s c e n e , t h e r e are some remedies t h a t can be t a k e n . One i s more uniformly t o sample i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e s c e n e (Yarbus p r o v i d e s some e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h i s c o n j e c t u r e ) . A second remedy is i n t e n t i o n a l l y t o c o n s t r u c t imaginary p e r s p e c t i v e s t h a t a l l o w f o r t h e encoding o f h i g h l y c o n s t r a i n i n g alignment r e l a t i o n s among t h e o b j e c t s i n a scene ( a s s u g g e s t e d f o r F i g u r e 1 ) . I f imaginary p e r s p e c t i v e s a r e e l i c i t e d by t h e t h e m a t i c c o n t e n t o f t h e s c e n e , as i n ' C h r i s t i n a ' s h'OPZd, h i g h l y c o n s t r a i n i n g s p a t i a l alignment r e l a t i o n s may be encoded w i t h o u t i n t e n t i o n or e f f o r t . FOOTNOTES

1.

The r e s e a r c h r e p o r t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r was s u p p o r t e d by a g r a n t from t h e Army Research I n s t i t u t e ( #MDA903-82-V-0317). I thank L a r r y Malcus f o r h i s c a r e f u l r e a d i n g of t h e manuscript and t h e Department o f Experimental Psychology, U n i v e r s i t y o f Cambridge, England where t h e work was completed.

2.

Park and Mason (1982) found t h a t t h e r e t e n t i o n o f l o c a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n ( l e f t VS. r i g h t s i d e o f a s l i d e ) was b e t t e r when s u b j e c t s were i n s t r u c t e d t o s t u d y t h e items and t h e i r l o c a t i o n than when t h e y were i n s t r u c t e d t o s t u d y o n l y t h e items. They i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t l o c a t i o n memory was b e t t e r under i n t e n t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n , however, was c o n t r a d i c t e d by t h e i r f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e l o c a t i o n o f p i c t u r e s was r e t a i n e d with e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same a c c u r a c y when s u b j e c t s were i n s t r u c t e d t o s t u d y t h e i t e m s and t h e i r c o l o u r as when t h e y were i n s t r u c t e d t o s t u d y t h e items and t h e i r p o s i t i o n .

3.

Masangkay e t a1 (1974) have shown t h a t c h i l d r e n as young as t h r e e - y e a r s of age u n d e r s t a n d t h a t o t h e r people have viewing p e r s p e c t i v e s t h a t a r e d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e i r own. However, t h e i r a b i l i t y t o perform t h e v i s u a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o determine what t h e o t h e r p e r s o n s e e s i s a g e l i m i t e d . S i n c e t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s r e q u i r e d by P i a g e t and I n h e l d e r ' s (1948) three-mountain t a s k a r e r e l a t i v e l y complex, c h i l d r e n do n o t adequately d i s p l a y t h e i r nonegocentricity i n t h i s t a s k u n t i l about nine y e a r s of age.

4.

The d i s p l a c e m e n t o f 0.7 cm was e q u i v a l e n t t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - t h i r d o f t h e width of t h e barn.

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189

The A e s t h e t i c Experience and Mundane R e a l i t y

A.T.

Purcell

Sydney U n i v e r s i t y

Psychology and t h e a r t s have a l o n g and chequered r e l a t i o n s h i p . C e r t a i n l y t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p e x t e n d s from t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a s c i e n t i f i c psychology. Fechner (1876) a t t e m p t e d t o t e s t e x p e r i m e n t a l l y t h e importance o f t h e golden s e c t i o n by c o l l e c t i n g p r e f e r e n c e d a t a r e l a t i n g t o r e c t a n g l e s o f v a r y i n g p r o p o r t i o n s and examining a r t w o r k s f o r t h e p r e s e n c e o f s u c h r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h i s t y p e o f approach has r e a p p e a r e d i n t e r m i t t e n t l y s i n c e t h a t t i m e i n a v a r i e t y of c o n t e x t s and u s i n g a v a r i e t y o f materials. Some v a r i a t i o n s t o t h e b a s i c paradigm have o c c u r r e d : f o r example, Berlyne and h i s co-workers ( e . g . , Berlyne e t a l , 1974) have extended t h e r e s p o n s e s i d e o f t h e paradigm t o i n c l u d e s e t s o f work r e g a r d e d as r e p r e s e n t i n g d i f f e r e n t f a c e t s o f t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e ( c a l m / e x c i t i n g , simple/cornplex) and f a c t o r a n a l y s e d t h e c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x o b t a i n e d from t h e m a t r i x o f v e r b a l r e s p o n s e s by a e s t h e t i c s t i m u l u s m a t e r i a l averaged a c r o s s s u b j e c t s . The r e s u l t i n g f a c t o r s are r e g a r d e d as i d e n t i f y i n g u n d e r l y i n g dimensions o f t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e and t h e a e s t h e t i c s t i m u l u s material (e.g., e a c h p a i n t i n g ) can t h e n be g i v e n a s c o r e on e a c h o f t h e f a c t o r s a l l o w i n g an a n a l y s i s o f t h e a e s t h e t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the stimulus material as well as the a e s t h e t i c response. Another p e r h a p s l e s s d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between psychology and t h e a r t s arises from t h e c o n t i n u i n g i n t e r e s t t h a t h a s been shown i n t h e psychology of c r e a t i v i t y and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f c r e a t i v e people. T h i s i n t e r e s t was o f t e n based i n t h e a r e a of a b i l i t y t e s t i n g ( e . g . , G u i l f o r d and H o l l e y , 1949) or i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s ( e . g . , Barron, 1958). Much o f t h i s e a r l y work was a l s o r e l a t e d t o p o p u l a r c o n c e p t i o n s o f c r e a t i v i t y and t h a t c r e a t i v e t r a i t s were p a r t i c u l a r l y a s s o c i a t e d with artists. C r e a t i v i t y was a l s o c o n s i d e r e d t o be something a n i n d i v i d u a l e i t h e r d i d o r d i d n o t have and it was t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a b i l i t y which allowed c r e a t i v e i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e a r t s t o produce material c a p a b l e o f e l i c i t i n g a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e s i n o t h e r p e o p l e . Thus many s t u d i e s were conducted with p e o p l e who were c o n s i d e r e d t o have e x h i b i t e d c r e a t i v i t y i n t h e i r o u t p u t i n an a t t e m p t t o i d e n t i f y t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a b i l i t i e s . The q u e s t i o n o f whether or n o t c r e a t i v i t y is a n a b i l i t y p o s s e s s e d by a l l i n d i v i d u a l s b u t v a r y i n g i n d e g r e e or e x t e n t o r a n a b i l i t y unique t o p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s h a s i n more r e c e n t y e a r s g e n e r a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e d e b a t e . However, f o r a l a r g e p a r t o f i t s h i s t o r y i n psychology and c e r t a i n l y as a c o n t i n u i n g a t t i t u d e h e l d by t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c , b o t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l who 1 s c r e a t i v e , t h e work produced and, i n t h e c a s e o f a r t i s t s , t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e t o t h a t work, were r e g a r d e d as d i f f e r e n t and d i s t i n c t from o t h e r a b i l i t i e s and o t h e r t y p e s o f human e x p e r i e n c e .

can t h e r e f o r e be i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e two areas of psychology t h a t have had most t o do w i t h t h e arts. I t is a n assumption about t h e s e p a r a t e n e s s and d i f f e r e n c e between a r t o b j e c t s and t h e r e s p o n s e s t o them and everyday human behaviour and e x p e r i e n c e . I n a l l p r e f e r e n c e s t u d i e s t h e A b a s i c assumption

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s t i m u l u s material selected has only consisted of material i d e n t i f i a b l y the p r o d u c t o f a r t i s t i c endeavour, f o r example, sets o f p a i n t i n g s . S i m i l a r l y t h e response s t u d i e d h a s been p r e f e r e n c e or some s o r t o f v e r b a l r e s p o n s e s shown t o be e l i c i t e d by a r t i s t i c material. Both a s p e c t s have great f a c e v a l i d i t y . To s t u d y a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e s one should o b v i o u s l y s t u d y t h e o u t p u t o f artists: people e x h i b i t d i f f e r e n t i a l p r e f e r e n c e r e s p o n s e s t o what are c o n s i d e r e d t o be good and bad example o f a r t w o r k s ; p r e f e r e n c e i s t h e r e f o r e an obvious measure o f a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e and s o on. The aim o f t h i s c h a p t e r , however, is first t o a r g u e t h a t a f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e s can o n l y o c c u r when i t is p l a c e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a model which d e a l s w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s o f i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e is t h e same as t h e e x p e r i e n c e s r e s u l t i n g from t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t mundane r e a l i t y . R a t h e r t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e i s t h e r e s u l t o f a d i f f e r e n c e between t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a p a r t i c u l a r environment and t h e way t h i s i s o r g a n i z e d and remembered and t h e e x i s t i n g c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s concerned with ongoing everyday e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s g e n e r a l i d e a is n o t new. For example, Humphreys ( 1 9 7 3 ) p r e s e n t e d a c o n v i n c i n g argument about t h e r e l e v a n c e of s i m i l a r i t y and d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e a u t y and t h e i d e a o f u n i t y and d i v e r s i t y as t h e b a s i s f o r t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e is widespread i n a e s t h e t i c t h e o r y and t h r o u g h o u t t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e arts. Here I first r e v i e w b r i e f l y some r e c e n t models o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f everyday e x p e r i e n c e developed i n c o g n i t i v e psychology and review r e c e n t work on t h e g e n e s i s o f emotion. I t h e n develop a model o f t h e mechanism f o r t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e . The model i s a l s o s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c t o p e r m i t e x p e r i m e n t a l tests o f i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s ; a n d , i n t h e second p a r t o f t h e c h a p t e r , I p r e s e n t t h e r e s u l t s o f one such experiment. THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE

Most o f u s do n o t r e a l i z e t h a t e v e r y time we l o o k a t t h e same s c e n e i t w i l l b e d i f f e r e n t t o t h e p r e v i o u s time we looked a t i t . Even two s e q u e n t i a l g l a n c e s a t a s c e n e w i l l be d i f f e r e n t - t h e l i g h t i n g can change, head or body movement and s o on. The r e t i n a l image on which o u r v i s u a l e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e scene depends is t h e r e f o r e v a r y i n g t o a greater o r lesser e x t e n t through time, and y e t we p e r c e i v e t h e s c e n e as c o n s t a n t . S i m i l a r i l y we a r e a l l aware o f d i f f e r e n c e s between i n s t a n c e s o f t h e same c l a s s o f t h i n g s s e e n on d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s . For example, we a r e aware o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e g r e a t v a r i e t y o f p a r t i c u l a r dogs we have s e e n , b u t r e c o g n i z e them a l l a s dogs. The problem f o r t h e s t u d y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e environment t h e r e f o r e is how can o u r r e s p o n s e b e t o t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s between s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n t o t h e differences. This is i n f a c t a q u e s t i o n about how w e form c a t e g o r i e s which c o n t a i n similar i n s t a n c e s . A v e r y common approach u n t i l r e c e n t l y was t o a r g u e t h a t w e have a l i s t o f a t t r i b u t e s s t o r e d i n memory ( t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e a t t r i b u t e s b e i n g p o s s i b l y d i f f e r e n t i n s h o r t - and long-term memory) t o which w e compare t h e c u r r e n t i n s t a n c e . If t h e two match, t h e y a r e t r e a t e d as b e i n g similar. However, s u c h an approach h a s a number o f problems. We would a l l agree t h a t a cow i s an animal w i t h f o u r l e g s . Four l e g s would t h e r e f o r e a p p e a r t o be one of t h e a t t r i b u t e s on t h e c r i t e r i a 1 list. However, i f we are exposed t o a three-legged cow w e s t i l l c l a s s i f y it as a cow. A f i x e d c r i t e r i a l list o f a t t r i b u t e s r e q u i r i n g t h e p r e s e n c e of a l l a t t r i b u t e s b e f o r e

Aesthetic experience and mundane reality

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c l a s s i f i c a t i o n c a n occur h a s problems d e a l i n g with obvious a s p e c t s of o u r a b i l i t y t o respond t o similar i n s t a n c e s . R e c e n t l y , however, a number o f a u t h o r s have e l a b o r a t e d models based on a p r o p o s a l by W i t t g e n s t e i n (1953) t h a t family resemblance was t h e b a s i s f o r c a t e g o r y f o r m a t i o n . This approach i s p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by Rosch's work on n a t u r a l c a t e g o r i e s (Rosch, 1977; Rosch and Mervis, 1975) and Smith e t a l ' s (1974) model of semantic memory. Rosch a r g u e s t h a t c a t e g o r i e s a r e formed around p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s t h a t e x h i b i t t h e l a r g e s t number o f a t t r i b u t e s i n common w i t h a l l o t h e r members o f t h e c a t e g o r y . This e x a m p l e ( s ) is c a l l e d t h e p r o t o t y p e . Other c a t e g o r y members s h a r e g r e a t e r or lesser numbers o f a t t r i b u t e s with the prototype. If a n instance h a s many a t t r i b u t e s i n common with t h e p r o t o t y p e i t w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d a p a r t i c u l a r l y good example o f t h e c a t e g o r y . Two n o n - p r o t o t y p i c a l examples c a n , however, s h a r e d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s or p a r t l y o v e r l a p p i n g s e t s o f a t t r i b u t e s with t h e p r o t o t y p e and s t i l l be c o n s i d e r e d as e q u a l l y good members o f t h e c a t e g o r y . If t h i s d e s c r i b e s t h e c a t e g o r y f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s t h e problem o f t h e cow with t h r e e l e g s d i s a p p e a r s - i t would be recognized as a cow because i t would have a l a r g e degree o f o v e r l a p w i t h t h e p r o t o t y p e cow. I t would n o t , I e x p e c t , be regarded as t h e b e s t example o f a cow b u t probably an e q u a l l y good example as a cow w i t h no t a i l . This is what i s meant by a f a m i l y resemblance r e l a t i o n s h i p and a similar i d e a occurs i n Smith e t a l ' s (1974) concept o f d e f i n i n g and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a t t r i b u t e s of a word's meaning. Rosch and h e r c o l l e a g u e s i n an e x t e n s i v e s e r i e s o f experiments u s i n g a v a r i e t y of convepging methods have c o n v i n c i n g l y shown t h a t such a p r o c e s s does occur i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f n a t u r a l c a t e g o r i e s such as b i r d s , v e g e t a b l e s , and f u r n i t u r e . PROCESSING OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION T h i s does n o t , however, d e s c r i b e how t h e p r o c e s s o c c u r s i n ongoing everyday I t is a model o f c a t e g o r y f o r m a t i o n , n o t o f t h e use of s u c h experience. categories t o s o l v e t h e problem posed by v a r i a t i o n i n t h e i n p u t from t h e environment. A number o f a u t h o r s , however, have proposed t h a t we b u i l d up, on t h e b a s i s o f o u r c o n t i n u i n g e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e environment mental s t r u c t u r e s c a l l e d schemas, frames or s c r i p t s . These are mental o r g a n i z a t i o n s which p r o c e s s chunks o f e x p e r i e n c e . These chunks d e a l w i t h f o r example, k i t c h e n s , a s p e c t s of t h e environment s u c h as whole s c e n e s g a r d e n s , houses e t c . -- and t h e y c o n t a i n d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h e s c e n e v a r y i n g between v e r y d e t a i l e d p e r c e p t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n t o more a b s t r a c t , c o n c e p t u a l a t t r i b u t e s and relationships. These schemas are a l s o a r r a n g e d i n h i e r a r c h i e s which v a r y from t h e s p e c i f i c t o t h e g e n e r a l r o b i n , b i r d , m a m m a l , animal, l i v i n g t h i n g . I t is t h e n argued t h a t , a t each of t h e l e v e l s o f a h i e r a r c h y , i s s t o r e d a set o f a t t r i b u t e s f o r o b j e c t s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s , c a l l e d t h e d e f a u l t v a l u e s , which we match c u r r e n t e x p e r i e n c e a g a i n s t . If t h e r e i s a s u f f i c i e n t match t h e n w e c l a s s i f y t h e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i n immediate e x p e r i e n c e as a member o f t h e categ0t.y. These models make no e x p l i c i t s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of d e f a u l t v a l u e s : however, I propose t h a t t h e d e f a u l t v a l u e s found i n t h e s e schemas a r e t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e p r o t o t y p e .

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A number o f r e c e n t experiments have t e s t e d hypotheses d e r i v e d from s u c h models o f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e environment. P a r t i c u l a r y i n t e r e s t i n g from t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h i s c h a p t e r , however, h a s been work where p e o p l e ' s a b i l i t y t o r e c o g n i z e changes t o s c e n e s h a s been t e s t e d . For example, Friedman (1979) p r e s e n t e d i n d i v i d u a l s with a number o f everyday s c e n e s and t h e n t e s t e d t h e i r memory f o r v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f t h e scenes. A number o f d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f changes

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had been made t o t h e s c e n e s p r i o r t o t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n . O b j e c t s w i t h i n t h e s c e n e s had been c l a s s i f i e d as o b l i g a t o r y , non-obligatory and unexpected on t h e b a s i s of p r i o r r a t i n g s o f t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f f i n d i n g t h e s e o b j e c t s i n a p a r t i c u l a r s c e n e . Changes were made t o each o f t h e s e classes o f o b j e c t s , and it was found t h a t o n l y changes i n v o l v i n g t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f unexpected o b j e c t s i n t o a s c e n e were r e c o g n i z e d and remembered. Friedman i n t e r p r e t s t h i s t o mean t h a t p r o v i d i n g t h e r e is a s u f f i c i e n t f i t t o t h e d e f a u l t v a l u e s a t t h e r e l e v a n t l e v e l s i n t h e c o g n i t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n we respond as though t h e o b j e c t s w i t h t h o s e v a l u e s had been p r e s e n t and t h e r e f o r e f a i l t o d e t e c t and remember a l t e r a t i o n s t o o b l i g a t o r y and nono b l i g a t o r y o b j e c t s . Ongoing e x p e r i e n c e t h e r e f o r e c o n s i s t s o f matching c u r r e n t p e r c e p t u a l i n p u t t o s t o r e d p r o t o t y p e s . Where a s u f f i c i e n t m i s match o c c u r s , as when unexpected o b j e c t s are p r e s e n t , w e pay a t t e n t i o n t o and engage i n e x t r a p r o c e s s i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t n a t a s p e c t o f t h e external situation. EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE AND EMOTION

It i s t h i s a s p e c t o f t h e model o f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e environment which p r o v i d e s t h e l i n k t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f emotion. Most work i n psychology on t h e e m o t i o n s h a s been e l e m e n t a l i n o r i e n t a t i o n : t h a t i s , i t was a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e were a number o f independent t y p e s o f emotion - happy, e x c i t e d , drowsy and so on. However, S c h a c h t e r and S i n g e r (1962) d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t emotion depended on autonomic nervous system a r o u s a l and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e a r o u s a l o c c u r r e d . Thus d i f f e r e n t emotions s u c h as h a p p i n e s s o r a n g e r c o u l d be induced i n i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h t h e same a r o u s a l l e v e l ( r e s u l t i n g from i n j e c t i o n s of a d r e n a l i n ) a s a f u n c t i o n of what happened t o t h e a r o u s e d i n d i v i d u a l . When a c o n f e d e r a t e o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r a c t e d i n a happy, j o y f u l manner t h e s u b j e c t s r e p o r t e d e x p e r i e n c i n g s i m i l a r f e e l i n g s ; w h i l e i f t h e c o n f e d e r a t e w a s a n g r y and a b u s i v e t h e s u b j e c t a l s o e x p e r i e n c e d a n g e r . F i n d i n g s s u c h as t h i s l e d Mandler (1975) t o propose a model o f t h e c a u s a t i o n of emotional e x p e r i e n c e . Mandler argued t h a t any i n t e r r u p t i o n o r b l o c k i n g o f ongoing behaviour r e s u l t s i n autonomic nervous system a r o u s a l . He u s e s ' b e h a v i o u r ' i n t h e g e n e r a l s e n s e t h a t i n psychology i n c l u d e s mental The consequences of its a c t i v i t y as w e l l as o v e r t motor behaviour. i n t e n s i t y w i l l depend on what happens s u b s e q u e n t l y whether t h e and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n i n t e r r u p t i o n can b e overcome Mandlerls model t h e r e f o r e i n c l u d e s a s a n o t h e r which i t occurred. consequence o f i n t e r r u p t i o n o r b l o c k i n g , a t t e n t i o n and f u r t h e r c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y . The p a r a l l e l with t h e work on t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and p r o c e s s i n g o f chunks o f e x p e r i e n c e r e p r e s e n t e d by F r i e d m a n ' s work i s obvious - t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f unexpected o b j e c t s w i t h i n a s c e n e l e a d s t o f u r t h e r c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y and r e p r e s e n t s i n M a n d l e r ' s terms a b l o c k i n g or i n t e r r u p t i o n which w i l l t h e r e f o r e r e s u l t i n emotional e x p e r i e n c e .

--

--

I would a r g u e t h a t t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e conforms t o t h i s model. That is, a work o f a r t (and t h i s a p p l i e s t o both more r e c e n t e x p e r i m e n t a l a r t forms as well as t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ) p r e s e n t s u s w i t h a n e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t i m u l u s which c o n t a i n s unexpected ( n o n - d e f a u l t ) v a l u e s ; t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a b l o c k i n g o f an ongoing r e s p o n s e which r e s u l t s i n a t t e n t i o n and f u r t h e r a c t i v i t y and emotional e x p e r i e n c e . The e x t e n t o f t h e r e s p o n s e and t h e t y p e w i l l govern t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e emotion e x p e r i e n c e d . Thus t h e r a n g e o f emotional a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e can v a r y between p l e a s a n t , a t t r a c t i v e f e e l i n g s ( a t low l e v e l s o f b l o c k i n g and t y p e o f unexpectedness combined w i t h s u c c e s s f u l p r o c e s s i n g of t h e d i s c r e p a n c y through e x c i t e m e n t and extreme

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i n t e r e s t ) t o e x t r e m e l y n e g a t i v e emotions ( r e s u l t i n g from extreme and unusual a l t e r a t i o n s t o an e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h f a i l u r e t o r e s o l v e t h e d i s c r e p a n c y by e x t r a c o g n i t i v e p r o c e s s i n g ) .

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN My e x p e r i m e n t a l work h a s been based on t h e above model. Before d i s c u s s i n g one experiment t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e model I i n t r o d u c e a number o f s p e c i f i c i d e a s about t h e way i n which t h e e x p e r i m e n t s were done. Amongst t h e many methods Rosch h a s used t o s t u d y whether or n o t p r o t o t y p e s a r e t h e b a s i s o f c a t e g o r y f o r m a t i o n is t h e r a t i n g o f d e g r e e o f goodness o f example o f a number o f i n s t a n c e s o f t h e c a t e g o r y . If i n s t a n c e s o f c a t e g o r y v a r y i n t h e number o f a t t r i b u t e s t h e y s h a r e with t h e c a t e g o r y p r o t o t y p e , i t would be e x p e c t e d t h a t r a t i n g s of widely d i s t r i b u t e d i n s t a n c e s would vary a l l t h e way from low r a t i n g s , i n d i c a t i n g v e r y poor examples, t o high r a t i n g s , i n d i c a t i n g v e r y good examples, and t h e h i g h e s t r a t i n g being i n t e r p r e t a b l e u n d e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n d i t i o n s as approximating t h e p r o t o t y p e . I f , as argued above, a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e s v a r y i n i n t e n s i t y and t y p e depending on t h e e x t e n t and t y p e o f d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o t o t y p e , t h e n c a r e f u l s e l e c t i o n o f examples from t h e s t i m u l u s domain o f i n t e r e s t s h o u l d e n s u r e v a r y i n g d e g r e e s o f e x t e n t and t y p e o f d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o t o t y p e .

F u r t h e r t h e i n t e n s i t y and t y p e of a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e c o u l d be indexed by a l s o having r a t i n g s o f a t t r a c t i v e n e s s , i n t e r e s t and p r e f e r e n c e . If t h e model i s c o r r e c t i t would be e x p e c t e d t h a t a t t r a c t i v e n e s s would be more c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o goodness of example t h a n i n t e r e s t b u t n o t i d e n t i c a l w i t h goodness o f example. The p r e f e r e n c e o f r e s p o n s e would i n d i c a t e whether an o v e r a l l a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e w a s r e l a t e d t o g r e a t e r or l e s s e r d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o t o t y p e . S i m i l a r i l y a n examination o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p o o r examples, t h e l e a s t a t t r a c t i v e , l e a s t i n t e r e s t i n g and l e a s t p r e f e r r e d s h o u l d r e v e a l whether or n o t t h e least a t t r a c t i v e and l e a s t p r e f e r r e d c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o p o o r examples o r u n i n t e r e s t i n g examples. The v a r i o u s r a t i n g s can be u s e d t o t e s t t h i s i d e a r e l a t i v e l y d i r e c t l y . For each o f t h e s t i m u l i a mean v a l u e a c r o s s r e s p o n d e n t s can be c a l c u l a t e d f o r each o f t h e s c a l e s . Measures of c o v a r i a t i o n or c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s can t h e n be c a l c u l a t e d which w i l l i n d i c a t e how similar t h e judgements on e a c h p a i r o f scales a r e . If a t t r a c t i v e n e s s r e p r e s e n t s r e l a t i v e l y small d e p a r t u r e s from t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e p r o t o t y p e a h i g h b u t n o t p e r f e c t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n would b e p r e d i c t e d . If i n t e r e s t r e p r e s e n t s g r e a t e r d e p a r t u r e s from t h e p r o t o t y p e , l o w e r c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h goodness o f example, r a t i n g s would be e x p e c t e d w i t h h i g h e r c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . These r e l a t i v e l y d i r e c t a s s e s s m e n t s o f t h e model c o u l d however be m i s l e a d i n g . Producing a v e r a g e s c a l e s f o r e a c h t y p e o f r a t i n g i m p l e s t h a t t h e y are u n i d i m e n s i o n a l : t h a t i s , t h e p r o c e s s by which t h e judgement was made t o o k a c c o u n t o f o n l y one a t t r i b u t e o f t h e s t i m u l u s . However, i t is easy t o imagine t h a t t h e same degree of a t t r a c t i v e n e s s , f o r example, could t h e n b e t h e r e s u l t o f d i f f e r e n t combinations o f a t t r i b u t e s : t h a t is, t h e p r o c e s s may b e multi-dimensional. Fortunately, it is possible t o test t h i s idea u s i n g t h e same s e t of r a t i n g - s c a l e r e s p o n s e s . R a t h e r t h a n simply a v e r a g i n g a c r o s s i n d i v i d u a l s t o g i v e a mean s c o r e f o r each s t i m u l u s it is p o s s i b l e t o c a l c u l a t e an i n d e x o f s i m i l a r i t y between each s t i m u l u s and a l l t h e o t h e r s t i m u l i . T h i s g i v e s a s e t o f measurements o f t h e degree o f s i m i l a r i t y between a l l p a i r s of s t i m u l i and t h i s c a n be a n a l y s e d t o t e s t how

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many u n d e r l y i n g dimensions a r e r e q u i r e d t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between each s t i m u l u s and e v e r y o t h e r s t i m u l u s . Both t y p e s o f a n a l y s i s were used i n t h e experiments t o be r e p o r t e d . Thus c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s can be used t o assess t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s c a l e s o r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s , while measures o f s i m i l a r i t y a r e used t o examine r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s t i m u l i f o r each scale s e p a r a t e l y . Any t y p e o f s t i m u l u s m a t e r i a l c o u l d be used t o t e s t t h i s model; however, t h e r e s u l t s t o be d i s c u s s e d come from a s t u d y u s i n g houses a s t h e s t i m u l i . T h i s o b v i o u s l y r e f l e c t s my i n t e r e s t i n a r c h i t e c t u r e . However, n o t o n l y i s a r c h i t e c t u r e i n g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r e d one o f t h e a r t s , b u t t h e d e s i g n o f s i n g l e houses has been a n area o f a r c h i t e c t u r e where c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t s have been expended by a r c h i t e c t s a t t e m p t i n g t o r e a l i z e t h e h i g h e s t a e s t h e t i c aims. The s t u d y t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e d a s e l e c t i o n o f 43 s i n g l e , detached houses. The o t h e r advantage of u s i n g s t i m u l i such as houses i s t h a t i t is p o s s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y examples r a n g i n g from t h e everyday suburban house where l i t t l e c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t was expended on i t s a e s t h e t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o houses where a r c h i t e c t s a t t h e f o r e f r o n t o f d e s i g n are c o n s c i o u s l y and d e l i b e r a t e l y p u r s u i n g a e s t h e t i c aims. A sample o f forty-two s t u d e n t s drawn from a l l f a c u l t i e s and l e v e l s a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Sydney were p a i d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e s t u d y . They were shown e a c h o f t h e s l i d e s f o u r times and each time were asked t o r a t e e a c h s l i d e i n terms o f goodness o f example, i n t e r e s t and p r e f e r e n c e . RESULTS C o r r e l a t i o n s between Judgment Types The f i r s t a n a l y s i s c o n s i s t e d o f c a l c u l a t i n g c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s between a l l p a i r s o f r a t i n g s . These are p r e s e n t e d i n Table 1. A c l e a r e r i d e a o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between each of t h e judgments can b e g a i n e d from t h e g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n below Table 1 (see p a r t A ) . T h i s was o b t a i n e d by c a r r y i n g o u t a p r i n c i p a l components a n a l y s i s of t h e mean r a t i n g s f o r e a c h house on t h e f o u r judgment s c a l e s . Two p r i n c i p a l components ( t h e a x e s i n t h e diagram) accounted f o r 98% o f t h e v a r i a n c e . The l o c a t i o n o f each o f t h e scales i n t h i s s p a c e i s i n d i c a t e d . The h o r i z o n t a l f a c t o r ( F a c t o r 1 ) accounted f o r 68% o f t h e v a r i a n c e and is o b v i o u s l y c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e goodness o f example, a t t r a c t i v e n e s s and p r e f e r e n c e r a t i n g s . I n t e r e s t is more c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e v e r t i c a l f a c t o r ( F a c t o r 2 ) and a c c o u n t s f o r 30% o f t h e v a r i a n c e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y less t h a n t h e f i r s t f a c t o r . I t i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n r e f l e c t s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s p r e d i c t e d by t h e model. A t t r a c t i v e n e s s i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o goodness o f example, p r e f e r e n c e i s v e r y c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o a t t r a c t i v e n e s s b u t less c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o goodness o f example. I n t e r e s t i s s l i g h t l y n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h goodness o f example, s l i g h t l y p o s i t i v e l y w i t h a t t r a c t i v e n e s s ( n e i t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y ) and p o s i t i v e l y and s i g n i f i c a n t l y with p r e f e r e n c e a l t h o u g h t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n i s q u i t e small. While n o t t h e main emphasis of t h e c h a p t e r , t h i s diagram can b e used t o i l l u s t r a t e how a n o t h e r theme o f c o n t i n u i n g i n t e r e s t i n a e s t h e t i c s can be accommodated by t h e p r e s e n t model. The q u e s t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y as a f u n c t i o n o f v a r i a b l e s such as s o c i a l c l a s s o r e d u c a t i o n , h a s r e c e n t l y been reviewed by Eysenck ( 1 9 8 1 ) . A s w e l l as c o l l e c t i n g t h i s d a t a set from a widely d i s t r i b u t e d group o f u n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s t h e experiment has a l s o been conducted w i t h a group of s e v e n t e e n t h i r d - y e a r a r c h i t e c t u r e s t u d e n t s . The r e s u l t s of a p r i n c i p a l components a n a l y s i s o f t h e i r d a t a are p r e s e n t e d i n Table 1 ( B ) .

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TABLE 1 Correlation coefficients between the rating scales and graphic illustration based on a principal components analysis of general sample ( A ) and architectural students (B).

Preference

Goodness of Example

A

0.77

B

0.20

A

0.31

B

0.76

Interest

A

0.95

B

0.93

Attractiveness

\

Preference

A

B P

Goodness o f examp 1e

kInterest

4 U

Preference * A t t r a c t i veness*

Preference * Attractiveness, FACTOR 1

FACTOR 1

Goodness o f example

*

Interest

*

A. Z Purcrll

196

FIGURE 1 Multi-dimensional s c a l i n g of t h e goodness o f example r a t i n g s of t h e a r c h i t e c t u r e s t u d e n t group.

I

I

.

\

\ \

\

\ \

\ \

\ \

\ I

197

Aesthetic experience and mundane reality

FIGURE 2 Multi-dimensional scaling of the goodness of example ratings of the general student group.

1.o

-1.0

-2.0

2.0

I

1 \

2.0

2.0 I

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1.o

1.0

LO 15s)

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-: c

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0

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0 :

0

-42(S41

33

.%

-1.0

-1.0

-2.0

-2.0

-1.0

-1.0

Dlmo

GOODNESS

OF EXAMPLE

198

A. 7: Plrrcell

Again,two components accounted f o r 98% o f t h e v a r i a n c e , however, i n t h i s case, f a c t o r I which accounted f o r 68% o f t h e v a r i a n c e was most c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o i n t e r e s t , a t t r a c t i v e n e s s and p r e f e r e n c e , while goodness o f example is most c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o f a c t o r 2 which a c c o u n t s f o r 30% o f t h e v a r i a n c e . A r c h i t e c t u r e s t u d e n t s t h e r e f o r e g i v e g r e a t e r emphasis t o t h e i n t e r e s t dimension and t h e i r preferencejattractiveness judgments a r e r e l a t e d t o t h i s dimension r a t h e r t h a n t h e goodness o f example dimension which was t h e c a s e w i t h t h e more widely s e l e c t e d s t u d e n t sample. However, t h e two sets o f goodness o f example judgments a r e q u i t e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d ; t h e y c o r r e l a t e 0.77. C l e a r l y t h e b a s i c o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e material is t h e same i n b o t h cases; t h a t i s i n terms o f goodness o f example and i n t e r e s t . The d i f f e r e n c e s l i e i n t h e emphasis g i v e n t o e a c h and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e two dimensions and p r e f e r e n c e / a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . T h i s i s even more a p p a r e n t i n t h e multi-dimensional s c a l i n g of t h e goodness-of-example d a t a where t h e two c o n f i g u r a t i o n s a r e v e r y similar ( S e e F i g u r e s 1 and 2 ) . Multidimensional S c a l i n g A n a l y s i s The second t y p e o f a n a l y s i s d i s c u s s e d above was used t o s a y something a b o u t which houses were good examples, a t t r a c t i v e , p r e f e r r e d or i n t e r e s t i n g and what a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e houses l e d t o t h e s e d i f f e r i n g judgments. The approach used was m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l s c a l i n g . T h i s t a k e s t h e c a l c u l a t e d s i m i l a r i t y between a l l t h e p a i r s o f houses f o r e a c h judgment t y p e and c o n s t r u c t s a g e o m e t r i c model based on E u c l i d i a n d i s t a n c e s i n one o r more dimensions. A measure o f how well t h e model f i t s t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s i n e a c h o f t h e dimensions i s c a l c u l a t e d and t h i s i s used t o d e c i d e how many I n t h i s case i t was q u i t e clear t h a t two dimensions dimensions a r e needed. were s u f f i c i e n t f o r each t y p e o f judgment; and i t is p o s s i b l e t h e r e f o r e t o produce a map showing t h e p o s i t i o n s o f e a c h o f t h e houses i n t h i s space. The goodness-of-example map or c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r t h e g e n e r a l s t u d e n t sample is shown i n F i g u r e 2. The number i n b r a c k e t s n e x t t o t h e number i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s t i m u l u s i s t h e mean r a t i n g f o r t h a t s l i d e . If t h e a x e s are r o t a t e d s l i g h t l y as shown by t h e d o t t e d l i n e s i n t h e f i g u r e ( a p e r m i s s i b l e procedure as t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e a x e s is n o t u n i q u e l y determined by t h e a n a l y s i s ) i t i s c l e a r t h a t Dimension 1 r e p r o d u c e s t h e goodness-of-example r a t i n g s w i t h t h e h i g h e s t a t t h e l e f t hand end and t h e l o w e s t a t t h e r i g h t . There i s a l s o clear evidence o f a second dimension which, however, seems t o be asymmetric w i t h i t s t o p end c l o s e r t o t h e b e s t examples and i t s lower end c l o s e r t o t h e worst examples. F i g u r e 3 p r e s e n t s t h e two-dimensional c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r t h e i n t e r e s t judgments, Again t h e figures i n b r a c k e t s r e p r e s e n t t h e a v e r a g e r a t i n g f o r e a c h house. Here a g a i n t h e s l i g h t l y r o t a t e d Dimension 1 r e f l e c t s t h e o r d e r o f i n t e r e s t r a t i n g s , i n t h i s c a s e with t h e h i g h e s t r a t i n g s a t t h e r i g h t hand end and t h e lowest a t t h e l e f t . As well as r o t a t i o n s b e i n g p e r m i s s i b l e r e f l e c t i o n s a l s o do n o t i n d i c a t e any d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i n t h i s t y p e o f a n a l y s i s . If t h e s t i m u l i a t each end o f Dimension 1 are examined i t becomes a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e s t i m u l i a t t h e high i n t e r e s t end ( 2 7 , 26, 25, 1 6 ) are t h o s e a t t h e lower end o f Dimension 2 i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e goodness o f example r a t i n g s . S i m i l a r l y t h e l e a s t i n t e r e s t i n g examples ( 3 9 , 1 7 , 1 3 , 43) are t h o s e a t t h e t o p end o f t h e second dimension i n t h e goodness of example r a t i n g s . If e i t h e r end o f Dimension 2 i n t h i s a n a l y s i s i s examined i t is found t h a t t h e y c o n t a i n t h e same s t i m u l i a8 t h e extremes o f Dimension 1 on t h e goodness-of-example c a s e . Note a l s o t h a t t h e Dimension 2 i n t h e i n t e r e s t a n a l y s i s is a l s o o b l i q u e t o Dimension 1.

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A. 1: Atreell

Here t h e b e s t examples a r e c l o s e r t o t h e i n t e r e s t i n g end w h i l e t h e w o r s t examples are c l o s e r t o t h e n o n - i n t e r e s t i n g end. I t is as though i n t h e two c a s e s t h e same u n d e r l y i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n e x i s t s b u t t h a t t h i s i s a l t e r e d i n o p p o s i t e ways depending on t h e judgment b e i n g made. When a goodness-of-example judgment i s made g r e a t e r emphasis is p u t on t h i s dimension which is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s t r e t c h i n g o f Dimension 1 and t h e s h r i n k i n g o f Dimension 2 i n t h e f i r s t a n a l y s i s . Conversely when i n t e r e s t judgments a r e b e i n g made what w a s Dimension 2 i n t h e goodness-of-example r e c e i v e s l e s s emphasis. I t is c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e second dimension i n t h e first a n a l y s i s c o r r e s p o n d s t o an i n t e r e s t dimension and t h e l a c k o f c o r r e l a t i o n between goodness o f example and i n t e r e s t i s m i s l e a d i n g i f i n t e r p r e t e d as i n d i c a t i n g no r e l a t i o n s h i p . The two a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d i n a q u i t e unique and meaningful way. F i g u r e 4 p r e s e n t s t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s r a t i n g s and a g a i n t h e f i g u r e s i n b r a c k e t s r e p r e s e n t t h e mean ratings f o r e a c h house. A t t h e l e f t hand end o f Dimension 1 are t h e most a t t r a c t i v e houses ( 2 0 , 4 2 , 8 , 6 , 11) and t h e s e a r e t h e h o u s e s t h a t are judged as t h e b e s t examples (see F i g u r e 2). S i m i l a r i l y t h e l e a s t a t t r a c t i v e are a l s o t h e w o r s t examples. T h i s r e f l e c t s t h e high c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e two s e t s o f judgments. The houses a t t h e t o p and bottom o f Dimension 2 i n t h i s c a s e are a l s o t h e houses a t t h e t o p and bottom o f Dimension 2 i n t h e goodness-of-example a n a l y s i s and a t t h e t o p and bottom o f Dimension 1 i n t h e i n t e r e s t a n a l y s i s . Thus t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is t h e same i n attractivenss as i n t h e p r e v i o u s two a n a l y s e s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g however t h a t t h e asymmetry i n t h e p r e v i o u s c o n f i g u r a t i o n s h a s now d i s a p p e a r e d and t h e o v e r a l l c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s l e s s e l l i p t i c a l and more c i r c u l a r . T h i s may i n d i c a t e t h a t on t h i s judgment more e q u a l emphasis is b e i n g g i v e n t o t h e two dimensions a l t h o u g h t h e s t r o n g e r emphasis is on goodness o f example as t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s would s u g g e s t . F i g u r e 5 i s t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n f o r t h e p r e f e r e n c e judgments. An examination o f t h i s r e v e a l s e x a c t l y t h e same p a t t e r n as i n t h e p r e v i o u s a n a l y s e s . Here again t h e o v e r a l l c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s more c i r c u l a r b u t t h i s time w i t h a s u g g e s t i o n o f a g r e a t e r r o l e f o r i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r e f e r e n c e judgment. I n e f f e c t t h e s e r e s u l t s d e m o n s t r a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p which h a s been well documented i n t h e a e s t h e t i c and environmental p e r c e p t i o n l i t e r a t u r e . I n s t u d i e s u s i n g t h e semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l t e c h n i q u e two f a c t o r s o c c u r r e p e a t e d l y a l t h o u g h with v a r y i n g d e g r e e s o f c l a r i t y . The first is an a t t r a c t i v e / p l e a s a n t n e s s f a c t o r o f t e n l i n k e d with Osgood e t a l l s (1957) e v a l u a t i v e f a c t o r and an i n t e r e s t f a c t o r o f t e n l i n k e d with Osgood's a c t i v i t y f a c t o r . These have been c o n s i d e r e d as i n d e p e n d e n t a s p e c t s o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . However, as Ekblad (1980) has p o i n t e d o u t , t h e p a t t e r n o f r e s u l t s o f a large number o f s t u d i e s h a s a number o f a m b i g u i t i e s . These r e s u l t s demonstrate t h a t a t t r a c t i v e n e s s and i n t e r e s t a r e i m p o r t a n t i n such judgments b u t t h a t t h e y are n o t independent as p r e v i o u s models would r e q u i r e . O f perhaps f a r greater importance is t h e c l e a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n i n t h i s experiment o f t h e a b s o l u t e l y b a s i c importance o f goodness o f example i n b o t h a t t r a c t i v e n e s s , p r e f e r e n c e and i n t e r e s t . I t i s t h i s s e t o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s which makes s e n s e of t h e attractiveness/preference and i n t e r e s t r e s u l t s i n previous studies.

I t a l s o p r o v i d e s s i g n i f i c a n t e v i d e n c e f o r t h e t y p e o f model d i s c u s s e d i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n which e x p l i c i t l y d e a l s w i t h t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o everyday e x p e r i e n c e . I n b r i e f t h e house c a t e g o r y is p r o t o t y p i c a l l y a r r a n g e d as i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e ratings o f goodness o f example, However, t h e s e r a t i n g s are t h e r e s u l t o f two u n d e r l y i n g p r o c e s s e s - goodness

Aesthetic experience arid murulane reality

203

o f example and i n t e r e s t . I n t e r e s t r a t i n g s e x h i b i t e x a c t l y t h e same o r g a n i z a t i o n e x c e p t t h a t t h e a x e s show a d i f f e r e n t i a l s t r e t c h i n g and rotation. A t t r a c t i v e n e s s and p r e f e r e n c e a l s o e x h i b i t t h e same u n d e r l y i n g c o n f i g u r a t i o n . However, h e r e t h e a x e s are d i s p l a c e d s l i g h t l y away from goodness o f example towards i n t e r e s t f o r a t t r a c t i v e n e s s and s l i g h t l y more towards i n t e r e s t f o r p r e f e r e n c e . These r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e e x h i b i t e d i n both t h e p a t t e r n o f t h e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s between judgment s c a l e s and i n t h e m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l s c a l i n g o f each s e t o f judgments s e p a r a t e l y . Thus t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s p r e d i c t e d from t h e model are c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h i s example. A t t r a c t i v e houses r e p r e s e n t s l i g h t d e p a r t u r e s from t h e b e s t examples: p r e f e r r e d houses a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o a t t r a c t i v e houses b u t are r e l a t i v e l y c l o s e r t o i n t e r e s t i n g houses. U n a t t r a c t i v e and l e a s t p r e f e r r e d houses are obviously the reverse of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Housing A t t r i b u t e s and A e s t h e t i c Response While t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s analyses s o f a r has s u p p o r t e d t h e model of t h e a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n it h a s n o t d e a l t i n any way with t h e a t t r i b u t e s or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f houses which may make them more a t t r a c t i v e , p r e f e r r e d , i n t e r e s t i n g o r b e t t e r examples or, g i v e n t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f houses used i n t h e s t u d y i n c l u d e d many examples where t h e a r c h i t e c t ' s i n t e n t was s p e c i f i c a l l y a e s t h e t i c , what t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p is between t h e a e s t h e t i c r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e houses and t h e aim o f t h e a r c h i t e c t s . F i g u r e 6 c o n t a i n s b l a c k and w h i t e p r i n t s o f e a c h o f t h e houses numbered i n t h e o r d e r t h a t t h e y a p p e a r on t h e m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l s c a l i n g c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . Given t h e s i m i l a r i t y i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e of t h e s e houses t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s a s p e c t of t h e r e s u l t s is c o n f i n e d t o F i g u r e 5 , t h e p r e f e r e n c e judgments. The l e a s t p r e f e r r e d houses ( 2 2 , 2 , 35, 4 and 9 , which are a l s o t h e worst examples) are by some o f modern a r c h i t e c t u r e ' s most i l l u s t r i o u s p r a c t i t i o n e r s - Louis Kahn, P h i l i p Johnson, Mies van d e r Rohe, Peter Eisenman. A l l o f t h o s e houses l y i n g a l o n g t h e c e n t r a l l i n e and above i t t o S t i m u l u s 26 a r e by modern a r c h i t e c t s w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f S t i m u l u s 23 ( a v i l l a by P a l l a d i o ) and S t i m u l u s 1 ( a house by Walter Burley G r i f f i n ) . Houses w i t h s p e c i f i c a e s t h e t i c i n t e n t as designed by a r c h i t e c t s t h e r e f o r e f a i l t o communicate w i t h t h i s group o f r e s p o n d e n t s i n t h e s e n s e o f i n d u c i n g p o s i t i v e a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e . Presumably i t was n o t t h e a r c h i t e c t ' s i n t e n t t o i n d u c e n e g a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s . Note however t h a t House 39 which i s a l s o among t h e least p r e f e r r e d i s a v e r y low c o s t bungalow b u i l t by a p u b l i c housing a u t h o r i t y i n A u s t r a l i a . Below t h e c e n t r e , w i t h one o r two e x c e p t i o n s , are t y p i c a l p l a i n suburban housing showing very t r a d i t i o n a l r o o f f a f a d e and material d e t a i l i n g . A t t h e most p r e f e r r e d end o f t h e czdnfiguration is a number of t r a d i t i o n a l V i c t o r i a n / G e o r g i a n s t y l e house and t r a d i t i o n a l farmhouses. A c a r e f u l examination o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e houses as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n r e v e a l s a number o f c l e a r t r e n d s . S t a r t i n g with t h e l e a s t p r e f e r r e d h o u s e s , t h e r e are e x t r e m e l y s i m p l e house forms w i t h o u t a p i t c h e d r o o f , w i t h unusual m a t e r i a l s and w i t h nont r a d i t i o n a l wiidows and o t h e r d e t a i l s . A s p r e f e r e n c e i n c r e a s e s above t h e mid-line t h e houses become more complex i n three-dimensional form and s t a r t t o i n c l u d e t y p i c a l h o u s e d e t a i l s s u c h as a p i t c h e d roof or t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l ( s t o n e ) a l t h o u g h t h e s e are used i n u n u s u a l ways ( n o t e t h e most p r e f e r r e d examples o f t h e s e a r c h i t e c t designed h o u s e s , numbers 25 and 26 by

FIGURE 6

Black and white p r i n t s of t h e 4 3 c o l o u r s l i d e s used i n t h e experiment.

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Aesthetic experience and mirrulanc reality

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C h a r l e s Moore, a r e a l s o among t h e most i n t e r e s t i n g h o u s e s ) . Below t h e c e n t r e l i n e a r e t r a d i t i o n a l house forms t h a t l a c k complexity and a r e v e r y s i m p l e . Towards t h e more p r e f e r r e d end i n t h a t p a r t o f t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n are examples showing i n c r e a s i n g f a c a d e complexity ( 3 ) or c o h e r e n t p e r c e p t u a l l y well-organized houses which a r e a l s o o f i n c r e a s i n g complexity even though they l a c k t r a d i t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s such as p i t c h e d r o o f ( e . g . , 3 0 ) . F i n a l l y , t h e most p r e f e r r e d houses e x h i b i t t h e u s e o f t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s , c o n v e n t i o n a l b u t s t r o n g three-dimensional b u i l d i n g forms t o g e t h e r with complex b u t p e r c e p t u a l l y well-organized d e t a i l i n g . I n c o n c l u s i o n , while t h e a r c h i t e c t s sought t h e e s s e n c e o f a house through t h e p u r s u i t of a e s t h e t i c aims s p e c i f i c a l l y by s i m p l y f y i n g and r e d u c i n g t h e complexity o f both form and d e t a i l i n g and t h e u s e of c o n v e n t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s , t h e e s s e n c e of t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f a house f o r t h e g e n e r a l s t u d e n t group l a y i n c o m p l e x i t y of three-dimensional form and s t r o n g p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t o g e t h e r with t h e u s e o f t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s . The r e s p o n s e t o complexity of form and p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n I would a r g u e i s a fundamental a s p e c t of t h e way we o r g a n i z e our e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e world. S t i m u l i which are b o t h complex and p e r c e p t u a l l y well-organized a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g and a t t r a c t i v e . The a r c h i t e c t ' s s e a r c h is e n t i r e l y c o g n i t i v e and i n t e l l e c t u a l . I t w i l l f a i l i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e g r o u p s i n s o c i e t y who are n o t familiar with t h e aims of t h e d e s i g n e r and t h e moment i n a r c h i t e c t u r a l h i s t o r y a t which t h e works were produced; t h a t i s t o s a y with groups who l a c k r e q u i s i t e schemas t h a t would a l l o w t h e s e houses t o b e s e e n as less extreme d e p a r t u r e s from t h e p r o t o t y p e - a p r o t o t y p e which on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d h e r e may be shared between groups. REFERENCES Barron, F. ( 1 9 5 8 ) . The psychology o f i m a g i n a t i o n . 199, 3, 150-169.

S c i e n t i f i c American,

B e r l y n e , D . E . , Robbins, M.C. and Thompson, R . ( 1 9 7 4 ) . A c r o s s c u l t u r a l s t u d y o f e x p l o r a t o r y and v e r b a l r e s p o n s e s t o v i s u a l p a t t e r n s v a r y i n g i n c o m p l e x i t y . I n : D . E . Berlyne ( E d . ) S t u d i e s i n t h e New Experimental A e s t h e t i c s . New York: Wiley. Ekblad, G. ( 1 9 8 0 ) . The Curvex: Simple o r d e r s t r u c t u r e r e v e a l e d i n r a t i n g s o f c o m p l e x i t y , i n t e r e s t i n g n e s s and p l e a s a n t n e s s . Scandanavian J o u r n a l o f Psychology, 21, 1-16. Eysenck, H . J . ( 1 9 8 1 ) . A e s t h e t i c p r e f e r e n c e s and i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . I n : D. O'Hare ( E d . ) Psychology and The Arts. B r i g h t o n , Sussex: H a r v e s t e r . Fechner, G .

( 1 8 7 6 ) . Vorschule d e r A e s t h e t i k .

L e i p z i g : B r e i t k o p f and H o r t e l .

Friedman, A. ( 1 9 7 9 ) . Framing p i c t u r e s : t h e r o l e o f knowledge i n automatized encoding and memory f o r g i s t . J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 316-355. G u i l f o r d , J . P . and H o l l e y , J.W. ( 1 9 4 9 ) . A f a c t o r i a l a p p r o a c h t o t h e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e s i n a e s t h e t i c judgments. J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology, 39, 208-218.

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Humphreys, N.K. (1973). The illusion of beauty. Mandler, G. (1975). Mind and Emotion.

Perception, 2, 429-439.

New York: Wiley.

Osgood, C.E., Suci, G. and Tannenbaum, P.H. (1957). The Measurement of Meaning. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorisation. In: N. Warren (Ed.) Studies in Cross Cultural Psychology. Volume 1. London: Academic Press. Rosch, E. and Mervis, B. (1975). Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 573-605. Schachter, S. and Singer, J.E. (1962). Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of emotional state. PFychological Review, 69, 379-399. Smith, E.E., Shoebem, E.J. and Rips, L.J. (1974). Structure and process in semantic memory: a featural model f o r semantic decisions. Psychological Review, 81, 214-241. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmillan.

Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art W.R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.(North-Holland), 1984

21 1

EVENT P E R C E P T I O N , PERCEPTUAL O R G A N I Z A T I O N AND EMOTION

Richard D . Walk George Washington U n i v e r s i t y

The key terms i n t h i s c h a p t e r t i t l e may seem somewhat d i s j o i n t e d . But, w e a r e concerned h e r e with a s i n g l e t o p i c , and i t grew o u t o f my i n t e r e s t i n t h e new r e s e a r c h on e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n and i n t r y i n g t o f i n d new ways o f l o o k i n g a t p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n (Walk, i n p r e s s ) . The c o r e of t h e c h a p t e r is an experiment u s i n g body movement t o d e p i c t dance and emotion i n ' p u r e form' with p o i n t s of l i g h t and t h e t e c h n i q u e p i o n e e r e d by Johansson ( 1 9 7 3 ) . Such an experiment has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e s t u d y o f p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . EVENT PERCEPTION

Johansson (1978) d e f i n e s e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n as t a k i n g p l a c e over time. Motion p e r c e p t i o n t a k e s p l a c e over time and i s an example p a r e x c e l l e n c e o f e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n . Motion p e r c e p t i o n , as e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n , can be c o n t r a s t e d t o t h e s t a t i c p e r c e p t i o n o f , as an example, t h e s t a t i c v i s u a l i l l u s i o n s . Event p e r c e p t i o n u t i l i z e s a well-known word, ' e v e n t ' , w i t h i t s synonyms o f an ' o c c u r r e n c e ' or a ' h a p p e n i n g ' , and a p p r o p r i a t e s i t f o r u s e i n motion p e r c e p t i o n . But a ' s t a t i c ' p e r c e p t i o n , as o f a s t i l l photograph. may t a k e p l a c e over time s i n c e eye movements s e a r c h t h e photograph, and a f i n e photograph o r a f i n e p a i n t i n g may r e q u i r e more time f o r i t s i n f o r m a t i o n t o be a s s i m i l a t e d t h a n does a motion sequence i n which o n l y time and d i f f e r e n t views can r e v e a l t h e n a t u r e o f t h e e v e n t . An example o f photographs t h a t are themselves an ' e v e n t ' i s Robert C a p a ' s photograph o f a Spanish s o l d i e r , c a u g h t by t h e camera a t t h e moment he i s k i l l e d by a b u l l e t , Margaret BourkeW h i t e ' s photograph o f e m a c i a t e d inmates when t h e y were r e s c u e d from an i n t e r n m e n t camp i n Germany, and t h e many photographs o f Hollywood s t a r s o f t h e 1920s and 1930s, memorialized i n s u c h r e c e n t books as K o b a l ' s 'The A r t o f t h e Great Hollywood P o r t r a i t P h o t o g r a p h e r s ' ( 1 9 8 0 ) , and t h e s u b j e c t o f a 1983 e x h i b i t i o n o f over 100 such photographs a t t h e N a t i o n a l P o r t r a i t G a l l e r y i n Washington. Such s t a r s as Marlene D i e t r i c h , J e a n Harlow, R i t a Hayworth, Robert T a y l o r , Joan Crawford and Gary Cooper were as famous f o r t h e i r s t i l l photographs as t h e y were f o r t h e movies i n which t h e y p l a y e d . A comment by a former s t a r , G l o r i a Swanson - 'We had f a c e s t h e n ' - sums up t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e time when t h e s t u d i o s i n v e s t e d tremendous sums i n s t i l l photographs t o a d v e r t i z e t h e stars and t h e p r e s e n t when t h e stars must be known by t h e p r o j e c t e d moving image a l o n e . Event p e r c e p t i o n , i n a l a r g e r s e n s e , i s on a continuum r a n g i n g from s t i l l p i c t u r e s or photographs t o motion p e r c e p t i o n o f e v e n t s t h a t a r e meaningless w i t h o u t motion. The p o i n t s o f l i g h t t h a t move i n meaningful u n i t s as used i n J o h a n s s o n ' s r e s e a r c h a r e examples o f t h e l a t t e r ( J o h a n s s o n , 1973).

212

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EMOTION

Emotion as s t u d i e d i n r e s e a r c h is an example o f t h e complexity o f e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n , Emotion is o f t e n s t u d i e d with t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n s . The f a c e s used a r e t h o s e o f a c t o r s who d e p i c t t h e emotions i n a s t a t i c f a c e f r o z e n i n time by a photograph. 'Real emotion' i s n o t used because r e a l emotion r e q u i r e s a c o n t e x t ; i t t a k e s p l a c e over t i m e , t h e f a c e i s more mobile, t h e body and i t s autonomic nervous system p a r t i c i p a t e , and t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s u b j e c t i v e l y i n t e r p r e t s t h e emotion a s do o b s e r v e r s o f t e n . P a r t i c i p a n t s i n t e l e v i s i o n shows t h a t award p r i z e s p r a c t i c e t h e i r u n r e s t r a i n e d j o y beforehand, b e f o r e g e t t i n g t h e c o r r e c t answers and winning a p r i z e such a s a new t e l e v i s i o n s e t . The p r a c t i c e is t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e i r r e a c t i o n s f i t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e t e l e v i s i o n a u d i e n c e . The p o i n t is t h a t t h e f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n o f emotion i n a photograph f o r r e s e a r c h i s a l s o an event t h a t is c a p t u r e d a t t h e c o r r e c t moment t o f u l f i l our c u l t u r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s o f what t h e emotion s h o u l d be. The photograph i s n o t o f a r e a l emotion, b u t of what we t h i n k a real emotion s h o u l d look l i k e . The match between s u c h photographs and r e a l emotions a s e x p e r i e n c e d by p e o p l e i n r e a l - l i f e s i t u a t i o n s i s p r o b a b l y t o o complex a r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n t o be answered. S i n c e ' r e a l emotion' is m u l t i s e n s o r y , i n v o l v i n g t h e e n t i r e body o v e r a p e r i o d o f time, we can a l s o s t u d y t h e emotion a s b o d i l y e x p r e s s i o n , as e s s e n t i a l l y p u r e movement. To do t h i s , w e have used J o h a n s s o n ' s method o f o u t l i n i n g t h e body with p o i n t s o f l i g h t . T h i s i s emotion w i t h o u t f a c i a l c u e s , and t h e e a s e o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f such emotion c a n be c o n t r a s t e d with Tomkins' p o s i t i o n t h a t ' a f f e c t i s p r i m a r i l y f a c i a l b e h a v i o r ' (1980, p. 1 4 2 ) . The r e s e a r c h w i t h p o i n t s of l i g h t t h a t i s d e s c r i b e d below has a number o f implications f o r the study of perceptual organization; these implications a r e n o t s p e c i f i c t o t h i s t y p e o f ' e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n ' , b u t more g e n e r a l . They a r e d i s c u s s e d a f t e r t h e experiment on t h e b o d i l y e x p r e s s i o n o f emotion i s described. AN EXPERIMENT ON EVENT PERCEPTION

To i n v e s t i g a t e nonverbal dance and emotion we c o n s t r u c t e d a t a p e made w i t h t h e sequences d e p i c t e d i n J o h a n s s o n ' s p o i n t s o f l i g h t . We d i d t h i s by having t h e p e r f o r m e r s wear t w e l v e white c o t t o n b a l l s a t t a c h e d with t a p e a t t h e s h o u l d e r s , elbows, wrist, h i p s , knees and a n k l e s . They wore d a r k c l o t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g dark g l o v e s , and a bag w i t h eye h o l e s over t h e head. The background was d a r k , matching t h e c l o t h i n g . The o n l y l i g h t was from a s i n g l e b u l b n e a r t h e v i d e o camera i n t h e back o f t h e room. The video-tape had 13 t r i a l s i n a l l , e a c h s e p a r a t e l y numbered and photographed f o r 5 secs, t h e n a blank o f 5 secs, f o l l o w e d by an e v e n t sequence o f dance o r emotion t h a t l a s t e d 10-15 secs, t h e n a b l a n k o f 5 secs t h a t p e r m i t t e d a pause i n t h e (EXAMPLE: ' T r i a l video-tape s o s u b j e c t s c o u l d write t h e i r r e a c t i o n s down. 4 ' - 5 s e c s , p a u s e - 5 secs, b a l l e t sequence - 10 s e c s , p a u s e - 5 s e c s . ) For p r o j e c t i o n o n t o a 1 2 i n c h b l a c k and white t e l e v i s i o n screen, t h e c o n t r a s t on t h e t e l e v i s i o n was t u r n e d a l m o s t t o a maximum so o n l y t h e w h i t e c o t t o n b a l l s w e r e v i s i b l e . The t e c h n i q u e i s similar t o one d e s c r i b e d by C u t t i n g and P r o f f i t t (1978). The e v e n t s themselves were, i n o r d e r : a still f i g u r e , j a z z d a n c i n g , a w a l t z , b a l l e t , rock and roll, walking, a drunken sequence, s a d n e s s , h a p p i n e s s , fear, s u r p r i s e , a n g e r and contempt. The first 6 sequences were performed t o music where a p p r o p r i a t e by Carolyn Homan, a c o - i n v e s t i g a t o r f o r t h e s t u d y , who

Event perception and emorion

FIGURE 1

A person as represented by 12 points of light.

a

0 0 0

0

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s t u d i e d b a l l e t f o r many y e a r s , and t h e n e x t 7 by J a c q u e l i n e Samuel, who s p e n t 2 y e a r s w i t h a m i m e t r o u p e i n Holland b e f o r e b e g i n n i n g t h e g r a d u a t e s t u d y of psychology. The t a p e was p r o j e c t e d s i l e n t l y t o g r o u p s o f 2-13 s u b j e c t s a t a time, u n d e r g r a d u a t e and g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t s a t George Washington U n i v e r s i t y . Each s u b j e c t saw t h e t a p e twice. For t h e f i r s t t a p e showing s u b j e c t s were i n s t r u c t e d t o d e s c r i b e what t h e y saw; t h e second showing had t h e c o r r e c t c a t e g o r i e s a l p h a b e t i z e d i n 2 g r o u p s ( f o r t r i a l s 1-6 and 7-13) and s u b j e c t s were t o l d t o p i c k t h e i r c h o i c e s from them. The spontaneous comments on f i r s t showing r e v e a l e d a wide v a r i e t y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Some of t h e s e a r e d e s c r i b e d t o g i v e some f l a v o u r f o r t h e t a s k . The r e s u l t s are p r e s e n t e d i n g e n e r a l t e r m s and n o t t r i a l by t r i a l . W e had 24 s u b j e c t s i n a l l ( 1 2 male, 12 female). The f i r s t t r i a l was of a s t i l l f i g u r e and 22 o f t h e 24 s u b j e c t s (92%) mentioned l i g h t p a t t e r n s ( 2 v e r t i c a l columns, 2 d i c e , a g r i d o f d o t s , a c l u s t e r of s t a r s , l i g h t s on a runway) w h i l e 2 mentioned a p e r s o n ; o u t l i n e o f a person, a person standing. The l j a z z l t r i a l was t h e f i r s t movement t r i a l , and 92% o f t h e s u b j e c t s c a l l e d it d a n c i n g with 17% c a l l i n g i t d i s c o , j a z z or modern dance. Waltz was c o r r e c t l y named by 428, b a l l e t 79% and r o c k and roll by 50%; most o t h e r ' r e s p o n s e s mentioned dance f o r a l l dance sequences e x c e p t f o r r o c k and roll, where marching, machines moving up and down, swaying l i g h t s , and arms swinging g o t some r e s p o n s e s . Both walking and drunkenness were c o r r e c t l y and s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d 92% o f t h e time. One has i n t h i s r e s e a r c h a n o c c a s i o n a l s u b j e c t who resists p u t t i n g meaning i n the l i g h t displays. This disappeared during the constrained i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s ( t h e second showing), b u t i t appeared d u r i n g t h e first one. Responses l i k e : l i g h t s move a c r o s s screen, l i g h t s move up and down, l i g h t s back o f f , slow motion up and down, a r e examples. I t is as i f T i t c h e n e r i a n o r s t r u c t u r a l psychology which t r i e d t o d e s c r i b e t h e s t i m u l u s w i t h o u t a d d i n g meaning, is a n a t u r a l r e a c t i o n f o r one o r two o f our s u b j e c t s . (One c a n n o t h e l p b u t wonder i f t h e s e roughly 10% o f our sample might n o t w a r r a n t f u r t h e r study! ) The mimed emotional r e a c t i o n s gave much more v a r i a b l e r e a c t i o n s t h a n d i d t h e dance p a t t e r n s . Anger was e a s y t o i d e n t i f y , though t h e names were s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t ( f i g h t i n g , b o x i n g ) , and f e a r was r e a s o n a b l y good ( w i t h cowering a l s o c o u n t e d ) , b u t many o t h e r s were more d i f f i c u l t . Contempt and s u r p r i s e , f o r example, were n o t i d e n t i f i e d s p o n t a n e o u s l y . Contempt was c a l l e d f e a r more o f t e n t h a n fear was ( t i m i d , a f r a i d , r e t r e a t i n g ) and had o t h e r v a r i a b l e r e a c t i o n s : t r y i n g t o h i d e , k a r a t e , f e m a l e , f a s h i o n show, shy. S u r p r i s e seemed r e l a t e d t o s t a g e performance: blowing k i s s e s , c e l e b r a t i n g , s i n g i n g , g i v i n g a s p e e c h , a c c e p t i n g a p p l a u s e , waving t o t h e crowd, a l o n g with a n g e r and p r i d e . One s u b j e c t c a l l e d s u r p r i s e , 'Lucian0 P a v o r o t t i a t t h e end o f a performance. I Happiness and s a d n e s s were i n t e r m e d i a t e , o c c a s i o n a l l y i d e n t i f i e d b u t w i t h much i n a c c u r a c y . Happiness was a l s o c a l l e d a e r o b i c d a n c i n g , jumping, hopping, r u n n i n g and t h e can-can, and s a d n e s s was i d e n t i f i e d as s n e a k i n g , s t a g g e r i n g , l i m p i n g , t w i s t i n g , a f r a i d , s i c k , p o s i n g l i k e a body b u i l d e r . While it is obvious t h a t t h e mimed emotions d i d e l i c i t d i f f e r e n t r e a c t i o n s , t h e v a r i a b i l i t y was marked. One c a n n o t h e l p b u t t h i n k o f Gombrich's r e p r i n t o f a New Yorker c a r t o o n on nonverbal movement i n t h e e l e m e n t a r y c l a s s r o o m

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where t h e l i t t l e g i r l with hands o v e r h e r head t h i n k s s h e is d e p i c t i n g a f l o w e r , b u t t h e b a l l o o n s o v e r t h e heads o f t h e c h i l d r e n i n t h e c l a s s show t h a t t h e y i n t e r p r e t h e r pose as b e i n g a b e e , a s a i l b o a t , a n a e r o p l a n e , a b i r d , a p l a n t , an o c t o p u s , a h o r s e , a cow and a f i s h (Gombrich, 1972b). The v a r i a b i l i t y d i s a p p e a r e d with t h e second showing o f t h e t a p e . The o n l y m i s t a k e s f o r t h e non-emotional sequences ( T r i a l s 1-6) were t h e c o n f u s i o n o f j a z z with r o c k and r o l l , each with t h e o t h e r , s o each was c o r r e c t 71% o v e r a l l . T h i s is n o t a s u r p r i s i n g f i n d i n g , s i n c e t h e y are somewhat similar d a n c e s , with t h e r o c k and r o l l dance more s t a t i c . The emotional r e a c t i o n s s e t t l e d down with l a b e l l i n g , though t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n was f a r from p e r f e c t . The f i r s t and second showings o f t h e t a p e are shown i n Table 1. One n o t e s a marked jump i n mimed h a p p i n e s s from 25% t o 96% c o r r e c t , and t h a t anger s t a y e d c o n s t a n t a t 88% c o r r e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s while s u r p r i s e and contempt, u n i d e n t i f i e d i n i t i a l l y , were o v e r 70% c o r r e c t . Labels ( a n d perhaps t h e c o n t e x t p r o v i d e d by t h e f i r s t showing) make for a remarkable improvement. Labels a r e a l s o s u p p l i e d with s t u d i e s of f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n s o f emotion.

TABLE 1 EMOTION

C o r r e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f emotions FIRST SHOWZNG

SECOND SHOWING

8%

75%

Happiness

25%

96%

Fear

42%

71%

-

79%

88%

88%

-

71%

Sad

Surprise Anger Contempt

The women s t u d e n t s were s l i g h t l y b e t t e r a t i d e n t i f y i n g t h e c o r r e c t d e p i c t i o n s t h a n were t h e men. We had 13 t r i a l s p r o j e c t e d t w i c e , o r 26 p o s s i b l e c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e s . The female s u b j e c t s averaged 17.6 c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e s as compared t o 15.1 f o r t h e males. T h i s i s b a r e l y a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e on a 2 - t a i l e d t e s t ( p c . 0 5 ) . One s h o u l d , however, b e c a u t i o u s i n l e a p i n g t o c o n c l u s i o n s from t h i s r e s u l t , based a s i t is on 1 2 males and 1 2 females, s i n c e t h e r e s u l t s could b e due t o o t h e r f a c t o r s such as i n t e l l i g e n c e . Women may pay more a t t e n t i o n t o non-verbal c u e s t h a n do men, and t h i s t a s k may r e v e a l i t , b u t one s h o u l d n o t draw s u c h a c o n c l u s i o n from t h e p r e s e n t s t u d y w i t h o u t more evidence. The r e l a t i o n between t h i s s t u d y and s t u d i e s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f emotion i n photographs of faces i s shown i n Table 2. The accuracy i n i d e n t i f y i n g b o d i l y e x p r e s s i o n s o f emotion i s remarkably a c c u r a t e . The d a t a i n Table 2 were c o l l e c t e d by Ekman and F r i e s e n a n d a r e d e s c r i b e d i n Ekman ( 1 9 7 3 ) . For t h e l i t e r a t e c u l t u r e s t h e method w a s as f o l l o w s : ' I n e v e r y c u l t u r e we s t u d i e d t h e o b s e r v e r s were given t h e words f o r t h e s e emotions i n t h e i r own language

216

RD. Walk

and were r e q u i r e d t o choose on word f o r each p i c t u r e ( t h e o n l y e x c e p t i o n was t h a t f o r d i s g u s t both t h e words ' c o n t e m p t ' and ' d i s g u s t ' were u s e d ) . ' (Ekman 1973, p , 206). The Fore o f New Guinea, a n o n - l i t e r a t e c u l t u r e , were r e a d a s t o r y d e s c r i b i n g an emotional s i t u a t i o n ( h a p p i n e s s , f o r example) and t h e n were asked t o p i c k t h e b e s t p i c t u r e from 3 p i c t u r e s o f which t h e t a r g e t was one. TABLE 2

T h i s study,compared with s t u d i e s o f f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n o f emotion T h i s Study

Ekman and F r i e s e n ' s Data

U.S.

Literate Cul t u r e s

Fore of N e w Guinea

Happiness

96

97

92

92

Fear

71

88

74

80

Surprise

79

91

88

68

Anger

88

69

74

84

Disgust/ Contempt

71

82

84

81

Sadness

75

73

83

79

Number o f Observers

24

99

356

189

L i t e r a t e c u l t u r e s were J a p a n , B r a z i l , C h i l e and A r g e n t i n a . The p e r c e n t a g e s p r e s e n t e d a r e a rough median o f t h e p e r c e n t o f t h e f o u r c u l t u r e s ( e . g . , 87, 97, 90,and 94 e q u a l s 9 2 ) .

NOTE

T h i s s t u d y , one w i l l r e c a l l , was t h a t o f i d e n t i f y i n g emotion from b o d i l y c u e s where o n l y p o i n t s o f l i g h t r e p r e s e n t e d t h e body. Yet t h e r e s u l t s o v e r l a p w i t h t h o s e of e x t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h programmes o f f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n r e p r e s e n t i n g emotion. The r e s u l t s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p r e s s i v e when one c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h l s i s a f i r s t a t t e m p t , t h a t t h e mimed emotions a r e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f o n l y one p e r f o r m e r , and t h a t w e have no e x t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h programme t h a t picked o u t t h e b e s t mimed sequence. DISCUSSION The Sound o f S i l e n c e The f i g u r e with 1 2 p o i n t s o f l i g h t i s ' s e e n ' as a human b e i n g d a n c i n g , walking, r e t r e a t i n g , jumping with j o y - y e t o n l y 12 p o i n t s o f l i g h t are p r e s e n t i n v a r i o u s combinations o f r e l a t i v e and a b s o l u t e motion. Almost a l l o f t h e f i g u r e is seen as i n f e r r e d , t h e bulk o f t h e f i g u r e , as compared t o r e a l f i g u r e s , is ' s i l e n t ' . One might t h i n k o f t h e body p a r t s - s a y t h e head or t h e f e e t - as i n f e r r e d from t h e i r e f f e c t on o t h e r p a r t s , much as t h e e x i s t ence o f t h e p l a n e t Neptune was i n f e r r e d from p e r t u r b a t i o n s i n t h e o r b i t o f t h e p l a n e t Uranus. I n o t h e r words, t h e motion o f t h e p o i n t s o f l i g h t i n r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r might o n l y happen i f a head and f e e t e x i s t e d . But s i l e n c e is multi-sensory and t h e ' s i l e n c e ' i n areas t h a t are unseen y e t

Event perreption and emotion

217

i n f e r r e d i n p o i n t s - o f - l i g h t e x p e r i m e n t s l e a d s one t o t h i n k i n more g e n e r a l terms about t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of s i l e n c e i n p e r c e p t i o n i n g e n e r a l . I f i r s t became i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e o r g a n i z i n g p r o p e r t i e s o f s i l e n c e i n r e a d i n g a b o u t r e s e a r c h on speech p e r c e p t i o n (Liberman and Studdert-Kennedy, 1978). Simply by m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e i n t e r v a l between a n s-sound and t h e s y l l a b l e , ' l i t ' , one h e a r s , f o r a s h o r t i n t e r v a l , t h e word ' s l i t ' , as e x p e c t e d , b u t ' s p l i t ' f o r a l o n g e r i n t e r v a l . The b r a i n s u p p l i e s a ' p ' t h a t i s n o t t h e r e ; t h e ' p ' i s added by t h e s i l e n c e i n t h i s c o n t e x t . An o b v i o u s and well-known example o f t h e 'sound o f s i l e n c e ' i n v i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n comes from c o n t o u r s t u d i e s o f s u b j e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n ( s e e F i g u r e 2 ) . One sees a s u b j e c t i v e c o n t o u r t h a t i s n o t t h e r e i n t h e s q u a r e , a d e f i n i t e c o n t o u r t h a t i s n o t p r e s e n t i n t h e s t i m u l u s . Kanizsa (1976) s t a t e s t h a t t h e c o n t o u r r e q u i r e s a meaningful f i g u r e , t h e o u t l i n e must form a s q u a r e , a t r i a n g l e or o t h e r meaningful form; t h e same e l e m e n t s produce n o s u b j e c t i v e c o n t o u r u n l e s s t h e y o u t l i n e a meaningful f i g u r e .

FIGURE 2 contour'

A s q u a r e , t h e added c o n t o u r i s termed t h e ' s u b j e c t i v e

218

R D. Walk

Multisensory i n f l u e n c e s o f t h e sound o f s i l e n c e are p r e s e n t with b e a t s . The h e a r t b e a t s r a p i d l y when one is e x c i t e d and s l o w l y when one is calm. A dance t u n e i s r a p i d a n d a f u n e r e a l d i r g e is slow j o y , e x c i t e m e n t are f a s t b e a t s and sad,calm s t a t e s r e q u i r e slow b e a t s . Visual o r t a c t u a l b e a t s would produce t h e same e f f e c t s . The slow b e a t s a r e n o t j u s t s l o w e r ; t h e y a l s o can produce t e n s i o n , t h e i n t e r v a l is n o t b l a n k b u t f i l l e d w i t h t e n s i o n .

--

Artists u s e t h e p r e s e n c e o f a gap t o produce t e n s i o n , t o make f o r a more dynamic work t h a n would a j o i n e d element. Perhaps t h e best-known example is M i c h e l a n g e l o ' s p a i n t i n g 'The C r e a t i o n o f Adam' where God's hand r e a c h e s o u t t o touch and create Adam, b u t t h e f i n g e r s do n o t q u i t e t o u c h , c r e a t i n g a dynamic union, a f e e l i n g t h a t t h e energy from t h e C r e a t o r goes toward Adam, a f o r c e t h a t is more powerful t h a n i t would have been had t h e C r e a t o r ' s f i n g e r touched Adam. Arnheim reproduced a drawing by L i p c h i t z , 'Prometheus S t r a n g l i n g t h e V u l t u r e ' and commented 'The c o n t r a d i c t i o n between t h e s o l i d i t y o f t h e f l e s h s u g g e s t e d by t h e c o n c a v i t i e s and t h e l a c k o f t e x t u r e enhances t h e c o n f l i c t t h a t t h e drawing is meant t o convey' (1954, p. 225). The s c u l p t o r Henry Moore l e a v e s g a p s and h o l e s i n s c u l p t u r e s o f t h e human f i g u r e t o enhance t h e dynamic e f f e c t , u s i n g o u t s i d e s p a c e t o c r e a t e a more a c t i v e f i g u r e . Moore (1981) commented on h i s own work: ' E v e n t u a l l y I found t h a t form and s p a c e a r e one and t h e same t h i n g ' ( p . 1 1 2 ) ; ' T h i s s p a c e between each p i e c e i s t e r r i b l y i m p o r t a n t and is as much a form a6 t h e a c t u a l s o l i d . . . I ( p . 266). Gombrich (1972a) h a s w r i t t e n o f t h e u s e o f s u g g e s t i o n i n Chinese drawing t o c r e a t e human f i g u r e s with no e y e s t o s e e and t h o s e w i t h o u t e a r s t h a t seem t o l i s t e n .

I n b a l l e t , t h e gap between p e r s o n s can b e used t o produce i s o l a t i o n or i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , depending on how it i s u s e d , j u s t as f i g u r e s c l o s e t o g e t h e r may appear t o belong t o g e t h e r . A complete d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z i n g p r o p e r t i e s o f ' s i l e n c e ' i n a l l m o d a l i t i e s i s beyond t h e s c o p e o f t h i s c h a p t e r , b u t t h i s b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t it may be very fruitful. The easy i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a l l a s p e c t s o f t h e human f i g u r e from 1 2 p o i n t s o f l i g h t c r e a t e s an i n t e r e s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c r e p a n c y . A Helmholzian or c o n s t r u c t i v i s t view would s a y t h a t t h e p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e with f i g u r a l movement o f human b e i n g s l e a d s t h e o b s e r v e r t o i n f e r t h e m i s s i n g f e e t , h a n d s , head, e t c . i n t h e f i g u r e . A Gibsonian ( G i b s o n , 1979) o r d i r e c t p e r c e p t i o n v i e w p o i n t , one favoured h e r e , would p r e d i c t t h a t t h e moving a c t i o n o f t h e f i g u r e c o u l d only be produced i n t h e way t h a t i t i s by t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h e m i s s i n g p a r t s , t h e y are r e q u i r e d by t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n j u s t as Neptune was r e q u i r e d by t h e a c t i o n o f t h e o r b i t o f Uranus. The Alarm Hypothesis T h i s h y p o t h e s i s is based on p r i o r r e s e a r c h with odour and sound, and it s t a t e s t h a t non-verbal emotional behaviour h a s c r o s s - s p e c i e s g e n e r a l i t y f o r t h e emotions r e l a t e d t o fear and a n g e r , emotional r e a c t i o n s t h a t may t h r e a t e n or warn o t h e r s p e c i e s . The pheromones f o r alarm among i n s e c t s are broad. A s broad pheromones they are i n t e r p r e t e d by many s o c i a l i n s e c t s , w h i l e t h e s e x u a l pheromonesare more s p e c i f i c , a t t r a c t i n g o n l y t h e s p e c i f i c o d o u r s , d i s a g r e e a b l e t a s t e s o r s e c r e t i o n s t h a t burn t h e s k i n t h a t warn o f f many s p e c i e s , i n c l u d i n g human b e i n g s . Examples are t h e skunk, 'Bombadier b e e t l e s ' , s t i n k b u g s , t h e Puss Moth and t h e Magpie Moth ( C o t t , 1940). Birdsongs are songs where t h e male s i n g s b o t h t o a t t r a c t a female and t o warn o f f r i v a l males, b u t b i r d s a l s o have a high p i t c h e d c o n t i n u o u s w h i s t l e t h a t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e p r e d a t o r y hawk, f o r example, t o l o c a l i z e and warns many

Event perception and emotion

219

species of songbirds. Our research showed that the mimed emotions of anger and fear were the easiest to identify, without labels needed. The bodily action of threat or fear can be interpreted not only by human beings, but also by other species, just as we can interpret the behaviour of an angry bull, dog or lion. These are nonverbal bodily expressions, but happiness, while easily identified as a species-specific facial expression, does not generalize to other species. Music is a species-specific trait of human beings. The extent to which music in one culture is identified for its emotional quality by other cultures is interesting but not crucial to the hypothesis. Sundberg (1982) does note that the amplitude-modulation characteristics of the voice are particularly efficient in communicating fear (80% identified correctly), sorrow (66% correct) and anger (60% correct), while neutral and joy seemed to be signalled along some other acoustic dimensions since they were only 24% and 8% correct respectively. Sundberg calls the amplitude-modulation characteristics 'mere translation into the acoustic domain of general patterns of bodily movements' (Sundberg, 1982, p. 94). This is some support for the alarm hypothesis, though it may be stretching it a little. Best support for this alarm hypothesis with human beings comes from bodily postures. Facial expression is more species specific. Some sounds - the screams of alarm or the roar of anger - may also support the alarm hypothesis; the cooing of a lovesick human couple is species specific and one would expect little identification of it or interest in it by other species. The Use of Labels Most of the mimed sequences of emotion were ambiguous until a set of possible labels was supplied. Facial expressions of emotion also ask the subject to choose from a restricted set of labels the one that best applies to a facial expression, so our experiment is not different in principle from those. The early experiments on facial expressions of emotion in which the subject supplied the emotional labels had a wide range of names for each emotional expression (see Woodworth, 1938, Chapter XI). The range does not seem to be quite as broad, though,as that of the interpretations elicited by some of the mimed expressions. Other experiments have noted the constraining effect of labels. Gombrich (1972b) referred to experiments by Krauss in Germany in 1930 and described them as follows: 'Subjects were asked to convey through drawn abstract configurations some emotion or idea for others to guess at. Not surprisingly, it was found that such guessing was quite random. When people were given a list of various possible meanings, their guesses became better, and they improved progressively with a reduction in the number of alternatives..,..' (Gombrich, 1972b, p. 96) Roger Brown had a similar finding from studies of music. He asked musicians and non-musicians to pair musical selections in terms of similarity of emotional meaning. Neither group made spontaneous groupings that agreed with Brown, but when he supplied possible labels the instrumentalists agreed on pairings that matched his, while the nonmusicians, even with words supplied, never did. The words made a difference for the musically trained: 'With words, the instrumentalists, insofar as they agreed at all, made

...

220

RD. Walk

,.

..

p a i r s t h a t coincided with (my) intentions' (Brown, 1981, p. 2 5 2 ) . Brown used a powerful i l l u s t r a t i o n t o show t h e u s e f u l n e s s o f l a b e l s . If one c r o s s e s o n e ' s open hands and t o u c h e s t h e thumbs, palms i n , and s p r e a d s t h e f i n g e r s , and a s k s f o r g u e s s e s i n t h e meaning for s i g n l a n g u a g e , o t h e r s do n o t g u e s s c o r r e c t l y t h e l a b e l f o r t h e g e s t u r e . But i f t h e l a b e l ' b u t t e r f l y ' is s u p p l i e d , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e name t o t h e s i g n is immediately perceived. CONCLUSION An experiment on e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n i n which emotion is d e p i c t e d by a mime and only v i s i b l e t h r o u g h p o i n t s o f l i g h t i s d e s c r i b e d a l o n g w i t h s i m i l a r d e p i c t i o n o f dance and o t h e r movement s e q u e n c e s . The most i m p o r t a n t sequences, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , were t h e emotional ones. Tomkins' ( 1 9 8 0 ) s t a t e m e n t t h a t , ' a f f e c t i s p r i m a r i l y f a c i a l b e h a v i o r ' , should be changed t o r e a d ' a f f e c t is m u l t i s e n s o r y ' . The a f f e c t e x p r e s s e d by t h e body, with no f a c i a l c u e s a v a i l a b l e and t h e body r e p r e s e n t e d by 1 2 p o i n t s o f l i g h t i s as a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y e d and understood as a r e f a c i a l e x p r e s s i o n s . The s t u d y h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e s t u d y o f p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . The body d e p i c t e d o n l y by moving p o i n t s o f l i g h t is n e c e s s a r i l y m o s t l y unseen, s i l e n t , n o t d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e d . Thomas C a r l y l e wrote ' S i l e n c e i s t h e element i n which g r e a t t h i n g s f a s h i o n t h e m s e l v e s t o g e t h e r ' , and t h e s i l e n c e of v i s u a l gaps or o f v i s u a l o r a u d i t o r y time i n t e r v a l s h a s been e x p l o i t e d f o r powerful e f f e c t by artists, d a n c e r s , m u s i c i a n s and p e r c e p t u a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s . R i g h t l y u s e d , s i l e n c e may enhance p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . Emotion d e p i c t e d i n b o d i l y motion h e l p s s u p p o r t t h e 'alarm h y p o t h e s i s ' , t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e s u r v i v a l emotions o f a n g e r and f e a r a r e i n t e r p r e t e d by o t h e r s p e c i e s , w h i l e s p e c i e s s p e c i f i c emotions ( h a p p i n e s s , f o r example) do n o t have i n t e r - s p e c i e s g e n e r a l i t y . I n a d d i t i o n t o body p o s t u r e , t h e a l a r m h y p o t h e s i s i s s u p p o r t e d by c r o s s - s p e c i e s alarms i n odour, a u d i t i o n and t a s t e . A s i n facial s t u d i e s o f e m o t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , t h e u s e o f l a b e l s c o n s t r a i n s c h o i c e s and h e l p s a c c u r a t e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . ACKNOWLEDGMENT I thank Carolyn Homan f o r h e l p i n g w i t h t h e p l a n n i n g and e x e c u t i o n of t h i s s t u d y , J a c q u e l i n e Samuel f o r h e r f i n e mimed r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f emotion, and J a y Dowling f o r h i s h e l p f u l comments.

REFERENCES Arnheim, R. ( 1 9 5 4 ) . A r t and V i s u a l P e r c e p t i o n . U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press.

Berkeley, California:

Brown, R. ( 1 9 8 1 ) . Music and language. I n : Documentary Report o f t h e Ann Arbor Symposium. Music Educators N a t i o n a l Conference, Reston, V i r g i n i a . C o t t , H.B.(1940). Adaptive C o l o u r a t i o n i n Animals.

London: Methuen.

C u t t i n g , J . E . and P r o f i t t . D.R. ( 1 9 8 1 ) . G a i t p e r c e p t i o n as a n example o f how we may p e r c e i v e e v e n t s . I n : R . D . Walk and H.L. Pick Jr. ( E d s . ) I n t e r s e n s o r y P e r c e p t i o n and Sensory I n t e g r a t i o n . N e w York: Plenum.

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Ekman, P. (1973). Cross-cultural studies of facial expression. In: P. Ekman (Ed.) Darwin and Facial Expression. New York: Academic Press. Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin.

Boston,

Gombrich, E.H. (1972a). Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Gombrich, E.H. (1972b). The visual image.

Scientific American, 227, 82-96.

Johansson, G. (1973). Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis. Perception and Psychophysics, 14, 201-211. Johansson, G. (1978). Visual event perception. In: R. Held, H.W. Leibowitz and H.L. Teuber (Eds.) Handbook of Sensory Physiology, Volume VIII: Perception. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Kanizsa, G. (1976). Subjective contours.

Scientific American, 234, 48-52.

Kobal, J. (1980). The Art of the Great Hollywood Portrait Photographers. New York: Knopf. Liberman, A.M. and Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1978). Phonetic perception.

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R. Held, H.W. Leibowitz and H.L. Teuber (Eds.) Handbook of Sensory Physiology: Volume VIII: Perception. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Marler, P.R. (1972). The drive to survive. In: T.B. Allen (Ed.) The Marvels of Animal Behavior. Vashington,DC: National Geographic Society. Moore, H. (1981). Henry Moore Sculpture.

New York: Rizzoli.

Sundberg, J. (1982). Perception of singing. In: D. Deutsch (Ed.) The Psychology of Music. New York: Academic Press. Tomkins, S.S. (1980). Affect as amplification: some modifications in theory. In: R. Plutchik and H. Kellerman (Eds.) Emotion: Theory, Research and Experience: Volume 1: Theories of Emotion. New York: Academic Press. Walk, R.D. (In press). Perceptual organization. In: R. Corsini (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Psychology. New York: Wiley. Wilson, E.O. (1963).Pheromones.

Scientific American, 208, 100-114.

Woodworth, R.S. (1938). Experimental Psychology. New York: Henry Holt.

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Section 5

PERCEPTION OF MUSIC

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Cognitive Processes in the Perception of Art W.R. Crozier and A.J. Chapman (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1984

COGNITION

OF COMPLEX EVENTS:

James C .

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Bartlett

U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas a t Dallas

Rarely do s t u d e n t s o f memory have much t o s a y a b o u t a r t . This is i n c o n t r a s t t o s t u d e n t s o f p e r c e p t i o n , p e r s o n a l i t y and s o c i a l psychology, who c u r r e n t l y a r e s a y i n g a g r e a t d e a l ( s e e C r o z i e r and Chapman, 1 9 8 3 ) . Although i t might be argued t h a t t h e s i l e n c e o f memory r e s e a r c h e r s on t h e t o p i c o f a r t is j u s t i f i e d , i n t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of memory simply has n o t h i n g t o do with a r t , t h i s seems a n unwarranted i f n o t a downright p r e p o s t e r o u s claim. A r t works are t h i n g s t h a t p e o p l e remember, t h e y are sometimes about memory, they a r e o f t e n i n t e n d e d t o be h i g h l y memorable, and t h e y depend upon memory f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a p p r e c i a t i o n and a n a l y s i s . A more p l a u s i b l e c l a i m i s t h a t c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e knowledge o f memory h a s n o t h i n g t o do with a r t -- t h a t i s t h a t we know v e r y l i t t l e o f t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f memory i n n a t u r a l i s t i c c o n t e x t s t h a t are r e l e v a n t t o a r t . T h i s i s a claim t h a t makes much more s e n s e . I n d e e d , i t is simply a v a r i a n t o f t h e f r e q u e n t pronouncement t h a t -- d e s p i t e approximately one hundred y e a r s of memory r e s e a r c h -- w e s t i l l know very l i t t l e o f t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f memory i n any n a t u r a l i s t i c c o n t e x t , whether r e l e v a n t t o a r t or n o t ( J e n k i n s , 1977; Neisser, 1 9 8 2 a ) . Although our knowledge o f memory i n n a t u r a l i s t i c c o n t e x t s i s c u r r e n t l y q u i t e l i m i t e d , a new t r a d i t i o n of memory r e s e a r c h i s emerging, and i t p r o m i s e s t o r e c t i f y matters. T h i s can be termed a ' n a t u r a l i s t i c ' (Neisser, 1 9 8 2 a ) o r ' e c o l o g i c a l ' (Turvey and Shaw, 1979) t r a d i t i o n , which i s l i n k e d h i s t o r i c a l l y t o t h e e c o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n p e r c e p t i o n (Gibson, 1966; Neisser, 1 9 7 6 ) . and which stresses t h e importance o f n a t u r a l i s t i c s t i m u l i and t a s k s . My g o a l i n t h i s c h a p t e r is t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e e c o l o g i c a l approach as it h a s been a p p l i e d t o memory, and t o d e s c r i b e two r e l e v a n t l i n e s o f memory r e s e a r c h . One l i n e o f r e s e a r c h concerns memory f o r sequences o f n a t u r a l i s t i c photographs. I t was motivated by a d e s i r e t o develop some i d e a s t h a t have been g e n e r a t e d by t h e e c o l o g i c a l approach. The second l i n e o f work concerns memory f o r melodies and e f f e c t s o f t o n a l i t y upon such memory. Although i t was n o t i n i t i a t e d w i t h t h e e c o l o g i c a l approach i n mind, i t o b v i o u s l y is r e l e v a n t t o problems i n t h e psychology of a r t . F u r t h e r , t h e melody-memory work t u r n s o u t t o b e i n t e r p r e t a b l e a l o n g e c o l o g i c a l l i n e s . Indeed, I make c l e a r how both l i n e s o f work s u p p o r t t h e v i a b i l i t y o f an e c o l o g i c a l approach and a l s o i t s u t i l i t y f o r g e n e r a t i n g i d e a s and q u e s t i o n s f o r new r e s e a r c h . THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MEMORY The e c o l o g i c a l approach h a s become w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e domain t r a d i t i o n a l l y known as ' p e r c e p t i o n ' ( G i b s o n , 1966, 1979; Michaels and Carello, 1981; Shaw and P i t t e n g e r , 1 9 7 8 ) . However, i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o memory has been much l e s s thoroughly e x p l o r e d ( B r a n s f o r d e t a l , 1977; J e n k i n s e t a l , 1978; J o h n s t o n and Turvey, 1980; Turvey and Shaw, 1 9 7 9 ) . This h a r d l y i s s u r p r i s i n g given t h a t memory -- as a t h e o r e t i c a l or e x p l a n a t o r y c o n s t r u c t --

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i s g e n e r a l l y avoided by p r o p o n e n t s o f t h e e c o l o g i c a l approach. I n t h e i r w r i t i n g s on p e r c e p t i o n , Gibson and o t h e r e c o l o g i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d t h i n k e r s have opposed t h e n o t i o n t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n - ' p i c k - u p ' i s mediated by 'memories' o f information previously 'picked-up'. O p p o s i t i o n t o t h e memory c o n s t r u c t i s maintained i n c a s e s ( i n d e e d , e s p e c i a l l y i n c a s e s ) where i n f o r m a t i o n pick-up i s extended i n time -- as when l i s t e n i n g t o a symphony, l e a r n i n g t h e l a y o u t o f a c i t y , or d e t e c t i n g t h e changes i n a f r i e n d ' s a g e i n g f a c e ( s e e Shaw and P i t t e n g e r , 1978; Turvey and Shaw, 1 9 7 9 ) . Gibson h i m s e l f h a s e x p r e s s e d t h i s o p p o s i t i o n most c l e a r l y : Because we are l e d t o s e p a r a t e t h e p r e s e n t from t h e p a s t , we f i n d o u r s e l v e s i n v o l v e d i n what I have c a l l e d t h e 'muddle o f memory' e t h i n k t h a t t h e p a s t ceases t o e x i s t unless it (Gibson, 1 9 6 6 ) . W is ' p r e s e r v e d ' i n memory. We assume t h a t memory is t h e b r i d g e between t h e p a s t and t h e p r e s e n t . We assume t h a t memories accumulate and are s t o r e d somewhere; t h a t t h e y a r e images, or p i c t u r e s , or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e p a s t ; or t h a t memory is a c t u a l l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l , n o t m e n t a l , c o n s i s t i n g of engrams or t r a c e s ; or t h a t i t a c t u a l l y c o n s i s t s o f n e u r a l c o n n e c t i o n s , n o t engrams; t h a t memory i s t h e b a s i s o f a l l l e a r n i n g ; t h a t memory i s t h e b a s i s o f h a b i t ; t h a t memories l i v e on i n t h e unconscious; t h a t h e r e d i t y is a form o f memory; t h a t c u l t u r a l h e r e d i t y is a n o t h e r form o f memory; t h a t any e f f e c t o f t h e p a s t on t h e p r e s e n t is memory, i n c l u d i n g h y s t e r e s i s . If we c a n n o t d o any b e t t e r t h a n t h i s , w e should s t o p u s i n g t h e word. (Gibson, 1979, p. 254) Opposition t o memory as a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i m p l i e s n o judgment t h a t t h e problems o f memory a r e u n i m p o r t a n t or i m p o s s i b l e t o a d d r e s s . People do show t h e phenomena o f remembering and f o r g e t t i n g , and t h e r e i s no denying t h e n e c e s s i t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g j u s t how and why such phenomena occur. The i s s u e s r a i s e d by e c o l o g i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d writers c o n c e r n t h e c o n c e p t s we u s e t o understand t h e phenomena o f memory -- t h e c h a l l e n g e posed by t h e e c o l o g i c a l approach i s t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e t h e s e phenomena w i t h o u t r e l i a n c e on t h e n o t i o n o f memory ' s t o r e s ' c o n t a i n i n g c o u n t l e s s numbers of ' e n g r a m s ' , ' i m a g e s ' , ' t r a c e s ' , e t c . T h i s p o i n t i s made c l e a r l y by Bransford e t a l :

I t seems r e a s o n a b l e t o s u g g e s t t h a t c u r r e n t u s e s of t h e term memory f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e t a c i t or e x p l i c i t a s s u m p t i o n s n o t t o o d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e n o t e d by Ebbinghaus: f o r example, t h a t memory can be broken down i n t o a s e t o f memories, t h a t t h e s e c o n s i s t o f r e l a t i v e l y independent traces t h a t a r e s t o r e d i n some location, and t h a t t h e s e t r a c e s must be searched f o r and retrieved i n o r d e r t o produce remembering, and t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e t r a c e s must be ' c o n t a c t e d ' i n o r d e r f o r p a s t e x p e r i e n c e s t o have t h e i r e f f e c t s on subsequent e v e n t s . If memory i s t o be d e f i n e d i n t h i s way, it becomes i m p o r t a n t t o c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e concept o f memory ( a n d memories) is simply one o f many g e n e r a l h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t t h e p r o c e s s e s u n d e r l y i n g remembering and t h e manner i n which p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s have t h e i r e f f e c t s on current events. ( B r a n s f o r d e t a l , 1977, p. 432) So, what a r e some a l t e r n a t i v e s t o a 'memory h y p o t h e s i s ? ' C e r t a i n l y one such c u r r e n t l y e n j o y i n g g r e a t p o p u l a r i t y -- is t h a t p r o v i d e d by alternative schema t h e o r i e s ( e . g . , B a r t l e t t , 1932; Mandler, 1979; Rumelhart, 1975; Schank and Abelson, 1 9 7 7 ) . According t o such t h e o r i e s , memory is a p r o d u c t o f i n c o r p o r a t i n g or a s s i m i l a t i n g new i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o p r e v i o u s l y developed s t r u c t u r e s o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f knowledge i n long-term memory. Remembering,

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Cognition of complex events

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t h e n , i n v o l v e s ' r e c o n s t r u c t i n g ' p r i o r e v e n t s based upon schemata, which themselves have been modified as a r e s u l t o f a p e r s o n ' s e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e s e p r i o r e v e n t s . B a r t l e t t ( 1 9 3 2 ) spoke o f a n o r g a n i s m ' s ' t u r n i n g round' upon i t s own schemata i n o r d e r t o r e c a l l . Such an h y p o t h e s i s i s indeed r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f s e a r c h i n g f o r traces w i t h i n a l a r g e memory ' s t o r e ' . However, proponents o f an e c o l o g i c a l approach s u g g e s t or imply t h a t t o r e p l a c e t h e memory c o n c e p t with t h a t o f i n t e r n a l schemata i s i n s u f f i c i e n t as a d e p a r t u r e from t r a d i t i o n a l ways o f t h i n k i n g . T h e i r p r o p o s a l s are more radical. The e c o l o g i c a l approach t o memory phenomena might be made comparable w i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f schemata (see Neisser, 1 9 7 6 ) . However, it a p p e a r s t o d i f f e r from t h e c u r r e n t l y f a s h i o n a b l e schema t h e o r i e s -- as w e l l as most o t h e r t h e o r i e s -- i n t h e emphasis i t p l a c e s on t h r e e ' c o r e ' i d e a s . These t h r e e i d e a s are: (1) t h a t t h e u n i t s o f p e r c e p t i o n and memory are t e m p o r a l l y extended ' e v e n t s ' ; ( 2 ) t h a t t h e b a s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n and memory is t h e pickup o f i n v a r i a n t s o v e r t i m e ; and ( 3 ) t h a t p e r c e p t i o n and memory are e s s e n t i a l l y v e r i d i c a l . All t h r e e i d e a s a r e d e r i v e d from Gibson (1966, 1979). However, Idea-1 and Idea-2 have been e l a b o r a t e d by B r a n s f o r d e t a1 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , J e n k i n s e t a1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Shaw and P i t t e n g e r (1978) and Turvey and Shaw ( 1 9 7 9 ) . Idea-3 has been developed more f u l l y by Neisser (1976, 1982a, 1 9 8 2 b ) . THE EVENT PERCEPTION HYPOTHESIS

From t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f memory r e s e a r c h e r s , Idea-1 i s p e r h a p s t h e most c r i t i c a l o f t h o s e l i s t e d . The r e a s o n i s t h a t it speaks most d i r e c t l y t o t h e s t a t u s o f memory as a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t , and d e p a r t s most d r a s t i c a l l y from what many would a r g u e i s good common s e n s e . I t has been termed t h e ' e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s ' , and i s a t once a claim t h a t t h e r e i s no c l e a r d i v i d i n g l i n e between t h e t r a d i t i o n a l domains o f p e r c e p t i o n and memory, and t h a t t h e u n i t s o f memory ( p e r c e p t i o n ? ) c a n be g r e a t l y e x t e n d e d i n time. Thus, ' e v e n t s ' are t h e a p p r o p r i a t e u n i t s o f a n a l y s i s , whether t h e y a r e 'fast' ( p e r t a i n i n g t o p e r c e p t i o n as t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n c e i v e d ) or ' s l o w ' ( p e r t a i n i n g t o memory as t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n c e i v e d ) . Some f l e x i b i l i t y ( a n d v a g u e n e s s ) t o t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s is p r o v i d e d by t h e c o n c e p t o f 'embedding'. F a s t e v e n t s , f o r example a change i r l e x p r e s s i o n o f f a c e , can o c c u r w i t h i n slower e v e n t s , for example t h e a g e i n g o f a f a c e ( s e e J e n k i n s e t a l , 1978; and d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e embedded n a t u r e o f p e r c e p t u a l c y c l e s i n Neisser, 1 9 7 6 ) .

I t might h e l p c o n s i d e r a b l y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s i f t h e c o n c e p t of ' e v e n t ' were s a t i s f a c t o r a l l y d e f i n e d . It is n o t now ( J e n k i n s e t a l , 19781, though t h i s may soon change (see Shaw and P i t t e n g e r , 1 9 7 8 ) . We must work i n t h e meantime with t h e i n t u i t i v e n o t i o n t h a t e v e n t s ' a r e t h i n g s t h a t happen' ( P i c k , 1979, p. 1451, i n v o l v i n g ' c h a n g e s i n o b j e c t s or c o l l e c t i o n s o f o b j e c t s ' ( M i c h a e l s and C a r e l l o , 1981, p. 2 6 ) . I n t h e r e s e a r c h t h a t follows p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t on apprehension o f p i c t u r e sequences -t h e c r u x o f t h e matter a p p e a r s t o b e t h a t sequences o f s t i m u l i extended i n time might f u n c t i o n as u n i t s i n memory ( p e r c e p t i o n ? ) . Thus, a p r a c t i c a l problem f a c i n g r e s e a r c h e r s is t h a t o f d e t e r m i n i n g i f a s t i m u l u s sequence has been u n i t i z e d by t h e p e r c e i v e r , a n d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , t h a t o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e f f e c t s or m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f such u n i t i z a t i o n , i f i t o c c u r s .

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A s t r o n g form o f t h e e v e n t - p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s does n o t s t o p with t h e n o t i o n t h a t e v e n t s are t h e primary u n i t o f a n a l y s i s . I t c o n t i n u e s t o c l a i m t h a t a l l e v e n t s -- b o t h fast and slow are d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e d (Michaels and Carello, 1 9 8 1 ) . Thus, Shaw and P i t t e n g e r a r g u e t h a t :

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J. C. Bartlett

The p e r c e p t i o n o f change, even e x t r e m e l y slow change, i s immediately e x p e r i e n c e d ; t h e r e i s no n e c e s s a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n o f m e d i a t i n g c o n s t r u c t s such as s p e c i f i c memory f o r s t a t i c o b j e c t s or i n t e l l e c t u a l i n f e r e n c e s , f o r i t i s c e r t a i n l y a p h i l o s o p h i c a l conundrum t o assume t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f change can somehow a r i s e from t h e e x p e r i e n c e of s t a t i c t h i n g s . (1978, p. 188) Conundrum or n o t , many p s y c h o l o g i s t s might f e e l more c o m f o r t a b l e with a weaker form o f t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s , one which a d m i t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t memory and i n f e r e n c e may i n some c a s e s c o n t r i b u t e t o e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n . I n any e v e n t , t h e problem o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f e v e n t s -- t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n and t h e r o l e they p l a y i n producing memory phenomena -- can be s e p a r a t e d from q u e s t i o n s of mechanism. T h i s is t h e view o f J e n k i n s e t a1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , who s u g g e s t t h a t 'modeling o f how p e o p l e p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n ' and ' t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e u n i t s o f a n a l y s i s ' a r e two d i f f e r e n t though i n t e r d e p e n d e n t t a s k s . This weaker form o f t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s is t h a t which is d e a l t w i t h below. I N V A R I A N T PICK-UP

Idea-2 o f t h e e c o l o g i c a l approach t o memory phenomena is t h a t such phenomena r e f l e c t t h e i n v a r i a n t s -- t h a t is unchanging a s p e c t s -- o f s t i m u l u s i n f o r m a t i o n . So fundamental i s t h e c o n c e p t o f ' i n v a r i a n t ' t h a t p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f i s d e f i n e d as t h e pick-up o f i n v a r i a n t i n f o r m a t i o n o v e r time (Gibson, 1966, 1 9 7 9 ) . Extending t h i s i d e a t o memory phenomena, B r a n s f o r d e t a1 (1977) a r g u e t h a t ' l e a r n i n g i n v o l v e s t h e d e t e c t i o n of i n v a r i a n t i n f o r m a t i o n from a s e t of a c q u i s i t i o n e x p e r i e n c e s , and t h a t o n e ' s a b i l i t y t o a c c u r a t e l y remember depends on what was l e a r n e d ' ( p . 463). That i s , remembering depends upon t h e p r i o r d e t e c t i o n o f i n v a r i a n t s from sets of s t i m u l i or e x p e r i e n c e s , n o t upon p r i o r s t o r a g e o f d i s t i n c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f a l l of t h e a s p e c t s o f t h e s e s t i m u l i or e x p e r i e n c e s . Although t h e c o n c e p t o f i n v a r i a n t a p p e a r s much more c o n c r e t e t h a n t h a t o f e v e n t , i t remains somewhat vague ( C u t t i n g , 1 9 8 3 ) , e s p e c i a l l y as a p p l i e d t o memory phenomena. The problem f a c e d by memory r e s e a r c h e r s i s o u r i g n o r a n c e n o t simply o f what can c o n s t i t u t e an i n v a r i a n t o f an e v e n t , b u t a l s o o f t h e e f f e c t s t o be e x p e c t e d i f an i n v a r i a n t o f an e v e n t i s d e t e c t e d . F o r t u n a t e l y , c l a r i f i c a t i o n is added by J e n k i n s e t a1 (19781, who s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e i n v a r i a n t s e x t r a c t e d from a sequence o f s t i m u l i c a n i n e f f e c t s p e c i f y a l t e r n a t i v e s t i m u l i b e s i d e s t h o s e a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t e d ( G a r n e r , 1 9 7 4 ) . Such a l t e r n a t i v e s t i m u l i , i f e n c o u n t e r e d s u b s e q u e n t l y , should be p e r c e i v e d as r e l a t e d t o t h o s e o r i g i n a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d . I n d e e d , an e n t i r e l y 'new' s t i m u l u s t h a t matches i n v a r i a n t s might b e wrongly r e c o g n i z e d as ' o l d ' . In c o n t r a s t , a n o t h e r new s t i m u l u s t h a t mismatches i n v a r i a n t s s h o u l d be e a s i l y r e j e c t e d as 'new'. Aside from s p e c i f y i n g sets o f a l t e r n a t i v e s t i m u l i , i n v a r i a n t s have a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p r o p e r t y -- t h e y can p e r t a i n n o t o n l y t o s t a t i c f e a t u r e s o f s t i m u l u s i n f o r m a t i o n -- such as a n unchanging s p a t i a l l a y - o u t -- b u t a l s o t o dynamic f e a t u r e s -- s u c h as t h e r o u t e o f an o b s e r v e r a c r o s s a s p a t i a l lay-out. The former i n v a r i a n t s a r e termed ' s t r u c t u r a l ' , whereas t h e l a t t e r are termed ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l ' . Whereas s t r u c t u r a l i n v a r i a n t s p e r t a i n t o unchanging (or s l o w l y changing) f e a t u r e s o f s t i m u l u s i n f o r m a t i o n , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l i n v a r i a n t s p e r t a i n t o ' s t y l e s o f change' (Shaw and P i t t e n g e r , 1 9 7 8 ) , and u n d e r l i e t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f e v e n t s . 'Thus, if an e v e n t is something happening t o something, t h e "something happening" i s presumed t o be s p e c i f i e d by t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l i n v a r i a n t s w h i l e t h e "something" t h a t i t i s

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happening to is presumed to be described by structural invariants (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 26). It is obvious from the foregoing that the concept of invariants and the concept of events are tightly intertwined. Indeed, it seems implicit in much current writing -- particularly in Jenkins et a1 (1978) -- that transformational and structural invariants act as a kind of 'glue' that can 'unitize' a sequence of stimulus information into a coherent 'event'. Indeed such a conception follows from Garner (1970,1974). whose evidence shows that 'good patterns have few alternatives'. Stimulus patterns are perceived as belonging to sets (or subsets) of alternative stimuli, and a 'good' stimulus pattern is one for which the (sub)set of alternatives is small. Thus, to the degree that invariants of a sequence of stimuli specify a relatively small set of alternative stimuli, the sequence will function as memorability. In sum, it is plausible to suggest that a certain minimum amount of invariant structure within a sequence of stimuli may be a necessary prerequisite for an event to be perceived. Beyond this minimum, the amount or type of perceived invariant structure should determine the 'goodness' of the event. VERIDICALITY OF MEMORY Idea-3 of the ecological approach to memory phenomena is that memory -- if viewed in appropriate perspective -- is essentially veridical or accurate. Of course this is not to deny that errors of memory occur. Indeed, the framework suggested by Jenkins et a1 (1978) implies that certain types of memory errors are caused by the invariants extracted from perceived events. The point to be made is that subjects' performance in memory tasks -- even when this involves errors - is reflective of invariants they have (accurately) extracted from stimulus information. In discussing his analysis of John Dean's memory for events surrounding Watergate, Neisser (198213) makes this point clearly: What he says about those 'episodes' is essentially correct, even though it is not literally faithful to any one occasion. He is not remembering the 'gist' of a single episode by itself, but the common characteristics of a whole series of events. This notion may help us to interpret the paradoxical sense in which Dean was accurate throughout his testimony. Given the numerous errors in his reports of conversations, which did he tell the truth about? I think that he extracted the common themes that remained invariant across many conversations and many experiences, and then incorporated these themes in his own testimony Except where the significance of his own role was at stake, Dean was right about what had really been going on in the White House. What he later told Senators was fairly cose to the mark: his mind was not a tape recorder, but it certainly received the message that was being given. (pp. 158-159)

..

The idea that memory is essentially veridical is important in distinguishing the ecological from alternative viewpoints, particularly that of schema theory. As mentioned earlier, it may be possible to incorporate the schema concept within the framework of an ecological approach to memory. However, at least one important process pertaining to schemata appears quite foreign to the ecological approach. This is the concept of 'assimilation', most closely identified with Piaget.

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According t o F l a v e l l ( 1 9 7 7 ) , ' A s s i m i l a t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y means i n t e r p r e t i n g or c o n s t r u i n g e x t e r n a l d a t a i n terms of t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s e x i s t i n g c o g n i t i v e system. What is e n c o u n t e r e d i s c o g n i t i v e l y t r a n s f o r m e d t o f i t what t h e i n d i v i d u a l knows and how h e t h i n k s ' . A s s i m i l a t i o n can be c o n t r a s t e d with accommodation, which 'means t a k i n g a c c o u n t o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e e x t e r n a l d a t a ' ( F l a v e l l , 1977, p. 13). Although i n P i a g e t ' s system b o t h a s s i m i l a t i o n and accommodation a r e r e f l e c t i v e o f t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f schemata, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a c c e p t a r o l e f o r schemata, and t o a g r e e t h a t accommodation of t h e s e schemata t o e x t e r n a l i n f o r m a t i o n o c c u r s , b u t t o deny t h a t a s s i m i l a t i o n is a n i m p o r t a n t p r o c e s s i n o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t i o n o r memory. Thus, N e i s s e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , i n a p a s s a g e r e v e a l i n g o f b o t h t h e e c o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n and h i s own a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e schema c o n c e p t , writes t h e f o l l o w i n g : Although accommodation c e r t a i n l y o c c u r s , P i a g e t ' s companion c o n c e p t o f a s s i m i l a t i o n seems more dubious. Why s h o u l d we s u p p o s e t h a t t h e c h i l d a l t e r s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h e p i c k s up? He f i n d s o u t l e s s a b o u t h i s environment t h a n a n a d u l t would, b u t what he does d i s c o v e r need n o t be wrong. While h e makes m i s t a k e s , as we a l l do, t h e s e may be i n c o r r e c t e x t r a p o l a t i o n s from what h e h a s s e e n r a t h e r t h a n fundamental i l l u s i o n s . (Neisser, 1976, p. 6 6 ) ' I n c o r r e c t e x t r a p o l a t i o n s ' can presumably r e f l e c t p e r c e i v e d a l t e r n a t i v e s t o p r e s e n t a t i o n s t i m u l i , t h a t is v e r i d i c a l pick-up o f i n v a r i a n t s o f t h e s e s t i m u l i , T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h an e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s f o r memory phenomena. The t h r e e c o r e i d e a s o f t h e e c o l o g i c a l approach t o memory -- t h a t t h e u n i t s of memory are e v e n t s , t h a t memory phenomena r e f l e c t t h e pick-up o f i n v a r i a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , and t h a t memory i s e s s e n t i a l l y v e r i d i c a l -- are s u p p o r t e d by some o f my own r e s e a r c h e f f o r t s i n two r a t h e r d i s p a r a t e domains. One o f t h e s e domains is t h a t of s p a t i a l memory, and t h e o t h e r is t h a t o f memory f o r melodies. Both l i n e s o f work have r e c e n t l y converged i n s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n of e v e n t s and t h e pick-up o f i n v a r i a n t s have i m p o r t a n t e f f e c t s upon 'memory' f o r sequences extended i n time. These e f f e c t s are q u a l i t a t i v e i n n a t u r e , and a p p e a r q u i t e p r o v o c a t i v e f o r t h e o r y . They a l s o a p p e a r t o b e g e n e r a l l y c o n s i s t e n t with t h e v e r i d i c a l i t y o f memory f o r n a t u r a l i s t i c materials. RESEARCH ON MEMORY FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC SEQUENCES

S e v e r a l landmark e x p e r i m e n t s on e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n were r e p o r t e d i n t h e p a p e r The approach t a k e n i n t h e s e e x p e r i m e n t s was t o by J e n k i n s e t a1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . show s u b j e c t s s l i d e sequences d e p i c t i n g n a t u r a l i s t i c e v e n t s , s u c h as a s i m p l e s e r i e s of a c t i o n s (e.g., a woman making t e a , as viewed from one s t a t i o n p o i n t ) , or a 'walk' a c r o s s t e r r a i n (e.g., successive p i c t u r e s taken a l o n g a r o u t e a c r o s s a c o l l e g e campus). The s e q u e n c e s were such t h a t many i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a g e s o f t h e e v e n t s were n o t shown, though t h e y presumably were i m p l i e d by i n v a r i a n t s e x t r a c t a b l e from what was shown. I n s u b s e q u e n t t e s t s of r e c o g n i t i o n memory, s u b j e c t s saw t h r e e t y p e s o f p i c t u r e : ORIGINALS each o f which was i d e n t i c a l t o a p r e v i o u s l y viewed s l i d e ; BELONGING items e a c h r e p r e s e n t i n g an i n t e r m e d i a t e stage of an i n p u t sequence; and CONTROL items, e a c h o f w h i c h v i o l a t e d o n e or more i n v a r i a n t s of t h e i n p u t sequence. The t a s k was t o r e c o g n i z e o r i g i n a l s as ' o l d ' , and t o reject b e l o n g i n g and c o n t r o l items as 'new'.

Cognition of complex events

23 1

Coherence and Fusion E f f e c t s The c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n t h a t was asked i n t h e s e experiments was whether s u b j e c t s p e r c e i v e d t h e s l i d e sequences a s ' c o h e r e n t ' ( u n i t a r y ) e v e n t s . The p a t t e r n o f s u b j e c t s ' r e c o g n i t i o n r e s p o n s e s appeared t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e answer was ' y e s ' . S p e c i f i c a l l y , while s u b j e c t s were a c c u r a t e a t r e c o g n i z i n g t h e ' o l d n e s s ' o f o r i g i n a l s l i d e s and r e j e c t i n g t h e c o n t r o l s l i d e s a s 'new', t h e y f r e q u e n t l y were f o o l e d by belonging items. Such i t e m s f r e q u e n t l y were judged t o be ' o l d ' , though i n f a c t t h e y were 'new'. The r e s u l t s of a s t u d y by P i t t e n g e r and J e n k i n s (1979, c i t e d i n J e n k i n s e t a1 1978) were t y p i c a l . T h e i r i n p u t sequence comprised photographs t a k e n from 1 3 p o i n t s a l o n g a r o u t e a c r o s s a c o l l e g e campus. I n t h e s u b s e q u e n t r e c o g n i t i o n t e s t , t h e h i t r a t e t o o r i g i n a l p i c t u r e s averaged . 8 3 , and t h e f a l s e alarm r a t e t o c o n t r o l items averaged .08 ( t h e c o n t r o l i t e m s i n c l u d e d p i c t u r e s t a k e n on t h e campus b u t n o t a l o n g t h e r o u t e , and a l s o p i c t u r e s showing s i d e views a l o n g t h e r o u t e ) . The f a l s e alarm r a t e t o belonging items averaged .68, over 8 times t h a t of c o n t r o l items. T h i s t y p e o f p a t t e r n is d e s c r i b e d as ' c o h e r e n c e ' by J e n k i n s e t a l . An even more s t r i k i n g p a t t e r n -- one termed ' f u s i o n ' -- a l s o c a n occur. Fusion refers t o cases i n which o r i g i n a l and b e l o n g i n g items are n o t r e l i a b l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d , t h a t i s cases i n which t h e f a l s e alarm r a t e t o b e l o n g i n g items i s a s high a s t h e h i t r a t e t o o r i g i n a l s ( e . g . , A l l e n e t a l , 1 9 7 8 ) . An Event-Perception Hypothesis f o r Coherence and Fusion The e m p i r i c a l phenomena o f c o h e r e n c e and f u s i o n l e d J e n k i n s e t a1 (1978) t o conclude t h a t ' e v e n t s can be p r i m a r y u n i t s o f a n a l y s i s ' ( p . 1 4 2 ) , and t h a t t h e s e ' e v e n t s a r e n a t u r a l wholes t h a t a r e , so-to-speak, p e r c e i v e d through t h e s l i d e s ( o f a p i c t u r e s e q u e n c e ) , r a t h e r t h a n b u i l t up from t h e s l i d e s ' . ( p . 158). According t o t h i s view, s u b j e c t s ' f a l s e r e c o g n i t i o n s o f new-butb e l o n g i n g s t i m u l i o c c u r because some s t i m u l i match t h e i n v a r i a n t s o f t h e apprehended e v e n t . Indeed, u s i n g terms r e m i n i s c e n t o f Garner ( 1 9 7 4 ) , t h e a u t h o r s s u g g e s t e d t h a t new-but-belonging items are ' s p e c i f i e d ' by i n v a r i a n t s as a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e s t i m u l i p r e s e n t e d . And, ' S t i m u l i t h a t are t h o r o u g h l y s p e c i f i e d are l i k e l y t o be f a l s e l y r e c o g n i z e d j u s t because t h e y f i t a l l o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t s or i n v a r i a n t s o f t h e system ( t h e e v e n t ) t h a t h a s been apprehended' ( p . 158). The c o n c l u s i o n s r e a c h e d by J e n k i n s e t a1 r e c e n t l y have been termed a ' f u s i o n h y p o t h e s i s ' ( L i e b r i c h and White, 1 9 8 3 ) . T h i s c h o i c e o f l a b e l may be u n f o r t u n a t e as J e n k i n s e t a1 u s e t h e term ' f u s i o n ' p r i m a r i l y t o refer t o an e m p i r i c a l outcome ( z e r o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between o r i g i n a l and b e l o n g i n g i t e m s ) r a t h e r t h a n t o a h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o c e s s . F u r t h e r , t h e y were c l e a r i n s u g g e s t i n g t h a t b o t h t h e f u s i o n p a t t e r n and t h e coherence p a t t e r n were e v i d e n c e f a v o u r i n g e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n . According t o J e n k i n s e t a1 f u s i o n i s t h e l i m i t i n g case i n which ' s p e c i f i c knowledge' of what w a s s e e n i n a n experiment is t o t a l l y dominated by ' e x t e n s i v e knowledge' o f t h e e v e n t . I n more t y p i c a l cases, s p e c i f i c and e x t e n s i v e knowledge are t h o u g h t t o c o - e x i s t producing t h e c o h e r e n c e p a t t e r n . Effects o f Disordering'Upon Coherence and Fusion Although t h e e m p i r i c a l phenomena of coherence and f u s i o n a r e p r o v o c a t i v e , t h e y a r e n o t by themselves a d e q u a t e t o s u p p o r t a n e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s . The r e a s o n simply is t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h o s e two phenomena are p o s s i b l e . One s u c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s based on t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t similar s t i m u l i are d i f f i c u l t t o d i s t i n g u i s h i n r e c o g n i t i o n memory t a s k s .

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J.C. Bartlett

Thus, t h e high f a l s e alarm r a t e s t o belonging i t e m s i n t h e J e n k i n s e t a 1 (1978) experiments might r e f l e c t t h e f a c t t h a t each o f t h e s e b e l o n g i n g items was v e r y h i g h l y similar t o one o r more o f t h e o r i g i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d items. A second a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r coherence and f u s i o n p e r t a i n s t o p o s s i b l e problems with p r o c e s s e s o f r e t r i e v i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from memory. Assume, f o r example, t h a t s u b j e c t s s t o r e traces f o r i n d i v i d u a l p i c t u r e s , b u t t h a t they have d i f f i c u l t y r e t r i e v i n g j u s t t h e r i g h t t r a c e i n r e s p o n s e t o j u s t t h e r i g h t p i c t u r e a t t e s t . I n such a case, s u b j e c t s might a d o p t a ' c o n s i s t e n c y ' s t r a t e g y ( s e e Reder and Anderson, 1 9 8 0 ) . I f a p i c t u r e evokes r e t r i e v a l o f a t r a c e , and a p p e a r s t o be c o n s i s t e n t with i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s t r a c e ( e . g . , i f i t l o o k s l i k e i t could have been t a k e n from a l o n g t h e same ' w a l k ' ) , t h e s u b j e c t might simply s a y ' o l d ' on t h a t b a s i s . Hence, t r u l y o l d items and new-but-belonging items would n o t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from each o t h e r , though b o t h would be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from c o n t r o l items, based s i m p l y on t h e s e ' c o n s i s t e n c y ' t e s t s ( s e e a l s o Moeser, 1982, f o r some r e l a t e d i d e a s a p p l i e d t o memory f o r complex v e r b a l m a t e r i a l s ) .

J e n k i n s e t a1 (1978) were aware o f a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s , and developed a p o t e n t i a l l y powerful t e c h n i q u e f o r t e s t i n g t h e h y p o t h e s i s f u r t h e r . The t e c h n i q u e e n t a i l e d a m a n i p u l a t i o n o f o r d e r i n g o f t h e sequence o f p i c t u r e s p r e s e n t e d a t i n p u t . I n s t e a d o f always p r e s e n t i n g s l i d e s i n c o r r e c t temporal o r d e r , s l i d e s were sometimes p r e s e n t e d i n a d i s o r d e r e d f a s h i o n . I t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t d i s o r d e r i n g i n some c a s e s c a n d i s r u p t t h e process of e x t r a c t i n g i n v a r i a n t s , reducing t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a c o h e r e n t e v e n t i s p e r c e i v e d . If s o , and i f t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f a sequence as a c o h e r e n t e v e n t a c t u a l l y i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o h e r e n c e / f u s i o n e f f e c t s , s u c h e f f e c t s s h o u l d be weakened i n t h e d i s o r d e r e d c o n d i t i o n : t h a t i s , f a l s e r e c o g n i t i o n s o f b e l o n g i n g items r e l a t i v e t o c o n t r o l items, s h o u l d be reduced i n c o n d i t i o n s o f d i s o r d e r e d p r e s e n t a t i o n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e p r e d i c t e d tendency f o r d i s o r d e r e d p r e s e n t a t i o n t o reduce t h e coherence/ f u s i o n e f f e c t h a s sometimes been o b s e r v e d , b u t more o f t e n i t h a s n o t (see A l l e n e t a l , 1978; J e n k i n s e t a l , 1978; L i e b r i c h and White, 1983; P i t t e n g e r and J e n k i n s , 1 9 7 9 ) . The i n c o n s i s t e n t e f f e c t s o f t h e d i s o r d e r i n g v a r i a b l e were a d d r e s s e d by J e n k i n s e t a1 (1978), who argued i n e s s e n c e t h a t m a n i p u l a t i o n s o f o r d e r i n g a r e n o t always e f f e c t i v e i n a l t e r i n g t h e way t h a t e v e n t s a r e p e r c e i v e d . However, i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e o r d e r i n g v a r i a b l e is u n l i k e l y t o be t h e o n l y f a c t o r involved. I n a r e c e n t experiment by L i e b r i c h and White (1983, Experiment 41, t h e i n p u t sequence d e p i c t e d a complex e v e n t i n v o l v i n g p e o p l e meeting people a t a park bench. The e v e n t was c o n t r i v e d t o be h i g h l y time-dependent, and y e t n o t s o i n t r i n s i c a l l y o r d e r e d t h a t i t c o u l d be e x t r a c t e d from a d i s o r d e r e d sequence. Indeed, s u b j e c t s ' v e r b a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e i n p u t s l i d e sequences showed reduced comprehension i n a d i s o r d e r e d p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n d i t i o n , as compared t o a well-ordered c o n d i t i o n . D e s p i t e t h i s e f f e c t on v e r b a l comprehension, t h e performance of s u b j e c t s i n a r e c o g n i t i o n t e s t showed c l e a r l y t h e p a t t e r n o f coherence, even w i t h disordered presentation. Thus, t h e coherence phenomenon was shown t o be s e p a r a b l e from t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f a s l i d e sequence as an e v e n t . A d d i t i o n a l Evidence f o r Event P e r c e p t i o n The r e s u l t s o f t h e experiment by L i e b r i c h and White (1983) a p p e a r q u i t e damaging t o t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n h y p o t h e s i s as o r i g i n a l l y f o r m u l a t e d by J e n k i n s e t a1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . Indeed, t h e y raise t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n simply d o e s n o t o c c u r , a t l e a s t n o t with sequences o f p i c t u r e s o f

Cognition of complex events

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t h e t y p e w e have c o n s i d e r e d . However, a complete r e j e c t i o n o f t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n p r o c e s s a p p e a r s t o be unwarranted, as a t l e a s t 3 e x i s t i n g s t u d i e s have r e p o r t e d o b s e r v a t i o n s -- b e s i d e s t h o s e o f coherence o f f u s i o n -- which s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t t h e e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n i d e a . The g e n e r a l f i n d i n g o f t h e s e 3 s t u d i e s ( A l l e n e t a l , 1978; Hock and Schmelzkopf, 1980; Kraft and J e n k i n s , 1 9 7 7 ) i s t h a t viewing a set o f p i c t u r e s t a k e n from a s c e n e can g i v e rise t o r a t h e r d e t a i l e d knowledge o f i n v a r i a n t s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s among t h e o b j e c t s o r f e a t u r e s i n t h e s c e n e . This knowledge i s a c c e s s i b l e even i n r e s p o n s e t o new-but-belonging p i c t u r e s , n o t a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t e d a t i n p u t . P e r h a p s t h e most i m p r e s s i v e e v i d e n c e f o r e x t r a c t i o n o f s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s is provided by t h e Hock and Schmelzkopf (1980) s t u d y . S u b j e c t s were t r a i n e d t o c l a s s i f y photographs from a s c e n e with r e s p e c t t o t h e s t a t i o n - p o i n t from which t h e y were made (1 o f 4 l o c a t i o n s n e a r a s t r e e t i n t e r s e c t i o n ) . I n a s u b s e q u e n t t e s t , s u b j e c t s were a b l e t o judge whether 2 p i c t u r e s -- with nono v e r l a p p i n g c o n t e n t -- were made from p r e c i s e l y t h e same s t a t i o n - p o i n t ( w i t h t h e camera p o i n t e d i n d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s ) , v e r s u s 2 d i f f e r e n t station-points. The accuracy o f t h e s e judgments was c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r t h a n chance, even w i t h p i c t u r e s made from new s t a t i o n - p o i n t s , t h a t is s t a t i o n - p o i n t s w i t h i n t h e s c e n e t h a t were n o t used i n t r a i n i n g . I t is d i f f i c u l t indeed t o i n t e r p r e t s u c h d a t a w i t h o u t assuming some s o r t of u n i t i z a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e s l i d e s t h a t were used d u r i n g t r a i n i n g . Such u n i t i z a t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t with t h e h y p o t h e s i s of e v e n t p e r c e p t i o n . NEW RESEARCH ON EVENT PERCEPTION WITH PICTURE SEQUENCES

Some experiments performed by DeNeal and myself ( B a r t l e t t and DeNeal, i n p r e p a r a t i o n ; Wallace, 1982) were based on t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t sequences o f p i c t u r e s can indeed be p e r c e i v e d as c o h e r e n t e v e n t s , b u t t h a t such p e r c e p t i o n does n o t g e n e r a l l y produce t h e coherence and f u s i o n phenomena. I n o r d e r t o t e s t t h i s s i m p l e h y p o t h e s i s , w e p r e s e n t e d our s u b j e c t s with sequences o f s l i d e s d e p i c t i n g ' w a l k s ' a c r o s s a t e r r a i n , and s u b s e q u e n t l y tested the ability of these subjects t o distinguish i n recognition ( a ) between o r i g i n a l and belonging s l i d e s , and a l s o ( b ) between c o r r e c t l y o r i e n t e d and l e f t - r i g h t - r e v e r s e d s l i d e s . We a l s o i n c l u d e d both o r d e r e d and disordered presentation conditions. The procedure was i n some ways s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f K r a f t and J e n k i n s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , whose s u b j e c t s showed e x c e l l e n t memory f o r t h e o r i e n t a t i o n o f s l i d e s from a p r e v i o u s l y p r e s e n t e d sequence. A c r i t i c a l a s p e c t o f our experiment i n v o l v e d t h e o r d e r i n g m a n i p u l a t i o n . A s i n p r i o r r e s e a r c h , h a l f o f o u r s u b j e c t s saw i n p u t sequences i n c o r r e c t temporal o r d e r . The remainder o f our s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d a d i s o r d e r e d p r e s e n t a t i o n . However, w e took s t e p s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f o r d e r i n g would be a n e f f e c t i v e one. A l l o f our ' w a l k s ' began from one l o c a t i o n , proceeded i n an approximately s t r a i g h t l i n e t o a n o t h e r l o c a t i o n , and t h e n r e t u r n e d t o t h e s t a r t i n g l o c a t i o n . And a l l 4 walks c o n t a i n e d a s a l i e n t f e a t u r e ( e . g . , a c h a i n l i n k f e n c e ) t h a t extended a l o n g one or t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e p a t h o f t h e r o u t e . The consequence was t h a t a l l 4 walks i n c l u d e d a s a l i e n t f e a t u r e t h a t sometimes was on s u b j e c t s ' right-hand s i d e , and sometimes was on t h e i r l e f t - h a n d - s i d e . Our assumption was t h a t t h i s a s p e c t o f our m a t e r i a l s s h o u l d maximize ' i n c o h e r e n c e ' i n t h e d i s o r d e r e d presentation condition.

The procedure o f t h e experiment was s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . A l l s u b j e c t s viewed 4 d i f f e r e n t walks a t i n p u t -- w i t h 10 s l i d e s p e r walk -- i n e i t h e r an o r d e r e d or a d i s o r d e r e d sequence. The 16 s u b j e c t s i n t h e o r d e r e d c o n d i t i o n saw a l l 1 0 s l i d e s from one walk, i n c o r r e c t o r d e r , followed by a l l 1 0 s l i d e s from

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t h e second walk, a l l 10 s l i d e s from t h e t h i r d a n d , f i n a l l y a l l 10 s l i d e s from t h e f o u r t h . The 16 s u b j e c t s i n t h e d i s o r d e r e d c o n d i t i o n saw t h e f i r s t s l i d e from one walk followed by t h e first s l i d e from a second w a l k , t h e f i r s t s l i d e from a t h i r d , and t h e f i r s t s l i d e from a f o u r t h . Then, t h e t e n t h s l i d e from e a c h walk was p r e s e n t e d , f o l l o w e d by t h e second s l i d e from e a c h walk, t h e n i n t h s l i d e from e a c h walk, and so on through p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e s i x t h s l i d e from e a c h walk. S l i d e s were shown f o r 10 seconds e a c h , and s u b j e c t s were i n s t r u c t e d t o view each walk c a r e f u l l y i n p r e p a r a t i o n for a subsequent test. The r e c o g n i t i o n t e s t was i d e n t i c a l f o r t h e 2 e x p e r i m e n t a l g r o u p s and i n c l u d e d 20 o r i g i n a l s l i d e s i n c o r r e c t o r i e n t a t i o n , 20 o r i g i n a l s l i d e s i n r e v e r s e d o r i e n t a t i o n , 20 b e l o n g i n g s l i d e s i n c o r r e c t o r i e n t a t i o n , and 20 b e l o n g i n g s l i d e s i n r e v e r s e d o r i e n t a t i o n . Belonging s l i d e s were t a k e n from a l o n g t h e same walks as o r i g i n a l s , b u t a t d i f f e r e n t s t a t i o n p o i n t s . R e v e r s a l s were c r e a t e d simply by p l a c i n g s l i d e s 'backwards' i n t h e s l i d e p r o j e c t o r t r a y . The t a s k f o r s u b j e c t s was t o c l a s s i f y e a c h s l i d e w i t h r e s p e c t t o 4 c a t e g o r i e s : (1) Old ( o r i g i n a l ) and c o r r e c t i n o r i e n t a t i o n ; ( 2 ) o l d ( o r i g i n a l ) b u t r e v e r s e d ; ( 3 ) new ( b e l o n g i n g ) b u t c o r r e c t i n o r i e n t a t i o n ; or ( 4 ) new ( b e l o n g i n g ) and r e v e r s e d . Note t h a t t h e old-new dimension and t h e c o r r e c t - r e v e r s e d dimension were l o g i c a l l y independent and uncorrel a t e d . One p r e d i c t i o n f o r t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e s t u d y was t h a t s u b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c i n g o r d e r e d p r e s e n t a t i o n would be more a c c u r a t e i n t h e i r judgments o f o r i e n t a t i o n o f s l i d e s t h a n would s u b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c i n g d i s o r d e r e d p r e s e n t a t i o n . However, w e s u s p e c t e d t h a t t h i s e f f e c t might b e weaker w i t h o l d ( o r i g i n a l ) s l i d e s (for which i n d i v i d u a l p i c t u r e memory might be h e l p f u l ) t h a n with new ( b e l o n g i n g ) s l i d e s ( f o r which i n d i v i d u a k p i c t u r e memory s h o u l d e a l s o made t h e n e g a t i v e p r e d i c t i o n t h a t s u b j e c t s be r e l a t i v e l y u s e l e s s ) . W e x p e r i e n c i n g o r d e r e d p r e s e n t a t i o n would n o t show more e v i d e n c e f o r coherence o r fusion. Table 1 d i s p l a y s p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f ' s a m e - o r i e n t a t i o n ' judgments t o each item t y p e and i n t h e o r d e r e d and d i s o r d e r e d c o n d i t i o n s . Same-orientation judgments are ' h i t s ' when made t o c o r r e c t items, and ' f a l s e alarms' when made t o r e v e r s e d items. Thus, it i s obvious t h a t o r i e n t a t i o n h i t s exceeded o r i e n t a t i o n false alarms ( F = 77.9; d f = 1.30; p