Cognitive Aspects of Art and Science Ronald C. Hoy Philosophy of Science, Vol. 40, No. 2. (Jun., 1973), pp. 294-297. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28197306%2940%3A2%3C294%3ACAOAAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B Philosophy of Science is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.
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DISCUSSION COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF ART AND SCIENCE* RONALD C. HOY University of Pittsburgh
In his recent paper, "Art as Cognitive: Beyond Scientific Realism" [3], Laurence Foss carries a step or two further the trend which recognizes that what we usually call "artistic expression" can have a cognitive dimension (cf. [I] and 141). This trend is healthy, and its main thesis is probably true. But if we are to really understand and appreciate the nature of art's cognitive contributions it is important that we be sure that the parallels that are drawn between art and science are genuinely illuminating. In this paper I will suggest that although Foss has drawn parallels that are highly suggestive he has relied upon controversial issues in the philosophy of science in such a way that instead of advancing the cause of art he may have undermined the status of science. After noting similarities between art and science one can use the similarities either to make the point that art is, in some ways, like science, or that science is in some ways like art. Although he claims to be doing the former, the upshot of Foss's discussion is the latter. And even though science is in some aspects an art, it would be a mistake to use this fact to argue for the cognitive status of art-a mistake that might obscure sounder grounds for such an assessment. Fsss's point of departure is the observation that different scientific theories can be used to reorgailize the "same" phenomena. Very casually Foss decides that the final reasons for choosing between competing theories are, then, evaluative or aesthetic considerations: "does the candidate view enable you interestingly and effectively to pattern experience in its terms?'([3], p. 238). Against this background Foss's overall strategy is captured by the following argument: (1) Whatever contributes to our understanding of a phenomenon by organizing our expectations with respect to the phenomenon in an interesting and effective way is cognitive. (2) Both art and science contribute to our understanding by organizing our expectations with respect to certain phenomena in ways that are interesting and effective. (3) Therefore both art and science are cognitive.
In Foss's words : The world is not as science says (or will in the indefinite long run say) it is. It is rather as science, the arts, natural languages, etc., say (or in the indefinite long run will say) it is . . ([3], p. 239)
.
* Received July,
1972.
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Now, my quarrel is not with the force of the conclusion but rather with some of the implications of the way that it is made. First, Premise (1) leaves ambiguous the nature of the criteria for an "interesting and effective" organization of phenomena. Surely, not every interesting organization merits the label 'cognitive', and neither would every effective organization. In fact, a particular organization of phenomena might be interesting and effective for certain purposes precisely because it is noncognitive. So, we are forced to ask: interesting in what way, or, effective for achieving what purpose? If one wanted to insist on a traditional distinction between art and science he would surely apply the distinction to the different ways in which they are effective or interesting. For example, Premises (1) and (2) are vulnerable to the cognitive-emotive dichotomy, and if someone wanted to use it against Foss he could claim that in Premises (1) and (2) Foss is committing the Fallacy of Equivocation: the sense in which art contributes to our understanding is different from the sense in which science contributes; so, we cannot automatically conclude that art is cognitive. I do not think that Foss is making this straightforward mistake, but in failing to specify in more detail the criteria for an effective organization of phenomena he at least leaves his argument at a weak state of development. For it can be plausibly asked, if the final criteria for acceptability are of a fundamentally aesthetic nature even in the case of scientific theories (as Foss seems to claim) why, then, conclude that art is cognitive? Why not conclude instead that science is aesthetic, or that science itself has noncognitive aspects? In short, is the proposed cognitive status of art of such a miserable variety that even science would not want to claim it? Unfortunately, Foss seems to be precluded from giving encouraging answers to these questions by his adoption and emphasis of the relativistic features of the socalled "Quine-Feyerabend-Kuhn thesis." According to Foss, not only are there different ways to picture the world (different scientific theories, varieties of artistic expression, etc.), but the very criteria of factuality appear to be internal to the frameworks of these pictures: "Different theories prescribe somewhat different facts" ([3], p. 244). And, ". . . there is no uniquely apt set of categories for explicating facts" ([3], p. 235). So, Foss rejects any attempt to grade empirically different theories from different frameworks on the Feyerabendian grounds that they carve up the world so differently they cannot even be formally compared, let alone be shown to be empirically inconsistent [2]. Moreover, Foss rejects W. Sellars' proposal that since the meaning-content of successive competing theories can partially overlap the theories can be compared and graded to see which comes closest to an ideal scientific picture of the world [5]. (Apparently, Foss dismisses this view because he believes that all ideals, or values, are themselves dependent for their cogency on a framework-i.e. they are relative. I will return to this point later.) The outcome of this train of thought is that there are no privileged pictures of the world, and, in particular, it is a mistake to think that there is (or could be) a unique true picture of the world. Foss expresses his own version of ontological relativity by saying that "we cannot speak of any symbol (representation, description) as a necessary as well as
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sufficient condition for the symbolized" ([3], p. 242). In other words, although many different symbols may be sufficient to picture the world, none are necessaryi.e. there is no description (proposition) that must be a part of every picture of the world. This interpretation of Foss's statement in terms of a symbol's being necessary for a picture of the world is the fairest interpretation. Interpreted literally, Foss might be taken as saying that some symbols are sufficient for the existence of the world, although none is necessary. This thesis would probably over exaggerate the ontological importance of language. In any event, the ambiguous phrasing of Foss's claim conceals its true value. To say that no description is a necessary part of every symbol system is to say something true but trivial. After all, a set of symbols does not have to be about any particular thing to be a set of symbols; nor does it have to be good or true for it to be a symbol system. But to say that no description is a necessary part of every true (comprehensive) system is to say something that is controversial and probably false. If the latter is Foss's view, it amounts at most to a restatement of the doctrine that, when it comes to the details of picturing the world, truth is conventional. Now, whatever the merits of this controversial view of science may be, I want to propose that it is a mistake to use this thesis in the way that Foss does to argue for the cognitive status of art. Foss seems, in effect, to be saying that since scientific truth is conventional and relative (at least when it coines down to details) why not say that art is cognitive, as cognitive as science, because aesthetic value is also conventional and relative. Even if Foss were right about the larger background issues in the philosophy of science it is hard to see the value of this kind of victory. If one is arguing that art can be true, and if he intends his claim to be true for a significant sense of 'true', then he should argue that the mode of aesthetic truth is not just any old pragmatic variety. And simply weakening the concept of factual, empirical truth does not make art cognitive in any strong sense. At one point Foss implies that anything that causes "new connections to be made within our nervous system" is cognitive ([3], p. 242). Does this mean that hallucinatory chemicals are cognitive? Is this the sense in which both art and science are cognitive ? Later, Foss tells us that the measure of the effectiveness of a way of looking at the world depends upon a prior choice of an "evaluative framework" ([3], p. 245), but he says little about the rationality (or how we would determine the rationality) of choosing one framework rather than another. And when he quickly gives the nod to the value of survival he leaves the value of truth obscure, if not precarious. It is correct to say that any evaluation presupposes a prior set of goals or values. But it is a mistake to think that whatever achieves a goal through the use of symbols or whatever produces a feeling that something is understood is thereby cognitive: "The suggestion is that even empirical confirmation is a framework dependent concept and does not enable us to decide between competing overviews" ([3], p. 239). Should the conclusion then be that any framework can be called "empirical" or "cognitive"? No, it is rather the fact that competing frameworks or theories share a specijic common goal which grounds their claim to cognitive status. Presumably, this common goal is, at least in the case of scientific frameworks, to
DISCUSSION: COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF ART AND
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achieve a true picture of the world. To give up this goal, as Foss suggests we must, is a costly way to bring art closer to science. It is important to note that Foss does not have to resort to this strategy to achieve his goal. An example of a potentially more fruitful strategy would be to argue that some varieties of artistic expression (those claiming to be cognitive) are really informal, nascent scientific theories (about, for example, human nature, or "manin-the-world," etc.). Thus, their claim to be cognitive would be based upon their goal of trying to describe truly the way some things are and/or to predict the way some things will be. This is the goal they would share with the familiar sciences. To draw the parallel between art and science in such a way as this would be to make room for art within science, and the advantage of this approach is that it does not require us to dilute our concept of factual truth. A brief examination of one of the practical consequences of Foss's position may provide an indirect, concluding argument against his treatment of the issue. In keeping with his abandonment of descriptive truth, in any tough sense, Foss sees the role of the philosopher to be that of a world designer who, in actually building and testing his world, has gone beyond mere analysis (which is futile since it is framework dependent) in the evaluation of his visions. Briefly, the maxim is: build and if we are good designers we will survive the experiment ([3], pp. 246-249). But the folly of this recommendation lies in the simple fact that we might not survive the experiment. Survival is not framework relative, and surely there are ways of organizing life and matter on earth whose consequences would be irreversibly disastrous. Instead of having to put such schemes to the crucial (fatal) test, it would be wiser (if we do have the value of survival) to try to see in advance, using analysis as one tool, whether the particular world design is a good one. Such advance analysis requires a strong normative conception of factual truth and presumes some degree of continuity in the progress of science. So, whether or not we can now prove that there is (or could ever be) a unique true picture of the world, the search for such a picture ought to remain one of our values and our standards for what is to count as cognitive ought to remain high. REFERENCES
[I] Arnheim, R. Vi~itnlThinking. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. [2] Feyerabend, P. K. "Problems of Empiricism." In Beyond the Edge of Certainty. Vol. 2 of the University of Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy of Science. Edited by R. Colodny. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965. [3] Foss, L. "Art as Cognitive: Beyond Scientific Realism." Plzilosopl~yof Science 38 (1971). [4] Goodman, N. Languages of Art. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1968. [S] Sellars, W. Scicnce and Metaphjsic~.New Yorlc: Humanitics Prcss, 1968.
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Art as Cognitive: Beyond Scientific Realism Laurence Foss Philosophy of Science, Vol. 38, No. 2. (Jun., 1971), pp. 234-250. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28197106%2938%3A2%3C234%3AAACBSR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
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