Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF BILINGUALISM KECSKES: “FM” — 2007/5/5 — 15:04 — PAGE i — #1 COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF BILINGUALISM E...

Author: Istvan Kecskes | Liliana Albertazzi

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COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF BILINGUALISM

KECSKES: “FM” — 2007/5/5 — 15:04 — PAGE i — #1

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF BILINGUALISM Edited by ISTVAN KECSKES State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA and LILIANA ALBERTAZZI Trento University, Rovereto, Italy

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A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-1-4020-5934-6 (HB) ISBN 978-1-4020-5935-3 (e-book)

Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © 2007 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

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CONTENTS

Preface

vii

Part 1 Structure and Components of the Bilingual Cognitive System Chapter 1. The Neurofunctional Components of the Bilingual Cognitive System Michel Paradis Chapter 2. Synergic Concepts in the Bilingual Mind Istvan Kecskes

3 29

Chapter 3. Matrix: Schematic Universals. How Many Minds Does a Bilingual Have? Liliana Albertazzi

63

Chapter 4. Grammatical Gender in the Bilingual Lexicon: A Psycholinguistic Approach Angeliki Salamoura

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Chapter 5. Bilingualism and Cognitive Arithmetic Elena Rusconi, Giovanni Galfano, and Remo Job Chapter 6. The Role of Cross-Linguistic and Cross-Cultural Experiences in Bilinguals’ Divergent Thinking Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin

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175

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CONTENTS

Part 2 Bilingual Language Processing Chapter 7. Task and Context Effects in Bilingual Lexical Processing Ton Dijkstra

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Chapter 8. Representation and Skill in Second Language Learners and Proficient Bilinguals Judith F. Kroll and Jared A. Linck

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Chapter 9. Second Language Gender System Affects First Language Gender Classification Elena Andonova, Ani Gosheva, Armina Janyan, and Jasmin Sadat Schaffai Chapter 10. Beyond Language: Childhood Bilingualism Enhances High-Level Cognitive Functions Ágnes Melinda Kovács Chapter 11. Cross-Linguistic and Cognitive Structures in the Acquisition of WH-Questions in an Indonesian-Italian Bilingual Child Antonia Soriente

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P R E FA C E

Our everyday life is characterized by conscious purposiveness. Our actions, from preparing lunch to designing an experiment, are directed at goals. Anderson (1996) argued that this purposiveness reveals itself partly in our conscious awareness, partly in the organization of our thoughts and actions. Purposiveness involves a cognitive-functional perspective, in which thought and action are considered in relation to their functions in humans’ goal-oriented behavior. Language use is goal-oriented: we intend to communicate something to someone else. Research has demonstrated that a significant amount of cognitive development results from the internalization of interpersonal communicative processes. Consequently, language research should be cognitive research, and a cognitive theory of language appears to be the most suitable theoretical framework for bringing together psychology, linguistics, and bi- and multilingualism. This volume presents the latest research on cognitive aspects of bilingualism. Cognitive approaches to bilingualism attempt to find out what happens if the interpersonal communicative processes involve the use of two or more languages. The basic assumptions of cognitive theories of language are related to the ontology and the epistemology of human language. In cognitive linguistic theories researchers take different approaches to the “outside world-→ perception-→ inside world” relationships. The two main approaches are represented in the works of Langacker (1991, 1999) and Jackendoff (1983, 2002). Langacker’s cognitive theory of language analyzes meaning only on the conceptual level. His claim that “meaning reduces to conceptualization (mental experiences)” refers to the fact that perception is part of the process of conceptualization, and if so, then there are no clear boundaries between perception and interpretation. vii

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Langacker focuses on epistemology rather than ontology because for him perception is incorporated in the conceptualization process. In his theory there is little said about the outside world because he is mainly interested in the process of conceptualization. Jackendoff makes a clear distinction between real world and projected world, although he emphasizes that we have conscious access only to the projected world, which is “the world as unconsciously organized by the mind.” Information conveyed by language must be about the projected world. Most of the chapters in this volume follow Jackendoff’s line, which is a good fit to bi- and multilingual research because people with two or more languages may see the world from two perspectives, or from a synergic perspective. Differences in the outside world usually result in different projected worlds. Both the experimental results and the systematic claims in this volume call for a weak form of Whorfianism. In earlier research studies in bilingualism, the bilingual person and the product of thinking were at the center of attention, while recent trends have seemed to favor the process of thinking, focusing on language recall, reaction time, information processing, and memorization on the one hand, and social and conceptual development on the other. In this volume some relatively new or less-researched issues will be added to the well-known ones, such as gender systems in the bilingual mind, context and task, synergic concepts, conceptual blending, the relationship between lexical categorization and ontological categorization, and others. Discussions on these issues are unified by a common endeavor of the authors: to add something to the everlasting debate about the differences and similarities between monolingual and bilingual language development and use. Although current research tends to conclude that there are no major differences between monolinguals and bi- and multilinguals because their language systems develop and are used in a similar way (e.g., Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 2005; Paradis in this volume) researchers do not stop looking for differences. Several chapters (Paradis, Kecskes, Albertazzi, Kharkhurin, Kovacs) address this intriguing issue directly. Recent findings that the efficiency of bilingual language acquisition is fundamentally similar to monolingual language acquisition make one think that, at least in the language domain, bilingualism does not seem

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to alter the flow of normal language development. However, as Kovacs says in this volume, even if the outcome seems to be similar, this does not necessarily mean that the bilingual brain recruits the same mechanisms in the same manner when processing two languages as the monolingual brain operating one language. Mechanisms such as attention, inhibition, and selection might be used to a greater extent when dealing with complex input from which bilinguals have to construct two different systems. Three chapters (Kecskes, Kharkhurin, Kovacs) provide evidence of the capacity of bilinguals to perform blending operations among concepts in L1 and L2, but it is questionable if there is a real process of fusion. Some evidence refers to the fact that the concepts in L1 maintain their identity notwithstanding their being more easily translated, associated, and synthesized in L2. A bilingual is easily able to build up hierarchies of conceptualization, but the relative spaces do not fuse together. Kecskes’ findings show that there is some kind of synergism between existing L1-based knowledge and knowledge gained through the L2. Receiving new information through L2, bilinguals may change the conceptual domain attached to particular labels (words) and develop what is called “synergic concepts.” However, further research is needed to determine how exactly this process occurs, and what the outcomes of this conceptual change are in the bilingual mind. The chapters present both experimental data and systematic inquiries. The book consists of two parts. In the first part, the chapters focus on the structure and components of the bilingual cognitive system, while chapters in the second part discuss issues concerning bilingual language processing. In the first part of the volume there are six chapters. Paradis argues for a modular system of the bilingual mind. The neurofunctional system underlying implicit linguistic competence contains one subsystem for each language acquired by the speaker. Each subsystem contains its own phonology, morphosyntax, semantics and lexicon. The language subsystems, including their lexicons, are neurofunctionally distinct, but not stored in separate cerebral areas. Rather, the neural circuits that subserve them, while distinct, are intertwined within the same gross anatomical area. Kecskes presents his hypothesis of synergic concepts

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that are the results of conceptual blending. According to his approach, bilinguals get information about the same or similar concepts through two language channels. Because they have a common underlying conceptual base (CUCB) the blended information results in concepts that are neither exactly equal to the corresponding L1 concept nor to the corresponding L2 concept. Synergic concepts are a group of concepts that are lexicalized in both languages, but have a different socio-cultural load in each language. Albertazzi’s chapter underlines the importance of the ontological level of reality for linguistic research, which, in her opinion, has been ignored to a particular extent in cognitive linguistics in recent years. She emphasizes the structural differences among different kinds of categories, distinguishing between general ontological categories and regional ontological ones. The chapter shows that “recognizing” an item does not mean, by default, applying a taxonomic category or a base category. On that basis, a proposal is made for experiments to verify the existence of presentative pathologies, that is, pathologies occurring at the very basic format of representations. Salamoura’s study investigates the nature of gender representations in the bilingual lexicon, and claims that research on the organization of the bilingual lexicon points to an L1–L2 integrated gender system in which cognates rely more on the L1 gender value than noncognates. The chapter also suggests that this integrated gender system is not restricted to translation-equivalent nouns only, but that any L1 and L2 nouns with the same gender value share a gender representation in the bilingual lexicon. Rusconi, Galfano and Job intended to frame the relationship between bilingualism and number processing into a novel perspective by reporting some of the most recent empirical findings. They argue that a great deal of our knowledge of numbers is traded, thought, and manipulated by means of language, and seek an answer to the question of how essential verbal language is to numerical knowledge itself. Kharkhurin’s study investigates a possible effect that bilingualism might have on creative abilities. Three factors in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences of bilingual individuals are examined: language proficiency, age of second language acquisition, and experience and participation in two cultures. The empirical study with Russian-English bilingual immigrants living in the United States and English monolingual native speakers revealed

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that cross-linguistic factors in bilinguals’ development had an influence on their divergent thinking abilities, which is a necessary component of creative thought. These findings suggest that although bilingualism may lay the foundation of creative thinking it does not necessarily imply being creative. To account for these findings, a cross-language transfer is proposed as a cognitive mechanism facilitating divergent thinking in bilinguals. The second part contains five chapters. In the first chapter, Dijkstra argues that it is quite common in psycholinguistics to ignore the effects of task and context and talk about general models for particular domains of language processing. Researchers have a tendency to speak about, for instance, models of word recognition and parsing, as if performance would not depend on the actual circumstance in which it occurs. His chapter moves away from this tradition and examines the effects of task and context on language processing. He proposes a bilingual word recognition model that includes a system that explicitly takes into account task and context aspects. He demonstrates that the extended model is compatible not only with reaction time data, but also with data from electrophysiological and neuro-imaging techniques. In their chapter, Kroll and Linck examine the interplay of representation and skill in both second language learners and proficient bilinguals. A particular focus in their discussion concerns the implications of the finding that the activity of the unintended language is not eliminated once individuals achieve proficiency in the L2. Alarge body of recent research has demonstrated that even highly proficient bilinguals cannot effectively switch off the unintended language. There is evidence that aspects of both languages are active and potentially compete for selection. Although it might be expected that the weaker L2 would be affected by the more dominant L1 when learners are in early stages of L2 acquisition, the observation of parallel language activity among the most proficient bilinguals suggests that L2 skill is not a simple matter of overcoming the influence of L1. In an empirical study, Andonova, Gosheva, Schaffai and Janyan investigate the effect of the L2 gender system on L1 gender classification. They seek answers to the following questions: Does the acquisition of a second language in which grammatical gender demarcations do not

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repeat those in a bilingual’s first language lead to a contradictory set of expectations, hence less overall reliance on gender as a cue in linguistic and non-linguistic processing, or does it modify their representations of the grammatical items in their first language in line with the gender system of the second language? More specifically, can the grammatical system of L2 affect classification choices in L1 directly; that is, can the availability of a gender-marking system on nouns in L2 bias bilinguals’ preference for masculine vs. feminine gender classifications in their L1 in a way that would show alignment with the grammar of their second language? Kovacs makes an attempt to shed light on the ways in which the experience of being exposed to more than one language very early in childhood could influence the development of different cognitive abilities (with special emphasis on executive control and theory of mind). She discusses questions analogous to the ones that were asked when addressing the socalled paradox of bilingual language acquisition (Petitto et al. 2001), but she mainly focuses on socio-cognitive domains somewhat different from language development. Soriente examines language development in a bilingual child growing up with two typologically distinct languages – Italian and Jakarta Indonesian. She presents a case study of unbalanced bilingualism focusing on the development of WH-forms and concludes that the dominance of the loose Indonesian syntactic pattern results in a non-target word order in the construction of early WH-questions in Italian. The study discusses how children recognize languages as separate systems and how they gradually develop the cognitive patterns required for competence in separate though practically co-extensive linguistic domains. Istvan Kecskes and Liliana Albertazzi

REFERENCES Anderson, N. H. 1996. A functional theory of cognition. Mahwah: Erlbaum. Gumperz, J., and Jenny Cook-Gumperz. 2005. Making space for bilingual communicative practice. Intercultural Pragmatics, 2(1): 1–25. Jackendoff, R. 1983. Semantics and Cognition. Cambridge: MIT.

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Jackendoff, R. 2002. Foundation of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Langacker, R. W. 1991. Concept, Image and Symbol, Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, R. W. 1999. Grammar and Conceptualization. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Petitto, L. A., Katerelos, M., Levy, B. G., Gauna, K., Tetreault, K., and Ferraro, V. 2001. Bilingual signed and spoken language acquisition from birth: implications for the mechanisms underlying early bilingual language acquisition. Journal of Child Language, 28: 453–496.

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PART 1 STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE BILINGUAL COGNITIVE SYSTEM

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PART 1 STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE BILINGUAL COGNITIVE SYSTEM


CHAPTER 1

THE NEUROFUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF THE BILINGUAL COGNITIVE SYSTEM Michel Paradis McGill University, Montreal

Abstract The cognitive architecture of bilingual speakers contains at least four systems involved in verbal communication (i.e., implicit linguistic competence, explicit metalinguistic knowledge, pragmatic abilities and affect/motivation). The neurofunctional system that subserves implicit linguistic competence contains as many subsystems as the speaker has acquired languages. Each subsystem contains its phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and lexicon. These language subsystems are differentially connected to a single conceptual system that groups conceptual features together in accordance with the specific lexical semantic constraints of words in each language and the relevant pragmatic circumstances at the time of their use (Paradis 2004). Three main points will be discussed: (1) the distinction between the cerebral representation of concepts on the one hand and of lexical semantics on the other; (2) the representation of languages (including lexical semantics) as dissociable subsystems of the neurofunctional language system, connected to a single common conceptual system; and (3) the lack of qualitative difference between unilingual and bilingual brains in terms of conceptual organization and processing (though the contents of the representations may, and often do, differ). To paraphrase Kecskes and Papp (2000: 37), the main question will be: To what extent are the two languages [neuro] functionally independent, and to what extent do they constitute a single [neuro]functional system? Special emphasis will be placed on the relationship between the linguistic and conceptual levels.

1. B A C K G R O U N D

1.1. Neurofunctional Components of the Verbal Communication System As described in greater detail in a neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism (Paradis 2004), the native language (i.e., the grammar, what can be described by linguists in terms of rules: phonology, morphology, syntax and the lexicon) is acquired incidentally (i.e., by paying 3 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 3–28. © 2007 Springer.


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M I C H E L PA R A D I S

attention to something other than what is being internalized as linguistic competence), is stored implicitly (i.e., remains opaque to introspection), and is used automatically (i.e., comprehension and production are not consciously controlled). This implicit linguistic competence is subserved by procedural memory, which relies on neural structures in the right cerebellum, left basal ganglia – in particular the neostriatum – and perisylvian cortex (the classical language areas). In addition, individuals are aware of the observable characteristics of the manifestations of speech, including their own production, in particular the forms and default meanings of words. In other words, speakers are conscious of the input to, and output from, implicit linguistic competence, but not of the internal structure and operation of that competence. The knowledge emerging from these conscious observations is stored in declarative memory, which relies on neural structures in the hippocampal system, including the parahippocampal gyri and mesial temporal lobes. Its use is consciously controlled and as such, involves the anterior cingular cortex. Learners of a foreign language who are not exposed to constant communication with speakers of that language generally learn about the structure of the language from books or in the formal environment of a classroom. This learning, being conscious, is therefore subserved by explicit (declarative) memory. Because implicit linguistic competence is acquired only through frequent use of the language, foreign language learners often have little occasion to acquire implicit linguistic competence in L2. With time, especially if they enter into frequent real-life communication with speakers of that language, they may eventually acquire some implicit linguistic competence, but they will most likely continue to rely to a great extent on explicit metalinguistic knowledge. Besides the grammar of their language, speakers acquire the ability to infer intended meanings from the context in which utterances are produced, whether it be literal (the meaning derived from the meanings of words and the structure of the sentence, i.e., its semantic meaning), figurative, metaphorical, or simply enhanced by the situational, social, and discourse contexts. This is known as pragmatic ability. Each language possesses some specific pragmatic cues in addition to general pragmatic principles. Pragmatic ability is subserved by areas of the right hemisphere (Van Lancker 1997).


THE NEUROFUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS

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No one would ever say anything without the desire to communicate a message. Motivation is at the root of every utterance. It has been shown to have a considerable impact on the acquisition (Schumann 1998; Schumann et al. 2004) and attrition (Schmid 2002, 2004; Pavlenko 2005) of languages. Moreover, the manifestations of affect are closely related to certain forms in each language and language-specific pragmatics. Motivation, and affect in general, are subserved by a cerebral mechanism involving the amygdala and the dopaminergic system (Schumann & Wood 2004). All these neurofunctional systems are independent of each other, subserved as they are by different cerebral structures, and can be doubly dissociated by pathology. One system may serve as input to another, but does not modify its internal structure. For instance, pragmatics does not modify any part of the grammar; it only selects the elements of each component of grammar (phonology, morphology, syntax and lexical semantics) that optimally fit the intended meaning in the given context of each utterance. Whereas implicit linguistic competence is susceptible to impairment subsequent to damage to any of the cerebral structures that sustain it (aphasia), explicit metalinguistic knowledge is susceptible to impairment subsequent to damage to the hippocampal system (amnesia). Pragmatic abilities are selectively impaired by lesions in areas of the right hemisphere (dyshyponoia). Damage to the limbic system, causing lack of motivation, leads to loss of speech in the absence of impairment to language per se (dynamic aphasia). Each neurofunctional system is necessary but none is sufficient for normal verbal communication. As we are about to see in more detail below, all these systems are connected to a conceptual system where thoughts originate before they are encoded into language for production and where meanings are decoded into conceptual representations for the comprehension of perceived utterances or written text. 1.2. Neurofunctional Components of the Bilingual Cognitive System First, a historical note: The three-store hypothesis considered here originates in the psycholinguistic studies of the seventies that investigated whether the two languages of bilingual speakers are represented in two


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memory stores or one (McCormack 1977). Typically, bilingual subjects would be trained on a particular task in one language and then tested in the other. If the results differed from the same-language control condition (i.e., practice in the other language did not facilitate performance), they were interpreted as supporting the two-store hypothesis; if the results were similar, they were interpreted as supporting the one-store hypothesis. Experimental results were inconsistent, with some interpreted as supporting the one-store, and others the two-store option. Kolers (1968) reported that his own findings were not consistent with either hypothesis: the results were too similar to support the two-store hypothesis but not sufficiently alike to support one common store. He concluded that the actual situation of a bilingual person combines aspects of both hypotheses. In order to solve this problem, Paradis (1978) proposed to account for Kolers’ findings by postulating not one, not two, but three stores: one for each language, and one common system containing conceptual representations corresponding to both languages. The two language stores were later considered to be represented as subsystems of the language neurofunctional system (Paradis 1981). Lexical semantic representations of L1 and L2 words differ and are stored separately (each in its subsystem); conceptual representations corresponding to L1 and L2 words are also at least partially different, but within a common system. Lexical items rarely have the same meanings as their translation equivalents (Paradis 1997), besides having different syntactic connections within the language subsystem. Even when they have identical meanings, the lexical meanings are redundantly represented in each subsystem. Lexical items, including their meanings, are represented as part of their respective language subsystem and the conceptual feature groupings that correspond to the semantic constraints on lexical items of each language are represented in a common conceptual system. The three-store hypothesis holds that concepts are dissociable from language: aphasics retain concepts, even those that were acquired through language. Global aphasics behave intelligently; for example, they may beat you at chess and solve algebraic equations. Linguistically delimited concepts (i.e., English- or French-specific concepts), once they have been acquired, are stored independently of the language that



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shaped them, though they retain all their language-specific idiosyncrasies, and they remain available after the loss of language. Lexical meaning representations differ from conceptual representations in that the former are part of the language system, the latter, of the conceptual system; hence, the three-store hypothesis. Unfortunately, there is some confusion in the literature regarding the use of the terms semantic and conceptual. Often the term conceptual refers to the lexical semantic meaning and semantic refers to the conceptual level. Meaning representations are often called “conceptual” representations because most models do not distinguish between word meaning and concept (De Groot 2002; see Francis 2005 for a discussion of the confusion). But “the fact that pinpointing the difference between semantic and conceptual knowledge is tedious” (De Groot 2002: 48) should not cause us to ignore this distinction, which is supported by clinical studies. Certain types of aphasia that affect lexical semantic representations do not necessarily affect conceptual representations (Alajouanine & Lhermitte 1964; Lecours & Joanette 1980; Marshall 1984; Gurd & Marshall 1993). In the common conceptual system, conceptual features are grouped together in accordance with the specific lexical semantic constraints on words from each language and the relevant pragmatic circumstances at the time of their use. To the extent that lexical constraints are similar in the two languages, the same conceptual representations will be activated; to the extent that they differ, so will their conceptual representations. The lexical semantic constraints may have the greatest impact on language-derived conceptualization, though features of grammar also convey specific conceptual representations (as emphasized by Pavlenko 1999, 2000). Kecskes and Papp’s (2003) common underlying conceptual base (CUCB) corresponds to Paradis’ third store, the nonlinguistic cognitive system where conceptual features that conform to the lexical semantic constraints of each language are grouped together. As in the threestore hypothesis, it is in the CUCB that thoughts originate and are then mapped onto linguistic signs to reach the surface through one of the language channels. This is done directly: the perceived acoustic or graphic characteristics of the words automatically access the corresponding concepts, that is, an L1 or L2 concept depending on the word that has been


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heard or seen, just as, in unilinguals, two different words will each evoke their particular concepts (Paradis 2004). 1.3. The Subsystems Hypothesis The neurofunctional system underlying implicit linguistic competence contains one subsystem for each language acquired by the speaker. Each subsystem contains its own phonology, morphosyntax, semantics and lexicon. The language subsystems, including their lexicons, are neurofunctionally distinct, but not stored in separate cerebral areas. Rather, the neural circuits that subserve them, while distinct, are intertwined within the same gross anatomical area (Roux et al. 2004). The two languages never form a common system at any level of structure or at any time in development. At the phonological level, even when a person speaks L2 with a strong foreign accent, the phonemes of L2 are not the phonemes of L1: even though the values, as represented in the speaker’s brain, may be closer to L1 than to L2 values, the two systems are independent and may be selectively impaired by pathology (Alajouanine et al. 1949). The same goes for syntax, morphology and lexical semantics, no matter how many features of L1 are found in the L2 system, or feature values closer to L1 than is appropriate. In cases of full L1 values, the feature is then redundantly represented in the L2 subsystem. The subsystems hypothesis holds that the two language subsystems are totally separated (i.e., no part of any subsystem shares an item with another subsystem). If they can be said to share a feature; that is, a feature of L1 that is identical to its counterpart in L2, either deviantly or legitimately when the same parameter happens to be implemented in both languages, it can only mean that the same feature is redundantly represented in each respective subsystem. In this view, Cook’s (2003: 8) partial integration Figure 1 may correspond to an abstract schematic diagram of the meanings of words. But, though it may correspond to representations at the extralinguistic neurofunctional conceptual level, it does not correspond to the way any grammatical or lexical component of two languages is represented in Paradis’ model of the bilingual brain, with which it is presented as being compatible.



Language A

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Language B

Figure 1. Partial integration (after Cook’s [2003] Figure 1.3 B).

1.4. Redundancy of Representation in each Subsystem From the perspective of a neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism, even an interlanguage, or transitory grammar, to the extent that it is internalized as implicit competence, is stored in the L2 subsystem in the same way as a bona fide L2, and continues to change and develop within that subsystem in the same way that any language develops. However, the sequence of development may differ from the L1’s, and many L1 or other deviant features may fossilize and remain part of the speaker’s L2 grammar. The “deviant” grammar is stored like any other grammar. The nature of what is represented in the L2 implicit linguistic competence subsystem is identical to that of any native language, namely parameters of linguistic principles of the relevant sort (phonological, syntactic, morphological, lexical semantic) – whether appropriate for the particular language or not. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that the brains of bilingual speakers, whose L2 implicit grammar incorporates more features identical to those of their L1 than to the grammar of L2 native speakers, should in any way represent and/or process their languages differently than the brains of speakers whose grammars legitimately incorporate those features. There is no reason for the brain to treat an illicit parameter differently from a correct one. Two languages may legitimately contain the same parametric instantiation of certain grammatical principles, while other parameters differ. The actual number of similar features in two languages


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is a mere historical accident and it changes over time. Let us consider a concrete example. If the main clause of a sentence is in the future, then clauses starting with when, in some languages, must use either (1) the present tense (as in English) or (2) the future tense (as in French); in other languages, one may (3) optionally use one or the other (as in Greek). The brain will develop a subsystem for L2 in which any one of these options is implemented. In some cases, it will actually correspond to the correct form in that particular language, in others it will not. Thus, let us assume that an English speaker acquires French imperfectly and systematically uses the present instead of the future tense in the “when” clause. That parameter will be inappropriately represented the same way in both the French and English subsystems, just as it would be legitimately represented in English and Italian. There is thus no reason to suspect that a subsystem that contains an instance of static interference from L1 should differ in its representation or processing from a system that legitimately contains the same feature in both subsystems. Cross-linguistic cognates are also quasi-redundantly represented in each subsystem, for at least three reasons: (1) A particular word may be available to a bilingual aphasic patient, but not its cognate in the other language (the same argument that rules out the extended and the tripartite systems – see Paradis 1981); (2) lexical meanings, as well as pronunciations, are very rarely identical; and (3) lexical items and their cognate translation equivalents have different intralingual connections and often possess different syntactic characteristics. For example, the verb “telephone” requires a direct object in English but an indirect object in French; “information” is a mass noun in English, but a count noun in French. At the conceptual level, the amount of overlapping features in the conceptual representation, for cognate and noncognate translation equivalents alike, will correspond to the actual degree of similarity in meaning between a word and its translation equivalent. 2. T H E N AT U R E O F R E P R E S E N TAT I O N S , T H E I R O R G A N I Z AT I O N , A C Q U I S I T I O N A N D U S E A R E THE SAME

Bilinguals have a conceptual base that is qualitatively identical to that of unilinguals. Only the number of language-governed concepts



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and their exact boundaries differ. Bilingual memory does not differ in kind or in organizational principles from unilingual memory. It can be said that “bilingual memory differs from monolingual memory to a great extent” (Kecskes & Papp 2003: 258) only with regard to what is represented and processed, not how. The common conceptual base of bilinguals is identical in nature, organization, development and use, to the unilingual conceptual base. It is simply bigger – at least in most cases (a unilingual literature professor may have more language-based concepts than a bilingual shepherd). The content of representations may be impoverished and/or deviant with respect to native speakers’ norms but it is stored and processed in the same way as any “correct” language-governed concept. Therefore, the cognitive functioning of bilinguals is identical to that of unilingual speakers. If, by “cognitive functioning” one means the actual contents of the ideas and values processed in the speaker’s mind, then the difference between the cognitive functioning of a unilingual and a bilingual speaker is of the same kind as that between a native Hungarian speaker and a native American English speaker: What they think may differ but the principles that underlie the thinking and feeling processes are the same. As Kecskes and Papp (2003: 258) rightly assert, “Each language used as an L1 of a community has a system of expectations and traditions.” But unilinguals living in a bicultural environment also have two sets of expectations and traditions for their native words and expressions, depending on the context of their use. “Liberal” may be considered a compliment in one group, an insult in another. Just as one can predict that a German speaker’s semantic boundaries of the word Freund (an intimate friend) will change after living in California for 20 years, where you introduce someone you have met at the bus stop 15 minutes ago as “my friend Bill,” one can expect the notion of cold weather to go through the same type of rearrangement when an English speaker moves from northern Vermont to Florida. Under the influence of the frequent use of the other language, concepts are modified in bilinguals to include or exclude a feature or features (i.e., static interference) in the same way that concepts are modified by new experience in unilinguals.


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2.1. Similarity in Nature The nature of what is represented is the same whether concepts originate in one language or a blend of two or more. The fact that a concept has been derived from L2 semantic constraints does not alter its characteristics: it is still made up of conceptual features, behaves in the same ways when activated, and combines with other concepts to give rise to mental representations. The fact that L1- and L2-derived concepts are part of a CUCB does not mean that translation equivalents have identical conceptual representations, in that the meanings of a word and of its translation equivalent correspond to one and the same concept. Far from it. Concepts in one language and their closest equivalents in another are rarely, if ever, identical; they overlap but do not share exactly the same contents (see Paradis 1997). Note that we should distinguish between the linguistic concept (i.e., the complete conceptual representation corresponding to the lexical semantics of an item) and the conceptual representation evoked by the utterance of a word in context – those (and only those) relevant features of the linguistic concept that are activated as restricted by the situation and the linguistic context in which the word is uttered. Not all features of a concept are activated whenever a word is used. What is activated by any given use of the word is modulated by the various pragmatic circumstances, the mental set, etc.; you never activate all the conceptual features associated with a given concept, only those relevant to the situation. Thus, in some cases, when the differences are not relevant in the context, the very same features may be activated when either an L1 word or its translation equivalent is used. For example, if on the tennis court I say “pick up all the balls” or “ramasse toutes les balles,” balles and balls refer to the same objects and the addressee will pick up all the tennis balls that are on the court. But, if in the gym I say “apporte-moi toutes les balles qui sont dans le placard,” the addressee will bring a different set of objects than if I ask for “all the balls that are in the closet.” In the latter case, basketballs and soccer balls will be brought along with the small baseballs and tennis balls that would be brought following the French request.



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The same L1 word may activate different concepts depending on the pragmatic situation. In a sarcastic remark, a word will be interpreted to mean the opposite of its usual meaning. Moreover, unilinguals cannot really be said to have, in contrast to bilinguals, a qualitatively different “one-language-governed conceptual base” (Kecskes & Papp 2003: 249), because many of the concepts in the CUCB do not correspond to a word or expression in L1. This could be true only in a theory of radical language determinism, in which no concept existed without a corresponding word as its source. Yet, children clearly have many concepts long before they acquire their first word. The unilinguals’ underlying conceptual base is simply quantitatively smaller, since it has fewer possible featural groupings that correspond to words. 2.2. Similarity in Organization As proposed earlier, bilinguals have two independent language subsystems, but both of them have access to the same underlying conceptual base where conceptual meanings group together certain features that correspond, say, to the word glass, another set, with considerable overlap, that corresponds to the word goblet, and yet another, also with considerable but not total overlap, that corresponds to the word verre. This is what it means to have a common conceptual system, independent of language and languages. The conceptual system is in a constant state of flux as it incorporates new insights from experience and new meanings for words (i.e., words that have different meanings in different contexts), as well as meanings for new words in both L1 and L2. Concepts of the two languages coexist and interact in the bilingual individual’s CUCB (the third store) in the same way that different concepts of the same language and those shaped by experience coexist and interact in the unilingual conceptual system. The contents differ, not the nature of the representations or the kind of cognitive functioning. With different material, a bilingual speaker functions cognitively in the same manner as a unilingual speaker. Note that no two unilinguals possess identical concepts, either. The difference is one of degree; it concerns only the content of representations (i.e., the specific combination of conceptual features), not the way concepts are acquired, formed, used or


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stored. In this respect, bilinguals differ from unilinguals no more than unilingual English speakers differ from unilingual Spanish speakers. L1 concepts are more easily modified by L2 concepts (and the reverse), than grammatical elements are, because they are sustained by declarative memory. The lexical semantic constraints on the use of a word, and consequently its corresponding conceptual representation, are generally known explicitly. For instance, one can demonstrate that one knows the meaning of the word mug by identifying an actual object: “Yes, this is a mug; no, this is not a mug.” Of course, there may be borderline cases: “This is not quite a mug.” It is nevertheless perceived as a mug-like cup or bowl and will be so described, for instance, when trying to explain to friends back home the type of large breakfast cup from which one drank one’s café au lait in France. What is represented may differ from target-language native speakers’ representations but the principles of conceptual organization and processing are the same. The content may be impoverished and/or deviant with respect to native speakers’ norms, but it is stored and treated in the same way as any bona fide language-specific concept. The conceptual system is affected by a new language in the same way as it is affected by the encounter with new L1 words and new real-world experiences. L2 words activate a different set of conceptual features than their L1 translation equivalents in the same way that L1 synonyms do. In the bilingual conceptual system, the number of concepts changes; their organization does not. 2.3. Similarity in Development The way the conceptual base of a second language develops does not differ qualitatively from the analogous process in the first language. Unilingual individuals continuously increase their conceptual base as they encounter new experiences and learn new words of their L1. The experience of learning new L2 words with their corresponding conceptual representations is not different in kind. It simply adds new featural groupings in the same way as learning new synonyms in the L1. There is thus no need to postulate an additional conceptual system for L2 – only an extended underlying conceptual base, extended in the same way that the unilinguals’ conceptual base is extended over a lifetime, as our



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knowledge of the world – and, to some extent, of our native language – increases. With prolonged language contact, concept boundaries may change so that L1 words no longer activate their original conceptual meanings, but incorporate some or all conceptual features of their L2 equivalents. Semantic constraints on the use of L1 words become blurred. Faux-amis from L2 will creep into L1; For example, an English speaker living in a French environment will call a lecture a conference, or a less colloquial calque will be used – the speaker will tell a friend that his flight was annulled – rather than cancelled. This follows the same pattern as the change in unilingual concept boundaries consequent to new experiences. To speak of the emergence of the CUCB when the learner has reached a certain threshold of L2 proficiency (Kecskes & Papp 2003: 250) might imply that a new system is developed, when in fact it is the existing conceptual system that gradually increases as boundaries of some L1 concepts start to gain and/or lose some features of previous L1-driven concepts and new L2 concepts are formed. The CUCB cannot be an additional “container” that would hold those L1 and L2 concepts whose meanings start to overlap improperly. The common conceptual system is a single system that contains unchanged L1 concepts, L1 concepts modified by L2 contamination, native-like L2 concepts, and L2 concepts modified by L1 contamination. All these combinations of conceptual features are represented in the CUCB and behave in all respects in exactly the same way any concept does. At early stages of development, the concept that corresponds to the L2 word may coincide with that of its L1 equivalent: the features that correspond to the L2 word start off by being identical to those of the corresponding L1 word. With time, the overlap ceases to be complete as some features are deleted and others added to a concept that eventually corresponds more closely to the actual native L2 conceptual representation of the L2 word. Thus, at first, the English speakers’ concept of balle may totally correspond to that of ball (and this concept is activated whether ball or balle is used), but as time goes by, the learner finds out that balle is used only for balls small enough to be held in one hand, and the feature [+small] is added to the L2 concept balle. The grouping of conceptual features for ball and balle is no longer identical, and the


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speaker learns the word ballon to refer to large balls. In a similar way, for the native English toddler, there comes a time when doggie takes on additional features and is no longer applicable to all four-legged animals, and the word cat is learned. The reverse may also occur in both bilingual and unilingual situations, when a new concept moves from the specific (one’s own house pet) to general (all dogs). Cook (2003) considers that the notion of the integration continuum is compatible with Paradis’ neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism in unifying both L1 and L2 within the same architecture of the mind, but that it differs in extending the continuum to concepts, whereas the neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism “has a single unvarying conceptual system” (p. 11). In the proposed theory, the bilingual conceptual system has indeed a single conceptual system, but it is not unvarying. Like the unilingual conceptual system (and perhaps even to a greater extent), it varies over time as new L2 concepts are incorporated. Again, the variation is in the contents, not in the nature or processing, of the representations. The process of development is the same. 2.4. Similarity in Processing In the bilingual language processing device, both language channels interact during production, resulting sometimes in mixing, switching, modifications and temporary dominance of either language (Kecskes & Papp 2000). Similarly, sociolinguistic and/or dialectal registers may interact in unilingual processing. As Labov (1972) pointed out, there are no single-style speakers. Every speaker encountered by his research team showed a shift in some linguistic variables as the context changed. Unilinguals switch registers when addressing different people in different circumstances. Unilingual parents do not speak to their children at bedtime in the same register as they speak to a judge in a courtroom. A change of register involves a change in lexicon, morphosyntax and even pronunciation – as does switching between languages. Unilinguals can mix registers the way bilinguals mix languages for a number of purposes, including jocularity. For example, a French person may say to a friend: “Hier j’ai rencontré Danielle et nous papotâmes” (Yesterday I met Danielle and we chatted). The verb papoter (familiar register) is used in the simple past (literary formal register), resulting in the intended



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comical effect. Unilinguals can suffer from interference between registers, inadvertently using a more frequently used familiar term in a formal conversation. Unilinguals can paraphrase. Paraphrasing is a phenomenon which does not differ in kind from translation, that is, saying more or less the same thing with different words and/or morphosyntax, even pronunciation. For example, baby or pet talk uses different intonation, pitch frequencies, and even, on occasion, different phonemes from speech to adults. Cook (2002: 5) raises the objection that L1 paraphrasing seldom leads to social roles such as acting as an intermediary between two other people. In other words, circumstances are such that unilingual speakers are not commonly placed in situations where they need to paraphrase what one person said so that another may understand. Nevertheless, parents often do translate adult speech that is addressed to their child by strangers into motherese. Some bilinguals, on the other hand, are seldom called upon to translate. They have little opportunity to do so, but they could if necessary. This is the point: the functions of mixing, switching and translating are available to unilinguals and bilinguals alike and some bilinguals make more extensive use of these functions. The difference is only in the actual frequency of use. Such frequency varies not only among bilinguals but among unilinguals as well: day care attendants need to paraphrase more often than people without children; lawyers need to paraphrase a judge’s statement for the benefit of their clients. There is no need to postulate a neurofunctional mechanism that would sprout only in bilingual brains to fulfill a new function. Another situation sometimes considered unique to bilinguals is that, when the expectation is that Language A will be spoken but, in fact, it turns out that Language B is being used, comprehension may be momentarily blocked. In the same way, unilinguals sometimes fail to understand what is said if they expect their interlocutor to speak about one thing but in fact that person starts speaking about another. Mindset affects comprehension in both unilinguals and bilinguals. There is therefore no reason to expect that anything in the bilingual brain should differ in kind from anything found in the unilingual brain. The mechanisms for comprehension and production in the bilingual brain do not need any additional component that is not already present


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in the unilingual person’s brain. The only difference is the extent to which unilinguals and some bilinguals make use of the various parts of the verbal communication system, but all such parts are available to bilinguals and unilinguals alike. The neurofunctional system need not be organized differently depending on whether an individual speaks one or more languages. Between different types of bilinguals and unilinguals, what changes is not the type of mechanism that sustains implicit linguistic competence or conceptual representations but the individual’s grammar; not the way in which the two languages are represented, but what is represented; not the organization of the system but its contents. The same is true of the CUCB: its nature and functioning principles are identical to those at work in the unilingual conceptual system. 2.5. Similarity in Handling Cultural Values Speakers may be aware of the different cultural values conveyed by each language and may, within this set, choose to adopt those specific to one or the other, or to compromise between the two, irrespective of the language they use. This is a question of contents rather than organization into one or two systems. Unilinguals may also choose implicitly or explicitly to accept or reject the values conveyed by their language community. For example, a French-English bilingual, even though a native speaker of French, may nevertheless consider that the Anglo-Saxon way of speaking in turns in a debate is preferable to the Latin way where all participants speak at the same time. Speakers may select from the values attached to each of their languages the ones they consider preferable, or modify them somewhat. They may also choose to behave one way in an L1 environment and another in an L2 environment, just as unilinguals adjust their behavior (linguistic or otherwise) to the company of close friends and relatives on the one hand, and to more formal company on the other. Bilingual/bicultural speakers thus have three choices. They may accept some of the traits of the other culture, choose a middle ground between L1 and L2 cultures, or stick to their L1 values as embedded in the connotations. Furthermore, they may have no preference, in which case they may use the L1 and L2 words with their respective



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language-specific connotations. There is no need to postulate a separate conceptual store for each of these situations; not to mention the fact that these behaviors are on a continuum, depending on a variety of circumstances. Nor does the conceptual system alter the way it acquires and handles values. To the extent that connotations are an integral part of the languagespecific meaning of a word, that is, are conventionalized and usually listed in standard dictionaries, they are stored as part of the language subsystem lexicon in the left hemisphere, and thus accessible to right-hemisphere-damaged patients who have difficulty with nonconventional connotations, figurative meanings and metaphors. Native speakers will naturally use the words of their language with their standard meanings, including their conventional connotations. To the extent that these connotations are absent from the conceptual system of L2 speakers of that language, there is interference in the same way as with the names of concrete objects (e.g., the meanings of balle, poil, chaise, chat vs. ball, hair, chair, cat). This simply means that the lexical constraints and corresponding conceptual representations have an impoverished content; the appropriate connotations are missing. Different languages have coined specific conventional metaphors, but the principle of a metaphor is independent of specific languages. Here again, the only difference is a question of what specific meaning is metaphorically attached to a specific expression in a particular language. There is nothing fundamentally different about storing an English-specific metaphor or a Russian-specific metaphor. Their translation into the other language may yield nothing but the literal meaning, but English-Russian bilingual speakers are aware of the metaphorical meaning of each. To the extent that speakers have not incorporated the cultural aspects of a foreign language into their repertoire, they may translate an L1 metaphor into the L2 language, and fail to communicate, as one fails to communicate when a linguistic parameter has not been internalized, reflecting static interference. If bilingual speakers are uncomfortable with the particular connotation of a word or expression in one of their languages, they will simply avoid using it or use a non-offensive translation equivalent (i.e., a word that, in the other language, does not have the unwanted


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connotation). Unilingual speakers do the same: they avoid words that they find offensive and use euphemisms or circumlocutions instead. When affectively charged words and taboo words elicit a greater autonomic activity (faster heartbeat, sweat) in speakers’ L1 than their L2 (Harris et al. 2003), it means that these words became associated with particular emotions early in life and have remained so for a long time, and links are therefore stronger than to their translation counterparts. However, in the case of attrition of L1 after decades of life in an L2 environment, the L2 emotive associations may strengthen over time – again, a quantitative difference that mirrors the variance in L1 situations. Different individuals speaking the same language in the same cultural environment will assign different emotive strengths to various words on the basis of their own personal circumstances. This in no way denies that different languages are bearers of different cognitive perspectives and different world views. Each of a bilingual speaker’s languages affords him or her a specific perspective. Both perspectives are acquired through communication in each language environment, or consciously learned from instruction. This is not incompatible with a CUCB: the bilingual individual simply has more choices (a quantitative difference). Unilingual speakers will likewise encounter different perspectives, and face the same choices, when they share the experience of two groups at opposite ends of the sociocultural and/or political spectrum – say, farm-hand paternal grandparents and aristocratic maternal grandparents. 2.6. Apparent Caveat: Late Bilinguals Late bilinguals differ from early bilinguals and unilinguals in the extent to which they rely on implicit linguistic competence, metalinguistic knowledge and pragmatics (Paradis 2004), but do not differ in terms of the type of conceptual development, representation, or functioning. It does not matter how the concepts get there, whether through language (L1, L2) or through experience. Once a conceptual representation is formed, its relevant parts are activated in the appropriate context. Late bilingual speakers’ L2 conceptual representations differ from those of native speakers of that language, but no two unilinguals



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have identical conceptual representations either, whether quantitatively or content-wise. New L2 lexical constraints delimit new concept boundaries and modify existing ones in the same way that new experiences do, including learning new L1 words. To the extent that metalinguistic knowledge is used to compensate for gaps in implicit linguistic competence, late L2 learners will differ from native speakers and early bilinguals in the degree to which the various cognitive systems are used for second language verbal communication – again, a possibly large, but still quantitative difference. Besides their reduced implicit linguistic competence in the L2, speakers may use metalinguistic knowledge in a controlled manner, thus resorting to a different grammatical system subserved by an altogether different cerebral mechanism. But at the conceptual level, since units of meaning are explicit, they do not differ from unilinguals in the nature of their representations or ways of processing. L2 words evoke their corresponding concept just as synonyms (or any two words) in one language do. In early bilinguals, two subsystems form from the start (from the time the child shows evidence of differentiating languages by using one with one set of interlocutors, the other with another set). To the extent that late bilinguals have internalized some implicit linguistic competence in L2, they possess two subsystems, even if one is less extensive than the other. At least at the beginning, and probably to some extent for the rest of their lives, their L2 will differ from their L1 in that a different neurofunctional system, subserving metalinguistic knowledge and relying on declarative memory, subserved by different cerebral mechanisms, will also be used to process L2. This mechanism is used in processing L1 as well but to a lesser extent, and usually in more formal situations. Whereas at no point and under no circumstances is there a single neurofunctional system of implicit linguistic competence common to both languages, even for those elements that happen to be identical in the two languages and will be represented once in each language subsystem, the opposite holds at the conceptual level. There is only one common conceptual system for both languages, and it works in accordance with the same principles in unilinguals and early or late bilinguals.


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2.7. Similarity in how, Dissimilarity in what is Represented It should be apparent by now that it is important to distinguish what is represented (specific phoneme, morphosyntactic rule, lexical semantic unit, concept) from the way in which it is represented (how the various mechanisms underlying the representation and processing of the different components of the verbal communication neurofunctional system operate). What is represented may differ; how it is represented and processed does not. There is even a way in which we may consider that the representations themselves, at least at the phonological, phonotactic, lexical and conceptual levels, differ only quantitatively from the unilingual norm. At first glance, they appear qualitatively different. For example, Spanish phonemes are not the same as Swedish phonemes; lexical semantic constraints on the use of a word are not the same as those on the use of its translation equivalent and do not refer to exactly the same objects, properties or events. But the apparent qualitative difference is the result of quantitative changes, changes that can be defined in terms of distance (in millimeters), duration (in milliseconds) and amplitude (in decibels) for sounds, and in terms of the number of meaningful features for concepts. The vocal apparatus is the same for all human beings. Native speakers of Oriya have the same vocal flaps, palate, lips, teeth and glottis as native speakers of English. They make different uses of the available principles of phonology – phonemes are more or less fronted, more or less labial, more or less palatalized, more or less nasal – but the underlying mechanisms for producing language sounds are the same. In production, the duration of vocal flap vibrations may vary, the proximity of the tongue to the teeth or the palate may vary, the size of the opening of the lips may vary, but all these differences are quantitative, measurable differences. The same phonotactics are available to everyone at birth. Each language to which children are exposed has its own set of phonotactic constraints, which differ from those of others. Further degrees of difference are possible within the limits of the perceptual and motor systems involved. Thus, when an L2 phonological feature is closer to L1 than appropriate, or over time an L1 feature becomes more similar to L2 values through prolonged contact with L2, the modification (“interference”)



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results in quantitative differences that give rise to a perceptible “foreign” accent. The underlying mechanisms that sustain the representation, perception and production of speech sounds are identical for these modified bilingual features. The differences result from quantitative variations in the use of these universally available devices. Even differences in phonological representations (what is represented) may be considered quantitative differences because they are the outcome of the inclusion of more or fewer traits of the relevant kind. The same argument applies to conceptual representations. Some concepts are acquired or allowed to be instantiated through experience and keep being modified by experience, that is, increasing or pruning the meaningful domain covered by each concept. Some concepts will be developed through linguistic delimitation (particular-language-driven concepts). These may modify some of the concepts acquired through experience by adding or subtracting meaningful features to constitute a new meaningful representational unit (a new concept). Modifications of this sort through exposure to two languages and/or two cultures are of the same kind as the ones that occur in unilinguals. Hence here, as for all other aspects of unidirectional or bidirectional interference, the difference is merely quantitative – more or fewer conceptual features enter into the constitution of a concept to match the corresponding lexical semantic constraints. In syntax, the differences are not in terms of more or less of a particular element, but of the use of a different parameter of a given principle – which again does not require the postulation of a bilingual-specific mechanism. The brain treats the “wrong” parameter – wrong in this particular language according to the current norm – in the same way as it would treat the correct one. If the contact between two languages is not just individual but societal, that parameter may in fact eventually become the correct one for the particular language. Even if we wish to consider representations as truly qualitatively different, they nevertheless do not differ in kind from unilingual representations in their acquisition, organization, development and functioning. The grammars of various languages differ from each other along a continuum of limited possibilities. Some of these differences are extensive,


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others are minor. Some elements are almost identical in any two given languages. Bilingual language subsystems do not contain anything different from this; there is nothing specific to bilinguals. Whether one or both of the bilingual’s language subsystems does or does not contain items that are identical to the corresponding native system does not make them different in nature; some deviant elements in one language are actually legitimate in others. Nothing sets apart the bilingual language systems except their size and actual content, though this content is of the same type and in most cases is quantitatively derived. The underlying mechanisms that sustain the various representations and their processing are the same in all individuals, whichever language or languages they speak. The only difference, for speakers with imperfect competence in a second, third or fourth language, is the degree of reliance on other systems within the verbal communicative system (metalinguistic knowledge and pragmatics) in order to compensate for an incomplete implicit linguistic competence system – but this does not affect the conceptual system subserved by declarative memory. A good analogy to clarify what is proposed here might be a computer program – say, MS Word – that underlies the typing of a document. The program is invariable, irrespective of the characteristics of the texts that are produced with its help. Documents may be typed in English or German, in 10- or 14-point characters, in Times or Courier font; parts of the text may be italicized or bolded; the text may be faultless or riddled with typos. Nevertheless, the Word program that sustains all the documents is the same. You may or may not actually use much italicization of characters or a lot of underlining, but these functions are available to you and to any user of MS Word. The texts differ only (quantitatively) in the extent of the use of the available options. To push the analogy a step further, let us assume that you type a text in German, your second language. You may systematically fail to use upper case for the initial letter of certain common nouns. Note that both upper and lower case are available and upper case is used to a certain extent when typing English. This is usually considered a transfer error (an interference) that leads to an inaccurate text from the viewpoint of standard German orthography. But all these transfers, errors and modifications are quantitative variations made possible by the underlying



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processing principles of MS Word, limited only by the nature of the program. There is little doubt that acquiring and using a second language is a dynamic process in which transfer, both linguistic and conceptual, occurs continuously between the two or more languages. However, what is involved in this dynamic process of bidirectional transfer is not the nature of linguistic and conceptual representation and processing. Linguistic representations remain parametric variations of phonological, morphological, syntactic and lexical semantic principles, and concepts continue to function along the same principles of temporary groupings of meaningful features, giving rise to thoughts. The contents of grammars fluctuate, but the principles of grammar and conceptual processing are not affected. The same systems continue to function in the same way, albeit with different phonological features, morphosyntactic rules and lexical items. The difference between a unilingual and a bilingual is akin to that between a native speaker of English and a native speaker of Farsi: they both possess a language system and a conceptual system that function in accordance with grammatical structures, rules, processes and conceptual representations, respectively. In each case, what is represented and processed differs, with English grammar and English-driven concepts in one, Farsi grammar and Farsi-driven concepts in the other, and non-linguistic concepts in both. In this light, total separation and total integration (Cook 2003) can only refer to the contents of representations, not to the language system or any module of the language system or subsystems. Neurofunctionally, total separation would correspond to the dual system and integration to the extended system, both of which are rejected for empirical reasons in favor of the subsystems hypothesis (Paradis 1981, 2004). The grammatical and conceptual transfers consist of linguistic and conceptual material, respectively. The identity of the material may differ, but the nature of the material (phonological, morphological, syntactic, semantic, conceptual) is not affected. There is not a single function or cerebral mechanism available to bilinguals that is not also available to unilinguals; the difference is one of degree of use of the various mechanisms as well as the form of what is represented and processed.


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What is represented varies from native speaker to native speaker of the same language in some respects (especially at the conceptual level), from language to language, and from unilingual to multilingual individuals. But the difference in the latter case is no greater and is of the same kind as the difference between native speakers of Russian and of Chinese; it is not specific to bilingualism. 3. C O N C L U S I O N

The language subsystems are connected to a single conceptual system where conceptual features are grouped together in accordance with the specific lexical semantic constraints of words in each language and the relevant pragmatic circumstances at the time of their use. The conceptual base of a bilingual speaker’s L2 differs only quantitatively from that of L1: What is represented may differ from L2 native speakers’ representations but the principles of conceptual organization and processing are the same as those of L1. Phonological, morphological, syntactic, lexical and conceptual modifications due to another language and/or cultural influence bear on the contents of bilingual speakers’ relevant neurofunctional systems, not on how these contents are developed, represented or processed. Even modifications in the contents of representations are often the result of quantitative changes. The bilingual’s CUCB is larger than a unilingual’s conceptual base, but does not differ in its structure or modus operandi. At no level of language or conceptual functioning is there anything in bilinguals that would involve an entity that is not available to unilinguals. There is therefore no need to assume the existence of any kind of cerebral function or mechanism that is specific to bilingual individuals.

REFERENCES Alajouanine, T., Pichot, P., and Durand, M. 1949. Dissociation des altérations phonétiques avec conservation relative de la langue la plus ancienne dans un cas d’anarthrie pure chez un sujet français bilingue. L’Encéphale, 28: 245–265. Alajouanine, T., and Lhermitte, F. 1964. Non-verbal communication in aphasia. In de Reuck, A. V. S. and O’Connor, M. (eds.), Disorders of language. London: Churchill. 168–182.

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Cook, V. 2002. Background to the L2 user. In Cook, V. (ed.), Portraits of the L2 user. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.1–28. Cook, V. 2003. The changing L1 in the L2 user’s mind. In Cook, V. (ed.), Effects of the second language on the first. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 1–17. De Groot, A. M. B. 2002. Lexical representation and lexical processing in the L2 user. In Cook, V. (ed.), Portraits of the L2 user. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 32–63. Francis, W. S. 2005. Bilingual semantic and conceptual representation. In Kroll, J. F., and de Groot, A. M. B. (eds.), Handbook of bilingualism: psycholinguistic perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 251–267. Gurd, J. M., and Marshall, J. C. 1993. Aphasia and intelligence. In Blanken, G., Dittmann, J., Grimm, H., Marshall, J. C., and Wallesch, K. (eds.), Linguistic disorders and pathologies. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 310–317. Harris, C., Aiçiçegi, A., and Gleason, J. 2003. Taboo words and reprimands elicit greater autonomic reactivity in a first language than in a second language. Applied Psycholinguistics, 24: 561–579. Kecskes, I., and Papp, T. 2000. Foreign language and mother tongue. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. Kecskes, I., and Papp, T. 2003. How to demonstrate the conceptual effect of L2 on L1? Methods and techniques. In Cook, V. (ed.), Effects of the second language on the first. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 247–265. Kolers, P. A. 1968. Bilingualism and information processing. Scientific American, 218 (3): 78–86. Labov, W. 1972. Sociolinguistic patterns. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Lecours, A. R., and Joanette, Y. 1980. Linguistic and other psychological aspects of paroxysmal aphasia. Brain and Language, 10: 1–23. Marshall, J. C. 1984. Multiple perspectives on modularity. Cognition, 17: 209–242. McCormack, P. D. 1977. Bilingual linguistic memory: the independence-interdependence issue revisited. In Hornby, P. A. (ed.), Bilingualism. New York: Academic Press. 57–66. Paradis, M. 1978. Bilingual linguistic memory: neurolinguistic considerations. Paper presented at the Linguistic Society of America annual meeting, Boston, 29 December. Paradis, M. 1981. Neurolinguistic organization of a bilingual’s two languages. LACUS Forum, 7: 486–494. Paradis, M. 1997. Représentation lexicale et conceptuelle chez les bilingues: deux langues, trois systèmes. In Auger, J. and Rose, Y. (eds.), Explorations du lexique. Québec City: CIRAL. 15–27. Paradis, M. 2004. A neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Pavlenko, A. 1999. New approaches to concepts in bilingual memory. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 2: 208–230.

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Pavlenko, A. 2000. New approaches to concepts in bilingual memory (summary). Bilingualism:Language and Cognition, 3: 1–4 Pavlenko, A. 2005. Bilingualism and thought. In Kroll, J. F., and de Groot, A. M. B. (eds.), Handbook of bilingualism: psycholinguistic perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 433–453. Roux, F. E., Lubrano, V., Lauwers-Cances, V., Trémoulet, M., Mascott, C. R., and Démonet, J. F. 2004. Intra-operative mapping of cortical areas involved in reading in mono- and bilingual patients. Brain, 127: 1796–1810. Schmid, M. S. 2002. First language attrition, use and maintenance: the case of German Jews in anglophone countries. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Schmid, M. S. 2004. Identity and first language attrition: A historical approach. Estudios de Sociolingüística, 5: 41–58. Schumann, J. H. 1998. The neurobiology of affect in language. Language Learning, 48: Supplement 1, ix–326. Schumann, J. H., Croewell, S. E., Jones, N. E., Lee, N., Schuchert, S. A., and Wood, L. A. 2004. The neuropsychology of learning: perspectives from second language acquisition. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Schumann, J. H., and Wood, L. A. 2004. The neurobiology of motivation. In Schumann, J. H. et al. The neuropsychology of learning: perspectives from second language acquisition. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 23–42. Van Lancker, V. 1997. Rags to riches: our increasing appriciation of cognitive and communicative abilities of the human right cerebral hemisphere. Brain and Language, 57: 1–11.


CHAPTER 2

SYNERGIC CONCEPTS IN THE BILINGUAL MIND Istvan Kecskes State University of New York, Albany

Abstract This chapter seeks answer to the following questions: How does bilingualism modify the concept-word symbiosis? How does the meaning structure (coresense, word-specific semantic properties (WSP), culture-specific conceptual properties) change when a close lexico-conceptual “equivalent” from another language is added to the existing construct? First, I will discuss the theoretical foundation of synergic concepts from several perspectives. Then, I will present a part of the results of two pilot studies whose goal was to give some empirically founded answers (however preliminary) to the questions above. Synergism comes from the Greek word “synergos” meaning working together. It refers to the interaction between two or more “things” when the combined effect is greater than if you added the “things” on their own. This is a type of “when is one plus one greater than two” effect, that is, an enhanced combined effect. It is hypothesized that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers there are synergic concepts that are the results of conceptual blending. Bilinguals get information about the same or similar concepts through two language channels. Because they have a common underlying conceptual base (CUCB), the blended information results in concepts that are neither exactly equal to the corresponding L1 concept nor to the corresponding L2 concept. Depending on age, socio-cultural and psychological factors, and the stage of cognitive and linguistic development of the individual, synergic concepts may be more or less beneficial for his or her cognitive development. Restructuring existing knowledge belonging to a particular label (word) in the L1 under the influence of new knowledge gained through L2 is expected to have a positive effect on the overall cognitive development, although this claim has not been fully proven yet. It is important to emphasize that synergic concepts do not mean some kind of mixture of knowledge and/or information. They are a group of concepts that are lexicalized in both languages but may have a somewhat different socio-cultural load in each language. In the CUCB of proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural loads are blended, which results in a conceptual domain that is not equal to the content of the conceptual domain in either language.

29 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 29–61. © 2007 Springer.


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I S T VA N K E C S K E S

1. T H E O R E T I C A L B A C K G R O U N D

The idea of synergic concepts derives from a cognitive pragmatic approach to bi- and multilingualism (Kecskes 2000) that assumes that semantic and conceptual representations are distinct levels of mental representation governed by the principles of two separate cognitive modules, the systems of linguistic and conceptual knowledge, respectively, and that languages in the mind have a CUCB that operates each linguistic system. 1.1. Two-Level Approach to Semantics One of the main theoretical assumptions for synergic concepts is rooted in a modified two-level approach to semantics. The two-level theory assumes that there is an intra-linguistic level of abstract semantic representations distinct from the extra-linguistic level of conceptual representations (Bierwisch 1996, 1997). As opposed to this assumption, the one-level theory, which is predominant in cognitive and computational linguistics, considers semantic representations as part of the conceptual system. Syntactic representations are directly mapped onto conceptual structures, with no separate, intra-linguistic semantic level mediating between the two kinds of representation (e.g., Jackendoff 1983). As a consequence, there is no distinction in principle between genuine linguistic knowledge about meanings and extra-linguistic, conceptually encoded knowledge (Herweg 1992). The two-level theory of semantic interpretation claims that the interpretation of a linguistic expression in a specific context of use involves the construction of a conceptual representation constrained by the semantic representation of the expression (e.g., Bierwisch 1996, 1997; Bibok & Németh 2001). Semantic and conceptual representations are distinct levels of mental representation governed by the principles of two separate cognitive modules, the systems of linguistic and conceptual knowledge, respectively. Herweg (1992) argued that semantic representations are structured configurations of semantic units which, on the one hand, are determined by the grammatical system of the language in question and, on the other hand, are grounded in – or motivated by – the conceptual system. Semantic representations are abstract representations of meaning in that


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they are not identical with specific conceptual interpretations which an expression may have in a certain context of use. Instead, they constrain the range of possible conceptual interpretations which may be contextually assigned to an expression. They do so by fixing general, abstract conditions for admissible conceptual interpretations. For instance: (1) Ms. Brown began the book in January and completed it by September. The publisher was delighted to get the manuscript so soon. It is clear that Ms. Brown began writing the book and not reading it based on the encyclopedic knowledge and context. Conceptual representations are structured configurations of conceptual units, which are mental representations of certain aspects of the external world (cf. Herweg 1992). In the semantic interpretation of a linguistic expression in a given context of use, they serve as contextually specified representations of meaning. These conceptual representations are subject to the principles of the conceptual system, which mediates between various cognitive systems (visual, auditive, motoric, motivational, linguistic, etc.). They provide the level of integration of extra-linguistic, conceptually encoded knowledge in the course of the semantic interpretation of an expression. Thus, while semantic representations are the unique level on which the principles of compositionality of meaning are operative, conceptual representations are the level on which non-compositional processes of interpretation take place. The two-level approach is important for synergic concepts because it offers a theory which recognizes the relative independence of the linguistic level from the conceptual level. This will help us explain the dual language system and the relationship between word and concept. 1.2. Dual Language The concept of “dual language” was put forward as an alternative to “interlanguage” (Kecskes 2003; Kecskes & Cuenca 2005). “Inter” means “in between”; however, the language learner is not necessarily “in between” something; rather, s/he is in the process of changing her/his


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existing conceptual and linguistic systems by adding new information which will result in qualitative changes in the original conceptual system and the eventual emergence of a new linguistic system that is rooted in one and the same conceptual system. The dual language approach is an “intake” rather than an “input” approach. It tracks changes in the conceptual system, and investigates what happens to the knowledge that enters the CUCB through the two or more language channels, and how this knowledge is put to work in the respective languages. Rather than focusing on the target language features, the dual language approach points to the process of language system construction as a result of conceptual changes, bidirectional influence between languages, and movements not only up but also down the developmental continuum. While the languages are kept separate, thoughts originating in one and the same conceptual system are fed into two different language channels. This has a profound impact both on production and comprehension: what we choose to say, how we choose to say something, how we understand things said to us, and what we consider relevant and appropriate. The fact that there is one CUCB that operates two or more different language channels leads to the development of synergic concepts which combine information coming through these language channels.

2. W O R D A N D C O N C E P T

2.1. Conceptual Development First we will have to discuss the relation between words, concepts, and the environment. It is the environment that we observe with our senses. Based on these sensory observations we make primary concepts to express and store what we sense. These primary concepts are usually concrete concepts that we develop through physical experience in the first period of our life (0–7 years or so) and label them with words that we hear in our environment. While our physical experience in the environment helps us develop basic concrete concepts that evolve as we grow older, language makes it possible for us to label these concepts and talk about them when they are not physically present. Brooks (1978) argued that the first-language learner:



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Is likely initially to acquire a concept representation based upon a particular instance. This may be the first instance encountered by the learner, and thus it may not necessarily be a “best” instance. Subsequent encounters with other instances bring about changes that may alter the stored representation of the concept toward the direction of typicality. However, such changes will continue to depend upon the particular instances and situations encountered by the learner. Because the learner does not acquire the concept at the first encounter, several other encounters with the same concept in various contexts should follow until the concept is firmly established in the learner’s mind. Gagne (1977: 99) claimed that “concrete concepts that are learned by young children are often given fuller meaning and greater precision when they are later brought to the formal level (as defined concepts) by learning in school.” Thus concepts in the L1 are not learned; rather, they grow. Conceptual content constantly changes under the influence of input and the environment. For instance “dog” indicates a concept for an animal, which has a tail and four legs, is a mammal, a domesticated animal, etc. The important thing is that a concept does not indicate only a group of sensations. Of course, we have sensations related to our concept of “dog.” However, the concept is much more than just auditory and visual sensations. We, for instance, cannot see that a certain dog is a mammal or that it is domesticated. These properties do not exist in the environment; they are part of our concept for “dog” that exists only in our mind. Based on primary concrete concepts, we elaborate all other concepts. As primary concepts usually develop through physical experience, they are normally quite well defined. However, many concepts, mainly abstract concepts derived from other concepts, are rather imprecise. Because more steps of generalization and abstraction are involved, they may become more and more blurred. In Piaget’s theory, the period from about age ten or eleven on is considered the formal operations period when genuinely abstract mental operations can be undertaken (e.g., the ability to entertain hypothetical possibilities). From the perspective of synergic concepts one of the most important things in concept development is the fact that people have different


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experiences with concepts. Consequently, words denoting concepts do not mean the same for everybody even within a relatively homogenous speech community. Many concepts that we develop, we have not learned by ourselves. They are concepts created when we hear a new word and receive some kind of explanation of the concept the word stands for. Such concepts are usually quite fuzzy. The same word will be used by different persons to label their own concepts. Any further abstractions and generalizations based on these fuzzy concepts will be quite vague. This problem appears to be even more serious in the case of bilingual development when conceptual development in the L1 is interrupted at a certain age, and input and production are shared by L2 and L1. As a consequence, psychological and socio-cultural factors start to play a decisive role in conceptual development. Several studies (cf. Birman & Trickett 2001; Persky & Birman 2005) referred to the negative effects that may accompany the process of acculturation. They may result in conceptual changes that lead to a poorly developed conceptual system. 2.2. Types of Concepts Kecskes and Papp (2000) and Kecskes (2003) argued that culture specificity is already present at the conceptual level. A significant number of concepts are culture-specific and language-specific in the sense that they are developed through one particular language channel. The CUCB contains common concepts, culture-specific concepts, and synergic concepts. In the bilingual memory there are many common concepts that are attached to both cultures, and the difference between them occurs only at the lexical level. English words such as “salt,” “water,” “ocean,” and others usually have equivalents in most other languages. Culturespecific concepts like “tapa” and “flamenco” in Spanish, or “scones” and “pudding” in English, have a specific socio-cultural load attached to them. These concepts are usually not lexicalized in the other language; rather, they are borrowed when the L2 is used. The term synergic concept denotes a unique group of bilingual concepts which are lexicalized in both languages but have a different socio-cultural load in each language. In the CUCB of proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural loads are blended, which results in a conceptual domain that is not equal to the content of the conceptual domain in either language. In order for



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us to understand the development of synergic concepts we will need to review the phrase “concept symbiosis.” 2.3. Stable or Dynamic? As a result of the thought-word interaction in actual speech production, thought usually undergoes several changes as it turns into speech. During this process conceptual categories (concepts) are mapped on linguistic categories (words). The problem is that there is no one-to-one relationship between concepts and words. There have been long debates about how much autonomy a lexical unit can have. Is it just a form which reflects the conceptual system and is filled with meaning when it is actually used? Or does a lexical unit have some kind of autonomy which allows for some consistency in its semantic content and a two-way relationship of semantics with both the conceptual level and the lexical level involved? Or from the perspective of the conceptual system: should concepts be considered as stable mental representations, or are they flexible, temporary, context-dependent constructions (cf. Lamberts & Shanks 1997: 3)? The relative consistency view may be represented by Vygotsky’s (1962) approach. He insisted that there is a unique symbiosis between thought and word through meaning, which is the result of their interaction. He quoted O. Mandelstam: “I have forgotten the word I intended to say, and my thought, unembodied, returns to the realm of shadows.” (Cited by Vygotsky 1962: 119). In other words, it is thought and word through which conceptualization and verbal formulation are united, and thought and word are amalgamated through word meaning. Vygotsky emphasized that the relation between thought and word is a process, “a continual movement back and forth from thought to word and from word to thought. Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them” (Vygotsky 1962: 125). Since thought and word are not cut from one pattern, there are more differences than similarities between them. Speakers cannot put thoughts on words directly like ready-made units because, as Vygotsky says, “the structure of speech does not simply mirror the structure of thought” (Vygotsky 1962: 125). Having reviewed the relevant literature, Smith and Samuelson (1997) came to a different conclusion. They reported that the traditional search


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for constant concepts has not been successful. Several studies (e.g., Malt 1994; Smith & Sloman 1994) have suggested that acts of categorization are not simply repeated; they actually vary. Different tasks and contexts appear to create different categories. Barsalou (1993) demonstrated that individual acts of categorization do not necessarily require an already represented concept. Based on these claims, Smith and Samuelson (1997) suggested a unified account of category stability and variability that is not built on the notion of fixed, represented concepts. In this chapter the word – concept relationship is understood as follows. A word (label) is a symbol that pulls together all knowledge and information that has been connected with the use of that label. It encodes the history of the use of that label in various situational contexts. The amount of this knowledge and information with its fuzzy boundaries creates what we call a concept. A concept is a construct that blends knowledge gained from actual situational contexts in an individual-centered way. The reason why concepts convey relatively similar information for a particular speech community is that community members have had relatively similar experiences with the given label in language use. As Vygotsky (1962: 83) pointed out: word meanings evolve. When a new word has been learned by the child, its development is barely starting: the word at first is a generalization of the most primitive type; as the child’s intellect develops, it is replaced by generalizations of a higher and higher type – a process that leads in the end to the formation of true concepts. 3. C O N T E X T U A L I T Y T H E O RY

3.1. No Context-free Language The development and use of synergic concepts in bilinguals’ speech production and comprehension can be understood in the framework of a contextuality theory that is built on the assumption that there is no context-free language. In order to explain this we must go back to the two-level approach to semantics, which claims the separation of the



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linguistic level from the conceptual level. This is important for synergic concepts because this distinction gives us the chance to explain the word (linguistic level) – concept (conceptual level) relationship. However, as I mentioned earlier, we must modify the two-level approach because it represents a traditional, external perspective on context. It holds that context modifies and/or specifies word meanings in one way or another. Context is seen as a selector of lexical features because it activates some of these features while leaving others in the background. This approach has led to the idea of “underspecified word meaning” that appears in several different contemporary linguistic theories, including Bierwisch’s (1996, 1997) two-level conceptual semantics, Pustejovsky’s (1995) theory of the generative lexicon, and Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, 1995) relevance theory. These approaches claim that the meaning of the lexical units is underspecified and gets conceptual specification in context. It is argued that the specification of word meaning in context is accomplished by conceptual shift, which “shifts” the core meaning into various conceptual fields, and by conceptual differentiation, which only “differentiates” the core meaning within one and the same conceptual domain, thereby yielding literal meanings. (e.g., Bierwisch 1996, 1997; Bibok & Németh 2001). The contextuality theory proposed here offers a more balanced approach in which the lexical units also function like contexts. The information encoded in a word is the result of contextual occurrences of the given word, so, in a way, words comprise their prior contextual use. As a consequence, when we utter a word it will create its own context even if it is uttered without any “context” in the traditional sense. The dynamic behavior of human speech implies a reciprocal process between language and situational context. People attempt to fit their language to a situation or context that their language, in turn, helped to create in the first place (cf. Gee 1999). The dynamic relationship of lexical units and situational context means that they mutually define and depend on each other; they both create the world and are created by it. Lexical units encode the history of their prior contextual use. There are no meanings that are context-free because each lexical item is always implicitly indexed to a prior recurring context(s) of reference.


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The conventional sign (lexical unit) is reproduced or “copied,” not discovered or invented anew by each producer-processor pair. Why is that so? Because what is encoded in a word is world knowledge, experience with the world, or abstraction based on this experience. Kecskes (2003) argued that world knowledge is available to interlocutors in two forms: as encapsulated in lexical items based on prior encounters and experience and as provided by the actual situational context framed by the given situation. Actual situational meaning is the result of the interaction of the two sides of world knowledge represented by the speaker and hearer, and the actual situational context. Violi (2000) claimed that our experience is developed through a regularity of recurrent and similar situations that we tend to identify with given contexts. Standard (prior recurring) context can be defined as a regular situation that we have repeated experience with, about which we have expectations as to what will or will not happen, and on which we rely to understand and predict how the world around us works. These standard (prior recurring) contexts are usually triggered by certain lexical items. When someone hears the word “meeting” without any further context it will still create a context in the mind. This context will be about the most frequent, familiar and conventional event encoded in the mind of that individual. When, for instance, I hear the word “meeting,” what comes into my mind first is “faculty meeting,” which is a specific instance of the type of event the word “meeting” encodes. But another individual may think of something else because of different prior experience. 3.2. Prior Experience A word encodes the history of its use in various situational contexts. This entails that a word comprises some kind of mental summary of its occurrences in a hierarchical order that depends on frequency, familiarity and conventionality. Why is this important for synergic concepts? In L2 use, prior experience attached to a particular label significantly differs from that of the native speakers. When we use a second language, prior experience with an L2 word contains the limited prior experience



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with the given label as in L2, and the prior experience with the lexical equivalent of the given L2 label in L1. For instance: (2) “school” – “escuela” When a native speaker of English learning Spanish acquires the word “escuela” as a corresponding label to the concept symbolized by the word “school” in his mind, s/he uses the conceptual load attached to the English word “school” even when s/he speaks Spanish. This conceptual load may comprise the following senses: (a) (b) (c) (d)

We did not go to school yesterday. John works for the School of Education. Ivy league schools are very expensive. and others.

However, in the Spanish sense (c) is missing. The following conversation illustrates this case: (3) American professor: So you say you went to school at Berkeley for three semesters. Spanish student: No, I went to the university at Berkeley. This conversation shows where non-native speakers usually go wrong. Lexical level equivalency does not mean conceptual level equivalency. The conceptual load attached to the word “school” in English and the equivalent lexical item “escuela” in Spanish is different. Not all senses of the English word can be found in Spanish as well. Consequently, these labels cannot function as translation equivalents in each case. This, however, does not mean that we need to develop a new concept for “escuela” when we learn Spanish. Rather, what we need to do is reconceptualize, that is, modify the content of the conceptual construct that we already have for the English word “school” in order to accommodate the new piece(s) of information. As a result we will have a synergic concept that differs from the English concept denoted by the label “school” and the Spanish concept denoted by the word “escuela.” This does not mean, however, that we have a conceptual mix; rather it is a conceptual blend.


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Blending (conceptual integration) is a general cognitive operation on par with analogy, recursion, mental modeling, conceptual categorization, and framing (Fauconnier & Turner 1998). It is dynamic, supple, and active in the moment of thinking. It yields products that frequently become entrenched in conceptual structure and grammar, and it often performs new work on its previously entrenched products as inputs. Through completion and elaboration, the blend develops structure not provided by the inputs. Inferences, arguments, and ideas developed in the blend can have an effect in cognition, leading us to modify the initial inputs and to change our view of the corresponding situations. Synergic concepts are conceptual blends that encode the history of their prior use represented by two or more labels (words) in L1 and L2 production and comprehension. 4. W H AT I S I N A W O R D ?

The dynamic model of meaning (DMM) was developed by Kecskes (2003) to explain the content and structure of lexical units. It claims that actual contextual meaning is constructed in the dynamic interplay of the conceptual system (relying on prior, encoded knowledge, blending schemes, mapping, and other cognitive operations) and the actual contextual operations triggered by the merging of lexical units and extralinguistic situational elements in action. The DMM (see Figure 1) demonstrates the two faces of word (lexical unit) meaning: coresense and consense. Coresense is a denotational, diachronic, relatively constant, and objective feature that reflects changes in the linguistic community, while consense is actual, subjective, referential, connotational, and changes according to situation and actual context. In the model, a lexical item represents world knowledge based on prior contextual experience. It is a blend of coresense (general world knowledge about the concept), WSPs1 (the lexicalized part of world knowledge), and culture-specific conceptual properties (the culture-specific part of world knowledge). 4.1. Coresense Coresense is abstracted from possible contextual occurrences of the word. It is neither conceptual nor lexical, but the interface between



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Word-specific semantic properties (WSPs) Lexical level

A c t.

C o r e s e n s e

Consense [1]

Consense [2]

Consense [n]

s i t u a t i o n a l c o n t e x t

Conceptual level

Culture-specific conceptual properties (CSCPs) Figure 1. The dynamic model of meaning.

the two levels. Coresense is not the sum of the most essential properties of the given category, but an abstraction from the most familiar, regular, typical, and (generally, but not always) frequent uses of a word. Coresense is not a pure linguistic phenomenon because it depends on extralinguistic features such as familiarity, conventionality, and frequency. It is an essential feature of the word that brings together conceptual semantic and lexical semantic information. Coresense has a unique relationship with the WSP and culture-specific conceptual properties (CSCP). WSPs link the coresense to the lexical level while CSCPs tie it to the conceptual level. CSCPs belong to


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conceptual pragmatics, while WSPs are features of the word itself, hence are a matter of lexico-semantics. As noted above, CSCPs tie coresense to the conceptual level. They are the basis for figurative meaning and the development of WSPs. CSCPs can be revealed easily if we compare words from different languages that show lexical equivalency but differ as to their CSCPs. For instance, let us take the concept denoted by the word “siesta” in Spanish and “nap” in English. “Nap,” for a native speaker of American English, refers to some sleep in any part of the day. “Siesta,” for a Spaniard, usually denotes the afternoon period from 1:00 to 4:00 when people have lunch and take a rest including some sleep. The coresense of the two words is relatively the same, there is no WSP attached to either; however, they differ in CSCPs. Not all concepts have CSCPs. For instance, the concept denoted by the English word “salt” has hardly any CSCP, nor do its lexical equivalents in other languages. CSCPs are very dynamic features of words and keep changing all the time. They are sensitive to socio-cultural changes in the given language community. CSCPs represent the cognitive base for word meaning and are responsible for changes in the coresense of a word and its word specific semantic properties. When CSCPs get fully lexicalized they turn into word specific semantic properties. This is why native speakers of English do not have to check with the conceptual system when they use words such as “chicken out,” “kidnap,” “blackmail,” etc. 4.1.1. Culture-specific conceptual properties

4.1.2. Word-specific semantic properties The term “word-specific semantic properties” (WSP) was coined by Cruse (1992) to denote specific properties that belong to the lexical rather than the conceptual level. WSPs make it possible for speakers to have alternative lexical access routes to a single concept: for instance, “run,” “dash,” and “rush”; or “sleep,” “doze,” and “nap.” Cruse (1992: 291) argued that cognitive synonyms map onto identical concepts. The meaning properties that differentiate such cognitive synonyms as “give up,” “capitulate,” “surrender,” and “chicken out” can be viewed as properties of the individual lexical units, as distinct from properties of the common concept.



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WSPs include such things as emotive coloring, stylistic value, and various kinds of contextual affinities (see Cruse 1990, for a more detailed discussion of WSPs). WSPs are the result of the recurrent use of words in particular contexts. Originally, WSPs are the results of the interplay of the lexical unit and context, and they are the best evidence for category stability and variability. They usually derive from metaphors or other figures of speech, and over time they become conventionalized. Cruse (1992) argued that words with WSPs can create a more emotive, more “colorful” context than words without WSPs. Compare the following sentences: (4) Peter gave up the race. - - - - - - - - - - -> Peter chickened out of the race. Bob repaired the car. - - - - - - - - - - - - -> Bob fixed the car. It should be emphasized that WSPs (i.e., “semantic loads”), just like CSCPs, are not mandatory features that attach to each lexical unit. There are lexical units that have neither WSPs, nor CSCPs (such as, “division,” “example,” “depart,” etc.). Actual context can suppress CSCPs but this is hardly the case with WSPs when they are encoded in the word, such as, “pass away,” “chicken out,” “dash,” and so forth. 4.2. Consense Coresense should be distinguished from consense, which is the situated, contextual meaning of a lexical unit. Coresense is the invariant, while consense represents the possible variants. Consense realizes a particular aspect or aspects of the coresense by uniting it with the appropriate WSP and/or CSCP when the word is actually uttered in a particular situation. Figure 1 demonstrates how coresense and consense fit within the DMM. As the diagram shows, coresense is the interface between the conceptual and lexical level. WSPs are links to the lexical level, while CSCPs are ties to the conceptual level. Consenses are the variations of coresense in context. The contextual interpretation of coresense is expressed in a consense connected to other consenses to form an utterance.


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4.3. The L1 Word-concept Symbiosis Changes When New Information is Added Through L2 When a Hungarian learns the English word “candy,” the most obvious lexical equivalent in Hungarian is “cukorka.” Merriam-Webster Online gives the following definition to the concept denoted by the word “candy” in English: 1: crystallized sugar formed by boiling down sugar syrup, 2a: a confection made with sugar and often flavoring and filling, b: a piece of such confection. The equivalent Hungarian word covers these meanings. However, the English word has a CSCP that is missing in the Hungarian word. The English word also comprises “chocolate.” So if someone looks for “chocolate” in a supermarket s/he’d better use the word “candy,” otherwise s/he will be directed to an aisle where baking chocolate is displayed. Consequently, a synergic concept in the mind of an English-Hungarian bilingual should contain this CSCP. The concept denoted by the word “kick off” comes from American football as its dictionary definition shows in Merriam-Webster Online: 1: to start or resume play in football by a placekick. The concept’s metaphorical domain covers the following meaning: 2a: to initiate proceedings, b: to start out : begin The CSCP comes out in the appropriate context. Compare: (5) (a) Bill kicked off the ball in the direction of the forward. (b) The president kicked off the meeting with a short speech. Learners of English usually have problems with this concept because the lexical equivalents of the word “kick off” in other languages (Spanish, Hungarian, Russian, etc.) lack the CSCP the word has in English; consequently they cannot be used with the same metaphorical sense. A well-developed synergic concept in the mind of a Hungarian learner of English should have a different metaphorical domain for the English word “kick off” and the Hungarian world “rúg.” As discussed earlier, WSPs usually derive from metaphors or other figures of speech, and over time they become conventionalized. They



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can be considered frozen metaphors that always have the same color of meaning no matter how the context changes. They usually derive from CSCPs that become lexicalized as a result of frequent recurring use. The English phrase “chicken out” is a good example. Its original meaning is rooted in the belief that chickens are cowardly animals. The metaphorical link between the source domain and target domain can be easily made: “cowards are chickens.” However, this metaphorical meaning is lexicalized to the extent that nowadays no native speaker of English will think of a chicken when s/he uses the word “chicken out.” This does not change the fact that the word form shows its etymology very clearly. According to the Diccionario Espasa Concise (Espasa-Calpe: Madrid 2000), the Spanish lexical equivalent to the word “chicken out” is “acobardarse.” The Spanish word, of course, has nothing to do with “chicken,” because in the Spanish culture that metaphor is not lexicalized the way it is in English. In the mind of an English – Spanish bilingual the synergic concept [SURRENDER] may be represented by the following lexical items (not a full list!): (6) English words: surrender, capitulate, give up, chicken out, quit Spanish words: rendir, capitular, renunciar, acobardarse, achiquitar It is not difficult to discover that some of the lexical routes are the same or very similar because the words come from the same Latin root such as “capitulate – capitular,” “surrender – rendir,” “quit – achiquitar.” However, there is no match where the words have some WSPs such as “give up,” “chicken out,” and “acobardarse.” 5. P I L O T S T U D I E S2

Two pilot studies were conducted to investigate the nature of synergic concepts and find out how the word – concept symbiosis is modified when there are two languages and cultures represented in the mind. We focused on changes in the conceptual content of certain concepts and the structure of words denoting those concepts. It is important to note that the studies have several flaws including the procedures, relatively small


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number of subjects, selection of concepts, translation of L1 words into English and others. However, they still have some significance because they have helped us identify important features of the word – concept symbiosis. 5.1. Pilot Study 1 In this study the primary focus was conceptual content. We wanted to find out how conceptual content is modified if subjects live in different socio-cultural environments. Our subjects were adults of ages 25–45. We had four groups and in each of them there were six females and six males:

5.1.1. Data collection

Group A: Bilinguals with Chinese L1 and English L2, living in the U.S. Group B: Bilinguals with Chinese L1 and English L2, living in China. Group C: Native speakers of American English, living in the U.S. Group D: Native speakers of Chinese (Mandarin), living in China. Subjects received a list of eight words belonging to different parts of speech in English: snack, night, welcome (noun), relax, wedding, ambition, honest, proud. Out of these words we focused on four labels (snack; night; wedding; ambition) denoting concepts that exist both in Chinese and American English culture. We did not tell our subjects that we focused on concepts rather than words. We used the term “word” consistently, both in the questionnaires and in conversations with the subjects. In each group subjects were expected to do the following tasks: 1. Explain in writing what the given word means to you. 2. Define whether the word denoting the concept has negative, positive or neutral connotation for you. 3. Use the word representing the concept in two sample sentences of your choice. The words were given to each subject in English only, with the exception of the Chinese monolingual group where they received the translation equivalents of the English words in Chinese.



5.1.2. Data analysis

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Data were analyzed from the following

perspectives: 1. Define the main aspects of concepts in each group. 2. Identify the common core (coresense) and CSCPs. 3. Define differences in understanding the concept in the different groups. [AMBITION] CORESENSE: Drive to succeed, reach a goal or accomplish something. Culture-specific conceptual properties highlighted in the definitions and sentences of different groups: Monolingual English: social mobility, moving ahead Monolingual Chinese: lofty ideas, hardship in society, buried in my mind Bilingual Chinese in the US: desire for success, eager to do, hardship Bilingual Chinese in China: lofty aspiration, dream, great career Definitions given by the subjects demonstrate that there is some difference in the culture-specific conceptual load attached to this word. Americans usually consider “ambition” a positive thing, while for most Chinese the word has negative connotations (Table 1). There is, however, something that we should take into account. In Chinese there are two words for the English word “ambition”: (7) “ye xin” (used in derogatory meaning): a strong and wild desire to succeed in something that is not considered positive. Table 1. Ambition

No. of subjects

Comparisons of connotations 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Positive Neutral Negative

MC

BC

BE

ME

Ambition


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“bao fu” (used positively): a strong desire for success, achievement, power or wealth. For the monolingual Chinese group we included only the Chinese word with the positive connotation. In spite of this the monolingual group mentioned mostly negative things in their definitions and sentences. Bilingual Chinese learning English in China have the most positive attitude to the concept. They seem to have modified their existing Chinese concept reflected in the answers of the monolingual Chinese group. It is interesting to note that bilingual Chinese living in the U.S. also show some change in the original conceptual structure. They identify “ambition” with success but also see the negative aspects of the concept, as their sentences and the table demonstrate. [SNACK] CORESENSE: Something light eaten between meals. Culture-specific conceptual properties highlighted in the definitions and sentences of different groups: ME: treat or reward, make you fat MC: girls, women have snacks, relieve hunger BE in the U.S: relax and enjoy BC in China: girls like snack, small food Most subjects had a neutral attitude to the concept (Table 2). However, the English monolingual group shows how people are divided about the positive or negative effect of snack. It is interesting to note that in Table 2. Snack

No. of subjects



MC

BC

BE

ME

Snack



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the Chinese culture having snacks is associated with women. Both the monolingual Chinese group and the bilingual Chinese group in China noted this. However, the bilingual Chinese group living in the U.S. highlighted mainly the positive side of snacking. [WEDDING] CORESENSE: Ceremony when two people are joined in marriage. Culture-specific conceptual properties highlighted in the definitions and sentences of different groups: ME: Celebration (party), tradition, sacredness, expenses MC: “enclosed city” (tie), giving money BE: differences: banquet, red packet vs. rings, church BC: differences, expenses Just like in the other two examples there is some correlation between the answers of the monolingual Chinese group and the bilingual Chinese group living in China (Table 3). In the case of this concept the difference between the two groups is minimal, which can be explained by the fact that the word refers to a strongly conventionalized concept. The bilingual Chinese in the U.S. have come closer to the monolingual English. They highlighted mainly the ceremonial part of the concept. 5.2. Pilot Study 2 The second pilot study aimed to investigate the interplay between L2 and L1 in defining concepts. Words were given to students in English Table 3. Wedding

No. of subjects



MC

BC

BE

ME

Wedding


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sentences. Some of the words were given in their idiomatic use. For instance: (8) After the accident Sarah decided to break up with Bob. The police officer taught David a lesson. Subjects were expected to read the English sentences very carefully and write down a word or expression in their native tongue (L1) that comes to their mind when they see the English word in that context. Two hours later they were presented with the word selected in their L1. The subjects were asked to write a sentence in their L1 using that particular word. We sought answers to the following questions: 1. Will the subjects’ word selection in L1 be influenced by the heavily biased English context? Will they choose a close lexical equivalent in their L1 or rather they select a conceptual equivalent? 2. When subjects are presented with the L1 word selected earlier by them, will that word create an L1 context for them, or they will recall the English concept and come up with something similar to that context? 5.2.1. Data collection The subjects were seventeen graduate students with different L1s including Spanish, Korean, Chinese, Hindi and Polish. They were all between ages 22 and 30 representing both genders. Their level of English was above average because they all were enrolled in a graduate class conducted in English. The following questionnaire was used:

WHAT IS YOUR FIRST LANGUAGE? ……………………… PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES CAREFULLY. IN EACH SENTENCE THERE IS A WORD OR AN EXPRESSION UNDERLINED. PLEASE WRITE DOWN IN YOUR FIRST LANGUAGE THE WORD OR EXPRESSION THAT COMES INTO YOUR MIND SEEING THAT ENGLISH WORD IN THE SENTENCE.



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Two hours later the subjects were presented with the L1 word they selected: This is your word in L1. Please write a sentence in L1 with this word. 5.2.2. Data analysis As in the first pilot study, subjects were given words belonging to different parts of speech such as “credit,” “score,” “break up,” “lesson,” “wipe out,” “nurse,” “cup,” “traffic.” Some of the words were used in their metaphorical sense. There is no space here to present all results so I will focus only on three concepts: [score], [cup] and [lesson]. Subject responses in the tables will be given in English. Although the translations were checked by several bilingual speakers they may distort the original sense of the L1 word used by a subject. Still, even these translations can give us some idea about how bilingual speakers think about the given concepts. [SCORE] The sentence with this word “The game just started and there is no score yet” was heavily biased for sport. We wanted to see whether speakers of different languages would keep this sense of the word in their responses. It is clear from the responses given in Table 4 that the concept exists in the cultures represented by the respondents. All sentences in the different languages referred to the sport aspect of the concept, which means that the subjects kept the sense in which the word was used in English. There are only two exceptions: one Spanish and one Korean subject used the concept in an educational sense. Differences occurred in the type of sports the subjects associated the concept with. For instance, a Hindi respondent referred to cricket scores, and a Pole mentioned football (meaning “soccer”). [CREDIT] The sentence with this word “How many credits did you get?” (Table 5) was neutral contextually. It could trigger basically any aspect of the concept including education, sport or banking. The table shows that the educational aspect prevailed across cultures. This may be due to the fact that most of the respondents are or used to be students not long ago, so they had this common prior experience.


Word in L1: score Sentence in L1: I received a low grade for physical education.

Word in L1: points Sentence in L1: By how many points did you win?

Word in L1: number Sentence in L1: In what number is the cricket match?

Word in L1: final score Sentence in L1: We could guess a game score.

Hindi

Polish Word in L1: score a goal Sentence in L1: There is no score a football game.

Word in L1: score Sentence in L1: The coach wasn’t satisfied with the scores of the ball game.

Chinese Word in L1: score/points Sentence in L1: In this game, there is a big difference between the two scores.

Word in L1: points gained Sentence in L1: At the Korean-Japanese soccer game, Koreans gained one point and won the game 1-0.

Korean

Speaker 2 Word in L1: points Sentence in L1: We don’t have enough point required for the test yet.

Speaker 1

Spanish Word in L1: score Sentence in L1: Anais scored 3 points last Sunday in basketball.

L1

Word in L1: win points Sentence in L1: How much was the total score of the game?

Word in L1: score Sentence in L1: Our tennis team went up by 2 times what it was before.

Word in L1: scoreboard Sentence in L1: The scoreboard of the game is not ready yet.

Speaker 3

Word in L1: score Sentence in L1: How many scores do they get?

Word in L1: points Sentence in L1: The game finished with 13 points.

Speaker 4

Table 4. The game just started and there is no score yet

Word in L1: score Sentence in L1: Both teams were not able to score.

Word in L1: no response Sentence in L1: no response.

Speaker 5

52 I S T VA N K E C S K E S


Word in L1: credit Sentence in L1: How many credits are you taking this semester? Word in L1: number Sentence in L1: How much marks did you get in your exam?

Chinese Word in L1: credit Sentence in L1: I have completed all my credits.

Word in L1: not given Sentence in L1: How many points in this subject?

Word in L1: credits Sentence in L1: I got two credits for selling a lot of newspapers.

Hindi

Polish Word in L1: bank credit Sentence in L1: How much money did the bank allow you to take?

Word in L1: credits Sentence in L1: How many credits are you taking?

Word in L1: credits Sentence in L1: How many credits are you taking this semester?

Korean

Speaker 2 Word in L1: credits Sentence in L1: I need to get 64 credits to graduate as a chef.

Speaker 1

Spanish Word in L1: not given Sentence in L1: The credits at the university are very expensive.

L1

Word in L1: credits Sentence in L1: I have taken 12 credits.

Word in L1: credit (as in credit card) Sentence in L1: You have to build your credit to get a credit card.

Word in L1: credits Sentence in L1: I have 49 credits at the university.

Speaker 3 Speaker 4

Word in L1: school credits Sentence in L1: How many credits have you taken so far?

Word in L1: credits Sentence in L1: How many credits did you get last semester at the university?

Table 5. How many credits did you get?

Word in L1: school credits Sentence in L1: I signed up for 9 credits this semester.

Word in L1: credits/classes Sentence in L1: How many classes are you taking this semester?

Speaker 5


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[LESSON] This word was used in its metaphorical sense in the following sentence: “The police officer taught David a lesson.” (Table 6) Out of the seventeen subjects, eight used the word in its literal sense, and the others tried to keep the figurative sense used in the English sentence. In this case individual learner differences play an important role because the figurative use of the word depends mainly on the bilingual speaker’s familiarity with this figurative sense. The absence or presence of a similar figurative sense attached to the L1 lexical equivalent also was an important factor. All Spanish speakers but one used an equivalent word in its literal sense, while four out of five Korean subjects understood the figurative sense of the word and attempted to reconceptualize it according to their L1. 6. D I S C U S S I O N

The results of the pilot studies demonstrated that the conceptual system is, to some extent, affected by the new language. The content of existing L1 concepts was modified when subjects lived in different socio-cultural environments. Modification mainly occurred in the CSCPs. The second pilot study showed that the L1 core conceptual content is strong even in fluent bilinguals. It affects how bilingual speakers use synergic concepts, and what aspects of the synergic concepts they highlight in language production. The use of synergic concepts and adjustments to the aspects of the conceptual content depend on several socio-cultural and individual factors that belong to conceptual socialization (Kecskes 2003). The development of the CUCB goes together with conceptual socialization, which refers to the transformation of the conceptual system that undergoes characteristic changes to fit the functional needs of the new language and culture. During the process of conceptual socialization the L1-dominated conceptual base is being gradually restructured, making space for and engaging with the new knowledge and information coming through the second language channel. This leads to the gradual development of a conscious awareness of how another culture is different from one’s own culture, the ability to reflect upon this difference in language production, and the development of an identity that is the reflection of


Word in L1: give a lesson Sentence in L1: That policeman is scolding the pedestrian who violated the law.

Word in L1: lessons Sentence in L1: The teacher gave a lesson to the whole class strictly. Word in L1: to teach a lesson Sentence in L1: Good! He learned his lesson. Word in L1: a lesson Sentence in L1: I have been taking an English class lately.

Word in L1: education Sentence in L1: Children go to school to get an education.

Word in L1: moral lesson Sentence in L1: This time I didn’t get a ticket, I got a lesson.

Hindi

Polish

Speaker 3

Chinese Word in L1: give a lesson Sentence in L1: The parents’ ideas about educational opportunities gives the child a good lesson.

Speaker 2 Word in L1: lesion Sentence in L1: During the tennis game I got a leg injury [lesion]. Word in L1: warning Sentence in L1: The teacher gave him a warning.

Speaker 1

Spanish Word in L1: lesson Word in L1: lesson Sentence in L1: Elizabeth Sentence in L1: My gave me a lesson yesterday brother takes tae after school. kwon do lessons. Korean Word in L1: to discipline, Word in L1: class, teach a lesson lesson Sentence in L1: You learn Sentence in L1: It is to not play with matches something you learn only after burning through class yourself. Only personal experience. experience teaches you a lesson.

L1 Speaker 4

Word in L1: discipline Sentence in L1: The police officer was disciplining David.

Word in L1: lesson Sentence in L1: I’ll help you learn the lesson.

Table 6. The police officer taught David a lesson

Word in L1: to teach, to educate Sentence in L1: Juan’s mother punished him. Word in L1: lecture Sentence in L1: That teacher’s lecture was great.

Speaker 5


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the dual culture. Examples in the first pilot study demonstrated that bilingual Chinese subjects modified their perception of the concepts “ambition,” “snack,” and “wedding.” They were ready to amalgamate American cultural information with existing Chinese understanding of the concepts. I use the term “conceptual socialization” to distinguish the process from “language socialization,” (cf. Ochs 1988; Willett 1995; Mitchell & Myles 1998) which has its roots in anthropological linguistics. Language socialization research represented by a number of studies (cf. Ochs & Schieffelin 1984; Ochs 1988; Willett 1995; Platt & Trudi 1997) emphasizes that language and culture are inseparable because they are acquired together: each supports the development of the other. Ochs’ and Schieffelin’s work has focused on L1 development. There are very few studies that extend the paradigm to second language acquisition (i.e., Willett 1995; Platt & Trudi 1997). Willett (1995) conducted a longitudinal study with young classroom learners of ESL in an elementary school with an international intake. Based on her results she argued that language socialization is a complex process in which participants construct and evaluate shared understandings through negotiation. This process leads to changes not only in their identity but also in social practices. Conceptual socialization broadens the scope of the paradigm of language socialization, which has its main focus on language developmental issues. Conceptual socialization differs from language socialization in that it emphasizes the primacy of mental processes in the symbiosis of language and culture, and aims at explaining the bidirectional (or tri- or x-directional) influence of the two or more languages in bi- and multilingual development. The process of conceptual socialization is strongly tied to the emergence of the CUCB that is responsible for the operation of two language channels. New knowledge and new information are processed through existing knowledge. The language learner can pick up a word or a fixed expression as a functional unit based on observations of use. What s/he cannot pick up, however, is the “load,” the CSCP that that expression may carry. This fact is crucial for the development of synergic concepts. Conceptual socialization has two sides which are inseparable: a skill side and a content side. They are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. Synergic concepts are connected with the



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content side. The skill side means that conceptual socialization will be reflected in the actual language skills: structural well-formedness, language manipulation, sentence structuring and lexical quality. Changes in both sides are qualitative rather than quantitative. The skill side of the conceptual socialization process is measurable (Kecskes & Papp 2000, 2003). Changes in the content side, however, can hardly be measured. They are qualitative changes in the content of what the language learner says and the way the language learner behaves in communication. In the first pilot study bilingual Chinese speakers’ attitudes to concepts such as “ambition,” “snack,” and “wedding” differed from that of monolingual speakers. They used the concepts slightly differently in their sentences as well. The second pilot study demonstrated that there is no full correlation between language proficiency and conceptual fluency. The dominance of L1 in the conceptual content of words was very strong even in bilinguals with advanced language proficiency. Knowledge may be blended and present in synergic concepts; however, it does not mean it is used in a native-like way. This is where synergic concepts are tied with conceptual socialization. Synergic concepts make it possible for speakers to sound native-like if they wish to, because they have developed the conceptual knowledge native-like language use requires. The question is whether they really want to sound native-like. This is, however, another issue that I do not wish to discuss here. 7. C O N C L U S I O N

This chapter argued that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers there are synergic concepts that are the results of conceptual blending. Synergic concepts are notions that are lexicalized in both languages but have a different socio-cultural load in each language. In the CUCB of proficient bilinguals the two different socio-cultural loads are blended. This may result in a conceptual domain that is not equal to the content of the conceptual domain in either language. The development of synergic concepts is the result of conceptual blending which is the driving force of the development of any concepts. Conceptual blending is not a bi- or multilingual phenomenon. It occurs in the mind of monolingual speakers as well. However, there is significant


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difference between monolingual and bilingual synergic concepts from the perspective of what is actually blended. It was argued that words encode prior experience. All information relevant to their use is blended in the concept that is mapped on its label (word). What makes bilingual and monolingual conceptual development different is the nature and content of information that is blended. In the case of monolinguals concepts grow in the socio-cultural environment the given language community has created for itself. Additional knowledge and information derives from this socio-cultural environment, which usually results in a kind of fusion of “old” and “new” incoming knowledge. This is, however, not the case with bilingual concepts that are attached to a particular label(s) in L1 and a particular close “equivalent” in L2, and represent two different socio-cultural backgrounds and environments to different extents. When we use a second language, prior experience with an L2 word contains the limited prior experience with the given label as in L2, and the prior experience with the lexical equivalent of the given L2 label in L1. Because knowledge and information come from two different socio-cultural backgrounds that often contradict rather than match each other (different CSCPs) we can hardly speak about full fusion here. Blending rarely results in fusion in bilingual concepts because the constituents usually keep independence to some extent, which depends on the exposure to the two languages and cultures. Languages influence each other reciprocally. When we have a synergic concept in the CUCB, no matter whether we use the L1 label(s) or L2 label(s) that can denote that concept, we always have access to conceptual information that differs to a particular extent both from the L1 concept and the L2 concept (see “school” vs. “escuela” example above.) Paradis (in this volume) wrote about this phenomenon as follows: “With prolonged language contact, concept boundaries may change so that L1 words no longer activate their original conceptual meanings, but incorporate some or all conceptual features of their L2 equivalents. Semantic constraints on the use of L1 words become blurred. Faux-amis from L2 will creep into L1; For example, an English speaker living in a French environment will call a lecture a conference …” I argued that concepts encode contexts. Their boundaries are fuzzy because blended information attached to them is in a constant state of



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flux. The bilingual mind is exposed to more “pressure” in this respect than the monolingual mind. Further research is needed to clarify the processes that are responsible for the development and use of synergic concepts. NOTES 1. I am using Cruse’s (1992) term here. 2. I am much obliged to my students Saihua Xia, Jing Lei, Xiaojing Lee, Julia Coryell, and Susan Nesbitt-Perez taking my doctoral seminar in the spring of 2005. They helped me a lot with data collection. REFERENCES Barsalou, L. W. 1993. Challenging assumption about concepts [commentary].Cognitive Development, 8: 169–180. Bibok, K., and Eniko˝, N. T. 2001. How the lexicon and context interact in the meaning construction of utterances. In Eniko˝, N. T., and Károly, B. (eds.), Pragmatics and the flexibility of word meaning. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 289–321. Bierwisch, M. 1996. How much space gets into language? In Bloom, P., Mary, A. P., Lynn N., and Merrill F. G. (eds.), Language and space. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 31–77. Bierwisch, M. 1997. Lexical information from a minimalist point of view. In Chris W., Hans-Martin G., and Manfred B. (eds.), The role of economy principles in linguistic theory. (Studia Grammatica 40.) Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 227–266. Birman, D., and Trickett, E. J. 2001. The process of acculturation in first generation Immigrants: A study of Soviet Jewish refugee adolescents and parents. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32(4): 456–477. Blommaert, J. 1998. Different approaches to intercultural communication: A critical survey.Plenary lecture, Lernen und Arbeiten in einer international vernetzten und multikulturellen Gesellschaft, Expertentagung Universität Bremen, Institut für Projektmanagement und Witschaftsinformatik (IPMI), 27–28, February 1998. Brooks, L. 1978. Nonanalytic concept formation and memory for instances. In Rosch, E., and Lloyd, B. B. (eds.), Cognition and categorization: 65–79. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Cruse, D. A. 1990. Prototype theory and lexical semantics. In Savas, L. T. (ed.), Meaning and proptotypes: studies in linguistic categorization. London: Routledge. 382–402. Cruse, D. A. 1992. Antonymy revisited: some thoughts on the relationship between words and concepts. In Adrienne, L., and Eva, F. K. (eds.), Frames, fields, and contrasts: new essays in semantic and lexical organisation. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum. 289–306.

KECSKES:

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Fauconnier, G. 1997. Mappings in thought and language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fauconnier, G., and Mark, T. 1998. Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22(2): 133–187. Fauconnier, G., and Mark, T. 2002. Conceptual blending and the mind’s hidden complexities. New York: Basic Books. Gagne, R. M. 1977. The conditions of learning and theory of instruction. New York: Holt, R. and Winston. Gee, J. P. 1999. An introduction to discourse analysis. London: Routledge. Giora, R. 1997. Understanding figurative and literal language: the graded salience hypothesis. Cognitive Linguistics, 7: 183–206. Giora, R. 2003. On our mind: salience, context and figurative language. Oxford: OUP. Gumperz, J. 1982. Discourse strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gumperz, J., and Jenny, C. 2005. Bilingual communicative space. Intercultural Pragmatics, 2(1): 1–26. Herweg, M. 1992. “Aspectual requirements of temporal connectives: evidence for a two-level approach to semantics.” James, P., and Sabine, B. (eds.), Lexical Semantics and Knowledge Representation: proceedings of the 1st SIGLEX Workshop, Berkeley, California, USA, June 17, 1991. Berlin: Springer. 185–200. Jackendoff, R. 1983. Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Jackendoff, R. 2002. Foundations of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kecskes, I. 2000. A Cognitive-pragmatic approach to situation-bound utterances. Journal of Pragmatics, 32(6): 605–625. Kecskes, I., and Tunde, P. 2000. Foreign language and mother tongue. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. Kecskes, I. 2001. The “graded salience hypothesis” in second language acquisition. In Niemeier, S., and Puetz, M. (eds.), Applied cognitive linguistics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter: 249–271. Kecskes, I. 2003. Situation-bound utterances in L1 and L2. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Kecskes, I., and Tunde, P. 2003. “How to demonstrate the conceptual effect of the L2 on L1?” In Cook, V. (ed.), The effect of L2 on L1. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters: 247–267. Kecskes, I. 2004. Lexical merging, conceptual blending and cultural crossing. Intercultural Pragmatics, 1(1): 1–21. Kecskes, I., and Isabel, M. C. 2005: Lexical choice as a reflection of conceptual fluency. International Journal of Bilingualism, 9(1): 49–69. Kecskes, I. 2006. On my mind: thoughts about salience, context, and figurative language from a second language perspective. Second Language Research, 22(2): 219–237. Lamberts, K., and David, S. 1997. Knowledge, concepts and categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Malt, B. C. 1994. Water is Not H20. Cognitive psychology, 27: 41–70. Mitchell, R., and Florence, M. 1998. Second language learning theories. London, New York: Arnold. Ochs, E. 1988. Culture and language development: language acquisition and language socialization in a Samoan village. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ochs, E., and Bambi, S. 1984. Language acquisition and socialization: three developmental stories and their implications. In Shweder, R., and LeVine, R. (eds.), Culture theory: essays on mind, self and emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 276–320. Paradis, M. 1998. The other side of language. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 11: 1–10. Persky, I., and Birman, D. 2005. “Ethnic” identity in acculturation research: a study of multiple identities of Jewish refugees from the Former Soviet Union. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36(5): 1–16. Platt, E., and Troudi, S. 1997. Mary and her teachers: a Grebo-speaking child’ place in the mainstream classroom. Modern Language Journal, 181: 28–49. Pustejovsky, J. 1995. The generative lexicon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Smith, E.E., and Sloman, S.A. 1994. Similarity- vs. rule-based categorization. Memory and Cognition 22, 377–386. Smith, L. B., and Larissa K. S. 1997. Perceiving and remembering: category stability, variability and development. In Koen, L., and David, S. (eds.), Knowledge, concepts, and categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press: 161–196. Sperber, D., and Deirdre W. 1995. Reprint. Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell. Original edition, Oxford: Blackwell, (1986). Violi, P. 2000. Prototypicality, typicality and context. In Albertazzi, L. (ed.), Meaning and cognition. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 103–123. Vygotsky, L. S. 1962. Thought and language. Boston: MIT Press. Wierzbicka, A. 1996. Semantics: primes and universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Willett, J. 1995. Becoming first graders in an L2: an ethnographic study of L2 socialization. TESOL Quarterly, 29(3): 473–503. Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.


CHAPTER 3

M AT R I X : S C H E M AT I C U N I V E R S A L S . H O W M A N Y M I N D S D O E S A B I L I N G U A L H AV E ? Liliana Albertazzi University of Trento, Italy

Abstract None of the current reflection on language universals analyzes the categorial question from the point of view of the ontological levels of reality. The levels of the cognitive processing of information and its linguistic expression are sometimes discussed, but not the ontological levels of reality, probably because of the “linguistic” version of ontology as a simple theory of descriptions which predominated in the last century. This chapter underlines the structural difference among different kinds of categories, avoiding the errors that may derive from imprecise delimitation of their roles. As to ontological categories, the analysis emphasizes the difference between general ontological categories and regional ontological ones. Finally, the chapter shows that “recognizing” an item does not mean, by default, applying a taxonomic category or a base category. On that basis, a proposal is made of experiments verifying the existence of presentative pathologies, that is, pathologies occurring at the very base format of representations.

1. P O E T RY R E S E M B L E S PA I N T I N G S ?

The relationship between ontology, categorization, and linguistic expression is still an open question. It requires the analysis of too many variables relative to the dynamic nature of information, where a certain role, as a Kantian “regulatory idea,” is also performed by the epistemological paradigm that predominates at a particular time. The issue becomes even more complex when considered in light of bilingualism or multilingualism, given that in this case account must be taken of an additional variable. In fact, while it is already difficult to analyze the connection between reference and conceptualization in the case of a monolingual, it is even more so in that of a bi- or multilingual, where the analyst must consider a variety of forms of conceptualization 63 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 63–97. © 2007 Springer.


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sometimes in conflict with each other, and which may affect both the reference and the conceptualization. Moreover, this greater complexity cannot be explained by simply adding additional categories. The conflict may come about at several levels, for instance when growing up monolingual and then learning a second or third language; learning implicitly and explicitly; being brought up bilingual; acquiring different types of language, for example, a spoken language and a sign language (on the development of Creole sign languages see Pinker 1994; Golden-Meadow et al. 1995; Emmorey 2004). The conflict may also concern different components of bilingualism, like proficiency, fluency, forms of low and elite bilingualism, individual pragmatic abilities, and emotional motivations. Finally, the conflict may arise not only on aspects of conceptualization relative to specific grammatical bases (Pavlenko 1999) but even within an alternative general paradigm, such as the ones underlying the Western languages or the Asiatic languages (On this type of bilingualism see Wei 1994; Noguchi & Fotos 2000; Shin & Milroy 2000; Mishina-Mori 2005), with the further variant of bilinguals who live, for example, in highly industrialized Western contexts, or vice versa. Analysis of bi- and multilingualism has a crucial problem to solve: determining how conceptual representations are organized on the basis of two or more conceptual systems with differing degrees of relational complexity (Clark 2005). Put more concisely: is the mind of a bilingual or multilingual different from the mind of a monolingual (On this topic see De Groot et al. 1997. See also Hakuta 1986. On the effect of L2 on L1 see specifically Kecskes & Papp 2000 and Kecskes in this volume). 2. C AT E G O R I Z AT I O N I N A S I A N A N D W E S T E R N C U LT U R E S A N D L A N G U A G E S

Recent studies in social psychology have sought to identify the conceptual paradigms that underlie two different cultures: that of Asia and that of the West. It seems that, while Westerners categorize according to the classical Aristotelian procedure of membership in classes and difference by genus and species, Asians rely on the concept of resonance


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between social forms and self-understandings on the one hand and the philosophical assumptions and scientific approaches on the other (Munro 1985; Nisbett 2003: 27–28). The Tao Te Ching is expressly contrary to the implausibility and defectiveness of the taxonomic categorization which obstinately distinguishes and restricts the meanings of terms and attributes. The only valid ontological categorization for the Asian mentality, in fact, seems to be that between part and whole which is intrinsically bound up with the concept of relation. Then, while Westerners distinguish and categorize mainly in terms of objects, properties and shapes, Asians categorize mainly in terms of stuff or continuity of matter – in other words, in terms of a generalized holism which often retains ancient animistic elements profoundly rooted in the Asian vision of the world (Nisbett 2003: 148). The essential difference between the two cultures would therefore reside in the categorization of the surrounding environment into objects by Westerners, and into relations by Asians, and respectively into sets of properties and qualitatively salient aspects. The difference is immediately apparent in Western and Asian languages (which may privilege the use of nouns or verbs, or which mark generic nouns by syntax or by contextual and pragmatic cues, etc.), in the manner in which they are learned, and in the categorial attitudes that derive from them. Experiments in developmental psychology with American and Chinese children show the existence of a diverse preference in categorization. For example, on the basis of the presentation of triplets like a cow, a chicken, and a bunch of grass, Chiu found that theAmerican children preferred to group objects because they belonged to the taxonomic category (cow, chicken), whereas Chinese children preferred to groups objects on the basis of their thematic relationship (the cow eats the grass) (Chiu 1972; see also Norezayan et al. 2002; Nisbett 2003: 140–148). Western children, for example, learn the meaning of a category expressed in substantival form as a set of objects which share certain properties denoted by the corresponding noun. This induces them to pay particular attention to individual features in order to form further categories based on sets of similar properties. The same applies to the creation of abstract objects from properties through the use of suffixes (“goodness,” “happiness,” etc.). Asian children belatedly learn to categorize objects


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because they are primarily oriented to categorizing relationships among objects which have concrete properties and interact with circumstances connected with the environment. In Asian languages, moreover, because words have multiple meanings in more instances than words in Western languages, the context is even more crucial for the understanding of sentences. The two types of categorization have considerable consequences in logic, in linguistics (context, role and limits of the various types of definitional or prototypical categorization, role of the principle of the excluded third), in the experimental sciences (how to conceive an experiment and how to interpret the data), and in multi-analysis (how to construct a conceptual space which comprises the many potential points of view on certain items of entities). In principle, one might hypothesize that there may be consequences not only for contents but also for the processes underlying the conceptualization of someone who speaks more than one language, especially if the languages are of very different geographical and cultural provenance, and which may configure entirely different “minds.” Verification of this hypothesis, which obviously has a close bearing on one of the central concerns of cognitive science, can be undertaken by inquiry of various kinds: from science of the brain, to experimental analysis of mental contents in the laboratory, to epistemological investigation. There remains the structural aspect of a language consisting in the pragmatics of communication, which applies to both monolinguals and multilinguals. As Marty observed, referring to the “internal constructive form” of a language: No language explicitly expresses everything that we want to communicate; each of them resembles a stenograph or a sketch. There is always a certain difference, often a considerable one, between on the one hand what the speaker thinks and feels and the listener must equally think and feel, and on the other, what is expressed (Marty 1976: 145). Here I shall not deal with the functionalist aspects and the communicative function of language (Bühler 1934; Vygotsky 1962). Rather, I shall focus on forms of reference and designation (bezeichnen).



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From a philosophical point of view, the question of categorization highlighted by the above-mentioned research on the differences between Western and Asiatic languages can be framed as follows: 1. Of the two prevalent modes (taxonomic and relational), only one (the taxonomic mode) has ontological value, because it concerns “objective” features of reality, while the other one does not. This conception has dominated Western epistemology for several centuries. 2. The two modes are simply points of view, local conceptualizations without ontological value derived from the specific development of a culture over time. In this sense, they are conceptual categories, lacking only historical-cultural reconstruction of the context of origin. Comparison with other forms of categorization in other languages therefore relates to social and/or anthropological comparative analysis, and their choice and/or use for pragmatic and functional purposes. 3. Both modes are valid categorial options: they comprise a universal (ontological) principle, and they hold at different levels of complexity. In this case, their ontological “typicality” must be explained: if the modes refer to different levels of reality, so that de jure one does not exclude the other; in what terms does their ontological relevance obtain de facto? 3. I S S U E S F O R D I S C U S S I O N

Between these extremes are the two conceptions dominant in linguistic analysis: innatism and relativism (Dirven, Verspoor 1998: Chapter 6). Regarding the innatist conception, the more natural forms of innatism turn into Platonism, and rationalist and idealist variants of it (Prinz 2005: 688–689), but they may equally well merge with syntactic generativism if they are referred to base capacities and structures (Chomsky 1981). From this latter point of view, innatism – which first arose from physiological studies after sparking renewed interest in the early stages of cognitivism – is today of particular interest to the brain sciences (see Jackendoff 2003: Chapter 4). The relativist theory instead emphasizes


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that the structural diversity of languages is due to their different cultures of provenance. Whorf writes: We are thus induced to a new principle of relativity, which told that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated (Whorf 1956: 214). Accepting this principle has important consequences, because: It will be found that it is not possible to define “event, thing, object, relationship” and so on, from nature, but that to define them always involves a circuitous return to the grammatical categories of the definer’s language (Whorf 1956: 215, Emphasis added). In other words, ontological categories do not exist. On careful consideration, however, the matter is not so simple, for various reasons. First, one must ask whether the relativist theory does not allow for ontological reference even if it is not directly connected with physiology (consider the third of the above categorization options). Second, the diversity of linguistic forms may concern external forms like suffixes or prefixes: as evident, for example, when there is a parallelism between the form of the expression and the thought expressed (Mensch, des Menschen) or when the same content is expressed in different ways (hominis/de Menschen). However, the diversity of linguistic forms also stems from inner parameters of differentiation between reference and conceptualization. This involves the so-called inner linguistic form (Marty 1976), which holds in two ways: (i) in situations where there is no parallelism between form of thought and the concept expressed, as in the case of impersonal expressions, and aspect which concerns the word form: and (ii) in the choice of different methods of designation, ranging from onomatopoeia to metaphor. The inner linguistic form is figural, because it uses images, mostly of perceptive origin, as collateral representations (“wavering of judgment,” “shaken persons,” “neither here nor there” or “keel” for ship) and thus characterizes a prevalent mode of designation by a particular language



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(Marty 1916–1920 II: 1–67). In those occurrences, the names arouse the same concept, choosing different means to lead toward it. Briefly, the images or the imaginative content can change, but the meaning (i.e., the way in which the object is intended) does not. The internal linguistic form of a linguistic sign is then a psychic component of the sign itself (see Apresjan 1974; Violi 1997: 8.5.2). When these modes of referring are lexicalized, they make designation possible without the original relationship having constantly to be reiterated: this is the case of lexicalized metaphors, which do not exist in all languages and may not have a shared meaning, therefore cannot be “translated.” The problem of the inner linguistic form is consequently of particular importance when two or more reference systems interact – that is, in bi- and multilinguals – because meaning may be activated at all these levels of inner and outer form of the two or more languages. The innatist and relativist theories have been put forward in several variants and with differing degrees of radicalness. The problem is that linguistic analysis sometimes combines innatist claims (the existence of universal parameters) with relativist assumptions. In numerous authors, universal structures of taxonomic categorization (variously understood as necessary and sufficient conditions in componential semantics, lists of distinctive classes, syntactic and/or formal structures) coexist with prototypical universals that have little to do with them. This may be evidence for the third ontological option in categorization, namely the ontological value of different types of categorization and different ontological levels of reality. The same situation is apparent in Lakoff’s work, where imageschemata (like “container”) are tied to perceptive invariants which are prevalently visual/sensomotorial, and therefore universal, but ample recognition is given to the anthropocentrism and cultural relativism of the types of conceptualization, as in the case of the radial categorization of the Dyrbal (Lakoff 1997: 6). However, as shown in categorization of terms by multilingual speakers, the semantic categories conveyed by word meanings do not all map in the same way onto the conceptual categories in specific domains (containers, e.g.) (Clark 2005: 460–461). Moreover, radial categories are actually a description of the semantic


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organization of polysemic lexemes (i.e., linguistic categories), and not categories in the prototypical sense (i.e., conceptual categories) (Kleiber 1990: 174; see Violi 1997: 6.12). From a philosophical point of view, in addition to the innatism/ relativism option, the mind/language/reality relationship comprises a further aspect, namely the direct or mediated relationship between language and reference: that is, whether language refers directly to states of affairs in the world (Wittgenstein’s hypothesis in the Tractatus) or whether it must pass through the medium of conceptualization. If conceptualization is viewed as the non-eliminable medium for reference, the question arises as to whether the cognitive processes can be modified by the semantic contents of a language’s lexicon. This point, too, is of obvious importance in the case of bi- and multilinguals. Here, I shall not seek to furnish a definitive solution for the problem of the relation between reference, categorization, conceptualization and linguistic expression. Rather, as a philosopher, I shall stress certain categorial elements connected with the problem of language universals. These are elements which I consider important for interpretation of empirical linguistic data, and which may therefore also assist analysis of more complex conceptual configurations, like those of bi- and multilingualism. On the basis of a categorial restructuring of the question, in the conclusions I shall also put forward a working hypothesis. My analysis, as opposed to a formalistic one, will be based on a cognitive approach to natural language (Albertazzi 2000a) similar to the theses of cognitive linguistics, but with some distinctions connected to the categorial structure of the framework. I agree with the contention of cognitive linguistics that the only strong argument in favor of universals consists in identifying the structures of the world which are transposed into natural language. However, in that area of inquiry, despite declarations in favor of phenomenology, these invariants (e.g., image schemata) are directly traced back to the material world and/or to the brain. My hypothesis that the transposition occurs at a different level of organization of information and that only indirectly can it be traced back to the other levels mentioned, in this case, the existence of universals, springs from a different conception of ontology.



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4. A N A LT E R N AT I V E A P P R O A C H TO C AT E G O R I Z AT I O N

4.1. Categories I am aware that the linguist is specifically interested in the dynamics of lexical areas in which categories are placed within a system, and the way in which they oppose and boundary themselves according the constraints imminent to the system itself. A scholar in bi- and multilingualism is consequently interested in eventual superposition and interference between the different configurations of semantic areas. Strictly speaking, the problem of ontological categorization is a philosophical problem. However, the two questions interrelate and my aim is to disentangle some of the interrelated problems. The current discussion on language universals fails to analyze the categorial question from the point of view of the ontological levels of reality. The levels of the cognitive processing of information and its linguistic expression (Levinson 2003) are sometimes discussed, but not the ontological levels of reality, probably because of the “linguistic” version of ontology as a simple theory of descriptions which predominated in the last century (Quine 1969; Putnam 1975; Bickerton 1981, 1984). In my analysis I shall stress the structural difference between categories, avoiding the errors that may derive from imprecise delimitation of their roles. Moreover, I shall emphasize the difference between general ontological categories and regional ontological ones. Finally, I shall show that “recognizing” an item does not mean, by default, applying a taxonomic category or a base category. In the classical Aristotelian classification, the categories are universal classes of being which can be affirmed or predicated of any object. They entail a pre-established organization like that by proximate genus and specific difference (Categories 5: 2a). In the Aristotelian table of categories, therefore, “category” has a twofold meaning: (i) that of the genera of predication, the column of predicates expressing the same meaning; and (ii) that of the summum genus, the predicate that defines the common feature of each column. In the category “zebra,” for example, the substance expresses what the thing is, the quality of how it is, the time and space when and where it is, etc. The determination of a subject is predicated by an inherence relationship. The categories therefore


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(i) are predicamenta, (ii) have “grammatical genesis,” and (iii) possess “ontological value”. As we have seen, the Aristotelian category has ontological value, but it has subordinate features as well. The “logical” aspect of categories, for example, resides in the fact that they are the highest predicates; and the “linguistic” aspect resides in their grammatical genesis, that is, in the fact that the predicates are extrapolated from propositions and then analyzed in themselves or in their primary dimension. In short, starting from Aristotle’s position, categories can be interpreted in three ways: (1) categories with lexical terms (semantic interpretation) (Trendelenburg 1833); (2) categories as concepts, supreme predicates (logical interpretation) (Apel 1963); (3) categories as real determinations (ontological interpretation) (Bonitz 1853). One may argue that the categories merely furnish the predicative framework within which to locate certain predicates, a sort of location for the species of the predication. In other words, the categories are points of view with which to classify the concepts that distinguish between the objects of thought, corresponding to which are various kinds of statement (Zeller 1859: 68). In modern terms, a conception like this would allow graded or partial category membership. One may argue that analysis of the grammatical differences between the categories shows that they are concepts, not forms of statements or manners of predicating concepts. However, they are not concepts in the sense of mere mental representations but instead in their relation to the judgment, insofar as they are the predicate. They express logical relationships (Trendelenburg 1833). For example, the category of substance has its grammatical genesis in the substantive, those of quantity and quality in the adjective, that of relation in comparison, those of where and when in the adverbs of place and time, those of doing and undergoing in the active and passive forms of verbs, that of posture in the perfect tense (for intransitive verbs). However, not all parts of the discourse (e.g., the article) have a correspondent category. Then, on the basis of the same language diverse ontologies can be framed (think of Plato and



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Aristotle). The reference of grammar to ontology, consequently, has to be taken with caution. Finally, one may consider the categories as real concepts, but deny that they are merely predicates, or that the table of categories is designed with merely logical and grammatical relations in mind. Categories, then, are not definable either in relation to mental representations or on the basis of logical-grammatical relationships as mere predicates (Bonitz 1853; Brentano 1975). This point of view affirms that the categories are therefore the summa genera denoted by the term being (on), and they provide us with orientation in the sphere of experiential data by expressing simple concepts. In other words, the categories have ontological value. However, the three above-mentioned variations are partially compatible. Even when the third point of view, the ontological one, is adopted, the other valences intrinsic in the concept of “category” imply that considering the categories as points of view in the division of the species, and/or taking them to be only locations for certain predicates, may be a prevalently figural mode of expression. Additionally, in the neo-Aristotelian framework given to the categories by Brentano, their ontological and therefore universal value is primary (Brentano 1975). The argument that the categories are general concepts with which a mind and/or a language group represents its thoughts and judgments – the concept of category with relativist value dominant in cognitive science – therefore admits various levels of interpretation which should not be lumped under a single heading. In other words, the fact that the categories can also stand as a particular community’s points of view does not exclude their ontological value. The problem is distinguishing between universal categories which hold for all the domains (like space, time, substance, accident, part, whole) and categories which relate to specific domains (e.g., law, economics, representation, etc.). Another problem is that of determining what is meant by the universal character (and its extent) of the categories, doing so independently and alongside their relativist, local nature as points of view relative to specific conceptualizations of languages. Asecond point relevant to categorial analysis is the difference between general ontological categories and regional ontological categories (to


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use Husserl’s terminology): that is, those categories which concern particular domains of reality like the mind, language, society (Hartmann 1935; Husserl 1970, 1982; Poli 2002). In other words, the ambit of linguistic reference comprises a general invariant categoriality which concerns the existent as such, and a specific categoriality relative to the realm of reference comprising the cognitive and social processes that give rise to language. From this latter point of view the categories are necessarily mixed, because they relate to categories of perceptive type (e.g., sensory schemata functionally transposed into a language’s cognitive grammar), of psychological type (figural contents, auxiliary representations, and linguistically expressed mental contents), and of social type (specific elaboration of the conceptualization and grammar of languages reflecting cultural factors in the broad sense, which may greatly differ). Consequently, there is no single meaning of “category” but different senses of the term referring to its diverse valences. When pronouncing in favor of an innatist or relativist account of language, therefore, it is important to make use of the proper and nonsynonymous senses of the term “category.” This is of special importance for analysis of conceptualization in bi- and multilinguals, and it may have consequences on the cultural organization of a society which comprises linguistic minorities. As mentioned, one may also have to pronounce simultaneously in favor of the universal and relativist value of the categories, but without lapsing into contradiction. I will now clarify this point. 4.2. Reference As Greenberg observed in his well-known papers on universals: The problem of universals in the study of human language as in that of human culture in general concerns the possibility of generalizations which have their scope all languages or all cultures. The question is whether underlying the diversities which are observable with relative ease there exist valid general principles. Such invariants would serve to specify, in a precise manner, the notion of “human nature” whether in language or in other aspects of human behaviour. They would, in



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effect, on the lowest level correspond to the “empirical generalization” of the natural sciences. On higher levels they might be dignified by the name of laws. The search for universals, therefore, coincides on this view with the search for laws of human behaviour, in the present context more specifically those of linguistic behaviour. (Greenberg 2005: 9) The theories that have been advanced on the existence of universals and specifically on the “mind/language/reality” relationship have varied from a minimum/maximum of nominalism to a minimum/maximum of realism. But the distinctive aspect of the question is that apparently similar conclusions have been reached from very different ontological premises. I will briefly review some crucial components of the question. Boetius, in his commentary on Porphirius (Boethius 1906), formulated the realist and conceptualist positions on “the question of universals”: 1. Universals exist as, for example, the substantial form or common nature of the things (realism). In this case, ontological universals and semantic universals coincide: general names signify species or genera. 2. Universals are abstractions, constructions of the mind (conceptualism). Conceptualism is per se a semantic theory, not an ontological theory of universals. Specifically, conceptualism maintains that the mental representation of a category consists of properties which are common and unique to the items in the category; each property is therefore individually necessary for category membership. A third position between the above two is nominalism. This maintains that: 1. There exist only individuals and individual events (i.e., species, sets, general properties, etc. are not mind-independent). 2. Representations signify individuals (they refer to singular things) determined by the place, space and part of matter that they occupy. 3. Universals are singular things, and they are such only by signification (they are signs of several things).


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4. Universals are not mental images, but signs. 5. Universals have an intentional structure; they are acts of intuitive (i.e., non-conceptual) reference to an object (Formigari 2002: 4.5). Briefly, universals are not realities as such, but ways of signifying. What is sensorially given becomes intelligible through a process of construction due to the intentional reference. Generality, then, is not a mode of being but a semantic feature (see Panaccio 2005). In nominalism, therefore, conceptualizations are ontologically founded on a specific entity, the individual existent bearing the representation. In other words, it is only in the structure of the act of intuitive reference – of which the individual is the existential bearer – that one should seek an ontological foundation for the invariants of categorization. All the rest depends on the context and on the generality of the representation. The problem is how the foundation of reference should be defined. Because reference is structurally connected to individual existence, it might be argued that it must be eminently “subjective” and situated, in that it is tied to the contingency of the existent. A solution to the problem has been offered by Brentano, who argues that: 1. The sole ontological foundation is given by the “who” that selfrepresents an object of some kind but is also a psychophysical system rather than a more complex individual (an Ego). 2. Although general, a representation follows structural modes of information organization which are primarily temporal and structural, and secondarily contentual. They are neither substantial forms nor concepts. 3. Consequently, generality is a feature of representation (not an ontological characteristic); however, representation’s structure is universal. However, here an important change has been made to classical nominalism. The structure of the space/time of the intentional reference no longer coincides with physical space/time: rather, it is the space/time of consciousness, which emerges at the primary and secondary levels of conceptualization and differs from the structures of the physical world



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because it is figural in character. This notion has been well expressed by Wertheimer when discussing the nature of perception: I stand at the window and see a house, trees, sky. Theoretically I might say there were 327 brightnesses and nuances of colour. Do I have 327? No. I have sky, house, and trees. It is impossible to achieve “327” as such. And yet even though such droll calculation were possible – and implied, say, for the house 120, the trees 90, the sky 117 – I should at least have this arrangement and division of the whole, and not, say, 127 and 100; or 150 and 177. (Wertheimer 1938: 71) The qualities of visual, acoustic, tactile, olfactory, and intermodal representation of the phenomenal field are always somewhat sloppy, in fact. As a consequence, they are not immediately codifiable in terms of angular degrees or wavelengths of color. Nor are they immediately codifiable in terms of mathematical invariants, that is, primitives which do not change in transformations; nor in terms of the non-accidental properties of the computational theory of vision. These measures can only be used to define the stimulus. Instead, apprehended in representation, are general qualities; these being the simple, essential structural characteristics of the items observed pertaining to a perceptive space with specific features. Additionally, these qualities have the marked tertiary and emotional valence of affordances. For example, rather than the “sun” as such, what we apprehend is “brightness,” “warmth,” “yellowness,” etc. (see Metzger 1941; Cornelius 1990; Albertazzi 1995). The characteristics of the space/time of representation can be summarized as follows: 1. It is eminently “topological” (consider the deformations that occur in so-called perceptual illusions) (Lipps 1879; Koffka 1935; Brentano 1988; Albertazzi 2006a), continuous and durational (James 1950). 2. It is qualitative: in fact perceptive phenomena have their own laws of figural organization (Wertheimer 1938). 3. It has non-metric representational units in that it is made up of neither points nor instants but a homogeneous coalescence of the spaces of the various items, where all perceived things and processes are


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located (see also James 1950 II: Chapter 4; Pöppel & Logothetis 1986; Pöppel 1994; Albertazzi 2002a). Specifically, in what laboratory research calls the “time of presentness,” that is, the time of the actual presentation, physical data are altered qualitatively, which means that the objects triggered by the stimuli undergo structural reorganization. The complexity of this reorganization is well exemplified, for example, by phenomena of temporal and spatial dislocation (Benussi 1913; Vicario 1970; Albertazzi 1999), which show that the phenomenal level is not reducible to the physical level, and that in perception qualitative factors of grouping prevail over quantitative ones. However, this conception does not fit easily with the merely psychophysical account of perception still dominant in cognitive science. The latter is a theory of measurement devices in its turn connected to the empiricist/common sense view of the mind. According to this account, which uses abstractions derived from the technology-shaped refinement of common sense taxonomies (e.g., color terms), the perceptual system has to inform us about elementary physical quantities such as energy of sounds, intensity and wavelength of light (see Berlin et al. 1969; Viswanath 2005; Regier et al. 2005). In this framework, therefore, perception cannot but be simply parasitical on the stimulus. Adopting one or the other conception, however, also has important consequences for the relationship between reference, conceptualization and language. Analyzing linguistic reference and conceptualization within a psychophysical framework, in fact, requires that these phenomena be considered only in relation to the underlying stimuli and/or neuronal processing, so that it is almost impossible to account for the specific qualitative nature of conceptualization and a cognitive space. In contrast, if reference is mediated by a structure which presents categorial novelties with respect to the physical world, it naturally acquires form through a (qualitative) content and finds expression in language and other forms of communication (Brentano 1977). In other words, the space/time of intentional reference is the matrix of conceptualization. Even more importantly, as the base structure it is the same for all phenomena, and is therefore universal. This, in short, is the conception at the origin of Marty and Bühler’s theory of language.



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Embedded in language, therefore, is a structural variety of semiotic ontological components (reference to the object – given “intentionally,” that is, mediated by the formal structures of consciousness) (Albertazzi 2005: Chapters 3, 4), conceptual components (reference to the content), and expressive components (reference to the lexical components). Hence, conceptual meaning and lexical meaning are clearly distinct, so that the frequent confusion between semantics and conceptualization is avoided. Indeed, as demonstrated by recent experimental studies, some forms of aphasia may affect the semantic representation of the lexicon of a particular language without involving or damaging its conceptual counterparts (De Groot 2002; Paradis, this volume). Additionally, it is highly likely that there exist conceptual components which do not have lexical counterparts, for various reasons including the following: 1. the reference to the object is given in plurivocal modes, direct or indirect, and via the contents that the inner form of a language selects for designation; 2. the existence of form of behavior definable as “wordless psychic exchange” (Bühler 1934) which takes place in everyday contexts; 3. the pervasive tenor of a particular language (Bühler distinguishes languages into impressionistic [Eskimo], categorial [Bantu], and universal [European languages]). However complex the grammar of intentional reference, what is saved in the nominalist conception of natural language is the invariance of the structure through which reference takes place – and therefore a form, albeit a highly peculiar one, of realism. Indeed, one may speak of “immanent realism” (Albertazzi 2005). Contrary to classical realism, in this conception universals do not exist independently of the subject, yet they are nevertheless invariant structures given by the way in which information is organized at the psychic level. Universality is therefore guaranteed by the structure of intentional reference, which is experimentally analyzable and largely coincides with Fechner’s inner psychophysics (Albertazzi 2005: Chapter 4). It has been the task of Gestalt psychology – which derives from Brentanism – to furnish experimental explanations of the nature of the intentional structure and the origin of cognitive processes; first at the primary (perceptive) level, then


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at the secondary level (inferences, hypotheses, deductions, memories, problem solving, etc.). It should be stressed that the analysis of linguistic conceptualization from the point of view of a formal theory is not in contradiction with the analysis of the phenomenon from the point of view of the underlying levels of information organization. In other words, analysis of the space/time structures of conceptualization does not deny the importance of determining their counterparts at the level of stimuli or neurons. Simply, it does not reduce meaning to these structures that pertain to the physical worlds; moreover, it does not consider the categories as such to be modes of perception (see Neisser 1978: Chapter 4). 4.3. Patterns The introduction of the psyche (I deliberately use the Aristotelian term instead of “mind” because it is situated, that is, comprises a broader array of phenomena) into the relation between linguistic expression and ontological reference is nothing new. Consider twentieth-century linguistics, from the physiologically based theories of Wundt (1904) and Steinthal (1968) to the already-mentioned descriptive ones of Marty or Bühler. The notion has assumed considerable importance in the development of cognitive science after decades of dominance by rationalism embedded in the first generations of AI and the logical-formal approach to natural language. The thesis of the conceptual character of semantics, in particular the presence of conceptual universals embedded in the semantics of natural language has been sustained in cognitive science on very different philosophical premises which have very different meanings from the categorial point of view. This thesis is put forward by representationalists like Fodor, mentalists like Johnson-Laird and Wierzbicka, and experientialists like Lakoff, Langacker and Talmy. All of these have argued for the uniqueness of the human mind reflected in the conceptual (Langacker 1990) processing of languages; but also taking into account the relativity and/or anthropomorphism of specific conceptual categories and forms of construal developed by language communities. Evidently, the thesis of the universality of some cognitive components and the thesis of linguistic



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relativism are linked, but different authors have interpreted the relationship between them in very different ways. The proponents of a lingua mentalis, for example, cannot hold the same assumptions as the proponents of experientialist theories. The assumptions of Wierzbicka, who connects mental operations with grammatical structures, are very close to those of a universal grammar and therefore presuppose the existence of language universals common to all languages, suggesting the idea of a lingua mentalis. Conversely, those of Lakoff relate to an experientialist conception of the mind as embodied or rooted in sensomotorial experience. In other words, this is more an Aristotelian psyche than a Leibnizian or computational mind. The concept of “primitive” – even if it shares the criticism of the concept of “naturalistic taxa” as the ordering of items into a system of concepts – differs profoundly among authors: for Wierzbicka (1996), for example, these are primitives similar to those of componential semantics. This point is crucial because, for example, cognitive semantics is often criticized for adhering to a correspondence theory of meaning (semantics as conceptual semantics). The criticism is directed at Wierzbicka as well as Langacker and Lakoff, despite the considerable differences between their positions; and above all despite the importance given to prototypical categorization (Rosch 1978) by each of them (Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1990; Wierzbicka 1996) – where concepts are functions of environmentally-based but subjectively characterized experience (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). As I have pointed out, however, if the foundation of the categorization of schemata and image-schemata lies at the neuronal level, then the criticism of psychophysical correspondence brought against cognitive linguistics is entirely justified: conceptualization becomes a reflection of the physical world’s properties according to the dictates of classical psychophysical theory (see e.g., Zeki 1993; Pulvermüller 1999; Martin 2001). There is consequently a conflict inherent in cognitive linguistics which must be resolved at categorial level. Another point concerns the fact that analysis by cognitive semantics has centered on spatial categorization (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976; Lyons 1977). Within the debate on the eminently spatial nature of linguistic conceptualization, not only are the points of departure different,


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but also the referents. For example, the referent for representationalist theory is early research in artificial intelligence (the mind as a computer), that for mentalist theory is a cultural Platonism (the idea of semantic primitives), that for experientialist theory is Gestalt psychology and, more generally, phenomenology (the experiential and bodily basis of human categories) (Svorou 1994; Ungerer & Schmid 1996; Heine 1997). An approximate grouping of theories conceals the differences between diverse approaches only apparently coming together in the same “relativist theory” of spatial conceptualization. Finally, one may agree that primitives can be identified in linguistic categorization (Jackendoff 1983; Wierzbicka 1996; Lamb 1999) without immediately attributing them either semantic or conceptual significance – that is, without considering them to be a set of conceptual features representing the properties of a category. Vice versa, by referring to the Kantian notion of empirical concept, one considers them semiotic primitives connected with perception. It is important to underline, however, that the idea of empirical concepts in Kantian terms is not the same as in British empiricism: the first are cognitive routes, the second are more like mental images or inner models. Also, Kantian empirical concepts are not immediately tied to action, so that the dichotomy between “representing for thinking” and “representing for doing” does not apply to them (see Prinz 2005). Generally, when dealing with problems regarding conceptualization, the questions to ask about space are still those raised by James: How do we apprehend space? How is the system of real space and spatial relations constructed, starting from infancy? (See also Clark 2004: 461.) How do we perceive the third dimension? What role does cognition play in the perception of space? (James 1950 II: Chapter XX). Put in these terms, the question of primitives can be addressed by adopting Eco’s distinction among Cognitive Type (CT), Nuclear Content (NC) and Molar Content (MC). A CT is a sort of procedural rule for organizing multimedia perceptive experience. It comprises characteristic notes or typical features and serves to identify occurrences of primary-level entities (Eco 1997: Chapter 3, 3.3.1ff; Albertazzi 2004a). In the first instance it can be compared to the base categories of cognitive psychology (Rosch 1978) but only if its character as a procedural rather



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than contentual procedural rule is preserved. In other words, an “apple” or “banana” is not treated as a picture endowing a semantic content but as a “type” (an item with a certain shape, size, texture, etc., which is therefore edible). Primitives should be taken not as conceptual features but as dynamic patterns anticipatory of a “type” (a similar position is held in Desclés 1993). The meaning of schematic pattern, then, should not be referred to the use of schema as in Hintzman (1986), which holds an opposite point of view, that is, that objects are categorized along a fixed set of features (see Treisman & Gelade 1980). A CT apprehended in a schema is subjective in nature: for example, that of “Rattus,” which instantiates the species Rodent, but for me may be instantiated as “mouse” and for others as “rat.” Concepts are not instantiated in the same way by everyone, as the Fregean theory would maintain. Both these individual CTs, however, obey common structural rules for the codification of perceptive forms, such as the “grouping” of the parts of the whole according to similarity, or “good form” for the unification of the item’s formal coherence. Therefore, at the basis of the individual instantiation of a CT, there is always recognition of a pattern which is as regular and symmetrical as possible. This pattern, however, is schematic in nature: it is not an image/picture in the sense commonly given to the term by cognitive semantics (Jackendoff 1992), nor in its dictionary meaning à la Wierzbicka (1996: 340). It is the processing of salient (i.e., qualitative, like a vivid color) features from the point of view of the constitution of form. The procedural nature of information processing is therefore the same for individuals speaking the same language but with different CT access, and for bi- and multilingual individuals. Vice versa, the semantic primitive “Rattus,” on which we agree in language, is the expressed nuclear content (NC) (Eco 1997: Ch. 3, 3.3.2), the outcome of negotiation, in regard to which descriptive statements can be collected in different languages (Wierzbicka 1996). It does not necessarily coincide with my specific CT of “Rattus” (which may be both a “rat” and a “laboratory mouse.” The meaning of NC is a way out of Fodor’s idea that concepts are public, because in a nominalistic framework even concepts have to undergo a sort of negotiation once lexicalized.


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There are then the changes of meaning that occur in the translation of the same negotiated contents from one language to another (Eco 2003: Chapter 4). The NC differs from the CT because it derives from the negotiation of various individual CTs in a particular language community, so that the public (i.e., semantic) meaning of the entity is collectively standardized (Eco 1997: 3.3.2.). The NC, which broadly corresponds to the lexical meaning of a term, may obviously be more multi-faceted in speakers of more than one language, because of their differing inner linguistic forms, with the consequent constraints and feedbacks that the facets of one language may exert on those of a different language. In the case of bi- and multilinguals, it is of particular importance to analyze the NC because it indicates the set of specific facets that have been negotiated and incorporated into the lexicon of a particular language. This may concern both specific content/s and the mode/s of reference, given that there may be different ways to encode and access knowledge. It is in this, according to additive theories, that one of the advantages of bilingualism or multilingualism consists, which give greater capacity to distinguish between word and concept, and therefore greater flexibility in the cognitive abilities underlying the formats of conceptual networks. Finally, the point of view of a particular language community is expressed by another sort of information: MC (Eco 1997: Chapter 3, 3.3.3), which comprises highly diverse information items. Distinguishing among CT, NC and MC may be useful for the analysis of how different languages relate to their underlying concepts (Weinreich 1953). Additionally, from this point of view lexical items rarely have the same meaning as their translation equivalents (Paradis 1997). In short, the conceptual contents negotiated in the semantics of the lexicon may be qualitatively diverse, especially in the case of bi- and multilinguals, but not so the procedural rules for pattern recognition, which are universal. From a categorial point of view, paying attention to the subjective character of the CTs seems to support the hypotheses of classical Ockhamist nominalism. But in fact it does not. Eco himself stresses the presence of what Plato in the Phaedo called “nervatures” of being and which no form of epistemological conventionalism can afford to ignore.



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That which is universal, to use Arnheim’s expression, is the structural skeleton of items – a skeleton also composed of a balance among not immediately visible forces (like those toward the left and toward the right which regulate the so-called “duck/rabbit” illusion; Arnheim 1954: Chapter 2). The ineliminable difference between individual CTs – which concerns geographical setting, imprinting, cultural evolution, religion, social status, attitudes, etc. (and as such naturally plays a crucial role in first language acquisition) – does not in itself rule out the existence of a “universal schema” of, for example, “Rattus.” In other words, “Rattus” has an approximate extension which is not shared precisely by all. 4.4. Schemata A schema is structured on certain perceptive characteristics of the entity in question. For example, it comprises secondary and tertiary figural qualities and expressive movement . On this basis the schema of Rattus is universal, even if it is intrinsically dynamic (constructed on the basis of Abschattungen; Husserl 1982: Section 3, iii), and even if, because of its structural instantiation in a CT, it is subjectively connoted in relation to the individual who is its bearer in a particular setting and a particular community. However, the schema is not to be understood in the descriptive sense as offering defining conceptual or lexical properties. Indeed, it maintains its invariance until a certain topological deformation takes place in the type itself. The extendedness (not “metric extension,” which relates to the computational idea of schema as image/picture, silhouette or contour) of the Rattus schema, for example, is not conceptually deformable beyond certain limits, after which it assumes features pertaining to a “different type” of item. Defense of the existence of universals in the form of schematic universals should not be regarded as a weak defense, because it maintains an ontological foundation (the structure of intentional reference at primary level) which forms its matrix. Subjective integrations, including ratiomorphic categorizations such as anticipatory scheme, relation, and abstraction, are structural components of the schema at the level of the primary organization of information in the spatio-temporal qualitative


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structure of the time of presentness which underlies pattern recognition and as such is universal (Benussi 1923; Michotte et al.1962; Fraisse 1963; Musatti 1964; Kanizsa 1991. Also see Albertazzi 2003). There are then different degrees of the modes of cognitive integration (e.g., from seeing to thinking), inferences, judgments, etc., as well as anthropological and social (relativist) cognitive integrations which dynamically regulate their translation into NCs and MCs of more extended knowledge, and into lexical items. Considering the question from a holistic point of view, it is obvious that if language acquisition (especially of the first language) is not considered to be a genetically transmitted capacity (under a reductionist assumption), it is certainly connected to geographical, environmental and broadly cultural imprinting. This is to say, however, that it is not possible to draw structural boundaries between the original schemata and the language that expresses them conceptually and grammatically. When one considers a second or third language, the processes connected with the CT and the NC become more complex, because they involve dynamic transforming processes of conceptual and grammatical translation – as demonstrated, for example, by studies on gender. Yet, as mentioned, the procedural rules for pattern recognition remain invariant. In my view, the presence of language universals – one of the base assumptions of cognitive semantics – should be downshifted from an already amply-structured conceptual plane to a primary, intrinsically dynamic, semiotic plane. Acting at this level are concrete universals of perception (schemata or typical anticipations) (see Violi 1997: 6.13.2). The relativist component instead consists in the innumerable operations involved in the construction of meanings in diverse cultures which are then incorporated into speech as grammatical or lexical structures. Also, the assumption of universal ontological schemata should be explained. The questions to be answered are the following. What are the universal rules for constituting schemata? On what bases do they operate: psychophysical for stimuli, physiological for neural elaboration? And what is the basis for the qualitative appearance of an entity? At present, the analysis of schemata has been conducted with particular



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reference to sensomotorial schemata, and in relation to neuronal processing (Lakoff et al. in press). Grounding the meaning structure of a schema to a low level – for example that of the Rattus schema to a low level of vision or neuronal motor perception – creates an almost unbridgeable gap between this type of bottom-up component (generally understood in cognitive science as being data-driven) and top-down ones (generally understood as inferential components, past experience, etc.). This is exactly the case of theories which, by positioning the nature of language universals at the syntactic level in the neurons, are forced to attribute “meaning” to intrinsically relativist components. The latter are distinct from the syntax of the generative mechanism (structurally top-down) based on mnestic traces and relative inferences. Therefore, conceptual meaning can be nothing other than “inferential” and “culture-driven” interpretation (Bunge 1980). If the contribution of conceptualization to the relationship between natural language and reality is considered undeniable, then the relationship must be explained on categorial bases, so that a dividing line can be drawn between the possible presence of language universals and the generally-accepted idea that language and thought closely parallel one another and linguistic diversity is reflected in cognitive diversity (Levinson 2003). 5. A WAY O U T A N D C O N C L U S I O N

To conclude, in accordance with the general paradigm of cognitive linguistics, and in support of the idea that there are primary schemata in conceptualization, the thesis argued in this chapter has been that the connections between the forms of categorization which regulate the meaning of perceptive situations and the linguistic renderings of those same perceptions are governed by the formal invariants of the perceptive process; specifically, it has been claimed that the invariants of the perceptive domain are conceptualized in accordance with the principles of gestaltic organization. For example, it has been shown that there is a strong correlation between Talmy’s Force Dynamics schema and the perceptual structures ruling the meaning of prototypical verbs of movement, confirming that causatives are related to that particular cognitive


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scheme (see Albertazzi 2002c). The thesis is similar to the principle of invariance proposed by Lakoff (1990) but differs from it in certain basic respects. Specifically: 1. It considers the initial domain of reference to be the structures of phenomenal perception (rather than the physical and/or neurophysiological domain). 2. It emphasizes the importance of the dynamic nature of the actual presentation. Analysis of this type yields surprising results (Albertazzi 2002c), and implies the existence of a natural semiosis of meaning, at least regarding the primary level of the cognitive processes (see also Violi 1997; Eco 1997). In light of these considerations, I suggest that conceptualization in languages should be analyzed from a new perspective, as follows. 1. First, render conceptualization independent from direct reference to neuronal activity or the psychophysics of stimuli, connecting it instead, in foundational manner, to the figural, experiential, and phenomenal level of intentional reference. Comparison should first be made between phenomenal structures, and only subsequently of the underlying physical structures evidencing their neurophysiological correlates and the relationship with stimuli. Meaning, in fact, is qualitative in nature. 2. Second, consider conceptualization in light of the diverse, subjectively integrated, formats of representation. My proposal is therefore that analysis should downshift from alreadystructured forms of semantic conceptualization to the matrix which gives origin to such conceptualization. The hypothesis, in fact, is that universals are rooted in the space/time of the actual presentation: that is, in the unfolding processes, anticipatory, retentive and qualitative, of the so-called time of presentness. This proposal has something in common with Mandler’s idea of image-schemata (Mandler 1992), but intends to analyze the microgranularity of the structure from the point of view of its phenomenal genesis.



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On this hypothesis, conceptualization has universal character at the presentative level as recognition of perceptive items in a schema (what has been called, by Arnheim, the “structural skeleton”). More precisely, in the actual reference a particular item is generalized as an item of a certain type, while at the same time the schema is particularized (Eco 1997: 153). Conceptualization is instead relativist at the level of conceptual representation, and it involves a series of further cognitive integrations, largely top-down, which merge into the linguistically expressed content, and into a broader, encyclopedic molar knowledge of items. This is the most relativistic component of meaning, given that its contents are strictly cultural and heterogeneous. As such, it is a highly functional variable in the case of bi- and multilingualism because it may activate networks of unpredictable meanings. Only experimental analysis can verify whether features invariant at the level of the actual presentative structure are evident at the linguistic level as well, in a sort of primary figural field of language (Bühler 1934; Albertazzi 1995). Some work in that direction concerning synesthesia, for example, is developing. The fundamental problem is that the presentative structure – the base format – is eminently temporal; an unfolding in an extendedness, however brief, and only on conclusion of this unfolding is it possible to talk of a spatialized objectual content (Benussi 1922–1923). Looking for universals at this level means looking for eminently temporal and dynamic universals – or in other words, unfolding schematic universals. It is no coincidence that, in organized languages, temporal terms derive from spatial terms and not vice versa. This is because at the lexical level information has already been organized contentually (i.e., spatially), thus losing the intrinsic dynamism of the pattern (see Traugott 1978; Clark & Clark 1979). If it is not possible to bring out the unfolding of structure at the temporal level, we must abandon the endeavor to prove the existence of language universals unless we refer – as in formal semantics – to a computational mind which zero-sets the qualitative dimensions to quantitative metrics. In contrast, if we are able to demonstrate a connection between, for example, linguistic deficits and deficits in the matrix of the


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generative, qualitative structure of semantics, the existence of language universals may be proven. Pathologies like anomie or aphasia are usually analyzed in relation to mental content (On bilinguals see Sasanuma & Park 1995; Green 1998; Roberts & Le Dorze 1998); or in relation to neuronal processing (see Nilipour & Ashyeri 1989; Paradis & Goldblum 1989; Obler et al. 2000; Green & Price 2001; Missina-Mori 2005). It would also be interesting to verify the existence of presentative pathologies: for example, in situations where the temporal structure of the presentation – which usually varies elastically according to the contents apprehended (Michotte 1963) – is in some way set by rigid parameters: that is, it cannot expand or contract owing to some sort of pathological fixedness of the speed of the proto-attentive mechanisms. For this purpose, experiments could determine whether there is an excess or shortfall in the time taken to switch from analytical to global vision; or in the time taken to switch from two-dimensional to three-dimensional vision; or in the times of apparent movement phenomena (like stereokinetic movements) that involve the relationship between space/time microstructures, unfolding of the phases and recognition, identification and the naming of objects perceived in succession (Albertazzi 2004). As the fundamental situation for the identification and prediction of the objects in our surrounding environment, movement is in fact one of the main sources of the genesis of meaning. Finally, experiments could focus on the structure of individual CTs in mono-, bi- and multilinguals, especially regarding the formation of metaphors and analogies. The discovery of schematic universals at the level of primary semiosis which regulate the way in which conceptual information is structured at the primary level, before the construction of semantic contents, may be a sound basis for discussion of language universals. Speakers of different languages or different types of languages always share, at the foundational level, a qualitative universal matrix, despite the presence of even very different forms of conceptualization driven by the semantics of those languages. The possibility of understanding and translating meaning (on translation see Eco 2003) from one language to another depends on this pre-linguistic matrix endowed with expressive qualities (Violi 1997), which is not yet fully conceptual but is constitutively



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completed by the structure’s subjective integrations. The originality of the mode of conceptualization is also connected with the conceptual CTs of the speakers of a particular language. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Irving Biederman, Istvan Kecskes, Lia Formigari, Roberto Poli and Patrizia Violi for their fruitful comments on the text, and Ton Dijkstra for having suggested some specialized literature while writing it. REFERENCES Albertazzi, L. 1995. Il campo figurale della lingua. Esprimere, indicare, rappresentare. In Negrini, G. (ed.), Categorie, oggetti e strutture della conoscenza. Rome: CNR. 9–43. Albertazzi, L. 1999. The time of presentness. A chapter in positivistic and descriptive psychology. In Cattaruzza, S. (ed.), Vittorio Benussi, special issue of Axiomathes 10: 49–74. Albertazzi, L. 2000a. Which semantics. In Albertazzi, L. (ed.), Meaning and cognition. A multidisciplinary approach. Amsterdam: Benjamins Publishing Company. 1–24. Albertazzi, L. 2000b. Directions and perspective points in spatial perception. In Albertazzi, L. (ed.), Meaning and cognition. A multidisciplinary approach. Amsterdam: Benjamins Publishing Company. 123–143. Albertazzi, L. 2002a. Continua. In Albertazzi, L. (ed.), Unfolding perceptual continua. Amsterdam: Benjamins Publishing Company. 1–28. Albertazzi, L. 2002b. Towards a neoaristotelian theory of continua: Elements of an empirical geometry. In Albertazzi, L. (ed.), Unfolding perceptual continua. Amsterdam: Benjamins Publishing Company. 29–79. Albertazzi, L. 2002c. Kinetic structure and causatives. Axiomathes, 1: 17–37. Albertazzi, L. 2003. From Kanizsa back to Benussi: Varieties of intentional reference. In Albertazzi, L. (ed.), The Legacy of Gaetano Kanizsa, special issue of Axiomathes 13: 239–259. Albertazzi, L. 2004a. Deformazioni secondo regole. La grammatica del vedere. Paradigmi, 2004: 35–57. Albertazzi, L. 2004b. Stereokinetic shapes and their shadows. Perception, 33: 1437–1452. Albertazzi, L. 2005. Immanent realism. Berlin-New York: Springer. Albertazzi, L. 2006a. Visual spaces. In Albertazzi, L. (ed.), Visual thought. The depictive space of the Mind. Amsterdam: Benjamins Publishing Company.

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Poli, R. 2002. Che cos’è l’universale?. In Boniolo, G., and Vidali, P. (eds.), Argomentare Corso di filosofia, 2. Milan: Bruno Mondatori. 86–91. Pöppel, E. 1994. Temporal mechanism in perception. International review of neurobiology, 37: 185–202. Pöppel, E., and Logothetis, N. 1986. Neuronal oscillations in the brain. Discontinuous initiators of pursuit eye movements indicate a 30Hz temporal framework for visual information processing. Naturwissenschaften, 73: 267–268. Prinz, J. J. 2005. The return of concept empiricism. In Cohen, H., and Lefebre, C. (eds.), Handbook of categorization in cognitive science. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 679–695. Pulvermüller, F. 1999. Words in the brain’s language. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 22: 253–336. Putnam, H. 1975. The Innateness Hypothesis and Explanatory Models in Linguistics. In Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quine, W. van Orman.1969. Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press. Regier, T., Kay, P., and Cook R. S. 2005. Focal colors are universal after all. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 102: 8386–8391. Roberts, P. M., and Le Dorze, G. 1998. Bilingual aphasia: Semantic organization, strategy use, and productivity in semantic verbal fluency. Brain and Language, 65: 287–312. Rosch, E. 1978. Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. Sasanuma, S., and Park, H. S. 1995. Patterns of language deficits in two KoreanJapanese bilingual aphasic patients. A clinical report. In Paradis, M. (ed.), Aspects of bilingual aphasia. Oxford: Pergamon Press. 111–122. Shin S. J., and Milroy, L. 2000. Conversational codeswitching among KoreanEnglish bilingual children. International Journal of Bilingualism, Vol. 4(3)(1): 351–383(33). Steinthal, H. 1968. Grammatik, logik und psychologie. Hildesheim-New York: Olms. Svorou, S. 1994. The grammar of space. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. Talmy, L. 1988. Force dynamics in language and thought. Cognitive Science, 12: 49–100. Talmy, L. 1983. How language structures space. In Pick, H. L., and Acredolo, L. P. (eds.), Spatial orientation: Theory, research and application. New York: Plenum Press. 225–282. Traugott E. 1978. On the expression of spatio-temporal relationships in language. In Greenberg, J., Ferguson, C., and Moravcsik, E. (eds.), Universals of human language 3. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Trendelenburg, F. A. 1833. De Aristotelis categoriis. Berolini.

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CHAPTER 4

G R A M M AT I C A L G E N D E R I N T H E B I L I N G U A L LEXICON: A PSYCHOLINGUISTIC APPROACH Angeliki Salamoura University of Cambridge, UK

Abstract This chapter is organized as follows. The first section is a general introduction to grammatical gender from various perspectives. Section 2 reviews studies which compare L2 with L1 gender processing; Section 3 discusses the role of the L1 gender information during L2 gender processing; and Section 4 focuses on the (language-shared or language-specific) nature of gender representation in the bilingual lexicon. After a brief overview of the present study which investigates further the nature of gender representations in the bilingual lexicon (Section 5), Sections 6, 7 and 8 present in detail two experiments on gender representation and discuss the experimental findings. Finally, Section 9 draws together the present and previous evidence on the representation of gender in the bilingual lexicon and gender processing in L2.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

Grammatical gender is one of the most complex and intriguing linguistic categories. Hockett (1958: 231) defines genders as “classes of nouns reflected in the behavior of associated words.” This definition alludes to the two main aspects of the correct use of grammatical gender: gender assignment, namely, the allocation of gender to nouns, and gender agreement, the reflection of a noun’s (or agreement controller’s) gender in the form of other lexical items. For the purposes of this chapter, the term gender will refer to grammatical gender only, which should be distinguished from natural/ biological gender, that is, nouns that take their gender according to the sex of their referent. While both grammatical and natural/biological gender might involve the same agreement processes, there is an important 99 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 99–151. © 2007 Springer.


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difference between them regarding gender assignment. The value of natural gender is determined by the conceptual message of the utterance, and more specifically, by the sex of a noun’s referent. The value of grammatical gender, on the other hand, is an inherent property of a noun (Levelt et al. 1999) and is stored and retrieved from the mental lexicon. Speakers of gender languages must retrieve gender information from the mental lexicon and compute gender agreement fairly frequently during the course of speech. Van Berkum (1997), for example, estimates that in Dutch, a language with a moderate degree of gender agreement, a speaker has to access gender information at least once every 10 sec. Although the demanding processes of gender assignment and agreement are fairly automatic and effortless for the native speakers of a language, this is not exactly the case for second language (L2) learners. Arguably, the correct use of grammatical gender is perhaps one of the harder linguistic phenomena to be mastered by L2 learners (e.g., Rogers 1987; Dewaele & Véronique 2001). Rogers (1987), for instance, presented evidence showing that grammatical gender in L2 German is a persistent problem even for advanced learners. What are the possible sources of L2 learners’ difficulties with gender? Do the difficulties stem from the possibility that gender processing by L2 learners – as a number of other areas in L2 – is different from gender processing by native speakers? For example, ERP research on L2 sentence comprehension has shown that native speakers and L2 learners process the semantic aspects of sentences alike but processing differences between the two groups emerge when it comes to the syntactic component of sentences (e.g., Weber-Fox & Neville 1996; Hahne 2001). Is L2 gender processing similar to, or different from, L1 gender processing? Or do L1 gender values interfere when processing gender in L2? It is now well-established that when bilinguals read, listen to or name words in their L2, depending on the task, information from translationequivalent, semantically related, or orthographically and phonologically related words in their L1 also become active (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1998; Hermans et al. 1998; van Heuven et al. 1998; Colomé 2001; Jared &


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Kroll 2001; Jared & Szucs 2002). If this nonselective activation is not restricted to semantic and word-form information only, but also extends to gender information, then the processing of a word in one language that requires access to its gender should be affected by the gender of its translation-equivalent in the other language. Finally, one natural question that follows from the above concerns regards the nature of the mental representation of gender: Is there a common integrated gender system or are there two distinct gender systems in the bilingual mental lexicon? Most findings on the organization of the bilingual lexicon converge on the view that the conceptual/semantic level is language-shared whereas the word-form level is languagespecific (e.g., Gerard & Scarborough 1989). This is the prevalent approach that the majority of bilingual studies and models have adopted, albeit with some variations, since the mid-eighties (e.g., Paradis 1985; Perecman 1989; Kroll & Stewart 1994; Kroll & de Groot 1997). Up to now, however, all discussion about the organization of the bilingual lexicon has revolved, with few exceptions, around the particulars of the representation of a word at the conceptual/semantic and form levels, leaving relatively untouched the issue of the representation of lexical-syntactic information, such as grammatical gender, which makes up a word’s “grammatical meaning.” Is gender information commonly represented for L1 and L2 as a word’s semantic information, or is it represented separately? In spite of the significance of gender for speech well-formedness and the apparent difficulties it poses for L2 learning and processing, only fairly recently has psycholinguistic research begun to explore the workings of gender processing in L2 and the nature of gender representations in the bilingual lexicon1 . The aim of this paper is to review recent research on the above issues and to present new empirical evidence that clarifies the nature of the mental representation of grammatical gender in bilinguals/advanced L2 learners. I assume a broad definition of bilingualism. Bilinguals are defined as all individuals who regularly use two languages at any level of proficiency. Therefore, the terms bilinguals and second language (L2) learners will be used interchangeably in this paper, following established practice in the bilingual literature.


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2. H O W D I F F E R E N T I S L 2 G E N D E R PROCESSING FROM L1 GENDER PROCESSING?

2.1. Behavioral Evidence A number of behavioral studies that have investigated on-line gender processing in L2 have focused on comparing L2 learners’ and native speakers’ performance in a variety of linguistic contexts and tasks. Apart from the finding that L2 learners’ performance falls short of that of the native speakers, a number of other issues have been raised. Holmes and Dejean de la Bâtie (1999) contrasted L2 learners and native speakers of French with respect to their gender assignment skills and their degree of reliance on gender-form regularities. They used a gender monitoring2 and a grammaticality judgment task3 in the visual modality with nouns whose ending was regular or exceptional for their gender, and invented nouns consisting of a nonword stem and a realword ending. They found that both groups were faster and more accurate in their responses to real nouns with regular rather than exceptional endings. However, where L2 learners were faster and equally accurate when responding to nonwords than nouns with regular endings, the native speakers were slower and much less accurate with nonwords than regular ending nouns. These findings indicate that L2 learners rely more heavily on gender-form regularities and less on the lexical entry of the noun itself to retrieve gender information. Taraban and Kempe (1999) conducted a self-paced reading task with L2 learners and native speakers of Russian to evaluate gender assignment across phrases (in this case, between the subject NP and the VP). The critical stimuli were sentences whose subject NP comprised either gender-unambiguous or ambiguous nouns that were preceded either by a gender-marked adjective or no adjective at all; the final reading window in each sentence contained two different (gender-inflected) versions of the main verb and participants had to choose the one that matched the gender of the subject NP. Although both the L2 learners’ and the native speakers’ reading and choice latencies on the main verb benefited from the presence of a gender-marked adjective in the subject NP, only the L2 learners’ performance was slower and less accurate in the presence of a gender-ambiguous subject noun. Again, this pattern of results indicates



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the higher reliance of L2 learners, in comparison to native speakers, on unambiguous, gender-marked forms to facilitate processing. Bordag et al. (2006) showed that gender retrieval involves different processes in L1 and L2. In a picture naming and grammaticality judgment task, they found no differences in the processing of nouns with a gender-typical, ambiguous and atypical ending in L1 German (Adj + N) NPs. In contrast, the processing of gender-atypical NPs by English learners of German was slower and more error prone than the processing of gender-ambiguous NPs which in turn was slower than the processing of gender-typical NPs4 . Finally, Guillelmon and Grosjean (2001), using a word repetition task in which the auditory target noun followed a gender-congruent, incongruent or neutral determiner + adjective sequence, found that both the monolingual French speakers and early English-French bilinguals demonstrated strong facilitatory and inhibitory effects. In contrast, late English-French bilinguals were insensitive to either gender-congruent or incongruent information in the preceding auditory context during word recognition and repetition. (see Scherag et al. (2004) for similar results in L2 German with an auditory lexical decision task [LDT]). Without ignoring the differences in terms of materials, languages and tasks among the previously discussed studies, their findings suggest that, unlike native speakers, late L2 learners5 process gender features – and more specifically, gender-form regularities – only when they have to explicitly compute gender agreement (e.g., Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999; Taraban & Kempe 1999), but not when speech processing requires no gender information, such as repetition of single words (e.g., Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001; Scherag et al. 2004). This means that a syntactic (gender) congruency check among the words of a phrase, which occurs at the post-lexical stage of word recognition, may not be obligatory for late L2 learners in contexts where no such checking is absolutely necessary. In contrast, it appears to be obligatory for native speakers. Nonetheless, when learners do process gender in L2, gendermarking on the noun ending itself appears to be a very reliable cue (Bordag et al. 2006). Finally, age of acquisition appears to be an important factor since only early bilinguals exhibit native-like performance (Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001).


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2.2. Electrophysiological Evidence Only a few studies to date have employed an ERP methodology to examine processing of grammatical gender in L2. Using a grammaticality judgment task, Sabourin (2003; see also Sabourin 2001) investigated the on-line processing of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences in Dutch by German, Romance language, and English speaking learners. The ungrammaticality of sentences consisted in violations of gender agreement within definite or indefinite NPs, or between an antecedent definite or indefinite NP and a relative pronoun. Sabourin mainly based her conclusions on the ERP data from the German group only, because only the German group’s accuracy scores were significant in the on-line grammaticality judgment tasks. The German group showed a P600 effect in all gender-mismatching conditions, just like the native Dutch speakers. However, the P600 pattern exhibited by Germans was different from that of the native speakers in terms of timing and distribution. For example, the German P600 effect had a very early onset and was present over more frontal electrodes (for gender violations in definite and indefinite NPs), or had a more restricted distribution and was more delayed (for gender violations between an antecedent NP and a relative pronoun). Thus, Sabourin argued that the ability to reach native-like performance while processing grammatical gender in L2 is limited. Only the learner group whose L1 gender system was very similar to that of the L2 approached a native-like pattern of gender processing (German group), but this pattern was quantitatively different from that of the native speakers. Given that only the German group performed significantly in the on-line judgment of gender agreement and only the German group showed similar processing to that of the native speakers, Sabourin also concluded that transfer plays a decisive role in the on-line processing of grammatical gender in L2. More specifically, the mere existence of the category “grammatical gender” in the L1 was not enough to lead to native-like processing of this feature in L2 (as was the case for the Romance group). Instead this ability was found to be dependent on the presence of the same or very similar surface gender features between L1 and L2 (as is the case between Dutch and German).



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3. T H E R O L E O F T H E L 1 G E N D E R S Y S T E M IN THE PROCESSING OF L2 GENDER

The role of the L1 gender system has been investigated during gender processing in L2 production, listening and visual word recognition, and during gender assignment in L2. The main question was whether the gender information of one language influences the processing or assignment of gender in the other language. In all studies reported in this section, apart from Paris and Weber (2005), the critical manipulation concerned the relation between the gender of the target responses and their translation in the other language. One segment of the target stimuli shared gender with their translation equivalent nouns, while the rest had a different gender from their translation. Costa et al. (2003) tested four groups of highly proficient bilinguals. In three experiments, Croatian-Italian bilinguals named pictures by means of gender-marked definite determiner + noun or definite determiner + adjective + noun in their L2 (Italian). Naming latencies were not affected by whether the Croatian translation of the Italian target responses had the same or different gender. The same result held under conditions of speeded naming or mixed language naming (target pictures were named in L2 and filler pictures in L1). In two further similar tasks with target responses in the form of gender-marked definite determiner + noun, Spanish-Catalan bilinguals named pictures in their L1 (Spanish), and Catalan-Spanish, while Italian-French bilinguals named pictures in their L2 (Spanish and French respectively). The findings were the same as those of the first groups of bilinguals: the production of L2 gender-marked phrases was not influenced by the gender values of their L1 translations and, likewise, the production of L1 phrases was not influenced by the gender values of their L2 translations. Costa et al. (2003) claimed that, although their results do not distinguish between a language-shared or language-separate gender system in the bilingual lexicon, they suggest the autonomy of the L1 and L2 gender systems in highly proficient bilinguals, regardless of the symmetry between the two systems in terms of gender values and gender agreement targets. Croatian, for example, has three gender values (masculine, feminine, neuter) as opposed to Italian, which has only two (masculine,


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feminine); all other language pairs used in the study have an equal number and type of gender values (masculine, feminine). Additionally, in all Romance languages definite determiners are gender agreement targets in a determiner + noun NP, whereas Croatian has no determiners and thus the corresponding NP does not require computation of gender agreement. These findings, however, cannot be considered conclusive with respect to the role of the L1 gender system during L2 production for the following reasons. First, all participants in the Costa et al. (2003) study were highly proficient, almost balanced bilinguals. This proficiency is evidenced by their L2 error rates, which were not significantly different from those of the native speaker groups tested on the same material6 . This low error rate is surprising for L2 production that involves retrieval of grammatical gender since the difficulty of L2 learners, even advanced L2 learners, with gender assignment and gender agreement in L2 is well attested (Rogers 1984; Dewaele & Véronique 2001; Sabourin 2001, 2003). It may be the case therefore that the autonomy of gender systems observed in this study is restricted to highly proficient, balanced bilinguals, whereas the influence of the L1 gender values is more pronounced in less fluent, L1-dominant bilinguals. Second, the failure to observe any effect from L1 may also be due to the type of processes involved in determiner retrieval in the target languages used in the study (Italian, Spanish, and French). In the L1 literature a gender-congruency effect has been reported in Dutch and German with a picture-word interference task, that is, picture naming with a gender-marked (Det + N) NP was faster in the presence of a distractor word of the same gender (gender-congruent) than a distractor of a different gender (gender-incongruent) (Schriefers 1993; van Berkum 1997; La Heij et al. 1998; Schriefers & Teruel 2000). This effect was not obtained in Romance languages – Italian, Spanish, Catalan and French (Costa et al. 1999; Miozzo & Caramazza 1999; Alario & Caramazza 2002). A plausible explanation of this difference was provided by Miozzo and Caramazza (1999) in terms of early and late selection languages. In Dutch and German the gender value of the head noun is sufficient to fully determine the form of the appropriate definite determiner. Thus, determiner selection in these languages takes



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place early during NP production and can be subject to priming from the gender value activated by a distractor word. By contrast, in Italian, Spanish, Catalan and French, the gender value of the head noun does not suffice to choose the appropriate definite determiner from the existing set of allomorphs. Phonological information about the onset of the word following the determiner is also needed. Determiner selection in these languages, therefore, occurs at a later stage during NP production than in Dutch and German, namely, at the stage of phonological phrase assembly. Miozzo and Caramazza (1999) argued that a gendercongruency effect at the level of gender selection may also be present in a language like Italian but it is rendered invisible because any competition that may have arisen at the stage of gender selection (due to the activation of a different gender feature by the distractor) will have been resolved by the stage of determiner selection. Thus, determiner selection in these languages takes place too late to be influenced by priming from a distractor word. Although there were no distractor words in the Costa et al. (2003) study, there is a clear analogy between the two types of naming tasks. The role of “distractor words” in the simple naming tasks performed by bilinguals is assumed by the target noun’s translation in the non-response language. These distractors are “internally set” by the structure of the bilingual mental lexicon, following the widely accepted assumption that a concept (in the form of a picture in this case) simultaneously activates its lexical representations in both lexicons. In the same way, therefore, that a gender-congruency effect is rendered invisible in L1, any activation of the gender of the L1 translation will have dissipated by the time determiners are selected in L2 NP production; therefore, any influence of the L1 gender on naming latencies in L2 will not be possible to detect. Finally, the manifestation of an L1 gender effect might be further hindered by the specific characteristics of the gender assignment systems of the target languages. Italian, Spanish and, to a much lesser degree, French (Tucker et al. 1977; Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999) have relatively transparent formal (phonological/morphological) principles of gender assignment, that is, classification of nouns into gender classes. Languages with such transparent gender attribution systems


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might encourage superficial processing of L2 gender on the part of L2 learners: instead of retrieving a noun’s gender from the mental lexicon, L2 learners might compute the gender and the corresponding determiner by analogy to the noun’s ending, a much easier way to remember and recover the apparently arbitrary information (Carroll 1989; Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999). Since the majority of nouns used in the Costa et al. (2003) study abide by the above typical rules of gender assignment, the last possibility cannot be excluded and could explain the absence of an effect. Bordag (2003) had German low intermediate to low advanced learners of Czech name pictures in their L2 using either a single noun or a gender-marked adjective + noun. For both types of phrases, response latencies were slower and less accurate when the gender of the L2 noun did not match the gender of its L1 translation equivalent. Bordag interpreted this effect as evidence of interference of L1 grammatical gender during L2 NP production. This conclusion, however, is undermined by the fact that the gender interference effect was obtained not only during the production of gender-marked NPs but also during the production of NPs that do not require computation of gender agreement, that is, single nouns. Even more revealingly, the duration of the effect generated by both types of phrases was similar (single nouns: 74 ms, adjective + noun: 61 ms). There is strong evidence, however, from the L1 literature that the production of bare nouns does not induce any gender effect, suggesting that the processing of phrases that do not require computation of gender agreement cannot benefit or be inhibited by gender activation (La Heij et al. 1998). The presence of an almost equal duration effect in both types of responses implies that apart from L1 gender, other factors, such as the mixed presentation of single noun and adjective + noun trials, may have contributed to the different latencies between the L1–L2 gender-congruent and -incongruent nouns. Lemhöfer et al. (submitted) avoided the above dilemma by administering the naming of the baseline (single noun) and gender-marked (definite determiner + noun) conditions in blocks. They, too, found that German learners of Dutch were slower and less accurate when producing L2 gender-marked NPs comprising L1 gender-incongruent



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nouns than NPs comprising L1 gender-congruent nouns, relative to a gender-unmarked baseline. This effect was obtained with phrases containing both cognate and noncognate nouns. Lemhöfer et al. also used the same material in a visual LDT to examine activation of L1 gender information during L2 visual word recognition. They obtained the same pattern of results as in L2 picture naming but only with NPs containing cognates. L2 listening also seems to be affected by L1 gender information. In a series of as yet unpublished eye-tracking experiments, Paris and Weber (2005; see also Paris & Weber 2004) had proficient L2 learners listening to L2 auditory NPs consisting of a gender-marked definite determiner and a noun while looking at four object pictures. They found that learners did not use L2 gender information to reduce activation of gender-mismatching word competitors during spoken-word recognition in L2. Instead, they seemed to activate the gender of the L1 translation of the phonological competitors and use this L1 gender information to inappropriately restrict competitor activation during L2 listening. This tendency held for both cognate and noncognate competitors. Finally, the congruency of the L1 gender system with that of the L2 seems to affect gender assignment in L2 even off-line (Sabourin et al. 2006). In a paper-and-pencil gender assignment task, the accuracy scores for German learners of Dutch were significantly higher for Dutch nouns that had the same gender as their German translation than for nouns that had a different gender. This tendency was particularly pronounced for middle-frequency rather than high-frequency items. However, as this L1 gender influence was off-line, it may well reflect an (explicit) learning strategy rather than implicit processing. To summarize, research so far suggests that L1 gender information is active and affects processing of gender-marked phrases during L2 production, comprehension and listening; it also appears to be active and influence gender assignment in off-line tasks (Sabourin et al. 2006). Furthermore, this activation of L1 gender appears to be modulated by L2 proficiency level – it is not obtained with balanced bilinguals (Costa et al. 2003) – as well as by word type and mode of language processing – it is present only for cognate nouns in visual word recognition (Lemhöfer et al. submitted).


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4. T H E R E P R E S E N TAT I O N O F G R A M M AT I C A L GENDER IN THE BILINGUAL LEXICON

Recently, one study focused on the organization of the bilingual lexicon in relation to grammatical gender. Salamoura and Williams (in press) investigated whether gender representations are shared or independent in the lexicon of advanced L2 learners. In a translation task from Greek (L1) to German (L2), nouns with the same gender in both languages were translated faster than nouns with different genders when the L2 target utterance required computation of gender (adjective + noun). The study also looked at the role of word-form similarities by using noncognate and cognate nouns. The results of RTs did not differ for cognates and noncognates. Unlike noncognates, however, gender-incongruent cognates yielded more errors than gender-congruent cognates. These findings were interpreted as evidence for a shared L1–L2 gender system with cognates relying more heavily on the L1 gender value than noncognates. 5. T H E P R E S E N T S T U D Y

While the previous studies investigated the role of the L1 gender information during the processing of L2 gender in comprehension and production (for L1-dominant bilinguals) and asked whether L1 and L2 have one shared or two independent gender systems, they did so by looking only at cases of translation-equivalent L1 and L2 nouns. If, however, there is an integrated L1 and L2 gender system – at least for L1-dominant bilinguals – as previous studies seem to suggest, this system will not be restricted to translation-equivalent words but encompass all L1 and L2 nouns. The present study will test for cross-language gender effects between non translation-equivalent L1 and L2 nouns during comprehension and production, that is, the activation and access of gender representations during grammaticality judgment (Experiment 1) and picture naming tasks (Experiment 2). If L1 and L2 have an integrated gender system, accessing the gender of a noun in one language will subsequently affect accessing the gender of a different noun with the same gender value in the



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other language – even if the two nouns are not translation-equivalents or semantically related. It will also investigate whether the common L1–L2 gender representations are shared between comprehension and production by testing for an effect of visual primes on picture naming (Experiment 2). Two different hypotheses were put to the test. The language-shared gender hypothesis states that gender specifications, and therefore inherent syntactic properties of words, are shared both within and across languages among all L1 and L2 nouns and predicts a gender-congruency effect both within and between languages for L1 and L2 nouns that are neither translation-equivalent nor semantically related. That is, processing of a target NP will be faster after processing a prime NP of the same gender relative to a prime NP of a different gender. Across languages this effect will be due to the activation of the same gender representation (e.g., masculine) in the between language (BLg) gender-congruent (CON) condition (see Figure 1a), as opposed to the activation of two different gender representations (e.g., feminine and masculine) in the BLg gender-incongruent (INC) condition (see Figure 1b). In the BLg CON condition the target gender representation (e.g., masculine in Figure 1a) receives simultaneous activation from two lemmas (the L2 target lemma and the L1 gender-congruent prime), whereas in the BLg INC condition the target gender receives activation from only one lemma (the L2 target lemma in Figure 1b). The higher level of activation of the target gender representation in the CON compared to the INC condition will result in faster response latencies for the CON condition. The language-independent gender hypothesis claims that gender specifications are language-specific and predicts a gender-congruency effect only within but not between languages. No BLg gendercongruency effect is predicted as neither the gender-congruent nor the gender-incongruent L1 prime will activate the target gender representation (see Figures 2a & 2b). These two hypotheses were investigated for Greek (L1) advanced learners of German (L2) who are L1-dominant. Although the main focus of this study is the bilingual lexicon, both Experiment 1 and 2 also incorporate an L1-only part to test the within-language predictions of the two hypotheses.


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Gen

′ “century”

der

o

Finger “finger”

der

Greek (L1)

Lemma level

Masc

er

Gend

German (L2)

Figure 1a. Model of language-shared representations of gender information associated with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999): An example of gender-congruent L1 & L2 nouns.

′ “edition”

Gen

Fem

r

Gende

der

Finger “finger”

der

Greek (L1)

Lemma level

Masc

German (L2)

Figure 1b. Model of language-shared representations of gender information associated with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999): An example of gender-incongruent L1 & L2 nouns.

′ “century”

Masc

Greek (L1)

Masc

Gen

der

o

der

Finger “finger”

Lemma level

r

de Gen

German (L2)

Figure 2a. Model of language-independent representations of gender information associated with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999): An example of gender-congruent L1 & L2 nouns.



′ “edition”

Fem

Greek (L1)

Masc

Gen

der

der

Finger “finger”

Lemma level

er

d Gen

113

German (L2)

Figure 2b. Model of language-independent representations of gender information associated with nouns at the lemma level in the bilingual lexicon (based on Levelt et al. 1999): An example of gender-incongruent L1 & L2 nouns.

6. P R O F I L E O F T H E B I L I N G U A L S I N T H I S S T U D Y

Twenty-six native Greek-speaking advanced learners of German took part in Experiment 1 and another 26 in Experiment 2, none of whom had participated in Experiment 1. Participants were either students or graduates of the department of German Studies of the University of Athens. All had an advanced level language certificate in German (e.g., Kleines Deutsches Sprachdiplom from the Goethe Institute or Abitur). [In the remainder of this section, numbers before the slash refer to Experiment 1 and numbers after the slash to Experiment 2.] On average they started learning German at the age of 10 (SD 5.1)/11 (SD 4.6) and had received 10 years (SD 3/SD 2.9) of formal instruction; they had lived in a German-speaking country an average of 3.5/1.15 years (SD = 3.98/SD = 4.24); 14/16 reported learning German through formal instruction and 12/10 through a combination of classroom instruction and exposure to a German-speaking environment. All but one spoke at least one other foreign language apart from German (M = 1.46/M = 1.5) but none were balanced bilingual in any of them. The participants scored a mean of 3.18(SD 0.42)/3.07 (SD 0.43) on a self-assessment 4-point scale designed to measure L2 communicative competence (Bachman & Palmer’s (1989) Method 2, Self-rating) and a mean of 7.56 (SD 1.47)/7.12(SD 1.36) when asked to rate their comprehension in L2 on a 10-point scale (1 = very low . . . 10 = same as in my native language).


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7. E X P E R I M E N T 1 : G R A M M AT I C A L I T Y J U D G M E N T S

Experiment 1 focuses on the representation of grammatical gender during language comprehension within and across languages. In particular, it investigates whether gender features are shared within a language (L1) and whether equivalent L1 and L2 gender features are also shared in the bilingual lexicon between (non translation-equivalent or semantically unrelated) L1 and L2 nouns during language comprehension. To that end, an on-line grammaticality judgment task with definite determiner + noun NPs was employed. Participants were presented with a continuous stream of NPs. Prime NPs were the trials immediately preceding target NPs and for both types of phrases participants had to perform a grammaticality judgment; that is, they had to decide whether each NP was grammatical or ungrammatical. The ungrammaticality in this case comprised a gender agreement violation between determiner and noun. Unlike the grammaticality judgment tasks used in previous studies (e.g., Bates et al. 1996; Akhutina et al. 2001), this task did not compare responses between grammatical and ungrammatical phrases; instead, it focused exclusively on the grammatical phrases and checked for a gender-congruency effect, that is, whether judgment on an NP accelerates following judgment on a gender-congruent relative to a gender-incongruent NP. Since previous research has shown that L2 learners process gender information only when the local syntactic environment necessitates it (Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999; Taraban & Kempe 1999; Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001), a task involving explicit computation of gender agreement, such as grammaticality judgments on gender-marked NPs, was considered the most appropriate means to test the representation of gender features in the bilingual lexicon. The L1–L2 pair was Greek-German. Findings that only learners whose L1 gender system resembled closely that of the L2 approached native-like gender processing in L2 (Sabourin 2001, 2003) render GreekGerman an optimal language pair for observing possible cross-linguistic gender effects. This is because both have a tri-partite gender system (masculine, feminine and neuter) and require gender agreement between determiner and noun (the type of NP to be tested in this and the following experiment).



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The task was divided into two blocks. In the within language block, primes and targets were in L1 (Greek). In the between languages block, primes were in L1 (Greek) and targets in L2 (German). In both Greek and German the definite determiner and the noun of an NP must agree in terms of grammatical gender, number and case. Number and case were kept constant throughout the task (singular nominative). More importantly, a key manipulation in the material was that none of the nouns in the German NPs had the same gender as its Greek translation (e.g., Wort (“word”) is neuter while its Greek translation λ´εξη is feminine). This procedure ensured that any effect obtained in the BLg block would not be due to priming of the gender of the Greek translation of the target NP. All L1 (Greek) primes and target NPs consisted of gender-opaque nouns. Greek, unlike German, morphologically marks grammatical gender on the noun ending. More specifically, nouns can be divided into two categories. The first are nouns that have identical inflectional suffixes across all three genders in the nominative singular (-oς is attached to masculine, feminine, and neuter word forms). I will term these genderopaque nouns since grammatical gender cannot be recovered from the word ending alone7 (see Bates et al. 1996 for a similar classification of nouns in Italian). The second are nouns that have different inflectional suffixes according to gender in the nominative singular. I will refer to these as gender-transparent nouns. This choice of gender-opaque NPs for Greek was made to deflect claims that gender judgment with gender-transparent NPs can be a very superficial process, a mere check between the definite determiner and the noun ending without any access and retrieval of the gender feature of the noun. For this reason, gender-opaque NPs, which require access to the mental lexicon to retrieve gender information, were thought to be more appropriate to use in a grammaticality judgment task in which processing of gender is fairly explicit. Had the L2 NPs been gendertransparent, it would have been possible for L2 learners to retreat to a conscious strategy on L2 gender decision (“infer the grammatical gender from the gender-transparent noun ending”). If equivalent gender representations are shared among L1 and L2 nouns of the same gender, a cross-language gender-congruency effect is expected. That is, activation of a gender representation via a NP in


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one language will not dissipate immediately and will speed subsequent processing of a NP in the other language that requires access to the same gender as opposed to a different gender. If gender representations are not shared between L1 and L2, then a gender-congruency effect is expected within L1. Finally, to investigate whether any priming effect obtained in this paradigm derives from the repetition of the definite determiner form between primes and targets, ungrammatical NPs were arranged into pairs of “primes” and “targets,” and were controlled for determiner congruency (whether the determiner was repeated or not between “primes” and “targets”) and gender transparency of the noun ending. If repetition of the definite determiner form is a determinant of priming in this task, then priming should be obtained both with grammatical and ungrammatical NPs. 7.1. Method The critical materials were grammatical NPs comprising a definite determiner and a noun. There was a within language (WLg) block which contained 16 gender-opaque Greek (L1) target NPs (6 masculine, 5 feminine and 5 neuter) and a between language (BLg) block which contained 16 German (L2) NPs (6 masculine, 5 feminine and 5 neuter). Both blocks used the same primes: 32 grammatical genderopaque Greek (L1) NPs. The German NPs did not involve correlations between phonological form and grammatical gender (Köpcke & Zubin 1984) as far as possible. The same also holds for the German material used in the ungrammatical NPs.8 None of the nouns in the German NPs had the same gender as its Greek translation to ensure that any effect obtained in the BLg block would not be due to translation priming. In the Gender-Congruent (CON) condition, each target NP was preceded by a prime NP with the same gender, and therefore the same definite determiner, in the WLg block or its translation equivalent determiner in the BLg block. In the Gender-Incongruent (INC) condition, each target NP was preceded by a prime NP with a different gender and hence a different definite determiner in the WLg block or a nontranslation equivalent determiner in the BLg block. Target NPs in the WLg and BLg blocks were paired based on frequency, syllable and letter length. In each block within each prime condition every prime NP 7.1.1. Material



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Table 1. Example set of grammatical prime and target material of Experiment 1

occurred only once. An example set of grammatical target and prime materials can be viewed in Table 1, while the Appendix provides the full list of grammatical prime and target NPs of Experiment 1. L1 and L2 target NPs were matched in terms of frequency of occurrence, syllable and letter length as far as possible (one-way ANOVAs: Frequency: F(1, 30) = .01, p > .9; Syllables: F(1, 30) = 19.23, p < .001; Letters: F(1, 30) = 10.28, p < .01). Likewise, prime NPs were matched for syllable and letter length as far as possible across the CON and INC experimental conditions (2 × 2 ANOVAs: Syllables: all Fs(1, 60) < 2.23, p > .14; Letters: all Fs(1, 60) < .03, p > .86). Table 2 presents the mean frequency and average length in syllables and letters of the critical grammatical items for Experiment 1. In addition, equal numbers of ungrammatical NPs were constructed by combining nouns with a gender-incongruent definite determiner (e.g., derMASC FeuerNEUT “the fire”). None, however, of the nouns from the grammatical NPs were used in the ungrammatical phrases. In all ungrammatical NPs, the nouns were combined equally often with their two incongruent definite determiners. The experimental design of these ungrammatical NPs was the same as that of the grammatical NPs since both were subjected to the same statistical analyses. That is, ungrammatical NPs were also presented in pairs of “targets” and “primes” in a WLg and a BLg block. In the CON condition, each “target” NP was preceded by an ungrammatical “prime” NP containing the same definite determiner in the


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ANGELIKI SALAMOURA Table 2. Frequency and average length in syllables and letters of the critical grammatical material of Experiment 1 Target nouns

Frequency∗ Syllables Letters

L1

L2

67.93 2.06 5.43

70.56 1.43 4.5

Prime nouns CON WLg 2.38 6.19

INC BLg 2.63 6.25

WLg 2.69 6.19

BLg 2.44 6.13

CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent, WLg = Within-Language, BLg = Between-Languages. ∗ Number of occurrences per million, using the word form frequency estimate of the HNC (1999)

for the Greek stimuli and the German version of the CELEX Lexical Database (1998) for the German stimuli.

WLg block or its translation equivalent determiner in the BLg block. In the INC condition, each “target” NP was preceded by a “prime” NP containing a different definite determiner in the WLg block or a non-translation equivalent determiner in the BLg block. The definite determiner in the ungrammatical L2 NPs matched neither the L2 noun nor its Greek translation (e.g., derMASC FeuerNEUT = ϕωτια´ FEM “fire”) apart from two exceptions dieFEM HerzNEUT = καρδια´ FEM ´ “heart”; dasNEUT BriefMASC = γραµµα NEUT “letter”). An example set of ungrammatical “target” and “prime” material can be viewed in Table 3, while the full list of ungrammatical material is provided in the Appendix. The nouns of the L1 and L2 “target” NPs were matched in terms of frequency of occurrence and average length in syllables and letters as far as possible (one-way ANOVAs: Frequency: F(1, 30) = .01, p > .9; Syllables: F(1, 30) = 40.0, p < .001; Letters : F(1, 30) = 5.0, p < .01). Similarly, the nouns of the “prime” NPs were tallied for length in syllables and letters as closely as possible across the CON and INC conditions (2 × 2 ANOVAs: Syllables: all Fs(1, 60) < 1.23, p > .27; Letters: all Fs(1, 60) < .28, p > .59) (see Table 4). At the beginning of each block an additional 12 NPs (6 grammatical and 6 ungrammatical) served as practice material. In the BLg block half of the practice NPs were in Greek and half in German.



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Table 3. Example set of ungrammatical “prime” and “target” material of Experiment 1

Table 4. Frequency and average length in syllables and letters of the critical ungrammatical material of Experiment 1 Target nouns Frequency∗ Syllables Letters

L1

L2

70.31 2.25 5.43

68.13 1.25 4.62

Prime nouns CON WLg 2.87 6.75

INC BLg 2.81 6.87

WLg 2.62 6.68

BLg 2.68 6.56

CON = Determiner-Congruent, INC = Determiner-Incongruent, WLg = Within-Language, BLg = Between-Languages. ∗ Number of occurrences per million, using the word form frequency estimate of the HNC (1999)

for the Greek stimuli and the German version of the CELEX Lexical Database (1998) for the German stimuli.

7.1.2. Design The experimental design was comprised of two factors, with two levels each: language of target – prime pairs (within language [WLg] vs. between languages [BLg]) and gender congruency of target – prime pairs (Congruent [CON] vs. Incongruent [INC]). Both experimental factors were within participants. Language was between items and gender congruency was within items. Two experimental lists were created. Each list consisted of a total of 32 (16 L1 and 16 L2) grammatical target items and 32 (16 L1 and


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16 L2) ungrammatical “target” items. There were two prime versions (CON and INC) for each of the 32 grammatical and 32 ungrammatical items and each list contained only one version. For each list, two further sub-lists were created in which the order of the Language blocks was rotated as follows: Sub-List 1: WLg block, BLg block; Sub-List 2: BLg block, WLg block. This resulted in four experimental lists in total. Each participant was tested on one of the four lists and both versions of the 32 grammatical and 32 ungrammatical items were tested every two participants. The order of grammatical and ungrammatical trials within each list was individually randomized so that: (a) no more than three successive pairs of prime-target trials belonged to the same prime condition; (b) each pair of grammatical prime and target NP and each pair of ungrammatical “prime” and “target” NP occurred only once; (c) targets did not have the same gender on more than three successive pairs of trials. In total each list contained 152 trials (32 grammatical target NPs, 32 grammatical prime NPs, 32 ungrammatical “target” NPs, 32 ungrammatical “prime” NPs and 24 practice NPs). Participants were seated in front of a 14-inch PC monitor at a viewing distance of approximately 80 cm. The instructions were presented on screen (in L1 in the WLg block and in L2 in the BLg block). Participants had to press the GREEN button on a response box if they thought a phrase was grammatically correct or the RED button if they thought it was grammatically incorrect. (The dominant hand was always used for the “grammatical” response.) Their response had to be as fast and as accurate as possible. Each experimental trial started with the presentation of a fixation point (*) for 300 ms, followed by a NP which stayed on screen until the participant’s response. The ITI was 1,000 ms. All stimuli were presented in lowercase black letters against a white background in their singular, nominative form. Response latencies were measured to the nearest millisecond from the onset of each NP stimulus using SuperLab. At the end of the task participants were presented with a post-test list containing all L2 nouns that had been used in the BLg block and were 7.1.3. Procedure



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asked to write down the correct L2 definite determiner for each noun. This post-test questionnaire was used to determine which items had to be removed from the data analysis, as explained in the results section below. Each experimental session lasted approximately 30 min. 7.2. Results Target response latencies that fell into any of the following categories were excluded from the data analyses: (i) latencies from trials on which the wrong button was pressed, (ii) latencies from target trials that were “misprimed,” that is, preceded by a prime trial on which the wrong button was pressed, (iii) latencies longer than a preset time of 2.5 s, (iv) latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations (SD) from a participant’s or an item’s mean (outliers), (v) latencies from L2 target trials on which the correct button was pressed but the participant failed to produce the correct definite determiner for the same L2 noun in a post-test “gender check-up” questionnaire. The same but separate analyses were performed for grammatical and ungrammatical items. Of all data points in the grammatical trials, 7.3% were identified as erroneous (1.56% in the WLg and 5.77% in the BLg block) and 1.6% as long responses (0.4% in the WLg and 1.2% in the BLg block) and were excluded from further analysis. Table 5 displays the mean response latency and the percentage of errors and long responses for each prime condition in the grammatical trials. Byparticipant and by-item analyses of variance were performed on mean response latency and arcsine-transformed percentage of lost data for all conditions. For the response latencies, a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language (F1 (1, 25) = 38.96, MSe = 42870.8, p < .001; F2 (1, 30) = 54.71, MSe = 17112.7, p < .001) and a significant main effect of Gender Congruency (F1 (1, 25) = 16.7, MSe = 6588.1, p < .001; F2 (1, 30) = 16.91, MSe = 4219.1, p < .001). Their interaction did not reach significance 7.2.1. Grammatical items


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(both Fs < .392). The mean RTs in Table 5 show that participants were faster at judging a target NP grammatical following a prime NP with the same gender than one with a different gender, and they were also faster at doing so in their L1 than L2 target responses. ANOVAs were also run on the lost data. The significant results of these analyses are reported below. A 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language in the Total Lost (= Errors + Long Responses) data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 9.83, MSe = .095, p < .01; F2 (1, 30) = 12.94, MSe = .045, p = .001) and the Total Error data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 4.33, MSe = .065, p < .05; F2 (1, 30) = 5.32, MSe = .034, p < .05), indicating that both the overall lost and error data were more numerous in L2 than L1. Most importantly, the gender-congruency effect was non-significant in all lost data analyses, suggesting that the gender manipulation of primes did not significantly affect the number of errors produced during grammaticality judgment in L1 or L2. Similarly, the off-line errors in the post-test “gender check-up” questionnaire (i.e., cases where participants failed to produce the correct definite determiner for the critical L2 nouns) Table 5. Results for the grammatical NPs of Experiment 1 (N = 26)

CON RT SD %Errora %Longb INC RT SD %Errora %Longb Difference

Within LG

Between LG

Difference

804 142 1.4 1

1071 219 11 2.9

267

883 139 4.8 0.5 79

1122 239 12 1.9 51

239

CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent, RT = mean Response Time (in ms), SD = Standard Deviation. a Mean percentage of total error data. b Mean percentage of total long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off

collapsed).



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were not significantly more numerous in the BLg INC (9.1% ) than BLg CON (7.2% ) condition (both Fs < .765). This finding implies that NPs appearing in the INC conditions were not inherently more difficult than those appearing in the CON conditions. After application of the five data exclusion criteria, one L2 item in the BLg block had more than 40% data points missing in one experimental condition and was discarded. To ensure exact comparability between the two blocks, the equivalent L1 item in the WLg block was discarded as well. Of all data points in the remaining items, 13.1% were identified as erroneous (2.7% in the WLg and 10.4% in the BLg block) and 2.1% as long responses (0.7% in the WLg and 1.4% in the BLg block) and were excluded from further analysis. Table 6 displays the mean response latency and the percentage of errors and long responses for each prime condition in the ungrammatical trials. For the response latencies, a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language (F1 (1, 25) = 7.2.2. Ungrammatical items

Table 6. Results for the ungrammatical NPs of Experiment 1 (N = 26)

CON RT SD %Errora %Longb INC RT SD %Errora %Longb Difference

Within LG

Between LG

Difference

1035 159 3.6 1.5

1372 333 17.9 2.1

337

1044 165 7.2 1 9

1345 301 23.6 3.6 −27

301

CON = Determiner-Congruent, INC = Determiner-Incongruent, RT = mean Response Time (in ms), SD = Standard Deviation. a Mean percentage of total error data. b Mean percentage of total long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off

collapsed).


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28.43, MSe = 93162.4, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 59.86, MSe = 19672.8, p < .001). The mean RTs in Table 6 show that participants were faster at judging a target NP ungrammatical in L1 than L2. Neither the main effect of Gender Congruency nor its interaction with Language reached significance (all Fs < .682). The pattern of results in the lost data analyses resembles that of the grammatical items. A 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Language in the Total Lost (= Errors + Long Responses) data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 20.46, MSe = .105, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 37.21, MSe = .034, p < .001) and the Total Error data rates (F1 (1, 25) = 13.98, MSe = .098, p = .001; F2 (1, 28) = 18.55, MSe = .04, p < .001). In both cases the main effect of Gender Congruency approached or reached significance in the participant analysis (Total Lost data: F1 (1, 25) = 4.02, MSe = .034, p = .056; Total Error data: F1 (1, 25) = 6.04, MSe = .027, p < .05) but not in the item analysis (Total Lost data: F2 (1, 28) = 2.45, p > .12; Total Error data: F2 (1, 28) = 21.73, p > .19). Simple contrasts between CON and INC conditions in the participant analysis did not show any significant differences (Total Lost data: all Fs < 2.79, p > .1; Total Error data: all Fs < 3.48, p > .074). The difference between the BLg CON (8.8% ) and BLg INC (12.3%) conditions in terms of “wrong L2 determiner” errors in the post-test “gender check-up” questionnaire approached but did not reach significance (F1 (1, 25) = 3.66, MSe = .02, p = .067; F2 (1, 14) = 3.17, MSe = .016, p = .097). In summary, as for the grammatical items, the total lost and error data were more numerous in L2 than L1 for the ungrammatical items. Additionally, the lack of any statistically significant difference between CON and INC conditions in any of the (on- or off-line) analyses suggests that NPs presented in the INC conditions were not more prone to error than those presented in the CON conditions. 7.3. Discussion The results demonstrate that a gender-congruency effect is obtained within language (L1) and more importantly, between languages (L1-toL2) among L1 and L2 nouns that were neither translation-equivalents



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nor semantically related. Judging the grammaticality of an L1 NP was on average 79 ms faster following gender-congruent L1 prime NPs than gender-incongruent ones. Judging the grammaticality of an L2 NP was 51 ms faster in the gender-congruent than – incongruent conditions. The difference in the size of the effect between the two language conditions did not reach significance. As expected for L1-dominant bilinguals, the processing of L1 NPs (in terms of grammatical gender agreement between determiner and noun) was clearly faster than that of the L2 NPs. The results are in line with the language-shared gender hypothesis, which claims that gender specifications are shared within a language but also between languages (cf. Figures 1a & 1b), at least in the case of equivalent L1 and L2 gender specifications. Moreover, the fact that no equivalence of word form held between L1 prime NPs and L2 target NPs speaks against the localization of the effect at the word-form level. The results support the view that the effect takes place at the level of abstract gender features that are utilized during the computation of gender agreement in language comprehension. More importantly, these gender features appear to be shared within and across languages by gender controllers and agreement targets wherever possible. Due to the nature of the task, we should address the possibility that the effect obtained within and between languages might be the result of either repetition priming of the determiner forms in the WLg CON condition, or translation priming between the determiner forms in the BLg CON condition. However, the fact that no such effect was observed either within or between languages with the ungrammatical NPs which were also preceded by “prime” NPs containing the same determiner (WLg CON), a translation equivalent determiner (BLg CON) or a different determiner (WLg & BLg INC), excludes the aforementioned possibility. The cross-language priming could alternatively be viewed as within-language priming resulting from a translation strategy. For instance, being L1-dominant bilinguals, participants might have silently translated L2 target NPs into L1 and computed gender agreement in L1. This possibility can be excluded, however, because the L2 target NPs had a different gender from their L1 translations in all conditions. Any


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influence, therefore, from L1 translation would have affected all experimental conditions equally and would not have resulted in a significant effect of gender congruency. Finally, one could also claim that the effects reflect the operation of a gender-congruency check rather than activation of gender features, due to the nature of the task employed. The grammaticality judgment task has been argued to tap into post-lexical processes that entail a checking mechanism which evaluates the gender congruency of an utterance’s constituents (e.g., Bates, Pizzamiglio et al. 1996; Bates, Devescovi et al. 1996). Gender information activated by an agreement target (an adjective in this case) remains active until it is checked against the gender information activated by an agreement controller (a noun). It is unlikely that such a checking mechanism would operate differently (and thus cause an effect) when applied to grammatical phrases that differ in terms of gender only (i.e., masculine, feminine or neuter phrases). It is more likely that it functions differently between grammatical (gendercongruent) and ungrammatical (gender-incongruent) phrases so that the latter take longer to be checked than the former. In summary, Experiment 1 demonstrated the existence of a gendercongruency effect both within (L1) and across languages (L1-to-L2) in comprehension. Participants tended to be faster when judging phrases of the same gender than when judging phrases of a different gender. This tendency was independent of word form repetition (either the definite determiner form or nominal inflection), both within and across languages. In addition, across languages this tendency held for semantically unrelated L1 and L2 nouns. These findings strongly suggest that gender features are activated during the comprehension of gender-marked phrases and that nouns of the same gender draw on a common representation of their gender feature in the monolingual and bilingual lexicons. 8. E X P E R I M E N T 2 : P I C T U R E N A M I N G

Experiment 1 showed an L1-to-L2 gender-congruency effect in a grammaticality judgment task, suggesting that the gender features accessed during comprehension are shared between L1 and L2 nouns. Experiment 2 extends this investigation further by testing whether



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equivalent gender properties of semantically unrelated L1 and L2 nouns are shared or remain independent across languages and across comprehension and production. Despite possible processing disparities between comprehension and production, the fact that communication takes place and speakers get their message across to listeners implies that at some level comprehension and production draw on the same linguistic resources. Monsell (1987) argued that while word recognition and production entail separate input and output phonological and orthographic lexicons, they have a common “conceptual/functional” domain where the semantic and syntactic properties of words are represented. Cutting (1997), for instance, showed that word production and recognition share semantic processes but employ different phonological processes. According to the shared semantics-syntax hypothesis, as Bock and Griffin (2000) note, one would expect comprehension and production tasks to yield different results when they do not tap into semantic or syntactic processing but the same results when they require activation of the semantic and syntactic properties of words. If, therefore, comprehension and production draw on the same lexical-syntactic information, then a gender-congruency effect – equivalent to the one obtained in Experiment 1 – is also anticipated in a production task, at least within L1. Thus, Experiment 2 tested for a gender-congruency effect in L1 (Greek) and from L1 to L2 (German) using a picture-word interference task. The picture-word interference task has long been used in L1 to explore activation and representation of gender information. Schriefers (1993), for example, had native Dutch speakers name pictures using a gender-marked NP in Dutch (e.g., het NEUT groene bedNEUT “the green bed”). The pictures were accompanied by visual distractor words which speakers had to ignore. Although distractors were not overtly marked for gender, naming latencies were significantly faster following a distractor of the same gender as the target picture name than following a distractor of a different gender (the gender-congruency effect). These findings show that nouns of the same gender access the same gender representations in L1. The gender-congruency effect has since been replicated and explored further in a number of studies (van Berkum 1997; La Heij et al. 1998) and languages (e.g., German; Schriefers & Teruel 1999, 2000).


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Experiment 2 was a bilingual version of the picture-word interference task with a WLg block (distractors and picture naming in L1) and a BLg block (distractors in L1 and picture naming in L2). If gender features are shared between any L1 and L2 nouns in the bilingual lexicon (the language-shared gender hypothesis), a BLg gender-congruency effect is predicted with non translation-equivalent nouns. If there are two segregated sets of gender features in the bilingual lexicon, one for the L1 and one for the L2 (the language-independent gender hypothesis), no BLg gender-congruency effect is predicted. 8.1. Method The critical material consisted of two types of stimuli: pictures and distractor words. There was a W(ithin)-Lg block in which distractor words and target pictures were presented and named respectively in Greek (L1); and a B(etween)-Lg block in which distractor words were presented in Greek and target pictures were named in German (L2). The former block included 15 target pictures, corresponding to two- or three-syllable Greek nouns, whereas the latter block included 15 target pictures, corresponding to one-, two- or three-syllable German nouns. In each block there were equal numbers of pictures of masculine, feminine, or neuter nouns, that is, five of each gender. None of the picture names were cognates in the two languages. In addition, none of the German picture names had the same gender as its Greek translation (e.g., Fin´ υλo is ger [“finger”] is masculine whereas its Greek translation δαχτ neuter). This procedure ensured that any effect obtained in the BLg block would not be due to priming of the gender of the Greek name of the target pictures. All Greek picture names were gender-transparent (e.g., κoυτ´ι “box”) except three masculine ones that ended in -oς/-óς. In the case of the German picture names, correlations between phonological form and grammatical gender were avoided as far as possible. Both blocks used the same 30 Greek (L1) distractor words: 30 gender-transparent nouns (10 of each gender) consisting of two- or three-syllables. Distractor words and picture names were used in their nominative singular form. ´ The gender-transparent endings of the Greek picture names (masc. -ας, ´ neut. -ι, -´ι) were different from the gender-transparent -ης; fem. -α; 8.1.1. Material



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´ fem. -η; neut. -µα)10 . endings of the distractor nouns (masc. -ας, -ας; Any effect obtained in the WLg block could not therefore be attributed to priming of the surface form of the noun endings. In every block each of the 15 pictures had three different versions, one for each of the three distractor conditions. In the gender-congruent (CON) condition, each picture was combined with a distractor noun that had the same gender as the picture name. In the gender-incongruent (INC) condition, each picture was combined with a distractor noun that had a different gender from the picture name. In the Baseline condition, each picture was combined with a string of 5 X (e.g., XXXXX). An example set of target and distractor material can be viewed in Table 7, and the full list of picture names and distractor words can be found in the Appendix. L1 and L2 picture names of the same gender in the WLg and BLg blocks were paired based on frequency, syllable and letter length (one-way ANOVAs: all Fs(1, 28) < 1.43, p > .24) as were the L1 distractor nouns across the CON and INC experimental conditions (one-way ANOVAs for frequency, number of syllables and letters: all Fs(1, 28) < .75, p > .39). Each one of the L1–L2 picture pairs received the same L1 distractor words in the CON and INC conditions. Table 8 presents the mean frequency, syllable and letter length of critical items for Experiment 2. Pairs of picture names and distractors were never

Table 7. Example set of target and distractor material of Experiment 2


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ANGELIKI SALAMOURA Table 8. Frequency, syllable and letter length of critical material of Experiment 2 Target pictures Frequency∗ Syllable length Letter length

Distractor words

L1

L2

CON

INC

29.46 2.26 5.33

34.46 2.06 5.66

184.5 2.53 5.33

186.1 2.53 5.53

CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent. ∗ Number of occurrences per million, using the word form frequency

estimate of the HNC (1999) for the Greek stimuli and the German version of the CELEX Lexical Database (1998) for the German stimuli.

phonologically, semantically or associatively related. In each block an additional eight pictures, six distractor words and two Baseline letter strings (XXXXX) were selected to serve as practice material. 8.1.2. Design The experimental design was comprised of two factors, each with two levels: Language of the target name – distractor (within language [WLg] vs. between languages [BLg]) and Gender Congruency of target name – distractor (Congruent [CON] vs. Incongruent [INC]). Both experimental factors were within-participants. Language was between-items and gender congruency was within-items. In addition there were two baseline conditions: a within language baseline and a between languages baseline. The baseline conditions constitute a neutral measure of production latencies when no distractor word is present. Two experimental lists were created and the order of the language blocks in each of them was rotated as follows: List 1: WLg block, BLg block; List 2: BLg block, WLg block. Apart from this difference, both lists comprised 90 target pictures: the 15 L1 target pictures in each of the three within language conditions and the 15 L2 target pictures in each of the three between languages conditions. The order of critical trials within each list was individually randomized so that:

(a) no more than three successive trials belonged to the same distractor condition; (b) each combination of target – distractor/prime occurred only once;



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(c) a target item (and its distractor/prime) was never preceded by a semantically, associatively, or phonologically related trial; (d) a target was not repeated within ten consecutive trials; (e) targets did not have the same gender on more than three successive trials. In total each list contained 106 trials (90 target + 16 practice trials). Every participant was tested on one of the two experimental lists which were used equally often during the task. Thus, all participants saw all three versions of the 30 (15 L1 and 15 L2) experimental pictures. The task consisted of two blocks: a within language and a between languages block. In turn, each block included two parts: a presentation/training part and a naming part. In the within language block instructions were given in L1 and stated that pictures should be named in Greek, while in the between languages block instructions were given in L2 and stated that pictures should be named in German. In the presentation part, the instructions stated that participants should name the pictures using an appropriate definite determiner and a noun, then press the shift key and compare their response with the phrase that appears on the picture. If their response differed, they were advised to pay attention to the phrase on the screen as they had to use only that name during the main experiment. This practice was necessary in the between languages block to ensure that participants would be able to access readily the target NP in the main experimental session afterwards. To attain comparability of the results of the two blocks, this practice was introduced in the within language block too. In the naming segment, participants were instructed to name the pictures on screen as quickly and as accurately as possible with a NP consisting of a definite determiner and a noun, or to say “don’t remember”/ “don’t know”. They were reminded to use only the names they had seen in the previous segment, ignoring any other words that might appear on the monitor. They were also asked to avoid starting a NP with the determiner without knowing what they would say next. Each experimental trial started with the presentation of a fixation point (+) for 300 ms followed by the picture and 100 ms later by the distractor word which 8.1.3. Procedure


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was superimposed on the picture. Picture and distractor word stayed on the screen until the participant’s response. The SOA was +100 ms. The choice of the SOA was based on a pilot study that employed SOAs of 0 ms and +100 ms and showed a priming effect only at the latter SOA. The ITI was 2,000 ms. A short practice section consisting of eight trials preceded the main experimental component. The fixation point and the pictures were centered on the screen. The distractor words were either centered on the screen or were presented in slightly different positions around the fixation point to discourage participants from ignoring distractors by fixing on one part of the picture but the position of the distractors remained constant for each individual picture though. All words were presented in lowercase letters and in singular, nominative case form without their definite determiner. The display size of the pictures was 8.78 × 6.16 cm. All stimuli appeared in black on a white background. Each experimental session was audio-recorded. From the recordings, response latencies were measured manually on a speech editor11 to the nearest millisecond from the onset of the target stimulus (picture). This measurement was made possible by using a beep sound, which was played simultaneously with the onset of each target stimulus and was inaudible to participants as it was sent directly from the PC on which the experiment was run to a tape recorder connected with the PC. Each experimental session lasted approximately 45 min. All other aspects of the procedure were identical to those of Experiment 1.

8.2. Results Target response latencies that fell into any of the following categories were discarded from the data analyses: (i) latencies from trials on which the response produced was not the designated one, (ii) latencies from trials on which the response was “don’t remember” or “don’t know”, (iii) latencies from trials on which there was a pause between the two words of the NP (disfluency) or a response was repaired,



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(iv) latencies longer than 2.5 s, (v) latencies that deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations (SD) from a participant’s or an item’s mean (outliers). Of all data points, 5.1% were identified as erroneous and 4% as long responses and were excluded from further analysis. Table 9 displays the mean response latency, standard deviation and percentage of errors and long responses for each distractor condition. By-participant and byitem analyses of variance were performed of mean response latency and arcsine-transformed percentage of lost data for the WLg CON, WLg INC, BLg CON and BLg INC conditions. Table 9. Results for Experiment 2 (N = 26) Within LG

Between LG

BLg-WLg Difference

Baseline RT SD %Errora %Longb

658 63 1.5 3.6

846 106 6.6 4.9

188

CON RT SD %Errora %Longb

741 71 3.3 3.6

875 120 8.7 5.4

134

INC RT SD %Errora %Longb

783 68 3.9 1.5

920 118 6.9 4.9

137

INC-CON Difference

42

45

WLg = Within-Language, BLg = Between-Languages, CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent, RT = mean Response Time (in ms), SD = Standard Deviation. a Mean percentage of data lost due to error. b Mean percentage of long responses (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off

collapsed).


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For the response latencies, a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Gender Congruency (F1 (1, 25) = 39.39, MSe = 12123.3, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 23.19, MSe = 1065.9, p < .001) and a significant main effect of Language (F1 (1, 25) = 32.08, MSe = 1533.1, p < .000; F2 (1, 28) = 57.35, MSe = 4356.3, p < .001). The interaction of the main factors did not reach significance (both Fs < .16). The mean RTs in Table 9 show that participants were faster at producing a target NP when the distractor word was of the same gender than of a different gender, and they were also faster when the target response was in their L1 than their L2. In addition, both Table 9 and Figure 3 show that the CON-baseline and INC-baseline differences are bigger in the WLg than BLg conditions and a second set of ANOVAs examined this issue. The 2(WLg vs. BLg) × 2(CON-baseline vs. INC-baseline) ANOVA confirmed the above. It yielded a significant main effect of language (F1 (1, 25) = 8.47, MSe = 8450.1, p < .01; F2 (1, 28) = 14.37, MSe = 1343.5, p = .001), indicating that the CON and INC differences from the baseline were shorter BLg than WLg. The main effect of gender congruency was also significant

Difference from the baseline

140 120 100 80

CON

60

INC

40 20 0 Within Lg

Between Lg

Figure 3. Effect of the two main factors (Language & Gender Congruency) in Experiment 2.



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(F1 (1, 25) = 32.1, MSe = 1533.2, p < .001; F2 (1, 28) = 23.2, MSe = 1065.9, p < .001), indicating that the INC-baseline differences were bigger than those of the CON-baseline both WLg and BLg, that is, once again showing a WLg and BLg gender-congruency effect. The interaction was non-significant (both Fs < .17, p > .6). The significant results in the lost data analyses are reported below. For the total lost (= errors + long responses) data rates, a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of language (F1 (1, 25) = 12.3, MSe = .048, p < .01; F2 (1, 28) = 7.34, MSe = .039, p < .05). The main effect of gender congruency was significant in the participant analysis (F1 (1, 25) = 4.38, MSe = .02, p = .047) and non-significant in the item analysis (F2 (1, 28) = 1.23), reflecting a tendency for participants (but not items) to produce more “lost” responses in the CON than INC conditions in both the WLg and BLg blocks. The interaction of the main factors did not reach significance (both Fs < .33). In the long response analysis (outliers and responses over the 2.5 s cut-off collapsed) only the main effect of language was significant (F1 (1, 25) = 8.52, MSe = .023, p < .01; F2 (1, 28) = 9.71, MSe = .013, p < .01). For the total error rates, a 2(CON vs. INC) × 2(WLg vs. BLg) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of language in the participant analysis (F1 (1, 25) = 7.27, MSe = .048, p < .05) and a marginally significant effect in the item analysis (F2 (1, 28) = 4.1, MSe = .038, p = .053). It also showed a significant interaction of the main factors in the participant analysis (F1 (1, 25) = 4.8, MSe = .012, p < .05) but not in the item analysis (F2 (1, 28) = .069, p = .79). Simple contrasts in the participant data showed a significant difference between the BLg CON (8.7%) and BLg INC (6.9%) conditions (F1 (1, 25) = 8.19, MSe = .01, p < .01). In summary, the effect of language was significant in all the lost data categories in both participant and item analyses, indicating that participants produced errors and long responses more frequently in L2 than L1. This is not surprising given that the participants’ L1 proficiency surpassed that of their L2 (all were L1-dominant bilinguals). In addition, participants were more likely to produce errors in naming a picture in L2 (but not L1) when the distractor word was gender-congruent with the picture name than when it was gender-incongruent.


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In the BLg block, error trials were also divided into: “wrong determiner – L1 CON” signifying a wrong determiner congruent with the gender of the L1 translation of the target L2 NP, and “wrong determiner – L1 INC” signifying a wrong determiner incongruent with the gender of the L1 translation of the target L2 NP. The effect of gender congruency was not significant in the analyses of these two types of error responses in the BLg block (both Fs < .66), showing that participants were not likely to produce more “wrong determiner – L1 CON” responses in an L1–L2 gender-congruent trial (2.8%) than in an L1–L2 gender-incongruent trial (2.6%). Note also that in this task all L2 target nouns had a different gender from their L1 translations. Finally, the mean proportion of “wrong determiner – L1 CON” responses (35.8%) was not significantly different from that of “wrong determiner – L1 INC” responses (37.3% ) across all conditions in the BLg block as tested by a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (participants: z = −.092, p > .9; items: z = −.357, p > .7). Together these results confirm the effectiveness of the different gender manipulation between L2 target names and their L1 translation because they indicate that the gender of the L1 translation of the target picture either did not affect performance or any effect was constant across all conditions. Otherwise, one would have expected more “wrong determiner – L1 CON” errors overall. The only source of the effect must therefore have been the gender of the distractor word. 8.3. Discussion The results show a gender-congruency effect within and, more importantly, across languages from L1 to L2 in oral production. Naming a picture in L1 was on average 42 ms faster following L1 gender-congruent distractor words compared to gender-incongruent ones. Similarly, naming a picture in L2 was on average 45 ms faster after L1 semantically unrelated but gender-congruent than gender-incongruent distractors. The difference between the gender-congruency effect in L1 and L2 naming was non-significant. In addition, as expected, picture naming was faster in L1 than in L2 (in both gender-congruent and genderincongruent conditions) by L1-dominant bilinguals. These findings



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are in line with the language-shared gender hypothesis which claims that equivalent gender representations are shared between languages (cf. Figures 1a & 1b). Furthermore, the present empirical evidence from production concerning the representation of grammatical gender within and across languages converges with that obtained in comprehension (cf. Experiment 1). Alternative explanations of the effect can be excluded. In particular, this effect cannot be explained by assuming competition among freestanding lexical items, such as determiners, during lexical selection (Miozzo & Caramazza 1999) rather than activation of abstract gender features. If it is assumed that there is cross-language lexical competition (e.g., Hermans et al. 1998; Colomé 2001; Costa et al. 2003), this view would predict no gender-congruency effect from L1 to L2. This absence occurs because in the BLg CON condition two different determiner forms will be activated and compete for selection (e.g., in Figures 1a & 2a the L1 masculine o from the L1 distractor and the L2 masculine der from the L2 target noun) and two different forms will also be in the BLg INC condition (e.g., in Figures 1b & 2b the L1 feminine η from the L1 distractor and the L2 masculine der). If it is assumed that there is no cross-language lexical competition (Costa & Caramazza 1999; Costa et al. 1999), the determiner-competition view again predicts no gendercongruency effect from L1 to L2. The absence of a BLg effect in this case would be due to lack of competition from L1 determiner forms in either the CON or INC condition. It is also unlikely that the cross-language effect is due to translation priming from L1 to L2 determiner nodes12 for the following reasons. First, if this were the case, one would expect more “wrong determiner” errors in the BLg INC than CON condition simply because the gender and determiner of L1 distractor word and L2 target noun were different in the former but not in the latter case. The error analysis showed that the difference was in the opposite direction to this prediction (BLg CON 6.2% vs. BLg INC 5.6%) and it was non-significant (both Fs < 2.4, p > .13). Second, if the production of the L2 target determiner was a direct translation of the L1 determiner form of the distractor word, then one would expect that the majority of “wrong determiner” errors in the BLg INC condition would be congruent with the determiner for the


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L1 distractor word. Analysis of the “wrong determiner” errors in this condition showed that this was not the case. Only 13 out of 22 “wrong determiner” responses were translations of the definite determiner of the L1 distractor word (χ 2 (1, N = 22) = .727, p > .39). Comparing the WLg and BLg effect, a difference that needs to be addressed is their relation to the baseline condition (cf. Figure 3). RTs in both the CON and INC conditions relative to the baseline were slower WLg than BLg. This effect did not interact with gender congruency, suggesting that it is just a reflection of the presence or absence of a distractor word. (The baseline is expected to be faster than the other conditions because the baseline distractor (XXXXX) is not a word and induces less processing than the distractor words in the CON and INC conditions.) This difference cannot be attributed to the fact that participants were not activating the L1 distractor word or its gender in the BLg CON and INC conditions in the same way that they were not activating a word distractor or any gender in the BLg baseline condition. This could be because they were able to “shut-off” L1 completely during L2 production. Such an account, however, cannot explain the gender-congruency effect obtained BLg. Had they been able to ignore the L1 distractors, no significant difference should have been obtained between the BLg CON and INC naming conditions either. An explanation as to why the CON/INC conditions were closer to the baseline BLg than WLg can be viewed in relation to the IC model’s (Green 1998) account of language control during lexical access in bilingual production. According to this model, language control is affected by means of language task schemas, networks specifying the target language and detailing the component processes of the target task. Such schemas (e.g., word production schemas, translation schemas, etc.) compete to control output from the lexico-semantic system and prioritize the processing of stimuli (Green 1998: 69 & 77). In the present task, the appropriate language task schema would be “picture naming in L1” and “picture naming in L2” for the WLg and BLg blocks respectively. Recall also that WLg and BLg trials were blocked (not mixed). In this account, then, a picture-word interference task, much like a Stroop



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task, elicits competition between a picture naming schema and a word reading/naming schema. Participants must therefore ensure that they are naming the picture rather than the distractor word. This is easier when the distractor is in a non-target language because activated lemmas whose tags do not correspond to the target language are inhibited to facilitate the target response. Consequently, the IC model predicts more interference from a target language than non-target language distractor because the language tag of the former matches one of the specifications (target language) outlined by the target schema, and this pattern has been experimentally observed13 (Ehri & Ryan 1980; Miller 1997). The fact that distractors in the WLg block are in the target language and distractors in the BLg block are not can explain why the CON/INC conditions are much slower than the baseline in the WLg block compared to the BLg block. Although fully activating their information (therefore their gender), the BLg distractors, belonging to the non-target language, interfere less with picture naming than the WLg distractors. Additionally, if gender nodes are shared between L1 and L2, as the present evidence suggests, they might not bear language “tags” and could not be subject to language control whether they have been activated by a target language or a non-target language lemma. This would further explain why gender features were fully processed in both the WLg and BLg block resulting in the WLg and BLg gender-congruency effect. Using picture naming, Experiment 2 showed a gender-congruency effect both within (L1) and between languages (L1-to-L2). This finding excludes the possibility that the BLg effect is due to determiner competition across languages. Overall, the pattern of results suggests that the L1 and L2 gender systems are not separate but interact in the bilingual mental lexicon during language production. Nouns with the same gender have a common representation of their gender feature within but also across languages. The common L1 and L2 gender representation in the bilingual lexicon pertains to all L1 and L2 nouns as shown by the priming between semantically unrelated words. Finally, these gender representations are shared between comprehension and production as suggested by the priming of NP production by visual distractor words.


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9. C O N C L U S I O N S

Grammatical gender information opens up a new scope of investigation in the study of the bilingual lexicon and the bilingual language system in general. Although still in its infancy, psycholinguistic research on grammatical gender has unfolded interesting findings regarding the nature of the bilingual lexicon. The empirical research reviewed in Sections 2, 3 and 4 shows that age of acquisition plays a role in L2 gender processing as only early bilinguals appear to reach native-like performance (Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001). Unlike early bilinguals, late L2 learners process gender features only when gender agreement needs to be explicitly computed (Holmes & Dejean de la Bâtie 1999; Taraban & Kempe 1999) but not when gender information is not necessary as in single word production (Guillelmon & Grosjean 2001; Scherag et al. 2004). When, however, L2 learners do process gender, they heavily rely on gender-marking on the noun forms (e.g., Bordag et al. 2005). Evidence from ERP studies complements the behavioral findings in showing that only L2 learners with an L1 gender system very similar to the L2 approach native-like performance in L2 gender processing (e.g., German (L1) learners of Dutch (L2) as opposed to Romance language (L1) and English (L1) learners, Sabourin 2001, 2003). It also appears that when L1-dominant bilinguals listen to, read, or produce gender-marked phrases in L2, L1 gender information is also activated and affects L2 performance (Bordag 2003; Lemhöfer et al. submitted; Paris & Weber 2004, 2005). But this does not appear to be the case for balanced bilinguals (Costa et al. 2003). Finally, research on the organization of the bilingual lexicon points to an L1–L2 integrated gender system in which cognates rely more on the L1 gender value than noncognates (Salamoura & Williams in press). Furthermore, empirical evidence presented in Sections 7 and 8 suggests that this integrated gender system is not restricted to translation-equivalent nouns only but any L1 and L2 nouns with the same gender value share a gender representation in the bilingual lexicon. Last, this common L1–L2 gender system is also shared between comprehension and production. Overall, it is hoped that the present paper has reviewed evidence but also offered new empirical findings as to why the study of gender information is a promising testing



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ground for elucidating the representational and processing architecture of the bilingual lexicon and the nature of L1–L2 interaction. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by a doctoral Greek State Scholarship (I.K.Y.) award. I would like to thank John N. Williams for fruitful comments on an earlier version of this work and Marina Terkourafi for proofreading parts of the manuscript. NOTES 1. This delayed interest may partly be due to the fact that the bulk of psycholinguistic research on L2 learning and processing is in English, a language that lacks grammatical gender. 2. A gender monitoring task requires deciding on the gender of a word or a phrase. 3. A grammaticality judgment task entails judging whether a phrase, clause or sentence is grammatically acceptable or not. 4. The only exception in this pattern were response times (RTs) in the naming task which yielded no effect of noun ending. 5. Neither Holmes and Dejean de la Bâtie (1999) nor Taraban and Kempe (1999) provide a language history of their L2 participants but their overall performance (and particularly their error rates) indicates that they are most probably late rather than early L2 learners. 6. In fact, the Catalan-Spanish bilinguals produced significantly fewer errors than the native Spanish speakers in Experiment 4A. 7. The distinction between gender-transparent and -opaque nouns is based on their inflectional suffix in the nominative singular only as this is the case and number in which all critical nouns are used in the experiments of this study. 8. The only exceptions were two grammatical (Brille [‘glasses’], Kerze [‘candle’]) and another two ungrammatical German NPs (Reise [‘journey’], Tasse [‘cup’]) which presented a correlation between feminine gender and noun ending -e. These exceptions were unavoidable given that the L2 NPs had to be matched with the L1 NPs in terms of frequency of occurrence, syllable and letter length as closely as possible. 9. These exceptions were unavoidable considering that L1 and L2 “target” NPs had to be matched for frequency, syllable and letter length, in addition to the rest of the restrictions in selecting the L2 nouns as well as the uneven distribution of the three genders among nouns in the two languages (the order of gender frequency in Greek was: neuter > feminine > masculine, whereas in German it was masculine > feminine > neuter).

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´ 10. The only exception was one pair of picture name and distractor word (masc.: κoυβας ´ “bucket” – βηχας “cough”). 11. The advantages of this method over the on-line measurement of latencies via a voice key are discussed in detail by Morrison and Ellis (1995). 12. One way such priming could be effected is via lexical/translational links that are assumed to exist between translation equivalent L1 and L2 lemmas/lexical nodes (Kroll & Stewart, 1994). These links are stronger from L2 to L1 than vice versa in L1-dominant bilinguals (ibid.). 13. For similar results in the bilingual Stroop task, see Preston and Lambert (1969) and Chen and Ho (1986). REFERENCES Akhutina, T., Kurgansky, A., Kurganskaya, M., Polinsky, M., Polonskaya, N., Larina, O., Bates, E., and Appelbaum, M. 2001. Processing of grammatical gender in normal and aphasic speakers of Russian. Cortex, 37: 295–326. Alario, F. X., and Caramazza, A. 2002. The production of determiners: evidence from French. Cognition, 82: 179–223. Bachman, L. F., and Palmer, A. S. 1989. The construct validation of self-ratings of communicative language ability. Langauge Testing, 6: 14–29. Bates, E., Devescovi, A., Hernandez, A., and Pizzamiglio, L. 1996. Gender priming in Italian. Perception & Psychophysics, 58: 992–1004. Bates, E., Pizzamiglio, L., Devescovi, A., Marangolo, P., Ciurli, P., and Razzano, C. 1996. Gender priming and gender processing in aphasia. Brain and Language, 55: 104–106. Bock, K., and Griffin, Z. M. 2000. Producing words: how mind meets mouth. In Wheeldon, L. (ed.), Aspects of language production. Hove: Psychology Press. 7–47. Bordag, D. 2003. Grammatical gender in first and second language production. Ceskoslovenska Psychologie, 47: 105–121. Bordag, D., Opitz, A., and Pechman, T. 2006. Gender processing in first and second languages: the role of noun termination. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 32: 1090–1101. Carroll, S. E. 1989. Second-language acquisition and the computational paradigm. Language Learning, 39: 535–594. CELEX Lexical Database. 1998. English version 2.5, German version 2.5. Provided by the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen. Chen, H. C., and Ho, C. 1986. Development of Stroop interference in ChineseEnglish bilinguals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 12: 397–401. Colomé, Á. 2001. Lexical activation in bilinguals’ speech production: language-specific or language-independent? Journal of Memory and Language, 45: 721–736.

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Costa, A., and Caramazza, A. 1999. Is lexical selection in bilingual speech production language-specific? Further evidence from Spanish-English and English-Spanish bilinguals. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 2: 231–244. Costa, A., Miozzo, M., and Caramazza, A. 1999. Lexical selection in bilinguals: do words in the bilingual’s two lexicons compete for selection? Journal of Memory and Language, 41: 365–397. Costa, A., Sebastian-Galles, N., Miozzo, M., and Caramazza, A. 1999. The gender congruity effect: evidence from Spanish and Catalan. Language and Cognitive Processes, 14: 381–391. Costa, A., Kovacic, D., Franck, J., and Caramazza, A. 2003. On the autonomy of the grammatical gender systems of the two languages of a bilingual. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 6: 181–200. Costa, A., Colomé, Á., Gómez, O., and Sebastián-Gallés, N. 2003. Another look at crosslanguage competition in bilingual speech production: Lexical and phonological factors. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 6: 167–179. Cutting, J. C. 1997. The production and comprehension lexicons: What is shared and what is not. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois. Dewaele, J.-M., and Véronique, D. 2001. Gender assignment and gender agreement in advanced French interlanguage: A cross-sectional study. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 4: 275–297. Dijkstra, A., van Jaarsveld, H., and Ten Brinke, S. 1998. Interlingual homograph recognition: Effects of task demands and language intermixing. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 1: 51–66. Ehri, L. C., and Ryan, E. B. 1980. Performance of bilinguals in a picture-word interference task. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 9: 285–302. Gerard, L. D., and Scarborough, D. L. 1989. Language-specific lexical access of homographs by bilinguals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 15: 305–315. Green, D. W. 1998. Mental control of the bilingual lexico-semantic system. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 1: 67–81. Guillelmon, D., and Grosjean, F. 2001. The gender marking effect in spoken word recognition: The case of bilinguals. Memory & Cognition, 29: 503–511. Hahne, A. 2001. What’s the difference in second-language processing? evidence from event-related brain potentials. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 30: 251–266. Hellenic National Corpus (HNC). 1999. Web version 1.0. Provided by the Institute for Language and Speech Processing, Greece. Accessed on-line in 2001 at http://hnc.ilsp.gr/statistics.asp Hermans, D., Bongaerts, T., de Bot, K., and Schreuder, R. 1998. Producing words in a foreign language: Can speakers prevent interference from their first language? Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 1: 213–230. Hockett, C. F. 1958. A course in modern linguistics. New York: Macmillan.

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APPENDIX Critical items for Experiment 1 Grammatical NPs Within-Language Block Target NPs

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

o καιρóς (“the weather”) o λαιµóς (“the neck”) ´ o παγoς (“the ice”) o στóλoς (“the fleet”) o δεσµóς (“the bond”) o λóϕoς (“the hill”) η oδóς (“the street”) ´ η ψηϕoς (“the vote”) ´ η αµµoς (“the sand”) η νóσoς (“the disease”) ´ η ηπειρoς (“the continent”) ´ τo αγχoς (“the stress”) ´ τo πληθoς (“the crowd”) τo ν´εϕoς (“the smog”) ´ τo βαθoς (“the depth”) τo κ´ερδoς (“the profit”)

Prime NPs g

CON

INC

g

m

o πóνoς (“the pain”) o σεισµóς (“the earthquake”) ´ o ταϕoς (“the grave”) ´ o ανεµoς (“the wind”) o κóσµoς (“the world”) o τρóµoς (“the terror”) η κιβωτóς (“the ark”) ´ η ανoδoς (“the ascension”) η δoκóς (“the beam”) ´ η διαµετρoς (“the diameter”) ´ η παραγραϕoς (“the paragraph”) τo µ´ισoς (“the hatred”) τo τ´ευχoς (“the issue”) ´ τo κυρoς (“the authority”) ´ τo παχoς (“the fat”) ´ τo θαρρoς (“the courage”)

´ τo χαoς (“the chaos”) τo δ´εoς (“the awe”) ´ τo κρανoς (“the helmet”) η υδρóγειoς (“the globe”) η πρóoδoς (“the progress”) η ε´ ϕoδoς (“the assault”) o νóµoς (“the law”) o oυρανóς (“the sky”) τo β´ελoς (“the arrow”) τo π´ελαγoς (“the open sea”) τo γεγoνóς (“the event”) o τóπoς (“the place”) ´ o υπνoς (“the sleep”) o πoταµóς (“the river”) η λεωϕóρoς (“the avenue”) ´ η αβυσσoς (“the abyss”)

n

m m m m m f f f f f n n n n n

n n f f f m m n n n m m m f f

g =gender, CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent.


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Between-Language Block Target NPs

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

das Ziel (“the aim”) das Konto (“the account”) der Ring (“the ring”) die Brille (“the glasses”) die Milch (“the milk”) der Wein (“the wine”) der Zug (“the train”) der Tisch (“the table”) die Kerze (“the candle”) das Kino (“the cinema”) die Nummer (“the number”) das Meer (“the sea”) der Baum (“the tree”) der Apfel (“the apple”) die Insel (“the island”) das Wort (“the word”)

Prime NPs g

CON

INC

g

n

´ τo χαoς (“the chaos”) τo δ´εoς (“the awe”) ´ o ταϕoς (“the grave”) η υδρóγειoς (“the globe”) η πρóoδoς (“the progress”) o τρóµoς (“the terror”) o νóµoς (“the law”) o oνρανóς (“the sky”) η δoκóς (“the beam”) τo π´ελαγoς (“the open sea”) ´ η παραγραϕoς (“the paragraph”) τo µ´ισoς (“the hatred”) ´ o υπνoς (“the sleep”) o πoταµóς (“the river”) η λεωϕóρoς (“the avenue”) ´ τo θαρρoς (“the courage”)

o πóνoς (“the pain”) o σεισµoς (“the earthquake”) ´ τo κρανoς (“the helmet”) ´ o ανεµoς (“the wind”) o κóσµoς (“the world”) η ε´ ϕoδoς (“the assault”) η κιβωτóς (“the ark”) ´ η ανoδoς (“the ascension”) τo β´ελoς (“the arrow”) ´ η διαµετρoς (“the diameter”) τo γεγoνóς (“the event”) o τóπoς (“the place”) ´ τo τευχoς (“the issue”) ´ τo κυρoς (“the authority”) ´ τo παχoς (“the fat”) ´ η αβυσσoς (“the abyss”)

m

n m f f m m m f n f n m m f n

m n m m f f f n f n m n n n f




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Ungrammatical NPs Within-Language Block Target NPs

1. η βαθµóς (“the mark”) ´ 2. τo λυκoς (“the wolf ”) 3. η καπνóς (“the smoke”) 4. τo δι´εξoδoς (“the outlet”) ´ 5. τo πυργoς (“the tower”) 6. η ωµoς ´ (“the shoulder”) 7. η λαóς (“the people”) 8. τo ε´ ξoδoς (“the exit”) 9. o δ´ιoδoς (“the passage”) 10. τo σoρóς (“the corpse”) ´ 11. τo συνoδoς (“the summit”) ´ 12. o υϕoς (“the style”) ´ 13. η δασoς (“the forest”) 14. ∗ o γ´ενoς (“the race”) 15. o ε´ θνoς (“the nation”) ´ 16. o λαθoς (“the error”)

Prime NPs g∗∗

CON

f/m

η µ´εγεθoς (“the size”) ´ τo καθoδoς (“the descent”) ´ η µηκoς (“the length”) τo θóρυβoς (“the noise”) τo θαλαµηγóς (“the yacht”) η ε´ δαϕoς (“the ground”) η o´ ϕελoς (“the benefit”) ´ τo θανατoς (“the death”) o στ´ελεχoς (“the stem”) ´ τo βραχoς (“the rock”) τo o´ ρoϕoς (“the floor”) o ε´ πoς (“the epic”) η χρóνoς (“the year/time”) ´ o διαλεκτoς (“the dialect”) o περ´ιoδoς (“the period”) ´ o παρoδoς (“the side street”)

n/m f/m n/f n/m f/m f/m n/f m/f n/f n/f m/n f/n m/n m/n m/n

g f/n n/f f/n n/m n/f f/n f/n n/m m/n n/m n/m m/n f/m m/f m/f m/f

INC

g

´ o συγκλητoς (“the senate”) o π´ενθoς (“the mourning”) o ε´ισoδoς (“the entrance”) η µ´ελoς (“the member”) η ξ´ιϕoς (“the sword”) τo επωδóς (“the refrain”) τo µ´εθoδoς (“the method”) ´ o σµηνoς (“the swarm”) ´ η καµπoς (“the plain”) η τ´ελoς (“the end”) o χρ´εoς (“the debt”) ´ η πλoυτoς (“the wealth”) τo επ´ετειoς (“the anniversary”) ´ τo παραδεισoς (“the paradise”) τo κ´ινδυνoς (“the danger”) η πóλεµoς (“the war”)

m/f m/n m/f f/n f/n n/f n/f m/n f/m f/n m/n f/m n/f n/m n/m f/m

g =gender, CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent. ∗ Items preceded by an asterisk were discarded from the analysis. ∗∗ The letter before the slash denotes the gender of the definite determiner whereas the letter after

the slash denotes the gender of the noun of the example NP.


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Between-Languages Block Target NPs

1. der Bild (“the picture”) 2. der Boot (“the boat”) 3. der Reise (“the journey”) 4. das Heirat (“the wedding”) 5. das Furcht (“the fear”) 6. die Hut (“the hat”) 7. die Arm (“the arm”) 8. das Brief (“the letter”) 9. der Tasse (“the cup”) 10. die Kreuz (“the cross”) 11. der Fabrik (“the factory”) 12. der Feuer (“the fire”) 13. die Berg (“the mountain”) 14. ∗ das Rock (“the skirt”) 15. das Stuhl (“the chair”) 16. die Herz (“the heart”)

Prime NPs g∗∗

CON

m/n

´ o συγκλητoς (“the senate”) o π´ενθoς (“the mourning”) o ε´ισoδoς (“the entrance”) τo θóρυβoς (“the noise”) τo θαλαµηγóς (“the yacht”) η ε´ δαϕoς (“the ground”) η o´ ϕελoς (“the benefit”) ´ τo θανατoς (“the death”) o στ´ελεχoς (“the stem”) η τ´ελoς (“the end”) o χρ´εoς (“the debt”) o ε´ πoς (“the epic”) η χρóνoς (“the year/time”) ´ τo παραδεισoς (“the paradise”) τo κ´ινδυνoς (“the danger”) η πóλεµoς (“the war”)

m/n m/f n/f n/f f/m f/m n/m m/f f/n m/f m/n f/m n/m n/m f/n

g m/f m/n m/f n/m n/f f/n f/n n/m m/n f/n m/n m/n f/m n/m n/m f/m

INC η µ´εγεθoς (“the size”) ´ τo καθoδoς (“the descent”) ´ η µηκoς (“the length”) η µ´ελoς (“the member”) η ξ´ιϕoς (“the sword”) τo επωδóς (“the refrain”) τo µ´εθoδoς (“the method”) ´ o σµηνoς (“the swarm”) ´ η καµπoς (“the plain”) ´ τo βραχoς (“the rock”) τo o´ ρoϕoς (“the floor”) ´ η πλoυτoς (“the wealth”) τo επ´ετειoς (“the anniversary”) ´ o διαλεκτoς (“the dialect”) o περ´ιoδoς (“the period”) ´ o παρoδoς (“the side street”)

g f/n n/f f/n f/n f/n n/f n/f m/n f/m n/m n/m f/m n/f m/f m/f m/f

g =gender, CON = Gender-Congruent, INC = Gender-Incongruent. ∗ Items preceded by an asterisk were discarded from the analysis. ∗∗ The letter before the slash denotes the gender of the definite determiner whereas the letter after

the slash denotes the gender of the noun of the example NP.



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Critical items for Experiment 2 Targets

Distractor words

L1 Picture Names

L2 Picture Names

g

CON

INC

g

´ ηλιoς (“sun”) ´ χαρτης (“map”) ´ ϕακελoς (“envelope”) ´ κoυβας (“bucket”) ϕακóς (“torch”) πóρτα (“door”) σηµα´ια (“flag”) ´ σκαλα (“ladder”) ´ τσαντα (“handbag”) ´ λαµπα (“bulb”) ϕ´ιδι (“snake”) ´ Ψαρι (“fish”) ρoλóι (“clock”) ´ πoτηρι (“glass”) κoυτ´ι (“box”)

Löwe (“lion”) Finger (“finger”) Schlüssel (“key”) Mantel (“coat”) Vogel (“bird”) Blume (“flower”) Zitrone (“lemon”) Hose (“trousers”) Flasche (“bottle”) Gabel (“fork”) Sofa (“sofa”) Herz (“heart”) Lineal (“ruler”) Motorrad (“motorcycle”) Feuer (“fire”)

m

´ µηνας (“month”) αιωνας ´ (“century”) α´ερας (“air”) ´ βηχας (“cough”) ε´ ρωτας (“love”) ε´ νωση (“union”) ´ λαµΨη (“flash”) ´ ανoιξη (“spring”) ´ ανεση (“comfort”) σκ´εΨη (“thought”) ´ κλασµα (“fraction”) ´ µαθηµα (“lesson”) ´ χρηµα (“money”) τ´ερµα (“finish/goal”) o´ νoµα (“name”)

θ´εση (“position”) ε´ κδoση (“edition”) ι´δρυµα (“institution”) ´ πληξη (“boredom”) ε´ γκληµα (“crime”) αγωνας ´ (“match”) ´ καυγας (“quarrel”) νóηµα (“meaning”) θ´εαµα (“show”) χρωµα ´ (“colour”) ´ µπελας (“trouble”) ´ αξoνας (“axis”) ´ δραση (“action”) ´ βoρρας (“north”) π´ιεση (“pressure”)

f

m m m m f f f f f n n n n n

f n f n m m n n n m m f m f



CHAPTER 5

BILINGUALISM AND COGNITIVE ARITHMETIC Elena Rusconi1 , Giovanni Galfano2 , and Remo Job3 1 University College, London 2 University of Padova, Padova 3 University of Trento, Rovereto

“He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.” John McCarthy, Computer scientist

Abstract In this chapter we aim to give a taste of the current research in bilingualism and numerical cognition. Far from being an exhaustive review, our chapter is intended to frame the relationship between bilingualism and number processing into a novel perspective, by reporting some of the most recent empirical findings. We will first introduce the topic by focusing more generally on the link between language and number processing. A great deal of our knowledge of numbers is traded, thought and manipulated by means of language. But how essential is verbal language to numerical knowledge itself? Recent studies have tentatively addressed the question by looking at numerical abilities in human populations having a very poor lexicon for numbers. Their results will be briefly outlined before addressing the more specific issue of bilingualism. We will then turn to the field of cognitive arithmetic, which has attracted most efforts and produced most of the studies lying at the convergence between bilingualism and mathematical cognition. As a general principle, basic experimental paradigms and effects that were originally described with monolingual participants were employed to explore arithmetic competence in the first and second languages of bilingual participants. We will end by showing how the introduction of novel experimental paradigms in the last few years promises to challenge the conclusions drawn by previous studies.

1. L A N G U A G E I N N U M E R I C A L C O G N I T I O N

It is widely agreed that the ability to represent numerical quantities is not uniquely human. Evidence for number representations and basic arithmetic reasoning has indeed been shown in non-human animals as well (e.g., Boysen & Capaldi 1993; Hauser et al. 2000). 153 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 153–174. © 2007 Springer.


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More precisely, human and non-human animals are thought to share a non-verbal representation of numbers having the distinctive feature of scalar variability (with the possible exception of the first three or four numbers; Trick & Pylyshyn 1994; but see Balakrishnan & Ashby 1992; Cordes et al. 2001). In other words, in enumeration tasks, behavioral accuracy gets proportionally worse as the target number increases, discrimination between numerical quantities obeying a Weber–Fechner law when based upon such non-verbal representation of number (Gallistel & Gelman 2000). Scalar variability has been first shown in experiments where animals (e.g., rats) were trained to press a lever a certain number of times to get a food reward (e.g., Platt & Johnson 1971). The variability in their behavioral approximation to the target number of presses was proportional to the numerical quantity of the target, even for very small numbers. When a similar procedure was adopted with humans (without any food reward and under instructions to avoid verbal counting), the results were strikingly similar to the animal model. Performance in numerical approximation (i.e., in approaching the target number of lever presses) was shown to be qualitatively different from performance in estimating temporal intervals, which is a possible complication in nonverbal counting procedures (Whalen et al. 1999); additionally, when the strategical use of subvocal counting was prevented by concomitant articulatory suppression the results remained the same (Cordes et al. 2001). This suggests that numerate individuals might have learned to map culturally transmitted symbols onto non-verbal numerical representations that still conserve their original scalar variability feature. Recent empirical evidence shows that children enter formal education with a starter kit of numerical abilities enabling them to abstract numerosities from sets of visual and auditory objects/events and perform approximate arithmetical operations before being formally taught their basic principles (Barth et al. 2005). Interestingly, after extensive training chimps can learn to associate symbols to sets of objects differing for just one unit, and to perform ordinal judgments on those symbols even more efficiently than human infants who received no training at all (e.g., Matsuzawa 1985; Boysen & Berntson 1989). Addition abilities of visual Arabic numerals were also reported by Olthof et al. (1997) in squirrel monkeys, which were trained to choose on a display the numeral corresponding to the


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largest number of reward peanuts. When various arrays of numerals were then presented on the same display, the trained animals tended to choose the array with numerals having the largest sum. There are, however, very substantial differences in numerical abilities between humans and non-human animals. For example, children can extend their representations well beyond the limits of counting procedures (e.g., to the concepts of fractions and zero; see Gelman 1991). They can use spoken and written language as flexible tools to represent and communicate exact numerosities. Mostly by means of spoken language, children can learn by rote sets of arithmetical facts and calculation procedures, which, along with numerical comprehension abilities and the ability to decompose and transform numbers, lead them to master simple and complex exact arithmetic (e.g., Ma 1999; Kilpatrick et al. 2001). The use of language is obviously one of the most distinctive characteristics of human numerical cognition. Language and numerical cognition appear to be intimately connected well before the beginning of formal education, at least since when children start to master the counting sequence, which normally occurs between the ages of 2 and 4 (Gelman & Gallistel 1978; Wynn 1990). Later on in the development, cross-linguistic differences in the grammatical representation of numbers may even predict the relative salience of numerosity in processing collections of objects (Athanasopoulos 2006). More precisely, speakers of languages with grammatical number marking (e.g., English) judge differences in the number of countable objects as more significant than differences in the amount of non-countable substances, whereas speakers of languages lacking grammatical number marking (e.g., Yucatec or Japanese) do not. Also, speakers of languages lacking grammatical number marking who learn a language with grammatical number marking proficiently judge differences in the number of countable objects as more significant than differences in the amount of non-countable substances. That is, they behave similarly to native speakers of the language with grammatical number marking (Athanasopoulos 2006; cf. Pavlenko 2005). From a theoretical standpoint, the relationship between language and numerical cognition could be instantiated in one of three different


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forms: a strong version of the Whorfian hypothesis, which maintains that language determines thought including numerical concepts, a weak version of the Whorfian hypothesis maintaining that our thoughts about numbers are influenced by the language we use, and a form of inverse relation for which numerical cognition precedes language and is mapped onto it. It is almost impossible to decide between these alternatives by studying people who are raised in a culture with well-developed spoken and written symbols for numbers. A language deprivation experiment, where the presence or the absence of a linguistic means for numbers is arbitrarily manipulated by the experimenter and assigned to two otherwise equivalent human groups, might solve the question instead. Such an experiment being ethically impossible, studies about numerical cognition in cultures that are intrinsically limited in their ability to express numbers can provide useful indications (e.g., Gordon 2004; Pica et al. 2004; Dehaene et al. 2006). Gordon (2004) conducted a study on the Pirahã, an Amazonian tribe of hunter-gatherers whose counting system is limited to the words corresponding to one, two and many. Having such a limited range of expressions, one might expect them either to make a recursive use of these terms to designate larger numerosities (e.g., two-and-one, to designate three, or two-and-two to designate four), which would signal the presence of a concept for exact numerosities larger than one and two, or to accomplish exact enumeration through alternative counting systems (e.g., with fingers or body parts). However, they seem to use neither verbal recursive expressions nor alternative counting systems. Gordon found that the word for one was sometimes used to denote a small numerosity of two or three, while the word for two always denoted a larger numerosity than the word for one when natives used both words in the same speech. In other words, their few expressions for numerosities are not equivalent to those of Indo-European languages, because their language does not assign a special status to oneness, which is by necessity the basis of a true integer system. A series of experimental tasks was then developed to test their numerical competence. In all of them, performance was relatively accurate up to 2 or 3 items, but it was much more variable beyond that range, showing on average a gradual decrease in precision with increasing numerosity. This strongly resembles the analog



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estimation ability that has also been found in pre-linguistic infants, monkeys, birds, and rodents, which we mentioned at the beginning of this section (see Dehaene 1997 and Butterworth 1999, for reviews). Gordon’s conclusion was the following: The Pirahã’s impoverished counting system limits their ability to enumerate exact quantities. […] The present experiments allow us to ask whether humans who are not exposed to a number system can represent exact quantities for mediumsized sets of four or five. The answer appears to be negative. The Pirahã inherit just the abilities to exactly enumerate small sets of less than three items if processing factors are not unduly taxing. (Gordon 2004). Otherwise stated, this would be a case in favor of incommensurability between languages, because Pirahã’s language does not possess any precise label for the unit, which renders any translation of exact numerical terms impossible, and in Gordon’s view this would be also a case in favor of linguistic determinism (strong version of the Whorfian hypothesis). It is, however, important to remember that quasi-experiments do not allow such strong claims, because the levels of the independent variable are not arbitrarily assigned by an experimenter and could therefore be systematically dismissed by other characteristics of the sample. For example, hunter-gatherers might use just approximate words because they do not really need to communicate exact numbers (a requirement that might have been introduced only after the transition from foraging to farming, trading and agriculture; see Premack & Premack 2005), and thus they only perform approximate matching or calculations in the experimental tasks. The absence of words for exact numerosities does not imply that the very concept of exact numerosity is absent, as acknowledged, for example, by Pica et al. (2004). In Pica et al.’s study, people from another Amazonian tribe, the Mundurukú, were tested for their numerical abilities. The experimental sample was divided into two groups: a group of monolinguals (adults without and children with formal education who spoke the Mundurukú language only) and a group of bilinguals (adults and children who spoke the Mundurukú language


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and also some Portuguese; some of whom had received education in basic school topics). In the Mundurukú language fixed expressions are available for numbers 1 to 5 only. Above 5, approximate quantifiers are used such as “some” and “many,” or locutions referring to the sum of body parts (e.g., “two hands”) with variable precision. No evidence for a counting routine or a verbal counting sequence was found, and with the exception of the words for 1 and 2, numerals were used in relation to a range of approximate quantities rather than to a precise number. Nonetheless, Mundurukú speakers were able to perform almost like French controls in a numerosity comparison task with large sets of dots (20–80) and approximate addition plus comparison. Both Mundurukú and French participants showed the classical distance effect (i.e., performance improved as the ratio between the numerosities to be compared increased) in either task. When tested on exact subtraction of small sets of dots, the monolingual Mundurukú participants still seemed to rely on an approximate numerosity representation, whereas the bilingual Mundurukú participants tended to be slightly more accurate (but still far from perfection). In contrast, the French controls performed almost at ceiling, showing that all the Mundurukú used approximate representations to perform a task which the French performed by exact calculation. The fact that bilinguals also performed worse than French controls may suggest that the availability of exact number words in the spoken language is not enough to warrant the use of an exact approach to numerosity. Also, the fact that monolinguals and bilinguals understood the arithmetic tasks (as shown by their significant performance), and could carry them out on the basis of an approximate numerosity representation, may suggest that sophisticated numerical competence can be present without a fully developed lexicon for numerosities. Perhaps, to be effectively used for exact arithmetic, the lexicon requires a concomitant development of counting routines, which would establish a one-to-one correspondence between discrete objects and verbal numerals. Only through counting, indeed, would a verbal numeral (or whatever other symbolic means – e.g., fingers, toes and body parts) be permanently associated to a precise quantity out of the initially approximate continuum (but see Gelman & Butterworth 2005).



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On the whole, these studies are certainly consistent with the hypothesis that learning to represent numbers by some precise communicable notation (e.g., number words, body parts or numerals) might facilitate the recognition of exact numerosities (Gelman & Gallistel 2004). They do not imply, instead, that exact numerical concepts cannot exist without a verbal notation. It is suggested that whether the notational system is acquired through counting routines, as opposed to simple exposure, seems to be even more crucial than its mere availability for an effective use in performing exact arithmetic operations. Language, therefore, seems to be a precious and useful tool for certain kinds of numerical manipulations but by no means it can be considered the trigger of numerical concepts (or of Euclidean geometry; see Dehaene et al. 2006). In the following section we will focus on adult simple arithmetic, which is a sub-field of mathematical cognition in which the contribution of language has been most often emphasized and has received a great deal of attention. 2. B I L I N G U A L I S M A N D S I M P L E A R I T H M E T I C

The field of cognitive arithmetic has seen an exponential increase of interest in recent years. Cognitive models of mental arithmetic (see Campbell & Epp 2005, for a review) share the assumption that, at least for those operations whose operands are represented by single digits, educated adults retrieve solutions from stored knowledge representations, generally labeled as arithmetic facts, although it has been shown that this does not hold for all of the four basic arithmetic operations. Specifically, addition problems are generally assumed to be solved mainly by retrieving the result from a dedicated network-like memory store (e.g., Ashcraft 1992), although fast counting strategies or semantic manipulation would also be available (e.g., LeFevre et al. 1996). In contrast, subtraction would rely on semantic and procedural knowledge based on the manipulation of quantities (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2004). As for multiplication, for which there is general agreement on a dominant retrieval strategy (e.g., Stazyk et al. 1982; Dehaene et al. 2004) it has been proposed that simple facts are stored in an associative network that is similar to the networks for word representation, in


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which the nodes are numbers instead of words and the links between them represent arithmetical relations (Ashcraft 1992). Basically, it is assumed that, upon presentation of a multiplication problem, activation would automatically spread from activated operands to linked nodes, such as the product (Collins & Loftus 1975). Finally, division may be solved through the retrieval of multiplication facts (e.g., LeFevre & Morris 1999; Rusconi et al. 2006a). Several neuropsychological studies have shown that arithmetic fact retrieval can be selectively damaged after brain injuries (e.g., McCloskey 1992), supporting the notion that arithmetic facts are likely stored separately from either other semantic knowledge or other numerical skills. However, although a neuropsychological dissociation between language-related abilities and arithmetic facts retrieval has been consistently reported (e.g., Warrington 1982; Rossor et al. 1995; Butterworth et al. 1996; Delazer et al. 2004), both behavioral and electrophysiological evidence has been documented showing that similar mechanisms may govern both the arithmetic lexicon (at least for multiplication) and the word lexicon (e.g., McNeil & Warrington 1994; Niedeggen & Rösler 1999; Pesta et al. 2001; Galfano et al. 2004), thus supporting models for cognitive arithmetic based on associative networks (e.g., Ashcraft 1992). One critical issue in the domain of cognitive arithmetic is whether language plays any role in the long-term-memory representation of arithmetic facts. In this regard, McCloskey (1992) hypothesized that arithmetic knowledge is stored in a single, amodal, notation-independent abstract format, which can be accessed from various numerical formats (e.g., Arabic, written verbal, spoken verbal) only after stimuli have been transcoded into an abstract form by notation-specific modules. Following this view, arithmetic fact retrieval occurs independently of surface format and is inevitably associated with semantic processing of numbers. An alternative view is represented by the Triple Code model proposed by Dehaene and Cohen (1995; also see Dehaene et al. 2003), according to which arithmetic facts (especially multiplication) would be learned by rote and stored in memory as chains of verbal associations. Thus, in order to retrieve the result of a simple fact, it is necessary to transcode numerical stimuli into the language in which arithmetic was first learned (also see Spelke & Tsivkin 2001). Finally, in the Encoding Complex model put



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forward by (Campbell & Clark 1988; Campbell 1994), the possibility is explicitly acknowledged that arithmetic may be embedded into as many networks as the available surface codes for numbers, retrieval efficiency depending on practice and familiarity with specific formats (Campbell 1994; Campbell & Epp 2004; also see Campbell 1998; Noël et al. 1998). Various studies have tried to address the issue of language-specificity in the storage of arithmetic facts by comparing the performance of monolinguals and bilinguals (in between-group designs), aimed to establish whether bilinguals possess one or two distinct language-related memory stores for arithmetic facts (see Noël & Fias 1998, for a review). However, this approach has produced somewhat inconsistent results, likely due to the adoption of different inclusion criteria for bilingual participants and methodological procedures (cf. Mägiste 1980a, b; Geary et al. 1993). A number of more recent studies have addressed the issue of languagespecificity in simple arithmetic following a different research approach, aimed at measuring within-group differences in bilinguals possibly emerging by requesting participants to perform cognitive arithmetic tasks in their first or second language (L1 and L2). This line of research is particularly important, in that it can throw some light on the nature of arithmetic facts representation, possibly clarifying the question of whether arithmetic facts are stored in an abstract format, as postulated by McCloskey (1992), or in a verbal format, as posited by both the Triple Code model (e.g., Dehaene & Cohen 1995) and the Encoding Complex model (e.g., Campbell 1994). In addition, this approach can also elucidate whether bilingual participants possess a single arithmetic lexicon or two separated lexicons, one related to L1 and the other related to L2. Marsh and Maki (1976) asked participants to perform a visual arithmetic production task with stimuli in Arabic format comprising single addition (in the form of “a + b =?”) and multiple additions (e.g., “a + b + c =?,” “a + b + c + d =?”). Responses had to be pronounced in either L1 or L2. Besides an advantage in performance for responses given in L1, the results showed that reaction time (RT) was a linear increasing function of the number of addition operations required, with no differences in the slopes exhibited by the functions related to responses given in L1 and L2. McClain and Shih Huang (1982) confirmed and extended the results obtained by Marsh and Maki, by


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presenting the problems in auditory (verbal) format. The lack of significance of the interaction between language (L1 vs. L2) and number of additions may be taken as tentative evidence in support of models that posit the existence of a single memory store containing arithmetic facts (Noël & Fias 1998). On the other hand, the main effect reported by Marsh and Maki concerning the fact that the participants were faster when they had to respond in L1 may also be interpreted as evidence consistent with the Encoding Complex view (Campbell 1994). More recently, Campbell et al. (1999) investigated the effects of language format on several number-related tasks with Chinese-English bilinguals. Stimuli were presented in either Arabic format or in Chinese Mandarin symbols, and the participants were required to respond verbally in either L1 (Chinese) or L2 (English). It was found that performance in an arithmetic production task was significantly better when response was given in L1. In addition, the results showed that this advantage in performance was magnified when stimuli appeared as Mandarin symbols. Campbell et al. (1999) attributed this and other format-related effects to the use of different associative networks for numbers and for arithmetic facts in the different languages and formats, and to the different strength and efficiency of these associative networks that are contingent on prior experience of the participants in using a specific format for a particular task. It is important to note here that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between international Arabic and Chinese written symbols (and numeral reading systems). Arabic relies on examining the positions of digits as a means for identifying value (whether 1 represents 1 or 10 or 100); whereas Chinese symbols do not rely on place to establish value, but include the values in the number formation instead. For example, in Arabic, twenty-five is 25, but in Chinese it is the symbol for “two” followed by the symbol for “ten” followed by the symbol for “five” or “two tens and five.” Thus, the Chinese representation decomposes the number, which may add to facility with numbers (Ho & Fuson 1998; Ma 1999). So, when working in Arabic, Chinese individuals who are used to Mandarin have the added cognitive load of using place for determining value rather than having it already structured in the numerical representation itself.



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In a subsequent study, Bernardo (2001) asked Filipino-English bilinguals to perform an arithmetic verification task. His participants were presented two addends and a probe number (the proposed result) in sequence and then they had to respond manually as to whether the probe was the sum of the two addends or not. Critical manipulations involved the format of the addends and the probe number and the so-called split effect (Ashcraft & Battaglia 1978), referring to the observation that RT for trials in which the probe is incorrect decreases as the incorrect answer is further away from the correct answer. Bernardo found that the participants showed a decreasing efficiency of processing from digit format to verbal-English (L2) to verbal-Filipino (L1). This result shows that people are faster and more accurate in verifying arithmetic problems in their preferred language for arithmetic (which is not necessarily L1), especially when tests with both languages are performed in the same experimental session. Additionally, a significant split effect was found with numbers presented in both digit and verbal-English format, but not with the verbal-Filipino format, suggesting that memory representations for addition facts may not be well developed in the Filipino code. These results are consistent with Vaid and Menon’s (2000) analysis of survey data showing that bilinguals’ language preferences for mental arithmetic are strongly predicted by their language of elementary school instruction, which is not always L1. Frenck-Mestre and Vaid (1993) employed an arithmetic verification task with English-French bilinguals responding to stimuli presented in digit, verbal-English, and verbal-French format, and exploited the so called associative confusion effect (Winkelman & Schmidt 1974) to examine arithmetic-related associative processes in L1 and L2. Basically, this phenomenon represents the first behavioral evidence demonstrating the existence of associative processes in mental arithmetic. When participants perform an arithmetic verification task with simple addition and multiplication, in which they have to decide whether a given equation is correct or not, RTs for false problems are higher when the proposed answer is correct for the other operation (e.g., 4 + 3 = 12, which is false for addition but true for 4 × 3 = 12) compared to when it is not (e.g., 4 + 3 = 9, which is false for both 4 + 3 = 9 and 4 × 3 = 9). This associative confusion effect is generally interpreted


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as evidence that the simple presentation of two single-digit operands generates the activation of the arithmetically related nodes via associative links in the network representing arithmetic facts. The most important result obtained by Frenck-Mestre and Vaid (1993) refers to the fact that, beside the main effect of presentation format, a significant associative confusion effect was found when stimuli appeared in digit format and in L1 format only. Based on these findings, Frenck-Mestre and Vaid concluded that arithmetic facts retrieval and the automatic spreading of activation within the network of arithmetic facts is crucially language-dependent. In this regard, however, it has been recently suggested that the associative confusion effect might not provide the most compelling measure of automatic access to arithmetic facts representations, in that it is observed when the participants are explicitly asked to perform arithmetic. Thus, the associative confusion phenomenon can hardly be interpreted as a purely automatic effect because it is contingent on the attentional control settings defined by task requirements (see Galfano et al. 2003). Even more important, it has been shown that the associative confusion effect does not fulfill the so called “resistance to suppression” criterion for automaticity (Zbrodoff & Logan 1986), and it can be abolished by loading working memory under dual-task conditions (Rusconi et al. 2004). Consistent with this analysis, Noël and Fias (1998) have suggested that differences between languages in arithmetic performance can be attributed to working memory rather than to access to arithmetic facts. In addition, as we pointed out earlier, in the context of arithmetic problem solving, people seem not to rely exclusively on direct retrieval processes when performing addition (e.g., they may opt for back-up strategies to reach an optimal performance; LeFevre et al. 1996; Shrager & Siegler 1998). In light of these arguments, the use of indirect tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require arithmetic knowledge) allows one to study the automatic retrieval component in isolation (Rusconi et al. 2004; Rusconi et al. 2005; Rusconi et al. 2006b). LeFevre et al. (1988) have developed a paradigm to test the presence of associative processes in mental arithmetic known as number matching. Typically, the participants are shown two numerical stimuli in sequence. The first stimulus (the “cue”) is a short-lasting pair



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of single- or double-digit numbers. The second stimulus consists of a single- or double-digit number (the “probe”). The participants have to perform a number-matching task, trying to establish whether the probe is one of the previously presented numbers or not. LeFevre et al. (1988) reported that RTs for rejecting non-matching probes were significantly higher when the probes were the sum of the numbers in the cue compared to when the probes were arithmetically neutral with respect to the cue numbers. This interference effect was obtained both when a “+” symbol was interposed between the numbers in the cue and when no retrieval cue (the addition symbol) was present. Within this paradigm, it can be reasonably argued that arithmetic is completely task-irrelevant, as the task simply requires perceptual and numerical comprehension processes (Campbell 1994). Thus, the interference effect is interpreted as evidence that the mere presentation of two single digit numbers resulted in stimulus-driven activation of the sum node via associative links in the network representing arithmetic facts. As a consequence, rejecting a non-matching probe activated via associative links would require more processing compared to a non-matching neutral probe receiving little or no activation. Galfano et al. (2003, 2004) and Rusconi et al. (2004) have recently extended the interference effect to multiplication and to the neighboring multiples of the product in the multiplication network. Rusconi et al. (2006c) have employed a modified version of the numbermatching task to investigate the representation of arithmetically related verbal numerals in the mother tongue and in L1 and L2 of bilingual participants (see below). To reiterate, the advantage of this approach is that interference in a number-matching task is much less sensitive to working memory manipulations than the associative confusion effect. Therefore, number-matching is an ideal measure of activation spreading in long-term memory (Rusconi et al. 2004). Rusconi et al. (2006c) focused on simple multiplication facts, as these are widely assumed to be stored in memory as a consequence of rote verbal learning (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2003). They tested whether the interference effect that is found with Arabic numerals in a numbermatching task can be replicated in a word-matching task, in which written number words instead of Arabic numerals are shown. Like in a typical number-matching task, participants were not required to solve


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arithmetic problems and no arithmetic sign was presented. The task was simply to decide whether a target word (e.g., forty-two) was present or not in the previous display where two cue words had been shown (e.g., six and seven), by pressing one of two response keys. The manipulation is not trivial because verbal and Arabic numerals are not processed in a similar way. Damian (2004), for example, showed that digits gain fast access to numerical magnitude but not to lexical representations, where number words gain fast access to their lexical codes but not to number magnitude. By employing naming and magnitude judgment tasks, he showed that the difference between Arabic and verbal numerals emerges when notation is blocked (i.e., participants are shown numbers in one format only within each block). Similarly, Fias et al. (2001) showed that the activation of lexical codes from Arabic distractors occurs too slowly to generate Stroop interference when participants are naming number words, where Fias (2001) showed that the activation of number magnitude from a number word occurs too slowly to generate a SNARC effect (which indexes access to number magnitude; Dehaene et al. 1993) in a phoneme monitoring task. Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) participants were highly proficient bilinguals who were asked to fill in a questionnaire (adapted from Sholl 1996) to assess their level of bilingualism and then to perform a word-matching task both in L1 and in L2 (in separate blocks). Words were presented in lower case both in the cue and in the target display. Neither active access to number semantics nor translation of number words from one language to another was necessary to perform the task. The word-matching task could easily be performed by processing orthographic and lexical information only. Unlike bilinguals tested with production and/or verification tasks (see e.g., Bernardo 2001), these participants could get no advantage from translating a pair of operands into their preferred language for arithmetic (which was L1 for all of them), because they were not required to solve any arithmetic problem, and a systematic translation would probably slow down performance in the matching task. To summarize their results, the effect of arithmetic relatedness was found in a word-matching task. The presence of interference both in L1 and in L2 for small size facts suggested that bilinguals possess multiple arithmeticons, at least for the easiest facts (see also Campbell &



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Xue 2001); the use of an indirect task rendered it extremely unlikely that participants intentionally translated both L1 and L2 cues into abstract codes, retrieved their product and then translated it back into L1 or L2 (which is necessary to solve simple arithmetic problems according to McCloskey 1992). In addition, verbal numerals gain faster access to the lexical rather than to the number magnitude code (e.g., Damian 2004), so a response could well be selected before activation could reach the lexical representation of product numbers through a putative semantic network (i.e., along the path: number words in the cue → their semantic nodes → semantic node of their product → product number word). In other words, arithmetic facts activation occurred even in a wordmatching task, where only lexical information was relevant. The effect was larger for small than for large facts, in line with the hypothesis that small facts are more likely to be learned by rote (Campbell et al. 1999; Dehaene et al. 2003). The novelty of Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) study consists of having employed an indirect task to test for associative links between number words and having extended this paradigm to a sample of bilinguals. It speaks directly to the issue of whether language plays any role in the long-term-memory representation of number facts, which is one of the major questions in simple arithmetic and is important both from a theoretical and an educational perspective. As already mentioned, both the obligatory semantic mediation (McCloskey 1992) and the verbal coding (Dehaene et al. 2003) hypotheses assume the cognitive system stores simple arithmetic facts in a single associative network (of either semantic or lexical nodes), whereas the encoding-complex model (Campbell 1994) posits the possibility of as many associative networks as the available numerical formats. By employing an indirect task (i.e., a task which does not require arithmetic fact retrieval – and in which fact retrieval would actually interfere with performance), it was possible to probe passive spreading of activation between arithmetically related nodes without eliciting intentional transcoding and retrieval processes. LeFevre et al. (1988) had already introduced number words as targets in a number-matching task, but the cue was always composed of Arabic digits so that participants were forced to access an abstract number representation to compare cues and targets (unless one assumes


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there is a fast direct pathway between Arabic digits and written verbal numerals). In Rusconi et al.’s (2006c) case, only written words were presented and visual word form representations were sufficient to comply with task demands. Their results showed that two written number words are sufficient to activate the representation of the verbal numeral indicating their product in the absence of any arithmetic cues. In turn, this might be evidence of long-term associative links between lexical representations of number words in multiple languages, which, in accordance with Campbell and Epp’s (2004) proposal, are limited to small-size facts. 3. C O N C L U S I O N

At the beginning of this chapter, we introduced a distinction between two qualitatively different ways of dealing with numbers: an “approximation” and an “exact” mode. Comparative and cultural anthropological studies have suggested that non-human primates and humans who belong to populations without any verbal counting system do, however, possess a number sense. They can carry out tasks requiring numerosity discrimination abilities and their performance shows the characteristic feature of scalar variability (i.e., discrimination obeys the Weber-Fechner law). Literate humans, when asked to estimate numerosities or to approximate the result of an arithmetic operation, perform in a way that does not seem to be qualitatively different from that of the above groups. Literate humans, however, are different from the above groups for their distinctive ability to perform exact computations. The role of language in numerical processing is unique and important because it facilitates the tasks to remember, manipulate and express precise numerosities. Such a fundamental role likely originates from its privileged relation, in our culture, with a counting routine. The availability of a language for numbers is largely exploited in learning and memorizing simple arithmetic facts. Precision and speed in everyday numerical problems (e.g., in deciding whether some spare coins are enough to buy a newspaper or in choosing a train to arrive on time at the airport), which are so important for being able to live in our culture, pushes the cognitive system to build up a repertory of the most



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frequent and simplest form of operations, which can thus be promptly retrieved from memory instead of being calculated anew every time. Being able to retrieve automatically and with efficiency those arithmetic facts can free precious cognitive resources, allowing one to solve problems of increasing complexity. More than other domains of knowledge and other branches of mathematical cognition, arithmetic is penetrable by language, and possesses language-specific representations in longterm memory (e.g., Spelke & Tsivkin 2001). Recent studies suggest that L1 is not necessarily advantaged, because the language in which training has occurred is what really counts – regardless of global proficiency. However, it has also been suggested that direct arithmetic tests may not be sufficiently able to capture the arithmetical competence of an untrained language. According to self reports, bilinguals tend to count and do arithmetic in just one of their languages, which is usually the one in which they were taught arithmetic (this is also true for the participants of Rusconi et al. 2006c). When, after having received formal education in one language, people move to a different linguistic community and remain there for a long time, they tend to lose proficiency in L1. But even when L2 has become dominant, they keep working out numbers and calculations in their original language (Dehaene 1997). However, our results suggest that the ability to function in a different language environment and to solve arithmetic problems quickly and efficiently in a new language should take advantage of existing lexical associations that appear to be already established without any specific training. This is particularly true in cases where performance in mental arithmetic can be influenced by specific verbal formulations, such as with differences in the order of units and decades (e.g., English, Italian, French vs. German or Dutch; Brysbaert et al. 1998) or in the regularity of number naming (e.g., English vs. Chinese; Zhang & Zhou 2003). The fact that bilinguals showed the interference effect during a word matching task for small facts only (i.e., the effect was less pervasive in bilinguals’ L1 than in monolinguals) opens the possibility that arithmetic knowledge takes a qualitatively different form – or relies mostly on different codes – in proficient bilingual than in monolingual individuals.


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by grants from MIUR (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca) and University of Trento to Remo Job, by a grant from University of Padua to Giovanni Galfano, and by a post-doctoral fellowship from the European Commission (MRTN – CT – 2003 – 504927 NUMBRA) to Elena Rusconi. The authors wish to thank Brian Butterworth, Carlo Umiltà, Rochel Gelman and Randy Gallistel, Ricardo Nemirovsky and Rogers Hall for stimulating talks and discussions about numbers and science. REFERENCES Ashcraft, M. H., and Battaglia, J. 1978. Cognitive arithmetic: evidence for retrieval and decision processes in mental addition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4: 527–538. Ashcraft, M. H. 1992. Cognitive arithmetic: a review of data and theory. Cognition, 44: 75–106. Athanasopoulos, P. 2006. Effects of the grammatical representation of number on cognition in bilinguals. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 9: 89–96. Balakrishnan, J. D., and Ashby, F. G. 1992. Subitizing: magical numbers or mere superstition. Psychological Research, 54: 80–90. Barth, H., La Mont, K., Lipton, J., and Spelke, E. 2005. Abstract number and arithmetic in preschool children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102: 14116–14121. Bernardo, A. B. I. 2001. Asymmetric activation of number codes in bilinguals: further evidence for the encoding complex model of number processing. Memory and Cognition, 29: 968–976. Boysen, S. T., and Berntson, G. G. 1989. Quantity-based interference and symbolic representations in chimpanzees (Pan trogolodytes). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 22: 76–86. Boysen, S. T., and Capaldi, E. J. 1993. The development of numerical competence: animal and human models. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Brysbaert, M., Fias, W., and Nöel, M.-P. 1998. The Whorfian hypothesis and numerical cognition: Is “twenty-four” processed in the same way as “four-and-twenty”? Cognition, 66: 51–77. Butterworth, B., Cipolotti, L., and Warrington, E. K. 1996. Short-term memory impairment and arithmetical ability. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 49A: 251–262.

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CHAPTER 6

T H E R O L E O F C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C A N D C R O S S-C U LT U R A L E X P E R I E N C E S I N BILINGUALS’ DIVERGENT THINKING Anatoliy V. Kharkhurin American University of Sharjah

Abstract Research addressing the possible consequences of bilingualism for individuals’ creative abilities has revealed a contradiction between experimental findings of bilinguals’ superiority in creative tasks and real life observations of no significant relationship between being bilingual and being creative. This chapter makes an attempt to resolve this contradiction and investigates a possible effect that bilingualism might have on creative abilities. Three factors in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences of bilingual individuals are examined: language proficiency, age of second language acquisition, and experience and participation in two cultures. The empirical study with Russian-English bilingual immigrants living in the United States and English monolingual native speakers revealed that cross-linguistic factors in bilinguals’ development had an influence on their divergent thinking abilities, which is a necessary component of creative thought. These findings suggest that although bilingualism may lay the foundation of creative thinking it does not necessarily imply being creative. To account for these findings, a cross-language transfer is proposed as a cognitive mechanism facilitating divergent thinking in bilinguals. A specific architecture of bilingual memory in which two lexicons are mutually linked to the shared conceptual system is theorized to facilitate the functioning of the cross-language transfer. The present study contributes to creativity research by examining the effect of bilingualism on creative thinking. It will start out with a brief survey of existing literature on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity and discuss an apparent contradiction therein. Although it is suggested that bilinguals show greater performance on creativity tests, we do not see outbursts of creativity among nationals of bilingual countries. To account for this contradiction, the study will offer a perspective on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity, in which bilingualism facilitates divergent thinking. Divergent thinking is assumed as a necessary but not sufficient trait of creative behavior. Subsequently, it will present empirical findings indicating the factors in bilingual development that may contribute to bilinguals’ superiority in divergent thinking. The following discussion will outline a model of bilingual memory, whose structure is suggested to facilitate cognitive processes underlying this trait. It will specifically


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A N ATO L I Y V. K H A R K H U R I N

discuss the potential effect of bilinguals’ cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences on their memory structure and interpret these effects within a proposed theoretical framework. The conclusion will point to the ways in which research with bilingual individuals may contribute to understanding the nature of divergent thinking and the cognitive ramifications of bilingualism.

1. T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P S B E T W E E N B I L I N G U A L I S M A N D C R E AT I V I T Y: A R E B I L I N G U A L S T R U LY C R E AT I V E ?

Throughout the history of human civilization, numerous attempts to understand human creativity have been made. Interest in human creative capacity has never ceased and contemporary creativity researchers are still debating the nature of creativity1 . Is the capacity for creative thought limited to a certain class of gifted or especially talented people, or is this creative capacity an essential property of normative human cognition? The former view considers creative people as a minority capable of genuine creative thinking, and thus creativity has little bearing on the everyday cognitive activities of the general population. In this view, geniuses use cognitive processes that are radically different from those employed by most individuals in everyday problem solving. In contrast, the latter, creative cognition, approach argues that geniuses use the processes of normative human cognition (Ward et al. 1999). The “mundane” cognitive functioning goes beyond the everyday human capacities and satisfies the criteria of creative products: novelty and utility. However, there is no doubt about the existence of individual differences in creativity. Some individuals produce more creative outcomes than others, and a limited few achieve extreme levels of accomplishment (e.g., Simonton 1994; Eysenck 1995). Although the creative cognition approach admits these differences, they can be understood in terms of variations in the use of specifiable processes, and the richness and flexibility of stored cognitive structures to which the processes are applied (Ward et al. 1997). The creative cognition approach is widely used in cognitive research on creativity. Most scientists converge on the notion that creative thinking is a complex process that may include problem definition and redefinition, divergent thinking, synthesis, reorganization, analysis, and evaluation (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi 1976; Ochse 1990;


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Lubart 1994, 2000; Sternberg & Lubart 1995; Sternberg 1999). Therefore, the focus of the creativity research is on the nature of these subprocesses and possible factors in individual development that may facilitate these subprocesses. A particular interest of creativity researchers constitutes the possible contribution of bilingualism to creative thinking. In her seminal review paper Ricciardelli (1992b) reported 24 studies examining the relationship between bilingualism and creativity. Although the paper provides mixed findings, it shows a clear tendency for bilinguals to outperform their monolingual counterparts on various tests of creative thinking. Interpreting these results, one is tempted to draw a conclusion which assumes bilinguals’ superior creative abilities. However, this assumption would be quite premature considering the real state of affairs in bilingual countries (e.g., Belgium, Canada, Switzerland). In spite of the fact that most nationals of these countries are bilingual, we do not find a higher level of creativity in these countries compared to monolingual countries. Rather, there seems to be no relationship between being bilingual and being creative. Several possible explanations can account for the contradiction between empirical studies showing bilinguals’advantages in the creativity tests and real life observations showing no remarkable differences in creative performance between bilingual and monolingual individuals. First, most of the studies on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity were conducted with children (see Ricciardelli 1992b). Although these studies show an apparent gain of bilingual children over their monolingual counterparts, it is entirely possible that the superior creative abilities of the bilingual children do not persist into adulthood. Indeed, virtually the only study done with college students (Lemmon & Goggin 1989) shows no advantage for bilinguals on creativity tests. Second, following example of Guilford and his colleagues (e.g., Christensen et al. 1960; Berger & Guilford 1969), most of the studies on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity use tests of divergent thinking (DT) as a measure of creativity (see Ricciardelli 1992b). The choice of this test has been supported by a large body of research, which provides evidence for the ability of DT tests to predict certain aspects of performance on creative problem-solving tasks


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(e.g., Plucker & Renzulli 1999) and real-world creative achievement (e.g., Mumford et al. 1998). However, there is a meaningful argument that questions the validity of DT tests as a measure of creativity, because there was remarkably little evidence showing a strong correlation between highly creative people and high scores on the DT tests (Barron & Harrington 1981). For example, some researchers argue that the validity of DT tests may depend, in part, on the scoring procedures being applied (e.g., Runco & Mraz 1992). Others claim that DT tests are weakly related to other kinds of creativity ratings and therefore measure only a small portion of creativity (e.g., Hocevar 1981). Still others question the nature of DT tests as the measures of creativity at all. They argue that what the DT tests really measure are other types of cognitive abilities such as intelligence (e.g., Sternberg & O’Hara 1999). Thus, it is entirely possible that mundane cognitive processing, which the DT tests might measure, cannot predict eminent creative performance. In other words, although bilinguals outperform monolinguals in experimental studies, they do not show overall greater creative performance in real life. Finally, note that in most of the studies on the relationship between bilingualism and creativity, bilingual groups included immigrants who, in addition to speaking two languages, were likely to experience and participate in two cultures2 . This cultural element has been virtually ignored in the study of the possible cognitive impact of bilingualism. However, it is likely that in addition to the virtue of speaking two languages, bilinguals who experience and participate in two cultures may benefit from the meta- and paralinguistic advantages of biculturalism leading to an increase in their creative abilities. As Peal and Lambert (1962) said over 40 years ago, a bilingual individual “whose wider experiences in two cultures have given him advantages which a monolingual does not enjoy. Intellectually his experience with two language systems seems to have left him with a mental flexibility, a superiority in concept formation, a more diversified set of mental abilities” (p. 20). Although this theme has been brought up in some other studies (e.g., Cummins & Gulutsan 1974; Okoh 1980; Francis 2000), it has not received enough attention in the empirical research. Therefore, another plausible explanation for the observation that the nationals of bilingual countries do not show exceptional creative performance can be traced to



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the fact that these individuals have acquired their languages in primarily monocultural environment of the respective countries (e.g., Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland). Thus, they cannot benefit from the potential cognitive advantages of the cross-cultural experience. More generally, it is entirely possible that the inconsistency in the findings in research on cognitive impacts of bilingualism can be explained by a failure to have controlled for this factor. Altogether, there is an obvious discrepancy between the observation of no remarkable differences between bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ creative performance in real life and the finding of significantly superior performance of bilinguals on creativity tests in laboratory settings. In view of proposed explanations, although bilingualism might have an influence on creativity, this influence seems to be indirect. That is, bilingualism may encourage the use of certain cognitive processes in a more efficient way, which paves the way for more sophisticated cognitive processing. The latter may result in creative production in some individuals, but other factors in their development (e.g., intelligence, education, motivation, personal experience) may play a more dominant role. 2. W H Y M I G H T B I L I N G U A L S H AV E A D VA N TA G E S I N D I V E R G E N T T H I N K I N G P E R F O R M A N C E ?

This chapter argues that bilingualism3 might contribute to individuals’ creative abilities, but its contribution is likely to be limited to an increase in divergent thinking. This argument stems from the notion that bilinguals show greater cognitive abilities compared to their monolingual counterparts. Although bilingualism researchers are still debating as to whether the ability to speak more than one language is beneficial or detrimental to an individual’s cognitive development (see Cook 1997 for an overview), a growing number of empirical studies (e.g., Peal & Lambert 1962; Ricciardelli 1992a; Bialystok et al. 2004, 2005) show that speaking two languages extends rather than diminishes the individual’s cognitive capacities. In addition, following the creative cognition approach (Ward et al. 1999), creativity can be explained by enhanced normative cognition. If bilingualism results in more elaborate cognitive


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structures and/or functioning, then it follows that it should also facilitate creativity. Having stated this, the next question is what cognitive processes might underlie creative thinking. During the past 50 years, a large number of studies have explored the nature of the processes involved in creativity, and a large class of models was proposed to describe these processes. Most of these models seem to converge on the mechanism of the simultaneous activation of different, often unrelated, concepts or categories that creates a new plane on which the original and novel ideas might be established. For example, Rothenberg (1996) describes Janusian thinking as ability for “actively conceiving multiple opposites or antitheses simultaneously” (p. 207). This concept is similar to another of Rothenberg’s (1979) ideas, that of homospatial thinking, which “consists of actively conceiving two or more discrete entities occupying the same space, a conception leading to the articulation of new identities” (p. 7). Similarly, Koestler (1968) introduces the concept of bisociation, which he defines as an ability for “combining two hitherto unrelated cognitive matrices in such a way that a new level is added to the hierarchy, which contains the previously separate structures as its members” (p. 183). Another model talks about remote associations, the ability of creative individuals to build connections between unrelated ideas or objects (Mednick 1962). Although these models are relatively fuzzy and provide no clear description of the subprocesses underlying creative thinking, they all seem to emphasize the important property of creative thought, the ability to establish distant associations that link concepts from distant categories. This communication between concepts is assumed to be an unconscious process during which activation is propagated throughout the conceptual network. These subprocesses resemble the kind of divergent thinking that involves a broad search for information, establishing distant associations that link concepts from distant categories and the generation of numerous novel alternative answers to problems (Guilford 1967). Guilford saw divergent thinking ability as a major component of creativity and associated it with four main characteristics: fluency (the ability to rapidly produce a large number of ideas or solutions to a problem); flexibility (the capacity to consider a variety



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of approaches to a problem simultaneously); elaboration (the ability to think through the details of an idea and carry it out); and originality (the tendency to produce ideas different from those of most other people). He contrasted divergent thinking with convergent thinking – the ability to narrow all possible alternatives down to a single solution. Both divergent and convergent thinking are necessary subprocesses that result in creative performance. Therefore, creative thinking is assumed to be an ability to initiate multiple cycles of divergent and convergent thinking, creating an active, attention-demanding process that allows generation of new, alternative solutions (Mumford et al. 1991). Thus, although divergent thinking is identified as one of the major components of creativity (Guilford 1967), other processes (e.g., synthesis, reorganization, analysis, and evaluation) may be the essential contributors to eminent creative performance. This study argues that although bilingualism might contribute to an increase in creative abilities, its contribution is limited to divergent thinking. The next section discusses three factors in bilinguals’ development (proficiency in both languages, age of acquisition of these languages, and experience with cultural settings in which these languages are learned) that are hypothesized to facilitate their divergent thinking abilities. However, other factors in individual development (e.g., intelligence, education, motivation, and personal experience) not accounted for by bilingualism may be necessary components for the ultimate creative production. The inability to develop these factors to a greater extent may prevent bilinguals from showing superior creative performance. 3. W H AT FA C TO R S I N B I L I N G U A L S ’ DEVELOPMENT MIGHT INFLUENCE THEIR DIVERGENT THINKING?

A large body of bilingualism research shows that bilinguals’ proficiency in two languages and age of acquisition of these languages (both assumed as cross-linguistic experience) as well as participation and experience with two cultures in which these languages are acquired (assumed as cross-cultural experience) have an impact on their cognitive development.


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A number of empirical studies suggest that bilinguals’ proficiency in both languages can be a reliable predictor of their cognitive abilities (e.g., Cummins 1976; Lemmon & Goggin 1989; Ricciardelli 1992a). Similarly, studies with bilingual children show that the age of second language (L2) acquisition can be an essential contributor to bilingual children’s cognitive development (see Swain & Lapkin 1982). Therefore, bilinguals’ cross-linguistic experience may be an important factor facilitating their cognitive capacities that may result in an increase in divergent thinking. The repeated switching from one language to another and constantly dealing with two code systems (phonological, grammatical, and lexical) may facilitate their dual linguistic perspective (Lambert 1977). This may account for bilinguals’ greater metalinguistic awareness, which presumably facilitates their cognitive flexibility (Ianco-Worrall 1972; Bialystok 1988). Furthermore, as contemporary research on conceptual representations in bilingual memory shows, bilinguals may undergo conceptual changes due to experience within different cultural and linguistic environments (e.g., de Groot 2000; Paradis 2000; Pavlenko 2000). These researchers argue that the conceptual system of individuals who acquire more than one language inevitably undergoes adaptations that are influenced by the cultural and social contexts in which these languages were learned. Cultural knowledge (in the form of schemas and frames) modifies conceptual representations and organizations in bilingual memory (Vaid 2000). New connotations, even entirely new meanings, may develop through acculturation. Thus, experience with two different cultures may cause modifications in the bilingual conceptual system that reflects cross-cultural diversity in conceptual representations. De Groot (2000) illustrates this with the example of a turkey. The conceptual features of TURKEY in non-North American culture-specific conceptual systems have no associations with great festivities taking place only in North America. However, for newcomers to North America, the concept THANKSGIVING develops over a series of Thanksgiving experiences and includes turkey as an attribute of the festival. As a result, a conceptual representation of a turkey may change over time as a function of experience with the L2 culture. In particular, the conceptual representation of a turkey



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may become extended once it includes additional celebration-related features. In turn, newly developed conceptual representations may allow bilinguals to see the same phenomenon from different perspectives. As a number of scholars suggest, bilingual individuals who experience and participate in two cultures may well perceive the world through the amalgam of two different conceptual prisms and view events with a wider range of enriched experiences (e.g., Cummins & Gulutsan 1974; Okoh 1980). These enhanced conceptual representations may promote cognitive flexibility, divergent thinking, and novel and creative ways of encoding experience. In addition, since different cultural commonalities may provide different perspectives on the same phenomena (Ricciardelli 1992b), bilinguals “may have a greater tolerance for ambiguity because they are comfortable with situations in which one basic idea may have different nuances” (Lubart 1999, p. 344). Tolerance of ambiguity, in turn, is considered a valuable trait of divergent thinking, because unrelated, often contradicting elements coexist during this process. Finally, both cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences may result in modifications in the structure of bilingual memory. The specific structure of bilingual memory may account for bilinguals’ “greater diversity of associations to the same concept because it is situated in two different linguistic conceptual networks” (Lubart 1999, p. 344). The diversity of associations is assumed as a key property of divergent thinking, which implies the ability to link unrelated concepts from different categories. Altogether, bilinguals’ cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences seem to facilitate cognitive flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity, and diversity of association. These cognitive processes may foster simultaneous activation and elaboration of a multitude of often unrelated concepts, that is, divergent thinking. The following section presents an empirical study in which the relationship between bilingualism and divergent thinking is examined. Three factors in bilingual development (language proficiency, age of L2 acquisition, and rate of cross-cultural experience) are considered as potential contributors to the increase in bilinguals’ performance on


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DT tasks. Based on the findings of this study a theoretical framework is proposed in which the specific structure of bilingual memory is argued to facilitate cognitive processes that might result in an increase in divergent thinking abilities. 4. E M P I R I C A L E V I D E N C E O F B I L I N G U A L S ’ P E R F O R M A N C E O N D T TA S K

Several hypotheses were tested in this study. First, bilingualism has an influence on divergent thinking, which should be manifested in superior performance of bilingual participants over their monolingual counterparts on the DT tasks. Second, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences influence bilinguals’ divergent thinking. It was expected that the degree of language proficiency in both languages, the age of acquisition of both languages, and the rate of experience with both cultures in which bilinguals’ languages were acquired would have an effect on bilinguals’ performance on DT tasks. 4.1. Participants The participants were Brooklyn College psychology students who participated for course credit. One hundred and three immigrants from the former Soviet Union living in the US who claimed to speak Russian and English (25 male and 78 female) aged between 16 and 39 (M = 21.57, SD = 4.63) were selected for the experiment. All participants indicated that Russian was their L1. They also reported to have various degrees of experience with Russian and North American cultures. In addition, 52 American participants who reported being native monolingual English speakers (21 male and 31 female) aged between 16 and 51 (M = 23.15, SD = 8.58) were selected for the study. 4.2. Materials and Assessment Techniques Divergent thinking abilities were assessed with the standard procedure in the field, the Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA, Goff & Torrance 2002), which measures verbal and non-verbal fluency (the total number of relevant responses), flexibility (the number of different categories of relevant responses), elaboration (the amount of detail in



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the responses), and originality (the statistical rarity of responses). The standard ATTA assessment consisted of four norm-referenced abilities (fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality). Several procedures were used to assess cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences in bilingual participants. The age of acquisition of both languages was obtained from a background questionnaire. Language proficiency in English and Russian was assessed using a modified version of the Picture Naming Test (PNT), in which participants’ knowledge of each of these languages was evaluated by the accuracy of participants’ responses to 120 pictures of simple objects, a technique similar to that used by Lemmon and Goggin (1989). These pictures, randomly selected from those scaled by Rossion and Pourtois (2001), a revised version of Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980), were arranged in a booklet with each page containing 30 pictures. Participants had two minutes to provide the names for all 30 pictures on each page. Each response was scored either 1 or 0, so that the maximum number of points for picture naming in either language was 120. A list of appropriate labels in English and Russian was generated for each picture by two independent native speakers for each language. If the participants’ label matched the corresponding item on the list, they scored 1 point, otherwise, 0 points. A composite PNT score was computed as the sum of participants’ performance on the English and Russian PNT with a higher score indicating greater proficiency in both languages. The cross-cultural experience was assessed by the cultural exposure coefficient (CEC), which was computed by dividing the absolute value of the difference between the number of years a participant lived in Russia (obtained from the age of immigration) and the number of years he or she lived in the US (obtained from the length of residence in the US) by the participant’s age4 . This coefficient is similar to an index previously used by Tropp et al. (1999). Smaller coefficient values represent the more balanced individuals’ cultural exposure, with 0 representing equal exposure to both cultures. Larger values represent those with a less balanced cultural exposure, with 1 representing monocultural individuals. In the same fashion, participants who were exposed to a new culture earlier had a greater CEC value than those who were exposed to a new culture later in life.


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Altogether, each bilingual participant had three developmental scores: age of L2 acquisition, composite PNT, and CEC. 4.3. Results An ANOVA was performed with four norm-referenced DT measures (fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality) as dependent variables and language group (monolingual vs. bilingual) as an independent variable. The analysis showed that bilingual participants outperformed their monolingual counterparts on the ATTA measures of fluency (F(1, 154) = 7.61, p < .01), flexibility (F(1, 154) = 5.96, p < .05), and elaboration (F(1, 154) = 2.16, p = .14), but there was no significant difference in their performance on the measure of originality (see Figure 1). This finding indicates that bilingualism has an impact on the ability to rapidly produce a large number of ideas or solutions to a problem (fluency), the capacity to consider a variety of approaches to a problem simultaneously (flexibility), and to think through the details of an idea and carry it out (elaboration). However, it does not have an effect on the tendency to produce ideas different from those of most other people (originality). Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis was applied to the data from the bilingual group to determine whether there was a direct relationship between the factors in the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural experiences and the four traits of divergent thinking. Standard multiple regressions were performed between the composite PNT score, age of L2 acquisition, and CEC as independent variables and ATTA measures of fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality as the respective dependent variables. The analysis revealed that the age of L2 acquisition contributed significantly to prediction of bilinguals’ fluency and flexibility scores (β=−.26, p < .01 and β=−.24, p < .05, respectively). The negative correlation indicates that bilinguals who acquired L2 earlier in life tended to show greater fluency and flexibility in divergent thinking. In addition, it was found that the composite PNT score contributed significantly to prediction of participants’ elaboration score (β = .28, p < .01). The positive correlation indicates that bilinguals who were more proficient in both languages tended to show greater elaboration


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Figure 1. Bilingual and monolingual groups’ performance on the ATTA measures of (a) fluency, (b) flexibiligy, (c) elaboration, and (d) originality with error bars representing 95% confidence interval (N = 155).

in divergent thinking. The CEC revealed no significant correlation with any DT measure. Altogether, the findings suggest that at least two factors in bilingual development might have an impact on divergent thinking abilities. Extensive cross-linguistic experience, as evidenced by early L2 acquisition and high proficiency in both languages, tends to be positively


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related to bilinguals’ performance on the divergent thinking traits that require simultaneous activation of a large number of concepts from different categories and the ability to keep them active during the thought process. 4.4. Bilingual = Creative The findings of the study show that bilingualism has an effect on the fluency, flexibility, and elaboration in divergent thinking, but has no influence on the originality trait. Note that the first three measures of the ATTA (fluency, flexibility, and elaboration) test the ability to rapidly produce a large number of ideas or solutions to a problem, the capacity to consider a variety of approaches to a problem simultaneously, and the ability to think through the details of an idea and carry it out. In other words, they require the ability to activate a multitude of unrelated concepts from different categories and work through concepts already activated. In contrast, the last ATTA measure (originality) probes the tendency to produce ideas different from those of most other people. This ability to generate novel and unique ideas seems to account for the divergent thinking trait that may directly contribute to genuine creativity. Logically, these four traits of divergent thinking are grouped together as two types of creative behavior: the ability to generate and to elaborate on various, often unrelated, ideas and the ability to extract novel and unique ideas. The first type seems to represent characteristics of the preparation stage of the creative process, that is, the ability to activate a multitude of unrelated concepts and work through concepts already activated. However, it does not imply that the ideas based on these concepts should necessarily be original (i.e., satisfy the criteria of novelty) and result in creative production. On the other hand, the second type of creative behavior accounts for originality in thinking, that is, the ability to produce innovative and useful ideas. This type therefore accounts for the finalizing stage of the creative process. This study assumes that the functions of the first category are basic cognitive processing (similar to early cycle capacity in Mumford 2000) that, according to the creative cognition approach (see Ward et al. 1999), paves the way for



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more sophisticated cognitive processing (similar to Mumford’s late cycle capacity) during which the original ideas may be extracted. Although these two types of processing were seen as distinct cognitive capacities (e.g., Guilford 1950), one might argue that the rate of idea generation during the first stage should provide a larger pool of ideas to work with thereby contributing to the production of more original outcomes (Simonton 1998). However, other individual cognitive capacities (e.g., intelligence, education, motivation, and personal experience) might play a dominant role here. In other words, the findings support the notion that although bilingualism might have an influence on creativity, it is rather indirect. Bilingualism may encourage the use of certain cognitive processes in a more efficient way, which paves the way for more sophisticated cognitive processing. The latter, in turn, may result in creative production in some individuals, but other factors in their development may override the effects of bilingual development. Thus, if bilingualism has any contribution to the increase in creative abilities, its possible function is to facilitate the basic cognitive processes responsible for generating a multitude of unrelated ideas and to work through the ideas already generated; that is, it encourages certain cognitive processes that might be responsible for an increase in simultaneous activation and processing of a large number of unrelated concepts. The limited contribution of bilingualism to creative thinking provides an explanation for the contradiction between superior bilinguals’ performance on the creativity tests in the laboratory settings and no systematic difference in bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ performance in real life. Most of the creativity tests employed in the studies on bilingualism and creativity (see Ricciardelli 1992b) probed the skills needed to activate conceptual representations simultaneously and produce multiple solutions to a problem, but not an ability to extract original solutions out of this multitude. Bilinguals seem to have some predisposition for creativity, but this predisposition must be supported by other factors in individual development (such as intelligence, education, motivation, personal experience, etc.) not related to bilingualism itself. Therefore, the fact that an individual speaks more than one language does not imply that he or she should be creative.


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4.5. Bilingual Developmental Factors Influencing Divergent Thinking This study also shows that cross-linguistic experience has a positive effect on bilinguals’ divergent thinking performance. In contrast, crosscultural experience reveals no significant effect on this ability. The following subsections present a detailed discussion of the effects of the age of L2 acquisition and language proficiency on bilinguals’ divergent thinking abilities. They are followed by somewhat speculative explanations for the finding of no effect of the cross-cultural experience on divergent thinking. The data above provides evidence that the age at which L2 was acquired relates to the ability to establish links between unrelated concepts from distant categories (fluency and flexibility in divergent thinking). The negative correlation indicates that individuals who acquired L2 at a younger age show greater divergent thinking abilities. This finding corresponds with the reports of bilingual children’s performance in the immersion programs (Swain & Lapkin 1982). A number of studies conducted in the 1970s with students in an early French immersion program in Toronto and Ottawa (Canada) showed that the age of entering the program could be an essential factor in bilingual children’s cognitive development. In the same fashion, other studies reported an age-related decline in encoding new information (Craik & Jennings 1992) and decrease in working memory capacity (Kharkhurin et al. 2001), cognitive processing speed, and attention (Kemper 1992). A possible explanation for these findings could be the notion that the changes in bilingual memory modulated by early acquisition of both languages may result in certain cognitive advantages. As predicted by Lenneberg’s (1967) critical period hypothesis, if L2 acquisition occurs before the age of puberty, it will be relatively fast, successful and qualitatively similar to first language (L1). He relates these advantages to the fact that language learning occurs before lateralization is complete. The brain at an early age is still flexible and therefore allows more detailed analysis of incoming linguistic information, which may result in a greater level of attainment in language acquisition (see Newport 1990, “less is

4.5.1. The effect of the age of L2 acquisition on divergent thinking



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more” hypothesis, for a similar view). Later on, as the person matures and learns various cognitive strategies, this early advantage may be lost. The studies with connectionist networks provide evidence for the maturation hypothesis. For example, Elman (1993) demonstrated that the training of a recurrent connectionist network with complex grammatical rules fails if the model is fully formed and equipped with adult-like capacity from the onset. However, learning is successful if the model initially has a restricted child-like capacity that gradually matures into an adult-like one. The results of the present study also show that language proficiency in both English and Russian positively correlates with the ability to keep concepts active during the thought process (elaboration in divergent thinking). This indicates that bilinguals with high proficiency in both languages are more successful in concept processing than their less proficient counterparts. This finding is in line with a number of studies on children showing proficient bilinguals’ superiority on various DT tasks (e.g., Ricciardelli 1992a). These studies converge on the idea formulated in the threshold theory (Cummins 1976) arguing that bilinguals need to achieve high levels of linguistic proficiency in both of their languages before bilingualism can promote cognitive advantages. For example, Ricciardelli tested this theory with Italian-English bilingual and English monolingual children. She found that only bilingual children highly proficient in both Italian and English showed superior divergent thinking abilities. Those bilinguals who had low proficiency in either one or both languages did not show any significant difference from the monolinguals. 4.5.2. The effect of language proficiency on divergent thinking

In addition to the influence of the cross-linguistic experience on divergent thinking, a possible impact of cross-cultural experience was examined. It was hypothesized that the experience and participation in two cultures that often accompany language acquisition may have a facilitating effect on the development of bilinguals’ conceptual system, which in turn may encourage divergent thinking. The obtained results, however, failed to support this hypothesis: there was no significant correlation between

4.5.3. The effect of cross-cultural experience on divergent thinking


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the degree of cross-cultural experience (as assessed by the CEC) and bilinguals’ divergent thinking performance. The most obvious interpretation of this finding is that cross-cultural experience is not related to divergent thinking abilities at all. However, for the sake of potential development for the bilingualism/biculturalism research, it is plausible to consider this issue in more detail. Several alternative, although not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations can be advanced for the finding of no significant correlation between the cross-cultural experience and divergent thinking. 4.6. The CEC is Not a Sensitive Measure of Cross Cultural Experience First, the CEC used in this study as a measure of cross-cultural experience could be insensitive to variations in the cross-cultural environment and its psychological ramifications that might have an influence on individuals’ divergent thinking. It is a well known problem in the psychological research on biculturalism: cross-cultural experience is not only extremely difficult to define, but even more difficult to measure and relate to the individual’s cognitive functioning (Francis 2000). Although the CEC has some redeeming features, it seems to be somewhat simplistic in that mere exposure to a culture does not necessarily reflect the psychological implications of that exposure. For example, as Tropp et al. (1999) noted, some individuals may live in the US throughout their lives without feeling a strong connection to it and may, in turn, be less likely to embrace North American cultural norms and expectations. Conversely, some recent immigrants may identify strongly with the prevailing US norms and standards and may therefore attempt to integrate aspects of North American culture into their daily lives. Therefore, it might be plausible for future research to introduce a more sensitive measure of cross-cultural exposure that reflects the psychological ramifications of the bicultural experience. 4.7. Bicultural Experience is Subcultural in Fact If there is indeed a relationship between the degree of cross-cultural experience and individuals’ cognitive and divergent thinking abilities,



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the specificity of cultural experience of participants in this study may have prevented them from showing this effect. A number of studies argue that bilinguals undergo conceptual changes due to experience within different cultural and linguistic environments (e.g., de Groot 2000; Kecskes & Papp 2000; Pavlenko 2000). Kecskes (2003; in this volume) hypothesized that in the mind of bi- and multilingual speakers there are synergic concepts that are the results of conceptual blending. According to his definition “synergic concepts are a group of concepts that are lexicalised in both languages but have a different socio-cultural load in each language.” The present study hypothesizes that these conceptual changes may result in increased cognitive flexibility and divergent thinking abilities due to, for example, the internalization of new concepts and convergence and restructuring of these concepts. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that bicultural individuals acquire the values and norms of the new as well as the original culture. In the “turkey” example presented above, the conceptual representation of a turkey may expand since it includes additional features related to the experience of celebration. The expanded conceptual system was supposed to facilitate individuals’ perception of a variety of events from different culture-specific perspectives, and therefore to increase their cognitive flexibility and divergent thinking abilities. However, it is entirely possible that the participants in this study who were assumed to have a bicultural experience had in fact a subcultural one5 . That is, they might have developed perspectives that were distanced from the source culture and yet differed from the culture of the country of their current residence (Ervin-Tripp 2000). Due to a variety of negative effects that were found to accompany the process of acculturation (see Birman & Trickett 2001), the subcultural experience could result in the attrition of the essential knowledge of the original country, and at the same time the inability to fully acquire the knowledge of a new culture. In other words, it could be speculated that due to the subcultural experience, participants in this study underwent those conceptual changes that resulted in a poorly developed conceptual system. This notion is supported by Pavlenko’s (2000) model of conceptual development, in which the interaction of two languages and cultures


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may result in conceptual changes that may include the internalization of new concepts, convergence of the concepts and restructuring, but at the same time, attrition and/or substitution of previously learned concepts by new ones and a shift from one conceptual domain to another. The conceptual changes of the latter types could result in the inability of bilingual participants in this study to develop their conceptual system to a greater extent. This, in turn, could eliminate any significant correlation between their cross-cultural experience and divergent thinking performance. Therefore, future research should control for the history of acculturation of bilingual individuals, namely for the sociocultural environment in which they reside. 4.8. The Limitations of Cross-Cultural Differences in this Study Finally, it is entirely possible that certain aspects of North American and Russian cultures are too similar to initiate remarkable conceptual changes that may result in an increase in divergent thinking. Both of these cultures have their roots in Western civilization. Therefore, there might be too few fundamental distinctions in the North American and Russian cultural settings to develop alternative perspectives on the same phenomena. Thus, it might be reasonable for the future research to consider more distant cultures that developed in completely different traditions (e.g., Western and Eastern). 5. B I L I N G U A L M E M O RY M O D E L

This study demonstrates bilinguals’ superiority over monolinguals in fluency, flexibility, and elaboration in divergent thinking. These traits represent the ability to activate a multitude of unrelated concepts from different categories and work through concepts already activated. This study also shows that bilinguals’ extensive experience with two languages facilitates this ability. To account for these findings, this chapter presents a theoretical framework in which the increase in divergent thinking results from enhanced spreading activation between conceptual and lexical representations in bilingual memory. In this framework, bilinguals’ proficiency in both languages and their age of acquisition



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of these languages are theorized to modify the structure of bilingual memory. Modified bilingual memory may subsequently facilitate bilinguals’ superiority in divergent thinking performance. 5.1. The Structure of Bilingual Memory One of the central issues in psycholinguistic studies of bilingual memory evolves around the levels of representation of bilinguals’ languages and their underlying concepts (see Kroll & Tokowicz 2005 for an overview). The present study employs the distributed lexical/conceptual feature model (see Kroll & de Groot 1997 for a detailed description of the model) to explain the facilitation effect of the specific structure of bilingual memory on divergent thinking. The model consists of a language independent (shared) conceptual feature level, a language non-specific (shared) lexical feature level, and a language specific lemma level that mediates between activation of lexical and conceptual features. Thus, this chapter assumes that bilingual memory is a dynamic system with three levels of representation: a conceptual features level that consists of representations of meaning, a lexical features level that does not include word meanings, but only aspects of word form, and a language specific lexical-semantic level that mediates the word forms and their meanings. The spreading activation is seen as a communication mechanism between all three levels. The conceptual features level contains distributed conceptual features, the lexical-semantic level contains language specific lemmas, and the lexical features level contains distributed lexical features (aspects of word form)6 . Note that throughout the following discussion, the terms lexicon and lexical refer to the lexical-semantic system, which consists of language specific units and more generally to bilinguals’ two languages, whereas the term lexical features refers to specific lexical features system that contains only the aspects of word form. 5.2. Association Routes in Bilingual Memory Several assumptions pertinent to the discussion of cognitive mechanisms facilitating divergent thinking in bilinguals follow from the proposed model of bilingual memory. As mentioned above, divergent thinking refers to the ability to activate and simultaneously process a large number


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of unrelated ideas and access concepts from distant categories (Guilford 1967). This property of divergent thinking may benefit from a greater diversity of associations to the same concept (Lubart 1999). This study suggests that bilinguals’ ability to activate a larger span of associations compared to their monolingual counterparts can be explained by the functioning of the spreading activation mechanism. This mechanism may assist bilinguals in simultaneously activating a set of unrelated concepts to a greater extent than monolinguals are able to activate them. The distributed nature of bilingual memory may facilitate the dispersion of activation throughout the conceptual network. Intuitively speaking, associations in monolingual memory can be established due to the distributed nature of the conceptual system. The same conceptual features may be a part of the representation of different concepts. For example, the concept CAT shares a set of conceptual features with the concept DOG (e.g., “4 paws,” “tail,” “animal,” etc.). The activation of the conceptual representation of a dog may result in a partial activation of the conceptual representation of a cat, as shown in semantic priming studies (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt 1971). These two concepts however, differ in some essential features that are unique for each (e.g., the “bark” feature for the DOG, and the “meow” feature for the CAT). Due to the distributed nature of conceptual system, these features can activate other conceptual representations (e.g., the “bark” feature can send partial activation to the conceptual representation of a fox) and additional associations can be formed. However, the activated concepts are likely to be members of the same or similar categories (as the concepts DOG and FOX in the previous example are the members of a category [animal]). Only people with exceptional associative thinking abilities may relate concepts that lie beyond the category boundaries. Various factors in individuals’ development (such as intelligence, education, personal experience, etc.) may stimulate this processing. Associative thinking is an inherent property of both bilingual and monolingual conceptual memory. However, in addition to an ingenious capacity to form associations due to the distributed nature of the conceptual network, bilinguals may benefit from structural and/or procedural changes in their memory, which result from cross-linguistic



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and cross-cultural factors in their development. The modified bilingual memory is theorized to permit broad language-mediated concept activation. That is, activation flow on the conceptual level, mediated by the lexical level, establishes the links between more distant conceptual units that cannot be readily activated in the monolingual conceptual network. The activation of distant concepts in turn may result in launching more distant associations, the process underlying divergent thinking. 6. L E M M A A N D W O R D F O R M M E D I AT E D C R O S S-L A N G U A G E T R A N S F E R

This chapter proposes that experience with two languages may enhance the lexical-conceptual routes in bilingual memory, which facilitates cross-language transfer. The latter occurs due to the mutual activation of language units representing translation equivalents in bilinguals’ languages. Cross-language transfer may assist the spreading activation in the conceptual network and therefore result in a greater span of associations in the bilingual conceptual system compared to the monolingual one. Kecskes and Papp (2000) spoke about a similar phenomenon that they called “bidirectional transfer.” The notion of cross-language transfer is based on the theory that communication between translation equivalents in bilinguals’ languages is concept mediated (see Kroll & de Groot 1997, for a discussion). Following the concept-mediated model, the translation equivalents in L1 and L2 lexicons activate each other through the corresponding conceptual units. For example, the word “cat” in English and its German translation “die Katze” share the same set of conceptual units (such as “4 paws,” “a tail,” “an animal,” “a meow,” etc.) that mediate between lexical units in these two lexicons. A bilingual variant of primed lexical decision tasks supports this notion by showing that semantically related words in different languages prime each other (e.g., Zeelenberg & Pecher 2003; Kroll & Tokowicz 2005). The present study goes one step further and suggests that once activated, these lexical units may send partial activation to the conceptual representations of objects, events, etc. that are lexically related to


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the given ones. In the framework of the distributed lexical/conceptual feature model, this activation can take place on two levels of processing: the lexical-semantic level, on which conceptual representations sharing the same lemmas can be activated (e.g., the figurative meaning of the word “cat” as in “cat burglar” in English, or the figurative meaning of the word “Katze” as in “die Katze im Sack kaufen” /to buy a pig in a poke/ in German); and the lexical features level, on which conceptual representations sharing the same word forms can be activated (e.g., “marker” in English and “marka” /stamp/ in Russian). 6.1. Lemma-Mediated Activation The lemma-mediated activation is believed to work as follows. A word in L1 activates corresponding lemmas in the L1 lexicon, which in turn, activate the corresponding conceptual features. The conceptual features send partial activation back to the L2 lexicon, which activates the corresponding L2 lemmas. These lemmas, once activated, may send partial activation to the conceptual features representing concepts that share this lemma with the target word. In the cat/Katze example, the presentation of the English word “cat” to English-German bilinguals activates a lemma {cat} in the English lexicon (see Figure 2). This lemma in turn sends activation to conceptual features that represent the literal meaning of a cat; additionally, it may send a partial activation to the conceptual representation of the alternative meaning of the lemma {cat} such as the one in the “cat burglar.” Thus, the conceptual representation of BURGLAR is activated. At the same time, the conceptual representation of a cat sends partial activation back to the lemma level in the German lexicon thereby activating the lemma {Katze}. This lemma, once activated, may in turn send partial activation to the conceptual representation of the additional meaning of the lemma {Katze} such as the one in “die Katze im Sack kaufen.” Accordingly, the latter may send partial activation back to the lemma level in the English lexicon thereby activating a set of lemmas corresponding to the idiom “to buy a pig in a poke,” an English translation equivalent to the German expression. Therefore, among the others, the lemma {pig} is activated and in turn triggers its corresponding conceptual features. As a result, a large pattern of conceptual representations is activated that allows simultaneous exploration of unrelated concepts



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Conceptual features level

(4) (6) (2)

(7)

L1

(8)

(5) (3)

pig

buy

poke

cat

kaufen

Katze

L2 Sack

Lemma level to buy a pig in a poke

die KatzeimSack kaufen

(1)

“cat” Lexical features level

(a)

“cat” (1)

{cat} (2)

CAT

(3)

CAT BURGLAR

(5)

{Katze} (6)

(4)

TO BUY A PIG IN A POKE “Die KatzeimSack kaufen” (7)

{pig} (8)

PIG

BURGLAR

Figure 2. Illustration of a lemma mediated spreading activation underlying cross-language transfer. Schematic representation of (a) a fragment of bilingual memory structure, and (b) the information flow in bilingual memory. Bilingual memory consists of the distributed lexical features level, language specific lemma level, and distributed conceptual features level. The presentation of the English word “cat” activates a lemma cat in the English lexicon (1) This lemma in turn activates conceptual features that represent the literal meaning of a cat (2) as well as the conceptual representation of the additional meaning of the lemma cat such as the one in the “cat burglar” (3) Thereby the conceptual representation of BURGLAR is activated (4) At the same time, the conceptual representation of a cat sends partial activation back to the lemma level in German lexicon thereby activating a lemma Katze (5) This lemma sends partial activation to the conceptual representation of the additional meaning of the lemma Katze such as the one in “die Katze im Sack kaufen” (6) Accordingly, the latter sends partial activation back to the lemma level in English lexicon thereby activating a set of lemmas corresponding to the idiom “to buy a pig in a poke.” Therefore, among the others, a lemma pig is activated (7) and in turn, triggers its corresponding conceptual features (8).

(such as BURGLAR and PIG) from distant categories (such as [crime] and [animal]). It is important to note, however, that this schema is rather speculative and requires empirical investigation.


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6.2. Word Form-Mediated Activation Furthermore, this study proposes that lemma-mediated cross-language transfer is facilitated by lexical features level activation. Words that share the same word forms (e.g., orthographic, phonological) may activate each other in the same way that words with similar lexical properties activate each other in the monolingual memory (e.g., Allopenna et al. 1998). This assumption was inspired by the findings of eye-tracking studies showing that cross-linguistic homophones tend to activate each other (e.g., Marian & Spivey 2003). Marian and her colleagues recorded the eye movements of Russian-English bilinguals while giving them instructions in one language (e.g., “Podnimi marku” /Pick up the stamp/ ). The recording showed that while participants’ eyes focused on the stamp they also looked briefly at the objects with a phonologically similar name in another language (e.g., a marker, /flomaster/ in Russian). Similar results were obtained in research on cross-linguistic orthographic priming with French-English bilinguals (Bijeljac-Babic et al. 1997). In the lexical decision task, orthographically related words in French and English tended to inhibit each other, indicating that printed strings of letters can simultaneously activate lexical representations in each of the bilingual’s languages. Thus, semantically unrelated words in bilingual lexicons can activate each other if they share similar lexical features. This assumption accords with the distributed lexical/conceptual feature model that presumes a set of distributed lexical features shared by both lexicons. Common lexical features can send the activation to the lemmas in different languages thereby initiating the lemma-mediated cross-language transfer. For example, the oral presentation of the English word “marker” to English-Russian bilinguals may activate a set of phonological features that are present in both “marker” and “marka.” These features therefore activate the lemma {marker} in the English lexicon and the lemma {stamp} in the Russian lexicon. These lemmas in turn activate the conceptual representations of the marker and the stamp, which appear to be unrelated in a monolingual lexicon. As a result, concepts from distant unrelated categories are activated, which may promote divergent thinking in bilinguals to a greater extent than in their monolingual counterparts.



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7. T H E E F F E C T S O F C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C EXPERIENCE ON DIVERGENT THINKING IN THE F R A M E W O R K O F T H E B I L I N G U A L M E M O RY M O D E L

In the framework of bilingual memory proposed in this study, cross-linguistic experience is theorized to have an influence on the lexical-conceptual routes by establishing stronger and more efficient connections between conceptual and lexical representations. The following subsections discuss the possible influence of the age of L2 acquisition and language proficiency on the communication routes between these representations. More efficient communication in bilingual memory may promote a greater activation flow that simultaneously activates concepts from distant categories and therefore may result in superior divergent thinking performance. Note, however, that these assumptions are speculative and require extensive empirical investigation. 7.1. Age of L2 Acquisition Individuals who acquired both of their languages early in life may develop a greater sensitivity to underlying concepts and more refined connections between lexical and conceptual representations. If bilinguals acquired both of their languages early and underwent an equal development in both languages, they might be able to establish equally strong direct links from both lexicons to the conceptual system. These links can be reinforced by a constant exposure to both languages in combination with frequent language switching. Thus, bilinguals who acquired their languages early in life would have two equally developed lexical systems connected to a shared conceptual one. This presumably fosters cross-language transfer by providing fast routing of informational exchange between both lexicons and the concepts. On the other hand, individuals who acquired their L2 later in life first establish the links between their L1 lexicon and their conceptual system. During L2 learning they initially access the meanings for L2 words through L1 and only later become able to conceptually mediate L2 directly. The shift from reliance on L1 to direct conceptual processing of L2 may result in creating an asymmetry in lexical access (see Kroll & de Groot 1997). Late bilinguals would have more lexical-conceptual


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connections from L1 than from L2, and the strength of these links would be different for first and second languages. Due to lexical access asymmetry, more conceptual features can be accessed through L1 than through L2. Since the vast majority of the conceptual system in late bilinguals was established during L1 acquisition, and since L2 lexical features were mapped to the conceptual features through the L1 lexicalconceptual route, there might be fewer shared conceptual features that have direct links from both lexicons in the memory of individuals who acquired L2 later in life. This may result in a less efficient cross-language transfer, and consequently in poorer divergent thinking performance. Indeed, this study shows that bilinguals who acquired L2 earlier in life outperformed those who acquired L2 later on the fluency and flexibility ATTA measures. 7.2. Language Proficiency The influence of the age of L2 acquisition on modifications in bilingual memory can theoretically be complimented by the effect of language proficiency. If the age of L2 acquisition may determine the directions of lexical-conceptual routes, the proficiency in L1 and L2 may determine the strength of connections between the lexical and conceptual systems. The degree of linguistic skills may influence the intensity of lexical access: greater language proficiency may result in establishing stronger and more elaborate links to the conceptual system. As a result, more concepts become readily available for cross-language transfer. Following this assumption, bilinguals who attained high expertise in both languages would have stronger and more efficient links between lexical and conceptual levels then those who were not able to develop any of their languages to a high degree. Thus, bilinguals highly proficient in both languages would employ the cross-language transfer mechanism more effectively and therefore may show greater divergent thinking performance compared to their less proficient counterparts. The present study supports this theory by showing that bilinguals with higher composite PNT score scored higher on the elaboration ATTA measure. Altogether, both factors in cross-linguistic experience are theorized to influence connections between lexical and conceptual representations



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in bilingual memory. Early bilinguals may develop equally elaborated direct links between the L1 and L2 lexicons and the conceptual system, whereas late bilinguals are likely to develop an asymmetrical system, in which L1 mediated route is more elaborated than L2 mediated one. In the same fashion, bilinguals with greater expertise in both languages would establish stronger links between the L1 and L2 lexicons and the conceptual system compared to their less linguistically proficient counterparts. The highly developed lexical-conceptual routes may facilitate the cross-language transfer, which in turn, as proposed above, may promote divergent thinking. 8. C O N C L U S I O N

In this chapter several research questions pertinent to the influence of bilingual development on individuals’ divergent thinking abilities were explored. First, bilingual participants were found to outperform their monolingual counterparts in fluency, flexibility, and elaboration, but not in originality in divergent thinking. These findings provide an explanation for the apparent contradiction between bilinguals’ superiority over monolinguals on creativity tests in the lab setting and no performance differences between the representatives of these two groups in real life creativity. This study claims that being bilingual does not necessary imply being creative. Bilinguals’ advantage was found for the divergent thinking traits that refer to simultaneous activation and elaboration of multiple unrelated concepts from distinct categories, but not for the trait that deals with the ability to extract unique and original solutions. Thus, the positive effect of bilingualism on creative abilities is likely to be limited to basic cognitive processing, which lays the foundation of more sophisticated processing during which truly creative ideas may be extracted. The effectiveness of the latter cognitive processes, however, might be influenced by various developmental factors different from bilingualism (e.g., intelligence, education, motivation, personal experience). Second, the cross-language transfer is proposed as a cognitive mechanism underlying divergent thinking. A specific architecture of bilingual memory in which two lexicons are mutually linked to the


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conceptual system is argued to facilitate this process. Due to elaborative cross-language transfer, different concepts from unrelated categories can be activated simultaneously, which may account for bilinguals’ greater performance on fluency, flexibility, and elaboration in divergent thinking. Two factors in bilingual development are proposed to facilitate cross-language transfer. The age of L2 acquisition might determine the way bilinguals’ two lexicons are connected to their conceptual system. Language proficiency might enrich the links between bilinguals’ lexicons and their conceptual system. Together, these factors of cross-linguistic experience are assumed to play an important role in establishing an elaborated lexical-conceptual system in bilingual memory that is theorized to facilitate the cross-language transfer assisting divergent thinking. However, this claim warrants further empirical investigation. Third, although no significant correlation was found between bilinguals’ cross-cultural experience and their divergent thinking performance, several particularly important directions for future research into bilingualism could be advanced. Bilingualism should be studied not only in the context of individuals’ linguistic abilities, but also in a sociocultural context. The psychological ramifications of living in two cultures on an individual’s behavior and reflections on the impact of cross-cultural experience on the conceptual system open a new line of research on biculturalism that should bring together the efforts of cognitive and social psychologists. Moreover, disregarding the joint operation of these factors puts research outside the mainstream of psychological investigation. Furthermore, in studying the psychological effects of cross-cultural experience, one should carefully examine the time and circumstances of this experience. In addition, the peculiarities of the cultures to which an individual is exposed should be taken into account. In this regard, a question that needs to be answered is what cultural cues might have an effect on the conceptual changes that presumably influence the individual’s cognitive development. Finally, the findings of this study also lend indirect support to the creative cognition approach (Ward et al. 1999). On one side, bilinguals seem to utilize the same cognitive mechanisms of concept formation and lexical access that are used by all people. On the other, they tend



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to show greater divergent thinking abilities. Thus, the various uses of mundane cognitive functioning may result in superior divergent thinking performance. Altogether, this study emphasizes the importance of bilingual education. Most of the policy debates over bilingual education have turned on issues relating to implementation, assessment and whether existing programs provide appropriate job training. Lost in much of the oftenangry disputes (e.g., the “Unz Initiative” – Prop. 227 in California) is a central question: Does bilingual education have a particular and measurable impact on cognitive functioning? This study provides a hint of the contribution of bilingualism to cognitive development in children. In particular, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural factors in bilingual education might be beneficial for individuals’ cognitive growth and creative abilities. With the latter, the idea that a high level of creative performance can be stimulated by reinforcing the same cognitive functions that are used in everyday activities suggests the importance of encouraging creative factors in education (Schank & Clearly 1995). In this direction, the methodologies of bilingual education should be studied with the potential to look into educational programs that are oriented towards creativity. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research reported in this article was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (No. BCS-0414013). Many thanks to Aneta Pavlenko for her comments on the draft version of this article and to Istvan Kecskes and Liliana Albertazzi for advice and their thorough editing of the volume. I also thank Edward Carlstedt for the proofreading of the earlier draft of this article. NOTES 1. One of the widely used definitions of creativity indicates that this is an ability to produce work that is novel (i.e., original or unexpected), appropriate (i.e., useful or meets task constraints; e.g., Sternberg & Lubart 1995), and can be “put to some use” (Martindale 1989, p. 211).

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2. The term “culture” has numerous overlapping meanings that sometimes are misleading and provide unclear definitions. Traditional associations with the word “culture” refer to the art, knowledge, and sophistication gained through exposure to the art exemplars as well as to the artistic and literary heritage of a particular nation. In this work, culture reflects social and anthropological aspects of human behavior. It is defined as a set of beliefs, moral norms, customs, practice, and social behavior of a particular nation or group of people whose shared beliefs and practices identify the particular place, class, or time to which they belong. 3. The present study defines bilingualism in the broadest possible terms including individuals who are fluent in at least two languages, individuals who actively use, or attempt to use, more than one language, even if they have not achieved fluency in the second language (Kroll & de Groot 1997). 4. The CEC was introduced to account for a strong argument in acculturation literature that the age of arrival and the length of residence in a new country are conceptually different and have different implications for immigrants of different ages (e.g., Birman & Trickett 2001). Individuals who were exposed to different cultures early or late in life may develop perceptual differences of L1 and L2 cultural values, which might be rooted in variations in their cognitive functioning. The present study assumes that it is prudent to measure the length and the age of individuals’ exposure to both cultures since the frequency and recency of exposure to different cultural settings may have impact on the cognitive system. 5. Note that they were overwhelmingly immigrants from the former Soviet Union residing in Brooklyn, and therefore might have been influenced by the pervasive Russian immigrant community of Brooklyn. 6. The distributed nature of the lexical features presumes that the same word forms can be shared by words in each language. For example, a word “marker” in English shares phonological features with a Russian word “marka” /stamp/. This is a particularly important notion for understanding a phenomenon of a cross-language transfer as discussed below in a section on the word form mediated association routes in bilingual memory.

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PART 2 BILINGUAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING


PART 2 BILINGUAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING


CHAPTER 7

TA S K A N D C O N T E X T E F F E C T S I N B I L I N G U A L LEXICAL PROCESSING Ton Dijkstra Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information, Nijmegen

Abstract All language users are aware of the ambiguity of words and the role that context plays to reduce this ambiguity. For instance, a word like “bank” will have a different meaning when one is talking about cash flow or about water flow. Thus, which semantic representation is ultimately derived from the lexicon must somehow be affected by context information. It is also clear that the task at hand must affect the type of lexical information that is selected for use. When one must name a word, its pronunciation or phonology needs to be retrieved, whereas allocating the object named to a semantic category requires a response based on word meaning. Although these facts are obvious to anyone, it is quite common in psycholinguistics to ignore the effects of task and context and talk about general models for particular domains of language processing. Researchers have a tendency to speak about, for instance, models of word recognition and parsing, as if performance would not depend on the actual circumstance in which it occurs. Fortunately, there is an increasing interest in the effects of task demands and different types of context on language processing. In this chapter, we consider this issue for the domain of bilingual word recognition. In the first part of the chapter, I describe a model for bilingual word recognition that gives only a rudimentary account of context and task effects. To demonstrate that this will not do, a number of reaction time studies are discussed next, showing the effects of different types of context on bilingual lexical processing. It will become evident that different types of context may affect word recognition in different ways. Later, in the second part of the chapter, the proposed bilingual word recognition model is therefore extended to include a system that explicitly takes into account task and context aspects. Finally, I will illustrate that the extended model is compatible not only with reaction time data, but also with data from electrophysiological and neuroimaging techniques.



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TO N D I J K S T R A

1. T H E L A N G U A G E U S E R F R A M E W O R K

Simply put, psycholinguists consider the processes of understanding and producing language in terms of computations that transform mental representations of different kinds. For instance, after entering the ear, an input speech signal is represented as a phonetic/phonological representation of sounds. Next, in a number of steps this phonetic/phonological representation of the utterance is recoded into a meaning representation. In order to do so, knowledge about language (e.g., syntactic rules) and the world needs to be retrieved from long-term memory, temporary products of processing need to be stored in a working memory, and the whole process must be monitored to detect possible derailments in an early stage. This requires cognitive control and the investment of attentional capacity. In all, language processing requires a number of complex components. The Language User Framework (Dijkstra & Kempen 1984, 1993; Dijkstra & De Smedt 1996) gives a functional analysis of the most important subprocesses that must be involved in monolingual and bilingual language processing. One of its basic assumptions is that language processing can be considered as a globally modular process with locally interactive components. As Figure 1 shows, the Language User Framework contains a number of structural and processing components that all play a role in language processing. First, it is concerned with structural units, such as representations (e.g., phonemes and words) and rules (e.g., morphosyntax), stored in Long Term Memory (LTM). Second, it must consist of processing components (“machines” or devices) that are dedicated to perform specific linguistic operations (e.g., parsing) on these representations and rules. Not indicated in the figure, but very important nevertheless, are components subserving working memory to temporally store intermediate products, and components involving cognitive control, attention, and monitoring that are concerned with the allocation of mental effort and checking procedures. 2. PA RT 1 : T H E B I A M O D E L

The Language User Framework in Figure 1 is too general to be considered a model of language processing. Zooming in on a component,


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TA S K A N D C O N T E X T E F F E C T S

Discourse comprehension

Discourse planning Conceptual system

Sentence parser

Conceptual memory

Grammatical encoder Formulator

Syntax Phonological encoder

Word recognizer Lexicon & morphology

Signal recognizer

Phonology

Articulator, motor control

Knowledge sources

Figure 1. The language user framework.

such as the word recognition system, requires a specification of the processes executed by that component; in other words a model of that component’s processing. In 1998, we extended a model for monolingual word recognition called the Interactive Activation (IA) model (McClelland & Rumelhart 1981) to the bilingual domain. The resulting bilingual model was called the Bilingual Interactive Activation or BIA model (Grainger & Dijkstra 1992; Dijkstra & Van Heuven 1998; Van Heuven et al. 1998). Both the IA and BIA models are computational models (i.e., they are implemented on the computer) of a localist connectionist type. As can be seen in Figure 2, the BIA model consists of four levels of representations corresponding to letter features, letters, words, and language membership. It assumes that the recognition of a word proceeds by deriving the characteristics of the letters in different positions in the words from LTM, activating the letter units they form and then the word candidates these letters make up. Next, language membership information may become active and, at the same time, activated word units may send activation back to their constituent letters. Thus, word recognition


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English

Dutch Language

Word

Letter

Dutch words

English words

pos 1

pos 4 pos 2

Feature

pos 3

pos 1

pos 4 pos 2

pos 3

Visual input

Figure 2. The bilingual interactive activation (BIA) model.



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is seen as a dynamic process with a kind of resonance between word and letter level in lexical memory (i.e., the mental lexicon). Although this model is considered to be a localist connectionist network, it may be noted that information about words is not only stored in the word nodes themselves (symbolically), but also in their constituent letters (subsymbolically and in a distributed way). The BIA model is a model for bilingual word recognition, because the lexical information can consist of words from several languages, and because each word unit is connected to a language node, which is a kind of tag indicating the word’s language membership. Note that the model does not require any special mechanism to account for bilingual word recognition relative to monolingual processing (cf. Paradis 2004). In other words, apart from adding second-language (L2) words and language membership information, no special provisions are asked for. This view has two immediate consequences, one for lexical structure and the other for lexical processing – The mental lexicon of bilinguals is integrated; that is, there is no qualitative distinction between words of one language or the other (assuming, of course, that the same orthography is used in the input); – When a particular input is processed, the model initially does not make any distinction between words from the first or second language. This language nonselective lexical access arises because word recognition is an automatic process in which language membership information becomes active only after word candidates have been activated. The BIA model has been used to simulate or mimic bilingual word recognition for different types of items. These types are “standard” words that exist in only one language of the bilingual and have a low or high frequency of usage in that language (e.g., the English words BLIGHT and BRIGHT); “standard” words that have different numbers of similar words (neighbors) within the same or another language (e.g., LYNX vs. WALK); and “special” words that have the same orthographic form across languages (interlingual homographs, such as ROOM, meaning “cream” in Dutch) or the same phonological form across languages


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(interlingual homophones, such as COW, sounding like the Dutch word KOU, meaning “cold”). Because the BIA model represents only the orthographic characteristics of words, it was not suited to simulate the recognition of translation equivalents with more or less similar (orthographic) forms (e.g., cognates, such as TOMATO and TOMAAT). In this paper, we will consider especially how late Dutch-English bilinguals (in particular, students) process interlingual homographs and cognates. In spite of the restrictions on the stimulus materials the model can cope with, it has had some impact on views of bilingual word recognition, because as an implemented (or computational) model, it has some real advantages relative to a merely verbal model. First of all, it provides an explicit well-specified theoretical framework. Second, the obligation to make a computer model actually work provides an inherent test of the completeness, consistency, and coherence of the theoretical framework underlying the model, because it makes the modeler aware of gaps and flaws in theoretical reasoning. Third, a model allows the derivation of quantitative predictions, even for interactions between several independent variables at the same time. Such predictions are impossible to make by a “model” that is only verbally specified. On the other hand, the implementation of a model may lead to relative inflexibility or oversimplification of viewpoints. This is especially true with respect to task and context effects, which are often underspecified anyway. Because empirical data patterns may be quite sensitive to context factors and task demands, models not only need components for representations and processes, but also a “task account” and a “context account.” 2.1. Types of Context Note that context is a rather broad term that can be used for many different aspects of language processing. In this chapter, we will consider effects of the following types of context on bilingual word recognition: (1) The lexical items from the same or another language similar to the target word (e.g., the Dutch reading of an English target word that is a Dutch-English homograph); (2) Stimulus list composition (e.g., whether the list contains items from one or from two languages);



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(3) Task demands (e.g., whether the task is lexical decision or naming); (4) Lexical items (primes) preceding the item in question (target); (5) The preceding sentence; (6) The instruction the participant received. In every-day language comprehension, many of these context types (and others) are present that may affect the recognition of words. In the following sections, we will give a compact review of experimental studies (mostly done in our lab) with respect to such context effects on the recognition of interlingual homographs and cognates. 2.2. Interlingual Homographs (IHs) As explained above, an interlingual homograph is a word that is orthographically identical but semantically different across languages. Examples of Dutch-English interlingual homographs are ROOM (meaning “cream”), ANGEL (meaning “sting”), and LIST (meaning “trick”). Interestingly enough, Dutch-English bilinguals seldom notice that there is something “special” about song titles like “White Room” by the pop group Cream, “Angel Eyes” by Sting, and the film title “Schindler’s List” by Spielberg. Several studies have shown that the result patterns obtained for interlingual homograph processing depend on stimulus list composition and task demands. For instance, Dijkstra et al. (1998b) had Dutch-English bilinguals perform three variants of the lexical decision task: an English lexical decision task with IHs, but without exclusively Dutch words; an English lexical decision with IHs and Dutch words (the latter requiring a “no” response); and a generalized lexical decision task with IHs and Dutch words, in which both English and Dutch words required a “yes” response. Among the stimulus materials were IHs of four different frequency categories: HFE–HFD (BAD), HFE–LFD (LIST), LFE–HFE (BOOM), and LFE–LFD (SMART). Other items included were onelanguage matched English controls, nonwords derived from English words, and, in Experiments 2 and 3, exclusively Dutch words. The result patterns in the three experiments were quite different for the IHs relative to their matched purely English controls. The first experiment led to about the same reaction times for IHs and English controls, while the second led to inhibition and the third to facilitation. The conclusion on the basis of this study was that, assuming a similar underlying lexical


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process in the three experiments (language nonselective access and parallel activation of both readings of the IHs), differences in task demands can lead to a clear modulation of the actual performance patterns. A later study by Schulpen et al. (2003) showed that the lexical retrieval process and the task/decision processes associated with these variants of the lexical decision task are established relatively early in L2 learning and do not qualitatively change over the next couple of years. The authors conducted the same three experiments with four different proficiency groups (but with three frequency categories, excluding the LFD–LFD category) of Dutch-English bilinguals: 15-year-old high school students, 17-year-old high school students, students of psychology, and Ph.D. students/university researchers. All result patterns were very similar across proficiency groups for Experiments 2 and 3; only for Experiment 1, there was some change in result patterns across proficiency groups. Several conclusions can be drawn on the basis of this study. First, there were systematic effects of list composition and task demands in the three different variants of the lexical decision task. Furthermore, word recognition processes and task demands were applied in an analogous fashion by bilinguals varying widely in age (15–45) and L2 proficiency. Finally, the automatization of L2 processing apparently took place at an earlier stage of L2 proficiency, and the observed degree of cognitive control in lexical decision was limited. The importance of stimulus list composition and instruction for IH effects was further demonstrated by Dijkstra et al. (2000a). DutchEnglish bilinguals performed an English lexical decision task in which they were instructed to say “no” to Dutch words; however, Dutch words were in fact presented only in the second half of the experiment. Two opposing predictions were formulated. If top-down effects based on expectations were strong, the information in the instruction that IHs would be presented should be an important determinant of the response pattern. In this case, the RTs to IHs should be the same in both halves of the experiment (like Dijkstra et al. 1998a, Experiment 1). However, if bottom-up effects on stimulus list composition were predominant, the RT patterns should differ between the two halves of the experiment. The evidence clearly favored the second prediction. Stimulus list composition



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and not instruction determined the presence of the inhibition effect. It was not present in the first half of the experiment, but arose immediately upon presentation of the first Dutch item. Stimulus list composition was also varied in several studies investigating the effects of cross-linguistic phonological (P) similarity in IHs. These studies involved interlingual homophones, that is, items that have phonological overlap across languages, such as COW (English) and KOU (Dutch). Dijkstra et al. (1999) systematically manipulated the between-language overlap of orthography, phonology, and semantics. In an English lexical decision task, effects of orthographic and semantic similarity across languages led to facilitation relative to purely English control words, while phonological overlap led to inhibition. In a follow-up study, Lemhöfer and Dijkstra (2004) examined the role of task demands by comparing the results in language-specific English and generalized Dutch-English lexical decision tasks. The result patterns indicated that responses to IHs are based on the fastest available of the two codes (L1 or L2) appropriate for the task at hand. In the generalized lexical decision task, the fastest available code that can be used for responding is the Dutch (L1) orthographic code. However, in the language-specific English (L2) lexical decision task, the response cannot be made before the English code is accessed and its language membership is verified. The observed result pattern can be explained by assuming that the time-course of word identification was different for Dutch (faster for L1) and English (slower for L2). Similarly, phonological effects also appeared to be most prominent when they became available early in a language that could not be used for responding (e.g., when L2 was the target language). On the whole, recent studies (including, e.g., the work by Jared) support the view that task demands, stimulus list composition, and L2 proficiency may affect the presence/absence of phonological effects, and even their direction (facilitatory or inhibitory). A complicating factor in the available studies is that the interlingual homophones are matched one by one to control items using a native speaker’s (L1) database. However, the conditions are perhaps not comparable in terms of the subjective L2 frequencies for bilinguals (we often do not know how the L2 word frequency for the bilingual differs from the L1 frequency for a native speaker) and, given


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the limitations in the number of items that can be found in a language, the conditions may further differ in terms of their item’ frequency distributions. A study by Dijkstra et al. (in preparation) also observed strong effects of the type of task that is performed on cross-linguistic effects. These authors manipulated the degree of cross-linguistic orthographic (O) similarity in cognates. Examples of cognate pairs with an increasing cross-linguistic form overlap are Dutch-English cognate pairs like COLOR-KLEUR, WHEEL-WIEL, HOPE-HOOP, BAKERBAKKER, and ALARM-ALARM. Dutch-English bilinguals performed either a progressive demasking task or an English lexical decision task including these items or one-language control words. In progressive demasking (PDM), the participant must identify a target word when its presentation is alternated with that of a mask. Mask presentation time decreases while target presentation time increases. In lexical decision, the participant decides if a presented letter string is an existing word or not. The results were quite different for the two tasks, even though the tasks usually correlate about 0.90 in many other studies (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1999). In the progressive demasking task, no clear differences in reaction times were found between cognates varying in cross-linguistic similarity, and all RTs differed nonsignificantly from those to matched English controls. Instead, in the English lexical decision task, reaction time differences did occur between cognates and controls, which increased with the similarity between the two cognate members. The largest effects (of about 40 ms) were found for identical cognates. The explanation for the different results in the two tasks can be sought in the different task demands. In PDM, the item must be uniquely identified, which implies that cross-linguistic similarity may help and hinder the response at the same time. In English lexical decision, in contrast, the participant’s response can be based on global activation in the lexicon. Thus, cross-linguistic similarity or any link between the two cognate representations helps to facilitate the response. As a conclusion, it appears that even the strong effects of cognates are task dependent. Thus, to fully understand bilingual lexical processing, the relationship between the language processing system and contextual factors such as task demands must be clarified. Because the size,



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direction, and type of effects may depend on the specific contextual factor involved, developing a systematic and testable account of different types of contexts is indispensable. In the second part of this chapter, we describe an extension of the BIA model that incorporates the effects of task and context. Next, some studies that have tested how this “BIA+ model” might be implemented in the brain are reported. The chapter ends with some general conclusions/perspectives for future research.

3. PA RT I I : T H E B I A + M O D E L

From a general point of view, there are two ways in which contextual factors may affect language processing. One possibility is that the effects of context cannot be considered apart from the process of lexical activation. In other words, bilingual processing varies qualitatively and quantitatively due to strong interactions with many different types of contextual factors. If this dynamic situation were the case, the best we might do as experimenters analyzing language processing would be to make an ordered list of more and less important factors in various circumstances. Fortunately, however, it appears that there is more stability to lexical processing than an extremely interactive view would predict. Some context factors (e.g., the type of task performed) have systematic effects on processing, which can be isolated from the underlying processes and representations. In line with this latter position, the BIA+ model assumes that there is a lexical system subserving processes that remain relatively unaffected in different contexts and task situations, and a decision system that uses the output of the lexical processing system in accordance with the task at hand. Thus, the BIA+ model extends the earlier BIA model (described above) by adding a task/decision system that uses lexical activation in accordance with task and context (Figure 3). As a consequence, observed response patterns will vary systematically across experimental conditions. The BIA+ model differs from the BIA model also in terms of its representations. It incorporates orthographic, phonological, and semantic representations that are assumed to interact within the


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Task schema

· Specific processing steps for task in hand · Receives continuous input from the identification system

·

Decision criteria determine when a response is made based on relevant codes

Identification system Language nodes

L1/L2

Lexical orthography

Sublexical orthography

Semantics

Lexical phonology

Sublexical phonology

Figure 3. The bilingual interactive activation + (BIA+) model.

language processing system. Because lexical representations are integrated within syntactic representations in sentence comprehension, the linguistic context of a target word is assumed to affect lexical processing as well. However, the task/decision system (and non-linguistic contextual factors) cannot directly modulate the activation of L1 and L2 words. Observed performance patterns will vary with changes in the types of activated codes that are used to perform the task at hand, and depend on the settings of response criteria (e.g., fast responding with high risk of error, or slow accurate responding). Additionally, the BIA+ model assumes that there is no top-down effect of the task on lexical activation. An alternative view would be that



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suppression of non-target language activation occurs when such suppression would be beneficial in a task situation. In that case, such suppression should become visible in RTs relative to a similar task situation where no suppression is needed. However, so far there is little evidence in support of this view, as the studies reviewed above attest. According to IH studies, no top-down suppression of the non-target reading of an IH occurred. Similarly, Dutch effects of phonological similarity were present even in exclusively English lexical decision tasks. Furthermore, English control items were not affected by changes in stimulus list composition or task demands, even though one would expect them to be if the relative activation of words from different languages changes with the task situation. In the experiment with two halves (Dijkstra et al. 2000a), English control items had almost the same RT in the two parts (581 ms in part 1 vs. 592 ms in part 2). Similarly, the control conditions in the three experiments by Dijkstra et al. (1998b) had nearly the same RTs across very different task situations (maximum 15 ms difference), just like the control conditions in De Groot et al. (2000). Finally, the results of mixed and pure PDM experiments correlated 0.98 for English and Dutch targets (Van Heuven et al. 1998). This indicates that the result patterns were the same irrespective of whether the lists contained words from one or from two languages. In conclusion, at present, there is no convincing RT evidence that the relative activation of words from two languages (“relative language activation”) is modulated by task demands or participant strategies. Thus with respect to word reading, there is no strong support for top-down feedback dependent on a bilingual’s expectations as in the “language mode” hypothesis (Grosjean 1997). In recent years, the BIA+ model has been subjected to empirical tests of different kinds. One interesting issue is to what extent studies measuring brain activity (e.g., using ERPs and fMRI) support different assumptions made by the BIA+ model. We will consider some recent evidence from our lab in the last part of this chapter. The first study to be reviewed examined how the BIA+ model could be extended to account for semantic priming in bilinguals; the second study investigated cognate effects in sentence contexts; and the third study tested if the distinction in the BIA+ model between a word identification system and a task/decision system can be mapped onto brain areas.


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3.1. Semantic Priming of Interlingual Homographs in Dutch-English Bilinguals: RT and ERP Evidenc Kerkhofs et al. (2006) formulated a variant of the BIA+ model to account for bilingual semantic priming of IHs and conducted an RT and an EventRelated-Potential (ERP) study to test this model. The model, depicted in Figure 4, assumes parallel activation of both readings of an IH. As we know from RT studies reviewed above, in an English lexical decision task, the recognition of the English reading of the IHs will be affected by competition from the Dutch reading. This inhibition will be largest for those items that have a low-frequency reading in English and a high-frequency reading in Dutch. However, if each IH target is preceded by a semantically related English prime, low-frequency English items should benefit most from the support; due to semantic priming, the target reading is strengthened and becomes less sensitive to competition by the non-target reading. For instance, if the target word ANGEL is preceded by the prime HEAVEN, the English target reading (“heavenly messenger”) should suffer less from the competition by the Dutch target reading (“sting”) than when the prime word is unrelated (e.g., BUSH). Dutch-English bilinguals performed an English lexical decision task on the target, which was preceded by the semantically related or unrelated prime. Reaction times did indeed show that (a) IHs with high-frequency Dutch readings were processed slower than matched IHs with low-frequency Dutch readings in the unrelated condition; (b) the conditions that suffered most from competition in the unrelated condition also benefited most from primes in the related condition. Furthermore, in the ERP study, an effect was found of semantic relatedness in the N400. The English frequency of an IH modulated the size of N400 effect, as was evident from an observed interaction between relatedness, English frequency, and midline electrodes. There was also a main effect of Dutch frequency on the N400: When the Dutch frequency of IH was higher, the ERP pattern was shifted in a more negative direction. Therefore, the study allows for a number of conclusions. First, a semantic priming effect was found in both the RT and ERP data (N400) for interlingual homographs processed in a second language (L2); both L1 (Dutch) and L2 (English) frequency affected the size and nature of the N400 effect; and there were consistent cross-linguistic



“yes”

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Response level

SD Lexical level

OE

“Heaven” prime

OE

OD

“Angel” target

Input level

Figure 4. The BIA+ model variant of semantic priming.

interference effects in RTs and ERPs that support a language nonselective access model. Note that the results are inconsistent with a study by RodriguesFornells et al. (2002). In this study, Catalan-Spanish bilinguals performed a Spanish go/no-go task involving Spanish and Catalan words and pseudowords. The ERPs for these bilinguals neither showed any sensitivity to frequency variations in Catalan (whereas they did for Spanish), nor any differences between Catalan words and pseudowords. On the basis of these results, Rodriguez-Fornells et al. (2005: 1026) concluded that “words from the non-target language are rejected at an early stage before semantic analysis in bilinguals.” In contrast, we found cross-linguistic inhibition that was modulated by the presentation of a semantically related prime word. This indicates that the cross-linguistic effects are, at least to some extent, located at the level of semantic representations. There are several possible explanations for the differences between our results and those of Rodriguez-Fornells et al. For instance, Rodriguez-Fornells et al. examined the ERPs for no-go responses (i.e., no reactions) to words that exist exclusively in one language, while we considered ERPs for lexical decisions to IHs, which are words in two languages. In our opinion, the direct contrast between the two readings of IHs allows the researcher to optimally play out two languages against one another. Thus, ambiguous words should be especially sensitive to cross-linguistic effects. For a more extensive discussion of the ERP results by Rodriguez-Fornells et al. we refer to Grosjean et al. (2003).


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To conclude, the present study indicates that cross-linguistic effects in the ERPs of a second language can occur, thus arguing in favor of a bilingual lexicon that is language nonselective in nature. 3.2. Sentence Priming of Cognates in Dutch-English Bilinguals: RT and ERP Evidence In a study by Dijkstra et al. (in preparation), Dutch-English bilinguals made English lexical decisions on target words that were preceded by a sentence context. The authors applied the technique of Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) and presented each word of a sentence for 345 ms and then replaced it by a blank for 300 ms. The sentence materials that were used were adapted from those by Van Hell (1998), which were rated with respect to several factors including context availability, length, and log word frequency. The target words were Dutch-English non-identical cognates or matched English control words, which fitted in the preceding sentence context with either a high or a low CLOZE probability (a measure of semantic expectation). An example of a sentence including a high CLOZE probability and a cognate target is: The/man/brought/his/sick/son/to/the/doctor. In the RT study, the participants had to make a lexical decision on the word “doctor” (a dot indicated that it was the target word). For the same materials (with a phrase added to avoid wrap-up effects), ERPs were also measured. A number of factors were manipulated in the experiment: cognate status of the target word (cognate/one-language control), semantic constraint of the preceding sentence context (high/low), and the language of the sentence preceding the target word (English/Dutch). In the RT results, main effects were found for semantic constraint and cognate status, but no interaction reached statistical significance. The result pattern in the ERPs, however, showed a more complex interaction between all three manipulated factors. The major conclusions were that cognate effects in RTs and ERPs also occur for cognates in sentences following a language (or code) switch, and that at least three factors affect bilingual word recognition in sentences (cf. Altarriba et al. 1996): the language of the sentence (English/Dutch) preceding the target item, the lexical characteristics of that item, and the semantic constraint between the item and its preceding sentence context. Other studies



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corroborate this view, but it is puzzling that the obtained result patterns appear to differ across studies (Altarriba et al. 1996; Schwartz & Kroll submitted). 3.3. Processing of Interlingual Homographs: RT and fMRI Evidence Van Heuven et al. (submitted) conducted an RT and an fMRI study involving IH processing by monolinguals and Dutch-English bilinguals. One issue they investigated was whether the BIA+ model’s distinction between a language processing system and a task/decision system is reflected in brain activation. Another issue was whether tasks varying in the assumed degree of competition lead to activation differences in areas of the brain that have been associated with cognitive control. Three lexical decision experiments were conducted: an English visual lexical decision task performed by 12 Dutch-English bilinguals; a generalized visual lexical decision task (GVLD) by 12 Dutch-English bilinguals; and an English visual lexical decision task (EVLD) by 12 monolinguals. In the fMRI study, the participants performed the tasks in a 1.5T scanner (letter strings were presented for 500 ms). Analysis of the RT and brain imaging data for the three participant groups in the various tasks showed the following. With respect to the RTs for bilinguals in the EVLD, slower RTs were found for IHs than for controls. In the GVLD, the RTs for the bilinguals were non-significantly different for IHs and controls, and the same held in the EVLD of the monolinguals. In the EVLD, there was more brain activity for the IHs than for Controls in the left inferior/middle frontal gyrus (BA 44/45/46) and in the medial part of superior frontal cortex (BA 32/6/8), which is part of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). In the GVLD, more brain activity was also found for the IHs than for the controls in the left inferior/middle frontal gyrus, but the activity was about the same for IHs and controls in the medial/superior frontal cortex. Finally, there were no brain activation differences for IHs and controls in the EVLD for monolinguals. A comparison of the two tasks (EVLD and GVLD) for the bilinguals indicated strong dACC activity in the EVLD but not in the GVLD, and


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this finding was accompanied by inhibitory effects in the RTs for the IHs in the EVLD. These result patterns for RTs and brain activity can be accounted for when the inhibition effect for IHs in the EVLD is interpreted as evidence for competition between the English and the Dutch readings of the IHs. According to BIA+, such competition takes place not only within the lexicon (lateral inhibition), but also at the level of responding: The English and Dutch readings of the same item are linked to two different and competing responses (“yes” vs. “no”). This view is supported by the brain data. The dACC has been associated with conflict detection and monitoring incompatible responses (Barch et al. 2000; Botvinick et al. 2001; Gehring et al. 2001). The presence of dACC activity in the EVLD can therefore be interpreted as the consequence of response-based conflict for the IHs relative to the controls. (Because the BOLD response for IHs turned out to be higher than for control words and for pseudowords, the observed increased brain activation cannot be ascribed to lexical status.) On the basis of further analyses, Van Heuven et al. reached the conclusion that a whole network of brain areas (also involving basal ganglia and cerebellum) may be recruited to resolve the response conflict for the IHs. To summarize this study, the behavioral results for Dutch-English bilinguals indicate that both readings of an IH become active and compete, whereas the imaging data show that the most involved brain areas are located in the left superior frontal regions (medial part) and bilaterally in the inferior and middle frontal regions. The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is more active when ambiguous language information leads to competing task-relevant responses; more generally, it appears that language conflicts may be resolved with the help of brain areas associated with cognitive control. Again, the results of this study involving IHs are different from those in the fMRI part of the study of Rodriguez-Fornells et al. (2002), mentioned above. According to these authors, their Catalan-Spanish bilinguals were able to effectively block the influences of a second language by using a phonological route to conduct the task at hand. As for the ERP part of the study, it appears that stimulus differences (IHs vs onelanguage words) and/or task differences (lexical decision vs. go/no-go)



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may underlie the observed differences in result patterns (note that a more recent word production study by Rodriguez-Fornells et al. [2005] found evidence supporting language nonselective lexical access.) Altogether, the results of our electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies are in line with the RT studies that support a language nonselective model of lexical access, such as the BIA+ model. In addition, the ERP studies provide some insight in the relationship of RT differences to N400 effects, for example, in semantic priming. The MRI study provides evidence with respect to the distinction between a representational system and cognitive control/task aspects in terms of differently located brain areas. Future research may attempt to extend functional models of bilingual processing (based to a large extent on RT data) to include electrophysiological and neuroimaging data (Dijkstra & Van Heuven, in press). 4. C O N C L U S I O N

Gradually, more and more evidence becomes available with respect to the role various types of context play during the processing of lexical items. The studies discussed here considered such diverse factors as similar lexical items, stimulus list composition, instruction, task demands, and sentence context. It is clear that in the last decade or so bilingual research has collected a considerable corpus of evidence with respect to bilingual word recognition. Nevertheless, a number of important questions remain to be answered and are not discussed extensively. Three of these are the following 1. Do some context factors change the activation of lexical items? Many researchers propose (or implicitly assume) that there is something like a “relative activation of languages,” meaning that all word candidates belonging to one language may be “more active” than the words belonging to another language. The idea that frequency and recency of usage affects the “resting level activation” of words is probably shared by most researchers. Because one language is usually predominant in everyday life, many words of that language are used more often than the words of the second language. The result is a relatively higher activation


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of this language (usually L1). This may be considered the “bottom-up” view of relative language activation. However, some researchers have proposed that other contextual factors such as instruction and expectations about the bilingualism of interlocutors may also affect the relative activation of L1 and L2. This could be called the “top-down” view of relative language activation. Although we do not think that the present evidence is in favor of this view (see above), a more thorough investigation of this issue remains to be done (see Dijkstra & Van Hell [2003] for a discussion of different views on relative language activation). 2. What is the exact nature of the decision criteria and strategies that participants use? As an alternative or complement to changing the relative activation of L1/L2 lexical items, it may be that certain types of contexts affect the setting of the decision criteria that are used to perform the task. However, this view begs the question of how to consider such decision criteria and their sensitivity to local and more global context effects. An even more difficult issue here is whether a task/decision system can be specified to such an extent that it can be implemented in a computational model like the BIA-framework. Given that this problem has been around for over 15 years, it does not seem likely that it will be resolved in the near future. 3. What (on-line) role can language membership information play? An issue that is related to relative language activation and decision criteria, but seldom explicitly considered, concerns the role of language membership information in bilingual word recognition. If a person performs an English lexical decision task incorporating English words, Dutch words, and nonwords, the only way that this task can be reliably executed is by retrieving language information; otherwise, all Dutch words would be given a “yes, it is a word” response (on the basis of their high activation). Nevertheless, it appears that the response times obtained under these types of conditions are hardly different from those in an experiment that incorporates only English words and nonwords (see Dijkstra & Snoeren 2004). The implication is that language membership



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becomes available simultaneously with or very quickly following word identification. In a sentence context, language membership information is available for all words preceding the target word. It is an interesting question whether the language of the preceding sentence is able to facilitate the processing of a subsequent target word. More generally, there is the question whether language membership is a characteristic only of individual words or also of syntactic frames or sentences as a whole. Thus, there are several issues specific to bilingual processing that researchers should turn their attention to in the future. However, the mere fact that researchers are now formulating unique questions with respect to the complex interplay between context and bilingual lexical processing, shows that research in bilingualism has left its infancy and is quickly growing up.

REFERENCES Altarriba, J., Kroll, J., Sholl, A., and Rayner, K. 1996. The influence of lexical and conceptual constraints on reading mixed-language sentences: evidence from eyefixation and naming times. Memory & Cognition, 24: 477–492. Barch, D. M., Sabb, F. W., Braver, T. S., and Noll, D. C. 2000. Anterior cingulate and the monitoring of response conflict: evidence from an fMRI study of verb generation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12: 298–305. Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, M., Carter, C. S., and Cohen, J. D. 2001. Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 108: 624–652. Bruijn, E. R. A. 2006. Testing a model for bilingual semantic priming with interlingual homographs: RT and N400 effects. Brain Research, 1068: 170–183. De Groot, A. M. B., Delmaar, P., and Lupker, S. J. 2000. The processing of interlexical homographs in a bilingual and a monolingual task: support for nonselective access to bilingual memory. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 53: 397–428. Dijkstra, A., Brummelhuis, B., and Lemhöfer, K. in preparation. Task-dependent orthographic similarity effects in cognates. Dijkstra, A., and Van Heuven, W. J. B. in press. On language and brain! Or on (psycho)linguists and neuroscientists? Language Learning. Dijkstra, A., and Van Heuven, W. J. B. 1998. The BIA model and bilingual word recognition. In Grainger, J., and Jacobs, A. M. (eds.), Localist connectionist approaches to human cognition Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 189–225.

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Dijkstra, A., Van Heuven, W. J. B., and Grainger, J. 1998a. Simulating competitor effects with the bilingual interactive activation model. Psychologica Belgica, 38: 177–196. Dijkstra, A., Van Jaarsveld, H., and Ten Brinke, S. 1998b. Interlingual homograph recognition: effects of task demands and language intermixing. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 1: 51–66. Dijkstra, A., Grainger, J., and Van Heuven, W. J. B. 1999. Recognition of cognates and interlingual homographs: the neglected role of phonology. Journal of Memory and Language, 41: 496–518. Dijkstra, A., De Bruijn, E., Schriefers, H. J., and Ten Brinke, S. 2000a. More on interlingual homograph recognition: language intermixing versus explicitness of instruction. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 3: 69–78. Dijkstra, A., and Van Hell, J. 2003. Testing the language mode hypothesis using trilinguals. International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 6: 2–16. Dijkstra, A., and Snoeren, N. 2004. Appartenance linguistique dans la reconnaissance et la production des mots ches les bilingues. In Ferrand, L., and Grainger, J. (eds.), Psycholinguistique cognitive: Essais en l’honneur de Juan Segui. Bruxelles: De Boeck and Larcier s.a: 377–399. Gehring, W. J., and Fencsik, D. E. 2001. Functions of the medial frontal cortex in the processing of conflict and errors. The Journal of Neuroscience, 21(23): 9430–9437. Grainger, J., and Dijkstra, A. 1992. On the representation and use of language information in bilinguals. In Harris, R. J. (ed.), Cognitive processing in bilinguals Amsterdam: Elsevier: 207–220. Grosjean, F. 1997. Processing mixed language: issues, findings and models. In De Groot, A. M. B., and Kroll, J. F. (eds.), Tutorials in bilingualism: Psycholinguistic perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 225–254. Grosjean, F., Li, P., Münte, Th., and Rodriguez-Fornells, A. 2003. Imaging bilinguals: when the neurosciences meet the language sciences. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 6: 159–165. Kerkhofs, R., Dijkstra, A.F.J., Chwilla, D.J., and De Bruijn, E.R.A. 2006. Testing a model for bilingual semantic priming with interlingual homographs: RT and N400 effects. Brain Research, 1068: 170–183. Lemhöfer, K., and Dijkstra, A. 2004. Recognizing cognates and interlingual homographs: effects of code similarity in language specific and generalized lexical decision. Memory & Cognition, 32: 533–550. Paradis, M. 2004. A neurolinguistic theory of bilingualism. Studies in bilingualism (Vol. 18). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Rodriguez-Fornells, A., Rotte, M., Heinze, H.-J., Nösselt, T., and Münte, T. F. 2002. Brain potential and functional MRI evidence for how to handle two languages with one brain. Nature, 415: 1026–1029. Rodriguez-Fornells, A., van der Lugt, A., Rotte, M., Britti, B., Heinze, H. J., and Munte, T. F. 2005. Second language interferes with word production in fluent

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bilinguals: brain potential and functional imaging evidence. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17: 422–433. Schulpen, B., Dijkstra, A., Schriefers, H. J., and Hasper, M. 2003. Recognition of interlingual homophones in bilingual auditory word recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 29: 1155–1178. Schwartz, A. I., and Kroll, J. F. submitted. Bilingual lexical activation in sentence context. Van Hell, J. G. 1998. Cross-language processing and bilingual memory organization. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis of the University of Nijmegen: 61–90. Van Hell, J. G. 1998. Cross-language processing and bilingual memory organization. Doctoral Thesis, University of Nijmegen. Van Hell, J. G., and Dijkstra, A. 2002. Foreign language knowledge can influence native language performance in exclusively native contexts. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9: 780–789. Van Heuven, W. J. B., Dijkstra, A., and Grainger, J. 1998. Orthographic neighborhood effects in bilingual word recognition. Journal of Memory and Language, 39: 458–483. Van Heuven, W. J. B., Schriefers, H., Dijkstra, A., and Hagoort, P. submitted. Language conflict in the bilingual brain.


CHAPTER 8

R E P R E S E N TAT I O N A N D S K I L L I N S E C O N D LANGUAGE LEARNERS AND PROFICIENT BILINGUALS Judith F. Kroll and Jared A. Linck The Pennsylvania State University

Abstract What does it take to become a skilled bilingual? Past research on the acquisition of a second language (L2) by adult learners has focused on the degree to which the attainment of proficiency is constrained by the age at which L2 exposure occurs (e.g., Johnson & Newport 1989; Birdsong 1999; Flege 2003), by the degree of transfer from the first language (L1) to the L2 (e.g., MacWhinney 1997; Pienemann 1998), and by the context of acquisition (e.g., Freed 1995). Most of this work has addressed issues of representation. The general assumption is that the representations at each level of linguistic analysis gradually approximate those of native speakers with increasing proficiency in the L2, although particularly for the phonology and syntax, there may be limits to how completely these representations can be acquired (e.g., Flege et al. 1995; Weber-Fox & Neville 1996). In addition to acquiring representations of the lexicon, grammar, and phonology of the L2, it is also necessary to acquire a set of cognitive skills that enable the L2 to be processed automatically (e.g., DeKeyser 2001; Segalowitz & Hultstijn 2005) and to learn to negotiate the activation of the two languages so that the intended language is selected (e.g., Green 1998; Grosjean 2001).


In this chapter, we consider the interplay of representation and skill in both second language learners and proficient bilinguals. A particular focus in our discussion concerns the implications of the finding that the activity of the unintended language is not eliminated once individuals achieve proficiency in the L2. A large body of recent research has demonstrated that even highly proficient bilinguals cannot effectively switch off the unintended language. In reading (e.g., Dijkstra & Van 237 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 237–269. © 2007 Springer.


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Heuven 2002; Van Hell & Dijkstra 2002), listening (Marian & Spivey 2003), and speaking (Hermans et al. 1998; Costa et al. 1999), there is evidence that aspects of both languages are active and potentially compete for selection. Although we might expect that the weaker L2 would be affected by the more dominant L1 when learners are in early stages of L2 acquisition, the observation of parallel language activity among the most proficient bilinguals suggests that L2 skill is not a simple matter of overcoming the influence of L1. It also suggests that proficient bilinguals may be particularly expert in executing the control that is required to accomplish skilled performance in the presence of potential competition, an implication that has been supported in recent studies of executive function in early bilinguals during childhood and in old age (e.g., Bialystok 2005). The paper is organized in four sections. First, we review the evidence regarding the development of L2 proficiency in light of the recent findings for parallel activity of both languages. We then consider how models of automaticity have been applied to language learning and examine the evidence that has been taken to support the presence of increased processing skill in the L2. In the third section of the chapter, we present the results of studies that have specifically addressed the factors that appear to modulate the cognitive processes that support skilled L2 use, including individual differences in memory and attentional resources, aspects of the context of language exposure, and the interactions between them. Finally, we discuss the implications of the evidence we have reviewed for the cognitive consequences conferred by bilingualism. Our discussion will focus primarily on skill at the level of lexical access because that is the context in which there has been the greatest research activity. However, we briefly consider findings at the level of the phonology and grammar where they are relevant to the development of L2 skill. Throughout the chapter we adopt a broad definition of bilingualism to include all individuals who use more than one language regularly. We distinguish bilingual groups with respect to their proficiency in the L2, their relative language dominance, and the degree to which the context of language use supports each of the two languages.


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2. D E V E L O P I N G L 2 P R O F I C I E N C Y A S A N A D U LT

For adult learners, the process of acquiring a high level of skill in a second language, particularly for individuals restricted to tutored instruction in a classroom environment, is typically a difficult and less than fully successful experience. Some past studies of learners during early stages of L2 acquisition suggest that access to the L2, at both the level of the lexicon and grammar, is initially mediated through the L1 and that only with increasing L2 proficiency are learners able to use the L2 independently (e.g., Kroll & Stewart 1994; Talamas et al. 1999; MacWhinney 2005). To the extent that the L1 provides information about the L2, the learner will benefit from transfer (but see Flege 1987, for evidence that cross-language similarity can impede as well as facilitate L2 development). Psycholinguistic research on language processing in the L2 has focused primarily on the performance of relatively skilled adult bilinguals, with fewer studies that specifically address the changes that occur in language processing as L2 skill develops. One question that has received some attention in the literature is whether and when learners are able to directly access the meaning of new words in the L2 without mediation via the L1. An early study by Potter et al. (1984) suggested that even L2 learners at early stages of acquisition are able to conceptually process the meaning of words in the L2 directly. The evidence on which this claim was based involved a comparison of picture naming and word translation, language processing tasks that engage shared component stages in speech planning. Potter et al. argued that if learners rely on the translation of the L2 word to understand it, then translation from the L1 into the L2 should be a relatively direct lexical process of word association, without conceptual processing. In contrast, naming a picture in the L2 would first require conceptual understanding and only after the L1 name of the picture was retrieved could the association to L2 be accessed. By this logic, translation should be performed faster than picture naming. In a series of experiments, Potter et al. (1984) showed that learners and highly proficient bilinguals were able to translate words and name pictures in the L2 in about the same amount of time, suggesting that direct word associations between the L1 and L2


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were not active. A surprising result in this study was that although the learners were slower to perform tasks in the L2 than the highly proficient bilinguals, the pattern of their data was the same, suggesting a common mechanism. Subsequent research challenged the conclusions of Potter et al. (1984) by showing that learners at stages of acquisition earlier than Potter et al.’s (19984) participants did indeed appear to rely on access to the L1 translation equivalent when using the L2 (e.g., Kroll & Curley 1988; Chen & Leung 1989). These studies used the same comparison of translation and picture naming as used in the Potter et al. experiments, but showed that at low levels of proficiency learners were faster to translate into the L2 than to name pictures in the L2, suggesting that translation was mediated directly by word-to-word associations from the L1 to the L2. At higher levels of proficiency, the results replicated the pattern reported by Potter et al. (1984) with similar performance for translation and picture naming, supporting a process of conceptual mediation across the two languages. A number of studies provided evidence to support a shift from initial reliance on L1 translations to more direct conceptual processing of the L2, with increasing proficiency in the L2. Talamas et al. (1999) used a translation recognition task first reported by De Groot (1992) in which individuals are shown a word in one language followed by a word in the other language and are asked to judge whether the second word is the correct translation of the first word. Two groups of English-Spanish learners were tested who differed in their L2 proficiency in Spanish. In the critical conditions of the experiment, the second word was not the correct translation of the first word but a foil that was similar in form or meaning to the translation equivalent. For example, if the first word was man in English, the second word might be hambre, which means hunger in Spanish but resembles the form of the correct translation, hombre. In addition to form-relatives of the translation equivalent, other foils were semantically related, such as mujer in Spanish, which means woman. The time to reject the foil as the incorrect translation was compared to the time to reject a completely unrelated distractor. Talamas et al. (1999) found that less proficient learners were more likely to be fooled by the translation relatives than the semantically related foils. The magnitude of



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interference was greater for the form pairs than for the semantic pairs. In contrast, the opposite pattern was found for the more proficient learners who produced greater interference for the semantic pairs than for the form pairs. Talamas et al. argued that the shift in sensitivity from form to meaning reflected a change in the degree to which learners were able to process the meaning of the L2 words directly with increasing skill in the L2. There has been a great deal of debate concerning the issue of how early in L2 learning access to the meaning of L2 words is available, with some studies supporting the initial claim by Potter et al. (1984) that even learners at the earliest stages have direct access to the meanings of words in the L2 (e.g., Altarriba & Mathis 1997; De Groot & Poot 1997; Frenck-Mestre & Prince 1997), and other studies support the idea that conceptual access changes as L2 skill increases (e.g., Dufour & Kroll 1995). More critically, in the time since these studies appeared, there has been a flood of research findings on the performance of highly proficient bilinguals that suggests that even at very high levels of L2 skill there is parallel activity of both languages. It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to review the findings on language nonselectivity exhaustively, but we summarize the main results briefly (see recent reviews by Dijkstra 2005, this volume; and Kroll et al. 2005). The recent experiments on visual and spoken word recognition demonstrate that when a highly skilled bilingual sees or hears a word in one language, information about the form relatives of that word are active in the other language. Thus, if a bilingual in English and Spanish sees the word actor in English, the cognate translation of that word in Spanish, actor, will also be activated briefly. When word forms in two languages also converge semantically, as in the case of cognates, there is typically facilitation in word recognition (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1998; Van Hell & Dijkstra 2002), although interference has been observed when similarly spelled cognates map onto different pronunciations in the two languages and when bilinguals are required to read the words aloud (e.g., Schwartz et al. in press). When word forms in two languages correspond to different meanings, as in the case of interlingual homographs, an inhibitory pattern is typically observed (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 1998; Jared & Szucs 2002; Von Studnitz & Green 2002). Perhaps


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most dramatically, there is evidence that word neighbors are activated in both of the bilingual’s languages even when a word recognition task is performed in one language alone and even when that language is the bilingual’s native language (e.g., Van Heuven et al. 1998; Jared & Kroll 2001). All of these results suggest that there is bottom-up activation of information corresponding to each language in a manner that is language nonselective. Only at a relatively late stage of processing is the language of the target word hypothesized to be selected. Of particular interest, studies that have attempted to induce language selectivity by making the language of a semantic or sentence context more salient (e.g., De Bruijn et al. 2001; Schwartz & Kroll in press) or by manipulating the bilingual’s expectations via instructions (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 2000), have largely failed to override the involuntary activity of the unintended language. How can we understand the changes that occur as learners achieve higher levels of proficiency in the L2 and, at the same time, the persistent form-related activity of the L1 that has been observed in even highly skilled bilinguals? Kroll and Stewart (1994) proposed the Revised Hierarchical Model (RHM) to account for the developmental changes that occur with respect to reliance on links from the L2 word to its respective translation equivalent in L1. The model, shown in Figure 1, represents the connections between lexical and conceptual representations for each of the two languages. At the lexical level, the L2 is hypothesized to be strongly associated to its L1 translation, whereas lexical associations from L1 to L2 are hypothesized to be relatively weak. However, L1 is represented as strongly associated to conceptual representations whereas the word-to-concept link for L2 is weaker. According to the RHM, at early stages of L2 learning, the lexical connections from L2 to L1 play an important role so that the learner is able to exploit the existing conceptual representations for L1. As learners become more proficient in the L2, the word-to-concept links become stronger so that L2 can be processed without access to the translation in L1. The activity of the L1 that is the focus of the RHM concerns the translation equivalent, not the form relatives that have been shown to be active for highly proficient bilinguals. Dijkstra and Van Heuven (1998) proposed the Bilingual Interactive Activation (BIA) model, shown in



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Figure 1. The revised hierarchical model (adapted from Kroll & Stewart 1994).

Figure 2, to account for the persistent form activity across the bilingual’s two languages (and see Dijkstra & Van Heuven [2002] for a description of the BIA+ model, an extended version of the BIA model). The BIA model takes the Interactive Activation Model first described by McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) for monolingual word recognition and extends it to the bilingual case so that activity among feature and letter information feeds into both of the bilingual’s languages. Unlike the monolingual model, the BIA model includes a set of language nodes that serve to sort out the intended language by integrating bottom-up activation with top-down inhibition. Whereas the RHM assumes that the lexical representations of the two languages are functionally independent, the BIA model assumes that the bilingual lexicon is integrated and that access is language nonselective. Because the RHM was initially proposed to account for the translation performance of learners and relatively proficient bilinguals, it is more of a model of production than perception. In contrast, the BIA model was proposed to account for the earliest processes engaged during the comprehension of words in each language. One way of reconciling the apparently conflicting claims associated with each model is to assume that the activity of the L1 involves different representations


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Figure 2. The bilingual interactive activation model (adapted from Dijkstra & Van Heuven 1998).



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in L2 production and in L2 comprehension. The top-down nature of L2 production will necessarily involve the activation of meaning-related alternatives, including the translation equivalent, whereas the bottomup nature of L2 comprehension will engage form relatives that resemble the initial input at the level of the orthography or phonology of words that are read or spoken. In a recent developmental study, Sunderman and Kroll (in press) attempted to test the RHM and BIA model directly in the same context. Native English speakers at different levels of skill in Spanish as the L2 performed the translation recognition task described above in the Talamas et al. (1999) study. Like the Talamas et al. (1999) study, the critical trials were those in which the two words were not translation equivalents, but related either by lexical form or meaning. Unlike the Talamas et al. (1999) study, Sunderman and Kroll included two different types of lexical foils. One condition included words in English like those in the previous study that resembled the translation equivalent of the Spanish word. Another condition included words in English that were direct lexical neighbors of the Spanish words; for example, the word man in English looks like the Spanish word mano which means hand. The lexical translation condition provides an indication of the degree to which the translation equivalent is active, the type of activity proposed by the RHM. The direct lexical neighbor condition provides an indication of the degree to which lexical properties in the L1 are active when L2 words are recognition, the type of activity proposed by the BIA model. Sunderman and Kroll found that native English speakers at early stages of learning Spanish were sensitive to both types of lexical foils. However, more proficient learners were sensitive only to the direct lexical form relatives and not to the distractors that resembled the translation equivalent. This pattern of results permits a clarification of the apparently conflicting predictions of the two models. There is a developmental course over which the activity of the L1 diminishes as learners achieve greater skill in the L2, but that activity is restricted to reliance on the translation equivalent. The activation of form relatives in L1 occurs early in L2 learning and persists as learners become proficient in the L2. Because the lexical level activity of form relatives does not diminish over development (indeed, the evidence suggests that it may increase, with greater effects of L2 on


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L1 as skill in L2 increases), there will be a need to develop mechanisms of control that allow the learner and bilingual to negotiate the relative activity of the two languages. Two other results of the Sunderman and Kroll (in press) study further suggest that even when learners at early stages of L2 acquisition are dependent on access to the L1 translation equivalent, they are also able to access aspects of meaning and grammatical form. Unlike the results of the Talamas et al. (1999) experiment, the learners in Sunderman and Kroll’s study showed significant semantic interference effects in translation recognition (e.g., mujer, which means woman in Spanish, was harder to reject as the translation of man than an unrelated control word in Spanish). Of interest is that these learners were also sensitive to the grammatical class of the words. When words in the translation recognition task are the correct translation of each other, they are necessarily members of the same grammatical class. However, words that are not translation equivalents can or cannot be members of the same class. Sunderman and Kroll manipulated this factor and found that both types of lexical form interference, that is, for translation relatives and for lexical form relatives, were eliminated when the two words were drawn from different grammatical categories. The result shows that even at stages of L2 learning in which learners rely on the transfer from the L1 translation, there is sensitivity to some grammatical information in the L2. A critical question for future research is to consider how these effects are manifest in actual sentence context and in production. The picture of L2 development that emerges from the studies reviewed suggests a more complex interaction across levels of language representation than previously assumed. On one hand, there is apparently early sensitivity to aspects of meaning and grammar that we might have expected to depend on greater proficiency in the L2. Support for this view comes from a recent study of L2 learners in the first months of L2 study (McLaughlin et al. 2004) that shows that although behavioral indices of sensitivity to L2 grammar may not reveal that learning has occurred, event-related potentials (ERPs) show that there is a pattern of brain activity suggesting very early sensitivity to the L2. On the other hand, increasing proficiency in the L2 does not correspond to a



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switching off of the L1. There is reduced reliance on the translation equivalent, but persistent lexical activity that suggests a system that is fundamentally open to cross-language influences. The question we consider in the remainder of the chapter is how successful L2 learners and proficient bilinguals acquire high levels of skill in the L2 and manage to negotiate the potential competition across languages that may result from the parallel activity of both languages.

3. D E V E L O P I N G A U TO M AT I C I T Y A N D I N H I B I TO RY C O N T R O L I N L 2

3.1. Automaticity Skilled performance typically involves the development of automaticity of the component cognitive processes (e.g., Kahneman 1973; Schneider & Shiffrin 1977). Although automaticity has been operationalized in a variety of ways in the cognitive literature (Segalowitz & Hulstijn 2005), most definitions include the following four characteristics: processing is fast, requires little or no attentional effort (i.e., consumes few cognitive resources), occurs outside of conscious awareness, and is ballistic in nature (i.e., cannot be stopped once it has been initiated). The issue we consider is whether this characterization also applies to the acquisition of L2 as a new skill and how automaticity of the L2 might be measured. In studies of adult L2 learners, it is clear that learners typically become faster in processing the L2 as they become more proficient. In Figure 3, we illustrate this effect with data from a study by Kroll et al. (2002). These are data for a simple task – naming words aloud in the L1 and the L2. Two groups of native English speakers learning French are compared, one more proficient and the other less proficient. The less proficient group had been studying French less than 5 years and the more proficient group for more than five years. As each of the graphs in Figure 3 show, less proficient learners were slower and less accurate to name words in L2 than more proficient learners. A further result of interest is that less proficient learners were also slower to name words in L1 than the more proficient learners, although the two groups were


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Figure 3. Performance data from two groups of learners (Kroll et al. 2002). Mean naming latencies (in ms) and percent accuracy for naming words aloud in the L1 and L2 are shown for two groups of native English speakers learning French. One group is less proficient in French as the L2 as the other is more proficient.

both native English speakers and the lists of words in each languages appeared in separate blocks. As we will suggest later in the chapter, this difference in L1 performance is consistent with the hypothesis that L1 must be inhibited for L2 to be spoken when learners are at early stages of L2 acquisition On one level, it might seem appealing to assume that as the processing of L2 becomes more automatic, it becomes more accurate and faster. As the data shown in Figure 3 suggest, lexical access is faster and more reliable and the ability to access the L2 phonology is more skilled with increasing L2 proficiency. However, automaticity is distinct from a simple increase in speed of processing (e.g., Segalowitz & Hulstijn 2005). That is, a given change in performance could be due to



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faster processing or more automatic processing. One method of distinguishing between these two possibilities involves examining the amount of time required for processing to occur. In particular, Segalowitz and Segalowitz (1993) proposed that the coefficient of variability for reaction times could provide useful information about the nature of the underlying cognitive processes. The coefficient of variability is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean reaction time for each individual. If faster responding is driven solely by an increase in the speed of processing, then the variability in time to perform that task should decrease in proportion to the overall time to perform the task. That is, the increased speed of processing essentially shrinks the time frame within which processing occurs, and this thereby shrinks the range of variability. If this is the case, the coefficient of variability should remain constant even as mean reaction time decreases (since the mean and standard deviation are adjusted by the same proportion), and therefore should not be related to mean reaction time. However, if instead faster responding is due to something other than an increase in speed of processing (e.g., more automatic processing), then the change in standard deviation should be larger than the change in mean reaction time (Segalowitz & Segalowitz 1993), and the coefficient of variability should be correlated with the mean reaction time. If this is found, then it is believed that fundamental changes have been made to the underlying processes resulting in automaticity. This has been a fruitful method for identifying automaticity in language processing. Segalowitz et al. (1998) found the predicted pattern of results in a study involving the lexical decision task. In lexical decision, participants decide whether letter strings are real words or not in a particular language. The time to make lexical decisions has been used extensively within the monolingual and bilingual literature as a means to model lexical architecture and processing (e.g., Balota 1994; Dijkstra et al. 1998). Segalowitz et al. (1998) found that in conditions in which automatic processing was hypothesized to occur, the coefficient of variability changed as a function of reaction time. But in conditions in which a general speed-up of processing was the only hypothesized change, the coefficient of variability remained constant.


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By this account, increased speed and accuracy alone does not indicate increased automaticity. Rather there is reorganization that changes the consistency with which processing occurs. One proposal for how this change comes about has been suggested by Logan’s (1988) instance theory of automaticity. Logan argued that there are two routes by which processing can occur. Initially, the system must compute each step in the process using some algorithm. Since this requires the computation of every step in the process, this first route is slower and requires more cognitive resources. However, each time these initial algorithms are computed, a memory trace of that process is left in memory, and a new memory trace is laid with each subsequent completion of the algorithm. So the second possible route for processing involves a search for the memory trace of the required steps. As the number of memory traces increases (i.e., with increasing practice), the system can more rapidly find a memory trace of the processing steps and implement the process based on this memory trace. This theory of automaticity is considered a race model in that the route by which processing occurs is the route which wins the “race” to identify the steps required to perform the process. Automaticity, therefore, is considered to be attained when the memory retrieval process is completed more quickly than the algorithmic process, thereby increasing the efficiency of processing. Within the domain of L2 learning, there are a number of different ways in which automaticity might develop, especially because different levels of language processing may impose differential processing demands that affect the rate at which these changes occur. But even within this brief review of automaticity, what is apparent is that the process of become proficient in the L2 is not simply a matter of acquiring adequate representations for the L2. Rather, that process must be accompanied by the development of cognitive procedures that themselves change with increased L2 skill. 3.2. Inhibitory Control Of the cognitive skills that are likely to be recruited during L2 learning, a prime candidate for predicting success in this process is inhibitory control. Although the research reviewed earlier suggests that even proficient bilinguals are unable to switch off one of their two languages



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when the context requires one language alone, during the earliest stages of L2 learning it is not clear how learners can ever begin to produce the L2 given the overwhelming dominance of the L1 without some degree of inhibition. Green (1998) proposed the Inhibitory Control (IC) model as a sketch of how this process might work. The model, shown in Figure 4, embeds the bilingual’s lexicon in a complex system of cognitive control mechanisms that serve to focus attention on the task to be performed and to reactively inhibit the representations not to be produced. The insight here was that linguistic representations alone do not enable actions. Lexical, grammatical, and phonological forms need to be selected both within and across languages to enable bilinguals to use the intended language. Without modulation by what Green called task schemas, it would be virtually impossible to engage linguistic representations in the specific tasks required by the context. The empirical context in which the predictions of the IC model have been examined most extensively is language switching. At the lexical level, the main prediction of the model is that to the extent that the L1 is more active than the L2, it will require greater inhibition than the L2. Meuter and Allport (1999) examined the predicted asymmetry by asking

Goal

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Figure 4. The inhibitory control model (adapted from Green 1998).


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L2 learners to name single digits in either the L1 or the L2 depending on the color of the background. In the switching task, the language of naming varies across trials, such that the participant must either name the digits in the same language as in the previous trial (i.e., non-switch trials) or switch to the other language (i.e., switch trials). Meuter and Allport found clear evidence for the asymmetry predicted by the IC model. There were switch costs for both languages, but they were larger when bilinguals switched into the L1 than into the L2. Although this pattern may seem counterintuitive, the account is that naming in the L2 requires suppression of the L1 whereas naming in the L1 requires little suppression of L2. Therefore, on a trial following L2 naming, L1 will be less available and will require additional processing resources to be named. Costa and Santesteban (2004) examined language switching in a similar paradigm but using picture rather than digit naming. In their experiments, an alternating runs design was adopted (Rogers & Monsell 1995) in which the languages alternated predictably (two L1 naming trials, two L2 naming trials, etc.). Research on task switching has shown that strict alternation reduces but does not eliminate switch costs. The goal of the Costa and Santesteban study was to determine whether the asymmetric pattern of switch costs reported by Meuter and Allport (1999) was the reflection of the language dominance of their subjects. If bilinguals who are strongly dominant in the L1 are functionally less proficient in the L2, then inhibition of the L1 may be necessary to enable production in the L2. Costa and Santesteban asked whether the same pattern would hold for highly balanced and proficient Spanish-Catalan bilinguals who had acquired the two languages in early childhood. If not, it might suggest that once a high level of proficiency was achieved, active inhibition of the unintended language is not required. They showed that there was indeed a difference in the pattern of switch costs as a function of language proficiency and balance. These data are shown in Figure 5. The highly proficient and balanced bilinguals produced switch costs but they were symmetric across their two languages. A group of less proficient Spanish-Catalan bilinguals replicated the asymmetry reported by Meuter and Allport. The interpretation that Costa and Santesteban assigned to these results was that there was a developmental progression


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from cross-language competition and inhibition for the less proficient bilinguals to selective control for the more proficient bilinguals. But is the switch cost asymmetry the best indicator of the presence of inhibition? A striking aspect of the language switching data is that the time to name in L1 is often slower than the time to name in L2, even when the pattern of switch costs is asymmetric for the two languages (see Figure 5). A feature of the language switching paradigm that potentially complicates the interpretation of these data is that both the switch and nonswitch trials occur in the context of a mixed language list. That is, the switching paradigm requires that both languages be active. The longer naming latencies in L1 in the Costa and Santesteban (2004) study, even for the highly proficient bilinguals who produced symmetric switch costs, suggests that L1 may be inhibited for both groups of bilinguals. To investigate this possibility, Kroll et al. (in preparation) manipulated the requirement for bilinguals to keep each of their languages active in a cued picture naming paradigm. In this task, a variant of simple picture naming, bilinguals either knew in advance the language in which they were to name (the blocked condition) or did not know the language to be used until signaled by a tone cue (the mixed condition). In the mixed condition, a high tone cued one language and a low tone cued the other language. In the blocked condition, the participants were instructed to name the picture when they heard one of the tones and to say “no” when

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Figure 5. Patterns of language switch costs in picture naming for two groups of SpanishCatalan bilinguals who differ in their proficiency and language dominance (adapted from Costa & Santesteban 2004).


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they heard the other tone. In both the mixed and blocked conditions, the timing of the tones was varied relative to the presentation of the picture to tap into the time course of speech planning. The participants were relatively proficient but late Dutch–English and English–French bilinguals. For present purposes, the critical result concerns the effects of language mixture on the two languages. The time for Dutch–English bilinguals to name pictures in each language and under each condition is shown in Figure 6. For L2, the requirement to keep both languages active in the mixed condition had little consequence relative to the blocked condition. In contrast, for L1, there was a marked cost in processing time when both languages were required to be active. Furthermore, like the language switching data, under the mixed language conditions the L1 naming latencies were actually longer than those in L2. Under the blocked conditions, the more typical advantage of L1 relative to L2 was obtained. The pattern of results suggests that L1 is normally active during the planning of L2 speech and must be inhibited.

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Figure 6. Mean latencies (in ms) to name pictures in L1 and L2 for Dutch-English bilinguals under mixed and blocked language conditions (adapted from Kroll et al. in preparation).



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If inhibition is required to achieve proficient performance, then we might predict that individuals who possess the cognitive resources that allow them to effectively inhibit irrelevant information more easily might also achieve L2 proficiency more easily than individuals who are less skilled in this respect. In the next section of the chapter we consider the evidence on the role of individual cognitive differences in L2 acquisition and performance.

4. M O D U L AT I N G AT T E N T I O N A N D LANGUAGE SELECTION

Even highly proficient bilinguals often say that speaking in the L2, particularly under formal circumstances, is mentally exhausting and that they experience word finding difficulties and make speech errors that they would never otherwise make. Research on the attentional modulation of L2 performance supports L2 speakers’ phenomenology in demonstrating that the L2 requires the allocation of greater processing resources than the L1 (e.g., Miyake & Friedman 1998; Hasegawa et al. 2002). If greater cognitive and attentional resources are needed to process L2, then a clear prediction is that individuals who normally have more of those resources should be advantaged in the process of L2 acquisition and performance (for a recent review of this topic, see Michael & Gollan 2005). To illustrate how individual differences might modulate L2 processing, we review four studies from our own work that examine different aspects of this problem. A particular hypothesis is that cognitive resources may be allocated to controlling the persistent activity of the unintended language that we have suggested is a feature of using two languages not only during early stages of learning but also once individuals become skilled in the L2. 4.1. Study 1: Cognate Susceptibility in L2 Learners Kroll et al. (2002) performed a study in which the ability of L2 learners at different stages of L2 proficiency was compared on word naming and word translation tasks. The data shown in Figure 3 for native English speaking students learning French were taken from the first experiment


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in this study. In the second experiment, Kroll et al. again examined the performance of L2 learners but compared their performance to highly proficient bilinguals and also administered a reading span measure to assess the role of memory resources in modulating L2 skill. The critical result concerned the effects of span on translation performance when the words to be translated were cognates or not. As noted earlier, cognates are translation equivalents that share aspects of lexical form (i.e., orthography and/or phonology). In translation, bilinguals are typically faster to translate cognates than matched non-cognate target words (e.g., De Groot 1992). However, the cognate facilitation observed in word translation for proficient bilinguals is not a superficial reflection of lexical transparency; cognate translations are affected by the same semantic variables that influence non-cognate translation (e.g., Kroll & Stewart 1994). In the Kroll et al. study, the degree of cognate facilitation was modulated by reading span. Ironically, L2 learners with higher memory span enjoyed less cognate facilitation compared to learners with lower memory span (see Figure 7). In fact, the higher memory span learners were slower than the lower memory span learners when translating cognates. The results suggests that the learners with greater memory resources avoided relying upon cues made available by the orthographic overlap of cognates, even when these cues would have enhanced their performance. Because shared lexical form is not a reliable cue to translation (i.e., there are also interlingual homographs or false friends), there is reason to resist reliance on superficial similarity. With greater memory resources available, these learners appeared to be able to exert more attentional control when translating from one language into the other. 4.2. Study 2: Errors in Spoken Translation A second set of informative results comes from research examining errors that learners make in attempting to translate words. Tokowicz et al. (2004) were interested in the types of errors made when translating words, focusing on factors that potentially influence L2 performance: working memory capacity and study abroad experience. The participants were relatively proficient L2 learners who were native English speakers with Spanish as the L2. Some of them had spent a substantial


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amount of time studying abroad (fifteen months or more) and other had spent less time abroad (eight months or less). Within these two groups, participants were assigned to subgroups based on their performance on an operation span measure of working memory (Turner & Engle 1989). All participants performed a translation task that involved producing the L2 translation of an L1 word. Trials in which the participant provided the translation of a semantically related word instead of the target translation were coded as meaning errors. If the participant simply did not produce a translation (e.g., “I don’t know”), then the trial was coded as a non-response error. The number of meaning errors was then compared with the number of non-response errors produced. For three out of the four groups, participants produced significantly more non-response errors than meaning errors. That is, when the participants did not produce the correct translation, they simply tended not to respond. However, a different pattern of results was found for the participants with more study abroad experience and higher working memory capacity. These participants produced as many meaning errors as nonresponse errors, suggesting that they preferred to err on the side of saying too much, even if they were unsure of their accuracy. Tokowicz et al. (2004) concluded that the study abroad environment encouraged the learner to attempt to communicate as much as possible through the use of approximate translations, but that only those learners with sufficient memory resources were able to do so due to the amount of information

300 Mean magnitude of cognate facilitation (ms)

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Figure 7. Mean magnitude of cognate facilitation (in) for L2 learners as a function of direction of translation and memory span (adapted from Kroll et al. 2002).


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that must be maintained in memory. Although this led to more errors in production, the joint combination of study abroad experience and higher working memory appears to have facilitated the development of oral fluency – a critical outcome for students who study abroad (Segalowitz & Freed 2004). 4.3. Study 3: Modulating Lexical Interference from the L1 The first two studies we have described focused on production skills. In a recent study on the effects of study abroad experience (Linck & Kroll 2005) we also investigated the role of working memory resources on modulating lexical interference from the L1. We hypothesized that while learners were immersed in a study abroad experience, they would be better able to reduce the activation of the L1, which would result in enhanced L2 performance. The further question was whether the predicted effects would be modulated by available cognitive resources. Linck and Kroll (2005) tested participants who were native English speakers learning Spanish either with or without study abroad experience. The immersed learners were tested while still immersed in the L2 environment towards the end of their semester abroad in Spain. The classroom learners were at the same level of university Spanish courses but had no previous study abroad experience. The critical task was the translation recognition described earlier in the study by Sunderman and Kroll (in press). An L2 word was presented (e.g., cara, meaning face in English), followed by an L1 word (e.g., card). The participant was instructed to decide whether the second word was a correct translation of the first word and respond by pressing a button marked yes or the button marked no. In the critical trials, the second word was a distractor word requiring a no response. On these trials, the distractor word was related to the target translation (e.g., face) in lexical form (e.g., fact) or in meaning (e.g., nose). The results of other translation recognition studies (e.g., Sunderman & Kroll in press; Talamas et al. 1999) have shown that at early stages of L2 acquisition, learners are more susceptible to interference from lexical relatives in the L1 that resemble the translation equivalent. The research reviewed earlier produced mixed findings with respect to meaning; some studies suggest that only more proficient learners are sensitive


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to meaning (e.g., Talamas et al. 1999), whereas other studies suggest that all learners are able to comprehend the meaning of L2 words (e.g., Altarriba & Mathis 1997; Sunderman & Kroll in press). Linck and Kroll showed that immersed learners were indeed less susceptible to interference from lexical neighbors in L1 than classroom learners who had similar levels of L2 study. However, the pattern of interference was modulated by learners’available working memory resources. These data are shown in Figure 8. The immersed learners overall showed an increasing sensitivity to the meaning distractors and a decreasing sensitivity to the lexical form distractors, indicating that the immersed learners were beginning to process the L2 words in a more conceptual manner. In addition, the higher working memory participants showed more sensitivity to the meaning distractors – even for the classroom learners with no immersion experience. More specifically, we see that the classroom learners with higher working memory performed very similarly to the immersed learners with lower working memory. Higher memory span appeared to reduce the degree to which learners were distracted by words that resembled the translation equivalent in L1. Moreover, the learners with study abroad experience who also had greater working memory resources Control group (classroom) Immersed group (abroad)

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Figure 8. Mean magnitude of interference (in ms) in translation recognition for control learners confined to the classroom vs. immersed learners studying abroad as a function of their relative memory span. Data are shown for interference generated by lexical translation relatives and meaning relatives (adapted from Linck & Kroll 2005).


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available demonstrated even deeper levels of conceptual processing. That is, study abroad experience and greater memory resources each provided benefits to the learners, but the combination of the two was especially valuable. A clear direction in future research on this topic will be to determine whether increased cognitive resources also function to maintain the benefits of the immersion experience once the learner returns home. 4.4. Study 4: Does Memory Span Modulate Parallel Activation of the Two Languages in Word Recognition Tasks? A final study (Michael et al. in preparation) asked whether the modulation of bilingual performance observed in the studies described above would also be seen in the performance of highly proficient bilinguals in word recognition tasks. Dijkstra et al. (1998) showed that Dutch–English bilinguals were slower to perform the lexical decision task in English, their L2, when the English words were interlingual homographs. For example, the English word room means cream in Dutch, and under some experimental conditions it is more difficult for a Dutch speaker to accept the homograph as a real word in English because there is a conflict in the meaning of the English and Dutch senses of the word. Michael et al. asked whether the magnitude of this inhibitory effect for language ambiguous words would be reduced for bilinguals who have relatively higher memory span relative to those who have lower span. Dutch–English bilinguals performed two tasks. One was an English lexical decision task which included English words that were unambiguous (i.e., not also words in Dutch), English words that were ambiguous in that they had a false friend in Dutch (e.g., room), nonwords that resembled English words, and unambiguous Dutch words that had to be rejected as not being English. The other was a single word translation task in which a different set of words had to be translated from Dutch to English and from English to Dutch. Michael et al. found that in both tasks, bilinguals were faster when they had higher rather than lower memory span. However, memory span did not modulate the magnitude of interference for interlingual homographs in lexical decision. That is, even bilinguals with high span were unable to avoid the cross-language activation and competition that occurred when these language ambiguous were presented.



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The results support the predictions of the BIA model (see Figure 2) in that the bottom-up activation of alternatives in each of the bilingual’s two languages appears to be outside cognitive control processes. Only later in the process can cognitive resources modulate the selection of the correct language alternatives. 5. C O G N I T I V E C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F B I L I N G U A L I S M

The evidence we have reviewed suggests that the performance of both L2 learners and highly proficient bilinguals is modulated by available cognitive resources that effectively direct attentional mechanisms to allow L2 skill to develop, that inhibit the unintended language when it is active to the degree that is possible, and that modulate the degree of crosslanguage competition created by the parallel activity of both languages. We now consider briefly the consequence of this characterization for the more general cognitive state of the bilingual (see Bialystok 2005 for a recent comprehensive review of research on this topic). In a series of pioneering studies on the cognitive consequences of bilingualism, Bialystok and colleagues have shown that young bilingual children appear to be advantaged relative to their monolingual peers, specifically in tasks that require executive control (e.g., Bialystok 1988, 1999, 2001; Bialystok & Codd 1997; Bialystok & Martin 2004). The cognitive benefits that bilingualism confers to young children is specific rather than general, so that bilinguals are not superior to monolinguals on all cognitive measures, but only on those that specifically require that irrelevant information be ignored. More recently, the demonstration of positive cognitive benefits from bilingualism has been extended to the elderly to show that a lifetime of bilingualism provides a degree of protection against the normal effects of cognitive aging (Bialystok et al. 2004). Research on cognitive aging has shown that elderly individuals are particularly vulnerable to decline on tasks that require inhibitory control. Bialystok et al. (2004) investigated this issue by having younger and older adults perform the Simon task (Simon & Rudell 1967), a nonlinguistic paradigm in which colored squares appear on a screen and the participant is instructed to press one key for one color and another key for the other color. In the congruent


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conditions, the position of the colored square on the screen corresponds to the location of the key press. In the incongruent condition, there is a conflict between the color of the square and its location with respect to the key press. The typical finding is that individuals take longer in the incongruent condition when the stimulus and response locations do not match. Bialystok et al. found that older individuals suffer more interference from the incongruence in the Simon task than younger individuals but that the rate of decline on the task with increasing age was modulated by bilingualism. Elderly bilinguals are susceptible to cognitive aging, but the level at which they suffer interference from stimulusresponse conflicts, such as those in the Simon task, is reduced relative to age-matched monolingual controls. It is tempting to speculate that the cross-language competition described earlier in this chapter is the source of the observed cognitive benefits. That is, bilinguals spend a lifetime sharpening a set of cognitive skills that specifically function to reduce competition across their two languages. If one language must be inhibited to use the other, then bilinguals potentially develop expertise in inhibitory control that then extends beyond linguistic tasks to domain general cognitive performance. In a sense, bilinguals become competition experts. This account is attractive in providing an integrated framework for understanding a large body of research results on the cognitive basis of bilingualism. However, at this time, there is very little direct evidence that shows precisely how the specific negotiation of competition across language systems might map onto benefits of the sort that have been described. This issue is a clear priority for the research agenda but the methods for linking bilingual performance to specific cognitive benefits have yet to be clearly described. Alternative accounts claim that bilinguals suffer costs associated with the use of two languages by virtue of using each of their languages less often than monolinguals. This view has been represented most prominently in the work of Gollan and her colleagues (e.g., Gollan & Acenas 2004; Gollan et al. 2005). The idea in this work is that the reduced use of each language when more than one language is available makes the relative frequency of each language lower. The evidence to support this view comes from experiments that show that bilinguals have more tip-of-thetongue (TOT) states than monolinguals (e.g., Gollan & Silverberg 2001;



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Gollan & Acenas 2004). In a TOT state, individuals cannot remember a word but are confident that they know the word they are attempting to retrieve and can provide details about the feature of the word (e.g., its stress pattern, number of syllables, first letter). In and of itself, increased TOTs for bilinguals relative to monolinguals could be explained as a reflection of cross-language competition. However, these studies have shown that the rate of TOTs is reduced for words for which the bilingual knows the translation. That is, easily accessed translation equivalents should pose the greatest problem with respect to cross-language competition because the competitors are highly available. Yet the results do not support that conclusion. Furthermore, bilinguals are slower than monolinguals in tasks such as simple picture naming, even when performance is compared on the native language for both groups. Gollan et al. have shown that it takes approximately five repetitions of the picture naming trials for the bilingual data to begin to approximate the monolingual data, a pattern consistent with the frequency explanation. It is not as clear how the frequency alternative can account for the positive cognitive consequences that have been observed on inhibitory control tasks. But the problem is sufficiently complex that is it probably premature to reject any one explanation at this stage. 6. C O N C L U S I O N S

Our goal in this chapter was to provide a brief review of the psycholinguistic studies that have examined the cognitive basis of L2 learning and proficient bilingual performance. The research we have reviewed suggests clearly that successful attainment of L2 skills relies on cognitive support in addition to the development of linguistic representations. Although much of the research on this topic is at an early stage of development, both with respect to empirical paradigms and with respect to theory building, the available studies provide an initial foundation that we believe holds promise for answering these questions. The initial picture based on this preliminary evidence is already quite complex and likely to become more so with the next generation of research findings. For example, we have discussed inhibitory mechanisms as if they are a unitary phenomenon. The cognitive literature has begun to consider


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how components of inhibitory control might differ in their locus and scope (e.g., Friedman & Miyake 2004). It will be critical for research on bilingualism to begin to consider more differentiated alternatives about control processes. In addition to the behavioral data we have reviewed, a current focus of intense research activity is on the neural basis of these phenomena. The emerging results of cognitive neuroscience investigations into these issues also suggests that bilingualism has consequences for both brain mechanisms and architecture (e.g., Mechelli et al. 2004; Ullman 2004; Bialystok et al. 2005; and see Abutalebi et al. 2005 for a recent review of brain imaging studies with bilinguals). The convergence of behavioral, neural, and developmental evidence is likely to provide an active agenda for research on the cognitive basis of bilingualism. In doing so, it demonstrates how research on bilingualism provides an important tool for investigating the constraints and plasticity of cognitive and neural systems. AUTHOR’S NOTES

The writing of this chapter was supported in part by NSF Grant BCS0418071 to Judith F. Kroll. Correspondence concerning this chapter should be addressed to Judith F. Kroll, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802 USA. Email address: jfk7psu.edu REFERENCES Abutalebi J., Cappa S. F., and Perani D. 2005. Functional neuroimaging of the bilingual brain. In Kroll, J. F., and De Groot, A. M. B. (eds.), Handbook of Bilingualism: Psycholinguistic Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press. 497–515. Altarriba, J., and Mathis, K. M. 1997. Conceptual and lexical development in second language acquisition. Journal of Memory and Language, 36: 550–568. Balota, D. A. 1994. Visual word recognition: the journey from features to meaning. In Gernsbacher, M. (ed.), Handbook of Psycholinguistics. New York: Academic Press. 303–358. Bialystok, E. 1988. Levels of bilinguals and levels of linguistic awareness. Developmental Psychology, 24: 560–567. Bialystok, E., and Codd, J. 1997. Cardinal limits evidence from language awareness and bilingualism for developing concepts of number. Cognitive Development, 12: 85–106.

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Bialystok, E. 1999. Cognitive complexity and attentional control in the bilingual mind. Child Development, 70: 636–644. Bialystok, E., and Martin, M. M. 2004. Attention and inhibition in bilingual children: evidence from the dimensional change card sort task. Developmental Science, 7: 325–339. Bialystok, E., Craik, F. I. M., Klein, R., and Viswanathan, M. 2004. Bilingualism, aging, and cognitive control: evidence from the Simon Task. Psychology and Aging, 19: 290–303. Bialystok, E. 2005. Consequences of bilingualism for cognitive development. In Kroll, J. F., and De Groot, A. M. B. (eds.), Handbook of Bilingualism: Psycholinguistic Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press. 417–432. Bialystok, E., Craik, F. I. M., Grady, C., Chau, W., Ishii, R., Gunji, A., and Pantev, C. 2005. Effect of bilingualism on cognitive control in the Simon task: evidence from MEG. Neuroimage, 24: 40–49. Birdsong, D. 1999. Introduction: whys and why nots of the critical period hypothesis. In Birdsong, D. (ed.), Second language acquisition and the critical period hypothesis. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.1–22. Chen, H.-C., and Leung, Y.-S. 1989. Patterns of lexical processing in a nonnative language. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 15: 316–325. Costa, A., Miozzo, M., Caramazza, A. 1999. Lexical selection in bilinguals: do words in the bilingual’s two lexicons compete for selection? Journal of Memory and Language, 41: 365–397. Costa, A., and Santesteban, M. 2004. Lexical access in bilingual speech production: evidence from language switching in highly proficient bilinguals and L2 learners. Journal of Memory and Language, 50: 491–511. De Bruijn, E. R.A., Dijkstra, T., Chwilla, D. J., and Schriefers, H. J. 2001. Language context effects on interlingual homograph recognition: evidence from event-related potentials and response times in semantic priming. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 4: 155–168. De Groot, A. M. B. 1992. Determinants of word translation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18: 1001–1018. De Groot, A. M. B., and Poot, R. 1997. Word translation at three levels of proficiency in a second language: the ubiquitous involvement of conceptual memory. Language Learning, 47: 215–264. DeKeyser, R. M. 2001. Automaticity and automatization. In Robinson, P. (ed.), Cognition and second language instruction. New York: Cambridge University Press. 125–151. Dijkstra, A., and Van Heuven, W. J. B. 1998. The BIA model and bilingual word recognition. In Grainger, J., and Jacobs, A. M. (eds.), Localist connectionist approaches to human cognition. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 189–225.

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CHAPTER 9

SECOND LANGUAGE GENDER SYSTEM AFFECTS F I R S T L A N G U A G E G E N D E R C L A S S I F I C AT I O N Elena Andonova1 , Ani Gosheva1 , Armina Janyan1 , and Jasmin Sadat Schaffai2 1 New Bulgarian University, Sofia 2 Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft, Osnabrück

Abstract When you speak about the sea, in some languages you have to refer to it in the masculine gender (il mare in Italian), in others in feminine (la mer in French), and in still others in neuter (Mopemo in Bulgarian). Examples such as these are usually provided as arguments for the arbitrariness principle going back to Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1916) postulate on the arbitrary nature of the relationship between the two aspects of the verbal sign – concepts and acoustic images. Grammatical gender is widely assumed to be a prime example of arbitrariness due to the fact that there is ample cross-linguistic variability in the genders of nouns referring to one and the same concept and little systematicity in the mapping between different gender categories (e.g., masculine, feminine, and neuter) and the meaning of nouns within languages. In the face of so much arbitrariness, a curious observer may ask whether the relationship between language(s) and thought may also be arbitrary or, alternatively, subject to certain constraints. While cognitive constraints on language are rarely in the focus of attention (however, see the literature on working memory and language processing, e.g., Caplan & Waters 1999; MacDonald & Christiansen 2002), there has been plenty of speculation and a growing amount of experimental data collected to address the possibility that cross-linguistic variation is associated with variation in mental processes. The latter view is usually subsumed under the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf 1956) whose strong version of linguistic determinism has long been discredited but whose softer formulation in terms of linguistic relativity has undergone a revival in recent years. The two issues are indeed intertwined, especially if the general conceptual or mental apparatus of humans is held to be cross-linguistically and cross-culturally universal. The arbitrariness principle would then predict dissociation between the variability of linguistic competence and behavior and the universality of mental processes and representations. In this sense, it would preclude the possibility for a “Whorfian” influence of the language we speak on the way we view extra-linguistic reality.



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E L E N A A N D O N O VA E T A L .

1. A LT E R N AT I V E V I E W S O N G R A M M AT I C A L G E N D E R

Alternative views focusing on the motivated, grounded and non-arbitrary nature of form-function mappings in human languages have been proposed in socially and functionally minded research communities, for example, from the almost forgotten general semantics of Hayakawa (1949), to the cognitive linguistics of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), social semiotics of Hodge and Kress (1988), critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1995), etc. In the psycholinguistic literature, a strong candidate for framing research on cross-linguistic variability and its functional implications for language acquisition, processing, and loss has been the Competition Model (Bates & MacWhinney 1989). Research within this framework has shown that languages differ not only qualitatively, for example, the types of cues speakers of different languages use in language comprehension, but also quantitatively, that is, the degree of reliance on these cues. For instance, even though animacy, agreement, and word order are all used as clues to understanding thematic relations in various languages, the degree to which each of them is a reliable source of information differs – in French, the sentence processing hierarchy is agreement > animacy > word order whereas in English word order dominates (Bates & MacWhinney 1989). Thus, even though structurally similar grammatical gender systems may be found in a pair of languages, the extent to which gender information is useful and reliable in language processing may vary. The processing of grammatical gender has attracted an explosion of interest in psycholinguistic research in the last few years. As a result of a number of these studies, the arbitrariness principle has come under more fire. At the word level, the mapping between syntactic features and form is not arbitrary; for example, in Italian, the correlation between the grammatical gender of a word and its ending is a reliable cue (see Bates et al. 1995). In a timed gender-monitoring task in Bulgarian, Andonova et al. (2004) established a role in grammatical gender processing for the so-called “semantic” gender – participants performed with higher accuracy and faster speed on items that had “sexed” referents, for example, “girl” and “teacher,” than others. Furthermore, they also found a grammatical gender by participant sex interaction whereby


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women’s performance on processing nouns in feminine was better than men’s. In addition, recent years have seen a new wave of evidence indicating the existence of cross-linguistic differences in cognitive performance. Such neo-Whorfian effects have been emphasized by findings on spatial language and categorization (Choi & Bowerman 1991; Majid et al. 2004), conceptualization of time (Boroditsky 2001), color cognition (Roberson et al. 2004), numerical cognition (Brysbaert et al. 1998), etc. For example, Choi and Bowerman’s (1991) finding of languagespecificity in spatial cognition shows that, unlike English speakers whose conceptualization of spatial configurations is associated with the distinction between support and containment relations, for Korean speakers, the dividing line falls between tight-fitting and loose-fitting arrangements. Thus, the neo-Whorfian view being explored considers variation in cognitive behavior and categorization in particular as a function of variation across languages. Part of this agenda is a host of studies examining the relationship between grammatical gender systems and speakers’ conceptualizations of non-sexed, inanimate objects in categorization and similarity judgment tasks (Sera et al. 1994; Flaherty 2001; Sera et al. 2002; Phillips & Boroditsky 2003; Vigliocco et al. 2005). Indeed, although grammatical gender has mostly been seen as a purely formal and semantically arbitrary distinction, some recent research suggests that this assumption may need to be revised. To begin with, studies have shown systematic correlations between the meaning of words and their grammatical gender, for example, in German abstract nouns (Zubin& Köpcke 1984). The partially non-arbitrary nature of the mapping between phonological form and grammatical gender across languages should not be underestimated, even if it may not strike a novice learner of a typical gender-marking language as a reliable basis for gender classifications. The strength of this correlation between form (word ending, for example) and gender varies across languages – it is relatively high in Spanish and Bulgarian, for example, but lower in German. Unlike the difference between three- and two-gender systems, the variability in the consistency of mapping between phonological form and gender categories and its consequences for categorization behavior


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(see below), however, are rarely discussed in the literature under review. The impact of grammatical gender on speakers’ non-linguistic behavior has been explored through a number of experimental paradigms, including male/female voice attribution to objects (Sera et al. 1994, 2002), male/female name attribution to objects (Flaherty 2001), similarity judgments and memory tasks (Boroditsky& Schmidt 2000; Vigliocco et al. 2005), etc. The findings have been mostly in line with the hypothesized conceptual-grammatical “alignment” effect, for example, speakers attribute voices to pictured objects that are consistent with grammatical gender distinctions in their language (Sera et al. 1994) both when the labels of the objects were supplied as part of the experimental paradigm and when they were not. In a typical experimental setup, voice assignment (male vs. female) to inanimate objects, the critical manipulation is on the grammatical gender (masculine vs. feminine) of the nouns that are normally used to name these objects. Finding evidence for the influence of grammatical gender systems on speakers’ behavior has not always been a straightforward task, however. For example, while positive evidence for the link between grammar and male/female categorization has been found in monolingual speakers of Spanish (Sera et al. 1994) and French (Sera et al. 2002), no reliable effects were found for German speakers (Sera et al. 2002). Such differences in results call for an explanation, even if somewhat tentative. One line of argumentation has been based on distinguishing types of languages while another is concerned with types of experimental tasks. A provisional explanation for the absence of grammatical gender effects in Sera et al.’s (2002) study of German has been the difference between two-gender (masculine, feminine) and three-gender (masculine, feminine, neuter) grammatical systems; the latter are seen as being at a disadvantage in such tasks, that is, exerting less influence on speakers’ categorization behavior. Vigliocco et al. (2005) discovered no effects of grammatical gender on triadic similarity judgments of words in German-speaking participants and interpreted this null result as supporting a “sex and gender” hypothesis which explains gender effects as arising as a generalization from the transparent relationship between the sex of human referents and the gender of nouns rather than an alternative



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“similarity and gender” hypothesis in which the same effects are seen as a consequence of similarity in linguistic contexts. Vigliocco et al. (2005) see German as a language with a weaker correspondence between the genders of nouns referring to humans and the sex of referents, that is, more arbitrariness, because of its tripartite gender system. Furthermore, a debate is currently under way on the locus of grammatical gender effects, which is based on the distinction between experimental paradigms involving language processing. While one view considers grammatical gender to be part of speakers’ conceptualization of even non-sexed objects in such languages (Boroditsky & Schmidt 2000), the alternative “lexicalist” position was recently defended by Vigliocco et al. (2005). As a reminder, earlier Sera et al. (1994) showed the presence of such effects in both their label and non-label (lexical and non-lexical) tasks. In their comparison of gender-specific effects on similarity judgments accompanied or not by a verbal shadowing task (meant to produce verbal interference and thus eliminate purely lexical effects), Phillips and Boroditsky (2003) found that similarity ratings did not differ across tasks. Based on these and similar results (Boroditsky & Schmidt 2000), they argue that, once established, the effect is not language-specific (not dependent on language processing since objects appear to have conceptual gender). Vigliocco et al. (2005) conclude that such gender-specific effects may be strictly limited to verbal tasks, given that they found no such effects in a picture similarity judgment task which could be performed without recourse to lexical labels (experiment 4), and that these mechanisms may have a role in language development but do not extend to conceptual structures. In a related discussion of how and when language affects cognition, Hunt and Agnoli (1991) maintained that the impact is only in terms of computation costs for users of a language, and not in terms of specific representations. 2. G R A M M A R E F F E C T S I N B I L I N G U A L S

The neo-Whorfian impact of cross-linguistic differences on cognition has been researched almost exclusively in monolingual populations. It is reasonable to ask if it is only the native language that can exert


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this kind of influence. Three recent studies have addressed this issue. Athanasopoulos (2006) examined the effects of variation in grammatical number marking systems in the two languages of Japanese-English bilinguals on a similarity of pictures task, and found evidence supporting the hypothesis that acquisition of a second language with different grammatical properties from the first language can further alter cognition. In addition, Athanasopoulos (2006) established that better knowledge of grammatical number in their L2 led Japanese-English speakers to resemble monolingual speakers of English in their behavior and concluded that L2 effects on cognition correlate with L2 proficiency. Two further studies have explored the possibility that knowledge of a second grammatical gender system may affect speakers’ performance in categorization tasks in similar ways as it does first-language speakers. Bassetti (2005) compared grammatical gender’s effect on object perception in Italian-German bilingual and in Italian monolingual nine-year-old children in a voice attribution task. She found an effect of Italian grammatical gender in the performance of the Italian monolingual children but not in the Italian-German bilingual children (only items of opposite genders in their two languages were included in the materials). While this is an interesting result in itself, her findings were based on only 12 test items. Bassetti concludes that when the bilingual’s two grammatical gender systems are in conflict, grammatical gender ceases to constitute a reliable cue; therefore, bilingualism eliminates a language-induced bias in the perception of reality. A notable exception to the predominantly “monolingual” picture on grammatical gender effects has been a study reported in Phillips and Boroditsky (2003) in which Spanish-German bilinguals who were also fluent in English (thus, in fact, trilingual) rated the similarity of objects and animals to human males and females. Participants’ experience with Spanish ranged from 1 to 61 years and with German from 1 to 67 years. On a scale from 1 (not fluent) to 5 (very fluent), they rated themselves as quite fluent, that is, on average 4.19 in Spanish, 4.27 in German and 4.28 in English. Phillips and Boroditsky found a significant positive correlation between people’s relative proficiency in Spanish/German and their biases in the similarity task. Their judgments were aligned more with the grammatical gender system of a language if their self-rated proficiency



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in that language was higher. The existence of such a correlation is a striking result which points towards the importance of how well a certain language is mastered for language-specific (here, gender-specific) effects on cognitive tasks to emerge. The participants in their study, however, were a mixed group whose gender-marking language may have been a recent acquisition (e.g., one year) or a life-long experience (e.g., 67 years), thus possibly varying across the L1–L2–L3 continuum and unspecified with respect to the question whether their dominant or preferred language was a gendermarking one (and which one – Spanish or German), or a gender non-marking language such as English. In this sense, it is not clear from these results to what extent the correlation between gender effects and language proficiency may be due principally to the first language dominating the scene vs. the second (or third) language additionally leaving its traces on cognitive behavior. In fact, there have been no published findings of the direct effects of a specific second language system on categorization in bilinguals, with the exception of number marking in English affecting advanced Japanese-English bilinguals (Athanasopoulos 2006). It is legitimate to ask, then, if bilinguals’ second language gender system may also affect their performance in a task that concerns classification in their first language. Does the acquisition of a second language in which grammatical gender demarcations do not repeat those in a bilingual’s first language lead to a contradictory set of expectations, hence less overall reliance on gender as a cue in linguistic and non-linguistic processing as expected by Bassetti (2005), or does it modify their representations of the grammatical items in their first language in line with the gender system of the second language? More specifically, can the grammatical system of L2 affect classification choices in L1 directly, that is, can the availability of a gender-marking system on nouns in L2 bias bilinguals’ preference for masculine vs. feminine gender classifications in their L1 in a way that would show alignment with the grammar of their second language? This is the main research question we started out with in examining the behavior of speakers of different gender-marking second languages in terms of gender alignment effects. Our first set of data came


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from Spanish- and German-speaking bilinguals whose first language is Bulgarian (gender-marking itself), but we also extended our investigation into German-L1 (also gender-marking) bilinguals (Russian- and French-speaking). As a result, we were in a better position to address the issue of generalizability of findings and also to look into variation arising from the different combinations of languages involved. Note that German is frequently cited as a rare exception to the growing body of evidence for gender effects on categorization. Interpretations invariably tend to focus on its three-member system (vs. two-member in Romance languages) and/or the relatively high degree of arbitrariness of formmeaning mappings. If German grammatical gender is indeed lacking in “semantic force,” to borrow Sera et al.’s (1994) term, then the gendered second languages of such bilinguals could be expected to produce an even stronger influence in classification tasks. The relative influence of second languages on Bulgarian-L1 bilinguals, on the other hand, is an open question. On the one hand, it may be rather fragile since grammatical gender processing in Bulgarian has been shown to be sensitive to semantic factors (Andonova et al. 2004); on the other hand, if a demarcation line is to be drawn between two-gender and three-gender systems, with the latter being more arbitrary, then the performance of BulgarianL1 bilinguals may also “fall prey” more easily to the second language system, especially if it is itself one of more (e.g., Spanish) vs. less (e.g., German) semantic force. In both studies we also included an English-L2 control group. Both Bulgarian and German have three genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter; that is, they are structurally but not lexically and functionally isomorphic. In order to reduce the potentially confounding influence of the gender system in bilinguals’ first language, we chose to elicit their classifications on a novel experimental task. Participants in both studies were instructed to imagine that there would be no neuter category in the gender system of their first language and to select a “new” gender (masculine or feminine) for a number of existing neuter nouns. In our first experiment, our hypothesis was that Bulgarian-German and Bulgarian-Spanish bilinguals would make their choices in line with the grammatical gender distinctions found in their second language. We also expected that the degree of bias in the two L2 groups may differ,



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based on previous studies which have concluded that the German system does not affect classifications as much as Spanish and French (Sera et al. 1994; Vigliocco et al. 2005). We expected that Bulgarian-Spanish and Bulgarian-German speakers would agree on the classification of items that are of the same gender in Spanish and German systematically by showing the greatest degree of consensus on those items (matching masculine, MM, and matching feminine, FF) in comparison with items whose translation equivalents are of different genders in German and Spanish (mismatching items). Finally, previous studies with monolinguals have also demonstrated “indirect” cross-linguistic effects, such as an apparent effect of Spanish gender among speakers of English (4th grade and older) and German (only children up to 4th grade were tested for German) but no crosslinguistic effect of French gender (Sera et al. 2002). Thus, if we find that one language’s gender assignments can predict the classification of words by speakers of other second languages, we expected the source of such an effect to be the “semantically strong” Spanish, but not German or French, as second languages. These linguistic constructions may then reflect shared ideas about the properties of gender.

3. E X P E R I M E N T 1 : B I L I N G U A L S W I T H BULGARIAN AS THEIR FIRST LANGUAGE

3.1. Participants The participants in this experiment were three groups of bilinguals whose first language was Bulgarian. There were 19 Bulgarian-English bilinguals (11 women, 8 men) whose average age was 13.83 years (range 13–14), 16 Bulgarian-German bilinguals (9 women, 7 men) with an average age of 15.70 years (range 15–16), and 15 Bulgarian-Spanish bilinguals (9 women, 6 men) with an average age of 15.86 years (range 15–16). They had studied their second language since the age of 12 for 2 years (English) or for 4 years (German and Spanish). Bulgarian was the first language for all of them; none knew a third language other than English, or had a parent whose first language was not Bulgarian. All participants were high school students in one of the so-called “language


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schools” in Sofia where the second language is studied intensively for a full year following grade seven. Afterwards, students continue to study the language as a special subject and take some other subjects in the medium of the same language. All in all, second-language exposure is abundant and rigorous and normally students develop a high level of command of the target language. 3.2. Procedure The experiment was conducted in classrooms in the three schools. For each Bulgarian neuter noun on the list, participants were asked to answer the following question (in Bulgarian): “If there were no neuter gender in the Bulgarian language, which gender would each of these words be in?” by indicating either masculine or feminine on the answer sheet. Participants could take as much time as they needed to fill out the questionnaire. 3.3. Materials A list with a total of 99 Bulgarian neuter nouns was set up. The gender of one-third of the translation equivalents for the Bulgarian nouns (33 items) was masculine in both German and Spanish, of another third it was feminine in both German and Spanish, and for the last third it was either masculine in German and feminine in Spanish or vice versa; that is, mismatched across the two gender-marking second languages. Nouns varied in concreteness, imageability, and frequency, and referred to natural kinds (including animals), artifacts, and abstract concepts. In the list, nouns were presented in a randomized order. One item was subsequently excluded from the analyses as an outlier. 3.4. Results The dependent variable was calculated as the mean percent of feminine choices across participants in the by-item analyses, and across items in the by-participant analyses. For example, if all participants chose feminine for a given item, the value of the dependent variable for that item would be 100%, and if they all chose masculine, the value of the mean percent choice of feminine (FCh%) would be 0% indicating an absolute bias against feminine in favor of masculine. Chance level



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performance would be reflected in values around 50% . As the dependent variable reflects a binary choice, the exact opposite would be valid for choices of masculine. Two sets of analyses were conducted on the mean percent choice of feminine, one where data were averaged over items and the second one with data averaged over participants. The overall picture of results from these analyses was very similar. Participants tended to assign masculine as a new gender category to the Bulgarian neuter nouns more than feminine (M = 41.15%, SD = 13.04% in the by-participants analysis; M = 40.28%, SD = 19.70% in the by-items analysis), a result which we interpret as a markedness effect, that is, an asymmetry between the two members of the gender category where masculine is the unmarked, or default, value, and feminine is the marked member of the opposition. A bias favoring male-like representations has been shown before (Sera et al. 2002); here we further extend this finding to a bias favoring masculine-gender choices. A one-way ANOVA with second language as a between-participant variable explored further this finding showing a main effect of L2 on the mean percent choice of feminine (F[2, 291] = 4.30; p < .05), with the values for English-L2, German-L2, and Spanish-L2 speakers being 43.38%, 41.80%, and 35.65%, respectively. A Tukey HSD posthoc test revealed that only the English and Spanish speakers’ choices differed significantly. In order to address the research questions outlined above, two sets of statistical analyses were conducted. In the first, we examined the effects of grammatical gender on the performance of each bilingual group. The second set compared the choices of the English-speaking bilinguals whose second language did not incorporate a system of grammatical gender with those of the bilinguals whose second language had a specific grammatical gender system, that is, the Germanand Spanish-speaking bilinguals. To avoid redundancy, we report here only the by-items analysis and the results of the by-participants analysis on those occasions where they diverged. Table 1 summarizes item means and standard deviations (SD) of percent choice of feminine in the three L2 groups for each gender in the two gender-marking languages.


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E L E N A A N D O N O VA E T A L . Table 1. Mean percent choice of feminine and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the three L2 groups for translation equivalents of items with masculine and feminine gender in German and Spanish German gender

German-L2 Spanish-L2 English-L2

Spanish gender

Masc

Fem

Masc

Fem

34.70 (22.42) 33.77 (20.40) 41.73 (16.86)

47.83 (21.09) 37.25 (19.76) 44.77 (13.40)

35.64 (22.82) 32.06 (19.52) 40.82 (14.47)

49.06 (20.22) 39.89 (20.00) 46.39 (15.40)

A one-way analysis of variance revealed a significant effect of German grammatical gender on the choices of German-speaking bilinguals (F[1, 96] = 8.90; p < .01), who assigned feminine gender 47.83% of the time to those Bulgarian neuter nouns whose translation equivalents in German are feminine nouns, and only 34.70% to items whose German equivalent is in the masculine gender. This significant difference shows that German-speaking bilinguals were aligning their choices with the grammatical system of their second language. Aone-way analysis of variance was run on German speakers’data with Spanish gender as a within-subject variable. Spanish gender was found to have affected the choices of German speakers indirectly (F[1, 96] = 9.33; p < .01): in their data set there was a bias towards choosing feminine for nouns with feminine equivalents (49.06%) in Spanish more than those with masculine equivalents (35.64%) (Table 1).

3.4.1. Bulgarian-German bilinguals

A similar one-way analysis of variance found a marginal effect of Spanish grammatical gender on the performance of Spanish-speaking bilinguals (F[1, 96] = 3.83; p = .0532) who assigned feminine 39.89% of the time to the Bulgarian equivalents of Spanish feminine nouns and 32.06% to those of Spanish masculine nouns. In the by-participants analysis this effect was statistically significant (F[1, 58] = 5.48; p < .05), with 40.45% assigned for Spanish feminine and 32.72% for Spanish masculine. Here the general trend is the same as in the German-speaking group; that is, participants were aligning their choices with the organization of grammatical gender in their second language.

3.4.2. Bulgarian-Spanish bilinguals



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A one-way analysis of variance was run on the Spanish speakers’ data with German gender as a within-subject variable. German gender had no effect on the choices of Spanish speaking bilinguals (F[1, 96] = .74; p < .4). Two further tests were carried out on the data for the English-speaking group. A one-way analysis of variance revealed no effect of German gender (F[1, 96] = .99; p < .4) and a second one-way ANOVA established only a marginal effect of Spanish gender on their choices (F[1, 96] = 3.40; p < .07). The byparticipants analysis revealed that this effect was statistically significant (F[1, 74] = 5.15; p < .05) with 46.97% assigned to Spanish feminine equivalents and 40.85% to masculine equivalents. The results for this bilingual group are important to keep in mind as a comparison with those for the gender-marking-L2 speakers, that is, German- and Spanishspeaking bilinguals. We hypothesized that there should be no principal difference in the choices of the control group of (English-speaking) bilinguals as a function of grammatical gender in German and Spanish and indeed we found none, with the above exception. The fact that their behavior was marginally consistent with the demarcation line between feminine and masculine in Spanish deserves future attention, however.

3.4.3. Bulgarian-English bilinguals

In the next set of analyses, we directly compared the performance of each of the two gender-marking L2 groups with the control English speakers’ group. A two-way ANOVA (L2 × German gender) revealed a marginal interaction between language group, that is, German vs. English, and German gender, that is, masculine vs. feminine (F[1, 192] = 3.55; p < .07). A Tukey HSD posthoc test revealed that German speakers honored the gender distinction found in German (47.83% for feminine nouns and 34.70% for masculine nouns) while English speakers’behavior remained indifferent to it (44.77% for equivalents to feminine German nouns and 41.73% for masculine equivalents). In a similar comparison between the English and the Spanish group and a subsequent Tukey HSD posthoc test, the behavioral profile of Spanish speakers did not differ from that of the English speakers. 3.4.4. Comparisons with the English-speaking controls


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3.5. Bulgarian-German and Bulgarian-Spanish (Gender-Marking Languages) The next question to address in our analysis of the data is whether the hypothesis listed earlier on the distinction between matching feminine (FF) and matching masculine (MM) items would hold for the gendermarking second languages. To answer this question, we collapsed the data for the two language groups together and examined their combined choices with respect to the three levels of the gender-match variable: (a) matching masculine items (masculine in both German and Spanish); (b) matching feminine items (feminine in both German and Spanish); and (c) mismatched items (masculine in German and feminine in Spanish or vice versa). This analysis showed that item type made a significant difference (F[2, 95] = 4.82; p < .05) for the gender-marking L2 speakers who agreed more on the matching items than the mismatching ones. These participants chose feminine gender for 44.96% of the matching feminine items, 31.00% for the matching masculine items, and 40.26% for the mismatching items. ATukey HSD posthoc test revealed that there was a significant difference in their choices between the two matching conditions (matching masculine and matching feminine genders). The same kind of analysis on the English-L2 data yielded no significant effect, that is, there was no specific preference or avoidance of feminine for either matching feminine items, matching masculine items, or mismatching items (F[2, 95] = 2.02; p < .2), confirmed also by a Tukey HSD posthoc test. However, the by-participants analysis yielded a significant main effect (F[2, 54] = 3.89; p < .05). A Tukey HSD test showed a difference between mismatching items (45.56%) and matching feminine items (44.82%). 3.6. Discussion The results of the analyses of bilinguals’ choices as a function of the grammatical gender distinctions available in their second language show that bilinguals aligned their categorization in this task with the grammars of their respective second languages. Both German- and Spanishspeaking bilinguals preferred feminine more for Bulgarian neuter nouns whose translation equivalent in their second language was also feminine,



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and less so if it was masculine. This kind of consistency is clear evidence for the involvement of the second language of bilinguals during the processing of first-language words in this categorization task. Even though the experiment was conducted entirely in their native Bulgarian language; that is, a monolingual language mode was aimed at and set up as much as possible, participants’ judgments were systematically affected by their bilingual status and their second language grammatical gender representations. Furthermore, the analysis of the combined data on gender-marking languages with respect to the cross-linguistic gender status of items (matching and mismatching gender) confirmed that these speakers were clearly differentiating between matching feminine and matching masculine items in their judgments. It was also important, however, to compare their performance with the choices of the non-gender-marking English-L2 speakers. A series of comparative analyses yielded a coherent picture of results – English speakers were not systematically affected by the grammatical gender assignments in German or Spanish. This set of results is in support of the claim that it was the specific second languages’ gender distinctions that affected German- and Spanish-speaking bilinguals and not a generic conceptualization pattern which may have been of a more universal and language-independent nature. The one exception to this generally predictable pattern was a weak indirect influence of Spanish gender in some of the analyses on participants’ choices. It appears that Spanish gender distinctions may indeed be closer to the intuitions of English speakers as established in previous studies (Sera et al. 1994, 2002). This is a plausible interpretation of the English-L2 results and one commonly shared by studies of cross-linguistic variation in grammatical gender effects. Future research, however, should address the question of whether English speakers’ performance provides a neutral baseline from which one would be able to generalize to non-gender-marking languages as a whole vs. merely a specific set of English speakers’ intuitions that may not be consistent with the intuitions of speakers of other non-gender-marking languages. Partial support for the argument that English speakers’ intuitions may be a suitable baseline comes from the results of cross-linguistic “implicit” gender influences in our study. Spanish gender distinctions


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were found to be indirectly affecting the choices of German-speaking bilinguals as well as those of the English-speaking group (in addition to Spanish-L2 speakers). Thus, it is possible that the distinctions between masculine and feminine in Spanish are consistent with a more general pattern of conceptual differentiation and classifications of some crosslinguistic validity, as they predicted, though not equally, the behavior of all participants in our study. Originally, we considered another baseline for a comparison with our gender-marking L2 speakers which would not have been possible in most of the studies reviewed earlier. Monolingual speakers of Bulgarian could have provided a “default” profile in this categorization task where knowledge of second, third, etc. languages is not required. However, two arguments against this choice convinced us otherwise. First, in line with international trends, true or “pure” monolinguals are an exception in this young age group and the urban cultural landscape where we conduct our research, thus we would be focusing on a somewhat “deviant” rather than a representative community. Second, we needed to study comparatively similar populations to be able to draw a conclusion with respect to the specific gender system of L2 affecting the bilingual speaker. With a monolingual control group, an alternative hypothesis could not have been ruled out; that is, that it was not the second language’s grammar but the fact that these speakers were not monolingual that was the basis for the (then) “apparent” bilingual grammatical gender effect. Having established the expected effect of the grammatical gender in the second language on the classification of words in the first language, we need to emphasize here that the bilingual participants in our study were guided partially but not entirely by the available grammatical distinctions in their languages. Various other aspects of the perception of these nouns’referents come into play in this gender-classification task as well as in others. An example may be helpful: both speakers of Spanish and German re-assigned the Bulgarian word for “tulip” to the feminine gender, although the translation equivalents in the two languages were of mismatching genders. More typically, however, the Bulgarian noun meaning “future” was re-assigned feminine gender by only 25% of the Spanish-L2 speakers but by as many as 73% of the German-L2 speakers (the Spanish translation equivalent, el futuro, is masculine, and the



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German one, die Zukunft, is feminine). An additional question we asked was whether speakers’ gender-consistent behavior would be in some way biased towards a default gender. Indeed, the data cited above point to a markedness effect in two ways: (a) masculine was the predominant choice overall; and (b) across gender-marking L2 groups, the degree of alignment with the gender of the L2 equivalent was much higher for L2-masculine items (69% ) than for L2-feminine items (44.96% ). To our regret, information on the distribution of gender-consistency across the different grammatical genders in a given task and language has not been reported before, thus preventing us from making a comparison with previous studies. In conclusion, this first study of the influence of second-language grammatical gender distinctions on bilinguals’ categorization of firstlanguage items constitutes an extension of the effect of grammatical gender in monolingual categorization tasks demonstrated in a number of studies in recent years. The results suggest that grammatical gender forms at least part of the basis for categorization for speakers of languages where the gender distinctions are readily available, even in the case of a second language system. Some aspects of this effect have remained unclear at the end of this first experiment. The variability of language-specific gender effects deserves further exploration. Two possible sources of this variability have been suggested in the literature so far. First, the presence or absence of effects in French, Spanish, and Italian vs. German monolinguals has been attributed to differences in the semantic transparency of gender in two- vs. three-gender language. Contrary to expectations based on the literature on gender effects in monolingual categorization tasks, we did not find German-derived effects to be weaker than Spanish-derived ones for the German-L2 and Spanish-L2 groups, respectively. This result raises an issue with the wide-spread assumptions in the literature of the relative arbitrariness of the German gender system and does not support Vigliocco et al.’s (2005) “sex and gender” hypothesis as it is formulated with respect to three-gender languages, but rather the alternative “similarity and gender” view. After all, how arbitrary is a language (German) for which Vigliocco et al. (1995) themselves admit that they could not balance their stimuli in terms of gender and category (animate


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vs. artifact)? We did find, however, indirect Spanish influences on German speakers and marginally so on English speakers, which favors an interpretation of cross-linguistically shared features involving Spanish. Secondly, if such effects are dependent on the acquisition of a certain grammar, then the level of proficiency in the second language may be a modulating factor – highly proficient speakers may be more likely to demonstrate gender effects not unlike their monolingual counterparts, whereas speakers who do not have advanced levels of proficiency may then be unable to rely on such gender representations in categorization tasks. Limited evidence exists that gender effects may emerge and grow stronger as an outcome of speakers’ language development. In monolingual categorization tasks, language-specific effects have been shown to vary with age and level of language development (Sera et al. 1994; Flaherty 2001; Sera et al. 2002), as well as in a study of bilinguals (Phillips & Boroditsky 2003). However, the answer to this question with respect to bilinguals is far from clear. In Phillips and Boroditsky’s study participants belonged to a mixed group where the gender-marking language for some was their first and stronger language, while for others it was their second and weaker language. Therefore, these were not clearly developmental second-language dependencies. In our second study, we attempt to throw more light on these two aspects of variability, that is, differences stemming from gender systems of varying transparency and variation in gender effects as a function of language proficiency level. We also explore how generalizable the findings from our first experiment are to bilinguals with another first language and other L1–L2 combinations.

4. E X P E R I M E N T 2 : B I L I N G U A L S W I T H G E R M A N AS THEIR FIRST LANGUAGE

4.1. Participants The participants in this experiment were three groups of bilinguals whose first language was German: 17 German-English bilinguals (7 women,10 men) whose average age was 24.12 years (range 20– 33), 15 German-French bilinguals (11 women, 4 men) with an average


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age of 22.87 years (range 20–30), and 11 German-Russian bilinguals (9 women, 2 men) with an average age of 23 years (range 21–27). They started to study their second language at an average age of 11.35 years – 9.53 for English (range 3–12; SD=2.60), 13.47 for French (range 10–18; SD=1.73), and 11.27 for Russian (range 3–22; SD=6.84). They had been studying their L2 for an average of 12.05 years – 14.59 for English (range 10–26; SD=4.58), 9.4 for French (range 7– 16; SD=2.47), and 11.73 for Russian (range 2–24; SD=7.59). The participants were university students who were all enrolled in study programs using their L2 on a regular basis. All participants were from German speaking families, except four participants of the GermanRussian bilingual group who indicated that some of their relatives were Russian speakers. Five German-English bilinguals, six GermanFrench bilinguals, and seven German-Russian bilinguals had spent at least one semester in a foreign country where their L2 was spoken. All participants filled out a language screening questionnaire at the end of the experiment in which they were asked to rate their comprehension and production abilities in their L2 on a 6-point scale (from 1 for poor ability to 6 for excellent). Self-reported mean proficiency scores for speaking, understanding, reading and writing in L2 are listed in Table 2. All German-French and German-Russian bilinguals reported having learned English as a foreign language in school, starting at a mean age of 10.31 years (10.53 for German-French bilinguals, and 10.09 for German-Russian bilinguals). All participants indicated using their L2 more often than English in everyday life, and further rated their Table 2. Self-report ratings of German-French (GER-FR), German-English (GER-ENG), and German-Russian (GER-RUS) bilinguals for speaking, understanding speech, reading and writing in English (1 reflects poor ability and 6 reflects excellence) Self-report ratings of: GER-FR GER-ENG GER-RUS

Understand

Speak

M

SD

M

SD

4,86 4,82 5

0,99 1,13 0,63

4,46 4,29 3,72

0,91 0,98 0,78

Read M −5 5,11 4,27

Write SD

M

SD

1,06 1,11 1,1

4,53 4,17 3,9

0,74 1,28 1,22


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competence in their L2 higher than English. None of the participants indicated a prolonged exposure to another foreign language than their L2 or English. 4.2. Procedure The experiment was conducted in university classrooms and participants could take as much time as they needed. Instructions were presented and read to the participants in German before presenting the list of German neuter nouns. Participants were told to imagine that there were no neuter gender in German but only masculine and feminine. They were asked to choose intuitively the gender that fits each of the nouns best, either masculine or feminine. 4.3. Materials A list with a total of 80 German neuter nouns was set up. The gender of half of the translation equivalents for the German nouns was congruent in Russian and French (20 nouns with common feminine genders in Russian and French, and 20 nouns with common masculine genders); the gender of the other half of the translation equivalents was different in Russian and French (20 nouns with masculine gender in Russian and feminine gender in French, and 20 nouns with feminine gender in Russian and masculine gender in French). Nouns were mostly common words in the four languages (German, English, French, and Russian) referring to inanimate objects apart from five names of animals; most were concrete except for eight abstract nouns. Items were listed in a randomized order. 4.4. Results As in the previous experiment, two sets of analyses were conducted on the mean percent choices of feminine, one with data averaged over items and another with data averaged over participants. The overall picture of results from these analyses was again very similar. Participants tended to assign masculine as a new gender category to the German neuter nouns more than feminine (M = 43.89%, SD = 14.47% in the by-participants analysis and M = 44.68% and SD = 24.08% in the by-item analysis), a result which replicates the finding from the first experiment of a markedness effect, that is, an asymmetry between the


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two members of the gender category where masculine is a default choice and feminine is the marked member of the opposition. One participant’s (an English-speaking male) data were excluded as his mean percent choice of feminine was two standard deviations below the average for all participants (7.45%). Only the by-items analyses are reported with the by-participants analysis added when necessary (see Table 3 for the overall item means and SDs for each condition). Overall, there were no significant differences across language groups on the percent choice of feminine in either the items’ analysis (F[2, 237] = .70; p < .5) or the participants’ analysis (F[2, 169] = .24; p < .8). For example, in the items’ analysis, the English-speaking, French-speaking, and Russian-speaking bilinguals chose feminine for 47.18%, 44% and 42.84% of all nouns, respectively. This uniformity shows that there was no language-specific preference for one gender over another, although all groups had a general bias towards masculine as the gender of choice (see above). We now turn to the analyses of data from each of the three groups of bilinguals. As a reminder, our expectations are that the choices of the speakers of French and Russian will be affected by the available gender distinctions in their second language while remaining indifferent to the gender distinctions present in the other gender-marking-L2 included in the design, that is, Russian for French-L2 speakers and French for Russian-L2 speakers. The English-speaking bilingual choices are not expected to be consistent with either the French or the Russian gender system. In addition, it is hypothesized that the mean percent choice of feminine will be affected by the degree of consistency in

Table 3. Mean percent choice of feminine and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the three L2 groups for translation equivalents of items with masculine and feminine gender in French and Russian French gender

French-L2 Russian-L2 English-L2

Russian gender

Masc

Fem

Masc

Fem

37.83 (20.39) 39.32 (25.08) 45.00 (22.92)

50.17 (22.85) 46.36 (26.27) 49.38 (25.27)

42.39 (19.56) 36.60 (22.51) 42.15 (22.75)

45.53 (24.94) 48.78 (27.48) 51.98 (24.58)


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gender assignment across the two gender-marking languages (matching masculine items, matching feminine items, mismatching items) for the speakers of French and Russian but not for the English speakers. There was a significant main effect of French gender on the performance of German-French bilinguals (F[1, 78] = 6.49; p < .05) who chose the feminine gender on average for 50.17% of the time for those German neuter nouns whose translation equivalent in French was feminine and only 37.83% for those nouns whose French equivalent was in masculine. Russian gender did not affect the performance of French-speaking bilinguals (F[1, 78] = .39; p < .6). 4.4.1. German-French bilinguals

There was a significant main effect of Russian gender on the Russian-speaking group (F[1, 78] = 4.68; p < .05) who chose feminine gender on average 48.78% for Russian feminine gender equivalents 36.60% for Russian masculine gender equivalents. There was no effect of French gender on the Russian-speaking group in the items’ analysis (F[1, 78] = 1.51; p < .3) but a main effect of French gender emerged in the participants’ analysis (F[1, 40] = 5.30; p < .05). On average, Russian speakers chose feminine for 46.09% of those nouns whose equivalent in French was in the feminine and 39.32% for those with masculine-gender French equivalents. 4.4.2. German-Russian bilinguals

No effect of French gender was observed in the English speakers’ data (F[1, 78] = 66; p < .5). The effect of Russian gender on English speakers was only marginally significant ([F(1, 78) = 3.44; p < .07]; they chose feminine on average 51.98% of the time for feminine items and 42.15% of the time for masculine items).

4.4.3. German-English bilinguals

4.5. German-French and German-Russian bilinguals (Gender-Marking Languages) In order to assess the level of consistency of the speakers of gendermarking second languages, we conducted the following additional analysis. Data for the two groups were collapsed and the effect of the gender match variable with three levels (feminine-matched,



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masculine-matched, and mismatched items) was examined. A one-way ANOVA on the gender-marking languages revealed a significant main effect (F[2, 77] = 3.58; p < .05) of the gender match variable. A Tukey HSD test showed a significantly higher percent of feminine choices for the feminine-matched items across the two languages (53.48%) than for the masculine-matched (36.92%) or mismatched (41.52%) items. The difference between the masculine-matched and mismatched conditions was not significant. Finally, there have been reports (Phillips & Boroditsky 2003) of a correlation between gender consistency and measures of language experience and proficiency but the correlation reported there may have reached statistical significance due to the wide range of participants’language experience. We examined whether the data for our participants who formed more homogeneous bilingual groups would reveal the same tendency. To this end, we carried out a set of correlation analyses involving gender consistency (the match vs. mismatch of participants’ choice of gender and the gender of the translation equivalent in their second language) and a number of language experience and proficiency measures such as the age of first exposure to L2, the duration of L2 exposure in years, and four proficiency scales based on their self ratings (understanding, speaking, reading, and writing skills). Although gender consistency did not correlate with the two measures of language experience and with most measures of self-rated proficiency, a significant positive correlation emerged between gender consistency and self-ratings of speaking ability in the analysis of the combined data from German-Russian and German-French bilinguals (r = .25, p < .02). The more highly participants rated their speaking ability in L2, the more their choices were consistent with the L2 gender system. In two further separate analyses, this positive correlation was found to be statistically significant for the German-French speakers (r = .27, p < .04) and to exhibit a trend in the same direction for the German-Russian bilinguals (r = .27, p < .075). 4.6. Discussion As in our first experiment, bilingual speakers based their re-classifications of neuter nouns in the first language on the grammatical gender distinctions available in their second language. This effect was


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found for both the French-speaking and Russian-speaking groups. We have thus been able to establish a more general pattern of L2 grammatical gender impact on categorizations in L1 which holds across two different first languages (Bulgarian and German) and four different second languages (German, Spanish, French, and Russian). The consistency of these findings provides a clear answer to our research question – the grammar of the second language does indeed affect categorization in the first language of a bilingual. In addition, we found some weak cross-linguistic influences such as the main effect of French gender on Russian-L2 speakers. Note that in the first experiment, an effect of Spanish grammatical gender emerged on the performance of all L2 groups. These results points toward the cross-linguistic relevance of the genders of these two languages in line with previous studies (Sera et al. 1994, 2002; Vigliocco et al. 2005). It is quite possible that the grammatical gender systems of Romance languages are more in synchrony with the categorization intuitions of speakers of other languages as well, as suggested by Sera et al. (2002). Alternatively, we need to consider the assumption that two-gender systems hold less arbitrariness (Vigliocco et al. 2005) and are thus full of more semantic potential, which allows them to have a greater impact on tasks beyond purely formal distinctions. On this account, three-gender systems such as German and Russian should exert no influence because of their high degree of semantic arbitrariness. The combined findings of the two experiments reported here do not support such an explanation. While it is true that one of the two-gender L2s (Spanish) did produce apparent or indirect cross-linguistic effects, the three-gender language systems also had the predicted impact on the performance of their L2 speakers. Thus, they were found to be a reliable basis for L1 classifications just as the two-gender systems. We must conclude, therefore, that all four gender-marking second languages covered in our studies guided their speakers’ choices. Admittedly, the Spanish gender system displayed some cross-linguistic validity as well, which needs further investigation. Despite wide variation, speakers across languages also share some common beliefs; for example, they have been reported to associate natural objects with feminine and artifacts with masculine gender (Mullen 1990; Sera et al. 1994). In addition, Sera et al. (2002)



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argue in favor of a close correlation between the Spanish gender system and conceptual/perceptual features of objects associated with men and women. These biases appear to overlap considerably with the gender differentiations found in Spanish grammar. Finally, we discovered a significant positive correlation between gender consistency and one of the measures of language proficiency (speaking ability in L2) but no correlations with the other proficiency scales or the language experience measures (age of first exposure and length of exposure in years). Thus, the data suggest the impact of a developmental trajectory on the consistency of the L2 gender effect in that the effect emerges and grows with enhanced speaking abilities. 5. C O N C L U S I O N

In two studies we have established that bilingual speakers make grammatically consistent gender re-assignments in line with their second language systems. These effects were demonstrated in speakers of two different first languages (Bulgarian and German) and four different gender-marking second languages (Spanish, German, Russian, and French); thus they appear to be generalizable beyond a single combination of linguistic skills. In addition, we found that Spanish and French but not German and Russian gender categories are associated with indirect cross-linguistic influence on speakers of other languages, thus providing a learning heuristic through their partially non-arbitrary nature. Such cross-linguistic correspondences have implications for learning new gender systems when the grammar-semantics mapping is relatively transparent. Taken together, these results indicate that grammatical gender affects not only monolinguals’ performance but also bilinguals’ choices; furthermore, the grammatical system of a bilingual’s second language can affect linguistic categorization related to their first language as shown in a novel word re-classification procedure. Additionally, we have established a positive correlation between participants’ gender choice consistency and their self-rated L2 speaking ability indicating the importance of the level of proficiency in a language for the emergence of effects specifically related to its grammar system.


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Future research needs to explore the conditions that constrain these effects in order to establish clear implications for theories involving interaction of the grammatical systems of a bilingual’s two languages, especially in the L2 → L1 direction. Until now, research on the impact of the second language on the first has focused mostly on the issue of attrition, including negative reverse transfer effects. Monolingualbilingual differences, however, do not have to be detrimental to the speaker of multiple languages; they may show (as in the case of our studies) a way of thinking and categorizing items in one’s first language that is mediated and possibly enriched by a speaker’s experience with a second language. These findings are more easily compatible with a highly integrated or at least highly interactive system of knowledge of the bilingual’s two languages. The grammar-specific effects of L2 established here go beyond what has been known as “thinking for speaking” (Slobin 1996), that is, they emerged when speakers were not in the mode of operation of the respective (second) language. In fact, the experimental setup was deliberately designed to be highly conservative to allow for a monolingual mode, in Grosjean’s (2001) terms, to be evoked as much as possible. They can also hardly be “blamed” on cross-cultural variation as a confounding factor, as all our participants belonged to the same cultural and generational background and continued to use their abundantly co-present first language daily, as well as to be immersed in the relatively homogeneous mainstream culture. Grammatical gender has been called various names, from a “quirk” of grammar (Phillips & Boroditsky 2003) to a semantic “force” (Sera et al. 1994). Gender marking and agreement is a useful structural device in language processing, which in some languages can also have a semantic component (e.g., Bulgarian; cf. Andonova et al. 2004). Attending to such distinctions in relation to meaningful extralinguistic reference may not only help learning but also have an impact on adult language processing as well. It appears that relating grammatical knowledge to meaningful experience with the extralinguistic world makes these differences salient not only grammatically, as speakers are not only mastering a set of arbitrarily differentiating features. It is indeed a different learning and processing scenario: grasping the systematicity



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of mappings within a linguistic category is less useful if one cannot further establish and exploit a regular match between this and an extralinguistic set of distinctions, that is, co-occurrence across meaningful categories shaped by experience. Bilinguals may be at an advantage in this respect if their first language is a gender-marking one – after all, they have already learned to use one set of gender distinctions and, depending on the extent of use of gender in their language (i.e., how much it is gender-loaded) and on the degree of form-function transparency, they may also be more sensitive to such mappings and “relate” more easily to a second language system as well. Having said that, it is also important to explore in future studies to what extent the match or mismatch between the two gender systems may affect bilingual processing. When comparing two gender systems, one can examine the degree of similarity between them along at least three different dimensions: structural (how many gender categories each distinguishes), lexical (the extent of overlap between the two lexicons in terms of gender), and functional (the range of functions it is recruited in, the gender loadedness of each language system, how often it is marked and is a cue to meaning), in addition to the degree of arbitrariness vs. transparency of form-function mappings in two senses, that is, the mapping between phonological form and grammatical gender (rarely discussed in the relevant literature on gender-based categorizations) and the mapping between gender categories and meaningful extra-linguistic distinctions (sex, animacy, etc.). Presumably, all of these may affect the relative difficulty of the language learning and language processing task in a bilingual. Our studies have left two related research questions open for future exploration, one of which is the developmental path of gender-specific effects arising from the second language. In addition, research on grammatical gender processing by monolingual adult speakers of Bulgarian has found evidence for an interaction of gender categories and speaker sex (Andonova et al. 2004). Future studies can examine whether participant-gender-specific influences are sufficiently strong to extend to grammatical gender processing in the second language as well and whether they increase or diminish with age and language experience. Flaherty (2001) discovered a clear influence of grammatical gender in


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Spanish children but not in adults: boys’ choice of male gender for the masculine nouns was higher, as was girls’ choice of female for the feminine nouns. This result, in addition to the interaction in Bulgarian adults mentioned above, speaks in favor of exploring this research issue further. Such an agenda fits well into a general focus on how experience enters the scene in linguistic and non-linguistic behavior, an aspect of cognitive behavior that is well worth pursuing.

REFERENCES Andonova, E., D’Amico, S., Devescovi, A., and Bates, E. 2004. Gender and lexical access in Bulgarian. Perception and Psychophysics, 66(3): 496–507. Athanasopoulos, P. 2006. Effects of the grammatical representation of number on cognition in bilinguals. Bilingual ism: Language and Cognition, 9(1): 89–96. Bassetti, B. 2005. Do Bilingual children think differently? grammatical gender and object perception in Italian-German bilingual children. European Second Language Association conference, Dubrovnik, September 14–17. Bates, E., and MacWhinney, B. 1989. Functionalism and the competition model. In MacWhinney, B., and Bates, E. (eds.), The crosslinguistic study of sentence processing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10–75. Bates, E., Devescovi, A., Pizzamiglio, L., D’Amico, S., and Hernandez, A. 1995. Gender and lexical access in Italian. Perception & Psychophysics, 57: 847–862. Boroditsky, L., and Schmidt, L. 2000. Sex, syntax and semantics. Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Philadelphia. Boroditsky, L. 2001. Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers’ conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43: 1–22. Brysbaert, M., Fias, W., and Noel, M. P. 1998. The Whorfian hypothesis and numerical cognition: is “twenty-four” processed in the same way as “four-and-twenty”? Cognition, 66: 51–77. Caplan, D., and Waters, G. S. 1999. Verbal working memory and sentence comprehension. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 77–94. Choi, S., and Bowerman, M. 1991. Learning to express motion events in English and Korean: the influence of language-specific lexicalization patterns. Special Issue: Lexical and conceptual semantics. Cognition, 41(1–3): 83–121. Fairclough, N. L. 1995. Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language. Harlow: Longman. Flaherty, M. 2001. How a language gender system creeps into perception. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31(1): 18–31. Grosjean, F. 2001. The bilingual’s language modes. In Nicol, J. (ed.), One mind, two languages. Oxford: Blackwell. 1–22.

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Hayakawa, S. I. 1949. Language in thought and action. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Hodge, R., and Kress, G. 1988. Social semiotics. London: Polity Press. Hunt, E. B., and Agnoli, F. 1991. The Whorfian hypothesis: a cognitive psychology perspective. Psychological Review, 98: 377–389. Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. MacDonald, M. C., and Christiansen, M. H. 2002. Reassessing working memory: comment on just and Carpenter (1992) and Waters and Caplan (1996). Psychological Review, 109(1): 35–54. Majid, A., Bowerman, M., Kita, S., Haun, D. B. M., and Levinson, S. C. 2004. Can language restructure cognition? The case for space. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8: 108–114. Mullen, M. K. 1990. Children’s classifications of nature and artifact pictures into female and male categories. Sex Roles 23(9–10): 577–587. Phillips, W., and Boroditsky, L. 2003. Can quirks of grammar affect the way you think? Grammatical gender and object concepts. In Alterman, R., and Kirsh, D. (eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Boston: Cognitive Science Society. Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I., and Shapiro, L. 2004. The development of colour categories in two languages: a longitudinal study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133: 554–571. Saussure, F. 1916. Cours de Linguistique Général. Paris: Payot. Sera, M. D., Berge, C. A. H., and del Castillo, P. J. 1994. Grammatical and conceptual forces in the attribution of gender by English and Spanish speakers. Cognitive Development, 9(3): 261–292. Sera, M. D., Elieff, C., Forbes, J., Burch, M. C., Rodriguez, W., and Dubois, D. P. 2002. When language affects cognition and when it does not: an analysis of grammatical gender and classification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131: 377–397. Slobin, D. 1996. From “thought and language” to “thinking for speaking”. In Gumperz, J., and Levinson, S.(eds.). Rethinking linguistic relativity. New York: Cambridge University Press: 70–96. Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D. P., Paganelli, F., and Dworzynski, K. 2005. Grammatical gender effects on cognition: implications for language learning and language use. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(4): 501–520. Whorf, B. 1956. Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Carroll, J. B. (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Zubin, D. A., and Koepcke, K. M. 1984. Affect classification in the German gender system. Lingua, 63: 41–96.


C H A P T E R 10

BEYOND LANGUAGE: CHILDHOOD BILINGUALISM ENHANCES H I G H-L E V E L C O G N I T I V E F U N C T I O N S Ágnes Melinda Kovács International School for Advanced Studies (S.I.S.S.A.–I.S.A.S.), Trieste, Italy

Abstract Children growing up in a bilingual environment have to build up two language systems from the linguistic input. They will use the two languages alternately as a function of their interlocutor in their everyday interaction. At a young age, a bilingual child may be faced with somewhat different requirements than a monolingual one. This chapter will discuss the possible changes that bilingualism might induce in the cognitive system in this early phase of development. Adult neuroimaging evidence suggests that bilingualism can result in differential functional specialization of the two languages depending on the age of acquisition, and moreover, can even lead to reorganization at neuronal level. Here we present behavioral studies indicating that bilingual children outperform their monolingual peers on tasks that require high levels of cognitive control, such as executive function and false-belief tasks. The extensive experience bilingual children gain in inhibiting one language while switching to the other may lead to an enhancement of their domain-general executive control abilities that are involved in different aspects of cognitive functioning. 1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

Mastering two languages is a very common phenomenon even in childhood. Nonetheless, how the developing mind manages more than one language is not as straightforward as it might seem at a first glance. In spite of the extensive behavioral and neuro-imaging research of the last twenty years that has brought various answers about how the adult brain deals with two languages, the nature of bilingual development remains open to different theoretical scenarios. One could think of several possibilities. It could be that the child’s cognitive system is actually overloaded by the input coming from the bilingual environment, and this might result in slower information 301 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 301–323. © 2007 Springer.


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processing reflected in a delayed performance. Alternatively, the young brain might be challenged by the complexity of the input; facing two languages might thus lead to functional and structural reorganization and to a mandatory acceleration in the development of the involved abilities. However, it is also feasible that processing an additional language does not pose specific demands to the child’s mind; therefore, we should not observe any differences in the developmental trajectories of bilinguals and monolinguals. Whichever of these frameworks turns out to be the case, it may carry interesting answers not only about the bilingual mind, but also about the organization and development of the cognitive system in general. The present chapter will examine these possibilities and will try to shed light on the ways in which the experience of being exposed to more than one language very early in childhood could influence the development of different cognitive abilities (with special emphasis on executive control and theory of mind) and might also bring us closer to understanding the architecture of these mechanisms. We will discuss questions analogous to the ones that were asked when addressing the so-called paradox of bilingual language acquisition (Petitto et al. 2001), but we will mainly focus on socio-cognitive domains different from language development. The bilingual language acquisition paradox actually refers, on the one hand, to the amazement of parents and scientists when observing how effortlessly children acquire two or more languages. On the other hand, it captures the worry that exposing children to two languages causes language delays and confusion. Recent studies suggest that bilingual children, who are exposed to approximately equal input in the two languages, mix the languages only if they hear language-mixing from their parents, and actually have no difficulties in keeping the language systems separate (Genesee et al. 1995). Moreover, they achieve the linguistic milestones in both of their languages around the same time as monolinguals do, even if the languages belong to different modalities (English and French or Sign Language and French; Petitto et al. 2001). This is not very surprising if we consider the powerful language discrimination abilities that are already present at birth and allow human newborns to differentiate languages based on their rhythmic properties (Nazzi et al. 1998; Ramus et al. 2000).


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At four months of age bilingual infants distinguish even two languages that have very similar rhythmic characteristics (Spanish and Catalan), while monolinguals at the same age cannot (Bosh & Sebastian-Galles 1997, 2001). The discrimination depends very much on the linguistic exposure, and bilingualism can make a significant difference in the development of this ability. The finding that the pattern of bilingual language acquisition is fundamentally similar to the monolingual one leads us to think that at least in the language domain, bilingualism does not alter the flow of normal language development. However, even if the outcome is similar, this does not necessarily mean that the bilingual brain recruits the same mechanisms in the same manner when processing two languages as the monolingual brain facing one language. Mechanisms of attention, inhibition and selection might get involved to a greater extent when dealing with the simultaneous use of two languages. 2. Y O U N G B I L I N G U A L B R A I N S

There is no doubt that the human brain can acquire two or more languages at different stages of development. The studies investigating how the bilingual brain deals with two languages in adulthood can also carry important insights about what might be happening during the developmental process. Early and late bilinguals are actually faced with the two languages in diverse stages of brain maturation and cognitive development, which would predict differences in language processing and in the neural substrates for the languages between these two populations. The interest of this field of research in bilingualism is twofold: one is related to the issue of brain plasticity and focuses mainly on the negative correlation between brain maturation and second language proficiency. The other addresses the question of differential brain specialization and investigates whether a new language could possibly engage brain regions that are different from the ones serving the first language, or if the two languages are actually processed by the same neural substrates. Addressing the first issue, some studies found that in the initial phase of learning a second language adults out-perform children (Snow & Hoefnagel-Hole 1978); nevertheless, the vast majority of the research


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data indicates that persons who have started learning a second language early in their childhood achieve higher levels of proficiency (Johnson & Newport 1989; Newport 1990). Various theories have been formulated to explain the phenomenon of an apparent critical period for acquiring different aspects of a new language. According to a maturational hypothesis, the language acquisition capacity declines during development due to changes in specific brain structures that lose their plasticity. Johnson and Newport (1989), studying Chinese and Korean immigrants, found a linear relation between the age of arrival to the United States and the level of language proficiency. According to their data, language acquisition seems to clearly decline up to puberty and reaches a plateau afterwards. Moreover, only those persons showed a comparable performance to native speakers who learned the second language before the age of six. Alternatively the “less is more” hypothesis was proposed by Newport (1990), suggesting that young children’s limited information processing and working memory capacities could be the reason why they acquire a new language more easily. These limited capacities form a “narrow window” that constrains the amount of information entering in the computational system but at the same time allows a better analysis and faster processing of the data that actually gets in. Furthermore, Pallier et al. (2003) found data that might shed new light on the critical period hypothesis. In their study, adults of Korean origin who were adopted by French families between ages 3 and 8 showed no recollection of the Korean language in behavioral tests and no specific brain activation when comparing the Korean language to a language they had never heard. Additionally, they had similar results to native speakers of French when tested with French linguistic stimuli. The authors argue that the plasticity of the language system can be very high even in middle childhood and early linguistic influences remain malleable to redescription for quite a long period. The second question related to the representation of the two languages in the bilingual brain has been a subject of great debate over the last ten years. The experimental results derived from imaging and neurophysiological studies have provided ambiguous results; therefore it seems hard to establish if there is a common cortical substrate within which all languages operate. The main question that arises is whether



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multiple languages are represented by possibly overlapping cerebral regions within the language dominant hemisphere, or whether the cerebral representation of a second language differs fundamentally from that of the first. Studies have found evidence suggesting that the same brain areas are responsible for the two languages in both early and late bilinguals (here the late bilinguals started learning their second language after the age of 6) (Klein et al. 1995; Chee et al.1999; Illes et al. 1999). They argue that this data does not seem to support the hypothesis that a language learned later in life is represented differently from the native language; there were no differences in the neural substrates thought to serve within- and across-language searches. However, other lines of research propose that there are important differences in how the brains of early and late bilinguals represent the two languages. Performing functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) during picture naming or sentence generation tasks, Hernandez et al. (2000) and Kim et al. (1997) have found that early bilinguals showed activation in corresponding brain structures, while late bilinguals showed differential activation as a function of languages. The latter finding was also sustained by Event Related Evoked Potential (ERP) results (Weber-Fox & Neville 1996). Moreover, some studies found diverse activation patterns for the two languages also in early bilinguals while subjects performed a grammatical decision task (Proverbio et al. 2002). Although the majority of the research in the field tries to relate bilingual processing to functional changes in the brain, there have been attempts that link bilingualism to impressive structural changes at the neuronal level. Mechelli et al. (2004) have shown that bilingual adults have greater gray matter density in specific brain areas (left inferior parietal cortex) than monolinguals. This structural reorganization was found to be more significant in early bilinguals (who learned the second language before the age of 5) when compared to late bilinguals, even if both groups used the two languages on a daily basis in the last five years preceding the study. Consequently, the main challenge will be to determine what this structural change and the possible differential localization and functional organization mean for the cognitive system, and additionally, to


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assess which mechanisms sustain these adjustments in the course of development. On the other hand, one could also think of alternative explanations for the common neural substrate finding by taking, for example, the processing of the two languages as analogous to the processing of two rules that are served by a single system in the prefrontal cortex. Diverse neural systems underlying the different languages in late bilinguals might mean that a new language learned after puberty will involve new areas, possibly because by this age the typical language areas might have already lost their plasticity. However, this argument does not hold for the dissimilar activation patterns observed in early bilinguals, since they were exposed to the second language early in their development. These latter results are quite intriguing and could lead to a reevaluation of our current theories about language processing and organization. On the other hand, when explaining the findings of common neural substrates for the two languages, we could think about the processing of the two languages in the specific language areas of the brain as analogous to two rules that are processed by a single system in the prefrontal cortex.

3. W H AT D O E S B I L I N G U A L I S M M E A N F O R THE DEVELOPING COGNITIVE SYSTEM?

3.1. Bilingualism as an Obstacle It does not seem warranted to presume that bilingualism causes delays in the child’s cognitive development, since we have evidence that it does not imply any confusion or delay at the linguistic level, which should be the most pertinent domain. However, it is still a possibility we have to consider. Thinking in a limited resources framework, it could be argued that achieving the same linguistic milestones may be realized at the expense of other cognitive abilities. For comprehensible reasons, the fear of negative effects is always stronger than the comfort of positive ones, so a great amount of positive evidence is needed to overcome negative or ambiguous data. Concern was first expressed at the beginning of the last century, when it was anecdotally observed that children of immigrants performed much



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lower on different cognitive tasks when compared to monolinguals. One of the explanations offered at that time was that bilingualism implies a cognitive overload, which affects performance since the two languages are competing for mental resources, and in this way causes cognitive confusion. This view did not have a long life, mainly because it was suggested that the studied bilinguals probably did not have the adequate proficiency level to perform the tasks in their second language. However, findings of consecutive studies point to possible negative consequences of bilingualism, mainly observed in adulthood. Such effects can be language mixing, interference, attrition (Seliger 1996), and confusion (MacNamara 1967). Nevertheless, it was argued that bilinguals develop high proficiency in certain abilities that help them overcome interference such as metalinguistic awareness and analytical strategies (Ben-Zeev 1977). Besides, as we will see later, problems of language mixing and low resistance to interference might be problems orthogonal to bilingualism and be more related to deficits of a central executive system. 3.2. Bilingualism as a Launch Pad: Three Hypotheses of Possible Advantages Induced by Bilingualism Recently, concerns about the negative aspects of early bilingualism have dissipated, as bilingual children exposed to two languages from birth have been found to be in line with their monolingual peers. At this point one could stop and acknowledge that bilingualism at least does not cause delays and disorders. However, converging data from different fields suggests that bilingualism might imply significant behavioral adjustments in adulthood and even structural reorganization in the brain, so it is worth searching for further positive effects that are observable from a young age. As discussed in previous parts of this chapter, adult neuroimaging studies suggest that bilingualism leads not only to functional plasticity (Kim et al. 1997), but also to structural changes in the brain (Mechelli et al. 2004). Acquiring two languages results in increased grey matter density in the left inferior parietal cortex, and the degree of structural reorganization is actually modulated by the age of acquisition and proficiency. Additionally, data coming from bilingual language processing studies with adults suggest that the extensive practice in language


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switching and control leads to superior performance when shifting to a third language (Costa & Santesteban 2004), or when shifting languages and performing an attentional shift at the same time, a conjecture that seems to overtax the processing resources of late bilinguals but not that of the early bilinguals (Kovács & Téglás 2005). While investigating the question from a developmental point of view, different frameworks could be formulated about how bilingualism might induce cognitive advantages in childhood, despite the heavier load that weighs on bilinguals’ cognitive systems. Of course, the brain cannot remain passive when faced with demanding tasks. According to the hypothesis of over-compensation, the developing human brain might receive the extra load of two languages as a challenge and greatly adapt to it, for example, by changing its morphology. In consequence, a structural reorganization makes the bilingual brain different from the monolingual one, thus possibly boosting the development of cognitive competencies in general. A more specific proposal would argue that experience in attending to one language and ignoring the other might enhance bilingual children’s selective attention and control abilities (Bialystok 1999; Polonyi & Németh 2001). Such early language switching, along with the permanent monitoring of the two language systems, employs mechanisms such as inhibition and control that thus might begin an exceptional developmental trajectory due to the extra training (Kovács 2003). A third conjecture would propose that encoding and associating words from two languages with a common concept might require superior representational abilities (Bialystok & Martin 2004). Considering that bilingual children are permanently in contact with two languages and often also two cultures in the early phase of development, the flexibility that allows all concepts to be expressed in at least two ways should have a positive influence on their representational abilities, possibly also inducing an advantage in representing mental states (Kovács 2002). In the following sections we will discuss evidence in favor and against these hypotheses and try to draw conclusions about what they could mean for the construction of the developing mind. All three frameworks posit a critical bilingual advantage; however, they greatly differ in modeling the mechanisms responsible for this advantage and in their



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predictions about well-defined enhancements that will either manifest in a domain-general manner, or be restricted to some very specific cognitive sub-systems. 4. C H A L L E N G I N G T H E B I L I N G U A L M I N D

In line with the over-compensatory hypothesis that proposed a general enhancement of the bilingual cognitive system as a result of structural brain reorganization, behavioral studies suggest that high levels of bilingualism imply high levels of cognitive functioning (e.g., higher flexibility in problem solving; Lambert 1992). We should note that the left inferior parietal cortex, where the morphological change was observed in bilinguals, seems to be linked to various competencies outside the language domain, such as working memory in monkeys (Friedman & Goldman-Rakic 1994) or spatiotemporal integration and procedural and declarative learning in humans (Willingham et al. 2002). Given the findings that show a functional relation between this brain area and these domain-general mechanisms, it is possible that the cognitive enhancement of bilinguals will actually extend to all information-processing taking place. Bochner’s (1996) research findings seem to support this view, and show that bilingualism has positive effects on the cognitive system in general. According to this study, bilinguals were more interested in the curriculum, they used strategies that allowed them to perform outstandingly in some areas, and they were more achievement-oriented when compared to monolinguals. Other studies propose that bilingualism implies higher cognitive flexibility, metalinguistic awareness, and creativity (Hakuta & Garcia 1989). In specific research on metalinguistic abilities, Bialystok (1986) showed that bilingual children performed better than monolinguals in judging the grammaticality of sentences with semantic anomalies (e.g., “Why is the cat barking so loudly?”). However, the study found no differences between the groups when judging sentences with grammatical violations that contained no distracting semantic information (e.g., “Why the dog is barking so loudly?”). The authors argued that judging sentences that involve disregarding a salient semantic anomaly (a cat


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barking) requires high levels of control to overlook this anomaly before performing the grammatical analysis, and bilinguals were found to perform better. In contrast, the sentences where no differences were found between the groups had no inhibitory demands and involved only high levels of analysis for performing the grammaticality judgment. This data does not provide strong support for the general bilingual advantage view, but instead gives good indications toward specific domains that might get facilitated. 5. S H A R P E N I N G E X E C U T I V E F U N C T I O N S D U R I N G L A N G U A G E S W I T C H I N G A N D M O N I TO R I N G

If we inspect bilingualism purely from an information-processing point of view, we cannot neglect what daily language switching and systematic monitoring of communicative behavior might mean for the cognitive system. Studies have found that the experience gained during continuous language selection and inhibition results in advantages not only in the language domain, but also in other areas that require central inhibitory functions to a large extent. In the theoretical background of these studies lies the hypothesis that bilinguals might use the same mechanisms for language switching that they recruit when solving executive function tasks (such as the Dimensional Change Card Sorting, the Day and Night Stroop and the Simon tasks for children). The term “executive function” (EF) refers to the cognitive processes responsible for high-level action control, planning, inhibition, coordination, and control of action sequences, which are necessary for maintaining a goal and for fulfilling it despite distracting stimuli. A functional model of these control functions was first described by Norman and Shallice (1986) with two distinct levels: the contention scheduling that entails the inhibition and activation of actions, and the supervisory attentional system, which constitutes a higher level of control and is involved in tasks requiring planning, decision making, novel or ill-learned action sequences, difficult actions, and in overcoming temptation or strong habitual response tendencies. The slow development of these functions has been linked to the gradual maturation of the prefrontal cortex, reaching adult levels only around adolescence



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(Bunge et al. 2002), with important improvements around the age of four (Gerstard et al. 1994; Frye et al. 1995). One of the typical tasks for assessing executive function development in young children is the Dimensional Change Card Sorting Task (DCCS – Frye et al. 1995). In this task, children have to sort 12 test cards (e.g., 6 red flowers and 6 blue cars) according to one of two rules in conflict in two boxes affixed with a target card (a blue flower or a red car). In the pre-switch phase children are asked to sort the cards according to one dimension (shape or color) and children from around the age of 3 usually perform well in this phase of the study. However, up to 4 or 5 years of age, children seem have difficulties in the post-switch phase when the rule changes and they have to sort the cards according to the other dimension. In one of her studies, Bialystok examined whether bilingual 3-to-5-year-olds have an advantage in performing this card-sorting task, which requires high levels of control and provides conflict (Bialystok 1999). The results show that bilingual children performed better than monolinguals, suggesting that bilingualism has a positive impact on the development of executive functioning, possibly as a result of the constant management of the two languages. In order to perform well in this type of card sorting task, children have to be able to clearly represent the different dimensions of the objects (color and shape), keep in mind the two rules, inhibit the first sorting rule and apply the second rule in the post-switch phase. A recent study investigated whether the bilingual advantage on the DCCS task might arise from superior representational abilities that help bilinguals to encode and represent the different dimensions of the task stimuli, or from their superiority in the inhibition of attention (Bialystok & Martin 2004). In this study abstract semantic dimensions (like “things to play with” and “things to wear”) were introduced as card sorting criteria in addition to the color and shape. The data seem to support the initial proposal of an inhibitory advantage in ignoring previously salient perceptual information, given the findings that bilinguals outperformed monolinguals on sorting tasks where the target was a perceptual feature (color or shape), but not on versions of the task where the target dimension was an abstract semantic feature (“things to play with” or “things to wear”), and thus posed higher representational demands.


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Furthermore, Bialystok et al. (2005) have found additional data supporting better-developed inhibition in bilinguals while subjects were performing a Simon task. This is a nonverbal spatial task that relies on stimulus-response compatibility. On the incongruent trials the irrelevant location of the stimulus, for example, the left side, interferes with the motor response performed by the right hand and in this way leads to slower reaction times. Instead, on the congruent trials there is no interference: the stimulus appears on the right side and the response has to be performed by the right hand. Three groups of bilinguals (5-yearolds, middle-aged adults, and older adults) showed faster reaction times compared to monolinguals on both congruent and incongruent trials. Interestingly, the bilinguals also showed better performance on the congruent trials that did not require any type of inhibition. The authors argue that the need to switch between congruent and incongruent trials might impose greater demands on the control processes of monolinguals than bilinguals. Another task used to test inhibition in children is the Day and Night Stroop test (Gerstard et al. 1994) that requires children to say “day” when a picture of a moon is shown and to say “night” when a picture of a bright sun is shown. In both cases children have to suppress the natural response tendency to say “day” to the sun and “night” to the moon and provide the conflicting response. The authors developed the task with the presumption that younger children will have difficulties in inhibiting the most evident response. The results revealed that 3-to-4year old children have greater difficulties in this task compared to older children. In order to exclude the hypothesis that the problems are due to memory deficits in remembering two rules or associations, the authors developed a control task where children had to label two neutral cards with unrelated labels. The results on this version of the task proved that the presumption of a memory deficit was wrong; even younger children had good performances in this version of the task. Not surprisingly, an inhibitory advantage of children growing up with two languages was found on this executive function task as well (Kovács 2002). In this study we compared 35 bilingual and monolingual preschool children aged from 3 to 5 years on the Day and Night Stroop test. The results showed that the bilingual group had a significantly lower



Mean error on Day and Night stroop 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

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Mean RT on Day and Night stroop

100 80 60 40 20 Bilinguals

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0

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Figure 1. Mean error and SD of the two groups on the Day and Night Stroop task (left); and mean RT (sec) and SD of the two groups on the Day and Night Stroop task (right).

error rate (p = .01 – see left figure) and faster reaction time (p = .03 – see right figure) than the monolingual group (Figure 1). The higher performance of bilingual children on these different executive function tasks may be a consequence of the permanent monitoring of the languages, and training in inhibiting one language while activating the other, that transfers and enhances performance in tasks that involve inhibition and selection.

6. L O O K I N G I N TO O T H E R S ’ M I N D S THROUGH THE LENSES OF TWO LANGUAGES

For successful social interaction and communication, a bilingual child needs to use some intricate computations. She has to choose between two different linguistic outputs, to figure out which language to speak to different monolingual or bilingual interlocutors, and to flexibly switch linguistic sets as a function of the languages spoken by the others. Consequently, scenarios can be formulated in which growing up with two languages could promote bilingual children’s representational or inhibitory abilities and thus possibly induce advantages in understanding abstract mental states. At some point, all normally developing children come to understand that humans are driven by goals, plans, and beliefs. Possessing a mechanism that can identify all these internal states has a great adaptive


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advantage in allowing young children to develop a prediction about others’ behaviors. The concept of theory of mind (ToM) was introduced by Premack and Woodruff (1978) and refers to the ability to ascribe mental states like beliefs, desires, and intentions to oneself and to others, and to predict and interpret behavioral actions dependent on these states. Figuring out that reality is not the only factor that can drive others’ behavior and that some actions are driven by false beliefs is crucial for developing a theory of mind. It is argued that this ability is strongly dependent on specific brain structures (Stuss et al. 2001) and its impairment is considered to be the main impaired cognitive structure in autistic disorders (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). A standard task for testing ToM in children is the unexpected transfer task (Wimmer & Perner 1983) also called the Sally-Ann task. In this task a protagonists puts an object (marble, chocolate) into location A. In her absence the object is unexpectedly moved to location B. To assess the understanding of the protagonist’s false-belief, children are asked where the protagonist will look for the object when coming back to the scene. The extensive research over the past twenty years proposed that 3-year-olds fail this task (answer that the protagonist will look for the object where it actually is) because they cannot represent mental states and understand how these relate to behavior, while most of the 4-yearolds and almost all 5-year-olds succeed (see Wellman et al. 2001 for a review). However, a group of scientists argues that the standard false belief tasks might not be an appropriate measure for the development of theory of mind (Leslie & Thaiss 1992; Bloom & German 2000; Leslie et al. 2005). On the one hand, they claim that the standard tasks are too hard for young children. Perner et al. (1987) proposed first that the standard variant of the Sally-Ann task might be too demanding. It could be that children do understand false belief, but they also have to take into consideration the events linked to two different protagonists and keep in mind two different hiding places. So, the cause of their bad performance could be their reduced memory capacity or poor attentional abilities. In consequence, the authors simplified the task in many ways, by asking more specific questions (like: “Where will Sally first look for the marble?”), and offering clues about the object’s old hiding place



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(Siegal & Beattie 1991; Freeman & Lacohee 1995). These modifications have led to an improvement in the performance of 3-year-old children. Besides, there is further evidence showing that three-year-olds, though they do not pass the standard ToM task yet, possess an implicit knowledge about false beliefs, as suggested by their anticipatory looking behavior (Clements & Perner 1994). Moreover, the finding by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), that even infants may appeal to mental states to predict others’ behavior, raises serious questions as to what the standard theory of mind tasks measure in 3 to 5-year-old preschool children. One answer could be what the authors argued on the other hand; namely, that solving a typical ToM task also requires the development of inhibitory functions (Leslie & Thaiss 1992; Carlson et al. 1998; Leslie et al. 2005). They posit that in these tasks children need well-developed executive functions to inhibit the default assumption that beliefs are true (Leslie et al. 2005) or to inhibit a prepotent response involved in the ToM tasks (the tendency to refer to the reality and indicate an empty location; Carlson et al. 1998). Many studies found a functional link between performance on ToM and executive function tasks (Carlson & Moses 2001), and that children with autism also showed associated impairments in ToM and EF (Oznoff et al. 1991). Furthermore, individual performance on ToM was found to correlate with performance on EF tasks (Carlson & Moses 2001). Imaging and patient studies have shown that the medial prefrontal cortex plays an important role in performing ToM tasks (Fletcher et al. 1995; Stuss et al. 2001), an area regularly associated with EF. Taking into account the above evidence about the controversial falsebelief task, we will describe two different frameworks in which bilingual preschoolers may come to solve false-belief problems earlier than their monolingual peers. According to the first, the exercise of bilingual children in conceiving a concept as having two different output labels in the two languages might transfer and concretize in an advantage in understanding that the same reality could be represented differently by two people. Consequently, bilingual children will be at an advantage when dealing with the different representations involved in the ToM tasks (their own true belief and the protagonist’s false-belief ).


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Actually, to express the same meaning, bilinguals can choose between two semantically equivalent lexical items, one for each of their languages. Monolinguals develop the ability to simultaneously assign two equivalent labels to an object (e.g., bunny and rabbit) only around the age of four, when they also develop ToM (Perner et al. 2002). In contrast, bilinguals must learn much earlier how to select between the two labels of one object for successful communication. Alternatively, bilingual children might show a higher performance on the ToM tasks because, as we saw in the previous section, they seem to develop higher-level control functions in the service of language switching that transfers to tasks that require inhibition. Given that the false-belief tasks have been shown to involve inhibition at different levels (inhibiting a true belief, or the current location of the object) bilinguals could be advantaged in dealing with these inhibitory demands, thus achieving the task earlier than monolinguals. To examine these assumptions in a previous study, we compared the performance of 44 monolingual and bilingual children on the standard unexpected transfer task (Kovács 2002). Children were aged between 3 and 5 years, with a comparable number of bilinguals and monolinguals in the two groups. The criteria for selecting bilinguals were to be exposed to both languages from birth in a more or less equal amount, and to have parents with different native languages. The results revealed important differences in performance between bilinguals and monolinguals. A significantly higher percentage of bilinguals (68% ) succeeded on this task in comparison with the monolingual group (32% ) (χ 2 = 4, 46, p = 0, 03, see Figure 2). In a different study, Goetz (2003) investigated the performance of 3 to 4-year-old children who entered a foreign language daycare after the age of two and that of monolingual children on ToM tasks, but no differences were found in the standard false-belief task. However, the author reported an overall bilingual advantage on the administered ToM tasks, even if the differences between the groups were not significant at the second testing time. These mixed results might be due to the characteristics of the studied population. The three-year-old bilinguals participating in this research started to learn the second language in a formal teaching environment only one year or less before the study. Even



100 80

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Percent of children passing the standard ToM task 68

60 40

32

20 0 Bilinguals

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Figure 2. Percent of bilinguals and monolinguals passing the standard ToM task.

if they achieved a sufficient proficiency level in their second language, the amount of exposure to the bilingual condition is considerably different from those children who are faced with two languages from birth. Nevertheless, the advantage of three-year-old bilingual children (who experienced both languages from the start) on the standard ToM tasks was reinforced by data coming from a further study where we carefully matched monolinguals and bilinguals on general information-processing abilities, intelligence, and socio-economic status (Kovács 2003). In light of the evidence about the ToM and EF relation, the early ToM abilities, and the better-developed inhibitory functions of the bilingual children, we would argue that the bilingual advantage in performing ToM tasks might not mean that bilingual children represent other’s mental states earlier than monolinguals (this ability possibly being innate and observable already in infancy, Onishi & Bailargeon 2005), but in fact they learn to face the inhibitory demands of false belief tasks earlier. 7. C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S

The bilingual condition could be stimulating for the highly plastic developing mind of the child, and seems to induce specific changes in the brain and in the cognitive system. In this chapter we have investigated different proposals related to the nature of these changes. The experimental evidence appears to be more in favor of one of the three initially presented hypotheses. On one side, there was the domain-general


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over-compensatory hypothesis, and on the other side there were the two domain-specific hypotheses predicting differential advantages in the representational or inhibitory abilities of bilingual children. The over-compensatory framework, proposing that a structural reorganization of the bilingual brain might result in an enhanced development of cognitive competencies in general, gained little support since the recent data about cognitive advantages seem to be mostly concentrated to one very specific field. However, it is likely that an over-compensation and reorganization does take place in the domains that are distinctively involved in specific stages of bilingual processing. The studies reviewed here suggest that the only clearly facilitated area is that of executive functions, and more specifically, of inhibition. The development of inhibitory abilities is usually studied using tasks in which children have to inhibit a welllearned, salient or automatic response, and bilingual children were found to perform such tasks better. This leads us to think that they possess an advantage exactly on this procedural/output level. This is also the level they operate on when choosing an output language, and thus they gain extra training in selecting and inhibiting competing responses. In the process of evolution the human brain has developed highly potent and very specific language acquisition mechanisms, so it is no surprise that the complex language input (being it monolingual or bilingual) constitutes no real challenge for the infant. Research findings have shown that not only the adult brain, but also that of a newborn baby, shows a strong left hemisphere specialization for human speech (Pena et al. 2003). This relation may reflect an innate disposition of certain brain areas for language, and would also justify the behavioral findings about newborns’ incredible capacities in discriminating languages belonging to different rhythmic classes. Possessing such powerful mechanisms at birth, dealing with bilingual input might not lead to a representational reorganization and a conceptual advantage. However, for reasons that are not completely clear yet, bilingualism might constitute a great challenge for the inhibitory system at the response level. This framework would predict that the bilingual advantages become observable only from the age when toddlers start using complex control functions for selecting languages in production.



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Nevertheless, even if a mechanistic proposal remains hypothetical faced with the lack of evidence, data coming from studies employing different executive function tasks seem to converge and strengthen the suggestion that permanent monitoring of two languages and early language switching boost the developmental trajectory of bilinguals’ executive functions. The enhancement of this cognitive domain seems to be so strong that it is even observable on tasks that were not explicitly designed to test control functions. Educators, policymakers and advocates of monolingual instruction should consider the growing experimental evidence, which though it does not directly address the issue of bilingual language acquisition and proficiency, does suggest that early bilingualism can promote various advantages for preschool aged children in the socio-cognitive domain. The stimulating environment surrounding a bilingual child triggers changes that might bring us closer not only to a better understanding of how the bilingual mind is constructed, but also to the organization and functioning of the developing cognitive system. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer and Ern˝o Téglás and my colleagues for their useful comments. The preparation of this work was supported by grants from HFSP (RGP 68/2002) and the Regione FVG (L.R. 3/98). REFERENCES Baron-Cohen, C., Leslie, A. M., and Frith, U. 1985. Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition 21: 37–46. Ben-Zeev, S. 1977. Mechanisms by which childhood bilingualism affects understanding and cognitive structures. In Hornby, P. A. (ed.), Bilingualism. Academic Press: New York. Bialystok, E. 1986. Factors in the growth of linguistic awareness. Child Development, 57: 498–510. Bialystok, E. 1999. Cognitive complexity and attentional control in the bilingual mind. Child Development, 70: 636–644. Bialystok, E., and Martin, M. M. 2004. Attention and inhibition in bilingual children: evidence from dimensional change card sort task. Developmental Science, 7: 325–339.

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C H A P T E R 11

C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C A N D C O G N I T I V E S T R U C T U R E S I N T H E A C Q U I S I T I O N O F W H-Q U E S T I O N S I N A N I N D O N E S I A N-I TA L I A N B I L I N G U A L C H I L D Antonia Soriente Max Planck Institute of Evolutionary Anthropology, Jakarta

Abstract This chapter examines language development in a bilingual child growing up with two typologically distinct languages – Italian and Jakarta Indonesian. It presents a case study of unbalanced bilingualism and focuses on the development of WH-forms and concludes that dominance of the loose Indonesian syntactic pattern results in a nontarget word order in the construction of early WH-questions in Italian. In conclusion, the chapter identifies cross-linguistic structures in quantitative and qualitative perspectives and hypothesizes theoretical explanations for cross-linguistic dominance and the gradual emergence of correct usage of Italian grammatical structures. In so doing, the study considers how children recognize languages as separate systems and how they gradually develop the cognitive patterns required for competence in separate though practically co-extensive linguistic domains.


This chapter presents a case study of language development of Guglielmo, the author’s first child. Guglielmo is a bilingual child growing up in Jakarta, with two typologically distinct and genealogically unrelated languages that are markedly different in terms of structure, and especially in intonational and gestural inflections. The study focuses exclusively on structural aspects of the hierarchical emergence of WH-questions. Though this is a case of language combination involving an as yet unstudied language pair displaying unbalanced bilingualism with language mixing, this is a common situation for children of mixed marriages. In this case, while Guglielmo’s mother speaks mainly Italian with him, the rest of his linguistic experience involves immersion in the Indonesian context. 325 I. Kecskes and L. Albertazzi (eds.), Cognitive Aspects of Bilingualism, 325–362. © 2007 Springer.


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A N TO N I A S O R I E N T E

This research project identified cross-linguistic structures and explored the acquisition of WH-questions. In order to do so, I studied the emergence of WH-questions in Jakarta Indonesian and Italian and identified their main syntactic features in order to situate this case within the literature on bilingual language acquisition. The study shows that Jakarta Indonesian is dominant1 and it does so through focusing on the mixed forms produced in an Italian context, namely in three broadly defined developmental stages – pre-production, early production and target production. The language choice, crosslinguistic structures and language differentiation in this bilingual context confirm the patterns which have been previously established in the extensive literature on bilingual acquisition. It adds a new dimension to this literature, as few studies have examined emergent bilingualism in such starkly distinct languages, though Park (2000) has done so in the case of Korean and English and Yip and Matthews (2000) have done so in the case of Cantonese and English. The central question is this: to what extent is interference occurring in this child’s speech? The initial and obvious answer is that significant interference is occurring because the dominant language, Jakarta Indonesian, exerts a transfer effect on the Italian spoken by the bilingual child in the earliest developmental stage in which his Italian is weaker. Typologically, Jakarta Indonesian (a colloquial variant as opposed to Standard Indonesian) is an SVO language, though it allows for a relatively flexible word order; it has prepositions, the noun precedes the unmarked genitive, the adjective and the determiner. Additionally, question words do not need to be fronted and relative clauses can only be accessed from the subject and object position of the hierarchy scale. It is mostly isolating and partly agglutinative; therefore there is no morphological inflection nor are there grammatical categories for gender and number or articles. According to Ewing (2005), in Jakarta Indonesian, there are only two open word classes, nouns and verbs. They can be monomorphemic or morphologically complex. The monomorphemic words can be easily shifted from one class to another. The tense markers, aspect and mood are not formally expressed other than through the use of a few aspect markers that precede the verb. The limited number of prefixes and suffixes is polyfunctional, and basic clauses are constituted


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by a subject and a predicate or only a predicate, so there is no copula. In addition, the subject and other core arguments are generally unmarked whereas oblique arguments are marked by prepositions. Verbal predicates can have an actor voice and an undergoer voice where the actor argument is optionally marked by a preposition, whereas non verbal predicates can be juxtaposed by a subject and any phrase-forming element without copula or linker. The language allows for null subjects and objects in finite clauses (see Ewing 2005)2 . Italian is also an SVO language3 , has prepositions, nouns precede (and in some cases follow) adjectives but always follow demonstratives. It is a highly inflected language with a very rich verbal and nominal morphology and agreement system based on number, gender and the use of articles. The relative clauses are realized in all the positions though in low varieties of Italian only the subject and object can be relativized. Questions are formed by moving the question word to sentence initial position, at least before the verb and by inversion. Lastly, the language allows for the use of the null subject (PROdrop) in finite clauses (see Renzi et al. 2001; Salvi & Vanelli 2004). Despite the many superficial typological similarities, the most important structural difference between Italian and Jakarta Indonesian is the distinct syntactic pattern in which the Italian word order, except for specific pragmatic reasons, is fixed. In contrast, in Jakarta Indonesian (JI), word order is relatively flexible. Thus to summarize the key differences between the two languages, Italian and JI are both SVO languages – but JI word order is much more flexible. Italian has obligatory determiners in NP while Indonesian does not. However, the most interesting difference between the languages is the range of strategies used to ensure accurate reference, the fact that Italian has a rich inflectional morphology involving agreement, cross-referencing and complex verbal categories. For the particular purpose of this study, only one area of the grammar is taken into consideration, mainly the expression and evolution of the WH-questions where the two languages display a different behavior. In Italian, questions are marked by WH-forms where movement and inversion are involved and an initial rising intonation pattern is requisite (Fava 2001: 94–98). In contrast, in JI, movement is optional, so that the


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WH-forms rest in most cases in-situ, do not trigger inversion (Cole et al. in press)4 , and display an obviously different intonation pattern5 . This chapter presents an overview of the studies on developmental bilingualism followed by sub-sections presenting data on the acquisition of WH-forms in Italian, in JI, and in the bilingual child. The final section discusses cross-linguistic structures of these WH-forms. 2. D E V E L O P M E N TA L B I L I N G U A L I S M

Research on children acquiring two languages in a simultaneous manner revolves around to what extent such children are able to distinguish between the two languages. Do bilingual children develop one linguistic system or two separate systems at the same time? The Unitary System theory, proposed by Volterra and Taeschner (1978), claims that bilingual children go through a process where they are unable to distinguish between the two languages. Recent studies using the Separate Development Hypothesis (SDH) have demonstrated that bilingual children are able to do so early on (see Meisel 1990, 2000; Lanza 1997; De Houwer 1995). The debate is essentially over how to deal with the fact that bilinguals’ language involves a great deal of variability and variation and that there are multiple variables to consider in the analysis. As Grosjean points out, “studying bilinguals is a very challenging enterprise. There are many variables that differentiate a monolingual from a bilingual other than just speaking two languages: input, context language, code switching, lexical borrowing and increased metalinguistic awareness” (1998: 34). Simply put, appropriate methodologies have to be used when studying cross-linguistic structures. Nevertheless, beyond the problem of how to assess whether the two languages are operating cognitively as separate systems, linguists are now more interested in simply observing the degree of separation and the interaction between the two languages. Mixed utterances produced by early bilinguals are a clear symptom of the interaction of different language pairs and therefore are particularly useful for studying this phenomenon. For example, Müller (1998), Döpke (1998, 2001), Yip and Matthews (2000), and Kupisch (in press),



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discuss the interaction of the developmental grammars of such children. They all stress the fact that the two languages interact in the performance level showing features of one language on the grammar of the other. However, most authors working on this issue maintain that the main reason for the language transfer of cross-linguistic structures is due to dominance by one of the languages. Paradis and Genesee (1996: 3) propose that syntactic dominance and overlap is especially evident when a child advances more rapidly in one language than in the other; whereas Schlyter (1993: 289) writes, “the two languages are not in quite balance during their development but that one of the two languages is weaker.” If this possibility is correct then the cross-linguistic influence should be unilateral, from the stronger to the weaker language. Most of the studies report the influence of the stronger language on the syntactic structures of the other. Yip and Matthews (2000) demonstrate that in the interaction of two typologically divergent languages, such as Cantonese and English, Cantonese dominates English. This is especially pronounced in the domain of WH-movement and relative clauses, though the case of null object transfer is due to input ambiguity. In a different case, Müller (1998) reports that ambiguity of input between the structures of verbobject word order and object-verb word order in German subordinate clauses favors the use of English syntax. She argues that this is the case because the fixed word order in English does not create any ambiguity; therefore it is the most effective solution to constructing sentences regardless of which language is dominant. Taking a different approach, Grosjean (1982) and Gawliztek-Maiwald and Tracy (1996) interpret lexical or syntactic borrowing as a strategy which allows children to express something they are not able to express otherwise, because it might be easier to learn it in one language than in another. Other studies raise similarly interesting issues which must be considered in this study. Döpke (2001) analyzes the “atypical” structures produced by young bilinguals in order to explain why mixing occurs, provided that the children have already differentiated their two languages. These cross-linguistic structures are a window in the bilingual mind and allow researchers to see what happens in the mind of a child growing with two languages when structures of one language move to the other language. Another possibility is that the structural properties of the


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languages involved play an important role in transfer (see Lanza 2001). On a different line, Sinka (2001), examining data from two bilingual English-Latvian girls in terms of language differentiation and analyzing the few mixed utterances, concludes that the fact that Latvian and English differ so much in their structural and morphological complexity enables the child to separate the two language systems from an early stage. In other words, the fewer parallel structures, the less ambiguous the task is for the child to produce language-specific structures while acquiring Latvian and English simultaneously. While Hulk and Müller (2000) argue that influence is at work independently of dominance when two languages display syntactic overlap, Kupisch (in press) argues that dominance and internal structures determine the transfer from a language to another as demonstrated in German-Italian bilinguals. Her study of the bilingual acquisition of determiners demonstrates that when two languages are in contact, a complexity hypothesis is at work where internal factors (the properties of the grammatical domain of a language) can be more or less beneficial for the acquisition of a certain feature, and external factors (language dominance) can determine influence. The following study attempts to observe many of these issues as they relate to the case study of Jakarta Indonesian and Italian bilingual acquisition. 3. M E T H O D O L O G Y

Guglielmo was born in Jakarta to an Italian mother and an Indonesian father and has been exposed to Italian and JI from birth. His parents have followed the one-parent-one language strategy to raise him and his sister, Beatrice, who is two years younger. The exposure of the children to the two languages is by no means balanced because the mother, the main source of input in Italian, works full time and spends less time at home with the children. Other sources of Italian input are watching cartoons and reading stories and occasionally socializing with Italian friends. Additionally, for two months each year the family lives in Southern Italy with the mother’s family. For the rest of the year, most of their daily social interaction takes place in a JI context, as they have an Indonesian



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caretaker and attend a local kindergarten. The siblings interact with each other either in either language depending on the context. Guglielmo is fluent in JI. He uses it in all contexts except when interacting with his mother. From an early age he appeared to comprehend Italian, though his production was very limited until the age of three. As expected, his Italian is typically mixed with Indonesian elements and though he is now five years old, he is able to speak Italian relatively fluently. However, he does so with clearly identifiable imperfections. The data presented below were taken from video recording transcriptions and from notes in diaries. The hour-long recordings were made weekly beginning when the child was eight months old. In these recordings, the two children are shown playing with each other as they normally do. Occasionally other actors enter the picture, such as visitors or the Indonesian maid and, when in Italy, relatives. For the most part, Italian or Indonesian were deliberately used in order to generate the required data base, though in some of the recordings both languages are used when both mother and father are present. The data in this study have only partially been coded and entered into a longitudinal database. This is part of a larger study currently under way at the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (MPI) in Jakarta in which these data, when completely coded, will be compared to a larger corpus of more than nine hundred thousand records of eight monolingual JI children recorded over four years. Comparing the data to monolingual acquisition patterns is necessary for ascertaining the degrees of similarity and difference from target structures. Herein, the MPI data base and the Italian data drawn from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney & Snow 1985) are crucial referents for analyzing the acquisition of WH-forms. They are also necessary for comparing syntactic structures and for discussing cross-linguistic effects in the forms deviating from the monolingual targets. All the WH-forms were analyzed and coded according to form and position in both languages. The same analysis was applied to the input. The purpose was to analyze the frequency of occurrence of the different WH-forms as well as the hierarchy of their cognitive function and their sequence and age of emergence.


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4. F O R M , F U N C T I O N A N D C O G N I T I O N I N W H-Q U E S T I O N S

In the development of WH-questions, the order of development of the WH-expressions seems to be similar in the two languages to which the bilingual child is exposed. The difference is that in the case of the weaker language, acquisition of both questions and appropriate structures is delayed, as would be expected. The order of acquisition is a universal feature of cognitive development (see Clancy 1989). In this, the acquisition of WH-questions is an accurate indicator of the child’s stage of conceptual development. For example, in studying the acquisition of Korean WH-questions through the analysis and comparison with cross-linguistic data, Clancy (1989) showed that the acquisition order is based on universals of cognitive development. Discrepancies in acquisition can be attributed to differences in interaction with caregivers, specifically in terms of how verbally interactive the contexts are and to what degree the caretakers stress syntactic repair through repetition of the child’s incorrect use of grammar. As observed cross-linguistically, children first acquire terms related to concrete objects when they start to grasp the notion of things around them and need to ask for their name with “what,” then “who” (which relates to people and possessions), then place (“where”). Next are terms related to more abstract concepts like causality (“why”), modality (“how”) and time (“when”). This matches with the developmental sequence of the WH-questions in Italian, JI and English, as can be seen in the Table 1 below6 . Despite the differences in methodology and samples across the studies, the pattern of acquisition is similar in the three languages7 . Table 1. Emergence of WH-forms in English, JI and Italian English what who where how why when

Age of acq.

JI

Age of acq.

Italian

Age of acq.

2;2 2;4 2;2 2;9 2;11 >3;0

apa siapa mana gimana kenapa kapan

1;8 1;8 1;8 2;4 2;6 3;4

che chi dove come perché quando

1;8 1;8 1;9 2;0 2;2 3;0



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The issues related to the cognitive aspect in the acquisition of the WH forms apply also to bilingual children, where it is important to understand the principles that determine the order in which linguistic forms are acquired. In the case of the focus of the study presented here, if we compare the acquisition time of the WH-forms, (see Table 4 and Figure 4) it is apparent that the child must have reached the cognitive stage where the notion already existed in his mind. He uses the Indonesian form first, just like any Indonesian peer would do, and only later the Italian form. It is obvious that he had reached the cognitive stage much earlier than the emergence of the Italian form. The question is: Are form and function coterminous or separate? If the child had clearly developed the cognitive aspect expressed by the WH-form “what” since the age of 1;9, then why is it that the first time it would appear in his Italian would be only at 2;5? Scholars such as Clancy (1989) and Park (2000) have pointed out a correlation between the input of WH-questions and the child’s cognitive level. If we examine the longitudinal data on children’s language acquisition in the MPI database, and compare adult input and children’s output, we find that in JI, the WH-questions typically occur in the following frequencies as shown in Table 2 and the first pie graph in Figure 1. The percentages in Table 2 refer to the distribution of these WH-forms throughout the database. In fact, the question-word “what” occurs with the highest frequency when adults are addressing the children. This is

Table 2. Comparative occurrence of WH-interrogatives JI

WH-form

Adult (%)

Children (%)

apa siapa mana gimana kenapa kok kapan berapa

what who where how why how come when how much

39 12 24 6 5 8 1 5

33 6 37 6 4 11 0.2 2


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Percentage of WH-forms in adult speech berapa “how much” 5%

kapan “when” 1% kok “how come” 8% kenapa “why” 5 % gimana “how” 6%

apa “what” 39% mana “where” 24%

siapa “who” 12%

Percentage of WH-forms in child speech kok “how come” 11%

kapan “when” 0.20% berapa “how much” 2%

kenapa “why” 4% gimana “how” 6%

apa “what” 33% mana “where” 38%

siapa “who” 6%

Figure 1. Pie-graphs comparing the frequency of WH-forms in adults and children’s speech.



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entirely predictable because when adults interact with children during the recording sessions they typically talk of things and persons in the “here” and now” framework. The case study presented in this chapter concurs with the conclusions of the above-mentioned studies. Clearly, in child directed speech, adults use a different proportion of WH-words than in conversation with each other. In effect, the most frequent forms and structures children hear are narrower than the relative incidences of WH-forms in the adult language. If the acquisition of the WH-words depends on repetition with variation in the input, then frequency is a key factor determining the emergence, use, and regularization of an item. This might partly explain the issue of the late emergence of “when” in JI, but also crosslinguistically in other languages8 . As mentioned earlier, Clancy (1989) has shown that the frequency of WH-forms in the input is a critical factor which has to be considered when studying language acquisition in children. According to Clancy, caregivers only introduce WH-words when they think the child is conceptually ready. But what happens when children are mature enough for notions such as time, but adults do not produce time related questions? In order to explore the fact that time-related WH-forms are last to emerge, it is worth examining the database for JI. This database contains more than 900,000 records. The most developmentally significant aspect of this data is the fact that kapan (when) makes up only 1% of the total of the WH-forms used by adults in their interactions with children in this context (see the first pie graph in Figure 1). The result is that it is acquired very late by children and is rarely used. Indeed, kapan only makes up 0.2% of the total WH-forms used by children, as seen in the second pie graph in Figure 1. Indeed, lay experience with children clearly shows that children’s concepts of time remain diffuse until well over the age of five. Even though Table 2 and Graph 1 show an even correspondence between adult input and children output for “what,” “who” and “why,” there is a striking difference between the “where” input and output. Simply put, children seem to like using “where” more than “what.” On the other hand, they use “how” far less frequently than it occurs in the input. One interesting difference in this data is the striking contrast in


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the use of kok (“how come”). Children use it more than adults, which becomes an important aspect of the following data and analysis. These differences between input and output are in all likelihood due to cognitive differences between children and adults, and to the nature of their worlds. Time is critical for adults in a way that it simply is not for children. Clearly, cognitively speaking it is far easier to understand “what” than “when” and this simple explanation adequately accounts for the developmental sequence. To summarize this data set, what is most significant is that “what” questions are by far the most common. This is a simple fact of cognition in that the easiest of all linguistic tasks is to label an object with a name. This is the most rudimentary aspect of learning a language for both adults and children. Once again, these figures confirm the general pattern found in the acquisition of other languages as well as the hierarchical developmental sequence. Through combining the study of syntactical structures and the developmental sequence of the emergence of WHinterrogatives, we can explore far more complex questions and revealing information regarding cognition.

5. S Y N TA C T I C S T R U C T U R E S I N W H-Q U E S T I O N S I N T H R E E L I N G U I S T I C C O N T E X T S : I TA L I A N , J A K A RTA , I N D O N E S I A N A N D B I L I N G U A L

5.1. Italian In Italian canonical interrogative sentences the WH-form always precedes the verb and occupies the initial position in the sentence, and in some cases, the dislocated position. On the other hand, yes-no questions display the same structure as statements with the difference in rising intonation (Fava 2001: 97–98). Commenting upon WH-questions, Guasti (1996) notes that in Italian there is a Subject Auxiliary Inversion (SAI) that has been analyzed by Rizzi (1990) involving movement to the beginning of the sentence. In the interrogative sentences, the subject cannot intervene between the WH-operator and the verb. Thus, the subject may occur at the end of the sentence or in a left-dislocated position. In the acquisition of WH-questions, Italian children do not produce questions



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in which there is no movement to the beginning of the sentence. Indeed, Italian children consider these interrogative sentences as fixed structures, which is evidenced by reproducing a particular intonation pattern (Antelmi 1997). In Italian the SAI rule is applied whenever the fronted WH-operator and the verb are adjacent (Guasti 2002: 188). Adjacency is obtained only when the subject is placed in left or right peripheral position or by using a null subject as in the following examples (Guasti 2002: 188–189). 1a) Gianni cosa fa? Gianni what do-ind.pres.3sg What does Gianni do? 1b) Cosa fa Gianni? what do-ind.pres.3sg Gianni 1c) Cosa fa? what do-ind.pres.3sg 1d) *Cosa Gianni fa? what Gianni do-ind.pres.3sg

Left peripheral position

Right peripheral position

Null subject

–

This adjacency has been interpreted by Rizzi (1990) as a well-formedness constraint on question formation, the WH-criterion. According to Guasti (2002: 192), Italian learners never place the subject between the WH-operators and the verb, as that would produce ungrammatical structures. Consequently, the head component of the WH-criterion is in place in early Italian except for the WH-operator perché (“why”). Both appear in this order in child and adult grammar. Antelmi (1997: 169) describes a situation in which the first questions in child language involve repeating adult intonation patterns. In Antlemi’s study, the WH-questions appearing in the Camilla corpus before the age of 23 months are considered to be non-productive. Actually, “who” and “what” are fused in the WH-operator chi (“who”), and


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the other operators like dove (“where”) have a formulaic aspect (Antelmi 1997: 170). Nevertheless, atypical structures with in-situ positions of the WH-operators were never produced. For this reason, Antelmi considers the first WH-questions as fixed structures reproducing a particular intonation pattern where the WH- is NP with copular constructions of identification and location. This is confirmed by the analysis of the data in the CHILDES database where very few in-situ WH-questions occur, and instances of WH-questions in left peripheral position, especially in copular sentences with “cosa,” “che,” and “dove.” 5.2. Jakarta Indonesian The Jakarta Indonesian pattern of cognitive development of the WH-forms match Italian pattern whereas its linguistic structures stand out as markedly different. Before describing the syntactic structure of the WH-forms, we observe the order of acquisition of these forms as seen in Table 3. From the MPI database, and as given above in Table 3, by the age of 1;8 these WH-expressions are used as isolates to express copular construction of identification and location. In some cases this even occurs earlier, as early as 1;6 and 1;7. As noted earlier, the developmental sequence is clear; first “what” emerges, then “who” and “where” emerge at the same time. Five months later “how come” emerges; shortly thereafter “how,” then “why” and “how much” at 2;6 and finally, at 3;4, “when.” To recapitulate, in JI, the acquisition of WH-questions does not differ markedly from any other linguistic context. This confirms the apparently universal hierarchy of the emergence of WH-questions. For example, Table 3. Order of Acquisition of WH-forms in JI children WH-form what who where how

JI

Age of acq.

WH-form

JI

Age of acq.

apa siapa mana gimana

1;8 1;8 1;8 2;4

why how come when how much

kenapa kok kapan berapa

2;6 2;3 3;4 2;6



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younger children (until 2;5) commonly use “what” and “where” but rarely “who,” and in addition do not pose adjunct questions. Adjunct questions emerge at 2;5 – first kenapa (“why”) then gimana (“how”) and much later kapan (“when”). In Indonesian, kapan (“when”) emerges only at 3;4, and in terms of frequency to a far lesser extent than all other WH-expressions9 . A syntactic analysis of WH-questions as proposed by Cole et al. (2001 and in press) shows that essentially JI is a WH-in-situ language, although instances of sentence-initial WH may occur. From the MPI database it emerges that WH-words occur in the same position as their no-WH-NP counterpart. This is interesting as JI allows a great degree of word order freedom; therefore, some object NPs can appear in preverbal position. As for adjuncts, these appear post-verbally and pre-verbally. As a result, questions of time, place, manner, and reason can appear either after or before the verb but not necessarily in the leftmost position. There is no evidence for obligatory movement to the beginning of the sentence (Cole et al. in press). 2a) Potong rambut di mana? cut hair loc where Where did you cut your hair? 2b) Di mana potong rambut? loc where cut hair All the WH-forms as listed in Table 3 above are poly-functional; that is, they function as indefinites amongst their other functions. As for culturally significant differences affecting WH-interrogatives, kok (“how come”) is an especially interesting case. It has the tendency to occur at the left end of the sentence and can be used to perform an unusually varied set of functions. In addition, on the issue of development, JI children prefer the in-situ structure especially in object position. Thus beyond the cognitive issue of the sequence and timing of the emergence of WH-interrogatives, there are some striking syntactic differences which are important to identify,


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as they allow us to ask questions about syntactic dominance and transfer. For example, in JI, copular verbs do not occur. Thus regular sentences are deictic and basic questions come in the form of a demonstrative (ini “this”) followed by the WH-form (apa “what”) or the reverse. With the development of the lexicon and the increase of the verbal types of sentences used by children, more WH-questions are uttered where the syntactic structure is always adult-like. In a number of examples by Cole et al. (in press), the acquisition of WH-questions is error free. Children reproduce questions spoken by adults, and the only development is not in the syntax but in the lexicon10 . 5.3. Bilingual Child In the case of the development of WH-questions in the bilingual child, we notice that while Guglielmo displays the same development as monolingual peers in JI, in Italian he produces many WH-questions in-situ, a sign that that there is syntactic interaction between the two languages. In terms of syntactic structures, when he speaks Italian, his production of WH-questions demonstrates that in most cases he is not able to move the WH-form from the in-situ position to the beginning of the sentence as expected in Italian questions. For this reason it seems obvious that he does not apply the inversion rule, considered fundamental in Italian, where a subject can never be placed between a WH form and the verb, but always in the left or right dislocated position. In observing these cross-linguistic structures from a quantitative and qualitative point of view, it is evident that the WH-in-situ structures are more frequent at the beginning of Italian utterances. However these utterances mostly involve cosa (“what”), dove (“where”), and chi (“who”), and it is significant that these in-situ structures are rarely found in the case of monolingual Italian development. Comparing the sequence of development of WH-interrogatives in the two languages, we can better understand the timing of the acquisition of WH-forms in Guglielmo’s Indonesian and Italian. These frequencies are provided below in Table 411 . When these data are compared with adult input as shown, it is clear that the age of acquisition of “what” and “where” occur significantly earlier in Indonesian than the other forms.


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C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C A N D C O G N I T I V E S T R U C T U R E S Table 4. The Timing and Relative Frequency of WH-forms in JI and Italian WH-form

Indon.

Age of acq.

Perc. (%)

Adult input (%)

Italian

Age of acq.

Perc. (%)

what who where how why how come when

apa siapa mana gimana kenapa kok kapan

1;9 2;5 1;9 2;6 2;6 2;3 4;0

29 5 43 3 12 7 0,3

44 15 21 7 8 2 1

che chi dove come perché – quando

2;5 2;5 2;5 3;2 3;4 – 4;4

23 9 18 7 42 – 0,4

Adult input (%) 52 13 18 10 5 – 0,3

Moreover, there is a relatively even correspondence between adult input and child output. The first WH-expressions in Italian begin to occur productively only at the age of 2;5. By this age the child has already mastered nearly all the Indonesian forms except for kenapa (“why”) and kapan (“when”). Also typical is the fact that in the case of the non-dominant language, in this case Italian, the emergence of all forms is significantly delayed. The late occurrence of “when” is a particularly striking feature of the emergence of these WH-questions. It does not just occur late, but at a very low frequency. In addition, in the case of the use of other WH-questions, it is notable that the subject combines “why” and “how come” in order to produce perché, and this explains the stark contrast in frequency of use with the adult input. To conclude the case for bilingual acquisition, the WH-form “when” emerges later than the other forms, a phenomenon which has been widely reported in the literature. Hyeson Park (2000) claims that the explanation for late development of whenquestions in children acquiring English as a second language is due to internal linguistic factors. He proposes that tense and temporal adverbials are interdependent. If this is the case, the problem devolves upon the interrelationship between temporal adverbials and the aspect/modality system in Indonesian. If we extend this consideration to the study of the bilingual child and the late emergence of the temporal WH-form, then part of the answer can be found in the interaction of the two typologically


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different systems that the child is growing up with. The word kapan is related to the Indonesian verbal system mainly based on modality and aspect in which a great deal of vagueness is implied. Italian, however, has a more complex tense based system. Obviously Guglielmo has not yet been able to acquire this system. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that at least until the age of five, he was not able to control tense-marking elements in Italian12 . This type of developmental complexity and the creative use of language are indications of the degree to which syntactic mixing is occurring, as will be explored further below. The following graphs (Figures 2 and 3) compare the acquisition of WH-forms between monolinguals and the bilingual child. Figure 2 shows the difference between the pattern for monolingual Indonesians and Guglielmo, and Figure 3 shows the difference between the emergence of WH-forms for monolingual Italians and Guglielmo. Figure 2 shows that the acquisition of the Indonesian WH-forms in the bilingual child follows the general trend of monolingual children, except for the siapa (“who”) form that emerges relatively later in the bilingual child. This might be due to a lack of input, though no in-depth study of this data has been carried out as of yet. If we exclude “who” (siapa), the pattern of acquisition is similar to other languages in which “where”

Age in months

Acquisition of WH-forms in Indonesian 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 apa

siapa

mana

gimana kenapa

kapan

WH-forms Indonesian (monolinguals)

Guglielmo

Figure 2. Comparison of the acquisition of WH-forms of Indonesian monolinguals and the case of Guglielmo.



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(apa) and “what” (mana) are acquired almost simultaneously. Subsequently, “how” (gimana) and “why” (kenapa) are acquired gradually, and finally “when” (kapan) is only acquired at the age of 4;0 – once again with a low frequency. Figure 4 combines the two previous graphs in order to allow for easier visualization of the entire data set of WH-acquisition development. The figure shows how the emergence of WH-forms follows the same pattern in the two languages when seen from a monolingual perspective as well as in the two languages from the perspective of the bilingual child. In

Acquisition of WH-forms in Italian Age in months

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 che

chi

dove come WH-forms

Italian (monolinguals)

perche'

quando

Guglielmo

Figure 3. Comparison of the Acquisition of WH-forms of Italian monolinguals and the case of Guglielmo.

Acquisition of WH-forms Comparison between monolinguals and the bilingual child 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 what Indonesian

who Italian

where

how

Guglielmo Indonesian

why

when

Guglielmo Italian

Figure 4. Comparing the combined monolingual and bilingual data.


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the case of this bilingual child, if we compare the acquisition of the WH-forms, we realize that Guglielmo must have reached the cognitive stage, that is, the notion is already established in the pre-operational stage. One possible explanation is that the paucity of input in Italian has delayed the acquisition of WH-expressions. In short, while he understands the form he cannot produce it until later, presumably because of the lack of sufficient input. In order to examine this hypothesis, we need to know more about monolingual WH-questions. In fact, if we look at the monolingual data from CHILDES and other authors’ data and analysis, it is clear that the placement of WH-expressions is always in place in Italian children (see Antelmi 1997: 170). Nevertheless, very few cases of in-situ expressions have been detected. These have probably been underestimated by other linguists as performance errors and therefore have not been accounted for. However, the fact that they do occur means that they are possible. Additionally, it appears to be the case that what the bilingual child is doing is overgeneralizing from the stronger language, something that other monolingual children might have done independently. This demonstrates the well known fact of linguistic dominance by the stronger language context. To begin with, it is useful to examine the case of “what” (apa) and “where” (mana). If we look at the production and distribution of the two WH-forms most used and mostly used in-situ, “what” (apa) and “where” (mana), we realize that the child starts to use them like other Indonesian peers at the age of 1;9. These structures persist for a relatively long period of time. In this case, they continue even after the child starts to produce sentences in Italian but start to decrease after the age of 4;0 when the child’s competence in Italian progresses rapidly toward the more adult-like forms. The case of “what” (apa) is slightly different. For instance, in most of the cases recorded before the age of 4;0 it rests in-situ. It is only rarely placed at the beginning of the sentence. This applies to the corresponding form in Italian, che cosa, which becomes operative at 2;5. Again, a vast majority of examples shows the WH-form in-situ. The early acquired in-situ WH-forms thus serve as the basis of a syntactic transfer from



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Indonesian to Italian. This explains the sentences presented in the next part of this chapter. 6. A N A LY S I S O F T H E D ATA13

A typical example of mixed utterances, like the following, usually emerges in a specific context in which Guglielmo is in an Italian environment. In this case he was on his way to an Italian friend’s house. Examples like this are in great part an expression of his excitement and knowledge that he is about to meet his Italian friend. Therefore, he seeks confirmation from his mother with the following type of mixed utterance: 3a) G2;8 Questa la casa siapa? Ini rumah siapa? dem.prox-f.sg def-f.sg house-f.sg who dem.prox home who Whose house is this? In Italian, the sentence should read as follows, where the WH-word is moved at the beginning of the sentence: 3b) Di chi of who

è be-ind.pres.3sg

questa casa? dem.prox-f.sg house-f.sg

In the utterance (3a) it is clear that the child is slowly putting together the pieces and gradually achieving competence in Italian. This is revealing, as at this stage, though his production of Italian is still limited to the expression of single words such as demonstratives (questa, “this”) or nouns (la casa, “the house”), he is able to put these things together and his task is aided by the relatively flexible Indonesian system. Thus the above mentioned sentence lacks a copula as appropriate in Indonesian and uses the function word (siapa, “who”) but still in the Indonesian manner. This is the stage where this kind of mixed sentence is mostly produced, and in the case of the WH-questions, maintained in their Indonesian form. It is interesting that by this time he was able to produce


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the appropriate Italian WH-form “chi” necessary in this sentence but only as an isolate or as a short fixed structure such as chi è? (“who is that?”). However, he is still unable to produce longer and more complex structures. In the following example, he substitutes the Indonesian form for what (“apa”) with the Italian correspondent che cosa, which is equally imprecise. It seems that in his mind, che cosa (“what”) is the default WH-form, at least in the early stages when he is slowly trying to produce full Italian sentences. It is interesting that it can even be used in a later example (7) to refer to “where”14 . 4a) Si chiama che refl.3sg call-ind.pres.3sg what What is it called?

G3;9 cos’è? thing = be-ind.pres.3sg

In Italian, the proper way to ask what something is called would be to employ come (“how”), as in the following sentence: 4b) Come how

si refl.3sg

chiama? call-ind.pres.3sg

In the next example, the contrast between Indonesian and Italian becomes clearer. Here the object position is occupied by the WH-word in-situ, while in Italian it should be moved to the beginning of the sentence. It was expressed as the child, his mother, and some other Italian friends approached a pond. The child uttered the following phrase while pointing at the fish in the pond: 5) G3;2 I pesci mangiare che cos’é? Ikan makan apa? def-m.pl fish-m.pl eat-inf what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg fish eat what What are the fish eating? In this sentence the child is reproducing the structure of an Indonesian question where the common word order is SVO and where the verb



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does not undergo any morphological change as the child uses the infinitive form. The WH-form che cosa (“what”) in object position is still left in-situ. Sentences like this are very frequent in the database and in the diary study, especially between the ages of 3;2 to 4;0. It is interesting to note that the child does not recognize the copula è (“is”) as a verb but considers it to be a unit with the WH-form “what.” This kind of pattern is also used very frequently with the other WH-forms considered below. 6) G3;5 Dicomprato che cos’è? (Yang) dibeli apa? pass-buy-ppart-m.sg what thing = be-ind.pres.3sg rel pass-buy what What did you buy? This mixed sentence where the WH-forms in object position rest in-situ is also interesting because the child produces a focused question with the Indonesian passive marker di-, which can be analyzed as a copula construction with a headless relative clause with the relativizer (yang “that”) in the subject position (see Aman 1999). In this case, the mistake is in the deletion of the relativizer. As Aman has shown, this kind of mistake is common in children (Aman 1999: 4). The following question still exemplifies Guglielmo’s tendency to leave the question word in-situ when he speaks Italian. 7) G3;3 Gulli vuoi andare che cosa? Gulli mau ke mana? Gulli want-ind.pres.2sg go-inf what thing? Gulli want to where Where is Gulli going? (where am I going?) In the example (7) it is clear that the placement of che cosa (“what”), which actually should be dove (“where”), matches JI syntax in that this mimics the normal Indonesian word order (keeping in mind the inherent flexibility in Indonesian). The Italian correspondent dove starts to be productively used only at 2;5, and in many of the examples is left in-situ. It is interesting to note that the use of vuoi (“you want”) incorrectly


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conjugated to match the third singular person of the subject, shows a clear influence of the Indonesian system where “mau” means both volition and near future. In this case where the sentence was uttered while the child was getting ready to go out, Guglielmo was not expressing volition but near future15 . The following is an example of the WH-form of “who” still in-situ. 8) G3;7 Maeldane vuole salutare chi è? Maeldane want-3sg greet-inf who be-ind.pres.3sg

Maeldane mau Maeldane want salamin siapa? greet-IN who

Who will Maeldane greet? Sentences 9–11 exemplify the developmental stage where the child produces Italian questions in which the WH-form dove rests in-situ and other structures of Indonesian are transferred. 9a) G3;2 Di Gulli dov’ è? (Yang) Gulli (punya) mana? of Gulli where = be-ind.pres.3sg rel Gulli have where Where’s mine?/which one is mine? Here the child produces a focused question in a copula construction with a headless relative clause with the relativizer in the subject position. This sentence is awkward for Italian speakers as in Italian the headless relative clause with the relativizer in subject position should be preceded by a demonstrative as follows: 9b) Dov’è quello di Gulli? where = be-ind.pres.3sg dem.dist-m.sg of Gulli Where is Gulli’s (mine)? In the next example, Guglielmo is clearly transferring the structure of the Indonesian sentence next to it, where by the past participle comprato (“bought”) he is trying to express the same focalization expressed by the Indonesian passive marker di-.



10a) Comprato dov’è? buy-ppart-m.sg where = be-ind.pres.3sg Where did you buy it?

G3;6 Dibeli pass-buy

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mana? where

The way the question is formulated is definitely awkward and would not be understood by somebody who did not have a sound knowledge of Indonesian. In Italian it would probably read as follows: 10b) Dove where

l’hai acc.3sg = have-ind.pres.2sg

comprato? buy-ppart-m.sg

The following question, a direct development of the sentence (7) where the right WH-question is being employed, was used very often by the child until the age of 4;6 regardless of his mother’s efforts to correct it. It is definitely not an echo question and therefore the in-situ WH-form should be moved to the beginning of the sentence. 11) Vuoi andare dove, Ma? want-2sg go-inf where Mom Where are you going Mom?

Mau want

ke loc

G3;9 mana Ma? where Mom

In a pragmatic context where the child is asking the mother where she is going, the use of the verb vuoi (“want”) seems to be due to contact with Indonesian, which uses the verb “want” to indicate future and volition. The question, not ungrammatical in Italian, would sound pragmatically more appropriate if it was uttered omitting the modal verb vuoi. As for come (“how”), its frequency of occurrence is very low in comparison to other WH-forms. Also, it tends to occur in pre-posed position in expressions that can be considered as fixed structures, as in the following case in which he asks the name of something he either did not know or could not remember. At this stage, we can see that his language has developed to the point where he can produce the target structure as follows.


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12) Come si chiama? how refl.3sg call-ind.pres-3sg What (how)is it called?

G3;7

The following sentence was uttered while the child was trying to put together a toy car. 13a) G3;11 Come faccio? Gimana bikinnya how do-ind.pres.1sg how do-3sg How do you do it? (How does it work?) This is not exactly what an Italian would say in this context. The word order is awkward. The appropriate question should be phrased as follows: 13b) Come si how imps

fa? do-ind.pres.3sg

The next two examples show that the adjunct perché, from the very beginning of production, is in pre-posed position. This effectively reproduces the appropriate Italian word order. 14) G3;11 Perché tajam, per che cos’è, per tusukare tanti dinosauri16 ? why sharp for what thing=be-ind.pres.3sg for pierce-inf many dinousar Why is it sharp? Why is that? To pierce many dinosaurs? The next sentence displays one of the very few examples containing a when-question in Italian. It was recorded at the age of 4;4 and occurred when the child was talking on the phone to his mother, who had been away for a while. The use of the Indonesian temporal adverbial lama demonstrates that the child still produces mixed structures.



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15) G4;4 Mamma quando vieni? No lama Mommy when come-ind.pres.2sg neg long time Mom, when are you coming back? Not too long. The examples employing when-questions in both languages are too scanty to allow any interpretation, but it should be noted that in the few recorded sentences, the WH-word for “when” is not in-situ. This confirms that adjuncts have the tendency to be pre-posed in the language of the bilingual child. The child has shown a delay in the acquisition of the WH-form “when” in both languages. In Indonesian, kapan is only used three times starting at 4;0, where in Italian it is only recorded once, at 4;4. From that age onward it is used very rarely. At the present the child, being 5 years old, still produces it with great reluctance. It might be interesting to use more structured elicitation tasks to obtain Italian sentences with the when-question word. It should be noticed that from a comprehension point of view the child has shown incapability to understand and often reluctance to answer questions introduced by “quando”. The reasons for this fact can probably be found within the cognitive system of the child, who seems to be too immature to understand the meaning of the questions within the system of the languages the child is exposed to17 . 7. D I S C U S S I O N : T H E E V I D E N C E F O R C R O S S-L I N G U I S T I C I N F L U E N C E

As Döpke (2001) notes, the observation of atypical structures allows us to understand the cognitive process in the bilingual speaker’s mind as well as the analytical skills being acquired. This is important as it provides insights into the process through which two languages are simultaneously acquired. If target forms are too difficult to be considered productive, they, in fact, cannot inform us about what is happening in the mind of the bilingual child. In any event, cross-linguistic structures are intricate aspects of a bilingual child’s normal course of development and are useful indicators of emerging language competence. Since the children probably did not learn the atypical utterances from their


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interlocutors as input, they must have created them themselves. In short, atypical structures are best understood as “experiments” based on the children’s developing analytic capacities (Döpke 2001: 5). In order to demonstrate why and where cross-linguistic structures occur, it is important to identify areas where the structures of the two languages display different patterns or where the child is prone to transfer from one language to the other. On one hand it is difficult to make predictions, yet on the other hand, the evidence gained by case studies such as Döpke’s demonstrates that there is a high degree of variation among bilinguals. The variation and the structures might depend on the language combination to which the bilingual child is exposed to, as some language combinations generate greater structural ambiguities than others. However, in addition to the question of whether one or two systems are being learned simultaneously, Paradis (2001) has shown that the occurrence of these structures depends on the degree of interlanguage ambiguity which is being generated by a particular language combination for a particular language module. In the case of Italian and JI, one of the areas where unusual structures and delayed development were produced by the bilingual child was in the expression of WH-questions. The preliminary results show that Guglielmo’s development of WH-questions follows that of Indonesianspeaking children. From the age of 1;7 he was able to produce Indonesian WH-questions comparable to those of other Indonesian-speaking children, but his Italian WH-questions lag behind those of his Italian peers significantly. The Italian WH-forms appeared much later, at 2;5, after he had gone through a process of producing mixed utterances in Italian clearly based on the JI grammar with many instances of insitu WH-forms as described in the previous examples. It is apparent that when Guglielmo produces WH-questions in Italian, he is typically unable to move the WH-operator from the in-situ position to the beginning of the sentence. The absence of questions with an overt subject where the movement has located the WH-word at the beginning of the sentence seems to demonstrate that he is not able to apply the inversion rule that is considered fundamental in Italian. Indeed, while in Italian a subject can never be placed between a WH-operator and the verb, in Indonesian such fluidity is perfectly acceptable.



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If, in the expression of yes-no questions, Italian and JI match exactly with the corresponding statements with the only difference being rising intonation, the two languages have starkly different grammars in WH-questions. This is represented by the fact that Italian involves movement of the WH-words to the initial position, while in JI they tend to remain in-situ. This contrast is more marked in object questions since subject question expressions can appear in the fronted position in both languages. It would appear that Guglielmo is integrating Indonesian WHmovement into his Italian. In JI, WH-forms generally do not move but adjuncts can. This is exactly what Guglielmo does in the expression of WH-questions. If dominance partly explains the phenomenon of crosslinguistic influence, the conditions of dominance are certainly being met here. The fact that he is able to move the adjuncts also serves as a demonstration that he is aware of the fact that cue competition exists, and is expressing this awareness as shown in other studies (Döpke 2001). Considering that target expressions are being produced correctly, and that both movement and inversion have been applied, it will be interesting to see at what point the movement and inversion rules become problematic. For example, will Guglielmo fail to apply the SAI rule in Italian WH-questions where movement has occurred but not inversion? Though this instance has not yet been observed, it would be interesting if it did since Indonesian has a relatively free word order. The following JI utterance from the MPI database is an example of such a violation of the so called Italian WH-criterion in which the WH-question is placed between the subject and the verb: 16) Apa tadi Dek what earlier younger.brother What did you (brother Ido) say?

Ido bilang? Ido say

To this date, the child has not produced such sentences. This may be because the frequency of such expressions in JI is very low and there is no such input in Italian. In short, it is a question of low input on one side and on the other a complete lack of any such input.


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Is cross-linguistic influence only a matter of dominance? In this case, we see that while the subject exhibits normal monolingual acquisition of JI, his Italian lags behind. If this possibility is correct then the cross-linguistic influence should be unilateral; that is, from the stronger to the weaker language. Another possibility is that the structural properties of the languages involved play an important role in transfer (see Lanza 2001). It is also possible that there is cognitive interaction between the two, and therefore the child’s immature stage of structure building is affected by cross-language cue competition. As Döpke writes: in that view, the children are aware of the fact that they are dealing with two different language systems and intend to express this awareness in their structural choice. In this view target structures should be in the majority, and cross-linguistic structures should be bilateral. (2001: 80) However, in this case study of WH-questions, the transfer seems to be unilateral (from Indonesian to Italian), though language-internal factors may also be at work. Unlike Italian children who from early on acquire WH-questions as formulaic expressions in the fronted position (Antelmi 1997), the bilingual child extends the rule of yes-no Italian questions, where the only difference with statements is in the intonational pattern, to the Italian WH-questions. He simply replaces the object NP with the in-situ WH-form following the more frequent pattern in JI. It might be interesting to see whether, in other areas of grammar, the same pattern of directionality is observed, or if bilaterality can be triggered by other factors. If this is the case, one explanation might be that object WH-forms in-situ are easier to process, producing a delay in the acquisition of the target structures in Italian. On the other hand, if Italian syntactic structures might be beneficial to the acquisition of other grammatical features in Indonesian, then we would observe a transfer from Italian to Indonesian, as demonstrated by Kupisch (in press) in the acquisition of determiners in bilingual German-Italian children where both internal and external factors are at work in transfer. Comparisons with other similar bilinguals could prove or disprove the hypothesis that in-situ acquisition of WH-forms is easier to acquire



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and therefore is the preferred form. The case study of bilingual children acquiring Cantonese and English (Yip & Matthews 2000) displayed exactly the same tendency of acquisition of in-situ WH-forms from the Cantonese dominant language to the weaker English language. Unfortunately, that case study has not been supported by other longitudinal studies on similar bilinguals. The fact that in many fewer cases Guglielmo leaves the adjuncts come (“how”) perché (“why”) and quando (“when”) in-situ can be explained because they were acquired at a more mature cognitive stage and because in JI these elements typically appear in initial sentence position. In particular for perché which is invariably placed at the beginning of the interrogative sentences, it might be that it corresponds to kok (“how come”) and kenapa (“why”) in JI. If kenapa can occur in-situ though the tendency is in fronted position, kok only and exclusively occurs in fronted position and is particularly liked by children. As for the other adjunct, quando (“when”), the paucity of examples does not permit much discussion. No case of transfer of Italian to JI has been observed in this area of grammar, but the fact that no occurrence of the mentioned adjacency constraint (allowed in JI) being violated in Italian WH-questions has been noticed in Guglielmo’s corpus could be the indirect explanation of the rule in Italian. Nor has any study been carried out on the intonation of JI sentences produced by the bilingual child as compared to JI monolinguals, to demonstrate different intonational patterns reproducing Italian ones. Müller (1998) debates whether ambiguity of input might be crucial for the occurrence of cross-linguistic structures. The scarcity of examples of echo questions in adult Italian in this database, and the left dislocated position structures both in the monolingual and bilingual corpus, might have been interpreted as ambiguous by the child. So we can pose the following question: Is it possible that the quantitatively significant production of in-situ questions, especially for “what,” “where,” and “who” (the first WH-words acquired by the child) might have been triggered by what has been generalized by the child in the right dislocated position WH-expressions? Or were they produced as a consequence of the few instances of echo-questions? Though


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either is possible, the limited occurrence of echo-questions does not seem to be the only factor inducing transfer. The best way to resolve this issue is to study other cross-linguistic structures in other areas of the grammar. 8. C O N C L U S I O N

This case of development of WH-questions in a bilingual child demonstrates that cognitive and cross-linguistic factors are at work. In the cognitive dimension, the WH-forms have apparently been acquired independently and at different times by the child. In Indonesian, the acquisition was similar to other Indonesian monolinguals, and while it was delayed in the case of Italian, the order of acquisition remained the same. It seems that the WH-forms constitute a developmental/cognitive package in which, although the child has already acquired the meanings of each question, he still needs to go through the same process of acquisition in the use of these forms that he experienced while learning Indonesian. In terms of the structural difference between the two languages, their combination has clearly resulted in the emergence of specific cross-linguistic structures. For example, in the expression of WH-questions to ask for “what,” “where,” and “who,” the very first to emerge in both systems, Guglielmo leaves the WH-question words in-situ in Italian exactly as is typical in Jakarta Indonesian. In short, we can distinguish three broadly defined developmental stages of WH-forms. First, there is the preproduction stage. In this stage, “what,” “where,” and “who” WH-questions are regularly produced in Indonesian, but in the case of Italian the child is still in the preproduction stage. This stage lasts until the age of 2;5 when the first WH-forms in Italian start to appear in isolation or in fragments. Second, there is an early production stage where mixing is involved. At this stage, Guglielmo started producing questions in Italian, but in many cases continued to use the WH-word as in Indonesian. This stage lasts until the age of four and above and the child leaves most of the WH-questions for “what,” “where,” and “who” in-situ, also as in the Indonesian case. Third, there is a final stage in which appropriate structures emerge, in



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which the target production of WH-forms in Italian is achieved, though relatively late compared to a monolingual. The simplest explanation for the above-noted occurrence of crosslinguistic structures is that of dominance. This explanation has been provided in other examples of bilingual acquisition in two typologically distinct languages which display exactly the same case of syntactic transfer. For example, Yip and Matthews (2000) discuss the development of syntax in Cantonese and English. Their data reveals the same kind of cross-linguistic influence in the production of WH-structures and their conclusions also apply to this Indonesian-Italian context. Future studies of other bilingual contexts may well confirm this pattern. In order to more thoroughly investigate these issues, a study on crosslinguistic influence and the interaction of different linguistic systems is needed as well as analysis of the behavior of non-target structures of monolingual children. It remains to be seen whether certain language combinations produce heightened degrees of structural cognitive dissonance and it is this domain of research, particularly with structurally acutely distinct languages and poly-linguistic settings, that offers an especially interesting research horizon. On a modest level, this study has simply sought to explore how WH in-situ questions in bilingual situations demonstrate syntactic dominance of the stronger language. In so doing, this study has added one more case to the literature on this phenomenon by examining a case of bilingual language acquisition rarely considered – that of Jakarta Indonesian and Italian. A B B R E V I AT I O N S

1 2 3: first, second and third personal pronouns def: definite article dist: distal f : feminine G: Guglielmo imps: impersonal ind: indicative mode inf: infinitive JI: Jakarta Indonesian


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loc: locative m: masculine MPI: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology neg: negation pass: passive ppart: past-participle pres: present tense prox: proximal refl: reflexive rel: relativizer sg: singular NOTES 1. The dominant language of a bilingual, in a broad definition, refers here to the language used with higher proficiency and following the trends of development of monolinguals, whereas the weaker language is the one where the pace of development is slower. Dominance also depends on quality and quantity of input resulting in quality and quantity in the output. No MLU (mean length of utterance) calculation has been performed simply because in Jakarta Indonesian the MLU calculation is not considered without problems. As an isolating language with some agglutinating features it is very difficult to calculate the number of morphemes in an utterance and also the MLUw (mean word length of utterance) is considered difficult to apply as it depends on what constitutes a word, a problem that in some cases cannot be resolved. It can be interesting to see that the same problematic issue has been addressed by Yip and Matthews (2000: 197) for Cantonese. As Döpke (1998: 564) observes, MLU may not be directly comparable across languages, especially those of different morphological types. 2. Many of the features listed above are also shared by Standard Indonesian though the main difference is in a stricter verbal morphology and less free word order (see Sneddon 1996, Musgrave 2001). 3. On this issue, recently Salvi and Vanelli (2005: 55–66) have proposed a double word order for Italian: SV in accusative sentences, and VS in inaccusative sentences. 4. Another relevant difference is that the so called WH-words in Jakarta Indonesian do not represent, as in Italian, a coherent class of words, but can be treated as pro-adverbs (Musgrave 2006 pc.). 5. Despite the interesting issues behind it, no particular study has been carried out on the different intonational patterns in Italian and JI, nor in the utterances produced by the bilingual child.

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6. Data for English refer to a work done by Bloom et al. (1982) aimed to study the acquisition of WH-questions by seven English speaking children aged two to three. Data for Jakarta Indonesian come from the Child Acquisition project of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Jakarta and data for Italian are based on the CHILDES corpus. 7. For a detailed cross-linguistic summary of the study of the development of WH-questions in other languages, see Clancy (1989: 329) 8. Cameron-Faulkner et al.’s work on the child directed speech approach shows that there is interdependence between the language used by adults addressing children and what children learn at particular stages. In documenting the proportional distribution of the kind of utterances that children hear early in their third year of life, they noted that in a surprisingly high proportion of questions (one third of the mothers’ utterances), they actively elicited linguistic interaction with their children (Cameron-Faulkner et al. 2003: 851). In exploring these discursive contexts, they found that “what” was the most common and accounted for half of all the WHquestions, followed by “where,” “why,” “how” and “which.” Interestingly enough, they make no mention of “when,” which is predictable, as “when” universally emerges later. 9. This issue is confirmed by another Indonesian case study carried out by Dardjowidjoyo (2000). He notices that Echa, the child he studied, starts with “mana” and “apa” (before the age of 2;0) and only later, she produces questions with “siapa” and “gimana.” At the beginning Echa does not seem to be able to differentiate between “apa” and “siapa” and “mana” means “where” and “which”. “Kapan” “when” is not acquired productively until the age of three (Dardjowidjoyo 2000:129). 10. This confirms the tendency that early-acquisition of WH-questions in-situ is error free as the syntactic structure is simpler since it does not involve movement (Cole et al. in press). 11. Data refer to a database containing so far about 20,000 utterances of one-hour monthly video-recordings taken during the age of 1;5 and 4;6. A number of data refer to the diary study. 12. Just to give a simple example, every time the child is asked a when-question “quando” related to the past, he simply replies with ieri “yesterday.” Ieri is the translation of the temporal expression in Jakarta Indonesian kemaren that means indeed yesterday but it is often used also to refer in a quite vague way to any time in the past and whose meaning is essentially contextual. 13. In the data produced by Guglielmo, I use the orthographic convention to mark the Italian forms in italic whereas the Jakarta Indonesian ones are underlined. Where necessary, the JI version of the mixed utterances produced by the child is displayed on the right. 14. It is important to notice that his sister Beatrice at more or less at the same age produces exactly the same kind of structures where the WH-form che cosa “what” is inappropriately used in many cases but probably means the WH-form

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by default. Early inappropriate uses of “what” for “where” are mentioned also cross-linguistically by other authors like Yip and Matthews (2000: 199) in their Cantonese English case study. 15. The use of “want” in this meaning happens all the time in Italian sentences and is employed in exactly the same way by Guglielmo’s younger sister. 16. This example is interesting because it shows the question word perché (“why”) and the form per che cos’è (“for what”) in the same sentence, and because other mixing features appear in the sentence like the morphological mixing of the Indonesian word tusuk (“pierce”) followed by the Italian infinitive suffix of the verb. 17. In order to explain the late acquisition of the WH-question, Clark (1973) proposes that its late acquisition depends on the fact that in English, time expressions are derived from space expressions. He explicitly states that: “description of time is based on spatial metaphor in which time is viewed as a single dimensional asymmetric continuum, running horizontally from front to back through the speaker” (Clark 1973: 52). This might explain some of the expressions used by the bilingual child in response to “when” questions in Jakarta Indonesian and Italian prior to the age of three where he used to reply with numbers or with a location. REFERENCES Aman, N. 1999. How to ask what in Malay: the acquisition of WH-Questions in Singapore Malay. PhD Dissertation, University of Delaware: Newark, Del. Antelmi, D. 1997. La prima grammatica dell’italiano. Bologna: Il Mulino. Bloom, L., Merkin, S., and Wootten, J. 1982. Linguistic factors that contribute to the sequence of acquisition. Child Development, 53: 1084–1092. Cameron-Faulkner, T., Lieven, E., and Tomasello, M. 2003. A construction based analysis of child directed speech. Cognitive Science, 27: 843–873. Clancy, P. 1989. Form and function in the acquisition of Korean WH-questions. Journal of Child Language, 16(2): 323–347. Clark, H. H. 1973. Space, time semantics and the child. In Moore, T. (ed.), Cognitive development and the acquisition of the language, New York: Academic Press. 27–63. Cole, P., Gil, D., Hermon, G., and Tadmor, U. 2001. The acquisition of in-situ WH-questions and WH-indefinites in Jakarta Indonesian. In Do, Anna. J. et al. (eds.), BUCLD 25 Proceedings. Somerville, Mass: Cascadilla Press, 1169–1179. Cole, P., Gil, D., Hermon, G., and Tadmor, U. in press. The acquisition of WH-forms in Jakarta Indonesian. In NUSA Linguistic studies in indonesian and languages in indonesia. Jakarta: Atma Jaya. Dardjowidjoyo, S. 2000. Echa. Kisah pemerolehan bahasa anak Indonesia. Jakarta: Grasindo. De Houwer, A. 1995. Bilingual language acquisition. In Fletcher, P., and Mac Whinney, B. (eds.), The handbook of child language. Oxford: Blackwell. 219–250.

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