China Contested: Western Powers in East Asia (Arbitrary Borders)

Arbitrary Borders Political Boundaries in World History The Division of the Middle East The Treaty of Sèvres

Northern Ireland and England The Troubles

The Great Wall of China The Green Line The Division of Palestine

The Iron Curtain The Cold War in Europe

The Mason–Dixon Line Vietnam: The 17th Parallel Korea Divided: The 38th Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone The U.S.–Mexico Border The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo

The Czech Republic: The Velvet Revolution Louisiana Territory South Africa: A State of Apartheid The Partition of British India London: From the Walled City to New Towns A South American Frontier: The Tri-Border Region China Contested: Western Powers in East Asia The Breakup of Yugoslavia: Conflict in the Balkans The Dispute Over Gibraltar

Arbitrary Borders Political Boundaries in World History

China Contested: Western Powers in East Asia

Matthew J. Flynn Arizona State University Foreword by

George J. Mitchell George Mitchell

Senator

Introduction by

James I. Matray

California State University, Chico

Frontis Thanks largely to foreign incursion and various ruling dynasties that both expanded and contracted its territory, China’s borders have been in flux over the centuries. Today, the People’s Republic of China is composed of 23 provinces and is the world’s fourth-largest country. China Contested: Western Powers in East Asia Copyright 2006 by Infobase Publishing All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher. For information contact: Chelsea House An imprint of Infobase Publishing 132 West 31st Street New York NY 10001 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Flynn, Matthew J. China contested : Western powers in East Asia / Matthew J. Flynn. p. cm. — (Arbitrary borders) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7910-8650-X 1. China—History—19th century. 2. China—History—20th century. 3. China— Relations—Europe. 4. China—Relations—United States. I. Title. II. Series. DS755.2. F58 2006 911’.51—dc22 2006008385 Chelsea House books are available at special discounts when purchased in bulk quantities for businesses, associations, institutions, or sales promotions. Please call our Special Sales Department in New York at (212) 967–8800 or (800) 322–8755. You can find Chelsea House on the World Wide Web at http://www.chelseahouse. com Text and cover design by Takeshi Takahashi Printed in the United States of America Bang EJB 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This book is printed on acid-free paper. All links and web addresses were checked and verified to be correct at the time of publication. Because of the dynamic nature of the web, some addresses and links may have changed since publication and may no longer be valid.

Contents Foreword by Senator George J. Mitchell

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

viii

Introduction by James I. Matray

xi

Testing the Limits

1

Defining China

14

Early Contact

28

Forced Opening

40

Facing National Disintegration

53

Two Chinas

67

On the Front Lines of the Cold War

80

Putting the Pieces Back Together

94

Chronology & Timeline

107

Notes

112

Bibliography

117

Further Reading

122

Index

123

Foreword Senator

I

George J. Mitchell

spent years working for peace in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East. I also made many visits to the Balkans during the long and violent conflict there. Each of the three areas is unique; so is each conflict. But there are also some similarities: in each, there are differences over religion, national identity, and territory. Deep religious differences that lead to murderous hostility are common in human history. Competing aspirations involving national identity are more recent occurrences, but often have been just as deadly. Territorial disputes—two or more people claiming the same land—are as old as humankind. Almost without exception, such disputes have been a factor in recent conflicts. It is impossible to calculate the extent to which the demand for land—as opposed to religion, national identity, or other factors—figures in the motivation of people caught up in conflict. In my experience it is a substantial factor that has played a role in each of the three conflicts mentioned above. In Northern Ireland and the Middle East, the location of the border was a major factor in igniting and sustaining the conflict. And it is memorialized in a dramatic and visible way: through the construction of large walls whose purpose is to physically separate the two communities. In Belfast, the capital and largest city in Northern Ireland, the so-called “Peace Line” cuts through the heart of the city, right across urban streets. Up to thirty feet high in places, topped with barbed wire in others, it is an ugly reminder of the duration and intensity of the conflict. In the Middle East, as I write these words, the government of Israel has embarked on a huge and controversial effort to construct a security fence roughly along the line that separates Israel from the West Bank.

Foreword

ix

Having served a tour of duty with the U.S. Army in Berlin, which was once the site of the best known of modern walls, I am skeptical of their long-term value, although they often serve short-term needs. But it cannot be said that such structures represent a new idea. Ancient China built the Great Wall to deter nomadic Mongol tribes from attacking its population. In much the same way, other early societies established boundaries and fortified them militarily to achieve the goal of self-protection. Borders always have separated people. Indeed, that is their purpose. This series of books examines the important and timely issue of the significance of arbitrary borders in history. Each volume focuses attention on a territorial division, but the analytical approach is more comprehensive. These studies describe arbitrary borders as places where people interact differently from the way they would if the boundary did not exist. This pattern is especially pronounced where there is no geographic reason for the boundary and no history recognizing its legitimacy. Even though many borders have been defined without legal precision, governments frequently have provided vigorous monitoring and military defense for them. This series will show how the migration of people and exchange of goods almost always work to undermine the separation that borders seek to maintain. The continuing evolution of a European community provides a contemporary example illustrating this point, most obviously with the adoption of a single currency. Moreover, even former Soviet bloc nations have eliminated barriers to economic and political integration. Globalization has emerged as one of the most powerful forces in international affairs during the twenty-first century. Not only have markets for the exchange of goods and services become genuinely worldwide, but instant communication and sharing of information have shattered old barriers separating people. Some scholars even argue that globalization has made the entire concept of a territorial nation-state irrelevant. Although the assertion is certainly premature and probably wrong, it highlights the importance of recognizing how borders often have reflected and affirmed the cultural, ethnic, or linguistic perimeters that define a people or a country. Since the Cold War ended, competition over resources or a variety of interests threaten boundaries more than ever, resulting in conten-



Foreword

tious interaction, conflict, adaptation, and intermixture. How people define their borders is also a factor in determining how events develop in the surrounding region. This series will provide detailed descriptions of selected arbitrary borders in history with the objective of providing insights on how artificial boundaries separating people will influence international affairs during the next century.

Senator George J. Mitchell September 2005

Introduction James I. Matray

California State University, Chico

T

hroughout history, borders have separated people. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to assessing the significance and impact of territorial boundaries on the course of human history, explaining how they often have been sources of controversy and conflict. In the modern age, the rise of nation-states in Europe created the need for governments to negotiate treaties to confirm boundary lines that periodically changed as a consequence of wars and revolutions. European expansion in the nineteenth century imposed new borders on Africa and Asia. Many native peoples viewed these boundaries as arbitrary and, after independence, continued to contest their legitimacy. At the end of both world wars in the twentieth century, world leaders drew artificial and impermanent lines separating assorted people around the globe. Borders certainly are among the most important factors that have influenced the development of world affairs. Chelsea House Publishers decided to publish a collection of books looking at arbitrary borders in history in response to the revival of the nuclear crisis in North Korea in October 2002. Recent tensions on the Korean peninsula are a direct consequence of Korea’s partition at the 38th parallel at the end of World War II. Other nations in human history have suffered because of similar artificial divisions that have been the result of either international or domestic factors and often a combination of both. In the case of Korea, the United States and the Soviet Union decided in August 1945 to divide the country into two zones of military occupation ostensibly to facilitate the surrender of Japanese forces. However, a political contest was then underway inside Korea to determine the future of the nation after forty years of Japanese colonial rule. The Cold War then created two Koreas with sharply contrasting political, social, and economic

xii

Introduction

systems that symbolized an ideological split among the Korean people. Borders separate people, but rarely prevent their economic, political, social, and cultural interaction. But in Korea, an artificial border has existed since 1945 as a nearly impenetrable barrier precluding meaningful contact between two portions of the same population. Ultimately, two authentic Koreas emerged, exposing how an arbitrary boundary can create circumstances resulting even in the permanent division of a homogeneous people in a historically united land. Korea’s experience in dealing with artificial division may well be unique, but it is not without historical parallels. The first group of books in this series on arbitrary boundaries provided description and analysis of the division of the Middle East after World War I, the Iron Curtain in Central Europe during the Cold War, the United States-Mexico Border, the 17th parallel in Vietnam, and the Mason-Dixon Line. Three authors in a second set of studies addressed the Great Wall in China, the Green Line in Israel, and the 38th parallel and demilitarized zone in Korea. Four other volumes described how discord over artificial borders in the Louisiana Territory, Northern Ireland, Czechoslovakia, and South Africa provide insights about fundamental disputes focusing on sovereignty, religion, and ethnicity. Six books now complete the series. Three authors explore the role of arbitrary boundaries in shaping the history of the city of London, the partition of British India, and the Tri-Border Region in Latin America. Finally, there are studies examining Britain’s dispute with Spain over Gibraltar, Modern China, and the splintering of Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War. Admittedly, there are many significant differences between these boundaries, but these books will strive to cover as many common themes as possible. In so doing, each will help readers conceptualize how complex factors such as colonialism, culture, and economics determine the nature of contact between people along these borders. Although globalization has emerged as a powerful force working against the creation and maintenance of lines separating people, boundaries likely will endure as factors having a persistent influence on world events. This series of books will provide insights about the impact of arbitrary borders on human history and how such borders continue to shape the modern world. James I. Matray Chico, California September 2005

1 Testing the Limits



China contested: Western Powers in East Asia

C

hina presents a fascinating study of arbitrary borders. The best-known boundary is the one that today separates the mainland from Taiwan, but it is only one of several arbitrary borders created in China by Western powers after a.d. 1500. At first, European inroads into China were insignificant and consisted of the Portuguese stronghold at Macao and then the British trophy of Hong Kong. These modest gains grew into Western-imposed boundaries that threatened to partition China into spheres of influence at the end of the nineteenth century. With the rise of Japan, the Western-imposed borders that defined China virtually disappeared altogether—because the Japanese invaded and occupied extensive areas of the country in the 1930s. During the great wars of the twentieth century, World Wars I and II and then the Cold War, China reconstituted itself and eliminated the arbitrary borders that the Western powers had created. The evolution of these Western-imposed boundaries is the focus of this book, as is the Chinese ability to successfully resist this imposition. The Chinese were able to maintain their identity despite the country’s territorial fluctuations, which ultimately proved how ineffective the Western powers were in trying to create new borders. This relationship between East and West was bridged some eight centuries ago by an empire that arose on the steppes of Central Asia and conquered parts of China and Europe. In the mid-thirteenth century, the Mongol Empire invaded eastern Europe and struck fear in the hearts of those Christians who lived in western Europe. In response to this invasion, Pope Innocent IV sent Friar Giovanni Da Pian del Carpini, a loyal, experienced, and hardy man even at age 60, to protest the Mongol intrusion on Christian lands and obtain information about their future plans. With only a few companions, Giovanni set out in a.d. 1245 to traverse Europe and Asia and reach the Mongol court in what was then part of China. He returned almost three years later. When he did come home, he brought ill tidings. The Mongolian emperor Güyük had rejected the pope’s demand that the Mongols cease to threaten Europe and accept Christianity. Instead, the great khan issued an ultimatum:

Testing the Limits

The pope must yield to Mongol authority or face destruction. The letter ended by declaring that, “you must all together at once come to do homage to Us. We shall then recognize your submission. And if you do not accept God’s command and act contrary to Our command We shall regard you as enemies.” John summed up the message starkly in his report to the pope, writing, “It is the intention of the Tartars to bring the whole world into subjection if they can. . . . This also accounts for their refusing to make peace with any nation unless . . . they surrender into their hands.”1 It was a complete impasse and an inauspicious omen for future East–West relations. Distance proved to be a blessing: It cooled the mutual hostility that the two civilizations had for one another. Very few individuals from either locale could muster the energy necessary to overcome the wide spaces between them and to interact in any way, hostile or otherwise. The handful of individuals who attempted this journey always had a story to tell. The most famous account is that of a Venetian merchant—Marco Polo—who covered the enormous distance from Italy to China after three years of travel, arriving at this destination in a.d. 1274. Having heard fantastic stories about the East from his father, he could barely contain his excitement to have the opportunity to see these wonders firsthand. He was not disappointed. Ushered into a great hall to meet Kublai Khan, the Mongol chieftain, Polo finally understood the enormity of China’s power. Great images adorned the wall, and pictures of dragons, birds, horsemen, beasts, and scenes of battle unnerved the most courageous visitor. Before his audience, Polo willingly prostrated himself before China’s leader.2 Polo’s entourage stated its intentions in the most humble of ways. The goal of trade they now discarded in the hope of an extended stay to observe the workings of the great empire. The khan granted this request. After all, Polo was a foreigner, an outsider, so these visitors were welcomed. The khan himself, a Mongol from the northern plains of Asia, represented such people. Always cognizant of his origins, the khan made it policy to assist those who were not Chinese. Polo spent the next 17





China contested: Western Powers in East Asia

Kublai Khan, the founder of the Yüan Dynasty, ruled China from 1276 to 1294. The Mongolian leader welcomed foreign visitors, including Venetian explorer Marco Polo, who served as an ambassador for the khan from 1275 to 1292.

years in China. On his return home in 1295, he described what he had seen in a book titled The Travels of Marco Polo. To Polo, the Mongols had created a great empire, and he intended his statements to be a lasting testament to their power. His account implied that Europe could benefit by emulating this Eastern empire. It also intimated that the physical border that separated the two regions had been bridged by two simple Venetian adventurers—Polo and his father. Marco Polo’s travel book whetted Europe’s appetite for more voyages of discovery to the “Far East.” However, more than two

Testing the Limits

centuries would elapse before Europeans could act on this desire with any degree of consistency. Europe was crippled by internal wars and impoverished because of this fighting. Anxiety naturally grew out of Polo’s stories. If what he wrote was true, more delay would only leave Europe further behind the East. When Europe did reach out its hand, two centuries later, weakness would be its defining characteristic. After years of pleading with the courts of Portugal and Spain, Genoese explorer Christopher Columbus managed a fleet of only three ships and a handful of men in hope of finding a shorter route to the Far East. Still, this small group opened the door for European exploration. After 1500, Europeans sailed the world’s oceans in search of trade to overcome the desperate poverty that accented life at home. The Far East was at the top of the list. An additional reason for exploration accompanied this economic goal. Priests and missionaries teamed with the more base adventurers to redeem those ignorant of Europe’s chief virtue: a firm belief in Christianity. In this way, Europe maintained a cultural superiority to offset the embarrassing need to secure wealth from outside countries. Early on, the Europeans achieved mixed results in China. After spending many years in China, Jesuit priests were finally welcomed to the Chinese court in 1601, where they became advisors who instructed Chinese officials in astronomy and mathematics. In doing so, they hoped to interact with China’s upper class and teach its members about the virtues of Christianity. To make their religious message more tolerable, they donned Chinese attire, spoke the language, and acknowledged the moral doctrines of Confucianism. The Jesuits followed their mentor, Father Matteo Ricci—a man who never lost sight of the ultimate goal of conversion, no matter how Chinese he became.3 To the Chinese, Ricci was one of them. He began his service as a figure of fascination in 1601, and when he died nine years later the Chinese requested a special place of burial for his remains. Moreover, they assumed that all subsequent Jesuits received as visitors in the capital would remain in Beijing permanently and never leave, just as Ricci had





China contested: Western Powers in East Asia

done.4 It was hard to tell who influenced whom more. It was also unclear whether the Jesuits had overcome a cultural border in China or if that border remained completely intact. The desire to establish a lucrative trade relationship with China dictated a much more single-minded aim and benefited from an easy measure of success—the accumulation of wealth. Most European merchants could take comfort in having achieved this goal. Saving souls was a less exact science. Soon, the need or tangibility of wealth eclipsed the evangelical purpose of European expansion. As this became clear and as Europe grew more powerful, Europeans undertook stronger measures to ensure that this wealth became accessible to the European states. China tested these limits, however. It was far away geographically, and projecting power into that region—power great enough to intimidate the Chinese—was difficult indeed. The prize was great, though, and the lure of riches too strong, so Europe set out on this path. Numerous powers joined the hunt, but England surpassed them all. How England conducted itself as Europe continued to gain strength and as China weakened dictated much of the relationship between East and West and much of the success of China’s ability to keep European influence at bay. The British approached the use of military force in China with caution and trepidation. China appeared to be a fearsome power, and testing this fact could result in dire consequences. Moreover, China represented only one interest of the British crown. Controlling India and checking competing rivals in Europe remained pressing concerns as well. For this reason, England initially tested China’s resolve through diplomacy rather than with force. Requests for trade fell on deaf ears and climaxed in a diplomatic effort undertaken at the end of the eighteenth century. At this time, England dispatched Lord George Macartney from the southern port of Canton—the accepted point for European contact with China—to the capital of Beijing. Macartney was to impress on the Chinese emperor England’s strong desire to trade

Testing the Limits

more openly with China. To convince the Chinese that this trade would be in their interest, Macartney’s 95-member entourage carried 600 presents that consisted of glass plates, plush carpets, ornate pottery, and scientific and mathematical instruments.5 He arrived in the capital in the fall of 1793 and at that point should have taken notice of his success. No other British party had made it to Beijing. The first attempt ended in 1787, when the diplomat making the journey died before reaching the Chinese capital. Macartney faced a larger problem, however. Ignorant of Chinese behaviors and diplomatic norms, he believed that his mission had just started and was optimistic that he could overcome any cultural differences between the two nations. He was soon disappointed. The Chinese did in fact greet him in the capital, but protocol stood in the way of a successful meeting. Macartney refused to perform the kowtow. This elaborate ceremonial act required a foreign dignitary to humble himself before the emperor. Specifically, the representative was to kneel three times and lay completely prostrate nine times. From the Chinese point of view, such an act of submission was a first step in establishing a dialogue, and a decree from the emperor ordered court officials to remind the British representative that, “when ambassadors of various vassal-states come to the Celestial Empire to present tribute and look upon her brilliance . . . they must perform the same rites [as other nations] without exception.”6 The decree insisted that the kowtow be performed. Macartney believed that this requirement humiliated his government, and he refused to perform the act. As Macartney proudly noted in his journal, “ . . . as [the emperor] passed we paid him our compliments by kneeling on one knee, whilst all the Chinese made their usual prostrations.” Macartney did this despite recognizing the importance of the occasion, noting that, during the ensuing dinner, “every function of the ceremony [was] performed with such silence and solemnity as in some measure to resemble the celebration of a religious mystery.”7 Macartney’s reaction to the kowtow ensured that his mission ended in failure. Offended by the diplomat’s behavior,





China contested: Western Powers in East Asia

the Chinese refused to even consider opening more of their ports to England. Macartney’s gifts did nothing to alleviate the situation; in fact, they caused more problems. His prized offering, an elegant carriage, offended Chinese sensibilities because the driver rode in a more elevated position than the emperor. In addition, the gifts reinforced Chinese prejudice, because they were mistaken as tribute—that is, as England’s acknowledgement of its inferiority to China. The Chinese described England’s petition for sending a diplomatic mission to the capital in this way, noting that, “both its sentiment and its language are submissive and sincere.” They treated the British like any vassal, recording the ceremony by grouping England with the other powers present that day: “[The English] were ordered to be honored together with the princes, dukes, and ministers in the Imperial suite and the Mongol princes, dukes, nobles and husbands of the Imperial princesses, the ambassadors of Burma and others. Gifts were bestowed upon them according to their ranks.”8 Macartney measured success by Chinese recognition of England’s parity (equality) with the Middle Kingdom (the English translation for China, or Zhongguo). He had hoped that he had done this by evading the requirement to kowtow. The Chinese rebuff told him otherwise and clearly signaled that a social border bolstered the trade barriers that separated China and England. From misunderstanding grew conflict, and, with England in the lead, Europe set out to force China to trade. Eventually, it succeeded by using military force to dictate terms of trade to a country that had become increasingly vulnerable due to a series of political upheavals in the mid-1800s. In the process, Europe found itself in the unusual position of caretaker to the country it so desperately needed for trade. Ironically, England, the nation that had done so much to weaken China, took the lead in this area as well, when it fended off the aggressive efforts of Russia, Germany, France, and Japan to seize Chinese territory in the late nineteenth century.

Testing the Limits

The United States rapidly surpassed England in the role of caretaker and for this reason took center stage in East-West relations in the twentieth century. This caretaker mentality was never more prominent than during World War II. As China reeled before the advancing Japanese armies, the United States offered military assistance and guidance. Two U.S. officers, General Claire Chennault and General Joseph W. “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, coordinated this effort. Their reactions to China’s leader, Chiang Kai-shek (now often spelled Jiang Jieshi), could not have been more different. Chennault always remained convinced of Chiang’s greatness. In the midst of the war, at a conference plotting strategy in the Pacific Theater, he told President Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Sir, I think the Generalissimo is one of the two or three greatest military and political leaders in the world today.”9 He never deviated from this view and continued to support Chiang long after World War II, because of his admiration for the man. He wrote in his memoirs that “it was the Generalissimo who stood between China and surrender to Japan, and it was the Generalissimo who stood between China and complete chaos after the war.”10 Stilwell, a very different figure from Chennault, had a much different view of Chiang. Stilwell believed himself an expert on China; he spoke the language and had been posted in the country two times prior to his assignment there in World War II. This outlook meant that he was less optimistic than Chennault in the notion that China could stop Japan. Stilwell considered a Chinese defeat a real possibility, and he believed Chiang held the key to that success. At first, he maintained some optimism, describing Chiang as a possible candidate to pull China from its disarray to allow the nation to emerge from the war unified and strong. Later, his opinion took a drastic shift, and he believed that Chiang was the main obstacle to success. At one point, Stilwell wrote in his diary that Chiang was “directly responsible for much of the confusion that normally exists in his command.” He believed Chiang was incompetent, writing that Chiang was “half-informed” and had a “distorted view of everything”



10

China contested: Western Powers in East Asia

Chiang Kai-shek, pictured here with his wife, May-ling, and U.S. General Joseph Stilwell at a conference in Burma in 1942, helped unify China under the leadership of the Nationalist Part, or Kuomintang (KMT), in the late 1920s. Stilwell, however, did not have confidence in Chiang and proved prophetic when the KMT was forced out of mainland China in 1949 by Communist forces led by Mao Tse-tung.

because of an unhealthy reliance on sycophants.11 In Stilwell’s estimation, Chiang was losing the war on the Asian mainland. The contradictory opinions of these two U.S. generals revealed that U.S. efforts at altruism did no more than hopelessly muddy the waters. The United States fumbled its opportunity to aid a beleaguered China virtually without defined territorial borders.

Testing the Limits

That the interaction between these two powers resulted in conflict is not surprising given the confusion inherent in U.S. policy during the war. This confusion bred hostility that continued after the war and reached a peak during the Cold War. In 1954, China took a seat at the Geneva Conference, which was held to address the lingering problem of Korea and to settle the issue of the war in Indochina. This invitation from the West represented a triumph for the new Communist nation so recently at war with much of the world in Korea. To the United States, however, China’s presence was odious in the extreme, and the U.S. representative made sure to stress this very point. As the proceedings got underway, China’s representative, Zhou Enlai, impressed the other diplomats with his charm and sophistication, a far cry from what they had expected given the dogmatic pronouncements of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Zhou succeeded in endearing himself to the representatives from England and France but not to those from the United States. In fact, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the ranking U.S. representative at the conference, made sure not to shake his hand in a desperate effort to maintain an artificial boundary. As the VIPs mingled, Dulles turned his back on the expectant Zhou, who was forced to maintain his smile and make the best of the situation.12 This he did, but Dulles’s affront signaled to the world that the political borders that separated the two countries remained in place. Such physical gestures mean a great deal in diplomacy. Eighteen years later, another American had the chance to shake Zhou’s hand, and did not miss the opportunity. President Richard Nixon descended from his plane, the Spirit of ’76, and stepped foot on Chinese territory in 1972. There to greet him stood Zhou Enlai. Nixon, aware of the momentous occasion, grasped Zhou’s hand warmly, and the two men stood in that position for many minutes. Zhou, steady as ever, made no expression that might reveal that he savored the moment, a vindication of the snub he had received from Dulles in 1954. Later, as the first meeting got underway, Zhou addressed the issue directly, acknowledging the handshake and commenting that

11

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China contested: Western Powers in East Asia

“John Foster Dulles didn’t want to do that.”13 With that handshake in 1972, the United States and China resumed relations that had been suspended for so many years and the borders so firmly in place started to crumble. From Marco Polo to the United States, Western contact with China emphasized how arbitrary borders separated the two regions. Under the control of the aggressive Mongol Empire, China posed a threat to Europe but still lured Europeans east in search of trade, penetrating what otherwise appeared to be a formidable territorial border. The splendor of China captivated more than European adventurers such as Marco Polo. Jesuit missionaries also found the Middle Kingdom intriguing. They made a special effort to convert its subjects to Christianity and they emulated Chinese culture. As a result, the cultural boundary that separated East and West appeared permeable. A base economic purpose drove European interest in establishing ties with China, however. For centuries, China successfully resisted this interest in trade, as reflected in its rebuff of British emissary Lord Macartney. When the West finally broke down this economic border, it weakened the great nation to such an extent that China faced political extinction. Ironically, only the political rivalries of the Western powers saved it from this fate. Americans factored prominently in trying to help China reconstitute its borders— reflected by the efforts of generals Stilwell and Chennault—but, ultimately, these efforts had mixed results. As China reestablished its political borders, it became an enemy of the United States until President Nixon’s dramatic overture to the People’s Republic of China, best symbolized by the handshake he offered Zhou Enlai in 1972. Today, all parties have largely overcome the arbitrary borders, whether territorial, cultural, economic, or political. Still, friction persists. Such factors as the importation of Western values, which are at odds with Communist doctrine; the West’s fear of China’s tremendous economic success and the political power that comes with it; and the mainland’s often acrimonious relationship with Taiwan, which threatens to spark a war that will

Testing the Limits

involve the United States, are all responsible for creating tension. These problems cannot detract from the fact that, at present, the United States and the West interact with China much more openly than before and that a more amiable relationship characterizes these interactions because of this openness. Regrettably, such an outcome grew out of a past marred by frequent conflict that led to tremendous human suffering. Arbitrary borders stand at the center of this history, because, in many ways, they fostered the difficulties that led to confrontation between East and West.

13

2 Defining China

Defining China

A

lthough China enjoys a long and distinguished history, disunity and fragmentation characterize its national heritage. At frequent times in Chinese history, magnificent dynasties unified the entire Asian landmass, leaving the country an awesome power. At other times, anarchy engulfed the region as rulers of varying ability managed to control only parts of the territory. When this happened, China exerted considerably less power. Many experts label these periods of unity and disunity a “dynastic cycle.” More recent scholarship has cautioned that arranging Chinese history in this fashion represents an oversimplification, but the model does call attention to an indisputable truth.14 Throughout its history, China alternated between the rule of a strong man and the chaos of warlordism, and this reality greatly altered its borders independently of any Western interference. The Chinese point to an ancient past that reaches back to at least 1200 b.c. At this time, the Shang civilization and then the Zhou emerged to rule China. These kingdoms were small in size, occupying only several hundred square miles of the central part of present-day China. Moreover, they were not homogeneous; non-Chinese peoples lived within their territory.15 Written records and archaeological evidence are scarce, but the main conclusion that can be drawn from this fragmented record is that controlling even a portion of what today is considered China was no easy task. The tension between the Shang and Zhou illustrates this point. They were related peoples who vied for supremacy in the same area; the Zhou merely supplanted the Shang around 1050 b.c.16 Such internal dissension did not go away during the rule of the Zhou; rather, it remained in place and exacted a heavy price. An extensive period of bloodshed and fighting characterized the remaining years of Zhou rule, so much so that the era is known to scholars as the period of the “Warring States” (481–221 b.c.). The endless state of war helped destroy whatever borders the Zhou had managed to create, but not before introducing a key change in warfare. This era of conflict ended the dependence of combatants on the chariot and marked the

15

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rise in the importance of infantry and cavalry in fighting battles. Outside peoples invading China taught the Zhou this lesson, underscoring the reality that, despite the boundaries designed to keep people out, exchanges in culture continued—in this case in pursuit of national survival.17 Unfortunately for the Zhou, they learned this lesson too late. As the bloodshed persisted and escalated, the Zhou weakened to a point where they were vulnerable to conquest. The first leader who managed to unify China did so when the Ch’in ended Zhou rule in 221 b.c. Once again, the new power in China came from within the existing state. Emperor Cheng ruled for just 14 years, until 206 b.c., but this was long enough to give China its name.18 The Ch’in emperor’s greatest testimony to the uneasiness he felt at the helm of this new state was his vast tomb that housed the famous terracotta army that features hundreds of soldiers arrayed in battle formation and buried with the emperor. He built this monument to his greatness underground, hidden from view. He should not have been so modest. Under his rule, Ch’in territory expanded north, south, and west—up to roughly two-thirds of the present-day state of China. Warfare again paved the way for conquest, but the main component that led to the success of the state was a highly centralized government that had an extensive and far-reaching bureaucracy. In this way, attempts at consolidating the new empire could be made, and the Ch’in did so in grand style. Court officials conducted a census, and once a tally that tracked all inhabitants of the new state was established, military service became compulsory for males. This same step allowed the empire to conduct labor drafts and begin elaborate public works projects. All monies, writing, and even the roads became standardized according to a government mandate.19 Emperor Cheng recognized the impermanence of the borders established by predecessor states due to internal strife and enforced a rigorous set of rules and regulations within China to overcome this very problem. Others strove to emulate this example of centralized rule. As a result, many empires were successful in following the Ch’in

Defining China

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The Mongol Empire—the largest contiguous empire in the history of the world— began its conquest of China in the early 1200s. By the last decade of that century, the Mongol, or Yuan Dynasty, ruled much of present-day China under the leadership of Kublai Khan.

model. The Han (207 b.c.–a.d. 220), Tang (618–907), Song (960–1279), and Ming (1368–1644) families successfully unified all of China. In between these powerful dynasties came

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long periods of disunified foreign rule that sometimes lasted for hundreds of years. When the Hans’ power reached its pinnacle in a.d. 220, after 400 hundred years of rule, that state dissolved into three warring kingdoms that championed a series of leaders. The shifting political factions became so numerous that scholars refer to the era as the “Six Dynasties” (a.d. 220–589). When the Tang Dynasty collapsed in the early 900s, a similarly unstable period—“Ten Kingdoms”—came to pass. A remarkable number of rulers vied for power in this 50-year period (a.d. 907–960). The Song Dynasty followed, but upon its collapse in 1279, Chinese rule came to an end, because the Mongols, non-Chinese peoples from the north capitalized on the internal dissension to seize control of China. The Mongols established the Yuan Dynasty, which ruled from a.d. 1279 to 1368. The Ming gained control of China in 1368, but Chinese rule gave way to foreign control once again when the Manchu arrived from Manchuria in 1644 and created the Qing, or Manchu, Dynasty. Qing rule collapsed in 1911, ending China’s imperial dynasties. Warfare among petty warlords and the resultant political disintegration that marked the periods between the centralized dynasties left China much reduced in size. Eventually, China was able to reconstitute itself. When it did so, it exerted a commanding presence on the Asian landmass. This dynastic cycle, however, merely repeated the problem apparent during the Shang and Zhou periods: A political boundary had been established, but the Chinese quality or “Chineseness” of the people within the kingdom remained in doubt.20 A unified Chinese state was still very much in question. Thus, the more territory that came under one ruling family, the more the modern shape of China started to emerge. As dynasties cordoned off larger sections of territory, borders became increasingly varied, because of persistent discord among the non-Chinese who lived within these territories. Geography complicated the task of creating a uniform Chinese state. China’s topography offers evidence to dispute all of China’s territorial boundaries, including Taiwan’s relationship to

Defining China

the mainland: The sea separates this island from the Asian continent. The mainland suffers from its own geographic divisions as well. The Qinling Mountains stretch from eastern coastal regions far to the west and divides the nation into two parts, north and south. So commanding is this mountain range that it dictates the weather—cold and dry in the north, warm and rainy in the south. Above and below this formidable barrier lay the two major rivers of China, the Huang Ho (Yellow) and the Yangtze. These mountains and rivers act to divide the landscape of China, and they add to the geographic boundaries that define each of China’s provinces. In fact, so isolating are these divisions that local dialects arose in each province and for one individual to understand another who hailed from a different part of the country was problematic.21 Predictably, this localism fostered strong regional ties that led to much conflict within China, conflict that undermined any borders. Only when an outstanding leader overcame this provincialism did the country take on more of its modern appearance. Despite these internal problems, strong rulers tried to expand Chinese territory. At times they succeeded, and at times they failed. Only the most successful of leaders managed to achieve the distinction of ruling a unified China and of turning neighbors located on the fringes of the empire into dependencies. The first to do so was Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty. Under his rule (141–187 b.c.), Chinese authority reached to Vietnam in the south, to the deserts in the west, and to Manchuria and presentday Korea in the north. Tang rulers matched this feat, maintaining a strong Chinese presence in Korea and Vietnam and to the west. Only in the latter stages of Tang rule did this authority weaken, and the subservience of both its northern and southern neighbors waned after a.d. 755. Mongol rule enjoyed even greater success. After a.d. 1276, Korea, Tibet, Burma (Myanmar), Siam (Thailand), and Vietnam all came under Chinese domination, although Vietnam managed to expel Mongol forces after 1287. The same pattern repeated itself with the Ming. After gaining power in 1368, Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang expanded China’s

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control in all directions, and Korea and the west came under Chinese rule, as did Vietnam. This leader’s successor, Emperor Yongle, went a step further and commissioned seven separate voyages of exploration in the early decades of the 1400s. These voyages headed into the southern seas and established Chinese power far beyond its borders. Later Ming rulers could not match this feat, and Ming power receded by the early 1500s, just as

China’s Voyages of Exploration Chinese Admiral Zheng He led seven voyages of exploration between the years 1405 and 1433. At this time, the Chinese were isolationists, so Zheng’s trips to Southeast Asia, India, and Africa deviated from his nation’s focus on domestic concerns. At least during this time, Chinese isolationism fell away as the Middle Kingdom embarked on this maritime expansion and did so on a massive scale. Each voyage was composed of 300 ships and 28,000 soldiers and sailors. The ships themselves were massive in size and carried the latest innovations in technology, such as water-tight compartments, numerous sails, and cargo holds filled with water and supplies for many months at sea. On each return home, the fleet brought great treasures to China, none more famous or prized than the giraffe proudly displayed at the Beijing zoo. Despite the spectacular nature of the voyages, they came to a sudden end and China again withdrew inside its borders. By some accounts, the Ming Dynasty felt confident that it had affirmed its majesty and, once convinced that it needed nothing beyond its borders, the sea travels came to an end. Some believe that internal feuds at court weakened the influence of Zheng He’s fellow eunuchs, the chief backers of the voyages. Others point to the growing threat from nomadic peoples along China’s northern border, prompting the Ming to manage their resources to contain this dangerous problem. Whatever the reason, China’s retrenchment forfeited a key maritime advantage: Sea power was perfected by the West, whose nations would then use it to visit China starting in the early sixteenth century and would eventually break down the artificial borders the Ming rulers had so confidently erected in the early fifteenth century.

Defining China

the Europeans arrived on China’s shores. Finally, the Manchu, or Qing, Dynasty reestablished Chinese domination of Korea, Mongolia, Tibet, and Vietnam. To maintain control, each leader of China sought to perpetuate the tributary system, in which these outlying states paid homage and deference to China and in exchange native rulers remained in power. The result was that, even when rulers were flushed with success, the responsibilities of rule continued to expand—but to what end? With the tributary system, Chinese rulers could tacitly admit the frailty of their new conquests without a public admission of weakness. Ultimately, China accepted the fact that the borders at the outermost reaches of its empire signified the limitation of its power. China’s interaction with its neighbors to the south and to the north during the Ming Dynasty exemplified this point. Chinese officials granted much autonomy to the native peoples in these areas, because China was not strong enough to do otherwise. In the south, 800 local chieftains who represented non-Chinese factions lived in Chinese territory and actively participated in China’s government as late as the Ming period. Conversely, within this “soft” southern border, Chinese citizens migrated beyond China’s borders and mixed with the local populations in great numbers and enjoyed privileged status ensured by the presence of Chinese provincial armies close by.22 A similar situation developed in the north, where Mongols and Chinese interacted in large numbers along this supposed hostile frontier. Long after 1368 or the end of the Yuan Dynasty, 250,000 Mongols remained on Chinese land and up to one million Chinese lived in Mongol territory. The result was what one scholar labeled “controlled confusion,” because trading opportunities were desired and pursued by both sides, although such interaction was officially discouraged by the Ming court.23 The northern border was to be maintained symbolically even if imperfectly enforced. The same could be said of the southern boundary. In each case, north and south, the porous nature of these borders pointed to the limitations of Chinese power lurking behind the denigrating label of

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“tributary power” that China placed on neighboring countries and peoples. The always-looming threat of invasion compounded the problem of determining what constituted the Chinese nation. Given Chinese territorial expansion, a violent response from those who saw themselves as victims of Chinese imperialism or who sought expansion in their own right became inevitable. Before the Europeans arrived on China’s coast in the early 1500s, this threat came primarily from the north. Nomadic peoples from this area managed to take control of China for long periods of time in its history. There were several different dynasties but none more famous than that founded by Genghis Khan (a.d. 1167–1227). This fearsome warrior united all Mongolian tribes in a powerful alliance by 1206. His army headed south and west, and at the time of his death in 1227, Mongol forces had occupied much of northern China and readied themselves for the conquest of the southern area as well. They completed this task under the reign of Kublai Khan, and China fell under the control of this non-Chinese Yuan Dynasty from roughly 1279 to 1368. The Mongol ascendancy meant that the borders so carefully erected by Chinese leaders disappeared. China continued to exist, however, because the Mongols were too few in number to occupy all positions of importance in their new empire. Needing Chinese help to maintain Mongol rule meant certain changes and modifications to policies that otherwise excluded the Chinese, and this practice helped mitigate Mongol influence. For example, because the Mongols had no written language, Chinese became the official language of the court. Just as important, the Mongols modeled two important state functions after Chinese designs: Taxation became uniform and regulated, and examinations became necessary for recruitment to government service.24 In this case, outside rule helped to establish a Chinese identity just as effectively as Chinese rule, if not more so given the imperative of national survival inherent in this cultural triumph over the Mongols.

Defining China

Under Mongol rule, non-Chinese and Chinese were forced to exist side by side within a certain geographic territory that covered much of the Asian landmass. The Chinese had experienced this situation before, because a mixture of peoples always had lived within China, but they were not accustomed to playing the lesser role as they did in the hierarchical society that placed the Mongols at the top. Now the Chinese were the barbarians, a term they previously had reserved for those they deemed inferior.25 Despite having to endure this insult, many Chinese willingly ascribed to Mongol rule: It meant a return to great power status, because China became part of a magnificent empire. This sentiment was far from universal.26 Mongol rulers managed to sustain this arrangement for almost 100 years before the difficulties that always had beset Chinese rulers undid Mongol power. Within China, many groups plotted against the ruling class, and these unruly factions naturally united and targeted the hated outsiders. Nationwide dissent became so acute that Mongol power collapsed in 1368. When the Ming Dynasty emerged from the chaotic end of Mongol rule to establish control of China, the Chinese again dominated the internal workings of the country, and Ming rulers primarily concerned themselves with securing China’s borders from outside attack. Several punitive missions launched by the first Ming emperors against Mongol power testified to this very point, as did the presence of the Great Wall, reinforced and expanded to aid in defending China from attacks from the north. In contrast to the Mings’ earlier aggressive posture, however, over time the empire grew defensive in the extreme. The missions of exploration that had reached the shores of Africa were abandoned after 1430, and the Ming took the additional step of limiting outside contact by curtailing trade with southern neighbors along the coastline. To the north, strikes against Mongolia ended and the Great Wall became the mainstay of defense. These precautions allowed Ming China to enjoy a long period of prosperity. Still, this benefit could not change the fact that the defensive thinking represented a complete reversal of

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Although the first unified defensive wall built along China’s northern border dates to the third century b.c., construction on the Great Wall of China was not completed until the Ming Dynasty (a.d.1368–1644). The wall, which stretched some 4,500 miles, served to protect China from raids by Mongol, Turkic, and other nomadic peoples.

earlier Ming success. In the face of this retrenchment, Japan, humbled earlier, grew defiant. Vietnam proved so troublesome that Ming rulers restored its independence in 1427. The erosion of the tributary system was an early indication of a general decay that became overt by the late 1590s.27 Naturally, the defensive measures did not completely eliminate the threat of foreign invasion, and this is a deciding factor that led to Ming destruction. The danger from intruders remained intact and became more complicated. The first European contact began as early as 1516, when the Portuguese arrived and insisted on trading rights. About 70 years later, China faced a new foe in the north, the Manchu from Manchuria. Ming rulers failed to appreciate the threat posed

Defining China

by these new developments. Consequently, they did little to prepare for the problems these challenges might create. The European impact was feeble early on and China could afford to ignore it. The same could not be said of the Manchu threat. While the Ming focused their attention on the Mongols, the Manchu attacked and seized control of China in 1644. Once again a non-Chinese people ruled China. The Manchu championed things Chinese, however, rather than holding the people in disdain as did the Mongols, apparently out of genuine admiration for Chinese culture and not just because such a stand helped them control the population.28 The benefit of dealing amiably with the Chinese paid large dividends for Qing rulers, and they could rely on Chinese cooperation to a great extent. For example, Chinese soldiers served in Qing armies in huge numbers. In fact, lingering Ming resistance was overcome by Chinese forces fighting for the Manchu against other Chinese. In this way, the Qing seized control of Taiwan in 1683, completing their subjugation of China.29 It is easy to see why the bulk of the Chinese population supported Manchu rule. First, the Chinese who opposed Manchu authority were left unmolested for the most part, as long as they did not take up arms against the state.30 In this way, the Manchu emperors largely defused the threat posed by the persistent problem of internal friction in China. Second, by embracing Chinese culture, the Manchu mollified the Chinese and they now accepted the secondary role in society that they had found intolerable during the Mongol period. The Chinese could tell themselves it was a Chinese empire even if administrated by Manchu personnel.31 Ironically, the conviction that China was the Middle Kingdom and the most important and powerful state in existence enjoyed its strongest conviction among the Chinese people at a time when China’s population answered to a foreign ruler. This self-imposed lie would reverberate with profound and negative consequences when the Manchu confronted European power.

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In general, from the founding of China and before the arrival of the Europeans, a very strong historical pattern of unity and disunity characterized Chinese nationalism. During periods of strong centralized leadership, China exerted much power. In between such empires, long periods of decline or internal unrest weakened Chinese power and invited foreign conquest. Consequently, a Chinese empire meant different things at different times in China’s history. The sovereign who controlled China proper ruled an empire often filled with contentious subjects who did not always consider themselves Chinese. After unifying his Chinese subjects, the emperor’s next task was to subjugate the non-Chinese populations in areas that neighbored the Chinese state to the north, west, and south. This meant that a leader needed to ensure the tributary status of the outlying states of Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Vietnam, and others. Only if an emperor achieved both of these goals would his task of ruling China be complete. This extensive territorial aggrandizement was impressive but difficult to accomplish. The resultant fluctuations in what constituted China emphasized just how arbitrary China’s borders had become over time. The Europeans benefited tremendously from the reality that China had a long history of border problems. The arrival of strangers (Europeans) was not a new experience for the Chinese. Outside arrivals had been frequent, if not from across the ocean then from the north and the west. Rather, the method of coping with the threat had changed. Now, China closed itself off from this contact. The Manchu decision to isolate China and Chinese compliance to this policy represented a fundamental shift in thinking—a costly one. A more open exchange with the European powers may well have mitigated their impact on China, much as had been the case with Mongol rule or that of the Manchu. Instead, the threat was ignored. Although the impact of the European intrusion was delayed by this coping mechanism, it came nonetheless. China again would face a period of national disintegration, this time

Defining China

at the hands of the European powers, and would survive only by enduring the most adverse hardships.

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3 Early Contact

Early Contact

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urope set out to discover the world after 1500, but in Asia it soon encountered the formidable strength of China. Nevertheless, European nations assaulted China from the sea in a seemingly innocuous manner—through trade. Although the Ming Dynasty was initially successful in limiting interaction with these seafaring powers, the Chinese eventually succumbed to European demands for more trading rights. This would prove to be a very slow process but a debilitating one for China. Early contact resulted in minimal European territorial gains, but by the late nineteenth century, while under the control of the nonChinese Manchu Dynasty, China faced national disintegration because of this outside threat. How this came to pass says much about China’s underestimation of the European powers and practice of the assumed virtue of patience. These two factors worked together to undermine Chinese strength and to allow the Europeans an opportunity to establish their first spheres of influence in China. The Portuguese led the way. Building on their successful exploration of the Indian Ocean, trader Rafael Perestrello reached China in 1516.32 Ming authorities restricted all such contact to the Canton area of southern China, and the Portuguese had to content themselves with occupying a few islands in this inlet sea. The area at the tip of this peninsula, Macao, represented the largest Portuguese settlement, and it became the first territory seized by a European power. The Chinese did not complain when Portugal built up the area as a permanent settlement and appointed a governor to rule the province in 1557. Instead, they walled off the peninsula from the rest of China in 1573, extending tacit recognition to Portuguese control of Chinese territory with the creation of a self-imposed border. The European presence in the Canton area grew slowly over the years, with Macao boasting a population of only 4,480 in 1830.33 It was a humble beginning, but it was the start of a permanent incursion into Chinese territory. The Spanish arrived almost at the same time as the Portuguese. Ferdinand Magellan’s expedition symbolized this congruence,

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In the early 1500s, Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan (depicted here discovering the path to the Pacific Ocean), who sailed under the employ of Spain, became the first European to discover a route in which ships could circumnavigate the globe. Thanks largely to Magellan’s discovery of the Philippine Islands, Spain was eventually able to establish an official trade relationship with China in the 1570s.

because he was a Portuguese captain in the employ of Spain. Magellan died in the Pacific in 1522, but not before he succeeded in bringing what would become the Philippine Islands to the attention of Spain. Once established there in 1565, Spain looked to exploit its gains in Latin America by trading with China. This it did successfully, sending silver from its mines in the New World to China in exchange for silk and spices. These interactions remained informal until a Spanish sortie destroyed a large Chinese pirate force of more than 62 ships menacing Manila in 1574. In doing so, the Spaniards earned the gratitude of Ming China, which had been hunting this force of pirates in their own right. The following year, official contacts were established and Spain secured trading rights at Xiamen and Fuzhou, located on the mainland opposite Taiwan.34

Early Contact

The Chinese noted the arrival of the Europeans but simplified these contacts by making little effort to distinguish one from another. They considered all such individuals barbarians. In fact, although people of numerous European nationalities collected on their shores, the Chinese bothered with only the most general classifications. Dutchmen and Englishmen they collectively referred to as “Red Hair,” and they grouped the Portuguese and

The Manila Galleon Trade The first extensive contact between Europeans and Chinese occurred in the sixteenth century. As the Spanish settled on what would become the Philippine Islands after 1521, their commerce with China increased markedly but in an indirect manner. From the island of Luzon, the Spanish initiated the Manila Galleon Trade in 1565. This network of commerce sent silk, spices, and porcelain to Spain and Spanish silver into China. The silver came from the mines of New Spain, located in Mexico and Peru. Spanish officials in Latin America then transported the bullion on galleons—fast, heavily armed ships—from Acapulco, in present-day Mexico, to Manila, in what is today the Philippines. Once there, an overseas Chinese community of merchants offered prized possessions in exchange for the silver. Both sides profited, but the Chinese benefited most. The majority of Chinese operating in the Philippines kept their ties to the mainland intact so that much of the silver made it to China and enriched an already wealthy civilization. This was an irony of some significance given that the Chinese court and population shunned merchants as parasites and therefore dismissed them as an inferior element of society, creating an artificial social barrier. Despite the benefits, China was careful to confine contact such as that between Spaniards and Chinese to the seas of Southeast Asia. The Spanish intermittently made it to the Chinese coastline, but these arrivals were few and far between. In a very real sense, China managed to impose an arbitrary border between itself and these arrivals from Europe, and this boundary governed their interactions with Spain for many years. Even as other European nations slowly opened China for trade, the Manila Galleon Trade persisted and remained functioning until the early 1800s.

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Spanish as “Franks.”35 It was an expected reaction from a people who merely tolerated and did not accept European arrival. It also was a testament to their underestimation of the threat that these new arrivals posed to China. Such indifference would eventually exact a steep price from the Middle Kingdom. Early on, however, European contact seemed benign and manageable, as underscored by Chinese contact with the Dutch. They centered their trading empire in Java in Southeast Asia, but the Dutch did not ignore the Chinese market: They seized a Taiwanese stronghold from the Spanish in 1642. More than any other European power, the Dutch scrupulously observed Chinese customs and protocol, and this paid some immediate dividends. In 1644, their representatives offered tribute to the newly established Qing Dynasty, and they performed the full kowtow, which involved nine acts of full prostration, before the ruler. The Chinese rewarded them with safe passage to Canton every eight years. Hoping for more concessions, a similar mission reached Beijing in June 1667, and again the Dutch strictly observed protocol—only to see their trading privileges rescinded this time. Powerless before the fickle nature of their hosts, they made do by clandestinely trading in the Canton region.36 Trade remained limited, and war became the main point of contact between China and Holland. A Chinese renegade named Zheng Chenggong seized the Dutch outpost on Taiwan in 1662. A Dutch punitive expedition came that same year. They looked to avenge their honor and found a willing ally in the Qing, because Zheng was a holdout from the recently deposed Ming Dynasty. The Qing considered the threat serious enough to evacuate all coastal inhabitants in the area a number of miles inland in 1662, presumably to deprive Zheng of aid from a sympathetic population.37 They also attempted to coordinate their military activities with the Dutch, an unprecedented course of action given the foreigners’ barbarian status. Cooperation proved difficult to secure, and it was not until November 1663 that Dutch and Qing forces launched an attack. The allies inflicted some damage on Zheng’s forces at Xiamen

Early Contact

but managed more to alarm one another than to satisfy either party’s military goal. The Chinese witnessed a Dutch naval barrage in support of a land attack near Xiamen and realized just how dangerous their new ally was. The Dutch pushed for trade commitments from the Chinese in return for their help in battling Zheng but received no definitive answers. This rebuff raised their ire. They settled for a planned combined operation against Taiwan, but this went nowhere, either. Qing admirals desisted (refused to proceed) on two occasions because of bad weather, and eventually the Dutch lost interest in Taiwan, which they realized was of little use for trade. Instead, the Dutch operated near Macao, Xiamen, and Fuzhou.38 Shunted to the side and having to compete with the other European powers in these areas, the Dutch realized that the meager returns of this alliance served as a testimonial to Qing power and Dutch—really European—weakness. Trade was only one reason for European arrival on Chinese shores. Christian missionaries also came in small but steady numbers. For the most part, they pushed inland, leaving the efforts of establishing a secure European presence to traders. Given this cultural, as well as economic, assault—military force would come later—perhaps it is understandable that European encroachment met with Chinese rebuff. It was during this time that the Canton System developed. Europeans could trade only in specific areas near this city. Technically, they could not enter the city itself and they resided in 13 factories, or agencies, located just outside the city limits—one for each European power. The Chinese called them “Barbarian Houses.” Other restrictions existed as well. European merchants could interact only with 13 Chinese handlers or “hong merchants”—one for each house, although the number of agents fluctuated from time to time. As the only conduit for European goods, these individuals set prices and therefore wielded enormous power. Beyond aspects of trade, the Chinese imposed other restrictions. Europeans could stay in Canton for only six months of the year. They were forbidden to bring their wives or children

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with them.39 In constructing these new boundaries, the Chinese clearly thought in terms beyond trade and sought to restrict the cultural impact of the European powers as well. This was not as absolute an arrangement as it appeared, however. That China allowed trade at all testified to its weakness; it did not have the strength to entirely prevent this. Rather than admit such a limitation, China’s rulers retreated into their history and adopted an old practice. The Chinese treated the Europeans as tributary powers, much as they would any outlying territory. As such, the Chinese did not believe that they were interacting with equals. Instead, they suffered the presence of inferiors. On the other hand the Europeans failed to grasp this cultural divide. They insisted that they be treated as equals. The Chinese refused to take this step, and it was a point of friction between the trading parties to say the least. The limited contact allowed the Chinese to sustain this friction for some time. With the arrival of more Europeans from several different countries and growing trade demands, it became a hollow gesture on China’s part to forgive European powers that did not pay tribute because they came from lands so far away that they could not bring such payment with them.40 Rather, it became clear that China was not as strong as it thought and it came to understand that it could not shut out the new arrivals completely. The Canton System was a defensive strategy, and an imperfect one at that. Even more telling was the fact that the Canton System was never as closed or as rigid as the Chinese liked to believe. First, limited official contact could not obscure the unofficial contact that punctuated early European interaction with China in the form of piracy. Second, the Qing had allowed free trade to exist between China and the European powers for almost 75 years, from 1684 to 1757. Only after this did the Canton System come into place. Third, during the duration of the Canton System, from 1759 to 1842, China did not restrict trade only to Canton, as is usually believed. This physical restriction was difficult to maintain, and numerous holes plagued the supposed boundary. For example, the British used Macao in violation of a Chinese

Early Contact

Tea drinking became widespread in China in the eighth century a.d., but it was not largely exported until the eighteenth century, when the British cornered the market. By the early nineteenth century, England imported approximately 30 million pounds per year. Here, Chinese farmers harvest and prepare tea for sale.

law that forbade foreigners other than the Portuguese from trading there. Xiamen also became a trading center. The Chinese declared this port open only to Spanish shipping, an easy concession to make considering that Spain seldom used the port. Spain sent only one ship there between 1810 and 1830. British merchants picked up the slack and traded there on a regular basis under the Spanish flag, apparently without Chinese objection. Finally, smuggling persisted on a large scale and surfaced at trading posts up and down the Chinese coast.41 Despite China’s best efforts, European trade remained consistent, if modest in size. Given China’s passive participation in these activities, the European presence could not have been entirely unwanted, signifying the impermanence of the border that the Canton System imposed.

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From Macao, the Portuguese dominated European trade with China. Soon, other Western powers arrived and challenged this monopoly. The British, and later the Americans, were the most successful in this regard and the most successful in disrupting Chinese authority in the process. For England, China meant tea. From humble beginnings of only two pounds imported into England from China in 1664, the tea trade grew quickly: By 1785 England imported almost 6 million pounds of tea. The East India Company presided over this trade that averaged 30 million pounds per year in the early 1800s.42 This was England’s principal reason for trading in China, and the island nation superseded other European powers in terms of the volume of shipping from the Far East by the mid-1700s. The trade mostly benefited China. To secure Chinese tea, the British had to surrender silver bullion, because the Chinese imported few British goods. A trade deficit only furthered the pain of surrendering hard currency in exchange for transitory commodities. In short, the Chinese grew rich and the British more refined, given their enormous consumption of tea. It was not always a gentlemanly affair. England had gone to great lengths to gain access to the Chinese market. British traders supplied weapons to Zheng as he fought against Qing and Dutch forces in order to gain trading rights at Xiamen and undermine Dutch efforts in the region. Unable to make significant headway in Canton given the Portuguese presence at Macao, British merchants pushed for trading rights at Ningbo, south of Shanghai, in the mid-1700s, testing the limits of free trade in China. When the Chinese responded to the British efforts by officially restricting trade to Canton in 1759—and followed this up with outrageous custom duties in all areas but Canton—trade again centered on the southern port. Confinement did not mean compliance and, on two occasions, 1802 and 1808, the British physically occupied Macao as a response to Portuguese reverses during the Napoleonic Wars. Chinese protests that the British had seized Chinese territory, not Portuguese land, had to be settled by armed conflict in 1808. The British withdrew

Early Contact

after an indecisive clash with Chinese forces and after receiving a payment from the Portuguese.43 Clearly, England would not tolerate a subordinate position to other European powers when it came to the China trade. How long the country would tolerate subordination to the Chinese now clearly came into question. Legal questions further antagonized relations between the two parties. On the whole, the European traders who called at China’s ports were violent and reckless, sparking conflict between themselves and the Chinese. Chinese officials dealt with these problems swiftly and forcibly and usually with immediate execution. International incidents were inevitable, and one in particular greatly strained the relationship between England and China. In 1784, a British ship, the Lady Hughes, discharged a salute that accidentally killed several Chinese mandarins (public officials). The Chinese demanded the surrender of the gunner. The British eventually complied but only because the Chinese halted all trade with England. This man’s execution stunned Britain because the trial was thought to have lacked due process and the judgment was considered too harsh.44 Such divergence on legal matters underscored the existence of yet another aspect of the cultural barrier that dogged all trade relations. A similar legal problem complicated Sino-(Chinese) American relations. In 1821, a U.S. sailor named Francesco Terranova accidentally killed a Chinese woman. He threw a flowerpot in anger, because he believed that he had been shortchanged during a bartering session; the flowerpot struck the woman in the head. The Chinese demanded Terranova’s surrender but were refused. The Americans guessed that the result would be the execution of Terranova, something that they deemed much too severe given the circumstances. When the Chinese ceased all trade with the Americans, U.S. officials relented and handed over Terranova. The Chinese executed him after four days of legal proceedings.45 Thus, Qing representatives faced off against another Western power over the issue of legal jurisdiction and succeeded in having their way. If refusal to trade was immediately successful, the long-term ramifications proved more deleterious to Chinese

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interests. The Americans, like the British, wanted a more free system of trade and pushed strongly in this direction. Eventually, they would get what they wanted. It should come as no surprise that Americans and Englishmen found common cause in the waters off China. The merchants of both nations were ardent free traders, and they insisted on this right. The shared misfortunes when confronting Chinese law underscored the reality that Chinese trading practices offended the commercial sensibilities of both nations and also trespassed on their beliefs in individual rights.46 The friction was bound to increase as the Americans became more involved in trade with China at the end of the eighteenth century. Like the British, the Americans matched trade with a missionary presence. This drive also came late, not until 1830. It made little progress and was soon overshadowed by the pursuit of commercial interests.47 Despite the late start, the U.S. effort on both fronts allowed them to quickly make up the lost ground, and soon the United States was second only to England in trade with China. Oversimplification when it came to understanding their rivals caused the Chinese to underestimate the threat that these two powers posed. Because the British and Americans spoke the same language, preferred one another’s company, and shared the single-minded pursuit of trade, the Chinese grouped the American and British merchants together, thereby simplifying the threat. The Americans remained largely ignored until the early 1830s, when the Chinese looked to distinguish them from the British if for no other reason than to possibly pit the two nations against each other.48 When the Chinese did recognize the Americans as different from the British, they liked what they saw, focusing on the Americans’ ability to successfully separate themselves from England during the Revolutionary War. It was an example the Chinese hoped to emulate. It is important to stress that trade with China generated large profits and real commercial gain for the European powers, but in the grand scheme of things it was but a small part of trade revenue. British vessels that called at Canton numbered only 10

Early Contact

in 1751 and 24 in 1780. The British remained the most powerful presence, and their modest numbers dwarfed those of other powers. The Dutch managed only four arrivals in both years mentioned. Given the Americans’ late start, they suffered accordingly and only two U.S. ships arrived in Canton in 1787, three years after the first year of U.S. trade in China. Five years later, in 1792, six American trading vessels reached Canton.49 Smuggling would add to these small numbers for all parties involved, but the point is that, even though the trade involved very small numbers of Westerners and enriched a small number of businessmen, it affected many, many people. The greatest impact was the Western belief in the idea of trade in China, a conviction that afflicted Great Britain and the United States in particular. The potential of a great “China market” kept them coming back. In pursuit of literally dreamed-of riches in China, Westerners demonstrated a willingness to overcome any border the Chinese erected. Confined, bullied, humiliated, and chafing under the controls of the Canton System, the Europeans looked to change a practice that stood firmly as a barrier to what they labeled “free trade.” The persistence of these merchants paid off, and despite a series of official decrees that shut off China from the outside world, trade continued. If successful in defying Chinese wishes, the Europeans still had to contend with custom, and here lay the strength of the Canton System. Despite the reality of trade, the Chinese refused to believe that they could benefit from interaction with Europe. Therefore, Qing rules kept the contact to a minimum. Other barriers presented themselves. Culturally, Westerners never understood the inferior status conferred on them by the Chinese through the tributary relationship or the Chinese propensity to group them all as barbarians. Legal differences only furthered the divide and increased the stakes involved. For the Western powers, once China learned to treat them on an equal basis, increased trade would follow. When they found China unwilling to do this, they turned to force of arms to break down the barriers that stood in their way.

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4 Forced  Opening

Forced Opening

E

arly European contact with China reinforced prejudice on both sides. China remained convinced of its superiority; the barbarians had little to offer the Middle Kingdom. Chinese leaders also remained confident in their ability to repel or expel Europeans when necessary. The European powers, principally England, continued to demand more trading rights with China despite that nation’s refusal to compromise, and Britain became increasingly confident in its ability to secure trade by force of arms. Ultimately, the outlook on both sides ensured a military clash. When it did come, in the form of the First Opium War— so called for Britain’s refusal to stop importing opium into China—against China from 1839 to 1842, the conflict resulted in a series of defeats that Western armies inflicted on the ailing Chinese empire. In this round of confrontation, the British dictated a harsh peace that led to their permanent settlement at Hong Kong. Britain’s victory prompted a frontal attack by the European powers, which was designed to carve out more land and overcome China’s economic boundaries. Having secured at least some limited trading rights with China, the Europeans soon confronted a serious complication. Their purchase of tea, silk, and rhubarb produced a trade imbalance, because the Chinese purchased few European commodities in return. Precious metals made up the difference. For example, England’s principal trading company in Asia, the British East India Company, routinely filled its shipping destined for China with 90 percent gold and silver and only 10 percent goods. Consequently, silver and gold flowed into China from European vessels. This problem grew in scale so much that, during the years 1800 to 1810, the Chinese boasted a surplus that totaled 26 million taels of silver (each Canton tael, or bar, weighed approximately 37.5 grams).50 The West, particularly England—because it dominated this trade—discovered that, having penetrated one barrier that prohibited trade altogether, they confronted another that consisted of this deleterious trade relationship. It was a lopsided exchange that, as all European parties recognized, could not continue.

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Arab traders introduced opium to China in the early eighth century, but recreational use of the drug did not become extensive until the late seventeenth century. By the nineteenth century, the consumption of the drug, depicted here in an engraving of opium smokers at an “opium den”, was outlawed and anyone involved in the trade or use of the drug faced execution.

What reversed the imbalance came as a surprise. Opium had been introduced to China in the early eighth century by Arab traders. Its use as medicine gave way to its use for pleasure only near the latter part of the 1600s. Recreational consumption skyrocketed in China at this point, when the drug was smoked, instead of drunk as a stimulant. Soon, it infected every level of Chinese society, including the imperial court. By 1729, the Qing emperor had prohibited the sale and consumption of opium in an effort to address the problem of addiction. In 1796, another Qing emperor banned its importation and cultivation.51 The decrees did little good. In 1799, China imported 4,000 chests (a chest of opium contained 133 to 160 pounds of the drug). This number doubled after 1830. As widespread addiction took hold, the importation of the drug reached staggering numbers. By 1836, 30,000 chests were traded in Canton.52 The Chinese faced

Forced Opening

a national epidemic, its borders battered down by an unusual but effective agent. China recognized the danger and dispatched a trusted court official to find a remedy. Lin Zexu, governor-general of Hubei and Guizhou provinces, arrived with a mandate from the court to end the opium trade in Canton. He relished the opportunity, having previously pointed to opium use as a cancer slowly eating away at China. He also had successfully purged the drug from the provinces he governed, although he did so by issuing a harsh mandate. All persons involved in the trade and use of the drug faced execution. Addicts had 18 months to rid themselves of reliance on opium. Although he offered help to those afflicted, the remedy he prescribed remained extreme—death to those who could not end the habit. Still, no one could deny that Lin was successful in bringing opium use to an end in the provinces he governed.53 Lin believed that the opium problem had to be addressed quickly or China would soon be too weak to resist European incursions because of the ill effects of the drug. This belief spurred him to employ the same forceful actions when he arrived in Canton in March 1839. Fearing England’s retaliatory measures if confronted directly, Lin mainly targeted the Chinese side of the trade. His agents arrested 1,600 persons involved in the trade and confiscated 42,741 pipes and a modest 290 chests of the drug from them by May 1839.54 Smuggling continued, so Lin moved against the Hong merchants. The Europeans had to rely on the Hong merchants to trade any commodity in Canton. This tactic soon forced British traders to surrender a whopping 21,000 chests of opium. Proud of this success, Lin elaborately disposed of the drug by digging three large trenches that stretched to the sea. He then ordered his workers to dump the opium into the trenches, along with lime and salt, and to wash the contents into the sea. In a few days, this procedure was complete and the opium trade had come to an abrupt halt—as did the self-destruction of China’s borders, which is what the opium trade represented.

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Lin’s actions reconstituted China’s desire to restrict trade with Europe, and this soon provoked a military response from England. England fought to push addiction—which the opium trade promoted—although it stated that it looked to uphold England’s national honor and to defend its right to trade, as well as to protect British subjects and officials in China.55 In an odd way, they were right. The heavy trafficking of the drug had never been by design. Indeed, the East India Company limited production of opium to secure a high profit margin. When other growers of the drug in India also exported their supply to China, a price war began and opium ceased to be an expensive item. A moral loophole also existed. The company grew the drug, but it sold the product to private merchants who peddled it in China. In other words, the company did not push the drug. The private individuals engaged in the trade also did not feel any moral responsibility. They transferred the drug at sea to Chinese “merchants,” who bought the drug ashore. These Chinese traffickers paid a tax on the drug to port officials in the employ of the emperor. Such practices meant that all parties involved benefited from the sale of the drug but distanced themselves from the responsibly of its impact on Chinese citizens.56 It was a strange situation to say the least, an illegal drug openly smuggled into the country with no one party to blame. Still, it was hard not to fault the supplier—England. Chinese motives hardly withstood scrutiny, however. The court’s repeated moral stands against the drug did little good, pointing to a lack of will to enforce its edicts and an inability to enforce its laws. Either choice suggested weakness, a step the Qing Dynasty could ill afford. Only money galvanized court officials into action: They acted to curb the outflow of silver from China. Silver had become the medium of exchange used to purchase the drug, a development that greatly eased British trading fears when they took the lead in the overall trade among European powers in China in 1773. On the eve of the impending clash in 1836, England could boast of having sold $18 million worth of opium in China and purchased $17 million worth

Forced Opening

of Chinese tea and silk.57 The trade imbalance had been erased and China was now open to foreign incursion. The First Opium War opened China’s borders; an unlikely occurrence given that it was a war neither side wanted but could not avoid. Chinese court officials decried the moral degradation of the drug, in particular its impact on the army. They reasoned that addiction within military ranks was so rampant that if China did not act immediately it would find itself defenseless in the future. Most British officials in China agreed that the opium trade had become noxious in the extreme. For example, as the war talk increased, they noted with disgust that drug traders were brazenly saling up and down the entire Chinese coast in heavily armed clipper ships looking to import the drug.58 Only a series of misunderstandings could derail the seemingly agreedon purpose of ending the opium trade, and this is exactly what happened. This misunderstanding occurred at the top levels of negotiation. Lin, for all his impressive credentials as a scholar, failed to understand the situation in Canton. His heavy-handed approach only worsened his chances of successfully dealing with the problem. The British acquiesced to Lin’s demand not to continue to sell opium only after Chinese forces laid siege to the British community in Canton for six weeks. This immediate success was overshadowed by the fallout of this move. England now viewed the war not as a right to trade the drug but as a duty to protect its citizens from unlawful detainment. Indeed, only at this point did the opium trade become widely known in England. When it did, the public reacted to the mistreatment of British citizens, not to the immorality of the drug trade. One press labeled Lin’s detention of women and children an “unquestionable atrocity,” another “overt aggression.”59 Calmer heads in Parliament recognized the exaggeration but could do little to stem the push for war. Lin’s tactics had cost him the moral high ground in the eyes of the English public. Lin’s actions also tied the hands of a valuable ally, the ranking British official in China, Rear Admiral George Elliot. Elliot, who

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viewed the opium trade with contempt, received orders from London to protect the rights of English citizens. These instructions left him no choice but to act in defense of the opium traders. Predictably, he did so by half measures, devising a policy of mitigated force that only prolonged the conflict. In a final irony born of misunderstanding, this was far from his intention. Once conflict erupted, Elliot proposed to destroy the Chinese forts that protected Canton, a blow he was confident he could deliver successfully in a short period of time and with few Chinese casualties. With British superiority established, the issue of the opium trade could be addressed once again. Instead, London ordered Elliot to blockade the entire coast, a more uncertain goal that Elliot had little faith in being able to accomplish with his limited forces. In sum, war would come in the name of opium, although the underlying issue remained a contest to determine the viability of China’s ever-weakening borders and the influx of Western traders who were certain to follow. Fighting erupted near Canton in early November 1839— before any declaration of war—when the Chinese navy Lin had assembled in the area engaged a handful of British ships. The British quickly sank at least four Chinese junks and damaged many more with no loss of their own.60 Here came an ominous warning of Chinese military weakness. More evidence followed. Elliot’s force remained very small, consisting of 16 warships with 540 guns and 28 troop ships bearing only 4,000 soldiers.61 Its small size soon proved to be an asset. It possessed great mobility and while Lin prepared Canton for defense, the British sailed north to enforce the blockade and struck with impunity at various places along the coast. In each instance, British commanders took great care to curtail the fighting. For example, when landing troops at Zhoushan Island, near the mouth of the Yangtze River, the naval commander who coordinated protection of the land force used round shot instead of canister to minimize Chinese losses. The army commander showed equal restraint, collecting his soldiers in a swamp instead of populated areas to avoid any contact with Chinese citizenry, thereby

Forced Opening

47

As a result of its victory over China in the First Opium War (1839–1842), Great Britain not only helped open Chinese ports to foreign trade but also revealed how weak China had become. Several British vessels, including the Nemesis, are depicted here destroying Chinese junks during the war.

escaping confrontation.62 The British paid the price: Malaria soon debilitated much of the British ground force. Moving on, the British eventually reached Tianjin, within striking distance of Beijing, and an alarmed Qing court opened negotiations. Misunderstandings again served to prolong the war. The Qing court fired Lin in a move designed to placate the British, and Elliot agreed to pull his forces back to the south and enter into negotiations. Chinese officials reported his withdrawal as a great victory, and the Qing court became emboldened. As negotiations dragged on, Elliot realized that no peace was forthcoming. Because Parliament’s blockade strategy had failed, Elliot at last had the chance to employ his original strategy of a sharp blow at Canton, which he always had believed would bring the Chinese

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to their senses. Making skilled use of England’s first iron steamer, the Nemesis, his forces destroyed several forts that protected Canton and did not lose a man in the assault. He then withdrew and waited for a peace offer that never came. Beijing learned only of a Chinese victory, not a defeat. Two more times, Elliot attacked and met fierce Chinese resistance that could neither

The Chinese Navy The British navy’s defeat of the Chinese navy during the First Opium War (1839–1842) paved the way for a British victory. Although maneuverable and manned by experienced sailors, the Chinese junks suffered from glaring shortcomings that rendered them completely incapable of challenging British vessels. The Chinese ships were small, perhaps 100 feet in length. Even the largest Chinese vessel of 1,000 tons was smaller than the typical British battleship that displaced more than 2,000 tons and carried more than 100 guns. The standard Chinese junk carried an unspecified number of cannons, from 2 or 3 to 14, all deployed on an unprotected deck that left their crews exposed to enemy fire. A lack of standardization also beset Chinese ordnance (military supplies). Some large guns appeared on junks but never seemed to fire. They were so large that the British were certain that, if they did fire, the recoil would throw the weapon into the ocean. The most common gun fired a ten-pound ball, far too small to damage British vessels, and many a British sailor enjoyed watching Chinese fusillade merely bounce off the side of his ship. The gunpowder was of poor quality, and this meant frequent misfires or, worse, gun implosion. Perhaps understanding this limitation, most junks carried abundant small arms such as lances, pikes, swords, and even stones, completely useless when opposed by British forces that seldom approached the enemy. Even with these great limitations, the sheer number of Chinese junks could have posed a problem to British control of the sea, but there was no centralized command structure to coordinate an assault. Consequently, even in the most hostile seas, a single British vessel felt safe. The Chinese neglect of the navy proved to be a key failure, because it led to British—and more broadly, European—supremacy at sea that facilitated the creation of the foreignimposed borders that were so damaging to China.

Forced Opening

hold the forts nor inflict many casualties on the British. After each attack, Elliot held his forces in check and waited for an admission of defeat. However, the Qing believed that their forces had been victorious. At last, the British fleet drew up next to Canton and its soldiers seized the city. Part of the garrison—700 men—occupied hills near the city and soon found themselves the target of an irregular Chinese militia numbering more than 7,000. While the British soldiers held their own and sustained few losses, the Chinese militia withdrew into the city and Beijing was notified of another Chinese victory. Here, Elliot’s policy of mitigated force undermined his efforts. After each blow he delivered, Elliot withdrew his forces in the expectation of a Chinese offer of peace. Instead, Canton officials reported his forbearance as weakness to Beijing. Elliot’s strategy of a sharp direct attack had failed for reasons he could not grasp. The next year, England again tried to bring this conflict to an end and did so in dramatic fashion. A new commander, Sir Henry Pottinger, replaced Elliot and opted for a different military strategy. Pottinger withdrew from Canton and traveled north. In August 1841, the British again seized the island of Zhoushan at the mouth of the Yangtze River. They then moved to the mainland, occupying the trading port of Ningbo. The Chinese recognized that, from this position, the English could threaten both Hangzhou and Nanjing, two large and important cities. The English spent the winter at this location, and the Chinese planned a counterstroke. To remove the threat, the emperor dispatched an army under the command of a trusted cousin. This individual of limited military experience attacked the intruders at Ningbo in March 1842, but without success. The meager results were not for lack of effort on the part of the Chinese. Their desperate measures included sending rafts aflame down river hoping to set fire to British ships. When this strategy failed, men volunteered to swim under the enemy vessels and damage the hulls.63 Nothing came of this approach, either. Incredibly, one man suggested that the Chinese attach firecrackers to the backs of monkeys and

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throw them onboard the British ships. In this way, the animals might stumble into the magazine holds and destroy the ship. Chinese officers rejected the absurd idea, because they could not find any volunteers willing to pass close enough to the British vessels and release the monkeys!64 Land battles proved just as fruitless for China. The British repelled the Chinese attacks virtually without loss while killing hundreds of Chinese. Still, the English felt harassed enough to withdraw from the Ningbo area and concentrate their forces. This step, of course, meant that the Chinese commander announced a great victory to the emperor. Whatever the reality, the imperial family believed that its forces were successfully defending the country, a falsehood made possible only by the enormous geographic expanse of China that literally prevented the truth from filtering back to the court. Pressing on, the British regrouped and planned a new offensive to seize Nanjing. As a preliminary move, they assaulted the stronghold of Chapu, north of Ningbo, and here the fighting lost its comical aspect. Many Chinese fought to the death, and several thousand men perished. The Chinese survivors killed their wives and children and then themselves. It was a gory spectacle that shocked the British. They also had suffered unprecedented casualties in the Chinese theater of war: 9 soldiers killed and 55 wounded. Pottinger ordered the expedition to continue, and Shanghai fell without a fight. The English proceeded slowly up the Yangtze, delayed more by treacherous waters and sandbars than by Chinese resistance. In July, the English seized the last major obstacle before Nanjing itself, the town of Zhenjiang. Here they met the same fanatical resistance they had faced at Chapu, and with the same result: Thousands of Chinese were killed or committed suicide and British losses were negligible.65 It was another ugly scene and one that Elliot, at least, had always tried to avoid. Yet, when it came, Beijing at last realized its impotence in the face of British arms. It could not defend Nanjing and so the Chinese sued for peace.

Forced Opening

The damage the war caused was minimal and therefore insignificant in terms of loss of British lives and, for that matter, Chinese lives. Despite the bloody sacrifices in the final campaign, Chinese losses could have been much worse if not for British restraint. The peace that ended the conflict hardly inflicted debilitating terms on China; however, England demanded that China pay a large indemnity of $21 million and this was a painful burden to bear. In addition, the Qing Dynasty formally surrendered Chinese territory to England when it signed the Treaty of Nanjing in August 1842. The island of Hong Kong became the British staging area for its trade in China. Ironically, what turned into a prized British possession was only an afterthought to the peace that ended the First Opium War. Hong Kong had served as a bastion during the war, offering refuge to English citizens fleeing Canton and to opium smugglers awaiting the outcome of the struggle. This functionality was not enough to entice English officials to demand that China give up Hong Kong. Its value stemmed from the expectation that British territory could harbor its citizens safely and enforce British law. In fact, from Hong Kong, the British declared the opium trade illegal, although this did nothing to curb the trade, because neither British nor Chinese officials did anything to stop it.66 China then formally requested legalizing the drug as long as England regulated its trafficking. England favored legalization but declined to implement the policy because it did not want to accept the task of administrating the drug trade. Within a year, the opium trade was again flourishing, much as it had before the war. The acquisition of Hong Kong seemingly underscored that, despite its success, England still only nibbled at the edges of a great empire. The nation’s size dwarfed European incursions. Even with the forfeiture of Hong Kong, China—although weakened—remained intact. Recognizing this fact, England issued one more demand: the end of the Canton System of trade. Here lay the greatest cost of the First Opium War for China. Soon, five treaty ports serviced European goods instead of one. Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai joined Canton as ports

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of call for the Western nations. The adverse impact on China caused by the elimination of the Canton System of trade again is best measured in the drug trade. The opium trade quickly arrived in each port, and it reached staggering proportions. In 1855, more than 65,000 chests traded hands along the coast. It was legalized soon afterward, in 1858.67 Opium remained a sign of European intrusion into Chinese affairs, and this reality agitated the Chinese people. Canton became a dangerous billet for Englishmen, with violence erupting again in 1847 and persisting thereafter, and sparking a second Opium War in 1856. Both the Americans and the French followed England’s lead: In Shanghai, for example, they created settlements after England had done so.68 China indeed had been forced open, its economic borders overrun by European powers that now took a closer look at the ailing giant. China’s weakness stood plain for all to see. The great empire clearly faced an imminent threat, and no border, artificial or real, could protect it.

5 Facing National Disintegration

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C

hina discovered in the middle of the nineteenth century that the European threat was tangible. So shattering was this discovery that, within the Middle Kingdom, dissension among its people exploded in the form of the Taiping Rebellion. The Qing Dynasty weathered this storm, but it staggered into the 1860s looking for answers as to how it should continue to rule China. Despite a concerted effort to examine itself, China was unable to stop Western powers from seizing its territory. National disintegration loomed, worsening domestic problems that came to a head just as the European powers boldly set their sights on China proper. As the new century began, the Qing Dynasty was in ruins, ransacked from within as well as without, a weakness that was brought about by Western powers. The Qing Dynasty responded to the threat posed by the European powers with a mixture of adherence to traditional customs and recognition of the need to modernize. The combination of old and new is best seen in the country’s actions in the aftermath of the unsuccessful Opium Wars of the midnineteenth century. After much internal wrangling over what to do about China’s weakness in the face of European aggression, Chinese leaders acknowledged the technological superiority of their enemies and concluded that, to survive, China had to model itself after the West. It therefore strove to adopt these technologies and did so with some success, initiating a “selfstrengthening” movement that started in 1861 and continued until 1895. Military advancement received priority, and modern weapons, including the steamship—the weapon that Chinese observers deemed the chief tool that led to their humiliation in the Opium Wars—arrived. Wisely, the court decreed that arms and munitions were to be manufactured in China, and in 1865 Shanghai became home to a factory that produced guns, cannons, and ships. Other factories followed, most notably farther south, in Fuzhou, where, with French help, the shipyard produced 15 naval vessels.69 Chinese reformers also pushed for development of railroads and telegraph lines, as well as

Facing National Disintegration

mining operations on a large scale and a textile industry.70 China accomplished much during this time, but the question remained: Were these technological changes enough to compete with Europe? Significantly, the conceit that China needed nothing from the outside world had been discarded; China now acted to dismantle the cultural arrogance it previously had embraced. The Chinese could not do this completely. Ever the traditional power, belief in its ancient customs did much to undermine the reform efforts. Fearing that an influx of technology would also open the door to Western values, some of China’s leaders successfully impeded the development of new technology. For example, although the dockyards in Fuzhou produced a number of ships, detractors argued that none of them were on par with European vessels, an assessment that was true but overlooked the fact that such enterprises represented a good start to a homegrown Chinese navy. Despite this small success, critics pushed for an end to these projects. Court meddling at Fuzhou helped create crippling financial problems and infighting among its two French directors.71 Financial problems proved more debilitating and underscored the fact that China’s reforms at Fuzhou and elsewhere remained one dimensional. There was no foreign investment and no effort to accumulate capital other than a tentative attempt at land tax reform.72 A lack of funds created many problems, among them an inability to maintain what had been built. To try to overcome the problem of the cost of maintenance, the newly constructed ships were dispersed among several coastal provinces, leaving China without a unified navy.73 The folly of this move would be made clear soon, when China confronted Japan’s growing military strength. Ultimately, the adoption of foreign technology without a satisfactory infrastructure or long-term financial commitment meant that the Chinese may have actively sought to alter their borders in order to modernize, but they did so in only a limited fashion, and their reforms were only partially successful.

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As China advanced by half measures, European powers increased their poaching of Chinese territory and ate away at the national integrity of China. The initial blow came symbolically. European representatives to the Qing court no longer performed the kowtow in homage to the emperor. In response, Chinese officials kept these dignitaries waiting for hours before granting them a perfunctory interview in a pavilion reserved for the reception of tribute missions.74 One form of disrespect earned another. The result was that, even as China’s territorial borders came under assault, its leaders still embraced the kowtow as a way to express its perceived cultural superiority. Such procedural games could not hide the very real danger of partition that China faced from several European powers. Ironically, England now proved to be a valuable ally in preserving China’s national integrity. The British shift in policy stemmed from the belief that a dismembered China would deny British merchants the long-sought-after Chinese market, because other powers could control portions of Chinese territory. In truth, England had fallen victim to its own success. Having done so much to destroy the Canton System, it watched with much surprise and alarm as other European powers not only adopted the treaty port system (which opened China’s ports to foreigners) but used it as an advantage. To the north, Russia advanced on Manchuria. To the south, France wrestled Vietnam away from China. To the east, Japan intervened in Korea, first in 1874 and again in 1894. Japan’s success on both occasions proved that it was a power to be reckoned with in Asia. The reality of Japan’s growing strength greatly complicated China’s fate and its relations among the European powers. Nothing made this clearer than the war that Japan and China fought in Korea in 1894. Japan intervened to protect a Korean religious group, the Tonghak, from so-called Chinese tyranny in the area. After hostilities erupted in July 1894, the island nation quickly scored land and sea victories against Chinese forces. This left Japan in complete control of the peninsula. Additional military triumphs allowed Japan to move deep into Manchuria.75

Facing National Disintegration

Manchuria

Rangoon

By the late nineteenth century, China’s weakness was reflected in its inability to stop foreign nations from partitioning its territory. Russia, Britain, France, Japan, and Germany all had large spheres of influence in China; in fact, the European powers controlled 13 of China’s 18 provinces.

Wary of the reaction of the European powers to its expansive aims in northern China, Japan’s peace terms asked for only the Liaodong Peninsula and its key city of Port Arthur and, much farther to the south, the island of Taiwan. This circumspection

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proved warranted, because Russia, France, and Germany forced Japan to drop its demand of the Liaodong region under the threat of war. In the end, Korea won its independence, although Japan kept a close watch. In addition, China agreed to pay Japan a huge indemnity of more than 200 million taels and to cede Taiwan.76 The loss of the tribute states of Manchuria, Korea, and Vietnam exposed a nearly helpless China to the world. This encouraged the European powers to acquire new cities and provinces, this time within China itself. In the aftermath of the 1894 war, Russia successfully demanded the right to build a railroad line across Manchuria and later occupied the strategic locale of Port Arthur. In response to this Russian move, Germany grabbed the port of Tsingtao in Shandong Province. To offset both of these powers, England added the city of Weihaiwei, opposite the new Russian stronghold, to its landholdings in China; it then occupied 200 square miles surrounding Hong Kong. In like fashion, France seized the metropolis of Canton and Japan moved to the mainland opposite Taiwan by grabbing the city of Xiamen. The establishment of spheres of influence soon followed in each area: Russia in Manchuria, Germany in the province of Shandong, France in what it labeled Tonkin, Japan in Fujian Province, and England, most grandiosely of all, staking out a vague claim to the entire Yangtze Valley by announcing that it would not welcome any other power in the area. Of China’s 18 provinces, 13 now fell under European control.77 This is a remarkably high number, and foreshadowed a move toward the imminent dismemberment of China. China’s efforts at modernization had proved insufficient to stop European encroachment, and so too had its aim of using the European powers against one another to forestall this end. Why this tactic proved unsuccessful is more difficult to explain. China had correctly deduced that competing economic interests drove the powers apart. At first glance, dividing China may have appeared enticing to the imperialistic parties, but this was not true. England had hoped to trade throughout all of China

Facing National Disintegration

and therefore opposed its partition. Similarly, Germany’s recent commercial gains in the region ensured that it would not take the next step and attempt to divide the country. France and Russia appeared to be the most predatory of the powers. Russia aspired to use political dominance in the country to curb economic competition, and French interests centered on lending and investment. In each case, partition could advance the economic aims of the country.78 Ultimately, the unpredictability of the Western powers doomed the Chinese strategy of playing one power off the other. Russia concluded that the partition of China would impede its longterm goal of absorbing more Chinese territory, so it ultimately opposed dividing the country. This did not prevent it from forming an alliance with France, a country that continued to favor partition. England, far from backing Chinese national integrity, encouraged Japanese gains in order to curb German economic ambitions on the mainland. It was a strange combination because the attackers acted both to preserve China and to establish their own spheres of influence that undermined the country’s territorial integrity. One more hand remained to be played in these competing games of international power, and this involved the United States. Always insisting on its lack of interest in acquiring Chinese territory, as the century came to an end, the Americans formalized their position diplomatically. President William McKinley authorized his secretary of state, John Hay, to issue a series of Open Door Notes to the great powers, the first in September 1899. In these statements, the United States asked for guarantees against trade discrimination. The intent here was openly economic. Only a rejuvenated China could thwart the threat of dismemberment and preserve a united country that offered a gigantic commercial market. More than this, combating the threat of imperialism revealed the moral and material uplift of goodwill toward China always present in Western views of that country. Now, the United States

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embraced this sentiment, which was a forerunner of things to come.79 Of course, the chief shortcoming inherent in the notes was that they lacked punch. The inability and complete unwillingness of the United States to support its aims with military force reduced the notes to mere diplomatic talk and no doubt explained the apparent acquiescence on the part of the European powers to America’s moral stand. The impact was more tangible, however, and some gains were made. First, the Open Door policy appeased an American public that decried the abuses suffered by China at the hands of the European states. Second, it offended no one country by asking for assent from all nations. By distancing the United States from the other powers, the notes did act as a gentle prod to the great powers to preserve China’s national integrity. Last, the notes did not preclude the use of force. No matter its public stand, the McKinley administration privately did not rescind its right to grab some territory if it deemed this action necessary. As the president put it, “May we not want a slice, if it is to be divided?”80 The notes became the official policy, but more aggressive tactics were always under consideration. Overall, Hay’s notes did much to position the United States diplomatically in the middle of the land grab for China and therefore at the center of the dispute over its arbitrary borders. Chinese officials certainly took notice of this U.S. action. Such official pronouncements encouraged a succession of court officials to test the anti-imperialist doctrine of the United States. Perhaps the United States could now be added to the powers curbing the aggressive actions of Russia and France? The Qing court feared the imposition of political borders by the West and hoped that the differing conceptions of how these new borders would work out on Chinese soil would be a key advantage and save China from partition. Chinese efforts to court American favor produced little in return because, at this time, China’s internal volatility came into play and overtook these matters of diplomacy. The Boxer Rebellion ended much of the diplomatic discussion between

Facing National Disintegration

In response to increasing foreign incursion into China, many Chinese citizens supported a secret society—the “Boxers”—that attempted to rid China of these predominately Western influences. The rebellion, which began in 1899, never earned the full support of China’s empress, Cixi (depicted here), and was crushed by a combined force of seven European nations and Japan.

China and the great powers. A strong belief in the traditional ways of ancient China was never discarded by the masses or, as it turned out, by the ruling dynasty. As the nineteenth century ended and humiliations at the hands of Western powers accumulated, anger peaked throughout the country. The Qing Dynasty keenly sensed this popular mood and felt threatened. On one

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hand, leaders feared that such popular unrest could turn against their rule for failing to protect China and thereby violating the Mandate of Heaven—a concept that legitimized the rule of Chinese emperors. On the other hand, perhaps this anger could be directed against the hated barbarians. Still, too overt a reaction against the European presence would spark further wars and, if

The Empress Dowager Poor leadership greatly contributed to the Chinese inability to stop the Western powers from carving up China. No figure bears more blame than the Empress Dowager Cixi, who ruled the Qing Dynasty for 48 years. She was the mother of the ninth emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Tongzhi, a weak ruler who died at the age of 19. However, even during Tongzhi’s reign, Cixi managed to make herself the power behind the throne through cunning and shrewd political skill. After Tongzhi’s death in 1875, she continued to rule as regent on behalf of her three-year-old nephew, Guangxu. This practice had deep roots. She was a favorite of Tongzhi’s father, Emperor Xianfeng, who had allowed her to read incoming correspondence and discuss policy matters with him. It therefore was not a great surprise that this woman managed to have herself named coregent, alongside her son, when her benefactor died in 1861. Obviously capable, she plotted to extend her regency indefinitely and managed to do so by dominating her son and nephew so that she, in effect, ruled China from 1861 to 1889. She oversaw everything, deciding court matters from behind a screen in deference to Chinese custom that shunned women’s involvement in political matters. Even when her nephew came of age, she ordered him into seclusion. The court obeyed her orders, making her the de facto ruler at the time of the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901). During her reign, China witnessed some hard times, including the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the country’s effort at self-strengthening, and, of course, the Boxer Rebellion. When she died in 1908, the Qing Dynasty was teetering on collapse and most male observers blamed her for the fall. As a woman, she was an easy target. China’s demise at this time grew out of deep-set problems, however, not the least of which was the Western powers and the arbitrary borders they had imposed on a hapless and helpless

Facing National Disintegration

these wars resulted in more defeats, they could produce a further loss of Chinese territory, allowing Western armies to create the arbitrary borders that Qing officials sought to prevent. It was a delicate situation to say the least, and when the public mood crystallized into a powerful military front self-labeled the “Boxers,” the time to taken action had arrived. Naturally, the Qing refused to do this and played both sides, neither denouncing the Boxers nor overtly endorsing them. Instead, the Empress Dowager Cixi, ruling behind the scenes, very slowly moved the court from expressing official displeasure with the Boxers to releasing public decrees that sanctioned their aggressive and violent tactics. At the end of 1899, she complied with the foreigners’ request to remove Yuxian, governor of Shandong Province and one of the Boxers’ biggest supporters. In January 1900, however, the court issued a decree that backed the Boxers when it announced that those training for what it called self-defense should not be considered bandits. Then, in May of the same year, the court made its sympathies toward the rebels clear when it ordered provincial officials to act with caution when disciplining Boxers. In the following month, Boxers destroyed the rail line between Beijing and Tianjin but the Court did not react.81 Once again, a moment of crisis had come to China and Europe stood poised to reap the benefits if it could crush the rebellion and hold the Qing court accountable. Self-deception again undid China. The Boxers got their name from the martial arts they performed that promised invulnerability to Western arms.82 Those who had studied the West scoffed at this notion and preached caution. Ambitious court officials, anxious to secure a more prominent role for themselves in government and to avenge China’s repeated setbacks, saw much virtue in the movement. Peasants, farmers, teachers, and other commoners made up its ranks, and a red sash identified these partisans. Already hungry because of looming famine and facing more hardship with the flooding of the Huang Ho River in 1898, the growing numbers of discontented and desperate Chinese mixed with the usual elements of criminals and thieves

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to form a group that the Chinese labeled, in complimentary fashion, the “Fists of Righteous Harmony.”83 Undoubtedly, the Boxers capitalized on a unique Chinese asset—people. Under the threat of Western control, China merely helped to combine what could have been competing interests into one movement to produce a spasm of violence within its citizenry. Soon, the West would learn that their influence in China would have to be established at the cost of thousands of Chinese lives. A few random acts of violence signified the growing popular unrest. Boxers ransacked many churches, a hated symbol of barbarian influence, and killed several missionaries as well as Christian converts. Acts of sabotage and vandalism increased. Throughout Shandong, German soldiers on patrol in the interior of this province faced harassment and were the targets of snipers. Europeans now sensed the danger and retreated to their city strongholds. As the Empress Dowager bided her time and did nothing, the Boxers grew bolder. The murders of a Japanese official first and then of a German foreign dignitary in Beijing spelled out the danger for all to see. The Chinese population, if not China, had declared war on the Western powers. Centered in Shandong and in neighboring areas, the Boxers soon flexed their muscles. European diplomats quickly found themselves cut off in the capital and facing an eviction notice signed by the empress herself. The Boxers, supported by regular Chinese troops, turned back a foreign relief column of 2,100 men headed to Beijing from Tianjin in early June. When Tianjin exploded in violence a short time later, the foreign powers responded by taking the Dagu Forts located on the coast and guarding the approaches to the city. This act emboldened those who favored the Boxers, and the court declared war on the foreign powers on June 21. Boxers now poured into the capital and laid siege to the foreign diplomats. There, 450 soldiers, 475 civilians, 12 foreign ministers, and 2,300 Chinese Christians banded together to fight for survival and await reinforcements. Relief came 60 days later: A multinational column of 20,000 soldiers from eight different countries marched from Tianjin to Beijing

Facing National Disintegration

and entered the capital city in triumph on August 14, 1900.84 The relief of the foreign delegation in the capital broke the spirit of the Boxers and, after suffering casualties that probably numbered several thousand, they retreated into the countryside from which they had come. The Qing court now had to make peace. The empress fled the capital but in a conciliatory gesture authorized Li Hongzhang, governor of Canton and someone who had opposed the Boxers, to represent China. With the immediate danger receding into the background, the Western powers renewed their rivalries against each other. Germany demanded a harsh peace and even favored the destruction of Beijing. Conversely, the Russians pushed for a conciliatory policy, hoping to endear itself to China and, in this way, use Chinese friendship to help them retain their already large land holdings in Manchuria. The British fell in line with the Germans to forestall Russian gains in territory. The Japanese, although deeply suspicious of Russia, favored that country’s policy of dealing kindly with China to gain Chinese favor in its own right in order to offset Russian ambitions. France announced that it had no designs on Chinese territory and that it did not desire a breakup of China. The United States adopted the same position as France with the release of a second note that reaffirmed its Open Door policy.85 Ultimately, Western demands coalesced into the 12 articles of the Boxer Protocol, signed by all the warring parties on September 7, 1901. In this agreement, China agreed to pay a huge indemnity of 67 million pounds (450 million taels) to the great powers. The victors sentenced the worst offenders to death or banishment, a fate that befell approximately 100 people. In addition, the Chinese had to erect a statute in Beijing to each of the 231 foreigners killed in the rebellion. This humiliation led to others, such as the demand that China send apology missions to Germany and Japan and the permanent stationing of foreign troops in and around the capital.86 The peace settlement revealed much about China and the foreign powers. The empress, who had done so much to spark

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the rebellion, escaped punishment. Clearly, the foreign powers needed an individual compliant to their wishes to affirm their territorial rights and, in the wake of the rebellion, a chastened empress logically would be this person. She retained her throne largely at the behest of the great powers. China would not be partitioned by its enemies, and the empress returned to the capital with a display of majesty in January 1902. This arrangement signified that all parties involved hoped to restore China to the way it was before the Boxer uprising. Such wishful thinking ignored the reality that the Chinese people, if not their ruling dynasty, would continue to resist any borders imposed on the country by outside nations. Moreover, propping up imperial rule in China indicated that the Western powers underestimated the depths of despair to which the Qing Dynasty had fallen. As a pawn of the West, China was discredited at home and lay prostrate before the great powers. In the years to come, China would be faced with more turmoil and hardship as the country entered a new century.

6 Two Chinas

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S

taving off the Western powers in the early 1900s did not bring stability to China. From the wreck of the Qing Dynasty came internal unrest on a monumental scale. A brief flirtation with a republic quickly gave way to internal discord that encouraged various warlords to compete for large chunks of China, creating yet a new set of fluctuating borders. World affairs did not offer China a reprieve at this time, either. On the contrary, as the country struggled internally, the Western powers again sought to take advantage. In this case, the Japanese empire presented the greatest threat to China. Once World War II ended, the external threat from Japan subsided, leaving China’s borders intact for the most part, except for the old European strongholds of Macao and Hong Kong. Unfortunately, China had to endure another painful internal struggle for power complicated by the emergence of the Cold War in the wake of world war. This global struggle would create a new border between the mainland and Taiwan that has left China divided from 1949 to the present. Disunity beset China in the aftermath of the 1911 revolution, an event that brought an end to the centralized rule of the Qing monarchy and initiated a period of warlordism in republican China. Eventually, two groups surfaced as competing rivals for control of China in the 1930s and 1940s: Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, and Mao Tsetung’s Communist Party. These groups had been battling each other for control of China for many years, starting as far back as the early 1920s. One of many factions attempting to wrestle power from the Kuomintang, the Communists turned out to be the most successful. Of course, success came only after an extremely long period of conflict, as the two sides confronted each other from 1927 to 1949. It was an extended, debilitating conflict. Weakened from within, the Chinese could not hope to expel the foreign powers that had divided their country in the late nineteenth century, nor stop the renewed efforts by Japan in the 1930s to seize even more territory.

Two Chinas

Mao Tse-tung founded the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 and quickly moved to challenge the Nationalist Party for control of China. The two groups coexisted for more than two decades, but after World War II, Mao’s forces drove the Nationalist forces, led by Chiang Kai-shek, out of mainland China.

Chiang had the first opportunity to try to overcome this turmoil when he inherited Sun Yat-sen’s revolution after the revered leader died in March 1925.87 A few years later, Chiang embarked on the unification of China, a nation now openly divided among various warlords and Western overseers. By 1927, Chiang’s efforts to achieve national unity climaxed with the start of the “Northern Expedition.” Chiang marched at the head of the Kuomintang army and moved from the southern part of the country to the north in an effort to unify the entire

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nation. He proved unable to attain this goal and instead settled for establishing himself as the political head of a fragmented country. He remained in no more than nominal control of the Chinese nation.88 His effort to reconstitute China’s borders had fallen short but still offered hope that China could heal its internal woes and then eliminate the Western-imposed borders in the near future. While Chiang made himself a symbolic hero of China at the head of the Kuomintang Party, Mao embarked on his own career. Mao joined a burgeoning Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1920s. Initially working with the Kuomintang, Mao and the other Communist leaders increasingly found themselves at odds with Chiang’s forces. Tensions between the two sides escalated into open conflict in Shanghai in April 1927, a battle the Communists handily lost. This defeat only helped Mao. In the wake of this blow, Mao successfully asserted his leadership of a fragmented CCP in 1934, when he helped lead the surviving Communist forces on their famous “Long March” out of Guizhou Province to the city of Yan’an in northern China. This feat saved them from annihilation by Kuomintang troops.89 The stage was now set for these two men, Chiang and Mao, to challenge each other for the control of China. Because Japan’s invasion of China greatly complicated the situation, once again, Western powers played a decisive role in Chinese affairs. Already occupying Korea and Taiwan, Japan slowly expanded its territorial conquests on the mainland, first in Manchuria and then in China proper, in the first few years of the 1930s. By the late 1930s, Japan had seized China’s northern capital, Beijing, and advanced southward, reaching the western mecca of Shanghai in 1937. Japan’s seizure of Chinese territory threatened the entire country. If Japan continued its assault, China faced disintegration and quite possibly subjugation. Japan’s militarism in China was upsetting to some countries, but the ambivalent response of the United States to Japanese aggression typified that of other major world powers. The

Two Chinas

administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt bolstered Chiang financially in the hope of helping him prolong China’s resistance. At the same time, the United States continued to trade with a powerful Japan, a nation that clearly had established itself as the dominate force in East Asia. As the 1930s came to an end, Chiang’s increasing inability to govern China effectively exposed this contradictory thinking behind U.S. policy. A predatory Japan carving up China offended American sensibilities, but not enough to move the United States to declare

The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere In the mid-to-late 1930s, Japan took the most definitive step of the great powers by establishing an arbitrary border in northern China and then advancing along the southern coastline. Its conquest of Chinese territory fell under the larger goal of the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan strove to create an empire in the Pacific that would render the island-state self-sufficient as it drew on raw materials in the region that it needed to sustain its industrial power. This aim first meant securing coal in Manchuria (in northeastern China). Once this was achieved in the early 1930s and as economic depression gripped the world, Japan directed its military offensive south and reached Shanghai in 1937. The sphere did not remain confined to the Chinese mainland but extended into the Pacific. This expansionist agenda resulted in war with the Western powers, which were so firmly entrenched in Asia. Japan, however, announced that it offered liberation to the suffering peoples of Asia by humbling the white race and establishing an Asia for Asians. In Japan’s case, a promise of racial equality quickly turned into an imposition of a racial hierarchy that placed Japan at the top. This encouraged war with other Asian nations, as well as the Western powers. Japan’s aim of creating a unified Asia ultimately propelled it into World War II, leading to the destruction of the Japanese empire largely at the hands of the United States. Despite this American success, China suffered greatly during this conflict as millions died defending their nation. However, in the process, it engaged and helped defeat an enormous Japanese army of occupation, which allowed the Middle Kingdom to take some pride in the Allied victory in the Pacific.

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war on Japan.90 The U.S. response mirrored that of the other treaty powers. Although disturbed by Japanese expansion into the key areas of China, not a single nation did anything about it. Japan’s actions, and the inaction of the Western powers, all but eliminated the spheres of influence that divided China at the turn of the century. Japan now occupied a dominant position that it could not have imagined attaining 30 years before. With U.S. efforts to encourage Chinese nationalism at this time, China remained alone in its fight against Japan. Chiang’s initial resistance to Japanese aggression gave way to the primacy of drawing additional powers, notably the United States, into the war against this Asian country. Once other Western nations were involved in a global battle, Chiang reasoned, he could direct his full attention to the elimination of Mao’s Communist Party. Confident in the international community’s ability to defeat Japan, Chiang fought World War II with this end in mind. To Mao, Chiang’s acceptance as the legitimate leader of China by the United States, before, during, and after the war, remained a bitter example of continued Western interference in China’s internal affairs. Still, he first would fight the Japanese to preserve the national integrity of China; then he would deal with Chiang once and for all. The bizarre Xi’an Incident that occurred in December 1936 is a testament to the steadfastness with which Mao clung to these priorities. Chinese Communist agents intervened to free Chiang, who had been kidnapped by his own troops and was released only after agreeing to the condition that he would lead all Chinese forces in a war against Japan. The civil war could wait.91 Chiang consented and his captors released him, but his questionable sincerity belied any reversal of policy. As he fought World War II, Chiang did so with the defeat of the Chinese Communists as his priority, and he would try to use the United States as much as possible to achieve this goal. When the United States completely defeated Japan and emerged triumphant from the war in August 1945, it ended Japanese aggression against

Two Chinas

China, vindicating Chiang’s strategy to a large extent. The Americans punctuated their overwhelming power by the use of two atomic bombs in Japan that same month, bringing the conflict to an abrupt end. It was unclear how much the U.S. victory in the Pacific helped Chiang, however. In fact, it may have weakened him more than any other factor. By waiting for outside forces to defeat Japan, Chiang allowed the Communists to control territory vacated by the Kuomintang. Mao’s forces then organized peasant resistance to the Japanese, thereby gaining the allegiance of the Chinese people. In addition, in retreating before the Japanese onslaught, Chiang purposely gave ground, but he soon found that he had isolated himself in a remote area of southern China. In effect, his “wait and see policy” had marginalized his importance to the war in China while allowing the Communist forces a chance to lead Chinese resistance. The Communists took full advantage of this opportunity. Thus, despite the U.S. participation in World War II, Japan’s assault on China greatly weakened Chiang and the Nationalists, contributing to their decline after 1945.92 U.S. military strategy in this theater of war also served to weaken Chiang’s position. China had figured prominently in U.S. plans during the early stages of the war, including the goal of arming Chiang’s armies to defeat the Japanese. Internal feuding on the part of the Chinese, Japanese success on the mainland due to Nationalist ineptitude in resisting their advances, and the U.S. ability to use its “island-hopping” strategy to swiftly move from island to island across the Pacific all undermined this approach. Ultimately, the U.S. military commitment on mainland Asia remained modest in the extreme and consisted of limited aid to Chiang, a detachment of U.S. soldiers deployed in Burma under the command of General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, and a small U.S. air army in China commanded by an equally dynamic figure, General Claire Chennault of the famous “Flying Tigers.” For the United States, China became a peripheral battlefield and Chiang deserved only enough attention and aid to keep him fighting the Japanese, nothing more. The

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Americans may well have done the lion’s share of the fighting in defeating Japan, and this reality did little to help Chiang shore up his position in China. Each U.S. general tried to assist China’s beleaguered armies that faced Japanese forces, causing them to develop differing opinions of Chiang. Stilwell’s repeated denunciations of Chiang for incompetence and vacillation that rendered Chinese arms ineffective contrasted sharply with Chennault’s persistent optimism that Nationalist China could field an effective army and play a key role in defeating Japan. Stilwell and Chennault proved to be such rivals that the U.S. high command recalled Stilwell in late 1944. Obviously, the dispute rested in the person of Chiang and for this reason Stilwell met defeat. Because Roosevelt considered Chiang the only figure capable of leading China and because the president needed a resurgent China as part of his postwar vision of the world, Stilwell became a necessary political casualty.93 A policy that endorsed Chennault’s view did not dispel the reality that Chiang’s control of China was very much in question, however, and so too was his ability to stop the Japanese. The possibility of a defeated China disturbed U.S. military leaders; too many Japanese soldiers would then be available to defend their home islands. To prevent this from occurring, in 1944, as the war against Japan reached its climax, U.S. officials considered arming the Chinese Communists so that China could better resist a Japanese offensive aimed at knocking China out of the war. The idea of American ties with Mao’s forces alarmed Chiang more than the advancing Japanese, and he did everything in his power to impede this interaction. He was successful. Nationalist troops prevented U.S. aid from reaching Mao’s forces in northern China, and Chiang raised enough political clamor within diplomatic channels to end U.S. contact with the Communists as well. Despite Chiang’s success in stopping U.S. aid to the Chinese Communist troops, he lost as much as he gained. U.S. State Department personnel came away from the experience con-

Two Chinas

vinced of Mao’s prowess in resisting the Japanese and aware of Chiang’s deliberate vacillation in the face of the enemy. Many of these “China Hands” foresaw the success of Mao in the aftermath of the war and advised those in Washington, D.C., to reach accommodation with the likely victor if U.S. policy sought a unified China.94 Still hoping to foster a united front in China to fight the Japanese, Major General Patrick J. Hurley, America’s ambassador to China from 1944 to 1945, attempted to get Nationalist and Communist leaders to form a coalition government. When this failed, Hurley expressed as much disdain for Chiang as he did for Mao. Mao returned this sentiment in kind, referring to Hurley as “the clown.” Hurley’s frustration with the situation surfaced once Chiang rejected the deal the U.S. ambassador had worked out with Mao, causing Hurley to proclaim that the Communists were the “only real democrats in China.”95 When Hurley resigned his position in November 1945, however, he offered no such praise of Mao’s soldiers. Instead, he vilified career men within the U.S. State Department, whom he believed opposed U.S. policy in the Chinese theater of war.96 In assigning blame to the “China Hands,” Hurley deflected the failure of his diplomatic mission from himself onto the State Department, which was a dubious assertion. Herein lay the root of a confused U.S. policy toward China after the war. The Chinese Communists and Nationalists resumed their civil war after the defeat of Japan. Their struggle for the control of China had only been pushed to the side during the world war, and it resumed with full vigor in 1945. Once again, foreign nations dictated much of the struggle within China’s political borders. Having entered the war in the Pacific a few days before it ended in August 1945, the USSR had swiftly advanced into northern China and Korea. Soviet armed forces, therefore, assured the USSR at least some influence in determining China’s fate.97 Not surprisingly, U.S. policymakers tried to limit Soviet influence in northern China and, although not without some reservations, the administration backed Chiang to achieve this

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purpose. U.S. planes transported many of his soldiers to the northern regions of China expressly for the purpose of having Japanese troops surrender to Nationalist forces and not to Communist units already in the area. In addition, the United States took the bold step of landing two divisions of marines in China in the area of Tianjin, ostensibly to secure the surrender of the Japanese troops in the vicinity. Such a maneuver had the added advantage of thwarting the gains of the forces of the USSR and the Chinese Communists, something immediately recognized by all parties.98 Although the United States had recognized Chiang’s weakness in 1944, it had begun to overlook this weakness by 1945. By the end of that year, the United States had sided with Chiang, even if reluctantly, in the Chinese civil war to forestall what it perceived as a growing threat from the USSR to manipulate China’s political borders. Another U.S. effort to broker peace between the two warring parties in China came in early 1946, when President Harry S. Truman sent General George C. Marshall to negotiate a settlement between Mao and Chiang. In doing so, the Truman administration again asked Chiang to accept a coalition government with the Communists. Marshall met with the same frustration and failure as Hurley had, eventually admitting the futility of the effort in January 1947.99 Marshall blamed extremists on both sides, vilifying Communists and Nationalists alike, and when he stepped away from the negotiating table, an artificial, ideological boundary descended on U.S.–China relations, creating a border that grew more rigid as the Cold War intensified. U.S. mediation efforts complicated and delayed the fighting, but they came nonetheless. Even before Marshall’s departure, the opposing sides readied themselves for a renewal of their internal feud. From the start, things went badly for Chiang, testifying to the emptiness of his “wait and see” policy. Although he had more troops and better arms, the Nationalist forces had clearly lost the support of the population. Whole units were defeated by the advancing Communists. Chiang’s position deteriorated so rapidly after 1946 that, only two years later,

Two Chinas

Chiang Kai-shek, pictured here with U.S. General Claire Lee Chennault in 1945, was recognized by the United States as the legitimate leader of China. However, Chiang did not have the support of the Chinese people, and that, coupled with his incompetence, ultimately led to his defeat at the hands of the Communists.

he had lost control of all of northern China and was making emergency plans to occupy Taiwan. He did this at the end of the following year. The Communists resumed their offensive in 1949 and quickly overran the remaining Nationalist positions in the southern portion of the country.100 By early 1950, Mao’s armies had conquered all of China except Taiwan. The fallout from this turn of events sparked a political battle in the United States that had a direct impact on China. As the Cold War loomed, the Marshall Mission came to be viewed in this prism. On one hand, those who defended the administration noted Marshall’s tremendous efforts to broker a peace, but they now wished to wash their hands of China. Chiang’s incompetence and his government’s corruption led to Communist gains

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in China. How else could one explain the generalissimo’s precipitous collapse? On the other hand, those critical of the administration believed that the Marshall Mission had created a lull in the fighting that enabled the Communists to recover from a Chiang offensive and then make use of captured Japanese munitions that the Soviets had turned over to Mao’s forces to defeat Nationalist armies. In short, the Truman administration’s diplomacy had weakened Chiang’s control of the mainland, causing his defeat. Chiang’s defenders in the United States argued that the same could not be allowed to occur in Taiwan and that the United States was now obligated to defend the island from a Communist assault.101 It was a stark picture: Mao the radical Communist extending tyranny over a reluctant China, Chiang the rabid antiCommunist defending a free China and the only hope of liberating the mainland from Mao’s despotism. Neither description was realistic. Forgotten was Mao’s heroic defense of China during World War II. By late 1949, the idea that Mao was the future of China was considered unappealing, leading to the fall from grace of the U.S. State Department personnel who had played a hand in “losing” China. Also forgotten were Chiang’s flirtations with Communism in 1924—when the up-and-coming general briefly visited Moscow—and his autocratic tendencies when he was the leader of China.102 Moreover, Nationalist China’s complete inability to defeat any enemy did nothing to diminish Chiang’s credentials as a foe of Communism. Such was the power of simplification inherent in America’s ideological division of China. A closer look revealed that there was little difference between the warring parties in China. Mao’s war with Chiang always had been a struggle for the dictatorial control of the entire nation. By 1950, both men controlled a part of the prize, the mainland in the case of Mao Tse-tung and Taiwan in the case of Chiang. Mao planned to complete his conquest of China by removing Chiang from his island stronghold, even if that step meant challenging the United States. Chiang now looked to play up fears

Two Chinas

of Communist aggression to compel U.S. assistance in securing his hold on Taiwan and possibly in returning to the mainland to reclaim China. In other words, the internal war over China continued, although it was complicated by the Cold War. A chief outgrowth of this global conflict was the bifurcation of nations along ideological lines of which China became an early example. One was Mao’s Communist state, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), on the mainland, the other Chiang’s small nation, the Republic of China (ROC), on Taiwan. The assumed ideological borders now created two Chinas. Few would have guessed at the time that this division would remain in place for more than five decades.

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7 On the Front Lines of the Cold War

On the Front Lines of the Cold War

I

t was regrettable that China emerged in modern times as the epitome of the larger global struggle that confronted world leaders after 1945. The initiation of the Cold War in the aftermath of World War II pitted the two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, against one another. The ideological gulf that defined these two powers resonated in the fragmented nature of China. The autocratic Chiang Kai-shek sought refuge on his island stronghold of Taiwan. Communist Mao Tse-tung sat triumphant on the mainland, plotting his next moves, which included the termination of the civil war with the capture of Taiwan. The eventual goal of the complete restitution of China symbolized the vitality of the Communist threat to those who resisted this end, the United States in particular. That Mao would not be able to meet these goals had much to do with U.S. power and China’s role on the front lines of the Cold War. Here lay a legacy of more violence and dissension within the country and along its borders, with increasingly greater ramifications for the rest of the world. After the Communists achieved their victory in 1949 and created the People’s Republic of China, they claimed to control the Chinese nation. Complete success eluded them, however. Consolidating their control of the mainland took some time and entailed not only taming a population now very much attuned to violence but also the pacification of Tibet. Moreover, the outlying territories of Macao, Hong Kong, and, of course, Taiwan, remained beyond their grasp. Mao’s commitment to restoring what he and many Chinese considered the rightful borders of China enmeshed the new nation in the unpredictable and high-stakes games of Cold War politics. How far would the United States go to defend Taiwan? What would be the response of European powers to Chinese advances on Macao or Hong Kong, areas that Mao rightly considered Chinese territory? Mao could not say for certain, but he was determined to find out. In this way, the old problem of Western interference in Chinese affairs remained and continued to profoundly influence China’s development

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for the next 20 years, oftentimes landing China at the center of the Cold War conflict. After Chiang’s collapse on the mainland, Mao’s China became a stalwart enemy of the United States, one that Americans considered no more than a tool of the USSR. American insistence that China was a Russian satellite proved to be self-fulfilling. It left Mao little choice but to “lean to one side” and tie his fortunes to the USSR, which he announced he would in a speech in June 1949. For a time, the relationship worked for Mao given the supposed ideological solidarity of the Communist bloc and his great fear of Western powers’ ability to inflict damage on China. The Russians were needed for security reasons, and Mao accepted Joseph Stalin’s division of the world into two camps, socialist and capitalist. Despite these broad points of agreement, Mao’s relationship with the USSR was stormy from the start. Economic aid and security guarantees came only with the price of granting the Soviets continued special privileges in Manchuria, a move clearly reminiscent of the unequal treaties of the not too distant past.103 At least one prominent figure within the Truman administration tried to capitalize on the tension that lurked between the Communist allies—Secretary of State Dean Acheson. He made one final effort to gain favor from the Chinese, an attempt to accept Communist China’s ascendancy and the eclipse of Chiang’s fortunes. Acheson announced this policy in the “White Paper,” a review of recent U.S.–China relations published by the State Department in August 1949. The White Paper concluded that Chiang had frittered away U.S. aid during and after World War II. The Kuomintang government’s inefficiency and corruption left its leader incapable of resisting further Communist aggression. Therefore, Chiang’s ineptitude justified a U.S. policy of no longer supporting him with aid of any sort. In effect, the White Paper blamed Chiang for the “loss” of China. The secretary of state believed that China’s deep-seated nationalism would prevent it from becoming a

On the Front Lines of the Cold War

satellite of the USSR; however, American refusal to cooperate economically and diplomatically with Communist China would only force Mao into alignment with Stalin in the USSR. Dealing amiably with the PRC might help drive a wedge between these two Communist countries.104 With this rationale and despite political opposition at home, the Truman administration, with Acheson in the lead, seemed well on its way to abandoning Chiang in favor of establishing closer ties with Mao. In so arguing, Acheson accepted that Taiwan would again become part of China and that the border that separated the two areas was to be temporary and undefined. Acheson’s was a sensible policy, but he underestimated the political climate at home and the belligerent nature of Mao’s government. Political opponents in the United States denounced U.S.–China policy as weak in the face of Communist aggression. Mao boldly and openly aligned China with the USSR. Only a spark was needed to solidify the gulf between the opposing sides and disrupt Acheson’s drive toward accommodation. This came in Korea. The clash between North Korea and South Korea erupted in June 1950, and quickly turned into an international conflict as first the United States and then the United Nations came to the defense of South Korea. Committed militarily in Korea, the Truman administration also interposed the U.S. 7th Fleet between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland to forestall a possible PRC offensive to seize the island. U.S. aid to Chiang accelerated as well.105 In response to what it perceived as an overt Communist threat in Asia, therefore, the administration indeed reversed itself and abandoned its White Paper. Chiang again became an ally and Mao assumed the role of intractable foe. Likewise, Taiwan shifted from a territory deemed part of China—and its fate an internal Chinese affair—to a key outpost of freedom in blunting Communist aggression in the accelerating Cold War. This political qualification now pushed the United States into a policy that acknowledged two Chinas and thereby helped solidify the arbitrary border between the mainland and Taiwan.

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Korea became a battleground between democracy and Communism in the fall of 1950, when UN and U.S. forces entered North Korea in hopes of unifying the country. China quickly retaliated, however, because Mao Tse-tung believed the UN–U.S. forces would continue into China. Mao’s counterstrike, depicted on this map, quickly drove U.S. and UN forces from North Korea, and the border between the two nations was eventually established at the 38th Parallel, just north of Seoul.

On the Front Lines of the Cold War

Mao played a large part in securing this outcome. He returned American animosity in kind, describing the United States as the great enemy of China and Communism. This belief led him to prepare to intervene in Korea. U.S. defensive measures first stabilized the front in South Korea, and this success paved the way for a UN counterstroke in the fall of 1950. This came in dramatic fashion in October at the port of Inchon, near Seoul, leaving the Americans and their UN allies with a decision to make: Should they enter North Korean territory and unify the country? Mao watched closely and nervously, convinced that American ideas of unification were veiled threats of conquest directed at Beijing. Once the Americans were in control of North Korea, would China be next? Unwilling to take this chance, once U.S. and UN forces advanced north, Mao ordered a huge Chinese army into Korea. The first clashes came in late October and the heaviest fighting in November. By year’s end, Mao could look proudly at his neighboring state to the east: Communist armies chased UN forces out of North Korea. American recovery came shortly thereafter, and the fighting deadlocked roughly at the 38th Parallel, the political demarcation line that has separated the two Koreas since the nation was partitioned into a Communist-led North Korea and a democratic-led South Korea in 1945. Both sides took stock of the situation and had much reason to despair. For the PRC, the Chinese soldiers had met and defeated a more technologically advanced enemy, but the cost in blood and money had been immense. Coming as it did a mere 10 months after the establishment of the Communist state, Mao’s intervention now placed much stress on the new nation. As for the Americans and their allies, a deadly war in Korea had never been anticipated, planned for, or desired. They, too, suffered loss of life and the hardships of war. Still, the Korean War dragged on into 1953 before all parties involved could agree only to a cease-fire, not to peace. Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presidential race in 1952, and Joseph Stalin died in 1953—as a result, both sides believed that the dynamics of the Cold War could change. Recognition

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proved to be unattainable for the PRC during the Eisenhower presidency because of the belligerent actions of the PRC toward the United States and the new administration’s resistance to take this step. Still, recognition appeared at least possible at the outset of 1953, when tensions between the two foremost Communist powers again surfaced.106 The differences grew out of the war in Korea. China waged a war in its backyard, and in Mao’s view the USSR had done as little as possible. Economic aid remained modest, because Stalin’s deference to the West remained strong out of fear of military confrontation.107 Given the success of Chinese arms in Korea, Mao lost his fear of the superiority of Western arms and looked to lessen his allegiance and dependence on the USSR and to go his own way. Such a step proved momentous and contributed greatly to the eventual break between the two allies. The possibility that the United States and Communist China might reach an accord was real enough to rally those fervently opposed to American recognition of the PRC in the United States. In October 1953, the president received a petition signed by more than one million Americans that asked him not to recognize Red China. The list of names included 49 Congressmen, 11 governors, and a host of retired military officers, diplomats, and former Congressmen. Many business, religious, and labor leaders also signed the document. This “China Lobby” then set its sights on the UN and pressured lawmakers to draft an amendment that required the United States to withdraw from the UN if Red China were admitted into this body. Eisenhower opposed what he considered such a drastic move. He did, however, relent enough to allow the release of a statement that expressed Congressional opposition to the UN seating Red China, but he omitted any directive for automatic withdrawal of the United States from the UN if Red China were admitted.108 As the Americans bickered, a chance for better relations between the two countries vanished. U.S. resistance in this respect blunted the PRC’s drive to once again become a respected nation abroad. This aim transcended

On the Front Lines of the Cold War

any restoration of borders, because restoring China to worldpower status remained a goal not just of Mao but of most Chinese. Effacement on the world stage at this time certainly curbed this ambition, and the United States was mostly to blame for this fact, because it acted to isolate China diplomatically. It largely succeeded—so much so that, in the early 1950s, only about 20 countries recognized the PRC.109 Seating in the

The China Lobby U.S. policy in East Asia was greatly complicated by politics at home. In this arena, no participant was more important than the China Lobby, a multifaceted special interest group that enjoyed a long and colorful history that dated to the 1930s. As China tried to stave off Japanese aggression at this time, many Americans looked to Chiang Kai-shek as the only leader who could save China from fascism. The China Lobby got a big boost when Madame Chiang Kai-shek traveled to the United States in 1942 to capitalize on this American sentiment and procure aid for her embattled husband. Over time, the China Lobby matured into a more active group that included Chinese Nationalists, as well as U.S. politicians, businessmen, former military personnel, and activist groups, all sympathetic to the cause of sending U.S. aid to China to help Chiang maintain his rule. The early years of the Cold War infused the Lobby with a single imperative: supporting Chiang’s fight against Communism to keep China “free.” Chiang’s defeat on the mainland at the hands of Mao Tse-tung galvanized the group. When the Truman administration hesitated to support the generalissimo, activists within the lobby became strong opponents of U.S. policy in Asia and raised enough clamor to help keep some U.S. aid flowing in the direction of Chiang even as his fortunes worsened. In the 1950s, crisis in the Taiwan Strait on two occasions again pushed the group to activism, which included sending a petition to President Eisenhower to demand that the United States not recognize Red China. It was signed by one million Americans. To this group, the boundary that separated mainland China and Taiwan was indeed an arbitrary border that they vigorously supported as central to a strategy that anticipated Chiang’s return to the mainland to reconquer what he had lost.

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UN would not come until 1971, again mostly because of the Americans’ uncompromising attitude. Instead, Chiang’s regime on Taiwan represented China in this world body. Yet, U.S. policy was often counterproductive. Most significant, when the United States, the USSR, France, Great Britain, and other countries met to decide the fate of Indochina at the Geneva Conference in April 1954, China attended as well. Given its geographical proximity to Vietnam, China could not be ignored. Its presence at the conference meant de facto political parity with the great powers, the exact end that the United States sought to avoid. It was a key moment—one that emboldened Mao. Taiwan now took center stage in the Cold War. In September 1954, the Chinese Communists started to shell the islands of Jinmen and Mazu, Kuomintang territory located close to the Chinese mainland. Chiang’s forces occupied both islands and used them to raid the territory of the PRC. In ordering this attack, Mao certainly tested American resolve to defend its client state, but he also tested his relationship with the USSR. With a new premier, Nikita Khrushchev, in the Kremlin, Mao hoped to sound out the loyalty of the USSR. He did not like what he learned. Khrushchev made it clear to Mao that he would not allow the USSR to be pushed into a nuclear confrontation with the United States. China would have to act on its own if it went too far. Mao again found that Soviet fears were exaggerated. He publicly downplayed the consequences of a nuclear confrontation by denigrating the countries equipped with nuclear weapons as “paper tigers.”110 Both superpowers understood this categorization as dangerous and as wishful, if not delusional, thinking. Some ambiguity was at play here, however, because Mao believed that he understood a key aspect of the developing Cold War. The advent of nuclear weapons had deadlocked the two superpowers, and they could not directly confront one another. This meant that so called “liberation movements,” or Communist fronts in other nations, could be supported aggressively given that the West was unlikely to use nuclear weapons— its chief deterrent—against such a threat.111 The Communist

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President Dwight D. Eisenhower (right) and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, are pictured here shortly after Dulles’s return from the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in September 1954. Both Dulles and Eisenhower supported the use of armed forces to protect Taiwan from invasion by Chinese Communist forces.

world possessed a key advantage, and Mao intended to capitalize on it to the fullest by aiding these movements in other countries and restoring China’s credibility in the world in the process. The first test of this policy came in the Taiwan Strait, but the results would prove inconclusive. The United States had much to do with this outcome given that its own position on nuclear war involved much ambiguity. Those in the Eisenhower administration feared that a Communist assault on these outposts foretold Mao’s intent to seize Taiwan. As the crisis escalated, the United States had to decide whether to help Chiang defend these islands. To repel any attack, the administration planned to rely on its “massive retaliation” strategy and resort to using nuclear weapons.112 This strategy was an outgrowth of its “New Look”

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policy that put a premium on nuclear deterrence to cut military spending. Now this approach to containing Communism faced its greatest test in Asia. Hoping to avoid war and in this way to avoid having to make the decision to use nuclear weapons, Eisenhower embraced some ambiguity of his own. He sought a resolution from Congress to grant him the authority to commit the armed forces of the United States to the defense of Taiwan “and such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands.” At the same time, the president and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, met in private and concurred in their willingness to use nuclear weapons. A few days later, Dulles went public and in a radio and television broadcast stated that the United States possessed “new and powerful weapons of precision which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers.” Eisenhower held a press conference on March 16 at which he said, “I see no reason why they [nuclear weapons] shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet.”113 Would they use these weapons to defend Jinmen and Mazu? The administration did not make this point clear. The Senate overwhelmingly endorsed the Formosa Resolution on January 28, 1955, giving Eisenhower the authority to keep the Chinese Communists guessing about his intentions. The Eisenhower administration also acted to solidify its relationship with Taiwan. On December 2, 1954, in the face of the continued standoff over the islands, the United States and Nationalist China agreed to a mutual defense treaty, each pledging to meet the “common enemy” in the event of an armed attack on one party. This treaty committed the United States to the defense of Taiwan, although it left the U.S. commitment to the defense of the offshore islands unclear. Such an agreement did not mean that the administration embraced Chiang. In fact, Dulles remained suspicious of Chiang and what he considered the generalissimo’s efforts to draw the United States into the Chinese civil war. As insurance, Dulles acted to keep the United States free of any entanglements by completing a supplementary

On the Front Lines of the Cold War

exchange that made it clear to Chiang that he had to check with the United States before taking military action.114 Once again, the United States supported the arbitrary border in the Taiwan Strait as a necessity in the Cold War, but it imposed some limitations on its relationship with Chiang with an eye on stopping short of validating the permanent division of China. It was a final ambiguity in U.S. policy, one born of the fluid nature of China’s borders. As the two sides tested each other’s resolve, the world watched nervously, fearing the worst. The Eisenhower administration offended its allies by its willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend what most experts considered insignificant islands. Likewise, the Chinese Communists alarmed the USSR with their recklessness in provoking the United States. Moreover, the American alliance with Taiwan had been an unwanted outgrowth of the crisis from Mao’s point of view and even from the perspective of many of those who orchestrated the treaty within the United States. Eventually, both sides agreed that diplomacy intended to secure a cease-fire was the best choice. This came to pass in mid-1955. Mao contented himself in having proved that the fate of Taiwan was an internal issue left over from the civil war and not a Cold War battlefield.115 He certainly demonstrated that China would have much to say in any settlement concerning the island. This was progress given China’s inability to defend itself in the face of Western aggression since 1840. Still, Mao had seized on the issue of China’s changing borders to win a Cold War battle, but in the process he had advanced a contradictory position. His decision to use a Cold War setting to make the point that the territorial integrity of China should not be at play in the Cold War made little sense. Fortunately for Mao, the Americans had their own contradictions. During the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration pursued the additional aim of using a firm U.S. response in the Taiwan Strait to possibly win concessions from a Soviet Union unnerved by the reckless actions of Communist China. Eisenhower and Dulles hoped that a too-dependent China

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might cause a split in Sino-Soviet relations, as Chinese aid requirements of the USSR—including defense obligations— would “burden the communist alliance beyond endurance.”116 In this respect, Eisenhower’s hard line toward Communist China was intended to allow him some leeway to deal more amicably with the USSR and perhaps lessen global tensions.117 Of course, such pressure on a Soviet ally created issues of credibility that limited Soviet options. The USSR could hardly just watch as a fellow Communist nation faced incriminations from the main capitalist power.118 Despite tensions within the Sino-Soviet bloc, American actions toward Taiwan only helped keep the alliance together. Given the uncertainty that surrounded the resolution of the first crisis, it is not surprising that a second crisis over the control of the islands erupted several years later. In August 1958, the PRC again opened fire on the islands and provoked a confrontation with the United States. Renewed U.S. threats of nuclear retaliation in the event of a Communist assault on Taiwan were met with Soviet warnings that the USSR would retaliate if the Americans used such weapons.119 Once again, a standoff was at hand. Fortunately, the crisis fizzled out as the year 1958 came to an end. This crisis ended much like the previous one but with more long-term consequences: Both superpowers recoiled from their ties to the two Chinas. The Russians backed away from Mao while the Americans openly spurned Chiang and even sought accommodation with the PRC. In effect, the two superpowers had backed away from the arbitrary border they had helped create. As before, better relations between the United States and China failed to materialize despite the fact that, by 1960, Communist China’s relationship with the USSR had at last reached the breaking point. That the United States could not reach an accord with the PRC even after witnessing an open split between the two socialist powers spoke to the deep animosity between the two nations. For the United States, China remained an implacable foe, and the Americans put forth few peace efforts. Despite its

On the Front Lines of the Cold War

problems with the USSR, the United States continued to serve as China’s chief enemy, viewed as an obstacle to its goal of achieving great power status. This impasse spoke to the reality that, in the midst of the Cold War, the contest over China’s borders had coalesced around defining China as a great power, with the United States seeking to deny this end and the PRC striving to surmount this opposition. That mainland China would eventually achieve this goal and do so with the help of the United States revealed the irony of the situation, particularly given the fact that Taiwan remained independent of the mainland. The rigid lines of the Cold War were blurring, and China stood poised to reap the benefits of this development, even if the fate of Taiwan remained very much in doubt.

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8 Putting the Pieces Back Together

Putting the Pieces Back Together

O

ver the past 30 years, China has succeeded in removing most of the barriers erected because of Western interference. In the 1970s, normalization of relations with the United States signaled China’s attainment of political legitimacy on the world stage. The economic ties with the outside world that followed in the 1980s reversed the defensive-minded Chinese position of preventing Western contact in favor of courting it. Economic gain came quickly and on a massive scale due to the elimination of this barrier. China cemented its position as a world power during the 1990s by actively seeking and securing the return of territory it considered part of China. This final barrier did not come down completely, given the lingering dispute with Taiwan, but even this issue could not derail the arrival of China as a key player in the twenty-first century. Diplomatic recognition came in two stages. First, U.S. President Richard Nixon traveled to China in July 1971, ending more than 20 years of no official contact between these two powers. It was an unlikely move given the man making the trip. Nixon had earned his status in U.S. politics as a fierce anti-Communist, and China had been a frequent target. That the president now agreed to deal with the reviled enemy in person signaled a shift in Cold War politics. Nixon reasoned that a China restored to its former position as a world power could benefit the United States. At last, the wedge theory (dividing the two Communist nations) was to be put into practice. China, openly at odds with the USSR, could now team with the United States and pressure the USSR to make concessions in the Cold War.120 The United States, laboring under the corrosive impact of its war in Vietnam, was in need of such concessions. Such a bold stand earned Nixon approval from around the world. It was a far cry from the United States viewing China as a satellite of the USSR and a big step toward admitting just how artificial the political boundary had been between the United States and China. Understanding Nixon’s previous hostility, the Chinese muted their view of the president to make the interchange possible. Mao Tse-tung toned down his anticapitalist rhetoric to seek an

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accord with the enemy. He knew that China would only benefit from the elimination of this political barrier between the two states. Greater interaction in the international community could lead to U.S. recognition of China and thus to UN membership. A subsequent benefit would be increased economic gain. Mao also hoped to end China’s isolation to help protect it from the Soviet threat, at this point deemed more dangerous than that posed by the United States.121 Last, if the PRC played a key part in world affairs, would Taiwan become isolated and a more vulnerable target? Easing political boundaries with its foremost enemy, the United States, could help make China whole again. Nixon understood the historical importance of his shift of position, and so too did Mao. Presiding over a united China would top all Communist achievements. This hope explained Mao’s willingness to tone down his rhetoric, which had been just as virulent as Nixon’s, and reach accord with the United States. The meeting lasted for a week and was positive, even festive. The two leaders announced the fruits of the proceedings in a document called the Shanghai Communiqué, released in that city on February 28, 1972. Nixon signaled to the USSR and North Vietnam that, in the larger Cold War struggle, the Americans had just neutralized a long-standing foe; they might even have gained an ally.122 Mao enjoyed the American acceptance of only one China, and Taiwan’s status as “China” lost the backing of its largest supporter. So important was the rejection of this arbitrary political boundary that, following the American lead, more than 100 countries rushed to accept China into the community of nations and restrict their relations with Taiwan.123 Perhaps only Nixon, a Republican with a reputation as a tough anti-Communist, could have initiated this shift in policy, but he was unable to complete this goal because of the political crisis of Watergate.124 When the president resigned in August 1974, the United States and China were talking but still trying to normalize relations. This task fell to Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, and then to a new president, Jimmy Carter. This was the second stage of recognition. After assuming the presidency in

Putting the Pieces Back Together

1977, Carter acted to recognize China. He faced pressure from the U.S. home front, in particular a Congress uneasy about abandoning Taiwan. It was an old fear that reached back to 1949. Carter stood this test well, willing to brave the uncertain political consequences at home, much like Dean Acheson had been willing to do in 1949. Normalization, he explained to Congress and the American public, did not mean the end of U.S. support of Taiwan. Military and economic ties would continue, but political changes had to occur. In December 1978, Carter publicly announced that the United States and the PRC had agreed to establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. In addition, the United States would break official relations with Taiwan and nullify the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the island a year later. It was a fine display of statesmanship and was recognized as such by the majority of the American people, who approved of the measure. Perhaps acknowledgement of the absurdity of a border that cordoned off almost one billion people carried the day.125 The Chinese celebrated recognition as a victory, and indeed it was one to a great extent. Still, China’s new leaders had had to ease American fears about the fate of Taiwan by offering assurances of only peaceful reunification and by tolerating the Americans’ continued commercial, military, and cultural ties with the island. These concessions were made in person when Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping visited the United States in early 1979. His aims of increased trade, gaining access to advanced technology, continued protection from the Soviet threat, and setting his own place in history to surpass Mao (who had died in 1976) in respect to normalization outweighed the importance of Taiwan.126 In short, the Chinese accepted the arbitrary boundary between the mainland and Taiwan just as the United States acknowledged it as this, an artificial border in need of revising. That these cross purposes now brought the opposing sides into greater harmony only spoke to the irony that often arises from such political boundaries.

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Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (center) meets with then-Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (right) and Vice Minister Chiao Kuan-hua in a meeting in New York, in 1974. Deng served as the de facto Premier after the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976 and was largely responsible for the economic reforms China made during the 1980s.

A larger prize smoothed over the inherent contradictions in establishing and removing arbitrary borders. After recognition in December 1978, economic gain for China followed on a huge scale. The trade grew from modest beginnings. In 1972, Sino-American trade totaled only $92 million. By 1988, the figure stood at $13.5 billion, approximately 10 percent of China’s overall trade. China’s trade with Japan grew as well, totaling 22 percent of all of its trade.127 In each case, the large volume certainly signaled emergence from isolation, but it also showed emergence from resisting such interaction. Now, China responded with its own Open Door policy, a self-proclaimed label and one reminiscent of the American expectation of free trade in China in the 1890s. Normalization, in fact, did bring an end to economic barriers. There were difficulties, of course, and China sustained a trade deficit for a number of years that it

Putting the Pieces Back Together

was unable to reverse until the late 1980s. Commerce with the United States provided the most dramatic example. By 1993, China could boast a $22-billion surplus in trade with the United States, overcoming an almost $3-billion deficit in 1980.128 The Open Door certainly has revisited China in the past two decades, but in reverse, because it was the Chinese who successfully battered down protectionist laws in the United States, gained most favored nation status from that country, and earned membership into the World Trade Organization. Numbers represented one measure of economic change but did not indicate the totality of the shift or of its dangers. The PRC now faced an influx of Western ideas and values, none more dangerous than democracy. This came through many sources, such as news, films, plays, music, and literature. People, of course, were the most important means of exchange: Foreigners now entered China in large numbers for the first time in 30 years. Almost 60,000 students and large numbers of scholars and officials, or delegates, left China and traveled abroad in a short time span. When they returned, they brought what they had seen with them.129 This cultural invasion proved to be a powerful catalyst for change that could not be ended by decree or law once it had started. Having always feared and rejected such an exchange with foreigners because of this very problem, China now struggled with the consequences of the lack of a cultural boundary between itself and the world. The greatest consequence given the sad outcome was the failed move toward greater political liberalization. A push for free elections, speech, assembly, and press threatened the CCP’s political values and its livelihood. Having initiated one series of changes with economic reform, China’s leaders now faced the task of curtailing what was not wanted, an open government. Students led the drive for greater political freedom and suffered because of it. A series of demonstrations centered in large cities across the country emerged in late 1986 and culminated in 1989 in a confrontation with the government in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. In the nation’s capital, student activism reached its

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peak in numbers, duration of protest, and defiance to the state. Ordered to disperse, the students became bolder, demanding contact with high-level government representatives who should hear their appeals for democratic reforms. After internal debate, the party adopted a hard-line approach and mobilized 300,000 soldiers. This force confronted 40,000 students and almost 100,000 other citizens and attacked on the evening of June 3, 1989. In seven hours, the army cleared the square with much death and destruction. Officially, no students or citizens died in the square, although the government reported that 23 individuals died in outlying areas. It also stated that the unrest claimed the lives of 150 soldiers. Witnesses and journalists reported at least 3,000 student deaths, if not more.130 The cultural impact of the Open Door clearly had a bloody price, indicating the hazards of eliminating long-standing barriers. The opening of China lost much momentum in the aftermath of the massacre at Tiananmen Square. Many nations recoiled in shock and dismay, and China looked to heal its internal wounds. One way to do this was to deflect blame from the government onto an outside foe, and in this way China rediscovered its desire to unify the country and so establish its power and legitimacy.131 Taiwan stood as the chief target, and for good reason. Here lay a rich prize. The mainland had only recently discovered the virtue of modernizing its economy through opening its borders, but Taiwan had embraced this goal and these means many years before.132 The result was that it became an economic powerhouse in a relatively short period of time. After 1952, the island averaged an annual economic growth rate of approximately 9 percent. Its GNP soared from $1.2 billion in 1952 to $14 billion in 1974. In 1973, it registered a trade surplus of $682 million. It continued this success in all categories in the 1980s and 1990s.133 More impressively, it could point to this success despite the end of U.S. economic aid after 1965, the loss of diplomatic status as an independent nation in 1979, and the continued politi-

Putting the Pieces Back Together

cal uncertainty of its future, given the frequent and persistent demands for reunification coming from the mainland. By the 1980s, Taiwan clearly stood on its own, complicating the issue of what constituted China by supporting the border between itself and the mainland. The expectation that economic vitality could lead to greater independence had been promoted by design. Nationalist leaders resolved to succeed on Taiwan where they had failed on the mainland—the instrument of which was agricultural reform. Success here helped bring prosperity, but industry proved to be the key to long-term success. The heavy machinery introduced in the 1970s complemented the light industry already in place. In that same decade, the island’s leaders completed a vast public works program made possible by its heavy industry, a program that ensured the continued growth of that industry with the improvement of ports, airports, and transportation lines.134 The Nationalists supported their autonomy and rejected the mainland’s calls for reunification. Once Taiwan lost U.S. recognition in 1979, the PRC offered a settlement that it deemed lenient. Taiwan could retain its present economic and social systems and retain a degree of autonomy, including its army. In a sense, the PRC offered a historically minded settlement. Taiwan would revert to the status of an autonomous special region of China, much like other provinces in the past. Taiwan rejected the offer because Communism threatened free enterprise. The two systems were so opposed to one another that Taiwan was prepared to fight to remain separate and pointed to its army and continued assistance from the United States as evidence that it would be successful in such a battle. They also looked to a historical barometer, recalling that two past efforts at collaboration with the Communists had ended badly for the Kuomintang.135 Taiwan tempered its stand to some extent over the years. In 1989, Taiwan’s leader, President Lee Teng-hui, acknowledged that the Republic of China represented only the island and a few neighboring territories. Gone were claims to represent all of China. He also suggested that negotiations with Beijing were

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possible if the PRC agreed to implement political reforms, consider Taiwan a political entity of equal status, and renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait. This meant one country but two areas and two political entities.136 The arbitrary border still existed but was becoming harder to pinpoint. When the PRC rejected these criteria, Taiwan declared that unification was desired but that it understood it would take a long time to occur. Maintaining a separate Taiwan into the future again drew the ire of the mainland, which feared a drive toward independence. Thus, by 1992, the opposing sides had clearly staked out a border based on hostility, one that appeared too rigid to allow much interaction. This was not quite the case. Some contact went back and forth, and this border, like so many that China had erected in the past, proved permeable. By 1992, 5 million Taiwan residents had visited the mainland since 1987 and Taiwan’s corporations had invested $10 billion in the mainland. Trade with the PRC grew to more than $7 billion soon after it started in the mid-1980s, and Taiwan regularly increased this number and maintained a substantial surplus that reached $5 billion in 1992 and $23.5 billion in 2002. Naturally, cultural exchanges followed this economic interchange; this included scholarly, scientific, journalistic, athletic, and artistic representatives that traveled between the two areas.137 The arbitrary border remained in place: China labeled Taiwan a province; Taiwan saw itself as a separate political entity. Yet, at the same time, both parties argued that there was only one China. Problems continued, and another crisis escalated tensions in 1995. Lee Teng-hui visited the United States that year, and from Beijing’s point of view it was a step toward tacit U.S. recognition of two Chinas. That summer, China held military maneuvers in the strait, a clear effort to intimidate Taiwan’s electorate as it prepared for elections the following year. At issue was how the citizens of Taiwan viewed their future: as moving toward independence or as favoring reconciliation with the mainland. Lee continued his ambiguous stand and did

Putting the Pieces Back Together

Lee Teng-hui, pictured here with the Dalai Lama in 1997, served as President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 1988 to 2000. Throughout his tenure, the People’s Republic of China feared Lee supported Taiwanese independence, but in reality he was responsible for easing trade and travel restrictions to the mainland.

not choose a side, a position intolerable to the PRC. It again made a military display in the strait in February 1996 to try to undermine Lee’s position. These maneuvers became provocative enough to prompt the United States to send its naval forces to the area. American and Chinese diplomats were able to assure one another that there would be no invasion and no effort by the United States to influence the election. The crisis passed, and Lee was reelected.138 The old sore remained unhealed, although experts considered a Chinese assault on the island unlikely. Such an attack would disrupt China’s economic development, because it probably would weaken the CCP’s rule on the mainland, not to mention the problems the CCP would encounter once it was responsible for an additional 20 million citizens in Taiwan who favored democracy and seethed with contempt for their new rulers. The deadlock remains today, and so too does an arbitrary border

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created during the Cold War—one that has outlived the conflict. In a final irony, the Chinese maintain this border themselves, having had much practice given Western interference in the past. Frustrated by Taiwan, the PRC made other steps toward reunification and moved to bring Hong Kong and Macao back under its control. Here, it enjoyed success. The return of Hong

Taiwan Taiwan has historically been on the outside edge of China’s purview and integration with the mainland began only in the later years of the Ming Dynasty. For this reason, the arbitrary border between Taiwan and China enjoys much historical validity, complicating the current status of the island. Up to the early 1600s, Taiwan appeared inhospitable to outsiders, its rugged coast and treacherous seas discouraging anyone from braving the waters to explore the island. A hostile indigenous population heightened the danger. A few desperate souls took the risk, usually Chinese or Japanese pirates. Europeans arrived after 1600, and the Portuguese named the island Formosa, or “beautiful.” The aesthetics could not hide the reality. Only a few shipwrecked sailors and determined missionaries reached the interior, and seldom did they survive for long. Global events soon outstripped the natural isolation of the island. It was a prickly pear, to say the least, but its strategic location made it the ideal spot for a military base. Europeans, first the Spanish and then the Dutch, created permanent settlements in the north and south of the island, respectively. Ironically, Chinese settlers followed the European lead and settled near the European strongholds. The most famous Chinese resident was Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong. His descendants met defeat only after a massive invasion force won the island for the Qing Dynasty in 1683. Despite this formal occupation, the island remained ambiguous in its relationship with the mainland. A Qing decree soon forbade further Chinese immigration to the island. Many Chinese ignored the order, making Taiwan a frontier of sorts just off the Chinese coast. Its ambiguous status and the mainland’s obvious inability to control the island left the province a dangerous territory from which outsiders could take refuge and keep a close eye on the mainland.

Putting the Pieces Back Together

Kong in particular signaled the end of imperialism. China forced England to relinquish its control of the island when its 99-year lease that secured the surrounding territories expired in 1997; it had occupied the area for a century and a half. Arguably China’s greatest European foe, England yielded control of the island on June 30, 1997. It could do little else. A war to retain the area was absurd, given that geography obviously favored China’s armies that lay nearby on the mainland. Moreover, such a battle would destroy the rich prize: Hong Kong was yet another area of China that had boomed financially and become a powerful economic entity in its own right. If the British shrank from this step, so too did the Chinese. They did not want Hong Kong harmed, because its economic stature was an integral part of China’s return to world power status. Outright seizure of the territory did China little good either, because it would spark fear more than awe of the new China.139 What transpired was a compromise of sorts. The English yielded administrative control, but China guaranteed not to change Hong Kong’s economic and social systems for at least 50 years. This agreement had been reached in 1984, and China, at least to this point, has made good on its word, describing its relationship with the former territory as “one country, two systems.” With the return of Hong Kong and that of Macao on December 20, 1999, the Western-imposed borders that afflicted China after European arrival in the sixteenth century were gone. China had reestablished its borders and the pieces—except Taiwan—were back in place. Arbitrary borders indeed profoundly influenced China’s growth and emergence as a modern nation and, for the most part, they proved harmful to the country and its people. To argue that these borders prevented China’s resurgence until very recent times is problematic, however. Too many problems and challenges faced the country to assign blame so specifically. The creation of these borders certainly did not help matters, inflicting physical damage, of course, given the occupation of territory and sub-

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sequent economic loss when key areas fell under the control of foreign powers. There was also psychological trauma. China went from a state marked by resplendent grandeur to one characterized by acute impotence. Falling from such great heights was an epic humiliation, one very hard for the Chinese people to accept—let alone overcome. Having endured these border troubles, the Chinese can note with satisfaction the restoration of the whole of the mainland—which greatly strengthened its political position—and look ahead with pride. The long-sought-after goal of successful modernization speaks less to a skillful, if painful, adaptation to present realities and more to a certain inevitability that grew out of its own history. This force acknowledges inevitability of history in awarding China a rightful place of importance in the world but also notes its fallibility. How long China will maintain its current stature can now be pondered, as can the role of any future arbitrary borders that may visit this giant again.

Chronology & Timeline 1200 b.c. The Shang people emerge as China’s first dynasty.



221 Emperor Cheng seizes control of China and gives it his name.



b.c.

207–220 a.d. The Han Dynasty rules China.



220–589 The collapse of the Han leads to a period of decentralized rule known as the Six Dynasties.



618–907 The Tang Dynasty unifies China under Chinese control.



907–960 Another period of chaos, known as the Ten Kingdoms, descends on China.



960–1279 The Song Dynasty restores centralized rule of China.



1245 Friar Giovanni Da Pian del Carpini reaches the Mongol court in northern China.



1279–1368 The Mongols rule China, creating the Yuan Dynasty.



1295 Marco Polo publishes The Travels of Marco Polo, describing his 17 years of travel in the East.



1368–1644 The Ming Dynasty reasserts Chinese control of China.



1516 European sailors reach China’s shores for the first time when the Portuguese arrive looking for trading opportunities.



1601–1610 Jesuit Matteo Ricci serves as an advisor to the Ming court.



1644–1911 The Manchu establish the Qing Dynasty, marking the return of foreign control of China.



1663 Dutch and Qing forces unite to eliminate Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong.





1759–1842 The Manchu formally confine a growing European trade to the south of China with the Guangzhou system. 1784 Chinese officials execute a British sailor from the Lady Hughes after a gun salute from that ship accidentally kills several Chinese bystanders. 107

Chronology & Timeline

1793 Lord George Macartney’s diplomatic mission to Beijing on behalf of England fails to end the Guangzhou system of trade.



1821 U.S. sailor Francesco Terranova is executed by Chinese authorities after he accidentally kills a Chinese woman.



1839 Lin Zexu arrives in Guangzhou to stop the opium trade.



1842 The Treaty of Nanjing ends the First Opium War as England defeats China.



1861–1865 China embarks on its “self-strengthening” movement to adopt Western technology to better defend the country.

1245 Friar Giovanni Da Pian del Carpini reaches the Mongol court

1516 The Portuguese reach China’s shores

1842

1245 1295 Marco Polo publishes The Travels of Marco Polo

108

1759–1842 The Manchu confine European trade to the south of China

1842 The Treaty of Nanjing ends the First Opium War

Chronology & Timeline

1894 Japan defeats China in a second war in Korea, signaling the emergence of Japan as a power in the Pacific and further advertising China’s weakness.



1899 The U.S. government issues the Open Door Notes, demanding the preservation of China’s national integrity in the face of growing Western “spheres of influence” in China.



1900 The Boxer Rebellion erupts as “Boxers” attack the Western powers in Beijing.



1901 China agrees to the Boxer Protocol, ending hostilities and underscoring its weakness.



1911 The Qing Dynasty collapses, ushering in a republican era of government in China.

Late 1930s Japan takes control of northern China, including Beijing

1899 1899 U.S. government issues the Open Door Notes

1972 U.S. President Richard Nixon travels to China

1997 1949 Communist armies drive Chiang Kai-shek out of China

1997 England yields control of Hong Kong

109

Chronology & Timeline

1925 Sun Yat-sen dies, further destabilizing China and leading to the “warlord” period.



1926 Chiang Kai-shek leads the “Northern Expedition” to unify China under the control of the Kuomintang party.



1934 Mao Tse-tung emerges as the head of the Chinese Communist Party after leading Communist forces to safety on the Long March.



1937 Japan’s military aggression against China reaches Shanghai, threatening to end Chinese resistance.



1941–1945 U.S. generals Stilwell and Chennault assist the Chinese during World War II.



1945 Major General Patrick J. Hurley’s diplomatic efforts fail to bring about a settlement between Chiang and Mao.



1947 General George C. Marshall’s diplomatic mission to China fails and civil war resumes.



1949 Communist armies drive Chiang out of China onto Taiwan, and Mao proclaims the existence of the People’s Republic of China—he then allies himself with the USSR; the Truman administration releases its White Paper to announce that the United States will no longer support Chiang.



1950 To stop U.S. “aggression,” Mao commits the PRC to the war in Korea; the Americans again back Chiang, leading to two Chinas.



1954 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles snubs Zhou Enlai at the Geneva Conference; the PRC shells the Kuomintang islands of Jinmen and Mazu, provoking a confrontation with the United States.



1958 The PRC again shells Kuomintang territory close to the mainland and faces the threat of nuclear retaliation from the United States.



1972 U.S. President Richard Nixon travels to China and reopens relations between the two countries.



1979 The Carter administration establishes diplomatic relations with the PRC and terminates official contact with Taiwan.



1989 The CCP cracks down on demonstrators at Tiananmen Square, killing thousands.

110

Chronology & Timeline

1995–1996 China holds military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait to forestall what it sees as Taiwan’s move toward independence.



1997 England yields control of Hong Kong.



1999 China regains control of Macao.



2001 China gains membership into the World Trade Organization.

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Notes Chapter 1 1. Igor de Rachewiltz, Papal Envoys to the Great Khans. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971, pp. 105, 214. 2. Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. Ronald Lathem. London: Penguin Books, 1958, pp. 40, 125. 3. Joseph Sebes, S.J., “The Precursors of Ricci,” in East Meets West: the Jesuits in China, 1582–1773, edited by Charles E. Ronan, S.J., and Bonnie B.C. Oh. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1988, p. 41. 4. Ranbir Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987, p. 28. 5. Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization, p. 27. 6. A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, 1644–1820, vol. 1, trans. Lo-shu Fu. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966, p. 325. 7. Lord Macartney, An Embassy to China, edited by J. L. Cranmer-Byng. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1963, pp. 122–123. 8. Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, pp. 323, 326. 9. Jonathan D. Spence, To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969, p. 237. 10. Claire Chennault, Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949, p. xxi. 11. Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911– 1945. New York: Macmillan, 1971, p. 197. 12. U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1984, p. 204. 13. Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The US and China Since 1972. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992, pp. 1–2; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978, pp. 559, 565.

Chapter 2 14. For a discussion of the dynastic cycle, see Charles O. Hucker, China to 1850. Stanford, CA: Stanford University

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Press, 1978, pp. 19–24, and John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, East Asia, The Great Tradition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962, pp. 114–118. Valerie Hansen adopts this cycle as well, al- though she does try to deviate from the model warning that much happened “between dynasties.” See Valerie Hansen, The Open Empire. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000, pp. 5–6. 15. Fairbank, East Asia, p. 60; Hansen, Open Empire, pp. 19, 52, 55. 16. Hucker, China to 1850, p. 31. 17. Fairbank, East Asia, p. 56; Hansen, Open Empire, p. 56. 18. Hansen, Open Empire, 97; Hucker, China to 1850, 51. 19. Ibid., pp. 100–104. 20. Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 1–7. 21. Hucker, China to 1850, pp. 3–11. 22. F. W. Mote, Imperial China, 900–1800. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 703–705. 23. Ibid., pp. 691–693. 24. Hansen, Open Empire, p. 354. 25. Mote, Imperial China, p. 28. 26. Ibid., p. 505. 27. Hucker, China to 1850, p. 139; Mote, Imperial China, p. 693. 28. Mote, Imperial China, p. 922. 29. Hucker, China to 1850, pp. 146–147. 30. Ibid., pp. 147–148. 31. Fairbank, East Asia, p. 373.

Chapter 3 32. Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 93. Steve Shipp wrote that Jorge Álvares was the first Portuguese to reach China in 1513. See Steve Shipp, Macau, China: A Political History of the Portuguese Colony’s Transition to Chinese Rule. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1997, p. 13. 33. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 151. Shipp says that Macau’s population reached 5,000 as early as 1570. See Shipp, Macau, China, p. 34. 34. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 94; Ng Chin-Keong, Trade and Society: The Xiamen Network on the China Coast,

Notes 1683–1735. Kent Ridge, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983, p. 59. 35. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 96. Peter Ward Fay asserted that the Chinese confused the Portuguese with the French, not the Spanish. See Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840–1842. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975, p. 31. 36. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 95; John E. Wills, Jr., “Qing Relations with the Dutch, 1662–1690,” in The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, edited by John King Fairbank. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 237–238. 37. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 139. 38. Wills, “Qing Relations with the Dutch, 1662–1690,” pp. 226–242. 39. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 130, 142–144. 40. Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization, p. 24. 41. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 141–142; Ng, Trade and Society pp. 28, 48; Yenp’ing Hao, The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986, pp. 15–16. 42. Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–1842. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 3. 43. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 139–140, 163; Shipp, Macau, China, pp. 64–65. 44. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 154–155; Jonathan D. Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 127–128. 45. Michael Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914. New York: Columbia University, 1983, pp. 1–2. 46. Yen-p’ing, Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China, pp. 27–29. 47. Hunt, Making of a Special Relationship, pp. 25–27. 48. Ibid., pp. 42–47. 49. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 149.

Chapter 4 50. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 168. 51. Fay, Opium War, 1840–1842, pp. 7–9, 42–43. 52. Hsin-pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964, pp. 22– 23; Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 26. 53. Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 120; Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 179. 54. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 180. 55. Ibid., p. 184. 56. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, pp. 26–27. 57. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 28; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 168–169, 173. 58. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 40; Hsin-pao, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War, p. 36. 59. Harry G. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: Britain’s 1840–1842 War with China, and Its Aftermath. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004, p. 89; Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 42. 60. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 184. 61. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, p. 102. 62. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 44. 63. Fay, Opium War, p. 357; Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, p. 136. 64. Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958, p. 170. 65. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, pp. 140–143. 66. Fay, Opium War, p. 357; Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, pp. 43, 48. 67. Fay, Opium War, p. 367; Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, p. 170. 68. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals, p. 162.

Chapter 5 69. John L. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Naval Development, 1839–1895. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 51. 70. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 279; Robert

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Notes A. Scalapino and George T. Yu, Modern China and Its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order 1850–1920. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 42–43. 71. David Pong, Shen Pao-chen and China’s Modernization in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 178–183, 250–254. 72. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 110; Scalapino and Yu, Modern China and Its Revolutionary Process, pp. 46–48. 73. Rawlinson, China’s Struggle for Naval Development, 1839–1895, p. 60. 74. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 116. 75. S. C. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power and Primacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 167–171, 179–189, 199–209, 222–228. 76. C. I. Eugene Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876–1910. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 83–84; Jonathan D. Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 222–223. 77. Paul H. Clements, The Boxer Rebellion: a Political and Diplomatic Review. New York: AMS Press, 1967, p. 34. 78. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 121. 79. Hunt, Making of a Special Relationship, pp. 153, 177. 80. Ibid., pp. 182–183. 81. Victor Purcell, The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, pp. 241–242; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 233–234. 82. Purcell, Boxer Uprising, pp. 236–238. 83. Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 231. 84. Henry Keown-Boyd, The Fists of Righteous Harmony: A History of the Boxer Uprising in China in the Year 1900. London: Leo Cooper, 1991, pp. 157–159. 85. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 400. 86. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 401; Spence, Search for Modern China, p. 235.

Chapter 6 87. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 523–526; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 276, 338–348. 88. Donald Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China’s National Revolution of 1926–1928. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976, pp. 292–293, 295; Spence, Search

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for Modern China, p. 460; Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization, pp. 140–143. 89. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 559–562; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 276, 322, 355, 370, 409. 90. Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China, 4th ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, pp. 105–119; Michael Schaller, US Crusade in China, 1938–1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, pp. 39–63. 91. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 563–565; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 422–424. 92. Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 92–95; Spence, Search for Modern China, pp. 456, 477. 93. Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 127–133; Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, pp. 75–80. 94. Gary May, China Scapegoat. Washington DC: New Republic Books, 1979, pp. 181–187. 95. Ibid., p. 114. 96. Russell D. Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy. London: Cornell University Press, 1973, pp. 269–271. 97. Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 124–126. 98. Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1992, pp. 84–88; Schaller, US Crusade in China, 1938–1945, pp. 272–275. 99. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953, pp. 355–430; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Statesman. New York: Viking, 1989, pp. 54–143. 100. Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp. 246–251, 291–293. 101. Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 162–168; Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, pp. 114–121. 102. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 521; Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization, pp. 131– 132.

Notes Chapter 7 103. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 318; Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, p. 161. 104. Warren I. Cohen, “Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,” Diplomatic History 21 (winter 1997): 71–116; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 68–69; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp. 291–298; David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: the Question of Accommodation with Beijing, 1949– 1950,” Diplomatic History 10 (winter 1986): 25–42; Warren W. Tozer, “Last Bridge to China: the Shanghai Power Company, the Truman Administration, and the Chinese Communists,” Diplomatic History 1 (winter 1977): 64–78; Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 16–17. 105. Melvyn Leffler put the total at $200 million in military aid. See Leffler, Preponderance of Power, p. 380. Tucker cited an initial amount of $14 million. See Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 201. 106. Nancy Tucker, “A House Divided: the United States, the Department of State, and China,” in The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960, edited by Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 42. 107. Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, p. 161; Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization, p. 215. 108. Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics, 1953–1971. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, pp. 66–69. 109. Vohra, China’s Path to Modernization, p. 215. 110. Ibid., 217. 111. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 320. 112. Stephen E. Ambrose, The President, vol. 2 of Eisenhower. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, pp. 238–239, 245; Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990, pp. 127–138; Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War. New

York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 62–63; Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1973, pp. 278–279; Chester Pach and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, revised edition. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991, pp. 101–102. 113. Hoopes, Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 278; Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, p. 101. 114. Hoopes, Devil and John Foster Dulles, pp. 271–272; Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two Chinas’ Policy,” in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, edited by Richard H. Immerman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 235–262; and Wang Jisi, “The Origins of America’s ‘Two China’ Policy,” in SinoAmerican Relations, edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1989, pp. 198–212. 115. Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 98. 116. Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 3, 143; David Allan Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: US Policy Against the SinoSoviet Alliance, 1949–1955. London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986, pp. 138, 150. 117. See John Lewis Gaddis, “The American ‘Wedge’ Strategy, 1949–1955,” in SinoAmerican Relations, 1945–1955, edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, p. 169; and Tucker, “Cold War Contacts: America and China, 1952–1956,” in Sino-American Relations, edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, p. 238. 118. Cohen, America’s Response to China, p. 100. 119. Ibid., p. 99.

Chapter 8 120. Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, pp. 159–160. 121. Ibid., pp. 167–168. 122. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 451. 123. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 740; Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, p. 173. 124. Schaller, United States and China in the Twentieth Century, p. 175.

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Notes 125. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 788–789. James Mann offers a less complimentary evaluation of Carter’s statesmanship, noting the president’s willingness to compromise his stand on human rights when it came to interaction with China. See James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, p. 81. 126. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, 790. 127. Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 76; Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 858, 862. 128. Foot, Practice of Power, p. 251; Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 865–866. Harry Harding specifies the trade deficit as $24.5 billion over the years 1986 to 1990. See Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1992, p. 338. 129. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 872. 130. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 936–937; Jonathan D. Spence, Search for Modern China. New York: W. W. Norton, 1990, pp. 742–743. 131. Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 345–346.

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1 32. Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, p. 457. 133. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 754–755, 905. Nancy Tucker notes some of the down periods in Taiwan’s economic growth. See Nancy Tucker, Taiwan, Xianggang, and the United States, 1945– 1992. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994, pp. 108, 142, 167. 134. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 904, 906; Tucker, Taiwan, Xianggang, and the United States, pp. 60, 106–108. 135. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 917–918. 136. Richard Bush, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Separatism,’” in Dangerous Strait: the US-Taiwan-China Crisis edited by Nancy Tucker. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 89–92; Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 920. 137. T. J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and Superconductivity,” in Dangerous Strait, edited by Nancy Tucker, p. 95; Hsü, Rise of Modern China, p. 922. 138. Mann, About Face, pp. 328–329, 335–338. 139. Hsü, Rise of Modern China, pp. 982–990.

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Fairbank, John King, ed. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968. Fairbank, John King, and Edwin O. Reischauer. East Asia, The Great Tradition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962. Feis, Herbert. The China Tangle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953. Foot, Rosemary. The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Gelber, Harry G. Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: Britain’s 1840–1842 War with China, and Its Aftermath. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004. Gray, Jack. Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Greenberg, Michael. British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–1842. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1951. Gungwu, Wang. The Chineseness of China. Oxford: Oxford University, 1991. Hansen, Valerie. The Open Empire. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000. Hao, Yen-p’ing. The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship: The US and China Since 1972. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992. ———, and Yuan Ming, eds. Sino-American Relations. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1989. Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1973.

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Hucker, Charles O. China to 1850. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978. Hunt, Michael. The Making of a Special Relationship: the United States and China to 1914. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. The Rise of Modern China, 6th edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Immerman, Richard H., ed. John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. Iriye, Akira. The Cold War in Asia. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974. Johnson, U. Alexis. The Right Hand of Power. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984. Jordan, Donald. The Northern Expedition: China’s National Revolution of 1926–1928. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976. Keown-Boyd, Henry. The Fists of Righteous Harmony: A History of the Boxer Uprising in China in the Year 1900. London: Leo Cooper, 1991. Kim, C. I. Eugene. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876–1910. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Leffler, Melvyn. A Preponderance of Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992. Macartney, Lord George. An Embassy to China. Edited by J. L. Cranmerbyng. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1963. Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. May, Gary. China Scapegoat. Washington DC: New Republic Books, 1979. Mayers, David Allan. Cracking the Monolith: US Policy Against the SinoSoviet Alliance, 1949–1955. London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986. McLean, David. “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the

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Shipp, Steve. Macau, China: A Political History of the Portuguese Colony’s Transition to Chinese Rule. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1997. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990. ———. To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969. Tozer, Warren W. “Last Bridge to China: the Shanghai Power Company, the Truman Administration, and the Chinese Communists.” Diplomatic History 1 (winter 1977): 64–78. Tuchman, Barbara W. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Tucker, Nancy. Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. ———. Patterns in the Dust. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. ———. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945–1992. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994. Vohra, Ranbir. China’s Path to Modernization: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987. Waley, Arthur. The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958.

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Further Reading

Chang, Gordon H. Friends and Enemies. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1990. Ebrey, Patricia Buckley. The Cambridge Illustrated History of China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Gregory, John S. The West and China Since 1500. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Hucker, Charles O. China to 1850. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1978. Morton, W. Scott, and Charlton M. Lewis. China: Its History and Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. Mungello, D.E. Great Encounter of China and the West, 1500–1800. Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: WW Norton & Company, 1990.

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Index Acapulco, 31 Acheson, Dean, 97 and the White Paper, 82–83 Africa explorations to, 20, 23 American Revolutionary War, 38 Barbarian Houses, 33 Beijing, 108 Boxer rebellion in, 63–65, 109 British attack on, 47–48 capital, 6, 50, 65–66, 70, 85, 99, 101–2 destruction of, 65 Germans in, 64–65 government in, 50, 66, 85, 101–2 Japan seizure of, 70, 109 Matteo Ricci in, 6 missions in, 6, 32 statues in, 65 Tiananmen Square massacre in, 99– 100 Boxer Protocol conditions of, 65 end of hostilities, 65–66, 109 Boxer Rebellion, 109 events of, 60–66 Burma (Myanmar), 73 Chinese rule in, 19 government, 8 Canton Americans in, 39 Europeans in, 33–34, 39 France in, 58 protection of, 36, 46–49 trade in, 7 and violence, 52, 65 Canton System and armed conflict, 36 boundaries, 33–34 end of, 51–52, 56 and opium, 42–43, 45 problems with, 34–35 strengths of, 39 trade regulations, 7, 33–36, 38–39 Capitalism, 82, 92, 95 Carter, Jimmy administration, 96–97, 110 relations with China, 97

CCP. See Chinese Communist Party Chapu assault on, 50 Cheng, Emperor of China reign of, 16, 107 Chennault, Claire and Chiang Kai-shek, 9–10, 74 and the Flying Tigers, 73 military assistance of, 9–10, 12, 73–74, 110 Chiang Kai-shek driven out of China, 77–78, 82, 109–10 and foreign relations, 9–10, 71–74, 82, 87, 92 Nationalist Party, 68, 73–77, 87–88, 90–91 and the Northern Expedition, 69–70, 110 in Taiwan, 77–78, 81–82, 87–92 United States abandonment, 83, 87–88, 92 Ch’in improvements during, 16 reign of, 16 China civil war, 81, 90, 110 customs and protocol, 32, 34, 38–39, 41, 55–56, 62, 99–100 economy, 13, 41, 52, 55, 58–59, 63, 82, 86, 95, 97–103, 105 expansion, 19 explorations, 20, 23 geography, 18–19, 31, 34, 56 history, 2–13, 15, 25 imperialism, 22, 59–60, 66, 104–5 isolation, 6, 20, 23, 26, 29, 41, 87, 96, 98 language, 5, 22 military, 16, 25, 33, 37, 41, 44–51, 55–56, 64, 72–73, 76–77, 85, 102–3, 105, 111 national disintegration, 43, 54, 81 national integrity, 2, 25–26, 29, 56, 59–60, 72, 82, 108 partition dangers, 56, 59–66 population, 64 and trade, 6–8, 12, 21, 23–24, 29–39, 41–45, 49, 51–52, 56, 59, 97–100, 107–8

123

Index unification attempts, 16, 18, 69–70, 85, 100–2, 104 at war, 2, 9–11, 45–51, 56–57, 68, 70–73, 75–79, 82, 86, 88, 108–9 China Hands, 75 China Lobby, 86–87 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 110 achievements, 96 forces, 11, 85, 88–89, 92, 103, 109–10 and Mao Tse-tung, 68, 70, 72–79, 81–83, 85–92, 95–96 and Russia, 82–83, 88, 91–92 values, 99, 101 Christianity converts, 64 priests and missionaries, 5, 33, 64 threats to, 2–3, 12 Cixi, Empress Dowager death of, 62 reign of, 62–66 Cold War, 11 acceleration of, 83 and China, 2, 68, 82, 88, 91, 93, 95–96, 104 events of, 68, 76–77, 79, 82–83, 85, 91, 104 initiation of, 81 politics, 81, 83, 85, 87, 95–96 and Taiwan, 88, 91 Columbus, Christopher, 5 Communism in China, 68, 70, 72–79, 81–83, 85–92, 95–96, 101, 103 doctrines, 13 Confucianism, 5 Customs and Culture Dutch observations of, 32 foreign influence on, 34, 38, 99 kowtow, 7–8, 32, 56 reforms to, 55, 100 superiority views, 39, 41, 55 women and politics, 62 Dagu Forts, 64 Da Pian, Giovanni del Carpini and the Mongol court, 2–3, 107–8 Deng Xiaoping visit to the United States, 97 Dulles, John Foster and the Cold War, 90–91

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at the Geneva Conference, 11–12, 110 and nuclear weapons, 90 and Zhou Enlai, 11–12, 110 Dynastic cycle, 15, 18 East India Company and trade, 35, 41, 44 Economy boundaries, 41, 52, 95, 98–99 foreign aid with, 82, 86, 100 growths in, 13, 97–101, 103, 105 problems with, 55, 58–59, 63 reforms, 55, 95, 97, 99, 102 Eisenhower, Dwight D. administration, 85–87, 89–92 New Look policy, 89–90 Elliot, George and the opium trade, 45–49 Europe expansion, 6 explorers, 4–5, 21–22, 29, 31, 107 military, 41, 63 powers, 25–27, 33–34, 37–39, 41, 44, 48, 52, 54–58, 60–66, 68, 70–71, 81, 88, 95, 104–5 threats to, 12 trade, 2, 5–6, 8, 12, 24–26, 29, 31, 33–36, 43–44, 107–8 Fists of Righteous Harmony, 64 Flying Tigers, 73 Ford, Gerald, 96 Formosa, 104 Formosa Resolution, 90 France in Canton, 58 government, 11, 88 military, 9 and the partition of China, 58–60, 65 settlements, 52, 56, 58 Fujian Province Japan in, 58 Fuzhou factories in, 54–55 trade in, 30, 33, 51 Geneva Conference events of, 11, 88, 110 problems of Korea, 11 Genghis Khan, 22

Index Germany military, 9, 64 and the partition of China, 58–59, 64–65 Government chaos in, 9, 15–16, 18, 20, 22–23, 25, 37, 42, 45, 54, 62, 66, 68–70, 74–79, 81, 99, 107, 110 Communism, 68, 70, 72–79, 81–83, 85–92, 95–96, 101, 103 democracy demonstrations, 99–100, 103 early, 2–12, 15–24, 29–33, 107–9 foreign rule, 2–4, 9, 15–26, 29–33, 107, 109–10 modern, 12, 81, 95–99, 102 power, 13, 21, 26, 34, 41, 95, 100 republican era, 68, 79, 109–10 taxation, 22, 55 Great Britain control of Hong Kong, 2, 41, 51–52, 58, 105, 109, 111 control of India, 6 explorers, 31 government, 7–9, 11, 45, 88 military, 8, 38, 45–51, 107 and the partition of China, 58–59, 65 and trade, 6–8, 35–39, 41–46, 51–52, 56, 59 at war, 41, 45–51, 108 in Weihaiwei, 58 in Yangtze Valley, 58 Great Wall for defense, 23 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 72 Guangxu, Emperor, 62 Guangzhou system disputes over, 108 formation, 107 Guizhou Province, 43, 70 Güyük, Mongol emperor reign of, 2–3 Han Dynasty collapse of, 107 rule of, 17–19, 107 Hangzhou threats to, 49

Hay, John and the Open Door Notes, 59–60 Holland explorers, 31, 104 forces, 32–33, 36, 107 settlements, 32 and trade, 32, 39 Hong Kong control of, 2, 41, 51, 58, 68, 81, 104–5, 109, 111 economy, 105 settlements in, 41 Hong merchants, 33, 43 Huang Ho (Yellow) River, 19 flooding of, 63 Hubei Province, 43 Hurley, Patrick J. in China, 75–76, 110 India, 20 Great Britain’s control of, 6 and trade, 44 Indian Ocean exploration of, 29 Indochina fate of, 88 war in, 11 Innocent IV, Pope response to Mongols’ invasion, 2–3 Italy explorers, 3–5 Japan atomic bombing of, 73 Chinese reign in, 24 control of northern China, 2, 58, 68, 70–75, 109 in Fujian Province, 58 government, 64 in Korea, 56, 70 military, 9, 55–56, 70, 72, 76, 78, 87, 110 and the partition of China, 58–59, 65 pirates, 104 rise of, 2 and trade, 71, 98 at war, 9, 56–58, 68, 70–76, 109 in Xiamen, 58 Java trade in, 32

125

Index Jesuit priests, 5–6 Jinmen, 110 violence in, 88, 90, 92 Khrushchev, Nikita premier of Russia, 88 Korea Chinese rule in, 19–21, 26 independence, 58 Japan in, 56, 70 military in, 83 problems in, 11, 75 in Taiwan, 70 war in, 11, 56, 83, 85–86, 109–10 Korean War events of, 83, 85–86 Kowtow, 56 description of, 7 and the Dutch, 32 Lord George Macartney’s refusal to perform, 7–8 Kublai Khan reign of, 3–4, 22 Kuomintang Party, 68, see also Nationalists armies of, 69–70, 72–74, 76, 78, 88 and Chiang Kai-shek, 68–70, 72–73, 82, 88 corruption of, 82, 101 Lady Hughes (ship), 37, 107 Latin America trade, 30–31 Liaodong Peninsula, 57–58 Li Hongzhang, 65 Lin Zexu, 108 firing of, 47 and the opium trade, 43–47 Long March and the CCP, 70, 110 Luzon, 31 Macao control of, 2, 29, 68, 81, 104–5, 111 trade in, 33, 36 Macartney, George mission to Beijing, 6–8, 12, 108 refusal to perform the kowtow, 7–8

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Magellan, Ferdinand death, 30 expedition, 29–30 Manchu, 24, see also Qing Dynasty Chinese support of, 25 confinement of European trade, 25, 54, 108 domination of Korea, 21 isolation of China, 26, 29 reign of the Qing Dynasty, 18, 21, 25, 54, 62, 107 Manchuria Chinese rule in, 19, 26 coal in, 72 railroad in, 58 Russia in, 56, 58, 65, 82 Mandate of Heaven, 62 Manila trade in, 30–31 Manila Galleon Trade, 31 Mao Tse-tung alliance with the USSR, 82–83, 85–86, 88, 92, 95 and the Communist Party, 68, 70, 72– 79, 81–83, 85, 87–89, 91–92, 95–96, 110 death, 97 forces, 75, 77–78, 87–89, 92 and the Long March, 70 Marshall, George C. in China, 76–77, 110 Marshall Mission, 77–78 Mazu, 88 violence in, 88, 90, 92 McKinley, William administration, 59–60 Mexico, 31 Military, 105 battles with the British, 37, 41, 44–51 battles with Japan, 55–56, 72–73, 76 and the Boxer Rebellion, 64 and civil war, 76–77 compulsory, 16 foreign aid to, 73, 76–77 in Korea, 85 maneuvers in Taiwan Strait, 102–3, 111 navy, 48, 55 in Qing armies, 25, 33, 51 weakness of, 46 and World War II, 72

Index Ming Dynasty collapse of, 20, 24–25, 32 court, 21, 29, 107 explorations, 20 independence, 24 isolation of, 23–24, 29–30 Mongol control of, 22–23 reasserts Chinese control, 17, 107 rule of, 17, 19–25, 29–30, 104, 107 and trade, 21 Mongol Empire collapse, 21, 23, 25 court, 2, 22, 107–8 forces, 19, 22 and the Great Wall, 23 invasions of Europe, 2–3 language of, 22 power of, 3–4 royalty, 8 rule in China, 3–4, 12, 18, 21–23, 25–26, 107–8 society, 23 and trade, 12 Mongolia Chinese reign in, 21 Mutual Defense Treaty, 97 Myanmar. See Burma Nanjing threats to, 49–50 Nanjing, Treaty of ending the Opium War, 51, 108 Napoleonic Wars, 36 Nationalists, see also Kuomintang Party battles with CCP, 68, 73–76 and Chiang, 68, 73–78, 90–91 forces, 76, 78 relationship with United States, 90–91 support of the population, 76–77, 82 in Taiwan, 87, 101 Nemesis (steamer), 48 New Look policy, 89–90 Ningbo threats to, 49–50 trade in, 36, 49, 51 Nixon, Richard and the Cold War, 95–96 relations with China, 12, 95–96, 110 resignation, 96

visit to China, 11–12, 95, 109–10 and Zhou Enlai, 11–12 Northern Expedition, 110 and Chiang, 69–70 Open Door Notes and the preservation of national integrity, 59–60, 108 Opium addiction, 42–45 regulation, 42–43 trade of, 41–46, 51–52, 107–8 uses of, 42 Opium War, First cost of, 51 end of, 51, 54, 108 events of, 41, 45–51 People’s Republic of China (PRC) cooperation with the Soviet Union, 82–83, 86, 92 cooperation with the United States, 96–99, 101–2 creation of, 79, 81 offensive, 83, 85, 92, 103 political reforms, 102–4 power of, 79, 93, 96, 99, 101–2 pronouncements of, 11–12, 110 Perestrello, Rafael, 29 Peru, 31 Philippine Islands explorations of, 30–31 Piracy, 34 Polo, Marco explorations of, 3–4, 12 The Travels of Marco Polo, 4–5, 107–8 Portugal explorers, 5, 29, 31–32, 104 stronghold at Macao, 2, 29 trade, 24, 29–30, 35–37, 107–8 Pottinger, Henry, 49–50 PRC. See People’s Republic of China Qing Dynasty, see also Manchu collapse of, 18, 51, 54, 62, 66, 68, 109 court, 47, 49, 55–56, 60, 63, 65 establishment, 18, 32, 104, 107 forces, 32–33, 36–37, 49 and opium, 42, 44, 54

127

Index payments to, 25 rebellions against, 54, 60–62 rule of, 18, 21, 25, 32–34, 39, 42, 44, 47, 49, 51, 54–56, 60–63, 107 and trade, 39, 47, 51, 55–56 Qinling Mountains, 19 Republic of China (ROC), 79, see also Taiwan leaders, 101 Ricci, Matteo advisor to Ming court, 5–6, 107 ROC. See Republic of China Roosevelt, Franklin D., 9 administration, 71, 74 Russia (USSR), 58, 110 assistance to PRC, 82–83, 86, 92 and the Cold War, 81–83, 85–86, 88, 91–92, 95–96 government, 88, 92, 95 military, 9, 75–76, 78, 92 and the partition of China, 58–60, 65 settlements, 56, 58, 65, 82 threat to China, 97 Seoul, 85 Shandong Province, 63 German settlement in, 58, 64 Shang Dynasty rule of, 15, 18, 107 Shanghai, 36 assault on, 50, 71 conflicts in, 70 factories in, 54 settlements in, 52 trade in, 51 Shanghai Communiqué document, 96 Siam (Thailand) Chinese rule in, 19 Six Dynasties period, 18, 107 Socialism, 82, 92 Song Dynasty rule of, 17–18, 107 Spain explorers, 5, 29–30, 104 galleons, 31 settlements, 31–32 trade, 31–32, 35 Spirit of ’76 (plane), 11 Stalin, Joseph

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and Communism, 82–83, 86 death, 85 and Mao Tse-tung, 83 Stilwell, Joseph W. and Chiang, 9–10, 74 diary, 9–10 military assistance of, 9–10, 12, 73–74, 110 Sun Yat-sen death, 69, 110 revolution, 69 Taiping Rebellion, 54, 62 Taiwan, 110, see also Republic of China borders, 2, 18–19, 87, 104–5 Chiang Kai-shek in, 77–79, 81, 87–92 and the Cold War, 68, 88–89, 91–92 government, 96, 100–1, 103–5 Holland control of, 32–33 independence, 93, 100–2, 111 isolation, 96 Japan’s control of, 57–58 military, 101 Qing Dynasty control of, 25, 32–33 relationship with China, 13, 18, 83, 91–93, 95–97, 100–2 relationship with the United States, 97, 100–4 settlements, 32 trade and technology in, 30, 100–2 Taiwan Strait military crisis in, 87, 89, 91–92, 102–3, 111 Tang Dynasty rule of, 17–19, 107 Tartars, 3 Technology military advancements, 54–56 mining, 54–55 and modernization, 58, 97 railroads, 54, 58 telegraph lines, 54 textiles, 55 Teng-hui, Lee leader of Taiwan, 101–3 visit to United States, 102 Ten Kingdoms period, 18, 107 Terranova, Francesco, 37, 108 Thailand. See Siam Tiananmen Square

Index demonstration in, 99–100, 110 Tianjin, 47, 76 rebellion in, 63–64 Tibet Chinese rule in, 19, 21, 26 pacification of, 81 Tonghak, 56 Tongzhi, Emperor, 62 Tonkin France in, 58 Trade, 21 disputes, 6–8, 12, 23, 32–33, 36–39, 41, 43–45, 49, 59, 108 imbalances of, 41–42, 45 open door, 97–100 of opium, 41–45, 51 of porcelain, 31 of precious metals, 30–31, 36, 41, 44 restrictions, 7, 24, 29, 33–35, 38–39, 43–44, 51–52, 56, 107–8 of rhubarb, 41 of silk, 30–31, 41, 45 of spices, 30–31 of tea, 36, 41, 45 of weapons, 37 Travels of Marco Polo, The (Polo) publication, 4–5, 107–8 Tributary system, 21–22 erosion of, 24 Truman, Harry S. administration, 76, 78, 82–83, 87 and the White Papers, 82–83, 110 United Nations aid to South Korea, 83, 85 and the PRC, 86–87, 96 United States aid to South Korea, 83, 85 as China’s caretaker, 9–12, 70–71, 73–77, 79, 82–83, 87 and the Cold War, 11, 81–83, 85–89, 91–93, 95–96 economy, 97–100 government, 12–13, 37, 71–72, 74–79, 81–83, 85–93, 95–97, 101, 103, 108–9 military, 9, 12, 37, 60, 73–76, 83, 87, 89–92, 97, 103, 108, 110 New Look policy, 89–90

nuclear retaliation threats, 92, 110 Open Door Notes, 59–60, 65, 108 and the partition of China, 58–59, 65 settlements, 52 and trade, 36–39, 59, 71, 97–100 at war, 9, 72–74, 82–83, 95–96 USSR. See Russia Vietnam, 88 Chinese rule in, 19–21, 26 conflicts in, 95–96 France in, 56, 58 independence, 24 Vietnam War, 95–96 Warlord period, 110 events of, 68–69 Warring States period, 15, 18 Wars and conflicts civil, 9–11, 70, 72–73, 75–79, 86, 110– 11 Cold War, 2, 11, 68, 76–77, 79, 82, 86, 88 First Opium War, 45–51, 108 with Great Britain, 45–51, 108 with Japan, 2, 9, 56–57, 68, 70–73, 75, 109–10 in Korea, 11, 56, 86, 109–10 World War I, 2 World War II, 9, 68, 72–73, 78, 82, 110 Watergate crisis, 96 Weihaiwei Great Britain in, 58 White Papers abandonment of, 83 review of U.S. and China relations, 82–83, 110 World Trade Organization China’s membership into, 99, 111 World War I, 2 World War II, 2, 9, 110 aftermath, 68, 73, 75, 81–82 events of, 72–73, 78 Wu, Han Dynasty emperor, 19 Xiamen Japan in, 58 trade in, 30, 33, 35–36, 51 Xianfeng, Emperor, 62

129

Index Xi’an Incident, 72 Yan’an, 70 Yangtze River, 19, 46, 49–50 Yangtze Valley Great Britain in, 58 Yellow River. See Huang Ho River, 19 Yongle, Emperor, 20 Yuan Dynasty rule of, 18, 21–22, 107 Yuxian, governor, 63 Zheng, Admiral, 20

130

Zheng Chenggong, 32 rebellion of, 32–33, 36, 104 Zhenjiang assault on, 50 Zhou civilization reign of, 15–16, 18 Zhou Enlai reign of, 11–12, 110 Zhoushan Island troops at, 46, 49 Zhu Yuanzhang, Ming emperor, 19–20

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About the Contributors Matthew J. Flynn specializes in U.S. foreign policy and military history.

He is presently a visiting assistant professor at Arizona State University, where he teaches twentieth-century U.S. military history. George J. Mitchell served as chairman of the peace negotiations in Northern Ireland during the 1990s. Under his leadership, a historic accord, ending decades of conflict, was agreed to by the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom and the political parties in Northern Ireland. In May 1998, the agreement was overwhelmingly endorsed by a referendum of the voters of Ireland, North and South. Senator Mitchell’s leadership earned him worldwide praise and a Nobel Peace Prize nomination. He accepted his appointment to the U.S. Senate in 1980. After leaving the Senate, Senator Mitchell joined the Washington, D.C. law firm of Piper Rudnick, where he now practices law. Senator Mitchell’s life and career have embodied a deep commitment to public service and he continues to be active in worldwide peace and disarmament efforts. James I. Matray is professor and Chair of the History Department at California State University, Chico. He has published more than forty articles and book chapters on U.S.–Korean relations during and after World War II. Author of The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941–1950 and Japan’s Emergence as a Global Power, his most recent publication is East Asia and the United States: An Encyclopledia of Relations Since 1784. Matray also is international columnist for the Donga Ilbo in South Korea.

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