Chewing Gum, Candy Bars, and Beer: The Army Px in World War II

´ Chewing Gum ´ Candy Bars ´ and Beer ´ Chewing Gum ´ C a n dy Ba r s ´ and Beer The Army PX in World War II Ja...

Author: James J. Cooke

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´

Chewing Gum

´ Candy Bars ´ and Beer

´ Chewing

Gum

´ C a n dy Ba r s ´ and

Beer

The Army PX in World War II James J. Cooke

´

´

´

Universit y of Mis so u ri P re s s Columbia and Lon d o n

Copyright © 2009 by The Curators of the University of Missouri University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65201 Printed and bound in the United States of America All rights reserved 5â•‡ 4â•‡ 3â•‡ 2â•‡ 1â•‡â•… 13â•‡ 12â•‡ 11â•‡ 10â•‡ 09 Library of Congress Cataloging‑in‑Publication Data Cooke, James J. Chewing gum, candy bars, and beer : the Army PX in World War II / James J. Cooke. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978‑0‑8262‑1867‑4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. United States. Army and Air Force Exchange Service—History. 2. Military exchanges—United States—History—20th century. 3. World War, 1939‑1945—United States. 4. United States. Army—Military life—History—20th century. I. Title. UC753.C665 2009 940.54’8373—dc22 2009031957 This paper meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984. Designer and Typesetter: Kristie Lee Printer and Binder: Thomson-Shore, Inc. Typeface: Adobe Garamond

In 1960 I was a young GI in Europe. I walked into the Special Service Club and met a new hostess. Forty-eight years later we are still married and have the first piece of household furniture that we bought in the Post Exchange. She has been an editorial queen for many books, and for this book my adviser, having worked with PXs and Special Service Clubs.

Contents

Acknowledgmentsâ•… ix

Introductionâ•… 1

1. From the Sutler’s Tentâ•… 10 2. Preparedness and Warâ•… 24 3. Regulations and Agreementsâ•… 42 4. Expansion and Shortages, 1943–1944â•… 60 5. No Beer!â•… 77 6. To Final Victoryâ•… 105 7. 1945 and V-Daysâ•… 123 8. Consequences and Aftermathâ•… 142

Notesâ•… 163

Selected Bibliographyâ•… 175

Indexâ•… 182

Acknowl edgments

No one person writes a book. There are many people involved, and many need to be recognized. The staff and the historians at the Na‑ tional Archives at College Park, Maryland, made hundreds of cartons of World War II documents available for research. They are public servants at their best. Betty Bradbury of Bloomington, Indiana, took very messy drafts and turned them into readable and comprehensible chapters. Her thoughts and suggestions were invaluable. Tim Frank, a professional historian and researcher in College Park, Maryland, obtained the photographs from the National Archives. His selection was invaluable for this book. My wife, as always, labored through pages and chapters, correcting my constant errors—a comma here, a semicolon there. I am indebted to Beverly Jarrett, Sara Davis, and Annette Wenda of the University of Missouri Press, who contributed their professional opinions and editorial expertise. Last of all were the many veterans of World War II who gave comments and memories of the PX, the Service Clubs, and many other military institutions. Their ranks thin day by day. To these great men and women we owe a debt that cannot be fully repaid.

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Chewing Gum

´ Candy Bars ´ and Beer

Introducti on

For Warrant Officer Paul E. Wesely of the 334th Harbor Craft Com‑ pany stationed at Rouen, France, it was a fine day. In early May 1945, two weeks earlier, he had gone to Paris for a few days, and while there visited the Post Exchange (PX) and bought a new hat and a pair of GI shoes. He went to the Paris Officers’ Club and then to eat at the Red Cross, “which wasn’t too bad for what they had. The only trouble was they did not give you enough. I was hungry all the time I was there.” Wesely and some friends went to a real French “restaurant which was a small place so I didn’t expect any fancy prices. But did we get fooled.” He paid forty-nine dollars, a very large sum, but did allow that the food was very good. Today, though, said Wesely, who was from Wash‑ ington, D.C., was a better day because the war in Europe was over. French cuisine was very fine, but this day he got from PX supplies one bottle of Coca-Cola and one can of American beer. All Warrant Of‑ ficer Wesely could say was, “It sure tasted good.”1 Brigadier General Joseph W. Byron, once chief of the Army Exchange Service (AES) and by war’s end chief of the Special Services Division, would have been gratified if he had read Wesely’s letters sent back to Washington. This was what Byron worked for since World War II broke out and he was called from civilian life to serve his country. He strove to make the Post Exchanges, which now spread over the entire globe, the best possible source of what the Army called “comfort items” for the American GI. In 1945 Byron could boast that the Army Exchange Service, which he commanded from 1941 to 1943, operated the world’s largest depart‑ ment store chain, serving the grandest Army the United States had ever put in the field.

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Chewing Gum, C a n dy Ba rs, and Beer

The cornerstone on which the AES operated was simple: the GI would get “his fair share” of what he enjoyed in civilian life. There would be an exchange operating somewhere close to where GIs were fighting, but close to the lines of battle the same products would be sent forward, free of charge, to the troops. The American soldier and airman could expect that there would be a supply of chewing gum (and that fixed in the minds of Europeans that GIs and chewing gum went hand in hand), candy bars, beer, cigarettes, razor blades, shaving cream, soap, and other items. Once overseas, prices were low. A pack of twenty cigarettes cost five cents, and so did an American chocolate Hershey bar or a pack of Juicy Fruit gum. His beer had an alcoholic content of 3.2 percent, but it was cheap, and unlike the British beer, it was served cold, thanks to PX coolers. Even General Eisenhower would fret over the availability of candy bars for his troops, training for that “Day of Days,” the cross-Channel invasion of France. GIs looked rich, and they had a swagger and a mouth full of gum. By American standards he was not rich, but by the lights of other peo‑ ples, especially the British, he was. There was an air of generosity about the GI, and it was not lost on the soldier that a constant supply of candy bars, cigarettes, and chewing gum gave him an advantage when flirting with the local girls, many of whom would go to the United States as “war brides.” It went beyond just courting and flirting. Sergeant Kenneth Lummer of the 482nd Tank Battalion recalled that as his battalion moved deeper into Germany, they encountered many of the wretches who had been in Nazi slave-labor camps. He wrote to his wife in York, Pennsylvania, “They were nearly starved to death and when we stopped on the road and gave them cigarettes they could not thank us enough even if it was only a small amount.”2 The United States had been “over there” in 1917 and 1918, but these soldiers were not the same as the doughboys of the Great War. This gen‑ eration was a product of a massive cultural revolution, and it formed the life experiences that they carried to the battlefields of Europe and Asia. These young men and women were familiar with the automobile. The Ford and Chevrolet companies had mass-produced vehicles that allowed a vast number of civilians to own cars. There were also sleek roadsters with names like the Stutz Bearcat, and roads between major cities were paved. The country was mobile. Fine American trains went from coast to coast at a reasonable price. In art and in building, lines represented speed and

i n t ro d u c t i o n

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mobility. The World War I doughboy had no such visual experience of a country in motion. In the mid-1920s letters could be sent by air, and telephone was available to most of America’s citizens. During this period women’s skirts went above the knee, while only a few years earlier the soldiers in France had been taken with the style of French women who displayed a well-turned ankle. Women could now vote, and despite dire warnings from observers of American elections, their doing so did not plunge politics into chaos nor did it seem to clean up American politics, as some had hoped. The movies opened up the world to Americans. They could see people in motion displaying emotions on the screen. What had been the pre–World War I “magic lantern show,” one slide at a time, was replaced by actors and actresses in such movies as cowboy westerns or the less-than-wholesome Our Dancing Daughters. By the start of World War II many movies were in color. By the mid-1930s the radio became the family source of news and entertainment. Orson Welles’s brilliant presentation of War of the Worlds on the radio produced near panic, as people actually believed that there had been an invasion by sinister and hostile forces from outer space. There was no illusion about war, either. The veterans of the Great War made no secret of what the western front had been like. When the United States finally joined the war in 1917, there was an explosion of patriot‑ ic emotions and music that at times could reach heights of silliness. In the 1920s movies such as Wings and The Big Parade depicted the horrors of the battlefield as never before. In 1930 All Quiet on the Western Front showed the futility of war and the terrific cost in human life that only a modern war could bring. The Great War had left a sour taste in the mouths of Americans because it appeared that nothing was really gained as far as peace and order were concerned. The United States had rejected the League of Nations and was content to hide behind the two great defensive barriers—the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. When the GI went to war his songs were free of the exaggerated patriotic bombast that characterized the music of World War I.3 In October 1929 the good life of the 1920s came to an end with the onset of the Great Depression. The 1920s was a decade of excess, and it molded the young men and women who would enlist or the men who were conscripted in the military branches of World War II. The decade had its share of fanatics who outlawed the manufacture and sale of alcoholic

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beverages, which brought very little improvement to the fabric of Ameri‑ can life. Bootlegger, speakeasy, and bathtub gin were words known across the country, as were the names Dutch Schultz, John Dillinger, Bonnie Parker, Clyde Barrow, and Al “Scarface” Capone. The GIs entering service had every reason to be suspicious of bombastic piety and overenthusiastic promises. Post Exchanges of World War II found beer and cigarette sales to be the foundation of their profits. The national memory of the privations of the Depression set in motion the grudging acceptance of rationing. Unlike World War I, the United States became directly involved when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Army, however, was not caught totally unawares, because in 1940 the National Guard was called into service for a year’s duration and peacetime conscription was institut‑ ed. In 1918 many divisions had been committed to the Meuse-Argonne campaign with almost no training and suffered high casualties, and some divisions simply ceased to be combat effective. With the coming of World War II, leaders like General George C. Marshall were determined that mis‑ takes made in 1917 and 1918 would not be repeated in 1940 and 1941. Marshall had observed on the battlefields of France the morale-reducing effects of not having a system to provide the doughboys with those small items that would lift some of the burdens of combat from their shoulders. While Marshall went about the business of building a modern Army, he was determined that the morale of the troops would be of great concern. Out of this the Army Exchange Service and the Special Services Division were born. One of the great problems of World War I was that there was no cen‑ tralized direction for those good-works organizations, such as the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), the Jewish Welfare Board, the Catholic Knights of Columbus, and the Salvation Army, that tried, with great difficulty, to provide some comfort for the troops. Well-meaning volunteers tried their best to serve the fighting men with such things as coffee and doughnuts, cigarettes and candy bars. To correct what had been a confused volunteer effort, President Roosevelt brought together these groups with some others to form the United Service Organizations, or USO. It is impossible to comprehend the workings, failures, and successes of the AES without seeing that all of these groups—the Special Services and the USO—were interrelated. To omit any group would be an error in


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understanding morale in World War II. All of the volunteers offered the soldier sandwiches, sweets, cigarettes (except the Salvation Army), coffee, and soft drinks. All of them drew on the same production of industries in the United States. The two Army institutions—the PX and the Service Club—served the Army in an official capacity. In World War I training camps were alcohol free, and there were no official places to go on post to just relax and have coffee or a Coca-Cola and a sandwich. The various volunteer groups during World War I had huts where soldiers could go, but their offerings were at best spotty. With the institution of the Service Clubs there would be uniformity, with civilian women acting as hostesses. The goals for both the PX and the Service Clubs were the same: to have a place on post for the GIs to keep soldiers away from the dens and dives in the towns around the post. Despite the great outpourings of patriotic support for the troops and the war effort after 1941, there were those who would prey on the GIs with cheap liquor, prostitutes, and other vices. When the Special Services were created there was a moral and spiritual component to its beginnings. Of course, there were those who willingly went off post to seek diversions. The USO set up canteens in towns for troops to have a place off post to congregate, dance with carefully screened young ladies, have refreshments (many homemade by willing helpers), or just sit and write a letter home. Generals Frederick Osborn of the Spe‑ cial Services Division and Joseph W. Byron of the Army Exchange Service were drawn from civilian life to make their organizations function for the welfare of the troops, and they did it well. The AES, the USO, and the Special Services Division all drew from the same base of support for the troops. What these groups could not control was the mass of well-meaning, patriotic, and concerned citizens and groups that sought to raise money for gifts for the troops. This usually took the form of solicitation for cigarettes for the soldiers, which became a huge nuisance. The AES was disturbed by the hundreds of committees, veterans’ associations, and individuals who had schemes to raise funds. How to stop these plans without insulting those who simply wanted to show their patriotic concern for the fighting forces was the proverbial hard nut to crack. The AES and Special Services had to rely on another gov‑ ernmental wartime agency to help remedy this situation. The President’s War Relief Control Board was created to oversee the efforts of groups who wanted to do something for their soldiers and sailors, as well as provide for

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causes such as Polish, French, Chinese, or Russian relief. The Board, as it was known, had the power to deny authorization to solicit funds, but it could do so only when a campaign went beyond a state border. Those who operated in one city or one state could pretty well continue raising funds. By the end of 1943 the ardor of solicitation campaigns waned due in great part to President Roosevelt’s public support for the National War Fund. On October 5, 1943, the president made a radio address asking citizens to contribute directly to the War Fund, which would determine what were the needs to support the overall war effort. While the fund did indeed centralize most efforts, it was based on a very serious need to bring some order out of chaos. By 1943 there were mountains of complaints about the AES and their policies in supplying the troops. Many came from candy, gum, cigarette, and beer manufactur‑ ers and distributors who did not get a contract or a large order for their wares. While this was going on, General Byron continued to open new exchanges and expand AES offerings. By 1944 the exchange service operated within a complex series of re‑ lationships in the government. Since combat, medical, and ammunition supplies for the troops in all theaters of operation became the first priority for the quartermaster general and the Army Service Forces, Byron and his AES had almost a free hand in providing comfort items for the troops. Little or no time by combat commanders could be spent on candy bars, chewing gum, beer, soft drinks, and cigarettes for those bearing the bur‑ dens of battle and those working at a fever pitch to build up for the battles in the Pacific, the fighting in Italy, and the invasion of France. One organization that is on the periphery of our wartime discussions about providing for the troops was the American Red Cross (ARC), which operated with its own procurement system, volunteers, and rules. The Red Cross had a good reputation for service and was the best-organized group prior to December 1941. The Red Cross had been a fixture in Ameri‑ can life for a long time, and it had in place the rules and regulations that made the transition from peacetime to wartime smooth. For example, in December 1941 (prior to Pearl Harbor) the Red Cross printed and dis‑ seminated a booklet titled Canteen Corps: Volunteer Special Services, which outlined in a comprehensive manner what a person could do to help in times of disaster or war. It called on women over the age of eighteen who could donate a minimum eighteen hours of service per year to volunteer,


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buy their own uniform, and be trained at the volunteer’s personal expense. There were courses offered to train women in running a canteen with an eye toward good nutrition. The booklet also pointed out that there was an agreement between the Office of Civilian Defense and the Red Cross that designated the Red Cross as “the agency responsible for furnishing the basic necessities for relief of suffering caused by disaster, both in peacetime and in war.”4 During the war the Red Cross did not get involved in unseemly solicita‑ tions for cigarettes because it had its own sources for buying large quanti‑ ties of cigarettes at a reduced price. As a standing policy, the Red Cross did not serve alcoholic beverages. Just as important was the Red Cross’s abil‑ ity to get the best possible publicity, often to the irritation of the Army’s Special Services and the AES. The activities of the Red Cross during the Second World War deserve extensive and impartial research far beyond the scope of this work on the Army PX system. In establishing the modern Post Exchange system the Army correct‑ ed what had been a system that did not serve the soldier very well. The doughboy of the Great War did not have a PX, nor did the quartermaster general see the need for supplying what were termed “comfort items.” The experience of 1917–1918 convinced thoughtful officers such as George C. Marshall that there had to be some centralized system that would serve the morale needs of the men in combat. Peacetime conscription such as the one instituted in 1940 made it imperative that the transition from civilian to military life be as painless as possible. National Guard units that were called to the colors in 1940 found the transition a little easier, since the men already knew one another, had basic soldier skills, and knew what the rank structure, the chain of command, was. Much to the distress of Regu‑ lar Army noncommissioned officers and officers, the National Guardsmen had a little different discipline. One could very well be a bank president one day and the next day be a sergeant, commanded by a bank-teller lieutenant. The Post Exchange and the Service Clubs became a gathering spot where new conscripts could get to know each other and the National Guardsmen could gather as they did back home. Total immersion into the military life was needed, and many units would find this over a low-cost PX pitcher of 3.2 beer or over a ham sandwich in the Service Clubs. If there is a universal truth about combat, it is that after all of the lec‑ tures on why we fight, the patriotic movies, and the “support the troops”

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banners, the soldier fights for his comrades-in-arms. The platoon became a new family, and after combat, after all of the miseries of war, the buddies remain that forever. It is hard for a civilian who never, as the Civil War soldier termed it, “saw the elephant” to explain this state of mind. The PX and the Service Clubs, and the two go hand in hand, were theirs, a little space of exclusivity. It did not hurt that General Byron put a soda fountain in the PX sys‑ tem. There the GI could buy a soft drink, a hamburger, a beer, or a slice of pie. The price was kept low because of low soldiers’ pay, but this was a part of home, making certain that the GI “got his fair share.” In fact, he got more because the exchange system operated at about a 10 percent profit, which was distributed to units for recreation and morale purposes or was withheld by the AES so that new items could be offered to the soldier. The AES grew so large that it could offer a sales catalog to the soldiers that was especially important for the GI overseas. “Mom and Apple Pie”—send her flowers for Mother’s Day. As the researcher works in the letters of GIs it becomes apparent that the Post Exchange was a matter of special interest for them. Soldiers’ mail is full of references to the PX and to USO shows. Sergeant William E. George of the 415th Night Fighter Squadron operating out of airfields in Sicily wrote to his parents: I really went strong on the PX yesterday—but they had quite a few things that I wanted so I just got them, they had been short of ciga‑ rettes and had given us some tobacco, and of course you know me (unlucky) I had no pipe. But they had some yesterday and I got one of them, so now I smoke a pipe. I don’t need any cigarettes tho, as Larry doesn’t smoke and I have been getting his so that makes my stock complete now. We got five boxes of cookies, but they don’t last long as they are only the nickel size and we eat them as fast as we get them.5

It comes then as no surprise that GIs were viewed as being rich, well supplied with goods that most Europeans and Asians had not seen since the outbreak of war. The American public demanded no less for their sol‑ diers; it was their sacrifice of war in order for the fighting men to have a little slice (or bottle) of home.


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When discussing the possibility of the United States entering the war, Hitler and Hermann Göring dismissed the Americans, saying that they could produce good razor blades but could never field an army that could stand up to the Germans in combat. How wrong they were was quite evi‑ dent in 1945 with VE Day ending Hitler’s thousand-year Reich. A small part of the victory was due to the Army Exchange Service, which had achieved the goal of supplying troops with those little items like Sergeant George’s small cookies or Warrant Officer Wesely’s bottle of Coca-Cola. This is the thesis of this work. One aspect of the Army’s overall experience was the PX, and the system that General Joseph W. Byron built worked and worked well. The key to understanding the work of the Army Exchange Service in World War II is morale. The exchange system worked with the Special Services and USO to provide for the GIs, especially in the overseas the‑ aters of operation. American troops arrived in Europe in the fall of 1917, and by November 1918 the fighting was over. World War II, however, was a war that would last for many years with intensive combat. Some American military units spent three years or more overseas, away from family, friends, and the comforts that they had enjoyed before volun‑ teering or being drafted into the Army. Maintaining individual and unit morale became a critical factor for the Army. The Post Exchanges stocked goods from home: candy, chewing gum, cigarettes, beer, and other items that the GIs remembered from home. The Special Services provided base‑ balls and bats, and footballs, and opened field houses where they could. The Special Services organized dances for the GIs where they could meet local girls. The USO provided shows, often using big-name stars of movies and the radio, and provided a constant flow of current American movies. The Army Exchange Service, Special Services, and USO were tied together in an effort to keep up the GIs’ morale while they trained for or were com‑ mitted to combat. It was fortunate that General Byron first commanded the exchange system and then the Special Services Division because there would be continuity of goals and policies. T-Sergeant Charles B. Linzy of the 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Battal‑ ion had been at Omaha Beach in Normandy, and his unit moved inland to liberate France. He summed up the effects of the PX system when he wrote to his wife: “The kids [in France] already know what candy and gum are over here as well as in England.”6

1

´ F ro m t h e

S u t l e r ’ s T e n t

Today every Army, Air Force, and Naval base has a PX, a Post Ex‑ change, or Base Exchange. It is the soldier’s department store, selling everything from clothes to cleaning supplies and television sets. By the end of the twentieth century most Army and Air Force installations had a PX that resembled fashionable civilian shopping malls. The his‑ tory of the PX, however, had its roots in war and was far different from what the soldier sees today. The modern PX was born just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and by the end of the war in 1945 it was the world’s largest department store, serving soldiers from Aruba in the Caribbean to Iceland in the North Atlantic, from France and England to India and Australia. Run by civilians in uniform, the system promised that wherever the GI went, the PX was certain to follow. The rule was that whatever the GI enjoyed in civilian life, he would get “his fair share” while wearing the uniform of the United States. The Army of World War II was a citizens’ army made up of vol‑ unteers and draftees. These citizen soldiers had grown up in a world that had the automobile, the radio, and the movies, a far cry from their fathers’ world of the Great War or their great-grandfathers’ experiences in the Civil War. The generation of the Second World War was not an indulged or pampered group; they had experienced the hardships of the Great Depression. But they were very different from their prede‑ cessors. General George C. Marshall understood what raw material he 10

F ro m t h e S u t l e r ’ s Tent

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had with which to build and wondered if indeed the Army and Army Air Force could match a battle-hardened enemy. At times he had doubts.1 The Army, however, would make sure these citizen soldiers were supplied with everything from rifles and artillery to sodas, cigarettes, chewing gum, beer, and candy bars. The Army had not done well in supplying what would become known as comfort items, those small items that made a soldier’s life endurable. There was little need as long as the Regular Army remained small and far from the civilian populations. Only when citizen soldiers became involved did the question of supplying items such as razors, soap, and, most im‑ portant, tobacco become a critical issue. In the years before the Civil War, merchants known as sutlers were allowed to peddle goods to the troops. A system was in place in 1861 that invited abuse and dishonesty. Every regi‑ ment was allowed to have a sutler, who followed the troops and set up shop near the camps. In makeshift shops and tents the sutler sold everything from fried pies (often moldy or rancid) to tinned oysters and the “soldier’s comfort,” tobacco. Although hard-liquor sales were prohibited, the sutler did a brisk business in brandied peaches, usually consisting of one or two peaches of doubtful quality and cheap, almost undrinkable, hard liquor. Sutlers were one of the most disliked groups of individuals in the Union army. The Confederate armies allowed for sutlers, but the dire conditions in the South dictated that there were very few comfort items for sale. Sol‑ diers in Union blue called the sutlers such names as “dog robbers,” or just plain thieves. Officers who had the well-being of their soldiers in mind constantly complained about the sutlers who sold shoddy goods, charged five cents for a three-cent postage stamp, and filled their men with rotgut whiskey. Generals such as U.S. Grant and William T. Sherman disliked the system and tried to ban the sutlers from the camps. Once the war was over, the question of supplying massive numbers of troops ended. The Regular Army was reduced in size as the number of missions increased. Part of the Army served on the East Coast (once Reconstruction was over), in Washington, and in installations designed to protect the harbors and cities. The remainder of the Army served in the West, along the frontier in isolated posts far from cities. There the canteen replaced the sutler, selling tobacco and other small comfort items. Pay was very low for both officers and enlisted men, and opportunities to spend money for comfort items were limited.

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The Army recognized that morale is an essential component of any military organization, and on July 1895 the chief of staff issued a Gen‑ eral Order that gave authority to subordinate commands to maintain Post Exchanges that would provide nonissue items to the troops at a very low price. The concept of the exchange had been in operation for a few years, and by the mid-1890s there was a contest within the War Department for control of the exchanges. The Subsistence Department in the Office of the Quartermaster Gen‑ eral did not like the idea of the exchanges because as Washington saw it, the exchanges provided many of the same items they did. Proponents of the exchange system argued that it was much better to have decentraliza‑ tion depending on local demands. Also, the Post Exchange was seen as a place where enlisted soldiers could go to relax, read, smoke, and play games such as checkers and cards without the oversight of their officers. Sergeants would oversee the good order and discipline in the exchange. Profits would be reinvested or could be divided among the patrons of the exchange. There were other forces that opposed the PX system because beer or other “light drinks” would be served. The temperance movement argued that soldiers should not be exposed to alcohol while on post, or in towns near the training camps. Some town merchants argued that the PX would draw patrons away from their establishments, denying profits from sales to soldiers wanting what were termed “luxuries.” The temperance movement and town merchants would continue to complain up to and beyond the early days of World War II. By the turn of the century the Post Exchange was an accepted fact of life on Army posts. The Army Regulations recognized the PX as the creation of a special order and stipulated various roles for the maintenance of the exchange. The indebtedness of soldiers was a critical item, and the regula‑ tions stated that debts owed the exchange would be deducted from the next month’s pay. Alcohol of any sort—beer, wine, or hard liquors—was strictly prohibited. The relationship of the exchange to Commissary Sales was defined, as was the disbursement of funds generated by PX sales. These regulations were printed in 1913 and then amended and corrected in 1917, just prior to the entry of the United States into World War I.2 The test of the Post Exchange and the regulations would come when the Army grew at a tre‑


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mendous rate when National Guard units and draftees entered the service in April 1917. There were changes in technology, however, that would affect what sol‑ diers would want. Machines were invented that would make such things as candy and cigarettes available on a large scale. The Civil War soldier smoked his tobacco in a pipe or as a cigar. Plug, or chewing, tobacco was also popular. When soldiers in blue and gray met between the lines they traded such Northern items as coffee for the Southern-produced tobacco. For the soldier in rank, the cigar was too expensive and the pipe required a pouch for holding tobacco and could be broken. The cigarette was inex‑ pensive and fitted the soldiers’ needs. The new technologies would bring about a major change in the supply of comfort items, and the situation came to the forefront in World War I. The Great War saw an unprecedented mobilization of manpower for service outside the United States. The Army in 1917 was made up of three parts, the Regulars, the National Guard, and the National, or conscript, Army. The vast majority of soldiers came from civilian life, and despite Na‑ tional Guard mobilization or conscription, they were still at heart civilians rather than Regular or career soldiers. The Army was overwhelmed with the multiplicity of tasks in training and supplying millions of troops for the battlefields of France and preparing combat divisions to join General John J. Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force (AEF) “over there.” There was little thought given to comfort items for the troops. National Guard divisions such as the 42nd Rainbow Division training at Camp Mills, New York, had access to large towns, and ladies’ groups provided candies, cakes, and cigarettes to the troops. Other troops were draftees and were sent to camps that were hard-pressed to provide rifles and bayonets, shoes, uniforms, and three meals a day. Private Eustace Fielder, a conscript from Vicksburg, Mississippi, wrote to his mother from Camp Joseph E. John‑ ston, near Jacksonville, Florida, for help obtaining socks, handkerchiefs, and candy. He could not get to town, nor were the items available in camp. Later Fielder wrote to his father to send him cigarettes, as none were avail‑ able.3 Fielder noted that after several weeks at Camp Johnston the Army opened a Commissary Sales store, but with very limited supplies. In France, with the AEF training for the trenches, the situation was equally bad. There were few large towns near training areas, and since the

14


French had been at war since 1914, supplies and comfort items were hard to come by. There was no lack of support for the troops, and many fundraisers were held in the United States to help the doughboys in France. Large charitable organizations sent representatives and workers to France. The Young Men’s Christian Association, the Salvation Army, the Jewish Welfare Board, the Red Cross, and the Knights of Columbus were deter‑ mined to show the AEF soldiers that the folks back home remembered and supported them in France. But they had not reckoned on General John J. Pershing and his vision for the AEF. A West Point graduate, trim, handsome, and the commander of U.S. troops in the Mexican expedition in 1916–1917, Pershing was the choice of President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of War Newton Baker to command the Army overseas, and they gave him near-dictatorial powers. Pershing proclaimed that the discipline of the AEF would be the discipline imposed at West Point. He was deter‑ mined that the AEF would emerge as the equal of any fighting force in the world and that American combat officers and men were just as good or better than their Allied counterparts. There was little time for comfort items. To the distress of the Prohibition movement in the United States, Pershing decreed that when there was time doughboys could have beer and light wine, but he and his excellent staff saw to it that there was very little off-duty time. Organizations such as the YMCA set up canteens for the soldiers and provided such things as paper and envelopes for the doughboys to write letters home. Coffee, hot chocolate, and doughnuts were served, but when it came to candy and cigarettes the YMCA canteens had to charge for those items. Pershing had decreed that items like candy and cigarettes were not to be given away. When the head of the YMCA in France protested to Pershing, the general stated in forceful terms that the American soldier would not become the recipient of charity. This was never fully explained to the troops, and many doughboys left France with no fond memories of “That Damned Y.”4 The problems of providing “luxury” items rested in the nature of an overseas war that the United States Army had never before faced. The old Post Exchange had no relevance to the situation in 1917–1918. The Com‑ missary Sales units of the quartermaster general were in France, but ini‑ tially were far behind the front lines, and their supplies of cigarettes and


15

other tobacco products were very limited. The space on supply ships was limited, and frankly the AEF had grave difficulties supplying American troops with basic subsistence, with the uniforms, weapons, helmets, and other items necessary for fighting a war.5 The YMCA, which coordinated more with Pershing and his staff than any other civilian agency except the American Red Cross, was simply stuck with this policy of not giving away candies, tobacco products, and other sundries. It was not until April 1918 that General Pershing recommended that tobacco be included in the daily ration for soldiers in the AEF. He esti‑ mated that “ninety-five percent of the men use tobacco in some form and that its supply increases their comfort and contentment while its absence causes distress.”6 While the recommendation was circulating around the War Department, a copy was sent to the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army for his consideration. On May 13 the surgeon general stated that he concurred with the issuance of tobacco for the AEF and added, “It is suggested that a pipe be included in the list of articles. The use of the pipe and tobacco, and limited number of cigarettes is preferable to issue of chewing tobacco.”7 The recommendation was approved by the quartermaster general, the judge advocate general, and the adjutant general of the Army and was sent to the Army chief of staff, General Peyton C. March. On May 13, 1918, Secretary of War Newton Baker informed Pershing that a tobacco ration was approved and would be added to the AEF’s ration.8 The recommen‑ dation by Pershing and the action by the War Department, however, came too late to be of help for the doughboys of the AEF fighting in France. While the YMCA’s hands were tied, other organizations ignored Per‑ shing’s policies and distributed what they had for free. One such group was the Knights of Columbus, which in theory was in France to serve the specific needs of Roman Catholic soldiers. The huts set up by the Knights of Columbus never turned any soldier away. Albert M. Ettinger, serving in the 165th Infantry Regiment of the 42nd Rainbow Division, had little use for the YMCA, but recalled, “Father Banahan was a wonderful man. . . . In his K of C hut you could always get free cigarettes, hot choco‑ late, candy bars, and reading material.” Elmer Sherwood of the 150th Field Artillery Regiment of the Rainbow Division recalled that he would walk several miles to the YMCA hut and buy what he could for his fellow

16


Indiana artillerymen.9 Too often, however, soldiers went without their monthly pay, and became what Pershing was determined they would not: a bunch of mendicants, asking for a free candy bar or pack of cigarettes. The men and women who managed huts were not oblivious of the cir‑ cumstances in which soldiers found themselves. This was especially true of those serving near the frontline trenches. During a heavy raid by the Germans on August 4, 1918, the soldiers of the 82nd Division saw a re‑ markable sight. With artillery rounds falling all around, Bernetta Miller of the YMCA calmly walked through the trenches, giving the troops hot chocolate, cake, and packs of cigarettes. With her brown curls under a doughboy’s helmet, Miller withstood the artillery and small-arms fire as well as any soldier. For this extraordinary act of bravery, Miller was men‑ tioned in the dispatches of the division for her “devotion to duty and disregard of personal danger.”10 When Miller had given out all she had, she returned to her hut, where she began to brew more hot chocolate for the troops in the trenches. There are numerous stories about the men and women of these volunteer organizations going into the trenches to give some comfort to the troops. The doughboys appear to have felt that those volunteers for the YMCA, Knights of Columbus, and Salvation Army who were right behind the dangerous trenches did a good job, while those farther away from shot, shell, and gas ignored the needs of the fighting soldiers. Eustace Fielder, now a sergeant, received a letter from home telling him that an old friend was considering volunteering for the YMCA in France. His response was firm and indicative of the soldiers’ attitudes: “You tell him that YMCA [recruiter] he does not know what he is talking about. . . . If he knew what the biggest part of the AEF thought of the YMCA he sure would not come over here.” Elmer Sherwood of the Rainbow Division was making ready to go into the Meuse-Argonne fight, and he recalled that the local YMCA man had gathered all of the candy, cakes, and cigarettes he could for Sherwood’s artillery regiment, which he gave away. Sherwood wrote in his diary, “He is a good scout but the organiz[ation] is simply too small for its great job.”11 Martin Hogan of the Shamrock Battalion of the 165th Infantry recalled that when his unit marched to the front to take over the fight from the bloodied 26th Yankee Division, a volunteer from the Knights of Columbus


17

simply gave away all of the supplies of candy, cakes, and cigarettes that he had in his hut.12 What was an ill-advised policy of the AEF’s commander had a serious effect on well-meaning volunteer organizations. The doughboys of the AEF had a legitimate complaint, and they voiced it through letters back home. The failure to provide comfort items for the troops had a serious effect on morale. The American Red Cross issued “comfort kits,” consisting of soap, washcloths, shaving gear, cigarettes, sta‑ tionery, and other items, to many of their ambulance drivers, wounded soldiers, and hospital workers. These kits were assembled from goods do‑ nated by Red Cross chapters in the United States, but very few kits were ever sent forward to the front lines.13 Civilian organizations tried to get goods to the troops in France, but shipping space was at such a premium that few large gift packages could be sent to the AEF. One organization that did have some clout was the New York Sun newspaper, which started the “Sun Fund” to provide com‑ fort items for the troops. The Sun, which is best remembered for its 1897 editorial “Yes, Virginia, There Is a Santa Claus,” had the advantage of be‑ ing one of New York’s most read daily papers and somehow secured the shipping space for large quantities of cigarettes that were sent to the troops and distributed by soldiers. Martin Hogan recalled, “But for no individual aid from back home has the AEF a more thankful memory than for The Sun Fund, whose tobacco supplies helped the men to stand up under their trials.”14 While certainly the Sun Fund gifts of tobacco were welcomed by the men fighting in France, a precedent was set that would bedevil the military during World War II. With five major civilian organizations trying to function in France, the competition for shipping space from the United States was fierce. General Pershing was not indifferent to the personal needs of his soldiers, but the military needs of the battlefield had to take precedence over comfort items. The chief executive officers of the YMCA in France sought and received an audience with Pershing, but he could spare them little time and could not be hopeful as to shipping space.15 After July 1918 the commanding general of the AEF and his staff had to plan for the early-September operation to reduce the Saint-Mihiel sa‑ lient. Following that attack, the AEF had to prepare for offensive operations in the Meuse-Argonne sector. In Pershing’s mind both Saint-Mihiel and

18


Meuse-Argonne would test the AEF, and would, if successful, prove to the European Allies that the AEF was the equal of any fighting force on the western front. To sustain two closely related combat operations, the Service of Supply had to get ammunition, food, clothing, medical supplies, and other important items to the soldiers who were to carry out the orders to move against a well-trained enemy in well-constructed defensive positions. There was no time to consider what the YMCA needed to maintain their huts. Soldiers could be away from their units to obtain comfort items while they needed to be preparing to carry out complex, detailed maneuvers. On the other hand, the doughboys, knowing that they were going into a serious fight, wanted those items such as cigarettes, candy, and cakes—small things that would make the upcoming battles a bit more endurable. The Saint-Mihiel operation, scheduled to begin on September 12, 1918, arrayed the best and most experienced divisions in the AEF: the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th of the Regular Army; the 26th and 42nd of the Nation‑ al Guard; and the 82nd, 89th, and 90th of the National Army. Despite the necessary military planning and briefings and a chaotic movement of supply vehicles, there were demands from the troops for comfort items. For example, Major John Paul Tyler, senior chaplain of the 82nd Division, had a large number of complaints from the regiments concerning the lack of cigarettes, candy, cakes, and writing paper. From what Tyler, who felt the pressure of preparing for the upcoming assault into the Saint-Mihiel salient, could gather, the YMCA, Salvation Army, and Knights of Columbus were out of supplies, and there was no coordination among the civilian volunteers serving the 82nd Division.16 The most pressing need was to see that his chaplains were prepared to deal with the wounded and to offer spiritual comfort to the dying, regardless of denomination or preferences. His efforts at bringing together the civil‑ ian agencies did not bear much fruit and could not, because they were all in competition for what few supplies were available. On the other hand, when comfort items were available, representatives did everything possible to get them to the troops, even if it meant going on the battlefield. A blind eye was turned to the AEF policy of charging for a pack of cigarettes or a candy bar when bullets flew and shrapnel cut the air. The fighting in the Meuse-Argonne was especially brutal. General Per‑ shing’s ideas about maneuver warfare simply did not work, and the AEF


19

found itself in bloody direct-frontal assaults on well-prepared and -defended German positions. To make matters worse, whereas the Saint-Mihiel offen‑ sive was made by the best-trained, most experienced divisions of the AEF, those who would make the first attacks into the Meuse-Argonne were un‑ tested, often poorly trained divisions, and the cost was high. The National Guard 35th Division’s YMCA representative, Henry J. Allen, who would later become the governor of Kansas, watched in hor‑ ror as the division sustained almost ten thousand casualties, and many of the wounded were left in the rain with poor medical treatment.17 Most of the YMCA personnel disregarded any directive to sell items and gave what they could to the growing number of casualties from the first phase of the fight in the Argonne, but there was precious little to give away. Pershing had to halt the Meuse-Argonne offensive as the tragic errors in planning became evident, and then he brought up the more experienced divisions to continue the battle. The longer these divisions were in combat, the more battle-wise the civilian soldiers became. The YMCA men knew that on some days a cigarette and candy bar were just as effective for morale as a bullet or bayonet. Mississippian Horace L. Baker of the hard-fighting 32nd Division recalled that on November 4 he entered the battered town of Cuneal and found that the YMCA had set up a hut there, ready to serve the troops.18 In October the 82nd Division attacked toward the town of Juvin and became involved in a costly fight with the German defenders. H. B. McAfee, the YMCA’s senior representative to the 82nd, saw the carnage as troops struggled to get through the barbed-wire defenses. Some companies had lost all their officers, and sergeants were directing the bloody assault. McAfee gathered as many candy bars, cakes, and cigarettes as he could and rushed forward with the troops, handing to each man something from his bags. Once he exhausted his supplies he went back to find more, and then refilled his bags and rushed forward again. For his gallantry that day he was mentioned in the General Orders of the 82nd Division for being “in the face of continual shell fire and sniping by rifles and machine guns, showing an entire disregard of his personal safety.”19 No one would ask McAfee if he charged for those small comfort items. On November 11, 1918, the Armistice went into effect, and the guns finally fell silent. This did not mean that the troops would be rushed home, because General Pershing had agreed to occupy a section of Germany,

20


west of the Rhine River. Many of the oldest, most battle-tested divisions began a march into what was enemy territory. Sergeant Eustace Fielder of Commissary Sales Unit No. 24 found himself in Antwerp, Belgium. Major Tyler, chief chaplain of the 82nd, organized the volunteer agencies to better serve the troops, but he was continually unable to procure the services of a Commissary Sales unit for his division.20 The May 1918 di‑ rective that made tobacco part of the soldiers’ rations remained in force as long as American troops remained in Europe, but even by the November Armistice the shipments of ration tobacco or comfort items to the troops were erratic at best. The U.S. Third Army, the army of occupation, made its headquarters at Koblenz, Germany, and Pershing insisted that the troops assigned to the Army had to maintain a full schedule of training. There was no guarantee that the November Armistice would hold together, and there were political troubles inside Germany. The Army commander, General George Dick‑ man, allowed for travel and recreation as well as serious training. Many of the doughboys were from small towns in the United States, and this was an opportunity to see Europe. Paris was a favorite place to visit, and the YMCA, Salvation Army, Knights of Columbus, and Jewish Welfare Board set up canteens for the soldiers, regardless of their religious preference. The Red Cross functioned mainly with the wounded and did quite well. Martin Hogan of the 42nd Division had been wounded in the Argonne and recalled that he was well treated by the Red Cross workers in France. Once on the ship to return to the United States, he remembered, “We had plenty of smokes; for the officers on the ship had made up a pool, and from this had supplied us with tobacco and chocolate from the ship’s canteen all the way over [to the United States]. This was appreciated more than the boys could tell them, because they had not been paid for some time and their money had given out.”21 An old problem had not been solved, and since the guns had fallen si‑ lent on the western front there was no sense of urgency in the War Depart‑ ment to deal with it. The supplying of comfort items to the troops would have to wait for another war. With no Post Exchanges functioning for the divisions of the Third Army, the YMCA had to continue to act as the source for candy, chewing gum, and tobacco. Of course, other agencies such as the Salvation Army and the Knights of Columbus were present as well, but for many of the


21

combat units who were on duty in Germany and along the lines of supply into Belgium, bitter memories of the war lingered concerning the YMCA. Elmer Sherwood of the 42nd Division serving in Germany wrote in his diary, “The months and months on the front when the Y did us no good we raved at it and it has become a habit to cuss it.”22 At Third Army headquarters all of the civilian agencies maintained liai‑ son officers and then opened huts for the troops on occupation duty. The Third Army published a small booklet of thoughts about occupation duty and the civilian volunteers that worked along the Rhine with the American forces. The anonymous writer wrote, “The Y.M.C.A. had put up a tent and there was something doing there every night. The girls [of the YWCA] put on some ‘home talent’ shows that were wonders. There had been box‑ ing, until with nothing else to do, it had gotten old. And now after a few days of ‘minstrels,’ things began to drag a little.”23 There seemed to be no sense of urgency in supplying the troops with comfort items, and the civilian volunteers had to shoulder a burden that rightfully belonged to the Army. The War Department was greatly con‑ cerned about recouping moneys from the tobacco companies that saw the demands of the War Department rise after the inclusion of tobacco in the overseas ration. In the haste to procure tobacco, the price of tobacco was not clearly set, and the War Department and the tobacco companies were at loggerheads over what was charged by the companies to meet the de‑ mands of war.24 The Office of the Quartermaster General disliked dealing with civilian tobacco companies, since its tasks in a postwar Army were considerable. Accountability for equipment, for example, was in sham‑ bles. Many discharged doughboys were simply allowed to return to their homes with all of their field gear, except for weapons. Troop comfort items had to take a backseat to the formidable amount of work that had to be done. Units in Europe could issue passes for soldiers to visit Paris and other places, but the task of finding them rooms and providing meals fell to agencies, and the YMCA performed well. The YMCA also opened a leave center in Aix-les-Bains in the Savoy region of France. The center had a hotel and casino (which did not operate while doughboys were there) that overlooked a large, beautiful lake. Major General James G. Harbord, who had been Pershing’s chief of staff, commander of the battle-worthy 2nd Division, and commander of the Service of Supply, visited the center and

22


recalled, “I went there to see how ‘our boys’ are being looked after. . . . [It] is now echoing to the voices of Yanks and Y.M.C.A. girls and to the shuffle of their dancing feet. The Y.M.C.A. to get the casino has to take over the lease and the list of employees, including the Grand Croupier, or boss gambler, to whom they still pay francs 500 monthly, and have nothing for him to do.” The center had to be closed for a while in February 1919 due to an outbreak of the dreaded influenza, but it did provide a successful, safe, and inexpensive recreational area for the doughboys.25 The quartermaster general did not like the idea of providing tobacco in the soldiers’ ration, and when the Third Army ended its occupation of Germany, the special addition to the ration ended. The contention between the Office of the Quartermaster General and the major tobacco producers continued well into the 1920s. The R. J. Reynolds Company, manufacturing Camel cigarettes and Prince Albert pipe tobacco, informed the office that it had provided tobacco at the price of more than ten mil‑ lion dollars.26 Other major tobacco companies charged about the same for their products. It was a cost that the Army did not like, and it was happy to get out of the wartime procurement of tobacco for the troops. The major problem was that after every war, there were lessons learned. The Army did not take into consideration that when a massive mobiliza‑ tion occurred, the National Guard was called to the colors and a draft was in force, and those citizen soldiers wanted comfort items such as cigarettes, candy, chewing gum, and the like available. As far as the post–World War I regular soldiers were concerned, the Post Exchange could very well an‑ swer the soldiers’ demands for comfort items at a low cost. There were some concessions to the soldiers’ smoking habits. For Commissary Sales the Army allowed the purchase of tax-free cigarettes for the troops with definite limitations. The position of the quartermaster general was, “In supplying the Army with tax-free cigarettes and smoking tobacco, in order that the privilege may not be abused, all Quartermasters are cautioned to make it their personal business to see that only reasonable quantities of tax-free tobacco products are sold and that sales are made only to those who are authorized to purchase.”27 To further reinforce the quartermaster general’s position, a short memo‑ randum to the adjutant general of the Army stated, “No tobacco was given away by the Army.”28 Although not exactly accurate given the addition to the doughboys’ rations, it was clear that the Army wanted no part of buy‑


23

ing any more tobacco or other comfort items other than for Commissary Sales, which normally maintained a thirty-day supply of tobacco to ensure freshness of the products. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Army remained small and isolated from the general population. As it happened after the Civil War, the Army had a small budget and too many missions. Soldiers’ pay was very low, and purchases of comfort items at a reasonable price at the PX were im‑ portant. The Army, and this include the Army Air Force, was scattered from the continental United States to Hawaii and the Philippine Islands. After World War I the United States was content to be secure behind the two great oceans. The Great War was a memory that for many veterans was a bitter one. With the rise of Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and imperial Japan in the Far East, it seemed the sacrifices made on the battlefields of France were in vain. Europe’s problems were exactly that— Europe’s problems. By the end of the 1920s, America was in the midst of the Great Depression and looked even more inward, away from the political turmoil in Europe and Asia. Going into the late 1930s life in the “Old Army” was secure and tedious. In a few years the armed forces would be forced to react to the rising tensions in Europe and Asia, and the Post Exchanges would be changing the way they did business.

2

´ P r epa r e d ne s s a n d Wa r

George Catlett Marshall became the Army chief of staff in September 1939. A graduate of the Virginia Military Institute in 1902, Marshall attracted the attention of his superior officers and was the star of the staff of the 1st Infantry Division in the Great War. His staff work as the division’s operations officer during the fight at Cantigny, which was the 1st Division’s first major combat operation, marked him as an offi‑ cer with a future. After the 1918 Cantigny fight Marshall continued to serve as the operations officer for the Aisne-Marne, Saint-Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. After World War I he became the aide to General John J. Pershing from 1919 to 1924. After his assignment as aide, Marshall went to China to command the 15th Infantry Regiment from 1924 to 1927. From 1933 to 1936 Colonel George C. Marshall became the senior instructor to the Illinois National Guard. When President Franklin Roosevelt selected him to be the chief of staff, he had the benefit of varied and important staff and infantry assignments. Like his predecessor General Malin Craig, he was concerned about the lack of preparedness in the face of rising tensions in Europe. Marshall had been involved in every level of soldier life, and he understood that morale was a critical factor for any army. But when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Marshall had no time to worry about what Commissary Sales units or Post Ex‑ changes offered for sale. As long as the Army was a professional, allvolunteer force, there was little to concern the chief of staff or the Department of the Army in Washington. If soldiers wanted packs 24

P r e pa r e d n e s s a n d War

25

of cigarettes, candy bars, or writing paper, they could buy them at the PX or the sales units. Soldiers or sailors in government hospitals could rely on the American Red Cross to provide comfort items and tax-free cigarettes as a part of their work in the hospital. In 1927, for example, the Red Cross purchased more than seven million Lucky Strike cigarettes and more than twenty-two thousand one-ounce bags of Bull Durham smoking tobacco.1 The “Grey Ladies” volunteers also distributed toilet articles such as razors, toothbrushes, and toothpaste to those who arrived at the hospital with nothing. The distribution of cigarettes and smoking tobacco by the Red Cross was extended to veter‑ ans’ hospitals, and, like the program in military hospitals, cigarettes and smoking tobacco were limited to patients only. For example, in two years, 1935 to 1937, the St. Louis, Missouri, chapter of the Red Cross ordered a million and a half cigarettes for distribution. Over the Christmas holidays in 1940, with the draft and call-up of the National Guard in force, many of the chapters gave away a special gift of one pack of cigarettes to patients and to Army hospital corpsmen.2 The Red Cross began this policy of dis‑ tribution during the Great War under the heading of “war service,” and the Army was very happy to allow the Red Cross to continue providing for military and veterans’ hospitals. Quantities of comfort items were shipped to American bases in Ameri‑ can Samoa, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands in 1939, 1940, and 1941 on supply ships. Commissary Sales units and Post Exchanges stocked the items that soldiers wanted but were not issued. As long as the United States was at peace and the Army relied on recruiters, there was no need to expand what the Army saw as items that were not part of the ration system. When the United States entered the Great War in April 1917, there was no plan for overseas deployment and training, and by the end of the war in November 1918 it was obvious that those divisions that were well trained in France did well under fire, while others rushed to the front had poor to disappointing records in combat. Marshall had witnessed this and was determined not to repeat the errors. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson were equally concerned, but little was done until the Germans overran France in a few weeks in May 1940 and Britain stood alone against a well-prepared, -led, and -equipped Ger‑ man war machine. After much discussion and pressure on Congress, the

26


Selective Service Act was passed in September 1940. This was the first peacetime conscription in American history, and draftees were to serve for one year. At the same time Marshall got the authority to call the National Guard to service for one year. One biographer of Marshall wrote, “The Selective Service Act of 1940 was written by the glare of burning English cities.”3 In a short space of time there were a half-million men undergoing train‑ ing in 1940. There was a sorting-out process as far as older or incompetent officers were concerned, and Marshall was determined to get rid of men who were too old or too ready to rely on old-school solutions to press‑ ing modern battlefield problems. Those who opposed the establishment of tank or airborne forces had to be pushed aside. Marshall was especially outraged at the failure of the quartermaster general’s staff to supply needed uniforms, equipment, and subsistence to the troops training in the large-scale maneuvers. It became quite clear that there had to be a massive reorganization of the quartermaster acquisition and supply system. The system simply could not cope with the influx of men from the start of the draft and the call-up of the National Guard. General Marshall then decided that the War Department and the supply system had to be reorganized in order to be ready if the United States was drawn into a war. In November 1941 Brigadier General Brehon Burke Somervell, a West Point graduate from Tennessee, became the chief logis‑ tician of the Army. A man who could engender strong emotions because of a brusque, no-nonsense manner, Somervell performed brilliantly.4 His appointment would have a direct bearing on the development of the Army Post Exchange system in World War II. Having seen the Army buildup in France during the Great War, General Marshall was not oblivious to the needs of soldiers. He was concerned for the morale of the troops and knew that troops not in combat needed recre‑ ational time provided by the Army. President Roosevelt was also concerned that soldiers with too much time on their hands could get into trouble, and in August 1941 Frederick Henry Osborn was appointed brigadier general in charge of providing wholesome and healthy recreational activities for the Army. Osborn was an interesting choice. Born to a wealthy family in 1889, he attended Princeton University, graduating in 1910. Unable to qualify for military service in 1917, Osborn went to France with the Red Cross


27

and served as commander of the Zone of Advance. There he had ample opportunity to observe the morale needs of the doughboys at the front. After the war Osborn devoted his life to the study of eugenics and helped found the Office of Population Research at his alma mater in 1936. He questioned the widely held belief that African Americans were somehow less intelligent than whites. In 1940 President Roosevelt selected Osborn to chair the Civilian Advisory Committee on Selective Service. A man of great intellect and energy, Osborn was made the chair of the Army’s Com‑ mittee on Welfare and Recreation. When the United States entered World War II, Osborn became the chief of the Morale Branch in the War Department and was commissioned a brigadier general. He was a man who was not content to read reports from the field, and by the end of the war he had the European and Asiatic Theaters of Operations Medals, a Bronze Star, and a Distinguished Service Medal. Here was a man who could cooperate fully with the Army Exchange Service because the Morale Branch and the AES were in the same business: providing morale-building services to the mass of men and women pour‑ ing into the training camps in the United States and then extending those services to the overseas combat areas. With no military experience, Osborn visited military posts to evaluate the availability of recreational equipment and the effectiveness of those of‑ ficers appointed as recreation officers. Too often officers would be assigned recreational duties when they had not done well in their military-career field. Osborn, however, saw his role as the catalyst for recreational activi‑ ties on the ball field or in the post Service Club, where soft drinks, coffee, and writing paper were available for off-duty soldiers. It was anticipated that the new emphasis on troop morale and recreation would reap ben‑ efits, but it did not address the comfort needs of the soldiers.5 While the Army was undergoing a massive transformation with the Se‑ lective Service and the mobilized National Guard, the president was busy reshaping the civilian sector for possible war. On April 11, 1941, an Ex‑ ecutive Order established the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPA), and on January 1942, in the wake of Pearl Harbor and the state of war between the United States and Germany, the War Production Board (WPB) was established. Both organizations would have a direct impact on the development and operation of the Army Post Exchanges during the war.

28


With a massive building program in place and with the training of sol‑ diers who could soon be in combat, Somervell could not devote any time to Post Exchanges. Candy bars, chewing gum, and cigarettes were on the bottom of the Army’s list of concerns. Those small items, on the other hand, were of great concern to the men in the ranks. During the Louisiana and Tennessee maneuvers, soldiers with a shopping list could sneak away to a town to buy small amounts of comfort items, but if the United States entered the war the system in place would not be up to the task. World War I had shown that a chaotic system of civilian support for the troops in training or in combat did not work well, and the soldiers would be the ones to suffer if the situation was not corrected. George C. Marshall and the War Department were staggered by the mounting requirements of training and equipping the Regular Army, draftees, and National Guard troops. There were too many staff officers who had direct access to Marshall, and he found himself too often deal‑ ing with petty matters and interdepartmental squabbles. The whole of the staff had to be reorganized, trimmed down in size, and made more effi‑ cient. In March 1942 Marshall, with the approval of President Roosevelt, announced a major new organization with only three officers having im‑ mediate contact with Chief of Staff Marshall. They were the chief of Army ground forces, the chief of Army air forces, and the Service of Supply, which would soon be known as the Army Service Forces (ASF). Marshall knew soldiers and knew what mischief they could do if left to their own devices. The dramatic buildup of the Army in 1940 and 1941 presented the problem of what a soldier, when his time allowed, would do when in the towns near the ever-expanding camps. Access to liquor, and often at the mercy of local barkeeps and merchants, made for a potentially explosive mixture. To combat this, the Army and the president prevailed upon the six leading civilian agencies—the YMCA (still smarting from its bad reputation during the Great War), YWCA, National Catholic Com‑ munity Service, National Travelers Aid Association, Salvation Army, and National Jewish Welfare Board—to unite in a single effort that became, on February 4, 1941, the USO, the United Service Organizations. The USO had one mission: to provide “a home away from home” for service mem‑ bers. The USO centers offered light refreshments, writing paper, coffee, soft drinks, doughnuts, and sandwiches. There were dances organized, and young women volunteers, after being carefully screened, served as host‑


29

esses and dance partners. Alcoholic beverages were not served, nor were drunkenness and lewd behavior tolerated. No one in February 1941 could have envisioned the worldwide mission of the USO, which would grow to three thousand centers by 1944. There was still a void, however, for the comfort of the troops. The old system of Post Exchanges and Commissary Sales simply could not cope with the massive influx of new troops. As far as General Somervell and the Army Service Forces were concerned, the needs of the Army for equip‑ ment, vehicles, weapons, and subsistence far outweighed the soldiers’ desires for candy bars, chewing gum, and cigarettes. If the situation was not controlled in some reasonable manner, it could become a nuisance of growing proportions. To remedy this, the Army Exchange Service was born to provide for the troops and to lift a burden from the shoulders of Somervell and his hard-pressed staff. The basis of the AES was that the sol‑ dier would get “his fair share” of what he enjoyed in civilian life. By 1943 the AES would become the world’s largest department store chain, having grown from a place to buy at low cost a few luxuries to a store offering almost anything the soldier could want. The USO and the AES would be success stories and show what civilian volunteers or businessmen taken into the service can do. On June 28, 1941, a War Department circular created a morale branch that would deal with the questions of exchange items and recreational needs of the influx of troops. The World War II Army Exchange Service came into being at that time. The problem was who would command such an operation and create a system to supply comfort items to the troops. In 1942 Joseph W. Byron was asked to take over the Post Exchanges, and there was no better choice for the task. Born in South Dakota in 1892, he was appointed to West Point, and upon graduation served in the Mexi‑ can punitive expedition as a cavalry officer. He manifested an interest in the new tank corps, and in 1918 he arrived in France assigned to the 304th Tank Battalion. Seeing no combat action, Byron returned to the United States in early 1919. He resigned from the army as a major in 1919 and had a successful career in business. With war clouds on the horizon, Byron served as a dollar-a-year man on the War Department’s General Staff. There he had an opportunity to observe the relationship between the War Production Board and the Army and to learn just how the General Staff felt about

30


supplying the troops with comfort items. When taking the job as direc‑ tor of the AES, he could no longer be the dollar-a-year volunteer and was commissioned a brigadier general in the Army of the United States, and in 1944 was promoted to the rank of major general after he had assumed command of the Special Services Division in November 1943. He would serve the war effort until 1946. Initially, the AES had a limited role, offering candy, tobacco, chew‑ ing gum, and cleaning equipment. It had to be recognized that at some point there would be different needs for those in training in the United States and those in overseas theaters of operation. As the Service of Supply evolved into the Army Service Forces, the leadership of the AES constantly enlarged the offerings of the PX, much to the distress of local merchants, barkeeps, and political pressure groups. There would not be comprehen‑ sive Army regulations until well into 1943. Byron was very clear as to what the mission of the AES was: “Unlike other branches of the Army, Army Exchange Service is not supported by appropriated funds. It is a self-sustaining business enterprise and if any profit is made, it goes back to the soldier in the form of dividends to orga‑ nization funds for the benefit of enlisted personnel. Officers may patronize the PX but they don’t share in the profits.” Being an experienced soldier, Byron knew that there were many complaints by merchants and political pressure groups about the PX system. To justify the existence of the Post Exchanges he wrote, “The civilian population as a whole want soldiers to have beer, soft drinks, candy, cigarettes, and other items to their hearts’ content. A full supply of these items build morale and will keep soldiers away from saloons and other activities in the same category.”6 Since the exchanges received no appropriated funds, they had to bor‑ row money just to get started. Late in 1941, Byron secured a two million– dollar line of credit from the Defense Supplies Corporation, and by the late summer of 1943 the total amount supplied to the AES was more than fifty million dollars. These funds were in turn loaned to the exchanges, which paid them back out of the profits, and then the remaining funds were made available for post recreational facilities. Byron added, “These dollars translated into cigarettes and candy bars, fruit juices and soft drinks, shaving cream and ice cream, magazines and books, fountain pens and stationery, and all the little items while a necessity at home, which are luxuries to the soldier.”7


31

The emphasis Byron placed on supplying the enlisted men with lowcost items was well placed, but what to do about the officers leading men through training and eventually combat? The historic idea that the PX should be a place where the troops went to relax, freed from the presence of demanding officers, was a good one. Officers, however, often had less free time than the enlisted troops due to training meetings, preparations for the next day’s exercises, and so forth. Consequently, the Army Exchange Service established PXs for officers only, which stocked the same basic items as carried by the regular PX, except that the offerings in uniforms and insignia were for officers only. The officers’ PX was usually a smaller building with a reduced number of staff. Officers were discouraged from using the PX snack bar for hamburgers, Coca-Colas, and beer because on most posts there was an officers’ club, often supplied with these items by the Post Exchange. The officers’ clubs could offer hard drinks, and most did, but the Army Exchange Service did not provide hard alcohol to the clubs. The unwritten rule about the snack bar was a sound one, because 3.2 beer was served there and it was possible that a soldier might drink too much of the cold brew, and if his officers were there it was possible that an embarrassing (or worse) incident could take place. This system was fine for the United States and stabilized overseas areas such as Australia, England, North Africa, India, and, eventually, Italy, but once combat began, having two PXs was not practical. Once in battle, troops would be provided by quartermaster rations that would be dis‑ tributed equally among all in combat. It was expected that officers would wait until their men were served first with what became known as “PX supplies.” It was traditional that a good officer placed the welfare and comfort of his troops before his own. When hot chow was served in the field, the offi‑ cer saw that all of his soldiers were fed before going through the mess line. Nothing could be more detrimental to a unit’s morale than an officer who placed himself first in the mess line or took his PX supplies before his men. Byron had been a soldier and knew that there had to be dividing lines between those who commanded and those who were subject to those or‑ ders. It was then important that the Army Exchange Service establish the officers’ PX wherever practical for morale, unit cohesion, and discipline.

32


Byron did not discourage news articles about the expansion of the AES, which, after December 1941, extended to North Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean. General Byron could proclaim that the PX was “one of the greatest morale-boosting organizations in the world.” He knew that there were constant complaints that civilians had access to low-cost items such as candy, and especially cigarettes, sold by the Post Exchange. The policy was that civilians working on post could buy items for personal use only while on the grounds of the military installation. As critical shortages began to occur in 1943 and 1944, particularly cigarettes, candy bars, soft drinks, and beer, exchange officers had to be vigilant so that no items left the confines of the installation. The exchange officers had to be very careful that orders were placed with a number of suppliers. Any hint of preferential treatment by the exchange officer was sure to bring many letters of complaint to the War Department, to congressmen, and even to President Roosevelt. Into 1942 the exchanges operated without specific orders or updated regulations. In March 1942 the AES articulated its relationship to the War Department, stating, “Army exchanges operate under the administrative control of United States Army Officers, and perform a necessary function delegated to the exchanges by the Army.” The Service of Supply made it quite clear that the exchanges could be subject to lawsuits, and Byron stated, “[The exchanges’] obligations are not obligations of the United States.”8 After December 7, 1941, the Army experienced a massive influx of new volunteers and conscripts. Patriotism was at its highest level, and as the Army increased there was a massive movement from the civilian sector to help support the troops. At the forefront of the movement to supply com‑ fort items such as candy and cigarettes were the veterans’ organizations. Most of the veterans served in France during the Great War and recalled their own problems in obtaining any sort of comfort items. The YMCA, still smarting from the hard feelings of the doughboys of 1917–1918, wanted no part of being a conduit for gifts for the troops. The YMCA had joined the United Service Organizations, and the USO was less than a year old when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Civic projects to supply the troops with comfort items threatened to be‑ come a distraction for the War Department and the Army Service Forces. Storage and shipping space was at a premium, and there were few controls


33

over what civilians were doing in raising funds for the troops. On March 13, 1941, President Roosevelt established the President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies with the mission of controlling the ever-expanding civilian groups that solicited funds or items for domestic and foreign relief (such as the Bundles for Britain), relief for those affected by fighting, for the welfare of the troops and their dependents, and for other charitable designations. The situation became critical, and in late July 1942 the committee be‑ came the President’s War Relief Control Board, with broad powers to deny or authorize fund-raising activities. The Board, as it was known, acted based on the fact that the American Red Cross, the USO, and the Army and Navy exchanges would provide what troops needed as far as luxury items were concerned. The number of organizations offering aid to the troops mushroomed by the end of 1941. Organizations and companies such as Comic Cartoon Publishing, the National Recreation Association, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, American Safety Razor Company, Smokes for Yanks, New York Library Association, Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), Cigar Institute of America, and Sigma Kappa Inter‑ national Sorority were just a few of the many groups asking permission to aid the troops.9 To deny these organizations the right to raise funds carried a political price, but the Board dealt with each request as quickly and fairly as possible given the wartime situation. There were so many organizations and so many schemes to provide for the troops that the legitimate ones were viewed as well-meaning nuisances. The Board also had to decide what groups were scams and what groups had too large a percentage of the contributed money going for administra‑ tive salaries or services. General Byron did not want charitable or patriotic organizations to compete with the exchange system. Many of the groups with political clout that were turned down by the Board for registration as a recognized organization bombarded their senators and congressmen with complaints and demands for intervention with the War Relief Con‑ trol Board. Byron had no intention of allowing the AES to remain a small opera‑ tion, especially with the massive expansion of the Army, but not everyone was in favor of the expansion. For example, the commanding general of the 8th Service Command, located in Dallas, Texas, complained about the “overexpansion” of the AES. He stated that local retail merchants

34


“registered their alarm over the increase in volume of exchange business and the increase in classes of merchandise sold by Exchanges throughout the country.” The exchanges, under Byron’s guidance, had indeed offered more than just candy bars, cigarettes, and other supplies that were the main offerings of the old PX before the entrance of the United States in World War II. The AES argued that soldiers’ pay was low, and the mass of men and women coming into the service were privates, consequently with little money. Second, the vast majority of service personnel were in intense training for combat overseas and had little time to leave the confines of the military post and go into town. To add to his list of complaints, the commander of the 8th Service Command added a rather strange state‑ ment: “Encroachment upon the business of the retail merchant will result in drastic curtailment of Army Exchange operations.”10 If that sort of logic swayed General Byron and his staff, it was not evi‑ dent, because the exchanges also opened snack bars that served the Ameri‑ can staples of hamburgers, hot dogs, Coca-Colas, and milk shakes. The operation of the AES snack bars would have to be reconciled with the aims of various government agencies tasked with rationing food. At some point a determination would have to be made whether the AES expansion into the food business was in line with wartime rationing and with directives from the Office of Price Administration. To complicate the picture, in early 1942 the decision was made to sell beer in military facilities run by the AES. The sale of beer was limited to beer with 3.2 percent alcoholic content, far less than a soldier could purchase in civilian establishments. Energetic exchange officers went to work to decide which brand of this now-called Army Beer to sell to their patrons. One exchange officer at the large Patterson Field facility in Ohio polled the troops and found that the most popular brands to be sold in the exchange Tap Room would be Bud‑ weiser, Pabst, and Schlitz. These would be served in draft form rather than bottles at a savings of 33 percent for the soldiers. A brewery located about eight miles from Patterson Field did not receive any orders and prompt‑ ly complained to its congressman that transportation imposed limits on bottles and kegs and that brewing restrictions imposed by the rationing agencies made the acquisition of nationwide popular beer brands a matter of discrimination against local breweries.11 Nothing would cause as much trouble for the exchange system as ciga‑ rettes and beer. The War Relief Control Board viewed the AES, USO,


35

and American Red Cross as special agencies, important for the war effort. The AES served the needs through the PX, while the USO operated cen‑ ters and dispensed sandwiches, hot coffee, and a little taste of home. The American Red Cross was seen as a quasi-governmental agency with its own managerial system. The ARC operated mainly in the hospitals, but as the war expanded the Red Cross also operated centers and huts in the combat area. Both the ARC and the USO stated firmly that there would be no alcoholic beverages served at any function. The ARC distributed cigarettes in the hospitals, and their supplies came directly from the manufacturers on a tax-free basis. The USO also bought tax-free cigarettes from the same sources, but they were sold on a nonprofit basis. Remembering the bad reputation that the YMCA had garnered in World War I, the USO was adamant that it would not be a participant in any public solicitation for cigarettes and tobacco. If the USO joined in any campaign to provide free cigarettes and other forms of tobacco and then charged for their own stock of cigarettes, it would quickly become “that damned USO.”12 With controls by the Office of Price Administration and the restrictions placed on American industry by the War Production Board, the USO and ARC had, given their status, a good ongoing supply of items. While all of this sounded like a reasonable approach to supply comfort items to the troops, the system was quickly challenged by politics and by celebrities. Mrs. Edward G. Robinson, wife of one of the best-known Hollywood actors of the time, proposed a campaign whereby a person who bought a pack of cigarettes for his own use would then buy a second pack to be given to service personnel. Within a few days the USO said no, citing its established policy of charging for cigarettes at cost and as a convenience for the troops. Also, Harper Sibley, president of the USO, told Joseph E. Davies, chairman of the War Relief Control Board, that to collect packs of cigarettes from hundreds of locations, sort them, package them, and then find shipping space would stretch the ability of the USO to its limits and cost money that otherwise could be used to offer the troops soft drinks, coffee, cakes, and sandwiches in the USO centers.13 It would become dif‑ ficult to say no to such a celebrity. Political pressure groups also posed a special problem for the AES be‑ cause of beer sales. Many of the states maintained their “dry” laws after the repeal of the constitutional amendment banning the manufacture and sale of all alcoholic beverages, and Prohibitionists could be a potent force.

36


During World War I the advocates of Prohibition persuaded the Army to ban alcohol on military property. Smarting from their defeat with the repeal of Prohibition, Prohibitionists constantly argued for alcoholfree installations. They painted pictures of drunken soldiers and sailors in uniform falling down in an alcohol-induced stupor on the streets of towns near the Army posts and Naval bases. The situation became seri‑ ous enough in 1942 to prompt the Office of War Information to issue a lengthy press release to the public. First, the office denied stories of a large number of military personnel staggering about towns, and then stated, “The sale of 3.2 beer in the post exchanges in training camps is a positive factor in Army sobriety.”14 After Pearl Harbor and well into 1942 the Army Exchange Service had to deal with problems as soon as they arose. There was little or no time for a study of the situation, nor were there weeks or months available for longterm debates. General Byron had little patience with those who were not motivated to get the job done, and quickly. Consequently, there were few standard policies concerning the operation of the PXs, and after Novem‑ ber 1942 the exchanges included England and North Africa in their areas of operation. The North Africa invasion, known as Operation Torch, was successful, and American troops were stationed in Morocco and Algeria. Within eleven months after Pearl Harbor the United States mounted a sealand operation, and as General Byron envisioned it the PX would not be far behind. In England American troops were arriving in ever-increasing numbers to train and prepare for the cross-Channel invasion of France. These were the same soldiers who used the PX in their camps and training areas in the United States, and they wanted no less overseas. One sergeant wrote to the Washington Post asking where the PXs selling American goods were. His main complaint was that American cigarettes were in very short supply and were rationed because “English weeds are not only foul but expensive.”15 American GIs did not like the British beer and made it very clear that they wanted American beer. In November the AES estimated that the average GI smoked a pack and a half per day, or thirty cigarettes.16 Consumption was likely to increase as training intensified or as troops went into combat. Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay, assistant chief of staff for material, was known for his organizational abilities, a reputation crowned by Clay


37

becoming the youngest brigadier general in the Army. He proposed a twotier system for the AES in early December 1942. In a memorandum that would be seen by General Somervell, Clay pointed out that there was a definite rule governing how the AES purchased supplies, and there needed to be a clear line between troops training in the United States and those deployed to overseas areas. With rationing in force in the United States, it seemed reasonable for the AES to be restricted in the purchase of sup‑ plies. The AES would have to abide by rulings of the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. Clay pointed out that sugar was strictly rationed for the civilian population and that soldiers training in the United States received their rations through the Army subsistence program. The AES requirements for sugar for their soda fountains and for other food items were very high and should be subject to policies issued by the OPA and the WPB. On the other hand, there should be no limitations on AES requests in the overseas areas. He wrote, “It is believed that the soldier overseas should be supplied with Post Exchange supplies to the greatest extent possible un‑ der the shipping limitations.”17 What exactly were shipping restrictions? It was not clear how much shipping space could be designated for the AES because of the position taken by the Army that the GIs overseas would get what they enjoyed in civilian life. Once that was articulated, often as a way to calm fears held by families with loved ones overseas in combat or as a call to respond favorably to wartime rationing, then the Army had to make good on the promises. No one could have envisioned what that meant for shipping. At the highest point in the war the Office of the Quartermaster General had to make room for about eight and a half million cases of beer, or twenty million gallons. This meant 220,000 tons of shipping space.18 Special containers had to be constructed for beer shipments, and the Army and Navy competed for the containers until 1944, when the quartermas‑ ter general decided to purchase all of the containers and then fill what the Army and Navy saw as their needs.19 The beer problem was complicated by the very nature of World War II. The war effort was and still is seen as an Atlantic and a Pacific war, but the AES was faced with serving U.S. military personnel in many places. For ex‑ ample, between January 1 and May 31, 1943, the AES received a 99,000case requirement (one case equaled forty-eight cans) for Iceland; 60,000

38


cases were ordered by the Canal Zone; 23,406 cases were earmarked for Tehran, Iran; 101,250 cases were sent to Argentina; and 55,118 were re‑ quired for AES facilities in Cairo, Egypt. The partial list, which did not in‑ clude shipments to Italy, Britain, and Australia, included twenty-five AES exchanges everywhere from Bora Bora to Greenland, Karachi to Liberia.20 One issue that needed to be settled was what actually constituted over‑ seas service and who could be given tax-free status. In April 1942 the AES had an official ruling that declared Hawaii, American Samoa, Alaska, and Guam to be overseas service and eligible for tax-free benefits, and the Treasury Department agreed as long as a special tax stamp was affixed to cigarettes, smoking tobacco, and playing cards. This special label would clearly state that the item was to be sold to armed forces personnel only. Alaska and Hawaii were special problems because military posts and bases existed side by side with large civilian communities, and possibili‑ ties of civilians getting tax-free tobacco were great. The overseas price for a pack of cigarettes was five cents, far below what civilians paid and well below the twenty-five cents for two packs sold in exchanges in the Unit‑ ed States. The Treasury Department was quick to issue a ruling stating that waivers would be granted to serve the needs of the troops overseas.21 Hawaii was especially important because the islands were used as staging areas for ground troops and for the Army Air Force that would soon be committed against the Japanese. While beer shipments to thirsty GIs were very large, there had to be space for the other GI giants such as Coca-Cola, chewing gum, candy bars, and cigarettes. The AES constantly revised its needs upward as more troops went overseas. At a conference with the quartermaster general’s staff, Lieu‑ tenant Colonel Karl A. Gardner, AES director of purchasing, stated that it was estimated “the list [of requirements for purchasing from civilian sources] actually calls for 15,600 candy bars for 1,000 men for 30 days. This means 15.6 bars per man for 30 days.” The AES called for an esti‑ mated two packs of cigarettes per soldier per day. Input from commanders in the field indicated that a plan for two packs per day available at overseas exchanges was advisable. Gardner stated, “I found myself smoking two packages, and I noticed [on a recent trip to evaluate Army exchanges] some of the other men smoking more than I did even.”22 Two problems emerged with overseas supplies for the AES. Field com‑ manders and their troops expected the best the United States could provide


39

for combat. There had to be enough shipping space to ensure new items for lost or destroyed field gear such as canteens, mess kits, helmets, am‑ munition pouches, and damaged weapons. Also, the AES had to compete for space with the USO and the American Red Cross, which had their own requirements for serving the needs of the troops. The home folks and soldiers expected that the Red Cross would offer cheer and free cigarettes for wounded soldiers. The USO also had its own needs for its overseas can‑ teens. As battle casualties mounted, the intensity of supplying the troops with comfort items grew. What had emerged by the end of 1942 was a complex system of rela‑ tionships. The AES had to deal with competing organizations for goods and, most important, shipping space. The Red Cross had a long-standing special relationship with the government. The USO, which provided so many centers and first-class shows for the GIs in the United States and overseas, also made its demands on goods and shipping space. On Decem‑ ber 5, 1942, Brigadier General Lucius Clay wrote a memorandum to Gen‑ eral Somervell and his staff advocating a plan for the exchanges’ acquisition of supplies that would limit items offered by the exchanges by making the AES fall into line with rationing as instituted by the Office of Price Administration and the War Production Board. If the AES had to comply with the regulations, it would then become a small organization, offering little to the troops. Of course, Clay wrote that the troops overseas would be fully supplied, and there the AES could order supplies on an equal foot‑ ing with the Quartermaster General’s Office.23 This did not sit well with Byron, who did not want the AES involved in the national rationing system, which he saw as chaotic. Clay had hinted that certain items should be part of the rations for the troops. In Byron’s mind that meant an issue of cigarettes, candy, and soft drinks, and he responded, “It is also essential that they [the soldiers] be able to procure a good wristwatch, pen and pencil. The theoretical issue of such items does not always meet the practical need.” In his heated reply to Clay’s memorandum Byron added, “Having spent fourteen months in the War Production Board, I know the War Production Board and Office of Price Administration leaders toward the Exchange system. The battle cry, ‘Leaks to Civilians,’ is an overworked one, and is most often used by administra‑ tive personnel with long periods of service in Washington and little field experience.”24

40


As Byron and his staff prepared the final draft of his reply, the above paragraph was omitted because it could very well have fanned the fires of dispute between the AES and other governmental agencies. Frankly, the AES had exceeded its original purpose, and many exchanges were offering services such as barbershops, laundries, snack bars, beer halls, and the like. As combat in Europe and the Pacific intensified and as more volunteers and conscripts filled training camps, the expansion of the Post Exchange system continued. There was no lack of civilian workers in the exchanges, but Byron and his staff wanted to professionalize the position of Post Exchange officer. To achieve this, the first of the exchange officer courses was established at Princeton University in New Jersey. The Army already had in place the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), which had students at vari‑ ous land-grant colleges and universities through the country. An exchange officer course did not seem to be out of place. With casualties mounting by November 1943, the Army began reducing the ASTP, sending many into infantry divisions scheduled for deployment overseas. The exchange officer program had to be reduced as well. Byron and his staff could look over 1942 and see expansion of the AES with more troops being served across the world. The offerings of the exchanges increased dramatically, responding to the demands of the soldiers in training camps and in combat. Paperwork also increased, as did problems with procurement and distribution in the most unexpect‑ ed places. For example, the Birmingham, Alabama, headquarters for the Birmingham Ordnance District reported that in one year the exchange had accumulated surplus funds of $459, and the exchange officer and the commanding officer of the district informed the 4th Corps headquarters in Atlanta that the exchange funds would “be used to partly finance pic‑ nics, dances, and other party-type entertainments open to all officers and civilian employees of the Birmingham Ordnance District.” Although this appears to be a petty matter, it was not for the AES, which had histori‑ cally directed that the district had no enlisted personnel, and if that was the case, why did it have an exchange?25 Since there was no reason to have one, the exchange was closed down and the funds sent to the War Depart‑ ment, “for the benefit of the Army as a whole.”26 The question arose as to what was a proper exchange purchase and who was responsible for payment. The 44th Division, made up of the New


41

Jersey and New York National Guards, was in training at Camp A. P. Hill in northern Virginia. The 165th Field Artillery Regiment of the division ordered a sizable quantity of cigarettes, cigars, and smoking tobacco for the troops without authorization from the AES. The division went on to other training and maneuvers, and no one paid the small Cliff Weil Cigar Company of Richmond, Virginia, the $399 owed for the shipments of to‑ bacco products.27 Several letters were sent to the 165th commander with no response. Byron’s staff finally got the matter settled, but after this situ‑ ation and other similar ones at ports of embarkation, the authorization to purchase items could go only through the AES office in Washington. The year 1942 was one of expansion, and it was a year of learning for Byron and the AES. It had been a good year for the AES, with an ever-increasing number of items and exchanges worldwide, with millions of soldiers depending on what was on sale in the PX. One of the great questions in 1943 was wheth‑ er American industries could keep up with civilian and military demands for everything from meat to candy and cigarettes. For the average soldier, questions about industrial and agricultural output did not occupy much of his time. Training for combat against the Japanese or German enemies took precedence over what was happening back home or outside the main gate of the post. The year 1943, however, would present greater challenges for everyone, whether in uniform or in civilian clothes.

3

´ R e g u l atio n s a n d

Ag r e e m e n t s

Staff Sergeant Charles B. Linzy of the 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Battalion was on maneuvers in Louisiana. Linzy had heard rumors that his unit was about to go overseas, but no one seemed to know where. On a hot August day near Shreveport, Linzy, who was from Little Rock, Arkansas, was disgusted. He wrote to his wife, Sibyl, that all leaves were canceled and that his battalion would move to a staging area at Camp Hulen, Texas. It mattered little where he went, because “We got orders today that there would be absolutely no buying at the country or town stores, no buying from watermelon peddlers, or anything.” The Post Exchange had not reached the troops in the field. Three weeks later Linzy was able to tell his wife, “I think we will start having a PX in a day or two now. Then I can get a coke or a piece of candy once in a while.” Linzy, who would serve in every major battle from D-Day on and leave the service in 1945 with a Bronze Star, also told his wife that with the promise of a PX he could get cigarettes, which had been in very short supply during the Louisiana maneuvers. Sergeant Linzy was similar to the millions of GIs training for deploy‑ ment to Europe or to the Pacific. They had become accustomed to having a Post Exchange where those small little bits of America could be purchased at a reduced price. With low pay and many with fami‑ lies at home receiving little assistance from the government, the PX became an important part of soldiers’ lives. Linzy tried to send home some items that were either heavily rationed or simply not available. He asked his wife, “Do you still have plenty of [chewing] gum or do 42

Re g u l at i o n s a n d Ag r e ements

43

you need some more? I think that I can get some more for you. . . . Would you like a box of candy or can you get all you want? I can get Mounds, Butterfingers, or Baby Ruths.” As his unit prepared for the departure from Texas for their overseas assignment, there were long periods of waiting. He wrote to his wife, “Well I am sitting here waiting for my coke to get cold. [T]he PX opened tonite without any ice so I bought three and put them in our water cooler at the CP [Command Post]. Of course the officers get ice all the time and that means I have cold water also. I have had to run two officers away from my cokes. It is about 1/4 mile to the PX.”1 A few days later Linzy asked Sibyl if she needed any White Canon bath towels. They were only fifty cents apiece at the exchange. As the war wore on, Linzy became an expert in judging the quality of the PX in the European theater of operations. The Post Exchange had become a fixture in Army life by 1943. What started out as a small operation had become a large department store chain. In January 1943 the War Department issued Circular 98 that stated ex‑ changes could sell “furs, jewelry, and toilet preparations on a tax-free basis. To satisfy the Internal Revenue Service, an excise tax had to be included in the exchange purchase of these items for resale. There was a stern warning in the circular that such sales had to be for the soldier’s use or for use by his dependents who were authorized to shop in the exchange.”2 It was a far cry from a Mounds candy bar to toilet preparations such as a good grade of skin creams and makeup. Given General Byron’s aggressive salesman‑ ship, the PX system was to expand even more as the war continued. On November 9, 1942, eleven months after Pearl Harbor, AngloAmerican forces landed in French North Africa. Operation Torch was the first step in the war to rid Europe of Nazism. It was also the first area outside of England where the American exchange system could serve the needs of the troops. General Byron decided that it would be a good time to visit the exchanges that were being established and see and hear for himself what GIs wanted. Upon his return, Byron briefed his staff and representatives of the Navy on what he found and what could be done to consolidate procurement for Army and Navy exchanges. What he learned was that soldiers wanted a continuous flow of CocaCola, an assortment of candy bars, American beer, razor blades, and ciga‑ rettes. Byron found that commanders in North Africa wanted to discourage soldiers from buying locally produced souvenir items because many items

44


were of inferior workmanship and it was difficult to actually bargain for a good price, since very few soldiers knew Arabic or French. Exchange offi‑ cers could shop for such items when they were accompanied by a qualified interpreter who was experienced with the bazaars of Morocco and Algeria. The general was very pleased to see how quickly exchanges opened their doors for business to serve the GIs. He viewed the exchange as a morale factor for troops in North Africa, and with training becoming intensive, it seemed that for many of the soldiers North Africa would be just a staging area for another major operation. If ever Byron doubted the importance of comfort items for the troops, he had an awakening when discussing the AES with one of the senior American generals in North Africa. He was told in no uncertain terms that there would be no overall discussion until the question of candy bars was settled. It seemed that candy bars were coming into North Africa from four different sources, which included the Navy. If Byron could consoli‑ date the shipment of candy bars under one agency, preferably the AES, there would then be a fuller discussion of the role of the AES in northern Africa. As Byron tried diplomatically to end the candy bar crisis, he was able to negotiate a deal whereby there would be one source, the AES, for candy bars, and so ensure equitable distribution to all services. Byron left North Africa and traveled to India, where he heard the same complaint from generals and admirals about chocolate bars, specifically their short‑ age and uneven distribution. In frustration, General Byron told his audi‑ ence, “We ran into hurdles because a Marine wants 10 [candy] bars a month, while the soldier wants 6, or the Navy wants 14, and somebody can’t get the paper work straightened out.”3 There were interservice rivalries that muddled the situation. General Byron talked to two Waves (female naval service personnel) who told him, “The Army has everything and the Navy nothing.” Everyone seemed to have a complaint about candy bars, including General Eisenhower, who told Byron that “he wanted the authority, and incidentally he has it, to be able to go to a warehouse of chocolate bars and take out as many as he liked and give them away if he saw fit.”4 The records give the impression that the war was being fought with American chocolate bars, and in some ways it was, because the “GI gets his fair share” motto raised great expecta‑ tions as far as comfort items were concerned. Byron’s solution was to cen‑ tralize through Army-Navy cooperation the acquisition and distribution


45

of all comfort items, especially candy, gum, cigarettes, and beer. It would be easier in the European theater of operations than the Pacific theater be‑ cause of distance and the nature of combat, which meant that U.S. forces fought from island to island, where setting up Army or Navy exchanges would be difficult, if not impossible. At the end of his briefing Byron warned those from the AES and from the Navy in attendance that if problems continued in the exchange sys‑ tems, in procurement and distribution, “[General Somervell] will turn to me and tell me to go back to civilian life where I belong,” and added that it was everyone’s problem and they too could lose their positions. Byron’s thirty-six thousand–mile inspection and consultation trip was covered by the New York Times, and he told the newspaper, “There is something in the little extras the soldier can buy that are important to him. . . . He gets a lift just out of seeing his familiar American label.”5 Byron could say cooperation was vital, but the official policy dictated how items were procured through the Purchase Division of the Service of Supply and, in the continental United States, subject to limitations imposed by the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. No such limits were placed on items designated for ports of embarkation and for overseas theaters. There were, however, gray areas that posed special problems for the AES. The embarkation ports were considered to come under the rules for overseas exchanges. Most troops were restricted to the port area, and the purchase of comfort items was important for those who faced a lengthy trip by sea. Post Exchanges on Army Air Force bases kept their snack bars open at all hours because there was no provision for a mess hall meal for those whose training missions brought them back to base af‑ ter the mess halls were closed. Many base commanders looked on a special meal for aircrews participating in late-afternoon and nighttime training missions as a luxury, not a necessity, and the PXs were ordered to remain open. Thus, given the existing regulations, there was no authorization for a twenty-four-hour mess hall. Maintaining a twenty-four-hour snack bar strained what the AES could order in the area of meats, breads, and the like. Extra funds had to be available for those workers who staffed the Post Exchange snack bar.6 Who paid for the extra meals at the exchange snack bars? Enlisted personnel did not pay for their meals in the established mess halls, but there was no provision to reimburse the soldier or the exchange for the meal provided. Sometimes the enlisted soldier was not charged.

46


Byron and his staff were very much aware of the need to make the exchange system work as efficiently as possible given the influx of recruits and draftees coming into the Army. There had to be a balance between the needs of the troops and the national effort to conserve food and certain products that were becoming difficult to obtain. Cellophane, which was once in great supply, was in 1943 a scarce and critical item. Tinfoil was in abundance prior to the war and national rationing, but by 1943 almost all of the production of foil went for military purposes. Of concern to the AES was that shipments of exchange goods would arrive overseas in good condition. Colonel Kerwin M. Treusch, the director of the AES’s Legal and Liaison Division, wrote to the chiefs of the AES asking what items were in need of cellophane wrapping for overseas shipments. Treusch’s main concern was for cigarettes, because “cellophane outer wrappings are necessary for cigarettes to keep them from drying out or becoming too humid. It is also necessary on certain candy bars.”7 The response from Lieutenant Colonel Karl A. Gardner, director of the Procurement Division in New York, was fast in coming. Gardner wrote, “It is deemed necessary that cigarettes, cigars, tobacco, and bakery goods (packaged cookies, sandwiches and sliced cake) be wrapped in cellophane or similar type wrapping in order to preserve the proper condition of such items as long as possible.”8 There was little need to make a case for the use of a scarce commodity for troops training or stationed in the United States, but a good argument could be made for items that had to be shipped to Europe or to the Pacific, which was an even longer sea voyage. As long as there was massive support for the troops in combat, there would be little public argument over the use of a scarce item. As rationing became more severe, the AES had to closely monitor its operations, especially in areas where combat was not taking place. In February 1943 the AES issued Bulletin No. 10, which was addressed to service and defense commands in the United States, Caribbean Defense Command, Alaskan Defense Command, the Military District of Washing‑ ton, and the United States Military Academy at West Point, and the stated purpose was, “CONSERVATION of all critical materials, of manpower, and transportation.” There was no change in the preferential treatment for the Post Exchanges, but there had to be limitations on procurement and very close scrutiny of items sold in the exchanges. The effect would be a ration‑ ing of basic items sold by the PX, and some items were no longer eligible


47

for a priority rating when ordering. These included such PX offerings as watches (which could be ordered only as standard “Men’s, Service Type”), wallets, pocket knives, military clothing, checkers, dominoes, chess sets, cough drops, sunglasses, flashlights and batteries, all stationery supplies, and many other items. Candy, chewing gum, ice cream, soft drinks, all tobacco products, sanitary napkins and belts, shaving equipment, dental hygiene equipment, and beer were among the items that the exchanges could consider as priority goods necessary for the comfort and morale of the troops.9 With shortages beginning to be felt by the civilian popula‑ tion, Byron and his staff reasoned that it would be a wise public relations move for the AES to take the lead in conservation. It would also be a good time for the AES to show the civilian popula‑ tion what the exchanges were doing for the men and women in uniform. Local exchanges had already started a public relations campaign to show what the Army was providing for its personnel. It was decided that the AES exhibit would be shown in connection with the Treasury Department’s Third War Loan Bond Drive, and would be part of an Army exhibit to be held in Washington for three weeks in September 1943. By 1943 there were dozens of civilian organizations and enterprises soliciting funds for various gifts for the troops overseas in combat areas. The President’s War Relief Control Board was deluged with requests for authorization to have public fund-raising, and the Board met for long pe‑ riods while trying to deal with every request. As far as the government was concerned, the needs of the soldiers were handled by three agencies: the USO, the American Red Cross, and the AES. Army Post Offices (APO) were weighed down by the number of packages sent by family, friends, and local organizations to GIs, and these packages usually contained cigarettes, candy, clothing items such as socks and underwear, and homemade jams, jellies, and relishes. The AES hoped its exhibit would at least highlight what the soldier could get while overseas. Cigarettes were five cents a pack of twenty, and an assortment of five-cent candy bars was usually in stock in exchanges. Corporal G. E. Yohe of the Medical Detachment, 305th Infantry Regi‑ ment of the 77th Division, wrote his girlfriend back in Oklahoma, “I am now the proud possessor of 21 packs of cigarettes and I don’t smoke. It’s bad enough they hand us some more free packs each time we turn around (I got a carton of Camels today) but we play Casino at a pack a hand and

48


I always win. I’ve given some away but I save money by doing my petty gambling with them. They’re only worth a nickel a pack anyway.”10 With every branch of the Army involved, the September exhibit would require a special effort by the AES. Colonel Vincent Wadden was selected to be the chairman of the planning committee with only two weeks left before the exhibit was to open to the public. Wadden was energetic and sent a memorandum to all division heads in the AES stating, “The Army Exchange Service will have an exhibit, which will include a full depiction of the major functions, scope, accomplishments, and efficiency of the ex‑ change service.”11 There could be no question that General Byron expected the AES to do the best possible job in showing the civilian what the exchanges were doing. Within a few days Wadden had his plan in place and submitted it to the Military District of Washington. The plan called for an allocation of 14,900 square feet, fifteen enlisted soldiers from the Military District (the AES had very few enlisted personnel), ten officers from the staff of the AES, and various materials, including a wooden frame for a thatchedroof hut with the grass for the roof coming from an outside contractor. In addition to the Pacific-area grass-roof hut exchange, there would be four other exchanges: boxcar, mobile (with the vehicle provided by AES), field tent, and peewee (a small PX operated out of the back of a small truck or a jeep). Wadden estimated that the contractor costs would be about nine thousand dollars. The site delegated to the AES exhibit had, in Wadden’s words, “quite a slope” and asked if Army engineers could level the ground.12 He did not get his engineers to reconfigure the terrain of the Washington Mall, however. Army exhibits would continue throughout the war, and the AES would provide what they could for these civilian morale-building opportunities. The pace of the war in Europe and the Pacific was quickly building to a point where all departments and armed services had little time to spare. From the fall of 1943 well into 1944 the number of packages sent through the APOs increased, particularly around Christmastime. The War Relief Control Board continued to contend with civilian organizations asking for authorization to solicit funds for every type of item. One senator in‑ troduced legislation to ban all alcohol from military bases in the United States and overseas. There was very little support for this bill, and it met


49

the fate it deserved. The United States had been at war for two years, and the public became aware of the ever-lengthening casualty lists. There could be little doubt that the AES filled a definite need for the troops both in the United States and in the ever-expanding areas of over‑ seas service. In early March 1943 the War Department issued Army Regu‑ lations AR 210-65, titled Post Camps and Stations, Army Exchanges, which gave legitimacy to what the exchanges were doing and also recognized the expanded sphere of the exchange into a large number of activities. The reg‑ ulation stated that the exchanges served two purposes: first, “to supply the persons to whom sales are authorized . . . at the lowest possible prices with articles of necessity and convenience not supplied by the government,” and second, “to make available from profits funds which may be used to afford to military personnel additional facilities for comfort, recreation, and amusement, and to contribute to activities which will foster the physi‑ cal and spiritual welfare of military personnel.” The regulation prohibited any direct civilian activity in the exchange except for managing and staff‑ ing a post restaurant, but AR 210-65 did not allow for civilian contracts in the Post Exchange snack bar, where military 3.2 beer was sold. The scope of activities for the exchanges was greatly expanded by AR 210-65. With the approval of the commanding officer of the post, the exchange could operate a main exchange with branches as needed, main‑ tain its own warehouses, and open a soda fountain, beer bar, meat market, grocery market, gasoline filling station and service stations, restaurant, barbershop, beauty shop, photographic studio, vending and amusement machines, gymnasium, recreation rooms (including pool tables and bowl‑ ing alleys), post theater, laundry, and watch, shoe, and radio repair shops. The regulation also stated that the only alcohol that a post exchange could sell was the 3.2 beer because it “is considered non-intoxicating.” The au‑ thors of the regulation had evidently never visited an exchange where cold 3.2 beer was served to GIs after they had completed a physically demand‑ ing week of hard training in the heat of summer, especially in the South or the California desert. The question of how to realistically operate such a large menu of ex‑ change services arose and was dealt with in AR 210-65 under the heading of “Concessions.” A concession was granted only if the concession agreed to assume all liability and to be responsible for state and federal taxes,

50


and under no circumstances could the concession use the word exchange, which would indicate to the general public that it was an agent of the AES. It was obvious that there had to be concessions granted if the ex‑ change was to fulfill its mission of serving the troops. Of course, there was a lot of money to be made by having an on-post concession. The Post Exchange officer, appointed by the post commander, had to be constantly alert to any possibility of fraud or dishonest practices. He had to oversee the civilian personnel employed to work in the exchanges, and the employees were by regulation allowed to purchase food, drink, and tobacco products at exchange prices for personal use while at the installa‑ tion. The exchange officer had a Post Exchange Council that had a rather sizable number of duties, such as distributing funds generated by PX sales, setting prices, making recommendations about concessions, setting salary scales, and much more. The exchange officer was no longer a cast-off, never-did-well-in-a-unit, unsuitable-for-combat individual. The responsibilities were great, and General Byron had already established an exchange officer school by 1943 and would try to establish more as the war went on and the exchange system grew in size and in strength. There is nothing so reassuring to the military mind as a well-written regulation, especially when it enlarges one’s sphere of influence and responsibility. In the case of the exchanges, portions of AR 210-65 ran counter to Mobilization Regulation 1-10 titled Morale, which was issued in June 1942, nine months before the issuance of the regulation governing the Post Exchange. All Army training bases and posts were required to provide a Service Club for the morale and recreation of enlisted personnel, and once the club was established on post, a Special Services officer was appointed to oversee its operation. The main Service Club was under the direction of hostesses, carefully screened, with very definite duties. The hostesses, under the direction of a senior hostess, arranged for off-duty games and “dances and similar activities in which women participate.” The hostesses were also directed by MR 1-10 to provide for women and children visiting the post to see husbands, brothers, and other rela‑ tives, with lists of recommended guesthouses on post and civilian hotels off the military installation. The writers of MR 1-10 were uncomfortable with women in such active roles on post in a time of war. According to


51

MR 1-10, if a club, such as the Lion’s Club, wished to establish itself on post to provide service for members, they would have to “furnish club features in which women are not included.” Women employed as Service Club hostesses would be considered civilian employees and would be paid as such. Women worked in the PXs as salaried employees, their backgrounds screened by the Post Exchange officers. On the other hand, women in large numbers joined the armed services during the war, and for older of‑ ficers this presented problems. The exchange system began carrying items in the PXs that appealed to these younger service women. It would be 1944 before the AES realized that the authorized list of products for sale represented only what they thought women in uniform might want. In 1943 the women’s organization known as the Women’s Army Aux‑ iliary Corps (WAAC, soon to be shortened to WAC, or Women’s Army Corps) was established, and the process to join was long and tedious. The WAAC was separate from the nurses, and it was “organized for noncombatant service with the Army.”13 Women had to be twenty-one years old, be of excellent character, have two letters of reference, and take a mental-alertness test. Once all of the hurdles were overcome, there was a period of basic training to familiarize these soldiers with life in the mili‑ tary. Upon completion they were, in theory, authorized to use all military facilities. Very quickly, however, it was clear that women soldiers were not really welcome at the PX-run beer hall and that the Service Clubs were male soldiers’ preserves. To make matters worse, women in uniform were barred from entering many USO clubs and civilian-run canteens in the United States and over‑ seas. Word reached the Navy Department that women in uniform were not welcome at the very popular Stage Door Canteen in Washington, D.C. Commander J. L. Reynolds, director of the Navy’s Welfare and Recreation Division, investigated the matter and called on the director of the Stage Door Canteen. He reported to his superiors, “Service women [of all the uniformed services] are not desired at the Stage Door Canteen. The direc‑ tor of the canteen stated in no uncertain terms, ‘ . . . women in the armed forces lend further military appearance and actions to the Club while civil‑ ian hostesses [selected by the director] give a feminine touch to the club.’ “The executive secretary of the Stage Door Canteen reported to Reynolds,

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“The [the women in uniform] shall not be permitted to sit at tables or sit on the balcony, dance, or partake of food or to remain in the canteen for an extended interval.”14 To the credit of the USO, John Schoolcraft, in Washington, reported that servicewomen were welcome and that as women’s numbers grew, the USO planned a separate USO that would be directed toward the special needs of the female soldier or sailor.15 The inhospitality to women in uni‑ form in the PX beer hall run by the AES, the openly hostile attitude of the Stage Door Canteen, and the lack of welcome in the Service Club on post put servicewomen at a distinct disadvantage. The establishment of the Service Clubs was an important part of Army life, and they did much to raise morale and provide a place for soldiers to spend safe off-duty time. Staff Sergeant Charles B. Linzy, stationed at Camp Polk, Louisiana, awaiting orders for his unit to be deployed to the European theater of operations, wrote to his wife, “I have a good table, an easy chair, paper and a pen so what more besides you could I want? This building covers about a block, coffee shop, library, pianos, cafeteria, danc‑ ing pavilions, and all. It is not a USO but an Army Service Club.”16 With low Army pay, even for a staff sergeant, recreation off post was expensive, and frankly the Army was well aware that in the Army towns there were saloons, prostitutes, and petty criminals who preyed on GIs and could damage the morale of the soldier. MR 1-10 also cited “religious instruc‑ tions, services, and ministrations” as vital to maintaining morale. The Ser‑ vice Clubs played an important role in giving the soldier, often bewildered by a regimented and restricted Army life, a small sense of home on the post. The Special Services were to maintain good relations with the Post Ex‑ change, which MR 1-10 stated was “a most important activity in a com‑ mand.” By AR 210-65 the exchange officer had to coordinate with other on-post agencies to provide for the troops. In most cases this meant giving the exchange officer the option to turn over to the Service Clubs some of the duties as outlined in the AR. Given the magnitude of his responsibili‑ ties in running the ever-expanding exchange, he was happy to do so and quickly. By the summer of 1943 the Army reached an all-time high in new soldiers, with combat intensifying in the European and Pacific theaters of operations, and the need for more combat soldiers grew. Of particular


53

concern was the number of infantry available for deployment. The Army began shutting down specialized education in civilian colleges and univer‑ sities, shifting the shocked campus soldiers to infantry divisions preparing to deploy to Europe and the Pacific. The pressures on the AES increased as well, and in July 1943 the War Department issued Circular 153, which was meant to clarify AES pur‑ chases for exchanges in the United States and overseas. There was recogni‑ tion of the standard demand items such as ice cream, candy, soft drinks, tobacco, toilet articles, and cleaning equipment, but it also indicated that “where the commanding officer is convinced that the sale of novelties and gift items, which can be procured locally . . . is necessary to [the] mainte‑ nance of morale in his command,” then those items too could be stocked. Staff Sergeant Linzy, representative of most of the GIs, wrote to his wife, “There’s just not much one can buy at a PX that is suitable for a wom‑ an.”17 What Circular 153 did was to expand the number of items offered in the exchange and give commanding officers the authority to deal with civilian concessionaires for novelty or gift items. While discussions went on about what constituted a novelty item and what constituted a gift item, there were problems for those who sought to provide comfort for the troops. General Frederick H. Osborn and his staff were deluged with complaints from Special Services officers and many post commanders about the availability of soldier comfort items that were in short supply because the designated Post Exchange officer would not provide items for the post Service Clubs. In simple terms, exchange officers ignored the requests made by the Service Clubs and sent all incoming shipments to the exchange for sale. An appeal was made to General Somervell’s staff for some official relief. To the headquarters of the Army Service Forces, this seemed like a childish complaint. It was not, however, just a squabble between lower-ranking officers, because the Service Clubs were established for the comfort and morale of the soldiers who would soon be in mortal combat. In a memo‑ randum to the Army Service Forces, the Special Services Division stated, “Service clubs in posts, camps, and stations have experienced difficulty in procuring adequate amounts of candy, soft drinks, ice cream, chewing gum, and tobacco.”18 Finally, there was a directive that outlined the relationship of the Ser‑ vice Clubs to the Post Exchanges, an outcome that made sense. The clubs

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were to estimate their requirements “at least four months in advance of the beginning of the quarter for which required.” The requirements would be given to the AES, and the AES would order supplies for the Service Clubs as well as the exchange. Once all that was done, the requirements would be sent to the Requirements Division of the Army Service Forces and, once reviewed, would be ordered. When the goods arrived, there would be a distribution based on the approved requests. The specter of an undignified brawl between two captains over cases of chocolate bars, ice cream cones, and cigarettes was a possibility. Consequently, the Army Service Forces stated, “In those instances in which a post, camp, or station contains both an exchange and a service club, the commanding officer [of the installation] will divide his allocation between both in such propor‑ tion as he deems advisable.” In other words, the post commander became a Solomon-like figure ready to cut the allocations as he saw fit to avoid unseemly feuds between two officers. Once the squabble between the exchange officer and the Special Ser‑ vices officer was settled, as the generals hoped, Byron and his staff had to deal with a nagging, long-standing situation. Byron had been a bit sur‑ prised on his lengthy fact-finding trip that so many commanders in the field complained about the various services competing for comfort items. In July and August 1943, at the insistence of the Joint Army-Navy Board and the commander of the Army Service Forces, representatives from the Army and Navy met in Washington to formulate a workable plan for the consolidation of purchasing and supply for the Army and Navy. The Army Post Exchange and Ship’s Stores had to consolidate their ef‑ forts to be more efficient and to deal with some major realities of World War II. The Navy had a vast area to cover in the Atlantic and the Pacific, while the Army had more or less fixed bases for operations. Army ground and air forces serving in the Pacific theater of operations could also be spread over large areas of Asia. Another problem that surfaced in 1943 was the heavy demand being placed on manufacturers and suppliers in the United States, and all too often the Army and Navy aggressively competed over large quantities of candy bars, chewing gum, cigarettes, and such. There were purchase or‑ ders from different services, all coming with the admonition that their products were being used to help the GI or the sailor maintain his morale and fight harder to win victory. Something had to be done to bring speed


55

and efficiency to what was becoming a major area of dispute between the Army and the Navy. There were conflicting views about procurement of items for the Post Exchanges and Ship’s Stores, but in August 1943 an agreement was ham‑ mered out, the basic reason being that “unified procurement will eliminate the competition now existing between the services for types of supplies of limited availability. . . . Unification of shipping will simplify handling and reduce personnel overhead employed there . . . [and] unification of storage will result in stock reduction through carrying one base stock in lieu of three base stocks.”19 The Navy representative came from the Pacific Fleet, South Pacific Force, and he readily agreed to the plan because there were severe shortages of exchange supplies for the troops engaged in very heavy, costly battles with the Japanese. The Army quartermaster general had the responsibility of maintaining an agreed-upon list of supplies and for the procurement of those items for resale to soldiers, marines, and sailors. The Navy, however, inserted a paragraph, “No consolidation of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Post Exchanges, Ship’s Stores . . . in the South Pacific Area is contemplated.”20 Service cooperation was one thing, but maintaining the spirit of the an‑ nual Army-Navy game was quite another. The meeting produced a list of items to be procured, stocked, and then shipped to American forces in the Pacific and to bases in the Atlantic. It differed only slightly from what was being offered in the European theater of operations. The list was massive and reflected what service personnel wanted from their exchanges. Ordering was done on the basis of supplying one thousand men for thirty days, and a special list was maintained for five female nurses for thirty days. The items most demanded were candy bars (five different brands), to‑ bacco (seven different brands of cigarettes, pipes, and pipe tobacco) and cigars, razor blades, toothpaste and tooth powder (seven brands), soap, shampoo, and hair tonics. Beer was not included on the list, but soft drinks, vegetables, and orange juice were. The nurses’ list (decided by an all-male panel) included sanitary napkins and belts, assorted lipsticks, cleansing cream, powder compacts, brushes and combs, hairnets, bobby pins, rouge, face powder, nail polish, and other items. Just what the colonels, captains, generals, and admirals thought the nurses were doing in the Pacific was not discussed, and possibly none of them had visited field hospitals after a

56


battle with the Japanese.21 The Atlantic Coast Fleet concurred with a plan and list very quickly. On September 9, 1943, General Byron was informed that the commander of the Army Service Forces approved of the plan “in principle,” and that the AES should move forward with it.22 The list was interesting. Appearing for the first time was reading materi‑ al. Comic books, westerns, and assorted popular magazines headed the list, with only fifty per month per one thousand troops. It seems obvious that whoever made up the list had not been around soldiers or sailors entering the armed forces. Colliers, Reader’s Digest, Life, the Saturday Evening Post, Cosmopolitan, Redbook, and Time were on the list as well. After General Byron returned from his visit to gauge the effectiveness of the exchanges, he told the New York Times that soldiers would appreciate mystery books, and “the more murders in the books the better.” No detective magazines were on the list. The Army and the Navy were in the process of producing small paperback editions of novels and mysteries, and quite possibly the AES and its Navy counterpart did not see the need for magazines of that sort. Although 1943 was a productive year for the Army exchanges, there were also problems centering on the PXs’ supply and sale of cigarettes. There was a constant stream of letters to the War Department, to sena‑ tors and congressmen, and even to President Roosevelt complaining about every sort of misadministration of the exchange. One agitated Great War veteran wrote to the War Department that soldiers at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, were made to buy two packs of cigarettes at a time for twentyfive cents. The veteran from St. Louis ended his letter with, “This matter, in the wrong hands, would make a nasty editorial.” This is not as trivial as it seems at first glance. The letter went to the AES, which in turn sent it to the 7th Corps exchange officer in Omaha, Nebraska, who had to respond to it by a lengthy memorandum. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sharpe was the corps’ exchange officer, and he explained that name-brand cigarettes sold at thirteen cents per package. It actually helped the soldier to buy two packs at a time, saving the soldier one cent.23 Since Army pay was so low for a private soldier, the savings over several weeks could buy candy or gum. When the letters of complaint from a politically powerful organization arrived, the time spent to respond was increased considerably. The veter‑ ans of the 37th Infantry Division, Ohio National Guard, contributed to


57

a fund to provide cigarettes for the 37th men at the ports of embarkation on the West Coast. The veterans’ organization did not have authorization from the War Relief Control Board, but sent the cigarettes anyway. Ac‑ cording to the organization, those cigarettes were handed to any soldier in the port, and the veterans called on Congressman W. G. Andrews, who asked the War Department for an explanation. Warren’s inquiry went from the War Department to the Army Service Forces to the AES, and Byron had to research it and respond to the irate former doughboy that gift cigarettes could not be designated for one unit, as there were many units loading boats for the Pacific theater. To Con‑ gressman Andrews Byron wrote, “The theater commander requested that no gift cigarettes be consigned to specific organizations. It is presumed that underlying that request were security reasons, the insurmountable difficulty of transportation and probably a desire on the part of the theater commander to treat every organization in his command alike.”24 The 37th Division veterans wanted to do something positive for the troops, but they fell into the category of well-meaning nuisance for those directly involved with the war. Evidently, the division veterans had already sent crap dice, reading material, and playing cards, but there seemed to be no way to be sure they reached the Buckeye Division. The whole process of dealing with these patriotic men of good intentions was time-consuming, as was finding out what schemes to provide for the troops were honest. There were also concerns that exchange items might be used by GIs to curry favor with the overseas local population, especially women. There could be no doubt that the policy of the PX was simply that the candy bars, gum, and cigarettes were for the use of the soldier only. The only exception to this covered civilian workers in the Stateside exchanges who used the snack bar for a meal or the PX for a pack of cigarettes. It appears that the officers who ran the AES did not realize what bar‑ gaining power PX supplies gave to the GI in the field. Candy bars and cigarettes, in short supply, were available to soldiers in good and evergrowing quantities. Master Sergeant Elmer Franzman of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the 329th Service Group, which had seen service in North Africa and in Sicily, was the son of a grocery store owner in Cannelton, Indiana, and as such he had insight into what constituted items of negotiating value. He wrote to his father, “There’s one [Sicil‑ ian] boy who sweeps the [USO] show place after each show. He saves all

58


cigarettes butts and sells them to the natives. He makes $3 or $4 each time. Cigarettes here sell for 75 [cents] on the black market. We buy them in the PX for 5 [cents] per pack. Boy I could be a millionaire if I had a boatload of cigarettes.” Just before Christmas of 1943, Franzman told his parents that soldiers were getting their packages, but added that much of what was being sent—candy bars, cigarettes, cakes, towels, and the like— was available at the PX and was cheaper than what the concerned kinsfolk were sending. He added, “We’ll get plenty of supplies like that. PX service is rather good.”25 In England the number of American troops was large, and the PX, USO, and Red Cross followed, supplying the GIs with what they were used to back home. The abundance became etched into the British mind and was translated into the “overpaid, over-sexed, and over here.” In a country that had been at war since 1939, survived the German victories of 1940, and endured the blitz, the British were taken aback by the brash swagger of the Americans, who seemed to have an unending supply of everything. Staff Sergeant Charles B. Linzy, who had finally arrived in Britain, wrote to his wife about his admiration for the English who had withstood the continual bombing during the Battle of Britain. But that did not stop him from complaining to his wife back in Arkansas, “They do not have beer over here. They have what they call bitters. It is.”26 The PX would soon remedy Linzy’s complaint. Byron’s vision for the AES was working well by the end of 1943. For example, when the New Zealand government inquired about purchasing “off-brand” cigarettes for distribution to its troops, Byron informed the quartermaster general that the AES would sell those cigarettes that soldiers rejected in favor of the better-known Camels, Lucky Strikes, Old Golds, and Chesterfields. The cigarettes would be sold only to the New Zealand government, not to any private individuals.27 It would seem that 1944 would be as good a year for the PX system as 1943 had been. The competition for shipping space was severe because not only did the AES require more and more space, but so did the Red Cross, USO, and Special Services Division. It appeared obvious that 1944 would be the year of the invasion of Europe and that heavy and costly fighting would continue in Italy. The war in the Pacific was still in the balance. The battle for Tarawa began in late November 1943.


59

Byron and his staff had every confidence that the AES could meet the challenge that an ever-expanding war required. But a strain had been placed on the producers of the comfort items, and by late 1943 there were warnings that some items would become very hard to obtain. GIs most wanted candy bars, cigarettes, chewing gum, soft drinks, and, most im‑ portant, beer. While demand rose, the supply became restricted due to rulings by the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administra‑ tion. Their duty was to maintain a supply of items for both civilians and the military, and by 1944 a clash was inevitable.

4

´ E x pa n sio n

a n d S h o rtag e s

1943–1944

Sergeant William E. George worked in the headquarters of the 415th Night Fighter Squadron for two years and had seen England and France. He was a constant visitor to the Post Exchange and found that some items were always in short supply. He wrote to his parents in Little Rock, Arkansas, that toothpaste and tooth powder had not been in stock for several weeks. However, he did tell his mother and father that when the weather was bad and the planes not flying, “We have so much time off that it makes it very nice to have the [headquarters] building to sit around in and listen to the radio and read. We can buy the Saturday Evening Post and Colliers at the PX so we have all of those we want.”1 Sergeant George, being from the warmer climate of the American South, marveled at the heavy snowfalls. As his unit moved closer to the heavy combat following the cross-Channel invasion of France, the PX was replaced by weekly combat rations, including five candy bars and cigarettes. Once larger cities like Paris were liberated, expanded versions of the PX opened for business for GIs lucky enough to have some time away from the front. Throughout 1943 and well into 1944 the AES grew in scope, with several hundred PXs in operation. The military and the AES often faced stiff competition for what civilian goods were available, and there were many items in short supply. The energetic General Byron, however, was not content just to open new exchanges. In the fall of 60

Ex pa n s i o n a n d Sh o rtag e s , 1943–1944

61

1943 the AES published a gift catalog, enabling soldiers to buy and have gifts sent to friends or family. The first Gift Catalogue for Every Occasion arrived in the European theater of operations on December 15, 1943, and provided items a soldier might want to send home, if allowable under ra‑ tioning guidelines. Of special interest were flowers. The AES had entered into an agreement with the Florists’ Telegraph Delivery Association where‑ by large numbers of a variety of flowers would be available for purchase for delivery at holiday times. The FTDA also stated that for Mother’s Day (a very important day for the GI) and for Easter, more types of flowers would be added to the AES gift catalog. For a soldier, sailor, or marine serving thousands of miles from home, this was a welcome service.2 The AES underwent a major change in November 1943 when Byron took over the Special Services Division, and Colonel Frank G. Kerr, at that time his deputy chief, assumed the top leadership position. Byron and Kerr had a good relationship, and Kerr had a good deal of experience in the complex world of War Department Washington. He would be more outspoken than Byron and in many ways more aggressive than his former boss in expanding the offerings of the PXs. Kerr would eventually follow Byron as deputy of Special Services. Brig‑ adier General Byron would earn his second star as a major general, but he did not give up his interests in the Post Exchange system, and he and Kerr communicated and coordinated on a number of key AES issues from 1943 to the end of the war. Both men firmly believed that the GI should get his fair share of those things he enjoyed in civilian life, that the PX system was vitally important for the soldier stationed overseas, and that good morale was an essential ingredient in the making of combat-effective soldiers and units. Communications between the AES staff in the United States and theater commanders overseas grew more difficult as the intensity of combat opera‑ tions increased and the number of American troops poured into England to prepare for the cross-Channel invasion. There was not a good system in place for direct dealings with the exchange officers overseas. Byron sent a memorandum to Colonel Frank G. Kerr, the AES chief, stating, “We should have a more direct system of correspondence with these theater exchange officers, and it seems to me they should be put on a separate mailing list and not handled like some small exchange in a merely routine manner.”3 This would present difficulties because the theater commanders

62


actually oversaw the distribution of AES goods and could, if the situation called for it, earmark AES supplies for direct issue to the troops free of change or through Commissary Sales units. Also, the commanders had to deal with the off-loading of critical supplies such as ammunition, replace‑ ment equipment, medical supplies, and gasoline before AES supplies. Of‑ ten weeks passed before exchange goods could be off-loaded. Neither Kerr nor Byron were the general managers of a corner grocery and sundries store; they were both dealing with issues for soldiers who would soon be fighting to stay alive in combat. In writing to Colonel Kerr, Byron said: I don’t know who figured the consumption factors for some of the items in Circular 245. The one on razor blades is so bad that I cannot think of enough punishment for the people who said it. If they had ever shaved in cold water with certain types of brushless cream which didn’t dissolve in cold water, with their faces sunburned and wellbitten by mosquitoes, no after-shaving lotion, or a small amount, and with a second-rate steel blade that was partially rusty through improper packing, I think they would appreciate what I am talking about.4

In fact, many GIs wrote home asking parents or wives to send razor blades to them. There was no question that Byron was outraged at officers who were far from combat, safe in a Washington or New York office, being cavalier about items that meant a good deal to the men fighting in the Pacific or in Italy. The AES was a strange environment, because in the same letter General Byron wanted one of the staff to look into a milk-dispensing machine called a “mechanical cow” produced by a Westchester, Pennsylvania, com‑ pany. He also wanted to know why the AES seemed to have a surplus of beer-dispensing equipment. The first gift catalog caused some problems as well, as it seemed that GIs liked the idea and flooded the AES with orders, especially for flowers, and not just for Mother’s Day. There were plenty of orders for flowers, and they were paid for, but word reached the AES that the floral delivery services could not find many of the addresses. The AES finally figured out what happened. Byron wrote, “One of the results was that a great many soldiers sent presents to some girl that they had met at a dance and only vaguely remember the


63

girl’s address. You couldn’t deliver the presents and this had caused a lot of correspondence, has left a sour taste. I appreciate that this might be better handled here in the field and have instructed them [the exchange person‑ nel taking the orders] to be more careful.”5 Byron was irritated that a good deal of money was lost by the GIs and that the FTDA had too many flowers that simply went to waste. He did allow that the catalog arrived very late in the European theater, but also said, “I would suggest that some of the people around the office who told me that they didn’t have too much to do when I left, be put on the job of getting this ready now and not wait until the last minute.”6 He could have thought that there were some officers and civilian employees in the AES offices who were dumb to tell a general that they did not have much to do. Byron was not a person to allow situations to develop when a decision on the spot was in order. A policy was set by Byron that when a task force left the United States for combat or staging areas, the exchange officer would calculate what the military personnel would need in the way of PX orders for thirty days, and then sell those supplies to the quartermaster of the task force. This was especially critical in the Pacific theater of opera‑ tions, and Byron made the arrangements very quickly to serve the needs of the troops. Byron’s directives and orders were issued by him in blunt terms, and his AES staff had to put the general’s ideas and orders into the proper mili‑ tary terminology. The general believed and transmitted to his staff that they were there to serve the needs of combat soldiers. One area that was acted on quickly was the ordering of bottle coolers. Although beer and soft drinks were available in the overseas exchanges, most beer was sold warm, not suitable for American tastes. This was especially true in EnÂ� gland, where dispensers for draft beer were available locally but the beer was still warm. Where bottled beer was available, coolers became a neces‑ sity. Byron was determined that coolers would be sent, and they were.7 By March 1943 the AES announced that in England the ration of ciga‑ rettes (packs of twenty) had been raised to seven packs per week, and the number of candy bars was raised from one to two a week.8 At a dinner hosted by the New York University Faculty Club in October 1943, Gen‑ eral Byron announced that the AES had established a six-week course of study at the university’s School of Retailing for exchange employees.9 It

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was not in Byron’s nature to be an officer who only reacts to events but one who guides and influences events. Watching the exchange system grow, the AES knew that there would be even greater growth as more units became available for overseas service. One of the things that troubled AES planners was the obvious fact that demand outdistanced supply. It became more difficult to obtain the Army 3.2 beer for training bases in the United States and overseas. The problem was that the War Production Board had limited the production of malt, an important ingredient in beer. It did not take long for Colonel-lawyer Kerwin M. Treusch to appeal to the quartermaster general’s Subsistence Branch to intervene with the War Production Board to have the limits on malt lifted.10 The War Production Board refused to increase malt supplies, and this situation would become a crisis in the production of beer by the end of 1943. Also of concern was the massive buildup of U.S. forces in England in 1943. For example, in the fall of 1943 the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions arrived along with the 28th Infantry and the 101st Airborne Division. The U.S. Eighth Air Force, known as the Mighty Eighth, was flying major com‑ bat missions over Germany. For every one combat soldier, there were four to five soldiers in support, so the number of support troops grew as well. One British comedian joked that, thanks to the GIs, there were so many more people in England that the island would soon sink into the sea. As the Allies planned for the invasion of the Continent in 1944, the number of troops necessitated that more exchange items be sent to Britain. The availability of so much from the exchange staggered the British peo‑ ple. Technical Sergeant Charles B. Linzy wrote to his wife in Little Rock, “A fellow like me . . . does not need but little money. . . . [W]e do not need to pay for shows or anything like that. Each week I get seven packs of ciga‑ rettes . . . [for] 35 cents, one pack of gum, for 5 cents, [10 cents] worth of candy, two razor blades [10 cents], package of cookies [10 cents].” Linzy, who would see continual action with the 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Bat‑ talion, spent seventy cents per week at the exchange. He confided to his wife, “I wonder sometimes if we would have stood up to the Blitz as this country has done.”11 Byron would have been pleased to see those personal letters from soldiers in Europe and Asia. The exchange system continued to expand, but there were problems that had to be addressed in Washington. The basic policy concerning comfort


65

items for the troops was clear. The Red Cross, USO, AES, and quarter‑ master general could purchase certain items that would be free of taxation, and the largest category of exempt items was cigarettes, cigars, and other tobacco products. In exchanges in the United States tax would be charged, but the price of the cigarettes remained lower than those purchased on the civilian market. Overseas there were no taxes on a package of twenty cigarettes. While other items were tax exempt for troops overseas, it was the cigarette that caused the most trouble for those trying to regulate sales. In 1942 the President’s War Relief Control Board and the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation found themselves del‑ uged with requests from individuals and organizations to solicit funds to send cigarettes to the troops overseas. There were very good reasons for trying to slow down the growing number of groups asking for permission to raise funds. The four organizations, and one must add that by 1943 the Special Services Division, were the only agencies permitted to buy ciga‑ rettes with tax-exempt status. Competition to buy cigarettes put a strain on the tobacco industry to fill orders for everyone. Of course, the major cigarette producers were en‑ joying the highest income in the history of the industry. Shipping space was limited, and the USO, AES, Special Services, quartermaster general, and Red Cross had priority. The Army Postal Service was already stressed to the limit in providing packages to GIs overseas. The War Relief Con‑ trol Board and the Joint Army-Navy Board were very suspicious of the cigarette manufacturers and thought that by encouraging groups to solicit funds and then buy their product, cigarette profits would go even higher. In May 1943, in frustration with the growing number of requests for authorization to solicit funds, the Joint Army-Navy Board sent a resolu‑ tion to the War Relief Control Board: That the Joint Army and Navy Committee recommend to the President’s War Relief control Board that in view of the supplies of tobacco products made available by the War and Navy Depart‑ ments overseas, it discourage the collection of funds for the purpose of purchasing cigarettes for free distribution to servicemen overseas. The Committee recommends that the President’s War Relief Control Board not attempt, however, to discourage the sending of cigarettes or other tobacco supplies to servicemen by members of their imme‑ diate family or personal friends.12

66


Eventually, the various committees and boards would try to stop the send‑ ing of tobacco products in gift packages, especially when, in the late fall of 1943, a shortage of tobacco products began to affect all aspects of Ameri‑ can life, including the military. Although this was the right thing to do, those with good intentions did not take into consideration the reality that politics did not end when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Many of the groups, inspired by patriotism and a real desire to do what they could for those who were fighting, had political influence in Congress and the White House. Since the five major agencies were interrelated as far as procuring items for the services, anything that upset the balance was of concern to all. From the outset it was pretty clear that being on the War Relief Control Board and the Joint Army-Navy Board would be no easy task. There was a flood of requests for authorization to solicit funds or to assist the services with canteens, food, coffee, and doughnuts. The two groups had to be suspicious of companies that sprang up after December 7 that proposed a prepaid kit for servicemen going overseas. Some organizations simply started their work and then sought permis‑ sion once GIs and sailors were being served their coffee, sandwiches, and donuts. One such organization with a lot of political clout was the Ameri‑ can Theater Wing, War Service, which included Helen Hayes, Vera Allen, and Gertrude Lawrence as officers. Founded before Pearl Harbor, the Wing worked with British war relief. After the U.S. declaration of war, the Wing turned its considerable talents and wealth to providing for American troops as well. The Wing produced a slipper for the services, “which is pleasant in the barracks, but more comforting, say the aviators, inside their boots at 30,000 feet.”13 Antoinette Perry, chairman of the board of the Wing, stated that the Wing did not conflict with the work of the Red Cross and that their relations were “most harmonious.” But when one looks at the records of the American Red Cross, which enjoyed a good reputation, one sees that the reverse was true. The Wing raised its own funds mainly from the acting and artistic community and from generous benefactors outside of the arts and theatrical community. Although there was no direct mention of the USO, the Wing was in di‑ rect competition with that organization as well. The best-known contribu‑ tion of the Wing was the opening of the Stage Door Canteen in New York,


67

and in less than one year it entertained one million soldiers. Food was enticement, and in 1943 the canteen announced “the donations of restau‑ ratuers [sic] and food supply companies! And the output of the kitchen!” It had served “three thousand pies in one day, 3,500 pounds of turkey, 4,000 full holiday dinners at Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Years! One million and a half cigarettes in a year, 1,000 crates of oranges, and 750,000 sand‑ wiches!”14 The chairman of the board of the Wing informed the War Relief Con‑ trol Board that the policies of the Stage Door Canteen did not welcome female service members into the building (and the canteen was all-white as well, since the Army maintained a racially segregated system). This policy had been a matter of some distress for the Army and Navy for some time, but the canteen maintained its status as an all-male preserve except for the volunteer hostesses and entertainers. The canteen was, however, in the process of setting up tea dances at a first-class hotel every Friday afternoon for women in uniform. The Relief Control Board was also informed that the Wing was in the process of setting up a Stage Door Canteen in Lon‑ don with the cooperation of the London Stage Society.15 There really was not a great deal the War Relief Control Board or the Joint Army-Navy Board could do about the segregation of women, since they were rendering a popular service for the troops and there was not a question of legally challenging the operation. Would any further dis‑ cussion of the status of female service members also call attention to the Army’s policy of racial separation? There were times when the War Relief Control Board had to take some action when an organization overreached its authority. One such group was the American Women’s Voluntary Services. In August 1943 the Chi‑ cago chapter of the AWVS gave an interview to the Chicago Sun, stating that the first shipment of one hundred thousand cigarettes was on the way to servicemen overseas. The spokesman for the AWVS told the Sun that another campaign was planned, and that for every ten cases (five hundred cartons) purchased, a “leading cigarette manufacturer” would contribute one case. The War Relief Control Board members were quickly told by the Spe‑ cial Services Division, AES, and USO that the AWVS’s plan conflicted with their mission. E. Pendleton Turner, consultant to the Control Board, wrote in no uncertain terms that this situation was in direct conflict with

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the initial authorization granted to the AWVS. No project of that nature could be undertaken without first informing the Control Board, and the position of the board was that the Red Cross, AES, USO, and Spe‑ cial Services dealt with cigarettes overseas. There were too many private schemes to provide for the troops, and this only added to the confusion for the civilian population, which was more than willing to sacrifice for the troops.16 The national director told Turner that the press release was done by an overzealous member of the Chicago chapter and that most probably the cigarette project was part of a proposed Christmas project to send packages to soldiers and sailors overseas.17 The AWVS continued its good work for the military, but no more was heard about a plan to provide free cigarettes overseas. The action of the Chicago branch of the AWVS only strengthened the suspicions of the Control Board that major tobacco companies were encouraging such schemes to enlarge their profits. Many groups seeking authorization to solicit funds for cigarettes mentioned that one or more leading manufacturers were offering discounts. When the Queens County Liquor and Restaurant Association of New York petitioned for authoriza‑ tion to raise money for cigarettes, the Control Board learned that Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company would sell the cigarettes to the association “at an exceptionally low cost,” and the association assured the War Relief Control Board that there would be no administrative costs. Rudy Marwede wrote that in making an application to the New York City Department of Welfare for permission to solicit funds, he was told that the city could grant no permission until the Control Board gave the liquor and restaurant association a license.18 The Control Board faced a dilemma because it really had no authority over local organizations like the Queens County association, so it could say only that they had no jurisdiction over strictly local operations. A member of the Control Board told Marwede that his group needed to remember that there were so many local solicitations that shipping space could not be guaranteed and would first be taken by those established agencies providing for the needs of military personnel. The situation had become so chaotic that a reasonable solution had to be found along the lines of a centralized collection, as was being done in Great Britain. Francis Keppel, secretary of the War Relief Control Board, called the movement


69

to raise funds for overseas cigarettes “a somewhat disreputable and undig‑ nified campaign carried on without authority all over the country.”19 Honest solicitation schemes poured into the Control Board. One pa‑ triotic New Yorker proposed that he would have small brightly colored cardboard boxes made up and placed throughout the city in bars, shops, and department stores. Every time a smoker walked by a box, he or she would deposit one cigarette. Every week the loose cigarettes would be col‑ lected and then be packed and shipped to the troops overseas. General Osborn also received a letter, and he thanked the sender and applauded his “patriotic motive.” The Control Board could do nothing except to point out the grave difficulties in packaging loose cigarettes and also the near impossibility of finding shipping space.20 General Osborn called the nationwide frenzy to get cigarettes into the hands of GIs “an unmitigated nuisance and an imposition on the public.”21 The AES wanted nothing to do with a deluge of gift cigarettes simply because the PX could provide a pack of twenty for five to six cents, not the ten to twelve cents per pack it would cost these organizations. The country had the National War Fund in place, so why not let veterans’ organiza‑ tions such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars conduct a centralized giving campaign? Under no circumstances could the War Relief Control Board or any other government agency make public its irritation with cigarette cam‑ paigns and offend a large number of well-meaning citizens. Nor could the agencies publicly air their suspicions about the major tobacco companies. The best that could be done was to make the public aware of governmental agencies such as the AES and the Special Services Divisions that provided for the troops. The American Red Cross and USO, though not specifically governmental, also provided for the troops, especially those in hospitals and in the field with shows and programs. The Army Postal Service weighed in on the discussions, pointing out that the War Department had officially stated that there had to be restric‑ tions on the number and size of gift packages sent overseas. Colonel S. G. Schwartz, chief of the Postal Operations Branch, suggested to the AES that the idea of substituting postal money orders for gifts might be in order, as the soldier could redeem the money order at the PX for the items he wished to purchase. There was a problem, however, with sending money orders, which “lack the sentimental appeal furnished by actual gifts.”22 The Army

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Postal Service could not handle the growing numbers of gift packages. The AES replied that money orders or gift certificates were not practical, be‑ cause in combat areas Commissary Sales units took over the functions of the PX and distributed supplies such as cigarettes, candy, razor blades, and the like to the troops free of charge, as a part of the combat ration. Every request for a license to send free cigarettes or other supplies to the troops had to be evaluated by the Control Board and then acknowledged. It took time, and even when there was no encouragement to continue, many groups kept pressing for authorization and often persisted in raising funds. The Better Business Bureau of Philadelphia decided that it wanted to send free Camel cigarettes to the troops and contacted state officials, who stated that a Philadelphia-wide solicitation did not violate Pennsyl‑ vania laws. The bureau then contacted the Control Board. The Board re‑ sponded that it could take no action if the solicitation took place within a state. If the campaign crossed state lines, however, it fell under the ju‑ risdiction of the Board, and the authorization would be denied. The legal representative did point out that shipping was stretched to the limit and there could be no guarantee that the cigarettes would reach the troops. The Board was particularly irritated that R. J. Reynolds, maker of the popular Camel brand, indicated to the Philadelphia bureau that many local organizations were raising funds for cigarettes and that their Camel brand would include a special label affixed to each package, carrying a word of encouragement. Every agency had expressed its opposition to any sort of personal message on packs of cigarettes, candy bars, chewing gum, and the like.23 There was another side to the coin, however, in that the major cigarette manufacturers were deluged by local groups with requests for information about shipments for the troops overseas. An internal memorandum cir‑ culated by the War Relief Control Board estimated that cigarette makers could deliver case lots of one thousand packs at five cents per pack to the ports of embarkation. Other items were shipped from ports on neutral ships that charged a very high risk charge per ton sent. The U.S. government had to pay the bill for such shipments.24 To make matters worse, some cigarette manu‑ facturers were enclosing reply cards for the troops to send a thank-you note back to the donor. Army intelligence was livid because some cards


71

arrived in the United States with the soldier’s name and complete military address, including unit. In a stern letter to the makers, it was pointed out that recently cards were received that gave “a complete station list of a heavy air bombardment squadron in England.” Army censors had orders from the War Department not to send any of the cards back to the United States, and it was requested that all cigarette and candy makers cease using these cards in the interest of security.25 Aggravation reached a high point in the summer of 1943 when the press printed articles indicating that since the Control Board had not reached a definitive policy on local solicitation of funds, it was all right to continue raising funds and sending gifts to the troops overseas. But the Control Board contributed to the confusion by not issuing any sort of policy about the raising of funds. If that was not bad enough, there emerged a competition between the various organizations, and all too often this resulted in press articles. In March 1943 the New York Times published an article about the work of the Red Cross in the Pacific theater of operations. The article said, “While some of the most desperate fighting raged in the Solomon . . . [Red Cross personnel] distributed clothing, cigarettes, soap, razors, tooth‑ brushes, playing cards, and other articles to American marines, soldiers, and sailors. Native Papuan bearers carried Red Cross Christmas packages on their backs through the dense jungles of New Guinea last winter in large measure, as a result of their efforts the Red Cross believes that every American soldier in New Guinea received a Red Cross present on or be‑ fore Christmas Day.”26 The Army Exchange Service and the Special Ser‑ vices Division were angry that this article left out the availability of items through either the Post Exchange or Commissary Sales. General Osborn called it “typical Red Cross publicity.” Almost every branch or agency of the government, civilian and military, was affected by the desire of a patriotic citizenry to provide for the troops. The Veterans Administration had a number of offers to provide free candy and cigarettes to patients on military hospital ships. The Disabled Amer‑ ican Veterans (DAV), the vast majority of its membership having been wounded during the Great War, recalled how little the soldiers of World War I received, and they were correctly informed that soldiers, once they arrived at a hospital, could purchase a ten-pack carton of cigarettes for

72


eighty cents. The Veterans Administration told the DAV that the best way to ensure that wounded soldiers, sailors, and marines got free cigarettes was to coordinate with the Red Cross, which would see that all wounded got packs of cigarettes free of charge. The director of the Hospital Admin‑ istration division in the Office of the Surgeon General gave his assurance that the DAV’s contribution would go where the DAV indicated.27 Coordination between the Control Board and the Joint Army-Navy Board, as well as the AES, USO, and Special Services Division, became a critical necessity, especially where providing for the troops was concerned. The Office of the Quartermaster General watched what the Control Board was doing because in combat the Commissary Sales took over supplying troops with the items that would normally be handled by the PX system. Army Regulations 30-2225, Quartermaster Corps, listed the number of items for sale, including candy, cigars, cigarettes, ice cream, shaving cream, toothbrushes, toothpaste and powder, and other small items that fell un‑ der the category of comfort items. The Control Board, therefore, had to take into consideration a large number of factors and competing interests before issuing or denying a li‑ cense. Normally, the Board began its deliberations by looking at adminis‑ trative costs, and if the costs exceeded one-third of the anticipated moneys, or if a professional fund-raising company was involved, the petition for a license was denied. As the requests for authorization increased in 1943, many groups, even groups with low administrative costs, were turned down through a letter explaining that the Army already took care of the soldiers’ needs through the AES or agencies like the USO. One of the stan‑ dard reasons for denial was the very real problem of shipping space. By 1943 the Control Board had to coordinate efforts with the National War Fund and invited representatives to be a part of the evaluation pro‑ cess. In March 1943 the Board decided to issue an appeal to all groups reg‑ istered with the Board to suspend all collections during Red Cross Week so the Red Cross could conduct a nationwide fund-raiser. The Board also decided to coordinate with various church groups that collected funds for the war effort. At the same time, the Board dealt with such groups as the Fighting French Relief Committee, the English-Speaking Union, Polish Relief, the British War Relief Society, Norwegian Relief Group, Ameri‑ can National Recreation Association, and many other groups soliciting


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funds.28 Groups that were turned down by the Control Board and not granted any authority contacted senators, congressmen, and other officials to intercede with the Board for reconsideration. Francis Keppel, secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Board, continually told the Control Board that the services were not in favor of any organiza‑ tion raising funds for items already provided. Sometimes the relationship of the Control Board and the Joint Board became heated over solicitation campaigns. It was pointed out that free cigarettes, for example, were not really free, because some nations, such as Australia, demanded that import duties be paid on cigarettes that did not come from official U.S. govern‑ ment sources such as the AES, USO, Red Cross, Special Services, and Office of the Quartermaster General.29 To muddy the waters, General Douglas MacArthur, in Australia, in re‑ sponse to a group seeking to send cigarettes in the amount of ten thousand dollars, asked that all moneys raised be converted into cases of cigarettes for the troops training in the Pacific.30 The American Red Cross, which had its own sources of funds, refused to be responsible for the distribution of free cigarettes to the troops overseas. Its policy clearly stated that it would distribute its own supplies to the wounded, and in dire circumstances to the troops in combat where no PX or Commissary Sales existed.31 Cases of cigarettes were being shipped to the ports of embarkation addressed simply to the “Officer.” Although the Special Services did distribute the cigarettes, in truth it wanted no part of being the official organization re‑ sponsible for these gifts.32 The lion’s share of cigarettes sent to the ports came from the New York VFW with a campaign known as “Smokes for Yanks.” The Board had denied the group a license to raise funds and had several times refused to reconsider the decision.33 No one wanted to stifle the ongoing patriotic zeal of citizens wanting to do something for the troops, but so many orga‑ nizations trying to do their part for the war effort and for the troops was putting a definite strain on the supply of items such as cigarettes, candy, and the like. While the Control Board dealt with the mass of requests for informa‑ tion or for a license to solicit funds, another problem arose. The vast ma‑ jority of citizens were honest, patriotic souls who wanted to provide for those fighting the battles in Europe and Asia. As could be expected, there

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were some who took the opportunity to make a dishonest dollar and cheat those who wanted to do something for the war effort. The Control Board had to decide how to proceed with dishonest companies and individuals. The organizations or businesses that claimed to act as middlemen, tak‑ ing contributions and then buying cigarettes and sending them to the ports of embarkation, were easy to detect. Their administrative costs were high, especially for the organization “Send ’em Smokes.” The solicitation letter claimed that each package would have a special label with the state‑ ment, “When the Going Gets Rough Have a Puff on ****** name and address of donor.” The letter went on to say, “You are making a vitally important contribution to the morale of some fighting man, perhaps on a battlefield in Europe, or at a lonely outpost in the Pacific.”34 The War Department and the Control Board believed that this group, which also operated under the title “Overseas Tobacco Service,” was not an honest effort and that the New York Better Business Bureau should investigate it quickly, before honest people contributed to the campaign.35 This organi‑ zation continued to solicit funds well into 1944, despite efforts to stop it. The AES became directly involved with the case of the Overseas Cig‑ arette Service and began an investigation of its own. As inquiries were made, it appeared that the service gave no assurance as to what brand of cigarettes were to be shipped to the GIs and that the service purchased cigarettes at four and a half cents a pack and charged six cents a pack to the person or concern who subscribed to the service. It was highly pos‑ sible that cheaper off-brand cigarettes, which GIs would not normally buy, would be shipped. As the AES reckoned it, this meant that the Overseas Cigarette Ser‑ vice charged a 33 percent handling charge. This very high administrative charge was, in the opinion of the investigating officer, unfair and not in line with other services that the Control Board monitored. Indeed, the Control Board had refused a license to the Overseas Cigarette Service. There were also indications that the Overseas Cigarette Service received a bonus from the manufacturers for the number of packs of cigarettes sent to the troops. A representative of the Better Business Bureau of New York went to the offices of the AES in New York and told the investigating of‑ ficer that the bureau’s investigating official could find nothing technically wrong with the service and could not, by law, proceed against it. The Navy


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Department had also conducted an investigation and agreed with the AES that the whole matter should be turned over to the assistant district attor‑ ney of New York.36 By the fall of 1943 the chaotic campaigns to raise funds to send free cigarettes had reached such proportions that the various official groups felt that there needed to be centralized control under one agency. The strains of the various schemes to raise funds to buy cigarettes was causing a shortage, so fewer cigarettes were available for purchase by the Red Cross, USO, AES, and the quartermaster general. The decision of the Subsistence Branch of the Office of the Quartermaster General to include cigarettes in combat rations put added stress on the market. The Joint Army-Navy Board called a meeting to discuss proposals to centralize citizens’ solicitations under one authority that would receive the contributions and then make the purchase from the producers. Homer S. Fox of the Control Board had doubts about the project and pointed out that even with a central authority, there was no guarantee that free ciga‑ rettes would reach “all forces overseas.”37 As with so many governmental agencies, it was decided that another expanded meeting was in order. General Osborn, never one to keep his feelings hidden, approved of a centralized effort, and called the present state of affairs “irresponsible campaigns for public collection of funds for purchasing cigarettes for the armed forces overseas.” He argued that the organization “should go even further than simply controlling the collection of funds for cigarettes, but also should by arrangement with the cigarette companies coordinate and control the free gifts which these cigarette companies are making for this purpose.”38 The meeting on October 7 began with a proposal that possibly the Red Cross, which had stature and the public’s esteem, could take over the proj‑ ect. The Red Cross representative wanted to maintain that public goodwill and quickly declined the offer. Walter Wesselius, the Red Cross official at the meeting, explained that the Red Cross bought its own supply of ciga‑ rettes, and if it were the central authority, there would be more cigarettes than the organization could possibly use. Wesselius stated that there could be public resentment if it appeared that the Red Cross was collecting ciga‑ rettes for its own programs, and not for the intended purpose of supplying all troops overseas.39

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One representative of the Special Services said that his organization was supplying the troops and that more cigarettes purchased by a fund, be it national or local, added to the problems occurring at the ports of embar‑ kation. Some ports were so filled with gift cigarettes that the cigarettes were going stale or being stolen or otherwise damaged. It was agreed that restricting public campaigns would cause resentment, because individuals and groups wanted to have some part of the war effort that directly af‑ fected the men on the battlefields. A few days after the meeting the Red Cross officially turned down any offer to be the centralized authority for the collection of funds to provide free cigarettes to the troops overseas.40 The Army Exchange Service want‑ ed nothing to impede its own efforts to obtain all manner of items for the American and overseas exchanges, and the AES representative remained basically silent on the whole matter. A few days after the inconclusive meeting, Arthur C. Ragland of the Control Board met with officials of the War Food Administration, and he was told that tobacco supplies were such that it would not matter whether the public campaigns continued.41 The War Food Administration had been seriously misinformed about the availability of leaf tobacco. Already makers were pointing out that there would be a severe shortage going into 1944 and 1945. The efforts to find a central authority to control public solicitation had reached a point where nothing could be decided. Cigarettes were not the only scarce product. There were shortages in many items that would impact the ability of supplying the troops. The AES was well aware of the problems in obtaining enough items to stock the PX, snack bars, and beer halls, and there was no remedy in sight going into the critical year of 1944. Byron had built an efficient worldwide system of supplying the Army wherever its troops were. Not a man to drift with the tides, Byron was determined to keep the candy bars, razor blades, cigarettes, chewing gum, and beer on the shelves of the PX. The year 1943 had been successful, but 1944 offered greater challenges for the AES.

5

´ N o B e e r !

It had been a very good day for Master Sergeant Elmer Franzman of the Headquarters Squadron, 329th Service Group, who was by June 1944 in India. This young man from Cannelton, Indiana, had served in England, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and now in India, in the China, Burma, and India theater of operations. He wrote to his parents, “We received our monthly issue of beer today and we were really surprised. Each man received one case (24 bottles). That is the largest issue to date, and am satisfied to know I’ll have refreshments to do me a few days. It’s a good brand too, Pabst Blue ribbon, but some was Schlitz, which is just as good.”1 Sergeant Franzman had every reason to be happy with the beer allotment, but back in the United States there was a critical shortage of beer for AES exchanges. By the spring of 1943 and well into 1944 the sources of beer dwin‑ dled severely. The exchange officer of the Desert Training Center at Coachella, California, sent an urgent memorandum to the 9th Ser‑ vice Command in San Francisco. “At the present time through every source known to us we are receiving approximately one-half of beer needed to reasonably serve the troops for which we are responsible. . . . In addition we would appreciate advice from your office as to possibilities of further consideration should we furnish the names of other suppliers who are anxious to serve us should requirement malt be made available.”2 One can only imagine that in the heat, which could reach 125 degrees, and the tough conditions of desert training, morale problems were caused by a lack of beer. It did not matter if the higher headquarters of the service commands or the staff of the AES

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were asked to find new sources of beer. There were no other sources of beer for the military or for civilians. The PX system grew at a rapid rate because of the increase in the num‑ ber of troops being trained for deployment overseas. Red flags were raised in the summer of 1943 when it became clear that certain mainstays of the PX—cigarettes, candy, dental items, and beer—were becoming difficult to obtain. When there should have been an expansion of those manufac‑ tured comfort items, there was a reduction in output due to circumstances outside of the AES. Master Sergeant Franzman wrote to his parents, “The next time you send a package enclose a few valet razor blades, and a few tubes of Colgate toothpaste and some Vaseline hair oil. The PX is short on these items and my supply is about out.”3 One of the pillars of American life, Coca-Cola soft drinks were in short supply as well due to a shortage of cork, which was then used to line the caps. The stress on the AES was great because the exchanges had to serve troops in the United States and in a rapidly growing number of overseas bases and staging areas, which had a priority for PX goods. It was a simple matter of numbers. For example, the number of American troops in EnÂ� gland training for the cross-Channel invasion increased dramatically as the 4th Infantry Division arrived in January 1944, the 9th Infantry Division landed in September 1944, and the 66th and the 76th touched ground in 1944. The 17th Airborne Division began training in England in August 1944. Some units, such as the 26th Division, went from the United States directly to France. There was a massive increase of American Army Air Force personnel as well. For every soldier in combat, there were four to five support personnel from the Quartermaster Corps, the Transportation Corps, and the Medical Corps, and these units had their own exchanges. Despite shortages, the American GI seemed rich and very well supplied when compared to the strictly rationed British. The same was true of the Pacific theater and in posts from the Caribbean to Africa and Iceland. The USO also felt the stresses of shortages, and so did the Special Ser‑ vices Division that depended on the AES for many supplies. As early as late March 1943 the USO requested that the organization have access to Army and Navy commissaries to save them money and ensure an ongoing supply of cigarettes, candy, chewing gum, and soda fountain syrups and drinks. In a letter to the Special Services the USO pointed out that of the annual requirements of $2,000,700, only $228,000 was paid to the commissaries

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for food and comfort items. The USO policy was to charge as little as pos‑ sible for meals and to mirror what the PXs charged in their snack bars. The largest number of visitors to USO centers was Army and Army Air Force personnel, and the numbers were growing.4 The USO was not concerned with the shortage of beer because it did not serve anything but soft drinks or coffee. Everyone felt the shortages, but beer and then cigarette shortages soon went from requests for help from exchange officers to a full-blown crisis. The Wall Street Journal published an article titled “Cigarette Shortage Laid to Big Shipments Overseas: Not Enough Leaf to Go Around.” The 1944 article stated that 25 to 35 percent of all cigarettes went to troops over‑ seas, and that the cigarette makers had only about 88 percent of the 1943 tobacco leaf production to manufacture for a growing demand in 1944.5 The beer producers were similarly affected, with about a 7 to 10 percent decrease in production. The AES had to be concerned as supplies dwindled. The number of complaints coming from PXs grew in intensity, but there was little help the AES could give. The beer crisis had its origins in the many commit‑ tees, boards, and offices established to fight World War II and with the failure of those many agencies to communicate to one another. When the war began, no one could envision the requirements from the AES for beer, and many of those working in the Office of Price Administration had little practical experience. Malt, strictly controlled by the War Production Board, very quickly became a difficult commodity to acquire, and without it beer could not be made. The relationship of the breweries, the OPA, and the AES was not a happy one. A good case in point was the friction between Baltimore’s National Brewing Company and the exchange officer for the Military District of Washington. On May 19, 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Miller telephoned Norman S. Almony, manager of the Na‑ tional Brewing Company. Faced with serious difficulties in obtaining beer, Miller asked the brewery if it could supply 3.2 Army Beer. The next day Almony wrote to Miller, “As explained to you yesterday on the phone, I regret that at this time we are not in a position to sell any beer to your exchange. We are now limited in our malt to 93% of our 1942 purchases. This means that we can brew just 93% of the beer which we brewed last year. Accordingly, all of our retail accounts are being rationed to approxi‑ mately 93% of our sales to them last year.”6

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A 7 percent reduction in malt, mandated by the War Production Board and other agencies, must be viewed in the context of the rise in the num‑ ber of troops being inducted into service, more than a 7 percent increase. Miller was in a serious predicament because in April 1943, the AES, aware of the beer problem, informed Miller and all other exchange officers in the United States that as many local breweries as possible should be used for the acquisition of beer due to the tremendous strain on the transportation system for the shipment of essential war supplies. Miller had, on the other hand, brought some of the problem on himself. Almony concluded his letter with, “It is too bad that you were not in a position to purchase our beer at the time we were bickering together during the winter months, for I would now be in a position to give you beer.”7 To make matters worse, the Anheuser-Busch Brewing Company of St. Louis, makers of the very popular Budweiser beer, stopped shipments to exchanges on the Pacific Coast. At Camp Hood, Texas, the exchange of‑ ficer was informed that Anheuser-Busch could not supply 3.2 beer to the exchange. This company also cited the 7 percent drop in the quantity of malt available for the brewery. Transportation was another problem, and the return of empty bottles by rail was out of the question. The St. Louis brewery stated that more than 70 percent of its 3.2 beer went to military purchase, and it would try to provide some beer to all of the camps that requested it. F. W. Templeton of the Anheuser-Busch Company informed all of the military customers that even darker days were ahead. Exchanges should, Templeton advised, seek out local breweries, because “within a very short time the WPB [War Production Board] will issue another federal restric‑ tion against us, whereby we will be able to use only 90% of the [railway] car mileage we used last year [1942] and this obviously will further cut down our ability to fill Army orders of 3.2 Budweiser.”8 The return of empty beer bottles and soda bottles was a critical fac‑ tor in keeping costs down, but the reduction of boxcar space for such items meant that breweries and soda makers faced problems in obtain‑ ing glass bottles, also a controlled item. Many bars, package stores, and grocery stores were charging a penny or two deposit on the bottle, which was refunded when the empty glass bottle was returned. It was becoming more and more difficult to obtain cork for use in bottle caps to keep car‑ bonation and taste intact. Cork was used by the Army and Navy in great

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quantities for such things as the cork lining in canteen tops, stoppers for medicinal glass bottles, and other necessary war supplies. To make beer matters even worse, the supply of hops, a plant whose dried flowers are used in the brewing of beer, was seriously reduced due to allocations set by the OPA, Department of Agriculture, and other agencies. While trying to keep price increases to a minimum in a wartime economy, the OPA did not understand at times what was causing the shortages. An official touring hop-producing industries in California telegraphed the of‑ fice in Washington: I wish to call to your attention to the fact that labor expenses for growing hops this season unquestionably will be at least doubled and perhaps tripled over those of last year [1943] due to both increased labor rates which are doubled over those of last year and to great inefficiency of labor now available. As concrete example 1942 labor costs to end May on three of our California farms totaled eightyfive hundred dollars. This year these labor costs to end may account nineteen thousand three hundred dollars. Most unsatisfactory situa‑ tion created for [hops] growers faced with these costs and no knowl‑ edge of your action ceiling prices.9

M. A. Taylor of the E. Clemens Horst Company of San Francisco, which claimed to be the largest hop grower in the United States, wrote to E. G. Even, head of the Beverage Section of the Food Price Division of the OPA, that hops growers could no longer deal with price increases. It seemed that hops, once dried and baled, weighed about two hundred pounds per bale. The government required hops in smaller packages. The growers had to rebale and recompress the hops, and Taylor claimed, “We cannot absorb these packing costs.” Taylor went on to warn, “The various governmental agencies that require hops for the war effort will be unable to procure them.” The correspondence between Taylor and Even became quite testy, with Taylor stating at one point, “Frankly, we believe that OPA’s attempt to force the provisions of [an OPA circular] on to the hop package industry when it is clear that said conditions are unworkable on the package business is entirely contrary to the President’s order.”10 The hops growers were not the only ones to bombard the OPA with complaints. The OPA in Washington believed that beer distributors in some sections of the country were making about a 25 percent profit in

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dealing with the retailers. A Detroit brewery disagreed, stating to the OPA, “The average Michigan distributor doesn’t make 25% and we know of any number who make anywhere from 13 to 16%.”11 As the OPA pondered a new round of controls nationwide, beer producers and distributors and their national organizations mounted a major campaign to keep the OPA from imposing blanket controls that did not take into consideration dif‑ ferences in regions of the country. The problem with the chaos in the production and sale of beer was that civilian workers and the military found their supplies seriously reduced, with no end in sight. When World War II broke out in Europe, the Brit‑ ish reviewed its rationing and production structure and decided that beer was essential to the war effort and that the beer industry could produce however much it wanted, depending on the flow of products such as malt, sugars, and the like. For the American worker and the military, beer was the drink of choice after a hard day’s work in the factories or training areas. The bureaucracy in Washington seemed determined to force new rules that would affect the growers and breweries and limit the production of beer for those who wanted it most. Hard-liquor production had its prob‑ lems with the acquisition of ingredients, too, but the distillers never faced the continuous problems with Washington as did the brewers of beer. Could it get worse for the thirsty GIs? Indeed it could. In June 1943 James G. Hamilton, secretary of the California State Brewers Institute, telegraphed the director of economic stabilization: Our members are advised by corn milling companies that unless the government does something immediately to create a movement of white or yellow corn from the farms and elevators to the mills that milling companies will shortly face complete shutdown. The lack of white or yellow corn for milling purposes is reported to be due to the ceiling price established for cash corn. Without corn grits from the corn mills the brewing industry is in a precarious position. The beer requirements of the armed forces on the Pacific coast and for overseas shipment total twenty-five percent of Pacific Coast production.12

With production costs rising and with output getting smaller, the flow of beer slowed down. The United States Brewers Association in New York explained to the OPA that prices on hops grown in 1938 and 1939 were forty cents per pound, but the 1940 crop was at sixty-five cents per pound.

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The 1942 hops crop was smaller than anticipated, and there needed to be action by the OPA to create some reasonable prices.13 The OPA respond‑ ed: “The subject matter is now under consideration, and your suggestions will be given due consideration.” This basically meant that no decision would be put into place in the near future. The AES was aware of the conflict between the OPA, the hops grow‑ ers, and the breweries, but Byron’s concern was for some sort of major increase in beer deliveries. There was no indication that the beer would flow into the exchanges. There were also grave dangers that overseas ship‑ ments would have to be curtailed. Once shipping-space expectations were lowered, it would be hard to get that space again. The year 1944 promised to be one of heavy combat and one of decision. Regardless of the dramatic history-making events taking place, complaints about beer shortages con‑ tinued to pour into AES headquarters, and telegrams and letters inundated the OPA and the War Production Board for relief. Not only were the beer producers concerned, but the meatpacking plants were also in dire straits. The problem centered on corn production, which had the breweries in a quandary, as they needed corn products to brew beer. Corn was also needed to feed hogs, and if there was not enough corn available, hogs could not reach a weight that would ensure meat for the military and for civilians. James Byrnes of the War Mobilization Office re‑ ceived a telegram from a major producer: “The corn situation has reached most critical stage. Many plants like this and other important industries force to curtail production. To avoid complete shutdown immediate action required. Vast amount of this industrys [sic] products are for armed forces and in demand by defense units. Twenty thousand employees in Chicago alone face immediate layoff.”14 While the various agencies in Washington grappled with production and pricing issues, the soldiers faced grave shortages. There were more than six hundred military camps in the United States by midyear 1943, and each had its own specific problems as to the acquisition of beer. First Lieutenant Herbert F. Leary, working the exchanges at the Desert Training Center, no‑ tified AES headquarters that his beer suppliers had just informed him that shipments of beer by boxcar would be cut from thirty-five cars to twentythree cars per month. The lieutenant said that large purchases of beer for overseas shipments, the decision of midwestern breweries to stop shipments to the West Coast, and the malt restriction caused the problem.15

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The 9th Service Command Headquarters at the Presidio, near San Francisco, informed the AES in Washington that the beer situation in Ari‑ zona and southern California fell into the category of “urgent emergency.” The camps in Arizona presented a special set of circumstances because there was a state tax on liquor and beer wholesalers, and the wholesalers were passing the tax on to the exchanges, which meant the beer in AES beer halls and snack bars cost more. Twenty-one breweries were contact‑ ed, but none could offer relief, citing transportation restrictions and the 7 percent reduction in malt. The reporting officer stated that temperatures had already reached 130 degrees in the training area, and that the beer shortage was causing morale problems.16 The problem affected the distributors, who would have been quite hap‑ py to ship large quantities of 3.2 beer to military camps, but one major dis‑ tributor in El Centro, California, informed the PX officer in Arizona that Anheuser-Busch stopped all West Coast shipments of Budweiser. The slack was taken up by a California distributor for Miller High Life and Blatz beers of Milwaukee. In March Blatz Beer sent twenty-five boxcar loads of beer, but in April 1943 the brewery informed the distributor that, given transportation difficulties and the 7 percent malt reduction, they could ship very little civilian or 3.2 military beer. Blatz Beer was doing its best, and suggested that the Desert Training Center could order beer. The center ordered sixty boxcar loads of beer per month. In April the Blatz brewery stated that delivery would be impossible and withdrew from the agree‑ ment. The distributor indicated that it might be possible to deliver about three boxcar loads in April and May, a far cry from the sixty boxcars that was reckoned to be what the center needed for the exchange.17 None of the exchange officers believed that breweries or distributors were at fault for this state of affairs. All placed the blame on the malt-reduction order and transportation restrictions imposed by the Defense Transportation Office. Even generals became involved in the situation. Brigadier General J. B. Sweet wrote to the AES, “High summer temperatures, lack of recre‑ ational facilities in the Desert Training Center, and the difficulty involved in moving recreational convoys of any large number of men out of the area to urban centers creates a heavy demand by our troops on our exchange service for beer and soft drinks. Attention is invited to the eight enclosures to basic letter indicating serious shortage of quota—free malt, bottles, and fiber cases.”18

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In the South, where there was the greatest concentration of training camps and bases, the same problems were bedeviling Post Exchange offi‑ cers and commanding officers. The 4th Service Command in Atlanta had additional problems not faced in California. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver A. Seaver, chief of the Army Exchange Branch for the 4th Service Command, wrote, “In view of the fact that there are comparatively few large breweries located within 4th Service Command and the ratio of troops to civilian population is far greater than in most sections of the country it is believed that some relief should be granted to the exchanges to continue selling beer to the troops. Request is made for assistance in permitting exchanges to procure their requirements of beer, quota exempt.”19 What the officer did not say was that there were large elements in the southern states that were hostile to beer and liquor sales. In fact, many of those states retained their Prohibition laws after the repeal of the con‑ stitutional amendment banning the manufacturing and sale of alcoholic beverages. If beer could not be obtained on post, then soldiers might flood into towns looking for a drink. This could very well result in unfortu‑ nate incidents; the possible clash between law enforcement or irate citizens and soldiers was a distinct possibility. Red-light districts sprang up around Army posts, and when no beer was available in the exchanges, soldiers could very well gravitate toward those areas. One such notorious district was in Phenix City, Alabama, where cheap bars, prostitution, and other vices flourished, attracting soldiers from nearby Fort Benning, Georgia. The situation became so bad that General George S. Patton publicly pro‑ claimed that he would bring his tanks into the city and level the red-light district.20 Mississippi offers one of the best examples of the problems caused by the shortage of beer. There were three large training bases in the state: Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg; Camp McCain, a few miles from Grena‑ da; and Camp Van Dorn, near Centreville. Of the three, Camp Shelby was the best known, as it was the most extensive training base in the United States, training a large number of divisions and the famed Japanese Ameri‑ can 442nd Regimental Combat Team that saw distinguished service in the European theater of operations. When time allowed, soldiers could visit New Orleans, which was only a few hours away from the military life. Camp McCain was near Grenada, a very small place with few places of entertainment of any sort. Memphis was about 120 miles away, but roads

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were very poor and travel to Memphis was almost impossible for a soldier on the weekends. There was also an air training base at Grenada, and that base relied on the same beer suppliers as did the divisional-size training base at Camp McCain. In April the Anheuser-Busch Company informed the Delta Dis‑ tributing Company in Greenwood, Mississippi, that it could not meet the demand for beer. Once that occurred, the Base Exchange officer informed the 4th Service Command that consumption of beer at the Grenada Air Base was forty cases per day. The PX was able to obtain only twenty cases per day, and that supply was in danger of ending. The PX at Camp Mc‑ Cain figured that its consumption of beer was two boxcars of beer per day for the more than thirty thousand soldiers training and in support there. Camp McCain could now expect twenty cars per month, if lucky. The base adjutant informed the service command that the shortage caused “a terrific morale problem for the city of Grenada.”21 This was a rather strange way to express the friction between military bases and a small southern town of about six thousand citizens. Camp Shelby added to the growing din of complaints as well. The PX officer there reported that from May 25 to June 24, 1942, one distributor sold to the PX 5,800 cases of beer, but by June 1943 the same distributor sold only 1,362 cases and then told the exchange officer that there proba‑ bly would be no more 3.2 beer available. General Byron met with General Somervell, the Army Service Forces commander, in July and was told that any change in priorities for the PXs in the United States was not going to happen. Byron’s position was, “Get what you can and let it go at that.”22 The third training base in Mississippi, Camp Van Dorn, named for Mississippi Confederate general Earl Van Dorn, presented a different problem during this period of serious beer shortages. Centreville is in the southwestern part of the state, and like other training camps in Mississippi it had available large tracts of land for infantry training. At that time, as did many southern states, Mississippi had strict laws separating the races, and the Army itself was racially segregated. The African American 364th Infantry Regiment was sent to train at Camp Van Dorn for overseas deployment at some unspecified future date. The 364th was an independent infantry regiment with no parent divi‑ sional organization to oversee training and to see to the welfare of the men in the regiment. Camp Van Dorn was possibly the worst place to send this

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unit. There was almost no entertainment in Centreville for white soldiers, and there certainly was none for soldiers of the 364th except for small bars in the African American community. The story becomes rather clouded, but certain conclusions can be made. The 364th arrived at Camp Van Dorn in May, the start of summer in the Deep South when extreme heat and dust are the rule. Very strict racial segregation was a way of life, and it is also clear that the white population was very suspicious of African Americans who had been trained as infan‑ trymen. On May 30, 1943, a member of the regiment was killed by a local law enforcement officer who witnessed a scuffle between the black sol‑ dier and a white military policeman. What happened next is unclear, but it appears that members of the regiment went into Centreville bound to avenge the death of the soldier. Some, and just how many is the subject of much current research and debate, were killed during confrontations with civilians and military law enforcement. Racial confrontations between the 364th and local, usually white, law enforcement in Louisiana and Arizona also occurred, but again archival evidence is spotty as to exactly what those incidents entailed. On June 10, a little more than a week after the incident, Captain W. W. Tyson, the PX officer for Camp Van Dorn, sent to Colonel Seaver of the 4th Service Command in Atlanta a memorandum asking for special assistance in obtaining beer for the camp. There was one distributor in Centreville that provided 3.2 Army Beer at fifteen cents per bottle. The distributor could supply for one day, and the camp had been without any beer since June 8. His narrative gives some insight into life at a training camp far from any large urban area: This past Sunday, at the opening of business, we had 3,800 cases of beer, making a total of 91,200 bottles. This entire amount was sold Sunday. Some [branch] Post Exchanges were without beer from 7 p.m. on. This enormous sale of beer Sunday was due to the fact that the nearest town is “off limits” and the soldiers are confined to the camp, due to the rioting of the 364th colored infantry. I also wish to point out that Camp Van Dorn is not situated near any large town or cities. The only activity the boys have is what is furnished to them on the post. Beer without a doubt, is one of the biggest morale builders that a Post Exchange can offer to an enlisted man.23

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Breweries had set up warehouses near Camp Van Dorn, but they had been empty for more than a week. Captain Tyson contacted the brewer‑ ies directly to ask for beer, explaining what had occurred (as he saw it). The response was the same that was given to Post Exchanges all over the United States: transportation was impossible, and due to the restriction on malt, the breweries simply did not have enough to send. In sheer frustra‑ tion, Tyson told Seaver, “We used approximately 34,000 cases of beer last month [May]. It will be much more this month due to increase in person‑ nel [the confinement of the 364th Regiment].”24 One gets the impression that the commander of Camp Van Dorn and his staff were sitting atop a tinderbox. The barracks area housing the 364th was cordoned off and patrolled by the military police, and the regiment was denied the use of the facilities on post except for the unit’s branch ex‑ changes. Eventually, in August, the regiment was redeployed to Fort Law‑ ton, Washington, and by January 1944 the 364th found itself in Alaska on garrison duty on Adak Island, where it remained until deactivated on May 15, 1946. Confrontations between civilians and the military services, some from time to time fatal, did occur during the Second World War. Whereas the 364th Infantry Regiment was involved in one altercation at Camp Van Dorn, on the West Coast of the United States there was a series of riots in Los Angeles between service personnel and Hispanic youths in what has become known as the Zoot-Suit Riots. There were other clashes in Lees‑ ville, Louisiana, near Camp Polk, and elsewhere. The deplorable situation at Camp Van Dorn does offer an opportunity to see how the Post Exchanges dealt with the supplying of troops in train‑ ing. The 364th was obviously confined to its regimental area, but did that mean the soldiers were deprived of any PX items? The branch exchange continued to serve the troops from the regiment despite their confine‑ ment. When the Army Exchange Service began expanding in early 1942, it was clear that one main Post Exchange could not serve all of the troops in training for overseas deployment. An infantry division had a strength of about fourteen thousand officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, and a division contained three regiments of infantry, with artillery, engineers, and other units as well. In the larger camps there was often more than one

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division in training at a time, and one main exchange simply could not handle the numbers of men wanting candy bars, gum, cigarettes, beer, and the like. Smaller branch exchanges were quickly established to handle troops at the regimental or battalion level, offering basically the same stock as the main exchange. The beer halls were especially needed in the troop areas, and usually they were in makeshift buildings that served just the cold 3.2 beer. When two divisions were training together on the same post, it was wise to sepa‑ rate the troops because unit identification could cause beer drinking to turn into a fistfight between men wearing different unit shoulder patches. To build unit cohesion and morale, each division began to think of itself as the best the Army had to offer. It was difficult for civilians to understand the group mentality that the Army successfully bred into the troops. It was very wise to keep these troops apart, especially when beer was involved. The idea that 3.2 beer would not intoxicate a soldier indicated that civil‑ ians and some higher-ranking officers had not seen young men after a hard day of training in dust and heat drinking cold 3.2 beer. It was true that in combat one unit would assist another, but in the Post Exchange beer halls teamwork, Army morale, and dedication to a common cause were quickly forgotten when another unit patch invaded “their” beer hall. Byron and his staff, being very experienced, knew that the branch exchange served a very valuable purpose for the troops being trained. The Army Exchange Service and the Special Services Division had as one of their core missions to provide on post inexpensive entertainment for the troops. The PX was deeply affected by the shortage of beer, which accounted for a very high percentage of sales at an exchange. In 1944 in ci‑ vilian establishments a twelve-ounce bottle of Schlitz, Pabst Blue Ribbon, Blatz, or Coors sold for about twenty-five cents. On post, when there was a good supply, the same beers sold at fifteen cents per bottle and sometimes less. When beer was sold in draft by the pitcher, the cost was even lower. Captain Tyson, exchange officer at Camp Van Dorn, reported that the one distributor in Centreville who had some beer was charging fifteen cents per bottle, a high price for what was not a brand-name or very popular beer. Captain Harris Gray Jr., the acting exchange officer at Camp Blan‑ ding, Florida, wrote to Colonel Seaver at the 4th Service Command, “The Exchange depends largely on its volume of beer sales for its profits and it

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is believed that if the supply of this item continues to be uncertain, it will be necessary for us to raise prices on other items in order to remain in the allowed percentage of profit.”25 Gray wrote that in May 1943 Camp Blan‑ ding received sixteen boxcars of beer, but the requirement for a training base was thirty boxcars. The camp received three hundred barrels of draft beer that month, but it needed five hundred barrels. Gray also brought up another subject pertaining to his lack of beer. He had been informed that the Red Top Brewery, because of the malt situa‑ tion, had to cut back production. The owners of the brewery decided that the first beer to be cut was the 3.2 Army Beer. In the captain’s opinion there was an unwarranted price increase on some premium beers, and he felt that three of the brand-name breweries “were protecting the so-called pres‑ tige accounts, or old accounts, to the inconvenience of the military trade.” Gray went on to complain that “the Jax Brewing Company, Jacksonville, Florida, is handling no military business at this time and apparently is not interested in the handling of [3.2] military beer. Information is requested as to whether breweries are instructed to release a certain percentage of their output to the armed forces.”26 One Tampa distributor was dropped from the supplier list when it was discovered that the representatives of the company were taking empty bottles that clearly belonged to other breweries. With the shortage of glass bottles, this was a serious breach of ethics. When that company was dropped from the supply list, Camp Blanding lost 20 percent of its sourc‑ es for beer. To put the beer shortage in perspective, Camp Blanding could train two full infantry divisions at the same time, and one World War II infantry division had 13,500 officers and enlisted men. The 1st, 29th, 31st, 36th, 43rd, 63rd, 66th, and 79th Infantry Divisions were trained at Camp Blan‑ ding, and there were artillery units, tank destroyer units, and other vital combat units as well. Scattered throughout the post were small branch ex‑ changes and beer halls, and they did a very brisk business on the weekends. Troops were not encouraged to leave the post and go to civilian towns. This meant that both the PX and the Service Clubs had to deal with large numbers of GIs. When beer was in short supply there was pressure on the commander of the post to provide for the troops, and he in turn expected the exchanges and the Service Clubs to meet the recreational needs of the soldiers.

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The breweries were in quite a different position than the candy bar, chewing gum, and cigarette manufacturers because of the military specifi‑ cations for the lower-alcohol 3.2 beer. A Hershey chocolate bar was just the same for soldiers or civilians, and five sticks of chewing gum was the same package regardless of who bought it. A brewery could, even if it seemed unpatriotic, opt not to produce military beer. Moreover, the restriction of malt, hops, bottles, and other vital ingredients reduced their output, and a company had to show profits to stay in business. There really was nothing General Byron and his AES staff could do if a company did not want to supply beer to the AES. The civilian community had embraced the idea that the GI should get his fair share of all that he enjoyed before entering the service, but by the early fall of 1943 the shortages in candy, cigarettes, soft drinks, and beer hit the civilian community as hard as it did the soldiers and sailors. And there was grumbling on the home front. Elmer E. Franzman, who owned a grocery store in Cannelton, Indiana, wrote to his master sergeant son in India, “The breweries are on strike and no beer. Boy, is it dry. Nobody had any beer yesterday except Otto Hirsh [who operated a diner in Cannel‑ ton], but he made them buy something [to eat] before they got any beer. He closed at 6 PM so he would have beer left for today at 25 cents a bottle. Not so dumb until he gets caught.”27 A few days later he complained again to his son about the acute shortage of beer. With the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration unwilling to raise malt allowances, beer would be a critical issue for civil‑ ians and the AES. Priority for 3.2 beer went to the troops serving overseas, and even that would be cut. It would take time for the agencies in Wash‑ ington to really address the fundamental reasons for the beer shortage. Late 1943 into 1944 would be a time to evaluate the AES’s overall suc‑ cesses and failures. Byron and his staff relied on reports coming from the field. An inspector whom Byron dispatched to North Africa sent to the Stock Control Branch of the Office of the Quartermaster General com‑ ments based on a recent inspection of exchanges in North Africa. First, a brand-name brushless shaving cream was almost worthless to the GIs. The colonel inspector tried to shave with it and found that high-alkaline water proved to be the problem. “I had a dickens of a job even getting it off my razor using cold water as most of them [GIs] have to do.” The recommen‑ dation was to buy no more for distribution and stop selling that brand in

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the PX. The troops were not hesitant to voice loudly their dislike of Pica-Pac tooth powder, either. As one of them said, “It was worse than using G.I. Soap.”28 No evaluation of the quartermaster or of the AES would have been complete if it did not include a critique of cigarettes. The problem cen‑ tered around the purchase of Chelsea cigarettes for distribution to the troops and for the PX. In a letter to a North Carolina senator one observer wrote: This cigarette is forced issue, forced purchase; and it is so rotten the boys who write me say that no one can smoke them. Even the Arabs refuse to take them in barter for eggs except at the rate of two Chel‑ sea cigs to one of the other American brand. With such excellent cigarettes as the leading brands made in this country, why should the troops have to smoke a lot of alfalfa and horse manure under a deah ol English name? I protest to high heaven; and a copy of this letter goes to General Brehon Sommervell [sic]. . . . I shall of course raise hell about this little matter in the press if I continue to get kicks on crappy cigarettes for our fighting man.29

There were times when the AES staff reached the limits of patience with complaints about the exchange service in the United States and over‑ seas. If it was not a complaint about the shortage of beer, it was something else. Colonel Frank G. Kerr, deputy director of the AES, received an in‑ quiry from a congressman who had gotten a less than coherent letter from a GI from his district about a shortage of cigarettes at a location in North Africa. Kerr, usually very diplomatic with members of Congress, replied, “Some isolated parts which can only be served by air are at the mercy of commanders who feel that medical supplies and more essential things must be transported at the expense of things such as cigarettes.”30 It did not help matters that the U.S. Senate was investigating the whole issue of cigarettes for the armed forces. Between September 5, 1942, to June 15, 1943, 44,723,330 packages of twenty cigarettes were shipped to the European theater of operations. There were reasons the people’s rep‑ resentatives would be concerned with the purchase, shipment, and sale of cigarettes by the AES in the theater. The senatorial inquiry into cigarettes would not come to much substance until a severe shortage appeared in 1944. Once that happened, everybody

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in Congress, the AES, and other agencies wanted to know why there was such a shortfall in the production of tobacco products. Of special concern were the shipments to the quartermaster general’s depositories in the Euro‑ pean and Pacific theaters of operations for the troops in combat. The AES and the quartermaster general were dependent on each other for an ongo‑ ing supply of cigarettes for the exchanges and for combat rations and distri‑ bution. The problem would impact the Red Cross and the Special Services Division. The relationship between the AES and Special Services was pretty well defined by the end of 1943, but the road to reach an accord was a very rocky one. By late March the USO raised the possibility of the USOs overseas purchasing items such as candy, cigarettes, flour for donuts, and coffee from the AES overseas. It became a legal question that involved Colonel-lawyer Kerwin M. Treusch, who formulated the AES position that overseas exchanges could be used by the USO to purchase what items they needed. In the United States, however, it should not be permitted because this would mean that an essentially civilian organization would be able to purchase items with all of the implications of rationing in the civilian sector.31 The Service of Supply was in favor of such an arrangement in the overseas theaters only. The deputy chief of administrative services of the Service of Supply, Brigadier General Madison Pearson, pointed out that if the USO was denied access to AES goods, an entire Army regulation would have to be written to cover the situation, and that would take more time than the armed services could afford if it was really about structuring morale-building institutions for millions of men and women. The USO pointed out that it was not only in England, Italy, North Af‑ rica, and Australia that it served GIs and naval personnel. There were clubs in such places as Aruba (one club), Antigua (two clubs), Brazil (six clubs), Trinidad (two clubs and a mobile club), and Jamaica (one club), and there were many others scattered throughout the world. By 1944, for example, the one club in Jamaica would face a 100 percent increase in costs for goods bought locally if it did not have some relief from the AES. It simply made sense for all organizations to cooperate for the benefit of the troops overseas, and by 1944 agreements and authorization were in place. Everyone recognized that the USO shows were of great morale value, and when Hollywood stars such as Bob Hope, Phil Harris, Dorothy

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Lamour, and others entertained, they were greeted by loud, enthusiastic cheers by the GIs, sailors, and marines. The day-to-day opening of a USO club was really the backbone of the organization, however. Everything pointed to 1944 as the year of decision for the Allies, with plans for a cross-Channel invasion. U.S. and British forces were moving in Italy, and Army and Navy forces were slowly pushing a hard-fighting Japanese military back toward the home islands. For General Byron and the AES, the new year would bring larger requirements for the troops, but it also meant that old ways of doing business with other agencies had to change. The Army PX had to be ready to support the war effort, deal with shortages, and make relationships with other troop-supporting agencies. The year 1944 would be one of challenge.

Brigadier General Joseph W. Byron, 1943. Courtesy of the National Archives.

95

Major General Byron decorates Colonel Frank Kerr with the Legion of Merit Medal, 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives.

Major General Frederick A. Osborn, 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives.

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Well-stocked PX at Fort McPherson, Georgia, 1942. Courtesy of the National Archives.

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Branch PX, 40th Infantry Division, Talasea, New Britain, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives.

Red Cross worker in the PX beauty shop, Brisbane, Australia, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives. 98

WACs, Motor Pool, Sydney, Australia, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives.

PX serving the 153rd Hospital Station, Sydney, Australia, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives. 99

Sixth Army PX, San Fernando, Philippine Islands, 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives.

GIs and WACs at Coca-Cola Bar No. 1, Manila, Philippine Islands, 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives. 100

PX supplies for the 32nd Infantry Division at the front, 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives.

101

PX for released prisoners of war, Manila, 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives.

Inventory of PX goods, 39th Quartermaster Sales Company, Nettuno, Italy, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives.

102

Mobile PX, Slapton Sands, England, 1945. Courtesy of the National Archives.

PX supplies, Fifth Army, Nettuno, Italy, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives.

103

Interior of enlisted PX, England, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives.

Interior of officers’ PX, England, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives. 104

6

´ To Fi n a l Vic to ry

T-Sergeant Charles B. Linzy of the 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Bat‑ talion tried to write every day to his wife in Little Rock. For two weeks he could not find the time to communicate because his bat‑ talion had been attached to the hard-fighting, fast-momentum, 29th Infantry Division. His battalion had entered France at Omaha Beach, and when his unit finally stopped for some needed refitting and rest, Linzy wrote, “I’ll bet you cannot guess what I have been doing for the past thirty minutes. I have been listening to the Bob Hope show of all things. We do not buy anything, cigarettes to toothpaste is all furnished. If we just had anything beside this darned canned food and dog biscuits to eat.”1 As planned, when troops were in combat a small range of items normally sold in the Post Exchanges would be given to the troops free of charge. This made sense to everyone. Certainly, no one would think of a PX truck rushing from unit to unit under fire to sell Juicy Fruit chewing gum, Lucky Strike cigarettes, and Hershey bars. Just the name PX had become so ingrained in the mind of the GIs that free distribution by Commissary Sales simply became “PX supplies.” It would take the liberation of a large town or city to have a fully stocked PX established, if there were any buildings left standing. There were problems that surfaced in 1943 and into 1944 that would affect the AES and its mission to supply the GIs in the United States and overseas. The critical shortage of beer was one problem, which could be addressed over time if the War Production Board agreed to release more malt and hops to offset the 7 percent reduc‑ tion. If the beer crisis was not enough for General Byron and then 105

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Colonel Kerr and the staff to fret about, there emerged a shortage of ciga‑ rettes, a problem that would greatly affect quantities and brands for the troops. To complicate the picture, the patriotic outpouring of support for the troops waned as the war went into its third year. There were complaints, usually from local merchants and their business associations, that PXs were selling goods to unauthorized civilians or that GIs were sending to civilians items from the PX. With millions of men under arms being trained in the United States, the question of PX goods being supplied to civilians was a major one. It was obvious that GIs could shop at the Post Exchange, but could the immediate families of the soldier also use the exchange? It was inevitable, but gift items got mixed with items for sale in the exchange system, and nowhere was this so evident as with cigarettes. This caused continual storms of protest that had to be answered by the War Department and by the AES. It was estimated by the AES and the quartermaster general that a stag‑ gering 57 billion cigarettes would be ordered during 1944. Given the growing shortage there would be a shortfall of about 10 billion cigarettes actually delivered by the tobacco manufacturers to the Army. It was fairly clear what caused the problem. The tobacco industry had not been de‑ clared an “essential industry,” and consequently manpower to do the work was limited, as the draft took men who were difficult to replace by the U.S. Employment Service. With the priority given to overseas shipment, the number of cigarettes for civilians went down. There were shipments of cigarettes by families to GIs overseas who already had access to about two packs per day through the AES, Commissary Sales, and quartermas‑ ter subsistence rations. The AES and the overseas commanders insisted that cigarette requisitions be filled with three or four of the most popular brands. Off-brands were shipped overseas but were the last resort for GIs, and were complained about to families and to members of Congress.2 The Army and the AES also reported a consistent rise in cigarette smok‑ ing in combat, and there was also a rise in the use of tobacco by civilians due to the stress and strains of the war. By Christmas 1944 the Army Postal Office reckoned that it had handled sixty million packages for GIs overseas, and although those gifts were not inspected, it was estimated that the lion’s share included from one to several cartons of cigarettes. The War Department estimated that if one package in five contained one carton of cigarettes, 2.4 billion would have been sent. The cutoff date for overseas

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Christmas packages was October 15, 1944, and the acute shortage of ciga‑ rettes was very much in evidence in the civilian sector at that time. The tobacco industry, especially those companies making the popular brands, did advertise, but by 1944 they were strained to deliver enough cigarettes to both the military and civilians. The war created increased demand from the military and the civilian sector. Then there had been the crush of de‑ mand created by civilian groups soliciting for cigarettes for the troops. These solicitations slowed down by the late summer of 1943, but they had added to the growing crisis over cigarettes.3 By 1944 an accessory package had been created to go with the usual combat rations, which included razor blades, shaving cream, toothpaste, toothbrushes, soap, candy, chewing gum, matches, and cigarettes. The ac‑ cessory packages were to support two hundred soldiers in the field for one day. Under overseas conditions those who were not in direct contact with the enemy could buy their comfort items at a local Post Exchange. Inter‑ pretation as to when a GI was in direct contact with the enemy would vary.4 One of the problems for the AES and quartermaster general was the reports from exchanges from the United States and from overseas con‑ cerning the brands that were offered for sale. GIs were insistent that only the top four brands of cigarettes—Lucky Strike, Camel, Chesterfield, and Philip Morris—be sold. To offer only those brands in the exchanges or through rations would place a hardship on the makers of the so-called economy brands such as Spuds, Sensation, Beechnut, Domino, Regent, Wings, and the infamous Chelsea. The economy brands sold at lower cost, and the OPA was concerned that many of the makers would go out of business if something was not done to ensure their sales. Of the purchases for overseas exchanges, 150,939,691 packs of cigarettes (twenty to a pack and fifty to a pack), the top four brands counted for well over half.5 When GIs wrote home requesting cigarettes in gift packages, the top four brands were the most requested, and these had to be purchased on the civilian market, further increasing the problem of shortage. Purchases by family and friends for gift packages for soldiers overseas could not account for the shortages in cigarettes. The cigarettes were avail‑ able, often on a limited basis, and the sending of a carton as a gift meant that someone had to limit his or her purchases for their own use. The to‑ bacco companies blamed the rationing system when certain basic supplies

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were either cut or strictly limited. A good case in point is the acquisition of sugar for tobacco production. For example, in early 1943 R. J. Reynolds representatives wrote to the AES asking that it intercede with the Sugar Branch of the War Production Board, citing the invoices for the popular Camel brands for PXs both in the United States and overseas. “During the year 1941 our average monthly use of sugar was 1,157,125 pounds and during 1942 our average monthly use, taking into consideration re‑ strictions imposed thereon, was 922,615 pounds. . . . [W]e have been restricted in our use of a number of our processing materials, such as glyc‑ erin, glycols, honey, etc. . . . as well as packaging materials, such as metal containers and cellophane.”6 The AES responded a few days later by refusing to intercede with the War Production Board, stating that the relief the company sought would come through established channels by obtaining a sugar purchase certificate from the PXs in the United States showing that an increase was meant only for those items produced for exchange sales.7 That did not solve the prob‑ lem of cigarette shortages, though, especially for civilian consumption. There were political pressures over brands of cigarettes, and the makers of the economy brands needed by 1943 a price increase to stay in business. The manufacturers of the top brands opposed any sort of price adjustment because they feared an increase in their price might motivate consumers to buy the cheaper package of cigarettes. To make matters even worse, tobacco producers were asking for a price increase on their products. The OPA did note that the farmers were already selling their tobacco at record high prices. The top brands might be able to absorb the increase in farm prices, but not the economy brands. In the civilian market the economy brands sold for twelve cents per pack of twenty or at times two packs for twenty-three cents. The top brands sold at sixteen cents per package of twenty or twenty-nine cents for two packs. In the exchanges in the United States two packs of top-brand cigarettes sold for two packs of twenty each for twenty-five cents.8 Overseas, the GIs could buy their cigarettes at five to six cents per pack of twenty, and no one wanted a price increase of ciga‑ rettes for the armed forces. The overall result was a shortage going into 1944. With an increase in tobacco requirements as the war increased in intensity both for the military and for the civilian sector, it seemed fairly clear that the crisis in supply of tobacco products, especially cigarettes, would rival the ongoing


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beer shortage. In early 1944 the OPA engaged experts to examine the problem and propose wartime and postwar solutions. A number of uni‑ versity professors were engaged in the research and the reports that would follow. At that time, however, the prospect of American troops remaining in Europe or in Asia for any length of time seemed remote. The American occupation of Germany west of the Rhine River began in 1918 and ended in 1923, and very few practical lessons could be learned from that experi‑ ence. Dealing with a cigarette shortage, as with the beer problem, had to be a day-by-day set of decisions. At the heart of the matter was the simple fact that cigarette production was big business, and in 1943 the largest single amount of revenue for the U.S. government was the more than $444 million derived from the stamps placed on cigarette packs. In a wartime situation it was to the benefit of the government to respond to any shortage. The Federal Trade Commis‑ sion studied the problem and found that shortages of cigarettes occurred mainly in the four top brands, and that there were sufficient amounts of cigarettes in the economy brands. In reviewing needs, the Office of the Quartermaster General stated that in 1945 the Army would order seventyseven billion cigarettes, a considerable increase over the 1944 estimate of sixty-eight billion. This order reflected the requirements of domestic and overseas exchanges, increased number of cigarettes in rations, and USO purchases from the exchanges in the overseas theaters of operations only. Beginning in 1943 the Army orders for tobacco grew so large that the ci‑ vilian market began to suffer shortages. By 1944 the cigarette makers had instituted a form of voluntary rationing.9 The detailed study found that a third of all civilians smoked as a habit, and that many smokers hoarded cigarettes three times their usual require‑ ment. The study stated, “The shortage of cigarettes in the American do‑ mestic market and particularly in the civilian market is directly traceable to the volume of cigarettes moving to the armed services and to the allies. The shortage created by such movement has been magnified by an in‑ creased demand from the American people.”10 In studying the increased demand for cigarettes, it was cited that workers who once rolled their own now had full-time jobs that paid higher wages. Those with the larger paycheck bought the packages of brand-name ciga‑ rettes and abandoned the cloth bag of tobacco and cigarette papers. The study did point out that the growing shortage of cigarettes was exacerbated,

110


“at least in September and October 1944, by the purchase of a huge vol‑ ume of cigarettes to be sent to members of the armed forces overseas.”11 To be sure, the makers of cigarettes advertised their particular product in magazines and on the radio, but the increase in smoking was brought about by the stresses and strains of combat and the pressures placed on civilians already working long hours and who, with good reason, fretted over friends and family members in uniform and in increasingly dangerous situations. The number of private solicitations for cigarettes had waned by the fall of 1943, but there were still some groups raising large sums of money to purchase cigarettes for overseas troops. Many of these gifts were just sitting in warehouses awaiting shipping space and were vulnerable to damage to containers and theft. Complaints reached the War Relief Control Board, and they had to be dealt with or face the possibility of letters from senators or congressmen. Complaints could come from unexpected sources. A lawyer in a promi‑ nent New York City law firm with political connections received a letter from an irate Red Cross worker in Great Britain saying, “I am amazed at what I find to exist in our Post Exchanges as far as tobacco is concerned. The sale of cigarettes is limited to seven packages weekly, four of which may be standard brands, but three must be off-brands. (Wings and some brands made by . . . [writer does not cite the makers] of which I never previously heard). You can be sure this compulsory selection is not popular with the men.”12 The problem with this letter, which was sent by the civilian lawyer to a high War Department official, is that it came from a person who in his civilian profession was employed as a lawyer for a major tobacco company. The situation described was correct in that exchanges did have to ration the number of packs of cigarettes, and there were economy brands in the system that had to be sold. The “off-brands” did indeed include the much hated Chelsea, which was seldom bought by GIs. Few GIs would ever have envisioned just what a pack of the much despised Chelsea would get them in France, Belgium, Holland, or Germany. However, if the AES stocked only the four or five most eagerly sought brands by soldiers, there would be a rising tide of complaints that the smaller tobacco companies were being driven out of business in favor of the large major cigarette pro‑ ducers. General Byron understood the marketplace and competition, but it was not the AES’s business to favor one set of producers over another.


111

Not all complaints dealt with tobacco products. The executive secretary of the National Association of Retail Druggists complained to Congress‑ man Wright Patman of Texas that Post Exchange items were being bought for friends and families of GIs. As an example the secretary used the Post Exchange at the Middletown, Pennsylvania, Air Depot, which employed about fifteen hundred civilians who, the complaint stated, could purchase cigarettes, toothpaste, cosmetics, and other drugstore items, “sometimes at a price less than what retail druggists can buy it for.”13 In one case it was claimed that an employee at the depot bought one dozen bottles of Mennen’s Skin Bracer, a popular aftershave lotion. The AES and General Somervell’s office explained that it was not the policy of the AES to sell items to civilians employed on post over and above a pack of cigarettes, soft drinks, or food at the snack bar for one day’s use while working on the post. A soldier could buy for his immediate family living off post but not for friends.14 An irritated General Byron summed up his thoughts about the growing number of complaints: “There is an amazing amount of greed at the root of many of the complaints directed against the Army Exchange System.”15 As Byron said many times, the AES would not discriminate against small busi‑ nesses in favor of larger firms. The same thing was clear as the AES tried to balance beer from the large national breweries with the local makers. Moving toward 1944 the War Relief Control Board and the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Recreation and Morale tried to reach some rea‑ sonable solution to the solicitations for cigarettes for the troops. There was a decline in applications to solicit funds received by the Control Board, but the problem was still there. Generals Byron and Osborn were of the opinion that those patriotic and well-meaning groups had to be controlled by some centralized authority. Goods for the PXs and Service Clubs in the United States and overseas had their own official sources of supply and did not need precious shipping space taken up by other goods. The war in the Asian and European theaters of operations was about to enter a new year and a critical phase in 1944. And as the war increased, the number of Post Exchanges expanded. There were differences in how the AES dealt with the two major theaters of operations. In the Pacific it was difficult to follow units engaged in the fighting. In Europe, however, there were stabilized bases in England, Italy, and North Africa, and in places such as India there were permanent PXs. Byron’s main area of interest was

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the European theater of operations, and with an invasion of France loom‑ ing in the future the AES chief felt another detailed inspection of Post Ex‑ change operations in the Mediterranean, England, and Italy was in order. In 1943 General Byron made a thirty-one thousand–mile inspection and fact-finding trip with good results. When Colonel Frank Kerr assumed command of the AES in November 1943 he felt the need to inspect overseas PX for himself. One of his first activities was to prepare the groundwork for an extensive inspection tour of the European theater. There were periodic reports from exchanges, but Kerr was

not the type of soldier who relied only on them. He had been involved in the growth of the Post Exchange and was determined that under his con‑ trol the system would expand even further. Frank Kerr would not soften criticism or offer meaningless praise, and he was not unwilling to take on new offerings for all of the soldiers who relied on the Post Exchange for items from home. Kerr also knew the problems that the AES experienced with the beer and cigarette shortage, and he was aware that everything from razor blades to candy bars and chewing gum was in growing short supply. Kerr’s trip would come at a historic time. He would be in England on the Day of Days, June 6, 1944. His reports were down to earth, free of ob‑ scuring military jargon, and bold in pointing out where there were failures to accomplish the mission. He inspected Service Clubs as well. He began his visit with Morocco, Algeria, Sardinia, Sicily, and Italy. No subordinate unit really likes an inspection, and usually the inspector starts his visit with a time-honored and meaningless cliché, “I am not here to find fault, only to help.” Kerr would also be dealing with some exchange officers who deeply resented being assigned to the Post Exchange while other officers were leading men into combat. Some others would be happy just to have the chance to serve in the European theater of operations in any capacity rather than at a training base in the United States. Colonel Kerr would have to exercise some diplomacy in dealing with these men. He had an old friend in General David Larkin, serving on General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army staff, and this would help him a great deal dur‑ ing the Italian phase of his inspection. With Larkin he could be direct and open as to deficient areas in exchange services. Kerr could also be a good listener, which many inspectors were not. While in Italy Kerr very quick‑ ly became aware that General Clark was determined that the Americans


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would liberate the city of Rome with all of the publicity and problems that such a liberation would mean. The exchanges would have to function to provide for the GIs that had fought such a miserable and bloody campaign in Italy. Kerr’s report was disjointed, covering large territories of the European theater of operations. He observed that in the main the PXs offered good service and supplies, depending on shipping space, off-loading facilities, and dockside storage. Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca were well on their way to having a very good set of Post Exchanges. French North Africa was invaded in November 1942, and had suffered little damage to its ports. The French North Africans seemed willing to work with the Americans, but did their friendly demeanor have a hidden political and social agenda? Exchange services on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia seemed to be quite good, but a lot of this could very well be because of the smaller num‑ ber of troops, requiring a smaller number of supplies. While the exchange got high marks for services and products, the Special Services did not. In Kerr’s words the Service Clubs were very “spotty.” The problem rested with Special Services officers who either were not especially aggressive or suffered from a lack of basic supplies.16 There were supplies in depots in the United States that were earmarked for Service Clubs in the postwar world. Kerr observed that in dealing with supplies, the United States was actually facing a postwar situation, especially in Italy with the fall of Rome. Exchanges and Service Clubs in Rome brought the whole question of postwar facilities and supplies to the forefront. Why not use those items in storage in depots in the United States? The Fifth Army had plans for the taking of Rome, and these operation‑ al plans included locations of Post Exchanges and Service Clubs. There had been sordid stories of what GIs were involved in when Naples was taken, talk of bars with cheap wine, prostitutes, and thieves and even as‑ saults on single and drunken soldiers. The Fifth Army did not intend to see a repeat of Naples. Going into Rome the exchange and Special Services officers came under sniper fire and actually took nine German soldiers as prisoners of war. Beer, candy bars, chewing gum, and 3.2 military beer were sent into Rome for the troops. Within a few days the exchange and recreational facility opened to the first two thousand combat soldiers. Kerr reported, “Exchange store will be opened with lots of gift items purchased

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in Rome. Mussolini’s stadium is set for athletics it has fine facilities includ‑ ing two swimming pools, large hotels for officers and enlisted men—a theater track meet is scheduled for the 20th [June] and all the beer made here is going to combat troops.” As Kerr said, he “poked my nose into everything I could find.” After Rome, Kerr went to the bloody beachhead at Anzio, where he found the combat veterans pleased with their PX ser‑ vice, the ongoing supply of current movies, and their very active softball league. AES officials very much felt the pinch of the shortage of beer, and some plan had to be put in place to ensure that the troops had a flow of beer that the Army could control. Kerr urged Byron to get the War Department to send civilian beer technicians to Europe, as they had done with soft-drink makers. “We [the Army] are going to operate breweries, actually are now doing, we should not put officers on this when we are short of personnel.” Colonel Frank Kerr was aware that exchange and Special Services officers were ordered back to the United States to attend school at Lexington, Virginia, and the colonel urged that while there they should be taught the rules and techniques of the European game of “socker,” or football. Kerr pointed out that the game was wildly popular among the Allies, and the Americans knew nothing about it. The game would be a good link between Americans and their European Allies. Kerr did indeed poke his nose into everything possible in Europe. The Special Services had been sending to the theaters of operations a thing called a “Hit Kit,” which included words and music for the most popular music. This was all very fine, except, as Colonel Kerr stated, men needed more than a paperback full of words. Let’s get bands and musical instru‑ ments to Europe. Some commanders grumbled to Kerr that USO shows were frustratingly dull, with no variety. And as one older officer grumbled, if you “see the right kind of a girl [onstage] and you won’t think tramp thoughts.” The energetic Kerr was not afraid to deal with any problem, and he turned his attention to women in uniform, whether in Europe, Asia, or the United States. When the AES went into action there were few women in the armed services, but by the midpoint of the war there were about 150,000 women in the Women’s Army Corps, serving in every major the‑ ater of operations. Many of the more conservative members of the officer corps opposed the introduction of women in uniform other than the nurs‑


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es in the established Army Nurse Corps (ANC). The impact of the WAC was clear when it was pointed out that the numbers of those women who joined the service were worth seven divisions of men freed for combat op‑ erations. More than 17,000 ANCs served in the European theater, where they first came under fire in North Africa in November 1942. Wherever there was combat, Army nurses were close to the fighting. The early offer‑ ings for women in the AES inventory were few, bland, and very generic. No women were consulted in preparing the stock lists. That might have been satisfactory in 1942, but not in 1944. As Frank Kerr looked into everything possible pertaining to the Post Exchange he was told in no uncertain terms that stocks were not what the ANC or WAC wanted. Kerr wrote, “There’s complaint on all sides on women’s items.” Then this old-line Army officer gave a list of areas that needed reforms for women in uniform: “Girdles are built for mature women, these girls are kids, with figures corresponding. They want garter belt stuff, brassieres are like canvas hammocks—they don’t need them. The panties are so long they reach from the chest to the knees.” There was no shortage of humor with Byron, and one can think of some ribald comments about the detail and intensity of Colonel Kerr’s inspection. But Colonel Kerr continued on with his foray into the needs of WACs and ANCs: “Compacts—reach them all in one shade (light) and the sales girls tell us they usually want dark. They want lipsticks of better grade [than] the QM buys. They want higher priced perfumes, heavier hairnets, hairpins, Kleenex and Tampax. (I think that the QM has this although it hasn’t reached all places.) The cheap lines of sanitary napkins (Ben Franklin [five and dime] stores stock, I saw the labels) they don’t want. They want light tan, cotton socks, and slacks if they can be had.” Indeed, Byron intended to see the Post Exchanges expand into a world‑ wide full-service department store for GIs, and now the AES chief, Colo‑ nel Kerr, was making a major contribution toward that goal. To justify his extensive list of changes and new additions to exchange offerings for women, Kerr wrote, “After seeing these dirty cities, nothing to be had in either materials or finished garments in stores, the primitive billets the girls live in [especially in North Africa and Italy] and having heard from all sides the fine job they are doing and how little comforts they actually have, I am for going the limit. I am still not in favor of buying high priced jewelry and watches, however.”

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It is too bad, in retrospect, that the AES did not have another officer of the quality of Colonel Kerr to send to the Pacific theater of operations. But what was done by Kerr in the European theater and the changes made to the overall offerings of the AES would have its effects in the Pacific as well. Kerr’s report pointed out problems that members of the Women’s Army Corps and the Army Nurse Corps faced not only in Europe but in all the‑ aters of operations, including the United States. There was overt hostility to the introduction of the WACs by many, and little was done to assist those serving their country. At one point even the Red Cross refused to aid women soldiers, arguing that the traditional role of the Red Cross was to assist male soldiers. Eventually, good sense prevailed, and the Red Cross served both male and female military personnel. Service organiza‑ tions such as the famous Stage Door Canteen refused admission to female service personnel in uniform. According to historian Elizabeth D. Schafer, when women began to arrive in England to help in the preparation for D-Day they were subject to the most slanderous attacks claiming that WACs were of low moral standards, and rumors were rife concerning the sexual activities of the women. On the contrary, those WACs selected to serve in Europe were required to undergo a rigorous physical examina‑ tion, to have at least two years of high school, and to undergo a strict background check, much more than was demanded of male GIs prior to overseas deployment.17 Of course, it would be foolish to say that there were not wartime ro‑ mances between male and female soldiers, just as there were with English women. Although it was stressed that there should be no contact between the sexes, it did occur despite command emphasis against such liaisons. It would also be wise to consider that when young men and women worked in close proximity, relationships would develop. Many GIs also had a ten‑ dency to exaggerate their sexual exploits when talking to their buddies or writing to those who were still in the United States. Some were short-term romances, and some endured even after the war. In 1943 the Eighth U.S. Army Air Force in England requested that a full battalion of women be sent to work in various assignments within the “Mighty Eighth.” Some women (and the numbers are unclear) were awarded the Purple Heart for wounds received during bombings in Brit‑ ain or in service in France after D-Day.


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The Kerr report then takes on more significance when it points out what women serving in the European theater of operations wanted pro‑ vided by the Post Exchanges. He appears to have a much better appre‑ ciation of women’s service than did many other senior officers, and when one looks at what Kerr wrote, there are references to what a good job the WACs were doing for the war effort. Possibly because the AES was run by businessmen, the WACs were seen as customers for an ever-expanding business effort. No major department store could afford to ignore more than 150,000 customers. Kerr reported other negatives. It seemed that the very popular Zippo cigarette lighters and expensive fountain pens were being stolen either while in transit or when on the off-loading docks. This could be dealt with by placing lighters and fountain pens in the same security containers as watches and placed under the strict authority of a security officer. With a war as expansive as World War II, thievery and misuse of items in short supply were to be expected. There were reports of theft and black marke‑ teering in England, but what would happen when the invasion of France began? Preparations for the occupation of Rome by the Fifth Army had been good, and the AES and Special Services officers selected protected sites for Post Exchanges and recreational facilities for the GIs. Lessons had been learned with the occupation of Naples. It stood to reason that as the Allies went deeper into France, the best place for the exchange to set up shop would be Paris, if there was anything left of the city. Paris, however, had been under harsh Nazi occupation, with luxury goods available only through collaborators, the black market, or the occupiers. It had been a de‑ prived city, with even food in continual short supply. It would take a very firm hand to make Paris a safe place for PX supplies and a city unfriendly to black-market criminals. General Eisenhower pondered bypassing Paris, leaving the German garrison to simply wither on the vine, but would that be possible given Allied wartime politics and the unpredictable nature of Hitler and the Nazi government in Berlin? In September Private Raymond James Oblinger was only a few miles from Omaha Beach in a replacement depot. Soon he would be assigned to the 80th Division and then the 104th Infantry Regiment of the 26th Division, but until that transfer was completed he watched what was go‑ ing on around him. PX supplies had been issued by the commissary as

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per the established procedures, but GIs with nothing better to do “traded cigarettes, candy bars, or other items with the local farmers for eggs, veg‑ etables, apple cider, and Schnapps. Schnapps is a 180 proof liquor—the equivalent of American ‘white lightening.’“ One man said, “Drinking Schnapps is like swallowing red-hot lead as it burned all the way down.”18 This was not what PX supplies were intended for, and it was clear that items like cigarettes, candy, soap, and razor blades had more currency with the French citizens than did Allied or Free French money. Oblinger realized that something was wrong with the system. The heavy fighting across France stretched supply lines trying to keep up with the fast-moving Allied combat units. To keep the troops fighting, a long road filled with vehicles full of the sinews of war was opened and became known as the Red Ball Express. Although it was necessary to keep the trucks moving, there were far too few military police and Army inspec‑ tors to stop constant pilfering from the trucks. As Oblinger, a young man from a small Pennsylvania town with traditional honest American values, observed, the U.S. Army did not bring the black market to Europe, but too many men in uniform profited from it. The most common stolen supplies were cigarettes, gasoline, and PX items such as candy, soap, and razor blades. When these items were sold to the black-market gangsters, soldiers who were fighting in cold and rain and facing wounds and death were denied the most simple pleasures.19 Before Normandy and the heavy fighting in the Pacific it was pretty clear to everyone involved that there could be considerable confusion over GI supplies. With so many cigarettes pouring into England, for example, there was bound to be continual confusion about who received what shipments. Boats had to be off-loaded quickly, freeing very limited dock space for more necessary military supplies. It seemed that Red Cross cigarettes were sent to the Post Exchanges in London and in southern England. A Red Cross representative noticed that the exchanges were selling brand-name cigarettes marked “with the compliments of the American Red Cross,” and obviously they should not have been in a Post Exchange. Some Post Ex‑ change officers were not closely watching and inventorying the incoming shipments. AES and quartermaster officers stopped the sale and sent the Red Cross the remainder, plus exchange cigarettes equal to the number sold. The confusion over Red Cross cigarettes and PX goods occurred sev‑ eral times in Brisbane, Australia. The theft rate of American cigarettes in


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England was constant, usually a case of sixty thousand packs being stolen at one time. When this occurred the military police and Scotland Yard investigated, with very few results.20 T-Sergeant Charles B. Linzy had just drawn his PX supplies on August 19 in preparation for a battalion move to support combat operations in the Falaise area. Linzy, a senior sergeant at the 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Battalion headquarters, received on August 23 an order to prepare for a new mission to move with the 2nd French Armored Division to occupy the city of Paris. General Eisenhower had been inclined to bypass this major urban area in order to conserve gasoline, food, and manpower and to concentrate on the job of driving German military forces from France. All of this was fine, except that an uprising had begun in the city with a return of French Resistance politics and hatred for the Germans, and there was no indication how severe the German reaction would be. Linzy, once a member of the Arkansas National Guard, found his unit trying to keep up with General Philippe Leclerc’s French tankers, intent on avenging the French defeat and the German occupation of Paris in 1940. On August 27 the battalion set up its headquarters in a building once occupied by the French Ministry of Agriculture and then by German city administrators. It did not take long for word to circulate that French and American troops were in Paris, and despite grave dangers from gunfire the GIs were mobbed by Parisians intent on celebration. Linzy confided to his secret diary, “Boy what an entry to town.”21 What Linzy was seeing was a population that saw between 60 and 70 percent of its food supply di‑ verted to German use while collaborators dined with Nazis in great Paris restaurants. Linzy enjoyed his stay in Paris, but he could sense an undercurrent in the city. He wrote to his wife, “The people nearly go nuts to see us coming in. Wine, flowers, and everything. I enjoyed a present today more than anything I have had. An old woman about 60 or 70 came up to me with tears in her eyes and gave me a tomato and two cucumbers. Boy were they delicious.” After several days in Paris the celebrations continued, especially with Linzy’s battalion, but he noted, “The shops and stores all seem to have a pretty full stock of wares. It’s the eats they seem to be short on.”22 This was a city that suffered four years of harsh occupation, and Linzy felt the unease enough to tell his wife several times that he wanted out of the city despite the continued euphoria.

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Linzy’s battalion left Paris a few weeks before Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, Eisenhower’s chief of the Service of Supply, the chief quar‑ termaster for the entire European theater of operations, moved twentynine thousand officers and men into Paris to oversee supply operations. Historian Stephen Ambrose calls Lee “the biggest jerk in the ETO,” and there is very little evidence to dispute the title. Lee moved a large number of vehicles and troops into Paris at a time when gasoline was reaching critically low levels, and once in the city proceeded to commandeer hotels and buildings for his supply activities. Eisenhower was furious but could not spare the gasoline to order to Lee out of the city. Generals Bernard Law Montgomery and George C. Patton and other senior combat com‑ manders were arguing for every drop of gasoline they could get, and Ike was stuck. For the Army Exchange Service, the Special Services, and the Red Cross the movement into Paris spelled serious problems. If PX supplies were be‑ ing pilfered on the Red Ball, the criminal opportunities offered by Paris were extraordinary. According to Ambrose, “A black market on a grand scale sprang up.”23 GIs hoping for a few days’ respite from combat found that Lee’s supply troops had hotel rooms with bathrooms, but what was available to them was a cot in a hard-pressed Red Cross facility. Soldiers fresh from the line watched as supply troops smoked the most popular brands of cigarettes at a time when any tobacco products, in‑ cluding the maligned Chelsea cigarettes, were in very short supply at the front. Millions of cigarettes, originally designated for the Post Exchanges, Commissary Sales, and Red Cross, simply disappeared into the depths of the black market. Sergeant Linzy wrote to his wife on November 12, 1944, “[Cousin] Zerle sent me some cigarettes and Ina [another relative] some smoking [tobacco] too. . . . We are not getting enough smoking [tobacco] up here. With what they sent though I will be able to get by.”24 By November Linzy’s battalion was fighting in some bloody battles in increasing snow and cold. This was not what Army exchange officials ex‑ pected, and they were learning hard lessons, lessons that would continue well into the postwar occupation. Not all of the massive supply problems could be, by any stretch of the imagination, blamed on pilfering. Simply put, the lack of decent har‑ bor facilities, the intensity of combat operations, and faulty planning


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put the Allied move across France in a serious situation. General Brehon B. Somervell, chief of the Army Service Forces, was no fan of Lee, and when Somervell visited the European theater of operations after D-Day he found conditions in shambles. Supplies were still being moved across the beaches at Normandy, since the Port of Cherbourg was not available for off-loading men and supplies. Supply ships awaiting off-loading were backed up at an alarming rate.25 Sitting on many of the ships were the supplies that the exchange system counted on for the troops going into combat. It should have come as no surprise that GIs turned to home for help. The Army Postal Service had hoped that the Christmas packages for the troops would decrease in number and weight, but just the opposite oc‑ curred. GI letters during the fall of 1944 were filled with requests for presents of cigarettes, candy bars, soap, towels, and the like. These were things that the AES or the quartermaster should provide, but conditions were such that they could not on a regular basis. Rations, gasoline, am‑ munition, and medical supplies had to be the first priority for the supply system. The troops echoed a constant refrain: let’s hope that the war will be over by Christmas 1944. For Byron, Kerr, and the AES, 1944 had its high points and low points in supplying the troops with exchange items. The buildup to Normandy and the taking of Rome had some very positive aspects in preparations and inventories. Certainly, the low point came with the pilfering and black marketeering that came in the wake of the Normandy operation and the race across France. It did not help that General John C. H. Lee moved al‑ most thirty thousand supply personnel into Paris, where it appeared to the frontline combat soldiers that those not under fire or living in rain, bitter cold, and snow, eating unheated combat rations, enjoyed the war, whereas they were in miserable, dangerous conditions. By November 1944 there was a feeling in the armies in Europe that the war would be over soon. As Sergeant Linzy wrote to his wife, despite the bad conditions at the front one of the main topics of discussion in the 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Battalion was the proposed extensive Christ‑ mas Day menu. The conventional wisdom was that with the pounding the German Army took from June to November the fight had gone out of them

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and the end was in sight. That was not the position held at Hitler’s head‑ quarters or with the panzer, infantry, and artillery forces silently gathering in the snow-covered Ardennes Forest. The war in Europe would not be over by Christmas 1944, and there would be even greater challenges in 1945.

7

´ 1 9 4 5 a n d V-Days

It was an especially hot and humid Easter weekend of 1945 in the Philippine Islands for Captain William C. Hurt of Company C, 108th Medical Detachment, 33rd Infantry Division. His division, formally of the Illinois National Guard, had fought in New Guinea, and after landing at Lingayen Gulf on February 10 went into combat against an entrenched Japanese garrison on the island of Luzon. Hurt, a medical doctor volunteer from Memphis, returned to the medical base from an especially bloody combat mission on Good Friday, and after clean‑ ing the mud and blood from himself went to a dinner of combat ra‑ tions and local pickled green papayas. Of great surprise to Hurt was a treat of cold American beer. A few days later he wrote to his parents, “You asked about sending me some cookies, etc. Our PX supplies are coming in regularly and with surprising variety so I won’t need any from you just now. . . . If you will you can send me a nail file and some more flints in occasional letters. That’s about all I could use.”1 There had been a constant stream of complaints from GIs in the Pacific theater of operations over the spotty delivery of PX goods ei‑ ther through an established exchange or through the quartermaster. There were established and well-stocked exchanges and recreation‑ al facilities in Australia, especially in Brisbane. A leave or a pass to Brisbane was highly prized by the GIs, and for the Army Exchange Service the city offered a fairly secure base where supplies could be collected and offered to the GIs. Once away from Australia it was dif‑ ficult to follow the course of operations in such areas as New Guinea and then in Luzon, where combat was constant, weather conditions were terrible, and the needs for necessary combat supplies were the 123

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first priority. Captain Hurt had obtained a short leave from his unit in New Guinea and went to Brisbane where he had “a great time.” Kerr and his staff would have been pleased to see letters from GIs over‑ seas about available PX services, but a good PX still did not ease con‑ ditions, especially in Europe, where combat continued across northern France into Belgium and Holland. Some units, like the 101st Airborne Division, were pulled back in December from direct contact with the Ger‑ mans to a rest and refitting area. Members of the division were perplexed to find PX items, either from field exchanges or from the quartermaster, in very short supply, especially the basics of cigarettes, candy, chewing gum, razor blades, shaving cream, lotions, and the like. Units like the very green, untested 106th Infantry Division, in foxholes and dugouts in the bitter cold and snows of the Belgium Ardennes Forest, had almost no supplies from the quartermaster. At least the 106th Golden Lion Division was told they were in a very quiet sector of the line where they could acclimate to the harsh winter conditions and train for future combat operations. Morale was especially low in the 106th and other fresh divisions in this so-called quiet sector. Supplies of all sorts had slowed down considerably, and major combat items were at dangerously low levels. GIs at the front continually relied on gift packages from home to make up for a decreasing amount of comfort items. On December 14, 1944, T-Sergeant Charles B. Linzy received a welcome package from home. “Got a package from Fay [a family friend] and also one from [cousin] Zerle. Carton of tobacco from Fay and a car‑ ton of Luckies from Zerle.”2 Lucky Strike cigarettes were one of the most sought-after brands by GIs, but they all but disappeared from PX supplies at the front. Even many of the packs of cigarettes sent with the larger com‑ bat rations were economy brands, including the much rejected Chelsea brand. Some observers were concerned that a false sense of well-being had settled in as the Christmas season approached. By November 1944 the Red Ball Express suspended operations. His‑ torian A. Gregory Gutgsell Jr. has pointed out that the express consumed three hundred thousand gallons of gasoline a day, and the wear and tear on vehicles was great. Gutgsell states, “Many shipments were hijacked by other supply-starved U.S. units along the way, and a dismally high per‑ centage of supplies wound up on the French black market.”3 Even though the Red Ball Express delivered critically needed supplies in late August

1 9 4 5 a n d V-Days

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and early September, it became necessary to end it. Regardless of the suc‑ cesses or failures of the attempts to supply troops in combat, the situation was critical when, on December 16, 1944, the Germans launched a major winter offensive in the Ardennes Forest. Operation Wacht Am Rhein began before dawn, with three German armies striking at weak points in the American lines. Hitler and his gener‑ als began a rare and risky winter offensive with weather conditions that would limit Allied air superiority, and German planners had also noted a slowdown in Allied advances and correctly estimated that supplies were short. There was also a lack of aggressive patrolling by many of the untested divisions, and German operational security in massing forces was first rate. Four hundred and twenty tanks and assault guns, nineteen hundred artil‑ lery pieces, and a quarter-million troops were available for the offensive, and when they struck they sent the Allies reeling. The American 106th Division was surrounded, and mass surrenders occurred. Troops were retreating in a disorderly manner. The 101st Airborne, short of winter clothing, ammuni‑ tion, food, and medical supplies, was moved into the crossroads town of Bastogne to block the Germans from using the vital road network into and out of the town. On December 19 Allied commanders met at Verdun to decide how to deal with the dire situation in what had become known as “the Bulge.” Patton’s Third Army, leaving one corps in place, pivoted two corps and moved toward the heaviest fighting. His Third Army’s march in severe weather against enemy resistance was one of the great exploits of the war. But it is not the purpose of this study to recount the European and Pacific campaigns, but to recount the types of supplies available and the delivery of those items to the troops in the field. T-Sergeant Linzy continued to receive packages from home during the Christmas season of 1944 while his unit was in combat. His letters back to his wife indicated that what was sent made up for the lack of supplies pro‑ vided by the quartermaster or the PX. He told his wife that he had needed some soap for weeks, and when one of his kin sent soap and a carton of Camel cigarettes, he could not have wanted a better Christmas present.4 A hard lesson was being learned by the Quartermaster Commissary and the Army Exchange Service. All of the plans and the stockpiling of exchange goods prior to D-Day became chaos and fair game for a number of dishonest GIs and French black-market criminals once troops were fighting on French soil. There

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had been thefts in Italy and in Britain, but little could prepare quarter‑ masters and exchange officers for what would occur once in France. Of course, General John Lee’s Service of Supply moving into Paris did not help, and the move made Paris one gigantic Pirates Alley for stolen goods. As exchange officials would find out after VE Day, the black market in Paris would not end; it would expand, and would extend into occupied Germany. While soldiers on the line of battle suffered without sufficient clothing and medical supplies, their supplies of soap, cigarettes, candy, and other comfort items dried up. Sergeant Linzy, who relied on his wife and kin for gift packages, was left with Patton’s one corps that was left in place when the remainder of the Third Army marched north. He wrote his wife, “A Red Cross club mobile just rolled up and were handing out coffee and doughnuts. Gee but they tasted good.” Normally, these field club mobiles carried cigarettes as well as the usual hot coffee and doughnuts, and dur‑ ing the fierce Ardennes fighting all items were gladly received by the GIs. Although the Red Cross was better known for their hospital work, field operations, under combat conditions, were also a part of the Red Cross mission. This official policy was in force in the Pacific theater of operations as well, and began on Guadalcanal. It was meant to supplement activities by the Quartermaster Commissary and the exchange system when condi‑ tions dictated it for the welfare and morale of the combat troops.5 To complicate matters for the AES there was a continued shortage of critical items for the overseas exchanges. Beer and soft drinks were in short supply since the question of raising malt levels for breweries had not been resolved, nor had the allowance of cork for beer and soft drink produc‑ ers been increased to meet all of the civilian and military demands. For Post Exchanges in the United States and the stable areas in Europe and the Pacific theater, Coca-Cola and other soft-drink makers could deliver barrels of syrup for mixing drinks such as found in American civilian soda fountains. For the troops in the field, bottled drinks were the only way to get beer and soft drinks into the hands of those fighting at the front. Master Sergeant Elmer Franzman of the 329th Service Group, Head‑ quarters, told his father in August 1944, “On our beer issue we received Budweiser beer. Not bad uh. Costs only 11 [cents] per bottle [in the PX].” Franzman’s unit, stationed in India, had an ongoing supply of beer, and in September he told his father, “Now I have just finished an ice-cold bottle


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of Budweiser. . . . My beer usually lasts a week. Here it is nine days old and I still have nine bottles left.” Franzman’s father, a grocer from Cannelton, Indiana, wrote about the beer shortage in the civilian sector and told his son in late June 1944, “No beer in town for 4 days, and it’s been awful hot here.”6 What Master Sergeant Franzman had was a premium beer that was not always available in PXs in the United States, and, as has been seen, often there were times when no beer was to be had. Byron and his AES staff had made a decision to send the majority of the national premium brands of beer overseas first for the troops in combat. When beer was available, the majority was usually apportioned between the training bases where combat units were being trained and prepared to be sent to either Europe or the Pacific. For example, once some premium beer was available for the AES, a large amount was sent to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, where divisional units were located, such as the 69th Division, which was completing its train‑ ing and scheduled to deploy to Europe as quickly as possible. The Camp Shelby exchange officer opened beer halls to serve beer and ensure that all empty bottles were kept inside the makeshift wooden beer hall. The veter‑ ans of the 69th Division remembered their hard training in the heat of the Mississippi summer, and one of the things they found well worth recalling was the 3.2 premium beer they enjoyed.7 Colonel Kerr and his AES staff had to be careful in supplying the ex‑ change system. In late 1944 a war weariness began to set in with the ra‑ tioning and the shortages imposed by wartime priorities on the American public. By the spring of 1944 the requests to the President’s War Relief Control Board by civilian groups to supply the troops, mainly with com‑ fort items and cigarettes, had slowed down to a trickle. In 1942 and well into late 1943 the Control Board had been deluged with requests for per‑ mission to solicit funds for various projects. Trying to end the confusion caused by patriotic citizens with the best of intentions, President Roosevelt had urged all Americans to contribute to the National War Fund. Most requests for permission had been to supply cigarettes, but by 1944 there was an ongoing and severe shortage. With the introduction of cigarettes in the combat rations, the Office of the Quartermaster General placed even more requirements on the cigarette makers. The Christmas season of 1944 placed another strain on the quantity of cigarettes available for civilian consumption when, as the Army Postal

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Service reported, the number of gift packages increased, especially to the European theater of operations, and fully one-fifth of all packages were believed to contain at least one carton of cigarettes. By late January and February 1945, GIs in Europe were still getting packages filled with candy bars, shaving cream, aftershave lotion, soap, and cigarettes, and those pack‑ ages were mailed after the Christmas rush of 1944.8 Military authorities in Europe had to find a way to increase the flow of PX supplies to the troops at the front, but with the lion’s share of military police serving in the com‑ bat areas where they were needed most, and with Paris remaining as the center of the growing French black market, the problem would be hard to resolve. Some units solved their supply problems on their own. Private Raymond James Oblinger of the 104th Infantry Regiment, 26th Division, was fight‑ ing on German soil, and recalled that abandoned civilian German stores were simply looted by GIs. A lieutenant in the antitank platoon in which Oblinger served found a local brewery that had not been destroyed in the fighting. There he found barrels of beer, broke one open, and found it to be fresh. He filled his vehicle with five-gallon kegs of beer and brought them back to his very appreciative platoon. In mid-February the 104th Regiment was pulled off the line for rest and refitting before the final push against the remains of the German resistance. Private Oblinger remembered fondly the quartermaster bath and laundry units where the men got hot show‑ ers and clean clothes for the first time in many weeks. PX supplies were distributed, and the Special Services officer of the 26th Division found a usable building and arranged for a show for the troops. In the evening the Red Cross club mobile arrived and handed out its standard fare—coffee and donuts.9 The amount of PX items sent to the troops in the field increased by February 1945, but the shortages continued to plague AES officers. If it were possible to bypass Paris and move quickly to the east, supplies were protected. With the black market in France growing, the less time sup‑ plies were subject to pilfering on a grand scale, the greater the possibility that supplies would get to the frontline troops. T-Sergeant Linzy’s 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Battalion received their PX supplies about the time that Oblinger’s 104th Regiment did. The inventory of his share points out the shortages for troops at the front. He wrote, “Boy we got some [PX] supplies given to us today. . . . We got 9 Hershey almond bars, 7 packs


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cigarettes, 1 package Spearmint [chewing gum], and we also will get a coke later in the week.”10 The last PX supply that came to Linzy, almost two weeks prior to this distribution, was programmed by the Office of the Quartermaster General so that soldiers should receive at least a pack of cigarettes a day through either actual purchase from a PX or by distribution of the PX supplies that would substitute for purchase at an exchange. Candy bars and chew‑ ing gum could not be issued at one each per day because there were not that many bars and packages in the theater of operations. Soap, wash‑ cloths, razor blades, and the like were in short supply as well. Sergeant Linzy requested soap and washcloths from his wife in Little Rock, and she sent then as quickly as possible. What had been set up as a good system with a steady supply of comfort items for the troops did not work as well as hoped once troops were in combat across northern France and into Belgium, Holland, and Germany. Private Oblinger recalled that issues of clean underwear and clothes were few and far between, and the soldiers often wore dirty clothes for weeks at a time. In the offices of the Army Service Forces and the Army Exchange Ser‑ vice there was an awareness that something had to be done, and one of the solutions was a basic policy that offered viable and understandable controls for PX and commissary items in all theaters of operations. By 1945 it was obvious that U.S. troops would spend a great deal of time in an occupation of Germany, and then Japan. Troops would also have to stay in North Africa, Italy, and places like India for some time after the cessation of hostilities. The post–World War I occupation of German soil west of the Rhine River offered no lessons learned for what was about to happen. The U.S. Third Army was there, but it did little to impend the normal day-to-day activities of the German people. There had been little destruction of German towns and cities through air bombardment or direct combat. By 1945, however, the city of Tokyo had more than one-third of its urban area in burned ruins. Two of Japan’s cities in August 1945 would simply cease to exist. Unlike the Germany of 1918, there were massive numbers of homeless, hungry citizens. As American soldiers crossed over into Germany in 1944 and 1945 the Army issued orders of nonfraternization with German civilians, and it would levy fines against soldiers who violated the policy, which was no more obeyed than it was from 1918 to 1923. This time, however, the GIs came into the enemies’

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lives with cigarettes, candy bars, soap, spare rations, and many of the other things that had disappeared except for the higher-ranking Nazis. There had to be a policy that would apply in 1945 and beyond. If con‑ trols were reasonable and well enforced, there seemed to be no reason there would be dire shortages for the GIs if the black market could be limited and the conditions that sprang up in Paris after the liberation were not repeated. In a series of communications within the Army Service Forces it was acknowledged that there was a control problem and that there had to be a coherent system of rationing and distribution for Army personnel in the United States and for the GIs overseas in the combat areas. One policy would not suit the situation as it existed, and the policies had to be flexible enough to deal with occupation conditions. The work done by the Army Service Forces was massive and was classified as secret because it revealed what American plans were in the postwar world. The files created by the ASF were code-named “Spicy.” Also, the work being done had to be coor‑ dinated with the Navy Department, and plans had to be mirror images of each other if they were to work in a fair manner.11 This control policy had to be the work of all sections of the ASF, with General Byron’s AES staff heavily involved. It was generally acknowledged that the army could not return to its hesitancy to supply comfort items as it had after the Great War.12 James Forrestal, secretary of the Navy, had given his blessing to the work being done, and to make sure that any new policy would “prevent discrimination between two services, the Armed Services should adopt similar programs.”13 Forrestal pointed out that the Navy Department had already adopted a system of rationing for its personnel, with differences between those in the United States and those sailing in hostile areas of the war. No one really knew when nationwide rationing would be lifted and what effect that would have on supplies for the Army and Navy. What the War Department and the Office of the Quartermaster Gen‑ eral wanted was a two-tier system, one a ration system and the other an allocation system. The allocation plan, which was scheduled to go into effect on June 1, 1945, placed PX goods, especially cigarettes, under the control of the Office of the Quartermaster General, which would see to the security and the shipping of supplies to the theaters of operations. The allocation would be based on projected consumption and an estima‑ tion of future troop levels and would be adjusted up or down depending


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on the circumstances. Comfort items, especially cigarettes, would then be issued as part of the rations normally distributed to the troops. Requisi‑ tion of items would be done quarterly and would be computed by the Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington. To reduce the flood of uncontrolled comfort items, especially the sought-after black-market cigarettes, Army post commanders would be re‑ sponsible for overseeing the exact number of items to be shipped overseas. Interestingly, the plan called for no cigarettes to be issued to prisoners of war; they would receive smoking tobacco and papers. “Italian Service Units,” so-called because of Italy’s change in alliance during World War II, would be issued ten cigarettes per man per day.14 If this plan remained in force, the status of the Post Exchanges in the overseas areas would be in doubt, and there were dangers that the question of comfort items could revert back to the antebellum status quo. The rationing plan involved the United States and directly affected the operations of the PX because it involved a ration card and would be under the direct supervision of the chief of the Army Exchange Service. The ration card would affect the PX, Commissary Sales, post restaurants, Service Clubs (under Byron’s Special Services Division), officers’ clubs, noncommissioned officers’ clubs, and prisoner-of-war canteens. The AES had the responsibility to design the ration card and see that all service commands received enough cards for every soldier in its area of responsi‑ bility, which then would be passed to the post commanders for issuance to all authorized personnel on the post. Commanders would be responsible for the security of the cards. A civilian working on post would also receive a card for purchases for use while working on post. Ration points would be formulated. For example, two ration points would allow the purchaser to buy three packs of cigarettes or twelve cigars per week. There was a list of other items such as candy, chewing gum, toothpaste, soap, and razor blades that required a ration card.15 This was a wise move because there had been a growing number of complaints over PX purchases finding their way to civilians who were not family members. By the June target date for the plan to go into effect, the armed services were training large numbers of troops, and units were being sent overseas as rapidly as possible. Germany might be on the verge of total military collapse, but was the same true of Japanese military resis‑ tance and civilian support for imperial Japanese resistance?

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The ration-card plan did not alter the way the PXs did business, and the cards did offer some much needed controls. What was different was the possibility that the Post Exchange system could fade away overseas once peace was established. This was no conspiracy by any means, but it did reflect some of the prevailing attitudes as to what would be done with a defeated Germany and Japan. American combat units in the European theater could very well be either sent back to the United States and demo‑ bilized or, and this was a real fear of many GIs, sent to the Pacific theater to prepare for the invasion of Japan. There would be less of a reason to keep full combat units in Europe or Japan once actual combat ended, when the actual administration of conquered countries would pass to constabulary and to administrative units that would oversee peace and good order and a transition to some sort of democratic state. While the war was going on, no one could have envisioned the post‑ war relations with the Soviet Union that would necessitate keeping large numbers of American ground and air forces overseas in Germany and Japan. At any rate, it seemed that with a few exceptions in the AES, ev‑ eryone involved with postwar planning was satisfied that the new plan was reasonable and would work. Also, it was very hard for planners in Washington to envision the amount of destruction and dislocation that had taken place. The GIs on the ground revealed in their letters home that they were awestruck by the devastation of modern war and had a bet‑ ter grasp of the dire conditions on the ground than office-based officers in Washington. In April tank commander Sergeant Kenneth Lummer of the 4th Ar‑ mored Division wrote that his battalion passed through many German towns, “and two were nearly burned to the ground.” A few days later Lummer’s tanks encountered resistance and opened fire on one town, and “then we got a fire mission and pulled off the road and really laid another town to the ground. We went through in half an hour later and darned near roasted ourselves.” Sergeant Linzy moved with his unit into the town of Hameln and was surprised to see that part of the town had been lev‑ eled, but he reckoned that a fair portion of Hameln could have water and electric lights if there were any city workers available to get the utilities operational again.16 While the GIs were dealing with the realities on the ground, planning went on in Washington. Henry L. Stimson, the secretary of war, became


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involved in the issue of what was being sent overseas and determined that with shortages in the civilian sector, items sent overseas had to be con‑ trolled and limited. His particular concern was the number of cigarettes sent overseas, and he wanted a plan to ration cigarettes in the United States and “a plan for allocating issue to overseas theaters based upon fixed consumption factors and the respective strength of the varying types of personnel in each theater.”17 Implied, but not spelled out, was that under the plan a rear-area supply soldier would receive less than a combat soldier. Of interest to Secretary Stimson were the various committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate investigating all sorts of shortages from beer to sugar and cigarettes. With the war into the fourth year, there was a weariness on the part of the public with rationing and shortages, and complaints came into every office on Capital Hill. With it settled that a rationing system would go into effect, in March 1945 the AES requested budgetary authority to have the cards printed. It was not that simple, of course, as there had to be at least three cards produced to control items, especially tobacco products. There would be a buff-colored card for military personnel, a white-colored card for civilians, and a pink- or salmon-colored card for prisoners of war.18 When asking for authority to allocate money for this project, it was stated that the cost of printing the cards was unknown. It would be some time before the AES could issue cards and make it clear that commanders, soldiers, and authorized civilian employees were to be instructed in their use. There was also no guarantee that if more products, especially candy bars, soap, and shaving products, were made available to the public that they would not wind up being shipped to loved ones overseas. This was a far cry from “the GI gets everything” of 1942–1943. While discussions were ongoing in Washington, troops were still in combat, but it was fairly obvious that the war in Europe was winding down, with more towns hanging out white flags and with German sol‑ diers surrendering en masse to GIs. Operations were so fast-moving that it was hard enough to keep gasoline, ammunition, repair parts, combat rations, and medical supplies moving to supply those units going deeper into Germany, Austria, and even Czechoslovakia. It seemed that the only opposition came from the young of the Hitler Youth and the SS, and the roads and towns were filled with regular German Army troops moving to the west to escape the Red Army to surrender to the British or the

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Americans. The flow of PX items slowed down because of the pressing combat needs and the difficulties of finding vehicles to move PX supplies forward. Some units were ordered to simply cease combat operations and move into whatever buildings were available to house troops. Sergeant Linzy’s 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Battalion was one of those units that came under the operational control of corps-level command. There was no Luftwaffe for the battalion to deal with, nor was the bat‑ talion needed to supplement the combat firepower of the fast-moving di‑ visions. Linzy and five other noncommissioned officers were billeted in a large home that was owned and occupied by two members of German royalty, who were not pleased to have six GIs in their house. “The old Heine bat,” as Linzy called her, continually complained about everything the six GIs did; she was ignored, which only irritated her more. The man‑ sion was situated on the Rhine River, and life there promised to be enjoy‑ able for the veterans of Normandy and the heavy fighting from December 1944 into March 1945. Since the unit was now stationary and to the rear of the main battle area, PX supplies were issued on a regular basis. Linzy wrote to his wife that his cigarette issue was at seven packs per week. A Post Exchange opened near the battalion headquarters, and Linzy found, “For the first time since being over here the PX had salty crackers for sale 1/2 pound box per man. One of the boys had some cheese spread, Kraft, [and] I had a jar of very delicious olives . . . much better and tastier than C-ration stew.”19 T-Sergeant Linzy’s battalion was in a state of high excitement in April because they believed they would be part of the final assault on Berlin. The 2nd Armored Division and the 30th and 83rd Infantry Divisions were preparing mentally for the last fight in the Nazi capital. The highly battletested 82nd Airborne Division had plans either to drop into Berlin or to send combat infantry by train to Berlin. Linzy wrote in his diary that they were on the Elbe River and the next stop would be the famed Unter den Linden.20 None of these things would happen because the Russians would finally take the city. An experienced combat veteran like Linzy, who constantly wrote to his wife that he could think of nothing but coming home to her, was overcome by adrenaline while thinking of and hoping for this final


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fight. On April 18, 1945, Linzy’s battalion entered Schönebeck-on-Elbe, and there they found a large cache of cognac, rum, and gin, sixty-four full quarts, which was then “liberated” and distributed throughout the bat‑ talion, which Linzy simply described as “WET!”21 That night all regrets over not being the American troops to enter Hitler’s capital were literally washed away. Sergeant William George of the 415th Night Fighter Squadron, Ninth Air Force, moved with his unit into the environs of Darmstadt, Germany, in April 1945, with “the armies advancing so rapidly we were becoming rear echelon boys, which is good news for us.” George admitted to his mother that he sent her a dress he obtained in Paris, but when he was in Paris in late 1944 legitimate civilian stores were required to ask for Army “tickets” to buy anything. To get a nice dress for his mother, “I had to go to the black market [to buy a fashionable Paris dress].”22 Obviously, the Paris black market was flourishing when GIs knew how to contact it and buy contraband goods, circumventing any controls that were imposed on GIs visiting the city. There appeared to be a three-level priority for PX supplies: first were the combat units moving very quickly into Germany and Austria; second were those units that were now stationed in Germany where there was no combat, and this included military hospitals in Germany and France; and third, the rear areas in France and in England. The Quartermaster Com‑ missary had a difficult time getting PX supplies, still being issued free, to those units that needed the basic sinews of war before comfort items. In areas of Germany that were now occupied, the PXs opened and sold their wares to the GIs, and in military hospitals the PXs were quick to open. In the third, or rear, areas the PXs had never ceased to function, and in those areas there were few problems with offering American beer, candy, gum, soft drinks, cigarettes, soap, and the like. The Office of the Quartermaster General and the AES did not take into consideration that there would be a high black-market demand for American coffee, a common item for GI mess halls, USO and Red Cross centers and club mobiles, and PX snack bars. As more controls over American products went into effect, coffee would have to be guarded and rationed like candy bars, razor blades, and cigarettes.

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Due to the harsh, cold conditions, Private First Class Raymond James Oblinger of the Headquarters Company of the 104th Infantry Regiment, 26th Division, had fallen ill, developing a lung condition and what was called battle fatigue. He was sent to the Fifty-eighth Army General Hos‑ pital in France. The Red Cross was there, offering services for which they had earned a good reputation among most GIs. They maintained a small recreation room with table tennis, two pool tables, and a small library. For those patients who could not leave their beds, the Red Cross distributed candy and cigarettes free of charge. But for those who were ambulatory and had some money, “The hospital PX offered American cigarettes for 10 cents a pack along with cigars, candy, soap, and eventually ice cream and Coca-Cola.”23 Sergeant William George’s 415th Night Fighter Squadron was in the second level of troops, but they were continuing to receive free rations. He wrote to his parents, “We got our rations today and I’ll have you know that we got 14 bars of candy each, yes 14.” There were, by George’s stan‑ dards, so many that he gave some of the candy bars to German children. T-Sergeant Linzy, who was still bedeviling the German princess and duch‑ ess by his very presence in the manor house in Lauterbach, found out that the end-of-hostilities changes would take place in their supply of comfort items. He wrote to his wife, “We have to start buying our cigarettes and stuff now [from the PX]. While we were combat troops didn’t have to as they furnished them to us. This will be the first ones that I have paid for since I left merry old England.”24 There were built-in problems with the opening of PXs in areas where combat had ended. Who would decide what units would be no longer supplied with free-issue PX items and who would not? Linzy’s 459th Mo‑ bile Aircraft Battalion ceased to receive free rations and had to use the PX that had opened nearby. Sergeant George’s unit, the 415th Night Fighter Squadron, which was stationed near Linzy’s battalion, continued receiving the free commissary rations. When soldiers used the Post Exchanges there had to be some form of currency to pay for items. Many soldiers had not been paid in several months. Linzy had five dollars in his wallet when the battalion landed on Omaha Beach, and there was no indication at that point that he needed any money until the end of the war. What sort of currency would be used in the Post Exchange? U.S. mili‑ tary script had been issued for some time, and it was better that script be


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used in the exchanges. It was also hoped that large amounts of American currency would not find their way onto the black market, but military script was another matter. Military script, or Military Payment Certificates, was issued to Ameri‑ can forces for use in military establishments like the Post Exchange. The script would be worthless to European civilians because, by regulations and orders, they could not patronize places like the GI beer hall or the PX. American dollars were much sought after by black marketers, but the issuance of the script aimed at stopping that. Also, in immediate postwar occupied Germany and in Austria there were no governments that could issue their own currency. The same script system was also used in the Pa‑ cific and in occupied Japan. Script in conjunction with a PX ration card provided safeguards against the black market. The best way to deal with PX items in the postwar European theater was to issue the buff-colored “Army Exchange Ration Card—European Theater.” Each card had a serial number and carried the warning, “Anyone apprehended reselling, trading or bartering Post Exchange merchandise will forfeit all rights to exchange privileges and will be dealt with under the appropriate article of war.” A number of items were placed on the ration list: toothpaste, laundry and regular soap, shaving cream, razor blades, candy bars, chewing gum, and coffee. The strict rationing of cigarettes aimed at one pack per day per PX customer. Matches were also under the rationing system. Other items such as Sergeant Linzy’s salty crackers were sold as the items were obtained, and there was no guarantee that they would appear on the shelves on a reg‑ ular basis. Basically, the rationed items corresponded to what was included in the accessory packets for combat rations. Beyond that, the PX would of‑ fer what it could to the GIs. The biggest problem for the PXs was the Army cigarette policy that stated that the popular brands—Lucky Strike, Camel, and Chesterfield—would be 75 percent of the amount shipped overseas to both Europe and the Pacific theater; the remainder would be economy brands. This was not possible given the political situation in the United States. Also, there was pressure from the Office of Price Administration that every manufacturer have an equal chance at selling their brands, even though they were listed as economy brands.25 The numbers available were staggering, with more than nine billion cigarettes in the theaters either in storage, on ships, in the possession of

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the quartermaster general, or in the stocks of the PX.26 The potential for abuse and theft was built into the numbers, which had grown out of con‑ trol. There were several sets of estimates as to how many packs should be ordered for every soldier in the theaters, and this confusion would con‑ tinue well after the guns fell silent in Europe and in the Pacific. It was also unclear as to how many candy bars and packs of chewing gum should be stocked for the troops. Some items that had been available when the Post Exchanges opened their doors for business were in very short supply. Cleaning materials, which were on the original authorization lists, seemed to have gotten lost in the mass of candy bars, chewing gum, and ciga‑ rettes. Captain William C. Hurt of the 33rd Division found that flints for his lighter were never available in the PX, and he asked his parents in Tennessee to send him six containers of brown shoe polish and some pickles and olives, but no canned meats such as Spam. Serving in the Phil‑ ippines, Hurt, a medical doctor, found the stocks of the PX to be erratic at best.27 He would find conditions to be worse when he arrived in Japan in September. The shortage of brown shoe polish was interesting, given the Army’s insistence that when not in direct combat, soldiers were to look smart, with their brown boots and shoes shined. Soldiers also complained about the lack of washcloths in the exchange offerings. The closer final victory over Germany and Japan came, the more difficult it was for the AES to maintain levels of stocks for the GIs. Once the rumors that Hitler was dead and that German military forces were surrendering en masse were confirmed, it would have seemed that there would be euphoria, especially among the frontline combat troops. There were many more celebrations in London, New York, and Paris than there were among GIs in Germany or Austria. There was an air of uncer‑ tainty for the soldiers who had fought so well since D-Day. Fighting still raged in the Pacific, and place-names like Luzon and Okinawa were as well known to the GIs in Europe as they were to folks back home in the United States. As historian Dennis Showalter points out, many of the Army divi‑ sions fighting in the Pacific were being refitted and rebuilt by a constant flow of draftees, and the veterans of hard-fought battles understood that the next operation would be against the Japanese home islands.28 A land‑ ing of American troops on the beaches of the home islands promised to be a bloodbath for both Americans and Japanese. Tested, battle-hardened


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troops would be needed for this last battle, and many units in the Euro‑ pean theater of operations were on alert for redeployment to the Pacific. Sergeant Kenneth Lummer of the 4th Armored Division wrote, “I am afraid I will have to go to the other theater in China though am hoping I will be shipped through the states so I will have thirty days at home with you.” Sergeant George of the 415th Night Fighter Squadron wrote to his parents about VE Day, “Of course we knew it [the German surrender] be‑ fore they announced it, but still it was not much of a thrill for us, because we don’t know what is to become of us.” The usually upbeat Sergeant Linzy wrote to his wife, “Hope I am not in the bunch that has to go over to the Pacific Area. Believe that I had rather stay over here a while than go over there.”29 It does seem strange to say, but the end of war in Europe caused a morale problem for those GIs and units that could very well find themselves on the beaches of the Japanese home islands. Adding to the uncertainty was the specter that the tested combat units could very well be turned into occupation-constabulary forces in Germany and Austria. This would be a very difficult transition for highly proficient combat divisions such as the 26th, 29th, or the 101st Airborne, for example. Armored divi‑ sions like the 2nd, 4th, and 9th would be prime candidates for redeploy‑ ment to the Pacific, especially if there would be heavy fighting in Japan proper, and all intelligence summaries indicated that one of the results would be horribly high American and Japanese casualties.30 There was something else taking place that affected the troops in Eu‑ rope. GIs found the German people to be friendly, despite the tremendous destruction caused by the fighting. Of course, former Nazi officials and members of the SS were hunted down by soldiers to be brought to justice for the deeds committed during the twelve-year life of the Thousand-Year Reich. Sergeant Linzy told his wife, “Honey you cannot imagine the num‑ ber or truth about all of these people who were slaves for the Nazis.”31 The roads were filled with half-starved men and women who were finally released from bondage in Nazi Germany, and this did not include the situ‑ ation in the liberated concentration camps where so many perished. There appeared in the minds of the GIs a dividing line between the civilians and those who committed atrocities against humanity. During the 1918–1923 occupation of Germany, the French were par‑ ticularly angered with the American Third Army’s relationship with the

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Germans in their zone. Americans appeared to prefer to fraternize with the Germans than with their wartime French allies. This was especially true of the young soldiers who found the German girls to be wholesome looking and fun loving, as most young people are. Eisenhower, however, wanted a strict nonfraternization policy in Germany and was determined to enforce it. Commanders such as George S. Patton knew that such a policy was doomed to failure, particularly when the GIs had in their packs what many Germans had not seen in five years of war—cigarettes, candy bars, soap, extra food—in other words, PX supplies. Many of the soldiers who had fought from Normandy to VE Day were not old enough to buy a beer or, for that matter, vote in an election in the United States, but they fancied themselves as men among men, confident and victorious, and this certainly appealed to the young German women they were about to encounter. The relationship between American soldiers and German civilians would have a long-lasting impact in the postwar world and would affect the re‑ tention and growth of the Army Exchange Service. In the spring of 1945, with the Third Reich collapsing around the armies, the future of anything or any soldier was unclear. There was no time for crystal-ball gazing for the AES because of more pressing needs. Once the German surrender was complete, attention was turned to redeploying troops to the United States for demobilization. The Army was determined that there would be no re‑ peat of the confusion that marred the transition from doughboy to civilian after the Great War. A number of World War I soldiers returned to civil‑ ian life, bringing with them all of their field gear. Paperwork, so vital to postwar claims, was basically in shambles depending on how conscientious clerks were in the demobilization camps in the United States. Camps were being prepared to receive entire divisional-size units to process everyone properly. Unlike the post–World War I period, GIs had programs in place to ease the transition to civilian life. In 1944 Congress passed the Service‑ man’s Readjustment Act, better known as the GI Bill, which guaranteed educational benefits, home loans, and the like. Correct paperwork was vi‑ tal. The processes would be long, and waiting time for transportation back to the United States seemed to be never-ending. While there were some morale problems in Germany, conditions in the various camps in France could very quickly deteriorate. Every moralerelated asset had to be used for the waiting troops, and the PX, Special Services, USO, and Red Cross did everything they could. At the many


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camps, the Post Exchange opened as quickly as possible to provide as much as possible. Special Services obtained as much sports equipment as they could find, the USO organized shows, and the Red Cross club mobiles arrived. Private First Class Oblinger was moved from unit to unit after his release from the hospital. He finally was assigned to the 89th Division in camps in Normandy called “cigarette camps,” because each camp was named after a brand of American cigarettes. His camp was called “Twenty Grand” after one of the less popular brands, and it was close to the largest camp, called “Camp Lucky Strike.” While there, Oblinger was able to tour several nearby French towns, and the Special Services organized dances with local girls and included a lot of American food and drinks. At Camp Twenty Grand the Post Exchange was in full operation, with candy bars and Coca-Cola.32 While Oblinger was waiting in Camp Twenty Grand, T-Sergeant Linzy was in Gruenberg, Germany, waiting for some indication of when his bat‑ talion would be ordered home. While there he was awarded the Bronze Star, but wrote to his wife, “I was in need of a morale builder. Just now watched a bunch of little Heinie kids at our retreat. They all froze to atten‑ tion and saluted as the flag was lowered. Well today was pay day, not that I use all of it but we now have to pay a darn good price for everything that we get. They used to furnish us with everything but those days are over with.”33 The end of the war in Europe and the impending final operation against Japan offered greater challenges to the Army Exchange Service. Could the occupation troops in Germany be sustained by the Quartermaster Com‑ missary? It was obvious that there would be more requirements in the occupation and reconstruction of Germany than originally envisioned by Washington planners. What should be done with the mass of displaced persons and the liberated slave laborers with no identification, how should the survivors of the Nazi death camps be treated and processed, and where should they go once they recovered from their ghastly ordeal? Did the Army really want morale builders such as the PX and the Special Services to simply go away and to have soldiers rely on their own devices for com‑ fort supplies and recreation? Even the best units in Germany and Austria were reporting some discipline problems, but the end of the war did in‑ deed offer opportunities for the Army Exchange Service.

8

´ Co n s e q u e nce s and

Af t e r m at h

Sergeant William George of the 415th Night Fighter Squadron was stationed near Darmstadt, Germany, and with the war in Europe over he planned a leave in England. While there in 1943 he had made friends with British families and became something of an Anglophile, and he wanted a visit before his unit left for the United States, when‑ ever that might be. He went to the local PX, and “I bought me one of those new ETO jackets yesterday [at the PX] to wear to England. . . . Looks rather nice with my 9th Air Force insignia on the left sleeve and the old 12th Air Force on the right sleeve, and my overseas stripes on the left sleeve and my other stripes on . . . I look like a circus sideshow.”1 George did not mention his ribbons for the European theater of operations, with four campaign stars, and his Victory medal. Of course, George wanted to look his best for his trip to England and to show his pride in the Army Air Force combat units he had served with. His sojourn with his old friends in England and Scotland went well, and he enjoyed what seemed to be an unending supply of CocaCola provided by the Red Cross and the exchanges in Britain.2 If ever there was a need for the PX, it was in Europe after the guns fell silent. The greatest areas for the AES to function were in the camps where tens of thousands of troops awaited ships to return to the United States, in the hospitals that would be opened for a long 142

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time, and in the cities and towns in England, France, and Germany where GIs went as tourists to see the sites. The exchanges worked in concert with the Special Services and with the military administration to provide for these tourists in olive drab. In Heidelberg, Germany, for example, the exchange provided a GI restaurant that was staffed by French women. There was no extensive menu by any means, but after touring that famed German university town, the opportunity to sit down and enjoy a meal on real plates was most welcome.3 To the battered people of Europe the American GI appeared to be rich, having a day-to-day supply of items that had long since disappeared from European shops. The British said the GIs were “overpaid, over-sexed, and over here.” Private Oblinger was very surprised at the resentment shown to‑ ward GIs by the French, who stated that the Americans had wrought more destruction after D-Day than the Germans caused after the military defeat of and occupation of France in 1940. Once the euphoria of being liberated passed and reality set in, the process of rebuilding ruined cities, villages, and farms from Normandy across northern France began; the whole pro‑ cess of recovery seemed almost insurmountable and unaffordable. In Germany, which had been the country of the Nazi enemy, there ap‑ peared on the part of the GIs a liking for the German people. In the minds of the GIs there was a line that separated the average German civilian from the hard-core Nazis. There was a sympathy for the common soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe who had seen the privations and horrors of the battlefield. German children were the first to break down barriers between GIs and Germans. T-Sergeant Charles Linzy wrote about the children, and told his wife that groups of children congregated around his battalion headquarters, where they had received candy bars and chewing gum. “One a little blonde-headed girl about 3 edged out of the crowd from the others, smiled, and in a very low voice said goot morgan. I gave her a big smile. . . . [W]hen I did that she run in and grabbed me by the leg and hugged me. . . . Personally I think being friendly to the little kids will help as much as anything over here.”4 There was an antifraternization policy in effect all across occupied Germany, but the rule was more observed in the breaking than in the observation. The GIs were the victors and had a constantly growing sup‑ ply of everything from candies to soap and cigarettes. Historian Stephen Ambrose states, “The GIs were surprised to find out how much they like

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the Germans. Clean, hardworking, disciplined, cute kids, educated, mid‑ dle class in their tastes and their lifestyles the Germans seemed to many American soldiers to be just like us.”5 This growing relationship would be a two-edged sword. On one hand, with all of the destruction and privations, it was to the Americans’ advan‑ tage to maintain good relations with the Germans. They were in dire need of everything from clothes to food and medical supplies. On the other hand, Germany had been the enemy, and the atrocities of the Nazis were only now being discovered. In areas where there was little to no destruc‑ tion and where Nazi officials vacationed or had villas, large caches of wine and liquor were found as well as food. For GIs who had been raised in a democratic society, it was easy to feel that the average German was a victim of the Nazi elites who ate and lived well while they often went homeless, hungry, and cold. How much relief would be available for civilians when the Army had to feed, clothe, and medically care for a mass of freed prison‑ ers of war and large numbers of displaced persons, including the inmates of the concentration camps? It disturbed GIs to see German civilians going through mess hall garbage cans to salvage food for their families. An un‑ der-the-table sharing of rations grew with the civilians who were obviously in such dire circumstances. GIs who were combat veterans found some strange situations now that the war was over. Sergeant Linzy, who had seen heavy fighting since land‑ ing on Omaha Beach, had time on his hands and decided to visit a bar and beer hall that had been opened by a resident of Gruenberg. Like many GIs, Linzy had developed a liking for the rich full-bodied German beer, and he ordered a glass. Then he noticed “3 Heinie soldiers [in uniform] were also in there drinking. I don’t know what they think but it seems kind of funny to me.”6 Just two months before, these soldiers had been engaged in killing each other on the battlefield. Like many GIs, Linzy realized that returning German soldiers had no change of clothing, and a German Army uniform on the streets of towns was therefore not uncommon. Stephen Ambrose points out that there were cases of mistreatment of German civilians by GIs, but many were carried out by replacements coming into the units in Germany. The “old soldiers” who had fought from Normandy to final victory had the discipline imposed by combat operations to maintain some order, and they were used to the military structure. New men were never under fire, nor were they a part of the


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vital unit cohesion that ensured a modicum of adherence to orders from established officers and noncommissioned officers in battle.7 The veterans, however, found out in France, Holland, and Belgium just what the power of a GI ration, a pack of cigarettes (even the despised Chelsea brand), a bar of soap, or a candy bar had with civilians. One combat veteran of the European theater said that “two packs of smokes would get you a Lugar [pistol].” Despite strict orders against fraternization with civilians—GIs were even ordered never to speak to a German—a brisk trade for PX items grew, as GIs traded for antiques, Nazi memorabilia, and sexual favors, which brought about a rising sexually transmitted disease rate. While the European theater had to deal with a postwar world, combat continued in the Pacific. With the surrender of Japan and the arrival of American occupation troops in the home islands, the same problems sur‑ faced. There was much less sympathy for the Japanese people than there was for the Germans. Captain William Hurt of the 33rd Division, much to his disgust, was sent to Kyoto to render medical support for the Ameri‑ can forces. He noted that there was a rising venereal disease rate due to the GIs’ abundance of supplies that could traded for intimate encounters with the destitute Japanese.8 The PX and Commissary Sales moved into Japan as quickly as possible in order to supply troops on a better schedule than they could when in hard combat from island to island. In the Pacific the exchanges continued to function for troops in Aus‑ tralia, but the focus of AES activities shifted to the liberated Philippine Islands, where there were large numbers of American troops, many of them in training for the expected invasion of the Japanese home islands. When the war with Japan ended in early August 1945, there was a collec‑ tive sigh of relief, and units that had been scheduled for combat were now earmarked for occupation duty. The PX system reacted to the situation in the Philippines by opening a number of exchanges throughout the islands, with a very large effort in the capital, Manila. It was hard to find buildings there that had not been damaged in the heavy fighting to take the city, but the AES found a large, centrally located building for a main exchange to be fully stocked. Large crowds of GIs and WACs lined up before the exchange opened. Beer halls were established, but one of the most popular branch exchanges estab‑ lished was a hamburger, Coca-Cola, and ice cream bar that welcomed all Army personnel.

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Post Exchanges were set up for the released prisoners of war, and items were given to them at no cost. After years of brutal captivity, a Coke, ciga‑ rettes, and candies were most welcomed by men and women who had existed on a handful of rice a day, and exchange officials made certain that those branch exchanges remained fully stocked and open twenty-four hours a day. In the European theater, supplies for the PX were moving as quickly as possible to the troops in the most distant areas. The roads were con‑ gested, and the situation in Germany was unclear. First Sergeant Will C. Johnson of Company H, 104th Infantry, 26th Division, was stationed with his unit in Budweis, Czechoslovakia, and besides keeping his combat veterans busy he had to deal with Russian troops only a few miles from his company headquarters. He did not like the Russians and certainly did not like the way they treated German and Czechoslovakian civilians. Johnson had been in the heaviest fighting with the 26th “Yankee Division,” and he had been awarded the Bronze Star and the Silver Star for valor. As the first sergeant, Johnson had to see to the discipline and the morale of his veteran troops, but he was frustrated, and wrote to his parents, “Gee, our cigarette supply has just about gone to nothing. In the last ten days, we have got‑ ten two packages and we are supposed to get a package a day, so all of us are really bad off for cigarettes. They keep promising us but they never come in so we shall just wait and do without I presume.”9 The last issue had arrived at Company H eleven days before his letter of complaint, and Johnson distributed candy bars, gum, and cigarettes to his company. But now they would have to wait a few more days before the trucks arrived. While First Sergeant Johnson was struggling with obtaining PX items for his troops, other American units were trying to overcome the boredom that accompanied occupation duty. There seemed to be a lot of time for doing nothing, and there was little training for the former combat units. Lowering morale remained a constant threat to the good order and dis‑ cipline of soldiers stationed in Germany. It was very important that the PX and the Special Services work overtime to supply the GIs. To assist in these efforts the USO provided as much top-tier entertainment as possible. Sergeant George was ordered to take a detail from the squadron to prepare for the arrival of a Bob Hope USO show, and his men were happy to have something productive to do. George wrote to his parents, “You have heard


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of ‘sweeping the front yard’ haven’t you? Well, we really did that for three days before the scheduled performance. We swept and swept, then had to get the stage all set, pull stumps so the trucks could get into the area, get the loud speakers set up, a new piano, so all in all it took quite a lot of work to get the setting ready for him.”10 After the show for five thousand GIs, Bob Hope, Dale Rogers (wife of the famed cowboy star Roy Rogers), Jerry Colonna, and three young women came to George’s mess hall to have lunch with the troops. For days after the USO show, according to Sergeant George’s letters, morale stayed at a good level. A number of men got passes to visit Paris, Brussels, and London, and at times there were more troops on passes than were present for duty. A month after George saw the Bob Hope USO show, the same group of Hollywood stars entertained in Sergeant Linzy’s area. He was singularly unimpressed with Hope and the show, telling his wife, “Some of their stuff was good and some was just plain silly.”11 Time was wearing thin for the veterans. The European and Pacific theaters struggled with their own problems, but the AES had to deal with the important aspects of the postwar mili‑ tary, such as the reality of large-scale demobilization in the United States. The Army did not want to repeat the chaotic conditions that appeared after World War I. To maintain good order and discipline the Army des‑ ignated a number of camps as demobilization centers where paperwork was completed, equipment cleaned and turned in, medical examinations conducted, and men released from Army service back into civilian life. A good case in point is Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, which was opened in 1942 as a center for processing troops for overseas duty. A full Engineer General Service Regiment was ordered to Camp Kilmer to build what would become the largest center for overseas processing and eventual de‑ mobilization in the United States Army by 1945. The process of demobilization was a slow one, with troops remaining at Camp Kilmer until everything was complete. The exchange system and the Special Services had to provide for the troops, trying hard to keep them on post until all processing was completed. Many of the troops arriving at Camp Kilmer had been deployed to North Africa and Italy in 1942 and 1943 and had not been in the United States for several years. The war was

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over, their time in the Army was short, and there was a tendency for some soldiers just to wander away from the camp, going absent without leave, or AWOL, a punishable offense. Every soldier who walked down a ship’s gangplank received a PX ra‑ tion card and a booklet prepared by Camp Kilmer’s Special Services and then was transported to large barracks. Once they saw their new home, the troops were marched to a special mess hall for feeding. Depending on the individual soldier’s reaction to seasickness and conditions on the troop ships, some of them had not eaten in many days, and a good meal with solid ground beneath their feet was welcomed. The next day the wait for space in the processing procedure began. The PX at Camp Kilmer maintained a large main exchange with small‑ er branches scattered throughout the camp. The smaller branches kept a stock of candy bars, gum, cookies, toilet articles, cigarettes, magazines, and some gift items. The sale of cigarettes was strictly controlled through the buff-colored PX ration card. Four PXs operated a laundry, tailoring, and uniform repair service, and the soldier could buy extra ribbons, chev‑ rons, and other decorations, but those four exchanges could not offer the service of sewing them on. The Special Services Clubs, in connection with the exchanges, had women civilian volunteers sew on what the soldier needed after the presentation of orders for the ranks and unit patches. The PX had one branch for the sale of officers’ clothing and insignia. The main PX and the branch exchanges had a barbershop, which did a brisk business since troops could not leave Camp Kilmer unless uniforms and haircuts met strict Army standards. Since post and unit policy discouraged passes, the exchange opened four GI beer halls serving premium and local brands of 3.2 beer. On train‑ ing bases the PX beer hall was usually in a very plain, makeshift wooden building, but at Camp Kilmer each beer hall had a separate theme: Gay ’90s, the Barn, the Circus, and the Pirates’ Den. The theme beer hall prob‑ ably did not mean a lot to a large group of returning GIs, but it was done to add some semblance of ambience for troops who really could not leave the post on a pass. The PX sustained through beer and food allocations an officers’ club and a noncommissioned officers’ club and an officers’ restaurant called the Victory Room, located across from the officers’ Post Exchange. There were three main Service Clubs on post, and there was athletic equipment available for individuals and units wanting to have a


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baseball or football game. For the Army Exchange Service and the Special Services this was a massive undertaking that did well for the returning troops.12 There were limits as to what the PX could provide at Camp Kilmer. Officers and enlisted men were discouraged from using exchange snack bars and clubs as their primary source of food. The troop areas contained a number of large mess halls where both officers and enlisted men were to be fed. The only difference between officers and enlisted men in the mess halls was that the rank-and-file GIs were required to bring their own knives, forks, and spoons from their mess kits, while officers were charged twentyfive cents per meal for the use of mess hall utensils. After hours, however, if a GI wanted a hamburger or a Coca-Cola or a beer, the exchanges were ready. The camp was under the control of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps, and they maintained an on-post bus system to take GIs to the vari‑ ous facilities offered by the exchange and the Service Clubs. Once the lengthy process of demobilization was complete and the sol‑ dier was ready to leave Camp Kilmer, he was advised to make one last visit to the PX to get his cigarettes, candy, toilet articles, and chewing gum for the trip home. Before they boarded buses or troop trains, their buffcolored PX card was collected because the discharged soldiers would no longer be authorized to use exchange facilities.13 Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, was a prime example of the Army Exchange Service in action. In its existence as a processing center for overseas de‑ ployment and as a demobilization station, the camp processed two and a half million GIs, and it was the largest of the Army’s processing centers in World War II. The PXs that existed on other posts offered the same services, but not on the massive scale as Camp Kilmer. The organization of the exchange system with a main exchange and branch exchanges, four beer halls, and the like took into consideration the needs of the troops at a time when boredom and waiting could have worked against good order and discipline. In the European theater the exchange system needed a two-pronged ap‑ proach to supply the troops. It was important to push PX goods forward to units in Germany and Austria, and it was equally important to set up a series of exchanges that would serve those units and individuals moving to port areas, especially in France, for the trip back to the United States for demobilization or reassignment. Unit cohesion was vitally important in

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the movement to the west to the ports, but to move entire units took time and required frequent stops along the way. The journey from Darmstadt, Germany, to Marseilles, France, under‑ taken by Sergeant William George can serve as an example. From his base in Germany he traveled to Reims, France, where he observed, “Gee this is a wonderful assembly area. We have a nice PX just next door to us and can get cokes and ice cream anytime we want it. I am just about filled up on them now.” While he waited for transportation to his next destination, George told his parents that as long as the PX continued its good ser‑ vice, he was content just to wait, and added in a letter that it was “almost like being in the states.” Once in a camp outside of Marseilles, Sergeant George continued to wait for his name to appear on a ship’s manifest for departure, and he told his parents that they had a good PX, and “I guess we should be happy.”14 George left his unit in Germany about September 10, and by October 10 he was still sitting in an assembly area awaiting as‑ signment to a ship. He wondered if he would leave for the United States before 1946. He did, and returned home to North Little Rock before Christmas 1945. Sergeant Linzy found himself in late August assigned to the 69th In‑ fantry Division, and he was back in England at the port of Southampton awaiting his ship back home. In late September he arrived at Camp Kilmer and then went to Camp Robinson, Arkansas, for final separation. He too would spend Christmas with his wife and kinfolk. Warrant Officer Paul Wesely of Washington, D.C., who had such an expensive dinner in Paris, was not so lucky. Being in a harbor-craft unit in France, his services were needed in the European theater, and he would not see Christmas 1945 in the United States. Elmer Franzman’s family in Cannelton, Indiana, would not have their son, Master Sergeant Elmer Franzman, home by Christ‑ mas, either. Sergeant Will C. Johnson of the 104th Infantry Regiment left Czechoslovakia and was able to return home to Nettleton, Mississippi, for Christmas dinner, as was Captain William Hurt of Halls, Tennessee, who was happy to leave Japan. Hurt had bitter memories of the bloody battles in New Guinea and in the Philippines and could not bring himself to rec‑ oncile with the Japanese. While the veterans left Europe for home, the exchange system contin‑ ued to provide for the troops under a very different set of circumstances. The impact of so many GIs in Europe and in Asia was great and long


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lasting. Nowhere was this so apparent than in England and Germany, and eventually Japan. England, however, offers an interesting set of circum‑ stances that still resonate today. There was no question that England had been battered by war, first with the daring rescue of British forces from the beaches of Dunkirk and then with the merciless Battle of Britain in which British towns and cities were bombarded by the German Luftwaffe and the question of victory or defeat rested with a handful of Royal Air Force pilots, a determined British government led by Winston Churchill, and a staunch population that withstood the worst of the blitz. Into that mix, after Pearl Harbor came a flood of American GIs whose country many English reckoned came to the war two years late. The GIs were brash young men who trained for combat or flew costly combat mis‑ sions over France and Germany. The vast majority of the Americans had never been out of their home states, let alone in a foreign nation, and while the Americans and British could communicate with a common lan‑ guage, sort of, it was clear that they were two separate peoples. When the United States entered the war in December 1941, the Office of War Information published unrealistic expectations as to what Ameri‑ can consumers could expect as far as the availability of food was concerned. In September 1942 the newsletter of the OWI stated that the proposed allocation for the following year would be 130 pounds of meat, including beef, mutton, veal, and lamb, at a rate of 2.5 pounds per week. Accord‑ ing to the newsletter, what caused American rationing was the necessity of sending meats to the armies and to the Allies. In late October 1942 the OWI newsletter warned that if one wanted to feed pets any meats, it would have to come from the meats rationed under the system.15 Within a year reality set in, and the rosy picture of American abun‑ dance began to fade as millions of men and women poured into training camps or were deployed to the combat theaters. As in the British rationing system, canned fruits, vegetables, and especially meats began to disappear from the grocers’ shelves. The Office of War Information in 1943 issued a monthly newsletter, the Home Front, which told American citizens that “tin and steel are needed for war purposes” and that the home front could use their ration coupons to buy fresh meats when they were available. Citi‑ zens were urged to plant “victory gardens” to supply fresh items and to re‑ duce the demand for anything canned. The Home Front stated, “America’s kitchens have gone to war. Every housewife is in the line of battle against

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the axis. Her weapons are waste cooking fats. With these she can stop tanks, sink ships, demolish bridges.” Home-canned fruits and vegetables could be donated to school lunch programs, up to fifty quarts per school year.16 There was a also constant struggle against hoarding and against an American black market. In the snack bars of the PXs in the United States hamburgers and hot dogs were continuously available, and in Army mess halls GIs were fed balanced meals. This was the background of the GIs that came into England in 1942 and 1943. Historian Mark Roodhouse has written that while Britain’s agricultural production went up during the war, the nation still relied on imports of such things as beef, fats, sugar, and flour. Canned goods such as fruits could not be had in England. He points out that while there was grum‑ bling over rationing, the system did allow for reasonable consumption. The British bought large quantities of tobacco, especially from the United States, but there were strict controls on the distribution of cigarettes and tobacco in England. In 1942 the British weekly allowance of bacon or ham was four ounces, eight ounces of cheese, eight ounces of sugar, and two ounces of tea.17 This would be the climate into which the American GIs came, and it would be hard for them to really understand the dire circumstances in Britain. And the attitudes of GIs and the availability of food and comfort items such as candy, cigarettes, soaps, and the like still resonate in popu‑ lar culture today in Britain. For example, in 2001 British ITV presented a series called Foyle’s War, which ran for six seasons. In one episode the Americans arrived near Hastings, where Foyle was a police inspector, to build a camp. The American camp commander organized a dance with re‑ freshments for his GIs and local girls. When Foyle’s driver, a young woman in the Motor Transport Corps, went to the dance she was shocked at the abundance of sandwiches, cakes, soft drinks, and punch prepared for the GIs. Inspector Foyle, very much aware of shortages in England, looked upon the display with disapproval. There were concerns by British officials and representatives of the U.S. armed forces that there could be serious complications arising from this influx of well-paid (by British standards) and well-supplied American sol‑ diers. Of course, London would be a magnet for GIs when their training or air missions allowed them some free time to visit the city. The lord mayor of London and the chairman of the London City Council, work‑


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ing with the Special Services of the European theater of operations staff, prepared for the GIs a booklet about the city that contained a warning: “Food, clothing and sweets (candy to you) are, with rare exceptions re‑ ferred to later in this book, rationed; and rationing severely limits our hospitality to you. London is acutely sensitive of her seeming lack of lib‑ erality; but rationing does not apply less strictly in London than elsewhere in the kingdom. . . . The men and the women and the means are simply not there to irradiate the atmosphere of civility which was the happy lot of the peacetime tourist.”18 The same booklet pointed out that the American Red Cross operated sixteen locations for accommodations, two of which were set aside for women serving in the U.S. Army. The YMCA and the YWCA also main‑ tained places where GIs could stay and eat while in the city. It was pointed out that items such as candies, soap, cigarettes, food, and the like were strictly rationed for the English people and required rationing coupons. In other words, GIs were not to impose on the English people when such items were available to them through American sources such as the PX, the Red Cross, and agencies of the USO. This was very wise advice, because there were problems with the influx of so many GIs. One British housewife whose son was serving in the Brit‑ ish army recorded her feelings while a member of the Women’s Voluntary Service serving in a canteen near American bases. When asked if she no‑ ticed large numbers of local Lancashire girls congregating near the can‑ teen, she wrote, “No, but we have not had Scotties or Australians before. We were warned of the queer attraction they—and the Americans too— have for young girls.”19 This woman had every reason to be concerned, and she would have been especially outraged had she seen some of the letters going back to the United States. One GI serving in the Army Air Force wrote back to a soldier friend in the United States, “Went out with an English gal the other night, and they are something. They haven’t got that old life like a few girls I know back home . . . so over here you have to be damned careful and over here we have to . . . [here the Army censor blacked out the vulgarity] in the fields there’s no rooms like back in New York. I have plenty of women over here . . . more than enough.”20 Historian Ian Whitehead has pointed out that by 1942, “the [ration‑ ing] screw was tightened still further” in Britain. Given the number of GIs pouring into England, there was a need to billet many of them with

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British families, and the government encouraged opening British homes to the American GIs. As has been pointed out elsewhere, “One incentive for the Brits to participate in the hospitality program was the shortage of produce, meats, baking goods, and diary products. Soldiers were instruct‑ ed by the Army to bring rationed goods to their hosts, including hardto-find meats and sweets.” If American soldiers were warned about the strict nature of British rationing and told not to impose on that system, where were they to find such items? They could try to convince a unit mess sergeant to surrender meat and butter for the greater good of the war effort, they could raid the unit’s supplies, or they could buy a goodly portion of things like candies, gum, cigarettes, and such from the local Post Exchange. Some units did indeed make food items available. One GI showed up at an Ipswich family’s home with a seven-pound tin of corned beef, a present for their hospitality.21 It was advised, however, that British families who opened their homes to GIs should not bring out the monthly whiskey ration because it was possible that the Americans, unused to such rationing, could finish the bottle in one sitting. The youth and swagger of the GI, his pay, at least three times higher than a British soldier’s pay, and the availability of hard-to-get goods in the Post Exchange made for an attractive mix in Britain. A new term came into the American lexicon: war bride. Of course, there were many fac‑ tors that prompted marriages between GIs and British girls (just as there would be in postwar Germany, France, and Japan). But it appears that there can be little doubt that the abundance that many GIs openly dis‑ played attracted young women. One historian has noted, “The American invasion struck the British Isles like a huge Technicolor bomb, scattering nylons, and cigarettes, and candy and goodwill over the whole country.”22 It would be unfair and inaccurate to say that what GIs had from the Post Exchanges was the sole reason for the intense feelings between GIs and British women. Young, vital, their whole world shaped by a great world war, the vast majority simply fell in love. General Joseph Byron made his thirty-six thousand–mile inspection of Post Exchanges in 1943. Colonel Frank Kerr conducted his visits in 1944, and both resulted in an expansion of exchange activities and offerings. The idea that “the GI will get his fair share” of what he or she enjoyed in civilian life was certainly well meaning and very patriotic, but it did have


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unforeseen consequences. The opening of the Red Cross, YMCA, and YWCA facilities in England and then in France and Germany, and later in Japan, reinforced the view that American soldiers were too generously supplied with all that they had back in the United States. The Red Cross reported to Scotland Yard that cigarettes had been stolen, and high-value goods were stolen from the exchanges as well. Nothing, however, that oc‑ curred in England could match the growth of the black market in France and later in Germany. Regardless of what happened at the end of World War II, it did not mean the end of the Post Exchange. The Office of the Quartermaster General was content to allow the PX to continue because it had enough to contend with. The war ended in Germany in May 1945, late for farmers to begin their work plowing the fields, if indeed the fields were cleared of shells, mines, and destroyed vehicles. The mass destruction extended from Normandy into Germany, then into Austria, with vast sec‑ tions of Italy also having extensive destruction. While those dire circum‑ stances were being dealt with by other Allied authorities, the PX had to function to supply GIs who had become a constabulary force. The U.S. Army was not hesitant to be open about the growing black market and civilian demands for American comfort items. In less than a year there were Post Exchanges at every American base providing for the occupation force what the wartime GIs got. By the spring of 1946 American dependents began to arrive in Europe, and the focus of the PX had to adjust to meet that demand. The GI newspaper Stars and Stripes constantly reported on the exchanges, that is, what they were offering and at what cost. In April 1946 the exchanges in Europe announced that the price of cigarettes would be raised from ten cents to twelve cents, with the additional profits being used to buy household items in the United States for sale in the PXs. A month later the European theater exchange told the Stars and Stripes that the standard items in the PXs would also see a slight increase in price.23 The PX ration card controlled matches, toothpaste, laundry and bath soaps, shaving cream, cigarettes, razor blades, candy bars, chewing gum, and coffee. The old problems of rationing and the availability of ciga‑ rettes surfaced in 1945 when the exchanges stated that GIs could buy ten packs of cigarettes per week, but four of those ten packs would have to be economy brands. When complaints were heard from the units in the field,

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the quartermaster explained that those cheaper brands were ordered dur‑ ing the war by calendar-year quarter; they were shipped, and they would not be wasted. This was a problem for the exchange system because it had to clear the shelves of the cigarettes already sent to the European theater. Colonel Robert J. Marshburn, chief of the exchange system, reported that by the new year of 1946, the exchanges would be offered cartons of ten packs of the most popular brands and that seventy million packs were on their way from the United States.24 General Eisenhower authorized the European quartermaster to use the cigarettes earmarked for free distribu‑ tion with the wartime combat rations to keep the exchange stock available for GIs to purchase. It was no secret that many of the GIs who did not want cigarettes, candy, or chewing gum used their ration cards to buy for soldier friends. Everyone was aware of the value of a bar of soap, a candy bar, a pack of razor blades, or a pack of cigarettes with the deprived civilian popula‑ tion. Waiters in restaurants frequented by GIs made a good deal of money by taking cigarette butts and tearing them open, extracting the tobacco. Resale of the tobacco was brisk because the price of a pack of American cigarettes on the black market was well above what a civilian could afford. It was reported that a waiter in Vienna made nearly one thousand dol‑ lars by collecting cigarette butts and selling them on the Viennese black market. Prostitution also became a problem in both Europe and in Japan, with a rising venereal disease rate. Sex was traded for candy bars, coffee, and cigarettes openly in the destroyed cities and towns. In late 1945 Post Exchange officials in Vienna found that many of their items, especially cigarettes, candy of all types, and razor blades, had been stolen. The thieves broke into the exchange warehouse, took the items out of their large containers, and then filled the empty boxes with sawdust and rocks. This meant that hundreds of thousands of packs of cigarettes, candy bars, and other items had disappeared onto the black market. The fourteen thousand GIs in Vienna found that their rations of candy were cut in half and that half of the weekly cigarette ration had to be in the less than popular brands.25 No one believed that the black market or prostitution could be stopped, but steps had to be taken to curb those activities. Military police and Army criminal investigators were heavily involved with other, more criti‑


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cal, Army occupation issues, and the German police were in their postwar formative phase and could be of minimal help. The tasks were overwhelming for GIs and Germans in 1945 and 1946, and it was not at all clear what the future of Europe would be. Many GIs who had contact with the Russians found very quickly that the Russian troops, who were quite friendly in the first blush of victory, were cold and distant. Russian officers assigned to deal with the Americans and British were becoming very difficult in meetings over the future face of Europe. Occupation troops would be in Germany for quite some time, and the Army Exchange Service had to support them. The same problems faced GIs in the occupation of Japan, and there they also found the power of the candy bar, soap, razor blades, and cigarettes. In Japan, however, there was a hesitancy to broadcast problems in theft and in the rise of the black market. In Paris a pack of American cigarettes fetched $1.50 on the black mar‑ ket, and in Austria a pack brought $2.70. The same packs cost $0.12 in the Post Exchange.26 Where did all these black-market packs come from? There were two sources: thieves and shipments of cartons from relatives and friends back in the United States. The main Frankfurt warehouse for quartermaster and exchange items was broken into in February 1946 by a gang of German thieves who stole fifteen thousand cartons of cigarettes, the entire allocation for one week for a U.S. division.27 American-made candies also appeared in large numbers on the black market, as did soap. Commanders, including General Lucius Clay, were determined to stop the continual influx of cigarettes from civilians in the United States. The free flow of money through the black market corrupted not only Germans, French, and Austrians but also some of the GIs. It was estimated that in Berlin one thousand cartons of cigarettes sent from the United States were available for resale on the black market. The remedy was threefold: stop the entry of cigarettes into Europe by inspection or the imposition of cus‑ toms duties on those cartons sent, prosecute both American and German offenders, and secure and stabilize shipments to the Post Exchanges and increase the numbers of packs available for the GIs. All three remedies were applied, and slowly the power of the black market decreased. The decrease was also due to the slow rebuilding process, and as recovery crept along until the Marshall Plan was implemented, wages and goods became

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more available to civilians. The Post Exchange in Europe, Asia, the United States, and anywhere American military personnel were stationed became a permanent fixture and remains so today. There were some amusing aspects to the transition from wartime to occupation duty. An American ship anchored in Philippine waters held 830 tons of beer that had been designated for exchanges in the Pacific theater of operations. A civilian commission in the United States declared the beer to be surplus and offered the cargo for sale to a foreign coun‑ try. The unnamed ship arrived off the coast of the Philippine Islands in 1946 and remained anchored awaiting off-loading, but it was decided in Washington that since fresher beer for GIs on occupation duty had already arrived in Pacific ports, this beer would then be offered for sale to any non-U.S. organization. The beer was sold, but there is no record of who actually bought the large amount of beer. At least the beer was not poured into the ocean.28 Stabilization and security were the keys to the success of the Post Ex‑ changes in Europe and in Asia. It also had to be recognized that while combat troops were coming home in large numbers, American troops were arriving to carry on the many tasks of occupation. The PX had to be as active as it had been in wartime. In looking at occupation duty the exchanges were important, and the other morale branch, the Special Ser‑ vices Division, continued its operations as well. While much of the Army entered the process of demobilization, the exchanges and the Special Services actually increased their number of personnel. In July 1945 the Army Service Forces decided that a course for Special Services personnel at Lexington, Virginia, would not be closed but would be expanded.29 It was correctly thought that if the posts overseas offered a well-stocked exchange and Service Clubs with many activities for the GIs on post, mo‑ rale would rise and the number of negative incidents would decrease. There still remained the problem of getting the number of supplies to the troops, via the exchanges and Special Services. The Office of the Quar‑ termaster General would become a place where every type of shipping would be sought to carry needed supplies to Europe and to Asia. The enormity of supplying troops in Europe and in Asia was stagger‑ ing. For example, the Office of the Quartermaster General reported that on civilian ships in April 1947, 21,920 packages of chewing gum and an equal number of packages containing gumdrops and cigarettes arrived for


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American forces serving in Germany.30 The same report noted that more than 1.3 million pounds of dried peas and more than 4 million pounds of dried skim milk and many other subsistence items in huge quantities were delivered to the troops. Many of the incoming supplies were designated for Post Exchange sale. The same situation existed in occupied Japan, and the quartermaster recÂ� ords show that for August 1947, 193,000 packs of cigarettes and almost 4,000 packs of pipe tobacco arrived in Japan, a goodly portion designated for exchange sales. By November 1947 the quartermaster general reported that 6.5 million packs of cigarettes had arrived in Japan, obviously for ra‑ tions and for the exchanges.31 Mixed into the items necessary to feed the troops a well-balanced and, depending on the mess sergeants, tasty meal were exchange items such as mixed nuts, candy, chewing gum, and com‑ mercial cough drops—all of the PX standbys for GIs. Unfortunately for the GIs in Germany, someone in the Office of the Quartermaster General contracted for more than 300,000 packs of Dia‑ mond-brand cigarettes. They had to be either held for rations or sold in the Post Exchanges at a time when soldiers were complaining about the quality of the so-called economy brands that had to be a part of their weekly exchange ration. Conditions in France, Germany, and Austria were such that even by 1947 there was little that could be locally purchased for the Army mess system or for the exchanges. Household items were shipped from the United States for the growing number of dependents. Larger numbers of troops in Europe resulting in a growing demand by GIs on occupation duty led to an enlargement of the exchange system. In January 1948, for example, the quartermaster general reported 1.3 million five-cent candy bars, 168,000 chocolate Hershey bars, 1.8 million packs of cigarettes, and 258,000 packages of Orbits and Clark chewing gum (on one ship, the Hoosier State).32 The amount of comfort items for the troops pales when one considers the millions of pounds of sugar, wheat, flour, canned or dried fruit and meats, and other commodities that poured into Europe and into Japan. Some U.S. civilian ships even carried rice to Japan for use in the mess halls. But the greatest expansion was yet to come, as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated. A major change for the PX occurred on September 18, 1947, when the U.S. Air Force was created. Up to that date the Army Exchange Service served ground and air personnel, and when the Air Force was founded it

160


was decided to maintain a single exchange service for both the Army and the Air Force that eliminated duplication of management and procure‑ ment. The Air Force decided to use the name Base Exchange to reflect the fact that there were now air bases while the Army retained the Post Exchange designation. The Base Exchange served the uniform needs of the newly created Air Force, which decided to have a blue uniform with its own distinctive badges. In 1948 the new name of this organization be‑ came the Army Air Force Exchange Service. Events in Europe and eventually Asia would have a long-lasting and dramatic impact on all American military commitments overseas. In 1947 President Harry Truman appointed retired Army chief of staff General George C. Marshall as secretary of state. Marshall was well aware of condi‑ tions in Europe and in Asia and was determined to do what was possible to assist in recovery. He was concerned about deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and felt that American assistance was of primary importance to keep Western Europe from falling into the Soviet orbit. In working with President Truman and Congress, Marshall drew up the European Recovery Program, or the Marshall Plan, signed by the president on April 3, 1947. The Soviet Union reacted strongly to the American initiative and began to pressure American forces in Berlin to withdraw from the battered city. Reports from the U.S. military had indi‑ cated for some time that the Russians were interfering with supplies going into the city, and on June 24, 1948, the Russians closed Berlin to Allied travel and supply. The decision was made to supply the two million Berliners by air, dar‑ ing the Russians to stop it. It took fifteen hundred tons of food, fuel, and medical supplies to sustain the population through the Berlin air lift. The air lift, while successful, pointed out the need to deal with a changing diplomatic and military situation. On April 4, 1949, the United States en‑ tered into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to defend Western Eu‑ rope, and this meant that more American combat troops would be going to Germany to train and prepare for any possible Russian attack. For the Army and now the Air Force Exchange Service it was an opportunity to expand services for the troops stationed in Europe. There were numerous quartermaster bases and air bases in England and France that would main‑ tain a flow of supplies to combat units forward deployed in Germany.


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By 1949 and 1950 there were increases in shipments to the European Command containing the standard items for the exchanges that were ex‑ panding to meet the demands of troop deployments.33 Every ship that arrived in Europe contained PX supplies, but unlike the World War II exchange stock, civilian clothes for soldiers and dependents, housewares, furniture, automobile accessories, and much more were offered to a new type of customer. The buff-colored ration card remained in effect for the purchase of cigarettes, coffee, candies, and the like. There were some prob‑ lems in the procurement system, however, when someone in the Office of the Quartermaster General sent almost a half-million packages of Red Label– and Diamond-brand economy cigarettes to the exchanges and to warehouses containing combat rations. The GI complaint was loud and quick. Asia was not forgotten by the exchange service, and PX supplies flowed into places where American troops were stationed. In one shipment to Japan, in addition to massive food supplies for Army messes, there were almost 104,000 candy bars, 700,000 rolls of peppermint candies, 1.2 mil‑ lion packs of cigarettes, more than 300,00 packages of smoking and pipe tobacco, and nearly 1 million packages of chewing gum.34 This was a far cry from the sutler’s tent of the Civil War, the YMCA hut of the Great War, and the makeshift wooden buildings on training bases in the United States and the combat-zone tents of World War II. The success belonged to General Joseph W. Byron, Colonel Frank Kerr, and the rest of the Army Exchange Service that built the PX into an institution that all soldiers and airmen came to rely on for those comfort items that made training and combat more bearable. In December 1945 Major General Byron formally decorated Colonel Frank Kerr’s contribution to the Army Exchange Service and to the Spe‑ cial Services Division by awarding him the Legion of Merit Medal. Kerr was recognized for his outstanding service in maintaining high morale in the Army during World War II. He had been a natural selection to take over the AES when Byron took command of Special Services because he was outspoken and more aggressive than Byron had been in expanding the offerings of the exchanges for GIs and for WACs. Both Byron and Kerr made the Post Exchange a part of Army life, especially when lengthy

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occupation duty became a reality. The exchange was a link to home for the GIs serving in what could be boring occupation duty in countries so obviously ravaged by war. In 1946 Major General Joseph W. Byron left the service of his coun‑ try, having been decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal for his work in making the Army Exchange Service an integral part of every GI’s life during the war and to the occupation of Germany and Austria. Mrs. Douglas MacArthur had chosen to do her Christmas shopping in 1945 in the main PX in Manila, and the ordering of flowers was brisk for overseas GIs. After five years of service, thirty-six thousand miles of inspections in 1943, and planning for continual expansion of the entire exchange system into the world’s largest chain department store, and thereby expanding Special Services, Byron returned to his business and civic interests. While on vacation by automobile, on April 12, 1951, Byron was taken ill and died. He did not live to see the important work that the PX did during the Korean War to Vietnam and beyond. Byron was typical of the business‑ men and -women who gave up their personal and civic lives to serve the nation in World War II. It would not surprise General Byron to see Post Exchanges that today resemble upscale civilian shopping malls selling ev‑ erything from television sets and gasoline to stylish clothes and, of course, candy, chewing gum, and beer.

Notes

Introduction 1. Paul E. Wesely to the Crouch family of Washington, D.C., Rouen, France, May 3 and May 12, 1945, Wesely Letters, author’s personal collection. 2. Kenneth Lummer diary, April 19, 1945, author’s personal collection. 3. James J. Cooke, “The Songs behind the Stars and Stripes,” 60–63. 4. See also American Red Cross, What Can I Do to Help? 5. William E. George to his parents, Sicily, November 3, 1943, George Letters, author’s personal collection. 6. Charles B. Linzy to his wife, France, June 29, 1944, Linzy Letters and Pa‑ pers, author’s personal collection.

1. From the Sutler’s Tent 1. Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 2. 2. See Regulations of the Army of the United States, 1913, Corrected to April 15, 1917, 1917. 3. Eustace Fielder to Mother, Camp Joseph E. Johnston, May 30, 1918; Field‑ er to Father, June 3, 1918, Fielder Letters, 1918–1919, courtesy of Mrs. Gail Fielder Andrews. 4. Frederick Palmer, Newton Baker: America at War, 2:4. 5. For problems in supplying the AEF, see Phyllis A. Zimmerman, The Neck of the Bottle. 6. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Washington, May 11, 1918, RG 165, Records of the War Department, General Staff. 7. Memorandum, May 13, 1918, Records Group (RG) 112, Records of the Office of the Surgeon General, Carton 296. 8. Memorandum for the Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1918, ibid. 9. Albert M. Ettinger and A. Churchill Ettinger, A Doughboy with the Fighting 69th, 175; Robert H. Ferrell, ed., A Soldier in World War I: The Diary of Elmer W. Sherwood, 53. 163

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N ot e s to Pag e s 16–26

10. James J. Cooke, The All-Americans at War: The 82nd Division in the Great War, 1917–1918, 52. 11. Fielder to his parents, France, November 2, 1918, Fielder Letters; Ferrell, Soldier in World War I, 98. 12. Martin Hogan, The Shamrock Battalion in the Great War (1919), 75. 13. Arlen J. Hanson, Gentlemen Volunteers, 121–22. 14. Hogan, Shamrock Battalion, 65–66. 15. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, 2:40. 16. Cooke, All-Americans at War, 67. 17. Robert H. Ferrell, America’s Deadliest Battle: Meuse-Argonne, 1918, 71–72. 18. Horace L. Baker, Argonne Days in World War I, 99. 19. Cooke, All-Americans at War, 100. 20. Ibid., 120. 21. Hogan, Shamrock Battalion, 122. 22. Ferrell, Soldier in World War I, 245. 23. Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, General Doughboy and Five Other Generals: A Modern Legend of the Rhine, 5. 24. Memorandum for the Director, Supply Division, General Staff, Washing‑ ton, D.C., November 1, 1920, RG 165, Records of the War Department, General and Special Staff, Carton 190. 25. James G. Harbord, Leaves from a War Diary, 373; Ferrell, Soldier in World War I, 134–35. 26. R. J. Reynolds Company to War Department, Winston-Salem, N.C., June 26, 1919, RG 92, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Purchase and Subsistence Division, Entry 4322, Carton 511. 27. Memorandum from the Quartermaster General to the Quartermaster 1st Corps Area (Boston), Washington, D.C., April 11, 1923, ibid. 28. Memorandum from the Quartermaster General to the Adjutant General of the Army, March 1, 1924, ibid. For a detailed analysis of the Office of the Quartermaster General, see Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army, 1775– 1939.

2. Preparedness and War 1. Memorandum, Headquarters, American Red Cross, Washington, D.C., May 26, 1927, RG 200, Records of the American Red Cross, Group 2, Carton 422. 2. Inter-Office Letter, St. Louis, Missouri, July 7, 1937, and February 15, 1940, ibid., Carton 660. 3. Forest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942, 80. 4. For a recent study, see John Kennedy Ohl, Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII.

N ot e s to Pag e s 2 7–40

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5. See U.S. Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, A Report on Army Special Services Activities and Facilities to Nonmilitary Cooperating Agencies. 6. Memorandum by Byron, Washington, D.C., August 27, 1943, RG 160, Re‑ cords of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196, Carton 27; ibid., January 9, 1943, Carton 125. 7. Ibid., August 27, 1943, Carton 127. 8. Memorandum by Major J. C. Danley, Finance Division, AES, ca. March 1942, ibid., Entry 196A, Carton 139. 9. Memorandum by Chairman Fowler Harper, Washington, D.C., March 7, 1942, RG 225, Records of the President’s War Relief Control Board, Entry 32055, Carton 103. 10. Memorandum by Major General Richard Donovan, Dallas, Texas, January 26, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 138. 11. Memorandum by Captain Robert Engel, Patterson Field, Ohio, Septem‑ ber 22, 1942, ibid., Carton 121. 12. Harper Sibley to Joseph Davies, Washington, D.C., February 7, 1942, RG 225, Records of Presidential Committees and Boards, Entry 32055, Carton 228. 13. Ibid., February 27, 1942. 14. Advance Release, Office of War Information, Washington, D.C., Decem‑ ber 30, 1942, RG 200, Records of the American Red Cross, Carton 660. 15. Circular from the AES, Washington, D.C., January 2, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 131, Carton 29. 16. Lieutenant Colonel Cornell Smith, AES, to J. H. Powell, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1942, ibid., Carton 110. 17. Memorandum by Clay, Washington, D.C., December 5, 1942, ibid. 18. Office of Economic Warfare, Supply of Beer . . . , ca. 1945, ibid., Entry 131, Carton 252. 19. Memorandum, AES, Conflict in Army and Navy Procurement of Con‑ tainers, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1944, ibid., Carton 247. 20. Memorandum, AES, Washington, D.C., ca. August 1943, ibid. 21. Memorandum for Byron, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1942, ibid., Car‑ ton 30. 22. Karl A. Gardner to Colonel Lawhorn, New York City, July 13, 1942, ibid., Carton 121. 23. Memorandum by Clay, Washington, D.C., December 5, 1942, ibid., Car‑ ton 125. 24. Memorandum by Byron, Washington, D.C., January 9, 1943, ibid. 25. Memorandum to Commanding General, 4th Corps Area, Birmingham, Alabama, July 6, 1942, ibid., Entry 196A, Carton 139. 26. Memorandum, Headquarters, 4th Service Command, Atlanta, Georgia, July 6, 1942, ibid.

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27. Memorandum, Army Exchange Service to Commanding General, Fort Lewis, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1942, ibid.

Regulations and Agreements 1. Linzy to his wife, Shreveport, Louisiana, August 2, August 22, and August 23, 1943, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 2. War Department Circular 98, Washington, D.C., January 5, 1943, RG 165, Records of the War Department, General Staff, Entry 196A, NM25, Carton 138. 3. Briefing by Byron, Washington, D.C., September 28, 1943, ibid., Carton 241. 4. Ibid. 5. New York Times, May 28, 1943, ibid. 6. Byron to Chief of Staff, Service of Supply, Washington, D.C., January 9, 1943, ibid., Carton 125. 7. Kerwin M. Treusch to Gardner, Washington, D.C., March 29, 1943, ibid., Carton 122. 8. Gardner to Treusch, New York, ibid. 9. AES, Bulletin No. 10, Washington, D.C., February 22, 1943, ibid., Carton 125 (emphasis in the original). 10. V-Mail from Corporal G. E. Yohe, en route to Hawaii, to Mildred Collins, author’s personal collection. 11. Memorandum from Colonel Vincent Wadden, Washington, D.C., August 19, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Carton 23. 12. Plan submitted by Wadden to Russell Mathews in the War Department, Washington, D.C., August 20, 1943, ibid. 13. War Department brochure, This Is Our War (1943), author’s personal col‑ lection. 14. Lieutenant Commander W. D. Thompson to Commander J. L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C., April 22, 1943, RG 225, Records of Presidential Committees and Boards, Carton 44; Bertha Stone to Reynolds, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1943, ibid. 15. John Schoolcraft to Reynolds, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1943, ibid. 16. Linzy to his wife, Camp Polk, Louisiana, September 5, 1943, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 17. Ibid., October 4, 1943. 18. Memorandum, Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C., July 10, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Carton 123. 19. Memorandum, South Pacific Fleet, Washington, D.C., August 2, 1943, ibid., Carton 241. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid.


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22. Memorandum for General Byron from Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1943, ibid. 23. Edward Dubinsky to War Department, St. Louis, Missouri, February 12, 1942, ibid., Carton 342; memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sharpe, Omaha, Nebraska, March 4, 1942, ibid. 24. Byron to W. B. Andrews, Washington, D.C., February 7, 1944, ibid. 25. Master Sergeant Elmer Franzman to his parents, Sicily, December 4 and December 21, 1943, Franzman Family Letters, author’s personal collection. 26. Linzy to his wife, England, November 11, 1943, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 27. Memorandum for Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Kerr, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Carton 124.

4. Expansion and Shortages, 1943–1944 1. George to his parents, France, November 5 and November 18, 1944, George Letters, author’s personal collection. 2. Memorandum from AES to Special Services Division, New York, December 29, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 124. 3. Byron to Kerr, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1943, ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Memorandum from AES to Special Services Division, New York, December 29, 1943, ibid. 8. AES Bulletin, Current Items, March 9, 1943, ibid., Carton 27. 9. AES Bulletin, Current Items, October 8, 1943, ibid. 10. Memorandum from Treusch to Office of the Quartermaster General, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1943, ibid., Carton 138. 11. Linzy to his wife, England, May 17 and November 11, 1943, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 12. Resolution by the Joint Army-Navy Board, Washington, D.C., ca. May 1943, RG 225, Records of the Joint Army-Navy Board, Carton 39. 13. Antoinette Perry to E. Pendleton Turner, New York, June 6, 1943, RG 220, Records of the War Relief Control Board, Entry 32055, Carton 196. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Turner to Alice McLean, Washington, D.C., August 23, 1943, ibid., Car‑ ton 198. 17. Rolla A. Southworth to Turner, New York, September 10, 1943, ibid. 18. Rudy Marwede to the War Relief Control Board, New York, May 26, 1943, ibid., Carton 228.

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19. War Relief Control Board to Marwede, Washington, D.C., June 2, 1943, ibid.; Francis Keppel to the War Relief Control Board, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1943, ibid., Carton 39. 20. Jimmy Lyons to the War Relief Control Board, New York, March 16, 1942, ibid., Carton 225; Homer S. Fox to Lyons, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1942, ibid. 21. Charles P. Taft to Colonel Livingston Watrous, Washington, D.C., Sep‑ tember 2, 1943, ibid., Carton 228. 22. S. G. Schwartz to the AES, Washington, D.C., February 8, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 137. 23. This series of correspondence is contained in RG 220, Records of the War Relief Control Board, Entry 32055, Carton 228. 24. Internal memorandum titled “Free Cigarettes for Overseas Forces,” June 8, 1943, ibid. 25. This series of correspondence, September–October 1943, is contained in RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 342. 26. New York Times, March 1943, RG 225, Records of Presidential Commit‑ tees and Boards, Carton 17. 27. Colonel A. H. Schichtenberg to Disabled American Veterans, Washington, D.C., December 20, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 138. 28. Minutes of the War Relief Control Board, Washington, D.C., February 5, 1943, RG 220, Records of the War Relief Control Board, Entry 32005 A10, Carton 121. 29. Fox to Keppel, April 15, 1942, ibid., Carton 103. 30. Joseph E. Davies, Chairman of the War Relief Control Board, to Fowler Harper, Joint Army-Navy Board, May 6, 1942, ibid. 31. Arthur C. Ragland to Keppel, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1943, ibid. 32. Memorandum on “Smokes for Yanks,” Washington, D.C., January 20, 1943, RG 225, Records of Presidential Committees and Boards, Carton 39. 33. Keppel to Fox, Washington, D.C., January 8, 1943, ibid. 34. Advertising flyer, “Send ’em Smokes,” recorded November 17, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 342. 35. War Department memorandum, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1943, ibid. 36. AES memorandum, New York, January 21, 1944, ibid., Carton 342; AES to New York Better Business Bureau, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1944, ibid. 37. Minutes of Meeting, Washington, D.C., September 28, 1943, RG 220, Records of the War Relief Control Board, Entry 32055, Carton 228. 38. Osborn to the War Relief Control Board, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1943, ibid.


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39. Report on October 7 Meeting, ca. October 9, 1943, ibid. 40. Fox to Keppel, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1943, ibid. 41. Ibid.

5. No Beer! 1. Franzman to his parents, India, June 9, 1944, Franzman Family Letters, author’s personal collection. 2. Memorandum from Major Russell T. Walton to the 9th Service Command, Coachella, California, June 29, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forc‑ es, Entry 196, Carton 138. 3. Franzman to his parents, India, July 16, 1943, Franzman Family Letters, author’s personal collection. 4. William E. Leigh, Director, USO Overseas Division, to Lieutenant Colonel Frederick E. Weston, New York, March 24, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196, Carton 122. 5. Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1944, RG 188, Records of the Office of Price Administration, Entry 361 P195, Carton 3701. 6. Norman S. Almony to Harry Miller, Baltimore, May 20, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 138. 7. Kerr to Miller, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1943, ibid.; Almony to Miller, Baltimore, May 20, 1943, ibid. 8. F. W. Templeton to Exchange Officer, Camp Hood, St. Louis, Missouri, May 15, 1943, ibid. 9. John I. Hass to E. G. Even, Portland, Oregon, June 29, 1943, RG 188, Records of the Office of Price Administration, Entry 386, Carton 3860. 10. M. A. Taylor to Even, San Francisco, May 13 and May 20, 1943, ibid. 11. Edwin J. Anderson to Herbert Magnus, Detroit, October 24, 1943, ibid. 12. James G. Hamilton to Officer of Economic Stabilization, San Francisco, June 21, 1943, ibid. 13. Clinton M. Hester to Prentiss M. Brown, OPA, New York, June 21, 1943, ibid. 14. Henry H. Bolz to James Byrnes, Decatur, Illinois, June 24, 1943, ibid.; Walter H. Johnson to Fred Vincent, Chicago, Illinois, June 23, 1943, ibid. 15. Memorandum by Leary, Desert Training Command, ca. April 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196, Carton 138. 16. Memorandum by First Lieutenant Richard Ramsey to AES, Presidio, Cali‑ fornia, June 1, 1943, ibid. 17. Henry Swanson to Ramsey, El Centro, California, May 27, 1943, ibid. 18. J. B. Sweet to the 9th Service Command, Los Angeles, June 4, 1943, ibid. 19. Oliver A. Seaver to the AES, Atlanta, June 11, 1943, ibid. 20. For a recent and very revealing picture of this situation, see Margaret Anne Barnes, Tragedy and Triumph of Phenix City, Alabama.

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Not e s to Pag e s 8 6–110

21. Memorandum by First Lieutenant Tom Richardson, Grenada Air Base, June 9, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196, Carton 138. 22. Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel J. A. James, Camp Shelby, June 15, 1943, ibid.; Byron to Treusch, Washington, D.C., July 5, 1943, ibid. 23. W. W. Tyson to Seaver, Camp Van Dorn, June 10, 1943, ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Harris Gray Jr. to the 4th Service Command, Camp Blanding, May 19, 1943, ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Elmer E. Franzman to his son, Cannelton, Indiana, June 19 and July 3, 1943, Franzman Family Letters, author’s personal collection. 28. Memorandum by Colonel Bernard E. Babcock, Washington, D.C., July 26, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 138. 29. Letter to Senator Robert R. Reynolds (North Carolina), Washington, D.C., May 21, 1943, ibid. 30. Kerr to Karl Stefan, Washington, D.C., December 7, 1943, ibid. 31. Kerr to Julius H. Anberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Annex A, June 22, 1943, ibid.

6. To Final Victory 1. Linzy to his wife, France, June 21, 1944, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 2. Prepared statement by Colonel Fred C. Foy, Director of Purchase Divi‑ sion, Headquarters, ASF, to Congress, Washington, D.C., ca. November 1944, RG 188, Records of the Office of Price Administration, Entry 364 P195, Carton 3660. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Schedule A to memorandum by Colonel Frank G. Kerr, AES, to Julius H. Amberg, Washington, D.C., June 22, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Ser‑ vice Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 138. 6. H. C. Haberkorn to AES, Winston-Salem, N.C., January 28, 1943, ibid., Carton 122. 7. AES to Haberkorn, Washington, D.C., February 9, 1943, ibid. 8. Internal memorandum from M. S. Kolberg, Head, Tobacco Section, to Food Price Division, OPA, Washington, D.C., July 16, 1943, RG 188, Records of the Office of Price Administration, Entry 364, Carton 3660. 9. Study by the Federal Trade Commission, “The Cigarette Shortage,” ca. Feb‑ ruary 1944, ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid.

N ot e s to Pag e s 1 1 0 -128

171

12. George W. Whiteside to Robert Patterson, New York, February 25, 1943, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 196A, Carton 137 (emphasis in the original). 13. J. W. Dargavel to Wright Patman, Chicago, January 11, 1943, ibid. 14. Klefer Mayer to Dargavel, Washington, D.C., January 5, 1943, ibid. 15. Memorandum by General Byron, Washington, D.C., March 8, 1943, ibid. 16. Kerr Reports, Europe, June 1944, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 131, Carton 41. Subsequent quotes come from this same source. 17. Elizabeth D. Schafer, “Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps,” in World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia, ed. David T. Zabecki, 1:788–89. 18. Thomas Edward Oblinger, Old Man from the Repple Depple, 74. 19. Ibid. 20. Memorandum by Richard F. Allen, American Red Cross, Washington, D.C., March 25, 1943, RG 200, Records of the American Red Cross, Carton 660. 21. Linzy diary, Paris, August 27, 1944, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 22. Linzy to his wife, Paris, August 26 and August 28, 1944, ibid. 23. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 336–39. 24. Linzy to his wife, France, November 12, 1944, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 25. John Kennedy Ohl, Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in World War II, 227–30, 235–39.

7. 1945 and V-Days 1. William Hurt to his parents, Philippine Islands, March 30 and April 4, 1945, Hurt Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 2. Linzy to his wife, France, December 14, 1944, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 3. A. Gregory Gutgsell Jr., “Red Ball Express,” in World War II in Europe, ed. Zabecki, 2:1253–54. 4. Linzy to his wife, France, December 20, 1944, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 5. Ibid., January 6, 1945; memorandum by Robert E. Bondy, Administration Services, to Armed Forces, American Red Cross no. 26, April 1943, RG 200, Records of the American Red Cross, Carton 660. 6. Franzman to his parents, Assam, India, August 10 and September 10, 1944, Franzman Family Letters, author’s personal collection; Franzman to his son, Can‑ nelton, Indiana, June 25, 1944, ibid. 7. The Men of the 69th Infantry Division, Pass in Review. 8. Linzy to his wife, Germany, January 28, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection.

172


9. Oblinger, Old Man, 270–71, 275–76. 10. Linzy to his wife, Germany, February 5, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 11. Memorandum by Brigadier General F. A. Heilman, Director of Supply, ASF, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1945, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 131, Carton 252. 12. Memorandum by Major General Leroy Lutes, Acting Chief of Staff, ASF, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1945, ibid. 13. Memorandum by James Forrestal, Washington, D.C., March 29, 1945, ibid. 14. Draft copy of War Department Circular, Washington, D.C., ca. March 1945, ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Lummer diary, April 2 and April 10, 1945, author’s personal collection; Linzy to his wife, Alfred, Germany, April 10, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 17. Henry L. Stimson to Forrestal, Washington, D.C., March 31, 1945, RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces, Entry 131, Carton 252. 18. Memorandum by Colonel Fred C. Foy, Director, Purchases Division, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1945, ibid. 19. Linzy to his wife, Germany, March 8 and March 11, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 20. Linzy diary, Alfred and Altinweddingen, Germany, April 10 and April 16, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 21. Ibid., April 18, 1945. 22. George to his parents, Germany, April 20 and May 25, 1945, George Let‑ ters, author’s personal collection. 23. Oblinger, Old Man, 316. 24. George to his parents, Darmstadt, June 6, 1945, George Letters, author’s personal collection; Linzy to his wife, Lauterbach, May 17, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 25. Statement by Colonel Fred C. Foy, Washington, D.C., ca. October 1944, RG 188, Records of the Office of Price Administration, Entry 364, PI95, Carton 3660. 26. Ibid. 27. Hurt to his parents, Luzon, June 12, 1945, Hurt Letters and Papers, au‑ thor’s personal collection. 28. Dennis Showalter, “Americans on the Last Lap to Victory: a) By Land, b) By Sea and Air,” 6–17. 29. James J. Cooke, “The Americans and VE Day,” 21–26; Linzy to his wife, Lauterbach, May 13, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 30. James J. Cooke, “VJ Day and the Bomb,” 42–47.

N ot e s to Pag e s 1 3 9 –154

173

31. Linzy to his wife, Lauterbach, May 13, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 32. Oblinger, Old Man, 336–38. 33. Linzy to his wife, Gruenberg, July 31, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection.

8. Consequences and Aftermath 1. George to his parents, Darmstadt, June 6, 1945, George Letters, author’s personal collection. 2. Ibid., London, June 16, 1945. 3. Ibid., Darmstadt, May 19, 1945. 4. Linzy to his wife, Germany, July 8, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 5. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 449. 6. Ibid., Gruenberg, August 5, 1945. 7. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers, 449. 8. Hurt to his parents, Kyoto, October 14, 1945, Hurt Letters, author’s per‑ sonal collection. 9. Will C. Johnson to his parents, Budweis, June 8, 1945, Johnson Letters, author’s personal collection. 10. George to his parents, Darmstadt, July 25, 1945, George Letters, author’s personal collection. 11. Linzy to his wife, Gruenberg, August 18, 1945, Linzy Letters and Papers, author’s personal collection. 12. Special Services Branch, Camp Kilmer. 13. Ibid. 14. George to his parents, Reims, September 14 and September 12, 1945, and from Marseilles, September 20, 1945, George Letters, author’s personal collec‑ tion. 15. Office of War Information, Victory Newsletter, September 7 and October 19, 1942, RG 208, Records of the Office of War Information, Entry 211, Carton 1057. 16. Office of War Information, Home Front, February 1 and August 10, 1943, ibid., Entry 225, Carton 1088. 17. Mark Roodhouse, “Feeding Britain: Food Control, 1939–45,” 40. 18. For the U.S. Armed Forces in London, 3–4. 19. Richard Broad and Suzie Fleming, eds., Nella Last’s War: A Mother’s Diary, 1939–45, 237. 20. Corporal A. G. Watson to Corporal Charles Hampshire, England, Octo‑ ber 1, 1943, author’s personal collection. 21. Ian Whitehead, “Aspects of Life on the British Home Front,” 20; Barbara

174


G. Friedman, From the Battlefield to the Bridal Suite, 62. 22. Cited in Friedman, From the Battlefield, 52. 23. Stars and Stripes [southern Germany edition], April 2, 1946, 2; May 6, 1946, 4. 24. Ibid., October 2, 1945, 1. 25. Ibid., January 5, 1946, 3. 26. Ibid., October 16, 1946; ibid., December 2 and 5, 1946, 4. 27. Ibid., February 13, 1946, 1. 28. Ibid., January 9, 1946, 5. 29. Army Service Forces, Circular 273, July 16, 1945, RG 92, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General, Entry 1916A, Carton 30. 30. Report of Civilian Supply Ships—Germany, April 1947, ibid., Carton 3. 31. Report of Civilian Supply Shipments—by Commodity, Japan, August and November 1947, ibid., Carton 6. 32. Adjustment Report of Civilian Supply Shipments—Germany, ibid., Car‑ ton 3. 33. Large numbers of shipping reports by month and year are contained in ibid., Cartons 2–6. 34. Ibid., Carton 6.

Selected Bibli ography

This is a selected bibliography of sources used in compiling this study of the Army Exchange Service in World War II. There continue to be constant publications pertaining to World War II, and in the late twentieth century and early in this century, many veterans have felt the need to publish their letters and their accounts of combat in the European and Pacific theaters of operations for posterity. Too often, however, a veteran passes away never having discussed his experiences even with his family or close friends. Several years ago I began to collect sets of letters from World War II GIs. Many of these valuable sources could have found their way into the trash bin because their families had almost no knowledge of their father’s or grandfather’s service during the war. Despite wartime military censorship, many of these letters give valuable insights into what soldiers were thinking and how they reacted to military service in the United States and overseas. They wrote about home and rela‑ tives, but also about the conditions they endured and their reactions to such things as the Post Exchanges that served them. Censors were very good about blacking out or cutting out passages that had any strategic or tactical value, but they left the insights intact. Today sol‑ diers communicate by e-mails and other means of electronic devices, but from 1941 to 1945 the only way to stay in touch with home was by letter or by V-Mail. These sources, then, were not lost to history.

175

Se l e c t e d Bib li o gra phy

176

The sources from my own collection are:

Master Sergeant Elmer E. Franzman Family Letters Sergeant William George Letters Captain William Hurt Letters First Sergeant Will C. Johnson Letters T-Sergeant Charles B. Linzy Letters and Papers Sergeant Kenneth A. Lummer Diary, 1945 Warrant Officer Paul E. Wesely Letters

I am indebted to Mrs. Gail Fielder Andrews of Opelika, Alabama, for allowing me to use the Sergeant Eustace Fielder Letters, 1918–1919. In preparing this book I used a number of major collections at National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. No one working in the history of either the Great War or World War II can write in depth unless they have consulted the vast holdings in that comfortable and modern facility. The collections, consolidated into Records Groups, I consulted are: RG 92, Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General RG 112, Records of the Office of the Surgeon General RG 160, Records of the Army Service Forces RG 165, Records of the War Department, General and Special Staff RG 188, Records of the Office of Price Administration RG 200, Records of the American Red Cross RG 208, Records of the Office of War Information RG 220, Records of the War Relief Control Board RG 225, Records of Presidential Committees and Boards

Other Sources Ambrose, Stephen E. Citizen Soldiers. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997. American Red Cross. Canteen Corps: Volunteer Special Services. Washing‑ ton, D.C.: American Red Cross, 1941. ——. What Can I Do to Help? Washington, D.C.: American Red Cross, 1942.

Se l e c t e d Bib li o g r a phy

177

Baker, Horace L. Argonne Days in World War I. Ed. Robert H. Ferrell. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. Barnes, Margaret Anne. Tragedy and Triumph of Phenix City, Alabama. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1999. Bourne, John, Peter H. Liddle, and Ian Whitehead, eds. The Great World War, 1914–45. 2 vols. London: HarperCollins, 2000. Broad, Richard, and Suzie Fleming, eds. Nella Last’s War: A Mother’s Diary, 1939–45. Bristol, UK: Falling Wall Press, 1981. Cooke, James J. The All-Americans at War: The 82nd Division in the Great War, 1917–1918. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999. ——. “The Americans and VE Day.” Everyone’s War 11 (Spring–Summer 2005). ——. “D-Day and the Americans.” Everyone’s War 9 (Spring–Summer 2004). ——. “The Experience of Being Abroad: Doughboys and GIs in Europe.” In vol. 1 of The Great World War, 1914–45, ed. John Bourne, Peter H. Liddle, and Ian Whitehead. London: HarperCollins, 2000. ——. “The Peoples’ Experience: America.” In vol. 2 of The Great World War, 1914–45, ed. John Bourne, Peter H. Liddle, and Ian Whitehead. London: HarperCollins, 2001. ——. “The Songs behind the Stars and Stripes.” Everyone’s War 6 (Autumn– Winter 2002). ——. “VJ Day and the Bomb.” Everyone’s War 12 (Autumn–Winter 2005). Ettinger, Albert M., and A. Churchill Ettinger. A Doughboy with the Fighting 69th. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1992. Ferrell, Robert H. America’s Deadliest Battle: Meuse-Argonne, 1918. Law‑ rence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. ——, ed. A Soldier in World War I: The Diary of Elmer W. Sherwood. India‑ napolis: Indiana Historical Society, 2004. For the U.S. Armed Forces in London. London: Spottswood and Ballantyne, 1941. Freeland, D. J. T., ed. ’Til Then: Catherine Cain and William Pickle. Olive Branch, Miss.: WoodChimes Books, 2004. Friedman, Barbara G. From Battlefield to Bridal Suite. Columbia: Univer‑ sity of Missouri Press, 2007. Gowen, Kenneth K. Granddaddy, Tell Us about the War. Oxford, Miss.: Kay-Dot Publishing, 1998.

178

Se l e c t e d Bib li o gra phy

Hanson, Arlen J. Gentlemen Volunteers. New York: Arcade, 1996. Harbord, James G. Leaves from a War Diary. New York: Dodd and Mead, 1925. Headquarters, Third U.S. Army. General Doughboy and Five Other Generals: A Modern Legend of the Rhine. Koblentz, 1919. Hogan, Martin. The Shamrock Battalion in the Great War. Ed. James J. Cooke. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. Jones, Russell M., and John H. Swanson, eds. Dear Helen: Wartime Letters from a Londoner to Her American Pen Pal. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009. The Men of the 69th Infantry Division, Pass in Review. Atlanta: Albert Jones Enterprises, 1944. Oblinger, Thomas Edward. Old Man from the Repple Depple. Private print‑ ing, Xlibris Books, 2007. Ohl, John Kennedy. Supplying the Troops: General Somervell and American Logistics in WWII. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994. Palmer, Frederick. Newton Baker: America at War. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1931. Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. 1931. Reprint, Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: Tab Books, 1989. Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942. New York: Viking Press, 1966. Regulations of the Army of the United States, 1913, Corrected to April 15, 1917. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917. Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support for the Army, 1775–1939. Washing‑ ton, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989. Roodhouse, Mark. “Feeding Britain: Food Control, 1939–45.” Everyone’s War 5 (Spring–Summer 2007). Showalter, Dennis. “Americans on the Last Lap to Victory: a) By Land, b) By Sea and Air.” Everyone’s War 12 (Autumn–Winter 2005). Special Services Branch. Camp Kilmer. Camp Kilmer, N.J., 1945. Special Services Division. Army Service Forces. A Short Guide to Great Britain. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943. Stanton, Shelby. World War II Order of Battle. New York: Garland Books, 1984. Stars and Stripes [North Germany and South Germany editions]. 1945– 1949.

Se l e c t e d Bib li o g r a phy

179

U.S. Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation. A Report on Army Special Services and Facilities. Washington, D.C.: Gov‑ ernment Printing Office, 1942. War Department. This Is Our War. Washington, D.C.: Government Print‑ ing Office, 1943. Whitehead, Ian. “Aspects of Life on the British Hometown.” Everyone’s War 6 (Autumn–Winter 2002). Winchell, Meghan V. Good Girls, Good Food, Good Fun: The Story of the USO Hostesses during World War II. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. Zabecki, David T., ed. World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia. 2 vols. New York: Garland Press, 1999. Zimmerman, Phyllis A. The Neck of the Bottle. College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1992.

index

Aix-les-Bains, France, 21–22 Allen, Henry J., 19 Ambrose, Stephen E., 143–44 American Red Cross: alcohol policy, 35;Â€army camps in France 1945, 140, 141;Â€cigarette policy,Â€35, 39, 65, 68, 73, 75, 76, 93, 110, 118– 19, 155; comfort kits, 17;Â€during combat operations, 71, 73, 126, 135; London, 142, 153;Â€military hospitals, 9, 25, 35, 39, 68, 73, 136;Â€shipping space problems, 39, 58; Veterans Administration, 71, 72; volunteers, 6–7, 25; War Relief Control Board, 33, 72; World War I, 15, 17, 20, 25 American Theater Wing, War Service, 66–67 American Women’s Voluntary Ser‑ vices, 67–68 Andrews, W. G., 57 Anheuser-Busch Company, 80, 84, 86 Army Air Force Exchange System (AAFES), 150–60 Army Nurse Corps, 54–55, 113 Army Postal Service (Offices), 48, 57, 69–70, 106, 127–28 Army Regulations: no. 30-2225, 72; no. 210-65, 49 Army Service Forces, 28, 32, 53–54, 56, 121, 130, 158

Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), 40 Baker, Horace L., 19 Baker, Newton D., 14, 15 Better Business Bureau: New York City; 74; Philadelphia, 70 Beverage Section, Food Price Division (OPA), 81 Birmingham (AL) Ordnance District, 40 Blatz Beer, 84, 89 Brisbane, Australia, 118 British War Relief Society, 72 Budweiser Beer, 84 Budweis, Czechoslovakia, 146 Bull Durham Smoking Tobacco, 25, 109 Byrnes, James, 83 Byron, General Joseph W., 35, 36, 57, 88, 90–91, 110, 118; charitable or‑ ganizations, 33, 69; chief, AES, 1, 5, 30–31, 32, 59, 76, 91, 94, 110, 111; chief, Morale Branch, 61–62, 112; civilian merchants, 30, 40–41, 60; complaints against AES, 32, 33–34, 106, 111; death of, 162; early career, 29–30; General Eisen‑ hower, 44; European theater of operations tour, 43–45, 56, 154, 161–62; Exchange Officers School,

181

182

Index

63–64; Frank Kerr, 61, 62, 112, 114; gift catalog, 61, 62–63; gov‑ ernment service, 30; North African tour, 91–92; Special Services Di‑ vision, 30, 53, 54, 61, 131; War Production Board, 37, 39, 59 California State Brewers Institute, 82 Camp A. P. Hill (VA), 41 Camp Blanding (FL), 89, 90 Camp Hood (TX), 80 Camp Hulen (TX), 42 Camp Kilmer (NJ), 147–49 Camp McCain (MS), 85–86 Camp Mills (NY), 13 Camp Polk (LA), 52, 88 Camp Robinson (AR), 150 Camp Shelby (MS), 85–86, 127 Camp Van Dorn (MS), 85–87, 89 Cellophane, 46 Centreville (MS), 85, 86, 87 Chevrolet Motor Company, 2 Cigarette camps, 141 Civilian Advisory Committee on Selective Service, 27 Clark, General Mark W., 112–13 Clay, General Lucius D., 36–37, 39, 157 Coca–Cola, 1, 5, 9, 31, 34, 38, 43, 78, 126, 141, 142, 145, 146, 149 Commissary Sales (Army), 12, 14, 23, 24–25, 29, 62, 69, 70, 71, 73, 105, 106, 131, 145 Craig, General Malin, 24 Darmstadt, Germany, 141, 150 Davies, Joseph E., 35 Delta Distributing System (MS), 86 Desert Training Center, 77, 83, 84 Dickman, General George, 20 Division, 2nd French Armored, 119 Divisions (U.S.): —Airborne: 17th, 78;Â€82nd,

134;Â€101st, 64, 124, 125, 139 —Armored: 2nd, 64, 134, 139;Â€3rd, 64;Â€4th, 139;Â€9th, 139 —Infantry: 1st, 18, 90; 2nd, 18;Â€4th, 18, 78;Â€5th, 18;Â€26th, 18, 117, 128; 28th, 64;Â€29th, 90, 139;Â€30th, 133;Â€37th, 56–57;Â€42nd,Â€18, 20, 21;Â€44th, 40–41;Â€66th, 78,Â€90;Â€69th, 127;Â€76th, 78;Â€82nd, 18, 19, 20;Â€83rd, 134;Â€89th, 18;Â€90th, 18;Â€106th, 124, 125 Eighth U.S. Air Force, 64, 116 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 1, 2, 44, 117, 120, 140, 156 English Speaking Union, 72 Ettinger, Albert E., 15 Federal Trade Commission, 109 Fielder, Sergeant Eustace, 13, 20 Fifth U.S. Army, 112–13, 117 58th U.S. Army General Hospital, 136 Fighting French Relief Committee, 72 Florists Telegraph Delivery Associa‑ tion, 61 415th U.S. Night Fighter Squadron, 60 459th Mobile Anti-Aircraft Battalion, 9, 64, 105, 128, 136 Ford Motor Company, 2 Forrestal, James, 130 Fort Benning (GA), 84 Fort Leonard Wood (MO), 56 Foyle’s War, 152 Fox, Homer S., 75 Franzman, Elmer E., Sr., 90 Franzman, Master Sergeant Elmer E., Jr., 57–58, 77, 78, 126–27, 150 Gardner, Karl A., 38, 46 George, Sergeant William, 8, 60, 136, 139; Darmstadt, Germany, 142,

Index

150; demobilization, 150; England, 142; Marseilles, France, 150; Paris black market, 135; USO shows, 146–47; V-E Day, 136, 139 Gruenberg, Germany, 141 Gutgsell, A. Gregory, 124 Hamilton, James G., 82 Harbord, General James G., 21 Heidelberg, Germany, 141 Hogan, Corporal Martin J., 16–17, 20 Hope, Bob, 93, 105, 146, 147 Hurt, Captain William C.: Australia, 123–24; demobilization, 150;Â€ Kyoto, Japan, 145; Lingayen Gulf, 123; Memphis (TN), 123; observations on the PX, 123, 138; Philippine Islands, 123; venereal disease rate in occupied Japan, 150 Internal Revenue Service, 43 Jax Brewing Company, 90 Jewish Welfare Board, 4, 14, 28 Johnson, Sergeant Will C., 146, 150 Joint Army–Navy Board, 54, 72–73 Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, 65, 111 Keppel, Francis, 68, 73 Kerr, Colonel Frank: chief, AES,Â€61, 62, 105, 106, 121,Â€124, 161–62; decorated by General Byron, 161;Â€deputy chief, Special Services,Â€61,Â€92;Â€European theater tour 1944, 112–16, 127, 154;Â€ General David Larkin,Â€112;Â€ observations on Special Services, European theater, 113,Â€114; women’s offerings in the PX,Â€ 114–16 Knights of Columbus, 4, 14, 15, 20

183

Larkin, General David, 112 Lee, General John C. H., 120, 121, 126 Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company, 68 Linzy, Technical Sergeant Charles B., 42–43,Â€53,Â€58,Â€64,Â€120,Â€126, 128–29,Â€134,Â€137,Â€139; Camp Hulen (TX),Â€42;Â€Camp Polk (LA),Â€52;Â€Christmas 1944,Â€44, 121–22, 125; demobilization, 150;Â€English beer, 58;Â€European children,Â€9, 141, 143;Â€Gruenberg, Germany, 141, 144;Â€Hamelin, Germany, 132;Â€ Lauterbach, Ger‑ many, 136; Omaha Beach, 105, 136, 144;Â€Paris, liberation of, 119– 20;Â€Schonebeck-on-Elbe, Germany, 135;Â€service clubs, 52;Â€USO shows, 147; V-E Day, 141, 144 London, England, 67, 152 Lummer, Sergeant Kenneth, 1, 2, 132, 139 MacArthur, General Douglas, 73, 162 March, General Peyton C., 15 Marshall, General George C.: attitude toward the AES, 4, 7, 24; chief of staff, U.S. Army, 7, 24, 160;Â€China service, 24;Â€Â€Marshall Plan, 157, 160; preparedness, 10–11,Â€25, 26, 28; reorganization of the army 1942, 28;Â€Selective Service Act 1940, 25;Â€World War I service,Â€24 Marshburn, Colonel Robert J., 156 McAfee, H. B., 19 Mennen’s Skin Bracer, 111 Meuse-Argonne Campaign, 16, 18, 19 Middletown (PA) Air Depot, 111 Miller, Bernetta, 16 Miller, Lieutenant Colonel Harry, 79–80 Miller High Life Beer, 84

184

Index

National Association of Retail Druggists, 111 National Brewing Company, 79 National Catholic Community Service, 28 National Travelers Aid Association, 28 National War Fund, 6, 69, 72, 127 Navy Welfare and Recreation Division, 65 New York Sun, 17 New York Times, 45, 56, 71 New York University Faculty Club, 63 New Zealand, 58 Normandy, France, 9, 140, 141, 143, 144, 155 North Africa, 31, 36, 43, 44, 77, 91, 129 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 160–61 Norwegian Relief Group, 72 Oblinger, Private Raymond J., 117– 18, 128, 129, 136, 141, 143 Office of Civilian Defense, 7 Office of Price Administration (OPA), 27, 34, 35, 37, 39, 45, 59, 79, 81, 82, 83, 90, 91, 107, 137 Office of the Quartermaster General, 37, 39, 72, 73, 109, 129, 130, 131, 135, 155, 158 Office of the Surgeon General, 72 Office of War Information, 36, 151 Operation Wacht am Rhein, 125 Osborn, General Frederick J.: Ameri‑ can Red Cross, 71, 72;Â€attitude toward AES, 27,Â€53–54; chair, Army Committee on Welfare and Recreation, 27;Â€chair, Civilian Advisory Committee on Selec‑ tive Service, 27;Â€chief, Morale Branch,Â€27, 53–54, 75;Â€cigarette policy, 68, 75, 111;Â€cooperation with the AES, 53–54;Â€decorations,

27;Â€early career, 26–27; Overseas Cigarette Service, 74;Â€Special Ser‑ vices, 5, 53, 54, 89;Â€World War I activities, 26–27 Pabst Blue Ribbon Beer, 77, 89 Pacific theater of operations, 37, 45, 46, 48, 52, 55, 57, 93, 116, 126, 138, 145 Paris, France: black market in,Â€120, 126, 130, 135, 157;Â€General Eisen‑ hower, 117;Â€General C. H. Lee, 120, 121;Â€liberation of, 117–19; Post Exchanges in, 120, 126; Red Cross activities in, 135; YMCA activities in, 135 Patman,Wright, 111 Patterson Army Air Field (OH), 34 Patton, General George S., 85, 120, 125, 140 Pearl Harbor, 4, 6, 10, 17, 32, 36, 66, 151, 157 Pearson, General Madison, 93 Perry, Antoinette, 66 Pershing, General John J., 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18–19 Phenix City (AL), 85 Philippine Islands, 23, 25, 138, 145, 150, 158 Post Exchange Officer, 40, 50, 51, 53 President’s Committee on War Relief Agencies, 33 President’s War Relief Control Board, 5, 33, 47, 68, 127 Princeton University, 40 Queens County Liquor and Restau‑ rant Association of New York, 68 Ragland, Arthur C., 76 Ration Cards, 131, 132, 133, 137 Red Ball Express, 118, 120, 124 Red Top Brewery, 90

Index

Reynolds, J. L, 51 Rheims, France, 150 R. J. Reynolds Company, 22, 70, 108 Robinson, Mrs. Edward G., 35 Roodhouse, Mark, 152 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 25, 56, 127 Salvation Army, 4, 5, 14, 20 Schafer, Elizabeth D., 116 Schlitz Beer, 77 Schoolcraft, John, 52 Schwartz, Colonel S. G., 69 Seaver, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver A., 85, 87 Selective Service Act, 25–26 Send’em Smokes Campaign, 74 Service Clubs (Army), 7, 50, 51, 52, 63–64, 131 Service Commands: 4th, 85, 87; 8th, 33–34 Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill), 140 Service of Supply, 30, 32, 45, 93 Sherwood, Elmer, 15–16, 21 Showalter, Dennis, 138 Smokes for Yanks Campaign, 33, 73, 74 Somervell, General Brehon B., 26, 29, 37, 39, 45, 53, 86, 92, 111, 121 Special Services Division, 4, 5, 9, 27, 53, 58, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 93, 131, 140, 141, 143, 146, 148, 158, 161 Special Services Officer, 50, 52, 53– 54, 113, 114, 128 St. Mihiel Campaign, 17–18, 19 Stage Door Canteen, 51, 66–67, 83 Stars and Stripes Newspaper, 155 Stimson, Henry L., 25, 132–33 Sutlers, 11 Sweet, Brigadier General J. B., 84

185

Templeman, F. W., 80 Third (U.S.) Army, 20, 21, 22, 125, 126, 129, 140 334th Harbor Craft Company, 1 364th U.S. Infantry Regiment, 86–88 Tinfoil, 46 Treusch, Colonel Kerwin M., 46, 64, 93 Tyson, Captain W. W., 87 United States Brewers Association, 82 USO (United Service Organization), 35, 69, 135; alcohol policy, 35, 79;Â€canteens, 5, 35, 51; celebrity shows, 8, 57, 114, 141, 146–47; civilian hostesses and volunteers, 5;Â€dances, 67;Â€food preparation and services, 35, 36, 78, 79;Â€formed by President Roosevelt,Â€4, 28–29; procurement of supplies,Â€35, 65, 68, 72, 75, 78–79, 93–94, 135;Â€ relationship with AES, 9, 33, 79, 140;Â€relationship with Special Ser‑ vices,Â€78–79;Â€women in uniform, 51–52, 67 Veterans Administration (VA), 71, 82 Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), 33, 69, 73 Vienna, Austria, 156 Wadden, Colonel Vincent, 48–49 War Brides (British), 2, 154 War Department Circular 98, 43; Circular 153, 53 War Food Administration, 76 War Fund, 6, 69 War Mobilization Office, 83 War Production Board (WPB), 27, 35, 39, 45, 59, 64, 78, 80, 90–91, 105, 108 War Relief Control Board, 33, 34, 48, 57, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 110

186

Wesely, Warrant Officer Paul E., 1, 9, 150 Wesselis, Walter, 75 Whitehead, Ian, 153 Wilson, President Woodrow, 14 Women’s Army Corps (WAAC, WAC), 50, 114, 115, 116, 145, 161

Index

Women’s Voluntary Service (British), 153 Yohe, Private G. E., 47–48. Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), 4, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 35, 153, 155

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