British Policy in Persia, 1918-1925

BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 1918–1925 BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 1918–1925 HOUSHANG SABAHI FRANK CASS First published 1...

Author: Houshang Sabahi

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BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 1918–1925

BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 1918–1925 HOUSHANG SABAHI

FRANK CASS

First published 1990 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Gainsborough House, 11 Gainsborough Road, London E11 1RS, England and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS c/o International Specialized Book Services, Inc., 5602 N.E. Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Copyright © 1990 Houshang Sabahi British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Sabahi, Houshang British policy in Persia 1918–1925 1. Iran. Foreign relations with Great Britain, history 2. Great Britain. Foreign relations with Iran, history I. Title 327.41055 ISBN 0-203-98819-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-3377-1 (Print Edition) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sabahi, Houshang. British policy in Persia, 1918–1925/Houshang Sabahi. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ISBN 0-7146-3377-1 (Print Edition) 1. Iran—Foreignrelations—GreatBritain. 2. GreatBritain —Foreign relations—Iran. 3. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1910–1936. I. Title. DS271.9.G7S23 1990 327.41055—dc20 89–71190 CIP

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited.

CONTENTS

PART I:

Acknowledgements

v

Introduction

1

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 1.

Finance: The Power of the Purse

11

2.

Force: “The Diplomacy of Violence”

33

PART II: PERCEPTION OF THREAT 3.

Soviet Landing at Enzeli

59

4.

Persian Communists

85

5.

Zero-Sum Game?

103

PART III: IMPERIAL ACCORD 6.

Anglo-American Partnership

133

PART IV: BUFFER-STATE POLICY 7.

Britain’s Reaction to Reza Khan’s Ascendancy

149

8.

Reza Khan’s Rise to Supreme Power

167

Notes

191

Bibliography

253

Index

263

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first debt is to my mother. This work could not have been completed without her support. Sori has always been supportive. Nanaz, Farideh and Farhad have been helpful. Robbie, Kathy, Patrick and Parastu have been delightful. Professor Donald Cameron Watt read and commented on the draft. Professor Malcolm Yapp and Dr. Robin Bidwell read the typescript and encouraged its publication. I am also indebted to many other scholars whose studies provided the indispensable foundation for my research. Any errors or shortcomings in this work, needless to say, are solely my own. H.S. London, 1989

vi

Introduction

Viewed from the perspective of Whitehall, Persia was a crossroads where Britain’s European and Indian interests met. Control of Persia by any European power was bound to jeopardize the security of British India. A threat to India could in turn be used as a lever to upset the balance of power in Europe. To forestall this danger, Britain tried various policies. At first London and India hesitantly experimented with the policy of bringing Persia into the British sphere of influence either by contracting an alliance with her or by turning her into a protectorate. Persia’s crushing defeat in the war with Russia put an end to these experiments. The Turkomanchai Treaty of 1828 firmly established Russian influence at Tehran. For the rest of the nineteenth century, the basic thrust of British policy was to prevent Russia from taking control of Persia and, at the same time, to avoid a serious dispute with her over Persia. So Persia had to be preserved as a buffer state. But, as Russian influence continued to grow in the north and threatened to expand south-wards, Britain’s position began to shift. Persia’s independence was becoming a threat, rather than an asset, to the security of India. By the end of the century the north seemed to be irreversibly in Russian hands; the south must be secured for Britain. An increasing number of politicians and officials began to advocate the partition of Persia. The exponents of an agreement with Russia eventually prevailed. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 divided Persia into spheres of influence.1 The buffer-state policy had failed to hold back Russia. Many, including Curzon, doubted that the new policy would succeed in curbing her southward thrust. Nor did it seem much more effective as a crisis-prevention strategy.2 Persia remained a bone of contention between the two powers until the beginning of the First World War. So it seemed as if the Persian problem would remain unsolved and forever, as Grey put it in 1911, “very tiresome and very serious.”3 At the end of the First World War, with her rivals eliminated, it suddenly appeared that Britain could solve the Persian question once and for all by extending her control over the country. At the same time, the occupation of Mesopotamia and the Navy’s growing

2 BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA 1918–1925

dependence on Persian oil had increased Britain’s stakes in Persia.4 It was against this background that Curzon set out his Persian policy. His predecessors had missed their chance to bind Persia to Britain before 1828.5 He wanted to take full advantage of his opportunity. By the end of the war, Lord Curzon was in a position to act as the architect of British policy in Persia. The Persia Committee (an interdepartmental committee) set up at his suggestion in July 1917, had already provided him with a forum to influence the deliberations on Persia. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, chaired the meetings, but Curzon dominated the proceedings.6 He soon came to share the Foreign Office’s control over policy in Persia. When, at the end of 1917, Charles Marling, the Minister at Tehran, asked London for definite instructions as to the course of policy in Persia, the War Cabinet declared that “Lord Curzon and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should go into the matter and frame the necessary instructions.”7 Curzon’s position was strengthened by the formation of the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet which superseded and absorbed the Persia Committee. The Committee was set up at the request of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in March 1918 in order to coordinate British policy and strategy on the Eastern Front which had extended to north Persia and the Caucasus in the wake of the collapse of Imperial Russia.8 Wilson hoped the Committee would facilitate military operations in the area by smoothing over time-consuming bureaucratic wrangling. Lloyd George asked Curzon to draw up its terms of reference. He also became its Chairman, by reason of his War Cabinet status.9 The Committee also included Balfour, his deputy (Robert Cecil), Edwin Montagu (the Secretary of State for India), Wilson, General Smuts, and the officials of the departments concerned. Its purview was the Arab territories east of Suez, Persia, the Caucasus, Turkestan and Afghanistan.10 On the other hand, the formation of the Committee was a direct blow to the Foreign Office’s claim to control foreign affairs,11 despite the cabinet’s assurance that “care must be taken to safeguard the Departmental authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.”12 Balfour hoped the Committee would avoid “weakening the responsibility of the Departments concerned,” and confine itself “purely to the question of policy and the coordination of Departmental action in relief of the work of the War Cabinet.”13 But Curzon’s personality and background—his immense capacity for work, his fine grasp of details, his intolerance of opposition, his passionate interest in, and reputation as an authority on Eastern affairs—ensured that the Committee would go far beyond mere interdepartmental coordination. Under his chairmanship, the Committee soon developed into a body with wide-ranging executive

INTRODUCTION 3

functions. He insisted on exercising almost day-to-day control over British policy in the area. Cecil, who was much readier than Balfour to stand up for the Foreign Office,14 protested “in view of the Chairman’s attitude… he felt great diffidence even about inviting one or two officials from other departments to any informal preliminary discussion.”15 The India Office and the War Office also resented Curzon’s poaching on their turf. The jurisdictional conflicts meshed with personal antipathies. Curzon was disliked by his colleagues and was unable to establish close relations with any of them. His imperious manner and pomposity easily offended.16 “Curzon,” the Cabinet Secretary noted, “is an intolerable person to do business with—pompous, dictatorial, and outrageously conceited.”17 Montagu, for one, disliked him intensely. They were also cast in very different moulds. Montagu, a forty-year-old radical Liberal, regarded Curzon, a diehard Conservative and 20 years his senior, as an “obstructive survival from the Salisbury period.”18 Not surprisingly, he took the initiative to undermine Curzon’s position. He at first suggested that control of policy in Persia be transferred to India. He argued that Britain’s “difficulties in Persia were due to over-centralization of political control,” and warned that “in later days, when the history of the Committee and its decisions came to be examined, the Committee might not emerge from the ordeal with credit.” Moreover, he did not see why the government of India should contribute men and money to policies in which it had little say.19 But he soon realized he was on the wrong track. By this proposal he had only managed to unite the Foreign Office and the War Office with Curzon. “The knowledge and experience gained in Persia,” Cecil argued, “is to be found far more easily in London than it is in Simla or Delhi.”20 Curzon observed that the problems of Persia were “not Indian but international.” Therefore “it would be not only disagreeable but dangerous to have a minister at Tehran who might be pursuing a policy inspired or dictated from Delhi that did not fit with the foreign policy of Downing Street.”21 Wilson joined them in opposing the proposal.22 Montagu had to withdraw it. The role of the government of India remained merely an advisory one. Montagu, however, had another scheme up his sleeve for cutting the ground from under Curzon’s feet. This one called for setting up a subcommittee of the Eastern Committee consisting of the Foreign Office, the India Office and the War Office in order “to thrash out everything and give decision except on matters of high policy of such great importance as should go before the Ministers of the [Eastern] Committee for decisions.”23 With this proposal Cecil was in “hearty


agreement.” Only in important matters, he suggested, should “the Chairman of the Committee…be consulted just as the Prime Minister is, or ought to be, consulted in other departmental matters.”24 Wilson, too, supported this proposal. But Balfour, a weary old man, had no taste for confrontation, and he did not back Cecil up.25 Curzon at once detected an attack on his personal authority under the guise of a plan for improving the decison-making process. The proposed sub-committee, he noted would be tantamount to “the creation of an imperium in imperio.” Encouraged by Balfour’s attitude, he fought off the challenge with typical tenacity. He made it clear that he was not prepared to preside over an emasculated committee. Addressing the Committee, he said: He assumed that he had been charged with this duty because his public life had brought him into close contact with almost every aspect of Middle Eastern affairs; he had served as UnderSecretary of State both at the Foreign Office and the India Office; he had been Viceroy of India, and there are few of the countries concerned with which he had not personal acquaintance. He hoped that he was not so presumptious in inferring that these qualifications were thought to be of some value not merely in presiding over an inter-departmental Committee, but in assisting the Committee to arrive at everyday decisions both as regards policy and action. He threatened that “if the Committee accepted this proposal he did not see his services were any longer required.”26 Curzon’s threat of resignation and Balfour’s nonchalance forced Cecil and Montagu to back down. So Curzon continued to influence the course of policy in Persia during the closing months of the war and took the lead in defining and directing the post-war British policy after the Armistice. The question of Persia was one of Curzon’s major preoccupations. His journey of 1889 and his highly acclaimed Persia and the Persian Question had undoubtedly created an attachment to the country.27 His interest in Persia, however, went beyond this. He was not drawn to Persia merely by a romantic fascination with the land and its people. He saw Persia primarily as a “pawn in the struggle for India.”28 “Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these names breathe only a sense of utter remoteness, or a memory of vicissitudes and of moribund romances,” Curzon wrote. “To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world.”29 As he saw it, the key to the “dominion of the world” was India. “Without India the British Empire could not exist,”30 and Britain would “drop straight to a thirdrate power.”31 From having been the “the arbiter of the world,” Britain

INTRODUCTION 5

would sink into the “inglorious playground of the world.” “People,” he wrote, “would come to see us just as they climb the Acropolis at Athens or ascend the waters of the Nile.”32 The Empire, however, was not “merely the key to glory and wealth, but the call to duty, and the means of service to mankind.”33 He was imbued with a sense of mission. He believed “God had personally selected the British upper class” to fulfil the civilizing mission.34 The British had gone to India, he wrote, “in obedience to what I call the decree of Providence.”35 “To me,” he said, “the Empire is so sacred a thing that I cannot understand people quarrelling about it, or even holding opposite opinions about it.”36 He was one of those late Victorians who willingly admitted to the title of imperialist,37 describing himself as “an imperialist, heart and soul.”38 Imperialism was the “very core of his philosophy and faith,”39 and he viewed Persia through an imperial “prism.” The imperial “code” provided him with norms and standards that influenced his choice of policy and of the methods of implementing it.40 By Curzon’s standards, British control of Persia was moral as well as desirable, regardless of the wishes of the Persians. When told by Marling, who had just returned to London after long service in Tehran, that Persia wanted to be left alone, “to get rid of all foreign control,” and “to go to the devil in its own way,” Curzon replied that a policy of non-intervention “would please the Persians better than any other,” but it “would be immoral, feeble and disastrous.”41 In other words, Curzon’s policy “did not recognize Persia, it only dealt with her.”42 He believed, though, that British intervention would benefit Persia as well as the Empire. The security of British India required a stable Persia. The stability could be brought about by reforms. To him reform meant dependence on Britain. Only British “advisers”— not an “oriental government”—could be relied upon to carry out the “rescue mission” effectively.43 His policy would salvage Persia from “picturesque decay,”44 and the Persians should be grateful, as good government by imperial norms was better than self-government. After the collapse of his policy he still wanted to teach the Persians “that they cannot get on without us.”45 The British, Curzon believed, were particularly qualified to take over the running of Persia because “our knowledge of these parts of the world” was “by far the most profound.”46 By the same token, he felt personally entitled to take a hand in moulding Persia’s future. As a reviewer of Persia and the Persian Question observed: “Mr. Curzon seems to be under the impression that he has discovered Persia, and that having discovered it, he now in some mysterious way owns it.”47 Imperialists, like other crusaders, were not apt to be very scrupulous about the means of implementing the divine purpose. Coercion has in


fact been the “natural habit” of imperial diplomacy.48 No wonder Curzon was prepared to show that within his velvet glove was an “iron hand,” should the Persians choose to resist his policy.49 Curzon had little difficulty in persuading his colleagues to adopt his policy, despite the jurisdictional and personal conflicts. Few shared his belief in the imperial mission. But all were committed to the defence of the imperial system as the basic obligation of any British government.50 and consequently had no sympathy for the doctrine of self-determination.51 Buoyed up with the victory of the First World War, they were also in an expansionist frame of mind.52 Where they differed was over how far the sphere of British supremacy should expand.53 There was little disagreement over Persia in London in the immediate aftermath of the war. Balfour and his officials at the Foreign Office had begun to turn away from regarding Persia as an independent state before the end of the war.54 In the wake of Allenby’s victory in Palestine in September (which made British ascendancy in the Middle East certain), Balfour, with the approval of the Eastern Committee, instructed the Minister at Tehran that his “guiding principle must be the permanent maintenance of British influence” in Persia.55 This set the tone of post-war policy. Curzon took it upon himself to devise a policy that ensured the “permanent maintenance of British influence.” The War Office supported tight control over Persia. Montagu was not opposed to British control of Persia, but he was sceptical as to Curzon’s approach. Cecil was undecided and open to persuasion. Through the medium of the Eastern Committee, Curzon hammered home his Persian project and got it adopted as British policy. The Eastern Committee took up the question of post-war policy in Persia during two meetings on 19 and 30 December.56 Curzon opened the discussion by arguing forcefully against a hands-off policy. Britain, he said, could not “let Persia stew in her own juice” for two reasons: “first because it would be absolutely fatal to her own future and prosperity, and secondly because it would be scarcely less dangerous to ourselves.” Britain’s stake in Persia had in fact increased in consequence of the war. First, Mesopotamia had become a British interest; so “you have the situation now that Persia, instead of being a solitary figure moving about in a chronic state of disorder on the glacis of the Indian fortress, has the Indian frontiers on one side of her and what is tantamount to a British frontier on the other.” Second, British influence had extended to north Persia in the wake of the despatch of troops to the area. Third, the Navy’s dependence on Persian oil had considerably increased. “You have only to consult the Admiralty to realise the enormous importance which they attach to the oil fields in the region of Karun.” In view of these interests, Curzon concluded, “we

INTRODUCTION 7

must insist upon maintaining there in whatever form…the general political dominance.” General McDonogh, DMI, representing the War Office, supported Curzon: “We should take control in Persia, both financially and otherwise.” The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Hamilton Grant, wary of growing financial and military commitments in the Middle East, conscious of the rising tide of nationalism in the region and sensitive to the feelings of the Indian Moslems, especially after the Khalifat movement, urged a limited involvement in Persia in an “ingratiating way.” He wanted Britain to pay modest subsidies to Persia in order to prop her up as a buffer state rather than force herself on the country. Cecil deprecated the halfway measure suggested by India. No subsidies were to be paid without there being control over the way in which they were spent, he maintained. A choice had to be made between two options: “You may either go away and let the Persians have a try at governing themselves, or you may take them over.” He himself was not sure which one to choose, though he was “a little inclined to think” that Persia should be left to her own devices. Britain’s commercial interests in the country were “very trifling.” And the protection of the oilfields did not seem to require control over the government at Tehran. Montagu suggested that Britain take control of Persia only at the invitation of the League of Nations or of the Persians themselves.57 Curzon was not certain that the League would ever call on Britain to establish a mandate over Persia. And, as Marling pointed out, an invitation was unlikely to be forthcoming from Tehran. If Britain kept out of Persia, Curzon warned, “somebody, we do not know whether it will be the Bolsheviks or the Turks or a revived Russia, will come in to fill the place.” To take effective control of the country, he proposed that Britain would have to get Persia to employ a British adviser to run her finances and a British officer to command her armed forces. By the second meeting Cecil had made up his mind and come round to Curzon’s view. Curzon’s proposed policy was in fact similar to what Cecil had earlier suggested. If Britain decided to remain in Persia, he had said, “we shall have to have control of the finances and control of the armed forces. If you have that you have everything that matters in a country.” After agreeing with Curzon’s policy, he left the meeting. Montagu was absent. Curzon, the only minister present, brought the meeting to a close by proclaiming “the Committee were generally in favour of the policy recommended by the Chairman and Lord Cecil.”58 A few days later, Montagu protested that “the Committee consisted of the Chairman, and the Chairman, of course, not unnaturally agreed with the Chairman.” The proposed policy, he also objected, went too far and would thus be offensive to the Persians.59 Curzon, however,


managed, on this occasion, to persuade Montagu to withdraw his objections.60 Curzon took charge of the Foreign Office in January 1919 and continued to chair the reconstituted Eastern Committee (the InterDepartmental Committee on the Middle East). So he was in full charge of the Anglo-Persian negotiations culminating in the Agreement of August 1919. He saw the Agreement, which embodied his policy, as a “great triumph,” and crowed: “I have done it all alone.”61

PART ONE COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

10

CHAPTER ONE Finance: The Power of the Purse

When asked how he intended to overcome possible Persian opposition to his policy, Curzon replied “the case will be settled by cash.”1 The financial inducements were employed first, to buy local allies and second, to obtain leverage on the Persian government. They were established methods of bringing a country into Britain’s “informal empire.” Towards the end of the war cash was offered to several members of Persia’s ruling elite to induce them to cooperate with Britain. In January 1918 Cecil suggested that the Minister at Tehran be allowed to “bribe those Persians whom he thinks worth bribing.”2 In May, the Minister reported that the Shah was prepared to appoint Britain’s favourite candidate, Vasuq ud-Daula, as Prime Minister, in exchange for a monthly allowance of 20,000 tomans. The Eastern Committee authorized him to offer 15,000 tomans (£5,000) a month. At the same meeting, the Committee agreed to pay Sardar Zafar, the chief of the Bakhtiaris, 1,500 tomans (£500) a month until the end of the war, provided that he remained the chief and “conformed to our wishes in every way.”3 In June, when Fars was in the grip of an anti-British tribal uprising, the Committee decided to pay the Governor-General of the province, Farman-Farma, a monthly allowance of 6,000 tomans (£2,000) as long as he remained “Governor General, and friendly to us.” A similar allowance was also paid to Quavam ul-Mulk, chief of the Khamseh tribes.4 There was little disagreement over these payments. While discussing the situation in Fars, for example, Balfour argued that, as Britain did not have enough troops in south Persia, “we must adopt the alternative of payments.” Curzon only objected that the amount offered to Farman-Farma was “excessive.” Montagu retorted “if we wish to bribe him to remain on our side, we must be prepared to offer a sufficiently large bribe to secure his adherence.” Keynes, representative of the Treasury on the Committee, had no reserva tion except that “we must limit the financial assistance we give to the very important people.”5


So the payment made to the Prime Minister, Vusuq ud-Daula and his Foreign and Finance Ministers (Prince Firuz Nusrat ud-Daula and Prince Sarem ud-Daula), the so-called Triumvirate, in order to get the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 signed, was not a new departure in British policy. What distinguished this payment was its magnitude. The Triumvirate asked for £200,000 for “oiling the wheels.” Curzon thought the demand excessive. He was prepared to pay £20,000 from Secret Service funds, but did not want “200,000 pounds worth of corruption.”6 The Triumvirate turned down the offer. The Minister at Tehran, Percy Cox, suggested that the payment be made as the first instalment of the loan envisaged in the Agreement. Curzon was wary of accepting this suggestion. “Should the present Cabinet fall,” he wrote to Cox, “the fact that the first instalment of the loan had been expended for such purpose would become known in Persia and would effectively damn the career of the Triumvirate, and if made public would excite the severest criticism here.”7 But Cox persisted. Curzon eventually left the matter to his discretion. On the day that the Agreement was signed, Cox opened a credit in the name of the Finance Minister with the Imperial Bank of Persia for 400,000 tomans (£131,000).8 However, the financial inducement mainly took the form of loans to the Persian government. At the turn of the century chronic budget deficits forced the Persian government to search for external funds to meet its current expenditure. Before 1900 Persia’s only external debt was £500,000 borrowed from the Imperial Bank in 1892 to pay off the compensation claimed by British-owned Tobacco Regie after the cancellation of its concession.9 But the foreign loans shot up to the equivalent of £6.8 million (of which £2.6 million to Britain) by 1914 and to the equivalent of £10.6 million by 1919.10 During the first half of the 1900s Persia was the scene of fierce Anglo-Persian financial rivalry. The substantial Russian loans in 1900 and 1902 awoke the British government to the political necessity of making advances to Persia. Loans in Persia, the Minister in Tehran impressed on the Foreign Office, “mean political power.”11 As a part of the price for the Russian loans, Persia had undertaken not to borrow from any other power without Russian consent, at least until 1910.12 To bypass and break “the back of the financial monopoly and control which Russia fancied her loan contracts had given her,”13 the British government decided to lend money to Persia through the medium of the Imperial Bank of Persia which was not strictly covered by the Russian ban.14 The Bank was a British-owned company but operated as the state bank of Persia.15 Loans were employed not only to counter Russian influence, but also to strengthen Britain’s hold over south Persia by establishing a prior lien on the customs revenues of the Persian Gulf ports,16 and to

FINANCE: THE POWER OF THE PURSE 13

boost the standing of the Legation at Tehran. “The more we get her [Persia] into our debt,” the Minister wrote in 1903, “the greater will be our hold and our political influence over her government.”17 So the supply of funds to the Persian government became the principal tool of British policy. “The broad principle upon which we must necessarily proceed,” the Foreign Secretary wrote in 1906 “is to obtain leverage over the Persian government by assisting them in a financial sense.”18 In the wake of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 the financial rivalry between the two powers began to give way to a joint control over Persian finances.19 To keep Persia firmly in the clutches of the British and Russian governments, the British Minister at Tehran, for his part, brought pressure to bear on the Persian government to prevent it from borrowing from private sources in 1910.20 In London, the Foreign Office went out of its way to discourage five separate City houses from lending to Persia.21 The Majlis resisted the AngloRussian financial control. The employment of the American Morgan Shuster as the Treasurer General symbolized this struggle. But the Russian ultimatum of December 1911, threatening to occupy Tehran, forced the closure of the Majlis and the dismissal of Shuster, and thus shattered Persia’s hope of solvency and financial independence.22 A few months later the “staggering” Persian government accepted a joint Anglo-Russian loan. One of the political strings attached to the loan was Persia’s recognition of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.23 The war cemented Anglo-Russian cooperation in Persia. Their financial partnership was fortified by an agreement to make joint monthly advances to the Persian government in 1915. This scheme was called a “moratorium” so as to allow the the Persian government to accept the loan without needing the Majlis’ sanction. It was simply a monthly advance of £30,000 disguised as a suspension of the services on Persia’s debts. It was shared equally between the British and Russian governments and was secured on the customs revenues.24 It was a measure of the wartime Anglo-Russian cooperation that, when in January 1916 the Russians defaulted on their share, the British government agreed to pay the whole sum for the duration of the war and charge it against the credit allowed to Russia for various other war services.25 The payments were employed to bring about the formation of pro-Allied cabinets and to curb the proGerman activities of the nationalists in Tehran. The two powers also made use of the moratorium payments to tighten their grip on Persian finances. They forced the Persian government to accept the formation of a Mixed Financial Commission, consisting of two employees of the Imperial Bank and the Russianowned Banque d’Escompte (who acted as the representatives of the two governments), two Persian representatives and the Belgian head of


the Persian treasury, in order to supervise the expenditure of the funds provided under the terms of the moratorium.26 The March Revolution in Russia shook the foundation of the AngloRussian financial control and revived Persia’s hope of financial independence. The pro-nationalist cabinet of ‘Ala us-Saltana, which replaced the pro-Allied cabinet of Vasuq ud-Daula, refused to withdraw the May instalment of the moratorium paid into the Imperial Bank. The British government subsequently cancelled the payments to the defiant cabinet. To emphasize the desire to be rid of Anglo-Russian supervision, the two Persian representatives on the Financial Commission resigned in the summer of 1917. The Commission practically ceased to function, though Britain, claiming the two British and Russian representatives in addition to the Belgian head of the Treasury formed a quorum, continued to oppose its formal dissolution until September 1919.27 But Persia’s financial plight had taken a turn for the worse during the war, and had thus compelled her Treasury to subsist on the AngloRussian monthly advances. The central government had lost its control over, and consequently its revenues from, several large provinces which had been turned into a battleground or the scene of nationalistic and tribal uprisings.28 At the same time, the AngloPersian Oil Company, claiming a large sum of compensation for the damage done to its pipelines by tribal raids of 1915, withheld the payment of royalties due to the Persian government.29 Moreover, the collapse of trade with Russia in the wake of the Russian revolution drastically reduced the northern customs receipts from 31.4 million krans in 1913–14 to 4.8 million krans in 1917–18. These receipts were one of the government’s main sources of revenue.30 So towards the end of 1917 the Persian government could hardly meet its day-to-day expenses. Sensing that the promise of resumption of the monthly advances might bend Persia to the wishes of the British government, the Persia Committee, on November 10, decided to instruct Marling, the Minister at Tehran, to ask the Shah for the appointment of a proAllied cabinet, preferably one led by Vusuq ud-Daula, and for the recognition of the British-commanded forces in South Persia (the South Persia Rifles) as part of the Persian Army. In exchange for the “loyal fulfilment” of these conditions, Marling was authorized to offer payment of the arrears of the British share of the moratorium (from May to November) plus a new monthly allowance paid by the British government alone. With “the Russian Government being apparently out of the field,” the Committee decided, “we should become the real paymasters of Persia.”31 But the British government was not alone in seeing a brilliant opportunity in Persia’s financial straits. The Anglo-Persian Oil


Company was also anxious to take full advantage of her pressing need for funds. On November 7, the Chairman of the Company, Charles Greenway, presented his board with a set of proposals for settling the dispute with the Persian government over the compensation claimed for the cutting of pipelines by tribesmen in 1915. Greenway’s scheme called for cancellation of the Company’s claim for compensation and immediate payment of the royalties due to the Persian government. In return Greenway hoped to get the Persian government to accept the Company’s main demands: first, the extension of the expiry date of the concession from 1961 to 1986; and second, the change in the basis of calculation of the royalty from 16 per cent of total profit to two shillings per ton of oil produced in Persia.32 The latter was particularly important to the Company. It aimed at bringing about not only a quantitative but a qualitative change in the concession. Firstly, the Company, under the terms of the D’Arcy Concession of 1901, had undertaken to pay the Persian government “annually a sum equal to 16 per cent of the annual net profits of any company or companies that may be formed.” Greenway now wanted to deny the Persian government a share in the profits of the subsidiary companies which were not directly involved in oil production in Persia. Secondly, calculation of the royalty on the basis of profit gave the Persian government access to the Company’s books and thus technically a say in its operations. Greenway now intended to free the Company from any accountability to the host country. “The Persian government,” he warned the board, “might at some time be induced to question the price at which we are selling our products to the British government.”33 The Company’s questionable pricing practice was not confined to the discount offered to the Admiralty under the terms of the contract signed in 1914. The transfer pricing between the parent company and its subsidiaries allowed the Company to hide part of its profit. This, together with some other dubious practices of the Company, in fact came to light in 1920. Acting on behalf of the Persian government, William McLintock (a British accountant), after inspecting the Company’s books, concluded that “certain undoubted errors and irregularities of accounting…had resulted in underpayment of royalty to the Imperial government.”34 He also disclosed “the price the Bakhtiari Oil Company and the First Exploitation Company [the two subsidiaries operating in Persia] sold oil to APOC Ltd was unsatisfactory in view of the world price then ruling.”35 And Armitage-Smith, who was in charge of the negotiations with the Company on behalf of the Persian government in 1920, informed the Foreign Office that the Company “had sailed very near the wind as regards deductions made by them for working expenses etc.”36


Greenway’s scheme of November 1917 was at least partly designed to forestall such revelations. He was confident that his timing was right for extracting the Company’s demands from Persia because of “the pressing financial needs of the Persian government.”37 On November 23 Greenway submitted his scheme to the Foreign Office hoping that the British government would give it the “strongest possible” support. He wrote to the Foreign Office that “the opportunity should be taken of the present urgent financial needs of the Persian Government to clear up all these outstanding questions.”38 The Foreign Office instructed Marling to back up the Company’s demands in Tehran. The Company’s “interests and development,” Balfour wrote to Marling, “will inevitably become a vital political factor in the Middle East, and I feel that we should make every endeavour to consolidate and perpetuate their position while the war lasts.”39 To Marling, an old hand at Britain’s financial diplomacy in Persia, Greenway’s timing was absolutely wrong. The conflict of interests between the British government and the Company did not escape his notice. “To place so considerable a sum at the disposal of the Persian Government just now,” he informed the Foreign Office, “would weaken one of our strongest holds on them. And though I fully realize the importance of the Anglo-Persian Company, I suggest for the moment it should give way to the major interests.”40 In other words, the oil money in the Persian treasury would reduce the dependence of the Persian government on the British govern ment’s monthly advances and would thus make it less docile. Although the money offered by the Company (about £200,000) would have tided over the Persian government just for a few months, Marling thought it was undesirable to do anything “to prolong the life” of the pro-nationalist cabinets in Tehran, even for a short time.41 Cautioned by Marling, the Foreign Office pulled back and evaded the Company’s repeated requests for support. So Persia remained totally dependent on the British government’s monthly advances until the end of 1920 when it received the arrears of the royalties after reaching a modus operandi with the Company with the blessing of the Foreign Office. The Company, having lost this opportunity, had to wait until 1933 to achieve its objectives. Marling, with the approval of the Eastern Committee, could now concentrate on dangling the promise of monthly advances before the Shah in order to get a friendly cabinet, led by Vusuq ud-Daula, installed in Tehran.42 The financial position of the Persian government continued to deteriorate. It was such that the government could not pay the officers and civil servants. By the summer of 1918, their salaries were in arrears for months.43 The growing need for funds, coupled with the presence of increasing numbers of British troops who began to occupy north-west Persia in March, eventually compelled the


Shah to accept Marling’s demand. In early August, the Shah summoned Vusuq ud-Daula to form a cabinet. Shortly afterwards the Shah received the first payment of his monthly advance of 15,000 tomans (£5,000) and the British government began to pay monthly advances of 350,000 tomans (equivalent to between £116,000 and £137,000, according to exchange rate fluctuations) to the Persian government.44 With the apparently pliable Vusuq ud-Daula in the saddle, Britain hoped to place her financial control on a firm basis. Curzon’s proposed Anglo-Persian Agreement had been partly designed to secure Britain’s hold over Persian finances. When in January 1919 Vusuq agreed to open negotiations for agreement with Percy Cox (who replaced Marling in September 1918), it appeared that Britain was on course to achieve this objective. Throughout the negotiations, Cox pressed for tight financial control by Britain. He “wished to add a clause under which Persia undertook not to go elsewhere for advisers and loans.” To Vusuq, who happened to be the Foreign Minister in December 1911, Cox’s suggestion was déjà vu. He objected to Cox’s wording on the grounds that it was “the same as that of a certain Russian ultimatum, and would not be accepted in so many words.” It was unnecessarily offensive, as Vusuq had already agreed to contract a substantial loan from the British government and to employ a British chief financial adviser. He reminded Cox that if a British adviser was to run the Persian finances, the latter “obviously shall not agree to loans from other quarters.”45 The British tutelage must at least be camouflaged more artfully. When in early May the Inter-departmental Committee on the Middle East (IDCE) met to discuss the draft Agreement drawn up by Cox, Curzon proclaimed the proposals “would result in Persia being to a certain extent in the hands of His Majesty’s Government, but she would be able to avoid the ignominy of being placed under a mandate. The degree to which she would be in the hands of His Majesty’s Government was to be discussed at this meeting.” As far as Persian finances were concerned, he called for the widest possible control. For example, he said that he “did not see why we should only consider South Customs [as the security]. What was to become of the sources of revenues which had formerly been hypothecated to Russian loans?”46 Even the government of India, which had strongly opposed the proposed Agreement, could sink its differences with London on one thing—the desirability of financial control over Persia. The Viceroy urged Cox to concentrate on this aspect of the Agreement. “British financial control,” he wrote, “is to be our first aim. We should not hesitate to jettison a good deal of the scheme to secure it.”47 The linchpin of financial control was the loan of £2 million to the Persian government, repayable in 20 years time at 7 per cent interest.


It was to be paid in equal shares by the Treasury and the Indian government. When the Treasury initially refused to sanction the payment of its share, the India Office expressed concern that “if this decision is to stand Sir P.Cox’s projects are doomed to failure. The whole scheme hangs on a substantial loan from the British government.”48 The loan was to allow the British government to secure its hold over the Persian finances in three ways. First, the payment of the loan was conditional on the employment of a British adviser to run the Persian Treasury (Article 1 of the loan contract). Second, as the security for the loan, the British government was to prolong its prior lien on the customs revenues of south Persia and possibly to extend it to the customs revenues of the north (Article 3).49 The prior lien on the customs receipts would enable the British government to discourage other governments or private sources from lending to Persia, because the customs receipts, as the main dependable source of revenue, were the principal security Persia could offer for external loans. Third, to batten down the hatches and secure Britain’s position as the sole creditor, Article 4 of the loan contract stipulated that Persia could pay off the loan at any time, but “out of the proceeds of any British loan which it may contract for.”50 Persia was thus barred from borrowing from any other source to repay the loan. So it appeared that Britain was well on course to secure tight financial control over Persia. But this was not to be. According to the Persian Constitution all the treaties and loan contracts concluded with foreign powers required the sanction of the Majlis. But the Majlis had been in “recess” since November 1915. Vusuq, however, proceeded to employ the Financial Adviser as if the Agreement were operative, despite the widespread public opposition to it. In October the Treasury recommended Sydney Armitage-Smith, an assistant secretary to the Treasury and chief Treasury delegate to the Peace Conference, as the Financial Adviser to the Persian government. But he did not take up his duties as the head of the fiveman British financial mission in Tehran until May 1920. The delay was caused by the settlement of his terms of employment and the twomonth journey from London to Tehran. In June Vusuq fell and was succeeded, with the support of the new British Minister, by Mushir udDaula. The new prime minister was a man who had been principally responsible for drafting the Constitution in 1906, and was thus more scrupulous about observing its principles. He suspended the implementation of the Agreement until its approval by the Majlis.51 This decision practically pulled the rug from under the newly-arrived Financial Adviser. Mushir, however, was not motivated purely by “constitutional scruples.” He, like other nationalists, saw the employment of the Financial Adviser as a serious threat to Persia’s financial


independence and thus wished to remove him from Tehran.52 Despite regarding Armitage-Smith as a highly competent financial expert, the new Finance Minister, Mukhber us-Saltana, was even more determined to get rid of him, because he had been imposed on the Persian government. The day after taking office, he ordered his officials to lock the Financial Adviser out of his office at the Ministry.53 Armitage-Smith complained that he and his staff were being treated “as Pariahs.”54 As a way out of “cold storage” he agreed to go to London as the Persian government’s representative to settle the outstanding differences with the Oil Company.55 At the end of August he left for London, not returning to Tehran until the following May. His assistant, J.M.Balfour, remained in Tehran to occupy “the sinecure of directing the activities of a suspended mission,” as he described it.56 With the arrival of Armitage-Smith in Tehran, Britain’s £2 million loan had become payable to the Persian government, but Mushir refused to touch it, arguing that if his cabinet drew on the loan it would appear “to assume that the Anglo-Persian Agreement is already in force independently of its acceptance by the Majlis and would thus expose them to attack in many quarters.”57 Even Mushir’s more pliable successor, Sepahdar, followed the same line. He, too, maintained he could not accept any advance out of the loan “without exciting dangerous opposition.”58 The only payment out of the loan remained the “slightly soiled” instalment of £131,000 paid to the Triumvirate for signing the Agreement in August 1919. As the financial clauses of the Agreement were suspended, the Foreign Office had to fall back on the monthly advances, paid to Persia since September 1918, as its principal financial lever in Tehran. But this lever had already begun to slip from Curzon’s grasp. In view of the guarantees envisaged in the Agreement for Britain’s financial supremacy in Persia, the necessity of continuing the monthly advances had been called into question by the Treasury and the India Office. Moreover, at the end of the war both departments were anxious to reduce their commitments in Persia rapidly. In April 1919 the Treasury informed the Foreign Office that it would continue to sanction its share of the payments to Persia only “for a brief period pending the settlement of future relations between this country and Persia.”59 The two departments agreed to sanction the loan of £2 million on the understanding that they would not be called upon to make further advances to Persia.60 Curzon himself hoped that the loan would soon render the monthly advances superfluous. Just three weeks after the signing of the Agreement, he wrote to the Treasury that “the time had arrived to discontinue the monthly payments” in view of the loan arranged for Persia.61 The Treasury was only too glad to oblige. The Minister at


Tehran, however, needed money to support the pro-British cabinet. Although the loan was not technically payable until the Financial Adviser took up his duties in Tehran, Curzon assured Cox that he would press the Treasury to continue monthly payments as instalments of the loan of £2 million 62 Cox objected to this decision on the grounds that the loan would be used up by the arrival of the Financial Adviser, who whould then find himself without any clout to consolidate his position and set about the reorganization of Persian finances. He realized “the difficulty of position between the Foreign Office and the Treasury,” but still insisted that it was essential that the monthly advances should be continued independently of the loan in order to keep the cabinet of Vusuq afloat.63 Curzon trusted Cox’s judgement. He did a volte face and appealed to the Treasury and the India Office to resume the payment of the monthly advances, warning “that any failure of the Persian Government to find the necessary financial support at present may lead to great trouble, even danger from Bolshevism.”64 The Treasury agreed to continue its share until the arrival of the Financial Adviser in Tehran.65 It took longer to convince the India Office. Eventually it “reluctantly” agreed to sanction the Indian share of the advances for a period not extending beyond the end of February 1920, which it considered sufficient to allow the Financial Adviser to arrive in Tehran.66 By the end of February Armitage-Smith had not yet arrived in Tehran. Cox paid the March instalment of the monthly advances without authorization from London. Thus Curzon had to plead with the India Office to sanction the payment, promising that this would be “the last payment to be made to the Persian Government on this account.”67 But it was not to be the last payment. Shortly after his arrival in Tehran, Armitage-Smith informed Cox that it would take him at least until September to balance the Persian budget, and suggested the British government continue to pay the monthly advances so as to tide them over this period. “To refrain from doing so,” he warned, “will be either to stifle the Anglo-Persian Agreement in its infancy or to oblige Persia to mortgage its last available resources to private creditors at ruinous rates of interest to survive.”68 In order to save his policy, Curzon once again had to try to prise money out of the Treasury and the India Office. It was to prove an uphill task. The sharp increase in the exchange rate of the Persian currency, caused mainly by Britain’s military expenses in Persia, had stiffened the Treasury’s opposition to the monthly advances. The sterling value of the 350,000 tomans advances had risen from £116,000 in September 1918 to £186,000 in March 1920.69 After some haggling the Treasury had agreed to the payment of its share at the full rate for May, but only a half for June and a quarter for July.70 Cox and


Armitage-Smith had asked for the full payments. So Curzon, at a meeting of the Eastern Committee (IDCE) in mid-May, personally sought to impress on Montagu and the representative of the Treasury “how essential it is on political grounds to continue the monthly payments of Tomans 350,000 till September.”71 A few weeks later Montagu agreed to sanction the full payments of the Indian share until September.72 But in the end the Treasury was only prepared to pay its full share until the end of June, informing Curzon that farther payments would have to be sanctioned by the cabinet.73 At the same time the Tehran Legation kept on pressing for money. Towards the end of June, just two weeks after taking charge, the new Minister, Herman Norman, had embarked on his first attempt at “cabinet making”. In his view, Vusuq ud-Daula’s cabinet, having failed to summon the Majlis, had outlived its usefulness. He believed an honest and popular politician could manage to summon the Majlis and get the Agreement ratified. His “choice” was Mushir ud-Daula.74 But Mushir told the Minister that “unless continuance of a full subsidy for some months was guaranteed, he could not take office, and that nobody else could either.”75 Once again the success of Curzon’s Persian policy appeared to hang on the continuation of the monthly advances. “We must not allow our policy to be wrecked for a few hundred thousand tomans,” wrote Hardinge.76 Faced with an intransigent Treasury and an unsympathetic cabinet, Curzon saw only one way out—a personal appeal to Bonar Law, who was then the acting Prime Minister. “We have no alternative but to support the new Persian ministry provided that it holds firm by the Anglo-Persian Agreement and plays the game,” Curzon wrote to Bonar Law on June 30. He requested that Bonar Law give the requisite authority for the payment of the monthly advances, reminding him that “they are not a gift but a loan secured on the Customs.” If this modest request were not conceded, he warned, “we may as well throw in the sponge and contemplate a Bolshevik Persia with all the consequences that will ensue.”77 The next day he again wrote to Bonar Law insisting that “an immediate reply is essential.”78 Following the Soviet landings at Enzeli in midMay,79 Curzon’s mention of the Bolshevik threat was taken seriously. Bonar Law promptly obliged Curzon by authorizing the payments from July to the end of October. The Treasury did not give ground without a parting shot. The Persian government, it wrote to the Foreign Office, should not be “encouraged to expect any further prolongation of the monthly subsidy after the payment in October.”80 It also terminated the Shah’s allowance which was conditional on the premiership of Vusuq udDaula. Nor was the India Office prepared to make further contributions after October.81 Curzon, however, hoped that a case


could be made for the continuation of these advances if the Minister at Tehran succeeded in getting the Agreement ratified by the Majlis.82 But Mushir ud-Daula showed no haste in summoning the Majlis. By the end of October the Majlis had not yet met to consider, let alone ratify, the Agreement. In the meantime the Persian Treasury’s deficit grew larger, as a result of the costly military operations launched in July against the nationalist and communist guerrillas in north Persia.83 So it seemed certain that Persia, after the termination of the monthly advances, would turn to other foreign sources to meet her current expenditure; consequently, the British government’s hold over Persian finances would weaken. Envisaging this threat, ArmitageSmith, before his departure from Tehran, came up with a scheme to consolidate the British government’s financial control. No arrangements had yet been made for the repayment of the advances to Persia since the beginning of the war. Armitage-Smith’s scheme called for the consolidation of all the British loans and the placing of an immediate claim for repayment before the Persian government. His objective was “to obtain a lien on all security still remaining which is not yet pledged.” “In the absence of such a precaution,” he warned, “this security might…fall into the hands of another Power.” “Once such a lien is obtained,” he argued, “His Majesty ‘s Government will only release, or postpone it in the case of a loan contracted by the Persian Government with his approval.” He had no intention of giving this permission at the time, but “merely forecasting the possibility of circumstances arising hereafter which might render private loans desirable.”84 In short, this scheme would allow the Financial Adviser (a) to control the Persian Treasury by regulating the cash flow (the customs revenues or loans); (b) to prevent other powers from gaining a financial foothold in Persia; and (c) to subordinate advances by private sources to the requirements of the British government. But there was a snag: Persia’s debt burden was not so onerous as to allow Britain to establish an unshakeable hold over her finances. Compared to countries such as Egypt, Turkey and China, which had surrendered their finances to foreign control, Persia’s external debt was rather small. This was due at least partly to the strong local opposition to the entry of foreign capital into the field of Persian finances. After 1870 the clergy, a section of the merchant class, the radical nationalists, and the traditionalist courtiers, all for very different reasons, joined forces to oppose the economic penetration of the country. Although Russia and Britain came to dominate the trade of north and south Persia respectively, and the Imperial Bank and its Russian counterpart gained a firm foothold in the money markets, this opposition succeeded in frustrating two major British economic projects (the Reuter Concession of 1872 and Tobacco Regie of 1890).


The opposition was particulary vociferous as regards foreign loans, which had become a highly emotive issue as the prime symbol of foreign domination. The government managed to contract its first Russian loan in 1900 only after suppressing widespread protests, Growing opposition to the Russian loans was one of the principal causes sparking off the Constitutional Revolution in 1905. The first Majlis practically banned the foreign loans. As the Majlis and the public remained suspicious of borrowing from foreign powers, successive cabinets had to tread cautiously in their search for funds. Moreover, after the war, two developments reduced Persia’s debt burden. First the Soviet regime suspended all the Russian loans to Persia (amounting to the equivalent of £6 million or more than 60 per cent of Persia’s debts). Second, the sharp increase in the sterling value of the Persian currency (from 55 krans to the pound in 1915 to 30 in 1919) meant a 60 per cent reduction in the cost of debt services paid by Persia on Britain’s pre-war advances. These advances were secured on the customs receipts of Fars and the Persian Gulf ports. The’southern customs receipts were paid into the branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia at the ports of collection or at the nearest branches. The Bank, after paying the services on the British loans, released the surplus to the Persian government. The services deducted from the southern customs amounted to £132,000 per annum (£68,000 paid to British bondholders and £64,000 paid to the Treasury and the government of India).85 The southern customs receipts, which had risen considerably since the beginning of the war (from 8.4 million krans in 1914 to 14.4 million in 1918 and 18.8 million in 1919, at ten krans to one toman) were far in excess of these charges. Even after consolidating all the British loans to the end of 1919 (including the loan of £2 million envisaged in the Agreement) the annual cost of servicing of them would amount to £470,000 against which customs receipts stood at £610,000 (the sterling equivalent of 18.8 million krans at 30 krans to the pound). So the debts were “fairly well secured by the southern Customs alone.”86 This cast doubt on the success of Armitage-Smith’s scheme which depended not only on Britain’s complete hold over the southern customs revenues, but also on its extension over the other sources of revenues Persia could offer as security for foreign loans. Only a simultaneous drop in the sterling value of the Persian currency and in the southern customs revenues might have provided a better chance of carrying out this scheme. Nevertheless, the Accounts Department of the India Office enthusiastically adopted Armitage-Smith’s scheme, and sought to come up with a way of calculating the British loans that would ensure “the annual charges to be imposed…would be greater than the receipts of the Southern Customs.”87 To maximize the amount of the


consolidated loans the Accounts Department (a) included some of the expenses incurred by the British government during the First World War as loans to the Persian government; (b) charged 7 per cent on the monthly advances which were supposed to be interest free;88 (c) fixed the exchange rate at 50 krans to the pound. The India Office recommended that the Foreign Office place the maximum claim before the Persian government. “In view of the opinion expressed by the Financial Adviser,” the India Office urged, “it would be well for HMG to present its claim to the Persian government in the fullest justifiable form…in order to obtain as complete a lien as possible on all security not yet pledged.”89 But such a questionable calculation was bound to be disputed by Persia and thus obstructed the Financial Adviser’s desire for a prompt settlement of the claims, so as to counter the imminent threat to Britain’s financial supremacy in the wake of the termination of the monthly advances. However with the departure of Armitage-Smith from Tehran, his scheme was temporarily shelved. Even before the termination of the British government’s monthly advances, the Persian government, under pressure of mounting military expenditure, had to turn to other sources for money. The Imperial Bank agreed to advance 500,000 tomans to finance the military expedition to Gilan.90 The Bank had been forced to close down its branch in the provincial capital, Resht, following the declaration of the “Gilan Soviet Republic” in June 1920,91 and feared the success of the revolutionaries would jeopardize its business throughout the country.92 But the Bank’s loan was soon used up. The Persian government asked the British government for a new loan in addition to the monthly advances. Considering the attitude of the Treasury, the Foreign Office could offer no money unless it was chargeable to the loan of £2 million provided for in the Agreement. But the Persian government was not prepared to accept any advance in connection with the loan of £2 million prior to the Majlis’ approval of the Agreement. Mushir ud-Daula told Norman that his government “was at its wits’ end to find a way of meeting extraordinary military expenditure without burdening itself in the future.”93 The Prime Minister abandoned the idea of a loan from the British government and turned to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, demanding the payment of royalties. The Company refused to make any payment on account of the arrears before the settlement of the dispute with the Persian government, but agreed to pay at once a sum of £350,000 as the royalty for the year 1919–20. This payment came just in time to extricate the government “from a position of financial embarrassment occasioned by the constant demands for money made by the Commander of the Cossack Division.”94


Thus the Bank and the Oil Company emerged as the financial backers of the Persian government. In the Foreign Office, there was some unease at the intrusion of these private sources into the financial relations between British and Persian governments. Referring to the Bank’s loan of 500,000 tomans the Foreign Office instructed Norman that “it appears most desirable to avoid the recurrence of such a possibility.”95 But the Persian government was to become even more dependent on these sources after November 1920. On October 24 the British government made the last payment of its monthly advances. On October 26 Mushir ud-Daula resigned after refusing to submit to the Legation’s demand for British control of the Cossack Division.96 Norman had to embark on another round of cabinet-making and to install a malleable Prime Minister. His choice was Sepahdar “of whose willingness to carry out our programme,” Norman reported, “I have already assured myself.”97But one of Sepahdar’s conditions for taking office was the continuation of the monthly advances for a couple of months at least.98 Norman pleaded with Curzon to provide the new cabinet with “the funds necessary to enable them to carry out the policy which now offers the best guarantee for entry into force of the Anglo-Persian Agreement at an early date.”99 Curzon had no hope of extracting further money from the Treasury or the India Office and could only suggest that “the Persian government find relief in other quarters. They have already received £350,000 from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and the Financial Adviser will endeavour, while in this coüntry, to obtain the arrears of subsidy [royalty] from the same source.”100 So the Foreign Office had to rely on the private sources to prop up Norman’s new cabinet. This meant a change of tactics. Having been divested of its direct financial lever, the Foreign Office continued to use finance as the “screw for applying pressure,”101 but through the medium of the Imperial Bank and the Oil Company. This required the Foreign Office to hold them on a short leash. The Oil Company appeared quite willing to serve as an instrument of British policy in Persia. The Company, for instance, had readily acceded to the Foreign Office’s request to withhold payment of the royalty for 1919–20 as long as the Persian government resisted the British legation’s demands as regards the control of the Cossack Division.102 But the Bank seemed eager to lend financial support to the central government whose collapse “would completely ruin” its business.103 The Foreign Office, however, managed to limit the Bank’s lending in November to a single loan of 450,000 tomans by employing the British government’s claim to prior lien on the customs receipts.104 So the Foreign Office felt able to “exercise a restraining influence” over the Bank and the Oil


Company and thus thwart Persia’s “manoeuvring to be in a position of complete freedom.”105 But Persia could soon offer the Bank and other potential creditors a new security on which the British government had not established a claim. In December, after reaching a settlement with Persia, the Oil Company released the arrears on the royalties of £808,000. The prospect of regular payments of the oil royalty provided Persia with a new, dependable source of revenue and thus with a new security for foreign loans. The Bank had already indicated its interest in making further advances to Persia on the security of the oil royalties.106 In December the Bank switched to this security for its advance of 450, 000 tomans.107 The oil money, however, gave Persia a respite from the constant search for foreign funds and thus a “measure of financial independence.”108 This, coupled with the news of the impending withdrawal of the British troops, undermined the Legation’s capacity to influence the course of events in Tehran. Sepahdar’s cabinet was brought down by a coup in February 1921. The new Prime Minister, Sayyed Zia, authorized the signing of the Soviet-Persian Treaty. Though agreeing to employ British financial advisers and officers, he annulled the Anglo-Persian Agreement. But by the spring, Persia’s coffer was empty again. She turned to the Oil Company, the Bank and, ominously, from the British standpoint, to American sources for money. To boost the standing of the Legation, the Foreign Office moved to keep the British sources under control and the Americans out of Persia. As the troops had started withdrawing from north-west Persia,109 Britain’s supremacy in fact hinged on the maintenance of her financial leverage over the Persian government. At the suggestion of its financial adviser, H.W.MacLean,110 the Foreign Office decided to take up the scheme proposed by ArmitageSmith in July 1920, namely to consolidate all the British loans to Persia and demand their immediate settlement. “In the present state of Persian finances,” MacLean did not expect Britain to be “able to appropriate large sums.” But his proposal would put Britain in a position to “collect and release” the customs receipts and other securities as she pleased. “The exercise of such rights,” he noted, “may prove a useful instrument to our diplomacy in Persia during the period that we may be indisposed to grant more financial or other help. By allowing the claims to lapse we release pledged revenues, which the Persian government can offer, perhaps to our discomfort, as security for new loans from us or from others.”111 MacLean’s list of British claims included several disputed items. But, for the sake of prompt settlement, he suggested Britain should initially demand the repayment of only those claims accepted by both parties as loan.


The Foreign Office sent MacLean’s proposal to the Treasury for consideration. The Treasury, however, was in no hurry. The Foreign Office grew more apprehensive as the new cabinet (led by Qavam usSaltana, who replaced Sayyed Zia at the end of May) had stepped up the effort to enlist American financial assistance. George Churchill, who was in charge of the Persian desk, warned that The present Persian Government contemplate turning Persia entirely into the hands of the Americans. They want to borrow a sufficient sum to pay off their debt to us and use the balance to organize a National Bank under American guidance and build railways. They also want to engage an American to reorganize their finances. He urged Curzon to press the Treasury for an urgent reply to MacLean’s proposal, “with a view to presenting the bill…. This would, at any rate, tend to show the Persian Government that we cannot be trifled with in the question of finance.”112 Curzon concurred that Britain should “take this opportunity to put in a demand for the repayment of all our claims.”113 In fact, he had anticipated this course of action as early as December 1918. He had threatened that if Persia refused to fall in line with British policy, he would “ask for the settlement of our claims, for the return of the moratorium and all the various other debts.”114 In Tehran, Norman was impatiently awaiting the instruction to act on MacLean’s proposal, particularly in order to foil Persia’s “attempts to borrow elsewhere than in Great Britain.”115 After several months the Treasury’s reply finally arrived. The Treasury was more concerned with recovering its money than providing the Foreign Office with a lever to influence Persia. It demanded that “the statement to be presented to the Persian Government should include all advances.” Although some of the “items may give rise to prolonged discussion,” it maintained, “this is outweighed by the desirability of arriving at a final agreement in respect of all the British Government claims against Persia, and by the danger that the delay may still further prejudice the claims in respect of the advances in question.”116 This defeated the purpose of MacLean’s proposal, namely to obtain control over Persia’s sources of revenues before she managed to wriggle out of the British government’s financial tentacles. As expected, the claims, when presented to Persia in the form demanded by the Treasury, caused “prolonged discussion” lasting several years. The Foreign Office tried to use the claims to bully or cajole Persia from time to time,117 and to deter the Americans from lending to Persia.118 The British government, however, failed to establish direct control over Persian finances.


No longer able to employ the threat of force or the promise of direct financial assistance, the British government resorted to the threat of switching off the private funds in order to exercise pressure on Qavam us-Saltana’s cabinet, which was bent on keeping Britain at arm’s length. In complete reversal of the previous cabinet’s policy, the Prime Minister refused to re-employ Armitage-Smith as the Financial Adviser and the War Minister, Reza Khan, dismissed British officers from the Cossack Division. They not only solicited American help, but appeared susceptible to Soviet influence. To compel Qavam us-Saltana to reinstate Armitage-Smith, the Foreign Office threatened that “[the] Prime Minister must realize that no attempt whatever will be made by His Majesty’s Government to influence financial firms in this country to assist the Cabinet in their present impecunious state if he persists in curtailing the Financial Adviser’s powers.”119 To counter the perceived growing Soviet influence, Norman warned that “Russia could neither help nor harm Persia, whereas Great Britain could do either, according as money for the use of the Persian Government was provided or withheld by financiers in London.”120 Such threats did not bring about any change in the cabinet’s policies. So, Norman, prodded by Armitage-Smith, decided to starve the recalcitrant cabinet out of office, and to install a new cabinet in the summer of 1921. He urged the Foreign Office to demand that the Imperial Bank and the Oil Company cease advancing money to Persia. “Without such loans,” Norman noted, “the present government must fall, because they cannot obtain money from elsewhere in time to save themselves.”121 The Oil Company was inclined to comply with the Legation’s demand.122 But the Bank was reluctant to “lend itself to measures inimical to its own interests,” and wanted to “keep a free hand to advance when and if substantial security is provided.”123 Some Foreign Office officials advised against jeopardizing the Bank’s business in Persia.124 But Curzon was determined to get the Bank to stop funding the cabinet as he could not remain “completely indifferent to the form of Government that exists at Tehran.” “The present Government is not only bad and corrupt, but it is…antiBritish. Any alternative would probably be an improvement.”125 He instructed Eyre Crowe, the Permanent Under-Secretary, that “the situation should be confidentially discussed with the Chairman and the representative of the Bank.” In their interview with Crowe, the chairman, Hugh Barnes, and the general manager, Sydney Rogers, declined to withhold the Bank’s next (and last) payment of £100,000 to the Persian government, on account of that year’s oil royalty. They pointed out that the money in fact belonged to the Persian government, and would be payable to her by the Oil Company in November. So the government was entitled to draw on the money by way of discounting bills. And the Bank, as Persia’s state bank, could


not refuse to discount them. They only undertook to give notice to the Foreign Office, should Persia ask for further advances.126 Towards the end of September, the Persian government asked the Bank for a new loan to finance the military operations in north Persia. The Bank’s chief manager at Tehran, James McMurray, urged the London headquarters, “in the Bank’s interest, to permit me to advance the further sum of £150,000 on this year or if insufficient on next year’s Royalties.” He warned that “it is with difficulty I have restrained the Prime Minister from borrowing elsewhere…. Our relations with the Government which have been most friendly are becoming strained.”127 The Bank’s general manager was inclined to accept McMurray’s recommendation. Rogers, who had served for many years in Persia, regarded himself as well qualified to judge the situation independently of the views expressed by the Foreign Office. At a meeting with Lancelot Oliphant, the head of the Eastern Department, he pointed out that the central government, facing rebellion in Gilan and Khurasan, would completely lose control over the remaining provinces if left without funds. The ensuing chaos could ruin the Bank’s business. He conceded that “Persia having chosen to take up with M.Rothstein [the Soviet Minister] and Co. must pay the penalty”, but he regretted the position of the Bank was so difficult that it could not help in this respect. He warned that the Foreign Office’s attitude might compel the Bank to wind up the business “which was still a political asset” to the British government in Persia.128 Curzon remained unmoved. He instructed Oliphant to inform the Bank that “until the Persian Government absolutely change their attitude, I do not see how we can possibly favour their being subsidised by a British institution.”129 The Bank’s chairman defiantly replied that his “primary duty” was to “safeguard the interests of the shareholders.” These interests would “obviously be imperilled if the Bank allows its operation to be controlled by political considerations. For the Bank it is no light matter to incur the active hostility of the Persian government and people, as is likely to be the case if the Board acts as desired in your letter.” He asked the Foreign Office to reconsider its position,130 and also enclosed a telegram from the chief manager at Tehran warning that “if assistance is not immediately forthcoming, Cabinet must fall and the consequence may be very grave.”131 “But this is exactly what we want,” George Churchill commented, “and therefore must reiterate the objection to further advance being made to the Persian government.”132 Hoping to precipitate the cabinet’s downfall, the Foreign Office continued to press the Bank to avoid lending to Persia. The Bank was far too dependent on the Foreign Office’s political support to ignore its persistent demands. It was the


Bank, rather than the Foreign Office, which had to reconsider its position. In mid-October, the general manager advised McMurray that the Bank should be guided by the wishes of the Foreign Office “in matters where our interests diverge.”133 However, the chief manager at Tehran, “a determined and independent personality,”134 had already made an advance of £100,000 to the Persian government without seeking London’s prior authorization. The general manager apologized to the Foreign Office, stating that he would not have sanctioned the loan “unless with Lord Curzon’s approval.”135 A few weeks later, when the bank raised the possibility of another loan to Persia, Curzon wrote angrily that it was a “deplorable situation that while HMG are pursuing one policy, the Imperial Bank for purely selfish reasons attempt to pursue another.”136 He warned that “the Bank cannot have it both ways,” and that they would have to make a choice between the claims to “conduct their operations on an exclusively commercial basis unaffected by political consideration,” and to “come running to us for political support whenever they are in trouble.”137 The Bank opted for the latter course. Early in December, after a meeting with Curzon, the Bank’s chairman sent a telegram to Tehran ordering the chief manager that “under no circumstances can any further advances be made to the Persian Government.”138 However, just before receiving this telegram, McMurray had made another advance.139 In the end, Curzon succeeded in turning off the private funds, but he failed to topple the “anglophobe” cabinet. The Foreign Office’s three-month-long struggle to rein in the Bank gave the Persian government a breathing-space during which the Army, financed by the Bank’s loans, managed to restore the central government’s authority in the north.140 By December the cabinet had consolidated its position. A few months later, the new Minister at Tehran, Percy Loraine, whose assessment of the Persian situation was different from his predecessor’s, impressed on London the desirability of supplying funds to Reza Khan and his army.141 This, coupled with the Bank’s repeated requests for the resumption of lending to Persia and the fear of America obtaining lien on Persia’s unpledged securities, led the Foreign Office to lift the financial embargo.142 The Foreign Office did not cease to resort to financial pressure on occasions. But as an instrument of policy it was of doubtful value. To apply financial pressure to Persia, the Foreign Office, unable to draw on government resources, needed the private companies’ cooperation, which, as we have seen, was not always forthcoming. Persia’s efforts to reduce her dependence on foreign loans further weakened this lever.143 Moreover it came to be seen as “a two-edged weapon,” its use entailing “a risk of jeopardizing our general interests,”144 since to


weaken Persia financially would render her vulnerable to Soviet influence.

32

CHAPTER TWO Force: “The Diplomacy of Violence”

Curzon maintained diplomacy must be backed up by force. He “refused to believe that any one who was not prepared to contemplate the employment of force in the last resort could possibly have a policy worth the name.”1 The First World War afforded him the chance to practise what he had long preached. Britain had grown wary of using force as a foreign policy tool in the wake of the Boer War. In Persia, Britain would only consider military action in reponse to a Russian occupation of the north. “Until Russia moves,” the Prime Minister explained in 1902, “we remain still; as soon as Russia moves in the north, we move in the south.”2 The Russian troops, taking advantage of the civil war between the Constitutionalists and the Royalists, began occupying north Persia in April 1909. Russia’s move did not cause panic in London since Britain had already recognized the north as Russia’s sphere of influence by the Convention of 1907. Britain did not respond by landing troops in the south. As a greater part of the south had been designated a neutral zone, Britain’s military action could, in fact, have provoked Russia into extending her military presence to the Persian Gulf. With the outbreak of the First World War, and Russia’s agreement to the extension of Britain’s sphere of influence to the neutral zone, early in 1915, Britain felt free to take military action in the south. In November 1914 a British detachment landed in south-west Persia to protect the oilfields.3 In July 1915 the government of India ordered the consulates in Meshed, Bushire and Sistan to raise local levies in order to seal off the approaches to the Indian and Afghan borders in cooperation with Russian troops in north-east Persia.4 (This was the inception of the East Persia Cordon, which in 1918, under the command of General Malleson, extended its operation to Central Asia.) In August a combined naval and military force landed at Bushire to launch a punitive expedition against the local tribesmen who had attacked the British residency at the port.5 Early in 1916 the Minister at Tehran, Marling, taking advantage of Russia’s plan to raise the numbers of the Persian Cossack Brigade6 to the level of a division, suggested the formation of a corresponding force under the


command of British officers in the south. He admitted this scheme “would lead to a definition of spheres of influence not far removed from partition.”7 Both the Foreign Office and the government of India approved the scheme.8 In March 1916 Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes arrived in Persia to organize the force, which came to be known as the South Persia Rifles.9 These military activities helped Britain protect her commercial interests in the south, foil the agitations of the German agents in the area, and overawe the local nationalists and tribes. But they had only a marginal influence on the political developments in Tehran. Britain came to rely on the large Russian military presence in the north-west to keep the Persian government in line and the pro-German agitations of the nationalists at Tehran in check. In November 1915, when Tehran was rife with the rumours of an imminent Perso-German alliance, Marling urged General Baratov, the commander of the Russian troops, to march on Tehran. The advance of the Russian troops to Karaj, 25 miles west of Tehran, forced the departure of many of the nationalists, along with members of the German, Austrian and Turkish Legations, from the capital, and the closure of the Majlis.10 The presence of the Russian troops in the vicinity of Tehran ensured a succession of pro-Allied cabinets, led by Farman-Farma, Sepahdar and Vusuq ud-Daula, until the spring of 1917. But the March Revolution in Russia confronted Britain with the prospect of dealing with Persia alone. The new Russian Foreign Minister had to make allowances for the views of the liberals and the revolutionaries inside and outside the government in conducting his policy towards Persia. Moreover, the discipline of the Russian troops soon evaporated. Many formed revolutionary workers’ and soldiers’ soviets. The provisional government at Petrograd was therefore unable to respond to Britain’s demand for a show of force at Tehran in order to restrain the nationalists who saw in the Russian Revolution the golden opportunity for shaking off foreign domination.11 As a result of the Russian Revolution, Marling reported, “the hope of the democrats and their allies at once revived, and with greater vigour than ever. It was felt, or at least argued, that Russian democracy could refuse nothing to Persian democracy, and that the opportunity must be turned to account to recall the Majlis, to obtain the recall of the Russian troops, to be rid of the Sepahdar Agreement & etc.”12 At the end of May the pro-Allied cabinet of Vusuq ud-Daula fell and was succeeded by a cabinet comprised largely of nationalists. The Bolshevik Revolution made it certain that Britain could no longer count on “Russian cooperation in any part of the world.”13 There were divided views on how to meet the new situation in Persia. Marling, after some vacillation, urged London to dispatch British troops to north-west Persia to replace the disintegrating Russian

FORCE: “THE DIPLOMACY OF VIOLENCE” 35

Army. This would enable him to force a docile government on Persia. Britain, he stressed, had little choice but “to rely on force.”14 The government of India deprecated the use of force, warning “in default of serious provocation—and it would be difficult to show that such exists—such a measure would finally discredit us with Persia and bring on us the odium of the whole Moslem world.”15 The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, consistently advocated conciliation with the nationalists in order to wean them away from the Germans. The Foreign Office was more inclined to resort to force rather than to seek to accommodate the nationalists. Most of them had long been branded “extremists.” “Our experience of the last two years,” Balfour wrote to Marling, “shows that the only thing that keeps the Persians straight is force.”16 But the War Office was initially reluctant to get involved in another “side-show,” fearing that “a military expedition, even if of small dimensions, might subsequently necessitate the dispatch of large reinforcements which could not be spared from other theatres.”17 The War Office, however, was not indifferent to the situation in north-west Persia. It wanted to protect the western flank of the Mesopotamian Front against the Turco-German threat, and to secure the safe passage of a small military mission under Major-General Lionel Dunsterville, along the 500-mile road between Qasri Shirin (on the Mesopotamian border) and Enzeli (on the Caspian Sea), to the Caucasus, where they were to shore up the local resistance to the Turks.18 Dunsterville reached Enzeli in mid-February. But the Russian soldiers’ revolutionary committee, which controlled the port, opposed his progress to the Caucasus.19 And the Persian nationalist guerrillas under the command of Kuchik Khan,20 the Jangalis (men of the jungle), who controlled the road between Kasvin (90 miles northwest of Tehran) and Enzeli, threatened to attack the mission if they did not retreat from the area.21 Dunsterville was forced back to Hamadan in west Persia. The road to the Caucasus was “entirely closed.”22 The War Office considered two alternatives to the dispatch of British troops to north-west Persia. One was to organize a volunteer force from the fragments of the Russian troops. But the British could not find many volunteers. The vast majority of the 50,000-strong Russian Army was eager to leave Persia, as ordered by the Soviet government.23 The Commander of the Russian troops at Kasvin told a British official that no matter how much “we paid them it would be impossible to persuade my Cossacks to remain in Persia and their only idea was to get back to look after their lands.”24 The revolutionary committees also did their utmost to frustrate the efforts of General Baratov and the other White Officers to form a volunteer army in north Persia. The revolutionary committee at Enzeli told


Dunsterville that they “were strongly opposed to the raising of volunteers in Persia,” and that “it was the duty of Russia to withdraw all Russian troops from Persia as soon as possible, leaving Persia to the Persians.”25 The volunteers were denounced as “hirelings” who had “sold themselves to the British.”26 In the end, only Colonel Lazar Bicharakhov, the Commander of Russian troops in Hamadan, managed, with the help of British subsidies, to organize a force of 1, 200 men. But, despite the War Office’s repeated request that he keep his troops in Persia, Bicharakhov insisted that they should only be employed in the Caucasus.27 The second alternative considered by the War Office was to take over the Persian Cossack Division, which the War Cabinet had decided to subsidize early in December.28 The Persian government, the War Office hoped, “might be ready to consider the officering of the Persian Cossacks wholly or partly by British officers, in fact an extension of the South Persia Rifles system to the north, for the period of the War, in return for assurances that British troops would not enter Persia.” In this event, the Cossacks “might be enlarged and rendered in a short time sufficiently reliable to safeguard the Qasri Shirin-Enzeli road.”29 But the Persian government was reluctant to recognize the South Persia Rifles, let alone agree to the extension of the system to the north. In fact, one of the main demands of successive cabinets was the replacement of British officers of the South Persia Rifles by nationals of a neutral country.30 With the withdrawal of Russian troops, which had turned the north-west into a battleground against the Turks, the Persian government saw Britain’s military presence as the only obstacle to keeping Persia out of the War. The Foreign Minister told Marling that his government was prepared to employ the Cossack Division to maintain the security of the northwest, provided that British troops evacuated east and south Persia.31 The Persian government, Marling reported, “would never accept the proposal to replace Russian by British officers or even to introduce… the latter into the division, except under pressure from our own troops at Kasvin or nearer” to Tehran.32 In order to gain control of the Cossack Division, Britain first had to occupy north-west Persia. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office, with the support of Curzon, sought to steer a middle course between the “alternatives of force and cooperation with the nationalists.” The former required the dispatch of troops to north Persia which the War Office was not yet prepared to sanction. The latter required the withdrawal of troops from east and south Persia which was not acceptable to any department or official in London. Curzon proposed that the Foreign Office offer limited political concessions and financial inducements to Persia in order to split “the Moderate from the Extremist wing of the Nationalist party.” If this policy met with no success, the Foreign Office still maintained


that “it might in the end become necessary to employ force.” Marling argued that the policy was not viable as it would leave the problem of dealing with the “extremists” unsolved, and that the “only means of dealing with the extremists is the employment of force.”33 Conciliation was useless as it was “trying to reconcile the irreconcilable.” He complained that he was “practically powerless” to prevent the “extremists” from throwing “themselves more and more into the arms of the enemy.” “We are rapidly approaching the situation of November 1915,” he warned, “which was saved by General Baratov’s column.” The remedy, in his view, was the dispatch of 10,000 troops to northwest Persia as soon as the Russians evacuated the area.34 Dunsterville and the India Office joined Marling in urging military intervention in north Persia. Dunsterville had noticed that the Persians “undoubtedly resent British intrusion.”35 Yet he asked for the dispatch of 5,000 men to burst the “Kuchik Khan Bubble” and to open the road to the Caucasus.36 The India Office was convinced of the necessity for military action “to safeguard the Western borders of Persia with the object of preventing Turco-German emissaries and influence from penetration into Persia and so the Afghan and ultimately the Indian borderlands.” The choice had to be made “between strong action on our part or leaving the Persian field open to the enemy.”37 The growing concern about the German threat, coupled with failure to organize a Russian volunteer force, or to take over the Cossack Division, ultimately led the War Office to decide on direct military action in north-west Persia. Field Marshal Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, like many politicians and other officials in London, believed that one of Germany’s principal war aims was to replace Britain as the dominant power in the East. The collapse of the Russian Army appeared to have opened to the Germans the route to the heart of Britain’s Eastern Empire, through the Caucasus and north-west Persia. To establish an effective barrier to Germany’s expansion eastward, Wilson proposed that British troops should “stretch out from Baghdad to North-West Persia, and, on a foundation of organised military strength between Baghdad and the Caspian, build up local organisations and work our way into the Caucasus.” Failure to do so, he warned, would entail “a grave risk of permitting the Germans to establish themselves in a position which will eventually lead to the downfall of our Eastern Empire.”38 At the War Cabinet meeting on 26 February 1918, the War Office pressed for military intervention in north-west Persia. The cabinet concluded that the policy of limited concessions to Persia “had come to nothing,” and asked the Persia Committee to consider the military option.39 Wilson attended the meeting of the Committee on March 1, and urged the dispatch of a force of 1,300 men to north-west Persia.


After hearing Wilson and considering the views of Marling, Dunsterville and the India Office, the Committee unanimously decided on military intervention.40 The Minister at Tehran was jubilant at the decision. Marling was confident that the arrival of British troops would enable him to install Vusuq udDaula, “who is almost the only string to our bow,” as the Prime Minister, and keep him in power.41 Early in April the first detachment of British troops—dispatched from the garrison in Mesopotamia—joined Dunsterville in Hamadan. In mid-May they entered Kasvin, 90 miles from Tehran.42 The immediate objective of the troops was to force Kuchik Khan’s guerrillas, the Jangalis, to open the Kasvin-Enzeli road—the main line of communication to the Caucasus. The Foreign Office and Curzon also wanted to see Kuchik Khan subdued for political reasons. He symbolized the opposition to British intervention in north Persia. He had compelled the Dunsterville mission to retreat from Gilan. Later his guerrillas captured Resht, the capital of Gilan, and arrested several British officials, including the Vice-Consul. He urged the nationalists and the clergy in other towns to follow his example and to “do all they can to prevent the British coming into North Persia.”43 The Jangalis, Curzon warned, were turning into a serious threat to British interests.44 In opposing the British, the Foreign Office believed, the nationalists at Tehran were “to a great extent” being encouraged by Kuchik Khan’s activities. A blow to his forces would therefore have a “great effect on the Nationalists.”45 On their way to the Caspian Sea, the British troops, 800-strong, had to cross the Manjil Pass, which was controlled by the Jangalis. On June 8 Kuchik Khan met the British Military Attaché at Tehran, Colonel Stokes, and the representative of Bicharakhov, whose Cossacks were acting as the advance party of the British troops. He agreed to let the Russians, who were quitting Persia, but not the British, who were regarded as an army of occupation, pass through his positions at Manjil.46 A few days later, after reconnaissance flights by British aeroplanes, the Russians opened artillery fire on the Jangalis and forced them to relinquish their positions at Manjil. On June 14 Bicharakhov occupied Resht.47 The British troops followed in his footsteps. The Jangalis kept on sniping and ambushing the British convoys on the Kasvin-Enzeli road. On July 20 they made a determined attack on British troops stationed at Resht. They captured the greater part of the town and burned down the British consulate. But after several days of bloody street-fighting, the British troops, backed up by aerial bombardment, managed to drive the Jangalis out of Resht. A British officer crowed: “They are in absolute terror of our aeroplanes.”48 Kuchik Khan resigned himself to signing a nonaggression pact with the British military authorities, whereby he


guaranteed an unimpeded use of the Kasvin-Enzeli road to British troops and agreed to discharge his German and Austrian military instructors. In return, the British undertook to refrain from interfering with the Jangalis’ activities in Gilan and in their relations with the central government. Kuchik Khan’s prestige, a British officer noted with satisfaction, “was severely shaken.”49 The Minister at Tehran was not content with the British troops twisting Kuchik Khan’s arm. He kept on arguing that the number of troops “were inadequate to secure success of our policy at Tehran … founded on force.”50 He wanted to have at least 1,000 troops at his beck and call in the vicinity of Tehran, in order to be able to coerce the Shah into appointing Vusuq ud-Daula as the Prime Minister and to cow the nationalists. “Presence of troops alone,” he wrote, “will probably suffice to preclude the possibility of opposition.” But he hastened to add “the possible necessity for movement towards Tehran must always be kept in mind nonetheless.”51 Marling became more persistent when he realized that the Britishsubsidized Persian Cossack Division could not be relied upon to cooperate with the Legation. Early in July, he instructed the Military Attaché, Colonel Claude Stokes, to organize a demonstration in support of Vusuq ud-Daula and against the incumbent Prime Minister, Samsam us-Saltana. Colonel Starosselski, the Russian Commander of the Cossack Division, supplied arms to some of the demonstrators, and promised his men would remain neutral. But the demonstration fizzled out when the Shah personally ordered the Cossacks to disperse the crowd. “The Cossack Division to which the British Government pays roughly £50,000 per month,” Stokes reported, with a touch of sarcasm, “has suppressed an agitation against the Cabinet for which the British Minister paid from £10,000 to £15,000.”52 Curzon, the Foreign Office and the India Office were all persuaded that Marling needed more troops to “steady the situation” and to install Vusuq in power. They asked the War Office to reinforce the British garrison at Kasvin —“within reach of Tehran.”53 The War Office had already instructed the British commander at Mesopotamia that it was “necessary, in order to support our Minister’s policy at Tehran and to induce the Persian Government to subserve British interests, to show sufficient force at Kasvin. A company or two of British infantry is not sufficient for this purpose.”54 A force consisting of 2,000 men and heavy artillery was ordered to move into north-west Persia.55 This doubled the number of British troops in the area. At the same time, the South Persia Rifles, with the help of reinforcements from India, succeeded in quelling the prolonged anti-British tribal risings in Fars.56 These operations in the south, “our activities in North-West Persia, the defeat of the Jangalis, and the obvious setback to the


Germans on the Western Front, all combined to induce the Shah to dismiss the anti-British government and to appoint one more friendly to us.”57 Early in August Marling managed to reinstate Vusuq as the Prime Minister after 15 months. So the Legation came to rely primarily on military force to keep the Persian government in check. A large part of Persia was under British occupation: (a) the East Persia Cordon running from Sistan in the south-east to Khurasan in the north-east; (b) the Indian Expeditionary Force, backed up by the South Persia Rifles, in Bushire and Fars; (c) the North Persia Force (Norperforce) covered the area between the Mesopotamian borders and the Caspian Sea. As long as the War lasted, the Legation could rest assured of the continued presence of these forces. But, with the end of the War, Britain’s military and political concerns in Persia began to diverge. Shortly after the Armistice, Cox, who had replaced Marling, impressed on the Foreign Office that the retention of British troops, particularly Norperforce, would “be of enormous assistance to our policy in Persia.”58 Curzon’s grand design—to create a cordon sanitaire around Russia—also required a continued military presence in Persia, at least as long as it took to implement his Persian policy. He conjured up all sorts of horrors in order to justify the occupation of Persia. If Britain were to withdraw her troops from Persia, he argued to the Eastern Committee on December 19, “there would be revolution, Bolshevism, and anarchy of a very dangerous description in the north, and in the whole of the country conditions scarcely distinguishable from chaos.”59 Yet the Treasury, the War Office, and the India Office, prodded by the government of India, soon began to question the necessity of retaining various forces in Persia. At the end of December, the representative of the Treasury on the Eastern Committee, J.M. Keynes, demanded immediate reductions in military expenditure in Persia, which amounted to more than £2.2 million a month (Norperforce £1.5 million, the Bushire Expeditionary Force £290,000, the South Persia Rifles £290,000 and Eastern Cordon £140,000).60 In April 1919 the Foreign Office was informed that the Treasury attached “great importance to the withdrawal of the British and Indian forces at present in Persia at the earliest possible moment.”61 At the same time, the War Office and the India Office asked for the withdrawal of the expeditionary force in south Persia, which had tied down more than 1,000 men at the cost of nearly £300,000 a month. “The military objectives,” General Radcliffe, the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, pointed out to the Eastern Committee, “had been attained and no further military gain appeared likely to accrue from the expedition.”


But for Curzon the British troops were primarily of political, rather than military, value. He was determined to oppose any reduction in the troops in Persia while the Minister at Tehran was engaged in the negotiations for the Anglo-Persian Agreement. He circulated to the Committee the telegrams from Cox stating that the withdrawal of the force from the south would weaken his bargaining position at Tehran.62 Similarly, when Montagu voiced doubt about the military value of the troops in north-west Persia for the British operations in the Caucasus, pointing out that the Batum to Baku route served as the main supply line, Curzon responded that “the Hamadan to Caspian troops helped Sir Percy Cox’s position in Persia.”63 Indeed, Cox relied upon Norperforce for the success of his negotiations with Vusuq. Firstly, he needed the troops in the vicinity of Tehran in order to keep the Shah in line. Marling had already warned that “as soon as we withdraw our troops the Shah would think that he could do exactly as he liked.”64 The Shah disliked Vusuq intensely, and, in the absence of British troops, was likely to dismiss him. Secondly, Cox feared the opposition to the negotiations by the nationalists, who relentlessly agitated against Vusuq’s cabinet, and Colonel Starosselski, who considered himself the custodian of Imperial Russian interests in Persia. He had prepared a contingency plan for a “demonstration by Kasvin garrison in the event of Starosselski or a few selected self-seeking democrats in the capital endeavouring to engineer trouble.”65 Thirdly, Cox employed Norperforce against Kuchik Khan’s guerrillas, who posed the gravest threat to Vusuq’s cabinet and thus to the negotiations, despite the non-aggression pact of August 1918 whereby British military authorites had undertaken to remain neutral in relations between the Jangalis and the central government. “Were our troops at the Hamadan-Enzeli line to be withdrawn or reduced below safe numbers before Persia can organise a force of her own,” Cox warned, “control of the Tehran situation would pass into the hands of Ittihad-Islam [the Jangalis] and the extreme democratic elements here.” He thought that Vusuq had to move promptly to break up the Jangali movement while sufficient numbers of British troops were stationed in northwest Persia. However, he believed that, “so long as our military authorities stand by their treaty and maintain an attitude of ‘neutrality’,” the government troops “can do nothing effective, and that some measure of active cooperation from us is essential.”66 So when, towards the end of February 1919, Vusuq decided to dispatch the Cossack Division to Gilan, Cox urged the Commander of Norperforce, Major-General H.B.Champain, to support the operations against the Jangalis, noting that “a good bombing at the psychological moment would quickly bring them to heel.”67 General Champain agreed to secure Resht, Enzeli, and the Manjil-Enzeli road for the


Cossacks, and to back them up by aerial bombing, though he saw no military reasons for these operations: “I am against the reopening of the Jangali question from a purely Military point of view, since the signing of the treaty our communications have been unmolested; I recognize the necessity of supporting the minister on the other hand.”68 In other words, the operations were purely coercive measures to further political ends. On March 24 the non-aggression pact which had become “very inconvenient” was abrogated. Then Captain Wickham, the political officer of Norperforce, delivered an ultimatum to the Jangalis to the effect that if they “persisted in their opposition to the Government they would incur our hostility.” Kuchik Khan was offered, as an alternative to submission to the central government, asylum under British protection in Mesopotamia. He rejected the ultimatum. On March 29 the British occupied Resht and launched air raids on the pro-Jangali villages. Two prominent leaders of the Jangalis, Haji Ahmed Kasma’i, a wealthy merchant and a leader of the Pan-Islamist wing of the movement, and Dr Heshmat, a young physician and a liberal nationalist, were forced to surrender, with 400 and 200 armed men respectively, to Starosselski’s Cossacks. At the court martial Dr Heshmat denied the charge of armed insurrection against the central government, stating that “his sole aim was to oppose the British.” He was executed on May 13. British mediation, however, saved the life of Haji Ahmed from Starosselski’s reign of terror in Gilan. The remainder of the Jangalis were broken up by the Cossacks and the British bombed the remnants into scattered bands of fugitives. Kuchik Khan, with a handful of his followers, melted into the thick forest, to re-emerge a year later after the British withdrawal from Resht and Enzeli.69 After the successful conclusion of the negotiations and the signing of the Anglo-Persian agreement in August, Cox still wanted to retain the troops in order to get the Agreement ratified and implemented. This was precisely what the government of India feared. “Were Cox’s scheme put into effect,” the Viceroy had told Montagu, “chances of our ever being able to withdraw from Persia would insensibly decrease to zero.”70 Curzon’s Persian policy, Chelmsford believed, “would only stand as long as it had the support of British bayonets.”71 He had consistently deprecated reliance on military force in Persia since 1917. Such a policy would lead to increasing demands on Indian resources and would add fuel to the Muslims’ agitations in India. Curzon’s argument that his policy had been devised primarily for the benefit of India’s defence, cut no ice with the Viceroy. He was opposed to the forward policy of defending India. He, like most of his predecessors, wanted to consolidate and not to expand. Moreover, London was often suspected of disguising Imperial interests as those


of India in order to extract money and men from Delhi. “For ourselves in India we have little concern with what may happen in Persia,” wrote the Viceroy to Montagu. “If His Majesty’s Government wish to give military support to Persia, it must be at the expense of the Imperial Exchequer.”72 The Viceroy had already asked Montagu to press for the withdrawal of Indian troops, under Major-General Malleson, from east Persia. From June 1919 to February 1920, Curzon fought off Montagu’s repeated demands for the recall of Malleson’s forces, arguing that the Bolsheviks would be in east Persia within a fortnight if the troops were evacuated from the area. Montagu responded that the defence of Persia against the Bolsheviks was “not an Indian matter…. I would stick within our frontiers.”73 The fate of the East Persia Cordon was sealed when the War Office, under increasing pressure from the Treasury to cut back its annual estimates, decided not to make further provisions for the maintenance of the troops in south and east Persia. “Fancy spending the whole cost of a British Territorial Army on a weak and futile interference in the affairs of Persia,” wrote Churchill, the War Secretary.74 Cox continued to warn that the withdrawal of the force would jeopardize the Agreement.75 Curzon sought to persuade Montagu to authorize the payment from Indian revenues for the maintenance of the force on a reduced scale. “The result of complete withdrawal,” he told Montagu, “might be that the whole Anglo-Persian Agreement would crumble. North-East [Persia] was part of the glacis of India.” Montagu was not inclined to sanction the expenditure of Indian revenues in Persia “when the Government of India themselves disclaim interest in it.” Moreover Curzon’s admission that his policy rested on military force lent credence to the Viceroy’s criticisms and hardened Montagu’s attitude. He told Curzon that “the retention of Malleson’s force was a Foreign Office matter. It was only there to keep up the Anglo-Persian Agreement.”76 Early in May the Cabinet ordered the withdrawal of the Eastern Cordon.77 While Curzon was engaged in these interdepartmental tussles, the officials at Tehran were hard at work implementing the military clause of the Agreement in order to put Britain’s military control on a firm foundation, secure from the uncertainties of bureaucratic politics in London. In November 1919 Brigadier-General William Dickson, who had served as the inspector-general of the East Persia Cordon, was appointed to head the seven-man British military mission to Tehran,78 whose task, under the terms of the Agreement, was to organize a uniform Persian Army absorbing the Cossack Division, the Gendarmerie and other small units. He was chosen in preference to other candidates, including General Dunsterville, because he knew “Persia, its language and people.” He was “most tactful and popular with the people of this country,” and had “decided diplomatic


instincts.”79 He needed all these qualities for his extremely unpopular task. The Persian nationalists had long espoused the formation of a uniform national Army.80 But their idea of such an army was very different from Curzon’s. He maintained that “the Commander ought to be an Englishman,” with the power to “colour and control” the whole administration of the Army.81 Montagu described Curzon’s scheme as “offensive to the Persian government and national feeling.”82 Chelmsford predicted that it would be strongly resisted by the Persians.83 In mid-December Dickson arrived in Tehran and started negotiations with the Persian military authorities led by the Assistant War Minister, Salar Lashkar (the younger brother of the Foreign Minister, Prince Firuz). There was soon widespread public agitation against the Anglo-Persian military commission, which affected its proceedings. “In framing their scheme for the reorganization of the new uniform force,” Dickson reported, “the British Commission, in consideration of the fears of their Persian colleagues, fears which appear to be largely due to the present temporarily disturbed political situation…had to make concessions,”84 Despite these “concessions,” it proved very hard to secure the approval of all the Persian members of the Commission.85 And the public agitations continued unabated after the completion of the Commission’s deliberations in early April. “A good deal of pamphleteering and anti-British talk,” the Military Attaché at Tehran reported, “is prevalent while the city is generally quiet. This evidently is mainly due to the intrigues of Starosselski and misleading reports circulated regarding the recommendations of the military Commission.”86 What really added fuel to the public anger was the suicide of Colonel Fazlullah Khan Aq-Evli, a British-educated Gendarmerie officer and the Persian secretary to the Commission, just four days before the formal signing of the Commission’s report. The Military Attaché reported the suicide “was due to overwork and a love affair.”87 But according to Persian sources, he committed suicide after having been harshly censured by the War Minister, Sepahdar, for refusing to sign the Commission’s report.88 General Hassan Arfa, who was then a Gendarmerie officer, later recalled that Fazlullah Khan “was found dead in his room in full parade uniform with a revolver in his hand. In front of him on the desk was a letter written by him stating that it was against his conscience, being a patriotic Iranian, to agree to the subordination of the Iranian Army to a British command; he preferred to quit this world.”89 Indeed, the Commission’s report provided for tight British control over the Persian armed forces. Paragraphs 116 and 300 of the report envisaged that a British officer, with the title of the Organizer-inChief of the Army, would be charged with “advising the War Minister


on all matters affecting any policy.” He would prepare the budget and supervise its expenditure. He would be responsible for “the efficiency of the army in peace and war.” In effect, he was to act as the chief of staff of the Persian Army. Moreover, Persia was to be divided into seven military areas, each to be commanded by a British officer (paragraph 229).90 The Viceroy criticized the report for not even bothering to camouflage British control. A British officer, he noted, was “designated coram populo as organiser-in-chief and British officers [were] placed in command of each area.” This was bound to “wound Persian amour propre and prevent the force from being regarded as really a Persian force.” He warned against “Egyptianisation of Persia.”91 The scheme was, however, to remain on paper. Caught between the growing domestic opposition and Britain’s persistent demands for the adoption of the report’s recommendations by his cabinet,92 Vusuq udDaula played for time. After the downfall of Vusuq’s cabinet, at the end of June, the possibility of the formation of a British-commanded Army seemed even more remote. The new Prime Minister, Oliphant noted, “might quite possibly tear up the Anglo-Persian Agreement. Mushir ud-Daula was nominally pro-British but unfortunately had no backbone.”93 As it happened, in mid-July Mushir ud-Daula told General Dickson that the Anglo-Persian Military Commission “should go into suspension until the assembly of the Majlis as the employment of foreign officers without the approval of Parliament was contrary to the Constitution.”94 Norman (who had replaced Cox in mid-June) observed that this decision had been “imposed on the Government by public opinion.”95 The British military mission, like the financial mission, was practically disbanded. So Curzon had to fall back on Norperforce. To shore up his Persian policy, he now needed the force not only to keep the Persians in check, but to deter the Bolsheviks from moving on Tehran after the landing of a Soviet force at Enzeli in mid-May.96 But the War Office wanted to evacuate north-west Persia as soon as possible. After the withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus in the summer of 1919,97 the continued occupation of north-west Persia could no longer be militarily justified on the grounds of protecting a supply route to Russia. However the War Office had initially agreed to retain Norperforce in order to avoid undermining Curzon’s Persian policy and to “endeavour by bluff” to prevent Bolshevik incursions.98 Shortage of money and men soon led the War Office to reassess the military commitment in Persia. Churchill was continually under pressure from both Lloyd George and the Chancellor, Austen Chamberlain, to cut back military spending.”99 The rapid demobilization had drastically reduced the number of troops at Wilson’s disposal. The British troops, he noted, were “scattered over


the world, weak everywhere, strong nowhere, and with no reserves.”100 He wanted to concentrate the War Office’s diminishing resources on the areas that he considered vital to the defence of Britain and the Empire. Persia did not figure high in his list of priorities: “I put our theatres in order of priority, viz: England, Ireland, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Rhine, Palestine, Persia, Constantinople.”101 He wanted the troops to come out of the “plebiscite areas, Constantinople, Palestine and all Persia, and the greater part of Mesopotamia.”102 “The idea of maintaining troops in Mesopotamia or Persia for the defence of India,” he maintained, “is radically unsound.”103 Moreover, at the beginning of May the War Office began to fear a full-scale Soviet attack on Persia. “Unless his Majesty’s Government are prepared to go to war with Russia” Wilson wrote to Churchill, “there is little chance of our being able to prevent them doing so.”104 Churchill had already made it clear that the military resources did not allow “us to offer effective resistance to a Bolshevik advance short of the main frontiers of India.” The government, he had urged, “should not, therefore, enter into obligations with the Persian government, or excite hopes among the Persian people of protection which it is physically beyond their power to extend should real danger arise.”105 So the British troops, Wilson urged, should evacuate Persia so as to avoid humiliation at Soviet hands. The Soviet landing at Enzeli, on May 18, strengthened the War Office’s argument for the withdrawal of Norperforce. The British garrison at the port, Churchill wrote to Curzon, was “first rounded up and then allowed to retire in circumstances of great humiliation to the British arms.”106 Having urged the immediate evacuation of Enzeli five days before the Soviet landing, Wilson “could not resist writing to Curzon a private letter of ‘I told you so.’”107 “Perhaps ‘the regrettable incident’ at Enzeli,” he wrote to Curzon, “which has now occurred and which will be followed by others may lead you to change your mind and even trust, a little, in the advice of the responsible military advisers.”108 In his tart reply, Curzon accused the “responsible military advisers” of misleading the Foreign Office by underestimating the Soviet military threat.109 The mutual recrimination and finger-pointing set the scene for a series of show-downs in the cabinet between Curzon and Milner, the Colonial Secretary, who regarded the protection of Persia against the Bolsheviks as essential to the security of the Empire,110 on the one side, and Churchill and Wilson (who often took part at the meetings as the military expert) on the other, in the summer of 1920. “For months,” Wilson wrote, “I have been begging the cabinet to allow me to withdraw from Persia.” Now the War Office, he thought, “must insist in order to avoid further disasters.”111 On May 21, when the


cabinet met to discuss the Soviet landing at Enzeli, Churchill and Wilson did insist on evacuating Persia. But as a result of the tenacious opposition of Curzon and Milner, the cabinet only decided to concentrate the troops at Kasvin, 130 miles south of Enzeli.112 On June 18 Wilson again urged the Cabinet to order the withdrawal of Norperforce. Wilson’s proposal “brought Curzon and Milner to their feet. It was quite clear that they would resign if this were done. Lloyd George therefore temporized and said he would wait for Percy Cox at Baghdad to get home.”113 It took more than a month for Cox to arrive in London to advise the cabinet on the Persian situation. In the meantime, the War Office stepped up its campaign for the withdrawal of the troops from Persia. The cabinet discussions were leaked to Lord Beaverbrook’s Daily Express which criticized the cabinet for deciding to lend military support to Persia “not to resist a foreign invasion or to secure Persia against foreign aggression, for the Russian Bolsheviks who came to Enzeli have departed,114 but to maintain the Government of the Shah against the revolutionary elements in his own country.” The decision, the paper wrote, was a victory for Curzon who “represents the far-flung imperialism of Palmerston, without the resources of which Palmerston disposed.” Ignoring “the limitations of our purse and our manpower,” Curzon’s policies risked “bleeding the Empire to death.” “It is a matter for deep regret,” the paper added, “that the Prime Minister should be won over to these grandiose adventures.”115 At the same time, Churchill and Wilson appealed to Lloyd George to support the evacuation of Persia.116 By August Cox was in London. On August 6 the cabinet resumed the discussions about Norperforce. Curzon and Milner once again “made it clear that they would resign if we came out of Persia.”117 Cox also opposed the withdrawal of Norperforce, arguing that it would increase the military difficulties in Mesopotamia and that “there could be no greater blow to our prestige than the sudden abandonment of our Persia policy and the evacuation of that country by the British troops.” On the other hand, Churchill and Wilson tried to impress upon the cabinet “with the utmost earnestness the risks that were being run by the dispersion of our forces in different theatres.” “Although these forces are inadequate in Persia and elsewhere,” they argued, “in the aggregate they absorbed the whole of our troops, and no emergency reserve of any kind was available.”118 On August 12 the cabinet finally reached a decision. Despite “the strong objections on military grounds to the retention of the British troops in Persia,” Lloyd George concluded that they “should be maintained at their present strength119 until the result of the discussion in the Persian parliament on the question of ratification of the Anglo-Persian Agreement was known.”120


Curzon carried the day thanks to the Prime Minister’s support. It is true that Lloyd George insisted on handling the major European questions personally through his “diplomacy by conference,” so ignoring his Foreign Secretary.121 Yet he left Curzon to conduct the Eastern questions which interested him most.122 He particularly did not wish to alienate Curzon totally by undermining his pet project the Persian policy. When asked by Wilson to support the withdrawal from Persia, he replied “Curzon would not stand it.”123He therefore sided with Curzon, despite his own disapproval of the military commitment in Persia.124 At the end of the cabinet meeting he wrote to Curzon: “If I had not felt that withdrawal from Persia would have let you down, I certainly should have voted for withdrawal in view of our serious financial [problems].”125 The cabinet decision meant that Norperforce could not be withdrawn before the following spring because of the climatic conditions in north Persia. Back in Persia, General Champain, after two years at the head of Norperforce, and particularly after his travails at Enzeli, felt “worn out,” and decided to retire. Edmund “Tiny” Ironside replaced him in early October. Born in 1880, he was the youngest major-general in the British Army.126 Wilson described him as “beyond question one of the most rising, if not the most rising, of the young fellows in the army, a very fine headpiece, a wonderful linguist, great physical strength, and infinite courage and resource.”127 Yet General Ironside’s career had taken a rather frustrating course since the end of the First World War, reflecting the widening gap between Britain’s political ends and her military means. He happened to serve in the areas where this gap was most glaring. He had commanded troops in Russia (Archangel, October 1918-September 1919) and Turkey (Ismid, July-August 1920), where the cabinet had hoped, in vain, to roll back the Bolsheviks and to contain the nationalists respectively. Now he found himself in a similar situation. The War Office was no longer willing or able to shore up Curzon’s Persian policy. “This was the third time since the Armistice in 1918,” he wrote in his diary, “that I had found myself commanding unpopular military forces in widely separated parts of the world. I was rapidly becoming a bird of ill omen.”128 The choice of Ironside was indicative of the War Office’s intentions in Persia. After commanding the evacuation of north Russia under perilous conditions, Ironside come to be known as “very much an expert in risky withdrawals.”129 He was to hold the fort pending the cabinet’s decision to withdraw from Persia and to avoid embroiling his troops in the country. In the meantime, he “should endeavour to establish his personal influence with Starosselski and any other Persian forces, so that their energies may be directed to the best advantage in order to meet the wishes of our political authorities in


Tehran.”130 In other words, he was to try to turn the local military forces into the Legation’s tool in lieu of Norperforce. Just a week after his arrival in Persia, Ironside came to see himself as the only man on the spot capable of reviving Britain’s flagging fortunes in the country. The Minister at Tehran, in his view, was “an indeterminate little man, a charming host, but not what the Canadians call a hustler.” He thought nothing was “being done to get the agreement through.” (Harold Nicolson describes Norman as a diplomatist of intelligence and vision.131 Norman was, to say the least, unenthusiastic about Curzon’s Persian policy. In fact he later described it as “an impossible and insane policy.”132) No admirer of diplomats, Ironside had only contempt for a soldier with “diplomatic instincts.” General Dickson,133 he wrote, “is not a man of outstanding ability and is not a soldier. He has commanded nothing, finding that he had nothing to do he got mixed up in politics…. He ought to go away.” He, however, agreed with Norman and Dickson on one thing. The British could not take control of the local military forces “with Norperforce away and Starosselski here.” He wanted to set about his task as soon as possible since “the formation of a British-controlled army is impossible, without the menace of Norperforce during its commencement.” And Starosselski must be removed from the head of the Cossack Division. Starosselski had proved a hard nut to crack. With the implicit support of the Shah, he had earlier opposed Britain’s military scheme, adamantly refusing to allow his Cossacks to be absorbed into a British-commanded uniform army.134 His removal, Ironside noted, “will require great firmness and great pressure on the part of the Minister. Surely we have enough with the money bag to insist upon this. A convenient moment must be chosen and it must be done and the substitution of British officers carried out immediately as a fait accompli.”135 Wilson anxiously observed: “Tiny wants to take over the whole thing himself and kick out Dickson at Tehran, and kick out Starosselski, the head of the Persian Cossacks.”136 He feared that Ironside’s zeal might prolong the military commitment in Persia; therefore he decided to wire him “to stand back. I don’t want to get embroiled in that beastly country.”137 Ironside had already set about removing Starosselski. Towards the end of October when the government forces under the command of Starosselski suffered a setback in their campaign against the Bolsheviks in north Persia, Ironside seized on the opportunity. He first ordered the British advance column at Manjil not to render any help to Starosselski: “From a political point of view it would be very advantageous to us to leave Col. Starosselski to make a mess of things as it would then be more easy for me to get rid of him.”138 Then he and Norman, without informing London, descended on the Prime Minister and “urged him at once to dismiss Col. Starosselski and put a Persian


in command of the Division as a fighting head with British officers to assist him.” They threatened the British subsidies to the Division would be cut off if Starosselski was allowed to retain his command. Mushir ud-Daula agreed to dismiss all the Russian officers,139 but refused to appoint British officers to the Division, arguing that it would weaken the position of his government and the prospect of the ratification of the Agreement. As a compromise, he proposed to employ officers from a neutral European country to reorganize and command the Division. If Norman persisted in his demand, Mushir ud-Daula added, he “would be bound in conscience to resign.”140 Norman, whipped up by Ironside, was prepared to let the government—which had come to power with his enthusiastic support —go, rather than abandon his demand. He turned to the Shah and asked him to sack the Russian officers and to appoint his uncle as the “nominal” commander of the Division with British officers under him. He threatened that he would not allow further money to be paid to the Cossacks and that London would immediately withdraw Norperforce if his advice was not taken. The Shah was in a dilemma. He feared, on the one hand, that any change in the Cossack Division might undermine its loyalty to the Crown, and, on the other, that his capital would be left defenceless if Norman’s threats were carried out. He grudgingly agreed to fire the Russian officers.141 Mushir ud-Daula resigned. Norman nominated a new Prime Minister, Sepahdar, who had already given his assent to the military scheme. The affairs of the Cossacks were temporarily handed over to Colonel Henry Smyth, who had served as a member of the British military mission under Dickson. Sardar Humayun, a member of the Royal family, who had served as a diplomat in Europe for many years, was appointed the nominal commander of the Division. “He was quite frank in acknowledging that he was not a soldier, and that he had been appointed to ensure the fidelity of the Brigade to the Shah,” General Ironside noted.142 “Expulsion of Starosselski and his Russian officers and virtual control by British officers of the only regular Military Force in Persia,” wrote Norman to the Foreign Office, “would make us practically independent of the vagaries of Persian internal politics and in the absence of external developments ensure gradual execution of the agreement.”143 London faced a fait accompli. The War Office, wary of further commitments in Persia, wanted Dickson (who was attached to the Foreign Office), rather than Ironside, to assume responsibility for reorganizing the Cossack Division.144 While realizing that it would not be easy to find men and money for reorganizing the force,145 the Foreign Office welcomed the dismissal of Starosselski who was not only an obstacle to the formation of a British-controlled army, but suspected of being tempted to throw in his lot with the new regime in


Russia. “Mr. Norman and General Ironside,” Oliphant noted, “are proving an energetic combination.”146 It now appeared that the military clause of the Agreement could be implemented whether it was ratified or not. The Cossack Division, Curzon observed, was the “only force capable, in existing circumstances, of providing a nucleus for the new Persian army we desire to create.”147 This optimism on the part of Norman and the Foreign Office was, however, premature. Ironside’s scheme soon fell through. Immediately after the formation of the new cabinet by his nominee, Sepahdar, Norman demanded that the Prime Minister should at once authorize the reorganization of the Cossack Division, hoping it would be fit to replace Norperforce by the time of the latter’s withdrawal. He wanted the British officers to be in “executive command” and to have “complete financial control.” But Sepahdar, who had come to power precisely because of his prior acceptance of Ironside’s scheme, now feared that the employment of British officers “would certainly arouse widespread disapproval and possibly even cause disorder.”148 Norman and Ironside, however, persisted in their demands and gave him a “friendly ultimatum.” Torn between the British demand and public opposition, he asked the Shah to relieve him of the responsibility by inviting a council of notables to decide on the issue. On November 27, while a large crowd in the street were calling on the participants to turn down the Legation’s demand, the council met, declaring itself unable to “pronounce on so important a question as the formation of a Persian force under British officers, which could only be decided by the Majlis.” The representative of the senior clergy and the nationalists, however, pointed out that the employment of British officers could be provocative to the Bolshevik forces in north Persia and “emphasised the importance of maintaining neutrality between Great Britain and the Bolsheviks.”149 Ironside’s scheme, like the Agreement, had to await the Majlis’ sanction. But Sepahdar, like his predecessor, made all sorts of excuses for delaying the opening of the Majlis. Now it was clear to the Foreign Office that the Persians were “determined at all costs to escape the Anglo-Persian Agreement.”150 The failure of the Legation to get the Agreement ratified eroded the residual support for Curzon in the cabinet, particularly as the War Office continued to press for the evacuation of Persia after the August decision to retain Norperforce, pending the Majlis’ decision on the Agreement. The troops served no military purpose and appeared incapable of helping the Legation to push through Curzon’s policy. Wilson had already voiced doubt as to the political function of Norperforce. “So far as I can judge” he told Churchill, “the political aims which we are endeavouring to support do not appear to be approaching fruition.”151 Confronted with the risings in Mesopotamia,


Egypt and Ireland, and the strikes in Britain, which he and many other officials feared might spark off a political upheaval, Wilson insisted on recalling the troops from other parts of the world. The government policies, he warned, “were quite out- running our power for enforcing them.”152 And Churchill wrote to Curzon: “We are at our wits’ end to find a single soldier.”153 Churchill also thought that the British troops in Persia remained in jeopardy, as “any day the Bolsheviks can send across by sea from Baku forces that would compel us to retreat, if indeed they do not surround us.”154 Even Milner, Curzon’s ally in the cabinet, acknowledged that the “military argument against tying up ten battalions and all that transport in a faraway corner of Persia, when we are so gravely threatened in Mesopotamia and elsewhere is very strong.” “Unless we can show that this division of force is doing some substantial good,” he warned Curzon, “we shall not be able to maintain this position.”155 But several months after the cabinet decision to retain Norperforce, Curzon could hardly claim that his policy in Persia had made “substantial” progress. In early November the cabinet decided that “Parliament would not be willing to keep the Norperforce in Persia beyond the next spring” and that “the Anglo-Persian Agreement must be submitted to and ratified by the Majlis before the end of the year.”156 Curzon accepted this decision with resignation, hoping that the Agreement would be ratified before the withdrawal of the troops. In a speech to the House of Lords, he indicated that he did not expect the occupation of Persia to continue beyond the spring.157 Churchill, however, kept on urging an early withdrawal, though part of north-west Persia was already snowbound. By November the rising in Mesopotamia had been quelled after several months of fierce fighting. The Commissioner at Baghdad, Cox, was pressing forward with the formation of a British-commanded Arab Army which was to “provide a substitute for the British forces”158 — what he had hoped to do in Persia. Now the War Office wanted to start evacuating the costly garrisons in Baghdad and Mosul. But the planned withdrawal had to be halted because of the presence of the troops in north-west Persia, which were supplied from Baghdad. In response to the persistent demands from Chamberlain (who had supported Curzon in the cabinet) for the reduction of military spending in the 1921–22 Army estimates, Churchill wrote: “I naturally feel very disheartened to have the whole army finance upset by Mesopotamia and Persia…. I wish I could have received your support in endeavouring to curtail these enormous leakages.”159 There was also a mounting cry for the evacuation of Persia in Parliament and the press.160 One MP, for instance, demanded that “General Ironside’s force be withdrawn at the earliest


possible moment,” protesting that the force was being retained “in order to bolster up an agreement which is one of the prime causes of the recent troubles in Mesopotamia.”161 Wilson noted: “The government are thoroughly frightened by the demand, in the newspapers and in the House of Commons, for retrenchment.”162 On December 8, the cabinet, after agreeing on the necessity of curtailing the military expenditure, decided that “the principal field for economy is in the Near and Middle East,” and confirmed that the troops would be withdrawn from Persia in the spring as soon as the passes were open.163 On December 21, the Finance Committee of the Cabinet, in Curzon’s absence, met to discuss the 1921–22 Army estimate. The reduction of only £10 million on the 1920–21 estimates “was felt to be disappointing.” (The original estimates for 1920–21 stood at £125 million which had risen to £165 million during the year.) It was agreed that military spending could best be cut by a reduction in the number of troops under arms. The main areas for saving were considered to be the garrisons in Mesopotamia (including Persia), Egypt and Palestine which absorbed more than £37 million annually. Having been informed that “if the withdrawal of the British forces in North Persia could be antedated, very considerable economies, perhaps amounting to £10 or £12 million would be effected,” the Committee decided that Norperforce should be withdrawn “earlier than has hitherto been contemplated, that is to say, at the earliest possible date.”164 (The annual cost of Norperforce was £3.5 million. The above-mentioned saving was supposed to be possible because of the early evacuation from Upper Mesopotamia in the wake of the withdrawal of Norperforce.) Churchill immediately telegraphed General Haldane (Officer in Command of GHQ, Mesopotamia) to “find out the very earliest day at which Ironside could withdraw, coute que coute, from Persia.”165 Haldane, in turn, ordered Ironside at once to begin the withdrawal, weather permitting, so that his troops could reach Baghdad by the end of February.166 Curzon was furious. He had not yet given up on his Persian policy and was determined to keep Norperforce at least until the spring.167 In the full cabinet meeting on December 31, he succeeded in reversing the Finance Committee’s decision.168 On 4 January 1921, the cabinet finally set the date for the evacuation of north-west Persia “after very heated argument” between Curzon and Churchill.169 The withdrawal of Norperforce was to begin on April 1. In Tehran, repercussions were felt immediately. “The withdrawal of our troops and the discontinuance of financial assistance,” the Minister lamented, “must sooner or later involve the loss of our influence over the Persian government.”170 Just two weeks later, during a cabinet crisis, Norman felt powerless to embark on another


round of cabinet-making or to nominate a new Prime Minister. As he noted: Any statesman, now selected for office on my recommendation, would be known as the candidate of the Legation, and now that I am to lose that moral force which I have hitherto derived from the presence of British troops, I could not keep him in power in face of attacks which would immediately be made on him by the Opposition. Further blows could thus be dealt to the already damaged prestige of the Legation.171 The Legation’s hopes were briefly revived after the coup of 21 February 1921. Reza Khan, a brigadier in the Cossack Division, led some 2,000 Cossacks in a march on the capital, which had been masterminded by Sayyed Zia.172 The premier, Sepahdar, was forced to step down. Sayyed Zia, a noted Anglophile journalist who had staunchly supported the Agreement in his newspaper, took office as Prime Minister. He denounced the Agreement but offered to employ British financial advisers and military officers to reorganize and control Persian finances and armed forces. He told Norman that the idea was “to throw dust in the eyes of the Bolsheviks and native malcontents, while placing the two essential administrations in British hands,” adding that “this policy would in the end gain for Great Britain most of the advantages she had expected to obtain from an impracticable agreement.” To conciliate other foreign powers, he wanted to invite in the French, the Americans, and even the Russians, “in small numbers to occupy posts in the less important ministries.”173 The Foreign Office grudgingly acquiesced in the “internationalization” of Persia, but still wanted to “adhere rigidly to our control of the Ministries of War and Finance.”174 The Foreign Office, however, had to overcome the War Office’s reluctance to let any British officer remain in north Persia after the withdrawal of Norperforce, fearing it “might (and probably would) lead to further military commitments of an indefinite nature, for which neither the funds nor the troops would be available.”175 The War Office was particularly concerned about the possibility of British officers becoming involved in the operations against the Bolsheviks in north Persia. The Foreign Office suggested that officers should enter into the Persian service individually on a voluntary basis, which would not engage the British government’s responsibility. After a long meeting, Oliphant failed to allay the anxieties of General Radcliffe, the Director of Military Operations, who still felt it “incumbent on the War Office to make efforts to save them, should their lives be endangered.” Oliphant appealed directly to Wilson. He finally agreed


to allow any officers who might volunteer to do so, but warned that “they must understand that in the event of their lives being in danger there can be no question of sending an expedition to extricate them.”176 By mid-May 14 officers had volunteered to serve in the Cossack Division. Their number was expected to rise to 21. Colonel Smyth was appointed to be in “chief command” of the Division. Another British officer, Colonel Huddleston, took the command of the Cossacks at the front in north Persia.177 No sooner had these officers been employed than Sayyed Zia was deposed and forced to leave the country. His downfall was brought about by a plot hatched by the Shah in collaboration with the War Minister, Reza Khan.178 Norman had tried hard to save Sayyed Zia’s cabinet, but to no avail: “All my efforts to dissuade the conspirators from this disastrous intrigue failed, owing to the fact that, since the withdrawal of our troops, the Minister of War no longer fears us.”179 (The withdrawal of Norperforce had started on April 12 and was completed on May 25.) Reza Khan had strongly opposed Sayyed Zia’s decision to employ British officers and place them in executive command of the Cossack Division. He feared that it would weaken his own control over the Division, which was his sole power base.180 Besides, he, like many other Cossack officers, resented British intrusion. Ironside had noted that the Persian officers of the Division were “imbued with” antiBritish feeling.181 Moreover, having enjoyed a new independence since the removal of the Russian officers, they had no desire to exchange one master for another. When they learned that the Prime Minister wanted to employ British officers, a large number of Persian officers “met and swore on the Koran never to serve under British officers.”182 After the employment of British officers, a senior Cossack officer at Kasvin demanded that his subordinates should treat them as mere technical instructors and thus take no orders from them, stating that “no self-respecting nation can allow foreigners to hold command in its army.”183 Reza Khan himself ordered the Cossack officers at the front to inform him personally of all the troop movements, threatening severest punishment if any mistake occurred and warning that “no excuse would be accepted even though the movement was carried out by the orders of a British instructor.” He also forbade innovation in drill and demanded a return to the old Russian system. Reza Khan, the Military Attaché at Tehran reported, had evidently issued these orders “to undermine the control of British officers and weaken their position.”184 Shortly after Sayyed Zia’s downfall, Reza Khan terminated the contracts of the British officers.185 Curzon’s scheme for the creation of a Persian Army under British control had in the end come to nothing. Reza Khan had his own plan for the formation of a modern army.


By the summer of 1921, the British government had lost much of its military and financial hold over the Persian government. “The British Legation here,” Norman complained in July, “is unable to influence the course of events…having neither the force nor the money at my disposal.”186 Soon British influence in south Persia came under threat, as the Treasury and the India Office both ceased to fund the South Persia Rifles.187 Curzon viewed the situation “with a feeling of disappointment, almost of despair.”188 He laid the blame for the failure of his Persian policy squarely on the cabinet: The weakness of our position is the dreaded consequence of (a) the withdrawal of our troops from north Persia; (b) the disbandment of the S.Persia Rifles. Both of these acts were the result of Cabinet decisions taken out of combined economy and ignorance at the advice of persons who knew nothing of the case.189

PART TWO PERCEPTION OF THREAT

58

CHAPTER THREE Soviet Landing at Enzeli

Towards the end of 1919 the British government began to realize that the removal of the Bolshevik regime in Russia was a lost cause. By the end of October the anti-Bolshevik forces had been driven back on all fronts. In his annual speech at the Guildhall on November 8, Lloyd George stated: “We cannot, of course, afford to continue so costly an intervention in an interminable civil war.”1 Bolshevism, he concluded, “could not be suppressed by the sword.”2 In December Denikin’s army, the only remaining White force, began to disintegrate. When, on December 12, Lloyd George and Clemenceau met to discuss Churchill’s request for further help to Denikin, the two Prime Ministers decided “not to enter into any further commitments as to furnishing assistance to the antiBolshevik elements in Russia, whether in the form of troops, war material or financial aid.”3 By the end of the year, it seemed that even the hopes of Churchill, the chief advocate in the cabinet of an all-out campaign against the Bolsheviks, had been exhausted. On December 31 he wrote to Wilson: “There seems to be very little doubt of the complete victory of the Bolsheviks in the near future.”4 As the possibility of rolling back Bolshevism faded away, official thoughts turned towards its containment. The advance of the Red Army in Turkestan and the Caucasus raised the spectre of a Bolshevik threat to the Middle East where Britain had enjoyed undisputed supremacy since 1918. The Bolsheviks captured Ashkhabad and Kizil Arvat on the Transcaspian railway in July and October respectively. They were now pushing on Krasnovodsk, the last stronghold of the anti-Bolshevik Transcaspian regime.5 The Red Army was also moving down along the Caspian coast towards Azerbaijan Republic. “The ghost of the Russian bear,” observed Churchill on 3 January 1920,”… ranges widely over the enormous countries which lead us to the frontiers of India, disturbing Afghanistan, distracting Persia, and creating far to the South- ward great agitations and unrest among the millions of our Indian population who have hitherto dwelt in peace and tranquillity under British rule.”6 On January 5 Churchill asked


Wilson constantly to survey the possibilities of action in the countries bordering Russia, in case the War Office was empowered to act.7 In early January the General Staff, under the direction of Wilson, conducted a war game to study in detail what action could be taken to meet a Russian advance on the Middle East. Three lines of defence were considered: (a) Constantinople-Batum-Baku-Krasnovodsk-Merv; (b) Constantinople-Batum-Baku-Enzeli-Tehran-Meshed; (c) North Palestine-Mosul-Khaniqin-Birjand. The defence of the first two lines required at least an additional force of seven divisions (two for the Caucasus, five for north Persia) and complete or at least partial command of the Caspian Sea. The General Staff ruled out these two lines on the grounds that they did not have the necessary force at their disposal and regarded it as impractical to raise the additional troops for the purpose. They therefore recommended that, in case of a Russian attack, no serious defence in front of the third line should be attempted. Only the third line seemed defensible. First, the defence of this line called for no great addition to the existing garrisons in the area, at least at an early stage. Secondly, the desert in the east and the Zagros mountains in west Persia provided natural barriers against a hostile force. Thirdly, this line was within the reach of the Britishcontrolled railheads. The adoption of this line of defence meant that Britain could not resist any Bolshevik advances on the Caucasian republics and into north Persia. However the General Staff refrained from suggesting an immediate withdrawal of Norperforce in view of “strong political reasons for remaining in occupation of North Persia.” Moreover the Caucasian barrier had not yet collapsed, and thus the British forces in north Persia did not seem to be in immediate danger.8 The result of this strategic exercise set the pattern for the War Office’s policy towards Persia in the following months. This line of defence ran counter to Curzon’s idea of containing the Russian threat. His post-war Eastern policy essentially aimed at creating layers of British-dominated states between Russia—Red or White—and the Indian frontiers. Curzon’s image of Russia had been shaped in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when he came to view her expansion in Central Asia and growing influence in north Persia as a serious menace to the British Empire in the East. After his journey to Central Asia in 1888, he wrote: “Russia was as much compelled to go forwards as the earth is to go round the sun.”9 His travels in north Persia convinced him that Russia was intent on devouring the provinces of Khurassan, Mazandaran, Gilan and Azerbaijan.10 “The passion for territorial aggrandisement,” he observed, “is one which, though it is indignantly repudiated by Russian writers, no one with his eyes open can believe to be other

SOVIET LANDING AT ENZELI 61

than a dominating influence in the Russian mind.”11 To him, Russia remained a perennial threat to British India.12 Curzon did not mean that Russia intended to conquer India. AngloRussian rivalry in Asia was, in his view, inextricably linked to the balance of power in Europe. The Russians would invade the frontiers of India, not with the expectation of wresting her from Britain, but with the purpose of distracting Britain from checking their ambitions in Europe: “To keep England quiet in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia, that, briefly put, is the sum and substance of Russian policy.”13 To forestall this danger, Curzon advocated a forward policy of defending India which entailed keeping Afghanistan under British control and consolidating British commercial and political interests in south Persia. Otherwise, he thought, the British might wake up one morning to find a Russian naval base on the Persian gulf. “Are we content to see a [Russian] naval station within a few days sail of Karachi and to contemplate a hostile squadron battering Bombay?”14 During his tenure as the Viceroy of India, Curzon vehemently opposed London’s tendency to regard an alteration of the balance of power in the Middle East in Russia’s favour as unavoidable. “It should be a cardinal axiom of British policy,” he stated, “that Her Majesty’s Government will not acquiesce in any European Power, and more especially Russia, overunning Central and Southern Persia, and so reaching the Gulf, or acquiring naval facilities in the latter, even without such territorial connection.”15 In his wilderness years, 1905– 15, Curzon was the most vocal critic of Edward Grey’s flexibility vis-àvis Russia’s ambitions in the East, particularly of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which put the British seal of approval on Russian domination of north Persia: “I do not feel at all sure that this treaty in the Persian aspect will be conducive either to the security of India, or to the independence of Persia, or to the peace of Asia.”16 The collapse of Imperial Russia presented Curzon, who was a member of the War Cabinet, with an opportunity to revive and extend his forward policy of defending India, that is, not only to extend British influence to north Persia, but to create a barrier in the Caucasus and Transcaspia between Russia and Persia. In December 1918 Curzon induced his colleagues to agree to the employment of British troops in the Baku-Batum line. He argued that it was essential to the security of India that Britain should exercise some measure of political control over the Caucasus. “Any sort of anarchy, disorder, or Bolshevism there” would “inevitably react” on the British position from Persia eastward.17 He wished to keep the other powers, above all Russia, from this avenue to Persia and by extension to India. Denikin was warned that if his troops crossed into Georgia and Azerbaijan, he would forfeit British support.18


In January 1920 Curzon was confronted with the prospect of Bolshevik occupation of the Caucasus and its consequent impact on Persia. The danger came not only from Russian arms, but also from her revolutionary ideology. This added a new dimension to Curzon’s obsession with the Russian threat. “The Russian menace in the East,” he observed, “is incomparably greater than anything else that has happened in my lifetime to the British Empire.”19 In early January the Foreign Office received a stream of despatches warning of an imminent onslaught on the Caucasus and north Persia by the Bolsheviks. From Tiflis, the British envoy reported: “It would be prudent to consider the possibility of the complete collapse of Denikin at an early date.” He believed this would be followed by a vigorous Bolshevik attack on the Caucasian republics. He suggested that Britain should send material support to these republics, reinforce the British troops in north Persia and Batum and take over the command of the Caspian flotilla from Denikin. “Unless some speedy action is taken,” he warned, “there is a grave risk of the crushing of Trans-Caucasia by the Bolsheviks, who will work their will in Persia and Trans-Caspia and beyond.”20 From Tehran, Cox reported the imminent capture of Krasnovodsk by the Red Army had caused alarm among Persian politicians and officials, particularly the Prime Minister, who had asked him what measures Britain was prepared to take in defence of Persia against the Bolsheviks. Cox suggested that Britain should immediately secure the Caspian Sea and the BakuBatum line.21 From India, the Viceroy warned that the Bolsheviks might descend on India once they had consolidated their position in Transcaspia and secured the command of the Caspian. He indicated that neither India, nor the British forces in Mesopotamia could offer any military support to Persia. “But if we could obtain naval command of the Caspian,” he suggested, “we think it would afford a better defence of Persia against Bolshevist aggression than any other military measures we can take for the purpose.”22 These reports moved Curzon to rescue his Eastern policy. On January 10, he persuaded the Allied Foreign Ministers gathered in Paris to extend de facto recognition to the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan.23 He then telegraphed his Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Hardinge, in London asking him to convene the Eastern Committee to discuss the retention of British troops at Batum, protection of Baku, recovery from Denikin of the Caspian flotilla, and reinforcement of the British forces in north Persia.24 On January 12, the Committee met to discuss the measures Britain should take to “stop the Bolshevik onslaught on the Caucasian republics, Persia and India.” Presenting the result of the war game conducted by the General Staff, Wilson forcefully argued that not only was the protection of the Caucasian republics as a barrier against the


Bolshevik advance on Persia beyond the available military means, but also that the eventual loss of north Persia was unavoidable. Austen Chamberlain, who chaired the meeting in Curzon’s absence, concluded that the British troops in north Persia should retreat to Kasvin if and when they came under attack.25 A few days later Curzon personally presented his case to the Cabinet. Between January 16–19, the senior ministers and military advisers held three meetings in Lloyd George’s suite at Claridge’s Hotel in Paris to discuss the question of the containment of Bolshevism, particularly in the East. Curzon tried to impress upon his colleagues that British command of the Caspian Sea was the key to the defence of the Eastern Empire. If the Caspian was lost, according to Curzon’s domino theory, first Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia would go, and then: Enzeli would fall to the Bolsheviks, and this would be followed by the loss of North Persia, against which the Bolsheviks had designs. The Shah would then disappear, and North Khurassan would be occupied by the Bolsheviks. All this would stir the Afghans to their vitals and the position would become very serious. A wave would be set in motion that would not stop until it laved the mountain barriers of India. The Admiralty went along with Curzon’s argument. “The danger to our Eastern Empire was greater than it had ever been before,” warned the First Lord of the Admiralty, Walter Long. “If we did not take immediate steps, we might in the near future be fighting desperately for our Eastern Empire.” The Admiralty’s main interest in Persia was, of course, the oilfields. Admiral Beatty, the First Sea Lord, noted that one of the Navy’s chief concerns had been to obtain oil from the sources which were not under the control of the other major powers. “Of these sources it was found that Persian oil was by far the most important. In Persia there were great oilfields as yet untapped…. To hold the Caspian meant that these oilfields would be relatively easily defended.” He was prepared to send 1,200 sailors to take over the Caspian flotilla, provided that the Allied forces were dispatched to secure the Batum-Baku line of communication and the land defence of the naval base at Baku. Wilson balked at this suggestion. Military operations by Allied troops in the Caucasus were, in his view, out of the question. The protection of the Baku—Batum line required at least two divisions. Marshal Foch had told him that “if any Frenchman sent a single battalion to the Caucasus, he would at once be repudiated.” And it was impossible for Britain to find the necessary force. Wilson concluded that “the real question for us was the defence of India and


Mesopotamia. The command of the Caspian did not affect the defence of India.” Churchill came up with a completely different idea for the defence of India. To divert the Russians from the East, he suggested, Britain should attack them in Europe, for example, from Finland or Poland where the French were likely to be cooperative. Lloyd George had opened the discussion with a bold statement: “We ought now to say to the Bolsheviks that we were not concerned with what went on inside Russia, but that we were concerned with the independence of Russia’s neighbours and would fight them if they attempted to destroy it.” But after hearing the military advisers, he reminded the participants of the meeting of the Industrial Unrest Committee, held a few days earlier, which had concluded that there were not sufficient troops for maintaining law and order at home. “In these circumstances,” he said, “it was absolutely out of the question to send 3 divisions for the defence of the Caucasus unless the French would cooperate effectively.” He now played down the Bolshevik threat to the Eastern Empire, arguing that the Bolsheviks had neither the will nor the ability to launch a major military expedition in the East. They might advance on Azerbaijan in order to capture the oilfields of Baku, but there was no reason why the Bolsheviks should go beyond that. “Barbarians do not march after nothing.” He said that he was not in the least afraid of an attack by the Bolsheviks on Mesopotamia and India. “The fundamental mistake” was to suppose “the Bolsheviks were really a great military force.” The Prime Minister concluded the discussions by declaring that “it was quite clear” that operations in the Caucasus and the Caspian could not be undertaken.26 Curzon thus failed to win the agreement of the cabinet to the military defence of the Caucasian republics and north Persia. Wilson took a certain glee in having “completely wrecked Curzon’s ridiculous project.”27 The War Office was relieved of the responsibility for defending north Persia against the Russians.28 General Haldane, GOC Mesopotamia, was authorized to pull back Norperforce, if and when they were threatened by a serious Bolshevik attack, as far as Hamadan which was within easy reach of the Mesopotamian railhead.29 The War Office, however, stopped short of recommending to the cabinet an immediate withdrawal of the troops from north-west Persia, hoping that by keeping a small detachment of 500 men at Enzeli (Persia’s chief port on the Caspian), with some artillery reinforcement, and “showing a bold front,” the Bolsheviks would be deterred from landing there.30 At the same time, the War Office with the approval of the cabinet, gave orders to General Champain, GOC Norperforce, that “There is no intention of holding on to Enzeli should it be seriously attacked, and you should make your arrangements to ensure the withdrawal of your detachment at Enzeli.”31


Britain’s non-committal stance led the Persian Prime Minister, Vusuq ud-Daula, to reassess his foreign policy. Throughout 1918– 19 Vusuq had refused to respond to Moscow’s diplomatic overtures. In January 1918 Trotsky, in a note addressed to the Persian government, abrogated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The first Soviet envoy, Karl Bravin, arrived in Tehran in the same month. He carried a message from Lenin urging the Persian government to enter into negotiations with the envoy with a view to establishing good neighbourly relations. The message also invited Persia to join the Soviet government in the “fight against the most rapacious imperialist Government on earth, England, intrigue of which has hitherto disturbed the peaceful people of Iran and destroyed our great country.” Although the Persian Foreign Minister informally received the envoy, the Persian government did not show any interest in establishing relations with the Soviet Government which did not yet seem firmly established. In fact the Imperial Russian diplomatic mission in Tehran still functioned and had informal relations with the Persian government. Bravin was soon recalled. In the summer of 1918 the second Soviet envoy, I. Kolomiitsev, reached Tehran from Baku. His arrival coincided with Vusuq’s assumption of power. Vusuq’s government refused to receive him on the grounds that he had no credentials from Moscow, but only from the Soviet government in Baku. Vusuq also refused to recognize the Soviet government, despite Kolomiitsev’s repeated requests for such recognition. In November the building occupied by the Soviet mission in Tehran was attacked by the Persian Cossacks led by the former Imperial Russian Consul at Tehran. Kolomiitsev managed to escape and made his way to Moscow. In June 1919 the Soviet government sent a note to the Persian government renouncing all Persian debts to Russia and all Russian concessions in Persia, and cancelling consular jurisdiction enjoyed by the Russian subjects in Persia. In July 1919 Kolomiitsev was sent back to Persia with the proper diplomatic credentials from Moscow. But he was captured while crossing the Caspian Sea and shot by the White forces. After the signing of the Anglo-Persian Agreement on August 9, Moscow’s attitude towards the Persian government underwent a significant change. The conciliatory tone of the diplomatic notes was replaced by revolutionary warnings. On August 30 Chicherin appealed directly to the Persian workers and peasants, over the head of the Persian government. The appeal declared that the Soviet government looked upon “the shameful Anglo-Persian Treaty by which y our rulers have sold themselves and sold y ou to the English robbers, as a scrap of paper and will never recognize it as having legal force.” It went on:


soon our valiant revolutionary Red Army will reach through Red Turkestan to the frontiers of a still enslaved Persia. The Russian working people stretch out to you, oppressed masses of Persia, their brotherly hand; the hour is near when we will indeed be in a position to complete together with you our task of struggle against all robbers and oppressors, great and small, the origin of our and your untold sufferings. Ignoring this threat, Vusuq decided, “in view of the unstable situation in Russia,” to close down the Persian Legation in September.32 By signing the Anglo-Persian Agreement, Vusuq’s cabinet had formally renounced the century-old guiding principle of Persian foreign policy, that is, the maintenance of an equilibrium between Russian and British interests in the country. Persia’s ruling landed aristocracy had, not unnaturally, been alarmed by the Bolshevik Revolution. Vusuq and his Foreign and Finance Ministers, Firuz Mizra Nusrat ud-Daula and Akbar Mizra Sarem ud-Daula, both related to the Royal Family and owners of large estates in western and central Persia, who were the main advocates of the new foreign policy, hoped that the Agreement would serve as “an insurance against Bolshevism.” In a speech delivered at a banquet at the Carlton Hotel in honour of the Persian Foreign Minister, shortly after the signing of the Agreement, which was “widely promulgated in Persia,” Curzon gave assurances to that effect,33 though the Agreement did not commit Britain to defend Persia. As the Red Army approached the Persian borders, the nationalists stepped up their campaign for a return to a balanced foreign policy, many newspapers arguing that Persia had “to choose between the departure of the British and the horrors of a Bolshevik invasion.” But some members of the landed aristocracy, according to the British Minister, “find themselves in a dilemma, they fear that the Bolshevik poison is working rapidly in the Persian populace, and though anxious to stave off Bolshevik invasion at any cost, they realise there is no force to fill the void which British troops would leave and they fear immediate internal anarchy.” “One owner of large estates” told Cox that “he owed his life to the presence of British troops in the country.”34 But it gradually became clear that Britain was unable to afford the protection they hoped for. In January 1920 Vusuq, with the support of Cox, asked London for reinforcement of the British troops in north Persia. He had so closely tied Persia to Britain that he could argue that the “Bolshevik designs were directed against Persia mainly, if not wholly, because she was now the easiest channel through which the interest of the Allies in general and Great Britain in particular could be effectively assailed.”35 Cox, too, argued that the Bolsheviks might attack Persia simply because they regarded Persia “as one of


the shortest routes to London,” and not because of any hostility to Persia “towards whom they have already professed the most benevolent intention.”36 Curzon always wished to act as the protector of Persia against the “Russian Ogre,”37 but his hands were tied by the War Office. Therefore he could only reply: “It is of no use for the Persian government or anyone else to expect sudden appearance of large bodies of Allied Troops when it is perfectly well known that these are not and cannot be forthcoming.”38 No sooner had Vusuq ceased hoping for the arrival of any reinforcements than he was faced with the prospect of British withdrawal from north Persia. When in mid-March General Champain informed him that he had been instructed to withdraw from Enzeli if his forces failed to deter the Bolsheviks from landing there, Vusuq said “though the British were definitely at war with the Bolsheviks, Persia was not, and if the British intended or were obliged to retire, it might be the best policy for Persia to come to an understanding with the Bolsheviks, rather than court their reprisals.”39 In the meantime, he had been receiving alarming reports of the Bolshevik advance towards Azerbaijan and their hostile intentions towards Persia from his envoy at Baku, Sayyed Zia. Vusuq therefore decided to send a diplomatic mission to Moscow and asked his Foreign Minister, who was in London, to sound out Curzon on the issue.40 In early April Firuz met Curzon and asked if he favoured Persia’s “entering into direct relations with the Soviet Government and concluding a treaty with them.” Curzon was “startled.” He strongly opposed any initiative on the part of the Persian government to establish direct diplomatic relations with Moscow.41 He told Firuz that the cessation of the Soviet hostilities against Persia would be much more likely to result from an arrangement between Britain and Russia than from a separate treaty between Russia and Persia.42 Vusuq’s government was too dependent, both financially and militarily, on Britain to be able to go against Curzon’s wishes. Vusuq grudgingly shelved the issue and assured Cox that “he had no intention of acting in any way independently of the advice and concurrence of His Majesty’s Government in this matter.”43 However, the Persian government’s faith in British support had been shaken. Montagu was critical of Curzon’s opposition to the Soviet-Persian rapprochement. He maintained that Britain, unable to keep the Soviets out of Persia by force, should in fact encourage the Persian government to reach its own arrangements with Moscow. On hearing Curzon’s reply to the Persian Foreign Minister, Montagu wrote to him: You take an enormous responsibility in dissuading Persia from entering into a state of peace with the Soviet Government. Nobody was more enthusiastic than I about your agreement with


Persia. But I have always been unhappy about the fact that it seemed to me to involve, implied or explicit, the right of Persia to look to us to prevent invasion of that country by foreign forces. We have not got the forces with which to discharge this responsibility, and if you dissuade Persia from entering into relations with the Soviet Government, now also and unfortunately de facto Government of Russia you emphasize our liability which we cannot perform.44 But Curzon feared, under the “cover of a treaty, Bolshevik agents and propoganda directed against Great Britain might easily find a secure foot-hold in the country.”45 The resumption of Anglo-Russian rivalry would prevent the main objective of Curzon’s policy in Persia, that is, to exclude other powers, above all Russia, from Persia. Curzon did not yet think that Russia’s re-entry into Persia was unavoidable. And he believed Britain could contain any Bolshevik threat to Persia. His containment policy rested on two pillars: (a) the impending Anglo-Soviet trade talks; and (b) the presence of British troops in north Persia. Curzon thought Britain could make use of the trade talks as a lever to keep the Soviets out of Persia. He suggested that Krassin, the head of the Soviet trade delegation, who was due to arrive in London towards the end of May, should be told emphatically that Britain could not be expected to do business with the Soviets if they “were at the same time attacking us through Persia.”46 He also believed the British forces in north Persia, though small, served as a deterrent.47 This was in line with the views of the War Office, which “did not anticipate any formidable military effort on the part of the Bolsheviks.”48 But the views of the military officials at the War Office soon began to change. In mid-March the Director of Military Operations, General Radcliffe, thought “there was no real threat to Enzeli, where Norperforce should have no difficulty in retaining their position.”49 By mid-May, he came to take the view that the Russians could no longer be deterred from entering north Persia. The developments in the Caucasus brought about this change. At the end of March, the remnants of Denikin’s army in the Caucasus were routed. Denikin’s flotilla was forced to evacuate Petrovsk (Mahachqala), their last base on the Caspian. Having failed to come to terms with the Azerbaijan authorites at Baku, the flotilla took refuge at Enzeli, where the British interned and disarmed the 15 warships and their crews. The Bolsheviks thus became the masters of the Caspian Sea.50 In April the Red Army entered the Republic of Azerbaijan. By the end of the month, a Soviet regime was established at Baku.51 On May 1 the Red flotilla arrived in Baku. On May 6 a Soviet military official told the Persian officials at the border town of Astara that the Soviets had no


quarrel with the Persians, but “intended to advance against the English by sea and by land.”52 The following day, the British intelligence officer at Enzeli reported that Soviet reinforcements had landed at Lenkoran, a small port close to the Persian border.53 All this led the War Office to conclude that the Russians were determined not only to reimpose their rule on the Caucasus, but to regain their predominance in north Persia. The Russians, Wilson wrote to Churchill, “are obviously bent on reasserting their sway in N.Persia on pre-war lines, but unless HMG are prepared to go to war with Russia there is little chance of our being able to prevent them doing so.” Radcliffe also warned that the advance of the Russians from the north might encourage Colonel Starosselski, the Russian Commander of the Cossack Division, who intended “to keep the Russian flag flying in North Persia at all costs,” to attack the British troops from the rear. Both Wilson and Radcliffe called for an immediate withdrawal of the British detachments at Enzeli and Tabriz to Kasvin on May 13.54 Curzon was inclined to discount the worrisome indications of the imminent Russian action against the British in north Persia. To give credence to these warnings entailed reconsidering his Persian policy. He was therefore determined to dissuade the War Office from a hasty withdrawal from Enzeli. On May 17 he convened the Eastern Committee to consider the War Office’s proposal to pull the troops back to Kasvin. In his opening speech, Curzon conceded that the attitude of the Soviet military officials at Baku was “distinctly menacing,” but went on to say that “running away was not the only possible alternative.” The Soviet government, in his view, “were in a precarious state and very anxious to secure our assistance in restoring their economic position.” He would warn Krassin, when he arrived in London, that the Soviets could not expect any economic assistance from Britain if they took any hostile action against British forces in north Persia. He added that it was difficult “to say which one of us is bluffing the most in North-west Persia.” Radcliffe, representing the War Office on the Committee, did not defend his proposal as robustly as his superiors might have expected.55 The evacuation of Enzeli was not merely a military matter; it had far-reaching implications for British policy in Persia. He therefore sought to minimize his disagreement with the Foreign Secretary. He stated that the policy of retaining a small detachment at Enzeli to “bluff them had so far had the desired effect.” He went so far as to say that he himself was inclined to think that “all Russian efforts were largely bluff. They wanted to see us leave Enzeli so that they could come there themselves later.” Then he lamely tried to portray Starosselski’s Cossacks as a serious threat to the isolated British detachment at Enzeli. But this cut no ice with Curzon, as he


had already pointed out that any threat from the Cossack Division could easily be thwarted by cutting off British subsidies to the force. Taking his cue from Radcliffe, Curzon said that the British withdrawal “would be tantamount to an invitation to the Bolsheviks to land at Enzeli.” “A premature withdrawal,” he warned, “might have the effect of bringing down the whole castle about our ears.” Montagu, for once, sided with Curzon. He suggested that Norperforce should be instructed to stay put as long as possible. Finally it was decided that the War Office should postpone the withdrawal until the Committee had ascertained the views of the British Minister at Tehran.56 In effect, the Committee, under the direction of Curzon, decided that “Position at Enzeli does not appear to be exposed to immediate danger either by land or by sea.”57 It was only a matter of hours before they were proved wrong. At dawn on May 18, the 13 gunboats of the Caspian Red Flotilla, under the command of Feodor Raskolnikov, opened fire on Enzeli harbour. General Champain, GOC Norperforce, who happened to be at Enzeli, was surprised. He had not expected a direct attack on Enzeli. Barely a week earlier, he had reported to the Minister at Tehran that although there was only a small detachment, “it would be impossible for them [the Soviets] to shift him from Enzeli by direct attack either by land or sea,” unless they launched a massive attack, which seemed to him to be unlikely. If the Soviets decided to advance into Persia, he believed, they would try to outflank the British troops from the direction of Astara and Zanjan, the north-west and south-west of Enzeli.58 “The English did not expect in the least that we would appear,” Raskolnikov later observed,”…their carelessness might be proved by the fact that they had no posts on the sea shore.”59 At the same time, a force of 2,000 men landed about five miles east of the port, cutting off the line of retreat of the British detachment. Unable to retreat as he had been instructed by the War Office in February, Champain tried to put up some resistance. But a few more salvos from the Soviet gunboats convinced him that he had been outgunned. He therefore sent an emissary to the Soviet Commander asking for an armistice. Unable to contact the general headquarters at Baghdad, Champain asked the Tehran Legation for instructions. Cox, who was in touch with the Persian government, instructed him to “resist to the utmost should a landing [at Enzeli] be attempted.”60 In the meantime, the British intelligence officer at Enzeli, Captain Crutchly, accompanied by the Persian governor of Enzeli, met Raskolnikov on board the Soviet flagship. The Soviet Commander said he was acting on “his own initiative without orders from Moscow,” because he saw the presence of Denikin’s warships at Enzeli as a threat to the safety of the Caspian Red Flotilla, for which he was responsible. He would allow the British troops to leave Enzeli safely if


they handed over Denikin’s ships and war material to him. The future of Enzeli, he added, would be decided by direct negotiations between Moscow and London.61 At 6 p.m., after hearing Raskolnikov’s remarks, Cox once again urged Champain to resist the Soviet occupation of Enzeli, arguing that the Soviet Commander was unlikely to take responsibility for a severe fight because he was admittedly not authorized by Moscow, which, in turn, would not be inclined to sanction a major operation owing to the engagement of the bulk of the Red Army at the Polish Front.62 But the armistice had expired at 3 p.m., and Champain, outgunned and outnumbered four to one, had already accepted the Soviet terms. The British troops retreated to Resht in the evening. Raskolnikov refused to allow the remaining White crews at Enzeli to accompany them.63 In London, the Cabinet was divided on how to respond to the Soviet landing at Enzeli. The problem centred on two basic questions: did the Soviets intend to overrun Persia, or at least the northern part of the country? If so, would Britain be able to deter them? There were three main arguments. One was that of the War Office. The military officials had already called for the evacuation of most of north Persia, arguing that Moscow was intent on reasserting Russian influence in the area. They now felt that their view had been substantiated. The Enzeli landing, they claimed, showed that the British forces remained in Persia only “on sufferance of the Bolsheviks.” Churchill felt justified in declaring that Britain could not “possibly avert the complete loss of British influence throughout the Caucasus, Transcaspia and Persia.” “If we cannot resist the Bolsheviks in these areas,” he argued, “it is much better by timely withdrawals to keep out of harm’s way and avoid disaster and shameful incidents such as that which has just occurred.” He urged the cabinet to sanction an immediate and total evacuation of north Persia.64 The second position was advanced by Curzon and the Colonial Secretary, Milner. The Enzeli landing had not shaken Curzon’s faith in military deterrence, one of the two components of his containment policy. He and Milner maintained that Britain could deter the Soviets from dominating Persia. In their view, the policy of scuttle and withdrawal, advocated by the War Office, would be “tantamount to an invitation to the Bolsheviks to enter and make themselves the masters of north Persia.” This would lead to the downfall of the Persian government and to “an end to the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which, without infringing the independence of Persia, had been concluded with the object of establishing decent conditions and providing a barrier against Bolshevism.” They believed that the War Office was chiefly motivated by the desire to cut the cost of British garrisons in the Middle East. But the withdrawal from Persia, Milner argued, would be a false economy. If Persia were “to fall into the


hands of Russia, or to become a dependent ally of Russia, our whole position in the East would be gravely imperilled and the cost of maintaining it would be immeasurably increased.” “A Bolshevik revolution in Persia,” he told the cabinet, “would involve consequences for the British empire which it would be worth our while to spend not one but many millions to avert.” Curzon and Milner called for the retention of Norperforce.65 The third position, which appeared to be favoured by Lloyd George, held that “there was no evidence that the Bolsheviks had designs on Persia.” According to this line of argument, the Soviets were unlikely to occupy Persia for three reasons. Firstly, they had “many prior commitments in reorganizing their own country, in driving out the Poles, and in establishing their boundaries.” Secondly, the poor condition of communications in Persia rendered large-scale military operations almost impracticable logistically. Thirdly, Persia was not rich enough to attract the Soviets. They might resort to propaganda against British influence or the Persian government, “which our occupation could not prevent.” If they tried to regain the position that Imperial Russia had held in north Persia under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, “the British people would never embark on a difficult and costly war for the purpose of preventing the Bolsheviks from establishing this position, or even for preventing a Russian invasion of Persia.” As Britain could not defend Persia, she “ought to encourage the Persians to conclude some arrangements with the Bolsheviks.”66 However, Lloyd George could not ignore the views of his senior ministers on the eve of the Anglo-Soviet trade talks. He was particularly anxious to carry the War and Foreign Secretaries with his Russian policy. He was adept at “finding a formula” to reconcile opposing views in the cabinet.67 A formula was devised which not only met, to some extent, the concerns of the two ministers, but also gave them a stake in the success of the Anglo-Soviet trade talks. To meet Churchill’s concern about the Soviet threat to the isolated British detachments in north Persia, and, at the same time, to avoid removing the military deterrence, as demanded by Curzon, the cabinet decided to concentrate British detachments at Resht and Tabriz in Kasvin, where the British forces would be further reinforced from the direction of Hamadan and could stand firm, pending further moves by the Soviets. The cabinet also decided that “advantage should be taken of the forthcoming conversations with Krassin, if possible, as a condition of entering into trade relations to effect an all-round settlement which would include the East.”68 For two weeks after the Soviet landing at Enzeli, Curzon and his officials at the Foreign Office were in an optimistic mood. The Enzeli landing, in their view, did not necessarily indicate “a serious desire


either to invade Persia or to pick a quarrel with ourselves.”69 Curzon would not be “surprised if their forces were presently withdrawn.”70 The reports reaching London appeared to justify their optimism. In a conversation with Champain, the Commander of Soviet troops at Enzeli, Kajanov, assured him that “to secure the Volunteer fleet and guns was the only reason for their visit to Enzeli,” and that they would leave the port after taking over the fleet. He also told Champain that a force of 1,600 men, which had landed at Persian Astara on May 18 and had advanced towards Ardabil, would soon be withdrawn.71 On May 22 Cox reported that there was no sign of any Soviet movement from Enzeli inland, and that the force that had landed at Enzeli “had already been considerably reduced.”72 In his note of May 23, Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, assured the Persian Foreign Minister that “Soviet troops landed in Persia had been ordered to evacuate Persian territory, as soon as this was possible from a military point of view.”73 On May 30 it was reported that the Soviet troops at Astara had actually been withdrawn.74 But the mood in the Foreign Office soon changed. On June 3 the Foreign Office received a report from the War Office showing that the Soviets had landed some fresh troops and some guns and armoured cars at Enzeli on May 30. “This landing by the Bolsheviks at Enzeli,” George Churchill, the Foreign Office’s Persian expert, commented, “makes clear that the Soviet professions to Persia were insincere, and they evidently intend to give trouble.”75 A few days later there was a shock wave in the Foreign Office when Cox reported that on June 4, two days after the British withdrawal from the provincial capital, Resht, Kuchik Khan, accompanied by some Jangali guerrillas and a detachment of Soviet troops, entered the town and proclaimed the formation of the Soviet Republic of Gilan with himself as the Chief Commissar.76 “The developments at Resht,” Churchill noted anxiously, “are undoubtedly serious and are bound to be repeated sooner or later in other parts of Persia.”77 Did Moscow have prior knowledge of the Enzeli landing? And, if so, was it planned as a prelude to the occupation of north Persia or as a means of stirring up revolution in Persia? As we have seen, Raskolnikov portrayed the landing as some sort of hot pursuit operation, undertaken on his initiative. In a note addressed to the Persian Foreign Minister, Chicherin also claimed that “the Russian Soviet Government were informed of the events that took place at Enzeli only after the operation had been completed.”78 Notwithstanding these statements, Moscow had in fact ordered the Enzeli landing. Yet, from the available evidence, it would appear that the landing was not part of a grand design to export revolution or to occupy Persia. As the Soviet operation order, for instance, shows the objective of the landing was twofold. First, it aimed to ensure the


security of the Caspian Sea by “preventing the enemy from organizing a fighting force on the sea at any future time,” and second, to undermine Britain’s predominant influence in Persia, thus “dealing a blow to British rule in the East.”79 Raskolnikov suspected that the British were planning to convert Enzeli into a base for their operation on the Caspian and that they might even try to launch an attack on Baku from there. He therefore wanted “to seize Enzeli and to remove from there all the White ships, thus depriving the British of their mainstay on the Caspian sea.”80 The capture of three British naval officers and 30 ratings in Baku at the end of April may have further stoked his suspicion. This naval mission was en route from Constantinople, via Baku, to Enzeli, “for the purpose of taking over the guns of Denikin’s fleet.”81 As it happened, their arrival in Baku coincided with that of the Red Army. They stepped from their train into arrest and captivity.82 At least four weeks before the landing, Raskolnikov asked Moscow how to deal with the White flotilla at Enzeli. The War Commissar, Trotsky, after informing Lenin and Chicherin, instructed him: The Caspian must be cleaned of the White fleet at all cost. If a landing on Persian territory is required, it must be carried out, and the nearest Persian authorities notified of it and told that the landing is being undertaken by the of ficer in command with the exclusive object of carrying out a military assignment, which arose only because it was beyond the power of Persia to disarm the ships of the White Guards in her harbour, and that Persian territory remains inviolable for us and will be evacuated immediately after the completion of the military assignment.83 It appears that the Soviet government, by denying direct responsibility for the operation, hoped to avoid jeopardizing the trade talks with Britain and alienating the Persian government with which they wished to resume diplomatic relations. What then lay behind Soviet support for the Gilan revolutionaries? It appears that Raskolnikov and Sergo Ordzhonikidze, on-the-spot director of Soviet political and military policy in the Caucasus,84 played a decisive part in the developments in Gilan between May 18 (the landing at Enzeli) and June 4 (the declaration of the Soviet Republic at Resht). Raskolnikov was very impressed by the enthusiastic reception of his troops by the inhabitants of Enzeli: “The population greeted us with joy. All the streets and squares were packed with people. The whole city was covered with Red flags.”85 He wired to Moscow that “The population of Enzeli welcomed us…. Everyone expects the Revolution.”86


The people’s joyous reaction to the Soviet landing largely stemmed from the widespread resentment at the policies of the central government and the presence of British troops in the province. Cox well summed up the situation in the province towards the end of 1919: In Gilan the situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Although a few months ago our troops, in cooperation with the Persian Government, practically stamped out the Jangali movement,87 yet the behaviour of the Cossack detachment, set to occupy various points, has been so atrocious and the incompetency of the Persian administrative officials so complete that the peasantry would welcome the return of the Jangali regime.88 Just a week before the Soviet landing, the Assistant Political Officer at Resht, C.A.Butters, reported that the people “from all walks of life” had held several meetings against the Tehran government and the British. “At each meeting,” he reported, “there is a certain amount of anti-British talk and the object in keeping British troops is freely criticized. Egypt is quoted as a parallel case, and people are warned that the British should be moved out of the country before they can establish any claim here.” Some meetings had “resulted in a recommendation that a committee should be formed to make proper arrangements to welcome the Bolsheviks when they arrive.” He feared that these meetings could “develop into Bolshevism in a few weeks.”89 So it is small wonder that Raskolnikov perceived that Persia was ready for revolution. He invited Kuchik Khan, the undisputed leader of the popular movement in Gilan, who was in his hide-out, a few miles to the south of Enzeli, to meet him in order to draw up a common programme for action. The Soviet officials had long been aware of Kuchik Khan’s activities. The Bolsheviks in the Caucasus and Turkestan in particular had high hopes of him. Their communiqués often praised the “heroic efforts of Kuchik Khan to free Persia from autocrats and the British.”90 Some Bolsheviks went beyond that, maintaining that “the significance of Kuchik Khan’s activities lies not in his armed strength and his fight against the British, but rather in the point of possible contact with him for the purpose of successful revolutionary propaganda in Persia.” They saw him as a “socialist agitator,” and his work and slogans as “closely connected with communism,” which, “once it is carefully and skilfully cultivated, will produce a good harvest of revolutionary preparedness among the Persian masses.”91 Kuchik Khan was no “socialist agitator.” In fact, as a staunch liberal nationalist, he had little sympathy for Bolshevism. For five years, he and his Jangali guerrillas had fought basically for the restoration of parliamentary democracy, the removal of the landed


oligarchy from dominant positions in the government and the liberation of Persia from Anglo-Russian domination. The Jangali movement also advocated the separation of religion from politics, the legal equality of men and women, free education and limited agrarian reforms.92 Kuchik Khan’s political ideas, like those of many liberal nationalists, had been shaped largely by the events of December 1911, when he, as young constitutional partisan, witnessed the closure of the Majlis and the suppression of social and economic reforms by the ruling class in league with foreign powers.93 Moreover, educated in a seminary, he still held strong religious beliefs. When the offensive by the Cossacks and the British troops, in the spring of 1919, turned him into a fugitive, he, in desperation, contacted the Bolsheviks in Baku. But he was averse to committing himself to close cooperation with them. When some emissaries from Baku told him that the Bolsheviks might send troops to assist him, he was quoted as saying that “If he, with this assistance, managed to turn out the English, Persia would be no better off than before, because she would be unable to turn out the Bolsheviks and would require to ask England to help her to do so.”94 He also turned down the offer of cooperation from the Persian communists.95 After an interview with Kuchik Khan in March 1920, Butters reported that he was prepared to “work to prevent any Bolshevik movement in Gilan.”96 Two weeks before the Soviet landing, Colonel E.H. Sweet, CO Enzeli, decided to supply arms to Kuchik Khan and to entrust him with the task of protecting the Resht-Enzeli road in the event of a Soviet advance into Persia. But Butters dissuaded him from doing so, arguing that the Prime Minister, Vusuq ud-Daula, would be strongly against supplying his enemy with arms. Butters also believed that Kuchik Khan, being suspicious of both powers, would be unlikely to take sides in an Anglo-Russian confrontation.97 But, when Kuchik Khan received Raskolnikov’s invitation, he felt that he had to choose between the Bolsheviks and Vusuq’s government. Since his defeat in the spring of 1919, he and the remnant of his force had been constantly harassed by the Cossacks and the pro-government tribal forces. As a result, he had been forced to enter into negotiations with the central government, even promising to submit to the Prime Minister.98 By accepting the Soviet offer of assistance, he could avoid coming to terms with Vusuq, who represented all he had struggled against for years, and could even possibly remove him from power. Moreover, Soviet occupation of Enzeli was a fait accompli. He now hoped that he would be able to bring the Bolsheviks under his control. Indeed, he soon made it clear that he would align himself with them only on his own terms. However, it was not easy for him to overcome his deeprooted anxieties aroused by the reappearance of another Russian force in Gilan after


just two years. This exacerbated his chronic indecisiveness. After much agonizing, and prodded by his radical associate, Ihsanullah Khan Dustar, Kuchik Khan decided to meet Raskolnikov. On May 22 he entered Enzeli. The townspeople turned out in large numbers to greet him. Accompanied by some of his close associates he met Raskolnikov and some leading members of the Adalat Party”— soon to be renamed the Communist Party of Iran—who had arrived from Baku and who perhaps encouraged Raskolnikov’s revolutionary zeal. The meeting soon broke up in disagreement. Kuchik Khan had insisted that the Bolsheviks should refrain from propagating communism which, he believed, would alienate the majority of the people, who held strong religious beliefs, from the revolutionary movement. The Persian communists had vehemently opposed his demand, arguing that if they wanted to overthrow the status quo, they would have to lead, rather than slavishly follow, the people, who were still shackled by ignorance and poverty. Ordzhonikidze, who had just arrived from Baku, brought the two sides together again. After praising Kuchik Khan’s revolutionary credentials profusely, he urged the Persian communists to accept his terms. They reluctantly agreed to refrain from propagating communism and expropriating private property. The Russians promised to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of Persia and sending additional troops to Gilan without the prior approval of the Revolutionary Committee which was to be set up under the leadership of Kuchik Khan.100 The disagreement between the liberal nationalists and the communists was thus temporarily patched up. The provisional revolutionary government was to concentrate its efforts on overthrowing the Shah’s government and driving the British troops out of Persia. After the capture of Tehran, the form of government was to be decided by a general election. Raskolnikov reported to Moscow: “The conference decided that it wants to start immediately the Revolutionary Movement and organize the Revolutionary Soviet in Persia.”101 It appears that Moscow did not share his revolutionary zeal. In fact, most Soviet leaders had some reservations about the revolutionary activities of Raskolnikov and Ordzhonikidze. First, the Narkomindel tended to be sceptical about the possibility of starting a revolution in Persia as a whole. The Soviet envoy at Tehran in 1918, Kolomiitsev, who spoke Persian and had previously spent two years in the country, had reported that, as Persia lacked the necessary subjective and objective revolutionary conditions, the preparation of the internal forces for the revolution would be a long, painstaking process. “The Persians,” he wrote, “are enterprising people, and if one made a concerted effort to propagandize them results might be favourable.” But he also pointed out that:


One cannot dream at present of a radical coup d’ état in Persia, since Persia is still going through a feudal period having no industrial proletariat or organized peasantry. Those miserable Persians who die daily by hundreds and thousands in the cities of Persia102 prefer death to revolution, being terrorized and oppressed by religious prejudices and heartless exploitation on the part of the khans and officials who hold more than seventy percent of all the land in the country.103 Perhaps with this view in mind, Leon Karakhan, the Deputy Foreign Commissar, warned Raskolnikov: “Sentiments of the Persians in Resht, Enzeli, and Azerbaijan alone could not indicate the general feelings of the Persians as a whole.” He therefore advised Raskolnikov to treat Kuchik Khan’s and the communists’ desire to establish a Soviet regime in Persia with more caution.104 Secondly, Moscow’s primary concern was not the establishment of a Soviet-style regime in Persia, but the removal of the British troops and the predominant British influence from the country. In 1918–19, Persia had served as a springboard for Britain’s military intervention in the Caucasus and Turkestan.105 The Soviets therefore viewed the presence of British troops in north Persia as a potential threat to their national security. Moscow hoped that the Enzeli landing would precipitate the British withdrawal from Persia. For instance, to add fuel to the public opposition to the retention of Norperforce, Chicherin instructed Krassin to publicize their “shameful and cowardly” retreat from Enzeli in the British press.106 And Karakhan instructed Raskolnikov to make the struggle against the British his priority in Persia: “It is essential to unite Kuchikhan, the Persian communists and other democratic groups against the British.” “The toilers and the bourgeois democrats,” Karakhan wrote, “should be made united in the name of liberation of Persia and stirred up to drive the British out of the country.” It is significant that he advised Raskolnikov against a hasty implementation of Soviet principles in Persia which “could result in a class antagonism and thus weaken the Persian national liberation struggle against the British.”107 Thirdly, some Soviet leaders, at the same time, did not want their involvement in Gilan to jeopardize the trade talks with Britain and the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Persian government. Therefore Moscow decided to camouflage its involvement in Gilan. Trotsky, the chief advocate in the Politburo of rapprochement with the West, ordered Raskolnikov to withdraw the Russian detachments from Gilan, to hand over the occupied areas to Kuchik Khan, and to provide him with money, instructors and volunteers. He agreed to allow the Soviet warships to support Kuchik Khan if necessary, provided they


flew the Azerbaijani rather than the Russian flag. He stressed that all’ the assistance to Kuchik Khan must be given in the name of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan,108 which the Soviet government claimed to be independent of Moscow. On June 20, Chicherin wrote to the Persian Foreign Minister: “No Russian Military or Naval forces are at present on Persian territory or in Persian waters.”109 Trotsky’s instructions were, with few exceptions, followed by the officials in Baku throughout the Soviet involvement in Gilan. For instance, when Ordzhonikidze asked Moscow to sanction the dispatch of some warships from Baku to Enzeli in September, he stressed that “the ships will sail under the flag of Azerbaijan.”110 In the course of their advance on Resht in August, the Persian Cossacks captured some 600 prisoners and a large number of documents, but they all pointed solely to the involvement of the Azerbaijan government at Baku.111 Thus, throughout the trade talks with the British government, the Soviet government could, and did, deny any responsibility for the events in Gilan.112 On May 27 Leonid Krassin arrived in London to head the Soviet delegation in talks with the British government. In a memorandum distributed to the cabinet on the next day, Curzon wrote: We know from a great variety of sources that the Russian government is threatened with complete economic disorder, and that it is ready to pay almost any price for the assistance which we—more than anyone else—are in a position to give. We can hardly contemplate coming to its rescue without exacting our price for it, and it seems to me that price can far better be paid in cessation of Bolshevik hostility in parts of the world of importance to us, than in the ostensible interchange of commodities, the existence of which on any considerable scale in Russia there is grave reason to doubt. In short, in Curzon’s view, firstly, the trade talks were primarily a means of forcing the Soviets to make concessions on political issues, particularly in the East; secondly, Britain was in such a strong position that she could extract almost any concessions from the Soviets. One of the main concessions Curzon wanted to extract from the Soviets was their withdrawal from Gilan and thus their recognition of Britain’s dominant position in Persia: Whether the Soviet forces at Enzeli are a hostile and aggressive force or not, the Soviet Government should realise that we cannot acquiesce in a Soviet invasion of Persia, with which we have entered into a formal agreement and which is excluded from


the range of Soviet ambitions by the explicit declaration published to the world by Chicherin.113 At the cabinet meeting Curzon once again insisted that “any agreement in regard to trade would be impossible unless a general agreement on the political questions at issue with the Soviet government were arrived at.”114 In accordance with the cabinet’s instructions, two sets of proposals defining the basis of Anglo-Soviet talks were drawn up by the Admiralty and an interdepartmental committee. Both mentioned the withdrawal of Soviet forces from and the cessation of anti-British propaganda in Persia as two of the conditions for the conclusion of a trade agreement between Britain and Soviet Russia.115 On May 31, at the first meeting with Krassin, Lloyd George listed the British demands. Apart from the release of British civilian and military prisoners in Russia and the repayment of debts, the Prime Minister mentioned three main conditions for lifting of the blockade and the resumption of trade: (a) withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Enzeli; (b) cessation of all propaganda in Britain and other Allied countries; and (c) cessation of all propaganda directed against the British interests in the East, particularly in Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan and India.116 The Soviets were divided on how to respond to the British demands. Krassin believed that the British cabinet was not unified in its Russian policy. Shortly after his arrival in London, he reported to Moscow: “Lloyd George is wobbling under pressure from the Curzonites and the court politicians. He is afraid to take any definite steps.”117 He took the view that the Soviet government could strengthen the Prime Minister’s hand by making certain concessions. In a letter to Maxim Litvinov, who was officially the head of the Soviet delegation, but who had been refused entry to Britain, Krassin wrote that Lloyd George was “in great fear of a Bolshevik offensive in Persia.” “This fear and the labour troubles in England,” he continued, “have forced Lloyd George to enter into negotiations with Russia.” In his view, Lloyd George’s demands for Soviet withdrawal from Enzeli and the cessation of propaganda in Britain and the East were justified. He recommended that Moscow should agree to these three demands so as to demonstrate its honest desire for peace. Litvinov took an entirely different view. Lloyd George, he wrote to Moscow, was “only playing with Krassin.” The negotiations with Krassin were only “tricks to paralyse the offensive of the Red Army on the Polish and Persian fronts.” He advised Moscow not to make any concessions.118 In Moscow, Trotsky favoured Krassin’s view; Lenin and Chicherin that of Litvinov. However, the British demand for the withdrawal of Soviet forces in Gilan did not pose much of a problem. Trotsky had


already devised a solution which satisfied both those who did not want to be taken in by Lloyd George’s “tricks” and those who wanted to strengthen his hand in the cabinet. As we have seen, he had ordered Raskolnikov to camouflage the Soviet Russian involvement in Gilan. Thus Moscow could ostensibly accede to this demand. At the second meeting between the British Ministers and the Soviet delegation on June 7, Curzon once again raised the question of the Soviet landing at Enzeli and demanded that this “act of direct aggression against Persia” must be stopped. Krassin replied that “he had received information from Moscow that the order to leave Enzeli had already been given” and that the Soviet government was prepared to enter into friendly negotiations with the Persian government.119 Thus Krassin practically removed the question of the Soviet landing at Enzeli from the agenda of the Anglo-Soviet talks. Lloyd George must have found Krassin’s statement highly gratifying and was ready to take it at face value. As we will see, he later employed it to counter Curzon’s opposition to the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement on the grounds of continued hostile Soviet actions in north Persia.120 Even Curzon, at the time, found it expedient to believe Krassin’s assurance, because he saw it as a means of removing the Persian question from the agenda of the League of Nations. The Persian Foreign Minister, Firuz, had appealed to the League against Soviet aggression. The British government found this highly embarrassing, especially because “Prince Firuz has had the indiscretion to proclaim everywhere that his action is due to the fact that England has been unable to protect Persia against Bolshevik invasion.”121 The Foreign Office also feared this might lead to the involvement of other powers in the affairs of Persia. Oliphant had noted: “It would have been far better to keep clear of the League at present.”122 Now Britain could ask the League to drop the question. Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, rushed to communicate Krassin’s “very important statement about Persia” to the League.123 Moscow also agreed “to abandon communistic propaganda in Great Britain as part and parcel of the trading agreement.” But the third demand, cessation of propaganda in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and India, touched off a heated debate in Moscow. In a memorandum sent to the Politburo members and Chicherin on June 4, Trotsky suggested that the Soviet government should “come to an understanding with England with regard to the East.” His argument was based on two assumptions. First, he believed that the Eastern countries, such as Persia and Afghanistan, were not yet ready for a Soviet revolution, and that such a revolution “in these countries would at the present moment cause us the greatest possible difficulties. Even in Azerbaijan the Soviet republic is not capable of standing on its own feet, in spite of all the oil industry and its old connection with Russia.” Second, he


maintained that, “there is by no means absolute uniformity of line in British policy” By making concessions in the East, Moscow could “delay for some time yet the introduction of any such uniformity.” These two assumptions led him to conclude that a “potential Soviet revolution in the East is now advantageous for us chiefly as a major item of diplomatic barter with England.”124 Lenin did not accept at least the second assumption. He believed that “there undoubtedly is a uniformity of line” in the British cabinet. In his view, there was no point in making concessions in the East while the British government still pursued an anti-Soviet policy by helping Poland and Wrangel.125 Lenin continued to see the British government as centralized and Machiavellian, at least until the end of 1920. During the Polish crisis in August, for instance, he wrote to the Soviet delegation at London: “Obviously, Lloyd George is deliberately dividing up the roles with Churchill, using pacifistic phrases to conceal the real policy of the French and Churchill and duping the Henderson-and-co fools.”126 Chicherin leaned towards Lenin’s position. He wrote to Krassin: “Lloyd George apparently wishes that we should give everything, bind ourselves, put down the revolution in the East and release every British subject, all this for the sake of the problematic benefit of the renewal of trade relations which is not yet a matter of discussion. However necessary locomotives may be we must not sacrifice everything for the doubtful possibility of perhaps getting a few of them.” In sharp contrast to Curzon’s confidence that the Soviets would “pay almost any price,” Chicherin believed that Krassin could bargain from a position of strength: “You must in no wise yield to British blackmailing. The situation that has been created in the East is a difficult one for England. In Persia, they are almost helpless in the face of revolution. Disloyalty is increasing amongst the Indian troops.”127 In fact he went so far as to imply that Krassin could blackmail Britain: “In unofficial conversations you must make it clear that we are able to cause them serious damage in the East if we so wish. Picture to them what would happen if we sent a Red Army to Persia, Mesopotamia, and Afghanistan.”128 The price demanded by Chicherin for coming to an understanding with Britain, regarding the East, was a formal peace conference with the Allies, which was to lead to the recognition of the Soviet government. Without a peace treaty, the Soviets feared the resumption of Allied intervention in Russia. Lloyd George had an inkling of the disagreement among the Soviet decision-makers. He could tell from the intercepts that “the Soviet Government was by no means solid. Krassin represented the moderate element and Litvinov the extreme element.”129 He perhaps wished to offer more inducements to the “moderates” so as to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the “extreme elements.” In addition to lifting the blockade and resumption of trade, he was prepared to


discontinue support to Wrangel and Poland.130 But he could not, even if he wanted to, agree to a formal recognition of, and signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet government. Several senior ministers, especially Curzon and Churchill, and the Conservative majority in parliament were strongly opposed to such a move. Moreover, the Allied Supreme Council, while sanctioning the Anglo-Soviet trade talks, had explicitly barred Britain from entering into diplomatic relations with the Soviet government.131 The French premier, Millerand, even protested against discussion of the political issues, such as the Soviet propaganda in the East, in the course of the supposed trade talks with Krassin. Lloyd George defended these political discussions by reminding Millerand that the British “had had overwhelming reasons for insisting that the Soviet Government should call off their hordes in the East. There were 11,000 troops in Persia and in Afghanistan the Soviets could cause great trouble if they sent guns to the turbulent tribes.”132 However, he assured the French premier that Britain would not enter into peace negotiations with the Soviets. At the same time, Lloyd George was under growing pressure from the cabinet to insist on the demand for the cessation of Soviet propaganda and hostile actions in the East in return for the resumption of Anglo-Soviet trade. On June 26, in a memorandum distri buted to the Cabinet, Churchill wrote: “The one thing which is really worth for us to get out of the Krassin negotiations is a peace with the Bolsheviks so far as our Eastern possessions are concerned.”133 Lloyd George had repeatedly tried to impress on Krassin that “it was impossible for Great Britain to make trading arrangements involving the lifting of the Blockade and the cessation of support to Poland and Wrangel, unless the Soviet Government was willing to abandon its propaganda and interference in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India, etc.”134 But Chicherin continued to instruct Krassin that he must “make absolutely no statement concerning the Kemalists and Persia, nor concerning Afghanistan and China,” as he was “not conducting peace negotiations.”135 At the end of the fourth meeting between Lloyd George and Krassin on June 29, the issue of Soviet propaganda was still at a stalemate. The next day the British government sent Krassin a note which amounted to an ultimatum. Britain demanded a definite answer, “yes or no,” as to whether Soviet Russia was prepared to make a trade agreement on the following conditions: immediate release of all British prisoners, recognition of private debts, and commitment to “refrain from any attempt by military action or propaganda to encourage any of the people of Asia in any form of hostile action against the interests of the British Empire.” The last was regarded by Britain as “the fundamental condition for any trading agreement


between Russia and any Western power.” If within a week the British government did not receive an affirmative reply, the note said, the negotiations would be at an end.136 On July 7 Chicherin informed London that his government accepted the conditions laid down in the British note as the basis of a trade agreement between the two countries.137 It is not known how the Soviet leadership reached this decision. There is some evidence that Lenin and Chicherin were not much concerned about a rupture in the trade talks, which, they believed, would be only temporary.138 However, it appears that Krassin’s interpretation of the condition regarding Soviet propaganda in the East helped bridge the disagreement between the two strands of thought in Moscow, and led to its acceptance. Krassin urged Chicherin not to regard the condition as an immediate and specific commitment to refrain from supporting the revolutionary and nationalist movements or from engaging in anti-imperialist propaganda in the East. In his view, acceptance of the condition would amount to no more than a declaration of intent. From a practical point of view, he assured Chicherin, the Soviets would “risk absolutely nothing” by raising “all sorts of hopes” in the British mind.139 It seems that Moscow accepted this reading of the British condition. Later during the last round of the trade talks, Chicherin insisted that the July agreement regarding the British conditions was “merely a statement of principles” which was to be given a “concrete form at the Anglo-Russian political conference.”140 Curzon chose to take Moscow’s acceptance of the condition at its face value. He wrote to the British Minister at Tehran: The arrangements just concluded between His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government as a condition of resumption of negotiations contain the pledge that the Soviet Government will refrain from any attempt at military action against British interests or the British Empire. This undertaking is specially devised for the protection of Persia and should alleviate the claims [alarm] of the Persian Government about Bolshevik invasion of Mazandaran or Khurassan from which the Soviet Government will be called upon to desist. There was, however, a note of caution: “Our difficulty arises from the fact that it is apparently difficult to discriminate between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Persian Bolsheviks.”141 From the Foreign Office, George Churchill also warned that the threat came not only from the Soviets, but also from the Persian revolutionaries and communists: “The Bolsheviks have stirred up the unruly elements among the Persian population in the North and their withdrawal will not remedy the evil at once.”142

CHAPTER FOUR Persian Communists

The British officals in north Persia had long been concerned about the activities of the Persian communists and the possibility of their alliance with the liberal nationalists. As we have seen, the Assistant Political Officer at Resht, C.A.Butters, had kept tabs on Bolshevik activities in Gilan and particularly on contacts between the communists coming from Baku and Kuchik Khan. He sent regular reports to Major C.J.Edmonds, Political Officer with Norperforce, at Kasvin. Other British agents in north-west Persia also regularly reported to Major Edmonds, who in turn, kept the Legation informed of political developments in the area. Towards the end of March 1920, the reports of growing Bolshevik agitation in Tabriz drew the attention of Edmonds towards Azerbaijan. In Tabriz the communists had managed to recruit more than 800 members and were in contact with the party headquarters at Baku. They had formed an alliance with the Social Democratic Party, led by Ghulam Hussain Rezazada. They also enjoyed the active support of the German Consul at Tabriz, Kurt Wustrow, who was known for his anti-British campaign in Fars during the First World War.1 It seems that the communists even hoped to join forces with the Tabriz branch of the liberal-nationalist Democrat Party, led by a highly popular figure, Shaykh Muhammed Khiyabani.2 Khiyabani, like most leading Democrats, had long been branded as an “extremist” by the British officials. Edmonds was therefore alarmed when he learned that Khiyabani’s supporters had taken control of Tabriz and set up an autonomous local government on April 9. Edmonds decided to visit Tabriz personally. He arrived on April 26, and met some opponents of Khiyabani, including Ahmad Kasravi, who was one of the leaders of the minority faction of the Democrat Party. According to Kasravi’s account of the meeting, Edmonds was very anxious about Bolshevik activities in Azerbaijan and asked him if he could remove Khiyabani from the leadership of the party. Kasravi was neither able nor willing to do so.3 Edmonds’ fear was soon allayed when on May 1 he met Khiyabani, who assured him that he was no Bolshevik sympathizer. He told Edmonds that he was in fact

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determined to restrict the activities of the Bolsheviks as well as of the “reactionaries” (supporters of Vusuq). He went on to say: “His party had at bottom a great affection for England which had given them the constitution, they knew they had many sincere friends in England such as Professor Browne.”4 On his return to Kasvin, Edmonds reported to the Tehran Legation that Khiyabani’s movement “had started as a genuinely patriotic agitation for the restoration of the constitution; there was nothing Separatist or Bolshevik about it. It is of course impossible to foresee the results of mishandling by the Central Government.”5 A few days after the Soviet landing at Enzeli, Khiyabani began to crack down on the Bolsheviks. On May 30 the local police raided the pro-Bolshevik press and arrested many Bolshevik activists. Then the Democrat militia and the police laid siege to the German Consulate where some leading pro-Bolshevik activists (including two leaders of the Social Democrats, Rezazada and Abulqasem Eskandani) had taken refuge.6 Edmonds was delighted by the reports from Tabriz: “the democrats true to their promise have left nothing undone to stifle the Bolshevik movement.”7 The British Minister, Norman, was also “very much impressed by the behaviour of the democrats of Tabriz.”8 The lessons of the political developments in Gilan and Azerbaijan were not lost on the British officials at Tehran. As the case of the Democrats in Tabriz demonstrated, liberal nationalism could be harnessed against Bolshevism. If the British Legation continued to ignore the liberal nationalists, they might be driven into a tactical alliance with the communists, as had happened in Gilan. The British officials came to see that Vusuq’s policies were largely responsible for the “unusual discontent and rebellions” which had broken out in the revolting provinces of the north.9 Norman and some of his staff realized that the liberal nationalists’ agitations were primarily directed against the landed aristocracy who ruled the country with the backing of the British Legation and troops. As a result of supporting this class, Norman wrote, “we are in fact gradually drifting into a position formerly occupied in the public estimation by Russia”—the most hated foreign power. To gain the confidence of the liberal nationalists, the Legation had to keep its distance from the ruling oligarchy. “We are now identified with the most autocratic elements in the country and have lost the confidence of those who call themselves National Democrats or something else and are our natural friends since they owe the constitution to us,10 and who form moreover the only more or less organised party in the country.”11 Some nationalists in Tehran had made known that they were prepared to cooperate with the Legation.12 Norman therefore decided to jettison Vusuq, despite Curzon’s continued support for him who, according to Curzon, was “in a better position to safeguard agreement than anyone

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else.”13 Vusuq’s successor, Norman thought, “should be a man who while willing to continue his foreign policy should adopt a different Policy at home. He must at once also summon Parliament, and get the agreement passed.”14 (Norman later realized that these two conditions were in fact incompatible.) Norman’s choice, Mushir ud-Daula, seemed well suited to the part. He was on good terms with the Legation. At the same time, as a leading constitutionalist, he was highly respected by the liberal nationalists, including Khiyabani and Kuchik Khan. Vusuq’s willingness to resign facilitated Norman’s task. The developments after the Soviet landing at Enzeli had shaken his faith in the British support for his government. On May 20, in reply to a parliamentary question, Bonar Law had declared that “His Majesty’s Government are under no obligation” to defend Persia against a Soviet invasion.15 On May 21 the cabinet decided that “The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in reply to the Persian appeals for assistance, should not encourage hope that any financial assistance can be furnished, or any material assistance beyond the supply of arms, and those only if they are found to be available.”16 Although the arms were available, their delivery to Persia had been held up by wrangling among various departments over the price and payment.17 The withdrawal of the British troops from Tabriz and Resht on June 2 further undermined Vusuq’s position.18 At the same time, his Foreign Minister’s appeal to the League of Nations had come to nothing. The League just decided to ask the Persian government “to await the result of the promise made by the Soviet authorities.”19 The British government had not only antagonized the liberals, Norman observed, but they had also been “alienating the sympathies of other sections, notably rich reactionary land-owners, by our failure to carry out what they regarded as our moral obligations towards Persia in the matter of her defence.”20 Vusuq’s hopes were declining along with his health. On June 24 he stepped down, and was replaced by Mushir ud-Daula. In London, Curzon viewed with “considerable misgiving” the new pro-nationalist cabinet, and thought the change of government cast “serious doubt upon the likelihood” of ratification of the Agreement by the Majlis.21 But Norman believed that a popular Prime Minister was more likely to steer the Agreement through the Majlis successfully.22 Moreover, the British officials at Tehran maintained that “far more than the Anglo-Persian Convention” was at stake. They believed that Britian’s primary concern in Persia must now be the fight against Bolshevism, and that a nationalist like Mushir ud-Daula could “save the country.”23 The reports from various branches of the Democrat Party indicated the growing opposition to Bolshevism among the liberal nationalists. The British sources within the Meshed branch of the party reported that the members were “anti-Bolshevik to a man.”24 The Assistant Political Officer at Hamadan reported that the


news of the Bolshevik activities in Gilan had led the “democratic party to appreciate the necessity of presence of British troops for maintenance of law and order.” The leading Democrats in the town met him to impress upon him that “their principles are entirely opposed to Bolshevism.”25 The British agent at Zanjan wrote: “The majority of the Democrats here are reported to be very anti-Bolshevik owing to reports of recent events in Resht.”26 Mushir ud-Daula appealed to nationalism in his dealings with Kuchik Khan and Khiyabani. He decided to send a well-known nationalist (Sardar Fakher) as his envoy to Gilan to drive a wedge between Kuchik Khan and his communist allies. He also appointed Mukhber us-Saltana, a leading nationalist and ex-chairman of the Democrat Party, as the Governor-General of Azerbaijan, hoping that he would be able to persuade Khiyabani to submit to the nationalist government at Tehran.27 Yet the British officials and Mushir ud-Daula were well aware that the appeal of liberal nationalism was confined to a small section of the population. To mobilize the majority of the population against Bolshevism they had to play on the traditional religious and tribal allegiances. As early as April 1920, Major Edmonds reported to the Legation: “Recently a Chigini28 nomad on the Manjil Road was heard to express the wish that the Bolsheviks would come quickly and give the money of the rich to the poor. The most effective counter propaganda for this class is found to be insistence on the anti-Islamic aspect of Bolshevism.”29 At a meeting on July 7, the Prime Minister informed Norman that “he was about to send a secret mission to the Holy Places in Mesopotamia with a view to inducing the religious authorities there to issue a fetwa condemning Bolshevism as contrary to Islam,” a step which, Norman wrote, “I myself had been intending to advise.”30 Norman later urged the Prime Minister that he should “lose no time in despatching the mission to the Holy Places of Mesopotamia,” because he believed a fetwa condemning Bolshevism “would have a powerful and farreaching effect in Persia.”31 The Persian clergy were, of course, ready to launch an anti-Bolshevik campaign. Mushir ud-Daula told Norman that since he had been in office all prominent ecclesiastics of the capital, including those most hostile to the Anglo-Persian Agreement who are leaders of opposition to it, had spontaneously called on him to assure him of support and that a vigorous antiBolshevik campaign would at once be begun in all mosques.32 The mujtahids of the holy city of Meshed unanimously decided at a meeting to organize a protest against the Bolshevik activities and to telegraph to the Prime Minister urging the adoption of strong

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measures to put an end to these activities.33 From Hamadan, the Assistant Political Officer reported: “I have encouraged the Mullahs and the Aghayans to carry on an anti-Bolshevik campaign.”34 The British military authorities also believed that “much could be done to save the situation” if the Persian government encouraged the tribes of north-west Persia to cooperate with their regular forces in operations against the Bolsheviks in Gilan.35 Major Edmonds was in regular contact with the tribal chiefs of eastern Azerbaijan and Talish (western Gilan). Early in July, Mustafa Quli Khan Amir ‘Asha’er, the chief of the Shateranlu tribe (in the vicinity of Khalkhal), united a large number of the tribes of eastern Azerbaijan and then formed an alliance with Amir Muqtader, the most important tribal chief of Talish and an old enemy of Kuchik Khan.36 This tribal union was further strengthened when Haji Mirza Ali Akbar, the mujtahid of Ardabil who had just arrived from Najaf, declared his support for the tribes. He issued a fetwa for Jihad against the Bolsheviks, promising “the rewards of martyrdom” to anyone who fell. The tribal chiefs sent messengers to Kasvin to inform Edmonds that they were “ready to act as the British and the Persian Government ordered.” Edmonds was delighted that “the very persons we contemplated calling upon in any move on Gilan are themselves taking initiative in coming forward.” Edmonds immediately asked the Legation to press the Persian government to supply these tribes with arms and money. Fearing the tribes might later turn their guns against the government forces, the Persian government was initially wary of helping the tribes. But they eventually agreed to provide Amir Muqtader with some arms and money. In return, his tribal force actively cooperated with the government forces in the operations against the Bolsheviks and the Jangalis in Gilan.37 While there was a meeting of minds between the Prime Minister and the British Legation on internal anti-Bolshevik campaigns, the British officials viewed with some misgivings Mushir ud-Daula’s decision to send a diplomatic mission to Moscow “to demand from the Soviet Government abstention from all interference in Persian affairs, from provision of moral and material support to Persian insurgents, and from all propaganda in Persia.” In return, the Persian government would be ready to conclude a treaty of friendship with the Soviet government.38 Curzon and Norman tried to dissuade Mushir ud-Daula from embarking on this course of action, arguing “the despatch of a Mission to Moscow in present circumstances would appear foredoomed to failure.”39 But Mushir ud-Daula insisted that direct negotiations with Moscow were demanded by public opinion. He told Norman that if the mission “were sent the Government would be able to show even in the case of its failure that they had neglected no means by which the country might possibly have been saved.” Finally,


Norman reluctantly agreed to the Prime Minister’s plan.40 The Foreign Office continued to think that the mission was “bound to be a failure,” but it was clear that they could no longer prevent direct contacts between Persia and Soviet Russia.41 In fact the Foreign Office was equally concerned about the success of the mission which would spell the end of the subordination of Persia’s foreign policy to that of Britain. The Foreign Office still wanted Persia to continue to depend on British diplomacy, despite the fact that the Soviet government had already questioned the right of the British government to negotiate on behalf of Persia. At his meeting with British Ministers on June 7, Krassin had stated that the Soviet government would consider any protest as “proceeding directly from the Persian Government.”42 As was suspected by the British officials, by sending a diplomatic mission to Moscow, Mushir ud-Daula hoped not only to deprive the Persian communists of external support, but also to steer the foreign policy of Persia back to what he, like most nationalists, considered to be normality. While in Tehran, the Prime Minister and the British Legation were busy devising various methods of combating Bolshevism, the alliance of liberal nationalists and communists in Gilan had begun to break apart after only a few weeks. The communists were divided on one basic question: should they subordinate their revolutionary aims to the anti-imperialist struggle against the British influence in Persia? In his speech to the first Congress of the Communist (Adalat) Party held at Enzeli on June 22–24,43 Avetis Mikailian (alias Sultanzada),44 the leading theoretician of the party, argued that the communists should simultaneously follow three slogans: (1) Struggle against Britain; (2) Struggle against the Shah’s government; (3) Struggle against the tribal chiefs and big landowners. He stressed: “Even if one of these slogans is abandoned the Persian revolution will not succeed.” The representatives of the Russian Communist Party at the Congress sided with those who maintained that the national liberation struggle against Britain should take precedence over class struggle. One of the representatives said: “We have to try to convince the vacillating elements that Soviet rule [in Persia] threatens neither the landowners nor the bourgeoisie, and then they will support the national liberation movement. We should take no action against the landowners and the bourgeoisie. There should be only one slogan at present—Down with the British, Down with the Shah’s government.” This division was reflected in the resolutions of the Congress. On the one hand, Article 6 declared: “It is the duty of the Persian Communist Party to fight against world imperialism together with Soviet Russia and to support all the forces in Persia which would oppose the British and the Shah’s government.” On the other hand, the same article added that the party must “paralyse those elements

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who are interested in driving the British out of Persia but are afraid of revolutionary struggle.”45 However Sultanzada succeeded in convincing the Congress to adopt the programme drawn up by him, which called for distribution of the lands owned by the religious endowments and the landowners among the peasants.46 This meant that the communists intended to pursue their land reform programme which they had already started, despite the opposition of Kuchik Khan.47 The communists further antagonized the liberal nationalists by confiscating the houses of some leading clergy and landowners, imposing heavy taxes on the merchants and other rich residents of Resht and Enzeli,48 openly advocating “conduct contrary to Islamic law,”49 and shipping in a large number of the Persian oil workers, trained and armed by the Adalat Party organization at Baku, without the approval of the Revolutionary Committee.50 In mid-July a large crowd, including some leading clergy, landowners and merchants of Resht, gathered in the grand mosque of the city and “upbraided Kuchik Khan for not protecting their property and their honour as he had promised.” Kuchik Khan, in tears, protested that he had done his best, but could no longer control the situation.51 The tension between the two sides mounted when Kuchik Khan agreed to meet the Prime Minister’s envoy (Sardar Fakher), despite the fierce opposition of the communists and some of his associates who had chosen to side with them. Finding himself in a minority, Kuchik Khan gradually removed a large part of the arms and ammunitions which he had received from the Soviet authorities to the forest, and then left Resht for his hideout in the forest on July 17. Two weeks later the breach between the communists and the Jangalis was complete. On July 31 the communists seized all the government departments and arrested all pro-Jangali officials.52 After his withdrawal to the forest, Kuchik Khan wrote to Lenin: “I told him [Raskolnikov] that the Persians were not yet ready to accept the idealist communist programme, and an attempt to force it on them might drive them into the ranks of our enemy. The representatives agreed with me and accepted my political ideas in the east, to annihilate the English domination and dethrone the Shah….” But the Communists, he lamented, did not abide by the agreement, and thus turned most of the Persians against the revolutionary movement. Complaining of the interference in the internal affairs of Gilan by the Soviet authorities at Baku, he wrote: “The Persians, trying to escape from the domination of one set of foreigners, are falling under the domination of another set.”53 Unaware of these developments in Resht, the revolutionary forces, composed of Jangali guerrillas, pro-Jangali tribal forces, Persian communists, Caucasian volunteers and Azerbaijani troops under the joint command of a number of Jangali leaders and a few Russian


officers, were rapidly advancing towards Tehran. Towards the end of July they were in the vicinity of the strategic Manjil Pass. On July 26 they shelled the British outpost at Manjil. The attack did not develop but the British troops evacuated Manjil and retreated towards Kasvin on July 31.54 As a result of this retreat, Norman observed, the British military prestige “suffered another blow.”55 The General Headquarters at Baghdad was “baffled” by the withdrawal of the troops from Manjil without having been seriously attacked.56 The Persian government was alarmed that British troops had left Manjil without offering any resistance.57 The day after the retreat, the British Minister found “the Shah more despondent than I have ever seen him.” The Shah feared that the evacuation of Manjil would soon be followed by that of Kasvin, which would leave Tehran exposed to a Bolshevik invasion. The retreat had also aroused deep-rooted anxieties. The Shah asked Norman for an assurance that the withdrawal “had not taken place as appears to be widely believed here in accordance with an agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government.”58 Of course, there was no collusion between Britain and Soviet Russia to divide Persia into spheres of influence. But the Commander of the British troops in North Persia, General Champain, was planning to withdraw his force from Kasvin to Hamadan within easy reach of the Mesopotamian railhead. And the British Legation was “unobtrusively” making arrangements to evacuate Tehran.59 There were two reasons for the British officials’ anxiety and their seemingly baffling conduct. First, General Haldane, GOC Mesopotamia, had decided to withdraw two battalions from north Persia. Second, General Champain feared that the Soviet forces would soon march on Tehran. After his visit to north Persia in mid-June, General Haldane decided to reduce the British troops stationed in the area from six to four battalions by September.60 This news unnerved General Champain who had not yet recovered from the shock of the Soviet landing at Enzeli. He had in fact hoped for reinforcements. On June 28 he wrote to General Haldane: Although for the moment there is no indication of any advance in force on the part of the Bolsheviks, reports are current that they have expressed their intentions of moving on Tehran in the near future. It will be remembered that prior to their bombardment of Enzeli they had announced, somewhat bom-bastically as it sounded then, their intentions of landing troops at Astara and attacking us by land and by sea simultaneously. They carried out this threat and therefore…their present threats cannot altogether be disregarded.

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General Champain added that it would be impossible for him to check the Bolshevik advance if the forces under his command were reduced.61 Four weeks later when the British positions at Manjil came under fire, it appeared to him that the long-awaited push of Soviet troops towards Tehran had started. The shelling of Manjil also evoked the Enzeli incident in his mind. He wrote to the Military Attaché at Tehran: “It appears evident from the enterprise and skill displayed that the enemy are not merely gangs of Baku wastrels and Persian rebels, but organised by capable officers and Russians.”62 His suspicion seemed to be confirmed when, on July 30, a letter, written in Russian and signed on behalf of the “Persian and Russian Red Army,” was brought into Manjil, demanding the surrender of the British detachment.63 General Champain immediately ordered the troops to evacuate Manjil. He then asked the War Office either to reinforce him by another brigade and give him discretion to undertake offensive action,64 or to authorize him to withdraw completely from north Persia. He warned that if the two battalions were withdrawn, his forces would be so weak that he too would have no choice but to withdraw, which would result in the evacuation of Tehran by the British Legation and eventually in the fall of the Shah’s government.65 General Haldane, whose position in Baghdad was precarious as a result of the widespread rebellion, was disinclined to despatch reinforcements to General Champain. On the contrary, he hoped to reinforce his own troops in Mesopotamia further by drawing on the troops in north Persia.66 Meanwhile, in London, the War Office had been contemplating not the reinforcement, but rather the withdrawal of Norperforce from Persia.67 Wilson therefore thought it was “sheer madness for our people (civilians, women and children) to remain in Tehran.”68 But Curzon was not yet prepared to consider evacuating Tehran.69 Well aware of the views of the War Office, Curzon realized that he could not count on any reinforcements.70 But he was determined to prevent the War Office from withdrawing or reducing the troops in north Persia.71 At the cabinet meeting on August 12, Curzon succeeded in beating off Wilson’s and Churchill’s demand for withdrawal from north Persia. The cabinet decided that the British forces in Persia should be maintained “at their present strength.”72 Armed with this decision, Curzon forced Wilson to order Haldane to cancel the withdrawal of the two battalions from north Persia.73 Curzon’s success in the cabinet, coupled with the news of the rift between Kuchik Khan and the communists, so much soothed the anxieties of the British officials at Tehran that the British Minister reported that he could “hardly any longer regard evacuation of the capital as a possibility.”74


However, the Persian Prime Minister had not awaited the result of the interdepartmental tussle in London. No sooner had the British troops retreated from Manjil than Mushir ud-Daula ordered the Commander of the Persian Cossack Division, Colonel Starosselski, to collect all available Persian regular forces (Cossacks and the Gendarmes) for the defence of the capital.75 (A joint operation by the Cossacks and the Gendarmes had already checked the Jangalicommunist advance in Mazandaran.) With the support of Norman, he also borrowed 500,000 tomans from the Imperial Bank of Persia for the operation. A few days later his envoy (Sardar Fakher) arrived from Gilan with the news that Kuchik Khan and his following were prepared to submit to the central government as soon as the latter would send sufficient forces to deal with the Bolsheviks in Gilan.76 After a meeting with the British Minister and Colonel Starosselski, General Champain reported to Baghdad that “the necessity of immediate offensive against the Gilan was agreed by all concerned, especially in view of the reported disagreement between Kuchik Khan and the Bolsheviks.” Starosselski had asked Champain to support his operation. Champain, who seemed to have regained his nerve,77 was eager to join the operation. He wrote to Haldane: “An immediate successful action may settle the Gilan question, I think we ought to help him [Starosselski] as much as we can, and Manjil be re-occupied.”78 General Haldane agreed to the reoccupation of Manjil by British troops.79 The Shah and the Prime Minister disagreed over the extent of British involvement in the military expedition to Gilan. The Prime Minister wanted to “represent the expedition as being a Persian one sent against rebel subjects by the government,” in order not to provoke the Soviet government into landing more troops in Persia, and to make it easier for Kuchik Khan to join the government forces. He therefore preferred the British troops to keep a low profile and even not to enter Manjil. But the Shah wished the British troops to reoccupy Manjil and actively support Starosselski’s forces. Finally it was decided that there would be no united command, but that Champain and Starosselski would act in “close agreement,” and that the British troops would not enter Manjil at the same time as the Persian forces. On August 18 the Persian forces occupied Manjil and the British troops entered Manjil two days later.80 On the KasvinManjil road the British troops were fully engaged in the operations. On August 15, for instance, they drove back a revolutionary force “setting out to occupy Kasvin and Tehran.”81 But the War Office had not authorized Champain to take any offensive action beyond Manjil. However, the Persian Cossacks pressed their offensive. On August 23 they occupied the provincial capital, Resht, and set out to capture Enzeli.82 They advanced as far as Hassanrud, eight miles from Enzeli,

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where they came under shell fire from the Soviet gunboats on the Enzeli Lagoon. The Cossacks, who had suffered heavy losses, hurriedly retired to Resht, pursued by a force which seemed to be chiefly composed of the Russian sailors. On August 26 they evacuated Resht and fell back to Manjil.83 The reports that a Russian force was pursuing the retreating Cossacks once again unsettled General Champain. A message, intercepted on August 20 and relayed to him the following day,84 added to his anxiety. The message, from the Soviet authorities at Enzeli to Baku, read as follows: “Circumstances demand the despatch to Enzeli of Russian fighting detachments. Only the arrival of these detachments, which must be well equipped, can save the situation.”85 And, according to an intelligence report from Baku, “a detachment of the Bolshevik troops, which were concentrated at Baku and stated to be destined for Persia, was immediately despatched to Enzeli as soon as the news of the ‘Red’ reverses became known.”86 It appeared to Champain that the Soviet troops might try to march on Tehran. He wrote anxiously: “Heavy reinforcements are arriving for the enemy and should he pursue and the Cossacks retire, which, in my opinion, is highly probable, we shall before long be forced to withdraw on Hamadan.”87 He began making arrrangements for evacuating Kasvin, envisaging that “our leaving here will probably result in a revolution in north Persia.”88 In the event, the Persian Cossacks retreated behind the British positions at Manjil, but the Russians did not pursue them beyond Sangar, 40 miles north of Manjil.89 Nor was there any evidence of “heavy reinforcements.” Just how many Russian sailors were despatched from Baku is not known, but, three weeks later, Champain himself reported that “it appears that in Gilan there are not many Bolsheviks.”90 In fact, Starosselski after reinforcing the Persian Cossacks at Manjil, launched his second offensive and easily reoccupied Resht on September 22. But this time, he did not advance towards Enzeli.91 He had realized that his forces could remain in Gilan only on sufferance of the Soviet troops. In an interview with Norman, Starosselski observed that “the safety of Persia depended entirely on the inability or unwillingness of the Russian Soviet Government to send a force strong enough to overrun it.”92 The record is far from complete, but there is clear evidence that Moscow, at least in the summer of 1920, had no intention of sending a force strong enough to overrun Persia or install a communist government in Tehran. In fact, Ordzhonkidze, who was in charge of the Soviet operation in Gilan, and General Champain were both in a similar position. The insistence of the Foreign Office had kept Norperforce in Kasvin, but the War Office had forbidden Champain to advance towards Resht.93 Similarly, perhaps for comparable reasons,


Ordzhonikidze had to hold on to Enzeli but was not allowed to advance on Tehran. After reoccupation of Resht by the Persian Cossacks, Ordzhonikidze asked Moscow to authorize him to despatch a destroyer and a number of other warships to Enzeli, in order to secure the port. When Lenin hesitated to sanction the naval operation, Ordzhonikidze angrily wrote to him: “In general, the Persian problem must be resolved in one way or other: either strike at them, or make peace with the Shah’s government and quit Enzeli. The present situation cannot continue for long.”94 By the end of the summer there was another sign of Moscow’s restraint. After the capture of Krasnovodsk in February, the Soviet government was in full control of Transcaspia. The Persian government and the British Legation at Tehran feared that the conquest of Transcaspia would be followed by an invasion of the neighbouring Persian province of Khurassan by the Red Army. They particularly pointed to strengthening of the Soviet garrisons on the Persian-Turkestan frontier.95 But the Commander of the British forces in Khurassan, General Malleson, believed that the concentration of the Soviet forces on the Ashkhabad-Merv line was “purely defensive,”96 and was due to the Soviet officials’ anxieties in Turkestan. According to the intelligence reports received by Malleson, the Bolsheviks in Turkestan are very nervous regarding the Mohammedan situation. They know there are very few, if any, genuine Mohammedan Communists. They are convinced that everywhere British agents are secretly preparing widespread rising of all Central Asian Mohammedans against them and they believe the Afghans97 from Herat to Khorassan are similarly engaged. They believe both Khiva and Bokhara have all along acted under British control and that the whole Turcoman people look to the British as the ultimate deliverer…. They also greatly fear the possibility of British military action against Transcaspia. “Troops are seized with panic at this possibility and Broido98 himself is as scared as anyone in this connection.” So long as the British are in Khorassan they consider the whole of the Turkestan position dangerous for them, and this is the governing motive for action against Persia.99 Malleson believed the Soviet action against Persia was, at least initially, unlikely to take the form of direct invasion of Khurassan by the Red Army because “the Bolsheviks are more frightened of us than we are of them. They exaggerate our numbers.”100 But he warned that “the other scheme…whereby the Persians armed, trained, and instructed in revolutionary agitation by

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the Bolsheviks are to be let loose in Persia, on the other hand, seems much more probable.”101 The movement of Persian migrant workers into Turkestan began at the end of the nineteenth century. By 1920 there were some 100,000 Persians in Turkestan.102 In the wake of the entry of the Red Army into Turkestan, the leaders of the Persian Adalat (Communist) Party made a tour of towns and villages of the area to organize local branches among the Persian workers. By the middle of 1920 the party committee had been set up in 52 localities, with almost 7,000 members.103 What really disturbed the British officials at Meshed was the recruitment of the Persians into the Red Army. As early as February, Malleson reported: “Ashkhabad reports appear to indicate that the principles of Bolshevism have taken a firm grip of the Persian inhabitants of that place.” He added anxiously that the Persians were being recruited for “armed outbreaks in Khorassan.”104 By mid-March Ashkhabad and Merv were rife with rumours of an invasion of Persia. According to an intelligence report: “The idea is not openly supported officially but some officials are known to favour it. Most active supporters are Persian Bolsheviks.”105 It appears that the Soviet officials were divided. On the one hand, it was reported that the Commander of the Red Army in Turkestan, Mikhail Frunze, in a speech made in Ashkhabad on March 19, encouraged the Persian communists’ plan for invasion of Khurassan.106 In contrast, another report noted that a “prominent Bolshevik” sent by Lenin and Trotsky to investigate the situation in Turkestan, was “surprised to hear the talk of the invasion of Persia. Nothing was further from the thoughts of his chiefs than to fall foul of Persia and England. To the aid of the latter country they look for the regeneration of Russia.”107 However, the Persian communists continued to enlist men for operations in Khurassan. The conference of the Adalat committees at Turkestan, held in Tashkent, was “mainly concerned with the question of the forcible ejectment of the English from Persia.”108 By mid-June they had managed to recruit some 4,000 men.109 Most of the Adalat troops, after training at Tashkent and Fergana, were despatched to Ashkhabad, where the talk of invasion of Persia was “rifer than ever.” On June 10 four prominent members of the Adalat Party, led by the veteran revolutionary Haydar Khan Amu-Ughli,110 arrived in Ashkhabad to supervise the Adalat troops.111 To prepare the ground for their operations in Khurassan, the Adalat leaders in Ashkhabad tried to despatch emissaries and revolutionary literature to Meshed and other provincial towns, to win over the Gendarmes who constituted the only Persian regular force in the province, and to stir up Khuda Verdi Sardar, a Kurdish tribesman who had previously led a revolt against the provincial government. Many of the emissaries were arrested by the British and Persian


military authorities on the border, and large consignments of the literature were also captured.112 However, the British Consul-General at Meshed, Lieutenant-Colonel W.G.Grey, was not greatly concerned about this sort of activity: “No soil could be less suitable to Bolshevik propaganda…. Not more than 5 per cent of the population of the province and 10 per cent of that of Meshed is literate and the literate class is the most emphatically anti-Bolshevik of all. My intelligence arrangements for dealing with this [the Bolshevik propaganda] are sufficiently trustworthy.”113 The Persian communists managed to conduct some propaganda among the Gendarmes, particularly those stationed along the border.114 Haydar Khan personally appealed to the Gendarmes at the frontier garrison at Luftabad to leave their post and join their compatriots at Ashkhabad.115 Some intelligence reports indicated that there was “a great deal of pro-Bolshevik feeling among the men of the Persian Gendarmerie,” and that “some of the Persian Gendarmes on the Russo-Persian border south of Ashkhabad are fraternizing with the Bolsheviks.”116 In the event only a score of Gendarmes deserted and joined the Adalat troops at Ashkhabad.117 But Khuda Verdi’s willingness to cooperate with the communists alarmed the Persian and British officials at Meshed. He and his brother, Allah Verdi, visited Ashkhabad several times to meet the Adalat leaders. They were supplied with money, small arms and several machine guns.118 Khuda Verdi managed to mobilize a few hundred men and win over some minor chiefs of the Kurdish Zafaranlu tribe.119 “At the end of June the Bolsheviks’ preparations were nearly ready,” according to Captain Blacker, who served in the British frontier garrison at Bajgiran opposite Ashkhabad. “Poltaratsk [Ashkhabad] was full of troops and guns, and the ‘Adalat’ force had overflowed into Firuza, the little hill station only a few miles from the Persian frontier.”120 The British officials at Tehran and Meshed believed that the revolt by Khuda Verdi was only the “opening gambit” which would be followed by the invasion of Khurassan by the Adalat troops to support the rebels. In the event of the defeat of the Persian communists the Red Army would invade the province. They would appoint Khuda Verdi as “Bolshevik Commissary” in Khurassan. The loss of this rich province, Norman wrote, would further weaken the central government. The capital would be threatened from the east as well as the north. And British prestige “would be shattered not only in Persia but throughout the East, and we should have Bolshevism on our Indian frontier.” Norman and the British officials at Meshed were convinced that it was only the presence of the British troops that deterred the Bolsheviks from invading Persia from Turkestan. He therefore tried to impress upon

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the Foreign Office that the withdrawal of troops from Khurassan should be postponed “at least for a few months.”121 As we have seen, the cabinet had decided to withdraw the troops from east Persia on May 5.122 And the British troops were due to evacuate Meshed on August 14. The Foreign Office failed to persuade the India Office and the War Office to reconsider the issue.123 The India Office had in fact asked the Viceroy to speed up the withdrawal noting that the expense involved was “very great and the military commitment undesirable.”124 The government of India, which was responsible for the Meshed Mission, conceded that the situation in Khurassan was “undoubtedly unpleasant and difficult,” but did not regard it as so desperate as to justify the cancellation of withdrawal of the troops.125 As nobody was prepared to continue to pay for them, the Foreign Office could only lament that the withdrawal was “unfortunate but inevitable,” just hoping that the Soviet government would keep their presumed pledge not to threaten the British interests in the East.126 Curzon himself once again chose to be optimistic remarking that he was not convinced that the Bolsheviks really intended “to invade Khorassan and to seize Meshed.”127 Meanwhile, the Persian and British officials in Khurassan had not been idle. Ahmad Khan Qavam us-Saltana, the Governor-General, had reinforced his ties to the local magnate and the tribal chiefs, and appealed to them for aid against the Bolshevik threat. One of the archconservatives of the province, Azizullah Khan Sardar Mu’azzez, the chief of Shadlu tribe and the hereditary governor of Bujnurd, mobilized some 600 men. The Commander of the British troops, General W.B.Lesslie,128 agreed to supply him with some arms and ammunition.129 Other tribal chiefs soon followed suit. While the Governor-General was organizing the tribal force, several skirmishes had taken place between Khuda Verdi’s armed followers and the patrols of the British garrison at Bajgiran. In the second week of July, in a clash lasting a few days, the British-led patrols inflicted relatively heavy casualties on Khuda Verdi’s small force.130 General Lesslie immediately informed the Governor-General131 that “the time to strike has now arrived, and that he should not delay until the effect of the defeat had worn off.” To direct operations against Khuda Verdi, the Governor-General, accompanied by some fellow aristocrats (Prince ‘Adl ud-Daula, Prince Mu’tazed us-Saltana and his son Amjad udMulk), proceeded to Shirvan, nine miles north of the rebels’ stronghold at the Gilyan valley, close to the Russo-Persian frontier. He was joined by Sardar Mu’azzez and other tribal chiefs of Khurassan.132 A force composed of Gendarmes and tribal irregulars, numbering 1,200, encircled the valley. The Military Attaché at Meshed, LieutenantColonel E.A.F.Redl, reported that Khuda Verdi and his men were “hemmed in, and provided that no relief is sent to them by the


Bolsheviks, would probably be captured in the end.” There was no sign of the Adalat troops crossing the border to relieve Khuda Verdi. After resisting for two weeks, Khuda Verdi and some of his men managed to slip away through the cordon, and took refuge in Ashkhabad. The Governor-General’s troops captured the valley and executed three rebel leaders, including Khuda Verdi’s nephew. Khuda Verdi’s revolt had ended once and for all.133 According to an intelligence report, the “Adalat troops were much disappointed at a telegram from Moscow ordering the indefinite postponement of the advance on Khorassan and non-intervention in the Khuda Verdi affair.”134 Yet the Persian communists at Ashkhabad continued to speak of advancing on Khurassan, and the Adalat troops kept on arriving in the city from other parts of Turkestan. It therefore appeared to the British officials that the operations of the Adalat troops had only temporarily been held over until the withdrawal of the British forces, when it could be “more conveniently undertaken.”135 By the second week of August the official evacuation order had arrived in the British frontier garrison at Bajgiran. While evacuating the garrison on August 9, Captain Blacker “felt very sorry for…our Persian and Kurdish friends, in view of the Soviets’ invasion that was now a foregone conclusion, and the massacres that would accompany it.”136 The following day the British withdrawal from Bajgiran was known at Ashkhabad and the information was at once reported to Tashkent. In reply, the Soviet officials at Tashkent issued an order that no military action was to be taken against Persia.137 Yet the British intelligence reports at the same time stated that “the general opinion in Ashkabad was that little time would be lost in occupying the places in Khorassan evacuated by us.” One week later, the reports from Ashkhabad still noted: “Talk of the invasion of Khorassan continues unabated.” It was reported that an Adalat detachment at Kaakha (east of Ashkhabad) was poised to cross the border. The date of a large-scale advance on Khurassan was said to have been fixed for September 20. But the Soviet authorities soon began to rein in the Persian communists. The Adalat members at Kaakha were deported to Merv. The Soviet officials declared that the Persian subjects should not be forced to enlist in the Adalat force and that the recruits should be discharged if they wished to return to their country. The Adalat leaders “energetically” opposed the measure. Towards the end of August, there were reports of a “fracas resulting in a loss of life between the Adalat and communist elements on the one hand and the centre troops [the Red Army detachment] on the other.” Haydar Khan and several other Adalat leaders left Turkestan for Baku to attend the Congress of the Peoples of the East. But the remaining leaders of the Adalat Party continued, irrepressibly, to advocate despatching troops

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into Persia to “deliver Khorassan from the British yoke.” Hoping to remove the Adalat troops from the Russo-Persian border, the Soviet authorities asked the Adalat leaders to send their men to take part in the Red Army attack on Bukhara.138 But the Adalat leaders refused to participate in the operation. The Soviet officials now began to take more drastic measures against the Persian communists. In midSeptember it was reported: The unwillingness of the Adalat to take part in the Bukhara campaign appears to have brought the matter to a head. There are reports of disarming of some hundreds of Adalat troops and talk of dissolving the party. According to a later account the Bolsheviks themselves are taking over the organizations and installing a Russian official as executive chief. A week later it was reported: “The party at Ashkhabad, Merv, and Kaakha had practically been broken up.” “The Adalat as a society,” according to a report in mid-October, “is more than moribund and many of the leaders are under arrest.”139 It was with a sigh of relief that the British and Persian officials at Meshed received these reports.

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CHAPTER FIVE Zero-Sum Game?

The developments in north Persia during the summer of 1920 led the Foreign Office to the conclusion that “the Persian temperament” was not “susceptible to the virus of Bolshevism.” There was “no case of any Soviet organisation remaining after the removal of the force of the invaders.” “It is true that considerable anxiety was felt in regard to the possibility of a Bolshevik Government being set up in Persia,” Esmond Ovey wrote in a memorandum submitted to Curzon, “but this fear seems to have been almost exclusively based on the natural apprehension of a Bolshevik invasion in force.”1 Having witnessed the Soviet government’s restraint in Gilan and Khurassan, did London still fear a Bolshevik invasion of Persia? The War Office argued that the Soviets had hesitated to overrun Persia not because they had renounced the revolutionary goals in the country, but because the bulk of the Soviet troops were tied down in other fronts. On October 23 General Haldane, GOC Mesopotamia, wrote to the War Office: “Bolshevist situation and plans in TransCaucasia and North Persia are evidently dependent in certain degree on Wrangel’s success or failure, as reliable but fragmentary information comes to hand here from time to time of movements of Bolshevist material and personnel from Astrakhan to South Russia.” The War Office agreed that the Red Army would be able to spare considerable reinforcements for a military campaign in TransCaucasia and Persia as soon as the civil war was over.2 In a letter to Curzon, enclosing Haldane’s despatch, Churchill wrote: If he [Wrangel] is smashed up, as he very likely will be, before we have got out of our position at Kasvin, nothing else will be easier than for the Bolsheviks to reinforce their troops on the south side of the Caspian and involve us in very grave difficulties, if not in actual disaster. Even if our forces retreat successfully, Persia would be overrun. The only reason this has not happened is that the Bolsheviks have been defeated by the Poles and by Wrangel and have been forced to concentrate elsewhere.3


Churchill also warned the cabinet: “If this Autumn witnesses the destruction of Wrangel, it seems almost certain that the Spring will witness a great recrudescence of Bolshevik pressure in the East, upon Persia and towards Afghanistan.”4 By mid-November Wrangel’s army had been destroyed. After signing the preliminary peace treaty with Poland, on October 12, the Soviet government transferred the troops southwards to mount the final campaign against Wrangel. In a series of attacks during November 7–11, the Red Army broke through the heavily fortified White positions. On November 16 Wrangel’s men were evacuated from the Crimea and sailed to Constantinople. The two-year war on the Polish front and the three-year civil war had practically ended.5 It now seemed to the War Office that the Soviet government would concentrate its forces on the southern borders in preparation for an advance on Persia. The intelligence reports reinforced this perception of threat. In midNovember SIS reported: “There appears little doubt that the Bolsheviks are quite earnest in their desire to overrun Persia as a preparatory step to an invasion of India, and all force of Bolshevik propaganda is being brought to bear in this direction.”6 By the end of November the War Office was in the possession of more alarming reports. According to an intelligence report from Baku, the Soviet officials at Baku had promised the Commander of the Soviet troops in Gilan to despatch a brigade to reinforce his forces.7 Churchill, quoting the intelligence report, warned the cabinet: “An offensive is to be started against our troops as soon as this brigade arrives.”8 Moreover, in an intercepted message from Baku to Enzeli on November 11, the Commander of the Soviet troops in Gilan was ordered: “You should fortify your position and wait for the result of negotiations at Moscow with the Shah’s Government. It is not impossible that policy will be altered in favour of further determined action in connection with the general plan of activity in the East.”9 On the night of November 24, the newly arrived brigade began disembarking at Enzeli.10 At the same time, General Haldane ruled out the possibility of military defence of Persia by the British troops. “Although lack of railways and difficulties of road transport will handicap them [the Soviet troops],” Haldane argued, “possession of sea bases and the availability of requisite troops, vehicles and fuel will give them power to concentrate considerable numbers at short notice.” He added: “When the ice of the Northern Caspian breaks up this power will be increased and no force we can maintain in North Persia can hope to withstand a serious military advance on Kasvin and Tehran in the event of their plan taking form.”11 In addition to an advance from the Caspian Sea, in Haldane’s opinion, there was the possibility of a coordinated campaign by the

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Bolshevik and the Kemalist forces in Persian Azerbaijan. The Soviet control of the Baku-Alexandropol-Tabriz railway, Haldane noted, would pose the double threat of their advance on Kasvin and Tehran from the west as well as from the north, and their movement to northern Mesopotamia.12 From Tehran, Norman reported: “General Ironside is convinced that the Bolsheviks and the Turks are acting in conjunction and believes an invasion of Azerbaijan by one or both of them may occur this winter. He considers this to be the most serious danger threatening or likely to threaten Persia….”13 The British Consul at Tabriz, E.Bristow, had already advised the few remaining British subjects to leave the city.14 The arrival of the Turks and the Bolsheviks in Tabriz, Bristow believed, depended on how long the “Armenians keep them busy near Erivan. If the latter collapse and the former get use of the railway…they are bound to come here.”15 On November 29 the Red Army entered Armenia. On December 2 the nationalist Dashnak government in Erivan was transformed into a socialist republic governed by a revolutionary committee composed of five communists and two Dashnaks.16 It now seemed that the next step would be the occupation of Persian Azerbaijan, and perhaps its partition between the Turks and the Bolsheviks. There was nothing to stop them. The small British detachment had evacuated Tabriz in June. The only regular forces in the city consisted of a few hundred Persian Cossacks and Gendarmes. The tribes of Karadagh in the vicinity of Tabriz, who could normally have mobilized a few thousand fighters, were busy fighting amongst themselves.17 General Ironside wanted to send some arms and ammunition to the Shahsevan tribes,18 who had successfully resisted the Bolshevik advance in May. But they were far from Tabriz in their winter quarters in Mughan. Moreover they, too, seemed to be in the grip of inter-tribal strife.19 General Ironside suggested that the Governor-General should be ordered to have the Tabriz-Julfa railway destroyed.20 But the Governor-General, Mehdi-Quli Khan Mukhber us-Saltana, protested that such an act would be regarded as a casus belli by the Turks and the Bolsheviks and that he had no force with which to oppose them.21 On December 9 a delegation composed of seven Russian and Turkish officials, escorted by a dozen soldiers, arrived in Tabriz. This added to the anxieties of the British Consul and some Tabrizis. But the delegation stated that their mission was purely commercial and that they had brought four wagon-loads of cotton to exchange for grain. The Governor-General warmly received the delegation and even gave them some grain gratis. After a week the delegation left Tabriz.22 However, the fact that the Soviet troops had not immediately marched from Erivan to Tabriz hardly set the British fears at rest. General Haldane had already observed that the


Soviet-Turkish campaign in Azerbaijan might be put off until the spring because of the severe winters in the area.23 There is little doubt that Churchill and the War Office were expressing what they perceived.24 Yet they took the lead in warning against the Soviet threat because they also saw it as a means of persuading the Cabinet to sanction the withdrawal of the British troops from Persia in the teeth of the Foreign Office’s opposition. In early January when the cabinet met to set the date for the British withdrawal, it finally agreed with the War Office that the withdrawal “must in any case be undertaken before the melting of the ice on the Caspian exposed our forces to attacks by the Bolsheviks.”25 Did British perception of the Soviet threat correspond to the reality? Was the Soviet government, in the winter of 1920–21, planning to invade Persia in order to install a communist regime in Tehran? There is some evidence that Moscow was neither optimistic about nor ideologically committed to the establishment of a communist regime in Persia. Moreover, from the available information it appears that the troop movements, which London regarded as aggressive measures, were primarily defensive. It seems, by the end of the summer, Moscow’s initial doubts26 about the possibility of a home-grown Bolshevik revolution in Persia had been confirmed. In mid-July Jacob Blumkin27 arrived in Gilan to investigate the situation and report to Moscow. At the end of July he encouraged the Persian communists to take over the local government and sever their ties with Kuchik Khan. This decision indicated not so much his confidence in the Persian communists as his disillusionment with Kuchik Khan and his Jangali movement. A few weeks after his arrival in Gilan, Blumkin reported to Moscow that “it would be impossible to organize a local revolution in Persia, they should either evacuate or occupy the country by force.” And Kuchik Khan was portrayed as a “self-seeking adventurer” who was not interested in a Bolshevik movement and who was only “playing his own game.” In September another envoy, Shalva Eliava,28 was sent by the Narkomindel to investigate the split between Kuchik Khan and the communists. He endorsed Blumkin’s views.29 Some leading “Muslim” communists, notably Sultan-Galiev and Narimanov, had long been advocating the export of revolution to the Middle East through a military campaign.30 But the Soviet leaders were not ideologically committed to Bolshevik revolution in the East. In fact they, with the exception of Stalin, had not seriously addressed themselves to an Eastern strategy until June 1920, when Lenin drew up his theses on the national and colonial questions.31 In his theses, Lenin proceeded from the assumption that the local communists had a duty to support the bourgeois-democratic movements of national liberation in the East rather than struggle directly for power.32 Was

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this strategy applicable to Persia? The Persian representative at the Comintern, Sultanzada, argued that this thesis should be applied only to those countries where the national liberation movements were at their early stages. In his opinion, in the countries such as Persia and Turkey, which had at least ten years’ experience of bourgeoisdemocratic movements and these movements had already had power, the task of the communists was “to create and maintain a purely communist movement in opposition to the bourgeois-democratic one.”33 In contrast, Chicherin maintained that this thesis was particularly applicable to Persia: Making an alliance with the local bourgeoisie is perfectly all right, but only among oppressed people faced with the task of eliminating a home-grown feudalism supported by the bayonets of an oppressor nation, as in Persia. Especially among the Persians it is appropriate for the workers and the bourgeoisie to join forces to rid themselves of the unbearable yoke of their feudal lords, who have sold out to the British.34 However, the British officials, though not oblivious to the pronouncements of the Soviet leaders, were inclined to discount these ideological niceties. To them the movement of troops in south Russia in the direction of Transcaucasia and the Persian frontier was a more reliable indication of the Soviet Government’s intentions. It seemed to the British officials that the Soviets, disappointed with the revolutionary movement in Gilan, would try to install a revo lutionary government in Tehran by force. But from the available evidence it would appear that the despatch of reinforcements to Baku and Enzeli was, at least at the time, a defensive measure taken in response partly to General Ironside’s activities in north Persia and partly to the Turkish advance in Armenia. After the withdrawal of the Persian Cossacks from Resht on October 21,35 the British troops came into contact with the Bolshevik forces who occupied the city. Ironside immediately set about reinforcing his advance column at Manjil in preparation for an offensive against the Bolsheviks in order to drive them out of Resht and even possibly Enzeli.36 In contrast to his predecessor General Champain, General Ironside believed that the troops under his command were more than a match for the opposing force, which, according to his information, consisted mostly of Persians and Caucasians “with a small sprinkling of Russians.” It also seemed unlikely that they would be considerably reinforced in the winter while the northern Caspian was ice-bound.37 Wary of new commitments in Persia, the War Office soon stepped in and forbade Ironside to occupy Resht.38 However, the War Office agreed to allow Ironside to bomb Enzeli and undertake any local


operations which he might consider necessary to safeguard his troops. Ironside now thought he could force the Bolsheviks to pack up and quit north Persia by constantly harassing them. He wrote: “It seems to me quite possible to give them [the Bolsheviks] a knock, combined with heavy bombing of Enzeli, which might force them to leave Resht hurriedly and possibly Enzeli as well.”39 Throughout November the British aeroplanes repeatedly bombed the Bolshevik positions at Enzeli. The British troops also engaged the Bolshevik patrols in several bloody encounters (on November 6, 12, 18, 19, 23). By November 20 they had advanced as far as Imam Zadeh Hashem, 18 miles south of Resht.40 But there was no sign of Soviet withdrawal from Enzeli. The head of the Persian diplomatic mission, who arrived in Moscow at the end of October, reported that the Narkomindel’s chief concern was that the British troops might occupy Enzeli and thus threaten Baku. He had been told that the Soviets could not evacuate Enzeli as long as the British troops remained in north Persia.41 And the Persian Prime Minister protested that Ironside’s activities would only provoke the Bolsheviks into stepping up their efforts in Gilan.42 As we have seen, on November 24 a brigade was landed at Enzeli to reinforce the Bolshevik troops. Ironside’s activities in north Persia coincided with the rapid Turkish advance in Armenia. On November 16 Krassin telegraphed to Chicherin: “From our sources in close touch with the Foreign Office we learn of the possibility of an early agreement between the British Government and Kemal Pasha, on the basis of the occupation of Baku by the Turks, relying on the support of the Azerbaijan Tartars. Have we not perhaps allowed the Turks to proceed too far into Armenia? In any case keep both eyes open.”43 It has been noted that the Soviet leaders were extremely concerned about the Turkish advance against Armenia. On November 20 Lenin anxiously contemplated the possibility that “war may be forced on us from one day to the next.”44 On November 27 the Politburo decided: “A policy of utmost reconciliation is to be adopted towards Georgia, Armenia, Turkey and Persia, i.e. one directed most of all towards avoiding war.” It was stressed: “We must not set ourselves the task of conducting any campaign against Georgia, or Armenia, or Persia.” “The main task,” the Politburo declared, “is to be that of guarding Azerbaijan and securing possession of the whole Caspian.” For this purpose it was decided “the transference to Azerbaijan of no less than 7 divisions is to be speeded up in every possible way.”45 This resolution clearly shows the defensive nature of the troops’ movements. Yet it also indicates that the Soviets had no intention of evacuating Enzeli and thus allowing Ironside’s troops to secure a base on the Caspian Sea, close to Baku.

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There is also clear evidence that the Soviets were not planning to advance on Tehran in the wake of British withdrawal. In midDecember when Moscow learned that the cabinet had decided to withdraw the British troops from north Persia,46 Chicherin instructed the Commander of the Eleventh Red Army at Baku to send the following (intercepted) message to the Commander of the Soviet troops at Enzeli: “In case of the withdrawal of English troops at Kasvin, you are ordered to abstain from pushing them into the depth of the country, and not to occupy Kasvin with the troops under your command, but to limit yourself to detachments of reconnoitring patrols there.”47 The cabinet’s decision to withdraw the British troops in the spring undermined the Foreign Office’s containment policy in Persia. The Foreign Office shared the War Office’s perception of the Soviet aggressive designs, but had consistently argued that Britain’s military presence served as a deterrent. The British withdrawal, the Foreign Office believed, would provide the Soviets with an irresistible opportunity to advance on Tehran. The encouraging signs, such as the above intercept or even the smooth progress of Soviet-Persian negotiations at Moscow, did not immediately affect the Foreign Office’s perception. The Foreign Office initially believed that the talks at Moscow would be “abortive.”48 Even some members of the Persian diplomatic mission thought the Russians were only trying to deceive the Persian government and the negotiation would therefore be “fruitless.”49 But ‘Ali-Quli Khan Mushaver ul-Mamalek, the head of the mission, was determined to make a success of his talks with the Soviet officials. He, like most members of the Persian diplomatic elite,50 regarded the maintenance of equilibrium between Britain and Russia as essential to the independence of Persia and thus to the survival of the Foreign Ministry. The Anglo-Persian Agreement, he maintained, had seriously undermined the prestige of the diplomatic service by subordinating the foreign policy of Persia to that of Britain.51 Mushaver ul-Mamalek saw the talks at Moscow as an occasion not only to deprive the Persian revolutionaries of outside support, but also to restore balance to Persian foreign policy. Moreover, he held a personal grudge against the Anglo-Persian Agreement which had been negotiated behind his back while he, as the Foreign Minister, led the Persian mission to the Peace Conference in Paris.52 Throughout the negotiations at Moscow, he repeatedly urged the Persian Prime Minister to pursue a balanced foreign policy. “If we wish practically to give up our independence and consider ourselves a friend of one side,” he wrote, “what can we hope of the other side?” “If out of deference to others, the establishment of friendly relations with Russia is delayed,” he threatened, “I shall resign.”53 He also assured the Prime Minister that the Soviet forces


would be recalled from Gilan as soon as the British troops were withdrawn.54 By mid-December he had reached an agreement with the Soviet negotiators and despatched the draft Soviet-Persian treaty to Tehran.55 The Foreign Office soon began to acknowledge that the SovietPersian talks were bound to spell the end of British supremacy in Persia. Esmond Ovey wrote: It will be difficult for us to prevent the Persians from accepting from the Bolsheviks any treaty guaranteeing no trespass by them in Persia, unless we are prepared indefinitely to afford military support. Everything points to this being financially and politically impossible. If, however, we do not do so we shall have lost our preponderating influence in Persia….56 And the British Minister at Tehran noted that, given the cabinet’s decision to withdraw the British troops, there was no longer any chance that the Majlis would accept the Anglo-Persian Agreement, because “to do so were merely to give the Bolsheviks an additional pretext for aggression which this country would no longer have the means of resisting.” Norman added: “It would appear that instead of making agreements with us the interests of Persia lie in making the best possible terms they can with the Russian Soviet Government.”57 At the same time, Norman maintained that “no reliance could be placed on any guarantee offered by the Russian Soviet Government.” While a Soviet-Persian treaty would definitely wreck the AngloPersian Agreement, in his opinion, it would not necessarily ensure that the Soviet troops would not invade Persia. In fact the terms of the draft treaty, whereby Moscow undertook to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of Persia and renounce Persia’s concessions to Imperial Russia, aroused Norman’s suspicion. As the proposals did not fit in with the prevailing perception of Soviet policy in Persia, Norman could hardly believe that they had been made “in good faith.” The Soviets would not offer such favourable terms to Persia, he argued, if they had “any intention of adhering to them.”58 Curzon shared Norman’s scepticism about the Soviet Government’s motives.59 “Negotiations pending between Persia and the Soviet Government,” Curzon noted, “suggest some doubt as to whether British retreat would be followed by immediate Bolshevik advance upon Tehran.” “But prospect of this,” he hastened to add, “must be so attractive to Russia that they could hardly be expected to forgo the occasion.”60 The Foreign Office had already formulated a new containment policy to meet the possibility that Britain might soon be forced to abandon Tehran and the rest of north Persia to the Bolsheviks. In the

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wake of the cabinet’s decision to withdraw Norperforce, George Churchill of the Eastern Department wrote: “The Bolsheviks may, as soon as our forces evacuate Kasvin, seize the opportunity with the aid of their Persian allies in Gilan, to make our position and that of the Shah and his Government untenable at Tehran.” In these circumstances, he added, “the only thing to do is to consider how best we can save what will be left of Persia and how to protect our interests.” If and when the British Minister thought Tehran could no longer be held, Churchill suggested, he should withdraw the Legation to Isfahan, where he should try to induce the Shah and the Persian government to set up the capital. To defend the new capital and south Persia, Churchill thought, Britain could rely on the Britishcommanded South Persia Rifles and the friendly Bakhtiari tribal force. This plan, he noted, was “calculated to save Central and Southern Persia from Bolshevism and to prepare for eventual attempt to re-establish the Shah’s authority in the North.” It would also “protect the Oil Company’s wells at Shushter by screening them.”61 Commenting on Churchill’s contingency plan, Lancelot Oliphant noted that it was difficult to predict the course of events in Persia as “no country is liable to more kaleidoscopic changes than Persia,” and that the Persians might be able to persuade the Soviets not to advance on Tehran. Yet he thought it was essential to make arrangements for moving the capital to Isfahan.62 And Curzon minuted: “Mr Churchill has done well to forecast the consequences of military withdrawal in the spring. I have never concealed from myself they are gloomy. But a safe position at Isfahan may be better than the present intolerable position at Tehran.”63 Norman was instructed to make arrangements for the evacuation of women, children and other non-essential members of the British colony from Tehran at once.64 The “southern policy” proposed by the Foreign Office may have satisfied the Admiralty which was primarily concerned about the protection of the oilfields against a Soviet advance,65 but the government of India and the War Office, both detesting further commitments in Persia, took exception to the policy. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, did not share the Foreign Office’s perception of aggressive Soviet designs. In his view the prime objective of Soviet policy in Persia was to undermine the British influence. He therefore thought the terms of the Soviet-Persian draft treaty had been shrewdly devised “to throw Great Britain’s general attitude and demands under the Anglo-Persian Agreement into high relief.”66 By scrapping the Anglo-Persian Agreement, he suggested, Britain could cut the ground from under the Bolshevik propaganda. He added that it was essential that “we should seize every possible opportunity of working back to our old role of champions of Islam against the Russian Ogre.” However the Persian government, lacking any force to oppose a military


aggression, he noted, had no choice but to remain in Tehran and “gamble on the sincerity” of the Soviet assurance that they would not invade Persia in the wake of British withdrawal. A hasty departure of the Shah’s government from Tehran, he added, would be likely to lead to the establishment of some form of Bolshevik government there by the Persians themselves. Moreover, he maintained that it would have a bad effect on the Indian Moslems “for Persia to split up into a Soviet Government in the north and a Shah Government, supported or dominated by Britain, in the south.” The Viceroy therefore ruled out any Indian contribution towards implementing the “southern policy.”67 In fact the India Office, at the Viceroy’s proddings, informed the Foreign Office that the Indian contribution to the maintenance of the South Persia Rifles would be discontinued after March 31.68 This was a severe blow to the new containment policy. Without the continued presence of the South Persia Rifles in south Persia, George Churchill noted, it would be “somewhat hazardous to withdraw the Legation to Isfahan.”69 But Curzon hoped, if necessary, he might be able to persuade the War Office to send one of the battalions of Norperforce to Isfahan to guard the Legation.70 Having anticipated this possibility, the War Office also opposed the “southern policy.” The military officials at the War Office, unlike the Viceroy, went along with the Foreign Office’s view that it was highly likely that British departure would be followed by a Bolshevik advance on Tehran. But they argued the South Persia Rifles and the Bakhtiari tribal force could hardly halt the Bolshevik drive southward without the backing of the British troops, “in which case there would appear to be a danger that the objects of the Government in withdrawing from Persia would be stultified.” They suggested that the Legation should be withdrawn towards Mesopotamia rather than to Isfahan, and that the British government should “make a clean cut as regards our commitments in Persia.”71 However, the War Office was not unanimous in opposing the “southern policy.” Winston Churchill himself was, for once, willing to help the Foreign Office to keep the Bolsheviks out of south Persia. He proposed that Norperforce should withdraw via Isfahan rather than via Hamadan, the idea being, in Wilson’s words, “that if the Shah and his government were to withdraw to Isfahan he could do so under the cover of British bayonets, and that the same bayonets could remain in Isfahan for a little time in order to, as it were, establish the Persian Government in that town.” To Wilson, the whole thing seemed “perfectly ridiculous.”72 He was in dread of any plan which might prolong Britain’s military presence in Persia. The Chief of Staff therefore let the War Secretary know that “under no circumstances should Norperforce retire on Isfahan.”73 Wilson’s opposition put paid to the idea.

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By the beginning of February it was apparent that Curzon was facing an uphill task to persuade his cabinet colleagues to support the new containment policy. Meanwhile, however, Curzon’s perception of the Soviet threat had somewhat softened. An important input in the perceptual shift was a long despatch from Cox, who was highly esteemed by Curzon. The basic thrust of Cox’s argument was: “We should not assume that all is lost in Tehran.” Underlying his optimism were a number of factors. First, the Soviets were unlikely to march on Tehran immediately after concluding an agreement with Persia. Second, withdrawal of the British troops would deprive the Soviets of their “last excuse for armed intrusion into Persia.” Third, the Soviets were expected to occupy the defenceless city of Tabriz in December, but they had not yet done so. Fourth, the latest intelligence reports regarding the Soviet plans indicated that they had other preoccupations. Fifth, Cox was convinced the Persians in general were not “prone to welcome Bolshevism” and would hold out against it. He suggested that the British Legation should try to rally all the antiBolshevik elements in the capital and that Britain should scrap the Anglo-Persian Agreement as the basis of the Persian policy, which had provided the Soviets with a “pretext” for anti-British propaganda, and devise another agreement acceptable to the Majlis. If this policy was tried and failed and north Persia went Bolshevik, Britain, in Cox’s view, could protect her interests in south Persia by encouraging the Sheikh of Muhammerah, the Vali of Pushtkuh, the Qashqa’is, and particularly the Bakhtiaris to declare their independence from the government in Tehran and make a pact among themselves to resist Bolshevism. He believed such tribal confederations would be a “very formidable bulwark to Bolshevik aggression.”74 Curzon minuted: “Sir P.Cox is much nearer the mark than any of the others.” But the British officials in Persia were inaccessible to such sanguine views. By mid-January there was a clear perceptual disjunction between Curzon and the British Minister at Tehran. This was largely due to differences in perspectives. Curzon was inclined to see the threat to the Shah’s government as being mainly external, that is a Russian intervention. For him the significance of the domestic problems lay only in the opportunity they provided for Russian interference. But Norman’s perception came to be domi nated by the growing internal threat. As a result, an atmosphere of terminal crisis had gripped the Legation. The decisive inputs in the Legation’s increased perception of threat were the alarming reports from the Commander of Norperforce, General Ironside, whose perception of Bolshevik threat had been coloured by his experience in north Russia during the civil war.75 Ironside believed that the principal threat to the capital sprang not from direct aggression by the Red Army, but rather from the


revolutionary forces in Gilan who had been kept at bay by the presence of the troops under his command between Kasvin and Resht. Withdrawal of this force, he impressed on Norman, “will at once be followed by advance on Kasvin and Tehran of Bolshevik troops, now in Gilan, who call themselves the Persian national army, and who, thanks to recent reinforcements, amount to 6,000 men, including, however, only 400 Russians.” Signing of the Soviet-Persian Treaty, he added, would not remove this threat. He was convinced that the Soviet government would be unable, even if it was willing, to prevent advance of the revolutionaries on Tehran, and that a revolution would break out there before or on the arrival of the latter. He therefore insisted that the British colony and other Europeans should evacuate Tehran as soon as possible.76 Ironside himself went to Tehran and tried to persuade them to leave the capital. But they, he wrote, “ridiculed the idea of a Bolshevik invasion of Persia, despite the obvious inability of Persia to protect itself.” Ironside told them “of our evacuation of Archangel and how everyone had refused a passage. Then at the end they had all come clamouring for passage when there were no more ships available.”77 Adding to the anxieties of the British Legation and the military authorities was the political turmoil in Tehran, which, they thought, was making the capital easy prey for Bolshevik designs. Norman knew that the Shah had already been hoarding away his money in European banks in preparation for fleeing the country.78 Alarmed by the Legation’s arrangements for evacuation of the Europeans, the Shah decided to abdicate at once and join his bank account in exile early in January. He told Norman that “he could not bear to remain in Tehran under constant threat of attacks by the Bolsheviks.” Nor was he prepared to go to Isfahan where, he feared, he would become merely a puppet in the hands of the Bakhtiari khans. Norman tried but failed to stiffen his nerve. Eventually one of the senior aristocrats, ‘Ain ud-Daula, managed to calm down the Shah and persuade him to remain in Tehran.79 The quandary in the Court ended only to give way to the cabinet crisis. ‘Ain ud-Daula had impressed on the Shah that the “welfare of the country requires the Persian Government no longer to allow themselves to be entirely dominated by British influence,” because of the presence of the Soviet troops in north Persia.80 The Shah therefore wanted to appoint a popular and pro-nationalist Prime Minister to succeed Sepahdar ‘Azam, who, he considered, was “handicapped by his reputation for subservience to the Legation.”81 In fact Sepahdar had already lost the confidence of the British Minister. It seemed to Norman that the imminent withdrawal of the British troops had driven the Prime Minister “to seek support of demagogues, who profess to see Persia’s salvation in an agreement with Russian

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Soviet Government, and of the ignorant masses who follow their lead.”82 He was also suspected of being eager to come to terms with Moscow so as to save his large estates in Gilan which had been confiscated by the Persian communists.83 Moreover, it seemed that the Prime Minister, having chosen to place his faith in the Soviet government’s assurances, had no intention of taking any measure for the defence of the capital.84 Norman advised the Shah to appoint a “strong reactionary Prime Minister willing to resort to intimidation” against the widespread agitation against the Anglo-Persian Agreement, but the Shah protested that such a step would only arouse more violent opposition.85 Sensing that the cabinet had lost the support of the Court and the Legation, various office-seekers, including Prince Firuz,86 the Legation’s candidate for premiership, began jockeying for position. The Prime Minister was forced to reshuffle his cabinet several times. He also tendered his resignation twice. But he was asked to carry on until a replacement could be appointed. However, it proved practically impossible to find someone who would be acceptable to the Shah, the Legation and the nationalists, and who, at the same time, would not heighten Moscow’s suspicions.87 Sepahdar’s lame duck cabinet was hardly capable of controlling the situation in Tehran. Norman was growing worried that “considerable infiltration of Russian and other Bolsheviks into the capital” had already taken place, and that the news of the British withdrawal had “greatly swelled ranks and encouraged activities of native Bolshevik elements.”88 He asked the Prime Minister “to show firmness by at once arresting and deporting from the capital all dangerous characters.”89 But the forces at the government’s disposal in Tehran did not seem to be reliable. In early January the British Military Attaché at Tehran reported to General Ironside: Discontent is rife amongst the men of the Central Brigade and Cossacks stationed in Tehran owing to non-receipt of pay and the work of propagandists. Yesterday the men of the Central Brigade beat a battalion commander, and this morning the carriage of the Cossack Division Commander was held up by men who showered abuse on him.90 The reports from Tehran strengthened Ironside’s perception of internal threat. In his report to Ironside, the Military Attaché at Tehran added: Amongst the professional intriguers there is a tendency to combine and work together on Socialist lines. Hitherto these intriguers worked against each other. At the same time the


upper classes who have a stake in the country are busily engaged in competing for Government posts and show no sign of combination to combat the Bolshevik peril. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Smyth, the liaison officer between the Cossack Division and Norperforce, after his visit to Tehran in midJanuary, submitted another alarming report to Ironside. He wrote: PG [the Persian Government] had for the last two months been terrorised by Bolshevik Committees. On these Committees numerous Persian officers are serving. There is also actually a Committee of Officers. These Committees prevent the Majlis meeting, stop all effective Govt., and are simply a preparation for actual Bolshevism. Smyth had discussed with Sardar Humayun, the Commander of the Cossack Division, the possibility of employing the Cossacks stationed near Kasvin to deal with these “Committees.” Sardar Humayun had said that the Persian government had earmarked the Cossacks for this purpose and they would shortly be despatched to Tehran. But it seemed to Smyth that the government in Tehran lacked “the courage to carry the thing through.” He noted: “This attitude of the Government may cause a dangerous situation for the Persian Government, as the Cossacks may get the idea that the PG and Committees are intimidating the Shah….” Smyth thus hinted that the Cossacks might take upon themselves to act to defend the Crown.91 Having read these reports, Ironside was not averse to allowing the Cossacks stationed west of Kasvin to pass through the British lines and march on Tehran to deal with the “Bolshevik Committees.”92 Norman initially thought a few hundred Cossacks were due to arrive in Tehran to replace their unruly colleagues there. He and the Legation, as well as the Foreign Office and the War Office, were completely in the dark about the planned coup. When the Shah learned that more than 2,000, rather than a few hundred, Cossacks were approaching Tehran, he became apprehensive and appealed to Norman to stop them. The representatives of the Legation tried but failed to dissuade the Cossacks from entering Tehran. The coup of February 21 went some way towards allaying the fears of the British officials in Persia. The leaders of the coup made it clear that their movement was primarily anti-Bolshevik, and that they were determined to take care of the matters which worried the British officials—the military defence of the capital against the Gilan revolutionaries and the political turmoil in Tehran. On the eve of entering Tehran, Brigadier Reza Khan, the Commander of the Cossacks, told the Legation’s representatives, Colonels Haig and

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Huddleston, who were seeking to dissuade the Cossacks from seizing the capital: The Cossacks, who had experience of the Bolsheviks and knew what to expect from them if they advanced further into Persia, were tired of successive Governments who failed to take any steps for the organization of a force to oppose the invasion which might follow the withdrawal of the British troops. They were therefore resolved to come to Tehran and establish a strong government which would remedy this state of affairs.93 It was also known that Reza Khan had no taste for the political palaver in Tehran. In a conversation with Ironside, he had expressed “his dislike of the politicians who controlled the Majlis for their own benefit.”94 Shortly after entering the capital, the Cossacks arrested almost all the leading politicians and political activists. To the legation, the most reassuring feature of the coup was the emergence of Sayyed Zia ud-Din Tabataba’i, a thirty-two-year-old journalist, as the new Prime Minister. He was known to the British officials as an “ardent Anglophile.” His newspaper, Ra’ad (Thunder), had consistently championed the Anglo-Persian Agreement. The British officials were also aware of his various projects for combating Bolshevism. In July 1920, he, in collaboration with the two British officers, Colonel Wickham and Major Edmonds, drew up an elaborate plan for a campaign against the Bolsheviks in Gilan.95 In December, when it became known that Britain would soon withdraw her troops, Sayyed Zia came up with a plan for the organization of a large Persian force under British officers to defend the capital against the Bolsheviks.96 But these plans came to nothing. The Persian officials were disinclined to pay much attention to Sayyed Zia and his proposals. It appears that the coup was his ultimate plan. Major Edmonds, who came to know Sayyed Zia closely during 1920, later recalled: “As far as I know, it was Sayyed Zia who first came to the conclusion that some drastic action was necessary if the Bolsheviks were to be prevented from stepping into the vacuum left when Norperforce evacuated Persia in the spring, and eventually occupying Tehran.”97 He joined hands with the restless officers who perhaps had already decided to march on Tehran. However, Sayyed Zia’s Anglophilia and anti-Bolshevism were inextricably linked to his own political ambitions. In return for his services to the British, he hoped the Legation would back him up in his search for high office. Before the coup he had sought to join the cabinet. Yet it seems that his ambition went beyond that. Shortly before the coup, George Churchill, who knew Sayyed Zia during his service in Persia, described him as a young man who had “occasionally


unfolded the most fantastic projects with himself as Dictator.”98 As far as the Persian ruling elite was concerned, even his aspiration to be a cabinet minister was a fantasy. Access to cabinet posts was in practice (if not in theory) confined to the landed aristocracy and to a few tribal, mainly Bakhtiari, chiefs.” Sayyed Zia was a son of a provincial clergyman and a “mere journalist.” In his bid for power, he sought to cultivate the friendship of some ruling families, particularly the Farman-Farmas. But they viewed him with contempt and shunned him.100 He was irrepressible. On submitting his July plan, through the Legation, to the Prime Minister, he proposed that he should be appointed Governor-General of the Caspian provinces and Assistant Interior Minister, in order to conduct the propaganda against the Bolsheviks. The Legation backed up his proposal. The Prime Minister replied that the plan was “interesting,” but that there was no need for Sayyed Zia’s services.101 In December he hoped that his plan for the formation of a force to defend the capital would lead to his appointment to the cabinet.102 But some ministers threatened to resign if he joined the cabinet. He did not give up. He later approached Sepahsalar, a leading member of the ruling elite, and suggested that the British Legation would support his bid for premiership if he promised to appoint him as the Interior Minister. On hearing this supposedly impertinent suggestion, Sepahsalar was so enraged that he could not restrain himself, and bluntly told Sayyed Zia that he would be ashamed of presiding over a cabinet which included him.103 Having failed to join the ruling elite, Sayyed Zia decided to beat them. After the coup he saw to it that all the leading aristocrats in Tehran were put behind bars, including Sepahsalar, Farman-Farma and his sons, Salar Lashkar and Prince Firuz.104 In a proclamation issued shortly after taking office, Sayyed Zia lashed out against the ruling aristocracy: “A few hundred nobles, who held the reins of power by inheritance, sucked, leech-like, the blood of the people and made their clamour mount on high….”105 But Sayyed Zia was not merely conducting a personal vendetta. As the other points in his proclamation indicate, his attack on the aristocrats was also a part of his policy to take the wind out of the Bolsheviks’ sails. He denounced the Anglo-Persian Agreement and authorized the signing of the Soviet-Persian Treaty. He promised agrarian reform and health and education facilities to the peasants and workers. (The proclamation certainly impressed, at least, one of the leaders of the Persian Communist Party. Sultanzada described it as one of the most remarkable documents in the annals of the revolutionary movements in Persia.)106 The Times correspondent in Tehran observed that Sayyed Zia seemed to think that the country

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could be “saved from Bolshevism by drastic doses of homoeopathic medicine.”107 The British Minister fully supported Sayyed Zia’s actions against the ruling elite. He wrote: Power could not have been wrested otherwise than by force from a small gang of men either corrupt or incapable, or both, who have hitherto monopolized it and well nigh ruined the country, and imprisonment and exile provide the only means of preventing them regaining their former positions and completing their evil work. He added that “Some even of the old governing class welcome the coup d’etat and its results as Persia’s last hope of salvation from the Bolsheviks.”108Despite denouncing the Anglo-Persian Agreement, Sayyed Zia assured Norman that he intended to carry out its content with the help of British advisers.109 Norman felt that he could rely on Sayyed Zia to safeguard British influence in Tehran in the face of Soviet diplomatic pressure. Sayyed Zia’s plan to employ British officers to reorganize the Cossack Division110 raised Norman’s hopes that the new government would be able to contain the internal threat by a combination of force and reform. The relaxation of tension in Tehran was short-lived. Sayyed Zia’s concern about Moscow’s attitude towards his government soon led to increased perceptions of the external threat. From the outset of his rule, Sayyed Zia feared that his reputation as an Anglophile might stoke Moscow’s suspicion. “In order to avoid the hostility of the Russian Soviet Government,” he had told Norman, “it was of utmost importance that the pro-British character of the new administration should for the present as far as possible be disguised.”111 His concern was not totally groundless. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar, Leon Karakhan, in fact saw the coup and particularly Sayyed Zia’s invitation to British officers to enter Persian service, as hostile actions directed at Soviet Russia.112 And the Soviet Minister at Tehran later told Norman that Moscow had regarded Sayyed Zia as a “British agent.”113 In mid-April a despatch from Moscow convinced Sayyed Zia that his efforts to disguise the “pro-British character” of his cabinet had not succeeded. In reply to an enquiry from the Prime Minister, the Persian envoy at Moscow reported that the Soviet officials were not “well disposed” towards his government.114 This report, coupled with the start of British withdrawal from north Persia,115 unnerved Sayyed Zia. He now anticipated that the Soviets might either “take the offensive militarily or adopt terrorist tactics at Tehran.” He appealed


to the Foreign Office to restrain the Soviets by bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on them.116 At the time, the Foreign Office was rather anxiously waiting to see how the Soviets would react to the withdrawal of the British troops. In fact Karakhan had already suggested that a commission composed of the representatives of Britain, Persia and the Azerbaijan Republic should be set up to supervise the simultaneous withdrawal of the foreign troops from Persia. But Curzon had turned down the proposal for two reasons. First, he did not want to accept Moscow’s plea that the Azerbaijani, rather than the Russian, troops occupied Gilan. Second, he was not prepared to treat the British withdrawal as a part of an arrangement with the Soviets, as it would appear that the Soviets had forced Britain to withdraw her troops from Persia.117 On April 3 the British authorities had intercepted a message from the Commander of the Eleventh Red Army at Baku to the Commander of the Soviet troops in Gilan, Nicolai Gikalo, instructing him: “In order that the execution of…treaty may not be interfered with, you must stop all operations forthwith.” The Foreign Office thought it “may conceivably be a good sign.”118 But this cautious optimism did not last long. Three weeks later, Sayyed Zia’s appeal, coupled with the report that the advance positions of the Cossacks had been repeatedly shelled,119 once again raised the alarm of Soviet aggression. The “Russians,” Oliphant noted, “are coming in their true colours and the Persians will rue the day of their famous treaty.” At the same time, the Foreign Office felt powerless to exert any diplomatic pressure on Moscow because it was impossible “to bring the question within the four corners of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Agreement.” “Having passed the treaty with the Soviets on their own responsibility,” the Foreign Office wrote to Norman, the Persians must “find their own means of bringing pressure to bear on Russia.”120 Curzon’s containment policy was in tatters. Not only were the British troops evacuating north Persia, but it also appeared that the Foreign Office was unable to invoke the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement to contain the Soviet threat to Persia. As already noted, Curzon had sought to use the Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations as leverage to force the Soviets to leave north Persia. When, in November, the cabinet resumed the discussion about concluding the Trade Agreement,121 Curzon, backed by Churchill and Montagu, vehemently opposed signing any trade agreement with Soviet Russia as long as Moscow continued to threaten British interests in the East, particularly in Persia. But Lloyd George, who was primarily concerned about the unemployment in Britain, was keen on prompt resumption of trade with Soviet Russia. He expected the Soviet government to place ten million pounds worth of orders in British industry once the agreement

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was concluded. The Prime Minister was not prepared to deprive the industries in the Midlands of the presumed Soviet orders for the sake of places like Persia. He told the cabinet: “If we refuse it [the Soviet offer] it will leak out that we turned it down because of Persia and Tashkent, and because we hate the Bolsheviks at a time when we are voting 4 or 5 million pounds for the unemployed.”122 Moreover, Lloyd George discounted the Soviet threat to Afghanistan and Turkey; he added: “There are Bolsheviks in Persia for whom the Soviets are not responsible.” Curzon retorted that there was no doubt that a Soviet-controlled force of 3,000–5,000 men was in occupation of Enzeli.123 Lloyd George then argued that only after concluding the agreement, could Britain demand that the Soviets observe their July commitment regarding cessation of hostile actions against British interests in the East. He told the cabinet: “I would enter into the trade agreement, take the risk and say if you [the Soviets] break this the trade is gone and the burden rests with you.” The majority agreed with the Prime Minister.124 Curzon thus failed to make the conclusion of the agreement conditional on Soviet withdrawal from north Persia. However, to mollify Churchill, Curzon and Montagu, it was decided to set up a committee composed of the three ministers, to consider what specific commitments in the East the Soviets should be required to observe after the conclusion of the Agreement. The committee recommended that a specific reference to the Soviet activities in Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan and India should be inserted in the preamble to the Agreement.125 In the preamble to the draft Agreement, handed to Krassin, Britain proposed that each party should refrain from any hostile action against the other and more particularly, the Soviet government should refrain from “any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of action or propaganda to encourage any of the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against the British interests or the British Empire, especially in Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan and India.” Moscow initially held the view that detailed discussion of the propaganda in specific countries could only be considered in a political conference between the two countries. And Krassin tried to assure Lloyd George that there was no need to mention specific countries, in view of the Soviet government’s general undertaking to desist from propaganda against British interest in Asia. He said: “From the moment this agreement was signed, of course, the Soviet Government would cease all propaganda in Persia, Afghanistan, India, and other countries” against British interests. But Lloyd George reminded Krassin that “it would be almost impossible for him to get agreement of this kind through unless those who are specially interested in these particular countries were satisfied that hostile propaganda would


cease.”126 Chicherin suspected Britain’s motives. He wrote to Krassin: “It is quite possible that England will sign an agreement with us in order to make us quarrel with our Eastern friends. Having done this, she will hasten to seize the first opportunity to break off the agreement, leaving us isolated.”127 He therefore decided to seek similar specific undertakings from Britain. He proposed that Britain should undertake to refrain from any hostile action against the interests of Soviet Russia in Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan and India, as well as in those countries which previously formed a part of the former Russian Empire (notably Georgia), and that Britain should refrain from encouraging or supporting hostile actions against Soviet Russia on the part of Japan, Germany, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia. Moreover, the two countries, Moscow proposed, should undertake to respect the independence and integrity of Persia, Afghanistan and the territory of the Turkish National Assembly.128 On March 14 the cabinet met to discuss the Soviet proposals. It was decided to refuse the proposal regarding the hostile actions by Japan, Germany, etc. The cabinet also decided that “while retaining Afghanistan and India, if M.Krassin would agree to exclude Asia Minor from his list, we should consent to omit it from our list and that we might also agree to eliminate Persia, in so much as it was clear that the Anglo-Persian Agreement was not likely to be ratified.”129 Krassin agreed to this formula and the Agreement was signed on March 15.130 The omission of Persia meant that Britain had given up her initial demand that Soviet Russia should recognize Persia as being exclusively within the British sphere of influence. Yet the Agreement provided some safeguard for the British interests in Persia. The Soviet government undertook to refrain from encouraging “any of the the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against British interests or the British Empire.” As Krassin had pointed out, this applied, among other countries, to Persia. In fact, in a note addressed to the Soviet government, in September 1921, Curzon strongly protested against the anti-British propaganda by the Soviet Minister at Tehran, on the grounds that it constituted a violation of the AngloSoviet Trade Agreement.131 However, strictly speaking, the Agreement, as the India Office observed, “only binds each party to refrain from acts hostile to each other…. Russian aggression on Persia is not barred.” Therefore Sayyed Zia’s “enquiry as to the diplomatic support vis-à-vis Russia that HMG can afford,” the India Office noted, “is rather embarrassing.”132 Nor was the Legation able effectively to back up Sayyed Zia against his domestic opponents who, the British officials thought, enjoyed the support of the Soviet Minister, Feodor Rothstein.133 Sayyed Zia was

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forced to resign and leave the country on May 25. The weakness of the British Legation and the attitude of the Soviet officials undoubtedly emboldened Sayyed Zia’s opponents, but his fall was due chiefly to internal factors.134 There is no evidence that the Soviets were planning to take any direct action against his government. In fact the Soviet troops began to evacuate north Persia before his fall. On May 6, during a reception at the Court, the Persian Foreign Minister introduced the Soviet Minister to Norman. Rothstein at once asked for an appointment to call on him.135 On May 9 Norman held his first meeting with Rothstein at the British Legation. “Almost the first remark which I made to Mr. Rothstein,” Norman reported, “was to the effect that the British troops had all left Kasvin on their way to Mesopotamia.” This news clearly delighted Rothstein. He exclaimed: “Are they really going right out of Persia? That is a relief. Now ours will be able to begin to move also. Our people have been so suspicious.”136 On May 19, five days before completion of the British withdrawal, the Soviet Military Attaché, Colonel Boris Rogachev, visited the British Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders, to inform him that “all Soviet troops are evacuating Persia immediately and that the Russians will not interfere in any action the Persian Government may take to deal with rebels such as Kuchik Khan.”137 Two days later it was reported that the area south of the provincial capital of Gilan—Resht—had been evacuated. On June 17 the Soviet troops left Resht. The Soviet withdrawal appeared to have been completed by June 23.138 The Soviet military withdrawal did not dispel Norman’s anxieties. It now appeared to him that the Soviet diplomatic pressure and propaganda was once again turning north Persia into a Russian sphere of influence, and that Britain could “no longer hope successfully to oppose Russian influence” there.139 Norman was prone to view the Anglo-Soviet rivalry in Tehran in zero-sum terms.140 A few months earlier, he had predicted that even if the Soviets were to adhere strictly to their treaty with the Persians and refrain from invading Persia, they “after withdrawal of our troops in the spring must inevitably dominate whatever government may survive in Tehran together with a great part of the country.”141 After the fall of Sayyed Zia, which coincided with completion of British withdrawal, the situation in Tehran appeared to bear out his prediction. Towards the end of June the British Financial Adviser reported from Tehran: It is essential to realise the bitter and widespread feeling against everything British at the present time. The Anglo-Persian Agreement alienated all persons of liberal sympathies, and the late regime [of S.Zia], popularly supposed to be the work of the


British, has infuriated all the conservatives. Russian propaganda of course encourages this state of mind.142 Norman’s enthusiastic support for Sayyed Zia had indeed led the ruling elite to hold the British Legation responsible for organizing the coup and thus for their own imprisonment.143 The most notable example was Prince Firuz, one of the signatories of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. A few months earlier he “had been feted in London” and was “considered so devoted to British interests that a GCMG had been conferred upon him.” A short spell in prison had transformed him into a “violent Anglophobe.”144 Now he, Norman reported, “put himself at the head of the anti-British party,” sparing “no effort to injure us.” He was even trying “to ingratiate himself with the Russian Minister.”145 In turning their backs on the British Legation the ruling elite were not simply acting out of pique. “Their tendency,” Norman noted, “is to attach themselves to the Power which for the moment is predominant. In North Persia this power at present is Russia.”146 And it seemed that the Soviet Minister was not averse to cultivating the friendship of the landed oligarchy. Almost every one of the notables after his release from prison had received a visit from Rothstein.147 The British officials were particularly concerned about the relations between the Soviet Legation and Reza Khan, who had emerged as the most powerful man in the country after Sayyed Zia’s downfall. Reza Khan appeared to be “openly anti-British and working in close touch with Rothstein.”148 In addition to his frequent meetings with the Soviet Minister, every day he held two private meetings with the Soviet Military Attaché.149 Indeed, fearing the Soviets might actively support the Persian revolutionaries, Reza Khan made every effort to stay on good terms with the Soviet Legation. In a conversation with the British Military Attaché, he “reiterated his desire to crush Bolshevism, but said that should Russian regular troops back up the Persian Red Army, the Government forces could not hope to attain success, and he himself would resign.”150 But Norman maintained that the ruling elite and Reza Khan were playing into the hands of Rothstein, who was regarded by the British officials as an “arch intriguer.”151 The governing class, Norman noted, believed themselves to be clever enough to outwit Mr. Rothstein and I imagine that even Sirdar Sepah [Reza Khan] himself, in spite of his close cooperation and daily confabulations with Col. Rogachev, flatters himself that he is using the Russians and will be able to throw them over when they have served his purpose…. I feel sure that, on the contrary, Mr. Rothstein is using these people.152

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Moreover, Norman suspected that the Soviet Legation subsidized several newspapers to carry out Bolshevik and anti-British propaganda, and that there were even “many mullahs among Mr. Rothstein’s paid agents,” so as to help the Soviet Legation win over the “lower classes” in Tehran.153 Adding to Norman’s anxieties was the formation of a new alliance between the communists and Kuchik Khan in Gilan. In October a plenary meeting of the Persian Communist Party in Baku had elected a new central committee headed by the veteran revolutionary, Haydar Khan ‘Amu-Ughli. Those such as Sultanzada and Javadzada, who were opposed to a united front with the radical nationalists, were expelled. In a conversation with the Persian Vice-Consul at Tiflis in April, Haydar Khan had “openly announced his intention to stir up a revolution in Persia and establish there a Soviet Government.” When the Persian diplomat protested that “this policy would result in the ruin of Persia at the hands of Russian forces,” he replied that the Persian communists “had arranged with the Soviet authorities to effect a revolution in Persia without the intervention of the Russian troops.”154 After protracted negotiations,155 Haydar Khan succeeded in persuading Kuchik Khan to join the communists in a new alliance against the Shah’s government in early May.156 As the Persian Cossacks and Gendarmes took over the positions evacuated by the British troops, so the Persian revolutionaries, whose number had considerably increased,157 replaced the Soviet troops.158 According to the intelligence reports reaching the British Legation, the revolutionary forces, under the command of Kuchik Khan, Ihsanullah Khan and Khalu Qurban, were preparing to mount a three-pronged attack on Tehran. The British Military Attaché also reported: “the rebel movement in North Persia is …being controlled and directed by Russian Bolsheviks in touch with Rothstein.”159 Rothstein repeatedly tried to assure Norman that he was opposed to Kuchik Khan’s advance on Tehran and that “he was determined to do his best to prevent it.”160 But Norman maintained that “the Rebels’ plan of campaign which provides for the simultaneous march on the capital of three converging columns…surely emanates from no Persian brain.” Moreover, the recent events in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where the revolts by the local Bolsheviks and radicals had been followed by the Red Army’s intervention, reinforced Norman’s perception of the Soviet threat. “The usual Bolshevik procedure already familiar from its adoption in the case of Baku, Bokhara, Erivan, and Tiflis,” Norman wrote, “is likely to be followed in that of Tehran.”161 All this led Norman to the conclusion that “the game of Great Britain in Northern Persia is up.” “The only course which remains open to His Majesty’s Government,” he added, “is to consolidate our


position in the rest of the country.”162 The Legation’s Oriental Secretary drew up an elaborate plan for the protection of British interests and influence in the south, on the basis of the maintenance of the South Persia Rifles and the alliance with the local tribal chiefs, particularly the Bakhtiari Khans. All this amounted to the creation of a British protectorate in south Persia as opposed to the supposedly Russian-dominated north.163 Norman’s concern found an echo in London. The intelligence reports reaching Whitehall spoke of a considerable Soviet military build-up in the Caucasus.164 It seemed to the British officials that it was an “indication of a desire on the part of the Moscow Government to bring influence to bear on the Angora Government and to intervene in the affairs of Mesopotamia and Persia if opportunity offers.” More ominously, the British agents had learned that some Soviet officials at Baku were actually urging Moscow to sanction an all-out attack on Persia.165 From the intelligence reports and the despatches from Tehran it appeared that the situation of Persia was “indeed similar in some respects to that of Georgia prior to the advance of the Russian army on Tiflis.”166 However, the Foreign Office no longer considered the “southern policy” a realistic option. The hope of maintaining the South Persia Rifles was fading fast because of the Treasury ‘s and India’s adamant refusal to carry on financing the force.167 Moreover, Major E.W. Noel, who had been sent in March to investigate the situation in the Bakhtiari territory, had reported that the tribesmen were no longer prepared to follow their chiefs’ lead. And it would thus be “fatal to us to pin our faith on the khans and use them as our weapon” against the spread of Bolshevism from the north to south Persia. He suggested that it would be “necessary for us to step into the breach between the khans and their people” by raising a Bakhtiari force under British officers.168 But the Foreign Office knew that the chance of prising men and money from the other departments for such a force was remote. In effect, Norman and his colleagues had little choice but to remain “passive spectators” in Tehran. In mid-July 1921 the fall of Tehran suddenly seemed not only likely but imminent. On July 2 some 500 Soviet troops landed at Enzeli. Two days later they occupied the provincial capital, Resht. At the same time, a group of the Persian revolutionaries, consisting of 2, 000 fighters and a few Russian staff officers, under the command of Ihsanullah Khan and Sa’ed ud-Daula,169 began to march on Tehran. On July 12, after defeating the Cossacks, they occupied the strategic Salambar Pass, threatening the Kasvin—Tehran road. Panic swept through the capital. After an interview with the War Minister on July 14, the British Military Attaché reported that Reza Khan “seemed thoroughly alarmed at his position, having found his intrigues with

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Rothstein had done him no good.” When Reza Khan asked the Soviet Minister “the meaning of the return of the Soviet troops,” Rothstein replied that “he knew nothing about the matter and it must be some action taken by the Azerbaijan Soviet Government whose activities the Moscow Government has great difficulties in controlling.”170 These events seemed to confirm the British suspicions. Now there was no doubt in the Foreign Office that the Soviets were “pursuing towards Persia their usual policy towards Bokhara, Georgia…. They make a treaty, then set some other power—Azerbaijan, Soviet Armenia or the Third International—over whom they profess to have no control to tear it up.”171 And Oliphant noted that these events show “the value to be attached to Soviet promises.” “The Persians,” he added, “can only learn by experience to what they have exposed themselves by their Soviet policy conducted by Mushaver ulMamalek.”172 But this crisis melted away almost as quickly as it had loomed. On July 18 the Soviet troops once again began to withdraw from Gilan.173 And the advance of the Persian revolutionaries soon ground to a halt, owing largely to “considerable friction” between the Persian commanders and the Russian staff officers.174 When the revolutionary forces were further weakened by the defection of Sa’ed ud-Daula and his following to the government side,175 the Cossacks counterattacked and reoccupied the Salambar Pass, inflicting heavy casualties on the revolutionaries.176 The withdrawal of the Soviet troops indicated that the “Caucasian lobby” had failed to persuade the Soviet leadership to change their policy towards Persia. The Soviet-Persian treaty of 26 February 1921 signalled the decision of Moscow to make the cooperation with the central government in Tehran rather than with the Gilan revolutionaries the keystone of its Persian policy.177 But it appears that the “Caucasian lobby,” led by Ordzhonikidze in Baku, and backed by Stalin in Moscow, continued to press for support for the Gilan revolutionaries and even for a military campaign in Persia.178 They had succeeded in inducing the reluctant Lenin and Trotsky to sanction the Eleventh Red Army’s intervention in Georgia in midFebruary.179 The success of the operation in Georgia had emboldened them. On March 2—barely a week after the occupation of Tiflis—the Political Commissar of the Eleventh Red Army, Pavlosky, sent a letter to Moscow urging a similar operation in Persia. He stressed that he was convinced that resistance of “the Anglo-Persian block” would “easily be broken by the first attacks of our Red troops.”180 Moscow’s reply to this letter is not known. But in an interview with Narimanov, the head of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic, Chicherin stated that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Gilan if and when the British troops had left Persia. He added: “In the East we are not


contemplating a military campaign in the near future. We attach tremendous importance to our agreement with Great Britain, and our future military activities will depend on how successful we are in profiting by this agreement.”181 It also appears that the pressures from Baku were to some extent counteracted by the despatches from Rothstein, who was regarded highly by both Lenin and Chicherin.182 Rothstein agreed with Moscow that Persia was “far from ready” for a Soviet revolution.183 Moreover, he believed that Soviet intervention in north Persia would jeopardize the Anglo-Soviet rapprochement184 and might lead to British intervention in the south.185 It seems that when Rothstein learned that some fresh troops had landed at Enzeli in early July, he appealed directly to Lenin to rein in Baku. He also wrote to Lenin that Persia was a backward country and had no working class to speak of. To export a revolution to such a country, he added, would cause endless difficulties with the Shah’s government and Britain, and it would probably not result in a Soviet Persia.186 On July 16 Lenin wrote to Chicherin: “Rothstein is complaining about Baku.” He suggested that a resolution warning the Baku officials against violations of the Soviet government’s policy in respect of Persia should at once be put through the Central Committee “to make it binding on Ordzhonikidze.”187 In his reply to Rothstein, Lenin wrote, “I seem to be in full agreement with your circumspect policy in Persia. I have not heard the ‘other side,’ but I do not think your main considerations could be refuted.” He added: “Why don’t you write a work on Persia to give us all a chance to make a study of such an interesting country, which is so obscure for all of us.”188 In effect, it was left to Rothstein to direct Soviet policy in Persia. In the wake of the July crisis, British perceptions of the Bolshevik threat to Persia began to shift in reponse to the changing events and reports reaching London. The despatches from Tehran indicated that Rothstein had adopted a “circumspect” policy. In early August Norman reported: The general information which I have of late been able to collect regarding the recent activities of the Russian Soviet Legation make it clear that they have changed their direction. They are no longer so much designed to instil communistic doctrines into the Persian people, which is now thought to be a hopeless task at the present stage, as to excite them against Great Britain….189 A few days later, the British Military Attaché at Tehran reported that the Soviet Minister had “entirely ceased communist propaganda.” He added: “The Bolsheviks are greatly alarmed at the bad news received from Russia regarding the economic situation. Their officials in Persia,

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under the guidance of Rothstein, are concentrating all their energies on obtaining as much foodstuff as possible for export to Russia.”190 The messages from Tehran were backed up by an intelligence report in mid-August from the British Consul-General at Kashgar: According to reports received by me from Tashkent, dated 2nd August, it would now appear that the Bolsheviks have temporarily suspended their activities regarding Afghanistan, Persia, and other adjacent states, owing to their internal position in Russia proper. Orders have been issued from Moscow for the despatch of all available foodstuff, clothing, and supplies of every description to cope with famine and the economic danger now threatening Russia.191 Shortly afterwards, London received the intelligence reports indicating that the Soviet leaders had instructed the foreign communists to cease the active propaganda and other revolutionary tactics until Russia had overcome her difficulties.192 A few months later, when the Persian officials expressed concern about the possibility of Soviet aggression, the British officials assured them that Soviet Russia was so “impotent” that she could not afford to entertain any aggressive designs against Persia, and that her recovery would be very slow.193 The perception of the decreased Bolshevik threat was reinforced by completion of the Soviet withdrawal by the end of September and Reza Khan’s decisive victory over the Gilan revolutionaries towards the end of October. The tenuous alliance between the communists and Kuchik Khan once again broke up towards the end of September. In the ensuing clashes between the two sides, the leader of the communists, Haydar Khan, was killed. Taking advantage of the general disarray among the rebels, Reza Khan launched his offensive in Gilan on October 4. Many of the rebels, led by Khalu Qurban, soon surrendered to the government forces. Some, including Ihsanullah Khan and Sardar Muhi, left Gilan and took refuge in Baku. Kuchik Khan and some of his following put up fierce resistance. But, in an unusually bloody encounter with the Cossacks on October 20, Kuchik Khan lost most of his men.194 On October 24 the Cossacks occupied Enzeli. Kuchik Khan, who had become a fugitive in the hills, was caught in a snowstorm and froze to death on December 6.195 On his visit to Gilan in January, the British Military Attaché found no sign of Bolshevik influence.196 The Foreign Office was delighted that the Bolsheviks had “completely lost their former hold in the Northern provinces.”197 The British perception of the Anglo-Soviet rivalry in Tehran also began to change after the departure of Norman at the end of


September. As already noted, Norman was prone to perceive Britain’s losses as Russia’s gains. And there was little doubt in his mind that the Soviet Legation was responsible for Persia’s actions against British interests—such as the dismissal of the military and financial advisers—and the general anti-British feeling. He continued to report to London that the Soviets were bound to dominate the government in Tehran as British influence waned.198 After his farewell audience with the Shah on September 25, he reported: “I repeated my warning against the danger of the present Government’s complete surrender to Russia.”199 These despatches reinforced Curzon’s belief that the “vacuum” left by British withdrawal would be filled by Russian influence.200 But only a week later, Reginald Bridgeman, who took over as the Charge d’Affaires, pending the arrival of Sir Percy Loraine, reported: “Prime Minister [Qavam us-Saltan] asked me to disbelieve reports that he is in close relations with the Bolsheviks, explaining that it was impossible for a man of his ideas to sympathise with communistic doctrines.” Bridgeman hastened to add: “This, I think, is true. He must of course avoid rupture with the Russians and means to adopt a neutral attitude.”201 Bridgeman noted that the anti-British press campaign in Tehran was only in part due to Rothstein’s instigation and “in part attributable to a wave of anti-foreign feeling which seems to be passing over all Islamic countries.” He also sensed a growing feeling among the Persians that they could “manage their own affairs just as well as, if not better than, foreign experts.”202 Shortly after his arrival, the new British Minister lent his support to Bridgeman’s views. Loraine’s first and strongest impression was “that of the growing national feeling.” He wrote: “There is a far more effective and coherent public opinion than when I formerly knew this,203 and it is intensely nationalist.” The Persian government, he noted, was therefore determined to keep both Britain and Russia at arm’s length.204 It also became evident that the Soviet Legation had lost much of its leverage on the Persian government after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the collapse of the Gilan Revolution. Early in December Reza Khan told the British Military Attaché: “Now that Resht and Enzeli were in the hands of the government troops and the rebel movement was crushed, he no longer feared the Russians.”205 The following year, a stream of reports indicating the Soviets’ failure to dominate the Persian government206 convinced London that the AngloSoviet rivalry had not been a zero-sum game: “While they [the Soviets] had shaken British influence they had failed to bring the country definitely within their orbit.”207

PART THREE IMPERIAL ACCORD

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CHAPTER SIX Anglo-American Partnership

The basic objective of Curzon’s Persian policy was to prevent any rival power from gaining either a political or economic foothold in the country. In line with this policy, the Foreign Office was determined to resist any American involvement in Persia. In April 1919 when the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, told Balfour that he might raise the issue of Persia at the Peace Conference if Britain did not, Crowe urged: “Why do we not take the bull by the horns and tell the Americans that Persia is for us covered by what is our equivalent in Asia of the Monroe doctrine: this is our preserve!”1 This summed up the attitude of the Foreign Office. So when a few months later Lord Grey, on special mission at Washington, alarmed by the vociferous objections of the Senate and the State Department to the AngloPersian Agreement, suggested that the U.S. government be allowed to participate in providing advisers and loans to Persia, Curzon brushed aside his advice.2 Despite these forays into Persian affairs, the State Department was not, as the Foreign Office saw it, eager to get involved in the country.3 The Americans had not pressed the case of Persia with the British delegation at Paris, and their protests against the Anglo-Persian Agreement soon petered out. When shortly after the Anglo-American diplomatic exchanges regarding the Agreement, the American Ambassador met the Foreign Secretary, he, Curzon noted, “exhibited no desire either to repeat or renew the complaints.”4 In the following months, the growing isolationist tendency in the United States cast further doubt on the possibility of American political involvement in Persia.5 The Foreign Office was, however, determined to “oppose the entry of the United States into competition with us in Persia if and when it is clear that this is their intention.”6 An American economic thrust into Persia seemed more likely, particularly in view of their quest for oil in the Middle East. The prospect of the “influx” of American capital into Persia was troubling to London.7 The British feared that the U.S. government, despite its aversion to political entanglement in the Middle East, might be drawn


into Persia in the wake of American investors. They already suspected that the Standard Oil Company were “at the back of “the State Department’s interest in Persia.8 Moreover, American investment would provide the Persian government with new sources of revenues beyond British control. This was bound to loosen the British grip on Persian finances. Therefore the Foreign Office was equally determined to keep American businessmen out of Persia. In an interview with Curzon on 8 April 1920, Prince Firuz, the Persian Foreign Minister, hesitantly enquired his view about American participation in the development of the oil resources of Persia. “I at once realized that he was referring to the American Standard Oil Company,” Curzon noted, “and that that omnivorous organisation was endeavouring to secure a foothold on Persian soil.” He warned the Minister “very strongly against any attempt to introduce the Standard Oil Company in Persia.”9 Shortly afterwards, to forestall any competition, the Foreign Office agreed to lend diplomatic support to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s acquisition of Khoshtaria’s claim to oil resources of the five northern provinces of Persia, the only opening for the possible American entry.10 However, the Persians refused to recognize the transaction and continued to regard the Khoshtaria concession as null and void, on the grounds that it had been made under duress and had not been ratified by the Majlis. In August, when the Foreign Office found out that the Persian envoy at Washington was secretly engaged in negotiations with the State Department with a view to bartering the north Persian oil concession for a loan, it instructed Norman, the British Minister at Tehran, to inform the Persian government “categorically” that the British government intended to support the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in their purchase of the Khoshtaria concession.11 In October the Foreign Office rejected Norman’s advice that American participation in oil enterprise in north Persia would be politically beneficial as a counterweight to Soviet influence in the area.12 However, in the summer of 1921 the Foreign Office began to retreat from its original stand against American entry into Persia. Early in June the Foreign Office urged APOC to invite Standard Oil to share in the Khoshtaria concession.13 Three major factors contributed to this policy reversal. One was growing concern about Standard Oil’s strength and activities. It is debatable whether the State Department, in pursuing an aggressive foreign oil policy, acted to defend national interests by enhancing security of supply in the face of fears of depletion of domestic petroleum resources,14 or simply to advance purely commercial objectives as defined by corporate interests.15 The British perception of American policy corresponded to the latter.

ANGLO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP 135

As the British saw it, the U.S. government had no reason to worry about the security of petroleum supply for the American navy and industries. The United States produced 70 per cent of the world output of petroleum. As new productive fields were being found, her production continued to rise; there was little indication of an early decline in American output. “Even if the pessimistic forecasts — in which the American oil industry as a whole probably places little faith —as to the early exhaustion of the United States fields prove to be well-founded,” the Petroleum Department argued, “she has vast reserves of high grade oil shale and has almost at her door the immense resources of Mexico.”16 What then lay behind the U.S. government’s aggressive foreign oil policy? The answer had been provided by the British Ambassador at Washington, Sir Auckland Geddes. The oil companies, led by Standard Oil of New Jersey, were dragging the government into adopting “a policy which would secure them in their present dominant position in the oil industry of the world and provide for the continuance of that position in the future.”17 Geddes believed that the U.S. government could not be expected to resist these pressures. Shortly after his arrival in Washington, he wrote to Curzon that the oil interests were “dominating the Government and angry at being forestalled by British interests in many potential fields.”18 “It should,” he noted, “be clearly recognised that the American Executive can no more control the oil interests than a young girl can physically hold a charging bull.”19 The Standard Oil Company, according to Geddes, exercised influence on the Executive through a combination of personal ties,20 control of information21 and press campaign.22 Standard’s influence also extended to some members of Congress.23 For example, the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act, Geddes thought, was due to “the inspiration of the Standard Oil Company.”24 Geddes feared that Standard Oil’s influence on the U.S. government could not but heighten the tension in Anglo-American relations.25 Moreover, Standard Oil’s press campaign against the British government’s attempts to shut American companies out of the oilfields of the Empire and the Middle East was largely responsible for the rampant anti-British feeling in the United States. In his annual report for 1920, Geddes noted that the demonstrations of anti-British feeling had “been more violent than usual” because of the Irish question and the “active propaganda recently promoted by the Standard Oil interests.”26 Standard Oil’s tentacles, in British eyes, spread further. Standard Oil were, “with good reason,” suspected of subsidizing Sinn Fein, the Kemalists, the Iraqi nationalists, together with various anti-British newspapers and groups in France and other European countries.27 As


Curzon put it, the British officials were inclined to see Standard Oil as the “villain in every piece.”28 The Republican victory in the Presidential election of 1920 intensified British concern. The Republican administration was expected to be even more amenable to Standard Oil’s influence.29 The day after the election of President Harding, William Tyrrell, one of the Foreign Office’s petroleum experts, noted that the American demand for participation in oil enterprise in north Persia should be treated “with more caution,” as the Republican victory would “considerably strengthen the Standard Oil Company.”30 This seemed to be borne out by the new administration’s “close attention to oil affairs abroad,” despite the fact that the oil shortage scare had begun to peter out,31 and particularly by its vigorous support for Standard Oil in the Dutch East Indies oil dispute, shortly after taking office.32 Now it seemed certain that the Anglo-American friction over the oil question would grind on as long as Standard Oil had not been accommodated. Important as petroleum was to the British, the Foreign Office’s interest in friendly relations with Washington was sufficiently strong to override the impact of the oil question on British foreign policy. The British wished to win American cooperation in resolving the major outstanding issues of the day, such as naval disarmament, the British war debts, and the Irish question. By allowing Standard Oil to participate in the exploitation of oil resources of north Persia, the Foreign Office hoped to eliminate one powerful factor from amongst the hostile influences in the United States.33 The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was primarily concerned with the protection of their interests in south Persia and Mesopotamia, went along with the Foreign Office in the hope of fobbing Standard Oil off with a 50 per cent share in the Khoshtaria concession.34 Shortly after the opening of negotiations between Standard Oil and APOC in New York, in November 1921, both Geddes and John Cadman, the APOC representative, reported that there had already been a “marked change” in the press attitude and “anti-British comments” had practically ceased.35 Geddes urged the Foreign Office to continue to promote Anglo-American co-operation in north Persia because “the power of the Standard Oil Company to organize and maintain a hostile propaganda is difficult to cope with and menacing to our relations with this country.” He also quoted Secretary of Commerce Hoover as saying that if a friendly feeling could be “created between the Anglo-Persian and Standard Oil nothing more would be heard about the oil question in this country.”36 On his return from the Washington Conference, Balfour lent his support to Geddes’ views. Addressing a cabinet committee, he remarked:


Whatever we might wish, it would be impossible not to work with the Standard Oil Company in North Persia—all the marketing arrrangements were in their hands and it was impossible not to cooperate. Nothing could be more important than to avoid having an open, or even a concealed, breach. If we could work with them it would be to our advantage politically…. If the United States had to choose between the Standard Oil rights and Great Britain, they would support the Standard Oil Company through thick and thin. He added: “the great strength of the Standard Oil Company arose from their predominant financial position and from their elaborate system of information and propaganda. In the latter case they were absolutely unscrupulous and had resorted to every method, good or bad, in every part of the world where they had the power to make mischief.”37 Early in 1922 there was another reason for avoiding a breakdown in the Standard-APOC negotiations on the north Persian oil. The British government had decided to extend Anglo-American co-operation to the Mesopotamian oilfields, but without appearing to be beating a diplomatic retreat from its support for the validity of the Turkish Petroleum Company’s claim. The north Persian negotiations provided a convenient channel for commercial arrangements between the two companies regarding Mesopotamia.38 In Mesopotamia, as in Persia, one of the considerations influencing Britain’s cooperative attitude was, as the Petroleum Department noted, to secure “a cessation of the anti-British activities which have undoubtedly been carried on by the Standard Oil Company in many directions.”39 However, to find out why Britain made the first move towards cooperation with the Americans in Persia, we should turn to the two other factors. One was the desire to contain the Soviets. As early as September 1919 Lord Grey had suggested that the presence of “the Americans in Persia would secure at any rate moral influence of the United States Government against any renewal of aggression from Russia.”40 As the Soviet threat loomed large, some officials began to stick their necks out in support of Lord Grey’s suggestion. In July 1920 Esmond Ovey noted that, by admitting the Americans into Persia, the British could avoid “drifting into a position of rivalry with Russia, in which we should, as Lord Grey points out, have no one on our side, and in which unfriendly elements in America would have grounds for ‘schadenfreude.’”41 In October, the British Minister at Tehran wrote to Curzon that American involvement in north Persia would be advantageous to the British as a counterpoise to Soviet pressures in that region.42 Confident that Britain would contain the Soviets, and


determined to keep Persia within Britain’s exclusive sphere of influence, Curzon ignored all these suggestions. But the collapse of his containment policy forced Curzon to change his attitude. As noted earlier,43 in November Curzon failed to make the resumption of British trade with the Soviets conditional on their withdrawal from Gilan, and in December the cabinet decided to pull the British troops out of north Persia. In the wake of British withdrawal at the end of May 1921, it seemed that the Russians were set, at least, to restore their pre-1917 influence in north Persia. So when, in July, Lindsay, speaking of American investment in north Persia, suggested that “it would be to our advantage to have the Americans interested in regions where a Russian menace exists or threatens,” Curzon was inclined to concur with him, noting that the Americans would after all be on “our side against the Bolsheviks who are the sole real peril.”44 Moreover, the collapse of Curzon’s containment policy contributed to the ruin of his Persian policy. As a result, the British began to acknowledge that they could no longer “entirely monopolise Persia.”45 Therefore the admission of Standard Oil into north Persia was, as Curzon noted, simply the case of “better Americans than Bolsheviks.”46 The third factor influencing Britain’s cooperative attitude was the concern about the possibility of an independent American entry into Persia. Britain had given up the hope of monopolizing Persia, but she still wanted to maintain supremacy in the country. To impose a paramount influence, Britain, after the withdrawal of her troops, came to rely chiefly on her financial leverage on the Persian government.47 But, at the same time, the Persians had stepped up their effort to solicit American financial assistance and investment as a counterweight to Britain’s virtual monopoly on their finances. On 28 June 1921, shortly after its opening, the Majlis urged the government that no time should be lost in employing American financial advisers; in curbing the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s political and economic powers in the country; and in granting the oil concession in the northern provinces to “some progressive American companies.”48 The British officials also learnt that the Persian cabinet had already discussed “the advisability of applying to America for a loan of 6,000,000 tomans.”49 In addition, two intercepted telegrams, dated 13 June and 11 July, from Qavam us-Saltana, the Persian Prime Minister, to the Persian Legation at London, showed that he had asked his brother, Vusuq ud-Daula, who was then in London, to enquire about the possibility of obtaining loans from American companies, and had appointed Mirza Hussain Khan ‘Ala’, one of Persia’s most capable diplomats, as the new Minister to Washington to pursue the matter in the United States.50 Moreover, the AngloPersian Oil Company informed the Foreign Office that Vusuq ud-


Daula had held negotiations with A.C.Bedford, the Chairman of Standard Oil.51 These activities alarmed George Churchill: The present Persian Government contemplates throwing Persia into the hands of the Americans. They want to borrow a sufficient sum to pay off their debt to us, and use the balance to organise a National Bank under American guidance and to build railways. They also want to engage an American to reorganise their finances. Although Curzon was not “disturbed at these manoeuvres,” and doubted that the Americans would seek to supplant the British in Persia, he could not rule out the possibility that the Americans might make “themselves disagreeable or dangerous to us over the oil.”52 In mid-November it appeared that the efforts of the Persian Minister at Washington had come to fruition. Standard Oil had agreed to underwrite an American loan of five million dollars to the Persian government, in exchange for the north Persian oil concession. On November 22 the Majlis authorized the government to grant the concession exclusively to Standard Oil. Now the British moved to force the Persians to abandon their overtures to the Americans. The Foreign Office threatened that it would not lift the embargo on British advances to Persia53 unless Persia (1) undertook to curb the activities of her envoy at Washington; (2) agreed to recognize the British claims to north Persian oil and railway concessions; (3) refused to offer the APOC royalty as security for loans from a third party.54 To put further financial screws on the Persian government, the Foreign Office demanded an immediate settlement of Persian debts to Britain.55 But these threats only served to emphasize to the Persians the need for financial independence. As the intercepted Persian communications between Tehran and Washington showed, far from deterring the Persians, these threats led them “to push matters as much as possible in order to obtain an American loan at any cost.”56 Having failed to bring the Persian government into line, the British saw the cooperation with the Americans as the only means of limiting Persia’s room for manoeuvre. “If American funds are forthcoming,” Loraine, the British Minister at Tehran, anxiously wrote, “the situation here will for a certain time at all events pass out of our hands, we shall lose ground which it will be difficult to recover, and the Persians’ belief that they can stand independent of England will be confirmed.” He thought “these consequences could no doubt be averted by timely agreement between the Americans and ourselves.”57 The Standard-APOC partnership, the British hoped, would eliminate the American company “as a possible source of independent aid to the


Persian Government.” As a result, “the hope of financial assistance from America which that Government now entertain,” Geddes observed, “will be very much weakened and they may be forced to abandon the unfriendly activities and intrigues.”58 The British were at first uncertain as to how the Americans would respond to their offer of cooperation. “It is in some respects rather late in the day to endeavour to work in conjunction with the Americans,” noted Oliphant. “Unless the matter was handled very delicately, we should expose ourselves to rebuff for only looking for American help when we ourselves have been worsted by the Persians.”59 In fact the Americans were in a position not only to exclude the APOC from north Persia, but also to erode British influence in Tehran. In doing so, they could gain exclusive access to the oil reserves of north Persia and enhance their benevolent reputation in Persia. If “the Americans are bent on queering our pitch,” Loraine observed, “they have an excellent chance of doing it.”60 But neither Standard Oil nor the U.S. government were intent on undermining British hegemony in Persia. To be sure, the State Department sought to secure a share for American interests in the oil resources of Persia. And the American objections to the Anglo-Persian Agreement were primarily motivated by the concern that the British would consolidate their position in such a way as to secure total control of the all Persian oil.61 Yet, in Persia, as in Iraq and Turkey,62 the State Department never considered siding with local nationalists against Britain. Washington saw the situation in a broader context than merely the scramble for oil. First, as the State Department bluntly told the Persian Minister at Washington, neither sympathy for Persia nor desire for oil was so great that the United States would risk alienating Britain.63 Britain held a pivotal position in the American policy of preserving a common front among the great powers in order to maintain peace and order in the world and jointly supervise development of non-industrialized areas.64 The State Department was therefore determined not to allow Persia to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain. When, in June 1921, the Persian government informed the American Chargé d’Affaires at Tehran, Van Engert, of its “readiness to grant liberal concessions for oil, railroads, mines, etc.,” Engert advised Washington that the Americans should “sound London and possibly invite cooperation as otherwise the Persians are certain to try the timehonoured Oriental practice of playing one against the other.” He believed that “in the interest of civilization it would be regrettable if the Persians gained the impression that we were particularly anxious to thwart British plans [for cooperation]….”65 According to Yeselson, 66 Washington shared Engert’s concern.66


Similarly, fearing the Persians would use him “as a make-weight against the British,” the State Department had ignored the Persian government’s repeated requests for designating a financial adviser,67 until the Foreign Office dropped its objection to the employment of American advisers by Persia.68 Moreover, when drawing up a list of candidates for the post of financial adviser, the State Department rejected the name of William Coffin, the American Consul General in Berlin, on the grounds that he had “pronounced antipathies against the British.”69 The final choice, Arthur Millspaugh, the State Department’s oil expert, was known as a strong advocate of AngloAmerican cooperation on the petroleum question.70 Second, the State Department believed that Persia owed such security as she enjoyed “to Great Britain alone.” As the Americans were not prepared to “undertake the thankless task of attempting to bolster up Persia,” they did not wish to “open the door to chaos in Persia by ousting Great Britain.”71 The British presence, as the Americans saw it, ensured order and thus a congenial environment for American economic expansion. In Persia, as elsewhere in the Middle East, it was through partnership with Britain that the U.S. government could achieve the basic objective of the open-door policy—cost-effective imperial expansion.72 The third factor that led the U.S. government to support British supremacy in Persia was the concern about Bolshevism. The British influence was regarded as “an antidote to Bolshevism.”73 As the Americans perceived it, the decline of British influence would inevitably increase Soviet “political and military menace to other foreign interests.” The Americans were therefore willing to submerge their commercial differences with the British in the common interest in stemming the tide of Bolshevism and other revolutionary forces. “The danger of cooperation between Soviet Russia and the restless elements of the Middle East to further their respective anti-Christian aims,” Engert wrote, “is a real one and can only be obviated by prompt and unselfish encouragement of all influences striving to maintain law and order.”74 Standard Oil also saw cooperation with the British as the preferred path and abandoned their independent attempts to enter Persia. Three factors entered into their calculations. First, they considered cooperation in north Persia as a stepping-stone to the partnership in Mesopotamia. The directors of Standard Oil were “unwilling to cross the Anglo-Persian group in Persia for fear of imperilling the more important negotiations simultaneously going on for American participation in Iraq.”75 Second, as APOC were quick to point out, Standard Oil needed the cooperation of the British company, which held exclusive rights to the laying of pipelines in south Persia in order to transport the oil produced in the north to the Persian Gulf.76


Finally, Standard Oil wanted to secure diplomatic protection for their investments. In Persia such protection could come primarily from the British Legation.77 *** By the end of January 1922, following several anxious months during which “the American competition” seemed “very threatening,”78 the British officials began to realize that the Americans were not seeking to steal a march on the British in Persia. There was growing evidence that Washington did not intend to align itself with the Persian government. The State Department repeatedly assured the British Embassy at Washington that it supported the Standard-APOC partnership in north Persia and would do nothing “to encourage the Persian Government in their efforts to play off the United States Government against His Majesty’s Government.”79 The State Department also told Geddes that the American Charge d’Affaires in Tehran was “working in complete harmony with his British colleague.”80 This was confirmed by several reports from the British Minister at Tehran,81 and by an intercepted telegram from Engert to Washington, in which he advised the State Department that no money should be made available to the Persians until they accepted the Standard-APOC partnership.82 Moreover, the new American Minister, shortly after his arrival in Tehran, called on Loraine and expressed his firm belief in “the kindred nature of British and American conceptions and ideals and their will to good.” He was, Loraine reported, “persuaded that nothing, and least of all in Persia, must be allowed to disturb their harmonious relations or impair their common efforts to secure peace and order.”83 It also became clear to the British officials that Standard Oil and American financiers preferred to operate under the British umbrella rather than make separate arrangements with the Persian government. It did not escape the notice of the British that Standard Oil had readily abandoned their independent concession in favour of partnership with APOC.84 Standard Oil also welcomed the British suggestion that APOC should participate in underwriting the American loan to Persia. They even refused to accept Persia’s pledge of the APOC royalty as security for the loan, unless the British agreed to its assignment. This, as one Foreign Office official noted with satisfaction, gave “HMG a valuable grip over the chief asset of the Persian Govt. for raising money.”85 In conversations with Geddes and Cadman, Bedford went so far as to say that his company did not “desire to acquire any interest in Persia, if their presence there should, for any reason, be distasteful to His Majesty’s Government.”86 Moreover, during the signing of the agreement between Standard Oil and APOC, the director of J.P. Morgan and Company, which was due to provide the loan, told Cadman: “If this money has been made


available for Persia, it is only because the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s name is connected with the transaction. Without the participation of this great British group, not one single dollar could have been found in America for a country with so bad a record as Persia.”87 In the Foreign Office, Lindsay observed: “The Americans, when venturing their money outside their own continent, are as timid as hares.”88 The consequences of the American attitude were twofold: in the first place, Persia soon ceased to be an issue in Anglo-American relations. It had, as Loraine noted, become “evident that they [the Americans] would make no bid for the acquisition of political influence in Persia, and that they would on no account risk any embroilment of their relations with His Majesty’s Government in connection with Persian affairs.” “The one thing about Persia which attracted American attention was the alleged oil deposits in the northern provinces,” he added, “even in this case American industry showed a marked reluctance to embark on an adventure in Persia except in association with a first-class British enterprise.”89 Second, as far as Anglo-Persian relations were concerned, Britain had achieved her objective to eliminate Standard Oil as a possible source of independent aid to the Persian government.90 The Foreign Office hoped it would now be able to make the Persians see that they could not easily break loose from Britain’s financial control, thus rendering them more tractable. The arrangements between Standard Oil and APOC involved sufficient active British participation to be useful to the British Minister at Tehran, Lindsay remarked, “if he wants to tell the Persians that they cannot get on without us.”91 Loraine had “studiously” set about hammering home to the Persians that “the relations between London and Washington are so intimate and involve matters of such Worldwide importance, that a rift on the subject of some concession, or even on the question of Persian policy, is quite unthinkable,”92 and convincing them that “Persia’s attempt to stand by herself was a failure.”93 But the Persian government refused to recognize the Standard Oil— APOC combine, despite its pressing financial needs. The Persians impressed Loraine as being bent on martyrdom: “These people seem quite capable of suicide.”94 He soon gave up his futile attempts to press the Persian government into accepting the Standard Oil-APOC partnership. Indeed, the Persians were fully resolved not only to resist the extension of British influence to north Persia, but to break their grip on Persia’s finances. (At the same time they wanted to introduce American interests into north Persia to insure against the possible revival of the Bolshevik threat in the area.)95 In June 1922 the Majlis voted for the concession to be granted to an independent American company, thus excluding British interests.96 In the following two years, the Persian Minister at Washington was hard at work seeking


out independent loans and investments. But his efforts came to nothing for two reasons. One was the State Department’s firm commitment to the Anglo-American partnership; another was the American bankers’ reluctance to put their money in Persia, except in league with British investors. In a private letter to Loraine, Engert, who was now in charge of the Persia desk at the State Department, wrote that the two countries should do “everything that was humanly possible” to avoid rupture in Anglo-American accord in Persia. “It is not so much a question of oil, or money, or railroads, or even of Persian finances,” he added, “as it is of demonstrating to the world that your country and mine see eye to eye when it comes to the great problem of trusteeship of backward races and maintenance of law and order on the ‘frontiers’ of our common civilisation.”97 The State Department’s adherence to this policy was illustrated by its refusal to support Sinclair Consolidated, a purely American company, in their independent attempt to acquire the oil concession in north Persia, whereas it was actively backing the Standard-APOC combine.98 When the Majlis awarded the concession to Sinclair in return for a loan of ten million dollars, the American Minister at Tehran sought to uphold the Anglo-American partnership by inviting the British to take part in advancing the loan to Persia and recognizing priority of British claims to the security offered by the Persian government.” Although some American officials rejoiced at Sinclair’s success, the British Chargé d’Affaires at Washington assured London that there was “no reason to suspect that the State Department would endeavour deliberately to discourage further extension of British interests in Persia.”100 The Foreign Office could also rest assured that Sinclair would find it difficult to lift the concession when it came to arranging the loan for Persia. Thomas Lamont, a leading partner in J.P. Morgan and Company, told Geddes that, as the New York bankers had no “faith in the continuing energy of the United States Government to look after the business interests of Americans abroad,” they would insist on British participation before agreeing to grant a huge loan to, or finance any large enterprise in, such unstable countries as Persia or Turkey, so as to gain the support of the Foreign Office. Secretary of State Hughes, he said, “was not a little annoyed” at this policy of the bankers.101 In January 1924 the British Chargé d’Affaires at Washington reported: “During the last year or so the Persian Minister at Washington with the assistance of Morgan Shuster102 has repeatedly sounded American bankers and financial houses as to the possibility of floating a Persian loan on this market. He met with no success in any quarter.”103 As “a further deterrent to American financial enterprise in Persia,” the British Embassy took “discreet steps” to acquaint American financiers with, and get the New York


papers to print material about, the Persian government’s indebtedness to Britain and “their unsatisfactory financial methods.”104 However, Sinclair’s involvement in the Teapot Dome affair, coupled with the murder of the American vice-consul at Tehran, Robert Imbrie, in the summer of 1924,105 sank whatever prospect there was for raising the loan. Sinclair gave up the concession and withdrew from Persia. Disappointed with the United States, the Persians turned to Germany as a counterweight to Britain and the Soviet Union.

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PART FOUR BUFFER-STATE POLICY

148

CHAPTER SEVEN Britain’s Reaction to Reza Khan’s Ascendancy

Reza Khan’s meteoric rise from obscurity to power, between February and May 1921, coincided with and was aided by the weakening of the British Legation’s powers to influence the course of events in Tehran.1 The Legation at first wrote him off as an “honest and capable officer without political aspiration.”2 The Minister pinned his hopes on the civilian leader of the coup, Sayyed Zia, who became Prime Minister. He re-employed British advisers and officers to reorganize and run the Persian finances and armed forces. Moreover his wide-ranging programme for social and economic reforms appeared to provide the necessary antidote to the revolutionary agitations.3 But Sayyed Zia’s hold on power soon proved precarious, despite the detention of a large number of his opponents, including the leading members of the ruling oligarchy. He failed to win over the majority of his natural constituency, that is, the intelligentsia who resented the arrogance of the aristocrats4 and their total dominance over the state apparatus. Though a few admired his attempt to break the spell of aristocratic rule, many dismissed him as a mere puppet of the British Legation.5 Some abhorred his autocratic pronouncements and manners, and his arrest of some leading nationalists.6 The bureaucrats and educated men who hoped to join their ranks felt threatened by his plan “to throw the whole Civil Service into the melting-pot, reduce staff largely, and cut in half the salaries of such officials as survived the purge.”7 Sayyed Zia’s fate was sealed when the Court and the Cossack Division joined forces to bring him down. The Shah regarded him as a mere upstart. He disliked “the small, outspoken journalist,” and thought Sayyed Zia’s attitude towards him lacking in proper respect.8 To him, Sayyed Zia’s reform programme smacked of Bolshevism. The Shah was also alarmed at the detention of the leading aristocrats. Though their imprisonment was “agreeable to him personally because he disliked and feared them and because the misfortunes of others, especially if rich and important people, appealed to his sense of humour,” the Shah, in spite of the British Minister’s assurances, could


not believe that he himself would not eventually become the victim of similar measures.9 He suspected, not without reason, that Sayyed Zia and his younger brother, Crown Prince Muhammad-Hassan Mirza, were scheming to dethrone him.10 Sayyed Zia did not go out of his way to ingratiate himself with the Shah. Just as the Shah viewed him with contempt, even so did Sayyed Zia view the Shah.11 It has been noted that he “treated the Court as if he had been sent as something between the scourge of God and a modern schoolmaster.”12 He hit the Court where it hurt most: he cut down the Civil List.13 He also ignored the Shah’s requests for the release of the imprisoned aristocrats. Sensing that the British Legation, without money and troops, could not shore up Sayyed Zia, the Shah moved to pull away his only prop— the Army. For this purpose, he, through the Court Minister, Mushar ulMulk, who hoped to replace Sayyed Zia, cultivated the friendship of Reza Khan, the Commander of the Cossack Division. Reza Khan was responsive to the Court’s overtures for several reasons. First, the Cossacks were traditionally regarded as the imperial guards. The Cossacks, unlike many Gendarmes, demonstrated their loyalty to the monarch by refusing to join the rebels in Gilan and Tabriz in 1920. After the occupation of Resht by the Bolsheviks and the Jangalis in June 1920, the Cossacks stationed in the town even staged a demonstration in support of the Shah.14 Second, Reza Khan and many other Cossack officers were strongly opposed to Sayyed Zia’s decision to employ British officers and invest them with executive authority. Reza Khan declared it was the “equivalent of selling to foreigners ‘the soul of the nation’ which is the army.”15 Third, Reza Khan shared Sayyed Zia’s antipathy to the aristocrats. Yet his dislike was mixed with a certain awe, perhaps because he had served under some leading members of the ruling class, such as Farman-Farma and Sardar Bahadur (later Sardar As’ad), in a number of military campaigns.16 Fourth, Reza Khan had come round to the view that the Army had to forge an alliance with the influential aristocrats in Tehran in the face of the revolutionary agitations in the north and the tribal unrests among the Kurds and the Lurs. Finally, Reza Khan was an ambitious man with a taste for intrigue.17 Shortly after the coup, Sayyed Zia realized that Reza Khan would not be content with commanding the Cossacks and suspected he intended to undermine his position.18 Playing on his ambition and hoping to remove him from the head of the Cossack Division, Sayyed Zia appointed him as the War Minister in early May. (Though acknowledging that Reza Khan had great influence over the troops and a strong determined character, the British Military Attaché believed he was “ill-fitted for the task, being of poor education, and little knowledge of military matters beyond that of an NCO in the

BRITAIN’S REACTION TO REZA KHAN’S ASCENDANCY 151

Cossack Division.”)19 This manoeuvre backfired. Reza Khan entered the cabinet but insisted on remaining in command of the Cossack Division which was his power base. Soon he further consolidated his position by extending the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War over the Gendarmerie, which had been under the Ministry of the Interior since the former’s inception in 1912.20 He was now in charge of all the regular forces. As Reza Khan gained more power, the Prime Minister’s position grew more tenuous. In mid-May the British Legation realized that the fall of Sayyed Zia was imminent.21 The British officials became more anxious as they began to suspect that “the Russian Legation, though outwardly neutral, secretly encourages Reza Khan and his adherents.”22 Norman moved to rescue the Prime Minister upon whom he had staked many hopes and to prevent the Soviet Legation from notching up a victory against the British Legation. But his “repeated efforts” to put an end to the plot against Sayyed Zia “proved unavailing” as, “since the withdrawal of our troops, the Minister of War no longer fears us.”23 The British Legation was no longer capable of making or breaking cabinets. On May 24 Reza Khan ordered the release of the imprisoned notables and sent a letter to Sayyed Zia “ordering him to resign and quit the country.”24 A large crowd, angered by the new taxes and whipped up by the mullahs who denounced Sayyed Zia as a British agent,25 tried to storm the Prime Minister’s residence. The next day Sayyed Zia left Tehran for exile in Mesopotamia.26 Norman lamented the downfall of the Prime Minister whose “energy, honesty and constructive effort” had been “beyond all praise.”27 It was evident to the Legation that Reza Khan had emerged from the power struggle as the dominant political figure in the country, even a potential “Military Dictator.” But he was still a political unknown. The future, Norman wrote, “inspires me with the greatest misgiving.”28 In London, Curzon was “amused” by the rapidity with which the officer “without political aspiration” had turned into an almost fully-fledged military dictator.29 George Churchill, the Foreign Office’s Persian expert, thought the Soviet Minister was the villain of the piece. Reza Khan, he wrote, had “evidently fallen victim to M.Rothstein’s intrigue.” However, he regarded Reza Khan as an interim figure: “I do not believe that the Shah trusts Reza Khan any more than he did Sayyed Zia and we will not have long to wait before Reza Khan is banished.”30 The British did not wait for a showdown between the Shah and Reza Khan. Just a few weeks after Sayyed Zia’s downfall, the Foreign Office, prodded by the Tehran Legation, decided to starve the new cabinet out of office by cutting off all the loans from British sources.31 Curzon was angry at the new Prime Minister’s policy of keeping the


British at arm’s length, while currying favour with the Soviets and soliciting American assistance.32 In a message to the Foreign Secretary, Qavam us-Saltana had stated that he could show no bias in favour of Britain in order to avoid incurring the unpopularity which Sayyed Zia had incurred as a result of his pro-British attitude.33 The financial embargo was particularly aimed at the “sinister figure”34 of the War Minister who was in dire need of funds for expanding the Army and for military operations against the Jangalis and proBolshevik guerrillas in north Persia. His unceremonious dismissal of British officers from the Cossack Division, and particularly his apparently “intimate relations with the Russian Legation,” led the British to see Reza Khan as a menace to their influence in Tehran.35 At times he appeared to be “thoroughly pro-Russian.”36 As Norman saw it, Reza Khan would seize the British advances for the Cossack Division which was “certain before long to become once more an instrument of Russia.” He even suspected the Soviet Minister, “with the aid of the War Minister,” might topple the cabinet in order to secure the appointment of a cabinet “more openly hostile to us and completely subservient to Russia.”37 So Norman specifically urged the Foreign Office that no loans be made to the Persian government until Reza Khan was “disposed of.”38 But the Imperial Bank’s procrastination in acceding to the Foreign Office’s financial sanction provided Reza Khan with a breathing-space during which he further consolidated his position.39 Much to the dismay of the British officials, Reza Khan retained his post in a major cabinet reshuffle in October. “The inclusion of Reza Khan,” Churchill commented, “does not give much confidence” in Qavam’s new cabinet.40 Then the Minister of War, in search of funds, extended his authority over some other government departments. He appropriated for the Army all the government revenues he could lay his hands on.41 By the end of 1921, Reza Khan’s hold on power had considerably strengthened, as a result of the death of the two men— MuhammadTaqi Khan Pesyan and Kuchik Khan—who could have seriously challenged his bid for national leadership. In early October, Colonel Pesyan, the charismatic Commander of the Khurassan Gendarmerie, who had refused to take orders from the central government since Sayyed Zia’s downfall, was killed in a battle with a tribal force, acting on the Prime Minister’s orders.42 (Reza Khan thus reaped the first fruit of his alliance with the aristocracy.) Towards the end of October, the Cossacks, largely funded by the Imperial Bank’s loans, succeeded in defeating Kuchik Khan’s guerrillas and the other Gilan revolutionaries.43 Early in December Kuchik Khan was caught in a snow storm and froze to death. “The death of Kuchik Khan, following the destruction of the rebel forces in Gilan,” the British Military Attaché reported, “has increased enormously Reza Khan’s


power and prestige in the country. He is now more a military dictator than ever, controls the Cabinet, has the greatest contempt for the Majlis and is feared by the Shah.”44 In both cases Anglo-Soviet rivalry helped Reza Khan’s fortunes. The British Consul-General at Meshed strongly advised Colonel Pesyan, who was confident that his force of 4,000 men could capture Tehran, against marching on the capital, fearing that the Soviets would exploit the ensuing civil war to expand their influence in Persia.45 On the other hand, the Soviet Minister, ironically suspecting the British were behind Colonel Pesyan’s revolt, offered to assist Reza Khan in restoring the central government’s authority in Khurassan by despatching troops from Turkestan.46 Rothstein also refused to support Kuchik Khan’s resistance to the Cossacks, at least partly because he believed Soviet intervention in north Persia would encourage the British to intervene in the south47 and would drive Reza Khan into the British camp. Reza Khan had in fact told him that if Soviet troops re-entered Persia to back the rebels, he would appeal to the British for assistance and “would put himself entirely in British hands.”48 Reza Khan’s decisive victory over the Gilan revolutionaries recast him in British eyes. The British officials had been anxiously waiting to see how he would deal with the Jangalis and the Persian communists in north Persia. Reza Khan’s action in Gilan, the Military Attaché had reported, would show to what extent he was “under the thumb of Rothstein.”49 The rout of the rebels by the Cossacks dispelled the British misapprehension that Reza Khan was either pro-Russian or duped by the Soviet Legation. The British saw Reza Khan’s victory as a “severe blow to the Soviets.”50 In his first interview with the new British Minister, Sir Percy Loraine, in January 1922, Reza Khan stated: “People had accused him of being Bolshevik because last summer he had frequented the Russian Legation assiduously. This frequentation was part of his policy to get the Russians out of the Caspian provinces. His policy had succeeded and the Russians were fooled.” Loraine replied that he had discounted the reports of his proRussian tendencies, “because he felt sure that the man who had settled the Gilan question in this manner could not really be proRussian.”51 Now the British Minister thought Reza Khan could in fact be “an asset to us,” chiefly because he was “the only man…who today by his prestige and watchfulness is preventing the machinations and intrigues of the pro-Bolshevik elements from gaining ground.”52 The British officials were well aware that Persia’s nascent communist and labour movements were minuscule. But this did not set their minds at rest. In a conversation with Reza Khan in February 1922, the Military Attaché urged him to nip the pro-Bolshevik organizations in the bud,


arguing that “an organised minority can often do a lot of harm if allowed to continue its activities unchecked and such movements are best crushed at the start.”53 According to British intelligence, the communists, following the collapse of the Gilan revolution, concentrated their efforts on setting up party organizations in major cities, particularly in Tehran, Tabriz and Meshed,54 organizing trade unions, and conducting propaganda. Apart from Britian, the main target of their propaganda was Reza Khan who, in the Military Attaché’s words, “the Bolsheviks feel is the only defence Persia possesses against the Communist doctrine.” In addition, British officials believed that the Soviet Consulates in various cities were “in reality purely propaganda centres.” Their objective was “to penetrate Persia with their doctrines, knowing well that a state of anarchy would considerably facilitate their efforts against India and Iraq.” Loraine feared the Soviets might even “stampede Persia into a revolution of the classical Soviet type,” with “liberating Red troops being called in at the allegedly unanimous appeal of the Persian people to redress centuries of wrong and oppression and to deliver Persia from the clutches of the rapacious capitalists!”55 Reza Khan, in turn, was quick to play upon British anxieties and promote himself as Persia’s saviour from the supposed Bolshevik takeover. During a dispute with the Majlis, for instance, he told Loraine that “his resignation would mean the removal of the chief obstacle to Russian encroachments, a probable revolution or coup d’etat followed by a form of Government which would be a mere tool in Russian hands.”56 His immediate aim was to persuade the British to lift their financial embargo, as he still badly needed funds for his rapidly expanding army. While only a few months earlier the British officials at Tehran wanted to remove him from power by cutting off funds for his army, they were now anxious lest the financial stringency “should lead to the fall of Reza Khan and the disappearance with him of the last visible element of stability.”57 The Foreign Office agreed to allow the Imperial Bank to resume lending to the Persian government.58 One main consideration influencing this decision was that Reza Khan had “prevented the Bolsheviks from achieving any marked success with their communistic propaganda in Persia.”59 By funding his army, the British felt that they could safely rely on Reza Khan to keep Bolshevik and Soviet influence out of north Persia. Early in 1923 Loraine noted with satisfaction: “I regard the danger of Bolshevism in Persia as definitely removed. This result could not have been obtained without Reza Khan.”60 There were other factors as well which impelled the British to reckon with Reza Khan. One was the very fact that Reza Khan had risen to power in the face of opposition from the British. This clearly


testified to their waning influence in Tehran. Shortly after his arrival in Tehran, Loraine recognized this weakness and urged the Foreign Office to come to terms with it. “The basis of our post-war policy,” he wrote, “has been cut away from under our feet.” While his predecessors were in command of large sums of money to buy influence, he “had practically none.” Moreover, the disappearance of British troops, coupled with the appearance of a rival in the shape of Soviet Russia on the scene, had “undermined the whole fabric of a British-controlled regime.” Without money, or the threat of force, the British Minister was left with little leverage to intervene effectively in Persian affairs. “A return to the interventionist policy brought about by the circumstances of the War is clearly impossible,” he concluded. He himself soon grew “quite accustomed” to his advice being ignored by the Persians.61 No longer able to decide the outcome of the power struggle in Tehran, the British had to content themselves with siding with the winner. In fact Loraine later prided himself on spotting Reza Khan as “a winning horse in the political race very soon after my arrival.”62 By allowing the Imperial Bank to supply funds for Reza Khan’s army, the British government wished to curry favour with the “winning horse.” Urging the Foreign Office to raise the financial sanction, Loraine wrote: “As things are now Reza Khan calls the tune in Persia, and best guarantee for protection of our legitimate interests is that he should realize the advantage of being on good terms with us.”63 Loraine also saw some virtue in the necessity of non-interference in the power struggle in Tehran. He felt beleaguered by the rampant anti-British agitations in Tehran and the provinces.64 “Press, public, pulpit and Parliament,” he reported, urged on the government “an antiBritish policy; hatred of the English and the total elimination of all English interference in Persian affairs were the watchwords.”65 The anti-British climate, in his view, was the product of Britain’s incessant meddling in the internal affairs of Persia since the beginning of the war. This had led the Persians to think that Britain intended to gobble up their country and turn it into a colony. To restore British prestige and influence, he should “remain as strictly neutral as I can in regard to the domestic affairs.”66 “We must leave to time the task of effacing in Persian minds the memories of the last seven years,” he wrote. “During this process British officials must be content to efface themselves, to avoid local partisanship and to limit their activities to the discreet protection of direct British interests.”67 Curzon was not enamoured of Loraine’s hands-off policy, but had to resign himself to it. When he insisted that “the Persians ought to want our help and advice,” Loraine replied “they don’t want either.”68 He consoled himself with the hope that one day the Persians would be “knocking again at the door of the British Legation.”69


Only with a strong man like Reza Khan at the helm did the British feel they could safely keep out of Persia’s internal affairs. Loraine believed it was due largely to “the unexpected emergence of so vigorous a personality as Reza Khan” that Persia, in the wake of the withdrawal of British troops, did not slide into chaos, which not only would have jeopardized Britain’s commercial interests, but might have dragged her into a serious international crisis.70 In fact Reza Khan “frequently” assured the British officials that “he would do with Persian hands that which the British had wished to do with British hands—i.e. create a strong army, restore order and consolidate a strong independent Persia.” He asked them to give him time and content themselves just “with watching.”71 Moreover, the Foreign Office looked favourably upon the possibility of Reza Khan’s “attainment of supreme authority,” in the hope that he would then be able to rein in the rampant anti-British agitations by the “press, public, pulpit and Parliament,” and would relieve the beleaguered Minister at Tehran. When, during a confrontation with the Majlis in the autumn of 1922, it appeared that Reza Khan might stage a coup, George Churchill noted: “If Reza Khan’s coup d'état comes off and he abolishes the Majlis and institutes a military dictatorship, the local press will close down automatically and Sir P. Loraine’s troubles will cease. For this reason I hope that Reza Khan will succeed.”72 Finally the British came to count on Reza Khan because they had become totally disillusioned with the ruling elite in Tehran. Curzon was especially bitter and felt let down by “the incomparable, incurable and inconceivable rottenness of Persian politicians.”73 Practically no member of the ruling class in Tehran from the Shah downwards was exempt from British wrath. Ahmad Shah was seen as an inconsequential figure.74 The usual candidates for premiership could not be counted on as Britain’s allies. When at the end of January 1922 Qavam us-Saltana resigned, Curzon commented: “Anyhow it is a good thing that he has gone.”75 But a few weeks later, when it became clear that the new Prime Minister was determined to pursue a similar foreign policy, Curzon noted: “Mushir-ed-Dawleh seems as bad as any of them.”76 Now he could not see “that it makes the smallest difference who is in or out. All are equally incompetent and corrupt.”77 Loraine concurred with him. “Qavam-es-Saltaneh, Mushir-ed-Dawleh and Mostufi-ul-Mamalek,” he wrote to Curzon, “are no use to us and never will be. As you say, we must let them come and go and perform their rather stale tricks without emotion or surprise.”78 Nor could the other grandees be relied on to cooperate with Britain any longer. Some held the British Legation responsible for Sayyed Zia’s coup and thus for their own imprisonment under his rule.79 As a result, they joined the anti-British chorus after Sayyed Zia’s downfall.


“Nothing one can say will convince the Persians,” Loraine lamented, that the coup “was not a stroke of British policy.”80 The most notable example was Prince Firuz, who, as the Foreign Minister, had been one of the pillars of Curzon’s Persian policy. Now he was very bitter about his imprisonment which “he could neither forget nor forgive.”81 His rage against the British “almost amounted to mania.”82 Consequently he had been transformed into one of the leading advocates of curbing British influence in the Majlis. Curzon, in turn, was furious at his volte-face. “What a contemptible man,” he sneered.83 He wrote to Loraine: “Some day give a good smash between the eyes to that traitorous Firuz.”84 The other grandees who had formerly aligned themselves with Britain came to regard the friendship as a “dubious asset” in the wake of the withdrawal of British troops. No longer able to count on active and effective British support, they gradually “gravitated towards either a timorous neutrality or a discreet opposition” in order to protect their interests in the face of the widespread anti-British agitations.85 Loraine, in turn, came to view association with the old ruling class as “merely compromising.”86 The vast majority of the “Mulks, Saltanehs and Dawlehs,” he wrote, were “avaricious selfseekers” with “no god but mammon and no incentive but greed for money and power.” The root of many of Britain’s difficulties in Persia, in Loraine’s opinion, was the fact that, owing to her policy during and immediately after the war, she had become “associated in the popular mind with the reactionaries, who are profoundly distrusted and cordially disliked.”87 Loraine, however, could not count on the cooperation of the counterelite. Despite the strained relations between the Legation and the conservative grandees, he could hardly expect the radical nationalists readily to range themselves with the British against their rivals. The Anglo-Persian Agreement had totally estranged them from the British.88 Loraine later toyed with the idea of mending the Legation’s relations with them and briefly established contacts with their leaders, Suleiman Mirza Eskandari and Muhammad-Sadegh Tabataba’i.89 But they constituted only a small minority in the Majlis and could not therefore be regarded as very useful allies. In fact aware of their own weakness, many of them soon attached themselves to Reza Khan’s coat-tails. Adding to the Legation’s isolation was the active hostility of the clergy. They had been angered not only by the British policy in Persia, but by their policy in Turkey and Iraq. The expulsion of several prominent Persian clergy from Iraq further fuelled their opposition.90 Under these circumstances, the British saw little alternative but “watching the star of Reza Khan and, without committing ourselves to him in any positive way, slowly influencing him and preparing the


ground for a possible collaboration should he emerge as supreme topdog.”91 The Foreign Office saw him as “the only pebble on the beach.” He was “the least bad man at present prominent in the political life of Persia.”92 And Loraine noted that Reza Khan was “by no means a paragon but I would rather have him than all the rest.”93 Loraine was impressed by Reza Khan’s physique and demeanour. “He is a powerfully built, well set-up, big-boned man, well above the average height, with a quiet voice and a direct manner of speech, which is most unusual in a Persian.” Despite his humble origins and upbringing and his lack of education, Loraine noted, “he betrays no awkwardness of manner, nor self-consciousness, he had considerable natural dignity, and neither his speech nor his features reveal any absence of self control. In speaking with him I had rather the impression of an unemployed brain than of an empty one.”94 Reza Khan was not averse to rudeness and unpleasantness in his dealings with other Persians, but he posed as an amiable and reasonable man in his meetings with British officials. “He is very friendly and ready to listen and his relations with the Military Attaché are excellent,” Loraine wrote.95 Loraine also admired his “exceptional will power and singleness of purpose” which had propelled an ordinary young soldier into becoming, by his mid-forties, the most powerful man in the country—much “to the discomfiture of many of his aristocratic compatriots.” And he had proved himself as a competent leader by transforming Persia’s ramshackle armed forces into a rather efficient national Army, comparable with “some second-class European armies.”96 Though Reza Khan was “an independent character,” Loraine hoped that “the inexorable pressure of circumstances” and especially his hostility to Bolshevism would eventually drive him “into our camp.”97 While the British came to watch with satisfaction as Reza Khan continued to consolidate his power in Tehran, they remained opposed to the extension of his authority to south Persia, where they still maintained their close ties with various semi-autonomous tribal chiefs, particularly Sheikh Khaz’al and the Bakhtiari khans. Had they been confronted with a choice between Reza Khan and the southern chief in 1922, both Loraine and the Foreign Office would probably have opted for the latter. When in September it seemed that the Majlis’ criticism of his increasingly arbitrary measures might force Reza Khan to resign, the British were prepared to “let events take their course,” because they believed “the risk of increased Bolshevik propaganda” after his downfall would be to some extent compensated by the disappearance of the risk of a conflict between him and the southern chiefs.98 Support for Reza Khan’s policy of bringing the south under the direct control of the central government would involve more than the


sacrificing of old and loyal allies; it would require a major policy reassessment. Since the turn of the century, Britain had come to view south Persia as the last line of defence against Russia’s push towards the Persian Gulf and India’s frontiers. As Russia gradually brought the north under her sway and became the dominant power in Tehran, Britain sought to reinforce her influence in the south, through strengthening her relations with the local tribal chiefs. The AngloRussian Convention of 1907 virtually marked the abandonment of the buffer-state policy, in favour of creating a sphere of influence in the south. After the collapse of Curzon’s attempt to extend British influence to the north after the war, and the revival of the Russian threat, Britain once again fell back on her alliance with the southern tribes. Watching the north slipping out of British control, Curzon impressed on the Minister at Tehran: “Never release or slacken our hold on the Gulf.”99 The emergence of Reza Khan at the head of a powerful national Army, however, injected a new element into the north-south equation. His success in pacifying the north and keeping Soviet influence at bay in Tehran, held out the promise of the establishment of strong central government, capable of resisting external pressure and maintaining law and order throughout the country. With such a government at the helm in Tehran, Britain could afford to loosen her ties with the southern chiefs and return to the buffer-state policy. Yet three factors, apart from attachment to the old allies and the traditional policy, held Britain back from reconsidering her policy and siding with Reza Khan’s centralizing policy. First, the success of the central government hinged on Reza Khan’s survival. But it was far from certain that his hold on power would be durable. Besides various tribal challenges to his authority, he still had to contend with three rival centres of power— the court, the Majlis and the clergy. There were even some signs of dissent within the Army which underpinned his rule.100 As the British saw it, Reza Khan’s downfall would once again leave the north “at the mercy of Russia.”101 In these circumstances, the British were not prepared to risk alienating their allies in the south. When asked by Reza Khan in August 1922 whether it would be more convenient for Britain to deal with “one central authority rather than with a pack of grasping local chiefs,” Loraine replied it would certainly be so, “provided the central regime were durable and solid; that was not yet the case.” The British, he added, “should be foolish to throw over the arrangements which, if not altogether satisfactory, had stood the test of time and vicissitudes, in exchange for any alternative but a certainty.”102 Second, it was also far from certain that Reza Khan could easily subdue the tribes and establish order in the south. He had been fairly successful in asserting authority of the central government in the


north. But his task in the south seemed “a much harder one.”103 The southern chiefs were not apparently averse to picking up the gauntlet thrown down by the War Minister. Some Bakhtiari khans had told British officials that they were prepared to resort to force to thwart Reza Khan’s scheme.104 In fact, at the end of July, the Kuhgilu tribesmen, instigated by the Bakhtiaris, ambushed and disarmed an army detachment en route to Arabistan, the territory of Sheikh Khaz’al.105 Even if the government troops managed to get through the Bakhtiari territory, they would then have to tackle a large force of Arab tribesmen under the command of Sheikh Khaz’al,106 the chief of the largest Arab tribe in south-west Persia. Moreover, the reports reaching the Legation indicated that the Sheikh was hard at work organizing a federation of the southern chiefs to oppose Reza Khan. In addition to establishing close ties with some Bakhtiari khans and the Vali of Pushtkuh, the most powerful chief among the Lur tribes, the Sheikh was in contact with Qavam ul-Mulk, the head of the Khamseh tribal confederation, and Saulat ud-Daula, the Qashqa’i chief.107 Though Reza Khan had applied himself relentlessly to the task of expanding the central government’s armed forces, they were still insufficient to deal with the combined forces of the southern chiefs. The prospect of protracted warfare in the south alarmed the British. It would weaken Reza Khan and the central government, and would thus open up an opportunity for the Soviets to interfere in the north. It might also jeopardize British commercial interests in the south, especially the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whose protection, in the absence of effective central government control, had been entrusted to the Bakhtiaris and the Sheikh.108 Finally the British feared they might eventually be dragged into the conflict to protect not only the oil installations, but also the autonomy of Sheikh Khaz’al. On several occasions in the past (December 1902, 1903, 1908, May 1909, October 1910 and November 1914), the British government had pledged to the Sheikh the support necessary for maintaining his local autonomy “in the event of any encroachment by the Persian government.”109 Apart from the question of honouring their past undertakings, the British had to take into consideration the adverse effect of the Sheikh’s downfall on their relations with the other Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf.110 But any direct support for the Sheikh was bound to encourage him to defy the central government and antagonize Reza Khan. So the British government, for instance, turned down the Sheikh’s request for the purchase of 10,000 rifles because it would “put us hopelessly in the wrong” with the Persian government, and would fuel Reza Khan’s suspicion that the British were “deliberately encouraging the Sheikh and other southern chiefs to flout the central government with the premeditated design of partitioning Persia.”111


To avoid all this, the British decided to refrain from taking sides and “give counsels of moderation to the Bakhtiaris and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, as well as the Persian Government.”112 At his meeting with Reza Khan, Loraine repeatedly advised him against despatching troops to the south, especially to Arabistan. At the same time, he discouraged the southern chiefs from provoking a confrontation with the central government. But, as he indicated to Loraine, Reza Khan was determined to press on with his centralizing policy. He was free from any tribal allegiance. In his vision of modem Persia the tribes were a social anachronism to be swept away. He also saw them as rival centres of power and potential levers in the hands of foreign powers to bring pressure to bear on the central government. Moreover, his efforts to build up a strong national Army had for the first time set the central government free from dependence on tribal forces.113 The Army’s run of successes in the north, especially their victory over Simko, who at the head of a Kurdish tribal force, had for several years harassed the government troops and had dominated western Azerbaijan, fortified Reza Khan’s resolve.114 Nevertheless, seeking to allay British concern about the possibility of a long drawn-out military campaign in the south, he told Loraine that he would “bide his time and make preparations so complete as to ensure prompt and permanent results.”115 Faced with Reza Khan’s inexorable drive to bring the south under his direct control, Loraine found it increasingly difficult to keep sitting on the fence. It was not long before he came down on Reza Khan’s side. Despite his advocacy, in unison with the Foreign Office, of “strictly non-partisan” policy throughout 1922, he had in fact begun edging towards backing Reza Khan’s centralizing policy. “It must be borne in mind,” he noted in September, “that Tehran is the ultimate criterion of our relations with Persia, and that the cohesion of the Persian Empire as a whole is far more vitally important to British interests in the long run than the local supremacy of one of our particular protégés.” The crushing of Simko’s rebellion towards the end of August, in his view, provided a clear indication that Reza Khan’s policy of gradually bringing the whole country under the direct control of the Persian national Army had a distinct chance of success. “Indeed,” he wrote to the Foreign Office, “I regard it as not impossible that the task will be completed within the next twelve or eighteen months.” Yet he stopped short of advising the Foreign Office to abandon the sphere of influence in the south in favour of the buffer-state policy, because he still had his doubts about the stability of Reza Khan’s regime in Tehran. As he saw it, “the whole fabric” of the Army centred around Reza Khan. Therefore, “if his personality were suddenly removed it would probably collapse.” He had no qualms about cutting


adrift the “old friends” in the south, provided there was some guarantee that “the central regime remained solid and vigorous.” “But that is,” he wrote, “precisely the contingency with which it is impossible to reckon in a country like Persia; and suppose the central regime collapsed, as has happened so often in the previous history of the country, we should not find it so easy to resume our local friendship and relations.”116 By May 1923, Loraine had overcome his doubts, and was well and truly on Reza Khan’s side. “The moment for dealing one way or another with Reza Khan’s centralizing policy,” he urged the Foreign Office, “has now come and the nettle must be grasped.” He hastened to add: “I think our major interests indicate an alliance with Reza.”117 In his view, two developments rendered it necessary to adopt the new policy. First, Reza Khan had considerably strengthened his position in Tehran and had practically “effaced” the civil government. The latter might be persuaded to accept the status quo, but the War Minister had set his mind on centralizing the country and could now drag the rest of the government along with himself.118 Second, the resistance of most of the southern chiefs had begun to crumble. While brandishing his modern Army in the background, Reza Khan had successfully availed himself of the traditional device of playing on intra- and inter-tribal rivalries to undermine the authority of the southern chiefs and to prevent them unifying against the central government. The Bakhtiari khans were in the grip of one of their periodic quarrels over tribal leadership. Seizing on this opportunity, Reza Khan coopted some senior khans. He also incited disputes between the two main sections—Haftlang and Chaharlang—of the Bakhtiaris. At the same time, he had elicited pledges from the Qashqa’is and Khamseh tribes to side with the government forces against the Bakhtiaris.119 “The barrier of tribes,” Loraine wrote to London, “which covered our position in the south and south-west is as good as broken.”120 Thus the British came face to face with Reza Khan. They had to make a choice between supporting or standing up to him. To maintain the status quo in the south against Reza Khan, they had either to employ force to prop up their protégés or to try to undermine the War Minister’s position by cutting off funds to his army. The former course, Loraine thought, was not viable. “I do not suppose,” he argued, “that Parliament would countenance for a second any resort to forcible methods on our part. Nor would they be wise, unless we are going to bring Russia into the whole business again.”121 They might be able to “break” Reza Khan in the end by the “power of the purse,” but would “probably break Persia also in the process,” thwarting the one chance that had “appeared for decades of stability of Persia under Persian


control.”122 This would also add up to “playing into the hands of Russia,” who would “give anything to have him out of the way.”123 In contrast, the support for Reza Khan would “strengthen the bulwark against Russia.”124 A stable, centralized and orderly Persia would not easily be “swayed by every breath of wind from the north, whether from Petrograd or Moscow.”125 The consolidation of the central authority in Persia, Loraine stressed, “was the best guarantee that we could find against the aggressive penetration of Russian influence and power over Persia, which would constitute a real and serious threat to our important Asiatic possessions.”126 It also seemed to Loraine pointless to try to hold back what was bound to come sooner or later. Unifying Persia under the central government was the “evolution” through which “all countries pass.”127 Moreover, by supporting Reza Khan in the south, Loraine hoped to “gain influence at Tehran.”128 Although Reza Khan was “too much a patriot ever to be a subservient instrument,” he could be “a very useful friend.”129 To side with Reza Khan would of course entail “lapse of our local friendships.”130 This did not worry Loraine, as he now expected the central government “to become stronger rather than weaker.” Even if the central authority weakened or collapsed, he now argued, the southern chiefs would have little choice but to gravitate “automatically” towards Britain which would be the only serious power left in the area.131 And the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Loraine believed, could do away with their arrangements with the local chiefs, as Reza Khan had repeatedly pledged himself to take over the responsibility for the protection of the oilfields.132 There remained, however, the thorny question of Britain’s undertakings to protect Sheikh Khazal’s local autonomy. How to reconcile honouring this commitment with support for Reza Khan, Loraine privately admitted, “beat him.”133 He nevertheless sought to persuade the Foreign Office that the timely support might enable the British “to control Reza Khan to some extent and perhaps tie him down to definite assurances as regards the Sheikh’s position.”134 Curzon and his officials were not convinced by Loraine’s elaborate arguments for a change of policy. Curzon usually looked favourably upon Loraine’s reports, as the Minister was one of his very few “favourites.”135 But Loraine’s numerous despatches, from May to October 1923, urging clear-cut support for Reza Khan hardly made a dent in Curzon’s reluctance to abandon the south, where he still hoped to maintain Britain’s ascendancy in alliance with local tribal chiefs against the central government, which he still considered hostile to the British. He sneered: “Sir P.Loraine sees nothing but Reza Khan.”136 He had told Loraine not to commit himself to Reza Khan because he did not “like the story of all his doings in the South and he is quite capable of talking sweet and acting sour.”137


Curzon did not accept Loraine’s view that Reza Khan’s actions, while designed in the Persian interest, were also “on the whole favourable to us.”138 He, for instance, was creating a national Army “in order to smash our supposed or actual friends.”139 His centralizing policy was perhaps “quite right” from the Persian point of view, but ran counter to important British interests in the south. “Reza Khan seems bent upon pursuing the policy,” he wrote to Loraine, “which I have consistently deprecated and which he ought by now to know must meet with the disapproval of His Majesty’s Government.”140 George Churchill, who was in charge of the Persian desk, was at least equally opposed to Reza Khan’s centralizing policy. He saw “no necessity whatever for an alternative policy.” He wanted Loraine to carry on mediating “between Reza Khan and our protégés.” At the same time, the British government should continue to support the Bakhtiari khans, who were “a very important factor for the preservation of the Oil Company’s interests,” by “financial means through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,” and to honour the obligations to Sheikh Khaz’al, “even though such support may eventually lead to the despatch of a gunboat to Muhammerah.” “In the last resort,” he suggested, “if Reza Khan cannot be made to see the folly of his present course, it is possible for us to exert pressure upon him by withholding financial assistance without which he will be utterly incapable of maintaining his army.” Curzon fully approved his recommendations.141 The Foreign Office’s attitude had at least partly been influenced by the reports from the consular officials in the south.142 Recruited from the Indian Political Service, they were disposed to view Britain’s presence in south Persia as an extension of the British Raj. As they saw it, the southern chiefs, like the semi-independent Indian princes, constituted support for British influence. To them, Reza Khan thus represented a menace. His policy of subjugating the tribal chiefs was little short of “anti-British.” Besides British interests, their own careers were bound up with maintaining their clients in power. They considered themselves much better qualified than the Legation to gauge the situation and direct British policy in the south. They therefore resented any intrusion by the Minister into their domain. With the south under the direct control of the central government, they would be reduced to mere agents of the Legation. Britain’s reaction to Reza Khan’s centralizing policy had thus been enmeshed with competing perspectives and interests of the Legation and the southern officials. In Loraine’s view, these officials assumed Reza Khan’s motives were anti-British because they were blinkered by the attachment to their clients and narrow local considerations, and thus failed to see the wider issues affecting British interests in the country.143 The Legation, he argued, was better placed to assess the


situation and advise the Foreign Office. “The situations in South Persia and the North,” he wrote to the head of the Eastern Department, “are admittedly different, and that makes it all the more necessary to have a coordinating centre of policy.” This centre could “obviously only be the Legation,” because it “gets much more reliable information about the South than the South gets about the North.”144 While Loraine was still trying to win over the Foreign Office, Reza Khan suddenly ordered an Army detachment to move, through Bakhtiari territory, towards Arabistan in mid-September. Loraine was surprised by Reza Khan’s move. When Loraine had met him a few days earlier, “he was very friendly and seemed to have nothing on his mind.”145 The Bakhtiaris were now unlikely to attempt to obstruct the government forces. Riddled with intra-tribal quarrels, they were in disarray. Moreover, Loraine had already impressed upon them that the Legation would frown upon any action on their part against the central government. So most of the senior khans saw little choice but to come to terms with Reza Khan.146 But Sheikh Khaz’al seemed prepared to put up a strong resistance, and expected the British government, in accordance with its undertaking, to back him up. Loraine stood uneasily between Reza Kahn and the Sheikh, and had to act as a mediator, on London’s instructions. He managed to patch up a precarious settlement between the two sides and took the heat out of the situation—temporarily. Reza Khan agreed to hold back his troops from advancing into the territory under the Sheikh’s direct control, and to give a written assurance to respect his interests. In return, the Sheikh undertook to pay his tax arrears and to refrain from making common cause with other tribes against Reza Khan. Loraine optimistically described the settlement as “the corner-stone of the future relations in Arabistan.”147 But the head of the Eastern Department, for one, doubted whether the “good relations” between Reza Khan and the Sheikh would last long.148 The “visits” by two British gunboats to Muhammerah, the seat of the Sheikh’s rule, had strengthened Loraine’s position in the negotiations with Reza Khan. On the other hand, Reza Khan decided to stay his hand, because large numbers of his troops were tied up in a fierce fight against the Lur tribes of western Persia, the only remaining barrier between the government forces and northern Arabistan. However, some troops were stationed on the eastern borders of the Sheikh’s territory, and a government official was appointed to supervise the revenue collection in Arabistan. Reza Khan had thus driven the thin end of the central government control into the area, and soon began chipping away at the Sheikh’s authority.

166

CHAPTER EIGHT Reza Khan’s Rise to Supreme Power

While the British were closely involved in Reza Khan’s centralizing policy, they practically stood aside as he steadily increased his grasp over the government in the capital. As noted earlier, they were not able to influence effectively the course of events there. Nor were they willing to commit themselves definitely to any personality or group as long as the political situation remained in a state of flux. Yet both the Foreign Office and the Legation watched with satisfaction as Reza Khan continued to climb up the political ladder and obviously did not wish to see him toppled. However the power struggle in Tehran soon became inextricably entwined with the conflict in south Persia. To secure his position in Tehran, Reza Khan had to bring the south firmly under his control. Consequently, the Foreign Office was confronted with the choice between Reza Khan and the southern chiefs, especially Sheikh Khaz’al. After Curzon’s disappearance from the scene, early in 1924, the Foreign Office gradually, though tortuously, came down in favour of Reza Khan’s centralizing policy.1 Towards the end of October 1923, Reza Khan forced the Shah to appoint him Prime Minister. Loraine’s role in the affair did not go much beyond acting as a “reluctant intermediary.”2 (A few weeks earlier, when a group of Reza Khan’s supporters sounded out the Legation about his premiership, Loraine was non-committal, abiding “absolutely by my principle of having no relations with any political party and of taking no hand in the making or breaking of cabinet.”3) The twenty-seven-year-old Shah had grown thoroughly frightened by the rapid increase in his War Minister’s power, recognizing that he intended to become the “Persian Kemal.” Reza Khan, he told Loraine, had “started abusing him and Vali Ahd quite openly and saying he could chain both brothers when it suited him.”4 He therefore wanted to leave for Europe to be “out of the way and secure from any attempt against his life and liberty.” “The Shah has not the slightest intention of putting up any fight for his throne or his dynasty,” Loraine wrote to London.5 Curzon replied that he would view the end of the Qajar dynasty “with perfect composure.” He nevertheless prescribed “a douche of cold


water” on the Shah’s idea of flight.6 Loraine tried, but failed, to stiffen his nerve.7 The Shah, he observed, “is an utterly useless young man.”8 The Shah eventually appealed to Loraine to get guarantees from Reza Khan for his safe departure from the country. In return, he acceded to Reza Khan’s demand to become Prime Minister.9 One Foreign Office official noted that Reza Khan could “hardly do worse than his predecessors and may do a good deal better.” However, it did not seem that he was “aiming at an immediate overthrow of the Kajar dynasty.”10 For Reza Khan premiership was in fact merely a stepping-stone; he had set his sights higher. Just three months later, he launched a nation-wide campaign for the establishment of a republic. Military commanders in Tehran and the provinces set about organizing demonstrations and rallies demanding the deposition of the Qajars. Loraine was uneasy about the campaign for two reasons. First, he maintained Persia was not “ripe for a republican regime,” and thus feared it could be destabilizing. Second, he initially suspected that the Russians were fanning the agitations and that “they would acquiesce in the presidency of the present Prime Minister but would get rid of him as soon as they could afterwards.” He therefore wanted to advise Reza Khan against pursuing this scheme. But the Foreign Office, wary of getting entangled in the internal power struggle, forbade him: it was entirely for the Persians to decide their form of government. Moreover, the Shah had “proved a failure and his disappearance from the scene would be no loss.”11 The pro-republic agitations were not, however, totally inspired by Reza Khan. The idea was genuinely popular with some sections of the population, especially a large part of the intelligentsia. They regarded the Qajar dynasty as an obstacle to social and economic reforms. But the campaign soon ran into an unexpectedly stiff opposition, led by the clergy. They did not wish to see a further increase in Reza Khan’s power, who, they believed, was intent on imposing Western values on the country.12 Moreover the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey in early March led them to equate republicanism with secularism.13 The clergy were joined by some liberal intellectuals who saw republicanism as a device to subvert the constitution and set up an outright military dictatorship.14 Even some Army officers, out of loyalty to the Shah or personal dislike for Reza Khan, opposed the idea.15 The majority in the Majlis supported Reza Khan. But a vocal minority, led by a cleric, Sayyed Hassan Mudarres, filibustered the debate on the abolition of the monarchy. The heated arguments in the Majlis led to clashes on the streets. A large crowd, organized by the clergy and the bazaar merchants, roamed the streets shouting “Down with the Republic.” They cowed the smaller republican

REZA KHAN’S RISE TO SUPREME POWER 169

demonstrations. Sensing that the situation was getting out of hand, Reza Khan backed down and abandoned the campaign.16 Reza Khan’s prestige and authority was badly shaken by this setback.17 “He is no longer able, like Persian mountain torrents, to sweep away obstacles,” the Military Attaché observed.18 By July 1924 it appeared to the British that his influence was steadily waning and that the power struggle in Tehran would “end in the triumph of the forces of reaction,” unless Reza Khan resorted to a coup.19 Buoyed up with their success, the opponents of Reza Khan had indeed set about cutting him down to size, or even possibly removing him from power altogether.20 Led by Mudarres, “a conceited and narrow-minded bigot,”21 according to the Legation, they intensified their criticism of Reza Khan and held up the passage of the Army’s budget in the Majlis; reinforced their ties with the Crown Prince in Tehran; established contacts with the Shah in Europe, hoping to persuade him to return to Persia to serve as a rallying point for the opposition; and put out feelers to the southern chief, especially Sheikh Khaz’al, who seemed capable of neutralizing Reza Khan’s army.22 The Sheikh, in turn, made covert overtures to the Court and the opposition in the Majlis.23 He saw in the developments in Tehran an opportunity to strike back at Reza Khan. Convinced that Reza Khan was bent on subjugating him, along with other tribal chiefs, the Sheikh could not feel safe so long as the Prime Minister remained in power.24 He expressed concern to British officials about interference in his affairs by the local military commander and other minor government officials in the area, in violation of the settlement worked out by Loraine. He was also “extremely uneasy” about the “gradual crumbling of the barrier between himself and the armed forces of the Persian Government.” The troops under the fearsome Commander of the Western Army, who had put to death several Lur chiefs, were trying to force a passage through mountainous Luristan to lowland Arabistan. The Sheikh feared that they would then be easily able to overrun his territory, reducing him to a “mere cypher.” He could no longer “defer definite action” to defend himself.25 Towards the end of August the Sheikh started mobilizing his tribal force and resumed contacts with the Lur and Bakhtiari khans, with a view to organizing a united southern front against the Army. He invited the Shah to Muhammerah to head a rival government in the south. Hoping to deal the final blow to Reza Khan’s apparently faltering authority, he openly challenged him in early September. He sent telegrams to the Majlis, the foreign legations and the clergy in Tehran, denouncing Reza Khan as an enemy of Islam, the Shah, and the constitution. He was “up in arms” and seemed “determined to overthrow Reza Khan or perish in the attempt.”26


The Consul at Ahwaz, E.G.Peel, who handled Britain’s relations with the Sheikh and the Bakhtiaris, eagerly grasped at the Sheikh’s defiant mood as an opportunity to have the “anti-British” Reza Khan removed from power. “Centralizing policy of Reza Khan,” he wrote to the Foreign Office, “appears definitely to have failed.” The Bakhtiaris were ranging themselves “solidly on the side of the Sheikh.” In addition to several thousand Bakhtiaris, the Sheikh could “mobilise 25,000 Arabs.” This force would be more than a match for Reza Khan’s army in the south. So if the British government strictly adhered to the policy of neutrality and left him alone, Peel wrote, the Sheikh was “confident” that he could “compel the resignation of Reza Khan and protect British lives and property.”27 The local managers of the AngloPersian Oil Company in the south, fearful of a protracted military confrontation in the vicinity of the oil installations, also wished to see Reza Khan toppled. They thought a “bloodless victory for the Sheikh of Mohammerah” was “the only sure means of protecting the company’s interests, which can alone be effected by the resignation of Reza Khan.”28 And the Consul-General at Bushire, on the advice of a local grandee, noted that the Legation could precipitate Reza Khan’s downfall simply by conveying the impression that the British government was more sympathetic to the Sheikh than Reza Khan. “If this is done,” he wrote, “the Prime Minister’s majority in the Majlis will become a minority.” The Shah could then return to Persia to take over the reins of power.29 Esmond Ovey, the Chargé d’Affaires, who had assumed Loraine’s mantle in his absence, was infuriated by the anti-Reza Khan chorus from the south. The consuls had overstepped their jurisdiction. “I am appalled,” he wrote to the Foreign Office, “at the liberty with which the consul-general at Bushire openly suggests that His Majesty’s Government should lend themselves to the plot to overthrow the Prime Minister and recall the Shah.”30 Any attempt at destabilizing the cabinet would unravel the Legation’s efforts to win over Reza Khan and would cut across London’s objective to see a stable Persia. Moreover, the consuls, like the Sheikh, misread the situation in Tehran. The Sheikh had no genuine grievance and simply wanted to bring the matters to a head to take advantage of the “supposed temporary weakness of Reza Khan’s position at Tehran.” But by September Reza Khan had recovered from the set-back caused by collapse of the republican campaign. Far from resigning, Ovey noted, Reza Khan enjoyed the confidence of the majority in the Majlis and was, with widespread public support, making preparations for military operations against the Sheikh. He could mass a force of 40, 000 men and was “completely confident of his powers to defeat the Sheikh even with the Bakhtiaris.”


In Ovey’s view, the Sheikh, by rebelling against the Prime Minister, had forfeited his right to invoke British pledges to protect his local autonomy, as they were conditional on his loyalty to the central government. In case of his submission to the central government, the Legation could dissuade Reza Khan, who had otherwise no intention of “brow beating the Sheikh,” from sending his troops to Arabistan. Any policy which did not bring the Sheikh to submit to the central government, Ovey concluded, would lead to war and would consequently endanger the oil installations. Having failed to persuade the Consul at Ahwaz to desist from encouraging the Sheikh’s “warlike attitude,” Ovey asked the Foreign Secretary either to order the consul to cooperate with the Legation or to remove him from his post.31 The Foreign Office sided with the Legation rather than the Consul at Ahwaz, though he was regarded as an “admirable official.”32 It was not for the Consul “to anticipate the political situation in the capital— 700 miles away—of which Mr. Ovey alone can judge.”33 From Ovey’s recent reports of Reza Khan’s skilful manoeuvres, besides the attempts at cowing the opposition, to restore his authority, it appeared to London that he was “too big a personality to be as easily shifted from the saddle as previous Prime Ministers.”34 The Consul could not entice London to support the Sheikh by portraying him as the winning side. Even if the Consul’s estimate of the Sheikh’s relative strength was correct and he could defeat the Army in the south, Britain would lose whatever influence she had in the north by favouring him.35 Nor could the Foreign Office stand aside and let the two sides slug it out. In fact the Sheikh’s rebellion ran counter to London’s two main objectives in Persia. One of these was to “prevent a disastrous outbreak of civil war in the neighbourhood of the oilfields.”36 The security of supplies from the Persian oilfields was of “vital importance” to Britain’s strategic planning east of Suez.37 There was no guarantee that Reza Khan’s downfall would prevent hostilities between the central government and the Sheikh. The representative of the Oil Company at Tehran had indeed reported: “There is a likelihood that even if Reza Khan were eliminated, the administration of the army will continue the present policy regarding the Sheikh of Mohammerah, which is backed by public opinion.”38 The second and more important objective was to see “a strong man at the helm at Tehran,”39 in order to establish order in the country and thus keep the “Bolshevik menace” at bay. Loraine’s numerous despatches praising Reza Khan had finally convinced London that, not only was he the man who could play the part, but also his centralizing policy served Britain’s basic objective in Persia. Moreover, Reza Khan was the legal Prime Minister, while the Sheikh was only a local magnate who wanted to increase his power “at the expense of the Central Government of his country.” Therefore the


Foreign Office did not wish to “take any action which might prejudice the continuance in his office of the Persian Prime Minister.” If any one was “to be forced to give way it should be the Sheikh.”40 Ramsay MacDonald, who was at that time both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, ordered the Consul at Ahwaz to “speak with one voice” with the Legation and discourage the Sheikh’s rebellious attitude.41 The Foreign Office’s position had clearly shifted in favour of the central government. This was at least partly due to the change of personalities. MacDonald did not share Curzon’s fixation with south Persia and the Persian Gulf as part of India’s penumbra. Victor Mallet, who replaced Churchill at the Persian desk, was one official who had, during Curzon’s reign, supported Reza Khan’s centralizing policy.42 He had repeatedly argued that Reza Khan’s policies generally coincided with Britain’s interests. For instance, shortly after Reza Khan became Prime Minister he observed: Our essential interests in Persia demand a stable and strong central government able to resist Russian penetration and the spread of communist propaganda, to keep order on the trade routes, in the oil fields districts and in the provinces on the Baluchi and Afghan frontiers, and to check the anti-British activities of both priesthood and press. It is towards such conditions that Reza Khan appears to be aiming.43 Yet the Foreign Office did not wish to see Reza Khan subjugate the Sheikh, and continued to waver between them for two main reasons. First, the Sheikh would be entitled to call upon Britain to protect his local autonomy as soon as he agreed to stop taking aggressive measures against the central government. Failure to honour this “definite” commitment would cause “a serious loss of British prestige” among the other Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf.44 Second, London thought it would be “disastrous” if the central government established so complete a control over Arabistan as to eclipse the Sheikh’s local autonomy, because it would place the oil installations “at the mercy of a Persian Government which might at any time become hostile to us at the instigation of the Bolsheviks.” Under the prevailing regime the Sheikh and the Bakhtiaris had safeguarded the British interests in the oil areas “even when the Persian Government has been definitively anti-British.” This was the case during the First World War, Mallet noted, “when, in spite of a pro-German Government at Tehran, our agreement with the local chieftains in south Persia enabled us to keep the oifields working and supplying the British Navy with oil.”45 So Ovey was instructed to restrain Reza Khan as well.46


Ovey warned Reza Khan against rushing into a civil war, stating that the Sheikh had mustered a formidable force and that hostilities could lead to British intervention to protect the oil installations. Reza Khan replied that he would not take any military action against the Sheikh, provided the British made him apologize and submit to the central government. Perhaps he preferred to avoid the onerous cost of a military expedition and to undercut the Sheikh’s authority gradually in his usual devious manner. (Loraine had already observed that Reza Khan could sooner or later “bust up the Sheikh by intriguing among the Arab tribes, among whom Khazal has many enemies, without moving a single man into his territory.”)47 Yet he did not wait idly for the Chargé d’Affaires’ good offices. Two factors compelled him to embark at once on making arrangements for a military operation against the Sheikh. In the first place, he suspected Britain’s motives, thinking that the Charge d’Affaires was seeking to frighten him into action while the Sheikh had not yet completed his preparations against the government forces. Faced with British “deception,” he felt justified in outwitting them. He agreed to stay his hand temporarily, only because he himself needed more time to prepare for the military expedition. As several weeks passed without any sign of the Sheikh’s submission, he became almost convinced that the British were out to deceive him. He therefore saw little choice but to resort to at least a show of force to subdue the Sheikh. Second, the Sheikh’s rebellion had emboldened the opposition in Tehran, threatening to unravel his efforts to restore his authority in the aftermath of the collapse of the republican campaign. He sensed that even his majority in the Majlis was beginning to disintegrate because of his apparent passivity. To secure his position in Tehran, he had to quell the rebellion in the south. He called a closed session of the Majlis and told the deputies that he would shortly rid the country of the Sheikh and his adherents.48 Ovey was well aware of Reza Khan’s suspicions and his difficulties with the opposition. Before despatching reinforcements to the south in mid-October, Reza Khan sent his Foreign Minister, Mushar ul-Mulk, who was on very friendly terms with the Legation, to meet the Chargé d’Affaires. The Foreign Minister, Ovey reported, “spent three hours to ascertain whether or not we were supporting the Sheikh. Had we any secret designs to bring pressure to bear on Persia? Was there anything that Persia could do for us?” So long as the Sheikh had not declared his submission, Ovey doubted whether his assurances that Britain was not backing the rebellion would allay Reza Khan’s and Mushar ulMulk’s suspicions. “They are both trying to believe me,” he complained, “but it becomes daily increasingly difficult.”49 Ovey did not object to the despatch of reinforcements to the south, fearing that


his protest would further stoke Reza Khan’s suspicions and that Reza Khan’s inaction would weaken his position in Tehran. The Foreign Office also decided to soft-pedal any efforts to restrain Reza Khan, as the Soviets were trying to exploit his suspicions. The Soviets, Ovey reported, were posing as “his only friends.”50 The Soviet press, the British envoy at Moscow reported, continually accused Britain of actively backing the Sheikh’s rebellion in order to destroy “the national progressive forces of Persia.”51 Reza Khan had in turn started flirting with the Soviet Legation once again.52 Despite his distrust of the Soviets, Ovey observed, he might be driven “more closely into their arms.”53 The reports, Mallet noted, showed “how important a bearing on our future relations with Persia the outcome of the quarrel of Reza Khan with the Sheikh of Mohammerah will have. The Bolsheviks hope that they may be able to persuade Reza Khan that we have helped the Sheikh in his intrigue.”54 In short, the British faced a dilemma. They did not wish to weaken Reza Khan’s position vis-à-vis his “reactionary” opponents in Tehran, or to drive him into Soviet arms. Nor did they wish to see Reza Khan bring the Sheikh to heel. The Foreign Office once again turned to Loraine to mediate between Reza Khan and the Sheikh. He was supposed to have “great personal prestige in Persia” and to carry clout with the two protagonists. It appeared that he might be able to bring off a settlement by holding a meeting with them.55 So Loraine grudgingly cut short his honeymoon and set out for Persia.56 Ovey had difficulty persuading Reza Khan to attend a meeting with the Sheikh and Loraine. He maintained “such action would not only ruin his prestige, but might provoke trouble in the capital,” since it would be tantamount to acceptance of British interference in the internal affairs of Persia. He eventually agreed to meet them at Bushire, on the Persian Gulf, in mid-November, provided that his visit to that town was disguised as for a purpose other than the meeting, and that the Sheikh sent a submissive telegram before-hand. Unless the Sheikh did so, he told Ovey, he was “absolutely determined on war.”57 But the Sheikh resisted sending the telegram demanded by Reza Khan, despite agreeing, under pressure from the Consul at Ahwaz, to disband his force.58 So when, in early November, Reza Khan left Tehran to journey southward, the Foreign Office was not certain whether he intended to speed up the military operation or to go to Bushire to confer with the Sheikh and Loraine.59 Just before his departure, he told Ovey that British mediation had broken down and that he should be given a free hand to “defeat the Sheikh, which he was confident he could do.” He, however, acceded to Ovey’s request to halt his troop movements toward Arabistan for a week and give Loraine “a chance of bringing the Sheikh to reason.”60 But he soon broke his “promise.”61 A few days


later on his arrival in Isfahan, he told the British Consul at the city that his troops had to continue to advance towards Arabistan because of climatic conditions, but went on to add that he would pull back the Army as soon as Loraine succeeded in making the Sheikh give his submission.62 He in fact suspected that the British intended to delay his troop movements until the passes in the area were closed by snow. In his own account of the expedition, Reza Khan contends that he had set out to march on Arabistan at the head of the Army in order to overthrow the Sheikh and thereby disarm his supporters in the Court, the Majlis and the press.63 He understandably denies any knowlege of the peace conference at Bushire.64 There is little doubt that he wanted to bring the Sheikh to heel. Yet it would be plausible to argue that he had not decided how to achieve his objective on his departure from Tehran. A resort to force entailed the risk of British intervention. A piecemeal approach, through a combination of show of force and negotiations, was bound to arouse suspicion in Tehran. Whatever his intentions, it soon became practically impossible for Reza Khan to attend the meeting at Bushire. The news of the forthcoming meeting was leaked out by Reuters in Tehran in midNovember. It immediately caused an outcry in the Majlis against foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the country. Even some members of the pro-Reza Khan faction joined the minority in attacking the Prime Minister and the cabinet for allowing such interference. “It is considered probable,” the representative for the Oil Company at Tehran reported, “that if Reza Khan proceeds with the Bushire conference he will fall.”65 Grilled by the Majlis, the members of the cabinet, who were apparently in the dark about the Bushire Conference, sent a telegram to Reza Khan, advising him against any mediation by the British and demanding to know how he intended to deal with the Sheikh. Reza Khan publicly repudiated the news of the Bushire Conference. Shortly afterwards he issued a statement declaring that he was about to march on Muhammerah.66 The anti-British outcry in Tehran coincided with Loraine’s arrival in Muhammerah. He soon induced the Sheikh, who was in conciliatory mood because of a revolt against him by one of the major Arab tribes,67 to send a submissive telegram to Reza Khan. Loraine then demanded that Reza Khan carry out his side of the bargain: to withdraw his troops and to attend the Bushire Conference.68 When he learned that Reza Khan had gone back on his promises he became angry and suspicious. He began to suspect that Reza Khan might “be using our intervention with the Sheikh to get complete military hold in Arabistan for which he would otherwise have had to fight.”69 Through the Consul at Shiraz where Reza Khan had now arrived, Loraine sent him a “stiff personal note,” repeating his demands. After a lengthy—and, according to Reza Khan,70 acrimonious—interview,


the Consul reported that he had “failed to change the Prime Minister’s decision regarding Bushire.” Reza Khan explained that he had to abandon the projected meeting at Bushire because of the opposition in Tehran, but promised to arrest the advance of his troops.71 Yet it was shortly after this meeting with the Consul that Reza Khan issued his public statement declaring that he would soon place himself at the head of the Army and march into Arabistan.72 To Loraine, this “bellicose” statement left “no way of escaping the conclusion that Sardar Sepah [Reza Khan’s title] had chosen war rather than peace and friendly mediation.”73 He could no longer trust Reza Khan’s private assurances, as the latter had “broken every pledge.”74 He was almost convinced that Reza Khan had “secured our help in bringing the Sheikh to heel under false pretences.”75 It now seemed to him that nothing short of the threat of military intervention on the part of Britain could deter Reza Khan. And this threat would have to be backed up by the visible presence of force in the area, since Reza Khan was adept at the game of bluff. As Loraine had earlier observed, Reza Khan does not understand any barrier to his own activity unless they are made perfectly plain to him and until he has tested their solidity…. He measures the importance of things by what he sees himself, and a general warning of displeasure, even that of His Majesty’s Government, would need to be followed by some visible effect to carry real weight with him. He has a pretty shrewd notion of the strength of the other man’s hand, and will always call it rather than risk being bluffed.76 He therefore suggested that, in addition to several gunboats, two battalions at once be despatched from India to be put on standby across the border at Basra.77 For the Foreign Office it was “difficult to judge how far Reza Khan’s actions are directed by a desire to throw dust in the eyes of his nationalists at Tehran or how far he really is breaking faith with us.”78 However, almost all the officials were disposed to give him the benefit of the doubt: he was surely an “uncertain customer to deal with,” but the intrigues at Tehran probably accounted “considerably for Reza Khan’s vagaries.” Therefore his public statements should not be “taken too literally by Sir P. Loraine.”79 The new Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, concurred: “If Reza Khan is not wholly insincere, for heaven’s sake, let us save his face and so save him from his own opposition.”80 In any case, Chamberlain thought it would be “gravely embarrassing” for him to embroil British troops in south Persia, while a crisis was already brewing in Egypt in the wake of the assassination


of the British Commander of the Egyptian Army. “We must avoid if we can too many crises at one time,” he noted. He expected Loraine to see “this question in perspective.”81 He wrote to Loraine: “I cannot emphasize too strongly the reluctance with which His Majesty’s Government would embark upon any military intervention in Arabistan.” In view of the situation in Egypt, he added, “we must go to the utmost lengths and even take some risks in order to avoid complications in south Persia at the present moment.”82 All this, though, did not mean that the Foreign Office had decided to abandon the Sheikh and allow the central government to establish its authority in the south-west. The Foreign Office opposed the despatch of troops from India, but asked the Admiralty to send two warships to Basra, in the hope that their arrival would “probably do much to impress Reza Khan.”83 And the Legation at Tehran was instructed to deliver two notes to the Foreign Minister, warning that the British government would take necessary measures to fulfil its obligations to the Sheikh and protect British lives and property in the oil area.84 At the same time, Loraine sent his Oriental Secretary, Godfrey Havard, to make another “vigorous representation” to Reza Khan.85 Havard was to impress on Reza Khan that Britain was determined to protect their subjects and vital interests in the south and to see that the Sheikh, having submitted, receive a fair deal.86 In fact, the Oriental Secretary found Reza Khan in a fairly conciliatory mood. Notwithstanding the truculent tone of his public statements, Reza Khan was, according to one of his close aides, growing anxious that the British might join the plot to dislodge him from power and recall the Shah.87 Moreover, he was concerned about the outcome of the operations against the Lur tribesmen, who had for a long time tied down large sections of the Army north of the Sheikh’s territory. The victory in Luristan, which was crucial to the success of the operation in Arabistan, still seemed far from certain.88 Therefore Reza Khan could not ignore the British representations. At the same time, he could not afford to lose sight of the opposition in Tehran. In addition, the Soviet Legation had made a strong representation against yielding to British pressures,89 even threatening, by one account, to break off relations with Persia, should Reza Khan attend the meeting at Bushire.90 Therefore, he was anxious to avoid being accused of having been warned off by the British from going to Arabistan and subduing the Sheikh. He had to walk a tightrope, and his response to Havard reflected his delicate balancing act. He was ready to meet Loraine and the Sheikh, but separately, and not in Bushire, but in either Ahwaz or Muhammerah, both within the Sheikh’s territory. Loraine’s arrival in either town should not be made public beforehand. And the Sheikh must send a more fulsome apology for his rebellious actions — “for Tehran consumption.”91


Loraine still thought the situation would remain “critical” until he conferred with Reza Khan. Now he wanted the Foreign Office to sanction the immediate despatch of one battalion to Basra “in order to strengthen my hand in the forthcoming negotiations.” “My difficulty hitherto,” he wrote to Chamberlain at the end of November, “has been to get any pressure to bear on the Prime Minister.” He assured Chamberlain that he would do his best to avoid the troops’ actual intervention in Arabistan.92 But the Foreign Office once again turned down his request for troops, arguing that the arrival of the warships in Basra would “create the required impression on the mind of Reza Khan.”93 Just a few days later, however, London’s attitude suddenly changed. The Foreign Office officials began to contemplate not only the despatch of troops to Basra, but their actual intervention in Persia. On 2 December 1924 the Consul at Ahwaz reported that Persian troops had finally broken through Luristan and were pouring into Dezful, on the northern border of the Sheikh’s territory. As a result the Sheikh was on the verge of a nervous breakdown.94 The following day Loraine reported that Reza Khan, having “taken full advantage of our desire to avoid complications,” was now in command of the situation. As his forces were converging on Arabistan from the east and south as well as the north, he was in a position to occupy Muhammerah or force the Sheikh to accept dictated terms. “I fear,” Loraine added, “it would be extremely difficult now to obtain terms favourable enough to make it worth the Sheikh’s while to remain in Arabistan.”95 The possibility of the Sheikh’s flight set off alarm bells in the Foreign Office. The downfall of the Sheikh, a loyal protégé of Britain, would “be most damaging to our reputation all over the Middle East.” In particular the other Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf would feel that Britain was “equally prepared to leave them also to the mercy of the Persian invading Army.” Apart from upsetting the whole Britishdominated system in the Persian Gulf,96 the establishment of the central government’s authority in the south-west would put an end to Britain’s de facto control over the oil areas.97 The Navy’s supply of fuel would therefore be “at the mercy of” the Persian government. Unless Reza Khan suddenly showed himself “more reasonable” than could be anticipated, these undesirable consequences could hardly be “obviated without recourse to the threat of using force.” But it was “no use to employ threats,” unless Britain was “prepared to carry them out if necessary.”98 The Foreign Office officials were unanimous in urging that an immediate request be made to the India Office for a battalion to be held in India, ready to embark at short notice.”99 Chamberlain authorized the request to go forward.100 The India Office responded


positively.101 It only remained to seek Loraine’s views, as he had not repeated his request for troops in his latest telegram. “The decision as to the fulfilment of our pledges,” one official urged on December 5, “will have to be examined and adopted unless we have better news from Sir P.Loraine within 48 hours or so.”102 Meanwhile, a note of caution crept into the Foreign Office’s bellicose mood. On December 3, the Legation at Tehran reported that the Soviets had offered to send troops “to protect Persia.”103 And according to the reports from Moscow, the Soviet press had been “full of rumours regarding threats of British military intervention in Persia.”104 The Soviets, Mallet noted, “are making the most of our difficulties in Arabistan.”105 In case of Britain’s military intervention, he observed, Russia would “throw in the whole of her weight on the side of Reza Khan, and might quite possibly avail herself of the excuse of our landing of troops in the south to send a Red Army into Azerbaijan or Gilan.”106 This caution was reflected in the telegram sent to Loraine: We may ultimately be forced to take steps in fulfilment of our pledges to the Sheikh to bring Reza Khan to reason; bearing in mind our strong disinclination for a military expedition to Arabistan, can you suggest other methods of bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon the Persian Government?107 The Foreign Office deferred any definite decision until it had heard from Loraine. Loraine, in turn, postponed his reply until he had met Reza Khan himself.108 He had, however, changed his mind about how to deal with Reza Khan. Far from employing the threat of force, he now wanted to placate him. As a first step, he ordered the two warships anchored at Abadan to sail out of Persian territorial waters, in order to avoid “any appearance of naval demonstration.”109 This change of tack had been prompted by various factors. First, in the face of Reza Khan’s overwhelming military superiority, in Loraine’s view, the Sheikh’s fortunes could only be retrieved by Britain’s intervention. But the Foreign Office had vetoed his repeated requests for troops. And the latest telegram from London, despite reiterating the desire to prop up the Sheikh against Reza Khan, gave no indication that the Foreign Office was in fact seriously considering the use of force. So Loraine did not wish to court another rebuff by renewing his request for troops, in order to implement what was, after all, the Foreign Office’s, not his, policy.110 Second, Britain’s discomfiture in the south was, in his view, Russia’s opportunity in the north. The Soviets, he observed, were grasping eagerly at the Arabistan question as the best opportunity to bring about a breach between Britain and Persia. A serious crisis in Arabistan, he also


feared, might even involve Britain in “international complications of a graver kind with Russia.”111 Third, as the latest reports from Tehran showed, Reza Khan’s position in the Majlis was still far from secure.112 Loraine had no wish to weaken Reza Khan further vis-a-vis the anglophobe “extremists.” Fourth, he saw in friendly negotiations with Reza Khan an opportunity to elicit a charter protecting at least the Sheikh’s properties and some of his other privileges, and thus enabling Britain to rescind her troublesome commitments to the latter.113 Finally, since Reza Khan had now definitely gained the upper hand in the south, Loraine was inclined to accommodate, rather than antagonize, the winning side, as he had done in Tehran three years earlier.114 All this in effect meant that Britain had little choice but to acquiesce in Reza Khan’s centralizing policy, even though there were some “undesirable consequences.” This was precisely what Loraine had been pressing the Foreign Office to do for the past 18 months. Reza Khan’s apparently conciliatory attitude facilitated Loraine’s task and helped him induce London to swallow the bitter pill. Reza Khan was now confident of being in command of the south. On hearing the news of the success of the Army in Luristan, he crowed: “I have turned the table on Sheikh Khaz’al and his allies.” While a few months earlier they had set out to put him under siege, Reza Khan noted, his Army now surrounded the Sheikh. The latter had either to flee across the border or to submit to him.115 The Sheikh’s territory was indeed his for the taking. Yet he stayed his hand, because he was still concerned about Britain’s reaction. In fact, on December 4, a telegram from the Foreign Minister advised him against sending the Army into Ahwaz and Muhammerah, noting that the Soviet press spoke of Britain’s readiness to land troops in Arabistan if the central government took any military action against the Sheikh.116 So Reza Khan was in a cautious mood when he met Loraine in Ahwaz on December 6 and 7. At first he sensed a whiff of threat in the air. After expressing Britain’s interest in the maintenance of the Sheikh’s authority in Arabistan, Loraine told him: “I had been within an ace of informing His Majesty’s Government that the time had come to implement their assurances to the Sheikh. I have refrained from doing so in the almost forlorn hope that a way might even yet be found to solve the difficulties without resort to force.” In reply, Reza Khan assured the Minister that he “did not intend substantially to alter the Sheikh’s position and privileges.” But he had to take certain “temporary measures” to assert the supremacy of the central government in Arabistan, in order to disarm his critics in Tehran. However, in the spring the troops would be withdrawn and the governership of the province would be handed back to the Sheikh.


This was what Loraine wanted to hear. He needed Reza Khan’s conciliatory gesture in order to sell his policy to the Foreign Office. His mood changed. He was now anxious to please Reza Khan. He assured him that the British government wanted “to see a united, stable and friendly Persia.” “But I went further than that,” he reported to London. I wished all the friends of England in South Persia to be the friends of Tehran, to stand by and help the government; I wished the government, who had many anxieties, to feel that the south was safe, loyal and helpful, so that, should danger arise from other quarters, the south could be relied on. Reza Khan, as Loraine noticed, “was evidently not expecting a statement of this sort, and it quite took him aback.”117 “In making this statement,” he wrote to Chamberlain, “I went somewhat beyond the specific instructions which you had given me, but in view of the extent to which Serdar Sepah had shown his willingness to adapt his policy to suit our interests I felt that my language would meet with your approval.” His statement, Loraine admitted, amounted to “making Serdar Sepah and his Government a present of our friends in the south.” This would free Reza Khan’s hands to deal with any Soviet threat. To keep Soviet and Bolshevik influence out of the north, Britain had to forsake her ties with the southern chiefs. In effect, Persia would serve as a buffer state. This policy, Loraine noted, “will make not only Persia’s position, but also our own far stronger than hitherto, and will give us the best guarantee obtainable in present circumstances against any attempt by Russia at absorption or aggression.”118 The Foreign Office concurred: “A stabilized and unified Persia is our best buffer against Bolshevik penetration towards India and the Gulf.”119 The Foreign Office accepted Loraine’s argument that Britain, short of going to war with Persia, could not hold on to her sphere of influence in the south. There was a sense of relief in London at Loraine’s defusing a potentially explosive crisis. Therefore, far from rebuking Loraine for exceeding his instructions, the Foreign Office was “filled with admiration” for “his masterly handling of the Arabistan crisis.”120 The adoption of the buffer-state policy meant that the British would ultimately stand by and let Reza Khan deal with the Sheikh as he pleased. The Sheikh was now regarded as “an anomaly, also an anachronism.” His fate must be “made subsidiary to the main consideration,” that is, the revival of a unified and stable Persia as a bulwark against the Soviet threat to India and the Persian Gulf.121


Just two weeks after his meeting with Loraine, Reza Khan set about occupying the Sheikh’s territory. “There is every indication,” the Consul at Ahwaz reported, “that this occupation is intended to be permanent.”122 On receiving the news, the Foreign Office’s reaction was simply to find “a new arrangement relieving us of our obligations” to the Sheikh “as soon as possible and before a fresh crisis supervenes.”123 Loraine merely proposed a policy of “watchful inaction,” namely to wait and see whether Reza Khan would fulfil his promise in the spring.124 Britain had just got out of “this Arabistan business in time,” he wrote to the head of the Eastern Department, and must avoid being drawn into it again by insisting on restoration of the Sheikh’s former authority. Moreover, the Oil Company was fully satisfied with the new regime in the province under the Army. This was “the best criterion” by which to judge the situation in Arabistan.125 In the spring, instead of pulling out the Army and restoring the Sheikh’s authority, Reza Khan, undoubtedly encouraged by Britain’s “watchful inaction,” had him detained and removed to Tehran where he was put under house arrest for the rest of his life. The British accepted it as a fait accompli without a murmur of protest.126 The Sheikh’s downfall was of course a blow to British prestige in the Middle East,127 and entailed the loss of Britain’s indirect control over a strategically important territory at the head of the Persian Gulf and over Persia’s oil areas. Yet the British were relieved to be rid of the imbroglio which had presented the Soviets with “wonderful opportunites for fishing in troubled waters,”128 and which had soured their relations with Reza Khan. Moreover, they drew comfort from the fact that the end of the Arabistan question considerably strengthened Reza Khan’s position in Tehran, as their policy in Persia was now totally bound up with his remaining in power. The Sheikh’s downfall threw the opposition into disarray. Reza Khan further paved his way to supreme power through a series of political manoeuvres. He placated the clergy by going through the motions of consulting them, making a show of piety and paying lip service to the Islamic precepts in his public statements. “He is of course anything but pro-clerical,” Loraine observed, “and the probability is that he is humouring the clergy until he has ascended the throne and feels himself in a strong position to disregard them.”129 These tactics paid off. The senior ulema in Iraq raised no objection to the change of dynasty whatsoever. Shortly after the Majlis voted for the deposition of the Qajars, the leading mujtahids of Tehran made their obeisance to Reza Khan as the provisional head of the state.130 Some clergy even actively supported his accession to the throne.131 Reza Khan reinforced his ties with the traditional ruling elite by inviting several influential grandees to join his cabinet.132 He also


played on the fear of Bolshevism and of “Persian extremists,” to ensure himself a solid majority in the Majlis.133 As Loraine observed: The underlying ground on which the parties of the Right are giving their support to Reza Khan, for whom they have no special personal or political affection, and are finding him a stable majority in the Majlis, is the conviction that he is the statesman best fitted and in the best position to protect and save this country from Bolshevisation and the insidious processes of the Moscow revolutionaries.134 At the same time, Reza Khan could count on the support of the “Socialist” deputies who regarded him as a modernizer. Failing to coopt his opponents, he was of course prepared to try to cow them into silence. He was not averse to having his outspoken critics beaten up, imprisoned or even assassinated. So when at the end of October 1925 the Majlis decided on the deposition of the Qajar dynasty, only a few brave and staunch liberals voted against Reza Khan.135 Reza Khan had kept the Legation in the dark about his plan to replace Ahmad Shah, though the British officials had noticed some indications that he perhaps intended to “bring the issue with the Shah and the dynasty to a head.” As late as mid-October, Loraine reported that he had no clear knowledge of the “intentions of Reza Khan, who keeps his own counsel.”136 At one point, Loraine even advocated the Shah’s return to the country. “Poor as is my opinion of the Shah,” he argued, his presence would contribute to the “normalization of the internal situation.” “Would you,” he asked Chamberlain, “object to my expressing privately to Vali Ahd the opinion that the Shah would be most unwise to reject the invitation to return if made by the government and the Majlis?”137 The Foreign Office did object, for the following reasons. Firstly, the Shah’s return would not ease the situation, as he “would certainly intrigue against Reza Khan.” Secondly, Loraine’s action would inevitably leak out and would thus sour Britain’s relations with Reza Khan. Finally, it would not only drag Britain into the political infighting in Tehran, but also commit her to protect the Shah. The Foreign Office felt the Shah had done “nothing to earn him the gratitude or support of HMG.”138 Just ten days before the vote in the Majlis, the Foreign Minister met Loraine to inform him that Reza Khan wanted “to get rid of the Kajars.” As Reza Khan was “obsessed with the idea that in all Persian crises British influence had been felt and prevailed,” the Foreign Minister told Loraine, he feared that the British might oppose his action against the Qajars. Loraine replied that Reza Khan “was fighting shadows,” and that Britain had no desire to take sides in any constitutional struggle. A few days later Loraine met Reza Khan


personally to assure him that “His Majesty’s Government were determined to leave Persia absolutely free to settle her internal affairs.”139 Nevertheless, both Loraine and the Foreign Office were uneasy about Reza Khan’s plan. They feared it might cause a prolonged political crisis, destabilizing the country. They wished he would content himself with wielding virtual supreme power without insisting on assuming the title of head of state. “There is considerable risk in Reza Khan’s move to supplant the Kajars,” Mallet complained, “and it is not easy to see why he finds the present position impossible.”140 But Reza Khan was determined to overthrow the Qajar dynasty. He suspected, not without reason, that the Shah and the Court were plotting against him.141 He also despised the “feckless” Qajars, regarding them as responsible for the ruin of the country.142 He wanted to establish a “benevolent dictatorship,” which, he believed, suited the Persians best at that time. “Only a strong leader,” he noted, “could save the country.”143 Moreover, as already noted, he had well prepared the ground for his accession to the throne. Much to the relief of the British, the change of dynasty passed off smoothly. The new regime was, however, greeted “without much enthusiasm” in the country.144 Apart from the widespread, though unfounded, suspicion that the British were behind Reza Khan’s rise to supreme power, this was largely due to the fact that the people saw the new dynasty for what it was—a military dictatorship. True, there were those who were willing to connive at, or even support, such a regime. For instance, the majority of the clergy were disillusioned with the Consitutional Movement with its emphasis on the Western concept of liberty. And a large section of the intel-ligentsia, who had earlier been the main advocates of a constitutional government, were growing impatient with the slow and arduous process of reform through a Majlis dominated by conservative politicians. They were now prepared to sacrifice political freedoms for fast modernization from above. Yet there was already widespread resentment at Reza Khan’s and his army’s high-handed actions. Reza Khan, the Military Attaché reported, was “regarded almost with hatred in the country owing chiefly to the abuses of his Amir Lashkars [military commanders].”145 Many relished the order established by the Army, but felt they had paid too a high a price for it. “Thanks to Reza Khan, the country is secure,” an old grandee confided to his diary, “but nobody feels secure on account of the excesses committed by the military.”146 While the Majlis was debating the change of dynasty, a group of bazaar merchants, having been turned down by the Soviet Legation, requested British officials to allow them to stage a sit-in on the grounds of the Legation in protest against the “new absolutist


government and dictatorship.”147 They were told the Legation would not receive them. The British were well aware that Reza Khan’s government was “actually a dictatorship,” despite its efforts to maintain a facade of legality.148 This did not trouble them. In fact, the Foreign Office had long since come to rely on Reza Khan’s strong-arm tactics to check the Majlis, the press, the clergy and the “extremists.”149 The Majlis particularly was a thorn in their flesh. When in June 1921, after a sixyear hiatus, the fourth Majlis was inaugurated, George Churchill, who was then at the Persian desk, grumbled that the Majlis would make it “infinitely more difficult” to govern the country and posed a threat to the power of the British advisers.150 At one point, he even hoped Reza Khan would “abolish” the Majlis altogether.151 The new Foreign Secretary was unlikely to bring about any change in the Foreign Office’s attitude. Chamberlain was not generally unsympathetic to the dictators if they were efficient and friendly. Justifying his admiration for Mussolini, for instance, he remarked: “If I ever had to choose in my country between anarchy and dictatorship, I expect I should be on the side of the dictator.”152 Loraine at first had some reservations about Reza Khan’s “scheme of military domination,” even advising him that “any attempt to interfere in the normal working and development of the constitutional system in Persia would be a serious mistake.”153 But the Foreign Office soon let him know that it was not concerned about Reza Khan riding roughshod over the Majlis and the press, as his unconstitutional actions could in fact curb the anti-British agitations.154 Two other factors also led Loraine to set aside his misgivings about Reza Khan’s “autocratic steam-roller-like methods.”155 First, Reza Khan continually held out the promise of closer relations with Britain if and when he managed completely to subdue the Majlis. He even told Loraine that one of the main reasons for his blatant interference in the elections was to secure the election of a subservient Majlis which would go along with his policy of improving Anglo-Persian relations.156 Loraine was inclined to believe that Reza Khan was genuinely desirous of “an orientation of Persian policy, in Persia’s own interest, towards Great Britain.” So, with Reza Khan’s rise to the supreme power, Loraine hoped, “the bars to the inception of the policy in which he believes would be removed.”157 Second, a strong antiBolshevik government at the helm at Tehran, regardless of its other features, was essential to the buffer-state policy advocated by Loraine since mid-1923. When a leader of the opposition, Mudarres, appealed in desperation to Loraine to urge on Reza Khan “the desirability of less arbitrary actions,” he offered him little comfort. Loraine sympathized with his view, but went on to state: “The fact must not be


lost sight of that only a strong government would prevent injurious agitations and noxious propaganda.”158 In Loraine’s view, a strong government would be able to establish order; order was a prerequisite of expansion of trade and economic progress; economic prosperity would lead to stability; and a stable Persia could serve as buffer state. Reza Khan had proved himself capable of maintaining “a rough-and-ready order in the country.”159 Now by encouraging Persia’s economic development and trying to find a solution to her financial problems, Britain “should be rendering her and ourselves the best possible service and forge the most potent weapon against Russian penetration.” “A programme of this sort, impossible three years ago,” Loraine noted in early 1925, “is possible now because the Prime Minister had created the basis of internal security.” In short, Loraine wanted Britain to help “build up a stable Persia bound to us by ties of common interest in whatever interval remains before the resurrection of Russian power.”160 Other policies, Loraine argued, had been tried and they had failed. Britain must avoid being “drawn into a duel with Russia over the body of a semi-derelict Persia,” of the kind which had occurred before 1907. A weak Persia was not a viable buffer state. She was easily swayed by Russia; Britain had difficulty matching Russian influence in Tehran. Then came the system of agreement with Russia after 1907, which “gave the worst possible results of all so far as our position in Persia was concerned.” It undermined British prestige and influence and drove Persia into the embrace of Germany. Moreover, as Russia did not abide by the terms of the agreement, the Persian affairs continued to be “a constant source of embarrassment and anxiety to His Majesty’s Government, and, when the war broke out in 1914, matters had very nearly reached the point of a serious breach with Russia in regard to Persia.” Finally, Curzon’s policy after the war, whatever its merits, “broke down,” as a consequence of the change of circumstances. The Anglo-Persian Agreement, however, reinforced Persia’s suspicion of Britain’s motives and led her to seek “to introduce and establish American interests in this country as a counterpoise to those of Great Britain and Russia.” In contrast, the new policy was unlikely to antagonize Persia or to draw Britain into a serious crisis with Russia over Persia.161 The Foreign Office agreed with Loraine that the creation of a stable buffer state under Reza Khan was the best way of warding off the Soviet threat.162 London had already begun to detect some signs of the “renewed concentration of Soviet efforts on the East, following upon failure in the West.”163 For example, each of the five newly-created republics in Soviet Central Asia was inhabited by the “tribes racially allied to the inhabitants of the adjacent Persian and Afghan districts.” This was seen as a plan “to keep the frontiers elastic with the object of


establishing Soviet influence and promoting agitation among the Persian and Afghan border tribes, so as to secure penetration of Persia and Afghanistan by Soviet agents, gradual undermining and, if possible, disruption of central authority, and thereby ultimate access to India.”164 Also, the intercepted communication of the Comintern showed that the Persian communists were being urged to step up their revolutionary agitations.165 No sooner had London settled on the new policy than Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, at a meeting with the British Envoy at Moscow, came up with an offer of a new Anglo-Russian Agreement, as part of a “general arrangement” to reduce tension between the two countries, to regulate their relations in Asia, where “difficulty continually arose.” He specifically mentioned Persia and China. It was to be “a kind of 1907 agreement expressed in another form.” Each side would in fact recognize certain areas as the other’s sphere of influence, but without formally identifying them as such. “For example,” Chicherin explained, “the Soviet Government might say that in exchange for the absence of British representation on the Caspian, Great Britain would be given a free hand in Mohammerah.”166 The Narkomindel appears to have been considering the division of Persia into spheres of influence at least since July 1923. According to Soviet documents in British hands, Moscow hoped “Russian control of the northern sphere of influence would expedite the complete downfall of British influence throughout Persia.” The demise of British influence would in turn strengthen the Soviet position in Persia considerably.167 British intrigue, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires at Tehran reported, was “a serious obstacle here at every step” in establishing closer relations with the Persian government.168 The British representatives in north Persia, the Soviet Vice-Consul at Enzeli reported, continued to “fight against us by every possible means,” in spite of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement.169 Moreover, the British presence in north Persia was seen as a threat to the security of the Soviet Union. Britain’s “vigorous” intrigues and agitations in the Middle East, in Moscow’s eyes, were also aimed at destabilizing Soviet rule in the Caucasus and Central Asia.170 In a conversation with the German Minister at Tehran, Count Schulenberg, Chicherin expressed concern that “Persia was going to fall pretty completely into the hands of Great Britain.” He harked back to “the ever-recurrent Russian apprehension…of the position of Russia in the Caucasus and England coming through Persia and threatening it.”171 To the Soviets, the prolonged unrest among Persia’s Turcoman tribes—ironically suspected by the British to be the work of Soviet agents—appeared to have been instigated by the British officials in Khurassan, with the aim of causing anarchy in the area


adjoining Soviet Turkestan in order to facilitate contraband supplies to the anti-Soviet “Basmachi” movement in Central Asia.172 However, as Chicherin indicated, Moscow’s objective was wider than establishing a cordon sanitaire in north Persia and China. A new settlement in Asia, like the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, was hoped to lead to an understanding in Europe, where Moscow feared the new Conservative government in London was engaged in creating an anti-Soviet bloc. The proposed Locarno Pact was seen as a proof of Britain’s intention to isolate the Soviet Union.173 The British government’s response to Chicherin’s proposal was far from enthusiastic. And Loraine strongly advised the Foreign Office to ignore the proposal.174 The circumstance that had propelled Britain into signing the Convention of 1907 no longer existed. Now neither the Asian nor the European interests of Britain demanded an understanding with Soviet Russia. Moreover, there was vociferous opposition within the cabinet to any agreement with the Soviets. In 1907 Tehran and the rest of north Persia was, the British government feared, practically in the grip of the Russians. The Foreign Office, wary of their southward expansion, was only too glad to reach an agreement restricting the Russians to the north.175 Now, Britain was not “unduly alarmed” by the “Russians’ intrigues which seem on the whole to have been hitherto clumsy and unsuccessful.” Try as they might, the Russians had not succeeded in regaining their pre-war influence in Persia.176 The Persian government was not enamoured of the new regime in Russia and felt strong enough to keep the Russians at arm’s length.177 Nor had the Persian communists made much headway. Persia’s Chief of Police assured the British officials that “there was no widespread Communist organisation among the Persians.”178 “All the evidence,” a Foreign Office official noted with satisfaction, “points to the complete failure of the Russian policy and cumulative success of our own.”179 Chicherin’s proposal, in Loraine’s view, was in fact an indication of Soviet Russia’s weakness and “the first sign of nervousness” as regards her position in Persia. In contrast, Britain was under no “pressure of circumstances” to come to an agreement with Russia. “We can therefore not only afford to ignore a proposal from which we should probably stand to lose as much as the Russians hope to gain,” he wrote to the Foreign Office, “but may even permit ourselves to regard it as a tribute, albeit an unwitting one, to the soundness of our policy.”180 Besides, Moscow’s recognition of Britain’s “free hand in Mohammerah,” as Chicherin put it, was of little value. Now Persia had a fairly efficient central government bent on maintaining effective control over all the outlying provinces. As the Arabistan crisis amply demonstrated, Britain could regain a free hand in south-west Persia


only through direct military intervention. Apart from an aversion to such an open-ended commitment, Chamberlain did not wish to be arraigned before the League of Nations “on any ground on which we cannot defend ourselves.”181 Nor was the Foreign Office gravely alarmed by the Soviet activities in other parts of Asia. The intercepted communications between Moscow and Kabul, for instance, showed that the Soviets had little hope of matching British influence in Afghanistan.182 Even in China, where the communists continued to gain strength, it appeared Soviet agents would eventually compromise their work because Bolshevism was “repugnant to the thought and feeling” of the people.183 Therefore Russia could hardly avail herself of the traditional Asian lever to bring pressure to bear on Britain. In Europe, too, circumstances did not really necessitate an agreement with Russia. In 1907 concern over the German threat drove Britain to seek an understanding with Russia. Now the Foreign Office saw a close link with Germany as essential to the security of Western Europe.184 Chamberlain was in fact concerned about containing a strong Russia which he expected to re-emerge in the near future.185 The Foreign Office, nevertheless, did not rule out a settlement with Russia, thinking that it might contribute to the security of Europe and the stability of the Middle and the Far East. Yet the Foreign Office felt it could “afford to wait upon events,” and by so doing, could eventually exact better terms from the Russians who were growing anxious about being isolated.186 But the longer the Foreign Office waited, the more vocal grew the ministries who advocated a breach with the Soviet Union.187 After the General Strike of 1926 they gained the upper hand in the cabinet, and in 1927 they forced a rupture with Moscow. So Persia remained a buffer state under Reza Shah until 1941, when the German threat once again brought Britain and Russia together.

190

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. This historical background draws on the following studies: D.R.Gillard, The Struggle for Asia, 1828–1914 (London, 1977); R.L.Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 1884–1892 (London, 1959); E.Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828–1834 (Oxford, 1979); E.Ingram, In Defence of British India (London, 1984); F.Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914 (Yale, 1968); D. McLean, Britain and Her Buffer State (London, 1979); M.E.Yapp, Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798–1850 (London, 1980). 2. For a brief discussion of buffer state policy and spheres of influence as crisis-prevention strategies, see P.G.Lauren, “Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth Century Diplomacy”, in A.L.George, ed., Managing US— Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colorado 1983). 3. Greaves, p.28. 4. It should be noted that oil was not a major factor influencing Curzon’s policy of extending British influence to north Persia, far from the oilfields. See J.Danwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East (London, 1981), pp.260–61. 5. G.Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1892), Vol. II, p. 620. 6. For the minutes of the Committee, see Curzon Papers, F1 12/271. 7. War Cabinet, 303rd Meeting, 20 Dec. 1917. Curzon Papers, F1 12/141. 8. “The Present Situation in Russia and the Near East”, Memo by H.Wilson, 7 March 1918, L/PS/10/734/1270. 9. War Cabinet 363rd Meeting, 11 March 1918; War Cabinet, 369th Meeting, 21 March 1918, Curzon Papers, F1 12/142. 10. “Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet”, Memo by Curzon, 13 March 1918, Curzon Papers, F1 12/274. 11. R.F.Mackay, Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (Oxford, 1985), pp.320–21. 12. War Cabinet, 363rd Meeting, 11 March 1918, Curzon Papers, F112/142. 13. War Cabinet, 366th Meeting, 18 Mar. 1918, ibid.


14. R.Warman, “The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the Making of Foreign Policy, 1916–1918”, Historical Journal, 15 (1972), p.153. 15. Eastern Committee, 24th Meeting, 13 Aug. 1918 CAB 27/25. 16. H.Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase (London, 1934), pp.32–35; Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, 1917–1918 (London, 1956), pp.316–22. 17. S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets (London, 1970), Vol. 1, pp.271–72. 18. Nicolson, p.33; D.S. Waley, Edwin Montagu (London, 1964), pp. 163–64. 19. Eastern Committee, 18th Meeting, 4 July 1918, CAB 27/24. 20. Memo by Cecil, 20 July, 1918, EC978, ibid. 21. Memo by Curzon, 1 Aug. 1918, EC1008, ibid. 22. Memo by Wilson, 15 July 1918, EC 809, ibid. 23. Memo by Montagu, 5 July 1918, EC718, ibid. 24. Memo by Cecil, 20 July 1918, EC978, ibid. 25. Note by Balfour, 27 July 1918, ibid. 26. Eastern Committee, 24th Meeting, 13 Aug. 1918, ibid. 27. Nicolson, p.120. 28. P.King, Curzon’s Persia (London, 1986), p.10. 29. Curzon, 1892, Vol. I, p.3. 30. Ibid. 31. Curzon to Balfour, 31 March 1901, quoted in S.Gopal, British Policy in India, 1858–1905 (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1984), p.224. 32. G.Curzon, “The True Imperialism”, Nineteeth Century, 63 (1908), p.157. 33. Ibid. 34. Nicolson, p. 1 35. Curzon’s letter dated 19 October 1904, quoted in Gopal, p.225; see also Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon (London, 1928), Vol. 2, p. 418. 36. Quoted in K.Rose, Superior Person (London, 1969), p.197. 37. A.P.Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism (London, 1965), p.7. 38. See note 31. 39. See note 29. 40. For a useful discussion of the importance of decision-makers’ fundamental beliefs in shaping their policies, see A.L.George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decison-Making”, International Studies Quarterly, 13 (1969), pp.190–222; A.L.George, Presidential Decison making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colorado, 1980) pp. 45–46. Michael Brecher uses the term “attitudinal prism” to describe a similar, though somewhat broader, concept. See M.Brecher et al, “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13 (1969), pp.75–94. 41. Eastern Committee, 45th Meeting, 19 Dec. 1918, CAB 27/24. 42. A.P.Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies (London, 1959), p. 178. 43. For a connection between reform and imperial expansion, see ibid., pp. 68–69.

NOTES 193

44. “Anglo-Persian Relations after the signature of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, 1919”, Memo by Curzon, 9 Aug. 1919, DBFP, Is, IV, No. 710. 45. Curzon to Loraine, 30 May 1922, Loraine Papers, FO1011/49. 46. See note 36. 47. The Sunday Sun, 5 Jan. 1892, quoted in Ronaldshay, Vol. I, p.156. 48. A.P.Thornton, Imperialism in the Twentieth Century (London, 1978), p. 73. 49. Eastern Committee, 48th Meeting, 30 Dec. 1918, CAB 27/24. 50. Darwin, pp.14–23. 51. F.Stanwood, War, Revolution and British Imperialism in Central Asia (London, 1983), pp.47–48, 119–120; W.Stiver s, Suprem acy and Oil (Cornell, 1 982), 42. 52. J.S.Galbraith, “British War Aims in World War 1: A Commentary on ‘Statesmanship’”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 13 (1984), pp.25–26. 53. Darwin, p.161. 54. W.J.Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations During World War I (London, 1984), p.124. 55. Balfour to Cox, 24 Oct. 1918, Appendix to 36th Minutes of Eastern Committee, CAB 27/24. 56. For a novel discussion of how the participants in these two meetings conducted their arguments, see R.Axelrod, “Decision for Neoimperialism: The Deliberations of the British Eastern Committee in 1918” in R.Axelrod (ed.), The Structure of Decision (Princeton, 1976). 57. Eastern Committee, 45th Meeting, 19 Dec. 1918, CAB 27/24. 58. Eastern Committee, 48th Meeting, 30 Dec. 1918, ibid. 59. Montagu to Curzon, 6 Jan. 1918, Curzon Papers, F112/253. 60. Nicolson, pp.133–34. 61. Curzon to Lady Curzon, 17 August 1919, quoted in Ronaldshay, Vol. III, p.217.

CHAPTER ONE 1. Eastern Committee, 48th Meeting, 30 Dec. 1918, CAB 27/24. 2. Cecil to Balfour, 8 Jan. 1918, quoted in B.C.Busch, Madras to Lausanne (N.Y., 1976), p.55. 3. Eastern Committee, 10th Meeting, 28 May 1918, CAB 27/24. 4. Eastern Committee, 15th Meeting, 21 June 1918, ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Olson, p.245. 7. Curzon to Cox, 17 May 1919, L/PS/10/736/2777. 8. Cox to Sarem ud-Daula, 9 Aug. 1919, in Cox to Curzon, 20 Aug. 1919, L/ PS/10/ 872/6141. 9. C.Issawi, The Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914 (Chicago, 1971), p. 370.


10. “External Debt of Persia,” Note by McLean, in Cox to Curzon, 3 Dec. 1919, L/PS/ 10/872. The figure for 1919 includes the suspended Russian loans. 11. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 29 March 1903, quoted in D. McLean, “Finance and ‘lnformal Empire’ before the First World War,” Economic History Review, 29 (1976), p.297. 12. Kazemzadeh, 1968, pp.324–31; H.Feis, Europe: The World’s Banker, 1870–1914 (N.Y., 1930), pp.363–64. 13. Hardinge to Lansdowne (1903), quoted in D.C.M.Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy (London, 1968), p. 230. 14. G.Jones, Banking and Empire in Iran, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1986), p.88. 15. Ibid., Ch. 1. 16. McLean, 1979, p.60. 17. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 18 July 1903, quoted in Mclean, 1976, pp.297– 98. 18. Memo by Grey, 23 Feb. 1906, quoted in Mclean, 1979, p.143. 19. Kazemzadeh, 1968, pp.537–39, 549–61. 20. Ibid., p.553. 21. McLean, 1979, pp. 96–100; Feis, pp. 373–74. 22. Kazemzadeh, 1968, ch. 9. For Shuster’s account of this crucial episode of Persian history, see M.Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (N.Y., 1912). For a good recent study, see R.McDaniel, The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution (Minneapolis, 1974). 23. Feis, p.376. 24. Marling to Grey, 12, 21 Oct. 1915, L/PS/10/872/7698, L/PS/10/550/4968. See also Olson, pp.57–60. 25. Buchanan (Petrograd) to Grey, 2 Jan. 1916, L/PS/10/550/94. 26. Marling to FO, 18 May 1916, L/PS/10/550/2196, 4966. 27. Cox to FO, 13 Sept. 1919, L/PS/10/550/4968, 5717. 28. J.M.Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia (London, 1922), p.154. 29. R.W.Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1982) pp.359–60. 30. “Note by MacLean” in Cox to Curzon, 3 Dec. 1919, L/PS/10/872. 10 krans=1 toman. 31. Persia Committee, Meeting on 10 Nov. 1917, Curzon Papers, F1 12/271. 32. Ferrier, pp.360–61. 33. Greenway’s Memorandum to Board, 7 Nov. 1917, quoted in ibid., p.360. 34. Ibid., pp.366–67. 35. APOC to FO, 14 April 1921, FO371/6413/4503. The Company requested the Foreign Office to suppress the publication of McLintock’s report in Tehran. 36. Minute by Oliphant, 15 April 1921, ibid. 37. Greenway to Inchcape, 9 Nov. 1917, quoted in Ferrier, p.361. 38. Balfour to Marling, 13 Dec. 1917, L/PS/10/557/4988. 39. Balfour to Marling, 3 Jan. 1918, L/PS/10/557/47. 40. Marling to Balfour, 9 Jan. 1918, L/PS/10/557/197. 41. Marling to Balfour, 21 Dec. 1917, L/PS/10/557/47.

NOTES 195

42. Eastern Committee, 9th Meeting, 21 May 1918, CAB 27/24; Balfour to Marling, 22 May 1918, L/PS/10/550/3405. 43. Marling to Balfour, 22 Aug. 1918, ibid. 44. “Note by Monteath”, IO, 9 Sept. 1919, L/PS/10/550/4968. 45. Cox to Curzon, 10 April 1919, L/PS/10/736/2000. 46. IDCE, 18th Meeting, 7 May 1919, Curzon Papers, F1 12/275. 47. Viceroy to Montagu, 28 Jan 1919, L/PS/10/736/2000. 48. Minute by Shuckburgh (IO), 1 May 1919; Treasury to FO, 21 April 1919, L/PS/10/ 736/2307, 2329. 49. Curzon to Cox, 9 May 1919, L/PS/10/736/2542. 50. The Agreement and the Loan Contract are printed in Cmd. 300. 51. Norman to Curzon, 26 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 492. 52. M.Bastani-Parizi, Struggle for Liberty: Political Biography of Mushir udDaula (in Persian) (Tehran, 1969), pp.264–65. 53. M.Hedayat (Mukhber us-Saltana), Memoirs and Hazards (in Persian) (3rd reprint, Tehran, 1982), p.311. 54. Norman to Curzon, 21 July 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 516. 55. Norman to Curzon, 11 Aug. 1920, ibid., No. 539. 56. Balfour, p.156. 57. Norman to Curzon, 17 Sept. 1920, L/PS/10/910/6894. 58. Norman to Curzon, 28 Oct. 1920, L/PS/10/910/7940. 59. Treasury to FO, 21 April 1919, L/PS/10/736/2329. 60. IO to FO, 3 May 1919, L/PS/10/736/2329; Curzon to Cox, 17 Sept. 1919, L/PS/10/ 872. 61. FO to Treasury, 28 Aug. 1919, L/PS/10/872. 62. Curzon to Cox, 17 Sept. 1919, L/PS/10/872. 63. Cox to Curzon, 10 Oct. 1919, L/PS/10/6350. 64. FO to Treasury, 21 Oct. 1919, L/PS/10/872. 65. Treasury to FO, 4 Nov. 1919, L/PS/10/872/7086. 66. IO to FO, 26 Nov. 1919, ibid. 67. FO to IO, 1 April 1920; Minute by Financial Secretary to IO, 4 April 1920, L/PS/10/ 872/2569. 68. Cox to Curzon, 15 May 1920, L/PS/10/872/3890. 69. Cox to Curzon, 18 May 1920, L/PS/10/872/8474. The economic crisis in Britain and the adoption of a deflationary policy in early 1920 also accounts for the Treasury’s opposition. 70. Curzon to Cox, 4 May 1920, L/PS/10/872/3890. 71. IDCE, 38th Meeting, 17 May 1920, Curzon Papers, F112/275. 72. 10 to FO, 11 June 1920, FO371/3873/203277 (also L/PS/10/872/4564). 73. Treasury to FO, 26 June 1920, FO371/3874/206172 (also L/PS/10/872/ 5553). 74. Norman to Curzon, 23 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 484. 75. Norman to Curzon, 26 June 1920, ibid., No. 492. 76. Minute by Hardinge, 30 June 1920, FO371/3874/206172. 77. Curzon to Bonar Law, 30 June 1920, Bonar Law Papers, 99/2/16. 78. Curzon to Bonar Law, 1 July 1920, Bonar Law Papers, 99/3/2. 79. See Chs. 2 and 3. 80. Treasury to FO, 24 July 1920, FO371/4912/2182.


81. Minute by Hirtzel on FO to IO, 10 July, 1920, L/PS/10/872/5379; IO to FO, 21 July 1920, FO371/4912/1932. 82. Curzon to Norman, 1 July 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 497. 83. Norman to Curzon, 23 Oct. 1920, L/PS/10/910/7866. 84. Norman to Curzon, 27 July 1920, FO371/4923/2454. 85. Memo by MacLean, 5 May 1921, L/PS/10/920/2294. 86. “Note by MacLean on the External Debt of Persia” in Cox to Curzon, 3 Dec. 1919, L/PS/10/872; Cox to Curzon, 14 May 1919, L/PS/10/736/2592. This increase, however, was not large enough to offset the loss of revenue from the northern customs completely. 87. “Liability of Persia”, Memo by Shuckburgh in IO to FO, 30 Nov. 1920, L/ PS/10/ 920/5924. 88. The Foreign Office had informed the India Office there was no mention of interest in the original agreement. FO to IO, 28 Nov. 1919, FO 371/ 3865/151733. 89. See note 87, also FO/371/4923/12694. 90. Norman to Curzon, 26 Aug. 1920, L/PS/10/910/6436. 91. See Ch. 3. 92. Jones, p.191. 93. Norman to Curzon, 17 Sept. 1920, L/PS/10/910/6894. 94. Norman to Curzon, 9 Oct. 1920, FO371/4906/8380. 95. Curzon to Norman, 10, 13 Sept. 1920, L/PS.10/910/6954. 96. See Ch. 2. 97. Norman to Curzon, 27 Oct. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 570. 98. Norman to Curzon, 28 Oct. 1920, FO371/4906/9884. 99. Norman to Curzon, 3 Nov. 1920, FO371/4906/10290. 100. Curzon to Norman, 5 Nov. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol XIII, No. 576. 101. Minute by Oliphant, 4 Nov. 1920, FO371/4906/10290. 102. Norman to Curzon, 25 Oct. 1920; FO to APOC, 28 Oct. 1920; Minute by G. Churchill, 29 Oct. 1920; APOC to FO, 4 Nov. 1920, FO371/4906/9574, 10449. 103. Norman to Curzon, 2 Dec. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 594. 104. Curzon to Norman, 11 Nov. 1920; “Memorandum on Various Renewals of Prior Lien of the Imperial Bank of Persia”, by G. Churchill, 28 Jan. 1921, L/PS/10/910/ 8236, 1026. 105. Minute by Ovey, 4 Dec. 1920; Curzon to Norman, FO371/4907/12838. 106. Curzon to Norman, 18 Nov. 1920, L/PS/10/910/8313. 107. Norman to Curzon, 7 Dec. 1920, L/PS/10/910/8895. 108. Norman to Curzon, 17 Aug. 1921, FO371/6415/9492. 109. See Ch. 2. 110. He had served in Persia for many years in various capacities, including as an employee of the Imperial Bank, the British representative on the Mixed Financial Commission, and as the honorary commercial attaché. On his return to London in 1920, he advised the Foreign Office on financial matters. 111. “Memorandum by MacLean”, 5 May 1921, L/PS/10/920/2294. 112. Memo by G.Churchill, 29 July 1921, FO371/6415/8788. 113. Minute by Curzon, 30 July 1921, ibid.

NOTES 197

114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144.

Eastern Committee, 48th Meeting, 30 Dec. 1918, CAB 27/24. Norman to Curzon, 21 Sept. 1921, L/PS/10/920/4260. Treasury to FO, 24 Sept. 1921, L/PS/10/920/4341. See for example, Balfour to Loraine, 25 July 1922, FO371/7817/7030; Chamberlain to Loraine, 27 Nov. 1924, FO371/10148/10054. See Ch. 6. Curzon to Norman, 14 June 1921, L/PS/10/903/2721. Norman to Curzon, 11 Sept. 1921, L/PS/10/903/5120, Norman to Curzon, 5, 11, Aug. 1921, FO371/6415/7987, 9205. Imperial Bank to FO, 1 Sept. 1921, FO371/6415/9920. Imperial Bank telegram to Tehran, 24 Aug. 1921, in ibid. Minutes by Churchill and Lindsay, 3 Sept. 1921, ibid. Minute by Curzon, 4 Sept. 1921, Ibid. Minute by Crowe, 7 Sept. 1921, ibid.; “Memorandum on Recent Advances Made to the Persian Government”, in Imperial Bank to FO, 8 Sept. 1921, FO371/6415/ 10294. Telegram by McMurray, 27 Sept. 1921, in Imperial Bank to FO, 28 Sept 1921, FO371/6415/10823. Minute by Oliphant, 4 Oct. 1921, FO371/6416/11024. Minute by Curzon, 4 Oct. 1921, ibid. Imperial Bank to FO, 6 Oct. 1921, FO371/6416/11127. Urgent telegram from McMurray, 5 Oct. 1921 in ibid. Minute by Churchill, 7 Oct. 1921, ibid. Rogers to McMurray, 20 Oct. 1921, quoted in Jones, p.194. Ibid., p.185. Imperial Bank to FO, 10 Oct. 1921, FO371/6416/11224. Minute by Curzon, 15 Nov. 1921, FO371/6417/12424. Minute by Curzon, 26 Nov. 1921, FO371/6417/2908. Telegram to the chief manager, 3 Dec. 1921, in Imperial Bank to FO, 6 Dec. 1921, FO371/6418/13525. Telegram from chief manager, 3 Dec. 1921, in ibid.; Jones, p.193. Extracts from chief manager’s confidential letters, 19, 27 Oct 1921, in Imperial Bank to FO, 8 Dec. 1921, FO371/6418/13490. See Ch. 7. Loraine to Curzon, 30 May 1922; Curzon to Loraine, 2 June 1922, FO to Imperial Bank, 2 June 1922, FO371/7817/5585; Minutes by Churchill, 7, 28 July 1922, FO371/7817/6647. Loraine to Oliphant, 17 Feb. 1926, Loraine Papers, FO/1011/20. Loraine to MacDonald, 16 Feb. 1924, Loraine Papers, FO/1011/51.

CHAPTER TWO 1. Ronaldshay, Vol. II, p.206. 2. Balfour to Lansdowne, 6 Sept. 1902, quoted in McLean, 1979, p.46. 3. F.J.Moberly, Official History of the War: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. I (London, 1923), pp.95ff. 4. Olson, pp.89–90.


5. Moberly, Vol. I, pp.308–9. 6. This force had been formed under the command of a Russian colonel in 1889. The Brigade (later Division) had the dual functions of protecting Russian interests in the north and acting as the Imperial Guard of the Shah. The Commander of the force took his orders directly from the Shah and consulted the Russian Minister at Tehran on political matters. 7. Marling to Balfour, 9 Jan. 1916, L/PS/10/579/160. 8. FO to WO, 13 Jan. 1916; FO to Treasury, 24 March 1916; Viceroy to IO, 19 Jan. 1916, L/PS/10/579/1094/, 160, 227. 9. P.Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. II (London, 1921), pp.452–53. The force was financed jointly by London and India, but Sykes took his orders from the British Minister at Tehran. 10. Olson, pp.1 15–16. 11. F. Stanwood, “Revolution and the ‘Old Reactionary Policy’: Britain in Persia, 1917”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 6 (1978), pp.147–48. 12. Marling to Balfour, 11 June 1917, L/PS/10/712/2084. The abortive Sepahdar Agreement of 1916 was to formalize the Anglo-Russian military and financial control of Persia. 13. “Note Prepared for the Persia Committee”, 10 Nov. 1917, Curzon Papers, F112/ 271. 14. “Persia, March 1917–July 1918”, Memo by H.Nicolson (FO), 16 July 1918, L/PS/ 10/735/3164; Marling to Balfour, 17 Dec. 1917, L/PS/10/712/ 5103. 15. Viceroy to IO, 16 Feb. 1918, L/PS/10/734/636. 16. Balfour to Marling, 25 Dec. 1917, L/PS/10/712/5146; Persia Committee Meeting, 12 Jan. 1918, Curzon Papers, F112/271. 17. Persia Committee Meeting, 9 Feb. 1918; Balfour to Marling, 21 Feb. 1918, ibid. 18. For Dunsterville’s account of the mission, see L.C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (London, 1920). For a critical study of the mission in the Caucasus, see A. Arsalanian, “Dunsterville’s Adventure: A Reappraisal”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12 (1918), pp.199–216. 19. War Diary (Dunsterforce), 17, 18 Feb. 1918, WO95/5042. 20. Kuchik Khan took part in the Constitutionalists’ march on Tehran in 1909. In 1915 he returned to Gilan and formed a small guerrilla force of local nationalists and Pan-Islamists. His men harassed the Russian and Persian Cossacks in the area. After the collapse of the Russian army, he came to control a large part of Gilan and began to agitate against the British. See also Chs. 3 and 4. 21. War Diary (Dunsterforce), 19 Feb. 1918, ibid. 22. Dunsterville to CIGS (WO), 20 Feb. 1918, GT.3712, CAB24/43. 23. The Soviet government undertook to evacuate Persia by the BrestLitovsk armistice. Trotsky ordered the troops out of Persia early in January. “Note from Trotsky to the Persian Government on the Withdrawal of Troops from Persia”, 4 Jan. 1918, in J.Degras (ed.),

NOTES 199

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, pp.28– 29). The withdrawal was completed by the end of March. “Summary of Telegrams regarding the Necessity of the Retention of Allied Forces in Western Persia”, L/PS/10/734/554. War Diary (Dunsterforce), 18 Feb. 1918, WO95/5042. War Diary (Dunsterforce), 1 March 1918, ibid. See note 24. War Cabinet, 289th Meeting, 3 Dec. 1917, CAB23/4. “Policy in Persia”, Memo by Gen. Macdonogh (DMO, WO), 8 Feb. 1918, L/PS/ 10/734/554; see also Balfour to Marling, 25 Dec. 1917, L/PS/1/712/ 5146. Marling to Balfour, 1 March 1918, L/PS/10/734/934. Marling to Balfour, 5 Feb. 1918, L/PS/10/734/554. Marling to Balfour, 12 Feb. 1918, L/PS/10/734/623. “Summary of Recent Policy in Persia”; “Persia, March 1917 to July 1918”, Memos by H. Nicolson (FO), 8 June 1918, 16 July 1918, L/PS/10/ 735/3164; “Note for the Persia Committee”, 12 Jan. 1918, Curzon Papers, F112/217. Marling to Balfour, 26 Feb. 1918, L/PS/10/734/768. War Diary (Dunsterforce), 15 Feb. 1918, WO95/5042. Dunsterville to CIGS, 26 Feb. 1918, GT3779, GT3780, CAB24/43. Note by Gen. Cox (Military Secretary to IO), 19 Feb. 1918; Minute by Shuck-burgh, 19 Feb. 1918, L/PS/10/734/636. “Note by the Imperial General Staff”, 11 March 1918, GT3891, CAB24/ 44. War Cabinet, 357th Meeting, 26 Feb. 1918, CAB23/5. Persia Committee Meeting, 1 March 1918, Curzon Papers, F1 12/271. Marling to Balfour, 18 March 1918, L/PS/10/550/3405. Weekly Summary of Military Situation for the War Cabinet, General Staff (WO), for weeks ending 4 April, 23 May 1918, Curzon Papers, F1 12/127. War Diary (Dunsterforce), 23 Feb. 1918, WO95/5042. Eastern Committee, 10th Meeting, 28 May 1918, CAB27/24. Balfour to Marling, 22 April 1918, L/PS/734/1634. War Diary (Indian Army, HQ), Persia, July 1918, No. 53285, L/MIL/17/5/ 4165. Bicharakhov’s Cossacks embarked at Enzeli for Baku on June 22. Intelligence Summary (Dunsterforce), by Maj. Saunders, No. 21, for week ending 26 July 1918, WO157/855. The British troops were backed up by three aeroplanes. “Military Report on Tehran and Adjacent Provinces of North-West Persia, 1921”, by Capt. L.S.Fortescue, L/MIL/17/15/23; Intelligence Summary (Dunsterforce), No. 15, for week ending 14 June 1918, WO157/ 854; “Report on Operations at Resht” by Lt. Col. C.D.Matthews, 4 Aug. 1918, WO95/5042; Weekly Summary of Military Situation for the War Cabinet, General Staff (WO), for weeks ending 22, 29 June, 1 Aug. 1918, Curzon Papers, F1 12/127; Dunsterville, pp. 158–64, 201–4. For a


50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75.

Persian account of these events, see I. Fakhra’i, The Commander of the Jungle (Tehran, 1965), pp.129–57. Balfour to Marling, 1 July 1918, L/PS/10/735/3695. Marling to Balfour, 19 June 1918, in War Diary (Indian Army, HQ), Persia, June 1918, No. 48432, L/MIL/17/5/4164. Eastern Committee, 16th Meeting, 24 June 1918, CAB27/24. Stokes to CIGS (WO), 10 July 1918, L/PS/10/735/3164; Olson, p.205. Eastern Committee, 18th Meeting, 11 July 1918, CAB27/24. WO to Gen. Marshall (GOC, Baghdad), 28 June 1918, quoted in Moberly, Vol. IV, p.187. Ibid, p.189; Eastern Committee, 19th Meeting, 11 July 1918, CAB 27/ 24. Moberly, Vol. IV, pp.186, 208; Sykes, Vol. II, Ch. 89. Moberly, Vol. IV, pp.208–9. Cox to Balfour, 14 Nov. 1918, L/PS/10/735/5106. Eastern Committee, 45th Meeting, 19 Dec. 1918, CAB27/24. Eastern Committee, 48th Meeting, 30 Dec. 1918, ibid. Treasury to FO, 21 April 1919, L/PS/10/735/2329. Interdepartmental Committee on the Middle East (IDCE), 4th, 13th, 14th Meetings, 4 Feb., 21 March, 9 April 1919, Curzon Papers, F1 12/ 275. IDCE, 6th Meeting, 13 Feb. 1919, ibid. Eastern Committee, 45th Meeting, 19 Dec. 1918, CAB27/24. Cox to Curzon, 30 April 1919, L/PS/10/736/2390. For Cox’s report, see FO248/1243. Ibid. Norperforce to GHQ (Baghdad), 1 March 1918, ibid. For reports of Norperforce HQ, Wickham, and the Vice-Consul at Resht see ibid. and FO248/1244. See also “Military Report of Tehran and Adjacent Provinces of North-West Persia”, by Capt. L.S.Fortescue, L/ MIL/17/15/23, pp.82–83. Chelmsford to Montagu, 27 Jan., 24 April 1919, quoted in K.Jeffrey, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 2918–1922 (Manchester, 1984), pp.140–41. Chelmsford to Montagu, 12 Feb. 1920, quoted in Ibid., p.37. Ibid. It has been argued that, from 1808 onwards, the rulers of India, with a few exceptions like Curzon, did not regard Persia as essential to India’s defence, and that the Foreign Office’s strategy in Persia “was founded not upon the needs of Indian defence but upon those of the European balance”. See Yapp, pp.95, 14–20, 581–89. Montagu to Curzon, 5 Jan. 1920, Curzon Papers, F112/217B; IDCE, 23rd, 24th, 32nd Meetings, 19 June, 1 July, 18 Nov. 1919, Curzon Papers, F1 12/275. “Army Estimates, 1920–21”, Churchill, 7 Feb. 1920, in M.Gilbert, Winston Churchill: Documents, July 1919–March 1912 (London, 1977), p.1033 (hereafter cited as Churchill Documents). Cox to Curzon, 16 March 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 388.

NOTES 201

76. IDCE, 37th Meeting, 13 April 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/275; Curzon Papers, F112–217B. 77. See also Busch, pp.274–75. 78. War Diary (Indian Army, HQ), Persia, Nov. 1919, No. 7770; see also W.E.R. Dickson, East Persia: A Backwater of the Great War (London, 1924), pp.247–56. 79. Cox to Curzon, 17 Aug. 1919, L/PS/10/859/5036, 5723. 80. J.Qa’emmaqami, Political Developments of the Iranian Army (in Persian) (Tehran, 1947), passim. 81. Eastern Committee, 48th Meeting, 30 Dec. 1918, CAB27/24. 82. Montagu to Curzon, 6 Jan. 1918, Curzon Papers, F1 12/253. 83. Viceroy to IO, 28 Jan. 1919, L/PS/10/735/602. 84. “Confidential Supplement to the Report of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission by the British Members”, 4 April 1920, L/PS/10/859/5460. 85. Dickson to Curzon, 14 May 1921, FO371/6427/5814. 86. MA (Tehran) to DMI (WO), 9 April 1920, L/PS/10/859/2947. Starosselski was opposed to the absorption of the Cossack Division into the new uniform Army (see Cox to Curzon, 13 March 1921, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 387). 87. Ibid. 88. Qa’emmaqami, p.168; M.T.Bahar, A Short History of the Political Parties (in Persian), Vol. I (Tehran, 1944), p.40. 89. H.Arfa, Under Five Shahs (London, 1964), pp.91–92. 90. For the report, see L/PS/10/859/5355 and FO251/93. For a summary, see Cox to Curzon, 9 April 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 403. 91. Viceroy to IO, 10 May 1920, L/PS/10/859/3829. 92. Cox to Curzon, 6 May 1920; Norman to Curzon, 18 June 1920, FO371/ 3874/ 204961, 204984; Gen. Radcliffe’s interview with Prince Firuz, in Radcliffe to Oliphant, 4 June 1920, FO371/3872/202979. 93. “Interdepartmental Conference on the Report of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission”, held at the FO, 28 June 1920, FO371/4911/197. 94. Norman to Curzon, 13 July 1920, FO371/4908/1492. 95. Norman to Curzon, 13 July 1920, FO371/4908/1386. 96. See Ch. 3. 97. For a brief account of British intervention in the Caucasus, see “Outline of Events in Transcaucasia from the Beginning of the Russian Revolution in the Summer of 1917 to April 1921” by W.J.Childs and A.E.R.Mcdonell, 31 May 1922, in Curzon Papers, F1 12/270. See also, J.D. Rose, “Batum as Domino, 1919–1920: The Defence of India in Transcaucasia”, International History Review, 2 (1980), pp.266–87. 98. Jeffrey, 1984, p.142. 99. Ibid., pp. 18–21; Darwin, pp.33–35. 100. Wilson to Gen. Haldane (GOC, Baghdad), 17 Nov. 1920, Wilson Papers, 55, No. 4. See also Jeffrey, 1984, Ch. 4; Darwin, pp.26–32. 101. Wilson Diary, 5 Aug. 1920. 102. Wilson to Haldane, 28 Dec. 1920, Wilson Papers, 55, No. 5.


103. Quoted in K. Jeffrey, “Sir Henry Wilson and the Defence of the British Empire, 1918–22”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 5 (1977), p.288. 104. Wilson to Churchill, 13 May 1920, WO106/961 (original emphasis). 105. “Army Estimates, 1920–21”, 7 Feb. 1920, Churchill Documents, p.1034. 106. Churchill to Curzon, 20 May 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/215. 107. Wilson Diary, 20 May 1920. 108. Wilson to Curzon, 20 May 1920, Wilson Papers, 20A, No. 44; also in Curzon Papers, F1 12/218 and in K.Jeffrey (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 1918–1922 (London, 1985), No. 119 (hereafter Wilson Letters). 109. Curzon to Wilson, 20 May 1920, Wilson Papers, 20B, No. 1; also Wilson Letters, No. 120. 110. Memo by Milner, 24 May 1920, CP1337, in Curzon Papers, F1 12/253. 111. See note 107 above. 112. Cabinet 30 (20), 21 May 1920, CAB23/21. See also Ch. 3. 113. Wilson Diary, 18 June 1920. 114. Shortly after landing at Enzeli, Moscow declared that it had withdrawn its troops from north Persia, and claimed that the remaining troops belonged to the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic (see Ch. 3). 115. Daily Express, 21 June 1920, in FO371/3874/205583. Hardinge wrote: “Lord Beaverbrook has friends in the Cabinet who are probably indiscreet.” 116. Churchill to Lloyd George, 5 Aug. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F9/2/37; Wilson Diary, 15 July 1920. 117. Wilson Diary, 6 Aug. 1920. 118. Cabinet Finance Committee, 26th Meeting, 6 Aug. 1920, CAB27/71. 119. The strength of Norperforce was 1,783 British and 5,620 Indian, including 149 British officers, 70 Indian officers and 827 NCOs. War Diary (Norperforce HQ), Vol. 11, Nov. 1920, National Army Museum, 6403/2. 120. Cabinet Finance Committee, 27th Meeting, 12 Aug. 1920, CAB27/21. 121. G.A.Craig, “The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain”, in G.A.Craig and F. Gilbert (eds.), Diplomatists, 1918– 1939 (8th reprint, N.Y., 1974), pp.28–35; A.J.Sharp, “The Foreign Office in Eclipse, 1919–22”, History, 61, (1976), pp.201–205. 122. J.P. Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London, 1962), pp.359–60. A.J.Sharp, “Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office”, in R. Bullen (ed.), The Foreign Office, 1782–1982 (London, 1984), p.80. 123. Wilson Diary, 15 July 1920. 124. Ibid., 18 June 1920; Cabinet Finance Committee, 6 Aug. 1920, CAB27/ 71. 125. Lloyd George’s Note to Curzon, 12 Aug. 1920, Curzon Papers, F112/71. 126. For a brief, though hagiographical, biography of Ironside, see J.Eastwood, General Edmund Ironside (London, 1940). 127. Wilson to Haldane, 24 Aug. 1920, Wilson Papers, 55, No. 2; also in Wilson Letters, No. 145.

NOTES 203

128. Lord Ironside (ed.), High Road to Command: The Diaries of MajorGeneral Ironside, 1920–22 (London, 1972), p.163. 129. Ibid., p.l55. 130. WO to GOC, Mesopotamia, 10 Oct. 1920, FO371/4906/8240. 131. Nicolson, p.144. 132. Norman to Loraine, 25 Dec. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/126. 133. After the disbandment of the British military mission, Dickson remained at Tehran, attached to the Legation, hoping to resume his task after the ratification of the Agreement. 134. Cox to Curzon, 13 March 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 387. 135. Ironside (Kasvin) to Haldane, 9 Oct. 1920, in Haldane to Wilson, 18 Oct. 1920, Wilson Papers, 55, No. 3; “Appreciation of North West Persian Situation by GOC Norperforce”, 25 Oct. 1920, CO95/4968. 136. Wilson Diary, 27 Oct. 1920. 137. Ibid., 1 Nov. 1920; Wilson’s telegram in Haldane to Ironside, 1 Nov. 1920, WOl 58/687. 138. Ironside to Manjil, 22 Oct. 1920, WO158/697. 139. The strength of the Division was: Russians, 56 officers and 66 NCOs; Persians, 202 officers and 5,000–7,000 other ranks, costing 160,000 tomans (£5,000) per month. 140. Norman to Curzon, 25 Oct. 1920, FO371/4914/9573, 9600. 141. Norman to Curzon, 26, 27 Oct. 1920, FO371/4914/9759, 9847. 142. Ironside, pp.147–48. Ironside’s published diary is reticent about his part in Starosselski’s dismissal. 143. Norman to Curzon, 28 Oct. 1920, FO371/4906/9881. 144. Hankey to FO, 4 Nov. 1920; WO to FO, 5 Nov. 1920, FO371/4914/10912, 11587. 145. Minute by Oliphant, 28 Oct. 1920, FO371/4914/9847. 146. Minute by Oliphant, 26 Oct. 1920, FO371/4914/9573. 147. H.L.Deb., 16 Nov. 1920, col. 289. 148. Norman to Curzon, 25 Nov. 1920, FO371/4915/12323. 149. Norman to Curzon, 1 Dec. 1920, FO371/4915/12941; Military Attaché to WO, 29 Nov. 1920, FO371/4910/12796. For a Persian account of the meeting, see Y. Daulatabadi, Yahya’s Life, Vol. IV (Tehran, 1952), pp. 190–203. 150. Minute by Ovey, 4 Dec. 1920, FO371/4907/12838. 151. Wilson to Churchill, 30 July 1920, WO32/5745. 152. Wilson to Haldane, 24 Aug. 1920, Wilson Papers, 55, No. 2. 153. Churchill to Curzon, 31 Aug. 1920, Curzon Papers, F112/217B. 154. Churchill to Lloyd George (unsent letter), 3 Aug. 1920, Churchill Documents, p.1199. 155. Milner to Curzon, 3 Aug. 1920, Curzon Papers, F112/217B. 156. Cabinet 59 (20), 3 Nov. 1920, CAB23/23. 157. H.L.Deb, 16 Nov. 1920, col. 289. 158. Cabinet 67 (20), 8 Dec. 1920, CAB23/23. 159. Churchill to Chamberlain, 15 Nov. 1920, Churchill Documents, p.1236. 160. See FO371/4906/11154, 11369.


161. Ormsby Gore, H.C.Deb, 15 Dec. 1920, cols 570–71. Some British officials maintained that the Persian clergy in Mesopotamia had whipped up the anti-British rebellion because of their opposition to the Anglo-Persian Agreement. 162. Wilson to Haldane, 28 Dec. 1920, Wilson Papers, 55, No. 2. 163. Cabinet 67 (20), 8 Dec. 1920, CAB23/23. 164. Cabinet Finance Committee, 30th Meeting, 21 Dec. 1920, CAB27/71. 165. Churchill to Curzon, 21 Dec. 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/215; WO to Haldane, 23 Dec. 1920, FO371/4914/14719. 166. Norman to Curzon, 31 Dec. 1920, FO371/6399/2. 167. Curzon to Norman, ibid. 168. Cabinet 67 (20), 31 Dec. 1920, CAB23/23. 169. Wilson Diary, 4 Jan. 1921; Cabinet 1 (21), 4 Jan. 1921, CAB23/24. 170. Norman to Curzon, 14 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/717. 171. Norman to Curzon, 20 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/958. 172. See Ch. 5. 173. Norman to Curzon, 25 Feb. 1921, FO371/6401/2605. 174. Minute by Oliphant, 28 April 1921, FO371/6403/4805. 175. WO to FO, 3 March 1921, FO371/6426/3166. 176. WO to Haldane, 19 March 1921, WO32/5807; FO to WO, 16 March 1921; “British Officers for Persian Force: Arrangement Agreed to by WO and FO”, Memo by Oliphant, 16 March 1921, FO371/6426/3166, 3420, 3399. 177. Norman to Curzon, 14 April, 20 May 1921, FO371/6426/4483, 6028. 178. See Ch. 7. 179. Norman to Curzon, 25 May 1921, FO371/6404/6040. 180. Intelligence Summary (Military Attaché, Tehran), No. 3, for week ending 21 May 1921, FO371/6435/8863. 181. “Appreciation of Position in North-West Persia”, by Gen. Ironside in GOC, Mesopotamia to WO, 26 Oct. 1920, FO371/4906/10687. 182. Balfour, p.235. 183. Quoted in Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 7, for week ending 18 June 1921, FO371/6435/9236. 184. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 4, for week ending 28 May 1921, FO371/6435/9971. 185. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 9, for week ending 2 July 1921, FO371/ 6435/9650. Report by the Military Attaché (Tehran), 25 June 1921, FO371/6405/ 7780. 186. Norman to Curzon, 8 July 1921, FO371/6415/7952. 187. See Ch. 5. 188. H.L.Deb, 26 July 1921, col. 16. 189. Minute by Curzon, n.d. (Nov. 1921), FO371/6407/12282).

CHAPTER THREE 1. Quoted in R.H.Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, Vol. III (Princeton, 1972), p.11.

NOTES 205

2. Quoted in M.Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 1916–1922 (London, 1975), p.356. 3. Ibid., p.362. 4. Ibid., p.364. 5. A.Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917–1927 (Columbia, 1957), p.30. 6. Quoted in Ullman, Vol. III, p.328. 7. Gilbert, p.366. 8. “Memorandum by General Radcliffe” (DMO, War Office), 21 May 1920, in FO371/4904/11. 9. G. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia (Cass, London, 1967, reprint), p.319. 10. Curzon, 1892, pp.171, 386, 524. 11. Ibid., p.2l6. 12. Ronaldshay, Vol. I, p.143. 13. Curzon, 1967, p.321; see also Ronaldshay, Vol. I, pp.297–98. 14. Quoted in Ronaldshay, Vol. I., p.299. 15. Quoted in ibid., p.99. 16. Ibid., Vol. III, pp.42–44. 17. Ullman, Vol. II, p.67. 18. Ibid., pp.77, 225. 19. Cabinet 61 (20), 17 Nov. 1920, CAB23/23. 20. Wardrop to Curzon, 3 Jan. 1920 (very urgent), FO371/3867/16849. 21. Cox to Curzon, 6 Jan. 1920 (urgent), ibid. 22. Viceroy to IO, 28 Dec. 1919, in IO to FO371/3867/168554. 23. “Notes of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held at Quai d’Orsay, Paris”, 10 Jan. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. II, No. 65. 24. Derby (Paris) to Hardinge, 10 Jan. 1920, ibid., Vol. III, No. 635. 25. IDCE, 34th Meeting, 12 Jan, 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/275; Wilson Diary, 12 Jan. 1920. See also: Ullman, Vol. II, pp. 323–24; Busch, pp. 257–260. 26. S–10–12, 16, 18, 19 Jan. 1920, CAB23/35. 27. Wilson Diary, 16 Jan. 1920. 28. WO to FO, 17 Jan. 1920, FO371/3867/17160. 29. WO to GHQ (Baghdad), 28 Jan. 1920, WO158/697. 30. “Note on the Question of Enzeli and the Defence of Persia” (CP647), by W. Churchill, 13 Feb. 1920, in FO371/3868/179759. 31. WO to Gen. Champain, 25 Feb. 1920, WOl 58/697. 32. “Appeals from Chicherin to the Workers and Peasants of Persia”, 30 Aug. 1919, in J.Degras (ed.), Vol. 1, p. 161–64; E.H.Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917– 1923, Vol. III (London, 1953) pp.240–42; X.Eudin and R.North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1917–1924; A Documentary Survey (Stanford, 1957), pp.93–95; H. Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927 (Geneva, 1965), pp. 154–64; G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948 (N.Y., 1949) pp.48–49; R. Ramazani, Foreign Policy of Iran, Vol. I (Charlottesville, 1966), pp.146–51; M. Volodarsky, “Soviet-Iranian Relations, 1917–1921”, Slavic and Soviet Series, 3 (1978), pp.50–86. The English Translation of the Soviet note of 26 June 1919, in FO371/3874/205742. 33. Cox to Curzon, 21 Feb. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 375.


34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

Cox to Curzon, 14 May 1920, FO371/3871/197889. Cox to Curzon, 17 Jan. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 367. Cox to Curzon, 21 Feb 1920, ibid., No. 375. Nicolson, pp.128–29. Curzon to Cox, 7 Feb. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 373. Cox to Curzon, 13 March, ibid., No. 387. Cox to Curzon, 5 April 1920, ibid., No. 401. Curzon to Cox, 10 April 1920, ibid., No. 406. Curzon to Cox, 11 April 1920, ibid., No. 407. Cox to Curzon, 14 April 1920, ibid., No. 409. Montagu to Curzon, 14 April 1920, Curzon Papers, F112/217B. See also T.Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. I (London, 1969), p.103. See note 43 above. IDCE, 36th Meeting, 17 March, Curzon Papers, F1 12/275. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Colonel Sweet (CO, Enzeli) to Norperforce HQ (Kasvin), 2 April 1920, WO158/ 697; Gen. Radcliffe’s report to IDCE, 37th Meeting, 13 April 1920, Curzon Papers, F112/275. For the developments in Azerbaijan, see: T.Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920 (Cambridge, 1985), Ch. 7; F.Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (N.Y., 1951), Ch. 18. Cox to Curzon, 9 May 1920, FO371/3871/196934. Ibid. “Situation in North-West Persia, May 1920”, memo by General Radcliffe, 13 May 1920; Wilson to Churchill, 13 May 1920, WO106/961 and FO371/ 4904/11. Churchill later accused Curzon of deliberately keeping him and Wilson in the dark about this meeting of the Eastern Committee. He was so enraged by Curzon’s exploiting the Committee for his own purposes that he decided to ask the Cabinet to dissolve the Committee (Churchill to Curzon, 20 May 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/215. IDCE, 38th Meeting, 17 May 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/275; see also, Ullman, Vol. III, pp. 358–61. Curzon to Cox, 18 May 1920, FO371/3871/198025. Cox to Curzon, 10 May 1920, L/PS/10/905/3801. Raskolnikov’s interview with the Vladikavkaz Communist, 30 May 1920, in H.C. Luke (Tiflis) to Curzon, 5 June 1920, L/PS/10/905/5085. Cox to Enzeli, 18 May, in Cox to Curzon, 18 May 1920, FO371/3872/ 198609. Enzeli to Tehran Legation (received at 4.30 p.m.), in Cox to Curzon, 18 May 1920, FO371/3872/198704. Cox to Enzeli, 18 May in Cox to Curzon, 18 May 1920, ibid. The Polish army launched its offensive against Soviet Russia on April 26. By midMay they had occupied Kiev. GHQ (Baghdad) to CIGS (WO), 20 May 1920, WO95/4968; Cox to Curzon, 19 May 1920, FO371/3872/16869; Raskolnikov’s interview with

NOTES 207

64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

85. 86. 87. 88.

Petrogradskaia Pravda, 15 July 1920, in Eudin and North, Doc. 35. The War Office severely criticized Cox for issuing instructions to Champain which were at variance with the explicit orders of the War Office (WO to GOC (Baghdad), 21 May 1920; Cox to FO, 24 May 1920, FO371/3872/ 19972). Cabinet 30 (20), 21 May 1920, CAB23/21; Churchill to Curzon, 20 May 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/215. Memorandum by Milner, 24 May 1920 (CP1337) in Curzon Papers, F1 12/253; Cabinet 30 (20), 21 May 1920, CAB 23/21; Wilson Diary, 21 May 1920. Cabinet 30 (20), 21 May 1920, CAB 23/21. Mackintosh, p.366. See note 66 above. Curzon to Cox, 21 May 1920, FO371/3872/199364. Curzon to Cox, 27 May 1920, FO371/3872/200676. GHQ (Baghdad) to WO, 20 May 1920, WO95/4968. Cox to Curzon, 22 May 1920, FO371/3872/199404. Chicherin to Persian Foreign Minister, 23 May 1920, L/PS/10/905/4115; Cox to Curzon, 28 May 1920, FO371/3872/200561. GHQ (Baghdad) to WO, 30 May 1920, FO371/3872/201078. Minute by Churchill, 3 June 1920 (endorsed by Curzon); GOC (Mesopotamia) to WO, 1 June 1920, FO371/3872/201531. Cox to Curzon, 6, 10 June 1920, FO371/3872/201931, 203108. Minute by Churchill, 11 June 1920, ibid. See note 73 above. Operation order No. 2, 17 May 1920, in Crutchly to Norperforce HQ, 4 Sept. 1920, Edmonds Papers, Box VI, file 4. Raskolnikov’s interview, see note 63 above. Cabinet 30 (20), 21 May 1920, CAB 23/21. Ullman, Vol. III, p.402. Trotsky to Lenin and Chicherin, 20 April 1920, in J.M.Meijer (ed.), The Trotsky Papers, 1917–1922 (The Hague, 1971), No. 522 (hereafter Trotsky Papers). R.Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary (N.Y., 1973), p.227. He was the head of the Central Committee’s Caucasian Bureau (Kavburo) established in April 1920. At the end of June, he was officially charged “with the leadership of the entire foreign and home policy of Azerbaijan and with supervising the fulfilment of the directives of the Central Committee and of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in regard to Persia, Armenia and Georgia.” (Lenin to Ordzhonikidze, 29 June 1920, in V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 44, No. 624. pp.395–96.) Raskolnikov’s interview, see note 63 above. Raskolnikov to Chicherin, 22 May 1920 (intercepted by the Erivan wireless station) in Luke (Tiflis) to Curzon, 8 June 1920, FO371/4943/ 7921. See Ch. 2. Cox to Curzon, 21 Nov. 1919, FO371/3867/168496.


89. Butters (APOC, Resht) to Cox (Tehran), 10 May 1920, Edmonds Papers, Box VI, file 4. 90. Gen. Malleson (Meshed) to Chief of General Staff (Delhi), 24 Feb. 1920, FO371/ 3872/201100. Kasvin Division Report, March 1920, by Edmonds (Political officer to Norperforce, Kasvin), in Edmonds to Cox, 2 April 1920, FO248/1292. 91. Zhizn Natsionalnastei, May 1919, in Eudin and North, Doc. 34. 92. For the programme of the movement, see Fakhra’i, pp. 56–58. 93. For the deep impact of the events on the nationalists, see: R.Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1964), pp.174–75. For a Persian nationalist’s account of these events see A.Kasravi, The Eighteen Years in the History of Azerbaijan (in Persian), Vol. III (Tehran, 1978, reprint), pp.479–490. 94. Situation Report (Resht) No. 3, Butters to Edmonds, 22 Jan. 1920, Edmonds Papers Box VI, file 4. 95. Situation report (Resht) No. 9, Butters to Edmonds, 28 April 1920, ibid. 96. Memo by Butters, 30 March 1920, ibid.; Kasvin Division Report, March 1920, FO248/1292. 97. Sweet to Norperforce HQ, 3 May 1920, WO158/697. 98. Kasvin Division Report, Dec. 1919, in Edmonds to Cox, 13 Jan. 1920, FO248/ 1292. 99. The Adalat (Justice) Party was formed in Baku in 1916. It was affiliated to the Azerbaijan Muslim Social Democratic Party (Hummet) led by Nariman Narimanov, who became the leader of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan after April 1920. The membership were chiefly recruited from the large number of Persian migrant workers in the Baku oilfields. 100. Fakhra’i, pp.243–44. The Revolutionary Committee was composed of four Jangalis, two commanders of Soviet forces at Enzeli and one Persian communist. In his report to the Tehran Legation, Edmonds, without being specific, referred to the differences between Kuchik Khan and the Bolsheviks “over their programme”. (Kasvin Division Report for April and May, in Edmonds to Cox, 4 June 1920, FO248/1292). 101. Raskolnikov to Chicherin, 22 May 1920, in Luke to Curzon, 8 June 1920, FO371/ 4943/7921. 102. In 1917–18, a large part of Persia was in the grip of a severe famine. 103. Quoted in Eudin and North, p.94. 104. Karakhan to Raskolnikov, 23 May 1920. For a Persian translation of the document, see Fakhra’i, p.260, for an English translation see S.Zabih, “The Dynamics of the Communist Movement in Iran, 1920–1962” (Ph.D, Berkeley,1963), p.20. 105. After the abortive Dunsterville mission to Baku in Aug.-Sept. 1918, a force of 2,000 Anglo-Indian troops under Gen. W.M.Thompson retraced Dunsterville’s steps in north-west Persia and landed at Baku in November. The British military mission at Meshed, under Gen. W.Malleson, made a foray into Turkestan between July 1918 and Feb. 1919. 106. Chicherin to Krassin (London), 17 June 1920 (Intercept no. 003031), Lloyd George Papers, F/203/1/10.

NOTES 209

107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

See note 104 above. Trotsky to Raskolnikov, 26 May 1920, in Fakhra’i, pp.260–61. Chicherin to Firuz, 20 June 1920, in FO371/3874/205919. Ordzhonikidze to Trotsky and Lenin, 24 Sept. 1920, Trotsky Papers, no. 617. Norman to Curzon, 25 and 26 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/4934, 4982. The Foreign Office, of course, did not find Moscow’s denials totally convincing. Firstly, the intelligence reports and the British envoy at Tiflis rejected the Soviet government’s claim that Azerbaijan was independent of Moscow (Intelligence Report (SIS, Constantinople) No. 83, for week ending 25 Aug 1920, FO371/5171; minute by Churchill, 2 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/4937). Secondly, the British Intelligence services gathered some evidence of the Soviet government’s direct involvement in Gilan towards the end of 1920 (Memo by Ovey, 29 Nov. 1920, FO371/4904/12195). “Negotiations with M. Krassin”, memo by Curzon, 27 May 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/236. For Chicherin’s declaration, see: Degras, Vol. I, pp. 161–64. Cabinet 33 (20), 28 May 1920, CAB23/21. “Bolshevik Naval Forces”, memo by Admiral Beatty, 28 May 1920 (CP316) in Lloyd George Papers, F/202/1/20; “Notes of a Meeting held in Sir L.Worthington-Evans’ Room, May 28 1920”, in ibid., FO/202/2/7. “Secretary’s Note of a Conference of British Ministers with the Head of the Russian Trade Delegation, held at 10 Downing Street on May 31 1920”, DBFP, Is, Vol. VIII, No. 24, pp.288–89. Krassin to Chicherin, 29 May 1920 (Intercept No. 002700) Lloyd George Papers, F/58/1/11. Krassin Mission, Political Report (Copenhagen), 8 June 1920 (based on intercepted communications between Krassin and Litvinov in Copenhagen, and between Litvinov and Moscow), FO371/4036/205118. “Secretary’s Note of a Conference of British Ministers with the Head of the Russian Trade Delegation, held at 10 Downing Street on June 7 1920”, DBFP, Is, Vol. VIII, No. 25, pp.301–2. Cabinet 62 (20), 18 Nov. 1920, CAB23/23; Curzon to Lloyd George, 18 Nov. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/l 3/1/33. Minute by Hardinge, 9 June 1920, FO371/3873/202930. Minute by Oliphant, 5 June 1920, FO371/3873/203723. Roskill, Vol. II, p.171. Trotsky Papers, No. 556. Minute by Lenin, in ibid. Lenin to Kamenev (London), 20 Aug. 1920, in Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 44, No. 670, p.421. Chicherin to Krassin, 12 June 1920 (Intercept no. 002930) in Lloyd George Papers, F/203/1/10. Chicherin to Krassin, 25 June 1920 (Intercept No. 003178) in ibid. “British Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation between Lloyd George and Millerand at Lympne on June 20 1920”, DBFP, Is, Vol. VIII, No. 29, p. 325.


130. After the retreat of the remnants of the White Forces to the Crimea in April, Denikin resigned and was replaced by Gen. Baron Piotr Wrangel as the commander of the Volunteer Army. On June 7, he launched a major offensive against the Bolsheviks. Early in June the Polish Army was also deep inside Russian territory, but by mid-June the tide turned against the Poles. 131. “Conclusion Reached by the Supreme Council”, 23 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/202/3/l. 132. See note 129 above. 133. “British Attitude towards the Poles and Wrangel”, memo by W. Churchill, 26 June 1920, Churchill Documents, p.1131. 134. “Interview between M. Krassin and the Prime Minister, held at 10 Downing Street on June 16 1920”, Lloyd George Papers, F/202/3/19. 135. Chicherin to Krassin, 1 July 1920 (Intercept No. 003232) in ibid., F/203/ 1/10. 136. “Curzon Note to Krassin”, 30 June 1920, FO371/4036/207569. This note had in fact been prepared by Lloyd George and his Secretariat, see Lloyd George Papers, F/ 202/3/20. The Soviet government had already agreed “in principle” to release the British prisoners and to recognize the debts. 137. Leslie to Curzon, 8 July 1920, FO371/4036/270663. 138. Lenin to Krassin, 9 July 1920, in Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 44, No. 633, p.41. Chicherin to Krassin, 20 June 1920, in Lloyd George Papers, F/203/1/10. 139. Krassin to Chicherin, 30 June 1920, in “Text of the Draft Trade Agreement with Soviet Russia with Comments and Criticisms by the Moscow Foreign Office and M.Krassin”, compiled by Basil Thompson (Director of Intelligence, Home Office), Davidson Papers, box 16. Similarly, Moscow recognized the Russian debts only “in principle”, which did not commit the Soviets to “immediate payment”. (Krassin to Chicherin, 18 June; Chicherin to Krassin, 24 June; Litvinov to Chicherin, 25 June 1920, in ibid.) 140. Chicherin to Krassin, 14, 15 Dec. 1920, in ibid. 141. Curzon (Spa) to Hardinge, 13 July 1920, FO371/4904/1233. 142. Minute by Churchill, 14 July 1920, ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR 1. Intercepted letters from the Persian Bolshevik Commissary (Tabriz Branch) to Communist (Adalat) Party of Persia (Baku), 31 May 1920; and Report by Nicolai Billar (Tabriz) to Field Staff XIth Army (Baku), 28 May 1920, in Edmonds to Norperforce HQ, 20 July 1920, FO248/ 1278. In an interview with the Soviet agent, Billar, the German Consul said that he himself was not a Bolshevik but believed that “the only people who can destroy the British are the Bolsheviks.” 2. Khiyabani, who came from a merchant family, had entered into national politics as one of the Tabriz deputies at the Second Majlis (1909–11). In

NOTES 211

3. 4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

the Majlis he joined the Democrat parliamentary group. He soon rose to prominence because of his oratorical skills. His impassioned speeches inside and outside the Majlis against the Russian ultimatum in December 1911, established his reputation as an ardent nationalist. Kasravi, Vol. II, pp.874–76. Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 12 May 1920, FO248/1278. Kasvin Division Report for April and May 1920, Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 4 June 1920, FO248/1292. Edward G.Browne (1862–1926), Professor of Arabic and Persian at Cambridge, was an ardent and outspoken champion of the Persian constitutionalists in Britain. See D. McLean, “English Radicals, Russia, and the Fate of Persia, 1907–1913”, English Historical Review, 93 (1978), pp.338–52. E.Bristow (British Consul, Tabriz) to Tehran Legation, 24, 30, 31 May, 4, 9 Jun 1920. Captain R.C. Geard (APO, Tabriz) to Edmonds (Kasvin), 9 June 1920, FO248/1278, Edmonds Papers, Box VI, file 5. The German Consul was killed during the exchange of fire. The communists reported to Baku: “Most of our active members have been imprisoned by the Police, at the instigation of the English under the instruction of Shaikh Mohammed.” Another report to Baku says: “The Comrades are suffering severe persecution. A number of Bolsheviks are in prison or deported. Some of us are surrounded in a house near to the German Consulate.” (See note 1 above.) Kasvin Division Report for June and July 1920, Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 5 Aug. 1920, FO/248/1292. Tehran Legation to Tabriz Consulate, 13 June 1920, FO248/1278. A.Azari, in his standard biography of Khiyabani, The Revolt of Khiyabani (Tehran, 1951), tends to portray him as a Bolshevik sympathizer. He even describes his left-wing opponents as agents provocateurs (p.234). The Soviet writers are divided. Some acknowledge that he was suspicious of the Soviet regime. Others argue that he was sympathetic towards Bolshevism. For a critical summary of Soviet writings on Khiyabani, see Central Asian Review, 6 (1958), pp.347–56, 432–47; also M.S. Ivanov, Modern History of Iran (Persian Translation) (Tehran, 1977), pp.37–39. Kasravi notes that Khiyabani had no Bolshevik tendencies but initially flirted with the communists in order to scare the British officials and the central government (Kasravi, p. 874). Norman to Curzon, 23 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 484. For British policy during the Constitutional Revolution, see N.Keddie, “British Policy and Iranian Opposition, 1901–07”, Journal of Modern History, 39 (1967), pp.266–82; I. Klein, “British Intervention in the Persian Revolution, 1905–09”, Historical Journal, 15 (1972), pp.731–752. Norman to Curzon, 18 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 468. Norman to Curzon, 20 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 475. Curzon to Norman, 23 June 1920, ibid., No. 481. The Shah was eager to get rid of Vusuq too. Norman to Curzon, 23 June 1920, ibid., No. 484.


15. Cox to Curzon, 25 May 1920, FO371/3872/19997, H.C.Deb., 20 May 1920, Cols 1601–1602. On 28 May Lloyd George, in reply to another parliamentary question, repeated that the British Government did not have any naval or military obligations towards Persia, FO371/3874/ 206572. 16. Cabinet 30 (20), 21 May 1920, CAB23/21. 17. The War Office had made ammunition and arms ready for despatch to Persia, but wanted to charge £500,000 for them (a quarter of the British loan to Persia). The India Office accused the War Office of charging excessive prices for “goods which have only a scrap value.” The Foreign Office agreed with the India Office that the transaction was one which “would not stand a public investigation.” The War Office believed that the India Office had no moral authority to object, because they had already charged the Persian government for captured Turkish ammunition much more than its scrap value. At the same time the Treasury was reluctant to sanction the payment to be charged on the loan to Persia. Minute by Ovey, 24 June 1920, WO to FO, 9 June 1920, Treasury to FO, 24 June 1920, FO371/3874/205066, 205374. 18. Cox to Curzon, 6 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 453. 19. Resolution Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at the meeting held on 16 June 1920, FO371/3874/205308. 20. Norman to Curzon, 18 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 468. 21. Curzon to Norman, 1 July 1920, ibid., No. 497. 22. Norman to Curzon, 26 June 1920, ibid., No. 491. 23. Financial Adviser to Treasury, in Norman to Curzon, 2 July 1920, L/PS/ 10/905. 24. Meshed Diary (Consul-General, Lt.-Col. W.G.Grey), No. 25 for week ending 26 June 1920, L/PS/10/820/6273. 25. Hamdan Monthly Report, June and July 1920, FO248/1290. 26. Zanjan Report for the period 1–26 July 1920, Edmonds Papers, Box VI, file 5. 27. Norman to Curzon, 26 June, 22 July 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, Nos. 492, 517; Norman to Curzon, 28 June 1920, FO371/3874/206641; Norman to Curzon, 8 Aug. 1920, FO371/4920/3303. 28. A tribe in the vicinity of Kasvin. 29. Kasvin Division Report, March 1920; Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 2 April 1920, FO248/1292. 30. Norman to Curzon, 7 July 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 503. 31. Norman to Curzon, 20 July 1920, ibid., No. 515. 32. Norman to Curzon, 8 July 1920, L/PS/10/906/5420. 33. Meshed Diary (Consul-General, Grey) No. 28, for the week ending 17 July 1920, L/PS/10/820/7028. 34. Hamadan Monthly Report, July 1920, FO248/1290. 35. Gen. Champain to GHQ Baghdad, 7 July 1920, WO158/697. 36. Since 1915 Amir Muqtadir’s forces had continuously been harassing the Jangalis. But Amir Asha’er had briefly aligned himself with Kuchik Khan in 1918, and was appointed the Governor of Resht by him.

NOTES 213

37. Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 6 July 1920, FO248/1278; Edmonds to Military Attaché, (Wickham), 22 July 1920; Norperforce HQ to Military Attaché, 31 July 1920, WO158/697; Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 2 July 1920, Kasvin Division Reports for June, July and September 1920, FO248/1292. Mizra Ali-Akbar pursued his anti-Bolshevik Jihad with vigour. In November he sent some 2,000 Shavesvan tribes across the border to assist anti-Bolshevik rebellion in Lenkoran. 38. Norman to Curzon, 23 July 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 521. 39. Curzon to Norman, 1 July 1920, ibid., No. 497. 40. Norman to Curzon, 26 June 3, 5 July 1920, ibid., Nos. 492, 506, 505. 41. Minutes by G.Churchill and Curzon 23, 24 July 1920, FO371/4904/1997. 42. Secretary’s Note of a Conference of British Ministers with the Head of the Russian Trade Delegation, held at 10 Downing Street on 7 June 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. VIII No. 25, pp.302–3. 43. Some sources maintain that the congress was held on 23–25 July, but a British intelligence report quoting a Russian paper dated 25 June says “the first meeting of the Persian Communist Adalat party…took place at Enzeli.” Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the week ending 24 July 1920. Intelligence Summary of East Persia, WO157/1261. 44. He was born into an Armenian family in Persian Azerbaijan in 1889. When he was eleven, he emigrated with his family to the Caucasus. In 1912 he joined the Bolshevik Party for which he worked in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. He became the spokesman of the Persian Communist Party at the first meeting of Comintern. He was elected to the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Later he left the Comintern to work for the Soviet government. In 1928 he took part in the 6th Congress of the Comintern expressing disagreement with certain official positions. He was accused of “leftist deviation.” In 1932 he was expelled from the Central Committee of the Persian Communist Party. He was arrested during Stalin’s purges and died in prison in 1938. See also, C.Chaqueri, “Sultanzade: The Forgotten Revolutionary Theoretician of Iran: A Biographical Sketch,” Iranian Studies, 17 (1984), pp.215–35; and Central Asian Survey, 3 (1984), pp.57–73. 45. “The Proceedings of the First Congress of Iranian Communists (the Adalat Party)” in Historical Documents: The Workers, Social Democratic and Communist Movements in Iran (in Persian), Vol. 1 (Mazdak Publication), Florence, 1972, pp.70–73 (hereafter cited as Persian Communist Movement Doc.); M.A. Persits, “Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National Liberation Movement, 1918-July 1920”, in R.A Ulyanovsky (ed.), The Comintern and the East (Moscow, 1979), pp.99–101. 46. “The Programme of the Communist Party of Iran (Bolshevik) Adopted at the Enzeli Congress”, in Persian Communist Movement Doc., Vol.6, pp. 95–105. 47. Kuchik Khan chose not to oppose land reform in principle, but argued that it would antagonize the landowners and the tribal chiefs whose support was essential in the struggle against the Shah’s government and the British. (See Kuchik Khan to Yusuf Zia-Bayk in Fakhra’i, pp.


48. 49. 50.

51.

52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57.

309–10.) His argument was based on the experience of the Constitutional Revolution when the revolutionaries succeeded in overthrowing the government in Tehran only with the active support of some important sections of the landowners and the tribal chiefs. But the communists were averse to turning the revolutionary struggle into an intra-elite conflict. They could point to the fact that the triumphant tribal chiefs and landowners, who came to dominate the Majlis and the cabinet after 1909, soon betrayed the ideals of the Constitutional Revolution. “This contemptible Constitution,” according to a communist leaflet, “has done nothing but promise, and has given nothing to the people.” (“Announcement of the Persian Communist Party”, in Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the week ending 21 Feb. 1920, Intelligence Summary of East Persia WO158/1261.) The Communists wanted to mobilize the peasants rather than rely on illusory support of “liberal” landowners and tribal chiefs (Persian Communist Movement Doc., Vol. 4, Selected Writings of Sultanzade pp.94, 100). But Kuchik Khan counter-argued that the relationship between the peasants and tribal chiefs was not simply feudal but also patriarchal, which meant land reform would not immediately put an end to the chiefs’ hold over the peasants. (See above, Kuchik Khan to Yusuf ZiaBayk.) The revolutionary movement faced a dilemma. Kasvin Division Report for June and July, in Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 5 Aug. 1920, FO248/1292. As described by Kuchik Khan. Memorandum by Edmonds sent to the Tehran Legation, 18 Aug. 1920, FO248/1292. The British envoy at Tiflis reported that the Persian Bolshevik Party (Adalat) had set up a large organization at Baku for training and arming labourers “for service against the British in Persia.” According to his report, 4,000 of these armed men were shipped to Persia on June 15. Luke to Curzon, 21 June 1920, FO371/4943/ 7982. According to the Prime Minister’s envoy there were 1,200 armed oil workers at Resht in mid-July. Norman to Curzon, FO371/4920/3303. For two eye-witness accounts of this meeting see Edmonds to Norperforce HQ, 7 Aug. 1920, Edmonds Papers, Box VI, file 4; and R. Rezazadeh-Malak, Biography of Haydar Khan Amu-Ughli (in Persian) (Tehran, 1973), pp. 239–40. Kasvin Division Report, August 1920, in Edmonds to Tehran Legation, 9 Sept. 1920, FO371/4930, also FO248/1292. Fakhra’i, pp. 269–72. Kuchik Khan to Lenin, 1 Aug. 1920; for an English translation of the letter, see Edmonds Papers, Box VI, file 4. It is also partly quoted in Special Bureau of Information Report, No. 38 for week ending 13 Nov. 1920, L/PS/10/887. For the Persian text of the letter see Fakhra’i, pp. 279–82. War Diary (GHQ, Baghdad), WO95/4968; Norman to Curzon, 31 July 1920, FO371/4904/2766. Norman to Curzon, 1 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/2920. GHQ (Baghdad) to Norperforce HQ, 31 July 1920, WO158/697. Military Attaché to Norperforce HQ, 31 July 1920, ibid.

NOTES 215

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80. 81.

Norman to Curzon, 1 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/2913. Norman to Curzon, 30 July 1920, FO371/4904/2759. Haldane to Wilson, 20 June 1920, Wilson Papers, file 55, No. 1. Champain to GHQ (Baghdad), 28 June 1920, WO158/696. As quoted in Military Attaché to WO, 28 July 1920 (CP1717), CAB24/ 110. Norperforce HQ to GHQ (Baghdad), 31 July 1920, WO158/697. The War Office had forbidden any advance towards Resht. WO to GHQ (Baghdad), 14 July 1920, FO371/4904/1378. Champain to GHQ (Baghdad), 27 July 1920, WO158/697, Norman to Curzon, 28 July 1920, FO371/4922/2595; GOC (Mesopotamia) to WO, 30 July 1920, CP1719, CAB24/110, Military Attaché to WO, 28 July 1920, CP1717, ibid. GHQ (Baghdad) to WO, 3 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/3119. In mid-July the War Office had ordered a full division from India to be despatched to Mesopotamia in order to enable Haldane to suppress the revolt. WO to GOC (Mesopotamia), 17 June 1920, FO371/4922/1906. Wilson to Churchill, 30 July 1920, WO32/5745. WO to Churchill, 30 July 1920, Wilson Papers, file 18c, No. 11; (also CP1717, CAB24/110). Curzon wrote: “I would not talk at this stage about evacuating Tehran.” Minute, 2 Aug. 1920, FO371/4904/2728. Oliphant’s memo on his interview with Gen. Thwaites (DMI, WO), 31 July 1920, Curzon to Norman, 2 July 1920, ibid. Curzon’s Minute, 30 July 1920, FO371/4922/2595. CAB27/71, 12 Aug. 1920. Curzon to Norman, 13 Aug. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 540. See also Ch. 2. Curzon to Wilson, 13 Aug. 1920, WO to GOC (Mesopotamia), 18 Aug. 1920, in Wilson to Curzon, 18 Aug. 1920, Wilson Papers, file 20B, No. 6. Haldane continued to insist on a reduction of the troops in north Persia. In September Curzon once again had to appeal to the cabinet to ward off his demands. GHQ (Baghdad) to Norperforce, 27 Aug., 3, 14, 17 Sept. 1920, WO158/696; WO to GOC (Mesopotamia), 15 Sept. 1920, WO 32/ 52350; Cabinet 51 (20), 15 Sept. 1920, CAB23/22. Norman to Curzon, 16 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/4904. Norman to Curzon, 1 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/2920. Norman to Curzon, 8 Aug. 1920, FO371/4920/3303. Perhaps because the reconnaissance flights by the British aeroplanes had not found any sign of a major operation by the Soviet troops around Manjil. GHQ (Baghdad) to Norperforce HQ, 1 Aug. 1920, WO158/697. Baghdad thought the opposing force composed of 1,400 Jangalis. Norperforce HQ to GHQ (Baghdad), 8 Aug. 1920, WO158/697. GHQ (Baghdad) to Norperforce HQ, 8 Aug. 1920, ibid. Norman to Champain, 10, 11 Aug. 1920, Champain to Norman, 18 Aug. 1920, ibid. Kasvin Division Report, for August 1920, Edmonds to Norman, 6 Sept. 1920, enclosure in Norman to Curzon, 25 Sept. 1920, FO371/4930. It appears that the revolutionary forces on the Kasvin-Manjil road were


82.

83.

84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94.

composed largely of Jangalis and pro-Jangali tribesmen under the command of a Jangali leader (’Ali Daylami) and the two Russian officers (Sarokin and Shustik), see Fakhra’i, pp.262, 273. It seems that Starosselski’s swift success was, at least, partly due to the fact that the two pro-Jangali Commanders of the revolutionary forces on the Manjil-Resht road (Hassan Aliyani and Gendarmerie Colonel Fatullah Saqafi) had already been detained by the communists in Resht. See ibid., pp.262, 271, 273. Norman to Curzon, 25, 27 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/4937, 4982. Manjil Column to Military Attaché, 25 Aug. 1920; Manjil Column to Norperforce HQ, 25 Aug. 1920, WO158/697. Throughout the operation Kuchik Khan and his following remained neutral. He was, however, attacked by the Talish tribal chief, Amir Muqtader who defeated Kuchik Khan’s forces in a major battle on 28 July, killing one his leading commanders, Ghulam ‘Ali-Baba Masuli’i. Amir Muqtader, after occupying a large part of the territory under the control of the Jangalis, worked his way to within 12 miles of Enzeli where he briefly engaged the Bolshevik forces on 24 Aug. 1920. Kasvin Division Report, for August 1920, FO371/4930. MA to Norperforce HQ, 21 Aug. 1920, WO158/697. As quoted in “Kameneff and Krassin”, memorandum by Curzon, 2 Sept. 1920 (Very Secret), in Curzon Papers, F1 12/236. (Also Lloyd George Papers, F/203/1/ 3.) In this memorandum Curzon argued for termination of the Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations on the grounds of propaganda in Britain by the members of the Soviet delegation and the Soviet government’s hostile actions in the East, particularly in Persia. Weekly Summary of Intelligence by SIS (Constantinople Branch), Report No. 84 for the week ending 1 Sept. 1920, FO371/5171. Report from Norperforce HQ. 26 Aug. 1920, WO158/697. Champain to GHQ (Baghdad), 26 Aug. 1920, ibid. GOC (Mesopotamia) to WO, 30 Aug. 1920, FO371/4905/5586. Champain to GHQ (Baghdad), 16 Sept. 1920, WOl 58/697. At the end of September, Champain reported that “the enemy at Enzeli had been reinforced by 400 Russians.” Norperforce to GHQ (Baghdad), 29 Sept. 1920, ibid. Norperforce HQ to GHQ (Baghdad), 26 Sept. 1920, ibid. Norman to Curzon, 8 Sept. 1920, FO371/4905/6004. WO to GOC (Mesopotamia), 1 Sept. 1920, FO371/4905/5585. Ordzhonikidze (Baku) to Lenin, 24 Sept. 1920, and Lenin’s minute in Trotsky Papers, No. 617, p.305. Ordzhonikidze to Lenin, 24 Sept. 1920, ibid., No. 618, p. 307. E.H.Carr notes that “In Persia, as throughout the Middle East, the summer and autumn of 1920 were a period of hesitation in Soviet policy.” In his opinion this was due to two factors. First, “divided counsels” at Moscow; second, the Soviet government’s preoccupation in Europe (chiefly the war against Poland and Wrangel). The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. III, p. 244. He also adds: “In the summer of 1920 Soviet policy still halted before the fateful choice between universal support of communist parties in the foreign countries for the

NOTES 217

95. 96. 97. 98.

99. 100.

101.

102.

103.

furtherance of world-wide revolution and cooperation with selected governments, where national interests appeared to require it, even at the expense of the communist parties in the countries concerned.” Ibid. p.250. Of course, it did not mean that the Soviet authorities opposed the advance by the local revolutionaries towards Tehran. However, the Cossacks and the Gendarmes proved more than a match for the divided revolutionary forces. During the second offensive by the Cossacks, Kuchik Khan once again remained neutral. But 400 Jangalis led by Sayyed Jalal Chamani joined the Cossacks. Cox to Curzon, 11 March 1920 (Very Urgent), L/MIL/7/16933. Viceroy (Army Dept) to IO, 9 April 1920, L/MIL/7/16922. In Jan. 1920 the Emir of Bukhara wrote to Malleson that the Afghans had made overtures of “an anti-Bolshevik nature” to him. Viceroy (Army Dept) to IO, 11 March 1920, L/MIL/7/16922. Malleson believed that he was the chief advocate of invasion of Khurassan. Grigori Broido was in charge of the Dept of External Relations of the Turkestan Commission. The Commission was set up in Tashkent in Oct. 1919 by Moscow to bring the Bolsheviks in Turkestan into line. But, like its counterpart in the Caucasus, Kavburo, the Commission itself was sometimes in disagreement with Moscow. See Park, pp.63–79, 109–54; M.Rywkin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (London, 1982), Ch. 2. Malleson’s report of 10 March in Viceroy (Army Dept.) to IO, 16 March 1920, L/ MIL/7/16922. (Also Malleson to Tehran Legation, 15 March 1920, FO248/1318.) The Malleson Mission consisted of 2,200 Indian troops in Meshed plus 5, 000 troops and 3,400 levies on the line of communication between Meshed and the Indian railhead at Duzdap (600 miles). See “Central Asian Problem” WO to IO, 17 Jan. 1920, L/MIL/5/810. According to the intelligence reports there were 8,000 Soviet troops on the AshkhabadMerv line and 13,000 troops along the Afghan border in April. See Viceroy (Army Dept) to IO, 9 April 1920, L/MIL/7/16922. Malleson report March 13, in Viceroy (Army Dept) to IO, L/MIL/7/16922 (also in CP988 CAB24/101). See also Viceroy (Army Dept) to IO, 1 April 1920, ibid., and Malleson to Tehran Legation, 9 March 1920, FO248/ 1318. Persits, p.72; ‘A.Kambakhsh, A Short History of the Workers’ and Communist Movements in Iran (Tudeh Publication, 1972), pp. 13–14. See also H. Hakimian, “Wage Labour and Migration: Persian Workers in Southern Russia, 1880–1914”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 17 (1985), pp.443–62. Sultanzada’s report to the first congress of the Communist Party of Persia, in Persian Communist Movement Doc. Vol. 1, pp. 70–1; Persits, pp.97–98; A British intelligence report notes that “the Adalat is active in all centres in Turkestan.” Intelligence Summary for East Persia (compiled by Lt. Col. E.A.Redl, Military Attaché, Meshed). Report No. 24, for the week ending 12 June 1920, WO157/ 1261.


104. Malleson to Tehran Legation, 19 Feb. 1920, FO248/1318. (Also Malleson to CIGS (India), 19 Feb. 1920, FO371/3872.) 105. Viceroy (Army Dept) to IO, 29 March, 1920, L/MIL/7/16922. 106. lbid.; Malleson to Tehran Legation, 22 March 1920, FO248/1318; Special Bureau of Information Report No. 7, for the fortnight ending 3 April 1920, L/PS/10/887/ 3849. Special Bureau of Information had been set up by the Government of India to monitor the Bolshevik activities in India and the neighbouring countries. It was disbanded in December 1920. 107. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed) No. 20, for the week ending 15 May 1920, WO157/1261. Malleson believed that the threats against Persia emanated from local Bolsheviks at Tashkent rather than from Moscow. The local Bolsheviks were buoyed up by the Persian communists who described the conditions in Persia as ripe for revolution. 108. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), No. 24, for the week ending 12 June 1920, Ibid. 109. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), No. 25, for week ending 19 June 1920, ibid. 110. Haydar Khan was born in Western Azerbaijan. He settled with his family in the Caucasus. He graduated from Tiflis Polytechnic as an electrical engineer. He started his revolutionary activities in Meshed in 1902. During the Constitutional Revolution he came into prominence as a leading Constitutionalist partisan. In 1910, suspected of involvement in the assassination of a leading mujtahid, he was forced to leave Persia for Europe. In Switzerland he joined the Russian Social Democrats. During the war he cooperated with the Persian nationalist exiles in Berlin, Paris and Constantinople. After the October Revolution he went to Moscow. See A.R.Sheikholeslami and D. Wilson, “The Memoirs of Haydar Khan Amu Ughlu,”, Iranian Studies, 6 (1973), pp.21–56; R.Ra’isnya, Riding the Storms (in Persian) (Tehran, 1981); R.RezazadehMalak. 111. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), No. 27, for the week ending 3 July 1920, WO1 57/1261. 112. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), Nos. 6,16, 25, for the weeks ending 7 Feb., 17 April, 19 June 1920, ibid. Some of the communists who managed to reach Meshed were arrested by the police. However it appears that they had established a small organization in the provincial capital. Malmiss to Tehran Legation, 24 Sept. 1920, FO248/1318. 113. Grey to Foreign Secretary, government of India, 3 March 1920, FO371/ 3872/ 201101. (Also Grey to Tehran, 4 March FO248/1318.) 114. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), Nos. 24, 25, for the weeks ending 12, 19 June 1920, WO157/1261. Grey to Tehran Legation, 26 June 1920, FO248/1318. 115. Meshed Diary (Consul-General), No. 26, for the week ending 3 July 1920, L/PS/ 10/820/6273. 116. Special Bureau of Information Reports, Nos. 16, 21, for the weeks ending 5 June, 3 July 1920, L/PS/10/887.

NOTES 219

117. Meshed Diary (Consul-General), No. 20, for the week ending 22 May 1920, L/PS/ 10/820/5818; Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), No. 27, for the week ending 3 July 1920, WO157/1261; Malmiss (Meshed) to Tehran, 29 June, FO248/1318. 118. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), Nos. 20, 21, 25 for the weeks ending 22 May, 19 June, 26 June WO157/1261. Meshed Diary (Consul-General), No. 22, for the week ending 5 June, L/PS/10/820/59/6. Special Bureau of Information Report No. 19, for the week ending 26 June 1920, L/PS/10/ 887/5907. 119. An intelligence report noted: “Haidar Khan, the Adalat leader for Ashkhabad, was reported to be acting as Khuda Verdi’s chief adviser.” Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), No. 28, for the week ending 10 July, WO157/1261. 120. L.V.S.Blacker, On Secret Patrol in High Asia (London, 1922), p. 277. Blacker had been employed on intelligence work in Transcaspia in 1918– 19. In Bajgiran, 150 miles north-west of Meshed, his duty was “to watch over 160 miles of rugged mountain frontier against Bolshevik penetration and to find out all about them and their intentions.” Ibid., p. 217. On 11 July he reported: “Detachments of Bolshevik troops at Ashkabad are put at 5,000…. The Adalat force at Ashkabad is expecting to enter Persia at any moment.” Malmiss (Meshed) to Tehran Legation, 12 July 1920, FO248/1318. 121. Norman to Curzon, 4, 7, 13, 18 July, FO371/4916/458, 889, 1278, 1632, 1633; CGS (India) to DMI (WO), 14 July 1920, L/PS/10/906/5601; Grey (Meshed) to Tehran Legation, 6 July 1920, FO248/1318; Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), No. 29, for the week ending 17 July 1920, WO157/ 1261; Meshed Diary (Consul-General), No. 27 for the week ending 10 July 1920, L/PS/10/820/6542. 122. See Ch. 2. 123. WO to FO, 14 July 1920; IO to FO, 20 July 1920, FO371/4916/1301, 1830. It should be noted that the British troops were not authorized to resist a Red Army invasion of Khurassan. Pending the withdrawal, the Commander of the force was ordered “to protect the Persian territory against inroads by small parties, if large forces act aggressively he is to avoid committing his force and is to withdraw and evacuate Meshed if need be.” Viceroy (Army Dept) to IO, 30 June 1920, L/MIL/7/16933 (also L/PS/10/912/5261). 124. Montagu to Viceroy, 5 July 1920; Montagu to Hankey, n.d. (July 1920), FO371/ 4916/575, 1250. 125. Viceroy to IO, 19 July 1920, L/PS/10/906/5582. 126. Minutes by G.Churchill and Oliphant, 14 July 1920, FO371/4916/1278. 127. Minute by Curzon, 20 July 1920, Curzon to Norman, 21 July 1920, FO371/4916/ 1580. 128. Gen. Malleson was dismissed because of “personal friction” between him and the Consul-General at Meshed in April. CGS (India) to Maj. Gen. Malleson (Meshed), 9 April 1920, L/MIL/7/16922. Lesslie, who was the Inspector-General of the line of communication in east Persia, took command of the Meshed Mission in May.


129. Meshed Diary (Consul-General) Nos. 27, 29, 30 for the weeks ending 10, 17, 24, July 1920, L/PS/10/820; Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed), Nos. 27, 29, 30, for the weeks ending 3, 17, 24 July 1920. WO157/1261; Blacker, p.290. 130. Blacker, pp.278–279; Malmiss (Meshed) to Tehran Legation, 18 July 1920, FO248/1295. 131. The British troops had been forbidden to intervene in “internal risings against local Persian authorities, unless their safety was threatened by remaining inactive.” (See note 123.) 132. Including Muhammad-Reza Khan Shuja ul-Mulk, the chief of the Hazara tribe with 100 cavalry, Imad ul-Mulk with 300 Turshizi fighters, Muhammad Ja’far Khan Salar Shuja of Turbat-i Haydariya with 50 men, and Sayyed Haydar, the Barbari chief with 70 men (Meshed Diary Nos. 28–9 for the weeks ending 17, 24 July, L/PS/10/820/ 7028, 7124 and Diary of Inspector-General of Line of Communication, East Persia, July 1920, WO95/5417). According to Blacker: “There were Firuz Khuhis, Jamshedis, Baluchis, Hazaras, Taimanis, Taimuri, Kurds, Afshar, and Turks and a dozen other strange tribes from the Afghan and Russian frontiers” (p. 290). 133. Meshed Diary (Consul-General), Nos. 28, 29, 30, 32 for the weeks ending 17, 24, 31 July, 14 Aug. 1920. L/PS/10/820/2028, 7124, 7127, 7600; Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed) No. 29–34, for the period of 17 July— 21 Aug. 1920, WO157/1261. 134. Malmiss (Meshed) to Tehran Legation, 26 July 1920, FO248/1318. 135. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed) Nos. 32, 33, for the weeks ending 7, 14 Aug. 1920, WOl 57/1261; Malmiss (Meshed) to Tehran Legation, 3 Aug. 1920, FO248/ 1318. 136. Blacker, p.291. 137. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed) No. 34, for week ending 21 Aug. 1920, WO1 57/1261; Special Bureau of Information, Report No. 27, for the week ending 21 Aug. 1920, L/PS/10/887/7270. On August 12 the Persian telegraphist at the border town of Khakistar wired: “A considerable force of Bolsheviks with guns reached Khakistar. A portion of the detachment had proceeded towards Kalat-i Nadiri.” The next day he reported that the Bolsheviks had left the Persian territory. Before leaving they told the telegraphist that “they had orders to invade Persia, but that a later order from Tashkent recalling them had just been received.” Malmiss to Tehran Legation, 12, 13, 14 Aug. 1920, FO248/1318. 138. The Red Army attack on Bukhara began on August 30. After a threeday battle the fortress of Bukhara fell. Park, pp.48–49. Intelligence Report (MA, Meshed) Nos. 32–43, for the period of 7 Aug- 23 Oct., WO157/1261; Malmiss to Tehran Legation, 16 Aug., 16, 20 Sept. 1920, FO248/ 1318. Special Bureau of Information Report No. 32, for week ending 25 Sept. 1920, L/PS/10/887/8146.

NOTES 221

CHAPTER FIVE 1. “Bolshevik Attack on Persia”, memo by E.Ovey, 20 Nov. 1920, FO371/ 4907/ 12195. 2. GHQ (Mesopotamia) to WO, 23 Oct. 1920; WO to GHQ (Mesopotamia), 29 Oct. 1920, WO 106/1212. 3. Churchill to Curzon, 27 Oct. 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/215. 4. Cabinet Memorandum by W.Churchill, 27 Oct. 1920, Churchill Documents, p. 1240. Churchill was, of course, more concerned about Wrangel than about Persia. He hoped to persuade Curzon and the cabinet to reconsider their opposition to further aid to Wrangel. 5. Ullman, Vol. III, p.311; Gilbert, p.436. 6. Summary of Intelligence Report by SIS (Constantinople Branch) for week ending 18 Nov. 1920, FO371/5172/15525. 7. Summary of Intelligence Report by SIS (Constantinople) for week ending 27 Nov. 1920, FO371/5172/16089. 8. Cabinet Memorandum by W.Churchill, 29 Nov. 1920, Churchill Documents, p. 1256. 9. GHQ (Mesopotamia) to WO, 29 Nov. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/203/1/ 11. 10. Ibid., FO371/4907/12895; Summary of Intelligence Report by SIS (Constantinople) for week ending 4 Dec. 1920, FO371/6497/138. 11. Haldane to WO, 28 Nov. 1920, WO 32/5235. (Also FO371/4907/12738.) 12. Ibid. 13. Norman to Curzon, 1 Dec. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 592. According to Hovannisian, at least as early as Feb. 1920 Chicherin had written to Mustafa Kemal calling for a coordinated military campaign in Transcaucasia. See R. Hovannisian, “Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4 (1973), pp.143–47. However the British officials knew that the Soviet-Turkish relation was not devoid of mutual suspicion. 14. Bristow to Tehran Legation, 17 Nov. 1920, FO248/1282. 15. Bristow to Tehran Legation, 5 Dec. 1920, ibid. Bristow learned of the establishment of a socialist republic in Armenia on December 9. 16. Carr, Vol. III, p.297. 17. A few months earlier, during the suppression of the Khiyabani revolt, AmirArshad, the most important chieftain of Karadagh, had managed to mobilize more than three thousand men. Bristow suspected that the fighting had been instigated by Bolshevik agents. 18. See note 13 above. 19. Bristow to Tehran Legation, 2, 9 Dec. 1920, FO248/1282. 20. Ironside to Tehran Legation, 7 Dec. 1920, ibid. 21. Bristow to Tehran Legation, 18 Dec. 1920, ibid. 22. Bristow to Tehran Legation, 18 Dec. 1920, ibid. See also the memoirs of the Governor-General, Mukhber us-Saltana, pp.322–30. 23. Haldane to WO, 28 Nov. 1920, WO 32/5235. 24. Their warnings against Soviet aggressive designs were not confined to the public statements or the cabinet memoranda. There are numerous references to the Soviet threat to Persia in the departmental and private correspondence of Churchill and the War Office officials.


25. Cabinet 1 (21), 4 Jan. 1921, CAB23/24. 26. See Ch. 3. 27. He was known for the assassination of the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, in 1918. He had studied Persian and written a book about the Persian economy before the war. In 1934 he was arrested and shot because of his connections with Trotsky. See also V. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901–1941 (Oxford, 1978 reprint), pp.255–257. 28. Eliava was not unknown to the Persian revolutionaries. He, like many other Georgian revolutionaries, had taken part in the Persian Constitutional Revolution. He was appointed the Chairman of the Turkestan Commission in 1919. He was the Chairman of the Transcaucasian Federation in 1927–34. 29. “Extract from the Kasvin Division Report for September 1920”, by Maj. Edmonds, enclosure in Norman to Curzon, 14 Oct. 1920, FO371/4907/ 13013 (the entire report in FO248/1292); “Who’s Who of Bolshevik Personalities in Gilan”, 2 Oct. 1920, Edmonds Papers, Box VI, file 4; Summary of Intelligence Report by SIS (Constantinople) for week ending 18 Aug. 1920, FO371/5171/1107; Fakhra’i, pp. 272, 285. Stephen White notes that the Soviet leaders were disenchanted with the revolutionary movements in the East because the “Gilan episode” and the Baku Congress in September demonstrated the difficulties of bringing about a socialist revolution in the East. S.White, Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution (London, 1979), pp.124–27 and S.White, “Communism and the East: The Baku Congress 1920”, Slavic Review, 33 (1974), pp.492–514. 30. A.Bennigsen and S.E.Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago U., 1979), pp.52–56; M.A.Persits, pp.114–28. 31. White, 1979, pp.117–19. 32. V.I.Lenin, “Preliminary Draft Theses on National and Colonial Question”, Collected Works, Vol. 31; A.B.Reznikov, “The Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International on the National and Colonial Questions”, in R.A. Ulyanovsky, ed., The Comintern and the East (Moscow, 1979), pp.142–54. 33. The Second Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings, fifth session, 28 July 1920 (London 1977), p.135. Sultanzada regarded the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906–9 as a bourgeois-democratic movement. 34. As quoted in B.Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, Vol. I (Hoover Institute, 1972), p.384. 35. See Ch. 2. 36. Ironside to Col. S J. Francis (CO, Manjil), 26, 28 Oct. 1920; Ironside to Zanjan Col., 27 Oct. 1920, WO158/697. 37. “Appreciation of Position in North-West Persia”, by Gen. Ironside in GOC (Mesopotamia) to WO, 26 Oct. 1920, FO371/4906/10687; Ironside to High Commissioner (Baghdad), 25 Oct. 1920, WO 95/4968. 38. GHQ (Baghdad) to Norperforce HQ (Kasvin), 30 Oct. 1920; Haldane to Ironside, 1 Nov. 1920; Ironside to Col. Francis, 30 Oct. 1920, WO158/ 687.

NOTES 223

39. Ironside to Francis, 3 Nov. 1920, WO158/697. 40. War Diary (HQ, Norperforce) Vol. II, Nov. 1920, National Army Museum 6403/ 2; War Diary (GHQ Baghdad), 1920, WO95/4968; Norperforce to GHQ (Baghdad), 18, 26 Nov. 1920, WO158/697. 41. Mushaver ul-Mamalek to Persian P.M., 8 Nov. 1920, in Norman to Curzon, 10 Dec. 1920, FO371/6401/2124. 42. Ironside to GHQ (Baghdad), 12 Nov. 1920, WO158/687. 43. Krassin (London) to Chicherin, 16 Nov. 1920 (intercept No. 004872), Lloyd George Papers, F/203/1/11. 44. Carr, p.296. 45. “Draft Resolution of Politburo of the C.C.R.C.P. (B)”, 27 Nov. 1920, in Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 42, p.228. However it is not unlikely that some members of the Politburo favoured an aggressive policy. According to the Persian envoy at Moscow, a powerful faction in the Soviet leadership advocated continued support for the Gilan revolutionaries. See A.H.Masud-Ansari, My Life (in Persian) (Tehran, 1972), Vol. II, p. 79. See also S.Blank, “Soviet Politics and the Iranian Revolution of 1919–1921”, Cahier du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 21 (1980), pp.173–94. 46. On 8 Dec. the cabinet decided to withdraw the troops. On 9 Dec. it was announced in the House of Commons that the British troops would evacuate Persia in the spring. 47. Hekker to Gikalo, 14 Dec. 1920, in GHQ (Baghdad) to WO, 23 Dec. 1920, FO371/ 6399/26. 48. Minute by G.Churchill, 18 Nov. 1920, FO371/4906/1159. 49. Mu’azzez ud-Daula (Persian Consul-General at Tiflis) to Foreign Minister, Baku, 28 Oct. 1920, in Norman to Curzon, 16 Nov. 1920, ibid. 50. Mushaver ul-Mamalek was an archetypal member of the elite. His grandfather, who had married into the royal family, had been in charge of foreign affairs during the reign of Mohammed Shah (1834–48), and his father was a career diplomat who had served for many years as the Persian Consul-General at Astrakhan. He himself was a career diplomat and had served several times as the Foreign Minister since 1913. His son, too, joined the Foreign Ministry in 1918. 51. After the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, his son decided to quit the Foreign Ministry because he thought “it was no longer an honour to serve as a diplomat.” See Masud-Ansari, Vol. II, pp.6, 82. 52. ’A Mustaufi, Story of My Life (in Persian), Vol. III (Tehran, 1964), pp. 184–85. Mushaver ul-Mamalek had his first inkling of the AngloPersian negotiations at Tehran in an interview with Balfour at Paris. When he heard the news of the negotiations, he was “flabbergasted.” (See his Paris Diary, 7 Feb. 1919, and memoirs printed in MasudAnsari, Vol. I, pp.264, 276.) He later appealed in tears to the Shah to oppose the Agreement. Ibid., Vol. II, p.27. 53. Mushaver ul-Mamalek to Prime Minister, Jan. 1921, in Norman to Curzon, 16 Jan. 1921, FO371/6402/3496. When he learned the Prime Minister communicated his despatches to the British Legation, he wrote: “I am sorry that my telegrams reach other quarters, but I am not afraid to act for the interests of my country.”


54. Mushaver ul-Mamalek to Prime Minister, 2 Dec. 1921, in Norman to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1921, FO371/6402/3493. 55. Mushaver ul-Mamalek to Prime Minister, 21 Dec. 1920, in Norman to Curzon, 12 Jan. 1921, FO371/6402/3491. 56. Minute by Ovey, 4 Dec. 1920, FO371/4907/12838. 57. Norman to Ironside, 27 Dec. 1920, FO248/1301. 58. Norman to Curzon, 27, 30 Dec. 1920, FO371/4907/14853, 15093. (Also DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 621.) 59. Curzon to Norman, 3 Jan. 1921, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 629. 60. Curzon to Norman, 3 Jan. 1921, ibid. No. 628. (Also FO371/6399/2.) 61. Memorandum by G.Churchill, FO, 20 Dec. 1920, FO371/4907/14455 (DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 616); Minutes by Churchill, 21 Dec. 1921, FO371/4915/14376. 62. Minute by Oliphant, 22 Dec. 1920, ibld. 63. Minute by Curzon, 20 Dec. 1920, FO371/4907/14455. 64. Curzon to Norman, 3 Jan. 1921, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 628. 65. Memorandum by Walter Long, 24 Dec. 1920 (CP377), CAB24/117. 66. Chelmsford to Montagu, 5 Jan. 1921, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 634. In fact, three years earlier an article in Izvestya (1 Jan. 1918) had pointed out that Soviet renunciation of the Tsarist concessions in Persia was the best means of destroying British influence in the country. See Carr, p. 233, n. 3. And Prince Firuz later told Norman that the Anglo-Persian Agreement, in its existing form, would never be ratified by the Majlis at least partly because of the advantages of the Soviet-Persian treaty. Norman to Curzon, 21 Feb. 1921, FO371/6404/2144. 67. Chelmsford to Montagu, 10, 22 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/646, FO371/6400/ 1196 (DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, Nos. 634, 662). Oliphant minuted: “We cannot gamble on the sincerity of the Soviets.” Minute 11 Jan. 1921, FO371/ 6409/17. 68. For the correspondence between FO and IO regarding the SPR, see FO371/6409. 69. Minute by Churchill, 27 Jan. 1921, FO371/6400/1196. 70. Minute by Curzon, 29 Jan. 1921, ibid. 71. Gen. Radcliffe (DMO) to Gen. W.Thwaites (DMI), 29 Dec. 1920; Thwaites to Radcliffe, 31 Dec. 1920; WO to FO, Jan. 1920, WO32/5807. 72. Wilson to Haldane (Baghdad), 24 Jan. 1921, Wilson Papers, file 55, No. 8. 73. DCIGS to Churchill, 28 Jan. 1921, WO32/5807. 74. Cox to Montagu, 29 Jan. 1921, FO371/6400/1621 (DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 668). 75. For his account of the British retreat from Archangel in the face of the Bolshevik advance, see Field Marshal Lord Ironside, Archangel 1918– 1919 (London, 1953). 76. “Situation in Persia in December 1920,” Gen. Ironside to DMO (WO), enclosure in Ironside to Norman, 10 Dec. 1920, FO248/1301; Norman to Curzon, 8, 19, 20 25 Jan. 1921, FO371/6400/1355, 1226, FO371/6399/ 406, 1009 (DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, Nos. 640, 656, 658, 665). In the Foreign Office, Oliphant was inclined to think that Ironside’s views “may

NOTES 225

77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

85. 86.

87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92.

conceivably be correct.” But Curzon angrily minuted: “Everyone in Tehran is a coward.” FO371/6399/1008. Lord Ironside, p.157. “Monthly Summary for December 1920”, in Norman to Curzon, 23 Feb. 1921, FO371/6434. Norman to Curzon, 7, 8, 12, 15 Jan. 19 20, DBFP , Is , Vol. XI II, Nos. 638, 651; Norman to Curzon, 14 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/717. ’Abdul Majid ’Ain ud- Daula, as a man who had led the Royalist troops against the Constitutionalists in the Tabriz siege of 1909, enjoyed the confidence of the royal household. Ibid. Norman to Curzon, 15 Jan. 1921, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 651. Norman to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/667. Minute by Oliphant, 25 Jan. 1921, FO371/6400/1188. Mushaver ul-Mamalek had assured the Prime Minister that Soviet Russia intended not only to withdraw her troops but also to dissolve the revolutionary government in Gilan. Norman to Curzon, 16 Jan. 1921, FO371/6402/3496. Norman to Curzon, 11 Feb. 1920, FO371/6401/1985. Firuz was highly recommended by Cox, the British High Commissioner at Baghdad. He had apparently obtained a fetwa from the Mujtahids in Iraq declaring Bolshevism to be incompatible with Islam. He also promised to begin a campaign against the Soviet-Persian treaty. Cox to Curzon, 9 Jan. 1921, FO371/ 6399/667; Norman to Curzon, 23 Jan. 1921, Minute by Oliphant, FO371/6400/ 1135, 1188; Norman to Curzon, 23 Jan. 1921, FO371/6401/2144. Daulatabadi, pp.211–18. Norman to Curzon, 8 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/406. Norman to Curzon, 24 Jan. 1921, FO371/6400/1188. MA (Tehran) to HQ, Norperforce (Kasvin), 6 Jan. 1921, WO158/687. “Appreciation of Tehran Situation”, by H.Smyth, 19 Jan. 1921, ibid. Smyth’s account of Bolshevik activities in Tehran appears to be exaggerated. The agitation against the opening of the Majlis to discuss the Anglo-Persian Agreement was chiefly conducted by the nationalists and some clergy. It should be noted that the British troops had been forbidden to enter Tehran without being explicitly authorized by London. (WO to GOC (Mesopotamia), 3 June 1920; FO to Wilson (WO), 5 June 1920; Wilson to Crowe (FO), 7 June 1920, FO371/3873/202036, 202451.) The details of the coup are still obscure. It appears that Smyth had prior knowledge of the coup and cooperated with the conspirators. (W.G.Grey, “Recent Persian History”, Journal of Central Asian History. 13 (1926), p. 35; Dixon to Curzon, 14 May 1921, FO 371/6427/5814.) Ullman and Wright, both drawing on Ironside’s manuscript diary, note that the general was also in favour of a military coup. But they do not produce any direct evidence showing that he had actually planned the coup (Ullman, Vol. 3, pp.386–8; D.Wright, The English Amongst The Persians (London, 1977), pp.181–4). In fact the available evidence


93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

98.

99.

suggests that although he had some knowledge of Reza Khan’s intentions he was not fully aware of the coup plot. For example, he makes no mention of Sayyed Zia, the civilian leader of the coup, in his diary (Ullman, p.389, n.117). Whatever the extent of his involvement, he seems to have acted on his own initiative without informing his superiors. Shortly after the coup when his immediate superior, Gen. Haldane, enquired about the Cossacks’ move, he simply stated that they “originally went to Tehran to arrest the turbulent Cossack officers by the order of the shah and with the knowledge of Mr. Norman” (Haldane to WO, 23 Feb. 1921, FO 371/6409/ 2515). Indeed with the knowledge of the Legation, Sardar Humayun, prodded by Smyth, had eventually summoned the Cossacks to the capital to replace their illdisciplined colleagues there. The conspirators seized on this opportunity to carry out the coup. On the day the Cossacks set off for Tehran Ironside hinted to Norman that Reza Khan might try to topple the government. Norman was far from enthusiastic about the idea (Wright, p.184). However it appears that he continued to expect the arrival of only a few hundred Cossacks simply in order to replace their colleagues in Tehran (Norman to Norperforce HQ, 18 Feb. 1921, WO 158/687). He and his Counsellor, Haig, later denied that the Legation had been privy to the coup plot (Norman to Curzon, 1 March 1921, FO 371/6403/4926; W.Haig, “The Rise of Riza Khan Pahlavi”, National Review, 86 (1925), pp.624–32). There is no indication that the officials in London had any inkling of the planned coup. Norman to Curzon, 1 March 1921, FO371/6403/4926. Lord Ironside, p.160. Edmonds to Norperforce HQ, 5 July 1920, WO158/697 (FO248/1320). Norman to Curzon, 7 Dec. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 599. Edmonds (FO) to Lt. Col. G.E.Wheeler (Tehran Embassy), 13 Jan. 1949, Edmonds Papers, Box XII, file 6. Sayyed Zia did not reveal his plan to Edmonds, but Edmonds “did form a pretty shrewd idea what was in the wind.” “I did not probe too deeply,” he added, “because I thought S. Zia’s fears were well-founded and thought that too much knowledge would be embarrassing to me.” Some other comtemporary observers also credit Sayyed Zia with masterminding the coup. See Balfour, pp.218–19; Bahar, Vol. I, p.63, passim. Minute by Churchill, 8 Dec. 1920, FO371/4915/13222. Indeed after the coup, Sayyed Zia asked the Shah to grant him the title of “Dictator.” But the Shah objected on the grounds that this “would constitute a humiliation to the position and dignity of the Sovereign” (Norman to Curzon, 1 March 1921, FO371/6403/ 4926). M.Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton, 1971), pp. 126–27. Between 1907 and 1918, no fewer than 40 cabinets held office in Tehran but only about 70 men held more than 350 positions in these cabinets, moving from one post to another in different cabinets. (See M.FardSaidi, “Early Phases of Political Modernisation in Iran, 1870–1925” (Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1974) p. 80.) See also Z.Shaji’i, The Political and

NOTES 227

100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115.

116. 117.

118.

119. 120.

Sociological Study of Ministers and Ministries in Iran (in Persian) (Tehran, 1977), p.155. Bahar, pp.64–65. Minute by Champain, July 1920, WO158/697. Norman to Curzon, 7 Dec. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 599. Mustaufi, pp.203–5. There were a few exceptions, such as Mustaufi ul-Mamalek, Mushir udDaula and Mutamen ul-Mulk. And the coup leaders did not dare touch the Bakhtiari chiefs who resided in Tehran. For the text of the proclamation see Mustaufi, pp.217–20; Daulatabadi, pp.233– 39; an English translation in FO371/6403/4926. Selected writings of Sultanzada, p.96, Persian Communist Movement Doc., Vol. 4. The Times, 4 April 1920, in FO371/6402/3955. Perhaps disliking its attack on the aristocrats and its pseudo-revolutionary language, Curzon described the proclamation as “pure bunkum.” FO371/6403/4926. Norman to Curzon, 3 March 1921, FO371/6401/2883. Norman to Curzon, 25 Feb. 1921, FO371/6402/2605. See Ch. 2. Norman to Curzon, 25 Feb. 1921, FO371/6401/2605. Mr William Peters’ (Assistant Agent at the British Mission in Moscow) Report of a Conversation with Karakhan on 5 May 1921, in Dept Overseas Trade to India Office, 26 May 1921, L/PS/10/912/2549. Norman to Curzon, 23 May 1921, FO371/6405/8862. Norman to Curzon, 23 April 1921, FO371/6403/4808. Sayyed Zia had unsuccessfully appealed to Lloyd George to put off the British withdrawal until September by which date he could reorganize the Persian forces. Sayyed Zia to Lloyd George, n.d., Lloyd George Papers, F/57/4/1. See note 114 above. Norman to Curzon, 18, 21 Feb. 1921; Minute by Oliphant, 21 Feb. 1921, FO371/ 6401/2226, 2243; Curzon to Norman, 22 Feb. 1921, ibid.; Norman, Gen. Ironside and the Persian government strongly urged the Foreign Office to accept the proposal. But the War Office and Gen. Haldane opposed the proposal, fearing it would delay British withdrawal. WO to FO, Feb. 1921, GOC (Mesopotamia) to War Office, 22 Feb. 1921, WO32/5807. GHQ (Mesopotamia) to WO, 4 April 1921; Norman to Curzon, 6 April 1921; Minutes by Churchill and Oliphant, 11 April 1921, FO371/6403/ 4263, 4216. It should be noted that Sayyed Zia had informed Moscow that he would not allow the Soviet Minister to enter Tehran unless the Soviets stopped their operations in Gilan in accordance with the SovietPersian treaty. Norman to Curzon, 18 April 1921, L/PS/907/1985. The Soviet operations had stopped on 18 April (see Summary of Intelligence (MA, Tehran), No. 1, for week ending 7 May 1921, FO371/6435/8863). Minute by Oliphant, 26 April 1921; Curzon to Norman, 28 April 1921, FO371/ 6403/4805, 4808.


121. The Anglo-Soviet talks had practically been brought to a halt between July and November because of the Polish crisis and the objection of some ministries to the activities of Kamenev, the head of the Soviet delegation in Britain. 122. Cabinet 61 (20), 17 Nov. 1920, CAB 23/23. Krassin had dangled the prospect of substantial Russian orders in front of several British firms, hoping that it would lead the industrialists to pressurize the government to resume the trade talks with Soviet Russia (see Carr, pp.285–86; White, 1979, pp.16–18). In fact Lloyd George, at the cabinet meeting, referred to the pressures from the Midland manufacturers in favour of a resumption of Anglo-Soviet trade. But the financiers opposed the agreement before settlement of the Russian debts to the financial houses. Their views were expressed in the cabinet by the Chancellor, Austen Chamberlain. 123. After the meeting Curzon sent a despatch to the Prime Minister, which he had just received from Tehran, showing that the Azerbaijan officials had asked the Persian diplomatic mission to raise the question of the withdrawal of the Bolshevik troops from Gilan in Moscow. Curzon noted that this despatch bore out his contention “this morning that the Bolshevik forces at Enzeli and in Persia are launched and controlled by Moscow.” Curzon to Lloyd George, 18 Nov. 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F/ 13/1/33. 124. Cabinet 63 (20), 18 Nov. 1920, CAB23/23. 125. Report of the cabinet committee consisting of the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, War, and India, 24 Nov. 1920, CP2138, CAB24/115. 126. Draft Secretary’s Notes of a Conference between the British Ministers and the Head of the Russian Trade Delegation, 21 Dec. 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. VIII, No. 102. 127. Chicherin to Krassin, 15 Dec. 1920, Davidson Papers, Box 16. 128. Chicherin to Curzon, 5 Feb. 1921, L/PS/10/912/1158; Memo by Curzon on the Krassin negotiations, Feb. 1921, DBFP, Is, Vol. XII, No. 835. 129. Cabinet 13 (21), 14 March 1921, CAB23/24. The Anglo-Persian Agreement had already been denounced by Sayyed Zia. 130. For the text of the Agreement see DBFP, Is, Vol. XII, No. 845. 131. Curzon note to Soviet government, 7 Sept. 1921, Curzon Papers, F1 12/ 236. 132. Minute, 28 April 1921, L/PS/10/907/2040. The India Office however discounted the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Persia and maintained the Soviet sporadic military actions in north Persia were only “sabre rattling.” 133. Norman to Curzon, 25 May 1921, FO371/6404/6040; Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 3, for week ending 21 May 1921, FO371/ 6435/8863. Rothstein arrived in Tehran on 24 April. 134. See Ch. 7. 135. The Foreign Office had initially instructed Norman that he should have “no relations” with the Soviet Minister. Later he was instructed not to initiate but to return courtesies, and not to refuse to transact official business. The French and American Ministers were however forbidden

NOTES 229

136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

152. 153. 154.

to have any relations with Rothstein. FO371/6401/2334; FO371/6405/ 8272. Norman to Curzon, 23 May 1921, FO371/6405/8862. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 3, for week ending May 21 1921, FO371/6435/8863. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), Nos. 7, 8, for weeks ending 17, 25 June 1921, FO371/6435/9236. Norman to Curzon, 1 July 1921, FO371/6405/7560. The history of the Anglo-Russian rivalry before 1907 had probably influenced Norman’s perception. Norman to Curzon, 9 Jan. 1921, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 642. The report by Armitage-Smith in Norman to Curzon, 27 June 1921, FO416/68. Norman to Curzon, 30 June 1921, FO371/6405/9258. Balfour, p.218. Norman to Curzon, 19 July 1921, FO371/6405/8400. Curzon wrote in a minute: “What a contemptible man.” Norman to Curzon, 5 July 1921, FO371/6406/9654. Norman to Curzon, 26 July 1921, FO371/6406/10093. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 9, for week ending 2 July 1920, FO371/ 6435/9650; Norman to Curzon, 1 July 1921, FO371/6405/7560. Norman to Curzon, 5 July 1921, FO371/6405/9521. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 10, for week ending 9 July 1920, FO371/ 6435/9650. The term is used in Norman to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/458. Feodor Rothstein had lived for some 30 years in Britain as a political refugee, working on various newspapers including the Daily News and the Manchester Guardian. In 1917 he was employed on intelligence work by the War Office. But he was soon fired, suspected of being antiAllies. After the expulsion of Litvinov in 1918, he came to be regarded as the chief Bolshevik agent in Britain. He played a major part in organizing the British Communist Party. He later joined the Soviet Trade Delegation as the political adviser. In August 1920 he went back to Moscow to report to Chicherin about the Anglo-Soviet negotiations. But on arrival in London he was refused entry by the Home Office. For the police file on Rothstein see Scotland Yard to FO, 12 Jan. 1921, FO371/6399/667. Norman to Curzon, 5 July 1921, FO371/6406/9054. Ibid. Haydar Khan added: “If in the midst of such a revolution Russian troops encroach upon Persia, the Persian revolutionaries are under obligation to oppose the Russian troops.” When during a meeting with the Azerbaijan officials in Baku some Persian revolutionaries, including Sardar Muhi, Khalu Qurban and Hesabi, asked for direct military support, Haydar Khan “openly opposed the despatch of troops to Gilan.” He pointed out that the inhabitants of Gilan “had welcomed the Red Army on its arrival but had been so disgusted by the conduct of the Red soldiers that, at the time of the temporary withdrawal from Resht, they


155.

156. 157.

158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169.

had poured boiling water on the retreating Red soldiers.” He argued that “the despatch of troops not only served no useful purpose but turned the Persians against the Russians and endangered the fundamental revolutionary object in view.” Muazzed ud-Daula (ConsulGeneral at Tiflis) to Persian Prime Minister, 12 April 1921, in Norman to Curzon, 24 May 1921, FO371/6404/7500. In February Edmonds reported that the Persian communists had made “several abortive attempts” to come to terms with Kuchik Khan. Kuchik Khan had insisted on taking command of the entire revolutionary forces, “dropping of the Bolshevik programmes in Persia and the establishment of a Democratic Republic” (Memo by Edmonds, Kasvin, 14 Feb. 1921, FO248/1329). Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran) No. 5, for week ending 4 June 1921, FO371/ 6435/9972. Some intelligence reports put the strength of the revolutionaries at up to 6,000 men, 3,000 under Kuchik Khan, 900 under Khalu Qurban, and 2,000 under Ihsanullah Khan and Sa’ed ud-Daula. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 13, for week ending 30 July 1921, FO371/ 6435/1145. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 7, for week ending 18 June 1921, ibid. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 9, for week ending 2 July 1921, ibid. Norman to Curzon, 10 June 1921, FO371/6406/9974; Norman to Curzon, 5 July 1921, FO371/6406/9054. Ibid. Ibid. Enclosure in Norman to Curzon, 2 July 1921, FO371/6405/9260. According to these reports 20 out of the Red Army’s 84 infantry divisions and 9 out of 26 cavalry divisions were stationed in the Caucasus. See below. Report of Interdepartmental Committee on Bolshevism as a Menace to the British Empire, held at the Foreign Office in July 1921, L/PS/10/ 886. See FO371/6409–6411; Chamberlain to Curzon, 21 March 1921, Curzon Papers, F112/219A. The South Persia Rifles were disbanded in September. Report by Maj. Noel, 12 May 1921, FO371/6405/9258 (also L/PS/11/912). They were strange bedfellows. Ihsanullah Khan was a firebrand revolutionary of humble origin. He was not a member of the Communist Party, but in the dispute between the communists and Kuchik Khan in the summer of 1920 he had sided with the former. Sa’ed ud-Daula was the eldest son of Sepahsalar, the biggest landowner in the Caspian provinces. It seems that he was primarily motivated by personal ambition.

NOTES 231

170. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 11, for week ending 16 July 1921, FO371/6435/10094; MA (Tehran) to DMI (WO), 14 July 1921, FO371/6405/8341. 171. Minute by Lindsay, 19 July 1921, ibid. 172. Minute by Oliphant, 19 July 1921, ibid. 173. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 13, for week ending 30 July 1921, FO371/6435/1145. 174. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 12, for week ending 23 July 1921, ibid; MA (Tehran) to DMI (WO), 18 July 1921, FO371/6405/8371. By one account, the Soviet Minister at Tehran, Rothstein, hurriedly ordered the Russian officers not to cooperate with Ihsanullah Khan (Fakhra’i, p.347). 175. When Sepahsalar learned that the revolutionaries were approaching Tehran, he secretly sent a message to his son, Sa’ed ud-Daula, warning him that the victory of the rebels would lead to the loss of their large estates (J.Tabrizi, Historical Secrets of the Punishment Committee (in Persian) (Tehran, 1983), p.97). See also Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 20, for week ending 17 Sept. 1921, FO371/6435/11701. 176. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), Nos. 14, 15, for weeks ending 6, 13 Aug. 1921, FO371/6435/1145. 177. According to the Persian envoy at Moscow, it took Lenin a few months to overcome the opposition to signing the Soviet-Persian Treaty (MasudAnsari, Vol. II, p.79). 178. L.Fischer, Men and Politics (N.Y., 1947), pp.135–36. Sultanzada, the Persian representative at the Comintern, also agitated for a revolutionary policy towards Persia. The British agents reported that he was “so eager as to need curbing by the [Soviet] authorities.” Secret Report (Russia), 28 Feb. 1921, FO371/6426/2625. 179. Tucker, pp.230–35; D.M. Lang, A Modern History of Georgia (London, 1962), pp.232–37. 180. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Bolshevism as a Menace to the British Empire, July 1921, pp.74–76, L/PS/10/886. 181. lbid., p.8. The British officials discounted this intelligence report believing that Chicherin’s remarks were designed to satisfy Narimanov who was known to be a “moderate.” 182. Lenin to Rothstein (London), 15 July 1920, V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 44, p.403; Lenin to Stalin, 8 Dec. 1922, ibid., Vol. 45, p.598. The Scotland Yard file on Rothstein also notes that he “appears to have a certain amount of influence with Chicherin” (FO371/6399/667). See also M.V.Glenny, “The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, March 1921”, Journal of Contemporary History, 5 (1970), p.78. 183. Norman to Curzon, 23 May 1921, FO371/6405/8862. Rothstein also noted that the commander of the Soviet troops in Gilan, Nicolai Gikalo, who was “a very sensible man,” held the same view and “had strongly supported at Baku the Russian point of view.” 184. Glenny notes that Rothstein “was regarded by the Soviet leaders as the unchallenged expert on British affairs and both Lenin and Trotsky deferred to his judgement on this subject.” He argues that Rothstein


185. 186. 187.

188. 189. 190.

191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196.

was chiefly responsible for inducing Lenin to pursue rapprochement with Britain. Glenny, pp.77–78. See also note 183 above. Norman to Curzon, 10 June 1921, FO/371/6406/9974; Rothstein to Kuchik Khan (Sept. 1921), in Fakhr’ai, pp.356–61. Fischer, p.136. Lenin to Chicherin, 16 July 1921, V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 45, p. 212. On July 17 four ships arrived at Enzeli from Baku to evacuate the Soviet troops (Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 13, for week ending 30 July 1921, FO/ 371/6435/11455). A few weeks later Ordzhonikidze had to justify Moscow’s Persian policy to his Caucasian comrades. In a speech made at a conference of the communists at Tiflis in August, he stated: “We knew that there was no proletariat in Persia, and the peasantry were ignorant, downtrodden, and passive. …We were quite aware of the fact that the trading Nationalist bourgeoisie, though hostile to Britain, were more hostile still to the Communists…. Our support of Kuchik Khan was at first crowned with success, but an unfortunate quarrel ensued with another revolutionary party. From that moment the revolutionary movement began to weaken.... It must be admitted that the Persian Communist Party is still very weak. The Communist Party of Iran is faced with extremely difficult problems.” (As quoted in “Memo on Soviet Policy, March 1921-December 1922”, Curzon Papers, F1 12/236.) However it appears that there was still some opposition to Moscow’s Persian policy in the Caucasus. In mid-October Moscow ordered the communists at Baku to follow strictly the Soviet government’s policy towards Persia. (V.I.Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 42, p. 351.) Lenin to Rothstein, 13 Aug. 1921 (in reply to Rothstein’s letter dated 17 July), Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 45, pp.254–55. Norman to Curzon, 8 Aug. 1921, FO/371/6407/1145 MA (Tehran) to DMI (WO), 11 Aug. 1921, FO/371/6405/9325; Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), Nos. 15–17, for weeks ending 13, 20, 27 Aug. 1921, FO/ 371/6435/11461, 11692, 11698. These reports began to affect the Foreign Office’s perception of the Soviet threat to Persia (Minute by Churchill, 16 Aug. 1921, FO/ 371/6405/9260; Minute by Churchill, 27 Aug. 1921, FO/371/6448/9698; Minute by Lindsay, 9 Sept. 1921, FO371/6415/10096). Col. P.T. Etherton to Curzon, 16 Aug. 1921, FO/371/6743/11531. (Also L/ PS/10/ 836/7701.) “Memorandum on Soviet Policy, March 1921-December 1922”, Curzon Papers, F1 12/236; FO/371/6856/11569,11963. Loraine to Curzon, 20 Feb. 1920, FO/371/7805/4712. The government troops lost 680 men and Kuchik Khan’s casualties were at least equally heavy. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), Nos. 21–32, for the period 24 Sept.-10 Dec. 1921, FO/371/6435/14224; FO/371/7826/285, 293, 445, 1056, 1953. “Visit to Gilan by Military Attaché, 8–16 Jan. 1922”, in Loraine to Curzon, 29 Jan. 1922, FO/371/7803/3067.

NOTES 233

197. Minute by Churchill, 20 March 1922, ibid. 198. Norman to Curzon, 11 Sept. 1921, FO/371/6407/12282; Norman to Curzon, 23 Sept. 1921, FO/371/6406/106667. 199. Norman to Curzon, 28 Sept. 1921, FO/371/6406/10915. 200. Minute by Curzon, 9 Nov. 1921, FO/371/6407/12282. Believing that Persia was about to knuckle under to Russian pressures, Curzon noted: “Persia is beginning to learn the consequences of her own folly.” Minute 2 Oct. 1921, FO/371/6406/ 10847. 201. Bridgeman to Curzon, 6 Oct. 1921, FO371/6406/11113. 202. Bridgeman to Curzon, 10 Oct. 1921, FO/371/6407/13446. 203. From 1907–09 Loraine had served as Third Secretary at the Tehran Legation. 204. Loraine to Curzon, 22 Dec. 1921, FO/371/6408/14290. 205. Quoted in Bridgeman to Curzon, 8 Dec. 1921, FO/371/6407/13579. 206. See for example Loraine to Curzon, 13 Jan. 1922, FO/371/7802/584; Loraine to Curzon, 31 Jan. 1922, FO/371/7804/3074; Loraine to Curzon, 28 Nov. 1922, 7 Dec. 1922, FO/371/7811/13340, 13398, 13764; Loraine to Curzon, 11 Dec. 1922, FO/ 371/9024/1110. 207. “Memorandum on Soviet Policy, March 1921-December 1922”, Curzon Papers, F1 12/236.

CHAPTER SIX 1. Minute by Crowe, 18 April 1919, quoted in Busch, p. 138. 2. D.L.Smith, “Viscount Grey’s Special Mission and Postwar AngloAmerican Relations”, Southern Quarterly, 11 (1973), pp.264–66; DBFP, Is, Vol. IV, Nos. 794, 803, 818, 824, 826. For detailed accounts of American reaction to the Anglo-Persian Agreement, see N.S.Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia 1917–1923 (N.Y., 1952), Ch. 2; A.Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883–1921 (N.Y., 1956), Ch. 7; F.Venn, “Middle East Oil and the Anglo-American Relations, 1918–1934" (Ph.D., Bristol, 1981), pp. 94–101. 3. Minutes by Oliphant and Hardinge, 18 Oct. 1919, FO371/3865/142965. 4. Curzon to Grey, 21 Oct. 1919, DBFP, Is, Vol. IV, No. 824. 5. Minutes by Ovey and Hardinge, 14 July 1920, FO371/4919/1234. 6. Minute by Churchill, 14 July 1920, ibid. 7. Minute by Ovey, 14 July 1920, ibid. 8. Minute by Mallet (April 1919), in Busch, p. 138. 9. Curzon to Cox, 10 April 1920, DBFP, Is, Vol. XIII, No. 406. 10. APOC to FO, 15 March 1920; FO to Cox, 9 April 1920; FO to APOC, 10 April 1920, FO371/3879/185583, 188324. In January 1916 Akikie Khoshtaria, a Russian subject, acquired the oil concession in the five northern provinces which had been excluded from the D’Arcy concession of 1901. At the time the Russian troops were in occupation of north Persia. 11. Curzon to Norman, 21 Aug. 1920, FO371/4919/4542; Curzon to Norman, 30 Aug. 1920, FO371/4920/4871.


12. Norman to Curzon, 26 Oct. 1920; Curzon to Norman, 8 Nov. 1920, FO371/4920/ 9883. 13. APOC to FO, 2 June 1921; Minutes by Churchill, Oliphant, Lindsay, 3, 4, 6 June 1921; Petroleum Dept to FO, 21 June 1921, FO371/6414/6361, 7134. 14. Most historians subscribe to this view of American foreign oil policy. See J. DeNovo, “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918 1920”, American Historical Review, 61 (1956), pp.854–76; G.Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890–1964 (Pittsburgh, 1968), pp.43– 49; M.Hogan, Informal Entente (University of Missouri Press, 1977), p. 160; S.Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1978), pp. 48–49, 106– 09; S. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy, 1919–1948 (McGillQueen’s U.P., 1985), pp.13–18. However DeNovo and Krasner are not oblivious to commercial interests. They see a convergence between corporate goals and state objectives (DeNovo, p.866; Krasner, pp.109, 118–19). 15. The most forceful advocate of this line of argument is W.Stivers. See Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918–1930 (Cornell, 1982), Ch. 4, pp.194–99; “International Politics and Iraqi Oil, 1918–1920: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy”, Business History Review, 55 (1981), pp.529–32. Stivers goes as far as to say the State Department acted “at the behest of” the oil interests (Stivers, 1982, p.113). 16. “Memorandum on Anglo-American Petroleum Relations”, Petroleum Dept, 4 April 1921; “Note on Petroleum Position in Certain Countries”, Petroleum Dept, 24 May 1921, FO371/7014/5405; Curzon to Geddes, 7 May 1920, FO371/5108. 17. Geddes to Curzon, 26 Nov. 1920, FO371/4587/8526. 18. Geddes to Curzon, 21 May 1920, Curzon Papers, F1 12/236. 19. Geddes to Curzon, 29 July 1920, FO371/4585/5494 (also FO414/246). 20. For example, Secretary of State Colby had previously acted as a legal adviser to Standard Oil. Therefore Geddes thought it was “only reasonable to suppose” that Colby’s demands for an open-door policy in Mesopotamia were “directly inspired by the Standard Oil Company.” Geddes to Curzon, 9 Dec. 1920, FO371/4586/ 8944. He later noted that the State Department under Colby “had fallen almost completely under the influence of Mr. Bedford [chairman of Standard Oil].” Geddes to Curzon, 20 Jan. 1922, FO371/727 8/904. 21. In formulating its foreign oil policy, according to Geddes, the U.S. Government drew mainly on the reports written by the former director of the Bureau of Mines, Van H.Manning, “a gentleman of small means and few scruples,” who had lent himself to Standard’s schemes (Geddes to Curzon, 24 Sept. 1920, FO371/4586/ 6981; Geddes to Curzon, 20 Jan. 1922, FO371/7278/904). And the Standarddominated Petroleum Institute, which acted as a link between the Government and the oil industry, was concerned with the publication of the facts in so far as they did not “conflict with the great object of creating a popular demand

NOTES 235

22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41.

for an aggressive foreign policy by the Government of the United States.” (Geddes to Curzon, 26 Nov. 1920, FO371/4587/8526.) Geddes to Curzon, 29 July 1920, FO371/4585/5494. For example, Senator James Phelan, the champion of an aggressive foreign oil policy, was suspected of being “on the payroll of the Standard Oil Company.” (“Memorandum on the Standard Oil Company’s Activities”, 23 Dec. 1921, by Weakley, FO371/6345/13886; Geddes to Curzon, 21 May 1920, FO371/5212/ 5631.) Geddes to Curzon, 26 Nov. 1920, FO371/4857/8526. This act enabled the Department of the Interior to refuse grant of oil exploitation permits on public lands to the nationals of those countries which did not provide reciprocal privilege to American citizens. Geddes to Curzon, 21 May 1920, FO371/5212/5631. United States Annual Report, 1920, FO371/5713/7058. Memorandum by Weakley, see above note 23; Minute by Weakley, 30 Nov. 1921, FO371/6362/13144. Minute by Curzon, 26 Nov. 1921, ibid. Geddes to Curzon, 26 Nov. 1920, FO371/4587/8526, 8944. Minute by Tyrell, 3 Nov. 1920, FO371/4920/9883 (also FO371/5080/ 13385). “Note on the Petroleum Position in Certain Countries”, Petroleum Dept. 24 May, 1921, FO371/7014/5405; Geddes to Curzon, 11 March 1921, FO371/5639/1824, 2563. In the first few months of 1921 the price of crude oil fell by 50 per cenL E.H.Davenport and S.R.Cooke, The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations (London, 1923), pp.108–9. This contemporary account identifies the Foreign Office’s concern over Standard’s activities as the main reason for its cooperative attitude towards the Americans in north Persia. The historians have overlooked this aspect of the AngloAmerican oil dispute. There is only a passing reference to Geddes’ views in the recent study by Randall (p.21). Geddes to Curzon, 20 Jan. 1922, FO371/7278/904. Inter-Departmental Committee on Petroleum Minutes of the 6th Meeting Held on 30 June 1921, FO371/7014/8377. Cadman (N.Y.) to APOC (London), 13 Dec. 1921, in APOC to FO, 14 Dec. 1921, FO371/6418/13802; Geddes to Curzon, 18 Jan. 1922, FO371/ 7813/712. Geddes to Curzon, 20 Jan. 1922, FO371/7278/904. Cabinet Committee on Oil Companies Amalgamation, conclusion of a meeting held on 13 March 1922, FO371/8288/2588. Churchill to Curzon, 1 Feb. 1922; Curzon to Churchill, 8 Feb. 1922; Minutes by Weakley and Lindsay, 4, 6 Feb. 192 2, FO371/7782/11 Petroleum Dept to FO, 3 Jan. 1922, FO371/7782/152. See also Minutes by Curzon, Crowe, Tyrrell, Weakley, 26, 25, 24, 30 Nov. 1921, FO371/ 6362/13144. For a first-rate treatment of the other factors influencing the Anglo-American cooperation in Mesopotamia, see Stivers, 1981. Grey to Curzon, 28 Sept. 1919, DBFP, Is, Vol. IV, No. 794. Minute by Ovey, 14 July 1920, FO371/4919/1234.


42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71.

Norman to Curzon, 26 Oct. 1920, FO371/4920/9883. See Ch. 5. Minute by Lindsay and Curzon, 29 July 1921, FO371/6415/8788. Norman to Curzon, 23 April 1921; Minute by Oliphant, April 1921, FO371/6403/ 4804, 4805. Minute by Curzon, 23 Nov. 1921, FO371/6417/12845. See Ch. 1. N.S.Fatami, Oil Diplomacy (N.Y., 1954), p.107. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 7, for week ending 18 June 1921, in Norman to Curzon, 3 July 1921, FO371/6435/9236. Minute by Oliphant, 21 July 1921, FO371/64O5/8528. APOC to FO, 7 July 1921, FO371/6415/7813. Minutes by Churchill and Curzon, 29 July 1921, FO371/6415/8788. See Ch. 1. Curzon to Bridgeman, 5 Dec. 1921, FO371/6417/13187; Loraine to Curzon, 7 Jan. 1922, FO371/7812/253. Bridgeman to Persian Foreign Minister, 16 Dec. 1921, FO371/7814/1951; Minute by Oliphant, 6 Jan. 1922, FO371/7812/193. Minute by Churchill, 17 Jan. 1922, FO371/7813/590. Loraine to Curzon, 21 Dec. 1921, FO371/6418/14104. Geddes to Curzon, 23 Dec. 1921; Minute by Lindsay, 11 Jan. 1922, FO371/7812/ 329. Geddes believed that if Standard did not advance money to Persia it would be difficult to induce anyone else to do so. Minute by Oliphant, 10 Jan. 1922, FO371/7812/253. Loraine to Curzon, 7 Jan. 1922, ibid. Venn, 1981, pp. 98, 117; Yeselson, p.161. See Stivers, 1982, pp.113–24, 174–81. Washington’s lack of sympathy for the nationalists was also evident in other countries such as China and Mexico. See Randall, Ch. 2; L.C.Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913–1923 (N.Y., 1984). Yeselson, p.192. W.A.Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (N.Y., 1972), p.129; see also Stivers, 1981, p.535. Engert to the Secretary of State, 21 June 1921, FRUS 1921, Vol. II, pp. 634–35. Yeselson, p.204. Ibid., p.192. Assistant-Secretary of State (Dearing) to Under-Secretary of State (Fletcher), 11 Feb. 1922, FRUS 1927, Vol. II, p.523. Venn, 1981, p.117. Hogan, pp.165, 168–69; Randall, p.25. For the Millspaugh Mission see his own account, The American Task in Persia (N.Y., 1925); and D.L.Smith, “The Millspaugh Mission and American Corporate Diplomacy in Persia, 1922–1927”, Southern Quarterly, 14 (1976), pp. 151–72. “The Memorandum by the Near Eastern Division of the Department of State,” 20 April 1921, in Yeselson, pp.187–88.

NOTES 237

72. For this interpretation of the open-door policy, see J.C.Thomson, et al., Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia (N.Y. 1981), pp.132– 33. 73. See note 65 above. 74. Engert to the Secretary of State, 25 May 1921, intercepted and quoted in “Report of Interdepartmental Committee on Bolshevism as a Menace to the British Empire,” L/PS/10/886, pp.15–16. 75. G.S. Gibb and E.H.Knowlton, History of Standard Oil: The Resurgent Years, 1911–1927 (N.Y., 1956), p.310. However, the Standard used Persia’s offer of concession as a bargaining counter to extract better terms from the British. 76. lbid.; APOC (London) to Cadman (N.Y.), 2 Dec. 1921, in APOC to FO, 6 Dec. 1921, FO371/6418/13490. 77. Hogan, p.172; Stivers, 1982, pp.126. 78. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Jan. 1921, Curzon Papers, F112/226A. 79. Geddes to Curzon, 23 Dec. 1921; Curzon to Loraine, 29 Dec. 1921, FO371/6418/ 14093, 14104; Minute by Oliphant, 11 Jan. 1922, FO371/ 7812/329; Geddes to Curzon, 15 Jan. 1922; Secretary of State Hughes to Geddes, 11 Jan. 1922, in Geddes to Curzon, 23 Jan. 1922, FO371/7813/ 578, 1340; Hughes to Geddes, 30 Jan. 1922, in Geddes to Curzon, 3 Feb. 1922, FO371/7814/1726. 80. Geddes to Curzon, 8 March 1922, FO371/7814/2654. 81. Loraine to Curzon, 4, 7 March 1922, FO371/7814/2461, 2633; Loraine to Curzon, 15 March 1922, FO371/7816/4744. 82. Minute by Churchill, 13 April 1922, FO371/7815/3907. 83. Loraine to Curzon, 8 May 1922, FO371/7817/6582. 84. Geddes to Curzon, 23 Dec. 1921, FO371/7812/329. 85. Minute by Lindsay, 17 Jan. 1922; APOC to FO, 19 Jan. 1922; Geddes to Curzon, 27 Jan. 1922, FO371/7813/10055, 821, 590. 86. Geddes to Curzon, 18, 23 Jan. 1922, FO371/7813/708, 1340. 87. Minute by Churchill, 16 March 1922, FO371/7814/2461. For the Standard-APOC negotiations, see Gibb and Knowlton, pp.308–17; B.Shwadran, The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers (N.Y., 1974, reprint), pp.71–78; Ferrier, pp.570–80; N. Kittner, “Issues in AngloPersian Diplomatic Relations, 1921–1933” (Ph.D., London, 1981), pp. 254–69. 88. Minute by Lindsay, 30 Jan. 1922, FO371/7813/1005. 89. “Persia: Annual Report, 1922”, in Loraine to Curzon, 16 July 1923, FO371/9051/ 8057. 90. Geddes continued to assure the Foreign Office that “the Persian government could scarcely hope to raise another loan if the Standard Oil Company’s loan fell through.” Geddes to Curzon, 8 March 1922, FO371/7814/2654. 91. Minute by Lindsay, 31 Jan. 1922, FO371/7813/1193. 92. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Jan. 1922, Curzon Papers, F112/226A. 93. Loraine to Curzon, 17 April 1922, FO371/7804/4043. 94. Loraine to Curzon, 7 March 1922, FO371/7814/2633.


95. Memorandum on Conversation between Sir P.Loraine and Minister of War, by Smart, 31 Jan. 1922, FO371/7804/3074. 96. Loraine to Curzon, 12 June 1922, FO371/7816/5978. 97. Engert to Loraine, 8 July 1923, FO371/10128/110. In his reply to Engert, Loraine wrote: “The difficulty is that the Persians do not want any trustees.” 98. Hogan, pp.176–78. 99. Ovey to MacDonald, 15 May 1924, FO371/10126/4282. 100. Chilton to FO, 31 Jan. 1924, FO371/10143/1046. 101. Geddes to Curzon, 27 April 1923, FO371/9151/4624; see also Stivers, 1981, p.535. 102. The Fiscal Agent of the Persian Legation. He had been the Treasurer General in Persia in 1911. 103. See note 100 above. 104. Minute by Churchill, 2 Feb. 1924; Macdonald to Chilton,? Feb 1924, FO371/ 10148/1043; Minute by Churchill, 5 Feb. 1924, FO371/10144/ 1121; Chilton to MacDonald, 8 Feb. 1924, FO371/10143/1391. 105. For a recent study of this incident, see M.P. Zirinsky, “Blood, Power and Hypocrisy: The Murder of Robert Imbrie and American Relations with Pahlavi Iran, 1924”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 18 (1986), pp.275–92.

CHAPTER SEVEN 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

See Ch. 2. Norman to Curzon, 3 March 1921, FO371/6403/4922. See Ch. 5. For example, see Daulatabadi’s and Farrukh’s accounts of their encounters with Farman-Farma and Qavam us-Saltana respectively. Daulatbdabi, p.212; M. Farrukh, Political Memoirs of Farrukh (in Persian) (Tehran, 1968), pp.90–91. Mustaufi, pp.205–6; Daulatabadi, pp.239–42. For example, Bahar and Daulatabadi, two prominent liberal intellectuals, criticized his proclamation issued on taking office for ignoring the rule of law and the constitutional principles. Bahar, p.90; Daulabatabadi, pp.243–44. Balfour, pp.239, 66. P.Avery, Modern Iran (London, 1965), p.253; Balfour, p.248; Mustaufi, pp.267–68. Norman to Curzon, 6 June 1921, FO371/6406/9970. There is some evidence that there were contacts between Sayyed Zia, after his removal from power, and the Crown Prince over a plot to dethrone the Shah. Sayyed Zia to Norman, 8 July 1921; Norman to Oliphant, 8 July 1921; Viceroy to IO, 18 July 1921, FO371/6446/7986, 8805. See also Bahar, pp.102–4. Norman noted that Sayyed Zia “heartily despises” the Shah. Norman to Curzon, 21 March 1921, FO371/6403/4926.

NOTES 239

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

Avery, p.252. Bahar, p.102. Fakhra’i, p.259. See note 9 above. See also Ch. 2. Bahar, pp.71–72, 113–15. He had been involved in other plots in the Cossack Division before joining Sayyed Zia’s coup. Dixon to Curzon, 14 May 1921, FO371/6427/ 5814. Ibid. Intelligence Summary (MA,Tehran), No. 1 for week ending 7 May 1921, FO371/ 6435/8863. Intelligence Summary (MA,Tehran), No. 2, for week ending 14 May 1921, ibid.; Balfour, p.249. Sayyed Zia was popular with some Gendarmerie officers. Intelligence Summary (MA,Tehran), No. 3 for week ending 21 May 1921, ibid. Ibid. Norman to Curzon, 6 June 1921, FO371/6406/9970; Norman to Curzon, 25 May 1921, FO371/6404/6040. Norman to Curzon, 25 May 1921, FO371/6404/6298. Norman to Curzon, 6 June 1921, FO371/6406/9970. Sayyed Zia later settled down in Palestine. After the fall of Reza Shah in 1941, he returned to Persia and resumed his political activities as a member of the Majlis and the leader of the anti-communist National Will Party. Norman to Curzon, 25 May 1921, FO371/6404/6040. The Foreign Office did not share Norman’s enthusiasm for Sayyed Zia. Oliphant thought Sayyed Zia was “a mere visionary and weak at that.” Minute, 25 Sept. 1921, FO371/6406/9970. Norman to Curzon, 25 May 1921, FO371/6404/6040. Minute by Curzon, 26 May 1921, ibid. Minute by Churchill, 26 May 1921, ibid. See Ch. 1. H.L.Deb., 26 July 1921, cols 14–17. Memo by Oliphant, 11 June 1921, FO371/6404/6678. The term was used by the British Financial Adviser, Armitage-Smith, in Norman to Curzon, 11 Aug. 1921, FO371/6415/9204. See Chs. 2 and 5. Minute by Churchill, 21 June 1921, FO371/6404/7118. Norman to Curzon, 11 July 1921, FO371/6405/7560. Norman to Curzon, 5 Aug. 1921, FO371/6415/8978. See Ch, 2. The Foreign Office asked the Bank to cease lending to the Persian government in July. But the Bank continued to fund Reza Khan’s Army until December. Minute by Churchill, 13 Oct. 1921, FO371/6406/11286. Bridgeman to Curzon, 27 Nov. 1921, FO371/6417/13078; Bridgeman to Curzon, 14 Dec. 1921, FO371/6418/13790.


42. Bahar, pp.151–56. Col. Pesyan had enthusiastically supported Sayyed Zia’s rise to power and his reforms. Consul-General Meshed to Government of India, 8 April 1921, FO371/6404/5722. 43. See Ch. 5. 44. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 32 for week ending 10 Dec. 1921, FO371/7826/1953. 45. Meshed Diary (Consul-General) No. 23, for week ending 4 June 1921, FO371/ 6405/9182. 46. MA (Tehran) to DMI (WO), 14 Sept. 1921, FO371/6406/10474. 47. Rothstein to Kuchik Khan (Sept. 1921), in Fakhra’i, pp.356–61. 48. MA (Tehran) to DMI (WO), 5 Sept. 1921, FO371/6406/10171. 49. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 20, for week ending 17 Sept. 1921, FO371/6435/11701. 50. Loraine to Curzon, 22 Jan. 1922, FO371/7802/909. 51. “Memorandum of Conversation between Sir P.Loraine and Minister of War,” by W.Smart (Oriental Secretary), in Loraine to Curzon, 31 Jan. 1922, FO371/7804/ 3074. 52. Loraine to Curzon, 21 April 1922, FO371/7806/5893; Loraine to Foreign Secretary to Government of India, 21 April 1922, FO371/7805/5194. 53. Lt. Col. Saunders (MA) to Loraine, 18 Feb. 1922, in Loraine to Curzon, 20 Feb. 1922, FO371/7805/4712. 54. The British officials believed that the party branch at Meshed acted as a conduit between the Bolsheviks at Baku and the Indian revolutionaries. Loraine to Curzon, 9 Feb. 1922, FO371/7802/1499; MA (Meshed) to Army HQ (Delhi), 20 Jan. 1922, FO371/7804/3157. 55. Loraine to Curzon, 15 June 1922; Lt. Col. Saunders to Loraine, 15 June 1922, FO371/7807/8135. For other reports of Bolshevik activities in Persia, see: MA (Meshed) to Army HQ (Delhi), 28 Jan. 1922, FO371/ 7804/3954; Consul-General (Meshed) to Loraine, 24 Feb. 1922, FO371/ 7804/3126; MA (Tehran) to Loraine, 26 Feb. 1922, FO371/7809/10106; Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), Nos. 11, 17, for weeks ending 19 March and 29 April 1922, FO371/7827/4751, 6580; Loraine to Oliphant, 21 Sept. 1922, FO371/7809/9869; Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 43 for week ending 28 Oct 1922, FO371/7828/14483; “Report by Lt. Col. Saunders respecting Communist Activites in Persia”, in Loraine to Curzon, 23 Nov. 1922, FO416/72. 56. Loraine to Curzon, 26 Sept. 1922, FO371/7810/12256. 57. Loraine to Curzon, 27 May 1922, FO371/7816/5470. Reza Khan threatened that if the British continued to refuse him the necessary funds he would be compelled to borrow from the Russians. Loraine to Curzon, 30 May 1920, FO371/7816/5585. 58. Minute by Churchill, 1 June 1922; Curzon to Loraine, 2 June 1922, FO371/7816/ 5585. 59. Minute by Churchill, 7 July 1922, FO371/7817/6647. 60. Loraine to George Lloyd (Bombay), 13 March 1923, Loraine Papers FO101l/127.

NOTES 241

61. Loraine to Curzon, 2 Aug. 1922, Curzon Papers, F112/226A; Loraine to Curzon, 2 March 1922, FO371/7805/4730; Loraine to Oliphant, 6 July 1922, FO371/7807/ 7928. 62. Loraine to Lindsay, 30 Nov. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/127. 63. Loraine to Curzon, 24 Jan. 1922; Minute by Churchill, 26 Jan. 1922; Curzon to Loraine, 27 Jan. 1922, FO371/7813/911. 64. G.Waterfield, Professional Diplomat (London, 1973), p.59. 65. “Persia: Annual Report, 1922,” in Loraine to Curzon, 16 July 1923, FO371/9051/ 8057. 66. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Jan. 1922, Curzon Papers, F112/226A. 67. Loraine to Curzon, 2 March 1922, FO371/7805/4730. 68. Loraine to Curzon, 2 Aug. 1922, Curzon Papers, F112/226A. 69. Minute by Curzon, 23 May 1922, FO371/7805/5237. 70. See note 67 above. 71. See note 51 above. 72. Minute by Churchill, 9 Oct. 1922; Curzon to Loraine 10 Oct. 1922, FO371/7809/ 10669. Churchill to Loraine, 10 Oct. 1922, Loraine Papers, FO1011/123. In the event, Reza Khan beat a tactical retreat and acceded to the Majlis’ demands to lift martial law in Tehran and to avoid interfering in other departments. 73. Curzon to Loraine, 30 May 1922, Loraine Papers, FO1011/49. 74. Ibid., Loraine to Curzon, 11 Jan. 1922, FO371/7802/539. 75. Minute by Curzon, 25 Jan. 1922, FO371/7802/883. 76. Minute by Curzon, 9 March 1922, FO371/7814/2629. 77. Minute by Curzon, 18 April 1922, FO371/7804/4043. 78. Loraine to Curzon, 2 Aug. 1922, Curzon Papers, F112/226A. 79. W.G.Grey, “Recent Persian History”, Journal of the Central Asian Society, 13 (1926), pp.37–38. 80. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Jan. 1922, Curzon Papers. F112/226A. 81. “Memorandum on Interview with Prince Firuz”, by R.Bridgeman, 25 March 1922, in Loraine to Oliphant, 26 March 1922, FO371/9024/4612. 82. Memorandum by Oliphant, 2 Jan. 1922, FO371/7802/102. 83. Minute by Curzon, n.d.(July 1921), FO371/6405/8400. 84. See note 73 above. 85. Loraine to Curzon, 2 March 1922, FO371/7805/4730. 86. Loraine to Marling, 17 Feb. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/127. 87. Loraine to Curzon, 19 June and 24 May 1923, FO371/9024/8049, 6928. 88. Gray, p.37. 89. Loraine to Curzon, 19 June 1923, FO371/9024/8049. 90. Loraine to Curzon, 13 Sept. 1922, FO371/7808/9304; Curzon to Loraine, 4 and 5 Oct. 1922, FO371/7809/10062, 10669; Intelligence Summary (MA,Tehran), No.37, for week ending 6 Sept. 1922, FO371/7828/12254. 91. Loraine to Curzon, 2 Aug. 1922, Curzon Papers, F112/226A. 92. Minutes by Oliphant, 1 June 1922, FO371/7816/5585. 93. Loraine to Norman, 17 Feb. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/127. 94. Loraine to Curzon, 31 Jan. 1922, FO371/7804/3074. 95. Loraine to N.P.Cowan (Consul, Kermanshah), 15 April 1922, FO248/ 1367.


96. See note 94 above. 97. See note 95 above. 98. Loraine to Curzon, 24 Sept. 1922; Curzon to Loraine, 26 Sept. 1922, FO371/7809/ 9844, 9869. Oliphant to Loraine, 28 Sept. 1922, Loraine Papers, FO1011/10. 99. Curzon to Loraine, 30 May 1922, Loraine Papers, FO1011/49. 100. Loraine to Curzon, 7 April 1922, FO371/7804/3755. The British Legation had even learned that a group of Gendarmerie officers, who resented the dominant position of the Cossack officers in the new uniform Army, were plotting a coup against Reza Khan. MA to WO, 1 March 1922, FO371/7803/2605; “Conspiracy against Sardar Sepah,” 22 Feb. 1922, in FO248/1367. 101. Loraine to Balfour, 9 June 1922, FO371/7807/7332. 102. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Aug. 1922, FO371/7808/8684. 103. Minute by Mallet, 23 Aug. 1922, FO371/7808/8385. 104. Loraine to Curzon, 22 July and 9 Aug. 1922, FO371/7807/7260, 7956. British Consul (Ahwaz) to Loraine, 20 July 1922, FO371/7809/9958. For the BritishBakhtiari relations, see G.Garthwaite, “The Bakhtiari Khans, the Government of Iran and the British, 1846–1915”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3 (1972), pp.23–44; G.Garthwaite, Khans and Shahs (Cambridge, 1983), pp.103– 12. 105. Loraine to Curzon, 13 Aug. 1922, Minute by Mallet, 14 Aug. 1922, FO371/7807/ 8043. 106. According to British estimates, the Sheikh was capable of fielding 30, 000 men, far in excess of the number of troops Reza Khan could despatch to the area. (“Appreciation of Government Forces versus South West Tribes,” by Military Attaché, 30 Oct. 1923, FO371/9025/10602.) One Foreign Office official noted that Reza Khan would not dare to send his troops to Arabistan (Minute by Mallet, 18 Aug. 1922, FO371/7808/ 8207). 107. Loraine to Curzon, 19 Aug. 1922, FO371/7808/8260. 108. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Aug. 1922, FO371/7808/8684; Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (Bushire) to Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, 18 April 1922, FO371/7805/4931, 5194. 109. “British Relations with Khazal, Sheikh of Mohammerah”, memo by H. Grey, 26 Nov. 1946, in R/l5/2/1747. For a de tailed ac count o f British rela tio Sheikh, see W.T.Strunk, ‘The Reign of Shaykh Khaz’al Ibn Jabir and the Suppression of the Principality of Arabistan: A Study in British Imperialism in South Western Persia, 1897–1925” (Ph.D., Indiana, 1977). 110. Cox (Baghdad) to Duke of Devonshire (Colonial Secretary), 9 April 1923, FO371/ 9024/4736. 111. Loraine to Curzon, 3 Sept. 1922; Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to Political Resident of the Persian Gulf (Bushire), 26 May 1922, FO371/7830/8840. 112. Loraine to Curzon, 4 Sept. 1922, Curzon to Loraine, 12 Oct. 1922, FO371/7830/ 10179; Loraine to Curzon, 22 Aug. 1922; Minute by Mallet, 23 Aug. 1922, FO371/ 7808/8385.

NOTES 243

113. There is no doubt that Reza Khan played a crucial role in centralizing the country. Yet his efforts should be seen against the background of socio-economic developments since the mid-nineteenth century which had laid the ground for the emergence of the modern Persian state. See V.F.Nowshiravani, “The Beginnings of Commercialized Agriculture in Iran”, in A.L.Udovitch (ed.), The Islamic Middle East, 1700–1900: Studies in Economic and Social History (Princeton, 1981). 114. Loraine to Curzon, 11 Sept. 1922, FO371/7835/12242. See also, M.van Bruinessen, “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case of Simko’s Revolt”, in R.Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London, 1983). 115. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Aug. 1922, FO371/7808/8684; Loraine to Curzon, 20 July 1922, FO371/7807/7230. 116. Loraine to Curzon, 4 Sept. 1922, FO371/7830/10179. 117. Loraine to Oliphant, 8 May 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/13; Loraine to Curzon, 5 May 1923, FO371/9024/4612. 118. Loraine to Curzon, 17 May 1923, FO371/9024/5076. 119. Loraine to Curzon, 23 April, 7, 10 May and 23 Sept. 1923, FO371/9043/ 4392, 4669, 6343; Loraine to Curzon, 8 May 1923, FO371/9021/6078; Minute by Churchill, 1 Aug. 1923, FO371/9020/7854. Loraine’s attitude had further shaken the Bakhtiaris’ resolve to resist Reza Khan. He repeatedly impressed upon the senior khans that they had little choice but to cooperate with Reza Khan. To hammer home his message, he quoted them an Indian proverb: “If you have to live in the river, it is best to be friends with the crocodile.” 120. See note 118 above. 121. Loraine to Oliphant, 8 May 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/13. 122. Loraine to Curzon, 5 and 17 May 1923, FO371/9042/4612, 5076. 123. Loraine to Curzon, 23 Aug. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/50. 124. Loraine to Curzon, 5 May 1923, FO371/9024/4612. 125. Loraine to Curzon, 4 Feb. 1923, FO371/9024/2823. 126. Loraine to Curzon, 25 Oct. 1923, FO371/9025/10570. 127. Loraine to Curzon, 10 Jan. 1923, FO371/9024/1864. 128. Loraine to Curzon, 21 May 1923, FO371/9024/6353. 129. Loraine to Curzon, 17 May 1923, FO371/9024/5076. 130. See note 124 above. 131. Loraine to Curzon, 30 Sept. 1923, FO371/9029/9725; Loraine to Curzon, 31 Oct. 1923, FO371/9030/11735. 132. lbid.; Loraine to Curzon, 24 Sept. 1923; MA (Tehran) to WO, 25 Sept. 1923, FO371/9029/9553, 9724; Loraine to Curzon, 17 May 1923, FO371/ 9024/5076. 133. See note 121 above. 134. See note 124 above. 135. Horace Rumbold to Loraine, 16 April 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/126. 136. Minute by Curzon, 5 June 1923, FO371/9024/6353. 137. Curzon to Loraine, 12 April 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/50. 138. See note 136 above. 139. Minute by Curzon, 7 May 1923, FO371/9043/4570.


140. Curzon to Loraine, 29 May 1923, FO371/9043/5230. 141. Minute by Churchill, 9 May 1923; Curzon to Loraine, 10 May 1923, FO371/9024/ 4612. The Foreign Office soon got in touch with the India Office and the Admiralty, regarding the despatch of gunboats to Muhammerah to demonstrate British support for the Sheikh. (FO to IO, 7 May 1923; IO to FO, 16 May 1923; Admiralty to FO, 17 May 1923; and FO to Admiralty, 30 May 1923, FO371/9043/ 4392, 5010, 5061.) 142. See for example, Trevor (Political Resident in the Persian Gulf) to Foreign Secretary to Government of India, 10 Dec. 1922, 14 Jan. 1923, FO371/9024/2823, 2319. 143. Loraine to Curzon, 10 Jan. 1923, FO371/9024/1864. 144. Loraine to Oliphant, 29 Nov. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/13. 145. Loraine to Curzon, 15 Sept. 1923, FO371/9024/9223; Loraine to Curzon, 16 Oct 1923, FO371/9043/11560. 146. Loraine to Curzon, 20 Sept., 13 Nov. 1923, FO371/9043/10202, 11754. 147. Loraine to Curzon, 7 Dec. 1923, FO371/10/34/263; Loraine to Curzon, 30 Oct., 27 Nov. 1923, FO371/9043/11731, 11369; Loraine to Curzon, 12 Nov. 1923, FO371/ 9029/10967. 148. Minute by Oliphant, 17 Dec. 1923, FO371/9043/11731.

CHAPTER EIGHT 1. On 22 January 1924, Baldwin’s first cabinet left office and was succeeded by a minority Labour government, led by Ramsay MacDonald. The new Prime Minister himself replaced Curzon as the Foreign Secretary. In November the Conservatives were back in the saddle. Austen Chamberlain took charge of the Foreign Office in the second Baldwin government (1924–29). Curzon was made the Lord President. He died a few months later. Neither of his successors shared Curzon’s passionate interest in Eastern affairs or his belief in a close link between India’s security and Britain’s predominance in south Persia. Yet neither was prepared to relinquish Britain’s position in south Persia easily. 2. Loraine to Curzon, 28 Oct. 1923, FO371/9025/10570. 3. Note by Loraine, 2 Oct. 1923, FO248/1369. 4. Loraine to Curzon, 3 Sept. 1923, FO371/9024/0904; Loraine to Curzon, 6 Oct. 1923, FO371/9025/10603. 5. Loraine to Curzon, 8 Sept. 1923, FO371/9025/10324. 6. Curzon to Loraine, 3 Sept. 1932, FO371/9024/9094. Oliphant wrote to Loraine: “Some of the comments by the Secretary of State on the Kajar dynasty were very far from flattering, one being that they were not worth the flicker of an eyelid.” Oliphant to Loraine, 7 Nov. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/12. 7. Loraine to Curzon, 6 Oct. 1923, FO371/9025/10603. 8. Loraine to Lord Stamfordham (King’s private secretary), 30 Nov. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO1011/79.

NOTES 245

9. Loraine to Curzon, 26 and 28 Oct. 1923, FO371/9025/10512, 10570. Despite Reza Khan’s pledge of safe passage out of the country, the Shah was still so frightened that he ordered his chauffeur to drive as fast as possible and non-stop to the border. Bahar, Vol. II, p.164. 10. Minutes by Mallet, 25 and 29 Oct. 1923, FO371/9025/10479, 10512. 11. Minute by Churchill, 1 Feb. 1924; Loraine to FO, 31 Jan., 26 Feb. 1924; MacDonald to Loraine, 29 Feb. 1924, FO371/10144/1045, 1788. 12. H.Makki, Mudarres: Champion of Freedom, Vol. II (Tehran, 1980), p. 654. 13. For the clergy’s reaction to Reza Khan’s rise to power, see Sh.Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period (N.Y., 1980), pp.25–32; A. Ha’iri, Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden, 1977), pp.138–46. 14. Bahar, Vol. II, p.41. 15. MA to WO, 27 March 1924, FO371/10145/2914; Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No. 12, for week ending 22 March 1924, FO371/10132/ 4131. Some officers did not “approve of’ Reza Khan because of his “plebian origin.” ConsulGeneral (Meshed) to Government of India, 10 April 1924, FO371/10124/4218. 16. Monson to MacDonald, 20 March 1924, “Diary of Events concerning the Republic Movement in Persia”, by Havard (Oriental Secretary), in Ovey to MacDonald, 1 April 1924; Ovey to MacDonald, 7 April 1924, FO371/ 10145/2528, 3743; Makki, 1980, Vol. I, pp.265–349; Bahar, Vol. II, pp.36– 63. 17. Col. Fraser (MA) to Col. Musprett, 1 June 1924, in Ovey to Oliphant, 7 June 1924, FO371/10145/5427. 18. Ovey to MacDonald, 17 June 1924, FO371/10146/5863. 19. Ovey to MacDonald, 1 July 1924, FO371/10164/6283. 20. Bahar, Vol. II, p.85; Mustaufi, pp.600–05; Mudarres declared opposition to Reza Khan’s premiership as he was “more fitted for the simple post of war.” (Memo by Havard, 1 July 1925, in FO371/10164/6283.) 21. Loraine to Curzon, 19 June 1923, FO371/9024/8049. 22. Bahar, Vol. II, p.98; Makki, 1980, Vol. II, pp.482–514; Reza Shah, Diary of the Khuzestan Expedition (in Persian) (n.p., 1984 reprint), pp.234– 39; B.Dehgan (ed.), Secrets of Ahmad Shah’s Downfall: Memoirs of Rahimzadek-Safavi (in Persian) (Tehran, 1983), passim. 23. Makki, 1980, Vol. II, pp.552–53; Mustaufi, pp.637–40. 24. Trevor (Consul-General, Bushire) to Ovey, 11 March 1924, in Ovey to Mac-Donald, 16 April 1924, FO371/10134/4642. 25. “Memorandum on the Bakhtiari Situation in June 1924”, by E.G.Peel (Consul, Ahwaz), 28 June 1924, in Ovey to MacDonald, 30 July 1924, “The Sheikh of Mohammerah”, memo by G.Churchill, 14 Aug. 1924; Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Muhammerah) to APOC (London), 11 and 25 Aug. 1924, FO371/ 10134/7103, 6983, 7371. 26. Report from Ahwaz, in Ovey to MacDonald, 11 Sept. 1924; Prideaux (Ahwaz) to FO, 15 Sept. 1924; Ovey to MacDonald, 17 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/7831, 7968, 8010; MacDonald to Ovey, 23 Aug. 1923;


27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

APOC (Muhammerah) to APOC (London), 11 Aug. 1924, FO371/10134/ 7136, 7383; Makki, 1980, Vol. II, p.554; Dehgan, p.89. Peel (Ahwaz) to FO, 23, 25, 27 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8215, 8293, 8314. Tel. from Muhammerah, 16 Sept. 1924, in APOC to FO, 17 Sept. 1924, FO371/ 10135/8010. Prideaux to FO, 15 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/7969. Ovey to MacDonald, 16 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8007. Ovey to MacDonald, 20 Aug. 1924, FO371/10146/7219; Ovey to MacDonald, 14 Aug. 1924, FO371/10134/7016, 7017; Ovey to MacDonald, 15, 17, 24, 29 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/7964, 8048, 8049, 8438; Ovey to MacDonald, 9, 10, 23 Oct. 1924, FO371/10136/8754, 8795, 9236. Not all the British officials at Tehran shared the Chargé’s and the Oriental Secretary’s (Havard) pro-Reza Khan attitude. A member of the Legation complained that Ovey’s tendency throughout had been “to swallow everything Reza Khan tells him” and “to regard Peel with most unfair and indeed insulting suspicion.” Michael Huxley to Loraine, 1 Nov. 1924, Loraine Papers, FO1011/128. Minute by Oliphant, 18 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8007; see also, Oliphant to Loraine, 7 June 1923, Loraine Papers, FO101/12. Minute by Oliphant, 24 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8215. Minute by Mallet, 3 Sept. 1924, FO371/10146/7501. Minute by Mallet, 18 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8007. Minute by Mallet, 24 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8215. C.Davies, “British Oil Policy in the Middle East, 1919–1932” (Ph.D., Edinburgh, 1973), p.75. Fairley (Tehran) to APOC (London), 3 Oct. 1924, FO371/10135/8553. The Company’s expert on the southern tribes (Dr Young) in fact wished the British government to side with the central government. The London management of the Company, faced with the conflicting reports from the south and Tehran, did not take a definite stand. (Dr Young to Loraine, 3 Sept. 1924, Loraine Papers, FO1011/128; Minute by Oliphant, 18 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8007; Ferrier, pp.390–394.) Minute by Churchill, 23 May 1924, FO371/10145/4484. Minutes by Mallet, 18 and 24 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/8007/, 8428. MacDonald to Peel, 1 Oct 1924, FO371/10135/8438. Minute by Mallet, 1 Nov. 1923, FO371/9025/10602. “The Political Situation in Persia”, memo by Mallet, 14 Nov. 1923, FO371/9025/ 11626. Minutes by Mallet, 29 Nov., 2 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10562, 10692. lbid.; Minute by Mallet, 3 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10780. MacDonald to Ovey, 13 and 22 Sept. 1924, FO371/10135/7833, 8082. Loraine to Oliphant, 8 May 1923, Loraine Papers, FO/1011/13. Reza Shah, pp.8–18. Ovey to MacDonald, 9 Oct. 1924, FO371/10136/8754. Ovey to MacDonald, 23 Oct. 1924, FO371/10146/9753. Hodgson to MacDonald, 25 Sept. 1924, FO371/10136/8615.

NOTES 247

52. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), Nos. 31 and 42, for weeks ending 2 Aug., 18 Oct. 1924, FO371/10132/7518, 10388. 53. See note 50 above. 54. Minute by Mallet, 11 Nov. 1924, FO371/10146/9735. 55. Minutes by Mallet, 10 Oct., 5 Nov. 1924; Minute by Oliphant, 11 Oct. 1924, FO371/10136/8794, 9610. 56. In a letter to Loraine, Ovey laid the blame for disturbing his honeymoon on “Peel’s will to war.” Ovey to Loraine, 8 Nov. 1924, Loraine Papers, FO1011/128. 57. Ovey to MacDonald, 23 and 26 Oct. 1924, FO371/10136/9263, 9300. 58. The Sheikh bitterly accused the British government of “doing everything in their power to strengthen his adversary when he had a right to count upon their neutrality.” Reports from Peel in Ovey to FO, 24 Oct., 4 Nov. 1924, FO371/10136/ 9318, 9590. 59. Minute by Mallet, 6 Nov. 1924, FO371/10136/9643. 60. Ovey to FO, 4 and 5 Nov. 1924, FO371/10136/9610, 9643. 61. Ovey to Loraine, 8 Nov. 1924, Loraine Papers, FO1011/128. 62. Report from Consul at Isfahan, in Ovey to FO, 8 Nov. 1924, FO371/ 10136/9709. 63. Reza Shah, pp.17–18. 64. Ibid., pp.42–43, 52–53. 65. Fairley (Tehran) to APOC (London), 17 and 18 Nov. 1924; Monson (Chargé, Tehran) to FO, 17 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/9992, 10073, 9991. Reza Khan also notes that some deputies seized on the opportunity to force his resignation. (Reza Shah, p.132.) 66. Reza Shah, pp.43–46, 49–50; Monson to FO, 24 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/ 10242. 67. Ovey to FO, 10 Nov. 1924; Minute by Mallet, 12 Nov. 1924, FO371/ 10137/9781, 9845. 68. Loraine to FO, 14 and 15 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/9914, 9926. 69. Loraine to FO, 18 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10094. 70. Reza Shah, pp.44–45. 71. Loraine to Chamberlain, 20 Nov. 1924; Report from Shiraz, 21 Nov., in Loraine to Chamberlain, 25 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10146, 10364. 72. Reza Shah, p.46. 73. Loraine to Chamberlain, 22 Dec. 1924, FO371/10843/649. 74. Loraine to Chamberlain, 24 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10291. 75. Loraine to Chamberlain, 24 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10290. 76. Loraine to MacDonald, 11 Feb. 1924, FO371/10145/2493. 77. Loraine to Chamberlain, 24 Nov. 1924, L/PS/10/934/4630; Loraine to Chamberlain, 25 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10281. A few months earlier, in July 1924, the Imperial Defence Committee had decided that India should earmark two brigades for the defence of the Persian oilfields in case of emergency. (See, Kittner, p.272; Davies, Ch. 5.) The Air Ministry had already made it clear that it was beyond the capacity of the garrison in Iraq to protect the Persian oilfields. Air Ministry to FO, 5 Nov. 1923, FO371/9029/10773. 78. Chamberlain to Loraine, 28 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10414.


79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94.

95. 96.

97.

98. 99. 100. 101.

Minutes by Osborne, Tyrell, and Mallet, 27 Nov. 1924, ibid. Minute by Chamberlain, 27 Nov. 1924, ibid. Minute by Chamberlain, 20 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10094. Chamberlain to Loraine (Baghdad), 25 and 28 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/ 10281/ 10414. Minute by Mallet, 26 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10426. Loraine to Chamberlain, 21 Dec. 1924, FO371/10137/10281. Loraine to Chamberlain, 21 Dec. 1924, FO371/10843/649. Loraine (Baghdad) to Chamberlain, 27 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10506. Makki, 1980, Vol. II. pp.583–84. Reza Shah, pp.93–94. Ibid., p.47. Loraine to Chamberlain, 25 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10365. In an interview with Izvestiya the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires at Tehran stated that it was difficult to say whether Reza Khan would finally give in to British pressure or would bring the south under the central government’s authority. “Interview with Shumiatsky”, in Izvestiya on 4 Dec. 1924, in Peters (Moscow) to FO, 5 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/ 11306. Loraine (Baghdad) to Chamberlain, 27 Nov. 1924; Consul-General (Bushire) to FO, 27 Nov. 1924, FO371/10137/10464, 10463. Loraine to Curzon, 29 Nov. 1924, FO371/10138/10562. Minute by Mallet, 29 Nov. 1924; Chamberlain to Loraine, 29 Nov. 1924, ibid. Reports from Peel in Loraine to Chamberlain, 2 Dec. 1924, FO371/ 10138/10780, 10785. Just before receiving these despatches, Mallet had observed that Reza Khan’s victory in Luristan would be a “big nail in the coffin of the Sheikh’s autonomy.” (Minute, 2 Dec. 1924, FO371/ 10138/10737.) Loraine to Chamberlain, 3 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10850. Indeed one of Reza Khan’s objectives was to reassert Persia’s authority in the northern coastlines of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, he felt he was following in the footsteps of Shah Abbas, who drove the Portuguese out of the strait of Hormuz in the early seventeenth century (Reza Shah, pp. 66–73, 84). The Oil Company was no longer concerned about the safety of their operation in the area. The local manager reported that he did not see any immediate danger to the pipelines and the oilfields as Reza Khan’s army was about to bring the tribes under its control. (Muhammerah to APOC (London), 2 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/ 10780.) Minute and Memo by Mallet, 3 and 6 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10780, 11138. Minutes by Mallet, Osborne, and Tyrrell, 3 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/ 10780. Minute by Chamberlain, 3 Dec. 1924, ibid. He nevertheless added, “Do not take action without PM’s approval.” However, it seemed to the India Office that it was “rather late for the battalion, if now sent from India, to exercise a stabilizing influence.” (Minute by Monteath, 4 Dec. 1924, L/PS/10/934.) India had earmarked

NOTES 249

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

111. 112. 113. 114.

115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.

two brigades for the defence of the Persian oilfield, as it was decided by the Imperial Defence Committee. (See note 77.) Minute by Osborne, 3 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10780. Monson to Chamberlain, 3 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10833. Peters (Moscow) to Chamberlain, 5 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/11306; The Times, 5 Dec. 1924, in FO371/10138/10902. Minute by Mallet, 5 Dec. 1924, ibid. Minute and Memo by Mallet, 4 and 5 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10833, 10937. Chamberlain to Loraine, 4 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10870. Loraine to Chamberlain, 4 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10922. Loraine to Chamberlain, 5 Dec. 1924, FO371/10138/10900. Loraine’s repeated, three times, requests for troops had indeed irritated the Foreign Office. One official later wrote to him: “Your first sudden calls for ships and battalions were a little alarming on top of the Egyptian crisis. It seemed a little as though on the return of a Conservative Government all our strong silent men were bursting their bonds and being embarrassingly articulate in a chorus of blood and iron.” Osborne to Loraine, 29 Dec. 1924, Loraine Papers, FO1011/128. Loraine to Chamberlain, 22 Dec. 1924, FO371/10843/649. Monson to Chamberlain and Loraine, 5 Dec. 1925, FO371/10138/10959. Loraine to Tyrrell, 1924, FO371/10138/11203. Arnold Wilson, the ex-manager of APOC in south Persia and former adviser to the Sheikh, wrote reproachfully to Loraine that the diplomats and businessmen abroad “must always be prepared to play the part of the Vicar of Bray.” Wilson to Loraine, 25 July 1925, Loraine Papers, FO1011/130. Reza Shah, pp. 105–06. Ibid., p.l22. Reza himself noted that he was surprised by Loraine’s friendly manner and remarks. (Reza Shah, pp.150–51.) Loraine to Chamberlain, 22 Dec. 1924, FO371/10843/649. Minute by Mallet, 7 Feb. 1925, ibid. Mallet to Loraine, 22 Jan. 1925, Loraine Papers, FO1011/130. Loraine to Osborne, 7 Feb. 1925; Osborne to Loraine, 29 Dec. 1924, Loraine Papers, FO1011 1/131, 128. Report from Peel in Loraine to Chamberlain, 24 Dec. 1924, FO371/ 10138/11643. Minutes by Osborne, Tyrrell and Chamberlain, 27 Dec. 1924, FO371/ 10138/ 11642. Loraine to Chamberlain, 12 March 1925, Minute by Mallet, 19 March 1925, FO371/10843/2100, 1572. Loraine to Oliphant, 25 March 1925, FO371/10843/2393; Jacks (local manager, APOC) to Loraine, 24 March 1925, enclosed in ibid. Minutes by Mallet, 24 April, and Chamberlain, 11 May 1925, FO371/ 10843/2441, 2695. Some 20 years later, however, a British official noted that the Sheikh’s downfall “did not lead to a loss of British prestige to the extent that


128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153.

might have been expected given the key position which he formerly held and the manner in which that position had been built up with the support of the British government.” “British Relations with Khazal, Sheikh of Mohammerah”, Memo by H.Grey (FO), 26 Nov. 1946, R/15/2/1747. Ibid. Loraine to Chamberlain, 6 Nov. 1925, FO371/10840/7222. Loraine to Chamberlain, 21 Nov. 1925, FO371/10840/7540. One notable example was Abul-Qassem Kashani. See Y.Richard, “Ayatollah Kashani: Precursor of the Islamic Republic?”, in N. Keddie (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven, 1983), pp.106–07. Loraine to Chamberlain, 10 Aug. 1925, FO371/10840/5210; Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), Nos. 21, 22, for weeks ending 8 and 22 Aug. 1924, FO371/10842/5218, 5737. Loraine to Chamberlain, 13 Oct. 1925, FO371/10840/6258. Loraine to Chamberlain, 29 Sept. 1925, FO371/10840/6723. For detailed accounts, see H.Makki, The Twenty Years in History of Iran, Vol. III (Tehran, 1983, reprint); Bahar, Vol. II; Daulatabadi, Vol. IV. Loraine to Chamberlain, 13 Oct. 1925, FO371/10840/6258. Loraine to Chamberlain, 2 March 1925, FO371/10840/1262. Minutes by Mallet, 23 Jan., 3 March 1925; Minute by Chamberlain, 3 March 1924, FO371/10840/402, 1262. Loraine to Chamberlain, 21, 22, 29 Oct. 1925; Chamberlain to Loraine, 32 Oct 1925, FO371/10840/6473, 6930, 6429, 6649. Minute by Mallet, 30 Oct 1925, FO371/10840/6429; Loraine to Chamberlain, 23 Oct. 1925; Chamberlain to Loraine, 10 Nov. 1923, Chamberlain Papers, FO800/ 258. Reza Shah, pp.233–40. Reza Khan had intercepted some of the correspondence between the Shah and the Crown Prince. Ibid., pp.23–24, 71–73. Ibid., pp.27–29. See for example, Wickham (Meshed) to Loraine, 3 Nov. 1925, FO248/ 1372. Col. Fraser to Col. Muspratt (IO), 1 Aug. 1924, FO371/10146/7152. M. Tafazuli (ed.), Diary of Sepahsalar (in Persian) (Tehran, 1983), p. 366. Letter to Legation, 31 Oct 1925, FO248/1372. Loraine to Chamberlain, 16 June 1925, Chamberlain Papers, FO800/ 258. Minute by Churchill, 9 Oct 1922, FO371/7809/10723; memo by Mallet, 14 Nov. 1923, FO371/9025/11626. Memo by Churchill, 23 June 1921, FO371/6404/7192. See note 149 above. Quoted in D.Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics (London, 1985), p.293. “Instructions Given by Sir P.Loraine to Havard (Oriental Secretary) for His Interview with Reza Khan”, 7 Oct. 1922, FO371/7811/13963; Loraine to Curzon, 24 Sept., 7 Oct. 1922, FO371/7809/9844, 10723.

NOTES 251

154. Churchill to Loraine, 10 Oct. 1922, Loraine Papers, FO101/123; Curzon to Loraine, 10 Oct. 1922, FO371/7809/10723. 155. The term was used by Loraine, in Loraine to Curzon, 29 Sept. 1925, FO371/10840/ 6723. 156. Loraine to Curzon, 11 Oct. 1923, FO371/7810/10954; Loraine to MacDonald, 16 Feb. 1924, FO371/10145/2430. Loraine to Chamberlain, 6 Nov. 1925, FO371/10840/7222. The Foreign Office was more sceptical and doubted if Reza Khan would “come up to scratch.” Minute by Oliphant, 25 Nov. 1925, ibid. 158. Loraine to Chamberlain, 10 Aug. 1925, FO371/10840/5210. 159. See note 148 above. 160. Loraine to Chamberlain, 2 Feb. 1925, FO371/10841/635. 161. Loraine to Chamberlain, 13 Feb. 1925, FO371/10841/1597. 162. Minutes by Oliphant and Tyrrell, 24 Feb. 1925; Chamberlain to Loraine, 1 April 1925, FO371/10841/635, 1597. The War Office also maintained that Reza Khan’s policies had foiled Soviet aggressive designs. See “The Extension of Soviet Influence in Asia”, memo by General Staff, 28 Nov. 1925, WO32/5916. 163. Chamberlain to Loraine, 22 Jan. 1925, FO371/10841/407. 164. lbid; Peters to Chamberlain, 7 Nov. 1924; British Documents on Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Union 1917–1939, Vol. 7, Doc. 146. 165. The Middle East Section of the Third International to Sultanzada, 11 Nov. 1924, in FO371/10133/11462. 166. Peters (Moscow) to Chamberlain, 22 May 1925, FO371/11016/3153; also in BDFA, the Soviet Union 1917–1939, Vol. 8, Doc. 25. 167. SIS Report: “Extract from the Secret Bulletin of the Eastern Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for July 1923”, in FO371/9026/ 8682. 168. lbid.; Shumiatsky (Tehran) to Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Moscow), 14 Dec. 1922, in FO371/9336/607. 169. Soviet Vice-Consul (Enzeli) to Shumiatsky (Tehran), 4 Sept. 1923, in Loraine to Curzon, 21 Sept. 1923, FO371/9027/10629. 170. “Secret Minutes of a Session of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, Held in Moscow on Dec. 15, 1922”, in FO371/9336/ 607. 171. Loraine to Vansittart, 10 Dec. 1923, Loraine Papers, FO101l/127. Loraine commented that Chicherin’s fear was “almost insane.” Loraine got this information from the German Minister. 172. Translation of “English Intrigue in Persia”, in Sovietskya Turkomenia, 10 Oct. 1924, in Maj. Thompson (MA, Meshed) to Col. Fraser (MA, Tehran), 4 Nov. 1924, FO371/10841/264. Mallet commented: “The Bolsheviks accuse us of fostering unrest among the Persian Turcomans in order to cloak their own activities in that area.” (Minute, 17 Jan. 1925, ibid.) The Soviet and British officials at Meshed met and accused each other of provoking the unrest. (Report by MA, Meshed, 14 July 1925, in Loraine to Chamberlain, 14 Aug. 1925, FO371/10843/5215.) Reza Khan believed that the Shah and the Court were behind the unrest, hoping to destabilize his cabinet. (Reza Shah, p.233.) For the


173.

174. 175. 176. 177. 178.

179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187.

“Basmachi” movement, see G.Fraser, “Basmachi”, Central Asian Survey, 6 (1987), pp.1–73; Rywkin, Ch. 3. G.Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1924–1927 (London, 1977), p.76. Hodgson to Chamberlain, 26 Feb. 1925, BDFA, the Soviet Union, 1917–1939, Vol. 7, Doc. 177. “Extract from Report on the International Position of the Union delivered by M. Frunze…”, 15 Feb. 1925, ibid., Doc. 178. Loraine to Chamberlain, 4 July 1925, FO371/10841/4283; Memorandum by Sir P. Loraine, 10 Oct. 1926, DBFP, IAs, Vol. II, No. 449. See B.Williams, “The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907”, Historical Journal, 9 (1966), pp.360–73. Chamberlain to Loraine, 22 Jan. 1925, FO371/10841/407. Loraine to Chamberlain, 13 Feb., 18 July 1925, FO371/10841/1597, 4616. “Minutes of Interview between the Military Attaché, Oriental Secretary and Colonel Mohammad Khan, Chief of Police on 29 July 1925”, in Loraine to Tyrrell, 1 Aug. 1925, FO371/10841/4885. In Tehran, for example, British officials knew of only two “communist committees.” The larger one had about 24 members. Intelligence Summary (MA, Tehran), No.5, for week ending 31 Jan. 1925, FO371/ 10841/1594. Minute by Osborne, 14 Aug. 1925, FO371/10841/4803. Loraine to Chamberlain, 4 July 1925, FO371/10841/4283. Minute by Chamberlain, 11 May 1925, FO371/10843/2695. Minute by Gregory, 19 Aug. 1925, FO371/10841/4803. However the following year, London briefly thought the Russians might resort to military action against Afghanistan. “Memorandum by Mr. Newton”, FO, 25 June 1925, quoted in W.R.Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939 (London, 1971), p.123. A.Orde, Great Britain and International Security, 1920–1926 (London, 1978), Ch. 4. Gorodetsky, p.80. “Memorandum by Mr. Gregory respecting Anglo-Soviet Relations”, FO, 1 Nov. 1925, DBFP, IAs., Vol. 1, No. 46; D’Abernon (Berlin) to Chamberlain, 15 April 1926, ibid., No. 460. Shortly after the new Conservative government came to power, the Chancellor, Churchill, wrote to Chamberlain: “The more I reflect on the matter, the more sure I am that we should revoke the recognition of the Soviet government which was decided on by MacDonald.” (Churchill to Chamberlain, 14 Nov. 1924, quoted in Dutton, p.234.) The Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, publicly called for the expulsion of the Soviet diplomatic and trade missions in the summer of 1925. (J.Campbell, E.F. Smith: First Earl of Birkenhead (London, 1983), p.785.) The Home Secretary, Joynson-Hicks, relentlessly pressed, both publicly and privately, for severance of relations with the Soviet Union. (Gorodetsky, pp.62–64.)

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II PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS Bourne, K. and D.C.Watt (eds.) British Documents on Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Union: 1917–1939 (University Publications of America, 1985–): DBFA, Vols. 7, 8 Butler, R. et al. (eds.) British Documents on Foreign Policy, 1919– 1939 (London, 1947–): BDFP, Is, Vols. 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 13; IAs, Vols. 1, 2 Cmd 300: Agreement between His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Persian Government, 9 August 1919 Degras, J. (ed.) Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. 1 (London, 1951) Eudin, X. and R.North Soviet Russia and the East, 1917–1923: A Documentary Survey (Stanford, 1957) Gilbert, M. Winston Churchill: Documents, July 1919-March 1921 (London, 1977): Churchill Documents *Historical Documents: The Workers, Social Democratic and Communist Movements in Iran (Florence, 1972–): Persian Communist Movement Doc., Vols. 1, 4, 6 Jeffrey, K. (ed.) The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 1918–1922 (London, 1985): Wilson Letters Lenin, V.I. Collected Works (Moscow, 1960–70), Vols. 31, 42, 44, 45 Meijer, J.M. (ed.) The Trotsky Papers, 1920–1922 (The Hague, 1971): Trotsky Papers Official Report, Parliamentary Debate: Houses of Commons and Lords: L.C.Deb. and H.L.Deb. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1921, Vol. II, 1927, Vol. III (Washington, 1936, 1942): FRUS The Second Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings (London, 1977)

III BOOKS, ARTICLES AND THESES Abrahamian, E. Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, 1982) Adelson, R.D. “The Formation of British Policy towards the Middle East, 1914–1918” (Ph.D., Washington University, 1972). Akhavi, Sh. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: ClergyState Relations in the Pahlavi Period (N.Y., 1980)

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Allison, G.T. and M.H.Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications”, in R.Tanter and R.H. Ullman (eds.), Theory and Policy in International Relations, supplement to World Politics, 24 (1972): 40–79 Andrew, C.M. “The British Secret Service and Anglo-Russian Relations in the 1920s, Part I”, Historical Journal, 20 (1977): 673– 706. — Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London, 1985) Anonymous “The 1920 Revolution in Persian Azerbaijan: A New Appraisal”, Central Asian Review, 6 (1958): 348–56, 432–47. Arfa, H. Under Five Shahs (London, 1964) Arsalanian, A. “Dunsterville’s Adventure: A Reappraisal,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12 (1980): 199–216. Avery, P. Modern Iran (London, 1965) Axelrod, R. “Decision for Neoimperialism: The Deliberations of the British Eastern Committee in 1918,” in R.Axelrod (ed.), Structure of Decision (Princeton, 1976) *Azari, A. The Revolt of Khiyabani (Tehran, 1951) — *The Revolt of Colonel Muhammad-Taqi Khan Pesyan in Khurassan (Tehran, 1950) *Bahar, M.T. A Short History of the Political Parties, 2 Vols. (Tehran, 1944 and 1984) Balfour, J.M. Recent Happenings in Persia (London, 1922) *Bastani-Parizi, M. Struggle for Liberty: Political Biography of Mushir udDaula (Tehran, 1969) Beaverbrook, Lord Men and Power, 1917–1918 (London, 1956) Beck, L. The Qashqa’i of Iran (Yale, 1986) Bennigsen, A. and S.E.Wimbush Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago, 1979) Bishop, D.G. The Administration of British Foreign Policy (Syracuse, 1974) Blacker, L.V.S. On Secret Patrol in High Asia (London, 1922) Blank, S. “Soviet Politics and the Iranian Revolution of 1919– 1921”, Cahier du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 21 (1980): 173–94 Brecher, M. et al. “A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3 (1969): 75–94 Bruinessen, M.M.van “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case of Simko’s Revolt”, in R.Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London, 1983) Busch, B.C. Mudros to Lausanne (N.Y., 1976) Callwell, C.E. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diary, Vol. II (London, 1927) Campbell, J.E.F.Smith: First Earl of Birkenhead (London, 1983) Carr, E.H. The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923, Vol. III (London, 1953) Chaqueri, C. “Sultanzada: The Forgotten Revolutionary Theoretician of Iran: A Biographical Sketch”, Iranian Studies, 17 (1984): 215–35, and Central Asian Survey, 3 (1984): 57–73 Cottam, R. Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1965)

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Index

Abadan 178 Adalat Party 77, 90, 100, 207 n99 recruitment of Persian workers 96–4, 213 n50 see also Communist Party of Iran Afghanistan 60, 79, 81, 8 7, 1 25, 122, 128, 187, 188 Ahmad Shah 11, 16, 21, 50, 51, 92, 12 116, 149–8, 156, 165–7, 183, 226 n98, 237 n10, 244 n9 Ahwaz 169, 170, 177, 179, 181 ‘Ain ud-Daula, Sultan Abdul-Majid Mirza 113, 114 air attacks 38, 41, 42, 107 ‘Ala us-Saltana, Muhammad-Ali Khan 13 ‘Ala, Mirza Hussain Kahn 138 Aliyani, Hassan 214 n82 Allah Verdi 97 Allenby, Field Marshal Edmund 5 Allied Supreme Council 82 Amir-Arshad 221 n17 Amir ’Asha’er, Mustafa Quli Khan 88, 212 n36 Amir Muqtader 88, 89, 212 n36, 214 n83 Anglo-Persian Agreement 16–20, 24, 40, 42, 44, 51, 52, 53, 65–9, 87, 88, 109, 110, 111, 114, 116, 118, 123, 133, 140, 157, 187, 223 n66, 225 n91, 227 n129, 232 n2 Anglo-Persian Military Commission 43– 5 Anglo-Persian Oil Company 13, 14– 16, 24, 25, 28, 133, 135–5, 138, 159, 163–4, 169, 175, 245 n38

Standard Oil partnership 139, 142–3 Anglo-Russian Convention v, 12, 31, 60, 187 Anglo-Russian cooperation, in Persia 12–13 Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement 120, 187 Anglo-Soviet trade talks 68, 72, 74, 77, 78–9, 120–9, 137, 227 n121, 227 n122 APOC see Anglo-Persian Oil Company Arab Army 52 Arabistan 159, 164–5, 170, 174, 175, 177, 179,191 Archangel 223 n75 Ardabil 88 Arfa, General Hassan 43–6 aristocrats, arrests 118 Armenia 62, 104, 108 Armitage-Smith, Sydney 15, 18–19, 20, 22–5, 27, 28, 239 n34 arms, for Persia 86, 211 n17 army, Persian 43–6, 55, 161, 163, 241 n100 Ashkhabad 59, 96, 99, 100 Astara 68, 69, 72 Azerbaijan 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 77, 78, 81, 84–1, 87, 88, 104–11, 108, 119, 127, 207 n99, 208 n112, 229 n154 Baghdad 52 Bajgiran 99, 218 n120

263


Bakhtiaris 11, 111, 112, 112, 117, 125, 158, 159, 160, 161–2, 163, 164, 169, 170, 226 n104, 243 n119 Baku 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 73, 76, 78, 84, 90, 91, 95, 103, 107, 108,126, 125, 127, 129, 229 n154, 231 n187 Baldwin, Stanley 244 n1 Balfour, A.J. 1–2, 3, 5, 11, 1 5, 34, 136, 222 n52 Balfour, J.M. 16–20 Baratov, General 33, 35, 2 Barbari 224 n132 Barnes, Hugh 28 Basmachi movement 187, 251 n172 Basra 177 Batum 61, 62, 63 Beatty, David, 1st Earl 63 Beaverbrook, Lord 46 Bedford, A.C. 138, 142, 234 n20 Bicharakov, Colonel Lazar 35, 38 Birkenhead, F.E. Smith, 1st Earl 251 n187 Blacker, Captain L.V.S. 97, 99 Blumkin, Jacob 105–12, 221 n27 Bolsheviks 20, 21, 49, 51, 53, 71, 84, 84, 87, 88, 89, 94, 141, 211 n6, 217 n107 opposition to, in Persia 87–4 perceived threat 20, 21, 59–7, 84, 129, 141 Persian campaign against 49, 89, 94 plans to counter 116–4 see also communists bombing, air attacks 38, 41, 42, 107 Bonar Law, Andrew 21, 86 Bravin, Karl 64, 65 Bridgeman, Reginald 129–8 Bristow, E. 104, 221 n13 Britain Anglo-Soviet trade talks 68, 72, 74, 77, 78–9, 120–9, 137, 227 n121, 227 n122 and Bolshevism in Persia 84–5, 92–9 control over Persian forces 42–6, 48- 2, 53–9

financial relations with Persia 11– 11, 16–17 loans to Persia 11–14, 17–18, 19– 30 maintenance of influence in Persia 5- 6 military intervention in north Persia 34–42, 45–51 perception of Soviet threat 59–7, 101- 11, 106–13, 108–15, 112, 114– 2 reactions to ascendancy of Reza Khan 152–7 relations with United States 133– 53 response to Soviet landing at Enzeli 69–78, 79, 80 and Reza Khan’s struggle with Sheikh Khaza’l 158–8, 159–75, 170–6, 177–92 withdrawal of troops from Persia 36, 40–2, 45–9, 52–6, 86, 123, 137 British Empire 4 British officers, employed in Cossack Division 49, 51, 53–8 Broido, Grigori 95, 216 n98 Bujnurd 98 Bukhara 220 nl39 Bushire 31–4, 40, 169, 174, 175, 177 Bushire Expeditionary Force 40 Butters, C.A. 75, 76, 84 Cadman, John 136, 142, 142 Carr, E.H. 216 n94 Caspian Flotilla, Red Navy 70 Caspian Sea 59, 61, 62, 63, 73, 104 Caucasus 59, 59, 61, 63, 75, 77, 187, 230 n164 Cecil, Lord Robert 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, v Chaharlang 162 Chamberlain, Austen 45, 52, 62, 176– 7, 178, 180,196, 188, 227 n122, 22 n1 Champain, Major-General H.B. 41–3, 47, 64, 67, 69–4, 72, 92–9,94, 95–2, 107, 206 n63

INDEX 265

Chelmsford, Frederick Thesiger, 1st Viscount 17, 34, 41–3, 43, 44, 61- 4, 111–18 Chicherin 72, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81–7, 83, 84, 106, 108, 127, 187–188, 221 n13, 230 n181, 250 n171 China 21, 187, 187, 188, 234 n62 Churchill, George 26, 29, 72–7, 110– 17, 117, 138, 151, 152, 156, 163–4, 184–6 Churchill, Winston 42, 51, 68, 82, 83, 206 n55, 220 n4, 251 n187 Soviet invasion of Persia 101–9 and Soviet Union 59–2, 63, 82, 83, 105 trade agreement with Soviet Union 120, 121 withdrawal of Norperforce 45–8, 47, 52, 53, 93 civil war, Persia 31 Clemenceau, Georges 59 clergy 88, 225 n91 attitude to Constitutional Movement 184 hostility to British 157 opposition to republicanism 167–8 Coffin, William 140–50 Colby, Bainbridge 234 n20 Comintern 106, 187, 230 n178 communist parties, foreign, Soviet support 216 n94 Communist Party, British 229 n151 Communist Party of Iran 77, 90, 118, 124, 231 n187 see also Adalat Party Communist Party, Soviet 90 communists 153 Persia 84–100, 187 see also Bolsheviks Constitutional Revolution 22, 213 n47 Constitutionalists 31, 75, 184 Cossack Brigade 33, 197 n6 Cossack Division 35–7, 37, 39, 43, 68, 69, 78, 149, 197 n6, 216 n94, 241 n100 against Jangalis 41, 42

against revolutionaries 126, 129, 152 British officers dismissed 27, 55 British officers employed 49, 51, 53–8 operations in Gilan 93–95, 107, 126 proposed British control 24, 25, 37, 49–3, 118 Reza Khan’s coup 53, 116, 225 n92 Cox, Sir Percy 11, 16–17, 19–1, 40, 41, 42, 42, 44, 46, 47, 52, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 112, 206 n63, 225 Crowe, Eyre 28 Crutchly, Captain 70 Curzon, George, 1st Marquis Curzon of Kedleston v, 36, 38, 42, 45, 48, 51, 81, 82, 89, 98, 101,144, 151, 165, 171, 199 n72, 206 n55, 220 n4, 226 n107, 232 n199, 244 n1 Anglo-Soviet trade talks 78–4, 80, 84, 120, 121, 216 n85 on consequences of British withdrawal 129 contingency plans for withdrawal from Persia 111, 112 Eastern Committee 1–3 loans to Persia 17, 19–2, 24, 26–9, 28, 29–2 on military presence in Persia 40– 2 and Norperforce 44–7 opposes withdrawal of Indian troops from Persia 42 opposes withdrawal of Norperforce 46, 47, 52, 53, 55, 68, 69, 93, 119, 214 n73 payments to Persians 11, 11 Persian Army 43, 55 on Persian change of government 86- 2 Persian policy 1–7, 158 Qajar dynasty 167 response to Enzeli landing 71, 72 Reza Khan’s tribal policy 163, 164 and Soviet-Persian relations 67– 1, 110 United States 133, 137


on use of force 31 views of Persian elite 156, 157 views of Russian threat 59–5 customs receipts 22 British prior lien on 17–18 D’Arcy Concession 14, 232 n10 Daily Express 46–9 Dashnak government, Armenia 104 Daylami, ‘Ali 214 n81 debt, Persian 21–4 Democrat Party 84, 85, 87 Denikin, General A.I. 59, 61, 68, 70 Dickson, Brigadier-General William 42–5, 44, 48, 50 dictatorship, Reza Khan’s government as 184–6 diplomatic mission, Persian, to Moscow 89, 109–16 Dunsterville, Major-General Lionel 34, 35, 36, 37, 208 n10 East Persia Cordon 31, 39, 40, 42–5 Eastern Committee 1–3, 11, 20 Edmonds, Major C J. 84–1, 87, 88, 116, 117, 226 n97, 229 n155 Egypt 21, 51, 53, 75, 176, 177 Eliava, Shalva 106, 221 n28 Engert, C.Van 140, 142, 143 Enzeli 34, 35, 41, 42, 62, 64, 68, 90, 94, 95, 107, 108, 129, 130, 187, 231 n187 proposed withdrawal 67, 68–3 Soviet landing 21, 45–8, 69–78, 79, 80, 95, 125–4 Erivan 104 Farman-Farma, Abdul-Hussain Mirza 11, 33, 118, 149, 237 n4 Fars 11, 22, 39, 40, 84 Fazlullah Khan Aq-Evli, Colonel 43– 6 Fergana 96 fetwa, condemning Bolshevism 87–4, 225 n86 financial advisers British, in Persia 17, 18–20

US 138, 140–50 Firuz, Prince 11, 43, 66, 67, 114, 118, 124, 156–6, 223 n66, 225 n86 Foch, Marshal Ferdinand 63 foreign capital, opposition to entry 21–4 Frunze, Mikhail 96 Geddes, Sir Auckland 134–4, 136, 142, 234 n20, 234 n21, 234 n23, 234 n32, 234 n58 Gendarmerie 43, 94, 97, 99, 150, 216 n94, 241 n100 General Strike 188 Georgia 61, 62, 108, 125, 127 Germany 36–8, 188 Gikalo, Nicolai 119, 231 n183 Gilan 91, 103, 114, 208 n112, 227 n118, 229 n154, 231 n183 British military expedition 23, 94– 1 revolutionaries 29, 37, 42, 74–9, 76, 84, 85, 87, 88, 106, 113, 124, 126- 4, 129, 149, 152–2, 221 n29, 222 n45, 225 n84, 229 n157 Soviet Republic 23, 73, 74 Soviet withdrawal 77–3, 79, 80, 109, 123, 227 n123 Grant, Hamilton 6 Greenway, Charles 14, 15 Grey, Edward, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon v, 60, 133, 137 Grey, Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. 97 guerrillas 151 see also Jangalis Haig, Colonel T.W. 116, 225 n92 Haldane, General 53, 64, 92–9, 94, 101, 103–10, 214 n66, 214 n73, 225 n92, 226 n117 Hamadan 34, 35, 37, 64, 87, 92–9, 95 Hankey, Maurice 80–6 Harding, President W.G. 135 Hardinge, Charles, 1st Baron Hardinge of Penshurst 21, 62 Havard, Godfrey 177, 245 n31

INDEX 267

Haydar Khan ‘Amu-Ughli 97, 100, 124, 217 n1 11, 229 n154 Heshmat, Dr Ebrahim 42 Holy Places, Mesopotamia 87–4 Huddleston, Colonel 116 Hughes, Charles 143–4 Ihsanullah Khan 76, 124, 126, 129, 230 n157, 230 n169, 230 n174 Imbrie, Robert 144 Imperial Bank of Persia 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28–2, 151, 196 n110, 239 n39 Imperial Defence Committee 246 n77 imperialism 4 India 2, 4, 6, 17, 42–4, 45, 59, 60, 60– 4, 79, 81, 83, 103, 121, 181,187, 199 n72, 246 n77 Indian Expeditionary Force 39 Iraq 140, 157, 246 n77 see also Mesopotamia Ireland 51 Ironside, Major-General Edmund 4749, 50, 51, 52, 54, 104–11, 107, 108, 113, 114–2, 116, 223 n76, 225 n92, 226 n117 Isfahan, proposed withdrawal of Legation to 111, 112 Jangalis 34, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 73, 89, 91, 105, 149, 151, 153, 214 n81, 216 n83 Javadzada, Mir Ja’far 124 Jihad, against Bolshevism 88 Joynson-Hicks, William 251 n187 Kaakha 100 Kamenev, L.B. 227 n121 Karadagh, tribes 104, 221 n13 Karakhan, L.M 77, 119 Karun 6 Kashani, Abul-Qassem 249 n131 Kashgar 128 Kasma’i, Haji Ahmed 42 Kasravi, Ahmad 84–1 Kasvin 34, 35, 37, 39, 46, 54, 62, 68, 72, 88, 91, 92–9, 95, 113, 123

Kemal Pasha 108, 221 n13 Kemalist forces 104 Keynes, J.M. 11–11, 40 Khalkhal 88 Khalu Qurban 124, 129, 229 n154, 230 n157 Khamseh 11, 162 Khaza’l, Sheikh 158, 159–70, 163, 164, 165, 165, 168–9, 170–1. 172–6, 177–8, 179, 180, 181–3, 241 n106, 246 n58, 247 n94, 249 n114, 249 n127 Khiyabani, Shaykh Muhammed 84– 1, 86, 87, 209 n2, 211 n6, 211 n8 Khoshtaria concession 133, 134, 232 n10 Khuda Verdi 97–5, 99 Khurassan 29, 95, 96–5, 99, 187, 216 n98, 218 n123 Kizil Arvat 59 Kolomiitsev, 0 , 77–2 Krasnovodsk 59, 95 Krassin, Leonid 68, 77, 78, 79–5, 81, 82, 83–9, 89, 108, 121, 122, 227 n122 Kuchik Khan 34, 36, 37–9, 41, 42, 7576, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 129, 152, 198 n20, 208 n100, 212 n36, 213 n47, 214 n83, 216 n94, 229 n155, 230 n157, 230 n169, 231 n187, 231 n194 relations with communists 73, 77, 77, 78, 91, 93, 94, 105–12, 123, 124 Kuhgilu 159 Kurds 150 Lamont, Thomas 143 land reform 90, 213 n47 Lansing, Robert 133 League of Nations 7, 80, 81,92, 1 Lenin, V.I. 64, 74, 80, 81, 91, 95, 96, 106, 108, 127, 230 n177, 231 n184 Lenkoran 68 Leslie, General W.B. 98, 99, 218 n123 liberal nationalists 75, 84, 85–2, 87, 90


Lindsay, Sir Ronald 137, 142 Litvinov, Maxim 79, 80, 82, 229 n151 Lloyd George, David 1, 45, 47, 59, 62, 63–7, 71–6, 79–5, 81, 82, 120–8, 226 n115, 227 n122 loans British, to Persia 11–14, 17–18, 19–30 USA, to Persia 133, 138–8, 143–4 Locarno Pact 187 Long, Walter 62–6 Loraine, Sir Percy 129, 130, 143, 157, 158, 247 n110, 249 n114, 250 n171 on agreement with USA 139, 140, 142, 144 and Reza Khan 30, 153–4, 160–1, 171, 174, 175, 176–7, 177–90, 180– 2, 182, 183, 185–7, 187, 243 n119, 249 n117 Luftabad 97 Lur tribes 159, 165, 177 Luristan 177, 179 Lurs 150, 169 MacDonald, J. Ramsay 171, 244 n1, 251 n187 McDonogh, General 6 MacLean, H.W. 26, 27, 196 n110 McLintock, William 15 McMurray, James 28, 29, 30 Mahachqala 68 Malleson, Major-General W. 31, 42, 95–3, 208 n105, 216 n98, 216 n100, 217 n107, 218 n123 Mallet, Victor 171–2, 173–4, 247 n94 Manjil 41, 49, 94, 95, 107 withdrawal from 91–9 Manjil Pass 38 Manning, Van H. 234 n21 Marling, Charles 4, 14, 15, 16, 33, 34, 35–7, 37, 39, 40 Masuli’i, Ghulam ‘Ali Baba 216 n83 Mazandaran 94 Merv 96, 100 Meshed 31, 88, 97, 98, 99, 100, 153, 239 n54, 251 n1

Mesopotamia 1, 6, 51, 53, 64, 125, 135, 136, 234 n39 Holy Places 87–4 see also Iraq Middle East 60, 141, 181 migrant workers, Persian, recruitment by Adalat Party 96–4, 213 n50 Mikailian, Avetis see Sultanzada military action, south Persia 31–4 military expedition, north Persia 34– 39 military expenditure, reduction 53 military intervention, in Arabistan 176- 6, 177, 178, 179 Millerand, Alexandre 82 Millspaugh, Arthur 141 Milner, Alfred, 1st Viscount 46, 47, 52, 71 Mineral Leasing Act 134, 234 n24 Mirza Ali Akbar, Haji 88 Mixed Financial Commission 13, 196 n110 Mohammed Shah 222 n50 Montagu, Edwin 1, 2–3, 6, 7,11, 20, 21, 40–2,44, 43, 67–1, 120, 121 moratorium payments 12–14 Morgan, J.P. and Company 142, 143 Mosul 52 Mudarres, Sayyed Hassan 168, 186, 245 n20 Muhammad-Hassan Mirza, Crown Prince 149, 237 n10 Muhammad-Sadegh Tabatataba’i 157 Muhammerah 112, 165, 169, 175, 177, 179, 188, 243 n141 Mukhber us-Saltana, Mehdi-Quli Khan Hedayat 18, 87, 104–11 Mushar ul-Mulk, Hassan Khan 149 Mushaver ul-Mamalek, ‘Ali-Quli Khan 109, 126, 222 n50, 222 n52, 223 n53, 225 n84 Mushir ud-Daula, Hussain Khan 18, 19, 21, 21, 23–6, 44, 49, 50, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93–94, 156, 226 n10 Mustafa Kemal see Kemal Pasha

INDEX 269

Mustaufi ul-Mamalek, Hassan Khan 156, 226 n10 Mutamen ul-Mulk, Hassan Khan 226 n104 Narimanov, Nariman 106, 127, 207 n99, 230 n181 Narkomindel 77, 106 national liberation, movements 106 nationalists 33–5, 38, 75, 84, 85–2, 87, 90, 124, 149, 157, 225 n91, 231 n187, 234 n62 Nicolson, Harold 48 Noel, Major E.W. 125 Norman, Herman 21, 24, 27, 28, 44, 48, 49–2, 50–3, 53, 54, 5 7, 91 -2, 3, 89, 91, 9 7, 1 v, 98, 104, 112–20, 114, 116, 118, 119, 123, 124–2, 124– 3, 128, 129, 150, 151, 225 n92, 226 n117, 227 n135 Norperforce 40–4, 44, 44–7, 59, 64, 68, 69, 77, 95, 202 n1 18 withdrawal, contingency plans for 111–19 proposed 45–9, 52–6, 70–5, 93 oil 1, 6, 63, 133–53, 171, 246 n77 royalties 14–16 oil concessions, north Persia 139 oil policy, US 134–4, 232 n14, 234 n21 Oliphant, Lancelot 29, 44, 54, 80, 111, 120, 126, 139, 223 n76, 239 n27 Ordzhonikidze, Sergo 74, 77, 78, 95– 2, 126, 127, 207 n84, 231 n187 Ovey, Esmond 101, 109–16, 137, 16976, 172, 173, 245 n31 Palestine 5, 53 payments, to members of Persian ruling elite 11–11 peace treaty, with Soviets 82 Peel, E.G. 169, 245 n31 Persia American involvement 133–53 army 43–6, 55, 161, 163, 241 n100

British financial control 11–14, 17–23, 26–30 British military intervention in north Persia 33–42, 45–51 British officers in Cossack Division 49, 51, 53–8 communists 84–100 Curzon’s policy 4–7 fear of Soviet invasion 101–19 internal threat 113–1 loans 11–14, 17–18, 19–30, 133, 138- 7, 143–4 maintenance of British influence 5–6 relations with Soviet Union 64– 68, 223 n66, 225 n86, 227 n118, 21 n177 Reza Khan coup 116–6, 123–1, 149–8 ruling elite 11–11, 117–5, 123–2, 149- 7, 156–6, 182, 226 Soviet withdrawal 77–3, 79, 80, 109, 123, 198 n23 withdrawal of British troops 36, 40–2, 45–9, 52–6, 69–4, 86, 123, 137 Persian Communist Party see Adalat Party; Communist Party of Iran Persian Gulf 158, 160, 177, 182 Petroleum Institute 234 n21 petroleum see oil Petrovsk 68 Peysan, Colonel Muhammad-Taqi Khan 152, 239 n42 Phelan, Senator James 234 n23 Poland 81, 82, 83, 103, 216 n94, 227 n121 propaganda Soviet 121, 221 n85 British ask for cessation 79–5, 81, 82–9 Pushtkuh 112, 159 Qajar dynasty 167, 244 n6 deposition 182–5 Qashqa’i 159, 162 Qasri Shirin 34


Qavam ul-Mulk, Ebrahim Khan 11, 159 Qavam us-Saltana, Ahmad Khan 26, 27, 98–6, 129, 138, 151, 156, 21 n4 Radcliffe, General 40, 54, 68, 68–3 radical nationalists 157 Raskolnikov, Feodor 69, 70, 73–8, 75, 76, 77, 77, 80, 91, 206 n63 Red Army 59, 66, 68, 73, 104, 119, 124, 127, 220 n139, 229 n154, 230 n164 recruitment of Persians 96 Red Navy, Caspian Flotilla 68, 69, 70 Redl, Lieutenant-Colonel E.A.F. 99 republic, campaign to set up 167–8 Resht 23, 37, 38, 41, 42, 69, 72, 73, 7 8, 77, 78, 9 5, 91, 94, 95, 107, 113, 123, 126, 130, 149 Reuter Concession 22 revolutionaries, Gilan 124, 126–5, 129, 149, 152–2, 225 n84 Reza Khan 30, 53, 54–8, 126, 129, 130, 237 n17, 240 n57, 240 n72, 244 n9, 245 n31, 246 n65, 247 n96, 249 n117, 250 n141, 250 n157, 250 n162, 251 n172 anti-Bolshevism 152–3 British funding of Army 155 British support for government of 184–8 centralizing policy 158–75, 165, 169, 171, 241 n113, 247 n90 coup 116, 149–8, 225 n92, 226 n97, 226 n98, 226 n104 dismisses British officers 27, 55 overthrow of Qajar dynasty 183–5 Persian elite and 156–6 Prime Minister 165–7, 245 n20 pro-republican campaign 167–8 struggle with Sheikh Khaza’l 168– 89, 181–3, 247 n94 War Minister 150–61 Rezazada, Ghulam Hussain 84 Rogachev, Colonel 124 Rogers, Sydney 28–1

Rothstein, Feodor 29, 122–30, 124, 124, 126, 127–6, 151, 152, 153, 229 n151, 230 n174, 231 n182, 231 n183, 231 n184 Royalists 31 royalties, oil 14–16 ruling elite, Persia 11–11, 117–5, 123–2, 149–8, 156–6, 182 Russia 48 Anglo-Russian Convention 187 influence in Persia v loans to Persia 11–13, 22 military presence in Persia 31, 33 see also Soviet Union Russian Army 35, 37 Russian revolution 13, 33–5, 66 Sa’ed ud-Daula 126, 230 n157, 230 n169, 230 n175 Salar Lashkar, Abbas Mirza 43, 118 Salar Shuja, Muhammad Ja’far Khan 220 n132 Samsam us-Sultana, Najaf-Quli Khan 39 Sardar Bahadur (Sardar As’ad), Ja’far- Quli Khan 149 Sardar Fakher 87, 91, 94 Sardar Humayun 50, 115, 225 n92 Sardar Mu’azzez, Azizullah Khan 98, 99 Sardar Muhi, Abdul-Hassain Khan 129, 229 n154 Sardar Zafar, Khusrau Khan 11 Sarem ud-Daula, Akbar Mirza 11,69 Saulat ud-Daula, Esma’il Khan 159 Sayyed Zia ud-Din Tabataba’i 25, 53, 55, 116–7, 123, 124, 149–9, 151, 152, 156, 225 n92, 226 n97, n98, 226 n115, 227 n118, 227 n129, 237 n10, 237 n11, 237 n17, 239 n26, 239 n27, 239 n42 Schulenberg, Count 187 secularism 167 Sepahdar ‘Azam, Fatullah Khan Akbar 19, 24, 33, 34, 50, 51, 53, 114

INDEX 271

Sepahsalar, Muhammad-Vali Khan 117–5, 230 n169, 230 n175 Shadlu tribe 98 Shahsevan tribes 104 Shateranlu tribe 88 Shiraz 175 Shirvan 99 Shujar ul-Mulk, Muhammad-Reza Khan 220 n132 Shuster, Morgan 12, 144 Sinclair Consolidated 143, 144 Sistan 31 Smuts, General J.C. 1 Smyth, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry 50, 115, 225 n92, 225 n86 Social Democratic Party 84, 85 South Persia Rifles 14, 33, 35, 39, 40, 55, 111, 112, 125 Soviet Central Asia 186 Soviet Union 27, 225 n84 Anglo-Soviet trade talks 68, 72, 74, 77, 78–9, 120–9, 137 Arabistan question 173, 179 British relations with 251 n187 fear of invasion of Persia by 101– 19 influence in East 186–8 landing at Enzeli 45–8, 69–78, 79, 80 perceived threat 59–7 proposed Anglo-Russian Agreement 187–188 relations with Persia 64–68 suspending Russian loans 22 withdrawal from Gilan 77–3, 79, 80, 109, 123 see also Russia Soviet-Persian Treaty 25, 110, 113, 118, 126, 223 n66, 225 n86, 227 n118, 230 n177 Soviet-Turkish relations 221 n13 Stalin, J.V. 106, 126 Standard Oil Company 133, 134–4, 136, 138–8, 141, 142–2, 142, 234 n20, 234 n21, 234 n23, 234 n32, 234 n58 Standard Oil-APOC partnership 139, 142–3

Starosselski, Colonel 39, 41, 42, 43, 50 49, 68, 69, 93, 94, 95,214 n82 Stokes, Colonel Claude 38, 39 Suleiman Mirza Eskandari 157 Sultan-Galiev 106 Sultanzada 90,112, 118, 124, 212 n44, 230 n178 Sweet, Colonel E.H. 76 Sykes, Brigadier-General Sir Percy 33 Tabriz 68, 72, 84, 85, 104, 112, 149, 153 Talish 88 Tashkent 96, 99–7, 128, 217 n1 Tehran, proposed evacuation 93, 113 Thompson, General W.M. 215 n105 Tiflis 61, 127, 231 n187 Tobacco Regie 11, 22 trade talks, Anglo-Soviet 68, 72, 74, 77, 78–9, 120–9, 137 Transcaspia 59,64, 95 Transcaucasia 106, 221 n13 tribal chiefs 158, 159, 164, 168 British relations with 158 tribes 88–5 rivalries among 161–2 unrest 149–9 Triumvirate 11 troops Adalat 96–5, 99 British, pressure for withdrawal from Persia 36, 40–2, 45–9, 52–6 withdrawal 86, 123, 137 Soviet, withdrawal 77–3, 79, 80, 109, 123, 129 Trotsky, Leon 64, 74, 77–3, 80, 81, 96, 127, 198 n23, 221 n27, 231 n184 Turcoman 187 Turkestan 59, 75, 77, 95, 187 Persian migrant workers 96 Turkey 21, 48, 81, 83, 108, 120, 122, 140, 143, 157, 167 Turkish forces, in Armenia 108 Turkish Petroleum Company 136 Turkomanchai Treaty 1 v


Turshizi 220 n132 Tyrrell, William 135 United States involvement in Persia 133–53 Persian attempts to obtain financial support from 25, 26 USSR see Soviet Union volunteer army, Russian 35, 36 Vusuq ud-Daula, Hassan Khan 11, 11, 13, 14, 16–17, 18, 20, 21, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 41, 64, 65, 66–67, 76, 85, 86, 138 White flotilla, Caspian 73–8 Wickham, Colonel 42, 116 Wilson, Arnold 249 n114 Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry 1, 2–3, 37, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51–4, 53, 54, 59, 59, 63, 68, 93, 112–19, 206 n55 Wrangel, General P.N. 81, 82, 83, 101- 8, 216 n94, 220 Wustrow, Kurt 84 Young, Dr M.Y. 245 n38 Zanjan 69, 87

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