British Policy In Mesopotamia 1903-1914

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British Policy Mesopotamia,

British Policy in Mesopotamia,

in

B

About the author Stuart Cohen is a professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. He specializes in Middle East diplomatic history. HISTORY

ISBN 978-0-86372-325-4

9 780863 723254 www.ithacapress.co.uk

‒

 ‒  Stuart A. Cohen

ritish imperial interests in Iraq during and after the First World War are well known and have often been studied. But what of British policy towards the Mesopotamian provinces before 1914? In this well-documented study, Stuart Cohen provides the first coherent account of growing British interest in these provinces, in which the defence of India, commercial considerations, the protection of Shia Muslim pilgrims and fear of a German-dominated Berlin to Baghdad railway all had a vital role to play. First published in 1976 and now available in paperback for the first time, this book is essential reading not only for an understanding of the making of British policy towards the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire but also of the last days of Turkish rule in Iraq itself.

British Policy in Mesopotamia,

ITHACA PRESS

Stuart A. Cohen

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British Policy in Mesopotamia, ‒

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British Policy in Mesopotamia, ‒

Stuart A. Cohen

ITH ACA P

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S

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BRITISH POLICY IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1903–1914 Published by Ithaca Press 8 Southern Court South Street Reading RG1 4QS UK www.ithacapress.co.uk Ithaca Press is an imprint of Garnet Publishing Limited. Copyright © Stuart A. Cohen, 1976, 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review. First Paperback Edition ISBN 13: 978-0-86372-325-4 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Typeset by Samantha Barden Jacket design by David Rose Cover photograph used courtesy of Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-DIG-Matpc-04665 Printed by Biddles, UK


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To the memory of my father


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Contents

Foreword Preface Guide to Abbreviations Used in Citations Maps Introduction

ix xi xiii xv 1

PA RT O N E T HE F OUNDATION OF P OLICY, 1903–1907

1 The Absence of Policy, 1903 2 The Context of Policy 3 The Formulation of Policy

21

27 35 53

PA RT T W O T HE I MPLEMENTATION OF P OLICY, 1907–1910

4 The Criteria of Decision-Making 5 The Implications of Decision-Making 6 The Method of Decision-Making

[vii]

69

75 107 133


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B R I T I S H P O L I C Y I N M E S O P OTA M I A , 1 9 0 3 – 1 9 1 4

7 8 9 10 11

PA RT T H R E E T HE M ODIFICATION OF P OLICY, 1910–1914

147

The Pressures on Strategy The Modification of Strategy The Significance of Strategy Epilogue to Policy: The Genesis of I.E.F. ‘D’ Conclusion

151 169 187 221 233

Bibliography Biographical Appendix Index

239 259 263

[viii]


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Foreword

There has been increasing interest in recent years in the study of the establishment of Britain’s position in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is partly a question of its relevance to the contemporary political situation. But there are also important historical questions concerned with analysing the establishment of an “informal” empire in an area of great power rivalry poised midway between the spheres of interest of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office in London and the government of India in New Delhi. European merchants, financiers and entrepreneurs also had a significant role to play. And over the whole enterprise, at least in its latter stages, there hangs the smell of oil. Stuart Cohen has made a useful contribution to an understanding of the expansion of British interests at the northern end of the Gulf, in Mesopotamia. Unlike other historians, he is concerned principally not with the genesis of the Indian expeditionary force which landed at Basra soon after the start of the First World War but with the developing British efforts to consolidate a position in the Ottoman provinces of Iraq in the face of the threat posed by foreign, mainly German, rivalry and by the plans to build the Baghdad Railway. Using material from government archives, Dr Cohen describes the search for a coherent British policy in a skilful and convincing narrative. Although this work is not directly about the internal situation in the Iraqi provinces, students of the Middle East will also find much interesting information relating to the politics and economics of the area. Early British contacts with politicians like Seyid Talib are described in detail, and there is as well a great deal of material relating to plans to develop the area by improving the system of irrigation and river transport. Roger Owen

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Preface

This book is not intended to be either a comprehensive study in international relations or a detailed account of the domestic politics of Mesopotamia between 1903 and 1914. It has two more restricted, but nevertheless important, aims. The first is to measure the extent of official British interest in the region during this period, and in so doing to redress a traditional historical bias. Commonly, Britain’s interest in Mesopotamia before 1914 has been treated merely as a prologue to the Mesopotamian campaign of the First World War and the subsequent British mandate over Iraq: the subject has been considered of little importance in its own right. The accelerating momentum of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy (which the present work attempts to describe) suggests that this is to misinterpret the evidence. The British and Indian governments had long possessed a strategic interest in the region, because it constituted a highway to India. By 1914, they had also taken active steps to secure a position of prominence in all areas of Mesopotamian commercial development and to establish a claim on the political loyalties of the Arab inhabitants of the region. Britain’s Mesopotamian policy before 1914 must therefore be treated as an important element in Britain’s general policy towards the Middle East in the early twentieth century. The second aim of this book is to weigh the various pressures which influenced British officials in the formulation of their policy towards Mesopotamia. This aim is restricted, and accounts for the exclusive concentration on the motives of the British government. However, it is also of wider relevance, since the subject forms part of a reassessment of the purposes of British foreign policy before the First World War. Thus the study aims to investigate not only the details of Britain’s involvement in Mesopotamia but also the motives (idiosyncratic and collective) which accounted for the parabola of that involvement. Such considerations have largely determined the structure of the argument presented in the following pages. The formulation and the nature of Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia between 1903 and 1914 is here treated in three chronological parts. These are preceded by an [xi]


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examination of the government’s attitude towards the Baghdad Railway in 1903; they are followed by an analysis of the reasons for the despatch of an expeditionary force to Basra in 1914. Together, the successive chapters attempt to describe the manner in which Great Britain became increasingly, albeit hesitantly, involved in the region. Individually, each of the parts also attempts to account for the pressures which at various points in time precipitated that process. Consequently, much of the book is devoted to an analysis of the tactics and strategy of individual “policy-makers”. This is undoubtedly not the whole story. But it does seem an indispensable part of any fruitful enquiry into the factors which determined Britain’s imperial policy.

*** I have many debts to acknowledge. Since this book grew out of an Oxford D. Phil. thesis, the foremost are to individual members of that university: to the late Mr A. Hourani of St Antony’s College and to Mr D. K. Fieldhouse of Nuffield College for their strenuous supervision of the original enterprise and for their benevolent interest in its subsequent development; to the Master and Fellows of St Catherine’s College for their warm encouragement throughout my stay in their midst; and to Miss E. Monroe of St Antony’s College for the benefit of her advice and erudition. In addition, I would like to make special mention of the help and criticism received from the late Prof. M. Verete of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. My debt to the officials of the archives and libraries in which I have worked will be obvious, but it is nonetheless great for that. The unfailing patience and habitual courtesy of the staffs of the Public Record Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the British Museum, the Bodleian, the Cambridge University Library and the Middle East Centre, Oxford measurably increased the pleasures of historical research. Extracts from the material in their possession appear by their kind permission. Thanks of a particular, and more recent, kind are due to those who have made the publication of this book possible: the directors of the Middle East Centre, who invited me to participate in their monograph series, and the Publication Committee of Bar-Ilan University, Israel, which contributed generously towards the cost involved. My greatest debt, which is impossible to specify, is to my wife. [xii]


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Guide to Abbreviations Used in Citations

ADM BD BS BT CAB CID DDF DNB

FO GP

HARD L/P & S/ LANS NIC PD WO

Admiralty Records, Public Record Office (PRO), London. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley eds. (London, 1926–1938). Babington Smith MSS, St. Antony’s Collection of private MSS, The Middle East Centre, Oxford. Board of Trade (B of T) Records, PRO, London. Cabinet Records, PRO, London. Committee of Imperial Defence. Documents diplomatiques francais, 1871–1914 (2nd series, Paris, 1930–1955). Dictionary of National Biography: 1901–1911 (Oxford, 1912), 1912–1921 (Oxford, 1927), 1922–1930 (Oxford, 1937), 1931–1940 (Oxford, 1949), 1941–1950 (Oxford, 1959), 1951–1960 (Oxford, 1971). Foreign Office (FO) Records, PRO, London. Die grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette, 1871–1914, J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and F. Thimme eds. (Berlin, 1922–1927). Hardinge MSS, Cambridge University Library. Political and Secret files of the India Office (IO), Commonwealth Relations Office, London. Lansdowne MSS, PRO, London. Nicolson MSS, PRO, London. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 1903–1914. War Office (WO) Records, PRO, London.

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The Various Proposed Railway Routes in Asiatic Turkey, 1903–1914

MAP ONE

Adapted from W. Willcocks, The Irrigation of Mesopotamia (London, 1911), Map no. 52.

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Proposed Baghdad Railway Route

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Projected Tigris Valley Railway route

Proposed Area to be irrigated

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The Proposed Tigris Valley Railway Route

MAP TWO

Adapted from BD 6, facing page 796.

The “Black” Railway

The Mohammera Project

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The Tigris Valley Railway

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The Willcocks scheme

Baghdad Railway – Complete by 1914

Baghdad Railway – Projected

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591 Mesopotamia 0.0 Intro

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Introduction

The intensity of Britain’s interest in Mesopotamia was indicated during the military and diplomatic Middle Eastern campaigns of the First World War. It was confirmed by the British government’s acquisition of a mandate over Iraq1 at the 1920 San Remo Conference. These events have long stimulated historical interest. Moreover, their study has been facilitated by the recent application of the “thirty years rule” to the relevant official British archives. However, one result has been a slight distortion in the balance of historical perspective. Britain’s involvement in Mesopotamia after the watershed of 1914 has become a major subject of historical concern;2 but British policy towards the area before the First World War has suffered proportional neglect. The imbalance is not rectified by the various studies of British interests in eastern Arabia during the early twentieth century. These studies have concentrated on either the Persian Gulf 3 or the Baghdad Railway.4 The geographical limitations of the former and the conceptual scope of the latter are equally restricting. They have diverted attention from the extent and variety of British interests in the Mesopotamian interior. In the German context, it has already been acknowledged that “irrigation and other public works, foreign trade, cotton, oil and settlement came into the picture as well as railways”.5 The influence of similarly diverse factors on Britain’s pre-war policy towards the Mesopotamian provinces of the Ottoman Empire has not been investigated. The chronology of the present study corresponds to that of the Anglo-German Baghdad Railway negotiations. This convenient arrangement of dates conceals, however, the central subject of interest. The report of the 1915 British de Bunsen Committee,6 rather than the railway clauses of the 1903 Turco-German convention,7 stimulated my interest in Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia before the First World War. The reason lies in the retrospective character of the 1915 report. In 1915, the Russian and French governments suddenly announced the [1]


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spoils which they each expected to gain after the successful conclusion of the war against Turkey. In order to frame a British response, the de Bunsen Committee was asked to assess Britain’s own desiderata in Asiatic Turkey. The committee completed its formal investigations, but did not fulfil its intended function. The de Bunsen report did not serve as a blueprint for future British policy in the Middle East. The committee concluded that British interests would best be served by a series of modest changes in Asiatic Turkey. These proposals were never officially approved by the British government; they were soon superseded by others whose more ambitious nature reflected the hasty march of war. Ultimately, therefore, the de Bunsen Committee summarised, rather than anticipated, Britain’s Middle Eastern policy. Therein lies the historical interest of its report. This document provides a convenient digest of Britain’s pre-war interests in the Middle East in general and in Mesopotamia in particular. The present study will attempt to discover the process whereby the policy enunciated in 1915 had gradually been formulated between 1903 and 1914. The de Bunsen Committee concluded that Britain possessed three main interests in Mesopotamia. The first was strategic, the need to maintain Britain’s supremacy in the Gulf and, in doing so, to protect India’s western flank. Basra was therefore to be “incorporated into Great Britain’s possessions”, and all non-Turkish powers were to be excluded from Baghdad and Mosul.8 Secondly, the committee acknowledged Britain’s commercial interests in Mesopotamia. It proposed to preserve the trade of the region for British merchants, to retain the petroleum resources for British enterprise and to ensure that Mesopotamia provided India with a granary in time of famine.9 Finally, the committee indicated Britain’s interest in the future complexion of Mesopotamian politics. The Arab inhabitants of the region were not to be permitted self-government. Neither, however, were they to be alienated by the replacement of Ottoman suzerainty with direct Indian rule. Britain’s need for stability and friendship was to be served by a “devolutionary scheme” which provided for Turkish rule with indirect British supervision.10 These three interests – strategic, commercial and political – were all apparent, although in varying degrees, in 1903. The purpose of this introduction is not to compress Britain’s Mesopotamian policy before 1903 into a few pages, but to indicate the incidents and trends which ensured the continuity of interest finally enunciated in 1915. [2]


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INTRODUCTION

Britain’s strategic interest in Mesopotamia was a consequence of its control of India. In the early twentieth century, the German naval threat and the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian agreements increasingly concentrated Britain’s attention on Europe.11 The defence of the Indian empire remained, however, an established principle of British foreign policy12 to which the “whole British military and naval machine was heavily geared”.13 In 1904, India was both the largest consumer of British goods14 and the greatest concern of the recently formed Committee of Imperial Defence.15 Curzon16 asserted that “as long as we rule India we are the greatest Power in the world”.17 But Britain’s control over India imposed upon it responsibilities concomitant with the attendant benefits. Palmerston once asked whether, because he might possess one house in York and another in London, he need also own all the inns inbetween. The expansion of the British Empire had provided a positive answer. Successive British governments had determined to secure India from all possible attack. They had therefore found it necessary both “to safeguard all the routes leading to India”18 and to establish control over all the bases from which those routes might be threatened. Initially, these motives had dictated the acquisition of a string of places d’armes from Gibraltar to Singapore. In the late Victorian age, they also dominated the workings of British policy in eastern and central Africa.19 The route to India had also stimulated British interest in Mesopotamia. The area constitutes a natural depression between the mountains of Iran and of Armenia, the deserts of Syria and of north Arabia and the waters of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The valley formed by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers thus bestrides a natural land highway between India and Europe. Traditionally, British strategy relied on control of the maritime lanes to India. The Royal Navy dominated the route via the Cape and, after 1875, British finance controlled the destiny of the Suez Canal. The British government had also, however, responded to successive foreign threats to make active use of the Euphrates route. The initial reaction had been modest. The despatch of a permanent agent to Baghdad in 1798 was Britain’s only local counter to Napoleon’s supposed intention to march across Mesopotamia to India.20 But in subsequent decades a combination of technological inventions and diplomatic circumstances stimulated more serious British interest in the overland route. In the 1830s, Palmerston feared that France might benefit, and that Britain’s [3]


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communications with India might suffer, if Mehemet Ali continued to control both Egypt and Syria. At the same time, Chesney called the country’s attention to the possible utility of steam boats on the Euphrates. In 1836, therefore, the British government financed an expedition to investigate the possibility of navigating the great river from its source in Syria to its outlet on the Persian Gulf.21 By the 1850s, railways had captured the popular imagination. During this period, Russian advances in Persia appeared to threaten Britain’s Middle Eastern communications. Andrew’s scheme for a Euphrates valley railway from the Mediterranean to the Gulf therefore evoked public sympathy and aroused official interest.22 Support for the scheme increased after the 1857 Indian mutiny had revealed the deficiencies in Anglo-Indian communications. It intensified after 1869 when, despite British opposition, de Lesseps opened the Suez Canal and thus threatened to place France in control of a maritime route to India. As a result, in 1871, a select Parliamentary committee was asked to investigate the possible value to Britain of a Euphrates valley railway.23 Finally, the 1875 Eastern Crisis appeared to emphasise Britain’s need for this alternative. In order to prevent a possible Russian sweep upon Mesopotamia and the Gulf, Parliament was again asked to consider, and the public were again asked to support, various railways designed to traverse the overland route between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.24 None of the overland schemes materialised in the nineteenth century. Chesney’s expedition foundered in a storm and was finally abandoned in 1842. Neither Andrew nor his various successors obtained sufficient public funds or sustained official support for a Euphrates valley railway. In any case, Britain had no need of the overland route. In 1840, Palmerston, by a masterly settlement, simultaneously confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt and deprived Russia of some advantage at the Dardanelles. In 1878, Disraeli claimed to have been equally successful: the acquisition of Cyprus safeguarded Britain’s position in the eastern Mediterranean and secured a new staging post on the route to India. Furthermore Gladstone, by reluctantly occupying Egypt in 1882, had reinforced Britain’s control over the Suez Canal. Nevertheless, the various British reactions to the successive threats to the Mesopotamian route proved significant. They indicated that even if Britain itself did not need to use the Mesopotamian route, it would not allow any other European power to control it. [4]


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INTRODUCTION

This attitude also dominated Britain’s reaction to the later German scheme to construct a railway from the Bosphorous to the Gulf. In 1887, Sir William White, Britain’s ambassador at Constantinople, reiterated that the government should adopt “a friendly but reserved” attitude towards the scheme.25 His advice did not, however, allay official fears that the line might threaten Britain’s communications with India. Indeed, the German project continued to progress. In 1888, the Deutsche Bank appeared to have won the confidence of the Porte, and in 1901 the Anatolian Railway Company obtained a provisional concession for the Baghdad Railway (as the line was popularly known). The subsequent Anglo-German pourparlers concerning this project in 1901 and 1902 were desultory and indecisive.26 Curzon, however, had already indicated the tone of future British policy. In 1899, he concluded a “bond” with Mubarak, the sheikh of Kuwait. Mubarak received Rs 15,000; in return he agreed not to cede any Kuwaiti territory (particularly for a railway terminus) and also not to receive the representatives of any foreign state without the consent of the British Resident at his court. Curzon himself feared a Russian, as much as a German, line to the Gulf.27 His action demonstrated Britain’s continued fear of foreign control over the overland Mesopotamian route to India. The subject soon assumed greater importance. In 1903, the German financiers obtained a final Baghdad Railway concession from the Porte. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office had encouraged the formation of a British financial syndicate interested in the railway. The Germans, represented by Gwinner28 and the Deutsche Bank, sought the City’s financial support for the scheme. The British, represented by Cassel,29 Dawkins30 and Revelstoke,31 aspired in their turn to secure a measure of British control over the railway. Both sides were supported (and at times hindered) by their respective governments. Another diplomatic struggle for the overland route was about to commence. The apparent unity of purpose in Britain’s Mesopotamian policy during the nineteenth century is deceptive. The demands of commercial expansion were no less insistent than those of Indian security. The relative importance of “political” and “commercial” motives in British policy during the era of the “New Imperialism” is debatable;32 but the existence of both factors is undeniable. The defence of the route to India was, in the last analysis, an economic as well as a strategic requirement. Moreover, once the British government had acknowledged its strategic [5]


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interest on the littoral of Asia and Africa, it could not subsequently ignore Britain’s commercial position in the interior of those continents. The achievements of British merchants and the growth of foreign competition demanded an official response. Specifically, the de Bunsen Committee stressed Britain’s commercial stake, as well as strategic interest, in Mesopotamia. Vasco da Gama’s rounding of the Cape in 1497 had heralded the decline of the Persian Gulf as a major trade artery between East and West.33 Centuries later, the construction of the Suez Canal confirmed the ascendancy of the Egyptian route. But in the early twentieth century, Mesopotamia was thought to possess limitless commercial potential: the region therefore promised to become an important trading area in its own right. Hitherto, neglect had prevented the utilisation of Mesopotamia’s vast agricultural resources, and ignorance had precluded the exploitation of the enormous petroleum reserves. Both failures, it was believed, would soon be rectified. Sensible conservation of the spring floods of the Tigris and Euphrates would improve the grain, rice, cotton and date crops. The remains of ancient irrigation canals indicated, and the wonders of modern engineering promised, that the quality and quantity of those crops could be vastly increased. Similarly, the sustained investment of European capital would speedily expand the amount of Mesopotamia’s petroleum production. By 1903, plans for the development of irrigation and mining works in Mesopotamia were being publicised in England and Germany.34 Britain’s subsequent Mesopotamian policy owed much to the belief that “the present poverty-stricken condition of the land is due not to the niggardliness of nature, but to the destructive folly of man.”35 The value of the existing trade, no less than the hope of future exploitation, intensified Britain’s interest in Mesopotamia. By 1903, Britain had ceased to dominate the overall Turkish market, just as its influence had also waned at the Ottoman court. German merchants had increased their share of Turkish trade.36 French financiers controlled the majority of Turkish investment.37 The situation in Mesopotamia, however, was markedly different. Firstly, Britain controlled the carrying trade to the area. Between 1900 and 1902, ships totalling 478,000 tons called at Basra; and of these, 453,000 tons flew the British flag.38 Secondly, the British Empire was the region’s largest trading partner. India was second only to Persia as an importer of Mesopotamian dates, hides and wool. The United Kingdom supplied sixty-five percent of the [6]


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INTRODUCTION

Mesopotamian market, with goods valued in 1903 at £21⁄2 millions per year.39 The vast majority of this trade consisted of cloth, which was exported from Manchester.40 Finally, British merchants also controlled a significant portion of the carrying trade within Mesopotamia itself. The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company had been established in 1859 by one of Chesney’s lieutenants, H. B. Lynch.41 Under the control of his nephew, H. F. B. Lynch,42 it remained a family and a British concern. In 1903, the Porte permitted the company to run only two steamers in Mesopotamia, each of which was capable of carrying 400 tons of cargo in winter and 280 tons in summer. The Lynch service was not a monopoly: the company faced competition from both native sailing craft and, more particularly, from the Oman Steamship Company, sponsored by the Turkish government. Nevertheless, and despite its high tariffs,43 the Lynch company had captured the major part of cargo traffic on the Euphrates. Britain’s commercial predominance was complemented and paralleled by its unique political privileges in Mesopotamia. Lynch’s position itself testified to this combination of commercial achievement and political pressure. The vizierial letter of 1861 which permitted the company to run two steamers on the Euphrates was based on earlier firmans of 1834 and 1841, which had conferred these privileges on British government vessels.44 Lynch’s rights were subsequently contested. Thus in 1883 the Porte attempted to rescind his warrant to fly the British flag in Turkish waters.45 Moreover, the Lynch company had itself tampered with these rights by unilaterally transferring to the river Tigris the privileges originally applied to the Euphrates.46 Nevertheless, the British government reiterated its determination to retain this outward sign of British prestige. Moreover, Britain’s local representatives themselves built upon the foundations which British merchants had secured. The East India Company had established its first representative at Basra in 1764, and had opened a native agency in Baghdad in 1783.47 By 1903, both the prestige and the duties of the latter post had increased. The consul general at Baghdad styled himself the British “resident” in Turkish Arabia, and lived in the most imposing building in the town.48 He also maintained his own steamer (the Comet) on the Tigris, and was protected by his personal sepoy detachment. This unit had, in 1800, been established merely as an “honorary guard”. By 1904, it had grown to a mobile force of over forty cavalry and infantry.49 [7]


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The extent of the consul’s responsibilities complemented the prestige which accrued from the size of his establishment. He was, firstly, the recognised protector of the thousands of Indian Shia pilgrims who flocked every winter to the shrines in Karbala and Najaf.50 Secondly, he was the acknowledged representative of the Indian government in all matters which affected the large Indian communities which had settled in Mesopotamia.51 Finally, he was the official administrator of the Oudh Bequest. In 1825, Ghazi-ud-Din, King of Oudh, had willed an annual sum of Rs 11⁄2 millions to be divided between the mujtahids (religious leaders) of Karbala and Najaf, who would in turn distribute it to deserving persons “for the benefit of the King’s soul”.52 The management of this bequest involved successive consuls general in numerous local disputes. It also conferred upon them extensive local influence. In 1903, the government of India empowered the Baghdad resident to check the credentials of the claimant mujtahids.53 In 1912, he was also permitted to nominate the members of the local charitable committees at Karbala and Najaf which supervised the ultimate distribution of the funds.54 The Oudh Bequest was not considered to be of direct interest to the Foreign Office.55 The British government appreciated all the same the power of proscription, as well as the advantages of ostentation. In September 1914, the mujtahids were to be warned that the flow of funds would stop unless the recipients ceased their political activities against the British government.56 Throughout the nineteenth century, the British government had recognised that the protection of its strategic, commercial and political interests in Mesopotamia necessitated administrative stability in the area. The de Bunsen Committee’s interest in the future complexion of Mesopotamian politics reflected, therefore, a consistent British concern with the past failures of Ottoman misgovernment. Indeed, the repeated British complaints about such failures had aroused the Porte’s abiding suspicion that the British government harboured political designs on the Mesopotamian provinces.57 For its own part, the British government denied the charge. It had, in fact, rejected this opportunity. Throughout the nineteenth century, British statesmen had persistently refused to initiate a partition of Turkey’s Asiatic provinces. Turkey, according to Palmerston’s axiom, was “as good a guardian of the route to India as any Arab would be”. In 1898, Salisbury did discuss partition in theoretical terms with the Russians.58 In practice, however, he and his predecessors [8]


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attempted to retain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire east of the Bosphorous.59 There nevertheless remained an inherent dichotomy in Britain’s eastern policy. The British government’s insistent demand for Ottoman reforms required European intervention in the Empire. It could not, therefore, be reconciled with the desire for Ottoman integrity, which necessitated European exclusion.60 This dichotomy was never resolved. Nor, on the other hand, was the Ottoman Empire ever properly reformed before the First World War. The efforts of Mustafa Resid Pasha in the first half of the nineteenth century, and those of Midhat Pasha in the second half, were ultimately ineffective. The Young Turks of the twentieth century proved equally disappointing as a reforming force.61 The administrative failings of Ottoman rule were particularly evident in the Mesopotamian provinces. They were governed by an apparently orderly system. The area was divided into the three vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, which were subdivided into sanjaqs and kazas. Each district was thus of easily manageable size. Moreover, the chain of authority and links of responsibility between the provincial chief (vali) and the mukhtar of each village appeared clear and well defined.62 In practice, however, a combination of communal disunity and individual inefficiency ruined the system. The inhabitants of Mesopotamia, who were estimated to number about 11⁄2 million in 1905,63 were divided by race, religion, occupation and tribal loyalty. The Turkish, Kurd, Arab and Jewish communities each preserved their distinctive traditions and cultural habits.64 The Sunni and Shia Muslims retained their mutual antipathy and traditional hatred.65 Moreover, the basic distinction between urban and rural communities was compounded by the complicated tribal system which prevailed among the latter. The local Turkish garrison neither matched in number nor compared in ferocity with such vast tribal conglomerations as the Muntafik and the Bani Lam.66 The remoteness of Mesopotamia from Constantinople caused additional difficulties. “Iraq . . . was neither a land of Turks nor attractive to them.”67 In the early centuries of Ottoman rule it had attracted few Turkish settlers; later it was served by obviously inferior officers. The independent hold of the great Mamluk lords of Baghdad was not broken until the second decade of the nineteenth century.68 The factional tendencies of the sheikhs of the lower Tigris were not quelled until after the First World War. Between 1869 and 1872, Midhat Pasha did improve Mesopotamian communications,69 and attempted to harness the resources [9]


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of the region for the benefit of the Ottoman administration. He failed, however, to reform the local system of land tenure which was the source of Mesopotamian particularism. The indigenous peasants refused to buy directly from the government tenures which they already possessed from their local sheikhs. Ultimately, Midhat Pasha’s land sales thus inadvertently increased, rather than decreased, the power and influence of the tribal chieftains and the city merchants.70 Midhat’s successors repeated his failings and lacked his virtues. In the period of this study only Nazim Pasha, the vali of Baghdad in 1910–1911,71 inspired the respect of local British officials. The latter recognised the sincerity of Nazim’s intentions and therefore excused even the evident Anglophobia of his methods.72 The other valis of Baghdad were distinguishable only by the varying degrees of their incompetence or the differing extent of their corruption.73 These faults were matched by the valis of Basra and Mosul.74 They were compounded by the deficiencies of the several commissions established by the old Ottoman regime75 and by the absence of significant improvement under the Young Turks. The former ignored the enmity caused by the sultan’s acquisition of large holdings in the region.76 The latter failed to solve the problem of tribal separatism. Turkish inefficiency was not solely responsible for Arab backwardness.77 But it was a matter of concern to British statesmen. Disturbances along the Tigris, factionalism in Baghdad and militancy in Basra formed as much of the background to Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1903 and 1914 as did tension in Europe. Cromer78 articulated a common fear when prophesying that “If the Turkish hold over Asiatic Turkey is ever abolished, it will be through Turkish misgovernment and not as a result of foreign intrigue.”79 The manner in which the British government responded to the dual challenge of German ambitions and Turkish indolence in Mesopotamia forms the subject of this study. It remains to be noted that the tone of the response was primarily determined by the varying attitudes of British policy-makers. The diffusion of administrative responsibility prevents most governments from having a clear idea about a particular policy in a specific area. This difficulty was especially evident during the formulation of British policy towards Mesopotamia. This was not a reflection of domestic political change. The continuity of British policy towards Mesopotamia was not noticeably affected by the fall of Balfour’s80 Conservative government in 1905 nor by Campbell-Bannerman’s81 death [10]


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and Asquith’s82 succession to the premiership in 1908. In a general sense it is probably true to say that “The change in the party tenure of power did indeed coincide more or less with a shift in generation in the leadership of the country and the Empire.”83 The emergence of new men and new ideas, at the Foreign Office in particular, was to affect the extent of Britain’s European commitments.84 But at the level of the formulation of Mesopotamian policy, 1906 does not represent a break in the official mind. Even the Foreign Office reforms of that year were initiated by the previous administration.85 They hardly influenced either the social unity or the common psychology of the group of men charged with the management of Britain’s foreign affairs.86 At the Foreign Office, Lansdowne87 and Grey88 successively shared the services, although in different capacities, of Hardinge89 and Bertie.90 At the India Office similarly, Brodrick91 and Morley92 were both assisted by Godley93 and Ritchie.94 In India, Curzon and Minto95 were in turn advised by Kitchener.96 As will be seen, the important changes in Mesopotamian policy coincided with later changes in personnel: when Lowther97 and then Mallet98 replaced O’Conor99 as ambassador at Constantinople, when Nicolson100 replaced Hardinge as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, when Crewe101 replaced Morley at the India Office, when Churchill102 arrived at the Admiralty and when the preoccupation of the senior members of the civil service with European affairs allowed Parker103 and Hirtzel104 to assume a seemingly important role. The joint interest in the Mesopotamian region of the British and Indian governments exerted a more serious strain on the unity of British policy between 1903 and 1910. Neither interdepartmental coordination as practised in the Committee of Imperial Defence105 nor the common interests of both governments could obscure the differing perspectives of England and India. The need for consultation between the two authorities was often a source of delay.106 The lack of such consultation could also lead to confusion. The appointment of the British resident in Turkish Arabia was usually an affair of the Indian Political Service. However, the posts at Baghdad and Basra were also subordinate to London through the ambassador at Constantinople. The result, as one official noted, was that India was “often very much in the dark about information which the Basra Consul . . . sends through the Ambassador to London”.107 Finally, and more important, the divergent ambitions of the two authorities also resulted in dispute. Lansdowne’s unwilling [11]


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accession to Curzon’s determined forward policy in Kuwait, although outside the present field of study, formed a portentous overture to it. It began a series of debates between the India Office and the Foreign Office which hindered the unified formulation of a British Mesopotamian policy. In 1906, Balfour both depicted and exacerbated the atmosphere when asserting that “India ought not to treat us as if we were an allied, but foreign, Power. We are engaged in a common work; and we are the predominant partner.”108 The British and Indian governments did at least share their sources of local information. Britain’s representatives in Mesopotamia, however, despatched reports of varying standards, and thereby further diversified the shape of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. Most consuls tended to magnify the importance of local events.109 Newmarch110 in particular was inordinately concerned with the physical appearance of the Baghdad residency.111 Others were annually affected by the summer heat. Thus Crow112 at Basra asked for extended leave,113 and Grieg at Mosul requested a transfer.114 All were acutely conscious of their isolation. Ramsay115 complained that “most people in England think that Baghdad is at the end of the earth and on the road to no-where.”116 Even his successor at Baghdad, Lorimer117 (who was probably Britain’s finest Mesopotamian consul of the period), felt that neither Simla nor London appreciated that “Baghdad lies much more remote from European aid than Tien-tsin or even Peking.”118 Geographical factors thus often influenced the nature of the local despatches. The quality of reports was further affected by the abilities of their authors. The deficiencies in the academic training of the Levant Diplomatic Service,119 and the military bias in that of the Indian Political Service,120 were equally at variance with the British government’s increasing desire for commercial intelligence after 1903.121 Thus Newmarch in 1904122 and Young in 1909123 were both criticised for the quality of their trade reports. On the other hand, Maunsell, the military attaché at Constantinople,124 complained that not one of Britain’s Mesopotamian officers had provided him with any sketch or map worthy of inclusion in a military handbook.125 The Foreign Office considered that Crow’s work was impaired by his inefficiency,126 that Ramsay’s local influence was limited by his ignorance of Arabic127 and that Lorimer’s outlook was restricted by his strict Presbyterian upbringing.128 These idiosyncrasies did not inspire respect; they were sometimes presented as an excuse for the neglect of consular reports.129 [12]


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They certainly fostered the predilection to judge local events by standards established at the executive centre. The formulation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was influenced by the prejudices of the recipients, as well as the authors, of consular despatches. This study follows the lines of enquiry suggested by the de Bunsen Committee report. It will also attempt to trace the influence of three factors on the formulation of British policy towards Mesopotamia between 1903 and 1914 – British strategic and commercial interests, Eurocentric diplomatic considerations and individual official attitudes. The exclusive concentration on British policy is deliberate. It is the consequence of a desire to discern the internal evolution of official attitudes rather than to analyse the mechanics of international diplomacy. This study therefore relies mainly upon the available despatches, minutes and correspondence of the officials most closely concerned. The records of interested financiers, journalists and travellers have been reproduced only when they appear to illuminate the activities and thoughts of those whose responsibility it was to formulate British policy. The Baghdad Railway must form one of the central themes of this analysis: the project dominated both public and official discussion of Mesopotamia before the First World War. However, both the diplomatic history of the line and a detailed record of its construction lie outside the scope of examination. British policy towards the railway will only be considered in so far as it reflected, or related to, British attitudes towards Mesopotamia. The evolution of Mesopotamian policy was marked in four different documents – a memorandum by Lansdowne in 1903, a Cabinet statement in 1907, a despatch by Grey in 1910 and (taken together) the AngloTurkish and Anglo-German agreements of 1913 and 1914. Within the limits allowed by continuity, the three intervening periods will be treated as self-contained units. Each document appears to represent a definitive stage in the formulation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy; and the aim of this study is to explain under what pressure and by what process of assessment each stage was reached.

[13]


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NOTES 1 The terms “Mesopotamia” and “Iraq” are used as political, rather than geographical, descriptions; the former will be used to describe the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Strictly speaking, Iraq (Arabic, the plain) refers solely to the alluvial plain south of a line from Beled (north of Baghdad) to Fellujah on the Euphrates. The northerly region of Mesopotamia is known as Jezirah (Arabic, the island). See Admiralty War Staff Intelligence Division, A Handbook of Mesopotamia, vol. 1 (August 1916), p. 1. The British and Indian documents consulted adopt no consistent method of spelling of places: the “Bagdad” Railway and the “Baghdad” Railway are sometimes found in one document. I have used the spelling adopted in The Oxford Atlas (rev. ed., Oxford, 1961). 2 E.g., E. Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921 (London, 1956); E. Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956 (London, 1963); J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920 (London, 1969); G. Atiyyah, Iraq, A Study in Political Consciousness (Edinburgh University Ph.D. thesis, 1968); R.D. Adelson, Mark Sykes and the Formation of British Policy towards the Middle East, 1915–1919 (Oxford University B. Litt. thesis, 1970), H. J. F. Mejcher, The Birth of the Mandate Idea and its Fulfilment in Iraq up to 1926 (Oxford University D.Phil. thesis, 1970). 3 E.g., R. Kumar, India and the Persian Gulf Region: 1858–1907: A Study in British Imperial Policy (New York, 1965); J.B. Plass, England zwichen Russland and Deutschland. Der Persische Golf in der britischen Vorkriegspolitik, 1899–1907 (Hamburg, 1966); and B.C. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894–1914 (Berkeley, 1967). 4 E.g., E.M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (New York, 1923); J. B. Wolf, The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad (Missouri, 1933); L. Ragey, La Question du chemin de fer de Bagdad 1893–1914 (Paris, 1936); M. K. Chapman, Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway, 1888–1914 (Massachusetts, 1948); and H.S.W. Corrigan, British, French and German Interests in Asiatic Turkey, 1881–1914 (London University Ph.D. thesis, 1954). 5 W.O. Henderson, “German Economic Penetration in the Middle East, 1870–1914”, Studies in German Colonial History (London, 1962), p. 74. 6 30 June 1915, Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister. British Desiderata in Asia. Cabinet Papers (hereafter CAB), Public Record Office (PRO), London, series 27, vol. 1. A full discussion of the Report is in A. S. Klieman, “Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915”, Journal of Contemporary History 3 (iii) (November 1968), pp. 225–236. 7 Text in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, vol. 1, 1535–1914 (Princeton, 1956), pp. 252–263. 8 Minutes of 2nd meeting, 13 April 1915, Evidence to the Committee, pp. 44–46 and Report of the Committee, p. 9, para. 28, CAB 27/1. 9 Minutes of 1st meeting, 12 April 1915, Evidence, p. 41 and minutes of 4th meeting, 17 April 1915, Evidence, p. 51 and Appendix 21, pp. 123–125, ibid. [14]


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10 Report, p. 14, para. 47 and p. 26, para. 88 and Appendix 8, p. 99, ibid. 11 The 1904 Anglo-French entente and the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention settled issues of solely colonial importance. 12 “India . . . held British foreign policy a captive.” A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London, 1959), p. 42. 13 M. and T. Zinkin, Britain and India: Requiem for Empire (London, 1964), p. 48. 14 D. Dicks, Curzon in India, vol. 1, “Achievement” (London, 1969), p. 113. 15 G. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900–1907 (London, 1963), p. 95. 16 G.N. Curzon, later 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859–1925), Viceroy of India, 1899–1905. Dictionary of National Biography (hereafter DNB) (Oxford, 1937), pp. 221–234. The biographical notes will refer to the activities of the individual only within the period 1903–1914; they follow the appearance of his name in the text. 17 31 March 1903, Curzon-Balfour, quoted in D. Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874–1932 (London, 1968), p. 231. 18 H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (2nd impression, London, 1966), p. 130. 19 R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Deny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1961), p. 289. 20 Hoskins, Routes, p. 64. 21 On Palmerston and the Levant crisis see Sir C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, vol. 1 (2nd ed., London, 1969), ch. 4; M. Verete, “Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832”, Journal of Modern History, vol. 24, ii (1952), pp. 143–151; and J. Marlowe, Perfidious Albion: The Origins of Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant (London, 1971). On the Chesney expedition see Hoskins, Routes, ch. 7 and E. Elath, Britaniya u-Netiveha le-Hodu [British Routes to India] (Jerusalem, 1971), ch. 3. 22 Hoskins, Routes, ch. 13; Elath, Britaniya, ch. 5; and W. Bamforth, British Interests in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, 1856–1888 (London University M.A. thesis, 1948), pp. 33–56. 23 Hoskins, Routes, ch. 17 and Elath, Britaniya, ch. 6. 24 D. E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Harvard, 1934), chs. 1–3. 25 25 July 1887 “Remarks applying to different British schemes for the construction of Turkish railways in Asia”. Quoted in C. L. Smith, The Embassy of Sir William White at Constantinople, 1886–1891 (London, 1957), pp. 112 118 and Appendix 4, pp. 164–167. 26 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, pp. 38–50. 27 Busch, Britain and the Gulf, pp. 108–113; J.B. Kelly, “Salisbury, Curzon and the Kuwait Agreement of 1899”, Studies in International History. Essays presented to Professor W. N. Medlicott, eds. K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (London, 1967), pp. 249–290. 28 A. von Gwinner (1856–1931), director of the Deutsche Bank, president of the Anatolian Railway Company. Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 7 (Berlin, 1965), p. 361. 29 Sir E. Cassel (1852–1921), financier, after 1909 director of the National Bank of Turkey. DNB (Oxford, 1927), pp. 97–100. 30 Sir C. E. Dawkins (1859–1905), partner in banking firm of J. S. Morgan and Co. [15]


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31 John Baring, 2nd Baron Revelstoke (1863–1929), partner in banking firm of Baring Bros. 32 Compare D. K. Fieldhouse, “Imperialism’: An Historiographical Review”, Ec. Hist. Rev. (2nd Series), 14 (1961–1962), pp. 187–209 with D.C.M. Platt, “Economic Factors in British Policy during the ‘New Imperialism’ ”, Past & Present, 39 (April 1968), pp. 120–138. See also H. Gollwitzer, Europe in the Age of Imperialism, 1880–1914 (London, 1969), ch. 5. 33 “For the city-states of the Persian Gulf the deviation of the sixteenth century was a major tragedy, for it had always been the Levant trade, the lure of the Mediterranean markets, that had invested the Gulf with prosperity.” J. B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880 (Oxford, 1968), p. 1. 34 For a description of the agricultural potential and mineral resources of Mesopotamia see Admiralty, Handbook of Mesopotamia, chs. 3, 4, and 11 and S. H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development (London, 1954), ch. 1. The subject was discussed at the beginning of the century in D. G. Hogarth, The Nearer East (London, 1905), ch. 12; P. Rohrbach, Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt: Die Bagdadbahn (Berlin, 1903) and Sir W. Willcocks, The Restoration of the Ancient Irrigation Works on the Tigris, or The Re-Creation of Chaldea (Cairo, 1903). 35 G. Bell, From Amurath to Amurath (London, 1911), p. 186. 36 “In 1888 British goods constituted 42.8% of Turkey’s total import trade, in 1900–1901 they amounted to only 35%, and by 1908–1909 they had dropped to 30% of the total.” Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 19. 37 Corrigan, British, French and German Interests, Appendix I. 38 Report for the year 1902 on the trade of Basra (1903), Annual Series 3025, Command paper (hereafter Cd), 13806. 39 23 June 1905 Board of Trade (hereafter B of T) memorandum, Foreign Office Records (hereafter FO), PRO, London, series 78, vol. 5449. 40 G. Lloyd, Report on the Trading Possibilities of Mesopotamia (1908), enclosed in 11 Jan. 1909 B of T-India Office (hereafter 10), India Office Records, London. Political and Secret files (hereafter L/P & S/), series 3, vol. 259, no. 2832, p. 35. 41 The firm of Lynch Bros. acted as local agents for the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (ETSNC). The two concerns were jointly referred to as “the Lynch company” or “Lynch’s company”. On the origins of the firm see Hoskins, Routes, pp. 424–427 and J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ‘Oman, and Central Arabia (Calcutta, 1908–1915, reprint Hants. 1971. 2 vols. in 4), vol. 1 “Historical”, p. 1391. The Gazetteer provides the most authoratitive account of local conditions and British interests in the area until 1907. 42 H. F. B. Lynch (1862–1913), senior partner in Lynch Bros., Liberal for West Riding Yorks, 1906–1910. 43 Freight charges for 1905, listed in 16 May 1905 Crow-O’Conor 23, Constantinople Embassy archives, PRO, London (hereafter FO 195), FO 195/2188; those for 1910 are in 2 May 1910 Tod-Babington Smith, Babington Smith MSS, St. Antony’s College, Oxford (hereafter BS MSS), BS MSS, 10. 44 L. & E. Hertslet (compilers), A Complete Collection of the Treaties and Conventions and Reciprocal Regulations . . . Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers . . . so far as they relate to Commerce and Navigation . . . (19 vols., London, 1820–1885), [16]


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45 46

47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60

61

vol. 13, pp. 838–840 and 845–846. The original firmans had been issued in order to assist Chesney’s expedition. Hoskins, Routes, p. 162. Corrigan, British, French, and German Interests, pp. 10–11, 40. The reason was the greater navigability of the Tigris, 6 Sep. 1908 Lowther-Grey 545, FO 371/547, file 27410, doc. no. 30975. D. Fraser, The Short Cut to India (Edinburgh, 1907), suggested that in 1834, the Porte itself had not appreciated the difference between the Tigris and the Euphrates and believed that Baghdad was situated on the latter, pp. 254–256. A. Malet, Precis containing information with regard to the first connection of the Honourable East India Company with Turkish Arabia (Calcutta, 1874). The Company had first established a factory at Basra in 1639, ibid., p. 4. See also Gazetteer, vol. 1, pp. 1223, 1279, 1291. See descriptions of the Residency in E. Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell: From her Personal Papers, Vol. 1, 1889–1914 (London, 1958), p. 265 and Gazetteer, p. 1583. On the strength and origins of the Residency guard see 6 July 1905 NewmarchO’Conor 500/49, enclosing a memo. dated 5 Jan. 1884 by T.C. Plowden, FO 195/2108 folios 395–405 and Gazetteer, p. 1296. On the numbers of the pilgrims see Admiralty, Handbook of Mesopotamia, pp. 84–85. On the responsibilities they imposed upon the Residency see 20 Aug. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther, enclosed in FO 371/1015/34750/34750. See e.g. 7 July 1903 Newmarch-O’Conor, F0195/2139. On the origins of the Oudh Bequest see the 1911 correspondence between the Government of India (G of I) and the British government, FO 371/1244, file 3201 and L/P & S/10 vol. 77, file 1905/1290 and also Gazetteer, pp. 1409–1414. 13 July 1903 Dane-Newmarch 1577, FO 195/2139, folio 80. Lormer’s January 1912 summary, enclosed in 20 March 1912 IO-FO40, FO 371/1490/3025/26070. E.g., Norman minute on 20 March 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1492/12148/12148. 25 Sep. 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 857, FO 371/2140/46261/53073. For examples of the extent of Turkish suspicions in this period, see e.g. 25 Apr. 1905 O’Conor-Sanderson private (hereafter pte.), FO 78/5394; Grey minute on 23 June 1910 Maimon-FO, FO 371/995/184./23095; and 25 Jan. 1911 Lowther-Nicolson pte., Nicolson MSS, PRO, London (hereafter NIC MSS), 1911 vol. I, FO 800/347, p. 167. 25 Jan. 1898 Salisbury-O’Conor tel. 22 secret, G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (11 vols. in 13, London, 1926–1938) (hereafter BD), BD vol. 1, no. 9, p. 8. The occupation of Egypt in July 1882 was, of course, a striking exception to this rule. A Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables”, Beginnings of Modernisation in the Middle East: the 19th Century, W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers eds. (Chicago, 1968), p. 65 and Kedourie, England and the Middle East, pp. 16–20. The subject of Ottoman reform in the period before the First World War is comprehensively discussed in B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961), chs. 4, 6, and 7 and R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876 (Princeton, 1963). [17]


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62 The Ottoman administration of Mesopotamia is described in Admiralty, Handbook on Mesopotamia, ch. 9; G. Bell, “The Basis of Government in Turkish Arabia”, The Arabs of Mesopotamia (Government Press, Basra, 1918); and S. H. Longrigg, Iraq, 1900–1950: A Political, Social and Economic History (London, 1953), pp. 35–40. 63 Gazetteer, vol. 2, “Geographical and Statistical”, p. 768. 64 The different communities are described in Admiralty, Handbook on Mesopotamia, ch. 7; Gazetteer, pp. 768–772; and 27 Feb. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther 191/10, reprinted in “The Jews of Baghdad in 1910”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 7 (3) (Oct. 1971), pp. 355–362. For later descriptions see C. J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs (London, 1957) and W. Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs (London, 1964). 65 The Shi’a community predominated in southern Mesopotamia, and the Sunni in the north. S. H. Longrigg and F. Stoakes, Iraq (London, 1958), p. 24. One important anomaly must be noted. The large and powerful Muntafik tribes were predominantly Shi’as, but their leaders (the Saduns) were Sunnis. Gazetteer, p. 1273. On the split between the two communities see R. Coke, The Heart of the Middle East (London, 1925), ch. 4. 66 The strength of the Turkish garrison is discussed in Gazetteer, p. 868 and in Lorimer’s August 1910 Summary, enclosed in 26 Sep. 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/1008/12174/35086. On the strength and variety of the tribes see Gazetteer, pp. 1273, 1081 and H. K. Chiha, La Province de Bagdad: son passé, son present, son avenir (Cairo, 1908), pt. 3. See also the comprehensive list in Arab Tribes of the Baghdad Vilayet (July 1918), War Office Records (hereafter WO), PRO, London, WO 106/919. 67 S. H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (Oxford, 1925), p. 323. 68 P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922 (London, 1966), p. 248. 69 He initiated, for instance, the Oman (Ottoman) Steamship Company. 70 A Jwaidah, “Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq”, St. Antony’s Papers, no. 16 (Middle Eastern Affairs No. 3) (1963), pp. 106–134. 71 Huseyn Nazim Pasha (1848–1913), commander of the Istanbul garrison April 1909, vali of Baghdad Apr. 1910–Feb. 1911, Minister of War, 1912–1913. 72 22 Aug. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther, enclosed in FO 371/1000/930/34748. 73 Thus Mejid Pasha (vali 1905–6) was “ignorant” (27 June 1906 O’Conor-Grey 441, FO 371/151/17927/22165), Hazim Bey (1906–7) was “corrupt” (4 Dec. 1906 Barclay-Ramsay, FO 195/2216) and Shevkat Pasha (1909–1910) was “weak” (1 Nov. 1909 Ramsay-Lowther, FO 195/2310); and there were three valis in as many months in 1913 (Lorimer’s Jan. 1914 Summary, L/P&S/10, vol. 12, no. 1914/1416, p. 1). 74 By the end of the period, the valis of Basra were dominated by rival tribal factions, and those in Mosul were baffled by the religious divisions in the town. 75 E.g., 25 Sep. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 617, FO 371/355/ 32535/32535. 76 The Sultan owned, through the Da’arat es-Saniyeh (the Civil List), 30 percent of the cultivable area of the provinces of Baghdad and Basra. In 1904 he also acquired the Ottoman steamer service, which was renamed the Hamadieh Company (8 March 1910 Lowther-Grey 139, FO 371/1003/5151/8739). In 1909 these properties were transferred to the Ministry of Finance. 77 According to Z. N. Zeine, Arab-Turk Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1966), p. 17. [18]


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78 E. Baring, 1st Earl of Cromer (1841–1917), Agent and Consul General in Egypt 1883–1907, DNB (1927), pp. 20–28. 79 22 May 1906 Cromer-Grey 79 conf., FO 371/151/18929/18929. 80 A. J., later 1st Earl, Balfour (1848–1930), Prime Minister, 1902–1905, DNB (1937), pp. 41–56. 81 Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman (1836–1908), Prime Minister, 1905–1908, DNB (1912 (1)), pp. 302–312. 82 H. H. Asquith, later 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith (1852–1928), Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1905–1908 and Prime Minister, 1908–1916, DNB (1937), pp. 29–40. 83 M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset, vol. 1, “Britain’s Liberal Empire, 1897–1921” (London, 1969), p. 111. 84 Z. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914 (Cambridge, 1969), ch. 3. 85 Ibid., p. 213. 86 Ibid., Appendix 3. 87 H. Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne (1845–1927), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1900–1905, DNB (1937), pp. 667–675. 88 Sir E. Grey, later 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon (1862–1933), Sec. of State for For. Affairs, 1905–1916, DNB (1949), pp. 366–375. 89 C. Hardinge, after 1910 1st Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858–1944), Perm. Under-Sec. FO, 1906–1910, Viceroy of India, 1910–1916, DNB (1959), pp. 356–358. 90 Sir F. Bertie, later 1st Viscount Bertie of Thame (1844–1919), Asst. Under-Sec. FO, 1894–1903, Ambassador in Rome, 1903–5, Ambassador in Paris, 1905–1918, DNB (1927), pp. 43–44. 91 W. St John Brodrick, later 1st Earl of Midleton (1856–1942), Sec. of State for War, 1900–1903, Sec. of State for India, 1903–1905, DNB (1959), pp. 108–110. 92 J. Morley, after 1908 Viscount Morley of Blackburn (1828–1923), Sec. of State for India 1905–1910, DNB (1937), pp. 616–624. 93 A. Godley, after 1909 1st Baron Kilbracken (1847–1932), Perm. Under-Sec. IO, 1883–1909, DNB (1949), pp. 344–345. 94 Sir R.T. Ritchie (1854–1912), Sec. Pol. Dept. IO, 1902–1910, Perm. UnderSec. IO, 1910–1912, DNB (1927), pp. 462–463. 95 G. J. M. K. Elliot, 4th Earl of Minto (1845–1914), Viceroy of India, 1905–1910, DNB (1927), pp. 172–174. 96 H. H. Kitchener, after 1914 1st Earl Kitchener of Khartoum and of Broome (1850–1916), C in C India, 1902–1909, Agent and Consul General Egypt, 1911–1914, Sec. of State for War, 1914–1916. DNB (1927), pp. 306–314. 97 Sir G. Lowther (1858–1916), Ambassador at Constantinople, 1908–1913. 98 Sir L. Mallet (1864–1936), precis writer for Lansdowne, 1903–1905, pte. sec. to Grey, 1905–1907, Asst. Under-Sec. FO, 1907–1913, Ambassador at Constantinople, 1913–1914. 99 Sir N. R. O’Conor (1843–1908), Ambassador at Constantinople, 1898–1908, DNB (1912 (3)), pp. 37–40. 100 Sir A. Nicolson, later 1st Baron Carnock (1849–1928), Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1906–1910, Perm. Under-Sec. FO, 1910–1916, DNB (1937), pp. 637–639. [19]


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101 R.O.A. Crewe-Milnes, after 1911 1st Marquess of Crewe (1858–1945), Sec. of State for India, 1910–1915, DNB (1959), pp. 183–186. 102 W. S. (later Sir Winston) Churchill (1874–1965), President B of T, 1908–1910, Home Secretary, 1910–1911, 1st Lord of the Admiralty, 1911–1915. 103 A. Parker (1877–1951), Junior Clerk FO, 1906–1912, Asst. Clerk FO, 1912–1917. 104 Sir A. Hirtzel (1870–1937), pte. sec. to Sec. of State IO, 1903–1909, Sec. Pol. Dept. IO, 1909–1917. 105 On the origins of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) see N. H. Gibbs, The Origins of Imperial Defence (Oxford, 1955); F. A. Johnson. Defence by Committee (New York, 1960); and S. Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, vol. 1, 1877–1918 (London, 1970), ch. 4. 106 “What an intolerable method of doing business. Indian government, India Office, Minister at Teheran, Foreign Office, Cabinet Committee, Treasury, Cabinet”, 24 Apr. 1903 Selborne-Curzon, quoted in Dilks, Curzon, vol. 1, p. 111. 107 Barnes minute 6 March 1902, quoted in Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 7. 108 6 Oct. 1906 Balfour-Esher, Balfour MSS, British Museum, London, Add. MSS 49719, folio 55. 109 See D. C. M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825 (London, 1971), p. viii. 110 L. S. Newmarch (1879–1930), Resident, Turkish Arabia, 1902–1906. 111 11 July 1905 Lansdowne-O’Conor 224, FO 78/5391. 112 F. E. Crow (1863–1939), Consul, Basra 1903–1914. 113 18 Nov. 1908 Crow-Grey 1 consular, FO 195/2275. 114 5 Mar. 1911 Grieg-Lowther 9, FO 195/2367. 115 J. Ramsay (1862–1942), Resident, Turkish Arabia, 1907–1910. 116 29 Oct. 1907 Ramsay-O’Conor, FO 195/2243. 117 J. G. Lorimer (1870–1914), Resident, Turkish Arabia, 1910–1914. 118 11 Apr. 1912 Lorimer-Lowther, enclosed in FO 371/1491/6666/22445. 119 See Sir. R. Bullard, The Camels Must Go (London, 1961), ch. l. But note that Bullard himself, who was acting Consul at Basra in 1914, was described as a first-class student (17 Nov. 1911 Marling-Grey 58 consular, FO 369/332/42574/42574). 120 See Lorimer’s description of his training in 20 Aug. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther, enclosed in FO 371/1015/34750/34750. 121 D. C. M. Platt, “The Role of the Consular Service in Overseas Trade, 1829–1914”, Ec. Hist. Rev. (2nd Series), 15 (1962–1963), p. 509. 122 28 Jan. 1904 O’Conor-Newmarch, FO 195/2161, folio 10. 123 Weakley minute on 21 Nov. 1909 Young-Lowther, FO 195/2310. W. Young, Consul at Mosul, 1908–9. 124 F. R. Maunsell (1861–1936), Military Attache at Constantinople, 1901–1905, employed at WO, 1907–1910. 125 Enclosure in 14 March 1904 WO-FO, FO 78/5354. 126 Parker minute on 2 Sep. 1908 Lowther-Grey 539, FO 371/549. 30975/30975. 127 24 Dec. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 786 conf., FO 371/356. 42479/42479. 128 18 July 1908 Lowther-Mallet pte., FO 371/1003/4241/28349. 129 The most convenient digests of local events are provided by the monthly reports from the Residents at Baghdad, entitled Summaries of Events in Turkish ‘Iraq.

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PA RT O N E

T HE F OUNDATION OF P OLICY, 1903–1907


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INTRODUCTION

Lansdowne’s April 1903 Baghdad Railway memorandum1 differed in tone, purpose and content from the Cabinet paper of May 1907 on the same subject.2 These differences revealed the extent to which the British government had formulated a new policy towards Mesopotamia during the intervening period. The 1903 memorandum was drafted after the Foreign Office had given its blessing to negotiations between British and German financiers interested in the railway. It offered a hasty apologia for a posture which had thus already been adopted. The tone of the 1907 paper, however, indicated that the British government had assumed a more definite attitude towards the Baghdad line. The Cabinet now reserved its freedom of action by stipulating that British financiers would not be allowed to participate in the project unless the German government agreed to certain new conditions. The two documents also differed in intent. Lansdowne’s memorandum had stressed the diplomatic advantages of employing the Baghdad Railway as a means of reducing Anglo-German tension. It had also emphasised Britain’s need to neutralise a potentially hostile railway terminus on the Persian Gulf. Diplomatic and strategic factors had thus overshadowed consideration of the commercial benefits which the Baghdad Railway might afford to British trade. But by 1907, the emphasis had shifted significantly. The Cabinet paper reiterated Britain’s objections to foreign control of the overland route to India. In addition, it introduced an estimate of the possible effect which the German line might have on Britain’s commercial interests in Mesopotamia. The differences in the content of the two documents emphasised their contrasting tone and intent. The 1903 memorandum had not restricted British interests to any particular section of the Baghdad Railway. It proposed that British financiers be accorded a share equal to that of any other foreign group in the construction and control of the complete line from Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf. In return, the government would grant the line a subsidy for carrying Indian mail, [23]


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consent to an increase of three percent in Turkish customs duties and help the Baghdad Railway Company to acquire a terminus on the Persian Gulf, probably in the vicinity of Kuwait. By 1907, however, the proposal to “internationalise” the Baghdad Railway had been replaced by a scheme which involved its division into geographical sections of national interest. The Cabinet paper declared that British interests would only be satisfied by a monopoly of the construction and control of that portion of the line which was to traverse Mesopotamia.3 The editors of British Documents on the Origins of the War indicated the relevance of changing diplomatic relationships to the shifts of British foreign policy in the early twentieth century. Subsequent students of Britain’s Baghdad Railway policy have similarly related the distinctions between the Lansdowne and the Cabinet memoranda to the respective domestic and diplomatic contexts of the two documents. The 1903 memorandum was occasioned by a remarkable public outcry against Anglo-German cooperation; it was addressed to a Conservative government divided on the issue of tariff reform, suffering from by-election losses and without a firm friend in Europe.4 The 1907 paper, however, was endorsed by a Liberal government whose domestic strength had been revealed by an electoral landslide and whose ties of friendship in Europe were recognisably firm. The importance of maintaining a united Anglo-Franco-Russian front had been demonstrated at the Algeciras Conference in 1906.5 It was acknowledged in 1907 by the communication of the Cabinet paper “in the first instance” to Cambon and Benckendorff, the ambassadors of the French and Russian governments in London.6 Britain’s Baghdad Railway policy thus appeared to illustrate the hardening of the diplomatic division of Europe after 1904. It indicated that “the Bagdad Railway had become a political question, an integral part of the great diplomatic struggle being waged by Britain, France, Russia, and Germany.”7 Such a presentation illuminates the background to the two documents. It does not explain their differences in content. In particular, it fails to account for the specific British attention paid to the Mesopotamian section of the Baghdad Railway which characterised the May 1907 paper. Excessive concentration on the arena of European diplomacy has distorted the process by which Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was formulated between 1903 and 1907. It has also obscured the change in the criteria upon which that policy was based. Between 1903 [24]


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INTRODUCTION

and 1907, the British government regarded the Baghdad Railway as more than a challenge to Britain’s diplomacy or a test of its strategy. The government also became increasingly aware of the dangers which the line presented to Britain’s changing commercial interests within Mesopotamia itself. The purpose of the first part of this study is to indicate the changes in these interests and to show how a determination to preserve them led to the first major change in Britain’s original attitude towards the Baghdad Railway.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5

14 Apr. 1903 Lansdowne memo., BD 2, no. 216, pp. 187–188. 31 May 1907 Cabinet memo., FO 371/340/12/17743. Literally, “from a point north of Bagdad to the Persian Gulf ”. Farther afield, an alliance had been concluded with Japan in 1902. On Anglo-French-Russian relations during the conference, see E. N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904–1906 (Chicago, 1930), pp. 384–396. 6 4 June 1906 memo., BD 6, no. 250, pp. 355–356. P. Cambon (1843–1924) was French ambassador in London in 1898–1920 and Count A de Benckendorff (1849–1917) was Russian ambassador in London in 1903–1917. 7 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 76; see also Wolf, The Diplomatic History of Bagdad Railroad, p. 66: “After 1903 the Bagdad Railway became involved in the high politics of Europe.”

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1 The Absence of Policy, 1903

On 7 April 1903, Balfour informed Parliament that he supported Lansdowne’s proposal to participate in the Baghdad Railway on an “international” basis.1 On the twenty-third, however, he acknowledged in the same place that the terms offered by the German financiers would not provide British interests with “sufficient security”.2 The change in policy had been occasioned by a public outcry against the government’s original proposal. It was apparently sanctioned by a Cabinet meeting on 22 April. No records of this meeting have been preserved, and Balfour’s parliamentary statements were both relatively short and uninformative.3 Even so, Balfour’s omission of any reference to Mesopotamia in those statements would appear to have been a just reflection of the attitude towards the Baghdad Railway hitherto adopted by both the government and the public. Neither Lansdowne’s memorandum, which advocated British participation in the scheme, nor the numerous articles in the press which opposed this policy had been influenced by a particular consideration of British interests in Mesopotamia. The debate was dominated by arguments of wider geographical relevance, and revealed the absence of a British policy towards Mesopotamia in 1903. Over two years after Balfour’s parliamentary announcements, Lansdowne asserted that even in 1903, the government had envisaged making certain changes to the original German Baghdad Railway concession.4 This recollection is misleading. Lansdowne himself had insisted on the inclusion of the German Anatolian Railway in the final concession. He had also maintained the rights of British financiers to participate in the Baghdad Railway Company on terms of equality with the representatives of any other foreign power.5 In principle, however, the British government had not contested the German proposal to “internationalise” the complete line. In 1902, the director of military intelligence had warned that “it would be a great mistake to oppose the project.”6 In 1903, the Foreign Office advised the government to obtain [27]


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“a proper share in the control of the railway and of its outlet on the Persian Gulf ”.7 But neither statement had made specific reference to the Mesopotamian section of the line. Brodrick, admittedly, later recalled that one of the objections to the German proposal was that “our commercial interests would have been adversely affected by the provision that no section of the line between Baghdad and Bussorah should be worked before the completion of the line from Konieh to Baghdad.”8 This had not, however, been the government’s chief concern.9 In April 1903, when British participation in the project was “on the threshold of achievement”,10 the government did not suggest any alterations to the concession which might have affected Britain’s Mesopotamian interests. Neither was Balfour’s rejection of the German terms the result of a study of Mesopotamian considerations. Lansdowne admitted that a “sharp recrudescence of the anti-German feeling” had frightened the government and forced it to reconsider the question of British participation in the Baghdad Railway.11 The tone of this outcry was the object of Lansdowne’s recrimination. Yet it did not elicit from him a justification of the benefits which the line might accord to Britain’s Mesopotamian interests. Subsequent discussion has concentrated on a totally different question – whether the government first wilted under the strain of public criticism or whether the British financiers had first sounded the retreat.12 Dawkins reported that Balfour had forced his hand;13 and this version of events was believed by Esher14 and echoed by Morley.15 Newton and Wolf have also concluded that “the Government became intimidated and gave way”.16 Their argument is supported by the available copies of Lansdowne’s correspondence with Revelstoke in April 1903.17 On the other hand, Lansdowne claimed that the financiers had themselves “scuttled”.18 This accusation was loyally supported by Sanderson,19 and has been tentatively repeated by A. J. P. Taylor.20 For the purposes of the present study, this debate is largely unimportant. The content of the press campaign is more relevant than the reactions to it; and the outcry against British participation in the Baghdad Railway did not reveal a coherent public concern with Mesopotamia.21 Some protests were made in The Times against the lack of consideration apparently being accorded to the possibility that Britain might control the southern section of the project.22 These arguments were far less numerous than the public criticisms of other aspects of [28]


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T H E A B S E N C E O F P O L I C Y, 1 9 0 3

Lansdowne’s proposal. The principal objection voiced against the “Venezuelan partnership of the East”23 was that control of the line would always lie in German hands. This was the core of Gibson Bowles’s24 outburst in Parliament and of his letters to the press. The substance of his advice was that the government should “give no encouragement to this portion of the Pan-Germanic scheme”.25 In the general clamour of opposition to the railway,26 no distinction was made between Mesopotamia and any other region of the Ottoman Empire. Waugh’s27 recently published trade report indicated that in order to finance the kilometric guarantees for the Baghdad line, the Porte would have to raise the Ottoman customs duties by three percent.28 This action, however, would harm British merchants throughout Turkey; the argument did not apply specifically to British trade with Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamian region was similarly ignored in the detailed public criticisms of the German terms. These criticisms were threefold. They concerned, firstly, the diplomatic consequences of British participation in the Baghdad Railway. Such Anglo-German cooperation, it was believed, would “remove every prospect of reconciliation between our own interests and those of Russia in Asia”.29 Secondly, objections were raised on strategic grounds to the construction of a new route to the East. In 1902, Mahan30 had warned that “the control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval potentiality” would seriously affect Britain’s supremacy in the Indian Ocean.31 In 1903, various organs of the British press also maintained that by assisting the German railway concessionnaires to obtain an eastern terminus, the government might forfeit Britain’s traditional supremacy in Gulf waters.32 Only the spokesmen for British commercial interests narrowed their conceptual perspective. Simultaneously, however, they shifted the geographical direction of the public’s gaze. The most specific commercial criticisms were directed against the probable influence of the Baghdad Railway on British trade in Asia Minor and on the prosperity of the British Smyrna–Aidin line.33 Lynch’s interests did not even play a prominent part in discussion of the government’s proposal to subsidise the railway for the carriage of Indian mail. The future of the Peninsular and Orient Steamship Company was apparently an object of wider public concern.34 The attempted replies to such criticisms also made no particular reference to Mesopotamia. Balfour himself spoke only in broad terms of the benefits to British merchants and entrepreneurs of participation in [29]


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“a great international highway”.35 Revelstoke attempted to justify British participation in the line by demonstrating the cosmopolitan character of the board of directors of the Baghdad Railway Company. He also stressed that the Germans were willing to include their own Anatolian line within an “international” Baghdad Railway scheme.36 O’Conor attempted to repudiate the charges made in the press in the course of a diffuse despatch. But his arguments too did not concentrate on Britain’s Mesopotamian interests. His main concern was to challenge claims that Germany would eventually control the through line and use it as an instrument of rate manipulation. He also pointed out that the contingency of a German or Russian port on the Gulf might arise whether Britain participated in the Baghdad Railway or not.37 Gwinner attempted to defend the British government’s original position in an interview with the Berlin correspondent of The Times. But although he revealed various details concerning the financing of the line, Gwinner did not discuss the effect it might have upon any particular geographical area. Significantly, he disclosed that the question of exclusive British control of the Baghdad–Kuwait section of the railway had not been raised during the Anglo-German discussions.38 Finally, Mesopotamia was similarly ignored in the aftermath of the government’s retreat. The welcome accorded to Balfour’s final parliamentary announcement in the press39 was not echoed by all of the premier’s colleagues. But those who regretted the decision did so on general grounds, and were silent on its more specific defects. Lansdowne feared that Britain had now lost the opportunity of “insisting on our own terms”.40 Subsequently, Morley felt that his predecessors had committed “one of the most stupid blunders in the history of old John Bull”.41 Retrospectively, Parker commented that henceforth the Germans were allowed to assume the position of “beati possidentes”.42 The relevance of Balfour’s decision to British interests in Mesopotamia, even if discerned, was not to be discussed until the formulation of the 1907 Cabinet memorandum.

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NOTES 1 7 Apr. 1903 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (hereafter PD), Commons Series 4, 1903, vol. 120, cols. 1247–1248. 2 23 Apr. 1903, PD 4, 1903, 121, co1. 222. 3 Balfour’s reports to King Edward VII are silent for the period between 17 March (CAB 41/28/6) and 5 May 1903 (CAB 41/28/7). Similarly, Balfour’s papers contain no letters from Sir F. Knollys (the king’s pte. sec.) between 31 March (Balfour MSS, Add. MSS 49683, p. 142) and 2 May 1903 (ibid., p. 154). A Cabinet meeting took place on 22nd Apr. (23 Apr. 1903, The Times, p. 9), and on the 24th Sir A.W. Fitzroy (clerk of the Privy Council) recorded: “The decision of the Government not to countenance the Baghdad Railway is wise and the Cabinet had no difficulty in arriving at it.” Memoirs, vol. 1 (London, 1925), pp. 128–129. 4 25 Aug. 1905 Lansdowne-Drummond Wolff pte., Lansdowne MSS (hereafter CANS MSS), PRO, London, 29, FO 800/145, p. 189. “It was always supposed that we were ready to take the German scheme as we found it. Nothing was further from our thoughts”. 5 12 March 1903 Lansdowne memo, BD 2, no. 211, p. 183. 6 Quoted in 14 Apr. 1903 Lansdowne memo, BD 2, no. 216, pp. 187–188. 7 Ibid. 8 Remarks made at 12 Apr. 1905, 70th CID meeting, CAB 38/9/32. 9 Nor had it been Brodrick’s. In 1902 his main concern had been that cooperation with Germany “would be certain to raise her claims to Kuwait”. 4 Nov. 1902 memo., enclosed in CAB 38/4/10 no. 3. 10 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 52. 11 24 Apr. 1903 Lansdowne-Curzon pte., LANS MSS 29, FO 800/145. 12 Both sides were vulnerable. Cassel was of German and Jewish stock; Dawkins’ firm of Morgan had been compromised by its recent role in an unpopular Anglo-American shipping combine. The financiers had therefore already wished to avoid the public limelight (4 Feb. 1903 Lansdowne-Cassel, BD 2, no. 206, pp. 179–80). The government had recently been criticised for cooperating with Germany in the Venezuelan expedition, and was subject to the venom of Chamberlain’s “bile”. (12 Apr. 1903 Lansdowne-Balfour pte., Balfour MSS, Add. MSS 49278, p. 41). 13 23 Apr. 1903 Dawkins-Gwinner, printed in Avon Gwinner, “The Baghdad Railway and the Question of British Co-operation”, Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 65 (June 1909), pp. 1090–1091. 14 M. V. Brett ed., Journals and Letters of Viscount Esher, vol. 1 (London, 1934), p. 397. R. B. Brett, 2nd Viscount Esher (1852–1930), perm. member CID 1905–1914, DNB (1937), pp. 106–109. 15 11 Apr. 1906 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS (India Office Records, London), vol. 1, p. 84. 16 Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (London, 1929), p. 254 and Wolf, Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad, p. 43. 17 E.g., 24 Apr. 1903 Lansdowne-Revelstoke, FO 785322. 18 Minute on 15 Dec. 1903 O’Conor-Lansdowne 831, BD 2, no. 224, p. 196. [31]


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19 5 Aug. 1903 Sanderson-Lascelles pte., Lascelles MSS, PRO, London 3, FO 80015. Sir, later Baron, T.H. Sanderson (1841–1923), Perm. Under-Sec. FO 1894–1906, DNB (1937), pp. 739–740. 20 The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1957), p. 410, n. 2. The most recent discussion of this episode is by R.M. Francis, “The British Withdrawal from the Bagdad Railway Project in April 1903”, Historical Journal, 16, 1 (1973), pp. 168–178. 21 Only the Daily Telegraph, Statesman and Daily Graphic supported the government’s plan to participate in the railway. The Manchester Guardian, Scotsman, Birmingham Post, Liverpool Post and Glasgow Herald all echoed the opposition voiced in the London press. O. J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, With Special Reference to England and Germany (New York, 1940), p. 262 22 “Railway Enterprise in Asiatic Turkey”, 9 Apr. 1903, p. 6; letters to the editor from H. F. B. Lynch, 18 Apr.1903, p. 13; and T. C. Plowden, 22 Apr. 1903, p. 7. 23 The phrase is in W. L. Courtney, “The Latin Rapprochement and the Baghdad Imbroglio”, Fortnightly Review, vol. 79 (May 1903), p. 810. 24 T. G. Bowles (1844–1922), Unionist MP for King’s Lynn, 1892–1906. 25 8 Apr. 1903, PD 4, 120, 1903, cols. 1358–1364 and letters to the editor, The Times, 14 Apr. 1903, p. 4 and 20 Apr. 1903, p. 7. 26 E.g., 18 Apr. 1903, “The Baghdad Railway”, Economist, vol. 61 (i), p. 683; 18 Apr. 1903, “The Baghdad Railway Entanglement”, Spectator, vol. 9, p. 596; and 18 Apr. 1903, editorial, The Times, p. 11. 27 A. T. (later Sir) Waugh (1865–1950), consul, Constantinople 1903–1914. 28 Accounts and Papers 1903, Ann. Ser. 2950, Report for the Year 1902 on the Trade of Constantinople, received at FO on 16 March 1903. The report was summarised in The Times on 11 Apr. 1903 (p. 5) and quoted in Gibson Bowles’s letter published in 14 Apr., above number 25. See also A. T. Waugh, Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (London, 1930), p. 104. 29 W. L. Courtney, above number 23; also E. J. Dillon, “The Bagdad Railway”, Contemporary Review, vol. 83 (May 1903), p. 743; 18 Apr. 1903, editorial, The Times, p. 11; and 18 Apr. 1903, editorial, Westminster Gazette, p. 5. Mention was also made of the effect of British cooperation on the better (i.e. opposition) elements in Turkey. 18 Apr. 1903, Economist, vol. 61, (1), pp. 683–684. 30 A. T. Mahan (1840–1914), United States naval officer and historian; an influential exponent of sea power. 31 A. T. Mahan, “The Persian Gulf and International Relations”, National Review, vol. 40 (Sep. 1902), pp. 27–45. 32 Fears of Germany were expressed in 9 Apr. 1903, editorial, The Times, p. 7; 18 Apr. 1903, “Baghdad and India”, Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, vol. 95, pp. 477–478; and 25 Apr. 1903, “The Lessons of Baghdad”, Economist, vol. 61 (1), p. 730. Leo Maxse (1864–1932), editor of the National Review, was more concerned with the threat of a Russian “Port Arthur” in those waters. “Episodes of the Month”, National Review, vol. 41, no. 242 (Apr. 1903), p. 169. 33 Bowles, 8 Apr. 1903, PD 4, 120, 1903, cols. 1358–1364, quoting Vice Consul Sorrell’s report on the trade of Constantinople for 1899–1900. 34 Compare Fortnightly Review (May 1903), p. 824; National Review (Apr.1903), p. 169; 11 Apr. 1903, Saturday Review, p. 442; and Sir T. Sutherland’s letter to [32]


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35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

the editor, The Times, 22 Apr. 1903, p. 7 with H. F. B. Lynch’s letter, 18 Apr. 1903, The Times, p. 13. 8 Apr. 1903, PD 4, 1903, 120, cols. 1364–1375. 21 Apr. 1903 memo., BID 2, no. 218, pp. 189–190. Enclosure to 28 Apr. 1903 O’Conor-Lansdowne, 217, FO 78/5322; omitted in BD 2, no. 221, p. 219. 24 Apr. 1903, The Times, p. 5. See, e.g., 25 Apr. 1903, Spectator, vol. 90, pp. 648–650; 25 Apr. 1903, Economist, vol. 61 (1), pp. 729–730; and 24 Apr. 1903, The Times, p. 9. 24 Apr. 1903 Lansdowne-Curzon pte., LANS MSS, 29, FO 800/145. 8 Jan. 1908 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 3, p. 15. “The Bagdad Railway Negotiations” (unsigned), Quarterly Review, vol. 228 (Oct. 1917), p. 495. Parker’s authorship is confirmed by his private letter to Hardinge of 18 Sep. 1917 (enclosed in BS MSS, 13).

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2 The Context of Policy

Neither the objectives of diplomacy nor the imperatives of strategy focused official British attention on the Mesopotamian section of the Baghdad Railway between 1903 and 1907. During this period, no steps were taken to renew a direct Anglo-German dialogue, and no immediate fear was occasioned by a line which was still far from India. Only within the economic context did the pace of British interests in Mesopotamia gather momentum. Even this restricted influence, however, caused a change in policy. The expansion of the volume and nature of Britain’s economic interests in Mesopotamia promised rewards which exceeded the boundaries of commercial statistics. Underlying Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was the knowledge that “commercial enterprise and political influence have gone together in these regions.”1 The expansion of the former indicated an accretion of the latter. In 1907, Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was not immune to diplomatic pressures – nor did it ignore strategic considerations – but it was primarily influenced by developments which were hardly foreseen and barely recognised in 1903.

The Diplomatic Context Strictly diplomatic requirements militated strongly against the British government’s eventual preference for participation in the Baghdad Railway on a “sectional”, rather than an “international”, basis. In 1903, Lansdowne considered that Britain had more to fear than to gain from the division of the line into geographical sections. “Internationalisation”, he maintained, was the course “best calculated to remove the international rivalries to which the construction of such a line was sure to give rise”.2 Had Britain claimed exclusive control of the southern section, “we should have had all the other Powers on our backs at once.”3 This assessment of diplomatic preference was unaltered when, in the last year of Conservative rule, Germany replaced Russia and France [35]


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as the principal object of British concern. The rise in diplomatic tension produced by the kaiser’s visit to Tangier in March 19054 convinced Lansdowne that it would be inopportune to seek a Baghdad Railway arrangement “which would be resolutely opposed by Germany”.5 The need to preserve Anglo-French amity in the period after Delcassé’s6 fall also precluded a unilateral British abandonment of the “international” scheme. Lansdowne therefore rejected the various “sectional” proposals made in May 1905 by O’Conor,7 the Foreign Office staff 8 and the Cabinet.9 Privately, Lansdowne warned O’Conor that France and Russia would oppose Britain’s exclusive control of the eastern end of the Baghdad Railway.10 Officially, he informed Bertie of French suspicions (voiced by Cambon) that Britain had a “visee politique” in both an Anglo-German agreement and a geographical division of the line.11 O’Conor retorted that French control of Syrian railways might be considered a sufficient “counterpoise” to a British Baghdad–Basra section.12 This suggestion was premature. The Cabinet supported Lansdowne’s “international” proposal and decided that Britain would not cooperate in the construction of the Baghdad Railway “unless France, and perhaps America, could be induced to take part”.13 O’Conor was informed that in view of the state of European tension, “we are particularly anxious to avoid making any overtures to the Germans.”14 Lansdowne maintained that for the moment, Britain should play “a waiting game”.15 The diplomatic context of British thinking on the Baghdad Railway did not change with the advent of Grey to the Foreign Office in December 1905. He was even less anxious to allow the subject to become either a bone of Anglo-German contention or an obstacle to Anglo-French friendship. The first requirement was an inducement to flexibility. Grey agreed to an increase of three percent in the Turkish customs dues16 without insisting that the revenues thus released would not be used to finance the Baghdad Railway.17 The need to preserve the entente cordiale proved a further disincentive to the “sectional” proposal. As early as ApriI 1906, Grey informed Cambon that Britain was unwilling to renew Baghdad Railway discussions with the Germans without French and Russian agreement.18 Grey was even more anxious than Lansdowne to support France at Algeciras,19 to sanction Anglo-French military conversations20 and to encourage the completion of an Anglo-Russian settlement in Asia.21 Like his predecessor, therefore, Grey too resisted the [36]


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THE CONTEXT OF POLICY

temptation to test O’Conor’s claim that “the French Government is not disposed to pay too much attention to Russian susceptibilities in regard to this the Baghdad Railway matter.”22 Instead, he repeatedly asserted: “I am not going into any business with the Germans without France and Russia.”23 When, in May 1906, Cambon again warned that “there would be difficulty in making any arrangement by which the southern section should be entirely controlled by England”, Grey denied all interest in such a proposal.24 Grey’s Baghdad Railway discussions with the Russians revealed a similar preoccupation with the diplomatic disadvantages of a British “sectional” demand. Izwolsky’s25 agreement to consider the terms on which he might withdraw Russian opposition to the line26 was a minor victory for British diplomacy and a timely revolution in Russian policy.27 However, the “sectional” proposal was neither directly responsible for, nor immediately affected by, Izwolsky’s announcement. It rewarded Grey’s patience28 and justified Nicolson’s care in excluding this delicate subject from his St. Petersburg negotiations.29 But it did not alter Grey’s conviction that the “internationalisation” of the Baghdad Railway was the necessary corollary of the European diplomatic situation.30 This consideration continued to influence Grey’s attitude towards the “sectional” proposal even after the Cabinet had sanctioned the May 1907 memorandum, which demanded British control over the Mesopotamian section of the Baghdad Railway. Grey supported this demand, but remained aware of the diplomatic difficulties which it would entail. In March 1907, he had insisted, during a conversation with Metternich,31 that Britain deserved a say in the construction of an alternative route to the East.32 In April, he had also warned Cambon that the control and working of the Mesopotamian end was Britain’s “most essential” Baghdad Railway condition.33 He was, however, perturbed by the spectacle of the kaiser–Etienne discussions at Kiel in May 1907,34 and therefore retracted both statements. Thus in November 1907, the Germans learned that Britain’s Baghdad Railway requirements were still open to discussion.35 In July, the French had been given a more substantial sop. Cambon then informed Grey that the French government found the May 1907 memorandum unacceptable because “it could not be reconciled with the internationalisation of the line.” Grey therefore unilaterally reversed the Cabinet’s decision: the memorandum, he accepted, represented merely “a desire, and not a condition”.36 [37]


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Had the state of European diplomacy been the sole influence on Britain’s Mesopotamian policy, the 1907 Cabinet memorandum would not have assumed its ultimate form. In 1907, as in 1903, the “internationalisation” of the Baghdad Railway remained the course least likely to arouse either the antagonism of Britain’s rivals or the suspicion of its friends. The change in the diplomatic situation had not induced the formulation of a new British policy towards either the Baghdad Railway or Mesopotamia.

The Strategic Context The substitution of a “sectional” for an “international” Baghdad Railway proposal did appear to reveal that changes in the local strategic situation had influenced Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. Between 1903 and 1907, the British fear of a Russian threat to the Gulf gradually abated and that of German designs on the region steadily increased. During the Conservative administration, Hamilton,37 Chamberlain38 and Balfour had considered using the Baghdad Railway as a means of “running Germany against Russia and Turkey in the Gulf ”.39 This scheme was discussed at length during an interdepartmental meeting in November 1902.40 By 1907, the plan no longer accorded with strategic realities. The occasional appearance of Russian agents at Karbala41 or of Russian steamers in the Gulf 42 continued to cause sporadic British alarm. They did not undermine the confident estimate (evident even before Tsushima) that Russia’s difficulties in the Far East had temporarily blunted the force of its threat to India.43 Sykes’s44 nightmare that “a force of five or six thousand cossacks might . . . sweep through Sulemanie, destroy Kirkuk and then . . . raise an insurrection in Baghdad”45 was not shared in London. Neither was Maunsell’s estimate that British forces might one day wish to advance through Mesopotamia towards Russia’s underbelly in the Caucasus.46 In 1906, the Indian government did fear a possible Russo-German agreement inimical to Britain’s Mesopotamian interests.47 But the Foreign Office remained confident that Russia’s hostility to the Baghdad Railway indicated a desire to fence off Mesopotamia against foreign encroachment rather than to expand its own influence there.48 Germany’s growing interest in the region was a matter for greater concern. As early as 1902, Curzon apprehended that the Baghdad Railway project would “rivet” the kaiser’s attention on Mesopotamia and [38]


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“revolutionise” the situation at Baghdad.49 His conviction that “the German Emperor would sell us for a wink of Russia’s eye”50 was the basis of his opposition to British participation in the line. The possibility that the railway would be followed by the establishment of a German naval base on the Gulf was even more ominous. The Indian government feared that such a base would threaten Britain’s maritime supremacy in eastern waters.51 The War Office warned that it might challenge the safety of the Suez route to India, and predicted that it would improve Germany’s communications with Kiaochou, the Pacific and East Africa.52 From a local viewpoint, Cox53 cautioned that it would damage British prestige amongst the local Gulf populace.54 The growing appreciation of the German threat did not, however, result in a proportionate desire to extend Britain’s military responsibilities in the Mesopotamian interior. In 1903, Lansdowne had considered that the German danger might be parried merely by the internationalisation, and therefore neutralisation, of the Baghdad Railway’s Gulf terminus.55 This proposal was subsequently modified in detail, but its substance was not altered. Thus in 1904, the government of India advised that Britain strengthen its control of all possible railway termini in the Gulf by supporting the sheikh of Kuwait’s claim to Bubiyan island (the most likely terminus for the German line).56 In the same year, the War Office reiterated the necessity for keeping “the control of the Gulf terminus in our hands”.57 These suggestions were designed to prevent German expansion, not to increase British responsibilities. The prospect of the Baghdad Railway did not activate plans for the establishment of a British naval base on the Mesopotamian littoral in Gulf waters. Indeed, the Admiralty maintained that such a base was undesirable. Its personnel would be exposed to attack from an alien hinterland58 and would suffer from the excesses of an unkind climate.59 The government of India, moreover, acknowledged that the establishment of a new Gulf base was unnecessary. The Royal Navy’s control of the narrow entrance to the Gulf remained India’s surest safeguard against the threat of a hostile fleet within those waters.60 Battenberg61 considered that the need to control the local arms traffic was the only reason for a British naval presence in the Gulf at all.62 By 1906, Clarke63 suggested that even this force might be reduced.64 These opinions had already influenced Britain’s Russian policy. Grey would ultimately have agreed to Russian access to the Gulf on condition that Britain retained control of its mouth.65 Nicolson too [39]


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was prepared to rely on the fact that “our position is thoroughly assured so long as we retain our sea supremacy; and if we lose our sea supremacy we lose our Empire.”66 Britain’s Mesopotamian policy remained similarly passive. The 1907 demand for exclusive control of the Mesopotamian section of the Baghdad Railway did not portend an increase in local activity by the British navy. Neither did the 1907 memorandum indicate that the British government seriously contemplated military ventures in Mesopotamia during this period. Curzon reputedly claimed that British interests in the region were occasioned by “the needs, not only of Indian defence, but of Indian expansion”.67 This attitude did not reflect the tone of British policy. The context of official thinking was more accurately illustrated by Grey’s sober assessment of the consequences of an invasion of Mesopotamia. Such an expedition, he observed, would impose an unacceptable strain on Britain’s military resources and would entail the expenditure of “millions a year in keeping a new frontier in a state of defence”.68 By the time the 1907 memorandum was approved by the Cabinet, the consideration of India’s defence, the temptations of Arab insurgencies and the provocations of Turkish aggression had not caused it to decide otherwise. British strategy made no calls for the immediate construction of an overland route to India. The chiefs of staff decreed that if denied access to the Suez Canal by hostile Mediterranean fleets, British troops would travel by the long sea route around the Cape. This plan was expounded by both the War Office69 and the Admiralty,70 and was not affected by the possibility of molestation from French bases in the Atlantic (Dakar) or Indian oceans (Diego Saurez).71 As late as July 1907, Tweedmouth72 affirmed that the Cape route was Britain’s safest link with its eastern empire.73 The possibility of a British railway extension from Basra to Karachi along the Persian Gulf littoral was not seriously aired until after the signature of the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention;74 and even then it was deemed beyond the range of practical achievement.75 Similarly, the 1907 memorandum did not indicate a sudden desire to profit from Turkey’s local unpopularity in Mesopotamia. The increasing signs of Arab disturbances in this period have a retrospective fascination for historians, but held no attraction for British strategists. The British files record that the Turks withdrew some of their local units for service in the Yemen,76 that the khazi of Baghdad promised to welcome a British [40]


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campaign with “open arms”77 and that “the whole of Mesopotamia is thoroughly disaffected.”78 The government systematically noted such information, but persistently refused to succumb to the obvious temptation. Morley’s conviction that Britain “had nothing to fear from an Arab uprising in Mesopotamia”79 was comforting but passive. Hardinge’s appreciation that popular support in the area “may be a valuable asset in the future”80 was of no immediate consequence. O’Conor’s recognition that “seeds have been sown which may in the course of time bear fruit and . . . alter the condition” of Mesopotamian affairs 81 was prescient but cautious. The lack of cohesion, concerted action, and leadership amongst the Arabs of the area82 permitted British policy to remain watchful but passive. This attitude was not even affected by Grey’s awareness that “the Power making the Baghdad Railway would . . . acquire political influence” in the area.83 Local British representatives made no concerted attempt to foster the friendship of potential allies amongst the local inhabitants. Nor did they try to penetrate the barriers of obstruction which local Turkish authorities placed in the way of such communications.84 The chief of the most powerful tribe in the area was refused military assistance,85 and the head of the most influential family in Baghdad was antagonised by a long and petty property squabble with the residency.86 O’Conor’s conviction of the “importunity of mixing ourselves in entanglements . . . among Arab tribes” in Mesopotamia87 reflected the prevalent attitude of British policy between 1903 and 1907. The British government did, admittedly, consider despatching a military expedition to Mesopotamia during the 1906 Akaba crisis. The discussions on that occasion did not, however, anticipate the 1907 memorandum or contribute to its formulation. Instead, they provided a forum for the articulation of military reticence towards the area. The Committee of Imperial Defence rejected proposals by Clarke and Grey that “the occupation of Basra” and “the seizure . . . of the Sultan’s private trading vessels on the Tigris” might effectively injure the Turks.88 The difficulties of the climate, the lack of a “really valuable objective” and the danger of German opposition89 convinced French90 that the plan was “futile”.91 A Mesopotamian campaign was disparaged by Cromer92 and discarded in Esher’s blanket prohibition against “strikes delivered at the extremities of the Turkish Empire”.93 Instead, a scheme whereby British forces might attack the south Syrian coast at Haifa was adopted [41]


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and perfected.94 The Basra expedition, like the Dardanelles campaign,95 was deferred until the very different circumstances of the First World War. The increasing British attention to Mesopotamia revealed by the 1907 memorandum was not the result of a change in Britain’s local strategic ambitions.

The Commercial Context In the absence of either diplomatic or strategic incentives to a change in Britain’s attitude towards Mesopotamia between 1903 and 1907, the genesis of the 1907 Cabinet memorandum must be seen in view of the changing role of Britain’s commercial interests in the region. The evolution from the “international” Baghdad Railway policy of 1903 to the “sectional” proposal of 1907 reflected the expansion of Britain’s commercial activity in Mesopotamia. It also indicated the government’s growing determination to retain Britain’s control over the markets of the region in the face of foreign competition. The Baghdad Railway itself, therefore, was not the only subject of immediate official concern. The belief that “the whole of Mesopotamia is overrun by German commercial travellers”96 was an equally important, and allied, preoccupation. The terms of Britain’s trade with Mesopotamia themselves gave cause for concern. In 1907, Britain’s predominance in the carrying trade to Basra was still unchallenged. The volume of British ships which called at the port rose from 135,000 tons in 1904 to 218,000 tons in 1906.97 However, the value and weight of “Manchester” cotton goods exported to the region showed a disturbing decline. In 1903, these exports to Baghdad had been worth £1,285,000, and constituted eighty percent of the total goods imported to the town. The figures for 1906 were £867,000 and fifty-six percent respectively.98 The simultaneous rise in Indian exports to the region (from £81,000 to £200,000)99 was considered less significant than the sudden surge in the local import of heavy agricultural machinery of German origin.100 The apparent materialisation of plans for the construction of the German railway towards the region raised such figures from the level of statistics of temporary concern to omens of far-reaching importance. Improved communications themselves would not harm British trade, but if they were under foreign control they would deflect its course. Crow predicted that unless Britain controlled the southern section of the Baghdad Railway, “markets in Mesopotamia [42]


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hitherto supplied by Britain from the South and the Persian Gulf will eventually be inundated with the manufactures of Central and Eastern Europe . . . These, encouraged by preferential treatment, will be in a position to supplant British goods.”101 The danger had political overtones: an influx of German goods into Mesopotamia might result in an increase in local German prestige. Proportionately, Britain might lose its influence amongst the inhabitants of the area and thereby forfeit the political advantages hitherto ensured by its commercial predominance and exclusive privileges. Initially, however, the British government treated the threat as a strictly commercial problem. The objective of British policy was limited to the protection of British commerce, and its tactics concentrated on commercial expansion. The 1907 memorandum therefore expressed the government’s determination to employ diplomatic means to achieve primarily commercial ends. It had been preceded, and was accompanied, by similar attempts to defend traditional British commerce and to encourage new fields of British enterprise in Mesopotamia. This policy was clearly expressed by the government’s attitude towards British navigation concerns in Mesopotamia. The intrinsic value of the Lynch firm was doubtful. Its mail service was erratic102 and its trading practices were monopolistic.103 The British government did not therefore offer the company indiscriminate support. Crow assiduously encouraged the construction of two competitive Turkish steamers.104 Bertie surprisingly recommended even the most disreputable offers of a rival concessionnaire.105 Hardinge unhesitatingly supported Sir G. Mackenzie’s106 attempts to establish a “second British line on the rivers”.107 The government’s distrust of Lynch’s firm did not imply a willingness to accept its disappearance. British officials were clearly disturbed by the increasing efficiency of the rival Hamadieh Steam Navigation Company.108 The Foreign Office carefully noted reports that the Porte had questioned Lynch’s time-honoured right to attach barges to his two steamers,109 had delayed the transfer of cargo to his vessels110 and had deferred litigation in which the company was involved.111 Weakley112 reflected the general concern when noting that “the subjection of the British Company to continual annoyance . . . will, in time, bring about . . . the disappearance of the British flag from the river.”113 Percy114 anticipated the tenor of British policy when minuting that it was important to retain the advantages which Lynch had given to [43]


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British trade. Unless Lynch was defended, the initiative would pass to the Germans.115 By 1907, fear of the Baghdad Railway had affected the government’s response to the threat to Britain’s privileged position on the Mesopotamian rivers. In 1905, the Board of Trade admitted that the Baghdad Railway would present a threat to Lynch’s control of the Mesopotamian carrying trade.116 In 1906, Grey warned the Porte that if Lynch’s ships suffered any discrimination, he would instruct the Royal Navy to seize Turkish vessels in the Gulf.117 By 1907, the Foreign Office had decided to press for an increase in the size of Lynch’s fleet. Hitherto, the Foreign Office and O’Conor had agreed that Lynch’s repeated requests for a third steamer would arouse foreign envy.118 But by early 1907, O’Conor felt it necessary to “press with all his might” on the company’s behalf.119 Lloyd120 certainly had no qualms about the merits of the case. “Any weakening of our position on the Tigris”, he wrote, “means not only the weakening of our whole position in Mesopotamia, but a corresponding increase in German trade and activity . . . Our privileged position on the river is now becoming daily more valuable, in view of the approach of the Baghdad Railway.”121 Moreover, by 1907, the Germans appeared to threaten new, as well as traditional, areas of British commercial enterprise in Mesopotamia. The progress of the proposals to irrigate the area was therefore earnestly followed. Paradoxically, the government was unmoved by the enthusiasm which the British engineer Sir William Willcocks122 displayed for these schemes. Cromer doubted his financial acumen;123 and O’Conor suspected his patriotic devotion.124 The practicability of Willcocks’ schemes was independently verified in 1904.125 Moreover, Willcocks himself had translated his ideas into definite plans by 1905.126 Even so, Sanderson continued to believe that Willcocks’ schemes “will end in splutter”.127 In Baghdad, Willcocks had caught Newmarch’s imagination,128 but in London he was disregarded. The Foreign Office refused to support his schemes unless Willcocks himself found a financial sponsor,129 and rejected the government of India’s offer to despatch an independent engineer to study his proposals.130 In 1905, the Cabinet decided that O’Conor was “to keep an eye on the irrigation proceedings but not to evince too much interest in them”.131 By 1907, however, the dual pressure of German activity and Turkish interest had aroused official concern for this sphere of Mesopotamian [44]


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development. As early as 1903, O’Conor had warned that British participation in the irrigation scheme would be adversely affected by complete German control of the Baghdad Railway.132 In 1906 Sykes too apprehended that the German railway concessionnaires might obstruct the efforts of the predominantly British Anglo-Egyptian Land Allotment Company to raise the necessary capital to finance the irrigation project.133 Ramsay’s 1907 report that the Turkish government had accepted the designs of a French engineer for the construction of the Hindiyah Barrage134 was a more immediate cause for alarm. In October 1907, the Foreign Office asked that the Board of Trade widely publicise the Turkish request for tenders.135 In December, it reacted with alacrity to the news that Pearsons and Sons had expressed interest in the project.136 The barrage, it was agreed, would be “of great utility as a foundation for British enterprise in Mesopotamia”.137 Within the same period, the future destination of the concession for the working of the Mesopotamian petroleum deposits also became a subject of official concern. As early as 1900, O’Conor had demonstrated the relationship of the Baghdad Railway concession to the petroleum fields.138 By 1904, Newmarch had verified the existence of significant deposits along the line’s Mesopotamian tracé.139 The government’s interest in D’Arcy’s140 attempts to gain the petroleum concession increased in proportion to the degree of apparent German efforts to the same end. Thus D’Arcy was accorded official embassy support,141 the activities of Dr Hugo Groethe (of the German ministry of trade) were carefully watched142 and Lynch’s doubtful interests in the scheme were skilfully deflected.143 Henceforth, Britain’s attitude towards the Baghdad Railway was to be influenced by the knowledge that the petroleum negotiations were “in a critical though fairly promising state”.144 O’Conor had long feared that unless Britain participated in the southern section of the line, it would lose the “chance of developing the petroleum fields of Mesopotamia”.145 With this in mind, Maunsell, in 1907, advocated that the Baghdad line run, under British control, from Mosul to Kirkuk and Kifri.146 The 1907 Cabinet memorandum was implicitly to accept the belief that “the creation of such important British interests will greatly enhance our general position and influence in that country.”147 By 1907, therefore, Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was not assessed solely, or even primarily, in diplomatic and/or strategic terms. The appointment of new British consular representatives to the area, for [45]


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instance, reflected the primacy of commercial considerations. In 1906, Grey and O’Conor had rejected the War Office’s suggestion that it was necessary to appoint a vice-consul to Mosul in order to remedy the government’s deficiencies in local military knowledge.148 In 1907, however, they accepted Lloyd and Ramsay’s opinion that the appointment was justified on commercial grounds.149 Wilkie Young was thus sent to Mosul with instructions to “devote yourself quietly and exclusively to the promotion of British trade interests, watching the local markets and looking for any opening for bringing in British goods”.150 Similarly, in 1907, Gaskin was appointed commercial assistant to Newmarch, in order to facilitate the expansion of British commerce in Baghdad.151 The condition of Britain’s existing Mesopotamian trade, and the prospect of British control of the navigation, irrigation and petroleum developments of the region, had similarly affected the official attitude towards the Baghdad Railway. By then, it was agreed that “if ever an arrangement is come to with regard to the Baghdad Railway, there should be a condition that the Germans should bind themselves not to oppose, directly or indirectly, the grant of a concession supported by the British Government for the economic development of the region by British capital.”152 The government continued to acknowledge the limitations imposed upon Britain’s Mesopotamian policy by the circumstances of European diplomacy and the needs of Indian strategy. However, the specific concentration on Mesopotamia, which was the most significant aspect of the May 1907 “sectional” proposal, reflected a change in local circumstances. The influence of this change was revealed during the process whereby the 1907 Cabinet memorandum was formulated.

[46]


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NOTES 1 Grey minute on Lloyd memo., enclosed in 30 Sep. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 639 conf., FO 371/354/29685/33254. 2 4 Feb. 1903 Lansdowne-Cassel, BD 2, no. 206, p. 179. 3 Minute on 15 Dec. 1903 O’Conor-Lansdowne, BD 2, no. 224, p. 196. 4 See Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery, pp. 414–437 and S. R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Harvard, 1969), pp. 31–58. 5 12 Apr. 1905, 70th CID meeting, CAB 38/9/32. 6 Th. Delcassé (1852–1923), French foreign minister, 1898–1905. 7 10 May 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne pte., LANS MSS 27, FO 800/143, p. 293. 8 22 May 1905 Sanderson and C.A. Hopwood (senior clerk FO, 1899–1906)Lansdowne, FO 78/5449. 9 23 May 1905 Balfour-the King, CAB 41/30/19. 10 23 May 1905 Lansdowne-O’Conor pte., LANS MSS 27, FO 800/143, p. 297. 11 19 July 1905 Lansdowne-Bertie 485, FO 78/5449. 12 31 July 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne tel. 110, ibid. 13 1 Aug. 1905 Balfour-the King, CAB 41/30/30. 14 1 Aug. 1905 Lansdowne-O’Conor tel. 144, FO 78/5449. 15 25 Aug. 1905 Lansdowne-Drummond Wolf pte., LANS MSS 25, FO 800/145, p. 189. 16 Under the Capitulations, which originated in the 15th and 16th centuries, European consent was needed before the Turks could raise their customs dues. See H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, vol. 1, pt. 2 (London, 1957), p. 15. On the struggle over the implementation of the 1881 Decree of Mouharrem in the case of the three percent customs increase, see D.C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York, 1929), pp. 154–173. 17 British Baghdad Railway conditions would have “flung the glove down to the Germans”, 7 Oct. 1906 Fitzmaurice-Lascelles pte., Lascelles MSS, FO 800/13. 18 6 Apr. 1906 Grey-Bertie 205, FO 371/148/10401/12336. 19 Monger, End of Isolation, pp. 275–276. 20 Williamson, Grand Strategy, pp. 72–77. 21 R. P. Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Iowa, 1939), p. 107. 22 12 Apr. 1906 O’Conor-Grey 249 conf., BD 6, no. 223, p. 339. 23 16 Apr. 1906 Grey-Spring Rice pte., Spring Rice MSS (PRO, London), vol. 1, FO 800/247. 24 29 May 1906 Grey-Bertie 287, FO 371/148/10401/18736. 25 A. Izwolsky (1856–1919), Russian foreign minister, 1906–1910 and Russian ambassador at Paris, 1910–1917. 26 3 Nov. 1906 Nicolson-Grey tel. 288, BD 6, no. 235, pp. 346–347. 27 On Russian opposition to the line in 1903, see, e.g., 16 Apr. 1903 ScottLansdowne 109, FO 78/5322. 28 He had, for instance, refused to be hurried by Hardinge’s advice that if the Russians were not joining the project, Britain should take the initiative. Minute on 4 Sep. 1906 O’Conor-Grey 615, BD 6, no. 234, p. 346. [47]


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29 6 June 1906 Nicolson-Grey pte., NIC MSS Supp. vol., FO 800/337, p. 58. 30 31 Oct.1906 Grey-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS 1906, FO 800/338, p. 270. 31 Count P. von Metternich (1853–1934), German ambassador in London, 1901–1912. 32 8 March 1907 Grey-Lascelles 77, BD 6, no. 247, p. 354. 33 25 Apr.1907 Grey-Bertie 256, BD 6, no. 249, p. 355. 34 E.g., 13 May 1907 Grey-Bertie pte., Bertie MSS, PRO, London, “A” 16, FO 800/174, p. 20 and FO 371/255. 35 15 Nov. 1907 Grey-Salis 335 v. secret, FO 371/340/12/38220. 36 31 July 1907 Grey-Bertie 432, BD 6, no. 252, pp. 357–358. 37 Lord G. F. Hamilton (1845–1927), Sec. of State for India, 1895–1903, DNB (1937), pp. 388–390. 38 J. Chamberlain (1836–1914), Sec. of State for the Colonies, 1895–1903, DNB (1927), pp. 102–118. 39 Dilks, Curzon, vol. 1, p. 148. 40 Minutes of 19 Nov. 1902 meeting, CAB 38/4/10, no. 5. 41 E.g., 28 Sep. 1904 Newmarch-O’Conor 774/55, FO 195/2164. 42 14 Oct. 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 712, FO 78/5397. 43 23 July 1904 Clarke-Balfour pte., Balfour MSS Add. MSS 49700, p. 82. Fears of Russian designs on Afghanistan persisted until 1907. See B. J. Williams, “The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907”, Historical Journal, vol. 9, no. 3 (1966), pp. 360–373. 44 Sir M. Sykes (1879–1919), honorary attaché at Constantinople 1905–1907 and Conservative MP for Hull, 1911–1919, DNB (1927), pp. 522–524. 45 Memo. enclosed in 11 March 1903 0’Conor-Lansdowne 131, FO 78/5265. 46 It was “chimerical”. Parker minute on 28 Oct. 1906 Maunsell-FO, FO 371/155/ 36546/36546. 47 12 July 1906 G of I-IO 98, L/P & S/10 vol. 56, file 2764. 48 1 May 1906 O’Conor-Grey 295 and minutes, FO 371/150/ 15451/15451. 49 8 May 1902 Curzon-Lansdowne pte., LANS MSS 29, FO 800/145, p. 242. 50 3 Apr. 1903 Curzon-Dawkins pte., quoted in Dilks, Curzon, vol. 2, p. 58. 51 4 Feb. 1904 G of I-IO, enclosed in FO 78/5385. 52 15 Nov. 1904 General Staff memo., WO 106/52. 53 Sir P. Z. Cox (1867–1937), Resident, Persian Gulf, 1904–1914 and For. Sec., G of I 1914, DNB (1949), pp. 196–199. 54 8 Jan. 1907 Cox-Crow secret, enclosed in FO 371/340/12/4582. 55 14 Apr. 1903 memo., BD 2, no. 216, pp. 187–188. 56 4 Feb. 1904 G of I-IO, above number 51. 57 15 Nov. 1904 Gen. Staff memo., WO 106/52. 58 12 Nov. 1902 Admiralty memo., enclosed in CAB 38/4/10, no. 4. 59 3 Apr. 1904 Admiralty paper 39d, CAB 38/4/25, p. 2. 60 21 Jan. 1904 G of I-IO, enclosed in Admiralty Records (here-after ADM), PRO, London, series 127, vol. 29 and 3 Apr. 1904 Admiralty paper 39d, CAB 38/4/25. 61 L. A. Mountbatten (Battenberg), 1st Marquess of Milford Haven (1854–1921), Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), 1902–1905, DNB (1927), pp. 394–395. 62 Minute on 24 Feb. 1904 10-Adm, ADM 1/7729. See also P. K. Kemp ed., The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, vol. 1 (London, 1960), p. 102. [48]


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63 Sir G. Clarke, later 1st Baron Sydenham of Combe (1848–1933), sec. to CID 1904–1907, DNB (1949), pp. 181–182. 64 A Russian naval base at Chahbahar was only a remote possibility. 8 Feb. 1906 Clarke-Kitchener pte., Kitchener MSS, PRO, London, PRO 30/57/34. 65 10 Aug. 1906 Grey-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS 1906, FO 800/338, p. 155. 66 19 June 1907 Nicolson-Hardinge pte., NIC MSS Sup. vol., FO 800/337, p. 183. 67 Quoted in 8 May 1903 Lascelles-Lansdowne 110, FO 78/5322. 68 25 June 1906 memo., FO 371/152/22545/22545 and minute on 21 Aug. 1906 O’Conor-Grey 573 conf., FO 371/154/29027/29027. 69 23 March 1904 WO paper 41d, CAB 38/4/20. 70 Nov. 1905 Admiralty paper 88d, CAB 38/10/87. 71 21 May 1903 (printed Aug. 1904) Roberts memo., CAB 38/6/93 and 26 June 1903 Battenberg memo., CAB 38/3/52. 72 E. Marjoribanks, 2nd Baron Tweedmouth (1849–1909), First Lord of the Admiralty, 1905–1908, DNB (1912 (2)), pp. 569–571. 73 20 July 1907 Admiralty paper 99d, CAB 38/13/26. 74 16 September 1907 Parker memo., FO 371/340/12/30891. 75 Grey minute, ibid. 76 24 May 1905 DMO-FO, FO 78/5421. 77 21 Aug. 1906 O’Conor-Grey 573, FO 371/154/29027/29027. 78 Sykes’s report, enclosed in 24 June 1906 O’Conor-Grey 392 conf., FO 371/152/22155/22155. 79 11 May 1906, 87th CID meeting, CAB 38/11/19. 80 Minute on 13 May 1907 O’Conor-Grey 280 conf., FO 371/350/16407/16407. 81 O’Conor’s Annual Report for 1907, enclosed in 13 Jan. 1908 O’Conor-Grey 21, FO 371/537/4526/4526. 82 See Maunsell’s Military Report on Asiatic Turkey (1904) p. 5, WO 33/325. 83 Minute on 27 Sep. 1906 Barclay-Grey 664, FO 371/148/8750/33883. 84 27 Sep. 1906 Barclay-Grey 664, ibid. 85 Sadun Pasha of the Muntafik; 8 Feb. 1904 O’Conor-Lansdowne 73, FO 78/5329. 86 5 June 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 383, FO 78/5395. The reference is to the Naquib, Sheikh ‘Abdyr Rahman Effendi. On his power, see Gazetteer, vol. 1, App. H, pp. 2368–2379. 87 Minute on 17 Apr. 1907 Crow-O’Conor, FO 195/2242. 88 9 May 1906 paper 746, CAB 38/11/27 and 11 May 1906, 87th CID meeting, CAB 38/11/19. 89 WO minutes on May 1906 paper, WO 106/41, file C 3/10. 90 J. D. P. French, later 1st Earl of Ypres (1852–1925), C in C Aldershot, 1902–1907; 1912, Chief of Imperial General Staff (CIGS), DNB (1937), pp. 319–324. 91 11 July 1906 memo., WO 106/42, file C 3/21a. 92 16 July 1906 paper 846, CAB 38/12/42. 93 24 July 1906 paper 876, CAB 38/12/45. 94 WO 106/42, file C 3/14 and 1909 Report of CID subcommittee on Military Requirements of the Empire as affected by the defence of Egypt and the Soudan, CAB 16/4. 95 This was also rejected in 1907. 20 Dec. 1906 Admiralty paper 926, CAB 38/12/60 and 28 Feb. 1907, 96th CID Meeting, CAB 38/13/12. [49]


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96 1 Aug. 1907 FO memo., Grey MSS, PRO, London, vol 22, FO 800/61. 97 In the same period, the total shipping calling at the port rose from 170,000 tons to 248,000 tons. In 1906, German ships accounted for only 9,000 tons. Figures in G. Lloyd, Report on the Trading Possibilities of Mesopotamia (1908); enclosed in 11 Jan. 1909 B of T-10, L/P & S/3, vol. 259, no. 2832, p. 26. 98 Ibid., p. 103. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., p. 93. 101 8 Jan. 1907 Crow-Barclay 1, secret, enclosed in FO 371/340/12/4582. 102 27 June 1903 Newmarch-Maxwell, FO 195/2138; in 1905, the government of India refused to renew the firm’s mail subsidy unless it promised a regular service and accepted a fine for every hour’s avoidable delay. 1 May 1905 IO-FO, FO 78/5462. 103 It cost more to carry a ton of cargo by Lynch’s steamers from Basra to Baghdad than from London to Basra via the Suez Canal. 4 Sep. 1905 Newmarch-O’Conor, FO 195/2188. 104 Even while on leave in England. 24 Sep. 1904 Crow-Sanderson, pte., FO 78/5350. 105 22 Oct. 1904 Bertie-Landsdowne, FO 78/5461. For an account of the frauds perpetrated by the supposed concessionnaire “Baron de Penmarsh”, see 3 March 1905 Criminal Investigvation Dept. memo., FO 78/5462. 106 Sir G. S. Mackenzie (1844–1910), partner in the Gulf shipping firm of Gray, Dawes and Co. and director of the British India Steam Navigation Company, DNB (1912 (2)), pp. 528–529. 107 Minute on Armstrong and Co FO, 6 Feb. 1907, FO 371/343; the whole file is relevant to Mackenzie’s negotiations with the Porte. 108 20 Jan. 1904 Crow-O’Conor 5, FO 195/2163. 109 11 March 1902 O’Conor-Lansdowne 112, FO 78/5324. 110 21 March 1903 Newmarch-O’Conor 244/20, FO 195/2138. 111 E.g., 11 Sep. 1903 Crow-O’Conor 63, FO 195/2139. 112 A.Weakley (1861–1923), commercial attache, Constantinople, 1897–1914. 113 Memo., 30 July 1903, FO 195/2138. 114 H. A. G. Earl Percy (1871–1909), Parl. Under-Sec. FO, 1903–1905, DNB (1912 (3)), pp. 103–104. 115 Minute on 4 Aug. 1903 O’Conor-Lansdowne 440, FO 78/5324. 116 23 June 1905 B of T-FO, FO 78/5449. 117 He warned that if Lynch’s ships were obstructed, Turkish shipping would be seized. 10 May 1906 memo., FO 371/150/ 16113. 118 See the correspondence in 1905 between O’Conor and Lansdowne, FO 78/5462. 119 6 Feb. 1907 O’Conor-Grey pte., Grey MSS 40, FO 800/79; the request was granted in February. 8 Feb. 1907 O’Conor-Grey tel. 21, FO 371/343/ 1910/4345. 120 G. A. Lloyd, later 1st Baron Lloyd of Dolobran (1879–1941), attaché, Constantinople, 1905–1907. In 1907 he was special commissioner to enquire into the future of British trade in Turkey, Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, DNB (1959), pp. 512–514. 121 18 Dec. 1906 Lloyd-Hardinge, FO 371/157/42651/42651. [50]


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122 Sir W. Willcocks (1852–1932), Indian, Egyptian and Mesopotamian irrigation expert. 123 “He is clever but extremely flight.” 12 March 1903 Cromer-Lansdowne pte, LANS MSS 8, FO 800/124. 124 Despite O’Conor’s express warning, Willcocks revealed his plans to the German consul at Baghdad. 3 May 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 206, FO 78/5393. 125 Smythe’s report p. 21, enclosed in 6 May 1904 WO-FO, FO 78/5449; see below p. 69. 126 12 June 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 406 conf., FO 78/5395. 127 Minute on 8 June 1905 IO-FO, FO 78/5421. 128 “His object is to make another Egypt out of Mesopotamia, and he seems to me just the man to do it.” Enclosed in 3 April 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 206, FO 78/5393. Gertrude Bell later described Willcocks as “a twentieth century Don Quixote, erratic, illusive, maddening – and entirely lovable”. The Letters of Gertrude Bell, selected and edited by Lady Bell, D.B.E., vol. I (London, 1927), p. 292. 129 30 June 1905 Sanderson-Willcocks, FO 78/5421. 130 12 Aug. 1905 IO-FO 78/5421 and minutes. 131 30 Aug. 1905 Landsdown memo., FO 78/5421. 132 28 Apr. 1903 O’Conor-Landsdowne 217, BD 2, no. 221, p. 191. 133 Memorandum enclosed in 23 Jan. 1906 O’Conor-Grey 36, FO 371/145. 134 This was for the first stage of the irrigation scheme. Enclosed in 30 April 1907 O’Conor-Grey 45 commercial, FO 368/134/14637/14637. 135 Hardinge minute on 30 Oct. 1907, Eyres (consul, Constantinople)-Grey 2 commercial, FO 368/134/14367/36447. 136 Mallet minute on 9 Dec. 1907 B of T-FO, FO 368/134/14367/40553. The Foreign Office immediately asked that Willcocks act as advisor to the firm. 19 Dec. 1907 Grey-Gorst tel., FO 368/134/14367/41587. 137 8 Dec. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 752 conf., FO 371/356/41058/41058 and minutes, ibid. 138 M. Kent, British Government Interests in Middle Eastern Oil Concessions, 1900–1925 (London University Ph. D thesis, 1965), p. 17. 139 4 April 1904 Newmarch-O’Conor 204/23, FO 195/2163. 140 W. K. D’Arcy (1849–1917), British petroleum speculator. He had obtained a petroleum concession in Persia in 1901. 141 Kent, British Government Interests, p. 30. 142 See, e.g., 23 Apr.1907, Cartwright (consul, Munich)-Lascelles pte., Lascelles MSS Germany 3 (5), FO 800/13. 143 14 May 1907 O’Conor-Grey 278, FO 371/345/4580/16405. 144 10 July 1907 O’Conor-Grey tel. 88, FO 371/350/16321/22877. 145 2 Aug. 1905 O’Conor-Sanderson pte., FO 78/5449. 146 26 March 1907 evidence before the 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee, p. 10. FO 371/340/12/9865. 147 6 Feb. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 81 conf., FO 371/345/4580/4580. 148 5 Apr.1906 WO-FO, FO 369/43/11793/11793 and minutes, ibid; 1 May 1906 O’Conor-Grey 29 consular, FO 369/43/11793/15640. 149 Enclosed in 17 July 1907 0’Conor-Grey 53 cons., FO 369/105/14241/24313. 150 4 Feb. 1908 O’Conor-Young, FO 195/2276. The IO judged the appointment by the same standards, and therefore opposed it. They could find “very few references [51]


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to Indian trade in Mosul”. Holderness minute on 11 Oct. 1907 FO-IO, L/P & S/3, vol. 246, no. 3763. 151 See L/P & S/10, vol. 117, file 1907/636. 152 28 0ct. 1907 Block-Hardinge pte. and minutes, FO 371/344/3208/36290.

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3 The Formulation of Policy

The “sectional” Baghdad Railway scheme proposed by the May 1907 memorandum was not original. As early as 1903, O’Conor in Constantinople and H. F. B. Lynch in London had advocated that Britain concentrate on the Mesopotamian section of the line.1 The novelty of the 1907 declaration lay more in the process by which it was formulated than in its content. A considered, rather than an arbitrary, decision was possible only after the rejection of Lansdowne’s memorandum. The absence of a British policy towards Mesopotamia in 1903 had been accompanied by a lack of information concerning the area. The Cabinet decision of 1907, however, was based on a detailed corpus of information. The modification of the substance of British policy did not, therefore, reflect only a change in the object of official concern. It was also influenced by the manner in which the government reached its later decision. The Increase of Information In 1903, the British government was confessedly deficient in information concerning both Mesopotamia and the Baghdad Railway. Newmarch complained of the “poor state of surveys” of Mesopotamia2 and Selborne3 warned of the lack of information concerning the Gulf.4 Willcocks was unable to find recent maps of the area5 and Maunsell had to bribe his draughtsman to steal a copy of a German report on Mesopotamian petroleum resources.6 For information on the Baghdad Railway, the Foreign Office depended primarily on German material,7 and the public relied on amateur tours.8 As Morley recollected, the government had lacked “the facts of the case – the state of the land and peoples between Baghdad and Bussorah . . . the prospects of trade, the plans for the provision of cash for the railway”.9 By 1907, the situation had been considerably rectified. In 1903, the War Office despatched Captain Smythe10 to survey the land through [53]


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which the Baghdad Railway would pass;11 and in 1904, the Admiralty sent Captain Kemp12 to investigate the terminal capacities of the Khor Abdulla.13 At the same time, Lorimer spent two months in the region preparing his gazetteer14 and Maunsell completed his military report on Turkey in Asia.15 In 1905, Sykes produced an authentic report on the petroleum resources of the area,16 and Captain Bingham17 presented an equally weighty document on the Baghdad Railway to the Board of Trade.18 By 1907, Willcocks’ advertisement of the future prospects of Mesopotamia was substantiated by an Indian Marine survey of the Tigris,19 and was corroborated by Lloyd’s researches into the trading possibilities of the area between Basra and the Black Sea.20 British credibility bore as much of the cost as the Treasury. As early as 1905, Crow claimed that “all this coming and going of British officials” (often without Ottoman permission) had contributed to Turkey’s suspicion of British interests in Mesopotamia.21 These reports supplied the information upon which the 1907 memorandum was based. They also considerably influenced the government’s ultimate disavowal of Lansdowne’s “international” proposal. Smythe’s report, for instance, justified O’Conor’s prejudiced request that the officer should “put aside the military aspect” of the Baghdad Railway and concentrate on the economic consequences of a German line south of Baghdad.22 Smythe confirmed that as a through route between east and west, the Baghdad Railway did not threaten India; but it did represent a danger to British trade in lower Mesopotamia. There it would undercut British Gulf carriers and ruin Lynch’s company. However, “if the control of this section by a British Company were real . . . the commercial advantages to British exports and imports” would be “very great”.23 Once the report was digested in Constantinople and London, its effects were soon apparent. In December 1904, O’Conor privately renewed his pressure for a “sectional” proposal.24 In January 1905, Clarke conducted the campaign at an official level. He advised the Committee of Imperial Defence that British commercial interests in Mesopotamia demanded a rate agreement and “the construction, control and management of the Baghdad-Bassorah section” of the railway.25 This pressure was not immediately effective. Lansdowne continued to disparage the particular claims of the Lynch firm26 and the Committee of Imperial Defence restricted its ambitions to “the effective neutralisation of the Gulf terminus”.27 However, the “sectionalists” soon received [54]


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T H E F O R M U L AT I O N O F P O L I C Y

additional support. Bingham too estimated that German control of the southern section of the Baghdad Railway would ruin British trade. He also proposed that British cooperation on the line be made conditional on equal commercial treatment throughout its length, the retention of Britain’s Tigris navigation rights28 and the “predominance of British capital in the construction and working of the Gulf-Baghdad section”.29 Once again, Clarke used this information to press the “sectional” claim. He maintained that the problems of internationalising the complete line were “insuperable”. Germany had already staked independent claims in Anatolia, and France had announced its own ambitions in Syria. Bingham’s memorandum strengthened his conviction that it was imperative to secure British control of the eastern section of the Baghdad Railway.30 In November 1905, therefore, Clarke again pressed the Committee of Imperial Defence to sanction this course.31 By the time Grey studied the Baghdad Railway question “with a view to seeing . . . what the present situation was”,32 the champions of the “sectional” proposal had increased. Despite several warnings that a new British initiative was urgently required,33 Grey refused to be hurried. The delay gave his own staff an opportunity to propose a departure from Lansdowne’s policy. A series of new Foreign Office memoranda proclaimed that “Exclusive British control and construction of the Railway east of Bagdad” was the only condition which would satisfy British interests.34 Parker, in particular, conducted a detailed study of the course of railway development in Asia Minor, of the 1903 Baghdad Railway concession, of the abortive 1903 negotiations and of the influence which the line was likely to have on British trade. He was convinced by these researches that the “internationalisation” of the Baghdad Railway would not prove the course best suited to serve British interests. The Mesopotamian section of the line presented the greatest threat to British trade; it also afforded the greatest prospects for British enterprise. Therefore, the government ought to ensure that British interests obtained predominant control of this end of the line.35 O’Conor’s subsequent reports that responsible German financiers were personally amenable to a British “sectional demand”36 added immediacy to Parker’s memoranda and increased the force of his requests for haste.37 Grey’s virtual abrogation of the “sectional” proposal, in deference to Cambon’s objections,38 did not silence the domestic advocates of the scheme. Indeed, they were spurred on to further efforts and ingenuity. [55]


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Thus Parker protested that “it is a matter of much . . . import whether the Bagdad-Gulf section is under British or German control.”39 He warned that on an international board, the French and German members might combine to isolate their British colleagues.40 Hardinge and Grey maintained that even in an “international” scheme, the unity of British shares might be preserved by special arrangements.41 This suggestion elicited a change in Parker’s tactics, but did not modify his objective. He retorted that “it would obviate much friction if the line were divided for construction purposes into three sections which would be built respectively by British, French and German engineers.”42 Clarke skilfully elaborated Parker’s scheme and successfully propounded his compromise. He suggested to the Committee of Imperial Defence that the French might drop their objections to British construction and control of the Mesopotamian section of the railway if the British government agreed to the overall jurisdiction of an international board of directors.43 By July 1906 this proposal had obtained the CID’s formal approval.44 Its resolution was a significant indication of the direction in which British policy was moving. It did not, however, signify the end of the process whereby Lansdowne’s 1903 memorandum was replaced by that of May 1907. Although Grey supported the resolution,45 he apparently considered it neither binding nor final. In November 1906, he communicated Britain’s outline desiderata to the French and Russian governments. On this occasion, he stressed the possibility of international control of the railway, but did not mention the request for a British manager of the southern section.46 Moreover, the resolution did not accord with the wishes of the government of India.47 In these circumstances, Hardinge suggested that the whole question be referred to an interdepartmental committee.48 In 1907, the Baghdad Railway Committee (as this body was known) did not reverse the movement towards a “sectional” proposal. By utilising the information already at the disposal of the government, and by supplementing it with investigations of a similar nature, it confirmed the trend.

The Influence of the Government of India The appearance of administrative unity during the formulation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1903 and 1907 is deceptive. The Admiralty, War Office and Board of Trade, together with O’Conor [56]


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and his consuls, all participated with the Foreign Office in the process of policy-making. Ultimately, so too did the India Office.49 The government of India, however, exerted surprisingly little influence on the formulation of British policy. Despite India’s geographical proximity to Mesopotamia and its traditional ties with the area, the Indian administration was not allowed a voice in the formulation of British policy. Indeed, the British government ignored the public demand that “it is imperative that any policy in this district should be submitted to the judgement of the Indian Government.”50 In 1903, Chirol51 complained that the British government’s Baghdad Railway pronouncements did not quote “any statement . . . of the views of the Indian Government”.52 This criticism was equally valid in 1907. Between 1903 and 1907, the British and Indian governments held conflicting views on the possible methods of British participation in the Baghdad Railway. During this period, the British government gradually substituted a “sectional” for an “international” proposal. For its part, the government of India moved simultaneously in the opposite direction. In 1904, it had favoured a “sectional” scheme, and advised that “should the line ever be constructed south of Bagdad, this cannot be done without British co-operation and consent.”53 By 1906, however, the Indian government favoured an “international” proposal. It now suggested that since the Germans “do not intend to restrict their activities to Mesopotamia only . . ., our interests can most effectively be safeguarded by some arrangement that will enable the British Government to take part in the scheme as a whole.”54 Kumar’s explanation of the antithesis between the two Indian statements is instructive but inadequate.55 He illustrates the change in India’s policy by reference to the Military Department’s fears of a Russo-German combination in the Gulf and of renewed Russian pressure in southern Persia. Kitchener, for instance, believed that “the acquisition of a small section of the line would be of little use to us in a crisis.”56 By adopting a “sectional” proposal, the British government clearly disregarded this advice. The grounds on which it did so remain obscure. The 1907 Cabinet memorandum appears to illustrate not “the role played by the Government of India in the shaping of imperial policy”57 but that Britain’s attitude towards imperial problems should “properly be viewed through the eyes of . . . Westminster rather than the Calcutta of yesterday”.58 [57]


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The India Office was itself chiefly responsible for the exclusion of the Indian government from the formulation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. The commercial development of the region does not appear to have aroused its particular interest.59 The India Office made no comment on Smythe’s report in 1904;60 neither did it actively intervene in the controversy between the “internationalists” (led by Lansdowne) and the “sectionalists” (led by O’Conor and Clarke) in 1905.61 Ritchie’s only, and reluctant, written observation was: “We are to some extent committed by our actions at Kuwait and Bubiyan Island to the view that the rly [sic] from Baghdad to the sea is an Indian interest.”62 Morley, in 1906, was more specific in his comments on the Baghdad Railway, but even less enthusiastic about Britain’s cooperation in its construction. He feared that by participating in the line at all Britain would assume the responsibility, and cost, of protecting it.63 The India Office was also reluctant to invite the views of the government of India on the Baghdad Railway. In 1904, even Curzon had cause to complain that the subject had “never been referred to us for opinion”.64 Minto’s subsequent attempt to initiate discussion on the question during the Liberal administration65 was firmly resisted. The Baghdad Railway was but one of a series of topics on which Morley considered that the Indian government was “no better informed and less well qualified to form an opinion” than Whitehall.66 In general he considered it of “cardinal” importance “to depose the Government of India from their usurped position of an independent power”,67 and he was determined to undermine the entrenched position of the “Anglo-Indian bureaucrats”.68 The viceroy was therefore mistaken in his belief that Britain “would not be likely” to formulate a Baghdad Railway policy without consulting him.69 Indeed, Morley deliberately withheld information from Minto70 and declared that the Indian government’s “unsought counsel” on the Baghdad Railway was “thoroughly out of place”.71 He ignored Minto’s pleas that although “better means of communication have drawn many matters towards the Imperial centre”,72 the opinions of even a “subsidiary Government” merited attention.73 India’s 1906 despatch was sent to the Foreign Office only “unofficially”,74 and its government was excluded from the process of decision-making. Minto was informed that consideration of the 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee’s report was restricted initially to Morley and Grey75 and that only Asquith and Lloyd George76 had otherwise helped to draft the [58]


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May 1907 memorandum.77 Minto learned of the Cabinet’s final decision only privately and belatedly.78 His own contribution was limited to an acknowledgement that “what you tell me about the Baghdad Railway is full of interest.”79

The Drafting of the 1907 Memorandum The arguments expounded in the 1907 Cabinet memorandum were prepared by the Baghdad Railway Committee, which Maxwell,80 acting on Hardinge’s instructions, had established in November 1906.81 This committee confirmed the extent of British interests in Mesopotamia and completed the process whereby the government departed from Lansdowne’s recommendations of 1903. The committee’s membership and scope, as well as the conclusions of its report, indicated the foundations on which British policy was now based. The 1903 memorandum had been drafted by the Foreign Office on the basis of evidence principally supplied by the military departments of the government. The latter were not represented on the 1907 committee. Instead, that body’s terms of reference specifically required a study of the commercial and financial aspects of the railway scheme, and significantly assured the representation of the Board of Trade.82 Its members supplemented the evidence already available by examining eleven witnesses, commissioning several consular reports and despatching Parker to Constantinople to consult with Adam Block.83 The committee’s recommendations were to reflect the commercial nature of its criteria. Unlike Lansdowne in 1903, the 1907 committee did not suffer the embarrassment of prior commitments either to British financiers or to foreign governments. In one respect, however, it was subject to greater pressure than had been exerted upon Lansdowne. The committee’s intensive study of the prospects of the completion of the Baghdad Railway without British financial cooperation disclosed a sense of urgency. The members of the committee were indeed worried by reports that the German Baghdad Railway concessionnaires possessed sufficient capital to complete the line without British assistance. Even in 1903, Balfour had suspected that the German financiers did not require British help.84 But his claims to this effect were criticised in the press85 and doubted at the Foreign Office.86 Moreover, in 1905, Clarke had calculated that the Porte’s reluctance to grant the railway concessionnaires the promised [59]


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kilometric guarantees for the next two sections of the line had resulted in “financial deadlock”.87 Nonetheless, the successful completion of the first section of the line in November 1904 had already shaken British confidence.88 Henceforth, the Germans themselves expressed increasing faith in their ability to finance the rest of the railway independently.89 The Board of Trade observed in 1905 that the Taurus range presented the only significant, or expensive, obstacle to the German engineers. This cast further doubt on the validity of Clarke’s assumption that British capital would eventually be required.90 Sykes believed that by skilfully manipulating the kilometric guarantees the German financiers might even produce a surplus.91 By 1906, a reconsideration of the whole question seemed urgently necessary. In the first place, as Parker revealed, French financial support for the Baghdad Railway appeared to have increased.92 Secondly, the British government had failed in its attempts to ensure that the surplus revenues released by the three percent increase in the Ottoman customs duties would not be used to finance kilometric guarantees for the Baghdad line.93 The reports of German financial difficulties which emanated from Switzerland, Constantinople and Paris94 did indicate to the 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee that the Germans were experiencing temporary financial difficulties.95 They did not allay British fears of the German concessionnaires’ ultimate ability to raise the requisite capital to complete the line96 or of Turkey’s ultimate capacity to meet the kilometric guarantees for the Taurus section.97 Parker feared that the French government’s hostility to the existing Baghdad Railway concession was not shared by its overseas representatives.98 This suspicion seemed to be confirmed by reports of unofficial Franco-German discussions on financing the line.99 Grey’s warning that “unless I can give an answer soon, the French financiers may break away”100 indicates the atmosphere which determined the timing of the Cabinet’s ultimate decision. The activities of foreign financiers were not the only factors to influence the deliberations of the 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee. Its report also revealed the influence exerted on the committee by the criteria whereby the “sectionalists” had already assessed the Baghdad Railway. Significantly, the committee avoided serious consideration of either the diplomatic or strategic factors appertaining to the railway. It made no reference to the views expressed by the French and Russian ambassadors. It hoped that the two powers would be satisfied101 with [60]


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promises of a “free hand” in their own respective spheres of interest. Similarly, its members admitted that they had not studied the opinions of the War Office or of the Imperial Defence council “in detail”.102 Their specific interests were merely acknowledged by the sonorous declaration that “the possibility of the shortest route to India being exclusively under the auspices of Germany gives rise to serious anxiety.”103 The majority of evidence both sought by and presented to the Baghdad Railway Committee concerned the commercial effects of the line. This bias was influenced by the content of the consular reports prepared for the committee’s reference.104 It was illustrated by the interests of the witnesses whom the committee consulted. The lengthiest and most influential verbal testimonies were those of Sir E. Law (a former British delegate on the Council of the Administration of the Imperial Ottoman Debt),105 Huth Jackson (a governor of the Bank of England)106 and Inchcape and Mackenzie (shipping magnates with extensive interests in the Persian Gulf ).107 Even Newmarch’s evidence was devoted mainly to commercial matters.108 Admittedly, Col. W. Robertson109 did provide the committee with a summary of Germany’s supposed strategic designs in the Middle East.110 Similarly, Maunsell and Mahon111 described the military advantages which the Baghdad line would presumably afford to Turkey.112 However, the final report did not refer to these background briefings, nor did it appear to be influenced by them. The body of the committee’s eighteen-page report consisted of an estimate of the cost of constructing the Baghdad Railway and an assessment of its effect on Britain’s commercial interests. This “remarkable unanimity of evidence”113 applied as much to the geographical area under review as to the subject matter discussed. The claim that “British interests in the Baghdad scheme centre in the Mesopotamian delta” was the basis of Crow’s memorandum. It was also the corollary of his premise that British commercial interests in the region “predominate over those of every other European country”.114 Cox’s apprehension that the line would encourage the Porte “to encroach and extend” its influence in those regions115 and Ramsay’s conviction that unless Britain participated, the railway would prove “fatal to British interests and influence in Mesopotamia”116 were equally limited in geographical relevance. The verbal evidence presented to the committee substantiated the geographical bias and confirmed the consular forebodings. Newmarch prophesied that unless Britain [61]


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controlled the southern section of the railway, its trade in south-west Persia, Baghdad and Basra would “first languish and then vanish”.117 Jackson estimated that it would suffer a “disaster”,118 and Inchcape foretold that it would lose all importance.119 In the opinion of the committee, such declarations confirmed the validity of the government’s interest in Mesopotamia. They also necessitated the abrogation of Lansdowne’s Baghdad Railway proposals of 1903 and their replacement by a “sectional” scheme of British participation. The committee ignored Law’s pessimistic warning that the Germans would limit Britain’s exclusive control over the line to the area south of Basra.120 It also rejected as “inconveniently complicated” Clarke’s compromise of subordinating British construction to an international board.121 The report even implicitly disparaged Cox and Crow’s suggestion that Britain demand exclusive British management and control south of Baghdad. It agreed that within this area, efforts to “safeguard and extend” British navigation rights were desirable.122 On the railway, however, its “essential” demand was for exclusive control as far north as Mosul.123 It strongly recommended that the government encourage British financiers to subscribe to the railway within this region by itself guaranteeing them a profit of three percent on the capital invested.124 The government did not accept all the Baghdad Railway Committee’s recommendations, which were recognised to state Britain’s maximum demands. Thus Hardinge was ready to waive the insistence on British control from as far north as Mosul.125 The Cabinet, moreover, admitted that “the initiation and concession of the railway have been due to German enterprise”.126 The ultimate May 1907 memorandum nevertheless embodied the essence of the “sectional” proposal. Hardinge observed that “if the whole line were to be completely internationalised it is a foregone conclusion that it would in a few years time be entirely German.”127 The Cabinet asserted that “the commercial position of Great Britain in the Mesopotamian delta is altogether exceptional.”128 Both statements illustrated the extent to which Lansdowne’s 1903 proposal was now considered inadequate.129 The possibility that the Baghdad Railway might serve as a through route to India was no longer the only criterion by which its implications were assessed. In this context it was spoken of merely as a conveyer of “commercial correspondence”.130 By 1907, the railway’s possible effect on British commercial enterprise, both traditional and nascent, in Mesopotamia was considered to be of prime importance. [62]


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The May 1907 memorandum thus revealed the extent to which the government had laid the foundations of a new British policy towards Mesopotamia. The evolution from Lansdowne’s “international” Baghdad Railway proposal of 1903 to the “sectional” scheme adopted in 1907 was accompanied by a detailed official study of Britain’s interests in one particular region through which the railway planned to pass. The prospect of the Baghdad Railway did not, therefore, determine Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia. It was, rather, the promise of future enterprise in Mesopotamia which had dictated Britain’s attitude towards the railway. The 1907 memorandum revealed that the government’s policy was not related solely to considerations of immediate diplomatic preference or sudden strategic necessity. Neither did it accord with the wishes of the government of India. In 1903, the government had regarded the Baghdad Railway primarily as a potential strategic threat and a possible diplomatic lever. By 1907, local developments and official investigations had changed the criteria of British policy.131 The government was now anxious to exploit the future commercial development of Mesopotamia and to check the expansion of German economic competition in the region. The substitution of a “sectional” for an “international” scheme of British participation was a consequence of gradual changes in Mesopotamia and a lengthy debate in London.

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NOTES 1 29 Apr. 1903 O’Conor-Sanderson, BD 2, no. 202, pp. 174–176 and Lynch’s letter to the editor, 18 Apr. 1903, The Times, p. 13. 2 20 May 1903 Newmarch-O’Conor 239/18, FO 195/2138. 3 W.W. Palmer, 2nd Earl of Selborne, later Viscount Wolmer (1859–1942), 1st Lord of the Admiralty, 1900–1905, DNB 1959, pp. 647–650. 4 13 March 1903 Selborne-Balfour pte., Balfour MSS, Add. MSS 49707, p. 112. 5 He had to rely on maps drawn in 1749. Willcocks, The Recreation of Chaldea, p. 17. 6 Enclosure in 15 Nov. 1904 Townley-Lansdowne, FO 78/5337. 7 Rohrbach’s Die Bagdadbahn was extensively quoted in 22 July 1903 O’ConorLansdowne 415, FO 78/5322 and in Waugh’s memorandum of 31 Aug. 1903, ibid. A supposed German foreign office memo. was cited at length in 20 Oct. 1903 Chirol-Hardinge pte., ibid. 8 E.g., H. J. Wingham, The Persian Problem (London, 1903). 9 15 Nov. 1906 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 1, p. 246. 10 Capt. H. Smythe (1874–1927), later attached to I. E. F. ‘D’. 11 3 July 1903 Lansdowne-O’Conor 168, FO 78/5322. 12 Captain, later Admiral, T.W. Kemp (1860–1928). Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, 1904–1906. 13 21 July 1904 Monahan-Lansdowne 36, FO 195/2164. 14 On the origins of this work see 19 Feb. 1971 Times Literary Supplement, p. 223. The reviewer commented: “There is no modern substitute for the Gazetteer.” 15 Printed at WO in 1904, WO 33/325. 16 Enclosed in 15 Oct. 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 716 secret, FO 78/5398. 17 Capt. A. G. Bingham (1873–1933), later attached to I. E. F. ‘D’. 18 Enclosed in 23 June 1905 B of T-FO, FO 78/5449. 19 Enclosed in 18 Sep. 1907 IO-FO, FO 371/344/2821/31316. 20 Enclosed in 11 Jan. 1909 B of T-10, L/P & S/3, vol. 259, no. 2832. Grey had decided that a report on Mesopotamia was more necessary than one on Mexico (Minute on 12 Nov. 1906 B of T-FO, FO 368/132/66/997). There is a short account of Lloyd’s tour in C. F. Adam, Life of Lloyd (London, 1948). Lloyd’s own records of his trip are in the Lloyd MSS (Box 7) at Churchill College Cambridge, but are not open to public inspection. 21 10 June 1905 Crow-O’Conor 34 conf., FO 195/2188. 22 22 July 1903 O’Conor-Lansdowne 415 conf., FO 78/5322. 23 Report enclosed in 6 May 1904 WO-FO, FO 78/5449. 24 30 Dec. 1904 O’Conor-Sanderson pte., FO 78/5338. 25 26 Jan. 1905 paper 476, CAB 38/8/5. 26 The railways might be “a useful adjunct to the river navigation”. Minute on 4 Nov. 1904 WO-FO, FO 78/544.9. 27 12 Apr. 1905, 70th CID meeting, CAB 38/9/32. 28 And their extension as far as Mosul, 23 June 1905 memo., para. 27, FO 78/5449. 29 Ibid. To this end he was prepared to advise British financiers to contribute £21⁄2 million towards the cost of the western sections, over which they would have no control (para. 33). [64]


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30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

4 Aug. 1905 Clarke-Sanderson pte., BD 6, no. 217, pp. 331–334. 1 Nov. 1905 paper 676, CAB 38/10/77. 6 April 1906 Grey-Bertie 205, BD 6, no. 222, pp. 336–337. E.g., Fitzmaurice minute on 30 Jan. 1906 Block-Hardinge pte; FO 371/142/ 1410/4406; 22 Feb. 1906 O’Conor-Grey pte; and Grey MSS vol. 40, FO 800/79. 12 March 1906 Parker memoranda, FO 371/148/8750/8750. Parker’s revised memo. Although dated 10th March, it was not completed until later. FO 371/148/104.01/10680. E.g., 12 April 1906 O’Conor-Grey 249 conf., FO 371/148/10401/13649 and 14 May 1906 O’Conor-Grey v. conf., FO 371/148/10401/16252. Parker minute on 16 April 1906 O’Conor-Grey 257 conf., FO 371/150/ 13657/13657. Above, p. 47, no. 24. 26 May 1906 minute, FO 371/148/10401/18044. 31 May 1906 Parker-Hardinge pte., FO 371/148/10401/18840. Hardinge claimed that this was the procedure adopted in the Morocco State Bank, and Grey cited the example of the Suez Canal Company. Minutes, ibid. 6 June 1906 memo., FO 371/148/10401/19434. 14 June 1906 paper 776, CAB 38/12/46. 26 July 1906 92nd CID meeting, CAB 38/11/29. Ibid. 8 Nov. 1906 Grey-Bertie 621, BD 6, no. 238, p. 348 and 27 Nov. 1906 memo. to Izwolsky. In the latter case, the original draft mention of the British manager was minuted by Grey: “Omit this last for the present.” BD 6, no. 241, p. 350, note 3. See below, pp. 56–58. Minute on 7 Nov. 1906 Nicolson-Grey tel. 290 and BD 6, no. 237, p. 348. See Parker’s minute to this effect on 7 Nov. 1906 Nicolson-Grey tel. 290, FO 371/148/10401/37536. 11 Apr. 1903 “Notes of the Week”, Saturday Review, vol. 90, p. 442. Sir V. Chirol (1852–1929), director of the foreign dept. of The Times, 1896–1912; he was a frequent visitor to India and conducted a regular correspondence with Hardinge. DNB (1937), pp. 182–184. Sir V. Chiral, The Middle Eastern Question, or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence (London, 1903), p. 223. 4 Feb. 1904 G of I-IO, quoted in CAB 38/4/10, no. 7, p. 1. 12 July 1906 G of I-IO 98, L/P & S/10, vol. 56, file 2764. Kumar, India and the Persian Gulf. See memoranda by Malleson (27 Apr. 1906), Mulally (1 May 1906) and Kitchener (11 May 1906), quoted in ibid., pp. 183–185. Ibid., “preface”, p. i. J. F. Standish, in a review of Kumar’s book, Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3 (Apr. 1968), p. 323. Indicated by the lack of minutes to the reports on navigation, irrigation and petroleum developments in this period. It was seen by the Under-Secretary of State and Secretary of State. Minutes on 24 May 1904 FO-IO, L/P & S/3, vol. 221, no. 2701. [65]


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61 E.g., minutes on 21 Aug. 1905 FO-IO, L/P & S/3, vol. 230 no. 3288 and on 6 Oct. 1905 FO-IO, L/P & S/3, vol. 231, no. 3479. 62 Minute on 27 June 1905 Grierson-Sanderson, L/P & S/10, Vol. 87, no. 1905/3131. 63 6 Aug. 1906 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 1, p. 166. 64 13 Feb. 1904 G of I-IO, above p. 84 number 53. Moreover, as late as May 1904, the G of I had not received an authentic copy of the 1903 Baghdad Railway Convention. 18 May 1904 Dane-Ritchie, L/P & S/10, Vol. 56, no. 1904/1046. 65 E.g., 2 May 1906 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 8, p. 35. 66 4 July 1906, entry in Hirtzel’s political diary, IO Records, Home Miscellaneous Series (microfilm), reel 740. 67 S. A. Wolpert, Morley and India, 1906–1910 (Los Angeles, 1967), p. 42. 68 S. E. Koss, John Morley at the India Office, 1905–1910 (Yale, 1969), p. 95. 69 12 July 1906 G of I-IO 98 secret, L/P & S/10, vol. 56. 70 E.g., minute on 11 May 1906 Grey-Spring Rice tel 85, ibid. 71 3 Aug. 1906 minute on G of I-IO 98 secret, above, no. 69. 72 4 Oct. 1906 Minto-Morley pte, Morley MSS, 9, p. 72. 73 25 July 1906 Minto-Morley pte., ibid., p. 6. 74 Parker minute on 12 Oct. 1907 IO-FO, FO 371/340/12/3843. 75 15 Nov. 1906 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 1, p. 246; also quoted, with some omissions, in Viscount Morley, Recollections, vol. 2 (London, 1917), p. 191. 76 D. Lloyd George, later 1st Earl of Dwyfor (1863–1945), Pres., B of T, 1905–1908, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908–1916, DNB (1959), pp. 515–529. 77 31 May 1907 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 2, p. 120. 78 30 Aug. 1907 Ritchie-Dane, L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (ii), no. 1907/1444. 79 18 June 1907 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 12, p. 15 80 R. P. Maxwell (1853–1928), senior clerk, FO, 1900–1913. 81 26 March 1907, Report of the inter-departmental Committee on the Bagdad Railway, CAB 37/87/36. A full statement of the evidence presented to the committee is in FO 371/340/12/9865. 82 24 Nov. 1906 Maxwell memo., FO 371/148/10401/34946. The report was signed by W. H. Clark (B of T), Maxwell (FO), Parker (FO), Ritchie (IO) and Tyrrell (FO). 83 A. Block (1856–1941), British representative on the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, and an authority on Turkish finances. 84 8 Apr. 1903, PD 4, 120, 1903, cols. 1364–1375. 85 E.g., 18 Apr. 1903 Economist, vol. 61 (1), pp. 603–604, and 14 Apr. 1903, The Times, p. 7. Both reports were based on articles in the Russian Novoe Vremya. 86 24 Apr. 1903, Lascelles memo., Lascelles MSS, FO 800/15 and 22 Apr. 1903 Cranborne-Bertie pte., Bertie MSS, “A”, 16, FO 800/174. 87 26 Jan. 1905 CID paper 476, CAB 38/8/5. 88 Kumar, India and the Persian Gulf, p. 179. 89 See Gertrude Bell’s account of her conversation with members of the Baghdad Railway Company in 1905, quoted in Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, vol. 1, p. 229. 90 10 June 1905 L. L. Smith memo., FO 78/5449. 91 The surplus receipts of one Turkish railway could be used to finance the guarantees for others. Memo. enclosed in 20 March 1906 O’Conor-Grey 187, FO 371/ 148/7716/10401. [66]


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92 16 June 1906 Parker memo., FO 371/143/1410/28633. 93 Hardinge blamed this failure on the French delegate to the Ottoman Debt Commission’s desire to foster a “Franco-German consortium”. Minute on 7 Dec. 1906 Barclay-Grey te1. 216, FO 371/144/1410/41207. See also W. D. David, “European Diplomacy in the Near Eastern Question, 1906–1909”, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 20–44. 94 17 Dec. 1906, Evidence of Sir H. Angst (Consul General Zurich), Evidence, p. 8; 12 Dec. 1906 Barclay-Grey 802 secret, FO 371/148/10401/42093; and 7 Feb. 1907 Tyrrell-Bertie pte, Bertie MSS, “B”, FO 800/185, no. 07/24 respectively. 95 Report, p. 2. 96 British opposition would not delay the Germans “by more than 10 years”, Report, p. 9. 97 Report, p. 11, section 5. 98 20 Feb. 1907 Parker memo., Evidence, p. 29. 99 E.g., 20 Dec. 1906 Barclay-Grey 527 conf., FO 371/148/10401/42680, and 21 March 1907 Cambon memo., FO 371/340/12/9248. 100 9 April 1907 Grey-Asquity pte, Grey MSS, 62, FO 800/101. 101 Report, p. 2. 102 Report, p. 14. 103 Report, p. 14. 104 8 Jan. 1907 Crow-Barclay 1 secret; 8 Jan. 1907 Cox-Crow, and 9 Jan. 1907 Ramsay-Barclay, all enclosed in 6 Feb. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 83 secret, FO 371/340/12/4582; quoted in Report, pp. 14–15. 105 Sir E. F. Law (1846–1908). 106 F. Huth Jackson (1863–1921). 107 Sir J. L. Mackay, 1st Earl Inchcape (1852–1932), member of the Indian Council, 1897–1911, and chairman of the Peninsular and Orient and the British India Steam Navigation companies. DNB (1949). 108 12 Dec. 1906, Evidence, p. 6. 109 W. R. (later Field Marshal) Robertson (1860–1933), in 1907 head of foreign intelligence at WO, DNB (1949), pp. 738–743. 110 30 Jan. 1907, Evidence, p. 14. 111 E. E. Mahon (1851–1912), Inspector General of Fleets, 1903–1912. 112 19 Dec. 1906, Evidence, p. 8. 113 Noted by the Report, p. 13. 114 8 Jan. 1907 Crow-Barclay 1 secret, FO 371/340/12/4582. 115 8 Jan.1907 Cox-Barclay, ibid. 116 9 Jan.1907 Ramsay-Barclay, ibid. 117 12 Dec. 1906, Evidence, p. 6. 118 23 Jan. 1907, ibid., p. 12. 119 13 Feb. 1907, ibid., pp. 15–16. 120 5 Dec. 1906, ibid., p. 4. 121 Report, p. 17. 122 Ibid., p. 14. 123 Ibid., p. 2. It added that “such control cannot be obtained under any system of internationalisation”. 124 This method was known as the “Indian system”. Until the profits of the line reached three percent per annum the government (or the British and Indian [67]


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125 126 127 128 129

130 131

governments if the latter would agree to carry part of the burden) would be committed to an annual outlay of £180,000. When profits exceeded three percent, they would be shared by the government and the financiers. The details of the scheme were explained in the Report (p. 2) and in 17 May 1907 Inchcape-Grey pte, Grey MSS, 62, FO 800/ 101; and 22 May 1907 Grey-Asquith pte, ibid. 7 April 1907, minute on the Report, FO 371/340/12/11954. The final Cabinet memo. spoke only of control “from a point north of Bagdad.” 31 May 1907, FO 371/340/12/17743. Ibid. 7 Apr. 1907, minute, FO 371/340/12/11954. 31 May 1907 memorandum, FO 371/340/12/17743. The Cabinet’s willingness to supply a guarantee “to enable the necessary British capital to be raised for that part of the railway in regard to which their control would cover their responsibility” (ibid.) was not in itself revolutionary. As early as 1902 Lansdowne had noted that “the acquisition and retention by the British Government of a certain number of shares seems to be the only mode of securing for this country a permanent share in the control of the railway.” (Minute on 10 Apr. 1902 O’Conor-Lansdowne 173, BD 2, no. 205, p. 179). Parker had also claimed that “HMG cannot remain indifferent to the scheme in deference to a hard and fast theoretical axiom that a Government should not interfere in commercial transactions.” (26 May 1906 minute, FO 371/148/10401/18044). Grey too suggested that “the Government should treat the undertaking in a similar manner to the Suez Canal, and take up the necessary shares.” (26 July 1906, 92nd CID meeting, CAB 38/12/46). 31 May 1907 FO departmental memo., FO 371/340/12/17749. In terms used by political scientists, both the “environmental” and the “psychological” conditions had changed. J. Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making (London, 1963), p. 71.

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PA RT T W O

T HE I MPLEMENTATION OF P OLICY, 1907–1910


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INTRODUCTION

Grey’s despatch to Lowther of 20 April 19101 indicated that British interests in Mesopotamia had intensified and expanded since 1907. It revealed the government’s intention to implement the policy whose foundations had been laid in the 1907 Cabinet memorandum. The two documents, however, contrasted in form and conflicted in aim. First, the 1910 despatch abandoned the conditional desire for future British control over the southern end of the German Baghdad Railway and replaced it with an unqualified demand for the immediate construction of a British line between Baghdad and Basra. While the Germans planned to connect the two towns by way of the Euphrates valley, the British railway was to follow the course of the river Tigris. Second, the 1910 despatch omitted all reference to France and Russia, the two powers whose agreement had in 1907 been a prerequisite of an Anglo-German Baghdad Railway arrangement. The despatch was addressed solely to the Ottoman government, and did not repeat the 1907 acknowledgement of Germany’s position as the original concessionnaire country. The editors of British Documents on the Origins of the First World War have attempted to explain the change in Britain’s Mesopotamian policy by reference to the international diplomatic scene. They place the 1910 despatch within the context of a lengthy Anglo-German debate concerning the form which the Baghdad Railway discussions were to take. According to this account, the British government calculated that repeated demonstrations of Anglo-Franco-Russian unity on the Baghdad Railway issue would strengthen the triple entente in Europe.2 The Foreign Office, therefore, insisted on negotiations à quatre. The German government, however, wished to drive a wedge between its European rivals. It therefore linked the settlement of the Baghdad Railway with a solution to extraneous political questions, and consequently insisted on negotiations à deux. The British position was initially enunciated to the kaiser during his visit to Windsor in November 1907.3 The German response was finally articulated during the Gwinner–Cassel pourparlers [71]


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in 1909 and 1910.4 Britain’s subsequent Tigris valley railway demand, therefore, was merely an ingenious tactic designed to break a diplomatic deadlock. It represented a stage in the history of the diplomacy of the Baghdad Railway but not a significant expression of British interest in Mesopotamia. Gooch and Temperley’s account in British Documents reflects their own interests,5 and seems to distort those of the British government. Grey certainly formulated the Tigris valley railway demand within the context of the Baghdad Railway negotiations; but he did not thereby divorce it from that of other projects whereby Britain planned to exploit the development of southern Mesopotamia. Although his principal concern was to strengthen Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian ties, he was also aware of the local requirements of Britain’s Mesopotamian position.6 When the government assessed the relative merits of the Euphrates and Tigris railway alignments, it paid more attention to the local interests each would serve than to the Eurocentric advantages each might produce. The study of Mesopotamian railways demanded as much knowledge of the local irrigation, petroleum and navigation resources as of contemporary European diplomacy. The objectives which the British government sought to gain by the Tigris valley railway demand were as parochial as the criteria by which it was assessed. The British demand of 1910 differed significantly from that expounded in the 1907 Cabinet memorandum. The latter had been an essentially defensive document, inspired by fear of the Baghdad Railway and its effect on British interests in Mesopotamia. The 1910 despatch, by contrast, embodied a “forward” proposal: the tone of the despatch was abrupt and its meaning was unequivocal. It indicated that the British government was not primarily interested in the diplomatic advantages which would accrue from a successful Baghdad Railway agreement between Britain, Germany, France and Russia. What it really wanted was international recognition of Britain’s right to an exclusive economic sphere of influence in Mesopotamia.

[72]


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INTRODUCTION

NOTES 1 20 Apr. 1910 Grey-Lowther 107 secret, BD 6, no. 352, pp. 468–472. 2 During this period Nicolson was reprimanded for using the phrase “triple entente” (30 Apr. 1909 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS 1909, FO 800/342, p. 104). But the term often aptly described the relationship between the three powers. 3 Described in Sir E. Lee, King Edward VII, vol. 2, “The Reign” (London, 1927), pp. 555–561 and Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 83. 4 Described in BD, vol. 6, ch. 46, pt. 2. 5 Earle’s earlier account had stressed that the Tigris valley railway demand was made “in order that British economic interests in Mesopotamia might be defended”. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, p. 277. 6 Grey’s latest biographer has complained that “excessive concentration on the major crises of European history has led commentators to neglect the fact that Sir Edward presided over ‘the Imperial FO’.” K. Robbins, Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon (London, 1971), p. 172.

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4 The Criteria of Decision-Making

The Relevance of Diplomatic Considerations The pattern of European diplomatic alignments did not affect the content of the Tigris valley railway demand. The diplomatic negotiations which preceded the April 1910 despatch neither enlarged its international context nor expanded its Eurocentric implications. They merely helped to influence its tone and to determine its timing. For much of the period between 1907 and 1910, Grey did hope to utilise the international Baghdad Railway discussions as a means of improving Britain’s relations with Germany, strengthening its ties with France and Russia and demonstrating its friendship for Turkey. The 1910 despatch represents a departure from that course. The British government demanded the Tigris valley railway concession despite German opposition, Franco-Russian displeasure and Turkish dissent. The demand indicated the government’s refusal to submit its Mesopotamian ambitions to a set pattern of European requirements. The Tigris valley demand was inconsistent with Grey’s declared policy of preserving the unity of the entente during the Baghdad Railway discussions. It must, therefore, qualify Chapman’s claim that Grey persistently, and with integrity, adhered to the à quatre principle.1 Grey respected the framework of the undertaking when refusing to sacrifice his French and Russian friends for any Mesopotamian “mess of pottage”2 which the Germans might proffer. He impaired its spirit, however, by authorising a despatch which demanded the satisfaction of Britain’s independent ambitions. The Tigris valley railway demand was designed to secure Britain’s Mesopotamian interests rather than its European friendships. Some measure of unilateralism had long been inherent in the logic of Britain’s Baghdad Railway policy. During the domestic discussions, which had focused British attention on the southern end of the Baghdad Railway, British officials had neither consistently, nor unanimously, [75]


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advocated the à quatre position. In 1905, O’Conor3 and Clarke,4 and in 1907, Fitzmaurice5 and the Baghdad Railway Committee,6 had all hinted that Britain should independently seek to satisfy its Mesopotamian demands. In return, France and Russia might be accorded a “free hand” in their own respective spheres of interest. Grey had not, therefore, accurately reflected the trend of British thinking when, in 1907, he hastily assured Cambon that Britain would not desert the à quatre front.7 Neither did the French government find this assurance satisfactory. On the eve of the kaiser’s visit to Windsor, Pichon8 felt it necessary to repeat that the British Cabinet memorandum “would render impossible any agreement between the Powers . . . The proper means of bringing into harmony all the rights and interests involved would be to endeavour to find some formula as to the internationalisation of the line.”9 By 1909, such warnings were even more justified. At Windsor, Haldane10 had, admittedly, insisted on discussions à quatre.11 In 1908, this principle was reiterated by Hardinge to Block,12 and in 1909 by Grey to Cambon.13 However, the records of the foreign secretary’s conversation with Metternich in October 1909 mark a turning point. On that occasion, Grey substituted excuses for imperatives. He admitted to the German ambassador, and reminded his own staff, that “French financiers already had an interest in the project before I came into office.” He had also “told the Russian government more than once that they ought not to oppose, in principle, the construction of the Baghdad Railway but ought, instead, to make up their minds as to the terms on which they could join in the project.”14 The Gwinner–Cassel negotiations that immediately followed provided an even more concrete illustration of his change of attitude. The British decision to sanction bilateral financial discussions was inconsistent with the 1907 proposal to postpone such talks until after a quadrilateral diplomatic exchange.15 Moreover, official records and private correspondence belie Haldane’s subsequent claim that “Sir Edward Grey kept France and Russia informed of all we did.”16 One month elapsed before Cambon was informed of either the conversation with Metternich, or Gwinner’s approaches.17 By that time, French protests were as useless as they were vociferous.18 Grey was even more reluctant to reveal his policy to the Russians. He deferred action on Mallet’s minuted suggestion that Izwolsky be informed of the German overtures19 until after the Russian foreign minister had himself asked Nicolson to explain their meaning.20 Even [76]


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THE CRITERIA OF DECISION-MAKING

then, Grey’s official despatch was reserved. It stressed that British control of the Baghdad Railway in southern Mesopotamia was an imperial necessity, but omitted to state whether the principle of à quatre discussions was a British diplomatic requirement.21 Grey deplored, but was unable to refute, Izwolsky’s subsequent charge of ill faith.22 He resorted to the argument that whatever the Russian and British governments might wish, the Germans had a free hand. “What we have to do now is to protect ourselves . . . by making . . . some stipulation about the Railway. Russia is at liberty to make a similar stipulation.”23 The Russians too had no choice but to capitulate. Grey’s awareness of the European implications of his actions in no way affected his April 1910 despatch to Lowther. He refused to be deflected by Lindsay’s24 fear that the Tigris valley demand might throw Russia into Germany’s arms25 or by Mallet’s warning that if Britain did not “keep strictly” to the à quatre promise, “we shall be the losers and our ententes with France and Russia might suffer.”26 Nicolson explicitly (but reluctantly) admitted the change in British policy to Izwolsky.27 Mallet resignedly (but pointedly) made the same observation to Grey.28 But the latter made no comment. His April 1910 despatch to Lowther itself proclaimed his refusal to force Britain’s Mesopotamian policy into the mould of European alignments.29 In the brief interlude between the Balkan troubles of 1909 and the Agadir crisis of 1911, and at a time when Anglo-French military conversations were languishing through lack of urgency,30 he felt no compulsion to act otherwise. Grey’s Tigris valley railway demand did not, however, indicate that he was prepared to desert France and Russia for Germany. The apparent consistency of British attempts to employ the Baghdad Railway in the service of Anglo-German amity in this period is deceptive. By April 1910, all efforts towards this end had been frustrated. Fitzmaurice’s suggestion that after Windsor, the British government treat the Baghdad Railway “as part of a far larger question”,31 had indeed been implemented during the early Anglo-German Baghdad Railway conversations. In 1909, Grey told Goschen32 that he had raised the subject with Metternich because he thought it might generally help to “clear the air”.33 In 1910, he thought that it might provide “the key to smooth relations” between the two countries.34 His object was to keep open a line to Berlin. As Hardinge calculated, “Since there is no question at present . . . of any naval agreement, the situation between England and Germany might [77]


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be considerably eased by some agreement connected with the Baghdad Railway.”35 The Tigris valley railway demand was in fact evidence of a departure from this pattern. It ignored the German concession, and thus demonstrated the extent to which the British government was already disillusioned by Germany’s evident determination to derive exclusive political profit from the Baghdad Railway overtures. The Anglo-German dialogue on the question had never been wholly harmonious, and the kaiser’s 1907 promise to consider the conduct of negotiations à quatre36 was an aberration on his part. As early as 1908, Metternich had insisted on restricting the consultations to a conference à deux.37 Subsequent German communications persistently attached a substantial political quid pro quo to a Baghdad Railway agreement. Thus the 1909–1910 Gwinner–Cassel negotiations were stifled, and Grey’s 1910 overture was blunted, by von Schoen’s38 insistence that the success of both was dependent on a formal Anglo-German political arrangement.39 The British regarded the Baghdad Railway discussions merely as a barometer of Anglo-German feeling.40 Germany, however, evidently wished to use them as the stepping stone towards an Anglo-German alliance which would leave it “practically mistress of Europe”.41 By April 1910, this difference of purpose had completely removed the Mesopotamian railways question from the agenda of Anglo-German negotiations. Grey had decided that although Anglo-German relations might be influenced by the Baghdad Railway discussions, they would ultimately be determined by naval conversations.42 A naval agreement was the only price which might have made a political arrangement acceptable.43 Germany’s attempt to place a Baghdad Railway agreement within the context of an Anglo-German alliance in the spring of 1910 saddened Hardinge44 and angered Mallet.45 To Grey it revealed the futility of continuing Anglo-German discussions on the railway. The renewed British Mesopotamian offensive of April 1910 was thus totally divorced from an Anglo-German context. Britain’s Tigris valley railway demand was neither related to, nor influenced by, the ultimate possibility of an understanding with Germany. It even accepted, although of course it did not invite, the possibility of Anglo-German friction. The relevance of the needs of Anglo-Turkish friendship to the content of the April 1910 despatch is equally slender. The apparent rejuvenation of Turkey in 1908 did not retard the formulation of British [78]


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policy towards Mesopotamia.46 Neither did it restrain the formulation of Britain’s desiderata concerning the Baghdad Railway. The Tigris valley railway demand belies Hardinge’s earlier acknowledgement that the Young Turk revolution had made it necessary to “consult the Turkish Government and obtain their consent” to any proposed Mesopotamian railway arrangement.47 The demand merely retained the appearance of this requirement, but abjured its substance. The suspicion with which the Young Turks were initially reported to have regarded Germany promised commensurate Baghdad Railway advantages to Britain. Almost as soon as Hardinge heard the news of the revolution, he expressed the hope that a revival of British influence at Constantinople would induce the Germans to be more amenable about the Baghdad Railway.48 Mallet soon forecast that Turkish opposition to the 1903 convention might force the Germans “to beg us and France and Russia to participate” in the line.49 By September 1908, Parker trusted that “the new regime in Turkey is based on rigid economy.” It would therefore welcome British suggestions as to the manner in which the Porte might refuse to honour its agreement to finance the German line.50 Although the change at Constantinople excited British sympathies,51 it did not affect the objectives of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. The omission of any mention of the Porte in the 1907 memorandum had reflected the government’s feeling that Britain was “not indifferent, but powerless” at Constantinople.52 The despatch of the 1910 Tigris valley railway demand to the Turkish government indicated the confidence felt by London. The change was discernible as early as September 1908, when Lowther was instructed to inform the new regime that Britain opposed the system of kilometric guarantees.53 It was confirmed in 1909, when the Turks requested British consent to a further increase (this time of four percent) in their customs dues.54 On the latter occasion, Britain recognised the diplomatic disadvantages of ignoring Turkey’s potential contribution to the European balance of power55 but deemed them subsidiary. The Foreign Office, especially, considered the possible danger of a diplomatic setback in Europe less important than the attainment of immediate and tangible advantages in Mesopotamia. The most vital issue raised by the Turkish request was the connection between the revenues of the Ottoman customs and the finances of the German Baghdad Railway. In January 1909, Hardinge was alarmed lest the German recipients of the kilometric guarantees might benefit from [79]


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an increase in the Turkish customs.56 In February, Grey announced that the British government would have to “make a stand” on the issue.57 When, in May 1909, the Turks presented a formal request for the customs increase, Mallet advised the government to broaden its reply. He suggested that Britain make its consent to the customs increase conditional on the satisfaction of its Mesopotamian railway demands.58 The senior staff at the Foreign Office ultimately accepted Mallet’s suggestion. In so doing, however, they deliberately rejected the opinions of those advisers to whom the proposed British reply was referred for comment. From Constantinople, Lowther and Block warned Hardinge that any British attempt to profit from the Porte’s financial straits would offend Turkish national susceptibilities.59 In London, a specially constituted interdepartmental Mesopotamian railways committee likewise feared a resurgence of popular and official Turkish anglophobia.60 The committee did not dispute the desirability of a British railway in Mesopotamia. But its report suggested that the government keep the question separate from that of a Turkish customs increase.61 Although the Foreign Office representatives signed the report, their recommendations were opposed by the most senior officials in their own department. Hardinge insisted that the suggested course would result in a “hopeless dilemma”.62 He impressed upon Lowther that “once we have given our consent to the increase in the customs duties, we shall have no other lever in our hands.”63 Grey was equally obdurate. He decreed that despite the committee’s findings, “We shall have to make a stand about the Baghdad Railway and resist any increase in the customs till we get our way.”64 The April 1910 despatch to Lowther disregarded the consequences of Turkish displeasure to Britain’s international position. Instead, it emphasised “that His Majesty’s Government will in no circumstances agree to the desired increase of the customs duties until the Ottoman Government show a disposition to meet their wishes with regard to this, i.e. the Tigris valley railway concession.”65 The difference in content between the 1907 memorandum and the 1910 despatch, therefore, cannot be explained solely by the diplomacy of the Baghdad Railway. As will be seen, the diplomatic negotiations which Britain conducted with Germany, France, Russia and Turkey indicated the extent of Britain’s local ambitions and ignored the exigencies of its European situation. German intransigence provided an excuse for an independent British manoeuvre; Turkey’s poverty presented an [80]


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opportunity for a specific British demand; and the comparative peace of Europe permitted British freedom of action. But the particular timing and specific content of the Tigris valley railway demand were dictated by local factors. The fear that Germany might finally obtain the finances to complete its Baghdad Railway project66 hastened the British demand. The hope that Britain might ultimately establish its Mesopotamian position determined the British proposals.

The Alternative Routes The April 1910 despatch specifically demanded that railway lines in Mesopotamia should be under British control. It also stipulated that those lines should follow the route of the Tigris river.67 The latter requirement was as significant as the former. Excessive concentration on the diplomacy of the Baghdad Railway has exaggerated the British government’s determination to obstruct the German concession throughout Asiatic Turkey. Conversely, neglect of the detail of the Tigris valley railway demand has obscured the desire of Britain to construct railways to further its interests in Mesopotamia. The process of debate whereby the Tigris valley railway demand was formulated has thereby been concealed. Between June 1907 and April 1910, the British government had considered the effect which three other railway routes would have on Britain’s interests in Mesopotamia. The first was the original German proposal to link Baghdad and Basra by the Euphrates valley. The second was a line between Mohammera, at the head of the Persian Gulf, and Khurramabad, in western Persia. The third (the “Willcocks scheme”) was a connection between Baghdad and the Mediterranean via Hit and Homs in Syria rather than the north-westerly route chosen for the Baghdad Railway.68 The 1910 despatch implicitly rejected each of these three routes, expressing a specific preference for a link between Baghdad and Basra along the Tigris.69 The criteria for this choice reveal the nature of the ambitions which the concession was designed to fulfil. At one level, the British government’s opposition before April 1910 to the proposed tracé of the Baghdad Railway appears insincere and unreal. The German plan for a Euphrates valley connection between Baghdad and Basra possessed the attraction, and the advantage, of having already been accepted by the Turkish government. The various alternative British railway proposals, therefore, seemed designed merely [81]


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to frighten the Baghdad Railway concessionnaires into transferring the southern section of their line to British control. In 1908, Hardinge, in particular, believed that the threat of a future Persian railway would serve this purpose. He maintained that Britain’s “only hope” was to exert pressure on the Persian government to grant the Mohammera concession:70 the publication of Britain’s intention to build such a line would force the Germans “to bring us in” to the Baghdad Railway on satisfactory terms.71 In 1909, Mallet saw the Willcocks scheme in the same light. The threat of a rival concession running to the Mediterranean would place Britain “in a magnificent position for negotiation with Germany”.72 On the other hand, official support for this scheme would prove “the best way to induce the Germans to come to terms with us”.73 The decision to seek a concession for the Tigris valley railway seems to complement this pattern. In April 1910, Parker forecast that Turkish agreement to the British proposal would force the Germans to “alter their present conception of British participation in the Baghdad Railway”.74 This apparent consistency of motive is deceptive. The Mohammera line, the Willcocks scheme and the Tigris valley railway each possessed merits other than a common diplomatic function. The ultimate choice of the Tigris valley route was the result of a lengthy study which bears little relation to the fortunes of the Baghdad Railway negotiations. Grey had anticipated the trend of Britain’s railway policy in June 1906. He then suggested that the Baghdad Railway be aligned in accordance with commercial rather than, as the original concession planned, strategic requirements.75 Maunsell’s suggestion, in 1907, that the German railway be diverted to exploit the petroleum resources of Mosul had indicated a similar ambition.76 Mallet, in the same year, pointed out that according to some opinions, the Baghdad Railway concession did not confer upon Germany exclusive railway privileges between all points on the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.77 The intensity with which the British government subsequently studied alternative railway routes owed much to this attitude of mind. Each route was assessed on the basis of its economic potential. The studies were not occasioned by temporary diplomatic landscapes, and neither did they represent a search for momentary strategic benefits. The criteria which had been applied to the original Baghdad Railway concession before 1907 were related, with equal consistency, to its various competitors before 1910. [82]


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The Mohammera railway was designed to tap the trade with western Persia; this traditionally travelled by way of southern Mesopotamia, and its entrepot was Baghdad. This trade was increasing in volume:78 it accounted for over half the commercial traffic of Baghdad79 and it consisted mainly of British and Indian goods.80 The knowledge that the Baghdad Railway would inflict considerable damage on British control of this route stimulated the government’s attempts to divert the course of trade to southern Persia. Originally, southern Persian railways were seen mainly as defensive schemes: they were designed to soften the blows to be inflicted by the Baghdad Railway on British trade. Soon after the signature of the 1903 Turco-German convention, Percy had stressed the need to combat the German threat by “getting the refusal of any railway” in Persia.81 In 1907, Cox forcefully, and Morley tentatively, also suggested to the government of India that “the possibility of the Baghdad Railway being constructed without our participation clearly enhances the potential importance to us of the alternative trade routes into south-west Persia via the Karun river.”82 Interest in such schemes, however, was still spasmodic. In 1907, official investigation was restricted primarily to Mesopotamia itself. Concentration on the southern section of the Baghdad Railway, an unwillingness to consider enterprises in the disturbed area of Luristan83 and the novelty of the Anglo-Russian convention on Persia combined to produce an impression that the construction of railways in southern Persia was a distant prospect.84 The relevance of Persian railways to British interests in Mesopotamia was investigated by an imperial defence subcommittee in the spring of 1908.85 This study indicated the value of a Mohammera project. The evidence presented to the committee by Dane,86 Lynch,87 Douglas88 and Yate89 was conflicting with regard to the exact alignment desirable for a railway north from Mohammera.90 But their testimony was unanimous in stressing the commercial advantages which such a line would confer on British trade.91 The scheme promised not merely to challenge the Baghdad Railway but to render the German concession completely innocuous south of Baghdad. As early as April 1908, Hardinge confided to Nicolson that the committee had “quite decided on the project”. He was personally convinced that a Mohammera line “would entirely cut out the Baghdad Railway”.92 In February 1909, a full meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence also accepted the subcommittee’s [83]


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report that independent British lines in southern Persia would “obviate the danger . . . of a railway under foreign control” in the western regions of the Persian Gulf.93 The committee thus transformed the original character of the Mohammera scheme; it had now become an aggressive, not a defensive, design. The government had, nonetheless, preserved the purpose of the project. Because the Baghdad Railway presented primarily a commercial threat, it was to be neutralised by a line which possessed primarily commercial value. The Willcocks scheme aroused the government’s interest for similar reasons. Willcocks himself was neither the first advocate, nor the original apostle, of the establishment of communications between the Mediterranean and Baghdad by way of the Euphrates. The novelty of his proposal lay in the criteria by which the British government judged it. During the nineteenth century, official studies of substantially similar Euphrates valley schemes had been dominated by considerations of military strategy and political geography. Chesney’s scheme in 1834, Andrew’s plan in 1856 and the Duke of Sutherland’s project in 1878 had all carried weight with the government of their day chiefly because they promised to curb the territorial aggrandisement of Russia and to limit the political influence of France. Mehemet Ali’s incursions into Syria were the key to an understanding of Palmerston’s sympathy for the first proposal;94 the Crimean war and the opening of the Suez Canal dominated discussions of the second;95 and the strategic background to the Cyprus convention illuminated the third.96 “Omitted from discussion at this time was the economic angle of later policy in Asia Minor.”97 The Willcocks scheme too was evolved at a time when German designs in the Middle East were arousing political and strategic concern. British support for the project in 1909, however, was based on wholly commercial criteria. Willcocks himself denied that his proposed railway was designed to implement British political ambitions in Mesopotamia. He told Gorst98 that he regarded “England’s entangling herself on the mainland in Mesopotamia as an imitation of the Russians entangling themselves in Manchuria”.99 His premise was the need for railways to exploit the future commercial wealth which the irrigation works would bring to Mesopotamia. His object was to draw Mesopotamian goods westwards to the Mediterranean and thus to the large European market. In a private letter to Graham100 in February 1909 and in a public lecture to [84]


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the Royal Geographical Society in May, he emphasised that the main attraction of a railway from Baghdad to Alexandretta (now Iskenderun) was its commercial potential.101 The initial official response to Willcocks’ scheme was based on similar criteria. In January 1909, before Willcocks had notified the government of his plans, the Foreign Office had deliberately refused to countenance a similar scheme. It rejected Sir C. Campbell’s request that Britain support a line from Tripoli to Homs.102 Instead, it heeded Lowther’s warning that this railway offered insufficient commercial advantages to offset the diplomatic inconvenience of German antagonism, which it would undoubtedly arouse.103 The Willcocks scheme was likewise planned to undercut the Baghdad Railway concession. In this case, however, the apparently unassailable commercial arguments in its favour compensated for the opposition which it would encounter from the German government. In a lengthy memorandum from Baghdad in June 1909, Ramsay emphasised that the irrigation of Mesopotamia was “the remedy for the impoverished state of the Turkish treasury”. Yet the success of the irrigation scheme depended upon markets for the crops which it would produce. The consequent need for speedy access to Europe thus rendered the construction of a railway to the Mediterranean by the shortest (i.e. the Willcocks) route “absolutely essential to the success of any large irrigation projects”.104 Lowther, while disagreeing with Willcocks and Ramsay on points of detail, did not dispute that the line was an attractive commercial proposition. Indeed, he noted that British interests in the Willcocks scheme were likely to prove of such dimensions that “it would be worthwhile carefully to examine whether the prospects of such a railway are not sufficiently good to warrant His Majesty’s Government guaranteeing the interest on British capital invested in it.”105 The strategic aspects of the railway, which were in 1915 to play such a large part in Kitchener’s thinking,106 were not mentioned in 1909. The irrigation schemes were also the touchstone of the Tigris valley railway project. But in contrast to the Willcocks scheme, which planned to carry Mesopotamian products westwards, the Tigris line aimed to direct them along the traditional trade route southwards towards the Gulf. The difference in geographical orientation reflected a difference of intention. Willcocks’ scheme was primarily intended to exploit the irrigation works; the Tigris valley line stemmed from a decision to improve their value. [85]


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Various observers had sporadically commented that south of Baghdad, irrigation works and railway schemes were mutually dependent. The prosperity of both would be improved by routing the latter in line with the geography of the former. In 1903, Waugh107 had noted that any other course would prove “an irreparable mistake”. This view was corroborated by Newmarch in 1904108 and echoed by Maunsell in 1907.109 The axiom appeared increasingly important in 1908 and 1909, when work on the irrigation works themselves seemed about to commence.110 The fact that the irrigation scheme was intended to develop the basin of the Tigris rather than that of the Euphrates was of equal consequence. In March 1908, Mr P. Thomas (manager of the Gulf shipping firm of Bucknall Bros.) criticised the Baghdad Railway concessionnaires for neglecting the importance of constructing railways in Mesopotamia “side by side with the progress of irrigation works”.111 In September, Parker congratulated himself for remembering this dictum.112 He stressed that a railway along the Tigris valley therefore promised “incomparably greater commercial possibilities” than the German route along the Euphrates.113 In October 1908, he commented that it seemed “hardly worthwhile” to arouse foreign envy by requesting control over any part of the original Baghdad Railway concession. Such a request might “wreck our chances of promoting a much more important railway between Bagdad and Basra along the Tigris valley”.114 Willcocks later tried to disparage the importance of the Tigris valley railway. Even so, by the close of 1908, before his mind had turned to his Mediterranean scheme, he too had preached the necessity for an alternative route south of Baghdad. He informed the embassy at Constantinople that the proposed German railway, by planning to run from Baghdad to Karbala, and then westwards into the desert before coming down to Basra, sacrificed profitability for speed.115 Lowther promptly reported these facts to London.116 Parker, with equal haste, advised bringing the matter to the attention of the Porte.117 At the India Office, Ferard118 too noted that an additional line “would probably be required” in the Tigris valley region.119 The comparative advantages of the Mohammera line, the Willcocks scheme and the Tigris valley railway were to be the subject of a lengthy, if occasionally muddled,120 debate. The objectives of each project, however, were remarkably alike. None of the three railway proposals originated as a response to political pressure or to strategic demands. The Mohammera [86]


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project was stimulated by fear of the loss of a trade route to British and Indian goods. The others aspired to foster the expectations aroused in the British government as to fitting responses to changing economic circumstances; their respective diplomatic merits and strategic virtues were secondary considerations. The ultimate official preference for the Tigris valley project showed that commercial standards of measurement were those that the government adopted.

The Preference for the Tigris Valley Route The insistent tone of the April 1910 despatch contradicts the contention that Grey’s policy was “to dally over the negotiations as long as possible, thereby delaying the building of the Baghdad Railway”.121 The process by which it was formulated likewise repudiates the claim that the Tigris valley railway demand was merely a delaying tactic. This route had been carefully selected from among the various railway schemes which vied for the government’s attention. It represented a considered choice, not an arbitrary impulse. Only the 1907 Cabinet memorandum can be said to have predetermined the final decision. The 1910 despatch confirmed, as the 1907 memorandum had anticipated, that British interests in Asiatic Turkey centred on the southern Mesopotamian delta. The concentration on railway lines during the official debate was deliberate. The demand of 1910 was influenced by the government’s awareness that beyond Baghdad, British control of Tigris navigation would not offer a viable economic alternative to German control of Mesopotamian railways. Discussions on the subject between 1903 and 1907 had been inconclusive. In 1905, memoranda by Clarke122 and Bingham123 had predicted the ultimate superiority of railways. These, however, had not been supported with sufficient evidence to invalidate the competing claims made earlier by Smythe124 and Newmarch.125 Admittedly, the 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee, by emphasising the need for British railways in Mesopotamia, had implicitly cast doubt on the value of river traffic. But the evidence before the committee had not been unanimous.126 The 1907 report had therefore advised the government to secure British control of the rivers as well as the railways.127 By 1910, the superiority of the railways seems to have assumed the status of an axiom. Control of navigation, as Ramsay remarked, still remained “something worth fighting for”.128 Increasingly, however, [87]


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steamers were relegated to the role of an unsatisfactory second choice. Thus, in July 1908, the Board of Trade suggested that only “in the event of the Germans having the Railway to the Gulf ” should Britain concentrate on control of Tigris navigation.129 Lowther continued to believe that “heavy goods from Baghdad would naturally go by river.”130 But Stanley131 categorically maintained that “Between rail and river transport, the railway will win every time.”132 In November 1909, precedence appeared to be settled beyond dispute. Indeed, the whole future of navigation in Mesopotamia was jeopardised by Willcocks’ announcement that his irrigation works would close the great rivers to steamer traffic within five or ten years.133 This announcement, although the butt of Marling’s scepticism,134 made a strong impression on Grey. He immediately accepted that damage to Lynch’s pre-eminence was inevitable. In November 1909, he minuted: “We cannot contend that navigation concessions on the Euphrates or Tigris should stand in the way of irrigation. The object of means of communication is to develop country, not to block the development.”135 By March 1910, he was convinced that “the Rly [sic] is the real solution.”136 Which was the correct railway alignment to choose? This was a matter of anxious consideration. The Mohammera line was accorded the least attention, mainly because it offered the smallest advantage. Railways in Persia might merely capture the transit trade to Baghdad; they could not develop Mesopotamia itself. Thus, the government’s enthusiasm for the Mohammera scheme waned once the Young Turk revolution promised a possible revision of the Baghdad Railway concession.137 As early as August 1908, Mallet thought that the change at Constantinople allowed Britain to “hold fire” on the Persian project.138 In September, Hardinge warned that Britain might even restrict its options in Mesopotamia by pressing too hard for the Persian concession. Precipitate action might cost it the chance of obtaining a line between Baghdad and Basra.139 Parsimony had dictated Morley’s request that the Foreign Office seek merely to “block” the Mohammera line to other powers.140 Prudence determined Hardinge’s ultimate acceptance of this advice.141 By 1910, the Mohammera line’s main value was that of a diplomatic bait with which to mollify Russian opposition to independent British railways in Mesopotamia.142 Its attractions as a commercial alternative to the latter had otherwise receded. [88]


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An impressive amount of official support was subsequently given to the British financial syndicate which proposed to construct the Mohammera line.143 Similarly, a substantial degree of diplomatic pressure was exerted on the Persian government to grant, and on the Russian government to permit, the concession.144 This activity did not, however, reflect the degree of British interest in Mesopotamia. The Mohammera railway exchanges derived their impetus from the 1911 Potsdam agreement, which cleared the way for the speedy construction of a German branch line from Baghdad to Khanikin, in western Persia.145 British interests in the transit trade to Persia were therefore revived.146 Thus the Mohammera railway negotiations attained a momentum quite independent of Britain’s railway ambitions in Mesopotamia. After 1911, the dealings over the Mohammera line were confined to the realm of Anglo-Russian Persian policy. Kulmann’s147 belated attempt to introduce the topic into the Anglo-German dialogue over Mesopotamia in 1913 was firmly rejected.148 By then, the government appreciated that in commercial terms, the Mohammera line was of doubtful value to British interests even in Persia.149 It had become wholly irrelevant to British interests in Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office150 and the India Office151 both noted that the prosperity of British trade in Mesopotamia would ultimately depend upon the success of the Tigris irrigation works and not on British control of the western Persian trade route. The Board of Trade was even more conscious of the distinction between interregional and intra-area communications. In 1911, Stanley reiterated that “it is the Mesopotamian region and not Persia, upon which we have got to concentrate our thoughts . . . It is here that the future of trade development and political interests lies, here that we look for great things in increasing population, agriculture and stock raising industry and in material wealth after irrigation.”152 In the discussions both before and after 1910, the Mohammera railway had only “incidental” relevance to the formulation of British policy towards Mesopotamia.153 In contrast to the Mohammera railway, which threatened to divert the government’s attention from Mesopotamia eastwards towards Persia, the Willcocks scheme turned it westwards towards Syria. The British government never seriously contemplated accepting the implications of the former project; but Grey, for one, was sorely tempted by the promise of the latter. Not even Grey’s interest, however, justifies the broad claim that “after the 1880s British Railway ambitions in the area [i.e., the [89]


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Middle East] centred on a scheme for a line from Haifa to Baghdad, known as the Willcocks project.”154 This claim seems to ignore the criteria, as well as the content, of the April 1910 despatch. The Willcocks scheme aroused intense debate not because it anticipated Britain’s future political ambitions but because it promised to expand its existing local commercial interests. Ultimately, the latter dictated the shape of British policy. Not until June 1909 did the Foreign Office seriously debate the respective merits of the Willcocks scheme, and the Tigris valley line was unquestioned. Although Willcocks was known to disparage “that hole in the corner place, the Persian Gulf ”,155 Parker insisted that a Mediterranean line was “not nearly so important” to British interests as a railway from Baghdad to Basra along the Tigris valley.156 Hardinge agreed with Parker. He maintained that the Tigris scheme would “place a large slice of the development of Mesopotamia in our hands”. It would also give Britain “such a start over the Baghdad Railway that it might prove to be hardly worthwhile for the German Company to prolong their railway further south.”157 But Willcocks’ scheme did not lapse. Indeed, it obtained official recognition in Mallet’s suggestion of May 1909 that in return for consenting to the requested Turkish customs increase, Britain should express its desire to construct a railway “along the Valley of the Euphrates to Tripoli or some other Mediterranean port”.158 An independent British line to the Mediterranean was still a secondary ambition. The primary aim of Mallet’s draft was to demand control over either the Tigris valley line or the southern section of the Baghdad Railway. Willcocks’ scheme was to be merely an “optional prolongment” to this project.159 Any comments which Grey might have wished to make on Mallet’s draft were forestalled. By early June, consideration of Mesopotamian railways had been transformed, and complicated, by the receipt in London of Ramsay’s memorandum advocating Willcocks’ project for an outlet to the Mediterranean.160 Despite Ramsay’s memorandum, Fitzmaurice (in the embassy at Constantinople)161 and Lindsay and Maxwell (at the Foreign Office)162 continued to prefer that British attention be confined to the area south of Baghdad. Mallet himself, however, now protested that it was impossible thus to ignore Ramsay’s views and Willcocks’ own prestige at the Porte.163 He advised the government to change the bias in his original draft “and demand as the price of our consent to the increase [90]


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of the customs the Euphrates Valley line.” This was now the primary aim, and “a prolongation from Baghdad down the Tigris” was a secondary objective.164 The resignation with which Hardinge proposed that the problem be presented to an interdepartmental committee was unremarkable.165 It merely reflected his own uncertainty. The enthusiasm with which Grey accepted this proposal is worthier of note. It indicated a personal preference for the Willcocks scheme, which immediately worried Ritchie166 and which eventually prolonged the debate. To the members of the 1909 interdepartmental Mesopotamian Railways Committee,167 the disadvantages of the Willcocks scheme appeared overwhelming. From the India Office, Ritchie bombarded his colleagues with a series of memoranda and statements; these attacked Willcocks’ proposal because “it does not dwell on the importance of Mesopotamia as a consumer of Indian goods imported via the Gulf.”168 India, he claimed, “would have no interest in a line which merely ran from the Mediterranean to Baghdad, but she certainly would have an interest in a line to that place from the Persian Gulf ”.169 At the Board of Trade, Stanley was equally convinced that the Willcocks scheme distracted attention from the main area of British interest. In any case, Willcocks’ line “could not and would not pay under existing conditions. It would take twenty–thirty years of hard work, sound irrigation, and good government.”170 Tyrrell,171 representing the Foreign Office, could add nothing to the debate on the merits of the Willcocks scheme. But he did question the motives of its author, by pointing out that Willcocks’ contract to supervise the irrigation works172 had no fixed term. The more ambitious his railway schemes, therefore, the greater his prospects of future employment.173 Ultimately, the committee unanimously condemned the project. “In our opinion”, they reported, “a railway from Alexandretta to Bagdad by way of the Euphrates valley, though of some use to British (but not to Indian) trade, must for a considerable number of years be of value chiefly for political and strategical purposes, the advantages of which will accrue mainly to the Turkish Government.” A line from Baghdad to Basra, on the other hand, would immediately pay its way and “would certainly be at once of very great use to the trade of both the United Kingdom and India”. Even if an independent British railway had to compete with the German line between Baghdad and the Gulf, it “would be of more value than a concession from Bagdad to Alexandretta”.174 [91]


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The interdepartmental committee’s report temporarily shelved, but did not settle, the issue. In August 1909, Lowther was instructed to present the Turks with a demand for British control of southern Mesopotamian railways. In accordance with Mallet’s original (May) draft, Willcocks’ scheme was relegated to a secondary place.175 But the lull was deceptive. The Porte protested against the British terms,176 and Willcocks ridiculed them. Ramsay, unaware of the committee’s deliberations, had in July forwarded to Lowther Willcocks’ unchanged opinion that “the true development of Mesopotamia” depended on a Baghdad–Aleppo–Alexandretta railway.177 Willcocks himself, conscious of the committee’s report, determined to contest it. In October 1909, he “burst a bomb” at Constantinople “by declaring in the most categorical . . . way that a railway from Baghdad to Basra would be perfectly useless, but that a railway from Baghdad to Damascus is absolutely necessary and would rapidly pay”.178 In November, he equally vehemently put substantially the same argument to Hardinge in London.179 This furore occasioned a debate in the winter of 1909 which revealed that the allegiances and arguments of all parties had been unshaken by the Mesopotamian Railways Committee. As in the previous summer, the issue turned on the economic merits of the Willcocks scheme. At the Foreign Office, Parker, Lindsay and Maxwell reiterated: “The fact remains that between Bagdad and Basra there is much land that can be developed easily and quickly and a natural trade route to the Indian market. While between Bagdad and Damascus there is no population, no important trade centre, and a railway will have to pass over what is now, at any rate, mere wilderness.”180 Hardinge took the same position as he had in May, and reportedly had “no view”.181 Grey, by contrast, eagerly reverted to his earlier enthusiasm for the Willcocks scheme. To him, railways south of Baghdad were not unattractive, but were certainly less important than the Baghdad–Damascus route.182 He minuted that Sir William Willcocks’ scheme was the one “we ought to get into any settlement”.183 The settlement of which Grey spoke encountered another barrage of criticism from other departments. The India Office, now represented by Hirtzel, again protested that “everything that encourages direct trade between Europe and the Middle East, causing Bombay and Karachi to drop out, even if only as places of trans-shipment, seems to be disadvantageous to India.”184 At the Board of Trade, Churchill felt that [92]


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the issue warranted a private letter to Grey. He and Llewellyn Smith (the permanent secretary of the Board)185 both reiterated that “while . . . Willcocks’ Hit project appears, on the materials at our disposal, to possess important advantages over the present German scheme, we do not feel at all inclined to let go of the Baghdad-Basra section.”186 On this occasion, moreover, the British financiers concerned with railway schemes in Asiatic Turkey added the weight of their authority to the official clamour. Cassel187 thought Willcocks’ estimates were “extremely vague . . . and unreliable”.188 Babington Smith189 doubted “whether such a railway could compete successfully with the Persian Gulf route”.190 C.S. Palmer, the Constantinople representative of the construction firm of Pearsons and Sons, spoke with more authority than the officials in London. He too was sceptical of the Willcocks scheme. He compared it with the routes proposed in southern Mesopotamia, and concluded that the receipts of the latter would greatly exceed those of the Mediterranean line.191 Faced with this pressure, Grey finally gave way. Cassel, after discussing Mesopotamian railways with Grey and Churchill on 29 November 1909, happily reported that the Willcocks scheme was “dead”.192 A few days later, Grey himself conceded that the arguments in favour of concentrating on railway schemes south of Baghdad were “overwhelming”: it would be “hopeless” to carry through Willcocks’ scheme successfully.193 By 1910, the Foreign Office was already acting in accordance with this assumption. The government continued to express interest in the construction of a line from the Mediterranean to the Gulf which would relieve British trade of its otherwise exclusive dependence on the German route for access to the west by rail. However, the British share in such a scheme was to be limited to the profitable southernmost section. In January 1910, Lindsay, Mallet and Hardinge agreed that if the Willcocks line were ever built by a French firm, “all that we can possibly want would be secured” by control and construction of its continuation south of Baghdad.194 Similarly, in April of the same year the Foreign Office refused to be tempted by the Earl of Ronaldshay’s195 proposal that British financiers join the French group interested in extending the Willcocks scheme to the Gulf.196 Mallet and Parker both declared that “we want to concentrate on the Tigris Railway, and the junction with the Bagdad-Homs line is a subsidiary object.”197 On this occasion, Grey endorsed this policy. By now he had initiated diplomatic negotiations intended to ensure that French control of railways north of [93]


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Baghdad would be matched by British control of the lines south of that town.198 Ronaldshay’s “international” proposal, like Lansdowne’s of 1903, was therefore rejected. Grey himself drafted a reply to Ronaldshay which precluded official support for British involvement in the Homs line and which refused to relinquish the ambition of a British monopoly over the Tigris valley project.199 The Willcocks scheme had been judged on its commercial merits, and these, when compared to the advantages offered by railways south of Baghdad, had been found wanting. As in the case of the Mohammera project, the dictates of commerce had prevented the diversion of British attention to an area other than southern Mesopotamia. The debate over the Willcocks scheme did not, however, result in the repetition of the policy enunciated in the 1907 Cabinet memorandum. Although concentrating on southern Mesopotamia, that memorandum had not questioned the commercial value of the proposed German route from Baghdad to Basra by way of the Euphrates. The 1910 despatch, conversely, did not doubt the commercial superiority of a British route between the two towns along the Tigris valley. The change resulted from a detailed study of the two lines. The Tigris valley study began before the Willcocks scheme debate, and was subsequently prolonged by it. The Tigris proposal had captured Parker’s imagination,200 and had been included in Mallet’s draft,201 before the receipt of Ramsay’s influential despatch in June 1909.202 But it had also incited the India Office’s opposition. In May 1909, Ritchie and Morley asked the Foreign Office to justify its interest in a Tigris line; they questioned the wisdom of abandoning the 1907 Cabinet proposal in favour of a scheme of unproven economic merit and doubtful diplomatic worth.203 The Foreign Office reply, although communicated unofficially,204 was informative. It stated that the Tigris valley railway deserved official support precisely because of its intrinsic commercial value. The predictions that the railway, if constructed before its German rival, would attract City financiers and capture the pilgrim traffic were incidentals. The “main point” of the Foreign Office memorandum appealed to economic logic. If aligned with the irrigation works, the Tigris valley railway would ensure British pre-eminence in all the future development schemes in Mesopotamia.205 This exchange was interrupted by the debate over the Willcocks scheme. The India Office, therefore, did not challenge these arguments, [94]


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nor did the Foreign Office repeat them. The Board of Trade, however, ignored and thereby discredited them. In April and May 1909, the Board, although prepared to consider the advantages of an independent British line south of Baghdad,206 had not explicitly related its tracé to the irrigation schemes. It concentrated solely on the construction costs and traffic receipts,207 and in June 1909 Stanley doubted whether these allowed “room for two competing lines”.208 In his memorandum to the Mesopotamian Railways Committee he reported that south of Baghdad, a German railway would always possess the advantage of being able to quote cheap rates for through traffic northwards.209 The committee, by accepting Stanley’s opinion, also left out of account the southern Mesopotamian irrigation works. In addition to disparaging Willcocks’ scheme, it reported that “so far as the Bussorah-Bagdad region is concerned, participation in the existing German concession would be more valuable than a concession for the construction of an independent line.”210 But the committee’s adverse report had little effect on the fortunes of the Tigris valley proposal; further study revived support for the scheme. By August 1909, Ramsay had investigated the course of the irrigation works around Baghdad. These indicated that “the best railway route” between Baghdad and Basra would run “down the right bank of the Tigris and the Hai by way of Ur of the Chaldees . . . There would be no question of its necessity, and of its power to pay.”211 In November 1909, a Board of Trade review also concluded that in any future Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agreement, “a route between the Tigris and Euphrates is to be substituted for the route as at present arranged by the German concession.”212 At the same time, Brerton of the India Office213 also argued that the German route’s distance from the irrigation schemes was a considerable defect. It contrasted unfavourably with the Tigris line’s proposal to pass “through the centre of the region already cultivated and capable of still further development.”214 Cassel’s failure to mention this factor to Gwinner alarmed the Board of Trade on 20 December 1909.215 By the thirty-first it had provoked Llewellyn Smith’s opposition to the details of the proposed arrangement between the two bankers.216 He advised the Foreign Office, and instructed Babington Smith, that “the German proposal is worthless unless we can have (among other things) the power to vary the route of the railway.”217 Once Willcocks’ scheme had been discredited and the government was free to concentrate its attention on southern Mesopotamia, the [95]


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Tigris valley proposal took practical shape. By the spring of 1910, the government’s appreciation of its intrinsic value was unaffected by the imminence of Grey’s approach to the Germans.218 In March, Hardinge, Llewellyn Smith and Hirtzel collectively authorised an invitation to British engineering firms to prepare tenders for the Tigris line.219 They were disappointed by the hesitant response of Pearsons and Sons220 but were encouraged by the enthusiastic reply of Ogilvy, Gillanders and Company.221 The Foreign Office welcomed the latter firm’s assurance that the Tigris line would “not only enable British interests to retain their present hold over the trade of Mesopotamia, but that it would largely increase the volume of that trade.” It approached the Turks on the basis of the firm’s prediction that “the project would be popular in London not only from a financial, but from an Imperial, point of view.”222 The Tigris valley railway request was neither a temporising manoeuvre nor a diplomatic ploy. It had been preceded by a lengthy official controversy; it was occasioned by a favourable financial climate in London; and it responded to an urgent need for rail communications in Mesopotamia. Although the government expressed its demands in a diplomatic despatch, it did not aim for a political success. The Tigris valley demand responded to the requirements of economic geography rather than of diplomatic necessity. The government’s reasons for replacing the 1907 memorandum by the Tigris valley demand lay, as Parker pointed out, in the commercial shortcomings of the German line. “I firmly believe”, he wrote early in April 1910, “that our only prospect of safeguarding our long-established commercial interests in Mesopotamia lies in our concentrating on the Tigris Valley Rly concession . . . The district to be served by the Tigris Valley Rly is quite distinct from that to be served by the German Rly. It is true that the two lines would converge on Bagdad and Bussorah, but similarly in this country the Midland Rly and the N.W. Rly run both [sic] from Carlisle to London while serving intermediate districts many miles apart.”223

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NOTES 1 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 114. 2 The phrase was Hardinge’s. Draft of 10 Apr. 1910 Grey-Lowther 107 secret, FO 371/991/100/11933. 3 31 July 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne, tel. 110, above, p. 47, n. 12. 4 4 Aug. 1905 Clarke-Sanderson pte., above, p. 65, n. 30. 5 8 May 1907 Fitzmaurice-Lascelles pte., Lascelles MSS, 3, (5), FO 800/13. Lord E. G. Fitzmaurice, later 1st Baron of Leigh (1846–1935), Under-Secretary, FO, 1905–1908, DNB (1949), pp. 690–692. 6 Above, p. 67, n. 101. 7 31 July 1907 Grey-Bertie 432, above, p. 48, n. 36. 8 S. Pichon, French Foreign Minister, 1906–1911 and 1913. 9 27 Oct. 1907 Bertie-Grey 516, FO 371/340/12/35720. 10 R. B. Haldaane, Viscount Haldane of Cloan (1856–1928), Secretary of State for War, 1905–1912 and Lord Chancellor, 1912–1915, DNB (1937), pp. 380–386. 11 15 Nov. 1907 Haldane Memo., BD 6, no. 63, pp. 96–98. 12 31 July 1908 Hardinge-Block pte., Hardinge MSS, Cambridge University Library (hereafter HARD MSS), vol. 13, p. 70. 13 10 Feb. 1909 Grey-Bertie 80, BD 6, no. 269, p. 370. 14 28 Oct. 1909 Grey-Goschen, 266 secret, BD 6, no. 277, pp. 378–379. 15 22 Nov. 1907 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 2, p. 297. 16 Viscount Haldane, Before the War (London, 1920), p. 52. Significantly in his own memoirs, Grey inverted the emphasis. He recalled that “the Entente with France was not to be used against German policy or interests.” Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1896–1913, vol. 1 (New York, 1925), p. 120. 17 23 Nov. 1909, Grey-Bertie 470, BD 6, no. 393, pp. 343–394. 18 In January 1910 Cassel learned that Pichon had threatened to counter an Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agreement with a flat French refusal to sanction the Turkish four percent customs increase. 21 Jan. 1910 Spitzer-Cassel, BS MSS, 3. 19 Minute on 5 Nov. 1909 Goschen-Grey 372, FO 371/764/2074/40905. 20 15 Nov. 1909 Nicolson-Grey tel. 490, BD 6, no. 284, p. 386. 21 18 Nov. 1909 Grey-Nicolson tel. 1344, BD 6, no. 287, p. 387. Nicolson’s earlier avowal of the à quatre position, (above, n. 20) had been made in a personal capacity. 22 23 Nov. 1909 Grey-Nicolson tel. 1340, BD 6, no. 292, pp. 392–393. 23 Minute on 24 Nov. 1909 Nicolson-Grey tel. 495, FO 371/765/2075/43086; omitted in BD 6, no. 294, p. 394. 24 R. C. Lindsay (1877–1945), Assistant Private Secretary to Grey, 1908–1911. 25 Minute, ibid. 26 29 Dec. 1909 memo., FO 371/765/2074/47321. 27 27 Nov. 1909 Nicolson-Grey tel. 497., BD 6, no. 298, pp. 398–399. 28 Minute on 26 Dec. 1909 Nicolson-Grey tel. 517 secret, FO 371/765/2074/ 46697; omitted in BD 6, no. 311, p. 412. 29 Grey had already found it impossible to unite Anglo-Russian policy in the Balkans. M.B. Cooper, “British Policy in the Balkans, 1908–9”, Historical Journal, vol. 7 (no. 2) 1964–5, pp. 258–279. In Persia, the relationship was to [97]


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30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46

47 48 49 50

prove an even more “Uneasy Alliance”. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism (Yale, 1968), ch. 8. Williamson, Grand Strategy, p. 111. Minute on 19 Dec. 1907 Bertie-Grey, FO 371/340/12/41621. Sir W. E. Goschen (1847–1924), ambassador at Vienna, 1905–1908 and at Berlin, 1908–1914. 28 Oct. 1909 Grey-Goschen 266 secret, BD 6, no. 277, pp. 378–379. 31 March 1910 Grey-Goschen 80, BD 6, no. 337, pp. 442–443. 4 Apr. 1910 Hardinge-Goschen pte., HARD MSS, 21, p. 108. Described in Chapman, Britain & the Bagdad Railway, p. 84. 31 July 1908 Hardinge memo., BD 6, no. 266, p. 367. F. W. von Schoen, German foreign minister, 1907–1910. 15 Dec. 1909 Goschen-Hardinge pte., FO 371/765/2074/45560; 20 Dec. 1909 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1909, FO 800/342, p. 257; and 8 Apr. 1910 Goschen-Grey v. conf., BD 6, no. 342, pp. 449–450. “We shall not really know how we stand with Germany until [sic] the moment comes when we are seriously alongside of the Baghdad question.” 8 May 1907 Fitzmaurice-Lascelles pte., Lascelles MSS, 3 (5), FO 800/13. 14 Apr. 1910 Goschen-Hardinge pte., BD 6, no. 348, pp. 463–465. 26 Aug. 1908 Grey memo. to Cabinet, CAB 37/94/108. “An understanding . . . on naval matters is a primary and essential condition for the improvement of relations between the two countries.” 25 Aug. 1908 Hardinge minute, BD 6, no. 190, pp. 285–286. This was equally true during a subsequent period. See M. Langhorne, “The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912–14”, Historical Journal, vol. 14, 1971, p. 369. 1 Feb. 1910 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1910 (i), FO 800/343, p. 39. Minute on 11 Apr. 1910 Goschen-Grey 102 v. conf., BD 6, no. 344, p. 460. On the 1908 Young Turk revolution, see B. Lewis, Modern Turkey, ch. 6; E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, 1957); and F. Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914 (Oxford, 1969). On the effect of the 1908 revolution on Anglo-Turkish relations, see H. Temperley, “British Policy towards Parliamentary Rule and Constitutionalism in Turkey, 1830–1914”, Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. 4 (1932–1934), p. 190 and P. P. Graves, Briton and Turk (London, 1941), ch. 6. On Anglo-Turkish relations in this period, see F. Ahmad, “Great Britain’s Relations with the Young Turks, 1908–1914”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 2 (no. 4) July 1966, pp. 302–324 and A. Cunningham, “The Wrong Horse? – A Study of Anglo-Turkish Relations before the First World War”, Middle Eastern Affairs, no. 4, St. Antony’s Papers no. 17 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 56–76. I am grateful to Dr. Y. Heller for allowing me to see his thesis on British Policy Towards The Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914 (London School of Economics Ph.D. Thesis, 1970). 20 Jan. 1909 Hardinge-Goschen pte., HARD MSS, 17, p. 163. 31 July 1908 Hardinge-Block pte., HARD MSS, 13, p. 70. 18 August 1908 minute, FO 371/503/765/28420. 19 Sept. 1908 Parker memo., The Duration of the Bagdad Railway Concession, secret, FO 371/538/5399/32518. Hardinge minuted: “The prospects of the Baghdad Railway from a German point of view are not very favourable.” Ibid. [98]


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51 Especially those of Minto. “In my belief the greatest card we have to play is the establishment of a firm friendship with the Turk, – the most unjustly maligned of nations, possessed of the finest military material in the world, a Mussulman power with whom our Mohammedan subjects are in the closest sympathy.” 23 Sept. 1908 Minto-Morley, pte., Morley MSS, 17, p. 77. 52 Mallet minute on 27 Jan. 1908 O’Conor-Grey 25, FO 371/533/488/2889. Grey considered that “a conciliatory policy has no effect whatever”. 17 Dec. 1907 Grey-O’Conor pte., Grey MSS, 40, FO 800/79. 53 22 Sep. 1908 Grey-Lowther 402 secret, FO 371/538/5399/32518. 54 2 Jan. 1909 Hardinge memo., FO 371/762/659/712. 55 “It would be a most serious blow to us if ever Turkey joined the Central Powers.” Mallet minute on 6 Apr. 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 1906–1914, PRO, London, FO 800/192. 56 2 Jan. 1909 Hardinge memo., above, n. 54. 57 Minute on 1 Feb. 1909 Lowther-Grey 71, FO 371/762/659/5071. 58 Mallet’s draft reply to Jevad Bey’s memo, 27 May 1909 FO 371/762/659/20101; enclosed in 29 May 1909 FO-B of T, FO 371/762/659/21881. 59 19 June 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., FO 371/762/659/23582 and 20 June 1909 Block-Hardinge pte., FO 371/764/2074/29701. 60 The Committee was Hardinge’s idea. Minute on 25 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 375 secret, BD 6, no. 270, p. 373. Its report was presented on 24 July 1909, FO 371/764/2074/29701, and signed by Ashley (B of T), Lindsay, Maxwell, Ritchie, Stanley (B of T) and Tyrrell (FO). 61 Report, ibid. and 30 June 1909 Ashley memo., Board of Trade Records, PRO, London (hereafter BT), BT 11/3. 62 Minute to Report, FO 371/764/2074/29701. 63 21 Sep. 1909 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 155. 64 Minute on 13 Aug. 1909 Lowther-Grey 660, FO 371/764/2074/31619. 65 20 Apr. 1910 Grey-Lowther 107 secret p. 4, BD 6, no. 352, p. 472. 66 28 March 1910 Lowther-Grey tel. 50, FO 371/991/100/10397, reporting that the Ottoman government had guaranteed the surplus of various tithes to the Baghdad Railway Company. 67 Specifically: “approximately . . . from Baghdad to Kut-el-Amarah, and . . . from that point . . . proceed in a south easterly direction to Bussorah, and from that point, to Koweit.” 68 See Map 1, p. xv. 69 See Map 2, p. xvi. 70 2 June 1908 Hardinge-Block, pte., HARD MSS, 13, p. 67. 71 30 June 1908 Hardinge-Barclay, pte., Lowther MSS, p. 32. For earlier indications of this attitude, see the minutes by Hardinge and Grey, 20 May 1908, BD 6, no. 259, pp. 363–364. 72 Minute on 13 Sep. 1909 Lowther-Grey tel. 321, FO 371/764/2074/3439. 73 Minute on 11 Oct. 1909 Lowther-Grey 839, FO 371/765/2074/38360; omitted in BD 6, no. 276, p. 378. 74 Minute on 10 Apr. 1910 Goschen-Grey tel. 25, BD 6, no. 343, p. 451. 75 26 May 1906 minute, FO 371/148/10401/18044. 76 Above, p. 51, n. 146. 77 Minute on 14 June 1907 Spring Rice-Grey 127, FO 371/310/22392/22392. [99]


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78 Its size had already been noted by Percy in 1903 (minute on 4 Aug. 1903 O’Conor-Lansdowne 440, FO 78/544.9). In 1908, Barclay estimated that it had increased by 30 percent since 1904 (4 Nov. 1908 Barclay-Grey 288 secret, FO 371/503/7658/40837. 79 According to Lloyd’s Report, goods worth a total of £1,857,000 entered Baghdad in 1906. The transit trade to Persia was worth almost £2 million. (Lloyd’s Report p. 44). Ramsay, in 1909, calculated that the figure was 60 percent. 25 Jan. 1909 Ramsay-Lowther 69/6, FO 195/2308. 80 12 July 1906 G of I-IO 98 secret, enclosed in 14 Dec. 1906 IO-FO, FO 371/ 148/8750/41923, and 26 March 1907 report of the 1907 interdepartmental committee on the Baghdad Railway, pp. 15–16, CAB 37/87/36. 81 Minute on 1 Dec. 1904 IO-FO, FO 78/5461. 82 19 March 1907 Cox-G of I, enclosed in FO 371/309/4863/4863, and 13 Dec. 1907 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 2, p. 319. 83 28 Oct. 1907 Marling-Grey 228 and minutes, FO 371/309/4863/35496. 84 In Minto’s words “far off ”. 26 Sep. 1907 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 12, p. 103. 85 Report and Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Baghdad Railway, Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf (dated 26 Jan. 1909), CAB 16/10. The members of the committee were Morley (chairman), Grey, Lloyd George (later replaced by Churchill), Esher, Hardinge, Ritchie, Slade, Nicholson (WO) and Ewart (WO). They held seven meetings between 2 and 30 March 1908, and the report consists of almost 300 pages. Its proceedings are described in Plass, England zwichen Russland and Deutschland, pp. 441–451 and Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 373. These authors correctly emphasise that the majority of the committee’s time was spent on a discussion of Gulf shipping interests; but they make no mention of the discussions on the Persian railways. 86 Sir L. W. Dane (1856–1946), Sec. to the Foreign Dept. G of I, 1903–1908; evidence presented on 17 March 1908, CAB 16/10 paras. 512ff. 87 Evidence presented on 25 March 1908, CAB 16/10 paras. 880ff. 88 Major J. A. Douglas (1862–1932), R.E, evidence presented on 25 March 1908, CAB 16/10 paras. 1,000 ff. 89 Col. C.E. Yate (1849–1940), consul, Muscat, 1889–1890; member of the Indian Political Service, 1890–1910; and Conservative M.P. for Melton 1910–1924. DNB (1949), p. 928. Evidence presented on 30 March 1908, CAB 16/10 paras. 1088 ff. 90 Dane suggested a Mohammera–Shiraz alignment (paras, 512, 514); Lynch did not question the proposed Mohammera–Julfa tracé (para. 953); and Douglas and Yate wished to add an Ahwaz–Dizful–Khurramabad line as a “supplementary”, (paras. 1000 and 1125–1127). 91 Especially, according to Lynch, as it would avoid “the torid [sic] zone”. Para. 953. 92 1 Apr. 1908 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1908, FO 800/341, p. 69. 93 The report was presented on 26 Jan. 1909 (CAB 16/10) and accepted by the CID on 25 Feb. 1909. Minutes of 101st meeting, CAB 38/15/4. 94 “After years of disinterestedness . . . the wheels of government were set in motion by the urge of foreign policy . . .” Hoskins, Routes, p. 159. 95 Ibid., ch. 13. 96 D. Lee, Britain & the Cyprus Convention Policy (the whole work is relevant). 97 Ibid., p. 41. [100]


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98 Sir J. E. Gorst (1861–1911), Assistant Under-Sec. FO, 1904–1907, agent and consul general, Egypt, 1907–1911, DNB (1912 (2)), pp. 133–134. 99 5 July Willcocks-Gorst pte., FO 78/5421. 100 W. P. C. Graham (1861–1918), Director General, Dept. of Public Health, Egypt, 1907–1918. 101 13 March Graham-Mallet pte., FO 371/764/2074/35406 and 16 May 1909, The Times, p. 8. 102 12 Jan. 1909 Sir C. Campbell-FO, FO 371/764/1623/1623. 103 30 Jan. 1909 Lowther-Grey 64 conf., FO 371/764/1623/5947. 104 10 March 1909 Ramsay-Lowther 257/25, enclosed in 25 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 375 secret, FO 371/764/2074/20290. 105 25 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 375 secret, ibid. 106 See J. Nevakivi, “Lord Kitchener and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916”, Studies in International History; Essays Presented to Professor W. Norton Medlicott (London, 1967), pp. 316–329. 107 3 Aug. 1903 Waugh memo. on The General Commercial Situation in Asia Minor as Affected by the Nationality of the Owners of the Railways; enclosed in 31 Aug. 1903 O’Conor-Lansdowne 107 commercial, FO 78/5278. 108 6 March 1905 Newmarch-O’Conor 152/16; enclosed in 3 Apr. 1905 O’ConorLansdowne 206, FO 78/5393. 109 19 Dec. 1906 evidence presented to the 1907 interdepartmental committee on the Baghdad Railway, p. 11. FO 371/340/12/9865. 110 On the progress of the irrigation works, see below, p. 121. The distinction between the Willcocks railway scheme and Willcocks’ irrigation works must be preserved. The former was inspired by the latter. The railway, however, concentrated on the area north and west of Baghdad; the irrigation schemes planned to develop the area (initially) south and east of the town. 111 19 March 1908 evidence to the 1908 CID subcommittee, CAB 16/10 para. 780. 112 19 Sep. 1908 Parker memo., FO 371/538/5399/32518. 113 29 Sep. 1908 Parker memo., FO 371/503/7658/33780. 114 Parker minute 1 Oct. 1908, FO 371/538/5399/33865. 115 27 Oct. 1908 Willcocks-Hohler pte., FO 195/2308. 116 4 Nov. 1908 Lowther-Grey 740 secret, FO 371/538/5399/33846. 117 Minute to above, ibid. 118 H. C. Ferard (1864–1936), Asnt. Sec. Pol. Dept. IO, 1907–1912 and Asnt. Sec., Judicial and Public Dept. IO, 1912–1916. 119 Minute on 4 Nov. 1908 Lowther-Grey 740 secret, L/P & S/10 vol. 57 (2), no. 1908/4102. 120 The plethora of railway schemes was both heartening and confusing. In 1908 Lloyd complained: “In attempting to sketch the possibilities for railway enterprise in Mesopotamia, one is confused by the variety of railway opportunities that exist. The truth is that the whole country is crying out for railways and that possibilities exist at every turn.” Quoted in 12 Jan. 1909 B of T-FO, FO 368/ 335/724/2544. 121 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 108. 122 “An attempt to develop navigation in British hands as a scheme competing with the German Railway would probably fail.” 26 Jan. 1905 memo., CAB 38/8/5. [101]


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123 1 June 1906 memo., FO 78/5449. 124 “The Railway would not compete with the rivers as regards freight.” Report, enclosed in 6 May 1904 WO-FO, ibid. 125 “River-borne traffic will always be cheaper than rail-borne traffic.” 6 March 1905 Newmarch-O’Conor 152/16; enclosed in 3 Apr. 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 206, FO 78/5393. 126 Mahon, Maunsell and Inchcape all supported the railway. Evidence presented to the 1907 committee, pp. 11, 16, FO 371/340/12/9865. Newmarch and Robertson supported the river, pp. 6, 16, ibid. 127 Report of the 1907 committee, CAB 37/87/36. 128 Confidential memo. 9 (dated Sep. 1907); enclosed in FO 371/356/41058/41058. 129 Jan. 1908 memo. “The Position of British Trade in the Persian Gulf ”, App. 8 to the Report of the 1908 CID sub-committee on the Baghdad Railway, CAB 16/10. See also 5 Aug. 1908 Wilson-Fox-Mallet pte., FO 371/534/900/27476. 130 Minute on 28 May 1909 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 105. 131 G. J. Stanley (1852–1931), Asnt. Sec., Commercial Dept., B of T, 1909–1918. 132 27 June 1909 memo., BT 11/3. 133 2 Nov. 1909 Marling-Grey tel. 348, FO 371/760/322/40389. 134 Sir C. M. Marling (1862–1933), counsellor, Constantinople, 1908–1913, ibid. 135 Minute on 6 Nov. 1909 Hardinge memo., BD 6, no. 281, p. 384. 136 Minute on 22 March 1910 Lowther-Grey 166, FO 371/996/189/10512. 137 See above, p. 79. 138 Minute on 1 Aug. 1908 IO-FO, FO 371/503/7658/27118. 139 15 Sept. 1908 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1908, FO 800/341, p. 110. 140 28 Sep. 1908 IO-FO, FO 371/503/7658/33769. 141 Compare Hardinge’s minute to above, ibid., with his letter to Nicolson on 25 Nov. 1908, NIC MSS, 1908, FO 800/341, p. 183. 142 See below, pp. 115–118. 143 E.g., Mallet minute on 19 June 1911 Maxwell memo., FO 371/1185/3606/24602 and Parker minute on 19 March 1913 Townley-Grey tel. 66, FO 371/1710/ 167/7928. 144 For British pressure on Sazonov at Balmoral, see Grey minute on 24 Sep. 1912 Sazonov memo., FO 371/1435/575/40425 and 29 Sep. 1912 Nicolson-Grey pte., NIC MSS, 1912 (6), FO 800/358, p. 161. For British pressure at Teheran, see, e.g., 29 Dec. 1912 Parker memo., FO 371/1435/575/51829 and 8 Feb. 1913 Grey-Townley tel. 66, FO 371/1710/167/5939. 145 On Potsdam, see below, pp. 152–154. 146 Especially in the IO. See, e.g., 14 Jan 1908 IO-G of I tel., L/P & S/10 vol. 58, no. 1911/2840 and Hirtzel minute enclosed in 28 Feb. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1185/3606/7629. 147 R. von Kuhlmann (1873–1940), counsellor at the German embassy in London, 1908–1914. 148 8 May 1913 Parker minute, BD 10 (2), no. 66, p. 98; Grey minute on 9 May 1913, Hardinge-Nicolson pte., FO 371/1790/ 6463/21958; and 13 May 1913 Nicolson-Goschen pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (5), FO 800/366, p. 209. 149 1 Jan. 1912 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10 vol. 58; 12 Jan. 1912 B of T-FO, FO 371/1484/264/1723; and 12 Feb. 1912 G of I-IO tel.; enclosed in FO 371/1433/ 575/6426. [102]


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150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168

169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184

Grey minute on 13 Sep. 1910 B of T-FO, FO 371/995/2901/33431. Hirtzel minute on 30 May 1912 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/2065. Memo. (not dated but probably March 1911) BT 11/4, no. 2. 10 July 1911 Stanley-Norman, FO 371/1191/1937/24128. H. Frischwasser-Ra’anan, The Frontiers of a Nation (London, 1955), p. 48. 14 Feb. 1909 Willcocks-Graham, enclosed in 13 March 1909 Graham-Mallet pte., FO 371/764/2074/35406. Minute, ibid. Minute, ibid. Draft enclosed in 29 May 1909 FO-B of T, FO 371/762/659/20209. Ibid. 10 March 1909 Ramsay-Lowther; enclosed in 25 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 375 secret, FO 371/764/2074/20290. Referred to above, p. 85. G. H. Fitzmaurice (1865–1939), first sec., Constantinople, 1908–1914. “Surely all these animals and foodstuffs could find a market in the east?” Minute on Ramsay’s memo., FO 195/2308. Minutes on 25 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 375, BD 6, no. 270, p. 371. Minute, ibid. Ibid. Minute, ibid. 18 June 1909 Ritchie-Morley pte., L/P & S/10 vol. 57 (2), no. 1909/3923. On the composition of the Committee, see above, p. 99, n. 60. 19 June 1909 Ritchie memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2), no. 1909/3924 and 27 June 1909 Stanley memo. (reporting Ritchie’s remarks to the committee), BT 11/3. Morley wrote a personal letter to Grey protesting that “the diversion of Indian trade from Mesopotamia in favour of the Mediterranean . . . is adverse to India.” 22 June 1909 Morley-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 59, FO 800/98. 27 June 1909 Stanley memo., BT 11/3. Ibid. and memo. (dated June 1909) printed as an appendix to the committee’s final report, FO 371/764/2074/29701. W. Tyrrel, later 1st Baron Tyrrell of Avon (1886–1947), Grey’s private sec., 1907–1915, DNB (1959), pp. 893–896. See below, p. 121. 27 June 1909, Stanley memo., BT 11/13. 24 July 1909, report of the committee p. 3., FO 371/764/2074/29701. 18 Aug. 1909 Grey-Lowther 245 secret, BD 6, no. 272, pp. 374–375. 13 Sep. 1909 Lowther-Grey tel. 321, FO 371/764/2074/34395. 9 July 1909 Ramsay-Lowther 735/39; enclosed in 13 Aug. 1909 Lowther-Grey 660, FO 371/764/2074/31619. 12 Oct. 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., FO 371/764/2074/39221 and 15 Oct. 1909 Lowther-Grey 849, ibid. 6 Nov. 1909 Hardinge memo., BD 6, no. 281, pp. 381–383. Parker minute on 13 Aug. 1909 Lowther-Grey 660, above, no. 177; and Lindsay and Maxwell minutes on 12 Oct. 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., above, no. 178. 9 Nov. 1909 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 11. Minute on 6 Nov. 1909 Hardinge memo., BD 6, no. 281, pp. 383–384. Minute on 10 Nov. 1909 Hardinge memo., FO 371/765/2074/41367. Minute (not dated, but probably Nov. 1909), L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1909/4183a. [103]


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185 S. H. Llewellyn Smith (1864–1945), Perm. Sec., B of T, 1907–1919, DNB (1959), pp. 794–795. 186 19 Nov. 1909 Churchill-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 50, FO 800/89 and 25 Nov. 1909 B of T-FO, FO 371/765/2074/43162. 187 Who “recognised my old friend [i.e. Willcocks] by his statement that, in July last, he discarded all his previous conclusions and started on a new line which he says is the only satisfactory one.” 6 Nov. 1909 Cassel-Babington Smith pte., BS MSS, 10. 188 Ibid. and 19 Nov. 1909 Hardinge memorandum, BD 6, no. 289, pp. 389–390. 189 Sir H. Babington Smith (1863–1923) in 1909 became Administrative DirectorGeneral of Cassel’s National Bank of Turkey, DNB (1937), pp. 789–790. 190 10 Nov. 1909 Babington Smith-Cassel pte., BS MSS, 10. 191 16 Nov. 1909 Pearsons and Sons-FO, FO 371/767/42187/42187. 192 2 Dec. 1909 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 10. 193 9 Dec. 1909 Grey-Hardinge pte., FO 371/765/2074/45560. 194 Minutes on 10 Jan. 1910 Lowther-Grey 21 secret, enclosing a memo. by Marling. The despatch is in FO 371/991/100/1801; the minute sheet, it appears, was sent in the original to the B of T and is in BT 11/3. 195 Earl of Ronaldshay, 1st Marquess of Zetland (1844–1929). 196 Ronaldshay-FO, 30 March 1910, FO 371/995/184/10842. 197 Mallet minute on 7 Apr. 1910 Ronaldshay-FO, FO 371/995/184/12657 and Parker minute on 22 Apr. 1910, Ronaldshay-FO, FO 371/995/184/14075. 198 See below, pp. 113–115. 199 Minute on 22 Apr. 1910 Ronaldshay-Grey, FO 371/995/1&4/14075. 200 Above, pp. 86, 90. 201 29 May 1909 FO-B of T, above, p. 134, no. 158. 202 10 March 1909 Ramsay-Lowther; enclosed in 25 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 375 secret. See above, p. 101, n. 104 and p. 103, n. 160. 203 Ritchie memo. (not dated, but probably late May 1909), L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2), file 2764 and 21 May 1909 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 4, p. 112, recording a visit by himself and Ritchie to the FO to discuss “the new Foreign Office Mesopotamian Railway scheme” with Hardinge and Grey. 204 No trace of this dialogue was to be found in the FO files; references to it in the IO records are scattered, limited and vague. The two most important documents are one long memo. by Ritchie (cited above) and one long reply typed on Foreign Office paper but neither signed nor numbered. L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2), file 1904/2764. 205 Ibid. 206 See especially report by C. E. Akers on The Trade of Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, commissioned by the B of T in 1908 and completed in 1909; enclosed in FO 368/371/14974/ 14974, pp. 15–16. 207 17 May 1909 B of T-FO, FO 371/764/2074/18814, calling attention to Akers’ report. 208 Stanley memo. June 1909, FO 371/764/2074/29701; referred to above, p. 91, n. 170. 209 Ibid. 210 24 July 1909, report of the Mesopotamian Railways Committee, ibid. 211 20 Aug. 1909 Ramsay-G of I; enclosed in L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1909/1530. [104]


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212 25 Nov. 1909 Ashley memo., BT 11/3. Parker had already made the same observation at the FO. Minute on 31 Oct. 1909 Marling-Grey tel. 346, FO 371/764/2074/39959, omitted in BD 6, no. 278, p. 380. 213 A. Brerton (1849–1926), Govt. Director of guaranteed railways, 1905–1914. 214 Remarks quoted in 3 Dec. 1909 Ashley memo., BT 11/3. 215 20 Dec. 1909 minutes by Ashley and L1. Smith, ibid. 216 31 Dec. 1909 Ll. Smith memo., ibid. 217 7 Jan. 1910 B of T-FO, FO 371/991/100/814 and 31 Dec. 1909 Eddison (B of T)-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 10. 218 See above, p. 76. 219 Hardinge minute on 4 March 1910 B of T-FO, FO 371/991/100/7681; 10 March 1910 Ll. Smith-Hardinge pte., FO 371/991/100/8477; and 19 March 1910 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 57, no. 1910/3146. 220 17 March 1910 Pearsons & Sons-FO, FO 371/991/100/9030. 221 5 Apr. 1910 Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co-FO, FO 371/991/100/11933. 222 Ibid. 223 8 Apr. 1910 minute, ibid.

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5 The Implications of Decision-Making

The April 1910 Tigris valley railway demand aimed to achieve local, rather than global, objectives. Within its local context, however, the demand embodied a far-reaching claim. The diplomatic exchanges which preceded the presentation of the demand revealed both aspects of British policy. As has been seen, these exchanges did not influence the content of the despatch to Lowther. But they did illustrate the true implications of the British demand. The exchanges were designed to serve a dual function. Firstly, they enabled the British government to communicate its local ambitions to foreign governments. The latter were thus given ample notice of the extent of Britain’s determination to defend its local interests in Mesopotamia and of its desire to remove the region from the arena of European diplomatic conflict. At the same time, the diplomatic exchanges which preceded the presentation of the Tigris valley railway demand emphasised the nature of Britain’s local ambitions. The railway demand conformed to a pattern of other British demands in Mesopotamia; it was presented after a series of other diplomatic arrangements designed to give Britain a free hand in the region. The Tigris valley railway demand thus confirmed the British government’s determination to acquire an exclusive sphere of influence in Asiatic Turkey. The diplomatic exchanges of 1909 and 1910 were designed to create the conditions whereby the British government might demand from the nations of Europe international recognition of a British monopoly over all commercial development in Mesopotamia. The British claim was restricted but emphatic.

The Nature of the Claim The 1910 despatch was definite in tone but limited in aim. Between 1907 and 1910, neither the creation of European mandates, nor the collapse of Turkish authority, appeared imminent in Mesopotamia. The [107]


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British government, therefore, felt no need to reverse its earlier policy of avoiding military intervention in the area. Yate indicated the extent of British sensitivity when declaring in 1908 to an imperial defence subcommittee that “Our position in Baghdad City is so peculiar that it would never do for us to have divided authority with any other Foreign Power.”1 This statement, however, warned of future consequences; it did not reflect present ambitions. As Hardinge pointed out, “Had we intentions on Mesopotamia, it would have been very easy to have realised them at various epochs of the late regime.”2 Not even several murderous Arab attacks on Lynch’s steamers in 1908 and 19093 affected this policy. Ramsay counselled, and Grey agreed, that it would be unwise to “step in and put things right by direct intervention”.4 For this reason the Foreign Office also discouraged routine military surveys of the area. In 1910, the War Office was informed that military operations in Mesopotamia were not contemplated in the immediate future and that no advantage would be gained by permitting itinerant British officers to arouse Turkish suspicions to the contrary.5 Similarly, the British government continued to abstain from involvement in the internal political affairs of the region, and resisted the temptations to intervene occasionally presented by local disturbances. In 1908 and 1909, the Foreign Office warned Ramsay not to interfere in the upheaval at Baghdad occasioned by the news of the Young Turk revolution.6 Ramsay himself persistently preached the virtues of a policy of neutrality between those who favoured and those who opposed the Young Turks.7 He did so despite invitations from both parties,8 his personal dislike of the Young Turks9 and his awareness that “serious disturbances here against the Government might mean the loss of Mesopotamia to Turkey.”10 Similarly, in 1909, Young was instructed to avoid involvement in a power struggle at Mosul between the Nestorians and the Catholics.11 During the same period, Crow was told to take no advantage of the opportunities for intervention that occurred at Basra, where there was local opposition to the Porte’s attempts to revolutionise the tribal system of landholding in the area.12 Ramsay adumbrated the hesitant tone of British policy when warning that “by interference of the most limited character we start on the road of which we cannot see, or imagine, the end.”13 Caution also restrained such ambition as there was to penetrate Mesopotamia peacefully, by means of Indian colonists. The plan to [108]


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T H E I M P L I C AT I O N S O F D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G

utilise the area as “a possible outlet for the surplus population of India”14 was two-edged. Its advantages were stressed by enthusiasts such as Yate, who foresaw that the irrigation works would provide employment for Indian labour and food for Indian garrisons.15 The disadvantages, however, were paramount for those who ultimately formulated British policy. In 1905, Willcocks ignored the proposal,16 and Clarke17 and Godley18 questioned its wisdom. By 1906, Minto had “put it out of court”.19 India had no wish to be accused of, or to bear the expense for, changing the political balance within Mesopotamia. Besides, Britain’s local representatives had no desire to increase their burdens by supervising hordes of Indian immigrants. In 1909, Ramsay complained that they would increase his administrative duties at Baghdad,20 and Fitzmaurice protested that “this . . . terrible prospect” would add to his political difficulties at Constantinople.21 In 1909, the British government did not even bother to study the proposal. The plan did not reappear until 191422 and was not proposed to the Cabinet until 1915.23 Only the dictates of political prestige compounded, as they complemented, those of commercial promise. Between 1907 and 1910, the government indicated that even if it were not prepared to extend Britain’s political responsibilities in Mesopotamia, it was determined to maintain its political standing in the region. The India Office and the Foreign Office agreed with Ramsay’s estimate of the importance of his relations with the naquib of Baghdad. They therefore welcomed the settlement of the residency’s long-standing dispute with him.24 They concurred with Ramsay’s judgement that the naquib’s attitude had revealed the extent of British influence in Mesopotamia and its value “should we think fit to use it”.25 Although the temptation was resisted, British political influence itself was not jettisoned. The government received with alarm the Church Missionary Society’s warning that its Mesopotamian mission might, for reasons of economy, have to be withdrawn.26 Ramsay and Lloyd protested that “it seems most inadvisable that such a powerful lever of political influence should be thrown aside.”27 Parker, Hardinge and Grey decided that the Foreign Office should pay a small “retaining fee” to the Society.28 Also, the Foreign Office refused to sanction the Treasury’s proposal to reduce the status, size, and therefore expense, of the Baghdad residency. Ramsay warned that the small financial saving would not compensate for the great political damage which would result from the diminution of British prestige in [109]


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the eyes of a people who “at present consider England as the foreign nation”.29 Hardinge agreed that “special reasons” precluded a course which would have adverse effects in a region where political appearances might turn into political realities.30 The implications of the Tigris valley railway demand were therefore limited. The demand did not anticipate Britain’s wartime Mesopotamian policy. By 1916, the imperatives of imperial strategy were to supersede Grey’s earlier “fascination” with the idea that Mesopotamia was “one of the greatest commercial prospects at present undeveloped in the world”.31 The Sykes–Picot agreement owed little to his previous concern with the fact that sixty-five percent of Mesopotamian trade was in British hands.32 In 1908, however, the Foreign Office, no less than the Board of Trade, was “greatly encouraged” by Ramsay’s efforts to promote British commercial enterprise in the area.33 In 1910, both departments were most upset by Wilkie Young’s failure to overcome the apathy of British traders.34 This attitude illustrated the nature of Hardinge’s 1909 claim that Mesopotamia “has always been the sphere of British influence and we intend to keep it so”.35 Even within a restricted economic and political context, the Tigris valley railway concession appeared important enough to warrant a British declaration to Germany, an agreement with France and Russia and an ultimatum to Turkey.

The Declaration to Germany Both sides in the Anglo-German Baghdad Railway negotiations attempted, as has been seen, to derive diplomatic advantages from the dialogue.36 The ultimate and global impossibility of acceding to Germany’s diplomatic conditions was not, however, the only reason for the failure to reach a Baghdad Railway agreement in 1910. The immediate and local inadequacies of the German railway proposals were equally important factors. The British government refused to compromise on its Mesopotamian, as welI as its European, demands. The 1909 Gwinner–Cassel negotiations indicated the extent of Britain’s local claims. The Tigris valley demand emphasised that in 1910, the British government sought a monopoly over the future destiny of commercial enterprise in Mesopotamia. Britain’s claim that its exceptional position in the Persian Gulf gave it a strategic interest in the Baghdad Railway37 was no obstacle to [110]


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an Anglo-German agreement in 1910. The British did not await recognition of the claim, and the Germans did not deny it. In 1907, the British government secured a lease on the foreshore of Kuwait, and thus appeared to have baulked the construction of a German naval base at the most likely Gulf terminus for the Baghdad Railway.38 In the same year, the kaiser acknowledged Britain’s pre-eminence in the Gulf. He mocked Morley’s fear that the Baghdad Railway might convey German troops to India,39 but accepted Haldane’s request for a “gate on the Gulf ”.40 As late as April 1910, Kuhlmann indicated that if agreement were reached on the railway itself, “Germany would no doubt be ready to recognise Britain’s special position on the Persian Gulf.”41 In strategic terms, this was all Britain was to request in 1914 and all it might have required in 1910. The negotiations failed in 1910 because the British government maintained, and the German government rejected, the British claim to a railway monopoly throughout southern Mesopotamia. Grey’s contention that Britain was “principally” concerned with the southern section of the line42 had met with an “unfavourable” response from the kaiser in 1907;43 it was also questioned by Metternich in 1910. On the latter occasion, Metternich complained that the late Conservative government, which “were certainly not less Imperialist than the present Government”, had stipulated only that “an arrangement should be made with Great Britain when a port was actually selected on the Persian Gulf . . . No mention had been made of British control of the line from Bagdad to the Gulf.”44 His protest indicated Germany’s objections to the implications, as well as the terms, of the British demands. The Gwinner–Cassel negotiations had already shown that the 1907 Cabinet requirement, to construct and control the southern Baghdad Railway, had been extended. By 1910, the British government sought German recognition of Britain’s dominant position not only on the Gulf but in lower Mesopotamia as well. The contention that “the bankers could have reached an agreement, had political factors of various sorts not interfered”45 must be qualified if it is to remain true. Cassel’s desire to “work with” Gwinner46 was ultimately frustrated by the German stipulation for diplomatic concessions, and his interest flagged from time to time because of his daughter’s illness.47 Moreover, his work was continually undermined by the British government’s insistence on absolute control over the southern section of the Baghdad Railway. Cassel’s own request that Gwinner accord British firms sixty [111]


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percent of the railway south of Baghdad48 reflected the extent of Hardinge’s pressure49 but concealed his own scepticism. To his intimates, Cassel confided that the Foreign Office’s insistence on absolute control over the southern section was unrealistic. He complained that the department “do not seem to appreciate that if the Germans are willing to enter into a bargain, it must be on a basis which is satisfactory to them”.50 He protested that the matter could not be dealt with “as if no concession for that section were in existence”.51 His attitude was essentially defensive: “fifty percent participation prevents any one else controlling.”52 The British government, however, persistently placed the financiers “in rather an awkward position as regards Gwinner”53 by adopting a far more aggressive approach. It had accorded a warm reception to Babington Smith’s November 1909 report that Gwinner had offered Britain “control” of the southern section.54 But it was dissatisfied with Whittal’s55 subsequent variant limiting British participation to fifty percent.56 At the Board of Trade, Ashley57 objected that fifty percent “is not what we want: it would give us a share only, not control”,58 and Llewellyn Smith warned Hardinge not to accept any scheme which would give “any effective share of control to any foreign country”.59 At the Foreign Office, Grey, on 5 December 1909, told Cassel to bear both points in mind in his forthcoming negotiations in Berlin.60 Cassel’s labours on the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth of December were in vain: he could extract no more than an offer of fifty percent from Gwinner. Hardinge expressed curt disapproval of these terms.61 The Board of Trade insisted that “we must have at least fifty-five and preferably sixty percent”;62 and Hirtzel, for the India Office, advised that “we ought to try for even more than sixty percent.”63 Despite Babington Smith’s assertion that “the German position is a very strong one”,64 Grey remained intransigent on the principle of majority British control.65 The British government’s refusal to accede to the German railway proposals illustrated the intensity of its demand for “exclusively British possession of railway development from Baghdad to the Gulf ”.66 The Tigris valley railway demand demonstrated the persistence of this attitude. The failure of the Anglo-German negotiations, and the turn to an Anglo-Turkish confrontation, had complementary implications for British policy. The demand displayed Hardinge’s determination to “preserve our supremacy in Mesopotamia”67 as well as Grey’s refusal to allow Germany “the only door for trade” into the area.68 The desire for a [112]


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specific tracé, which explains the content of the April 1910 despatch, was born of a specific intention, which accounts for its tone. By rejecting Gwinner’s terms and then insisting on the Tigris valley railway, the British government declared to the Germans its claim to an exclusive sphere of influence in Mesopotamia.

The “Squaring” of France and Russia The negotiations which Grey conducted with France and Russia before signing the April 1910 despatch to Lowther confirm that he expected the Tigris valley railway demand to fulfil purely local ambitions. The diplomatic atmosphere of the talks did not conceal the uncompromising nature of the demand. Grey was less intransigent when negotiating with his potential European allies than when dealing with a ubiquitous rival for Britain’s world position. His readiness to accommodate the Asiatic ambitions of France and Russia contrasts with his determination to thwart those of Germany. But Eurocentric considerations continued to be secondary to local ambitions. By April 1910, Grey had engineered a diplomatic arrangement with France and Russia. He did so not to preserve the triple entente but to compensate them for their tacit recognition of a British sphere of influence in Mesopotamia. In this period, the Foreign Office became convinced that French designs in Syria would balance British ambitions in Mesopotamia. The strength of the former had already been demonstrated by the French government’s attitude towards the Baghdad Railway. In 1903, Delcassé had insisted that Gwinner recognise French supremacy in Syrian railways,69 and in March 1905 French pressure had forced Turkey to grant the Damas à Hama et Prolongements (DHP) company a concession for a line from Hamah to Aleppo with excessive kilometric guarantees.70 British officials had long appreciated the opportunities which French demands in Syria offered to Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. This balance had been noted by O’Conor in 1905,71 Minto in 190672 and the interdepartmental Baghdad Railway Committee in 1907.73 In 1909, a bargain appeared even more practical when Pichon, notwithstanding the “absolutely hostile” attitude of the Baghdad Railway Company, supported the DHP’s intention to apply for a Homs–Tripoli line which would undercut the German scheme.74 As early as February 1909, Mallet appreciated that Campbell’s identical project would excite French, as [113]


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well as German, opposition.75 He therefore advised consulting the French government before according the British syndicate official support.76 By the end of the year, his advice had been taken. It is tempting to attribute Grey’s abandonment of the Willcocks scheme77 solely to his desire to satisfy French ambitions in Syria and to suggest that he was prepared to jettison Britain’s local interests in order to acknowledge Anglo-French friendship in the Middle East. However, this conjecture would leave out of account the estimated defects of the Willcocks line in terms of British trade.78 It would also ignore the Foreign Office’s own awareness of the difficulties of Anglo-French cooperation in the Levant.79 Furthermore, it would conflict with Pichon’s suspicion of British designs.80 Finally, and most important, it would overlook the British concern with Mesopotamia, expressed in Parker’s statement that “we consider the Tigris Valley project much more important for our interests than the Homs-Baghdad line.”81 By the end of 1909, conditions were favourable for the formulation of “some sort of engagement with the French as regards joint action in the Willcocks line”.82 The distinction between the Tigris valley and the Homs projects nevertheless remained; and French aims in Syria, as far as the British Foreign Office was concerned, were incidental to both. Britain acceded to French control of the Willcocks project because it appeared to offer a quid pro quo for British control of the Tigris line. The complementary nature of the British and French designs produced a change in French, as well as British, policy. Pichon retained his aversion to “land concessions” in Asiatic Turkey83 but did not repeat his earlier disapproval of the 1907 Cabinet memorandum.84 Indeed, he appeared to accept the implications of the British position. On 1 December 1909, he informed Bertie that if Britain demanded exclusive control over the southern Baghdad Railway, France would insist on a connection (raccordement) of its lines in Syria with the Baghdad Railway.85 Grey, in turn, elucidated his own objectives when accepting Cambon’s intimation that the French government would demand a concession for a Baghdad–Homs railway in return for its consent to the proposed Turkish customs increase.86 To Grey, the confusion within his own department as to whether Pichon desired a French concession for the complete Willcocks scheme or for only part of it87 was unimportant. The Board of Trade’s protest that it knew no details of the French syndicate’s schemes88 was immaterial. Cassel’s warning that the French [114]


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government was “guided more by political than by financial considerations”89 was ineffectual. Grey was determined to gain French recognition for a British sphere in Mesopotamia. He therefore instructed that British financiers interested in the Homs project should be referred to the French government.90 In the spring of 1910, Hardinge followed this precept when approached by both British91 and various French92 syndicates. Grey admitted that the expected corollary was exclusive British control over Mesopotamian railways.93 The Tigris valley railway despatch confirmed the British government’s conception of the implications of the Anglo-French railway conversations. Grey maintained the 1907 à quatre position only insofar as the French government was informed of British ambitions. However, he had extended the application of the original principle by indicating that the entente powers ought to take the initiative, rather than await German overtures, in the matter of the Baghdad Railway. By his standards, the Anglo-French conversations had implied a tacit and mutual acknowledgement by the two powers of their respective spheres of influence in Asiatic Turkey: France in Syria and Britain in Mesopotamia. The manner in which the British government sought to compensate Russia for the abandonment of the à quatre principle reflected the same intention on Grey’s part. The 1907 Anglo-Russian convention had neither dissipated Russia’s fears of German interference in Persian politics94 nor dispelled its anxiety that the Baghdad Railway presented a threat to Russian domination of northern Persian markets.95 The failure of the Russo-German discussions in 1908,96 and the threat of an Anglo-German bargain in 1909–1910, afforded the Foreign Office an opportunity to negotiate Russian recognition of a British monopoly in Mesopotamia, by agreeing to Russian proposals in Persia. Grey’s abandonment of his earlier opposition to railway construction in Persia97 was due to his assessment of Britain’s military strength in the Gulf.98 The chronology of the Russian negotiations concerning the Mohammera project, however, conformed to his estimates of the importance of the Tigris valley line. British enthusiasm for the Mohammera project had waned at the close of 1908, when the government realised that the line would not secure British interests in Mesopotamia itself.99 The Foreign Office therefore abandoned its attempts to persuade Izwolsky that a joint Anglo-Russian project from Mohammera to Julfa would prove a more [115]


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attractive alternative to the Baghdad Railway than the Russian proposal for a trans-Persian line.100 Indeed, the British government did not respond when Izwolsky reversed the unfavourable attitude towards the Mohammera project which he had voiced at Reval101 and in September 1908 declared himself eager to proceed with plans for its construction.102 Initially Grey procrastinated; he objected to the Russian desire to link the railway question to that of an external loan to Persia.103 Ultimately he temporised by suggesting that since the Mohammera project would traverse an area which had not yet been sufficiently surveyed, the two governments should merely “earmark”, but not construct, the line.104 By November 1908, Hardinge was convinced that “the Mohammera-Julfa railway question may wait a little. We, and especially the Russians, have got so much on our hands at present, without unduly loading them further.”105 By the end of 1909, however, the British appeared eager to reopen discussions on the Mohammera project with the Russians. In Parliament, the British approaches were attributed to the imminent expiry of the Russo-Persian railway sterilisation agreement of 1890.106 They had originally been a response to the apparent recognition of Russia’s sphere of influence in Armenia, the Turco-Russian Anatolian railway negotiations and the Franco-Russian Samsoun–Sivas railway agreement.107 Yet between November 1909 and April 1910, Britain’s initiatives were specifically related to the fortunes of its bid for control of Mesopotamian railways. The Mohammera project returned to the Anglo-Russian agenda with the increase of Britain’s determination to obtain the Tigris valley railway. As Nicolson’s reports of Russian dissatisfaction at the abandonment of the à quatre principle became more frequent,108 the Mohammera project became more important. By 1910, the line had therefore assumed a function unforeseen in 1908. Now, the British government’s intention was not to neutralise the Baghdad Railway but to gratify Russia’s feelings and thereby encourage its recognition of Britain’s pre-eminence in southern Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office was adamant on the need to reopen the discussions with Russia. In the winter of 1909, Izwolsky’s unwillingness, or inability, to define Russia’s Baghdad Railway desiderata surprised Hardinge109 and annoyed the Eastern Department.110 Grey himself therefore took the initiative by directing Russian attention towards Persia and by indicating his willingness to give Izwolsky a free hand to negotiate with the Germans over the future of the Baghdad Railway [116]


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north-west of Baghdad.111 He also emphasised the danger that further Russian delay might enable Germany to snap up the Mohammera concession.112 In December 1909, Izwolsky swallowed the bait and told Nicolson that “in connection with the Baghdad Railway, it would be necessary for our two countries to converse on the policy to be pursued in respect to Railways in Persia.”113 Hardinge thereupon immediately noted that by agreeing to such discussions, the government would secure a lever with which to obtain Russian consent to Britain’s Mesopotamian railway demands.114 In pursuance of this aim, the Foreign Office also exerted pressure on the India Office. Hirtzel, as in 1908, pleaded for time “to see the effect of the Anglo-Russian Convention, to see the fate of the Baghdad Railway, and what part Germany is to play in the Middle East”.115 He repeated India’s opposition to any Russian lines in the direction of the Gulf:116 “Our immediate purpose”, he claimed, “is to keep the Germans out. From our point of view this is better served by a renewal of the bar on railways than by the grant of concessions which put us commercially at the mercy of Russia.”117 In contrast to the India Office, which thus saw the Mohammera railway as a loss on the Persian front, the Foreign Office insisted that it was a Mesopotamian gain. The latter maintained that by obtaining Russian and Persian consent to construct the Mohammera line, Britain would block German expansion, affirm its own interest in Persia’s commercial future and, not least, reconcile Russia to the Tigris valley demand.118 By 18 February 1910, the Foreign Office had instructed Barclay in Teheran119 to agree to offer Persia a joint Anglo-Russian loan of £400,000 in return for the right of first refusal on railway concessions in Persia.120 Metternich’s complaint that this condition “seemed to exclude all foreign enterprise” in the country121 merely confirmed what had been obvious for some time – that “the question of Persian railways was closely connected with that of the Baghdad Railway.”122 By March 1910, Grey appeared confident that his negotiations with the French and Russian governments would show returns in Mesopotamia. He informed Kuhlmann that he did not expect objections from the French government to the British demand for control of the southern Baghdad Railway, and thought that Russia would be satisfied with commensurate compensation in Persia.123 Grey had himself been forced to make sacrifices. He had acknowledged French predominance in Syria and had overcome many of the Indian objections to railway [117]


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construction in Persia.124 However, he looked to Mesopotamia as the area which would remain Britain’s exclusive preserve. The omission of all reference to France and Russia in the April 1910 despatch illustrates how little influence these two countries exerted on Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia. The omission also implies that Grey believed that the French and Russians were prepared to accept the ambition which his despatch articulated. The selection of the Tigris valley railway route had reflected British interests in Mesopotamia; the demand for the exclusive Tigris valley railway concession demonstrated Britain’s desire for an internationally recognised monopoly there.

The Ultimatum to Turkey The Anglo-Turkish negotiations prior to the ultimate April 1910 despatch provide the final indication of the true import of the Tigris valley railway demand. Railway construction was but one of a range of projects designed to exploit the commercial potential of Mesopotamia. British railway policy both complemented the pattern and completed the process which had already been demonstrated during negotiations on the petroleum, navigation and irrigation concessions. Throughout these negotiations, the British government had aimed to acquire a dominant position in the most vital commercial enterprises in Mesopotamia. The Tigris valley railway demand was therefore of symbolic as well as intrinsic importance. As early as March 1909, Grey had declared that “the question of whether or not the Turks favour a concession to us on sound lines with no kilometric guarantees will be some test of how much virtue there is in the new regime.”125 By April 1910, it was also to be a test of the strength of British claims in Mesopotamia and a demonstration of Britain’s determination to proclaim its sphere of influence there. Strategic as well as commercial factors influenced the government’s attitude towards the possibility of foreign control over the Mesopotamian petroleum fields. D’Arcy’s failure to obtain a concession to work the deposits in January 1908126 neither stifled official interest in the fields127 nor interrupted official support for him.128 The Foreign Office continued to demand exclusive British control over the concession despite persistent German opposition,129 traditional Turkish lethargy130 and hostile American initiatives.131 D’Arcy had the first claim on the government’s support not only because he had been the earliest prospector in the field132 but [118]


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also because he had already demonstrated his patriotism. Hardinge, in September 1909, refused to support the rival Shell group because he feared that it was under foreign control.133 Mallet, in the following month, emphasised D’Arcy’s consistent furtherance of British interests. He particularly noted the Admiralty’s report that the Burmah Oil Company (directed by D’Arcy) “have gone to much trouble and expense to produce an oil suitable for use in H.M.’s ships, and have entered into a contract with the Admiralty for its supply over a term of years”.134 In February 1910, therefore, Lowther was instructed to inform the Turks that the British government “attach much importance” to the allocation of the oil concession,135 and in April he was told to give his “strong support” to D’Arcy’s claims.136 Grey himself informed the American ambassador that although he desired Anglo-American cooperation in matters such as the Anatolian railway schemes, he would not promote, and would try to frustrate, non-British participation in a British concession for Mesopotamian oil.137 Despite the Foreign Office’s growing belief in the superiority of railways over steamers as a means of Mesopotamian communication,138 it also supported British efforts to obtain a monopoly of the carrying trade on the Tigris during this period. In this case, the choice of concessionnaire was less important than the individual’s prospects of success. Lynch’s traditional position and Mackenzie’s financial respectability were both examined in the light of Grey’s stipulation that “the main thing is to get them [i.e. all the Tigris steamers] into the hands of British interests.”139 In 1907 and 1908, Mackenzie reported that he was about to purchase a controlling interest in the Turkish Hamadieh Company.140 The Foreign Office therefore supported his claims.141 By 1909, however, Mackenzie’s negotiations had collapsed,142 and Lynch’s efforts to fuse his shipping interests with those of the Turkish company in a monopolistic concession appeared about to succeed. The Foreign Office therefore switched its allegiances. The Foreign Office had never ceased to dislike Lynch. Hardinge objected to the manner in which he had initiated the fusion negotiations without informing the British government,143 and complained of the haggling style to which Lynch resorted even after the Turkish terms appeared “quite satisfactory”.144 Law145 warned against ensuring the ultimate permanence of a Lynch monopoly146 and Grey sympathised with the aversion of several Baghdad merchants to a firm of “Irish absentee [119]


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landlords”.147 Nevertheless, only once did the Foreign Office enquire whether Mackenzie had definitely withdrawn from the field,148 and personal preference did not influence the official selection. The government ultimately abandoned its support for Lynch’s scheme in February 1910, but it did so for reasons of expediency. By that time, the fusion scheme appeared impossible of attainment. Britain could not match the pressure brought against it by several Turkish deputies and the German embassy at Constantinople; neither could it ignore the anti-British riots which news of the scheme occasioned at Baghdad.149 In any case, the scheme appeared worthless. In November 1909, Willcocks had announced that the irrigation works would have first claim on all the available water in Mesopotamia.150 Until November 1909, however, the British government had strongly supported Lynch. Despite Maxwell’s advice not to “enter into the details of the negotiations”,151 Grey had instructed Lowther to support even the most detailed of Lynch’s demands.152 He left Lowther in no doubt that the extension of Britain’s Mesopotamian monopoly, not the size of Lynch’s personal fortune, was the object of official concern. The fusion scheme appeared “vitally important to the interests of Great Britain in Mesopotamia”153 because it promised to provide a means of demonstrating the scope of British interests. The nature of British ambitions had been emphasised by Grey’s warning that it would be “an unfriendly act and fatal to British trade in Mesopotamia” were the concession to be given to a firm “financed by other than British capital”.154 By 1910, the British government had adopted a similar attitude towards the grant by the Porte of concessions for Mesopotamian irrigation works. As early as 1907, Ramsay had advised that the construction of the Hindiyah Barrage was of “sufficient importance from a political point of view” to warrant a government of India subsidy to British firms willing to undertake the project.155 In 1908, O’Conor too considered it “of the utmost importance that the first work of this kind, in a region which is likely to offer so many similar opportunities in the future, and in the development of which Britain is so interested, should be executed by a British firm”.156 Both warnings were heeded. The Indian government tentatively approached Indian firms in May 1907,157 and the Foreign Office, suspicious of French158 and German159 interests in the scheme, privately requested Willcocks’ advice in January 1908.160 The pace of official interest gathered momentum after the Porte’s announcement that all tenders for the Hindiyah Barrage were to be submitted by 12 [120]


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March 1908.161 The Foreign Office suggested that the Board of Trade interest Pearsons and Sons in the scheme.162 It also ensured that the firm’s engineer (Mr Money) was given every official assistance163 and protected against Turkish obstruction164 during his surveys in Mesopotamia. In 1908, Pearsons agreed to undertake the project165 and Willcocks was appointed irrigation adviser to the Turkish government.166 Both developments were regarded as signs of unexpected Turkish energy. They were also welcomed as portents of future British supremacy in Mesopotamian commercial enterprises.167 Hardinge did not have “a very high opinion of Willcocks’ patriotism, where his own financial interests are concerned”.168 Even he, however, considered that Willcocks’ appointment was of “very great importance” to Britain’s Mesopotamian interests.169 Official pressure for irrigation concessions in Mesopotamia slackened noticeably in 1909. The Foreign Office, in particular, had neither the time nor the expertise to study Willcocks’ mass of blueprints.170 Further approaches to the Porte were therefore suspended until the completion of his laborious local investigations.171 By 1910, however, Willcocks had apparently finalised his plans,172 and the British government renewed its interest. In January, Parker noted with both satisfaction and surprise that “more has been accomplished than might have been expected. Sir W.W.’s [sic] schemes have appealed vividly to the imagination of the Turkish Government and he still commands their confidence.”173 Lowther’s report of the ambitious nature of Turkish intentions174 encouraged the Foreign Office to prepare for a renewed bid to ensure that the construction of the irrigation works would become a British preserve.175 With British bankers prepared to finance the projects176 and a British engineer in charge of their implementation,177 the British government determined that this concession, together with those for petroleum and navigation, would become a British monopoly. The pressure which the Foreign Office exerted on the Porte in order to secure the Tigris valley railway illustrated a similar attitude. When coupled with British attempts to control the petroleum, navigation and irrigation concessions in Mesopotamia, the April 1910 despatch amounted to a demand for Turkish recognition of a British sphere of influence, and not merely for a railway line. Marling apprehended that “the designs of England for territorial aggrandisement in the regions about the Turkish [sic] Gulf ” had greatly contributed to “a widespread, if vague distrust of our policy”.178 As a result of this warning, the Foreign [121]


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Office modified its tactics but did not abandon its ultimate ambition. Mallet179 and Hardinge professed that Britain would not insist upon any railway scheme distasteful to the Porte.180 However, the April 1910 despatch made few concessions to Turkey’s national sentiments and indicated no inclination to negotiate on Britain’s demands. Neither did the 1910 demand altogether accord with Turkey’s best interests. By April 1910, the British government’s determination to obtain the Tigris valley railway concession had caused it to drop its previous contention that the system of kilometric guarantees was injurious to the Turkish economy. Hitherto, the government had persistently opposed the financial clauses of the 1903 Baghdad Railway convention.181 In 1906, Parker had complained that kilometric guarantees offered no incentive to the concessionnaires to work the line in an economic manner.182 In 1907, the Baghdad Railway Committee had insisted that they would “eventually lead to Ottoman financial disaster”,183 and in 1909, Hardinge had disparaged them in a conversation with Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish ambassador in London.184 As late as January 1910, Grey maintained that “were we to accept any scheme of co-operation in the Baghdad Railway which included participation by this country in the kilometric guarantees under the Convention of 1903, it would be almost impossible to defend our action in Parliament against the attacks which would be made upon it both there and in the press.”185 In its determination to obtain the Tigris valley railway concession, however, the British government ultimately abandoned this altruistic stand. The Foreign Office continued to object to Gwinner’s condition that his company be compensated by £2,000 per kilometre in return for fifty percent British participation in the southern Baghdad Railway.186 But it no longer disputed Cassel’s contention that railway construction in Mesopotamia would prove impossible unless there were some guarantee.187 Neither did the Foreign Office pursue the various suggestions that the British government itself provide a guarantee:188 this subterfuge would be resented by the Turks189 and opposed by the Germans.190 In any case, Hardinge and Grey saw little point in adopting a position which was plus royalists que le roi by objecting to a system with which the Turkish government appeared satisfied.191 Such objections would merely delay the negotiations and distract attention from the main British aim – exclusive control of the Mesopotamian railways. The primacy of this aim above all other considerations was confirmed by Parker’s suggestion that “we [122]


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might even go so far as to offer to pay the guarantee to the Turkish government, allowing them to make the actual disbursement” to the company which was to build the Tigris valley line.192 Although the 1910 despatch repeated the formal objections to the kilometric guarantees and suggested the substitution of the “Indian” system,193 it laid far more stress on the need to protect British interests than Turkish finances. A proposal that the company building the Tigris line would be nominally Ottoman was the only concession which the Foreign Office was prepared to make to Turkish national pride. A statement recognising Ottoman sovereignty in Mesopotamia and denying British political ambitions in the area was the only recognition it was willing to accord to Turkish territorial integrity.194 The April 1910 despatch insisted that the Porte should in turn acknowledge Britain’s exceptional commercial standing in the area. The British government’s desire for exclusive commercial rights in Mesopotamia had already been the subject of a declaration to Germany and the object of negotiations with France and Russia. It had also already been intimated to the Porte by the British government’s attitude towards the petroleum, navigation and irrigation concessions. The Tigris valley railway demand was an important stage in the development of British policy towards Mesopotamia because it explicitly formulated this ambition. The content of the despatch had been determined by the local commercial potential of a particular railway alignment. Its tone was dictated by an awareness of the implications which Turkish acceptance of the demand would have for the future implementation of the local British aim. It even merited an ultimatum.195 The Porte was warned that “His Majesty’s Government will in no circumstances agree to the desired increase of the customs duties until the Ottoman Government show a disposition to meet their wishes with regard to this concession, and . . . the future attitude of this country towards the Ottoman Empire will be largely affected by the reception with which Your Excellency’s application may meet.”196

[123]


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NOTES 1 30 March 1908, evidence before the Baghdad Railway Committee, CAB 16/10, para. 1089. 2 11 Jan. 1910 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p, 219. 3 Various incidents reported in FO 371/541, file 11393 (1908) and summarised in 6 Dec. 1909 Lorimer-Lowther, FO 195/2310. 4 13 June 1908 Ramsay-Grey 2 conf., FO 371/541/11393/20418 and minutes, ibid. 5 29 Apr. 1910 FO-WO, FO 371/1009/13041/1304.1. 6 Minutes on 23 Oct. 1908 Lowther-Grey 796, FO 371/560/37953/41694. Ramsay reported that the news of the revolution “electrified” the town and polarised loyalties within it. 22 July 1908 Ramsay-O’Conor 677/71, FO 195/2275. 7 The riots between the “Young Turk Committee” and the Mashwara Party are described in 31 Aug. 1908 Ramsay-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/546/28627/ 35261. 8 7 Sep. 1908 Ramsay-Lowther 821/90, FO 195/2275 and 14 Nov. 1908 Ramsay-Lowther 1036/122; enclosed in FO 368/230/29310/44452. 9 14 Sep. 1908 Ramsay-Lowther 848/93; enclosed in FO 371/560/36123/36123. 10 16 Oct. 1908 Ramsay-Lowther tel.; enclosed in FO 371/560/37953/41694. 11 22 Feb. 1909 Ramsay-Young, FO 195/2308. 12 The Porte’s attempts to encourage separate land contracts with individual tribesmen, rather than collective arrangements with sheikhs, are described in 6 Apr. 1908 Crow-O’Conor tel. 29, FO 195/2274; 31 Jan. 1910 Lowther-Grey 55, FO 371/1002/4235/4235; 15 March 1910 Crow-Lowther 15, FO 195/2338; and W. Willcocks, Sixty Years in the East (Edinburgh, 1935), p. 245. 13 22 Feb. 1909 Ramsay-Young, FO 195/2308. 14 See 3 Aug. 1903 Waugh’s report, FO 78/5278 and 10 March 1906 Parker memorandum, FO 371/148/10401/10680. 15 See the report of Yate’s views during the discussion after a public lecture by Lovat Fraser on “Some Peoples of the Persian Gulf ”, The Times, 9 Jan. 1908, p. 4 and 30 March 1908 evidence before the CID subcommittee, CAB 16/10, paras. 1089 and 1099–1101. 16 Not unwisely, he told the sultan that “the hill Kurds of Sulemanie and the Mosul districts would flock to the region in sufficient numbers”. 9 June 1905 Willcocks memo.; enclosed in 12 June 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne 406 conf., FO 78/5395. 17 28 July 1905 Clarke-Ritchie pte., L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1905/3210. 18 18 Aug. 1905 Godley-Sanderson pte., FO 78/5395. 19 2 May 1906 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 8, p. 35. 20 29 July 1909 Lowther-Grey 52 consular, FO 369/249/204.66/29241. 21 Minute on 1 June 1909 Ramsay-Lowther 565/50, FO 195/2308. 22 When it appeared original enough for A. T. Wilson to excuse the length of his proposal by the preface “in case it has not occurred to you”. 28 Nov. 1914 A. T. Wilson-Yate pte., L/P & S/10, vol. 463, no. 1914/4717. 23 14 March 1915 Hirtzel memo.; printed as App. 6 to the 1915 de Bunsen Report CAB 27/1 pp. 84–85. See also the mention of Harcourt’s memo. entitled The [124]


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24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39

40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47

Spoils, dated 25 March 1915, referring to Mesopotamia as “an outlet for Indian immigration” in M. Gilbert, W. S. Churchill, Vol. 3, 1914–1916 (London, 1971), p. 373. 16 Sep. 1907 IO-FO, FO 371/342/1174/31078 and 21 Jan. 1908 O’Conor-Grey 42, FO 371/531/3311/3709. 1 Oct. 1909 Ramsay-Lowther 1011/108, FO 195/2310 and minutes on 2 March 1910 Lowther-Grey 125, FO 371/996/189/7778. 14 Aug. 1907, Church Missionary Society-FO, FO 371/353/24055/27261. 26 July 1907 Ramsay-O’Conor 649/85; enclosed in FO 371/353/24055/29279 and Lloyd memo.; enclosed in 3 Sep. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 547, FO 371/353/ 24055/30070. Minutes to above, ibid. Ramsay-Lowther 856; enclosed in 8 Sep. 1909 Lowther-Grey 60 consular, FO 371/780/34200/34200. Minute to above, ibid. 2 March 1908, evidence presented to the 1908 CID subcommittee, CAB 16/10, para. 232. 5 May 1910 Grey-Goschen pte., GREY MSS, 21, FO 800/62. E.g., Mallet minute on 10 Nov. 1908 Lowther-Grey 170, FO 368/231/34316/ 39829. For a detailed summary of Ramsay’s efforts see 25 Jan. 1909 RamsayLowther 69/b, FO 195/2308. Minutes on 4 Apr. 1910 B of T-FO, FO 368/470/922/11667. 24 Nov. 1909 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1909, FO 800/342, p. 237. Above, pp. 77–78. 8 March 1907 Grey-Lascelles 77, BD 6, no. 247, pp. 354–355. Busch, Britain and the Gulf, pp. 308–310. “With the position on the railway prepared, Kuwait secured, and the Persian problem decreased for the moment by the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian accord, Britain might simply have awaited the inevitable German overture.”, p. 310. “Now think of the journey these men would have to take before they got to the tapping point, – through Austria, the Balkan Powers, Turkey, Persia. And they would only start if we were at war with England: and if we were at war with England, we should most assuredly want our armed men on a certain frontier a very long way from India.” Reported in 22 Nov. 1907 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 2, p. 299. Haldane, Before the War, pp. 47–52. Hardinge considered that “the advantage gained at Windsor was that the Germans admitted that we have a political and strategic interest in the line.” 25 Nov. 1907 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1907 (2), FO 800/340, p. 170. But note that Grey was “sure the Emperor mentioned the Bagdad Railway without having consulted Bulow.” 20 Nov. 1907 Grey-Bertie pte., Grey MSS, 11, FO 800/50. 4 Apr. 1910 Hardinge-Goschen pte., HARD MSS, 21, p. 108. 28 Oct. 1909 Grey-Goschen 266 secret, BD 6, no. 277, pp. 378–379. 14 Nov. 1907, entry in Hirtzel’s political diary. 31 May 1910 Grey-Goschen 148 secret, BD 6, no. 375, pp. 490–491 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 109. First enunciated in 16 Nov. 1909 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 2. 9 Feb. 1910 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 3. [125]


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48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

22 Dec. 1909 Cassel-Gwinner, BS MSS, 10. Hardinge minute on 20 Dec. 1909 Cassel-Hardinge, BD 6, no. 309, p. 411. 22 Jan. 1910 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 3. Ibid. Churchill, in particular, was “quite uninformed as to the real situation”. 26 Nov. 1909 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 2. See also Whittal-Babington Smith, 16 Nov. 1909, BS MSS, 10. 18 Jan. 1910 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 3. Babington Smith agreed. See 31 Dec. 1909 L1. Smith memo, BT 11/3 and 13 Jan. 1910 Babington Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 11. 13 Jan. 1910 Cassel-Babington Smith, ibid. 9 Nov. 1909 Marling-Grey 893, BD 6, no. 282, pp. 384–385 and App. 7, pp. 793–794. E. Whittal, partner in Sir W. Whittal & Sons and British administrator of the National Bank. Hardinge minute on 9 Nov. 1909 Marling-Grey 893, BD 6, no. 282, p. 385. P. Ashley (1876–1945), staff officer, Commercial Dept., B of T, 1907–1916. 26 Nov. 1909 Ashley memo., BT 11/3. 8 Nov. 1909 Ll. Smith-Hardinge, ibid. 9 Dec. 1909 Grey-Hardinge, FO 371/765/2074/45560. Hardinge minute on 20 Dec. 1909 Cassel-Hardinge, BD 6, no. 309, pp. 409–411. Hardinge later recalled that he had seen Cassel, on the Tatter’s return from Berlin, for only ten minutes; the financier had been twenty minutes late for his appointment. Minute on 29 Dec. 1909 Mallet memo., FO 371/991/100/100. 7 Jan. 1910 B of T-FO, FO 371/991/100/814. 31 Dec. 1909 Hirtzel-Ritchie, L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2), no. 1909/4387. 8 Feb. 1910 Babington Smith-Hardinge, BD 6, no. 322, pp. 426–429. 31 May 1910 Grey-Babington Smith, BD 6, no. 376, pp. 491–492. 55 percent was said to be the “minimum” British demand. 9 Dec. 1909 Grey-Hardinge, FO 371/765/2074/45560. Minute on 17 Sep. 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., FO 371/764/2074/35426. Minute on 11 Apr. 1910 Goschen-Grey 102 v. confidential, BD 6, no. 344, p. 461. On this subject, see W. I. Shorrock, “The Origins of the French mandate on Syria and the Lebanon: The Railway Question, 1901–1914”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 1 (no. 2) April 1970, p. 140. 24 March 1905 Constans (French ambassador at Constantinople)-Delcasse tel. 33, DDF, series 2, vol. 6, no. 180, pp. 234–235. 31 July 1905 O’Conor-Lansdowne tel. 110, FO 78/5449. 2 May 1906 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 8, p. 35. Above, p. 67 n. 101. 7 Aug. 1909 Pichon-Constans 196, DDF, series 2, vol. 12, no. 183, p. 228. 6 Feb. 1909 minute on Lowther-Grey 64, FO 371/764/1623/4783; Campbell’s project is referred to above, p. 85. 24 Feb. 1909 Mallet memo., FO 371/764/1623/7552. Above p. 93. Above, p. 91. As early as 1906, Block had complained that in Turkey, “in spite of the Anglo-French entente, England and English finance is left out in the cold”. 19 June 1906 Block-Hardinge pte., FO 371/152/22545/22545. See also the dismal [126]


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80

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

93 94 95 96

97 98 99 100

101

reports in 1907 of the failure of “Anglo-French industrial co-operation in Turkey”. FO 371/350. Babington Smith had heard that the French feared that the Turks might grant Britain a concession for the Willcocks scheme, and had warned the Porte that “they would specially resent a railway starting from the Syrian littoral if they have no share in it.” 30 Oct. 1909 Babington Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 2. Minute on 22 Apr. 1910 Ronaldshay-Grey, FO 371/995/184/14075. 20 Oct. 1909 Babington Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 2. 1 Dec. 1909 Bertie-Grey 470 secret, BD 6, no. 303, pp. 403–404. Above, p. 97, n. 9. 1 Dec. 1909 Bertie-Grey 470 secret, BD 6, no. 303, pp. 403–404. 22 Jan. 1910 Grey-Bertie 38, BD 6, no. 321, pp. 425–426. Lindsay, Mallet and Hardinge minutes on 1 Dec. 1909 Bertie-Grey 470 secret, BD 6, no. 303, p. 404. Ashley minute on 1 March 1910 FO-B of T, BT 11/3. 15 March 1910 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 3. First minute on 1 Dec. 1909 Bertie-Grey 470 secret, BD 6, no. 303, p. 403. 1 Apr. 1910 Ronaldshay-Grey, FO 371/995/184/10842. 21 Apr. 1910 Hardinge memo., FO 371/995/184/14473. Two rival French groups requested the British government’s favour. The more substantial one was led by MM. Bardac and Ornstien, the more vociferous one by MM. Barry and Maimoun. J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, appears to lay too much stress on the latter group (p. 4, n. 2). Maimoun’s methods were often distrusted by the FO (e.g., Hardinge minute on 23 June 1910 Maimoun-FO, FO 371/995), and he was ultimately exposed in the courts as a confidence trickster (3 June 1911, The Times). Minute on 22 Apr. 1910 Ronaldshay-Grey, FO 371/995/184/14075. See Kazemzadeh, Britain and Russia in Persia, pp. 508–509. Ibid., pp. 488–489. The negotiations had been initiated in 1906 (Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, pp, 84–86) and formally closed in 1908, when the Russians refused to build the Khanikin extension to the Baghdad Railway until the Germans recognised their sphere of influence in northern Persia. (22 Feb. 1908 Grey-Nicolson 44 secret, BD 6, no. 253, p. 358). Described in 22 Dec. 1905 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 28, p. 6. 19 Sep. 1907 FO-IO, FO 371/312/30587/30587. Above, pp. 88–89. On Izwolsky’s desire for a trans-Persian line, see 21 Nov. 1907 Nicolson-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 10, p. 169, On Grey’s willingness to open Anglo-Russian negotiations on the Mohammera project, see 17 March 1908 Grey-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1908, FO 800/341, p. 65. 21 July 1908 Grey-Marling 128 conf., FO 371/503/7658/23132. Hardinge reported that after studying a map, Izwolsky declared that “although the route would have the undoubted advantage of neutralising the Baghdad Railway, he feared that it would be economically disadvantageous to Russia, as it would facilitate the competition of foreign sea-borne trade with that of Russian goods brought by rail.” 18 June 1908 Hardinge-F.H. Villiers (minister at Lisbon, 1906–1911), Villiers MSS (PRO, London), vol. 2, FO 800/23. [127]


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102 16 Sep. 1908 Nicolson-Grey tel. 135, FO 371/503/7658/28420. 103 After advice from Marling that the loan was unnecessary. 10 Sep. 1908 MarlingGrey 251 conf., FO 371/503/7658/33437. 104 14 Oct. 1908 aide memoire to Izwolsky, FO 371/503/7658/33780. 105 25 Nov. 1908 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1908, FO 800/341, p. 183. 106 7 Apr. 1910 Grey, PD 5, 1910, 16, cols. 571–572. On the 1890 Russo-Persian sterilisation agreement, see Kazemzadeh, Britain and Russia in Persia, p. 235. 107 27 Oct. 1909 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1909, FO 800/342, p. 190. 108 For examples, see above, pp. 76–78. 109 8 Dec. 1909 Hardinge-Nicolson, pte., BD 6, no. 305, pp. 405–406. 110 Dec. 1909 Stanley memo., BT 11/3. 111 23 Nov. 1909 Grey-Nicolson tel. 1340, BD 6, no. 292, pp. 392–393. 112 Minute on 30 Nov. 1909 Nicolson-Grey tel. 499, FO 371/765/2074/43850. 113 1 Dec. 1909 Nicolson-Grey 632, FO 371/717/22311/4.4307. 114 Minute, ibid. 115 18 Dec. 1909 Hirtzel memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 160, no. 1909/4355. 116 And also its fear that as soon as Persian railway construction was permitted, the Russians would begin work on the Askabad–Meshed line, ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Hardinge minute on 1 Dec. 1909 Nicolson-Grey 632, FO 371/717/22311/44307; Mallet minute on 6 Jan. 1910 Nicolson-Grey 11, FO 371/947/124/1015; and 19 Jan. 1910 FO-IO, FO 371/717/22311/46604. 119 Sir G. H. Barclay (1862–1921), minister at Constantinople, 1906 and April–July 1908 and minister at Teheran, 1908–1912. 120 Kazemzadeh, Britain and Russia in Persia, p. 551 and 18 Feb. 1910 Barclay-Grey 22, FO 371/947/124. See also Hardinge’s advocacy of a further Anglo-Russian declaration in minute on 29 March 1910 Barclay-Grey tel. 134, FO 371/951/ 2901/10745. 121 22 March 1910 Grey-Goschen 67; quoted in Ferard memo. on Persian railways (dated 20 June 1911), L/P& S/10, vol. 160, no. C. 122. 122 The observation is Ferard’s. Ibid., p. 30. 123 31 March 1910 Grey-Goschen 80, BD 6, no. 337, p. 442. Nicolson, however, already feared a Potsdam-type deal. When, in April 1910, Sazonov (who had recently replaced Izwolsky as Russian foreign minister and was to hold the post until 1916) told Nicolson that the Germans were willing to negotiate, the ambassador anxiously stressed the “absolute necessity of the British and Russian governments maintaining the closest solidarity”. 14 Apr. 1910 Nicolson-Grey tel. 124, BD 6, no. 347, p. 462. 124 The IO also wanted to obtain options on railways between Kerman and Bandar Abbas, Ahwaz and Bandar Abbas via Shiraz with an option for a port at Khor Musa, Ahwaz and Bushire via Aliabad, Rabat and Kerman, and Gwadar (or Chahbahar) and Kerman. See 15 Apr. 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/951/2901/12874 and 3 May 1910 G of I-IO tel., L/P & S/10, vol. 160, no. 1910/663. 125 Minute on 13 March 1909 Graham-Mallet pte., FO 371/764/2074/11023. 126 13 Jan. 1908 O’Conor-Grey 21, FO 371/537/4526/4526. 127 E.g., 14 May 1908 Young-B of T; enclosed in FO 195/2274. 128 E.g., Hardinge minute on 1 Nov. 1908 D’Arcy-FO, FO 371/560/31179/31179. 129 Noted in, e.g., 23 Aug. 1908 Maxwell-Grey pte., FO 371/538/ 5399/29565 and 1 Dec. 1909 Marling-Grey 931, FO 371/777/ 23256/44347. For a full discussion [128]


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130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144

145 146 147 148 149

150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158

of the international competition to gain the petroleum concession in this period, see Kent, British Interests in Oil, ch. 2. Note the bitter complaint against Turkish dilatoriness in 9 Dec. 1908 Gilchrist, Walker and Co-Lowther, FO 195/2295. The “Glasgow” and “Chester” schemes. See 17 Aug. 1909 Lowther Grey 674, FO 371/777/23256/31632 and Kent, op. cit., p. 43. Minutes by Law on various alternative British applications for official support, e.g., 24 Aug. 1909 R.W. Cohen-FO, FO 371/ 777/23256/31930 and 26 Aug. 1909 Harmsworth-FO, FO 371/777/23256/32316. 21 Sep. 1909 Hardinge memo., FO 371/777/23256/35669. Minute on 28 Oct. 1909 Adm.-FO, FO 371/777/32356/39751. 18 Feb. 1910 Grey-Lowther tel. 39, FO 371/1004/5693/5789. 19 Apr. 1910 Grey-Lowther 102, FO 371/1004/5693/12060. 27 June 1910 Grey-Bryce (ambassador at Washington, 1907–1913), FO 371/ 1004/5693/23499. Above, pp. 87–88. Minute on 24 March 1907 Mackenzie-Hardinge, FO 371/343/1910/9749. 24 March 1907 Mackenzie-Hardinge, FO 371/343/1910/9749 and 13 July 1908 Mackenzie-Hardinge, FO 371/535/2344/24508. E.g., 13 May 1907 Hardinge-O’Conor pte., FO 371/343/1910/15350. 19 Apr. 1909 Mackenzie-Hardinge, FO 371/759/322/21745. Minute on 5 June 1909, FO 371/759/322/21046. Maxwell minute 16 Sep. 1909, FO 371/759/322/34629. Later in September Hardinge minuted: Lynch “is an impossible person to deal with as he is never satisfied and always wants to go one better”. 24 Sep. 1909, FO 371/ 759/322/35589. Sir A. Law (1856–1943), counsellor on commercial and consular affairs, FO, 1907–1914. “If British trade in Mesopotamia in the next 25 years develops as we hope it will, it is quite conceivable that the termination of the Lynch monopoly would then be most desirable.” 23 Sep. 1909 minute, FO 371/759/322/35522. Enclosure in 22 March 1910 Lowther-Grey 166, FO 371/996/189/10512. Grey minute on 18 June 1909 Hardinge memo., FO 371/759/322/23153. On the riots in Baghdad and the political demonstrations in Constantinople, see 23 Feb. 1910 Lowther-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 1906–1911, FO 800/192 and 2 March 1910 Lowther-Grey 125, FO 371/996/189/7778. By February 1910 Hardinge had decided that “we cannot upset i.e. overturn the Turkish government for the sake of the Lynch concession.” Minute, FO 371/996/189/5976. See above, p. 102 n. 133 and below, p. 134. Minute on 7 Sep. 1909 Lynch-FO, FO 371/759/322/34932. E.g., 1 Oct. 1909 Grey-Lowther tel. 674, FO 371/759/322/33701. 18 June 1909 Grey-Lowther tel. 358, FO 371/759/322/23153. 22 June 1909 Grey-Lowther tel. 361, FO 371/759/322/22987. 30 March 1907 Ramsay-G of I; enclosed in L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1907/3135. 13 Jan. 1908 O’Conor-Grey 21, FO 371/537/4526/4526. 13 May 1907 Benton (inspector-general of irrigation, G of I) the chief engineer Bombay; enclosed in L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1907/2135. Lloyd minute on 8 Dec. 1907 O’Conor-Grey 752 conf., FO 371/356/41058/ 41058. [129]


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159 Grey was disturbed by the Kaiser’s hope that “Germany should do in Mesopotamia, in the way of irrigation, what we had done in Egypt.” 13 Nov. 1907 Grey memo., FO 371/351/18186/ 42737, pp. 7–8. 160 24 Jan. 1908 Willcocks-Graham pte.; enclosed in FO 195/2291. 161 9 Jan. 1908 O’Conor-Grey tel. 6 commercial, FO 371/534/900/900. 162 23 Jan. 1908 FO-B of T, FO 371/534/900/1428. 163 31 March 1908 Fox (B of T)-Hardinge, FO 371/534/900/11098. Willcocks was told that the FO would pay his expenses to Turkey if he would agree to advise Money, 9 March 1908 Barclay-Gorst, FO 195/2293. 164 25 March 1908 Barclay-Grey 141, FO 371/534/900/10776. 165 5 Aug. 1908 Pearsons-Fox; enclosed in FO 371/534/900/27476. 166 18 Sep. 1908, The Times, p. 5. 167 Grey minute on 17 Sep. 1908 Lowther-Grey 583, FO 371/534/900/33324. 168 21 Sep. 1908 Hardinge-Block pte., HARD MSS, 13, p. 75. 169 25 Sep. 1908 Hardinge-Graham pte., ibid., p. 175. 170 See below pp. 134–136. 171 Described in Willcocks, Sixty Years, pp. 233–239. 172 5 Apr. 1910 Lowther-Grey 209, FO 371/1002/4235/12176. 173 Minute on 21 Jan. 1910 Lowther-Grey 55, FO 371/1002/4235/4235. 174 The ambassador ascertained from the Turkish minister of public works that the Porte was already prepared to embark upon the opening of a new canal at Rumuli, the repair of the old Hindiyah dam and the construction of a regulator at Fellujah. These works would cost £7–8,000. At a cost of £2–3 million, the Turks hoped, within the next year, to construct a dam at Fellujah, another at Kut and irrigation canals running from the Euphrates. 5 Apr. 1910 Lowther-Grey 209, FO 371/1002/ 4235/12176. 175 16 May 1910 Lowther-Grey 310, FO 371/1002/4235/18143 and minutes. 176 4 Apr. 1910, Babington Smith memo., BD 6, no. 34.1, pp. 447–449. 177 Cuignin, the French engineer, whose initial disappointment at the Turkish preference for Willcocks had led him to announce that he would seek employment in China (10 Aug. 1908 Ramsay-Lowther 732/78, FO 195/2275), eventually announced that he would work for the English engineer (7 Dec. 1908 RamsayLowther 1125/132, ibid.) 178 5 Dec. 1909 Marling-Grey 946 secret, BD 6, no. 304, p. 405. 179 Mallet minute on 10 Jan, 1910 Lowther-Grey 21; found in BT 11/3. 180 22 Jan. 1910 Grey-Bertie 38, BD 6, no. 321, pp. 425–426. 181 By the 1903 convention, the Turkish government agreed to grant the Baghdad Railway Company two forms of guarantee. The first was a 99-year annuity for the construction of the line and the provision of rolling stock. It amounted to 11,000 francs for every kilometre of the line completed, and was to be put in state bonds and secured by a first mortgage on the railway and its properties. The payment of interest and the sinking fund on these bonds was to be guaranteed by the assignment to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, specifically for this purpose, of the revenues of certain of the districts through which the railway was to pass. The second guarantee was for the working expenses of the line. The convention provided that until the receipts of any particular section of the line reached 4,500 francs per kilometre, the Ottoman government was to guarantee the company that sum. Receipts between 4,500 and 10,000 francs would all go [130]


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182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195

196

to the Ottoman government, and those above 10,000 francs would be divided between the Porte and the Baghdad Railway Company on a basis of 40 percent and 60 percent respectively. See Art. 35 of the 5 March 1903 Baghdad Railway convention (Cd. 5635); 12 March 1906 Parker memo., FO 371/148/10401/ 10680, pp. 17–20; 25 Nov. 1909 Stanley memo., BT 11/3; 10 Jan. 1910 Grey memo., FO 371/991/100/1355; and Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, pp. 77–78. 12 March 1906 Parker memo., FO 371/148/10401/10680, p. 21. Mackenzie had been the only witness to suggest that Britain accept the system. 13 Feb. 1907 evidence before the Baghdad Railway committee, FO 371/340/ 12/9865, p. 17. 10 Oct. 1909 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 161. 20 Jan. 1910 Grey memo., FO 371/991/100/1355. See enclosure in BD 6, no. 309, pp. 410–411 and Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 108. 22 Jan. 1910 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 2. Of which Inchcape’s suggestion (above, pp. 67–68, n. 124) was but one. 29 Dec. 1909 Mallet memo., FO 371/991/100/100. 14 March 1910 L 1. Smith-Hardinge pte., FO 371/991/100/7681. 4 Apr. 1910 Hardinge-Goschen pte., HARD MSS, 21, p. 108; 26 May 1910 Babington Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 11 and 31 May 1910 Grey-Babington Smith, BD 6, no. 376, pp. 491–492. Parker minute on 5 Apr. 1910 Ogilvy, Gillanders & Co.-FO, FO 371/991/ 100/11933. See above, pp. 67–68, n. 124. The idea was Parker’s (above, n. 192). It was seconded by Mallet and Hardinge (minutes, ibid.) and embodied in the April 1910 despatch. 20 Apr. 1910 Grey-Lowther 107 secret, BD 6, no. 352, p. 468. “The ultimatum embodies the final condition or concession, ‘the last word’ so to speak . . . It ordinarily, but not always, implies a threat to use force if the demand is not complied with.” Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice, ed. Sir N. Bland (4th edn., London, 1957), p. 105. 20 Apr. 1910 Grey-Lowther 107 secret, BD 6, no. 352, p. 472.

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6 The Method of Decision-Making

The process whereby the British government formulated its decision to despatch the Tigris valley railway demand substantiates two conclusions which have already been indicated. First, the merits of the particular line were assessed solely on the criteria of alleged local British interests in Mesopotamia. Second, the line was intended to bring about the creation of a local British sphere of influence. The demand itself expressed a policy which had been initiated in London and which was favoured by the Foreign Office. It articulated the ambitions and hopes of the British government; it also illustrated the weaknesses of Britain’s decision-making machinery. Only one consular report notably influenced the Foreign Office, and on only one occasion did interdepartmental advice deflect it from its course. Invariably, however, independent or “external” reports were consulted only when they corroborated the department’s preconceived views. Similarly, ambassadorial advice was rejected unless it concurred with the government’s ambitions. Interdepartmental or “horizontal” opinions were contested when they conflicted with the Foreign Office’s prejudices.

“External” Information The apparent attention to detail in the discussions which preceded the formulation of the April 1910 despatch is deceptive. Although British policy-makers possessed a commendable grasp of the variety of British interests in Mesopotamia, they were rarely prepared to modify their opinions in the light of new and available evidence concerning the area. Not only were relevant reports sometimes read in the light of a desired policy but the policy also appears to have been determined before all the necessary reports had been received. The former tendency was indicated after Willcocks had announced, on 2 November 1909, that his irrigation works would render the [133]


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Mesopotamian rivers unfit for navigation.1 The government reacted to this news with unnecessary alarm and unwise haste. Although the announcement itself did not modify Britain’s Mesopotamian policy, it hurried the Foreign Office into presenting its Tigris valley demand to the Turkish government. Lindsay recollected that “the possibility contemplated made it the more urgent for HMG to secure adequate participation in the railway schemes of Mesopotamia.” Willcocks’ announcement appeared to destroy all hope that a British navigation concession would neutralise the detrimental effects of a German railway.2 As has been seen, this conviction was already gaining ground;3 but Lindsay’s account indicates that because the issue had not yet been settled, Willcocks’ announcement assumed great importance at the Foreign Office. A similar situation seems to have prevailed at the India Office. On 5 November, Hirtzel noted with some concern that “irrigation works will eventually spoil Baghdad-Basra navigation.”4 He later wondered whether “we may not all the time have been putting our money on the wrong horse” by supporting the proposed Lynch fusion scheme.5 Although both departments eventually withdrew their support for the fusion proposals as a result of local opposition in Turkey,6 their initial reaction to Willcocks’ announcement is puzzling. His statement should not have come as a surprise. Willcocks had long preached the doctrine that in Mesopotamia “rivers are for irrigation, railways for communications.”7 More particularly, throughout the latter half of 1909, Ramsay had sent to the Constantinople embassy, as well as to the commercial department of the Board of Trade and the government of India, lengthy summaries of Willcocks’ plans.8 Admittedly, those for July 1909 indicated that it might be possible to preserve and improve Tigris navigation by constructing the Kut Barrage.9 However, as early as 20 August 1909, Ramsay had reported Willcocks’ explicit statement that “the waters of the rivers would be used up in irrigation.”10 Moreover, on 15 October of the same year, Lowther forwarded to London a copy of Willcocks’ final report to the Ottoman minister of finance. This had also predicted that “navigation between Baghdad and Bussorah would gradually deteriorate.”11 The surprised reception of Willcocks’ November announcement may have been due to faulty recording techniques. The use to which it was subsequently put, on the other hand, appears to illustrate official single-mindedness. Willcocks’ prediction was regarded as a convenient [134]


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THE METHOD OF DECISION-MAKING

confirmation of the necessity for Britain’s railway demands. Once Grey had reconciled himself to the future destruction of river navigation,12 the Foreign Office deliberately foreclosed discussion on the matter. Although Marling questioned the veracity of Willcocks’ statement13 and Hardinge doubted the word of an “irrepressible enthusiast”,14 the Tigris railway demand was pushed forward as the only means of safeguarding Britain’s trade in Mesopotamia. As late as March 1910, the department refused to pass any judgement on Lynch’s conflicting contention;15 and in April it appeared to ignore Lowther’s opinion that “Willcocks is prone to exaggerate the incompatibility of the two [the navigation and irrigation] interests.”16 In June, Mallet admitted that the future of Tigris navigation was a “most puzzling question”.17 Grey, however, merely deferred discussion of its merits, noting that Turkey’s financial difficulties would, in any case, undoubtedly delay the execution of the irrigation plans.18 Although the future utility of the rivers was unclear, the Foreign Office did not re-examine the necessity for a Tigris valley railway. The confidence with which the government stipulated the need for one particular railway alignment in the April 1910 despatch is equally surprising. As has been seen, the Foreign Office, the India Office and the Board of Trade appeared convinced of the superiority of the Tigris valley tracé over all others.19 As early as 1908, Parker had committed himself to supporting this route, despite the objections of George Lloyd20 and before reports by Akers and Palmer had strengthened his case.21 In 1909, the Foreign Office was momentarily distracted by the advocates of the Willcocks scheme, but it persistently ignored Ramsay’s warning that “it is not possible to form an opinion as to whether the line south of Baghdad should run on the right or left bank of the Tigris, until Sir William Willcocks’ surveys are further advanced and more is known about existing marshes and how the irrigation works are likely to alter them.”22 The evidence which pointed to the practicability of the Tigris valley route in the winter of 1909 was only tentative. Willcocks himself was not convinced of the need for a line south of Baghdad until June 1910, and then he advocated an alignment along the left bank of the Tigris, not, as the April 1910 despatch had demanded, along the right bank.23 The picture was further complicated in 1911. Although Lorimer then boldly endorsed the dictum that a through route to the Mediterranean would be “worthless”,24 more detailed researches indicated otherwise. [135]


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Money, who surveyed the area on Babington Smith’s behalf, considered that of all the railway schemes proposed, that to the Syrian coast via Hit “offers superior advantages to each of the others”.25 But Babington Smith himself advised the government that in view of the conflict between all the reports hitherto commissioned, the German route from Baghdad to Basra down the Euphrates was preferable. “One great difficulty in expressing decided opinions about the various lines”, he wrote to Lowther, “is the kaleidoscopic nature of Willcocks’ plans; one never knows when they are final, if ever they are. One great advantage of the German tracé, is that it is independent of the precarious nature of the irrigation schemes.”26 Had his opinion been seriously considered at the Foreign Office, British railway plans might have resulted in a very different despatch to Lowther. But the British government lacked the flexibility to adapt its Mesopotamian policy to changing conditions. London had determined to attain a definite objective and therefore listened only to what it wanted to hear. The reception accorded to Ramsay’s advocacy of the Willcocks scheme was therefore unique.27 It provided the only example of an external report that deflected official attention from lower Mesopotamia to Syria. But it did not set a precedent. Ramsay’s ability was recognised and respected,28 especially when it was contrasted with the dismal record of his predecessor Newmarch.29 However, his recommendation was ultimately overruled.30 The true tenor of British policy was indicated in Hardinge’s admission that another railway project, the Mohammera line, was “my own idea”.31 The Foreign Office sought confirmation rather than information. When the Mohammera line was referred for consideration to the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1908, the Foreign Office representatives deliberately prompted witnesses to testify to the virtues of the scheme.32 The Foreign Office’s determination to retain control of Mesopotamian policy even led to occasional lapses in communication with British ambassadors abroad. In 1908, O’Conor complained that he was being “left in the dark” on the progress of the government’s attempts to interest Pearsons and Sons in the Mesopotamian irrigation scheme.33 In 1909, Bertie protested that he had not been informed that “some time ago” Lowther had been instructed to demand a Mesopotamian railway line (the reference is to the August 1909 despatch).34 This ignorance was causing him acute embarrassment in Paris. Was he always to be expected [136]


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to “make bricks without straw”?35 At the end of the year Nicolson too was unprepared to answer Izwolsky’s enquiries concerning the implications of the Gwinner–Cassel negotiations. He warned that continued unilateral action of this kind on the part of his superiors would bring about “the first rift in the lute on which we and Russia have been playing so harmoniously together”.36 Lowther was subjected to even more cursory treatment. Contrary to common practice, the Foreign Office did not make Lowther’s reports the starting points of its policy or use them as material on the basis of which British objectives might be adjusted.37 Lowther is partly to blame. He failed to fulfil the hopes raised when he was appointed,38 and by February 1909 was being criticised for leaving the Foreign Office “very much in the dark” on Baghdad Railway developments.39 More blame attaches to the Foreign Office. In June 1909, the department deliberately ignored Lowther’s advice. Worried by the effect of “snubbing” the Turks and of making a “frontal attack” on the Germans, Lowther asked the British government to abandon the idea of associating its Mesopotamian railway demands with the Turkish customs request.40 Hardinge merely replied that the ambassador’s advice had not been “very helpful”, and bluntly asked Lowther whether he was adequately supplied with secret service funds.41 At the meeting of the 1909 interdepartmental Mesopotamian Railways Committee on the thirtieth of June, the Foreign Office representatives suggested that in view of Lowther’s attitude, the initial railway approaches to the Ottoman government should be made by Adam Block.42 Lowther was therefore relegated to a subsidiary role during the subsequent negotiations. Hardinge cursorily informed him that “we are drawing up a demand for a railway concession from Baghdad to the Gulf, and we shall see what comes of it.”43 He neither asked the embassy’s views nor invited its reactions. Lowther doggedly, but nevertheless ineffectively, reiterated his objections.44 By October 1909, it was common knowledge that “there is a tendency to speak in deprecatory terms of our Ambassador’s capacity.”45 In April 1910, Parker rather pointedly warned that Lowther should be reminded to put the forthcoming Tigris valley demand “in writing”.46 Although Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was ultimately executed at Constantinople, it was initiated in, as well as controlled from, London. Because the government’s determination to establish a sphere of British interest in Mesopotamia had assumed a fixed rather than flexible quality, [137]


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it was not influenced by either independent reports or ambassadorial advice; these might have invited a re-examination of the ultimate objective. The final content of the April 1910 demand reflected the result of sincere and lengthy study. Its tone, however, echoed the attitude of mind with which those studies had been undertaken. The process of decisionmaking in London emphasised that for the Foreign Office especially, tactics were often subordinated to strategy.

Interdepartmental Consultation The primacy of the ultimate objective similarly restricted the free flow of “horizontal” dialogue. Although the government observed the formality of interdepartmental consultation when formulating the April 1910 demand, the Foreign Office, in particular, did not consistently abide by the principle of collective responsibility for the process of decision-making. The Committee of Imperial Defence was consulted on the question of the Mohammera railway,47 and Grey acknowledged that Mallet’s first draft reply to the Turkish request for a customs increase would have to go to the Cabinet “eventually”.48 Furthermore, the India Office and the Board of Trade regularly received printed copies of important despatches and memoranda relating to Mesopotamia,49 and participated in the discussions to which they gave rise. Both departments were represented on the 1909 Mesopotamian Railways Committee,50 and they greatly influenced that body’s decision to reject the Willcocks scheme. Hardinge reported that the replies to the Turkish customs request had been “worked out with the IO [sic]”,51 and Grey refused to pass any final comment on Gwinner’s offer until the Board of Trade too had expressed its views.52 Subsequently, Mallet reminded his chief that “it is important that we should have the written approval of the B of T and IO in any step we may take”,53 and Morley recalled that in Grey’s absence, the subject had caused a “battle royal” with the Foreign Office.54 Communication was thus maintained, but consultation would not appear to have been welcomed. The India Office, for instance, continued to exclude the government of India from the process of decision-making. Morley did not intend Mesopotamia to be among the areas to which he had referred in 1906 when declaring: “Asiatic policy is now much the most momentous branch of foreign policy, and to leave out the opinions of Simla would be absurd.”55 Minto’s plea that “the expressions of the [138]


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Government of India as regards southern Persia and the Gulf should always carry weight with HMG”56 was ineffective. Morley merely reiterated that “in essence Gulf questions are inextricably bound up with questions of European diplomacy. These arise from, and are settled by, forces over which the Indian Secretary has no control, which the Government of India is in no position fully to comprehend or rightly measure, mainly because it is too far off the moving forces.”57 Thus, the government of India made no contribution to the debate during which the details of Britain’s Mesopotamian railway policy were thrashed out in London. Its silence was partly the result of Minto’s own preoccupation during 1909 with Indian reforms.58 It was also a reflection of the secretary of state for India’s attitude. In 1906, Morley had declared that India’s views on the Baghdad Railway were “thoroughly out of place”;59 by 1907, he considered them “totally incorrect”;60 and by 1909, he had decided that “in this stage, at any rate, the question is European, not Indian.”61 The Indian government was therefore again excluded from the process of formulation. The July 1909 report of the Mesopotamian Railways Committee was merely sent privately, and without comment, to Minto.62 Morley also stated that he could only send the viceroy the papers concerning the Gwinner approach of November 1909 “privately and non-officially”.63 The most important despatches concerning the aftermath of the Tigris valley railway demand were specifically tabbed “not to India” at the India Office.64 In London, the Foreign Office guarded its prerogatives even more jealously. It divulged no information on the Baghdad Railway to Parliament and withheld some knowledge from its sister departments. In the Commons, Grey repeatedly stated that the questions of the Gulf and the Baghdad Railway did not lend themselves to public disucssion.65 To the 1909 interdepartmental Mesopotamian Railways Committee, he did not even reveal the existence of the à quatre promise to France and Russia.66 Neither did he disclose the “delicate . . . diplomatic tactics to be adopted”67 when negotiating about Mesopotamia with foreign governments. Initially, as has been seen, Grey refused to abide by the committee’s recommendations.68 Not until January 1910, and only after considerable pressure from the Foreign Office staff as well as from the India Office and the Board of Trade, did Ashley feel that the foreign secretary was at last “tending” towards the committee’s views.69 [139]


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The tension which underlay the interdepartmental discussions on the Tigris valley railway demand originated in a conflicting sense of priorities. These differences, however, did not correspond with the supposed areas of interest of the departments. In this sense, their priorities belied their nomenclature. The Foreign Office, as has been seen, regarded a Mesopotamian railway line as a commercial venture, the political implications of which possessed strictly local relevance. It appreciated, but was not primarily influenced by, the strategic importance of Mesopotamia and the diplomatic consequences of the April 1910 demand. Conversely, those members of the British administration whose main function was not the conduct of foreign affairs expressed more concern with diplomatic and strategic factors. The Board of Trade, for instance, would have liked to believe that “broadly speaking, our policy regarding the Baghdad Railway is governed by political and strategic, rather than by commercial, considerations.”70 Similarly, the India Office would have liked British policy to make more concessions to the demands of European diplomacy. But in presenting the Tigris valley railway demand, the Foreign Office deliberately excluded both considerations. The India Office and the Board of Trade persistently pointed to the diplomatic errors of the Foreign Office’s ways. Morley felt that each of the various schemes, presented as “alternatives” to the Baghdad Railway, suggested that “the Foreign Office is too anti-German, just as not so many years ago it was anti-French.”71 His staff, together with that of the Board of Trade, felt that by insisting on predominance in Mesopotamia, Britain would merely aggravate Germany’s fears of its “European isolation”,72 provide “an impetus to German naval expansion”73 and present an opportunity for Anglo-German rivalry in Mesopotamia.74 Morley voiced his “considerable alarm” to Grey in a private letter, and warned him that a British request for an independent Mesopotamian railway “will be a direct and irresistible invitation or provocation to Germany to give us a new buffet.”75 Similarly, the India Office and the Board of Trade maintained that the Tigris valley railway demand failed to account for “the chauvinism of the Turks”.76 Stanley opposed the suggestion that the British government link its railway demand to a reply to the Turkish customs request in view of his analysis of the possible effect on general Anglo-Turkish relations. “We had far better”, he wrote, “let the Turks have what they [140]


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want willingly and without anything in the nature of a quid pro quo, for by that means we should at least keep Turkish good will and be reasonably certain of getting some benefit from it later on.”77 Ashley proposed, and Llewellyn Smith rejected, various financial alternatives to the system of kilometric guarantees for the Tigris valley line, on the grounds that they might respectively assuage, or wound, “Turkish national sentiment”.78 Grey’s ingenious proposal for a British guarantee of the interest on the capital and an equal Anglo-Turkish division of the profits of the line79 met with a similar response. The Board of Trade insisted that whatever the failings of the kilometric guarantees system, “it does at least guarantee their [the Turks’] national pride by making them nominal possessors of the railway from the outset.”80 The principal British financiers involved in the discussions felt that the Porte would, for similar reasons, place “great difficulties” in the way of any other scheme.81 As late as April 1910, these objections do not appear to have been answered satisfactorily. Hirtzel, at the India Office, considered that “Sir H. B. Smith . . . is far more in touch with actualities than the Foreign Office”;82 he was perturbed by the fact that “the FO bring their heaviest artillery to bear on the Turkish Government.”83 At the Board of Trade, Stanley also doubted Grey’s wisdom in throwing the ball with such force into Turkey’s court; he protested that “by substituting ourselves for the Germans, we should not satisfy Turkey’s national sentiments.”84 On the day before the Tigris valley demand was sent to Lowther, Llewellyn Smith commented: “I do not like the present position, and only hope that the FO may not find it necessary to take up the foot they have put down so heavily.”85 The Foreign Office knew of these objections when it despatched the Tigris valley demand, but completely disregarded them. Neither Ritchie’s recommendation that “careful consideration” be devoted to the effect of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy on “the general diplomatic situation”86 nor Stanley’s request for “the Defence Committee’s” advice on governmental “financial responsibilities in the Levant”87 mitigated the Foreign Office’s concentration on the establishment of a British sphere in Mesopotamia. The diplomatic objections to a British demand were curtly dismissed. The Foreign Office insisted that “so long as the German concession is not infringed, the German Government has no right 88 to feel resentment at the proposed Tigris Rly. The Smyrna-Aidan Rly. and the Mersina Rly., both originally British, have had their hinterlands cut [141]


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away from behind them by the German line . . . The Germans are the invaders, and HMG are on the defence. The proposed Tigris Rly. is a weapon of defence.”89 Similarly, because the projected line was “so far from the Russian frontier”, Russian susceptibilities were unwarranted.90 Finally, the pursuit of British objectives had to override the consideration of Turkish sensitivity. Grey protested that he could not see “how we are to guard against the construction of the Baghdad Railway without our participation unless we take advantage of such opportunities as the increase of the Customs Dues may give us for making conditions”.91 Of the Foreign Office staff, only Hardinge considered that the Mesopotamian railway negotiations might fail because “I cannot conceive that the Turks in their present frame of mind, would agree to any scheme which contained a proposal to create spheres of influence for Foreign Powers.”92 Nevertheless, by March 1910, even he agreed that the British government ought to “work the Turks”, and insisted that a favourable response to the Turkish customs request would be conditional on the grant of the Tigris valley railway concession.93 The process whereby the government formulated the April 1910 despatch emphasised the degree to which its Mesopotamian policy had crystallised since 1907. The position adopted in the May 1907 memorandum had reflected the effect on the central administration of a series of local enquiries and independent studies which had been stimulated by fear of the Baghdad Railway. The demands stipulated in the April 1910 despatch, by contrast, were conceived, initiated and formulated within the Foreign Office. They indicated the British government’s determination to achieve a specific objective and articulated an ambition which was both single-minded and persistent. In this period, local reports could barely influence the direction of British policy, and diplomatic pressures could only delay its implementation. Neither consideration, however, could any longer dictate its pattern. Centrifugal ambitions now dominated centripetal information. The Tigris valley railway demand revealed that information and ambition were insular. The psychological factors which influenced the tone of the April 1910 despatch, and the developments within Mesopotamia which determined its content, combined to produce a policy which was rigid both in aim and in implementation. By April 1910, the British government’s determination to secure a monopoly over commercial development in Mesopotamia was inexorable. British [142]


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demands exceeded the limited needs of India’s security and the restricted dictates of local political prestige. Concurrently, the momentum of British policy seemed unaffected by the pressures of European diplomatic obligations. The 1907 memorandum had merely stated the local interests which the British government felt could not be sacrificed. The 1910 despatch stipulated the local requirements which the Foreign Office sought to attain. The former had represented a short-term adjustment to an external threat. The latter stated a long-term objective in accordance with which extraneous developments would have to be adjusted. The Foreign Office had selected a railway route which it considered commercially profitable. It regarded the Turkish request for a customs increase as a diplomatic lever with which to obtain Britain’s demands. It therefore disregarded both the wishes of foreign governments and the apprehensions of domestic critics. Neither were allowed to obstruct the 1910 claim to an internationally recognised British sphere of economic interest in Mesopotamia.

NOTES 1 2 Nov. 1909 Marling-Grey tel. 348, FO 371/760/322/40389. 2 28 Jan. 1910 Lindsay memo., the Bagdad Railway in 1909, FO 371/991/100/ 3743. 3 See above, pp. 87–88. 4 5 Nov. 1909 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1909/4183a. 5 20 Apr. 1910 memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1910/580. 6 See especially the reactions to 22 March 1910 Lowther-Grey 166, FO 371/996/ 189/10512 and 28 Apr. 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/996/189/14684. 7 Willcocks, The Re-Creation of Chaldea, p. 27. 8 See the heads of Ramsay’s despatches in L/P & S/10, vol. 87, file 1905/3131 and FO 371/768, file 8915. 9 14 July 1909 Ramsay-G of I 758, L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1909/1248. 10 20 Aug. 1909 Ramsay-G of I 896 p. 22, L/P 8 S/10, vol. 87 no. 1909/1530. 11 15 Oct. 1909 Lowther-Grey 84.9 (received 25th), FO 371/768/8915/39221; also enclosed in 26 Oct. 1909 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1909/4183a. 12 Above, p. 102, n. 135. 13 2 Nov. 1909 Marling-Grey tel. 348, FO 371/760/322/40389. 14 16 Nov. 1909 Hardinge-Marling pte., HARD MSS, 17, p. 315. 15 Lindsay and Mallet minutes on 4 March 1910 ETSNC-FO, FO 371/1004/ 5156/8034. 16 5 Apr. 1910 Lowther-Grey 209, FO 371/1004/5156/12176. [143]


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17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31

32

33 34 35 36 37 38

Minute on 20 June 1910 Lowther-Grey 393, FO 371/1004/5156/22860. Minute, ibid. Above, pp. 94–95. 19 March 1908, evidence before the 5th meeting of the 1908 CID Baghdad Railway sub-Committee, CAB 16/10. Parker first advocated the Tigris route in Sep. 1908 (above, p. 86). Akers’ report was not recieved until Apr. 1909 (above, p. 104, n. 206) and Palmer’s in Nov. 1909 (above, p. 104, n. 191). The origins of Parker’s enthusiasm for the Tigris alignment are not clear. I have been unsuccessful in my search for Parker’s private papers. The house in which Parker lived at Thursley near Godalming, Surrey has been sold by his family, and his sole surviving sister (Miss Mabel Dulcie Parker) has intimated that she knows of no surviving private papers relative to Parker’s period in the FO (20 Feb. 1971 Drury, Hopwood and Co. (solicitors) -the author). 10 March 1909 Ramsay-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/764/2074/20290. 17 Oct. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/992/100/43071. 31 March 1911 Lorimer-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/1234/21/17174. 3 May 1911 Money-Babington Smith, enclosing a 42 page report, BS MSS, 13. 28 March 1911Babington Smith-Lowther pte., FO 195/2380. Lowther reported this to London in 29 March 1911 Lowther-Grey tel. 71, FO 371/1233/21/11573. Above, pp. 90–91. E.g., 9 Nov. 1906 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 1, p. 240; Grey minute on 27 Sep. 1906 Barclay-Grey 664, FO 371/148/104.01/33883; and Weakley minute on 22 Aug. 1908 Ramsay-Lowther 770/83, FO 195/2275. Although Morley was personally impressed by Newmarch (30 July 1906, Hirtzel’s political diary), Minto considered that “he is a terrible person . . . We have had to tell him that he is totally unsuited for the position in every way.” 15 July 1907 Minto-Morley pte., Money MSS, 12, p. 52. By the 1909 Mesopotamian Railways Committee, above, p. 91. 17 March 1908 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., HARD MSS, 13, p. 257. Hardinge later regarded the Mohammera project as his “infant . . . since it was I who first suggested it as a counterpoise to the Bagdad Railway”. 22 May 1913 HardingeCrewe pte., HARD MSS, 119 (2), 24, p. 60. Thus Grey slanted his questions to Dane (17 March 1908 evidence before the 1908 CID subcommittee, CAB 16/10, para. 554) and Douglas (25 March 1908, ibid., para. 1008), and Hardinge revealed his preferences to Lynch (25 March 1908, ibid., para 953) and Lee-Warner (30 March 1908, ibid., para 1054). 19 Feb. 1908 Tilley-Law pte., FO 371/534/900/2895. See above, p. 103, n. 175. “E. P.”-Maxwell pte., Bertie MSS “B”, 1909–1911, FO 800/186, no. 09/67. 19 Nov. 1909 Nicolson-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 34, FO 800/73. According to D. Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (London, 1968), p. 99, “it is the ambassadorial report which is often made a principal, and very often, the initial building block out of which policy is constructed.” In 1908 Hardinge had been “quite certain that it would be impossible to find a better or more able representative”. 19 May 1908 Hardinge-Barclay pte., HARD MSS, 13, p. 47. Minto was impressed by the fact that Lowther was a “great Tory”. 2 Apr. 1908 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 15, p. 6. [144]


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39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

6 Feb. 1909 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 75. 19 June 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., FO 371/762/659/23582. 29 June 1909 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 120. 30 June 1909 Ashley memo., BT 11/3. As early as June 1908 Hardinge had noted: “It is useful to be in touch with . . . Block. On more than one occasion he has offered us very useful suggestions which have been adopted.” Minute on 2 June 1908 Barclay-Grey 300, FO 371/538/5399/19733. 9 Aug. 1909 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 134. E.g., 11 Aug. 1909 Lowther-Grey pte., FO 371/764/2074/35406, and 17 Sep. 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., FO 371/764/2074/35426. 23 Oct. 1909 Cassel-Babington Smith, BS MSS, 2. Minute on 2 Apr. 1910 Lowther-Grey tel. 51, FO 371/991/100/11372. Above, pp. 83–84. Minute on 29 May 1909 FO-B of T, FO 371/762/659/20209. A process which duplicates the reading of the researcher but which also indicates which papers the FO itself thought were important. It is significant that the War Office, the Admiralty, the Colonial Office and the Treasury were not consulted. This would appear to emphasise the limited nature of the government’s aims. 28 May 1909 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 105. Minute on 20 Dec. 1909 Cassel-Hardinge, BD 6, no. 309, p. 411. 29 Dec. 1909 memo., FO 371/991/100/100. 19 Jan. 1910 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 5. 15 Aug. 1906 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 1, p. 168. 6 May 1909 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 20, p. 52. “Seistan, southern Persia, and Bagdad must I think always be of such importance to India that she cannot afford to lose touch with them.” Ibid. 15 Apr. 1909 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 4, p. 79. The viceroy declared that the only foreign matter with which he was initiating consultations at all was Tibet. 11 Nov. 1909 Minto-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 22, p. 83. On Minto’s Indian reforms, see M.N. Dos, India Under Morley and Minto (London, 1964), pp. 183–250. Above, p. 58. 22 Nov. 1907 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 2, p. 299. Minute on 10 Nov. 1909 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 57(2), no. 1909/4210. “P.S.” to 20 Aug. 1909 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 4, p. 185. 19 Jan. 1910 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 5. E.g., minutes on 6 June 1910 Grey-Lowther 155, L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2), no. 1910/3541 and 29 July 1910 Parker memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 58. E.g., 16 June 1908 PD 4, 1908, 190, col. 711; 27 July 1908 PD 4, 1908, 193, col. 988; 22 July 1909 PD 5, 1909, 8, col. 596; and 1 Sep. 1909 PD 5, 1909, 10, col. 346. 24 Jan. 1910 Stanley-L1. Smith, BT 11/3. 5 Aug. 1909 Ritchie minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2). Above, p. 92 and minute on 12 Oct. 1909 Lowther-Hardinge pte., FO 371/ 764/2074/31619. 22 Jan. 1910 Ashley memo., BT 11/3. Stanley memo. (not dated but probably winter 1909), BT 11/3. [145]


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71 21 May 1909 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 4, p. 112. 72 10 Aug. 1908 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 3, p. 244. The reference is to the Mohammera line. 73 27 June 1909 Stanley memo., BT 11/3. The reference is to the Willcocks scheme. 74 19 June 1909 Ritchie memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2). The reference is to the Tigris valley demand. 75 22 June 1909 Morley-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 59, FO 800/98. 76 The phrase was Marling’s. 10 Jan. 1910 memo; enclosed in FO 371/991/100/1801. 77 27 June 1909 Stanley memo., BT 11/3. 78 22 Jan. 1910 Ashley memo., ibid. and 1 Feb. 1910 LI.Smith-Churchill, ibid. 79 20 Jan. 1910 Grey memo., FO 371/991/100/1355. 80 4 March 1910 LI.Smith-Hardinge pte., FO 371/991/100/7681. 81 31 Dec. 1909 Babington Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 10 and 11 Apr. 1910 Babington Smith-Hardinge, BS MSS, 11. 82 Minute on 18 March 1910 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2), no. 1910/3146. 83 Minute on 6 May 1910 FO-IO, enclosing the despatch of 20 Apr. to Lowther, L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2), no. 1910/3539. 18 Apr. 1910 Stanley memo., BT 11/3. 84 18 Apr. 1910 Stanley memo., BT 11/3. 85 19 Apr. 1910 LI.Smith memo., BT 11/3. 86 Minute on 6 Nov. 1909 Hardinge memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 87, no. 1909/4183a. 87 7 Nov. 1909 memo. (not signed but in Stanley’s hand), BT 11/3. 88 My emphasis. The question of “right” was not at issue; the question of probability was. 89 May 1909 FO memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 57 (2); referred to above, p. 104, n. 204. 90 27 Sep. 1909 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1909 (1), FO 800/342. p. 162. 91 14 July 1909 Grey-Lowther pte., BD 6, p. 374, ed. note. 92 18 Jan. 1910 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1910 (i), FO 800/343. p. 24. 93 5 March 1910 minutes by Parker, Hardinge and Grey, FO 371/991/100/7681.

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PA RT T H R E E

T HE M ODIFICATION OF P OLICY, 1910–1914


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INTRODUCTION

The Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agreements of 1913 and 19141 contrasted in content, objective and tone with the 1910 despatch to Lowther. First, the agreements revealed that Britain had abandoned its specific concentration on the Tigris valley railway. The Mesopotamian railway question was treated not in isolation but in conjunction with a number of other issues. These included the boundaries of Aden, the status of the Persian Gulf, the rights of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, Mesopotamian irrigation, petroleum and navigation concessions and uniform rates on all railways in Asiatic Turkey. Second, Britain’s agreements with Turkey and Germany formed part of a series of railway agreements simultaneously negotiated by Turkey, Germany, France and Russia.2 In 1907 and 1910, the British government had unilaterally determined the timing of its statements of Mesopotamian policy. By 1914, however, the implementation of its Baghdad Railway agreements was dependent on the completion of the Franco-German and Turco-German conventions.3 Third, the 1910 demand, and the 1913 and 1914 agreements, also differed in tone. The former had disregarded the competing international interests in Mesopotamia. The latter, by contrast, were designed to achieve international accord within the region. They indicated the extent of Grey’s desire to harmonise Britain’s ambitions in Mesopotamia with Turkey’s rights and Germany’s claims there. These changes reflected the intrusion of Eurocentric calculations into the formulation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. The 1910 Tigris valley demand had reflected the Foreign Office’s exclusive concentration on Britain’s local requirements, but the 1913 and 1914 agreements were the consequence of a reversal of the priorities of British policy. By 1914, local interests were subordinate to global requirements. The British government continued to recognise the need to defend its strategic, commercial and political interests in Mesopotamia. But in the pursuit of these local aims, it was no longer prepared to forfeit Turkish neutrality or to risk German antagonism. Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was therefore reformulated, and optimum demands made way for limited proposals. [149]


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NOTES 1 See the 29 July 1913 Anglo-Turkish Persian Gulf agreement, signed by Grey and Hakki Pasha, BD 10 (2) no. 124, pp. 183–198; the 12 August 1913 Anglo-Turkish Railway convention, initialled, (ibid., no. 133, pp. 203–206); and the final draft of Navigation Concession, 12 Dec. 1913, ibid., no. 188, pp. 283–298. See also the 15 June 1914 Anglo-German Baghdad Railway convention, initialled, ibid., no. 249, pp. 397–408. The final agreements were negotiated by Tewfik Pasha, (Turkish ambassador at London, 1909–1914), Hakki Pasha (Turkish minister plenipotentiary), Kuhlmann, Lichnowsky (German ambassador at London, 1912–1914), Mallet, Crow and Parker. 2 See diagram in Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 202. 3 29 June 1914 Sir E. Grey, PD 5, 1914, 64, cols. 116–117.

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7 The Pressures on Strategy

The modification in Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1910 and 1914 owed as much to the subjective fears of British officials as to actual changes in local circumstances. The former were, by nature, indeterminate; the latter were varied. The relationship between cause and effect is therefore a complicated one. It is possible, nonetheless, to distinguish between the specifically diplomatic, strategic and conceptual pressures which modified the government’s previous insistence on an exclusive sphere of economic influence in Mesopotamia. This distinction simplifies the chronology of the shifts in the minds of various British policy-makers. But it aids the understanding of their changing pattern of thought, which was a more important factor. Between 1910 and 1914, a continuous feeling of global restriction combined with an occasional sense of local helplessness1 to necessitate a modification in British policy towards Mesopotamia.

Diplomatic Between the autumn of 1910 and the summer of 1911, Britain’s Baghdad Railway diplomacy suffered the triple setback of the Turco-German loan negotiations, the Russo-German Potsdam agreement and the revision of the Baghdad Railway convention.2 The “hasty abandonment of the Tigris Valley demand”,3 however, preceded all three developments. As early as July 1910, the Foreign Office appreciated that a satisfactory reply to its despatch of the previous April was rendered unlikely by the persistent and obstinate Turkish refusal to grant Britain the Tigris valley railway concession.4 Instead, the British government was presented with an ingenious Turkish proposal to form and finance an Ottoman company which would construct and control railways south of Baghdad. Although ultimately irrelevant, the initially hostile British reaction to the new Turkish proposal illustrates the extent of the eventual modification of British policy. In May 1910, the proposal was rejected by Mallet because [151]


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the Turks had clearly “quite misunderstood” the Tigris valley railway demand.5 It was also dismissed by Grey and Hardinge, who saw “not the slightest ground for hope that the German Government will agree to such a scheme”.6 As late as 21 July 1910, Parker insisted that “a fair means of control over the means of communication in Mesopotamia” was still Britain’s price for an agreement to the customs increase.7 By 27 July 1910, the Foreign Office had altered its position. It had dropped its insistence on the claim to a British monopoly over Mesopotamian railways. Recognising the steadfast nature of Turkish intransigence on this question,8 it now restricted its demands to a stipulation that no such monopoly would ever be accorded to Germany. In an interview with Jevad Bey9 on 27 July, Parker accepted that the Tigris valley railway project “did not commend itself to the Ottoman Government”. Instead, he announced Britain’s willingness to accept Turkish ownership of a Baghdad–Gulf railway. Britain’s only conditions were that Turkish ownership was to be permanent, that British merchants were not to be subjected to adverse manipulation of rates on any part of the Baghdad Railway, that British firms were to secure contracts for at least sixty percent of the railway material and rolling stock and that the Gulf terminus of the line would be built, again by British contractors, at Kuwait.10 The Foreign Office continued to demand that the Porte present an official reply to the April 1910 despatch before receiving Britain’s permission for an increase in the customs dues.11 But British policy was already assuming a passive form. The Russo-German Potsdam negotiations of November 1910 further undermined the British Tigris valley railway demand. Sazonov, who had recently assumed charge of Russia’s foreign affairs,12 demonstrated his appreciation of Russia’s European interests when rejecting the proposals of Kiderlen-Wachter, his German counterpart,13 for a political arrangement between the two countries.14 However, he weakened Britain’s Mesopotamian bargaining power when hastily accepting the German’s Baghdad Railway formula. The British Foreign Office was not perturbed by the German recognition of Russia’s special position in northern Persia. Neither was it dismayed by Russia’s long-awaited withdrawal of opposition to the German Baghdad Railway. The former concession appeared to complement the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention and the latter to facilitate an international railway agreement. But the subsidiary clauses of the Potsdam agreement did alarm the Foreign Office. Sazonov had [152]


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T H E P R E S S U R E S O N S T R AT E G Y

agreed to construct a line from Teheran to Khanikin within four years of the completion, by the Germans, of the Sadijeh–Khanikin branch of the Baghdad Railway. This scheme threatened to bypass the traditional trade route into western Persia via Baghdad, which had hitherto been a British preserve. Parker appreciated that even if Russia found the finances for the Khanikin line,15 “we shall have what will shortly become a Turco-German hegemony at Teheran, – resting as it will upon through railway communication under German and Turkish control from the Bosphorous to Teheran.”16 The British government therefore increased its own pressure for the Mohammera railway, which was itself designed to neutralise the Khanikin branch. Hirtzel warned that whatever the fate of the Tigris valley railway, Britain’s Persian trade would require an alternative which only the Mohammera line would provide.17 Hardinge too renewed his pressure for an independent British “entry” to Persia from the Gulf.18 The Foreign Office also claimed that only a British Mohammera line would prevent the pre-eminence of a possible Russo-German combination on an east–west basis in Persia.19 As has been seen, the government retained the distinction between its interests in Mesopotamia and its desire to control the trade of south-western Persia.20 Nevertheless, such was the German threat to the latter that, by 1914, a survey party to map the Mohammera route had been accorded official support.21 The government had more difficulty in parrying the blows which the Potsdam agreement had aimed at Britain’s Mesopotamian position. Sazonov apparently ignored the British demand of April 1910 by acknowledging Germany’s right to complete the whole Baghdad Railway from Konya to Basra.22 Britain failed in its hurried attempts to persuade the Russians to restrict this acknowledgement to the sections north of Baghdad; not surprisingly, the Germans flatly refused to alter the wording of the Potsdam agreement.23 The Russian concession, therefore, increased Germany’s bargaining power against Britain on the southern section of the Baghdad Railway. This consideration presented a greater threat to British interests than did the apparent disharmony of the entente.24 The British government had never relied solely on the firmness of the à quatre position to protect its Mesopotamian interests. But the Foreign Office had, in April 1910, presented the Tigris valley railway demand on the premise that Russia and France had been “squared” and that Germany had been isolated. Russia’s acceptance of [153]


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the 1903 Baghdad Railway convention altered this picture, and ensured that “it will be necessary for us to proceed most cautiously, otherwise we run the risk of making our relations with Germany far worse than they are now.”25 The March 1911 Turco-German convention also changed the diplomatic conditions which had made the Tigris valley railway demand possible. Hitherto, the British government had been able to play off Young Turk distaste for the 1903 concession against German anxiety to complete the Baghdad line. Britain had suggested to both parties that a British railway south of Baghdad offered the only viable alternative. As early as March 1910, however, Marschall26 had appreciated the advantages to Germany of substituting Turkish for British control of southern Mesopotamian railways,27 and the German foreign ministry pondered this proposal throughout the summer of 1910.28 The following autumn, after Jevad’s failure to negotiate a large loan from either French or British sources had led him to beg at Berlin’s door, the negotiations for a revision of the 1903 Baghdad Railway convention were accelerated. The German loan relieved Turkish financial distress29 and increased German prestige at Constantinople.30 More specifically, it ensured that Turkey could now finance the guarantees for the construction of the German railway as far as Baghdad. The loan thus made possible the Turco-German convention of 18 March 1911.31 As in the case of the Potsdam agreement, the subsidiary clauses of the Turco-German convention presented greater threats to Britain’s Mesopotamian policy than did the principle of the convention itself. The definitive provision of kilometric guarantees for the railway as far as Baghdad was an important gain for the Germans;32 but it was not necessarily a loss to the British. Britain’s agreement to the three percent customs increase in 1906 had revealed its inability to prevent the continuation of the line to Baghdad; the 1909–1910 Anglo-German negotiations had indicated its unwillingness to do so. Lowther lamented that “if the Germans get to Baghdad . . . it rather takes the wind out of our sails.”33 But Parker noted that Britain would not be affected by a Turco-German arrangement which only concerned the area north of Baghdad.34 To the British government, the most crucial aspect of the March 1911 convention was the provision that German interests would be given the right to participate equally with other foreign (i.e. non-Turkish) groups in financing any railways south of Baghdad. This condition [154]


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precluded the repetition of Britain’s claim to control railway construction in lower Mesopotamia. It thus rendered anachronistic both the 1910 demand for a monopolistic Tigris valley railway and the 1907 request for control over the southern section of the German line. Henceforth, Britain could expect no more than fifty percent in any line south of Baghdad, and British statesmen, no less than British financiers, appreciated that “the position of the Germans is very much strengthened.”35 Hardinge immediately acknowledged that “we have certainly been done.”36 Parker, retrospectively, admitted that the 1911 convention proved “an absolute bar to any scheme of British predominance in the Gulf section”.37 A combination of Turkish obstinacy, Russian negligence and German pressure had, in diplomatic terms, outflanked the British manoeuvre of April 1910.

Strategic The modification of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1910 and 1914 was influenced by military as well as diplomatic circumstances. The latter were later exhaustively investigated by Gooch and Temperely; but at the time, the former seemed equally important to British policymakers. In April 1910, Hardinge had boasted that should the Turks refuse the Tigris railway demand, “we can make things unpleasant” for them.38 This confidence was soon shaken. By 1912, the British government had concluded that strategic considerations precluded a military enforcement of the 1910 demand. Instead, they necessitated a modification of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. Not the Tigris valley railway demand but a tedious succession of seemingly coordinated political and economic harassments in Turkish Arabia necessitated a review of British striking power at the head of the Gulf. In the summer of 1910, the vali of Basra exerted renewed pressure on Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait to accept Turkish citizenship.39 At the same time, the mudir of ‘Uqair once again staked a Turkish claim to the disputed island of Zaknuniya.40 Simultaneously, Nazim Pasha, the dynamic and newly appointed vali of Baghdad, insisted on routing the city’s new thoroughfare in a way that necessitated the demolition of Lynch’s business premises and a reduction in the size of the grounds of the British residency.41 These provocations were relatively minor.42 But their frequency,43 and the Porte’s tardy response to official British [155]


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complaints,44 affected Britain’s prestige in the Gulf and Mesopotamia. They thus represented a symbolic challenge to the spirit of the Tigris valley railway demand in whose wake they appeared to mushroom.45 At both a local and central level, British officials warned of the threat to Britain’s Mesopotamian railway policy.46 According to one assessment, “the object of the Turks is to assert claims which they think will strengthen their hands in the impending Baghdad Railway and Persian Gulf negotiations.”47 The government therefore determined to “make a stand against Turkish encroachment”.48 In general, the Foreign Office wished to restrict this determination by invoking only diplomatic sanctions,49 but the government did also contemplate military measures. Grey’s proposals were relatively modest. He warned Asquith to be “on guard” against Anglo-Turkish hostilities,50 and advised the Committee of Imperial Defence of the possible need for “local retaliatory measures”.51 However, his only belligerent suggestion was that the despatch of HMS Redbreast to Zaknuniya was “certain to be reported and its importance magnified by the local Arabs up to Bussorah and Bagdad”. Such action, he argued, “may counteract . . . the deplorable impression among British subjects at Bagdad caused by the high-handed actions of the local Turkish authorities”.52 Indian officials, by contrast, were more impressed with the opportunities for British action afforded by Mesopotamian tribal insurgencies53 and by the depletion of Turkey’s local military strength.54 They were therefore persistently bellicose, and Hirtzel scorned the utility of a “visit” by one gunboat to an island 600 miles away from Basra.55 In December 1910, he suggested that a strong force be sent to the head of the Gulf “and remain as long as possible in that neighbourhood”.56 In April 1911, he also castigated the Committee of Imperial Defence for deferring consideration of this suggestion until the summer.57 Hardinge, now the viceroy of India, also advocated stern measures. In a spate of private letters and telegrams both before and after the Committee of Imperial Defence’s discussions, he stressed the need to “show the Turks we mean business”.58 Hardinge suggested extracting a leaf from the Italian manual of limited warfare against the Porte,59 and eagerly anticipated the possibility of “vindicating our position . . . in the ensuing cold weather”.60 Crewe, recently appointed Secretary of State for India, sympathised with Hardinge. In October 1911, he ordered the preparation of contingency plans for a Mesopotamian expedition.61 However, detailed investigation by the military departments revealed that Britain possessed [156]


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neither the naval flexibility nor the tactical freedom to support Hardinge’s scheme. One reason was the general fear of committing British troops to an action far from the English Channel or the Indian frontier. As early as August 1910, Mallet warned that it would be difficult to prevent the escalation of a minor local operation into a major widespread campaign.62 The more specific disposition of British forces was a greater disincentive. In January 1911, Nicolson, now Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, pointed out that the great disadvantage of a Mesopotamian expedition was that it would require strong naval support.63 This consideration increased in relevance in 1912. Churchill (the new First Lord of the Admiralty) then proposed a depletion of Britain’s Mediterranean fleet in order to meet the German threat from across the North Sea.64 This proposed naval realignment, which caused considerable debate, emphasised the restricted options of British policy against Turkey; it ratified the impossibility of forcing the Dardanelles65 and precluded support for a Gulf expedition by diversionary operations elsewhere in the Mediterranean.66 Nicolson opposed Churchill’s proposals because, in any case, they did not include the necessary complement of an Anglo-French alliance67 and because a reduction of Britain’s strength in the Mediterranean would increase Germany’s influence at Constantinople.68 Parker, more specifically, appreciated the restraining influence which Churchill’s proposals would exert on Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. In May 1912, he warned that “our impending withdrawal from the Mediterranean” might obviate the possibility of British action in the Gulf.69 His fears were not allayed by Churchill’s sharp warning that “our diplomacy ought to be able to save us” from a naval combination between Turkey and the Triple Alliance.70 Considerations of more immediate geographical relevance also induced an aversion to a resort to naval action in the Persian Gulf. During the May 1911 Committee of Imperial Defence discussions, Wilson71 boldly offered the Navy’s services in any Mesopotamian campaign.72 But the Admiralty clearly lacked the strength to mount the Gulf operation which would thus be required. As early as 1903, the Gulf squadron had been reduced to three ships,73 none of which, as was noted in 1907, “carry sufficient numbers for a landing operation”.74 In April 1911, Slade, then Commander in Chief of the East Indies Station,75 confirmed that this force was insufficient to support a major campaign. With the ships at his disposal, Slade could merely inconvenience the [157]


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Turks, not inflict permanent damage on them. The most drastic action he might take would be to remove signs of Turkish sovereignty from the Gulf, to blockade the trade of Baghdad and Basra or to threaten the Porte’s communications with Hodeidah.76 Despite Slade’s conclusions, the Admiralty persistently refused to augment his force. In December 1910, it had rejected Grey’s suggestion to send the Redbreast from Bombay to Zaknuniya.77 In 1912, it could not spare one additional ship to help control even the Persian Gulf arms traffic.78 The India Office was therefore warned not to entertain the hope that a Gulf expedition was possible. If ever Britain went to war with Turkey, “it would . . . be unlikely that any vessels except the small sloops would be available for service in the Persian Gulf.”79 The War Office proved equally incapable of supplying the means to effect a coercive Mesopotamian policy. The Imperial General Staff appreciated the geographical and tactical advantages of striking at Mesopotamia whilst Turkish troops were diverted by a revolt in Albania, a frontier dispute with Persia and a war in the Yemen.80 But the War Office disparaged these considerations. Instead, it warned the Committee of Imperial Defence that British action at the head of the Gulf might invite Turkish reprisals on Egypt or arouse Moslem antagonism in India. Even a temporary British occupation of Kuwait, which might avoid both eventualities, would “not cause Turkey any material inconvenience or loss”.81 Nicolson82 explained that “so soon as the ships or troops went away, and we could not . . . keep them in these places permanently, the Turks would come back again.”83 In 1912, the War Office firmly rejected the government of India’s suggestion that British forces might attempt to occupy Basra.84 The Imperial General Staff doubted whether the suggested operation was “practicable”.85 It was also uncertain of the forces the scheme might require.86 It therefore refused to reverse its earlier decision. Even the Indian authorities ultimately acknowledged this verdict. In January 1912, a government of India committee considered that, if really necessary, a British force might temporarily occupy Basra and the surrounding region. But it hesitated to advocate this measure. The committee finally admitted that it could only recommend a limited occupation of El Bidea and the removal of Turkish lighters and buoys from the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab. It rejected more ambitious operations because to lock up a division in Basra “might be a matter of serious [158]


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inconvenience in connection with military operations elsewhere”.87 In June 1912, India revealed that its plans for an attack on Basra were only tentative, “and would have to be revised in the light of the political situation at the time of undertaking the enterprise”.88 As early as December 1910, Nicolson had revealed a prescient sense of the strategic, as well as diplomatic, realities of Britain’s Mesopotamian position. “The difficulty”, he told Marling, “is to bring really effective pressure to bear on the Turkish Government . . . It is of little use administering homilies to them unless one is prepared to follow them up with some decided action.”89 The Committee of Imperial Defence proved equally realistic. In May 1911, it agreed to aim for a political rather than military settlement of Britain’s Mesopotamian and Gulf quarrels with Turkey.90 Hirtzel opposed this course;91 but Mallet acknowledged, and Parker reiterated, that “we are not able to do very much” in those regions.92 Crewe ultimately admitted that “there is no practical chance of our . . . coercing Turkey.”93

Conceptual Conceptual pressures on British policy-makers between 1910 and 1914 confirmed the necessity for an abrogation of the ambitious claims of 1910. During this period, the requirements of the European diplomatic situation began, for the first time in the twentieth century, to exert a determining influence on the formulation of Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia. The pattern of the latter had to be correlated in accordance with that of the former.94 Grey struck the keynote of Britain’s new Mesopotamian policy in March 1911. He told the Commons that he “frankly” wanted to settle the Baghdad Railway question “because, if an agreement is come to which is satisfactory to Turkey, to ourselves, and to Germany, it will, at any rate, remove one possible cause of political friction”.95 This remark accorded with Grey’s increasing feeling that “Local arrangements outside Europe would not affect the grouping of powers on the continent while a friendly Germany would be a positive asset.”96 His persistent desire to relax the alarming state of Anglo-German tension97 accounts for his encouragement of Baghdad Railway discussions between the two countries in December 1910.98 It also explains his preference for such a limited agreement over a more ambitious naval convention in May [159]


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1911.99 Grey was still not prepared to abandon British interests in Mesopotamia, but he was not prepared to pay a price for their defence. Thus in December 1911, he suggested that “if British participation came into a German enterprise in the case of the Bagdad Railway, German enterprise might be assured of participation in British in some other part of the world.”100 The 1914 Anglo-German Baghdad Railway convention was consistent, moreover, with his desire for other Anglo-German agreements over Persia101 and the Portuguese colonies.102 It also reflected Grey’s hope that if the two countries continued to discuss subjects of mutual interest, “the effect on the political atmosphere would in the course of two or three years be very ameliorating.”103 Grey did not wish an Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agreement to precipitate a realignment of European loyalties. Despite the strain imposed upon Anglo-Russian relations before 1914 by events in Persia,104 there is no evidence that the 1914 Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agreement articulated Britain’s desire to take sides “with Germany against Russia in the great question of Turkey-in-Asia”.105 Hirtzel did warn that the effect of Russia’s Persian policy “can only be to drive us into Germany’s arms”.106 But this statement must be weighed against Mallet’s simultaneous admonition that “we should go rather slow in this direction and not allow ourselves to be utilised against Russia. A very pro-German policy will not endear us to France either.”107 By 1914, Nicolson feared Russian secession from the entente far more than its incursions into Persia,108 where in any case Germany presented the greater threat to British interests.109 The Baghdad Railway agreement was designed to relax European tension, but not to revolutionise the pattern of European alignments. Asquith in 1910 and Grey in 1912 both stipulated that “France, Russia and ourselves should all be on the best of terms with Germany, without losing touch with each other or losing the confidence which exists between us.”110 Britain’s attitude towards an Anglo-Turkish Baghdad Railway agreement was also influenced by the government’s concern with its European position. This consideration outweighed even Britain’s traditional fear of wounding Indian susceptibilities. Hardinge, whose bellicosity occasionally overruled his caution, shared Nicolson’s desire to create a “good effect . . . on the Moslem world”.111 He agreed that “for us to put pressure on Turkey when she is lifting up her head again will have the worst possible effect on our 180 millions of Mohammedans in [160]


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India, who are still in a restless and discontented frame of mind.”112 This warning, however, reflected a conventional concern; it did not present an immediate reason for a modification of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. More recent was the fear that by implementing the threats expressed in the 1910 demand, Britain would drive Turkey into the arms of the Triple Alliance. The Foreign Office increasingly considered that the delicate balance of European forces made Turkey “a Power to be reckoned with”.113 As early as December 1910, Grey acknowledged that were the entente to “cold shoulder” the Turks, it would have “precipitated them into the arms of the Triple Alliance and into a Pan Islamic policy”.114 Although Nicolson rejected repeated Turkish offers of an alliance115 and although Grey apparently ignored Kitchener’s advocacy of an Anglo-Turkish “entente”,116 they did not thus abandon hope of securing Ottoman neutrality. The Agadir crisis of 1911, the failure of Haldane’s mission in 1912 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 successively emphasised the need to limit Germany’s circle of allies. Privately, Churchill warned of “the consequences of throwing Turkey . . . into the arms of Germany”.117 Public conjectures were voiced to the same effect.118 Grey himself officially conveyed these sentiments to the Committee of Imperial Defence in July 1912.119 The Anglo-Turkish negotiations, like the Anglo-German negotiations of the same period, thus reflected the government’s desire to utilise a Baghdad Railway agreement as a means of improving Britain’s diplomatic position. Even when Anglo-Turkish tension over Mesopotamia and the Gulf was at its height in the first half of 1911, Nicolson wished to “translate” his desire for an accommodation with the Turks into “friendly acts”.120 Simultaneously, Grey admitted that his policy was dominated by the wish for “a general settlement of our outstanding differences with Turkey”.121 His desire to avoid causing “embarrassment” to the Porte accounted for his refusal to lay the 1910 consular papers (dealing with Nazim’s Baghdad demolitions) before the Commons in August 1911.122 Similarly, his wish, expressed in October, to “warm the atmosphere a little by showing that we are prepared to get on in earnest with the Baghdad Railway negotiations” influenced his willingness to send the Porte the full text of the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement.123 In 1912, the Foreign Office rejected the Indian demand for a stiffer attitude during the negotiations. It pleaded the need to keep the Turks “in a good temper”124 and stressed that the Baghdad Railway and Gulf [161]


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negotiations provided a means of preventing Turkey “from joining the German coalition”.125 The criteria by which British policy was assessed therefore changed. Hitherto, Britain’s attitude towards Mesopotamia had been primarily determined by local conditions and economic aspirations. Between 1910 and 1914, however, the pressures of Baghdad Railway diplomacy, local strategy and Eurocentric circumstances changed the context of British policy. The attendant modification in British policy reflected the government’s sense of its negotiating weakness on the Baghdad Railway question as well as its appreciation of the invalidity of an insular approach to Mesopotamia.

NOTES 1 Grey admitted with regard to the Baghdad Railway that “It is always possible . . . to fix on certain parts of the world which are not under our control, which are not likely to be under our control, and in which events may not altogether be moving according to our minds.” 8 March 1911, PD 5, 1911, 22, col. 1281. 2 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, ch. 7. 3 The phrase is Babington Smith’s. 26 May 1910 Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 11. 4 It was not necessarily unanimous. The divisions within the Committee of Union and Progress continuously affected the negotiations. In May 1910 Jevad himself was prepared to accept the Tigris valley demand; his main interest was the four percent. “It is the army which wants the German Baghdad Railway, and Hilmi and Hakki Pashas follow the military party.” 23 May 1910, Block-Smith, ibid. I am indebted to Col. D. Farhi of the Hebrew University Jerusalem for the patient manner in which he has explained contemporary Turkish politics to me. 5 Minute on 3 May 1910 Lowther-Grey 276 secret, FO 371/992/100/15938. 6 13 May 1910 Grey-Lowther 103 secret, FO 371/992/100/15938. See also 19 May 1910 Grey-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 217; 31 May 1910 HardingeLowther pte., ibid., p. 251; and 6 June 1910 Grey-Lowther 155, BD 6, no. 377, p. 492. 7 21 July 1910 Parker memo., FO 371/992/100/26453. 8 E.g., 3 May 1910 Block-Hardinge pte., FO 371/992/100/16572, and 20 June 1910 Lowther-Grey 392, BD 6, no. 378, pp. 493–494. 9 Jevad Bey (1875–1926), served as Minister of Finance and Public Works in a number of Young Turk cabinets. 10 Parker’s minutes (dated 27th) in FO 371/992/100/27275 and his official memo. of the conversation (dated 29th) in BD 6, no. 388, pp. 503–505. 11 Nicolson minute on 20 Dec. 1910 Marling-Grey 920, FO 371/992/100/46569. 12 S. D. Sazonov (1860–1927), Russian foreign minister, 1910–1916. [162]


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13 A. von Kiderlen-Wachter (1852–1919), German foreign minister, 1910–1912. 14 15 Nov. 1910 Hollweg-von Pourtales 1604, GP vol. 27 (2), no. 1015, pp. 846–849. The “Potsdam” agreement was not signed until 19 August 1911 (text in BD 10 (i), no. 741, pp. 719–720); but its details were settled and known by Nov. 1910. On the agreement see Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, ch. 7 and M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923 (London, 1966), p. 266. 15 An unlikely proposition; if not, then the line would revert to Germany. 16 31 Jan. 1911 minute, BD 10 (i), no. 664, p. 637. 17 Hirtzel minute, enclosed in 28 Feb. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1185/3606/7629 and minute on 27 July 1911 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 177 folio 18. 18 16 May 1911 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (2), FO 800/348, p. 279 and 8 Aug. 1912 Hardinge-Crewe pte., HARD MSS, 118 (2), 38, p. 109. 19 21 May 1913 Harrison-Langley, FO 371/1727/13139/23412. 20 Above, pp. 88–90. 21 See FO 371/2061, file 343. 22 13 Dec. 1910 Buchanan-Grey 486 secret, BD 10 (1), no. 620, p. 577. 23 11 May 1911 Buchanan-Grey 127 secret, BD 10 (1), no. 721, pp. 698–699. 24 Buchanan’s subsequent accusation of Russian ill faith (Sir G. Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memories, vol. 1 (London, 1923), p. 94) and Earle’s comment that “the first breach had been made in the heretofore solid front presented by the entente” (Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, p. 241) ignores the unilateral British demand of April 1910. Taylor has presented a more plausible reason for British displeasure. “Each member of the Triple Entente wanted to be on good terms with Germany, while deploring attempts at reconciliation by the other two.” (Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery, p. 468). 25 Mallet minute 16 Jan. 1911, BD 10 (i), ed. note, p. 623. 26 A. Marschall, Baron Von Bieberstein (1842–1912), German ambassador at Constantinople, 1897–1912, and at London, 1912. 27 18 March 1910 Marschall-Hollweg v. conf., GP, vol. 27 (2), No. 9997, pp. 626–634. Tewfik Pasha did not discuss the idea with the British government until May, 3 May 1910 Hardinge-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 247. 28 Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, pp. 118–119. 29 According to Jevad, the loan was “the greatest diplomatic victory in the history of the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and the outbreak of the Great War”. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, p. 219. 30 9 Nov. 1910 Nicolson-Goschen pte., NIC MSS, 1910 (2), FO 800/344, p. 299. 31 Text in 22 March 1911 Lowther-Grey 183, BD 10 (2), no. 23, pp. 34–35. 32 21 March 1911 Marschall-Hollweg tel., GP 27 (2), no. 10037, pp. 686–687. 33 15 Feb. 1911 Lowther-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (i), FO 800/347, p. 182. 34 8 Feb. 1911 minute, BD 10 (2), no. 11, p. 21. 35 21 March 1911 Bab. Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 6. A dejected Cassel wrote: “The result of what we have done has been wiped out.” 23 March 1911 Cassel-Bab. Smith, ibid. 36 5 Apr. 1911 Hardinge-Bertie pte., Bertie MSS, “A”, 22, FO 800/180, p. 149. 37 Parker, “The Bagdad Railway Negotiations”, p. 512. 38 26 Apr. 1910 Hardinge-Goschen pte., HARD MSS, 21, p. 113. [163]


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39 By refusing, otherwise, to register the Sheikh’s date properties at Fedaghlia (on the Shatt al-Arab), 2 May 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/1010/16960/28116. 40 Ten miles south of ‘Uqair. The Turkish flag was run up despite previous British protests in 1909. 30 May 1909 Grey-Lowther in L/P & S/10, vol. 162, no. 1909/757 and 25 July 1910 G of I-IO, ibid., no. 1910/1071. 41 16 July 1910 Lowther-Grey tel. 157, FO 371/996/189/29853. 42 “Of very little intrinsic importance”, 31 Dec. 1910 Bab. Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 5. 43 A comprehensive list is in 22 Aug. 1910 Grey-Lowther 603, BD 10 (2), no. 1. pp. 1–6. 44 Not until Dec. 1911, and only after numerous British notes verbales, was Lowther handed a cheque in compensation for British losses in Baghdad and Karbala. 1 Dec. 1911 Lowther-Grey 1911 tel. 328, FO 371/1236/29/48035. 45 Lowther suggested that the April 1910 demand was itself the immediate cause of the wave of Anglophobia. 24 Oct. 1910 Lowther-Grey tel. 232, FO 371/1015/ 36702/38783. 46 See, e.g., Mallet minute on 21 July 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/1008/12174/27430 and 15 Nov. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther tel., FO 195/2340, folio 427. 47 6 Apr. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1236/29/12765. 48 The phrase is Mallet’s. Minute on 16 Aug. 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/1013/29914/ 29914. 49 By warning of the British attitude towards a Turkish loan (19 Jan. 1911 Grey-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 269) and towards the Turco-Italian Tripoli dispute (Mallet minute on 26 Jan. 1911 Lowther-Grey tel. 18, FO 371/1238/ 250/3114). 50 22 Oct. 1910 Grey-Asquith pte., Grey MSS, 61, FO 800/100. 51 6 March 1911 FO memo. for CID, FO 371/1245/8429/8429. 52 23 Nov. 1910 Marling-Grey 843, FO 371/1015/36702/43062 and 21 Dec. 1910 FO-IO, ibid. 53 Described in 17 Jan. 1910 Tyrrell (mil. attaché, Constantinople)-Lowther 8, FO 195/2346. 54 Described in Cox-Hardinge tel.; enclosed in 1 Dec. 1910 G of I-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 162, no. 1910/1716. 55 Minute on 23 Nov. 1910 FO-IO, ibid. 56 9 Dec. 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/1004/5607/44632. 57 5 Apr. 1911 Hirtzel-Ritchie, L/P & S/10, vol. 162, no. 1911/3267a. But Ottley pleaded that Crewe’s illness had necessitated a postponement. 6 Apr. 1911 Ottley-Nicolson, NIC MSS, 1911 (2), FO 800/348, p. 36. 58 8 June 1911 G of I-IO tel., L/P & S/10, vol. 188, no. 1911/4523. 59 “When I come to think of it, we have a far worse [i.e. better] cause for complaint against Turkey in Baghdad and Mesopotamia, than ever the Italians had in Tripoli.” 15 Oct. 1911 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (5), FO 800/351, p. 185. 60 12 Oct. 1911 G of I-IO tel., L/P &S/10, vol. 188, no. 1911/1677. 61 17 Oct. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1236/29/40988. 62 Minute on 16 Aug. 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/1013/29914/29914. 63 17 Jan. 1911 Nicolson-Goschen pte., NIC MSS (i), FO 800/347, p. 336. 64 On this subject, see E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (new edn, London, 1964), pp. 377–395; A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, [164]


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65

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

vol. 1 (Oxford, 1961), pp. 287–310; Williamson, Grand Strategy, pp. 264–283; and P.G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908–1914 (Harvard, 1971), pp. 13–46. 15 June 1912 Churchill memo., quoted in R.S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill vol. 2, Companion vol. 3 (London, 1969), pp. 1564–1569. Compare with 18 March 1892 DNI and DMI memo.; quoted in J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and the Foreign Office: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London, 1964), pp. 25–26. 9 May 1912 WO memo., The Effect of the Loss of Sea Power in the Mediterranean on British Military Strategy, CAB 37/110/68, para. 6. 6 May 1912 Nicolson-Bertie pte., NIC MSS, 1912 (4), FO 800/356 p. 167. 9 May 1912 FO paper 147b, The Effect of British Evacuation of the Mediterranean on Questions of Foreign Policy, CAB 38/20/14, para. 3. Minute on 21 May 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1484/264/21766. 4 July 1912, 117th CID meeting, CAB 38/21/26. Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson (1842–1921), 1st Sea Lord, 1910–1911 (DNB, 1927), pp. 579–581. 4 May 1911 110th CID meeting, CAB 38/18/29. 21 Dec. 1903 Drury (C in C East Indies)-Adm. 133/331; enclosed in ADM 1/7964. Minute (unsigned) on 18 Nov. 1907 FO-Adm., ADM 1/7985. Vice-Admiral E. J. W. Slade (1859–1923), C in C East Indies, 1909–1912; later attached to Admiralty staff in London. 23 Apr. 1911 Slade-G of I 84/1462, received by CID on 17 May 1911, Adm.-CID, FO 406/37, no. 76, pp. 87–91. 21 Dec. 1910 Adm.-FO, FO 371/1015/36702/46211. Ballard (DNI) minute on 20 Jan. 1912 Slade-Adm. tel., ADM 116/1247, case 376(2). Enclosure in 30 March 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1490/3369/18365. 24 March 1911 and 20 Apr. 1911, memoranda by H. Wilson (DMO) and Col. Gleichen (head of the operations section of the DMO), WO 106/43 file C3/21. 1 May 1911 WO paper 104d, CAB 38/17/25. Sir W.G. Nicholson (1845–1918), DMO, 1901–1904; CIGS, 1908–1912 (DNB, 1927), pp. 407–408. 4 May 1911, 110th CID meeting, CAB 38/18/29. 15 Jan. 1912, G of 1-IO, enclosed in FO 371/1490/3369/18365. 14 Apr. 1912, Major Gorton memo., WO 106/42, file C3/37. 19 Apr. 1912, Major F. Cunliffe-Roan memo., ibid. 15 Jan. 1912, Report by Slade, Lake, McMahon and Cox, enclosed in 7 March 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1490/3369/10200. 27 June 1912 G of I-WO, WO 106/42, file C3/37. 12 Dec. 1910 Nicolson-Marling pte., NIC MSS, 1910 (2), FO 800/344, p. 323. It asked a subcommittee to consider “to what extent Turkish claims in that region can be reconciled with British interests”. 4 May 1911, 110th CID meeting, CAB 38/18/29. Minute on 5 June 1911, CID-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 162, no. 1911/3267b. Minutes on 7 March 1912, IO-FO, FO 371/1490/3369/10200 and on 18 June 1912, IO-FO, FO 371/1485/264/26183. [165]


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93 21 Aug. 1913 Crewe-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 119 (i), 38, p. 65. 94 This pattern was not restricted to Mesopotamia. “The history of British policy in China from 1905 is in part a record of adjustment to meet the conditions imposed by her changing world position.” E. W. Edwards, “Great Britain and the Manchurian Railways Question, 1909–1910”, Eng. Hist. Rev., vol. 83 (Oct. 1968), p. 741. 95 23 March 1911, PD 5, 1911, 23, col. 648. 96 Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 128. 97 See, particularly, his minute on 17 Feb. 1912 Buchanan-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1912 (i), FO 800/353, p. 74. 98 Enclosure in 23 Nov. 1910 Grey-Goschen 312 secret, BD 6, no. 414, pp. 550–553. 99 24 May 1911 Grey Cabinet memo., CAB 37/107/60, para. d. 100 20 Dec. 1911 Grey-Goschen 304, BD 6, no. 480, p. 651 and P. Rowland, The Last Liberal Governments, vol. 2 (London, 1971), p. 100. 101 Minute on 19 Jan. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1178/1/2304. 102 9 March 1912 Harcourt memo., CAB 37/110/44. Even Nicolson, who opposed the Portuguese colonies arrangement in principle, admitted that it had improved Anglo-German relations. 9 Jan. 1913 Nicolson-Hardinge pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (i), FO 800/362, p. 204. 103 4 July 1912 Grey-Goschen pte., Grey MSS, 21, FO 800/62. 104 “By the time war came the 1907 Convention had reached the end of its tether.” R. L. Greaves, “Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and its Workings in Persia, 1907–14”, pt. 2, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 31, 1968, p. 303. 105 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery, p. 518. 106 Minute on 6 March 1914 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol, 415, no. 1914/927. 107 5 Apr. 1914 Mallet-Nicolson pte,, NIC MSS, 1914 (2), FO 800/373, p. 210 and 5 May 1914 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80. 108 E.g., 30 March 1914 Nicolson-de Bunsen pte., N1C MSS, 1914 (2), FO 800/373, p. 80. 109 See especially the long memo. by Clerk dated 23 July 1914, quoted extensively in Greaves, “Some Aspects”, p. 308. 110 20 July 1910 Asquith-the King, CAB 41/32/67 and 13 May 1912 Grey-Goschen pte., Grey MSS, 21, FO 800/62. 111 E.g., 6 Jan. 1911 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (i), FO 800/347, p. 33 and 1 Apr. 1912 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 397. 112 22 July 1913 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (8), FO 800/369, p. 52. 113 E.g., Mallet minute on 25 June 1912 Goschen-Grey 306, FO 371/1496/27692/ 27692. 114 28 Dec. 1910 Grey-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1910 (2), FO 800/344, p. 168. 115 E.g., 2 Nov. 1911 draft reply, FO 371/1262/43250/43250. On the Turkish offers of Oct. 1911, Nov. 1912 and June 1913, see Ahmad, Britain and Turkey, pp. 316–321. 116 2 June 1912 Kitchener-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 9, FO 800/48. 117 4 Nov. 1911 Churchill-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 48, FO 800/87. 118 E.g., A. Cheradme, “The New Turkish Army and the Balance of Power in Europe”, Quarterly Review, Apr. 1911, pp. 454–472. 119 4 July 1912, 117th CID Meeting, CAB 38/21/26. [166]


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120 6 Feb. 1911 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 299. 121 24 May 1911 first meeting of CID Persian Gulf subcommittee, CAB 16/15, p. 3. 122 Minute on 3 August 1911 McCallum Scott parliamentary question, FO 371/ 1261/30991/40312. 123 Minute on 30 Oct. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1234/21/42892. In the Cabinet, Grey stressed his wish to “do all in our power to reciprocate the Turkish wish for a solid and friendly understanding” as soon as the Turco-Italian war ended. 2 Nov. 1911 Asquith-the King, CAB 41/33/28. 124 Minute on 13 March 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1490/2865/11094. 125 26 May 1912 Parker-Hardinge pte.; quoted in Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 333.

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8 The Modification of Strategy

As a result of the pressures outlined above, the government modified the substance, objective and tone of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1910 and 1914. Traditional aspirations obstinately continued to contend with newer realities for the attention of the official mind. But by 1912, Britain’s Mesopotamian policy reflected novel criteria of assessment. The modification of British strategy did not always relate exactly to the chronology of the various pressures. A gradual, rather than immediate, sense of cumulative restraint accounted for the differences between the demands of 1910 and the agreements of 1913 and 1914. Ultimately, however, the agreements reflected the Foreign Office’s awareness that Britain’s local strategic impotence and its global diplomatic aspirations had necessitated a modification of the policy enunciated in the Tigris valley railway despatch.

The Modification of Substance The substance of the April 1910 despatch was modified when the government replaced the unconditional demand for British control over a line from Baghdad to the Gulf with the limited stipulation that no railway should be built south of Basra without British consent. The Foreign Office initiated the change. The India Office and the Board of Trade, having reluctantly acquiesced in the Tigris valley railway demand, now wished to insist upon its implementation. The Indian authorities, for instance, pressed Grey to demand at least fifty-five or sixty percent control of southern Mesopotamian railways.1 They strongly objected to the Turkish suggestion, made in March 1911, that Britain, France and Germany each take twenty percent in a joint stock company to construct such lines and leave Turkey with the remaining forty percent.2 But Grey displayed increasing flexibility. Within two weeks of the Turkish offer, he asked the India Office and the Board of Trade to consider the merits of minority [169]


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British participation in the southern section of the Baghdad Railway.3 Moreover, although Grey continued to impress upon foreign ambassadors Britain’s demand for “control” of this section,4 his domestic correspondence reveals that he had already abandoned his previous insistence on the issue. This modification did not meet with the approval of Grey’s colleagues. On 30 March 1911, an interdepartmental committee recommended that Britain still demand fifty percent in any Turkish company formed to construct railways south of Baghdad.5 Furthermore, the India Office and the Board of Trade subsequently reiterated that “the degree of control offered by a twenty percent or even twenty-five percent share is illusory.”6 Grey, however, still considered it “improbable” that the Porte would accept a fifty percent demand.7 In addition, Grey was supported by his own staff. In April 1911, Norman,8 Mallet and Nicolson advised that instead of demanding fifty percent, the British government should press for the concession to a joint Anglo-Franco-Russian bloc of a combined share of sixty percent.9 Ultimately, the British government’s counterproposals of both July 1911 and April 1912 were dominated by fixed notions of diplomatic desiderata. Nicolson, in particular, was blinkered10 by the consideration that “our understandings with France and Russia form the basis of our present foreign policy.” Were Britain to exclude both powers from the southern section of the Baghdad Railway and share control of that enterprise with Germany alone, “the world would undoubtedly believe that Germany had scored another success and that the understandings had been further weakened.”11 The suggestion that Britain seek combined sixty percent participation in the line with France and Russia, on the other hand, provided an opportunity for “bringing the entente into action”.12 In July 1911, both the India Office and the Board of Trade challenged this reasoning. Hirtzel protested that the joint sixty percent scheme “must be the sport of international considerations elsewhere, which at any moment may break it up”.13 Buxton14 too feared that the proposal was “fraught with dangers”.15 Nicolson, however, ignored these and similar warnings of Russian diplomatic infidelity and French financial volatility.16 Instead he insisted on the inclusion of the joint sixty percent scheme in the British proposals to the Turks of July 1911.17 This pattern of debate was repeated in the following year. In April 1912, the Porte, which objected to “dragging in” Russia,18 instead suggested an equal quadrilateral division of the line south of Baghdad between [170]


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T H E M O D I F I C AT I O N O F S T R AT E G Y

Britain, France, Germany and Turkey.19 The Indian authorities wished to use this proposal as an excuse to revert to a demand for complete British control of the railway, in which cause they were even prepared to risk a “rupture” of Anglo-Turkish relations.20 Hirtzel belatedly remembered that even the 1911 joint sixty percent scheme had been the subject of only informal interdepartmental discussions;21 Crewe ultimately realised that there was no evidence to prove that “an attempt had been unsuccessfully made to obtain a fifty percent British participation”.22 But the Foreign Office, although initially disappointed with the Turkish proposal,23 refused to sanction India’s suggested “subversive . . . departure from the rules of diplomatic procedure”.24 Instead, it increasingly stressed that in the context of European diplomacy, British control of the “fag end” of the southern Baghdad Railway was relatively unimportant.25 On this point, Nicolson proved devious as well as obstinate. At a series of interdepartmental conferences in June 1912, he pleaded the need to preserve a united entente front. He even advocated that Britain withdraw from the Baghdad–Basra line altogether because “France and Russia do not want us to participate.”26 This claim, as the Foreign Office itself admitted, was not substantiated by the available records of diplomatic exchanges.27 Nevertheless, Nicolson continued to frustrate his domestic colleagues and to mislead his foreign friends by indulging in additional casuistry. Throughout the summer, he ignored suggestions from both the India Office and the Board of Trade that Britain’s entente partners be “sounded” again.28 Instead, Nicolson deliberately flouted this request. In September 1912, Cambon did express support for joint Anglo-French cooperation in the line, but Nicolson then informed him that this information had “arrived too late”.29 By that time, Nicolson’s obsession with the need for Anglo-Russian friendship30 and his refusal to “inconvenience” the Turks31 had substantially modified Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. Privately, Nicolson hoped that, in any case, a British company would ultimately construct the southern Baghdad Railway.32 Officially, however, he insisted on the abandonment of the Tigris valley railway demand. In July 1912, therefore, Britain finally replaced its earlier insistence on a majority share in the line above Basra with a stipulation that it would merely determine its future south of that town.33 Throughout this debate, the Foreign Office persistently rejected any proposed resurrection of the 1910 demand. Nicolson tersely referred to suggestions to this effect by Lorimer and Cox34 as “outside the realm of [171]


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practical politics”.35 Maxwell deemed them “not on the tapis”.36 As early as June 1911, Grey informed the Committee of Imperial Defence that Britain could expect no more than a “share” in the southern Baghdad Railway.37 In September 1912, Nicolson confirmed the extent to which Britain’s Mesopotamian policy had been modified. He admitted to Cambon that not even German control of the line from Baghdad to Basra – which both the 1907 memorandum and the 1910 demand had been designed to prevent – would obstruct an Anglo-Turkish or Anglo-German agreement.38 In 1913, the British government did resist German attempts to obtain British “support” for a German line south of Baghdad. It did not, however, revise the Foreign Office’s promise “not to oppose” such a project.39 In 1914, the only faint remnant of the Tigris valley railway demand was a belated British request to be allowed to construct a north-easterly line from Kut al-Amara (to Mandali) as a feeder to the irrigation works.40 The substance of the April 1910 demand had been irretrievably modified.

The Modification of Objective The ultimate Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-German agreements also revealed a change in the geographical region with which the British government was now primarily concerned. The strategic and political implications of the proximity of Mesopotamia to the Gulf had been a subsidiary factor in the formulation of Britain’s Tigris valley railway demand. Between 1907 and 1910, British policy-makers frequently affirmed their determination to maintain the interests in the Gulf which the British and Indian governments had developed in the nineteenth century.41 At the same time, they had attached equal importance to Britain’s commercial interests in Mesopotamia. Repeated public expressions of British political supremacy in the Gulf 42 and the consistent official determination to resist German encroachments on this preserve43 had underlined but not determined the content of the 1907 memorandum and the 1910 demand. But by 1914, this balance was awry. The ultimate Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-German agreements subordinated the implementation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy to the defence of its Gulf interests. Indeed, the former was impossible without the latter. In 1913, Grey admitted that “a settlement recognising our de facto position in the Persian Gulf and on the Shatt-el-Arab” was “the only way in which we can now safeguard our [172]


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great interests in Mesopotamia”.44 By 1914, Parker conceded, negotiations which had originated in the Tigris valley railway demand had culminated in the need to ensure that “Britain’s historical position should be recognised on the shores of eastern and southern Arabia and on the waters of the Persian Gulf.”45 The change in the substance of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy had thus been accompanied by a change in objective. The development was symbolised by a change in Britain’s negotiating tactics. As recently as May 1909, Lowther had advised that all Baghdad Railway negotiations should be kept entirely separate from the problems posed by Mubarak’s Ottoman de jure allegiance to the sultan and de facto control by the British government.46 However, Germany’s Baghdad Railway diplomatic successes, Turkey’s political encroachments in the Gulf and the growing awareness of Britain’s inability to respond forcefully to either development invalidated this approach. By August 1910, Lowther was requesting “a comprehensive as opposed to piecemeal treatment” of Britain’s outstanding difficulties with Turkey in the Gulf area.47 In January 1911, Nicolson too wanted the government to settle “the whole range” of these issues.48 The following March, Parker felt that “we ought to open our mouths wide” and not restrict international discussions to the Baghdad Railway alone.49 Moreover, although the Indian authorities disagreed with the Foreign Office’s proposals to meet the Mesopotamian situation, they did not dispute the shift in Britain’s attention to the Gulf. Indeed, they shared London’s proposal to widen the discussions.50 Thus Hardinge agreed with the “absolute necessity of preserving Britain’s Gulf supremacy”.51 At the interdepartmental conference of 30 March 1911, the India Office therefore accepted Grey’s suggestion that Britain include Gulf issues in the Anglo-Turkish Mesopotamian railway discussions.52 The fear that the terminus of the Baghdad Railway might provide Germany with a port on the Gulf was again only one aspect of Britain’s attitude. Public warnings of this possibility and official apprehensions that “if we weakened our hold over Kuwait it might easily become a fortified base in the future” did increase in 1911.53 Grey was therefore adamant that “we could not agree to a Baghdad Railway settlement” unless it precluded such an eventuality.54 But more subtle considerations also impelled British policy in the same direction. The imperatives of local political prestige combined with the pressures of diplomacy and [173]


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strategy to ensure that a Gulf settlement became the “crux” of the British negotiating position.55 Britain had to save face in the Gulf not merely in order to impress “a few Parsees in Bombay”56 but specifically in order to gain the confidence of the leading Arab rulers along its littoral. The British and Indian governments acknowledged, for instance, that they had to afford Mubarak protection against persistent Turkish harassment. Failure to do so would “raise the cry of ‘perfide Albion’ all round the Gulf ”57 and “alienate him and all the Arab Chieftains with whom we have engagements, and destroy our reputation for good faith”.58 As early as April 1911, Nicolson was preoccupied with the thought that “were we to show any inclination to abandon the position we have always maintained in these waters we should lose greatly in prestige and would also open the door to encroachments.”59 Increasingly, therefore, a settlement of the Baghdad Railway question became the bait with which to encourage the Turks to discuss the Gulf. A British railway concession was no longer the ultimate objective of the negotiations. Thus the Foreign Office ignored the Porte’s readiness,60 and rejected Marling’s advice, “to use the leverage offered to us by the Turkish anxiety to settle the Koweit question to secure our interests on the Bagdad-Basra section” of the railway.61 The British financiers, who concentrated solely on the railway issue, claimed that “to raise a new difficulty [the Gulf ] when an effort is being made to get an old difficulty out of the way, is the best way not to arrive at a solution.”62 The British officials, however, reversed these priorities. When the Foreign Office contrasted the advantages of gaining a Mesopotamian railway with the dangers of losing Britain’s position in the Gulf, the promise of the former paled before the implications of the latter. By March 1911, Grey had begun to denigrate the importance of the Tigris valley railway63 and Eyre Crowe64 to advise that “it is probably more important to us to get a settlement of the Gulf question in general than to agree about the exact proportion of British participation in the railway.”65 The Indian authorities ultimately accepted this doctrine. Hirtzel had initially doubted whether “the materials existed” for a comprehensive Anglo-Turkish Gulf settlement.66 But Crewe privately admitted to Hardinge that “if . . . no friendly agreement is reached, Baghdad Railway will still be built and difficulties of continuing our good offices to Sheik [of Kuwait] will be increased as Turkish power consolidates.”67 For this reason, in August 1911, Hardinge accepted the proposed twenty percent share in the [174]


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southern Baghdad Railway provided that “we are able to obtain all our other desiderata in the Persian Gulf ”.68 Moreover, in July 1912, Crewe ultimately withdrew his opposition to Britain’s exclusion from the line, in order that the Turks might thereby be induced to accept his Gulf proposals “in their entirety”.69 This attitude was extended to the Anglo-German negotiations. During a conversation with Metternich in May 1911, Grey deliberately omitted all mention of British control of southern Mesopotamian railways, but he specifically stressed the government’s Gulf desiderata.70 The following year Parker too asserted that only the safety of Britain’s Gulf position dictated the demand for Germany’s exclusion from a Basra–Kuwait line.71 Britain’s position in the Mesopotamian interior had ceased to dominate the government’s attitude towards the Baghdad Railway. In July 1912, Nicolson advised Hardinge, and in September warned Cambon, that “so long as the terminus of the [southern] section was at Bussorah, the question as to who should construct the line was not of such importance to Great Britain as was the settlement of the Persian Gulf and other questions.”72 The negotiations of 1913 confirmed the parabola of this change of negotiating objective. Fitzmaurice in Constantinople and the India Office in London expressed decreasing concern for the advance of British claims in Mesopotamia. Simultaneously, however, they voiced their increasing determination to combat projected German encroachments in the Gulf.73 By March 1913, there was no doubt in Parker’s mind that the Persian Gulf agreements were “the most important of all”74 and that the German promise not to establish a port or terminus on those waters was “a great concession”.75 The ultimate conventions therefore upset the delicate balance, which the 1907 memorandum and the 1910 despatch had achieved, between Britain’s interests in the Gulf and in Mesopotamia.

The Modification of Tone The pressures exerted on Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1910 and 1914 affected the tone, no less than the form and direction, of the negotiations. The tone of the April 1910 despatch to Lowther had been unconcealedly aggressive; that of the 1913 and 1914 agreements was decidedly conciliatory. The Tigris valley demand had defied Germany and threatened Turkey. The final conventions, by contrast, were conceived in [175]


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the hope that they would be “full of promise for the future relations of Great Britain and Turkey,76 and owed much to Britain’s “earnest desire” to “prevent causes of further friction” with Germany.77 The tone of the Anglo-German discussions was determined by the British government’s desire to avoid an international confrontation over Mesopotamia. As early as February 1911, Crewe acknowledged that “general good” would result from “letting in German capitalists” to railways in southern Mesopotamia “in moderate quantities on an international basis”.78 By 1913, this consideration was also extended to other Mesopotamian issues. Thus Parker noted the “political advantage” of granting Germany a twenty percent share in Britain’s Mesopotamian navigation concession,79 and Grey warned of the diplomatic inconvenience which would result from a British demand for an unimpaired irrigation monopoly.80 Similarly, Llewellyn Smith observed that Britain had to regard the petroleum negotiations “not as an isolated transaction but as part of a general settling up [with Germany] of questions in Mesopotamia”.81 The commercial considerations which had determined British policy until 1910 were not discounted.82 But they were correlated with the political desire to “remove the last outstanding cause of possible friction between British and German interests in Asiatic Turkey”.83 The press sensed that a Baghdad Railway agreement presaged a general reduction in Anglo-German tension.84 British diplomats worked towards this end. Nicolson stressed the Eurocentric benefits which might accrue from such an agreement,85 and his ambitions were paralleled by Crewe’s hope that the government would take “full advantage” of the spirit of the discussions to improve Anglo-German relations in other matters.86 Ultimately, Hirtzel even referred to the negotiations as evidence of “a kind of limited partnership” between England and Germany.87 The modification of Britain’s tone was more strikingly evident during the Anglo-Turkish negotiations. Once again, the Foreign Office was the architect of the change. Lowther continued to warn against flouting Turkish national pride; he therefore opposed the Indian suggestion to punish Turkish recalcitrance. He reiterated his earlier fears that British aggression might “encounter a most violent stream of ill-feeling and opprobrium”88 and incite a Turkish boycott of British goods.89 Similarly, Llewellyn Smith repeated his previous warnings that “we have got to keep well in mind . . . Turkish national sentiment.”90 But neither the fears of the ambassador nor the warnings of the Board of Trade were [176]


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original. Their statements of 1910 and 1911 merely echoed sentiments which they had voiced in 1909 and which had hitherto made little impression on Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. Repetition alone would not have been effective had not the Foreign Office itself changed the mood in which it was now prepared to receive such advice. Ultimately, therefore, the Foreign Office’s decision to replace the threats and warnings of 1910 with the feelers of 1911 was the result of its own estimate of Britain’s negotiating weakness. Thus despite Hirtzel’s protests,91 Grey in October 1910 defended Lowther’s request that Britain mollify the tone of its protest to Turkey against the Baghdad demolitions. Grey himself thus departed from the attitude which he had adopted towards the Tigris valley railway demand. He now insisted that a “despatch is a diplomatic step, not a menace, and as such diplomatic considerations must have some weight in deciding the moment to present it.”92 In 1911, Nicolson too thought that “an amicable understanding” with Turkey over the railway and the Gulf would produce “a very good general result”.93 Grey ultimately claimed that the peaceful settlement of compensation for the Baghdad demolitions was “a justification of the course we have taken”.94 The modification of Britain’s tone also explains the procedural aspect of the negotiations. The Foreign Office determined to palliate Turkish pride by refusing to negotiate about the Baghdad Railway with Germany above the Porte’s head. In December 1909, Grey had specified that Turkey would be allowed a “say” on the issue only after Britain had reached an agreement with the German financiers and statesmen.95 But by 1912, Bertie and Nicolson were agreed that it was necessary to invert this order of negotiation.96 Parker and Crowe attempted to justify the change on tactical grounds. They warned that Germany, once having tied Britain’s hands in an agreement, would use the opportunity to sow Anglo-Turkish discord.97 The India Office, however, argued that even on tactical grounds, the opposite surmise might be made. Thus Morley maintained that “a friendly agreement with Germany appears essential before a satisfactory settlement of the Baghdad Railway question can be arrived at, and indeed before the subject can be profitably discussed with Turkey.”98 His view seems to have corresponded more closely than that of the Foreign Office to the situation created by the March 1911 Turco-German convention. The Foreign Office inflated the importance of Turkey in the Baghdad Railway situation; but the India [177]


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Office appreciated that the last word would rest with Germany. As Hirtzel noted, such was Turkey’s financial situation that “the Turks . . . will . . . have to do what the Germans tell them, whether they like it or not.”99 The Foreign Office’s attitude was a reflection of its concentration on Eurocentric diplomatic factors, which transcended the immediate realities of the Baghdad Railway situation. In 1911, Grey impressed on Hardinge the general need for not pushing Turkey “too hard”.100 He thereby rejected the Indian claim that “while it will no doubt be necessary to pay all outward respect to Turkish susceptibilities, they can in practice be treated as negligible.”101 Similarly, in 1912, the Foreign Office rejected Crewe’s suggestion that Britain break off its Baghdad Railway discussions with Turkey and concentrate on a prior agreement with Germany which would modify the 1911 convention.102 Privately, Parker reminded Hardinge of the importance of preventing Turkey from “joining the German combination”.103 Officially, the Foreign Office warned that the Ottoman government “would deeply resent the discontinuance of the present discussions and the initiation of negotiations between two Powers, England and Germany, one of whom [Germany] has largely renounced her claims [in the southern section of the Baghdad Railway] in return for a substantial quid pro quo, the other of whom does not possess any legal claim at all in those regions”.104 Not even Britain’s entente partners were spared this manifestation of the Foreign Office’s desire to accommodate Turkish national sentiment. In 1911, the Foreign Office had considered it “impossible” to expect Turkey to accede to a fifty percent British share in the southern section of the Baghdad Railway. It had therefore advocated the compromise of a joint Anglo-Franco-Russian sixty percent participation.105 By 1912, however, the same diagnosis had stimulated a different prescription. The Foreign Office now wished to avoid “the possibility of indisposing the Turks” by insisting even on the joint sixty percent scheme. Nicolson therefore discouraged entente participation in the Baghdad line altogether.106 The evidence presented by the tone of the negotiations contradicts the claim that “the ultimate possibility of political annexation” lurked unmistakably behind Britain’s attitude towards the 1914 Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agreement.107 Before the First World War, Britain’s Mesopotamian policy did not reflect Salisbury’s embryonic conviction that “the time has come for some territorial re-arrangement” in Asiatic [178]


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Turkey.108 Neither did it anticipate Asquith’s wartime determination to “abandon the formula of ‘Ottoman integrity’”.109 Even in 1915, the de Bunsen Committee was to advocate retaining a large Turkish empire in Asia,110 and Grey was uncertain whether Britain “should put forward a claim for ourselves” in Mesopotamia.111 This reticence had been even more evident before 1914, when the British and Indian governments were anxious to postpone, rather than to initiate, the partition of Turkey’s Asiatic provinces. The Foreign Office had proposed an economic partition in April 1910. But by the time of the 1913 and 1914 agreements, the government had acknowledged that the military, political and diplomatic disadvantages of such an eventuality outweighted the commercial benefits which it might have conferred. In the first place, partition was unwelcome to Britain on military grounds. It inevitably implied German predominance in Cilisia and French supremacy in Syria; it would therefore exacerbate Britain’s Mediterranean weakness.112 Moreover, as the 1910–1911 Gulf dispute itself indicated, Britain could not balance such losses by an advance into Mesopotamia. This would impose “an intolerable strain upon our already overburdened military resources”.113 By 1913, Norman appreciated that “we have enough to do at present” in containing the Gulf situation,114 and Mallet warned that “we had better not have a sphere of interest which we could not defend.”115 India too prefered to bolster, not undermine, those parts of the Ottoman Empire unaffected by the Balkan wars. In its view, “the existence in Asia of a strong Turkish power, friendly and reformed, will be a safeguard against interference with India from the west.”116 The Indian government had another, more domestic, reason for opposing the partition of Asiatic Turkey. Britain’s acquiescence in such a scheme, it feared, would alienate India’s Moslem subjects.117 This factor influenced discussions on the despatch of a Gulf force in 1911.118 Subsequently, it overshadowed consideration of Anglo-Turkish relations. Thus in 1913, Hardinge warned Nicolson, and Chirol informed Grey, that they could think of no other question “that would be so likely to provoke a serious rising among the Muhammedans of this country”.119 Nicolson agreed; he too refused to “be party to any measure which might alienate or disappoint our Moslem population in India”.120 The Indian and British authorities thus agreed that in deference to Moslem opinion, “every effort should be made to avoid actions likely to lead to [179]


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[Turkish] partition either now or in the future.”121 The 1913 and 1914 agreements reflected this aspiration. According to Hardinge and Mallet, they had facilitated Anglo-Turkish friendship and would therefore “certainly be to our very great advantage in India”.122 Diplomatic considerations of Eurocentric relevance confirmed this attitude. In 1913, the fear that a “scramble” for Turkey would threaten European peace was persistently stressed by Nicolson123 and forcefully echoed by Parker.124 It was formally enshrined in Mallet’s famous minute that “a division of the Asiatic provinces into spheres of interest could not benefit us . . . and might bring about a European war.”125 This calculation was ultimately rendered irrelevant by the assassination at Sarajevo. But the desire to avoid European “complications”126 had previously influenced British policy throughout the latter stages of the Baghdad Railway negotiations. In 1913, Grey convinced the Cabinet, and Mallet (now ambassador at Constantinople) warned the Foreign Office, that whatever the commercial advantages of the reversion of Mesopotamia to British domination, Eurocentric considerations dictated that “for the time being the only safe policy is to preserve Ottoman rule in Asia.”127 The British government therefore modified the tone of its Mesopotamian policy by repudiating the “forward” initiatives undertaken in 1910. The formal protests against the formulation of German claims to Anatolia,128 French ambitions in Syria129 and Italian designs on Asia Minor130 may have been motivated by jealousy and fear. However, the domestic echoes of such international murmerings demonstrate the sincerity of the British wish to avoid precipitating the dismemberment of Asiatic Turkey. Thus, within the Foreign Office Parker suggested that the government postpone the conferment of honours on the sheikhs of Kuwait and Mohammera in order to avoid charges of altering the Gulf status quo.131 At the interdepartmental level, the Foreign Office advanced the same argument when asking India to curtail its contacts with Ibn Saud.132 It also informed the Admiralty that “grave objections of foreign policy” precluded the participation of government capital in the Mesopotamian petroleum concession.133 As Crewe noted, “The transaction may be represented – quite untruly – as a colonial aquisition of interest by HMG.”134 The Foreign Office was equally firm with the diplomatic service. Maxwell admitted that “if there is going to be a partition of Turkey in Asia, this [Mesopotamia] is the part that we should keep our eyes on.”135 However, Lorimer’s frequent proposals that [180]


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the government should itself induce this eventuality were sharply criticised. Mallet advised that “the strong tendency on the part of our consuls to talk of spheres of influence . . . must be discouraged.”136 Parker requested that Lorimer be curtly informed “that it is the policy of HMG to uphold the integrity of Turkey”.137 The ultimate agreements thus repudiated the forthright claims of the 1910 demand. The latter had stipulated the necessity for a sphere of exclusive British commercial development in Mesopotamia. But the object of the 1913 and 1914 agreements was to ensure that “a mingling of European interests all over Turkey will diminish the danger which is threatened by each country having a sphere of influence to itself.”138 By 1914, therefore, Grey had modified the tone, as well as the substance and objective, of the Tigris valley railway demand. A reappraisal of Britain’s general diplomatic situation and local strategic position had precluded the repetition of his earlier challenge to the Germans and threat to the Turks. By 1914, he wished “to clean the slate and remove all the possibilities of further friction”139 with both countries. In order to encourage this desire, Britain finally withdrew its opposition to the completion of the German railway to Basra and consented to a four percent increase in the customs duties.

NOTES 1 E.g., 13 Feb. 1911 G of I-IO; enclosed in FO 371/1232/21/7409 and 6 Jan. 1911 Parker and Maxwell minutes, FO 371/1232/21/637. 2 Substance of the Turkish proposal in 1 March 1911 Lowther-Grey tel. 52, BD 10 (2), no. 14, p. 24. For hostile reactions, see 7 March 1911 G of I-IO tel., L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1911/428 and departmental minutes on 3 March 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1232/21/7880. 3 16 March 1911 FO-IO & B of T secret and immediate, FO 371/1232/21/7880. 4 28 March 1911 Grey-Bertie 114, BD, 10 (2), no. 24, p. 37. 5 The remainder to be German or Turco-German. 30 March 1911 Parker memo. point ‘B’, FO 371/1233/21/12280. 6 29 March 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1233/21/12463. The date is deceptive: the despatch was sent after the conference and mainly “for the sake of record”. 31 March 1911 Hirtzel note, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1911/516. See also 7 Apr. 1911 B of T-FO, FO 371/1233/21/12979. 7 Minute on Parker’s memo., above, n. 5. 8 H. C. Norman (1872–1955), 1st Sec., Diplomatic Service, 1907–1914. [181]


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9 Minutes on 18 Apr. 1911 Buchanan-Grey 110, FO 371/1234/21/15141 and 12 Apr. 1911 Nicolson-Goschen pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (i), FO 800/347, p. 456. 10 When speaking of the official mind in this period, Professor Beloff has noted: “It was . . . neither intelligence nor character that failed Britain but imagination, the ability to see facts afresh without professional blinkers.” Imperial Sunset, p. 179. 11 6 Apr. 1911 Nicolson-Grey pte., Grey MSS 54, FO 800/93. Initially Grey had opposed the joint sixty percent suggestion. See his April despatches to Bertie and Buchanan in BD, 10 (1), no. 716, pp. 692–693 and no. 717, pp. 693–694. 12 19 Apr. Nicolson-Hardinge pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (2), FO 800/348, p. 477 and reported in 15 July 1911 Hirtzel-Ritchie, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1911/3912; further quoted in Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 328. 13 12 July minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1911/3912. 14 S. Buxton (1853–1934), Pres. B of T, 1910–1914 (DNB, 1949), pp. 131–132. 15 19 July 1911 Buxton-Grey, FO 371/1234/21/28300. 16 E.g., 1 March 1911 Babington Smith-Cassel, BS MSS, 6. 17 29 July 1911 memo. to Tewfik Pasha, BD 10 (2), no. 34, pp. 45–46. 18 18 Aug. 1911 Lowther-Grey 583, BD 10 (2), no. 36, pp. 50–51. 19 15 Apr. 1912 aide-memoire, BD 10 (2), no. 47, p. 59. 20 29 May 1912 Hardinge-Crewe tel. pte., HARD MSS, 96 (2), 165, p. 61 and Hirtzel’s 9-page memo. of 6 June 1912; enclosed in FO 371/1484./264/24342. 21 Minute on 30 May 1912 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/2065. Hirtzel correctly recollected that the last official interdepartmental decision, of 30 March 1911, had called for fifty percent participation (above, p. 170). Nicolson, who had not attended that meeting, proposed the joint sixty percent scheme only in subsequent private conversations. See also Parker memo., 26 July 1911, FO 371/1234/21/28300. 22 10 June 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1485/264/24955. 23 13 May 1912 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 413. 24 30 May 1912 FO-IO, quoted in Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 334. 25 E.g., Parker minute on 23 Jan. 1912 Lowther-Grey tel. 9, FO 371/1484/264/ 21766. 26 Records of these conferences (of which no official account could be found in the FO files) in 11 June 1912 Hirtzel memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/2065; 11 June 1912 memo. (unsigned), NIC MSS, 1912 (5), FO 800/357, p. 246; 12 June 1912 Ashley memo., BT 11/4; and 28 June 1912 Hirtzel memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/2500. 27 Mallet, Grey and Parker minutes on 1 July 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1485/264/ 28093. 28 Hirtzel minute on 23 July 1912 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 60, no. 1912/2890. 29 20 Sep. 1912 Grey-Bertie 463, BD 10 (2), no. 57, pp. 87–88. 30 22 July 1912 Nicolson-Marling pte., NIC MSS, 1912 (1), FO 800/357, p. 338. Nicolson’s desire for Russian friendship has been described as “an obsession to which he would sacrifice not only abstractions such as truth, fairness, or honor [sic], but at times even the concrete interests of his country.” Kazemzadeh, Britain and Russia in Persia, pp. 482–483. 31 28 June 1912 Hirtzel memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/2500. 32 24 June 1912 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 425. [182]


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33 18 July 1912 memo. point 5, BD 10 (2), no. 55, p. 78. As far as the railway was concerned, this draft was substantially that which was incorporated into the final agreement. 34 23 Feb. 1911 Lorimer and Cox-Lowther tel., FO 195/2367, folio 68. 35 27 Feb. 1911 Lowther-Nicolson pte. and minute, NIC MSS, 1911 (i), FO 800/347, p. 193. 36 Minutes on 20 March 1911 Lorimer-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/1234/ 21/17174. 37 15 June 1911, 2nd meeting CID Persian Gulf subcommittee, CAB 16/15, p. 15. The record continues: “KITCHENER: But only a share? GREY: Yes.” 38 20 Sep. 1912 Grey-Bertie 463, BD 10 (2), no. 57, pp. 87–88. 39 3 Nov. 1913 Kuhlmann-Grey clause ‘b’, BD 10 (2), no. 156, p. 243 and 15 Dec. 1913 Grey-Kuhlmann clause ‘b’, BD 10 (2), no. 189, p. 299. 40 BD 10 (2), no. 215, p. 347 and Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 186, n. 40. 41 Comprehensively treated in Kelly, Britain and the Gulf. 42 See particularly Lansdowne’s famous 1903 Gulf declaration (5 May 1903, PD 4, 1903, 121, col. 1348), Curzon’s illustrious tour of the region in 1903–4 and the declaration attached to the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention. Churchill, Anglo-Russian Convention, pp. 263–264, 267–268. 43 E.g., the Abu Musa affair (Busch, Britain and the Gulf, pp. 369–372) and Bailin’s shipping enterprises (Plass, England zwichen Russland and Deutschland, pp. 402, 443). 44 8 Aug. 1913 Grey-Buchanan tel. 579; BD 10 (2), no. 131, p. 202. 45 24 July 1914 Parker-Mallet (a draft summary of the Baghdad Railway negotiations which was never sent), FO 371/2125/2390/33655, pp. 1, 49. 46 28 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 396, FO 371/768/21185/21185. On the legal difficulties of the Kuwaiti situation, see BD I, App. pp. 333–334. 47 22 Aug. 1910 Lowther-Grey 603, BD 10 (2), no. 1, pp. 1–6. 48 16 Jan. 1911 Nicolson-Grey pte., FO 371/1232/21/1958. 49 Minute on 3 March 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1232/21/7880. 50 On this point, “the disagreement between India and Home authorities was slight, concerning only details and not the basic necessity.” Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 326. 51 7 March 1911 Hardinge-Morley tel. pte., L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1911/428. 52 30 March 1911 Parker memo., FO 371/1232/21/12280. Parker also noted: “One point . . . is clearly brought out . . . Whether British participation in the Bagdad Rly. is or is not brought about, . . . HMG will not agree to the customs increase unless (i) Kuwait question . . . is settled (ii) Turkey gives guarantee that status quo on the Gulf will not be disturbed to our detriment.” Minute on 29 March 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1232/21/12463. 53 Chirol discussed this matter with the Foreign Office in February 1911 (Parker minute on 27 Feb. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1232/21/7409). Bertie raised it in March (15 March 1911 Bertie-Nicolson pte., Bertie MSS, “A” 13, FO 800/171), and Lovat Fraser’s April article on the subject (“Why help the Baghdad Railway?”, National Review, vol. 57, April 1911, pp. 220–230) captured Grey’s imagination (3 Apr. 1911 Mallet-Hirtzel pte. (2nd letter), L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1911/3428). [183]


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54 13 Apr. 1911 Grey-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 277. 55 The word was Nicolson’s. 15 Feb. 1911 Nicolson-Barclay pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (i), FO 800/347, p. 268. 56 Sir W. Nicholson, 15 June 1911 2nd meeting CID Persian Gulf subcommittee, CAB 16/15, p, 16. 57 Parker minute on 4 Jan. 1911 Marling-Grey 14 secret, FO 371/1232/21/848. 58 15 March 1911 Bertie-Nicolson pte., Bertie MSS, “A”, 13, FO 800/171 and 23 March 1911 Hardinge-Morley pte., Morley MSS, 26, p. 22. 59 16 Apr. 1911 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 327. The appearance was, of course, more important than the reality. In Feb. 1913 Norman was “very glad” that the Turks had finally agreed to register Mubarak’s date properties, but would have been happier still “if it could be made to appear that we had been instrumental in obtaining this boon for the Sheik”. Minute on 4 Feb. 1913 Lowther-Grey 88, FO 371/1490/6026/6026. 60 22 Aug. 1910 Lowther-Grey 603, BD 10 (2), no. 1, pp. 1–6. 61 4 Jan. 1911 Marling-Grey 14 secret, BD 10 (2), no. 6, pp. 10–12. 62 13 Sep. 1910 Cassel-Bab. Smith, BS MSS, 4 and 30 Dec. 1910 Bab. SmithNicolson pte., FO 371/1232/21/637. 63 16 March 1911 FO-IO, FO 371/1232/21/7880. 64 E. (after 1911 Sir Eyre) Crowe (1864–1925), Senior Clerk, FO, 1906–12 and Asnt. Under-Sec., FO, 1912–1920 (DNB 1937), pp. 219–221. 65 27 March 1911 minute, BD 10 (2), no. 23, p. 36. 66 7 Dec. 1910 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 162, no. 1910/1716. 67 18 March 1911 Crewe-Hardinge tel. pte., L/P & S/10, Vol. 59, no. 1911/428. 68 2 Aug. 1911 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (3), FO 800/349, p. 205 and 6 June 1912 Hardinge-Chirol pte. HARD MSS, 92 (2), 168, p. 172. 69 8 July 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1485/264/29140. 70 18 May 1911 Grey-Goschen 114, BD 10 (2), no. 30, p. 42. 71 11 May 1912 memo., FO 371/1484/264/20715. 72 18 July 1912 Nicolson-Hardinge pte. NIC MSS, 1912 (5), FO 800/357, p. 311 and 20 Sep. 1912 Grey-Bertie 463, BD 10 (2), no. 57, pp. 87–88. 73 17 Feb. 1913 Fitzmaurice-Maxwell pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80 and, e.g., 6 Aug. 1913 IO-FO, FO 371/1785/2659/36518. Note also the noli me tangere attitude adopted towards Germany’s request that it be allowed to facilitate communications with its colonies in East Africa by laying a cable in the Gulf. 29 May 1913 Lichnowsky memo., 29 July 1913 WO-FO and 29 Sep. 1913 IO-FO; all in FO 371/1824, file 25763. 74 6 March 1913 memo., FO 371/1795/9216/25942. 75 28 Aug. 1913 Parker-Stanley pte., FO 371/1792/6463/39776. The Germans first conceded this declaration on 4 June 1913; enclosure 3 to BD 10 (2), no. 89, p. 139. 76 24 July 1914 Parker-Mallet (draft), FO 371/2125/2390/33655, p. 4. 77 Ibid., p. 18. 78 17 Feb. 1911 Crewe-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 117 (1), 17, p. 40. 79 30 July 1913 minute, FO 371/1792/6463/33602. On the navigation concession, see below, pp. 193–197. 80 27 March 1914 Grey-Mallet tel. 116, FO 371/2128/3782/13443. On the irrigation concession, see below pp. 188–190. [184]


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81 Reported in 18 Nov. 1913 Ashley-Parker, FO 371/1761/16/52517. On the petroleum concession, see below pp. 190–192. 82 Mallet suggested that by joining forces with the Germans, “we shall be in a better position to fight the [American] Standard Oil” Company. 23 March 1914 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80. 83 23 Oct. 1913 Ashley-Parker, FO 371/1761/16/48236 and 16 Jan. 1914 CroweD’Arcy, FO 371/1761/16/57611. 84 See both Daily Telegraph, 25 May 1912 and Frankfurter Zeitung, 24 July 1913. 85 2 June 1913 Nicolson-Goschen pte., NIC MSS, 1913, (6), FO 800/367, p. 186. 86 9 June 1913 IO-FO, FO 371/1741/6463/26553. 87 30 July 1913 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 399, no. 1913/3071. 88 27 June 1910 Lowther-Grey 434, FO 371/992/100/23954. 89 10 May 1911 Lowther-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (2), FO 800/348, p. 331. 90 4 March 1911 LI. Smith memo., BT 11/4, no. 7 and 21 Apr. 1911 Stanley memo., BT 11/4, no. 9. 91 Parker minute on 24 Oct. 1910 Lowther-Grey tel. 232, FO 371/1015/ 36702/38783 and Hirtzel minute on 26 Oct. 1910 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 162, no. 1910/4103b. 92 24 Oct. 1910 Grey-Lowther tel. 218, FO 371/1015/36702/38783 and minute on 28 Oct. 1910 IO-FO, FO 371/1015/36702/39310. 93 23 Jan. 1911 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 289. 94 Minute on 22 Dec. 1911 Lowther-Grey 959, FO 371/1236/29/51595. 95 31 Dec. 1909 Grey-Goschen pte., BD 6, no. 314, pp. 418–419. 96 16 Feb. 1912 Bertie memo., Bertie MSS, “A”, 13, FO 800/171 and 19 Feb. 1912 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 385. 97 27 March 1911 Minutes, BD 10 (2), no. 23, p. 36 and 29 March 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1232/21/12463. 98 29 March 1911 IO-FO, ibid. 99 Minute on 6 June 1911 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1911/3648. 100 16 May 1911 Grey-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 92, 94a, p. 110. 101 9 May 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1242/1698/17592. 102 19 May 1912 Crewe memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/1858a and Parker minute on 21 May 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1484/264/21766. 103 26 May 1912 Parker-Hardinge pte.; quoted in Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 333. 104 30 May 1912 FO-IO, FO 371/1484/264/21766, pp. 1–2. The FO ignored Hirtzel’s subsequent contention that even when breaking off the negotiations, “we should say that we have shown our own good will by making three attempts to meet the Turkish wishes.” 6 June 1912 memo., FO 371/1484/264/24342. 105 Mallet minute on 7 Apr. 1911 B of T-FO, FO 371/1233/21/12979. 106 20 Sep. 1912 Grey-Bertie 463, BD 10 (2), no. 57, pp. 87–88. Nicolson, despite his ardour for the joint sixty percent scheme, had earlier acknowledged that “if Russia does not want to come in, it would greatly facilitate our discussions.” 26 March 1912 Nicolson-Buchanan pte., NIC MSS, 1912 (2), FO 800/354, p. 342. 107 Cunningham, The Wrong Horse?, p. 73. 108 9 March 1877 Salisbury-Lytton, quoted in Lady G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, vol. 2 (London, 1921), p. 130. [185]


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109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139

3 Nov. 1914 Asquith-the King, CAB 41/35/56. 30 June 1915 report, Conclusions, para. 98, CAB 27/1, p. 28. 23 March 1915 Grey-Bertie, quoted in Grey, 25 Years, vol. 2, p. 230. E.g., 11 Apr. 1912 Cartwright-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1912 (4), FO 800/356, p. 127. 20 March 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1490/3025/12865, p. 16. Minute on 26 March 1913 Lowther-Grey 354, FO 371/1816/19797/19797. Minute on 21 Aug. 1913 IO-FO, FO 371/1792/6463/38825. 13 Sep. 1913 G of I-IO; quoted in FO 371/2123/1940/12320. It is curious but relevant that: “The British image of the Indian people centred on the Muslim community.” A. J. Greenberger, The British Image of India (London, 1969), p. 128, Maxwell minute on 17 Oct. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1236/29/40988. 24 Feb. 1913 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (3), FO 800/364, p. 104 and 9 July 1913 Chirol-Hardinge, HARD MSS, 93 (i), 52, p. 81. 8 July 1913 Nicolson-Cartwright pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (7), FO 800/368, p. 143. 13 Sep. 1913 IO-FO and minutes, FO 371/1825/25533/42105. 11 Aug. 1913 Mallet-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 93 (i), 65, p. 97 and 4 Sep. 1913 Hardinge-Chirol pte., HARD MSS, 93 (2), 78, p. 82. E.g., 21 Jan. 1913 Nicolson-Goschen pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (i), FO 800/362, p. 192 and 4 Feb. 1913 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 465. Minute on 2 June 1913 IO-FO, FO 371/1820/22076/25377. 19 June 1913 Mallet memo., BD 10 (1), App., pp. 901–902. 14 June 1913 Bertie-Grey pte., Bertie MSS, “A”, 22, FO 800/180, p. 189. 18 July 1913 Asquith-the King, CAB 41/34/25 and 17 Dec. 1913 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS 41, FO 800/80. E.g., 17 Apr. 1913 Goschen-Nicolson pte., BD 10 (i), no. 477, p. 425. E.g., Tilley minute on 26 Dec. 1912 Bertie-Grey 539 conf., FO 371/1522/ 52330/54463. E.g., 11 Dec. 1913 Grey-Rodd tel. 366, BD 10 (i), no. 168, p. 153. Minute on 21 Aug. 1913 IO-FO, FO 371/1795/9216/38837. 1 Apr. 1914 FO-IO, FO 371/2123/1990/12370. 13 May 1914 FO-Adm., FO 371/2121/1067/20259. Minute on 13 May 1914 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 301 (2), no. 1914/1771. Minute on 26 March 1913 Lowther-Grey 354, FO 371/1816/19797/19797. Minute on 23 June 1913 Lorimer-Lowther 41; enclosed in FO 371/1817/ 20107/29184. See also 18 June 1913 Honey-Marling 18; enclosed in FO 371/1805/14470/34001. Minute on 7 Sep. 1913 Marling-Grey 774, FO 371/1845/42138/42138. 10 March 1914 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80. 1 June 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 308, BD 10 (2), no. 246, p. 395.

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9 The Significance of Strategy

The extent to which Britain modified its Mesopotamian strategy between 1910 and 1914 poses a historiographical problem. The government’s agreement to a German monopoly over all railway development in southern Mesopotamia represents a withdrawal from the 1907 Cabinet memorandum and the 1910 Tigris valley railway demand. It does not, therefore, support the recurring traditional claim that even in 1914, “British political control was recognised as dominant in southern Mesopotamia.”1 Although the 1913 and 1914 agreements did secure Britain’s position in the Gulf 2 and also guaranteed its control over any railway from Basra to Kuwait, they nevertheless appeared to grant Germany a sphere of influence as far south as Basra.3 Far from conferring upon Britain control over the region, the agreements thus seem to represent a British retreat from Mesopotamia. The significance of Britain’s policy between 1910 and 1914, however, lies in the fact that the government did not completely abandon its interest in Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office was aware that some sectors of the public continued to attach importance to the defence of British interests in the area.4 It also appreciated, in Chirol’s words, that “Baghdad is growing every day in importance.”5 Neither did it dispute India’s abiding determination “to do all in our power to consolidate our position in Mesopotamia”6 and to secure “the whole country between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf . . . for British enterprise”.7 Indeed, the British government, because it recognised the dangers of sacrificing all Mesopotamian railway development to the Germans, deliberately attempted to secure Britain’s predominance in other spheres of Mesopotamian commerce and to ensure its future pre-eminence in Mesopotamian politics. Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1910 and 1914 cannot, therefore, be studied solely within the context of the Baghdad Railway agreements. It can be explained only by reference to the government’s attempts to initiate commercial and political alternatives [187]


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to the German railway. Incidentally, these alternatives justify the traditional historical claim of Britain’s Mesopotamian supremacy. This, however, is not the only subject of concern: whether Britain’s policy was ultimately justified is, as Hardinge later admitted, “an open question”.8 The process by which the Foreign Office, in particular, formulated its several alternatives is of greater significance. It reveals the changing priorities of the official mind and thus, ultimately, explains the final shape of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy in 1914.

The Commercial Corollaries The 1907 memorandum and the 1910 demand had both revealed the extent to which Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was conditioned by commercial considerations. There was no reason to expect a decline in the importance of this factor by 1914. Britain and India continued to control between sixty-seven and seventy percent of the trade to and from Baghdad;9 and even a slight decline in the percentage of British trade with Mosul10 conceals the simultaneous rise from thirteen to twenty-five percent in India’s share of this traffic.11 Moreover, in anticipation of the vast resources which would be released by the implementation of Willcocks’ irrigation schemes, the number of British trading companies registered in Mesopotamia increased between 1910 and 1914.12 This combination of existing interests and expected gains ensured that the British government would not abandon all commercial enterprise in Mesopotamia to the German proprietors of railways there. Instead, the government attempted to compensate for its exclusion from the Baghdad Railway by confirming its interests in the Mesopotamian irrigation and petroleum concessions. It also attempted to neutralise the railway’s commercial effect by securing a rate agreement on all lines in Asiatic Turkey and by strengthening Britain’s control over the navigation of the Tigris. The government’s attitude towards the allocation of the Mesopotamian irrigation and petroleum concessions indicated its determination to expand Britain’s commercial interests in the region. In both cases, the pressure exerted for the grant of the concessions to British firms was in inverse proportion to the government’s readiness to abandon its claim to control over Mesopotamian railways. The 1913 and 1914 agreements ultimately included clauses concerning the irrigation and petroleum concessions. They thus confirmed the government’s determination to [188]


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T H E S I G N I F I C A N C E O F S T R AT E G Y

offset its sacrifice of the railway by securing potential economic advantages in other spheres. As early as the summer of 1910, the Foreign Office had observed with some dismay that a combination of Turkish penury, Willcocks’ inability to repair the old Hindiyah Barrage and Nazim Pasha’s bureaucratic obstinacy13 had made it “quite likely that the whole [irrigation] scheme will fall through”.14 In 1911, therefore, Grey vigorously supported the efforts of Messrs. Jacksons to secure an interim contract for the repair of the barrage.15 Despite the diplomatic desirability of Anglo-French amity, Grey also consistently opposed the efforts of French firms to obtain the contract.16 In the same year he instructed Marling to obtain the Porte’s assurance that only British tenders would be accepted for the remainder of the irrigation works.17 He also warned the Turks that the French Societe de Batignolles were copying the blueprints for the majority of the projects from papers already prepared by Jacksons and Pearsons.18 Despite the frustration caused to the British firms by the Porte’s frequent change of intention,19 Grey continued to “attach the greatest importance to the award of the irrigation contract to a British firm”.20 Official pressure for the award of the irrigation contract to British firms increased as the government’s determination to control the railway concession diminished. In 1911, the Foreign Office staff had been scarcely perturbed by Willcocks’ resignation from Turkish service.21 In 1912, however, they were profoundly dismayed by Jacksons’ warning that Turkey’s lack of funds would impede the progress of irrigation works already undertaken.22 Moreover, when it became apparent in 1913 that not even a National Bank loan of £50,000 would suffice to ensure the continuation of the works,23 the British government itself initiated various other financial proposals to meet the situation. In June, Grey instructed Lowther to encourage the Porte to undertake a further loan in order to finance the work on the Hindiyah Barrage.24 In July, he asked the British delegates to the Balkan Financial Commission to ensure that certain Turkish revenues would be earmarked for the remainder of the Mesopotamian irrigation schemes.25 By that time, the Foreign Office had also extended a welcome to Hardinge’s interest in the matter. In December 1912, Grey had considered that the appearance of British neutrality during the Balkan wars was more important than the supply of funds for Mesopotamian irrigation. He had, therefore, opposed the viceroy’s suggestion that the British government authorise a loan to the [189]


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Porte for the latter purpose.26 By 1913, however, he agreed that “having regard to the present political situation in Asia Minor and possible future developments, it seems important that we should make every endeavour to consolidate our position in Mesopotamia, and to that end control of irrigation works should prove a factor of some value.”27 Grey considered that the projected irrigation scheme was “the most important in the future of Mesopotamia”.28 He therefore determined to incorporate the subject into the Anglo-Turkish discussions. The Foreign Office proposals of June 1913 deliberately balanced Britain’s abandonment of any claim to participation in the Baghdad Railway against its demand for “the grant to British firms of concessions and contracts for more extensive works of irrigation”.29 During the Anglo-German negotiations too, Parker and Crowe resolutely maintained the British claim to the first option on those irrigation works for which British firms had already submitted tenders.30 The official concern with the award of the Mesopotamian oil concession in this period indicated a similar refusal to abandon British commercial interests in the area. The attitude of the Foreign Office was determined by the political need to compensate for Britain’s exclusion from the Baghdad Railway. It therefore differed from that of the Admiralty, whose main concern was to secure oil for warships at the cheapest possible price.31 Churchill did not disparage the future potential of the Mesopotamian fields, but he was more anxious to ensure that the present output of the Persian wells remained in British hands. His interest in Mesopotamian oil was indirect. It was primarily stimulated by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s warning that unless it secured the Mesopotamian concession, the company would be forced to amalgamate its Persian interests with the rival (and foreign) Shell combine.32 The fear that Britain might thus lose its hold over the Persian fields explains why, in 1914, the Admiralty advocated a forward contract to the Anglo-Persian Company and a government purchase of shares in the concern.33 Churchill revealed his main interest when warning that during the negotiations over the Mesopotamian deposits, “the position of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in its relation to the oil fields of Persia will be kept out of the discussion.”34 Churchill was concerned more with the proximity of Persia to Mesopotamia than with the intrinsic value of the Baghdad and Mosul oil deposits.35 The Foreign Office, however, was apparently disinterested in the Persian oil fields,36 and concentrated its attention on the political [190]


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importance of securing the Mesopotamian concession. Grey was determined not to repeat the policy which he had initiated with regard to the Baghdad Railway. He therefore initially repudiated the Turkish proposal, of 1912, to form an international company to work the Mesopotamian petroleum fields.37 Instead, he warned the Porte not to grant this concession to any group of which the British government did not approve.38 In November 1912, Nicolson placed the question in its largest context. “The Germans”, he declared, “already control the Baghdad Railway, they are believed, through the National Bank of Turkey, to be seeking to control navigation on the Mesopotamian rivers, and if they also get the oil concessions in Mesopotamia and Persia, they cannot fail to acquire enormous political influence at British expense, in regions which are of supreme importance to India.”39 Parker too stressed the political importance of the Mesopotamian oil fields. Thus in 1912, he contested the Indian opinion that the petroleum negotiations raised primarily economic questions in which India had no interest.40 In 1914, he also asked Grey to overrule the Board of Trade’s readiness to allow the supposedly uneconomical Basra and Kuwait deposits to fall under foreign domination.41 The course of the subsequent negotiations was complicated by the apparent strength of the German claims to control of the Mesopotamian petroleum fields under the 1903 Baghdad Railway convention.42 It was confused by the Turks’ refusal to honour their verbal promise of 1909 to D’Arcy43 and by the constant threat that, faced with Anglo-German rivalry, the Porte might grant the concession to a third party.44 Moreover, the tone of the discussions was influenced as much by the Foreign Office’s desire to reach a friendly accommodation with the Germans45 as by Grey’s determination to ensure that the deposits “should not pass into the hands of a foreign controlled combine”.46 In the spring of 1913, therefore, the Foreign Office rejected as impractical Lowther’s proposal to “sterilise” the fields completely by closing them to all foreign competition.47 It also considered speculative his suggestion that they be divided on a geographical basis between the British and the German contestants.48 Instead, the Foreign Office took advantage of the agreement of the National Bank, Shell and Gulbenkian to withdraw their respective claims to the concession. This now left D’Arcy and the Baghdad Railway Company as the only contestants.49 In 1913, therefore, the Foreign Office adopted the Turkish proposal of an amalgamation [191]


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between the two groups in a “Turkish Petroleum Company” as the best means of ensuring that British interests would command a significant voice in the undertaking. This decision necessitated enforcing a reduction of D’Arcy’s demands to fifty percent control of the Mesopotamian field. As Mallet pointed out, “If, in every respect, the interests of the British Government do not go so far as the interests of the Anglo-Persian, then the Anglo-Persian must be urged to moderate its claims.”50 The Foreign Office was equally firm, however, with the Germans and the Turks. The former were informed that a British share of fifty percent in the Mesopotamian petroleum concession was “a fundamental condition of any settlement acceptable to His Majesty’s Government”.51 Similarly, the Turks were warned that if they too did not comply with this condition, Grey would “be forced to break off all negotiations with Hakki Pasha and to reconsider the terms on which His Majesty’s Government could assent to the customs increase”.52 The formal petroleum agreement, like the customs increase, was ultimately forestalled by the outbreak of war.53 But by 1914, the British government had demonstrated its refusal to relinquish British claims to Mesopotamian petroleum and thereby to follow the precedent of the Baghdad Railway negotiations. By thus insisting on British participation in the irrigation and petroleum concessions, the Foreign Office could ensure that British enterprise continued to participate in two of the most vital areas of commercial development in Mesopotamia. Even so, these concessions could only provide additional options to railway development. They could not totally compensate for Britain’s sacrifice of the Tigris valley railway demand. Neither, by themselves, could they meet the threat which a German railway in Mesopotamia would present to Britain’s existing commercial interests there. The British government therefore sought more direct commercial alternatives to the Baghdad Railway in a rate convention on all railways in Asiatic Turkey and in a monopoly over river navigation in Mesopotamia. The timing of British pressure for both agreements was determined by the chronology of the government’s withdrawal from the railway, and thus reflected the continued official concern with Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office considered that the most direct means of protecting British trade using the Baghdad Railway was to prevent complete German domination of the railway board and to prohibit rate discrimination on the line. As early as March 1911, Parker suggested [192]


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that an international rate convention would allay fears that the Germans might manipulate railway charges to suit articles of German trade more than those in which Britain was interested.54 It would also compensate British merchants for a minority share in the Mesopotamian railway line.55 Grey too was more impressed with Metternich’s suggestion that “the control of rates could be separated from the management of the line”56 than with the Board of Trade’s warning that it would prove impossible to frame an absolutely watertight rate convention.57 This was not the unanimous view of all British officials. In December 1911, Lowther feared that even if the convention were signed, rate manipulation might still be possible,58 and in May 1912, the India Office objected that fifty percent British participation in the southern Baghdad Railway was still desirable.59 The Foreign Office, however, appeared genuinely convinced that “the most efficacious means of excluding differential treatment . . . is by a binding international agreement on the subject, and by making the continued levy of the increased customs duty dependent on the precise observation of that instrument.”60 In a deliberate attempt to minimise the disadvantages of German control of the southern Baghdad Railway, the British negotiators insisted, in 1911 and 1913, that the Turks agree to a rate convention barring discrimination on all railways throughout Asiatic Turkey.61 They also demanded, in 1914, that the German government use its good offices with the directors of the Baghdad Railway Company to ensure that two British representatives would sit on their board.62 Lowther suspected that those two gentlemen would not “be allowed to know anything that is going on”.63 The Board of Trade, moreover, continued to doubt the utility of a rate convention which was not supported by British ownership of some part of the Baghdad line.64 Nonetheless, the Foreign Office ultimately believed that it had done much to preserve the competitiveness of British trade in Mesopotamia.65 Britain’s pressure for a Tigris navigation monopoly provides even more striking evidence of the government’s determination to compensate for its exclusion from Mesopotamian railways. Indeed, the timing of the British demand for a navigation monopoly was determined by the government’s acceptance of German supremacy on the railways. In August 1910, Grey had still been prepared to “leave things as they are for the moment” and not to press for an extension of Lynch’s rights.66 Similarly, in April 1911, neither Mallet nor Norman had yet found a [193]


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good reason for supporting Hirtzel’s suggestion that the government “bolster” Lynch’s company.67 The Foreign Office was still harbouring designs on a share in the southern section of the Baghdad Railway. By the summer of 1912, however, the pattern of Britain’s railway policy had become evident, and the navigation concession therefore assumed increased importance. The idea that the government might meet the German railway threat by a British navigation monopoly was first mooted by Hirtzel. In June 1912, he argued that British trade in Mesopotamia might not be affected by a German railway, provided that Britain’s navigation rights were placed on a secure footing.68 He further maintained that a concession which assured the navigability of, and British control over, the river Tigris69 “is as good as – indeed even better than . . . the Railway, and the British merchant will probably see that if it is explained to him”.70 At an interdepartmental meeting on 11 June 1912, Llewellyn Smith too argued that an agreement which secured Britain’s position on the rivers would, in the absence of British control over Mesopotamian railways, “be a main defence in the interests of the British import trade”.71 By the twenty-sixth of June, moreover, Nicolson had agreed to press the Turks to permit three more British ships to ply the Tigris.72 This clause was inserted into the draft agreement handed to Hakki on 18 July 191273 as a clear counterweight to the British withdrawal of any claim to participate in the Baghdad Railway. The British government itself subsequently removed control of the British Tigris vessels from Lynch’s traditional but incompetent hands. The manner in which it did so further demonstrated the government’s determination to establish a British navigation monopoly as a viable economic alternative to the German railway. Lynch had already aroused the government’s suspicions when agreeing to form a syndicate with the Baghdad Railway Company for the transport of construction material from the Gulf to Baghdad.74 Although this agreement did not contravene British law,75 it did appear to portend Germany’s ultimate domination of the Lynch firm.76 Consequently, as early as July 1912, the Board of Trade suggested that if Turkey agreed to permit Britain three additional Tigris steamers, they “should not necessarily be placed under Messrs. Lynch’s control”.77 This suggestion appeared even more relevant in October 1912. It was then learned that Lynch planned to amalgamate his interests with those of the Deutsche Bank in a new Mesopotamian navigation company which would negotiate with the Ottoman government for a [194]


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complete monopoly of the Tigris service.78 At the level of local appearances, Lynch’s new proposal was disappointing because he had agreed to remove the British flag from his ships. At the level of Britain’s railway strategy, the proposal was positively damaging. It threatened the viability of an independent British alternative to the Baghdad Railway. Lynch’s subsequent argument that the proposed arrangement would increase Britain’s hold on the rivers, by freeing German capital to support the British concessionnaires, was dismissed as “pitiable”.79 All the interested government departments were agreed that Lynch’s arrangement would have exactly the opposite effect. Parker feared that it would exclude the possibility of “competing rates” with the German railway;80 the Board of Trade warned that it would preclude the possibility of British control over “a competing means of communication” in Mesopotamia;81 and the India Office stressed that it could not be reconciled with the government’s earlier decision to keep “the control of the river between Bagdad and the Gulf entirely independent of the Bagdad Railway Company”.82 The Foreign Office, therefore, not only refused to sanction Lynch’s proposed arrangement83 but also itself pressed for the selection of an alternative British navigation concessionnaire. By 1913, the earlier insistence on the addition of only three British ships on the Tigris84 appeared anachronistic. In March the Porte apparently contemplated the absorption of Lynch’s firm into a Turco-German combine which would monopolise the Tigris.85 As Mallet warned in April 1913, “The Germans have got the rly. [sic] and now want the river too.”86 The Foreign Office therefore extended the Board of Trade’s original suggestion that Inchcape be offered control merely of the three additional ships.87 It also embellished the India Office’s subsequent proposal that because “the maintenance of effective river competition is essential”, the Porte should be asked to agree to the formation of a British-controlled navigation monopoly.88 The Foreign Office’s ultimate proposals combined the most advantageous aspects of both suggestions. They extended Britain’s position on the Tigris to that of an official monopoly and also reduced Lynch’s share of the steamer traffic to that of a minority. In May 1913, the Foreign Office was insistent that Inchcape would best serve British interests.89 Parker therefore encouraged the shipping magnate to announce his interest in the Mesopotamian venture.90 He also informed Lynch that he would be [195]


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accorded no more than a small share in any new navigation company which the Turks might agree to form.91 The government’s subsequent negotiations with the British shipowners, and the Turkish and German ambassadors, were dominated by Grey’s dictum that “The main object of His Majesty’s Government is to secure effective competition between river-borne traffic and the Railway if and when the latter is extended from Baghdad to Basra, this being the necessary corollary of the withdrawal of our objections to the extension.”92 The Foreign Office never revised its opinion of Lynch93 nor its distaste for his business methods.94 Neither did Parker conceal his gratitude for the help in the negotiations with Inchcape which he had unexpectedly received from the Euphrates and Tigris Steamship Company’s own solicitors95 and from Lynch’s sudden demise.96 Throughout the negotiations which the government initiated between Lynch and Inchcape, Parker insisted that the former’s interest be subordinated to the latter’s.97 The Foreign Office was equally firm with the Germans.98 The British government had decided to “put our money on the navigation”,99 and Kuhlmann was therefore informed that Britain insisted on a monopoly of river transport.100 The Foreign Office restricted German interests in the navigation concession to a twenty percent share and one director with only a voix consultative,101 and prohibited independent ferry services by the Baghdad Railway Company between the river banks at Baghdad, Samarra and Mosul.102 Finally, the government extracted even more concessions from the Turks. The Tigris valley railway had been planned to run no further north than Baghdad. As early as the end of April 1913, however, Mallet and Hirtzel had claimed that “we must be able to reach Mosul by boat.”103 By the second of May they had incorporated this demand into those presented to Hakki.104 The Foreign Office, moreover, confirmed its insistence on absolute primacy in the Mesopotamian navigation company when insisting on the appointment of a British subject to the chair of its Anglo-Turkish board.105 It also rejected the Porte’s demands for consideration of the prior navigation rights of various Turkish subjects.106 Instead, it supported Inchcape’s claim for a guarantee of compensation if the irrigation works should render the rivers unnavigable.107 British pressure for the navigation concession thus complemented the government’s railway policy. The Foreign Office had been forced to modify the substance of the 1907 and 1910 demands, but attempted to [196]


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retain their essential purpose. British commercial interests in Mesopotamia were undoubtedly endangered by the forced sacrifice of the railway. But they were nevertheless supported in the ultimate agreements. The government attempted to ensure that British enterprise would continue to dominate Mesopotamian irrigation and petroleum developments, that British goods would not suffer rate discrimination on the Baghdad line and that British merchants would be provided with a viable alternative means of carriage for their trade as far as Mosul.

Political Alternatives The political implications of the government’s decision to relinquish its claim to Mesopotamian railways were an equally important subject of official concern. The Foreign Office continued to acknowledge the close relationship between local commercial supremacy and local political influence. As early as 1906, Ramsay had warned that the power which constructed the southern Baghdad Railway would reap political benefits in Mesopotamia. It would become the principal employer of local labour and have first call on local talents. “If it suited the Power concerned to become the de facto ruler of the country, I can see nothing to prevent it from attaining that position.”108 Britain’s abandonment of the Tigris valley railway demand thus threatened to deprive it of the local political influence hitherto assured by the government’s consistent protection of Indian communities and pilgrims in Baghdad and guaranteed by the annual distribution of the Oudh Bequest.109 The modification of Britain’s railway policy therefore necessitated a change in its previously passive attitude towards the Arab inhabitants of the region. This consideration did not lend itself to international negotiation. The irrigation, petroleum and navigation agreements, although marked “secret” at the Foreign Office,110 were openly discussed between Britain, Germany and Turkey.111 The government’s attempts to increase its political influence in Mesopotamia, however, did not find diplomatic expression. This explains why although these local political initiatives were an essential corollary of Britain’s Mesopotamian railway policy, they have been neglected in traditional assessments of the 1913 and 1914 agreements. The government’s determination to increase its political influence in Mesopotamia did not emanate from a desire to secure control over an alternative route to the East. In this period too, the need to defend [197]


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India did not greatly influence Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. Indeed, between 1910 and 1914, this factor assumed even less importance than, as has been seen, it had possessed in previous years. Not even the Potsdam agreement altered Crewe’s opinion that there was “no solid ground” for a “German-Turkish-Pan Islamic scare”.112 Hirtzel described as “fantastic in the extreme” the fear “of danger to India from a Turkish move to Teheran by a German controlled railway”.113 Similarly, it appeared increasingly unlikely that the Baghdad Railway itself would ever affect Anglo-Indian communications. In 1911, Chirol questioned its utility as a carrier of Indian mails,114 and in 1912, The Times believed that the line had abandoned all pretence to becoming “a high road to India”.115 In 1913, Lorimer propounded the thesis that even as commercial enterprises, the railways of Mesopotamia, like those of India and Egypt, would serve local, not global, needs. They could never compete with maritime communication between Europe and the East.116 The defence of India from the west continued to depend upon Britain’s control of the Gulf. This control had been acknowledged in 1907 by the Anglo-Russian Gulf declaration and was underwritten in 1913 by the German promise not to construct a naval base in those waters. It was ultimately dependent, as Hardinge noted, on the Royal Navy’s continued ability to “bottle up” the entrance to the Gulf by establishing a “watering station” at Khor Musa and an “anchorage” in the Hormuz Straits.117 In 1914, the government did give the appearance of wishing to neutralise the strategic effects of the Baghdad line by reserving an independent railway between the Mediterranean and the Gulf. Grey then insisted on reserving Britain’s right to construct a line from Aqaba to Kuwait. He claimed that only this concession would overcome his “considerable hesitation” in agreeing to the German formula, which precluded the construction of any other project which might compete with the Baghdad Railway by linking the Mediterranean and the Gulf.118 This consideration, although noteworthy, must not, however, be exaggerated. Before 1914, no importance had been attached to the sporadic proposals that Britain construct a railway along the thirtieth parallel. In 1907, the War Office had ignored Maunsell’s suggestion to this effect.119 In 1908 and 1909, neither the Foreign Office nor the India Office had given any consideration to similar suggestions which had been made by British financiers and by Ibn Saud.120 Moreover, in 1911, Parker had firmly resisted the public and private pressure which C.E.D. Black (who had [198]


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been retired from his position in the geographical section of the India Office) attempted to exert on behalf of such a line.121 Indeed, Parker dismissed Black as a “crank” and described the project as “fantastic”.122 As late as 1913, he minuted that “the scheme in question . . . is not one which is considered practicable either commercially or politically.”123 Parker did, admittedly, give the matter more respectful consideration during the latter stages of the Anglo-German negotiations. In 1913, he refused to “mortgage the future as regards any line from the Mediterranean to Lower Mesopotamia”, and therefore repudiated the German claim to a monopoly of all railway construction “east of Aleppo”.124 Instead, he limited Britain’s acquiescence in such a monopoly to “the provinces of Bagdad and Mosul” and to an area within certain specified lines of longitude and latitude which would not include an Aqaba–Kuwait connection.125 In February 1914, Hirtzel and Crowe also stressed the importance of gaining Turkey’s approval of Britain’s right to construct such a line.126 Nonetheless, their purpose was still to maintain Britain’s commercial rights on the Baghdad Railway rather than to construct a strategic alternative to it. Thus, Hirtzel stressed that Black’s line was important because “the threat of supporting [it] may some day be our only lever for seeing that the Baghdad Railway keeps its [rate] compact.”127 Moreover, in his final draft despatch to Mallet (which, although never sent, was approved by Grey), Parker revealed that “it is perhaps unlikely that any railway connection with Egypt would ever be contemplated or desirable.”128 The evident dissatisfaction of the local Arab inhabitants of Mesopotamia with Turkish rule129 exerted a greater influence on British designs on the area during the period of the Anglo-German and Anglo-Turkish negotiations. The consular reports of local disturbances were long and tedious but consistent. In 1911, Lorimer considered that as a result of Muntafik opposition to Nazim Pasha’s tax reforms,130 Mesopotamia was “capable of becoming a second Albania, requiring to be held down by garrisons of European or Anatolian Turks”.131 In 1912, in the wake of further “serious” disturbances along the lower Tigris,132 he concluded that “the support of the Baghdad province will be lost to any party which does not concede to the Arabs political equality with the Turks.”133 By 1913, he was equally impressed with the local feelings stirred by Seyid Talib’s134 call for reforms in Basra.135 Arab sentiments were illustrated by the continued refusal of the Hindiya [199]


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sheikhs to pay taxes,136 and were aroused by Ibn Saud’s victory over the Turks at El Hasa.137 These reports produced a significant effect on British policy-makers. As early as July 1910, Hardinge had noted that “the Turks are in a tight place in Mesopotamia and unable to assert their authority.”138 By April 1911, Shakespear139 was advising the government to devote “serious consideration” to the Arab question “in the light of recent events in the Hauran, in Yemen, and perhaps also in Irak”.140 In May 1912, Hardinge had still considered it impossible to make any definite forecast as to the future complexion of Mesopotamian politics.141 But by February 1913, Fitzmaurice, at least, anticipated that “the Arabs down there are almost certain very soon to eliminate the Turks.”142 By then Nicolson too feared that the Turks would find it difficult to maintain a “hold” on their Asiatic provinces.143 This estimate was not revised, despite Marling’s cautious appraisal that “the underlying tendency of the Basra programme is one of aversion from the rule of the CUP rather than of separation from the Ottoman ‘Turkish’ Government.”144 The Foreign Office neither disputed nor challenged Mallet’s 1914 assessment that “the Arab movement” was “the most serious feature of the present situation in Mesopotamia”.145 The British and Indian governments did not, however, encourage a concerted Arab revolt against the Turkish government in Mesopotamia. Such a policy would not have made good economic sense. The annual interruptions to British trade and shipping caused by the Tigris disturbances146 and the price in British life and property already paid during the 1913–1914 feud between Seyid Talib and Sheikh Ajeymi of the Muntafik147 had already demonstrated that uncontrolled tribal movements would damage British as well as Turkish interests. At a personal level, moreover, the British government prefered to deal with the legal Ottoman authorities rather than the “utterly unscrupulous” leaders of a “rabble of bashi bazouks”.148 As Kitchener pointed out “The welfare and indeed safety of Indian pilgrims to Mesopotamia is intimately bound up with the maintenance of order in the districts in question.”149 In any case, the outcome of an Arab revolt appeared uncertain. Nicolson suspected, and Britain’s local consular representatives confirmed, that in Mesopotamia “there is no organisation and little cohesion among the several races.”150 The Arab leaders, it was thought, had merely “vague and ill-considered ideas”.151 Finally, diplomatic considerations also prohibited active British incitement to an Arab [200]


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revolt. The British government, as has been seen, considered that only by preserving the unity of Turkey’s Asiatic provinces could a European scramble for the Middle East be avoided. In May 1914, Mallet reiterated that it was a cardinal point of British policy “to prevent, or at least postpone, anything which might lead to a general Arab outbreak, and so endanger the integrity of the Turkish dominions in Asia”.152 However, the government did attempt to avert the possibility that British prestige among the Mesopotamian Arabs might decline in proportion to the degree of German control over railways in the area. The necessity of preventing an Arab outbreak during this period did not invalidate the value of Arab friendship. By spreading Western influence among the Mesopotamian Arabs, Britain might fulfil a cultural “mission”;153 by attaining their good will, it might also avoid the commercial inconvenience of local Anglophobia.154 Even more important, by winning their friendship, it might secure the loyalty of potential military allies. The military importance of the friendship of such confederations as the Muntafik tribes was noted by the military attache at Constantinople in April 1911.155 It was stressed by the War Office in May of the same year156 and confirmed by Lorimer in October.157 By 1914, the government had demonstrated its refusal to sacrifice such advantages to other powers. It had intensified its attempts to impress Mesopotamian Arabs with British grandeur and had also revised its hitherto passive attitude towards anti-Turkish approaches by local sheikhs. The Indian and British governments consistently responded to pressure by consuls to magnify the outward signs of their prestige in Mesopotamia. Thus, the Foreign Office agreed with Lorimer that despite the Treasury’s continued desire for economy, a reduction in the size of the British establishment at Baghdad would probably “be regarded as a sign that British interests here no longer stand on the same dignified and unassailable basis as formerly”.158 Similarly, the India Office sympathised with Lorimer’s estimate of the necessity to counteract the effect on the native mind of the 1910 and 1911 Baghdad demolitions.159 Ultimately, therefore, the government accepted his proposals to support the Church Missionary Society at Baghdad,160 to prevent the planned closure of the British post office in the city161 and to strengthen the Indian sepoy detatchment under his command.162 Moreover, Lorimer’s fears that the Germans might attempt to derive political advantage from the construction of a “sumptuous” consulate at Baghdad163 increased the [201]


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official determination to maintain the outward signs of British prestige.164 The importance of the possible “effect on the native mind”165 had, in 1911, contributed to Hardinge’s initial rejection of the Turkish offer of twenty percent on the southern Baghdad Railway.166 In 1913, Hirtzel argued that although Britain had no commercial interest in the construction of the ports of Baghdad and Basra, political factors made it imperative that “no big enterprise should be undertaken without our being seen to participate – and on as large a scale as possible.”167 Similarly, in 1914, Parker stressed the “political importance” of the retention of the British flag on the Tigris. He therefore asked Inchcape to ensure that Lynch’s original three ships would not be incorporated within Inchcape’s own new Anglo-Ottoman company, which would fly the Turkish ensign.168 This consideration also influenced British contacts with individual Arab leaders during this period. Lorimer assiduously courted,169 and the Indian and British authorities closely observed,170 the Anglophile tendencies of the naquib of Baghdad. Details of the communications between the residency and the naquib are understandably rare.171 However, by 1914, Gertrude Bell172 was confident, and the British military authorities were assured, that “the big man in Baghdad” (i.e. the naquib) was “bitterly hostile to the Ottoman Government and good friends with our merchants.”173 Similarly, prudence dictated that although the government might continue to rebuff them, it could no longer ignore the friendly approaches made to British representatives by various Mesopotamian leaders throughout this time.174 Mallet had already set a precedent during the Anglo-Turkish Gulf tension in 1911. He had then commented that “we must not at the moment enter upon negotiations with Ibn Saud, but keep on friendly terms with him in the event of not coming to an understanding with the Turks.”175 In 1913, he reacted even more significantly to Crow’s recommendation that it would “detract from our local interests” if the representatives of the Bani Lam were “turned away empty handed”.176 “It would”, Mallet minuted, “be a pity to alienate finally three powerful sheiks, who will turn to some other country. We are always talking of our prestige and interests in Mesopotamia, we do not know what may happen in that part of the world during the next few years – there has been talk of an Arab revolt and declarations of independence. It is a question of whether without committing ourselves we might not find some way of showing the Arabs that we are not entirely indifferent to their interests.”177 Neither his [202]


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appointment to Constantinople nor the impending completion of the Anglo-Turkish agreement changed Mallet’s attitude. In 1914, he was clearly impressed with the report that Seyid Talib, Mubarak, Ibn Saud and the Grand Sharif of Mecca were “acting together”. “This”, Mallet informed Grey, “is a new phenomenon and the results may be far reaching.”178 He was not prepared to counsel any assistance to the movement,179 but both privately and officially Mallet advised his chief to “wait and watch events”.180 Both the Turkish and German government would undoubtedly have refused to sanction a public acknowledgement of Britain’s political supremacy in Mesopotamia. No attempt was made, therefore, to include such a clause within the ultimate agreements. The British government had, however, indicated its growing appreciation of the importance of the political factor. By maintaining British establishments in the area and by fostering the friendship of the native inhabitants, it had attempted to minimise the loss of local prestige portended by German control of the complete Baghdad Railway. European considerations had dictated Britain’s sacrifice of the Tigris valley railway. Local requirements, on the other hand, demanded that provision should be made for the defence of Britain’s political prestige as well as its commercial interests in Mesopotamia. The international Baghdad Railway agreements thus represented merely a tactical retreat. By its increasing intervention in the political affairs of the area, the government had demonstrated its ultimate determination to retain Britain’s supremacy in Mesopotamia.

The Institutional Context The 1913 and 1914 agreements reflected the prejudices as well as the ambitions of the British Foreign Office. The modifications of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy were induced by global pressures and alleviated by local precautions. But they were ultimately determined by the insular concepts of a small group of men in London. Britain’s attitude towards Mesopotamia between 1910 and 1914 thus repeated the pattern which had been indicated by the formulation of the Tigris valley railway despatch. The criteria of policy had, of course, changed. By 1914, diplomatic imperatives had replaced commercial considerations as the priorities of policy. The goals of British policy were, however, subject to similar prejudices. The standard continued to be not whether such goals were [203]


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attainable but whether they were desirable. Thus the Foreign Office’s view of local phenomena continued to be conditioned by apparently sacrosanct objectives which were impervious to the influence of interdepartmental consultation, of ambassadorial advice and of relevant changes in local circumstances. At one level, this consideration accounts for the formulation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy at this time. At another level, it indicates a pattern of deeper significance. As a clue to the process of policy formulation, the multitude of interdepartmental conferences which preceded the agreements of 1913 and 1914 is deceptive. The Foreign Office remained more faithful to the letter than to the spirit of the doctrine of collective responsibility. It presented the need for such conferences as an excuse for conducting the Baghdad Railway negotiations in London rather than at Constantinople or Berlin.181 It also acknowledged the assistance which the India Office and the Board of Trade had provided in drafting the final agreements.182 Ultimately, however, the Foreign Office shaped Britain’s Mesopotamian policy in accordance with its own criteria. Its relative disregard of the strategic importance of the Baghdad Railway, for instance, was indicated by its failure to send the War Office all the material necessary to an understanding of the state of the negotiations in 1911.183 In June 1912, the Director of Military Operations asked to be invited to the interdepartmental conference which was to consider Britain’s Baghdad Railway desiderata. Parker’s suggested reply was pointed and indicative of his general attitude. “I cannot”, he minuted, “see any objection to, or any necessity for, the attendance of a WO representative.”184 Similarly, the Foreign Office prohibited the encroachment by the Board of Trade on the preserve of diplomatic negotiations. It claimed that the Board had “nothing to say on political questions. We only want advice from them on technical details.”185 Only Llewellyn Smith’s threat to raise the Baghdad Railway question before the Cabinet in the spring of 1911186 forced the Foreign Office to invite him to the interdepartmental discussions. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office continued to attach more importance to its own desire to reach a railway agreement than to the Board’s more detailed commercial investigations. The latter did make substantial contributions to the Mesopotamian irrigation and petroleum negotiations, but had remarkably little influence on the framing of the international railway rate convention. Indeed, Mallet adopted a particularly sanguine approach to the Board’s warning that “it would be impossible to frame a [204]


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rate convention which should of itself preclude every conceivable form of discrimination.”187 The relationship between the India Office and the Foreign Office, because it was even more acrimonious, also belies the contention that Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was the result of interdepartmental consultation. In 1912, Parker complained of the difficulties of working with Hirtzel, who was ready to “chuck” the latest Turkish railway proposals into the fire before even reading them.188 Hirtzel himself had more grounds for grievance. In 1913, he protested that although he was “paid to do this kind of thing”, the Foreign Office staff made him feel guilty every time he made a “fuss”.189 The relationship had already been embittered by the 1911–1912 Baghdad Railway debate. Despite Nicolson’s admission that the Indian authorities were “the more directly involved” in Persian Gulf and Mesopotamian questions,190 the Foreign Office remained jealous of its powers. In 1910, Hirtzel complained that “the FO are content to send us papers [on the Baghdad Railway] both incomplete and out of date.”191 In 1912, he accused Grey’s staff of attempting to gain India’s adherence to a policy in whose formulation it was allowed no say. Hirtzel was offended as much by the manner as by the fact of Nicolson’s disregard of India’s opposition to a joint AngloFranco-Russian sixty percent participation scheme.192 Hirtzel ultimately accepted that the Foreign Office’s Middle Eastern policy was decided “not on the basis of any Indian interest, but of international considerations of which India has no cognisance”.193 But he never revised his opinion that in this case, “it would really be very much better if the Foreign Office would habitually confine themselves to their own functions, and leave us to ours.”194 Similarly, neither can the modification in Britain’s Mesopotamian policy be attributed to the influence of the government’s overseas representatives. In fact, the Foreign Office continued to adopt an inflexible attitude towards relevant consular advice. One reason for this attitude is indicated by the department’s intermittent suspicion of the competence of Britain’s overseas representatives. Thus, Crow at Basra was criticised in 1910 for neglecting to report Turkish pressure on Mohammera,195 and in 1913 for his “incomprehensible” failure to verify the credentials of the Arab sheikhs with whom he advocated improved relations.196 In 1912, Young was blamed for Britain’s inconvenient involvement in “a very doubtful squabble between the Nestorians and the Chaldean patriach” [205]


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at Mosul.197 Lorimer was recognised to be “a very useful man”,198 and his untimely death in 1914 was genuinely felt to be “a great loss to us”.199 But even he did not escape criticism for his tendency to make a “mountain out of a molehill” during the Baghdad demolition crisis.200 His successor, Erskine,201 was from the very first described as “a square peg in a round hole”.202 Moreover, Lowther increasingly appeared to be an unfortunate choice at Constantinople.203 Throughout much of the period of Mesopotamian and Gulf negotiations, he was handicapped by myopia,204 dogged by sickness205 and preoccupied with his personal losses during a fire at the embassy premises.206 Furthermore, Lowther himself felt “at a loss” to contribute to the final agreements207 and was confessedly “in the dark” about their ultimate purpose.208 Having apparently failed to maintain contact with the most influential sources of Turkish power209 and to press Britain’s Mesopotamian claims with necessary vigour,210 Lowther finally departed unpraised from his post in 1913.211 Not all consular advice was disregarded. Indeed, as has been seen, the government took particular note of reports of Arab disturbances in Mesopotamia. Even in this case, however, the Foreign Office adopted a prejudiced attitude. Crewe was prepared to accept that “some good judges . . . despair of a strong Asiatic Turkey and consider ultimate partition inevitable.”212 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office hoped to avoid this eventuality. Mallet therefore discouraged discussion of the topic,213 and Nicolson preferred to believe that the loss of Albania and Macedonia would leave Turkey in a “better position” to deal with Mesopotamia.214 Ultimately, the neglect of local advice was a consequence of prejudice on the part of those to whom it was directed. This characteristic was particularly evident when the government decided to neutralise the effect of a German Baghdad Railway by securing a British monopoly on the Tigris. The decision reflected not a change in local circumstances but the fixed desiderata of the official mind. It was not based on any new evidence which might have disputed the 1910 conclusion that railways would always prove a superior form of transport to the rivers.215 In 1913, Lorimer repeated the earlier claim that “railways will kill navigation.”216 At the same time, Willcocks confirmed that although the irrigation works might not harm navigation between Basra and the sea, they would be bound to do so between Baghdad and Basra.217 Crewe appears to have acknowledged the importance of this statement.218 Parker, by contrast, dismissed it as “a moot point”.219 He had already [206]


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made up his mind that if Britain were to sacrifice the railway, it had to look around for an alternative means of Mesopotamian transport. Rather than accept Lorimer’s findings, Parker therefore expressed to his colleagues, and invited from Babington Smith, the hope that “if irrigation is carefully carried out by storage, it is . . . unlikely to affect navigation.”220 The modification of British policy cannot, however, be attributed solely to Parker’s conduct of the last stages of the Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-German negotiations. Parker’s control over Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was more apparent than real. He did possess an impressive mastery of the details of Mesopotamian issues221 and he also displayed an enormous capacity for labour on them.222 But Parker never rose above the level of a technocrat. He earned the praise of his colleagues223 for implementing, but not initiating, Britain’s changed Mesopotamian policy. The main modifications were decided upon between 1910 and 1912, and during that period, Parker was occupied in other departmental work.224 On the few occasions in 1911 and 1912 that he did put forward new suggestions, he was often overruled.225 By the time Parker was given what Ms Steiner has called an “almost free hand” in the negotiations,226 the most important British postures had already been adopted. Subsequently, Mallet continued to exert a more powerful influence on the direction of Britain’s policy.227 Parker’s apparent supremacy in 1913 and 1914 was a consequence of the preoccupation of the more senior Foreign Office staff with Balkan questions.228 And even then, Grey requested an assurance that Britain’s Mesopotamian policy “moves on the lines” which he had “from time to time approved”.229 Thus Parker’s absence from the Foreign Office for a month in the spring of 1913 did not affect the autonomous momentum of the negotiations.230 Parker himself admitted that in any case, his function was often merely that of a messenger231 or post box.232 In the absence of influence from sister departments, consuls or even junior members of the Foreign Office on British policy, the reasons for the change in the government’s negotiating position must be sought in the attitude of senior officials. At this level, it is significant that the relinquishment of the Tigris valley railway demand coincided with Nicolson’s replacement of Hardinge as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. The physical differences between the two men, which impressed their subordinates,233 were matched by their contrasting [207]


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approach to diplomatic problems. In particular, Hardinge and Nicolson had different estimates of the relevance of grand strategy to local ambitions. Both men had an intense suspicion of Germany;234 but they drew contrasting conclusions concerning the consequent necessity for Russian and French friendship. Hardinge was confident that an Anglo-German Baghdad Railway agreement would not affect Britain’s entente ties.235 This confidence was not impaired by his later appreciation of Britain’s need to take independent steps to secure its Gulf position.236 Nicolson, on the other hand, feared the consequences of Russian disaffection.237 This fear was increased by his assessment of Britain’s need to “maintain unimpaired the present grouping of Powers”.238 Nicolson failed to establish the personal rapport with Grey which Hardinge had enjoyed.239 But by 1914, his view had prevailed and brought about an essential modification in Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. Between 1910 and 1914, the viceroy represented merely an interested pressure group; his influence on the shape of British policy could not match that of the head of the department which possessed a general view of Britain’s global requirements. In any case, Nicolson’s fear of European isolation matched Grey’s desire for limited agreements with Germany and Turkey. Britain’s Mesopotamian policy therefore responded more to Nicolson’s fears than to Hardinge’s hopes. The most apparent result was a heightened sensitivity on the part of the Foreign Office to Britain’s apparent negotiating weakness over the Baghdad Railway. The department now lost the confidence which it had possessed in 1910, and tended to exaggerate the importance of any information which appeared to confirm the strength of Britain’s rivals. This was particularly evident in 1911. In April of that year, Slade reported that changing geographical conditions in lower Mesopotamia had enabled Basra to become as suitable a railway terminus as Kuwait: the Shatt al-Arab was deeper than had been thought and could now accommodate heavy ocean liners.240 This report caused consternation at the Foreign Office. Norman claimed that it had “radically altered” the situation facing the British government, which could no longer use its unique position at Kuwait as a lever with which to extract Baghdad Railway concessions from the Germans.241 Nicolson reported that the reconsideration therefore required accounted for the lengthy British delay in replying to the Turkish proposals of March 1911.242 In fact, however, the Foreign Office’s alarm was both belated and unwarranted. Chiral blamed Minto’s “morbid [208]


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jealousy of everything that his predecessor had taken in hand” for the failure to obtain Slade’s information earlier.243 But various other British authorities had long noted that by dredging the Shatt al-Arab, German railway engineers might obviate the necessity to extend their line to Kuwait.244 In any case, Slade’s report was not the momentous document which Norman supposed. The Imperial Defence subcommittee which discussed the situation in the summer of 1911 suggested that the new information might even serve British interests. By allowing the Baghdad Railway to terminate at Basra, Britain could avoid the delicate subject of the exact status of Kuwait during the discussions with the Turks. It could also insist that “if ever the railway is prolonged to the Persian Gulf the terminus must be at Kuwait under circumstances to be settled in agreement with His Majesty’s Government.”245 But Nicolson had already jumped to a more pessimistic conclusion. “The only justification for sharing equally with Germany in the southern section”, he wrote to Hardinge, “was to be found in the fact that we could claim absolute superiority over the terminus at Kuwait.” However, since “the latter place is now eliminated”, the British proposals had to be modified.246 Once these modifications had been decided upon, the Foreign Office did not thereafter review the situation. For this reason, after 1912, Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was not altered in accordance with changes in both diplomatic and local circumstances. It did not, for instance, reflect the fact that the Balkan wars considerably alleviated Turkish pressure in Mesopotamia and the Gulf.247 Hirtzel feared that “there is a serious danger that the Turkish Government, in its financial embarrassment, may sell concessions right and left, and we may wake up to find the whole position so different that our proposals of 18th July [1912] will be wholly inappropriate and the ground cut from under our feet.”248 But the Foreign Office did not heed this warning. Instead, it attributed Hakki Pasha’s extensive bargaining during the last stages of the negotiations to his wish to derive personal pecuniary advantage from a lengthy stay in London.249 Similarly, the British determination to settle the Baghdad Railway and Gulf questions was also unaffected by the perceptible difficulties of the German railway engineers and financiers. Parker subsequently claimed that “for several years before the outbreak of the . . . war, it was always practically certain . . . that the Railway would be completed as far as Bagdad by the autumn of 1915 at the latest.”250 But this recollection confuses the issue by telescoping the history [209]


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of the construction of the line. By 1914, it was clear that the Germans would not fulfil their ambition to reach Baghdad within five years of the 1911 convention.251 As early as 1912, local British observers had suspected,252 and by 1913 Britain’s consular representatives had confirmed, that the progress of the line had met with a “severe check”.253 In February 1914, Grey publicly announced that the Germans had yet to pierce the formidable Taurus range,254 and in June of the same year Holderness255 estimated that it would still take them five years to reach Baghdad.256 The progress of the railway thus presented no cause for either haste or alarm. Nevertheless, the formulators of British policy did not desist from their set course. As early as 1911, Grey had determined that the early completion of the line to Basra was a “foregone conclusion”.257 In 1913, he revealed that “we had made up our minds that nothing could prevent this.”258 By 1914, Nicolson was equally determined that the necessity to complete the negotiations precluded a review of the situation.259 Such idiosyncrasies ultimately determined the character of Britain’s attitude towards the 1913 and 1914 agreements. They thus added a dimension to the significance of the modifications in Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. The tone of the Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-German agreements reflected the government’s overriding concern with the requirements of Britain’s European situation. At the same time, the various commercial alternatives and political safeguards which the Foreign Office initiated in Mesopotamia indicate the department’s awareness of the local need to offset its relinquishment of the Tigris valley railway demand. Ultimately, these alternatives justify the traditional claim that even before the First World War, Mesopotamia was a British sphere of influence. But the manner in which the Foreign Office attempted to combine its Eurocentric needs with its local ambitions revealed that Britain’s position in Mesopotamia was threatened by the failings of British policy-makers. The Foreign Office had not used the institutions provided for decision-making to the best advantage, even where it had used them at all. It had, instead, permitted the intrusion into British policy of personal fears and prejudices. The latter had bred insularity; and one result was that Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was often inconsistent with both local requirements and British interests.

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NOTES 1 Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, p. 265; Frischwasser-Ra’anan, Frontiers of a Nation, p. 53; and H.N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923 (Oklahoma, 1923), p. 58. 2 The point is stressed by The Times, 17 May 1913 and by Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, p. 207. 3 A claim made by Prince Lichnowsky; quoted in Earle, Turkey the Great Powers, p. 266. 4 21 March 1914 Grey-Goschen tel. 79, BD 10 (2), no. 215, p. 347. 5 4 June 1914 Chirol-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 93 (i), 209, p. 249. 6 29 May 1912 Hardinge-Crewe tel. pte., enclosed in FO 371/1484/264/24342. 7 15 May 1914 IO-FO, L/P & S/10, vol. 272, no. 1914/1808. 8 Lord Hardinge, Old Diplomacy (London, 1947), p. 47. 9 Figures in 29 March 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1233/21/12463; 19 Apr. 1911 Lorimer-Lowther 356/23, FO 195/2368, folio 236; and 7 June 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1484/264/24342. Local trade was monopolised by Jewish merchants. Lorimer’s report encl. in 30 March 1910 Lowther-Grey 191, FO 371/1007/ 11232/11232. 10 From 55 percent in 1906 to 51 percent in 1910. 11 22 Apr. 1911 Grieg-Lowther 21, FO 195/2368, folio 226. 12 28 June 1913 Lorimer-Grey 687 commercial, FO 368/872/454/34751. 13 Described in 7 June 1910 Lowther-Grey 361 conf., FO 371/1004/5156/20898. An account of Willcocks’ specific failings is in 20 July 1910 Lowther-Grey 502, FO 371/1004/5156/26785. 14 Maxwell minute on 7 June 1910 Lowther-Grey 364, FO 371/1004/5156/20901. 15 Minute on 25 Jan. 1911 Lowther-Grey 18 commercial, FO 368/601/3442/3442. On local consular help to the firm in 1910, see FO 195/2341, folio 192. 16 Mallet minute on 2 Aug. 1911 Lowther-Grey 548, FO 371/1240/330/30989. 17 21 July 1911 Grey-Marling 282, FO 371/1250/26563/27811. 18 2 Apr. 1912 Lowther-Grey tel. 9 commercial, FO 371/1492/12432/14064. 19 See an account in The Times, 21 May 1912, p. 5. 20 26 June 1912 FO-Messrs. Pearsons, FO 371/1492/12432/25829. 21 “He is a very strange man and his work in Mesopotamia was not entirely satisfactory. Happily the Turks originally engaged him without asking our advice.” Norman minute on 22 July 1911 Marling-Grey 514, FO 371/1250/ 29590/29590. 22 21 Nov. 1912 Jacksons-FO, FO 371/1492/12432/50856. 23 Lorimer’s March 1913 Summary, L/P & S/10, vol. 212, no. 1913/10953. 24 13 June 1913 Grey-Lowther tel. 259, FO 371/1826/27103/27103. 25 17 July 1913 Grey-Delegates 8, FO 371/1826/27103/32160. 26 Minute on 3 Dec. 1912 Hirtzel-Maxwell, FO 371/1492/12432/51653. Hardinge’s original suggestion is in 28 Nov. 1912 Hardinge-Crewe tel. pte., L/P & S/11, vol. 25, no. 2879/3076. 27 26 July 1913 G of I-IO tel.; enclosed in FO 371/1826/27103/37307. 28 26 Apr. 1913 Lowther-Grey 354 conf., FO 371/1816/19797/19797. 29 13 June 1913 Parker memo., FO 371/1826/27103/27148. [211]


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30 22 Apr. 1914 Parker minute, BD 10 (2), no. 232, p. 371. 31 The government’s increasing involvement in Middle Eastern oil concessions is fully discussed in Dr Kent’s thesis. It is not intended here to give another detailed account of the Anglo-German negotiations. 32 26 Sep. 1912 Adm.-FO, conf., FO 371/1486/472/50516. 33 M. Jack (later Dr Kent), “The Purchase of the British Government’s Shares in the British Petroleum Company, 1912–1914”, Past and Present, vol. 39, Apr. 1968, pp. 139–168. 34 29 May 1913 Adm.-FO, FO 371/1760/16/25022. 35 13 Jan. 1913 Cabinet memo., CAB 37/114/5 and June 1913 memo., CAB 37/115/39. 36 “Such was the Foreign Office’s lack of interest in the Persian oil concession that when it was asked in 1912 to define its extent, the wrong information was given.” Greaves, “Some Aspects”, pt. 2, p. 299 and n. 32. 37 12 Sep. 1912 Grey-Marling 608; enclosed in L/P & S/10, vol. 300, no. 1912/3548. 38 6 Dec. 1912 Grey-Lowther tel. 1092, FO 371/1486/472/151845. 39 20 Nov. 1912 Nicolson-Grey, FO 371/1486/472/50815. 40 Compare 30 Nov. 1912 Drake minute, L/P & S/10, Vol. 300, no. 1912/4575 with Parker minute on 3 Dec. 1912 IO-FO,FO 371/1486/472/51935. 41 Minute on 12 March 1914 B of T-FO, FO 371/2115/188/11065. 42 E.g., 28 Dec. 1912 Lowther-Grey 1125, FO 371/1760/16/16. 43 E.g., 17 March 1913 Lowther-Grey 197, FO 371/1760/16/12194. 44 Especially American companies. Jack, “The BP Company”, p. 159. 45 See above, pp. 175–176. 46 20 Feb. 1913 Grey-Lowther tel. 105, FO 371/1760/16/7820. 47 E.g., 20 March 1913 Lowther-Grey 227 conf., FO 371/1760/16/13760. The oil fields would thus be denied to foreign competitors. 48 Lowther suggested that the Germans take the vilayet of Mosul and D’Arcy that of Baghdad (25 Apr. 1913 Lowther-Grey 349,” FO 371/1760/16/19792); but Norman minuted: “We do not know that Mosul is not much more petroliferous than Baghdad and that the British group would not therefore be making a bad bargain.” Ibid. 49 See 29 Apr. 1913 Greenway-FO, FO 371/1760/16/20063; 16 May 1913 B of T-FO, FO 371/1760/16/22678; 14 Nov. Parker memo., FO 371/1761/16/51680; 17 Dec. 1913 Ashley-Parker, FO 371/1761/16/57611; and 16 Jan. 1914, FO 371/2120/1067/2221. See also Kent, British Interests in Oil, ch. 4. 50 2 Aug. 1913 Mallet-Hopwood, FO 371/1761/16/35778. 51 16 Feb. 1914 Ashley-Parker, FO 371/2120/1067/7068. Detailed Anglo-German discussions began in July 1913. FO 371/1760/16/31596. 52 11 March 1914 Grey-Mallet tel. 133, FO 371/2120/1067/10926 and 19 March 1914 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10, Vol. 300, no. 1914/1087. 53 Kent, British Interests in Oil, p. 222. 54 Minute on 10 March 1911 Lowther-Grey 154, FO 371/1232/21/9344. For public fears regarding rate manipulation, see 11 March 1908 evidence of Mr E. Lloyd (Managing Director of Bucknall’s) before third meeting of 1908 Persian Gulf CID subcommittee, CAB 16/10, para 410; 8 March 1911 G. Lloyd, PD 5, 1911, 22, col. 1338; and 25 May 1912, Daily Telegraph. 55 Minute on 3 March 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1232/21/7880. [212]


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56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

20 Dec. 1911 Grey-Goschen 304, BD 6, no. 480, p. 651. March 1911 B of T memo. (unsigned), BT 11/4, no. 2. 13 Dec. 1911 Lowther-Grey 922, FO 371/1234/21/50577. 21 May 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1484/264/21766. But note that by 1912 Parker was impressed with the B of T’s arguments; minute on 12 Jan. 1912, B of T-FO, FO 371/1484/264/1723. 30 May 1912 FO-IO (Mallet’s draft), FO 371/1484/264/21766. 29 July 1911 memo. to Tewfik Pasha, BD 10 (2), no. 34, p. 46 and 5 May 1913 Grey-Lowther 139 conf., BD 10 (2), no. 68 enclosure 2, pp, 101–103. 15 June 1914 Anglo-German convention, article 1 clause “b”, BD 10 (2), no. 249, p. 398. 5 June 1913 Lowther-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1913. (b), FO 800/367, p. 103. 26 June 1912 Stanley memo., BT 11/4, no. 15; 28 Aug. 1913 B of T-FO, FO 371/1817/20107/39832; 17 Nov. 1913 Ashley-Parker, FO 371/1793/6463/52480. Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, pp. 154–155, also attaches some importance to the rate convention. 28 Aug. 1910 Grey-Lowther 326, FO 371/996/189/37935. He feared that further pressure on Lynch’s behalf would incite a renewal of the 1909–1910 Anglophobia. Minutes on 4 Apr. 1911 and 7 Apr. 1911 Hirtzel-Mallet pte., FO 371/1233/21/ 12535 and 13369. 6 June memo. p. 4–b; enclosed in FO 371/1484/264/24342. “By that is meant not only ensuring that it is kept properly dredged and navigable, and that no prohibitive dues are placed upon shipping . . . but also by maintaining the rights of navigation as far as Bagdad.” Ibid. 10 July 1912 memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 60, no. 1912/2676. “What we want to do is to encourage the Turks to put their money into the river (they will then have no inducement to build the railway) and to ensure that the river service shall expand with the expansion of trade.” 12 June 1912 Ashley memo., BT 11/4, no. 15. 28 June 1912 Hirtzel memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/2500. 18 July memo. to Tewfik Pasha, para. 6, BD 10 (2), no. 55, p. 78. The government first heard of the negotiations in October 1911 (27 Oct. 1911 Picot memo., FO 371/1236/29/42585). In December, Honey reported from Mosul that an agreement had actually been reached (22 Dec. 1911 Honey-Lowther 39, FO 195/2369, folio 486). Norman and Maxwell minutes on E & T SNC-FO, 27 March 1912, FO 371/1484/264/13396 and 23 Apr. 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1484/264/17234. 25 Apr. 1912 B of T-FO, FO 371/1484/264/17619. 19 July 1912 B of T-FO, FO 371/1485/264/30763. 21 Oct. 1912 Babington Smith-FO, FO 371/1494/16799/44554. Law minute on 11 Apr. 1913 E & T SNC-FO, FO 371/1790/6463/16836. Minute on 21 Oct. Babington Smith-FO, FO 371/1494/16799/44554. 31 Oct. 1912 B of T-FO, FO 371/1494/16799/46213. 1 Nov. 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1494/16799/46326. 13 Dec. 1912 FO-Babington Smith, FO 371/1494/16799/50411. Repeated in 26 Feb. 1913 Mallet-Hakki Pasha, BD 10 (2), no. 60 and enclosure pp. 90–91. [213]


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85 2 March 1913 Lowther-Grey 177, FO 371/1790/6463/10818 and 30 March Mallet minute, FO 371/1790/6463/14674. 86 Minute on 11 Apr. 1913 E 8 T SNC-FO, FO 371/1790/6463/16836. 87 31 Oct. 1912 Parker memo., FO 371/1494/16799/46213. This is the first time that Inchcape’s name appears in this connection in the official records. 88 13 Apr. 1913 IO-FO, FO 371/1790/6463/17449. 89 “Initially, Llewellyn Smith and Huth Jackson thought that Lynch was the only man with enough experience to whom the concession could be given, but the FO would not hear of this.” Hirtzel minute on 22 May 1913 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 382, no. 1913/2073. 90 Inchcape was first approached on 9 May (11 July 1913 Stanley-Parker, FO 371/1792/6463/42364), and on the thirteenth he agreed to put up either £100,000 to buy Lynch out of the concession or to cooperate with him. 13 May 1913 Parker minute, BD 10 (2), no. 71, pp. 121–122. 91 19 May 1913 Parker memo., FO 371/1791/6463/23045. It was a tribute to Parker’s negotiating skill that he extracted from Lynch himself the suggestion that Inchcape should be the main British concessionnaire. 21 May 1913 Parker memo., FO 371/1791/6463/23340. 92 28 May 1913 memo. to Cabinet, CAB 37/115/31. 93 Contrast Grey’s reply to Ronaldshay’s parliamentary question on 22 July 1913 (PD 5, 1913, 55, cols. 1831–33) with the long list of complaints which Parker handed to the questioner on the same day (22 July 1913 Parker memo., FO 371/1792/64.63/35018). Hirtzel had already noted that the main difficulty in drafting the navigation concession was “the invariable objections of the FO to Mr. Lynch and all his works.” Minute on 22 May 1913 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1913/2073. 94 Both the FO and the IO believed that Lynch incited Turkish objections to granting Inchcape the navigation agreement, e.g. 7 Nov. 1913 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 414, no. 1913/4629. 95 Messrs. Slaughter and Sons. See 12 July 1913 Parker memo., FO 371/1791/ 6463/32339. 96 “Rather a dramatic denouement”. Crow’s minute on 24 Nov. 1913 Thurston (Calais)-Clerk pte., FO 371/1793/6463/53326). Mallet was “greatly relieved to see Lynch’s death in the papers, and hope that it has facilitated your riverain negotiations”. 8 Dec. 1912 Mallet-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (10), FO 800/371, p. 224. See the more charitable obituary in The Times, 26 Nov. 1913. 97 E.g., minute on 27 Aug. 1913 B of T-FO, FO 371/1792/6463/39674. 98 With whom navigation negotiations began in May 1913. BD 10 (2), no. 66, pp. 97–98. 99 Hirtzel minute on 16 July 1913 Parker memo., L/P & S/10, vol. 399, no. 1913/3071. 100 21 May 1913 Parker minute, BD 10 (2), no. 78, pp. 126–127. 101 Minute on 3 Nov. 1913 Kuhlmann-Grey, BD 10 (2), no. 156, p. 244. Grey would have liked to exclude the Germans altogether, “but I am doubtful if they would have acquiesced in the creation of a monopoly without participation in it.” 25 Nov. 1913 Grey-Mallet tel. 554, BD 10 (2), no. 173, pp. 265–266. 102 15 Jan. 1914 Grey-Lichnowsky, FO 371/2115/277/1986. [214]


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103 26 Apr. 1913 Mallet minute and 26 Apr. 1913 Hirtzel-Mallet, FO 371/1790/ 6463/19242. 104 2 May 1913 Mallet memo., FO 371/1819/20855/20855; thus implementing a suggestion which Gingham had first made in 1905. See above p. 64, n. 28. 105 8 July 1913 Parker memo., FO 371/1791/6463/31464. 106 E.g., 18 Nov. 1913 Grey-Mallet tel. 536, FO 371/1793/6463/51669. 107 3 Dec. 1913 Parker memo., BD 10 (2), no. 183, pp. 276–279. The conservancy of the river below Kurna was placed in the hands of a Shatt riverain commission, 15 May 1914 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 272, no. 1914/1808 and 31 May 1914 Grey-Mallet tel. 245, FO 371/2125/2390/26460. 108 25 Aug. 1906 Ramsay-O’Conor; enclosed in FO 371/148/8750/33883. 109 Moreover, these subjects were growing in importance. By 1913, the number of British subjects registered in Baghdad had risen to 5,000 (Lorimer’s Aug. 1913 summary, L/P & S/10, vol. 212, no. 1913/4285), and the Oudh Bequest merited a separate annual report (15 Nov. 1913 Lorimer-G of I, L/P & S/10, vol. 77, no. 1913/380). 110 Norman minute on 28 Dec. 1910 Marling-Grey 931, FO 371/1232/21/21. 111 “In the negotiations with Hakki we have always assumed that he reported everything to the German embassy.” Hirtzel minute on 8 May 1913 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 271, no. 1913/1823. 112 Crewe minute on 2 Feb. 1911 FO-IO, L/P & S/3, vol. 276, no. 1910/2961–2. 113 Hirtzel minute, ibid. 114 24 Feb. 1911 Chirol-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 92 (1), 38, p. 60 and 12 May 1911 Money-Hardinge pte., Morley MSS, 6. 115 “British Interests in the Middle East” (anon.), 24 May 1912. 116 4 Aug. 1913 Lorimer-Lowther 845; enclosed in FO 371/1845/42138/42138. 117 8 Jan. 1913 Hardinge-Crewe tel. pte., HARD MSS, 97 (2), 15, p. 6. 118 21 March 1914 Grey-Goschen tel. 79, BD 10 (2), no. 215, pp. 346–348 and Grey minute on 2 Apr. 1914 Crowe-Grey, FO 371/2129/4601/14278. 119 26 July 1907 DMO-FO, FO 371/350, p. 15. 120 22 Sep. 1908 Law memo., FO 368/231/32422/32897 and 22 Sep. 1909 Ramsay-G of I; enclosed in L/P & S/3, vol. 266, no. 4045. 121 See his articles: “A Railway to India”, Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 65, 1909, pp. 163–169 and 9 March 1911, Pall Mall Gazette. Also 6 Apr. 1911 Black-Tyrrell, FO 371/1246/9388/13011. 122 Minute 9 March 1911, FO 371/1246/9388/10991. See also 16 June 1910 WO memo., Strategic Railways in Persia, WO 106/52 file p. 17/23, p. 17. 123 Minute on 14 May 1913 MacFloss-FO, FO 371/1820/22317/22317. 124 Minute on 3 Nov. 1913 Kuhlmann-Grey, BD 10 (2), no. 156, p. 245. 125 15 Dec. 1913 FO-Kuhlmann, BD 10 (2), no. 189, pp. 298–303. The limits within which lines would be deemed “in competition” with the Baghdad Railway were finally specified as north of 34º lat. when west of 36º long., and north of 31º lat. when east of 36º long. 3 March 1914 FO-Lichnowsky, BD 10 (2), no. 207, p. 337. 126 28 Feb. 1914 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 414, no. 1914/7536 and 2 Apr. 1914 Crowe-Grey, FO 371/2129/4601/14278. 127 18 Nov. 1913 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 414, no. 1913/4704. 128 27 July 1914 Parker-Mallet (draft), FO 371/2125/2390/33655, p. 21. The principle of the railway isolation of Egypt had already been shown when Gorst [215]


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129

130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160

in 1910 and Kitchener in 1913 vetoed a Syrian-Egyptian connection via El Arish. 1 May 1910 Gorst-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 8, FO 800/47; 11 May 1913 Kitchener-Grey 45, FO 371/1813/18&48/22433; and M. Verete, “The Balfour Declaration and its Makers”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 6 (i) (Jan. 1970), p. 50. It is not within the scope or competence of the present study to analyse the depth of Iraqi nationalism in this period. One commentator has described the disturbances as merely “the blind protests of aggrieved men who desired better things which they knew not how to attain.” A. T. Wilson. Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914–1917 (Oxford, 1930), p. 2. Others have claimed that “Iraqi nationalism was in the early years of the twentieth century already a discernable movement.” Longrigg and Stoakes, Iraq, p. 76. August 1910 Summary para. 2, FO 371/1008/12174/39782. Jan. 1911 Summary para. 5, FO 371/1243/2482/10502. 6 March 1912 Lowther-Grey 187, FO 371/1492/10394/10394. Apr. 1912 Summary para. 2, FO 371/1490/26070/30265. Seyid Talib, Basra notable; head of provisional Iraqi government after the war. Feb. 1913 Summary L/P 8 S/10, vol. 212, no. 1913/1535. Apr. 1913 Summary, ibid., no. 1913/2358. According to Crow, this victory produced a “far reaching” and “powerful” local impression. Enclosure in 17 June 1913 Lowther-Grey 533, FO 371/1820/ 22076/28326. Minute on 19 July 1910 Lowther-Grey 489, FO 371/1007/9852/26782. Capt. W. H. I. Shakespear, agent, Kuwait, 1909–1915. 8 Apr. 1911 Shakespear-Cox; enclosed in FO 371/1249/20868/20868. 29 May 1912 Hardinge-Crewe; enclosed in FO 371/1484/264/24342. 17 Feb. 1913 Fitzmaurice-Maxwell pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80. 17 March 1913 Nicolson-Cartwright pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (3), FO 800/364, p. 181. 25 May 1913 Marling-Grey 818, FO 371/1845/45367/45367. 23 March 1914 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80. E.g., FO 371/541, file 11393 (1908); FO 195/2308 (1909); FO 371/1785, file 45001 (1913); and FO 371/2124, file 1990 (1914). In Feb. 1914, a local British merchant, Capt. Butterworth, was murdered in Basra. FO 371/2150, file 6015. 27 June 1914 Bullard-Mallet 39; enclosed in FO 371/2135/29919/42808. 4 Apr. 1914 Kitchener-Grey 58, FO 371/2128/4588/15883. 4 Feb. 1913 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 465. Reports by Honey in FO 371/1805/14478/34001 and Lorimer in L/P & S/10, vol. 212, no. 1913/2358 and 1913/3105. 12 May 1914 Mallet-Grey 355, FO 371/2124/1990/22042. 28 June 1910 Lowther-Grey 433 secret, FO 371/1007/9852/23953. Lorimer’s Dec. 1910 Summary, FO 371/1243/2482/6498. Enclosure in 4 Apr. 1910 Lowther-Grey 210, FO 371/1009/13041/13041. 1 May 1911 CID paper 104d, CAB 38/17/25. 9 Oct. 1911 Lorimer-Lowther 830/31 v. Conf., FO 195/2369, folio 432. 17 Nov. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/1015/34750/46581. E.g., 6 Sep., 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1236/29/35169. 27 Jan. 1911 Lorimer-Lowther 90/1, FO 195/2367, folio 70. [216]


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161 162 163 164

165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173

174

175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184

30 Oct. 1911 Lorimer-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/1263/48323/48323. 11 Apr. 1912 Lorimer-Lowther secret; enclosed in FO 371/1491/6666/22445. March and April 1912 Summary L/P & S/10, vol. 212, no. 1912/2325a, p. 25. Lorimer even wanted more help extended to British archaeological expeditions in Mesopotamia because “it is important at the present critical epoch, which will determine future political influence, that no means of establishing British interests should be neglected.” Ibid. The phrase is Maxwell’s. Minute on 30 Dec. 1910 Bab. Smith-Nicolson pte., FO 371/1232/21/637. 7 March 1911 G of I-IO tel.; enclosed in FO 371/1232/21/8629. 30 July 1913 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 399, no. 1913/3071. 21 Jan. 1914 Parker-Inchcape, FO 371/2115/277/3134. 22 Aug. 1910 Lorimer-Lowther; enclosed in FO 371/1000/ 930/34738 and Sep. 1911 Summary, para. 12, FO 371/1243/ 2482/45029. E.g., minutes in FO 371/1490/3025/31429, and in L/P & S/10, vol. 212, no. 1913/4285. “The suspicion of the Turks imposes great caution” on the naquib family “in their dealings with foreigners”. Lorimer’s May 1912 Summary, p. 24, FO 371/ 1490/3025/31429. G.M.L. Bell (1868–1926), traveller and later Oriental Secretary to the High Commissioner of Iraq (DNB, 1937), pp. 74–76. Quoted in 16 Oct. 1914 Cromer Cabinet memo., The Steps to be Taken in the Event of War with Turkey, CAB 37/121/124, p. 4. See similar sentiments in the contemporaneous letter from Bell to Deedes (which Grey sent to the DMO); quoted in E. Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, vol. 2, p. 14. E.g., the brother of Sadun Pasha, the Muntafik chief, in 1912 (14 Feb. 1912 Lowther-Grey 139, FO 371/1491/7064/7064); the Bani Lam tribe in 1913 (Lorimer’s July 1913 summary, L/P & S/10, vol. 212, no. 1913/3800, p. 6); and Seyid Talib in 1914 (6 March 1914 Mallet-Grey 150, FO 371/2138/4588/11479). Minute on 31 Aug. 1911 IO-FO, FO 371/1261/34412/34412. 13 March 1913 Crow-Lowther tel.; enclosed in FO 371/1799/11950/11950. 14 March 1913 Minute, ibid. 23 March 1914 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80. Unlike Fitzmaurice, who thought that the Turks “will have to be grateful if, at the Arab request, we refuse to occupy Basra, Baghdad etc., instead of such potty holes like Koweit, Katar etc”. 17 Feb. 1913 Fitzmaurice-Maxwell pte., ibid. 23 March 1914 Mallet-Grey pte., ibid. and 27 March 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 194, FO 371/2123/1990/13605. Parker minute on 21 Aug. 1912 Marling-Nicolson pte., FO 371/1510/37224/ 37224. 11 Sep. 1913 Parker memo., FO 371/1817/20107/42417. 20 Apr. 1911 WO-FO, FO 371/1234/21/14916. Minute on 18 June 1912 WO-FO, FO 371/1485/2064/26379. The War Office itself, however, evinced little interest in Mesopotamia. When, in 1913, Hubert Young asked whether his proposed tour of the area might serve a military purpose, he was told that the General Staff did not think “there is anything you could do there which would be of any use.” 21 May 1913 unsigned letter to Young, Young MSS, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, file 1. [217]


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185 Parker minute on 22 March 1911 B of T-FO, FO 371/1232/21/10716. 186 4 Apr. 1911 LI. Smith-Pres. B of T, BT 11/4, no. 7. 187 28 Aug. 1913 B of T-FO, FO 371/1817/20107/39832. The preceding investigations are described in 26 June 1912 Stanley memo., BT 11/4, no. 15. See also above, pp. 192–193. 188 Busch, Britain and the Gulf, p. 331. 189 4 June 1913 Hirtzel-Nicolson pte., FO 371/1712/167/27788. 190 20 March 1911 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 319. 191 Minute on 23 Nov. 1910 FO-IO, L/P & S/3, vol. 275, no. 1910/4252. 192 On the 60 percent debate, see above, pp. 170–171. 193 2nd minute on 27 Dec. 1912 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 300 (i), no. 1912/4969. 194 Minute on 30 Apr. 1912 FO-IO, L/P & S/10, vol. 59, no. 1912/2065. 195 2 Feb. 1911 Lowther-Crow, FO 195/2369, folio 30. 196 Mallet minute on 28 March 1913 Lowther-Grey tel. 172, FO 371/1799/ 11950/14277. The reference is to the Bani Lam approaches. See above, p. 202. 197 11 Sep. 1912 Marling-Maxwell pte., FO 371/1510/38758/38758. 198 Parker minute on IO-FO, 9 Jan. 1911, FO 371/1232/21/1062. 199 24 June 1914 Hardinge-Chirol pte., HARD MSS, 93 (2), 176, p. 167 and 10 Feb. 1914 Nicolson-Townley pte., NIC MSS, 1914 (1), FO 800/372, p. 305. Lorimer accidently killed himself at Bushire whilst cleaning his gun. 200 22 Dec. 1911 Lowther-Grey 959, FO 371/1236/29/51595. 201 Lt. Col. D. Erskine (1863–1914), resident, Turkish Arabia, 1914. 202 4 June 1914 Chirol-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 93 (1), 209, p. 249. 203 He refused a transfer to St. Petersburg in 1910. 10 Aug. 1910 Lowther-Grey pte., Grey MSS, 40, FO 800/79 and 5 Aug. 1910 Hardinge-O’Beirne very pte., HARD MSS, 21, p. 231. 204 “Please mark anything of interest. The typing is very trying for my eyes.” Minute on 2 Oct. 1911 Lorimer-Lowther, FO 195/2369, folio 425. 205 Necessitating long recuperations at Marienbad. E.g., 6 June 1912 Lowther-Grey 484, FO 371/1495/24551/24551 and 1 Oct. 1912 Lowther-Grey tel. 415, FO 371/1511/41181/41181. 206 FO 371/1263 (1911), file 50077 and FO 371/1483 (1912), file 43. Both contain extensive correspondence on this topic. 207 9 Jan. 1913 Lowther-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (1), FO 800/362, p. 104. 208 8 May 1913 Lowther-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (5), FO 800/366, p. 111. 209 17 Oct. 1910 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 263. 210 Mallet minute on 11 Dec. 1912 Lowther-Maxwell pte., FO 371/1486/472/53729. 211 In Hardinge’s words, “A great disappointment”. 22 May 1913 Hardinge-Sanderson pte., HARD MSS, 93 (2), 26, p. 27. 212 Minute on 8 Sep. 1913 G of I-IO tel., L/P & S/11, vol. 63, no. 3724. 213 Above, pp. 180–181. 214 21 Nov. 1912 Nicolson-Hardinge pte., NIC MSS, 1912 (8), FO 800/360, p. 269. 215 See above, pp. 87–88. 216 2 June 1913 Lorimer-Lowther tel.; enclosed in FO 371/1791/6463/25397. 217 21 June 1913 Cheetham-Lowther tel. pte., FO 195/2378, folio 203. 218 30 July 1913 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 399, no 1913/3071. 219 Minute on 23 June 1913 Lorimer-Grey 452 conf., FO 371/1791/6463/29510. [218]


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220 Minute on 4 Aug. 1913 Lorimer-Marling; enclosed in FO 371/1845/42138/42138 and 4 May 1914 Babington Smith-Parker pte., FO 371/2125/2390/20103. 221 Grey described him as an “expert” (22 March 1911 minute, FO 371/1233/21/ 10716) and Morley as a “clever fellow” (24 March 1911 Morley-Hardinge pte., Morley MSS, 6, p. 6). 222 Indicated by his voluminous minutes and his own complaints of a heavy timetable. 9 July 1912 Parker-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 92 (i), 281, p. 320. Inchcape later warned Parker against “over-straining yourself ” (8 Dec. 1913 Inchcape-Parker, FO 371/1793/6463/55408). 223 At the IO (16 Jan. 1914 Hirtzel and Crewe minutes, L/P & S/10, vol. 414, no. 1914/218) as well as the FO (3 Dec. 1913 Crowe, Nicolson and Grey minutes, FO 371/1817/20107/42886). 224 31 Jan. 1911 Parker minute, BD 10 (i), no. 664, pp. 637–638. 225 E.g., Parker and Mallet minutes 4 March 1911, FO 371/1232/21/7880 and 22 May 1912, FO 371/1484/264/21766. 226 Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 121 and pp. 144–145, no. 8. 227 Even after his appointment to Constantinople, Mallet continued to use despatches as a platform for policy pronouncements. 228 Nicolson in 1913 (6 May 1913 Nicolson-Goschen Pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (5), FO 800/366, p. 206) and Grey in 1914 (23 July 1914) minute, FO 371/2121/ 1067/33485). Both confessed that they had little time to follow the details of the Baghdad Railway negotiations. 229 18 Sep. 1913 Crowe-Grey, FO 371/1792/6463/42832. 230 Nicolson thought Parker might be “rather surprised” on his return to find “all his pet questions settled and solved”. 30 Apr. 1913 Nicolson-Lowther Pte., Lowther MSS, p. 499. 231 Minute on 28 Oct. 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1486/472/45745. 232 5 Sep. 1913 Parker-Picot, FO 371/1792/6463/41078. 233 For a contrast between the upright, athletic and jaunty Hardinge and the arthritic, frail and stooped Nicolson, see R. Vansittart, The Mist Procession (London, 1958), p. 99. 234 And therefore in 1911 and 1912 objected to the Cabinet’s pressure on Grey for Anglo-German naval talks. Steiner, The Foreign Office, pp. 124–127. 235 16 Nov. 1909 Hardinge-Marling Pte., HARD MSS, 17, p. 311. 236 29 March 1911 Hardinge-Nicolson Pte., BD 10 (2), no. 25, p. 38. 237 Steiner, The Foreign Office, p. 124. 238 19 Feb. 1913 Nicolson-Lowther pte., Lowther MSS, p. 475. 239 Steiner, The Foreign Office, pp. 92, 122. 240 23 Apr. 1911 Slade-G of I, IO files 73/7 L no. d. 19. News of the report was first received in London late in April (23 Apr. 1911 1040, FO 371/1247/15282/ 15325) but the full document did not arrive until May (17 May 1911 Adm-FO, FO 371/1247/15282/18952). 241 Minute on 12 May 1911 Lowther-Grey 328, FO 371/1234/21/18750. 242 The British did not reply until July. 10 July 1911 Nicolson-Bab. Smith; enclosed in FO 195/2380, folio 116. The delay is ignored by Chapman and Busch, although it was noted by the Turks (3 June 1911 Lowther-Grey 385, FO 371/1242/1698/22632). 243 20 Apr. 1911 Chirol-Tyrrell pte., Grey MSS, 67, FO 800/106. [219]


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244 E.g., 26 Jan. 1905 Clarke paper 47b, CAB 38/8/5; 2 May 1906 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, 8, p. 35; 23 Jan. 1907, Newmarch evidence before 1907 Baghdad Railway Committee, FO 371/340/12/9865; 20 July 1910 Bab. SmithCassel, BS MSS, 3; and 16 March 1911 Crow-Lowther tel. 50, FO 195/2367. 245 15 June 1911 Curzon evidence before 1911 CID Persian Gulf subcommittee, CAB 16/15, p. 9 and 14 July 1911 Report of the Committee, para. 1, ibid. 246 5 July 1911 Nicolson-Hardinge pte., NIC MSS, 1911 (3), FO 800/349, p. 309. 247 Although the “better atmosphere” at Baghdad was noted at both the FO (minutes on 15 Feb. 1913 Lorimer-Lowther tel. 19, FO 371/1490/3369/7496) and the IO (23 March 1912 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 212, no. 1912/1093). 248 21 Nov. 1912 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 271, no. 1912/4462. 249 Hakki was staying at Claridge’s and was believed to be earning £15 a day whilst the negotiations took place (10 Nov. 1913 Nicolson-Mallet pte., NIC MSS, 1913 (10), FO 800/371, p. 200 and 24 Apr. 1914 Crowe minute, FO 371/2118/756/ 18025). 250 Parker, The Bagdad Railway Negotiations, p. 525. 251 Reported in 14 Jan. 1911 Marling-Grey tel. 9 secret, FO 371/1232/21/1627. 252 16 May 1912 Anglo-Persian Oil Co-FO, FO 371/1485/264/30306. 253 Lorimer’s Feb. 1913 Summary, FO 371/1790/6463/20173 and 28 March 1913 Honey-Lowther, enclosed in FO 371/1805/14478/19790. 254 17 Feb. 1913, PD 5, 1914, 58, col. 57; see also U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918 (Princeton, 1968), p. 7. 255 Sir T. Holderness (1849–1924), Perm. Under-Sec. IO, 1912–1919 (DNB 1937), pp. 423–425. 256 16 June 1914 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 410, no. 1914/2248. 257 24 May 1911, 1st meeting CID Persian Gulf subcommittee, CAB 16/15, p. 3. 258 2 May 1913 Grey-Bertie 322, FO 371/1791/6463/23545. 259 10 Feb. 1914 Nicolson-Goschen pt., NIC MSS, 1914 (i), FO 800/372, p. 174.

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10 Epilogue to Policy: The Genesis of I.E.F. ‘D’

The despatch of the Indian Expeditionary Force (I.E.F. ‘D’) to Mesopotamia in the autumn of 1914 opened a new chapter in British policy towards Mesopotamia. At a heavy price in lives and reputations, the force ultimately confirmed Britain’s claim to a mandate over Iraq. Henceforth, Britain was to retain a commanding voice in the government of the region, a position which it held until the fall of Nuri Pasha and King Faisal II in July 1958. At the inception of the force in 1914, however, such control was neither foreseen nor planned. It was designed to serve a specific and limited aim which reflected Britain’s past policy towards Mesopotamia and did not anticipate the future history of its relations with the area. The British campaign in Mesopotamia was ultimately to be plagued by accident and confusion. Its genesis, by contrast, has the appearance of deliberation and design. The early history of I.E.F. ‘D’ has been conveniently summarised in the first volume of F.J. Moberley’s History of the Great War based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia.1 His account emphasises that the despatch of the force was not a response to any particular act of Turkish aggression. The Turks did not bombard Odessa until 29 October 1914; the entente powers did not declare war on the Ottoman Empire until 5 November. Yet the despatch of a British expedition to the head of the Persian Gulf had been advocated by the senior Indian official in the area (Major Knox) as early as 20 August.2 By the time Hardinge had forwarded the suggestion to Crewe in September,3 the idea had been independently mooted in London by Slade4 and at Constantinople by Mallet.5 On 26 September, Barrow, the military secretary at the India Office,6 drafted a formal proposal for action in the Gulf;7 his plan received full Cabinet sanction on 2 October.8 Under the command of Delamain,9 the force left India on 15 October and arrived at Bahrain on the twenty-third. Although it did not proceed to the Shatt al-Arab until after news was received of the [221]


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Turkish attack on Odessa on the twenty-ninth,10 the force was clearly prepared for such action. The simplicity of this account is deceptive. The chronology of I.E.F. ‘D’ has never been questioned; but the goals which the force was designed to achieve are open to debate. It is possible to discern three different interpretations of the British government’s aims in despatching the expedition to the head of the Gulf in the weeks preceding the outbreak of Anglo-Turkish hostilities. One recurring view is that the force was designed to serve imperialist aims: I.E.F. ‘D’ formed the vanguard of a British drive to benefit from Turkey’s legendary weakness and to add Mesopotamia to the British Empire.11 Moberley has suggested a different objective. In his analysis, the primary aims of the force were propagandist: “The Arabs were to be conciliated and to be shown that we were prepared to support them against Turkey.”12 A third, more specific, aim was put forward in Liddell Hart’s The Real War. In his view, the force’s objectives were primarily strategic. In 1914, the Abadan oil stores and Persian oil fields at the head of the Gulf were “essential” to Great Britain, and I.E.F. ‘D’ was despatched in order to secure them from Turkish attack.13 Liddell Hart’s interpretation has since become part of British historical folklore. It has been echoed in several standard works14 and repeated by the author of a recent work on the Mesopotamian campaign.15 On the other hand, the importance of the oil fields in the planning of the expedition has been qualified in some specialist works and specifically denied in others.16 These three interpretations cannot therefore be reconciled. Neither do they accord with the history of British attitudes towards Mesopotamia before the First World War. Each of them emphasises one particular aspect of Britain’s future interests in Iraq. Their common weakness is that they all conceal the fact that I.E.F. ‘D’ was designed to serve traditional, and therefore carefully circumscribed, aims. The force did, ultimately, establish British control over Iraq. It was not, however, designed to do so. As has been seen, the British government feared that a partition of Turkey would cause diplomatic complications in Europe and incite Muslim unrest in India.17 These considerations had constricted the extent of Britain’s Mesopotamian ambitions before 1914 and were to do so again in 1915, when they were discussed by the de Bunsen Committee. Moreover, in October 1914, an expansionist Mesopotamian campaign would have been inconsistent with British strategic tradition and doctrine. In 1906, the War Office had dismissed [222]


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E P I L O G U E T O P O L I C Y : T H E G E N E S I S O F I . E . F. ‘ D ’

as “futile” the proposal that British forces might “take action at” or “occupy” Basra.18 In 1911, the Director of Military Operations had equally firmly rejected the India Office’s pleas for a British attack on Mesopotamia. “If we wanted to fight Turkey”, he minuted, “we should not do so up the Valley of the Euphrates.”19 The War Office had therefore warned the Committee of Imperial Defence not to countenance “operations in the direction of Bussorah and Bagdad”.20 By 1912, the Indian government too could spare no more than one division and one cavalry brigade for action in the region.21 This passive attitude was unchanged in the late summer of 1914. Hardinge was aware of the opportunities for British expansion which a war with Turkey would present;22 but he worked to prevent, rather than to provoke, an outbreak of hostilities. In August 1914, he repeatedly stressed the importance of not inciting Indian Moslem feelings by initiating military ventures against the Turks.23 In September, he supported Mallet’s advice that Britain should conciliate the Porte and prolong negotiations at Constantinople. Mallet suggested that the Turks be reassured by a resumption of British trade at Basra;24 Hardinge wanted to match this gesture by sending the newly appointed British consul general at Baghdad to his post.25 Such was the extent of Hardinge’s fear of wounding Turkish susceptibilities that he even attempted to alter the destination of I.E.F. ‘D’. On 3 October 1914, the India Office had itself displayed caution when ordering the force to land not in Turkish territory but at Abadan.26 Hardinge, however, immediately objected to the choice of terminus. He feared that the Turks might construe a British landing at Abadan as a provocative violation of Persian neutrality; on the fifth he therefore suggested the alternative of Bassidu, further down the Gulf.27 On the following day, Beauchamp Duff28 confirmed Hardinge’s worst fears, and warned that a British landing anywhere near Turkish territory would spring a “deliberately laid” German trap.29 Hardinge therefore requested that the force be diverted as far south as Bahrain.30 Shakespear objected that “You may be held up there for days if the wind is the wrong way”,31 but Hardinge sustained his opposition to any form of provocation. Even after the India Office had agreed to despatch the force to Bahrain, Hardinge doubted the wisdom of the whole expedition. Together with Mallet, he continued to plead (as late as 29 October) that Britain exercise restraint.32 This attitude contrasts with the expressedly belligerent objectives of the Indian expedition to German East Africa.33 [223]


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It is therefore clear that at its inception, I.E.F. ‘D’ was not designed to form the vanguard of a programme of sustained expansion. Neither was defence of the Persian oil fields the prime objective of the force. Oil, admittedly, “provided a new and vital factor in the whole [Gulf ] situation”.34 But there was no historical sequence between the British government’s acquisition of a majority shareholding in the British Petroleum Company in June 1914 and the despatch of I.E.F. ‘D’ in October. First, defence of Persian oil fields was not yet vital to British interests. Although the Admiralty hoped, eventually, to obtain as much as a million tons of oil annually from the Persian source,35 Churchill had consistently denied that Britain would come to rely exclusively on these fields.36 Second, a military operation at Abadan had already been rejected. The Indian authorities had never shared the Admiralty’s enthusiasm about the value of the Persian fields.37 Even before the outbreak of war with Germany, they had questioned India’s ability to defend Abadan during a time of international tension. In April 1914, the India Office had asked the Admiralty to confirm that the British Petroleum agreement “contains no provisions imposing further responsibilities on the Government of India”.38 In the summer, Barrow specifically precluded the possibility of undertaking military responsibilities on behalf of the company. In the wake of a critical Times leader of 27 May 1914, he minuted: “In the event of war with Russia or Turkey the military problem would be a serious one . . . If in the future either Power becomes a menace to us . . . I doubt very much whether we could spare the necessary force from India to protect this area.”39 At the same time, Holderness warned that “India, in the event of war, will want all its forces for its own defence.”40 In June 1914, several MPs in London subjected Churchill to close questioning on the possible need to defend the Admiralty commitment by military means.41 On the same day Hardinge in India asserted that however important the oil supply, he would “strongly deprecate any attempt to vindicate our position in these territories vi et armis”.42 Grey assured Parliament, on both 17 and 29 June, that the conditions under which a force would be sent to Abadan from India “were, in fact, impossible”.43 The India Office, however, was not satisfied.44 Crewe refused to give “any sort of guarantee to any of my colleagues” on the use of Indian forces,45 and asked Hardinge to confirm that an Indian expedition would never be contemplated.46 The tone of his statements indicate that he was unlikely [224]


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to have sanctioned the despatch of I. E. F. ‘D’ specifically for the defence of Abadan. Defence of the oil fields remained a secondary consideration in the autumn of 1914. Some pressure was applied for the despatch of the force for this purpose, but it was ineffective. As early as 18 August, Hardinge refused to sanction protection for the Abadan settlement. He insisted that the ultimate danger of provoking the Turks outweighed the immediate welfare of the oil stores.47 A few days later, the India Office too rejected Blade’s suggestion that the safety of the oil fields warranted the preparation of an expeditionary force at Karachi.48 Blade personally put his case to Hirtzel.49 He also claimed that “The question of defence has nothing to do with the involvement of Government capital in the Company . . . The Force is necessary in order to ensure the supply of oil for the fleet.”50 The India Office, however, remained unconvinced. On 1 September, Churchill admitted that “There is little likelihood of any troops being available for this purpose . . . we shall have to buy our oil elsewhere.”51 Slade immediately renewed his pleas for a force, but the political importance of avoiding hostilities was recognisably paramount.52 Hardinge was prepared to “let the Abadan oil works take their chance” rather than risk war;53 and Crewe thought that “if the oil stores cannot be safeguarded without irritating Turkey’s not unreasonable sentiments”, the Admiralty would have to forego this particular source “for the moment”.54 Ultimately, as has been seen, the force was diverted away from Abadan. The Admiralty was therefore forced to make other preparations for the defence of Abadan, and ultimately ordered the Espeigle to devote itself to this task.55 Delamain’s orders did empower him to occupy Abadan island “with the object of protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipeline”,56 but this was not the primary objective of his force. He did not land more than 200 men at Abadan.57 Only Moberley’s conclusion that I.E.F. ‘D’ was designed to “conciliate” the Arabs58 approximates to the pattern of Britain’s pre-war Mesopotamian policy. The British government had long acknowledged the importance of conciliating local Arab sentiment. As has been seen, between 1910 and 1914 especially, British policy-makers had also recognised the implications of Fitzmaurice’s caustic prophesy that “the Arabs down there are almost certain very soon to eliminate the Turks.”59 In the summer of 1914 too, the “Arab question” was a subject of concern. On 20 August, Knox argued that a British capture of Basra [225]


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would be “the important blow to Turkish reputation” and “the sign for a general insurrection along the River Tigris”.60 On the twenty-second, the India Office pressed the Admiralty to increase its forces in the Gulf because “the political feeling of the people (which will be a very important factor in the case of Turkish hostility) is principally influenced by what they see.”61 Similarly, in September, Hardinge and Crewe discussed various possible religious assurances and personal inducements to Gulf and Mesopotamian Arabs in case of war.62 In October, the Foreign Office too opposed any action which might “destroy our prestige with the Arabs” or “put them definitely on Turkey’s side”.63 At the same time, the India Office organised the dissemination of pro-British propaganda amongst the tribes at the head of the Gulf.64 This atmosphere certainly influenced the planning of I.E.F. ‘D’. On 2 September 1914, Hirtzel asked Barrow to consider the proposal for an expedition to the Gulf because “the political effect in the Persian Gulf and in India of leaving the head of the Gulf derelict will be disastrous.” The following day he stressed that “there is no question of naval operations in the real sense, but only of showing the flag.”65 Barrow agreed with this approach. He argued that the whole point of despatching the force before the outbreak of hostilities was not the “ostensible” aim of protecting the oil supplies but the very real need to avert a possible Turco-Arab alliance.66 Crewe as well stressed “the moral effect on the Arabs” rather than “protection of the oil stores” when advocating the scheme to Churchill and Hardinge.67 Delamain was specifically instructed to “avoid any action which is likely to cause friction with them [the Mesopotamian Arabs] as their co-operation may be required in the event of a rupture with Turkey”.68 The command “prepare to help the Arabs” immediately followed the India Office’s announcement to Hardinge of the Odessa raid.69 I.E.F. ‘D’ was not, however, designed to serve the cause of Arab nationalism in Mesopotamia. Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia before 1914 had indicated some enthusiasm for nascent Arab Turcophobia; it had also indicated considerable suspicion of the advantages of an uncontrolled Arab uprising. Moberley emphasised the British desire to cooperate with the Arabs; he thereby stressed the alliance of Anglo-Arab interests against the Turks. But he ignored the previous prejudices of Anglo-Indian attitudes towards the Mesopotamian Arabs; he therefore missed the true motives of the British government in despatching I.E.F. ‘D’. During the last period of the Baghdad Railway negotiations, British [226]


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policy was designed to foster the friendship of Mesopotamian Arabs in order to further British, not Arab, interests. The discussions which preceded the despatch of I.E.F. ‘D’ revealed that this policy was to be pursued by restraining rather than inciting an Arab rebellion. Once Britain and Germany were at war in 1914, British policy towards the Mesopotamian Arabs was ambivalent. The government continued to recognise the useful role which the Mesopotamian Arabs might play in a conflict with Turkey; but it balanced this consideration against the knowledge that it would be necessary to channel the unruly local forces likely to be released by Anglo-Turkish hostilities. In September 1914, Ryan70 wrote a spirited memorandum on the possibility of engineering an Arab revolt. He had, however, cautiously qualified his own enthusiasm for the scheme by noting that in the event of an Arab uprising in Mesopotamia, Britain would probably want “to set up some stable authority strong enough to administer, but weak enough to be dependent upon us”.71 At the India Office, Hirtzel’s comments on this paper were not enthusiastic. He advised the government to remember that the Arab desire for autonomy was two-edged. “The strength of our position vis a vis the Arabs”, he wrote in October, “has lain in their own divisions and in their hostility to Turkey. The substitution of an Arab confederacy might well result in the withdrawal from us of a loyalty that has been paid to us, less because we are loved, than because the Turks are hated. Moreover, Pan-Islam is a danger that must be steadily born in mind, and it seems highly probable that eventually a consolidated Arabia would be a far greater danger, alike in Africa and Asia, than the Jewish free-masons who now control the Caliphate.”72 Crewe subsequently modified the tone of Hirtzel’s minute; but he did not contradict its sentiments. On 19 October, he informed the Foreign Office that “he would regard the creation of a powerful politico-religious [Arab] entity . . . with serious misgivings . . . He would not encourage it even indirectly.”73 More specifically, the government of India asserted that Ryan’s proposal to establish an independent Shia enclave around the Mesopotamian holy places was “premature”.74 In the particular case of Seyid Talib, such caution was compounded by mistrust. In August 1914, Bullard reported from Basra that “all Moslems” in the town were anti-British.75 The government could not, therefore, ignore the potential assistance of a man who was assumed to be the most influential individual in Basra.76 Kitchener thought Talib might [227]


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be “useful”. Hardinge considered it “essential to secure his adherence”; and the Foreign Office noted that “if the British had to attack Basra, Talib . . . could and would either raise a disturbance in the town [against the Turks] or induce Arab troops to desert.”77 When, early in October, Talib requested Bullard’s assurance of British support, Grey and Kitchener deliberately made the tone of Mallet’s proposed reply more attractive.78 Nevertheless, British officials did not forget Eyre Crowe’s pre-war description of Talib as “a worthless and corrupt intriguer”.79 In October, Mallet warned of his “untrustworthy” character. For its part, the India Office feared that Talib might accept an invitation to go to Constantinople; and Hardinge, although prepared to sanction certain personal assurances to Talib, carefully ensured that they would not be put into writing.80 In any case, Indian support for Talib was conditional upon his good conduct. Talib was told that “his eventual position in the event of war” would depend upon the extent to which he used his influence “in our interests”.81 When Basra was ultimately taken without Talib’s help, Hardinge unhesitatingly announced that he had “forfeited all claims to our consideration”.82 The decision to despatch I.E.F. ‘D’ reflected this atmosphere. Any account of the decision-making process which created the expedition must note the British desire to channel, as well as to encourage, an Arab uprising at the head of the Gulf. Knox’s awareness of this need was apparent in his earliest advocacy of the force. Far from fearing Arab passivity in the region, he thought that “there is, in fact, every likelihood of a rising on the part of the Arabs without our intervention.” But in that case, “the safety of European inhabitants at Baghdad and Basra must be a question of the gravest concern.”83 Barrow too, in one of his first comments on the need for the force, apprehended the detrimental consequences of “ferment” in the area.84 Hardinge was more concerned about the effect of an Arab rising on British interests in Mesopotamia than on Muslim sympathies in India.85 In this spirit, Crewe informed Churchill that the India Office desired not only to “show the Arab emirs that we are active” but also that Britain was “not to be ignored”.86 Delamain’s order to “assure the local Arabs of our support against Turkey” was therefore to serve a dual function. The carrot was to be attached to a stick. The underlying intention of the British government was revealed in a private note which Capt. Smythe (who had first visited Mesopotamia in 1903)87 conveyed from the War Office. “A point not in [228]


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the instructions”, he wrote to Delamain in October, “but on which I know CGS has views, is keeping uncivilised bodies of fighting men out of reach of Basra as far as possible.”88 Claims that in October 1914, Britain initiated a Mesopotamian campaign in order to expand its dominions or to defend its Persian oil investment are therefore unwarranted. The plan to control Iraq was not developed until 1916; the Anglo-Persian Oil Company did not pay a dividend until 1917.89 The notion that I.E.F. ‘D’ was despatched in order to form an independent Arab state is also a misconception. In 1914, Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia was based on the need to preserve those interests which had been apparent in the nineteenth century and which had been developed since 1903. It thus aimed to achieve limited results; the objective was stability rather than revolution. The officials who sanctioned the despatch of the force in 1914, no less than those who discussed Britain’s Mesopotamian desiderata in 1915, considered that the maintenance of the status quo would best serve Britain’s strategic, commercial and political interests in the region. The despatch of I.E.F. ‘D’ is thus important because it indicated the extent to which the government’s thinking on Mesopotamia had evolved since 1903. Lansdowne’s memorandum had not distinguished Mesopotamia from any other region in the Middle East: I.E.F. ‘D’ restricted its activities exclusively to Mesopotamia. But the aim of the force – to control an Arab uprising – also demonstrated the continuity of British policy. In this sense, the force represented a consummation of Britain’s pre-war policy. Only the convergence of what A. J. P. Taylor has called “Turkey’s supreme blunder” and what Grey termed the pressure for “hasty but imperative decisions” was later to change the pattern of British thinking about Mesopotamia.

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NOTES 1 (London, 1923); hereafter Moberley. Moberley used, but did not cite, the official British archives. 2 20 Aug. 1914 Knox-Hardinge tel. 996; enclosed in L/P & S/10, vol. 462 (i), no. 3683. 3 4 Sep. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. 360 pte., HARD MSS, 101 (2), no. 179, p. 80. 4 Minute dated 21 Aug. 1914, ADM 136/7, folio 22 and Moberley, p. 79. 5 4 Sep. 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 629, FO 371/2140/46261/46520. 6 Gen. Sir E. G. Barrow (1852–1934), Mil. Sec., IO, 1914–1917. 7 Entitled The Role of India in a Turkish War, WO 106/52, p. 1 and (with omissions), Moberley, pp. 86–88. 8 2 Oct. 1914 Crewe-Hardinge tel., HARD MSS, 101 (i), 548a, p. 231. 9 W. S. Delamain, (1862–1932), first commander, I.E.F. ‘D’. 10 16 Nov. 1914 Delamain-WO, printed in Despatches Concerning Operations in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia (1915), Cd 8074, p. 4. 11 E.g., M. Jastrow, The War and the Bagdad Railway (Philadelphia, 1917), pp. 114–117; W. Ormsby-Gore, “Great Britain, Mesopotamia and the Arabs”, Nineteenth Century and After (Aug. 1920), p. 232; Howard, Partition of Turkey, p. 59; T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (London, 1935 edn.), pp. 58–59; Z Saleh, Mesopotamia (Iraq), 1600–1914: A Study in British Foreign Affairs (Baghdad, 1957), p. 291; and Zeine, Arab Nationalism, p. 58. 12 Moberley, p. 95; Wilson, Loyalties, p. 9; P. Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development (London, 1937), p. 208. 13 B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War (London, 1930), p. 208; repeated in A History of the World War, 1914–1918 (London, 1934), p. 208. 14 C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War, 1914–1918 (2nd edn. Oxford, 1936), p. 339; W. Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Michigan, 1958), p. 211; The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12, “The Era of Violence, 1898–1945” (ed. D. Thomson, Cambridge, 1960), p. 363 and 2nd edn. “The Shifting Balance of World Forces, 1898–1945” (ed. C. L. Mowatt 1968), p. 187; A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914–1945 (Oxford, 1965), p. 49; and Sir E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 1914–1918 (London, 1967), p. 99. 15 A. J. Barker, The Neglected War: Mesopotamia, 1914–1918 (London, 1967), p. 37. 16 Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 29; Monroe, Britain’s Moment, p. 25; and P. Guinn, British Strategy and Politics, 1914–1918 (Oxford, 1965), p. 43 are all cautious. Kent, British Interests in Oil, p. 255; V. Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914–1918”, Historical Journal, vol. 13 (ii), 1970, p. 294; and B.C. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914–1921 (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 6–7 all deny the importance of oil in the planning of I.E.F. ‘D’. 17 See above, pp. 178–180. 18 Grant Duff minute, May 1906, WO 106/42, file C 3/10. 19 H. Wilson minute, 24 Apr. 1911, WO 106/43, file C 3/23. 20 1 May 1911 WO paper 104d, CAB 38/17/25. 21 1 Aug. 1912 G of I-WO, WO 106/42, file C 3/37. [230]


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22 8 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe pte., HARD MSS, 120 (ii), 51, p. 162. 23 18 Aug. 1914 Hardinge-Bayley pte., HARD MSS, 88 (ii), 148, p. 76 and 24 Aug. 1914 Hardinge-Willingdon pte., ibid., no. 162a, p. 85. See also 17 Aug. 1914 Asquith-the King, Asquith MSS (Bodleian Library, Oxford), 7. 24 14 Sep. 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 629, FO 371/2140/46261/46520. 25 16 Sep. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. pte., HARD MSS, 98 (ii), 466, p. 187. 26 5 Oct. 1914 Crewe-Hardinge tel. 1158, HARD MSS, 101 (i), 5626, p. 239. 27 5 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. 568, HARD MSS, 98 (ii), 4986, p. 202. 28 Sir B. Duff (1855–1918), C in C, India, 1913–1916 (DNB, 1927), pp. 164–167. 29 6 Oct. 1914 Duff-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 88 (i), 313a, p. 284a. 30 7 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. 578, HARD MSS, 101 (2), 447a, p. 2066. 31 9 Oct. 1914 Hirtzel-Barrow pte., L/MIL/5, box 10. 32 10 Oct. 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 952, FO 371/2142/50458/58203 and 29 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Chirol pte., HARD MSS, 93 (i i) 242, p. 211. 33 30 Sep. 1914 Crewe-Hardinge tel. 1106, HARD MSS, 101 (1), 530a, p. 222. 34 Beloff, Imperial Sunset, p. 165. 35 Jack, British Petroleum Company, p, 162. 36 17 June 1914 PD 5, 1914, 63, col. 1131. 37 E.g., 11 Apr. 1913 Crewe-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 119 (i), 17, p. 28, and 1 May 1913 Hardinge-Crewe secret and personal, ibid. (ii), 21, p. 52. 38 2 Apr. 1914 IO-Adm, L/P & S/10, vol. 410 (i), no. 771. 39 10 June 1914 Barrow minute, ibid., no. 2248. 40 12 June 1914 minute, ibid. 41 G. Lloyd, 17 June 1914, PD 5, 1914, 63, col. 1157; D. Dillon, ibid., 1200; Sir F. Flannery, ibid., 1204; and Beresford, ibid., 1213. 42 17 June 1914 Hardinge-Chirol, HARD MSS, 93 (ii), 173, p. 163. 43 17 June 1914, PD 5, 1914, 63, col. 1181 and 29 June 1914, PD 5, 1914, 64, cols. 109–110. 44 26 June 1914 Holderness-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 120 (i), 30, p. 67 and 27 June 1914 Hirtzel minute, L/P & S/10, Vol. 300 (i), no. 2351. 45 1 July 1914, ibid. 46 17 July 1914 10-G of I, no. 288, ibid. 47 18 Aug. 1914 Hardinge-Knox, tel. 592, L/P & S/10, Vol. 462 (i), no. 3683. 48 21 and 23 Aug. 1914 minutes, ADM 136/7, folios 22 and 28. 49 29 Aug. 1914 Hirtzel-Barrow pte., L/P & S/10, Vol. 462 (i), no. 3356. 50 30 Aug. 1914 minute, ADM 136/7, folio 34. 51 Minute ibid., Moberley, p. 81. 52 3 Sep. 1914 Jackson minute, ADM 136/7, folio 38. 53 5 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., NIC MSS, 1914 (4), FO 800/375, p. 194. 54 9 Oct. 1914 Crewe-Hardinge pte., HARD MSS, 120 (i), 50, p. 97. 55 Moberley, pp 107–108. 56 8 Oct. 1914 CIGS-Delamain, WO 106/880, file d. 1 and Moberley, p. 99. 57 7 Nov. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. 716, HARD MSS, 102 (2), 665, p. 306. 58 Moberley, p. 99. 59 17 Feb. 1913 Fitzmaurice-Maxwell pte., Grey MSS, 41, FO 800/80. 60 20 Aug. 1914 Knox-Hardinge tel. 996, L/P & S/10, Vol. 462 (i), no. 3683. 61 22 Aug. 1914 IO-FO, ibid., no. 3308. 62 4 Sep. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. pte., HARD MSS, 101 (2), 179, p. 80. [231]


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63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

11 Oct. 1914 Grey-Mallet tel. 659, FO 371/2142/50458/58203. E.g., 30 Oct. 1914 Hirtzel-Knox tel. pte., L/P & S/10 vol. 462 (i), no. 4183. 2 and 3 Sep. 1914 minutes, ibid., no. 3439. 26 Sep. 1914 minute, WO 106/52, p. 1. 1 Oct. 1914 Crewe-Churchill pte., ADM 136/7, folio 72. Moberley, p. 99. 29 Oct. 1914 Crewe-Hardinge tel. pte. and personal, HARD MSS, 101 (i), 738b, p. 309. A. Ryan (1876–1949), acting 1st dragoman, Constantinople, March–Nov. 1914. Memo., enclosed in 22 Sep. 1914 Mallet-Grey 604 conf., FO 371/2140/46261/ 57234. 17 Oct. 1914 minute, L/P & S/10, vol. 558 (i), no. 1914/4051. 19 Oct. 1914 IO-FO, ibid. 26 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel, pte., ibid. Enclosure in 18 Aug. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel., L/P & S/10, vol. 462 (i), no. 3254. 5 Sep. 1913, Adm.-FO, FO 371/1799/11950/41370. 8 Oct. 1914, Kitchener minute, FO 371/2140/46261/57074; 11 Sep. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. 404, HARD MSS, 98 (2), 457, p. 184; and 21 Oct. 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 1019, FO 371/2140/46261/61942. Minutes on 7 Oct. 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 942, FO 371/2140/46261/57090. Minute, 3 July 1914, FO 371/2135/29919/29924. 28 Oct. 1914 Mallet-Grey tel. 1081, FO 371/2140/46261/64636; 25 Oct. 1914 IO-FO, FO 371/2140/46261/63560; and 28 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel., HARD MSS, 98 (2), 575, p. 228. 28 Oct. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel. pte., HARD MSS, 101 (2), 598, p. 282. Enclosure in 30 Nov. 1914 IO-FO, FO 371/2140/46261/77724. 20 Aug. 1908 Knox-Hardinge tel. 996, L/P & S/10, vol. 462 (i), no. 3683. 2 Sep. 1914 minute, ibid., no. 3439. 4 Sep. 1914 Hardinge-Crewe tel, pte„ HARD MSS, 101 (2), 179, p. 80. 1 Oct. 1914 Crewe-Churchill pte., ADM 136/7, folio 72. Above, pp. 53–54. 10 Oct. 1914 Smythe-Delamain, WO 106/881. “People forget how lately this asset began to dominate the region’s economy and disturb its politics.” Monroe, Britain’s Moment, p. 95.

[232]

591 Mesopotamia 11 Conclusion

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11 Conclusion

In his introduction to A History of the Crusades, Runciman complained that historians too often take refuge in small fortresses of learning. Although easy to defend from attack, such fortresses control too narrow a field of fire to assist the general campaign of furthering the boundaries of historical knowledge.1 By its nature, this study has constructed another such fortress. It covers a specific subject of official British interest during a brief period of British history. Moreover, it may appear detached from the mainstream of historical interest. Between 1903 and 1914, the British government finally committed itself to a policy which ultimately involved the country in the First World War. Yet Britain’s policy towards Mesopotamia neither contributed to nor formed part of this process. Although the Baghdad Railway was the subject of intense diplomatic exchanges, it never constituted a truly inflammable issue. Indeed, on the eve of war in 1914, Britain and Germany reconciled their conflicting claims in Mesopotamia. As Ms Chapman, some of whose assumptions on other matters have been questioned in this study, has pertinently remarked, the Baghdad Railway “was at most only a very minor contributory irritant in Anglo-German relations prior to 1914. Even had a settlement been effected in 1903, there is no reason to believe that Europe would thereby have been saved from war in 1914 or that failure to reach an agreement at that time hastened war by a single day.”2 Professor Saleh’s claims to the contrary3 are as unfounded as they are unsubstantiated. If, therefore, to extend Runciman’s metaphor, sorties are to be launched from the confines of this study, they must take a different form and aim to achieve different objectives. The formulation of British policy towards Mesopotamia between 1903 and 1914 provides a case study and example of the decision-making process in Britain during this period. When considering Mesopotamia, British policy-makers had to balance criteria at two levels. One was local, transient and challenging [233]


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– the potential economic value of the region and the fluctuating loyalties of its inhabitants. The other was global, constant and sober – the strategic necessity to defend all routes to India and the diplomatic requirement to reduce international tension in Europe. These two perspectives were more often contradictory than complementary. Ultimately, all British policy had to conform to established principles of strategy and diplomacy; but often these factors were either too broad in conceptual scope or too distant in geographical relevance to serve as guidelines for the pursuit of any particular local objective. The principles of British strategy had been distilled from a century or more of cumulative experience; the dictates of diplomacy were determined by circumstances which revolved in a Eurocentric orbit. They transcended the details of British requirements in Mesopotamia. Only the personal fears and hopes of individual policymakers spanned both global and local dimensions and provided the symbiosis between them. Upon their reactions to particular events and their motives at a particular time depended the weight which, at any specific moment, might be attached to local or global factors. The key to the formulation of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy between 1903 and 1914 is to be found in the interplay between the government’s subjective approach and objective local developments. The 1907 Cabinet memorandum, the 1910 Tigris valley railway demand and the 1913 and 1914 agreements each marked the end of a stage in the development of Britain’s policy towards the Mesopotamian interior. This study has attempted to explain the differences between these documents, but a retrospective survey must note one characteristic common to them all. The strategic importance of Mesopotamia as a link in the chain of Indian communications was the original motive for Britain’s interest in the region. But this one factor did not alone determine the detailed evolution of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. British thinking about Mesopotamia between 1903 and 1914 was not dominated by the fear that the Baghdad Railway might provide Germany with a route to the East. Lansdowne’s 1903 memorandum, therefore, also closed a period of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy. By stressing the need to prevent foreign control of the overland route, it reflected the pattern of nineteenthcentury priorities. The early twentieth-century statements were based on a different criterion of assessment. Fear for the route to India does not explain Britain’s concentration on the southern section of the Baghdad line in 1907, the British demand for a Tigris valley railway in 1910 nor [234]


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the despatch of I.E.F. ‘D’ in 1914. The shadow of the Indian glacis remained, of course, always present; it was assumed rather than expressed, tacit but unmistakable. “India once gone, neither virtue nor virtuosity would have availed to preserve Britain’s position at Suez, Haifa and Habbaniya.”4 But far from being dependent for its development upon the needs of Indian defence, Britain’s Mesopotamian policy increasingly responded to influences only indirectly connected with that requirement. In doing so, it distorted the ultimate nature of British interests in the region. Changing local conditions entailed frequent adjustments of short-term policies, and these often obscured the original motive of the long-term objective. Flexibility of policy was the great advantage which accrued from Britain’s readiness to respond to changing local conditions. Because the official mind was not dominated by strategic considerations, it was free to range over several other aspects of Mesopotamian life. The diversity of the government’s interests is impressive. It followed the progress and encouraged the planning of petroleum, irrigation, navigation and railway schemes. Similarly, it observed the emergence, and fostered the friendship, of local movements towards Arab separatism from Turkish rule. The government also promoted the establishment, and protected the interests, of British archaeological and educational institutions in Mesopotamia. Moreover, British policy was justifiably egocentric and commendably pliant. The government was prepared to examine the respective claims of Mackenzie, Lynch and Inchcape to control British interests in Tigris navigation; it respected the desires of both Pearsons and Jacksons to construct local irrigation works; it studied the possible advantages of the Mohammera, Willcocks and Tigris valley railway schemes; and did not restrict its options to Cassel and Babington Smith, who favoured the German tracé. It also maintained contact with the Sunni naquib of Baghdad as well as such Shia tribes as the Bani Lam. There was hardly an important political or economic development in Mesopotamia during this period with which the British government was not involved and interested to a greater or lesser extent. The very flexibility of British policy, however, entailed one great responsibility. Because the government did not concentrate attention on any one constant and immediate point of reference, it allowed itself to adopt a policy of cumulative involvement in Mesopotamia. During the nineteenth century, British policy had been primarily passive. Its [235]


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aims were essentially defensive and strategic, and the government had attempted to ensure merely that Mesopotamia did not fall under the control of any non-Turkish power. Even in 1903, official activity in Mesopotamia was largely restricted to the defence of Lynch’s rights and the distribution of the Oudh Bequest. By 1907, however, the government had begun to encourage the involvement of British capital in petroleum and irrigation concessions, and in 1910 it announced Britain’s claim to a monopoly of all commercial development in Mesopotamia. By 1914, Britain had relinquished the Tigris valley railway demand but had taken its first hesitant steps towards involvement in the cauldron of Mesopotamian politics. The despatch of I. E. F. ‘D’ demonstrated that although Britain still disclaimed military expansion and imperial ambitions in Mesopotamia, the government’s policy towards the region had attained a momentum of its own. The defence of the route to India was now only the sheet anchor of Britain’s attitude. Amplifying and complementing, but at the same time almost obscuring, this consideration was the need to defend Britain’s commercial and political interests in the area. These interests had, by stages, assumed importance in their own right. The de Bunsen Committee acknowledged this development. It reiterated the strategic importance of Mesopotamia but also admitted that the government’s growing interests in the commercial and political development of the region necessitated a wider arc of British involvement than might otherwise have been thought wise or necessary. The 1915 de Bunsen Committee could not disregard the area in the same way as Lansdowne’s 1903 memorandum had done. The successive expressions of the government’s policy thus corresponded to the degrees of Britain’s involvement in Mesopotamia. But the 1907 memorandum, the 1910 demand and the 1913 and 1914 agreements also reflected the changing priorities of official concern during the periods of their formulation. They were thus contingent upon the responses of the individual members of the executive machine to pressures from both within Mesopotamia and outside the region. Public opinion was not a determining factor. Neither did various pressure groups – commercial, financial or humanitarian – which communicated with the Foreign Office seriously influence its policy. The outburst of 1903 was an exception which, in any case, was directed against British cooperation with Germany rather than on behalf of British interests in Mesopotamia. The support accorded to Lynch’s fusion scheme in 1909 [236]


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was also unique. The government was not immune to public pressure, nor were individual members of the administration oblivious to the dangers of public criticisms.5 But when formulating their Mesopotamian policy, ministers usually responded to commercial or philanthropic agitation only when it suited their individual purposes to do so. Ultimately, the amount of information on the Baghdad Railway laid before Parliament was small. The ambitions of D’Arcy and Lynch, moreover, were not fully supported, and no concerted attempt was made to match the educational work being done in Mesopotamia by French institutions. The individual calculations and personal reactions of various officials had a far greater influence on the formulation of British policy than external pressures. Between 1903 and 1907, their aspirations in Mesopotamia were fostered by a series of local reports. Consequently, it appeared vital to prevent German control of a railway south of Baghdad. By 1910, official ambitions had been further aroused by an estimate of the promise of Mesopotamian commerce. The value of an exclusive British “sphere” in Mesopotamia then appeared worthy of intricate diplomatic exchanges and acrid domestic debate. Between 1910 and 1914, the implementation of British policy was restricted by the government’s hope of strengthening Britain’s European friendships and by its apprehensions of Britain’s local strategic weakness. Britain’s Mesopotamian policy was therefore modified in order to improve its relations with Turkey and Germany and to preserve its interests in the Gulf. At each stage, the influence of desiderata established in London, and of standards determined by officials far from Mesopotamia itself, grew stronger. Only during the first phase did British policy-makers appear to base their decisions on reports which emanated from Mesopotamia. But in this period too, the Indian government was excluded from the process of policy-making. Subsequently, British policy was determined almost exclusively by the preoccupations and purposes of the Foreign Office. Even when, as in the formulation of the Tigris valley railway demand, the government dealt with the minutiae of local circumstances, the Foreign Office both initiated and implemented policy. This tendency increased after 1910. Not only were the broad outlines of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy modified in order to conform to the demands of European diplomacy but even the details of that policy were determined [237]


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by the personal conceptions of officials in London. The decision to withdraw all British claims to participate in the Baghdad Railway north of Basra was a consequence of Nicolson’s preoccupation with the maintenance of the triple entente. The decision to establish a navigation concession in competition with the railway reflected the predelictions of his staff, who acted upon their own aspirations rather than Lorimer’s realistic observations. The de Bunsen Committee report, therefore, concealed as much as it revealed. The report presented a true reflection of the extent and variety of British interests in Mesopotamia. It did not, however, disclose that the importance of those interests depended not on their intrinsic worth but on the value which they assumed in a fluctuating scale of idiosyncratic values. The evolution of Britain’s Mesopotamian policy had not followed a pattern of gradual progression. Rather, it stumbled, jerked and shifted in accordance with the flexibility, resourcefulness and imagination of those who formulated it. The domestic reality which lay behind the local appearance of British strength is therefore sobering. The British government had demonstrated its capacity to meet the challenge of European competition in Mesopotamia and to respond to the call of changing local circumstances. The process whereby it had done so, however, indicated one weakness of possible general relevance. “I cannot”, as Lady Hester Lucy Stanhope once remarked to the Duke of Wellington, “but lament on a fault too common in our public men – that of seeing things in the light they wish them to be and not as they are.”6

NOTES 1 2 3 4

S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1954), p. xiii. Chapman, Britain and the Bagdad Railway, pp. 210–211. Z. Saleh, Iraq, pp. 256–257. E. Kedourie, “Cairo, Khartoum and the Arab Question, 1915–1918”, The Chatham House Version and other Middle Eastern Studies (London, 1970), p. 13. 5 “Although Edward Grey might hanker after trout streams, Loulu Harcourt for unlimited game at close range and Morley for his unread library, Grey believed that Walter Runciman, with his shipping interests, was almost the only man in the Cabinet who had a real perhaps even preferable alternative to office.” C. Hazlehurst, “Asquith as Prime Minister, 1908–1916”, Eng. Hist. Rev., vol. 85, July 1970, p. 507. 6 Quoted in Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy, p. 101. [238]

591 Mesopotamia 12 Biblio

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PRIMARY SOURCES Printed British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (London, 1926–1938), 11 vols in 13. Documents diplomatiques francais, 1871–1914 (2nd Series, Ministre des affaires entrangeres, Paris (2nd Series, 14 vols. 1930–1955, 3rd Series, 11 vols. 1929–1936). Die grosse Politik der europaischen Kabinette 1871–1914, edited by J. Lepsius, A Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and F. Thimme (Berlin, 1922–1927). Hansard, Parliamentary Debates 4th Series, Commons, vols. 118–199, 1903–1908. 5th Series, Commons, vols. 1–64, 1909–July 1914. 4th Series, Lords, vols. 118–199, 1903–1908. 5th Series, Lords, vols. 1–16, 1909–July 1914. British Government Command Papers Annual Reports on the trade of Baghdad and Basra 1902, Cd. 1386 A & P 1903, vol. lxxix, nos. 2987, 3205. 1903, Cd, 1766 A & P 1904, vol. ci, nos. 3168, 3235. 1904, Cd, 2236 A & P 1905, vol. ciii, no. 3382 (Basra). —A & P 1906, vol. cxxiii, no. 3477 (Baghdad). 1905, Cd. 2682 A & P 1906, vol. cxxix, nos. 3609, 3663. 1906, Cd. 3283 A & P 1907, vol. xciii, nos. 3865, 3873. 1907, Cd. 3727 A & P 1908, vol. cxvi, no. 4024 (Basra), —vol. cxvii, no. 4073 (Baghdad). 1908, Cd. 4446 A & P 1909, vol. xcviii, nos. 4267, 4354. 1909, Cd. 4962 A & P 1910, vol. cii, nos. 4482, 4513. 1910, Cd. 5465 A & P 1911, vol. xcvi, nos. 4696, 4730. [239]


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1911, Cd. 6005 A & P 1912–13, vol. c, nos. 4980, 4999. 1912, Cd. 6665 A & P 1913, vol. lxxii, nos. 5055, 5168. 1913, Cd. 7048 A & P 1914, vol. xcv, no. 5369 (Basra). —Cd. 7620 A & P 1914–1916, vol. lxxv, no. 5407 (Baghdad). —Cd. 8074, Despatches Concerning Operations in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. —A & P 1914–1916, xlix, pp. 699–752. Lorimer, J. G. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ‘Oman, and Central Arabia (Calcutta, 1908–1915, reprint Hants. 1971), 2 vols, in 4.

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8039 East India Station. 8043–8051 Admiralty. 8096–8098 Foreign Office. 8099 India Office. 1910 8118 East India Station. 8123–8132 Admiralty. 8092–8195 Foreign Office. 8196 India Office. 1911 8214 East India Station. 8217–8222 Admiralty. 8254–8256 Foreign Office. 8257 India Office. 1912 8267 East India Station. 8271–8275 Admiralty. 8308–8309 Foreign Office. 8310 India Office. 1913 8325 East India Station. 8327–8335 Admiralty. 8355–8356 Foreign Office. 8357 India Office. Adm. 136 War Histories 1914–1918, vol. 7, Mesopotamia, 1914. Adm. 127 East India Station Records, 1903–1914, vols. 28 & 29; Persian Gulf Records, 1903–1914. Board of Trade Records, Public Record Office, London BT 11/3, File C/912b/09, Baghdad Railway (Gulf Section). British Construction and Control, 1909. BT 11/4, File C/5527/11, Baghdad Railway (Gulf Section). British Construction and Control, 1911. Cabinet Records, Public Record Office, London CAB 37 (memoranda). 1903 64–67 1904 68–73 1906 82–85 1907 86–90 1909 97–101 1910 102–104 1912 109–113 1913 114–117

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CAB 41 (Prime Minister’s letters to the King) 1903 28 1904 29 1906 30 nos. 37–83 1907 31 nos. 1–36 1909 32 nos. 1–44 1910 32 nos. 45–73 1912 33 nos. 34–75 1913 34

1905 1908 1911 1914

30 nos. 1–36 31 nos. 37–74 33 nos. 1–33 35

Committee of Imperial Defence Records, Public Record Office, London CAB 38 (memoranda, minutes, miscellaneous papers) 1903 2–3 1904 3–7 1905 8–10 1906 11–12 1907 13 1908 14 1909 15 1910 16 1911 17–19 1912 20–22 1913 23–25 1914 26–28 CAB 16 (Reports and Proceedings of Subcommittees). 4 June 1907, Military Requirements of the Empire as Affected by the Defence of India and the Soudan. 10 March 1908, The Baghdad Railway and the Persian Gulf. 15 May 1911, The Persian Gulf. CAB 27/1 15 June 1915, British Desiderata in Asia. Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, London General Correspondence 1903 FO 78/5263 Turkey Diplomatic Drafts. FO 78/5264–71 " Diplomatic Despatches. FO 78/5272 " Diplomatic Telegrams. FO 78/5274 " Consular Drafts. FO 78/5275 " Consular Despatches. FO 78/5276 " Commercial Drafts. FO 78/5277–8 " Commercial Despatches. F0 78/5322 " Baghdad Railway, 1903. FO 78/5324 " Navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, 1901–4. 1904 FO 78/5328

"

Diplomatic Drafts. [242]


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FO 78/5329–38 FO 78/5339 FO 78/5341 FO 78/5342 FO 78/5343 FO 78/5344–5

" " " " " "

Diplomatic Despatches. Diplomatic Telegrams. Consular Drafts. Consular Despatches. Commercial Drafts. Commercial Despatches.

1905 FO 78/5391 FO 78/5392–5400 FO 78/5401 FO 78/5403 FO 78/5405 FO 78/5406–7 FO 78/5449

" " " " " " "

FO 78/5461

"

FO 78/5462

"

Diplomatic Drafts. Diplomatic Despatches. Diplomatic Telegrams. Consular Drafts and Despatches. Commercial Drafts. Commercial Despatches. Asia Minor and the Baghdad Railway, 1905. Navigation of Tigris and Euphrates, 1904. Navigation of Tigris and Euphrates, 1905.

1906 FO 371/139–157 FO 368/57–59 FO 369/43–45

" " "

Political. Commercial. Consular.

1907 FO 371/340–356 " FO 368/132–135 " FO 369/105–107 " FO 371/309, 310, 312 Persia

Political. Commercial. Consular. Political (Mohammera Railway).

1908 FO 371/531–561 FO 368/226–231 FO 369/173–176 FO 371/503–4


Turkey " " Persia

[243]


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1909 FO 371/747–781 FO 368/334–339 FO 369/247–251 FO 371/713, 717

Turkey " " Persia


1910 FO 371/992–1017 Turkey Political. FO 368/464–476 " Commercial. FO 369/328–332 " Consular. FO 371/947, 951, 954 Persia Political (Mohammera Railway). 1911 FO 371/1228–1263 Turkey Political. FO 368/589–605 " Commercial. FO 369/413–417 " Consular. FO 371/1178, 1185–6 Persia Political (Mohammera Railway). 1912 FO 371/1481–1523 FO 368/589–605 FO 369/770–778 FO 371/1433–1445 1913 FO 371/1757–1848 FO 368/867–875 FO 369/626–631 FO 371/1706, 1709–13, 1725 1914 FO 371/2110–2147 FO 368/1135–1145 FO 369/770–778

Turkey " " Persia


Turkey " " Persia


Turkey Political. " Commercial. " Consular.

[244]


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FO 424 Confidential Print, Asiatic Turkey, PRO London 1903 205 1904 206 1905 208 1906 210 1907 212–3 1908 214–7 1909 219–221 1910 222–225 1911 226–9 1912 230–3 1913 237–240 FO 195 Consular and Embassy Files, Constantinople, PRO London 1903 2138–9 Correspondence with Baghdad and Basra. 2150 From Military Attaché. 2151–3 Miscellaneous Official Correspondence. 2154–5 Miscellaneous Private Correspondence. 1904

2163–4 2176 2177–8 2179–81

Correspondence with Baghdad and Basra. From Military Attaché. Miscellaneous Official Correspondence. Miscellaneous Private Correspondence.

1905

2188–9 2200 2201 2203–5


1906

2214–2216 2226 2227–9 2230–1


1907

2242–3 2256 2257–9 2260–2


1908

2275–6 2290 2291–3 2294–6


1909

2308–10 2319

Correspondence with Baghdad and Basra. Euphrates and Tigris Navigation. [245]


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2323 2324–5 2326–7

From Military Attaché. Miscellaneous Official Correspondence. Miscellaneous Private Correspondence.

1910

2338–41 2346 2353–4 2355–6


1911

2367–9 2378–9 2380

Correspondence with Baghdad and Basra. Miscellaneous Official Correspondence. Miscellaneous Private Correspondence.

1912 1913

Various files. 2449 2451 " 2453

File 18 Mesopotamian Oil Concession. File 147 Baghdad Railway. File 423 Basra Unrest. File 2196 Alleged British Intrigues in Mesopotamia.

FO 602 Basra Consulate Records, PRO, London 22 Arab Disturbances lower Tigris 1903–1908. 28 Registration of land belonging to Sheiks Mubarek and Khazal. India Office Records, Commonwealth Relations Office, London Home Correspondence Miscellaneous 1903 L/P & S/3 vols. 209–216. 1904 " " 217–225. 1905 " " 226–232. 1906 " " 233–239. 1907 " " 240–248. 1908 " " 249–258. 1909 " " 259–267. 1910 " " 268–275. 1911 " " 276–284. 1912 L/P & S/11 " 1–40.

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" "

" "

41–69. 70–86.

Gulf Records: Bushire R 15/1 1903–1914. Political and Secret Files Vol. File 56 1904/2764 (i) 57 1904/2764 (ii) 58 1904/2764 (iii) 59 1904/2764 (iv) 60 1904/2764 (v) 70 1905/370 77 1905/1290 87 1905/3131 88 1905/3531 117 160 162 177

1907/636 1908/3874 1909/757 1910/1702

188

1910/3846

212 246 271

1912/211 1912/930 1912/1808

272

1912/1846

300 301 316 332

1912/3877 (i) 1912/3877 (ii) 1912/4648 1913/240

333

1913/342

Subject Baghdad Railway, 1903–1907. " 1908–1910. " 1910–1912. " 1911–1912. " 1912–1914. Basra Consulate, 1905–1920. Oudh Bequest, 1904–1914. Mesopotamian Irrigation, 1905–1911. Mesopotamia; Navigation of Tigris and Euphrates; Mail Contact, 1904–1911. Baghdad Consulate: Mr. Gaskin, 1904–1928. Trans-Persian Railway, 1907–1911. Persian Gulf: Turkish Aggression, 1909–1911. Khoramabad-Mohammera Railway, 1910–1912. Mesopotamia: Baghdad Affairs, misc. [sic.], 1910–1912. Turkish Arabia: Summaries, 1912–1914. Mohammerah: Khoremabad Railway, 1912. Baghdad Railway; navigation of Tigris and Euphrates, 1912–1913. Turkey in Asia: Shatt-el-Arab Riverain Commission, 1912–1914. Turkey in Asia: Oil Concession, 1912–1913. Turkey in Asia: Oil Concession, 1913–1914. South Persian Railway Projects, 1912–1916. Mohammera: Khoramabad Railway, 1912–1913. Mesopotamia: E & TSNC; mail contract, 1912–1917. [247]


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380

1913/1584

382

1913/2073

399

1913/2977

410

1913/3654

414

1913/403

415

1913/404

462

1914/3136 (i)

463

1914/3136 (ii)

Mohammera: Khoramabad Railway, 1913–1914. Baghdad Railway: Navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, 1913. Baghdad Railway: Negotiations with Germany, 1913. Persia: Admiralty Oil Concession, 1913–1918. Baghdad Railway: Navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, 1914. Baghdad Railway: Negotiations with Germany, 1914. German War: Situation in Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, 1914. German War: Situation in Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, 1914.

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[258]

591 Mesopotamia 13 Appendices

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Biographical Appendix

Biographical The official positions occupied by many of the personalities who figure in the text has been noted only when they are first mentioned. This list is designed to clarify confusions likely to arise in the reader’s mind, particularly in regard to minor officials. The list is confined to those personalities whose names recur with some frequency. H. H. Asquith, later 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith (1852–1928), Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1905–1908, Prime Minister, 1908– 1916. P. Ashley (1876–1945), Staff Officer in the Commercial Dept., Board of Trade, 1907–1916. Sir H. Babington Smith (1863–1923), after 1909 Administrator of the National Bank of Turkey. Sir F. Bertie, later 1st Viscount Bertie of Thame (1844–1919), Ambassador in Rome, 1903–1905, Ambassador in Paris, 1905–1918. A. Block (1856–1914), British representative on the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. Sir E. Cassel (1852–1921), after 1909 Director of the National Bank of Turkey. Sir V. Chirol (1852–1929), Director of the Foreign Dept. of The Times, 1896–1912. Sir P. Z. Cox (1867–1937), Resident, Persian Gulf, 1904–1914. R. O. A. Crewe-Milnes, after 1911 1st Marquess of Crewe (1856–1945), Secretary of State for India, 1910–1915. F. E. Crow (1863–1939), Consul, Basra, 1903–1914. E. (after 1911 Sir E.) Crowe (1864–1925), Senior Clerk at the Foreign Office, 1906–1912, Asnt. Under-Sec., FO, 1912–1920. G. N. Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859–1925), Viceroy of India, 1899–1905. [259]


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W.K. D’Arcy (1849–1917), British petroleum speculator. G. J. M. K. Elliot, 4th Earl of Minto (1845–1914), Viceroy of India, 1905–1910. Sir W. E. Goschen (1847–1924), Ambassador at Vienna, 1905–1908, Ambassador at Berlin, 1908–1914. Sir E. Grey, later 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon (1862–1933), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1905–1916. A. von Gwinner (1856–1931), Director of the Deutsche Bank, President of the Anatolian Railway Company. C. Hardinge, after 1910 1st Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858–1944), Permanent Under-Secretary, FO, 1906–1910, Viceroy of India, 1910–1916. Sir A. Hirtzel (1870–1937), Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, 1903–1909. Sir T. Holderness (1849–1924), Permanent Under-Secretary, IO, 1912– 1919. R. von Kuhlmann (1873–1940), Counsellor at the German embassy, London, 1908–1914. R. C. Lindsay (1877–1945), Asnt. Private Secretary to Grey, 1908–1911. Sir H. Llewellyn Smith (1864–1945), Permanent Secretary at the Board of Trade, 1907–1919. J. G. Lorimer (1870–1914), Resident, Turkish Arabia, 1910–1914. Sir G. Lowther (1848–1916), Ambassador at Constantinople, 1908–1913. H. F. B. Lynch (1862–1913), senior partner in Lynch Bros., Liberal MP for West Riding Yorks, 1906–1910. Sir J. L. Mackay, 1st Earl Inchcape (1852–1932), member of the India Council, 1897–1911, Chairman of the Peninsular and Orient and the British India Steam Navigation companies. Sir I. Mallet (1864–1936), precis writer for Lansdowne, 1903–1905, Private Secretary to Grey, 1905–1907, Asnt. Under-Secretary, FO 1907–1913, Ambassador at Constantinople, 1913–1914. Sir C. M. Marling (1862–1933), Counsellor, Constantinople 1908–1913. R. P. Maxwell (1853–1928), Senior Clerk, FO, 1900–1913. J. Morley, after 1908 Viscount Morley of Blackburn (1828–1923), Secretary of State for India, 1905–1910. L. S. Newmarch (1879–1930), Resident, Turkish Arabia, 1902–1906. Sir A. Nicolson, later 1st Baron Carnock (1849–1928), Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 1906–1910, Permanent Under-Secretary, FO 1910–1916. [260]


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BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

H. C. Norman (1872–1955), 1st Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, 1907–1914. Sir N. R. O’Conor (1843–1908), Ambassador at Constantinople, 1898–1908. A. Parker (1877–1951), Junior Clerk, FO, 1906–1912, Asnt. Clerk, FO 1912–1917. H. Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne (1845–1927), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1900–1905. J. Ramsay (1862–1942), Resident, Turkish Arabia, 1907–1910. Sir R. T. Ritchie (1854–1912), Secretary to the Political Dept. of the IO 1902–1910, Permanent Under-Secretary, IO, 1910–1912. Vice-Admiral E. J. W. Slade (1859–1923), C. in C. East Indies, 1909–1912, later attached to Admiralty staff in London. G. J. Stanley (1852–1931), Asnt. Secretary, Commercial Dept., Board of Trade, 1909–1918. W. Tyrrell, later 1st Baron Tyrrell of Avon (1886–1947), Private Secretary to Grey 1907–1915. Sir W. Willcocks (1852–1932), irrigation engineer.

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Index

A Abadan 222, 224–5 Admiralty 39, 40, 54, 56, 118, 157–8, 225 Akaba as railway terminus 198–9 crisis (1906) 41 Anglo-Persian Oil Company 190 Arabs see Native population Ashley, P. 112, 116 B Babington Smith, H. 93, 114, 112, 127 Baghdad British residency at 2, 9, 11, 108 British trade via 7, 40, 100, 188 Baghdad Railway Anglo-German agreement 149 as threat to India 5, 40 British policy (1901–3) 5–6 British policy (1903) 23–30 British policy (1907) 59–63 British policy (1910) 112–4 British policy (1914) 169–74 German concession (1903) 5, 23, 25, 59 kilometric guarantees 79–80, 118, 130–1 rate convention (1914) 192–3 Turco-German convention 149, 154 Baghdad Railway Committee (1907) 58–63 Barrow, E. 221, 224, 226 Basra as railway terminus 208–9 British consulate at 2, 9, 11, 108 British trade via 42, 50, 104, 188 disturbances in 199–200 Bell, G. 51, 66, 202 Black, C. 198–9

Block, A. 59, 66, 76, 80 Board of Trade 44–5, 57–9, 88, 94–5, 112–4, 139, 169–70 C Cassel-Gwinner negotiations (1909) 112–114 Chesney, J. 3–4, 85 Churchill, W. 11, 20, 157, 224–5 Clarke, G. 39, 41, 49, 55, 58–61 Committee of Imperial Defence 3, 11, 41, 55–6, 59, 89, 138, 156 Cox, P. 39, 48, 61 Crow, F. 20, 42, 60–61 criticism of 12, 205 D D’Arcy, W.

45, 51, 118, 191–2

E Euphrates & Tigris Steam Navigation Company 7, 43–4, 118–20, 194–5 F Fitzmaurice, E. 76, 90, 97, 109 Foreign Office 23, 28, 44, 51, 59, 71, 78, 83, 90–95, 110–118 predominant influence on policy 133–9, 159–61, 203–4, 237–8 France 23, 51, 78, 83, 111–8 influence on British policy 38–9, 170–1 G Germany 40–41, 71–8, 111–3, 154, 159–60 Government of India 44, 63, 83, 158–9 influence on policy 138–9, 179–80 Grey, E. 11, 13, 19, 37, 41, 44, 55–9, 64, 71–6, 95–6, 177–9 [263]


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B R I T I S H P O L I C Y I N M E S O P OTA M I A , 1 9 0 3 – 1 9 1 4 influence on policy 87–91, 138–9, 207–8 Gwinner, A. 5, 30, 76, 95, 110–12 H Hamadieh Steam Navigation Company 44, 119 Hardinge, C. 11, 12, 19, 41–2, 45, 55, 59, 64, 119 influence on policy 136, 207–8 Hindiyah Barrage 45, 120, 130, 189 Hirtzel, A. 12, 96, 112, 141, 205, 227 I Ibn Saud 180, 198, 202 I.E.F. ‘D’ 221–234 Inchcape 67, 102, 195–6, 202 India importance of 3, 160–1 Muslim inhabitants of 186 threatened by Baghdad Railway 3, 15, 91 India Office 11, 57 influence on policy 138–9, 178, 204–5 Irrigation schemes 85, 189–90 K Kuwait

4, 23, 29, 52, 208–9

L Lansdowne 11, 19, 20–24, 36–40, 54–60 Law, E. 61, 67, 129 Lindsay, R. 77, 97 Llewellyn Smith, S. 93, 96, 112, 141, 176, 204 Lloyd, G. 44, 50, 101, 135 Lorimer, J. 12, 20, 54, 201, 206 Lowther, G. 11, 19, 71 criticism of 137, 206 Lynch, H. 7, 16, 39, 109, 119–20 distrust of 194–5 M Mackenzie, G. 44, 50, 61, 119 Mallet, L. 11, 19, 85–6, 207 Marling, C. 88, 102 Maunsell, A. 12, 45, 54, 61, 82 Maxwell, R. 60, 66

Mediterranean 3 realignment of British forces in (1912) 157 Mesopotamia Britain rejects partition of 178–80, 206 British political privileges 7 British trade in 6, 45 commercial potential 2, 5 geographical term 1 military action considered in 41, 155–9 Ottoman government of 8–9, 199–200 strategic importance of 3–4 Mesoptamian Railways Committee (1909) 91–5 Minto 11, 19 influence on policy 138–9 Mohammera Railway 81–4, 88 Morley, J. 11, 19, 30, 41, 53 influence on policy 57, 138–40 Mosul 45, 188, 212 N Native population 41, 108, 199–202, 225–8 Newmarch, T. 11, 54, 61 criticism of 136, 144 Nicolson, A. 11, 19, 77 influence on policy 169–70, 207–8 O O’Conor, N. 11, 29, 36, 41, 44–6, 53–6 Oudh Bequest 8, 197 P Parker, A. 12, 55, 59–60, 144 influence on policy 207 Pearsons & Sons 45 Persia petroleum in 190–1 railways in 84–5, 88, 128 Persian Gulf importance of 3–4, 77–8, 172–5 possible site of German naval base 42, 209–10 Petroleum 45, 118–9, 190–2, 224–5 Potsdam agreement (1910) 152–3, 198

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INDEX R Ramsay, J. 12, 46, 61, 85, 88, 90, 94, 108–9, 135 Revelstoke 5, 29 Russia 113–8 influence on British policy 37, 75–7, 159–60, 170–1, 208 S Seyid Talib 199–200, 227 Shakespear, W.H.I. 199, 223 Slade, E. 157, 208–9 Smythe, H. 53, 58, 64, 86, 228 Stanley, G. 88, 141 T Tigris, navigation of British concession 6–15, 41, 55, 118–20 British monopoly recognised 193–7 relative merits of 85–6, 134–5 Tigris Valley Railway 71–2, 84–96, 112–3 abandoned 172–3 W War Office 40–1, 54, 56, 204 Willcocks, W. 45, 51, 54, 81, 84–96 criticism of 211 Willcocks railway scheme 81–2, 84–6 Y Yate, W. 100 Young, W. 12, 45 criticism of 206 Young Turk Revolution (1908) effect on Baghdad 108

9, 79, 92

[265]

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