Britain and Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia 1945-1949 (LSE)

Britain and Regional Cooperation in SouthEast Asia, 1945–49 Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945–...

Author: Tilman Remme

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Britain and Regional Cooperation in SouthEast Asia, 1945–49

Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, 1945–49 traces plans by the British Foreign Office to establish an inter-national regional system in South-East Asia, that would allow Britain to dominate the region politically, economically and militarily. Tilman Remme explores the changing emphasis of Britain’s regional policies, from plans in 1945 for cooperation with other colonial powers to the aim of drawing India and other fledgling Asian states into a Singapore-based regional organisation. Dr Remme examines the effects of nationalism and of the colonial wars in Vietnam and Indonesia, as well as competing regional initiatives by India, Australia and the United Nations which threatened British dominance in the region. He further shows how, after the Malayan Emergency of 1948, regional cooperation became Britain’s key strategy to contain communism in Asia. By tracing Britain’s foreign policy initiatives, Tilman Remme puts the issues affecting South-East Asia in the postwar period into a wider context, discussing events in the light of the sudden Japanese defeat in the Second World War, the transfer of power in India, the communist struggle for supremacy in China, the development of Anglo-American relations in Asia and the beginnings of the Cold War. Tilman Remme is a writer and producer of historical and political television documentaries. Books published under the joint imprint of LSE/Routledge are works of high academic merit approved by the Publications Committee of the London School of Economics and Political Science. These publications are drawn from the wide range of academic studies in the social sciences for which the LSE has an international reputation.

Britain and Regional Cooperation in SouthEast Asia, 1945– 49

Tilman Remme

London and New York

First published 1995 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1995 Tilman Remme All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-97353-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-09753-3 (Print Edition)

Contents

Acknowledgements

vi

List of abbreviations

vii

Introduction

1

Part I Return to South-East Asia 1

Wartime planning and diplomacy

9

2

The dilemma of peace in South-East Asia

27

3

‘Famine averted’: the Special Commission in Singapore

43

4

Regional cooperation and regional defence

53

Part II Asian nationalism 5

India, Vietnam and the limits of colonial cooperation

65

6

Singapore and the ‘radiation of British influence’

79

7

Regional competition: India and Australia

93

8

Regional competition: the United Nations and ECAFE

103

9

Western Union and South-East Asia

117

Part III Communism 10

Cold War and Commonwealth

129

11

Enter the dragon: South-East Asia and the Chinese civil war

147

12

Regional cooperation and regional containment

159

13

The final stages of regional planning

177

v

14

To Colombo and beyond

193

Notes

209

Bibliography

239

Index

247

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to the British Council, whose financial support from 1985 to 1988 enabled me to research and write the thesis on which this book is based. I would also like to thank Dr Alan Sked of the London School of Economics for his help, advice and guidance. Further-more, I would like to thank Professor Ralph B.Smith and the members of his special seminar on South-East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies for their helpful advice and criticism, and for giving me the opportunity to present some of the ideas developed in my thesis. I would also like to thank Edward Lucas, the late Dr Roger Bullen, Dr Richard Aldrich, Dr Taka Tanaka, Dr Michael Leiffer, Shams Ul-Alam, Professor Peter Lowe and Professor Ian Nish for their advice and encouragement and for giving me inspiration. Thanks also to the staff at the LSE’s International History Department and at the Public Record Office in Kew. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Ernst Nolte, Professor Michael Erbe and the late Professor Hellmut Becker for their support during the preparation of this project. This book is dedicated to my wife Fiona, without whom it would never have come about.

Abbreviations

AFPFL ALFSEA ANZAM ANZUS BO CO COS CRO DO DRV ECAFE ECE ECOSOC FO IEFC IO JIG JPS MPU NATO OEEC PHP PRO

anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, Burma Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia Informal defence agreement between Britain, Australia and New Zealand in South-East Asia Burma Office Colonial Office Chiefs of Staff Commonwealth Relations Office Dominions Office Democratic Republic of Vietnam Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Foreign Office International Emergency Food Council India Office Joint Intelligence Committee, Chiefs of Staff Joint Planning Staff Malayan Planning Unit North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Post-Hostilities Planning Staff Public Record Office

viii

PUSC RAAF SACSEA SEAC UMNO UNRRA WO

Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee, Foreign Office Royal Australian Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia South-East Asia Command United Malay National Organisation United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration War Office

ix

South-East Asia in the 1950s Source: John Bartholomew & Son, 1958. Published by The Times Publishing Company Ltd., 1958.

x

Introduction

On 8 January 1950, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, arrived in the Ceylonese capital of Colombo to attend the first Commonwealth conference ever to be held on Asian soil. The British had asked the Ceylonese government at very short notice to convene the week-long meeting. The official purpose was to discuss foreign policy issues of mutual concern. However, there was one topic that the British were particularly concerned about: the rapid spread of communism in the Far East. For eighteen months now, communist forces had been threatening British interests in eastern Asia. In Malaya—a highly lucrative British possession because of her dollar-earning rubber exports to the United States—groups of communist insurgents were conducting a destructive guerrilla campaign against British plantations and installations. Burma and Indonesia, too, were affected by com-munist strife, while in Indochina the French were waging a fullscale war against the communist-dominated Viet Minh. Most worrying, from the British point of view, was the fact that China had only recently been ‘lost’ to the communists, jeopardising British trading interests in the country and threatening to export Chinese-style revolutions to the rest of Asia. By the end of 1949, the British had decided to regard Asian communism not in isolation, but as a regional problem. London feared that if the rice-exporting countries of French Indochina, Thailand and Burma were going to fall to communist forces loyal to Moscow or Peking, the result would be food shortages and widespread unrest in the rice-importing countries of SouthEast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. To counter this trend, the British believed that, similar to the provision of Marshall aid in Europe, the non-communist governments of South and South East Asia should be granted Western aid and financial assistance that would help to stabilise the economies of the region. The finance for this could only be provided by the United States, but the Americans could only be convinced if the original initiative came from

2 BRITAIN AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

the Asian countries themselves. At the Colombo Conference, the British thus encouraged the Asian members of the Commonwealth to propose the establishment of an international plan for ‘mutual self-help’ and for the economic development of Asia. The Colombo proposals paved the way for the Colombo Plan, an aggregate for the provision of bilateral aid to South and South-East Asia, which eventually included some twenty-three Asian and Western countries from inside and outside the Com-monwealth. Between 1950 and 1961, the Colombo Plan channelled almost 10 billion dollars of bilateral aid and assistance to the noncommunist countries of South and South-East Asia. The bulk of this assistance was provided by the United States. When I started the initial research for this book, my intention was to examine the development and achievements of the Col-ombo Plan during the 1950s. Instead, I ended up tracing its origins. The Colombo Conference was in fact the culmination of years of interdepartmental planning at the British Foreign and Colonial offices. It was based on a policy which British officials in Whitehall and in South-East Asia referred to as ‘regional cooperation’. The notion of regional cooperation in South-East Asia first appeared in a British cabinet paper drafted by the Colonial Office in December 1944. However, London dropped the paper, which formed part of protracted Anglo-American negotiations on the future of colonial empires, following the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The reasons for this were first outlined by William Roger Louis in his book Imperialism at Bay. This book picks up the thread in the second half of 1945, when the British Foreign Office developed new regional pro-posals for South-East Asia. The department’s somewhat vague idea was to use the British-led South-East Asia Command (SEAC) under Lord Louis Mountbatten as the basis for a Britishdominated international organisation in South-East Asia. Immediately after the war, SEAC was in temporary control of Thailand as well as of the British, French and Dutch colonies in the region. By implication, the Foreign Office hoped that a regional organisation would maintain a maximum degree of British influence in the area after the return to civilian rule. Yet it wasn’t until 1950 that the Foreign Office’s plans came to fruition. Throughout this period, the general aim of the Foreign Office’s regional policy was to establish a South-East Asian regional organisation under British leadership that would provide for international cooperation at the economic and poli-tical levels. Eventually, this might also lead to a regional defence arrangement in South-East Asia. Through such an organisation the British hoped to

INTRODUCTION 3

maintain and extend the regional hegemony of South-East Asia which they enjoyed immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945. However, while the underlying aim of Britain’s policy of regional coope-ration remained the same until 1950, the means of achieving it underwent some fundamental changes. Britain’s regional plans were affected by a number of key historical factors in Asia. First, there was the unexpectedly difficult task of postwar relief and administration in South-East Asia. The war had ended much sooner than anticipated, and Mountbatten’s command had at the last minute been given responsibility for a much larger area than originally planned. Apart from the volatile political situa-tion in the various South-East Asian territories, the British also had to deal with widespread food shortages resulting from wartime mismanagement and destruction. Due to a shortage of rice, South-East Asia was even facing a famine by February 1946. To alleviate the rice crisis, Britain established the so-called Special Commission in Singapore. Its main function was to organise the international allocation and distribution of food in South-East Asia, through regular meetings of international liaison officers sent by the various countries in the region. Though the Special Commission was a Foreign Office body under the direction of Lord Killearn, it was also the first organisation in South-East Asia ever to organise regional cooperation at the ‘technical’ level. In the long run, the Foreign Office hoped to develop the Special Commission as the nucleus for a wider regional commission. Another key factor affecting the Foreign Office’s regional policy was the rapid advance of Asian nationalism in South and South-East Asia, and the transfer of power in India in August 1947. Under its impact the Foreign Office enlarged the geogra-phical scope of its planned regional scheme, aiming to include India, Pakistan and Ceylon in a British-led regional system with its centre in Singapore. The outbreak of the internationally unpopular war in French Indochina served as a catalyst for the formulation of the Foreign Office’s new regional concept. However, the further effect of Asian nationalism was that it encour-aged the idea in Asia of establishing exclusively Asian regional alignments. This goal was first pursued by India during the 1947 Asian Relations Conference. In its wake, the United Nations and Australia too emerged as competitors to Britain, vying for the lead in organising regional cooperation. Despite the redefinition of the Foreign Office’s regional policies at the beginning of 1947, Asian nationalism thus had a highly detrimental effect on London’s plans. At the same time, Britain’s increasing financial weakness severely jeopardised the Foreign Office’s


plans to turn the Special Commission in Singapore into an international regional commission. Finally, Britain’s regional policy was fundamentally affected by the shift of the Cold War to South-East Asia. In 1948, after the beginning of the Malayan Emergency and a series of communist victories in China, the Foreign Office revived its by now flagging regional plans. Regional cooperation became one of the Foreign Office’s prime strategies in containing communism. London’s plans culminated in the Colombo Con-ference and the subsequent Colombo Plan. Throughout the period between 1945 and 1950, regional cooperation remained primarily a Foreign Office policy. The department even had to fight a series of bureaucratic battles with the Colonial Office over the issue, the latter fearing that regional cooperation was synonymous with international interference in the affairs of Britain’s colonial territories. Within the Foreign Office, it was Esler Dening, Mountbatten’s political adviser during the war and subsequently Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who was the leading architect of British regional policies in South-East Asia. The regional idea originated with him in 1945; he also seems to have been the main author of the 1949 cabinet paper that led to the Colombo Conference. Lord Killearn, Britain’s Special Commissioner in Singapore, also had considerable influence on the Foreign Office’s plans for SouthEast Asia. He was enthusiastic about the idea of a Singaporecentred regional arrangement that might eventually include East, South and South-East Asia. His was also the idea of progressing empirically from technical to wider regional cooperation through his Special Commission. The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, on the other hand, was less involved in the formulation of his department’s regional plans. However, at times he too played a crucial role. It was at his initiative that the government went ahead with Lord Killearn’s appointment as Special Commissioner after the extent of the rice crisis had become fully apparent in February 1946. In 1948 and 1949 he was also instrumental in carrying his department’s regional policies through the cabinet. However, his own ideas on regional coope-ration were sometimes inconsistent with those of his department. During the 1946 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, for example, Bevin suggested turning the Special Commission into a proper regional commission that would include Australia. This was done without previous departmental consultation and caused great confusion at both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. Another example was Bevin’s reference to the resources of the European colonies in his speech on Western Union in January 1948. It led to

INTRODUCTION 5

Asian accusations of a European conspiracy in South-East Asia and contradicted Foreign Office plans for cooperation with the new Asian states. Finally, a word on the geographic terminology used in this book. In line with modern historiography, ‘Thailand’ rather than ‘Siam’ is employed. Equally, Indonesia’ refers to the Dutch East Indies after September 1945. However, rather than speaking of only Vietnam, the term ‘Indochina’ or ‘French Indochina’ has sometimes been used in reference to all the French colonies in South-East Asia, which included Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The term ‘South-East Asia’ has been the cause of some confusion: it only came into fashion after the creation of SEAC in 1943 and it originally included Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya (including Singapore and North Borneo) and Indonesia. By 1949, in line with Britain’s growing interest in regional cooperation with the United States, Washington’s former colony, the Philippines, was added to Whitehall’s definition of South-East Asia. This slightly broader definition is indeed in line with the one applied in this book. It should, however, be noted that in 1949 some British officials were beginning to include South Asia (i.e. India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nepal, Tibet and Afghanistan) in the definition of South-East Asia, reflecting the new British tendency towards a Singapore-rather than Delhi-centred view of South and South-East Asia. Further confusion is caused by the term ‘Far East’. At the time, it could describe anything from East Asia (i.e. China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea and Japan) to the whole of South, South-East and East Asia. Where the term is used in this book, it refers to East and South-Ea st Asia.

6

Part I

Return to South-East Asia

8

Chapter 1 Wartime planning and diplomacy

On 26 July 1945 King George VI asked Clement Attlee, the leader of the British Labour Party, to form a new government in Britain. Unexpectedly, Labour had won a landslide victory in the country’s first general election since the end of the war against Germany. Attlee and his party had won on a ticket that promised the British electorate both prosperity and social reforms, includ-ing the establishment of a national insurance system and a national health service and the provision of a costly housing programme. Foreign affairs had only played a secondary role during the campaign. Yet it was Britain’s taxing international commitments and responsibilities at a time of severe financial weakness that were to present the most serious challenge to the new government. When Labour came to power in 1945, the geographical extent of Britain’s power and influence had never been greater. Her empire stretched from Africa and the Middle East via the Indian subcontinent to the Far East and the Pacific, where the war with Japan was drawing to a close. In Europe, she was responsible for the administration and postwar order of a large part of defeated Germany. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, British troops were also put in charge of large parts of South-East Asia, including Thailand and the Dutch and French colonies in Indonesia and Indochina. Yet Britain found it increasingly difficult to shoulder her international commitments. In Germany, the British had to feed the undernourished population in the country’s devastated industrial heartland, the Ruhr area, which was part of the British occupational zone. In war-torn South-East Asia, too, the British soon faced the prospect of widespread famine. In addition to these costly humanitarian obligations, Britain was facing nationalist turmoil and unrest in Palestine, India and Burma, preventing the country from scaling down her defence expenditure to prewar levels. Added to this was the growing conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe and the


Middle East which demanded continuous vigilance and high defence spending. Even six months after the Japanese surrender, Britain had more than two million troops under arms who were spread across the globe, and her defence expenditure for 1946 was estimated at about 2 billion pounds, compared to the govern-ment’s long-term target of 500 million pounds.1 Attlee’s main problem was that the country he had come to lead was close to bankruptcy as a result of the war. Britain had entered the war with debts of just under 500 million pounds, a burden that had been offset by massive reserves of gold and dollars, and by substantial foreign investments. By 1945, most of these reserves had all but disappeared, and the country’s debts had spiralled to 3.5 billion pounds. At the same time, Britain’s manufacturing industry was becoming increasingly obsoletegeared to producing war materials rather than the consumer goods now wanted by the British population. Traditional sources of invisible income, such as banking, insurance and shipping, had also suffered greatly because of the war.2 It soon emerged that Britain’s economic weakness would have a significant effect on her standing as a world power, in particular vis-à-vis the United States, which had emerged from the war as the most powerful nation on earth. Since 1941, the lend-lease agreement with the United States had allowed Britain to import both consumer goods and arms from America while deferring payment to a later date. However, after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, President Truman suddenly cancelled the agree-ment, exposing Britain’s dependence on American financial support. Unable to purchase vital American imports, the British had to accept an American loan of 3.75 billion dollars which had certain strings attached. Though the interest was low, the loan was linked to a British promise to eventually dismantle the system of imperial trade preferences and to make sterling fully convertible. Sooner or later, Britain would thus have to open up her colonial empire to powerful commercial competition from the United States. Not only was Britain effectively broke in 1945, but her tra-ditional markets in the Commonwealth were under pressure from the outside. The new Labour government was also con-fronted with strong secessionist forces at the heart of its empire, India, where the political situation had been fundamentally transformed by the war. Britain had taken India into the war without consulting any of the Indian nationalist leaders. As a result, the Hindu-dominated Indian Congress Party under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had organised the powerful ‘Quit India’ campaign directed against British rule. The

WARTIME PLANNING AND DIPLOMACY 11

movement was forcibly suppressed for the duration of the war, but when the interned Congress leaders were released in the summer of 1945, Attlee and his ministers lacked the stomach to put up with a new civil disobedience campaign in the country.3 Unlike the Conservatives, the Labour Party was at least morally committed to eventual Indian independence,4 though the new government was hoping that India would maintain strong economic and military ties with Britain.5 Soon, the question was no longer if but when and under what circumstances India would be given independence, in particular whether demands by the Indian Muslim League for a separate Muslim-dominated Pakistan would be met. The Labour government reacted to the changed international realities with considerable flexibility. Many politicians and government officials sensed that Britain’s influence in the world was on the wane and that the future of the Empire was by no means certain. Under the pressure of events, it was often decided to withdraw where Britain’s position had become untenable. Within two years, Britain handed over power in India and Burma, and decided to abandoned her mandate in Palestine. However, both in Africa6 and in other parts of Asia, Attlee and his ministers had no intention of giving up power. In China and South-East Asia, the British made every effort to re-establish their prewar position, in particular in the trading centres of Hong Kong and Singapore, and in the prize colony of Malaya. In fact, while the British were preparing to withdraw from India, South-East Asia assumed increasing importance in British thinking. Singapore, not Delhi, soon became the focus of British power east of Suez. As will be seen, London was hoping to use Singapore as the ‘centre for the radiation of British influence’ in the region, laying the foundation for continuing British hegemony in both South and SouthEast Asia after the com-pletion of European decolonisation. The British called their ambitious new policy ‘Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia’. Prior to the Second World War, the British had tended to underestimate the importance of South-East Asia, both for the security of their empire and for Britain’s worldwide trade. As a Foreign Office paper pointed out in 1946, South-East Asia, before the war, had been regarded as an ‘unimportant and little-known area’; only the war had demonstrated its political, economic and strategic importance.7 The region’s prewar trade with Britain had in fact been considerable. SouthEast Asia’s main products were rubber, tin and rice, as well as sugar, tobacco, tea and palm oil. The region took up 9.5 per cent of Britain’s


total prewar exports and provided 6.5 per cent of British imports.8 British investments in the region, including the Philippines, were equally significant, amounting to about 775 million dollars before the war, nearly three times as much as those of the United States in the area. More than half of Britain’s investments were in her possessions in Burma, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, though considerable assets also existed in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.9 Malaya played a particularly important role in Britain’s trade with South-East Asia. It was one of the world’s largest producers of rubber, the bulk of which was exported to North America. These exports provided Britain with some of the dollars needed to finance her increasing trade deficit with the United States. When, after the war, the triangular trade pattern between Britain, Malaya and the United States was resumed, Malaya provided the British with dollar earnings worth 60 million pounds in 1948, an income that London considered to be vital for the British economy.10 The fall of Singapore to the Japanese on 15 February 1942 emphasised South-East Asia’s enormous strategic importance for the British Empire and Commonwealth. Not only was the region the western gateway to China and Japan. It was also the last natural defence before the Japanese or any other eastern invader could reach India, as well as the last major obstacle on the way to Australia. After the Japanese captured the remaining Western colonies in South-East Asia, the British were forced to retreat to the line west of Burma. All Western trade with the area was completely cut off, adding to Britain’s wartime shortages, and depriving her of vital dollar earnings. Throughout the war, the British remained determined to reconquer their lost territories from the Japanese in order to resume their prewar position in the region as well as their lucrative trade with Malaya and Burma. Back in London, officials in Whitehall were soon beginning to draft blueprints for the postwar administration of their former South-East Asian colonies. Completely cut off from South-East Asia, they paid little attention to the possibility that Britain’s prestige had suffered greatly as a result of the fall of Singapore, and that the war might have fundamentally altered the political situation in the region (see Chapter 2). By the time that the Attlee government came to power, British planning for the future of Burma was in its most advanced state. Having gone on the offensive at the end of 1944, the British-led South-East Asia Command (SEAC) under Lord Louis Mountbatten had recaptured the Burmese capital of Rangoon on 1 May 1945. Soon after, the Churchill government had published a White Paper on the future of


Burma. The paper cautiously mentioned the ultimate goal of granting Burma self-government and dominion status; however, during an interim period of three years the returning British Governor of Burma would be given sweeping administrative powers.11 The White Paper reversed some of the concessions made to Burmese nationalists in the 1935 Government of Burma Act, which gave the Burmese a limited say in their country’s government. Critics argued that all that London was interested in was the restoration of British com-mercial interests in the country: before the war, Britain had investments worth about 200 million dollars in Burma—the Burmah Oil Company being one of the most important British investors.12 As will be seen, the attempted implementation of the policies outlined in the White Paper was to result in a massive disobedience campaign by Burmese nationalists in 1946. Coinciding with the Burma White Paper, planning for the postwar administration of Malaya was entering its final stages. Under the watchful eye of the Colonial Office, a special Malayan Planning Unit (MPU) under General Ralph Hone had spent the previous two years drafting a streamlined new constitution that would merge the federated and unfederated Malayan States, as well as Penang and Malacca, into a single British colony, the Malayan Union. The aim was to create a unitary state embracing the whole Malayan peninsula with a citizenshipscheme appli cable to Malays, Chinese and Indians alike, and to prepare the country for eventual self-rule.14 Although Singapore would remain a separate colony, a Governor-General would be appointed who would control the British administrations in the area as well as coordinate British policies throughout the Malayan Union, Singapore and Borneo. In great secrecy, the MPU’s recommendations had on 31 May 1944 been given provi-sional approval by the war cabinet.15 After the war, London’s policies were to run into considerable trouble, as the Malay sultans were required to surrender even more of their remaining sovereignty to the British Crown. Planning on the future of the non-British territories in SouthEast Asia fell to the Foreign Office. Like the rest of Whitehall, the Foreign Office, which was largely detached from the events in South-East Asia, assumed that Britain and the other European powers would be able to continue where they had left off in 1942. Apart from this, the department had given the future of the region relatively little thought. It expected French and Dutch rule to be restored in Vietnam and Indonesia, failing to take into account that the European defeat in 1942 might have fundamentally shaken the basis of colonial rule in Asia. So far as Indonesia was concerned, the British, like their Dutch and


American counterparts, were almost completely unaware of the extent of the nationalist fervour that the Japanese had fostered in the country during the occupation.16 Britain’s commitment to the restoration of Dutch sovereignty was expressed in a civil affairs agreement with the Dutch, which came into power immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945. It gave the Dutch wide-ranging administrative powers during the Allied occupa-tion and was to be followed by the swift reestablishment of Dutch colonial rule.17 In Indochina, too, the British failed to anticipate the strong nationalist feelings generated by the war, expecting the French to swiftly regain control of their colony after a Japanese defeat. The case was, however, complicated by the fact that the American President, Franklin D.Roosevelt, wanted to prevent the French from returning to Indochina. Instead, he wanted to place the colony under international trusteeship. Roosevelt was particu-larly critical of the fact that for most of the war the French colonial administrators in Indochina had openly collaborated with the Japanese troops in the country, similar to the Vichy regime’s collaboration with the Germans in France: it was only in March 1945 that the Japanese arrested all French personnel in Indochina to take complete control of the country. However, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, vehemently opposed Roosevelt’s ideas: twice in 1944 the war cabinet endorsed pro-posals by the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, that France should be allowed to return to Indochina.18 As one senior Foreign Office official wrote at the end of 1944, the British believed in ‘the colonial powers sticking together in the Far East’.19 In Thailand, as well, the British were aiming to restore the status quo ante. Before the war, the bulk of Western investments in the country had been British, and London wanted to reimpose Britain’s dominant prewar position. But again differences with the Americans came into play. As the Foreign Office admitted in a policy paper of July 1945, the Thai question was by no means straightforward: under Japanese pressure, the Thais had in 1941 ‘flung themselves into the arms’ of Japan and were now in a state of war with Britain. The paper recommended pressuring the Thais into an agreement with Britain which provided for the delivery of 1.5 million tons of free rice. Furthermore, Thailand was to be forced into a close defence relationship with Britain, allowing the latter to deploy troops in Thailand during times of war. However, the problem was that the Americans did not regard themselves as at war with Thailand, and they were bound to


sympathise with the new Thai government that had succeeded the collaborationist government of Luang Pibul from 1941.20 Anglo-American differences over the future of Thailand and Indochina were in fact part of a much wider debate between Washington and London on the future of the European colonial empires after the war. Ever since Churchill’s attempts in 1940 and 1941 to draw the United States into the war against the Axis powers, the Americans had been pressing for greater economic access to the European colonies in Africa and Asia. At the same time, Washington saw itself as the champion of national inde-pendence movements throughout the world. In August 1941, Churchill and Roosevelt had signed the Atlantic Charter, which in its third article declared respect for ‘the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live’. Though Churchill publicly maintained that this did not affect developments inside the Commonwealth,21 the charter triggered a debate between London and Washington about the future of colonial empires that would continue until the end of the war. The Anglo-American dispute over the future of the Western colonies reached a high point in March 1943, when Washington handed a paper titled ‘National Independence’ to the British. It demanded that all colonial powers, including Britain, should prepare their colonial territories for self-government and eventual independence. As a first step, after the end of the war, all colonies should be opened up to international supervision. At the same time, the colonial powers would collaborate through a number of international regional commissions. In addition, an international trusteeship administration should be set up in order to prepare all dependent peoples for independence. The American draft instantly set the alarm bells ringing in Whitehall. While the tone of the document was enough to upset the guardians of the British Commonwealth in Whitehall, London regarded the two emotive terms ‘independence’ and ‘interna-tional supervision’ as completely unacceptable, the latter being implicit in the American understanding of international trusteeship.22 To regain the initiative in an increasingly heated debate with Washington, the British decided to make a unilateral statement lest the Americans try to force them into unacceptable commit-ments.23 The Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, told the House of Commons on 13 July 1943 that it was Britain’s policy to keep sole responsibility for her colonies. But he welcomed greater international cooperation in colonial areas:


[He had in mind] the possibility of establishing certain Commissions for certain regions. These Commissions would comprise not only the States with Colonial territories in the region, but also other States which have in the region a major strategic or economic interest. While each State would remain responsible for the administration of its own territory, such a Commission would provide effective and permanent mach-inery for consultation and collaboration so that the States concerned might work together to promote the well-being of the Colonial territories. An important consideration in designing the machinery of each Commission will be to give to the people of the Colonial territories in the region an opportunity to be associated with its work…. In this way it would be possible to have international cooperation which consisted of something more than theoretical discussion but would be able to grapple with realities and get down to the solution of individual problems.24 Stanley’s statement was little more than a tactical move to publicly dissipate the American initiative on colonial policy. It picked up the least important part of the American proposal, namely the creation of regional commissions in colonial areas, yet dropped the idea of international supervision and colonial independence which was at the centre of the American declara-tion. Stanley’s regional commissions would nominally involve the United States in European colonial affairs while the colonial powers would remain in complete control of colonial develop-ments. A precedent existed in the Anglo-American commission in the Caribbean. The organisation had recently been established after Britain had allowed the United States to lease a number of air and naval bases in her Caribbean dependencies, and it was meant to provide for bilateral cooperation towards the economic and social development of the British and American possessions in the Caribbean.25 However, the commission had no executive powers, only consultative functions restricted to dealing with general economic, social welfare and health matters.26 It is doubtful whether Stanley would ever have followed up his regional ideas if it had not been for renewed international pressure for the international supervision of colonial territories. In January 1944, Australia and New Zealand picked up the regional idea in a bilateral agreement in which the two countries effectively demanded a greater say in international planning for the postwar world. The agreement included proposals for the creation of a South Seas regional commission


in which Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, the United States and France would be represented. The commission would have advisory powers, enabling it to recommend arrangements for the participation of natives in colonial administration, with a view to promoting the ultimate aim of self-government. It would also advise on econ-omic development, on the coordination of health and medical services, and on education. The Australian-New Zealand sugges-tions were ‘based on the doctrine of trusteeship’, the term so disliked in London.27 The Australian-New Zealand agreement forced Stanley to formulate his regional ideas in greater detail. Stanley opposed recent American plans for a central international commission with supervisory powers for colonial territories. Instead, he suggested to the cabinet that they should ‘make the idea of international regional associations our main contribution to the solution of Colonial questions’. The commissions he had in mind would have no executive functions, and there would be ‘opportunities for participation by the people of the region’ without obliging Britain to accept some particular form of association. Defence would be excluded from the commissions’ scope.28 By the end of 1944, a major policy paper written by Hilton Poynton and Kenneth Robinson of the Colonial Office’s Interna-tional Relations Department formally proposed the regional commissions concept as an alternative to American plans for international trusteeships and supervision. The paper, titled ‘International Aspects of Colonial Policy’, also tackled the internationally contentious issue of the future of the mandated territories which Britain and France had taken over from the Ottoman and German empires after the First World War. The authors proposed to scrap the mandates and turn them into proper colonies. At the same time, a new international colonial system would be established—based on international cooperation through regional commissions and through so-called ‘functional bodies’, dealing mainly with social subjects, which would be attached to the new world organisation (namely the United Nations). Areas eligible for regional commissions were the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, West Africa and Central, East and Southern Africa.29 Unlike under the American and Australian-New Zealand schemes, the commissions proposed by the Colonial Office would be consultative bodies without executive or supervisory powers, leaving the question of selfgovernment and eventual independence to be decided by the respective colonial power. As Hilton Poynton had told a French official in Washington in September 1944, the emphasis of the regional


commissions should be on collaboration and consul-tation on practical issues, ‘not supervision and “inquisition”’.30 The paper had enormous potential implications for British interests in South-East Asia. In contrast to other colonial regions, South-East Asia included both colonial territories and indepen-dent or ‘emerging native states’.31 Unlike the South Pacific’s ‘small, primitive and weak communities’, one official lamented, South-East Asia was made up in the main of communities which were either independent states or states ‘which it would not be an absurdity to expect to develop into national independent states within the foreseeable future’. The representatives of the SouthEast Asian territories would therefore expect a much more substantial voice in a regional commission than those in the South Pacific.32 Another problem, from the British point of view, was the fact that the area was still under enemy occupation and that no detailed plans could be made prior to liberation from the Japanese. In addition, the Colonial Office regarded South-East Asia as particularly prone to outside interference: the region had much greater wealth than the other areas under discussion, possessing rubber and tin, and a large population of around 120 million people. Outside countries like the United States, Aus-tralia, China, India and possibly even Russia would therefore have major strategic or economic interests in the region.33 A further problem was that in any regional organisation China was likely to make claims on behalf of the Chinese immigrant communities in the area.34 Added to this was the membership problem. Would Burma, Ceylon and Hong Kong be considered part of the region, and should outside powers like the United States, Australia, China and India, as well as the Soviet Union, also be included?35 And if India was included, would it be an outside or an inside member? The question of Indian participation in a South-East Asian commission had first been raised by Sir Maurice Gwyer, a retired Chief Justice of the Indian Federal Court. Gwyer argued that India, after achieving ‘autonomy’, would be left at the mercy of China and Russia, who were likely to dominate postwar Asia. He therefore suggested an Anglo-Indian defence council that could also include parts of South-East Asia, and that could be linked to some kind of Anglo-Indian economic council.36 As will be seen later on, his ideas were not dissimilar to the Foreign Office’s regional plans in 1949, when China and Russia were indeed making their influence felt in South and South-East Asia. However, in 1944 the Colonial Office argued against Gwyer’s proposal for economic or defence cooperation between India and South-East Asia.37 As Stanley told his colleague at the India Office, Leo Amery,


whatever the views of the services depart-ments on the suitability of the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit, it certainly was not a natural economic or political unit.38 Finally, the Colonial Office had to address the question of what a South-East Asian commission should actually be dealing with. Before the war, the only institutionalised form of coope-ration in South-East Asia had been the exchange of epidemiological information and a certain amount of political coordination concerning opium smoking through the League of Nations. In addition, there had been the International Regula-tions Agreement on Tin and Rubber, which had offered the governments and chief producers in the area ‘scope for consul-tation and coordination’.39 London saw few other matters that would require regional coordination. As one Colonial Office official pointed out, any cooperation on rubber had to take account of synthetic production. So far as tin was concerned, other producers such as Bolivia, Nigeria and Congo also had to be considered. The only commodity that could be considered on a purely regional basis was rice.40 Despite the many difficulties and uncertainties tied to the question of regional cooperation in South-East Asia, the Col-onial Office included the region in its proposals of December 1944, as it wanted to present the Americans with a coherent new policy applicable to all colonial territories around the world. International Aspects of Colonial Policy’ thus stated reluctantly that South-East Asia too ‘seems to be an area suitable eventually for the establishment of a Regional Commission, though clearly it is impracticable to make any progress with the formulation of regional organisation while the area is still in enemy occupa-tion’. The membership of a South-East Asian commission would include: the United Kingdom with its Malayan territories, Singapore, North Borneo and Hong Kong; the Netherlands with the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia); Portugal with Timor; France with Indochina; the United States with the Philippines; Thailand as an independent state within the region; and Aus-tralia, China and India as interested outside countries.41 So far as the commission’s scope was concerned, the department decided in an internal memorandum that a South-East Asian regional council should be limited to research into the improvement of tin, rubber and agricultural production, the control of immi-gration and emigration, the development of fisheries and the preservation and protection of the area’s distinctive fauna.42 Though the war cabinet endorsed the Colonial Office’s paper on the future of colonial territories, it soon became apparent that Stanley’s ambitious colonial scheme would never be implemented, as neither the


dominions nor the United States were willing to replace the mandates system with the new regional commissions plan.43 Further bad news emerged during the Yalta Conference in February 1945. During the conference, Churchill unwittingly accepted a ‘trusteeship formula’ worked out by the American Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius.44 Yet it was the despised term ‘trusteeship’ that the Colonial Office had hoped to eradicate in the first place. Even worse, the Yalta Protocol also implied that the future of the mandates would be discussed at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference on the new world organisation, the United Nations. An angry Oliver Stanley, whose department had not been represented at Yalta, stressed in March 1945 that the policy outlined in ‘International Aspects of Colonial Policy’ had orig-inally been intended to be discussed with the United States alone, after agreement with the dominions, but not within the United Nations. As the original argument for the abolition of the mandates had been a plan which applied to the entire colonial empire, Stanley argued that it would now mean ‘throwing the whole Colonial Empire open to discussion by this motley assembly [the UN], a procedure which I should regard as hazardous in extreme’.45 In other words, proposing the mandates’ replacement with the Colonial Office’s regional cooperation scheme now might have required discussing the future of the British empire in a potentially hostile international forum. At Stanley’s initiative, government ministers therefore decided to continue the mandates system and to withdraw ‘International Aspects of Colonial Policy’.46 While the Colonial Office was disappointed about the failure of its worldwide regional coope-ration plans, it was relieved in so far as South-East Asia was concerned. Of all the regions mentioned in the department’s paper, South-East Asia had after all been regarded as least suitable for a regional organisation. However, a few months later, after the end of the war in Europe, the Foreign Office at last became interested in the future of South-East Asia. Previously, the department had not been involved in the drafting of ‘International Aspects of Colonial Policy’. In fact, the Foreign Office had done hardly any planning work on the future of East and South-East Asia. During the war, Eden had tended to neglect Far Eastern questions in favour of those concerning Europe, allowing his department’s Far Eastern machinery to deteriorate. As Roger Buckley has argued, Churchill and his ministerial colleagues suffered from an unfortunate inability to consider the nature of the postwar international situation in Asia.47


In June 1945, the new head of the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern Department, J.C.Sterndale Bennett, brought the lack of Far Eastern planning to the attention of his superiors. He complain-ed, in an extensive memorandum, that upon his return to Far Eastern work in August 1944 he had found a small department organised to deal only with current work, and that there was virtually no machinery for Far Eastern planning. The Foreign Office seemed to regard the Far Eastern war as a sideshow: diplomatic issues involving Russia and the United States were dealt with on a ‘hand-to-mouth basis’ with little regard to Britain’s main Far Eastern interests or her relations with the dominions. At the higher level of the Foreign Office, no one had given attention to the Far East, and at international conferences vital decisions had been taken without members of the Far Eastern Department being available for consultation. On the interdepartmental level as well, all was not right. Although the Official Far Eastern Committee had recently been revived, there was a continuing tendency to ‘watertight departments’, and plans for the future of Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong were prepared without Foreign Office participation. Sterndale Bennett believed the Foreign Office required a more com-prehensive machinery to deal with questions such as the future of China, the Japanese settlement and the satisfaction of Russian claims, as well as the more immediate problems of relief, rehabilitation, economic recovery and population movements. He suggested a Minister of State or a Parliamentary Under-secretary be appointed to ensure the coordination of Far Eastern foreign and colonial policies; alternatively there could be a small ministerial committee superimposed on the Far Eastern Committee.48 The memorandum made a considerable impression in Whitehall. Though Sterndale Bennett failed to secure the appointment of a Londonbased Minister of State responsible for East and South-East Asia, his initiative immediately resulted in the establishment of a Civilian Planning Unit for Japan,49 and it paved the way for a special ministerial committee on the Far East a few months later. In addition, the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern Department was provided with additional staff and divided into three sections, one dealing with Japan and the Pacific, one with China and one with South-East Asia (including Thailand, Indochina, Indonesia and Nepal). In the following years, a separate Foreign Office department was created for South-East Asia. Once the new Labour government had taken over, Sterndale Bennett’s paper immediately caught the attention of the new Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who assumed office on 27 July 1945.


Bevin showed much greater interest in Far Eastern affairs than his predecessor, and he was highly concerned about the lack of interdepartmental coordination in the area. Despite the recent changes in Whitehall, Bevin complained in November that the newly appointed committees were only concerned with individual Far Eastern questions. He therefore proposed a con-ference of British officials and ministers to discuss overall Far Eastern policies and organisation.50 Though Bevin’s planned conference never materialised due to the logistical difficulties of bringing back British representatives from abroad, and because of his own overburdened timetable,51 he had nevertheless alerted ministers and officials to the urgency of East and South-East Asian problems. In addition to Sterndale Bennett, another Far Eastern expert, Esler Dening, was pushing for change both at the Foreign Office and in the way that Britain was conducting her affairs in SouthEast Asia. As Dening was to become the chief architect of Britain’s regional policies in South-East Asia, his position in 1945 and his initial ideas have to be explained in greater detail. Though appointed by the Foreign Office, Dening had since 1943 served as political adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, Lord Louis Mountbatten (SACSEA). His offi-cial job was to advise Mountbatten on matters relating to foreign territories including Japan, Thailand and Indochina, as well as on political warfare. After eighteen months in office, Dening had gained considerable political influence at the headquarters of South-East Asia Command (SEAC), in Kandy, Ceylon.52 His position was strengthened by the fact that he had independent cipher communications with the Foreign Office, which in turn relied on him to make its and the Colonial Office’s voices heard at SEAC. Despite this, Dening and Mountbatten were not always on best terms, and the latter sometimes ignored his chief political adviser’s views. In June 1945, Dening visited London for consultations with the Foreign Office. Dening found it increasingly difficult to work for both Mountbatten and the Foreign Office. He argued that the Supreme Allied Commander was overburdened with the increas-ing speed of military developments, and SEAC, theoretically responsible to both the British and the American governments, should not be put in the situation of having to take sides when the two governments’ policies differed, i.e. regarding the colonial territories. In an interdepartmental memorandum, Dening there-fore proposed to strengthen the position of the civilian depart-ments at SEAC, and to curb some of Mountbatten’s political powers. He suggested two alternative courses of action. The first option was to increase the staff and the powers of the political adviser at SEAC,


to make him directly responsible to London, and to ask him to advise Mountbatten not only on foreign affairs but also on political, economic and financial matters, regardless of the department involved. The second option was to appoint a Minister of State for South-East Asia, on the precedent of the Middle East and the Mediterranean, who would report to the cabinet and who would coordinate the views and needs of the British territories concerned, and relate them to developments in foreign territories. Dening personally favoured the second option, not least to avoid some of the mistakes of the prewar years. He argued that before the war: British territories east of Suez tended to be governed largely on parochial lines…unfamiliar with each other’s problems, and still less with the problems of non-British territories in the Far East….That such a state of affairs was both strategically and politically undesirable was proved by subsequent events when Japan delivered her attack. To-day there is a danger that, with the preoccupations of reconstruction and rehabilitation …we shall drift once more into the same position as before the outbreak of hostilities.’53 The Foreign Office approved of Dening’s recommendations. When Dening returned to SEAC, Sterndale Bennett was con-fident that he could gain the approval of other Whitehall departments for either of Dening’s suggestions before submitting the matter to the cabinet.54 Copies of his memorandum were sent to the Colonial, India, Burma and Dominions offices and to the services departments. In an accompanying letter, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Orme Sargent, further explained that ‘it would be most desirable to have in SEAC some political authority of high standing to undertake local centralisation and coordination of matters affecting more than one Department’, while relieving the Supreme Commander of a great deal of non-military work. Sargent therefore favoured the appointment of a Minister of State, possibly after the recapture of Singapore.55 Whitehall’s response to the Foreign Office initiative was mixed. The India, Burma and Dominions offices and the Air Ministry gave their consent to either of Dening’s alternative proposals, the Dominions Office mentioning that the dominions might themselves find it convenient to appoint political repre-sentatives to such a coordinating authority.56 Only the War Office fully opposed Dening’s plans, arguing that after a Japa-nese surrender the tendency would be to bring the


British territories within SEAC back under the direct control of the appropriate departments in Whitehall.57 The Colonial Office was in two minds about Dening’s proposals. Before his return to South-East Asia, Dening explained his ideas to colonial officials in London, arguing that Mountbatten tended to send telegrams to the Chiefs of Staff which were primarily political and had only the ‘flimsiest strategic significance’. A Minister Resident would relieve the Supreme Allied Commander of the burden of political decisions, though he admitted that Mountbatten’s objections to the scheme could be expected.58 Initially, the Colonial Office was tempted by Dening’s suggestions as they promised to give the department an early foothold in South-East Asia.59 However, the head of the Colonial Office’s Eastern Department, Edward Gent, opposed a ministerial appointment. The Colonial Office itself had in mind ‘the appointment of a ‘Governor-General’ with direct powers over the British authorities in Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak’, an appointment which had been provisionally approved by the war cabinet in 1944. Gent there-fore believed that all that was required was the appointment of a political adviser in SEAC who was of greater political weight than Dening, and who was directly responsible to London.60 Gent’s objections were shared by the Permanent Under-Secre-tary of State at the Colonial Office, Sir George Gater, and the new Labour Colonial Secretary, George Hall, who was seeking final cabinet approval for the Colonial Office’s plans for the develop-ment of Malaya. This included the appointment of a GovernorGeneral with direct powers over British authorities in Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak.61 As Gater replied to the Foreign Office, his department only agreed with the more moderate option of making the political adviser at SEAC respon-sible to London. Once civil government was re-established there might be an appropriate place for the Foreign Office’s political adviser to be attached to the staff of the Colonial Office’s Governor-General.62 Gater’s reply made it clear that the proposed appointment of a Minister Resident conflicted with his department’s own plans for SouthEast Asia. The Colonial Office was eager to regain its dominant prewar position in Britain’s South-East Asian terri-tories. A superior minister undoubtedly would have had the power to overrule Colonial Office decisions; this would certainly have upstaged the new Malayan Governor-General. It is obvious that after years of intensive planning, the Colonial Office didn’t want its new constitutional scheme for Malaya to be spoilt by the Foreign Office, which had entered the South-East


Asian scene belatedly and ill prepared. However, by the time that Gater’s letter arrived at the Foreign Office, the situation in South-East Asia had been radically transformed: Japan had just announced her surrender to the Allies. Suddenly, the future organisation of South-East Asia was no longer in the realm of postwar planning. It had to be decided swiftly, and under the pressure of rapid and often dramatic events.

26

Chapter 2 The dilemma of peace in South-East Asia

On 14 August 1945, after two American nuclear bombs had wiped out the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan announced her surrender. The Allies had finally triumphed over the last of the Axis powers. In Britain, joyful crowds instantly took to the streets to celebrate the news, and the government declared a special two-day holiday. In South-East Asia, however, the British were soon confronted with problems that were completely unexpected and for which they were hardly prepared. As the headline of Pacific Post, the daily newspaper of the British Pacific Fleet in the Far East, predicted on 16 August 1945: ‘War is over—the job isn’t’. In the previous month, Mountbatten had visited Germany for the Potsdam Conference. While attending the conference, he was told of a highly important decision to extend the operational boundaries of his command. Since its creation in 1943, SEAC’s operational responsibility had included Burma, Malaya, Singapore and the northern Indonesian island of Sumatra. He was now informed that the American and British Chiefs of Staff had agreed to transfer the rest of Indonesia from the Americanled South-West Pacific Area Command (SWPA) to SEAC. They also added the southern half of Indochina to Mountbatten’s command, and confirmed SEAC’s responsibility for Thailand.1 The decision implied that after Roosevelt’s untimely death in April, Washington decided to accept Britain’s desire to re-establish her prewar position in South-East Asia.2 At the same time, the United States could concentrate on Japan, which was to be primarily an American responsibility. Also in Potsdam, Churchill told Mountbatten about the existence of the nuclear bomb. He was instructed to prepare for a Japanese surrender in the middle of August.3 Not only would SEAC have to liberate and relieve a vastly increased command area; it would also have to do so at least six months earlier than planned.


Initially, Mountbatten was confident that he would be able to cope with his additional geographical responsibilities.4 How-ever, it soon emerged that SEAC was stretched beyond its limits. It was a military command geared to fighting the Japanese, not to deal with the complex logistical and political problems of postwar relief, reconstruction and administration in most of South-East Asia. As Mountbatten reflected in a television interview in the 1970s: Suddenly, I found myself responsible as the Supreme Commander for an enormous area of the globe, with a distance of 6, 000 miles across it…with 128 million starving and rather rebellious people who had just been liberated, with 123,000 prisoners of war and internees, many of whom were dying,… and at the very beginning I had some 700,000 Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen, to take the surrender, disarm, put into prison camps, awaiting transportation back. Even look-ing at that it sounds a big problem, but I had no idea what I really was in for— what I really was in for was trying to re-establish civilisation and rule of law and order throughout this vast part of the world. We didn’t even know what the conditions were going to be. I had no staff really trained or qualified to help me in this task, except some professional civil affairs officers from various countries whose one idea was to go back and carry on where they left off three or four years ago.5 SEAC’s official postwar task was to disarm and enforce the surrender of the approximately 740,000 Japanese troops in South-East Asia before their eventual return to Japan, and to restore law and order in the reoccupied territories. It was also in charge of recovering approximately 125,000 Allied prisoners-ofwar and internees in the area, some of whom were held in remote jungle camps. To fulfil his task Mountbatten had at his disposal a total of about 1.3 million British and Indian troops of whom only 350,000 were initially deployed. His fleet consisted of only 120 warships, and his air force included only 50 RAF squadrons6 -a small force considering the vast geographical extension of his command. At the same time, there was pressure from home to further scale down SEAC’s strength; the PYTHON repatriation scheme, introduced at the end of 1944, had already reduced the time that British soldiers had to serve in the Far East from five years to three years and eight months.7 SEAC’s resources were thus fully stretched, and one wonders what would have happened if the Japanese had refused to obey Allied orders in

BRITAIN AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 29

defiance of their country’s official surrender. In the event, the Japanese showed themselves cooperative and Mountbatten decided to maintain their chain of command. This allowed SEAC to use Japanese troops for its own purposes: even months after the surrender the British often relied on the Japanese to police the recaptured territories. Of the many problems facing the British in South-East Asia, the question of how to deal with the nationalist movements in the region was of paramount importance. During the occupa-tion, the Japanese had fostered the fledgling nationalist move-ments in each country in order to secure the collaboration of parts of the population. By 1945, many nationalist movements had gained enough self-confidence to put up armed resistance against the returning European powers. The first SouthEast Asian country where the British were confronted with the new brand of militant nationalism was Burma. Even before the war, nationalist sentiment had been stronger in Burma than anywhere else in South-East Asia. After occupying the country in 1942, the Japanese had tried to exploit Burmese nationalism for their own purposes, by establishing the Burma Defence Army under the command of the Burmese leader Aung San, and by declaring the country’s ‘independence’ in 1943.8 However, following clan-destine negotiations with British forces Aung San’s troops swapped sides in March 1945 and engaged the Japanese in guerrilla warfare. This greatly helped the advancing British forces under General Slim to recapture Rangoon before the onset of the monsoon rains in the late spring of 1945. Aung San’s involvement in the recapture of Rangoon con-stituted a political dilemma for the British. On the one hand, they were committed, under the Burma White Paper, to re-establish direct British rule for a transitional period. On the other hand, demands for self-government and independence by the nationalist movement behind Aung San, organised in the AntiFascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), could not be ignored. Mountbatten sensed that open conflict with the Burmese natio nalists would make Burma untenable. In May, he recognised the Burma National Army, renamed the Burmese Patriotic Forces, as a British ally. In September an agreement was signed with the league providing for the creation of a Burmese army out of the Burmese Patriotic Forces.9 However, while Mountbatten temporarily succeeded in appeasing Burmese nationalism (before the return to civil government in October brought matters to a head), armed conflicts soon broke out in other parts of South-East Asia. Things weren’t helped by the fact that SEAC’s troops had been prevented from landing in Indonesia and Indochina


before the beginning of September; General MacArthur, the designated American Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the Far East, had ruled that no Japanese-held territory should be reoccupied by any of the Allied troops before the official surrender documents had been signed in Tokyo on 2 September.10 As a result, a power vacuum existed in the Japanese-held territories that was playing into the hands of both Indonesian and Vietnamese nationalists. In Indonesia, as in Burma, the Japanese had since 1942 fostered nationalist movements to increase local cooperation. On 17 August 1945, the Indonesian nationalist leader, Sukarno, used the opportunity of the Japanese surrender to proclaim an inde-pendent Indonesian republic. In the following weeks, Indo-nesian nationalists, many of whom had previously received paramilitary training from the Japanese, seized arms from the now passive Japanese troops and gained control of large parts of the islands of Java and Sumatra. When British troops eventually reached Batavia in the west of Java they were too weak to force the Indonesian Republic into surrender. In November 1945, a fierce battle ensued for the control of Surabaya in the east of the island. Though the British eventually gained the upper hand, they had also experienced at first hand the fanaticism and determination of the Indonesian nationalists. The episode finally convinced Mountbatten that a British military campaign to restore Dutch rule was out of the question.11 In view of SEAC’s experiences in Burma and Indonesia, it slowly dawned on the British that they had completely under-estimated the significance of the war for the growth of South-East Asian nationalism. In Indonesia, the British soon used their position in the country to urge the Dutch that they should enter into negotiations with the Indonesian nationalists. As Dening wrote to Sterndale Bennett at the beginning of October: These independence movements in Asia must be treated with sympathy and understanding. Otherwise they will become really serious. As I have indicated, they are half-baked and treated the proper way they should not be very terrifying. But treated the wrong way, they may well, in the end, spell the end of Europe in Asia…. Let us therefore stand no nonsense from the French or the Dutch.12 Despite this, Britain’s flexible postwar policies in Burma and Indonesia were in marked contrast to those pursued by SEAC in Indochina. Here,


too, nationalist forces had seized the oppor-tunity given to them by the delayed arrival of the Allied troops. During the war, the communistdominated Viet Minh movement had kept a low profile, while the French colonial administrators were grudgingly cooperating with the vastly superior Japanese forces occupying the country. In March 1945, the Japanese finally took over complete control of Indochina and interned all the remaining French troops and civilians. After the Japanese surrender five months later, the French were thus unable to regain the political initiative in the country. Instead, the Viet Minh’s moment for action had come. As in Indonesia, the nationalists obtained large quantities of arms from the Japanese troops, who were waiting passively for the arrival of Allied forces. On 2 September, the Viet Minh leader, Ho Chi Minh, proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) during a large open-air rally in Hanoi in the north of Vietnam. The DRV’s main power-base was to be in the northern province of Tonkin where it was tolerated by the Chinese occupational armies until the return of the French in the spring of 1946. According to Mountbatten’s new directive, SEAC was in charge of liberating the southern half of Indochina, where the Viet Minh had effectively taken over control of the local admi-nistrations in and around Saigon. However, the commander of the British occupational forces in the country, Major General Douglas D.Gracey, decided not to make any concessions to the Vietnamese nationalists. Soon after his arrival in the country on 13 September 1945, Gracey declared a state of siege around Saigon and released and armed the few thousand French troops held in Japanese prison camps. On his own initiative, Gracey then organised a coup d’état against the Vietnamese. On 23 September, his British, Indian and crack Gurkha troops arrested the surprised Viet Minh authorities in Saigon’s public buildings, and firmly reinstated the French administrators. In the following weeks and months, SEAC units became involved in active fighting with Viet Minh forces for the control of Saigon and its surrounding areas, an episode which one historian has called ‘The First Vietnam War’.13 New French troops under the com-mand of General Philippe Leclerc arrived in October, and by February 1946 the French and British completed the reoccupation of Saigon and of large parts of Cochin-China in the south of Vietnam. British forces gradually withdrew and in March General Gracey officially transferred his remaining authority to the French. Nationalism wasn’t the only unexpected problem confronting the British in South-East Asia. SEAC was also faced with serious economic problems throughout the region. It soon became apparent that South-


East Asia’s agricultural economy lay in ruins as a result of the Japanese occupation. Traditional riceproducing countries like Burma, Indochina and to a lesser degree Thailand had all suffered from serious neglect and mismanage-ment under the Japanese, and there existed hardly any stocks of rice or other foodstuffs in the area. No new crops had been planted, and the indigenous transport systems were disintegrat-ing. The Japanese supply system—never very efficient—broke down completely at the time of the surrender, and there was a shortage of clothing, consumer goods, coal, machinery and fertilisers.14 As a result, South-East Asia was soon threatened by famine (see Chapter 3). The British had only very limited means to deal with the economic crisis in the region. SEAC’s own food stocks were completely insufficient to meet the area’s food demands, and since the shortage of rice was not confined to South-East Asia, the Combined Food Board in Washington, responsible for world-wide food allocations during and immediately after the war, was in no position to provide large-scale imports either.15 Another problem was SEAC’s lack of transport facilities. Mountbatten had a fleet of only 130 cargo ships, too little to keep up the flow of supplies to and within his enlarged theatre. Things were made worse by the fact that the turn-around of ships was usually delayed by the lack of port equipment and the shortage of labour. SEAC’s inadequate shipping resources were further strained by the need to transport Indian coal supplies to South-East Asia; the latter’s coal production was seriously reduced as a result of the war. All this had the effect that the few surplus stocks of rice, which existed for example in Thailand, were extremely difficult to transport to deficit areas.16 Last but not least, SEAC had hardly any qualified staff to deal with the civil administration, let alone the economic rehabilitation, of the re-occupied territories. However, as difficult as the political and economic situation might have been in South-East Asia, it also provided Britain with a unique political opportunity in the region. SEAC, which was completely controlled by the British, was temporarily responsible for the administration of almost the whole of South-East Asia. If the British played their cards right, SEAC might be turned to long-term advantage, providing the basis for lasting British hegemony in the region. No one grasped this more clearly than Mountbatten’s political adviser, Esler Dening, who soon pro-posed setting up a British-led civilian successor organisation to SEAC that would be responsible for the relief and economic development of the whole of South-East Asia. As Dening told


London after first hearing of the Japanese surrender, everything depended on how Britain coped at this critical moment in history: By the creation of the South-East Asia Command, which is predominantly British, we assumed responsibility for the areas contained within its boundaries. That is all to the good provided we discharge that responsibility. If we do, then we stand a fair chance of restoring British prestige in a part of the world where it had sunk to a very low ebb. If we do not, then I should expect that, as the years roll on, the peoples of the Far East will tend to look less and less to Britain and more and more to any Power which is in a position to afford them strategic, political and economic security.17 To cope with the enormous economic problems in the region Dening soon suggested setting up a ‘coordinating agency’ in South-East Asia which would deal with economic questions such as rice distribution, inflation or price fixing. Dening argued in a telegram dated 23 August that without such an agency: There will be no overall economy which I believe to be necessary to future prosperity of South-East Asia, and we shall find ourselves drifting back to bad days when a number of political entities existed in this region with no consciousness of, or interest in, the problems of their neighbours, and no coordination of their economy or security.18 In September, Dening further wrote to Sterndale Bennett: I am all for the setting up of local civil administrations as soon as possible. At the same time I have not altered my view that it would be a pity to split up once more into isolated parishes, and some organisation should, I think, be preserved which will preserve the unity of purpose engendered by the war. Regional economy and regional security are, at any rate, essentials, and the more we can break down political barriers at this stage the better.19 Taking into account Dening’s earlier proposals, his ideas amounted to a scheme that provided for the establishment of a regional successor organisation to SEAC that would be linked to or led by the proposed


British Minister Resident. Senior officers at SEAC were apparently thinking along similar lines to Dening. According to the War Office, there was enthusiastic support among top SEAC officials for a scheme which would make the maximum political use of the command under the lead of Mountbatten.20 At the Foreign Office, Sterndale Bennett concluded that ‘if the scheme were properly handled SEAC might become the nucleus for a consultative regional commission in South-East Asia which has long been one of our tentative objectives’. However, due regard would have to be be paid to the susceptibilities of foreign countries, as it might appear that Britain was trying to fasten her control over French and Dutch territories; so far as Thailand was concerned it would also ‘revive American suspicions of our wish to reduce that country to a kind of subject State’. In the early stages the scheme would therefore have to apply to British territories, Indonesia, Indochina and Thailand only.21 Sterndale Bennett’s comments highlighted one key aspect of Dening’s and other officers’ proposals. The creation of a civilian successor organisation to SEAC, linked to a British Minister Resident, implied the continuation in the postwar years of Britain’s factual hegemony in South-East Asia under SEAC. Although the proposed organisation was to secure the economic revival and development of South-East Asia, there is no doubt that Dening also saw it as a potential tool for British great power interests in Asia. It was this aspect of Dening’s proposal which would have made the concurrence of France and the Netherlands in such a British-dominated regional scheme questionable, despite the two countries’ weakness in 1945 and their reliance on British support in South-East Asia. Despite these potential pitfalls, the Foreign Office supported the idea of promoting regional cooperation in South-East Asia on the basis of SEAC. However, before launching an interna-tional initiative in this direction, the department had to try and convince the rest of Whitehall to back Dening’s proposal. His telegram of 23 August was therefore passed on to the Official Far Eastern Committee and to the other departments involved, thus reviving the issue of regional cooperation which had been dormant since the failure of the Colonial Office’s worldwide plans earlier in the year. As Sterndale Bennett pointed out to Ernest Bevin on 9 October, three issues were now under consider-ation. First, there was the question of whether a Minister of State or merely a high and independent government official should be appointed in SouthEast Asia, as SEAC was unprepared for dealing with the political and economic problems arising in the area. The second point was the serious


supply problems in SEAC and the need for some better coordinating machinery. Third, there was the tendency of the various territories to ‘drop back into more or less water-tight compartments’. However: The existence of South-East Asia Command does provide an opportunity for working on a regional basis and perhaps for laying the foundation of some kind of regional organisation when the immediate military tasks of South-East Asia Com-mand are over.22 On 18 October, cabinet ministers discussed the various plans for the future organisation of South-East Asia. It was argued that although SEAC urgently needed a stronger political machinery, there were signs that Mountbatten did not favour the appoint-ment of a Minister Resident and that such an appointment would be embarrassing to the Indian Viceroy and to the Gov-ernor of Burma. In view of these objections, the meeting decided instead on the appointment of an official of ambassadorial status, responsible to the Foreign Office, who would deal with political questions in the non-British territories and who could achieve further coordination in consultation with the Indian Viceroy and the Governor of Burma. Concerning the supply situation in South-East Asia and the region’s future economic organisation, it was generally accepted that coordinating machi-nery for economic and supply matters was needed. However, it was left to the various departments to discuss whether this machinery would be under the supervision of the proposed high official.23 Although the minutes of the meeting do not mention any objections by the Colonial Office, there is little doubt that the department’s plans for a Malayan Cover nor-General helped to tip the balance against the appointment of a Minister Resident. Although the Foreign Office had initially supported a new ministerial appointment in South-East Asia, it was pleased that the planned appointment of a senior diplomat would increase the department’s influence within the region. It also offered the Foreign Office the opportunity to assume some regional econ-omic responsibilities—so long as the new post would be linked to the new economic machinery also envisaged by the ministerial meeting. If it played its cards right, the new Foreign Office post might even become the basis for an international regional commission. However, it soon became clear that Whitehall was divided over the question of regional cooperation. During a first interdepartmental meeting on the issue, Sterndale Bennett invited other departments to comment on the desirability, from the economic


point of view, ‘of setting up some machinery for cooperation as between the territories at present included in SEAC’. This subsequently inspired the meeting’s chairman from the Ministry of Production, McGregor, to circulate a paper proposing an ‘international advisory supply council’ for SouthEast Asia, composed of high-ranking officials, and with a secretariat in charge of the daily work. The council would deal with issues such as colonial economic policies, short-term rehabilitation and price control of the region’s commodities such as rubber, tin and rice.24 The Colonial Office was surprised by McGregor’s paper, arguing that the meeting on 22 October had reached no agree-ment on any aspect of long-term economic cooperation: there was no reason why SEAC should be taken as a nucleus for a regional economic council, as the command’s boundaries were determined by reasons other than economic. Furthermore: While fully appreciating the advantages of regional economic cooperation…it is not the most propitious moment for proposing a regional body providing for coordination and cooperation in respect of economic matters on a regional basis. If the proposals are put forward now, they might be met with some suspicion on the ground that we are trying to take advantage of our military position in the Far East….We would suggest that the question should be deferred for, say, a year, and reviewed at the end of that time in the light of the then conditions.25 The Colonial Office had thus expressed its opposition to any plans for regional economic cooperation in the near future. Its officials further argued that the resources of Britain’s South-East Asian colonies were too scarce to be shared with their non-British neighbours. Regional cooperation would also be complicated by Britain’s problems with Indonesia and Thailand, and there was a chance that other countries would be highly suspicious of British intentions behind a regional scheme. If a regional organisation was eventually created, it would have to be on the lines of the Caribbean Commission, which had only token economic and political powers.26 However, the Ministry of Production wouldn’t give up easily, circulating a revised paper that had the support of the Board of Trade and that again stressed the need for economic collaboration.27 The Foreign Office too continued to lobby for some form of regional cooperation in South-East Asia, hoping that it would be linked to its new appointment. As Sterndale Bennett wrote in a departmental minute, the question was now whether the planned


Foreign Office post would be given responsibilities for the coordination not only of foreign affairs but also of general political, economic and financial questions in the area. The problem was that the Colonial and Burma offices would oppose anything which looked like impinging on the prerogatives of the governors of the various British territories.28 A high-ranking interdepartmental meeting on 19 November reconsidered the whole issue. It decided that the title of the new Foreign Office appointment would be Special Commissioner and that his headquarters would be in Singapore. He would not concern himself with the internal problems of the British territories in South-East Asia; nor would there be any derogation from Mountbatten’s authority. It was also agreed that for the time being the Governor of Malaya and, when appointed, the Cover nor-General of Malaya would be the King’s principal representative in Singapore. The duration of the appointment was left for further consideration.29 However, no agreement could be reached on the Special Commissioner’s economic respon-sibilities. Sterndale Bennett had written a draft directive which stated that the new appointment would encourage political and economic coordination and that it would preside over a regional economic advisory council in Singapore. The directive was criticised by the heads of the Colonial Office, Sir George Gater, and of the Treasury, Sir Edward Bridges. The latter apparently wanted to avoid additional financial commitments in connection with the new post. So far as economic coordination and cooperation in general were concerned, representatives from the ministries of Supply and of Food further argued that ‘raw materials from SouthEast Asia were wanted by the rest of the world and only to a small extent by the territories themselves’; trade would be with the outside world and the scope for interchange was not great. As a result of these objections, consideration of the Special Commissioner’s economic functions was postponed to a later date.30 Despite this set-back to the Foreign Office’s South-East Asian plans, further reports on SEAC’s inadequate economic organisa-tion strengthened the department’s hand. In the middle of December, Dening repeated his demand for a civil successor to SEAC. There were many matters that a military command should not be dealing with, such as the allocation of Indian textiles to South-East Asian territories. This was more for a civilian organisation which would be equipped with a staff trained in international affairs and in economic and financial matters, as well as in civil government. As most territories in South-East Asia had been liberated without having to undergo the horrors of battle, the populations were expecting an earlier return to normalcy. The result


was growing unrest and dis-content. The proposed civil organisation would alleviate the position more quickly than the military ever could, removing the suspicion of neglect, coordinating the area’s requirements so as to ensure equitable distribution, and dealing with political developments of more than a local significance. As in his earlier representations, Dening also saw use for such an organisation beyond the immediate postwar period: Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies were all completely parochial in their outlook before the war and we had no organisation which was capable of surveying the scene as a whole and of making appropriate recommenda-tions to HMG, while in Whitehall reports from these areas were canalised with the Foreign Office, as the case might be, so that again there was no comprehensive picture. I think we should avoid doing that in the future. In London I understand that the necessary machinery has been set up. Out here I do not consider that a military command can fill the bill. Dening added that links should be made between such a ‘clearing house’ and Australia, New Zealand, China and India.31 Inspired byDening, the Foreign Office took the opportunity of an interdepartmental meeting on 18 December to press for a link between regional cooperation and its new appointment. As the attending Colonial Office official was insufficiently briefed and unfamiliar with the Special Commissioner’s appointment,32 the Foreign Office managed to steamroller any opposition. Accord-ing to the official minutes, the meeting agreed that regional cooperation could be useful in matters concerning supply, distribution and pest control and that the Special Commissioner should be invited to make recommendations on whether the existing machinery in South-East Asia was sufficient to deal with economic questions. He should also recommend what arrange-ments should be made for the period immediately after control had been handed over to the civil governments, and whether the foundations could be laid for a long-term organisation for regional cooperation.33 The head of the Colonial Office, Gater, was furious when he heard of the meeting’s outcome, and he asked Kenneth Robinson, the Colonial Office’s leading expert on regional commissions, to comment. Robinson, who had not been consulted before, warned of the ‘dangers involved in Regional Commissions’. While the Colonial Office was in general agreement that South-East Asia was an area suitable for regional commissions, the present situation underlined in the most acute form all the problems which were considered in Stanley’s paper on ‘International Aspects of Colonial Policy’. Regionalism would be used


by the Americans and the two Pacific dominions to undermine the position of the colonial powers, assisted by China, and probably by India and Russia. Because of this, the French were already highly suspicious of all these regional proposals. While regional cooperation was of vital importance in raising the standard of living throughout the area, it should not be considered without realising the wider political issues involved, particularly the ‘Colonial Question’.34 Robinson’s reservations against any regional schemes in South-East Asia were the same as those voiced by the Colonial Office after the Yalta Conference in February 1945: regional cooperation bore in it the danger of international interference in colonial territories. This danger was particularly acute during the current political troubles in the SouthEast Asian territories. In a letter to the War Office, Gater therefore expressed serious doubts about including any reference to international regional cooperation in the Special Commissioner’s directive. This issue involved many problems of a political character, in particular the question of the relationship between such regional machinery and the United Nations Organisation.35 While Whitehall was considering Robinson’s objections to regional cooperation, the men on the spot had eventually got wind of the Colonial Office’s plans for Malaya.36 As Dening telexed to London on 5 January 1946, Mountbatten, Dening, MacMichael and Hone had concluded that instead of a Malayan Governor-General there was need for an overall civilian orga-nisation to coordinate British domestic and foreign policy in the region. It would also act as a clearing house for the resolution of regional problems which were at the same time of concern to individual British territories. The functions of the head of such an organisation would be those of an umpire, coordinator and perhaps adjudicator rather than of an executive officer. His authority would furthermore derive from the cabinet, and he might one day maintain links with any United Nations offices in the region.37 Dening added in a second telegram that the appoint-ment of two high officials would be wrong, and that a GovernorGeneral’s mind would ‘naturally be influenced towards colonial problems only as opposed to problems of the whole area of South-East Asia’.38 However, Dening’s comments arrived too late to make any difference, as the cabinet had long decided against the appoint-ment of a Minister Resident in South-East Asia. Even the Foreign Office had come round to the view that it would be more practicable, if less ambitious, to make the Special Commissioner responsible to the Foreign Secretary, and to keep him out of inter-Malayan affairs.39


Nevertheless, Dening’s telegrams encour-aged the Foreign Office not to relent on the Special Commiss-ioner’s economic directive. Though there was a risk of delaying the new appointment, officials at the Foreign Office argued that the department should not for the sake of speed agree to the restrictions on the Special Commissioner’s terms of reference suggested by the Colonial Office.40 The matter was subsequently referred to the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, who told Gater in a letter of 10 January that some civil organisation was needed to meet the overall requirements of South-East Asia. The value of regional cooperation had been accepted by the Colonial Office in other parts of the world and some form of regional organisation would help to increase the wealth and welfare of the region and of its inhabitants. The Foreign Office had a particular interest in regional developments since South-East Asia com-prised, apart from Thailand, ‘colonial territories with the mother-countries of which it is our general policy to develop the closest community of interests’. Cadogan therefore saw a good case for having the problem investigated by the Special Commis-sioner who would merely make recommendations.41 However, Gater was not convinced that any reference to regional cooperation should be made. He had Very clear indica-tions of the sensitivity and suspicion with which the French view any form of regional cooperation involving their Colonies especially if any outside powers such as the United States or, in this case, China are to participate’. There were good prospects for appropriate ad hoc collaboration with the French and with other colonial powers, but the inclusion of non-colonial powers as contemplated by Stanley in 1943 was fraught with great difficulty. Furthermore, relations with the Dutch in the Neth-erlands East Indies were uneasy, and the situation in Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Indochina, was being used by ‘antiimperialist’ elements in the United States and elsewhere to support the case for international intervention in the area.42 However, the Foreign Office was far from satisfied with Gater’s reply, Sterndale Bennett complaining that the Colonial Office had been Very obstructive’ about the Special Commissioner’s terms of reference: ‘Their fears about regional commissions may have some substance, but this letter gives no real argument why the Special Commissioner should not be asked to consider the question of regional cooperation in economic matters and to make recommendations about it.’43 The Foreign Office was in fact becoming increasingly concerned that agreement of the terms of its new appointment might be delayed. A


departmental memo stressed that SEAC, which had provided a previously nonexisting link between the South-East Asian territories, was now ‘dwindling'.44 Moreover, Dening’s relations with Mountbatten were at an all-time low after a row over SEAC’s Far Eastern publicity division and it was clear that he would soon have to be transferred.45 Unless the Special Commissioner were soon appointed, Dening’s departure would leave the Foreign Office unrepresented at a time when SEAC was handing over to civil governments in the various territories.46 Furthermore, someone was urgently needed to report on regional economic develop-ments affecting both foreign and British territories in the area. By the end of January 1946, Whitehall was thus divided into three different camps so far as the issue of regional cooperation was concerned. The first group was the traditionalists, for example at the Ministry of Supply, who saw no need for any kind of regional cooperation in South-East Asia. They believed that the prewar pattern of trade between a colony and the metropolitan power should be resumed, and that inter-regional trade should be discouraged. By implication, the economic development and welfare of the colonies were of secondary importance. However, this group was in the minority. The second group, namely the Colonial Office, agreed in principle that economic collaboration was important for SouthEast Asian prosperity and social welfare. However, colonial planners feared at the same time that the establishment of a regional commission would lead to outside interference in the South-East Asian colonies, for example by the United States. Furthermore, they expected that any regional proposals tabled by Britain would be regarded with suspicion by France and the Netherlands. So far as colonial officials in charge of Malayan affairs were concerned, they were also disinclined to spare the colony’s limited resources for the economic reconstruction of neighbouring foreign territories while there was still a shortage of food and basic consumer goods. Of equal importance was the Colonial Office’s objection to a link between regional coope-ration and the Foreign Office’s new appointment. From the outset, Colonial Office officials had regarded the Foreign Office’s plans with suspicion, fearing that a Special Commissioner with economic responsibilities would trespass on the grounds of the Governor-General. The third group consisted of the promoters of regional coope-ration. Officials at the Ministry of Production were enthusiastic about greater inter-regional trade and the control of commodity prices by an


international organisation. The Foreign Office, too, believed in the short-and long-term economic benefits for SouthEast Asia’s warshattered economy. However, the department was primarily interested in the political opportunities that a regional scheme might offer— helping to promote British influence throughout the region. After the Colonial Office objected to the establishment of a regional organisation based on SEAC, the Foreign Office’s minimal aim was to keep the regional option open by officially instructing the Special Commissioner to make recommendations on regional cooperation. Within the third group, certain differences existed between officials in South-East Asia and those in London. For example, Dening did not intend to involve the Americans in any regional arrangement, whereas Foreign Office officials in London were prepared to include the United States as well. Furthermore Dening, who was not fully aware of the developments in Whitehall, was adamant that the proposed organisation should be linked to, or even headed by, a British official or minister responsible to the cabinet. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, accepted the ministerial decision that the new appoint-ment would be responsible to the Foreign Secretary. Dening also kept pressing for the immediate establishment of a civil organisa-tion in order to relieve SEAC of its non-military responsibilities. The Foreign Office, by contrast, came to realise by the end of January that regional cooperation would have to be a long-term policy. The primary aim was to ensure that Britain would remain the dominant power in South-East Asia for years to come.

Chapter 3 ‘Famine averted’: the Special Commission in Singapore

Since the Japanese surrender, the Attlee government had con-sidered the problems of South-East Asia to have been of second-ary importance compared to the problems in Europe, the Middle East and India. However, at the end of January 1946 the region went right to the top of the cabinet’s agenda. During talks in Washington, the British Minister of Food had learnt that the world production of grains had been overestimated and that a shortage of 5 million tons of wheat could be expected during the next year. Apart from expected shortfalls in Germany, both South-East Asia and India would be seriously affected because of crop losses and procurement failures on the subcontinent.1 On 31 January, cabinet ministers were further told that South-East Asia was now facing famine because of a worldwide shortage of rice, the main diet of the region. The estimated supply of 3.1 million tons of rice was 0.7 million tons below the expected annual world demand of 3.8 million tons (excluding Japan’s requirements of 1 million tons).2 Due to the shortage of wheat, rice could not be replaced by other crops. The gravity of the situation was brought to the world’s attention when on 11 February the United Nations General Assembly urged all governments to take immediate and drastic action against the worldwide shortage of food.3 Four days earlier, Britain had already announced the introduction of bread rationing and the cessation of her rice imports. The rice shortage was a direct result of the Japanese occupa-tion of South-East Asia. During the war the Japanese had forced the territories under their control to aim for economic selfsufficiency, with the result that the production of rice-exporting countries, such as Indochina, Burma and Thailand, had been scaled down while rice-importing countries like Indonesia and Malaya were facing starvation. Indochina’s rice-exports were affected the most and had fallen from 1.3 million tons before the war to a mere 0.1 million tons after the war. The country’s rice production further declined because of the fighting between the French


and the Viet Minh in the rice-producing south of the country. At the end of 1945, the Chinese-controlled north of Indochina was hit by famine. The only country that was still producing rice on the prewar level was Thailand, as she had been spared the destruction of war due to her collaboration with the Japanese. On 1 January Britain had signed a peace treaty with Thailand in which the latter promised the free delivery of 1.5 million tons of rice as part of her war reparations. However, hardly any rice had been forthcoming as Thailand’s rice trade was controlled by Chinese merchants who were busy selling the commodity on the black market.4 As a first measure to deal with the food crisis, the cabinet grudgingly decided to modify claims for free rice from Thailand, hoping that a postponement of British repa-ration demands would increase Thai rice supplies. It was also decided to set up a ministerial committee for world food supplies to monitor the situation at the highest level.5 The announcement of an imminent rice crisis helped to speed up the appointment of the Special Commissioner in South-East Asia. After the cabinet meeting on 31 January, Bevin suggested to Attlee that the new Special Commissioner should be charged with coordinating South-East Asian food supplies. His choice for the new post was Lord Killearn, the British ambassador in Egypt. Attlee agreed, and on 3 February Bevin sent a telegram to Killearn, offering him a two-year appointment as Special Com-missioner in South-East Asia, stressing the gravity of the food situation and the need for someone who could ‘coordinate the efforts of Governors and other agents in the area’.6 Killearn was completely surprised by Bevin’s offer, but after two days of hesitation decided to accept.7 He was in his mid-sixties and realised that it was either Singapore or retirement. After Bevin told the cabinet about the new appointment on 11 February an official committee on South-East Asian food supplies was appointed in London under the chairmanship of Lord Nathan, a junior minister. Its aim was to increase food and rice supplies in South-East Asia, and to coordinate the actions of the Special Commissioner and of the ministries concerned with South-East Asian food problems and related economic questions.8 The Special Commissioner’s terms of reference were approved by the middle of March. He was responsible to the Foreign Secretary, and would advise the government on foreign affairs in the area of Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, Borneo and Indonesia. He would give guidance to SACSEA on foreign affairs and would maintain contacts with the British governors in the area, with the British minister in Thailand, and with the representatives of the dominions in Singapore.

‘FAMINE AVERTED’ 45

He would furthermore direct the activities of the Foreign Service officers in the area, except for Thailand, and would contact foreign administrations after the restoration of civil administ-ration.9 A compromise was found on his economic responsibili-ties. Apart from being invited to make recommendations on whether the existing machinery in South-East Asia was suf-ficient to deal with the economic problems in the region, he was asked to advise the government on the issue of regional col-laboration. It was, however, left to London whether or not it would accept his recommendations.10 In addition, the Special Commissioner was instructed to ensure that all possible steps were taken to alleviate the food crisis in South-East Asia: he would maintain close contact with the Indian government and the dominions, and would invite the French and Dutch authori-ties in the region to cooperate in matters relating to food whenever it appeared desirable to do so. He would also try to secure agreement with any other foreign authorities on the adoption of measures designed to alleviate the food crisis.11 The Foreign Office had thus succeeded in providing its new Singapore office with considerable economic responsibilities for SouthEast Asia, and in keeping the issue of regional coope-ration alive. However, the department was forced to com-promise in its choice of candidates. Originally, it had been looking for someone from outside the department, in order to make the new appointment more acceptable to the rest of Whitehall. Potential candidates included Sir Harold MacMi-chael, an experienced colonial official, who was preoccupied with renegotiating the Malayan treaties prior to the Malayan Union, and Malcolm MacDonald, the former Colonial Sec-retary and son of the first Labour Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. Malcolm MacDonald currently served as British High Commissioner in Canada but was already designated to become Cover nor-General of Malaya.12 At the last moment, Lord Killearn was chosen from inside the Foreign Office. He had considerable experience of the Far East and had served as British Minister to China between 1926 and 1933 when he had renegotiated the ‘unequal treaties’ with China.13 Since 1934, first as High Commissioner and then as ambassador in Cairo, Killearn had been one of the true powers behind the Egyptian throne—indeed ‘one of the last great Proconsuls’ as William Roger Louis has described him.14 During the war, he had gained experience of Middle Eastern supply questions; this made him suitable for dealing with the task of rice distribution in South-East Asia. His transfer to Singapore coincided with the Labour government’s reassessment of British policies in Egypt


following the Egyptian government’s request to revise the 1936 treaty relations with Britain.15 Partly because of Killearn’s reputation as an old-style imperial-ist, British press reaction to his new appointment was mixed. Though the Sunday Times saw the new Singapore post as proof of the British government’s recognition that utmost efforts were needed to avoid disaster through famine in Asia, it also suggested that Killearn, at sixtyfive, was too old for such a difficult job in Singapore’s enervating climate.16 More critical voices argued that Killearn was not only too old but also out of touch with public opinion in Britain, and that his appointment was dangerous in an area where change was so rapid that it would test the understanding of even the most sympathetic mind.17 However, the Foreign Office was confident that Killearn’s diplomatic and political standing would give its new post enough clout both to promote British diplomatic influence throughout the region, and to be able to compete with the local British governors. Killearn arrived in Singapore in the middle of March. Apart from his diplomatic activities during his two years in office—he played a key mediating role in the conflict between the Dutch colonial authorities and Indonesian nationalists—his primary, if less glamorous, task was to tackle the regional rice crisis. Throughout 1946, South-East Asia remained on the brink of famine. Burma, Thailand and Indochina constituted the traditio-nal ‘rice bowl’ of Asia, yet in 1946 the three countries only produced about 2 million tons of rice compared to the annual production of 6 million tons before the war. At the same time, the demand for rice by traditional importing countries such as India, China, Malaya and Indonesia had grown significantly because of the increase in their populations. Apart from the humanitarian aspects of a widespread famine, the governments of the region were extremely worried about the prospect of politically unset-tling hunger riots in their respective territories. Killearn soon assumed Mountbatten’s responsibility for the ‘equal and fair distribution’ of the existing rice stocks to the countries of the region. His intergovernmental powers derived from the Combined Food Board in Washington (superseded in June 1946 by the International Emergency Food Council, the IEFC), which was responsible for the world distribution of food after the war.18 As a first step, the new Special Commissioner organised a conference of regional food experts in South-East Asia, followed by a high-level conference of British representa-tives in the area. During these conferences initial plans were made to increase production, and to control the consumption of


foodstuffs.19 The two food conferences were succeeded by regular monthly meetings in Singapore attended by British as well as foreign representatives who were acting as liaison officers to their governments. By the beginning of 1948, the membership of these socalled Liaison Officers’ Meetings had grown significantly and included representatives from Burma, Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, Hong Kong, India, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore, Indonesia, Indochina and Thailand. There were also unofficial observers representing China, the Philippines and the United States. To ensure harmony between the attending representatives, the meetings strictly avoided political issues. According to British diplomats, decisions were made unanimously and no voting was ever necessary.20 In fact, Killearn’s international Liaison Officers’ Meetings soon became his chief instrument in dealing with short-term food problems in South-East Asia. The meetings’ main aim was to agree on the fair distribution of the available rice supplies in South-East Asia allocated by the IEFC. The attending officers also discussed ‘every problem connected with food which might confront any of the territories at any time’.21 To ensure close collaboration, the IEFC in October 1946 appointed a subcommit-tee in Singapore whose members immediately endorsed or amended the shipping programmes decided at the Special Com-mission’s regional meetings. The main reason why non-British territories regularly sent delegates to Killearn’s rice and food meetings was the simple fact that only the Special Commission’s Economic Department had the administrative machinery to prepare shipping and distribu-tion programmes, and to implement them once they were agreed by the Liaison Officers’ Meetings and the IEFC subcommittee. From the outset, Killearn had asked for sufficient staff to be attached to his organisation, including food and technical experts, as well as experienced administrators.22 Attlee and Bevin had agreed, and by April 1947 the Special Commission had a staff of approximately 500 people. Most importantly, the Special Commission had the support of Lord Nathan’s Rice Committee in London, which was doing a lot of the coordinating work for the Singapore office, for example by working out the movements of transport ships at a time when shipping space continued to be scarce.23 To give an example of the work of the Special Commission’s Economic Department, it was the job of the rice and cereals assistant to determine how far the rice available from South-East Asian sources in any given month would fulfil the allocations from these sources. If


required, temporary switches from one territory to another to meet ‘spot critical conditions’ were then arranged by common agreement during the monthly Liaison Officers’ Meetings, whose membership was virtually identical with that of the regional IEFC sub-committee meeting immedi-ately afterwards. Once a programme had been agreed, the shipping assistant, another important expert, would ensure the programme’s implementation. Coal was another area covered by the Special Commission’s economic staff, which negotiated with the Indian government, with the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan and, by liaison, with the London Coal Committee.24 In addition to the immediate problem of rice distribution, the Special Commission’s Economic Department also tried to deal with the longterm task of increasing the food production in South-East Asia. Apart from encouraging the cultivation of rice fields, for example in traditional importing countries, a number of regional conferences were held in Singapore dealing with special subjects. These conferences, like the Liaison Officers’ Meetings, were attended by representatives from British as well as foreign territories. The first such event was a Nutrition Confer-ence in May 1946 ‘to discuss ways and means of improving and supplementing the diet of the local populations on a scientific basis, and to prepare for assimilation of alternative foodstuffs in the event of a breakdown in rice supplies’. This was followed by the South-East Asia Fisheries Conference in January 1947, a Social Welfare Conference in August 1947 and a Statistical Conference in January 1948.25 Throughout Killearn’s term in office questions were asked about the Special Commission’s success in dealing with the rice crisis in SouthEast Asia. In the Malayan press, the Special Commission’s activities were seldom mentioned except at moments of rice shortage: ‘Killearn’s Empty Talk Does Not Help to Relieve Rice Shortage’ was not an untypical headline, and only the Straits Times in Singapore would draw attention to the difficulties faced by the commission.26 As Killearn wrote in his diary at the beginning of 1947, his commission had inevitably come in for many kicks over the food shortage, ‘but there was a moment when some of the gutter press went well beyond their limits of decent criticism—the main offender was the editor of the notorious Singapore Free Press, a most objectionable little bounder’. While local papers were critical of the continuing shortage of food, Conservative MPs in London complained about the high costs of the Foreign Office’s organisation in Singapore, which were initially estimated to be about £150,000 a year.


Despite this, the Special Commission’s regional distribution programmes played a vital part in averting famine in South-East Asia. According to Killearn’s final report to the Foreign Office, it was ‘touch and go’ throughout 1946, as it was uncertain whether the small rations on which the populations in the deficit areas existed could be maintained. In October 1946, only 55 per cent of the estimated available rice actually materialised. In 1947, the situation was never as critical, but rations in the recipient territories ‘remained at a level scarcely high enough to avoid starvation and serious malnutrition for the poorer sections of the community who had not the means to buy extra rice in the black market’. Killearn thus concluded that, on the economic side; ‘The achievements of the Special Commission may be summed up in the statement that famine was averted and that most has been made of every means towards the production and distribu-tion of foodstuffs.27 The Foreign Office accepted Killearn’s conclusion. Apart from coordinating the fight against famine in SouthEast Asia, the Special Commissioner soon became a chief advo cate of greater regional cooperation. Throughout his term in office, Killearn travelled widely, including to China, Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Indo-nesia, as well as most British territories in the region. He used his trips to discuss political issues as well as regional economic problems with national governments or the local colonial auth-orities. As will be seen, he also kept pushing the idea of increasing international cooperation in South-East Asia—if possible under British leadership. During a visit to Bangkok at the end of April, for example, Killearn told the Thai Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong how the whole of South-East Asia should become ‘some sort of bastion of civilisation’: I told him [Prime Minister Pridi] how, after the April Food Conference, we had talks with the Governors of the surround-ing areas, and also with our people from French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. It seemed to me vitally important that some form of political consolidation, of course nothing to do with territorial questions, should be set in train…. He said that he entirely agreed and would be more than ready to play up.28 Killearn also mentioned his ideas to a senior Dutch official in Indonesia, Van Byland, telling him in June that he


had in mind something really big and constructive in regard to South-East Asia. [Van Byland] only had to look at the map to see what I meant…. There was the whole stretch of SouthEast Asian territories strung out in a circle from Siam through Burma, French Indochina, Malaya and Dutch East Indies right up to and including the Philippines. I did not pretend to have crystallised my thought…but daily it seemed clearer to me that something really big would come of it to be set in train by the building up of all areas to form a valuable part of a new scheme of world security. Killearn admitted that all this was still quite vague in his mind it was his personal idea and he did not know how it would strike London. But he hoped that the Dutch and the Indonesians would end their difficulties, because the Dutch East Indies would have to play an important part in this constructive work lying ahead.29 Killearn’s ideas for regional cooperation also included outside powers interested in South-East Asia. During a visit to China at the beginning of June, Killearn told the leader of the Chinese nationalists, Chiang Kai-shek, of his ‘pet idea of a bastion of stability in South-East Asia and, God willing, in the Far East'.30 Australia, too, would have to play a much more important role in the area, Killearn telling the Australian Commissioner in Singapore, Claude Massey, of ‘the big idea, getting all the interested regions here jointly into consultation, with a view to a discussion of the future world lay-out’. The idea was that: Sooner or later we should all meet here in Singapore, to discuss our mutual problems, including representatives from French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. Also quite possibly America, owing to her special status in the Philippi-nes. Massey said he was well aware of this scheme, of which he personally approved most heartily. But he agreed that it was a matter that must be approached most delicately.31 Killearn also tried to win over Whitehall to his ideas. On 17 June he telexed a ‘Survey of Co-ordination within the Territories of South-East Asia’ to London. The report had the backing of both Mountbatten and MacDonald, the newly appointed Malayan Governor-General. To begin with, Killearn argued that South-East Asia would ‘continue to be a bastion of vital political, strategic and economic importance to the British Common-wealth’. Thailand, France and the Netherlands had territorial stakes in the area, while Australia, New Zealand and India


were interested neighbours. Furthermore, China and the United States were intimately concerned, and the Soviet Union might become active within the area in the future. The area was facing a number of potential threats, such as the collapse of law and order, the troubles in Indonesia, and difficulties with various nationalist movements as well the ethnic Chinese. Killearn recommended a coordinated approach to the area’s problems. What happened in one part of the region was of interest to all other parts, and a ‘reversion to the prewar system of handling these problems in water-tight compartments and penny packets would be a fatal step’. He added that in ‘matters of Colonial Administration cooperation should be encouraged between Great Britain and other colonial Powers in the Far East’.32 Killearn in fact hoped that the Special Commission’s Liaison Officers’ Meetings, which now provided for cooperation on the technical level, should one day deal with wider regional coope ration, including defence. As he wrote in his diary in January 1947, the system of monthly Liaison Officers’ Meetings was proving to be extremely valuable and had the advantage of ‘setting the example of how supplies of communal interest to the whole region can profitably be handled’. He added: What one hopes is gradually to proceed from subject to subject until all these adjacent territories form the habit of acting together to discuss and plan regarding their various problems of mutual interest. My deliberate intention is that gradually this system shall lead up into the realm of international politics, and from that into the most important sphere of all, namely regional defence.33 Killearn’s regional plans had considerable influence on the Foreign Office’s thinking. In April 1946, the Special Commissio-ner sent a telegram to London which reported on a high-level meeting of British regional authorities in South-East Asia. During the meeting, Killearn had stated that he regarded SouthEast Asia as an essential strategic bastion of the Commonwealth. Mountbatten had agreed, urging the necessity of coordinating thinking and action in terms of the area as a whole. The ensuing general discussion had furthermore emphasised the importance of carrying the Dutch, French and Thais along with the British. The hope of general collaboration with the United States had also been expressed.34 It is highly likely that Killearn’s telegram was shown to Ernest Bevin, and that the Foreign Secretary was particularly impressed by the Special Commissioner’s reference to South-East


Asia’s strategic importance. A few days later, Bevin was to attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in London, the first of its kind since the end of the war. He used the occasion to raise the issue of regional cooperation in South-East Asia with the governments of Australia and New Zealand. What Bevin primarily had in mind was the issue of regional defence cooperation.

Chapter 4 Regional cooperation and regional defence

The announcement of the rice crisis to the cabinet, and the subsequent establishment of the Special Commission, had made the new Labour Foreign Secretary increasingly aware of his department’s regional plans for South-East Asia. In April 1946, Bevin decided to float the issue of regional cooperation during a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London. How-ever, while he seemed to be genuinely interested in the long-term economic development of South-East Asia, his initiative was equally motivated by new worldwide defence plans of the British Chiefs of Staff, which had been drafted as a result of Britain’s deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union. By the spring of 1946, relations between London and Moscow had in fact reached a new postwar low. It had long become clear to the British that the Soviet Union had no intention of withdrawing from the eastern zone of Germany, and that she was turning East European countries like Romania and Bulgaria into mere satellite states. However, London was even more concerned about Soviet intentions in the Middle East. In September 1945, during the first Council of Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in London, a stalement had been reached over the future of Germany and the question of an Italian peace treaty. At the same time, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, had demanded that Russia should be given a base in the former Italian colony of Tripolitania (Libya).1 From London’s point of view, Molotov’s demand was a worrying indication of Soviet expansionist ambi-tions in the Middle East, where Britain could not rely on the political support of the Americans. The British were equally concerned about Moscow’s bullying tactics towards Turkey, a country that was linked with Britain by a prewar treaty of alliance. At the end of 1945, there were even rumours that the Soviet Union might be going to war with Turkey over the latter’s eastern territories and the question of the control of the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.


In March 1946, Anglo-Soviet differences in the Middle East came to a head. The focal point was Iran, where British, American and Soviet troops had been stationed since 1941 to guard the Allied supply lines to the Soviet Union. The with-drawal of all foreign troops from Iran was scheduled for March 1946, six months after the end of the war. However, Moscow announced on 1 March that it would delay its troop withdrawal. Furthermore, the Iranian Prime Minister was asked to recognise the separate state of Azerbaijan inside Iran, and there were reports that Soviet troops were heading for Teheran. Though the Soviets eventually climbed down and withdrew their troops in the face of fierce protests by the United States and Britain, the crisis finally changed the political atmosphere between the former allies. It happened to coincide with Winston Churchill’s famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, where he proclaimed the t an iron curtain had come down between eastern and western Europe.2 The Cold War had at last become reality. The developments in Europe and the Middle East had a significant impact on Britain’s defence plans, including those relating to SouthEast Asia. British military planners had long mistrusted the Soviet Union’s worldwide ambitions. During the war, the Chiefs of Staff had set up a special military planning unit, the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHP), in order to assess Britain’s worldwide defence requirements following the end of hostilities.3 By the middle of 1945, the PHP had drafted compre-hensive recommendations for the postwar defence of British interests around the world. The PHP’s main assumption was that the Soviet Union was the most likely adversary in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. A PHP paper of June 1945 on ‘The Security of the British Empire’ therefore proposed the creation of a number of regional defensive systems around the world, including Britain, the United States and in some cases France and the Benelux countries as participants. So far as South-East Asia and the Pacific were concerned, the Soviet threat was seen as remote. Despite this, the paper argued that Britain, France, the Netherlands and Thailand should cooperate in regional defence measures. There should also be a system of forward naval and air bases in the Pacific in cooperation with the United States and China.4 The PHP’s recommendations failed to convince either the Chiefs of Staff or the Foreign Office. At the time, neither shared the planners’ view that the Soviet Union was the most likely adversary in a future war, and the paper was shelved as strategic background material.5 The PHP itself was dissolved a few months later. However, in February 1946, in view of the deterior-ating relations with Moscow, the PHP’s

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND REGIONAL DEFENCE 55

worldwide analysis and defence recommendations were revived by a newly created Joint Planning Staff (JPS). In South-East Asia, the JPS argued that any direct threat to British interests in the region was most likely to come from the Soviet Union, with possibly China, Japan or both under her control. The JPS therefore proposed the estab-lishment of two defensive systems. The first would be a chain of forward air and naval bases in the Pacific, running from Hong Kong via Formosa, the Philippines and the Marshall and Mid-way islands to the Aleutians. They would be held by Com-monwealth countries and/or the United States. The second defensive system would be in South-East Asia and the SouthWest Pacific. Here, Britain, Australia and New Zealand, in cooperation with France and the Netherlands, would maintain an alternative system of bases along a general line from Indo-china, which had special importance for the defence of SouthEast Asia, through Samoa, the Celebes, the Admiralty and Solomon islands and Fiji.6 The paper’s main difference to the PHP’s proposals from 1945 was the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the regional defence of South-East Asia. The JPS paper was incorporated into two Chiefs of Staff reports distributed to the delegations attending the Com-monwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in April 1946. One paper, titled ‘Strategic Position of the Commonwealth’, argued that recent developments indicated that Russia was the most likely potential enemy of the British Commonwealth. Should a conflict with Russia occur, American participation on Britain’s side would be vital. The Commonwealth, it was further argued, depended on four main support areas, namely the United King-dom, the North and South American continents, the southern half of Africa, and Australia and New Zealand. To ensure the security of the Commonwealth, the Chiefs of Staff argued that it was essential to secure enough ‘depth’ in front of these four support areas before the start of a conflict, in order to win time for mobilisation and for American resources to be brought in. The areas that needed to be secured for in-depth defence and for the maintenance of strategic air bases were Western Europe and the Middle East, where Russian pressure was already evident, as well as India and South-East Asia, where Russian pressure could be expected.7 A second COS paper stressed that to ensure the Com-monwealth’s security, South Africa had to take on greater responsibility in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean, while Australia and New Zealand would have to share responsibility for South-East Asia. While in some areas political and economic action was required to prevent a


potential enemy from gaining a dominating position, in others the actual presence of military forces would be necessary. As this principle developed, it seemed reasonable that other members besides the United Kingdom should contribute to the efforts required. In short, Australia and New Zealand were invited to contribute to the defence of SouthEast Asia. London must have been aware of the fact that both Australia and New Zealand would be reluctant to commit themselves to the defence of South-East Asia, not least because of the costs involved in large-scale troop deployments. It therefore appears that Bevin, who as Foreign Secretary knew of the Chiefs of Staff’s proposals, decided to sweeten the bitter pill. In return for an Antipodean defence commitment to SouthEast Asia, he decided to offer Australia and New Zealand a larger share in the region’s markets. At the same time, the two dominions would be given a greater political say through the medium of the Special Commission. Bevin launched his regional initiative in his introductory speech to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting on 23 April 1946. He began by describing the ‘rising tide of natio-nalism’ as the dominant political factor in South-East Asia. As the people of the area were becoming better educated they realised the extent to which the West had in the past drawn from their resources which might have improved their own standards of living. However, Bevin postulated, the people of the British Commonwealth were now prepared to help the people of this area to develop their economy and raise their living standards. Later on in the meeting Bevin explained what he had in mind: South-East Asia had great resources while the general standard of living was low; the raising of this would be to everyone’s benefit. With an eye on the delegations from Australia and New Zealand he stressed that many countries were concerned with this area, that there existed a Vast and untapped’ market and that a coordinated effort in this area would be to the ‘common advan-tage’. Getting to the point, Bevin suggested that Singapore and the headquarters of Lord Killearn’s organisation were the focus around which Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India could build up the development of the whole area. The new organisa-tion, he hoped, would provide the meeting point for certain practical purposes, and could form a binding link between the different parts of the empire. So far, Killearn’s organisation was primarily concerned with food supplies, but further useful work could be done in the field of nutrition, broadcasting and publicity services as well as the coordination of


shipping. Bevin therefore proposed that the opportunity should be taken to discuss fully the possibility of developing the new organisation.8 There is little doubt that Bevin was genuinely concerned about the low standard of living in South-East Asia, that he was interested in a new relationship with South-East Asia’s indige-nous population9 and that he wanted to improve the regional standard of living through the provision of Australian consumer goods which Britain could not provide. On the other hand, though the records of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ defence discussions are not available, circumstancial evidence suggests that Bevin was trying to lure Australia and New Zealand into a defence commitment to South-East Asia,10 so that Britain could reduce her defence expenditure in the region. In return, he was offering the two countries greater access to the region’s markets (and implicitly raw materials), and a political say through the medium of the Special Commission. Bevin’s initiative played on Australian economic ambitions in SouthEast Asia. Prior to the war, Australia had, for example, had extensive tin mining interests in Thailand, but she had been unable to resume them.11 Furthermore, the idea of jointly developing the Special Commission seemed to fit in with Aust-ralia’s wartime proposals for regional cooperation in colonial areas. The Australian Foreign Minister, Dr H.V.Evatt, welcomed Bevin’s emphasis on the need for higher economic standards in South-East Asia, which he saw as important from the point of view of both security and welfare. He also saw great possibilities in the idea of closer association for regional purposes, and he suggested that in studying the subject earlier proposals made by Australia and New Zealand for the establishment of a regional commission in the Pacific should be included. Bevin agreed;12 the issue of regional cooperation in colonial areas was thus back on the international agenda. However, while the Australians favoured Bevin’s economic initiative, the two dominions flatly rejected the Chiefs of Staff’s defence proposals. During the conference’s fourth meeting the Australian Prime Minister, J.B. Chifley, stated that his country naturally accepted primary responsibility for her own security and that she was willing to make a greater contribution to the common defence of the British Commonwealth than before the war. But she simply lacked the financial resources and men to accept special responsibility for South-East Asia.13 Canberra thus expressed its reluctance to become financially or politically involved in the defence of Britain’s South-East Asian colonies. It disagreed with the British Chiefs of Staff’s assessment of a worldwide Soviet threat14 and refused to accept that SouthEast Asia was


threatened by any outside power. Chifley further suggested that he regarded the acceptance of the defence commit-ments demanded by the Chiefs of Staff as an impingement on his and other Commonwealth countries’ sovereignty.15 Attlee, who had not anticipated this response, showed himself ‘struck’ by Chifley’s comment that strategic requirements must be con-sidered in relation to manpower and financial resources. That certainly was the case with the United Kingdom as she had very heavy overseas commitments which were a great strain on her resources.16 Despite Attlee’s protestations, the British defence initiative had failed. However, while the Australians refused to commit themselves to the defence of South-East Asia, they maintained their interest in Bevin’s proposals for economic cooperation. On 27 April Chifley circulated a memorandum which suggested the immediate establishment of a South Seas regional commission for the promotion of welfare and the advancement of native peoples in the Pacific area in cooperation with Great Britain, a proposal dating back to Australian and New Zealand initiatives in 1944. So far as South-East Asia was concerned, Chifley’s memorandum recalled that consideration had been given in the past to a South-East Asian commission, including Australia and New Zealand as well as the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands and other interested countries, which would give at least some attention to air communications and the allocation and disposal of vital raw materials besides the more strictly welfare aspects such as health, nutrition and social and political developments.17 Though stopping short of demanding the crea-tion of a South-East Asian regional organisation straight away, the Australians had called Bevin’s bluff. As a result of Chifley’s paper, London was forced to define its line on South-East Asian regional cooperation more clearly. It also had to decide whether to agree with the proposal for a regional commission in the Pacific. Officials in Whitehall hastily arranged a meeting to work out the British response to the Australian paper. The problem was that Bevin had failed to clear his earlier proposals on regional cooperation with either his own department or the Colonial or Dominions offices. As civilian departments they were also unaware of the defence proposals by the Chiefs of Staff which had triggered Bevin’s initiative. Yet Bevin was unavailable for consultations as he had left London for the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris soon after the opening of the Prime Ministers’ Conference.18 Before the meet-ing, the head of the Foreign Office’s South-East Asia Depart-ment, Richard Allen, who appeared to be as surprised by Bevin’s initiative as the Colonial Office,


explained to the Colonial Office that his department was hoping to use Killearn’s organisation as a centre for cooperation with the dominions. The best course would be to inform the dominion representatives of how Killearn’s organisation was being developed and to what extent the dominions could usefully develop their own collaboration with it—over and above already existing cooperation.19 The Colonial Office agreed with the proposed establishment of a regional commission in the South-West Pacific but it warned of the dangers of international supervision inherent in proposals for a regional commission in South-East Asia. A departmental memorandum stressed that there was ‘a consensus of opinion that some form of regional collaboration in economic and social welfare matters is desirable in South-East Asia’; however, the area had not yet recovered from the effects of the Japanese occupation, while further difficulties had arisen through the clash between insurgent nationalism and the restoration of the French and Dutch colonial systems. It was therefore ‘unlikely’ that under the present circumstances ‘anything but harm would be done by the creation of an international body such as a Regional Commis-sion’. If at a later stage it was decided to set up a regional commission, it should fall within the scope of the Malayan Cover nor-General, not the Special Commission. Britain’s major interests in the Far East arose out of her colonial dependencies, which should not be ‘sacrificed to diplomatic convenience’.20 In line with the Colonial Office’s paper, the interdepartmental meeting on 2 May approved the suggested establishment of a regional commission in the South-West Pacific area. There was also consensus that in South-East Asia a regional commission could hardly be suitable for the time being in view of the abnormal and disturbed conditions there. Killearn’s organisa-tion, it was further agreed, could be seen as the first step towards the eventual constitution of a regional commission once SouthEast Asia had settled down to more peaceful and prosperous conditions. However, it was left open whether the Special Commissioner or the Governor-General would ultimately be Britain’s representative on a regional commission. In the absence of the Foreign Secretary, a brief was drafted on the lines of the meeting’s conclusions for the use of the Colonial Secretary during the Prime Ministers’ Meeting.21 During the interdepartmental meeting, Allen failed to follow up Bevin’s ambitious proposal to use the Special Commission for the joint economic development of South-East Asia. It seems that after the Australian refusal to contribute to the defence of SouthEast Asia Bevin had decided to withdraw his regional economic bait, and that he had


instructed the Foreign Office accordingly. Allen was therefore satisfied with the Colonial Office’s line that regional cooperation was desirable in principle, though at a later date. A further reason for the Foreign Office’s reservation was that the Australian proposals now under consideration went much further than Bevin’s suggestions, as they envisaged United States membership in a regional commission. The Colonial Secretary, George Hall, clarified Britain’s line during a Commonwealth meeting on 3 May. He stressed that he would be ‘extremely ready to see a regional commission established in the South Seas, and he suggested that the details should be discussed between the officials of the three Govern-ments’. Other countries, such as the Netherlands and France might be invited to join in at a later date. So far as South-East Asia was concerned, Hall said that a regional organisation of the same type was desirable in the area, though he doubted whether the time was ripe for such a body as civil government had only just been resumed. Lord Killearn had recently been appointed as Special Commissioner and his organisation might provide the nucleus around which a more formal organisation could later develop. In the meantime, Australia and New Zealand should attach special liaison officers to Lord Killearn’s staff.22 The British had thus committed themselves to the establish-ment of a regional commission in the South-West Pacific. From the Colonial Office’s point of view, conditions for such a body were much more favourable in this area than in South-East Asia. All the territories in the South-West Pacific were governed by colonial powers, while the indigenous cultures were at a much lower level of political and economic development than those of South-East Asia. Regional cooperation would be limited to politically safe issues such as welfare or health, and there were no independence movements demanding representation. Another factor influencing London’s decision was that only a few days earlier the British, Australian and New Zealand delegations had reached an understanding on defence cooperation in the SouthWest Pacific.23 Evatt welcomed Hall’s initiative, and soon after the end of the conference Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, the Netherlands and the United States started negotia-tions that led to the establishment of the South Pacific Commis-sion on 6 February 1947. Similar to the Caribbean Commission, the organisation was to be a consultative and advisory body dealing with the economic and social development of colonial territories in the region.24 The conference’s outcome for SouthEast Asia was less spectacular. Though Hall endorsed the principle of regional cooperation in South-East Asia, he refused to


establish a regional commission in the near future. The conference’s only visible achievement was the despatch of an Australian liaison officer to the Special Commission in the following month. The new appointment overlapped with the work of the Australian trade commissioner in Singapore, Claude Massey, who was already attending all important meetings convened by the Supreme Commander or the Special Commissioner.25 Despite the conference’s limited outcome on South-East Asia, the meeting had at least revealed Australian ambitions in the region. While Canberra refused to commit itself militarily to what it considered was the defence of British colonial interests, it nevertheless demanded a greater political and economic say in the area. In the following years, Australia would continue to promote greater regional cooperation in South-East Asia, emerg-ing as one of Britain’s main competitors for the region’s leader-ship. The British, on the other hand, remained primarily inter-ested in involving Australia and New Zealand in South-East Asian defence cooperation. Under the pressure of the Cold War in South-East Asia, London eventually succeeded. At the end of 1948, Britain, Australia and New Zealand secretly concluded the ANZAM treaty, an informal agreement which coordinated defence planning by the three countries in the South-East Asian area.26 In addition to the issue of regional defence cooperation, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting introduced another new aspect to the Foreign Office’s plans for regional cooperation. Prior to the conference, the Foreign Office had been thinking in terms of cooperation primarily with the colonial powers, possi-bly also involving outside powers like Australia and the United States. After the conference, Asian nationalism began to play an increasingly important role in Britain’s plans. As Bevin stated in his introductory speech, nationalism had become the single most important factor in Asia. More importantly, Whitehall agreed in the course of the conference to postpone its plans for regional cooperation partly because of the disturbances caused by the nationalist uprisings in Indonesia and Indochina. The confer-ence in fact marked a turning point in British planning. In the wake of the meeting and under the pressure of rapid events in both South and South-East Asia the Foreign Office would soon prepare the ground for regional cooperation in post-colonial Asia.

62

Part II Asian nationalism

64

Chapter 5 India, Vietnam and the limits of colonial cooperation

The year of 1946 was a turning point in the history of Asia. It marked the beginning of the end of European colonial rule in the South and South-East Asian regions. The Indian subcontinent was of crucial importance to the rapidly changing situation. After the late spring of 1946 there was little doubt that India was edging towards independence. Inevitably, developments in the world’s second most populous country had a profound effect on her neighbours, fuelling the nationalist aspirations of countries like Burma, Indochina and Indonesia. In addition, the establish-ment of an Indian nationalist government indicated that India would soon emerge as a powerful independent player in Asian politics who would compete with, rather than supplement, Britain’s Asian policies. In fact, India soon took a keen interest in the affairs of South-East Asia, at the same time promoting herself as the champion of the Asian independence movements. As will be seen, both the rapid advance of Asian nationalism and the emergence of an independent India would soon induce London to completely redefine its plans for regional cooperation in South-East Asia. Ever since coming to power, the British Labour government had been confronted with a potentially volatile situation in India. In November 1945, the Indian Viceroy, Wavell, told the new Secretary of State for India, Pethick-Lawrence, that he feared there would be another ‘Quit India’ campaign unless there was the firm prospect of independence. Britain had the choice between capitulating to the Indian Congress Party and accepting its demands, or suppressing the movement with the use of all resources.1 As the British had little enthusiasm for attempting to suppress Indian nationalism with military means, Attlee and his ministers soon privately considered handing over power in India, although hoping that the country would remain closely linked to Britain.


However, there remained a major stumbling block in the way of an Indian settlement. While the Hindu-dominated Congress Party insisted that India should remain united after indepen-dence, the powerful Muslim League advocated the country’s division into separate Hindu and Muslim states. To find a constitutional formula acceptable to all sides, Attlee despatched a special cabinet mission to India, which remained in the country between February and June 1946. It came up with a complicated proposal for a three-tier government of a Union of India that satisfied neither Hindus nor Muslims. Eventually, the Congress accepted the British initiative which led to the creation of the Hindu-dominated Indian Interim Government in September 1946, under the premiership of Jawaharlal Nehru. However, the Muslim League initially remained opposed to the British pro-posals, calling for a ‘day of direct action’ in the middle of August which triggered the first in a series of gruesome inter-ethnic killings in the country. When the Muslims subsequently joined the interim government, deadlock ensued over the country’s future constitution. As London saw itself unable to break the deadlock, the cabinet’s India Committee soon considered an early withdrawal from the country.2 On 20 February 1947, Attlee announced Britain’s intention to withdraw from India within the next eighteen months. Lord Mountbatten was appointed as the last Viceroy in charge of negotiating the transfer of power. After further ethnic clashes between Muslims and Hindus, power was transferred to India and a separate Pakistan in August 1947. Despite the clashes between Hindus and Muslims, the develop-ments in India greatly encouraged the nationalist movements in South-East Asia, in particular in neighbouring Burma. Since SEAC had handed over to civilian rule in October 1945, the country had been shaken by nationalist unrest. Unlike Mountbatten and his military adviser, Brigadier Hubert Rance, before him, the new British Governor of Burma, Reginald Dorman-Smith, refused to make concessions to Aung San and his powerful Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), who were calling for full self-government and independence. In line with the recommendations of the Burma White Paper of May 1945, Dorman-Smith insisted that for a three-year period his administration would have sweeping emergency powers, thereby giving Burmese politicians less of a say in their country’s government than they had had before the war. Aung San and the League soon embarked on a collision course with the British, organising mass protests which further destabilised the precar-ious political and economic situation in the country. DormanSmith threatened to arrest Aung San, adding further

INDIA, VIETNAM AND THE LIMITS OF COLONIAL COOPERATION 67

fuel to the dispute; soon there were constant clashes between the police and remnants of the Burmese guerrilla forces, while the Burmese economy and in particular the production of rice further declined. When the situation in Burma threatened to get out of hand, Attlee intervened, replacing Dorman-Smith with Sir Hubert Rance in June 1946.3 The decision marked the turning point in Burma’s struggle for independence. After widespread strikes in September, Rance appointed five AFPFL members to important posts in the country’s executive council, making Aung San the council’s vice-president. After further Burmese pressure and demands for national independence, Attlee announced on 20 December 1946 that he would enter into constitutional talks with a Burmese delegation in London and that Burma would be given independence within the next year.4 Although Aung San and his ministers were killed by Burmese assassins in July 1947, Burma was formally granted independence on 17 October under the premiership of U Nu, a former political associate of Aung San. On 1 January 1948, Burma left the Commonwealth to become a republic. Undoubtedly, the events in India and Burma encouraged antiBritish opposition in Malaya. Though there existed no indige-nous movement towards national independence in the country, the Colonial Office’s Malayan Union scheme had run into serious trouble after the British had pressured the often collabor-ationist Malay rulers to accept new treaties with Britain. The once politically apathetic majority Malay community was enraged by the proposed Malaya citizenship scheme which would grant equal political rights to Malaya’s Chinese, Indian and Malay communities. The Malays feared an erosion of their political privileges in favour of the economically dominant Chinese. The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), under the leadership of Dato Onn bin Ja’afar, soon demanded the replacement of the Malayan Union by a federal constitution.5 Malay protests culminated in a boycott by the Malay leaders of the inauguration ceremonies of Sir Edward Gent as Governor of the Malayan Union on 1 April and of Malcolm MacDonald as GovernorGeneral for Singapore, Malaya and the British territor-ies in Borneo on 22 May 1946.6 The events in India and in Britain’s South-East Asian territor-ies were closely watched by the Foreign Office’s Asian experts. Some argued that Britain needed to approach the problems of South and South-East Asia in an entirely new way. As early as May 1946, a memorandum written by a former Indian civil servant, J.P.Stent, who now served with the Foreign Office, predicted that in the next twelve to


eighteen months eastern Asia would cease to be a vast area of colonial territories. India was described as the key to the whole situation; the country had to be kept within the Commonwealth and on pro-Western lines at all costs: ‘With India and South-East Asia securely within the sphere of influence of the British Commonwealth and the USA, communism on the Russian pattern is much less likely to make headway in the Far East proper.’ Britain should thus launch an ‘overture of friendly cooperation on a basis of equality’. As a first step, the author demanded a ‘greater measure of coordination and interchange of views on foreign policy not only among the countries of South-East Asia but between them and India as well’. Eventually, Stent expected ‘the logic of geography and common interest’ would lead to some sort of close association between India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia and probably Indochina.7 The head of the Foreign Office’s South-East Asia Department, Allen, could only ‘warmly endorse all that is said about the importance of coordination between these territories, where there was a complete lack of it before’. Furthermore: As regards some closer association between India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China, which Mr Stent also favours, we have in a sense already advanced a step along this path…. Killearn’s organisation might provide the nucleus from which [a regional commission] might develop later. One of the important truths which emerges from Mr Stent’s memorandum is that any such Regional Commission would be meaningless unless it included representatives of an independent India.8 Allen sent copies of Stent’s memorandum to other Whitehall departments, but he failed to convince the Colonial Office. It remained opposed to any new regional initiatives in South-East Asia, whether or not they included India.9 The India Office also had its doubts, pointing out that the Indian leadership might not even be willing to participate in Killearn’s coordinating machi-nery in Singapore: the Indian leaders would probably view any such attempt to bring India within the orbit of Commonwealth policy with considerable suspicion.10 The India Office had made a valid point. Not only were the Indian nationalists likely to mistrust the British. They would be even more suspicious of anything that involved the Dutch and the French, as both these refused to compromise with the nationalist movements in their respective SouthEast Asian colonies. In 1946, Indian public opinion was particularly


critical of French policies in Indochina, and Indian leaders would not want to be seen as teaming up with unreconstructed European imperialists. Indochina soon became a major stumbling block to British regional ambitions in SouthEast Asia. Unlike the British in India and Burma, the French had never seriously contemplated making any real concessions to the Vietnamese nationalists in Indochina. By the time that the last British troops left southern Vietnam in the spring of 1946, the French had successfully suppressed the Viet Minh’s forces in the south of the country, firmly reestablishing French authority in Saigon and Chochin-China. But France had yet to regain control of the north of Indochina, which was still under nationalist Chinese occupation. While the Chinese had agreed to withdraw their forces by June, France’s real problem was that the Viet Minh, after proclaiming the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), had established themselves as the true power in northern Vietnam, equipped with weapons taken from the Japanese or bought from the often corrupt Chinese troops. When in the late winter of 1946 the first French troops were preparing to land at the northern port of Haiphong, they came close to an armed clash with Viet Minh forces. For the time being, an open conflict could be averted, not least because neither side was ready for a prolonged war. On 6 March 1946, the Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, signed an agreement with Jean Sainteny, who was representing the French, in which France formally recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a free state with its own government, parliament, army and finances, yet as part of the Indochinese Federation and within the French Union. The Vietnamese in return accepted the stationing of French garrisons in the northern province of Tonkin. How-ever, in the following months fundamental differences emerged over the status of the DRV. It soon became evident that France merely intended to rule with native support rather than cede any real autonomy to the nationalists.11 A further problem was the status of Cochin-China in the south which the Viet Minh insisted belonged to Vietnam but which the hard-line French High Commissioner in Indochina, Admiral Thierry D’Argenlieu, in June unilaterally declared a free state. Subsequent highlevel talks in Fontainebleau near Paris failed to achieve a compromise on either the issue of Vietnamese sovereignty or the status of CochinChina. After the departure of the Vietnamese delegation only a modus vivendi was signed between the French Overseas Minister, Marios Moutet, and the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, on an Indochinese


monetary and customs union.12 The future of Indochina was looking increasingly bleak. In the meantime the British, whose intervention in 1945 had facilitated the French return to Indochina in the first place, continued to support the French war machine in South-East Asia, albeit in great secrecy. In September 1945, London had in fact agreed to arm and equip France’s Far Eastern forces.13 In the spring of 1946, as Bevin later admitted in Parliament, Gracey’s departing troops also handed over ‘a certain amount’ of war material to the French.14 Furthermore, following a secret agree-ment between Paris and the British Admiralty, British vessels continued to provide logistic support for French supplies to Indochina. The agreement, which was unknown even to the Foreign Office, was crucial for the continuing flow of French arms and equipment to Indochina, particularly as there existed a worldwide shortage of shipping space. In addition to the pro-vision of transport facilities, the Admiralty was involved in the covert sale of ammunition for French warships of British origin used in South-East Asia.15 However, despite the fact that Britain was France’s main foreign arms supplier in South-East Asia and that British troops had ensured France’s return to Indochina, the French authorities in Saigon initially showed little interest in close relations with their British counterparts in Singapore. In trade matters as well, the French administration in Indochina soon resumed its prewar habit of discriminating against foreign banks and enterprises. As a Foreign Office memorandum pointed out in January 1947, it did not appear that ‘the French authorities contemplate throw-ing open the Indo-Chinese market to foreign trade at the present moment’—despite reports of a new proBritish mood in Saigon and Paris resulting from ‘the tactful way in which the situation in Southern Indo-China was handled (under the able leadership of General Gracey)’.16 Initially, Saigon was also reluctant to cooperate with Britain’s efforts to fight the regional shortage of rice. As Killearn reported to the Foreign Office in October 1946, Indochinese rice exports were essential to overcome the food shortage in South-East Asia. However, French administrators were highly suspicious of the Special Commission and of the International Emergency Food Council in Washington (formerly the Combined Food Board) behind it, and in July 1946 completely halted their rice supplies from Indochina—at a time when the food situation in South-East Asia was particularly serious. Killearn later concluded that the French had been stubborn and that they had not received any instructions from Paris.17 It was not until August 1946 that


a French official from Indochina for the first time attended one of Killearn’s Liaison Officers’ Meetings in Singapore. Killearn used the opportunity to test French willingness for greater regional cooperation, explaining to the French official, Clarac, his ‘dream of fuller consultation and cooperation…amongst all regional authorities within the South-East Asia area’, in particular French Indochina.18 Clarac reported the conversation to Saigon and Paris. One week later, Admiral D’Argenlieu invited the Special Commissioner to Saigon.19 Although an injury prevented Killearn from travelling, his deputy Michael Wright visited Saigon between 4 and 6 September 1946. Much to his surprise, Wright found the French authorities in an ‘extremely friendly and co-operative frame of mind’. They told him that they owed largely to Britain the initial re-establishment of their position in Indochina and that they fully appreciated the interdependence of British and French interests in South-East Asia and elsewhere.20 Wright replied that the British desired improved cooperation between the neighbourly and friendly countries in South-East Asia, and that a beginning had already been made through the Liaison Officers’ Meetings. In addition, a common approach with France towards security and other problems was required—there was for example the important question of the common use of airfields.21 D’Argenlieu replied that he would continue sending representatives to the meetings in Singapore and that he hoped to discuss increased cooperation on infor-mation and publicity matters. In defence and other matters, progress could be made on an informal basis. He further appreciated the impact of famine on the political situation: communism was after all the greatest danger, and failure to improve material conditions would play straight into the hands of the communists.22 As a sign of French goodwill D’Argenlieu subsequently sent 8,000 tons of emergency rice deliveries to Singapore.23 Shortly after Wright’s return to Singapore, D’Argenlieu travelled to Paris where he informed his superiors of his talks with Killearn’s deputy. His reports encouraged Paris to instruct an official at the French embassy in London, LeRoy, to take up the matter of South-East Asian cooperation with Esler Dening, who was back at the Foreign Office. Referring to Wright’s visit, LeRoy told Dening in the autumn of 1946 that, in addition to the monthly food conferences and to normal diplomatic consul-tations, there could be an additional interchange of visits and views between the territories facing the problems of reconstruction after the Japanese occupation. His enquiry was purely tentative, he assured, and he was aware that several Whitehall departments were


concerned; he would nevertheless be grateful to learn in due course whether London was receptive to his suggestions.24 LeRoy’s cautious approach coincided with an increase in tensions in Indochina. The negotiations between the French and the Viet Minh had reached a stalemate, and both sides were secretly preparing for war. By the end of 1946 the Viet Minh had an estimated 100,000 men and women under arms, controlling large parts of the countryside in Tonkin as well as parts of Cochin-China. In contrast, French troops in their Tonkinese strongholds, though better equipped for open warfare, numbered little more than 20,000.25 There is little doubt that Paris and Saigon were trying to improve relations with the British in case France needed Britain’s political or even military support in the event of a showdown with the Vietnamese nationalists. The British initially failed to assess the full gravity of the situation in Indochina. As Dening told the Colonial and Burma offices after his meeting with LeRoy, the problem was that ‘at a time when nationalism is running high in most areas in South-East Asia, a visit by French officials to say Rangoon, Singapore or Kuala Lumpur might not be welcome’. On the other hand, if dis-cussions were explicitly limited to economic and reconstruction questions, he expected no great harm to result: since France had manifested a desire for it, the Foreign Office did not wish to discourage the French from friendly cooperation.26 Indeed, LeRoy’s initiative also coincided with the start of AngloFrench talks on economic collaboration in Europe, which were helping to improve the flagging relations between the two countries.27 There were also negotiations on an Anglo-French defence treaty in Europe, the first in a series of military alliances signed under the shadow of the Cold War.28 Bevin, in fact, attached great importance to better relations with Paris, and Anglo-French cooperation played an important role in his plans for a British-led Western European grouping.29 The Foreign Office’s Western Department, which was closely involved in the current negotiations with the French, consequently welcomed Paris’s initiative on South-East Asia. Furthermore, as one official pointed out in November, ‘we have been doing our best to promote Anglo-French cooperation in the colonial field…we are of course entirely in favour of any step forward on the thorny path of Anglo-French colonial cooperation’.30 The Burma Office, however, took a different view. One of its officials, F.W.H.Smith, argued that French colonialism was unpopular in Asian nationalist circles. He was therefore not convinced of the political wisdom of closer collaboration with French Indochina. After


all, any official contacts by French visitors with Burma would have to be made primarily with the Burmese political leader holding the office of counsellor to the governor in respect of external affairs.31 Subsequent events in Indochina strengthened the Burma Office’s case. On 23 November 1946 a minor dispute over Haiphong’s customs control resulted in a French naval bombardment of the city during which up to 6,000 Vietnamese were killed. On 19 December Viet Minh forces retaliated and attacked French garrisons in Hanoi and in other parts of Tonkin. On 20 December Ho Chi Minh called for a nationwide people’s war against French colonialism.32 The outbreak of war in Indochina roused considerable antiFrench resentment in both India and Burma. Sarat Chandra Bose, a member of the All India Congress Committee, urged patriotic Indians to fight sideby-side with the Vietnamese as part of Asia’s struggle against Western domination, while leading members of the All India Trade Union Congress called for a boycott of French ships at Indian ports. At the end of January 1947, a violent anti-French demonstration in Calcutta resulted in 500 arrests and in 19 people being injured. Initially, Prime Minister Nehru was more cautious. He seemed to be apprehen-sive about Ho Chi Minh’s communist affiliations,33 and wanted to maintain good relations with France to secure the return to India of the French colonial enclaves along the Indian coast: Franco-Indian talks on the issue were to begin soon after the eventual transfer of power.34 However, increasingly under the pressure of Indian public opinion Nehru announced on 18 February that French operational and combat aircraft were no longer allowed to fly over Indian airspace.35 It took some time for the significance of the war in Indochina to sink in on London. At the beginning of January, the Colonial Office discussed Anglo-French cooperation in South-East Asia with MacDonald, who was visiting London. The meeting gener-ally favoured closer collaboration with the French authorities on technical problems, leaving out political issues for the time being. Any cooperation would have to be part of a regional system and should be dealt with in Singapore by Killearn and MacDonald. However, further action should be postponed until the situation in Indochina had become clearer.36 The Burma Office was even more cautious, warning that the current political situation in Burma was very delicate, and that recent correspondence about the passage of French military aircraft through Burmese airspace had further emphasised the unpopularity in Burma of French policy in Indochina. The Burmese Governor therefore felt it


inopportune to pursue the French proposal for high-level visits to British territories.37 The question of Anglo-French cooperation in South-East Asia took on a new meaning when France made an urgent request for British arms supplies to Indochina. Only one month after the fighting had begun, French troops were short of arms and ammunition and on 24 January 1947 the French Military Mis-sion in Singapore approached the headquarters of Allied Land Forces in South-East Asia (ALFSEA) for the supply of large quantities of arms (and ammunition) from British stocks in Singapore. Killearn, who until recently had been a leading proponent of closer relations with Saigon, now urged caution: a similar situation had previously arisen in Java, where only by great luck had the British managed to prevent the Indonesians from making an issue of British arms supplies to the Dutch. In view of obvious political repercussions Killearn therefore dis-liked the prospect of ‘laying ourselves open to the charge of supporting the French by supplies from Singapore’. Preferably, supplies should come from Europe, though even this might land Britain in extremely deep waters.38 London knew that any large-scale arms supplies to the French in Indochina could not be kept secret. Thus, the arguments for and against arms shipments were clearly cut: on the one hand there was the impending alliance with France in Western Europe, as well as AngloFrench rapprochement in South-East Asia, which favoured meeting France’s demands. Open British support for the French war effort would be proof of Britain’s genuine desire for closer relations with France, while refusing the French offer might jeopardise the Anglo-French alliance in Europe. On the other side of the argument were Britain’s Asian interests. India and Burma were moving closer towards selfgovernment, and London was keen on maintaining good rela-tions with the Indian Interim Government and with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. In view of Indian and Burmese condemnation of the French war in Indochina, arms shipments might have alienated Asian opinion and jeopardised Britain’s political prestige on the subcontinent. There was the further danger that Britain might herself be drawn into the hostilities in Indochina. Whatever Britain’s response to the French request for arms would be, London would have to decide between the priorities of its Asian and its European policies. Foreign Office opinion on the issue was divided. The British ambassador in Paris, Duff Cooper, wanted to meet the French demands in full. He argued that it was in Britain’s interest for France to restore order in Indochina, as a prolongation of the Indochinese situation would


afford a ‘stimulus to elements in our Far Eastern and other dependent territories hostile to all European control’. Another important reason was the forthcom-ing conclusion of an alliance with France.39 Cooper failed to convince officials in London. Gordon Whitteridge of the Far Eastern Department acknowledged that it was desirable to help France at this moment when an Anglo-French alliance was in the offing, and when contacts with the French authorities in Indo-china were being developed as part of British plans for regional cooperation in the whole of South-East Asia. However, he also believed the French were pulling against the tide with their policy in Indochina: the future was with the native people not only in Indochina but throughout the Far East. Britain therefore had to be careful not to stultify her policy towards India, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia by openly supporting France in Indo-china. Britain was under no obligation to continue supplying portions of French forces with arms. Whitteridge concluded that open support for a colonial power in a struggle against an independence movement would gravely affect Britain’s position in the Far East. The French should therefore be told that no arms or ammunition could be spared from Singapore, but that metropolitan France could be supplied from surplus stocks elsewhere. As a gesture of goodwill, the Treasury might also be asked not to insist on payment in advance.40 At the Foreign Office’s Western Department Moynehan agreed with Whitteridge’s conclusions. It was unfortunate that the whole issue had cropped up at this moment when AngloFrench relations on the spot were developing satisfactorily, and when an alliance was under consideration. Turning down the French request would no doubt lead to hostile criticism in France, but it would be a great deal less than the criticism that would be provoked not only in India and the Far East, but in Britain as well, if France were supplied with stocks from Singapore. In the long run, Anglo-French relations would indeed suffer more if London took action wrhich might start an outcry aginst French policy in the Far East. Moynehan added that: French policy towards some of their dependent territories is not in line with our own views. While we have every desire to work as closely as possible with the French in all these colonial matters we must not let the French, or indeed our own Embassy in Paris, think that the conclusion of the Alliance will necessarily mean that the French will be able to count on our support in their dealings with their dependent territories, regardless of the merits of the case.41


Dening subsequently summed up the department’s views in a memorandum for Orme Sargent, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. According to Dening, the Foreign Office’s telegrams and minutes brought out clearly the difficulties now facing London: If we turn down the French altogether, this is bound to have an adverse effect on our relations at a time when we are hoping to conclude an alliance. On the other hand, we do NOT wish the French or anyone else to suppose that we necessarily support their policy in their Colonial Dependencies.’42 The French made a further approach on the subject of British arms deliveries at the beginning of February. This time the British embassy in Paris was contacted about the supply of ammunition from Singapore stockpiles, which had long been the subject of secret negotiations, to be used by French warships of British origin operating in Indochina.43 For the Foreign Office, this was ‘the first inkling that we have had that the Admiralty were engaged in shipping ammunition to the French in the Far East’. As Whitteridge learnt from the Admiralty, the latest order had been placed by Paris some three months before but had not been fulfilled ‘because the French found our price too high and have been arguing about it ever since’. The Admiralty now wanted to know from the Foreign Office whether deliveries from Singapore could go ahead. Whitteridge stressed in a depart-mental minute that: In view of the urgency of the matter, we cannot wait to see whether the French Govt is in fact about to embark on a new and conciliatory policy towards the Viet Nam [Viet Minh], and I suggest therefore, that we should now tell the Admiralty what we have already unofficially told the War Office, that we are opposed to direct supply to the French in the Far East, but would have no objection if similar ammunition were supplied to metropolitan France.44 The issue was now referred to the highest political level. Dening explained the problem in a draft memorandum to the Prime Minister. Dissenting from the rest of the Far Eastern Department, Dening argued that at the moment of establishing an alliance with France, French demands should be met in full. France was suspicious of British indifference to French colonial interests, a frame of mind which dated back to events in the Middle East during the war when Britain more or


less compelled the French to grant independence to Syria and the Lebanon, and which had been revived by differing policies over the economy and future of Germany. On the other hand, Dening recognised that ‘we have to be careful that we do not run into trouble through supplying arms to the French from Singapore’; a decision was thus required: as to whether we should supply the French from Singapore in the interest of Anglo-French friendship, or whether in the light of possible repercussions in the Asiatic territories we should only agree to supply arms and ammunition to metropolitan France from this country.45 The Prime Minister himself made the final decision. During a staff conference on 11 February 1947 Attlee ruled that ‘we ought not to ship military supplies to the French from Singapore but that there was no objection to our doing so from the United Kingdom’.46 His decision has to be seen in the light of his policy on India. On 20 February, only nine days after his ruling on war material for Indochina, Attlee announced Britain’s intention to transfer power in India within the following eighteen months. Britain was of course deeply interested in maintaining a close relationship with an independent India in the sectors of both foreign affairs and defence—through either the Commonwealth or a special bilateral treaty.47 At such a crucial moment for Anglo-Indian relations open support for the French war effort in Indochina might well have wiped out the political credit that Britain was likely to gain in the subcontinent by announcing her withdrawal from India. At the same time, London did not want to openly offend the French immediately before the signing of a bilateral defence treaty. Paris was therefore told that Singapore stocks represented local operational reserves which could not be spared, but that the services departments would do their best to meet French demands from the British mainland to metropolitan France as soon as possible.48 In March, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Hector McNeil, told Parliament that no aid specifically designed for Indochina had been given to the French armed forces.49 He did not mention, however, that London had imposed a de facto embargo on direct arms deliveries to Indochina in order to prevent Britain from being associated with, or becoming involved in, the unpopular war in the country. As J.E.D.Street of the South-East Asia Department warned later on in 1947, if Britain’s public attitude contained even an implied criticism of French policy in Indochina, ‘we


should lose much, if not all, the goodwill which France bears us and which, in the condition of Europe at the moment, is so vital a factor’.50 Although Britain refused to publicly condemn the French war against the Viet Minh, the debate on the urgent question of arms deliveries to Indochina nevertheless had a profound effect on the Foreign Office’s regional plans in South-East Asia. While the Stent memorandum of April 1946 had made Foreign Office officials aware of the fact that an independent India would have to be included in a South-East Asian regional system, it now became apparent that Anglo-French cooperation in South-East Asia might well be incompatible with Anglo-Indian cooperation in the region. Cooperation with France had previously been at the centre of British regional plans. After the outbreak of war in Indochina, France was now becoming a liability to the British.

Chapter 6 Singapore and the ‘radiation of British influence’

The debate on British arms deliveries to Indochina and the developments in India inspired the Foreign Office’s Far Eastern experts to redefine their policies in the South and South-East Asian region. The department formulated its new regional strategy in a series of policy papers used as background for the Foreign Secretary. Though the papers never reached the cabinet level, they still constituted a major landmark in Britain’s policy towards South-East Asia. The first of the three papers was titled ‘Stock-Taking Memor-andum —Far East’. It argued that Britain’s position in the Far East had been adversely affected by three key factors. First, there was the British defeat in 1942 and the loss of considerable British territory to Japan, plus the fact that the Far East in general’ considered Britain subsequently to have played a relatively minor role in defeating Japan. Second, there was the factor that the United States had dominated the war against Japan, and that Washington now assumed the leadership in Far Eastern affairs, particularly north of the tropic of Cancer. Finally, there was the ‘tide of nationalism which pervades the whole area, and which received great impetus as a result of the war’. The paper stressed that Britain’s position would be further affected by the fact that India would probably become a foreign power in the near future, and that Burma would at best become an independent entity within the Commonwealth. In China, Britain’s prewar role had been virtually replaced by that of the United States, though a serious threat would arise only if the Soviet Union ever replaced the United States as the dominant foreign power in China. However, while Britain’s position in India and China was declining, the paper argued that her influence in South-East Asia was still strong: even in South-East Asia’s non-British territories, Britain’s leadership was tacitly, if not publicly, recognised. The area represented an important link in the strategic chain of Commonwealth defence, and it


provided products such as sugar, vegetable oils, tea and coffee for soft currency and could allow Britain to cut down her (dollar) purchases from hard-currency areas. Britain should therefore devote close attention to SouthEast Asia, in order to improve her position there. Despite the political troubles in Indochina and Indonesia: It should not prove impossible in the course of the next few years to build up a regional system, with Singapore as its centre, which should not only strengthen the political ties between the territories concerned and facilitate a defensive strategy, but also prove of considerable economic and financial benefit to the United Kingdom.1 The second Foreign Office paper, titled ‘British Policy in SouthEast Asia’, took a closer look at British policies and interests in individual South-East Asian territories. In Thailand, it was Britain’s main interest to promote stability and the development of democratic institutions in order to guard against ultranationalist governments like the one before the war, which by experience tended to discriminate against Western interests. The paper believed that Thailand’s liberal elements needed to be strengthened. This would help to maintain British trading interests in the country and ensure that in the event of any conflict in the area Thailand could be integrated into a (regional) British defence system. The situation in Indochina was seen as more difficult. Britain’s ‘cooperative attitude’ after the war, when she ‘did nothing to hamper French efforts to re-establish their sover-eignty’ was much appreciated both locally and in Paris. How-ever, the outbreak of hostilities in December and the continuing struggle between the French and the ‘Vietnam Republic’ had put Britain in an awkward predicament given her close relationship with France, and in view of the sympathies of the Burmese and Indian populations with the Vietnamese nationalists. There had also been little progress in the trade sector: British hopes that the French government would follow a more liberal economic policy and that Britain could extend her commercial influence in Indochina had met with little success. The paper recommended that Britain should promote any arrangements which provided for real long-term stability in Indochina; France should therefore resume talks with either the Viet Minh or the two nationalist parties. Almost predicting the Geneva settlement of 1954, the paper argued that at worst ‘it should be possible for the French to concentrate their forces and administration in IndoChina south of Parallel 16° while allowing the territories north of

SINGAPORE AND THE ‘RADIATION OF BRITISH INFLUENCE’ 81

Parallel 16° to develop into an autonomous buffer state between themselves and China’.2 In Indonesia, on the other hand, the prospects for the extension of British interests were far more promising. After her direct postwar involvement, Britain still had considerable politi-cal influence in the country: Britain’s prestige stands high there today. We came as a victorious power (unlike the Dutch) and we went when our tasks were completed without having sought to obtain any economic or other special advantage. Our disinterestedness, the restrained behaviour of our troops and the influence of two men in particular, Lord Inverchapel and Mr MacKereth, have strongly impressed the Indonesian leaders and intellectuals. However, Britain was not so popular with the Dutch who rumoured that the British had downed Indonesia in order to benefit Malaya’s tin and rubber industries, and who were cling-ing to their monopolistic commercial practices.3 The paper stressed that Britain had a unique opportunity in Indonesia. Before the war, British investments in the country had been worth £25 million, quite a considerable amount. The country’s economy was now run down after four years of Japanese occupation and eighteen months of bitter fighting after the war, yet it was not fully realised how much the great material resources of Indonesia were currently in demand. Exports on a prewar scale of the products of Indonesia would go far to relieve the world of some of its most acute shortages, such as of sugar, tea, vegetable oils and oil. Britain should therefore help to restore stable conditions as a basis for the country’s speedy economic recovery. Furthermore: It is clear that we have a remarkable opportunity in Indonesia to further British influence. It is perhaps a unique oppor-tunity in the world today since nowhere else do we find an area comparable in natural resources and population which is embarking on a new independent existence, which is eager to accept help and guidance from outside and which at the moment is looking to Britain to provide these things…. The main object of our diplomacy should therefore be to show the Indonesians at all times that we have their interests at heart and to guide the present leaders in the right direction.


The paper then turned to developments in Malaya, which were closely watched by neighbouring territories. Britain’s stock in the country was still high, and her attitude towards nationalist hopes in India, Egypt and elsewhere had gained her trust and respect. This had, however, been lessened by her handling of the consti-tutional question and of the situation in Sarawak. Everything therefore depended on successful negotiations with the Malays and the local Chinese on the new constitution. Furthermore, Britain should replace the old generation of colonial adminis-trators with younger men with a broader outlook.4 The paper finally turned to South-East Asia as a whole, where Britain should seek to extend her cultural influence. The nascent nationalisms following the Japanese occupation were looking round for a model, and although such models were being provided by Russia and the United States, Britain appeared to find much favour, particularly among the Indonesians. Having been cut off from British influence, the inhabitants of South-East Asia were now clamouring for renewed contacts with Britain and for instruction in English. The scope for the extension of Britain’s cultural influence was greatest in Thailand and Indo-nesia—in Indochina it was the French, and in the Philippines the Americans who were dominant.5 The paper concluded: All the Colonial territories of South-East Asia look forward to a future of greater self-government or total independence. At the same time they are looking to other countries for help, guidance and example…. We ought to grasp the oppor-tunity which this tendency gives us, firstly by promoting rehabilitation by every practical means, and secondly by offering them the advice and help they need in developing their lives on modern lines. Lord Killearn’s organisation, the paper added, should play a prominent role in centralising these efforts in South-East Asia. The Special Commissioner had already built up a system of cooperation with other British authorities in the area and beyond, and had taken steps towards regional collaboration by holding monthly food liaison conferences. Regional conferences on nutrition and fisheries had also been held, and there was no doubt that by beginning on a technical plane the value of regional collaboration had been demonstrated: ‘As confidence grows it should be possible to progress towards regional collab-oration in political matters also. Our aim should be to develop Singapore as a centre for the radiation of British influence.’6


The two papers thus proposed a new British approach to the affairs of South-East Asia. First, it was argued that Britain’s declining power in India and China could be compensated through the extension of British influence in South-East Asia. As Dening commented within the Foreign Office: With our imminent withdrawal from India and Burma, South-East Asia becomes of even greater significance as a strategic link between the United Kingdom, Africa and Aus-tralia. Though it is not believed that our influence will entirely disappear from India and Burma, its focus will be centred in South-East Asia, and geographically the centre is Singapore. It may well be that the closer contacts of the UK with India and Burma will be maintained through some organisation such as that of the Special Commissioner in Singapore, in view of the great distance from the U.K.7 Second, the papers stressed that rather than feeling threatened by the recent wave of nationalist successes, Britain should exploit the opportunities offered by the new political situation, by cooperating with the nationalist movements in the region. According to Dening: We must not appear to be ganging up with Western Powers against Eastern peoples striving for independence. Rather should our aim be to contrive a general partnership between independent or about-to-be independent Eastern peoples and the Western powers who by their past experience are best able to give them help and, in our case, to some extent protection.8 Dening regarded it as vital that Britain’s regional activities should be coordinated through the Special Commission, not the Malayan Cover nor-General’s office: a colonial appointee in charge of cooperation with foreign territories was bound to raise suspicion of British intentions.9 The Special Commission should also be given responsibility for policies in the ‘cultural’ sector. The Defence Ministry had recently indicated its intention to withdraw ‘white troops’ east of India and Burma except where it was necessary to build up local formations. In this case, Britain would no longer be able to influence South-East Asia through the display of armed strength, but would have to rely on the impact of cultural and information organisations on the local populations, bodies that should fall under the auspices of the Special Commissioner. Dening


attached particular importance to the establishment of a powerful broadcasting organisation such as the ‘Voice of Britain’; at the moment, the only com-petitors were the Americans, but one day the Russians might come up with a powerful station in eastern Siberia. By that time, a British station ought to have established its own audience.10 Dening’s recommendations were discussed during a depart-mental meeting with the Foreign Secretary on 8 February 1947. Bevin agreed with Dening’s appreciation of South-East Asia, stating that: We should consolidate our position in South-East Asia as soon as possible, and before the attention of the world was focussed in that direction, which would happen when the Japanese Peace Treaty came up for consideration, possibly at the end of 1947 or early in 1948. Bevin also agreed to maintain an organisation in charge of food allocations until at least the middle or end of 1948, and he promised to discuss with the Ministry of Food the desirability of extending the IEFC Rice Committee beyond 1947. When Dening drew attention to Colonial Office plans for the reorganisation of Malaya and Singapore under one governor, and the possible abolition of the Cover nor-General’s office, Bevin promised to discuss with the Colonial Secretary the question of the division of responsibility between Killearn and colonial officials. By impli-cation, this meant pressing for an increase in Killearn’s coordinating functions. Bevin was also keen on the expansion of Britain’s cultural activities in South-East Asia, both through the activities of the British Council and through broadcasts by the ‘Voice of Britain’.11 The Foreign Office’s stock-taking papers and the subsequent departmental discussions constituted a highlight in the develop-ment of Britain’s policy of regional cooperation. The Special Commission had firmly moved into the centre of the depart-ment’s regional plans. Killearn had started with regional coope-ration on the technical level, and it was hoped that his organisa-tion would provide the nucleus for a larger British-led regional organisation. As in 1945 and 1946, the ultimate aim was to create a regional system or organisation in order to consolidate and extend Britain’s political and commercial influence in SouthEast Asia, in particular in Indonesia. However, there were also significant changes: contrary to previous regional concepts, great attention was given to cooperation with the nationalist movements in South-East Asia. A further difference to previous plans was the enlarged geographical scope of a regional system, which was to include


India, Burma and Ceylon. In fact, one of the main aims of regional cooperation was to maintain close links with the countries of the subcontinent after their independence. In a nutshell, the Foreign Office was confident that in view of Britain’s assumed popularity with the Asian nationalists, London would be able to use the proposed Singapore-based organisation to maintain a high degree of political and economic influence in both South and South-East Asia. However, the three Foreign Office papers failed to address the question of whether France and the Netherlands should be included in the revised regional plans. Though Britain had quietly decided to stop supplying French troops in Indochina, the previous autumn’s initiative by the French embassy in London still required an official reply. In the middle of Febru-ary, the Foreign Office consequently agreed with Colonial Office recommendations that collaboration with the French should be limited to economic and technical subjects, leaving out political matters for the time being. This corresponded with existing Anglo-French collaboration in Africa. Furthermore, any collab-oration with the French authorities in Indochina should form part of a regional system rather than being conducted on a bilateral basis. Questions like health, which called for a regional treatment, could best be tackled by regional technical conferences that included the French. Moreover, any such Anglo-French collaboration would best be organised locally, i.e. by Killearn and MacDonald, rather than by the British Colonial Office and the Ministry of France Overseas.12 As Gordon Whitteridge of the Foreign Office’s South-East Asia Department pointed out in a departmental minute, no particular action regarding the French was required. They would continue to send representatives to the Liaison Officers’ Meetings and had been invited to the other conferences. Though a visit by Killearn to Saigon might be useful, it was undesirable in the present political situation.13 Back in Singapore, Michael Wright agreed with the Foreign Office’s line. Visits by French and British experts on rice, coal and economic matters were already going ahead, and there were periodic talks between the Special Com-missioner and the French consul-general in Singapore. He added: It is clearly desirable to promote collaboration with neighbouring territories in South-East Asia, and not least with the French who are important to us in Europe and with whom we have just signed an alliance. On the other hand we must be extremely careful to avoid giving any false impression of a policy of ‘South-East Asia for Europeans’. So long as there is no agreement between the


French and Asiatics in Indo China we must put each foot down warily.14 Dening, too, argued that Britain should avoid giving the impression of a European policy in South-East Asia.15 The French embassy in London should therefore be informed about the conclusions reached in London and Singapore. This should be done orally rather than in writing; after all, it had never been contemplated to ‘make a splash’ about it with the French. His own impression was that they were by no means unaware of the considerations which prompted Britain to move cautiously in this matter.16 The outbreak of war in Indochina had thus stalled efforts towards closer Anglo-French relations in South-East Asia. How-ever, since Britain never admitted that she had imposed a de facto arms embargo on Indochina, it did not prevent Paris and London from signing a military alliance in Europe. Though officially directed against Germany, the Dunkirk Treaty of 4 March 1947 was the precursor of an anti-Soviet security arrange-ment in Western Europe;17 its signing fu rther improved AngloFrench relations and helped to draw Paris closer into the AngloAmerican camp. The treaty also inspired closer Anglo-French cooperation in Africa; in September 1947 Bevin told the French Premier, Paul Ramadier, that he wanted to step up economic cooperation in the colonies.18 In December, the French responded by officially suggesting bilateral talks on economic collaboration in West Africa.19 However, the British continued to avoid closer cooperation with the French in South-East Asia, with London remaining primarily concerned about Asian nationalist opinion. As Dening told the Colonial Office in December: The question of regional cooperation in South-East Asia (not only of course with the French) has been very much in our minds, but we have rather steered clear of having anything laid on in the way of Anglo-French colonial discussions on Africa. This is of course because of the political situation in Indo-China. Our colonial territories in particular are nervous of any association with the French which might be interpreted by the national movements in South-East Asia as having political significance…. If the French should by any manner of means contrive a satisfactory political settlement in IndoChina, things would of course be different.20


While the prospects for France’s inclusion in a South-East Asian regional system were thus greatly diminished as a result of the war against the Viet Minh, Dutch hard-line policies in Indonesia had an even more profound effect on the Netherlands’ chances of being included in a British-sponsored regional scheme. In November 1946, the Dutch and the Indonesian nationalists had signed a compromise agreement on the consti-tutional position of Indonesia. Under the so-called Linggadjati Agreement—negotiated under British pressure and finalised only days before the departure of the last British troops from Indo-nesia21—the Dutch had recognised the Indonesian Republic’s de facto authority over the islands of Sumatra and Java. The Republic had in turn consented to a federal form of government for the proposed United States of Indonesia, which would be established not later than 1 January 1949 and which would be an equal partner in a Netherlands Union under the Dutch Crown. Though ratified in March 1947, the agreement was never implemented. On 27 May 1947, the Dutch put an ultimatum to the Indonesian side, asking them to recognise de jure Dutch sovereignty in Sumatra and Java prior to January 1949, and denying the Republic the right to conduct her own foreign affairs. After an Indonesian refusal to meet the ultimatum in full, the Dutch, ignoring the Linggadjati provision for arbitration by a third party, on 20 July 1947 launched a military campaign against the Republic. Within days the Dutch captured large parts of Java and Sumatra, failing, however, to destroy the bulk of the Indonesian guerrilla forces.22 The Dutch police action, as The Hague called it, put London in an awkward position. On the one hand, the British saw the aspirations of the Indonesian nationalists with sympathy. As the three stock-taking papers of February 1947 had shown, some officials at the Foreign Office hoped to exploit Britain’s compar-atively good standing with the republicans in order to extend British commercial and political influence in Indonesia after the end of Dutch rule. On the other hand, Britain had continuing obligations to the Dutch as former wartime allies. It was also in London’s interest to see the Netherlands regain both economic and military strength at a time of heightening East-West tensions in Europe. After the war, Britain had supplied the Netherlands with military equipment worth 40 million pounds. Though intended primarily for the defence of Western Europe, British arms supplies had been crucial for the Netherlands’ military build-up in Indonesia: by June 1947 about 90,000 Dutch troops had been equipped, and in Java some 60 tanks as well as 12,000 to 14,000 vehicles and a number of surplus aircraft had been delivered.23


However, the worsening of relations between the Dutch and the Indonesian nationalists between the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement and the beginning of the Dutch police action had forced the British to rethink their arms policies regarding the Netherlands. In May 1947, Attlee warned the cabinet that a Dutch resort to force would have serious political and economic consequences. Britain would be criticised for having brought Dutch forces back to Indonesia. An armed conflict was ‘bound to disturb our own relations with native populations throughout South-East Asia’; it would also delay for years the food exports from Indonesia needed to reduce Britain’s dependency on hardcurrency countries.24 In June, Richard Allen pointed out to the Foreign Office that ‘we are faced with the serious prospect of hostilities in the Netherlands East Indies in the near future’.25 The outbreak of war in Indochina had clearly made the British wary of Asian and, in particular, Indian opinion and the Foreign Office warned The Hague on 16 June that public opinion might pressure Britain to cut off the supply of war material in the event of the Netherlands resorting to force in Indonesia.26 The cabinet supported the Foreign Office’s line thus deciding in principle that Britain might have to impose an arms embargo against the Dutch.27 However, Foreign Office officials were still in the dark about how, and under what circumstances, to implement the cabinet’s policy. At the beginning of July, the Dutch authorities in Indonesia asked for permission to fly locally-bought British ordnance stores from Changi airfield in Singapore to Sumatra. Killearn asked London for guidance, arguing that: In the light of Dutch intentions and of extremely delicate position we are in as regards Asiatic opinion by reason of the fact that we have already supplied military equipment to the Dutch forces and stopped it to the Indonesians, my own view is that we should say frankly as each case arises that we are unable to furnish or facilitate transport of any further military stores from South-East Asia for the present.28 Killearn’s telegram raised once again the ‘thorny question of the Asiatic reaction to our policy in respect of the Dutch and the French’. As John Street minuted at the Foreign Office, it was well known that Britain had trained and equipped almost all the Dutch troops presently in Indonesia. ‘What is not so well-known is our constant pressure on the Dutch not to make fools of themselves by resorting to force.’ However, he added,


‘we cannot afford to forget that the Dutch are our allies in Europe’. If the Dutch had actually bought the stores concerned, Street thought they should be allowed to load them onto their planes.29 Gordon Whitteridge disagreed, arguing that even such local deliveries were likely to do Britain much harm in the eyes of the Asians, particularly as no deliveries had been made to the Indonesians. Stopping local deliveries would annoy the Dutch without affect-ing their ability to wage war; however, if things were left as they were it would be difficult to defend Britain’s actions.30 In this particular case, the Foreign Office decided that the Dutch could not be stopped from buying or taking away surplus equipment which Britain had put on the open market in Singapore.31 However, the stakes were raised dramatically after the Dutch police action in July 1947 caused a worldwide outcry against the Netherlands. India was one of the Netherlands’ most outspoken critics. The Indian press unanimously condemned Dutch aggression. Nehru, too, was highly critical of the police action, using much stronger terms than in the case of Indochina: unlike the Viet Minh, the majority of Indonesia’s nationalist movement was not communist.32 He insisted in a telegram to London that Britain and the United States should put pressure on the Dutch in order to end the conflict. In public, he made it clear that he regarded the police action as an affront against the whole of Asia.33 The Dutch resort to military force was highly unwelcome in London. It destroyed the prospects for a return to normalcy in Indonesia and for a resumption of full British trade with the country in the near future. Most seriously, it threatened to poison the political atmosphere in Asia less than a month before the transfer of power in India. Despite this, the British were forced to take a middle line, in view of their conflicting interests in good relations with both India and the Netherlands. Bevin told the House of Commons that Britain did not intend to lay the problems before the UN Security Council, but that she was hoping for other methods to end the fighting. The Dutch, however, refused arbitration.34 Further British efforts to negotiate a compromise solution failed when the Americans rejected a secret British proposal that London and Washington should jointly induce the Netherlands to accept some form of arbitral solution to the conflict.35 At the instigation of Australia and India, the Indonesian question was subsequently taken to the Security Council, which in the following months repeatedly tried to arrange a cease-fire. Following the Dutch police action and the British failure to find a compromise, London was bound by the cabinet’s previous decision to


implement an arms embargo against Indonesia. However, as the head of the Foreign Office, Orme Sargent, pointed out, the question was whether only arms deliveries to Java would be stopped, or whether direct supplies to the Neth-erlands should also be affected—to which Britain was committed in execution of her general policy of building up the Dutch armed forces in Holland for the defence of Western Europe. A public announcement that Britain would refuse shipping mili-tary supplies to the Netherlands was ‘likely to prejudice the readiness of the Dutch to collaborate with us in Europe’ and would cause deep and lasting resentment by the Dutch. It was also ‘liable to affect adversely our policy of standardisation since the Dutch might be led to adopt nonBritish types of standards of equipment and operational methods’. Sargent therefore suggested making the same distinction as in the case of Indo-china by announcing the stoppage of military supplies to Java only.36 The Chiefs of Staff supported Sargent’s line during a Defence Committee meeting on 23 July, but they failed to convince the Foreign Secretary. Bevin stressed that Britain had already offered her good offices to the Dutch; if a further approach failed, the provision of supplies and facilities in the Far East should stop at once. Furthermore, ‘if other action proved ineffective, it would be necessary to deny military assistance to Metropolitan Holland’.37 After Bevin convinced himself that his effort at mediation had failed, he told a staff conference on 28 July that it was now essential for Britain to announce her neutrality by declaring that no war materials would be supplied either to the Dutch or to the Indonesians. Nevertheless, supplies of British war materials to metropolitan Holland and for training Dutch forces in Europe could be continued. Bevin’s line found the support of Attlee,38 and the Foreign Secretary told Parliament on 30 July that his government had prohibited the supply of war materials to Indonesia. The embargo also banned supplies to metropolitan Holland which were intended for Indonesia.39 The terms of the Indonesian arms ban were much harsher than in the case of Indochina. The Dutch had to assure in the case of each British delivery that the supplied war materials were not destined for Indonesia, whereas the French, who of course had much greater international clout than the Netherlands, were free to do with their deliveries to the mainland as they pleased. London’s decision to impose an arms embargo on Indonesia meant that any ideas of primarily colonial cooperation in SouthEast Asia, which had been at the heart of both Colonial Office and Foreign Office plans in 1945, were finally put to rest. At the same time, the prospects for joint


European and Asian coope-ration, laid down by the Foreign Office only four months earlier, were greatly diminished. The wars in Indochina and Indonesia were poisoning the political climate in Asia, and Asian leaders continued to attack not just the Dutch and the French but the colonial powers per se. Britain could not escape the fact that so long as the conflicts in Indonesia and Indochina remained at the centre of world attention, the prospects for any kind of Britishsponsored regional system in South-East Asia were dim. Things were made worse by the fact that the Special Commission, which was at the centre of British regional plans, had recently come under threat by a series of unexpected international develop-ments. It is these developments that will be examined next.

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Chapter 7 Regional competition: India and Australia

The crisis in Indonesia demonstrated the difficulties of drawing India and other fledgling Asian states into a British-led regional system in South-East Asia. As the unexpectedly vociferous Indian reaction to the Dutch police action showed, Delhi would not want to be associated with a South-East Asian grouping that involved either the Netherlands or France. To the contrary, Nehru regarded mutual Asian resentment of French and Dutch policies as an opportunity to further India’s own influence in South-East Asia. It slowly began to dawn on London that, if Nehru had his way Delhi, rather than London or Singapore, would be the focus of any South-East Asian regional develop-ments. Indian interests in South-East Asia were historical. In the precolonial period Indian cultural and religious influence, in the form of Hinduism and Buddhism, extended to Burma, Thailand, Indochina, parts of Malaya and Indonesia, and even the Philippines.1 Indian merchants also maintained significant trade links with the area. Though the appearance of the European colonial powers reduced the cultural contacts between India and South-East Asia, it strengthened the economic ties between the two areas. Under the British, Indian labourers settled in Malaya, and the country developed into an important trading entrepôt for Indian goods and textiles exported to other parts of East and South-East Asia. Burma became an almost exclusive market for Indian manufactured textiles and consumer goods. In return, British India heavily depended on Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand and Indochina for imports of oil, tin, rubber, rice and timber.2 South-East Asia was also of great strategic importance to India. The Japanese invasion of South-East Asia and neighbour ing Burma during the Second World War reminded Indians that South-East Asia was a key for the defence of India against an invader from the north-east. While preparing for independence in 1947, it seemed almost natural that India would try to establish a maximum of political and economic


influence in South-East Asia, a region that was itself undergoing radical political changes. Nehru showed a keen interested in South-East Asia, which he had toured in the spring of 1946. Shortly after assuming office in the Indian Interim Government in September 1946, Nehru explained the principles of his foreign policy in a broadcast speech to the nation. First, it was to be based on the principle of non-alignment and neutrality between the European powers, in particular the growing conflict between East and West: ‘We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.’ Nehru then outlined a second aim in Indian foreign policy, namely for India to become the champion of the Asian independence movements and to assume a kind of moral leadership in Asia. He also seemed to be thinking of possible Indian associations with South-East Asia and the Middle East: We are of Asia and the peoples of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot of Western, Southern and South-East Asia. In the past her culture flowed to all these countries and they came to her in many ways. Those contacts are being renewed and the future is bound to see a closer union between India and South-East Asia on the one side, and Afghanistan, Iran, and the Arab world on the other. To the furtherance of that close association of free countries we must devote ourselves.3 Nehru soon put his ideas for greater cooperation with other Asian states to the test. In March 1947, he convened the informal Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi—attended by delegates from twenty-eight Asian countries, some of which were still under colonial rule. During the meeting, he publicly denied that India had any desire for Asian leadership. However, behind the scenes he proposed creating an interAsian organisation with a permanent secretariat on Indian soil. Western observers suspected Nehru wanted to establish India as the moral if not political leader of the Asian independence movements. However, Nehru’s plan failed to convince the participating delegations. The (nationalist) Chinese successfully lobbied against an Indiandominated Asian organisation, while the smaller countries of South-East Asia expressed their fear of both Indian and Chinese domination. Instead, some of them suggested an exclusively South-East Asian grouping. The Middle Eastern countries remained altogether uninterested and the six

REGIONAL COMPETITION: INDIA AND AUSTRALIA 95

attending Soviet republics largely abstained.4 Despite the set-back to his regional ambitions at the Asian Relations Conference, Nehru was to intensify his efforts in the following two years to create for India a leading position among the states of South and South-East Asia. Though Nehru was genuinely outraged by the Dutch police action in July 1947, it also provided him with a welcome opportunity to indulge in anticolonial rhetoric aimed at uniting the smaller Asian countries behind him. The United Nations was a welcome international platform for his policies.5 London was slow to grasp Indian aspirations in South-East Asia. Though the Foreign Office had acknowledged the fact that a South-East Asian regional system had to include the Indians, its plans from February 1947 underestimated Nehru’s desire for South-East Asian leadership. So far as the Asian Relations Conference was concerned, the British were initially apprehen-sive: the India Office regarded the conference’s announcement in September 1946 as a sign of the Indian Interim Government’s expansive tendencies in foreign affairs, and the Foreign Office complained about Soviet participation.6 However, when the conference failed to produce a permanent Asian organisation, London lost interest in the issue. It was only after India’s continuing agitation on behalf of the Indonesian Republic that the Foreign Office began to take Indian ambitions in South-East Asia into account. London also underestimated some of the knock-on effects of the Asian Relations Conference: the meeting encouraged a series of international initiatives for regional cooperation, most of which were directed against the European colonial powers. Weeks after the meeting in New Delhi, the Burmese leader, Aung San, called for a ‘South-East Asia Economic Union’ consisting of Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Indochina and Malaya.7 In June, the French proposed a rival plan for Pan South-East Asian Union’,8 though this was little more than a tactical proposal during Franco-Thai negotiations on the fate of the Indochinese territories annexed by Bangkok. In September 1947, a group of intellectuals from Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indo-nesia, Burma and Malaya officially founded the ‘South-East Asia League’. The league’s manifesto spoke critically of South-East Asia’s foreign domination and subjugation, postulating that the days of colonialism were past. It also claimed that there was an increasing sentiment among the subjected peoples of South-East Asia to ‘join in an effort toward a regional development of common interests’ as had been expressed during the Asian Relations Conference and in Rangoon with the late Aung San (Aung San had been assassinated on 19 July 1947). The


league’s primary aim was described as the achievement of unity among the various peoples of South-East Asia, leading to a ‘Federation of South-East Asia’.9 Though none of these proposals took off, they still demonstrated that Britain’s idea of Asian-European collaboration was being superseded by proposals for exclusively Asian alignments. Even worse, from Britain’s point of view, were the competing regional proposals by one of her key allies in the area, Australia. Ever since the Canberra Agreement between Australia and New Zealand in 1944 (see Chapter 4), Australia had shown a much more active interest in South, South-East and East Asia—areas colloquially referred to as ‘The Near North’.10 Australian inter-ests in a South-East Asian regional commission, expressed during the 1946 Prime Ministers’ Conference, were a further sign that Canberra—at a time when the political situation in Europe’s Asian colonies was in a state of flux—was aiming for greater influence in the region. When Nehru failed to invite Australia to the Asian Relations Conference, the Australians became increas-ingly concerned about being excluded from Asian regional developments. After Britain’s announcement on the transfer of power in India, the Australian Foreign Minister, Dr Herbert V. Evatt, decided to go on the diplomatic offensive. On 26 February 1947, he told the Australian House of Representatives: Just so far as the peoples of South-East Asia cease to be dependent upon the decisions of European Governments, so far do Australia’s interests in the councils of South-East Asia increase…. The time has now arrived when there should be formed in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific an appropriate regional instrumentality, concerning itself with the interest of all the peoples of this area. It should include the representatives of the peoples and Governments directly inter-ested in the problems of the South-East Asia area…. The proposed regional instrumentality will at least facilitate the free and rapid interchange of basic information concerning the problems of administration, education, health, agriculture, commerce and cultural relations.11 A week later, on 5 March, Evatt further announced that Australia intended to invite some thirteen countries, including India, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Britain, the United States, France and the Netherlands, to an interna-tional conference to discuss defence, trade and cultural relations in the Indian Ocean and in the South-West Pacific.12


The British were not amused. Evatt’s conference proposal interfered with their own plans and constituted a veiled threat to Britain’s lead on South-East Asian regional developments. Initially, British officials in London and Singapore were aware only of Evatt’s first speech on India and a ‘regional instrumentality’ in South-East Asia, not of his proposal for a regional conference: according to one official at the Colonial Office, conditions in South-East Asia were unsuitable for a regional commission similar to those in the Caribbean or the South-West Pacific. In South-East Asia there were the Dutch, whose empire was ceasing to exist, the French, whose empire was already much reduced, ‘and ourselves, whose Asiatic interests are undergoing an extraordinarily rapid change and whose position is bound to be affected by events in the French and Dutch territories’. He suspected that Evatt’s proposal would allow countries like India and the Philippines ‘to stimulate in our colonies that brand of nationalism which we do not want to go out of our way to encourage’. Furthermore, there already existed Killearn’s organisation which extended British influence through economic encouragement and guidance.13 Lord Killearn, who had been invited to discuss regional cooperation with the Australians and who was planning a visit to the country, regarded Evatt’s initiative as encouraging. But he doubted whether its contents and timing were suitable. Unlike the Colonial Office, the Special Commissioner did not seem to fear the inclusion but rather the exclusion of Asian nationalists from a regional organisation. He told the Foreign Office: We must in my view be very careful to avoid giving the impression that our policy is that of South-East Asia for the Europeans or, indeed for the white race. Yet if we were to proceed with proposals for a Regional Association before political agreement has been reached in the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China two of the principal territories in South-East Asia would be represented by European admi-nistrations whereas they ought to be represented by administ-rations of Europeans and Asiatics in partnership. Added to this was the question of whether Burma, Ceylon, India and China would have to be included, ‘and what about US and Soviet participation?’. Furthermore, the Indian government was sponsoring conferences on economic, social and other problems in Asia, while both India and China were playing for leadership throughout the Far East. In


view of these unresolved issues, Killearn recommended to wait until the situation in Indonesia and Indochina had become clearer. On the other hand, it might become impossible to postpone some form of regional associa-tion much longer, and something on the lines of Evatt’s proposals presented fewer disadvantages than others.14 When news of Evatt’s South-East Asian conference plans subsequently reached London, the British sensed a challenge to their position in South-East Asia. As Sir David Monteath of the India Office argued in a letter to the Foreign Office, Australian policy should be developed in concert with Britain, especially since the future of India was uncertain. It was British policy to steer India and Burma into a relationship in which they would cooperate with Britain and Australia, either within the Com-monwealth or as an ally. The precise formulation of a scheme for regional association would be premature before India’s consti-tutional problem was resolved and her position in relation to the Commonwealth was established. Furthermore, for Australia to try and impose a regional organisation with herself in the lead would be as little acceptable to the Asian countries concerned as similar attempts by the European powers.15 Four days before his departure for Australia and New Zealand, Killearn was instructed by the Foreign Office to find out exactly what kind of instrumentality Evatt had in mind and to explain the work of the Special Commission to the Australians. He should also stress that Britain and Australia had to avoid giving the impression that they were developing a white man’s policy for South-East Asia. Any attempt to present the Asian countries with a cut-and-dried policy of United Kingdom or Australian manufacture would ‘frustrate our main object of securing the wholehearted and friendly cooperation of India and Burma, whether they remain in the Commonwealth or not’.16 Killearn met Evatt in Canberra on 17 April, where he explai-ned the Special Commission’s functions and the regional work of the monthly food liaison meetings. When Killearn later on enquired what precisely Evatt had in mind with his proposed regional instrumentality, he got Very little new from him, maybe owing to his having gathered from my remarks at lunch that the Special Commission was in practice covering the ground which he had in mind, to some considerable extent’. According to Killearn, Evatt appreciated his warning to proceed with caution and to avoid any impression of wanting to create a ‘white man’s’ organisation. Evatt also agreed that the timing of new initiatives would have to await the clarification of the situation in Indo-china. At the same time, Killearn stressed that everyone in Singapore wanted to


see Australia more closely associated with British activities, and that there were great commercial and trade opportunities for Australia in South-East Asia.17 Killearn’s talks in Canberra gave the Foreign Office the impression that Evatt had not been fully informed of the extent of regional collaboration already achieved by the Special Com-mission.18 As Allen minuted: Dr Evatt seems to have discovered that most of the ‘instrumentality’ after which he hankers (under Australian leadership) already exists under the aegis of the Special Commissioner and UK leadership. He may not greatly care for this but on the other hand it may be difficult for him not to accept this situation with a good grace. Allen also pointed out that New Zealand opposed Australian designs to play a greater role in Asia.19 New Zealand’s Secretary for External Affairs, McIntosh, had informed Britain of recent talks with Evatt and J.W.Burton, the head of Australia’s External Affairs Department. According to the New Zealander, Evatt hoped that countries like India, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, which were steadily moving towards self-government and independence, could be induced to turn to Australia for guidance, help and leadership which they would prefer not to seek from the West. He saw this as the basis of Evatt’s policy of ‘currying favour with Nationalists in these countries’. At the same time, the Australians seemed to have given little thought to what might be on the agenda of their proposed South-East Asian regional conference. McIntosh had replied that his country feared that supporting the ‘resurgent Nationalist Eastern peoples would result in New Zealand (and Australia) becoming tiny white islands in a large coloured sea’. New Zealand opposed watertight regional arrangements and preferred wider organisations such as the United Nations.20 Killearn’s talks in Australia and the report by McIntosh gave London the impression that the Australian proposals were only half-baked. Evatt had been unaware of the Special Commission’s regional work, despite the fact that the Australian Commissioner in Singapore had been working closely with Killearn ever since the latter’s arrival in SouthEast Asia. When Killearn stopped over in Canberra on 13 June during his return trip from New Zealand, Evatt no longer mentioned his regional plans.21 He was increasingly preoccupied with a forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in Canberra, scheduled for 26 August. The


meeting had been arranged to prepare a common Commonwealth line on the question of a Japanese peace treaty, another area of AngloAustralian disagreement.22 Since Evatt was to chair the meeting, it seems that his desire for an international conference in Australia which would deal with Asian issues was at least partly fulfilled, and that he therefore dropped his plans for a South-East Asian conference. During the Canberra Conference, the issue of regional cooperation was not discussed. Despite the failure of his South-East Asian initiative, Evatt had made it clear that Canberra was demanding a greater say in the affairs of South and South-East Asia. Britain was watching this increasingly independent line in Australia’s foreign policy with some concern. According to a Foreign Office minute of the end of May 1947: [Evatt’s] present policy is to keep in with the present natio-nalist movements…with the idea that Australia might be able to take over leadership from the present European occupying powers. He would in fact like to be in on the ground floor. New Zealand on the other hand would prefer to stick to the United Nations and British Commonwealth.23 However, as Dening pointed out: We must not lose sight of the consideration that Australia may not always be Dr Evatt. While Dr Evatt dominates Australia’s foreign policy, I think it can be said that the broad aim is to put Australia in the foreground of the picture wherever it can be managed, I don’t think he really judges any prior grouping by what area it covers, but by how far Australia can predomi-nate in it.24 In the following months and years, Canberra continued to seek greater influence in South-East Asia. Like Nehru, the Australians used the Dutch police action in July 1947 to woo the Asian nationalist movements. Canberra sharply condemned the Dutch offensive and jointly with India took the Indonesian problem to the Security Council. The Indonesian Republic subsequently nominated Australia as its member of the UN’s Good Offices Committee—the Netherlands nominated Belgium and both sides picked the United States as third member. However, there were limits to Australian ambitions in Asia. Many Asians resented Australia’s traditional ‘White Australia’ policy, which severely restricted Asian immigration into the country. In June


1948, for example, an Australian goodwill mission to South-East Asia nearly ended in failure because of the recent expulsion from Australia of a group of Malayan seamen.25 Despite this, the Australians, like the Indians, would refuse to give up their regional ambitions.

102

Chapter 8 Regional competition: the United Nations and ECAFE

While in 1947, neither India nor Australia managed to overtake Britain’s lead in organising regional cooperation in South-East Asia, a serious challenge to the Special Commission emerged through the body of the recently created United Nations Orga-nisation. After little advance warning, the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) decided on 19 March 1947 to establish the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), covering South, East and South-East Asia. ECAFE constituted the most serious threat so far to Britain’s regional plans, as it was intent on taking over the coordinating functions previously performed by the Special Commission in Singapore. Plans for ECAFE dated back to a joint proposal by Britain, the United States and Poland in 1946 to establish an Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in order to meet the challenge of wartime devastation. (The Polish socialist and peasant parties were keen on maintaining economic ties with the West.) The ECE was intended to bring together existing European economic bodies, such as the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, the European Coal Organisation and the European Central Inland Organisation. It would also continue the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which the United States had stopped funding because it was seen as propping up anti-American governments in Eastern Europe.1 When the question of an ECE was considered by the Second Committee of the UN’s General Assembly at the end of 1946, the Asian members of the UN, particularly China and India, made it clear that they would only support the proposed Economic Commission for Europe if a similar organisation was established in Asia. They were supported by the Latin American countries. Though most European countries doubted whether there was a need for an economic commission in Asia, they bowed to Asian demands in order not to forestall the creation of the


ECE. On 11 December 1946 the UN’s General Assembly recommended unanimously that: In order to give effective aid to countries devastated by war, the Economic and Social Council at its next session give prompt and favourable consideration to the establishment of an Economic Commission for Europe, and an Economic Com-mission for Asia and the Far East.2 The two commissions were now referred to the UN’s Economic and Social Council, which would have the final say on their establishment. Though the British delegation to the UN regarded ECAFE as unnecessary,3 both India and China lobbied hard in the relevant ECOSOC working group for the commis-sion’s immediate establishment. Since they were supported by the Netherlands, the Philippines and the Soviet Union4 , the Foreign Office instructed its representative at ECOSOC, J.P.Stent, not to oppose the Chinese proposal but to ensure that ECOSOC would have a free hand in determining the new commission’s compo-sition and organisation.5 However, London had failed to take the views of its officials in Singapore into account. Two months after the General Assembly’s recommendation on ECE and ECAFE, the Foreign Office still had not told Killearn about the current negotiations at the UN. When on 21 February 1947 London enquired whether Singapore knew of any useful jobs for ECAFE,6 Killearn was dumbfounded. It was the first thing he and MacDonald had heard about the proposed organisation. He told London that if possible the commission’s establishment should be prevented. The Special Commission’s Liaison Officers’ Meetings were themselves trying to extend their scope and could be geared over a much wider economic field. The IEFC had already accepted the Singapore meetings as its main instrument in South-East Asia, and had put this on a constitutional basis by establishing a subcommittee on rice in Singapore. Killearn therefore wondered whether ECOSOC, like the IEFC, could be persuaded to operate through his Liaison Officers’ Meetings rather than through ECAFE. The ECAFE project revealed once again the consistent determination of India and China (either separately or together) generally to oust us from leadership in this area. Both politically and strategically that seems to me highly undesirable. It also presumably means bringing Russia into the affairs of South-East Asia.7

REGIONAL COMPETITION: THE UNITED NATIONS AND ECAFE 105

Killearn’s telegram was communicated to the British delega-tion at the United Nations. From New York, J.P.Stent complai-ned that Killearn had not been kept fully informed of the fact that the General Assembly’s resolution made ECAFE’s establishment almost inevitable. British opposition to the plan would have had awkward political consequences and would at best have received the support of Australia, New Zealand and the United States. It was currently proposed that ECAFE should act as a coordinating body on all economic subjects and would normally take over all the unofficial conferences which Lord Killearn had been holding on matters other than food. Once it was fully established, it might also take over his food-coordinating functions.8 Stent’s comments did not go down well in London, as they implied the abolition of the Special Commission. The Foreign Office there-fore responded that it had ‘serious doubts as to the useful and practical work ECAFE could do’ and that it had ‘no desire to see it set up’. Stent should therefore ensure that ECOSOC would only despatch a field mission, which would report back later on. Failing this, he should make sure that the commission’s main functions were confined to fact-finding.9 By the time that the Foreign Office’s objections reached New York, the ECAFE Working Group had already decided in favour of the immediate establishment of ECAFE. Stent, who had officially supported the decision, refused to take the blame, complaining to London that his conflicting instructions could have been avoided had the South-East Asian authorities been informed earlier on. Killearn’s opposition to ECAFE had so clearly been based on misapprehensions that it had not occurred to the British delegation that his views could be endorsed by the British government. The first suggestion that London shared Killearn’s views had reached Stent too late for him to act accordingly: If, as a result of this sequence of events, I am found to have committed HMG to a course of action which they do not wholly approve, I hope at least that I may be personally acquitted of exceeding instructions which I did not receive in time to make use of them.10 Though the Foreign Office subsequently admitted that some of its instructions to Stent had not been sufficiently explicit,11 it was too late to prevent the new organisation. On 19 March 1947, ECOSOC unanimously approved the establishment of ECAFE, following an earlier decision in favour of ECE.12 According to Lalita Prasad Singh, a


leading historian on ECAFE, the decision was a ‘concrete recognition by the world organisation of the political renaissance of Asia’.13 It certainly was a diplomatic victory for India and China, who had lobbied hard to push the commission through. It was, however, less certain whether the organisation would ever achieve anything in practice. Its official instructions were vaguely worded as helping to facilitate ‘concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Asia and the Far East’, while strengthening the economic relations between the countries of the area and the rest of the world. ECAFE would also sponsor economic and technological studies relevant to Asia and the Far East, as well as the collection of economic, technological and statistical information.14 ECAFE’s terms of reference covered vast parts of the Asian continent. By definition, Asia and the Far East included in the first instance British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, the Malayan Union and Singapore, Hong Kong, Burma and Ceylon, the Indochinese Federation, the Netherlands East Indies (Indo-nesia), India, China, the Philippines and Thailand. Only four of these countries and territories were also full members of the commission; namely India, China, the Philippines and Thailand. To this were added the region’s three colonial powers, Britain, France and the Netherlands; as well as the United States, Australia and the Soviet Union. ECAFE’s organisational structure crystallised in the following years. Its main policymaking body was the commission, with its committees, sub-committees and specialised conferences. The commission included representatives from each member-state who met twice, and later on once, every year. Decisions were made by simple majority vote. ECAFE also had a permanent secretariat, which served as both research institute and service agency for the commission and its subsidiary bodies. ECAFE’s chief diplomat was the commission’s Executive Secretary and head of the secretariat.15 (By 1981 ECAFE’s name had been changed to Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), including thirty-five countries as members.) From the outset, ECAFE was hampered by its lack of clearly defined tasks and powers. Rather than tackling the problems of postwar relief, ECAFE was limited to giving advice on long-term economic developments, and to the promotion of research and the collection of data. It lacked the funds to finance large-scale development programmes, and hopes by countries like China that the commission could serve as a clearing house for interna-tional aid were soon dashed by the United States.16 While ECAFE’s economic impact was thus limited, it did, however, assume some importance as an international


political forum. India soon used ECAFE as a platform for the propagation of Asian independence, for example by lobbying for the inclusion of the Indonesian Republic as an associate member of ECAFE. In later years, ECAFE sessions were increasingly affected by Cold War rhetoric between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Following ECAFE’s creation in 1947, London soon changed its negative line in favour of giving pragmatic support to the new commission.17 Its change of heart was inspired by Killearn, who maintained his reservations but argued that now that the decision to set up ECAFE had been taken there was no going back on it: How we can best turn ECAFE to advantage will no doubt emerge more clearly as time goes on. But I should certainly favour His Majesty’s Government taking a leading part in it. I should also welcome from the outset close and friendly contact between this mission and ECAFE.18 However, he regarded it as vital that a reference to the Special Commission be included in ECAFE’s terms of reference, in order to safeguard Killearn’s organisation against interference by the new commission.19 In other words: ECAFE would have to be prevented from affecting Britain’s regional plans in general, and the Special Commission in particular. A special interdepartmental Working Party on ECAFE, set up in Whitehall, agreed that Britain should attempt to ‘guide the commission along practical lines’, but that the British delegation to the first ECAFE session in Shanghai should consult London before agreeing to any expansion of the commission’s activities.20 The British delegation to ECAFE was also told that the commis-sion should be confined to practical tasks which would not interfere with Britain’s own reconstruction efforts in Asia.21 However, a British proposal at ECAFE’s first session in July 1947, aimed at establishing a formal relationship between ECAFE and the Special Commission, was turned down not only by the Asian countries and the Soviet Union but also by the United States.22 During a follow-up meeting in New York, the British refrained from launching a further initiative, to avoid another defeat on the issue.23 The hostility against the Special Commission came as a surprise to London. It showed that while the Special Commis-sion was popular at the regional level, it was regarded with the greatest suspicion at the United Nations. Should it ever have come to a diplomatic showdown


between Britain’s and the UN’s regional organisations in Asia, the Foreign Office must have been aware that the latter would undoubtedly have maintained the upper hand. Though ECAFE still lacked clear tasks and functions, its UN background gave it legitimacy as a truly intergovernmental organisation. The Special Commission might have performed some useful coordinating work in the field of food distribution, but it was funded and run by London and was therefore unable to shake off the stigma of British imperialism. The muddle at the Foreign Office prior to ECAFE’s creation was thus beginning to show its negative effects on British policies. Had Killearn been consulted immediately after the General Assembly’s resolution in December 1946, and had the Special Commission’s requirements subsequently been taken into account, Stent could have been instructed to make the inclusion of Killearn’s organisation in ECAFE’s terms of refer-ence conditional for Britain’s consent to the new commission. In this way, competition between the two organisations could have been avoided, and the Special Commission might have received the UN’s sanctioning at a time when Killearn’s regional work was still crucial for avoiding famine in South-East Asia. How-ever, the Foreign Office had missed its opportunity. Lord Killearn initially failed to appreciate the force of the storm clouds that were amassing against his organisation at the United Nations. In March, he was still confident about the prospects for the Special Commission, writing in his diary: It appears that they are all in favour of keeping it [the Special Commission] on…. Malcolm said that when he was home he had been asked at the Colonial Office what his views were as regards the continuation of this commission and he had emphatically recorded his view that it would be entirely against the public interest to withdraw it for another four or five years. He believed that the Colonial Office had duly registered what he had said.24 However, Killearn was unaware that in London, too, his organisation and his own position were now being called into question. Since the summer of 1946 there had been constant complaints in the British press and by Conservative MPs about the Special Commission’s rising running costs. At the end of July 1946, Killearn had a staff of approximately 200, and his organisa-tion’s total annual cost was estimated at £150,000.25 Eight months later the Special Commission had turned into an even larger bureaucratic machine with a staff of 500


people in March 1947, including a host of specialists and administrators.26 London later admitted that the organisation’s total cost from February 1946 to 30 June 1947 amounted to £424,30027—more than twice the sum that had originally been estimated. The Treasury watched the Special Commission’s inflation with growing anxiety. Britain was facing an increasing pay-ments deficit in 1947.28 In January, £40 million had already been slashed off Britain’s projected defence budget to achieve some immediate savings—a reduction of 5 per cent of overall defence spending. However, the Treasury was looking for cuts all round, and the Foreign Office was asked to reduce its expendi-ture in Singapore. Killearn had estimated that in the 1947/48 financial year his organisation would have to spend £121,000 in wages and allowances alone. The Treasury wanted this to be reduced to £70,000.29 In March, the Foreign Office sent Richard Allen to Singapore to investigate possible areas for cut-backs. After his return, Allen reported that he strongly believed in the continuation of the Special Commission’s regional work. It was the focal point for the radiation of British influence in South-East Asia and might even be the starting point of a regional commission. It had also dealt successfully with the food crisis, but now that things were settling down, Killearn’s staff of mainly ex-Army personnel was too big. He in fact saw a lot of duplication between the Special Commission and the Governor-General’s office; there was presently the tendency for the Special Commissioner to insist that, whenever a new officer was appointed to the GovernorGeneral’s staff, he must have someone separate for the same purpose. The best idea would be to merge the two organisations. MacDonald had secretly agreed to take over Killearn’s functions while continuing his coordinating work in the colonial field. His distinguished political record meant that he would be welcome to foreign authorities, and forthcoming constitutional reforms in Malaya would in any case diminish the Governor-General’s responsibilities and enable him to take over additional duties.30 Dening was initially against a merger of the two organisa-tions,31 but the Treasury convinced an interdepartmental meet-ing at the end of April 1947 that it was the only way to significantly reduce Britain’s expenditure in Singapore. All the participants agreed that the amalgamation would not mean abandoning the policy of coordinating political, economic and cultural affairs throughout South-East Asia. The new merged post would be offered to Malcolm MacDonald, who would have a small ‘colonial’ as well as a ‘foreign’ staff. At the instigation of


Dening, the merger would not materialise until March 1948.32 From the Treasury’s point of view, the decision made financial sense. It would avoid the existing duplication, and it gave London the opportunity to send inspectors to Singapore who would examine further fields for spending cuts. The Colonial Office was also pleased, as it spotted an opportunity to increase its influence on the conduct of foreign policy in the region. A merger would also counter criticism of insufficient coordination between Britain’s colonial administrations in South-East Asia. MacDonald was a popular choice for the combined post as he was regarded as more than a ‘purely Foreign Office nominee’.33 Killearn, however, who was told about the decision in the following month,34 was incensed by the plan. He told London that it was imperative that the Special Commission remained an ‘FO organisation, under an FO man’. In the eyes of neighbour-ing countries, the Special Commission’s position derived from the fact that it represented the Foreign Office, and that it was not an instrument of colonial policy.35 MacDonald also doubted whether the time was right for the junction of his and Killearn’s offices, though he gratefully accepted the offer to take over the new post.36 Killearn’s former deputy, Michael Wright, who had recently been transferred back to London, also worried that the Foreign Office would lose some of its influence on the affairs of SouthEast Asia.37 Allen replied that the department had: no intention of losing [its] grip in that part of the world and that, as long as Mr MacDonald was out there, there seemed no real reason for our doing so since he was by no means a Colonial Official, but a distinguished politician who could view things from the angle of both departments.38 Unlike Killearn, the Foreign Office believed that the combined post would improve the coordination of British policies in South-East Asia. As Allen pointed out, the merger, in a way, achieved what had originally been planned in 1945/46: the appointment of one top official dealing with foreign and col-onial policy in South-East Asia.39 With hindsight, there is no doubt that the Foreign Office underestimated the damage that the amalgamation of the two Singapore posts would do to Britain’s regional policies in SouthEast Asia. As Killearn had pointed out, one of the main reasons why the Special Commission had gained credit as an organisa-tion providing for international cooperation was the fact that it was working independently from the Colonial Office. The problem with the amalgamation was that


it linked the interna-tional section of the Special Commission too closely to Britain’s colonial authorities in South-East Asia. A merger between Killearn’s and MacDonald’s offices was thus bound to reduce the Special Commission’s reputation as a quasi-international organisation in South-East Asia. Consequently, its chances of develop-ing into a larger regional organisation acceptable to the new Asian states were greatly diminished. As Killearn pointed out in a lengthy telegram in September: When Special Commission was first established there was a general assumption in neighbouring foreign areas that it was a thinly disguised agent of British National policy. This suspicion has been dissipated as a result of over a year’s working…. But when this organisation is amalgamated into a system with what cannot avoid being regarded as British colonial complex not only will suspicion be revived but it will probably be intensified and thus undermine much of our work in establishing system of wholehearted regional consultation without national bias.40 In fact, when news of the planned amalgamation emerged, it immediately affected the Special Commission’s reputation. In September 1947, London confidentially informed Australia, New Zealand and South Africa of the planned merger in Singapore.41 The Australians responded that they were concerned lest there was a diminution of the Special Commissioner’s work and of the ‘cooperation and goodwill’ built up over the past eighteen months. Canberra wondered whether the Special Commission could continue as a joint British-Australian responsibility; the Australian Minister in China, Professor Copland, might be a suitable candidate for the Special Commissioner’s post.42 The Australian response greatly annoyed London, which sent a polite refusal.43 However, the episode showed that the planned amalgamation was bound to weaken Britain’s chances of orga-nising regional cooperation, and that London’s regional competitors were only too eager to step in. In fact, the premature leakage of the planned merger to the press, also in September 1947, was to turn Killearn into a ‘lame duck’. It further raised the question whether London should continue to press for a formal relationship between ECAFE and the Special Commission’s international section. The alternative would be to use ECAFE, not the Special Commission, as the focus for Britain’s regional policy, abandoning the plans of February 1947 to turn the Special Commission


into a proper regional commission. In view of the UN’s hostility to the Special Commission, expressed at the first ECAFE session in Shanghai, Stent argued that Britain should give up the Special Commis-sion’s international functions at the time of the merger. The functions of the merged post would presumably be confined to coordinating the requirements of British territories and of the territories directly concerning them. Other functions, such as the collection of economic statistics and the holding of conferences on economic and related matters, should presumably be taken over by ECAFE.44 J.P.Clow, Britain’s representative during the Shanghai session, disagreed. His views were known to be ‘diame-trically opposed’ to those of Stent. Clow had little confidence in the new UN commission, which he thought was set up merely for reasons of prestige, and would inevitably be a useless body.45 The future of the Special Commission’s regional work was discussed by the ECAFE Working Party in October 1947. Stent pointed out that the Asian delegates in Shanghai had not raised a single voice in defence of Killearn’s organisation, regarding it as purely temporary, and assuming that its functions would be taken over by ECAFE. He therefore wondered how Britain could continue to support indefinitely ‘a regional commission within a regional commission’ where the larger was a United Nations body and the smaller was not. The representative from the Foreign Office’s South-East Asia Department, Kenneth Christophas, disagreed. The Special Commission’s international functions should continue under the new post, at least until ECAFE had emerged from the embryo stage. The Working Party agreed with Christophas and decided that individual members of ECAFE should be asked to support the Special Commission’s continuing existence until ECAFE was a going concern.46 The decision meant that London was not yet prepared to abandon its regional organisation in Singapore, together with the high political hopes that had once been attached to it. The Foreign Office subsequently asked countries like Thailand, France and the Netherlands to oppose as premature any resolu-tions tabled at the next ECAFE meeting in December which demanded an immediate transfer of responsibilities from the Special Commission to ECAFE.47 Furthermore, London asked ECAFE’s secretariat to make a statement at the commission’s next session on relations with the Special Commission.48 The secretariat agreed, and ECAFE’s Executive Secretary, Dr P.S. Lokanathan, subsequently visited Singapore for talks with the Special Commissioner. Lord Killearn, increasingly disillusioned about the


prospects for his organisation, told Lokanathan that the Special Commission’s functions would eventually have to be taken over by the UN,49 though ECAFE still had to show that it could function efficiently. In return, Lokanathan agreed to recommend establishing a formal relationship between the two organisations. Britain’s diplomatic efforts bore fruit during ECAFE’s second session in Baguio (Philippines) in November/December 1947, when the commission accepted Lokanathan’s recommendation to establish a ‘satisfactory working relationship’ with the Special Commission. The two organisations would exchange liaison officers and would inform one another of any economic confer ences they might hold. Eventually, it was perhaps desirable that some of the Special Commission’s functions should be assumed by ECAFE, though this depended on ECAFE’s ability to provide the necessary organisation. To begin with, a survey of the Special Commission’s work was required before possibly transferring some of its functions to ECAFE.50 Lokanathan’s proposal was opposed only by the delegates from the Philippines and the Soviet Union, who argued that the Special Commission was not intergovernmental. The British delegate, Christofas, countered that fifteen countries participated in the Liaison Officers’ Meet-ings, and that no voting had ever been necessary.51 As Stent subsequently reported to the Foreign Office, Britain had achieved her objective of obtaining ‘formal recognition for the organisation of the Special Commissioner in South-East Asia as an international economic body’, laying the foundation for a ‘rational scheme of cooperation between Killearn’s organisation and ECAFE’.52 However, at the same time Britain had accepted the fact that unless ECAFE turned out to be a complete failure, the UN’s commission would be gradually allowed to absorb the Special Commission’s regional functions. It is ironic that at the very moment that the Special Commission was recognised by the United Nations, its prospects of becoming a proper regional commission had all but vanished. Whether or not the Foreign Office realised it at the time, it had just abandoned the regional strategy laid down in February 1947. In Singapore, Killearn was instructed to maintain his rice, coal and edible oils activities for the time being, to continue with the Liaison Officers’ Meetings, and to retain the Special Commis-sion’s advisory services to British and non-British territories. He should only drop his monthly economic bulletins and leave statistics entirely to ECAFE, in order to prevent the feeling that Britain was unwilling to surrender anything at all.53 However, the Special Commissioner was becoming


increasingly bitter about the bleak prospects of his organisation, and about his forced retirement. He refused the governorship of Eastern Bengal as compensation for the Singapore post and criticised the Foreign Office whenever high-ranking British officials or politicians were visiting Singapore.54 Because of his alleged ‘propaganda’ against the proposed combined post, London decided to recall Killearn in March rather than letting him stay on until after MacDonald had taken over in May.55 The decision further poisoned relations relations between London and Killearn, who complained to the head of the Foreign Office, Orme Sargent: After sweating blood for you for 44 years it would have been much pleasanter to quit your Service with less feeling of having been scurvily treated. I know full well just how the Department (and possibly you yourself) feel towards me: I believe that to be largely based on perversion of the facts. But in any case it couldn’t leave me colder than it does. But it is sad -very sad—to leave a Service one has worked for nearly half a century, feeling as I now do about your office.56 Six weeks after Killearn’s departure, the Special Commission was merged with the Malayan Cover nor-General’s office. On 1 May 1948 Malcolm MacDonald was officially appointed Com-missioner-General of the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. He was given two deputies, one for his colonial and one for his foreign affairs staff.57 Linked to the foreign affairs side of the Commissioner-General’s office was the former economic section of the Special Commission, now restyled ‘The Economic Depart-ment of the Commissioner-General’s Organisation’.58 In June 1948, Lokanathan presented the third ECAFE session with a survey of the Special Commission which had been drafted with considerable ‘help’ from the British. The survey honoured the regional work of the Special Commission (now called the Economic Department of the Commissioner-General’s Organisa-tion), the organisation’s food and coal activities, its collection of statistics, its holding of specialised conferences and the staff of experts who were advising the Liaison Officers’ Meetings. The survey recommended maintaining the existing working relation-ship between the two organisations; there would continue to be an exchange of liaison officers and an exchange of the ‘fullest documentation on their respective activities’.59 The majority of ECAFE members endorsed the survey. Only the Soviet Union opposed the paper, describing the Special Commission as a purely British


organisation that was dominating shipping in the region. The fact that the Special Commission had previously been merged with the Governor-General’s office proved to be no problem after a British observer from the Commission-General explained that the change of title had not affected the commis-sion’s functions.60 London thus succeeded in establishing a working relationship between ECAFE and its regional organisation in Singapore at a time when the fortunes of the former Special Commission were at an all-time low. Though the Commissioner-General’s organisa-tion continued the coordinating work of the Special Commis-sion, MacDonald’s regional coordinating activities never featured as prominently in the Foreign Office’s South-East Asian plans as they had under Killearn. Two months after assuming office, MacDonald became preoccupied with the Malayan emerg-ency. He also temporarily took over as Malayan High Commis-sioner, after the death of Edward Gent in an aircrash over London on 2 July 1948.61 Furthermore, the Liaison Officers’ Meetings were slowly running out of things to do because of the improving rice situation. In the following year, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation dissolved the international rice alloca-tion system. Though the Commissioner-General’s economic department continued, the last Liaison Officers’ Meeting was held in November 1949. Britain’s hope of turning its organisa-tion in Singapore into a proper regional organisation had failed. At the same time, ECAFE never qualified as a viable alternative to the Special Commission. Its geographic scope was too big to organise effective regional cooperation. More importantly, it included the Soviet Union and served Asian politicians like Nehru as a platform for anti-colonial rhetoric. When, as a result of the Cold War, the Foreign Office subsequently decided to revive its policy of regional cooperation, a completely new approach had to be found.

116

Chapter 9 Western Union and South-East Asia

British regional policies in South-East Asia were in considerable disarray at the beginning of 1948. Lord Killearn was about to leave his post, and ECAFE was intent on assuming the Special Commission’s coordinating functions. Furthermore, Australia and India had tried to gain the initiative on regional cooperation while the Asian Relations Conference had fuelled demands by smaller Asian countries for exclusively Asian cooperation. Last but not least, the continuing conflicts in Indochina and Indo-nesia made the creation of a joint AsianEuropean scheme impossible for the time being. Even a British regional initiative that excluded France and the Netherlands would have been doomed to failure because of the anti-colonial atmosphere prevailing in Asia. While the prospects for regional cooperation between Britain and the new Asian states were thus low, there was mounting pressure from the Foreign Office’s Western Department to increase cooperation with the other colonial powers in SouthEast Asia. As a first step, it demanded revising the ban on British arms deliveries to the Dutch forces in Indonesia. The Western Department based its arguments on two new developments. Firstly, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic had signed the so-called Renville Agreement on 17 January 1948, which provided a truce between the two parties.1 Though the agreement constituted a humiliating defeat for the Republic2 —failing to solve the issue of sovereignty and recognising considerable territorial gains made by the Dutch—it satisfied the Foreign Office’s Dutch experts. They were convinced that the accord would take the Indonesian issue away from the world’s attention. In addition to the Renville Agreement, developments towards greater Western European unity instigated a reappraisal of British regional policies in South-East Asia. After secret fivepower negotiations, Bevin on 22 January 1948 announced plans by Britain, France and the Benelux


countries to forge a military alliance in Western Europe. Two months later, on 17 March, the five powers signed the Brussels Pact, promising mutual defence against an aggressor. No particular adversary was mentioned; however, it was clear that the ‘Western Union’, as it became known, was aimed against the Soviet Union.3 In addition to its military provisions, the Brussels Pact contained clauses on economic, social and military collaboration, in line with Bevin’s ideas on general Western European cooperation.4 Inevitably, moves towards greater Western European unity raised the ques-tion of whether, or to what degree, cooperation between the Western European powers would extend to colonial territories. The Foreign Office’s Western Department believed that the forthcoming Western European alliance required a re-orien-tation in South-East Asia. A few days before Bevin’s Western Union speech, it described the Renville Agreement as a good opportunity to lift the arms ban in Indonesia: From the point of view of our plans in Western Europe it is important that this obstacle [the embargo] to closer relations with Holland should be removed as soon as possible…. [We are] fully aware of the reasons which made the imposition of the ban inevitable in the first place, [but] its continuance when we are discussing a treaty of alliance with the Dutch will be to say the least anomalous.5 At the Foreign Office’s South-East Asia Department, J.E.D. Street saw some merit in the Western Department’s arguments, pointing out that the ban had been introduced to satisfy public opinion in Britain and to avoid incidents in Singapore and in other British Far Eastern territories. By now, British public opinion was concerned with ‘matters of far greater moment than Indonesia’.6 However, Gordon Whitteridge wanted to maintain the ban until a political agreement and not just a ceasefire was reached.7 The head of the South-East Asia Department, Paul Grey, agreed that it would be unwise to re-open the question of the ban, as the omens for a final settlement in Indonesia were still not good. Commenting on a Royal Navy enquiry whether British ships should be allowed to visit selected ports in the Netherlands East Indies, Grey argued: From the point of view of satisfying feeling in India and among the native population in Malaya as well as in SouthEast Asia

WESTERN UNION AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 119

generally, we do not want at this stage to suggest that we have gone over into the Dutch camp. The Dutch militarists, among whom I should include the Navy, do not want encouraging if a political settlement is to be reached.8 From Batavia, the British consul-general, F.M.Shepherd, supported Grey; the Royal Navy should refrain from visits which would be interpreted as gestures of sympathy towards the Dutch as distinct from the Republic—at least so long as the embargo was in force.9 Five days after the Western Department’s initiative, Bevin announced his plans for a five-power alliance in Western Europe that was based on the precedent of the Dunkirk (defence) Treaty between Britain and France. He indicated that the treaty was also of economic relevance to some of the European colonies, whose primary resources, raw materials and foodstuffs could be turned to the ‘common advantage of the peoples of these territories, of Europe and of the world as a whole’. Bevin stressed that: Europe has extended its influence throughout the world, and we have to look further afield. In the first place we turn our eyes to Africa, where great responsibilities are shared by us with South Africa, France, Belgium and Portugal, and equally to all overseas territories, especially of South-East Asia, with which the Dutch are closely concerned. The organisation of Western Europe must be economically supported. That involves the closest possible collaboration with the Com-monwealth and with overseas territories, not only British but French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese.10 It has recently been argued that Bevin was pursuing the idea of ‘EuroAfrica’ between 1947 and 1948. African colonial resources were meant to enable Britain to regain the economic lead in Europe, a position that was being threatened by the United States and her Marshall Plan. There would also be cooperation between the European colonial powers in Africa, in the first place between Britain and France, in order to turn the continent into a vital element in the eventual creation of a Third World grouping under British leadership.11 Whatever Bevin’s plans for Africa may have been, it is unclear whether he wanted to include South-East Asia in his plans for colonial cooperation. At the time, many Asian observers believed this was the case, alleging a colonial conspiracy in South-East Asia. ‘Is the Western Union also a league of colonial powers


to perpetuate colonialism?’ a promi-nent Malayan paper was asking at the end of January. The paper suspected that Bevin’s reference to collaboration with overseas territories meant that the colonies were to become economic appendages of European power politics.12 Bevin’s speech linking European cooperation to the use or exploitation of colonial resources was highly unwelcome to the Foreign Office’s South-East Asian experts. Apart from the fact that the Foreign Secretary’s remarks increased Asian suspicion of British imperial designs, the South-East Asia Department was concerned lest plans for Western Union encouraged the Dutch to demand an end to the arms embargo. As Paul Grey stressed at the beginning of February, it was undoubtedly an ‘anomaly’ that while Britain was proposing to negotiate an alliance with the Netherlands in Europe, every Dutch request for supplies to the East Indies had to be checked to see whether it was covered by the ban. Nor did the ban prevent the Dutch from carrying out their police action, and it was unlikely to prevent them from taking similar action in the future. On the other hand, the Indonesian republicans would ‘undoubtedly feel that the lifting of the ban was a further nail in the coffin of their aspirations’. Britain did not ‘wish to alienate nationalist sentiment in Asia, which it is our own policy to try to meet half way’. Public opinion in Britain and Australia, too, was critical of the Dutch. Grey therefore recommended maintaining the ban at least until the Security Council’s Good Offices Committee had reviewed the situation.13 Dening and Sargent agreed. Dening’s ‘own instinct’ was to do nothing for the present, particularly as the Australian attitude to Indonesia had to be considered.14 In March, the Treasury proposed lifting the embargo. There was progress in the UN’s mediating efforts in Indonesia: though the Dutch representative had failed to defend his government adequately against the charge of continuing to treat republican interests unfairly, the Security Council had approved the report of the Good Offices Committee; furthermore, the signing of the Brussels Treaty was imminent. At the Foreign Office, Grey personally wanted to see the embargo maintained.15 However, if it was decided to lift the ban then now was the moment to do so. As he explained to Bevin, the Dutch were trying to interpret Britain’s Western Union policy as an indication that London was changing its line on Indonesia. In South-East Asia, particu-larly among the Indonesians, there was a corresponding fear that Britain had abandoned her ‘sympathies for the coloured people’ and that she wanted to use the colonial territories to bolster the European economy. While lifting the ban would certainly be convenient, the


Foreign Office would ‘have to think seriously of the political consequences on opinion in the Security Council as well as in Malaya, India and South-East Asia generally’.16 Dening supported Grey’s line, arguing that ‘we have never at any time taken sides in the Indonesian dispute, nor do we propose to do so now’.17 Shepherd similarly advised from Batavia that a lifting of the ban would be seen in Indonesia as a ‘political endorsement of Dutch conduct of negotiations with the Repub-lic’. It would also imply that Britain would not object to the resumption of military action in the case of a breakdown of political negotiations. Politically, it would amount to taking definite sides at the moment when political discussions were about to begin, and it would strengthen the hands of the Dutch military commanders and thus tend to prejudice a reasonable and fair settlement.18 Killearn added from Singapore that if Britain offered military supplies to the Dutch, wouldn’t she also ‘be bound to offer them to the Indonesians and would not [the] Dutch take a poor view of that?’19 Two days before the signing of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, the Dutch ambassador in London, Baron Bentinck, told Dening that Western Union ought to make Britain and the Netherlands see eye to eye in South-East Asia, and that the British embargo should be lifted. Bentinck also mentioned the issue of regional security in South-East Asia. Dening replied that Britain was not yet in a position to consider regional security, particu-larly where non-British territories were concerned; one of the reasons was that he did not know what the Americans had in mind. Dening subsequently explained in a Foreign Office minute: I feel that we must resist the suggestion that, because of Western Union, the policy of the United Kingdom is bound to coincide with that of the Dutch or the French in South-East Asia. That is not to say that we may not some day hope to secure regional collaboration in that area too, but we have enough troubles of our own at present without becoming involved in those of the NEI or French Indo-China.20 However, the Foreign Office had underestimated the strength of Dutch feelings on the embargo. The Netherlands increasingly resented the fact that, despite the new five-power alliance in Europe, the British arms embargo remained in force. On 1 April, the Dutch ambassador in London told I.Kirkpatrick of the Foreign Office that a member of the Dutch Upper House had argued with some force that it was quite wrong


that an arms embargo should continue to exist between the two parties. Bentinck, under instruction from his government, therefore asked Britain to consider lifting the embargo as soon as pos-sible.21 Once again, London found itself in the dilemma of having to choose between its interests in Asian and in those European cooperation. Grey explained the problem to Killearn’s new deputy in Singapore, P.S.Scrivener: Indonesia, he argued, had become a test case. Not that India or Burma was really passio-nately devoted to Indonesian independence; that devotion was very theoretical. However, they were watching Britain closely ‘to see how far we would carry our profession of interest in the Indonesian people and [they] were alert for any signs that we would be willing to sacrifice what we professed to believe in’. The difficulty remained that: We have to associate more closely with the European powers than ever before. We have, at the same time, to undertake a complete reconstruction of our relations with the East. And we have to do the latter in the face of a growing nationalism and a struggle for dominance by forces which would seek to divorce the East from the West altogether.22 Despite this, Grey eventually advised that there should be a limited relaxation of the arms ban in private on material urgently needed by the Dutch. The British ambassador in the Netherlands had just confirmed how strongly most political parties in Holland felt about the embargo.23 Dening still objected to the lifting of the ban as premature, but agreed that Britain should offer relaxing the ban on non-lethal equipment.24 Sargent went even further and suggested publicly withdrawing the embargo: A great deal of water has flown under the bridges since it [the embargo] was imposed and I cannot believe that its cancel-lation would arouse much criticism here. As for criticism in South-East Asia, we might meet this by getting the Dutch Government in return for the cancellation to state equally publicly that any war material which they buy from the United Kingdom is for the defence of Metropolitan Holland and nothing else.25 Surprisingly, Bevin refused to abandon the embargo, despite the fact that it had been his speech on Western Union which had set the ball


rolling in the first place. He seemed to be primarily concerned about criticism in the House of Commons, arguing that: Sargent oversimplifies the matter. Delightful in a country where there is no political opinion and no watchful eye on Ministers and their policy. The sympathy of a large number of the House is with the Indonesians and therefore of the cabinet too. I cannot meet the request.26 The Dutch Foreign Minister told Bevin during a subsequent meeting in Paris that the Brussels Treaty made the Indonesian embargo an anomaly. Bevin replied that lifting the ban might lead to reactions in Australia and India which could be very unfortunate from the point of view of the Dutch government. Britain already had considerable difficulties with India on the Kashmir question and the raising of the embargo was, in any case, not really needed by the Dutch for practical purposes; it would be better to let sleeping dogs lie.27 However, the Dutch were insistent and the Dutch ambassador asked Bevin a few days later whether he would agree to a statement by the Dutch government on the line that it had reason to believe that Britain would take into favourable consideration Dutch representations regarding equipment for Dutch troops in the Netherlands East Indies. Bevin refused, but hinted that Britain might consider helping out with the supply of uniforms and transport equip-ment—as long as the Singapore stockpiles allowed this.28 The Hague took Bevin’s remarks as an indication that he was softening his line on the embargo. The Netherlands Foreign Minister subsequently told the Dutch parliament that talks with Britain on the arms ban had been resumed, and that he expected them to be favourable. Since the announcement attracted no attention in Britain, London decided not to comment on it.29 In June, the Dutch ambassador changed tactics, telling Grey that the Netherlands was reluctant to agree to any further assurances that equipment ordered from Britain would not go to their South-East Asian territories. Grey replied that a lifting of the embargo was out of the question, but suggested that Britain might be more forthcoming on ‘non-lethal’ equipment, i.e. equipment other than weapons, ammunition or armoured fight-ing vehicles of any kind.30 By June 1948, Britain was thus indicating a relaxation of the Indonesian arms embargo. However, London was resisting sug-gestions that Western Union should lead to increasing coope-ration with either


the Dutch or the French in South-East Asia. At the beginning of April, the French consul-general in Singapore, Guibaut, had told Scrivener that the five Western Union coun-tries should work out a common colonial policy at government level. Scrivener had agreed, and he subsequently told London that five-power cooperation provided by the Brussels Treaty should be reproduced overseas, ‘including the area containing Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya and the other British territories in South-East Asia’. Much had already been achieved in the techni-cal sphere, but there was a lack of political cooperation, in particular in resisting communism. Scrivener was hoping for a broad policy statement which would ‘show our adversaries that our solidarity extends beyond the confines of Europe’, though he realised that the attitude of the local populations might be difficult.31 The Foreign Office disliked the idea of a policy statement by the colonial powers. As Christophas pointed out, Britain had previously avoided close cooperation with the Dutch and French in Indochina, instead maintaining collaboration through the less metropolitan medium of the Special Commission. So long as the Foreign Office side of the merged Commissioner-General’s office remained in existence, there was no need to change this habit. The fact was that Britain had consistently pursued a more liberal policy in South-East Asia than either of the other two Metropolitan powers concerned. There is great danger that, if our alliance with the other Western Powers in Europe were to be correspondingly reflected in our behaviour in the East, we should lose the sympathy of the Asiatic peoples by whom ‘Colonialism’ and Imperialism’ are considered a far greater menace than ‘Communism .32 Dening, too, recommended that the Western Union should ‘hasten slowly’ in South-East Asia and persist in collaborating in technical matters until the participants had become so accus-tomed to cooperating that higher flights could then be essayed.33 During a meeting in London on 26 April between representa-tives from the French embassy and members of the Foreign Office, as well as MacDonald, who was in London for consul-tations, LeRoy followed up Guibaut’s proposal. The French diplomat was keen on governmental discussions on South-East Asia, as Paris sometimes took little account of what was going on under the Special Commissioner’s aegis. MacDonald replied that he welcomed local collaboration but that Western Union had made the peoples of South-East Asia very suspicious of the motives


of the Western colonial powers. It was therefore desirable not to give colour to these suspicions by embarking on formal intergovernmental consultations. The French embassy staff, according to a Foreign Office minute, took the points but did not seem entirely satisfied.34 In June 1948 Michael Wright summed up Britain’s continuing regional strategy in a Foreign Office minute. The Special Commission’s aim had been to promote regional cooperation by starting with economic and social subjects, then working upwards to political matters as circumstances permitted. At the same time, it was felt that political collaboration ought not to be confined to the three colonial powers ‘but should be on the basis of Europeans and Asiatics working together’. However, so long as the questions of Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies remained unsettled it was difficult to initiate political cooperation except on a predominantly European basis. Western Union complicated the matter and made it ‘still more difficult to get away from the pattern of purely European collaboration in the area, which it is desirable to avoid’. Wright objected to the proposed policy statement by the metropolitan powers. For the time being, Britain had to be content with the policy of promot-ing cooperation on technical matters. At the same time, Singapore should be encouraged to take any opportunity for further cooperation on the technical level, and to ‘keep on the look out for possible openings however modest for political collaboration also’. Wright concluded: ‘If only the Dutch would make further progress in Indonesia, the whole problem would become easier. The longer matters drift the greater becomes the risk that communistic tendencies, as in Burma, will become accentuated.’35 The Western Union episode demonstrated that, despite the decline of Britain’s regional organisation in Singapore and the prevailing anticolonial climate in Asia, London remained committed to the idea of regional cooperation primarily with the new Asian states. Nor had it given up hope that its regional activities in Singapore might be the starting point for wider regional cooperation. London therefore resisted any notion that Western Union cooperation extended to South-East Asia, and it thwarted French attempts at open colonial cooperation in SouthEast Asia. As Grey argued in July: Western Union was taken by many Dutchmen as an indication that we would be willing to revise our Indonesian policy…. Unfortunately, and for the same reason, Western Union was greeted with the greatest suspicion in Asia, and attempts were immediately made by the Russians, as well as by extreme local


nationalists, to persuade the Asiatic peoples that we had reversed our policy of increased freedom for Asiatic peoples…. We cannot afford to give further material to our critics in that area by agreeing to any form of Anglo-Dutch collaboration in South-East Asia so long as the Indonesian problem remains in its present state. Finally, any collabor-ation in South-East Asia must be between all the countries which have interests in the area—i.e. it must include the countries in the area as well as the colonial powers con-cerned.36 However, rapid new developments in South-East Asia soon led to a change of Britain’s regional strategy. On 18 June 1948, one day after Wright’s comments, the British colonial authorities in Malaya declared a state of emergency in the colony. The announcement was made in reaction to an increasing number of attacks by communist guerrillas on British-owned rubber plan-tations and mining enterprises, as well as on police outposts. The emergency coincided with heightening tensions in Europe, where the Soviet Union started to blockade the Western sectors of Berlin on 24 June. The British soon suspected Moscow of being behind the Malayan insurrection. From the British point of view, the beginning of the Malayan Emergency marked the extension of the Cold War to South-East Asia. As will be shown next, regional cooperation would soon become a key British policy in trying to contain the spread of communism in Asia.37

Part III Communism

128

Chapter 10 Cold War and Commonwealth

Like the British withdrawal from India the previous year, the onset of the Malayan Emergency in June 1948 was a watershed in the postwar history of Asia. It marked the extension of the Cold War from Europe and the Middle East to the Far East. From the British point of view, communism, not nationalism, now constituted the overriding problem of the day. The Malayan Emergency followed the outbreak of communist guerrilla warfare in Burma in March 1948, which seriously destabilised the country throughout the year.1 In Indonesia too, communist forces were to make a bid for power, though their attempts to gain control of the Indonesian Republic in September 1948 were quashed by troops loyal to the moderate nationalist government of Mohammed Hatta.2 Towards the end of 1948, a number of decisive victories by the Chinese commu-nists against the nationalist Kuomintang government in China further added to London’s worries. The Chinese communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, had publicly aligned himself with Moscow, and the British feared that China, once it had fallen under communist control, would encourage other communist movements in South and South-East Asia to intensify their struggle against the colonial powers and the pro-Western governments in the region. The British had been concerned about Soviet intentions in South-East Asia for some time. In 1947, the head of Britain’s Security Intelligence, Far East, had warned of growing commu-nist strength in South-East Asia, arguing that most of the local communist parties, though temporarily out of touch or disorga-nised, were bound to be directly or indirectly controlled by the Soviet Union.3 One year later, the communist campaign in Malaya increased British suspicion of Soviet designs in the region. As Paul Grey told Bevin in the middle of July 1948:


There is no direct evidence of co-ordination by Russia of communist activities throughout South-East Asia, though it is strongly suspected. When the Cominform was set up last September, there must have existed in Moscow some plan for Asia as well as Europe. The Cominform manifesto declares quite clearly that it is the task of communism to combat imperialism not only in Europe but also in South-East Asia. Grey added that the Calcutta Youth Conference in February 1948 had ‘provided a means of co-ordinating communist activities in all the South-East Asia countries, and probably of relaying the latest ideas from Moscow’.4 Historians have been arguing since the 1950s whether the communist insurrections in South-East Asia were orchestrated by the Soviet Union. One line of argument suggests that Moscow used both the Calcutta Youth Conference, which was attended by communist delegations from South-East Asia, as well as the immediately following Congress of the Indian Communist Party to instruct the attending communist delegates to initiate armed uprisings in their respective countries. The Soviet Union’s intention is described as wanting to destabilise the Western European economies by depriving them of vital raw materials from South-East Asia.5 However, while there is little doubt that the meeting encouraged the subsequent outbreak of communist insurrections, Ruth T.McVey’s convincing study of the Calcutta Conference has called into question whether it was Moscow that gave the orders for armed revolt.6 The current historical consensus is that there is no concrete evidence that Moscow used the conference to order the South-East Asian uprisings, but that the meeting did serve as a forum for the advocacy of the Soviet Union’s two-camp thesis propagated by Zhdanov during the founding meeting of the Cominform in 1947, and that it quick-ened the pace of communist revolutionary movements in Asia.7 New evidence may come to light if and when the relevant Soviet documents are released. However, what matters in the context of our story is that at the time London came to the conclusion that Moscow was behind the communist uprisings in South-East Asia. The insurrections were seen as part of a Moscow-inspired campaign to assume control of the region. As a result, South-East Asia soon took on global importance in the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West, and the development of an anticommunist strategy in the region became of paramount importance to London.

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In September 1948, Grey stressed that direct evidence of the Russian connection was still remarkably small, but ‘circum-stantial evidence strongly suggests Russian inspiration and guidance in the recent series of communist outbreaks in SouthEast Asia, of which the latest example is the sudden Communist revolt in the Republican-held territory in Java’.8 The same opinion was expressed in a Foreign Office memorandum prior to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in mid-October: In general, the pattern seems to be one of attempting to overthrow established government and to create economic chaos. Though there is no concrete evidence of direction from Moscow, nevertheless the pattern suggests that communists in South-East Asia are following the Moscow line.9 One month later, the Foreign Office had largely made up its mind as to who was behind the South-East Asian insurrections. London told the Commissioner-General’s office in Singapore that the communist developments in South-East Asia were of concern not only because they presented an immediate problem in the defence of Britain’s vital interests, but also because they ‘fit into the general strategy of the Kremlin in the cold war against us’. The paper suspected that after a tightening of Moscow’s control during the Calcutta Conference the Kremlin’s ‘grand strategists’ decided that the world’s international situation required a more active campaign of open violence and disruption in most of South-East Asia. Hence, ‘the result of the Calcutta Conference was that violence directly organised by the Commu-nists broke out throughout South-East Asia’.10 P.S.Scrivener, at the Commissioner-General’s office, was not convinced. At the end of November he sent a letter to the American consulate-general in Singapore, stressing that the ‘evidence for the integration of terrorist activities in Malaya with a Communist schedule of uprisings elsewhere in South-East Asia rests only to a small extent on documents discovered here’.11 Despite this lack of concrete evidence, any remaining doubts about Moscow’s central role had been removed by December: the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIG) of the Chiefs of Staff argued that after the inauguration of the Cominform there had been a reorientation of communist policy in India, Burma and Malaya, and that ideological guidance had been reinforced by personal contacts established during the Calcutta Conference, to which a large Russian delegation was sent. As a result, the communist parties from the three countries had all decided to embark on a course of militant opposition,


encouraged also by the increas-ingly influential Chinese Communist Party. The strategic plan, the JIC concluded, was initially to forge a militant communist front in the Far East, aiming to aggravate the conflict between imperialism and the oppressed colonial people, as a step towards total communist control. The revolts in Burma, Malaya and Indonesia all fitted into this pattern.12 London was determined to fend off the perceived Moscowinspired communist onslaught on South-East Asia. In Malaya, the communist insurgents would have to be defeated by military means.13 At the same time, the British realised that they needed to coordinate their own anticommunist campaigns with those of the neighbouring territories—in particular at the intelligence and police levels. Furthermore, some kind of diplomatic initiative might be required to strengthen the political resolve of the South and South-East Asian countries against the communist threat. Soon, the issue of regional cooperation was back on the political agenda. However, the old question remained of who to cooperate with first, and whether France and the Netherlands could be included without upsetting India. The issue first came up in July 1948, prior to a Brussels Treaty meeting in The Hague. The Foreign Office warned Bevin before his departure to the Netherlands that he might be questioned about the spread of communism in South-East Asia. The department advised him not to make any public announcements on a common anti-communist policy by the colonial powers, as there was the danger that this might mistakenly be construed as anti-nationalist rather than anticommunist. However, exchanges of information about commu-nist activities in the respective colonies would be advantageous so long as they were given no publicity.14 During the meeting in The Hague, the Dutch Prime Minister, Louis Beel, subsequently used the opportunity to propose a joint study of the role of overseas territories in the development of the ideas embodied in the Brussels Treaty. His proposal in fact implied the extension of Western Union cooperation to South-East Asia. Bevin was reluctant to discuss the Dutch proposal, but failed to thwart it altogether; the issue was consequently referred to the council’s next meeting in October.15 By the autumn, London would thus have to make up its mind whether it wanted to increase its cooperation with the other colonial powers in reaction to the communist insurrections. British Foreign Office officials in Singapore, unaware of the Dutch government’s initiative, saw some merit in increasing cooperation with the French and the Dutch, particularly at the intelligence level. As MacDonald told London at the end of July 1948, fresh signs of


communist activities gave the issue of cooperation in South-East Asia greater importance and urgency. There were strong movements towards the extreme left in Burma, further communist progress in China and a communist-inspired outbreak of terrorism in Malaya. In Thailand, a Soviet League had been established. MacDonald believed that these events might reduce to some extent the prejudices of the local peoples against Western cooperation, and a framework of such collabor-ation should therefore be studied if not erected. He saw three possible forms of cooperation: 1) a more generous exchange of security intelligence; 2) the association, in some form, of the local Dutch and French representatives with the activities of the British Defence Coordination Committee; and 3) confidential discussions between the three governments to ascertain what measures of agreement already existed between them, whether it could be increased and whether it could be reduced to a formula calculated to discourage the Russians without provoking the Asians. MacDonald added that a discreet ‘education campaign’ could be launched in the South-East Asian territories which would argue that if these countries wished to stand on their own feet they had to be safe from aggression in the process, and that protection could only be supplied by the great democratic powers and their associates. It would perhaps be possible to use some kind of ballon d’essai to estimate the real depth of Asian opinion regarding Western collaboration in SouthEast Asia.16 At the Foreign Office, Dening was not particularly pleased that the issue of colonial cooperation had come up again. In an extensive draft reply to MacDonald, he argued that the Russians were out to rouse Asian opinion against the West, and that one therefore had to be careful not to offer them a weapon by entering into open colonial collaboration in South-East Asia. London did not wish to alienate the ‘Asiatic races of South-East Asia by an overt association in this area with France and the Netherlands so close as to appear exclusive’. Politically, strategically and eco nomically, the aim had to be to get all the peoples of the area to work together, and not just the Western powers. This was impossible unless and until the issues of Indonesia and Indo-china had been resolved, as Britain would otherwise be unable to carry Pakistan, India, Ceylon and Burma with her:


Practically speaking therefore, we see insuperable objections for the present to associating the Western Union in any way publicly with South-East Asia, although we…see advantage in the exchange of information with the French and the Dutch, on a secret basis, about communist activities and methods of combating them, always provided that this is without risk to the security of our own information.17 Christofas agreed with Dening’s line, minuting that: We have consistently opposed any integration with the French and the Dutch in the Far East on the Colonial level and insisted that instead all our collaboration should be through the medium of what was the Special Commission and is now the Foreign Office side of the Commission-General…. Developments in the third session of ECAFE, where an overwhelming majority displayed pro-Indonesian and antiDutch sympathies, should serve as a warning to us of the dangers of appearing anti-nationalist in the eyes of the Asian peoples.18 Dening’s draft letter was subsequently circulated to other departments in Whitehall. The Commonwealth Relations Office (formerly the Dominions Office) agreed with Dening: Australia’s and New Zealand’s reactions to signs that Britain was underwrit-ing measures taken by the French in Indochina and the Dutch in Indonesia could well be unfavourable; the same could be said of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.19 However, other departments tended to favour MacDonald’s ideas. The Defence Ministry, for example, ‘attached rather more weight than [Dening] to the arguments in favour of three-power cooperation in the Far East in the struggle against Communism’. It realised there had to be a cautious approach to the problem, but hoped that in view of the possible strategic advantages the risks would be acceptable.20 The Colonial Office was divided over the issue. Its Eastern Department regarded Dening’s draft reply as too negative, argu-ing that the communist emergency required closer collaboration with the Dutch and the French. Holding rigidly aloof from the Dutch would merely isolate Britain from her friends in the area while not necessarily increasing her ‘popularity with the races of South-East Asia’.21 Galsworthy of the Colonial Office’s Interna-tional Relations Department, on the other hand, had misgivings about open cooperation with the French and the Dutch at the present time,22 though he agreed


that it was undesirable to urge MacDonald to go more slowly than he thought safe. After ‘exhaustive discussions’ between Galsworthy and the Eastern Department, J.M.Martin sent a letter to the Foreign Office hoping to turn the ‘red light which Mr Dening was proposing to flash to Mr MacDonald not into green, but into Amber’.23 The department wanted to avoid going any more slowly than MacDonald and other local officials thought to be safe: just as there was technical as well as some political cooperation with the French on colonial matters in Africa, a number of conferences with France and the Netherlands could be arranged on technical subjects in South-East Asia. These conferences would not be exclusive: other states would attend, and representatives from the local populations could be invited.24 However, the Foreign Office used the opportunity of a forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference, scheduled for midOctober, to thwart proposals for open colonial cooperation in South-East Asia. During an interdepartmental meeting on 29 September, which discussed the forthcoming conference, Dening recalled that the Special Commissioner’s organisation had empirically built up regional collaboration on economic matters, and that its monthly Liaison Officers’ Meet-ings were regularly attended by representatives from fifteen countries. The economic emergency which had brought these meetings into being was now rapidly passing, but it seemed a pity to let them die, particularly because ECAFE was unlikely ever to prove effective since the Soviet Union was one of its members and would seek to make mischief in it. Dening suggested that, similar to the existing cooperation through the Liaison Officers’ Meetings, anti-communist collaboration should be built up empirically by liaison between the criminal investigation departments, as well as the police and security services of all the countries of the area, colonial and Asian alike. The representative of the Commonwealth Relations Office, MacLennan, supported the idea, but Martin from the Colonial Office doubted whether security cooperation with the Asian powers could be as close as with the Dutch. In Africa, there were two degrees of cooperation with Britain: France and Belgium formed an inner circle, while the other powers concerned (Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa) constituted an outer circle. The meeting subsequently agreed that, while security coope-ration in South-East Asia would best be achieved through direct contacts between the agencies concerned (there was already some cooperation between the police in Malaya and India), the Com-missioner-General could coordinate two degrees of collabor-ation. Britain, France and the Netherlands, on the inside, would cooperate


primarily at the security level, while there would be a second circle of Commonwealth countries working together at the political level. Since cooperation between the colonial pow-ers would be kept secret, it would not offend Asian opinion.25 However, a few days before the beginning of the Com-monwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, Ernest Bevin came up with a much grander idea. According to a departmental minute by Dening, the Foreign Secretary was thinking of ‘a kind of OEEC for Asia’.26 Bevin’s idea hit a raw nerve at the Foreign Office. The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was an intergovernmental organisation with a compar-atively high degree of autonomy in decisionmaking. If an Asian equivalent was established on similar lines, Britain would be unable to influence the organisation in the way that it had directed the Special Commission. Not surprisingly, Dening warned not to broach the idea with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers without very careful study in advance. He saw ‘real danger that if such an organisation were set up, either India or Australia would try to assume the leadership, and in either case the results might not be very happy for the United Kingdom’.27 A.L.Scott added that China would also try to assume the leadership within such a scheme. In his opinion, the special interests of Asian countries already received adequate attention through ECAFE.28 Apart from the political pitfalls of an Asian OEEC, the Foreign Office believed that Bevin’s proposal had dangerous economic implications. In Europe, the OEEC had been created as a result of Marshall aid provided by the United States. An Asian OEEC would require similar aid packages—aid that Britain was unwilling and unable to provide because of her precarious financial situation. The Asian countries had in fact requested some form of Marshall aid for Asia during the last two sessions of ECAFE.29 As one of the Foreign Office’s economic experts warned: Anything like an Asiatic OEEC would at the present time be most undesirable. Our role in ECAFE, and that of the other Commonwealth members, permits us to exercise fully the limited degree of influence on the economic development of the area which can be experienced without involving us in commitments which we cannot afford.30 The only alternative source of aid or loans would have been the United States. Yet there were no signs that Washington was prepared to


provide financial support for the development of South and South-East Asia. Even if the Americans had been interested in financing an Asian OEEC, the British were reluctant to encourage American involvement in an area of primarily British responsibility and economic influence. Malaya, Australia and New Zealand as well as the ‘new dominions’— India, Pakistan and Ceylon—were all part of the so-called ‘sterling area’, which helped to strengthen the pound as well as Britain’s trade balance. The sterling area dated back to 1939 and provided for the pooling and rationing of the Commonwealth’s hard-currency reserves during the war (with Canada, a dollar-area country, as the main exception). Under its provisions, Britain bought all the hardcurrency reserves from the sterling area countries and credited them with sterling balances in return. This allowed Britain to make vital dollar purchases of war materials and consumer goods from the United States. The sterling area also enabled Britain to purchase goods from the Commonwealth countries and to credit them with sterling rather than pay them with exports. Before the war, Britain had had sterling liabilities worth 600 million pounds. After the war, Britain’s liabilities had increased to 3.7 billion pounds, of which almost 2.5 billion pounds were owed to sterling-area countries. After the balance of payments crisis in 1947, Britain had temporarily blocked some of the sterling balances, as countries like India and Pakistan were drawing too freely on them to finance their trade deficits. Malaya played a particular role within the sterling area, as she was one of the most important dollar earners within the Com-monwealth’s trading bloc, exporting considerable amounts of tin and natural rubber to the United States. Yet the provisions of the sterling area prevented Malaya from spending the dollars she had earned. Instead, she had to use the dollars’ sterling equivalent, calculated at a fixed exchange rate, to buy goods from Britain or from other parts of the sterling area. As many goods could not be provided by British industry, Malaya was running up a massive sterling surplus; Malayan sterling balances were worth 85 million pounds at the end of 1947.31 As one historian has argued, the deal provided by the sterling area was rough on the dollarearning countries, including Malaya and the Gold Coast, because the others, such as Britain and India, were only too ready to spend the surplus.32 It certainly suited Britain, as she was able to use the dollarearning exports from colonies like Malaya to finance the purchase of vital imports from the United States. Britain could also delay the repayment of her war debts, and in the case of Australia and New


Zealand even convinced creditors to waive some of London’s sterling debts. Apart from providing Britain with hard currency, the sterling area also served as an external trade barrier that protected the Commonwealth countries against excessive dollar imports33 much to the dismay of the United States. In 1945, as one of the conditions for the American loan, Britain had to agree that she would start repaying her sterling debts from 1951 onwards, and that sterling would be made convertible. However, when in 1947 the Americans attempted to break up the sterling area through the convertibility of sterling, the pound entered into free fall and convertibility had to be aborted. It was therefore not surprising that the Foreign Office’s economic experts poured cold water on Bevin’s idea of an Asian OEEC, fearing that his plans would involuntarily undermine the sterling area and jeopardise the triangular trade pattern between Malaya, Britain and the United States. According to J.F.Turner of the Foreign Office’s Econ-omic Relations Department: If the implications of the present proposal are that Asia should receive assistance, either in the form in which Marshall aid is being given to Europe, or in the form of a comprehensive government loan from sources outside Asia, the consequences must be economically undesirable. The UK is not in a position to provide such aid itself, from its own resources, & aid from any other source must necessarily mean the establish-ment of an economic bloc in Asia, cutting right across the operation of the Sterling Area including the principal dollar & other foreign currency contributors to the Sterling Area pool.34 The Foreign Office soon decided to play down Bevin’s ideas. Christophas of the South-East Asia Department wondered whether the Foreign Secretary was really just thinking of a medium for regional collaboration that would go beyond the economic field. This had been suggested in Dening’s brief for the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. The brief envisaged setting up a forum that was similar to the Commissioner-General’s Liaison Officers’ Meetings, but that was empowered to deal not with economic or technical matters but with measures to combat communism. If the Commonwealth agreed, such cooperation could be built up around MacDonald’s existing organisation. It would ‘give new stimulus’ at a time when the organisation’s economic raison d’être was rapidly


ceasing to exist, and it would ‘encourage the countries of SE Asia to continue to look to the United Kingdom for spiritual leader-ship’.35 Bevin, however, had given up on the former Special Commis-sion’s prospects for expanding its regional role. Yet he was determined to launch a regional initiative at the forthcoming Commonwealth conference. After a top-level meeting with offi-cials from the Foreign and Colonial offices, he agreed to drop his idea of an Asian OEEC. Instead, Bevin would propose that government ministers from Britain, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand should meet at regular intervals to discuss matters of mutual interest, including SouthEast Asia.36 Bevin was further briefed that he should suggest at the beginning of the Commonwealth conference that South-East Asia’s problems were of sufficient importance to demand some form of regional collaboration, and that members of the Commonwealth should meet at six-monthly intervals for discussions on the region.37 Dening subsequently explained to his department that ‘the idea as now developing is political rather than economic, with the basic fear of communism and of Russia as the driving force’.38 The Foreign Secretary’s brief for the London meeting con-stituted the first interdepartmental agreement on regional coope-ration since the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in April/May 1946. It also marked the beginning of a new phase in London’s regional policy. Instead of concentrating on the former Special Commission as the nucleus of a wider regional system in South-East Asia, London finally decided that a Commonwealth approach offered the best chance of regaining the initiative on regional cooperation. Britain was the dominant power inside the Commonwealth and London was optimistic that it could play a leading role at the suggested regional conferences. It also hoped that it could use the communist bogey to mould the Asian countries into a regional grouping under British leadership. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in October 1948 provided London with an opportunity to implement its revised regional policy. Throughout the meeting, the British stressed the communist menace in both Europe and Asia. During one of the initial sessions of the conference, on 12 October, Bevin suggested that the Commonwealth countries interested in SouthEast Asia should hold regular consultations to put the political and economic life of the region, which was threatened by communism, on a firm footing. He had not worked out detailed proposals and was not suggesting any elaborate machinery, but he hoped that an understanding particularly with the new dominions could be worked out. Bevin’s proposals met with a favourable response.


Evatt endorsed the idea of Commonwealth consultation on South-East Asia, and Nehru stated that India was vitally interested in South-East Asia and that regional understanding between India, Britain, Australia and New Zealand was desirable.39 A few days later, Attlee repeated Bevin’s proposals for regional discussions, suggesting that economic developments in SouthEast Asia might be discussed by representatives from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon.40 On the following day, Nehru replied that regional arrangements were desirable but must not conflict with the United Nations. He had hitherto resisted proposals from other Asian countries for the formation of an Asian Union, but there would be increasing pressure as the ‘regional idea’ was growing inside Europe. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, was more forthcom-ing, stating that the Commonwealth should give a lead to the countries struggling against communism by drawing up a plan for strengthening the countries of the Commonwealth, the Middle East and South-East Asia by methods similar to those which were being applied in Western Europe. Bevin replied that regional associations could form a basis for confidence in the UN. He did not have precise plans in South-East Asia, but was convinced of the necessity for consultation and association. He agreed with Nehru that it was wise to associate Burma with such consultation, but believed it to be difficult to save the country from communism, as Britain had already attempted everything short of military intervention.41 London was generally pleased with the conference’s dis-cussions on communism. As Machtig of the Commonwealth Relations Office pointed out, the conference’s outstanding feature was the large measure of support given to the policy of offering firm resistance to ‘Soviet totalitarian pressure’, be it in the form of external aggression or communist infiltration.42 The Foreign Office was particularly pleased that advice by Nehru on combating communism provided ‘valuable confirmation of our own thinking on this matter, coming as it does from a man with such experience of leftist thinking in Asia’.43 However, the conference did not fulfil all of the Foreign Office’s expectations for South-East Asia. As Dening pointed out, the initial response to Bevin’s proposal for periodic meetings of Commonwealth countries interested in South-East Asia had been favourable. Yet this idea was subsequently overtaken by a proposal for general Commonwealth meetings on foreign affairs:44 during one of the later conference sessions the suggestion was made that in the future the Commonwealth Prime Ministers should meet as often as practicable, and that in the intervals


there would be regular ministerial meetings on foreign affairs. The first such meeting was contemplated for May 1949 in Ceylon. It was therefore unclear whether whether the Prime Ministers still favoured a special conference on South-East Asia. Despite the confusion over the focus of the proposed follow-up meetings, the Foreign Office further embraced the the idea of using the Commonwealth as a basis for regional cooperation in South-East Asia. As Grey minuted, the Foreign Office had always favoured regional political collaboration in South-East Asia as an ‘object towards which we should work’; indeed ‘the idea in establishing the organisation in Singapore was that economic collaboration should eventually produce political collaboration’. A Commonwealth conference therefore might well lead to such a development.45 Dening, too, was hopeful, arguing that Nehru seemed willing to agree at least to a certain amount of collabor-ation—provided that it was covert. As a first step, closer contacts with the police and security services should be established. Dening supported the proposed follow-up to the Com-monwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, ‘and if a [separate] regional conference was arranged the matter should be carried further, possibly bringing in other non-British territories as well’.46 At the same time, London decided that the new Com-monwealth approach to South-East Asia was incompatible with the kind of colonial cooperation proposed by other Western Union powers. As Dening told a meeting of Whitehall represen-tatives on 20 October, the Asian populations would be strongly prejudiced against political cooperation with the Brussels Treaty powers in the Far East. MacDonald, still in London after attending the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, now supported Dening’s line. The meeting therefore agreed that Bevin should explain to Western Union members that Britain opposed open political cooperation in South-East Asia, but that she was prepared to collaborate covertly.47 A meeting of the Brussels Treaty con-sultative council in Paris at the end of October provided the opportunity for Britain to clarify her line. Before leaving for France, Bevin was briefed by his department that he should oppose any special Anglo-Dutch-French consultations on South-East Asia. The only exception was collaboration ‘behind the scenes’. There was ‘already effective cooperation in Singapore with the Dutch and French as regards the activities of Commu-nists, arms smuggling, contraband and so on’.48 During the Paris meeting on 25 October, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, raised his country’s proposal from July 1948 to study Western Union cooperation in colonial territories. He stressed that not


only the Netherlands but also France and Britain were in trouble in South-East Asia. However, Bevin was unforthcoming, explaining that the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference had shown that Australia and India were unfavourable to the situation in South-East Asia. Official discussions of the problem within the framework of the Brussels Treaty would encourage nationalist feelings in South-East Asia and give the communists a good propaganda weapon. Any consultations should therefore be held through the ‘normal diplomatic channels’.49 It soon became evident that other West-ern Union powers were equally disinclined to become entangled in the Netherlands’ problem in Indonesia. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Henri Spaak, stressed that it was inconsistent for the Dutch to argue in the Security Council that Indonesia was an internal Dutch affair, and no threat to peace, while taking the view in the consultative council that the matter was of interna-tional concern and a threat to peace. The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, added that discussions on Indonesia, perhaps on the grounds that the Netherlands’ financial stability was threatened, would be stretching the Brussels Treaty to mean rather more than it actually said. The meeting therefore decided that any discussions on Indonesia should be mentioned in the official communiqué only after other international issues such as Palestine, Spain and the Italian colonies.50 As Christofas com-mented a few days later at the Foreign Office, the meeting had satisfactorily disposed of Dutch attempts to extend the scope of the Brussels Treaty to overseas territories.51 Bevin also refused to make any further concessions on the Indonesian arms embargo. On 19 July 1948, Bevin had told the Dutch Prime Minister that the arms ban could not be lifted before the introduction of constitutional reforms in Indonesia; however, this did not preclude ‘special arrangements being made for the supply from Singapore or elsewhere of a few spare parts or uniforms required by the Dutch in Indonesia’.52 In August, London had confirmed to The Hague that subject to availability Britain ‘would in future supply orders for what we consider to be non-lethal equipment (including spares) without requiring any guarantee that it would not be forwarded to the Netherlands East Indies’.53 However, this was as far as Bevin was prepared to go. In October, the Dutch proposed that the British would no longer ask for specific undertakings but would assume that the Netherlands would not order any lethal material for Indonesia. Bevin objected —against the advice of the Foreign Office.54 The Foreign Secretary saw the proposal as a subterfuge that could not be defended in the House of Commons:55 it would mean the end of the embargo.56 Bevin explained


to his officials that there was the possibility of a second police action in Indonesia, in which case he would be questioned closely about the embargo. The matter should be left as it was, though Grey was instructed to help the Dutch as much as he could administratively.57 The decision of the Brussels Treaty’s consultative council against special Western Union talks on Indonesia, as well as the maintenance of the arms embargo, cleared the way for a British initiative towards Commonwealth cooperation on South-East Asia. As Grey wrote to Britain’s diplomatic representatives in South-East Asia in November, the Foreign Office intended, when the time seemed ripe, to propose a special regional conference in Singapore on the problems of South-East Asia. The department intended to keep the initiative in South-East Asia which we took when we established the Special Commissioner’s Organisation. But secondly we should like at some stage to bring in nonCommonwealth countries. It was always intended that the economic collaboration initiated at Singapore should develop into a wider political collaboration.58 At the end of November 1948, MacDonald invited British officials in South-East Asia to talks in Singapore. The meeting concluded that although much was to be said for the calling of an early regional conference on the lines suggested by the Foreign Office, it would be better to delay the proposal. As MacDonald pointed out to London, the proposal to hold a larger Commonwealth conference in Ceylon in April or May 1949 was holding the field, and Commonwealth countries would probably be upset by an earlier regional Commonwealth conference in Singapore which might cover much of the same ground. It was also thought that countries like Thailand and Burma would be reluctant to attend such a conference. They probably wanted to avoid ‘ganging up against the Russians and Communists’ while ‘lining up with “Imperialists”’, though any American participation would make it easier for non-Commonwealth countries to attend. Furth-ermore, the Indonesian problem remained a stumbling block. According to MacDonald: The Indonesian situation is so vital to developments in South East Asia generally that a conference without representatives of Indonesia would be like a performance of ‘Hamlet’ in the absence of one of the important characters, if not the Prince of Denmark


himself…. An attempt to hold such a [conference] prior to settling of Indonesian question will result in great controversy between us, the Dutch, the Indians and Indo-nesians. The reactions of such a controversy in South-East Asia would be very bad.59 Despite the Dutch-Indonesian irritant, MacDonald’s meeting confirmed the new British line on South-East Asia. This was that a series of Commonwealth conferences, and not the former Special Commission, would be used to encourage regional cooperation in the area. The driving force would be the mutual fear of communism in Asia. Britain, still the dominant power in the Commonwealth, would be in the best position to organise regional action, at the same time preventing countries like India from becoming the champion of exclusively Asian alignments. However, a number of problems remained. Britain simply could not escape the fact that so long as France and the Netherlands failed to find a settlement with their respective nationalist movements, the two powers were unlikely to be accepted as regional partners by the other Asian states. Yet Indonesia and Indochina were an essential geographical and political part of South-East Asia, and regional cooperation, whether on the security, economic or political levels, would eventually have to include the two territories. Indeed, confining cooperation to the Commonwealth meant that mainly countries from the South-East Asian periphery would be included. A further question was whether Burma and Thailand could be convinced to participate in future Commonwealth conferences. Burma feared both British and Indian domination, while Thailand was reluctant to commit herself to any grouping without securing considerable gains in return, such as largescale financial or military aid. Finally, Britain had to make up her mind about the kind of regional cooperation she wanted. Would collaboration be con-fined to the police and intelligence levels, would defence be included, and what exactly did political cooperation entail? Economically, the problem was that the South and South-East Asian countries were bound to demand loans or financial aid from Britain to raise their populations’ standard of living. Without such aid, an agreement on regional cooperation under British leadership was highly unlikely. Would it perhaps be necessary to bring in the Americans, and what consequences would this have for Britain’s economic interests in the region? Furthermore, would Washington be at all interested in support-ing British policies in South-East Asia? Britain’s new regional plans were thus full of questions and uncertainties.


However, dramatic new developments in China soon induced London to make up its mind about its future course of action.

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Chapter 11 Enter the dragon: South-East Asia and the Chinese civil war

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London had concentrated primarily on the internal threat posed by the communist movements in South and South-East Asia. Little attention was given to the developments in China and to their possible significance for the country’s neighbouring regions. Yet only two months later, the Chinese civil war was catapulted to the top of Whitehall’s political agenda. After sudden military successes by the Chinese communists, London feared that Mao Tse-tung’s forces would soon gain the upper hand in the country. Not only would this have serious implications for Britain’s trade with China and for the position of Hong Kong. The British were equally concerned about the effects that a communist take-over in China would have on South-East Asia. The conflict between the Chinese communists under Mao Tsetung and the nationalist Kuomintang forces under General Chiang Kai-shek dated back to the late 1920s. Though immediately before and during the Second World the two sides concentrated on fighting the Japanese invaders, the civil war flared up again in the spring of 1946—following the breakdown of communist-nationalist peace talks, and after failed American attempts to arrange a truce between the warring factions. During the Second World War, the Kuomintang had been America’s main ally in China, and therefore the recipient of massive US aid. However, the Americans had become increasingly disillusioned with Chiang’s corrupt Kuomintang regime, and after 1947 Washington decided to ‘let the dust settle’ and see what emerged from the civil war. Britain, who was hoping to resume her strong prewar trade position in China, was equally disillusioned about the prospects of the Chiang Kaishek government.1 But neither London nor Washington anticipated the rapid military successes achieved by the communists towards the end of 1948. Countering the nationalists’ attempt to reconquer Manchuria, the commu-nists launched an all-out offensive in September 1948. By 1


November the Kuomintang army in Manchuria, suffering from corruption and extremely low morale, had finally collapsed. In December, the communists turned towards Peking, forcing the city to surrender by the end of January 1949.2 After the fall of Manchuria, London began to take the commu-nist successes in China extremely seriously. Mao was publicly aligning himself with the Soviet Union, who was believed to be behind the South-East Asian uprisings. As a result, the British no longer watched the Chinese developments in isolation but as an integral part of the Cold War in Asia. On 9 December 1948, a lengthy cabinet paper drafted by the Foreign Office alerted the British government to the new situation.3 According to the paper, it now looked certain that at least the north of China would permanently fall into communist hands, as Chiang Kaishek had virtually lost control of the area north of the Yangtze river. In the long run, it was highly possible that the communists would take over the whole of China. Apart from considering the negative implications of the communist advance for British and American trade interests in China, the cabinet paper examined the likely effects on adjacent territories. So long as the communists controlled only the north of China, the effects on Malaya and Singapore would be limited. However, should the whole of China fall to the communists, Malaya would be in grave danger. ‘Militant communism’ would be very close to Malaya’s frontier only Thailand and French Indochina would remain as buffers. Inside Malaya, the morale of the Malayan communists would improve and there might be increased communist infiltration from China. The problem was that even relatively small successes by the Malayan communists would have considerable repercussions among the traditionally passive Chinese commun-ity. Other parts of South-East Asia would also be adversely affec-ted. Any communist successes in the north of China, the paper argued, would stimulate communist movements throughout the entire region, and if all of China was overrun, contacts between Chinese communists and the communists in Indochina and Thailand would be greatly facilitated. Furthermore, Burma was likely to be infiltrated because of her partly undefined border with China and because of the Burmese government’s lack of effective control over the country. There was also the danger that communism would ‘seep over’ into India and to the eastern part of Pakistan. Things would be particularly difficult in Indochina where ‘the failure of the French Government….to seek a solution has resulted in an alliance between the Nationalist and Communist elements’. Any communist Chinese reinforcements for the

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Viet Minh might make the French position in the north of the country untenable and would increase the threat to other parts of South-East Asia. Furthermore, if the Dutch failed to reach a political settlement in Indonesia, and again resorted to military action, the country’s nationalists might decide to forge an alliance with the communists, creating long-term disorder that would have serious consequences for the whole of SouthEast Asia. Thailand as well had a strong communist element which might get out of hand as a result of the developments in China. In southern Thailand in particular there was the danger that local communists would combine with the Malayan com-munists. The paper expected that the communist domination of China would also have indirect but ‘none the less formidable’ conse-quences for India and Pakistan. The strengthening of commu-nism in Burma, Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan, following a commu-nist take-over in China, would threaten to encircle India and Pakistan strategically and politically. At the same time, India’s attitude of neutrality between the communist states and the Western powers would probably be strengthened. The situation on the subcontinent was further complicated by the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. So long as this dispute existed, there was the danger that Pakistan, who was potentially anticommunist, might seek Russian support against India. The developments in China would also have a serious economic knock-on effect in neighbouring regions. Burma, Thailand and Indochina were the main rice producers of the entire area. Communist disturbances in these three countries would lead to a significant decrease in the production of rice, with immediate repercussions for Britain’s colonial territories and in the Asian Commonwealth countries: A decrease in rice consumption will provide fertile ground for Communist agitation. This—together with general disturbances in other South-East Asia industries—would cause further disruption of the economy of the area with consequent adverse effects on the production of such vital commodities as rubber, tin, edible oils, &c., which are of such importance to world economic recovery. Having painted the gloomiest of pictures, the cabinet paper made recommendations for possible British counter-action. In China, Britain should maintain de facto relations with the communists to safeguard existing trading interests and to keep a ‘foot in the door’.4 In South-East Asia, the problem was that the Americans were apparently not prepared


to accept any political responsibility, nor would they take any action to maintain the position of friendly powers there. The powers geographically situated in the region therefore had to take their own measures to ‘meet the Communist menace’. Britain would have to make strenuous efforts to clear up the situation in Malaya, while in the region as a whole the measures of the different governments had to be coordinated. There were, however, a number of problems. It would, for example, be difficult to associate Burma with French Indochina. Moreover, the Commonwealth countries primarily concerned, i.e. Australia, New Zealand, India and Pakistan, who all had a vital interest in the peace and prosperity of South-East Asia, would probably be unwilling to join in any activities to support the French and Dutch governments in this area. Britain would therefore have to act as coordinator, though it would be necessary to consider the political consequences very carefully at each stage. The paper concluded that Britain should inform all the interested powers about the problems likely to arise as a result of the communist successes in China, and consult them on the best method of dealing with the situation. This included the United States who should be kept informed and whose support should be sought. The paper also suggested stepping up intelligence and police cooperation, so far as political considerations permitted, and conducting a study of the economic consequences of communist domination of China for the whole area. In addition, the Chiefs of Staff were being asked to consider the possibility of coordinating military measures against any stra-tegic threat in the area between Afghanistan and the Pacific region.5 The cabinet endorsed the paper’s recommendations on 13 December 1948,6 thus committing the government to attempts to coordinate international action against the further spread of communism in SouthEast Asia. However, what exactly such action entailed still had to be worked out. MacDonald, probably still unaware of the exact contents of the cabinet paper, told London on 10 December what he thought ought to be done. He argued that the communist advance in China constituted a most formidable threat to all the countries further south; the further north the communists could be stopped, the better. Though South-East Asia would only be a minor theatre of operations should a ‘hot war’ ever break out: We must accept that South-East Asia is now a major theatre in the ‘cold war’, and will continue so throughout this period. The communist friends of Russia, with such help as Russia deems it


advisable to give, will push as far as they can by propaganda, agitation and subversive activities. Britain could only counter this through a diplomatic and political offensive and had to do everything that lay in her and American power to strengthen the forces opposed to the commu-nists inside the Asian populations. In Malaya, for example, the establishment of a Central Information Bureau was required, while in Indonesia the Foreign Office’s energetic policy of influencing both the Dutch and the Indonesians towards a compromise settlement had to be maintained. Thailand also required action. The country was now ‘dangerously exposed to the Communist threat from outside and inside’. As a sign of goodwill Britain should waive 1 million pounds’ worth of war reparations claims, and supply some military equipment for use against bandits in southern Thailand. Furthermore, the Amer-icans would have to be convinced to do whatever they could in terms of economic and military aid. In addition, both Britain and the United States had to examine the position with a view to formulating a joint programme for adequate economic and military support. There should also be talks in Singapore between the British and Thai military authorities—if the Americans were ready to join in these talks, all the better. Washington would, in any case, have to be taken into Britain’s confidence. MacDonald then turned to Indochina, which from the military point of view was ‘of course of great importance to our position in South-East Asia’. Unfortunately there seemed ‘little chance of a complete political agreement between the French and even moderate elements in Indochina’. Despite this, MacDonald recommended discreetly adopting the course of cooperation with France, by discussing strategic questions with the local French military chief, and by arranging secret joint planning dis-cussions. At the same time, diplomatic action in Paris should encourage the French to reach an agreement with the anticommunists in their colony, although he was not optimistic that such an initiative would be successful. Finally, there was the problem of Burma whose government was weak and where the situation was confused. MacDonald found it difficult to know what more could be done before he had visited the country, believing, however, that India might be able to help by showing military strength, or perhaps by giving some form of support to the Burmese government.7 MacDonald attached unprecedented importance to AngloAmerican cooperation on South-East Asia, in particular so far as Thailand was concerned. As MacDonald explained in a followup telegram, the Thai


Prince Chumbot had recently told him that the Thais were in some ways cowardly and never put up a firm resistance to an enemy unless they felt sure it would be effective. This, the Prince asserted, was the reason why the Thais had not resisted Japan: they wished to resist but knew that their foreign friends would give them no support. The same would happen with the communists unless the Bangkok government saw practical evidence that Britain was granting help.8 The British ambassador in Thailand, Thompson, strongly endorsed MacDonald’s proposals, arguing from Bangkok that: The frontiers of Malaya are on the Mekong and…if we desire to establish a bastion against communism in this area, we must be ready to give very substantial help to Siam. We must, moreover, work in conjunction with the United States. American assistance to Thailand was meagre, and encroached upon or competed with British interests. There was in fact considerable AngloAmerican rivalry in the country which der-ived primarily from American disappointment over Britain’s commercial come-back. This rivalry had to go if Thailand was to be strengthened. Thompson stressed that Anglo-American help would have to be generous and would have to include paying for the equipment and training of the Thai Army and Air Force. In Thai eyes the threat was primarily Chinese rather than commu-nist. In 1941, Britain had offered Thailand no help apart from Churchill urging Prime Minister Pibul to uphold the cause of democracy. Having had as little hope of successfully resisting Japan as Denmark had of standing against Hitler, Pibul had followed a policy which enabled the country outwardly to maintain its independence and spared its people much suffering, gambling in the process on an eventual Allied victory. Now a new danger threatened and Thailand could scarcely be blamed if, in the absence of any resolute Anglo-American action, she sought to conjure it by again employing methods which in both the recent and the distant past had proved successful.9 The Foreign Office had its doubts about MacDonald’s idea of involving the Americans in military talks with the Thais; A.M. Palliser arguing that ‘our enemies might make fruitful pro-paganda out of an “Anglo-American colonial policy” towards Siam’. The Americans should, however, be taken into Britain’s confidence.10 In a further comment, this time on Thompson’s telegram, Palliser admitted that the Thais were using AngloAmerican rivalry to play one country off against the other and that it would obviously be preferable to persuade the


Americans to take an interest in this part of the world. He was, however, not convinced of the need for aid to Thailand. The country had enough foreign exchange to meet her rehabilitation and defence requirements and he foresaw the danger that Western pounds and dollars would go the the way of US aid to China.11 At the same time, Palliser welcomed MacDonald’s proposal for secret staff talks with France on Indochina. However, he refused to contemplate Indian intervention in Burma, which would actually constitute an invasion of the country. While the Burmese government would gladly accept arms and money, it did not want advice about how to use them. Direct Indian military intervention in Burma would be just as unpopular as direct British intervention. Nehru might, however, have more influence with the present Burmese government than any European could hope to exert, and he might be ready to use it if it looked as though Burmese rice exports were stopping.12 As the debate on the Thai question demonstrated, the details of London’s anti-communist policies were still unclear. Should there be military intervention by either Britain or India in troublespots like Burma?; was financial aid required to keep the Thais in the pro-Western camp?; and where and how would the Americans come in? Despite this lack of coherence, London decided to set the ball rolling. It opted for three separate diplomatic initiatives towards anti-communist collaboration in South-East Asia. The first concerned the Commonwealth. At the end of December, short versions of the cabinet paper on China were sent to all Commonwealth countries and to Thailand. This was in line with the policy of pursuing Commonwealth coope-ration as the basis for a wider regional scheme in South-East Asia. Britain’s second initiative was aimed at convincing the United States with her overwhelming financial power to support British policies in South-East Asia; despite earlier fears that American involvement might cut across the sterling area. Shocked by the developments in China, London believed that only the Amer-icans could stem the perceived communist tide in Asia. Just as Washington had come to the rescue in Western Europe by providing Marshall aid, it now had to make a commitment to South-East Asia. The problem was, however, that the United States had shown little inclination to become involved in what it regarded as the problems of the colonial powers in South-East Asia. As Thompson told London on 18 December, the American ambassador in Bangkok, Stanton, supported his views on AngloAmerican consultation and agreement, but Stanton also feared that little could be expected from


the United States. Washington felt it had so much on its hands in Europe that there was little it could do in South-East Asia.13 Despite such discouraging reports, London decided to go ahead with the diplomatic offensive suggested in the cabinet paper. As Grey explained in a Foreign Office memorandum, Britain had hitherto b een dealing rather piecemeal with furnish-ing support against communism in countries like Afghanistan, Burma and Thailand. What was needed was a ‘full-scale review with the United States of the possibilities of action in South-East Asia, militarily, political and economic’.14 On 20 December the Foreign Office instructed its embassy in Washington to approach the Americans on the issue of communism in Asia as a whole. A summary of the cabinet paper on China was given to the State Department on 5 January as a basis for bilateral discussions.15 The Foreign Office’s third initiative aimed at stepping up collaboration with France. As MacDonald had pointed out to London, Indochina was in the front line in the fight against communism, and it was expected that the activities of the communist Viet Minh would increase once Mao’s troops had reached China’s border with Vietnam. But before Britain could openly cooperate with the French in Indochina, London believed that Paris had to be seen to be making concessions to the noncommunist nationalists in the Vietnam, in particular to the former Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai. The French had in fact been involved in constitutional talks with Bao Dai since the end of 1947. London now hoped that a ‘Bao Dai solution’ to France’s political image problem in Asia would make French participa-tion in South-East Asian regional cooperation acceptable to India. In November 1948 Dening had visited Paris, where he had stressed the need for a French understanding with the noncommunist Vietnamese nationalists. The French had agreed that they would have to make concessions to Vietnamese nationalist feelings.16 This further encouraged London to pursue a more active policy on Indochina. On 21 December, Dening returned to Paris for further talks on South-East Asia. His comments now centred on the communist threat to the region, and on the need for intelligence cooperation as well as high-level talks.17 A few days later, London sent Paris a summary of its cabinet paper on China.18 In the following months, there occurred a series of AngloFrench consultations on South-East Asia. During these meetings, London pursued three objectives. First, it tried to encourage Paris to come to an agreement with Bao Dai that was based on real concessions to the Vietnamese nationalists. The aim of this was to remove Indian objections to France’s participation in regional talks on communism in


South-East Asia.19 A second British objective was to improve cooperation on the police, intelligence and propaganda levels. Bevin was particularly enthusiastic about this, and he suggested to the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, in January 1949 that the British, French and Dutch should pool their information work; possibly in Singapore where Britain already had a powerful broadcasting station.20 Most of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office files dealing with intelligence and security cooperation in South-East Asia are still classified. However, it seems that in this field considerable progress was subsequently made between the local French and British authorities.21 The Foreign Office’s third objective was to leave Paris in no doubt that Anglo-French cooperation would not take precedence over collaboration between Britain and the independent Asian countries— despite Bevin’s enthusiasm about the pooling of Western intelligence in the region. In February, a French reply to the British paper on China welcomed Anglo-French cooperation in the region but suggested that the United States and the independent Asian countries would merely be associated with efforts by London and Paris.22 In addition, the French consul in Singapore, Guibaut, suggested to MacDonald that a ‘colonial charter’ be drawn up between Britain, France and the Neth-erlands with a set of economic and political principles. Possibly, some Asian countries could be associated.23 In response, Dening made it clear to MacDonald that a colonial charter was a nonstarter. Only after settlements had been found in Indonesia and Indochina was there a possibility of associating the Dutch and French not only with Britain but with Asian countries as well.24 While the prospects for France’s inclusion in a regional scheme sponsored by Britain were thus temporarily improving, the opposite was the case with the Netherlands, due to the completely different circumstances in Indonesia. Unlike the Viet Minh in Indochina, the Indonesian nationalist movement was relatively free of communist influence. In October 1948, the Republican government under Mohammed Hatta had managed to crush an insurgency by the Indonesian Communist Party. The event proved to both Britain and the United States that the Indonesian Republic was not a communist spearhead, as the Dutch were suggesting, but should indeed be regarded as a bulwark against communism.25 From the British point of view, the danger was that open support for the Dutch position in Indonesia might drive the nationalists into the camp of the communists. A further reason for London’s reluctance to include the Dutch in its regional plans was


that international opinion remained far more concerned about the situation in Indonesia than about that in Indochina. The moment of truth came on 19 December 1948 when the Dutch launched a second ‘police action’ aimed at liquidating the Indonesian Republic. Within two weeks, most of the Indonesian leaders, including Hatta and Sukarno, were arrested, and most of the republican cities in Java and Sumatra were occupied by Dutch troops.26 The move instantly resulted in a worldwide outcry against the Netherlands. While the Security Council called for a cease-fire and the release of the republican leaders, India was among the most outspoken critics of the Dutch. Flights by the Dutch airline KLM over Indian territory were suspended and the departure of the first Indian ambassador to The Hague was postponed ‘indefinitely’. There were demonstrations at the docks in Bombay, where a Dutch ship was being unloaded, and in front of the city’s Dutch consulate. The Indian national Congress assured the Indonesian Republic of its complete sympathy.27 In Britain too, public opinion was critical of the Dutch intervention. Though London refused to back a Soviet demand for a Dutch troop withdrawal,28 it nevertheless put diplomatic pressure on The Hague to stop the fighting. Bevin also gave instructions to discontinue the recent relaxation in the arms embargo.29 On 29 December, Bevin told the Dutch ambassador in London that the Netherlands had not paid sufficient attention to recent international developments. The whole situation had changed with the granting of independence to India, Pakistan and Ceylon. There had also been enormous advances in Malaya; the Dutch should have kept in step with this general progress. Bevin suggested the Dutch called a conference of all the parties in Indonesia, including the republicans. They should offer to set up an interim government and set a firm date for the transfer of power. India and Pakistan might then adopt a constructive attitude. Nehru and Liaqat Ali Khan were ‘both well aware of the dangers of Slav expansion in South-East Asia, especially since Russian territory was near their frontiers’. If the Dutch handled this problem right, they could make friends in Asia, instead of antagonists. He added that it was Britain’s policy to make friends in South-East Asia for many years to come, and to maintain our trade and our economic position there. It might be possible to hold at no distant date a South-East Asia conference, including India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand and the Western European powers concerned. But the Dutch must show,


in any declarations they make, that they appreciate nationalist sentiment in South-East Asia and intend to follow a forward looking policy. If they did this, we would use what influence we could with Asiatic countries to help them.30 However, news subsequently reached London that Nehru was planning a conference of mainly Asian countries in order to condemn the Dutch action in Indonesia. The proposed confer-ence set the alarm bells ringing in London. The Foreign Office immediately cancelled all telegrams, addressed to other Com-monwealth governments, which contained reports of Bevin’s conversation with the Dutch ambassador, fearing that countries like Australia would ‘conclude that we had been outwitted by the Indians’.31 The prospect of an anti-Dutch conference sponsored by India made the Netherlands’ participation in the joint AsianEuropean scheme, proposed by Bevin, virtually unthinkable. Until the transfer of power in Indonesia one year later on, the Netherlands in fact ceased to feature in London’s regional strategy. To sum up, London was by the end of 1948 considering three levels of cooperation on South-East Asia. First, Britain remained committed to the plan of using the Commonwealth as the basis for regional cooperation. One of the immediate issues that the Commonwealth, and particularly India, would have to address was the deteriorating situation in Burma. Second, Britain was hoping to secure the material and political support of the United States in order to stabilise the countries of South-East Asia. Initially, cooperation would centre on Thailand where the Americans had established an economic foothold after the war. Joint Anglo-American action would prevent the Thai govern-ment from siding with the Chinese and enable it to suppress possible communistresistance movements. Finally, Britain decided to embark on separate talks with France. The aim was to increase security and intelligence cooperation in South-East Asia in order to strengthen the anticommunist campaigns in both Indochina and Malaya. London also hoped to induce the French into granting concessions to the noncommunist nationalists in Indochina. This would provide a nationalist alternative to the Viet Minh, and it might turn France into an acceptable partner in a European-Asian scheme of cooperation in South-East Asia. The Netherlands, on the other hand, had missed her chance. After the second police action, the British privately recommended that the Dutch should withdraw from Indonesia. As Dening reflected four months later, the cabinet paper was originally designed to give the impetus which would induce the South-


East Asian territories, the United States and the Com-monwealth to consider concerted action to resist Russian expansion and communist tactics in South-East Asia.32 However, while the short-term goal nay have been the creation of an anticommunist bloc in South-East Asia, London’s diplomatic efforts also fitted in with the Foreign Office’s longterm policy of setting up a regional system that would guarantee Britain lasting political, economic and military influence in South-East Asia. Six months before the cabinet paper, the prospects for British-led regional cooperation had been extremely dim given the rise of ECAFE, the concurrent decline of the Special Commission, and regional competition from India and Australia. At the end of 1948, none of these problems had disappeared. However, the Cold War now dominated British thinking on South-East Asia. Against the odds, London was determined to press ahead with its revised regional plans. Regional cooperation was turning into one of Britain’s main strategies for countering communism in South-East Asia.

Chapter 12 Regional cooperation and regional containment

After years of interdepartmental planning and debating, Whitehall had firmly lifted the issue of regional cooperation to the governmental level. Out went the idea of using the Special Commission as the basis for a British-sponsored regional com-mission; rather than organising regional cooperation from the grassroots upwards, London now opted for international talks at the government level. The precarious situation in South-East Asia urgently required concerted action by the West and by the pro-Western governments in the region. The aim was to stem the perceived communist tide through an anti-communist front: regional cooperation as a means of regional containment. However, the problems that London would have to overcome were considerable. After despatching shortened versions of the cabinet’s paper on China to the United States, France, Thailand and the Commonwealth countries, London was hoping for quick and forthcoming responses from all quarters to its pro-posals for greater anti-communist collaboration. Yet only France and to a lesser degree Thailand were receptive. The Americans indicated that they were financially overstretched because of their commitments to European recovery. They had also burnt their fingers in China, where billions of dollars had been wasted on supporting the Kuomintang. Washington was reluctant to make the same mistake again by supporting the European colonial regimes in South-East Asia. The Asian Commonwealth countries were equally hesitant. Though they were interested in obtaining Western aid, they wanted to avoid being associated with any proWestern or anti-communist bloc in Asia. However, more than any other single factor, the Indonesian crisis continued to interfere with the British initiative. The second Dutch police action in December 1948 provided Nehru with an ideal opportunity to wrest the regional initiative away from London. If anticommunism was the driving force behind Britain’s revived regional


policies, then the theme of anticolonialism continued to serve the Indians as a means of rallying the fledgling Asian states behind them. Between 20 and 23 January 1949, Nehru invited representatives from fifteen Asian countries to a conference in Delhi to discuss ways and means of helping the Indonesian nationalists. Of the Western countries only Australia was fully represented.1 The conference was highly critical of Western policies in Asia, and Nehru called not only for Indonesian independence but for the elimination of all forms of colonialism. In one of the final conference resolutions, the delegates in Delhi demanded the complete transfer of power from the Netherlands to the Indonesian Republic by 1 January 1950. This greatly added to the mounting international pressure on the Netherlands, exerted also by the United States, Britain and the United Nations. The Dutch eventually gave in and in April 1949 began negotiations with the Indonesian Republic. After a roundtable conference at The Hague in August, the Dutch transferred their sovereignty to the republican government on 29 December 1949.2 Apart from calling for Indonesian independence, Nehru used his conference to launch a new initiative for exclusively Asian cooperation. At India’s instigation, the meeting recommended that: ‘Participating Governments should consult among them-selves in order to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery, having regard to the areas concerned, of promoting consultation and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations.’3 Immediately after the conference, the Indians organised a’private’ meeting to discuss detailed steps towards the third resolution’s implementation. The meeting was attended by repre-sentatives from most of the countries who had participated in the conference—with the exception of Burma, the Philippines and Australia. According to the Australian High Commissioner in India, Gollan, the meeting was specially postponed until the Australians had departed.4 During this informal meeting, it was proposed at India’s instigation that all the countries concerned should collect and exchange information of mutual importance, and that they should collaborate on matters of common policy, for example in the UN, and take steps to improve cultural relations. Once official replies to these proposals had been received, there should be a meeting in Delhi to confirm plans for a proposed interna-tional organisation that would be linked to periodical ambassadorial meetings in Delhi. If certain countries were not prepared to take part in the organisation, the remaining coun-tries should not be prevented from carrying out these proposals. The Indians subsequently

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communicated a copy of the meeting’s minutes to the Australians, indicating that there might be two (regional) groups, one Middle Eastern and one South-East Asian. Gollan passed on his information to London, telling the British that it was his impression that India intended to be the leader of both these groupings.5 From the outset, London had disliked Nehru’s conference plans which excluded Britain and which interfered with its own regional plans. However, the British had soon realised that there was little they could do about the Delhi Conference. Bevin consequently wished Nehru success during his meeting,6 and London encouraged Australia to take a moderating stance. The conference’s outcome further depressed British officials. Com-menting on the informal Indian-sponsored get-together at the end of the meeting, the British High Commissioner in India, Archibald Nye, argued that ‘whether we like it or not, this organisation would get going and would remain in being’. But all was not lost, and Nye advised his Australian colleague that the membership of Australia and New Zealand (in an Asian organisation) would have a stabilising effect.7 The Com-monwealth Relations Office agreed that there might be an advantage if Australia and New Zealand were associated with any organisation that might develop out of the Delhi Conference’s resolution.8 From Singapore, MacDonald agreed that the movement to-wards Asian cooperation had probably come to stay, and he recommended maintaining an understanding and reasonably sympathetic attitude towards gatherings of Asian governments. Putting too much of a brake on the movement might render its mood hostile towards Britain rather than stop it, whereas by giving it sympathetic support Britain would help to lead it along paths of moderation and cooperation with the West. Australian and New Zealand participation would be of advantage, and it was desirable that Britain would also join. This could be done through Malaya and British Borneo, who would be represented by MacDonald as well as local Malayan and Chinese leaders.9 The Foreign Office was less sympathetic to Nehru’s plans, which clearly conflicted with its own ambitions. When, by the begin-ning of March, India, Pakistan and Ceylon had all indicated general agreement with the British analysis of the situation in South-East Asia, but had refrained from suggesting closer Com-monwealth collaboration, the Foreign Office blamed Nehru. It suspected that the cautious replies were partly a result of the Delhi Conference’s anti-colonial undertone.10 However, there were also signs that the Asian countries were beginning to regard the Soviet Union as a potential threat. Moscow had in fact condemned the Delhi


Conference. London hoped that the Soviet move would now backfire, and it stressed that the ‘Recent outspoken criticism of New Delhi conference may result in hardening of attitude against Soviet and open more eyes to the indivisibility of Communist menace and the urgency of resisting its encroachments.’11 Despite this glimmer of hope, the Foreign Office was becom-ing increasingly depressed about the lack of international action against communism in Asia. In January, the Chinese commu-nists had occupied Tientsin and Peking, and had cleared the way to the Yangtse river which divides the northern and southern halves of China. The leader of the Kuomintang forces, Chiang Kai-shek, had (temporarily) declared his retirement, and in February the nationalist headquarters had been moved from Nanking to Canton in the south of the country. At the beginning of March, the Chiefs of Staff told the cabinet that the spread of communism in southern China would lead to further unrest in SouthEast Asia. Furthermore: Should the Russians establish bases in Southern China, the threat to South-East Asia and to our sea communications might become serious. If Communism successfully spreads into the Indian subcontinent, our whole position in SouthEast Asia would become untenable…. Until all countries interested in the area have agreed on a policy for the Far East, the only military consultative and information organisation which is likely to be effective is the exchange of intelligence information on Communist activities and the exchange of police information. Bevin presented the Chiefs of Staff paper to the cabinet. He told his ministerial colleagues that Britain should continue her international initiative that had begun in December. London, together with the other powers that had been approached, should also examine any possible economic measures in defence of British interests mentioned in the cabinet paper on China. Authority should also be given to establish international liaison between police and intelligence organisations in the area.12 The cabinet fully supported Bevin’s line.13 After the set-back to the British plans following the Delhi Conference, some of the ‘men on the spot’ gave Britain’s regional initiative a new impetus. Coinciding with the Chiefs of Staff paper, the British, American, Australian and Indian ambassadors in China were holding informal talks on the implications of the communist victories. The four diplomats subsequently sent a joint memorandum to their


respective governments, known as the Nanking Proposals, which suggested an internationally coordinated aid plan for South-East Asia. The paper, which expressed the ambassadors’ private views, was to have a consider-able impact in both London and Washington. It argued that the communist victories in China had created a ‘revolutionary situation’ in South-East Asia, including the subcontinent. Inde-pendence had failed to transform oriental societies based on starvation economies into modern communities organised on principles of social justice and economic freedom. Unless this situation was brought under control the communists with their easy and immensely appealing solution of ‘Land to the Tiller’ and ‘Power to the Worker’ would step in and take charge. The four ambassadors believed that there was only one solu-tion: a confederation of South-East Asia that would provide for a planned and integrated economy, and that would turn the small units in this region into a viable state with a progressive economic and social policy. However, countries like Indochina and Burma, who were struggling for or had recently acquired independence, would be unlikely to consider anything which might limit their independence. The immediate solution was therefore to establish a ‘permanent consultative council of the states of this area’. As a first step, Indonesia and Indochina would have to acquire political freedom, while a new constitutional set-up in Malaya would have to enable the country to participate as well. The council would then work out common policies in the region and provide for an ‘integrated economy’ capable of resisting the pressure of communist doctrines. To formulate the ‘principles on which the New Society in South-east Asia should be fashioned’, an economic survey could be conducted by a small committee of four or five high-level political and economic thinkers from Britain, the United States, Australia and India. The paper further stressed that the programme’s success depended on Western aid. A second advisory committee should therefore be established consisting of representatives from Britain, the United States, Australia and India, as well as France and the Netherlands, whose continuing economic interests in South-East Asia were believed to be considerable. The advisory committee would be responsible for determining the amounts and the procurement of Western assistance.14 In an accompany-ing letter to the Foreign Office the British ambassador in China, Stevenson, explained that the proposed second advisory committee might be criticised as an ‘Imperialist Syndicate’; the committee’s main advisory functions might therefore be given to the United States, so long as the Europeans might provide expert assistance.15 This


indicated that Stevenson regarded Washington as the principal source of assistance to South-East Asia. The Nanking Proposals showed distinct similarities to the Marshall aid programme in Europe. As in Europe, American funds would be used to develop the economies and social infrastructures of South-East Asia in order to provide prosperity and democracy, and to keep the region firmly within the proWestern camp. However, while in Europe aid was distributed through the OEEC, the Nanking Proposals envisaged a twocouncil system that would give the United States and the European powers a decisive say in the economic development of Asia; at the same time safeguarding Western economic interests and investments. It is of course doubtful whether the proposals could ever have been implemented, not least because countries like Burma and Indonesia would have objected to Western economic supervision. However, the paper had made two important points. First, it argued that a successful anti-commu-nist policy had to be based on regional cooperation, including the new Asian states and the Western powers. Second, any attempt to stop the communist advance in Asia required Western aid, the bulk of which could only be provided by the United States. The Foreign Office, which only recently had rejected Bevin’s suggestions for an Asian OEEC, now agreed that Amer-ican aid was required to stabilise the situation in South-East Asia. Confirming the recent shift in British thinking, Dening told the Commonwealth Relations Offices that if the Asian countries showed a disposition to create a united front against Russian expansion, ‘we should hope that the Americans would be disposed to offer material help when and where it is required’.16 In Singapore, MacDonald was thinking along similar lines to his colleagues in China. At the end of March he was urging London to intensify its efforts in South-East Asia, as the political situation was deteriorating. In addition to the communist victor-ies in China, the Burmese government was now unable to restore law and order in its own country. Furthermore, there was the possibility of collaboration between the free Thais and the communists in Thailand, as well as a dangerous deterioration of the situation in Indonesia. MacDonald believed that these developments should no longer be dealt with in isolation: We should regard South-East Asia as a whole, and devise a coherent policy for dealing with it over the whole region. There is evidence that our Communist enemies view the region as one whole and more or less plan their campaign on a theatre-wide


basis. We shall not defeat them unless we do likewise, and do it in conjunction with all the friendly governments both within and [outside] the region who are concerned. MacDonald saw the communist campaign in South-East Asia as part of a global communist offensive. For the time being, European cooperative action and American and Canadian help, culminating in the Atlantic Pact, appeared to have held commu-nism along the Iron Curtain, but it was probably because of frustration in the West that the planners of international com-munist strategy had given more attention to the East where economic and social conditions in some Asian countries provided the communists with a good field for propaganda and other activities. Unless counter-action was firm, areas like Burma and Indonesia might be lost as a prelude to losing a large part of the rest. Such counter-action had to be collective: The analogy of what has been done in Western Europe is quite a good one. We need Asian equivalents of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact. We appreciate that in many respects they would have to be very different from the arrangements in Europe, but in general they should offer the Asian Govern-ments and peoples economic, political, and, if necessary, military aid in their resistance to Communism. To devise such a plan, all the governments concerned in the region should be invited to cooperate, including Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The latter was particularly important as no adequate military and economic plan was possible without large measures of American help. However, since it would be difficult for the moment to contemplate constructive discussions which included both India and the Netherlands, and since the United States was not ready to participate, a conference of Britain, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand should be held as soon as possible to discuss, among other things, the situation in South-East Asia. It now seemed that the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Minis-ters’ Conference might not discuss South-East Asia at all, and MacDonald warned that if a Commonwealth conference in the near future did not examine the SouthEast Asian situation, the effect throughout the region would be serious.17 Similar to the Nanking proposals, MacDonald’s letter indicated how recent Western policies in Europe were influenc-ing British thinking on


South-East Asia. As in Europe, the countries directly concerned with South-East Asia would have to get together and demonstrate their willingness to cooperate against communist pressure. Initially, this would be on a Com-monwealth basis. The United States would then have to come in to provide financial aid in order to stabilise the region economi-cally and militarily. However, the main problem both with MacDonald’s ideas and with the Nanking Proposals was that Washington had given no indication that it was prepared to help out financially. Prior to the British initiative of December 1948, the United States had been extremely reluctant to assume a more prominent role in the area—with the exception of the Philippi-nes. Though the United States became involved in the Indo-nesian dispute through her membership in the UN’s Good Office Committee, she generally accepted Britain as the politically dominant power in South-East Asia. At the same time, Wash ington refused to make any significant financial contributions to the rehabilitation of the European colonies in the region. In the spring of 1948, Dening had been sent on a tour of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States to orga-nise five-power talks on the Far East. Dening failed in his aim, partly because of American-Australian antagonism over the future of Japan.18 However, another reason was that 1948 was a presidential election year in the United States, and thus full of political uncertainties. As the American Under-Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, pointed out to Dening at the time, there were fears in Washington that an expected economic recession would increase the pressure to cut American commitments abroad; there was the further worry that a newly elected administration might revert to isolationism. If, under these circumstances, Congress received an inkling that the State Department was about to hold fivepower talks on the Far East, there would immediately be an adverse reaction. When Dening referred to the lack of an Amer-ican-aid plan in Asia, the State Department’s director of Far Eastern affairs, Walton Butterworth, stressed that Washington had no intention of sponsoring a Far Eastern Marshall Plan.19 The ‘Dening Mission’ made it clear that for the time being no American support would be forthcoming for South-East Asia The United States was traditionally anti-colonial in her outlook, and any notion that the Washington administration intended to prop up the European colonial regimes in South-East Asia could have damaged Truman’s electoral prospects. Apart from that, there was a general feeling that Congress had reached its limits by providing Marshall aid to Western Europe. An aid programme for South-East Asia would have


had little chances of success. At the end of 1948, the apparent failure of American policies in China added to Washington’s reluctance to become involved in South-East Asia. Despite the fact that the United States had, since 1945, contributed more than 2 billion dollars of aid to nationalist China,20 the collapse of the Kuomintang regime was now only a matter of time. Washington feared that American dollars for other parts of Asia might equally go down the drain. To London, the only sign that the Americans might be contemplating a more active involvement in South-East Asia was the fourth point in Harry Truman’s inaugural address as reelected President on 20 January 1949, in which he stressed the United States’ intention to foster capital investment in and technical assistance to the underdeveloped world.21 However, if the British were hoping that ‘Point Four’ was a prelude to an American-aid programme in Asia they would soon be disillusio-ned. When the State Department received a shortened version of the cabinet paper on China it was reported to be ‘keen to discuss the whole problem’ with the British.22 At the same time, it refused to make any premature commitments, and was highly concerned about the publicity that the British were giving to their consul-tations with Washington. When Reuters reported in January 1949 that British and American officials were discussing a plan to contain communism in South-East Asia, the Thai ambassador in Washington assured the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that Bangkok, too, was willing to cooperate. There were, however, limits to what Thailand could do on her own, and the diplomat wondered whether the Americans could help recover Thai gold that was retained in Tokyo. As Butterworth subsequently explained to H.A.Graves of the British embassy in Washington, Washington welcomed every move to get other countries interested in the problem; however, he wondered whether it was opportune to let them know at this early stage that Britain and the United States were devising a plan to contain communism. If countries like Thailand got the impression that they could hold out their hands, it would be difficult to persuade his superiors to go along without tremendous caution.23 Dening, alarmed by the American rebuke, assured Graves that London was careful not to commit the United States, particularly as it did not know what American policy was. Equally: The habit of oriental countries of asking what we or the United States will do for them without making any serious effort to do anything for themselves is by now so familiar… there is no reason


why either we or the United States should respond to Siamese blackmail, or indeed blackmail from anyone else. The first task, Dening added, was for the Asian countries to take the communist menace seriously. However, it would be fatal to let the Asians believe that they could sit still and leave it to Britain and the United States to defend them. Britain’s own resources were in any event too limited to make this a practical proposition, and he imagined that the United States would be equally reluctant to make any considerable commitments over so vast an area. Both Britain and America were firmly wedded to the principle of self-help. His own personal view was ‘that it is diplomacy rather than dollars which will be required for some time to come’.24 After further talks with the State Department Graves reported to the Foreign Office that the Americans appeared reluctant to embark on any sort of economic assistance plan for Thailand. He therefore suggested that Britain’s aim should be to get the American government ‘to help us press the orientals to build up their own front against communism’. If this had the ‘convenient sequel that America should become economically involved in South-East Asia so much the better, but we should encourage the United States authorities to act politically first’.25 On 23 February, Graves again met with State Department officials, including Butterworth and the chief of the Division of South-East Asian Affairs, Charles Reed. Graves repeated some of the points made by Dening, particularly that the Foreign Office did not envisage an anticommunist movement in terms of US dollars; it was only hoping for American cooperation in terms of moral support for the British thesis that the Asian countries must set their houses in order and evolve a policy of their own in the struggle against communism. AngloAmerican cooperation was merely to fill the gaps while the greatest emphasis was to be put on self-help.26 Graves subseque ntly enquired what American policy was. Butterworth replied that American policy was well defined. In Korea, the United States intended to put Rhee’s government on a solid basis, and she would extend the occupa-tion in Japan so that the country would not fall prey to communism. In China, the US would test any successor admi-nistration to see if it gave signs of good faith. In the Philippines, the United States was already available for defensive purposes, while she stood by the UN resolution on Indonesia. Graves then mentioned that Butterworth had not touched on the continental territories which were in the line of the communist march, and he asked whether there was not ‘some urgency about


measures which would take into important consideration the danger to South-East Asia’. Butterworth’s response was ‘lukewarm’, and Graves had the impression that the United States was prepared neither to accept any responsibility for South-East Asia nor to act to maintain the position of friendly powers in the area. However, after Butterworth had left the meeting, Reed stayed on and suggested to Graves that Britain and the United States should jointly tackle the problem of Indochina. This was the ‘area where the flow could, and ought to be stemmed’. He thought perhaps something could be done together with the French in Paris. United States policy ‘ought to consider remedial measures at any rate in IndoChina, if not in other parts of SouthEast Asia’. The initiative was shortlived; Butterworth soon got wind of Reed’s suggestion and told Graves to forget that any such proposal had been hinted at. Reed’s statement did not represent State Department views and would not be included in the eventual reply to the British paper.27 Graves subsequently told London that talks with Butterworth were going slowly, and he doubted that any written analysis given to Britain would contain suggestions for a grand plan.28 Despite the obvious rift between Reed and Butterworth, the British failed to detect a gradual shift inside the State Department on the issue of South-East Asia. Slowly recovering from the shock they had received in China, some American officials were becom-ing concerned about the prospects for similar communist advances in South-East Asia. As some American historians have recently mentioned, Washington was in 1949 becoming increas-ingly aware of South-East Asia’s economic importance both for the United States and for the recovery of Europe. Malaya for example, as has already been pointed out, exported considerable amounts of natural rubber and tin to the United States. These exports provided Britain with scarce dollars that were needed to finance the recovery of her domestic economy; an economy that in 1949 continued to stagnate despite the provision of Marshall aid to Europe. Apart from this, South-East Asia was a source of raw materials for Japan and a potential outlet for Japanese manufactured goods—at a time when the United States was moving towards the re-establishment of Japanese commercial and industrial power.29 Some American officials were therefore beginning to regard the stability of South-East Asia as closely linked to the success of American policies in both Asia and Europe. In January 1949, Charlton Ogburn Jr of the State Depart-ment’s South-East Asian Division was one of the first American officials to argue in favour of a more active policy in South-East Asia. He was


inspired by the Delhi Conference, which the majority of his department feared might encourage the formation of an anti-Western bloc in Asia. Ogburn, in contrast, suggested supporting Asian unity as a means of stopping the spread of communism in South and South-East Asia. He reflected that America’s postwar prestige as a champion of independence in Asia had declined nearly to the vanishing point. In China, American policy had failed, after supporting an unpopular, dictatorial and corrupt regime. Washington had also refused to oppose France’s war against the Vietnamese and had provided financial backing for the Netherlands’ campaign in Indonesia. As a result, India now regarded the United States as the heir of British imperialism. Yet South-East Asia was in great peril due to the communist success in China. If the communists managed to assume control of the nationalist movements in Indonesia, they might soon achieve the conquest of the whole of East Asia, leaving Australia in a most precarious situation. Ogburn there-fore proposed to the State Department that Washington should encourage the formation of a southern or non-communist Asian bloc. It was immaterial that such a bloc would initially be antiWestern. Once the French and Dutch had lost control of Vietnam and Indonesia, the source of friction between Asia and the West would disappear and the anti-Western bloc could develop into a common Asian front against communist aggression.30 Ogburn’s paper, strongly anti-Dutch and anti-French in its outlook, opened the State Department’s eyes to the possibility of using regional cooperation in Asia as a means of containing communism. One month later, the American ambassador in China, Leighton Stuart, provided Washington with an analysis that came close to British ideas for regional cooperation. He argued that communism in Asia could not be stopped by military force or economic aid alone. If ‘Soviet expansionthroughCommunism’ was to be contained, then convincingly dramatised ideas were required. Unlike Ogburn, Stuart was thinking of a united Asian-European scheme in South-East Asia. He proposed that Britain, France and the Netherlands, together with the United States, should join a federation that would help to restore the complete independence of the peoples of East and South-East Asia. It would further help to protect Asia from more subtle forms of imperialism through highly organised minorities who were linked to international communism. India, the Philippines and other countries in the area might be included. So far as Indonesia and Indochina were concerned, the Netherlands and France might be convinced that the two colonies should be ‘liberated graciously rather than grudgingly and as a total


loss’. Britain, too, might make an unequivocal statement about ‘how long it intended to maintain its protectorates in Hong Kong and Malaya’.31 Stuart gave a copy of his memorandum to his British colleague, Stevenson.32 A few weeks later, the two ambassadors, together with their Australian and Indian colleagues, drafted the Nanking Proposals, which came close to proposing some kind of anticommunist Marshall Plan for South and South-East Asia. Proposals by officials like Ogburn and Stuart had a consider-able impact in Washington. Together with the British paper on China and the Nanking Proposals, they inspired the State Department’s high-ranking Policy Planning Staff to draft a paper which attempted to redefine American policies in Asia including Washington’s stance on regional cooperation. The American paper, titled PPS 51, stated that it was America’s objective to contain and reduce ‘Kremlin influence’ in SouthEast Asia through multilateral cooperation primarily with the British Commonwealth countries and the Philippines. After AngloAmerican talks with France and the Netherlands, there should be prompt discussions with Britain, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Australia on a cooperative approach to SouthEast Asia. To minimise the suggestion of American imperialist intervention, India, the Philippines and other Asian states should take the public lead. America’s role should be to offer discreet support and guidance. Furthermore, the United States should seek vigorously to develop the economic interdependence of Japan and the raw-material-supplying region of South-East Asia, and of India and Western Europe as a supplier of finished goods. To achieve this, every effort should be made to initiate and expand programmes of technical assistance through bilateral arrangements and international agencies. Last but not least, ‘efforts should also be made to supplement conservatively private investment, with Governmental assistance’.33 Though the PPS paper did not express official American policy, it was later on adopted by the National Security Council and circulated as NSC 51 in July 1949. Despite its shifting line, Washington refused to indicate to London that it was reviewing its South-East Asian policies. As a result, the British maintained their diplomatic offensive. In the middle of March 1949, the Chiefs of Staff’s analysis of the communist threat to SouthEast Asia and the cabinet’s recom-mendation for joint economic measures and greater intelligence cooperation were communicated to Washington.34 The Foreign Office was also planning for Bevin to discuss South-East Asia during a forthcoming visit to Washington. A brief was therefore prepared which outlined the department’s current


regional policy, and which was intended to be left with the Americans. The brief argued that while Russia’s threat to South-East Asia was unlikely to be a military one, the conditions in the region were favourable for the spread of communism. Furthermore: If the general impression prevails in South-East Asia that the Western Powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Russian pressure the psychological effect may be that local resistance is weakened, with the result that the process of undermining the systems of Government in that region will succeed to the extent that eventually the whole of South-East Asia will fall a victim to the Communist advance and thus come under Russian domination without any military effort on the part of Russia. The brief continued that the will of the South-East Asian territories to resist communism had to be stiffened: no vast resources were required; initially it was a question of political and economic efforts rather than of large-scale outright aid. The alternative was the abandonment of the whole position. If the Asian governments made an effort to stabilise the position, the Western powers might make limited contributions through technical assistance and advice, and by the provision of capital goods and arms. To avoid suggestions that Britain or the United States was seeking to dominate the situation, London should prompt the fully sovereign governments of South-East Asia to take the initiative. At the same time, self-interest should provide the inspiration for the new unity needed to resist Russian expansion. If a common front could be built up from Afgha-nistan to Indochina inclusive, it should be possible to contain the Russian advance southwards. A stable South-East Asia might also eventually influence the situation in China and make it possible to redress the situation there. The paper concluded: While the strategic necessities of Europe and the Middle East are greater and should have priority, the requirements of South-East Asia, though in a different category, are of vital importance. We should therefore, parallel with our efforts in Europe and the Middle East, do our utmost to encourage a spirit of cooperation and self-reliance in South-East Asia with a view to the creation of a common front against Russian expansion in that area.35


Dening explained to the Colonial and Commonwealth Rela-tions offices that it would take months, if not years for the policy to crystallise in the manner suggested in the brief. If, however, Asian countries showed a disposition to create a united front against Russian expansion, ‘we should hope that the Americans would be disposed to offer material help when and where it is required’.36 Dening advised Bevin that he could hand a copy of the brief to Acheson. There had been little progress in the recent discussions with the Americans. His strong impression was that the Americans had not yet developed any policy in this part of the world, and that they were reluctant to become involved in any commitments. Bevin’s talks were intended to be an initial step to enlist American support in principle for the policy the Foreign Office hoped to pursue. It would, however, be premature to ask for material support, since the Americans would want to be firmly convinced that the principle of self-help was firmly established before they considered an outlay of dollars.37 During Bevin’s visit to Washington, issues like the Atlantic Pact and the future of Germany took precedence over Far Eastern topics.38 However, Bevin briefly raised the issue of South-East Asia during a meeting with Acheson on 2 April, arguing that Russia had an ‘opening’ in the region since 60 per cent of the population were Muslims. Britain could exercise influence through Pakistan but was hoping for American help. So far as Indonesia, Burma and Malaya were concerned, Bevin was look-ing for a ‘sort of South-East Asia conference arrangement’ in which the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand could cooperate for economic and political purposes—as distinct from a military understanding or pact for this area which should not be considered at the moment. The only American comment on this came from a State Department expert on German and Austrian affairs, who interposed that the United States might like to set up a kind of Caribbean Commission for South-East Asia. At the end of the meeting, Bevin left his brief on South-East Asia with the State Department.39 Apart from this, the Americans gave few indications that they might be considering a more forthcoming attitude towards cooperation with the British in South-East Asia, though gener-ally agreeing that a spirit of cooperation should be encouraged. Graves feared that it would be difficult to bring the Americans in on South-East Asia: ‘They have burnt their fingers so badly in China that they are at present in a very cautious mood.’40 Even more disappointing than Bevin’s talks with Acheson was the American response to the British paper on China of December 1948. The American reply, arriving in London at the end of


March 1949, described the British memorandum as a thoughtful, detailed and well-reasoned analysis. However, it maintained that the British could have laid greater emphasis on the growing strength of nationalism and its long-term incompatibility with communism. Furthermore, ‘a word of caution is desirable regard-ing dependence upon American material aid in approaching the problems of South Asia’. Since 1937, the United States had given vast amounts of American financial, economic and military aid to China. The failure of America’s policy in this country was enough evidence that external aid could neither induce nor replace effective measures of self-help.41 The British were extremely disappointed by the American reply. As Graves pointed out to the Foreign Office, the weakness of the American paper was that it contained several isolated comments which had not been developed into any general conclusion.42 R.A.Hibbert of the Foreign Office’s South-East Asia Department was even more disconcerted. The United States seemed to be petrified by the failure of her policy in China and it was quite clear from the memorandum that no American aid would be forthcoming for South-East Asia.43 Despite this, the Foreign Office wouldn’t give up hope. As R.H.Scott commented at the end of April 1949, the American response contained no new statement of policy, but confirmed what London already knew: The important thing about the Memorandum—mixture of defeatism and pious advice that it is—is that the State Department has been induced to consider these problems and to formulate a statement of policy which we can use as a basis of argument. I am all for steadily pegging away at the Americans, on the principle of the steady drip wearing away the stone.44 In addition to the disappointing American response, Britain’s hopes for the success of her anti-communist initiative in SouthEast Asia were further dampened by discouraging news from France and Indochina. For some time, the French had been negotiating with the former Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, in the hope of establishing him as a proFrench alternative to the Viet Minh. On 8 March 1949, the French President, Vincent Auriol, had come to an agreement with Bao Dai, committing France to eventual Vietnamese independence, though without any time-table for the transfer of power. In the meantime, Bao Dai would become head of state in Vietnam, which included the provinces of Cochin-China, Annam and Tonkin. However, the French retained responsibility for foreign affairs and defence, as well as


keeping a number of political privileges. Furthermore, Vietnam together with Laos and Cambodia would form part of the French Union, which embraced other parts of France’s colonial empire and which was under the direct control of France.45 The Elysée or Bao Dai agreement, as it soon became known, in fact provided for little more than the establishment of a French puppet regime in Vietnam to placate international opinion. From the outset, the British therefore doubted whether the deal would convince India that the French were really interested in changing their colonial policies in Indochina. Yet without Indian consent, France could not become part of a regional grouping in South-East Asia. As a Foreign Office memorandum pointed out on 24 March, neither India nor Australia would regard the Bao Dai agreement as giving true independence to Indochina so long as it secured so many privileges for France. The problem was, however, that the French ‘would not take kindly to any pressure or suggestion from us to make a more liberal offer of independence to Viet Nam’. Britain could only hope that if the new agreement failed the French would see for themselves the urgent necessity for the future of the whole of South-East Asia of granting something more than just the token independence which they appeared to have bestowed under the new agreement.46 During the following months, the British in fact refused to endorse the Bao Dai agreement.47 London feared offending the Asian Commonwealth countries and jeopardising the chances of its regional initiative. The Indian attitude remai-ned crucial. Though Nehru had no wish to see communism established in Indochina, he still argued consistently that the French would have to grant full independence to Vietnam and that they had to come to terms with Ho Chi Minh as the real leader of Indochinese nationalism.48 The upshot of the international controversy over France’s agreement with Bao Dai was that Britain remained unable to include France in her regional plans. Some British officials quietly hoped that France, together with the Netherlands, would soon disappear from the region.49 For the time being, however, there was little more the British could do both about the situation in Indochina and about the Americans. As a result, the emphasis of Britain’s regional diplomacy shifted back to the Com-monwealth countries.

176

Chapter 13 The final stages of regional planning

After the disappointing news emanating from Paris and Wash-ington in the early spring of 1949, fresh reports from Delhi encouraged the British to step up their South-East Asian initiative. According to the British High Commissioner in Delhi at the end of March, Nehru’s proposals for an Asian regional organisation had not been accepted by the smaller states of South and South-East Asia.1 Many of the countries whose delegates at Delhi had originally welcomed Nehru’s initiative had apparently been intimidated by the Soviet Union’s condemnation of the Delhi Conference. Even more significant was the fact that most Asian states generally mistrusted Indian intentions. Since inde-pendence, Indian prestige had suffered greatly as a result of her military intervention in Kashmir, and the continuing conflict with Pakistan over the disputed border province. As Dening explained to the Foreign Office’s new Permanent Under-Secre-tary, Sir William Strang, Nehru wanted to ‘take the lead in building up a “united Asia front” on lines which may not be entirely dissimilar from our own views on the subject’. However, Dening added, the response had not been very eager. The Indian Prime Minister had cast his net too wide, and India was not much loved in Asia. Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma all feared India, and Thailand as well was afraid of being overlaid. Nor did India have the necessary know-how, judgement and tact to lead a united Asian front.2 Instead, Dening believed that ‘We are the obvious people to take the initiative in this matter, and if we play the hand skilfully, there is no reason why we should not succeed where India is likely to fail.’3 Apart from the failure of Nehru’s initiative at Delhi, unex-pected Australian and Filipino proposals on South-East Asia induced the British to step up their regional diplomacy. Since February 1949, there had been growing press speculation in Australia and the Philippines about the prospects of a Pacific defence pact. Such rumours were


inspired by the current negotia-tions between the United States, Canada, Britain, France and the Benelux countries on a mutual defence treaty covering Western Europe and the North Atlantic area. On 4 April 1949, a total of twelve Western countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty, which established the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Both Australia and the Philippines now suggested that a similar defence arrangement was needed in the South-East Asian/Pacific area to protect the region against a possible communist onslaught from China and the Soviet Union. The Australian Minister for Defence, Dedman, was reported to have stated on 14 March, four days before plans for NATO were officially unveiled, that ‘discussions were taking place for the conclusion of a Pacific Regional Defence Pact embracing nonBritish as well as British countries’.4 Six days later, the President of the Philippines, Elpidio Quirino, followed up the Australian statement by proposing a Pacific pact somewhere along the lines of the planned North Atlantic agreement.5 Quirino continued to pursue his idea throughout the rest of the year.6 London was in two minds about the issue of South-East Asian defence. On the one hand, British military planners had for years been advocating greater international defence cooperation in the area. Since the 1946 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, Britain had also been urging Australia to station troops in the region. In August 1948, Canberra had told London that it was not prepared to send troops to Malaya.7 However, in the follow-ing months the Australians suggested that they would assume responsibility for defence planning in the area including Indo-nesia, Malaya and Borneo. Despite Foreign Office fears that Britain’s influence in South-East Asia would be ‘finally extinguished’ if it became known that she would surrender her position to Australia in a future war,8 London agreed in November 1948 that Australia should ‘assume the initiative in peacetime’ for defence planning in the area.9 The decision paved the way for the secret ANZAM defence agreement, negotiated between Britain, Australia and New Zealand at the beginning of 1949, which coordinated trilateral defence planning in the Aus-tralian, New Zealand and Malayan area.10 In September 1949, New Zealand stationed a number of military aircraft in Singapore, and in June 1950, Royal Australian Airforce (RAAF) planes were moved to Malaya.11 However, after the signing of the ANZAM agreement London regarded a wider Pacific defence pact as premature. Firstly, India was known to oppose power blocs, and was unlikely to join in an anticommunist defence grouping only shortly after the failure of her own

THE FINAL STAGES OF REGIONAL PLANNING 179

regional initiative. Excessive speculation about a Pacific pact might have frightened Nehru off London’s more limited plans for economic or political cooperation in South and SouthEast Asia. Secondly, there was the danger of alienating the Americans if they came to believe that Britain wanted to involved them in a regional defence organisation. Immediately after Quirino’s proposal in March 1949, Acheson made it clear that the United States was not ready to consider a Pacific pact. As American diplomats in London explained to the Foreign Office, a Pacific defence pact would open the United States to the accusation that she was underwriting British, French and Dutch colonial policies in the region: this was something the American people were certainly opposed to. Dening got the point, assuring the Americans that the whole thing was a ‘pipe dream’ of Australian politicians and newspaper men; he added, however, that some other type of pact was possible, for example to combat communism in the Far East.12 The Foreign Office soon realised that it needed to intensify its diplomatic efforts if it wanted to steer the current multitude of regional developments and proposals along pro-British lines. It was spurred on by MacDonald, who kept warning London that the situation in the Far East would further deteriorate unless something was done to check the process.13 Furthermore, as Dening pointed out in Whitehall, there were two, in a sense contradictory, trends which needed correcting: one was the feeling that Europe and America were preoccupied with their own selfish interests to the detriment of South-East Asia; the other was that the Atlantic Pact would somehow involve SouthEast Asia in a war of European creation.14 At the end of April 1949, another meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London promised the Foreign Office a muchneeded opportunity to intensify its regional efforts. The confer-ence had been arranged at short notice because of India’s intention, announced in December 1948, to become a republic, albeit within the Commonwealth.15 Unlike the originally planned meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon, which had to be postponed to a later date, the London Conference would not officially deal with the troubles in SouthEast Asia. Despite this, Dening suggested the need ‘to have something on paper’ lest the South-East Asian issue came up during the meeting.16 As he explained in a letter to the other departments, only Britain had the experience and ability to knit the South-East Asian region together. However, for this to be successful Nehru had to be convinced that the colonial powers in the region should not entirely abandon their position, and that the West had a material


contribution to make to the welfare of South-East Asia. Even if India’s aim was the ‘overlordship of Asia’, the Indian leaders might accept that they needed the West. Economic cooperation might initially be more fruitful than political cooperation.17 Dening stressed in a brief for the Foreign Secretary that Britain’s attempts to build up a united front against communism had not brought any marked response. At the same time, Nehru had hoped that his regional conference might develop into a regional organisation. Though he had cast his net too wide, there remained the danger that an Asian regional organisation would develop anti-European tendencies. There was the disquieting feature that Nehru had the tendency to harp on the theme of colonialism and racial discrimination, both of which were harmful to cooperation with the West. The situation might get out of hand if it was allowed to drift until a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon in 1950, and Den-ing suggested an approach be made during the next Com-monwealth conference.18 Annexed to Dening’s brief was a memorandum titled ‘South Asia’ that was apparently intended to convince the Com-monwealth delegations at the London meeting of the wisdom of Britain’s regional policy. The paper was approved by the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee, a high-level planning committee recently established by Attlee that was similar to George F.Kennan’s Policy Planning Staff in Wash-ington. The paper warned that the Russians were aiming at world hegemony. Militarily, the greatest threat was towards Europe and the Middle East, but politically, the threat was worldwide. In South Asia, communism might undermine and liquidate governments and thereby bring the area into the Soviet orbit. Thus, the need of South Asia was not so much to build up military strength against the threat of armed Russian aggression, but to establish conditions of stability which would defeat the Stalinist techniques. A great deal could be done in the economic field: In economic development there is a need for co-operation between South Asian territories and other Commonwealth countries…. The United States and other countries can also eventually make their contribution…. Economic co-ope-ration may in fact prove to be the first step towards political cooperation, so that in the process of time a degree of unity will be achieved in South Asia which will render it immune from Russian attempts to undermine the position and to dominate the area.19


The British thus offered unspecified economic benefits if the Asian Commonwealth countries agreed to fall in line with Britain’s regional anti-communist policies. Though initially such benefits would be derived from mutual aid, the paper hinted that in the long run American aid might be forthcoming as well. Bevin approved the paper and asked Attlee to take the intiative during the Prime Ministers’ Conference. If he approached the problem from the economic angle, it might lead to some kind of regional conference, perhaps including countries from outside the Commonwealth as well. Economic cooperation might later on result in ‘some kind of security arrangement’.20 It appears that the paper was subsequently given to the attending delegations. Coinciding with the Prime Ministers’ Conference, both the Colonial and the Commonwealth Relations offices commented. While they agreed with Dening that Britain had to give evidence of a more active interest in South-East Asia,21 they also warned of the financial implications of the current proposals. Garner of the Commonwealth Relations Office warned that in the absence of a Marshall Plan or of any indications of an American contribu-tion, economic cooperation was likely to be mainly a British contribution, in the form of either finance or consumer goods. Many items were scarce at the time and British resources were strained; indeed, for ‘dollar earning purposes’ Britain was currently trying to divert some of her exports away from India and Pakistan to Canada and the United States. A working party of the Official Far Eastern Committee should therefore assess what contributions Britain could actually make. A conference of only Commonwealth countries could then be held in Colombo, Ceylon, to prove that Britain had a contribution to make in overcoming the problems of the area.22 The Colonial Office, however, warned that the Foreign Office’s plans might jeopardise the development of British colonies elsewhere, in particular in Malaya. As J.J.Paskin pointed out, the achievement of social progress based on economic development in the undeveloped countries of South-East Asia was a slow and laborious process, and it was illusory to expect too much in a short time in the way of creating an atmosphere unfavourable to the growth of communism. Even if there was the prospect of something like Marshall aid for the countries of SouthEast Asia, large quantities of the required material and technical staff would probably have to be diverted from other colonial development schemes. There was the danger that the butter would be too thinly spread. Paskin felt that the best contribution towards checking communism in South-East Asia was to set Malaya once again firmly on


the road to social and economic progress, creating a ‘bastion of contentment’ in South-East Asia which would also influence other countries. The Colonial Office was currently negotiating with the Treasury substantial grants to Malaya, and it would be nothing ‘short of calamity’ to jeopardise this pro-gramme by diverting scarce material and personnel to the development of foreign countries in the area.23 In the event, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, gathering in London between 24 and 27 April 1949, was primar-ily preoccupied with the question of India’s position in the Commonwealth. The participating Prime Ministers unani-mously recommended to the King that an Indian republic should remain in the Commonwealth, which would accept him as its head.24 However, although the conference gave Attlee no oppor-tunity to raise the issue of South-East Asian regional coope-ration, Nehru indicated in the course of the conference that until the Dutch and French faced the facts and granted independence to their respective South-East Asian colonies, nothing much could be done in Asia about wider cooperation with the colonial powers.25 His remarks strengthened London’s conviction that any regional initiative had to exclude the other colonial powers so long as they refused to make genuine concessions to the respective nationalist movements. There was only one South-East Asian issue on which the conference produced some concrete results: Burma. Since gaining independence at the beginning of 1948, the country’s internal situation had declined considerably as a result of the continuing fighting between government troops and the country’s minority Karen community. In December and January 1949, Burma had secretly asked Britain for financial and military aid for its campaign against the Karens. London had used the opportunity to bring in the Commonwealth, encouraging Nehru to organise a Commonwealth meeting in Delhi on the issue of Burma. However, the attending British, Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese delegates had failed to agree on financial aid for Burma. Instead, they proposed Commonwealth mediation in the Karen dispute, an offer refused by the Burmese Prime Minister, Thakin Nu, at the beginning of March 1949.26 During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in April, Britain, India, Pakistan and Ceylon now decided that they would try to meet Burmese requests for arms and military equipment. It was furthermore proposed to establish an informal committee consisting of the four countries’ ambassadors in Rangoon to consider financial assistance to the country.27 Though the Burmese initially dragged their feet about the proposed committee, a Com-monwealth loan of 350


million rupees was negotiated by the end of December 1949.28 From the British point of view, the fourpower initiative was important primarily because of its ‘educa-tional’ effect on the participating countries, as it constituted the first example of Commonwealth cooperation on SouthEast Asia. It seemed to matter very little to London that the Karens, who had supported the British forces during the war against the Japanese, were losing out. In the meantime, further communist advances in China made the issue of anti-communist collaboration in Asia increasingly urgent. On 23 April 1949, communist forces captured Nanking, the former headquarters of the Kuomintang government. The way was now open to Shanghai, where many of the city’s Western residents were preparing themselves for evacuation. The communist advance on the city meant that before long Mao’s troops would reach the border with Indochina and Burma. There was also the danger that Britain would be drawn into the fighting after communist forces had shelled the British frigate HMS Amethyst which had become trapped in the Yangtse river. Britain’s men on the spot were highly alarmed by the situation in China. At the beginning of May, the Far Eastern Defence Coordination Committee in Singapore, consisting of MacDonald and the British Commanders-inChief in South-East Asia, told London that diplomatic, economic and military action was required to form a ‘containing ring’ against further communist penetration. The ring should be formed as a result of ‘coordi-nated action’ between Britain, India, Burma, Thailand, Indochina and Indonesia.29 The Foreign Office passed on the warning to Bevin. It suggested a meeting of British officials in South-East Asia to discuss the situation. The meeting could be attended by Commonwealth observers and should be followed by a confer-ence of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon.30 Soon after, MacDonald visited London and on 24 May attended an interdepartmental meeting between representatives from the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations offices, as well as the British High Commissioner in India, Archibald Nye. During the meeting, MacDonald described the current situation in dramatic terms, outlining the core of what later on became known as the ‘domino theory’: the communists had just conquered the whole of China and could probably seize large parts of Indochina within the next six months; Thailand would then be unable to resist, while the possibilities of commu-nist domination of Burma were well known. If these three countries were to fall, Malaya as well as India would be exposed to a direct communist


threat. MacDonald strongly argued in favour of regional countermeasures: If, however, we could devise a political, economic and defence policy which could convince the peoples of South-East Asia of our and their ability to resist Communism, we would be able to hold a line north of Pakistan, Burma, Indo China, Hong Kong and the Philippines. Dening, too, believed that urgent measures were required. He stressed that ‘the object of regional cooperation would be the building of a common front against Russia’, though this did not necessarily mean the formation of a regional defence pact. One of the problems remained the Americans, who were still holding aloof from South-East Asian problems. It seemed, however, that they would be content to let Britain go ahead with her plans for regional cooperation, waiting to see whether the policy was working before offering assistance. In Western Europe, Dening added, international cooperation would never have been achieved without Britain’s initiative. The same could probably be said of South-East Asia where there would be no cooperation unless Britain discreetly took the lead. India was another problem, the meeting was told, because of her opposition to colonialism and her aim of becoming a third force in Asia. Nye believed it would be difficult to ask Nehru to join a regional conference whose chief purpose was the effective building of an anticommunist front. However, ‘regional collab-oration could be made attractive to India by using the economic bait’. MacDonald agreed that India could not be expected to participate in a conference with the French and the Dutch, but asked why Britain should not hold a conference limited to Commonwealth powers at which India played a leading part. India’s cooperation in giving aid to Burma was a good omen, and while cooperation was developed within the Commonwealth in South-East Asia, the Dutch and the French might disappear from the scene as colonial powers and so facilitate a wider conference. Dening then proposed to hold a Commonwealth conference in Colombo which, for climatic reasons, would have to be held in January or February 1950. Britain could offer technical help and capital, and if some concrete plan could be put forward after the conference it might be possible to interest the Americans as well. However, Paskin of the Colonial Office warned of the ‘insatiable appetites’ of India and the colonial empire; there was only a ‘limited amount of assistance


available from United Kingdom sources’ and the Colonial Office would find it difficult to agree that colonial development should suffer because of assistance given elsewhere, ‘particularly to India’. Dening blocked Paskin’s objections by stating that economic studies and country surveys were now in progress which should not be prejudiced. Eventually, the meeting decided that ‘Efforts should be made to hold a Commonwealth Conference in Ceylon in January or February of 1950. A paper should be prepared for Ministers outlining the position as seen by officials and recommending a policy.’31 The interdepartmental meeting on 24 May 1949 gave the Foreign Office a green light for its regional policies, which aimed at creating an anti-communist front in South and SouthEast Asia to safeguard Britain’s interests in the region. But prior to launching a new regional initiative at the next Com-monwealth conference, considerable work needed to be done. As a first step, the Foreign Office commissioned two comprehensive economic studies of the region. The first study was written by a so-called interdepartmental Working Party on Food Supplies and Communism and concentrated on the effects that communism would have on the supply of rice to the countries of South and SouthEast Asia. It pointed out that the extension of communist control throughout China ‘will bring organised Communism to the northern borders of the countries of SouthEast Asia, three of which, French IndoChina, Siam and Burma, constitute the major rice exporting region of the world’. This would have serious consequences. The three countries’ rice production was already much lower than before the war. The situation was worst in Indochina, who was currently producing 160,000 tons of rice compared to 1.3 million tons before the war. Thailand, with a production of 800,000 tons, had now reached about 60 per cent of its prewar exports of rice, but its trade was controlled by Chinese merchants and would be jeopardised if the communists tried to influence the country’s Chinese minority. Burma, the paper further argued, was threatened not so much by communist domination, but by a complete breakdown of law and order leading to a cessation of exports. The paper concluded that a cessation of rice exports from Thailand and Burma would be extremely serious for Malaya, North Borneo, Hong Kong, Ceylon and India. In Malaya, a shortage of rice would ‘predispose the urban populations to active participation in disorder’, while in Ceylon and India any failure of supplies would result in disturbances and provide ‘fruitful soil for Communist agitation’. The problem was that the local populations would be reluctant to accept wheat as a substitute for rice. Furthermore, any wheat supplies to the


area, which would come from countries inside the sterling area, would reduce the amount of ‘sterling wheat’ available to Britain. As a result, Britain would have to import wheat from countries outside the Commonwealth, and the total effect would be a ‘substantial drain direct and indirect on the dollar resources of the sterling area’.32 The study thus shared the Foreign Office’s concern that further communist troubles in the rice-producing countries would affect the subcontinent and Malaya through the back door. The paper in fact provided the economic rationale for MacDonald’s argument that the countries of South-East Asia were in danger of falling into the Soviet orbit once the Chinese communists had reached the Indochinese border. In a second economic study, a working party of the Official Far Eastern Committee went on to examine possible economic counter-measures against communist disturbances. The aim was to find ways of encouraging conditions which would ‘prevent Communism from finding a fertile soil’ in South, South-East and East Asia, as the whole region was now in the ‘front line in the fight against Communism where fighting is actually taking place’.33 As an early draft of the second study explained, the area under consideration (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Nepal, Tibet, China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indochina, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and Indonesia) was of great importance. It had more than half of the world’s population and played a significant role in Britain’s external trade. For example, Britain was vitally dependent on Malayan dollar earnings, worth 60 million pounds in 1948. At the same time, the area was economically behind. It was ‘rice eating’, and there was malnu-trition and illiteracy as well as a widespread lack of responsibility on the part of the privileged for the underprivileged, creating conditions favourable for the spread of communism among the latter. The single most significant factor was the food situation: if the control of rice supplies fell to the communists ‘the disruptive political and economic consequences in Asia are likely to be serious’. The paper suggested that the urgent short-term problem was to assist Burma, Thailand and Indochina to increase their exports, and to stimulate the production of rice, wheat and grain in deficit areas. In the next five years, the aim should be to develop the economic potential of the area, recognising the need for improved communications and encouraging industries. Above all, agricultural production had to be increased. Any Western assistance should be directed towards improving the production of valuable primary products for the West. In the long term, the problem was to raise the general standard of living


through a greater degree of industrialisation. The only problem was that Britain could not be expected to provide large-scale capital investment to assist the area, though it was essential to offer training to the people from the countries concerned, as they might otherwise use similar facilities in the Soviet orbit.34 When the Official Far Eastern Committee discussed the study, it recognised the further problem that the Americans had given no indication that they were prepared to provide financial or material assistance. Therefore, the International Bank for Recon-struction and Development had to be regarded as one of the main instruments of assistance.35 The economic studies enabled the Foreign Office to draft two comprehensive policy papers on South-East Asia. They were subsequently adopted by the department’s Permanent UnderSecretary’s Committee (PUSC) and submitted to the cabinet. At the end of July, the department completed a first paper, PUSC (32), titled ‘The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East’ which set out the goals of British policies in the eastern half of Asia. It argued that unless Britain used her particular position in Asia to bring about closer cooperation between East and West, there was a Very real danger that the whole of Asia will become the servant of the Kremlin’. Economically, Britain depended on the area for imports of rubber, tea and jute, while the sterling area’s dollar pool derived substantial earnings from Malaya. However, the area was affected by considerable political difficulties. The paper stressed that nationalism was ‘rampant to-day from Afghanistan to the China Sea’ while the Soviet Union was seeking to dominate the whole Eurasian continent. The political immaturity of the Asian countries and their economic distress made them particularly susceptible to communist tactics. The paper went on to state that it was ‘fair to say that from the Persian Gulf to the China Sea there is no single Power capable of dominating the region’. Despite this, Britain could use her influence to weld the area into some degree of regional coope-ration to resist Russian expansionism. Politically, Britain’s chief advantage was that she had been the most successful of the Western powers in coming to terms with the new nationalist spirit in Asia. Britain also enjoyed the moral prestige of a victory in the Second World War, moderated, however, by the memory of earlier defeats at the hand of the Japanese. She also had consider-able economic influence in the area, and the value of her trade with South-East Asia and the Far East was second only to that of the United States. However, the area’s full economic develop ment could only be brought about with American assistance,


and Washington had to be encouraged to supplement Britain’s efforts. Militarily, as well, there were limits to what Britain could achieve on her own. She could not afford military commitments of a size enabling her to offer effective resistance against a fullscale attack. Her peacetime commitments should rather be for the purpose of maintaining internal security in Britain’s own territories. In the long run, it would be for the ‘Asian countries themselves to preserve their national integrity’. Despite this, there was no other power capable of undertaking the formidable task of trying to link South-East Asia with the West and to create some kind of regional association which would be capable of effective resistance against communism and Russian expansion: The aim of the United Kingdom should be to build up some sort of regional association in South-East Asia in partnership with the association of the Atlantic Powers. Not only are we in the best position to interest the United States in active participation in maintaining the stability of the area, but our relation with the Commonwealth provides a means of influencing and coordinating the policies not only of the Asiatic Dominions, but of Australia and New Zealand, whose strategic interest in the area is, in fact, equal to our own. The immediate object of a wider association of the West, including the Pacific members of the Commonwealth and the SouthEast Asian countries, would be to preserve the spread of communism and to resist Russian expansion: its long-term object would be to create a system of friendly partnership between East and West and to improve economic and social conditions in South-East Asia and the Far East.36 PUSC (32) thus proposed a two-pronged approach to SouthEast Asia. Britain should endeavour to create a common proWestern front to contain the further spread of communism. This would be in line with Britain’s long-term aim of establishing a regional system which provided for the area’s economic develop-ment and allowed a maximum of British political and economic influence. However, a second paper, PUSC (53) dated 20 August 1949 and titled ‘Regional Co-operation in South-East Asia and the Far East’, outlined the problems of implementing the pro-posed regional policy. Addressing Asia’s apparent disunity, the paper stressed that the relationship between the Asian countries and the West was bedevilled by the struggle between emerging nationalism and the European colonial powers, in particular


France and the Netherlands, who were discrediting Britain in the eyes of Asian nationalists. Further discord was provided by continuing interAsian conflicts such as the Afghan-Pakistani and Kashmir disputes, as well as the chaotic state of Burma. India, the paper continued, was the ‘key to the whole problem of South-East Asian regional cooperation’. Little could be achieved without her, yet she was presently in no mood to co-operate with the establishment of an anti-communist front in South-East Asia and the Far East. India and most other SouthEast Asian countries failed to realise that the Soviet threat was worldwide, and they mistrusted the West and desired to remain clear of entanglements with the great power blocs. However, while India believed in her destiny as the leader of the Asian peoples, the other Asian countries appeared to ‘fear and mistrust domination by one of their own number as much as they disliked European domination’. To counteract Asian suspicions of British intentions, London had to convince the nations of SouthEast Asia that they would be unable to maintain a position between the power blocs and that a joint front against commu-nism was in their interest. Furthermore, India needed to be convinced that ‘unless she is prepared to play a more positive role, there may be no Asia left for her to lead’. To achieve this, concrete help of a technical, financial and economic nature would be of great importance. In addition, there were encouraging signs that ‘Communist expansion, just as it served to bring about greater cohesion of the West, is bringing the leaders of the countries of Asia to a more realistic frame of mind with regard to regional cooperation in the face of common danger’. Furth-ermore: Having agreed that it is for Great Britain to play a major (if unobtrusive) part in organising South-East Asia for regional political, economic and military co-operation, there is much to be said for using a Commonwealth rather than a purely United Kingdom approach to achieve our aims. Not only will India be less suspicious that she is being used as a pawn in a EuropeanMoscow chess match, but her aspirations to be a leading member of the team can largely be satisified without a) causing undue offence to Pakistan and Ceylon (since the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand will all be playing, too), b) Frightening other countries in the area that Asian regional collaboration is not another name for Greater India or Mahabharat.


The suggestion to hold a Commonwealth conference in Ceylon in 1950 remained in abeyance. Further communist successes and disturbances in Asia would help to bring India to the conference table. Furthermore, Burma, where the political situation was ‘thoroughly unstable’, was a ‘useful field for the exercise of a policy of Commonwealth cooperation, and success here would create an encouraging precedent for a joint approach to other South-East Asian problems’. The paper then turned towards individual countries. It stated that Thailand, unlike her neighbours, was peaceful and prosper-ous. However, unless the Thais were ‘satisfied that they will receive material support they may in the end follow the line of least resistance, as they did with Japan in 1941, and come to terms with Communist China, thus contributing to their own downfall’. So far as Indochina was concerned, it was ‘unfortu-nate’ that the country would be more directly threatened than any other South-East Asian territory. For the time being, the presence of French troops and the retention of French bases ‘should act as a reasonably effective counter to infiltration or direct aggression from China, although here, again, charges of imperialism may be the price to be paid for greater security’. Malaya, the paper continued, was of ‘utmost importance strategically and economi-cally to the United Kingdom and is the major dollar earner of the sterling area’. An assurance that Britain was not prepared to abandon the area and was taking active steps to safeguard it from external aggression might do much to encourage the local Chinese to believe that reinsurance with a communist China was not an absolute necessity. So far as the Philippines was con-cerned, the paper doubted whether the country could bring ‘positive strength’ to any Asian Union. However, she could ‘nevertheless serve as a link in a system embracing South-East Asia and the Far East and Pacific areas’. Summing up the situation, the paper stressed that South-East Asia would not allow the same degree of political cooperation as in Europe. Nor was the United States prepared to play the same part or produce the same material incentives to greater unity. For the time being, the colonial powers remained suspect and there were many local jealousies and rivalries. Any thought of a SouthEast Asian pact could therefore be ruled out for the time being. Furthermore, before establishing a regional defence system, Britain would have to attempt to obtain a ‘nucleus of strategic cooperation’ with the Asian Commonwealth countries, Australia and New Zealand. This cooperation would have to be entirely in the field of planning and exchange of views, since Britain was unable to increase the present flow of arms. The paper con-cluded:


Political differences between the countries of South-East Asia and the Far East and their unwillingness and inability to collaborate militarily leave economic collaboration as the only form of greater unity which the countries of the area are likely to accept at present…. Regional collaboration in the econ-omic field, if achieved, may well lead not only to a better understanding between the countries of Asia themselves, but also between East and West. It is therefore at present the only possible line to pursue in the direction of our long-term objective of political and military, as well as economic, co-operation throughout the region in partnership with the West.’37 The two PUSC papers offered the most detailed and precise definition of British regional plans in South-East Asia since the Colonial Office’s paper on International Aspects of Colonial Policy’ in 1944. The papers’ authors suggested establishing, under British leadership, a regional organisation which provided for cooperation primarily in the economic field, and which would help develop the South and South-East Asian economies. The Commonwealth would provide the initial platform from which a regional initiative would be launched. The underlying aim of regional cooperation was the containment of communism in Asia: economic cooperation, together with Western aid, would help to stabilise the countries most threatened by the communist successes in China, namely Burma and Thailand. Sooner or later, Indochina might also be included, though it was not clear whether this would be under French or nationalist rule. The countries on the subcontinent, too, would benefit. Apart from safeguarding their food supplies from the riceproducing coun-tries in the north of South-East Asia, Britain’s regional plan would prevent the growth of communism by slowly raising their populations’ standards of living. Aid and economic cooperation would also place them firmly in the Western camp and prevent them from siding with the Soviet Union or communist China. In the long run, collaboration could be extended to the political and military spheres. If the proposed regional scheme was successful, the authors of the two PUSC papers believed that Britain would benefit con-siderably. Though she could not hope to dominate the region, regional cooperation would nevertheless provide her with a maximum degree of political and economic influence in the area. It would further help to safeguard the position of the dollarearning colony of Malaya, and might one day provide for a regional defence system to protect the colony against a potential attack from the outside. At the same time, regional cooperation


would help to develop the region’s economies in concert with the West, providing Britain with new markets and securing the flow of raw materials to Europe. Last but not least, a regional system would guarantee Britain’s long-term survival as a Far Eastern power. Though never directly expressed, the papers’ authors seemed to be thinking ahead to the time after Malaya’s eventual independence. However, the difficulties that had to be overcome in organising regional cooperation were manifold. There was the problem of associating India with London’s plans, and of convincing her that she would not be entering into an anti-communist bloc in Asia. A further problem was that the whole area was dominated by national rivalries. The Commonwealth approach to regional cooperation undoubtedly promised to be the best way to over-come these difficulties. However, the papers failed to provide a satisfactory solution to the recurring problem of aligning France and Indochina with the new Asian states. A more immediate problem was Britain’s lack of financial resources. The papers’ authors knew that only the Americans could give large-scale aid. It was even stated that no system of regional collaboration could hope to exist in the long run without American participation. All efforts therefore had to concentrate on drawing the United States into Britain’s plans.

Chapter 14 To Colombo and beyond

The two PUSC papers had left the Foreign Office with the major problem of trying to secure American financial support for its grand regional strategy in South-East Asia. Before submitting the papers to the cabinet, the department therefore decided to increase its lobbying efforts towards the United States. First, the British had to convince Washington that they would not involve the Americans in a potentially hazardous defence arrangement in South-East Asia. Yet, renewed speculation about a Pacific pact continued to fuel American suspicions of British intentions. On 15 May 1949, the Australian Prime Minister, Chifley, had stated that planning between Australia, New Zealand and Britain for the Pacific area was proceeding parallel with corresponding planning for the Atlantic area. The statement, which probably referred to the ANZAM treaty, drew fresh attention to Australia’s earlier proposals for a Pacific pact. Both Washington and London immediately dampened Canberra’s hopes for a Pacific defence treaty. On 18 May, Acheson publicly reiterated American opposition to a Pacific pact: While it is true that there are serious dangers to world peace existing in the situation in Asia, it is also true, as Prime Minister Nehru of India stated to the press the other day, that a Pacific defence pact could not take shape until present internal conflicts in Asia were resolved…. Nehru’s view appears to be an objective appraisal of the actual, practical possibilities at the present time.1 Anglo-American discouragement induced the Australian Defence Minister to tell the Australian House of Representatives that it was impossible to get other nations on the Pacific littoral to join in a Pacific pact. The best that could be done for the present was to integrate Australian defence plans with those of Britain and New Zealand.2 However, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, was more persistent than his Australian counterpart. He told Attlee on 19 May of his increasing concern over the communist successes in creating or


exploiting chaos and strife in the South-East Asian area. He further suggested that some form of Pacific pact was needed, and that Bevin might pay a visit to the Pacific to discuss the whole issue.3 Bevin expressed sympathy with Fraser’s anxiety, but told the Foreign Office that likely American reactions made it necessary to proceed with caution. He particularly did not want to complicate matters before the Atlantic Pact had been ratified.4 Fraser was therefore sent a polite refusal: Bevin was unable to leave Europe for the time being, and he was reluctant to take the initiative on a Pacific pact in view of Acheson’s recent statement. However, Britain was anxious to press on with her joint defence arrangement with Australia and New Zealand.5 In the following months, London continued to quell specula-tion about defence cooperation in the Pacific, advising its diplomatic representatives abroad to discourage any talk of a Pacific pact.6 When, in July, a British military planning mission was sent to Australia and New Zealand to discuss common defence planning, London refused to let the delegation discuss the question of a Pacific pact, as had been demanded by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff.7 The British wanted to avoid anything that would scare Washington or Delhi off their SouthEast Asian plans. Any Pacific or South-East Asian pact would have to follow regional cooperation in the economic and political sphere. Despite London’s refusal to contemplate any regional defence arrangements, there were few signs that the Americans were warming to Britain’s overtures on South-East Asia. In July 1949, George F. Kennan, head of Washington’s Policy Planning Staff, visited London. He explained that the United States was con-ducting a full survey of the situation in the Far East. At the same time Kennan repeated Washington’s refusal to join any kind of defence arrangement in South-East Asia. He also made it clear that the main task of resisting communism in SouthEast Asia had to fall to the Commonwealth. Kennan’s visit offered London little hope that American attitudes towards South-East Asia were changing, and a Foreign Office memorandum lamented: The general impression left by Mr Kennan’s comments on SouthEast Asia was that the Americans expected the United Kingdom to take the lead in this region. They will welcome frank discussions with us, but will not readily be persuaded to enter into any commitments. They will certainly not enter into military commitments, and we shall probably have difficulty in persuading them to give economic help. Mr Kennan said the military threat to South-East Asia from Russia was negligible, and South-East

TO COLOMBO AND BEYOND 195

Asian countries must learn in the event of war they must be capable of defending themselves.8 However, British officials’ hopes were raised again in August 1949, after Washington’s publication of a White Paper on China which aimed to explain the failure of American postwar policies in China. In Singapore, MacDonald was encouraged by the cover note to the White Paper, written by Acheson, which ‘contains a statement of policy about South-East Asia which seems to mark, or at least to foreshadow a considerable change in the American attitude to this part of the world’.9 Dening, however, doubted whether there had been a change of attitude.10 In September, Anglo-American talks in Washington on the situation in the Far East gave the British an opportunity to put further pressure on the Americans. Dening, accompanying Bevin in Washington, was hoping to sell to the Americans the idea of an economic approach to South-East Asia—based on the two PUSC papers.11 On 12 September, according to an account by the State Department, Dening told the Americans that the British wanted to discuss ways and means of defending South-East Asia, i.e. the area stretching from Afghanistan to Indochina and including the Philippines, against communism. In his opinion, it was necess-ary to develop the economies of the countries of the area to a degree of strength equal if not superior to Communist pressure. Mr Dening said that his Government believed if such a program was successful even in preserving the present standard of living in Southeast Asia that area could be successfully orientated toward the West. Dening added that the cost could not be met completely from local resources, but that Western economic aid would hopefully build up the habit of cooperation with the West. Butterworth, speaking for the State Department, generally agreed that there should be greater political and economic cooperation; however, he also stressed that it would be difficult to extend financial and economic assistance until the area’s political difficulties were approaching a solution. When the discussion turned to ECAFE, Butterworth stressed the United States had been obliged to discourage the members of ECAFE in their efforts to lay the foundations of the Marshall Plan for Asia, not only because a Marshall Plan for Asia was in itself impractical but


because we felt that the Asiatics should make increased efforts to solve their own economic problems…public financing of practical projects should be done through the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank.12 Dening subsequently informed Bevin that the Americans were unduly cautious about an economic approach to a regional understanding, and that Butterworth seemed to put too much faith in the ability of India and the Philippines to bring about regional cooperation. Bevin should therefore repeat in his talks with Acheson that an economic approach was the best means of bringing about political cohesion. If the Asian countries developed the habit of cooperating with each other and with the West in the economic field, it would be easier to secure their political and strategic cooperation, something both Britain and the United States desired.13 On the following day, Acheson stressed that it would be important to encourage the Asian countries to take the lead in the area and that it would be helpful if the Philippines and India could get together. Bevin, however, urged caution in encouraging India to take a lead, since the smaller countries feared Indian domination.14 In a first assessment of the Anglo-American consultations, Dening felt that the talks had gone much better than expected, particularly on China and Japan. However, he did not get far with the State Department on the question of economic aid for South-East Asia. The State Department felt that Congress had just reached the limits in voting fresh funds for aid anywhere, and it therefore did not want to encourage British hopes that dollars might be forthcoming to South-East Asia other than through banks or private investment: Politically, the Americans seem to think that the Asiatics should get together on their own initiative. I tried to point out that if they are left to their own devices little cohesion is likely to result in view of existing disputes and suspicions. If we did not make much progress on the regional approach, we at any rate discovered a community of thought on the individual problems such as Indonesia, Indo-China, Kashmir etc. I am afraid I detected a distinct tendency to use the Philippines as a stalking horse in South-East Asia, while choosing to ignore the fact that this horse is not only weak-kneed but internally unsound.15 However, during subsequent Anglo-American talks with the French Foreign Secretary, Robert Schuman, Acheson gave a first hint that aid


might be forthcoming to a South-East Asian country. In view of Mao Tse-tung’s drive towards the south of China, Acheson urged the French to swiftly ratify the Bao Dai agreement, as it would be easier for the American administration to give assistance to the local nationalist governments than to the colonial administrations in South-East Asia. If the nationalists agreed to give guarantees for private investments in their coun-try, it would become much easier for Washington to take a more positive line.16 Bevin, who quickly grasped the importance that the Americans were attaching to the situation in Indochina, agreed that Paris should ratify the Bao Dai agreement, ignoring the fact that the French-Vietnamese accord had previously been spurned by the British. Acheson’s remarks helped to raise the Foreign Office’s spirits. In a final evaluation of the Washington talks, Dening wrote to MacDonald that the Americans were now showing a much keener interest in SouthEast Asia than during Bevin’s last visit in March, and that they greatly desired to see the economic surveys now being prepared by Britain. They seemed to realise that South-East Asia could not be left to its own devices and that US aid was necessary. However, the State Department did not believe it possible to persuade Congress to vote further sums for South-East Asia at a time when Washington had difficulties in pushing through Marshall, as well as military, aid for Europe. Any financial aid for South-East Asia would have to be found from sources already available to the administration. Seventy-five million dollars originally intended for nationalist China should now be placed at Truman’s disposal for use anywhere in the Far East. Further aid would have to be found either by the Interna-tional Bank or by the Import and Export Bank, which only financed commercial propositions. On the whole, the Wash-ington talks had gone some way in convincing the administ-ration of the need for aid, and time was required for the administration to convince Congress of the necessity of further appropriations.17 The Washington talks encouraged Bevin and Attlee to press ahead with their plans for regional cooperation. The question of South-East Asia became even more urgent after Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949. On 17 October, Bevin and Attlee agreed that there should soon be a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers to discuss the situation in the Far East.18 On 27 October, the combined PUSC papers on South-East Asia were submitted to the cabinet. As one minister (presumably Bevin) pointed out, ‘it should not be impracticable to maintain the political influence of the United Kingdom in South-East Asia while arranging for the United States to provide much of the capital investment that was


required’. The Americans’ unfortunate experience in China had made them more receptive to suggestions for collaboration with Britain on Asian affairs, ‘on the basis that the United Kingdom provided experience and the United States provided finance’. The cabinet seemed to be impressed and approved the combined paper.19 On 3 November, Attlee asked the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Don Stephen Senanayake, to organise a Commonwealth meeting on foreign affairs in Colombo at the beginning of 1950. Coinciding with this, Dening was sent to Singapore to explain the cabinet’s policy to British officials in South-East Asia, who were holding a meeting at Bukit Serene, MacDonald’s official residence. The meeting generally supported the policy that Britain should encourage the ultimate creation of a regional pact or association for economic, political and if necessary military cooperation, in order to prevent the spread of communism in South and South-East Asia. It also agreed that the initial approach should be to encourage economic cooperation. The meeting also welcomed London’s plan to hold a Commonwealth conference in Ceylon which would discuss South-East Asia. In addition, however, immediate anti-communist action was required in Burma, Indochina and Thailand, for example by giving the latter sufficient material support and encourage-ment.20 A few weeks later, further evidence emerged that Washington was changing its line on South-East Asia. In return for letting the Americans see the second of the PUSC papers on South-East Asia, the British were handed a copy of NSC 51. The paper had first been circulated in Washington as PPS 51 eight months before, and it suggested both multilateral cooperation and Amer-ican aid to South-East Asia (see Chapter 10). As R.F. HoyerMillar of the British embassy in Washington told the Foreign Office, PPS 51 had now been initialled by the President, thus becoming official policy. He added that both papers underlined the necessity for the United States and Britain jointly to encour-age the South-East Asian countries to reduce the effects of communism in the region. He consequently saw grounds for optimism, though he disliked the American paper’s reference to South-East Asia as a market and supplier of raw materials for Japan; Britain would have to be Vigilant over the extent to which the Americans seek to expose South-East Asia to Japanese penetration’.21 However, the Foreign Office was on the whole satisfied with PPS 51. Though the Americans tended to use the Philippines as a ‘stalking-horse’ in South-East Asia,22 the main point was that ‘American thinking, by and large, is on the same lines as our own’.23


Encouraged by PPS 51, a British brief on South-East Asia stressed that Britain and the United States were now pursuing the same two policies: to combat communism and to improve the standard of living of economically backward peoples. Though Britain would be able to provide technical help, for example in the agricultural sector, it was clear that she could not make any financial contributions in addition to the assistance given to her colonial dependencies, and to the release of some of the sterling balances held by the countries in the area. If substantial aid was going to be provided, it would have to come from the United States. The primary recipient of American aid would have to be India, who was most important because of her size, low standards of living and strategic position.24 However, a recent visit by Nehru to the United States had produced only disappointing financial and economic results. The British cabinet therefore recommended that every effort should be made to ‘convince the United States Government of the major importance of providing financial and economic aid for South-East Asia as the most effective bulwark against the further advance of communism’. It was added that for political reasons American aid should not be provided directly by the US government but through the machi-nery of the International Bank.25 The last recommendation undoubtedly implied the point made in the cabinet a few weeks earlier: though the United States was asked to provide the capital for the economic development of South and South-East Asia, Britain did not intend to give up her political leadership in the region. In a subsequent brief for the British delegation at the Colombo Conference, written shortly after the final collapse of the Kuomintang government in mainland China in December 1949, London spelled out, once again, the immediate aim of its regional policy: to prevent the further spread of communism in South-East Asia. Communist action was expected initially to be directed against Indochina, then against Thailand and Burma. This would lead to a serious threat to India, East Pakistan and Malaya, not least because of the drying up of Thai and Burmese rice supplies. In countering the communist threat, it was prema-ture to think about regional cooperation on the political and defence levels—the situation in the different Asian countries was too different for that. Instead, the Commonwealth should be used to promote economic cooperation, for example in the area of food production. But any such efforts had to be supplemented by the resources of the United States, whose cooperation was indispensable. In addition, the Commonwealth should be encouraged to formulate a common policy to deal with the situations in the non-Commonwealth


countries most threatened by communism, i.e. Burma, Thailand and Indochina.26 The Colombo Conference opened on 9 January 1950. The meeting was the first Commonwealth conference that was held in Asia, and international interest in the event was considerable. The British, who attached great importance to the meeting, sent a delegation of more than thirty officials to Ceylon, including MacDonald from Singapore. Bevin arrived on 8 January, despite serious heart problems, after a strenuous journey from London. The conference promised to breathe new life into the Com-monwealth after Nehru’s recent threat to leave the organisation unless India was allowed to obtained republican status. How-ever, the British were equally keen to use the conference in order to inspire a joint Commonwealth initiative towards South-East Asia, and to convince the Americans that they should contribute to the development of South and South-East Asia. Great efforts were therefore made to keep Washington’s interest going. The Foreign Office even provided the State Department with highly confidential daily reports on the conference discussions. In addition, American journalists were given the daily background briefings otherwise only afforded to the British press.27 The attending Commonwealth Foreign Ministers covered a wide range of topics during their five-day deliberations, includ-ing the situations in Europe and China, as well as the question of the Japanese peace treaty. However, from the British point of view the question of communism in South-East Asia was undoubtedly the most important issue. As Bevin told his Com-monwealth colleagues during the conference’s second session on 9 January, after the West’s successful resistance to communism in Europe the Soviet Union had now turned her attention to the East. He believed that the best response was for the countries with interests in the East to keep in close contact and to help each other in ‘resisting any attempt to hinder peaceful development on democratic lines’. He also held out the prospect of Western financial aid without political domination. A start had been made by Britain, and there was the encouraging promise of US aid under Truman’s ‘Point Four’. However, Bevin did not want to go as far as establishing a Pacific pact on the lines of the Atlantic Pact. In an obvious reference to India, he added that a Pacific pact would not be appropriate for some of the area’s newly emerging countries. Nehru, who was leading the Indian delegation, agreed that a Pacific pact was undesirable as it would only increase the menace of aggression without increasing the capacity to resist it. The new Australian Foreign Minister, Percy Spender, added


that the problem was essentially one of raising economic standards in the region, and that some kind of plan was required to assist the countries of the area. He also seemed to favour a regional defence arrangement, though he conceded that in view of what Nehru had said and in the absence of an assurance of American participation ‘he did not at this stage favour a military or defence pact, certainly not at this stage’.28 The first day of the conference showed that the British were playing their cards very carefully, testing the political ground for their regional policies. Instead of launching their own formal initiative for regional cooperation, they left it to others to table proposals which in fact closely resembled those developed in London during the previous months. On the second day of the conference, the Ceylonese Finance Minister, Jayawardene, pro-posed the establishment of a ten-year plan for the development of the agricultural and industrial economies of South-East Asia, which would also guarantee commodity prices. The plan would be implemented by a committee of officials who would study the problems of the countries involved before recommending what help the Commonwealth countries could give in carrying out the programme. He based his proposals on recommendations for the development of the underdeveloped countries of the Com-monwealth made by a Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meet-ing in London in July 1949.29 Later, a proposal for a South-East Asian OEEC had been added to this.30 In addition to the Ceylonese proposal, the Australian delegation submitted a paper on economic policy in South and South-East Asia. Similar to the recent planning papers in Whitehall, the Australian draft emphasised the communist threat to South-East Asia and the need to improve economic conditions so that the ideological attractions of communism would lose their force. Like the British, the Australians were thinking of mutual technical help within the Commonwealth, and of encouraging outside coun-tries, like the United States, to provide financial assistance.31 There is little doubt that the British had encouraged Ceylon to put forward her proposals. They had also been closely involved in drafting the Australian memorandum. The new Liberal Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, had only been in power for a few weeks. His government was both fiercely anticommunist and deeply committed to the Commonwealth,32 and therefore far more receptive to London’s plans than the old Labour government under Chifley and Evatt. According to Bevin’s subsequent cabinet report on the conference, two senior British officials, Sir Percivale Liesching and Sir Roger Makins,


had in fact asked Spender whether Australia could take the initiative in tabling proposals on South-East Asia. Spender ‘readily agreed’ and submitted a draft to the British delegation. Though the British made certain ‘observations’ on the paper, they did not attempt to table a joint proposal. The reason seems to have been that London wanted to avoid making any financial commitments to the development of South-East Asia. According to Bevin’s subsequent report, it would have been difficult for Britain to take the lead ‘in view of the strict limitations on any additional contribution which the United Kingdom could make in present circumstances.33 After the two papers were submitted to the attending delega-tions, it was decided to merge them into a joint Australian-New ZealandCeylonese proposal. Again, British officials seem to have been involved. The joint memorandum stated that the conference delegations should recommend to their respective governments that they should consult with each other on ways of making credit available for ‘essential productive purposes’ in South and South-East Asia, for example through the Interna-tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development. They should also encourage governments outside the Commonwealth to adopt similar policies—a strong indication that the Com-monwealth initiative would be open to other Asian countries. In addition, there should be bilateral arrangements for the pro-vision of aid. Furthermore, a consultative committee for South and South-East Asia should be established which would examine methods of coordinating development activities in the area. This committee would also consider an economic development plan for the underdeveloped countries in the area. The plan would be implemented by a proposed new organisation. The first meeting of the consultative committee should be held in Australia.34 The conference unanimously accepted the memorandum with only a few minor amendments. As Spender pointed out to the conference, Asia’s primary need was to improve her production of food. To achieve this, every effort should be made to encourage American participation in attempts to develop South-East Asia. Indeed, not much could be accomplished without considerable assistance from the United States. Yet American aid would not be forthcoming unless South-East Asia demonstrated her willing-ness to help herself. Bevin agreed but hinted that Britain would not be able to make any major contributions; since the end of the war she had already contributed 750 million pounds to the area, and she had to take the needs of the Middle East and Africa into consideration.35


The final communiqué told the international press corps that was covering the Colombo Conference relatively little about the new initiative. It mentioned that the meeting had made recommendations for the furtherance of the economic develop ment of South and South-East Asia, including the establishment of a consultative committee representing Commonwealth governments which would first meet in Australia.36 Though many observers were disappointed by the vagueness of the final statement, the British delegation had every reason to be pleased with the conference’s results. After more than five years of planning on the issue of regional cooperation, they had at last secured the agreement of three Asian Commonwealth countries, as well as of Australia and New Zealand, to participate in a regional development plan for South and South-East Asia. Crucially, India’s opposition to any regional arrangements that included the Western powers had been overcome. At the same time, London had avoided any major financial commitments to Asian development schemes. Furthermore, the meeting had met one of the preconditions for American aid to South-East Asia, as the attending countries had all agreed to try and help one another through mutual aid and development schemes. The British, as well as the other delegations in Colombo, now hoped that Washington would provide considerable financial assistance to the region. In retrospect, the Foreign Office’s considerable efforts in the postwar years to organise some form of regional cooperation in South-East Asia were a clear indication of the region’s growing importance to Britain. Economically, the region had become increasingly valuable as a producer of food and raw materials for the ruined economies of Western Europe, as the supplier of dollarearning rubber to the United States, and as the rice bowl of Asia. Politically, the region’s status was greatly enhanced when after Indian independence the centre of British influence in eastern Asia had shifted from Delhi to Singapore. Britain’s colonial foothold in Malaya now ensured her survival as a major Far Eastern power. In 1948, the region gained further geopolitical importance. London was convinced that Moscow was sponsoring the com-munist insurrections in the area. The Second World War had highlighted SouthEast Asia’s strategic importance for the defence of Australia and India. The British would not allow the region to be taken over by hostile forces for a second time. To counter the communist threat to South-East Asia, the British in 1949 adopted the policy of regional cooperation as one of their main strategies of containment. London’s regional plans outlined at the Colombo Conference had distinct similarities with those harboured by


the Foreign Office in the immediate postwar period. As in 1945, one of the key aims was to establish a regional system that would provide a maximum of British influence in the area. In both cases, regional cooperation would progress at the political and defence levels. However, in most other ways Britain’s regional plans had undergone considerable changes. While in 1946 the rice crisis and the threat of famine enabled the British to take the lead, the motor behind Britain’s regional policies in 1949 was the threat of communism. More strikingly, the underlying concepts of regional cooperation had changed radically. The 1945 plans were largely based on coope-ration with other colonial powers in the region. By 1949, Britain was hoping to cooperate primarily with the newly independent Asian countries in the region, sidelining France and the depart-ing Dutch, whose hard-line colonial policies had discredited them in the eyes of the Asian nationalists. Another difference was the enlarged geographic scope of the regional scheme envisaged at the end of 1949. It was no longer confined to Malaya, Thailand, Indochina, Indonesia and per-haps Burma, but included also Afghanistan, the whole of the Indian subcontinent and the Philippines. This enlargement was due to two key factors. First, India was no longer under British rule and had become a fiercely independent player on the world stage. During the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and the Delhi Conference in 1949 she had furthermore displayed her aim of becoming the moral and political leader of both South and South-East Asia. The British were now coming to terms with Indian aspirations and concluded that no regional plan would be successful unless Delhi was involved. At the same time, London hoped to use a successful regional scheme in South and SouthEast Asia to exert a maximum degree of influence on India, and to steer the country along pro-British lines. The second reason for the geographic extension of Britain’s regional plans was the fact that the Foreign Office had decided to use the Com-monwealth as the basis for its regional diplomacy. Since South Asia included all of the Commonwealth’s independent Asian countries, the region necessarily had to be involved. In addition, the Philippines were added to the definition of the region in order to win over the Americans. Indeed, by 1949 Britain was attaching overriding importance to the inclusion of the United States in her regional plans. Unlike in 1945, when many British officials feared that the United States would merely stir up trouble in the war-torn territories of South-East Asia, the British were now trying to draw Washington into a firm commitment towards the region. They knew that American financial support was vital for the


success of their South-East Asian plans. With the help of Marshall aid, Britain and the United States had managed to forge an anti-Soviet alliance in Western Europe. London now needed Washington’s financial support to create an anti-communist bloc in South and SouthEast Asia. Throughout 1949, British ministers and diplomats therefore bombarded the Americans with memoranda and statements about the communist threat to South-East Asia. British diplomacy in 1949 thereby played an important part in drawing the United States into the affairs of South-East Asia, and ultimately into the conflict in Indochina. The Colombo Conference in January 1950 marked the high point of Britain’s regional diplomacy in South and South-East Asia. Against the odds, the British had laid the groundwork for a scheme for international cooperation towards the economic development of the region. In the following months, London pressed on with the Commonwealth’s regional initiative, which soon became known as the Colombo Plan. In May 1950, the plan’s new Consultative Committee met for the first time in Sydney. It decided to draw up six-year development plans for each of the participating Asian countries, and agreed to establish a technical cooperation scheme for the region. In October 1950, the Colombo Plan’s second meeting in London drew up a report titled The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Develop-ment in South and South-East Asia which detailed individual development programmes worth more than 1.8 billion pounds. The required external finance for the programmes amounted to about 1.1 billion pounds. The development plans included projects in the sectors of irrigation, power generation, commu-nication, housing, health and education, as well as road and railway construction.37 However, for the Colombo Plan to be successful, the British needed to secure American support, as only the United States could afford to provide the considerable sums that were required. First signs that Washington was coming round to Britain’s analysis of the situation in South-East Asia had emerged in the form of PPS 51, the American policy paper that bore close resemblance to earlier British drafts on South-East Asia. By the end of 1949, Washington was indicating that it was thinking of providing financial aid to the region. On 30 December 1949, shortly after the final collapse of the Kuomintang government on the Chinese mainland, Truman endorsed a National Security Council paper, NSC 48/2, which recommended that Washington should be prepared to provide political, economic and military assistance to supplement the efforts of other governments in resisting communism in Asia. As a matter of urgency, 75 million dollars were programmed for


the area.38 Three months later, an official American fact-finding mission to South-East Asia under the publisher R.Allen Griffin recommended giving aid to the French in Indochina. On 8 May 1950, six weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, Acheson announced that the United States would send economic and military aid to the French in Indochina. Indochina and Indonesia were assigned a first grant of 13 million dollars.39 The United States had finally become involved in Vietnam. However, while the British welcomed the American commit-ment to Indochina, they were increasingly concerned about the lack of American interest in the Commonwealth initiative at Colombo. During the first half of 1950, British diplomats kept trying to convince their American counterparts that in addition to any short-term measures in combating communism, a longterm reconstruction programme was required to stabilise the situation in the region. The Americans were not entirely con-vinced, especially when the British admitted that Washington would be presented with a staggering bill as a result of the Commonwealth’s development plan.40 However, after the out-break of the Korean War in June 1950, Washington was begin-ning to approach the British-sponsored Commonwealth initiative with a more open mind. During the Colombo Plan meeting in London in October 1950, Colombo Plan members decided that external aid should be granted on a bilateral basis rather than being channelled through a central allocating agency such as the OEEC.41 This met one of the conditions for American involvement in the plan and Washington subsequently gave the Commonwealth initiative its support and blessing.42 During the third meeting of the Colombo Plan in February 1951, the United States attended as a full member. The establishment of the Colombo Plan was undoubtedly a considerable diplomatic achievement by the British. In addition to India, Ceylon, Pakistan and Britain’s Malayan territories, countries like Indochina, Nepal, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Japan joined the organisation in the follow-ing years. Of the Western countries involved, the United States became by far the most important donor. Between 1950 and 1961, the United States provided a total of 8.3 billion dollars in bilateral loans, grants and technical assistance. Britain’s con-tribution to the plan was much smaller, totalling about 250 million pounds between 1951 and 1961. In addition, Britain used the Colombo Plan to release some of the sterling balances held by India, Pakistan and Ceylon, worth another 250 million pounds, until 1958.43


Despite this, the British soon had to realise that their initial hopes and expectations connected to their policy of regional cooperation had been pegged too high. In fact, the Colombo Plan never fully lived up to its expectations for the economic development of Asia. Though the United States provided far more financial assistance than the cash-strapped British, the plan’s impact on Asia could hardly be compared with the far more significant effects of Marshall aid to Europe. According to Lalita Prasad Singh, the Colombo Plan’s total value of external capital assistance to South and South-East Asia amounted to almost 10 billion dollars between 1951 and 1961. This only made up one quarter of all the development programmes funded by the regional governments themselves. Most of the assistance con-sisted of loans rather than grants. Furthermore, the total expendi-ture on technical aid provided under the Colombo Plan between 1950 and 1965 amounted to just over 220 million pounds. Of this, 176 million pounds were provided by the United States. The prime recipients were Indonesia, Vietnam, India and Thailand.44 As an information pamphlet by the Colombo Plan Bureau explained in 1962, the plan’s assistance only supplemented the national effort, and was generally of a marginal character.45 Apart from having only a limited impact on the economic development of South and South-East Asia, the high political hopes connected to the Colombo Plan were never fulfilled either, as it failed to develop into the kind of anti-communist bloc envisaged by the Foreign Office in 1949. The main problem remained India, who refused to be drawn into an anti-communist alignment, and who instead tried to act as mediator in the conflicts in Korea and in Indochina. The British equally failed to use the new regional organisation as a means of promoting British political influence in the region. After 1950, Britain’s dominant position in South-East Asia was increasingly taken over by the United States. In 1951, the creation of the ANZUS defence treaty, which excluded Britain but included Australia and New Zealand in an American-sponsored defence system in the Pacific, was an embarrassing indicator of Britain’s declining status as a Far Eastern power. Bevin’s hope that Washington would provide the finance and London the political leadership in South-East Asia had obviously been wishful thinking. With hindsight, London’s regional policy between 1945 and 1950 can be described as an inspired attempt at managing Britain’s decline as a great power in Asia. Having briefly harboured plans for the expansion of Britain’s regional hegemony in 1945, the Foreign Office subsequently aimed to replace Britain’s dwindling colonial power base in South and


South-East Asia with a less formal system of British influence in the region. Diplomacy was to substitute colonial and military might. The Colombo Conference and the subsequent establish-ment of the Colombo Plan were the high point of London’s regional plans, a last attempt to regain the political initiative in South-East Asia. But they failed to stem the tide that was running against all the European colonial powers in Asia. After a last moment of diplomatic glory during the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, the British were slowly abandoning their position in the region. In 1957, London granted independence to Malaya, followed by Singapore in 1961. In 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, the British decided to withdraw all troops from SouthEast Asia by 1971.

Notes

1 WARTIME PLANNING AND DIPLOMACY 1 A.Gorst, ‘Facing Facts? The Labour Government and Defence Policy 1945–1950’, in N. Tiratsoo ed., The Attlee Years, London, 1991, pp. 192– 93. 2 D.Childs, Britain since 1945, 2nd edn, London, 1986, pp.23–24. 3 R.Jeffrey, ‘India: Independence and the Rich Peasant’, in R.Jeffrey ed., Asia—the Winning of Independence, London, 1987 (paperback), pp.94–6. 4 K.O.Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945–1951, Oxford, 1985 (paperback), p. 219. 5 D.K.Fieldhouse, ‘The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1945–51’, in R.Ovendale ed., The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951, Leicester, 1984, p.86. 6See J.Kent, ‘Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945–49’, in M.Dockrill and J.W.Young eds, British Foreign Policy, 1945–56, London, 1989. 7 FO 371, 54017, F 1933, memo for the Foreign Secretary, 31 January 1946. 8 CAB 134/287, FE (O) (49) 43, 20 July 1949, preliminary report of the Economic Survey Working Party. 9 L.A.Mills, Southeast Asia, Minneapolis, 1964, pp.229–230. 10 CAB 134/287, FE (O) (49) 43, 20 July 1949, preliminary report of the Economic Survey Working Party. 11 N.Mansergh ed., Documents and Speeches on British Com-monwealth Affairs, 1931–1952, Vol.2, London, 1953, pp.760–5: extracts from a government White Paper, May 1945. 12 See Mills, Southeast Asia,p.254. 13 A.J.Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945–1948, Kuala Lumpur, 1979, p.24. Although theoretically responsible to the War Office, the Malayan Planning Unit was staffed by colonial personnel and was supervised by the Colonial Office’s Eastern Department headed by Sir Edward Gent. 14 A.J. Stockwell, ‘Colonial Planning during World War II: The Case of Malaya’, in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.2, No.3, May 1974, pp.333–4. 15 Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics, p.30; also CAB 65/42, WM (44) 70th conclusion, minute 3, 31 May 1944. Apparently, the War Office


feared that early publicity would prejudice the renegotia-tion of the AngloMalay treaties. The Malaysian Planning Unit was subsequently transferred to Ceylon as a military unit within the headquarters of SEAC, while Sir Harold MacMichael of the Colonial Office prepared to negotiate new treaties with the Malay rulers after the eventual reoccupation of Malaya. 16 C.Thorne, Allies of a Kind—the United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941–1945, Oxford, 1978 (paperback), pp.613–14. 17 See P.Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace—Mountbatten and SouthEast Asia Command, 1945–46, Manchester, 1987, pp.79–80. The civil affairs agreement was extended to the whole of Indonesia after the extension of SEAC’s boundaries in September 1945. 18 J.J.Sbrega,’ “First Catch your Hare”: Anglo-American Perspectives on Indochina during the Second World War’, in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.14, No.1, March 1983, p.72. During the final months of his life, Roosevelt was beginning to accept the reimposition of French rule in Indochina; see W.LaFeber, ‘Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942– 45', in The American Historical Review, Vol.80, No.5, December 1975. 19See C.Thorne, ‘Indochina and Anglo-American Relations, 1942–1945’, in Pacific Historical Review, No.45, 1976, p.84, quoting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in November 1944. 20 FO 371, 46545, FE (45) 29, ‘Policy towards Siam’, 14 July 1945. 21 Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p.61. 22 See W.R.Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941–1945. The United States and the Dissolution of the British Empire, Oxford, 1977, p.231. 23 ibid., p.256. 24 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.391, 13 July 1943, col. 142. 25 See H.Corkran, Patterns of International Cooperation in the Carib-bean, 1942–1969, Dallas, 1970, pp.8ff. 26 CO 968/158/5, annexed paper titled ‘An Account of International Cooperation in Colonial Areas’, 1944. The paper stressed that independent South American countries which could be considered part of the Caribbean region might become involved in the Carib-bean Commission’s work. 27 Mansergh, Documents and Speeches, pp. 1157–64, agreement between His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and His Majesty’s Government in New Zealand, signed at Canberra, 21 January 1944; also CAB 66/46, WP (44) 70, memo by the Dominions Secretary, 2 February 1944. 28 CAB 66/49, WP (44) 211, memo by the Colonial Office, 18 April 1944. 29 CAB 66/59, WP (44) 738, ‘International Aspects of Colonial Policy’, 16 December 1944. 30 CO 968/158/5, extract from enclosures attached to letter from Poynton, Washington, to Gent, 22 September 1944.

NOTES 211

31 FO 371, 41727 A, F 2196, memo by Hudson, Foreign Office Research Dept (FORD), 5 May 1944. 32 CO 968/159/6, minute by Caine, 26 May 1944. 33 CAB 66/49, WP (44) 211, memo by the Colonial Office, 18 April 1944. 34 FO 371, 41727 A, F 2196, memo by Hudson, FORD, 5 May 1944. 35 See CO 968/158/6, minute by J.J.Paskin, 13 May 1944. 36 CO 968/159/7, memo on Post-war Security in the Indian Ocean’ by Maurice Gwyer, n.d., enclosed in a letter from Amery to Stanley, 8 November 1944. 37 CO 968/159/7, minutes by Sabben Clare, 28 November 1944; Rolleston, 1 December 1944; and Robinson, 4 December 1944. 38 CO 968/159/7, Stanley to Amery, 11 December 1944. CO 968/159/6, extract, titled Far East’, from a CO paper, n.d. 40 CO 968/159/6, minute by Caine, 26 May 1944. 41 CAB 66/59, WP (44) 738, International Aspects of Colonial Policy’, 16 December 1944. 42 CO 968/159/6, draft titled ‘Regional Organisation Proposals for Far Eastern Colonies’. 43 CAB 66/63, WP (45) 200, annexed memo by Stanley, 19 March 1945. 44 Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p.459. The formula stated that territorial trusteeship would apply to the mandates of the League of Nations, to territories detached from the enemy as a result of this war and to any other territories that might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship. 45 CAB 66/63, WP (45) 200, annexed memo by Stanley, 19 March 1945. 46 CAB 87/69, APW (45), 8th meeting of the Armistice and Post-War Committee, 26 March 1945. 47 R. Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy—Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945–1952, Cambridge, 1982, p.8. Buckley points out that by the time of VJ Day British policy towards Japan had not been clearly defined either; ibid., p.22. 48 FO 371, 46328, F 3943, memo by Sterndale Bennett, 8 June 1945. 49 FO 371, 46328, F 3943. The results of the meeting are summarised in a minute by Sterndale Bennett, dated 3 July 1945. 50 FO 371, 46424, F 9753, Bevin to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 14 November 1945. 51 FO 371, 46424, F 9753, Bevin to Dening (SEAC), tel.1196, 8 December 1945. Further material in FO 371, 54012, F 248ff. 52 FO 371, 46328, F 3944, memo by Dening, 26 June 1945, and his attached terms of reference. See also FO 371, 46434, F 8195, memo by Sterndale Bennett, 9 October 1945. 53 FO 371, 46328, F 3944, memo by Dening, 26 June 1945. 54 FO 371, 46328, F 3944, departmental memos by Sterndale Bennett from July 1945. 55 FO 371, 46328, F 3944, Sargent to Machtig, DO, 2 August 1945.


56 See FO 371, 46328, F 5357, for the reply of the India and Burma offices; ibid., F 5602 for the Air Ministry’s reply; and ibid., F 5684, for that of the Dominions Office. 57 FO 371, 46328, F 5598, Bovenschen to Sargent, 21 August 1945. 58 CO 273/677/50908, minute by Bourdillon, 27 June 1945, summaris-ing a meeting held between 24 and 26 June. 59 CO 273/677/50908, minute by Bourdillon, 27 June 1945. 60 CO 273/677/50908, minute by Gent, 7 August 1945. 61 CO 273/677/50908, minutes by Gater, 8 and 11 August 1945. 62 FO 371, 46328, F 5239, Gater to Sargent, 13 August 1945.

2 THE DILEMMA OF PEACE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1 C.Thorne, Allies of a Kind—The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941–1945, Oxford, 1978 (paperback), p.523; also R. Butler and M.E. Pelly eds, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series I, Vol.I, 1945: The Conference at Potsdam July-August 1945, London, 1984: document 183, meeting of Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, 18 July 1945, CCS 195th meeting (CAB 99/39): and document 193, meeting of Combined Chiefs of Staff, 19 July 1945, CCS 196th meeting (CAB 99/39). 2 For a discussion of the boundaries decision see R.J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War—the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49, Ithaca and London, 1981, pp. 76– 83. 3 S.W.Kirby, The War against Japan, Vol.V, The Surrender of Japan, London, 1969, p.226. 4 P.Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace—Mountbatten and South-East Asia Command, 1945–46, Manchester, 1987, p.11. 5 The World at War, Channel Four, penultimate programme in the British television series. 6 Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Post-Surrender Tasks: Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943–1945, London, 1969, p.282; and J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol.6, London, 1956, p.255. 7 Kirby, The War against Japan, p.65. 8 J.H.Esterline and M.H.Esterline, How the Dominoes Fell Southeast Asia in Perspective, Lanham, 1986, p.219. 9 J.Pluvier, South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, p.391. For Mountbatten’s role in Burma see N. Tarling, ‘Lord Mountbatten and the Return of Civil Government to Burma’, in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies, Vol.11, No.2, January 1983, pp. 197–226.

NOTES 213

10 ibid., pp.230–4. 11 ibid., pp.365–6 and 369–71. Recent literature on Britain and Indo-nesia: P. Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace; McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War. 12 FO 371, 46353, F 9497, Dening to Sterndale Bennett, 5 October 1945. 13 P.M.Dunn, The First Vietnam War, London, 1985. For a more critical appreciation of Britain’s postwar involvement in Indochina in the recent literature see Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace. A good selection of documents on British policies in postwar Indochina can be found in PREM 8/63. 14 Mountbatten Papers, Southampton University, MB1/C150, Killearn to Bevin, 27 April 1946. 15 On the Combined Food Board see S.M. Rosen, The Combined Boards of the Second World War, New York, 1951, pp. 191–256. 16 Account based on Kirby, The War against Japan, pp.238–41; and Mountbatten Papers, MB1/C150, Killearn to Bevin, 27 April 1946. 17 Butler and Pelly, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series I, Vol.I, 1945, p. 1256: document 599, letter from Dening to Sterndale Bennett, 2 August 1945, No. 1691 (F 5022/47/23); also CO 273/677/50908/1, Sterndale Bennett to Anderson, 12 September 1945, enclos-ing letter from Dening to the FO, 2 August 1945. 18 ibid. 19 FO 371, 46434, F 7496, Dening (SEAC) to Sterndale Bennett, 18 September 1945. 20 FO 371, 54020, F 5385, Jacob (WO) to Dixon (FO), 13 September 1945, commenting on a memo from a top SEAC official which is missing in the FO files. 21 FO 371, 54020, F 5385, memo by Sterndale Bennett, 19 September 1945. 22 FO 371, 46434, F 8195, memo by Sterndale Bennett, 9 October 1945. 23 FO 371, 46329, F 8951, meeting of ministers, 18 October 1945. 24 CO 273/677/50908/1, memo dated 14 November 1945. 25 CO 273/677/50908/1, Davies to McGregor, 11 December 1945. 26 See CO 273/677/50908/1, minute by Mayle, 22 October 1945; and Davies to McGregor, 11 December 1945. 27 CO 273/677/50908/1, McGregor to Brooke, cabinet Office, 30 November 1945. The only ‘economic’ department opposed to the principle of regional cooperation was the Ministry of Supply. 28 FO 371, 46329, F 9498, memo by Sterndale Bennett, 2 November 1945. 29 CAB 78/39, GEN.101/lst meeting, 19 November 1945. 30 ibid. 31 FO 371, 46424, F 12106, Dening to Bevin, 30 November 1945. 32 See CO 273/677/50908/1, minute by Davies, 18 December 1945. 33 FO 371, 46303, F 12337, GEN.101/2nd meeting, informal meeting at the cabinet Office, 18 December 1945.


34 CO 273/677/50908/1, minute by Robinson, 21 December 1945. 35 CO 273/677/50908/1, Gater to Armstrong, 21 December 1945. 36 The Colonial Secretary had first told Parliament about his plans for a Malayan Union on 10 October 1945, omitting, however, the planned appointment of a Malayan Governor-General. See Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.414, col.255, 10 October 1945. 37 FO 371, 54017, F 333, Dening to FO, tel.43, 5 January 1946. 38 FO 371, 54017, F 822, Dening to FO, tel.106, 15 January 1946. 39 FO 371, 54017, F 334, minute by Sterndale Bennett, 27 January 1946. See also ibid., F 333, minute by Wilson-Young, 12 January 1946. 40 FO 371, 53974, F 348, minute by Wilson-Young, 8 January 1946. 41 CO 273/677/50908/1, Cadogan to Gater, 10 January 1946. 42 FO 371, 53974, F 1069, Gater to Cadogan, 17 January 1946. 43 FO 371, 53974, F 1069, minute by Sterndale Bennett, 27 January 1946. 44 FO 371, 54017, F 1933, memo dated 31 January 1946. 45 See Mountbatten Papers, MB1/C30/18, Mountbatten to Bevin, n.d.; ibid., MB1/C30/21, Mountbatten to Bevin, SCH6/96/B, 6 February 1946; also FO 800/461, file page 108, draft tel. from Bevin to Clark Kerr, 28 January 1946. The Dening incident is also discussed in Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace, pp. 184–7. 46 See FO 371, 54017, F 2336, copy of a letter from the FO to the Secretary of the COS, 6 February 1946.

3 `FAMINE AVERTED': THE SPECIAL COMMISSION IN SINGAPORE 1 CAB 128/5, CM (16) 5th meeting, 15 January 1946. 2 CAB 129/5, CP (46) 28, memo by the Minister of Food, 29 January 1946. 3 S.M.Rosen, The Combined Boards of the Second World War, New York 1951, p.253. 4 See J.Pluvier, South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, p.407. 5 CAB 128/5, CM (46) 10th meeting, 31 January 1946; and FO 371, 54017, F 2933, FO to Bangkok, tel.115, 21 February 1946. In December, Britain eventually gave up its last demands for free or cheap rice deliveries and agreed to pay the world market price in full. 6 FO 371, 54017, F 2036, FO to Cairo, tel.180, 2 February 1946; FO 800/461, FO to Cairo, tel.181, 3 February 1946, file page 122. 7 FO 371, 54017, F 2037, Cairo to FO, tel.171, 4 February 1946. 8 FO 371, 54017, F 2478, conclusions of a meeting at the FO, 12 February 1946; and CAB 134/677, SEAF (46) 1st meeting, 18 February 1946.

NOTES 215

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26

27

28 29 30 31

Executive action within the committee fell to the Ministry of Food, the Board of Trade or the Ministry of Supply. FO 371, 54018, F 3117, FO to SEAC, tel.377, 1 March 1946. FO 371, 54018, F 3117, FO to SEAC, tel.378, 1 March 1946. CAB 134/678, SEAF (46) 34, 13 March 1946. See PREM 8/189, Bevin to Prime Minister, PM/45/47, 13 December 1945, for the difficulties of finding a suitable candidate. See Peter Lowe, Britain in the Far East: A Survey from 1819 to the Present, New York, 1981, pp. 132–4. W.R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951, Oxford, 1985 (paperback), p. 49. ibid., pp.48–50, 226–64. Sunday Times, 24 February 1946. News Chronicle, 19 February 1946 See Rosen, The Combined Boards, p.256 CAB 21/1956 (also F 5076/286/61), Killearn to Bevin, received 6 April 1948, ‘Work of the Special Commission in South-East Asia’. CAB 134/418, IOC (FE) (47) 1, 9 January 1948, report of the UK delegate on ECAFE, 2nd session, Baguio, November-December 1948. CAB 21/1956 (also F 5076/286/61), Killearn to Bevin, received 6 April 1948, ‘Work of the Special Commission in South-East Asia’. FO 371, 54017, F 2037, Cairo to Foreign Secretary, tel.171, 4 February 1945. Killearn also asked for equal pay to his job in Cairo—a demand which nearly caused a rift with Bevin; see FO 800/461, draft telegram from Bevin to Killearn, February 1946, not sent, file page 146. Off-the-record interview by the author with a former Foreign Office member of the Rice Committee in London. FO 371, 68911, UE 2923, ‘Survey of the Economic Organisation of the Special Commissioner in South-East Asia’. CAB 21/1956 (also F 5076/286/61), Killearn to Bevin, received 6 April 1948, ‘Work of the Special Commission in South-East Asia’. A.S.B.Olver, ‘The Special Commission in South-East Asia’, in Pacific Affairs, Vol.21, No.3, September 1948, p.290, quoting an article in Sin Chew Jih Pao, 23 August 1946. Malayan comment on the series of special regional conferences convened by Killearn was more positive. CAB 21/1956 (also F 5076/286/61), Killearn to Bevin, received 6 April 1948, ‘Work of the Special Commission in South-East Asia’. The outline of the Special Commission’s economic work is also based on Killearn’s reports in CAB 21/1956, Killearn to Bevin, 28 August 1946, F 12907/3/61; and ibid., Killearn to Bevin, 15 October 1946, F 15749/3/61. Killearn Diaries, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 1946, Vol.I, 30 April 1946. ibid., 1946, Vol.2, 19 June 1946. ibid., 1946, Vol.I, 5 June 1946. ibid., 1946, Vol.2, 18 July 1946.


32 CO 537/1437, Killearn to FO, tel.12 Saving, 17 June 1946. A first draft was sent to the Foreign Office at the end of April; see FO 371, 54020, F 6352, Killearn to FO, tel.315, 25 April 1946. 33 Killearn Diaries, 1947, 1 January 1947. 34 FO 371, 53995, F 7340, Killearn to FO, tel.285, 21 April 1946. The meeting included Mountbatten, the British consul-general in Bangkok, Thompson, and the governors of the British territories in Malaya.

4 REGIONAL COOPERATION AND REGIONAL DEFENCE 1 A.Bullock, Ernest Bevin—Foreign Secretary 1945–51, Oxford, 1985, (paperback), pp. 135–6. 2 ibid., pp.235–8. 3 See J.Lewis, Changing Direction—British Military Planning for Postwar Strategic Defence, 1942–1947, London, 1988. 4 CAB 81/46, PHP (45) 29 (0) (Final), ‘The Security of the British Empire’, 29 June 1945. 5 CAB 79/36, COS (45) 175th meeting, 12 July 1945. 6 CAB 134/280, FE (O) (45) 52, paper titled ‘British Foreign Policy in the Far East’, dated 31 December 1945. The paper was prepared by the Civil Planning Unit (CPU), a new sub-committee of the Official Far Eastern Committee. The JPS’s contribution was added in February. The meetings and memoranda of the CPU, which stopped its work in February 1946, can be found in CAB 130/4 and 5. 7 CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 1, ‘Strategic Position of the Commonwealth’, 20 April 1946. 8 CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 1st meeting, 23 April 1946. 9 According to Bevin’s Private Secretary between 1947 and 1949, Frank Roberts, Bevin believed that British industrial workers had to understand that markets could only be found if the standard of life of the peasant masses in the (third) world was improved. See F.K. Roberts, ‘Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary’, in R. Ovendale ed., The Foreign Policy of British Labour Governments, 1945–51, Leicester, 1984, p.28. 10 See CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 2nd meeting, 23 April 1946, item 1 only: strategic position of the British Commonwealth, not recorded. Though no direct evidence for a link between South-East Asian defence and economic cooperation during the conference could be found at the PRO, a meeting of British ministers and officials prior to the meeting emphasised that defence discussions would include the question of strategic responsibilities. It was also stressed that Bevin’s statement at the beginning of the conference would have special relation to the Pacific and South-East

NOTES 217

11 12 13 14

15 16 17

18 19 20 21

22 23

24

25 26

Asia; see PREM 8/179, DPM (46) 1st meeting, 3 April 1946, cabinet committee on prepara-tions for the meeting of dominion Prime Ministers. R.H.Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945–1958, New York, 1968, p.242. CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 1st meeting, 23 April 1946. CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 4th meeting, 25 April 1946. Chifley referred to Australia’s differing view of the Soviet threat during the 10th meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on 2 May; see CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 10th meeting, 2 May 1946. The same view seems to have been expressed on the day of Bevin’s initial speech. CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 4th meeting, 25 April 1946. ibid. CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 17, ‘Economic and Welfare Cooperation in South Seas and South-East Asia Areas’, memo by the Australian Prime Minister, 27 April 1947. DO 35/1620, Poynton to Sterndale Bennett, 26 April 1946. DO 35/1620, Allen to Poynton, 29 April 1946. CO 537/1437, memo dated 29 April 1946. FO 371, 54068, F 6596, minute by Allen, 4 May 1946, and memo by the FO’s South-East Asia Department, 2 May 1946. Further brief accounts of the meeting in CO 537/1437, minute by Poynton, 3 May 1946; and DO 35/1620, minute by Price, 6 May 1946. The meeting was attended by Poynton and Robinson (CO), Allen (FO), Price and Davies (DO), Morley (BO) and E.A. Armstrong (Cabinet Office). CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 11th meeting, 3 May 1946. CAB 133/86, PMM (46) 5th meeting, 26 April 1946. The American government was subsequently sent an appropriate message but declined to participate in regional defence arrangements in the South-West Pacific. N.Mansergh ed., Documents and Speeches on British Com-monwealth Affairs, 1931–1952, Vol.2, London, 1953, pp. 1050–2: agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission, 6 February 1947. It came into force one year later on 29 July 1948. (For an outline of the work of the South Pacific Commission see R.C.Lawson, International Regional Organisations, New York, 1962, pp.251–5.) DO 35/1621, Singapore to FO, tel.783, 2 June 1946. The agreement was subsequently extended to the defence of Malaya, and in the spring of 1955 Australia and New Zealand stationed military units in Malaya. See A.Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938– 1965, Cambridge, 1967, pp.163–6.


5 INDIA, VIETNAM AND THE LIMITS OF COLONIAL COOPERATION 1 N.Owen, ‘“Responsibility without Power”—the Attlee Govern-ments and the End of British Rule in India’, in N. Tiratsoo ed., The Attlee Years, London, 1991, p. 173, quoting a letter from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence in November 1945. 2 R.Jeffrey, India: Independence and the Rich Peasant’, in R.Jeffrey ed., Asia —the Winning of Independence, London, 1987 (paperback), pp.99–101; and K.O.Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945–1951, Oxford, 1985 (paperback), pp.219–24. 3 For Attlee’s role in Burma see K.Harris, Attlee, London, 1984 (paperback), pp.355–62. 4 J.Pluvier, South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp.389–92. 5 ibid., pp.394–6. 6 ibid. 7 FO 371, 53995, F 7340, memo by Stent, 24 April 1946. It is unlikely that his paper influenced the interdepartmental talks on regional cooperation held at the FO on 2 May, since Allen only found time to comment on it on 8 May. 8 FO 371, 53995, F 7340, minute by Allen, 8 May 1946. 9 CO 537/1478, minutes by Bourdillon, Sidebotham, Mayle and Lloyd from 17 June, 18 June, 2 July and 17 July 1946. 10 CO 537/1478, Donaldson (IO) to Allen (FO), 22 August 1946. 11 D.Marr, ‘Vietnam: Harnessing the whirlwind’, in Jeffrey, Asia, p.204. 12 Pluvier, South-East Asia, p.415. 13 See A.D.Griffiths, ‘Britain, the United States and French Indochina 1946– 1954’, unpublished thesis, University of Manchester, March 1984, p.77. 14 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.433, 19 February 1947. 15 FO 371, 63542, F 1423, minute by Whitteridge, 6 February 1947. 16 FO 371, 63549, F 2616, memo titled ‘British Policy in South-East Asia’, 24 January 1947. 17 CAB 21/1956, F 12907, report by Killearn to Bevin, 24 August 1946. 18 Killearn Diaries, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 1946, Vol.2, 15 August 1946. 19 ibid., 1946, Vol.2, 2 September 1946. 20 FO 371, 53912, F 13076, Singapore to FO, tel.2026,8 September 1946. 21 ibid. 22 ibid. 23 CAB 21/1956, F 15749, Killearn to Bevin, 15 October 1946. 24 FO 371, 54046, F 16726, Dening to F.W.H.Smith (BO), 18 November 1946.

NOTES 219

25 Marr, ‘Vietnam’, p.204; and Pluvier, South-East Asia, p.440. 26 FO 371, 54046, F 16726, Dening to F.W.H.Smith (BO), 18 November 1946. 27 See J.W.Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945–1951, Leicester, 1984, p.41. 28 See Morgan, Labour in Power, p.268. 29 J.Kent, ‘Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945–49’, in M.Dockrill and J.W.Young eds, British Foreign Policy, 1945–56, London, 1989, p.49. 30 FO 371, 54046, F 16726, minute by S.H. Hebblethwaite, commenting on Dening’s letter, 19 November 1946. 31 FO 371, 53969, F 17983, F.W.H.Smith to Dening, 12 December 1946. 32 Marr, ‘Vietnam’, p.204. For an analysis of the events leading to the outbreak of war see S. Tonneson, ‘The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945– 75’, in Journal of Peace Research, Vol.22, No.1, 1985, pp. 12–17; and S.Tonneson, 1946: Déclenchement de la Guerre d’Indochine, Paris, 1987. For a commented selection of French governmental documents relevant to the outbreak of war in Indochina see P. Devillers, Paris—Saigon— Hanoi, Paris, 1988. 33 C.H.Heimsath and S.Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India, Calcutta, 1971, p.253. 34 ibid., pp.322–3. 35 T.T.Thien, India and South-East Asia, 1947–1960, Geneva, 1963, pp. 122– 3. These events were reported in the British press, see for example The Times, 24 January 1947, reporting that a demon-stration by communists and admirers of Subhas Chandra Bose (the Indian wartime collaborator with the Japanese) in front of the French consulate in Bombay had caused two deaths and fourteen people being injured. 36 FO 371, 63518, F 560, Lloyd to Dening, 11 January 1947. 37 FO 371, 63518, F 757, F.W.H.Smith to Dening, received 20 January 1947. 38 FO 371, 63542, F 1035, tel.202, Killearn to FO, 26 January 1947. In an apparent effort to put pressure on London, Paris hinted to the American press that both France and Britain were contemplating an economic regional organisation also including the Dutch; see New York Times, 20 February 1947. 39 FO 371, 63542, F 1201, Paris to FO, tel.96 A, 29 January 1947. 40 FO 371, 63542, F 1035, minute by Whitteridge, 30 January 1947. 41 FO 371, 63542, F 1035, minute by Moynehan, 31 January 1947. 42 FO 371, 63542, F 1201, minute by Dening, 1 February 1947. 43 FO 371, 63542, F 1423, tel.112, Cooper (Paris) to FO, 3 February 1947. 44 FO 371, 63542, F 1423, minute by Whitteridge, 6 February 1947. 45 FO 371, 63542, F 1035, draft minute to the Prime Minister, February 1947, enclosed in a note from Dening to Bevin, 10 February 1947. 46 FO 371, 63542, F 10184, minute by Allen.


47 For Whitehall’s debate on this issue see R.J.Moore, Escape from Empire —the Attlee Government and the Indian Problem, Oxford, 1983, pp.220– 34. 48 FO 371, 63542, F 1201, FO to Singapore, tel.375, 14 February 1947. 49 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.435, 24 March 1947. 50 Griffiths, thesis, p.75, quoting FO 371, 63457, F 13675, minute by Street, 13 October 1947.

6 SINGAPORE AND THE `RADIATION OF BRITISH INFLUENCE' 1 FO 371, 63549,F 2616, ‘Stock-Taking Memorandum—Far East’, compiled by Dening, 22 February 1947. It appears, however, that the paper preceded the second paper (below) and was written in January. 2 FO 371, 63549, F 2616, ‘British Policy in South-East Asia’, 24 January 1947. 3 ibid. 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 ibid. 7 FO 371, 63547, F 1969, memo titled ‘South-East Asia’ by Dening, 7 February 1947. 8 ibid. 9 ibid. 10 ibid. 11 FO 371, 63547, F 1969, ‘Record of a Meeting Summoned by the Secretary of State to Discuss South-East Asia’, 8 February 1947. 12 FO 371, 63518, F 560, Dening to Killearn, 20 February 1947. 13 FO 371, 63518, F 560, minute by Whitteridge, 19 February 1947. See also ibid., minute by Lambert, 17 February 1947. 14 FO 371, 63518, F 7103, Wright to Dening, 14 May 1947. 15 FO 371, 63518, F 8650, Dening to Killearn, 11 July 1947. 16 FO 371, 63518, F 8650, Dening to Seel, 11 July 1947. 17 J.Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945–1951, Leicester, 1984, p.50. For the previous negotiations see ibid., pp.43– 51. 18 ibid., p.70. 19 J.Kent, ‘Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945–49’, in M.Dockrill and J.W.Young eds, British Foreign Policy, 1945–56, London, 1989, p.59.

NOTES 221

20 FO 371, 63518, F 16507, minute by Dening, 10 December 1947; and ibid., minute by Harvey, 10 December 1947, for a previous enquiry by Sir S.Caine from the CO. 21 RJ, McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War—the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49, Ithaca and London, 1981, pp.130, 135. 22 Account based on McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 137–68. 23 FO 371, 63631, F 9184, minute by Mayall, 16 June 1947. Further Dutch arms requests were under consideration; see FO 371, 63631, F 10291, memo dated 16 June 1947, ‘Recent Dutch Requests for Military Supplies’. 24 CAB 128/9, CM (47) 48th, 20 May 1947. 25 FO 371, 63631, F 9184, minute by Allen, 16 June 1947. 26 Reference to this in FO 371, 63631, F 10372, FO to The Hague, tel.699, 29 July 1947. 27 CAB 128/10, CM (47) 54th, 17 June 1947. 28 FO 371, 63631, F 9052, Singapore to FO, tel.1499, 4 July 1947. 29 FO 371, 63631, F 9052, minute by Street, 7 July 1947. 30 FO 371, 63631, F 9052, minute by Whitteridge, 8 July 1947. 31 FO 371, 63631, F 9052, FO to Singapore, tel.1709, 18 July 1947. 32 T.T.Thien, India and South-East Asia, 1947–1960, Geneva, 1963, p. 103. 33 McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp.172, 180. 34 A.M.Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, London, 1960, p.48. 35 See McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, p. 179. 36 FO 371, 63631, F 10291, memo by Sargent, 21 July 1947. 37 FO 371, 63631, F 10290, DO (47), 17th meeting, 23 July 1947. 38 FO 371, 63632, F 10372, staff conference, 28 July 1947. 39 Hansard, Paliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol.441, 30 July 1947.

7 REGIONAL COMPETITION: INDIA AND AUSTRALIA 1 For a discussion of early Indian influence in South-East Asia see D.G.E.Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 4th edn, Basingstoke, 1981 (paperback), pp. 12–24. 2 T.T.Thien, India and South-East Asia, 1947–1960, Geneva, 1963, pp.71– 3. 3 Extracts from a broadcast speech by Nehru from New Delhi, 7 September 1946, in A. Appadorai ed., Select Documents on India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, 1947–1972, Vol.I, Delhi, 1982, pp.2–5.


4 See T.Remme, ‘Britain, the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia’, in T.Gorst, L.Johnman and W.S.Lucas eds, Postwar Britain, 1945–64, Themes and Perspec-tives, London, 1989, pp. 109–34. 5 See C.H.Heimsath and S.Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India, Calcutta, 1971, p. 104. 6 FO 371, 54729, W 11239, Monteath to Sargent, 30 September 1946; and ibid., W 12230, minute by Warner, 9 December 1946. 7 Straits Times, 19 April 1947. 8 Bangkok Post, 1 July 1947; also FO 371, 63557, F 9373, Thompson (Bangkok) to FO, 2 July 1947. 9 Viet Nam News Service, 29 September 1949. For British concerns that the league was infiltrated by communists see FO 371, 69686, F 1216, Thompson, Bangkok, to SEA Department, no.2/2G/48, 12 January 1948, enclosing a memo by John Coast from 12 January 1948. 10 On the term ‘The Near North’ see R.Varma, Australia and Southeast Asia —the Crystallisation of a Relationship, New Delhi, 1974, p. 12. 11 FO 371, 63552, F 3458, extract from statement by Dr Evatt, 26 February 1947. 12 FO 371, 63552, F 4334, Monteath to Sargent, 26 March 1947. 13 CO 537, 2093, minute by Watt, 18 March 1947. Watt was still unaware of Killearn’s comments below. 14 FO 371, 63552, F 3281, tel.563, Killearn to FO, 10 March 1947. 15 FO 371, 63552, F 4334, Monteath to Sargent, 26 March 1947. 16 FO 371, 63552, F 3269, tel.858, FO to Singapore, 8 April 1947. 17 FO 371, 63543, F 5642, UK High Commission in Australia to DO, tel.280, 21 April 1947, following for FO from Killearn. 18 FO 371, 63543, F 5642, minute by Christofas, 28 April 1947. 19 FO 371, 63543, F 5642, minute by Allen, 24 April 1947. 20 FO 371, 65583, W 2919, note by the British High Commissioner in Wellington of a conversation with McIntosh, 29 March 1947. 21 FO 371, 63544, F 8250, UKHC Australia to DO, tel.417, 17 June 1947. 22 On the Canberra Conference and Anglo-Australian differences over Japan see R.Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy—Britain, the United States and Japan 1945–1952, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 142–57. 23 FO 371, 63552, F 5961, minutes dated 30 May 1947. 24 FO 371, 63552, F 5961, minute by Dening, 30 May 1947. 25 Varma, Australia and Southeast Asia, p.232.

NOTES 223

8 REGIONAL COMPETITION: THE UNITED NATIONS AND ECAFE 1 L.P.Singh, The Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia, Col-umbia, Missouri, 1966, p. 18–22. 2 ibid. 3 CAB 134/417, FE (47) 5 (Revise), 14 May 1947, brief for the UK delegation to the first meeting of ECAFE, summarising continuing British reservations. 4 ibid. 5 FO 371, 62256, UE 960, minute dated 20 February 1947. 6 FO 371, 62256, UE 960, FO to Singapore, tel.437, 21 February 1947. 7 FO 371, 62257, UE 1265, Singapore to FO, tel.495, 28 February 1947. Killearn’s line was supported by the Governor of Burma; see FO 371, 62257, UE 1265, FO to New York, tel.813, 12 March 1947, repeating tel. 113 from Governor of Burma, n.d. 8 FO 371, 62257, UE 1491, New York to FO, tel.732, 6 March 1947. 9 FO 371, 62257, UE 1265, FO to New York, repeated to Singapore, tel.729, 6 March 1947. 10 FO 371, 62472, UE 1966, Stent to Stevens, 13 March 1947. Stent’s criticism that the FO had failed to consult British posts in South-East Asia in time was shared by Killearn: FO 371, 62473, UE 2515, Singapore to FO, tel.833, 8 April 1947. 11 FO 371, 62472, UE 1966, Stevens to Stent, 17 March 1947. 12 FO 371, 62472, UE 1862, New York to FO, tel.904, 19 March 1947. 13 Singh, Politics of Economic Cooperation, p.26. 14 ibid., pp.242–3. 15 ibid., pp.65–83. 16 ibid., pp.56–7. 17 See FO 371, 62473, UE 2508, FO to Nanking, tel.385, 4 April 1947. 18 FO 371, 62473, UE 2576, Singapore to FO, tel.833, 8 April 1947. 19 FO 371, 62472, UE 2057, FO to New York, 26 March 1947. 20 CAB 134/417—IOC (FE) (47) 4, minutes of the First Working Party, Far Eastern Economic Commission, 15 April 1947. Other topics discussed at the meeting were issues like the permanent site for the new commission or the composition of Britain’s delegation attend-ing ECAFE’s first session in Shanghai in June. An examination of these topics lies outside the scope of this chapter. 21 CAB 134/417—IOC (FE) (47) 5 (Revise), 14 May 1947, brief for UK delegation to the first meeting of ECAFE. 22 See FO 371, 62476, UE 9447, Singapore to FO, tel. 1981,8 October 1947. 23 For a detailed British account of the meeting see CAB 134/417, IOC (FE) (47) (10), ECAFE, meeting of the Committee of the Whole in New York, July 1947, report of the UK delegate, 24 July 1947.


24 Killearn Diaries, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 1947, 12 March 1947. 25 See A.S.B.Olver, ‘The Special Commission in South-East Asia’, in Pacific Affairs, Vol.21, No.3, September 1948, p.290; also: Daily Telegraph, 30 July 1946. 26 See FO 371, 63543, F 7570, minutes by Dening, 10 April 1947, and by Allen, 14 April 1947. 27 Straits Times, 8 November 1947. 28 See R.N.Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspec-tive, New and expanded edn, New York, 1980, p. 309. 29 See FO 371, 63543, F 7570, minutes by Dening, 10 April 1947, and by Allen, 14 April 1947. 30 FO 371, 63543, F 7571, ‘Future of the Special Commissioner in SouthEast Asia’, report by Allen, 15 March 1947. 31 FO 371, 63543, F 7570, minute by Dening, 10 April 1947. 32 FO 371, 63543, F 7625, note of a meeting held at the Treasury on 24 April 1947. So far as the new post’s terms of reference were concerned, the Foreign Office and Colonial Office would find an agreement, while any successors to MacDonald would be chosen by the two respective Secretaries of State. 33 CO 537/2203, minute by H.T.Bourdillon, 7 May 1947. 34 FO 371, 63544, F 7679, Bevin to Killearn, 6 June 1947. 35 Malcolm MacDonald Papers, Durham University, file 17/2/34, Killearn to Bevin, 4 July 1947. 36 FO 371, 63544, F 7867, tel.178, Governor-General, Malaya, to S. of S., Colonies, 9 June 1947. 37 FO 371, 63544, F 9770, minute by Allen, 17 July 1947. 38 ibid. 39 ibid. 40 FO 371, 63545, F 12345, Singapore to FO, tel.1832, 5 September 1947. 41 See CO 537/2205, CRO to UK High Commissioner, Australia, 26 September 1947. The original telegrams were sent out on 10 September 1947; see CO 537/2205, minute by Bourdillon, 30 September 1947. 42 CO 537/2205, UKHC Australia to CRO, 22 September 1947. 43 CO 537/2205, minute by Bourdillon, 30 September 1947. 44 CAB 134/417, IOC (FE) (47) 15, 30 September 1947, basis of a brief for the UK delegate at ECAFE. 45 FO 371, 62475, UE 7613, minute by I.F.S.Vincent, 18 August 1947. 46 CAB 134/417, IOC (FE) (47) 16, 5th meeting of the Working Party, 3 October 1947. 47 See for example: FO 371, 62476, UE 9882, The Hague to FO, tel.543, 16 October 1947; FO 371, 62476, UE 9447, Thompson (Bangkok) to Luang Prabang, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 14 October 1947; FO 371, 62476, UE 9900, Millar (British embassy—Paris) to Pridham (FO), 14 October 1947.

NOTES 225

48 FO 371, 62476, UE 9398, Troutbeck to Keen, 16 October 1947. 49 FO 371, 62669, UE 10943, Singapore to FO, tel.2155, 11 November 1947. 50 FO 371, 62478, UE 11822, ‘Relations between ECAFE and the Special Commissioner’s Office’, 2 December 1947, Colonial Office document quoting Dr Lokanathan’s note. 51 CAB 134/418, IOC (FE) (47) 1, 9 January 1948, ECAFE, 2nd session, Baguio, November-December 1947, report of the UK Delegate. 52 ibid. 53 FO 371, 69664, F 2340, FO to Singapore, tel.252, 12 February 1948. Killearn had previously asked for instructions; see FO 371, 69664, F 2340, Singapore to FO, tel.195, 7 February 1948. 54 See Malcolm MacDonald Papers, Durham University, file 17/2/49, Bevin to Killearn, 9 August 1947; and file 17/2/47, Killearn to MacDonald, 21 August 1947. 55 ibid., file 17/2/99, MacDonald to Killearn, 29 January 1948. 56 FO 371, 69687, F 3347, Killearn to Sargent, 8 February 1948. 57 Malcolm MacDonald Papers, Durham University, file 17/4/7, Listowel to MacDonald, 19 April 1948. 58 ibid., file 17/4/14, Listowel to MacDonald, 27 April 1948. 59 FO 371, 68911, UE 3329, ‘Survey of the Economic Organisation of the Special Commissioner in South-East Asia’; also British Library of Political and Economic Science, Depository, Egham, UN document E/CN.1 1/88, 7 May 1948, survey of the Economic Organisation of the Special Commissioner in South-East Asia. 60 British Library of Political and Economic Science, Depository, UN document E/CN.1 1/SR.37, ECAFE, 3rd session Octacamund, India, 5 June 1948. 61 Malcolm MacDonald Papers, Durham University, file 22/8/55–60, 10 November 1949.

9 WESTERN UNION AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1 See A.M.Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, London, 1960, pp.66–97. 2 R.J.McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War—the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, Ithaca and London, 1981, p.206. 3 See K.O.Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945–1951, Oxford, 1985 (paperback), p.274. 4 J.W.Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945–1951, Leicester, 1984, p.84. 5 FO 371, 69796, F 1183, Foreign Office minute, 17 January 1948. 6 FO 371, 69796, F 1183, minute by Street, 19 January 1948.


7 FO 371, 69796, F 1183, minute by Whitteridge, 19 January 1948. 8 FO 371, 69796, F 1183, minute by Grey, 24 January 1948.1 would like to thank Sir Paul Grey for discussing with me his time at South-East Asia Department. Author’s interview with Sir Paul Grey on 27 September 1989. 9 FO 371, 69796, F 1384, Batavia to FO, 27 January 1948. 10 N.Mansergh ed., Documents and Speeches on British Com-monwealth Affairs, 1931–1952, Vol.2, London, 1953, pp. 1121–4: extract from a speech by Bevin in the House of Commons on 22 January 1948. 11 J.Kent, ‘Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945–49’, in M.Dockrill and J.W.Young eds, British Foreign Policy, 1945–56, London, 1989, p.62. 12 FO 371, 69682, F 1930, cutting from Morning Tribune, dated 28 January 1948. 13 FO 371, 69796, F 2156, memo by Grey, 2 February 1948. 14 FO 371, 69796, F 2156, minute by Dening, 4 February 1948; and FO 371, 69796, F 2156, minutes by Kirkpatrick and Sargent, 4 February 1948. 15 FO 371, 69796, F 2156, minute by Grey, 9 March 1948. 16 FO 371, 69760, F 4576, minute by Grey, 10 March 1948. 17 FO 371, 69760, F 4576, minute by Dening, 10 March 1948. 18 FO 371, 69796, F 4024, Batavia to FO, tel.212, 12 March 1948. 19 FO 371, 69796, F 4052, Singapore to FO, tel.352, 15 March 1948. 20 FO 371, 69688, F 4249, minute by Dening, 15 March 1948. 21 FO 371, 69796, F 4052, memo by Kirkpatrick, 1 April 1948. 22 FO 371, 69682, F 5258, Grey to Scrivener, either 6 or 13 April 1948. 23 FO 371, 69796, F 4052, minute by Grey, 13 April 1948. 24 FO 371, 69796, F 4052, minute by Dening, 13 April 1948. 25 FO 371, 69796, F 4052, minute by Sargent, 14 April 1948. 26 FO 371, 69796, F 4052, minute by Bevin, n.d. 27 FO 371, 69796, F 5788, minute by Roberts, 19 April 1948, on conversation between Bevin and the Netherlands Minister for For-eign Affairs between 16 and 17 April 1948. 28 FO 371, 69796, F 5804, conversation between the Secretary of State and the Netherlands ambassador, 20 April 1948. 29 FO 371, 69797, F 7130, minute by Whitteridge, 3 May 1948. 30 FO 371, 69796, F 8122, Grey to Gage, British embassy, The Hague, 11 June 1948. Whitehall had already launched an investigation into possible supplies for the Netherlands East Indies; see FO 371, 69797, F 7130, minute by Whitteridge, 3 May 1948. 31 FO 371, 69689, F 5922, Scrivener to Dening, 14 April 1948. According to Scrivener, Guibaut was a ‘very good friend of ours who actually understands our colonial policy, who genuinely deplores what he regards as the remoteness and particularism of the French authorities in IndoChina, and who indeed asssures me that had he not worked very hard

NOTES 227

32 33 34 35 36 37

indeed, the Quai d’Orsay itself would have but the vaguest knowlege of what we have been trying to do out here’. FO 371, 69689, F 5922, minute by Christophas, 27 April 1948. FO 371, 69689, F 5922, minute Whitteridge, 13 May 1948. ibid. FO 371, 69689, F 5922, minute by Wright, 17 June 1948. FO 371, 69770, F 10533, memo for the Foreign Secretary by Grey, 15 July 1948. On the Malayan Emergency see A.Short, The Communist Insurrec-tion in Malaya, 1948–1960, London, 1975; E.O’Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948–60, London, 1966; and A.J. Stockwell, ‘Counterinsurgency and Colonial Defence’, in T.Gorst, L.Johnman and W.S.Lucas eds, Postwar Britain, 1945–64, Themes and Perspectives, London, 1989, pp. 135–54.

10 COLD WAR AND COMMONWEALTH 1 H.Tinker, The Union of Burma, 4th edn, London, 1967, pp.34–7. 2 R.J.McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War—the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49, Ithaca and London, 1981, pp.242–3. 3 CAB 21/1956, Killearn to Bevin, 24 July 1947, paper titled ‘SouthEast Asia: Growing Communist Strength’. 4 FO 371, 69694, F 10350, memo by Grey dated 16 July 1948. 5 See J.H.Brimmel, Communism in South-East Asia, London, 1959, p.263; also F.N.Trager, Marxism in Southeast Asia, Stanford, 1959, p.268. 6 R.T.McVey, ‘The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings’, Cornell University paper, Ithaca, 1958. 7 C.B.McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia—an Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin, Princeton, 1966, p.360; Y. Toru, ‘Who Set the Stage for the Cold War in Southeast Asia?’, in Y. Nagai and A.Iriye eds, The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, New York, 1977, pp. 333–6, and T.Yoshihiko, ‘The Cominform and Southeast Asia’, ibid., pp. 370–1. 8 FO 371, 69695, F 13733, memo by Grey dated 29 September 1948. 9 FO 371, 69695, F 14002, memo from 11 October 1948. 10 FO 371, 69695, F 14002, memo titled ‘Communist Strategy in SE Asia’, dated 10 or 11 November 1948. 11 FO 371, 69695, F 17015, Scrivener to John H.Hamlin, American Consulate-General, Singapore, 24 November 1948. Scrivener enclosed a sequence of events that paid considerable attention to the congrees of the


12 13 14 15 16 17

18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35

Indian Communist Party in Calcutta immediately after the youth conference. India Office Library and Records, L/WS/1/1198, JIG (48) 113 (Final), paper titled ‘Communist Influence in the Far East’, 17 December 1948. See A.Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960, London, 1975, pp. 113–48. FO 371, 69694, F 10350, memo by Grey dated 16 July 1948. FO 371, 69702, F 136935, draft letter Dening to MacDonald, begin-ning of August 1948. FO 371, 69702, F 13635, MacDonald to Dening, 26 July 1948. FO 371, 69702, F 13635, draft letter from Dening to MacDonald, beginning of August 1948. In his letter, Dening referred to a separate (but untraceable) telegram apparently dealing with intelligence cooperation. According to a minute by Christofas of 6 August attached to Dening’s letter, Mr Kellar of MI5 was now in Singapore on a visit to discuss the issue. It seems that intelligence cooperation between the three colonial powers was subsequently stepped up. However, the relevant Foreign Office and Colonial Office documents are still classified. FO 371, 69702, F 13635, minute by Christofas, 6 August 1948. Other FO officials proposed minor amendments to Dening’s original draft which are included in the version summarised above. FO 371, 69702, F 13636, Archer to Dening, 26 August 1948. FO 371, 69702, Price, Secretary of the COS, to Dening, 14 August 1948. CO 537/3550, minute by Williams, 17 August 1948. CO 537/3550, minute by Galsworthy, 2 September 1948. CO 537/3550, minute by Williams, 3 September 1948. FO 371, 69702, F 13636, Martin to Dening, 6 September 1948. FO 371, 69702, F 13637, draft of a first version, meeting at the FO, 29 September 1948, attended by FO, CO and CRO representatives. FO 371, 69683, F 14589, minute by Dening, 8 October 1948. ibid. FO 371, 69683, F 14589, minute by Scott, 8 October 1948. FO 371, 69683, F 14589, minute by Christophas, 9 October 1948. FO 371, 69683, F 14589, minute of 8 October 1948. This account of the sterling area is based on D.K. Fieldhouse, ‘The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1945–51’, in R.Ovendale ed., The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Govern-ments, 1945–1951, Leicester, 1984, pp.95–6; and on CAB 129/48, C (51) 57, 20 December 1951. P.S.Gupta, ‘Imperialism and the Labour Government’, in J.Winter ed., The Working Class in Modern British History, Cambridge, 1983, p.111. S.Strange, Sterling and British Policy, London, 1971, p.62. FO 371, 69683, F 14589, minute by Turner, probably 8 October 1948. FO 371, 69683, F 14589, minute by Christophas, 9 October 1948.

NOTES 229

36 FO 371, 69683, F 14930, memo by Dening, 12 October 1948. 37 FO 371, 69683, F 14930, memo by Dening, titled ‘South-East Asia Commonwealth Co-operation’, 11 October 1948. 38 FO 371, 69683, F 14930, memo by Dening, 12 October 1948. 39 CAB 133/88, PMM (48) 3rd meeting, 12 October 1948. 40 CAB 133/88, PMM (48) 7th meeting, 18 October 1948. 41 CAB 133/88, PMM (48) 10th meeting, 19 October 1948. 42 FO 371, 70196, W 6400, memo by Machtig, 5 November 1948. 43 FO 371, 70196, W 6208, minute by J.H.Watson, 19 October 1948. 44 FO 371, 69684, F 15363, letter from Grey to British diplomatic representatives in SEA (signed by Lloyd), n.d. probably beginning of November 1948. 45 O 371, 69684, F 16408, memo by Grey for Bevin, 20 October 1948. FO 371, 70196, W 6208, minute by Dening, 2 November 1948. 47 FO 371, 69702, F 14679, meeting at the FO, 20 October 1948. 48 FO 371, 69684, F 16408, memo by Grey for Bevin, 20 November 1948. 49 FO 371, 69702, F 15179, record of a Consultative Council meeting at the Quai d’Orsay, 25 October 1948. 50 ibid. 51 FO 371, 69702, F 15179, minute by Christofas, 1 November 1948. 52 FO 371, 69796, F 10694, memo by Grey titled ‘Indonesia Arms Embargo’, 30 July 1948. 53 FO 371, 69796, F 11859, Lloyd to Gage, The Hague, summarising a letter to Dutch ambassador, 31 August 1948. 54 FO 371, 69796, F 15534, minutes by Grey, 19 October 1948; Dening, 23 October 1948; and Sargent, 26 October 1948. 55 FO 371, 69796, F 15534, minute by Roberts, 2 November 1948. 56 FO 371, 69796, F 15534, minute by Bevin, n.d. 57 FO 371, 69796, F 15009, Grey to Sir Philip Nichols, The Hague, 6 November 1948. According to the British ambassador in The Hague, Dutch feeling against the embargo remained ‘widespread and bitter’. ‘The fact that political circles do not say much about it, except the Right Wing opposition who find periodical opportunities to make remarks in the States General, does not mean that they do not resent it very much’; see FO 371, 69796, F 16427, Sir P.Nichols, The Hague, to Grey, 18 November 1948. 58 FO 371, 69684, F 15363, Grey to British diplomatic representatives in SEA (signed by Lloyd), n.d. probably beginning of November 1948. 59 FO 371, 69684, F 16872, MacDonald to FO, tel.1204, 27 November 1948.


11 ENTER THE DRAGON: SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28

See P.Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War, London, 1986, pp.98– 104. On the Chinese civil war see S. Pepper, Civil War in China, Berkeley 1978. CAB 129/31, CP (48) 299, annex titled ‘China’, 9 December 1948. ibid. Britain recognised communist China in January 1950. On AngloAmerican differences in 1949 over recognition see Lowe, Origins, pp. 104–13 CAB 129/31, CP (48) 299, annex titled ‘China’, 9 December 1948. CAB 128/13, CM (48) 80th meeting, 13 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17499, MacDonald to FO, tel.1252, 10 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17532, MacDonald to FO, tel.1253, 11 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17833, Bangkok to FO, tel.836, 14 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17499, minute by Palliser, 15 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17833, minute by Palliser, 17 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17499, minute by Palliser, 15 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17971, Bangkok to FO, tel.845, 18 December 1948. FO 371, 69684, F 17833, memo by Grey, 22 December 1948. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, Vol.9, p.2, Franks to Lovett, 893.00/1–549. See FO 371, 75961, F 3519, memo titled ‘Indo-China, March 1949. For two accounts of Dening’s talks see FO 371, 76002, F 623, memo on Dening’s visit to Paris, and ibid., translation of a French memo titled ‘Franco-British Conversation on the Situation in South-East Asia Held on 21st December 1948 in the Quai d’Orsay’. FO 371, 75735, F 4244, aide-mémoire dated 29 December 1949. See FO 800/465, meetings between Bevin and Schuman at the FO, 14 January 1949, file pages 156–9. ibid. Reference to improving intelligence cooperation in FO 371, 76002, F 4401, meeting at the FO on 14 March 1949 between Dening and Baron Bayens. See FO 371, 75740, F 2277, translation of an aide-mémoire by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 February 1949. FO 371, 76031, F 3010, MacDonald to Dening, 3 February 1949. FO 371, 76031, Dening to MacDonald, 24 February 1949. On the impact of the event on American thinking see R.J.McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War—the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–49, Ithaca and London, 1981, p.244. J.Pluvier, South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp.485–6. T.T.Thien, India and South-East Asia, 1947–1960, Geneva, 1963, p.99. A.M.Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, London, 1960, p. 173, note 13.

NOTES 231

29 FO 371, 69797, F 11859, minutes by R.C.Mackworth-Young, 29 December 1948, and Grey, 31 December 1948. 30 FO 371, 69788, F 18538, FO to The Hague, tel.6, 1 January 1949. 31 FO 371, 69788, F 18538, Foreign Office minute, January 1949. 32 FO 371, 76031, F 5016, Dening to MacDonald, 13 April 1949.

12 REGIONAL COOPERATION AND REGIONAL CONTAINMENT 1 The conference was attended by delegates from Afghanistan, Aus-tralia, Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi-Arabia, Syria and Yemen. Thailand and New Zealand sent observers. 2 T.T.Thien, India and South-East Asia, 1947–1960, Geneva, 1963, pp.99– 102. 3 FO 371, 76031, F 2879, CRO to UK High Commissioner in India, tel.600, 21 February 1949. 4 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, UKHC in India to CRO, tel.220, 5 February 1949. 5 ibid. 6 A.Bullock, Ernest Bevin—Foreign Secretary 1945–51, Oxford, 1985 (paperback), p.631. 7 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, UKHC in India to CRO, tel.220, 5 February 1949. 8 FO 371, 76031, F 2879, CRO to UKHC, India, tel.600, 21 February 1949. 9 O 371, 76031, F 5016, MacDonald, Singapore, to Dening, 15 March 1949. 10 FO 371, 75744, F 3729, CRO to UKHCs in India, Pakistan and Ceylon, tel.Y 69, 2 March 1949. 11 ibid. 12 CAB 129/32, CP (49) 39, memo by Foreign Secretary, 4 March 1949. 13 CAB 128/5, CM (49) 18th meeting, 8 March 1949. 14 FO 371, 75745, F 3790, memo enclosed in letter from Stevenson, Nanking, to Bevin, 4 March 1949. 15 FO 371, 75745, F 3790, Stevenson, Nanking, to Bevin, 4 March 1949. 16 FO 371, 76023, F 4486, Dening to Syers, 18 March 1949. 17 FO 371, 76033, F 4545; MacDonald, Singapore, to Bevin, 23 March 1949. 18 On the Japanese question during the Dening mission see R.Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy—Britain, the United States and Japan 1945– 1952, Cambridge, 1982, p. 164. 19 FO 371, 69926, F 7716, Washington to FO, tel.2541, 29 May 1948; and Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, Vol.6, memo of conversation by Lovett, 27 May 1948, 740.0011 PW (peace)/5–274. 20 R.Edmonds, Setting the Mould—the United States and Britain, 1945– 1950, Oxford, 1986, p. 143.


21 For an analysis of American intentions behind ‘Point Four’ see A.J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam—Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia, Ithaca, 1987, pp. 18–19. 22 FO 371, 76003, F 1308, FO to Bangkok, tel.28, 14 January 1949. 23 FO 371, 76003, F 2415, Graves, Washington, to Scarlett, 7 February 1949. 24 FO 371, 76003, F 2415, Dening to Graves, Washington, 14 February 1949. 25 FO 371, 76003, F 3215, Graves, Washington, to Dening, 21 February 1949. 26 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, Vol.7, p.1118, memo of conversation by Reed, Washington 23 February 1949, 890.00B/2–2349. 27 FO 371, 75743, F 3288, Graves to Scarlett, 25 February 1949. 28 FO 371 76003, F 3271, minute by Graves, 23 February 1949. 29 A.J.Rotter, ‘The Triangular Route to Vietnam: The United States, Great Britain, and Southeast Asia, 1945–1950’, in International History Review, Vol.6, No.3, August 1984, pp.404–5; and G.R.Hess, The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940– 1950, New York, 1987, p.334. For Rotter’s theory that the United States became involved in South-East Asia in order to safeguard the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan see also his detailed book, The Path to Vietnam. 30 National Archives, Washington, PSA, Box 5, file; SEA US policy in 1949, memo by Ogburn, 17 January 1949. 31 FRUS, 1949, Vol.7, pp. 1117–18, Stuart to Secretary of State, Nanking, 15 February 1949, 890.00B/2–1549: telegram. 32 FO 371, 76050, F 5095, memo by Stuart, n.d. 33 FRUS, 1949, Vol.7, pp.1128–32, Policy Planning Staff paper on United States policy towards South-East Asia, PPS 51, 29 March 1949 34 FO 371, 76023, F 3507, Scarlett to Franks, 23 March 1949 35 FO 371, 76023, F 4487, brief dated 23 March 1949; Also FRUS, 1949, Vol.7, pp. 1135–7, 890.00/4–2249, memo left by Bevin, dated 2 April 1949. 36 FO 371, 76023, F 4486, Dening to Syers, 18 March 1949. 37 FO 371, 76023, F 4487, minute by Dening to Secretary of State, 23 March 1949. 38 FO 371, 76023, F 5743, Graves to Dening, 16 April 1949. 39 FRUS, 1949, Vol.7, pp. 1138–41, memo of conversation, by Mr Jacob D.Beam, Acting Special Assistant in the Office of German and Austrian Affairs, subject: talk with Mr Bevin about the Middle East and South-East Asia, on 2 April 1949, 890.00/4–449; and ibid., pp. 1135–7, memo left by Bevin, dated 2 April 1949, 890.00/4–249. 40 FO 371, 76023, F 5743, Graves to Dening, 16 April 1949. 41 FO 371, 75747, F 4595, memo enclosed in a letter from the State Department, 15 March 1949. 42 FO 371, 75747, F 4595, Graves, Washington, to Bevin, 22 March 1949. 43 FO 371, 75747, F 4595, minute by Hibbert, 27 March 1949. 44 FO 371, 75747, F 4595, minute by R.H.Scott, 29 April 1949.

NOTES 233

45 46 47 48

G.R.Hess, The United States’ Emergence, p.314. FO 371, 75961, F 3620, memo titled ‘French Indo-China’, 24 March 1949. Hess, The United States’ Emergence, p.324. C.M.Turnbull, ‘Britain and Vietnam, 1948–1955 ’, in War & Society, Vol. 6, No.2, September 1988, p. 110, referring to Nehru’s line on Indochina in June 1949. 49 FO 371, 76034, F 8338, minutes of a meeting at the Foreign Office on 24 May 1949. Bevin, Dening and MacDonald discussed the whole issue in London on 19 May. No account of the meeting between Bevin and MacDonald was found apart from a minute by Dening, 19 May 1949, in FO 371, 76009, F 7516.

13 THE FINAL STAGES OF REGIONAL PLANNING 1 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, UK High Commissioner in India to CRO, tel.X 580, 24 March 1949; and ibid., UKHC in New Zealand to CRO, tel.129, 28 March 1949. 2 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, Dening to Strang, 29 March 1949; also ibid., minute by Dening, 4 April 1949. 3 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, Dening to Strang, 29 March 1949; also ibid., minute by Dening, 4 April 1949. 4 FO 371, 76375, W 4092, Foreign Office intel.249, 9 June 1949, ‘A Pacific Pact’. 5 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, Vol.7, pp.1123– 5, charge in the Philippines (Locket) to the Secretary of State, No.319, Manila, 21 March 1949, 890.20/3–2149; and ibid., p. 1125, Lockett to S.of S., confidential, Manila, 22 March 1949, 840.20/3–2249. 6 See C.M.Dobbs, ‘The Pact That Never Was: The Pacific Pact of 1949’, in Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol.3, No.4, Winter 1984, pp.29–42. 7 CAB 131/6, DO (48) 70, 7 October 1948, ‘Malaya: Possibility of Australian Assistance’, annex II, tel.629 from UKHC in Australia, 28 September 1948. 8 DEFE 4/17, COS (48) 150th meeting, 22 October 1948. 9 CAB 131/5, DO (48) 22nd meeting, 24 November 1948, and CAB 131/ 6, DO (48) 79, ‘Australian Defence Co-operation’, report by the COS, 18 November 1948. 10 See A.Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938–1965, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 164–5. Unfortunately, the relevant documents in the British archives are still classified. One reason for the secrecy surrounding the planning agreement at the time seems to have been London’s anxiety


that it might be interpreted as a weakening of Britain’s position in SouthEast Asia. 11 P.Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968, London, 1973, p.29. 12Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, Vol.7, pp. 1133–4, the ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, No.540, London, 29 March 1949, 890.20/3–2949. 13 FO 371, 76031, F 5864, MacDonald, Singapore, to Strang, 3 April 1949. 14 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, Dening to Syers, 4 April 1949. 15 See A.I.Singh, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth: British Political and Military Aims, 1947–49’, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.20, No.3, July 1985, pp.469–81. 16 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, Dening to Strang, 29 March 1949; also ibid., minute by Dening 4 April 1949. 17 FO 371, 76031, F 2191, Dening to Syers, 4 April 1949. 18 FO 371, 76031, F 8035, memo by Dening, 14 April 1949. 19 FO 371, 76031, F 5863, FO memo titled ‘South Asia’, 14 April 1949. 20 FO 371, 76031, F 5863, minute for the Prime Minister, 21 April 1949, signed by Bevin. 21 FO 371, 76032, F 8039, Garner to Dening, 22 April 1949. 22 FO 371, 76032, F 8039, Garner to Dening 25 April 1949. 23 FO 371, 76031, F 8037, Paskin to Dening, 22 April 1949. 24 See Singh, ‘Keeping India in the Commonwealth’, p.478. Singh argues that Britain decided to keep India in the Commonwealth because it expected the prestige of a united Commonwealth to outweigh the disadvantages of the Indian Republic in the group. She also hoped the Commonwealth would be able to influence in its favour Indian foreign and defence policies. 25 FO 371, 76031, F 5863, minute by Lloyd, 9 May 1949. 26 See FO 371, 75669, F 2998, memo by Dening, 23 February 1949; and FO 371, 75688, F 3971, summary of mission to Pakistan and India by A.G. Bottomley in February and March 1949. 27 FO 371, 75697, F 6105, FO to Rangoon, tel.397, 28 April 1949. 28 J.F.Cady, A History of Modern Burma, Ithaca, 1958, p.598. 29 FO 371, 76034, F 6670, GHQ Far East Land Forces to Ministry of Defence, SEACOS 900, 5 May 1949. 30 FO 371, 76031, F 8036, draft brief for the Foreign Secretary for use in discussion with Mr MacDonald, checked by Dening and Scott on 16 May 1949. 31 FO 371, 76034, F 8338, minutes of a meeting at the Foreign Office on 24 May 1949. Bevin, Dening and MacDonald discussed the whole issue in London on 19 May. No account of the meeting between Bevin and MacDonald was found apart from a minute by Dening, 19 May 1949, in FO 371, 76009, F 7516.

NOTES 235

32 CAB 134/287, FE (O) (49) 23, report of the Working Party on Food Supplies and Communism, ‘Food Supplies and Communism in the Far East’, Gen.271/14. 33 CAB 1347 286, FE (O) (49) 5th meeting, 12 May 1949. 34 CAB 134/287, FE (O) (49) 43, 20 July 1949, preliminary report of the Economic Survey Working Party. 35 CAB 134/286, FE (O) (49) 9th meeting, 27 July 1949. 36 FO 371, 76030, F 17397, PUSC (32), ‘The United Kingdom in SouthEast Asia and the Far East’, Foreign Office, 28 July 1949. 37 FO 371, 76030, F 17397, PUSC (53), Foreign Office, 20 August 1949.

14 TO COLOMBO AND BEYOND 1 FO 371, 76375, W 4092, Foreign Office intel.249, 9 June 1949, ‘A Pacific Pact’. 2 ibid. 3 FO 371, 76375, W 3159, UK High Commissioner to CRO, tel.205, 19 May 1949. 4 FO 371, 76375, W 3160, Bevin (Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris) to FO, tel.36, 24 May 1949. 5 FO 371, 76375, W 3161, Attlee to Fraser, CRO, tel.274, 27 May 1949. 6 FO 371, 76375, W 4092, Foreign Office intel.249, 9 June 1949, ‘A Pacific Pact’. 7 FO 371, 76375, W 4092, memo by Furlonge, 15 July 1949. London even tried to keep the planners’ visit secret, apparently trying to avoid any ‘deleterious affects’ on the situation in Malaya which might arise out of suggestions that the Australians were taking over Britain’s responsibility for defence planning in the area. 8 FO 371, 76383, W 4528, memo recording talks with Kennan in July 1949. 9 FO 371, 76024, F 13085, MacDonald to Dening, 23 August 1949. 10 FO 371, 76024, F 13085, FO to Singapore, tel.1043, 29 August 1949. 11 FO 371, 76032, F 14256, Dening to MacDonald, 1 October 1949. 12 All quotes taken from Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1949, Vol.7, pp.1197–1204, memo of conversation at the State Department by Butterworth, 12 September 1949, 890.20/9–1249. Account also based on FO 371, 76032, F 14256, record of conversation between Dening and Butterworth, 12 September 1949, pp. 14–18. 13 FO 371, 76024, F 15775, minute by Dening , 12 September 1949. 14 FO 371, 76032, F 14114, record of a meeting at the State Department, 13 September 1949. 15 FO 371, 76024, F 14149, Dening to Strang, 15 September 1949.


16 FO 371, 76024, F 14438, record of a meeting at the State Department on 17 September 1949. 17 FO 371, 76032, F 14256, Dening to MacDonald, 1 October 1949. 18 DO 35/2773, memo titled ‘Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs— January 1950’. 19 CAB 128/16, CM (49) 62nd, 27 October 1949. 20 FO 371, 75705, F 17415, MacDonald to FO, tel.928, 6 November 1949. 21 FO 371, 76025, F 17668, 16 November 1949. 22 FO 371, 76025, F 17668, minute by Lloyd, 24 November 1949. 23 FO 371, 76025, F 17668, minute by R.H.Scott, 24 November 1949. 24 AB 134/223, EPC(49)152, 1 December 1949. 25 CAB 134/220, EPC(49) 51st meeting, 13 December 1949. 26 CAB 134/669, SAC (49) 15 (Revise), 28 January 1949, South-East Asia, general: brief for the United Kingdom delegation to the Colombo Conference, January 1950. 27 CAB 129/38, CP (50) 18, 22 February 1950, ‘The Colombo Confer-ence’. 28 CAB 133/78, FFM (50) 2nd meeting, 9 January 1950. 29 CAB 133/78, FFM (50) 4th meeting, 10 January 1950. 30 CAB 129/38, CP (50) 18, 22 February 1950. 31 CAB 133/78, FFM (50) 4, 11 January 1950. 32 A.Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938–1965, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 106–9. 33 CAB 129/38, CP (50) 18, 22 February 1950. 34 CAB 133/78, FMM (50) 6, 12 January 1950. 35 CAB 133/78, FFM (50) 8th meeting, 12 January 1950. 36 CAB 133/78, FFM (50) 11th meeting, 14 January 1950, Annex A. 37 Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, The Colombo Plan: Fourth Meeting at Karachi; Report of the Consultative Committee on economic Development in South and South-East Asia, Colombo, 1952, p. 10. 38 R.Ovendale, ‘Britain, the United States, and the Cold War in SouthEast Asia, 1949–1950’, in International Affairs, Vol.58, No.3, Summer 1982, p.460. 39 A.Short, The Origins of the Vietnam War, London 1989, pp. 79–81. 40 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol.VI, p.51, record of conversation between Jessup and British Foreign Office representatives, 11 March 1950. 41 CAB 129/48, C. (51) 51, cabinet memo on the Colombo Plan, 20 December 1951. 42 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol.VI, pp. 160– 1, Secretary of State to the embassy in London, 22 November 1950. 43 Colombo Plan Bureau, The Colombo Plan—Basic Information, Colombo, 1962, pp.31–2.

NOTES 237

44 L.P.Singh, The Politics of Economic cooperation in Asia, Col-umbia, Missouri 1966, pp.170ff. 45 Colombo Plan Bureau, The Colombo Plan , p.4.

238

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246

Index

Acheson, Dean, US Secretary of State 167, 172, 173, 178, 192, 195; on China 194; and Indochina 196 Afghanistan 4, 153, 186, 188, 203 Africa 10; colonial cooperation in 84, 85, 118, 135 aid plans see economic development; Marshall aid Ali Khan, Liaqat, Pakistani Prime Minister 140, 156 Allen, Richard, Foreign Office 58, 59, 67, 87; and future of Special Commission 108, 110 Allied Land Forces in South-East Asia (ALFSEA) 74 Amery, Leo, India Office 18 anti-colonialism 90, 115, 159, 161; Asian Relations Conference and 94 Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) 28, 65 ANZAM Treaty (1948) 61, 177, 192 ANZUS Treaty (1951) 207 arms supplies: to Dutch in Indonesia 74, 87, 115, 117, 156; to France in Indochina 69, 73, 75, 75 Asian cooperation:

against communism 171; India’s plans for 3, 159, 160, 175; see also colonial cooperation Asian Relations Conference (1947) 3, 93, 95, 115, 203 Atlantic Charter (1941) 14 Atlantic Pact 164 Attlee, Clement, Prime Minister 9, 9, 10, 43, 47; and Burma 65; and Commonwealth 57, 139; and Indian independence 65, 76; on war in Indonesia 87 Aung San, Burmese leader 28, 65, 94, 95 Auriol, Vincent, French Prime Minister 174 Australia: at Delhi conference (1949) 159, 160; economic proposals for SE Asia 201; interests in SE Asia 19, 50, 56, 187, 190; regional ambitions 3, 61, 95; and SE Asia regional defence 51, 54, 56, 60, 175, 192; and South Seas regional commission 16, 57, 95; and Special Commission 111; support for Indonesia 100; ‘White Australia’ policy 100 247

248 INDEX

Bao Dai Agreement, between France and Vietnam 154, 174, 196 Beel, Louis, Dutch Prime Minister 131 Belgium, on Indonesia 142 Bennett, J.C. Sterndale see Sterndale Bennett, J.C. Bentinck, Baron, Dutch Ambassador in London 120, 121, 122, 123 Berlin, Soviet blockade of 126 Bevin, Ernest, Foreign Secretary: African colonial cooperation 118; Anglo-French relations 72; and Cold War 52; at Colombo conference ix, 199, 200; Commonwealth Meeting (1946) 52, 55; Commonwealth Meeting (1948) 138; and Dutch in Indonesia 89, 122, 142, 156; and Dutch proposals to combat communism 131; and European military alliance 117, 118; plans for Asian OEEC 135; and regional defence cooperation 51, 56, 58, 193; regional economic plans 56; and rice crisis 43, 45; role in policy on SE Asia 3, 21; and SEAC 34; supports expansion of cultural influence 83; visit to Washington (1949) 171 Bridges, Sir Edward, Treasury minister 37 ‘British policy in South-East Asia’ (FO paper 1947) 79, 84 Brunei 186 Brussels Treaty (1948) 117, 119, 120, 122; and political cooperation in SE Asia 141, 142, 142 Buckley, Roger 20

Burma 12, 28, 66, 78, 186; and Commonwealth cooperation 182, 189; communist threat to 147, 151; communist warfare in ix, 129, 131, 140; deteriorating situation in 151, 157, 164, 182; on French in Indochina 73, 151; Indian influence in 91, 152, 184; and Indonesia 121; nationalism in 12, 28, 65; rice production ix, 42, 45, 185; suspicion of regional cooperation 142, 143 Burma Office 72, 73 Burma White Paper (1945) 12, 28, 65 Burmah Oil Company 12 Burton, J.W., Australian External Affairs 98 Butterworth, Walton, US State Department 166, 167, 168, 195 Cadogan, Alexander, Foreign Office 39 Calcutta Youth Conference 129, 130, 131 Cambodia see Indochina Canberra Agreement (1944) 57, 95 Caribbean Commission 16, 36, 60 Ceylon 21, 185, 188, 201; see also Colombo Chiang Kai-shek, Chinese nationalist leader 50, 145, 161 Chiefs of Staff: on Chinese communist threat 161, 171; defence plans 53, 57, 58 Chifley, J.B., Australian Prime Minister 57, 192 China 45, 186; Communist Party 131; communist victories in ix, 129, 132, 145, 161, 182;

INDEX 249

and ECAFE 101, 105, 106; interests in SE Asia 18, 50, 104, 135; opposes Indian ambitions 94; People’s Republic declared (1949) 197; role in regional cooperation plans 19, 39, 49; UK trade with 10, 145; US aid to 145, 158, 166; US policy towards 78, 168, 170, 194 Chinese: immigrant populations in SE Asia 13, 18, 50, 66; troops in Vietnam 68 Christophas, Kenneth, Foreign Office 112, 113; opposes colonial collaboration 123, 133, 138 Chumbot, Prince, of Thailand 151 Churchill, Winston, Prime Minister 14, 19 Clarac, M., French official in Vietnam 70 Clow, J.P. 111 coal trade 31, 47 Cochin-China 68, 69 Cold War 52, 126; and SE Asia defence policy 3, 53, 147, 164 Colombo conference see Commonwealth Conference (Colombo 1950) Colombo Plan (1950–61): culmination of FO policy 3, 206; economic aid 1, 204; limitations of 206 colonial cooperation: Anglo-French 72, 74, 77, 84, 157; Bevin’s plans for 118; British resistance to 115, 118, 119, 120, 123, 155, 181; to combat communism 131, 141; covert 135, 141; opposed by Commonwealth 141, 149;

would alienate Asian opinion 34, 74, 77, 90, 119, 133, 134; see also Asian cooperation Colonial Office: on Anglo-French cooperation in SE Asia 73, 84; on Dening’s economic cooperation proposals 180, 181; and MPU 12; opposition to Special Commission 35, 37, 38, 39; and proposed regional commissions 17, 38, 58; proposes Governor-General for Malaya 13, 23; relations with Foreign Office 3, 24, 41; Special Commission merged with Governor-General’s office 109; views on regional cooperation 1, 40, 134; see also Foreign Office colonies see Indochina; Indonesia, and individual countries Commissioner-General’s Office 114; see also Special Commission (Singapore) Commonwealth: as basis for regional cooperation 138, 157, 188, 203; collaboration against communism 149, 153, 161; cooperation on Burma 182; defence plans 54; and sterling area 136 Commonwealth Conference (Canberra 1947) 99 Commonwealth Conference (Colombo 1950) ix, 142, 184, 189, 197, 199; diplomatic success of 204; see also Colombo Plan (1950–61) Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meeting (1949) 201

250 INDEX

Commonwealth Foreign Ministers’ meeting (1950) 197 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference: (1946) 4, 51, 52, 54; (1948), and communist threat 138, 139; (1949) 178, 181 Commonwealth Relations Office 133, 180 communism: Commonwealth discussions on (1948) 139; as threat 3, 125, 171, 179, 188; threat to food supplies ix, 185; uprisings in SE Asia ix, 126, 129, 199; in Viet Minh nationalism 71, 73, 89; see also China; Cold War; Soviet Union Cooper, Sir Alfred Duff 74 Copland, Professor, Australian Minister in China 111 cultural influences in SE Asia 81, 83, 91 D’Argenlieu, Admiral Thierry, High Commissioner in Indochina 69, 70, 71 Dedman, J.J., Australia Defence Minister 177 defence: excluded from proposed regional commissions 17, 60; proposed Anglo-Indian defence council 18; of SE Asia 2, 51, 58, 187, 188, 190; see also Chiefs of Staff; regional defence Delhi Conference (1949) 159, 162, 169, 175, 203 Dening, Esler, Foreign Office: adviser to Mountbatten 21, 40; architect of regional policy 3, 21; on Australian regional plans 100; on Bevin's plan for Asian OEEC 135;

on British influence in SE Asia 82; on civilian successor to SEAC 32, 37, 41; and Dutch arms embargo 119; economic cooperation against communism 179, 197; influence on Special Commission's role 38; need for Asian resistance to Soviet Union 172; need for US economic aid 164, 194; on Nehru's ambitions 175; regional cooperation 132, 141; regional cooperation against communism 157, 167, 183, 194; on regional cooperation with French 71, 85, 86, 154; on supply of arms to French 75 'Dening Mission' (1948) 166 Dominions Office 23; see also Commonwealth Relations Office 'domino theory', propounded by MacDonald 183 Dorman-Smith, Reginald, Governor of Burma 65 Dunkirk Treaty (1947) 85, 118 Dutch East Indies see Indonesia; Netherlands East Asia, defined 4 ECAFE see Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE): origins 101; terms of reference 105, 111, 115, 195; ineffectiveness 106, 134 Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) 101 economic cooperation: Asian OEEC proposed 135, 163; proposed by Dening 179; proposed in PUSC papers 188

INDEX 251

economic development 31; as bulwark against communism 162, 191, 198; Colombo Plan 206; Nanking Proposals 162, 170 economic functions: of regional commission 35; of Special Commission 38, 39, 40, 56 Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) see ECAFE Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 101, 103, 104 economic studies (Foreign Office), of effect of communist control 185 Eden, Anthony, Foreign Secretary 14, 20 Egypt, Killearn's work in 45 Europe: Anglo-French relations in 72, 74, 85; collaboration against communism 164, 165; see also Western Union and individual countries Evatt, Dr H.V., Australian Foreign Minister 56, 60, 95, 98, 139 famine, threatened in SE Asia ix, 9, 31, 42 Far East 4, 20 Far Eastern Defence Coordination Committee, Singapore 183 food production, Special Commission's responsibility for 47 Foreign Office: and Australian regional proposals 97, and Bevin’s plan for Asian OEEC 135, 163; brief for Bevin’s visit to Washington (1949) 171; and Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference (1949) 178; economic studies of SE Asia 185; on India 67, 94;

long-term policy of regional cooperation 1, 41, 203; and nationalism in SE Asia 61; Permanent UnderSecretary’scommittee (PUSC) papers 179, 187, 197; plans for non British SE Asia 13, 79; and proposals for ECAFE 103; proposes regional conference 142; reaction to Delhi conference 161; regional cooperation to contain communism 3, 131; regional policies (1945) 1, 19; (1949) 184; (reassessment 1947) 78; relations with Colonial Office 3, 24, 41; and Special Commission 3, 38, 107, 110; supports Dening’s proposals for SEAC 33; supports ministerial post in SE Asia 35, 36; views on colonial cooperation 72, 77, 84, 115, 123; see also Colonial Office; Special Commission France: and Bao Dai Agreement 154, 174; and British plans for regional cooperation 70, 77, 84, 154, 157; colonial policy condemned 72, 73, 74, 75; colonial rule in Indochina 13, 30, 68, 72; membership of ECAFE 105; Pan South-East Asian Union plan 94; and proposed SE Asia commissions 19, 59; suspicion of regional proposals 38, 39; suspicion of Special Commission 70; Western Union and colonial cooperation 124

252 INDEX

Fraser, Peter, New Zealand Prime Minister 193 French Indochina see Indochina Galsworthy, A.N., Colonial Office 134 Gandhi, Mahatma 10 Gater, Sir George, Colonial Office 23; opposition to Special Commission 37, 38, 39 Gent, Sir Edward 23; Governor of Malayan Union 67, 115 Germany 9, 126 Gollan, H.R., Australian High Commissioner in India 159, 160 Government of Burma Act (1935) 12 Gracey, Major General Douglas D., in Vietnam 30, 69 Graves, H.A., British Embassy in USA 167, 168, 173 Great Britain: anti-communist initiatives 131, 153; on communist threat in SE Asia ix, 147; defence expenditure 9, 108; and Delhi conference (1949) 160; development of policy in SE Asia 12, 19, 136; economic cooperation 117, 203; dollar earnings 11, proposals 180; economic weakness 9, 108, 136; influence in SE Asia 78, 84, 165, 184, 187; international commitments (1945) 9; leadership in South-East Asia 143, 165, 184, 187, 194; liberation of Vietnam 30, 68, 69; policy on SE Asian nationalism 28, 82, 84, 85, 87; pragmatic support for ECAFE 106; prewar trade with China 10, 145; provision of aid 186; relations with France in Europe 72, 74, 85;

relations with France over Indochina 69, 73, 84, 174; relations with India 74, 76; relations with Netherlands over Indonesia 39, 45, 86, 156; suspects Soviet control of communism in SE Asia 129; and US policy on colonialism 14; and US policy in SE Asia 170, 172; withdrawal from SE Asia 207; see also Colonial Office; Foreign Office Grey, Paul, Foreign Office: on Dutch arms embargo 117, 119, 121, 123, 125; on regional cooperation 141, 142; on Soviet influence in SE Asian communism 129 Griffin, R. Allen, US mission 205 Guibaut, M., French consulgeneral Singapore 123, 124 Gwyer, Sir Maurice 18 Haiphong, bombardment of 72 Hall, George, Colonial Secretary 24, 59 Hatta, Mohammmed, Indonesian leader 129, 155 Hibbert, R.A., Foreign Office 173 HMS Amethyst 183 Ho Chi Minh, Viet Minh leader 30, 68, 73, 175 Hone, General Ralph, Malayan Planning Unit 12, 38 Hong Kong 10, 18, 19, 170, 185, 186 Hoyer-Millar, R.F., British Embassy in USA 198 IEFC see International Emergency Food Council India: anti-colonialism of 94, 159, 184; and Asian Relations conference (1947) 3, 93, 95, 115, 203;

INDEX 253

aspirations as regional leader 93, 179, 184, 203; and Australian regional proposals 96, 97; communism in 131; condemnation of Dutch in Indonesia 89, 94, 121, 156; condemns French war in Indochina 73, 175; and ECAFE 101, 105, 106; economy 137, 198; importance in regional plans 18, 67, 191; independence movement 10, 65; influence in Burma 152, 184; interests in SE Asia 50, 91; nationalism and regional alignments 3, 65, 67; neutrality against communism 178, 184, 188, 191, 207; and regional collaboration 184, 188, 195, 203; rice consumption ix, 42, 45, 185; threat of Chinese communism to 148, 183; wants to become republic 178, 199; see also Nehru, Jawaharlal India Office 68 Indian Communist Party 129 Indian Congress Party 10, 65 Indochina 186; British liberation of 30, 69; British policy towards (1947) 79; communist threat in 147, 148, 154, 189; French colonial policy in 68, 72, 151, 174; French war against Viet Minh ix, 3, 73, 80; importance in regional cooperation 97, 98, 143, 190, 191; Japanese occupation 13; nationalism in 13, 30, 68; rice production ix, 42, 45, 70, 185;

US policy on 169, 196, 205; see also France Indonesia 4, 25, 186; Australian influence in 100; British influence in 80, 87; communism in 129, 148; of critical importance in regional cooperation 49, 142, 158; independence 159; Linggadjati Agreement 86; nationalism in 13, 29, 89; and Renville Agreement (1948) 115; Republic declared 29; rice shortage in 42, 45; war with Dutch 86, 141, 155; Western Union attitude to 141; see also Netherlands intelligence cooperation 149, 154, 162 ‘International Aspects of Colonial Policy’ (CO paper 1944) 17, 19, 38 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 187, 197, 199, 202 International Emergency Food Council (IEFC) 46, 70, 83, 103 International Regulations Agreement on Tin and Rubber 19 Iran, Soviet relations with 53 Japan: Foreign Office Civilian Planning Unit on 20; need for rice 42, 186; occupation of SE Asia 11, 13, 28, 31, 42; surrender of 2, 9, 9, 24, 25, 29; US policy towards 168, 198 Java 29, 86, 130, 156 Jayawardene, J.R., Ceylon Finance Minister 201 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIG) of Chiefs of Staff 130 Joint Planning Staff (JPS) 54 Karen minority, in Burma 182 Kashmir, Indian-Pakistani conflict over 148, 175, 188

254 INDEX

Kennan, George F., US Policy Planning Staff 179, 193 Killearn, Lord: advocates regional cooperation 48; on Australian regional proposals 96; disillusionment of 112, 113; on Dutch war in Indonesia 88, 120; head of Special Commission 2, 3, 43, 45; press criticism of 45, 48, 108; proposals for ECAFE 103, 106; relations with French in Indochina 70, 74, 85; use of Liaison Officers’ Meetings 46 Kirkpatrick, I, Foreign Office 121 Korea 168, 205 Kuomintang nationalists, in China 145, 147, 199 Labour Party 9, 45; and Indian independence 10, 65 Laos see Indochina Latin America, and ECAFE 103 League of Nations 19 LeRoy, M., French Embassy official 71, 124 Liaison Officers’ Meetings (Singapore) 46, 113, 114, 115; anti-communist collaboration 134, 138; success of 50, 71, 103 Libya 52 Liesching, Sir Percivale 201 Linggadjati Agreement (1946) 86 Lokanathan, Dr P.S., ECAFE Secretary 112, 114 London Coal Committee 47 Louis, William Roger: Imperialism at Bay 1; on Killearn 45 Lovett, Robert, US Secretary of State 166 MacArthur, General Douglas 29

MacDonald, Malcolm: AngloAmerican cooperation against communism 150, 164; at Colombo conference 199; on colonial cooperation in SE Asia 73, 124; CommissionerG eneral in SE Asia 114, 115; Commonwealth cooperation in SE Asia 142; ‘domino theory’ propounded by 183; and fate of Special Commission 103, 109; Governor-General of Singapore and Malaya 44, 67; on movement towards Asian cooperation 160; regional cooperation against communism 132, 134, 178; support for Killearn 50 McGregor, K. Ministry of Production 35 McIntosh, New Zealand External Affairs 98 MacLennan, I., Commonwealth Relations Office 135 MacMichael, Sir Harold 38, 44 McNeil, Hector, Foreign Office 77 McVey, Ruth T. 129 Makins, Sir Roger 201 Malaya: anti-British opposition 66; appointment of Governor-General for 23, 35, 37, 44; Australian troops in 177; British policy towards 81, 181, 189; communist threat to 147, 148, 150, 185, 186; Emergency ix, 3, 125, 129, 131; importance of 10, 11, 137, 186, 189; independence 191, 207; Indian interests in 91; plans for Malayan Union 12, 66;

INDEX 255

press criticism of Special Commission 48; rice shortage 43, 45, 185; rubber trade with USA ix, 11, 137, 169 Malayan Planning Unit (MPU) 12 Manchuria, fall of 147 mandated territories (British) 17, 19 Mao Tse-tung 129, 145, 147, 197 Marshall Aid 196, 204; and Asian OEEC 136, 163, 166; for SE Asia ix, 136, 138, 152, 196 Martin, J.M., Colonial Office 134, 135 Massey, Claude, Australian trade commissioner 50, 60 Menzies, Robert, Australian Prime Minister 201 Middle East, Soviet ambitions in 52, 179 Minister of State, proposed for SE Asia 20, 22, 33 Ministry of Production 35, 41 Ministry of Supply 37, 40 Molotov, V.M., Soviet Foreign Minister 52 Monteath, Sir David, India Office 97 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, Earl Mountbatten of Burma: advocates regional cooperation 48; and Burmese nationalism 28; Commander of SEAC 1, 12, 21, 22, 25; opposed to proposed Minister Resident 34, 38; supports Killearn’s report 50, 51; Viceroy of India 65 Moutet, Marios, French Overseas Minister 69 Moynehan, Foreign Office 75 Muslim League (India) 10, 65 Nanking Proposals, aid plans 162, 170 Nathan, Lord 43, 47

‘National Independence’ (US paper 1943) 15 nationalism: and anticolonialism 90, 159, 188; Australian policy towards 96, 99, 100; British policy towards 28, 61, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87; fostered by Japanese occupation 13, 28, 29; in South and SE Asia 2, 9, 29, 55, 65, 187; US policy on independence movements 14 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) (1949) 177 Nehru, Jawaharlal 10, 65; ambitions for India in SE Asia 91, 93, 159, 175; Asianconference in Delhi (1949) 157, 159, 162; at Colombo conference 200; Commonwealth regional collaboration 139; influence in Burma 152; opposition to colonial cooperation 181; proposes Asian regional organisation 160, 175; relations with France 73; and Russian expansion in SE Asia 156 Nepal 4, 148, 186 Netherlands: British arms embargo against 119, 125, 142; colonial rule in Indonesia 13, 29, 156, 159; membership of ECAFE 103, 105; Renville Agreement (1948) 115; role in regional cooperation plans 19, 49, 50, 59, 155, 157; and spread of communism in SE Asia 131; war with Indonesian Republic 87, 141, 155

256 INDEX

New Zealand: and Delhi conference (1949) 160; interests in SE Asia 50, 187, 189, 190; opposition to Australian regional plans 98; and SE Asia regional defence 51, 54, 56, 177, 193; and South Seas regional commission 16 North Borneo 4, 19, 185, 186 NSC 48/2 (National Security Council paper) 205 NSC 51 (National Security Council paper) see PPS 49 Nutrition Conference (1946) 47 Nye, Archibald, British High Commissioner in India 160, 183, 184 Ogburn, Charlton (Jr), US State Department 169 Onn bin Ja’afar, Dato 66 Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 135, 136 Pacific Pact on defence, proposed 177, 190, 192, 200 Pakistan 10, 148, 186, 188 Palestine 9, 10 Palliser, A.M., Foreign Office 152 Paskin, J.J., Colonial Office 181, 184 Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, Secretary of State for India 65 Philippines 4, 186, 189, 195, 203, 204; and ECAFE 105, 113; proposes SE Asia defence treaty 175; as ‘stalking horse’ 195, 196, 198; US policy in 165, 168 Pibul, Luang, Prime Minister of Thailand 14, 152 Poland, and proposed ECE 101 Portugal, colonial power 19 Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHP) 53 Potsdam Conference (1945) 25

Poynton, Hilton, Colonial Office 17 PPS 51 (US Policy Planning Staff paper) 170, 198, 205 Pridi Phanomyong, Prime Minister of Thailand 49 PUSC (Permanent Under-Secretary’s planning committee): Dening’s paper 179; policy paper (32) 187, 190; policy paper (53) 187, 198 PYTHON repatriation scheme 28 Quirino, Elpidio, President of Philippines 177 Rance, Brigadier Hubert, Governor of Burma 65, 66 Reed, Charles, US State Department 168 ‘Regional Co-operation in South-East Asia and the Far East’, (PUSC 1949) 187 regional commissions, proposed 15, 17, 38, 60 regional conference, proposed by FO (1948) 142 regional cooperation: against communism 131, 149, 157, 158, 163; (PUSC proposals) 188, 189, 190; differing views on 40, 115, 143; Killearn’s ideas for 48; Leighton Stuart’s plan for 170; need to involve US 153, 157, 187, 191, 199, 204; origins of policy 1; role of European powers in 3, 84, 94; see also Asian cooperation; colonial cooperation; Commonwealth cooperation; regional defence regional defence: ‘containing ring’ 183; PHP proposals for 53; proposals (1949) 177, 192 Renville Agreement (1948) 115, 117

INDEX 257

rice 19; communist threat to production ix, 148, 185; shortage of 2, 31, 42, 45, 48, 115; see also Special Commission Robinson, Kenneth, Colonial Office 17, 38 Roosevelt, Franklin D., US President 13, 25 Royal Navy 117 rubber trade 11, 19; exports to USA ix, 11, 137 SACSEA (Supreme Allied Commander SE Asia) see Mountbatten, Earl Saigon, re-occupation of 30 Sainteny, M. Jean 68 Sarawak 81, 186 Sargent, Sir Orme, Foreign Office 23, 75, 89, 122 Schuman, Robert, French Foreign Minister 142, 154, 196 Scott, A.L. 135 Scott, R.H., Foreign Office 173 Scrivener, P.S., Killearn’s deputy 121, 130 SEAC see South-East Asia Command ‘Security of the British Empire’ PHP paper (1945) 53 self-help in SE Asia, US insistence on 1, 168, 172, 194, 195, 202 Senanayake, Don Stephen, Prime Minister of Ceylon 197 Shanghai, ECAFE meeting in 111 Shepherd, F.M., consul-general Indonesia 118 shipping, in SE Asia 31, 46 Siam see Thailand Singapore 13, 88, 207; as centre for regional organisation 2, 3, 10, 82, 115, 203; fall of (1942) 11, 12 Singh, Lalita Prasad 105, 206 Smith, F.W.H., Burma Office 72

South Africa 55 South Asia, defined 4 South Korea 186 South Pacific Commission (1947) 60; proposed 16, 57, 59 South-East Asia: British influence in 78, 84, 165, 184, 187; defined 4, 203; economy 11, 31, 46, 203; European colonies 4, 13, 14, 119; independent states in 17; international interference in 18, 38, 39; parochialism in 22, 38; political differences within 187, 190, 191; strategic importance of 50, 79, 91, 187, 203; view of communist threat 161, 167 South-East Asia Command (SEAC) 2, 22, 23, 25; as basis for regional organisation 1, 32; Dening’s proposals for 22, 32, 37; and economic crisis in SE Asia 31; and liberation of SE Asia 12, 28 South-East Asia Fisheries Conference (1947) 48 South-East Asia League (1947) 95 South-East Asia Social Welfare Conference (1947) 48 South-East Asia Statistical Conference (1948) 48 South-West Pacific Area Command (SWPA) 25 South-West Pacific regional commission proposed 60 Soviet Union: ambitions in Europe 52, 126, 179; in Middle East 52, 179; condemns Delhi conference 161, 175; interests in SE Asia 18, 50, 54, 104, 147, 171;

258 INDEX

member of ECAFE 105, 107, 113, 115; perceived as threat 52, 57, 129, 161, 188 Spaak, Henri, Belgian Foreign Minister 142 Special Commission (Singapore) 36, 47, 108, 109; as basis for regional cooperation 38, 56, 81, 84, 110, 123, 124, 158; economic functions 2, 38, 39, 40, 134; position challenged 98, 101, 103; relationship to ECAFE 106, 107, 110, 114; and rice crisis 43, 46; see also Liaison Officers’ Meetings Special Commissioner see Killearn, Lord Spender, Percy, Australian Foreign Minister 200, 201, 202 Stanley, Oliver, Colonial Secretary 15, 18, 19 Stanton, E.F., US ambassador in Bangkok 153 Stent, J.P., Foreign Office 67, 77; on ECAFE 103, 104, 107, 111 sterling area 136, 185 sterling convertibility (1947) 9, 137 Sterndale Bennett, J.C., Foreign Office 20, 22, 33, 36, 40 Stettinius, Edward, US Secretary of State 19 Stevenson, Ralph, Sir, UK ambassador to China 162, 163, 170 Stikker, Dirk, Dutch Foreign Minister 141 ‘Stock-Taking Memorandum Far East’ (FO paper 1947) 78, 82, 83 Strang, Sir William, Foreign Office 175 ‘Strategic Position of the Commonwealth’ 54 Street, J.E.D., Foreign Office 77, 88, 117

Stuart, Leighton, US ambassador in China 170 Sukarno, Achmad, Indonesian leader 29, 155 Sumatra 86, 156 Thailand 1, 25, 44, 105; British interests in 14, 79, 81; com-munist threat to 16, 147, 150, 151, 164; demand for aid 143, 151, 158, 167, 168; and regional cooperation plans 19, 49, 142, 143, 189; rice production ix, 14, 31, 42, 45, 185; US relations with 14, 151 Thompson, Geoffrey Harrington, Sir, UK ambassador in Bangkok 151, 153 Tibet 4, 148, 186 trade 10, 11, 18, 170, 203; coal 31, 47; rubber ix, 11, 19, 137, 169; sterling area 136, 185; tin 18, 19 transport: problems of 31; shipping 31, 46 Truman, Harry S., US President 9, 166, 205 trusteeship, international 15, 16, 17 Turkey 52 Turner, J.F. 137 U Nu, Burmese premier 66 United Kingdom see Great Britain ‘United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East’, (PUSC 1949) 187 United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) 66 United Nations 3, 17; ECOSOC 101; Good Offices Committee 100, 119, 165; hostility to Special Commission 107, 111;

INDEX 259

and Indonesia 89, 119, 156; and mandated territories 19; Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 101; and world food shortage 42, 115; see also Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) United States of America: aid to China 145, 158, 166, 173; change of attitude to SE Asia 169, 198, 205; economic aid to SE Asia 1, 136, 163, 196, 205; on French colonial policy in Indochina 14, 170, 196, 205; and future of European colonies 9, 14; influence in Far East 25, 78; interests in SE Asia 39, 41, 50, 142, 144, 169; membership of Colombo Plan 206; and Nanking Proposals 162, 163; need to involve US in SE Asia 153, 157, 187, 191, 199, 204; policy on China 78, 168, 170, 194; Policy Planning Staff 170, 179; and proposal for ECE 101; relations with Thailand 14, 151; reluctance to support SE Asia 149, 150, 158, 165, 173, 183, 189; role in regional defence proposals 54, 178, 192; and self-help in SE Asia 1, 168, 172, 194, 195, 202; and war in Indonesia 89, 170 Viet Minh nationalist movement ix, 3, 30, 68, 71, 154 Vietnam: Bao Dai Agreement 154, 174, 196; declaration of Republic (DRV) 30, 68; see also Indochina ‘Voice of Britain’ broadcasting station 83 War Office, and Dening’s plans 23

Wavell, Field Marshal Lord, Viceroy of India 65 Western Union 132, 133; and pressure for colonial cooperation 117, 141; see also Brussels Pact wheat, shortage (1946) 42 Whitteridge, Gordon, Foreign Office 117; on Indochina 75, 75, 85, 88 Wright, Michael, Killearn’s deputy 70, 85, 124 Yalta Conference (1945) 1, 19

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