Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order

Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation

Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation National Interests and Regional Order EDITORS

See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya An East Gate Book

M.E.Sharpe Armonk, New York London, England

} An East Gate Book Copyright © 2004 by Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Asia-Pacific security cooperation : national interests and regional order / edited by See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya. p. cm. An East Gate book. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7656-1474-X (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. National security—Pacific Area. 2. National security—East Asia. 3. Pacific Area— Strategic aspects. 4. East Asia—Strategic aspects. I. Tan, See Seng, 1965– II. Acharya, Amitav. UA832.5A857 2004 355'.031'095—dc22

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Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48-1984.

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Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

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Part I 1. Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution of Concepts and Practices Ralf Emmers

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2. Convergent Security Revisited: Reconciling Bilateral and Multilateral Security Approaches William T. Tow

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3. Accelerating the Evolutionary Process of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: An Australian Perspective Ron Huisken

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Part II 4. The Evolving Chinese Conception of Security and Security Approaches Nan Li

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5. Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security Rizal Sukma

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6. Japan’s Compound Approach to Security Cooperation Yasuhiro Takeda

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7. South Korea’s Strategy for Inter-Korean Relations and Regional Security Cooperation Shin-wha Lee

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8. Malaysian Defense and Security Cooperation: Coming Out of the Closet J.N. Mak

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9. The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: The Triumph of Bilateralism Over Multilateralism in Philippine Foreign Policy? Renato Cruz De Castro

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10. Singapore’s Perspective on the Asia-Pacific Security Architecture Chin Kin Wah

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11. Thailand’s Perspective on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Chulacheeb Chinwanno

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12. Recalibration Not Transformation: U.S. Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Satu P. Limaye

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Notes About the Editors and Contributors Index

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Acknowledgments Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation was conceived to address certain nagging questions regarding contemporary Asia-Pacific security relations. Why, for instance, have some forms of security cooperation and institutionalization proven more feasible than others in the Asia-Pacific? Does the prevailing orthodoxy of security bilateralism therein complement or compete, or, worse yet, conflict with the growing fluency with multilateral processes in the region? And if the relationship between bilateral and multilateral modalities is more competitive than complementary, how might such modalities be rendered more congruent? An advance party of analysts and practitioners gathered in Singapore in November 2001 to brainstorm on these concerns. Their enthusiastic deliberations set the stage for a conference, held in Singapore in December 2002, that brought together an outstanding group of distinguished academics and younger scholars already making their mark. The first in a series of conferences on Asia-Pacific regionalism organized by the Singapore-based Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), the December 2002 meeting was an unqualified success in its effort to bridge academic theories of international relations and security with the “real world” of policy. The editors would like to record their deep appreciation to the Sasakawa Peace Foundations of Japan and the United States, whose generous support made this project possible in the first place. Heartfelt gratitude is also due to Ambassador Barry Desker, Director of IDSS, for his unstinting support and encouragement throughout the entire process of bringing this book to fruition. In addition, the editors wish to thank all the outstanding contributors who labored long and hard on their chapters and whose collective forbearance in the face of editorial demands was resolute and highly appreciated. Two anonymous reviewers for M.E. Sharpe offered very useful advice that strengthened the manuscript. Earnest thanks are also due the administrative staff of IDSS for their efficient logistical support during the December 2002 conference. Special mention in this regard goes vii

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especially to Ermayanty Binte Ginnin, who put in long hours in ensuring that myriad conference details were well taken care of. Indeed, without the hard work and good humor of these colleagues in the course of supporting not only this but three other conferences all held concurrently in that same week in December 2002—one for the Guinness Book of World Records, surely!—not much would have been achieved over those few hectic days. Finally, this book would not at all have been possible without the tireless enthusiasm, endorsement, and commitment of the excellent editorial team at M.E. Sharpe, Inc. The editors would in this respect like to offer particular thanks to Patricia Loo, Angela Piliouras, and Amy Albert for their part in making this project a reality.

Introduction Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan

Our present age is one where great powers no longer war against or form grand coalitions to oppose one another.1 However, great powers do war against and form coalitions to oppose global terrorist networks and pariah states, as evinced by the wars fought against Al-Qaeda and Iraq, respectively, by the United States and its allies. The worldwide trend of demilitarization, which started in the wake of the Cold War’s dissolution, is gradually being replaced by new militaristic techno-races (which some have euphemistically christened “revolutions”), at least among states that can afford it. Today, ideology and competition for resources and territory are not necessarily the primary drivers of war. Ethnicity, tribalism, and religion do just as well if not better at inciting violence, leading pundits to characterize various contemporary conflicts, correctly or otherwise, as clashes between civilizations and cultures. The complexity and fluidity of this new international security environment as such necessitates an incessant and ever-problematic search for a security architecture that would ensure regional order.2 As the Asia-Pacific region enters the twenty-first century, important questions have emerged as to the future security architecture of the region. Nontraditional or “soft” security issues therein have unquestionably grown in salience.3 Traditional or “hard” security concerns continue, however, to vex relations between regional states. Because of the commingling of soft and hard security, strategies that once worked are today perceived as inadequate for coping with the challenges that now confront the region. These concerns include, among other things, Cold War holdovers such as the divided Korean Peninsula; post–Cold War contestations over South China Sea atolls (and the natural resources that their ix

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surrounding waters purportedly hold); bilateral tensions between certain Northeast Asian states; bilateral border disputes between certain Southeast Asian states; and most recently, the growing regionwide threat of terrorism, narcotics, money laundering, failed or failing states, as well as human security concerns. The combination of emerging security challenges and inveterate ones that simply refuse to go away calls for new security strategies that complement older existing approaches that may have served the region well at one time, but which now require some reformulation. This does not mean, however, that all existing security approaches and structures are outmoded and no longer apply. Without doing away just yet with the region’s existing alliance structures, regional elites are nevertheless interested in new security forms (comprehensive security, cooperative security, human security, security community, and other new bilateral and multilateral modes of security management) primarily as a supplement to self-help strategies, whether of the strictly competitive, the intramural, or even the associative or cooperative types.4 In short, the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific is anything but tidy, consisting of a loose, complex patchwork of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral arrangements that reflect primarily realist approaches to regional security supplemented by liberal and constructivist features.5 Absent any clear sense of grand strategic orderliness or coherence to this region’s diverse modes of security management, the undertaking we have tasked for ourselves in this volume—to trace the evolution of security approaches adopted by regional states in the Asia-Pacific from the Cold War to the present, in response to quite specific security challenges confronting the region— poses a formidable, albeit not insurmountable, challenge, which we hope this book has succeeded in meeting. A Region in Transition During the Cold War, the region proved hospitable mainly to bilateral security arrangements. Neither collective security nor collective defense, the two traditional multilateral security approaches, could find roots in the region. The Asia-Pacific region, as Chin Kin Wah correctly observes in his chapter in this volume, “has never quite presented the kind of strategic coherence that would have facilitated the creation of a truly multilateral collective defense framework of the sort exemplified, say,

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by . . . NATO in the old Cold War divide of Europe.” Indeed, different subregions of the Asia-Pacific demonstrate partiality to specific modalities of security management. On one hand, Northeast Asia remains reliant upon traditional security approaches such as alliances and balance of power, although things could well change with a successful resolution to the five-decade-old standoff between the two Koreas. On the other, Southeast Asia has supplemented Cold War power balancing with a post–Cold War architecture based upon comprehensive security. A third and newer form of security multilateralism, cooperative security, also has had limited application in the region, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) espousing strict adherence to state sovereignty and providing a framework of conflict management on a subregional basis. In the 1990s several developments stimulated important changes to the traditional regional security architecture. A major source of change was the emergence of new ideas and initiatives for a regional multilateral security forum, culminating in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the only multilateral security forum of its kind serving the Asia-Pacific region. A second source of change was the proliferation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities of the United Nations (UN) around the world, including in Asia, where Cambodia hosted one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in history. A notable aspect of these operations was that the vast majority of them involved internal conflicts, raising issues of sovereignty. Third, the 1990s saw a growing debate over the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention, requiring states to rethink their capabilities and policy. Fourth, the Asian economic crisis cast a pall over existing multilateral institutions, aggravating doubts about them amid the revival of bilateral alliances. Finally, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001 have prompted states to rethink their approach to national and regional security. The subsequent bombings in Bali on October 12, 2002 have only reinforced the collective sense of urgency felt by regional governments. These developments seem to have produced divergent and apparently conflicting responses from Asia-Pacific countries. The region now accommodates a greater variety of approaches to security cooperation and regional order than was the case during the Cold War. This leads to an important question: How do the various approaches to regional order relate to each other? Are they inherently competitive, or mutually exclu-

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sive, as many scholars would claim? For example, a debate in international relations theory and practice persists as to whether the interest in multilateralism could lead to the eventual supplanting of bilateral arrangements. Although some scholars have pointed to fundamental tensions between bilateral security alliances and multilateral institutions like the ARF, others find them complementary. Similarly, to what extent does a state’s participation in the UN’s expanding security tasks affect its existing regional security relationships? Does it contribute to or detract from regional confidence-building efforts? Evolving Approaches to Security At the heart of the essays in this volume, as we have already noted, is a common concern with the evolution, over time, of security principles and approaches in the Asia-Pacific from the Cold War, through the post– Cold War, to the current post–September 11 (or, as some have taken to calling it, the “post-post–Cold War”) eras. Change, as and when it has occurred, has not been seamless or even progressive. The evolutionary process has been and continues to be characterized by the competition, congruence, and (as William Tow proposes in his chapter) convergence of security ideas and practices between and within subregions, regional states, and the “epistemic communities” that render ideational and policy contributions. The main argument underlying this volume of essays is as follows.6 Whether a security approach is bilateral, multilateral, or unilateral may not tell us much about its impact on regional order. Assumptions made about whether this or that approach is viable on the basis of nominal definitions are simply untenable. Multilateralism, for instance, is deemed to be a qualitative rather than quantitative relationship, in the sense that having more than two members in a security grouping does not make it multilateral unless the grouping is nondiscriminating as well.7 Similarly, bilateralism and unilateralism need not be inherently conflict causing. Rather, under certain conditions, they can be reconciled with multilateral approaches in ways that could ameliorate the security dilemma. Although states cannot be expected to entirely eschew unilateral and bilateral approaches to security, the latter can be made less competitive vis-à-vis multilateral approaches. There is thus a need to rethink the lines between traditional security approaches, such as collective security, collective defense, and cooperative security, for example,

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since these distinctions have been overtaken by new developments in the global and regional security environment. The contributors to this volume identify different types of security approaches that emerged in the postwar Asia-Pacific region from the Cold War to the present: bilateral alliances, collective defense, collective security, comprehensive security, cooperative security, and, arguably, security community. How, if at all, do these approaches relate to one another? Are they mutually exclusive and competitive, or can we discern elements of congruence and convergence among them? To what extent, and in what specific ways, can these approaches be reconfigured so as to induce greater congruence or convergence among them? That these approaches might compete with each other is, on one hand, evident from the following five examples of security management by regional actors throughout the Asia-Pacific. On the other, some scholars and analysts have nevertheless argued that the competitive dynamic involving the various approaches to security cooperation could be overstated, sometimes at the expense of congruent and/or convergent dynamics. To be sure, the following cases do not even begin to exhaust the gamut of security concerns and responses in the region, but they are invoked here simply as a reminder that Asia-Pacific security can be— indeed is—a rather complex undertaking. First, in the 1970s and early 1980s, ASEAN’s efforts to develop a cooperative security framework through intramural dispute settlement meant sacrificing any latent aspiration within the group’s leaders for regional collective defense. In other words, in developing its role as a regional security community, the association had to eschew its potential as a regional defense community. 8 But although several prominent ASEAN voices have in the past called for an increase in the level of security cooperation between the association’s member states, the traditional consensus among ASEAN leaders has long been against the idea of converting the association into a formal defense alliance.9 Second, the advent of cooperative security—as but one expression of multilateralism, albeit an important one to the Asia-Pacific region—in the 1990s seemed to undermine the ideational rationale for bilateral collective defense systems, prompting the United States and initially Japan to voice strong reservations about the need for a regional, multilateral security institution.10 Only after those concerns had been sufficiently assuaged did the United States lend its support to the ARF. Although the underlying rationales for cooperative security (inclusive/“security with”)

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and defense alliances (exclusive/“security against”) appear diametrically opposed, most of this volume’s contributors, however, have sought to identify areas where different approaches to security in the region complement or are congruent with each other, or evince the potential for such. For example, William Tow favors the “convergence” of bilateral alliances and cooperative-security–based multilateral institutions, whereas Yasuhiro Takeda urges that “compound” or integrative regional security policies be formulated whereby approaches as diverse as collective defense, (modified) collective security, and cooperative security can work synergistically in tandem to engender “public goods” for the entire region. Others elsewhere have similarly argued that a greater congruence between the various approaches to security cooperation can and should be realized. Recognizing the conflicts and contradictions between the various approaches, they suggest the need for the restructuring of these approaches so as to engender greater complementarity among them. Admiral Dennis Blair’s spirited advocacy of the formation of security communities in the region calls for opening participation in military activities carried out under the auspices of U.S. bilateral alliances and relationships to nonalliance members.11 Blair’s idea is a good illustration of an attempt at constructed congruence. Ralph Cossa, a respected security analyst, has persuasively argued that the development of security multilateralism in the form of the ARF is perfectly compatible with the continuation of the U.S. “hub-and-spokes” system.12 Yukio Satoh, a Japanese diplomat, coined the term “multiplex approach” to underscore why the Asia-Pacific region not only needs a range of bilateral and multilateral approaches to security cooperation, but can effectively accommodate them all. Ideas to make national security strategies more congruent with the demands of multilateral security have also been mooted, mirroring the notion of “concerted unilateralism” in the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). A third example has to do with Japan’s ongoing efforts to develop capabilities and a role in support of UN peace operations—a case, as it were, of “modified” collective security. These have created suspicions among some of its neighbors, especially China, thereby undermining the emergence of a cooperative security framework in the region. Furthermore, unresolved issues such as revisionism in Japanese history textbooks, wartime “comfort women,” and visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine continue to infuriate the Chinese (as well as the Kore-

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ans), hindering the evolution to full Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Despite China’s well-known skepticism of multilateralism, some analysts believe that Chinese security thinkers have begun incorporating at least some aspects of cooperative security into their own work. As Nan Li suggests in his chapter on the evolving Chinese view on security, cooperative security has had some influence on Chinese strategic thinking. For Li, this influence is most evident in Beijing’s “new security concept,” which emphasizes the need for equality of relations, cooperation, dialogue, transparency, and confidence building. Elsewhere, in contrast to certain alarmist claims regarding the “China threat,” Alastair Iain Johnston, a prominent Harvard China-watcher, has argued that Beijing (in relative terms) appears more status quo than revisionist in its foreign policy, as evidenced, among other things, by its growing commitment to and participation in multilateral institutions and frameworks.13 Chinese suspicions about Japanese intentions may be partially assuaged (at least in the short through medium term) by Tokyo’s longstanding position on its security relationship with America as well as its official view on China.14 To be sure, episodic nudging by Washington has led to some change in Japan’s defense posture, but as Prime Minister Koizumi noted at a press conference in June 2001, “I do not feel that I have to make extra efforts in particular on security. That is because Japan’s basic stance is to ensure its security with the Japan-U.S. security alliance serving as a basis. That is the way it has been, and it will remain so in the future.” A year later, Koizumi told reporters from the International Herald Tribune that he did not view China as a threat to Japan’s security, or that a growing Chinese economy would automatically pose a military threat to Japan.15 Furthermore, that nearly threequarters of Japanese elites who responded to a recent poll felt that building and strengthening a regional framework to promote peace and dialogue in the region was a “very important” security option bodes well for continued efforts toward cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific.16 The preceding example logically leads us to our fourth: China’s ostensible preference for bilateral approaches to regional disputes, such as the Spratly Islands imbroglio, which can be seen in its longstanding reluctance to “internationalize” such disputes. Some states and analysts view Beijing’s recalcitrance as a threat to the development of cooperative security. But as Li has argued in the following pages, Chinese strategic thinking has not been totally immune to the impact of cooperative security thinking. Indeed, we might also add that although Beijing’s

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ongoing efforts at regional cooperation—to the northwest with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the southwest with India, the southeast with ASEAN, and the northeast with Japan and South Korea—can arguably be described as a sort of “hub-and-spokes with Chinese characteristics,” they may also highlight a growing Chinese commitment, hitherto largely absent, to multilateral diplomacy. Moreover, Chinese obduracy is not the only impediment in the way of regional attempts to establish a viable cooperative security framework. As noted above, some analysts feel that Washington’s effort to rejuvenate its alliances in the region has rendered any option other than the existing alliance system less preferable among U.S. security planners. A final example worth mentioning is the American policy of “revitalizing” and adapting its hub-and-spokes system (such as the defense guidelines with Japan and new measures to strengthen the Australia-U.S. alliance) to meet the challenges of the post–Cold War era. Advocates of cooperative security regard this development as a threat to ARF-style multilateralism. The emerging security architecture in the region after September 11, with its emphasis on counterterrorism, complicates this picture even more. As Aaron Friedberg has argued, although September 11 did not fundamentally alter the course of U.S. policy in the AsiaPacific, it has nevertheless altered Washington’s view of the strategic importance of the region, broadened considerably the scope of its activities therein, and strengthened its relations with most of its strategic partners, friends, and allies17—a policy reorientation that Satu Limaye has termed “recalibration” in his chapter on the U.S. security perspective. Moreover, it is unclear whether revitalization of U.S. alliances would lead to the undoing of ARF-style multilateralism, or is partly a reaction to the perceived failure of the ARF to fully institutionalize cooperative security. As Renato Cruz De Castro argues in his chapter on the Philippines, Manila seized the opportunity afforded by its confrontation with Muslim extremists in Mindanao to revitalize the moribund PhilippineU.S. security relationship due to growing disenchantment within the Philippine national security establishment with the ARF. Equally interesting about the anticipated rejuvenation of the huband-spokes system is the fact that the global war on terror has encouraged a partial revival of American interest in Asia-Pacific multilateralism, albeit a parochial, utilitarian, and short-term version to be sure, since it is the counterterror mission that defines the multilateral coalition, rather than the other way around. However, “à la carte multilateralism” is bet-

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ter than no multilateralism at all. In a somewhat different formulation, others have argued that cooperative security and other ancillary multilateral initiatives are important as a supplement to, not replacement of, the existing alliance structure. In a similar vein, Tow (as we shall see below) views alliances and cooperative security as convergent approaches to the extent that both, in his opinion, can be synergistically combined within the Asia-Pacific security architecture. And in his chapter, Ron Huisken views alliances as integral to regional security, particularly when mixed with just the right dash of “accelerated” multilateralism. If the prognostications of Tow and Huisken are on the mark (as we believe they are), then what and how much of that “right dash” of multilateral initiative in combination with the prevailing bilateralism is a question of critical significance to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Architecture of This Volume This leads us to the collection of essays in this book.18 Patterns of change and of continuity in Asia-Pacific security management and cooperation at the regionwide and subregional levels are identified and analyzed in the twelve chapters of this volume, which are presented in two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that provide overviews of evolving security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region from the Cold War through the post–Cold War to the current post–September 11 eras. The first chapter analyzes shifting patterns of security cooperation in the light of concepts and approaches that have defined and are defining the security practices of the subregions and security clusters/complexes that constitute Asia-Pacific security. The second chapter argues that the multitiered commingling of realist and liberal security approaches adopted in the Asia-Pacific region can best be described as “convergent” in nature. The third chapter makes an impassioned plea for accelerating the evolutionary process of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. In Chapter 1, Ralf Emmers identifies two principal sets of influences on security thinking in the Asia-Pacific: alliances on the one hand, and concepts such as comprehensive and cooperative security on the other.19 With origins dating back to the Cold War, alliances focus narrowly on military security and are designed to work by deterring specific enemies. By contrast, comprehensive and cooperative security practices, Emmers notes, adopt a broader approach to security and are premised upon the

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need to seek security with others rather than against them. In the AsiaPacific, bilateral alliances between the United States and regional states have dominated the security architecture. Nevertheless, their long-term relevance is uncertain in the event of the rise of U.S. unilateralism, the widening technological gap between the United States and its allies, or the ever-complicated global war on terrorism. According to Emmers, the ARF has focused on creating habits of dialogue and confidence building. Although it has given AsiaPacific security cooperation a multilateral face, it is by no means a security community, not yet at least. To date, the ARF’s contributions have largely been limited to the promotion of norms and confidencebuilding measures (CBMs). The regional security landscape continues to be dominated by bilateral alliances, to be sure, but these are complemented or supplemented by comprehensive and cooperative security approaches. By comparison, William T. Tow, in Chapter 2, insists that bilateral alliances will continue to remain relevant to the Asia-Pacific in the long term. For Tow, a key advantage alliances have over more ambitious proposals on regional security management is that the former already exist and in fact are well established. Emphasizing a “judicious mix of realist and liberal strategies,” he advocates combining bilateral alliances and multilateral institutions—what Tow calls “convergent security”—in the Asia-Pacific region. Convergent security accepts the realist principle of the centrality of state interests, but promotes the liberal principle of cooperation. The concept recognizes that existing alliance mechanisms can be applied to meeting aims other than countering specific threats. In this respect, he argues that alliances should go beyond mere deterrence of threats to the broader concern of establishing and maintaining a new regional order. The current concern over counterterrorism, according to Tow, can help nudge existing alliances toward new and creative uses. Such a development will clearly require security cooperation among the major powers, which itself is dependent on the building of trust through diplomacy and interaction. Tow envisages the creation of a Sino-American system based on cooperation with small and medium powers, and urges the United States to come to grips with China’s “new security concept.” He does not, however, see convergent security as a path toward community building, but rather as an example of “expansive bilateralism.” In Chapter 3, Ron Huisken argues that the evolution of security coop-

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eration in the Asia-Pacific should be “accelerated,” especially (but not restricted to) the development of multilateral mechanisms. The AsiaPacific, notes Huisken, is a turbulent region with a limited history of security cooperation. Since the security challenges facing the region are mostly distinctive, their solutions should therefore be distinctive as well. The major regional approaches to security can be summarized as selfhelp, bilateral alliances with the United States, and “a dash of multilateralism.” Turning briefly to Australia, Huisken observes that Canberra, like most regional governments, employs a mix of approaches to promote security. Huisken is of the opinion that the Asia-Pacific is on the cusp of a major decision about whether to strengthen existing bilateral alliances and conceivably even create a multilateral collective defense structure. A small step in that direction has been taken with the formation of a trilateral dialogue between senior defense officials from the United States, Japan, and Australia. Huisken advocates forging more concentrated multilateral security processes. One way to do so, he suggests, is to build on APEC. Since APEC is essentially a meeting of the heads of state, it should broaden its agenda to include responsibility for the big issues of the region. Huisken does not think that this will hurt the ARF too much as its leaders can appoint the forum to address specific issues. However, he concedes that ASEAN’s tight rein over the ARF agenda and pace should be relaxed so as to encourage further institutionalization. Part II of this volume is a collage of perspectives on the various ways eight Asia-Pacific countries—China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand—and the United States have viewed and managed the perceived challenges confronting their respective national security situations from the Cold War to the present. The chapter on China by Nan Li examines the evolving Chinese perspective on security, whose key drivers have gradually changed as China, as a state, has undergone normalization—from revolution through realpolitik to becoming (or it is so hoped) a responsible great power in the international community. Contrary to recent analyses that account for predominantly external factors affecting Chinese security thinking and practice, Li’s chapter takes an intimate look at domestic dynamics that, over time, have variously shaped the security principles and approaches adopted by Chinese leaders since 1949. Li argues that since the top leaders of the People’s Republic, from Mao through Deng to

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Jiang, have dominated Chinese strategic thought and practice, analysis of the origins of Chinese security management should therefore focus on the leaders themselves. Under Mao Zedong, the emphasis was on war and revolution both within China and around the world. Li takes umbrage with those who suggest that Mao might have been a “closet realist,” and points to various instances whereby Mao’s security policies clearly contravened realist principles. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping accepted the idea of the nation-state as the focus of security policy. His successor, Jiang Zemin, supported the use of military force as an instrument in policy, for example in deterrence and war games. Nevertheless, Li is of the opinion that cooperative security has had an impact on China’s strategic thinking and approach to the region, particularly in the form of China’s “new security concept,” which emphasizes the need for equality of relations, cooperation, dialogue, transparency, and confidence building. Other specific examples of how multilateral security concepts have influenced Chinese security thinking are the recent agreement on conduct in the South China Sea and the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Li notes that the SCO is the “most remarkable example” of the new Chinese approach, which emphasizes intramural confidence building, enhancing transparency among members, and trade promotion alongside traditional modalities of security management. Yet he is careful to note that Chinese multilateralism has essentially been instrumentalist. Finally, Li suggests that the new security concept contributes to the view of a “kindler, gentler China” in the Asia-Pacific region as it is often employed alongside Chinese allegations of American obduracy in maintaining a Cold War mentality. In Chapter 5, Rizal Sukma discusses Indonesia’s experience with nonalignment, collective security, and cooperative security approaches. From the beginning, Indonesia has been opposed to collective defense ties, preferring nonalignment instead. Jakarta has long harbored suspicions of the intentions of major extraregional powers, which it suspected wanted to retain Dutch colonial rule over Indonesia. Domestic politics had also always conspired against the possibility of Indonesian participation in collective defense arrangements for fear of having Indonesia’s nascent national identity undermined. This partly explains the importance Indonesia placed on ASEAN. It is not without reason that Jakarta has long championed the mantra “regional solutions for regional problems.” In the post–Cold War era, however, greater recognition by Indo-

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nesia of the rights and interests of major external powers in the AsiaPacific region has been evident. Sukma discusses Indonesia’s support for a modified collective security approach via its involvement in more than sixty UN-mandated peace operations. Since the East Timor crisis, however, the Indonesian military has come to perceive UN missions as a tool appropriated by major powers to advance their own interests. Democratic transition, in Sukma’s view, has not diminished Jakarta’s “allergy” to external interference, as evinced by the Megawati government’s condemnation of Australian premier John Howard’s comments about preemption as a justifiable policy following the loss of Australian lives in the Bali bombings on October 12, 2002. Nevertheless, this has not dampened cooperation between Canberra and Jakarta in their joint investigations of the Bali incident. Sukma concludes that questions of sovereignty and antipathy toward foreign interference will continue to shape Indonesian strategic thinking as potential hindrances to closer regional security cooperation. In the chapter on Japan, Yasuhiro Takeda argues that Japan has adopted a “compound” approach to security cooperation, which brings together the concepts of collective defense, collective security, and cooperative security in a complementary fashion. Takeda begins with the observation that the Asia-Pacific region is organized under a mix of principles. Some view cooperative security as a good means of mitigating the security dilemma, whereas collective defense and/or collective security approaches are more attractive to those who see conscious rivalries persisting in the region. In Takeda’s view, these approaches are juxtaposed in regional security practice without being integrated as the region lacks a way to organically link them. The Japan-U.S. alliance operates as the core of this structure, but there is also an element of collective security, as evinced by Japan’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping, and of cooperative security in Japan’s embrace of multilateralism. Partly reminiscent of Tow’s notion of convergent security, Takeda argues that the Japan-U.S. relationship has gone from being a bilateral alliance against a common threat to a security regime for building new norms, principles, rules, and procedures. The widely held domestic consensus today, he notes, is that Japanese reliance on America should not prevent Tokyo’s embrace of multilateralism. This transformation of the Japan-U.S. relationship from alliance to security regime, he argues, constitutes a public good from which nonmembers also benefit. Takeda con-

xxii INTRODUCTION

cludes that what is needed is neither a single notion of security cooperation, nor a comprehensive system that combines all the various concepts, nor sole reliance on any one of them. Rather, the regional solution lies in finding integrative security policies that can help generate and sustain collective public goods for the Asia-Pacific region. In Chapter 7, Shin-wha Lee examines a Republic of Korea (ROK) whose populace has, in recent times, shown increasing disenchantment with Korea’s five-decade-old security alliance with the United States. Although this in no way signals the demise of the ROK-U.S. alliance or other bilateral arrangements such as the inter-Korean dialogue, it, however, reflects Seoul’s growing attraction to multilateral security approaches. To be sure, the ARF has contributed little by way of promoting inter-Korean reconciliation, which remains wedded to the state of DPRKU.S. relations. Though skeptical about North Korea’s commitment to the ARF, Lee believes that multilateral efforts by the forum as well as the UN may prove significant as a first step toward regional confidence building. According to Lee, the highly militarized nature of South Korean security during the Cold War has now given way to a broadened security agenda focusing on three interrelated concerns: traditional military threats, nontraditional security issues, and humanitarian matters. She therefore suggests that humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism will likely vie for equal—if not greater—attention with traditional military concerns in ROK security in the near future. In terms of traditional military concerns, the severity of the nuclear threat from the north has not prevented the surge in domestic unhappiness over U.S. forces in South Korea, prompting questions about the future of the American military presence on Korean soil. It is likely that South Korea and the United States will have quite a different alliance relationship in the future since President Roh Moo-Hyun emphasized the need for equality in the ROK-U.S. partnership. To be sure, Roh’s embattled presidency complicates an already uncertain situation. In Chapter 8, J.N. Mak makes a strong case for Malaysia’s inveterate but little acknowledged forays in security bilateralism. His “exposé” of the surprisingly extensive and intimate, albeit informal, military ties between Malaysia and the United States and Australia reflects the complexity of Malaysian domestic politics. For Mak, the major puzzle is that despite its avowedly neutralist stand, Malaysia maintains a slew of bilateral security and defense ties with a whole range of countries. For

INTRODUCTION xxiii

example, more than seventy-five U.S. ships have called at Malaysian ports in the last two-and-a-half years, more than one thousand flights over Malaysian airspace have been made by the American Air Force annually, and the U.S. Army and Navy SEALs have conducted training in Malaysia. Mak tracks Malaysia’s move to “actively, if quietly” engage the United States after it began to withdraw from Vietnam in the 1970s. Likewise, Kuala Lumpur renewed that engagement during the early post–Cold War period for fear of possible Chinese or Japanese dominance in Southeast Asia. What explains Malaysia’s habitually hostile rhetoric toward the West, despite its obvious close defense ties with the United States and Australia? One plausible reason, Mak suggests, is Kuala Lumpur’s concern that extremist groups could use those ties to foment support to topple the present government. In that respect, September 11 has been a doubleedged sword for Malaysia. On one hand, it has helped legitimate former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad’s tough stance against radical Islamic opposition groups. On the other, cooperation with the West against terrorism also irks nationalist and Islamic opinion within the country. In this context, Australian premier John Howard’s statement (in late 2002) about Australia’s “right” to military preemption in the region, Mak argues, undermines Malaysia’s ability to crack down on its own Muslim extremists because Kuala Lumpur cannot risk being seen to pander to Canberra. Despite these concerns, he concludes that we will likely not see any significant revision of bilateral security relations between Malaysia and its partners in the post-Mahathir era. In Chapter 9, Renato Cruz De Castro analyzes the Philippine experience with bilateral and multilateral security approaches. He charts the resurrection of the Philippine-U.S. security alliance. Although the alliance lapsed following the cooling of ties between Manila and Washington after the Cold War, the current preoccupation over terrorism has provided the right milieu for revitalizing it. Current U.S. assistance to the Philippines is helping the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) deal with external and internal threats, providing the additional benefit as insurance against China. De Castro’s assessment of Philippine security strategy is that it combines expedient defensive realism with multilateralism. De Castro notes Manila’s turn to multilateral mechanisms in the mid1990s in the light of its languishing relationship with the United States. The Philippines regarded multilateralism as a way to improve regional

xxiv

INTRODUCTION

comfort levels, pursue confidence building, and constrain powers such as China and Australia. However, Beijing’s unwillingness to internationalize its spat with Manila over Mischief Reef in the South China Sea exposes the limitations of the latter’s multilateral turn. The growing sense in the Philippines that the ARF is little more than a talk shop led Manila, in 1998, to rejuvenate the bilateral alliance with America. Nevertheless, De Castro emphasizes that its current enthusiasm for bilateralism notwithstanding, Philippine interest in multilateralism remains high. In the chapter on Singapore, Chin Kin Wah examines the vaunted pragmatism in Singapore’s approach to security, which has allowed that city-state to adopt a plethora of modalities from the realist to the liberal, bilateral to multilateral. Singapore thinks in power-balancing terms, views the U.S. forward deployment strategy and its Asian alliances as vital in ensuring regional security, engages in bilateral defense diplomacy with ASEAN and other militaries, and participates in more than eighty military exercises annually. It sees the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) as an important component in the regional security architecture, in which its bilateral relationship with Malaysia is also anchored. Where security bilateralism is concerned, Chin notes that Singapore’s ties with the United States are “most substantive and extensive,” although conducted within the context of a strategic friendship rather than formal alliance. Singapore openly supports U.S. presence in the region—including a small logistics presence in the city-state itself—and has offered the latter access to its military facilities. In terms of multilateralism, Singapore sees the ARF not as something that can replace America’s regional alliances for the foreseeable future, but as a means to influence the regional balance of power through building confidence and moderating relations between the major powers. In the post–September 11 setting, Chin believes that opportunities for multilateral cooperation may have increased. He concludes by underscoring Singapore’s “multilayered” approach to regional security: it supports alliances, extended defense arrangements, and regionwide multilateral forums. This pragmatism ensures that bilateralism and multilateralism are viewed as complementary, not inconsistent. Thailand, Chulacheeb Chinwanno contends in Chapter 11, has long combined bilateral and multilateral approaches in its pursuit of security. The lesson of World War II for Thailand was that it needed allies. This accounts for Thailand’s joining the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the 1950s, although its experience in multilateral col-

INTRODUCTION xxv

lective defense proved an unhappy one. For Bangkok, SEATO’s failure to keep Laos free from communism meant that multilateral collective defense was unreliable, which led to Thailand signing the Rusk-Thanat communiqué, establishing bilateral security ties with the United States. However, this initial faux pas with respect to multilateralism, notes Chinwanno, did not prevent Thailand from being a founding member of ASEAN in 1967, which it saw as added insurance against potential isolation should it come under pressure from any large state. Thailand also strongly supported the formation of the ARF and hosted the inaugural foreign ministers’ meeting in Bangkok in 1994. Moreover, Thailand has successfully hosted the annual COBRA GOLD military exercise, which originated as a bilateral Thai-U.S. venture but has since gone multilateral. Thailand’s continued reliance on security multilateralism is also evidenced in its current emphasis on multilateral initiatives to combat the problems of extremism and terrorism. The last chapter, by Satu P. Limaye, features a United States that views security bilateralism as the basis of its policy toward the AsiaPacific. Multilateralism, as and when it is entertained by Washington, has to be justified and its participants held to their commitments. Limaye draws attention to important changes in U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific that have their origins in doctrinal and policy revisions articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, as well as the September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. He identifies seven key elements of the Bush administration’s strategy. First, the administration seeks to revitalize America’s relationships with allies and friends in the region, which it believes had been neglected during the Clinton presidency. Limaye is of the opinion that the U.S. proposition to improve relations along the entire “East Asia littoral” has been welcomed by regional states. Second, the Bush team has recast its relationship with China as a major regional rival that is not as central to U.S. regional policy as previously viewed. Third, the United States is today considerably less enthusiastic about Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” of engaging North Korea, identified as a member of the “axis of evil.” Fourth, America desires to transform its relations with India, which the former increasingly sees as an important player in the region. Fifth, the United States demonstrates enhanced commitment to the region by redeploying military assets there, maintaining its forward troop presence, and deploying theater missile defenses. Sixth, Washington is more skeptical today of multilateral en-

xxvi

INTRODUCTION

gagements and treaties. Finally, the Bush administration evinces less interest in nontraditional security issues than did its predecessor. Taking these elements into account, Limaye concludes that the administration’s strategy in the Asia-Pacific is less transformation than “recalibration” of previous U.S. policy toward the region. Three Cheers and a Caveat We end this introduction where we started, with a reflection on a great power that has warred against and formed coalitions to oppose terrorism and pariah regimes—namely, the United States. The essays in this volume share the view that multilateral modalities, insofar as they matter in interstate relations in the Asia-Pacific, supplement a more basic regional architecture of bilateral alliances and strategic friendships. How the nations of the Asia-Pacific can successfully manage possible tensions and exploit potential synergies between a fundamentally bilateral architecture and an increasing fluency with multilateral diplomacy and cooperation will remain an important analytic as well as policy concern for contemporary regional security. For some, however, the view of the United States as the proverbial “800-pound gorilla” with an aggressive internationalist agenda has undoubtedly complicated that concern.20 Nevertheless, despite regional perceptions of a virulently unilateralist America after September 11, 2001, U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region has offered some unexpected surprises in terms of the Bush administration’s readiness to consider multilateral cooperation in meeting new transnational security challenges. As Limaye explains in his chapter on the U.S. security approach, Washington’s formulation of à la carte (or accountable) multilateralism does not amount to a blanket rejection of multilateral approaches. Rather, Washington treats them as mechanisms to be engaged in only as and when the United States chooses to participate. And thus far Washington for the most part has elected to participate where its policy toward the Asia-Pacific region is concerned. Nor has the urgent necessity for multilateral solutions to transnational problems escaped the attention of other regional states either. Hence, in a qualified respect, at least three developments—one regionwide and the others subregional (the first in Southeast Asia and the second in Northeast Asia)—offer some cause for cheer for proponents of multilateralism.21 First, for a region historically leery of security multilateralism, the

INTRODUCTION xxvii

institutionalization of an annual security dialogue among defense ministers of Asia-Pacific nations, inaugurated in Singapore in May 2002, has certainly been one of the more beguiling regionwide developments of late. Officially known as the IISS Asia Security Conference but popularly coined the “Shangri-la dialogue,” this new form of multilateral diplomacy has for the most part reflected an easy congruence with the prevailing bilateralism in the region. The importance which the major powers of the region attach to the dialogue is apparent in their enthusiastic support for it. For example, the United States, preoccupied as it has been with the war on terror, nevertheless dispatched the Pentagon’s second-in-command, Paul Wolfowitz, widely known as a principal architect of the Afghan and Iraqi campaigns, to the Singapore meetings. Complementing the annual official dialogues among Asia-Pacific foreign ministers at the ARF, the Shangri-la dialogue is unique in that its principal drivers are security studies institutes such as the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and (particularly during the dialogue’s formative phase) the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in Singapore. Not inconceivably, potential synergies arising from that complementarity might be enhanced were the Shangrila dialogue process to be linked or even merged with the ARF process. The second development has to do with multilateral cooperation in the regional war on terror in Southeast Asia. Despite the apparent circumspection of regional responses to terrorism, there has been and continues to be a fairly substantial level of multinational counterterror collaboration between and among the intelligence and security services of the ASEAN states and their partner countries, particularly Australia and the United States. Recent studies have tended to portray counterterror cooperation in Southeast Asia in rather bleak terms.22 Although more certainly can and needs to be done by ASEAN governments in interdicting terrorism in their own backyards, the capture of key militants from the clandestine Jemaah Islamiyah (JI or “Islamic community”) organization—explosives expert Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi in Manila in early 2002 (reportedly killed in a gun battle with Philippine security forces in October 2003 after escaping his Manila prison three months earlier); Mas Selamat Kastari in the Indonesian Riau archipelago in February 2003; Arifin Ali in Thailand in May 2003; and Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, JI operational chief and Al-Qaeda’s point man for Southeast Asia, in Thailand in August 2003—could not have been achieved without the governments of Southeast Asian nations, Australia, and America

xxviii INTRODUCTION

working very closely together.23 Indeed, had the Bush administration insisted on a policy of “regime change” for the Asia-Pacific, the state of regional security would have been drastically different. Another noteworthy development is the six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula in Beijing in late August 2003.24 The apparent lack of progress at the talks would seem to undermine the utility of a multilateral approach in persuading North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Among other things, Pyongyang seems concerned that Washington’s new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at arresting the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), might prove inimical to its own lucrative trafficking in WMD even if the PSI is not directed specifically or exclusively (or not yet at least) at North Korea. On its part, Washington has steadfastly rebuffed the call for a bilateral nonaggression pact, all the while alluding to the possibility of some multilateral security assurances. The obduracy of the two main protagonists aside, it is obvious all six parties wish to eschew war and secure a peaceful resolution to the problem, even if it means perpetuating (at least for the moment) the Kim Jong-Il regime. And as a noted security analyst has pointedly argued, what might possibly break the impasse is “a multilateral pledge by all parties that each will refrain from aggressive actions against [Pyongyang] while talks proceed in good faith.”25 Moreover, as others elsewhere have opined, if it is indeed the health of China-ROK-U.S. relations that would shape the future direction of Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and subregional prospects for cooperation, conflict, and competition, then it seems highly unlikely that plausible solutions to the North Korean problem would be anything other than multilateral—as Shin-wha Lee also notes in her essay below—unless, of course, the Pyongyang regime decides to abandon, unilaterally and volitionally, its nuclear ambitions (say, as South Africa had done) independent of external pressures to do so.26 Whether such ad hoc and selective attempts at multilateral diplomacy and cooperation bode well for the wider multilateralist enterprise in the Asia-Pacific remains unclear. What should be noted, however, is that the perceived gravitation of Washington toward a unilateralist foreign policy did not originate with George W. Bush’s presidency, since the U.S. proclivity for selective engagement in multilateralism in the post– Cold War period was already evident during the Clinton years, despite that administration’s stated preference for “assertive multilateralism.”27 Nevertheless, a capricious disregard for multilateralism may compli-

INTRODUCTION xxix

cate U.S. formulation and pursuit of a coherent foreign policy—a possibility perceptibly reinforced by the post–Gulf War II quagmire in which the Bush administration has landed itself after its “victory” over the Baathist regime in Iraq.28 But the United States is clearly not alone in taking à la carte approaches to multilateral engagements. Other Asia-Pacific states are just as, if not more, adept at this sort of utilitarian thinking and practice, as evidenced by the robust preference among various regional countries for bilateral military ties with the United States. A recent study conducted on Pacific Command (PACOM) activities in the post–Cold War Asia-Pacific, for example, has observed that U.S. allies (Japan, ROK, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia) and strategic partners (for example, Malaysia and Singapore), without exception, favor bilateral rather than multilateral military exercises, exchanges, and technology transfers with the United States—a point that Limaye also makes in his chapter.29 Ironically, this finding emerged in the context of the growing emphasis by PACOM on multilateral military exercises throughout the region, such as COBRA GOLD and RIMPAC. If anything, the foregoing illustrations should suffice as a caveat against post–September 11 caricaturizing, much of it unwarranted, of the United States as a staunch unilateralist and the rest of the Asia-Pacific as devoted multilateralists. The essays in this volume paint a much more complex portrait of regional security relations and evolving approaches: America, unilateralist on the one hand but also bilateralist and even multilateralist on the other; China, a normalizing great power that has shown surprising savoir faire in and for multilateral engagement; Australia, Japan, and South Korea, summoned to arms, as it were, by their common strategic ally, the United States, in a time of revitalized bilateralism, international terrorism, and North Korean intransigence; the Southeast Asian countries, juggling a host of security challenges, chief among them terrorism. How well Asia-Pacific nations and societies are able to negotiate these complexities is surely a question that will occupy scholars and analysts for some time. This volume goes some way in answering that question from a variety of state-based perspectives, and we trust it constitutes a significant contribution to an ongoing conversation about how Asia-Pacific security has evolved since the Cold War and where it likely is headed.

xxx LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ADF AFP AMDA AMS ANZUS APEC ARF ASEAN ASEAN-ISIS ASEAN-PMC AUSMIN BITACG CBMs CCP CIW CMC CPM CSCAP CSCE DAP DMZ DPRK EAEC EAEG xxx

Australian Defense Force Armed Forces of the Philippines Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement Agreement on Maintaining Security Pact involving Australia, New Zealand, and the United States Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies ASEAN post–ministerial conferences Australia-U.S. ministerial Bilateral, Training, and Consultative Group confidence-building measures Chinese Communist Party counterinsurgency warfare Central Military Commission Communist Party of Malaya Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Democratic Action Party demilitarized zone Democratic People’s Republic of Korea East Asian Economic Caucus East Asian Economic Grouping

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS xxxi

EASG EAVG EEZ EU FMS FPDA GBC GWOT IAEA IDSS IISS IMET INTERFET IR ISA JASA JI KASA KCNA KMM MAJDP MD MERCOSUR MNZDCP MOU MPR MSA MSDF NAFTA NATO NEP NGO NKCP NPT NSC NSS OAS OIC

East Asia Study Group East Asia Vision Group exclusive economic zone European Union foreign military sales Five Power Defence Arrangement General Border Committee global war on terrorism International Atomic Energy Agency Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies International Institute of Strategic Studies International Military Education Training International Force for East Timor international relations Internal Security Act Japan-America Security Alliance Jemaah Islamiyah Korea-America Security Alliance Korean Central News Agency Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia Malaysia-Australia Joint Defense Program missile defense Regional grouping of Southern Cone states of Latin America Malaysia–New Zealand Defense Cooperation Program memorandum of understanding People’s Consultative Assembly Mutual Security Act Malaysia-Singapore Defense Forum North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization New Economic Policy nongovernmental organization North Kalimantan Communist Party Nonproliferation Treaty “new security concept” National Security Strategy Organization of American States Organization of the Islamic Conference

xxxii

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

PACOM PACT PAS PECC PKO PLA PRC PSI QDR ROK SAF SAR SCO SDF SEAL SEANWFZ SEATO SOFA SSGN TCOG TMD TOR UMNO UN UN PKOs UNEF UNGCI UNIKOM UNMIBH UNMISET UNMISL UNTAC UNTAET VFA WMD WPNS WTO ZOPFAN

Pacific Command Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security Parti Islam Se-Malaysia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council peacekeeping operations People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Proliferation Security Initiative Quadrennial Defense Review Republic of Korea Singapore Armed Forces Special Administrative Region Shanghai Cooperation Organization Self-Defense Forces sea, air, and land Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons–Free Zone Southeast Asian Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement nuclear-powered, guided-missile submarines Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group theater missile defense terms of reference United Malays National Organization United Nations United Nations peacekeeping operations United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina United Nations Mission Support in East Timor United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor Visiting Forces Agreement weapons of mass destruction Western Pacific Naval Symposium World Trade Organization Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

Part I

——— 1 ——— Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Evolution of Concepts and Practices

Ralf Emmers

Security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has been influenced by two sets of approaches: bilateral alliances on the one hand, and comprehensive and cooperative security on the other. These distinct modes of security cooperation can be distinguished by two key differences. Alliances are narrowly focused on military security and are by definition based on the notion that security should be promoted against potential or actual enemies. Traditional defense arrangements operate in an anarchical system where individual states are responsible for their own security. Security is approached in competitive and zero-sum terms. In contrast, the concepts of comprehensive and cooperative security adopt a broader understanding of security and, especially in the case of the latter, support the notion that security should be promoted “with others” as opposed to “against others.”1 Although comprehensive and cooperative security have been the key influence within multilateral structures in the Asia-Pacific, bilateral alliances have dominated the strategic architecture and have remained the cornerstone of security cooperation in the region. In the long term, however, the relevance of bilateral defense arrangements may be uncertain. This chapter starts by discussing the study of alliances before comparing and contrasting various ideas on security that have been developed as alternatives to formal or tacit alliances; namely, collective, comprehensive, common, and cooperative security, as well as the notion of a security community. Based on this conceptual discussion, the second section analyzes the evolution of security practices in the Asia3

4

CHAPTER 1

Pacific. It indicates the central importance of bilateral alliances in the regional strategic environment both before and after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it demonstrates that the Asia-Pacific has been receptive to comprehensive and cooperative security, in contrast, for instance, to collective security, through the operations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).2 These multilateral structures have aimed to complement, rather than compete with or replace, a bilateral approach to security cooperation. Concepts in Security Cooperation Governments enter military alliances so as to enhance their power positions and to react to rising hegemonies in the international system. Alliances may affect the distribution of power by maintaining the status quo in a specific region. States will conventionally align themselves with the weaker side in order to restrain the rising power. Such alliances are defensive. States may also enter offensive alliances in the interest of hegemony. Wight explains that “political alliances are always contracted with third parties in view; unlike friendships, they are necessarily, so to speak, self-conscious; their purpose is to enhance the security of the allies or to advance their interests, against the outer world.”3 An alliance becomes a collective defense arrangement, which can either take a bilateral or multilateral form, when it includes the principles of reciprocity and mutual defense. The classic example of a collective defense arrangement is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was concluded during the Cold War to preserve the territorial status quo in Europe by defending Western European security from Soviet communism.4 To maximize their effectiveness, alliances should operate as flexible and temporary security arrangements, which implies that their participants must be willing to rapidly enter new alliances to preserve a balanced distribution of power. However, alliances can be influenced by ideology, which limits the flexibility of alliance formation. The study of alliances, analyzed as an expression of balance of power politics, has been influenced by the work of Stephen Walt. In The Origins of Alliances (1987), he examines their formation as a reaction to threats rather than power. Walt points out that instead of viewing balancing or “bandwagoning” as reactions to rising external threats defined exclusively in terms of capabilities (aggregate power), it is “more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power

SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 5

that poses the greatest threat.”5 He argues that the level of threat needs to be determined not only in terms of power but also according to three other essential factors: geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.6 As a result, the balance-of-threat perspective makes it possible to distinguish benign from hostile hegemons. For instance, China is perceived in the Asia-Pacific as a menacing actor, whereas the United States, which remains the regional and sole global hegemonic power, inspires confidence among most regional players.7 Various conceptual ideas on security have been developed as alternatives to alliances. Let us mention some specific perspectives, namely, collective, comprehensive, common, and cooperative security, as well as the notion of a security community. The tragedy of World War I led to the emergence of collective security. As its strongest supporter, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson was convinced that this approach to security would provide the means to prevent future conflicts. Collective security was formally integrated in the League of Nations as one of its underlying principles.8 Charles and Clifford Kupchan explain that “under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression.”9 Collective security is regulated by moral and legal justifications and is “predicated upon the notion of all against one.”10 Rather than dependence on individual political and military considerations, collective security leads, in principle after the violation of international obligations, to an immediate and common response by all the participants of a collective security arrangement.11 In practice though, governments have generally opposed or abdicated the obligations associated with the principle of collective security. This has meant that examples of operational collective security are limited and that security has required the active role of a hegemon. The experience of the League of Nations and of the United States during the Gulf War of 1991 should, for instance, be noted. In the Asia-Pacific, there have been no efforts to develop a collective security system. The notion of comprehensive security was first formulated in Japan in the 1970s. It focuses on political, economic, and social problems at different levels of analysis and offers therefore an alternative to traditional concepts of security, which concentrate exclusively on national defense and external military threats. It assumes that broadening the definition of the term itself beyond military issues can enhance security. Comprehensive security has also been recognized by some ASEAN

6

CHAPTER 1

states, primarily Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and has been included in their security doctrines.12 In contrast to the Japanese interpretation of the concept, the approach taken by the ASEAN states has primarily been inward looking. Lizée and Peou explain that ASEAN’s comprehensive approach “is based on the proposition that national security does not only reside in the absence of external military hostility but also in the presence of socio-economic development within national boundaries.”13 The inward-looking approach to domestic regime security and regional stability has been illustrated in the principles of national and regional resilience. The principles, advanced by the New Order in Indonesia, register an ambition to underpin domestic and regional stability with economic and social development. At issue is domestic regime security and consolidation. Unlike collective security, which is based on a collective reaction to aggression, common security seeks primarily to offer an alternative to the use of force.14 This principle, as defined by the 1982 Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the leadership of the late Swedish prime minister Olof Palme, needs to be located in the context of the Cold War. A key factor in common security is the mutual possession of nuclear weapons and the expectation of mutually assured destruction. The Palme report stressed that the nuclear deterrence doctrine led to a balance of terror and was no longer appropriate as a means of avoiding an East-West nuclear conflict. The Palme Commission report called on the adversaries to cooperate in an attempt to maintain stability and peace. Offering common security as an alternative, it argued that the two nuclear sides “must achieve security not against the adversary but together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.”15 The report proposed various criteria for security policies, including that they “should be in the interest of both opponents,” “should be pursued by both opponents together,” and should “favor activities where the possibilities for and advantages of deception are limited.”16 Mikhail Gorbachev and others tried later to introduce the notion of common security to an Asia-Pacific setting. In a speech in Vladivostok in July 1986, Gorbachev called for the creation of an Asia-Pacific equivalent to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was based on the notion of common security and was an outgrowth of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.17 Common security, as defined by the Palme report, has not been applied to the Asia-Pacific, but

SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 7

remains an essential idea for the region. Indeed, its characteristics have strongly influenced the formulation of the concept of cooperative security in the post–Cold War era. The principle of cooperative security is the key concept underlying the emergence of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific in the post–Cold War period. Acharya explains that this principle includes the “rejection of ‘deterrence mind-sets’ associated with great power geopolitics of the Cold War.”18 Discussing its purpose, Dewitt writes: “The intent has been to replace the Cold War security structure . . . with a multilateral process and framework with the following attributes: it must be geared toward reassurance, rather than deterrence; it must at best replace or at least coexist with bilateral alliances; and it must promote both military and nonmilitary security.”19 Cooperative security may be compared to the concept of collective security as embodied in the League of Nations Covenant because it is intended to be comprehensive in membership, with security arrangements obtaining on an intramural basis. The fundamental difference, however, is that unlike collective security, cooperative security lacks the vehicles of economic and military sanctions.20 In fact, it deliberately eschews sanctions. Cooperative security operates through dialogue and seeks to address the climate of international relations rather than tackle specific problems. It relies on the promotion of standard international norms and principles to be adhered to by the various participants. Focusing on reassurance, cooperative security arrangements aim to develop a “habit of dialogue” among the participants and to promote confidence-building and possibly preventive-diplomacy measures. Therefore, although collective security primarily takes a reactive approach to rising sources of unrest, cooperative security focuses on confidence building and a preventive dimension, albeit not through problem solving. Several similarities exist between the notions of common and cooperative security. These include a rejection of deterrence strategies and a broad definition of security that includes military and nonmilitary issues.21 Rejecting the perspective of the security dilemma, cooperative security supports the notion developed in the Palme Commission report that security should be promoted “with others” as opposed to “against others.” Both concepts are inclusive in their understanding of security, implying that they aim to engage all regional players without excluding political and economic systems or adversaries. Yet, predicting a more gradual institutionalization of relations in the Asia-Pacific, cooperative

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security is a more adaptable notion than common security: it favors a more gradual approach to the institutionalization of relations and recognizes the necessity of maintaining, at least at first, existing bilateral alliances. It acknowledges the importance of current “bilateral and balance-of-power arrangements in contributing to regional security and retaining them—indeed, for working with and through them—allowing multilateralism to develop from more ad hoc, and flexible processes until the conditions for institutionalized multilateralism become more favorable.”22 The notion of cooperative security also stresses the importance of flexibility, consensus building, and consultation. Finally, although the notion of common security developed in a context of nuclear weapons, this has not been the case with cooperative security. It is important to discuss the characteristics of cooperative security when applied to multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. The concept, which was first endorsed by the Canadian government in 1990, is based on four central principles.23 First, it assumes that the institutionalization of security relations in the Asia-Pacific will be slow and gradual. Second, the institutionalization of such relations is at first not aimed at replacing existing regional alliances, but rather at coexisting and working with them in the promotion of security. Indeed, cooperative security arrangements can be complementary to the existing security architecture. Ultimately, cooperative security is still expected to replace bilateral alliances and their narrow focus on military security. Third, cooperative security arrangements are based on the principle of inclusiveness, as they aim to promote a “habit of dialogue” among all regional states. Finally, the principle also includes an informal level of diplomacy, referred to as “track-two diplomacy,” which consists of constant communication between academics, nongovernmental organizations, and other nonstate actors in some dialogue with governments through, for example, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Let us conclude this conceptual discussion of security cooperation by introducing the idea of a security community, first discussed by Karl Deutsch in 1957.24 On a security spectrum, this concept may be viewed as at the other end from a military alliance. Deutsch argued that a community could exist not only within the boundaries of a state, but also across states, and that peace and peaceful change could be expected within such international communities. A security community is characterized by the assurance that its members will not resort to violent

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means to resolve their disputes. Moreover, the members do not even prepare to resort to force against other members. Hence, a security community makes the use of force unthinkable, as one observes a complete and long-term convergence of interests between members in the avoidance of war. Security communities do not necessarily entail formal agreements or institutional arrangements. States in a community may not have actively sought its formation or their participation in it, and yet be engaged in one. It is fair to say that Canada and the United States, the Western European nations, and the countries in the Southern Cone of Latin America constitute examples of security communities. The AsiaPacific has not yet evolved into a security community. Evolution of Practices in Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation in the Cold War System of Bilateral Alliances During the Cold War, the San Francisco system or the “hub and spokes” model, grew out of the East-West ideological rivalry and featured a series of strong bilateral security agreements linking the United States to its regional allies. This model of regional security was bilateral, not multilateral, in nature. The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed during the San Francisco Conference in September 1951, was at the core of the “hub and spokes” model. The United States also signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines in August 1951 and with the Republic of Korea in 1954, and pledged to ensure the security of Taiwan through the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and, after the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. All these bilateral alliances were intended to preserve U.S. interests in the region and the defense of its allies by deterring any possible Soviet expansion. This system was based on nuclear deterrence and a zero-sum game between Washington and Moscow. These alliances were examples of bilateral collective defense, as they included the principle of reciprocity. Yet, it was commonly understood that they primarily involved the United States coming to the defense of its East Asian allies in the event of external attack. Multilateral collective defense arrangements were particularly rare

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in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War. Such arrangements were limited to ANZUS—established by a treaty between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, signed in September 1951—and SEATO— created in February 1955 as a result of the Southeast Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of September 1954. The Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA)—whose membership by 1965 included Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand—was replaced in 1971 by a consultative Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA). The latter was not an example of multilateral collective defense, as it was limited to a role of consultation in case of an attack. In contrast to the strategic architecture in the Asia-Pacific, the security environment in Europe was dominated during the Cold War by two opposing and mirroring multilateral collective defense arrangements, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Contrary to its involvement in Europe, the United States feared that a multilateral collective defense system in the Asia-Pacific would undermine its bilateral arrangements while adding very little to its military capabilities in the region. The Soviet Union also did not form a multilateral collective defense system in the Asia-Pacific and focused like the United States on bilateral military agreements, including a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed with Hanoi in November 1978, less than two months before Vietnam invaded Cambodia. ASEAN and the Application of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security to Southeast Asia The emergence of ASEAN in 1967 constituted an important, if subregional, exception to the bilateral approach to security cooperation that characterized the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War. ASEAN adopted a model of security cooperation based on comprehensive and cooperative security.25 The original ASEAN members were anticommunist states that sought regional political stability in order to concentrate on economic development in the interest of domestic regime security. National and regional stability were therefore regarded as indivisible. ASEAN lacked a military aspect and focused instead on confidence building, dialogue, and conflict avoidance rather than dispute resolution. It was not formed as a direct response to an external adversary and never evolved into a formal or a tacit alliance. In the absence of joint military capabilities and a common threat perception, ASEAN could not act as a source

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of countervailing power to contain extramural threats. Not a collective defense arrangement and lacking ideological underpinnings, ASEAN was thus no substitute for the Manila Pact. Nonetheless, the member states developed outside of the ASEAN institutional framework a web of overlapping bilateral collaborations on defense and security issues, known as the “spider web” approach. This involved bilateral collaboration between the national defense forces of the ASEAN six (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei), including the exchange of information, cross-border agreements, training exercises, and naval operations against piracy. The result was a web of overlapping bilateral collaborations that sought primarily to contribute to the development of confidence and trust among the members of ASEAN. The ASEAN states adopted the notion of comprehensive security in the 1970s, as illustrated by the principles of national and regional resilience. The 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord formally proposed the principle of resilience as a common approach to domestic and regional security. At the opening of the Bali summit, President Suharto declared: “Our concept of security is inward-looking, namely to establish an orderly, peaceful, and stable condition within each territory, free from any subversive elements and infiltration, wherever their origins may be.”26 The concept of national resilience had previously entered the ASEAN vocabulary as a translation of an Indonesian term, Ketahanan Nasional.27 Influenced by Indonesia’s struggle for independence and by its socioeconomic vulnerability, the term had been advanced by the new military leadership when it came to power and had been officially endorsed as a national security doctrine in 1973. At a seminar in Jakarta in October 1974, Suharto had stated that national resilience “covers the strengthening of all the component elements in the development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of resilience in the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military fields.”28 Rather than focusing on external military threats, the principle of national resilience favored a nontraditional and inward-looking approach to security, one that sought domestic and regional stability through economic and social development. By improving the living conditions of local populations, the ASEAN leaders expected to check subversive influences.29 The ASEAN leaders also anticipated that resilient states would lead to regional resilience, which would constitute in the longer run a foundation against internal and external threats.30 Suharto had argued in

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October 1974 that if “each member-country develops its own ‘national resilience,’ gradually a ‘regional resilience’ may emerge, i.e., the ability of member-countries to settle jointly their common problems and look after their future and well-being together.”31 This bottom-up approach ostensibly decreased intraregional tensions and vulnerabilities that had facilitated external intervention in the past. One should note therefore the underlying premise of the synergy between national and regional resilience, namely, the indivisibility of national and regional political stability enhancing economic development. In short, the ASEAN states informally adopted the principles of national and regional resilience as a shared security doctrine. This approach was based on the notion that security should be promoted “with others” as opposed to “against others.” In addition to comprehensive security, ASEAN has also been an institutional expression of cooperative security. Although, as we noted, the principle of cooperative security is usually thought to have been born in the post–Cold War world, in fact through ASEAN it has been applied to Southeast Asian security relations for a long time. ASEAN’s greatest accomplishment as a cooperative security arrangement is related to its contribution to conflict avoidance and management. It has operated as an instrument to avoid the outbreak of conflict, and indeed it has reduced the likelihood of regional states using force to resolve disputes. ASEAN has improved the climate of regional relations and has generally succeeded in peacefully containing, rather than addressing or solving, differences between its members. Its approach to conflict avoidance and management has been defined by the absence of concrete confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. Rejecting formal or legal mechanisms, ASEAN has relied on dialogue and consultation, self-restraint, and the principles of national sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states. Security Cooperation in the Post–Cold War Era The Ongoing Relevance of the System of Bilateral Alliances Since the end of the Cold War, neither the United States nor any East Asian power has sought to form a multilateral collective defense arrangement in the Asia-Pacific. Similar to the Cold War era, the model of regional alliances has continued to be bilateral, not multilateral. Since 1991, the strategic architecture has been dominated by bilateral military

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obligations concluded at the height of the Cold War. This was, for instance, demonstrated in July 1993 when U.S. president Bill Clinton visited Japan and South Korea. During his trip, Clinton referred to the development of a “new Pacific community.” On July 7, 1993, he declared in Tokyo that such a community must “rest on the firm and continuing commitment of the United States to maintain its treaty alliances and its forward military presence in Japan and Korea and throughout the region.”32 The maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance was reconfirmed during Clinton’s official visit to Japan in April 1996, when the security treaty was extended into the next century. The United States redefined its alliance with Japan through a joint declaration and subsequent provision for new guidelines. The alliance, however, has also displayed problems and has engendered some opposition in both countries. Some hostility is linked to the U.S. bases located on the island of Okinawa. During the 1990s, bilateral relations were complicated by the rape of a twelve-year-old girl by three U.S. soldiers in Okinawa in September 1995, the high financial costs involved in the alliance, trade disputes, and questions about the need for such a treaty in the post–Cold War world. In addition to the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has remained the cornerstone of U.S. interests in Asia, other defense arrangements have also gone through some changes since the end of the Cold War. Most significantly, the Philippine Senate rejected a new base treaty with the United States in September 1991, leading to a complete U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base by November 1992. At issue were the terms for extending the leases. By then, Clark Air Base had to be closed down, as its operational use had been undermined by the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in June 1991. Despite the U.S. withdrawal, the United States and the Philippines have remained military allies through the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. The United States has also demonstrated its defense commitment to its regional allies. For instance, China’s military exercises in March 1996 to intimidate Taiwan and influence its coming presidential election led to a U.S. deployment of two carrier squadrons to deter further Chinese actions. Except for Singapore and Japan, the East Asian states did not respond publicly to China’s military exercises. The events demonstrated that the Asia-Pacific strategic environment remained dependent on bilateral power relationships, above all that between the United States and China.

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Various Southeast Asian states have continued to depend on bilateral defense relations with the U.S. to ensure their security. Singapore has relied on the United States as a conventional source of countervailing power in the region. Washington reached an agreement with Singapore in November 1990, allowing its air force and navy to use Singapore’s military facilities more extensively. This mitigated the strategic consequences of the U.S. departure from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. Singapore’s decision to accommodate U.S. facilities was not well received in Malaysia and Indonesia at first, but this later changed with the planning of the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines. After 1992, Malaysia and Indonesia were prepared to provide access to the U.S. Navy. A U.S. Navy logistics facility was also transferred in 1992 from Subic Bay to Singapore. In January 1998, the city-state declared that U.S. aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year 2000. Even the Philippines has attempted to lessen the effect of the 1992 U.S. withdrawal. In May 1999 the Philippine Senate ratified a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, initially signed on February 10, 1998, that enabled the resumption of joint military exercises. The Philippine desire to reach a bilateral agreement with Washington only seven years after the American departure was related to the South China Sea dispute. Furthermore, the U.S. strategic involvement in Southeast Asia increased after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The Bush administration deployed around 1,000 soldiers to the southern Philippines in late January 2002 for a period of six months to train, advise, and provide logistical assistance to the Philippine forces combating Abu Sayyaf. The Philippines is the only ASEAN member that has so far welcomed U.S. military troops on its territory since the terror attacks in the United States. Nevertheless, the long-term relevance of bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific can be questioned in the light of a resurgence of unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy and the enormous U.S. preponderance in military might. The coming to power of President George W. Bush in January 2001 led to a new unilateralist foreign policy that was reinforced by the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. Discussing the Bush administration and its attitude to alliances, Leon Fuerth argues that Washington is “deconstructing its alliances.” What “is to be abandoned,” he writes, “is the goal of a world system based on multilateral institutions, underwritten by security alliances anchored and cross-braced

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in the United States.”33 In addition, Washington expects its regional allies to accelerate the transformation of their military forces in order to be able to better contribute to alliance security. Yet, the gap in military technology that separates the United States from its East Asian allies, except for Japan, is widening at an alarming rate. Defense spending in the region is very low in comparison to the U.S. military budget. These growing differences make military cooperation and exercises increasingly difficult. The United States might therefore adopt an increased unilateral approach to security if its regional allies can no longer provide significant practical or military help. In short, the future of bilateral defense arrangements with the United States may be uncertain. The ARF and the Application of Cooperative Security to the Asia-Pacific In addition to bilateral security arrangements, which remain important, new multilateral structures have also emerged in the Asia-Pacific. Some regional specialists and policy makers already suggested at the end of the Cold War that bilateral arrangements would not be sufficient to address a rising regional interdependence and cope with the uncertain security environment in the Asia-Pacific. This led to a variety of proposals to complement bilateral alliances. One idea came from the former Soviet Union and Australia, which proposed, separately, the creation of a new regionwide security institution based on the CSCE model. Canada, through its minister for external affairs, Joe Clark, called for the establishment of a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, which emphasized the retention of bilateral security arrangements while encouraging a gradual process of confidence building and dialogue.34 Most East Asian leaders felt uncomfortable with a European model of cooperation. They did not support an overly structured and complex form of multilateralism, but preferred instead a flexible and informal arrangement whereby the level of institutionalization could be kept to a minimum. Post–Cold War multilateral security cooperation in the AsiaPacific seemed therefore to be dependent on an extension of the ASEAN model to the wider region. ASEAN’s own turn to multilateralism in the wider Asia-Pacific region required the abdication of its own security concept, the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). In essence, ZOPFAN registered a call for regional autonomy and a determination to avoid external intervention. The ASEAN states, led by

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Singapore as chair of its Standing Committee, brought about an increase in multilateral security cooperation by forming the ARF in 1994. The ARF is a multilateral discussion group focusing on dialogue and confidence-building measures as a first step to cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific. The ARF has rejected any form of collective defense. It aims to complement a bilateral approach, which has traditionally relied on military deterrence to preserve a stable security environment. The ARF is the first inclusive security arrangement at the level of the Asia-Pacific. Multilateral discussions are for the first time being held on regional problems and security matters. ASEAN has promoted within the ARF its own practices of self-restraint and consensus building and favored an informal security dialogue over legally binding confidence measures. The ARF helps lessen feelings of suspicion and provides a regional opportunity to discuss different views on security and integrate isolated countries, including North Korea, into the regional security system.35 Significantly, ASEAN has institutionalized a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific despite America’s preference for bilateral structures and China’s suspicion of multilateralism. The discussion group also includes Japan, which has viewed the ARF as supplementary to its alliance with the United States and as a diplomatic tool to increase its relations with South Korea and China. As pointed out by Singapore’s foreign minister S. Jayakumar in 1998, the ARF has thus become “a means of encouraging the evolution of a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations between major powers with interests in the region.”36 The Absence of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific ASEAN and the ARF have not yet evolved into institutional manifestations of a security community, in contrast to NATO in the post–Cold War period, the European Union (EU), and MERCOSUR in the Southern Cone of Latin America. As a diplomatic tool for managing intraregional disputes, ASEAN suffers from shortcomings. It is unable to resolve sources of conflict and is ill equipped to deal with pressing matters or with controversial issues where a clash of interests cannot be avoided. Its member states have never used their own dispute resolution mechanism, the High Council, to settle tensions or latent conflicts. Persisting bilateral disputes have affected ASEAN’s contribution to conflict management.37 The mode of conflict avoidance has also been restricted to the management of interstate tensions. Because of these

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limitations, regional relations have continued to be influenced by feelings of suspicion, competition, and a series of territorial disputes.38 The members maintain national security policies in which other participants are still perceived as potential enemies. Moreover, border clashes between Thailand and Myanmar in early 2001, which led to an extensive exchange of fire, demonstrated that the use of force between member states could not be excluded. Hence, the association should be defined as a security regime rather than as a security community. The ARF should be regarded as the first security regime at the level of the Asia-Pacific rather than as an emerging security community. The influence of the ARF on interstate relations has been limited to the promotion of dialogue and consultation, the implementation of some confidence-building measures, and the fostering of international norms, including the non-use of force. The shortcomings of the ARF with respect to the traditional security flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific—the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea—are clear. The institution is in no position to tackle these issues. The ARF’s involvement in the South China Sea dispute has been minimal and it has failed to make any contribution to the long-term objective of formulating a binding code of conduct for the disputed territories. North Korea only joined the ARF in 2000. However, the ministerial meetings have since then offered opportunities to the United States and North Korea to open a dialogue. Opposing Taipei’s participation in the ARF, the PRC refuses to discuss the Taiwan issue, which it considers a domestic matter. The 1996 events in the Taiwan Strait were also a reminder of the inability of the ARF to confront a major crisis.39 That said, the ARF ministerial meeting in July 1996 succeeded in offering a vehicle for dialogue between the United States and China. Conclusion Security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has continued to be dominated by bilateral alliances between the United States and its regional partners. These arrangements have been key to regional stability. In addition, the Asia-Pacific has seen the emergence of multilateral security structures that have aimed to complement existing bilateral alliances. Security practices in the region have therefore been influenced by military agreements, but also by the notions of comprehensive and cooperative security. Importantly, multilateral arrangements based on these two

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approaches to security have not sought to compete with or replace bilateral alliances and their narrow focus on military security. Nonetheless, the long-term relevance of bilateral military arrangements could be undermined by a resurgence of unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy since the election of President George W. Bush and the enormous U.S. preponderance in military power. Moreover, the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the Bali bombings on October 12, 2002 that killed almost 200 people have to some extent transformed security priorities in the Asia-Pacific. The notion of security “with others” as opposed to “against others” has become particularly relevant again in a post–September 11 context. Conventional alliances that focus on military threats and interstate conflicts are not appropriate to fight transnational terrorism, unless they succeed in the difficult task of partly reinventing themselves by adjusting some of their functions and activities. The war on terrorism and the current U.S. defense policy may therefore increase the importance of other approaches to security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

——— 2 ——— Convergent Security Revisited Reconciling Bilateral and Multilateral Security Approaches

William T. Tow

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the configuration of Asia-Pacific security politics has become increasingly ambiguous. Traditional strategic calculations had evolved around the dominance of American politico-military power in the region, and the George W. Bush administration had come to office determined to reaffirm this precedent. Regional security calculations, however, would now be inevitably affected by the cold fact that the world’s only remaining superpower had been attacked and humiliated on its own soil. The American response to the new international security environment would be global in scope and would engender a myriad of policy challenges and choices for other Asia-Pacific actors, extending well beyond counterterrorist imperatives. Indeed, the fundamental nature of the region’s future security order would be determined by how the U.S. response would take shape and by how other regional actors would react to the evolving American posture.1 American advocates of a “realist” strategy of collective defense have argued that state-centric considerations still must prevail over transregional security threats, such as terrorism, in shaping U.S. strategy. China constitutes a major potential regional security threat based on its alleged propensity to transform its economic growth into greater military power and regional hegemony. North Korea looms as a nuclear “rogue state” that must be tamed before it develops and deploys its own weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in numbers that would destabilize Northeast Asian peace and prosperity. Existing American bilateral alliances, realists argue, should constitute the 19

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framework of containment against current North Korean bellicosity and as a hedge against future Chinese power directed against American strategic interests.2 This “realist” approach seemed to be the one most pursued by the Bush administration prior to September 11. It moved to “revitalize” the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, upgrade military ties with India, and strengthen relations with Taiwan.3 The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001 anticipated that “large-scale military competition” would prevail in Asia and that the United States had to ensure greater access to allies’ ports, airports, and other facilities to project an effective deterrent strategy.4 President Bush’s version of Asian geopolitics was a direct refutation of what he viewed as his predecessor’s flawed endorsement of multilateral security postures during the 1990s. Contesting this “realist” perspective is one that may be labeled broadly as “liberal.” The latter has both American and Asia-Pacific adherents.5 It argues that the long-term value of Asian nation building and multilateralism has never commanded sufficient attention in the United States, and that regional community building, including in China, is the best way to overcome the politics of confrontation in Asia. Liberals posit that the United States cannot be the global or regional “hub” for disparate spokes of an American empire that fails to tolerate or respect diverse cultures and values. The “hubs and spokes” model that liberals accuse the Bush administration of pursuing through unilateralist postures is, in their opinion, misguided because it fails to distinguish other legitimate modes of interaction. It is argued here that what this author has elsewhere termed “convergent security” provides an optimum mix of realist and liberal strategy that the United States and its allies should employ to realize greater stability in the Asia-Pacific region.6 Convergent security incorporates the strengths of both realist and liberal policy prescriptions to achieve effective coexistence in the contemporary Asian security environment. The approach is sufficiently flexible to accommodate many of the imperatives confronting the region’s incumbent governments as their authority and legitimacy are tested by both domestic and transnational security challenges. It acknowledges that security policies predicated on relative gains can sometimes be significantly modified by incentives to cooperate. It simultaneously assigns greater weight than do many liberals to the competitive instincts of regional security actors. It views bilateral security arrangements, whether alliances or other, and more

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informal and crosscutting bilateral security ties, as more than merely “threat-based” mechanisms. By refining bilateral security ties in ways conducive to norm definition and regime building, Asia-Pacific alliances can transform their historical role of safeguarding the exclusive interests of great powers to one more conducive to promoting inclusiveness and to gradually integrating bilateral and multilateral regional security processes. Two caveats qualify the above argument. First, U.S. security elites must be willing to acknowledge, and to accommodate, other AsiaPacific states’ unique concepts of security and community building. In particular, they must work with China to create a system of order for the region that identifies their mutual strategic interests and builds avenues of trust to achieve those interests. Balancing the codification of a Sino-American system of regional security cooperation with continued American interest in cultivating ties with its longstanding regional allies will be difficult and time-consuming. U.S. accommodation with China, while simultaneously networking with its traditional allies, is pragmatic and constructive if support for U.S. interests in the region can be generated with Beijing and reinforced with other regional actors over the long term. The second caveat is equally critical. Convergent security is predicated on the United States, as the de facto hegemon underwriting contemporary international “order,” balancing its projection of material capabilities with nuanced power constraints, in Asia and elsewhere, and applying norms and respecting institutional parameters. American policy makers must demonstrate an understanding of acceptable limits to U.S. power projection. Regional and international order building will need to be viewed in Washington more as a collective enterprise than it has been to date.7 Convergent security provides one such framework for the United States to pursue and refine such an approach. The remainder of this treatise is divided into three sections and a brief conclusion. Initially, it offers a short account of recent developments in bilateral alliance politics in the Asia-Pacific in a post–Cold War context. The second section identifies variants of bilateral collective defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Convergent security is evaluated as a means of reconciling such bilateralism with other forms of regional order building. The chapter concludes by revisiting its central argument and proposing two initial and modest steps for accelerating the implementation of convergent security.

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U.S. Bilateral Security Alliances: Recent Trends Given the strategic preeminence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) during the Cold War, it is easy to overlook the fact that most significant postwar alliances were bilateral. Among these were those in the Asia-Pacific. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty was forged in early 1950, and constituted the world’s most powerful anti-Western coalition for most of the ensuing decade. During and following the Korean War, an American bilateral alliance network to contain communism in Asia was constituted, involving Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and ANZUS (a tripartite pact). Collectively, this group of associations became known as the “San Francisco system.”8 With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, neorealist international security observers promulgated a “common wisdom.” The American postwar global alliance framework in the Asia-Pacific would collapse, it was predicted, because the mutually perceived (communist) threat that it was collectively designed to contain no longer justified its existence.9 This, of course, did not happen. Other factors apart from threat response provided new foundations of alliance: preserving free-market economies in allied states, democratic governance, and related institutional outlooks based on shared sociopolitical contexts. The U.S. Department of Defense maintained in an East Asia Strategy Report released in late November 1998 that a U.S. forward-deployed military presence in the Asia-Pacific allowed the United States to stay “actively engaged” in and contribute to “constructive political, economic and military development within that region’s diverse environment.”10 More recently, the U.S. policy planners have added counterterrorism as an integral component of their Asia-Pacific strategy and have justified upgraded intelligence and logistical cooperation with regional allies as part of a more general American strategy for the pursuit of a stable and prosperous international community.11 It is clear that bilateral alliance politics in the Asia-Pacific today represent more than a narrow threat-response approach, encompassing cooperation and confidence building based on “shared socio-politico contexts.”12 This author has elsewhere characterized this broader pattern of collective defense—embracing both cooperative and competitive aspects—as “alliance mutuality.” The elements of alliance mutuality include a common desire to defuse regional security crises and to underwrite continued prosperity. They acknowledge the role of power in achieving these objectives by ac-

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ceptance of a “benign hegemon’s alliance leadership and because of allied determination to preclude the rise of a hostile regional hegemon.”13 In the Asia-Pacific, the combined membership of the San Francisco system, led by America, is a typical example of alliance mutuality. Alliance mutuality challenges the traditional realist “hub and spokes” model that Washington devised during the postwar era to utilize its force presence in the Asia-Pacific. Even with the demise of the Cold War, the first Bush administration resisted calls that the United States endorse and participate in regional multilateral security initiatives. It insisted that America had to remain the Asia-Pacific’s “regional balancing wheel” and that Washington needed to apply “cooperative vigilance” to manage its bilateral alliances in the region, striking a judicious balance between its burden-sharing expectations of security partners and maintenance of its forward regional force presence.14 Little has changed in U.S. alliance strategy toward the region since that time.15 Although forced by domestic political trends in the Philippines to withdraw from its key bases in that country, and compelled by congressional oversight to reduce its regional presence to permit waging of two-theater wars “almost simultaneously,” the United States has retained an Asia-Pacific forward military presence of 100,000 and most of its other regional basing operations. After an initial flirtation during the early 1990s with shifting its regional diplomatic strategy to one strongly supporting multilateral security in Asia, the Clinton administration gradually reverted to a more traditional bilateral posture. This followed criticisms by Asian observers of initial efforts by that administration to impose a “missionary approach” of narrow human rights agendas as a precondition for American participation in regional multilateral initiatives such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).16 During 1996, President Clinton visited all five Asia-Pacific bilateral allied countries (Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia) and reaffirmed the relevance of each alliance. The hubs and spokes strategy thus remained the key focus of American strategic thinking when the administration released an East Asian Strategy Report two years later (November 1998): “Foremost, the U.S. will continue to strengthen its strategic partnerships with allies, which serve as important pillars from which to address regional political and military challenges. All of our alliance relationships promise to expand both in scope and degree in coming years to encompass more comprehensive concepts of security cooperation.”17

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Contemporary Variants of Bilateral Collective Defense Beneath such doctrinal rhetoric, however, serious questions were being raised by the mid-1990s among various sectors of the American policymaking community, and by independent observers, about U.S. bilateral strategy. The United States Pacific Command (PACOM), invested with the task of interrelating with Asia-Pacific military and political elites, in particular began to reassess how the region’s diverse mixture of geography, culture, economics, and politics correlated with traditional U.S. power-balancing rationales. Enriched Bilateralism By the end of Clinton’s presidency this reassessment had crystallized into what PACOM described as “enriched bilateralism”: enhanced policy consultation and coordination with regional allies over a “full range” of American security interests, “going beyond those that affect only bilateral arrangements.”18 Because it emphasized policy collaboration over power balancing, enriched bilateralism contrasted sharply with the traditional realist calculus that had underwritten the San Francisco system for nearly half a century. It challenged the importance of hegemonic management of regional security as opposed to community building on the part of those who shared similar norms and policy visions. It also allowed for institutionalized policy consultations beyond traditional parameters of mutual interest (with the United States usually determining for its other ally where those parameters lie) if the policy problem under discussion affected more than just one ally. The “Perry process” of trilateral coordination with Japan and South Korea on the security of the Korean Peninsula, for example, led to PACOM spearheading the creation of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), which first met in Honolulu during April 1999. PACOM adopted a view similar to (but not identical with) the “security community” faction of international relations. Initially founded by Karl Deutsch as a prescription for postwar European integration, security community initiatives have been launched in the contemporary AsiaPacific.19 In 1991, Japanese foreign minister Nakayama Taro proposed a formal security dialogue between great powers and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).20 His Australian and Canadian counterparts, Gareth Evans and Joe Clark, also proposed variants of an Asian

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“collective security organization” equivalent to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Such an organization, they insisted, must be predicated on mechanisms for dialogue and identity building rather than merely administrating punishment for acts of aggression.21 Independent analysts have since developed the concept with a greater sensitivity to Asian preferences for informal dialogue mechanisms.22 The basic elements of a security community, nevertheless, appeared to fit the Asia-Pacific’s security goals: (1) the absence of war or preparations for war, (2) a long-term convergence of interests among community members, and (3) a sense of collective identity.23 PACOM visualized the gradual evolution of existing Asia-Pacific bilateral collective defense alliances into a formal network postulating regional peace and stability as those conditions are interpreted by Washington.24 Such a process had been anticipated by security community theorists. They had asserted that “advance alliances” can be transformed into security communities and that alliances can exist within a security community.25 Extreme Bilateralism As noted previously, this was not a worldview embraced by the George W. Bush administration when it came to office in January 2001. Key Bush advisers dismissed the need to negotiate with other states over norms and values different from those entertained by America and argued that American dominance in a global balance of power was the only real foreign policy choice.26 In this context, it supported an alliance posture that has been characterized as extreme bilateralism. This posture largely disdains multilateral security institutions and assigns decisive geopolitical weight only to great powers. It assumes that America’s “real” security partners in Asia—its traditional security allies—needed to be cultivated more while strategic competitors such as China and North Korea needed to be checked or deterred rather than coddled. A second Bush administration, Republican spokespersons warned, must “proceed from the firm ground of national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community.”27 Bilateralism was once more postulated as a threat-oriented strategy. Within this framework, America’s bilateral alliances in Asia were to be “reinvigorated.” The so-called Armitage-Nye report, released in October 2000, asserted that President Clinton had ignored the U.S.-Japan

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alliance in favor of evolving Sino-American ties.28 This was a misguided strategy, it argued, because China is fundamentally hostile to U.S. power and interests. Although advertised as bipartisan, analysts such as Richard Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, Torkel Patterson, and James Kelly, who largely wrote the report, all became key policy officials in the new Bush administration. The new administration’s threat-centric view of Asia was tested early by South Korea, one of its oldest Asian allies. Although regarding North Korea with extreme mistrust, President Bush swallowed hard and praised visiting South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” of détente with the North during the latter’s visit to Washington in March 2001. To compensate for Kim’s liberal and incremental approach to Pyongyang, however, the Bush administration advocated a more “comprehensive approach” to North Korean policy. Acknowledging the need for the United States to enter into dialogue with the DPRK, it nevertheless demanded that Pyongyang implement tangible measures of its own to reduce its massive conventional forces deployed near the Korean DMZ, reinforce its commitment to WMD nonproliferation, and otherwise modify its behavior and capabilities regarded as most threatening to security on the peninsula.29 Subsequent developments unfortunately intensified tensions, as President Bush lumped North Korea into his infamous “axis of evil” 2002 state of the union address and North Korea allegedly admitted to violating the Agreed Framework by covertly sustaining nuclear weapons production capabilities. The widening gulf between American hard-line perceptions and a continued South Korean desire to preserve the Sunshine Policy as the best means for avoiding war with the North is now severely testing U.S.–South Korean alliance relations. Continued moderation in South Korean policies toward the North contrast sharply with the Bush administration’s recent endorsement of U.S. preemptive military strikes against states or parties that are deemed to pose imminent WMD threats to the American homeland or American forces deployed abroad.30 The North Koreans interpreted this new American posture as nothing less than a justification to attack their country.31 America’s bilateral alliances with Thailand and the Philippines were slated for upgrading, with focus on joint military exercises in key sea lanes of communication prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks and on greater counterterrorism interaction in its aftermath.32 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

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visited Australia in July 2001 and discussed ways to institute closer dialogue between Australia, Japan, and the United States. Neither endorsed the ideas of an Australian-Japanese-American trilateral alliance or that of an “Asian NATO” that some Bush supporters had proposed.33 Both asserted that Australia and other U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific confronted new threats and challenges, ranging from WMD proliferation to China’s uncertain transition to great-power status, that would require more comprehensive alliance coordination.34 Extended and Expansive Bilateralism Although the Bush administration generally embraced exclusive bilateralism as a response to what it perceived to be growing regional threats, an element of ambiguity still remained in its approach to Asia-Pacific security. Both the National Security Strategy and a sweeping Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001, released almost immediately following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, incorporated dimensions of what might be termed extended bilateralism.35 Unlike exclusive bilateralism, extended bilateralism envisions bilateral alliances still playing the key role in regional security but supplemented or “extended” by multilateral mechanisms.36 The National Security Strategy and QDR 2001 signaled an evident shift from the American hub expecting strategic compliance from regional spokes to one more sensitive to the value of allied support, and even to occasional independent security initiatives when U.S. and regional allied interests and norms coincided. Both implicitly recognized that U.S. power and influence could be facilitated in selected instances by various forms of multilateral cooperation. By way of example, the National Security Strategy was most noticed for its adjustment of American strategy from nuclear deterrence to increased reliance on anticipating and preempting nuclear threats.37 Yet it also had something to say about Washington’s conduct of alliance politics in an era of intensifying globalization. It presented alliance cooperation in this context as entailing two main components: (1) coordinating antiterrorist measures, and (2) defusing regional conflicts. Asia-Pacific allies were asked to help disrupt the financing of terrorism, to neutralize terrorist capabilities by building up their military and economic assets, and to isolate terrorism by delegitimizing the politico-economic grievances that spawn it.38 This strategy coincides with PACOM’s recently increased emphasis on “nation building” programs (advertised as part

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of “enriched bilateralism”) and with U.S. support for allied participation (or even leadership) in peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian intervention operations. Significantly, every American bilateral ally in Asia was commended for the role it played in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.39 The QDR described an “East Asian littoral” as part of a U.S. global posture sustaining the forward deployment of U.S. forces, but reorganizing those forces to ensure mobility and preparedness for a broad spectrum of conflict prototypes and lethality. The Bush administration’s exclusive bilateralist emphasis, however, emerged in this report with an accent on power balancing and on allied burden sharing, including U.S. expectations that allies will bear a share of costs for the development of new weapons technologies and the logistics to support them in return for retaining American power in the region. Simultaneously, however, the QDR recognized that the contemporary geopolitical setting is increasingly “complex and unpredictable,” requiring active U.S. security cooperation with allies and other friendly nations as part of a broader American strategy directed toward maintaining regional and global stability. Successful balancing and alliance management were now viewed to be processes directed toward finding “common cause to shape the strategic landscape [and] protect shared interests.”40 This approach represents a patent departure from the hub-and-spokes philosophy traditionally endorsed by most American policy planners. It also hedges against any American presumption that China is moving inevitably toward becoming a “peer competitor” of the United States in this more complex Asian power configuration. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has instead characterized China’s emerging identity as that of a “transitional” strategic actor that may eventually become either a strategic collaborator or competitor of the United States.41 Whither Convergent Security? Convergent security postulates that, to achieve regional stability, regional powers must guarantee, and smaller powers must help shape, a system based on both bilateral and multilateral institutions. It envisions great powers working consistently and systematically with each other and with weaker Asian states to reconcile the ambiguities and tensions inherent in the postwar bilateral system with emerging regional multilateral approaches. This vision resembles more a benign hierarchy than a pure

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security community. It challenges the neorealist argument that hegemony cannot be benign. It falls short of concert by conceding influence in, and at least limited management of, such a system to large and small powers alike. Convergent security’s viability can be challenged by arguing that it would be extremely difficult for policy leaders to know when and on what specific issues bilateralism should be prioritized over multilateralism or vice versa. A common observation anticipates possible future tensions between bilateralism and multilateralism should the Asia-Pacific region’s growing familiarity with multilateralism undermine support for alliances. Convergent security would be in trouble, for example, if China were to adopt more cooperative postures toward ASEAN regarding the Spratly Islands dispute, on free trade politics, and on other aspects of its relations with ASEAN, thus undercutting the San Francisco system and targeting American strategic power and influence in the region. Such a Machiavellian Chinese posture would diverge from, rather than support, convergent security’s prescription that great powers must cooperate to modify regional tensions and to strengthen regional norms. To some observers, convergent security’s “top-down” approach to security management is less preferable than reliance on “bottom-up” community building.42 Current Sino-American policy coordination within a broadly international antiterrorist coalition, and evident agreement by Washington and Beijing over the need to check the North Korean nuclear threat, generates optimism, however, that the Asia-Pacific’s two dominant powers can overcome their strategic rivalry if they are confronted by a sufficiently compelling mutual threat. On the heels of the September 11 attacks, the PRC helped write two sweeping antiterrorist resolutions in the UN Security Council and focused on this issue during the APEC summit it hosted in Shanghai during 2001. Although differing with the United States over the latter country’s resistance to engage in direct bilateral negotiations with North Korea during the nuclear dispute between Pyongyang and Washington in late 2003 and early 2004, Beijing nevertheless quietly exerted influence over the DPRK to observe at least tacit limits in its provocations and propaganda. Both China and America have an immense stake in maintaining a sovereigntyoriented international system and both fear that rogue states, radical ethnic or religious movements, or other transregional forces could undermine it. The emergence of many less-powerful challengers in Asia and beyond could eventually undermine these two nation-states’

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own geopolitical preeminence by forcing them to deal with a multiplicity of smaller and possibly unstable actors. The policy test for merging bilateralism with multilateralism to realize better security outcomes involves the ability to utilize the most effective attributes of collective defense, collective security, and security-community building to forge a security hybrid.43 Both large and small powers must endorse this approach and play an active role in its pursuit to operationalize the convergent security vision. China and the United States must therefore concur on what constitutes their “mutual stake.” They must be seen to be working together to convince other regional actors that any such Sino-American consensus is sensitive to their own apprehensions, interests, and aspirations. Skeptics readily dismiss the ability of Chinese and American policy makers to identify, let alone to implement, any such modus operandi. This assessment, however, may be premature if specific preconditions around which convergent security must evolve can be fulfilled. Moving from bilateral security strategy to the community building that convergent security advocates regard as the preferred outcome will hinge on a determination by both China and the United States to clearly define and emphasize their mutual strategic interests. China will need to convince U.S. policy makers, for example, that its “new security concept” (NSC) is a means to move the region toward multilateral security cooperation and is not a mere updated version of the “Asian collective security” framework proposed by the Soviet Union over thirty years ago to neutralize American regional power. As it has been posited by the Chinese to date, NSC is predicated on the idea that bilateral alliances are relics of the Cold War and unnecessarily polarize the region into pro-American and nonaligned camps.44 Similarly, the United States and its regional allies will need to focus on those aspects of the San Francisco system that actually work in China’s interest, rather than advertising America’s Pacific alliances as instruments to reinforce American military and economic supremacy or to contain the PRC.45 Reaching the commensurate levels of trust needed for convergent security to emerge is difficult, but by no means unattainable. A framework already exists for pursuing regional trust building if the San Francisco system becomes increasingly perceived and is advertised as a potentially regionwide forum to complement the ARF and APEC as a basis for building a uniquely Asia-Pacific (not just “Asian”) security regime. Trust building in Asia, however, ultimately depends on China coming to

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terms with American power there in non-zero-sum terms.46 If and when the Chinese reach such a conclusion, the context will exist for a trustbased realist-liberal policy amalgam to begin shaping an order-oriented— rather than threat-oriented—Asia-Pacific security environment. Convergent security is a more fluid approach to order building than, say, an Asian great power concert.47 Unlike a concert arrangement, it does not assume that Chinese, Russian, Japanese, and American interests will likely ever coincide to the point where full top-down management of regional security will be effective. It does envision that trust building and discriminate engagement can lead to sufficient great power policy convergence on fundamental strategic interests that strategic leadership in the region can be developed and maintained. It also anticipates that U.S. allied regional powers such as Japan and Australia can spearhead a process, within the existing American network of alliance spokes, that will gradually reach a modus vivendi with ASEAN and even Chinese societies as they become more developed economically and more pluralistic politically. This outcome would achieve the vision that convergent security holds out for Asia: “a broad policy of strategic engagement . . . consolidating the political and economic liberalization of late 20th-century Asia . . . while guarding against [regional] fragmentation and collapse.”48 The U.S. “comprehensive power” and sense of policy pragmatism constitutes the realist component of this approach; its promotion of gradual democratization and prosperity in “key transition states” such as China and Indonesia comprises the liberal element. Conclusion The contemporary international strategic environment is a historic opportunity for the United States and other Asia-Pacific actors. The global antiterrorist campaign represents a positive foundation for exploiting this opportunity. Reconciling competing state-centric interests and norms remains central to future regional stability and prosperity. Convergent security offers one means for regional policy makers to reconcile and strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral infrastructures as complementary instruments for consultation, long-term politico-diplomatic engagement, and military cooperation. It is a superior approach to other commonly proposed models such as collective defense, concert, and community building because it incorporates the best parts of these other approaches

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into a concrete and gradual blueprint that accommodates the diverse interests and values of the various Asia-Pacific entities. Two measures—one symbolic and one practical—can be initiated as preliminary steps to implement an Asia-Pacific convergent security approach. Symbolically, the United States and its five treaty allies in the region could issue a statement similar to recent NATO summit declarations that have described collective security and, ultimately, community building as the long-term objectives of continued alliance collaboration. This statement of Asia-Pacific alliance orientation would not foreclose collective defense in instances of regional aggression. Nor would a continuing American power-balancing role be discarded. It would, however, demonstrate an increased American openness to exploring alternative approaches to regional security, modifying the uncompromising image of the hubs and spokes raison d’être that has dominated American strategic thinking and realist behavior in the region for over half a century. It could also provide fresh impetus for the ARF to become a more central and significant forum for defining and shaping regional security norms that go beyond mere rhetoric. PACOM’s “enriched bilateralism” could be applied creatively and productively. At a more pragmatic level, China and the United States can work together more systematically to promote weak-state security in the region. They can support institutionalist solutions to specific irredentist, territorial, and asymmetrical security problems now confronting Southeast Asian polities such as Indonesia and the Philippines and remaining as barriers to closer ties among the two Koreas and Japan. Such an institutionalism, supported by both America and China, is not synonymous with collective security; the latter envisions a joint response to specific acts of aggression, whereas the former is more about the norm creation and consensus building needed to overcome the various threats that dominate the Asia-Pacific landscape. Ultimately, it remains for the United States and China to collaborate in bringing the promise of convergent security to fruition. Both these powers must demonstrate the will and capacity to transcend their own unique national security ethos, and to lead, but genuinely share, the management of regional security with other states in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. This is, of course, the traditional argument that underpins institutionalism— that security can ultimately be only a shared commodity. In the case of Asian security politics, convergent security may be the best approach available to reconcile the imperfections of both bilateralism and multilateralism and to achieve a more stable and enduring Asia-Pacific security order.

——— 3 ——— Accelerating the Evolutionary Process of Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific An Australian Perspective

Ron Huisken

This chapter addresses the notion of balance among the various tools available, or potentially available, to the states of the Asia-Pacific to meet a common interest, namely a robustly stable security environment. The Australian experience is illustrative. Over the past quarter of a century, Australia made significant progress toward a more diversified or balanced portfolio of instruments to provide for its security. To the core instruments of the national defense force and the alliance with the United States, it added a progressive transformation in its relations with the states of Southeast Asia, recasting these neighbors from vague security concerns to strategic assets. More recently, in the 1990s, it was among the most active, ambitious, and optimistic proponents of developing a culture of cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region, especially through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This portfolio of instruments is still in place. A new government and changed regional circumstances—notably the Asian economic crisis and the political fallout from East Timor—resulted in some important adjustments to the balance of the portfolio. More emphasis was placed on the alliance with the United States relative to regional engagement and the development of multilateral security processes. This experience has not been unique to Australia. The region as a whole could be regarded as on the cusp of a critical strategic choice. That choice is whether to respond to security concerns predominantly through the traditional means 33

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of an enhanced defense effort and strengthening alliances or aspire consciously to a more balanced portfolio through the development of multilateral security processes sufficiently potent to credibly share the burden with these traditional instruments. The latter choice is both sensible and viable. Strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Cold War have already exposed the limitations of the traditional instruments in coping reliably with the longerterm challenges to regional stability. This has been reinforced by the daunting challenge thrown down by international terrorism. As states have more fully absorbed the unique characteristics and complexities of this challenge it is clear that many, Australia included, wished that more robust and reliable multilateral security processes were in place. Investing in Security: A Balanced Portfolio for the Asia-Pacific? This characterization of the issue prompts three questions. Why have multilateral security processes not developed further in the Asia-Pacific? Does this really matter? And finally, if it does matter, what can be done about it? Why Have Multilateral Security Processes Languished? History in East Asia is almost uniquely long. In the context of this broader history, to inquire into the history of the contribution that multilateral arrangements have made to regional order is almost an oxymoron. There is no such history. The architecture of regional security, such as it was, has always been elegantly simple: hegemonic. For millennia the hegemon was China. Some contend that the long experience with this state of affairs generated an instinctive deference toward China and some discomfit even today with arrangements that would challenge this “familiar” hierarchy.1 Japan briefly challenged this system in the first half of the twentieth century. At around four decades, Japan’s period at the helm can only be described as transient, even though its legacy continues to shape the political and security environment to this day. The prevailing construct for regional security is underpinned by the United States through its several bilateral alliances with states throughout the Asia-Pacific. This is often depicted as a so-called hub and spokes architecture for regional security. Since 1950, Washington has signaled

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its commitment to regional stability through its formal security obligations to Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and (until 1987) New Zealand. These obligations have been given substance through the forward stationing and/or deployment of substantial ground, sea, and air forces throughout the region, but predominantly in the Northeast. Over the years, many have been struck by the skeletal character of the postwar security architecture in Asia compared to the arrangements that were put in place in Europe, namely, NATO. Moreover, since these formative steps were taken, the contrast between Asia and Europe in terms of institutionalizing interdependence became even starker with the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and with the progressive development of what is now the European Union. As this contrast has been the subject of a great deal of analysis and debate we can content ourselves with a few general observations. History provides a big clue. The fact that multilateralism has been essentially a blank space in the Asia-Pacific cannot be an accident. The reasons for it must be compelling and, in significant measure, enduring. Observers have noted that Asia is distinctive (particularly from Europe) in being geographically vast, ethnically and culturally diverse, and, with China, sharply skewed in terms of the distribution of strategic weight. It could be said that the combination of motive and opportunity to develop collective approaches to the management of regional affairs never arose, not even the informal or indirect multilateralism that could be said to characterize arrangements like a balance of power or a concert of powers. In the decades since the Second World War, rampant technological change gradually attenuated the characteristics that had so effectively precluded the development of collaborative attitudes in the Asia-Pacific. The region became a more compact arena. International trade and flows of capital and technology flourished. The opportunity costs of resisting economic interdependence became increasingly unbearable, even to China that had prized autonomy for millennia. Huge advances in communications and transportation brought distant nations eyeball to eyeball, whether they liked it or not. And prodigious advances in the mobility, range, and firepower of weaponry meant that even distant nations could signal reservations about one another with great clarity. Today, the security interests and concerns of Asia-Pacific states are shaped predominantly by other states in the region.

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To a significant extent, therefore, modernity had qualified the characteristics of the Asia-Pacific that had made multilateralism irrelevant. The Cold War, however, allowed the region’s states to defer absorbing the full consequences of these developments, including accepting responsibility for the management of these consequences. The end of the Cold War was therefore as much of a shock in Asia as in Europe, notwithstanding the outward inscrutability for which most cultures in Asia are renown. This sense of shock was perhaps particularly strong in the arena of security. The primary purpose of this U.S.-based security system in the Asia-Pacific was to contain and deter, or to insulate the region from, a potential external threat, namely, the Soviet Union. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the challenges to regional strategic order switched from external to internal. By the time the Cold War ended, the process of economic transformation in the Asia-Pacific had already achieved impressive momentum. An Asia-Pacific in full flight economically was abruptly confronted with an end to the political and strategic rigidities (and the stability) of the Cold War. In a manner of speaking, the playing field quite suddenly became more level, and consequently some of the main rules of the game had been repealed. To persist with this metaphor, the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War has been wrestling with issues like: Does the game need new rules? How should these rules be created? And even, to some extent, who are the players? Does It Matter? The end of the Cold War was quick, decisive, and quite unexpected. The post–Cold War era was therefore a “come as you are” party. The AsiaPacific turned up at the party in what many considered to be rather daring attire: a thin network of bilateral alliances with the United States; a Washington visibly uncertain about the sort of role it wanted to play in the new era; and a new, tentative forum for the multilateral discussion of trade and economic issues, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). After a few years, with the establishment of the ARF in 1994, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proffered some prospective additional protection from the elements through developing the attitudes and practices of cooperative security.2 The question now (and always) is whether we are on the right track. Are the arrangements currently in place to protect and strengthen re-

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gional security adequate to the task? Can we look forward with confidence to a region in which shared interests and expectations yield a strengthening presumption against the use of force, and a growing contentment with a balance of military power that precludes expectations of advantage from the use of force? My own view is that we do not have grounds for much confidence, and that the tools at our disposal for the management of regional security are not coping well with the challenges that confront us. It is certainly important to retain a sense of perspective. Even if we define the Asia-Pacific broadly as the huge triangle extending from Japan in the north, the subcontinent in the west, and Australia in the south, it is a region essentially devoid of interstate conflict, and has been so for some considerable time.3 The absence of war, however, is a decidedly minimalist criterion for regional security. We must—and to an extent we do—set our sights much higher, toward a process of deepening political and strategic accommodation, and toward shifting national postures further away from hedging and deterrence and closer to reassurance and collaboration. Against this more ambitious agenda, I would argue that we are not coping particularly well. Indeed, on what I regard as the elemental issue for the security of the Asia-Pacific—an enduring accommodation between the United States, China, and Japan—a lot of ground has been lost. I have set out the basis for this assessment elsewhere.4 It is by no means a lonely or particularly original position among academic observers, so I will not rehearse the arguments here. What is more relevant to the theme of this book is that many governments share this concern and have been exploring ways to make the regional security architecture more robust. What Can Be Done About It? Although the balance between the various instruments available to enhance regional security—bilateral relations, alliances, defense efforts, and multilateral processes—is never static, it does appear that a rather significant shift has been under way in recent years. For some governments, the developments of the recent past and expectations for the future point to the need to strengthen alliances and to begin to develop linkages between them. It is appropriate, therefore, to look a little more closely into the role that alliances have played and continue to play in the region.

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Alliances For more than 50 years, the several U.S. bilateral alliance relationships with states in the Asia-Pacific have constituted the core of the regional security system. These two characteristics—familiarity and their bilateral character—reduce the weight of these arrangements and are a considerable asset in the task of positioning the alliances in the transition to a broader security regime focused on the distinctive contemporary challenges to security. In addition, the end of the Cold War and of the defining threat from the Soviet Union had, to varying degrees, an important influence on the character of alliance relationships, including those in the Asia-Pacific. An alliance not facing a clear and present danger will lose some focus and intensity as political and economic factors compete more equally with security and defense considerations. In these circumstances, parties to an alliance have to accept a greater potential for positions to diverge, even on important issues. The absence of a defining threat also tends to mean that the range of contingencies that could potentially invoke alliance obligations will become broader and more varied in their origins, the issues or principles at stake, the countries involved, and the possible ramifications. All parties, but especially the alliance leader, have an interest in recalibrating their security obligations to fit the less acute but more varied threats that move into prominence when the major threat evaporates. Further, the post–Cold War political environment encouraged states to build deeper bilateral relationships across a wider front, thereby tending to make alliance relationships less distinctive. These several, and related, tendencies—all of which have been visible in the alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific—also contributed to making these arrangements somewhat softer or less prominent.5 There are, however, pressures pushing in the other direction. In the absence of the global ideological contest, the United States, initially at least, looked upon alliances rather more pragmatically. As indicated above, it looked more closely at the risks they posed in terms of unwanted entanglements. It looked more closely at whether allies were pulling their weight in providing for their own security rather than leaning on America. And it looked more closely into what allies could bring to the table in the form of concrete, reliable services of benefit to U.S. interests. It must also be noted that alliances are invariably forged in what are perceived as crisis points in international affairs, when there is a big

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“them” out there that threatens “us.” Alliances are fundamentally about enhancing the capacity to deter and, if necessary, to defeat aggression.6 Alliances, in other words, are to an extent inherently defensive of a particular order, a characteristic that runs counter to the inculcation of more inclusive approaches to security. In the Asia-Pacific, these various pressures on the character of alliance relationships played into the core issue of accommodating a new major power, China, into the regional order. Alliances, especially the U.S.-Japan alliance, have never been far from the center of the turbulence that has characterized the U.S.-China and Japan-China relationships over the post–Cold War period. The several bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific are not, in my view, inherently incompatible with more inclusive approaches to addressing security interests and concerns.7 It is plain, however, that achieving compatibility will not happen easily or automatically: alliances need to be the subject of thoughtful management and careful diplomacy. China’s Perspective on U.S. Alliances Over the course of the Cold War, China’s official position on the U.S. alliances fluctuated with its assessment of trends in the balance of power between East and West, and on where it considered itself to be positioned in this contest at any particular time.8 Even so, China’s position ranged from hostility to relatively warm acquiescence: it tended to stop well short of positive support. In Beijing’s eyes, the end of the Cold War deprived contemporary alliances of their primary strategic and intellectual justification, rendering them conceptually obsolete.9 Obsolescence, however, did not translate into opposition, at least not immediately. The U.S.-Japan alliance had always been special in having a second rationale that constitutes a compelling common interest between the United States and China (and most other states in the Asia-Pacific). This rationale, of course, is to backstop the profound changes within Japan following its defeat in World War II by obviating any need for Japan to aspire to a comprehensive independent capability to provide for its security.10 The months leading up to the U.S.-Japan security declaration in April 1996 constituted something of a watershed. Beijing appears to have emerged from this turbulent period with the view that the U.S.-Japan alliance had transitioned from a valuable cap to a springboard for Japan’s

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reemergence as a major military power.11 Such a reassessment would, inescapably, have involved further key judgments. For one, it removed the last good reason for China to be at least tolerant of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific. For another, it strengthened the view that Washington and Tokyo may themselves have crossed a Rubicon in the sense of coming down more firmly in favor of deterrence and containment over reassurance and engagement as a means of coping with the rise of China. The years that followed brought further shocks to China’s relations with both America and Japan. The more prominent of these included Japan’s new guidelines on defense cooperation with the United States (1997); the U.S. commitment to deploy “limited” ballistic missile defenses against the threat from “rogue” states (1999); and the U.S. decision to bypass the Chinese and Russian vetoes in the UN Security Council, and (with NATO) use force to compel the former Republic of Yugoslavia to desist from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (1999). With the arrival of the Bush administration, many of these undercurrents became overt policy settings. China’s importance to Washington was consciously downgraded. Alliance relationships (most particularly with Japan) were promoted. Washington struggled to find a more diplomatic phrase to capture its posture toward China than the “strategic competitor” label that had been used in the election campaign. The policy of “strategic ambiguity” designed to keep both Beijing and Taipei honest by keeping them guessing was replaced by a presidential declaration that America would do “whatever it takes” to prevent a change in the status quo by force. Over the past six or seven years, China’s worldview has become increasingly pessimistic as its two most critical relationships—with the United States and Japan—deteriorated. And they deteriorated together in large measure because of the alliance between them. U.S. foreign policy was seen as increasingly skewed toward security and military considerations, and Japan was perceived as accelerating its transition from a contained junior partner in the alliance to a fully fledged major power. Yu Bin observed in his 1999 paper that communications had effectively broken down: “No matter what China says, Washington and Tokyo are bound to strengthen their relationship; no matter what assurance is given by American and Japanese officials, China remains skeptical.”12 The strong preference to perpetuate the Cold War alliances in the Asia-Pacific, and the varied activities within

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them to make them more effective and relevant to contemporary circumstances, have clearly been central features of the ongoing transformation following the end of the Cold War. And even though these alliances are fifty years old, the issue of the contribution they are or should be making to regional security has been the source of significant and growing division. If this is true of arrangements that are part of the regional furniture, it follows that we have to be particularly careful and thoughtful about developments that could be seen as a potentially significant refurnishing of the regional house. One such development was the proposal that emerged from the Australia-U.S. ministerial (AUSMIN) talks in Canberra in July 2001 for a new dialogue forum on regional security among Australia, the United States, and Japan. (In some initial press reports, South Korea was also a potential participant.)13 The initiative surfaced prematurely, with ministers, particularly the Australian foreign minister, obliged to insist that no significant new piece of regional security architecture, let alone a Pacific counterpart to NATO, was intended. Press reporting, of course, took precisely the opposite tack, and forecasted a sharp reaction from Beijing (which, in the event, was measured but decidedly cool). The first meeting of this new trilateral group (South Korea, it seems, was never part of the plan) took place in Tokyo in August 2002 at a senior official level (Australia: secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; United States: deputy secretary of state; Japan: vice minister of foreign affairs).14 Prior to the talks, Australia’s foreign minister formally briefed China’s ambassador to Canberra, presumably to reiterate that the new forum was not directed at China. Nor should the forum be seen as the precursor to defense linkages that might be of concern. The minister and senior officials also put out the broader message that the defining axis of the new forum was Australia-Japan and Australia’s interest in being an integral part of Japan’s development into a more substantive player in the regional security scene.15 The controversy in the media in 2001 over the new forum was typically short-lived. And China appears not to have reacted to the first meeting. It is doubtful, however, that Beijing has accepted that this is a development of little consequence. And it would be naïve on Australia’s part to assume that some public and proactive diplomacy had succeeded in delivering such an outcome. A major reason for the dilemma is that maneuvering the Pacific allies toward starting on the long road to being able to conduct combined military operations has been on the U.S. (par-

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ticularly Republican) agenda for some time. The studies advocating such a course are all premised—directly or implicitly—on coping with a rising China in a turbulent Asia-Pacific.16 And many of the authors of these studies have joined the Bush administration, some in influential positions. Beijing will not easily be dissuaded from the suspicion that the new forum will prove to be the first step toward linking America’s several bilateral alliances in the region. These observations support two conclusions. First, alliances have been integral to the systemic decline in major power relationships in the AsiaPacific. Alliances are an entrenched and valued feature of the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific. Few states in the region wish to contemplate a future without the constraints and boundaries generated by these arrangements. But locating alliances that are themselves evolving securely in a profoundly dynamic regional system of power and influence is proving to be very difficult. Analysts on all sides can argue that determining the appropriate niche for alliances in a system for regional order is an acute challenge. A Chinese scholar, Yu Bin, for example, can argue that “the San Francisco system . . . has been so encompassing and convenient that few see that the system itself can be part of the problem rather than the solution to regional issues. . . . These alliances at best are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the region’s future stability and prosperity.”17 An American counterpart, Benjamin Self, can present the same thought as follows: “The obstacles for China to accept the [U.S.-Japan] Alliance not only as a means of mitigating rivalry with Japan but also as the foundation of the regional order are manifold.”18 Second, it would appear that states are falling back onto alliance relationships and strengthening them to carry more weight in maintaining regional stability because they consider the other tools available to be too weak or too unreliable. Enhancing the Performance of Multilateralism It is only too plain that multilateral security processes are not considered competitive as a means of alleviating security concerns. And looking around the region, it cannot be said that making these processes stronger and more competitive is currently a policy priority for any government. In the multilateral security field, the glacial process of natural evolution has been the order of the day. Key issues for the region include what such an evolutionary trend could mean for the quality of the

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security regime in the Asia-Pacific, and whether multilateral processes can be made more competitive as a means of strengthening the region’s security architecture. Leaning too heavily on alliances for regional stability both connotes and reinforces precisely the divisions that essentially all states in the region declare they aspire to avoid. Yet, to the extent the region fails to develop other processes and mechanisms that could, over time, share the burden of maintaining regional security, it is virtually certain that we will end up leaning too heavily on alliances. The region has not lacked proposals, including some floated by governments, to further develop multilateral security processes. All, however, have simply been rejected, regarded suspiciously, and diverted to track two, or have been withered by indifference. We have seen in the Asia-Pacific a great deal of anxiety and regret over the broad trend of strategic developments, but little in the way of political determination to forge additional tools to better manage these developments. In saying this, I have not forgotten about the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF has been the region’s pioneering foray into multilateral consideration of security issues. The ARF has become a valuable component of the region’s security architecture. It can and should develop further in this role, but it almost certainly needs to be restructured and repositioned in a broader multilateral structure if this is to occur. The ARF retains the characteristics that were necessary in the early 1990s to secure broad regional participation. It was launched by ASEAN for the purposes of ASEAN, with cautious ground rules and a predisposition (natural in a pioneering endeavor) to value participation above all else. ASEAN has carefully protected its ownership of, and responsibility for, the process from encroachment and likely “domination” by the region’s major powers. The ARF can take credit for many developments that make a positive contribution to regional security. But it has had little or no detectable influence on the key relationships of power and influence in the region, and the steady drift of these relationships toward suspicion and animosity.19 The ARF is on the right track. It is close to what the region needs, but as the saying goes, “it’s not far, but you probably can’t get there from here.” The region needs, urgently, multilateral security processes that engage the full authority of the major powers and that embody their acceptance of the responsibility to give these processes the opportunity to make a full contribution to regional security, alongside bilateral relationships and alliances.

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There are probably a number of ways to approach this objective.20 An approach that I believe has some merit is to recast the annual meeting of heads of state for APEC as a true leaders’ forum, that is, as a forum with the authority and responsibility to address all of the bigger issues shaping the Asia-Pacific, including defense and security. Such a leaders’ forum could be expected to endorse the ARF as the region’s specialized security body (subject to it also being recast as an Asia-Pacific, rather than an ASEAN, body). Similarly, APEC itself would remain to address trade and related issues, but with “member economies” meeting at ministerial rather than head-of-state level. This general approach has the considerable virtue of not requiring deliberate institution building and the formal specification of common premises that such a process seems to require (for example, democracy or agreed international boundaries). It should be acknowledged, however, that heads of state cannot have a casual collective meeting. The preparatory process, not simply in terms of logistics but agreeing on agenda priorities and building consensus prior to the meeting, is an elaborate one, involving a range of ministers and very senior officials from every participating state. This process diversifies and deepens the multilateral experience. And if it has strong inbuilt tendencies toward institution building, that would be no bad thing. It is worth stressing too that a leaders’ forum would be a lofty and generalized process. It would not be a security forum any more than, say, a trade forum or an environment forum. This should attenuate past concerns—attributed to China among others—that some proposals for new, broad multilateral security processes would give states with at best a marginal stake in a particular issue or geographic area a direct voice in any negotiations. The target of these concerns, of course, is Northeast Asia with its unique concentration of major powers and intersecting interests.21 For a long time many people have identified a first-track process focused on Northeast Asia as important. North Korea’s most recent gambit for leverage has again revived interest in striving for a holistic and more durable solution. The approach recommended here could accommodate such a process. The leaders’ forum could provide the necessary impulses to achieve consensus on the modalities of a process dedicated to this crucial subregion. It would be consistent with the spirit of this approach for the leaders’ forum to nestle such a process, however loosely, under an adapted ARF. It is fair to ask why any significant development in the direction rec-

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ommended here is more likely or more feasible now than in the past. It is also fair to ask who might take the initiative in making it happen. The two questions are, of course, interrelated, but let us deal with them sequentially. On the first, the key consideration is that the evidence is now overwhelmingly strong that the present array of tools for the management of regional security is not coping particularly well. Very few, if any, observers would argue that the outlook on this front was more positive in 2001 than in 1991. In fact, there is pretty much a consensus that there has been a strong trend in the negative direction. The war against terror has introduced both positives and negatives into the equation. It is still too early to make confident judgments on the net outcome, but it is hard to see even this uniquely challenging threat erasing the divisions that have accumulated since the end of the Cold War. It should also be noted that, although use has been made of the existing multilateral processes in the Asia-Pacific to address the issue of terrorism since September 11, 2001, these processes were too underdeveloped to support a prompt and proactive response, and to function as mechanisms of ongoing coordination. All this means is that the views accepted in the past (reluctantly by some) that the political consensus would support only modest multilateral security processes, and then only if the development of these processes could be tightly regulated, have now become more contestable. As to who might take the political initiative, the smaller states of the region—and the prime movers in the past—certainly have strong interests in new arrangements that could help address the prevailing trends. On this occasion, however, the critical requirement is to engage the major powers directly and fully. This objective essentially requires that one or more of these powers take the lead. At the present time, and for the foreseeable future, the candidates are America, Japan, and China. Both the United States and Japan have in the past (some years ago now) advanced proposals broadly consistent with the thesis of this chapter. These proposals were not, however, pursued with much resolution: a cautious or indifferent reaction was sufficient to see them dropped. Either or both could revisit the issue, although the United States in particular may consider that it has enough on its plate. Generally speaking, however, the past and even current policy settings in both countries make it likely that they would give any proposals serious consideration. What of China? China has been instinctively suspicious of, and hesitant about, any development on the multilateral security front beyond

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the ARF. Even in the ARF, China was initially watchful and remains inclined to ensure that the “pace comfortable to all” is a sedate walk. At the same time, China has been sharply critical of the persistent and strengthening role that others in the region are assigning to national defense efforts and alliances. China’s concerns about these developments may well run even deeper than its public positions suggest. When it wishes to be relatively polite, China characterizes alliances as sadly outdated, the relics of Cold War thinking that continues to linger in some countries. On other occasions, its position becomes that the Cold War thinking of deterrence and containment is alive and well and directed at China rather than the Soviet Union (or Russia). Perhaps to highlight the lack of imagination and innovation on the part of some in the region, China introduced a “new security concept” in 1997, condensed by President Jiang Zemin in 2001 to the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and collaboration.22 These are noble sentiments, but China’s attempts to give this concept a higher profile in the region, to see it picked up as an alternative foundation for regional stability and security, do not appear to have met with much success. A key part of the problem is that there is no regional process that has both the focus and the authority to act as an effective marketplace for the presentation and collective assessment of such basic principles, let alone translating them into operational practices. The Chinese leadership, which does not indulge in sentimentality in framing its foreign and security policy, is almost certainly aware of this. Chinese scholars are themselves drawing attention to this as a weakness in the security architecture for the Asia-Pacific. For example: “What East Asia international relations lack is mechanism. . . . Mechanism construction should become a new growth point in [China’s] diplomacy in the new century”;23 and, “It is even more imperative to ask for proactive involvement of big powers in the regional multilateral institutions.”24 China, therefore, might conclude that it is not enough to lament or to criticize what it sees as the growing weight that defense preparedness and alliances are assuming in the regional security equation. It may conclude that part of the reason for this, possibly an important part, is that multilateral security processes remain underdeveloped and therefore not competitive with these more traditional responses to potential security concerns. And, finally, China may accept that it bears significant responsibility for the slow development of multilateral security processes in the Asia-Pacific because, in the past, it saw more risks than benefits in such processes.

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Conclusion More than a decade into the post–Cold War era, it is clear that the regime or architecture for stability and security in the Asia-Pacific has not coped well with the challenges that have emerged. The region has lost ground. This architecture has remained unbalanced in the sense that multilateral security processes have not been forcefully developed with the intention to test their capacity to make a substantive contribution to regional security. To a greater extent than might otherwise have been the case, regional states have fallen back on national defense efforts and alliances to address potential security concerns. If this imbalance is to be addressed, it must be through multilateral processes that fully engage the major powers in terms of their authority and in terms of accepting responsibility for outcomes. Although the main purpose of this chapter has been one of advocacy, it has also suggested that the balance of political attitudes in the region toward a significant development in the arena of multilateral security processes has shifted favorably. The impact of international terrorism on Asian, especially Southeast Asian, attitudes toward cooperative approaches to addressing security concerns has been mixed. It has been a divisive factor to the extent that countries have differed sharply in their assessments of the seriousness, urgency, and location of the threat. On the other hand, specific events and a growing appreciation of the characteristics and modus operandi of terrorist organizations have allowed (or compelled) some states to compress the process of reestablishing or deepening collaborative attitudes and machinery. The Bali bombing, for example, has driven Australia and Indonesia together. Neither was ready and, although the joint investigation into the bombing has been fruitful, whether the two countries can use this experience to begin a deeper transformation of their bilateral relationship remains an open question. Nonetheless, on balance, the imperatives of the campaign against terrorism are likely to reinforce and prolong this favorable shift in regional attitudes toward enriching multilateral security processes. The management of the crisis over North Korea could consolidate this favorable shift. As things now stand, a good outcome will be attributable to Washington and Beijing succeeding in skillfully (but discreetly) orchestrating their respective bags of carrots and sticks. But there are also countervailing pressures. The same trends and developments that may lead states to look more favorably on multilateral

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security processes also lead them to look at other means of hedging against an uncertain future. Developing multilateral security processes to the point where they can make a real difference takes time, even when this approach has the determined support of key states. For some years now, the states of the Asia-Pacific have been marking time on this issue. It is time for this hesitation to end. The Asia-Pacific is critically important to international peace and security. It is already the world’s economic center of gravity and is expected to be the source of most of the new wealth generated in the world for some time to come. At the same time, however, the Asia-Pacific is decidedly immature in strategic terms. Relationships of power and influence are undergoing profound and stressful change. Furthermore, the architecture of processes and mechanisms to protect and strengthen regional security has remained stubbornly thin. The effort through the ARF to begin to build a cooperative security element into this architecture has stalled well short of a process that can carry real weight. In parallel, and certainly to some extent in consequence, interest in linking the region’s bilateral alliances has grown. If it develops further, this interest would make the alliances more competitive with, rather than complementary to, inclusive processes of cooperative security. There can be no doubt that the Asia-Pacific is trending toward a security system, that is, where the security interests and concerns of regional states are shaped most strongly by other states in the region. It remains the case, however, that the region is too large and diverse, and has too little experience with cooperative endeavors, to warrant aspiring at this stage toward a particular regime of cooperative security. A large and strategically lumpy area, the Asia-Pacific historically has been viewed as several distinct regions—North, South, and Southeast Asia plus Oceania—with distinctive outlooks and security concerns. These geographic, strategic, and political realities have given rise to a variety of approaches to protecting and developing regional order and security. Equally, however, the forces pulling these regions together are gathering strength, and the most sensible expectation is that this will continue to be the case. The widespread perception in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the Asia-Pacific would trend toward a security system with security interests and concerns intersecting and overlapping more strongly over time has proven to be accurate. The approach advocated here is not prescriptive as to the final destination. What this approach would do, however, is send an authoritative

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signal of the intent to see cooperative approaches form an important part of the region’s eventual security architecture. The continuing imperative is to ensure that the transition toward an Asia-Pacific security system is as smooth as possible. Further, the objective must be to see the emerging security system in the Asia-Pacific characterized by welldeveloped cooperative security arrangements to complement (and attenuate) the harder traditional instruments of security policy. An appropriately loose but authoritative multilateral security process should be seen as indispensable to the achievement of these objectives.

Part II

——— 4 ——— The Evolving Chinese Conception of Security and Security Approaches Nan Li

As China’s economic growth and military modernization continue, analysts are paying increasing attention to Chinese security policy. Two shortcomings, however, have become apparent in their analyses. First, contending schools of thought tend to hold that the conceptual foundation of Chinese policy is constant and static over time. One such school, for instance, argues that realism has continuously underwritten Chinese security policy, from the time of the Ming dynasty, through Maoist China, to post-Mao China. Such an approach has clearly decontextualized Chinese security policy by not paying sufficient attention to substantial and important variations over time, in both conceptual basis and policy behavior.1 Such variations and differences become particularly pronounced at the time of leadership changes, such as the coming to power of Mao in 1949 and the rise of Deng following the death of Mao in 1976. The second shortcoming has to do with the debate on whether China is a revisionist or a status quo power. The differences between the two positions in this debate are quite clear. The revisionism advocates argue that China challenges the extant international institutions, norms, and power distributions because they impede China’s rise. The status quo proponents, on the other hand, maintain that China is being socialized into the international institutions and norms, and has not challenged the existing power distributions.2 The internalization of these institutions and norms in the long run may lead to the redefinition of Chinese identity and interests, thus moderating Chinese behavior. In spite of these differences, the premise shared by the two positions is that Chinese policy 53

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has primarily been driven by external constraints and opportunities. Such a premise ignores the plausibility that Chinese policy is motivated more by domestic changes than by external stimuli. This chapter attempts to correct these two shortcomings by addressing two research questions. First, how has the Chinese conception of security and security approaches evolved over time, and what are the major changes and differences? Second, what accounts for major changes in this conception: domestic or external dynamics? Let us begin by defining key terms and indicators. First, security here has two meanings: (1) assumptions about the central unit in seeking security, that is, socioeconomic class or nation-state, and (2) assessments of the security environment by this unit, that is, the level of vulnerability and the degree of security that the unit has to deal with. Second, security approaches here refer to ways to enhance security, ranging from revolutionary strategies, unilateral threats and use of force, bilateral diplomacy, and collective defense–based alliances against an external threat, to cooperative security–based multilateral institutions. Such institutions aim to enhance intramural confidence building and transparency in order to reduce tension and conflict. Major examples include ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This essay will highlight the Chinese conception with regard to these three institutions. Finally, this chapter employs leadership changes as the key indicator of changes in the Chinese conception over time, from the Mao Zedong era, to the period under Deng Xiaoping, and then to that of Jiang Zemin. Using this indicator is justified on three grounds. First, changes in the Chinese conception and behavior have usually become quite prominent after changes in the top leadership. Second, in revolutionary China, the view of key leaders such as Mao greatly influenced the formation of the collective consciousness on issues such as security and security approaches, and policy. Third, as a collective, technocratic type of leadership has gradually replaced the revolutionary and charismatic type, the view of key leaders has come to reflect the aggregate view of the diplomatic and defense bureaucracies and think tanks, and remains highly influential. This chapter makes two arguments. First, the Chinese conception of security and security approaches under Mao was mainly driven by the concern for subnational and transnational class-based security and struggle. As a result, nation-state–centered concepts such as collective

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defense and cooperative security were only marginally relevant to the Chinese conception and behavior. As Deng shifted the policy emphasis away from Mao’s class struggle to nation building, however, the Chinese conception also shifted: from class-based security and struggle to nation-state–centered security and competition. As a result, realism replaced Maoism as the dominant paradigm driving Chinese policy. Jiang had largely inherited this paradigm, but unlike Deng, who advocated “hiding one’s capabilities and biding one’s time,” he chose to “attempt to accomplish some deeds” through defense budget increases and the endorsement of a new security concept. Second, major domestic changes, such as leadership changes and the consolidation of a new leadership, bureaucratic bargaining, the need to create a secure external environment for domestic economic development, and changes in the economy and military capabilities, account for major changes in the Chinese conception of security and security approaches. In comparison, external changes play a secondary role. The essay has four substantial sections. The first three examine the Chinese conception of security and security approaches under Mao, Deng, and Jiang respectively, and highlight major changes in this conception over time. The fourth section addresses the issue of what accounts for changes in the Chinese conception. The Conception of Security and Security Approaches under Mao (1949–1976) The key to understanding the Chinese conception under Mao is the subnational and transnational notion of class-based security and struggle, not the realist concept of nation-state–centered security and competition, or the neoliberal premise of cooperative games among nation-states, or the constructivist idea of cooperative norms that reshape interstate relations. Mao’s renowned 1949 declaration of “leaning to one side” meant China’s commitment to the Soviet Union–led socialist camp and its active participation in the messianic struggle against the Western capitalist countries. A brainchild of this commitment was the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, signed in early 1950. This treaty can be understood as a bilateral collective defense alliance because it served to deter and defend against a common perceived threat. This threat was first conceived to be Japan, but later, after the outbreak of the Korean War, it became the United States.

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This treaty proved to be short-lived, mainly because Mao suspected that the Soviet Union had become a conservative, status quo power concerned more with preserving Soviet national interests than promoting class-based world revolution. This suspicion was particularly reflected in Chinese criticism of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization and détente with the West. Together with the radicalization of domestic politics (shifting policy emphasis from economic construction to class-struggle–based continuous revolution, leading to the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76), this suspicion motivated Mao to envisage a global, class-based revolution on his own terms and to embark on a dual strategy of “people’s war” and a “united front” drawn from the lessons of the Chinese revolution. This strategy entailed active support of armed struggles by radical class-based and progressive national liberation movements throughout the world. These movements constituted what Mao called the world’s “countryside,” which would march against and finally conquer the world’s “cities”—the Western capitalist powers. China during this period had certainly developed foreign relations and alliances. But they were more concerned with the class-based transnational radical movements and insurgencies that attempted the overthrow of their governments than with these governments. As the Cultural Revolution intensified in the late 1960s, for instance, besides the United States and the Soviet Union, major third-world countries such as India, Indonesia, and Burma also became “targets of the revolution.”3 Under Mao, China remained outside the United Nations for the most part. It also fought large or indirect wars on foreign soil. These include the 1950–53 Korean War, the 1962 war with India, and the deployment of thousands of Chinese soldiers in North Vietnam for infrastructure construction, transportation, and air defense during the Vietnam War. China also provided generous aid to radical insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and fought a small war with the Soviet Union on their common border in 1969. China was not a member of any cooperative security framework, but was treated as the threat to be defended against by a variety of bilateral or multilateral collective defense treaties. It is not an exaggeration to say that China under Mao was largely perceived by foreign governments as something that resembles what is today known as a “pariah.” Such a policy orientation changed somewhat with the decline of domestic radicalism, Nixon’s visit to China, and China’s entry into the United Nations in the early 1970s. The Sino-U.S. security cooperation

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that followed was not what is now understood as cooperative security, but rather a quasi-alliance, or collective defense, driven by a common threat: the Soviet Union. This alliance did not mean that China had abandoned its revolutionary agenda. Rather, China simply perceived the United States as among the less aggressive of its ideological foes, and believed it could be used to constrain the more aggressive Soviet Union. “War and revolution” continued to be the conceptual lens through which China’s policy makers viewed the world.4 Some scholars argue that Mao was actually a “closet realist” who promoted Chinese national security interests under the guise of classstruggle–based revolutionary rhetoric. Such an argument has several major flaws. First, Mao had discriminated against and persecuted millions of his fellow Chinese based on rigid class categories, while at the same time providing generous economic and military aid to his fellow revolutionaries in foreign lands. This is certainly not what a realist would have done; a realist would have promoted national unity and cohesiveness in the face of external threats. Moreover, Mao’s conception of security and competition was largely nonterritorial. This is reflected in Chinese nationalist intellectuals’ recent criticisms of Mao for allowing Outer Mongolia to go independent, for withdrawing Chinese troops from North Korea in 1958, for not holding the lands taken in the 1962 war with India, and for conceding large chunks of territories to North Korea, North Vietnam, and Burma. Similarly, the Maoist notion of people’s war was based on the assumption of “luring the enemy in deep” by abandoning territories and major cities in case of a foreign invasion. Such a casual manner of handling territorial issues implies that Mao really treated territories as transit bases in his highly mobile project of “continuous revolution.” The nonterritorial and mobile nature of Maoism clearly contradicts realism, which regards bounded, stable, and organic territories as the essence of nation-states. Finally, that the Maoist foreign policy was revolutionary rather than realist is also evident in the fact that had China been governed by a nonrevolutionary regime, the major security concerns of China’s neighbors about such things as communist insurgencies would have been much less acute. This can also be illustrated by comparing the policy of Maoist China with that of post-Mao China. Those in Southeast Asian countries who are old enough to have held higher government positions in the late 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, for instance, may recall that a top security concern of their countries then was the China-backed communist

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movements or insurgencies that attempted to overthrow their governments. In contrast, the current challenges and opportunities that postMao China presents to Southeast Asia are largely related to issues such as trade, investment, and the Spratlys. The Conception of Security and Security Approaches under Deng (1978–1989) What differentiates Deng from Mao was his substitution of the Maoist notion of class security and struggle with nation building, national security, and competition based on “national comprehensive power.” The domestic implication of such a change was a shift of policy emphasis from large-scale class struggle to economic-development–based nation building, couched in the notion of four modernizations (modernizing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense). The external implication was the gradual scaling down and termination of material and financial support for transnational class-based radical movements and groups and normalizing relations with the governments of various countries. Deng’s nation-state–centered policy emphasis is quite similar to what is understood in the West as the realist assumption of international politics, namely that states strive to build up their relative economic and military strength in order to survive and compete in an anarchic international environment. Deng, for instance, believed that because China economically lagged behind other major powers due to decades of class-struggle–driven internal strife and support of radical movements abroad, it now needed to concentrate on economic development to narrow the gap. As a result, he endorsed the notion of “peace and development” to replace the Maoist idea of “war and revolution.”5 Moreover, he believed that too much defense spending would divert resources from economic development, and that a larger economic pie in the long run could translate into more spending to sustain a more powerful military. As a result, he declared at a Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting in 1985 that the Maoist assumption of an “early, total, and nuclear war” (implying a Soviet invasion) was no longer valid, and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) should make a strategic transition to peacetime army building, with an eye toward preparing for local, limited war (implying local military conflicts to resolve territorial issues).6 The narrowing of war aims contributed to

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the scaling down of defense spending, the downsizing of the force structure by demobilizing a million soldiers, the freeing up of more resources for economic development, and the reduction of the role of the military in domestic politics. Finally, Deng believed that Mao’s highly vocal and assertive agenda of world revolution did China more harm than good. China’s early alliance with the Soviet Union led to the “buck-passing” behavior of the latter, involving China in a costly war on the Korean Peninsula. China’s generous aid to radical movements and smaller socialist countries such as North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania diverted scarce resources away from China’s own economic development, and did not win their gratitude, but instead led to “free-riding” behavior by some of these movements and countries. As a result, Deng argued that Chinese foreign policy should concentrate on maintaining an equal distance from the two superpowers, on avoiding entanglement in formal alliances with either large or small countries, and on “taking a low profile and never take the lead.”7 Under Deng, China normalized relations with most governments, sometimes by withdrawing aid from the radical groups that were trying to overthrow these governments. It also maintained good relations with the United States and other developed countries, the major sources of capital, technology, markets, and managerial expertise for China’s economic development. On the other hand, China was not active in resolving territorial disputes with its neighbors. It was neither a part of any formal or informal collective defense alliance, nor was it actively involved in any cooperative security framework. While it was not involved in any major foreign conflict, it did fight local wars with Vietnam, both over the land border (from the late 1970s to the late 1980s) and over the Spratlys (1988). The central notion for understanding the Chinese conception of security and security approaches under Deng was his dictum taoguang yanghui, or “hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time.”8 The Conception of Security and Security Approaches under Jiang (1989–2002) There are two major similarities between Jiang’s conception of China’s security environment and Deng’s. First, like Deng, Jiang believed that “peace and development,” not “war and revolution,” continued to be the dominant trend. He offered several reasons for this assessment. World

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war is too costly even for a superpower, due to its disruption of economic integration and its demand for very expensive high-tech weapons. Also, the trend toward multipolarization, as shown in the growing influence of the European Union, Japan, Russia, India, and China, constrained the only superpower from initiating a major war. Furthermore, “comprehensive national power” and technological advances in nuclear capabilities enhanced the credibility of deterrence. Finally, the urgent desire for economic development, not just by the third world but also by the developed and socialist countries, served to reduce the incentives for a major war.9 Second, like Deng, Jiang maintained that even though a world war is not likely, local, limited wars are quite likely. Such wars could be triggered by several major factors, including the continued presence of “hegemonic power politics and a Cold War mentality,” religious and ethnic differences, territorial disputes, the downside of economic integration involving such things as a growing gap in wealth and technology as well as hazards caused by exposure to globalization, and a continued arms race among the major powers (more in qualitative than quantitative terms).10 On approaches to enhance China’s security, there are similarities as well as differences between Jiang’s conception and Deng’s. First, Jiang continued to share Deng’s view that scientific, technological, and economic-development–based “comprehensive national power” is the key to reducing China’s insecurity and vulnerability.11 Second, although not abandoning Deng’s advice of staying low, Jiang also believed that China should “attempt to accomplish some deeds” (yousuo zuowei). To “attempt to accomplish some deeds” in the military and diplomatic arenas constituted Jiang’s major conceptual departure from Deng. In the military arena, although Jiang agreed with Deng that defense modernization should be subordinate to economic development, he also believed that years of economic growth made it possible to allocate more resources to defense modernization in order to meet the challenges of the revolution in military affairs. He also saw a smaller, technologyintensive, and well-trained military as an effective instrument for accomplishing foreign policy objectives such as “national reunification” and “preserving territorial integrity.”12 In the diplomatic arena, unlike Deng, who wanted to stay low, Jiang was quite vocal in endorsing and propagating his new idea of cooperative security (hezuo anquan), which was operationalized into the “new

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security concept” (xin anquan guan).13 Unlike the traditional concept of security driven by the so-called Cold War mentality, which “stresses competition, collective defense, unilateralism, and absolute security,” Jiang claimed the new security concept was based on several new premises. These include mutual trust (huxin, or nonhostility and nonsuspicion sustained by regular, multiple-track dialogue and communications), mutual benefit (huli, or economic-integration–driven common security), equality (pingdeng, or equality of voice regardless of differences in wealth, size, and power, and respect for diversity of cultures and ideologies), and cooperation (xiezuo, or nonexclusion, nontargeting of third parties, tolerance of differences, peaceful and equal consultation to resolve disputes and prevent military conflicts, and gradualism).14 Among the major features claimed for the new security concept were the so-called five principles of peaceful coexistence: respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the new security concept was more concerned with comprehensive security (economic, political, military, scientific and technological, environmental, and cultural security) than just with military security. It was also more concerned with nontraditional security issues, such as fighting transnational crime and terrorism. Finally, it was characterized by the “organic intertwining of national security and international security”; hence, it was said, common security would result from increased interdependence (internal vulnerability being related to external factors, internal stability or instability impinging on the security of one’s neighbors, and the variable-sum nature of interactions to deal with common security problems).15 Jiang’s idea of “attempting to accomplish some deeds” translated into policies that were absent during the Deng period. On the military front, under his call for “strengthening the army through science and technology” (keji qiangjun), defense spending grew steadily and a large quantity of high-tech arms was acquired from abroad. China also used the military more frequently as an instrument of foreign policy, as shown in the highly offensive war games along China’s east coast since 1996 and the deployment of many ballistic missiles there. On the diplomatic front, the new security concept also translated into concrete policies. These included the settlement of China’s land border disputes with most of its neighbors (with the exception of territories

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claimed by India and a few small riverine islands on the border with Russia), introduction of confidence-building measures with India regarding disputed borders, the signing of a code of conduct with ASEAN regarding the South China Sea, participation in UN peacekeeping, mediating multilateral talks over the North Korean nuclear crisis, and maintaining workable relations with the United States. It is particularly remarkable that China was one of the sponsors of a genuinely multilateral cooperative security framework: the SCO, which groups China, Russia, and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The SCO began as an intramural confidence-building mechanism to reduce border tensions among the member states, and not as a collective defense alliance against a common external threat. It later evolved into an entity that grappled with nontraditional security issues such as counterterrorism and economic security issues such as trade and investment. Finally, China continued to shun any formal or informal collective defense alliances. Accounting for Changes in the Chinese Conception Two major changes in the Chinese conception of security and security approaches need to be accounted for: (1) the shift from Mao’s stress on class-based security and struggle to Deng’s emphasis on nationstate–centered security and competition; and (2) the shift from Deng’s admonition of “lying low” to Jiang’s advocacy of “attempting to accomplish some deeds” through defense budget increases and the new security concept. Accounting for the First Shift Some suggest that benign changes in China’s external environment, such as President Nixon’s visit to China, China’s membership in the UN, the end of the Vietnam War, and increased trade with the West, may have strengthened the hands of the nation-building advocates such as Zhou Enlai and Deng in their struggle against the Maoist radicals of the Gang of Four, which in turn led to this shift in the Chinese conception and behavior. Similarly, some argue that the substitution of the Maoist notion of “early, total, nuclear war” with Deng’s idea of border-defense– based “local, limited war” was a response to the declining Soviet threat, an outcome of Gorbachev’s “new thinking.”

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Although plausible, these explanations run into major difficulties. First, benign external changes need to be “filtered” through the cognitive lens of competing domestic forces, to the point at which they may not always translate into benign domestic changes, but may cause radical backlashes. Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinization and détente with the West in 1956, for instance, might have influenced Mao to allow intellectuals to criticize the shortcomings of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in early 1957. This, however, was quickly followed by an anti-rightist crackdown, the result of Mao’s belief that these criticisms represented attacks on “proletarian dictatorship,” and thus necessitated renewed class struggle to weed out “bourgeois representatives.” Similarly, benign external changes following Nixon’s visit to China in the early 1970s might have enabled Zhou to persuade Mao to rehabilitate Deng in 1973, and, in view of the easing of Western sanctions, to pursue industrialization through the purchase of advanced foreign technologies. But these endeavors soon became political liabilities, because Zhou and Deng were criticized by the Gang of Four for “having blind faith in things foreign,” and for “capitulationism” and “reversing the verdict of the Cultural Revolution.”16 As a result, by early 1976, following the death of Zhou, Deng was removed from the position of first deputy premier. Moreover, in 1985, when Deng introduced the concept of “local, limited war” to replace Mao’s “early, total, nuclear war,” it was not yet clear that Gorbachev would consolidate his position as the new general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and translate his “new thinking” into removal of the three obstacles (Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, heavy deployment of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border, and Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia), the precondition for improving Sino-Soviet relations. Finally, even though a realist China may be less destabilizing than a revolutionary China, it is still not clear that this is the kind of China that the external inducements intend it to be. It is not totally inconceivable that modernization-driven nation building may create a China that is economically and militarily more powerful, but politically authoritarian: a China that may become more discontented with the status quo, and therefore less stabilizing. If external changes are not the best indicators, what then can better account for the shift? Major domestic changes, such as the death of Mao and the arrest of the Gang of Four in late 1976, are clearly crucial events

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in accounting for the shift, largely because they allowed for the final official endorsement of the views and policies of the nation-building forces led by Deng. But this endorsement did not necessarily mean that China’s bureaucratic constituencies, such as the military, would jump on Deng’s bandwagon. Many military leaders, for instance, had been promoted for being actively involved in Mao’s policy of internal “class struggle” and supporting “world revolution.” As a result, Deng, after becoming chair of the CMC in 1982, implemented extensive organizational and personnel changes and intensive ideological education within the military. Such organizational and ideological consolidation in turn ensured the military’s firmer endorsement of Deng’s view and policy, and by 1985 enabled Deng to substitute Mao’s “early, total, nuclear war” with his notion of “local, limited war.” Accounting for the Second Shift Domestic politics also mattered as much as external changes in accounting for the second shift. It is certainly true that external events such as the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S. intervention in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis gave the military strong reasons to argue for a budget increase. But even if these external events had not happened, defense modernization would still have proceeded, albeit under quite different pretexts (such as pursuing the long-term goal of reunification with Taiwan and controlling the South China Sea), largely because it is an organic component of Deng’s nation-building project. Moreover, these external events would not have been sufficient for the military to argue its case successfully had the economy not achieved years of steady growth. Finally, Jiang, as the new party leader, needed to consolidate his influence in the military and to persuade it to stay on the course of defense modernization, but to stay out of domestic politics and business activities. All these factors certainly provided strong incentives for Jiang to increase the defense budget. As for the new security concept, domestic changes also count. The switch to the economic-development–centered policy required a more peaceful environment on the margins of China. This may be achieved through military deterrence or the limited, quick use of force under the new rubric of “local, limited war.” But military means may also trigger security dilemmas, incurring higher security costs or causing more insecurity. As a result, the notion of “local, limited war” needs to be supple-

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mented by diplomatic and economic instruments; the new security concept met this need. It also reflected a more institutionalized division of labor between the defense and diplomatic bureaucracies. Moreover, the growth of the Chinese economy and military capabilities may have contributed to a higher level of confidence on the part of the Chinese leaders. Such confidence in turn may have translated into a reduced sense of insecurity, and therefore a heightened desire to pursue China’s security interests through nonmilitary means. The endorsement of the new security concept may have also been influenced by external changes. But such influence may have been based more on the realist concern for relative gains than a genuine socialization into the norms of cooperative security. The concept’s criticism of “a Cold War mentality of military alliances and blocs,” for instance, was clearly targeted at the looming, post–Cold War U.S. dominance in Asia, which Jiang perceived as complicating Chinese objectives, constraining Chinese influence, and increasing China’s vulnerability. On the other hand, major principles of the concept such as “nonaggression, equality, and peaceful consultation and coexistence” do not seem to have had much of an impact on China’s handling of the Taiwan issue. Similarly, China has been highly discriminating with regard to its approaches toward the ARF and SCO. China has strong reservations about institutionalizing the ARF. Chinese analysts, for instance, argued that the ARF should remain a low-key dialogue forum, driven primarily by ASEAN and focused on ASEAN issues, rather than become an action-based institution dominated by non-ASEAN members and engaged in non-ASEAN issues. This is because the ARF is “too big and diverse, its goals too vague, and its processes too slow and informal,” and it is “not designed to solve problems such as East Timor and the Asian financial crisis.”17 A more important reason, however, is the Chinese concern that a highly institutionalized ARF might open its leadership to big powers such as the United States and Japan and focus on non-ASEAN issues, which could complicate Chinese objectives and constrain Chinese influence, for example by internationalizing issues such as the status of Taiwan and the Spratlys.18 On the other hand, China is comfortable to see the SCO institutionalized and action-based, rather than remain merely as a dialogue forum. Although the SCO began as a confidence-building forum to discuss arms reduction along borders, it has grown to become a substantial institution, moving from political cooperation (negotiating and demarcating

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borders), to security cooperation (establishing a counterterrorism center and conducting joint military exercises), and then to economic cooperation (joint exploration of energy). Chinese analysts believe that the growth of the SCO can be attributed to the fact that it had relatively concrete but modest goals, and its membership was limited, making it comparatively easy to build consensus. But a more important reason, according to Chinese analysts, was the absence of the United States and Japan from the organization; as a result Chinese interests and concerns were much better accommodated. Had China been genuinely socialized into the norms of cooperative security, this sort of discrimination based on double-standards should not have existed. This also shows that China uses the concept primarily as a convenient tool for reducing its relative vulnerability and enhancing its relative power. China and ASEAN Some scholars suggest that the Chinese agreement to a code of conduct with ASEAN in the South China Sea and China’s recent signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation demonstrate that China has been won over by ASEAN’s engagement policy. Though this premise is plausible, there are strong reasons to believe that other, major internal and external factors are more important in driving Chinese cooperation, and that the Chinese acceptance of ASEAN norms of cooperative security is more instrumental than transformative. In the eyes of many Chinese analysts, for instance, ASEAN is not sufficiently strong to produce a unified, coherent foreign policy. Major intra-ASEAN differences have been abundant, and few states are willing to delegate to it the authority to arbitrate disputes. Domestic turmoil, terrorism, and separatism haunt major ASEAN countries that are still struggling to recover from the 1997 financial crisis. These problems may force leaders to focus on internal, rather than foreign policy, issues. Moreover, the ASEAN principle of “noninterference in internal affairs” and its consensus-driven process may make it difficult to produce unified and timely positions on foreign policy. But more important, many member countries rely on bilateral alliances with outside powers, national diplomacy, and national military capabilities to hedge against various security threats.19 This apparently weakens the premise of a coherent China policy for ASEAN, whether in terms of engagement

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or containment. As a result, China’s cooperation with ASEAN may be motivated more by other, internal as well as external factors. A major internal factor is the need to secure a peaceful external environment for internal economic development. China’s signing of the code and the treaty, for instance, met this need by consolidating what China has acquired, such as the Paracels and part of the Spratlys, and making it difficult for the contestants to resort to the threat or the use of force to destabilize Chinese procession. Moreover, Southeast Asia straddles major sea lines of communications and has rich deposits of oil and natural gas, which China has become increasingly dependent on to sustain its rapid economic growth. Furthermore, as the ASEAN economy grows, it is becoming a more substantial market for Chinese goods, and richer member countries are already a major source of capital, technology, and managerial expertise for Chinese development. Chinese cooperation may dilute the perception of a “China threat,” in terms of both draining investment away from the region and enforcing territorial claims. It also helps to present a friendlier image of a China concerned mainly with economic development, thus laying the basis for deeper economic cooperation and integration.20 Finally, signing the code and the treaty is consistent with the Chinese policy of “setting aside the sovereignty issue and concentrating on joint exploration.” To the extent some ASEAN countries have softened their position on joint exploration, China can isolate those that are less flexible. As ASEAN becomes less united, China’s position is enhanced, making it more difficult for external powers to intervene on ASEAN’s behalf. A major external factor is China’s need to deter Taiwan from going independent. If deterrence fails, a military conflict may become inevitable. Since the United States is likely to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in such a conflict, mitigating U.S. influence on the flanks of Taiwan—such as Southeast Asia—appears to be a sensible policy. If China took a confrontational approach by enforcing its claims over the Spratlys now, it would alienate ASEAN and hand the United States an excuse to intervene. This could lead to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition against China, thus complicating Chinese objectives vis-à-vis Taiwan.21 Also, the Spratlys are uninhabitable, exposed isles and atolls, which cannot be used as staging platforms for any military conflict in Taiwan. But by signing the code and the treaty, China may have eased ASEAN’s concerns and denied the United States an excuse for organizing a countervailing alliance. Also, the resolution of the Taiwan issue would

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significantly improve China’s strategic posture with regard to the South China Sea. At a time when the United States has become increasingly unpopular because of its single-minded concentration on fighting terrorism and its lack of interest in multilateralism, to be the first major outside power to have signed the treaty may have significantly improved both China’s image and its strategic position in the region vis-à-vis America. In view of the fact that ASEAN is geographically close to China, that China and most of the ASEAN countries are developing economies, that China and many ASEAN countries are nonliberal democracies, and that the region has the largest concentration of overseas ethnic Chinese, it can be expected that China will utilize these comparative advantages to enhance its image and its position in the future. Another external factor has to do with the nature of the code and the treaty itself. It is true that agreeing to the norms of the code such as resolving territorial disputes by peaceful means and exercising selfrestraint in activities that may trigger disputes could constrain China from enforcing territorial claims by force. On the other hand, the limits of the code and the treaty are also obvious. The code, for instance, has not addressed the issue of sovereignty and is not legally binding. The treaty prescribes a High Council to resolve territorial disputes among signatories by recommending “appropriate means of settlement.” But historically, none of the signatories involved in territorial disputes has ever invoked the High Council for arbitration, largely because its recommendations are not legally binding and it has no enforcement power. Finally, the treaty does not compel signatories to negotiate overlapping territorial claims if they are not considered a direct threat to regional security.22 These limits have largely allowed territorial disputes to remain bilateral issues. Because China has always preferred the bilateral approach in dealing with territorial disputes, it had good reason to sign the code and the treaty. On the other hand, largely because of these limits, as well as the generally held belief among Chinese strategists that credible military deterrence enhances the chances of diplomatic outcomes favorable to China, it is highly doubtful that China will abandon military force as an instrument of policy and leave the consolidation of its gains in the South China Sea to the goodwill of the contestants. The scenario of a possible conflict over Taiwan may primarily drive the current Chinese naval buildup. But some new, advanced ships may be deployed to China’s South Sea fleet, mainly to enhance deterrence. Zhang Yunlin, for in-

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stance, specified two scenarios where a clash of arms in the South China Sea may take place even after the signing of the code: (1) one side unilaterally declares sovereign ownership and tries to change the status quo by force; and (2) an outside power (implying the United States) directly intervenes in order to create an outcome unfavorable to China.23 Both the internal and external factors that drive Chinese cooperation are apparently instrumental: the internal factors aim to build up China’s “comprehensive national power,” whereas the external factors intend to reduce its vulnerability. New developments have supported this premise. At the recent Boao Asian economic forum, for instance, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao reiterated the “new security concept” and called for deeper regional integration to reverse “the unfair and inequitable old international political and economic order.” This shows that China uses regionalism mainly as an instrument to limit the influence of the United States, which is obviously responsible for this order. This is in sharp contrast to the view of the Singaporean prime minister Goh Chok Tong, who argued that regionalism should not come at the expense of global ties, because “ties with the U.S. and European Union have largely spurred dynamic growth in the region.”24 Moreover, the recent and more frequent visits by Chinese survey vessels and warships to the unoccupied shoals and reefs of the Spratlys show that the constraining effect of the code and the treaty has not yet become that strong.25 Had the norms of the code and the treaty transformed the Chinese conception, the difference between Wen and Goh should not have existed, and the incident in the Spratlys should not have taken place. Conclusion The Chinese conception of security and security approaches under Mao was mainly driven by the concern for subnational and transnational classbased security and struggle. Under Deng, however, the policy emphasis shifted to nation-state–centered security and competition. Jiang continued the emphasis of Deng. But unlike Deng, who believed in “lying low,” Jiang become more proactive, and chose to “attempt to accomplish some deeds” through defense budget increases and endorsing a new security concept. Major internal changes, such as leadership changes and the consolidation of a new leadership, bureaucratic bargaining, the need for a more secure environment for economic development, and growth in the

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economy and military capabilities, account for two major changes in the Chinese conception: (1) the shift from Mao’s stress on class struggle to Deng’s emphasis on national competition, and (2) the shift from Deng’s advice on “lying low” to Jiang’s proactive policy. In comparison, external changes play a secondary role. A major implication of these findings is that the task of socializing China into the norms of cooperative security through multilateral institutions can be arduous. First, when the Chinese policy process was highly fractured, as it was under Mao, external inducements either were manipulated by competing domestic factions to enhance their relative gains in the fierce domestic factional strife, or they triggered extremist backlashes. But even if the policy process became more institutionalized under Deng and Jiang, China’s genuine assimilation of such norms cannot be guaranteed. Such initiatives may still be “exhausted” by domestic dynamics associated with leadership changes and the consolidation of a new leadership, or with bureaucratic bargaining. But more important, the thinking of the post-Mao leadership has largely been influenced by realism. As a result, rather than genuinely assimilate such norms, China is more likely to employ external inducements in such a way as to promote China’s strategic advantage: to reduce its vulnerability and enhance its “comprehensive national power.”

——— 5 ——— Indonesia and Regional Security The Quest for Cooperative Security

Rizal Sukma

From the very outset of its postcolonial existence, the Republic of Indonesia has fervently stood for a Southeast Asian voice that eschews any involvement by extraregional powers in the affairs of the region. It strongly believed, and still does, that the management of the Southeast Asia regional order should be the responsibility of the region’s countries themselves. That vision was a consequence of a conviction that collective regional responsibility for the management of security was required if the region was to avoid external interference. For the founding leaders of the republic, the vision of a self-reliant approach to the management of regional security was required in order to preserve the hard-won independence from the predations of external powers. They also believed that regional security needs would best be served, and challenges be overcome, through intramural cooperation rather than through dependence on external powers. In reality, however, the realization of such an approach to regional security has always been subject to the contending preferences of individual states on the one hand and the limits of domestic capacity on the other. Such a dilemma in attaining its distinct vision of regional order has been clearly manifested in Indonesia’s involvement within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1967. Even though it has been forced to accommodate and tolerate some members’ preference for maintaining access to extraregional sources of countervailing power, Indonesia has continued to promote the vision that regional security can be best served by intramural cooperation aimed at reducing tension by building trust and confidence among regional partners. As such, Indonesia’s quest for regional security has from the very beginning been character71

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ized by a strong preference for the notion of multilateral cooperative security and an unfavorable attitude toward collective defense systems. This, however, does not mean that Indonesia had never been engaged in a bilateral security relationship with an external power. The experiences in managing bilateral security arrangements with the United States in 1951, and then with Australia in the 1990s, were two notable exceptions to Indonesia’s preferred approach of intramural cooperation to regional security. Jakarta’s decision in 1992 to participate actively in a wider security arrangement beyond Southeast Asia, through the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), also marked its willingness to accommodate the legitimate interests of extraregional powers in regional security matters. Moreover, Indonesia has not avoided the obligation to participate in global peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Although Indonesia is generally reluctant to participate in UN-sanctioned peace-enforcement operations, it is usually not opposed to them. In fact, Indonesia has consistently argued that a UN mandate is compulsory for any peace-enforcement operation. This chapter examines Indonesia’s approach to regional security within the context of contending security approaches adopted by its regional partners on the one hand, and its opposition to collective defense systems on the other. For that purpose, the discussion is divided into five sections. The first section provides an overview of Indonesia’s approach to regional security from a historical perspective. The second examines Indonesia’s experience in bilateral security arrangements, especially with the United States in the 1950s and then with Australia in the 1990s. The third examines Indonesia’s view of, and involvement in, ASEAN and the ARF as multilateral cooperative security endeavors. The fourth discusses Indonesia’s participation in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations and how they relate to, and interact with, its preference for regional self-reliance in its approach to security. The final section examines Indonesia’s view and approach to regional security in the post-Suharto era, and more specifically, after September 11, 2001. Indonesia’s Approach to Regional Security: A Historical Overview Indonesia’s approach to regional security has been a manifestation of its faith in the merits of its bebas-aktif (free and active) foreign policy practice. Such practice, when it was first conceived on September 2, 1948,

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was meant to navigate Indonesia’s international position amid the growing rivalry between two opposing blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union. It charted for itself an independent position that rejected a commitment to either bloc. Through an independent position in world politics, the government sought to prevent ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow from aggravating acute political differences within the country’s political elite. In operational terms, this meant a nonaligned policy that precluded the government from signing any international agreement that would link Indonesia to either side of the two opposing blocs.1 Indonesia’s enduring opposition to the notion of involving extraregional powers as a means to achieve regional security grew out of its experience in the struggle for independence during the period of national revolution (1945–48). Indeed, during this period the embryonic republic faced enormous challenges. One challenge was confronting the reality of postwar international politics marked by the absence of an immediate, strong sympathy for the aspirations of colonized peoples for selfdetermination and independence. Indonesian nationalists faced the fact that, at the outset, their struggle against the Dutch did not receive clear backing from the major powers. For example, nationalists received only ambivalent support from America, which assisted the Dutch diplomatically and to a degree militarily. In a United Nations Security Council meeting in 1946 the United States, prompted by Cold War considerations, even joined with the colonial powers in blocking a Ukrainian proposal to take up the issue of the role of British troops in Indonesia. At the time, Indonesian nationalists strongly suspected that the Dutch were using these British forces as a vehicle for returning to Indonesia in order to recolonize the country.2 The difficult negotiations with the Dutch also left the unpleasant impression of involvement in a game being played by Western powers to delay the recognition of Indonesia’s independence. For example, the refusal of the Western powers to order the Dutch to withdraw from territory they had occupied by force undermined the initial expectations of Indonesian leaders that the West, especially the United States, would favor national self-determination for colonial peoples. Later American pressure on the Dutch to this end did not erase this first impression.3 Nationalists widely believed that Holland’s ultimate recognition of Indonesia’s independence was far more the result of Indonesian resistance than of international pressure.

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The experience derived during this period was important in that it had a significant bearing on the formation of Indonesia’s early image of the nature of the contemporary world after the Second World War. For most nationalist leaders and others involved in the revolutionary struggle, the major Western powers’ ambivalent attitude toward Indonesia’s revolution reinforced the already widely held belief that the powers’ interests coincided with those of the colonial Dutch. The reluctance of the Western powers to acknowledge Indonesia’s independence reinforced anticolonialist ardor.4 It was that bitter experience also that aroused among Indonesian elites a strong suspicion that Western colonialism might return in a new form. Indonesians believed that, despite decolonization, the Western powers would always try to weaken postcolonial states in order to keep them dependent on their former colonial masters. Because of this suspicion, Indonesia cherished a regional vision that sought to limit the role and involvement of external powers in the affairs of regional security. As Michael Leifer has argued, “the experiences of the periods of national revolution and of outer islands dissidence have institutionalized a common apprehension among Indonesians of differing political persuasions of the intentions of all extra-regional powers.”5 And, this concern “has been articulated . . . in opposition to regionally located foreign bases.”6 Reflecting on the rejection of collective defense, former Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik argued that “the nations of Southeast Asia should consciously work toward the day when security in their own region will be the primary responsibility of the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Not through big power alignments, not through the building of contending military pacts or military arsenals but through strengthening the state of respective endurance, through effective regional cooperation with other states sharing this basic view on world affairs.”7 Indonesia’s opposition to foreign military presence, and its distaste for collective defense, are also influenced by the country’s perceptions of sources of threats to its national security, and by extension, to regional security. It believes that as many Southeast Asian countries are still faced with the difficult task of nation building, their primary security concerns are necessarily internal in nature. Thus, it sees the primary sources of threats emanating from state weaknesses, ranging from the contested nature of the state and the lack of economic development, to the lack of social cohesion. Moreover, threats to national and regional stability may

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also emanate more directly from intraregional tensions. Based on such an assessment of the sources of threats, Indonesia believes that collective defense is not a suitable approach to regional security because it cannot address the intraregional conflicts and internal weaknesses of individual regional states that constitute serious challenges to the security of Southeast Asia. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia’s opposition to foreign presence in the region, both militarily and politically, was carried out in a clearcut manner. For example, apprehension about collective defense was clearly expressed in Indonesia’s unwillingness to join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), a collective defense system established by the United States in 1955 with the object of countering the spread of communism in the region. For Indonesia, “SEATO represented a flawed approach to regional security” because although it “might be useful against a threat of outright aggression, an unlikely scenario as far as many non-communist Southeast Asian states were concerned, [it] could not address revolutionary social problems.”8 Politically, Indonesia’s opposition to a foreign presence was clearly expressed in its staunch opposition to Britain’s creation of the Malay Federation. When General Suharto took over power in 1966, Sukarno’s total opposition to any foreign presence was replaced with a moderate and pragmatic position. However, Suharto’s Indonesia continued to maintain its view of collective defense as an inappropriate strategy for Southeast Asian states. Such a view was clearly spelled out by Suharto on August 16, 1969, when he stated that “military pacts have proven not to be an effective form of defense, as they would weaken our national resilience and identity.”9 Under Suharto, Indonesia continued its strong preference for a regionally self-reliant approach to security. Its threat perception continued to stress domestic weaknesses and the opportunities they created for external intervention. A challenge of this sort could only be overcome through national development. And, in this regard, Indonesia considered intraregional tensions, rather than direct military aggression from extraregional powers, as posing more direct threats to regional security. For Indonesia, genuine regional security could only be achieved through intramural cooperation among the states of the region themselves. Indonesia’s strong advocacy of regional cooperation through ASEAN was based on this position. As Adam Malik put it, Southeast Asian nations should “jointly and separately build their own indigenous, ideological, political, economic, and socio-cultural strengths.”10 In the

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Indonesian view, ASEAN was to provide the matrix for this process.11 Regarding foreign military bases in Southeast Asia, Indonesia under Suharto was prepared to accommodate the divergent security needs of its regional partners through an understanding, included in the Bangkok Declaration issued at the time of ASEAN’s founding, that they were only “temporary.” However, disapproval of military alliances as a national defense strategy remained strong when, for example, Malik continued to assert that “the presence of military bases of other countries in a nation always creates suspicion.”12 The Cost of Deviation: Indonesia’s Experience with Bilateral Security Arrangements Despite its opposition to military alliances and strong preference for multilateral cooperative security systems, Indonesia did not practice what it preached without deviation. It did experiment with bilateral security relationships. However, these experiments soon proved vulnerable to pressures emanating from strong nationalist sentiment within Indonesia. Indeed, such deviations did not receive genuine support from within the domestic constituency. The first experiment took place in 1951, when the Masjumi-led government of Indonesia signed an agreement with the United States enabling it to receive American foreign aid under the Mutual Security Act (MSA). Under this agreement, Indonesia was obliged to “make a full contribution, consistent with its political and economic capacity, its population, natural resources, facilities and general economic situation, to the development and maintenance of its own defense and to the defensive strength of the free world.”13 The nature of the agreement, especially the inclusion of the term “free world,” soon brought Prime Minister Sukiman under severe criticism from the opposition at home. He was accused of abandoning an independent foreign policy and bringing Indonesia too close to the U.S. camp. As domestic opposition to the MSA mounted, Prime Minister Sukiman was obliged to tender his resignation in February 1952.14 The second experiment was with Australia. On the eve of the fifth ASEAN summit in Bangkok in December 1995, Indonesia surprised its ASEAN partners when Moerdiono, the minister for the State Secretariat, announced that Indonesia had concluded a “security agreement” with Australia. The agreement, officially called the Agreement on Maintain-

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ing Security (AMS), consisted of three main points. First, both sides agreed to “consult regularly at ministerial level on matters affecting their common security.” Second, both countries agreed “to consult in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the process of each party.” Third, the two countries committed themselves to promoting “beneficial cooperative security activities.” In short, the language of the AMS registered the spirit of a military pact not dissimilar to the ANZUS treaty (involving Australia, New Zealand, and the United States). The AMS provoked mixed reactions in Indonesia. Some readily accepted the official justification for it, others were critical. Retired general Hasnan Habib, for example, saw the AMS as “a military pact, because the two countries commit themselves to provide mutual assistance in defense.” In his view, this provision meant that “if Indonesia was attacked by a third party, Australia could intervene to help it, and vice versa.” Habib even went so far as to say that “this agreement creates the impression that Indonesia has become part of the FPDA [Five Power Defense Arrangement].” He also stated that the agreement must have been drawn up in anticipation of a “threat” from a foreign country or a third party.15 In fact, there was speculation at the time that President Suharto entered this agreement with Australia with the growing assertiveness of China in mind. In general, however, Indonesians did not interpret the AMS as an extraordinary departure from accepted policy. Nor did they consider it as contradicting the principle of bebas-aktif. The government’s rationale that the AMS only constituted “security” cooperation, and not cooperation for “defense,” was not challenged. Nor did the pact suffer the fate of the MSA. The strong position of President Suharto in Indonesia’s pyramid of power might have been the reason for the absence of effective opposition to the AMS. However, the fact that the government was obliged to explain the AMS in terms of “security” rather than “defense” clearly demonstrated that the issue of bilateral military cooperation with extraregional powers remained sensitive. In other words, Indonesia remained uncomfortable with such a practice. When grave problems erupted between Indonesia and Australia over East Timor in September 1999, Jakarta made no serious attempt to maintain the agreement. Provoked by what it saw as Canberra’s aggressive behavior toward Indonesia, the government simply revoked the agree-

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ment. Indeed, many within Indonesia’s elite applauded the decision. They generally maintained that the AMS reflected a personal initiative between Indonesia’s Suharto and Australia’s Paul Keating that would not bring any benefit for Indonesia’s security. Moreover, the way the agreement was brought to an end in 1999 clearly demonstrated once again the absence of genuine and strong domestic support in Indonesia for bilateral military ties with extraregional powers. Indonesia and Regional Security Institutions: ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum Indonesia’s consistent opposition to a military presence of extraregional powers and its rejection of military alliances as a means to guarantee both national and regional security clearly separates it from its regional partners. Indonesia thus stands out in a region where bilateral military alliances between regional countries and the great powers constitute the most salient features of security. In Indonesia’s view, “security must rest upon national and regional resilience rather than protection by foreign military patrons. The presence of foreign military interests in the region is viewed as an obstacle to the development of national and regional resilience.”16 Therefore, Jakarta has strongly advocated the view that regional security can only be genuinely attained through cooperation in a wide range of issues among regional states. For Indonesia, ASEAN was not meant to be a collective defense mechanism for member states. Jakarta expected ASEAN to provide collective internal security through its mechanism of preventing the outbreak of contentions between member states. As an observer has remarked, “the necessity to co-operate . . . is deemed a function of a ‘hostile’ environment.”17 Indeed, prior to the establishment of ASEAN, the politico-security situation in Southeast Asia was characterized by various conflicts among its prospective members, with Indonesia-Thailand relations an exception. The establishment of ASEAN, therefore, was motivated by a strong desire and political commitment to “promote a sense of regional identity as the basis for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations.”18 And ASEAN’s immediate achievement was to sustain conditions for peace following the restoration of relations between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This fact clearly demonstrates that ASEAN was initially formed with the objective of promoting regional reconciliation and managing intramural disputes.

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In terms of its preference for a regionally oriented cooperative security system, Indonesia’s motive for participating in ASEAN is selfevident. Indonesia saw, and still sees, ASEAN as a vehicle for realizing its vision of regional order. For Indonesia, ASEAN provides an opportunity to reduce the region’s reliance on external powers for regional security. It has been noted that “within this new organization Indonesia continued to stress non-alignment and a general interest in removing great power competition from the region.”19 President Suharto himself repeatedly argued that Southeast Asian states should not believe they were simply helpless pawns in the international game.20 Indeed, the most important aspect of ASEAN’s contribution to Indonesia’s national security has been the commitment by member states to prevent their region from being used as a base for foreign powers to act against fellow ASEAN states.21 Although ASEAN is not a defense organization, Indonesia has not eschewed the need to engage in bilateral security relationships with its fellow ASEAN states. Unlike in the case of its security ties with outside powers, Indonesia has welcomed defense cooperation with its neighbors, and indeed it has considered such cooperation necessary for maintaining harmonious relations among fellow ASEAN members. For example, Indonesia has developed very close bilateral defense cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore, including regular, mutual military exercises. As Dewi Fortuna Anwar noted, “these military ties and exercises serve many purposes, the most important being to get to know and understand each other, thus removing suspicions and misunderstanding.”22 Such bilateral defense cooperation notwithstanding, the bottom line has remained the rejection of any suggestion that ASEAN be transformed into a security organization. Indonesia’s reluctance to have security issues included on ASEAN’s agenda of cooperation, however, changed in response to the dramatic events following the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, “the underlying priorities of Indonesia’s foreign policy have not changed with the transformation of international relations attendant on the end of the Cold War.”23 Testifying to that assertion is the fact that Indonesia continues to view ASEAN as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Indonesia also continues to emphasize that the involvement of major powers in regional security affairs should be kept minimal. However, it has begun to accept the reality that it needs to reconcile its long-term aspiration for an independent Southeast Asia, on the one hand, with the immediate geopoliti-

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cal realities of post–Cold War regional politics marked by the inevitable involvement of major powers, on the other. That new awareness was an important motivation for Indonesia’s active participation in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 1993. Indeed, it has been argued that “Indonesia’s participation in the ARF serves as a significant compromise for, as well as an answer to, such a dilemma.”24 Even though the ARF, in essence, constituted a greater acknowledgement by Indonesia of the legitimate security interests of major powers in Southeast Asia, there were two significant aspects of the forum that made it particularly acceptable to Jakarta. First, Indonesia had initially insisted that it did not wish to see a new regional security arrangement dominated by extraregional powers. The ARF, when it was formed, recognized the central, though managerial, role of ASEAN within the organization. Indeed, ASEAN has been assigned a role as “the primary driving force.” Second, the ARF itself has adopted a style of work similar to that of ASEAN. These two characteristics of the ARF clearly assuaged Indonesia’s initial concerns that such a wider regional security arrangement would eclipse the importance and independence of ASEAN in “regulating” major powers’ involvement in Southeast Asia. Indeed, such characteristics of the ARF “provide a greater opportunity for Indonesia to overcome its security concerns and . . . to exercise its post–Cold War international role.”25 It is important to note, however, that even though Indonesia continues to favor a multilateral cooperative security system such as the ARF, and is still uncomfortable with the notion of bilateral alliances in the framework of collective defense, it no longer expresses outright opposition to such a system. Indonesia has not opposed the involvement of some ASEAN members in regional military alliances involving outside powers. Nor has it opposed the existing bilateral defense relationship between some ASEAN countries with extraregional powers such as the United States. The continuing presence of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), even though the undertaking is still seen as being directed at Indonesia, is hardly mentioned in the contemporary discourse of Indonesia’s foreign and security policy. From outside Southeast Asia, ANZUS has also been noted by an Indonesian security analyst as a nonissue, one to which little attention has been paid by ASEAN countries.26 Indeed, Jakarta is acutely aware that suspicions about its intentions in the region have not entirely vanished. Therefore, while expressing its understanding for the continuing existence of collective defense arrange-

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ments in the region, “Indonesia continues to hope that closer regional cooperation will eventually remove the underlying suspicions among ASEAN members, thus enabling that organization to develop a truly autonomous regional order in which members will no longer look to outside powers to guarantee their security.”27 For Indonesia, a cooperative security system—either within ASEAN or the ARF—is still the preferred mechanism by which countries can assure both national and regional security. Global Participation: Indonesia and UN Peacekeeping Operations In between Indonesia’s preference for cooperative security and its unfavorable view of collective defense system stands the country’s strong support for the collective security approach entrenched in the United Nations system. Indonesia sees its participation in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as a manifestation of both its international obligations as a member of the international community as well as its obligations under the Indonesian constitution of 1945, which obliges the republic to actively participate in building world peace and stability. Indonesia’s participation in UN peace operations started as early as 1957, when it sent the first Indonesian PKO delegation to Egypt as part of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). By 2000, Indonesia had sent sixty-four contingents to participate in UN PKO missions. The government feels that Indonesia’s participation in UN PKOs brings four main benefits to the country. First, it believes that such participation contributes to the maintenance and preservation of global security and stability. This improves Indonesia’s image abroad as a responsible, committed member of the international community. Second, participation in PKOs also benefits Indonesia’s diplomacy, especially by improving its relations with other members of the international community. Third, the government believes the experience gained in PKOs—including knowledge of tactics and the like that its armed forces develop through participation in the missions—will enhance its insight into conflict resolution. It expects PKOs to provide lessons for Indonesia that will help it professionalize its military and increase the military’s effectiveness in conducting future missions, especially domestic ones. Finally, participation in PKOs provides inputs for improving the conduct of future UN peacekeeping missions.28

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Such a positive view of involvement in UN PKOs, however, underwent a slight change when, for the first time, Indonesia itself become an object of international peacekeeping. This, of course, was the case of East Timor. Although there has not been any official change in the government’s policy pronouncements, sentiments have grown in Indonesia’s elite that such PKOs might also become an instrument of extraregional powers in their attempt to intervene in both national and regional affairs. It has been asserted, for example, that “PKOs can be seen as an ‘instrument’ of strong powers to intrude into a strategic region” and as “a cover for developed states’ attempts at achieving their national interests.”29 With a degree of trepidation, it has also been argued that, “judging from the reality in the field, and also from the preparedness of developed countries to undertake PKOs, the argument that PKOs can serve as a disguised invasion may contain some truth.”30 In a recent debate on Indonesia’s participation in UN PKOs, Indonesian defense planners also began to emphasize the importance of maintaining the noninterference principle in PKO missions. They argued that a distinction should be made between Indonesia’s participation in “peacekeeping operations” (based on the consent of the conflicting parties) and “peace-enforcement operations” (which can be carried out without absolute consent).31 Indonesian defense planners consider the latter not merely a contravention of Indonesia’s strict adherence to the sanctity of sovereignty, but also a Trojan horse for the vested interests of extraregional powers. This, for example, is evident in a direct reference to the role of the UN PKO in East Timor. Indonesian observers have described the role of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) as “not fully free from vested interests of certain parties” and have declared that “its violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty cannot be forgotten.”32 In light of this experience, therefore, it has been argued that Indonesia should limit its participation to PKOs where “its contribution to world peace can be carried out without violating the sovereignty of any state.”33 Suspicion of the major extraregional powers’ intentions is clearly evident in such arguments. The East Timor experience seems to have reinforced the memory of the 1950s and 1960s, when the external environment was basically hostile. Many Indonesians take the role of Australia in mobilizing world support for a UN mission in East Timor as evidence of a hostile external environment and of the unfriendly intentions of extraregional powers. Therefore, it is not surprising that some strategic planners in Indonesia began to voice the need for ASEAN to

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improve its capacity to undertake regionally based PKOs. In a “terms of reference” (TOR) for the National Workshop on Indonesia’s Participation in UN PKOs, the organizer (the Indonesian Foreign Ministry) stated that “it is not unlikely that ASEAN would become a solid vehicle and committed to resolve conflicts in its own region.”34 In that context, there have been suggestions that Indonesia should begin to actively promote the idea of an ASEAN regional peacekeeping center.35 After Suharto and September 11: More Continuity than Change The fall of Suharto in May 1998 has not changed Indonesia’s basic view of and approach toward regional security. Indonesia continues to uphold the principle of bebas-aktif in its foreign policy and thus rejects any possibility of entering a collective defense system. Suharto’s immediate successor, Habibie, also invoked the tenacity of this principle in his government’s foreign policy. Although different in style, the foreign policy of Habibie’s successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, also adhered to this principle. Megawati Sukarnoputri has similarly pledged to uphold the principle of bebas-aktif in her foreign policy. In her first speech before the parliament on August 16, 2001, President Megawati pledged that her government would continue to conduct a “free and active foreign policy.”36 In other words, there is still a very solid consensus among Indonesia’s foreign policy elite that bebas-aktif, which precludes collective defense as a policy option, should remain the cardinal principle of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Uneasiness and suspicion regarding the role of extraregional powers—especially the United States—in the region have remained the key characteristic of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the governments of the post-Suharto era. For example, President Wahid’s unrealistic proposal for a new “Asian coalition” comprising Indonesia, China, and India certainly evinced a degree of dissatisfaction with the dominant role of the West in international relations. Wahid contended that such a coalition would greatly help correct the “imbalance” in international relations that favors the West.37 In this context, the Asian coalition proposal has been seen as an attempt to “balance American and Western influence” and “limit the scope for external forces to undermine Indonesia’s sovereignty.”38 Under Megawati, Indonesia has also taken great care not to allow itself to be seen as under the influence of America or another

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foreign power. More explicitly, Megawati underscored her government’s intention of focusing foreign policy undertakings on Southeast Asia. This intention was clearly expressed in her comment to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) that her government wanted to reaffirm ASEAN as the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy and maintain Indonesia’s independence in regional and international affairs.39 In reality, however, upholding such a policy is not an easy task. The surge in terrorist threats after September 11, 2001 poses a new challenge to regional security. For the first time, regional states are faced with the fact that a serious threat to regional security has not come from a fellow state. With evidence of a regional terrorist network now mounting, the threat is more real than many regional states initially imagined. Such evidence first came from a string of arrests by Singaporean and Malaysian authorities of a number of Islamic militants linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, an organization allegedly tied to Al-Qaeda. Stronger, more convincing evidence of a terrorist threat in Southeast Asia came with the devastating attacks on Bali on October 12, 2002. In facing such threats, the notion of cooperative security–which seeks security with rather than against—is obviously extraneous. Indeed, the challenge facing Indonesia’s government has become more daunting in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. In formulating its official stance toward the September 11 atrocity and Washington’s subsequent response, the Indonesian government was torn between two conflicting positions. It recognized that Indonesia would soon have to undertake a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, Megawati seemed aware that the horrific event would become an international issue with serious implications for the whole world, including Indonesia. In that context, Indonesia had few choices aside from expressing its support for the American war on terrorism. On the other hand, Jakarta also recognized the need to carefully weigh its position against possible domestic reactions, particularly from the Muslim community. To that effect, the Megawati government was aware that its support for the American call for a global war on terrorism might be construed at home as an act of submission to the United States. This delicate balancing act was reflected in Jakarta’s ambiguous attitude toward the U.S.-led war on terrorism. While it continued to stress its commitment to combating terrorism, Indonesia opposed the U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan and the Taliban regime. At the end of October 2001, for example, Megawati called on America to stop its bombing of

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Afghanistan, especially during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and Christmas. She maintained that “prolonged military action is not only counterproductive but also can weaken the global coalition’s joint effort to combat terrorism.”40 She also demanded that Washington show proof that Osama bin Laden was responsible for the September 11 attacks. President Megawati reminded the Americans that “it is an obligation of every party to help find and show to the world the convincing evidence of connection of any elements allegedly involved in these irresponsible actions before taking measures to combat terrorism.”41 The statement clearly reflected a popular position within Indonesia against what was considered a unilateral action by a major power. Indeed, Indonesia displayed its uneasiness with the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism when Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, speaking at the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Shanghai, maintained that Indonesia wanted to see the United Nations take the leading role and initiate a collective response to international terrorism.42 Wirajuda repeated this after meeting with U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell: Indonesia believed “a collective international response” to the September 11 terrorist attacks was preferable to unilateral U.S. military action.43 Indonesia’s reluctance to fully become part of an American-led coalition against terrorism was also evident in its preference for working at a regional level. Foreign Minister Wirajuda, for example, stated that “long before the September 11 attacks, a region-wide program to combat terrorism and other transnational crimes had been an integral part of our ASEAN functional cooperation.”44 Indonesia has also signed a number of antiterrorism agreements with some regional states. In May 2002, it formed an “antiterrorism pact” with Malaysia and the Philippines, with emphasis on an agreement to exchange information and to establish communications procedures. 45 In July, Indonesia expressed its full support for counterterrorism cooperation between ASEAN and the United States.46 Following the Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, Indonesia fully supported the Declaration on Terrorism issued at the eighth ASEAN summit. Indonesia’s overall attitude, however, still registers a strong reluctance to move beyond a traditional mode of cooperation. With the exception of the joint investigation between Indonesia and Australia of the Bali bombing, Jakarta remains opposed to any suggestion that a U.S.Philippines style of cooperation should be considered as a model for future strategy in combating terrorism in the region. Indonesia is still highly sensitive to the notion of foreign troops helping to combat terror-

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ist networks on its own soil. Thus Indonesia reacted strongly, for example, to a report in the American media in March 2002 that the United States might be considering ways to get its forces into Indonesia based on supposed evidence that Al-Qaeda members have fled from Afghanistan to Indonesia.47 Indonesia has also reacted strongly to a comment made by Australia’s prime minister John Howard on the need for the UN to review its charter in order to allow states to launch preemptive strikes against threats from nonstate actors in foreign countries. Opposition to such an approach to regional security clearly reflects a strong adherence to the principle of the sanctity of state sovereignty. For that reason, Indonesia remains opposed to unilateralism and the presence of foreign military forces on its soil. It continues to promote the use of regional and international vehicles as an acceptable approach to regional and international security, including against the threats of terrorism. The September 11 and October 12 terrorist attacks have not brought about a fundamental change in Indonesia’s basic view, attitude, and approach to regional security. Conclusion From the outset of its postcolonial existence, Indonesia has been a strong proponent of cooperative security systems. Indeed, an implicit form of cooperative security, regardless of the failed experiments in bilateral security ties with outside powers, has been a consistent feature of Indonesia’s thinking on regional security. Indonesia simply despises collective defense, especially when it involves extraregional powers, as a mechanism for ensuring national and regional security in Southeast Asia. This attitude is deeply influenced by the country’s experience in securing its independence, and also by strong nationalist sentiments emanating from its political system. Its experience during the 1950s in dealing with internal dissident movements, which received backing from external powers that projected their support from military bases in Southeast Asia, strengthened Indonesia’s view that any foreign military presence in Southeast Asia could pose a threat to its security interests. This attitude was strongly expressed during the Sukarno era. Under President Suharto, however, Indonesia softened its opposition to collective defense pacts entered into by some regional countries. Nevertheless, Indonesia continues to promote the idea of an independent Southeast Asia, with little reliance on extraregional powers. It presents itself as

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a strong advocate of “regional solutions to regional problems” and argues that the security of Southeast Asia cannot be genuinely attained through the enhancement of the members’ collective defense capabilities. Such a regional vision, Indonesia believes, can be attained only through a cooperative security system among regional countries. Although it sees ASEAN as representing such an undertaking at the subregional level, it generally values the ARF for its commitment to seek security with, rather than security against, other countries. It no longer believes, however, that the continuing existence of a collective defense system involving some ASEAN members (that is, the FPDA) hampers cooperative security endeavors. For Indonesia, such arrangements are acceptable as long as they are not directed against any regional partners. Indonesia’s attitude toward the collective security approach as ingrained in the UN system is less ambiguous. Indonesia sees its participation in UN peace operations as necessary both in constitutional terms and in terms of its obligation as a responsible member of the international community. For that reason, Indonesia does not see its participation as an act that contravenes its commitment to cooperative security. In fact, it considers the collective security system, especially in the form of UN-sanctioned PKOs, complementary to a regionally oriented, cooperative security system in that it provides a mechanism by which international security at the global level can be preserved. However, in light of Indonesia’s recent experience in East Timor, there have been signs also that some Indonesian defense planners have begun to question the validity of UN-sanctioned operations in relation to the principle of sovereignty and to the interests of extraregional powers. Support for the establishment of an ASEAN regional peacekeeping center signifies Indonesia’s vision of regional order based on “regional solutions to regional problems,” with little involvement of extraregional powers. The surge in terrorist attacks has not changed that basic attitude. The September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and the October 12 Bali bombing in Indonesia, have not persuaded Jakarta to publicly support the involvement of external powers in regional problems. Indonesia consistently expresses its hope that ASEAN will continue to serve as the main vehicle for regional countries to cope with regional problems. In the final analysis, Indonesia’s approach to regional security has not undergone dramatic change since the proclamation of independence in 1945. Whenever deviation has occurred, it has only been temporary and, more importantly, a function of tumultuous domestic political developments.

——— 6 ——— Japan’s Compound Approach to Security Cooperation Yasuhiro Takeda

Since the end of the Cold War, the security environment in the AsiaPacific has become more opaque and uncertain, making the detection, identification, and prediction of danger in this region exceedingly difficult. The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States reminded us of the hard fact that the stability of civilized societies, which today make up parts of a global village, is threatened not only by overt military confrontations among sovereign states, but also by illicit and covert use of force by subnational groups. At the same time, a set of unresolved rivalries and territorial disputes, left over as a legacy of the Cold War era, bedevils this region. Academic debate about the security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region has revolved around at least two related questions: (1) What is the major obstacle to security cooperation? (2) What is the most appropriate security system in the region? Some groups tend to endorse cooperative security, which presupposes that security dilemmas, rooted in structural uncertainty, are the prime source of conflicts.1 On the other hand, others advocate collective defense or collective security, both of which view threats and insecurity as originating in conscious competition and hostility. Although the logic of cooperative security theoretically contradicts that of collective defense and collective security, recent discourse seems to suggest that these approaches are not necessarily incompatible. However, an appropriate way to organically link them together is still lacking. Therefore, the so-called multilayered approach that various analysts have talked about has not quite materialized as a viable security system yet. This chapter explores possible paths toward just such a nexus by reviewing the Japanese approach to security. The 88

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Japanese experience, it is argued here, provides some insights into how diverse approaches such as the Japan-U.S. bilateral alliance, contemporary variants of United Nations (UN) collective security, as well as cooperative security, can be organically combined into a “compound” approach to security. The first and second sections provide a brief explanation of the major obstacles to and the current regional framework for security cooperation through an analysis of the power structure and security order in the Asia-Pacific.2 The third section examines the changing nature of the Japan-U.S. alliance and its reliability as a provider of a “public good” for the general benefit of regional states. The fourth section outlines interconnections between UN collective security and the Japan-U.S. alliance at the policy level. The fifth section considers Japan’s basic attitude toward cooperative security. Growing Uncertainty and the Struggle for Power in the Asia-Pacific According to Barry Buzan, conflict formation in which “conflictual relations dominate, but amity is also possible,” is the defining feature of Asia-Pacific international relations.3 Unresolved rivalries and flashpoints exist throughout the region. Moreover, the inherent structural uncertainty and ongoing power struggle among regional states remain relatively unmitigated, since cooperative institutions for regulating security relations are still immature in the Asia-Pacific. First, during the Cold War era, the regional system in the Asia-Pacific was primarily dominated by global bipolarity, although the strategic power triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China greatly influenced security relations after the 1970s. But with the end of the Cold War, a certain degree of autonomy from the global system was restored to the region. The power structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union in this region has been characterized as “uni-multipolar,” with one superpower and three unequal major powers. Indeed, the wide range in military spending levels across the regional states is indicative of disparities within the current power structure. For example, in 2001 the proportions of defense spending of various powers in relation to what the United States spent on defense was approximately 20 percent for Russia, 12–14 percent for both Japan and China, and less than 4 percent for most other regional states.4

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Although the United States remains the predominant power in every conceivable region and domain today, its future role and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region is not assured. If the North Korean threat diminishes or the Taiwan issue is settled, the United States may reduce its military presence in South Korea as well as in Japan, even though the Nye report of 1995, which reviewed America’s East Asian strategy and redefined the Japan-U.S. security framework, endorsed the deployment of 100,000 troops in the region. Although Russian capabilities have been significantly reduced since the Cold War, Russia’s potential power resources are sufficient to preserve its status as a major power. With the reassertion of national pride, Russia regards a loose coalition with China via the “Shanghai five” (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO) as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony. China and Japan have also emerged as regional powers, but their capabilities are rather limited in some respects. China is a military power with a nuclear capability and strong land-based conventional forces, but its air and naval forces are still undergoing modernization. Moreover, China is likely to be swayed by prospects of economic development under globalization as well as domestic regime transition. On the other hand, although Japan is preparing to forgo its traditional self-restraint on international engagement in the security field, its once-dominant economic power has begun to erode. Such structural transformation from bipolarity to uni-multipolarity has created a high degree of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific. Compared with a relatively static bipolarity during the Cold War era, structural uncertainties both on the vertical and horizontal dimensions make it difficult to accurately predict who will be on whose side, and with what capabilities, in a confrontation.5 In other words, the current unimultipolar structure increases flexibility in coalition building, while making the balance of power fluid and complex. As a result, a low degree of predictability and mutual trust is likely to stimulate the dynamics of the security dilemma. Second, under the current uni-multipolar structure in the Asia-Pacific, the regional security order takes on both aspects of hegemonic and balance of power systems in an imperfect manner.6 On the one hand, U.S. hegemony has been functionally supported by its alliances with Japan and South Korea as well as military-access agreements with partners in Southeast Asia, despite the fact that none of the major powers has tried to provide an alternative to U.S. hegemony. On the other hand, Japan and China have not been able to provide an adequate counterbalance to

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the overbearing power of the United States, although latent dynamics of a balance of power among the regional major powers appear to exist. This mixed nature of the regional security order is the prime source of the intensification of the power struggle, because it is difficult to create a common understanding of the status quo among most if not all the state actors in the Asia-Pacific. The partiality of the hegemonic order distinguishes status quo states, whose security interests and values are supported by U.S. hegemony, from revisionist states that are not in sympathy with the existing order. Therefore, even though all states are not power-maximizers but security-maximizers by nature, a balance of power system would nevertheless be unstable. The buildup of defensive weapons by status quo states could be perceived by revisionist states as directed against them. Such uncertain developments in the dynamics of the balance of power tend to fuel tension between status quo and revisionist powers. For example, U.S. hegemony functions to freeze the territorial status quo in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula, in addition to the relative power positions of regional states. Japan is a status quo power in that it has enormously benefited from the current regional order under U.S. hegemony. In contrast, China is dissatisfied with the existing conditions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, although it takes a status quo attitude toward the Korean Peninsula. As a result, differences in orientation toward the status quo in the AsiaPacific are likely to intensify the power struggle between Japan and China. Third, despite the growing uncertainty and the continuous power struggle, cooperative institutions are still immature in the Asia-Pacific. To address relevant and pressing issues, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in July 1994 to cope with regionwide concerns. Since then the ARF has provided variable points of diplomatic contact and dialogue for the regional major powers as well as other Asia-Pacific countries. However, its major function still remains the promotion of confidence building and, at best, a rudimentary form of conflict prevention. Regional order and stability fundamentally cannot rely on either a stable balance of major powers or the hegemonic power of the United States, whose existence is also the prerequisite for a successful ARF.7 It may be said that security relations in Southeast Asia are more institutionalized and predictable than those in Northeast Asia. All states in Southeast Asia share a commitment to the norms of ASEAN, such as noninterference in the domestic affairs of fellow members, provision for peaceful resolution of conflicts between members, and soli-

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darity toward the outside world. However, these norms have not been transformed into concrete rules and procedures. Moreover, due to domestic regime transitions, norms of noninterference and solidarity seem to be on shaky ground. On the other hand, Northeast Asia still reflects traditional power politics. Multilateral security dialogues at the semiofficial level have started among Japan, the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia. In addition, bilateral military exchanges have also contributed to increases in transparency. However, there exists no multilateral security framework that squarely addresses the China-Taiwan issue or involves North Korea as a member. Six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue took place in August 2003, but it is unclear if this multilateral format will develop into a security regime. In fact, Northeast Asia lags far behind Southeast Asia in the institutionalization of security relations. Current Framework of Security Cooperation in the Region Security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is more critical and, arguably, more necessary, than in Europe, although it has proven far more difficult to realize fully. It is necessary because individualistic actions are likely to exacerbate security dilemmas in this region where multilateral arrangements are still incipient, and difficult because structural uncertainty is pervasive and the current power struggle is considerably more serious in the Asia-Pacific. As long as anarchy is a permanent feature of the international system, states cannot totally escape the security dilemma. However, if the security dilemma operates as the unintended consequence of policy under structural features of the international system, it is possible to mitigate the dilemma by lessening uncertainty through cooperative undertakings, not against others but with them.8 Therefore, cooperative security is considered a good means of mitigating the security dilemma. On the other hand, conflicts and insecurity arising from power struggles cannot be resolved by only enhancing transparency. It is also very difficult to constrain power struggles through cooperative institutions because relative power is zero-sum by definition. Conscious competition and hostility among states must be restrained externally by either the balancing action of states, the aggregate power of states, or the preponderant capacities of the hegemonic state. In this regard, an appropri-

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ate or attractive means to effective strategy is not necessarily through cooperative security, but either through collective defense or collective security. Accordingly, cooperative security combined with either the collective defense or collective security approach would make an intriguing theoretical proposition insofar as the growing uncertainties and the power struggle in the Asia-Pacific are concerned. In fact, the current security order in the Asia-Pacific is maintained under a mix of three organizing principles in an improvised, or specifically ad hoc, and multitiered manner. The first principle or pillar is bilateral collective defense whereby the U.S. military presence, so indispensable for the stability of the region, is backed by allies and other partners. The “hub-and-spokes” arrangement remains the only security scheme actually capable of effectively deterring and countering aggression. The alliances with the United States function as bulwarks against contingencies such as hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, conflict between China and Taiwan, and conflict in the South China Sea. In contrast, the collective defense approach is less effective in promoting trust and cooperation with potential aggressors and security at the domestic level. The second pillar is a modified version of collective security. As Andrew Butfoy argues, “imperfection should not be seen as fatally undermining the value of collective security.”9 Indeed, regional cooperation in peacekeeping within the framework of the United Nations has played a significant role in peacemaking as well as peacebuilding in Cambodia and East Timor. Eleven Asia-Pacific states participated in the UNTAC military component in 1992; nine in the Australian-led INTERFET in 1999. These internal conflicts would not have been resolved without the involvement of the United Nations. However, the likelihood of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in this region mounted solely by regional peacekeeping forces is slim, since regional states hardly share the same view as that held by UN PKOs. The third pillar is cooperative security arrangements at both the official and nongovernmental levels, such as the ARF, ASEAN+3, and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). These multilateral frameworks for dialogue and consultation on security issues have contributed to mitigating uncertainty and distrust among the regional states through the enhancement of transparency. As stated above, bilateral collective defense is most effective in dealing with the threats and insecurity deriving from power struggles, but

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less effective than cooperative security in mitigating security dilemmas. Although prospects for regional variants of collective security designed to deal with external aggression are dim, the looser version implemented by the UN has contributed to the region’s security. In the meantime, the security architecture of the region will continue to consist of unilateral defense policies (self-help), bilateral alliances, and emerging multilateral arrangements.10 However, problems exist in two respects. First, the three approaches discussed above (collective defense, collective security, and cooperative security) are juxtaposed without being organically integrated as a regional security system. In other words, there is no unifying mechanism. Moreover, employing three approaches to security cooperation does not automatically guarantee regional harmony. Indeed, given their distinct organizing principles, we may assume the existence of competition between collective defense and collective security on the one hand, and cooperative security on the other hand.11 Collective security originally emerged as a replacement for the balance of power on which collective defense plays. Whereas collective defense aims for the military security of particular states, collective security serves international society as a whole. However, as the structural uncertainty of the regional system increases, collective defense against particular threats is likely to make little difference in comparison to collective security against unspecified threats. Unlike the U.S.–South Korea alliance, whose primary objective is to deter the military threat from North Korea, the Japan-U.S. and the Australia-U.S. alliances have functioned to cope with any contingency in this region since the end of the Cold War. Cooperative security recognizes the value of either existing collective defense or collective security arrangements. However, it is basically the notion of security with the adversary that underpins cooperative security, rather than security against the adversary as in the case of collective defense and collective security. Accordingly, cooperative security, whether defined in terms of confidence building or conflict resolution, is inconsistent with collective defense and collective security at a certain stage. As G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama have argued, “if and when ARF has ‘teeth’ in the future, it might create contradictions with the U.S. bilateral alliances, especially with the U.S.Japan alliance.”12 Moreover, if UN collective security actively seeks to meddle in domestic affairs, it may collide with the basic norms and principles of cooperative security, which uphold state sovereignty. A second problem lies in the different views held by regional states

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on what sort of security order is most desirable. Most Asian states recognize the significance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Nevertheless, small and middle powers basically favor multilateral engagements partly to safeguard themselves against the unilateralist impulse of the more powerful. ASEAN countries tend to pursue the cooperative security model, believing it is the best approach, whereas the United States and Japan are more enthusiastic about the bilateral collective defense model. In addition, long-range perspectives on the regional order among major powers appear to be significantly divergent. Both China and Russia have allowed the military presence of the United States as a tentative stabilizer in the region. However, at the same time, these two countries have apparently struck a convenient “strategic partnership” in order to take a stand against the Japan-U.S. alliance. Essentially, they seem to seek the restoration of the traditional balance of power system consisting of regional states with relatively equal power. On the other hand, after the Cold War the United States and Japan have widened security cooperation by transforming their bilateral alliance into a kind of regional “public good.” Furthermore, they expect a lasting hegemonic system under the American security banner to maintain the existing distribution of power. The Japan-U.S. Alliance as a Security Regime Providing a “Public Good” The Japan-U.S alliance is a typical form of collective defense arrangement for dealing with potential adversaries, in this case particularly with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. In theory, it is natural to expect that such an alliance would dissolve with the demise of a clearly visible threat. However, the alliance still functions as a lynchpin of the “hub-and-spokes” arrangement of America’s bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific, even as some of the original spokes, specifically those with the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, have become more brittle. Moreover, since the mid-1990s Japan and the United States have revitalized their unique alliance to include a widening of its primary role from the defense of Japan to the security of the region. In April 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto released a Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the Twenty-first Century. In this joint communiqué, Japan and the United

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States “reaffirmed” the common goal of “maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twentyfirst century.”13 The geographical scope of the alliance seemed to literally expand to “the Asia-Pacific” from “the Far East,” as stipulated in Article 6 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. According to the official view, “the Far East” has been defined as “north [of the] Philippines and [the] area around Japan, including the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.”14 As the Japanese government has repeatedly explained, it does not consider the declaration a redefinition of the alliance, but just a reaffirmation of its importance. In fact, although the Japanese government has never placed a geographic limit upon the activities of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, it has adopted a minimalist stance where the activities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are concerned.15 Therefore, the geographic scope, by itself, remains unchanged. However, the point of the declaration is that the alliance’s rationale in the post–Cold War era has clearly shifted from the narrow role of defending Japan in Article 5 of the treaty toward managing regional security as covered by Articles 5 and 6.16 Following the declaration, significant progress was made with the announcement of the new Guidelines for the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in September 1997. First, the new guidelines emphasize that “the positive engagement of the United States in the region,” supported by the alliance, “benefits all in the region.”17 In short, the alliance is now described as regional public goods with the provision of a stable and steadfast U.S. military presence from which all the states of the region can benefit. Second, the new guidelines enlarge the activities of the SDF to include the provision of logistic support to U.S. forces as well as searchand-rescue operations “in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan.” The phrase “situations in areas surrounding Japan” is noteworthy since this means Tokyo now regards threats to its peace and security in situational rather than geographic terms.18 Although the geographic scope of the new guidelines remains more or less unchanged relative to “the Far East” stipulation in the treaty, the new guidelines empower Japan to respond to various crises and emergencies within that geographic scope and no matter what form they might take. In a sense, the Japan-U.S. alliance has been transformed from a bilateral collective defense against common threats to a type of “security regime” as a potentially effective vehicle for increasing the security not

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just of Japan but every regional state.19 If so, this would mean that Japan and the United States have succeeded in institutionalizing a cooperative arrangement without being swayed by either short-run interests or threat perceptions. Indeed, the treaty does provide a comprehensive framework for effective security, political, and economic cooperation based on shared values. Although ASEAN as an international regime aims to facilitate a coordination type of security cooperation, the Japan-U.S. alliance, as a security regime, is based on collaboration between its members.20 Put another way, the former aims to avoid specific patterns of behaviors, while the latter seeks to shape particular outcomes. Although ASEAN is a club good only for its member states, the Japan-U.S. alliance has the potential to offer public goods to be shared by every state in the region. This is because the Japan-U.S. alliance, by enabling U.S. forces stationed in Japan to deploy to any part of the Asia-Pacific, can be the only security framework with positive regional spillover effects. However, whether or not the renewed Japan-U.S. alliance is acknowledged as the legitimate provider of a regional public good depends on two factors. One is the capability of the alliance to guarantee provision of regional peace and security. The other is its implicit inclusiveness, since no state is excluded from enjoying the regional peace and security provided by the security treaty. To be sure, even though the benefits of regional peace provided by the U.S. military presence accrue to all, some states may nevertheless feel insecure if they recognize the Japan-U.S. alliance as an obstacle to advancing their relative capabilities. With respect to the alliance’s reliability, the major obstacle for Japan’s security cooperation lies in the limits on Japan’s ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense. The scope of rear-area support to U.S. forces has certainly been enlarged by the notion of “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” However, as long as Japan continues to take an official stance that “Japan has the right of collective self-defense, but the exercise of that right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the peace constitution,” the SDF cannot cooperate with U.S. forces in combat zones. As long as Japan’s cooperation in a “situation in areas surrounding Japan” fits under the rubric of the right of individual selfdefense, the functions and conditions of the alliance would be satisfied. In November 2001, Japan sent Maritime SDF ships to the Indian Ocean to provide noncombatant support for the U.S.-led military operation in Afghanistan. However, unlike NATO members, Japan’s contribution to

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the war on terror was implemented based on UN antiterrorism resolutions, not as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Since the Koizumi administration took office in 2001, the domestic environment has dramatically changed. According to a Nikkei poll conducted in early June 2001, 58 percent of respondents approved the change of the existing policy on the right of collective self-defense.21 A mid-October 2001 poll by Mainichi shimbun found that 57 percent supported the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean to aid the U.S.-led war on terror in the name of making an “international contribution.”22 However, the fact that the Koizumi administration avoided a constitutional debate indicates that the legal and policy constraints on the use of the SDF are still serious obstacles. On the other hand, greater Japan-U.S. cooperation must not incur the mistrust of regional states. In order to prevent reliability in the capability of providing regional peace and security and confidence among regional states from falling into a trade-off situation, it is important that Japan actively participate in security dialogues and defense exchange programs with neighboring countries at both bilateral and multilateral levels. The Nexus of UN Collective Security and the Japan-U.S. Alliance During the Cold War, Japan assiduously avoided collective security commitments. However, in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, Japan demonstrated a willingness to be actively involved in UN PKOs. As a responsible member of the international community, Japan has regarded participation in UN PKOs as an integral part of its “contributions” to international peace and security. The primary driver behind this radical policy shift was a growing sense of crisis in the Japan-U.S. alliance as a result of Japan’s limited commitment to the 1991 Gulf crisis, which evoked sharp criticism from the United States about Japan having to do more than just exercising “checkbook diplomacy.” In 1992, Japan finally enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law, which ended the forty-year-old ban on sending SDF troops abroad. Based on that law, Japan sent some 600 engineering-unit troops plus 75 civilian police to UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992–93. Since February 2002, Japan has dispatched 10 headquarters-staff personnel and 680 engineering-unit personnel to UNTAET (then to UNMISET) in TimorLeste. This contingent represents Japan’s largest commitment of SDF

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units to UN PKOs. Through its engagement with multilateral security arrangements, Japan has incrementally overcome its constitutional constraints on the use of the SDF and enlarged its security role in the Asia-Pacific. In addition, peacekeeping operations have functioned as a training ground to promote Japan-U.S. security cooperation. The revised 1997 guidelines stipulate “when either or both Governments participate in United States peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary.”23 However, Japan’s PKO activities remain severely restricted under a constitutional interpretation that prohibits the deployment of the SDF abroad in missions that might entail the use of force. Therefore, Japan fundamentally cannot send infantry to participate in peace-enforcement missions. The 1992 law also limited Japanese participation to logistic support for peacekeeping operations, while freezing the primary duties of peacekeeping forces (PKFs), such as monitoring disarmament, stationing, and patrol, until new legislation has been enacted. Furthermore, the use of weapons by the SDF was limited only to self-defense or emergency evacuations. The reasons for imposing strict legal restrictions on cooperation in UN collective security activities can be attributed to the necessity of obtaining domestic Japanese support as well as for relieving Asian neighbors of any anxieties. As far as the internal aspect is concerned, the public’s perceptions of the SDF’s role have drastically changed in the past decade. According to a government poll, respondents who supported Japan’s participation in UN PKOs increased from 45 percent in 1991 to 79.5 percent in 2001.24 A poll taken by News Station found that 68 percent of the respondents supported the bill to relax the conditions for the use of weapons.25 The government also judged that “expectation outside Japan for the SDF’s more active cooperation with international society centering on the UN’s building of world peace has heightened.”26 Under these conditions, in December 2001 the law was amended to lift the limitation on the primary PKF duties and to allow “the use of weapons to protect weapons and other equipment.” Although provisions in the five principles on the requirements for agreement on a cease-fire and consent of the conflicting parties are still effective, the scope of Japan’s peacekeeping activities has been significantly broadened. But the issue of rear support to multinational forces remains in limbo.27 As a

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result, Japan failed to participate in the Australian-led INTERFET operation in East Timor in 1999. Although political agreement by the ruling parties within Japan was reached in order to establish a framework to enable such operations in January 1999, concrete steps were not actually taken until September 11. If anything, the stimulus that brought Japan’s quick and robust participation in the antiterrorism war was the memory of the fiasco of Gulf War I. Based on the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law of October 2001, Japan decided to deploy Maritime SDF ships to the Indian Ocean to provide noncombatant support for coalition military operations in Afghanistan. The law imposed very restrictive rules on SDF activities, including no transport of weapons and ammunition and no supply of fuel to aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties.28 Notwithstanding these limitations, the Afghanistan war will go down in memory as the first case in which Japan participated in a multinational force authorized by the UN Security Council. In short, it means Japan has taken a new step toward collective security arrangements beyond UN PKOs. As Arnold Wolfers has emphasized, “collective defense and collective security fundamentally differ in respect to both intent and modes of action.”29 However, for Japan, they are complementary and supportive of each other. There is no doubt that active involvement in UN PKOs contributes to the promotion of Japan-U.S. security cooperation. In particular, Japan’s wider role in collective security arrangements can make up for any deficiency of the alliance arising from Japan’s self-imposed limitations on the exercise of its right of collective self-defense. Under the framework of UN collective security, it is possible for the SDF to have an opportunity for security cooperation in the cases beyond “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” Cooperative Security Beyond Just a Security Dialogue For the Japanese, the debate over whether priority rests with their alliance commitment or their multilateral engagements was almost over by the end of the1990s. Among Japanese foreign policy officials and security experts, there is now consensus that the Japan-U.S. alliance and multilateral diplomacy complement rather than supplant each other “because the latter can exist only when deterrence by the former works.”30 In short, bilateralism provides the base upon which multilat-

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eral commitments are erected. The 2001 Diplomatic Bluebook stated that “based on the premise of continued U.S. presence and involvement in Asia,” “the most realistic and appropriate approaches for the enhancement of the region’s security environment” should be to develop and strengthen “both bilateral and multilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation in a multi-tiered manner.”31 In other words, this virtually means that Japan regards the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as the core and multilateral security cooperation as only peripheral. As Japan renewed its security ties with the United States in the mid-1990s, its tentative enthusiasm for multilateralism in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War began to wane. However, this in no way implies any downplaying of multilateral diplomacy since delicate differences exist in views toward the role of cooperative security arrangements among those who seek complementary roles between bilateralism and multilateralism. The first view tends to see cooperative security as a hedge against any decline of American power or confidence in the Japan-U.S security arrangements. Considerable attention to the regional security dialogues such as ASEAN-PMC and the ARF in the early 1990s reflected a growing perception that “the United States no longer holds an overwhelming advantage in terms of overall national strength.”32 The Obuchi government proposed a four-power security summit or the sixpower talks in Northeast Asia in 1998, when diffidence characterized the Japan-U.S. security relationship. For instance, President Clinton decided to visit China without a stopover in Japan in June 1998. Also, after North Korea launched the Taepodong missile in August 1998, the United States agreed with North Korea to accelerate the construction of the light reactors. Despite the reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan has tended to display an interest in establishing a new mechanism for security dialogues whenever Japanese fears of American neglect and abandonment grow. However, Japan’s initiatives to create a subregional forum for security dialogue in Northeast Asia have not been successful due to opposition from both China and the United States. The second view expects a sort of division of labor between the Japan-U.S. alliance, with a crisis management function on the one hand, and cooperative security serving a confidence-building function on the other. It is assumed here that cooperative security has synergistic effects with the Japan-U.S. alliance on regional security. In particular, security dialogues and defense exchanges as part of a cooperative se-

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curity policy are used either to justify or reinforce the regional role of the Japan-U.S. alliance. A decade-long effort to gradually but steadily expand the geographic scope of SDF activities has succeeded in gaining support among a majority of the Japanese public. Given the changing public attitudes toward security affairs, in January 2000, for the first time, members of both houses of the Diet formed research panels to discuss constitutional revision.33 The Research Commission on the Constitution in the House of Representatives submitted an interim report in November 2002 pointing out the growing support for the amendment of Article 9, which provides the ground for the current interpretation of the right to collective self-defense. In a survey of lawmakers conducted by the Yomiuri shimbun in March 2002, 71 percent of respondents agreed to a revision of Article 9.34 However, enlargement of Japan’s security role within the frameworks of both the Japan-U.S. alliance and UN PKOs has not met with the unconditional approval of every state in the region. For example, the vast majority of overseas media had “mixed feelings and a certain degree of concern” about the revised 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines.35 In particular, China believed that Japan adjusted its relations with the United States at the sacrifice of Chinese security interests. As Thomas J. Christensen has pointed out, China recognizes that the function of the U.S.-Japan alliance is expected to shift from a “bottle cap” strategy for containing Japanese power to that of an “egg shell” for fostering its growth.36 In order for Japan’s widening role to grow unperturbed while assuaging any apprehension from its neighbors, Japan should continue to persuade them that the Japan-U.S. security alliance contributes to the peace and security of the region through security- and defense-related dialogues at bilateral and multilateral levels. Since the October 1998 joint declaration on “a Japan–South Korea partnership toward the twentyfirst century,” significant progress has been made in security relations between both countries. In addition to the start of a regular security dialogue in 1998, a joint naval search-and-rescue exercise was conducted in August 1999. Development of full-spectrum, bilateral exchanges have contributed to the institutionalization of a process for coordinating policy on North Korea among the United States, Japan, and South Korea under the Trilateral Consultation and Oversight Group. In contrast to Japan–South Korea relations, in which the issues of the past appear to have been buried, efforts at confidence building

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between Japan and China have not led to significant results. Historical concerns, for example, marred the November 1998 summit meeting between Prime Minister Obuchi and China’s president Jiang Zemin. Although the Japan-China Security Dialogue started in 1993, high-level visits and defense exchange programs were often suspended by disruptions over issues such as revisionist history in Japanese textbooks and official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Even a visit by a Chinese naval ship, planned for 2000, has yet to be realized. These incidents demonstrate how difficult it is to upgrade a security dialogue to bilateral defense exchanges without adequate development of mutual confidence. However, after September 11, China seems to have moderated in some measure its critical attitude toward Japan’s security role. According to Nihon keizai shimbun, on November 2001, China’s vice foreign minister, Wang Yi, stated, regarding the SDF overseas deployment, that “if the United Nations plays the leading role and under this framework, the countries concerned, including Japan, extend cooperation based on their circumstances, we will welcome it.”37 China’s muted response to Japan’s dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean may be attributed to its preoccupation with domestic affairs. However, it is noteworthy that China participated in the first multilateral exercises for humanitarian rescue operations, cooperating with over a dozen other countries, including Japan and the United States, in June 2001.38 This exercise was conducted under the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), a forum created in 1987 for multilateral security dialogue among the naval chiefs of staff of the western Pacific countries. The lessons learned from Japan’s experiences are two-fold. First, arrangements for security dialogues cannot be a hedge against any decline of confidence in the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Second, cooperative security has only a limited effect in mitigating mistrust whether it is a product of conflicting interests or misperception and misunderstanding.39 Military-to-military contacts at the bilateral level may be the effects rather than the cause of confidence building. However, multilateral military cooperation on a common task has the potential to promote mutual understanding and habits of cooperation. 40 In this regard, we should pay attention to the utility of regional military exercises for peacekeeping or humanitarian operations because they are unlikely to change relative capabilities among participating states.

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Conclusion Under the uni-multipolar power structure, security relations in the AsiaPacific will continue to be colored by a high degree of uncertainty, which stimulates the dynamics of the security dilemma. At the same time, the partiality of the U.S. hegemonic order remains a cause of the power struggle between status quo and revisionist states. These two challenges are major obstacles to, as well as strong motivating factors for, promoting security cooperation based on a logic that presupposes collective defense or collective security as modalities for constraining the power struggle, on the one hand, and cooperative security as the modality for ameliorating the security dilemma, on the other. Given the multilayered security architecture for the Asia-Pacific, the Japan-U.S. alliance is not only the foundation of the security policy of Japan, but also the single most effective institution for regional peace and security. Japan’s active participation in UN PKOs, regional forums for security-related dialogues, and multinational military exercises has contributed to diminishing regional anxieties over Japan’s expanding security role. This wider Japanese role, in turn, is expected to enhance the strength of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements by providing a structure for regional public goods in terms of reliability and confidence. Japan’s security approach can be understood as an organic and quite consistent integration of three forms of security cooperation, namely collective defense, collective security, and cooperative security. This particular Japanese compound approach may in part be attributed to its militaristic past and its exceptional status as the only country that has abandoned autonomy in the realm of security since the end of World War II. However, the more important factor that has enabled this synergistic nexus among three cooperative forms lies in the blurring of their conceptual distinctions and their modified translation into policy. First, the Japan-U.S. alliance has been transformed into a security regime combined with the public nature and idea of collective security in that the excluded member can enjoy some benefits outside the alliance. In other words, the Japan-U.S. alliance is no longer a traditional collective defense of particular states against particular adversaries. Second, a regional variant of UN collective security has been employed only for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in domestic crises, although these do not constitute an original scheme for enforcing inter-

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national peace. Third, emphasis in cooperative security has been placed not on strict organizing principles for security order, but on the building of confidence and trust in ways that rationalize rather than resist the status quo. The foregoing analysis implies that any single notion of security cooperation cannot provide the organizing principle for security order in the Asia-Pacific context, but that a meaningful mix of policy measures can succeed in carrying the burden of regional security. The challenge is neither to create a comprehensive system combining various security principles, nor to rely on any single scheme, but, instead, to find integrative security policies that develop the Japan-U.S. security arrangements into real, reliable, and lasting public goods for a precarious region.

——— 7 ——— South Korea’s Strategy for Inter-Korean Relations and Regional Security Cooperation Shin-wha Lee

Compared to many other countries, South Korea has had to face a consistently high level of insecurity. This has been the result of the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, already five decades long, where ideological rivalries still prevail and a renewal of war between the two Koreas remains possible. During the Cold War, inter-Korean relations were tainted by distrust and suspicion as both Koreas engaged in numerous diplomatic skirmishes to promote their respective ideological causes and obtain political legitimacy within the international community, including the United Nations (UN). Although the end of the Cold War called for a different security paradigm worldwide, inter-Korean relations have not yet emerged from their current state of hostility, while rivalry and tensions with neighboring states have precluded the as yet unresolved, subregional Cold War in Northeast Asia from ending. Yet, the post–Cold War era has led South Korea to seek a broader concept of security, one that acknowledges not just traditional military threats, but that also recognizes the importance of economic and other nontraditional security issues. Accordingly, South Korea has begun to focus on three different sets of concerns: traditional military threats, nontraditional security issues, and humanitarian matters. In the Korean context, all three are closely interrelated, albeit traditional military concerns continue to be of utmost importance. The current focus on traditional military concerns is, obviously, an inevitable corollary of the North Korean nuclear threat. The North’s revelation of its use of enriched uranium facilities to develop nuclear weapons has re-created the 1993–94 106

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crisis all over again, but this time the situation is more proximate and far more difficult to tackle. Although the threat from the North is real, security needs to be defined in a broader context than simply according to traditional military concerns alone. For example, humanitarian concerns are also security issues, as evidenced by the tensions raised by the incidents of North Korean “famine refugees” seeking asylum in foreign embassies in China. The U.S.–South Korea alliance, which has served as the fundamental pillar of security on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for nearly fifty years, is being challenged by the demand to redefine its raison d’être and roles. South Korea’s economic development and increase in military strength has brought about heightened confidence in its national defense capabilities and has also encouraged public opinion to demand a decrease in military dependence on the United States. Furthermore, the growing domestic discontent with U.S. forces in South Korea has led to calls for the revision of the Republic of Korea (ROK)– U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Given President Roh MooHyun’s stress on equality as the basis for the ROK-U.S. partnership, his administration has sought to reframe the future level and scope of the alliance. On the other hand, security concerns regarding Russia and China, former enemies during the Cold War, have considerably attenuated over the years. Although bilateral efforts such as the inter-Korean dialogues and the ROK-U.S. security alliance remain crucial to South Korea’s security, the increasing salience of multilateral approaches in the post–Cold War security environment has not been lost on Seoul. Given that the state of the inter-Korean relationship seems to be closely tied to the ebbs and flows in U.S.–North Korean relations, it remains uncertain if North Korea will pay real attention to multilateral mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the United Nations (UN). Nevertheless, multilateral approaches are important in facilitating not only political peace and stability, but economic and human security as well. For instance, economic incentives and humanitarian aid effectively channeled through different UN programs and agencies offered to the North are key factors both in ameliorating the abysmal living conditions within North Korea and in improving inter-Korean relations and regional security. Additionally, the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is essential for North Korea’s development and humanitarian needs, as well as for the enhancement of cooperative engagement. This role is vital,

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considering that NGOs may deal with North Korea on an issue-specific basis, whereas intergovernmental counterparts attempt to engage each other on a much broader basis, emphasizing primarily political and security dialogues, which North Korea may find excessively demanding. Against this backdrop, this chapter examines South Korea’s post– Cold War security strategy in terms of inter-Korean relations, the ROKU.S. alliance, and multilateral security cooperation. Although the focus of this chapter is mainly on the dimension of traditional security, nontraditional security issues such as developmental and humanitarian concerns will be briefly discussed as currently unfolding national security considerations. Inter-Korean Relations and South Korea’s Policies Overview South and North Korea remain technically at war inasmuch as no permanent peace treaty has been signed since the ceasefire of 1953, which ended the Korean War (1950–53). A majority of North Korea’s 1.1 million soldiers and South Korea’s 660,000 troops are still posted along the 150–mile border that stretches across the Korean Peninsula. Tensions between the two Koreas started to ease in 1991 when the two governments agreed that both would apply for membership in the UN, and especially after the historic inter-Korean summit of June 2000. With the “Sunshine Policy” of engagement (a comprehensive policy based on reconciliation and cooperation), the Kim Dae-Jung government greatly supported North Korea’s effort to join the international community with a view to ending the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula. However, the situation on the peninsula has since entered a new phase of uncertainty with the entry of the Bush administration in 2001, which has adopted a hard-line policy on North Korea. Because of Washington’s hawkish attitude, the North has ceased to pursue the flexible foreign policy that it had developed at the beginning of 2000, which has in turn slowed the development of inter-Korean relations. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. attitude toward suspected terrorist states hardened significantly, as highlighted by President Bush’s designation of North Korea as part of the “axis of evil.” Moreover, political tension between North Korea and the United States has escalated since October 2002, as the former resumed its nuclear activities. As such, the major security concern of the

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South Korean government has been to revitalize and eventually sustain the peace momentum on the peninsula. Nevertheless, the development of inter-Korean relations thus far has been mainly influenced by the altering conditions in U.S.–North Korean relations. A series of events in and around the Korean Peninsula has opened up a new era for South Korea under the leadership of President Roh Moo-Hyun. Although Roh’s triumph in the presidential election was technically only a defensive victory for the incumbent Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), the Roh administration, however, differed in many ways from that of Kim Dae-Jung, its predecessor. The new administration was more innovative, especially in the political sector, where it showed a substantial inclination to overcome inveterate regional antipathies and old traditions of plutocracy. This has provoked opposition even from within the MDP, which has in turn brought about the formation of the pro-government Uri Party in November 2003 by a group of former MDP parliament members loyal to President Roh. Notwithstanding the differences from the North Korean policy of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, President Roh’s North Korean policy appears to be congruent with that of President Kim, which also emphasized tolerance and a spirit of cooperation. This disposition is clearly evident in Roh’s “peace-prosperity policy,” which more or less broadly follows Kim’s Sunshine Policy. However, compared to six years ago, when President Kim introduced his North Korean policy, inter-Korean relations and the surrounding political environment on the peninsula have changed dramatically, as shown by the escalating events of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Thus, Roh’s policy toward Pyongyang on the whole took a direction similar to that of his predecessor’s, albeit with small but not insignificant variations. Changes in North Korea The dissolution of the communist bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and former communist states, and North Korea’s internal politico-economic difficulties all added to Pyongyang’s political instability and deteriorating international status in the early 1990s. In March 1993, the North Korean government announced its withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), aiming to employ its nuclear threat as part of its “diplomacy of bluff” in order to attain gains from the international com-

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munity. The United States and other Western powers had searched for ways to impose sanctions on North Korea through the UN, but with China strongly suggesting it might exercise its right to veto, they ended up opting for the “carrot” instead of the “stick.” At a meeting between the U.S. and North Korean delegations in June 1993, North Korea suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in return for a U.S. pledge to renounce its option of a preemptive strike and to recognize North Korea’s legitimacy. On October 21 of the following year, a basic agreement was drawn up between the two countries that included North Korea’s concession to suspend its nuclear program in return for two atomic lightwater reactors and crude petroleum provided by the United States. Since then, North Korea has been able to maintain its system (even after the sudden death of its leader, Kim Il-Sung, in July 1994) with the aid of the Clinton administration and tolerance from the international community. Having barely escaped a possible collapse of the regime, Kim JongIl, the oldest son of Kim Il-Sung and his successor, began adopting a more flexible foreign policy in 2000. He initially criticized and opposed the Sunshine Policy of his southern counterpart, but finally agreed to a summit meeting in June 2000, where the two heads of state met—the first such meeting in the fifty-five years since the country was divided. At the end of the summit, the two presidents announced the June 15 Joint Declaration to demonstrate their expanded mutual understanding. Since the declaration, the two Koreas have taken steps to normalize relations by launching ministerial-level defense talks, reuniting separated families, and working on connecting the Kyungui Railway between Seoul and Shinuiju, a northern city of North Korea. In addition, through its open diplomacy, the Kim Jong-Il regime also sought to present a more congenial image to the world. Capitalist nations with a common interest started befriending North Korea, which was once considered an enemy. After a series of summits and amity treaties, France and Ireland remain the only member states of the European Union (EU) that have not established diplomatic relations with North Korea.1 Further regional engagement was made through a summit meeting with Japan, held in Pyongyang in September 2002, where Kim Jong-Il officially apologized for the kidnapping of Japanese civilians, with the aim of seeking ways of normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan.2 Within North Korea, efforts were also made to lower barriers and to initiate reforms. A series of measures taken by the Pyongyang regime during the past few months signaled that significant economic reforms

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were under way. On July 1, 2002, Pyongyang announced its decision to abandon the food rationing system and launched a trial socialist market economy where people would receive higher wages, enabling them to buy food. On September 21, it designated the city of Shinuiju, located on the Yalu River (known as Amnok-gang to Koreans) across from Dandong, China, as a Special Administrative Region (SAR), which would have the legislative, judicial, and administrative discretion to develop business activities. In October 2002, Pyongyang also gave its permission to South Korean firms to operate in the Kaesong industrial park area. Furthermore, in March 2004, the North Korean government urged economic officials to accelerate the economic liberalization of the country by means of absorbing foreign technology and increasing trade.3 However, such reforms have not materialized smoothly.4 First of all, North Korea has had trouble in deciding the range and level of its policy administration. Evidently, such glitches have resulted from “limited” policies. Second, considering that its foreign policy has been under great pressure because of the current nuclear standoff with the United States, North Korea remains uncertain of whether it will be able to receive much-needed financial resources, be it through international aid organizations, donor nations, or foreign investors. Currently, North Korea has maintained its talks with the South concerning mutual exchange and cooperation, but if the South Korean position were to gravitate in favor of American sanctions against the North, inter-Korean relationships could freeze. South Korea’s Policy on North Korea South Korea’s policy on North Korea obviously has unification as its ultimate goal. Yet, South Korea has not sought to achieve unification by way of unilateral force, but rather has opted for an incremental approach. The South Korean governments of Presidents Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-Woo, and Kim Young-Sam all emphasized that it is more desirable to proceed with the unification policy under this principle of gradualism, which assumes peace as an essential prerequisite for unification. Seoul has also approached Pyongyang with the proposition of first establishing peace on the peninsula before actually pursuing unification. When the Kim Dae-Jung administration began its tenure in February 1998, inter-Korean relations were hostile. North Korea, under the basic principle of “mobilizing South Korea through the United States,” fo-

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cused on engaging in talks solely with America while intentionally excluding the South. As a result, the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae-Jung aimed at specifically redressing this forced exclusion through contacts with the North, and thus constructed a long-term plan under the goal of “making the Korean issue wholly Korean.” Due to North Korean obduracy, the Sunshine Policy did not gain any headway in the beginning. However, after the summit meeting in June 2000, inter-Korean relations dramatically improved. In addition, this improvement resulted in North Korea’s heightened reliance on the South Korean government. The fact that the Mt. Kumgang tourist industry and South-North exchanges of goods and dialogue continued, despite armed clashes between North and South Korean forces in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) in June 1999 and 2002, illustrated that interests resulting from support, exchange, and cooperation initiated by the South did indeed help sustain the Kim Jong-Il regime. In addition, North Korean perceptions of its southern counterpart have apparently changed. The joint entry by the two Koreas at the opening ceremony of the Sydney summer Olympic Games in 2000 and the Busan Asian Games in 2002—and, importantly, the compliant attitudes shown by the North Korean athletes toward the South Korean athletes and press, along with its unusually active participation in such sporting events—signals dramatic changes that previously were not possible due to mutual historical animosities. The fact that North Koreans appear to have relaxed their long-standing resentment of the South can be attributed to South-North civilian exchanges and humanitarian support enabled by South Korea’s consistent efforts at rapprochement. Nevertheless, the Kim Dae-Jung administration carried on an unsystematic, nonstructural policy toward the North, which separated economics from politics because its focus was on putting South-North relations back on track regardless of the cost. In fact, policy makers under the Kim Dae-Jung administration have been harshly criticized for their role in the so-called cash-for-summit scandal, which involved the transfer of enormous sums of South Korean funds in exchange for Pyongyang’s concurrence to a summit between the two President Kims. Accordingly, President Roh commissioned an independent counsel to investigate governmental officials of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, who might conceivably have been involved in the Hyundai Business Group’s U.S.$500 million payment to North Korea in June 2000.5 Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, Roh has continued Kim Dae-Jung’s

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policy of reconciliation and cooperation while adjusting to changes that have since taken place in the regional political environment. In addition to the five principles of the “peace-prosperity policy” announced in Roh’s presidential campaign, the key items on Seoul’s North Korean policy agenda are the following: the institutionalization of South-North relations; the settlement of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the formation and maintenance of a diplomatic coalition for normalizing North Korea–U.S. and North Korea–Japan relations; support for the North’s reforms; and the building of a peace structure on the peninsula and the establishment of a body for economic and peace cooperation in Northeast Asia.6 For the Roh administration, however, there have been two big obstacles to promoting a flexible North Korean policy. First, there is the problem of policy modulation with the United States, that is, how to harmonize a flexible North Korean policy in the face of the Bush administration’s firm stance against North Korea. Second, there is the task of securing public support. At the beginning of the comprehensive policy promotion, the Kim Dae-Jung government had received the support of more than 70 percent of the Korean electorate, but the South Korean public turned against the Kim administration at the end of Kim’s term in office. The Roh government has also been confronted with similar challenges in implementing its policy toward the North, the success or failure of which will depend on how well the former negotiates the aforesaid obstacles. South Korea’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis North Korea’s resumption of its nuclear development activities, which stalled after the October 1994 Geneva Framework, once again presents a serious challenge to the security of the Korean Peninsula as well as to the regional and international communities. There is a dire need to get North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear program. Failure to convince the North Koreans to do so could ignite a regional arms race as well as engender nuclear proliferation in East Asia. In response to Pyongyang’s intractability, the U.S.-led international consortium working on the light-water nuclear reactor project in North Korea has decided to halt its construction while Washington has stopped supplying fuel to North Korea, thereby triggering an aggressive display of nuclear brinkmanship by the latter. Pyongyang began reactivating the nuclear

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facilities that had been frozen since 1994 and visibly heightened tensions by removing seals and disabling surveillance cameras, installing nuclear fuel rods, and declaring its intent to restart disposal facilities, which had been mothballed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. On January 10, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. At a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate in March 2003, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that North Korea would be able to produce enough enriched uranium for the development of nuclear weapons within a few months.7 It is widely believed that Pyongyang has once again ended up using the nuclear issue as a form of brinkmanship diplomacy—if not blackmail—to secure a “big deal” with Washington; however, the current U.S. administration has proven itself much less amenable than its predecessor in striking deals. President Bush has insisted that unless the North shuts down its nuclear program and allows IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear sites, no demands from the North will be entertained. The six-party talks (a special multilateral arrangement between the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia) were held in August 2003 and February 2004 with the aim of solving the North Korean nuclear issue in a collective and peaceful way. Even if these talks bear the fruit of cooperation in future rounds, it is unlikely that the current Bush administration (and whichever administration will win the 2004 U.S presidential election) will repeat its error of adopting a “carrot policy” such as the 1994 Agreed Framework, which has not proven effective in preventing North Korea’s insistent claims on possessing nuclear arms. On its part, South Korea has progressively been taking the initiative in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem. This stands in contrast to the 1993 nuclear incident, when Pyongyang excluded Seoul from the deliberations and forced the latter to rely on Washington.8 However, there are limits to how far Seoul can go. First, there is the question of whether North Korea would accept South Korea being assigned a leading role. The North’s goal in playing the nuclear card is to initiate bilateral negotiations with the United States; as such, it is highly debatable whether North Korea would accept overtures from the South without a clear conviction that Seoul’s involvement would lead to America’s participation in bilateral negotiations with the North. For instance, President Kim Dae-Jung’s special envoy, Im Dong-Won, who visited North

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Korea in January 2003 in the hope of solving the nuclear issue, returned without having met Kim Jong-Il. Furthermore, it is not certain whether the United States would be content with greater South Korean involvement. Even if South Korea avoids taking sides in a debate over the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, America might oppose the South’s efforts on grounds that it (Washington) does not deserve to be put in the same category with Pyongyang. In other words, in any North Korea–U.S. exchange, Washington would likely expect Seoul to promote U.S. interests rather than play the role of a neutral arbitrator. With these concerns in mind, South Korea’s policy toward the North should proceed with more prudence than has hitherto been exhibited. First of all, it is better for Seoul to engage in ways that would not invite excessive public scrutiny. The proposal of South Korean arbitration (as suggested by President Roh during his presidential campaign), for example, could end up provoking over-sensitive reactions from both North Korea and the United States. Arguably, a better approach would have been to cast the situation as an essentially “Korean problem,” which would require an indigenous or “Korean-made” solution. In this way, Seoul could then serve as a guide for Pyongyang and Washington without prematurely revealing its own compromise solutions (if any). Moreover, while narrowing and understanding the conflicting points between the two parties, Seoul should not neglect to seek an overall settlement that would lessen the excessive demands of Pyongyang and Washington—particularly at Seoul’s expense. Above all, much as South Korea has sought and persisted in seeking conciliation and compromise with the North, it should do so without jeopardizing its own interests. The Post–Cold War Security Environment and the ROK-U.S. Alliance International Political Structure of Korean Security South Korea is surrounded by major powers in Northeast Asia and is in fact situated within a regional security complex long defined by great power rivalry. Since the traditional Korean nation (what had been part of the Chosun dynasty) opened its frontiers in the late nineteenth century and integrated with the modern international system, it has never enjoyed a time of peace. On the contrary, it has been plagued by intraregional power struggles and conflicts. Also, Korea has never had

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an easy time in achieving security. As a relatively weak power in Northeast Asia, it has had to resort to diplomatic means in order to protect and promote its own national interest and security. In particular, participation in alliances or dependence on coalition security systems has proved essential, especially when Korea was unable to independently overcome threats posed by neighboring powers. The Cold War division of the Korean Peninsula and the inter-Korean confrontation constitute situations essentially foisted upon the Korean people. Though the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, a Cold War–like scenario continues to haunt the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Despite the existence of Cold War–related security structures and commitments, the regional environment nevertheless has undergone significant political change since the end of the Cold War. Even with North Korea’s presence, South Korea has built new partnerships with China and Russia. Against this shifting backdrop, the raison d’être of the ROK-U.S. alliance, which relies upon a common enemy and shared aversions, has been put to the test. On the other hand, as China’s growing economic and political power continues to evoke the view that it is now a strategic competitor of the United States, the suggestion has been raised that South Korea should abandon its old Cold War alliance strategy and instead focus on balancing between America and China. The Roh administration has been advancing on several contingencies: (1) an independent defense strategy, which is a balance strategy better fitting the changing power configurations in Northeast Asia; (2) a strategy of free-riding on a world power (the United States) which, ironically, can pose a threat to South Korea’s national security; and (3) a pluralistic security strategy that takes into consideration the East Asian multipolar system enabled by the post–Cold War era. At the same time, the policy of tolerance toward the North was the outcome of efforts to change the existing ways of dealing with North Korea. If former president Roh Tae-Woo’s Nordpolitik during the early 1990s was an incipient attempt at security diplomacy, then Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy aimed to fundamentally eliminate the North Korean threat through reconciliation and cooperation. The ROK-U.S. Security Alliance In October 2003, South Korea and the United States observed the fiftieth anniversary of their bilateral security alliance. In a sense, the

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United States has been the single most influential force in the international affairs of the Korean Peninsula since World War II. Both Seoul and Washington enjoyed close, friendly ties and shared common strategic goals and understandings throughout the Cold War years. Though the end of the Cold War changed the security environment in Northeast Asia, the ROK-U.S. alliance was neither weakened nor completely ruptured. Despite the elimination of the Cold War threat from China and Russia, the United States and South Korea have continued to maintain a multidimensional and comprehensive alliance. From the military and strategic point of view, bilateral cooperation is still important because the threat of war still lingers on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s decision to resume its once mothballed nuclear program has certainly exacerbated tensions that could well provoke an outbreak of violence. As North Korea and the United States confront one another over the nuclear issue, the need to strengthen ROK-U.S. cooperation has grown even more pressing. Nevertheless, the “blood ties” between Seoul and Washington have reached a critical point. The ROK-U.S. relationship today is much more complex and strained than during the Cold War era because of an emerging slew of different interests and understandings. Furthermore, a number of unprecedented events, particularly in recent years, have strained the alliance in ways more severe than ever before. Given the fact that the ROK-U.S. alliance exists for the express purpose of containing North Korea, the June 2000 North-South summit has raised questions in regards to the security rationale and raison d’être of the alliance in the face of a diminishing North Korean threat. South Korea’s national elections in April 2000 and its presidential election in December 2002 involved the coming of age of a younger generation of leaders and civil society that were much less tolerant of, and in fact were opposed to, the “unequal” SOFA provisions and the more detrimental aspects of the American military presence in the South (for instance, the 1998 revelation of the killing of South Korean refugees by the U.S. military at Nogeunri village during the Korean War, the toxic goods discharge, and the Yongsan military base apartment construction plan). The recent statement by President Roh concerning U.S. actions in regard to the North Korean question, where he urged the United States to “not go too far,” further indicates how South Korea is “growing up” and accordingly wants to play its part, at times independent of America, in the international arena.9 The accidental killing in June 2002 of two middle school girls in

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Hyochonli, Gyeonggi Province of South Korea, by a U.S. Army armored vehicle gave vent to anti-American sentiments that had long percolated just under the surface of South Korean public opinion. The surge of anti-Americanism has prompted certain groups of Koreans to seriously assess whether the presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula is necessary. These groups have called for not only the reduction in the number of American troops but also the relocation of U.S. military bases in and around Seoul. Some argue that such a show of “South Korean ingratitude” has accelerated the process of changes in U.S military posture that intends to reduce the size and composition of its 37,000 forces in the South. As of early April 2004, Washington has put this process on hold due to possible negative security consequences, but has clearly expressed its intention to leave the peninsula if its forces “are not wanted.”10 The rapid spread of anti-American sentiment in South Korea can be seen as the outcome of the evolution of Korean perceptions of the United States from an ally to a preponderant (and increasingly self-absorbed) superpower—a view shared by a growing number of allies and friends as U.S. foreign policy has come to assume more of a unilateralist slant in the post–Cold War era. In an asymmetrical alliance, the weaker nation must paradoxically sacrifice a measure of its freedom and sovereignty in order to promote its national security. Moreover, the South Korean public no longer recognizes the North as its enemy, but has rather begun asserting a nationalism that regards its northern counterpart as a friend. Interestingly, the possibility of the North’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) does not seem to have evoked adverse reactions from the South—at least not anything substantial. In the end, it can be said that the key point in the alliance being enervated has largely resulted from the difference in how Seoul and Washington look at Pyongyang and the threat the North ostensibly poses to the United States. Not inconceivably, the United States may, in time, come to be seen as a new form of threat that could seriously restrict South Korea’s freedom of maneuver. Serious domestic debates have taken place on whether the U.S. preoccupation with missile defense (MD) is primarily related to the containment of China and less about maintaining South Korea’s security—which has obviously raised doubts on the pertinence of MD to South Korea’s strategic calculus. This has led to further questions over the rationale for maintaining U.S. troops on Korean soil even after unification. In summary, how South Korea should deal with North Korea and

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other security threats—particularly at a time when the ROK-U.S. relationship seems to be veering from Cold War balancing against clearly defined enemies toward post–Cold War bandwagoning with the sole superpower, the United States—is the critical concern. Recent ROKU.S. friction has tainted their decades-long security alliance, while the perception gap over the North Korean regime has widened. However, as far as the North Korean nuclear challenge is concerned, it is imperative for both countries to engage in close consultation so as to push for a united demand for the renunciation of the North’s nuclear program. South Korea’s Multilateral Security Arrangements As part of its comprehensive diplomatic efforts to ensure the full support of the international community, the South Korean government has been active in multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia in regard to not only its North Korean policy but also to its initiatives for realizing the vision of an East Asian community. Although the South Korean government has been determined to diminish the existing and potential intervention of surrounding countries in Korean Peninsula politics and carve out leading roles for the two Koreas in solving the Korean issue, it also recognizes that peace should be realized by closely cooperating with neighboring countries. Concerning regional multilateral institutions, East Asia—and Northeast Asia, in particular—has evinced a poor history of institutional frameworks, formal or informal, for dialogue and cooperation in addressing issues on a regional scale. Nonetheless, the South Korean government views the ARF, an official-level security forum for the Asia-Pacific region that employs both traditional “track-one” and nongovernmental “track-two” diplomacy, as valuable in promoting stable relationships in the region. The ARF is based on a gradual, three-stage process of evolution—starting from confidence building, then moving toward preventive diplomacy, and eventually reaching conflict resolution. The South Korean government has valued the positive role of the ARF as the only multilateral security mechanism in the region and has considered it a complement to existing bilateral security arrangements. South Korea has also agreed to maintain the ARF tradition of continuous efforts in confidence building, the development toward preventive diplomacy, and open discussions on sensitive issues.11 Since the forum’s establishment in 1994, Korean Peninsula security issues have been a priority in its

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deliberations. North Korea’s inclusion in the ARF as the twenty-third member in July 2000 provided the long-awaited opportunity to facilitate multilateral talks on Northeast Asian security issues by establishing a subregional Northeast Asia Security Forum within the ARF framework.12 Given that confidence-building approaches are crucial in facilitating North Korea’s integration into the international arena, the ARF members declared that North Korea’s admission to the ARF was the “beginning of the end of North Korea’s isolation.”13 ARF member states have voiced concerns over the North’s missile program and other activities that could undermine the peace and stability of the region, as demonstrated at the foreign ministers’ meeting of the ARF in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in June 2003, when the member states addressed the mounting crisis over North Korea’s nuclear standoff with the United States. Unfortunately, the ARF has not played an active role in promoting Korean reconciliation. Rather, the fate of inter-Korean ties has been more strongly associated with the state of U.S.–North Korean relations, as discussed in the preceding section. Still, the mere gathering of high-level officials in the Asia-Pacific’s foremost security forum is significant as a first step for regional confidence building as delegates from each member state could express their respective positions and promote mutual understanding through direct contacts that otherwise would have been difficult to arrange. In this context, between 1999 and 2002, the South Korean government played a leading role in facilitating the activities of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and the East Asia Study Group (EASG) with regard to discussing issues, developing ideas, and formulating agendas for East Asian cooperation.14 On a different note, countries other than the United States are also focusing on the Korean Peninsula in order to maximize their respective interests. Japan is trying to secure a political and diplomatic status on par with its economic and cultural power. Continued revision of its domestic laws is being undertaken in order to ensure Tokyo’s progress toward great-power status—as demonstrated by Japan’s contributions to coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, despite the unresolved issues of the nuclear standoff and the abduction of Japanese civilians, Japan has tried to obtain a foothold in Korean security and economic affairs through a treaty of amity. Russia has, from 2000, also tried to pursue the normalization of Russian–North Korean relations and cooperation with the United States. Even with the current nuclear issue,

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Russia has tried to provide a solution to the problem by assuming the role that former U.S. president Jimmy Carter played in 1994 and is continuing to play in North Korea’s energy issue. Russia’s participation can be viewed as an effort to regain the status it had lost when it was excluded from the previous quadripartite conference. On its part, China has been trying desperately to strengthen the role it plays in the Northeast Asia security complex. As for South Korea, in order to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis, cooperation with the United States and Japan must be strengthened and the arbitration of China and Russia must be encouraged. Yet before acting, Seoul needs to calculate precisely what these efforts may bring in the long term and how they may affect the future status of South Korea. Dependence on multilateral efforts runs the risk of such approaches generating diverse and often contradictory interests among the parties involved and providing North Korea with an opportunity to maneuver within those interstices. Such concerns, however, should not be allowed to deter Seoul from judiciously appropriating multilateral diplomacy in promoting and enabling bilateral negotiations and galvanizing the efforts of the individual countries involved in dissuading the North from fully executing its nuclear adventures. Such efforts are also useful in “providing a stronger security guarantee to North Korea while eliciting a firmer promise from Pyongyang that it would abide by the agreements it enters into.”15 In conclusion, the Korean Peninsula is faced with a problem of a “Korean dimension,” which includes a Cold War–type confrontation at a time, paradoxically, when the two Koreas are adapting to a changing post–Cold War context. Additionally, there exists a “Northeast Asian dimension,” where long-term coexistence and prosperity must be sought within the power balance of the region. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, diplomatic efforts were focused on North Korea, while the long-term agenda of Northeast Asia received scant, if any, attention. However, the current administration is inescapably confronted with the changing power balance in Northeast Asia. The issue of participating in the U.S.-led MD system, Japan’s strengthened right to speak following the signing of the amity treaty, along with both Russia’s and China’s stances in the matter, have raised many questions for the future of South Korean diplomacy. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration has aspired to establish a Northeast Asian system of peace and economic cooperation and to play a crucial role in Northeast Asian peace and prosperity. But

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such efforts, if they are not converted to a multiparty alternative that could strictly calculate the interests of the surrounding nations, will only fall prey to the usual power politics. The Implications of Nontraditional Security Concerns for South Korea’s Security This analysis would not be complete without a brief consideration of the nontraditional security aspects of South Korean national security. Although the threat from the reactivation of North Korea’s nuclear program requires urgent, serious, and coordinated attention by South Korea and the international community, it is also important to ensure that the North does not undergo a sudden chaotic collapse, or what some have called a “hard landing.”16 This would not only have negative consequences for the stability of the peninsula and the region, but a “bankrupt North” would also overburden South Korea economically. While the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other allies are increasing their pressure on the Kim Jong-Il regime to forgo its nuclear ambitions, it is also imperative that they promote a political agenda that does not diminish international aid. International efforts to promote North Korea’s development and the opening of its markets for trade and foreign direct investment should be encouraged and accelerated in order to turn around its crumbling economy. Although the initial aim must be to promote economic reform and development in an impoverished North Korea, there is a pronounced political-cum-security subtext since more open trade would induce greater involvement of the North in the international community, beyond the obvious economic and developmental gains it would bring. Hence it is vital that the South Korean government take a lead in engaging the North in solving its food crisis and the concomitant flow of refugees into China. Although the Pyongyang regime is primarily responsible for the country’s famine, South Korea and the outside world will be equally liable if they eschew taking prompt action to avert what by all accounts may constitute a major humanitarian disaster. Notwithstanding all the frustrations and difficulties of providing and monitoring humanitarian aid, it is impractical to withhold relief aid from North Korea and wait for the Kim Jong-Il regime to reform or ultimately collapse. Moreover, cutting aid to North Korea will not guarantee that the regime will collapse, but, more importantly, it will result in the death and suf-

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fering of ordinary North Koreans. Indeed, international humanitarian relief in North Korea is directly related to the very survival of millions in North Korea. Also, the devastating outcome of a famine, such as its long-term effects on the health of the population, would be immense. For instance, it has been argued that a generation of North Koreans could be at risk of death from malnutrition, as starving children and babies delivered by underfed mothers are usually subject to low weight, mental retardation, and short life-spans.17 Addressing North Korea’s famine is important not only for moral and humanitarian reasons, but also for security and political considerations. Even the most unsuccessful famine relief effort in North Korea would at the very least increase contact between North Koreans and the outside world. This could raise serious questions among North Koreans about the veracity and viability of the Pyongyang regime’s Juche ideology. According to North Korean defectors, the way to resolve the nuclear crisis and to undermine Kim Jong-Il’s resilient regime is through cultural penetration. One defector, for example, even suggested that the introduction of the Bible to North Korean society would greatly help to enlighten people about the true nature of the regime.18 In fact, North Koreans, who have been indoctrinated to blindly follow the authority of their government and leaders without being allowed to voice their own opinions, have now begun to express their grievances about the political and social conditions that have caused the famine. The most important objective of the Kim Jong-Il regime is survival. As such, famine, a popular uprising, or even a military mutiny can pose a serious threat to Kim Jong-Il. Notwithstanding the possible political consequences, Kim would then be compelled to take the risk of acquiring outside aid and undertaking urgently needed economic reforms since his country is on the brink of ruin. Evidently, several of the North’s economic reforms during the past couple of years are unmistakable indications of desperation. As to the issue of North Korean “famine refugees” who have illegally crossed into China in search of food, Chinese authorities have been increasing their surveillance and search activities since the late 1990s, imposing strong measures such as fining or expelling anyone caught assisting North Korean defectors. The recent surge of North Korean asylum seekers in South Korean and other diplomatic missions in China has given further impetus to China’s repatriation policy. Drastic measures by the Chinese in stemming the tide are likely to impel North

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Korean defectors to employ more dramatic methods such as suicide bombings and self-immolation. In this case, China’s plan to maintain domestic order and relations with the North Korean regime by rejecting North Korean defectors would disturb its own domestic security and tarnish its international reputation. It is true that present conditions in the North constitute a self-generated crisis. However, given the gravity of the situation, finger pointing can only go so far and obviously does not proffer viable solutions for the North’s politico-economic crisis. It is also true that, all things considered, North Korea’s past irresponsible behavior and failure to fully comply with international agreements reduces the sympathy it would need to win substantial international aid. Yet, any stepping up of economic and political pressure on North Korea may set off adverse consequences, such as exacerbating its already dire circumstances or, worse yet, provoking Pyongyang into irrationally launching a nuclear attack. All such scenarios—nuclear war, humanitarian crisis, refugee spillovers, or a combination of these—do not bode well for regional stability and security and must be avoided if possible. Conclusion In regard to South Korea’s external security relationship, the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem and a recalibration of the ROK-U.S. alliance seem to be the two foremost tasks in the near future. What is needed is a collection of responses and countermeasures that could unconditionally tackle various consequences. In formulating its security strategy, the South Korean government needs to consider the following set of approaches. First, a continuous effort at exchange and reconciliation must be promoted in North-South relations. Engagement policies should not be limited to simple relational interchanges, but should extend to fostering systematic structural change. The inter-Korean exchanges that the South wants will be realized only when North Korea’s centrally planned economic structure is gradually transformed into one that abides by the rules of a market economy. The relations that market reforms bring will set new parameters for future North-South ties, and open the possibility of reunification. Other Northeastern Asian states, rather than unwittingly forcing Pyongyang’s hand, should patiently allow such transformations to run their course in North Korea. To be sure, North Korea’s current survival strategy completely collides with

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America’s world security strategy. Consequently, South Korea, which needs America’s support for its “co-engagement” policy, must strengthen policy coordination with the United States. Second, concerning South Korean dialogue with America, it is imperative to clearly discern Washington’s interests regarding the Korean Peninsula, and thus find common ground upon how to engage Pyongyang in ways beneficial to both parties. The United States pursues its national interest through a regional and global strategy, from whence its strategy on Korea is derived. In contrast, South Korea delineates its regional and worldwide interests according to its strategy on inter-Korean relations. In consequence, the congruence in the Cold War strategic perceptions of Seoul and Washington has given way to a growing divergence. For instance, in response to North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy, the South Korean government, particularly since the Kim Dae-Jung administration, has attempted to reconcile with its northern counterpart based on the principle of engagement, whereas the U.S. government, especially the current Bush administration, has been rather cautious and punitive in dealing with the North. Evidently, the only way to overcome such differences is to find and realize a common interest. In this matter, South Korea’s object is to have America acknowledge that North Korea’s current WMD obstructs inter-Korean exchanges and hampers ROK-U.S. relations and that North Korea’s subsistence and development are crucial for peace in Northeast Asia. Third, although the South Korean government asserts its support for a continued U.S. security presence on the peninsula and the importance of maintaining a traditional ROK-U.S. security alliance, it remains to be seen whether such support will be sustained if the North Korean threat evaporates or if a nationalistic South Korean public wants reunification more than it wants an alliance with the United States. Therefore, the ROK-U.S. relationship of the twenty-first century requires that both countries develop a comprehensive partnership that goes beyond containment, and encompasses political, diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian dimensions. Fourth, importance should be placed on multilateral diplomacy as a means to resolve the Korean problem. Despite the obvious difficulties associated with such a strategy, patient commitment to the ongoing sixparty talks is a good indication that regional states seek to avoid war at all possible costs and to build toward collective regional interests mutually beneficial to all.

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Fifth, the Roh administration has to formulate a national consensus in order to promote domestically its policy on North Korea. Its predecessor’s Sunshine Policy was given full support, a support that, for various reasons, nevertheless waned dramatically toward the end of Kim Dae-Jung’s tenure. However, as the South Korean public and media largely concur that the policy of reconciliation and cooperation did succeed in improving inter-Korean relations and thereby reduced the threat of war, public opposition to the current North Korean policy has not quite burgeoned to uncontrollable levels yet. On the other hand, the choice of Roh Moo-Hyun as president possibly indicates a gradual abatement of regional rivalries. In any case, it behooves the Roh administration to learn from its predecessor’s mistakes. Finally, South Korean foreign policy should not yield to pressures from major powers, or to local sentiments and conservative-reformative conflicts at home. Moreover, current and future fluctuations in domestic politics in the wake of the threatened impeachment of President Roh and the national assembly election in April 2004 should not be a barrier to developing consistent and systematic policies in the fields of national security and diplomacy.

——— 8 ——— Malaysian Defense and Security Cooperation Coming Out of the Closet

J.N. Mak

Malaysia, together with China and Indonesia, is among a handful of Asia-Pacific countries that does not have explicit defense or security pacts with another country.1 Malaysia’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for such pacts is reflected in its staunchly nonaligned foreign policy stance. It is puzzling why such a small nation as Malaysia should consciously avoid entering into military pacts when the logic of survival would dictate otherwise. The major puzzle, however, is that despite its avowedly neutralist stand, Malaysia has established a slew of bilateral security and defense ties with a whole range of countries. The most active and important of these ties are, quite surprisingly, those with the United States and Australia, two countries with which Malaysia had had significant political differences in the recent past. This chapter sets out to explain this paradox between the avowed foreign policy of neutrality and the reality of active if quiet defense cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and, more significantly, with Western powers. This paradox, it is argued, is rooted in domestic politics. Domestic politics, specifically the goal-rational legitimacy of the dominant coalition party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which is based on a balance between preserving and perpetuating Malay dominance and building a multinational Malay nation, has defined the country’s threat perceptions and approach to defense and security. This goal-rational legitimacy has made Malaysia highly susceptible to conflicting demands at the domestic level, with the ruling regime subject to challenges from both within and with127

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out the ruling UMNO. This in turn has resulted in the country being susceptible to external subversion; hence the domestic level is paramount in regard to threat perceptions and potential conflict management. Malaysia employs a variety of instruments to manage these threats. Domestically, it uses the instrument of “comprehensive security” to maintain internal stability. Externally, it relies on regional institutions, in particular ASEAN and its offshoot, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to manage external threats and potential intraregional conflict. Malaysia therefore primarily uses nonmilitary instruments to secure its domestic and external environments. It supplements and complements this with bilateral, low-key defense and security ties at the functional level with a range of regional and extraregional countries. Significantly, it considers nonmilitary instruments paramount for conflict management, which puts defense cooperation behind security cooperation in terms of importance. Why does Malaysia place security before defense? Malaysia’s Threat Perceptions: Defense Versus Security Defense and security cooperation are, in the final analysis, derived demands. States cooperate because they expect some form of benefit, or to avoid being disadvantaged or penalized for not participating in cooperative ventures. Malaysia’s defense and security cooperation had always been pragmatic, rooted in both economic and political reality. As such, it is necessary to establish the kinds of threats that Malaysia has faced and expects to face, and to establish the linkages, if any, between threat perceptions and defense and security cooperation. Malaysia makes a distinction between security and defense. Defense essentially involves protecting the nation’s sovereignty, principally from external, conventional military threats. Security, however, is seen as allencompassing, to include both conventional as well as nonmilitary threats from within and without. Former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad clearly spelled out Malaysia’s defense priorities in 1984, declaring that, “Malaysia’s first line of defense is not its military capability. The first line of defense lies in its national resilience.”2 This was elaborated in a seminal paper on the “Malaysian Doctrine of Comprehensive Security” delivered by the then deputy prime minister Musa Hitam to the Harvard Club of Singapore in 1984. It pointed out that Malaysia faced an array of threats, including economic, political, psychological, and military

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threats and, as such, it needed to respond comprehensively. Malaysia’s three-pronged strategy was to ensure: • A secure Southeast Asia, • A strong and effective ASEAN community, and • A Malaysia that is sound, secure, and strong within. The emphasis would be on a domestically strong and secure Malaysia. Former prime minister Mahathir reinforced this view of security in 1986 by reiterating that “national security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Without these, all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being overcome by its enemies.”3 Thus Malaysia privileged the domestic level. Security, especially internal security, came before military defense, and security was defined comprehensively to include nonmilitary means of empowering and securing the state. A very clear distinction was therefore made between security and defense in Malaysian policy planning. Domestic Challenges of an Ethnic State This focus on the internal or domestic level is because the regime still does not enjoy complete, unconditional legitimacy. Malaysia is a plural society comprising three major ethnicities—Malays, Chinese, and Indians. The country in one sense is an ethnic state in that it privileges the religious, cultural, economic, and political interest of one ethnic group, the Malays, over those of the two other major ethnic groups.4 UMNO, an ethnic Malay party, has dominated the multiethnic Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition government that has been in power since independence in 1957. The Barisan rule has been underpinned by an informal intercommunal pact, or “settlement,” of the ethnic question by which the ethnic elites have agreed that the Malays, the largest ethnic group, should have political domination. 5 This is the basis of UMNO’s goal-rational legitimacy, which has been based on preserving the political, and later ensuring the economic, preeminence of the Malays. Political stability in Malaysia therefore depends on all ethnic groups accepting this inter-ethnic “deal.” This “bargain” was challenged during the 1969 race riots, when the Malays saw their political dominance being eroded in the 1969 elections. After 1969, UMNO’s goal-

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rational legitimacy based on Malay political dominance was extended to include affirmative action for the Malays through the New Economic Policy (NEP) to ensure that they could also achieve eventual economic dominance. Nevertheless, the UMNO-led regime’s legitimacy, and the nation-state that it has created, has not been seriously contested since independence.6 If this is so, why then is the UMNO regime still so inwardly focused? The answer is that the Malaysian political system is elite based. At the intra-ethnic level, the Barisan government has to constantly deal with the problem of elite-mass relations. This is compounded by the problem that ethnic accommodation was agreed upon by the ethnic elites, and there exists serious resentments at the mass level.7 Thus, ethnic fissures remain papered over. This lack of internal cohesion has created a state that is susceptible to both domestic developments and challenges. This is aggravated by the presence of its two large Malay neighbors, Indonesia and the Philippines, with which many Malays in Malaysia share historical, ethnic, and cultural ties and which makes the state vulnerable to external subversion. Similarly, the existence of a sizable Chinese minority also creates kinship and ethnic ties and, at the same time, opportunities for potential subversion. The establishment of Malay dominance, that is, the Malay right to rule, is a key plank of UMNO legitimacy. To ensure continued mass support, UMNO has used performance legitimacy to reinforce its goalrational legitimacy and to stave off challenges to its rule. Thus meeting the distributive goals of the NEP is critical, which, in turn, is highly dependent on rapid domestic economic growth. Rapid economic growth, which allows the distributive goals of the NEP to be reached without necessarily eating into the wealth shares of the other ethnic groups, depends on a favorable international economic climate, including continued “market access to the developed Western economies and on free investment flows.”8 Notwithstanding the importance of the latter, Mahathir became increasingly critical of the U.S. neoliberal free market model, which he saw as a threat to Malaysia’s domestic policy autonomy to direct and distribute the fruits of economic growth in line with domestic political priorities. Growth enabled UMNO to achieve its objective of creating a new class of Malay capitalists via state-directed economic distribution, and at the same time satisfying the needs and expectations of the other ethnic groups. This fine balance ensured that ethnic accommodation did not break down.

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The preoccupation with preserving Malaysia’s domestic economic autonomy is reflected in Malaysia’s first and only defense white paper, Malaysian Defense: Toward Defense Self-Reliance, published in 1998.9 The white paper, in outlining the country’s strategic outlook, criticized Western economic groupings such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) for being protectionist and discriminatory against the interests of the developing countries. Worse, some regional groupings in the West brought “extraneous issues” such as labor and the environment into trade negotiations, thus hampering market accessibility of goods from developing countries into the EU and NAFTA, which “could lead to . . . potential conflict between states.”10 It is very telling that economic “discrimination” by the West against developing countries should feature prominently in a document on Malaysian defense. Malaysian Defense went on to touch on the role of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Mahathir had advocated the EAEC, a proposed grouping of East Asian states minus the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, as an alternative to APEC to secure the interests of East Asian states. Mahathir was opposed to APEC because of the multilevel threats it posed to Malaysia, especially at the domestic level because its neoliberal ideology threatened to severely curtail the role of the state in the domestic political economy.11 Thus Malaysian Defense criticized some developed countries for using APEC and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to address nontrade issues such as labor standards, human rights, and corruption “to undermine member states.”12 The inference is that economic policy autonomy is a key component of Malaysian strategy and defense. The paper went on to elaborate on the role of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). Quoting Mahathir, this would include, apart from national defense, nation building. That nation building is one of the central roles of the armed forces more than forty years after independence reveals Malaysia’s central security preoccupation—that of regime consolidation.13 As Mohammed Ayoob has argued, third world states are insecure because they lack unconditional legitimacy, social cohesion, and “societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic and political organization.”14 As an ethnic state, consensus on social, economic, and economic organization is still absent in Malaysia. Hence the need to ensure and maintain domestic stability and security is paramount. Domestic politics therefore plays a critical part in Malaysian foreign and security policy.

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UMNO’s legitimacy is, therefore, dependent on domestic social and economic developments. Apart from the “religiosity” challenge posed by the Muslim, and largely Malay, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), UMNO also has to deal with the issue of Malay nationalism. This challenge emanates from both within UMNO and outside. In setting itself up as the champion of the Malays, UMNO nevertheless has to strike a balance between all three ethnic groups. However, certain UMNO members and opposition parties have, from time to time, attempted to seek greater legitimacy for themselves by accusing UMNO leaders of not being nationalistic enough. This was especially the case just after the attempt at forming a Malayan Union, and just before and after the May 1969 race riots. Historical Roots of Polarization: Invasion, Insurgency, and the Malayan Union Events have unfolded in such a way that they resulted in the increasing polarization of the ethnic groups, particularly the Malays and the Chinese. While UMNO’s goal-rational legitimacy helps to explain Malaysia’s vulnerability to subversion, other events have contributed to the development of Malaysia’s domestically focused threat perceptions and security policies. Four events are critical to the understanding of the making of Malaysia’s defense and defense cooperation policies. The first was the Japanese invasion of 1941, followed immediately by the insurgencies mounted by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) from 1947 to the late 1980s. The second was the success of the Malays, specifically UMNO, in opposing the Malayan Union in 1946. The third was the 1969 race riots, and the fourth was the Cold War and its demise in the late 1980s. The invasion of the Japanese in 1941 reinforced ethnic polarization. The Chinese, harshly treated by the Japanese, reacted by resorting to guerrilla warfare led by the CPM. In contrast, the Malays were consciously cultivated by the Japanese, who encouraged Malay nationalism, contributing to the development of a new Malay elite that, among other things, was the product of a “nascent Malay nationalism which had originated . . . in response to the growing influence and presence of both the British and Chinese.”15 The one galvanizing event that brought the Malays politically together was the 1946 British proposal for a Malayan Union, a unitary state where

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sovereignty would be transferred from the sultans to the British crown. Malayan citizenship was to be extended to all irrespective of race or creed. The Malays opposed the Malayan Union, feeling that it would demolish their special position in Malaya. In March 1946, delegates from forty-one different Malay organizations set up the United Malays National Organization. UMNO was the focal point for Malay opposition to the Malayan Union proposal, which was finally shelved in 1948 to be replaced by the Federation of Malaya, under which Malay special privileges and the sovereignty of the sultans were upheld.16 Federation was a victory for the Malays in general, and UMNO in particular. The party’s legitimacy, and ultimately UMNO’s own future as the dominant party after independence in 1957, was therefore based on its ability to protect and preserve the special position of the Malays in the domestic political economy, forming the basis of its goal-rational legitimacy. The Chinese, many of whom felt that their sacrifices in World War II were not appreciated, greeted the demise of the Malayan Union with dismay. This bitterness led some Chinese to feel that they had no choice but to turn to the CPM for justice. Although the rejection of the Malayan Union was not the direct cause of the communist insurgency, it served to underline the tensions between the two ethnic groups. The insurgency had its ideological roots in China, with the majority of insurgents being Chinese. The threat posed by the insurgency lay in its appeal to the Chinese community and its potential as a rallying point for those who were dissatisfied with the government. The significance of the Malayan Union was that it provided a focal point for Malay nationalism and Malay nationalists who, otherwise, might not have coalesced around a central issue. This Malay nationalism would have a significant impact on Malaysian defense and security cooperation, eventually forcing cooperation with the West into the closet, so to speak. Subsequent sections will deal with the impact of the May 1969 race riots and the Cold War on Malaysian defense planning and cooperation in more detail. It should be noted at this point that the May 1969 riots marked the end of one phase of ethnic accommodation. The event led to increased ethnic polarization, but the subsequent affirmative action policy introduced by the Barisan also reaffirmed UMNO’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Malays. However, the party’s affirmative action based on economic growth and distribution made domestic economic autonomy a strategic necessity. This was to have far-reaching results in the era of globalization for Malaysia under Mahathir. The end of the Cold War

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also brought uncertainty to Malaysia’s defense planning. The possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific with the demise of the Soviet Union was perhaps the most important issue then for Malaysia. This prompted Malaysia to attempt to persuade the United States into staying on in the region by engaging it more directly, using the instrument of defense cooperation among other things. For all these reasons, the UMNO-led Barisan is under two sets of pressures—from below from the masses, and from the elite at the top. This attempt to maintain legitimacy, a legitimacy that is constantly under challenge, means that the Barisan, and more specifically UMNO, has to ensure that economic distribution is accompanied by growth. At the same time, the “spiritual” challenge posed by the PAS also means that UMNO cannot take the support of the Malays, and the party’s goal-rational legitimacy among the Malays, for granted. This explains why the Barisan government gives priority to domestic-level security, using comprehensive security as the main instrument to achieve this aim. Very importantly, the continuous rule of UMNO since 1957, and its preoccupation with ensuring continued Malay dominance, has led the regime to blur the distinction between threats to the state and threats to the government.17 A Benign External Environment One could argue, however, that Malaysia could afford to focus on the domestic dimension because of the existence of a favorable and benign external security environment. This enabled Malaysia to rely on nonmilitary means to secure and manage the external security environment using two related instruments—regional/international institutions and diplomacy. Malaysia has played leading roles in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and attempted to set up the abortive East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG). However, the most important security institutions for Malaysia are ASEAN and the ARF. Malaysia was lucky in that it did not have to fight a war of national liberation. Instead, it was handed independence almost on a platter. This resulted in a smooth transition of power, with the erstwhile colonial power, Britain, still responsible for Malaysia’s external defense. When the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA) was terminated with the formation of Malaysia in 1963 when Sabah and Sarawak joined the

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federation, the external environment still remained favorable because of the U.S. military presence in the region. Thus external military threats were neutralized by the presence of the Western powers from the time of independence to the end of the Cold War. External military threats were therefore not a problem. External threats in the form of potential external interference in Malaysia’s domestic affairs were another matter. Neighboring countries with which Malaysia had problems of one form or another could destabilize Malaysia from within. These potential threats were especially marked at the time of the formation of Malaysia in 1963. The Philippines laid claim to Sabah, while Sukarno’s Indonesia launched the “Confrontation” campaign. Both these countries shared language, cultural, ethnic, and even religious affinities with Malaysia and could therefore subvert Malaysia. Similarly, many Malays in northern peninsular Malaysia have kinship ties with the people of the southern Thai provinces. Even China, although it did not have the capability to project power to Malaysia, offered fraternal support to the largely Chinese CPM. Closer to home, Singapore’s expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in 1965 also created tensions. The susceptibility of Malaysia to subversion, combined with the absence of overt external military threats, therefore led the ruling elite to conclude that conventional military power was of limited utility in securing the state. This later resulted in Mahathir’s directive that Malaysian defense planning should be based on the assumption that there would be no large-scale conventional war involving Malaysia. The process of globalization and interdependence also decreased the likelihood of largescale conflict.18 Security cooperation would therefore focus on dealing with internal dissension and possible external subversion. Thus comprehensive security was developed and refined to explain and justify the use of economic growth to underpin internal stability. Institutions and the Regional Order ASEAN and its offspring, the ARF, therefore represent the most important nonmilitary instruments used by Malaysia to manage intraregional order.19 In this sense, they provide the multilateral framework and foundation of Malaysia’s security cooperation that is essentially operationalized through a series of bilateral arrangements with its ASEAN counterparts at the functional level. The 1963–65 Confronta-

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tion and Indonesia’s refusal to recognize the Malaysia Federation, together with the Philippines’ claim to Sabah and tensions with Singapore after its ouster from the Malaysia Federation, all served to underline the possibilities and danger of cross-border subversion and political interference by neighboring states. The primary aim of security cooperation was therefore to ensure that its neighbors would not subvert Malaysia from within. ASEAN as such played a key role in ensuring that Malaysia would be left alone to chart its own course. All these factors combined to spur the formation of ASEAN as a tool for regional rapprochement, with the primary aim of enabling Southeast Asian states to concentrate on development and growth without being preoccupied by the possibility of cross-border subversion. It was this “reassurance game” that underpinned subsequent ASEAN defense and security cooperation.20 Former foreign minister Ghazali Shafie, for instance, emphasized the importance of diplomatic cooperation to “defend” Malaysia. In this context, ASEAN was the result of the decision by two former leaders, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia and President Suharto of Indonesia, not to settle differences through confrontation “whatever the circumstances.”21 Malaysia therefore saw regional institutions, principally ASEAN and the ARF—and not military power or pacts—as the primary instruments for managing intra-ASEAN and regional order. Mahathir, in particular, elevated ASEAN to the first order of importance since it was a regional grouping that had been established for “national and regional security.” Relations with the Islamic countries came second and the nonaligned movement third.22 Fundamentally, ASEAN rested on two pillars. The first was its insistence on nonintervention and state sovereignty. The second was its refusal right from the start to consider collective defense or security as an option for the association. Instead, ASEAN adopted a political-institutional approach, consciously eschewing the use of force and military alliances to manage the security environment. This, in effect, constituted the “operational security doctrine” of the association.23 Thus, we see emerging out of ASEAN the concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and subsequently the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons–Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The ARF has been described as an ASEAN attempt to maintain a balance of power without collective defense, an institutional attempt at maintaining the balance of power, with the United States as makeweight.24 Another interpretation is that the ARF was, among other things,

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a device to keep the United States engaged in Asia.25 In any case, the ARF enabled Malaysia and the ASEAN members to engage the superpowers, especially China, in a security dialogue. The ARF was also an acknowledgement by ASEAN that the association had neither the capability nor the inclination to deal effectively with the post–Cold War security situation through military means. Thus, in the words of Malaysian foreign affairs minister Syed Hamid Albar, the primary value of ASEAN and the ARF is as a cooperative security arrangement designed to eliminate the use of arms, allowing Southeast Asia to focus on its “known mutual desires for development.”26 ASEAN, he pointed out, was never intended to be a military alliance, but was designed to engage extraregional players so that common interests can be addressed. More specifically, the ARF was aimed at fostering “patterns of behavior that reduce the risks to security.” Ultimately, however, the success of both ASEAN and the ARF in preventing conflict depended on the successful economic development of their member countries.27 Thus, the main reason for security cooperation was that it enabled Malaysia to concentrate on domestic consolidation, without interference from its neighbors. Instead of diverting scarce resources to defense, it could focus on nation building (that is, economic growth). The Dynamics of Security and Defense Cooperation We have seen so far that Malaysia regards defense cooperation as a subset of security cooperation.28 The reasons for Malaysia’s security cooperation are easy to understand, since information and intelligence exchanges, among other types of cooperation, are essential for helping to secure the state from domestic and external enemies. However, since the U.S. military presence has resulted in a benign external security environment, there would appear to be little incentive for Malaysia to cooperate in defense matters. Indeed, one could even argue that this stable regional environment enabled Malaysia to adopt its official foreign policy of equidistance and to eschew all defense pacts. However, there are several important reasons why Malaysia chose to cooperate actively in defense. Defense cooperation can be divided into two clusters, that involving the United States and other Western powers, and defense cooperation with Malaysia’s ASEAN partners. In both cases, the domestic dimension plays a critical role in the decision to cooperate. Although security cooperation should theoretically benefit

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all parties, intra-ASEAN defense cooperation is limited by two factors. The first is the mistrust that lingers to this day between ASEAN members. The primary example would be Malaysia and Singapore, although Indonesia-Malaysia defense ties can also be somewhat strained at times even to this day. Thus, attempts to purchase weapons and equipment jointly have failed. The second reason is that defense cooperation between ASEAN members is limited by the perception that since technology levels tend to be somewhat similar, there is nothing to be gained from technological cooperation. Up to the 1980s, defense cooperation with the West was valued for the material and training benefits that it brought, such as U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and access to the latest military equipment. However, defense cooperation was also a diplomatic tool to signal to the United States that Malaysia valued a U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific and that Kuala Lumpur was willing to play its part to help sustain that presence. The first occasion was when Malaysia attempted to persuade the United States to stay on in Southeast Asia after the end of the Vietnam War. This was the time when America, under the Nixon doctrine, decided that it would no longer take a leading military role in supporting Asian regimes. During the late 1970s, Malaysia also cooperated with Indonesia and Thailand under the General Border Committee (GBC) agreements to deal with the communist insurgents along their common borders. Cooperation entered a new phase in the 1980s as a result of domestic and regional developments. This period saw a winding down of the counterinsurgency warfare (CIW) campaign against the communist insurgents in peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak, culminating in the signing of a truce in 1989 between the CPM and the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) and the Malaysian government. The truce was agreed to by the CPM and the NKCP at the urging of China, which realized that with the end of the Cold War, communism had lost its ideological salience for the region. The early 1980s also marked the first phase of Malaysia’s conventional-warfare reorientation as a result of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. By the time Vietnam formally ended its presence in Cambodia with the signing of the Paris Peace Accord in 1991, Malaysia had already shifted its defense reorientation from one designed to deal with overland threats to a more maritime orientation, with the Spratlys disputes in mind. As a consequence, defense cooperation took on a more outwardly oriented and conventional focus.

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Malaysia’s defense cooperation with its ASEAN partners after the mid-1980s focused in addition on common security threats, such as piracy and people smuggling. All these contributed to the establishment of a “strong bilateral defense network amongst ASEAN countries,” which was an important part of a regional confidence-building and transparency process.29 In addition, Malaysia regards ASEAN defense linkages as essential for strengthening bilateral ties, and hence as an important component of Malaysian foreign policy. This is the raison d’être for the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation, Training, and Exercises with Brunei. However, Malaysia established especially strong defense cooperation links with Australia and the United States, despite Mahathir’s deep reservations over America’s global agenda. How this came about is the subject of the next section. Nevertheless, despite the logic of defense cooperation, regional and domestic politics, especially Malay nationalism, made it difficult for Malaysia to cooperate fully and openly with the West by becoming a member of any defense alliance. The next section will show the constraining effects of nationalism on defense cooperation with the West. The focus will be on the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which Malaysia refused to join, and on the AMDA, which Malaysia joined only after overcoming great initial resistance from its Malay nationalists. The two examples are illustrative of the impact of domestic politics on Kuala Lumpur’s defense policies. Nationalism and the Constraints on Cooperation: SEATO and AMDA SEATO was a defense alliance specifically designed to contain China. When Malaysia was invited to join the organization after its independence in 1957, the Chinese-inspired communist insurgency was still not over. At the same time, two of Malaysia’s neighbors, the Philippines and Thailand, were already SEATO members. As such, the Americans were under the impression that Malaysia would have been more than eager to become a member of the anticommunist pact. That was not to be, with domestic politics playing a crucial role in Malaysia’s decision not to join the alliance. To begin with, the post–World War II Malay nationalists viewed SEATO as a U.S. ploy to dominate the region, and more specifically, to

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replace Britain as colonizer. The U.S. consul in Kuala Lumpur, in a confidential memorandum entitled “Incipient anti-Americanism in the Federation of Malaya,” quoted a senior UMNO official as saying that “we are afraid if we take your side in the Cold War that we will become an American puppet.” Two members of the Malay opposition, Ahmad Bostamam and Ja’afar bin Hussein, also told the consul that there was no real distinction, in their minds, between the United States and Britain.30 The Malaysian refusal to join SEATO was also due to, among other things, the opposition’s misperception that membership would include hosting SEATO bases. Malaysia’s first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, felt that he could not afford to give his political enemies “effective ammunition,” even though he was prepared to make bases available in the event of war.31 In the final analysis, the Tunku commented that SEATO was in any case “ineffective, negative, outmoded and under the stigma of Western domination.”32 However, although Malaysia was wary of arousing “incipient anti-American” sentiments, it was not above accepting U.S. military aid. A bilateral agreement on the sale of U.S. military equipment and services was signed in July 1958.33 Ironically, another consideration that made the Tunku government decide against joining SEATO was the domestic communist insurgency. Because of the delicate nature of ethnic politics, Malaysia’s membership in a specifically anti-China defense pact might have upset segments of the Chinese population whose cooperation was required in the fight against the communist insurgency. Equally important, membership might even arouse China to step up its fraternal support for the CPM insurgents to more direct, active support. Finally, the defense guarantee provided for in AMDA made it unnecessary for Malaysia to consider other forms of alliance security cooperation.34 The evolution of AMDA is in some ways similar to that of SEATO. Unlike Indonesia or Vietnam, countries that had to fight bloody wars of independence, Malaysia (then Malaya) was granted independence without a fight. Independent Malaysia in 1957 had no defense forces worth speaking of. As such, it would have been logical to depend on the defense umbrella offered by its erstwhile colonizer, Britain. AMDA seemed to offer the newly independent state such a ready-made security umbrella. Realizing the potential benefits of AMDA, the first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was keen to accede to the pact. However, the new generation of Malay nationalists disagreed. Once again, they viewed AMDA as a plot to compromise Malaysian indepen-

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dence, to ensure Western dominance of Malaysia, and therefore concluded that it was a sellout. This stand, taken by Malay nationalists within the PAS and UMNO, was also prompted by the ease with which Malaysia was given independence. The nationalists of Indonesia and Vietnam, as a consequence, regarded Malaysia’s credentials as a nonaligned, independent nation as suspect. This perception would have been reinforced by Malaysia entering into a security pact with its former colonizer. Domestic opposition to AMDA was so strong that the Tunku had to threaten to resign if the agreement was not accepted. Although he finally had his way, the Tunku nevertheless was forced to agree to a review of the treaty a year after it was initialed.35 The AMDA experience is instructive in that it revealed the depth of domestic opposition to formal security agreements with outside powers, because of what has been described as nascent Malay anti-Western sentiments, especially anti–Western imperialism. AMDA was put to the test from 1963–65 when Sukarno’s Indonesia launched its armed Confrontation against the formation of Malaysia, which brought together Malaya, Singapore, and the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak into a single federation. Britain was committed to honoring AMDA at that time.36 After Singapore’s expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, AMDA was transformed into the FPDA in 1971. However, two years after the end of the Confrontation, in 1967, Britain indicated that it would withdraw completely from Southeast Asia. This shocked both Singapore and Malaysia, which were forced to seriously reconsider their defense options. In any event, Britain’s withdrawal east of Suez underlined the fragility of external defense pacts and guarantees. This view was reinforced by the announcement of the Nixon doctrine in 1969, in which the United States expected regional states to be responsible for their own defense, the United States coming to the rescue only if those states were considered vital to U.S. security. These external developments, combined with domestic nationalist pressures, made it increasingly difficult for Malaysia to enter into overt defense pacts with the West. Contemporary Defense and Security Cooperation: Quietly Does It Nevertheless, defense and security cooperation constitutes an important plank of Malaysian foreign policy. Since domestic opposition, combined

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with the globalization of the world economy, made it difficult to cooperate openly with the West, Malaysia was eventually forced to adopt a two-faced approach. On the one hand, Mahathir especially was highly critical of the West’s neoliberal economic agenda that threatened to derail Malaysia’s domestic economic policy based on growth and distribution through an activist role for the state. It would therefore have been inconsistent to be fighting with the “enemy” of Malaysia in economics, and cooperating with it in defense. Hence defense cooperation had to be carried out quietly, especially with the United States. Malaysian resistance to the increasingly neoliberal economic policies of America in particular had its roots in domestic political economy imperatives. Neoliberal economic policies essentially prescribe a markedly reduced role for the state in national economic life, one that is confined to a “night watchman” role consistent with ensuring an unfettered free market in which private economic decision making prevails. For Malaysia, however, the 1969 race riots, which marked the end of the basic “elite accommodation system,”37 also required an activist role for the state in directing economic activity to achieve the distributive or affirmative-action goals of the NEP. At the end of the 1960s, the more militant Malay politicians (including then member of Parliament Dr. Mahathir Mohamad) had accused the Tunku of being too accommodating and compromising toward non-Malay demands. In the face of the Democratic Action Party’s (DAP) bid at creating a “Malaysian Malaysia,” they began pushing for a more assertive Malay nationalism.38 A government white paper, Toward National Harmony, released in 1971 cited the failure of earlier economic policies to address the relative economic backwardness of the Malays as the root cause of the 1969 race riots.39 The New Economic Policy adopted a two-pronged approach. The first was to eradicate poverty, while the second was to restructure society and close the income gap between the Malays and non-Malays. To ensure the success of this social and economic engineering, Malaysia adopted a statist development model in 1970, with the state as the protector of Malay interests and with the specific aim of creating a new class of Malay capitalists. The NEP objectives were given further impetus when Mahathir became prime minister in 1981. Mahathir’s adoption of the “look East” policy was not that he merely admired the work ethic of the South Koreans and the Japanese. He also attributed the rapid industrialization and progress of these two East Asian states to their adoption of the statist developmental model under which states had autonomy

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to formulate economic policy, set strategic directions, and pick winners and losers. His antagonism toward Western approaches and neoliberal values in particular were two-fold. The first was directed at what he perceived to be the shortcomings of the unfettered free market, which advantaged developed countries at the expense of the developing countries in general, and more specifically, created the economic imbalance between the Malays and non-Malays in Malaysia.40 Secondly, the political counterpart to liberal economic values, with its emphasis on human rights and democratic representation, also threatened the legitimacy of third world states. These developments underscored the regime’s belief that Malaysia’s primary security weakness was still internal, or domestic. The goalrational legitimacy of the UMNO-led government was in part dependent on performance, that is, on maximizing overall growth of the economy, and at the same time employing an activist distributive policy to create a class of new Malay capitalists. The Anglo-American neoliberal approach to economic development since the mid-1980s, based on the free market and the individual, threatened the policy autonomy of the Malaysian government to direct growth and development. As a consequence, Mahathir spoke out strongly against the “decadent West” and its negative values as a way of countering Western approaches to politics and economics. It also meant that Malaysia could not be seen to be “consorting with the devil” in its foreign policy, at least not openly, lest that might jeopardize the domestic political legitimacy of the ruling UMNO-led political regime. The value of external defense and security pacts and cooperation therefore had to be balanced against the need to maintain domestic economic autonomy. This was highlighted in the 1997 regional economic crisis, when the “conditionalities” imposed by the International Monetary Fund for bailing out countries like Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea were rejected by Malaysia. Similarly, Mahathir’s opposition to APEC was based on the perception that it was a U.S.-Australian vehicle to promote economic liberalization in the Pacific at the expense of the developmental states. Mahathir responded in 1990 with his abortive proposal for an EAEG, minus Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which would safeguard East Asian economic interests. The EAEG proposal did not meet with ASEAN support, and Mahathir thus was forced to tone down his proposal for a “grouping” to that for a “caucus” (that is, the EAEC).41

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Given this anti-Western rhetoric in general, and the criticism of the Anglo-American neoliberal agenda in particular, it would have been difficult for the Mahathir administration to be seen to be involved in any security alliance with Western powers. Indeed, because of domestic considerations, Malaysia could not be seen to be part of any security alliance—not with the West, nor China, nor even India because of the latter’s confrontation with Muslim Pakistan. This is not to say, however, that Malaysia’s open aversion to military pacts is based on moral principles. It is, rather, grounded in political realities. As far as cooperation with the Western powers was concerned, it was seen as a necessary way for Malaysia to acquire not only the latest arms, but also to ensure that it had access to the latest conventional warfare doctrines and training. This was because although the Malaysian Armed Forces prided itself on its CIW expertise, it still had a long way to go as far as conventional warfare was concerned. The result was that Malaysia, despite all of Mahathir’s anti-West and anti-U.S. rhetoric, developed a special relationship with the United States and Australia. The U.S. relationship was enhanced because of the fear that in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and with the Soviet Union in decline, the United States would withdraw from the region entirely. Defense cooperation, including offering America places instead of bases, was one way of persuading the United States that its presence was still valued and to therefore remain engaged in the region. Ironically, when Singapore offered to host U.S. “facilities” in 1989, Malaysia was the most vociferous in its opposition. “Facilities” could easily become bases, and the offer was a violation of the spirit of ZOPFAN, thus it protested.42 The Malaysian protests were, however, as much for domestic consumption as anything else. For so long as things were done quietly and out of the public eye, and not on a permanent basis, a foreign military presence was acceptable to Malaysia. Indeed, critics have pointed out that the presence of Royal Australian Air Force units at the Butterworth air base in Malaysia could also be construed as being against the principles of ZOPFAN. Although defense ties with the United Kingdom were once very strong because of Britain’s position as the former colonial power, defense linkages began to weaken after Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez. Defense ties with Europe had not been traditionally that strong, confined in the main to the purchase of military equipment, such as corvettes from Germany, fast strike craft, missiles, and submarines from France, and

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armored vehicles from various other sources. However, ties with the United States and Australia went beyond equipment purchases to include technology transfer, training, exercises, and human resource development. But what distinguishes these cooperative links from the rest of Malaysia’s ties with other Western powers is not merely the breadth of the links, but the depth and, above all, the intensity of these exchanges. The Australia-Malaysia Special Relationship The Australian-Malaysian link was crucial for the Malaysian Armed Forces first because it provided the MAF with a whole range of training and support activities, covering military activities, logistics, intelligence exchange, defense science, and defense industry. Second, the Australian connection was also important for keeping the United States committed indirectly to Malaysia because of the ANZUS treaty. The Australian military presence in Butterworth provided this linkage, in addition to the contribution to the Integrated Air Defense System covering Malaysia and Singapore. These ties have developed to the extent that functional cooperation is uninterrupted by political spats, with Malaysian officers making clear distinctions between foreign policy and militaryto-military relations.43 This Australia-Malaysia military linkage was the result of a conscious Australian policy to enhance the development of its own defense capabilities. In the 1989 Australian Defense Review, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) was expected to contribute to regional stability by promoting politico-military interaction through defense activities with Southeast Asia.44 This was a very marked change from the 1960s and 1970s, when defense cooperation was limited to the provision of military equipment. Henceforth, Australia would be involved in exercises, dialogues, intelligence consultations, and defense cooperation projects, the latter including visits and training. The Australians adopted a policy of allowing its partners to set the pace and tone of cooperation. The Defense Review identified Indonesia as the most crucial for Australian security, followed by Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, and way down the list, the Philippines. However, diplomatic problems with Indonesia precluded the ADF from developing close ties with the Indonesian military. The emphasis therefore was on Malaysia and Singapore, with the FPDA as the natural centerpiece of Australia’s multilateral defense involvement in Southeast Asia.45 The FPDA initially provided Malaysia

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and Singapore with the opportunity to develop their armed forces at their own pace. However, as the MAF and Singapore Armed Forces became more sophisticated, Australia upgraded the exercises to meet Malaysian and Singaporean requirements. “Proposals from ASEAN members to undertake cooperative military activity with Australia are received on a continuous basis. . . . These proposals reflect the reality that regional nations are motivated in the first instance by distinct desires to upgrade their respective self-reliant defense forces.”46 Significantly, Australia consciously eschewed playing “regional policeman” in order to engage ASEAN, stressing its willingness to have regional participants take the lead in proposing practical initiatives on an equal partner basis. However, Prime Minister John Howard’s recent assertion that Australia reserves the right to target terrorists overseas has underlined a new Australian approach to regional security, that of deputy sheriff for the United States. This new attitude does not sit well with Mahathir, who threatened to review Malaysia’s participation in the FPDA as a result.47 The U.S.-Malaysia Bilateral Security “Relationship”: A Jewel in the Crown? As mentioned before, Malaysia could not afford to be seen to be cooperating openly with the United States. Yet a great deal of behind-the-scenes functional cooperation had been taking place over the years. There are two reasons for this paradox. On the one hand, Mahathir saw the West, and especially America, with its emphasis on the rights of minorities and its perversion of values, as a source of threats to the Malay community. Even more dangerous was its neoliberal economic agenda and its attempts to control the world market and undermine the competitiveness of Eastern countries.48 The U.S. agenda, he felt, compounded the problem of maintaining high economic growth rates for a sustained period in a rapidly globalizing economy that tends to reduce economic policy autonomy at the national level. Economic liberalization brings along the possibility that the political elite could lose control over the sources of production and the domestic economic distribution system. Open and free markets tend to diffuse rather than concentrate power in the hands of ruling elites by distributing wealth away from the center and into the hands of individual firms and the masses. At the same time, however, the U.S. presence was also essential for

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maintaining regional stability so necessary for Malaysia to concentrate all its resources on state building. The United States had to be persuaded to stay on in the Asia-Pacific, and Malaysia was therefore prepared to cooperate fully, if quietly, with America. In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia and its military involvement in Vietnam were considered vital to the security of Malaysia.49 Malaysia trained South Vietnamese troops and policemen, provided the model for village resettlement in South Vietnam, and became a rest and recreation center for U.S. troops. After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Malaysia was apprehensive that the United States would withdraw from Southeast Asia, and Vice President Nelson Rockefeller visited the region, including Malaysia, in 1976 to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the region.50 Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 and the subsequent Soviet naval buildup in Cam Ranh Bay, the United States stepped up its military assistance to Malaysia, increasing its FMS and International Military Education Training (IMET) programs. In 1980, Kuala Lumpur bought eighty-eight used Skyhawk jets from Washington for U.S.$320 million.51 After Mahathir came to power, U.S.-Malaysia defense cooperation still continued, with the United States increasing its FMS credits from U.S.$10 million to U.S.$12 million and its IMET program from U.S.$300,000 to U.S.$650,000 in FY 1982–83. Malaysia also bought U.S. military equipment in the early 1980s because it was “far superior” to that of other countries.52 This cooperation was maintained throughout the 1980s, Mahathir’s rhetoric notwithstanding, it culminated in the signing of the Bilateral Training and Consultative Group (BITACG) agreement in 1984. In 1989, the Bush administration proposed U.S.$1 million in IMET aid to Malaysia “to ensure that Malaysian Armed Forces personnel are familiar with U.S. doctrine, equipment, and military management techniques and provide a foundation for close cooperation between United States and Malaysian forces.”53 The extent of this defense cooperation was revealed by Malaysian defense minister Najib Tun Razak in a Heritage Foundation–Center for Strategic and International Studies lecture, delivered on May 3, 2002, entitled “U.S.-Malaysia Defense Cooperation: A Solid Success Story.” Najib referred to the hush-hush nature of this cooperation in his opening sentence, saying that he had considered titling the talk “Malaysia-U.S. Defense Cooperation: The Untold Story.” The introductory paragraph says it all: “For many years U.S. and Malaysian forces have cooperated

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on a wide range of missions with virtually no fanfare or public acknowledgement. And in spite of its success, our bilateral defense relationship seems to be an all too well-kept secret.” Describing defense cooperation as “an unsung story” and a “special relationship,” Najib went on to describe the following: • There have been more than seventy-five U.S. military ship visits in the past two and a half years. • The United States Air Force conducts training exercises with its Royal Malaysian counterpart, flying with and against them in mock battles. • U.S. Navy SEALs conduct training in Malaysia twice a year. • The U.S. Army conducts field exercises with the Malaysian army. I might mention here that, for their expertise in jungle warfare, Malaysians are known in the business as “whispering death.” • Finally, 1,500 Malaysian defense personnel have benefited from the U.S.-sponsored IMET program. Significantly, Washington has so far turned down no Malaysian request for weapons purchases. Cooperation between the two nations started long before September 11, 2001, but the (in Najib’s words) “horrific events of that day galvanized our relationship as never before.” September 11 therefore marked a new stage in U.S.-Malaysia security and defense cooperation. Najib also pointed out the following: • The United States averages more than 1,000 overflights per year. Since September 11, this number has increased dramatically, and all requests have been approved. • The United States has excellent access to Malaysian intelligence. • Malaysia occupies a strategic location along the Strait of Malacca and the southern South China Sea. Since September 11, Malaysian forces have been protecting U.S. ships in the Strait. • In addition, Malaysia is actively identifying assets of terrorists and teaching Indonesia and other ASEAN countries how to freeze assets. Although U.S.-Malaysian security cooperation has a long history, it was only in 1984, after Mahathir became prime minister, that the relationship was upgraded and institutionalized in the 1984 BITACG agreement.54 Thus, BITACG meets as often as twice a year to discuss exercises,

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training, logistics, and intelligence exchange, a frequency that is probably exceeded only by Australia-Malaysia exchanges. The issue of Malay nationalism, and the sensitivities that an open military relationship with the United States would create, led Malaysia to keep cooperation with the West in the closet. Thus, we can see the dichotomy between foreign policy rhetoric and actual practice. Conclusion: Functional Cooperation to Secure the State Given the susceptibility of the Malaysian state to both domestic and international developments, most of the country’s security cooperation has been centered on securing the state and regime. As such, there is a considerable number of intelligence exchanges between the security forces, especially the police, of Malaysia and the security agencies of other countries, including America and Australia. Although long ongoing, this cooperation became public after September 11, 2001, with Malaysia openly cooperating with the United States, its ASEAN partners, and other states in tracking down terrorists. Why did Malaysia choose to publicly work so closely with the United States despite its anti-Western and anti-U.S. rhetoric? It was simply that the terrorists had the avowed aim of toppling incumbent regimes that they considered as secular and illegitimate. As such, the Mahathir administration saw Islamist groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) as direct threats to the regime. Thus, for the first time, Mahathir shared a common threat perception with the United States. Coming out of the closet was also necessary to prove that Mahathir’s crackdown and arrests of KMM members, using the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA), starting in June 2001 before the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center, were justified. Among those arrested was a PAS youth leader, who is also the son of a prominent leader of the opposition Islamic party, PAS. The arrests were construed as a bid by Mahathir to crack down on the Muslim opposition, which had been making inroads into key Malay states, including Kedah, Mahathir’s own state. Thus September 11 vindicated his crackdown on the KMM and also explains why Mahathir was so quick to jump on the antiterror bandwagon. Initially, the Malaysian government labeled the group Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Malaysian martyrs’ group), but in view of the positive connotations of the word “mujahidin,” quickly renamed it a week later Kumpulan

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Militant Malaysia (Malaysian militant group). Malaysia’s antiterrorism agreements with the United States and Australia served two functions. The agreements formalized at the highest level increased security collaboration and at the same time helped to legitimate, internationally and hopefully even domestically, Mahathir’s crackdown on Islamic militants in Malaysia. This also helps to explain Malaysia’s agreement to host the ASEAN-U.S. antiterrorism center, to be run jointly by the United States and Malaysia. Malaysia’s involvement with the U.S. antiterror campaign reveals the dilemma of Malaysia-U.S. security cooperation. On the one hand, there is a need to cooperate with America and the West, and to use the antiterror campaign to prove that Malaysia was not merely using a cover to crack down on the Islamic opposition groups. In this sense, the September 11, 2001 attack marked a crucial turning point in U.S.-Malaysia relations. Although it enhanced U.S.-Malaysia security ties, the attack by the United States on Iraq in 2003 highlights essential differences between the U.S. and Malaysian approaches to terrorism. Again, Malay nationalism plays an important role, with “nascent anti-Americanism” still alive and well. Farish Noor, a well-known Malaysian scholar, in an article in the online newspaper Malaysiakini on November 2, 2002, commented that Malaysia’s decision to host the antiterror center would carry risks that would outweigh the benefits. This was because the biggest opposition group in Malaysia is still the “Islamists who have their own deep reservations about the role that the U.S. has played internationally and in the Arab-Muslim world in particular.” Moreover, the power differentials between the developed West and the developing world remain concrete realities to be dealt with. As a consequence, neither party pushed for significant changes to their defense relationship. On the part of the United States, there are limits, essentially confined to intelligence, training grounds, overflights, and safe access from the South China Sea to the Malacca Strait, on what Malaysia can offer. At the same time, there is only so much that America can do for Malaysia, whose security concerns are still largely domestic. In addition, Malaysia has been steadfast in its opposition to extending the war on terrorism to Iraq. For former prime minister Mahathir, Iraq was merely “a side issue” in the war on terrorism, whereas the key issue was the need to reform American policy toward Israel and Palestine.55 Malaysia has been at the forefront of international condemnation of the U.S. attack on Iraq, and this will indubitably have serious repercussions

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on U.S.-Malaysia security cooperation. Although September 11 set the United States and Malaysia on the same path of cooperation, the U.S. attack on Iraq threatens to undermine this newfound open cooperation. Will this set back U.S.-Malaysia cooperation? At the very least, it could send cooperation back into the closet. However, it is unlikely that Washington will stop cooperating with Kuala Lumpur, despite U.S. chagrin at Malaysian opposition to the Iraq war. This is because Malaysia plays an important role as “an example of a successful moderate Muslim majority country and a progressive and democratic Islamic state.”56 It is therefore in Washington’s interest to continue supporting moderate Muslim governments such as Malaysia, in addition to ensuring the flow of much needed information on Muslim terrorists in Southeast Asia. At this point, it is still somewhat unclear where Malaysian security and defense cooperation with the West is heading. In all likelihood, it will have to remain low profile. However, arms and defense acquisitions will be subject to a great deal of publicity. In this area, it is likely that Malaysia will increasingly turn to France and Russia for defense technology and weapons. Acquisitions from these two countries will not stir up domestic controversy and raise the ire of Malaysia’s nationalists. More important, the PAS opposition will exploit the close links between the U.S. coalition and Malaysia in the battle for the Malay-Muslim vote. The final question is whether Malaysia’s defense cooperation will remain on the same trajectory now that Mahathir has retired as prime minister. The short answer is that it is most unlikely to change its course under the new premier, Abdullah Badawi. This is because UMNO is still relying on Malay endorsement of its goal-rational legitimacy to remain in power. Besides, there are no serious challengers as yet to UMNO as the representative of Malay interests and rights. The interethnic accommodation system will probably remain intact in the near future, with no serious challenge to Barisan rule. In short, all the domestic constraints are still present in the current post-Mahathir era. Indeed, without Mahathir’s strong personality and charisma, any successor of his—in this case Badawi—will be even more constrained by domestic politics. Badawi will have less freedom of action, and he will have to be more mindful of the challenges posed by Malay “nationalists” who are out to secure Malay votes. Besides having to live with all the constraints and challenges of maintaining domestic economic autonomy in an increasingly globalized world, he will have to prove his credentials as a Malay nationalist first. Malaysia’s new leader

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might well therefore find himself even more constrained in cooperating with the West. Appendix: Cooperation Programs Bilateral Defense Cooperation There are two principal clusters of security cooperation for Malaysia, involving twenty countries ranging from Albania to Turkey. The first is focused on ASEAN and the second involves the Western powers, principally Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The Russian connection has been gaining in importance over the years, but only with regard to operational and technical aircraft maintenance. The bilateral activities cover five major categories: (1) military activities, (2) logistics support, (3) intelligence and information exchange, (4) defense science, and (5) defense industry. ASEAN military cooperation is of different levels, including reciprocal visits, exchange-of-personnel programs, military courses, periodic seminars, and meetings culminating in the conduct of regular combined exercises. The General Border Committee (GBC) format is a relic of the CIW campaigns against communist insurgents, and includes Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The Malaysian Armed Forces website singles out for mention military cooperation with Thailand and Indonesia, which currently “takes the form of military exercises on land, sea and air.”57 Malaysia considers defense ties with these neighbors to be especially valuable. The most important Western partners are the United States and Australia. Australia-Malaysia (Since 1992) The Malaysia-Australia Joint Defense Program (MAJDP) includes training, attachments, exchanges, exercises, logistics, and projects. This relationship probably has the greatest scope and depth, covering all areas of cooperation, including defense science and industry. Thailand-Malaysia (Institutionalized since 1977) This is the oldest bilateral link, dating back to 1977. This Agreement on Border Cooperation is based on the GBC structure. Cooperation covers

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training, operational exercises, and intelligence exchange. Cooperation is quite active. Indonesia-Malaysia (Institutionalized since 1984) Malaysia has a special relationship with Indonesia. Cooperation is highly active and intense, involving all echelons. This relationship took on new meaning after September 11, 2001, with very close exchanges of intelligence between the two countries. Security arrangements exist in areas where Malaysia shares common borders with Indonesia under the broad aegis of the GBC established in 1984. Exercises, operations, intelligence exchange, training, and search and rescue operations are covered. Brunei-Malaysia (Institutionalized since 1992) Malaysia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Brunei on Defense Cooperation and Training and Exercises in 1992. Cooperation is presently confined to training and exercises, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers ties with Brunei as special. Philippines-Malaysia (Institutionalized since 1994) Ties are good, albeit low key. Cooperation is institutionalized under a MOU on training, coordinated patrols, and intelligence seminars. Singapore-Malaysia (Institutionalized since 1995) Cooperation is covered by the Malaysia-Singapore Defense Forum (MSDF), which includes training, exercises, and joint projects. Intelligence exchange is of paramount importance. Exercises were put on hold from 1997 until 2000. But otherwise the relationship is rated as very active. New Zealand–Malaysia (Institutionalized since 1996) The Malaysia–New Zealand Defense Cooperation Program (MNZDCP) is another very active program. It covers training, exchange and attachment, and exercises. The level of involvement covers middle-ranking officers in general.

——— 9 ——— The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations The Triumph of Bilateralism Over Multilateralism in Philippine Foreign Policy?

Renato Cruz De Castro

On November 26, 1992, the United States government turned over Clark Air Base to the Philippines as a result of the Philippine Senate’s decision not to ratify the Philippine-American Cooperation Treaty of 1991. A year later, Washington withdrew its forces from Subic Naval Base. These two events brought to an end almost one hundred years of American military presence in the Philippines, and ushered the “special relationship” between the two allies into a new and cool phase. Since the Philippines became independent in 1946, the presence of the U.S. bases in the country had provided a security umbrella that enabled the government to focus its attention and resources on internal security. With the U.S. withdrawal from these two major military facilities, however, the Philippine government found it exigent to address the country’s vulnerability to external security threats by veering away from its traditional bilateralism and moving toward multilateralism. Because its armed forces were preoccupied with a counterinsurgency campaign, the Philippines, lacking an external defense capability, relied on a new and an untested ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as an alternative to its bilateral alliance with the United States. In the mid-1990s, the Philippines hoped that the ARF would render anachronistic the country’s traditional pursuit of its mutual security interests with Washington and its reliance on America’s military capabilities and balancing role in East Asia. It expected the ARF to assume a more substantial role in fostering regional security cooperation, confidence building, and preventive diplo154

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macy, and possibly, even institutionalizing a conflict management and resolution regime in East Asia. But the hope that the ARF might be a viable security alternative to the Philippine-U.S. alliance was shattered by a series of events from 1995 to 1998 as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) occupied a reef deep inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and prevented the incident from being discussed in the ARF. Consequently, Manila, viewing the Chinese incursion into the South China Sea as the main long-term threat to Philippine interests, expeditiously reassessed and revived its bilateral security relations with the United States. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, the Philippines became the first Asian state to declare its full support for the international coalition against terrorism. Manila reopened Clark Air Base and Subic Bay to American forces, which then used these former American military facilities to transship supplies and ordinance to Central Asia. On January 16, 2002, U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the deployment of about 600 American military personnel to the Philippine island of Basilan.1 This deployment signified the revival of the Philippine-U.S. alliance and fanned widespread speculation of a possible return of U.S. forces on Philippine soil on a more long-term basis. This chapter explores the dynamics of Philippine foreign policy as it gravitated toward multilateralism in the mid-1990s, and reverted to the traditional form of alliance in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century. It examines the factors and events that caused the crisis in the Philippine policy on bilateralism, the country’s brief and futile experiment with multilateralism in the ARF, and the developments that led to the revitalization of its bilateral alliance with the United States. The chapter raises the following questions: How did the end of the Cold War affect the Philippines’ policy on bilateralism? What prompted the country to engage in multilateralism as a means of meeting its external security needs? What events led to the Philippine government’s reversion to bilateralism? What developments led to the revitalization of the two countries’ security relationship in the post-9/11 period? And, will the return to bilateralism mean the end of the Philippine experiment with multilateralism? The Legacy of Bilateralism States form alliances primarily for the purpose of “aggregation of power.” In other words, they form alliances to enhance the individual capacities

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of each member, either through a deterrent guarantee provided by a more powerful state, or by increasing the allies’ own defense capabilities by pooling their collective resources, abilities, and efforts in the process of creating security relations.2 Allies usually combine their resources against a specific and common enemy that may be more powerful than any of the allies individually. After the Philippines became independent in 1946, it entered into a de facto bilateral relation with the United States to ensure its external security concerns immediately after World War II. Traumatized by the Japanese occupation and the devastation that accompanied the liberation of the Philippines by American forces, Manila considered an American military presence in the country as crucial to its vital interests. From Manila’s perspective, an American military presence was necessary for the protection of the country and for attracting Washington’s concern and interest to its former colony. The country also saw its hosting of American forces as a contribution to the maintenance of security in the western Pacific. Consequently, the Philippines concluded a number of comprehensive bilateral security agreements with its former colonial master to ensure its security relations with the United States. The two countries became formal allies with the signing of a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951. Both also joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) of 1954. Membership in this organization substantiated the official U.S. pronouncements on the two countries’ commitment to respond jointly to an armed attack in accordance with their constitutional processes. The two countries, however, encountered conflicts of interest in their security relationship. They disagreed on the definition of “commitments,” the nature of the “common threat,” and the need for revisions of the maintenance of force levels. Both sides also raised questions about the kind and value of American economic and military assistance, and possible American involvement in the Philippines’ insurgency problem, among others.3 The most damaging of these problems was the gradual dissipation of a common threat. Crisis in Bilateralism From Washington’s point of view, U.S. security relations with the Philippines served a very important objective during the Cold War—to maintain the U.S. forward position against China, and possibly the Soviet Union, and to enable American forces to operate in this part of the world. Initially, the Philippines shared this view. Manila also adopted the Ameri-

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can position with regard to the threat of international communism. However, Manila’s predominant concern with domestic security problems eventually caused a rift in the two countries’ threat perception. This was demonstrated in the mid-1980s, when Washington’s primary security objective was to offset the growing Soviet naval presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. As a consequence, U.S. naval and air forces in the Philippines were tasked with securing the vital South China Sea lanes against the increasing Soviet threat.4 The Philippine government, however, was confronted by a growing communist menace at home. By the mid-1980s, the New People’s Army and the Communist Party of the Philippines expanded their base of operation beyond the main island of Luzon. Communist insurgents were able to establish a meaningful political and military presence in about two-thirds of the country’s rural areas. Thus, the government stopped its efforts to build its air and sea defenses aimed to counter the Soviet naval and air buildup in the South China Sea.5 The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) responded to the communist threat by acquiring counterinsurgency equipment.6 Manila also retrained its military in counterinsurgency tactics and strategy and deployed its forces to secure internal lines of communication. Lastly, the Philippine government formulated a coordinated approach to the insurgency problem. This development created a gap in the two countries’ security perspective, which was widened when the Cold War ended in 1989. Filipinos thought that no major foreign threat confronted the country; they considered the local communist insurgents as the only threat to Philippine national security. They argued that there was no need for the U.S. bases since they were of little use in dealing with the insurgency. Furthermore, they claimed that the U.S. military facilities served only American regional and global interests and allowed the United States to exert undue influence on the Philippine political process.7 The end of the Cold War meant that American air force and naval facilities in the Philippines had lost their primary function—as a counterforce to the predominantly land-based military might of the Soviet Union and to the war machine of its client state Vietnam. In this respect, the Philippine bases lost their war-fighting significance.8 The Pentagon, nevertheless, considered the Philippine bases valuable as they provided the training ground, logistical support, and lastly, political symbolism for American resolve to remain a power in East Asia.9 The Philippine government’s position was clear and unequivocal: the U.S.

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facilities were expendable as far as Philippine defense was concerned. Hence, the United States should pay the Philippines accordingly. The Philippine government did not consider Washington’s changing strategic calculations on the value of its Philippine bases. Rather, it assumed that the United States would continue to keep its bases no matter how much the Philippines asked in terms of base-related economic and military assistance. The Philippine government’s primer on the U.S. military facilities expressed Manila’s view regarding these facilities: “The Philippines faced no external enemies or threats and [believed] that threats arising from both communist insurgency and the right-wing military rebels could not be addressed by U.S. military presence in the country.”10 From 1990 to 1991, the Philippines and the United States conducted two-phase negotiations aimed at establishing a framework for discussing the future of the Philippine bases, the so-called new PhilippineU.S. relations, and a new bases treaty. Washington and Manila found themselves without any clear consensus on the alliance’s raison d’être during these talks. Nevertheless, after nearly eleven months of hard and tedious discussion and bargaining, Washington and Manila forged a new accord to replace the 1947 military base agreement—the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security (or PACT) of 1991. However, the predominantly anti-base Philippine Senate had to ratify this treaty. A majority of the senators were upset by the low base-related compensation of U.S.$203 million for the American use of Subic Naval Base. They were also bitterly opposed to the phase-out period of ten years instead of seven years without any extension.11 In addition, the senators were indignant that the arrangement would maintain the status quo and barely changed the provisions of the original military base agreement of 1947.12 They contended that the PACT was window dressing to disguise a continuation of the old protectorate arrangement by which the Philippines provided a platform for American forces in exchange for financial and military aid. The Philippine Senate, by a vote of 12 (against) to 11 (for), rejected the PACT on September 16, 1991. This rendered the eleven-month negotiating process useless. Manila proffered a three-year phased withdrawal to Washington, but the first Bush administration declined the offer. Instead, the U.S. Navy implemented a one-year withdrawal plan. The United States and the Philippines remained allies under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. However, Washington significantly downgraded

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its political and military relations with Manila by declaring that the United States could not guarantee the external defense of the Philippines since American forces had lost a facility from which they could operate.13 The Pentagon’s 1992 East Asian Strategic Initiative and 1995 East Asian Strategic Review barely mentioned the Philippines as an American ally.14 The latter relegated U.S. security relations with the Philippines to the same level as its relations with the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It emphasized as well Washington’s intention and effort to broaden the American military network of access and pre-positioning arrangements with other Southeast Asian states. The Experiment with Multilateralism: The ARF The United States withdrew its forces from the Philippines in the early 1990s. During this period, the Philippines enjoyed a relatively benign regional security environment, which could hopefully provide the country the opportunity to focus on political and economic development as well to concentrate its defense efforts on internal security problems. Buoyed by the immediate post–Cold War euphoria and encouraged by ASEAN’s success in the Cambodian peace process, the Philippines assumed that it could design a foreign policy beyond the “special relations” with the United States by experimenting with regionalism and multilateralism.15 The Philippine government took into account ASEAN’s increasing unity or cohesion as an important factor that prevented serious conflicts caused by irredentist claims, rebellions, and other intrigues in Southeast Asia from ramifying into outright military disputes during the Cold War.16 Moreover, Manila saw ASEAN as the most effective, resilient, and universally accepted regional organization providing new initiatives to preserve the environment of peace, prosperity, and cooperation in Southeast Asia and the entire Asia-Pacific region.17 One of the initiatives Manila expected to play a significant role in regional security affairs was the establishment of the ARF. The ARF was the result of a series of seminars in 1990–91, involving academics and officials from a number of ASEAN member states, that explored security issues and the role of the regional organization in the post–Cold War period. These seminars, held in various ASEAN cities, looked into the possibility of ASEAN playing an important role in bolstering internal consultation, fostering confidence-building measures, and institutionalizing conflict-resolution mechanisms throughout the East

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Asian region.18 The discussions about a regional security forum designated the ASEAN post–ministerial meeting as a possible venue for the ASEAN member states to discuss regional security concerns. In July 1994, ASEAN announced the establishment of the ARF. The ARF is intended neither to be an alliance nor a collective-security mechanism. Instead, it is primarily intended to formulate confidencebuilding and preventive-diplomacy measures.19 The ARF’s agenda is nonbinding. It is merely consultative and is aimed at contributing to regional security by promoting transparency in the member states’ strategic intent, building trust regarding their military capabilities and deployments, and developing among them a habit of cooperation in order to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts.20 The ARF in the mid-1990s, however, was untested and its ability to forge new arrangements to prevent interstate conflict could not immediately replace the more traditional and reliable security guarantees, such as bilateral alliances. Furthermore, ASEAN has been encumbered by minimal institutionalization as well as by a reliance on gradualism and decision making based on consensus. This makes it doubtful that it has the clout and capability to alter state behavior either by inducing states to surrender their sovereign rights or by preventing states from resorting to the traditional means of settling disputes involving national security— in short, the military option and the reliance on bilateral alliances. Finally, as a body steeped in ASEAN’s norms and practices, the ARF follows an evolutionary approach, emphasizing a pace comfortable to all the participants. As such, the forum cannot address security crises that require immediate action and a swift response. The Philippines assumed that the ARF could be the principal means of dealing with the regional security issues the country might face in the post–Cold War period.21 Manila thought that the forum could increase the “comfort level” among member states through its various confidencebuilding measures and preventive diplomacy, and eventually move its members toward the adoption of a common approach to the resolution of interstate conflict. As former undersecretary of foreign affairs Rodolfo Severino declared: “The Philippines sees the ASEAN Regional Forum as one of the important avenues by which to engage the key nations in the region on political and security issues that have impact on us.”22 The 1998 Policy Direction of the Philippine Department of National Defense stated that “the country’s national security could be enhanced through an active participation on the official or track-one dialogue

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mechanism and in regional confidence building measures like transparency in defense matters through defense white papers, military training exchanges, observers to military exercises, etc.”23 Likewise, the Philippines expected middle-power states (China, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) to abide by ASEAN’s negotiating principles of consensus and consultation, and to incrementally develop the cooperative behavior necessary to maintain peace and avoid conflict. Unfortunately, a series of events from the mid-1990s to 1998 shook the Philippines’ faith in multilateralism as a means of achieving security. The Philippines’ complacency was jolted by the discovery of Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef in 1995. This incident also tested the viability of multilateralism as a means of guaranteeing the country’s external security. The presence of Chinese structures on a reef just 135 miles off the westernmost Philippine island of Palawan caused alarm and apprehension in Manila regarding Chinese intentions in the South China Sea.24 Given the AFP’s weak conventional military capability, the country relied primarily on exerting diplomatic pressure on China.25 Along with the other members of ASEAN, the Philippines raised the issue of Chinese encroachment on Mischief Reef at the first ASEAN-China dialogue, in Hangzhou in April 1995. ASEAN sent a clear message that it would not tolerate any unilateral Chinese action in the South China Sea.26 However, Beijing thwarted the ASEAN plan to bring up the topic during the July 1995 ARF meeting as it declared, “the ARF should not be a venue for conflict resolution.”27 It also impressed upon the ASEAN member states that it preferred to deal with security matters on a bilateral basis.28 Then, at the 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta, the Chinese delegation forestalled a discussion of security concerns in the South China Sea. Thus, China’s deep intrusion into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has never been included in the ARF’s agenda despite its potential to jeopardize stability in the South China Sea in particular and in the region in general.29 This consequently forced the Philippines to rely on bilateral negotiations with China to minimize tension and prevent the outbreak of conflict pending the resolution of the dispute.30 In these bilateral negotiations, China assured the Philippines that it does not intend to disrupt or compromise the peace and stability of the region. However, Manila could not reconcile Beijing’s declaration of neighborliness and friendship with its continued military presence on Mischief Reef.31 Manila’s misgivings about China’s long-term intentions in the South

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China Sea were heightened in late 1998 and early 1999 when it discovered that the Chinese had substantially upgraded their military structures on Mischief Reef by adding electronics communication and surveillance equipment and multistory buildings with concrete platforms to serve as helicopter pads. The Mischief Reef incident has impressed on Manila that Chinese expansionism is its main long-term external security threat. This incident has galvanized the Philippines into sounding the alarm over what it perceives as Chinese expansionist and hegemonic designs in the South China Sea.32 It has also convinced the Philippine government that it will take some time before the ARF can be truly effective in regional confidence building, preventive diplomacy, and dispute settlement. In the meantime, the ARF is merely a “talk shop.” With the perceived creeping invasion and occupation of the South China Sea by China, Manila concluded that closer military relations with the United States are the only way to counter Chinese expansionism and reestablish a balance of power in Southeast Asia. Less than ten years after the last American marine left Subic Naval Base, Philippine decision makers came to the realization that preserving the strategic equilibrium in East Asia depends on U.S. bilateral security commitments and on maintaining a balance of power based on American forward deployment in the region. The Revival of the Alliance, 1997–2001 By the late 1990s, the Philippine government saw the importance of an American military presence in maintaining the balance of power in the Southeast Asian region.33 It recognized the need to revitalize the Philippine-U.S. alliance, which had been severely damaged by the two countries’ failure to conclude a new base agreement in the early 1990s. Furthermore, given the deficit in the national budget, the government considered the improvement of its security ties with Washington as vital in getting American support for modernizing the ill-equipped AFP.34 Thus, Washington and Manila reassessed their alliance and security cooperation, which had been moribund since 1992.35 In late 1996, the two countries conducted a series of negotiations on providing a legal guarantee for American troops deployed in the Philippines during military exercises and ship visits. It took Manila and Washington almost two years of tense and impassioned negotiations before an accord could be

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drafted.36 On February 11, 1998, the two sides finally signed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Both the United States and the Philippines deem the VFA important for reviving the alliance. For the United States, the VFA has facilitated the resumption of visits by U.S. naval vessels to Philippine ports and the conducting of Filipino-American joint military exercises. These activities definitely enhance the U.S. forward-deployment posture in East Asia in the face of China’s strengthening and flexing its military muscle. Washington has been apprehensive about the uneasy relationship between China and Taiwan since the March 1996 standoff. From its perspective, any improvement in Philippine-U.S. security relations increases American access to the air and naval infrastructure in Luzon and allows for the rehabilitation of these facilities to expedite the rapid deployment of U.S. forces in case of any security crisis in Northeast Asia.37 The United States also hopes that this military accord will lead to familiarity, cooperation, and interoperability of the two countries’ armed forces and to the general improvement of the Philippine-U.S. security partnership.38 The Philippines, on the other hand, has regarded the agreement as a means to facilitate military-to-military contacts with Washington that could help the AFP modernize, acquire operational strategy, and develop the interoperability of Philippine-U.S. forces. The country has also been motivated by self-serving interests—Filipino defense officials have considered a revived alliance with Washington as a hedge against conflicts that might erupt from its territorial claims in the Spratlys and the general instability in Northeast Asia.39 And in view of Manila’s inability to modernize its armed forces in the late 1990s, Philippine officials anticipated that any improvement in the security relationship could lead to an increase in U.S. military assistance that could hopefully bridge the gap until the country is able to finance its own military modernization program. Thus, President Joseph Estrada and Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado actively lobbied the Philippine Senate to agree to the VFA. Notably, these two former senators had voted to reject the PACT in 1992. In 1999, the Philippine Senate indeed ratified the U.S.-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement, which paved the way for the large-scale Balikatan military exercise in February 2000. The VFA also revitalized the two countries’ security relations since it provided the framework for the development and implementation of an effective AFP modernization program.

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The Revitalization of the Alliance, 2001–2002 The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and the consequent American response to form a global coalition against international terrorism created new opportunities for revitalizing the U.S.-Philippine alliance. In the aftermath of 9/11, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo quickly offered Washington access to the former U.S. Clark Air and Subic Naval bases for possible military operations. She later issued a fourteen-stage counterterrorism program to enhance intelligence cooperation with Washington and other members of the global antiterror coalition. Significantly, President Arroyo also announced that the Philippines was ready “to pay a price” in supporting its ally’s antiterrorist campaign.40 President Arroyo’s declaration of support injected a new dynamism into the fifty-year-old alliance. After 1992, the U.S. government did not initiate any major legislation that had anything to do with PhilippineU.S. security relations. As the former chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee admitted, “The [U.S.] Congress as a whole was smarting from what it perceived as the unceremonious booting out of U.S. military bases in the Philippines.”41 However, this attitude changed when President Arroyo followed up her swift announcement of unequivocal support for the United States by granting overflight rights and offering logistic support and medical personnel to American forces.42 In return, the George W. Bush administration raised the prospect of greater U.S. involvement in the Philippine government campaign against the Abu Sayyaf guerrillas on the southern island of Basilan—a group, linked to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, that was holding two kidnapped American missionaries for ransom. During a summit meeting in Washington in November 2001, President Bush and President Arroyo reaffirmed the validity and strength of the half-century-old Mutual Defense Agreement and declared that it was still vital to the two states, particularly in the wake of the September 11 attacks.43 President Bush expressed his appreciation for the Philippine offer of logistic and other support for the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, as well as for President Arroyo’s efforts to forge an ASEAN approach to addressing terrorism. He proffered direct U.S. military assistance to the Philippines in suppressing the Abu Sayyaf guerrillas. President Arroyo turned down the American offer of troops, and instead asked for new equipment and training for the AFP so that it could neutralize the notorious Muslim bandit group on its own.

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The two leaders approved an integrated plan for a robust training package for the AFP, the delivery of equipment needed to increase the mobility of the Philippine military, and the creation of a new bilateral defense consultative mechanism.44 Washington provided one C-130B Hercules transport aircraft and five UH-1H Iroquois utility helicopters to ease the Philippines’ chronic shortage of strategic and tactical lift capabilities, which, in turn, had hindered the army’s counterterrorist operations.45 Washington also agreed to furnish Manila with grenade launchers, mortars, sniper rifles, night-vision and thermal-imaging goggles, and a 360-ton Cyclone-class coast patrol craft for use in the AFP’s counterterrorist campaign against the Abu Sayyaf rebels. This assistance to the Philippine military is part of Washington’s enhanced aid program for its ally, which increased tenfold from U.S.$1.9 million in 2001 to U.S.$19 million in fiscal year 2002. More significantly, the Bush administration also approved the participation of 200 U.S. troops in a two-and-a-half-week joint exercise with Filipino forces, and 190 Special Forces officers to train the AFP in counterterrorism tactics. On January 16, 2002, U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the deployment of about 600 American troops in the Philippine island of Basilan. These troops would act as military advisers to the AFP’s Southern Command and would be based in the country for at least six months.46 The deployment of U.S. troops in the Philippines signified the revitalization of the PhilippineU.S. alliance and the possible return of U.S. forces to Philippine soil after an almost ten-year hiatus in the two countries’ security relations. Later that month, Manila and Washington agreed on an interim arrangement giving the U.S. military access rights to station weapons and supplies in the Philippines, to have permanent overflight rights in Philippine air space, and to set up temporary camps for American ground troops that would be deployed in the country.47 These moves were part of Washington’s effort to upgrade American military links in Southeast Asia to prevent the region from becoming a haven for international terrorism after 9/11.48 The Revitalized Alliance, 2002 The U.S. troop deployment in the Philippines has been part of the second phase of America’s war on terrorism, directed at depriving Al-Qaeda of a new home base and access to human and material resources. Unlike

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the U.S. forward deployment during the Cold War, the current American military presence in the Philippines is not aimed at ensuring the security of major sea and air lanes in East Asia for the Western alliance’s trade and commerce. Rather, U.S. forces have been deployed to encourage and assist governments in neutralizing terrorist groups that threaten their own countries and global security as well. The temporary stationing of American soldiers in the Philippines is undertaken to help a regional ally untangle the links between terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations converging within the so-called seam of lawlessness— a geographic area that stretches from Afghanistan to Southeast Asia. The Bush administration has described its military operations in the Philippines as part of a concerted effort to neutralize a geographic area where terrorist groups interact with drug kingpins, smugglers, pirates, money launderers, and other organized criminals. Washington has clarified that it will not send American troops to fight this campaign against lawlessness but will actively prepare other states for the battles ahead.49 Washington’s goal is to help several countries develop competent and professional armed forces that can provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, support United Nations peacekeeping operations, and counter terrorism and other international illegal activities.50 In conducting this type of military operation in the Philippines, the Bush administration has set an important precedent for future U.S. military assistance programs in Southeast Asia and other developing regions in the world. Explaining the objective of the mission, Robert Rotberg, the director of the Harvard Kennedy School Program on Inter-State Conflict, notes: “Basically we want to add military deployment heft through training and cooperation to friendly governments who have Muslim insurgencies that might or might not be fertile ground for Al-Qaeda. The idea is a kind of cordon sanitaire—an expression of U.S. muscle by proxy.”51 As noted, the American military exercise in the Philippines involves a small number of troops. In contrast to the policy of stationing sizable air and naval units in the Philippine bases during the Cold War era, the U.S. troop deployment for the Balikatan exercise totaled 660 personnel and ten aircraft (three C-130s and seven medium and heavy helicopters).52 Only 160 U.S. personnel directly participated in the actual military exercise, while 500 were crew and service personnel for the aircraft, watercraft, and other major equipment used during the operation. An additional team of 340 U.S. Navy engineers and their Marine Corps security detail were later deployed in Basilan to build roads, construct

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helicopter pads, and dig wells as part of the civic action component of the military operation.53 The exercise lasted six months and during this period American military officials reiterated that Washington had no intention of setting up a permanent base in the country. Instead, they emphasized the U.S. needed to expand its network of access arrangements with Southeast Asian countries and to include counterterrorist operations in extending the scope of military exercises involving U.S. and regional forces.54 Balikatan officially ended on July 31, 2002 when the bulk of the 1,200 U.S. troops (all the engineers and their marine contingent) were shipped out of Basilan. They left behind a small number of Special Forces officers to drill additional light reaction companies and conduct counterterrorism training both in the AFP’s Southern Command and in training areas in Luzon. Militarily, the operation produced mixed results. It was marked by a botched rescue effort that caused the death of two hostages and the wounding of another. The operation also failed to eliminate Abu Sayyaf. Nevertheless, it succeeded in upgrading the AFP tactical maneuver force’s combat capability and the Southern Command’s Integrated Territorial Defense System.55 This was evident when the Southern Command neutralized the Abu Sayyaf’s freedom of movement and minimized the terrorist group’s capability to conduct terrorist activities in Basilan. However, the Abu Sayyaf responded to the military’s tactical advantage by strategically transferring its operations to other parts of Mindanao. The military exercise’s biggest gain, however, may have been political and economic rather than military. Balikatan strengthened domestic political support for the revitalized alliance as it complemented the Philippine government’s programs of social reform and poverty alleviation in the poorest parts of Mindanao.56 The local people appreciated the road building, well digging, and other economic and humanitarian assistance that accompanied the counterterrorism training program. The exercise also boosted the local economy through the holding of regular trade fairs, the American procurement of local goods, and the hiring of local companies engaged in laundry and food-catering services.57 More significant, American participation in the counterterrorism exercise is widely credited with reenergizing the Philippine-U.S. alliance. On the one hand, the Bush administration has extended its war on terrorism to the Philippines without involving U.S. troops in actual combat, as their participation has been limited to advisory and humanitarian missions. On the other hand, President Arroyo has been able to use the Philippine

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rapprochement with the United States to get Washington’s commitment to provide U.S.$4.6 billion in economic and military assistance, which could add to her domestic political luster. Both Manila and Washington have viewed Balikatan as a political success and have discussed various ways of transforming it into a sustained program of security cooperation and counterterrorism training and assistance. After assessing the exercise, the two countries have agreed on a five-year work plan to enhance the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951.58 In August 2002, Philippine defense secretary Angelo Reyes and U.S. defense secretary Rumsfeld signed an agreement expanding the two countries’ security relations by creating a political committee to supervise the alliance’s military-to-military programs.59 This political committee will deal with issues concerning the management of the revitalized alliance and other topics of common interest and concern. The committee is also tasked with increasing political and civilian-to-civilian contacts between the Philippines Department of National Defense and the United States Department of Defense. This accord is reflective of the two countries’ intention to provide a political direction to their expanding military-to-military relations in the post-9/11 period. This development signals the reinvigoration of the Philippine-U.S. alliance—an alliance that was almost forgotten after September 1991. Eventually, one cadre and two new companies of this light reaction force were trained, formed, and equipped in Camp Magsaysay. These units will provide the AFP the capability for combined task force operations during crisis situations. These units can be used to respond quickly to “small-scale crises in the Philippines, . . . and be the country’s contribution to any regional and international response to crisis.”60 This development is an indication of the deepening involvement of the United States in Philippine security affairs as the U.S. military will play a key role in organizing, training, and equipping this AFP unit. Playing the Iraq Card In the light of imminent U.S. military action against Iraq in 2002, President Arroyo immediately pledged political, security, and humanitarian support for a U.S. military campaign against Iraq. In September 2002, she announced that Philippine air space, ports, and facilities would be opened to American planes and ships heading to the Middle East. However, faced by the prospect of earning the ire of Muslim states sympa-

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thetic to Baghdad, Manila added two conditions for its support to Washington: it will not endorse any war or unilateral U.S. military action against Iraq; and the United States must convince the Philippines that any possible military action against Iraq is linked to Washington’s war against international terrorism. A Philippine foreign department official stated, “Manila must see the connection of the planned U.S. move [against Iraq] with the anti-terrorism campaign before the government could support any U.S. attack against Iraq.” Washington was comfortable with Manila’s position as President Bush gave President Arroyo a personal briefing on the Iraqi situation and Washington’s plans in dealing with the Middle East crisis during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum held in Mexico in October 2002. The Philippines’ support of the United States during the Second Gulf War was based on Manila’s assumptions that any possible conflict in the Middle East would be swift and would be over in a matter of days, and that the country would not be adversely affected by any economic fallout from the war. Manila dismissed the prospect that the economy would suffer from any sharp increase in the price of oil in the event of a U.S.-Iraq war as it accepted its ally’s claim that U.S. military prowess could surgically remove the Iraqi political leadership and prevent its military forces from being deployed or could simply overwhelm Baghdad. The Philippine government expected minimal disruption of the country’s economic activities if a war in the Middle East was short. Manila also believed that the planned U.S. attack on Iraq would not spill over to neighboring states. Thus, it saw no need to evacuate Filipino workers from the surrounding countries as happened during the 1991 U.S.-Iraq war. The U.S. counterterrorism campaign produced a new area for cooperation between the United States and the Philippines in various regional forums. Since September 11, 2001, Manila has made concrete efforts to reinvigorate the Philippine-U.S. alliance, and this precluded the Philippines from taking any move that will impair its warming relations with its ally. Defense ties between the two countries have considerably improved after 9/11, and Manila thinks that this trend should continue in the face of looming and possible security challenges on the horizon—China and international terrorism. Conclusion The revitalization of Philippine-U.S. security relations seems to validate the realist theory of alliance, which posits that the formation and

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operation of alliances are purposive or intentional actions of rational entities responding to particular strategic problems. Its also raises the need to examine the viability of multilateral arrangements in East Asia given the following: (1) that the traditional means of managing security—the military instrument and bilateral alliances—are still very much part of international relations; (2) that international institutions and values are still in their embryonic stage and it will take some time before they become effective and are inculcated in states; and (3) that when states are confronted by a fluid external environment they tend to rely on instruments that worked in the past. The Philippine government’s decision and efforts to revitalize its bilateral security alliance with the United States have stemmed from its realization that it will take some time before the ARF becomes an effective regional forum for confidence building and preventive diplomacy. Thus, unfortunately the country must rely on a traditional and available means of ensuring its external security—bilateralism. Manila’s reversion to bilateralism is also based on its calculation that this policy can address both the country’s internal and external security concerns. Current U.S. military assistance is extended to enable an ally to develop its capability in the pursuit of American strategic interest in the war on terrorism. American equipment and counterterrorist training can also assist the Philippines in neutralizing two radical domestic insurgent groups—the communist New People’s Army and the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front. Bilateralism strengthens the Philippines’ ability to vanquish the enemy within and, at the same time, enables it to deal with the so-called geopolitical reality of the region—an emerging China. Manila also sees a strong security relationship with the United States as a deterrent to the hegemonic ambition of China.61 Another overriding Philippine interest in the reinvigorated alliance is the modernization of the AFP. The local top brass look to Washington for the AFP’s modernization. As a founding member of ASEAN, however, the Philippines cannot just quit ASEAN and ignore the ARF process. Rather, it must adopt policies and instruments that combine expedient/defensive realism and judicious multilateralism. The country can combine these two policy instruments in situations “where divergent interests might otherwise lead into escalation of crises.”62 The form of bilateralism adopted by the Philippines is far different from the type that emerged during the Cold War. Its goal is limited to preventing Southeast Asia from becoming a haven for international ter-

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rorist organizations. The Philippines pursues this objective by welcoming the deployment of a small number of American troops tasked with providing counterterrorism training to the AFP and undertaking civic programs for the benefit of the local population. The deployment of U.S. troops in the Philippines is also temporary and performs an essentially symbolic function—as a model of the Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy of supplying military hardware and providing training to countries threatened by terrorists and insurgents. In the long run, Manila hopes that the alliance will be a long-term insurance against an emerging regional power. Finally, the present bilateral arrangement is part of a global coalition against international terrorism, and distinct from the earlier one, which was exclusionary. As such, this bilateral arrangement is becoming a multilateral regime that can effectively address the region’s current concern with international terrorism, and in the long run can be transformed into a cooperative venture for defining and pursuing the common objectives of the Southeast Asian states.

——— 10 ——— Singapore’s Perspective on the Asia-Pacific Security Architecture Chin Kin Wah

A Historical Overview A background to Singapore’s perspective on the Asia-Pacific security architecture is better appreciated if we remind ourselves that the region within which the island-state is located has never quite presented the kind of strategic coherence that would have facilitated the creation of a truly multilateral collective defense framework of the sort exemplified, say, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the old Cold War divide of Europe. Within Southeast Asia, the lack of such coherence led instead to a patchwork of defense systems between local and extraregional states, for example the U.S.-dominated Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was at best nominally “regional.” In effect the regional strategic architecture was anything but “tidy.” American security underpinning of the region during the Cold War bought time for noncommunist Southeast Asia to concentrate on economic development. But the regional stability that the United States ensured through its policy of containment of China and later, North Vietnam and its extraregional patron, the Soviet Union, also allowed other regional states to avoid too deep or extensive an entanglement with American power. A complex mix of factors therefore shaped the attitudes of regional states toward collective defense during the Cold War. These factors include their different historical experiences, unique security needs and geostrategic location, and strategic and ideological orientation. A check172

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ered history of colonial disengagement reinforced the region’s ambivalence about overt military involvement with external powers. Also most regional states, with the exception perhaps of what was then North Vietnam, were traditionally far more concerned with internal threats to their security.1 During the Cold War one internal threat took the form of insurgency by Beijing-affiliated communist movements. Such a threat challenged the legitimacy of political regimes and underscored the importance of domestic efforts to promote socioeconomic development. Within noncommunist Southeast Asia, Singapore’s principal external security relationship then was anchored in a British-centric alliance system, which emerged in the context of British decolonization rather than from any grand regional security vision of containing communism. This system of common defense provided a defense guarantee to Malaya, later Malaysia and Singapore, from 1957 to 1971 under the AngloMalayan Defense Agreement (AMDA). Although they were not formal signatories, Australia and New Zealand were associated with the agreement. This alliance, whose members all belonged to the British Commonwealth, saw Singapore and Malaysia through Indonesia’s policy of Confrontation, which posed the most severe threat to the external security of the two local states. It also enabled Malaya to distance itself politically from the Cold War–inspired SEATO (whose members also included Britain, Australia, and New Zealand). A certain deliberate ambiguity in the treaty provisions, however, allowed external Commonwealth (that is, British, Australian, and New Zealand) forces based in Malaya to be redeployed through Singapore, which until its independence was essentially a British base, to “elsewhere” in Southeast Asia— in effect to the treaty area covered by SEATO.2 This pragmatic ambiguity in the defense agreement was extended when Singapore, together with North Borneo (now Sabah) and Sarawak, joined Malaya in a new Federation of Malaysia. Singapore’s ejection from Malaysia in 1965 marked the culmination of an increasingly acrimonious relationship between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore over the essential character of the Malaysian nation and transformed the local political context of AMDA. Although the Separation Agreement sought to preserve the status quo of the alliance, it was becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in the eyes of the external guarantor, Britain. Growing financial strains provided an imperative, while the fortuitous ending of Confrontation offered an opportunity for Britain to accelerate its military withdrawal from Southeast Asia. By 1971

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there was only a residual British military presence in the region. AMDA itself was replaced by a loose consultative arrangement involving the original signatories and associated powers of the old alliance. Renamed the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), this arrangement has survived to this day as the only multilateral defense network in Southeast Asia involving regional and extraregional states.3 The patchwork of arrangements for collective defense in Southeast Asia during the Cold War was a result of militarily disadvantaged local states turning to extraregional powers as a means of addressing external security needs. In the case of SEATO and the bilateral security treaties that Laos and Vietnam entered into with the former Soviet Union after 1975, the Cold War ideological divide helped determine the nature of local states’ external affiliations. In the case of AMDA and later the FPDA, a more benign variant of colonialism resulted in more enduring external affiliations that have persisted into the postcolonial and even post–Cold War eras. Some salient features of the Cold War collective defense systems in Southeast Asia are worth recalling at this juncture. First, each of the Cold War alliances had been sustained with varying degrees of success (as in the case of AMDA) or failure (as in the case of SEATO) by a hegemonic power. Second, all the alliances reflected the conjunction of intrusive power projections by external states with friendly local regimes seeking to augment limited national defense capabilities in an insecure or uncertain environment. Third, an inequality of power characterized all these alliances. Fourth, all these security relationships were exclusionary in character, focusing on “security against” rather than “security with” the other side. Fifth, regional attitudes toward these alliances ranged from benign indifference to cautious distancing and outright rejection at one end of the spectrum to quiet acquiescence and ready embrace at the other. Finally, these attitudes were dominated by overtly or covertly balance of power considerations and moderated by recognizably neoliberal perspectives. Singapore’s Bilateral and Multilateral Security Ties Since independence, Singapore has adhered to a foreign policy that is deeply influenced by balance of power assumptions. This realist paradigm continues to appeal, especially to a small state like Singapore whose past apprehensions over larger immediate neighbors have impelled it to

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favor not only a deterrent posture based on a steady buildup of national defense capabilities (in which regard Singapore also tended in the early days to discourage public debate on national defense issues given regional sensitivities to the rationale of its strategic posture) but also external balancing factors.4 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew underscored the relevance of this perspective in an interview in November 1999 when he said, “If we are not careful, we could get caught in a very big conflict; if there is no such thing as balance of power in the Pacific, we are very much at risk. You know the saying, big fish eat small fish; small fish eat shrimps. We are shrimps.”5 Although Singapore seeks to encourage a favorable balance of power in the wider Asia-Pacific by helping to keep the United States strategically engaged in the region while developing its own deterrent capabilities, it has over time actively engaged in bilateral defense diplomacy and today maintains close defense ties with many of the armed forces of fellow ASEAN members that constitute the immediate outer circle of Singapore’s strategic interests. Singapore’s defense establishment points to the steady development in scope and depth of these intraregional bilateral military relationships that “will remain a priority for Singapore to develop and strengthen . . . to realize the common vision of a cohesive and strong ASEAN.”6 A significant benefit of these bilateral ties, not just with ASEAN partners but with extra-ASEAN states as well, has been the access the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have gained to training facilities in about a dozen countries besides opportunities to participate in about eighty multilateral and bilateral exercises annually. For Singapore, defense networking with friendly powers in a multilateral setting remains an important aspect of its defense policy, which seeks to provide “extra strings for the bow” as well as strategic space. As an essentially loose political consultative framework that is far from being a collective defense system, the FPDA can be described as one such “extra string” that also provides some element of “balancing” between the two local powers themselves as well as within the region as a whole. Singapore, however, considers it an important component of its defense architecture despite vicissitudes in cooperation since the arrangements came into existence in 1971. Although the arrangements were largely dormant during the first decade of their existence, Singapore sees them as embodiments of its security interdependence with Malaysia. It values the loose framework for its flexibility in facilitating joint military exercises and bilateral confidence building between the local

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partners at a pace and intensity with which they are comfortable. And despite a more recent hiatus of two years (attributed, among other reasons, to Malaysia’s need to observe financial stringency because of the economic crisis of 1997–98), FPDA exercises were resumed in 2000 and have continued thereafter. In 2001 an FPDA combined maritime and air defense exercise was held off the east coast of the Malaysian Peninsula. While reaffirming the value of the FPDA, Singapore would also like to see more combined exercises in the future and more institutional substance in the arrangements. In this regard, the post–September 11 environment seems to have provided another opportunity to revitalize the FPDA. In October 2001, a meeting of FPDA defense chiefs outlined a five-year plan to expand FPDA exercises to include land forces—a development agreed to at the previous year’s FPDA defense ministers meeting. As an indicator of the widened emphasis, the Integrated Air Defense System (headquartered at Butterworth, Malaysia) was redesignated the Integrated Area Defense System.7 And reflecting the need to address nonconventional security threats too, the October 2001 meeting made specific reference to the new threats posed by terrorism, piracy, and illegal immigrants. Against the current furor in Malaysia (as well as in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia to varying degrees) over Australian prime minister John Howard’s public indication in late 2002 of preparedness to preemptively strike terrorists in other countries threatening Australia or its citizens, there has so far been no indication that Malaysia may disengage from the FPDA.8 It is also noteworthy that downturns in Malaysia-Singapore relations occasioned by increasingly vocal disputes over Malaysia’s supply of water to Singapore and their rival claims over Pedra Branca (or Pulau Batu Putih), in late 2002 and early 2003, did not seem to have adversely affected their bilateral defense cooperation within the multilateral FPDA. Indeed the Malaysian defense minister Najib Tun Razak reiterated that such ongoing disputes did not give cause for canceling joint military training with Singapore—a point promptly echoed by his then Singapore counterpart, Dr. Tony Tan.9 Bilateral Security Relations with the United States Singapore acknowledges that the U.S. military presence in the western Pacific is “vital to the stability and peace of the region.” As Singapore’s foreign minister S. Jayakumar has noted, “only the United

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States has the strategic weight, economic strength and political clout to exercise leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. . . . Without America’s involvement, the transformation of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific as a whole could not have happened with such speed and scope.”10 Furthermore, none of the regional states opposes a continuing American security role in the Asia-Pacific, although there is a spectrum of views among ASEAN countries with respect to the desired size, form, and duration of the U.S. presence. The catchword for a continuing American rotational presence within Southeast Asia is “places, not bases.” The provision of “places” is part of the contribution by certain regional states toward sharing the burden of maintaining U.S. forward deployments in the region. Among Singapore’s bilateral security relations the one with the United States is probably the most substantive and extensive. Yet Singapore does not characterize itself as an American ally, only as a “strategic friend,” although a former U.S. secretary of defense, William Cohen, has described Singapore as “a very steady partner and ally.”11 Singapore openly supports a strong U.S. presence, and to demonstrate its willingness to play a part in anchoring American power in the region, it has granted the United States through a memorandum of understanding signed in November 1990 access to the Payar Lebar air base and the port of Sembawang. It has also allowed America to relocate in Singapore a small logistical presence from the Philippines. A subsequent addendum to the 1990 MOU gives the U.S. Navy access to the new Changi Naval Base. In March 2001 three U.S. naval vessels including an aircraft carrier became the first foreign warships to berth at Changi.12 With the intensification of American military responses to the September 11 attacks and the retaliatory action in Afghanistan, Singapore has been providing logistics and support facilities for the increased number of transit stops made by U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels. In rendering such support Singapore is mindful of the obvious security risks to itself. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong himself has acknowledged the existence of such derived risks—including the big risk of being mistaken for a “client state” or “ally” of the United States, for which reason Singapore would rather stand on its own and cooperate with the United States as a “friend” whose interests coincide “in the short term, medium term and in a strategic sense.”13 The bilateral security relationship with America also provides an opportunity for Singapore to network into a web of joint military exercises

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that the United States engages in with other regional states. Singapore has since 2000 become a full participant (from being observer since 1993) in the U.S.-Thai COBRA GOLD exercises, which are acquiring a multilateral format and an added focus on humanitarian aid, peace enforcement, and counterterrorism.14 Singapore’s full participation now allows the SAF to undertake operational planning and execution of a large-scale combined exercise in a multilateral setting. It also takes part in Exercise COPE TIGER, which is an annual trilateral exercise involving the air forces of the United States, Thailand, and Singapore, as well as in the naval exercises codenamed CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) with the American Navy, which has similar exercises with Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Another indication of Singapore’s growing interest in multilateral joint exercises was its hosting in 2000 of a combined submarine rescue exercise involving the navies of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Representatives from Australia, Canada, Chile, Britain, Indonesia, China, and Russia were also invited as observers. In 2001 Singapore coordinated a twelve-day mine countermeasure exercise involving sixteen navies from western Pacific countries. The Republic of Singapore Air Force in turn participated in an eleven-country air exercise codenamed Exercise MAPLE LEAF conducted in Canada.15 On that occasion Singapore deployed ten F-16 aircraft and personnel from a detachment in Arizona (where some of the F-16s previously purchased from America are still being kept) and a refueling tanker from another detachment in Kansas. Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Missions Singapore’s election to the United Nations Security Council as a nonpermanent member from 2001 to 2002 highlighted its commitment, as well as its obligation, to being a “responsible citizen” in the international community despite material constraints faced by a relatively “small power” in the company of big players. As a measure of its commitment to international security undertakings, Singapore has over the past decade contributed 800 personnel from the SAF and police to twelve UN missions relating to peacekeeping, peacemaking, and arms inspection. In 2001 it was involved in peacekeeping missions on the Iraq-Kuwait border (where it has stationed four

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observers), in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in East Timor, where for the first time a platoon of armed SAF personnel was committed to a combined New Zealand and Fijian battalion. This was in addition to previous contributions of equipment, logistic support, and noncombatant personnel to the UN International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET).16 It could be said that the dispatch of a small contingent of about seventy SAF combat troops to peacekeeping operations in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) in May 2001 marked another milestone in exposing the SAF not only to cooperation at the operational level with other friendly forces, but also to potentially dangerous real-life situations, which provide far more valuable experience than simulated exercises.17 Implications of Other Alliance Relationships for Singapore’s Own Security Within the Asia-Pacific region, the Japan-America security alliance (hereafter JASA) and the Korea-America security alliance (hereafter KASA) are viewed as continuing manifestations of American forward deployments and involvement in the region. Their role in ensuring security of the wider Asia-Pacific, which constitutes the outer security environment of Singapore (ASEAN being its “inner” regional security environment, we may say), is recognized at a time when only a residual American military presence remains in Southeast Asia. These two security relationships have their utility in balancing the perceived power ascendancy of China and in moderating the future buildup of Japanese military power. Of the two bilateral alliances, JASA is perceived as critical to anchoring the United States in the Asia-Pacific. If JASA were to disappear, regional states including Singapore would be seriously concerned. Its disappearance would most likely unsettle Japan, perhaps prompting it to go nuclear. On the other hand, a consolidation of that bilateral security relationship could also generate anxiety of a different kind, especially if such consolidation acquires the appearance of a “common front” to constrain a rising China. Such a front would undermine stability in the U.S.-Japan-China relationship and frustrate other efforts to engage China constructively in multilateral confidence-building initiatives. Lee Kuan Yew, for example, welcomed the revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines. But he also indicated that if the guidelines covered Taiwan and its

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surrounding areas, they would increase tensions between Japan and China and adversely influence security perceptions in the region.18 Reactions to the U.S. proposed theater missile defense (TMD) system also suggests a nagging unease over its possible political impact and destabilizing consequences for the equation of forces in the Asia-Pacific. There is a more ready acceptance in the post–Cold War period of a higher Japanese profile in international peacekeeping not only in Southeast Asia but also beyond. Following the September 11 attacks, the external security role of Japan in terms of “rear area support” for the United States in a time of emergency has been progressively widened. In this respect, Japan’s sensitive Northeast Asian neighbors are being watched for their reactions to the passage in October 2001 of new legislation that authorized for the first time the dispatch of Japanese armed personnel outside Japan in a war situation and that allowed its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to operate in faraway areas, such as the Indian Ocean, albeit not directly in a combat zone. Singapore for its part does not seem to be discomforted by this incremental change in the external security role of Japan, especially if it is intermeshed with a wider global effort to combat terrorism. Perspectives on Post–Cold War Multilateral Security Cooperation In the 1990s the waning of Cold War cleavages in the region coincided with growing security interdependence and linkages across the wider Asia-Pacific region. On the economic plane these linkages have been given institutional form by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Although APEC has traditionally disavowed any conventional security agenda, its inherent soft security concerns, which focus on economic growth and development, have acquired additional dimensions since September 11. At its 2001 summit meeting, APEC began to directly address diplomatic security matters by placing within a new antiterrorism context its earlier concerns with money laundering and corruption. Indeed, the political significance of its antiterrorism statement has not been lost on observers. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the second track Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) institutionalized an ASEAN interest in the security of Northeast Asia. Singapore itself

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perceives in these developments an opportunity, circumscribed though it may be, to influence the changing balance of forces that affect its external security environment. Underlying this assumption is the recognition that the changed security relationships among the United States, Japan, and China have an important bearing on the security environment of Southeast Asia itself and that engaging them positively will work to Singapore’s advantage. Unlike the security frameworks of the Cold War era, the ARF, which was inaugurated in July 1994, operates on the fundamentally different assumption of cooperative security. Not sustained by the threat or use of force, the ARF groups together the states that had been on opposite sides of the old Cold War front in the Asia-Pacific. Currently, all ten ASEAN countries as well as China, India, North Korea, Russia, and the United States and its formal allies, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are members of the ARF. Together with the European Union, Canada, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia, they make up a group of twenty-three. Unlike military alliances, whose deterrent function (in particular, the preservation of a retaliatory capability) depends on opacity, the ARF focuses on confidence building and transparency. It emphasizes process rather than organizational and command structures. Further, it is not sustained by a hegemonic power. Its inclusive nature means it can accommodate states that belong to alliances. In Singapore’s view, it is quite clear that the ARF was not established to supplant bilateral alliances such as KASA or JASA.19 Given the persisting tensions on the Korean Peninsula, uncertainties over Taiwan’s future, concerns over a resurgent China, and the need to manage the evolving Japanese military role, the two American-led bilateral alliances, despite their Cold War lineage, are still deemed necessary and relevant to the need to reassure allies and other strategic friends. However, the ARF can help build trust and confidence in the region and so smooth the hard edges of the deterrent function of the alliances. It can help hopefully to moderate the competitive relationships among the major external powers, namely, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, by creating an environment for dialogue and security cooperation in a post– Cold War and post–September 11 setting. For Singapore, the cooperative security framework is a useful vehicle to engage the major external powers, particularly China, the United States, and Japan, and thus may facilitate a balanced relationship among them. After all, it was a certain strategic stability if not

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balance among these powers that enabled the ARF to emerge in the first place.20 Singapore’s commitment to regional cooperative security is evidenced by its support of the ARF, which it would like to see develop further, beyond the confidence-building stage. As Singapore’s foreign minister put it during the March 2001 budget debate, “From Singapore’s point of view we want to nudge ASEAN and other countries to move the ARF faster . . . to preventive diplomacy. . . . But we also have to be cognizant of the fact that we must do so at a pace comfortable to other members of the ARF.”21 In time, the long-term subscription to both confidence-building and preventive-diplomacy efforts will serve to make its deterrent posture less stark. Unilateralism, Bilateralism, and Multilateralism The relationship between unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism can be as complex as there are varieties and types of relationships and numbers of actors suggested by these categories.22 Unilateralism may seem antithetical to multilateralism, and yet the threat of unilateral action (for example, assertive American posturing prior to the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq) can also give impetus to multilateral endeavors just as “expansive bilateralism,” as opposed to exclusive bilateralism, can lead to multilateralism. Furthermore, certain types of bilateral relationships can be anchored within multilateral frameworks of cooperation with a view to underpinning the bilateral nexus. The diversity of security interests in the Asia-Pacific means that states have different political and security objectives when they take part in multilateral regional frameworks for cooperative security. China, for example, has in the past seen in such a framework an opportunity to dilute the utility or question the relevance of deterrent-based bilateral defense arrangements. In March 1997 China chose the multilateral setting of the ARF to argue that bilateral alliances in Asia were outdated relics of the Cold War and should be superseded by new modes of cooperative security.23 Other states acknowledge the utility of unilateral deterrents, which may, however, complicate some bilateral relationships. They have tacitly supported, for example, Washington’s dispatch of two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in March 1996, and the holding of naval maneuvers involving two American carrier groups in the South China Sea in August 1999 against the background of rising cross-strait ten-

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sions. For Singapore these episodes underline a certain tension given its preexisting logistical support arrangements for American air and naval forces in the western Pacific and its concurrent interest in good, stable relations with China. In the immediate aftermath of the EP3 spy plane incident in April 2001, Lee Kuan Yew observed that the Sino-U.S. relationship was “the single most important relationship in Asia. If it is troubled, there will be turbulence.”24 Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has put it more sharply. Speaking at the Fortune Global Forum in Washington in November 2001, he said, “All Asian countries were happy to see President Jiang Zemin invited to Crawford, Texas by President Bush. . . . No Asian country wants to have to choose between being friends with either the U.S. or China.”25 Yet other sets of bilateral relationships are embedded within multilateral frameworks of security cooperation with a view toward stabilizing the bilateral relationships. A case in point is the Singapore-Malaysia defense nexus, which was quite deliberately anchored within the FPDA from the very beginning, thus providing a useful extra, multilateral layer of cooperation that the local (as well as external) partners can relate to even when problems in their political relations make it difficult at times for them to square up to the task of working together bilaterally. ASEAN too has some embedded bilateral relations, which are equally if not even more sensitive.26 There is, of course, the possibility that bilateral problems can pose roadblocks to multilateral cooperation, but the spirit of regional belonging and membership (and all the norms of seemly behavior that are associated with it) might well be usefully invoked at times to cool off tempers. The United States, for its part, continues to view multilateral mechanisms such as the ARF as important and having a greater role to play in the future. But, as then secretary of defense William Cohen said publicly in Singapore in January 1988, “we also believe they will be successful only if built upon the foundation of solid bilateral relations and a continued U.S. forward presence in the region.”27 For Singapore, post–Cold War security management in the AsiaPacific, at least in the foreseeable future, can be seen in terms of multilayered and multifronted approaches encompassing bilateral alliances, subregional forums, unobtrusive multilateral security arrangements, and mega-regional forums. Bilateral and multilateral relationships, despite underlying tensions at times between them, are not seen as mutually exclusive since they address different needs and functions. The ARF

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and increasingly even APEC could address the “soft” security needs of the region. Nevertheless, the ARF’s ability to influence security developments in Northeast Asia is severely limited. The direct parties are better placed to deal with the security challenges in Northeast Asia. In this connection, two developments are worth noting. The first is that the search for peace and stability in the region (given the tendency toward recalcitrant and unpredictable behavior on the part of North Korea) has never been stronger. Second, China shows an increasing willingness to accept and play by international rules—its entry into the WTO being just one indicator of its “having arrived” in this regard. The more it enmeshes itself in regional and international networks, the greater will be its contributions to economic progress and security in the region. These positive developments provide opportunities for the ARF to evolve as a useful forum even as existing bilateral common defense systems (such as KASA and JASA) and loose multilateral defense networks (such as the FPDA) are adjusted to meet new circumstances. Singapore and the War on Global Terrorism Even before the September 11 attacks, a Singapore Ministry of Defense publication pointedly referred to potential unconventional threats to Singapore’s security, including terrorism and subversion. As such, the Singapore Armed Forces might be called upon to handle low-intensity conflicts and physical attacks aimed at disrupting the country’s social and economic life. Some of the threats might be targeted at third countries, but the SAF might have to deal with these threats too because they might occur within Singapore or Singaporean assets might be involved.28 Following the first roundup of terrorist suspects in Singapore in December 2001 and the uncovering of terrorist operations in Singapore and neighboring countries linked to the Al-Qaeda network, these forewarnings have been very sharply brought home to Singaporeans. Following September 11, Singapore has taken steps to implement measures against terrorism as adopted in UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). These measures, which include freezing of funds of terrorists, exchanging information on their whereabouts, restricting their travel, denying them sheltering, and cooperating in their prosecution, came into effect on November 13, 2001 following the passage through parliament on October 15, 2001 of the United Nations

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Act 2001.29 Although these efforts may be said to represent yet more attempts by Singapore to demonstrate “good international citizenship,” there is a more direct self-interest involved in its contribution to a more comprehensive effort to address the threat of terrorism given the vulnerability of its open economy to external turbulence and its exposure as an “open” city. At the bilateral level, the traditional but usually unobtrusive cooperation between police forces and intelligence communities, which Singapore has developed with its close ASEAN neighbors, particularly with Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, continues to prove useful in coping with transnational terror operatives. In November 2002 Singapore also entered into an initiative with Australia to combat terrorism—focusing on intelligence exchange and the development of measures to deal with threats from weapons of mass destruction.30 With the intensification of American military responses to the September 11 attacks and the subsequent retaliatory action in Afghanistan, Singapore (which, according to U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell, was one of the earliest to voice support for the United States— barely two hours after the 9/11 attacks)31 provided logistics and support facilities for the increased number of transit stops made by U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels. Singapore has also looked to cooperative security frameworks such as the ARF to develop more concerted multilateral efforts to meet the myriad challenges posed by a global network of terror. Singapore’s deputy prime minister cum defense minister Tony Tan has called for an expanded ARF role to deal with the diverse security threats facing the Asia-Pacific region. As he put it, “The basic structure and mechanisms of the ARF . . . are already in place, and a number of confidence building measures have been implemented. There is scope for defense officials to play a more active role in the ARF to improve the robustness of our responses to the security challenges of the 21st Century.”32 An ARF meeting in Brunei in August 2002 provided the occasion for the United States to obtain a joint declaration with ASEAN on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. Although for domestic political reasons not all ASEAN states have evinced the same resolve in combating terrorism (and indeed Indonesia prior to the October 12, 2002 terrorist attacks in Bali had been strongly criticized for its half-hearted efforts at dealing with the domestic threat), the significance of the joint declaration is to signal regional political support for the war on terror. In

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a more tangible way, the ARF meeting also resulted in cooperative measures to freeze assets and choke off financing of terrorist groups. In effect, cooperation was being expanded to include China, Japan, and South Korea—the external components in the ASEAN +3 process. To Singapore this would be a thickening of the web to combat terror. As Singapore foreign minister Jayakumar saw it, counterterrorism has given a special relevance to the ARF.33 As mentioned earlier, the rendering of such support to a “strategic friend” as well as the presence of American military assets in Singapore can put the island-state at some risk. Nevertheless, Singapore does not need to make invidious choices when faced with a threat that is directed not only at American and other Western interests on the island-state, but also at Singapore’s assets and its citizens. Its options are clear. It will have to act decisively in the protection of these interests. However, the public backing given by some Singapore leaders to President Bush’s hard-line foreign policy and stance on Iraq may become a lightning rod that will attract regional Muslim resentment toward Singapore itself at a time when the detractors of America have conveniently chosen to portray the war against terror as a “civilizational” conflict with Islam.34 Alignment with American leadership also puts into focus an underlying tension between the unilateral impulse and multilateralism. In short, Singapore wishes to see a decisive America, but also one that is prepared to go decisively with company. This concern with possible unilateral American intervention in Iraq was quite sharply felt before UN Resolution 1441. Singapore also feared that a protracted war with Iraq that resulted in excessive loss of Muslim lives would upset the Islamic nations worldwide and terrorists could then exploit the situation to mount attacks on American interests both in and outside the United States. Such an eventuality will heighten the sense of shared internal vulnerability across the Southeast Asian region already on edge after the October 2002 Bali bombings and spate of terrorist attacks in the Philippines. On one level then, war in Iraq might feed back into regional instability in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, at least in the short run. On another level, it will also complicate regional support for any U.S.-led war against terrorism—especially support and cooperation from otherwise moderate governments (Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei), which will have to relate to their majority Muslim constituencies. Some may distance themselves from the U.S. action while others may be more stridently vocal in their opposition. Singapore’s deputy prime minister Lee Hsien

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Loong has emphasized the need for America to keep moderate Muslim countries like Malaysia and Indonesia on its side. This will show that despite the best efforts of terrorists, America is waging a war on terrorism and not engaging in a “clash of civilizations” against Islam. And as long as the United States is seen to act with the endorsement of the United Nations and in the interests of the international community, it will “maximize goodwill and soothe resentments and apprehensions” in the region.35 As for the domestic political impact, perhaps we could take a cue from the experiences from the 1991 Gulf War when Singapore’s Muslims expressed their discomfort over the loss of Muslim lives and this in turn led to questions being raised about their loyalty.36 An echo of such sentiments could be seen in the joint statement issued by four Muslim groups in Singapore appealing to the government “to oppose, or at least abstain from supporting any collective attacks on Iraq.”37 It was feared that such fault lines might reemerge especially if the United States went into the fray as an exercise of hegemonic unilateralism. Lee Hsien Loong did acknowledge that a U.S. attack on Iraq could have a negative influence on race relations in Singapore.38 Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong for his part saw that “some Singaporean Muslims might mistakenly perceive [the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist suspects in Singapore], the global fight against terrorism and the United States’ impending attack on Iraq as a conspiracy against their religion. This could turn them against the non-Muslim community. Worse it could radicalize some of them, who then feel obliged to defend Islam.”39 These apprehensions notwithstanding, Singapore did openly endorse the use of force against Iraq by a U.S.-led coalition of the willing, in the absence of a fresh UN Security Council mandate.40 On March 14, 2003, one week before the outbreak of war in Iraq, Foreign Minister Jayakumar stated Singapore’s position in a parliamentary speech, which effectively supported the American stand and placed the onus on Iraq to disarm and immediately comply with all UN resolutions or face war. Jayakumar asserted Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. In the post-9/11 situation, if such weapons ended up in the hands of terrorist and extremist groups elsewhere the danger would be especially grave.41 Jayakumar, however, sought to balance support of the U.S. position by recalling past instances when Singapore had taken contrary positions to the United States, particularly on Israel. The consistent, realist bottom line was that Singapore was acting out of a sense of the nation’s interest.

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Conclusion Singapore’s perspective on the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific is shaped by realist-bound balance of power considerations. Much of that realism is rooted in the geopolitical circumstance of Singapore—a predominantly ethnic Chinese city-state located in a predominantly Malay-Muslim neighborhood, which at the time of its emergence as an independent state had been the very source of its insecurity. In its early years when national survival was its prime security concern, Singapore tended to favor a combination of national self-help efforts at bolstering its resilience, which led to a high deterrent strategic posture vis-à-vis its immediate neighbors and a favorable balance of power involving external allies and friends. Within the Asia-Pacific, Singapore desires a continuing favorable balance of power situation in which the preponderant role of the United States as a major underpin to the strategic architecture of the region is not unduly shaken. At a time of continuing post–Cold War uncertainties (over Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and shifting power profiles among the major actors, namely China, Japan, Russia, and even India, which reminds us of its strategic footprint in the Asia-Pacific) in the wider strategic environment, Singapore considers the “San Francisco system” of alliances to have continuing utility as a reassurance mechanism. Singapore’s dominant realist perspective, as well as its realistic recognition that national defense is first and foremost a national responsibility, have not precluded its active participation in multilateral cooperative security and confidence-building processes in a post–Cold War era when the security roles of the major external powers have become more benign. Hopefully, the ARF can entrench this benign disposition by providing a forum if not a framework to moderate likely future power competitiveness among the major external actors. Currently, given the need to address the new security challenges posed by international terrorism, the ARF has also an opportunity to reclaim some relevance to the common security needs of the region by providing a multilateral framework for counterterrorism. This is especially so since traditional deterrent-based alliances may not be the most appropriate mechanisms for dealing with threats posed by a formless transnational network. At another level the thickening of the network of overlapping bilateral security ties may also yield some flexibility in coping with the threat of terrorism where incongruent domestic politi-

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cal interests may frustrate attempts to forge a more coherent multilateral response within ASEAN. The relationship between bilateral and multilateral approaches to security is complex. Tension between bilateralism and multilaterism, although conceivable, is not necessarily dysfunctional. A multilateral defense framework can sustain and even nurture bilateral relationships that are embedded in it. The durability of the FPDA attests to its continued relevance in this regard. Although the American pursuit of the war against terror provides a stark reminder of the continued relevance of the military response, the multifaceted threats posed by the international terrorism network also call for a multifront approach that underlines not only the saliency of human security but also the importance of addressing the need for comprehensive security. For Southeast Asian states this is a familiar issue. Finally, it should be noted that Singapore has not allowed domestic politics, or rather politicking, to interfere with the definition and pursuit of its national security interests. Indeed, Singapore lacks a strong tradition of public questioning or domestic debate of its defense priorities and foreign policy. Nevertheless, as the war against international terrorism is once again showing, there is an inextricable meshing of external and domestic insecurity. Increasingly, addressing the threat posed by the global network of terror will call for intensified efforts at managing the challenge posed to domestic coherence, national resilience, and identity.

——— 11 ——— Thailand’s Perspective on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Chulacheeb Chinwanno

The Asia-Pacific is a region full of diversities and differences. States in the region have pursued different security arrangements to meet their particular national interests and strategic needs. These diverse security approaches have sometimes led to conflictual relations for some states, and cooperative relations for others, with the overall result being tension and instability. In the past fifty years, the Asia-Pacific, especially Southeast Asia, has experienced regional conflicts, crises, as well as wars as a result of diverse and incompatible strategic and security arrangements. Moreover, external actors, including the major powers, have played an influential role in the security order of the region. The Cold War conflicts at the global level have also had a great impact on regional interstate security relations, dividing Southeast Asia into two blocs, communist Indochina and noncommunist ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, and the demise of communism in Eastern Europe, facilitated the emergence of new security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. Other changes, including the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and the inclusion of the Indochinese states in ASEAN, also altered the strategic landscape in the region. In the process, many new concepts were introduced to help make sense of the emerging post–Cold War regional order. As the Asia-Pacific region entered the new millennium, it encountered a new set of challenges, including terrorism. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 190

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prompted many states in the region to reassess their approaches to national and regional security order. The Bali terrorist attack on October 12, 2002 was a wake-up call for states in the region to cooperate against terrorism. These developments appear to have evoked a variety of responses. Will they create opportunities for the realization of a new common security approach, or will they introduce differences that only exacerbate tensions? This chapter explores Thailand’s perspective on the security order in the Asia-Pacific, and particularly in Southeast Asia. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part examines Thailand’s security approaches from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War. The second analyzes Thailand’s search for a viable security arrangement in the post–Cold War period. The third discusses Thailand’s role in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. Finally, the fourth part looks into Thailand’s position on terrorism. Thailand’s Security Approaches during the Cold War Not only did the Second World War have a great impact on regional politics, but it also served as a milestone in the security environment in Southeast Asia. The Japanese occupation weakened Western colonialism as well as enhanced opportunities for local nationalist movements to develop in various parts of the Asia-Pacific region. These nationalist movements struggled against, and won independence from, their Western imperialist masters. Meanwhile, Thailand, a small Southeast Asian state with a weak military force, underdeveloped agricultural-based economy, and unstable political regime, became anxious about her ambiguous international status and uncertain security environment in the postwar world. Thailand’s bitter experience with the Japanese invasion and occupation during the war made its leaders painfully aware that without international recognition and a viable security arrangement, Thailand’s sovereignty and independence could be at risk. Immediately after the Second World War, Thailand moved to establish amicable ties with all of the major powers, especially the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.1 Thai postwar civilian leaders decided to seek membership in the United Nations in order to improve Thailand’s status in the world community and to enhance her security. They believed that the collective security promised

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by the United Nations was capable of deterring any external aggression and was appropriate for Thai security needs.2 By 1950, the strategic and security landscape in Southeast Asia had been redrawn by external changes at the global as well as regional levels. The Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union had not only divided the world into two camps—the free world and the communist—but also affected regional stability, including in Southeast Asia. The communist victory in mainland China in 1949 and the Korean War of 1950 were perceived as an expansion of communist influence.3 The prospect of a strong and revolutionary China was considered by some as a great danger, while others saw China as the new balancer against the West. The ramifications of the Cold War and the revolution in China provided new challenges to states in the region. Different states pursued different approaches, two of which are discussed briefly here. The first approach contended that the management of regional security should be the responsibility of the states in the region themselves. Indonesian leaders, especially the nationalist Sukarno, believed that regional security needs are best served and challenges overcome through regional cooperation rather through dependence on external powers.4 Indonesia seemed to oppose the notion of involving external powers as a means to achieve regional security. This attitude probably sprang from Indonesia’s experience in its struggle for independence. Indonesia felt that the major powers had failed to support Indonesia’s struggle for independence from the Dutch. The reluctance of Western powers to acknowledge Indonesian independence contributed to strong anticolonial and anti-Western feelings among the Indonesians. A different security approach, almost the opposite of Indonesia’s, was pursued by Thailand, which preferred to cope with regional security through embracing extraregional powers.5 This preference might have come about as a result of Thailand’s geographic location and her sensitivities regarding the regional balance of power as well as her historical experience during the Second World War. Thailand’s location on mainland Southeast Asia was geostrategically significant: it made Thailand the strategic hub of the region. Thai elites were realistic and pragmatic in their assessment of power relationships and were sensitive to changes and balances in regional powers. Such sensitivity helped the Thais maintain their independence during the period of Western imperialist expansion in the nineteenth century.6 Moreover, Thailand’s bitter experience

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during the Second World War—bereft of friends and allies, Thailand was forced by Japan to allow Japanese troops passage through its territory—taught Thai leaders the valuable lesson that without viable security arrangements, Thai sovereignty and independence could be at risk. Thus, fully cognizant of its limited military and economic capabilities, Thailand searched for a new approach to maintain its security as well as promote regional security. From Collective Security to Collective Defense In 1947, the overthrow of a constitutionally elected civilian government brought back to power the military regime led by Field Marshal Pibul Songkram, who subsequently became very much concerned with the communist threat posed by China. Thai leaders perceived the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the conflict between the two Koreas in 1950 as an expansion of communist influence and a potential source of regional instability. Moreover, Songkram regarded China’s creation of a Tai Autonomous Area in Yunnan Province in January 1953 as an effort to set up an alternative Thai government. In addition, the Thai government viewed the Vietminh victory over the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the subsequent establishment of communist North Vietnam as threats to national security and regional stability. On the other hand, Thailand looked upon the United States as a reliable friend, one that had supported Thailand against pressure from the British after the war and again had supported Thailand in its effort to gain admission to the United Nations. Thus Thailand decided to join the U.S.-led collective defense alliance in Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), against communism.7 Thailand sought a much stronger security guarantee than the United States was willing to give, such as a NATO-like commitment affirming that an attack on any one member would be an attack against all. The United States rejected this in favor of a clause requiring the members to consult and act in accordance with their constitutional processes. Moreover, it also rejected Thailand’s request for the stationing of permanent forces under a SEATO command in favor of periodic SEATO exercises. Nevertheless, Thailand was somewhat satisfied that the geographic area under the treaty was not only limited to the signatories but extended to include Indochina, which was critical to Thai security concerns.8 In shifting her preferred security approach from collective security

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under the United Nations toward multilateral collective defense, Thailand aroused the ire of her smaller neighbors that feared the possibility of intervention. However, the lack of a concrete commitment from the United States made Thailand receptive to China’s expression of goodwill in the form of a call for “peaceful coexistence” issued at the AfroAsian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955.9 Impressed by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” Bangkok sent a secret mission to Beijing in 1956–57 to probe China’s intentions. This subsequently contributed to a better atmosphere and relaxed trade and travel restrictions with China.10 This brief thaw came to an abrupt end with the coup against Pibul Songkram led by General Sarit Thanarat in October 1958. The new Thai military government pursued a staunchly anticommunist policy and continued Thailand’s commitment to multilateral collective defense. For this, it was rewarded with greater military and economic assistance from the United States. SEATO’s multilateral collective defense encountered an important test with the Laotian crisis of 1961–62. As the civil war in Laos between the three factional leaders—the neutralist Souvannaphouma, the leftist Soupanuvong, and the rightist General Phoumi Nosawan—heated up, it threatened regional security. The leftist movement Neo Lao Hak Xat under Soupanuvong proved the strongest, and advanced toward Vientiane, the Laotian capital. Thai leaders were concerned that Laos would become communist if leftists took control of Vientiane, as Soupanuvong was known to be close to, and supported by, communist North Vietnam. Thailand considered a free Laos as vital to national and regional security as a consequence of close geographic, historical, and ethnic identification.11 Moreover, it wanted Laos to remain a buffer state between Thailand and North Vietnam and China. Therefore, it requested that SEATO militarily intervene. However, other members of SEATO, especially the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, saw the situation otherwise. For them, Laos’s strategic and economic importance was marginal. Thus they were unwilling to have SEATO take forceful action. Thailand, very upset with the failure of SEATO to intervene in Laos, started to doubt the viability of multilateral collective defense. The Thai military became increasingly concerned that Thai security could be compromised if Thailand continued to depend upon a seemingly weak and uncommitted SEATO. Thai leaders, questioning the reliability and credibility of the SEATO commitments to Thailand in the wake of its paralysis during the Laotian crisis,

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searched for a new security approach that could ensure Thailand’s national security as well as regional security. From Multilateral to Bilateral Collective Defense Disappointed with the “unreliability” of multilateral collective defense, Thailand turned to a new security approach involving bilateral collective defense with the United States. Perceiving the sources of external threats to Thai national security to be China and North Vietnam as well as their client communist insurgents, Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat sent his foreign minister, Thanad Khoman, to Washington, D.C., to secure a firm commitment from the Americans. The result was the Thanad-Rusk Joint Communiqué of 1962, in which the United States reaffirmed its security commitment and obligation to Thailand. This obligation was not contingent on the prior agreement of the other SEATO parties to the Manila Treaty because it was an individual, as well as a collective, obligation.12 Under the new regime, Thailand became more confident of the U.S. security commitment, while America gained access to Thai soil to facilitate its containment of communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The 1963 Thai-U.S. Special Logistics Agreement committed the United States to assist Thailand in improving its transportation system, principally through developing a deepwater port near Sattaheep as a supply base for air bases in the northeast. Thailand and the United States signed several memoranda of understanding by which Thailand allowed America to use its territory and provided military facilities for the U.S. war effort in Vietnam, making Thailand increasingly dependent upon the United States for national security. Pursuing Multiple Approaches to Security Although Thai military leaders were quite satisfied with the bilateral collective defense with the United States, some of the civilian leaders, especially Foreign Minister Thanad Khoman, became uneasy with such a close alliance and dependence. Thanad, himself having been involved during the early 1960s in mediating conflicts among three of Thailand’s neighbors—Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines— felt that Southeast Asia needed a regional organization to enhance cooperation and mutual benefit. Moreover, he hoped this regional

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cooperation could be developed into a new regional security arrangement. In August 1967, Thanad invited the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore to discuss regional cooperation. They agreed to sign the Bangkok Declaration, setting up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. Thanad declared, “United, Southeast Asia will count and its views and opinions will be heard.”13 The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 can be seen as an alternative approach to regional security that served long-term Thai security interests. Cooperation with like-minded neighbors in Southeast Asia assured that Thailand would not be isolated if it came under pressure from a hostile, large state. Thanad said, “We are doing this to enable us to deal more effectively and more adequately with, not only with our foes . . . but also with our friends. If one is better organized, our friends will respect one more.”14 In addition, because of ASEAN, Thailand felt it could count on the moral and political backing of neighboring states. In other words, Thailand was pursuing a combination of two security approaches—collective defense with the United States as the primary mechanism, and regional cooperative security as a secondary or supplemental mechanism. However, the external strategic environment started to change radically in the 1970s at both the global and regional levels. The triangular relationship among the three major powers, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, changed as a result of the SinoSoviet conflict and the subsequent normalization process between America and China. At the regional level, the United States was, as a result of President Nixon’s Guam doctrine, withdrawing its troops from South Vietnam and mainland Southeast Asia. Understandably, Thailand became concerned that its bilateral collective defense with the United States could be jeopardized by these strategic changes. Thailand, having few options, decided to adapt to the new strategic and security environment by accommodating all three major powers. Thailand established formal diplomatic relations with China in 1975 and moved closer toward the Soviet Union, while it kept a distance from the United States.15 The equidistant strategic move in balancing the major powers’ interests in the region served Thailand well during the turmoil of the post–Vietnam War era. Another important change in the strategic landscape in Southeast Asia was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Thailand viewed the

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Vietnamese occupation as a security threat since Vietnamese forces were positioned extremely close to the Thai border and, in fact, had crossed into Thai territory on innumerable occasions and had clashed with Thai soldiers. The Vietnamese aggression also destabilized regional security. Moreover, it was known that Vietnam was militarily supported by the Soviet Union, which had been actively utilizing the Vietnamese naval base in Cam Ranh Bay and the air base in Danang. Thailand first turned to ASEAN and later entered into “an informal strategic partnership” with China to pressure Vietnam politically and militarily. This drew Thailand closer to China as a result of the congruence of strategic interest in preventing Vietnam and her ally, the Soviet Union, from dominating Indochina.16 With ASEAN, Thailand built up a correlation of forces with the United States, Japan, China, various countries in Western Europe, and other members of the United Nations to settle the Cambodian conflict politically. This effort enhanced not only the solidarity within ASEAN but also the prestige and credibility of ASEAN as an effective regional organization. To sum up, different states in the Asia-Pacific pursued different security approaches to meet the security challenges they faced. The selection of the approaches was influenced not only by external security challenges, but also by past experiences, national historical memories, and preferences. Thailand, unlike Indonesia, preferred to bring in an extraregional power to assure its security and oversee regional stability. During the Cold War, Thailand first pinned its security on multilateral collective defense under SEATO. After SEATO proved to be unreliable, Thailand moved toward a bilateral collective defense with one, single extraregional power, the United States, to counter the perceived threats from China and North Vietnam. The changes in triangular strategic relationships among the major powers in the 1970s, especially the normalization of relations between the United States and China and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, prompted Thailand to establish diplomatic relations with China while, at the same time, nurturing ASEAN as an alternative security arrangement. Later Thailand decided to engage in an informal strategic partnership with China to deter Vietnamese aggression and deal with the occupation of Cambodia. In other words, Thailand seemed to be pursuing a combination of several security approaches during the Cold War: collective defense, formal as well as informal, with extraregional powers, the United States and China, and also multilaterial security via ASEAN.

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Thailand and Regional Security in the Post–Cold War Era The demise of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union contributed to the end of the Cold War and opened new opportunities for new security approaches and arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. The relationships among the major powers became quite cordial, which contributed to a peaceful atmosphere. Moreover, the conflict in Cambodia also ended with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the signing of a peace treaty in Paris. Communist states in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam and Laos, could no longer depend on the communist bloc and decided to reform their socialist economies by utilizing the market mechanism, and otherwise prepared to coexist peacefully with their ASEAN neighbors. Thailand saw an opportunity to enlarge ASEAN so as to include all states in Southeast Asia. The Thai prime minister, Anand Punyarachun, formally invited Vietnam and Laos to join ASEAN during his visits to both countries in 1991–92. In 1995, both countries became observers and later joined ASEAN as full members. Extending the same offer to Myanmar and Cambodia proved more complicated because of their domestic problems. Nevertheless, before the dawn of the new century, all ten countries of Southeast Asia had become ASEAN members. The enlargement had a positive as well as a negative impact on the association. The positive impact was that all ten ASEAN members agreed to settle conflicts through peaceful negotiation, thereby reducing tensions and enhancing regional security. The negative impact stemmed from the diverse and different political and economic systems of the new members and the old members, which diluted solidarity and effective cooperation. Domestic change in Thailand was also very important, as the Thai military had lost its overwhelming influence and dominant position in Thai society and politics. The democratic transformation of Thailand brought more civilian politicians to power, politicians whose thinking on security differed from that of the military. Supplementing Bilateralism with Cooperative Security The peaceful atmosphere among the states in the Asia-Pacific in the post–Cold War period set this region apart from others in the world. The emerging new world order after the end of the Cold War had opened up possibilities for new approaches to regional security cooperation. Bilat-

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eral collective defense used to be the backbone of security in the region, but in the new environment, opportunities arose for multilateral security cooperation that could complement existing bilateral arrangements or even develop into the principal security framework of the region. As threats from external sources receded, Thailand enthusiastically supported the new security arrangement in the region. All states in Southeast Asia were able to sit together at the same table during the annual ASEAN ministerial meetings, discussing the future of the region. This did not mean that they agreed on everything. In fact, differences existed, but they did not flare up into open conflicts. Moreover, the relations among extraregional powers continued to be cooperative, contributing to a favorable atmosphere for setting up new regional security cooperative initiatives. At the fourth ASEAN summit in Singapore in 1992, ASEAN leaders agreed to set up a forum for regional security discussion and consultation. Thailand supported the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and hosted the inaugural ARF meeting, which convened in Bangkok in July 1994.17 The ARF became the only regional security framework covering the whole Asia-Pacific region, and the only one in which all major powers of the region, including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and India, were involved. Thailand recognized that constructive engagement among these major powers was desirable and important for a stable security environment in Northeast and Southeast Asia. In the first stage, the annual ARF meetings involved dialogues and exchanges aimed at promoting confidence-building measures, and, at later stages, moved toward preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The conflict-resolution stage was later developed into an elaboration of approaches to conflict to satisfy China, which was not comfortable with the original concept. The establishment of the ARF, representing a new approach to regional security, indicated that ASEAN was willing to explore the multilateral cooperative security approach, which might be more appropriate to the post–Cold War atmosphere. In addition, the second-track academic forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), comprising strategic and security institutes in the region that meet to discuss sensitive issues or to probe the reactions and intentions of the members, also played a vital role in the development of regional multilateral cooperative security. Thailand supported and actively participated in both the ARF and CSCAP. They became alternatives worth exploring in the light of Thailand’s

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preference for a strategy involving multiple security approaches or a combination of several security arrangements.18 Thailand did not want to be left with no choice or to be forced to depend on a single extraregional power exclusively, as in the past. In fact, Thailand at present still adheres to bilateral collective defense with the United States. Today the Thai military continues to have warm relations and cooperates with its U.S. counterpart in many ways, including exchanging intelligence and holding annual joint military exercises, such as COBRA GOLD. The COBRA GOLD military exercise has now been transformed from bilateral to multilateral with Singapore becoming the third participant since 2000. COBRA GOLD 2003, which took place in May 2003 and involved 100 Singaporean, 5,600 Thai, and 5,200 U.S. troops, focused on peacekeeping and antiterrorism operations, including evacuation and medical assistance.19 Eleven countries have been invited to observe this annual exercise: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Moreover, Thai-Chinese relations continue to be warm and close. This is assured through frequent exchanges at the senior military leader level of both countries and Thailand’s habitual purchases of Chinese military equipment. In other words, Thailand assiduously maintains bilateral defense cooperation both with the dominant power, the United States, and the rising power, China. On the other hand, Thailand seeks new and more viable alternatives as a supplement to bilateralism, such as multilateral cooperative security via the ARF. Through participating in the dialogues and confidence-building measures of the ARF, Thailand hopes that its strategic and security needs in the region can be met. Balancing between Two Great Powers For Thailand, the interactions between these two security approaches, collective defense and cooperative security, proved fairly compatible as the United States and China also participated in the ARF. There were a few times when Thailand had to reject U.S. requests as a result of the perceived multilateral concerns. In 1995 the United States asked for Thai cooperation in building a floating arms depot in the Gulf of Thailand. The Thai government, then under a civilian prime minister, Chuan Leekpai, politely refused the American request, saying that the depot was not needed and might unnecessarily provoke suspicions among Thailand’s neighbors. This response showed that Thailand was concerned

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about her neighbors’ sensitivities. Although bilateral collective defense was once important for Thai national security and for promoting regional security and stability, the lack of an external threat in the post– Cold War era and the coming to power of a civilian leadership prompted Thailand to relegate the bilateral relationship with the United States to a secondary position. Thailand realized that the post–Cold War security management in the Asia-Pacific might become more complex, multidimensional, and multilayered. Bilateral collective defense seems to have fallen out of favor most everywhere, but some countries still adhere to it as a result of strategic uncertainties. Multilateral cooperative security is still in its formative stage and needs more time to develop the capacity to manage and solve regional conflict. In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea continue to count on bilateral collective defense with the United States out of concern with the unpredictable behavior of North Korea. In addition to the tension on the Korean Peninsula, the uncertainties over the Taiwan Strait, and the rise of China as well as the new military role of Japan, make many small states in the region nervous. Thus they want the United States to maintain its presence in the region and honor its commitment to collective defense. Thailand is not unaware of the complexities of the new situation in the Asia-Pacific and fully realizes the opportunities as well as uncertainties. Since Thailand has a formal collective defense arrangement with the United States and an informal military cooperation arrangement with China, it is at ease as long as Sino-U.S. relations continue to be smooth. However, the tension between the United States and China over the EP3 spy plane incident in April 2001 made Thailand anxious and concerned that it might be forced to choose one against the other. Fortunately, the situation did not deteriorate and was solved diplomatically. Moreover, the September 11 terrorist incident seems to have brought China and the United States closer to each other. Meanwhile, Thailand wants the ARF to develop so that multilateral cooperative security will have the capacity to manage and hopefully solve regional conflicts in the future. Thailand’s Participation in UN Peace Operations As a member of the United Nations since 1946, Thailand has actively participated in UN activities and in return has received a great deal of

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benefit diplomatically, politically, and economically. The United Nations became the venue for Thailand and ASEAN members to bring world public opinion to bear on Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in the 1980s. Thailand supported former secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace, which included preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.20 Thailand has always recognized that peacekeeping operations have been one of the most effective instruments available for maintaining peace and stability and has demonstrated a strong commitment to and support for these activities. In 1991, Thailand sent five military personnel to the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), and in 1992 it dispatched a group of fifty military personnel to the UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI). It also sent police personnel to participate in the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) in 1997. And in 2000, it sent a group of armed forces personnel to participate in the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMISL).21 One of the biggest UN peace operations in which Thailand participated was the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1991–92. Thailand sent two army engineer battalions to clear mines and to rebuild roads in western Cambodia. Later, Thailand also sent a six-man team with ten mine-detecting dogs to train Cambodian personnel as well as a ten-man police team. Major General Vaipot Srinual, director general of intelligence of the Royal Thai Army, wrote that the considerations for Thailand’s participation in peace operations are: (1) the impact on national security as well as regional security; (2) the likelihood of promoting humanitarian and human rights; (3) the readiness of Thai troops; and (4) the mandates and risks involved.22 The East Timor peace missions were another important development for Thailand. The Thai leadership became concerned with the violence in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) and did not want it to destabilize regional security. Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai decided that his nation should participate in the peacekeeping operation, and Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan then consulted with Indonesian leaders, President Habibie and General Wiranto, to avoid misunderstanding. This consultation eased Indonesian apprehension. Thailand first sent a peacekeeping force of 1,581 men under the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), whose deputy commander was a Thai general. Later, the UN sent a peacekeeping force under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), where another Thai general was subsequently

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appointed as the taskforce commander.23 Thailand, which contributed 925 military personnel to the UNTAET operation, applied civic action to win the hearts and minds of the Timorese by training them in rice cultivation and the making of simple agricultural tools. Thailand has also committed to sending an engineering battalion to the UN peace operation in Afghanistan, with the task of rebuilding the airport runway in Kabul and keeping it operational. This would be the first time that a Thai peacekeeping force would be sent outside Southeast Asia in large numbers, probably several hundreds. The Thai armed forces must prepare the personnel and keep their morale high. Overall, Thailand’s armed forces have had good experiences in UN peace operations and so far they have not suffered any losses. Nevertheless, Major General Vaipot Srinual recommended that, “as the UN peace operations are multidimensional and multinational in nature, the opportunity to work or train with other forces in advance will make the troops better prepared and coordinated.”24 Several suggestions were made in many circles that ASEAN should set up and train peacekeeping forces together for better coordination, but these were not taken seriously because some ASEAN members still harbor concern about the potential for domestic interference by each other. Thailand’s Position on Global Terrorism Even before the September 11, 2001 incident Thailand had long recognized that terrorism is a threat to national security. In the Defense White Paper issued in 1996, the Ministry of Defense pointed out that one of Thailand’s national objectives is to defeat terrorism in every region so that violent activities are eliminated and dangerous situations brought under control.25 However, the terrorism the white paper referred to was a local one, mainly in the south as a result of ethnic tensions and maltreatment by corrupt government officials as well as separatist groups. The September 11 terrorist attack on the United States highlighted terrorism at the global level. Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra condemned the act and pledged to work with like-minded countries and the United Nations in the war on global terrorism. Thailand supported the UN Security Council resolution of September 28, 2001 and became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in December 2001. The Thai cabinet decided that Thailand would sign all twelve international conventions

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relating to terrorism and implement new measures, including exchanging information on terrorists’ whereabouts, denying them shelter, and freezing their funds. At the regional level, at the ASEAN ministerial meeting on transnational crime held in Singapore in October 2001, Thailand and ASEAN also agreed to cooperate in combating terrorism. The ASEAN summit in Brunei in November 2002 also issued a declaration on joint action to counter terrorism. The terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002 made ASEAN more aware of the possibility of a linkage between global terrorism and regional terrorism. Almost every ASEAN country has had to deal with ethnic tensions, which involve local terrorism that needs to be distinguished from regional and global terrorism. As Dr. Surakiat Sathirathai, Thai foreign minister, said in 2002, “The war against terrorism will be a long one. We need to be determined, and long-term incremental measures are necessary if we are to win. We must not let the threat of terrorism destroy our livelihood nor let this scourge disrupt our economies and markets. We must ensure that a safer and more secure world is provided for this generation and future generations. The success of the international community in fighting terrorism will depend very much on effective cooperation among its members.”26 In combating global terrorism, the United States has tended toward unilateralism and also has attempted to revive bilateral collective defense. This may affect multilateral cooperative security in the region. Moreover, the U.S. war on Iraq has complicated regional cooperation on counterterrorism. Conclusion In the past, states in the Asia-Pacific have pursued different security arrangements to meet their national security needs and to ensure regional security. They have relied on two main security approaches. The first approach contends that regional security should be managed by or be the responsibility of the states in the region. The second prefers to cope with regional security through engaging extraregional powers. Both approaches are clearly informed by several factors, including domestic as well as external challenges and threats, and historical experiences with colonialism or with aggressors. Thailand, realizing her limitations in the face of formidable threats during the Cold War, sought to engage extraregional powers through multilateral collective defense (that is,

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SEATO) with the U.S.-led West, and shifted to bilateral collective defense with the United States only in the 1960s after it concluded that SEATO was unreliable. By the mid-1960s Thailand and several other countries in Southeast Asia realized that an alternative approach to regional security might be political and security cooperation with each other, which led to the formation of ASEAN. But Thailand and the Philippines continued their collective defense arrangements with the United States. After the Cold War, Thailand began putting greater emphasis on multilateral cooperative security, working with friends through the enlargement of ASEAN to ten members and the establishment of the ARF. Thailand continues to keep her bilateral defense ties with the United States as a form of double insurance as long as Thai and U.S. security perspectives remain congruent. The turn to security multilateralism in supplementing bilateralism has been facilitated by the domestic transformation toward civilian democratic government, which saw the military losing its traditional control of the Thai national security establishment. In her search for security, Thailand has pursued a combination of two security approaches: collective defense (formal as well as informal) with extraregional powers, that is, the United States and China, and cooperative security with ASEAN through the ARF. Thailand has been quite successful in managing these two approaches so far. The key to this successful management has been Thailand’s flexibility and pragmatism.

——— 12 ——— Recalibration Not Transformation U.S. Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific

Satu P. Limaye

The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11), the ensuing “global war on terrorism” (GWOT), and the release by the Bush administration of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in late September 2001 and the document known as the National Security Strategy (NSS) in September 2002, have spurred intense debate about the future direction of U.S. foreign and security policies generally, including the evolving U.S. approach to the security order in the Asia-Pacific region. This debate has become more complicated, and its outcome more uncertain, since October 2002 due to tensions over North Korea’s clandestine nuclear activities and the March 2003 start of U.S.led military action against Iraq. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a “midstream” assessment of U.S. Asia-Pacific security policies. The Bush Administration’s Initial Policies toward the Asia-Pacific The Bush administration took office with several planned policies on Asia. Its first priority was revitalizing relations with “allies and friends.” The first of four goals identified in the QDR—much of which was written prior to 9/11 and released two weeks after the attack—is “assuring allies and friends of the United States’ steadiness of purpose and its capacity to fulfill its security commitments.”1 This emphasis was calculated to signal a divergence from the Clinton administration, which the Bush administration perceived as having neglected America’s key part206

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nerships. Hence, the Bush administration initially sought to focus on the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), Taiwan over China and most importantly Japan.2 Australia, too, received considerable attention. With slightly less emphasis, the Bush administration revived attention to a number of Southeast Asian friends, including Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines, and sought restored but limited military links with Indonesia.3 Indeed, the concept of an “East Asian littoral,” articulated in the QDR, assigns importance to Asian friends beyond the traditional U.S. allies of Japan and the ROK. Other than to distinguish itself from the preceding administration, the emphasis on “allies and friends” was designed to reinforce ideological components of U.S. foreign policy (that is, democracies, open markets), American primacy in the region based on politico-military relationships with welcoming partners rather than engagement through weak multilateral organizations, a revised regional threat assessment, and a distinction between those countries the United States considers like-minded, cooperative, and nonthreatening, and those it does not. Whether “allies and friends” for their part desired the level of attention, interaction, and expectations that the administration seemed keen to provide is another matter. For example, Japan’s ability to meet the bold and ambitious milestones that some in the administration desired was (and is) an open question. Moreover, the emphasis on “allies and friends” did not appear to have been very well coordinated with the countries involved. This was especially the case on the Korean Peninsula, where the administration initially undertook a lengthy and ominous-sounding policy review regarding North Korea, causing considerable anxiety in Seoul— identified as a key ally. Nor were other administration emphases and initiatives necessarily helpful to revitalizing “alliances and friendships.” A case in point was the administration’s early approach to China. The Bush administration’s emphasis on allies and friends partly reflected its views of China—which seemed contradictory. The first was to regard China, in U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell’s words, as a “competitor, a potential regional rival,” and the second was to treat it as a less-central player in U.S. policy toward Asia.4 Both approaches deviated sharply from the Clinton administration’s formulation of China as a “strategic partner” and its de facto treatment of China as the centerpiece of the U.S.-Asia relationship. Secretary Powell’s statement that the United States would “treat China as she merits” appeared to refer not only to

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competition and rivalry, but also to China’s weight relative to other regional countries.5 A pattern of statements and contacts was further evidence of an intention to take China off center stage insofar as U.S. Asia policy is concerned.6 But the apparent contradiction of treating China both as a “potential rival” and as “peripheral” was really not a contradiction. By treating China as less pivotal to its view of Asia’s international relations, the administration was again reinforcing China’s distinctiveness from America’s allies and friends while simultaneously highlighting its potential as a threat. Notwithstanding the administration’s nod that “Japan, South Korea, Australia, and our other allies and friends in the region have a stake in this process of nurturing a constructive relationship [with China] . . . and we will want to work with them,”7 the fact is that initially there were some significant gaps between “allies and friends” and the United States in dealing with China.8 A third characteristic of early Bush administration policy in the AsiaPacific was resistance to South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” or engagement with North Korea. The administration immediately halted official contacts with the North. There was to be no follow-up on then secretary of state Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang and there most emphatically was not going to be a presidential visit as had been contemplated during the waning days of the Clinton administration. Apart from the launch of a policy review, the new administration immediately and substantively diverged from the Clinton administration’s approach toward the peninsula by complaining about North Korea’s conventional force posture in addition to its missiles and “unconventional weapons.” The administration’s DPRK policy complicated the emphasis on “allies and friends,” particularly with the ROK (and to a lesser extent with Japan). A fourth and much-missed facet of the Bush administration’s AsiaPacific policies was its intention to “transform” relations with India. Interestingly, this policy was the most consistent carryover from the Clinton administration. An improvement of relations with India was predicated on a number of factors, of which two specifically involved East Asian considerations. (India’s perceived role in the wider AsiaPacific context was evident in the fact that the “Bush administration reorganized the National Security Council staff, such that India is now the responsibility of the Senior Director for Asia, rather than the Middle East.”)9 The first factor was the rise of China. Though both countries officially reject an improvement of relations based on third-party con-

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siderations, at least some in India and the United States see possible threats from China as a basis for enhanced relations. A second driver of improved relations with India, especially in the military field, was the intended adjustment of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific. In this regard, the United States looked upon India as a possibly promising partner for a range of military cooperation. In the military and defense realm, several elements comprised the Bush administration’s initial approach to the Asia-Pacific. The first element was a greater emphasis on Asia. Of the five “critical areas” described in the QDR, three encompass Asia: Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral—“stretching from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal”—and Southwest Asia.10 The administration initiated numerous studies as part of a planned process to reallocate U.S. resources, personnel, and attention in the region. Second, the QDR articulated plans to redeploy military assets to East Asia and to increase “access” for U.S. forces in the region. Specifically, the QDR “calls for an increase in aircraft carrier presence in the region . . . increased contingency stationing for the U.S. Air Force . . . and the possibility that three or four more surface combatants . . . and a yet to be converted Trident-class SSGN (with capability for ‘stealthy’ cruise missile strikes), could be forward stationed in East Asia.”11 Third, the Bush administration replaced “theater engagement” with “theater security cooperation,” indicating an emphasis on access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation. Both the proposed redeployments and the move from military-to-military engagement to security cooperation suggested a more military-oriented approach to regional security based on repeated administration warnings that war in Asia was more likely than in Europe. Fourth, the new administration indicated a continued commitment to forward-stationed forces—though these forces were to be adjusted in scale and location to meet a range of missions and to respond to technological innovations. Finally, the Bush administration made a commitment to missile defenses, which were in part aimed at “undermining China’s growing strategic capability” as well threats from rogue countries with weapons of mass destruction.12 The Bush administration’s skepticism about regimes, treaties, and multilateral organizations was another major feature of the early approach toward Asia—and elsewhere. The Bush administration’s objective was a U.S. foreign and security policy built on self-reliance, itself based on unrivaled (and not to be rivaled) power, assured self-defense

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(for example, through missile defense), flexibility (fewer regime and treaty commitments), and key bilateral relationships around the globe. The former director of policy planning at the State Department, Richard Haass, famously spoke of “à la carte multilateralism,” a formulation apparently designed to suggest that multilateralism was not rejected out of hand, but would be pursued only as and when the United States chose to participate. The favored phrase in President Bush’s White House for more than one country working with the United States was “coalition of the willing.” In its tone, rhetoric, and style the early approach of the Bush administration to security in the Asia-Pacific gave the appearance of being a major departure from the Clinton administration’s policies. But within just a few months of taking office, and before the events of September 11, adjustments were already beginning to be made. In the post-9/11 environment these trends accelerated. The Global War on Terrorism and U.S. Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific For the United States, the September 11 terrorist attacks are the most dramatic, if not yet definitive, events of the post–Cold War era. The GWOT shows no immediate sign of abating, as demonstrated by attacks elsewhere (most spectacularly in Bali, Indonesia, and in Kenya) and, as of this writing, the search for Osama bin Laden continues. Both U.S. official policy and public opinion concur that terrorism, and especially the threat that terrorists might obtain weapons of mass destruction, pose the greatest challenges to U.S. well-being and interests. The Bush administration considers Asia, or more precisely parts of Asia, as critical to the GWOT. Southeast Asia is popularly described as a “second front,” given terrorism-related developments in Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Though Northeast Asia, the home to America’s key regional alliances, is not the site of counterterrorism concerns, U.S. relations with the countries there remain an important aspect of support for the GWOT through direct support (such as from Japan and the ROK) and accommodation (such as from China). The United States also considers closer relations with Russia as important in the fight against terrorism. Though not directly related to Al-Qaeda, the antics of the DPRK regime—including the possibility of the DPRK transferring weapons of mass destruction to

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terrorists—continue to animate U.S. approaches to Northeast Asia. The DPRK also highlights the problem of stridently anti-American regimes with WMD capabilities and/or intentions. For these reasons connected to the war on terrorism, Asia remains important to U.S. interests, though the relative weight the United States accords to the Asia-Pacific today is less than what the Bush administration initially contemplated and planned. Against this background, the GWOT has had a number of effects on the main approaches of the Bush administration to security in the Asia-Pacific region. First, relations with allies and friends generally have been strengthened. This is especially so of U.S. relationships with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. Japan, for example, adopted new legislation allowing its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to provide support to U.S. and other forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom. With the Philippines, the United States has conducted a level of cooperation, including a recently signed logistics agreement, that would have been unlikely prior to 9/11. With Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand too, U.S. security ties have increased. The Indonesian case is more complicated, but considerable (and successful) efforts are being made to work with Jakarta in counterterrorism. Indeed, 9/11 in at least two cases, with Japan and Australia, helped improve earlier troubled relations.13 The case of the ROK is more complicated due to the North Korea problem, including the Bush administration’s policy review, the “axis of evil” speech, and the responses to Pyongyang’s clandestine uranium enrichment activities. This is not to suggest that there are no concerns and constraints in U.S. relations with friends and allies in the region regarding the war on terrorism. The level of priority given to military solutions, the asymmetry of resources and capabilities between the United States and regional states, and the delicate domestic balances required in counterterrorism require close, consistent dialogue with “allies and friends.” The administration mostly has been mindful of these challenges. There is recognition in America that countries will cooperate with the United States at levels and in ways that they can afford to—sometimes openly, sometimes not. Washington will also need to continue to be sensitive to the impact of sensible U.S. decisions (for instance, warnings to U.S. citizens that they might face dangers in certain parts of Asia) on the economies and societies of Asia. Nevertheless, on the whole U.S. relations with “allies and friends” have been strengthened in the wake of 9/11 and the GWOT.14

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Second, U.S.-China relations, though still highly complex and fragile, generally have become less confrontational too. Most obviously, the administration’s early attention to China has ebbed as the demands of counterterrorism have taken top place on the American agenda. Every indication is that this development is not unwelcome to China. Even before the events of 9/11, and especially after the EP3 incident in April 2001 was settled, Washington and Beijing fashioned a less prickly relationship. Stability and a certain pragmatism in U.S.-China relations have not diminished all of the administration’s concerns about China—such as “Chinese involvement in the proliferation of missile technology and equipment” and human rights.15 The Taiwan issue continues to impede better U.S.-China relations. Third, U.S.-India relations are not flourishing despite the dramatic increase in the number of high-level visits, military-to-military engagements, and cooperative initiatives since the Bush administration took office. In the short term, the events of 9/11 led to a significant increase in U.S.-India ties—partly to compensate for missed signals of support from New Delhi and to blunt fallout from the revived U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But differences regarding Pakistan, infiltration of terrorists into Kashmir, and, most important, structural problems in U.S.-India relations (such as poor trade and investment ties) have constrained any transformation in U.S.-India relations. Fourth, initially contemplated changes in U.S. military and defense policies toward Asia, though not abandoned, remain further downstream than earlier planned. Other changes may be sped up. And changes not envisioned two years ago might yet occur. For example, the GWOT has simultaneously increased attention to Southeast Asia (or the East Asian littoral) while diminishing the overall importance of Asia as the war on terrorism has gone global. Pre-QDR speculation that the United States would shift its strategic focus from Europe to Asia has faded. Indeed, although it is common to speak of Southeast Asia as a “second front” in the war on terrorism, U.S. defense officials such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz have insisted that the problem of terrorism is global (including in the United States) and not restricted to a particular region or country.16 And, interestingly, the American public now regards Europe, and U.S. partners in Europe, as “more important to the United States than Asia, and more [Americans] see the countries of the European Union as reliable partners in the war on terrorism than any other country asked about.”17 Whether such atti-

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tudes persist in the wake of French and German positions in the United Nations debate about Iraq is unclear. In any case, the attention now being given to Asia, especially Southeast Asia, is more negative than positive. Similarly, the GWOT has had the effect of delaying planned redeployments of forces to East Asia, as outlined principally in the QDR. These redeployments might yet occur following the end of the war in Iraq, when decisions are made about the return of forces to their points of origin. Third, the GWOT has had the effect of speeding up the transition from military “engagement” to military “security cooperation” as the United States works with a number of partners in Asia in counterterrorism. In the current environment, it is unlikely that any dramatic steps will be taken regarding U.S. forward-stationed forces, though the U.S. government continues to examine force structure and footprint in Asia as elsewhere as part of the effort to “transform” the U.S. military and to respond to a range of contingencies. Fifth, the U.S. commitment to multilateralism has increased in the context of the GWOT. Much has been said and written about a retreat from multilateralism by the United States. But at least in terms of the war on global terror, multilateralism has been an important component of U.S. policy. The United States has worked with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole, in addition to member countries individually, on counterterrorism. With the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for example, Washington has launched workshops on financial counterterrorism measures for senior officials. Similarly the United States is working through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum on a number of initiatives, including aviation and maritime security and customs enforcement. Still, the utility of regional institutions to the GWOT will be mixed, and not the prime focus of U.S. policy. This is because most Asia-Pacific countries will focus on local dimensions of the problem, and there are disagreements as to what the problem is, and how it should be dealt with. For example, the October 20–21, 2001 APEC summit denounced terrorism strongly, but did not mention Osama bin Laden, endorse U.S. air strikes, or offer concrete proposals to take on terrorism. There were nonbinding commitments to increase vigilance and deny terrorists access to money and weapons. Hence, while still skeptical of multilateralism, the GWOT has led the Bush administration to try to pursue its counterterrorism efforts with the support of and through rather than against these multilateral mechanisms— without ceding the right to act unilaterally.

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The net effects of the events of 9/11 and the ensuing GWOT on the evolving U.S. approaches to Asia-Pacific security, as initially outlined by the Bush administration, have not been transforming. Rather, they have led to a recalibration of policies: some initiatives have not occurred (for example, redeployment of forces to East Asia), others sped up (for example, increasing security cooperation with regional countries); some pre-9/11 and GWOT trends (for example, stabilizing relations with China) have gone further than might have been expected.18 The National Security Strategy and U.S. Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific One year after the attacks of 9/11 and in the midst of the GWOT, the Bush administration released, on September 17, 2002, its National Security Strategy (NSS). Unlike the GWOT, the effects of the NSS on U.S. approaches to the security order in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult to discern. There is considerable debate about whether or not the NSS constitutes a grand strategy and just how novel a strategy it is.19 Others have complained that the Bush administration has “still very little clarity about the real direction of U.S. foreign policy and the war on terror.”20 In its soaring rhetoric and forthright statements (for instance, symbolic is the fact that the Bush document uses the phrase “The National Security Strategy” whereas the Clinton administration used “A National Security Strategy”), the Bush administration does indeed seem keen to assert, to borrow one of its favorite words, “transformation” in the way the United States will conduct its business abroad. But the specifics of the strategy as they apply to the Asia-Pacific region are consistent with the Bush administration’s initial approach to Asia-Pacific security as noted above. The NSS is even more consistent with the recalibrated approach to AsiaPacific security that has emerged during the past year of the GWOT. A brief review of the key concepts of the NSS will reinforce the argument that it represents a recalibration rather than transformation in U.S. policies and will therefore have no transformative impact on the U.S. approach to the security order in the Asia-Pacific. The idea that the United States should remain the strongest power in the world, with no possibility of a peer competitor or coalition, is consistent with a strain of U.S. foreign policy thinking and behavior. U.S. officials in the past have used different phrases to capture this idea. Former secretary of state Albright described America as the “indispensable na-

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tion” and former Clinton administration official Joseph Nye has written that the United States is “bound to lead.” The Bush administration describes the same impulse as a “distinctly American internationalism.” America is the world’s dominant power both by default and design. Default because the nearest rival power collapsed. Design because research and technology, budgetary, and other policy decisions have been taken to perpetuate American predominance. No administration will wish to reduce American power to fit a concept of traditional balance of power politics. The central issue must therefore be how Washington exercises preponderant power so as not to engender a “backlash.” And unlike past “backlash” dangers, which would come from a coalition of states opposed to the United States, now the backlash could also come from nonstate actors—terrorists. On the promotion of American values, the Bush administration advocates moving from “enlargement” to “integration.” The NSS transmittal letter begins with reference to “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” This is not intended as a projection or imposition of American values, but rather an assertion that failure on these fronts gives rise to terrorist threats. As the NSS states, “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.” Much of this emphasis is to be found in an earlier address by the State Department’s Richard Haass. In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association of New York, Haass introduced the doctrine of integration.21 Integration on first appearance seems more radical than the Clinton administration’s notion of enlargement. It is true that the Bush administration has never been especially fond of the notion of community, but one senses this is because of the word’s association with the previous administration.22 Integration, then, is an extension of enlargement, not a break from it, and consistent with an idealist and liberal strain in American foreign policy. The administration’s view that terrorism emanates from the lack of freedom has given a utilitarian thrust to a consistent element in America’s approach to the world. Moreover, the appeal to universal principles is partly intended to distinguish between terrorists and tyrants on the one hand, and most of the rest of the world on the other.

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To the Cold War concept of deterrence is added (not substituted for) the right of preemption. This concept has provoked enormous controversy. But, references to the right of preemption in the NSS must be read carefully. First, preemption is related specifically to the possible use of WMD against the United States23 or action against terrorists and rogue states.24 Preemption is not open-ended. In essence, the concept is aimed at two specific kinds of grave threats to the United States. Second, reference to preemption is preceded by a commitment to work with other countries first to address these problems (that is, WMD and terrorism). Third, the right of self-defense is given as justification for resorting to preemptive action. There remains, notwithstanding press reports, a continued focus on deterrence with an appreciation that deterrence against nonstate, suicidal, and geographically diffuse actors may not be effective and therefore preemption may be required. The administration advocates moving from “assertive multilateralism” to a combination of à la carte as well as accountable multilateralism. Prior to the release of the NSS, the world was perhaps most familiar with the comment of Haass about à la carte multilateralism. The inference drawn then, correctly, was that the administration would pick and choose, as if from a menu, which multilateral mechanisms and organizations with which it would cooperate. The NSS is more forthcoming toward multilateralism, but with important caveats. The administration in essence provides a rationale for an à la carte approach. That rationale is accountability—both of the institution and parties to it. Thus the NSS asserts that, “Alliances [again, unsurprisingly, primacy is given to bilateral alliances] and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization of American States (OAS), and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions.” The two substantive caveats are that “international obligations are to be taken seriously” and that “they are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.” With reference to multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific, the NSS, in a section entitled Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power, reiterates that alliances and friendships come first, and that “institutions such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum build on stability provided by these alliances.” In sum, “a mix of regional and bilateral strat-

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egies to manage change in this [Asia-Pacific] dynamic region” will continue to guide the administration. If key concepts in the NSS do not suggest any major change in U.S. security policies in the Asia-Pacific, what of ongoing developments, such as the acute tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the war in Iraq? Implications of Tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the War in Iraq These two ongoing developments have raised considerable but different concerns about the implications for the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. war in Iraq has generated large and intense anti-American public protests even in countries that are close allies of the United States, such as Australia and South Korea. Government responses from the region have been considerably more muted and mixed. Although the impact on AsiaPacific security of the war in Iraq will depend upon the duration, nature, and outcome of the military action, the situation there is not likely to be a “tipping point” in U.S. relations with the region. Events in Iraq, though there is the matter of coreligionist countries in the Asia-Pacific, are not likely to reset the strategic game in Asia as they might in the Middle East. This is the case for a number of reasons. First, Iraq, unlike Palestine, has not had a strong resonance for Asia-Pacific countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. Second, Iraq itself has never advertised its Islamic credentials except in the most utilitarian and cynical of ways, and Muslim-majority countries in Asia have themselves emphasized their moderate credentials. Hence, events in Iraq could mobilize radical Islamists in the Asia-Pacific, but they have been activated well before military action began in Iraq. Third, the geographic distance of Iraq and paucity of direct, major security impacts on the Asia-Pacific make it a less critical variable to shaping Asia-Pacific security. A worrisome issue, however, is that military action in Iraq could either undermine moderates’ support for the United States or require generally pro-American governments to calibrate their positions to respond to public opposition to the conflict. There is evidence this has occurred. However, the lingering impact of the war in Iraq in shaping U.S. security policies in the Asia-Pacific region is likely to be minimal. The North Korea situation poses a more serious challenge for U.S. security policies in the Asia-Pacific because of geographic proximity and the direct interests of key surrounding countries. Given the still un-

218 CHAPTER 12

folding acts of the latest drama on the Korean Peninsula, it is difficult to predict what the impact on regional security will be. Still, it should be noted that regional countries recognize that it is North Korea’s behavior, not America’s, that is the source of tensions. China and Russia, worried by the prospect of a nuclear North Korea or further tensions and possible conflict on the peninsula, show signs of wishing to support the United States to achieve a peaceful resolution. However, given their limited leverage, they rely on Washington to take the lead. Though South Korea has had misgivings about particular U.S. approaches toward North Korea, and continues to have different priorities and perceptions regarding North Korean intentions, it still regards the relationship with the United States as crucial and it is working closely with Washington. The overlap (though not uniformity) between American, Chinese, Russian, Japanese, and South Korean interests is substantial enough to expect that a negotiated accommodation, as in the 1994 crisis, can be reached. Only miscalculation and inflexibility on relatively minor matters, such as the mechanism for dialogue, stand in the way of positive outcomes. Conclusions: Recalibrations Not Transformations The effects of the GWOT, the limited nature of change outlined in the NSS, and the uncertain but likely manageable impact of ongoing tensions in Korea and the war in Iraq are not the only factors that argue against a transformative change in U.S. security policies in the AsiaPacific. Intra-administration debates are likely to constrain any radical departure in U.S. foreign and security policies. It must be acknowledged that there are some in the Bush administration (supported by others in American society) who welcome a sharp break in U.S. foreign and security policies and therefore interpret the key elements of the NSS as the basis for transformative change. To such persons, preemption, for example, would not be seen as an unusual, post-consultation-with-allies, last-resort-against-specific-targets type of action. It would instead be seen as a more acceptable and wieldable policy tool. À la carte or even accountable multilateralism might be seen as bothersome if not downright dangerous because it can complicate, delay, and even constrain U.S. freedom of action. These views exist, but the evidence of the past two years suggests that these views have not succeeded in gaining the upper hand across a range of issues that would transform U.S. policies in the Asia-Pacific.

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Even if the administration as a whole were to press for transformations in U.S policies, it would encounter the reality of term limits. At a maximum, the Bush administration has four more years to be in office. Even if decisions were made now to make fundamental changes to U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific, it is difficult to see how they could be made operational in the time the administration has left in office. This is especially the case for translating policy changes to military force structure. American public opinion too will exercise a number of constraints on radical departures in U.S foreign and security policies generally, but also in Asia. First, although the salience of terrorism understandably has risen, it is not a “preoccupation” of the American public. It does not, for example, have the resonance of such events as the Second World War, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War. For this reason there will be limits to what the American public will tolerate in terms of damage to U.S. prestige resulting from extreme actions in the conduct of counterterrorism. Second, the fact that a fairly high level of interest in international news has been sustained during the past year suggests that Americans will be broadly informed about attitudes toward the United States, and sensitive to them. Third, support for an internationally engaged United States is very high—as high as in the 1950s. There is little support for isolationism. Fourth, support for multilateral rather than unilateral approaches remains very high—as does support for nonmilitary (for example, treaties, institutions) approaches to counterterrorism. The bottom line is that American public opinion is a constraint on radical changes in U.S. security policies. Similarly, international opinion, particularly responsible comments from allies and friends, will also influence U.S. policies. Although it is true that the Bush administration took office speaking about the critical importance of “allies and friends,” it did not always act in ways that suggested the views and concerns of allies would be taken into account. However, international public opinion does have a constraining influence on U.S. policy, and will continue to do so. Perhaps the most important reason why radical change in U.S. security policies in the Asia-Pacific should not be expected is because the United States is generally satisfied with the Asia-Pacific security architecture. There are three critical, overlapping aspects of this architecture. A commitment to forward-based U.S. forces persists. The precise “footprint” in terms of number, structure, and location may well be open to adjustment, but as Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz told an audience in

220 CHAPTER 12

Singapore in June 2002, “Fears that the end of the Cold War might lead to an American retreat from Asia have been laid to rest.”25 Secretary Powell also reaffirmed that, “Asia’s stability depends on our forwarddeployed presence.”26 Second, the importance of U.S. relations with allies and friends has grown. Expectations in these partnerships will have to be carefully managed, and the effort to recalibrate these relationships to current and possible future threats will continue. Finally, American commitment to key multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN and APEC, will continue, though an emphasis on their contributions to the GWOT will become a prime criterion for judging their efficacy and utility. In sum, as the NSS states, the United States will “develop a mix of regional and bilateral strategies to manage change in this dynamic region.”

Notes Notes to Introduction 1. Sheldon W. Simon, “Introduction,” in idem, ed., The Many Faces of Asian Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 1. 2. The debate on international order holds a venerable place in international relations study. A key question arising from that debate is whether order exists even though the international system is structurally anarchic. Various analysts, predominantly Western and realist, typically characterize the Asia-Pacific (or, for that matter, Asia or East Asia) as increasingly unstable and conflict ridden due to growing interstate rivalry and excessive reliance on power balancing. In their view, the region is fundamentally more dangerous than Europe, and potentially constitutes, in one scholar’s words, a future “cockpit of great power conflict.” Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993–94), pp. 5– 33, quotation on p. 7. Also, see Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993–94), pp. 34–77; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” Survival 36, no. 2 (1994), pp. 3–21; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999), pp. 49–80; and Thomas J. Christensen, “Spirals, Security, and Stability in East Asia,” International Security 24, no. 4 (2000), pp. 195–200. More recently, a major study has argued that despite periodic crises and conflicts, Asia has been more stable and predictable in the last twenty years than some have claimed. For this and other reasons, the study concludes that a security order exists in Asia even if that order is primarily “instrumental” (i.e., oriented toward the realization of self-interested ends) with some “normative-contractual” (i.e., oriented toward the realization of both selfinterested and shared ends via cooperation) features. See, Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 3. See, for example, Nontraditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, eds. Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Ken Boutin (Singapore: Select Publishing for the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001); and Terry Terriff et al., Security Studies Today (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999). 4. See Seng Tan with Ralph A. Cossa, “Rescuing Realism From the Realists: A Theoretical Note on East Asian Security,” in The Many Faces of Asian Security, pp. 15–47. 5. For this study’s purposes, the Asia-Pacific is treated as a loose security region comprising several interrelated subregional clusters or security complexes, each 221

222 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

evincing possibly different pathways and approaches to order. In this respect, Northeast and Southeast Asia are two interconnected yet relatively distinct clusters or complexes that partly make up the wider Asia-Pacific region. 6. The main argument underlying this book had its earliest articulation in Amitav Acharya, “Competing and Congruent Approaches to Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Concept Paper,” which provided the conceptual basis for a conference in Singapore in December 2002 organized by the Singapore-based Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundations of Japan and the United States. This volume is the outcome of that conference’s proceedings. 7. John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 6. 8. See the following works by Amitav Acharya on ASEAN as a security community: “Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Security Community or Defense Community?” Pacific Affairs 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 159–78; “Regional Community in Southeast Asia?” Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 175–200 (also published as a chapter in Desmond Ball, ed., Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region [London: Frank Cass, 1995], pp. 175–200); and, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001). 9. The Straits Times (weekly overseas edition), March 9, 1991. Also, see See Seng Tan, “International Regimes: A Study of Regional Cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” M.A. thesis (University of Manitoba, May 1992), p. 15. 10. The argument here does not assume that cooperative security and multilateralism are therefore interchangeable. There are, to be sure, many variants of multilateral security cooperation. This point simply addresses the approach of cooperative security as that variant of multilateralism that is foremost among most security analysts and policy planners in the Asia-Pacific. 11. Admiral Blair was commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Command, from February 1999 to May 2002. A good source for Blair’s thinking is found in Dennis Blair and John Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 7–17. Also, see the short exposition on Blair’s statements on security communities in David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 202–4. 12. Cossa has made this point at various times at regular meetings of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). 13. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5–56. The editors have also had the benefit of numerous conversations with Johnston on this matter at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, where Johnston was the distinguished S. Rajaratnam Professor in Strategic Studies in 2003. 14. This paragraph borrows heavily from the discussion by Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan,” in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg with Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2002–03: Asian Aftershocks (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), pp. 95–130.

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15. David Ignatius and Thomas Crampton, “A Confident Koizumi Keeps His Sails Set,” International Herald Tribune, June 20, 2002. 16. Cited in Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan,” p. 111. 17. Aaron L. Friedberg, “United States,” in Strategic Asia 2002–03: Asian Aftershocks, pp. 17–48. 18. Owing to a lengthy production process in the making of this book, our contributors have not been able to account for some of the recent changes in national and regional affairs. 19. The following chapter synopses are partly drawn from a report on the proceedings of a conference held in Singapore in December 2002, at which the earliest incarnations of the chapters of this book were first presented. The editors are grateful to David Capie for his contribution to that report. 20. See, for example, François Heisbourg, “American Hegemony? Perceptions of the U.S. Abroad,” Survival 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 5–19; and Peter Van Ness, “Hegemony, Not Anarchy: Why China and Japan are Not Balancing U.S. Unipolar Power,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 1 (2002), pp. 131–50. 21. A notion partly inspired by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Two Cheers for Multilateralism,” Foreign Policy, no. 60 (Fall 1985), pp. 148–67. 22. David Martin Jones and Michael Smith, “The Perils of Hyper-Vigilance: The War on Terrorism and the Surveillance State in South-East Asia,” Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002), p. 36; and David Wright-Neville, “Prospects Dim: Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” in Fighting Terrorism on the Southeast Asian Front, Asia Program Special Report no. 112 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 2003), pp. 5–10. 23. See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia’s War on Terror,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004), pp. 91–105. See also the contributed volume After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, eds. Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (Singapore: World Scientific, 2003). 24. The six countries involved are the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. 25. Ralph A. Cossa, “Prospects for the Six-Party Talks,” PacNet Newsletter, no. 25, August 25, 2003. Available at: www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0336.htm. Accessed in November 2003. 26. Scott Snyder and Ah-Young Kim, “China-ROK-U.S. Relations and Regional Security in Northeast Asia,” Comparative Connections, July 2003 (Special Annual Issue). Available at: www.csis.org/pacfor/annual/2003annual.html. Accessed in November 2003. 27. Since the Cold War’s end, the United States “has demonstrated a growing willingness to act alone and to opt out of multilateral initiatives.” Stewart Patrick, “America’s Retreat from Multilateral Engagement,” Current History, vol. 99 (December 2000), p. 437. 28. Chong Guan Kwa and See Seng Tan, “The Keystone of World Order,” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 98. 29. Sheldon W. Simon, “Asia’s New Regionalism and U.S. Security Interests: Theater Security Cooperation,” prepared for the University of Illinois Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies Symposium on Asia’s New Regionalism, October 16–18, 2003, Urbana-Champaign, IL.

224 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

Notes to Chapter 1 1. The notion of “security with others” was first developed in the Palme Commission report. See Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme (London: Pan Books, 1982). 2. ASEAN was established in Bangkok in 1967. The original members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. The founding dinner of the ARF was held in Singapore in July 1993. Its initial participants were: Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Cambodia was admitted in 1995, India and Myanmar in 1996, Mongolia in 1998, and North Korea in 2000. 3. Martin Wight, Power Politics, reprinted (London: Leicester University Press, 1995), p. 122. 4. For a discussion of the establishment and early development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), see Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 5. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 21. 6. Ibid., pp. 22–26. 7. Khong Yuen Foong, “Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia-Pacific?” Pacific Review 10, no. 2 (1997), p. 297. 8. For a critical assessment of the concept of collective security and its application to the League of Nations, see Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 245–65. 9. Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52–53. 10. Ibid., p. 53. 11. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 175. 12. On the relevance of the concept of comprehensive security to the security doctrines of these three ASEAN states, see Muthiah Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries,” in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Han Sung-joo, eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), pp. 50–78. 13. Pierre Lizée and Sorpong Peou, Cooperative Security and the Emerging Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities of Peace in Cambodia, YCISS Occasional Paper no. 21 (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, November 1993), p. 2. 14. Stanley Hoffmann, “Thoughts on the Concept of Common Security,” in idem, Policies for Common Security (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p. 54. 15. Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. Quoted in Radmila Nakarada and Jan Oberg, “We Can Survive—But Only Together,” in R. Nakarada

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and J. Oberg, eds., Surviving Together: The Olof Palme Lectures on Common Security 1988 (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1989), p. 12. 16. Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, quoted in E. Rothschild, “Common Security and Deterrence,” in Policies for Common Security, pp. 92–93. 17. On the Vladivostok speech, see Leszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 60–63. 18. Amitav Acharya, Reordering Asia: “Cooperative Security” or Concert of Powers? IDSS Working Paper no. 3 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, July 1999), p. 8. 19. David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994), p. 7. 20. Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake,” Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999), p. 27. 21. Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism: Managing Regional Security,” in Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, eds., New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), p. 7. 22. Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” p. 7. 23. Pierre Lizée, “Sécurité et Intégration en Asie-Pacifique: Dynamiques et Implications Théoriques,” Etudes Internationales 28, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 346–47. 24. See Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). 25. See Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper no. 302 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 10–16. 26. Address at the opening of the summit of the ASEAN heads of state and government, Bali, Indonesia, February 23, 1976. Quoted in Estrella D. Solidum, Bilateral Summitry in ASEAN (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1982), p. 31. 27. See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia’s Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata, Australia-Asia Papers no. 75 (May 1996). 28. Suharto, “Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia,” in Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 8. 29. Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 98. 30. Tim Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1993), p. 4. 31. Suharto, “Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia,” p. 8. 32. U.S. President Bill Clinton quoted in J. Friedland, S.J. Hoon, and S. Awanohara, “Clinton’s Clarion Call,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 22, 1993, p. 10. 33. Leon Fuerth, “Alliances for Next Generation,” Washington Post, August 23, 2002. 34. Acharya, “ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Multilateralism,” pp. 183–84. 35. Trevor Findlay, “Disarmament, Arms Control and the Regional Security Dialogue,” in Gary Klintworth, ed., Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities? (New York: Longman, 1996), pp. 238–39.

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36. S. Jayakumar, Opening Statement at the Thirty-first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, July 24, 1998. 37. See Narayanan Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post–Cold War ASEAN, Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 1–81. 38. See Hans Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984); and Harald David, Tensions within ASEAN: Malaysia and its Neighbours (Hull: Monographs on Southeast Asian Politics and International Relations, 1996). 39. James Clad, “Regionalism in Southeast Asia: A Bridge too Far?” Southeast Asian Affairs 1997 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p. 6.

Notes to Chapter 2 1. Possible regional responses are weighed by Muthiah Alagappa, “The Study of International Order: An Analytical Framework,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 33–69. 2. The prominent neorealist John Mearsheimer is an advocate of this position. See his The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (London: W.W. Norton, 2001), especially pp. 401–2. 3. George Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, “Getting Realism,” The National Interest, no. 69 (Fall 2002) at www.nationalinterest.org/gilboyheginbotham.html. Accessed in October 2002. Prior to George W. Bush’s election to the American presidency, Condoleezza Rice, his campaign adviser for foreign policy and his subsequent national security advisor, argued in a definitive article published in the journal Foreign Affairs that “China’s success in controlling the balance of power [in Asia] depends in large part on America’s reaction to the challenge.” See her “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000), p. 56. 4. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: USGPO, September 30, 2001), p. 4. The report is available on the Internet at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. Accessed in October 2002. 5. For an American version of this view, see Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). A regional development of this vantage point is Amitav Acharya’s Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001). 6. William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 7. This premise is developed in depth in G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 8. The term was initially coined by John Welfield in “Some Diplomatic and Strategic Aspects of Japan’s Present and Future Foreign Policies” (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australian National University, May 1981). An extensive treatment of the subject is by William Tow, Encountering the Dominant Player (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). 9. The neorealist version of this argument was developed by Kenneth Waltz,

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“The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44–79, and by Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5–51. 10. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1998) at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/ easr98.html. Accessed in February 2003. 11. Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Chief, U.S. Pacific Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 5, 2002 at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/blair13.html. Accessed in February 2003. 12. Ted Hopf, “Post Cold War Allies: The Illusion of Unipolarity,” in Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney, eds., U.S. Allies in a Changing World (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 28–46. 13. William Tow, “Alliances and Coalitions,” in Marianne Hanson and William T. Tow, eds., International Relations in the New Century: An Australian Perspective (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 21. 14. James A. Baker, III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 4–5. Cooperative vigilance was spelled out by Carl Ford, President Bush Sr.’s deputy secretary of defense for international security affairs, “Cooperative Vigilance: Essential to Asian Security,” address before the National Defense University’s Pacific Symposium, March 2, 1991. 15. A comprehensive assessment is provided by Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations, pp. 168–202. 16. Among the more significant of these critiques focusing on alleged Western (and especially American) intrusiveness into regional cultures are Kishore Mahbubani, “The Pacific Impulse,” Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 105–20, and Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 189–94. 17. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. 18. Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 11. 19. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in Light of Historical Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969). 20. Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism: The Nakayama Proposal,” Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000), pp. 367–97. 21. Gareth Evans, “What Asia Needs Is a Europe-Style CSCE,” International Herald Tribune, July 27, 1990; Department of External Affairs and Trade, Canada, “Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Colloquium on North Pacific Co-operative Dialogue in Victoria, British Columbia,” April 6, 1991 (text in author’s hands). 22. Examples include Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia; Muthiah Alagappa, “Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanation,” in idem, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Institutional Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 611–76; and See Seng Tan

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with Ralph A. Cossa, “Rescuing Realism from the Realists: A Theoretical Note on East Asian Security,” in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., The Many Faces of Asian Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 15–47. 23. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 21. 24. Blair and Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs,” pp. 15–16. 25. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 18. 26. Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” p. 49. 27. Ibid., p. 62. 28. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership” (Ft. McNair, VA: INSS, October 2001). 29. Ralph Cossa, “U.S. Asia Policy: Does an Alliance-Based Policy Still Make Sense?” Issues & Insights, no. 3–01 (September 2001). Available at: www.csis.org/ pacfor/issues_usasia_report.pdf. Accessed in November 2002. 30. The document, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, is located at www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.html. Accessed in October 2002. 31. See a Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) document (released on January 28, 2003) postulating North Koreans’ perceptions of the U.S. preemption strategy at http://nautilus.org/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/KANPC-3critical2.txt. Accessed in February 2003. 32. For a statement on Thai-U.S. bilateral security ties following Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s discussions with President Bush in December 2001, see Office of the Press Secretary, White House, “Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Thailand,” December 14, 2001 and appearing at: www.or.th/frame-ea-sec.html. Accessed in November 2002. On U.S.-Philippines security relations, see the press briefing by U.S. deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz in Manila, June 3, 2002 at: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/ wolfmanila.htm. Accessed in February 2002. 33. See Robert Blackwill, “An Action Agenda to Strengthen America’s Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Robert Blackwell and Paul Dibb, eds., America’s Asian Alliances (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 111–34, and Paul Dibb’s rejoinder in the same book on p. 135. 34. “Transcript: Powell, Rumsfeld Press Conference in Canberra,” July 31, 2001 at: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/ausmin.html. Accessed in February 2003. 35. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Also see Ron Huisken, “America’s New Military Roadmap for Asia and Australia,” AsiaPacific Defense Reporter 28, no. 4 (May 2002), pp. 40–42. 36. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations, p. 222; and Brian Job, “Bilateral and Multilateral Security Options,” in William Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshino, eds., Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era (Tokyo/Nathan: Japan Institute of International Affairs/Center for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1997), pp. 162, 168. 37. See, for example, William Pfaff, “A Radical Rethink of International Relations; National Security Strategy,” International Herald Tribune, October 3, 2002. 38. The National Security Strategy, pp. 5–6. 39. Ibid., p. 26. 40. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, pp. 5–6.

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41. “Transcript: Powell, Rumsfeld Press Conference in Canberra.” 42. Amitav Acharya, “Featured Review of Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era,” Australian Journal of Political Science 34, no. 1 (March 1999), pp. 99–100. 43. Ken Jimbo, “Emerging Feature of Bilateral-Multilateral Nexus on AsiaPacific Security: Search for a Strategic Convergence of Major Powers,” paper presented at JIIA-APCSS meeting, December 2001, Honolulu, Hawaii. 44. Background on China’s NSC initiative is offered by David Finkelstein and Michael McDevitt, “Competition and Consensus: China’s ‘New Concept of Security’ and the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” PacNet, no. 01, January 8, 1999. At: www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/Finkelstein010999.html. 45. Analysis of Chinese media commentary over several decades had led two researchers based in the West to argue that such factors constitute the basis for China to “tolerate” the continuation of U.S. alliance politics in Asia. See Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, “Against Us or with Us? The Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea,” Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, May 1998. At: http://aparc.stanford.edu.docs/WangWu.pdf. Accessed in November 2002. 46. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Is East Asia Integrating?” Washington Quarterly 24, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), pp. 27–28. 47. Proponents of the Concert of Asia concept include Amitav Acharya, “A Concert of Asia?” Survival 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 84–101, and Douglas T. Stuart, “Toward a Concert of Asia,” Asian Survey 37, no. 3 (March 1997), pp. 229–44. Nicholas Khoo and Michael L. Smith offer an extensive critique of this approach in “The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific: A Concert of Asia or a Clear Pecking Order?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (April 2002), pp. 65–81. 48. Gilboy and Heginbotham, “Getting Realism.”

Notes to Chapter 3 1. G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 1 (2002), p. 83. 2. Other multilateral processes also emerged, for example, CSCAP and ASEAN+3. A good overview can be found in Akiko Fukushima, “Multilateralism and Security Cooperation in China,” in An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002), p. 146. This is one of eight papers looking into the question of how the U.S.-Japan alliance could play a constructive role in relations with China. 3. The subcontinent is perhaps the most significant exception to this generalization. Indian and Pakistani forces clash frequently in Kashmir, and the two countries came close to a fourth war in 2002. In addition, although India, in my view, is clearly part of the East Asia security system, Pakistan’s qualifications as a player in this system are more debatable. 4. Ron Huisken, “Asia-Pacific Security: Taking Charge, Collectively,” Working Paper no. 368 (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, May 2002). 5. In the so-called Sydney statement of July 1996, Australia and the United

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States attempted explicitly to recast the objectives of their alliance to address the distinctive challenges of the post–Cold War era. The simple message of the statement was that the alliance was not dependent upon a defined threat. It declared that the parties had common interests and aspirations in the Asia-Pacific and that they intended to work together and with other states of the region to advance them. In the event, this collegiate message was overwhelmed by the fact that the alliance was being projected into the indefinite future. 6. See Glenn Herald Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 43–44. 7. For an interesting analysis that supports this view, see Chin Kin Wah and Pang Eng Fong, Relating the U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan Alliances to Emerging Asia-Pacific Multilateral Processes: An ASEAN Perspective (Stanford, CA: Asia/ Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, March 2000). 8. Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, Against Us or With Us? The Chinese Perspective of America’s Alliance with Japan and Korea (Stanford, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, May 1998), pp. 34–35. The Asia/Pacific Research Center in the Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, has generated a substantial body of excellent studies on the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea. They can be found at www.aparc.stanford.edu/. 9. Wang and Wu, Against Us or With Us? p. 36. 10. Broadly similar considerations applied to Germany, but circumstances in Europe permitted a quite different approach. 11. See, for example, Yu Bin, Containment by Stealth: Chinese Views of and Policies toward America’s Alliances with Japan and Korea after the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, September 1999), p. 14. 12. Ibid., p. 19. 13. The Australian foreign minister, Alexander Downer, may have floated this idea during his visit to Japan in May 2002. Downer reportedly intended to use this visit to encourage Japan toward a more prominent security role in the region. See Craig Skehan, “Downer to Tell Japan: Get Stronger and Lead More,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 17, 2002. 14. At a press conference with the visiting Japanese prime minister on May 1, 2002, Australian prime minister John Howard clearly indicated that the dialogue would be at the senior official level. When the idea first surfaced, the option of a ministerial forum was left open. 15. Greg Sheridan, “Pacific Powers Tackle Security,” The Australian, August 28, 2002. 16. Robert D. Blackwill, “An Action Agenda to Strengthen America’s Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., America’s Asian Alliances (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 111–34; Zalmay Khalilizad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, May 15, 2001); The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Relationship (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, October 11, 2000). 17. Yu, Containment by Stealth, pp. 26–27. 18. Benjamin L. Self, “An Alliance for Engagement: Rationale and Modality,” in An Alliance for Engagement, p. 146.

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19. For a thoughtful inquiry into the considerations shaping multilateralism in East Asia, including views on the ARF broadly sympathetic to those expressed here, see Koro Bessho, Identities and Security in East Asia, Adelphi Paper no. 325 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1999). 20. Renewed interest in expanding participation in the ASEAN summit may also stem from the perception that the Asia-Pacific needs a leaders’ forum, and that APEC does not adequately meet this need. See, for example, Mark Baker, “Howard Tests Asian Waters in Push for Seat at Summit,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 31, 2002. 21. For a Chinese commentary on this issue, see Wu Xinbo, Integration on the Basis of Strength: China’s Impact on East Asian Security (Stanford, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, February 1998), pp.10–12. Similar reservations have been expressed about the ARF tackling this issue. See Douglas Paal, Nestling the Alliances in the Emerging Context of Asia-Pacific Multilateral Processes: A U.S. Perspective (Stanford, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, July 1999), p. 8. 22. For a succinct, and sympathetic, discussion see, Chu Shulong, China and the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, June 1999). 23. Yu Xintian, “East Asian Development Trends and China’s East Asia Strategy,” in Contemporary World Configuration (Shanghai: Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 2002), pp. 7–18. 24. Chen Dongxiao, “New Approaches to Old Puzzle: Constructionist Challenge to the Debate on East Asian Security in the Twenty-first Century,” in Contemporary World Configuration, p. 247.

Notes to Chapter 4 1. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), and also his “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Mao’s China,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), and “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5–56. Another analytical issue regarding Johnston’s approach (particularly as spelled out in the first two writings) is whether it is appropriate to generalize about systemlevel Chinese policy behavior by reading a few works that are narrowly focused on unit-level military strategies and tactics. This, however, may require a separate and in-depth examination. 2. For a summary of the revisionist position, see Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” pp. 5–6, 7–8. In the same article, Johnston argues that China is a status quo power. 3. See Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), ch. 8. 4. For a detailed discussion of the Maoist conception of identity and security and how it is different from Deng’s, see Nan Li, From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military’s Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era, Peaceworks no. 39 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001).

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5. Deng Xiaoping, “Peace and Development Are the Two Major Issues in the Contemporary World” (March 4, 1985), in Academy of Military Science and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Archives Research Office, eds., Deng Xiaoping lun guofang he jundui jianshe (Deng Xiaoping on national defense and army construction) (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1992; circulation within the military only), pp. 137–40. 6. Deng Xiaoping, “The Army Should Be Subordinate to the Overall Situation of the Entire National Construction” (December 1, 1984), and idem, “Speech at the Expanded Conference of the Central Military Commission” (June 4, 1985), both in Deng Xiaoping lun guofang, pp. 134–36, 144–47. 7. Deng Xiaoping, “Maintain World Peace, Handle Well Domestic Construction” (May 29, 1984), and idem, “Speech at the Expanded Conference,” in Deng Xiaoping lun guofang, pp. 121, 146. 8. This translation is from A Chinese-English Dictionary (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1981), p. 668. 9. See Army Construction Research Institute of the National Defense University, Jiang Zemin guofang he jundui jianshe sixiang xuexi duben (Reader for studying Jiang Zemin’s thought on national defense and army construction) (Beijing: CCP History Press, 2002), pp. 25–30. 10. Ibid., p. 32. 11. Ibid., pp. 51–52. 12. Ibid., pp. 34–37, 50, 53. 13. A Chinese source claimed that the new security concept was officially introduced in Jiang’s speech to the Russian Duma on April 23, 1997. See Ibid., p. 43. 14. Ibid., pp. 43–45. 15. Ibid., pp. 45–50. 16. For an account of how the Maoist radicals exploited the issue of purchases of foreign technologies to undermine Zhou and Deng, see Su Chaiqing, “Struggle Surrounding the Issue of Feng Qing Lun,” in Zhang Hua et al., Huishuo “wenge” (Recollect the “Cultural Revolution”) (Beijing: CCP History Press, 2000), pp. 1125–46. 17. Nan Li, “China’s Foreign Policy Agenda and the PLA’s New Mission,” IDSS Commentaries, August 2002. Available at: www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/Perspectives/ research_050213.htm. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 19. For a detailed discussion of ASEAN’s lack of supranational jurisdiction (chao guojia quanli), see Chen Hanxi, “‘ASEAN Way’ and ASEAN Regional Integration,” Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific studies), no. 12 (2002), pp. 49– 51. See also Tang Yuhua, “ASEAN’s ‘Informal’ Mechanism,” Contemporary AsiaPacific Studies, no. 4 (2003), pp. 55–57. Chen is a doctoral candidate at the International Studies Institute of Qinghua University in Beijing, and Tang is an associate professor at Ji’nan University in Guangzhou. Dangdai yatai is a monthly journal published by the Asia-Pacific Studies Institute (APSI) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). 20. For a detailed discussion of China’s need for a secure external environment for economic development, see Zhang Yunlin, “How to Understand the External Environment China Faces in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, no. 6 (2003), pp. 3–4, 7–13; and Hou Songling and Chi

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Diantang, “South East Asia and Central Asia: China’s Geostrategic Options in the New Century,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, no. 4 (2003), pp. 10, 12. Zhang is director of the APSI. Hou is an associate professor at the South East Asia Studies Institute of Ji’nan University in Guangzhou, and Chi is a graduate student of that institute. 21. Some Chinese analysts, for instance, believe that the U.S. has attempted to exploit the Spratlys issue to divide China and ASEAN, so that it can increase its military presence in the region to contain China. See Qiu Danyang, “The U.S. Factor in the Dispute over Nansha between China and the Philippines,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, no. 5 (2002), pp. 44–48. On the need for a moderate strategy to deny an excuse for a counter-China coalition, see Tang Shiping, “China’s Rise and Regional Security,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, no. 3 (2003), p. 15. Some Chinese analysts argue that China enjoys some relative advantages that could make such a strategy successful. They suggest, for instance, that Southeast Asian countries use the United States to balance the influence of other major powers as well, not just China. Their main objective, however, is to acquire U.S. investment capital and technology for economic development, but not to see U.S. dominance in the region, or to join a U.S. counter-China coalition and get involved in a U.S.-China conflict. See Hou and Chi, “South East Asia and Central Asia,” p. 12. Other analysts argue that even though ASEAN hopes to use the United States to constrain the rise of China, it also wants to use China to balance the power and influence of the United States, thus offering more space for ASEANChina cooperation. See Han Feng and Zhang Jie, “The Implications of Counterterrorism Cooperation between the US and South East Asia,” Contemporary AsiaPacific Studies, no. 3 (2003), p. 30. Qiu is an associate professor in the Social Science Department of Ji’nan University in Guangzhou. Both Tang and Han are at the Regional Security Studies Center of CASS. Zhang received a doctoral degree from the APSI. 22. Regarding the strength and limits of the code and the treaty, see Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN, China and the South China Sea: An Opportunity Missed,” IDSS Commentaries, November 2002; and Alan Boyd, “South China Sea: Pact Won’t Calm Waters,” Asia Times, July 2, 2003. Available at: http://taiwansecurity.org/News/ 2003/AT-070203.htm. 23. Zhang, however, did not deem the two scenarios highly likely because, according to him, (a) China would resort to diplomacy to prevent escalation in the first scenario, and (b) China has been improving relations with ASEAN, thus denying the excuse for an outside power to intervene. But he did write that “under extreme circumstances,” force might be used. See Zhang, “How to Understand the External Environment,” p. 8. Also, factors such as a possible misperception and misinterpretation of intentions, a possible breakdown of civil-military coordination, and the PLA’s new doctrinal emphasis on offensive use of force following the collapse of deterrence and diplomacy may make it difficult to argue that a military conflict is completely impossible. 24. See “China’s Wen Calls for ‘New Security Concept’ for Asia at Boao Forum,” Agence France-Presse, November 2, 2003. Available at: http:// taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2003/AFP-021103.htm. 25. See Luz Baguloro, “Manila Considers Spratlys Protest,” Straits Times (Singapore), November 8, 2003.

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Notes to Chapter 5 1. Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the ‘Security Agreement’ With Australia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997), pp. 232–33. 2. For a comprehensive discussion of U.S. early policy on this issue, see Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945–1949 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981). 3. Jon M. Reinhardt, Foreign Policy and National Integration: The Case of Indonesia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1971), p. 32. 4. For a comprehensive and detailed discussion on the importance of the revolutionary struggle for national independence in shaping the anticolonialism in Indonesia, see Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983). 5. Michael Leifer, “Indonesia’s Regional Vision,” World Today 30, no. 10 (1974), p. 418. 6. Ibid. 7. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 25, 1971, quoted in Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, pp. 148–49. 8. Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 68. 9. Quoted in Justus M. Van der Kroef, “Indonesia: Strategic Perceptions and Foreign Policy,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 2, no. 3 (January/February 1975), p. 165. 10. Indonesia Times, October 21, 1974. 11. Van der Kroef, “Indonesia,” p. 169. 12. Kompas, April 24, 1975. 13. Quoted in Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 199. Emphasis added. 14. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945–1965 (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), pp. 183–84. 15. Kompas, May 23, 1996. 16. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 496–97. 17. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, “The World of ASEAN Decision-Makers: A Study of Bureaucratic Elite Perceptions in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 8, no. 3 (December 1986), p. 204. 18. Ten Years of ASEAN (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, April 1978). 19. Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN, Pacific Strategic Papers no. 10 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 22. 20. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia: National vs. Regional Resilience? An Indonesian Perspective,” in Derek da Cunha, ed., Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 83. 21. Ibid., p. 91. 22. Ibid. 23. Michael Leifer, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: The Primacy of Political Economy,” unpublished manuscript (1994).

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24. See Hana Afiya Satriyo, “Indonesia and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Managing A New Regional Order,” M.A. thesis (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1996). 25. Ibid., p. 29. 26. See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “A Southeast Asian Perspective,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 2 (July 2001), pp. 213–23. 27. Ibid., p. 215. 28. Admiral Bijah Subijanto, “Partisipasi Indonesia Pada Operasi Pemeliharaan Perdamaian PBB: Suatu Perspektif Pertahanan” (Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions: A defense perspective), paper presented at National Workshop on Indonesia’s Participation in UN PKO, Bogor, May 31–June 1, 2001. See also Bantarto Bandoro, “Operasi Pemeliharaan Perdamaian PBB dan Kepentingan Indonesia” (UN peacekeeping operations and Indonesia’s interests), Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional 2, no. 8 (June 2001), p. 58. 29. Rear Admiral Robert Mangindaan, “Kepentingan Indonesia Di Dalam Operasi Pemeliharaan Perdamaian” (Importance of Indonesia in peacekeeping operations), paper presented at National Workshop on Indonesia’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Bandung, August 8–10, 2000, pp. 11–12. 30. Ibid., p. 12. 31. Subijanto, “Partisipasi Indonesia,” p. 6. 32. Ibid., p. 8. See also, Mangindaan, “Kepentingan Indonesia,” p. 7. 33. Subijanto, “Partisipasi Indonesia,” p. 13. 34. Terms of reference, Indonesian Foreign Ministry, no date. 35. Bandoro, “Operasi Pemeliharaan Perdamaian,” p. 65. 36. State address by H.E. the President of the Republic of Indonesia Megawati Sukarnoputri Before the House of People’s Representatives on the Occasion of the Fifty-sixth Independence Day, August 16, 2001. Official translation by Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry available at: www.deplu.go.id/policy/statements/president/pidato. 37. Kompas, December 1, 1999. 38. Ibid., October 26, 1999. 39. Speech by President of the Republic of Indonesia at the Annual Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly, November 1, 2001. 40. “Megawati Urges End to U.S. Strikes.” Available at: www.cnn.com/2001/ WORLD/asiapf/southeast/11/01/megawati.address. Accessed on February 24, 2002. 41. Richard C. Paddock, “Indonesian President Urges Halt to U.S. Bombing of Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, November 2, 2001. Available at: www.tech.mit.edu/ v121/N56/Indonesia_Prez.56w.html. 42. “Indonesia Wants U.N. to Lead Fight Against Terrorism,” IslamOnline.net, October 19, 2001. Available at: www.islam-online.net/English/News/2001–10/20/ article6.shtml. 43. “Bush Sells War Versus Terror to APEC,” Manila Times, October 21, 2001. Available at: www.manilatimes.net. 44. Statement by H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda at the Fifty-seventh Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 18, 2002. Available at: www.dfadeplu.go.id/world. 45. Kompas, May 7, 2002. 46. Jakarta Post, July 30, 2002. 47. See Press Release of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 21, 2002. Available at: www.dfa-deplu.go.id/release/2002/pr-019–220302.htm.

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Notes to Chapter 6 1. The term “cooperative security” has both aspects as an organizing principle for building security order and as a policy instrument to realize it. According to David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994), p. 7, the basic elements of cooperative security as an organizing principle are reassurance rather than deterrence; inclusive rather than exclusive; multilateral rather than bilateral. Cooperative security as a policy instrument includes confidence-building measures, defense exchanges, and security dialogues to cultivate and maintain the cooperative relations among states. Cooperative security tends to favor nonmilitary means, but it does not necessarily exclude enforcement by force. 2. The power structure is a mere distribution of power among the principal states in the region. The security order means a pattern of international activity that sustains regional peace and security. 3. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 186–226. 4. The United States is the largest spender, its $322 billion in 2001 being five times that of second-ranked Russia, with $64 billion. China, at $46 billion, is the third largest, followed by Japan at fourth with $40 billion. South Korea ($11 billion) and Taiwan ($10 billion) are fifth and sixth in the Asia-Pacific region, respectively. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002/2003 (London: IISS, 2003), pp. 332–35. 5. According to J. David Singer, the horizontal dimension reflects the strength and variety of ways that the states are linked together, and the vertical dimension reflects the hierarchy, ranking, and status ordering. J. David Singer, “System Structure, Decision Processes, and Incidence of International War,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 3–6. 6. G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama argue that the current order in the Asia-Pacific is a partial hegemonic order, whereas Peter Van Ness ignores the partiality of U.S. hegemony. The former emphasize the point that both China and Japan fail to balance U.S. power, but their views vary on the question of whether China exists outside or inside this order. See G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Co-Operation in the Asia-Pacific,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 1 (2002), pp. 69–94; Peter Van Ness, “Hegemony, Not Anarchy: Why China and Japan Are Not Balancing U.S. Unipolar Power,” International Relations of the AsiaPacific 2, no. 1 (2002), pp. 131–50. 7. Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper no. 302 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 57. 8. Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth refer to security dilemmas arising as unintended consequences of policy as “system-induced” security dilemmas, and distinguish them from “state-induced” security dilemmas, which occur from evil state design. However, the “state-induced” security dilemma is not an accurate extension of the original concept, because the term “dilemma” should be “a choice between

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two unpleasant alternatives.” If a state seeks greater power at the expense of others’ insecurity, it is neither inappropriate policy nor a dilemma for the target state to try to protect its security. See Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth, “The Security Dilemma” in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger, eds., Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Alan Collins, The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 9. Andrew Butfoy, Common Security and Strategic Reform: A Critical Analysis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 119. 10. Paul Dibb, “The Emerging Strategic Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Denny Roy, ed., The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 117. 11. On collective defense and collective security, see Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 73–94. On cooperative security, see Sugio Takahashi, Redefinition of Cooperative Security and “Regional” Security in the Asia-Pacific, NIDS Security Reports, no.1 (March 2000), pp. 101–15. 12. Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of Power and Community,” p. 86. 13. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the Twenty-first Century, April 17, 1996. See Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2002 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2002), p. 348. 14. Special Committee on Security Treaty, Lower House, February 26, 1960. Available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_logout.cgi? SESSION=7044. 15. Akio Watanabe, “Japan’s Postwar Constitution and Its Implications for Defence Policy: A Fresh Interpretation,” in Ron Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama, eds., Japan’s Military Renaissance? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 45–46. 16. Patrick M. Cronin, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance Redefined,” Strategic Forum, no. 75 (May 1996), p. 3. 17. U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, New York, September 23, 1997. 18. Ibid. 19. Jervis suggests that the security regime is a “form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interests,” and has a longer life expectancy than the alliance under the balance of power. Robert Jervis, “Security Regime,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 173. 20. Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 39–44. 21. Available at: www.nikkei-r.co.jp. 22. Available at: www12.mainichi.co.jp/mews/search-news/838915/90a298 92b28db8–0–18.html. 23. U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Completion of the Review of the Guidelines. 24. Available at: http://zu15.gif/www8.cao.go.jp. 25. Available at: www.tv-asahi.co.jp/broadcast/n-station/research/011014/ roe.html.

238 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 6 AND 7

26. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2002, p. 224. 27. The “five participation principles” are: (1) agreement on a cease-fire, (2) consent of the parties under conflict, (3) impartiality, (4) withdrawal from the operation when the above requirements cease to be satisfied, and (5) minimum, necessary use of weapons. 28. The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, October 2001, Article 4. 29. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 182–83. 30. Council of Defense-Strategic Studies, Report on Defense and Strategic Studies 1999–2000 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, May 2001), p.14. 31. Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap2–1–a.html. 32. Advisory Group on Defense Issues, The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the Twenty-first Century (Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1994), pp. 2–3. 33. The government already established a similar constitutional study panel within the cabinet in 1957. However, lawmakers were wary of discussing amendments in the legislature because such moves could lead to a revision of Article 9. 34. Yomiuri shimbun, November 3, 2002. 35. United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines: Fears of a ‘Provoked’ China, a ‘Remilitarized’ Japan,” October 6, 1997. 36. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 62. 37. Nihon keizai shimbun, December 14, 2001. 38. Participants are Japan, the United States, Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2002, pp. 250–51. 39. Robert A. Manning and James J. Przystups, “Asia’s Transition Diplomacy: Hedging Against Futureshock,” Survival 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 62. 40. This is because sensitivity to relative power will decrease as the number of actors becomes greater than two. Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 274–78; Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42 (1988), pp. 485–507.

Notes to Chapter 7 The author is indebted to Hyun Myoung Jae, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, for her assistance. 1. This does not include the ten new member states that were admitted to the European Union on May 1, 2004. 2. However, this still remains as a barrier in Japan-DPRK relations, especially in regards to the repatriation of the family members of the five abductees, who still remain in North Korea. 3. Andrew Ward, “N. Korea Aims for ‘Leaping’ Economic Progress,” Financial Times, March 26, 2004. Available at: http://news.ft.com/home.

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4. For instance, the SAR project faced difficulties from its very start. Soon after Chinese-born tycoon Yang Bin was appointed by North Korea to run the SAR, China accused him of tax evasion and placed him under house arrest. Although the Chinese government initially expressed its support for the North in transforming Shinuiju into a special trade zone, the arrest of its first governor apparently dampened enthusiasm and prospects for the project. 5. Portions of the Hyundai money came in the form of a loan from a state-run bank, which has not been repaid. The opposition Grand National Party charged that the money was a payment to North Korea in return for the 2000 summit, but Hyundai insisted it was to develop its business interests in the North. 6. The five principles of peace and prosperity are: (1) priority on building trust; (2) a policy based on public consensus; (3) a comprehensive security embodying military and economic security; (4) economic cooperation as a long-term investment; (5) international cooperation led by the parties concerned, that is, North and South Korea. 7. “NK Close to Developing Nuke Uranium.” Available at: http:// english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200303/200303130011.html. 8. When North Korea’s declaration in 1993 of its withdrawal from the NPT caused the North Korean nuclear problem to receive international attention, the South Korean government adopted the notion of “U.S.–South Korean mutual assistance” as the main principle for dealing with the issue. It excluded itself from the issue by relying on the U.S. negotiations with North Korea and giving up its right to intervene. 9. On Roh’s statement, see L.R. Parry and R. Thomson, “Don’t Go Too Far South Korea Leader Tells Bush,” The Times, March 5, 2003. 10. In February 2004, Richard Allen, a former national security adviser to President Ronald Reagan, said, “We must make clear to the South that while we will honor the terms of our mutual defense treaty, which means we will respond to any aggression by the North, we will not stay where we are not wanted.” Available at: www.news.com.au/common/story_page. 11. Available at: www.mofat.go.kr/en. 12. Ralph A. Cossa, “North Korea’s Coming Out Party Continues,” Korea Times, July 24, 2000. Available at: www.hk.co.kr/kt_op/200007/. 13. Mahesh Uniyal, “Southeast Asia: Regional Meeting Thaws North Korea’s Isolation,” World News, July 27, 2000. Available at: www.oneworld.org/ips2/. 14. The task of the EAVG (“track-two”), consisting of twenty-six members— two experts from each member state of ASEAN plus Korea, Japan, and China—was to raise issues and conceive a vision for greater cooperation among the nations of East Asia. EAVG’s recommendations serve as guidelines for the EASG (“trackone”) to consider concrete measures for implementing further regional cooperation. Both the EAVG and EASG, created in 1999 and 2000 respectively, were initiatives of President Kim Dae-Jung. 15. Han Sung-Joo, “Coping in North Korea: A Multilateral Plan is Urgently Needed,” International Herald Tribune, March 14, 2003. Available at: www.iht.com/ ihtserach.php?id=89692&owner. 16. Parts of this section are drawn from the author’s previous publications. 17. “A Generation at Risk in the DPRK,” Choong Ang Ilbo (English edition), May 8, 2002. 18. James Brooke, “North Korea Defectors Jump into the Debate,” International Herald Tribune, January 9, 2003.

240 NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

Notes to Chapter 8 1. There is, of course, the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA). However, as the name implies, the FPDA is not a defense pact, but a loose arrangement to consult in the event of an attack against any of the five members. The FPDA was also intended to be a transitional arrangement. Chin Kin Wah, The Defense of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System, 1957–71 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 182. 2. Keynote address to the Global Community Forum, Malaysia 1984, Kuala Lumpur, December 3, 1984. 3. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Keynote address, First ISIS National Conference on Security, ISIS Focus, no. 17 (August 1986), pp. 16–17. 4. Lim Kian Tick, “Competing Regionalism: APEC and EAEG, 1989–1990,” in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, eds., Nontraditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Security Studies, 2001), p. 58. 5. Alasdair Bowie, “The Dynamics of Business-Government Relations in Industralising Malaysia,” in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 168–69. 6. William Case, “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 71. 7. Ibid., p. 74. 8. Lim, “Competing Regionalism,” p. 59. 9. The publication date for this document is uncertain since no date of publication has been provided. 10. Malaysian Defense: Toward Defense Self-Reliance (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Defense, Malaysia, no date), pp. 14–15. 11. Lim, “Competing Regionalism,” p. 74. 12. Malaysian Defense, p. 18. 13. The definition of regime here is borrowed from Alagappa, who defines it as the “principles, institutions, and procedures that constitute the political system.” Muthiah Alagappa, “The Anatomy of Legitimacy,” in Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, p. 27. 14. Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 28. 15. Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Macmillan Education, 1982), p. 248. 16. Ibid., p. 256. 17. Lim, “Competing Regionalism,” p. 58. 18. Najib Tun Abdul Razak, minister of defense, “Malaysia’s Security and Defense Policy for the Next Decade,” speech delivered at the Armed Forces Defense College, September 27, 2002. 19. Ibid. 20. Yuen Foong Khong and Helen E.S. Nesadurai, “Hanging Together, Institutional Design, and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The ASEAN Experience,” paper prepared for the Workshop on Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutional Design in Comparative Perspective, jointly organized by Harvard University and the Insti-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

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tute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, July 2003. 21. “Don’t Craft Defense Policy Based on Fear, Says Former FM,” Bernama News Feature, October 13, 2000. Available at: www.bernama.com/bernama/features/ fe1310_1.html. 22. Khoo Boo Teik, Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 74. 23. Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper no. 302 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 15. 24. Ibid., p. 19. 25. Alice Ba, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Maintaining the Regional Idea in Southeast Asia,” International Journal 3, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), p. 637. 26. Syed Hamid Albar, “Interstate Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia,” keynote speech at the Workshop on Interstate Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia: Strategies, Mechanisms, and Best Practices, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, July 15, 2002. 27. Razak, “Malaysia’s Security and Defense Policy for the Next Decade.” 28. Ibid. 29. Malaysian Defense, p. 23. 30. Pamela Sodhy, The U.S.-Malaysian Nexus: Themes in Superpower–Small State Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1991), pp. 169–70. 31. Ibid., p. 214. 32. George Modelski, Six SEATO Studies (Melbourne, 1962), p. 43, quoted in ibid., p. 215. 33. Sodhy, The U.S.-Malaysian Nexus, p. 207. 34. Chin, The Defense of Malaysia and Singapore, p. 2. 35. Ibid., pp. 34–35. 36. Ibid., p. 68. 37. Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 2. 38. Ibid., p. 9. 39. Ibid., p. 23. 40. Khoo, Paradoxes of Mahathirism. 41. Lim, “Competing Regionalism,” pp. 58–59. 42. Philip Methven, The Five Power Defense Arrangements and Military Cooperation Among ASEAN States: Incompatible Models for Security in Southeast Asia? Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense no. 92 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1992), p. 75. 43. Communicated to the writer on many occasions, especially after the KeatingMahathir rift over the issue of Mahathir’s “recalcitrance.” 44. Methven, The Five Power Defense Arrangements, pp. 6–7. 45. Ibid., p. 8. 46. Ibid., p. 171. 47. “PM: Kerjasama mungkin tamat—Sekiranya Australia terus ancam serang orang di rantau ini” (PM: Cooperation may have to cease in the event that Australia continues to claim to be deputy sheriff in this region), Utusan Malaysia, December 5, 2002.

242 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 8 AND 9

48. Khoo, Paradoxes of Mahathirism, pp. 43–47. 49. Sodhy, The U.S.-Malaysian Nexus, p. 285. 50. Ibid., pp. 329–30. 51. Ibid., pp. 350–51. 52. Ibid., p. 403. 53. Ibid., p. 406. 54. In 1964, during “Confrontation,” the U.S. offered to train “sizable” numbers of Malaysian troops and to sell military equipment. Another landmark was the visit of the U.S. Seventh Fleet flagship, the USS Oklahoma City, to Port Klang in 1964 as part of gunboat diplomacy to signal to Indonesia that Malaysia had the support of the United States. Sodhy, The U.S.-Malaysian Nexus, pp. 257–59. 55. Joseph Liow, “Malaysia’s Opposition to the Iraq War: A Matter of Principle or Expediency?” IDSS Commentaries, April 11, 2003. 56. Ibid. 57. Available at: http://maf.mod.gov.my/english/atm/KERJASAMA1.html.

Notes to Chapter 9 1. Jay Solomon, “Plan to Deploy U.S. Troops Spurs Debate in Philippines,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2002. 2. Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?” Journal of International Affairs 13, no. 1 (Summer/Fall 1989), p. 1; and David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 6. 3. Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 113–52. 4. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee, Oversight Hearing into the Current Political, Economic, and Civil Unrest in the Philippines, 99th Congress, 1st session, 1985, p. 33. 5. See Larry A. Niksch, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, November 1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 42. 6. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings: The Current Situation in the Philippines, 100th Congress, 1st session, 1987, pp. 25–26. 7. Secretary Raul Manglapus expressed this view during the May 1990 exploratory talks. See Raul Manglapus, “U.S.-Philippine Relations: Is There a Future? Opening Statement at the RP-U.S. Exploratory Talks, Central Bank Building, Manila, 14 May 1990,” in Marita Castro Guevarra, ed., The Bases Talks Reader: Key Documents of the 1990–91 Philippine-American Cooperation Talks (Manila: Anvil Publications, 1997), pp. 48–53. 8. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Delegation to the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia of the Committee on Armed Services, the House of Representatives. 9. Richard L. Armitage, “U.S. Security in the Pacific in the Twenty-first Century,” Strategic Review 14, no. 3 (Summer 1990), p. 16.

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10. “Bases Primer Part 2,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 19, 1990, FBISEAS-90–186, September 25, 1990, p. 49. 11. “Offer Not Acceptable to Senators,” Quezon City Radio ng Bayan, July 17, 1991, FBIS-EAS-91–137, July 17, 1991, p. 33. 12. “Effects of Rejection Discussed,” The Chronicle, July 31, 1991, FBIS-EAS91–147, July 31, 1991, p. 38. 13. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearings: Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from Clark and Subic Bases, 102nd Congress, 2nd session, 1992, p. 35. 14. U.S. Department of Defense, The United States Strategy for the Asian-Pacific Region: Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992), p. 14; and U.S. Department of Defense, The United States Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995), pp. 11–12. 15. See Jose T. Almonte, “New Directions and Priorities in Philippine Foreign Relations,” in David G. Timberman, ed., The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), pp. 148–50. 16. Ibid., p. 148. 17. Secretary Domingo Siazon, “Contemporary Philippine Foreign Policy,” in Preparing for the Twenty-first Century: Challenges for Philippine Foreign Policy (Pasay City: Foreign Service Institute, November 1996), p. 21. 18. Donald Crone, “New Political Roles for ASEAN,” in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton, eds., Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 44. 19. Sheldon Simon, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” in William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, eds., Asian Security Handbook (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 42. 20. Ibid. 21. Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN and Regional Security,” in Philippine Foreign Policy Statements of Rodolfo Severino (Pasay City: Foreign Service Institute, December 1997), p. 35. 22. Rodolfo Severino, “1996 Philippine Foreign Policy Overview,” in The Philippines in the Asia-Pacific Century (Pasay City: Foreign Service Institute, January 1998), p. 9. 23. Secretary Orlando S. Mercado, Policy Direction for Defense (Quezon City: Office of Public Affairs, November 1998), p. 11. 24. Rodolfo Severino, “Contemporary Philippine Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities,” in Preparing for the Twenty-first Century, p. 22. 25. See Noel Morada and Christopher Collier Simon, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influence (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 573–75. 26. Ibid., p. 574. 27. “ARF to Discuss Spratly Dispute Despite PRC Objection,” The Nation, June 3, 1995, in FBIS-EA-95–105, June 7, 1995, p. 4. 28. See Sheldon Simon, “The Parallel Tracks of Asian Multilateralism,” in Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon Simon, eds., Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 29. 29. See Rommel C. Banlaoi and Ma. Asumpta R. Milalos, “Security Issues and

244 NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

Challenges Facing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at the Turn of the Twentyfirst Century: Policy Implications for the Philippines,” unpublished monograph, National Defense College (date unknown), p. 2. 30. Severino, “Contemporary Philippine Foreign Policy,” p. 22. 31. Almonte, “New Directions and Priorities,” p. 147. 32. William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 143. 33. “VFA will Ensure Security,” Philippine Star, May 16, 1999. 34. Marichu Villanueva, “Pentagon: VFA Ratification First, Then AFP Modernization,” Philippine Star, January 9, 1999. 35. Doug Bandow observed this improvement in U.S.-Philippine security relations in the late 1990s. He claimed that the Clinton administration and its successor, the Bush administration, expanded the U.S. security role in Southeast Asia by signing new defense agreements, increasing training exercises, naval visits, and weapons transfers, and providing implicit security guarantees to its friends and allies in Southeast Asia. He maintained that the current U.S. activism in Southeast Asian security affairs has to do with Washington’s effort to deal with the so-called China challenge. See Doug Bandow, “Needless Entanglements: Washington’s Expanding Security Ties in Southeast Asia,” Policy Analysis, no. 401 (May 24, 2001), pp. 1–30. 36. Raymond G. Falgue, “Very Passionate Negotiations,” Business World, February 18, 1998, pp. 1–3. 37. Zalmay Khalilzad, David T. Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David A. Shalapak, Abram N. Shulsky, and Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 62. Available at: www.rand.rg/publications/MR/ MR315. 38. U.S. Secretary of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region (Washington, DC: Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, November 1998), p. 29. 39. Sean Reyes, “R.P.-U.S. Finally Sign Visiting Forces Agreement,” Philippine Star, February 11, 1998. 40. “The Philippine Connection: Washington and Manila are a Natural AntiTerrorist Team,” Asian Wall Street Journal, September 28–29, 2001. 41. Jennie L. Ilustre, “RP-US Relations Now Back on Track,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 26, 2001. 42. “U.S. Official Praises Philippine Anti-Terrorism Efforts,” Washington File, November 16, 2001, p. 1. 43. Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines,” Malacanang, Manila, November 20, 2001, p. 1. 44. Jim Garamone, “U.S. Forces to Help Philippines Fight Terrorists,” American Forces Press Service in DefenseLink: U.S. Department of Defense, January 16, 2002, p. 1. Available at: www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/no1162002_200201164.html. 45. See Robert Karniol, “Philippines to Receive U.S. Arms,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 14, 2001, p. 16. 46. Solomon, “Plan to Deploy U.S. Troops Spurs Debate in Philippines,” p. 1. 47. Raymond Bonner, “Terror Fight Helps U.S. and Manila Revive Old Relationship,” International Herald Tribune, March 5, 2004.

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48. Michael Richardson, “U.S. Seeks More Access to Bases in Southeast Asia,” International Herald Tribune, February 8, 2002. 49. Michael Richardson, “Joint Operation Easier to Begin Than to End,” International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2002. 50. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, “Theater Security Through Cooperation,” AsiaPacific Defense Forum (Winter 2001), p. 1. 51. Dan Murphy, “Long-Term U.S. Strategy Emerges out of the Philippines,” Christian Science Monitor, July 24, 2002. Available at: www.Csmonitor.com/2002/ 0703/po7502.woap.html.p.2. 52. Dennis Acop, Jose Gil E. Guillermi, Rita Sescar, Raymond Lopez, Beverly Portem, and Rachel Garcia, “Assessment of Balikatan 2002–01 and Recommendation for Further Improvements in the Conduct of the Combined Military Exercise,” Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, July 11, 2002, p. 8. Unpublished. 53. James Dao, “U.S. Forces in the Philippines Hits 1,200: Navy Engineers and Their Guards Join Soldiers in Basilan,” International Herald Tribune, April 22, 2002. 54. Richardson, “U.S. Seeks More Access to Bases in Southeast Asia.” 55. Acop et al., “Assessment of Balikatan 2002–01,” p. 12. 56. Ibid., p. 13. 57. Ibid., p. 13. 58. Joint Statement by the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board, June 27, 2002. Available at: www.pacom.mil/news/news2002/rel020–02.html. 59. Jim Garamone, “U.S.-Philippines Contacts to Expand,” American Forces Information Service (August 13, 2002), p. 1. Available at: www.defenselink.mil/ news/Aug2002/n08132002_200208134.html. 60. Martin Marfil, “Secret RP-US Plan to Deploy Rapid Force,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 3, 2002. Available at: www.inq7.net/nat/2002/dec/04/text/nat_2– 1p.htm. 61. Bonner, “Terror Fight Helps U.S. and Manila Revive Old Relationship.” 62. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations, p. 6.

Notes to Chapter 10 1. For a discussion of the essential elements in this internal dimension of security in a wider Asian setting, see Muthiah Alagappa, “Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations,” in idem, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 615– 28. 2. Background to the emergence of AMDA is given in Chin Kin Wah, The Defense of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System, 1957– 1971 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch. 3. For a later historical study that also addressed the Malaysian aversion to SEATO, see Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 7–9. 3. The FPDA is essentially a loose multilateral consultative defense arrangement rather than a military alliance cast within a formal treaty. Over the years, however, defense collaboration and military exercises within the FPDA have become more embellished and sophisticated. Some of these changes are discussed in Chin

246 NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

Kin Wah, “The Five Power Defense Arrangements: Twenty Years After,” Pacific Review 4, no. 3 (1991), pp. 193–203. 4. For a comment on the impact of geostrategic circumstances on the threat perceptions and strategic posture of Singapore, see Chin Kin Wah, “Reflections on the Shaping of Strategic Cultures in Southeast Asia,” in Derek da Cunha, ed., Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 7–8. See also Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000), pp. 55–57. 5. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 11, 1999, p. 34. 6. Defending Singapore in the Twenty-first Century (Singapore: Ministry of Defense, January 2000), p. 18. For a more detailed treatment of these bilateral military ties, some more successfully forged than others, see Huxley, Defending the Lion City, pp. 212–20. 7. The Straits Times (Singapore), October 22, 2001. 8. Although Malaysian prime minister Mahathir threatened to end counterterrorism cooperation with Australia in strong reaction to Howard’s statement, the Malaysian defense minister Najib Tun Razak was reported to have said that Malaysia was happy to continue having military ties with Australia. The Straits Times, December 5, 2002. Significantly, Australia continues to provide the commander to the FPDA’s integrated area defense system. 9. See The Sunday Times (Singapore), January 26, 2003, and Today (Singapore), January 27, 2003. 10. The Straits Times, November 20, 1997. 11. Ibid., January 16, 1998. 12. Within a year of its opening, five American carriers and about one hundred naval vessels had berthed at the base. The Straits Times, February 28, 2002. Interestingly, in May 2002, China made its naval presence felt for the first time in Singapore when a Chinese guided missile destroyer and a support ship berthed at the Changi Naval Base for four days. The Straits Times, May 18 and 24, 2002. 13. Goh made this remark in answer to a question following his luncheon talk to the Singapore Institute of International Affairs on November 27, 2002. The Straits Times, November 28, 2002. 14. An American official has pointed to the range of threats that these combined exercises are meant to address—from large-scale conventional attacks to peace enforcement operations and “other military operations other than war.” He saw the new emerging threats in terms of “piracy at sea; nuclear, biological and chemical attacks; and terrorist incidents.” Remarks by Chargé d’Affaires Ravic Huso for Cobra Gold 2002 Closing Ceremony, Utaphao Air Base, Thailand, May 28, 2002, Embassy of the United States of America press release, #054/02, May 28, 2002. 15. The Straits Times, June 13, 2001. 16. For other details of Singapore’s contributions to UN and coalition operations, see Huxley, Defending the Lion City, p. 225. 17. The Sunday Times, March 25, 2001. In 2002, having served a year in TimorLeste, the original contingent was replaced by a larger one of 160 Singapore peacekeepers. At the same time a Singaporean officer was appointed commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Timor-Leste. The Straits Times, July 31, 2002. 18. The Straits Times, June 5, 1999. 19. For a fuller discussion of Singapore’s perspective on the two bilateral alli-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10 247

ances and the emerging multilateral cooperative security process in the Asia-Pacific, see Chin Kin Wah and Pang Eng Fong, “Relating the U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan Alliances to Emerging Asia-Pacific Multilateral Processes: An ASEAN Perspective,” Stanford University, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Discussion Papers series, March 2000. 20. This is admittedly a realist assumption to the neoliberal multilateral institutionbuilding experience as exemplified by the ARF and is reflected in Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper no. 302 (Oxford: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996). 21. Parliamentary Debates Singapore, Official Report, vol. 73, no. 8, 13 March 2001, cols. 898–899. 22. For a discussion of the possible tensions between bilateralism and multilateralism, see Brian Job, “Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in William Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshina, eds., Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era: The Future of the San Francisco Alliance System in the Asia-Pacific (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs and Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 1997), pp. 160–69. 23. IISS, Strategic Survey 1997/98 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), p. 173. The Chinese reaction at the time was inspired by fears that the area of operations of the new Japan-U.S. security guidelines would apply to the Taiwan Strait. Since 1999 there has been little evidence of Chinese attempts to press this challenge to bilateral alliances in Asia. 24. At the same time a Singapore Foreign Ministry spokesperson reiterated the view that “Good Sino-US relations are vital to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.” The Straits Times, April 6, 2001. For a commentary, see Michael Richardson, “Asian Countries Dread Having To Pick Sides,” International Herald Tribune, April 4, 2001, p. 6. 25. The Straits Times, November 13, 2002. 26. Some of these bilateral tensions are detailed in N. Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post–Cold War ASEAN, Pacific Strategic Papers no. 9 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999). 27. The Straits Times, January 16, 1998. 28. Defending Singapore in the Twenty-first Century, p. 8. 29. The United Nations Act 2001, Singapore Government Gazette No. 44 of 2001 and United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures), Regulations 2001, Singapore Government Gazette No. S. 561 of 2001. 30. The Straits Times, November 8, 2002. 31. The Straits Times, September 19, 2001. 32. Bangkok Post, February 25, 2002, p. 7. 33. The Straits Times, August 2, 2002. 34. Lee Kuan Yew cast this in a broader context when he commented that “cooperation of Southeast Asian governments in the U.S. anti-terror campaign has injected another unpredictable dimension into their domestic politics. A U.S. attack in Iraq may stir-up more anti-American sentiments among Asian Muslims.” See excerpts of his speech to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation’s 125th anniversary dinner, The Straits Times, September 28, 2002. 35. The Straits Times, November 13, 2001. 36. In January 1991, shortly after the Gulf War broke out, an opinion poll

248 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 10 AND 11

conducted by The Straits Times found that although 8 out of 10 Singaporeans felt that the U.S.-led alliance was right to use force to evict Iraq from Kuwait, 6 out of 10 Malays disapproved of it. Available at: http://aixpn:8712/brsweb/ newslink.brsw. 37. The four organizations were the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers’ Association (Pergas); a volunteer welfare group known as Perdaus; the Muhammadiyah Association; and the Center for Contemporary Islamic Studies. The Straits Times, September 5, 2002. 38. Ibid., September 9, 2002. 39. Ibid., October 15, 2002. 40. Although a State Department spokesman said that Singapore had agreed to be named a part of the “coalition of the willing” backing the American effort to disarm Iraq, Tony Tan preferred to see Singapore as being part of a “coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq” lest it be implied that Singapore was contributing troops to the war effort. The Straits Times, March 21 and 22, 2003. Be that as it may, Singapore allowed U.S. aircraft and naval vessels to transit bases in Singapore, as was the case during operations in Afghanistan. 41. The Straits Times, March 15, 2003.

Notes to Chapter 11 1. See Songsri Foran, Thai-British-American Relations during World War II and the Immediate Postwar Period 1940–1946 (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University, 1981). 2. Direk Jayanama, Siam and World War II, English edition, Jane Godfrey Keyes, ed. (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand Press, 1967), pp. 243–44. 3. George Modelski, “Thailand and China: From Avoidance to Hostility,” in A.M. Halpern, ed., Policies toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), p. 352. 4. See Rizal Sukma’s chapter, “Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security,” in this volume. 5. Danny Unger, “From Domino to Dominant: Thailand’s Security Policies in the Twenty First Century,” in Robert S. Ross, ed., East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 234–35. 6. Likhit Dhiravegin, Siam and Colonialism, 1855–1909: An Analysis of Diplomatic Relations (Bangkok: Thai Wattanapanich, 1975), pp. 46–55. 7. Frank C. Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 127. 8. David A. Wilson, The United States and the Future of Thailand (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 47. 9. David A. Wilson, “China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part I),” China Quarterly, no. 30 (April–June 1967), p. 157. 10. Anuson Chinvanno, Brief Encounter: Sino-Thai Rapprochement after Bandung, 1955–1957 (Bangkok: International Studies Center, 1991), pp. 32–36. 11. Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1978), p. 115. 12. Ibid., p. 117.

NOTES TO CHAPTERS 11 AND 12 249

13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, “Preliminary Working Paper on Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” mimeograph (Bangkok, 1959). 14. Thanad Khoman, speech of August 28, 1968, in Collected Statements of Foreign Minister Thanad Khoman, vol. 4, October 1967–1968 (Bangkok: Yodying Sopon, 1969), p. 61. 15. Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Thai-Chinese Relations, 1975–1995 (Niigata: International University of Japan, 1998), p. 5. 16. Ibid., p. 16. 17. The ARF began with eighteen founding members, including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, the European Union, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. The subsequent meetings of the ARF admitted Myanmar, Cambodia, India, and North Korea to the group. 18. John Funston, “Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence,” in Southeast Asian Affairs 1998 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), p. 295. 19. Bangkok Post, April 9, 2003. 20. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding report of the Secretary General, June 17, 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992). 21. Vaipot Srinual, “Peacekeeping and External Roles: The Thai Experience,” in Cavan Hogue, ed., Thailand, Australia and the Region: Strategic Developments in Southeast Asia (Canberra: National Thai Studies Center, Australian National University, 2002), p. 52. 22. Ibid., p. 51. 23. See Lt.-General Boonsrang Niumpradit (force commander UNTAET PKF), Forty Days in East Timor: A Peacekeeper’s Diary (Bangkok: Darnsutha Press, 2002). 24. Srinual, “Peacekeeping and External Roles,” p. 55. 25. Ministry of Defense, Thailand, The Defense of Thailand 1996 (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, 1996), p. 13. 26. Surakiat Sathirathai, Thailand’s Foreign Policy Forward Engagement: Collection of Speeches (Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003), p. 176.

Notes to Chapter 12 1. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), p. 11. 2. The top Asia hands in the Bush administration are Japan rather than China hands (for instance, Under Secretary Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary James Kelly, the National Security Council’s Torkel Patterson—who has since left the administration—and Michael Green). 3. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly noted at his confirmation hearings that “Singapore, a longtime friend that is not a treaty ally, recently completed new port facilities specifically designed to accommodate visits by U.S. aircraft carriers.” 4. Prepared statement of Colin L. Powell, secretary of state–designate, January 17, 2001. 5. Ibid.

250 NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

6. Despite the administration’s desire to calibrate China’s place in the region, it was difficult to do so. The first country to which then secretary of state–designate Powell turned his attention in his confirmation hearings was China. A couple of months later, in a prepared statement at his confirmation hearings, Assistant Secretary of State Kelly made a brief reference to Japan, but immediately turned to China— perhaps understandable in the aftermath of the EP3 incident three weeks earlier. 7. Prepared Statement of Colin L. Powell. 8. See Ronald Montaperto and Satu Limaye, “Asians on America: Real Problems Don’t Get U.S. Attention,” International Herald Tribune, July 26, 2001. 9. Harry Harding, “The Bush Administration’s Approach to Asia: Before and After September 11,” speech to the Asia Society, Hong Kong, November 12, 2001. Available at: www.asiasociety.org/speeches/harding2.html. 10. Europe and the Middle East were the other regions identified in the QDR. 11. Admiral Michael McDevitt, “The Quadrennial Defense Review and East Asia,” PacNet Newsletter, no. 43, October 26, 2001. 12. Harding, “The Bush Administration’s Approach to Asia.” 13. The U.S.-Japan alliance was dealing with the Ehime Maru accident. And U.S.-Australia relations were complicated by “Canberra’s lukewarm response to Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage’s comments that the test of a faithful ally was its willingness to shed blood on behalf of the United States.” Harding, “The Bush Administration’s Approach to Asia.” 14. “In leading the campaign against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.” President Bush, “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends,” speech delivered at the National Cathedral (Washington, DC), September 14, 2001, p. 7. An excellent review of U.S. efforts with Asian partners may be found in the “Statement of James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the House International Relations Committee’s East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee,” February 14, 2002. 15. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “Remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner,” New York, June 10, 2002. 16. See Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz interview with CNN International, November 5, 2002. 17. See Worldviews 2002: American Public Opinion & Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 2002). 18. For more details by the same author, see Satu P. Limaye, “Almost Quiet on the Asia-Pacific Front: An Assessment of Asia-Pacific Responses to U.S. Security Policies,” in Special Assessment: Asia-Pacific Responses to U.S. Security Policies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, March 2003. 19. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy,” Foreign Policy (November–December 2002), pp. 50–57; and G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs (September–October 2002), pp. 44–60. 20. Michael Hirsh, “Bush and the World,” Foreign Affairs (September–October 2002), pp. 18–43. 21. See Richard N. Haass, “Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post–Cold War World,” Arthur Ross Lecture, remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002.

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22. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has used the word “illusory” to describe the international community. 23. “We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as matter of common sense and selfdefense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” The National Security Strategy of the United States, White House, September 2002. 24. “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.” President Bush, “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends,” speech delivered at the National Cathedral (Washington, DC), September 14, 2001. 25. Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. deputy secretary of defense, “The Gathering Storm: The Threat of Global Terror and Asia/Pacific Security,” speech presented in Singapore, June 1, 2002. 26. Remarks at the Asia Society Annual Dinner, June 10, 2002.

About the Editors and Contributors

The Editors Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director, Head of Research, and Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Acharya has published over 100 academic works, including four self-authored books, an IISS Adelphi Paper, and numerous monographs, journal articles, and book chapters. Among his latest publications are Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2001), and Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific, 2nd edition (Eastern Universities Press, 2003). He is a member of the Eminent Persons/Expert Group of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a member of the editorial board of the journals Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, and Global Governance, and a coeditor of the Asian Security monograph series published by Stanford University Press. His areas of specialization include regionalism and multilateralism, Asian regional security, and international relations theory. See Seng Tan is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he coordinates the Multilateralism and Regionalism Program. He is the coeditor of After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (World Scientific, 2003). He has published on critical social IR theory, multilateralism and regionalism, conflict prevention and management, foreign policy analysis, and Old Testament biblical theology, and has just completed a book manuscript on a critical social perspective on Asia-Pacific security for an American university press. He is a member of the Singapore executive 253

254 ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). He was educated at the University of Manitoba, Arizona State University, and Fuller Theological Seminary. The Contributors Renato Cruz De Castro is the Dr. Aurelio Calderon Professorial Chair of Philippine-American Relations and the chairperson of the International Studies Department of De La Salle University. He earned his Ph.D. in International Studies (with a major in U.S. foreign policy) at the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar. Since 1994 he has written eighteen articles on international relations and security that have been published by a number of scholarly journals in the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany, South Korea, Malaysia, and the United States. He worked as a research fellow at the European Institute of Public Administration (Maastricht, the Netherlands) in 1989, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) in 1991 and 1995. He started his professional career as a Foreign Affairs Research Analyst at the Research and Information Division of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs, in 1986. Chin Kin Wah, Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, is Senior Fellow in the Regional Strategic and Political Studies Program at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Prior to this he was an Associate Professor in Political Science at the National University of Singapore. He has held visiting appointments at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, the London School of Economics (the Center for International Studies and the Asia Research Center), and the University of Toronto. He has published widely in the areas of ASEAN regionalism, Asia-Pacific security issues, and majorpower policies in Southeast Asia. Chulacheeb Chinwanno is Associate Professor at Political Science at Thammasat University, Thailand, where he also holds an adjunct appointment with the Faculty of Economics. He is the author of ThaiChinese Relations 1975–1995 and Thailand-China Relations: From Strategic to Economic Partnership, and has published widely on the politics of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University.

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS 255

Ralf Emmers is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include nontraditional security issues and multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. Among his publications are Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (Routledge, 2003), a coauthored monograph entitled A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum (IDSS, 2002), and articles in Pacific Review, Contemporary Southeast Asia, and Pointer. Ron Huisken joined the Strategic and Defence Studies Center, the Australian National University (ANU), in 2001, where he has focused, in particular, on U.S. security policies and multilateral security processes in East Asia. Dr. Huisken spent nearly twenty years in government, with the departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defense, and the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Prior to government he worked with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the University of Malaya, and the United Nations Secretariat in New York. He holds degrees in economics from the University of Western Australia and the Royal Stockholm University, and a Ph.D. in International Relations from the ANU. Shin-wha Lee is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. She received her Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Maryland at College Park and held a postdoctoral fellowship at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (1994–97). Among her previous positions were Researcher at the World Bank, Special Advisor to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, member of the Rwandan Independent Inquiry, and Chair’s Advisor of the ASEAN+3’s East Asian Vision Group. She has published three books and more than forty articles (in English and Korean) on environmental and human security and the roles of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Nan Li is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has published on Chinese civil-military relations, military doctrine, military organization, and naval modernization. He has also published on the problem of Chinese nationalism, Chinese central military decision making, and Chinese views of the political and military implications of September 11

256 ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

and the U.S. war in Iraq. He is currently writing a book, From Balancing to Bandwagoning: The Evolving Structure and Dynamics of Chinese Military Politics. Satu P. Limaye is Director of Research and Publications at the AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies, a unit reporting directly to the United States Pacific Command. Previously, he was an Abe Fellow with the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies, and a Luce Scholar and Head of the Program on South Asia at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. Dr. Limaye has taught at Georgetown University and Sophia University in Tokyo. His articles appear in leading journals such as The Washington Quarterly, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian Affairs, and newspapers such as the International Herald Tribune. His recently edited works include Asia-Pacific Responses to U.S. Security Policies (2003) and Asia’s China Debate: Implications for the United States (2003). He is the author of U.S.-Indian Relations: The Pursuit of Accommodation (Westview Press). Dr. Limaye received his Ph.D. in International Relations from Oxford University, where he was a Marshall Scholar. J.N. Mak graduated from the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, in 1975 with an M.Sc. (Econ) in Strategic Studies. He served as Senior Fellow (after official retirement) and concurrent head of two centers, the Center for Maritime Security and Diplomacy, and the Center for Economic Studies and Ocean Industries, at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) from October 2001 to December 2003. Prior to that, he was the Institute’s Director of Research and concurrent head of the Center for Maritime Security and Diplomacy from July 1993 to October 2001. He was also with the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, as Senior Analyst (Defense and Security Studies) from January 1984 to June 1993. Presently, he is a consultant to the Managerial Development Program for the Sime Darby Group, specializing in research methodology. Rizal Sukma is Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia. He received a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 1997. He is also the Secretary to the International Relations Bureau, Central Executive Board of Muhammadiyah (the second larg-

ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS 257

est Islamic organization in Indonesia, with approximately 25 million members); member of the board at Syafii Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity; a visiting lecturer at the Post-Graduate School of Political Science at the University of Indonesia; and a member of the National Committee on Strategic Defense Review, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense. Dr. Sukma has published extensively on Southeast Asian security issues, ASEAN politics, Indonesian defense and foreign policy, and Indonesian domestic politics. His books include Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (Routledge, 1999) and Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). Yasuhiro Takeda is Professor of International Relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo, Graduate School of International Relations. His recent publications include a book (in Japanese), Comparative Politics of Democratization: Regime Transitions in East Asia (Minerva, 2001), which was awarded the Eighteenth Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize, as well as (in English) several articles and chapters in edited volumes on, among other things, U.S. foreign policy, U.S.-Japan relations, security in Northeast Asia, and Japanese foreign policy William T. Tow is Professor of International Relations at the School of International Business and Asian Studies, Griffith University, in Brisbane, Australia. He has published thirteen authored or edited books and over eighty-five journal articles and book chapters on problems of Asian security and alliance politics. His latest major work is Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge University Press, 2001). He currently edits the Australian Journal of International Affairs and is on the Australian Members Board, Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (AUS-CSCAP). He has served on the Foreign Affairs Council of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and on the Australian-American Fulbright Commission’s Board of Directors.

Index Abdul Rahman, Tunku, 140 Abdul Razak, Tun, 136 Abdullah Badawi, 151 Abu Sayyaf rebels, 164–165, 167 Acharya, A., 7 Afghanistan, 28, 84–86, 97, 100, 185, 203 Agenda for Peace, An, 202 Al-Qaeda, 84, 86, 165–166, 184, 210 Albright, Madeleine, 208, 214 Alliances, 3–4, 38–39; see also Bilateral alliances; Multilateralism alliance mutuality, 22–23 balance of power politics and, 4 ideology and, 5 post–September 11 strategy, 27 threat level and, 5 Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA), 10, 139–141, 173–174 Antiterrorism campaign, 22, 29, 31, 45, 149; see also Global war on terrorism (GWOT) Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, 79 ANZUS treaty (United States, Australia, and New Zealand), 10, 22, 80, 145 Armitage, Richard, 26 Armitage-Nye report, 25 Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal, 164, 167–169 Asia-Pacific; see also specific country balanced security portfolio, 34–38 bilateral collective defense, 93–94 Bush administration security policies in, 206–210, 214–220 Cold War era, 10, 89 conflictual relationship in, 89–90 Palme report, 6–7 post–Cold War era, 36, 89 post–September 11 security politics, 19, 22 security cooperation concepts, 3, 92–93 uni-multipolar security structure, 89–90 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 23, 36, 85, 131, 180 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 4, 24, 36, 54, 196

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (continued) China and, 66–69 comprehensive security approach, 6, 10–12 cooperative security, 12 global terrorism and, 204 Indonesia and, 71, 78–81 Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), 8 limitations of, 16–17 Malaysia and, 127, 134–139 national and regional resilience, 11–12 spider web approach, 11 Thailand and, 196–197 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 4, 15–17, 23, 32–33, 54, 199 China and, 46, 65 Indonesia and, 72, 78–81 limitations of, 17, 94 Malaysia and, 127, 134–138 North and South Korea, 119–120 Philippines and, 154–155, 159–162 role of, 43–44, 48, 91 Singapore and, 180–181 Australia, 27, 47 balanced security portfolio, 33 Indonesia and, 76–78 Japan and, 41 Malaysia and, 145–146, 152 Australia-U.S. ministerial (AUSMIN) talks, 41 Ayoob, Mohammed, 131 Balance-of-threat perspective, 5 Bali bombings, 18, 47, 84–85, 87, 185–186, 191, 204, 210 Bandwagoning, 4 Bangkok Declaration, 196 Bilateral alliances, 3–4, 7, 17, 38–39 in Cold War era, 9–10 cooperative security and, 8 dependency on U.S., 14 Indonesia’s experience with, 76–78 post–Cold War era, 12–15, 21

259

260 INDEX Bilateral alliances (continued) post–September 11, 14–15 regional security and, 9–10 as threat-based mechanisms, 20–21, 25 U.S. recent trends, 22–23 Bilateral collective defense, 9, 93–94 contemporary variants of, 24–28 enriched bilateralism, 24–25 extended and expansive bilateralism, 27–28 extreme bilateralism, 25–27 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 202 Brunei, 153 Burma, 56 Bush, George W., 14, 18, 26, 114, 169, 183, 186 Bush administration, 14, 19–20, 25 Asia-Pacific security policies, 206–210, 214–217 China and, 40, 207–208, 212 doctrine of integration, 215 extreme bilateralism policy, 25–28 global war on terrorism and, 210–214 India and, 208–209 Iraqi war, 217–218 Korean peninsula tensions, 217–218 national security strategy, 214–217 North Korea policy, 108, 113, 206, 208, 211, 217–218 Philippines and, 164–166 post–September 11 “realist” security approach, 20 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 206 Butfoy, Andrew, 93 Buzan, Barry, 89 Cambodia, 93, 196, 198, 202 Chin Kin Wah, 172 China antiterrorism efforts, 29 ASEAN and, 66–69 Bush administration and, 207–208, 212 Cultural Revolution, 56, 63 East Asian security and, 34, 39, 44–46, 90 evolving concepts/approaches to security, 53–55 accounting for changes in, 62–66 Deng era (1978–1989), 58–59, 62–64, 69 Jiang era (1989–2002), 59–62, 64–65, 70 Mao era (1949–1976), 55–58, 62–64, 69 Japan and, 40, 103 Mischief Reef incident, 161–162 new security concept (NSC), 55, 60–61, 64–65, 69

China (continued) Taiwan issue, 17, 64, 67 territorial disputes, 68 threat of, 5, 13, 19, 67 United States and accommodation of, 21 extreme bilateralism and, 25–26 as peer competitor, 28, 30, 32 perspective on alliances, 39–42 Chinwanno, Chulacheeb, 190 Christensen, Thomas J., 102 Chuan Leekpai, 200, 202 Chun Doo-Hwan, 111 Clark, Joe, 15, 24 Clinton, Bill, 13, 23, 25, 95, 101 Clinton administration, 23–24, 110, 206–208 Cohen, William, 177, 183 Collective defense arrangement, 4, 88; see also Bilateral collective defense alliance mutuality, 22–23 American “realist” strategy of, 19–20 Japan-U.S. alliance, 95 recent trends in, 22–23 Collective security, 3–7, 93–94 Common security, 3, 5–7 nuclear weapons and, 6, 8 Palme report, 6 Community building, 20, 29; see also Security community Comprehensive security, 3, 5–6, 11 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 6, 25, 35 Convergent security, 20–21 future of, 28–32 viability of, 29 Cooperative security, 3, 5, 12, 88, 93–94 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and, 15–16, 33 bilateral alliances and, 8 habit of dialogue, 7–8 inclusiveness principle, 8 multilateralism and, 7–8 norms and principles, 7 Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific (CSCAP), 8, 93, 180, 199 Counterterrorism strategy, 22, 29, 31, 45, 149 Cruz De Castro, Renato, 154 Cultural Revolution, 56 Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976), 11 Deng Xiaoping, 53–55, 58–64, 69–70 Deutsch, Karl, 8, 24 Dewitt, D., 7 Diplomacy, track-two diplomacy, 8 Doctrine of integration, 215

INDEX 261 East Asia Strategy Report (1998), 22–23 East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 131 East Timor, 33, 65, 77, 82, 87, 93, 100, 179, 202 Emmers, Ralf, 3 Enriched bilateralism, 24–25, 28 Estrada, Joseph, 163 Evans, Gareth, 24 Extended (expansive) bilateralism, 27–28 Extreme bilateralism, 25–27 Farish Noor, 150 Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), 10, 80, 174–176 Fuerth, Leon, 14 Geneva Framework (1994), 113 Ghazali Shafie, 136 Global war on terrorism (GWOT), 206, 218 multilateral approach to, 213 U.S. security policies and, 210–214 Goh Chok Tong, 69, 177, 187 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 6, 62 Guam doctrine, 196 Gulf War, 5, 98, 169, 187 Haass, Richard, 210, 215 Habib, Hasnan, 77 Habibie, President, 83, 202 Hashimoto, Prime Minister, 95 Helsinki Final Act of 1975, 6 Howard, John, 86, 146 Hubs and spokes model, 9, 20, 23, 34, 93, 95 Huisken, Ron, 33 Human rights agendas, 23, 107, 122–124, 178–179 Ikenberry, G. John, 94 Im Dong-Won, 114 India, 20, 56–57, 62, 208–209 Indonesia, 14, 47, 56, 76, 153 Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), 76–78 antiterrorism efforts, 85–96 ASEAN and ARF, 71–72, 78–81, 87 Australia and, 76–78 bebas-aktif (free and active) foreign policy of, 72, 77, 83 bilateral security arrangements and, 76–78 East Timor and, 77, 82, 87 global participation of, 81–83 intramural cooperation, 71–72, 75 national resilience, 11–12 New Order in, 6 post–Cold War era, 79–80 post–September 11, 84–86

Indonesia (continued) post–World War II, 74 regional security and, 6, 71–72, 87, 196 historical overview, 72–76 Suharto and, 83 UN peacekeeping operations and, 72, 81–83, 87 Intramural cooperation, 71–72, 75 Iraq, war in, 150, 168–169, 186, 217–219 Japan Asia-Pacific power struggle and, 89–92 Australia and, 41 bilateral and multilateral framework, 100–103 China and, 40, 103 comprehensive security, 5–6 International Peace Cooperation Law, 98 right to collective self-defense, 98–99, 102 security approach of, 88–89 Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 96, 98–100, 102–103 Singapore and, 179–180 South Korea and, 102–103 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, 24 UN collective security and, 98–100, 102, 104 U.S.-Japanese alliance, 9, 13, 20, 22, 34–35, 39–40, 95–98, 104–105, 201 Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997), 96 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on SecurityAlliance for the Twenty-first Century, 95 Jayakumar, S., 16, 176, 186–187 Jemaah Islamiyah, 84, 149, 187 Jiang Zemin, 46, 54–55, 59–62, 64–65, 70, 103, 183 Keating, Paul, 78 Kelly, James, 26, 114 Khrushchev, N., 63 Kim Dae-Jung, 26, 108–109, 111–114, 121, 125, 208 Kim Il-Sung, 110 Kim Jong-Il, 110, 112, 115, 122–123 Kim Young-Sam, 111 Koizumi administration, 98 Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), 149 Kupchan, Charles, 5 Kupchan, Clifford, 5 Laos civil war, 194 League of Nations, 5 League of Nations Covenant, 7

262 INDEX Lee Hsien Loong, 183, 186–187 Lee Kuan Yew, 175, 179, 183 Lee, Shin-wha, 106 Leifer, Michael, 74 Li, Nan, 53 Limaye, Satu P., 206 Lizée, P., 6 Mahathir Mohamad, 128–129, 131, 133, 135–136, 142–144, 146, 149–151 Mak, J. N., 127 Malaysia anti-terrorism efforts, 149–151 ASEAN and ARF, 127, 134–139, 152 Australia-Malaysia relationship, 145–146, 152 bilateral defense cooperation, 152 comprehensive security in, 6 cooperation programs, 152–153 current defense/security cooperation, 141–145 defense vs. security, 128–129 domestic challenges of ethnic state, 129–132 ethnic polarization, 132–133 external security environment, 134–135 foreign policy of, 141–145 historical background, 132–134 institutions and regional order, 135–137 neutrality policy, 127 New Economic Policy (NEP), 130, 142 political system as elite-based, 130 SEATO and AMDA, 139–141 threat perceptions, 128–129 three-pronged security strategy, 129 United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 127–130, 132–134 U.S.-Malaysia bilateral security, 146–149 Western defense cooperation, 138 Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), 131 Malaysian Defense: Toward Defense SelfReliance, 131 Malik, Adam, 74–76 Manila Pact, 10–11, 195 Mao Zedong, 53–59, 62–64, 69–70 Megawati Sukarnoputri, 83–85 Mercado, Orlando, 163 Military alliances/security, 3–4 Multilateralism, 4, 9, 15 Asia-Pacific region emergence of, 7, 17–18, 20, 23, 33, 183 lack of development of, 34–37 cooperative security and, 7–9 enhancing performance of, 42–46 global war on terrorism and, 213 Multilayered security approach, 88

Musa Hitam, 128 Myanmar, 17 Najib Abdul Razak, Tun, 147–148, 176 Nation building programs, 27 National resilience, 11 National Security Strategy (NSS), 27, 206, 214–216, 218, 220 Neo Lao Hak Xat leftist movement, 194 New security concept (NSC), 30, 46, 55, 60–61, 64–65, 69 New Zealand, 153 Nixon, Richard M., 56, 62–63, 196 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 107–108 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 109–110, 114 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 131 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 10, 22 North Korea, 16–17, 44, 47, 57 Bush administration and, 206, 208, 211, 217–219 changes in, 109–111 humanitarian crisis in, 107, 122–124 inter-Korean relations, 108–109, 120–121 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 107–108 nuclear threat of, 19, 29, 91, 106–110, 113– 115 as rogue state, 19 U.S. extreme bilateralism and, 25–26, 90 North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, 15 Nosawan, Phoumi, 194 Nuclear weapons, 6, 8 Nye, Joseph, 215 Nye report, 90 Obuchi, Prime Minister, 103 Okinawa, 13 Operation Enduring Freedom, 28, 211 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 134 Origins of Alliances, The (Walt), 4 Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), 180 Palme, Olof, 6 Palme Commission Report, 6–7 Patterson, Torkel, 26 Peou, S., 6 “Perry process,” 24 Philippines, 13–14, 22–23, 26, 135–136, 153 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), 157, 163, 165, 167–168, 170–171 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and, 154–155, 159–162

INDEX 263 Philippines (continued) bilateralism crisis, 156–159 bilateralism legacy, 155–156 China and Mischief Reef incident, 161–162 Cold War era, 156–157 Iraq war and, 168–169 multilateralism and, 159–162 post–September 11, 155 regional security, 196 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security (PACT) of 1991, 158 United States and 1997–2001 alliance, 162–163 2001–2002 alliance, 164–165 2002 alliance, 165–168 military withdrawal, 154 Mutual Defense Treaty, 9, 13, 156, 158 Philippine-American Cooperation Treaty of 1991, 154 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), 163 Political alliances, 4 Powell, Colin, 26, 85, 185, 207, 220 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 206–207, 209, 212 Reciprocity principle, 9 Report on the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982), 6 Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 107, 116–118, 124 Resilience principle, 11 Reyes, Angelo, 168 Rockefeller, Nelson, 147 Roh Moo-Hyun, 107, 109, 112–113, 115–117, 121, 126 Roh Tae-Woo, 111 Rotberg, Robert, 166 Rumsfeld, Donald, 26, 28, 155, 165, 168 San Francisco system, 9, 22–24, 29–30, 42, 188 Sanctions, 7 Security, defined, 54 Security approaches, defined, 54 Security community, 3, 5, 8, 24 absence in Asia-Pacific region, 16–17 characteristics of, 8–9 examples of, 9 security goals of, 25 Security cooperation; see also Cooperative security approaches to, 3 bilateral alliances, 3–4

Security cooperation (continued) Cold War era, 9–12 comprehensive approach to, 3 concepts in, 4–9 current regional framework for, 92–95 evolution of practices, 9–17 post–Cold War era, 12–17 Self, Benjamin, 42 September 11 attacks, 14, 18, 88, 190, 201 global war on terrorism, 210–214 post-attacks security politics, 19, 45, 84, 103, 150, 164 Severino, Rodolfo, 160 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 54, 62, 65–66, 90 Singapore, 14, 16, 69, 163 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and, 180–186, 188 bilateral/multilateral security ties, 174–176, 189 comprehensive security in, 6 Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), 174–176, 189 foreign policy, 174–175 historical overview, 172–174 Japan-America (JASA) security alliance, 179–180 Korea-American (KASA) security alliance, 179 other alliance relationships, 179–180 post–Cold War multilateral cooperation, 180–182 post–September 11, 176, 184–185 regional security, 196 unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism, 182–184 UN peacekeeping/humanitarian missions, 178–179 U.S. bilateral security relations, 176–178 war on global terrorism and, 184–187 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (1950), 22, 55 Songkram, Pibul, 193–194 South Korea, 22, 26 Bush administration and, 206, 208, 217–219 humanitarian concerns, 107, 122–124 international political structure, 115–116 multilateral security arrangements, 119–122 nontraditional security concerns, 122–124 North Korea and inter-Korean relations, 108–109 nuclear crisis of, 113–115 policy on, 111–113 threat of, 106–107 unification policy, 111

264 INDEX Security cooperation (continued) post–Cold War era, 106, 115–119 Singapore and, 179 “Sunshine Policy” of détente, 26, 108–110, 112, 208 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, 24 U.S.-South Korean alliance, 9, 107, 116–119, 201 U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 107, 116–118, 124 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), 10, 75, 139–141, 156, 172–174, 193–194, 197, 205 Souvannaphouma, 194 Soviet Union, 10, 36, 56–57, 59, 89 Spider web approach, 11 Suharto, President, 11, 75–79, 83, 136 Sukarno, President, 75, 192 Sukiman, Prime Minister, 76 Sukma, Rizal, 71 Taiwan, 9, 13, 20, 22, 90 Bush administration and, 206 China and, 17, 64, 67 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 9 Takeda, Yasuhiro, 88 Tan, Tony, 176, 185 Taro, Nakayama, 24 Terrorism, 14, 18, 34, 45, 165, 190, 203–204 Thailand, 17, 22, 26, 152 Cold War era security approaches, 191–197 collective security to collective defense, 193–195 multilateral to bilateral collective defense, 195 multiple approaches, 195–197 global terrorism and, 203–204 Laotian crisis (1961–62) and, 194–195 multiple strategy approaches, 195–197, 205 post–Cold War era, 198–201 bilateralism with cooperative security, 198–200 major world powers and, 200–201 regional security, 196, 198–201, 204–205 SEATO and, 193–194 UN peace operations and, 201–203 U.S. and, 193–194, 196, 200–201 Vietnam and, 196–197 Thanad Khoman, 195–196 Thanad-Rusk Joint Communiqué, 195 Thanarat, Sarit, 194–195 Threat level, 5 aggressive intentions, 5 balance-of-threat perspective, 5

Threat level (continued) geographic proximity, 5 offensive power, 5 Tow, William T., 19 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), 24 Tsuchiyama, Jitsuo, 94 Uni-multipolar security structure, 89–90, 104 Unilateralism, 182 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, 93 Indonesia and, 72, 81–83 Japan and, 98–99, 102 Singapore and, 178–179 United States; see also Bush administration bilateral security alliances, recent trends, 22–23 China’s perspective on alliances, 39–42 Gulf War, 5 international relations; see specific country Japan-U.S. alliance, 13, 22, 34–35, 39–40, 95–98, 104–105 Malaysia-U.S. bilateral security relationship, 146–149 Singapore and, 176–178 unilateralism of, 18 United States Department of Defense, 22 United States Pacific Command (PACOM), 24–25, 27, 32 United States Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001, 20, 27–28 Vietnam, 196–198 Wahid, Abdurrahman, 83 Walt, Stephen, 4 Wang Yi, 103 Warsaw Pact, 10 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 19, 26–27, 211, 216 Wen Jiabao, 69 Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), 103 Wight, M., 4 Wilson, Woodrow, 5 Wirajuda, Hassan, 85 Wolfers, Arnold, 100 Wolfowitz, Paul, 26, 212, 219 World Trade Organization (WTO), 131 Yu Bin, 40, 42 Zhang Yunlin, 68 Zhou Enlai, 62–63, 194 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), 15, 136, 144