Brazil: The People and the Power (Latin American Library)

Miguel Arraes BRAZIL: THE PEOPLE AND THE POWER Miguel Arraes, an exiled member of Brazil's once legal socialist party, re-examines the situation of his nalive country to estimate the weaknesses of the left and the strength of its enemies. Committed but detached, he analyses the economic and political history of Brazil, the military coup of 1964 and the workings of the present regime. He shows how economic dependence, first on Portugal, now on Brilain and the United States, has hampered national development and ensured that official policy upheld conservative interests. Unlil the resources of Brazil are fairly distributed and properly exploited, he argues, millions must live in acute poverty, while a ll popula r movements are suppressed.

Based on a thorough appreciation of political realities, and appearing for the first time in English, Brazil:The People and the

Power is a statement of faith in the people of Brazil and their ability to overthrow an intolerably repressive regime.

The Pelican Latin American Library The Pelican Latin American Library is concerned with a continent and a half of geographical and social contrasts: modern cities and primitive natives; unsealed mountains ..unexplored jungles and

fertile plains; huge repression in the towns. a lillie liberty in the campos. This series will attack current ignorance - our ignorance of an area where thousands thrive and millions starve and where politics lean three ways: towards the United Slates. towards national

independence, and towards Marxist-Leninist revolulion. Economic, political and even personal studies ( of the whole region or of

individual countries ) will attempt to fill in the backg:-"Iu�d against which such men as Che Guevara have fought and ar·

�ill fighting.

Cover photograph by Enzo Ragazzini

United Kingdom 40p Australia $1.35 (recommended) New Zealand $1.35 Canada $1.65

'Political Science ISIN 0 14 02.14811

19 THE PELICAN LATIN AMERICAN LIBRARY

Gtllerai Edito'; Richard Gott

Brazil: The Peo ple and the Power

Miguel Arrae� was born in 1916 in North·East Brazil, where he lived until 1964. Early in his career he was made Financial Secretary to the State of Pernambuco and a member of the state parliament. He later became Mayor of Recife and in 1962 was elected Governor of Pernambuco, the first socialist to hold this office. In 1964, after the military coup, he went into exile. He now lives in Algeria and continues the struggle t o overthrow the Brazilian regime.

Brazil: The People and the Power Misue/ Arraes Translated by Lallcelot Sheppard

@

Penguin Books

Contents

Penguin Books Lt d, Harmondsworth.

Middlesex, England

Books Inc., 1110 Ambassador Road. B3himore, Maryland 11101, U.S.A. Penguin Books Australia Ltd, Ringwood. Victoria, Australia

Inlroducrion by Yves Goussault Foreword 19

Penguin

1 The Brazilian Economy 2 Brazilian Political Life

7

21 75

3

The Ru1ing Gasses: How They Dominatcd The People and Popular Movements

Translation copyright "itid. 'This new phenomenon - the t:mergt!ua.

Editora Brasiliensc, sao Paulo, ,964. vol. 4, p.

116.

37

we can produce under more advantageous conditions than the other countries, and to import everything that they �n produce more advantageously than we.' Joaquim Mortinho, his minister uf fin.mce, made it quite clear in 1901 : 'Produc. tion in new countries like ours cannot be developed without the aid of foreign capital and workmanship.' And so the movement for modernization was slowed down. The most reactionary forces seized power and set up a system of internal government which allowed imperialism, a new. comer on the political scene. to check the industrialization of the country. From this time onwards progressive forces were obliged to contend with the government's declared hostility. Up to 1930 they were reduced to plotting in secret. During this period of minority government of the Republic a series of rebellious movements shows the determination to seize control of the government from the hands of the bourgeoisie .

THE MINORITY REPUBLIC

The minority, now united again, took control of the machin· ery of economic policy. With the social classes concerned in the establishment of an urban industrial system removed from the centres of political decision, the new politiCO­ economic structure which prevailed in the country until 1930 took shape clearly as follows: (I) The important coffee planters : they secured control of the machinery of economic policy at the national level; at the same time they guaranteed stability to the central govern­ ment. (2) The other large estate owners; in the federal system set up by the Republic they possessed an effective guarantee of their interests through the definitive establishment of regional centres of political power. (3) International financial interests : they secured a privi-

38 Brazil: The People and the Power

The Brazilian Economy

lEged posicion in the country and the cootrol they exercised . very large profits. over production enabled tbem to obtam The central government held the balance between interests al home and activities abroad; between the coffee exporters and imperialism it adopted a policy of conciliation which found expression in the pursuit of the 'valorization' of our principal export. . With the help of exceptionally favourable condJtlons the production of coffee had developed with great strides : between 1890 and II}OO the plantations of the Sao Paulo region bad increased from 220 to po million heads. The crop which in 1880-81 had been 3-7 million sacks (of 60 kg_) rose on an average to 6-1 millions during the years I8&) to 1892. Ten years later (1B99-19()2.) on an average it exceeded 11-5 million sacks or 70 per cent of the annual world con­ sumption. These surpluses exerted growing pressure f�r a lowering of pric('s on the foreign market. to the great preJud­ ice of the exporters_ Taking advantage of the producers' difficult financial position international finance concentrated in the first place on the coffee industry. The treaty of Taubate n i iC)06 was the first step in the direction of what would be later called the 'policy of valoriza­ tion' of coffee. In short, this policy consisted in holding back considerable quantities of coffee in order to release them on the market a t times of expansion of demand or shortage of supplies from other producing countries. To finance the pur­ chase of the stocks accumulated by the coffee producers the governmenr was obliged to have recourse to foreign loans, which proved a heavy burden on the country's balance of payments: between 19

2.,261,125

1.793.045

+4

Brazil: The People and the Power

161

to ensure the coordination of the various forces supporting it,

hegemony that it had so farenjoyed. That it succeeded in con·

so that it remained as a widespread movement of public opinion.

tinuing in existence and e\·en in obtaining a certain number

PSD

lar movement, which imbued it with far greater political

The combined action of the forces of the left and the

- following the old policy of Getulio Vargas - made possible the election of Juscelino Kubitschek as president of the Re­ public. This electoral success designated an apparent victory for the nationalist parties. In fact, the Kubitschek government marked the failure of Vargas's principles. The nationalist groups and the parties of the left became more radical during this period, while the national bourgeoisie, having adopted a purely defensive position, lost ground economically in the face of the massive penetration of foreign capital. The demo­

of advantages could be attributed to the support of the popu­ strength than its own economic power could have ensured. Owing to economic development this inferior status of the

national bourgeoisie undermined the former agreement 00.

tween employers and workers at its foundation, in spite of

growing popular support. The economic structure itself was going to develop n i such a way that this agreement couId no

longer work.

In other words, the nationalist movement could in future count only on the people, since the bourgeoisie was giving

cratic and liberal atmosphere that undoubtedly prevailed

way to conditions imposed by the economic position. By thus

under Kubitschek's government, tended, as a matter of fact, to conceal this penetration of foreign capital and, indeed, the

the Vargas government; it was this that had served as the

surrendering they gave up the power that they held under

new economic position of the country.

support of the movement.

Thus the political successes achieved by the popular move­ ment were scarcely reflected on the economic front. There the

amounted to recognition of the division that had already

nationalists were held in check even when they had the ear of the government or even when they appeared to manipulate

At the economic level the coup d'etat of

1

April only

occurred in the structure of the nation itself. It only remained to remove from political life those connected with the popular movement who were occupying positions of responSibility in

it. At certain moments, it is rrue, they were successful in im­ peding the advance of illlvcrialislII fur ex,uuple in the Petro­

V3riOUS spheres of national life. This was done on this date:

nationalist aspirations checked the attempted penetration of

organizations.

-

bras affair, when Marshal lott's intervention on behalf of the international groups. But the general trend of the Ministry of Finance and the institutions depending on it during the whole of this period remained favourable to the principle of integration with the United States. The men in key positions almost always favoured the North American point of view, and external pressure, of course, was always

there to secure its adoption. The pro-American view thus

weighed decisively on all the import:mt questions of economic and financial policy.

On this account the �ational bourgeOiSie lost the economic

next it was the tum of the trade unions and other popular In fact there was no single coup d'etat but a series of inci­ dents leading up to the 6nal act of April 1¢4: in

1945.

the

1954. the crisis which led to 1955 the attempt [0 prevent Kubitschek's in 1961, the resignation of Janio Quadros and the

deposition of Vargas occurred; in Vargas's suicide; in investiture;

legality crisis - a term designating the constitutional crisis

provoked by those opposing Goulart's investiture: lastly, in

1964 the coup d'etat itself.

Matters had come to a head and the theory of the economic integration of Brazil with the USA couId now prevail. " •.•• _8

162

The Coup d'�tat of April 1964

Brazil: The People and the Power

This was due to the development of economic forces - the

integration with the American economy; this capitulation

preceding period had witnessed in fact an intensive influx of

was rendered an the easier by the dose subordination of .

foreign capital into Brazilian industry and the taking over

Brazilian industry to foreign, particularly North American,

of the control of strategic sectors of the economy; the possi­

capital.

bilities of industrial expamion. on the other hand, had In

1964

Thus in Brazil there were two factors intervening to put an end to the phase of independent development under the

reached the point of exhaustion. the replacement of imports by home-produced

influence of a nationalist bourgeoisie. On the one hand was

goods (hitherto essential in the industrialization of the

the fact that industrial development was losing its impetus

country) had

reached its limits. Consumer goods. both

as a result of the special characteristics of substituting home­

durables and non-durables. were already wholly produced in

produced goods for imports. This was now encountering the

the country; it good proportion of the raw materials and inter­

mediary products were processed in the country; investments

were

running at a

(jgur� uf at It!ilst 75 per cent with the plant

slow growth of the nternal i market arising particularly from the high concentration of income among the employers' sector which in its tum was conditioned by the special requirements

and machinery produced by Brazilian industry. On the other

of the capitalist mode of development. On the other hand,

hand imports - chiefly fuel, intennediate goods and plant and

there was the fact that the heavy investments made by the

machinery not produced in the country - representing nearly 4 per cent of the gross national product had reached a level

that could not be reduced without relative difficulty. As a result, the growth of industrial production in about

1961

began to show signs of running down. This loss of im·

petus in the industrial se(:tor increased during the next few years, leading to a relaxation in the growth of the Brazilian

economy. The fact hecame very crease in

per capita income.

clear

in

1963

with the de­

This dormant stale of affairs was not therefore an isolated phenomenon, the result of passing events. It revealed the ex­ haustion of the type of development Ihat Brazil had experi­ enced during the preceding ten years, based essentially on the substitution of home-produced goods for imports. It had grown impossible to maintain �he level of investments in the industrial sectors concerned with the home market. The economic stagnation deprived the Brazilian bour­ geoisie of its remaining power of resistance. The actual im­ possibility of expansion was the cause of the complete capitulation of the bourgeoisie in favour of the policy of

•

163

imperialist groups gave foreign capital control over a large

part of national production. As a consequence in 1/)64 condi­ tions were ripe for an agreement between the Brazilian indus­ trial bourgeoisie and imperialism.

As imperialism effected its massive penetration of the Brazilian economy it laid plans to win the battle on the political and military fronts. On the military front the coup d'etat was preceded by the thorough indoctrination of the officers of all the armed forces,

many of them spending periods of training in the United States. Since the war the failure of various attempts al mili­ tary intervention made this preparation necessary; plans had been made for a long time beforehand, particularly at the Higher School of Warfare.

On the political front the national sectors linked with

imperialism were organized wilhin the framework of the National Democratic Union - a body which did not conceal its dose connection with foreign interests. despite the fact that among its members were to be found eminent nationalist

figures, such as the minister Gabriel Passes. In its articles of

164

The Coupd'Etat ofApril lg64

Brazil: The Pr;ople and the Power

association was the statement asserting the fundamental role of foreign capital in the development of the country. Specialized organizations, inter-party and otherwise, arose around the UDN with the purpose of encouraging political action favourable to imperialism. Some of the most important were the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (lBAD) and Parliamentary Democratic Action (ADEP), which in­

165

were fighting each other for power, they were both pursuing the same policy. This was by no means unheard of. since

a

similar agreement between two opponents had already contri­ buted to the downfall of Vargas in 1945. Lacerda and Kubits­ chek, moreover, were to show dearly that they were not irreconcilable enemies when after the coup d'etat they

collaborated in establishing the

Frr.:nte

ampla (literally, the

cluded a very numerous group of deputies.

wide front).

post-war period had all more or less totally failed. Vargas's

tendencies to be found on the economic front. Caught be­

The various attempts at military intervention made in the

suicide, for example, was torally unexpected and prevented

the coup d'etat being brought to a successful conclusion. These failures show that the problem couJd not be solved by mere force of arms; political and military solutions had to go hand in hand. The greatest political victory obtained by the UON was

The instability of Goulart's government reflected the

tween political forces on the left and those interests within

tbe country allied with foreign capital, Goulart's govern.

lIIeul .showtil lhe al;tual illl po.s:>ibili ty of political power based

on the advantage of certain clearly defined interests. The econom.ic policy then followed could satisfy no one: all the interests in conflict - national industry, imperialism, the

amounted actually to failure. The political solution was

workers, the large-estate owners, the peasants - were at the same time its beneficiaries and its victims. The internal con­

government. There was a twofold objective in view: the

of Vargas and reached a critical pt.int in 1964.

the election of Tanio Quadros, but its final consequences always enVisaged by these same forces under Joao Goulart's

political isolation of the government in order to facilitate a possible coup d'etat and preparation for the elections if a solution by force of arms proved to be impossible.

Putting up candidates in advance in the persons of Carlos

lacerda (UON) and Juscelino Kubitschek (PSO) to succeed Goulart was quite certainly a move to embarrass the govern­ ment. By opening the campaign for the succession, and thus at an early dale provoking the dear alignment of forces, the traditional parties aimed a t obliging Goulart to make an early choice : he must either come to an agreement with them or else adopt an independent position; in this case he would have to be content with the support of the popular movement, and

a t that time if nii! not possess the means effectively to oppose the

,,:"0 �werful electoral machines dominating the country.

ObJectively, and despite the fact tbat the two candidates

tradictions of the situation had heen evolVing since the death DUring the final months of its period in office the Goulart government endeavoured to reformulate its policy, relying on the support of the masses and the more thoughtflll sections of the middle class.

The political battle was practically lost. The only advan­ tages on the government side were the possession of the people's confidence. its own legitimacy and the general aware­

ness of the inevitability of the reforms. Events preceding the army's action added reinforcements to the opposition in the form of a large section of the middle dass who joined as the result of an n i tensive propaganda campaign. A law extending a guaranteed minimum wage to em­ ployees in the agricultural regions increased considerably the remuneration of workers suffering from a very low standard

of Jiving. Its most marked effect was to unite the landed pro-

.

166

The Coup d'Etat of April

Brazil: The People and the Power

prietors against the government; the lowness of the wages paid to their workers had always been their principal -asset, and they were accustomed to the advantages of a cheap labour force. Thus the prospect of agrarian reform 611ed them with

1964

16]

fluential on the political front and succeeded n i fOisting the

idea of integration even on the armed forces. The outcome. could then be foreseen; it was the conclusion which flowed

logically from the forces at work.

A radical change in the structure of Brazilian society had

horror. Laws concerning the transfer abroad of profits and the nationalization of the oil refineries ran directly counter to

occurred with the death of Vargas in 1954. The importance

of this was not always appreciated by the nationalists or by

imperialist interests; they did not therefore obtain the sup­

left-wing parties. Lacking accurate knowledge of the new

port of a bourgeoisie only mildly n i terested in the inde­

situation they did not feel compelled to formulate a new in­

pendent development of the country. Some few individual

clusive plan of action. Perhaps their political victories con­

industrialists may have welromed it, but as a whole they

cealed a more general view of the situation from them and

went to swell the ranks of the opposition. Finally, in the last week of March the closing of rhe discount branch of the Bank

caused them to underestimate the power of their opponents.

of Brazil deprived industry of an easy source of credit.

should have envisaged a different type of political action,

Reformulation of policy came therefore too late as the government was already isolated and had lost the support of

11

has now bcx:ome clear that from this time onwards they

and reshaped the strategy and tactics of the popular move­ ment.

those sections of the population on which i t could preViously

It is true that during the years before the coup thCIe

count. It is true that its popularity ncreased i among the

were numerous interpretations of the Brazilian situation and

poorer sections of the people but the organizations repre­

a whole series of plans. But these studies were not the ex­

senting these social classes were in no position to confront on

pression of

their own the powerful forces ranged against them, for the

they were merely the reflection of the many varied political

'government' was not merely the President of the Republic

trends in the several sections of Brazilian society. In this

an

inclusive and cohereD[ view of the situation;

but also the National Congress, the governors of the states, the armed forces, the various national and regional authori­

climate of ideological Coof11510n any artempt at comprehen­ sive and unified action against the existing politiro-economic

ties and institutions which almost without exception were

structure was doomed to failure. There was nothing left but

opposed to the measures recently adopted. It seemed clear

partial and isolated efforts, and these were ineffective because

that the conflict could be resolved only by force; either the

they in no way questioned the value of the system as a whole.

government was to impose the reforms demanded by the

Any desire to effect stmctural reforms under the gUidance

nation, or the reactionaries would overthrow the government

of a nationalist bourgeoisie had become utopian. The most

and thus emphaSize further the country's subordination to

advanced sections among the employers were certainly in

the United States.

favour of these refomls,

but that is another question.

The coup thus appears as the result of a slow process of

Actually it was by the conciliation of the traditional eco­

hy imperialism and of its alliance with those

nomic sections that the rapid process of economic develop­ ment had been made po>siblc. As we have seen, Ihe first

infilmtion

internal forces which would accept its domination. These forces, already in control of me economic sector, became in-

Vargas government had encouraged the large-estate owners'

168

Brazil: The People and the Power

interests as well as those of industry. Consequently, preser· vation of the agrarian structure, far from being an obstacle to industrial development, had become a prerequisite for it. There was no serious question of agrarian reform; it was pre­ vented by the policy of conciliation and this was continued down to the present time. Lastly. after Vargas's death the alliance of the industrial bourgeoisie with foreign capital

CHAPTER 6

The Military Regime

prevented its working for the independence of the country. Thus it seems that circumstances, particularly after '954, demanded a political reformulation which was only achieved in the last months of the Goulart government when a few

The coup d'etat of 1 April 1964 brought to power the most

measures were taken with the support of the masses alone.

reactionary and backward military factions in Brazil; they

But no one created a united,

resolutely

anti·imperialist politi­

were supporters of the economic integration of the country

cal structure capable of assuming responsibility in the face of

with the imperialist interests of the American economy. The

this new situation.

new government's principal objective was the adaptation of

In the past independence was compromised by various

all departments of Brazilian life, in its economy, social and

sections of the ruling class. At the present time it is com­

military organization, education and ideology. to the new

promised by the industrial bourgeoisie which has now allied

form of foreign domination.

itself with imperialism after previously being united for some

After the coup the two successive military governments

time with the people. Even if the imperialist position is not

maintained perfect political unity in their pursuit of the 0b­

held by all the leaders of industry as individuals and as

jectives laid down for them. Both followed a general plan

Brazilians. nonetheless i t is that of the bourgeoisie as a class.

whose purpose was to emure the consistency of the measures

In these circumstances it is for the people. for the poor and

adopted for the consolidation of imperialist domination over

middle-class sections of

the country. Both governments took care to give priority

Brazilian

society.

direction of the struggle for national liberation.

to

undertake

to

comprehenSive measures dealing with the country's economic

and institutional structure rather than to be concerned with details; both were aware that time was required to complete the establishment of the new type of domination now made possible by the development of the Brazilian and North American economies; they saw that this could only be achieved within the framework of a long-tenn programme. To understand exactly the measures adopted in all fields of national life it s i important, therefore. to consider the comprehensive and unifonn character of the actions under­ taken; in addition they must be seen from the long·term view-

170

Brazil: The People and the Power

The: Military Regime:

171

point. In this wide context these apparently isolated and

superiority of the United States integration means in actual

indiscriminate actions assume significance.

fact subordination of the Brazilian economy to North Ameri�

For this reason, if we are to avoid the only too frequent

mistakes that arise from partial analyses of national prob­ lems, we must continually have in mind the fundamental

can imperialist interests. These are the conditions of this subordination :

(I)

At the economic level the regime must control directly

data of the problem. Analyses made exclusively within the

the country's production. This control presupposes, of cornse,

narrow framework of immediate activities do not provide a

a close alliance with the Brazilian borngeoisie, an alliance

general view of the political activities of the country. A

which here and now has been achieved in all its essentials.

comprehensive analysiS of imperialist action can alone furnish

The isolated attitude of a few industrialists opposed to this

the data that would enable appreciation of what s i obtained

subordination is no indication of the position of their class

from observation of apparently isolated events; in this way

too the connection between the facts can be seen and the

as a whole. (2.) Politically the new regime must dominate the machin­

general plan of domination to which lht:y Ix:long madc uul.

ery of government in order to make it serve tllt: illlt:!t'Sl:i uf

Exact knowledge of these events and their situation wi thin

foreign capital. In view of the extensive and widespread

the framework of this plan shows the direction to be follow�

nature of the popular movement the necessary preliminary

in face of the enemy's acts which, without this general view,

to this domination is the liquidation of the workers' and

appear to be lacking in order and sometimes contradictory.

peasants' organizations and their replacement by new ones

Such knowledge prOvides the individual with the indispen.

subject to imperialist interests.

sable facts enabling him to corne to a decision about the role

(3) So far as security is concerned, political and police

can·

to be adopted in the struggle. A comprehensive view of im­

trol of the whole population is essential in order to foresee

perialist action can rid us of the illusion that it can easily be

and prevent any attempted opposition to the regime.

led into error; this illusion occurs when imperialism is can·

(4) Socially it is necessary to establish attractive future

fused with the mf'n who in appearance are temporarily

pro.�pect� for thf' mirlrlle classes :mrl to create jobs for techni·

governing the country.

cians and intellectuals so that their adhesion to and integra­

The personality of these men is not of course unimportant and their action, according to its degree of effectiveness, can

tion in the regime may be assured.

(5)

Psychologically, the regime must create an ideological

facilitate or impede the progress of imperialism. It is certain

climate favourable to the acceptance of the new system by

nonetheless that they can be rapidly replaced when they fall.

large sections of the population and capable of winning over

Perfect political and economic knowledge of the nation's

to the policy of subordination those sections of opinion which

condition and of the effects of imperialism are essential and

still oppose it.

every effort must be made in this direction; this knowledge

The economic control of the country, in this further stage

should extend to identification of the people and of the

of foreign domination, is to be acquired principally by direct

groups in the service of imperialism. Undeniably the regime's fundamental aim is integration

investment in various sectors of production: in industry.

with the United States. Given the economic and technical

The first measures taken by Castelo Branco's government

agricultrne and in mining.

The Military Regime

1 72 Brazil: The People and the Power in the limiting of credit to the economy were put before the people as necessary for the rehabilitation of the currency and for the cure of inflation. These extremely violent measures were intended nonetheless to create financial difficulties for undertakings in the different sectors of industry and to allow imperialist control

to

be extended over

the country's

economy. It led to the purchase of a whole series of industries by North American capital. These industries, finding them­ selvcl deprived of local credit facilities for their immediate working, were not in a position to resist foreign pressure.

173

appropriate ministry in Washington and the compensation thought necessary was paid by the government of the United States, which became the creditor of the Brazilian govern· ment for this sum, reserving the right to recoup it from any credit held by the Brazilian government in the USA. Settle­ ment was always to be made in dollars. Should one of the

governments renounce the treaty, investors would have six months more to ask for guarantees, and when these were obtained firms could send in their records for a period of twenty years following the cancellation of the treaty.

Other ndustrialists i opted for survival through formulas

Through association with the leaders of Brazilian industry

associating them with the American investors. For a great

foreign investors obtained representation of their n i terests thus could They nationals. own its by within the country

number of small and medium-sized businesses it meant ruin and bankruptcy pure and Simple. Credit restriction produced

profit from the s()-Called measures of 'protection' for national

a stronger concentration of industry, weeded out those busi·

industry. In this way through its association with Brazilian

nesses which did not reach the level of efficiency thought

firms imperialism was able to profit by all the legislation

necessary to justify their survival and led to the growth in

brought in before 1964 for the purpose of encouraging in·

importance and influence of the great monopolies. Elimination of any kind of risk to foreign capital was en· sured by the Agreement Relating to Investment Guaranties,

dustrial development. In this way, too, it benefited from exemption from taxes, long-term loans in Brazilian currency, preferential rates of exchange and so on.

signed in February 1965 between Brazil (Castelo Branco's

From this association, also, Brazilian industries obtained

government) and the United States. This treaty confirmed

in the first place access to international financial support and

the policy of the sectors under USA domination and trans­

to external sources of credit. The support that they received

lated into fact the recommendation in the statutes of the

at this time from the international combines enabled them

UDN regarding foreign capital. It provided North American

also to reach a more advanced technological stage, creating

investors with greater facilities than those normally enjoyed

in the country a mistaken feeling of 'modernization'. 1m·

by national investors and on this account forms an excellent

perialist action, since it eqUipped and made more profitable

illustration of the trend in foreign relations.

certain types of industry, o'n occasion created the illusion

According to this treaty a North American industry could

that it was making a positive contribution in some sectors.

ask the Brazilian government for the issue of a guarantee

Actually, this progress was principally intended to improve

against damage of any kind that it might suffer as a result of

conditions for exploiting the country.

inflation, appropriation. revolution and so on. By the grant

More recently, by the time that imperialism had carried

of this guarantee, the Brazilian government at once lost all right of judgement: if the undertaking asserted that it had suffered injury the matter went before the officials of the

out the essentials of its plan to gain a foothold in the various sectoTs of industry, the Brazilian bourgeoiSie discovered a new way of deriving profit from its association with foreign

174

Brazil: The Pe:ople: and the Power

capital. This took the fonn of the possibility of being able to invest in foreign firms. Sucb investments did not amount to an etl"ective victory on the parr of the Brazilian bourgeoisie for it always appeared as an auxiliary, an accessory and as sub­ sidiary to imperialism, which in any case was in complete control of the investments. All the same, these operations held out the prospect of an exploitation of the country in dose collaboration. Of course, there were some employers who did not take pan in the alliance with the Americans. Some of tbem de· rived no direct advantage from this association. But it is cerrain that tbey aU bad one n i terest in common - the main tenance of the status quo :md the reduction of the wage­ earners' share in the national income. The predominance of onc sector of production could never cause the destruction of this fundamental solidarity between the different sections of the ruling classes. At the time when coffee was the principal product, for example, the other sectors were no less concerned to preserve the social structures prevailing in the State until 1930. The same is true today when foreign n i terests and the more important section of the Brazilian bourgeoisie are pre­ dominant; the other sectors confine themselves to the quest for possible concessions from within the regime to enable them to survive and even to make progress side by side with the others. The present attempts at 'humanization' of the economy correspond precisely to the need to gain control over the sectors that are not immediately connected with foreign capital, to widen the bases of government and, as a result, those of imperialism, within the ruling classes. To the penetration of foreign capital into industry must be added the concessions made to the international combines in the field of tbe mineral wealth of the country. As with industry. the form in which me country is exploited am be direct or by means of the agency of Brazilian associates. i carThe exploiration of the mineral resources of Brazil s

The: Military Re:gime

17>

ried on on a large scale whether it is for the provision of raw materials for ndustries i at home or for export to me USA, . where the minerals are used in industry or are stock'pUed against a time of scarcity. At the present time we are witnessing a fresh onslaught on the oil industry, which is a State monopoly. Here i� � i a much more hazardous affair owing to the far greater VIgilance of the public; for a long time people have been alive to this problem. The arguments put forward to justify giving up Brazilian oil to foreign capital are dishonest and are sup­ ported now by more direct action going so far as sabotage of Petrobras, the State company. There has been no essential l:hangt' in the relations of the agricultural sector to the urban industrial sector and to im­ perialism. We have seen how the economic int�ratio� of the , . national territory, the result of Vargas s policy durmg hIS first government, led to a close association between the interests of the agricultural and urban industrial sectors of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. This concurrence of interests enabled the ruling class to preserve a remarkable political unity. The alliance between the two sectors of the Brazilian bom· geoisie is at the present time of capit:ll impn�t:mc.e fo� the . imperialists, as they see in it a guarantee of URlty of pohl1cal action for the preservation of the present regime. Actually, the large-estate owners formed the principal support for the April 1964 coup and they remain among the most reliable upholders of the new government. The political unity of the ruling class has thus become indispensable to imperialism if it is to bring its programme of integration to a successful conclusion. Despite the political strength due to its system of alliances, the latifundio is nevertheless economically weak on account of the decadent forms of capitalism prevailing in the nm-I areas of Brazil. Its obvious economic inefficiency makes it

176 Brazil: The People and the Power incapable of ensuring the increase in the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials necessary not only for tbe expansion of the system, but also to obtain foreign currency for the country by exporting to the developed countries. On the other band. the intense concentration of income caused by the system of large estates prevents that extension of the home market necessary for industrial development. Lastly. the ability to make a large profit by the use of cheap labour. an essential principle of the latifundio system which ensured irs survival, stood "in the way of investment that could lead to the introduction of modern technological methods necessary to increase agricultural production. Imperial ism and the military party directly associ ated with i t are well aware of the weakness of their ally and are striving to find a solution to the economic problems of the latifundios which will also serve their political interests. At the Punta del Este conference (1961) the problem was raised quite clear­ ly and the term 'agrarian reform', hitherto forbidden as highly subversive, made its appearance in an official document at an international level. Directly he came to power, Castelo Branco rackled the land problem and on 9 November of that same year obtained the approval of Congress for an amend­ ment to the constitution in the �Iion clealing with expro­ priation. Previous regulations laid down that there must be a preliminary payment in cash for expropriated land; the new rules authorized payment by national bonds repayable in twenty years. On }o November the 'Land Law' was approved. It was a serious attempt to lay down the rules for the new government's agrarian policy. This legislation, whose purpose was to remedy the ec0nomic advantages of the large-estate system, prOVided two kinds of action; on the one hand it aimed at the creation of an economically stable rural middle class occupying a posi­ tion between the great landowners and the peasants; on the other. i t was intended as a means to raise agricultural pro-

The Military Regime

171

duction by mechanization and the adoption of advanced methods of cultivation. To encourage the creation of a rural middle class the government would be able 10 use, among other legal mea­ sures, the sharing out of land and the colonization of hitherto virgin territory. Increase in production was expected as a result of various measures, such as technical assistance, mechanization, financial help and credit, rural electrification. subsidiary works, minimum price guarantees for farm pro­ duce. etc. Despite the alacrity with which the problem was initially tackled these measures remained at the stage of preliminary studies and statistical illvtstigaliou. Tilt: [t:w t:xpruprialiQus actually carried out were merely to save certain landowners from ruin. The really rather limited procedure for dividing up estates, as provided by the law, was not even applied. As a matter of fact the stubborn resistance of the landowners did not allow even the Simplest measures to be put into operation. Those of a more general nature provoked violent protests from all the landowners and the military party found itself threatened with the loss of a further source of support. This resistance on the part of the landowners to any change in the agricultural structure of the countTy derives from the labour problem. It has already been pointed out that the existence of a plentiful and cheap labour force, which could be transferred without difficulty from one type of work 10 another, is the key to the economic profitability of the large estates as a fonn of capitalist organization. Furthermore, control over the land and direct authority over a great parr of the population ensured for the great landowners considerable political power. The colonization measures and the transfer of surplus man­ power to unoccupied regions of the country would have de­ prived the landowners of precisc�y what enabled them to hold on. The inevitable increase in the cost of manpower result-

178

Brazil: The People and the Power

ing from these measures would have necessitated the enti�e reconstruction of the whole system if it was to remam economicaUy profitable. It would have been thrown Out of . joint and the distinct characteristics of the estate-ownmg class would cease to exist. Mere increase in the productivity of the land or of labour, if it were not accompanied by a large-scale redistribution of ownership so as to provide a living for a large number of workers, would cause a massive increase in rural unemploy­ ment and make the political problems created by the peasant masses still more acute. Under these conditions imperialism was obliged to facilitate so far as it could the preservation of the status quo in order to protect its alliance with the rural bourgeoisie. At the same rime it endeavoured, unsuc· cessfully, to prevent further worsening of the social situation in the country districts by various measures of assistance. On the political front the first steps taken by the govern· ment fonned after the coup were directed against the workers', peasants', students' and trade union organizations with a view to abolishing them. This was of importance both for the imperialists and the Brazilian bourgeoisie. The former wished to get rid of a very popular political movement whose roots were among the people and which was hostile to foreign domination - the only movement, in fact, capable of holding it in check; the latter wished to prevent the wage claims and political demands of the masses. In other words, the destruc· tion of the popular movement was intended to prevent any possibility of effective opposition to the new regime and to oblige the masses to submit to the necessity of integration with the economy of the United States. Next came the turn of public freedom, which vanished from aU sections of national life. The various Constirutional Acts of the 1966 Constitution concentrated in the hands of the federal executive greater powers than had ever been known in the history of Brazil, even during the periods of

The Military Regime

179

dictatorship. The concentration of powers in the hands of the president of the Republic was one of the headings chosen by . the coup's instigators under which to arrack Goulart's government. However. once in power they increased this concentration considerably. Similarly, the new government claimed to be restoring the power of the member states of the Federations which had been gradually reduced for the benefit of the federal executive. Nevertheless, ever since the coup d'etat the federal system had been even more severely limited than before. The concentration of power and lessening of the authority of the member states are direct consequences of the country's economic state. They result from the need to regulat� t'l:o. nomic activities, to organize State intervention in the economic field and for a minimum of planning in the channel· ling of government investments and activities. In this sense the necessity for concentration of power goes back to well before the coup. The difference between then and now is that at present this concentration is for a new purpose. It is meant to ensure the coherence and convergence of all measures to facilitate subordination of the Brazilian economy. The federal structure, with its multiplicity of regional and local powers. formed an obstacle to activities of the milit:uy party which had seized power. It was necessary for it to transform regional authorities into mere government representatives and subject them to severe con trol. The same need for intervention in the economic life of the country led to the attempt to submit the National Congress and the regional legislative assemblies to military control so as to achieve fleXibility of legislation for the needs of integra­ tion. The suppression of the multi-party system and the creation of two new parties. one the governmental, the other the opposition party, comes not only from the desire to preserve a semblance of democracy but also, and principally, from the

ISo

Brazil: The; Pe;op le; and the; Powe;r

The; Military Re;gime;

intention to establish a political organization capable of en­ suring the operation of the government's plan and the trans­ mission of the orders of the military authority to the country. The existence of an 'agreed opposition' changes nothing in tbe dictatorial nature of the regime since this opposition is in every case strictly subjected to the Tules laid down by the government. Obedience to these rules transforms the opposi­ tion into a part of the system, entirely incapable of offering the slightest resistance to the military dictatorship. All these measures (the purge, centralization of decision making, reorganization of the parties, etc.) were aimed at a modification in the previous structure of government. The

new structure

s i meant to prevent the political mobilization

of the people as alJowed by the theoretical freedom in force.

Political power was to be reshaped to facilitate carrying out the plan of integrating the country with the United States. Thus, to ensure the consolidation of the new form of domina­ tion, the State prOVided itself with the repressive machinery that it needed to eliminate all obstacles in its way.

�

The various measures for the modification and reorganiza­

t on of national life also affected the police forces very con­ Siderably. Both tbe military governments strove to increase and modernize the police, to tum it into a repressive force able to ensure strict control of the population. The immediate obj�tive �f this intensification of police action is painfully obvIous : It was to stop the popular and mass-appeal organi­ zations from reforming and continuing their political activi4 ties. It was intended to forestall manifestations against the government, prevent the growth of a climate of opinion hostile to the government's policy, and suppress mass move­ ments and popular demands on both

the political and

economic fronts. For this purpose the government could count on the finan­ cial support and direct technical assistance of the United States. Their various specialist services, coordinated by their

t8t

embassy in Rio de Janeiro, played a decisive role in this reorganization. An unprecedenterl llmount of material and · technical aid was put to work in the cities and rural districts and training of specialized personnel was increasingly to the fore.

Through the control of the various branches of the police that this coUaboration brought them, the Americans were in

a position to make use of the Brazilian information services for their own purposes. The National Infoonation Service set up under the Castelo Branco government functioned in close collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency. With the intensification of police activity the army also began to undertake police work and to take part n i the control of

the civil populations. It had its share in the campaign of

Violent repression inflicted on the country after April 1964, and many of the barracks became centres in this campaign. The failure of this system of police repression is now ob­ vious. At the present time, after the state of paralysiS follow· n i g immediately on the coup. the popular movement and the mass organizations are slowly setting to work again and seeking new forms of expression. There is a succession of protest movements;

demonstrations in the streers are In·

creasingly numerous; new leaders. better prepared for the struggle through the harshness of the regime. have come to the fore and give evidence of great courage. Despite the power of the police, the oppressed Brazilian masses are rapidly pre­ paring for new foons of the political struggle and the decisive confrontation with imperialism and the regime. On the politico-social front one of the government's greatest concerns was to ensure that there was a contented urban middle class by giving them the opportunity of attractive, pleasant and stable condilions of life. Several sec­

tions of the middle class. who felt their privileges threatened,

had supported the coup in 1964 and the military regime thai

181

Brazil: The: P&Op!e: and the: Powe:r

it established n i the country. By propaganda n i favour of

The: Military Re:gime:

183

middle classes in general, and still more of course with the

freedom, in the name of the ideals of liberty and the preserva­ tion of Christian and moral values. coupled with promises of

wages of the masses of urban workers. In this wayan attempt ·

agreeable social prospects, the leaders of the coup had ob­

setting the rest of the pop�lation. in the hope that by their

tained the support of the middle classes. Most of the press, together with radio and television, welcomed these ideas, and a well-planned campaign succeeded in hiding from public opinion the coup's real objectives_ Yet the situation of economic stagnation. and even regres­ sion, that characterized Castelo Branco's government was such that the middle classes soon lost their enthusiasm. The military group in power saw that they must not let this dis­ appointment on the part of one of the government's allies, which also regarded itself as one of its chief beneficiaries,

degenerate into political dissatisfaction. Support of the middle classes and particularly of the tech­ nicians and intellectuals thus became a necessary preliminary before the government could give the impression of a mini­ mum of democracy and of the controlled 'liberalization' of the regime. A large-scale conversion of the middle classes was therefore absolutely necessary for the regime as .such and not merely for its successive governments. Now this support has been won, through the device of using the middle classes for tecqnical or intellectual tasks apparently devoid of poli­ tical implications but which in reality served the interests of imperialism. Technicians, specialists in very varied fields, members of the liberal profesSions and intellectuals in general were used

in the country in differing but detenninate activities. Some

were directly connected with production while others were

confined to research of benefit apparently to the development

of the country, to social progress or national education.

was made to free the technicians from the daily cares be­

good knowledge of the special conditions prevailing in the country they would become more efficient in applying the measures essential to the functioning of the system.

Rationalization of the processes of production aimed at an

improved application of technology, far from being in the national interest as is claimed, actually provides the oppor­ tunity for putting the knowledge and labour of thousands to the service of foreign capital. And many of these are well informed enough to be personally hostile to imperialist domination. In the same way the schemes of education and social assistance carried out by Brazilians fascinated by professional technicians' use of modern techniques are aimed at the crc­

ation of an emotional and ideological climate favourable to American domination. In this general context, favourable to imperialism, the specialist bodies and the organizations for industrial and agricultural development (to all intents and purposes by the very nature of their activities) were transformed into auxi­ liary organizations of imperialist penetration. The activities were pursued, of course, under the guise of support and pro­ tection of the national economy_ But in actual fact, in the absence of all differentiation between national and foreign

capital there was no stimulant to the national economy which did not become at the same time a stimulant to imperialist penetration. In the various departments of research, both in the natural

as in the human sciences, Brazilian technicians have opened

Thus the technicians belonging to the val'iOllS government

Ollt far-reaching po�sihilities. The government h;ls �eemed

bodies had the benefit of salary increases out of all proportion

disposed to give Brazilian specialists living abroad for some

with those of other civil servants or of other members of the

motive or other, including even political persC{;ution at its

184 Brazil: Tht: Pt:oplt: and tht: Powt:r own hands, the possibiliry of returning to Brazil, offering them posts of distinction with bigh salaries. The possibility of having large resources at their disposal and the use of modern technical apparatus is naturally attractive to scientists who would prefer to work in their own country, in the belief that they will thus be making some contribution to its development. The emphasis placed on the technical aspects enables the military power's real intention

to be hidden; many people are upset, for it is true that it is difficult to oppose the transformation of the country.

By modernizing a whole series of jobs and facilitating the

carrying out of certain works, the imperialists sometimes give the impression that they are making a positive contribution. This is similar in every way to what happened at the begin­ ning of tbe century; loans intended for the construction of ports and railways seemed to many to be for the good of the nation, but although ports and railways in themselves con­ stitute progress, undeniably this progress was intended ex­ clUSively

[0

improve conditions under which tbe country

could be exploited by foreigners. The present 'modernization' is no different. Many of those who in otber respects sincerely reject subordination to the United States are actually working

for it by the collaooratiull Ih"t for various rt!