Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms (Global Issues Series)

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Arming Conflict The Proliferation of Small Arms

Mike Bourne

Global Issues Series General Editor: Jim Whitman

This exciting new series encompasses three principal themes: the interaction of human and natural systems; cooperation and conflict; and the enactment of values. The series as a whole places an emphasis on the examination of complex systems and causal relations in political decision-making; problems of knowledge; authority, control, and accountability in issues of scale; and the reconciliation of conflicting values and competing claims. Throughout the series the concentration is on an integration of existing disciplines towards the clarification of political possibility as well as impending crises. Titles include: Berhanykun Andemicael and John Mathiason ELIMINATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Prospects for Effective International Verification Mike Bourne ARMING CONFLICT The Proliferation of Small Arms Roy Carr-Hill and John Lintott CONSUMPTION, JOBS AND THE ENVIRONMENT A Fourth Way? John N. Clarke and Geoffrey R. Edwards (editors) GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Malcolm Dando PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE The Failure of American Leadership Toni Erskine (editor) CAN INSTITUTIONS HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations Brendan Gleeson and Nicholas Low (editors) GOVERNING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT Global Problems, Ethics and Democracy Roger Jeffery and Bhaskar Vira (editors) CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN PARTICIPATORY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Ho-Won Jeong (editor) GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Institutions and Procedures APPROACHES TO PEACEBUILINDING Alexander Kelle, Kathryn Nixdorff and Malcolm Dando CONTROLLING BIOCHEMICAL WEAPONS Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st Century

W. Andy Knight A CHANGING UNITED NATIONS Multilateral Evolution and the Quest for Global Governance W. Andy Knight (editor) ADAPTING THE UNITED NATIONS TO A POSTMODERN ERA Lessons Learned Kelley Lee (editor) HEALTH IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION Towards Global Governance GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH An Introduction Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson (editors) MAKING URBAN TRANSPORT SUSTAINABLE Catherine Lu JUST AND UNJUST INTERVENTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS Public and Private Robert L. Ostergard Jr. (editor) HIV, AIDS AND THE THREAT TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Graham S. Pearson THE UNSCOM SAGA Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation THE SEARCH FOR IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation Andrew T. Price-Smith (editor) PLAGUES AND POLITICS Infectious Disease and International Policy Michael Pugh (editor) REGENERATION OF WAR-TORN SOCIETIES Marco Verweij and Michael Thompson (editors) CLUMSY SOLUTIONS FOR A COMPLEX WORLD Governance, Politics and Plural Perceptions Bhaskar Vira and Roger Jeffery (editors) ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN PARTICIPATORY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Simon M. Whitby BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST CROPS

Global Issues Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–79483–4 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Arming Conflict The Proliferation of Small Arms

Mike Bourne Research Fellow, Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

© Mike Bourne 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–01933–1 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–01933–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bourne, Mike, 1975– Arming conflict : the proliferation of small arms / Mike Bourne. p. cm.—(Global issues) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-10: 0–230–01933–1 (cloth) ISBN-13: 978–0–230–01933–1 (cloth) 1. Social conflict. 2. Arms transfers. 3. Firearms. 4. Illegal arms transfers. I. Title. HM1121.B68 2007 327.1743—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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Contents

List of Tables

vii

List of Figures and Diagram

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

List of Abbreviations

xiii

Part I Weapons Spread 1 Introduction 2 Structure and Dynamic in Weapons Spread: The Trade and Proliferation of Weapons in Comparative Perspective

3

14

Part II The Global Level: Global Markets and Dynamic Structures of SALW Spread 3 The Foundations and Construction of Global SALW Trade 4 Global Structures and SALW Flows to Conflict

55 88

Part III The Regional Level: The Neglected Dimension 5 In Between the Global and the Conflict: Regional Facilitation and the Construction of Networks 6 Structures and Dynamics of Intra-regional SALW Spread to Conflicts

121 139

Part IV The Conflict-Complex Level and Arming Patterns 7 Arming Conflict from the Bottom-Up: SALW Spread at the Conflict level

v

181

vi

Contents

8 Constructing Top-Down Arming Patterns: Sovereignty, Money, Networks, and the Cumulative Impact of Structures and Dynamics of SALW Spread 9 Conclusion

206

Notes

249

Bibliography

253

Index

270

238

List of Tables 2.1 Weapons spread structures and applicable images 3.1 Small arms, light weapons and ammunition producers 3.2 Tiers of producers of small arms, light weapons and ammunition 3.3 Distribution of licensed production by region 3.4 Distribution of licensed production by tier 3.5 Licensors and client states 4.1 Multilateral arms embargoes in force on conflict-complexes since 1990 6.1 Regional Covert Aid to Insurgent Groups in the Post-Cold War Era 8.1 SALW acquisition by states in conflict

vii

32 57 63 64 64 65 93 144 222

This page intentionally left blank

List of Figures and Diagram 2.1 Spectrum of SALW Transfers 2.2 SALW flows through levels of analysis 4.1 Extra-regional stages of CIA pipelines during the Cold War

ix

31 50 102


Acknowledgements Throughout the long process of researching and writing this book numerous people have been of invaluable support and inspiration. I am indebted to colleagues at the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) and the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. In particular, I thank Owen Greene, who supervised the doctoral work that this book draws upon. Thanks too to Jim Whitman for his support in getting this published; and to all other colleagues in CICS for their patience and encouragement during the writing process. On a personal note, my deepest gratitude goes to my family and friends who over the years have engaged with my work, and given me respite from it. In particular, to my parents, to Richard, to Gurch Sanghera, Isabelle Ioannides, Toby Feakin, Juliette Ebrahimi, Eva Martin, Gerrard Quille, Marta Martinelli-Quille, Jez Littlewood, and many others who have all played a part in any success of this research (and have no part in its failings). Thank you.

xi


List of Abbreviations ADF ADFL AFL AFRC-RUF ANC APMs BND BTWC CDF CFE CIA CICS CIS CTBT CWC DDR DIE DRC ECOWAS EFTA EPLF ETA EU EUC FAL FAR FARC FDD FDN FIS/AIS FLAA FLN FMAP FMLN FNLA

Allied Democratic Forces Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Armed Forces of Liberia Armed Forces Revolutionary Council African National Congress Anti-personnel Landmines Bundesnachrichtendienst Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Civil Defence Forces Conventional Forces in Europe Central Intelligence Agency Centre For International Cooperation and Security Chartered Industries of Singapore Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Chemical Weapons Convention Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Departamentul de Informatii Externe Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Community of West African States European Free Trade area Eritrean People’s Liberation Front Euskadi Ta Askatasuna European Union End-user Certificates Fusil Automatique Léger Forces Armees Rwandese Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Forces for the Defence of Democracy Fuerza Democrátia Nicaraguense Front Islamique du Salut/Armée Islamique du Salut Front de la Liberations de l’Aïr et de l’Azawagh Front de Libération Nationale in Algeria Fabrica Militar De Armas Portatiles ‘Domingo Matheu’ Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola

xiii

xiv List of Abbreviations

FRELIMO FSLN HSMF IAEA ICRC IRA ISI JNA KGB KHAD KLA LRA LTTE LURD MANPADS MCA MEK MFDC MFER MFUA MILF MNLC MNLF MPLA MTCR NATO NBC NDA NGO NIF NIOD NLF NPFL NPT NRA NVA NVA NWFP NWFZs OAS OLF

Frente de Libertação de Moçambique Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional Holy Spirit Mobile Forces International Atomic Energy Authority International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Irish Republican Army Inter-Services Intelligence Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija Komitet Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti Khadamat-e Etela’at-e Dawlati Kosovo Liberation Army Lords Resistance Army Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Man Portable Air Defence Systems Major Conventional Arms Mujahideen e-Khalq Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance Ministry of Foreign Relations Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azaouad Moro Islamic Liberation Front Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo Moro National Liberation Front Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola Missile Technology Control Regime North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons National Democratic Alliance Non–governmental organisations National Islamic Front Netherlands Institute for War Documentation National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam National Patriotic Front of Liberia Non-Proliferation Treaty National Resistance Army Nationale Volksarmee (former-East German Army) North Vietnamese Army’s North West Frontier Province Nuclear Weapons Free Zones Organisation of American States Oromo Liberation Front

List of Abbreviations xv

OPCW OSCE PAC PAIGC PKK PLO PLOTE PMC PNDC PSC RAW RCD RENAMO RPF RUF SADC SADF SALW SIN SIPRI SNM SPLA SWAPO TCO TPDF TPLF ULFA ULIMO UN UNITA UNSC UPDF US ACDA WMD WNBF WTO ZANU ZAPU ZDI

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde Kurdistan Workers Party Palestinian Liberation organisation People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam Private Military Companies Provisional National Defence Council Private Security Companies Research and Analysis Wing Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana Rwandan Patriotic Front Revolutionary United Front Southern African Development Community South African Defence Force Small Arms and Light Weapons Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Somali National Movement Sudan People’s Liberation Army South-West African People’s Organisation Transnational Criminal Organisations Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces Tigray People’s Liberation Front United Liberation Front of Assam United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia. United Nations União Nacional Para A Independência Total de Angola United Nations Security Council Uganda People’s Defence Force US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency weapons of mass destruction West Nile Bank Front Warsaw Treaty Organisation Zimbabwe African National Union Zimbabwe African People’s Union Zimbabwe Defence Industries


Part I Weapons Spread


1 Introduction

The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems – and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as ‘weapons of mass destruction’ … Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and it benefits terrorists as well as the perpetrators of organized crime. (Annan, 2000) From conflict to crime, from acts of terrorism to the innumerable acts of violent repression by states, the use and misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is the common ingredient. SALW misuse in conflict and crime is estimated to result in over 500,000 deaths per year, and countless other injuries (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 1). For example, one oft-cited statistic indicates that in 90 per cent of conflicts since 1990, SALW have been the primary weapons used in fighting, and have contributed to the increased proportion (between 30 and 90 per cent) of civilian deaths in those conflicts (ICRC, 1999). Concern about the spread and use of SALW has developed rapidly since the mid-1990s. Initially stemming from increasing international involvement in peacekeeping operations in intra-state conflicts (Rana, 1995), concerns raised have been related to SALW in a variety of situations ranging from major armed conflict to criminality. Constituencies of concern include those that relate to conflict prevention and resolution; conflict 3

4

Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms

management and peacebuilding; security sector reform; development; humanitarian assistance; law and order; and a range of other issues. Armed violence perpetuated with SALW has devastating impacts that are not limited to massive direct civilian casualties, deaths, and maimings. Indirect effects are broad ranging and often profound. SALW and their misuse are a crucial and catalytic ingredient in human insecurity, increasing and crippling burdens on health care systems, rising criminality and the privatisation of security, wide-ranging impacts on human rights, humanitarian impacts including affecting the delivery and efficacy of aid, and longer-term development impacts from affecting individual and household livelihoods to the creation of a ‘conflict trap’ and macro-economic impacts. The misuse of SALW that is so devastating stems from the availability of those arms to the wide range of actors that engage in violent activity. The availability of SALW does not cause the outbreak of violence. However, while there is no clear causal relationship between arms and violence, as Edward Laurance (1998, p. 12) contends, there is ‘an undeniable critical mass of “correlational” evidence’. This relates to catalytic implications of SALW availability on potential or already violent environments. In such circumstances – that are complexly constructed – the availability of SALW may make violence more feasible (by providing tools), more likely (by contributing to dynamics of insecurity, polarisation, and fear), and more destructive (by expanding the scope of violence, by raising the lethal capacity of actors involved, by diffusing violence and its tools throughout a society, and by contributing to the challenges of post-conflict peace-building and development).

Definition of small arms and light weapons There are numerous definitions and typologies of small arms and light weapons. The definition commonly used as a working understanding of the scope of SALW is that produced by the 1997 UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, which distinguished these weapons by claiming that ‘Broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew.’ The panel produced the following illustrative list of weapon types: Small arms: ● ●

revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines;

Introduction ● ● ●

5

sub-machine guns; assault rifles; light machine guns.

Light weapons: heavy machine guns; hand-held under barrel and mounted grenade launchers; ● portable anti-aircraft guns*; ● portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles*; ● portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems*; ● portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; ● mortars of calibres up to 100 mm.1 * Sometimes these weapons are mounted. ● ●

Ammunition and explosives: ● ● ●

● ● ●

cartridges (rounds) for small arms; shells and missiles for light weapons; mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems; anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades; landmines; explosives.

Many uses and most acquisitions of SALW are legal and legitimate. The production, acquisition, accumulation, and use of SALW can be legal or ‘illicit’. While the broad range of misuse and associated constituencies of concern have created a degree of fragmentation in the framing of the problem, SALW concerns are dominated by the destructive impacts of the weapons of rebel groups, criminals, and repressive governments. Most academic and policy literature on SALW focuses on the supply side of the phenomenon and gives relatively less attention to the dynamics of demand. Within that expert literature the notion that misuse is facilitated by illicit acquisition is commonly criticised – legally acquired weapons are often misused, and most illicit weapons originate in the legal sphere, yet burgeoning policy initiatives on SALW focus largely on illicit SALW. Since the late-1990s a range of global and regional initiatives on SALW have been developed. These relate to international flows of SALW (legal and illicit) and also to such issues as disarmament and weapons collection, stockpile management and security, the disposal and destruction of surplus stocks of SALW and ammunition, and so forth. At the global level

6


the primary framework is the politically binding UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (July 2001). Additionally, there is a narrower but legally binding ‘Firearms Protocol’ (an additional protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime that was adopted in May 2001 and entered into force in July 2005), and a politically binding international instrument on marking, tracing, and record-keeping, agreed in 2005. Further, there are ongoing international processes that are building the foundations of possible global norms on conventional arms transfer controls. Numerous regional responses to the spread of SALW are also contributing to the potential for greater control, and are mutually reinforcing with these global measures. Significant agreements are in place in the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the European Union (EU), Stability Pact (south eastern Europe), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and a grouping of East African states under the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol; and the Pacific Islands Forum. Many actions on SALW are occurring at a national level. Particular projects, such as disarmament components of post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; programmes for destruction of surplus stocks of arms and ammunition; voluntary weapons collections, gun amnesties; and particular policy processes such as reviews of export controls, brokering controls, marking and record-keeping standards, controls over civilian possession and use of firearms, and the like have occurred with apparently increasing frequency since SALW rose on international agendas. Both internationally and nationally, the role of civil society groups is strong. While not replicating the success of the role of NGOs in the narrower issue of anti-personnel landmines, hundreds of NGOs ranging from think-tanks, conflict-prevention organisations, academic institutions, church groups, health charities, women’s groups, and numerous other types of NGOs have played a role in raising SALW issues nationally and internationally – often in constructive but critical partnerships with governments. The literature on SALW has grown with (and often ahead of ) policy agendas and processes. Until the early 1990s the literature on arms proliferation had largely ignored SALW. Early efforts to understand SALW spread focused on a key debate over the distinctiveness of SALW from Major Conventional Arms – and hence the need for a new analytic framework. As the literature developed, academics and policy practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds engaged with the issues and shaped the path

Introduction

7

taken in the literature’s further development. This occurred through the building of a strong foundation of case studies and policy-related literature. Inspired by the rapid progress of the landmines campaigns and a sense of urgency within the small arms community to develop practical policy proposals, the literature has been largely policy-oriented ‘grey’ literature leaving the academic literature much less developed. A concomitant effect of this has been that the early debate on frameworks was short lived, and largely resolved in favour of the conclusion that the spread of SALW is significantly distinct from the trade in other conventional arms. The nature of SALW spread remains inadequately understood. The paradigm that now predominates was derived from assertions of the distinctiveness of SALW. There are, in fact, only a handful of explicit attempts to outline and analyse the nature of the spread of these weapons, with much of the rest of the burgeoning literature focusing on particular aspects of the trade in SALW, or particular types of response to their flow, accumulation, and misuse. Michael Klare and Keith Krause have both proposed frameworks of SALW spread that portray the legal trade in SALW operating in a similar, but broader based, system of flow as that applied to Major Conventional Arms (MCA). In 1995, Michael Klare’s (1995, pp. 1–16) ‘Diffusion Model’ emphasised the need for a new model of arms transfers to take account of the greater range of suppliers and channels that form the system of the spread of SALW. In 2000, Keith Krause developed a similar framework that again emphasised the distinctiveness of SALW spread by delineating two circuits. The ‘primary circuit’ is the same as the system of spread for other conventional arms. However, this is added to by a large, shadowy range of stocks and channels that operates without overt state authorisation – a ‘secondary circuit’ encompassing both clearly illegal black market, and the ‘possibly legal, but either secret or unauthorized’ grey market (Krause, 2000, p. 18). These two explicit analyses share a common emphasis on the distinctive complexity of SALW spread. Yet both limit themselves to broad assertions and explorations of this added complexity of an array of extra suppliers and channels and were not able to develop understandings of what shapes the use of those channels. The SALW literature has grown exponentially since the early-1990s, primarily as policy-oriented literature and a loose set of case studies of particular conflicts, or particular thematic issues. There are now numerous substantial publications, such as the Small Arms Survey yearbooks, the Biting the Bullet ‘Red Book’ reports on implementation of various policy instruments (see Bourne, et al., 2006), and edited volumes of collected case studies, special issues of journals, and the like. More recently, enquiry

8


has moved towards developing better understandings of the impacts of SALW, and of ‘mainstreaming’ SALW issues with broader conflict, security, and development issues. The literature, therefore, is well established. Understanding of the nature of SALW spread has not continued to develop at the same pace. There has been an expansion of the information available for such development, including a growth in case studies, a progressive refining of quantitative estimates of the numbers of arms, producers, suppliers, market shares, and an ever growing policy-oriented literature. This development of the literature, however, has not incorporated significant refinement of understandings of the nature of SALW spread. Thus, while the SALW literature began by taking valuable first steps towards a more appropriate analytic framework, which established that a broader image of ‘diffusion’ is more appropriate for SALW than for other types of weapons, this process has stalled. The next step – moving from statements of difference to analysis and explanation of what structures and dynamics might exist and shape the nature of spread – has not been taken. The SALW literature, and the policy community that relies on this ‘expert’ knowledge (see Garcia, 2004; Krause, 2001), has instead been dominated by fragmented approach that underplays the complex links between the various aspects of SALW availability and spread. Likewise, within the ‘New Wars’ literature concerned with the conflicts within which the misuse of arms contributes to hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries, the nature of SALW spread is commonly referred to in a homogenised, simplified view of weapons spread that is rooted in this stalled process of understanding the spread of SALW. As a result, the structures of availability and the factors that shape the arming of conflict have not been adequately examined.

Organisation and approach of the book This book aims to develop better understandings of the nature of SALW spread, and in particular of the arming of conflict. In order to do this it is organised in four parts. The first part, including this chapter and Chapter 2, looks at SALW from the perspective of weapons spread. Chapter 2 looks at the nature of weapons spread for a range of different types of weapons – ranging from nuclear weapons to SALW. It analyses the ways in which weapons spread has tended to be understood, and the types of structures and dynamics that paradigms based on other types of weapons spread emphasise. It argues that the weakness or absence of

Introduction

9

these structures and dynamics familiar to students of arms proliferation has created an assumption that SALW spread is amorphous. The chapter then clarifies the nature of the amorphous image of SALW spread and discerns that it has created a homogenised view of the nature of how SALW get to the conflicts where they are misused. While there is a homogenised view of flows to conflict, the experience of those conflicts shows great variation in arming patterns. This chapter argues that this homogenised view and the amorphous image that underlies it are a result of inadequate analytic frameworks – the lack of familiar structures (at least in familiar forms) appears amorphous because there is a lack of a sense of level of analysis, and because of a range of conflation in key concepts of SALW spread. This has obscured structures and dynamics rather than accurately describe a lack of them. The chapter concludes by developing a new three-level framework designed to uncover the structures and dynamics that shape SALW spread to conflict. It refines key distinctions, and redraws levels of analysis to better reflect the nature of the political and economic spaces of conflict. The remainder of the book then applies and elaborates this three-level approach in the next three parts. Part II examines the global-level markets and dynamic structures of SALW spread. Chapter 3 looks at the foundations and construction of the global SALW trade, and Chapter 4 examines the nature of extraregional aspects of SALW flows to conflict and the degree to which they reflect global(ised) structures of spread. In particular, Chapter 3 outlines the global source base of SALW spread, including how it has been created and key characteristics of its evolution. It then focuses on the construction and evolution of the global legal SALW trade and their implications for the nature of legal SALW spread processes. Chapter 4 examines extra-regional processes of SALW flows to conflict and assesses the degree to which these operate within or separately from the global legal market. It looks at the structures of legal flows to conflicts; the nature and construction of covert aid to rebel forces by extra-regional governments; and the existence and dynamics of extra-regional black and grey market flows, and their implications for global illicit market structures. Legal SALW flows to conflict are found to have key characteristics of their own, and are not merely the expression of global market structures in a free SALW market. Extra-regional covert aid, is found to have evolved in three key phases that are distinct but related to those in the development of the global legal market. It also finds that in the post-Cold War period, a range of global processes have led to the regionalisation of covert aid. Finally, and in contrast to the amorphous image, it finds that

10 Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms

there is no global black market in SALW. Overall, this chapter finds that the primary global structure of SALW spread – including the spread to conflicts – is the legal market not a global illicit market. This part finds that the importance of the global level in arming conflict has evolved progressively, but in complex ways. Part III examines the regional level. This has been a neglected dimension in frameworks for analysing the spread of SALW to conflicts. This part, however, finds that the regional level is very important, and that SALW spread is highly structured as a result. It argues that this reflects distinct regional structures, rather than simply regional subsystems of global structures. The regional level plays two roles in SALW flows to conflicts: as an intermediate level through which SALW flow, and where much facilitation of illicit transactions takes place; and as a distinct space within which there may be particular structures of legal trade, covert aid, a grey market, and a black-market. Chapter 5 looks at the roles of regional actors and spaces in facilitating SALW spread from the global level to the conflict level. The extent to which these roles, and their combinations and characteristics, are a function of global or distinct regional structures and dynamics is examined. Chapter 6 then examines the existence and construction of distinctly regional legal markets, covert aid, and black and grey markets in the flow of SALW to conflicts. It looks at how particular regional structures are built and sustained. It begins with a brief examination of whether regional legal flows of SALW are a function of distinct regional sub-markets; or regional supplies merely follow global patterns. It then examines the nature and implications of the regionalisation of covert aid in the post-Cold War period. Finally the third section distinguishes between two types of black and grey markets: the ubiquitous small-scale ‘ant-trade’ and organised black markets, (large and relatively autonomous market structures within which large amounts of arms circulate illicitly). The dynamics and construction of each are examined, drawing on experiences from many conflict regions. Part IV then looks at the conflict-complex level. It is in this part that the cumulative implications of structures at multiple levels combine to shape distinct arming patterns for actors in conflict. Chapter 7 begins by outlining the different types of arming patterns that actors in conflict might operate. These are divided into bottom-up processes – in which arms are acquired by combatants for themselves – and top-down processes – in which larger stocks of SALW are acquired by the faction and distributed to combatants. It also outlines different types of conflict actors in relation to their control of particular resources of the geographical,

Introduction

11

political, and economic space of conflict. The relationship between these resources and the nature of conflict arming is examined throughout this part. Chapter 7 examines the ways in which the structures and dynamics of SALW availability and circulation, which may supply legal and illicit civilian arms acquisitions, evolve through pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases. It then examines how some armed factions operate a primarily bottom-up pattern of arming, and how and why this arming pattern is constructed and affected by the changing structures of SALW spread at the conflict-complex level. Chapter 8 analyses the construction of three ‘top-down’ arming patterns (dependent, semi-autonomous, and autonomous). Each of the three arming patterns is found to be constructed by factors at different combinations of overlapping structures at different combinations of levels. Thus, this chapter also shows how the different structures and dynamics at the global, regional, and conflict levels interact. It discerns which characteristics of those structures and dynamics, and of the conflict actors, particularly shape the nature of a recipient’s arming patterns. It thus clarifies the importance of sovereignty, wealth, and networks in shaping access to arms. For instance, in contrast to the amorphous image, sovereignty matters. There is a non-state threshold in SALW spread. Overall, the identification of key determinants of arming capacity contributes to an understanding of the manner in which acquisition patterns evolve and shift. Thus SALW spread and the arming of conflict are both highly structured and highly dynamic. Chapter 9 draws together the conclusions from the book. It highlights the ways in which these structures are formed and interact, and the factors that determine arming patterns. It summarises the nature of SALW spread to conflicts, and its construction at three distinct, inter-related levels.

A brief note on methodology Although the SALW community is now almost a decade into concerted enquiry into the nature of the SALW problem, there remain very significant limitations of data. In particular, most states still do not routinely report on their production, export, or import of SALW. Illicit or covert flows of SALW are inherently difficult to gather information on, much government data on this is impossible to access, and in-depth case studies tend to require expensive field research in dangerous environments (and even then have seldom focused on particular flows rather than general indications of weapons availability and misuse – though there are some


notable exceptions). Further, much of the information available relates only to the current period since awareness of SALW issues arose, making data on earlier flows more difficult to acquire. This book draws on evidence collected relating to numerous conflicts, in all areas of the world, and across a broad time-frame. In this sense it is anticipated that the breadth of sources and cases used, and the nature of the analytic processes applied to the information collected, will reduce the potential for making erroneous generalisations on the basis of a limited sample of conflicts, or a particular case. In addition to the core methodology of developing and applying the three-level approach this book also draws together a rich empirical basis for analysis into the SALW literature. It draws on information from the SALW and arms trade literatures, academic literature concerned with particular conflicts and regions, government and civil society documentation, legal documentation, UN reports, media sources, and research databases.2 Interviews and other communication with informed observers added a limited amount of primary data, but also served as a useful tool for verifying data on arms flows, and the author’s interpretation of that data, for the research conducted for this book and other studies of SALW spread in particular conflict regions. Much information on SALW flows is anecdotal. In particular, press and other media sources of information are commonly used within the SALW literature to provide information on particular arms transfers. Such sources have numerous advantages in their access to information, but require careful judgements in their use. In addition to obvious judgements between particular sources, particular publications or journalists, and particular contexts within which a piece of ‘information’ is being provided, a process of verification has been undertaken for each significant case used. In most cases this meant cross-referencing information in numerous different types of sources, ensuring that they were themselves not based on a single source, or rumour. Further, it usually included locating several different accounts of the same transfer, interpreted in the context of analyses of the conflict concerned drawn from academic literatures on the countries, conflicts, and regions concerned. Once triangulated in this way, care was also taken to analyse the basic information about the actors and processes of SALW flows, rather than to attribute the characterisations of the process used by the author concerned (which often would not be appropriate to the refined categories developed here). Thus, overall, in each case of SALW flows, and similar information, used in this book a process of triangulation of sources and information underlies the

Introduction

13

use of each illustration. A significant level of investigation was conducted for each conflict and SALW flow analysed. Thus, the examples and information presented are reflective of and underlain by significantly greater investigation; the sources cited reflect an easily accessible source for the reader, and are a small proportion of the information and sources used in this complex research. Some quantitative information is available in the SALW literature. Some of this represents the growing levels of official data – such as customs data – that is relatively reliable (though not without its problems and complexities). However, many of the broad numerical ‘facts’ about small arms are estimates. The research used to generate and analyse these estimates have become progressively more sophisticated and rigorous as familiarity with the data sources and their reliability has grown within the SALW community. However, some such numbers are based on extrapolations from cases that are not necessarily representative. While many within the SALW community are highly professional researchers and analysts, and produce such estimates with caution and accompany them with numerous ‘health-warnings’, due in part to the pressures of much of the literature and SALW community being policyrelated and advocacy-oriented documents, such estimates rapidly become ‘facts’ that do not reflect the range of caveats that accompany their initial production and use. Thus, throughout this book I have been wary of creating new numbers – that tend to take on a life of their own. Where such estimates are used, they are used critically and carefully. Overall the approach taken is to reorient and strengthen understandings of SALW spread on the basis of a deeper, broader, and longer analysis than has been produced to date. It takes a deeper view by giving analytic and explanatory depth through the development of and application of the three-level approach; it takes a broader geographical scope rather than being constrained by a regional or case study focus; and it takes a longer historical perspective to discern the development of structures and dynamics rather than simply seeing SALW flows as events that occur in an unchanging amorphous space.

2 Structure and Dynamic in Weapons Spread: The Trade and Proliferation of Weapons in Comparative Perspective

Understandings of SALW flows to conflict protagonists suffer from a lack of a sense of structure or dynamic. SALW are portrayed as easily available to any and all actors, nefarious or legitimate, the spread of these weapons appears particularly complex but banal, and not so much uncontrolled as uncontrollable. This chapter begins by stepping back. It examines the ways in which the spread of different types of weapons has been portrayed and understood. It discerns the types of structures and dynamics of spread that different images give primacy to, and then examines how those structures are constructed and how they shape the spread of weapons (and are created by them). In so doing it discerns key distinctions in the nature of the spread of different types of weapons, such as the existence and strength of barriers to acquisition by non-state actors. The types of structures that bound and shape the spread of other types of weapons are weak or non-existent for SALW. This is emphasised in a prevailing amorphous image of SALW spread. This has framed the spread of SALW to conflicts in a particular, homogenised way that yields little analytic or explanatory value. In order to identify and analyse other types of structures and dynamics that shape SALW spread to conflict, a new framework for analysis is needed. Thus this chapter concludes by developing a three-level approach by refining key categories and levels of analysis. This three-level approach forms the framework of the remainder of the book.

Images and structures of weapons spread The application of a particular image of spread informs and bounds the debate about the weapons to which it is applied, and frames the discourse 14

Structure and Dynamic in Weapons Spread 15

about appropriate policy responses. More specifically, the image reflects and constructs understandings about the structures of spread, the range of actors involved, and the nature and dynamics of those processes (Mutimer, 2000, p. 7). The understandings of SALW spread that evolved with the development of the issue since the mid-1990s were derived from images formed in relation to other types of weapons (Klare, 1995a; Krause, 2000). This profoundly shaped the development of understandings of SALW spread. The types of structures and dynamics that are argued to shape the nature of the spread of other types of weapons framed the questions and approaches of the academic and policy communities. These were either simply assumed or were found not to be present in familiar forms – leading not to further questioning of what types of structures might be present, but rather to an easy acceptance of a lack of structure. This has been reflected not only within the SALW literature (which has been largely dominated by policy-related rather than academic literature) but also in the emerging literatures on the types of conflict that generated so much of the concern about SALW (Keen, 1998; Kaldor, 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield, 2001). These literatures too, when referring to SALW spread to conflicts, have tended to adopt the overarching impressions of widely available arms open to all who can pay (Cooper, 1999, p. 33). Weapons spread may occur through the manufacture of weapons and the import of weapons. The spread of most types of weapons occurs through a combination of the two (Perry-Robinson, 1995, pp. 39–40). Within each method of acquisition a number of different channels may be used to obtain weapons or the technology to produce weapons. The nature and structure of these channels varies according to the type of weapon concerned and are reflected in the three images of spread. There are three main images of weapons spread, each of which portrays the processes through which a given actor obtains a particular type of weapon. These three images are proliferation, diffusion, and trade. While these images overlap and the boundaries between them are blurred, the applicability of each to the spread of a particular type of weapon relates to the structures of their availability and the implications of those structures for the processes of acquisition. The term ‘proliferation’ was first widely used in relation to arms in the context of fears of the spread of nuclear weapons during the 1960s (Roberts, 1993, p. 139). It has since been applied to numerous other types of weapons such that the term has progressively become used as a generic term applied to any process of weapons spread that is deemed as


having security implications. Proliferation implies narrowly constructed spread from a single source, or small number of sources, to a limited number of recipients – usually all states (Mutimer, 2000, p. 60). It has been largely related to the spread of technology and the acquisition of weapons through indigenous development. Indeed proliferation is often presented, in a somewhat overstated form, as a process of autonomous and inevitable technological spread.1 An image of ‘diffusion’ has been used in contrast to narrowly structured, state-centric, techno-centric proliferation. Diffusion simply refers to a more broadly structured process of spread drawing on a more diffuse system spread of weapons or technology from multiple sources to multiple recipients. It has been used primarily in relation to the spread of technology and, more recently, to the spread of SALW. Michael Klare (1995a, p. 3), as the first analyst to apply the term diffusion to SALW, claimed that While ‘proliferation’ suggests an increase in the number of weapons possessed by certain governments, or in the number of states possessing a particular weapon system, ‘diffusion’ suggests the dispersion of arms within societies, extending not only to governments and stateowned entities but also to private armies and militias, insurgent groups, criminal organisations and other non-state actors. A third image is that of the arms ‘trade’. While the proliferation image creates something as inherently threatening, the term trade implies a ‘normal’ process that is threatening only when it becomes potentially destabilising through the accumulation of coercive capability beyond the status quo of constellations of military power. The defining facet of the trade image is commercial availability. Trade does not imply breadth or narrowness of structure, nor does it significantly delineate the population of actors it encompasses. Rather, it is a characterisation of those structures that carry with it a range of assumptions about motive and dynamic in the processes of spread. Thus, in 1977 Anthony Sampson (p. 24), painted a picture of SALW traded as commodities in a free market – available to all: It is the small arms which have been the instruments of most of the hundred wars since the Second World War, from Lebanon to Biafra, from the Yemen to Katanga; and which have been the cause of most loss of life. And it is the trade in rifles, machine-guns or mortars which reveals the cold heart of a business in which diplomacy and


wars are translated into orders, balance-sheets and profits. It is here that the juxtaposition of death and commerce seems most casual, and the sale of guns looks as banal as any other business. While these incidental remarks have not been central to the development of current understandings of the nature of the spread of SALW, the image of wide and free availability has remained central. The ‘trade-image’ frames spread in particular ways. The terminology may seem banal and technical (‘arms sales’ (Pierre, 1982), ‘arms transfers’), or scandalised as a ‘lethal commerce’ (Boutwell et al., 1995), a ‘deadly business’ (Brogan and Zarca, 1983), but it raises different issues to ‘proliferation’ with its inherent sense of existential threat, or to ‘diffusion’ with its more familiar naturalistic image of uncontrollable, value-neutral, dispersion. However, whichever image is applied they imply certain structures and dynamics of spread. Here the term ‘structure’ is used very broadly to refer to the range of things that shape and bound weapons spread: things that are affective, and are prior to, but not necessarily unaffected by, the actors involved. These are neither crude determining mechanisms, nor necessarily formal, institutionalised, structures. Rather, they are as broad as Cox (1986, p. 217) defined historical structures: ‘a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not determine actions in any direct, mechanical way, but imposes pressures and constraints’. (While Cox’s definition is designed for a different type of enquiry, it is worth nothing that for Cox the forces that interact in a structure are ideas, institutions, and material capabilities – there are elements of all of these in the structures of different systems of weapons spread). Structures, then, impose pressures and constraints. They are the range of things that shape a system of spread including the universe of actors and processes involved, and the relationships between them. Structures shape processes, constrain choices, and impose requirements on a particular actor’s capacity to acquire arms. It is this sense of structure that is lacking in the SALW literature. Each image describes the nature of a system of spread that is constructed by a range of structures and processes. Three types of structures can be discerned that combine to form the system of weapons spread for various types of weapons. For weapons spread these are ● ● ●

structures of the availability and acquisition of technology; structures of the availability and acquisition of weapons; and normative and policy structures that constrain the processes of acquisition.


These types of structures are explicitly or implicitly the basic elements of understandings of weapons spread, including in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (NBC), their delivery systems (in particular Ballistic and Cruise Missiles), and MCAs. They shape the propensity of particular types of weapons and technologies to spread throughout the international system, and hence determine and reflect both the applicability of the above images and the manner in which weapons spread is understood and tackled. Taking these images and types of structures as the starting point for examinations of SALW spread has radically constrained the search for structures and dynamics in the nature of SALW spread. Structures of the availability and acquisition of technology Structures of the availability and acquisition of technology are familiar to those working on the spread of different types of weapons. Indeed, some types of weapons spread – particularly nuclear weapons proliferation – have been framed largely in terms of the spread of technology, and particularly of new and advanced technologies. In the case of MCAs, however, levels of technological sophistication have also been used as key dividing lines within a particular type of weapons spread: between ‘tiers’ of weapons manufacturer and supplier states within the arms trade, and between generations of technology (Krause, 1992). The global spread of technologies creates the potential for weapons acquisition through some form of (semi-)indigenous development and production. Actual weapons spread often requires significant investment for acquisition to occur. Broadly speaking, therefore, there are two primary types of technological structure that contribute to the character of the spread of weapons: 1. the availability of the technology and know-how, which is largely framed at a global level; 2. the requirements of technological infrastructure and know-how for those acquiring weapons.

Global availability of technology The primary structure of the availability of technology (material and knowledge) is the degree and nature of existing spread, as this determines the number of actors from whom technology may be available. For instance, when a technology is widely diffused there are more potential suppliers of technology thereby a broader source base for


further spread. A major factor here is the degree to which the specific knowledge or equipment is peculiar to the development of weapons or has a ‘dual-utility’ – with both civilian and military applications. Indeed the balance between the availability of dual-use and specific technologies significantly shapes the nature of weapons spread. Thus, non-proliferation agendas related to NBC weapons are complicated by long lists of dual-use technologies that have legitimate civilian applications in such industries as fertilizer production, pharmaceutical research development and production, and so-forth. Indeed, most of the normative and policy structures related to preventing the further proliferation of NBC weapons include provisions that encourage the spread of those same technologies for peaceful purposes. Significantly, weapons with higher degrees of dual-utility in their base technologies tend also to be those with the higher degrees of technological diffusion (see Table 2.1). Thus, technologies required for producing chemical weapons are more diffuse than those required to produce biological warfare agents, but less than those for nuclear weapons, and the technology required for developing cruise missiles, which is closely related to the technologies required by civilian aircraft production, is more diffuse than that required for the development of ballistic missiles, which is related to that found in space programmes (Greene, 1995, p. 71; Karp, 1995b, p. 14). Some aspects of technology are uniquely related to the development of weapons. For example, a key limitation to the spread of nuclear weapons is the limited availability of weapons grade fissile material. The spread of civilian nuclear technologies has widened the number of potential sources of highly enriched Uranium and Plutonium, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s has expanded the potential number of suppliers of fissile material and expert know-how (Sopko, 1996, p. 10). Nevertheless, the enrichment or chemical separation of Uranium or Plutonium requires unique equipment (such as gas centrifuges) and thus need for such equipment restrains the potential for proliferation. However, the technologies required for the weaponisation of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are less unique (Deutch, 1992, p. 123). Structures of technology availability are not static. For instance, the balance of dual-use and weapons specific technology appears to be evolving for some types of weapons. Within the field of conventional arms, the range of dual-use items is increasing, especially as arms technology is increasingly the beneficiary of spin-offs from civilian technology, rather than vice-versa (Moodie, 1995, pp. 186–187). Likewise, as innovation occurs, generation shifts in weapons technology take place. Thus, for


instance, the biotechnology revolution has been raised as a particular threat for the future spread of biological weapons (Dando, 1999). It is not merely the number but also the types of actors in possession of a particular technology that determine its future availability. This is also strongly related to dual-utility: highly dual-use technologies are significantly or even predominantly in the hands of private companies for whom technology is a commodity to be sold. The diffusion of technology into the commercial sector therefore frames the future spread of that technology within a market structure. Thus the commodification and commercial availability of a technology is a key aspect of the structure of future spread. The key to the construction of channels of technology spread is the degree to which this commodification is restrained and regulated by states and the international community. For example, as the technologies and materials necessary for the production of chemical weapons become more diffuse, it will become increasingly difficult to restrain their spread (Moodie, 1995, p. 191). Likewise, in the field of conventional arms, trends towards the globalisation of production, the licensing of production overseas, and the transfer of whole production lines has been an increasing feature of the arms trade in the post-Cold War era (Bitzinger, 1994). Acquiring actors’ capacities Acquiring actors require sufficient levels of investment and infrastructure to develop weapons and also to assimilate new weapons systems into their forces, to maintain those weapons, and, if desired, to use them. These requirements shape the type of weapons proliferation process that can be pursued within the confines of the global structures of technological and weapons availability. In particular, these requirements create a key threshold between different states, and between states and nonstate actors (see below), and are therefore a key aspect of the breadth of structures of weapons spread. The technological requirements for development and production of particular weapons impose restrictions on acquiring actors. For example, the production and deployment of nuclear weapons requires very high levels of industrial and technological development. This restricts the potential for proliferation to only the developed world and a handful of the most industrialised nations of the developing world. Likewise, the technological and industrial infrastructure required for the development and production of chemical and biological warfare agents, while varying significantly between types of agent, is lower than that for nuclear


weapons, but still requires some significant infrastructure (US Defense Nuclear Agency, 1994, p. 15; Perry-Robinson, 1995, p. 38; Zanders, 1995, p. 16). Thus, the capacity to weaponise chemical and biological technologies is largely contained to states. For NBC weapons, the capacity to weaponise technologies is not a commercially diffused aspect of proliferation, and does not tend to take place in the commercial sector. Likewise, the production of ballistic missiles is technologically difficult and requires a significant industrial base that tends to involve ‘the total mobilisation of national resources’ (Deutch, 1992, p. 124; Karp, 1995a, p. 13). This requirement is claimed to be the main reason why many attempts to develop ballistic missiles have failed. In contrast, cruise missiles, MCA, and SALW require lower, and progressively less sophisticated, industrial, and technological infrastructures to be produced domestically, (see Table 2.1). It is at this level of weapons technology that the availability of production equipment and expertise through licensed production arrangements significantly reduces the barriers to semi-indigenous production by circumventing the need for large-scale investment in industrial infrastructure. The final stage in any process of weapons spread is the deployment of those weapons and the preparations for their potential use. This requires a process of assimilation into military structures and doctrine, with associated requirements for training. Different types of weapons have different requirements for assimilation. Additionally, in order for assimilated weapons to remain effective they must be adequately maintained. These requirements may impose significant incremental costs on weapons spread processes. NBC weapons tend to require significant resources for their assimilation and maintenance. For example, chemical weapons tend to require substantial stockpiling, which can be expensive and requires significant infrastructure. Biological weapons require less stockpiling, particularly for those more advanced states whose technological infrastructures allow for the production of large quantities of weaponised agents in a short period of time. (US Defense Nuclear Agency, 1994, p. 27). Ballistic missiles also require significant military and support infrastructure for their deployment, maintenance and use, while cruise missiles have lower requirements. The maintenance and use of MCA requires significant expertise, training, logistical, and other support infrastructures – particularly in relation to a ready supply of spare-parts. While there are numerous examples of actors being supplied with conventional arms they were unable to use, this requirement still results in a fairly strong barrier to spread to non-state actors.


Overall, the spread of some types of weapons is framed as largely technological process, with the spread of technology autonomously and inevitably driving the spread of the weapons; and technological barriers restraining and challenging those who may wish to acquire them. However, SALW technology is seen as widely available from global sources or indigenous development. The production of most firearms requires only a basic level of industrial technology, and the level of dualutility of technology required in SALW production is very high. Most types of SALW have comparatively low rates of technological innovation (Prokosch, 1995; DeClerq, 1999), which contributes to the breadth of the supplier base. Technical expertise and design remains important and specialised, as evidenced by the continued relevance of licensed production and specific technology transfers. Further, some specific SALW (such as some guided MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence Systems: such as Stinger missiles)) or new technologies (such as new calibre weapons like the FN P90) are less easily available. Overall, though, SALW spread, is not (or is not portrayed as) a technologically constructed and constrained process.While references are made to the technological simplicity of SALW, technological structures are not just weak, they are absent. Structures of the availability and acquisition of complete weapons Complete weapons and munitions are available primarily from willing suppliers that have produced them or have themselves acquired them from external sources. The interaction of three types of structures or thresholds construct the availability of weapons: ● ● ●

the trade threshold; the supplier-base; the recipient-base and the non-state threshold.

The combination of these structures, and the ways in which these thresholds are crossed or maintained, then shapes the range of channels through which weapons can be acquired. The trade threshold is constituted by normative and policy structures that determine whether weapons of different types can be legitimately traded, and is crossed when legal transfers are permitted. The conditions imposed by permissive norms and legal structures divide weapons availability into ‘legal’ or ‘illicit’. Thus, complete NBC weapons are not traded or transferred. Rather, in the spectrum of weapons technology, the trade threshold is crossed at


the point of missiles. The trade in conventional weapons from this point onwards is largely legal, and thus the costs of establishing and maintaining an arms industry, or of developing new weapons systems within that industry, can be offset and profits can be generated or political influence sought by exporting arms. However, among those weapons that can be legitimately traded, the nature of supplier and recipients varies significantly. The supplier-base of a particular type of weapons is the universe of potential suppliers that may play a role in the system of weapons spread. Thus, the number and nature of potential suppliers have been key questions in conventional arms transfer literature, particularly in terms of the national arms transfer behaviour of particular actors and the evolution of different historical arms transfer systems. The sheer number of possible suppliers is of crucial importance in setting the parameters of a system of weapons spread. Significantly, the size of supplier bases of weapons for which the trade-threshold is crossed is much larger. For instance, there are 19 known producers of cruise missiles, 13 of which export newly manufactured missiles (Feickert, 2004, p. 22); 25 states are significant manufacturers of MCA (Krause et al., 1996), with many more producing particular categories (such as armoured personnel carriers). A huge increase occurs at the level of SALW: over 100 states have at some time produced some types of SALW or ammunition (see Chapter 3) and approximately two-thirds of those have exported some of that production (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 145). Further, if a particular type of weapon is produced widely in the commercial sector, rather than just by state actors, this opens up new channels and motivations for transfer, thereby enhancing availability. For instance, MCA and SALW are produced and exported widely by private companies, but ballistic missiles are not (their transfer is largely limited to state-to-state transfers). Perhaps more significant for the overall structures of weapons spread is the question of whether the number and types of potential suppliers is limited to those that produce weapons, or also includes any actor in possession of stocks of arms that may then re-transfer surplus stocks and obsolete models? Broadly speaking, while some second-hand missiles are exported, surplus arms become significant at the level of MCA. Transfers of MCA and SALW are a significant feature of their trade. A range of technical and normative factors restrain this trade; requirements for maintenance and training, and international and national regulations limit the scope of the surplus MCA trade. In contrast, these restraining factors do not appear to be present for SALW which are durable, simple, and widely distributed among every state and many


non-state actors. Thus the potential supplier base of SALW is quantitatively and, hence, qualitatively distinct from that of all other weapons. The nature of the recipient base, in combination with the supplier-base, determines the breadth and distribution of the structures of weapons availability and flow. The number of potential recipients is determined, in part, by the technology structures outlined previously. These distinguish largely between which states might have the capacity to demand, acquire, and assimilate particular weapons. However, the range of types of recipient is particularly significant. The key distinction here is the availability of weapons to non-state actors. For most types of weapons there is a clear barrier to spread across what can be referred to as the non-state threshold. The non-state threshold is constructed by the utility of particular weapons for non-state actors, determined by requirements associated with assimilation, maintenance, and use (see above); the legal frameworks that permit or deny legal transfers to non-state actors; and, especially, the capacity of non-state actors to engage in trade or other transfer relationships with suppliers. There are increasing fears of the acquisition of WMD by terrorist groups. These are worthy of a brief discussion as they now inform so much of understandings of non-state actors in weapons spread. Overall, concerns about the apparent erosion of the non-state threshold for these weapons are rising but often hyperbolic (Frost, 2006). The potential for the acquisition and use of NBC weapons, though very different, is often overstated – in the absence of evidence the threat of a hypothetical, but terrifying, potential has taken on a life of its own (in various interests). In contrast to the prominence of rhetorical threats, there are few known examples of any processes of such weapons spread. The main, oft-cited, exception is the Sarin nerve gas attacks on the Tokyo underground by the Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) cult in 1995 (Sopko, 1996/7, pp. 8–14). This attack with chemical weapons was preceded by nine failed attempts to use biological weapons, succeeded only in killing 12 people due to the lack of an effective delivery system, and required a huge investment that most terrorist groups would not be capable of replicating.A commonly raised spectre, are radiological weapons, or ‘dirty bombs’, the crudest of which require no high-technology industry and hence appear to have great potential for terrorist acquisition. While hypothetically, and structurally, easier than acquiring a nuclear warhead, no known radiological devices or attempts to manufacture them have been confirmed. Is the non-state threshold declining for ‘WMD’? The answer is a qualified ‘no’. The supply side constraints on the acquisition of complete


weapons or technology apply equally, and usually more, stringently to non-state actors. The technological capability required for the indigenous development, weaponisation, and assimilation of WMD apply equally to states and non-state actors – and thus the non-state threshold remains intact. Herein lies the qualification: this applies to the state-like acquisition and use. Terrorist groups would probably use biological or chemical weapons in a different manner – with much lower but still concerning consequences. This was the case with the Tokyo underground attacks, and the 2001 anthrax letters in the United States. There are key differences in the technological and logistical infrastructure required for ‘WMD’ warfare and those required for terrorism using the ingredients of that warfare – the chemical or biological agents. By weaponising for different purposes, terrorist groups can avoid the barriers to proliferation faced by many states. This represents not the breaking of the non-state threshold, but rather its circumvention. It also hugely reduces the ‘mass’ of potential destruction. Nevertheless, while the threshold is easier to circumvent than to break, it remains a very difficult and expensive project. Alarm(ism) about WMD state-sponsorship of terrorist groups often rings hollow, and the policy structures are strengthening existing norms against such sponsorship such as with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1540 (2004).While the potential for such weapons spread does exist, this does not mean (as it too often seems to be claimed) that it is likely – let alone certain; there is a world of difference between a chance that is not 0 per cent, and a 100 per cent certainty. The structures of spread of other weapons, however, do not create such a barrier to non-state spread. Some non-state actors, such as the more sophisticated insurgent groups, have been able to acquire MCA. However, this is limited and has largely occurred through capture from the government forces as with União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)in Angola, or state collapse – as occurred with the disintegration of the former Yugoslav National Army ( Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, (JNA)).In such cases the requirements for training and maintenance are generally not met and the weapons go unused. The crossing of the non-state threshold is exceptional for all types of weapons apart from SALW. SALW are possessed and acquired in large numbers by the wide range of types of non-state actors. Though, of course, this varies between weapons with pistols, rifles, and automatic weapons routinely moving beyond the non-state threshold, and more sophisticated weapons with smaller supplier-bases, such as some types of MANPADS, flowing to non-state actors comparatively rarely.


The lack of a strong non-state threshold is a central facet of SALW spread, particularly since technological structures are absent, and both new and surplus arms are available from a large number of suppliers. Further, while states are the only legitimate recipients of any other type of weapons, a range of non-state actors possess and trade in SALW legally. This includes, in many countries, many millions of individual civilians, as well as private security companies, museums and collectors, sports shooters and hunters. These factors together lead to a high propensity for the retransfer of weapons by and to non-state actors. Indeed, at the heart of the existing models of SALW spread is the fact that SALW do not just cross the non-state threshold, but also circulate widely beyond it – both legally and illicitly – through the widest possible range of channels. These three sets of structures construct the space within which weapons flow. Within that space they also determine the range of channels through which arms can be transferred. The range of possible channels of weapons flow includes 1. government-to-government sales; 2. government-to-government grants; 3. government negotiated or approved commercial sales to foreign governments or authorised recipients; 4. government grants to foreign insurgent groups; 5. government grants to militia groups within the state; 6. government approved domestic commercial wholesale to private dealers; 7. legal retail private domestic sales; 8. illicit trafficking; 9. circulation through theft or capture; 10. exchanges between non-state actors. The number of these types of channels actually used in the spread of particular types of weapons is determined by the combination of the above structures. For example, the proliferation of nuclear weapons does not occur through any of these channels, and only eight or nine states have such weapons.2Conversely, the crossing of the trade threshold combined with a broader supplier base, contributes to a structure in which most conventional weapons are available in a system which sees the majority of transfers as routine and unproblematic. The dominant channels of this trade are government-to-government transfers (either sales or grants to allies and friendly states), or government approved


commercial sales to foreign governments. However, this structure also contributes to the potential for illicit transfers. SALW flow through by far the broadest range of types of channels: a broader source base; the crossing of the trade threshold; and the apparent irrelevance of the non-state threshold, in combination with weak technological structures, means that all legal and illicit channels are common features of SALW spread. Many of these are unique to SALW. For instance, while illicit trafficking is hypothetically possible for all types of weapons, the structures of weapons and technology availability constrain this for all types of weapons – except for SALW which are routinely illicitly transferred. The wide range of weapons supply channels is the primary source of distinctiveness in the structures of SALW spread that is emphasised in much of the literature on the subject. The choice of channels by a particular recipient is more complexly constructed. A recipient’s access to different suppliers and channels is determined by a wide range of structures, dynamics, and capabilities. A primary determinant of the structural elements of arms availability and the accessing of different channels is the legal framework and associated boundaries. Norms and policy structures The third type of structure that shapes the nature of weapons spread is the existence and nature of normative and policy structures. The presence of strong regimes and/or norms against the spread of a particular weapon or technology (such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime) or against weapons acquisition by a specific recipient (such as UN arms embargoes) are barriers to weapons spread – though they are far from insurmountable. Most of these policy instruments have been supply-side controls. Policy structures constrain spread by establishing boundaries between legal/permitted and illicit processes and channels, both in terms of the flow of weapons or technology and also other spread processes. The strength of such barriers lies in the clarity with which they delineate the legal and the illicit (and the grey areas that exist in practice), and the manner in which regulations are enforced and norms are upheld. A key distinction is whether these policy responses, and the norms they embody, are absolute prohibitions on global spread, or discriminatory norms restricting or prohibiting transfers of particular weapons and technologies to particular recipients. Broadly speaking, absolute prohibitions establish clearer distinctions than discriminatory norms. Norms against most WMD are defined in (almost) absolute terms. For example, there is a relatively comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation


regime that – while proliferation has continued in spite of it – establishes a clear norm against proliferation beyond the five declared Nuclear Weapons States. This is made up of numerous agreements designed to limit nuclear weapons proliferation, including the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) safeguards; unilateral and multilateral export controls and co-ordinating forums (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group); regional agreements on Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs), and testing restrictions including the recent Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Anthony et al., 1997, pp. 348–351). While not all potential suppliers of nuclear technology are members of some of these mechanisms, (Potter, 1992) their presence reinforces a non-proliferation norm that contributes to the political costs involved in proliferation. Further, for chemical and biological weapons, the norms are stronger – against not just their further proliferation, but against their existence. Indeed, the most stringent norms against any weapon type are embodied in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which outlaws the possession of chemical weapons including that by existing holders. It is this non-discriminatory feature that makes the norm against chemical weapons stronger than that against nuclear weapons, at least in theory. Put simply a universal norm is, by definition, far stronger than one based on certain exceptions which maintains a status-quo that not all potential proliferators would wish to see maintained. The strength of the CWC norm is further augmented by supplier controls organised through the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Australia Group. In contrast, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is more limited. While it has expanded over the years since its inception, both in terms of its membership and its remit, a range of factors including advances in biotechnology and its current lack of a verification mechanism limit its strength as a structural impediment to biological weapons proliferation. The proliferation of all types of WMD has continued since the inception of these policy structures, but they remain a significant barrier. Thus, while many states possess the elements of a capability to produce nuclear weapons, the political and economic costs of breaking nonproliferation norms seem to outweigh the benefits of actual development and deployment for the majority of potential proliferators (Roberts, 1993, p. 150). Thus, for instance, in 2003 Libya renounced its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes. Nevertheless, in October 2006 North Korea conducted what it claims to be a nuclear weapons test. The spread of conventional arms, including potential WMD delivery systems, is bounded by less stringent norms and regimes. Broadly speaking, as one moves down the technological ladder for conventional arms,


the norms and policy structures become progressively less absolute and increasingly fragmented. The level of discrimination can be characterised as high, medium, or low thresholds with the range of actors permitted to acquire arms growing progressively. (See Table 2.1.) High thresholds apply to missile systems, particularly those that can potentially be used to deliver WMD. The 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a relatively rudimentary regime with no formal treaty, international organisation, or verification or sanctions powers (Greene, 1995, pp. 61–70). Nevertheless, it has had significant success at standardising export controls of its 34 member states, and has contributed to the growth of a wider norm beyond its members, including through the voluntary 2002 International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation – subscribed to by 111 states. The MTCR’s success has been significantly greater for ballistic missiles than for cruise missiles, largely because of the stronger norm against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the lower degree of dual-utility of the technology required for their development (Gormley, 2001, p. 55). Most other types of conventional weapons, with the exception of the anti-personnel landmines (APMs), that been largely banned under the 1997 Ottawa conventions, are covered by discriminatory norms with medium and low thresholds. These norms are discriminatory due to the inextricable link between the acquisition of these conventional arms and principles of sovereignty and the right to self-defence of states (article 51 of the UN Charter is often cited in export control documents). Additionally, the broader diffusion of both weapons and technology, the commodification of these weapons, and the associated trade-image framing of their spread mean that, at the very least, any attempts to control the transfer of such weapons and technology must balance a wide range of issues, interests, and demands. More significantly, MCA and SALW are not subject to globally applicable policy structures. The only global policy instrument that can currently be imposed on transfers of conventional arms is a UN arms embargo against a particular recipient. The closest thing to a response to global conventional arms proliferation is the UN Register of Conventional Arms, a transparency mechanism rather than a restriction on transfers. Thus, most structures that restrain the spread of these arms are constructed, in the first instance, at the state level – in national export controls. This leads to fragmented rather than unitary global structures, and diverse articulations of the threshold for discrimination. Individual states apply their own standards for the authorisation or denial of arms exports. There are, as yet, no globally agreed criteria bywhich states should judge whether or not to grant an export license – leading to a


lack of common approaches and standards among even the major suppliers. Conventional arms exporting states tend to apply criteria on a deal-by-deal basis, taking into consideration a range of criteria. Some states have very few explicit criteria, amounting to an assessment of the possible implications of a particular transfer on the national security interests of the exporting state, while others make judgements on the basis of a balance of assessments of criteria relating to inter alia: the possible impacts on the regional and internal security of the recipient state, the risk of exacerbating human rights abuses or having a negative impact on sustainable development, the recipient’s record of compliance with international law, the involvement of the recipient in armed conflict, and the potential for diversion to an illicit end-user. However, the way in which these are assessed, and final decisions are made, vary enormously even within those groups of suppliers that have begun to harmonise export control criteria. There are regional and supplier-group agreements that outline more harmonised criteria and processes for export authorisations. Attempts by groups of suppliers to harmonise export control criteria have enjoyed some success. These include multilateral supplier groups such as CoCom (The Co-ordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) that was an effective means of controlling exports of weapons and sensitive technologies to the Soviet Union during the height of Cold War tensions, and its successor, the Wassenaar Arrangement, which has some 40 members. Further, regional agreements on SALW and/or on arms exports include harmonisation of criteria, such as the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on arms exports. Nevertheless, while such efforts are to be applauded, they have only achieved a limited amount of harmonisation, and cover only a small proportion of the global supplier base. Given the breadth of the SALW supplier and recipient bases, these weaknesses in the policy structures shaping conventional weapons spread are particularly marked for these types of weapons. The existing fragmented and porous legal structures establish a blurred policy framework for SALW transfers. The boundaries between legal and illicit transfers, or distinctions between types of illicit transfer, are conceptually and practically blurred and there are often substantial ‘grey areas’. This has led to an analytic framework that emphasises the lack of clarity by outlining a spectrum of legality ranging from legal transfers to the black market (Figure 2.1). A very wide range of different SALW-related agreements exist at the global (UN Programme of Action, and UN Firearms Protocol), regional, and sub-regional levels. However, the implementation and coverage of


LEGAL TRANSFERS These occur with either active or passive involvement of governments or their authorised agents, and in accordance with both national and international law.

Figure 2.1

GREY MARKET TRANSFER BLACK MARKET TRANSFERS These happen when governments or In clear violation of national and/or their agents exploit loopholes or international laws and without official circumvent national and/or government consent or control, these international laws or policy. transfers may involve corrupt government officials acting on their own for personal gain

Spectrum of SALW Transfers (The Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 141)

these agreements vary widely. While they include a range of commitments to control SALW that directly or indirectly may constrain SALW spread, they are very far from a coherent and comprehensive global policy restricting international SALW spread. Overall, the policy structures that shape the processes of SALW spread are unclear, fragmented, and porous. Most analyses of SALW have emphasised the need for effective policy responses but have not systematically outlined how policy responses may form a structure that shapes the nature of the spread of SALW. Such assessments are not possible on the basis of current information, but it is clear that the lack of coherent policy structures allows illicit SALW spread to occur, contributes to a greater range of types of illicit (grey-and black-market) flows, and that such illicit trade accounts for a more significant part of the global spread of SALW than is the case for other types of conventional weapons. Thus, again, the spread of SALW is portrayed as lacking significant structures that shape other forms of weapons spread. Structures of Weapons Spread and the Applicability of Spread Images The three sets of structures examined earlier combine to form the overall structures of the processes of weapons spread. These structures create options, and constrain capabilities and choices of which weapons to acquire and the methods of acquisition pursued. Drawing on these familiar distinctions, there are discernible differences between systems of weapons spread that affect the applicability of the images of spread. Thus, for example, for those weapon types that spread primarily through technology diffusion and semi-indigenous development, including all WMD and both ballistic and cruise missiles, are best characterised within the proliferation image. The spread of these weapons is largely state-centric and techno-centric. The trade image applies only to MCA and SALW, while the diffusion image is most commonly applied to SALW, and to technology of all types.

Weapons spread structures and applicable images

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Table 2.1

Weapons

Structure Chemical

Biological

Ballistic missiles

Cruise missiles

Major conventional arms

SALW

Low (40)

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Almost all

Significant

High

High

Medium

High

High

Very high

Limited

Medium

Medium

Limited

Medium

High

Very high

Very high

High

High

High

Medium

Medium

Low

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

NA

NA

NA

18

19

50

105

No

No

No

Limited

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Unclear

Unclear

No

No

Absolute prohibition

Absolute – Discriminatory – Discriminatory – Discriminatory – Discriminatory – prohibition high high medium low threshold, emergent threshold threshold threshold norm against illicit trafficking. Some harmoFragmented but Highly Unitary Some harmofragmented nisation nisation some harmonisation

Nuclear

Technology availability and acquisition Number of states with technological capacity Dual-utility of technology Commercial availability of technology Infrastructure required for indigenous development

Weapons availability and acquisition Weapons trade threshold intact? Number of producer states Commercial production Production/surplus threshold intact

Normative and policy structures Policy Norm

Prohibition on further spread

Unitary/harmonised or Unitary fragmented policy structure

Unitary

Verification/enforcement

Strong

Strong

Limited (Australia group)

Limited

Limited

Weak

Very weak

Dominant spread Process Level of state proliferation (to weaponisation) Potential for non-state spread

Indigenous 8 or 9

Indigenous 26

Indigenous 15

Mixed 32

Mixed 75

Importation Most

Importation All

Very low

Low

Low

Very low

Low

Limited

Very high

Applicable image

Proliferation

Proliferation

Proliferation Proliferation

Proliferation /trade

Trade/proliferation

Diffusion/trade /amorphous image

Existing and potential spread

Note: This table draws on numerous sources for the specific data on spread. These sources do not all agree on the level of proliferation, and there are some discrepancies in the time of each estimate. Nevertheless, the data presented is broadly indicative of the level of spread. Numbers of states with biological and chemical weapons include all states that previously were plausibly suspected of having programmes to develop these weapons, including research programs such as in Algeria and Libya. Numbers in italics are the author’s estimates extrapolated from information in several sources. (See Bourne, 2004). The sources used include Krause (1992); Kellman, (1994); Greene, (1995); Saferworld and Deltac Limited (1995); Latter, (1996, p. 2); Gormley (2001, p. 12); Shuey, (2001); Cirincione, (2002); Arms Control Association (2002); Feickert (2004, p. 22); as well as others used throughout the chapter. N.B. Thick black lines denote a qualitative distinction in the nature of the weapons spread between weapons types.

33


Overall, though, SALW spread is portrayed as lacking any significant structures. The limitations on the number of suppliers and channels that determine the application of the proliferation image are not present; the thresholds (particularly the non-state threshold) that restrain the recipient base are absent, and the technological boundaries to production, assimilation, and use appear negligible. Thus, while early attempts to examine the nature of SALW spread delineated a diffusion model, this was done by emphasising what was different about SALW – the breadth of the system of spread, in which there are weak structures and no barriers to spread: an Amorphous image.

The amorphous image and SALW flows to conflict Due to the predominance of concerns about the flow of SALW to conflicts, a dominant image of arms flows to conflict actors, particularly to rebel groups has been superimposed against the backdrop of amorphous complexity. This image construes arms flows to conflicts as being a function of ● ● ●

a vast global stock of SALW; a vibrant globalised illicit trade; and a shadowy array of nefarious arms brokers.

This focus articulates implicit explanation and analysis that reinforces the view of amorphous, uncontrollable, open access to arms for anyone with the money to pay for them. However, much of this emphasis further reifies the amorphous image and limits the descriptive and explanatory value of SALW research. A vast global stock of SALW Early examinations of SALW estimated that there are 500 million firearms (which includes most small arms, but not light weapons) in existence (Singh, 1995, p. IX). The precision of this estimate, however, is dubious due to the limitations of publicly available information. Nevertheless, such numbers often take on a life of their own, and rough estimates of orders of magnitude (between 300 and 500 million) easily become interpreted as concrete factual data. In this case, this estimate was reinforced by its use by the 1999 UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms that repeated this figure as a conservative estimate. The Small Arms Survey (2003, p. 57), has subsequently expanded and refined this estimate to a current figure of approximately 639 million firearms in global circulation.


But what do such numbers mean? In abstraction, even precise numbers of small arms in existence would not reveal much about the nature of their spread. Implicit within much of the use of such estimates is the assumption that vast global accumulations of new and surplus SALW leads inevitably to broad and substantial availability through diverse channels – that assumption is based clearly on the amorphous image. Thus, large numbers are part of the equation that implies easy access. The phrase ‘awash with arms’ has been applied to many states and regions: Renner claimed in 1997 that ‘Small arms are so ubiquitous that many regions of the world find themselves awash in them … acquiring them is “as easy as buying fish in the market” ’ (Renner, 1997, p. 19). The vast global stock of SALW is often simply asserted and used as a premise for further emphasis on the distinctive complexity of SALW spread. A core aspect of this premise is that global accumulation leads almost inevitably to availability at all levels. Thus, for Klare (1999, p. 16), ‘the emergence of internal arms races and the outbreak of conflict in weak and divided societies is fostered by an immense worldwide abundance of small arms and light weapons.’ (emphasis added). This is not to say that local or regional aspects of the availability of SALW have been ignored, but that they have not been systematically analysed. Equally as prevalent as the use of these global estimates are references to countries or regions being ‘awash with arms’ supported by anecdotes of local markets in which an AK-47 can be picked up for the price of chicken. These anecdotes have a clear basis; in fact, small arms are available at roughly those prices in some market places. They do not, however, explain or even describe the nature of SALW flows to conflicts, but rather are the routine local arms trade that is related to that flow, but is not either a major source for it or a predominant form of it. Outside of the small academic community concerned with SALW, the SALW literature is largely a policy-oriented literature and many of its anecdotes serve an awareness raising/shock value purpose, rather than being descriptive or analytic. Yet, such statements often precede or take the place of appropriate description. The apparent tension between an emphasis on abundant local availability and an image of global abundance channelled to conflict through a global black market by nefarious actors has somehow remained unproblematised in the SALW literature. Both images coexist, and even inhabit the same rhetoric, as both are seen as reflecting the same chaotic, easy, and unbounded availability of arms. Explanations of accumulation, availability, and flow have tended to jump between levels without reference to the existence of structures and dynamics at each level of analysis.


The Small Arms Survey (2001, p. 197), has claimed that ‘Though only tentative conclusions can be drawn, their accessibility is linked to the liberalization of markets and the emergence of new brokering activities.’ By emphasising difference, particularly the crossing of the non-state threshold, most analyses of SALW spread have emphasised the global aspects of SALW flow in a world without barriers between local armed actors and international arms markets. The leap from the local to the global, and the flow back down again, is portrayed as a world of globalised illicit, or less-than-legal, trade populated by a new race of private profiteers: arms brokers and transport agents. Vibrant globalised illicit trade In terms of its dollar value, the illicit trade in SALW accounts for a small proportion of the global trade of these weapons: a loosely estimated 10 to 20 per cent (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 167). Some initial estimates suggesting that up to 55 per cent of the trade was illicit (Cairns, 1997) have been abandoned. Illicit flows of SALW have been dominant on the agendas related to SALW. This is largely because they are seen as disproportionately contributing to conflict and crime. While there are substantial definitional issues associated with the boundaries between legal and illicit transfers it is generally agreed that illicit arms flows follow a very different pattern from legal ones and that the two can be mixed. Many early analyses of SALW began their explanations of the significance of illicit transfers, or more particularly, of black-market transfers, with reference to the physical characteristics of SALW; their small size and low weight creates a propensity for illicit transfer since they are easily concealed (Karp, 1995, pp. 25–26; Klare, 1999, p. 14). This, in combination with the globalisation of all forms of trade, and the ever increasing volume of goods flowing around the world placing greater strain on customs services, were claimed to create an environment of impunity for those engaged in arms trafficking (Klare, 1995b, p. 39). This image simply assumes the global level construction of illicit SALW flows and reifies the globalisation of the illicit market. The dominant character of this illicit market is characterised differently, as either a global black market or a global grey market: as demonstrated by the machinations in the preparatory stages of the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects – the conference that agreed to the primary global framework for tackling SALW – there is a view, particularly among certain governments, that the problems of illicit trade lie in the purely black markets


rather than those aspects of illicit trade that have some link with states or their officials. This emphasis, however, has not been repeated among NGOs and academics: These concerned groups and individuals take an opposing view that emphasises the blurred boundaries between the legal trade, the black market, and the various shades of grey in between. Within this more nuanced view it is generally assumed that the grey market is of significantly greater size than the black market, due largely to the wider range of possible grey market channels and the improbability of long circuitous supply channels not including some state involvement or regulation. Claims are seldom made about which types of actors can access which types of channel. The Small Arms Survey did make such a claim, indicating that the grey market was larger than the black, and is more important for conflict. The basis for this claim is questionable, but much of the SALW literature retains this understanding: While it is difficult to distinguish between grey and black market transfers, research has provided sound evidence that each market has its own unique characteristics. The grey market is generally much larger, both in terms of value and volume; its covert transfers tend to supply small arms to non-state actors (e.g. rebel groups) in countries or regions in war or conflict. The black market is usually much smaller than the grey market; its illegal transfers tend to supply arms to individuals and criminal organizations. Of course, there are exceptions to these rules. More research is needed to understand the characteristics and ever changing dynamics of such markets. (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 190; emphasis added). Thus, there are two images of global illicit trade: the SALW literature claims that the grey market is larger than the black; but some in the policy community, and in many journalistic or populist accounts, the conception is of global black market, which in turn is part of a global illicit economy worth $1trillion every year (Naim, 2006) largely because of the lack of familiarity with the concept of a ‘grey market’. Importantly, however, both images relate to a vibrant market that is fully globalised. Within this dominant image of flows to conflicts through illicit channels, a central aspect that has been emphasised is the role of private arms brokers. A shadowy array of nefarious arms brokers In the absence of a sense of structure, everything is explained by agency or, in this case, ‘agents’. The diplomatic fiction of clear division between


legal and illicit spheres, and the limited nuance of understandings of the links between the two spaces, serve as the only sense of structure in the dominant image of those undesirable arms flows to conflicts. This other space, and the processes it contains, are – in the popular imagination – populated by actors that are as shadowy as the space itself. The stuff of Hollywood movies (Lord of War), nefarious, immoral profiteers with bloodied hands skulk in the dark and twilight spaces of global commerce. Such caricature is familiar in populist and journalistic renderings of the ‘illicit’ world, and is not so far removed from the SALW literature, or, particularly, the reference to SALW flow in broader New Wars literature. It is not either far removed from reality or wholly inaccurate. The role of private brokers and transport agents in various aspects of the flow of SALW has been raised as a core aspect of illicit trafficking (Wood and Peleman, 1999). While brokers are active within the legal trade, much of the concern about their activities has centred on the illicit transfer of weapons to insurgent groups and embargoed governments. The primary role of these actors is in facilitating access to global markets for actors who would otherwise not have that access. As such they form the link between illicit recipients and global accumulations. Thus, these unscrupulous privateers complete the prevailing amorphous image of SALW spread and flows to conflict: taking advantage of globalising illicit exports of conflict commodities (illicit drugs, diamonds and so-on), brokers and some poorly regulated private air and sea freight companies navigate legal loopholes and acquire SALW on behalf of illicit recipients in the world’s hotspots. Their realm is the illicit market. While it is not known how much of the illicit trade, or more specifically the flows of arms that fuel conflict, are attributable to these brokers, their role is believed to be highly significant. The prominence of brokers on the agendas of those concerned with SALW is very high. It is brokers that are blamed (quite legitimately) for diverting arms from the legal to the illicit. However, the profile of such brokers are embedded in the notions of vibrant globalised illicit trade drawing on vast availability. The role of brokers is the dominant (almost sole) explanation given for the access of conflict groups and embargoed governments to supplies of SALW. Yet simple reference to role of unregulated actors has little explanatory value, particularly when it leads to the exclusion of other aspects of SALW spread to conflicts that offer opportunities for more nuanced analysis. Overall, the picture of SALW flows to conflict is homogenised. A lack of a sense of structure has led to a lack of a sense of variation within undesirable SALW spread: anyone and everyone can get whatever SALW


they want, however they want, provided that they can pay for them. Yet a wide range of experiences of both state and non-state actors in conflicts show that different actors acquire arms in different ways and that of the range of possible channels of illicit SALW spread, different recipients use different means. It is also clear that some actors struggle to arm themselves. The amorphous image obscures this variation. It is also a static image, with little possibility of explaining any changes in arms flow and acquisition processes or patterns. Thus, it has little explanatory value, and it obscures the questions that might reveal the structures of spread: why ask what structures and dynamics shape the access of conflict actors to SALW when it is obvious that access to weapons is easily achieved by all through brokers accessing massive stocks on a globalised illicit market? It is evident that a new framework is required that explicitly addresses the level at which particular aspects of availability and acquisition take place, and discerns the structures within which the processes and potentialities of such acquisitions are bounded.

Developing a framework for analysis for SALW spread The lack or weakness of the types of structures that are familiar in other types of weapons spread, however, does not necessarily mean that there are no structures – just that they may be of a different type. The analytic frameworks applied to SALW conflate distinct processes and spaces into an amorphous whole, and thus are unable to adequately discern and analyse structures beyond the looseness or absence of those familiar in other forms of weapons spread. The task of developing that framework is one of drawing distinctions more clearly where they may be significant. Thus, the first step is to clarify the distinctions between types of SALW flow processes: in particular distinctions between legal and illicit flows, and, especially, between categories of illicit flows. The second is to tackle the amorphous image’s conflation of levels of analysis into a picture of globalised illicit markets. Thus, there is a need to refine a sense of what a structure is by clarifying levels of analysis that reflect the political and economic space in which SALW spread, and, in particular, flows to conflicts, take place. Thus, a three-level approach is developed with some redrawing of levels analysis so that they are better suited to uncovering the structures and dynamics that shape the spread of SALW. Legal and illicit distinctions Much current discussion of SALW spread, and its focus on conflicts, concentrates on ‘illicit’ arms transfers, which the 1997 UN Panel of Experts


defined as ‘that international trade in conventional weapons which is contrary to the laws of states and/or international law’. As shown above, the normative and policy structures that separate legal and illicit SALW transfers are fragmented. The resulting array of sources of ‘illicitness’ has led to the application of three categories of SALW transfers: legal, grey market, and black market. These categories dominate the discourse on SALW spread, but are often defined and applied inconsistently and import considerable conflation into understandings of SALW spread. The distinction between legal and illicit transfers of SALW relates primarily to the particular laws and procedures of the states involved, unless superseded by UN arms embargoes.3 Regional measures, such as regional agreements on SALW, codes of conduct, embargoes, and moratoria may also exist and be applied in particular cases. The breaking of national or international law would deem a transfer to be illicit. Any transfer that does not breach a UN arms embargo, and that does not break the laws and procedures of export and import authorisation of the countries involved, is therefore legal. Since many national laws are unclear, may be applied inconsistently or incompletely, and since states may contravene their own laws, further distinctions are required within the category of ‘illicit’ arms transfers. Most analyses divide illicit arms transfers into black-market and greymarket. Black-market transfers are wholly illicit, insofar as they are not authorised by either state involved in the transfer. The term ‘black market’, in popular parlance and in some parts of the SALW literature, refers to illegal trading by private actors. This is not the case here: corrupt state officials may be involved in clearly illegal activity such as theft from stockpiles, or turning a blind eye to cross-border shipments. The primary distinction between grey-market and black-market transfers is the clarity of a lack of appropriate authorisation. Grey-market arms transfers fall in between the purely illicit black market and legal arms transfers. Greyness can reflect one of two types of process that are usually conflated under a single category. These are: ●

●

the covert supply of arms to conflict protagonists, particularly insurgent groups, by governments and/or state security agencies – usually in pursuance of political objectives through arms transfers in contravention of its own laws and/or other legal frameworks; greyness caused by a lack of clarity on whether arms exported from a state are approved by competent authorities through due process defined by law.


The first represents a deliberate use of the illicit arms transfers by states or state agencies, while the latter often represents the opposite, a failure of due process and/or the manipulation or circumvention of government regulatory structures by illicit arms traders, often facilitated by corrupt state officials or legally authorised agents. Thus, it is useful to begin by further dividing the grey market category into two clearly distinct types of process: covert-aid and grey-market transfers. Even when covert aid is treated as a separate category a wide range of types of ‘grey-market’ phenomena remain. The term ‘grey-market’ here will be applied in cases where there is a discernable lack of appropriate authorisation, within existing legal frameworks (it is not used to cover any legal but ultimately undesirable transfers). This includes cases in which: ●

●

●

the transfer is authorised by one state but not the other (usually involving circumvention of the latter’s regulatory systems, or, in specific cases, where there is no effective authority in the importing state to authorise a transfer in flows to collapsed states); the laws and procedures are unclear and hence the authorisation is ambiguous; transfers where there is some authorisation but wider due process has not been followed.

Thus grey-market processes are those in which arms are diverted into illicit circulation as a function of some inadequacy of law, or the due process usually associated with it. This may also involve activities by corrupt officials that aid arms brokers or recipients in navigating and manipulating loopholes in regulatory systems or circumventing restrictive aspects of due process. In contrast, and fuelling the conflation inherent in the amorphous image, the term ‘grey market’ has tended to be applied to all cases where the flow process involves a mixture of the legal and the illicit: in multistage flow processes legal procedures are followed in the initial stage of the arms flow, but the weapons are diverted in a subsequent stage.4 This application conflates qualitatively different phenomena. Most types of ‘illicit’ arms flows are typically referred to as taking circuitous routes often involving several transfers, re-transfers and transhipment points. They, therefore, involve numerous distinct stages within the process of reaching the illicit end-user. Hypothetically, diversion from legal into illicit can occur at any stage. Categorising all overall flow processes in which diversion occurs somewhere as ‘grey-market’ does not help discern


where diversion occurs, and what structures and dynamics shape or permit that diversion. Rather it conflates all possible permutations of different mixtures – as a function of different structures and dynamics – as all one ‘grey market’. Such conflation may obscure significant structures and dynamics of SALW spread. Further, these qualitative distinctions also reflect different terrains of policy responses: if a negative consequence occurs through poor standards in law (i.e. legal trade) different responses are required to something occurring through unclear laws, poor enforcement of law or loopholes in procedure, or something occurring as the result of a powerful vibrant black economy. If we conflate any mixture with the grey market the SALW community may miss its target. Thus, in order to provide an adequate basis for thematic analysis, leading to a framework in which structures of spread can be discerned and analysed, it is useful to apply this, and other categories, not to the whole flow process but rather to each stage. A further source of conflation in the SALW literature relates not to the definition of these categories of flows, but to their application. There has been a conflation of structure and process in the language of the SALW literature which has occurred in a way that assumes and reifies largely untested and potentially misleading qualitative aspects of their construction: categories of illicit SALW flows are defined as characterisations of processes but are then referred to as legal markets, black markets and so forth – unquestioningly taking characterisations of processes to imply distinct, if overlapping, structures. In order to allow the following empirically based analysis to discern structures and processes and analyse their characteristics and construction, a simple hyphenation is used. Thus, for instance, there will be references to ‘black-market’ (as a compound adjective characterising a process, action etc) and ‘black market’ (a type of market). Long flows or pipelines Distinguishing stages of flow and applying categories accordingly will not, on its own, provide a structural picture of SALW spread. Rather, the structures are revealed when examining the patterns of relationships between consecutive stages, and locating those patterns. Thus, it is necessary to draw a further distinction between types of channels based on the nature of the organisation of the different stages. Much covert aid during the Cold War took the form of arms ‘pipelines’ from the superpowers to conflict protagonists, particularly transfers to insurgent groups. Such pipelines were established, for example, for US covert aid to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua,


and UNITA in Angola. Like other forms of transfers to illicit recipients, pipelines involved numerous stages with a number of different state and non-state actors playing a range of roles. However, for the purposes of discerning structures and dynamics of SALW spread it is useful to develop a definition of pipelines that is distinct from other multi-stage flows. Pipelines are distinguishable from other flow channels and processes by two key features. The first is that they involve a number of different actors in an organised and co-operative manner, through a series of consecutive transfers and transhipments with the aim of supplying a particular recipient. As such the flow of arms through these pipelines engenders dynamics and processes that are qualitatively distinct from those of direct arms transfers. This, however, may be a feature of many types of illicit transfers, including the predominant channels emphasised within the amorphous image. The second related feature of pipelines is that they become entrenched networks through which regular supplies are transferred. Thus, a single arms flow, even if it involves a range of actors in cooperation through multiple stages, would not be sufficiently distinct from other SALW flows to constitute a pipeline. Arms pipelines often generate a self-sustaining dynamism through the creation of powerful interest groups within the various stages of supply. Other illicit transfers occur on a more ad-hoc basis and thus do not generate such interest groups. Similarly, even well-established bilateral arms trading relationships, while they may generate interest groups in the supplier and recipient countries are not pipelines if they do not involve multiple cooperative stages. Thus, it is the convergence of both of these features that distinguish a pipeline from other forms of arms flows. The key utility of this notion of pipelines and other long arms flows is in discovering whether these are structures superimposed by powerful global actors, or are constructed within particular political/economic spaces at different levels of analysis. Addressing the amorphous image: Levels of analysis An understanding of structure needs a sense of location. Much of the lack of a sense of structure in the amorphous stems from assumptions of flow processes operating in a broad and uncontrolled, undifferentiated global space. Yet some aspects of SALW spread clearly operate only at the local level, while others are processes with an international scope. Due to the centrality of flows to conflict in the concerns and images of SALW spread the framework developed here, while of general utility, is mainly focused on examining SALW flows to conflicts.


The choice and definition of levels of analysis is particularly important in research designed to discover structures and patterns in the processes and dynamics of a particular phenomenon (Singer, 1969). The application of a particular definition of level confers particular characteristics upon a discrete political and economic space, and upon the actors active within that space. It is therefore essential that the levels of analysis applied are constructed in a way that minimises implicit assumptions about the structural boundaries of particular processes which could create artificial structures. The three traditional levels of analysis are ● ● ●

international (system: all states); regional (sub-system: a geographical grouping of states); state (unit) (Buzan and Little, 2000, pp. 68–72).

For the purpose of examining SALW spread to conflict, however, these levels of analysis import particular understandings and priorities that are not appropriate. Both SALW spread processes, and the conflicts to which they spread, do not reflect the boundaries and state-centrism of these levels. The use of the term ‘state’ as both the core actors and as one of three main levels risks significant conflation and may serve to obscure key structures and dynamics. It reinforces traditional ‘realist’ assumptions of states as unitary actors, and the analysis of other levels remains statecentric in focus thus imposing assumptions of the primacy of states and inter-state structures and processes. In analyses of phenomena that are exclusively or largely state-centric there is little problem in overcoming the dual-use of the term ‘state’ as the distinction between actor and level becomes largely semantic. And the fact that this often frames questions about weapons spread as being about decision-making processes within states are acceptable. However, SALW spread crosses the non-state threshold so fundamentally that the use of the term ‘state’ for both purposes is potentially misleading. Thus, throughout this book states are actors, not a level. A focus on conflict raises a further problem for the traditional state level of analysis. Most conflicts in the post-Cold War era have been intra-state conflicts as opposed to inter-state conflicts. However, the term ‘intra-state’ is often misleading. Fighting in such conflicts has demonstrated a propensity to spill across borders into neighbouring states. Additionally, the actors engaged in such conflicts may have rear bases and safe-havens in a neighbouring state. Conversely, some more localised conflicts take place only within a small local area. Thus, for


these and numerous other reasons, conflicts and the conflict protagonists are not necessarily contained within or appropriately represented by a level of analysis that draws its boundaries at the borders of one country. Further, complex reorientations of the political and economic space of ‘weak’ ‘failing’ and ‘collapsing’ states are a feature of conflict (Zartman, 1995, p. 9). Indeed, within the space in which conflict occurs, the state – if it continues to exist as an actor –may not even be the most powerful actor within their own borders. Large swathes of their territory, and hence the political and economic space over which they hold internationally recognised sovereignty, are often under the effective control of a range of non-state groups including large ‘warlord’ insurgent groups and a range of non-state militia. Thus, state and non-state actors inhabit the same political and economic space. This fragmented political and economic space is not merely a contested or an anarchic space within state borders, but rather often involves the building of alternative systems of power and profit, many of which also spread across state borders (Keen, 1996, p. 14). For instance, Duffield (2001, p. 163) talks about ‘emerging political complexes’ which ‘exploit the power and flexibility of non-formal economies’. Such formations have particular internal characteristics in terms of their political and economic structures and, of particular relevance here, distinct modes of interaction with global markets.5 Current levels of analysis may obscure the potential relevance of the structures of political, economic, and geographic spaces that merge and emerge through conflict. Thus, this book will use a ‘conflict-complex’ level that more adequately reflects the political and economic space of armed actors engaged in conflict, and reduces implicit assumptions of state-centricity, of the ontological unity of state actors, or of conflict and state atrophication as anomalous descent into anarchy. Thus, the conflict-complex is defined as the political and economic space within which conflict protagonists – both state and non-state actors – operate.6 More specifically, the use of the conflict-complex level ●

●

●

allows for more than one type of armed group in the geographic space of a juridically sovereign state; does not infer unity, power, control, and resources, solely or primarily to one actor within that space by virtue of its type, and in particular, does not confer characteristics upon state actors save for the possession of juridical sovereignty, nor deny such characteristics to nonstate actors save for their lack of recognised sovereignty; allows for the incorporation of territory of other states when that territory is under the control of another actor;

46 Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms ●

does not assume boundaries to SALW spread where none may exist, yet does not rule out the possibility of one existing.

This space is defined by a direct relationship with conflict, and is primarily the areas in which warring factions conduct violence and areas of territory that they control or operate in (thus it does not include, for instance, offices of diaspora organisations in far away countries that may support one faction or another). Most of this territory is within the main conflict-state, but it can sometimes span borders – particularly in places characterised by weak states and porous borders such as much of West Africa. Hence the area of territory controlled by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in the Liberian civil war, known as Greater Liberia, also included parts of Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. While such areas of territory are part of the conflict-complex, the primary constituent part of the conflict-complex geography is always the main conflict country – it is just not limited to the space within those internationally recognised borders.7 While defined with reference to conflict, it is important to note that conflict-complexes are durable spaces, (at least sufficient for analytic purposes without the need for constant redrawing of their boundaries). This may appear counter-intuitive as conflict is seen as an event, no matter how protracted: there is a perceived dichotomy between ‘war’ and ‘peace’. Yet, in relation to the political and economic space, this dichotomy is often more apparent than real. The political and economic – and indeed security situations – of countries afflicted by largescale armed conflict and those that are deemed to be ‘post-conflict’ are often very similar. The nature of the political and economic space, and the structures of power and profit that emerge during conflict continue into the post-conflict period. Likewise, state weakness and alternative power structures often exist prior to the outbreak of conflict. Thus, while the term ‘War’ tends to be applied to major armed conflicts that reach the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, the structures of the political and economic space in which that conflict occurs are more durable, and exist and evolve prior to, during, and after conflict. Thus, the conflict-complex is less transitory than it may appear at first sight and does not require an alternative level to be articulated for the periods prior to and after ‘conflict’. The regional level of analysis In order to see whether there are any structures of SALW spread other than, in addition to, or instead of, global trade, there is a need for an


intermediate level. The existence of distinct regional structures of spread would be a strong antidote to the amorphous image. Regions are often distinguished in order to sub-divide the global level into sub-systems, and are defined by a range of features including geographic propinquity, political, and economic interaction and interdependence, and political, economic, and social commonality. They are ‘clusters of units’ – usually states. However, the conflict-complex is the bottom level of distinct political-economic spaces, not a unit in a system in which I attempt to describe or explain the interaction of units. Thus, the defining of levels of analysis from the bottom level upwards and doing so with the base level being that of the conflict-complex requires a somewhat different approach to the definition of ‘region’. Retaining the central focus on conflict, the region must be defined outwards from the boundaries of the conflict-complex. Thus, this book does not rigidly apply the usual delineations of regions as divisions of the globe into useful sections such as distinctions between Central Africa and Southern Africa (though such terms are still used to locate a broad area), or between the members of different regional organisations. For example, while Zimbabwe is in Southern Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is in Central Africa, Zimbabwe has been a regional player in the DRC conflict. Thus, the region here must be able to cross the boundaries of traditionally demarcated sub-divisions of the global system. While it is a simple matter to determine which countries are immediate neighbours to the primary conflict state, and hence part of the ‘region’, this level cannot be solely defined by shared borders: a conflict-complex may be immediately bordered by geographically small states, and thus some other states would be relatively geographically close to the conflictcomplex, but not share a common border. It is these states that are proximate but not contiguous which create a requirement for further elaboration of defining features.8 However, extending the region to all countries that are separated by one state does not sufficiently delineate the boundaries of region – China and Finland both have borders with Russia but clearly would not be in the same region. Rather, the concept of ‘security-complexes’ is instructive in determining the criteria for inclusion or exclusion in the regional level. This concept groups together states whose regularity and intensity of interaction, be it cooperative or conflictual, means that their ‘primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’ (Buzan, 1983, p. 106). In relation to conflict-complexes this would indicate that the region


includes all states whose security is threatened by that conflict, or whose inter-state relations within their security-complex would be affected by that conflict. Thus, by defining the region for the conflict-complex level outwards, states that are usually seen as being part of different subsystems/security complexes, can be part of one conflict-region. While using these basic elements of the concept of security complex, regions are not defined as security complexes. The security complex, is also state-centric construct defined primarily by inter-state relations and centring around regional hegemons as security providers, or inter-state conflict-dyads as centres of insecurity (See Värynen, 1984, pp. 337–345; Ayoob, 1995, pp. 56–65). Security-complexes also focus on security, rather than being a characterisation of both formal and informal political and economic space. They also remain divisions of a global whole rather than spaces surrounding conflict-complexes that are less than the whole. It would be undesirable, and contradictory, for the regional level to be defined solely in these terms: to thereby assume that groupings of states defined as sub-divisions of a global whole necessarily reflect the political-economic space surrounding and interacting with the conflictcomplex, populated by state and non-state actors, and that is, in theory, shaped as much by transnational networks and relationships. To assume this may obscure structures or reify false ones. Rather, it is the guiding principles of proximity and interaction that are instructive. Thus, the regional level encompasses all of those actors and spaces that are sufficiently proximate to have a direct or regular engagement with conflict protagonists, but that are not part of the conflict-complex. It includes all states that share a border with the conflict-complex, and all non-state actors within the territory of those regional states. In terms of geography, therefore, it is reasonable to include all state and non-state actors with regular and interdependent interaction with the conflict protagonists within a security complex, and all state and non-state actors that are at a similar geographic distance. Though seldom defined, except for by a lack of the key features of the security complex, the boundary between regional and international levels remains relatively static, lying at the borders of regional states. However, by incorporating non-state actors into the definition of region, there is a potential for the regional level to expand too far: transnational links between non-state actors may cross many regions while still having a strong and regular interaction (e.g. diaspora groups). However, this can be overcome with reference to a simple principle – an area is only part of the regional level if those countries that lie between it and the conflict-complex are also ‘regional’. This effectively excludes


far-flung diaspora groups and so prevents the broadening of the regional level to unmanageable proportions. The regional level plays two key roles in the framework being developed. It is an intermediate level between the conflict-complex and the international level – in which a number of stages of flows may take place to facilitate spread from the international level to the conflict-complex: that is, SALW flow through the region. The regional level is also a distinct political and economic space, populated by a range of arms suppliers, and, potentially, encompassing discretely regional structures of SALW availability and flow. Thus, SALW spread may also take place completely within a region. These dual roles – and the links between them – are examined in depth in Chapters 5 and 6. The international level of analysis The international level of analysis is easily defined. The re-drawing of the lines between conflict-complex and regional levels does not need to be repeated in drawing the lines between the regional and the international level. The range of state and non-state actors can easily be accommodated within the usual use of the term – though the various characterisations of that space and the processes of ‘globalisation’ are infinitely more complex. The international level therefore encompasses all of the geographical political-economic space and the states and nonstate actors that are outside of the region. Much analysis of SALW spread has made claims framed at a global level. However, for the purposes of analysing flow processes the international level also needs to be distinct from the region and include all of those suppliers and processes that operate outside of the conflict-region. Therefore, for the purposes of this book, the international level is used in two ways: 1. For the purposes of discerning overall structures of spread – such as the availability of weapons from suppliers, and the global structures of the legal trade – the international level encompasses the whole globe. This is referred to as the Global level. 2. For the analysis of the flow of arms to particular conflicts, which allows examination of whether or not those non-regional aspects of flows to conflicts reflect broader global SALW spread structures, the international level covers those areas that are extra-regional. Disentangling SALW and conflict: A cautionary note The levels of analysis delineated here are to be used for examining the flow of SALW to conflicts and discerning the existence and character of

50 Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms Extra-Regional 1

2

3

Regional 4

Conflict Complex 5 Figure 2.2

SALW flows through levels of analysis

structures and processes of SALW spread. In order to address the amorphous image of SALW spread it is important to disentangle the SALW spread from conflict. The structures of SALW availability and spread are examined at each level, but these are not assumed to be the same as the conflict-complex and regional levels. If the structures of SALW spread coincide with these boundaries then these levels will be particularly meaningful. However, the absence of such coincidence might imply a different set of structures (largely reflecting the amorphous image). Thus, the levels of analysis applied here help clarify what the structures of SALW accumulation, availability, and flow are, and whether there are significant boundaries on their spread. Broadly speaking, SALW spread through processes involving five combinations of levels (see Figure 2.2): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

extra-regional direct to conflict-complex; extra-regional – regional facilitation – conflict-complex; extra-regional sourcing – regional (re)transfer – conflict-complex; regional – conflict-complex; conflict-complex.

Conclusion Early examinations of SALW spread were informed and conducted by those academics and policy communities that developed their analytic


frameworks in relation to the spread of other weapons – whether the ‘proliferation’ of NBC weapons or the ‘arms trade.’ These frameworks did not fit well, and observers and policy-makers were left with the perception that SALW spread was particularly complex, and particularly broad. The questions and explanations these frameworks offered have not been sufficient to explain how SALW spread, to discover and analyse differences in access to arms among the broader range of potential recipients. The limitations on spread familiar in the proliferation and arms trade literatures, that informed so much explanation and analysis, seemed simply not to exist, or not to matter very much. The spread of SALW was described in terms of its contrast to the spread of other weapons, rather than in terms of its own characteristics. As a result, the spread of SALW, both generally and to conflicts, appeared amorphous. Superimposed upon the amorphous image, a prevailing understanding of flows to conflicts points to a homogenised pattern of arming, as a function of a distinct globalised illicit market in which a massive and unregulated global stock of arms is open to all through a shadowy array of brokers. Thus the arming of conflict is portrayed as a matter of the choices made by arming actors, with no sense of limitation or effect of capacities to acquire arms in particular ways. Thus, the currently available analytic tools and frameworks have yielded limited understandings of the structures of spread and hence of the nature and determinants of conflict arming. The combination of categorical confusion and conflation and data deficiencies has lead to analytic incoherence. The clarification of distinctions between legal and illicit transfers and within illicit transfers aids the creation of a framework that is more appropriate to the more opaque structures of SALW spread. In order to establish patterns and structures, the location of particular phenomena must be determined. The crossing of the non-state threshold and a focus on conflict requires redefinition of levels of analysis. The different boundaries of the geographic, political, and economic space of conflict means that the base level of analysis needs to be reframed away from the potentially misleading boundaries of juridical sovereignty, to the empirical political and economic space of the recipient actors. Thus, a new three-level approach is proposed that looks at the existence, nature, and interaction of structures and dynamics at the conflict-complex level (which more adequately reflects the fragmented character of the political and economic space of armed actors engaged in conflict), the regional level (defined outwards from the conflict-complex), and the international level. This new framework reveals key aspects of current understandings and allows a more effective analysis of the structures and dynamics of


SALW spread. For instance, many analysts have claimed that most flows to conflict are a grey-market affair; and that the grey market is probably far larger than the black market (Karp, 1994, p. 181; Singh, 1998, p. 13 Mathiak and Lumpe, 2000, p. 55; Small Arms Survey, 2001). This claim can now be seen to be a function of the conflation inherent within the amorphous image: in particular, it is a global level estimate, which conflates both covert-aid and grey-market flows, confuses processes with structures, and portrays all possible permutations of mixed flows with a homogenous grey market. This, potentially, obscures more of the structure and dynamic of SALW spread to conflicts than it reveals. The refined three-level approach proposed here allows such claims, and other aspects of the spread of SALW, to be explored and with greater analytic and explanatory value.

Part II The Global Level: Global Markets and Dynamic Structures of SALW Spread


3 The Foundations and Construction of Global SALW Trade

The global level structures and processes of SALW spread are dominated by the legal (authorised) trade. This trade is inadequately understood, due particularly to limited systematic data. However, a lack of research on how this global trade was constructed and has developed has contributed to a lack of a sense of structure or dynamic. Views of the global legal trade are framed almost exclusively by reflections on recent transfers and references to the breadth of the global distribution of sources and suppliers. However, global level SALW spread processes are the product of development and interaction of structures that have been constructed over time. These structural features include the nature and distribution of sources and the ways in which broad systemic structures shape the nature of the global SALW trade. This chapter explores the structures and construction, of the global legal SALW trade. It discerns that the evolution of the global SALW trade has not been merely a subset of broad developments in the overall arms trade. It has distinct structures and processes of the spread of SALW that have had their own dynamics and characteristics. This chapter first examines the foundations of the global trade: the global source base of SALW spread, including the spread of production capacity. It then focuses on the construction of the global legal SALW trade, and discerns structures and dynamics of their evolution that combine to form a distinct system of weapons spread. Together, an understanding of the foundations and construction of the global SALW trade will allow the subsequent chapters to discern the degree to which global legal market structures shape the flow of SALW to conflicts. 55


Global sources of SALW SALW have the broadest source base of any type of weapons. This breadth has been a key emphasis in examinations of SALW spread. Over half of the world’s countries have the capacity to produce some SALW. Added to this, the potential for international transfers of surplus and second-hand weapons and ammunition, and the hypothetical (though actually very limited) possible role of illicit production, mean that almost any state is a potential source of SALW. However, breadth is not the only feature of the source base of the global spread of SALW, nor is it a static one. The production base of SALW is globally stratified and is also full of sectoral divisions, and the availability of surplus arms is not a constant. The source base was not always so broad: it did not appear fully formed and, while many national firearms industries are over a century old, it is a relatively recent creation. The processes through which it has expanded are more revealing of the structures of spread and the ongoing evolution of the SALW spread system than simple assertions of breadth. These processes are intimately inter-related to the construction of a global SALW trade. The global production base Millions of small arms and billions of rounds of ammunition are produced every year.1 The precise number of producer states and companies is not known, and it fluctuates as new countries develop or acquire production capacities, or production lines fall into disuse; companies open and close, merge or split. Since the beginning of concern about SALW, estimates of the production base of SALW spread have become increasingly nuanced and refined, and have tended to grow as they have done-so. By crossreferencing these current estimates and a range of other sources, it is possible to produce an estimate that 105 countries have – at some point in time, but not necessarily currently – produced SALW, including ammunition and landmines and parts and components thereof.2 This includes up to 60 states producing pistols, 84 producing rifles, and 65 producing light weapons. Recent estimates by the Small Arms Survey (2005, p. 13) also indicate that at least 76 countries produce ammunition for SALW, though other estimates indicate that this is a conservative estimate (see Table 3.1). While serving to emphasise the broader global production base of SALW, these figures do not, in themselves, lead to a better understanding of the structures of SALW spread. Indeed, these figures are potentially misleading: for instance, the number of manufacturers in a country reveals nothing of

Table 3.1

Small arms, light weapons and ammunition producers

Region/ State

Licensed production

Pistols

Rifles/assault rifles/submachine guns

Light weapons

Ammunition/ landmines

North America Canada United States Mexico

350 (3) 12 335 3

3 Yes Yes Yes

3 Yes Yes Yes

3 Yes Yes Yes

3 Yes Yes Yes

3 Yes Yes Yes

Western Europe Austria Belgium Cyprus Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Luxembourg Malta Monaco Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom

343 (19) 16 15 1 3 11 39 37 6 51 1 1 1 5 7 4 26 9 18 92

12 Yes Yes

9–11 Yes Yes

14–16 Yes Yes

14–16 Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes *

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes *

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes *

18 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

*

*

*

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes


Yes Yes Yes Yes


Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Continued

57

Number of manufacturers

Continued

Region/ State

Central, Eastern and Southern Europe Albania Armenia Belarus BosniaHerzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia F.R. Yugoslavia Georgia Hungary Lithuania Macedonia Moldova Poland Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Ukraine

58

Table 3.1


Licensed production

Pistols


Light weapons


166 (21)

8

12–15

16–19

13–15

16

1 2 1 7

Yes Yes *

Yes Yes Yes *

Yes

Yes Yes Yes

11 3 34 1 3 1 7 1 1 1 21 9 31

Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes * Yes

Yes * Yes Yes

* Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes

8 4 14 5

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes * Yes


Yes Yes

Yes

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

36 (13)

Latin America Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Cuba Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Nicaragua Paraguay

56 (15) 21 1 18 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1

1 10 4 1 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

7

4–6

7–9

4–6

11–12

Yes Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

*

9 Yes Yes Yes Yes

6–7 Yes * Yes Yes Yes

Yes * Yes Yes

Yes

9–10 Yes * Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

*

Yes Yes Yes 4–5 Yes * Yes Yes Yes

15 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (Mines) Yes Yes (Mines) Yes Continued

59

Middle East and North Africa Algeria Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Saudi Arabia Syria United Arab Emirates

Continued

Region/ State

60

Table 3.1


Licensed production

Pistols


2 1 1

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sub-Saharan African Burkina Faso Cameroon Ethiopia Guinea Kenya Namibia Nigeria South Africa Sudan Tanzania Uganda Zimbabwe

33 (12)

8

2–5

4–8

1–4

11–12

*

*

*

*

Yes *

*

Yes Yes Yes * Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Asia/Pacific Australia Bangladesh Cambodia China India

101 (22) 7 1 1 6 9

Peru Uruguay Venezuela

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 1 1 1 1

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes

Yes 15 Yes Yes Yes Yes

* Yes Yes *

Light weapons

Yes Yes Yes

* Yes

Yes 9–13 * Yes Yes Yes


15–19 Yes *

13–16

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

*

20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Indonesia Japan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Malaysia Myanmar/Burma Nepal New Zealand North Korea Pakistan Papua New Guinea Philippines Singapore South Korea Taiwan Thailand Vietnam TOTAL

3 10 2 1 6 1 1 2 1 11 1

Yes

5 7 15 4 6 1

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes

1085 (105)

62 states

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

* * Yes Yes *

Yes Yes * * Yes Yes *

Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes



45–60

68–84

62–65

94–96

* Yes *

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Note: The information contained in this table is drawn largely from the following sources: Omega Foundation; Brzoska and Ohlson (1986); Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, (1993); and Spear (1996); DeClerq (1998); Gander (1998); Abel (2000); Small Arms Survey (2001, 2002). Entries given as * indicates data from Small Arms Survey only with no information on types of arms produced, or that the state of current production is unknown. Entries in italics are not found in the Small Arms Survey.

61


the scale of production or the global market share of the producing country. SALW producers can be found in every region, and in every income level, of the world. However, this broad distribution is not without stratification. It has been estimated that approximately two-thirds of producer states have exported some of their production (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 145). The Small Arms Survey (2001, p. 16) has outlined tiers of producers based on the scale and sophistication of their production capacities and the global distribution of their products. These tiers, represented in an amended Table 3.2 below, are believed to be broadly indicative of the position of particular states in the hierarchy of suppliers in the SALW market: ‘Major’ and ‘Large’ producers have a full range of production capacity and are believed to be significant exporters; ‘Medium’ producers produce most types of SALW and ammunition but are not significant exporters from this production; ‘Small’ producers may only manufacture ammunition and/or a few types of small arms. Exports from ‘Small’ producers are more unusual, or at least there is little information on either supply or receipt from them, with most weapons and ammunition apparently destined for domestic use. The spread of production capacity: Licensed production While the early SALW literature emphasised the simplicity of the associated technologies, the creation of production capacity is not easy. Many SALW industries have still required the influx of technology and equipment through licensed production and other forms of technology transfer. This has been portrayed primarily as a north–south movement of technology through the supply of equipment, know-how, and components to developing states by major producers – often as a new aspect of a ‘buyers-market’ in the post-Cold War era in which recipients have more influence (Klare, 1999b; Abel, 2000, p. 83) However, licensed production of SALW is ubiquitous. It is not simply a north–south, or intertier, diffusion of production capability, and it has been a feature of the SALW trade throughout its history. The majority of producer states, around 60 per cent, have engaged in some licensed production (see Tables 3.3–3.5). Licensors include, at least, 16 per cent of producer states. If licensed production were primarily a north–south technology transfer process, as it has been construed, one would expect the majority of licensees to be in the south. In fact, Western Europe contains more licensees than most southern regions and also houses the most significant licensor companies. Licensees are fairly evenly distributed throughout different regions with two exceptions that

63 Table 3.2

Tiers of producers of small arms, light weapons and ammunition

Major

Large

Medium

Small

China Russian Federation United States

Austria Belgium

Argentina Australia

Albania Algeria

Brazil Bulgaria Czech Republic Egypt France

Canada Chile Colombia Croatia Denmark

Germany Hungary India Israel Italy North Korea

Finland Greece Indonesia Japan Malaysia Mexico

Pakistan Poland Romania Singapore South Africa South Korea Spain Switzerland Taiwan Turkey United Kingdom

Netherlands New Zealand Norway Peru Philippines Portugal Saudi Arabia Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Thailand Ukraine Venezuela Yugoslavia

Armenia Bangladesh Belarus Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Burkina Faso Cambodia Cameroon Cuba Cyprus Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Estonia Ethiopia Georgia Guatemala Guinea Iran Iraq Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Libya Lithuania Luxembourg Macedonia Malta Moldova Monaco Morocco Myanmar Namibia Nepal Nicaragua Nigeria Oman Continued

64 Table 3.2 Major

Continued Large

Medium

Small Papua New Guinea Paraguay Sudan Syria Tanzania Uganda United Arab Emirates Uruguay Vietnam Zimbabwe

3

24

27

51

Note: This table is based on that produced by the Small Arms Survey with the additional producers identified above included as small producers.

Table 3.3

Distribution of licensed production by region

Region

% of Producing states in region with licensed production

% of Global licensed production in region

100 63 38

5 19 13

54

11

60 67 68

15 13 24

North America Western Europe Central, Eastern and Southern Europe Middle East and North Africa Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Pacific

Table 3.4 Tier

Major Large Medium Small

Distribution of licensed production by tier % of Producer states in tier with licensed production

% of Global licensed production in the tier

67 92 67 39

3 35 29 33

Foundations and Construction of Global SALW Trade 65 Table 3.5

Licensors and client states

Licensing country Belgium Germany USSR/Russian Federation Israel United States Italy China United Kingdom Austria Switzerland France Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic Finland Pakistan Singapore Sweden India

Number of licensee countries 25 23 9 9 7 7 5 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

are easily explicable: North America contains only three states, so the figure of 100 per cent of states having some licensed production does not reflect a significant concentration of licensed production (representing only 5 per cent of global licensed producers); and for Central, Eastern and Southern Europe there is very little information available, so the apparently low figure is likely to be misleading – especially as many SALW industries in this region were established through Soviet licensing (see below). Likewise, one might expect a significant concentration of licensees in the lower tiers and licensors in the higher tiers. However, a significant proportion of every tier have been licensees. The providers of licensed production and assistance are not exclusively found in the major producer tier. Indeed, many are large producers, though this primarily reflects limited distinctions between the two tiers. The primary suppliers of SALW production technology have been companies from Belgium, Germany, the USSR, Israel, the United States, Italy, China, the United Kingdom, and Austria. The world’s primary licensor company is Fabrique Nationale d’Armes de Guerre (FN-Herstal) of Belgium, which itself was established to produce German Mauser small arms under licence in 1889 (FN Herstal, 2006). For instance, its FAL (Fusil Automatique Léger) rifle has been produced under licence in 15 countries, and along with many other FN designed


weapons brings the total FN licensees to 25. FN is closely followed by the German companies Heckler and Koch, Rheinmettal, and the formerly state-owned company Fritz Werner. For example, throughout its history Heckler and Koch of West Germany issued licences for the production of its G3 assault rifle to 18 countries. By 1982, according to Andrew Pierre (1982, p. 112): ‘Small arms and ammunition factories have been built by German industry in such developing countries as Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, Thailand and Burma. Ammunition plants in Iran were agreed upon which would reportedly have had a larger output than Germany’s own ammunition factories’. Similarly, during and since the Cold War, Soviet-designed SALW have been produced in a number of countries both inside and outside of the (former-)Eastern bloc. The AK-47, and its numerous variants, has been produced in 19 countries including all states of East and Central Europe as well as China, North Korea, Egypt, Finland, Yugoslavia, and Iraq (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 20). Although licensed production is not primarily a north–south diffusion process, most licensor states have been located in the north. The primary exceptions to this are Singapore’s licensing of production in Indonesia, and Pakistan’s building of a factory in Oman.3 These are southern states that initially established their arms industries through licensed production.4 Thus, many licensee states are now capable of becoming licensors. This may represent the beginning of a generation shift in the spread of the SALW production base, and the completion of a shift from a proliferation structure of SALW production technology spread to one of diffusion. Overall, it is clear that licensed production is both a primary engine of the spread of production capacity and the creation of the broad global production base, and a ubiquitous and routine phenomenon within and across the tiers of producers. Illicit production While the vast majority of SALW originate in legal, industrial-scale production, some SALW are illicitly produced. The manufacture of SALW can be illicit in a number of ways. It may be ● ● ●

illegal: contrary to the laws of the state within which it takes place; unregulated: as result of inadequate laws or enforcement of regulation; unlicensed: akin to licensed production but without the permission of the licensor, often through reverse engineering of other producer’s designs.

Foundations and Construction of Global SALW Trade 67

Illegal production is most often conducted by private manufacturers on a workshop scale (though not all craft-scale production is illegal). For example, some of the infamous artisan producers in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan are licensed by the state to manufacture weapons (Siddiqa-Agha, 1996). Further, some non-state actors in conflict have engaged in craft production on varying scales such as Khmer Rouge, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and others. Significantly, no examples of extraregional transfers of these weapons are known. Weapons produced illegally tend to remain in illicit circulation, and this circulation is largely contained locally and regionally. Some illicit production occurs on an industrial scale and, hypothetically at least, has greater potential to enter larger and longer transfer channels. However, this too seems limited. Industrial-scale production is rarely entirely unregulated except for in specific circumstances in which the state loses the capacity to regulate existing production (rather than criminal organisations establishing arms factories). Thus, according to Bluth (1996, p. 49), in the mid-1990s there was some unregulated industrialscale production in the former-Soviet republics using supposedly ‘idle’ production facilities. Further, there remain allegations that, in addition to some craft production, old Soviet factories in the Transdneister region of Moldova are being used to illicitly produce arms. While such illicit production may appear more likely to enter illicit circulation, there are no known examples of such illicit production feeding into extra-regional flows to conflicts. Unlicensed industrial-scale production is achieved through reverse engineering or continuing production once a license has lapsed. It occurs, therefore, in a grey area or through the breaking of international standards on copyrights, patents, and so forth, rather than being illegal or unregulated in the state in which it occurs. This is not a form of arms and ammunition originating within global illicit markets: the weapons produced are not necessarily illicit, and in fact are often legal in relation to the laws of the producer state, and, therefore, for the purposes of discerning spread structures they are not distinguishable from legally produced weapons and do not reflect a strong illicit structure and trade. Unlicensed production, however, is a key feature of the spread of production capacity. For example, China and Croatia are known to produce unlicensed copies of other manufacturers’ designs. Many Chinese weapons are copies of Soviet designed weapons, such as the Type-56 rifle which is a slightly modified copy of the AK-47 (Myatt, 1981). Likewise,


the Soviet SA-14 (Strela-2) missile is manufactured without a license in China, Egypt, and Pakistan (Pyadushkin, 2003, p. 17). Similarly, the Soviet SA-7 shoulder-fired surface to air missile is based on the American ‘Redeye’. It is reportedly based on a missile system which ‘found its way to the USSR through Scandinavia’ (Hogg, 1985, p. 678). Overall, illicit production is not a significant part of the global structures of SALW availability. Most of these arms either do not enter extraregional circulation, in the case of illegal production, or at least have no greater propensity to enter illicit flow channels, in the case of unlicensed production.

Surplus SALW Surplus weapons (used or new) are not seen as being of further utility – due to becoming obsolete, force downsizing, or a range of other factors. They thus hold value primarily as a commodity to be traded. Surplus arms are a major part of the global sources of SALW. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, the spread of SALW is the most surplus-intensive of all types of weapons spread. An un-quantified but significant proportion of the global trade in SALW draws on surplus stocks. The overall distribution of global stocks of firearms is estimated to be approximately 60 per cent in civilian hands; 38 per cent in the stocks of state armed forces, 3 per cent held by police forces and only 0.2 per cent held by insurgent groups (Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 103). However, the global trade in surplus SALW draws largely from state stocks rather than the fragmented stocks in civilian hands, or the illicit arms of insurgent forces. State surpluses include both used weapons and weapons that are surplus but have never been fired: some stocks of surplus arms have included weapons still in their original packaging. They may be surpluses from state military, police and paramilitaries, or from production stockpiles. Most analyses of surplus weapons emphasise the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as the origin of huge stocks of surplus SALW that have been transferred by both states and private suppliers (Musah and Castle, 1998). However, while the scale of this availability and the freedom with which the arms were transferred may be unprecedented, the transfer of surplus weapons is not a new phenomenon. The generation of surplus stocks is a continual feature of the life-cycle of weapons stocks: the categorisation of obsolete stocks as ‘surplus’ occurs regularly in many military institutions; routine reconfigurations of force structures and strategic reviews of defence priorities generate


surpluses; modernisation and harmonisation processes (such as efforts towards force compatibility within alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and procurement cycles may all generate significant stocks of surplus arms in particular states. The stimuli for this availability may come from the end of a confrontation or war (both global and regional conflicts); bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements (such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty); or unilateral decisions such as downsizing due to budgetary concerns or the modernisation of armed forces. In addition to state surpluses, SALW may be held by actors other than the state. The weapons of insurgents or civilians tend to be less concentrated and feed into small-scale domestic legal transfers, or local and regional illicit circulation rather than extra-regional flows. However, some broadly diffused arms have been re-aggregated by a state and then sold on. For example, after the 1975 fall of the Republic of South Vietnam, over 2 million SALW and 150,000 tons of ammunition were abandoned by the United States in Vietnam and Cambodia (Ezell, 1984, p. 229). These arms were retransferred extra-regionally, primarily by the government of Vietnam, to conflicts as far away as Central America. Likewise, later in the Cold War, many of the arms provided by the superpowers to allied insurgents in proxy conflicts were from surplus stocks, including weapons captured in other conflicts (see Chapter 4). Significantly, in the last several decades, there are very few known examples of illicit surpluses being recirculated internationally without returning to state control. As with the trade in newly produced weapons, transfers of surplus weapons are mostly legal. However, they may also be sources for illicit transfers, accessed through grey- or black-market mechanisms, where diversion occurs at the source rather than further down the supply line. In many states surplus stocks are less well guarded and are more vulnerable to theft on a large scale (Greene, 2000, pp. 6–7). The scale of sourcing of international arms flows through theft cannot currently be ascertained. Nevertheless, the majority of cases of theft from stocks appear to feed into domestic and regional black markets, or are directly conducted by factions within conflict-complexes. Overall, the routine generation of state surpluses means that any state can be a source for SALW transfers. The significance of the availability of surplus arms is naturally a more fluid and transitory feature of the global SALW supplier base than the more progressive expansion of production capacity. It is likely to have the most significant effect on the character of global source structures only when other systemic factors stimulate the growth of large surpluses in multiple countries.


The global structures of SALW sources Almost every state has the potential to be a source of SALW for extra regional flows. Yet, in spite of broad production and routine surplus generation, the global structures of the SALW source base are not amorphous. While broad it is not unstratified, and while mature it is not static and unchanging. The key to understanding the nature of the SALW source base, in structural and dynamic terms, is not just its breadth, but the various processes by which it has been, and is being, constructed. The SALW source base is a continually shifting multilayered foundation for global transfers of arms and ammunition. The first layer is the production base that has expanded through licensed production. The proliferation (and increasingly – diffusion) of production capacity has grown quickly but in a progressive, linear way. The significance of new producer states as sources/suppliers has grown but remains stratified. A second layer follows very different patterns; the significance of surplus stocks in the market has played a key role in changing the nature of the SALW trade, but this has not followed a linear expansion: it has been periodically but transitorily highly significant, particularly in the post-Second World War and post-Cold War eras (see below). The interplay between the availability of surplus and newly produced arms is complex and is shaped by the evolving political economic structures and dynamics of the global SALW trade.

Global market structures and extra-regional flows The global arms transfer system, as understood through analyses of the MCAs trade, is often seen as broadly reflecting the nature of the international system (Laurance 1992; Harkavy 1994; Louscher and Sperling, 1994). While its foundations go back over a century (Krause, 1992) the arms transfer system familiar to most arms trade analysts is that which progressively evolved in the post-Second World War era. This is seen as developing in several phases in which the structure of the MCA trade reflected the overall Cold War-era global divisions due to the strategic importance of MCA and arms transfer relationships. This began with the post-war creation of blocs, through rigid and then loosening bloc discipline as the Cold War progressed, and finally a reconfiguration into a commercialised trade in the post-Cold War era. The transfer of SALW within MCA package deals was common within many arms-transfer relationships. It has, therefore, been assumed that the duopolistic structures of supplier dominance present in the MCA trade imposed similar discipline in the SALW market. For instance, this assumption resonates in the Small Arms Survey’s (2001, p. 15) claim that ‘During the Cold War,


the global market for small arms was dominated by the former-Soviet Union and the United States, leaving a few European countries (e.g. Belgium, Germany) to squabble over the “spoils”.’ However, this assumption has not been fully explored in the SALW literature, which has a post-Cold War focus. The degree to which the processes of the construction of the system of SALW spread reflected (a) broad global divisions; and (b) the particular structures of the global arms trade; are key questions in discerning what structures and dynamics shape the spread of SALW. In particular, they can help discern whether the global SALW trade has its own distinct structures and dynamics, or SALW have simply been more banal, less controlled goods within the global arms trade. Different analyses of the MCA trade have discerned different phases of the development of the arms trade. Similarly, three broad phases can be distinguished in the development of the SALW trade. Notably, these phases tend to begin earlier than those discerned for the MCA trade, indicating a degree of distinctiveness in the structures of SALW spread. The three periods are: the post-Second World War period from 1945 until the mid-1960s, in which the structures of a global system of legal SALW trade were formed; the Cold War period from the mid-1960s to 1989, in which those structures continued to develop and shape the global trade; and the post-Cold War era in which the continuities in the SALW trade contrast with the changes in the MCA trade to reveal the strength of the distinct structures of SALW spread. Post-Second World War period: 1945 to the mid-1960s In the first decade of the post-war era the international small arms trade was relatively small. The future supplier blocs were created through intra-bloc arms and technology transfers, and the beginnings of the creation of spheres of influence. By the end of this phase, these foundations had developed into bloc competition in a global SALW market, but with some significant differences to that of the MCA trade. In the immediate post-war period, the international flow of SALW was dominated by the transfer of Second World War surplus arms by the United States and the United Kingdom (Stanley and Pearton, 1972, pp. 51–60; Pineo and Lumpe, 1996, p. 1). Until the 1960s most US arms transfers were grants rather than commercial sales (US Department of Defence figures cited in Stanley and Pearton, 1972, p. 89). Vast quantities of SALW, and other arms and equipment, were provided to NATO and Asian allies through the Military Assistance Program in order to create and solidify a sphere of influence and contain the spread of communism from the Soviet Union and China.


The United Kingdom was the other primary supplier of surplus SALW in the early post-war era, While large quantities of surplus weapons, of all types, were destroyed or ‘demilitarised’ many were transferred directly to foreign governments. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of British LeeEnfield rifles were modified for civilian use and sold to private dealers. Many military non-automatic rifles were also sold to private dealers, especially Crown Agents, who then transferred them to foreign governments, particularly to British colonies (Krause, 1992, pp. 55, 58). In addition to government-to-government transfers, private channels were an important mechanism of global transfers of both new and surplus SALW in this period. Prime among those involved in the private trade was the American Samuel Cummings and his company ‘Interarms’. Cummings bought up post-war surpluses all over the globe and sold them to foreign governments – including the governments of many developing states. This, however, was done only with a degree of approval from the US government, and sometimes the UK government. For example, in 1958 Cummings was approached by the newly independent government of Sudan, on the recommendation of the British government, and was contracted to provide more sophisticated self-loading rifles (in this case new American AR-10 rifles) to the emergent state’s armed forces, which had previously been equipped with less powerful Enfield .303 bolt-action rifles (Brogan, and Zarca, 1983, pp. 159–160). Supplier blocs were created during this time as western second-tier suppliers built their capacity to supply SALW and entered the market. For the first decade of the post-war era the French arms industry was not effectively re-established (SIPRI, 1975, p. 129), but once it had been rebuilt, France began exporting the arms it produced, along with American equipment it had received as post-war aid. Its primary recipients were in Southeast Asia (Kolodziej, 1987, p. 48). Likewise, West Germany entered the arms export market in the 1960s, providing stocks of surplus arms as military aid to developing countries (Krause, 1992, p. 134). The transfer of production technology was a feature of the creation of the Western bloc of suppliers and also of the emerging global SALW trade. In the 1950s many of the core Western SALW producing companies such as FN-Herstal of Belgium, Colt Manufacturing of the United States, and Heckler and Koch of West Germany licensed the production of some of their more popular small arms models to numerous other countries. These licensees were both within the Western bloc and beyond, including developing states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Thus, developing states such as Israel, Pakistan, and Myanmar entered the ranks of SALW producers in the 1950s, as did Thailand and Nigeria


in the 1960s, through licensed production agreements with western companies (Abel, 2000). The USSR and its bloc allies were not major suppliers in the emergent global arms trade until the mid-1950s, but rather concentrated on intrabloc supplies to European socialist allies, and to China, North Korea and North Vietnam (SIPRI, 1975, p. 79). Indeed, until the mid-1950s the only example of any arms supply to non-communist, and extra-regional recipients were Czechoslovak SALW transfers to the Israeli Haganah in 1947 and 1948, conducted at Moscow’s encouragement, in an attempt to weaken Western influence in the Middle East (Porter, 1984, p. 14; Menon, 1986, p. 4). In this period of limited international trade many Soviet SALW transfers took the form of licensed production. Thus, the capability to produce the AK-47, designed in 1947, spread rapidly – and exponentially – as production facilities were established throughout the Warsaw Pact and beyond as part of the construction of Soviet-centred power bloc. For instance, Poland was one of the earliest recipients of this technology and provided all of Bulgaria’s Kalashnikovs until Bulgaria, in turn, also began producing them (initially assembling components made in Poland). Other recipients of Soviet SALW technology by the end of the 1950s included East Germany, Romania, and Hungary, as well as non-pact allies China and North Korea. Similarly, Yugoslavia began producing AK-47s in 1964. (McNab, 2001, pp. 27, 54–57). After the mid-1950s Soviet arms transfers to developing nations increased, drawing on the supplier-bloc constructed through licensed production. Indeed it has been claimed that, from the 1960s, MCA transfers played a greater role in Soviet foreign policy towards developing nations than for the United States, since the USSR was less able to offer other forms of economic aid and assistance. Thus Soviet arms were offered at low prices and with flexible and long-term repayment options. (Pierre, 1982, pp. 73, 78). The transfer of technology by the USSR to China was one of the most significant expansions of the SALW production base. China was to become a major supplier in its own right, though rarely as anything more than a secondary supplier to clients of the two main blocs. Many developing states outside of the emergent northern supplier blocs had indigenous arms industries that had been established prior to this period and remained in operation, such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, the Dominican Republic, Iran, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey (Klare and Andersen, 1996, pp. 15–25; Small Arms Survey, 2001, pp. 25–47). However, there is little evidence of significant exports from this production in this period.


Overall, during the post-war era, supplier blocs were created through military aid and licensed production that laid the foundations for a global SALW trade. As the main blocs began exporting to the developing world, a range of other producers also became possible suppliers. Thus, there was an emergent structure of a core and periphery in the global SALW trade. The core was composed of the two main blocs of suppliers and China, while the periphery suppliers were located in the recipient regions. Cold War legal SALW market: Mid-1960s–1989 In the second period, the Cold War from the mid-1960s until 1989, the core suppliers provided large quantities of SALW to developing states and the now familiar global arms trade was born, supplanting the private trade in surplus arms and small grants by colonial powers that had fuelled limited SALW spread. The strength and impact of the evolving structures of the global SALW trade are revealed by the weaker oligopoly among supplier actors, and the ways in which this structure affected the access of recipient states to international supplies of SALW. Supplier oligopoly The core In the MCA trade, throughout the Cold War the primary suppliers were divided into two blocs dominated by the United States and the USSR. In the late 1960s and the 1970s numerous ‘second-tier’ arms suppliers entered the market, or dramatically increased their market share, thereby shifting the market structure from duopoly to oligopoly (Louscher and Sperling, 1994, p. 65; Nolan, 1997, p. 133). However, with the exception of China and a few others, supplier behaviour remained largely constrained by the power blocs that centred around these two major suppliers. Bloc discipline in the MCA trade derived from the use of arms transfers as a political tool, used to achieve a range of aims including gaining and maintaining political influence with allied governments, and competed for links with non-aligned states; building networks of bases and strategic installations; and propping up ideologically similar regimes to consolidate broad political/ideological alignments in all regions of the world. These motivations, and the arms transfers they drove, were clearly rooted in Cold War bipolar competition, and were explicitly justified in those terms (Luckham, 1985, p. 106; Kinsella, 1995). This imposed a discipline upon the arms supplier states in the core which even commercially motivated arms transfers could not contradict. This discipline was reinforced by the dominance of the United States and the USSR in their respective blocs, and intra-bloc coordination through mechanisms such as the Co-ordinating


Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). The degree to which the rigidity and discipline of these supplier blocs in the MCA trade was reflected in the SALW is a key question. Western bloc. During this period, the United States transferred large quantities of SALW for both political and commercial reasons. A senior US State Department official claimed, in 1982, that ‘Arms sales are the hard currency of foreign affairs … they replace the security pacts of the 1950s.’ (Klare, 1984, p. 1). Thus, for example, the United States provided US$61.7 billion worth of arms grants to governments between 1950 and 1994. An estimated 10 to 20 per cent of these were of SALW (Klare, 1995b, p. 9). Additionally, SALW transfers to police and states’ paramilitary forces were substantial, largely through commercial channels rather than as government aid (Klare, 1984, p. 190). The scale and form of US arms transfers fluctuated in response to both market conditions and changing administrations’ policies. For instance, transfers in the late 1970s increasingly occurred through commercial channels, while President Carter adopted a more restrictive approach to arms transfers. The increase in commercial channels continued under the Reagan administration, in parallel to the resurgence of the provision of SALW in military aid as arms transfers were reasserted as a routine tool of diplomacy. Indeed, during this time, up to 50 per cent of government Foreign Military Sales – including to governments involved in conflict – were provided under concessionary terms (Krause, 1992, pp. 100–103). Western bloc second-tier suppliers tended not to transfer SALW outside of the strategic confines of the Cold War. Many of these suppliers transferred SALW for political motives that, while largely contained within bloc allegiances, were provided for reasons separate from Cold War rivalry. This was particularly the case in the 1960s and 1970s: as states under British and French colonial rule became independent the former-colonial powers attempted to maintain influence by supplying arms and military training. This included substantial supplies of SALW to bolster friendly regimes against internal threats. Indeed, in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, and with the primary exception of the Horn states, it was the former colonial powers rather than the United States that were the primary western-bloc competition for the USSR in the arms market. (Luckham, 1985, p. 99). For example, in the case of French arms transfers, including that of SALW, to West Africa, according to Kolodziej, ‘France has maintained a semi-colonial relationship with many of its former West African colonies. France was their principal arms supplier, having transferred old and outdated equipment, including American material, to these countries on independence.’(Kolodziej, 1987, p. 311).


Other Western-bloc second-tier suppliers, such as Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Spain, and others, were primarily commercially motivated in their arms exports. (Krause, 1992, pp. 134–135). There is no evidence that SALW transfers were differently motivated than other arms transfers. However, it does seem that such bloc suppliers were far more active in the SALW market than in MCA, and at an earlier stage in the development of the market. For instance, Belgium played a far greater role in the SALW trade than in the MCA trade, and it was estimated in the mid-1980s that Belgium exported on an average 95 per cent of its SALW production with only minimal restraint. (Pierre, 1982, p. 123). Similarly, West Germany was a major supplier of SALW production technology and equipment, much of which bypassed its restrictive arms export regulations (Namboodiri, 1985b, p. 620). Soviet bloc. There were significant differences in the nature of Sovietbloc SALW transfers from those of MCA. Broadly, Soviet-bloc arms transfers were more closely politically controlled than those of the Western-bloc: the export of all types of conventional weapons from the USSR was under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MFER) of the USSR Council of Ministers, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence and the Komitet Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti (KGB)(Cooper, 1997, pp. 173–174). The USSR exported large quantities of both MCA and SALW, and Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) second-tier suppliers played a secondary role in the MCA trade. In relation to these second-tier suppliers, according to Krause (1992, p. 87): None of their sales or production (until recently) was determined freely, though, as decisions were made within the framework of Comecon economic planning and Warsaw Pact military policy. At least until 1989, ‘the Eastern bloc arms industries [were] integrated extensions of those of the Soviet Union’. These states have often also been used as simple conduits for Soviet-sponsored deals … In the MCA trade, Soviet-bloc second-tier suppliers generally exported fewer arms than their western counterparts. However, this was not the case with SALW transfers. States such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria had substantial SALW production capabilities that stimulated commercially motivated transfers both within the WTO and beyond. Indeed, second-tier suppliers such as Romania, East Germany, and Bulgaria, were the primary suppliers of SALW from the Soviet-bloc albeit in transfers that were ‘adjuncts to Soviet arms transfer decisions or retransfers of Soviet weapons’ (Krause, 1992, p. 135).


Soviet-bloc second tier suppliers engaged in SALW transfers to recipients outside of the bloc far earlier than they engaged in the MCA trade. For example, Czechoslovakian and Polish exports of MCA were primarily within the WTO states until the 1980s. (Krause, 1992, p. 135). However, SALW exports to developing states began far earlier. For example Czechoslovakia, which had a substantial SALW industry independent of Soviet licensed production in other Eastern European states, provided a large shipment of SALW to Guatemala in the early 1950s (Lefever, 1979, p. 289). China. SALW formed a high proportion of Chinese arms exports during the Cold War. China entered the market in the 1950s and supplied large quantities of SALW to national liberation movements and revolutionary governments. Indeed, it was claimed that during the Cold War ‘China has supplied more insurgent groups and independent states with small arms/light and medium groundforce equipment, than it has independent states with major weapons’ (Gilks and Segal, 1985, p. 32).By the 1960s most Chinese military aid to Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (except for supplies to Vietnam and North Korea) consisted almost exclusively of SALW, most of which were domestically produced. Nevertheless, the quantities provided to extra-regional recipients were dwarfed by Chinese aid to regional clients, particularly to Vietnam where the Vietminh received 80,000 tons of weapons by 1954 and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) were supplied with hundreds of thousands of SALW after 1960 (Gilks and Segal, 1985). After the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, Chinese arms transfers took on an added political dimension stemming from Sino-Soviet rivalry, and enmity between China and the United States. (Porter, 1984, p. 64). For example, China provided arms to Albania and North Korea in order to stimulate their independence from Moscow (Byman and Cliff, 1999, p. 3). In the 1970s and, particularly, the 1980s, China’s arms trade underwent significant change with many transfers, including SALW, taking place on a more commercial basis. The scale of SALW transfers increased as China sought out new markets and supplied newly independent governments rather than liberation movements (Byman and Cliff, 1999, p. 46). Thus, SALW transfers were incorporated within increasingly commercially motivated arms transfers often accompanying sales of MCA. For example, China provided a high proportion of Pakistan’s MCA in the 1970s and in 1970 a SALW factory in Pakistan was completed with Chinese financing (Bhagwan, 1988, p. 640). By the 1980s China had reorganised its arms industry and was actively seeking commercially motivated exports to markets in the Middle East and Latin America. (Namboodiri, 1985a, p. 1097).


The periphery Outside of the core, in which supplier oligopoly reflected and was reinforced by bipolarity, numerous second and third-tier suppliers engaged in international SALW transfers. In this periphery suppliers included both non-aligned northern states and suppliers in the South which were more numerous than for other types of weapons. Significant neutral and non-aligned producers, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and Austria, were important suppliers of SALW across the world. Their exports were not confined by bipolar bloc politics but were, nevertheless, shaped by it: these suppliers transferred SALW primarily to other non-aligned states in the developing world and Europe. Such transfers were largely motivated by commercial rather than strategic political reasons, particularly related to the maintenance of domestic arms industries and self-sufficiency in armaments as in Sweden and Switzerland (Pierre, 1982, pp. 120–121; Nichol, 1984). Producers in the South were also active in the SALW market. For instance, in the Six-Day-War of June 1967 the Israeli government captured large quantities of Soviet-standard ammunition that was then sold to foreign recipients. (Stanley and Pearton, 1972, p. 185). Israeli exports from domestic production grew dramatically in the 1970s, increasing ten-fold between 1973 and 1980 (Gilks and Segal, 1985, p. 157). These included military aid to US clients, such as Zaire, and illicit recipients – such as the embargoed government of South Africa. (Ezell, 1984, p. 233). By the late 1970s at least 29 developing nations produced SALW or ammunition. This included six in Latin America, six in sub-Saharan Africa, four in the Middle East, and 13 in Asia, the majority of which occurred through licensed production (Lock and Wulf, 1979, p. 215). While much of this production was for domestic use, it was also an occasional feature of the global SALW trade, primarily through exports by those developing nations with larger SALW industries, such as Brazil and Argentina. These exports were mostly to regional states and/or part of flows to conflicts, such as South African supplies to rebel forces in the frontline states (Minter, 1994, pp. 185–191). However, some occasional extra-regional SALW transfers also took place, such as Brazilian transfers of Soviet-type 7.62 39 mm ammunition to Iraq during its war with Iran (Ezell, 1984, p. 46; Klare, 1984, p. 83) and the supplies indicated by the presence of North Korean SKS carbines in Lebanon in the early 1980s (Ezell, 1984, p. 136). Nevertheless, the primary role of SALW production by peripheral suppliers was reducing dependency domestically and in neighbouring states. Additionally, some ‘private trade’ in SALW continued to operate during second half of the Cold War. This was on a limited scale having been


undercut by large-scale grants and inexpensive new weapons from the core suppliers. Indeed, the private trade appears only to have been significant in serving clients engaged in conflict, and even then was utilised by the core suppliers in covert arming of insurgents rather than being accessed directly by conflict protagonists (see Chapter 4). Supplier–Client patterns Some analyses of the MCA trade during the Cold War sought to distinguish supplier–client relationships based on the levels of dependence of client states on a particular supplier (Mihalka, 1979). This was a key question in relation to the patterns of arms transfers and the particular political and economic goals of the supplier states, and it also set the scene for analysis of the nature of influence and access ‘bought’ with arms transfers. However, here it is useful in assessing the impact of the structures of spread (such as looser oligopoly within bloc structures and the core-periphery distinctions) on the access of recipient states to international supplies of SALW. In his 1979 discussion of the nature of dependency and influence in supplier–client relationships, Geoffrey Kemp noted that, ‘Virtually any country in the world, including pariah states, can gain access to small arms and less sophisticated heavy weapons, owing to the diversity of suppliers and a flourishing private arms trade.’ (Kemp, 1979). This early articulation of the amorphous image needs to be critically examined. By examining analyses of changing supplier–client patterns and data on the national inventories of SALW in the mid-1980s it is possible to sketch an illustrative picture of supplier–client patterns in the global SALW market (Mihalka, 1979; US ACDA, 1987; Ezell, 1984; Harkavy, 1994, p. 21).5 It should be noted, however, that because of the broad aggregated nature of the data used to construct analyses of supplier–client patterns for MCA, and the limited reliability of using national inventories to assess the origin of arms, the following is only a tentative analysis. Within the core, the acquisition patterns of governments were almost exclusively contained within the blocs. Even as the arms market became increasingly driven by economic competition, the political logic of the Cold War prohibited states in one bloc from acquiring their weapons from the other. In the western bloc most states produced the majority of their own SALW including Austria, Belgium. Denmark, France, West Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A few others also had some significant stocks of imported weapons, including Italy, the Netherlands, and Ireland. In each case there was no cross-bloc sourcing and the majority of imported SALW were from the United


States, Belgium, and West Germany. Likewise, in the Eastern bloc, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, and the USSR produced most of their own SALW, and Bulgaria had Polish and Soviet weapons in addition to its own production. Similarly, China was selfsufficient for its small arms (Ezell, 1984). There was some limited cross-bloc trade, but this was private trade rather than a form of supply to state forces. The superpowers were able to obtain weapons from opposing bloc’s secondary producers through the private market, but these were acquired for the purpose of supplies to insurgent groups rather than for their own forces (see Chapter 4). Thus, supplier–client patterns in the core were not significantly affected by the operation of a private trade. Outside of the core, SALW supplier–client patterns were also broadly similar to those in the MCA trade, but with far lower dependency: as a result looser oligopoly within the core of SALW suppliers, the dominance of the two superpowers as sole or dominant suppliers was less marked in the supplier–client patterns of SALW to recipients in the periphery. Second-tier bloc allies provided a more significant proportion of SALW than they did MCA. For example, the USSR was the sole source of Cuban MCA, but Cuban armed forces were equipped with a mixture of Soviet, East bloc, Czechoslovakian, and Belgian SALW. Likewise, Mali was a significant client of the Soviet Union, receiving all of its MCA from the USSR, however, much of its SALW were of broader East bloc origin. (Ezell, 1984). There were more cross-bloc supplier–client relationships in SALW transfers, in the periphery, including for some strategically important clients and some governments involved in conflict such as Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Israel, and Lebanon. Importantly, however, the degree of variation from the supplier–client patterns of more politically sensitive MCA was less significant than might be expected for weapons that were not seen as being of great strategic importance. This appears to have been because other features of the global SALW trade – that were not present for the MCA trade – offered greater opportunities for reducing dependency than the utilisation of cross-bloc acquisitions. Thus, domestic production, including under license, and transfers from the periphery suppliers were significant. Due to the availability of licensed production and the low technological and industrial requirements for SALW manufacture, domestic production was a more significant way of reducing dependency than pursuing crossbloc acquisitions. At least 29 developing states, and probably more, had some domestically produced arms in their arsenals by the mid-1980s. For example, while most of India’s MCA were of Soviet and East bloc origin, its


SALW were predominantly of indigenous origin (Ezell, 1984, p. 111). Though few developing states approached self-sufficiency in SALW production, with the exception of some large producers such as Brazil, Israel, and Pakistan, domestic production was a significant feature of many states’ SALW acquisitions. Significantly, there is no evidence that the licensing of production of SALW was any more or less subject to bloc divisions and associated supplier–client patterns. Indeed there is only one, relatively minor, example of inter-bloc acquisition of manufacturing equipment: Bulgaria obtained Heckler and Koch machine tools in the 1980s which it used to manufacture 9 mm Makarov handguns (Ranger, 1992).6 Similarly, Iraq produced weapons of both Western and East-bloc designs. However, this was not a result of cross-bloc licensing as the latter were reportedly produced through copying and assistance from non-aligned suppliers, and Iraq also used a cross-bloc pattern of MCA acquisitions (Brzoska, 1986, p. 272). Domestic production was particularly significant for ammunition acquisition. The need for substantial and reliable supplies of ammunition, hypothetically, could have been a source of dependency in supplier–client patterns in the SALW trade. The capacity to produce some SALW ammunition was particularly widespread and contributed to lower dependency on core-suppliers in the SALW trade. For instance, in the early 1980s some 62 states were producing, or had previously produced, some types of rifle ammunition. During the Cold War most military rifles used one of three main types of ammunition: Soviet type 7.62 39 mm; NATO 7.62 51 mm; and the newer NATO standard 5.56 45 mm rounds used in M16 assault rifles and the like. In the mid-1980s these were produced in 25, 52 and 27 states respectively, including 9, 31 and 10 developing states respectively (Ezell, 1984, pp. 243–244). Significantly, there was a degree of cross-bloc-type ammunition production, with 17 producers manufacturing both NATO and Soviet standard ammunition, including both core producers and a few developing states such as South Africa, Sudan, and Syria. This does not appear to indicate cross-bloc licensing of ammunition production, as most producers could develop such ammunition for themselves, and this production supported crossbloc SALW acquisitions: for instance Sudan shifted blocs during the Cold War, and Syria had obtained FN-FAL rifles in the mid-1950s prior to becoming a predominantly Soviet client. Supplies from within the periphery were also important in reducing dependency. For most producers in the periphery exports were largely a regional affair, and while these states did not have a significant share of the global market they did reduce dependency among regional clients.


For example, Argentina was a significant SALW supplier to Central American states, with Argentinean weapons appearing in the inventories of Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay (Ezell, 1984, p. 252). Similarly, Brazilian weapons were supplied to Peru; Australian weapons were exported to Malaysia and New Zealand; 30,000 Singaporean license-produced M-16 rifles were supplied to Thailand in 1973–1974; Indian rifles and sub-machineguns were the standard weapons in Nepal; and some of the G3 rifles produced under license in Saudi Arabia were believed to be in the stocks of the United Arab Emirates (Ezell, 1984; Hogg, 1985; Ohlson, 1986). Thus the peripheral suppliers played a significant role in reducing dependency in some supplier–client relationships. Overall, therefore, during this phase the global SALW trade built upon the broader global source structure was a loose oligopoly. Second-tier Western- and Eastern-bloc suppliers accounted for a more significant proportion of the trade, and at an earlier stage than they did in the MCA trade. However, the structure of core and periphery appears to have been more significant than looser bloc discipline or more limited superpower dominance within the core in the overall structures of SALW spread. This was reflected in the nature of supplier–client patterns in the global market. Post-Cold War international flows of SALW In the early post-Cold War years the global MCA trade was widely claimed to be a buyer’s market, as commercial motives came to dominate as suppliers were released from bloc constraints to compete in a shrinking market for sophisticated weapons systems. Similar shifts occurred in the global legal SALW market. However, the post-Cold War era has not reinvented the SALW trade in the way that it was largely (re)-constructed in the post-1945 era: significant changes have occurred, but largely as continuations, and accelerations, of trends evident in the SALW market in the preceding phases. Knowledge of the authorised international SALW trade have improved substantially as the small arms community has grown and begun compiling and analysing more systematic (though far from comprehensive) information on transfers. Among the conclusions of these efforts have been remarkable consistency in the approximate scale of the SALW trade, which is estimated at around US$4 billion per year (Small Arms Survey, 2006, pp. 66–67). This is dwarfed by the scale of the MCA trade, and is seemingly unaffected by its more dramatic fluctuations. As with other arms trades the ranks of the top exporters and importers shift regularly, though the United States, Russia and China, are consistently in the top-ranks – joined by Belgium, Brazil, Italy, and Germany, and a host of other significant exporters (Small Arms Survey, 2004, 2005, and 2006).


The post-Cold War source and supplier structure The global source base of the legal SALW trade has undergone some significant changes in the post-Cold War era. Trends towards both consolidation and ‘globalisation’ of major conventional defence industry projects and companies were in evidence in the SALW market. In particular, the number of producers increased significantly in the 1990s, the number of manufacturing countries and companies rose by approximately 23 and 96percent respectively (Abel, 2000, p. 83).7 Much of this increase was due to systemic shifts adding to ongoing evolution of the producer base of the global trade: the fragmentation of the USSR into new republics, and the break-up of state controlled industries into numerous privatised facilities, added to the spread of production capacity through licensed production to dramatically expand the number of producers. Running parallel to this were processes of privatisation and numerous take-overs and mergers in the former-Western bloc producers. Even the manufacturers of some of the most ubiquitous small arms, such as FN of Belgium and Heckler and Koch of Germany went bankrupt in the early 1990s and their ownership has since changed hands several times. FN Herstal was initially taken over by GIAT of France and was subsequently re-acquired by the government of the Belgian Région Wallonne in 1997 (Small Arms Survey, 2001, pp. 31– 32). Heckler and Koch was taken over by Royal Ordnance, BAE Systems of the United Kingdom in 1991 and later sold to private investors in 2002 (Heckler and Koch, 2006) While the number of producers expanded, the scale of global production shrank. In the late 1990s, the scale of production in this more broadly spread production base declined by approximatley 30 per cent.8 The industry analysts Forecast International estimated in 2000 that this downturn would affect the larger producers and suppliers in the core more significantly than the producers in the periphery (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 14). In part, this was due to the decline of intra-bloc markets, combined with a new surplus-intensive phase in the SALW trade. While the availability of new weapons declined, a new period of surplus intensive trading began. The availability of surplus stocks only has a major effect on the structures and distribution of the global source base of the legal SALW trade when systemic factors stimulate the generation of surpluses in many major and large suppliers concurrently. The end of the Cold War and the scale of the associated military downsizing was one such systemic shift. The number of SALW made surplus is not known, but can be estimated to run into the tens of millions.9 Surplus stocks are significantly cheaper than new weapons. For example, R. T. Naylor (1995, p. 3) estimated that in 1995 a surplus AK-47 cost between US$30–40 in Russia, compared to US$100 new. Many large-scale transfers


of such surplus arms were reported in the early and mid-1990s. For instance, the re-unification of Germany instantly made surplus much of the arsenal of the Nationale Volksarmee (former-East German Army), many of which were transferred, such as the 304,000 assault rifles and 83 million rounds of ammunition sold to Turkey (Nassaur, 1995). The character and conduct of legal transfers According to David Mussington (1994, p. 58), in the post-Cold War era the structure of the international MCA market shifted from duopoly to oligopoly, stable supplier–recipient pairs transformed into fragmented supply networks, and the dominant export incentive had shifted from the political to the economic. This had long been the case in the SALW market, and such trends continued: the salience of key boundaries such as the divisions within the core and between the core and periphery has declined. The end of the Cold War resulted in the final collapse of already declining bloc divisions within the core and the associated rationale for the large-scale provision of grants of arms and other military aid to recipient states. The absence of bloc discipline and associated supplier–client groupings allowed the more diffuse production and supplier base of the SALW trade to assert itself as the decline of the supplier oligopoly throughout the Cold War accelerated during the early and mid-1990s. For example, many of the former Eastern Bloc manufacturers lost their primary market with the break-up of the USSR, and also underwent crises in their controls over stockpiles and the functioning of export control systems. Thus, states such as Bulgaria privatised their arms industries and pursued exports more aggressively and with less monitoring and discrimination than during the Cold War (Human Rights Watch, 1999b). These changes accelerated existing trends towards commercialisation of the motives of the core suppliers that were seen as the provision of grant aid decreased from the late 1980s. The chaotic changes in the arms industries in East and Central Europe had largely been stabilised by the end of the 1990s, with macroeconomic recovery in many states facilitating increased investment and military modernisation linked to the expansion of NATO (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 34–36). However, competition between former-bloc allies remains as commercial motives predominate. In the place of bloc discipline, supplier restraint through more stringent national export controls, developed through regional and other multilateral fora such as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (the successor to CoCom established in 1996 which developed specific SALW best practices in 2002), has, in principle, mitigated the decline of bloc discipline with


the development of common standards in export controls. While their implementation remains far from uniform, and numerous exports raise concerns in terms of the human rights, sustainable development, and other criteria established in these mechanisms, restraint stemming from bloc discipline was often not significantly stronger. In terms of supplier–client patterns, the decline of blocs and the resurgence of commercially motivated transfers provided all suppliers with greater freedom to supply old rivals and allowed more eclectic buying patterns on the part of recipients (Harkavy, 1994, p. 26). Thus, major divisions within the core have disappeared; new supplier groupings have emerged but do not create a new bloc-structure in the global trade. Rather, tiers of suppliers defined by market share have become the dominant structure of the SALW trade. These trends do not appear to have affected the producers in the periphery to the same extent as those in the former-core. Small and medium suppliers have continued to erode the dominance of the major and large suppliers and all compete with each other and surplus suppliers for shrunken markets (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 15). Within these tiers, former periphery suppliers have continued to increase their export activities. Many of the top exporters of SALW are former periphery states; thus Brazil often exports more than Belgium; Japan is a major supplier of civilian firearms; Turkey, South Africa, and South Korea are significant supplier; others like Mexico and Iran are occasional players, and North Korea, Pakistan, and Singapore are active producers and exporters about whom little data is available (Small Arms Survey, 2004, 2005, and 2006). While many of these periphery suppliers were active for several decades of the Cold War, their role does not appear to have been significantly diminished by the flood of cheap surplus arms or the freedom of suppliers in the former-core to sell to whomever they wish. Thus, the role of suppliers in the periphery has been consolidated and in some cases expanded. Their Cold War role, therefore, was clearly not an artefact of the capacity to fill in the gaps in the market left by supplier blocs in the Cold War’s divided global SALW trade. The decline and reconfiguration of divisions within and between the core and periphery was further enhanced by the re-emergence of private actors as significant feature of the SALW trade. It has been argued that a new breed of brokers and their commercial networks replaced ideological affinity as a significant means of recipient accessing of global stocks (Wood and Peleman, 1999). These are the actors at the heart of the amorphous image, with great attention paid to the most notorious characters in UN arms embargo busting such as Victor Bout and Leonid Minin. However, brokers and private security actors of various types also


play roles in the legal international trade in SALW. Unfortunately very little is known about the extent of brokers involvement in the legal trade, or how many such actors exist. In part this lack of knowledge is due to the oft-lamented inadequacy of controls over these brokers: only 37 states have even minimal controls in place over third-party brokering of arms transfers (Bourne, et al., 2006, p. 32), and most of these have been introduced in past few years (in July 2003 this figure stood at 18 (Greene, et al., 2003, p. 156)). It is likely that many hundreds, if not thousands, of private companies and individuals have played a role. The post-Cold War decline in the use of MCA transfers as a foreign policy tool was interpreted in the mid-1990s as a return to an international arms transfer system akin to that of the free market in the inter-war period. However, the legal SALW trade is not as amorphous as this implies. The Cold War structures of the SALW market have been eroded and reconfigured. The divisions within and between the core and periphery have declined, but the immediate post-Cold War turmoil did not result in the contraction of the structures of spread to a handful of dominant suppliers forged in a competitive free market. Rather it built upon existing trends and the continued evolution of the supplier base.

Conclusion Global level SALW spread processes are the product of development and interaction of structures that have been constructed over time as a function of both the evolution of the source and supplier base, and the distinct global structures and dynamics of the evolving global SALW trade. The character of the construction and evolution of both has been one of loose and decreasing supplier oligopoly. Significantly, while the development of the global SALW trade has taken similar directions to the evolution of the MCA trade, it has not simply followed or reflected those larger processes. This is unsurprising given the broader and expanding source-base. It is, perhaps, more surprising that during the Cold War the patterns of, and restrictions upon, supplier behaviour in the MCA trade had a significant spillover effect upon SALW availability. Nevertheless, and contrary to existing analysis, the major producers did not dominate the market to the same degree as in the MCA trade. Other suppliers within the core did more than ‘squabble over the spoils’ (Small Arms Survey, 2001. p. 15). During the Cold War a structure of core and periphery was present in the legal SALW trade that was not present for other weapons. This structure was more significant than the divisions between the four tiers of large, major, medium, and small producers and was


more important for reducing dependency in supplier–client patterns than looser bloc discipline or more limited superpower dominance. In the post-Cold War era this overarching structure has fallen away, but the muted effects of the end of the Cold War on the SALW trade (in comparison to the MCA trade) – such as the differing impact of post-Cold War dynamics on the former-core and the periphery, and the continuities in the scale and dynamic of the SALW trade – indicate that the global SALW trade has durable structures that are constantly evolving according to their own dynamics. It is within an understanding of the dynamic foundations, construction and evolution of the global SALW trade that examining the flow of SALW to conflict is made most fruitful. It allows us to discern whether, and the degree to which, flows to conflict occur within, reflect, or are separate from these structures and dynamics. This, then, allows us to uncover where and how the arming processes of actors in conflict are shaped.

4 Global Structures and SALW Flows to Conflict

This chapter examines the changing nature of extra-regional aspects of SALW flows to conflicts and discerns the structures that have evolved to shape them. Building on the findings of the previous chapter it assesses the extent to which those SALW flows to conflict actors are shaped by those global structures, or reflect distinct illicit market systems of spread. It does this by looking briefly at legal flows to conflicts – primarily in terms of discerning key similarities and differences from the overall patterns of access to SALW. It then turns to covert aid to insurgent forces – it determines the nature of those processes, and how and why they have evolved – in order to discern what structures and dynamics shape the availability and nature of covert aid and whether that represents a distinct system of spread. Finally, it examines the nature and evolution of black-market and grey-market structures and processes and critically assesses the operation, or not, of a global illicit market that is at the core of the understanding of flows to conflict in the amorphous image.

The global legal trade and conflict As the global legal SALW market has been constructed and has evolved, the potential sources and channels from which recipients involved in conflict could acquire arms have broadened and changed. As a result, the nature of legal SALW flows to conflicts has evolved, and so too has the overall role of the global legal market structure in shaping flows to conflict. The evolution of the nature of SALW flows to governments in conflict has occurred largely in line with overall trends in the legal market. Legal SALW flows to conflict in the post-1945 period were largely reflective and a function of the global legal trade. With the exception of South 88

Global Structures and SALW Flows to Conflict 89

Africa, no UN arms embargoes were imposed upon states engaged in intra-state conflicts during the Cold War, and so few flows to states in conflict were illicit.1 During the Cold War, the prevailing bipolar rivalry in the international system, and the associated structure of the core of arms suppliers, were expressed in arms transfers to clients engaged in conflict. However, there were some distinctive characteristics of flows to conflicts in this period: They tended to be more predominantly through military aid packages; and, as a result, supplies from the core tended to be dominated by the superpowers and former-colonial powers. Thus, for example, in the Vietnam conflict the government forces of North and South Vietnam were provided with large quantities of SALW through direct bilateral military aid from the core suppliers. US military aid to states in conflict in the 1960s was particularly oriented towards South Vietnam and its neighbours. US arms transfers to these ‘forward defence areas’ (particularly South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos) rose from 6 per cent of total US military aid during the 1950s to 37 per cent between 1960 and 1972 (SIPRI, 1975, p. 54). Likewise the USSR provided the majority of the North Vietnamese Army’s (NVA) arms, particularly after the United States increased the number of its forces in South Vietnam in 1965, totalling over US$3 billion from 1965 until 1972 (Porter, 1984, p. 22). In the post-Cold War era, as a result of the same dynamics that have transformed the global legal SALW trade into a competitive buyers-market, a number of significant changes in the nature of extra-regional aspects of SALW flows to conflicts can be observed. In particular, there have been changes in the nature of flows (whether they are commercialised, privatised, or military aid); and also some significant changes in the overall roles of the global legal market in supplying conflict The changing nature of extra-regional legal SALW flows Just as the global legal market has become more commercialised, flows to conflict in the post-Cold War era have undergone concomitant delinking from global political rivalries and an associated commercialisation of motive. However, this is far from an absolute change. Deprived of the advantages of Cold War bipolar logic, which encouraged large military aid packages from the core suppliers, few governments engaged in intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War era have large amounts of SALW as grant aid. However, they are also provided with the opportunities presented by an array of extra-regional suppliers competing for markets. As a result they have relied largely on legal commercial relationships with supplier states for their supplies of arms.


Declining boundaries within the legal trade, and associated privatisation and diversification of supplier–client patterns in the majority of the legal market, are reflected in acquisitions by governments engaged in conflict. This is true of both conflicts with a Cold War heritage and those that emerged in the post-Cold War period. For example, the Angolan government had been one of the largest African recipients of arms aid from the USSR during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period it benefited from cheaply available commercially motivated supplies of SALW from Russia and Eastern European suppliers (Musah and Castle, 1998, pp. 3–4; Reno, 1997a, p. 178). It also purchased SALW and MCA from a variety of other sources, including many that it could not have accessed during the Cold War. These suppliers have included Bulgaria, Brazil, North Korea, Portugal, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Additionally, there are unconfirmed reports of purchasing SALW from Nigeria, Israel, and South Africa (Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1994, pp. 39–47). Likewise, but on a commercial basis, the Sudanese government in 2002 signed a new military-technology agreement with Russia for the modernisation of its forces’ weapons (Novichkov, 2002). During the Cold War major providers of military assistance gave not only arms but also training, maintenance and logistical support, and in some cases direct covert involvement in military operations. These too have become commercially available in the post-Cold War era as Private Military Companies (PMCs) have proliferated. Just as surplus arms glutted the market, the downsizing of military and security agencies released a large number of skilled personnel into the private sector. Thus, for example, William Reno (1997a, p. 178) has claimed that While Angolan president Dos Santos lost Soviet supplies of arms on concessional terms, he now benefits from Russian eagerness to sell cheap weapons for cash. His South African corporate allies are adept at operating these weapons. Even better for limiting costs, Executive Outcomes and others contract out maintenance duties to low cost Ukrainian and Russian technicians. Such companies have a great deal of experience and expertise, as well as access to networks of contacts, which have also been used to arrange SALW deals. For example, the South African private military company Executive Outcomes purchased and transported arms for the Kamajor pro-government militia in Sierra Leone (Africa Confidential, 6 February 1998, p. 7), and the PMC Sandline International was at the heart of a now


infamous deal for the supply of SALW from Bulgaria to the then exiled government of Sierra Leone in 1998. It is important not to overstate the impact of overall trends towards the commercialisation and privatisation of extra-regional flows to conflicts. Supplies of SALW as part of military aid packages have continued in the post-Cold War era. However, these appear significantly less related to the conflicts than during the Cold War era. Those few examples that are clearly related to conflicts within the recipient countries also relate to a range of largely unique circumstances rather than a pervasive global logic – and most recipients also acquire arms from a broad range of suppliers on the global market: thus, US aid to Colombia has been substantial, such as the 7,000 M-16 assault rifles, 1 million rounds of ammunition, and 30,000 grenades among other SALW (Lumpe, 1999, p. 159), and is largely part of the ‘war on drugs’. Similarly, in 2002 the United Kingdom provided Nepal with arms, including eastern European surplus weapons (such as Mi-17 helicopters), in order to prosecute its war against Maoist guerrillas (Hencke, 2002; MacAskill, 2002). Nepal has also acquired SALW from the United States, Germany, and Israel (NISAT database). Some military aid has become part of post-Conflict support rather than support to win the conflict. Thus, the United Kingdom has provided large amounts of SALW to the Sierra Leone government as part of reconstruction package. The United Kingdom was not a major supplier of SALW to the government forces throughout most of the conflict (from 1992) but from late 1998 onwards the United Kingdom was the primary supplier of SALW to the Kabbah government: Britain donated SALW, largely from its own surplus stocks, as part of a wider package of training and reform of the Sierra Leone security sector (Berman, 2000, p. 23). Thus, for example, 17,500 rifles were delivered for a security sector that is estimated to be around 8,500, a number broadly sufficient to equip the entire force (Jane’s Information Group, 2002). Additionally, the United Kingdom provided assistance in Sierra Leone’s SALW acquisitions from other suppliers. For instance, some Romanian-made general purpose machine guns, 81 mm mortars and a range of ammunition were purchased for Sierra Leone by Crown Agents, in a deal paid for by the British Government.2 Since the September 11 2001 attacks by Al Qaida, the United States has increased the scale of its military aid to a range of governments, particularly in South and Central Asia, including some engaged in conflict or previously under unilateral embargoes (Ciarrocca and Hartung, 2002; Javanshir, 2002). For example, the United States has provided


US$100 million worth of surplus arms, including 30,000 M16 rifles, to the Philippines government to fight rebels such as Abu Sayyef. The Philippines has also purchased arms on a commercial basis from the United States, Canada and South Africa (Amnesty International, 2002). The pursuance of a ‘war on terror’ has, therefore, provided a new global logic for the supply of military aid from the United States to extraregional recipient governments. However, the absence of a bipolar global logic and associated action-reaction dynamics of arming proxies means that this renewed impetus is unlikely to generate the provision of military aid at a global level on a scale comparable with its Cold War apogee. The changing role of the global legal market Key changes in the role of the global legal market have occurred as a result of trends in covert aid to insurgent forces (see below) and changes in global normative and policy structures. The extra-regional stages of covert-aid flows to rebel groups have shifted from being covert aid to being largely legal transfers reflecting broad market structures: the global legal market is predominantly used as a sourcing mechanism for regional governments and private brokers (see below). In contrast, due to the increase in use of arms embargoes, more government actors in conflicts need to acquire arms in illicit transactions. Thus, global aspects of flows to rebels have become more part of the legal market, while flows to governments appear, at first glance, to have become less part of the legal market. The increased imposition of arms embargoes, however, has had relatively limited impacts upon flows to governments in conflict. Embargoes are only binding upon member states of the imposing organisation (which have included regional organisations such as the EU, the OSCE, and the OAS), and are therefore not binding on all states engaged in the SALW trade – and thus such embargoes have a political impact, and some effect on arms flows, but do not cut off access to the global legal market. The only embargoes that are binding on virtually all states are those imposed by the United Nations Security Council, and these have applied to only a small proportion of conflicts – for instance, while there were thirteen UN arms embargoes imposed during the 1990s (Lumpe, 2000, pp. 8–9), ten of which were imposed upon actors engaged in intra-state conflicts (though not all were imposed as a response to that conflict), these covered less than a quarter of major intra-state conflicts that were active during that time. Importantly, even those that were imposed began only after a long period of conflict in which

93 Table 4.1

Multilateral arms embargoes in force on conflict-complexes since 1990

Conflict

Start of conflict

Embargo imposed by

Afghanistan

1990

UN (voluntary) EU (non mandatory) UN UN

Angola Burundi

1975 1993

UN Regional statesa

Croatia

1991

EU b

Côte d’Ivoire DRC

2002 1997

Eritrea

1998

UN EU UN UN (nonmandatory) EU

Embargo applied to

27 October 1996 1 December 1996 Taliban Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden (Globally) UNITA

rebels

1998

UN (nonmandatory) EU

1991

All forcesc

Rebels

17 May 1994–16 August 1995 16 August 1995

OAS UN

Iraq

1990

Liberia Myanmar NagornoKarabakh (Azerbaijan) Rwanda

1989

EU

1990

UN UN EU OSCE

1990

UN UN

15 September 1993 6 August 1996–23 January 1999 5 July 1991–20 November 2000 15 November 2004 7 April 1993 28 July 2003 12 February 1999

15 March 1999–31 May 2001 17 May 2000–15 May 2001 30 September 1991–15 October 1994 13 October 1993–15 October 1993 4 August 1990–23 July 2004 6 August 1990 19 November 1992 29 July 1991 28 February 1992

UN Haiti

19 December 2000–16 January 2002 16 January 2002

15 March 1999–31 May 2001 17 May 2000–15 May 2001 12 February 1999

UN Ethiopia

Date embargo applied

Continued

94 Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms Table 4.1

Continued

Conflict

Start of conflict

Embargo imposed by

Sierra Leone

1992

UN

1989

EU UN UN EU UN

Somalia Sudan

Yugoslavia (SFRY)

1991

EU

Yugoslavia (FRY)

1998

UN UN

Embargo applied to

Date embargo applied

Rebels

8 October 1997–5 June 1998 8 December 1997 5 June 1998 23 January 1992 15 March 1994 30 July 2004

Nongovernment forces in Darfur

5 July 1991–8 October 2001 25 September 1991 31 March 1998–10 September 2001

a. Imposed collectively by Zaire/DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. b. EU associated countries in Eastern and Central Europe, Cyprus, and the European Free Trade area (EFTA) countries declared that they shared the objectives of this embargo. c. Including Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.

violence had already reached a high level of intensity, and after the establishment of primary arms acquisition networks. Theoretically, when a UN arms embargo is imposed against government forces, open military aid cannot continue. However, the enforcement of these embargoes has generally been weak. Extra-regional processes of embargo-busting have occasionally continued through indirect covert channels to replace direct military aid. For instance, French aid to Rwanda from 1990 to 1994 continued after the imposition of an arms embargo. Many arms transfers did not go through the proper legal export processes, but rather occurred at the behest of the French army ‘in disregard of correct procedure’ – in grey-market flows in line with French policy to keep the Forces Armees Rwandese (FAR) well armed (Mcnulty, 2000, p. 109–115). After the imposition of the UN arms embargo on Rwanda in May 1994 French supplies that were agreed prior to the embargo continued covertly. Five deliveries of weapons occurred between May and June 1994. These were transported via Zaire, with Zairian military personnel involved in their transport into Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 1995, pp. 6–8).


More often, friendly states and private brokers have often stepped in to facilitate flows and navigate weakness in systems of export control and embargo enforcement and have thus filled the vacuum left by direct legal arms supplies. For instance, arms transfers to the various forces in the former Yugoslavia did not end with the imposition of the embargo, but rather took the form of covert-aid and grey-market transfers. Arms acquired by Croatia and Slovenia came from a variety of sources (both legal and illicit) including sources in Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Singapore, and South Africa (Pearson, et al., 1992, pp. 408–409; Pearson, 1994, p. 62; Muni, 1996, p. 202). Likewise, some other states such as Iraq, have created embargo busting networks themselves to access suppliers on the legal market surreptitiously (see Chapter 8). Thus, embargoes do not shut off all avenues of arms procurement from the global arms market. Rather they limit the potential suppliers to those willing to break an embargo, or those that can be duped into doing so through the manipulation or evasion of export controls by a range of nefarious actors. The weakness of enforcement reduces the potential impact of embargoes in determining the character of arms flows to conflicts (see Chapter 8). Nevertheless, the main structure within which such flows take place is the global legal market – albeit occasionally in flows that divert arms from ostensibly legal processes, the extra-regional stages of which tend to remain in the legal sphere.

Covert aid Covert aid is the supply of SALW to an insurgent group by a state or its agents. It is done to pursue political objectives through arms transfers, often in contravention of its own laws and/or other legal frameworks. It is a form of intervention in a conflict in support of a rebel group in order to support victory, create a stalemate, escalate or balance a conflict, and to undermine the government in the conflict. The structures that shape covert aid are not found to be a distinct illicit market, though the supply lines (particularly pipelines as defined in Chapter 2) are a distinct feature of covert aid. Rather extra-regional covert aid has been shaped and constrained by the structures of the global legal SALW trade. While not an expression of those structures, patrons in covert supplies to insurgents have had to operate within the limits imposed by them. Thus, as with the legal trade, key questions about covert aid relate to the dominance of the core suppliers, the role of suppliers in the periphery; and the degree to which these affected the construction of covert-aid pipelines.


As with the legal SALW trade, three phases of development can be discerned in the extra-regional provision of covert aid to insurgent forces. These phases, however, are different from those for the legal market, discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, while the strengthening of bloc divisions changed the nature of the legal SALW market in the mid-1960s, the nature of covert aid to insurgents changed more significantly in the mid-1970s when it became the primary extra-regional channel of SALW transfers to insurgents after the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam in 1975. This coincided with a growth in the incidence of intra-state conflicts, and thus an expansion of the number of actors requiring supplies of SALW. The three phases, therefore, were 1945to mid-1970s; mid-1970s to 1989; and the post-Cold War era – 1989 to the present. Conflict and covert aid 1945–mid 1970s In this phase there were fewer intra-state conflicts than in the next, and those that occurred were armed relatively freely and legally by emerging suppliers across the core-periphery divide or supplier tiers. During this early period two primary areas of conflict were furnished with SALW by extra-regional suppliers: the conflicts in Indochina, particularly the Vietnam war, and those in Sub-Saharan Africa, including liberation conflicts and the Nigerian civil war. The provision of covert aid to insurgents in these conflicts was limited, but was largely done by suppliers within the emerging core of the global legal trade. While government forces in the Vietnam conflict received large amounts of military aid from the superpowers, the NLF insurgents in South Vietnam also obtained arms in covert-aid shipments from China. China was the first country to recognise the NLF and supplied them with substantial amounts of SALW from 1963. These supplies went through Cambodia, which, after Prince Sihanouk renounced US aid in November 1963, received significant quantities of Chinese military aid, in part to secure this supply route. Through this channel, both the NVA and NLF reportedly received over 2 million rifles and 270 million rounds of ammunition between 1962 and 1975. Similarly, from the late 1960s Kachin dissidents in Burma and Thai communist groups were provided with Chinese SALW (Gilks and Segal, 1985). In Africa, liberation movements also received small amounts of SALW from extra-regional patrons during the early years of the Cold War. The USSR and its bloc allies were the primary suppliers of SALW to these movements. China tended to provide arms to alternative and smaller liberation movements rather than act as a secondary supplier to


Soviet-sponsored forces. In 1959, for example, Chinese aided the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria with over 6,000 surplus Czech rifles and US weapons captured in Korea (Gilks and Segal, 1985). Additionally, for conflicts throughout sub-Saharan Africa, suppliers in the periphery such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya provided some SALW (SIPRI, 1975, p. 247). SALW flows to liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, in which there were large-scale conflicts, were particularly significant. In Angola, independence movements relied significantly on capturing German-made G3 rifles from the Portuguese army, but extra-regional supplies were also significant (SIPRI, 1975, p. 247). Each of the three major suppliers in the core, the United States, the USSR, and China, supported a particular liberation movement in Angola prior to 1975. The CIA, though unauthorised to do so, provided arms and training to the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) from July 1974 to January 1975, as did Romania and China; while UNITA received small amounts of aid from North Korea in the late 1960s. Thus, in the early stages of the Angolan conflict several of the independence movements were able to obtain arms in a cross-bloc pattern. However, large-scale aid to the factions did not begin until after independence in 1975 when bloc divisions in the global market had solidified (Mathiak, 1995, pp. 83–84; and Stockwell, 1978). Likewise, but on a far smaller scale, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau received significant shipments of arms from the USSR and eastern European sources through its regional ally, and main sponsor, Guinea (SIPRI, 1975, pp. 35, 238 and 250, SIPRI, 1969, p. 73). The PAIGC also received arms from a variety of regional and third-tier supporters including Guinea, Senegal, and Libya (Van der Graaf, 1997, p. 136; Africa Confidential, 17 April 1998, p. 7; St John, 1988, p. 127). In May 1967 eastern regions of Nigeria attempted to secede from the federal republic to form an independent state of Biafra, prompting the Nigerian civil war. The flow of arms to this conflict is particularly revealing of the structures of SALW spread to conflicts during this period: a diverse range of channels was used to provide both SALW and MCA to the two sides in the Nigerian civil war. Ad-hoc alliances of core arms suppliers to both sides in the conflict largely eschewed the emerging bloc divisions in arms trading. Prior to the civil war Nigeria had obtained arms from a multitude of different sources including approximately twenty countries. At the start of the conflict, however, this range of suppliers narrowed. At the start of the conflict the so-called ‘Kaduna Mafia’, a group of northern politicians


and bureaucrats, provided some finances for Federal Government arms acquisitions and also organised the purchase of French arms and the expansion of the production of ammunition, and the delivery of arms and equipment already on order in 1966 was hastened (Peters, 1997; Othman, 1989). As the conflict progressed, the United Kingdom was particularly important in SALW supplies, which were provided through Crown Agents. The USSR provided MCA that the United Kingdom refused to provide. (Stanley and Pearton, 1972; SIPRI, 1969, 1970, 1975) Czechoslovakia provided some arms as a Soviet ally. However, in one of the few Cold War era examples of an Eastern bloc supplier differing from the USSR in its arms transfers, when Alexander Dubcek came to power in 1968 he soon announced the cessation of arms transfers to Nigeria (Porter, 1984. p. 103). The flow of arms to the Biafran secessionists further reveals the loose structure of flows to conflict in this period. The Biafrans obtained Second World War era Czech weapons from French and Portuguese private dealers that were supplied through allies within the region such as Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire. Later, SALW were supplied by China and others through apparently legal, though relatively covert, channels. Chinese arms were sent in late 1968 through Tanzania, largely in relation to Chinese relations with that state rather than as an expression of significant solidarity with the secessionists. Likewise, the accessing of French supplies by the Biafrans was largely through regional allies such as Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire. For example, Gabon purchased arms from France and resold them to the Biafran forces at cost (Stanley and Pearton, 1972; SIPRI, 1969, 1970, 1975). Thus, covert aid was largely provided by regional patrons accessing extra-regional sources. These transfers were not overlaid or shaped by bipolar divisions or bloc discipline within the merging core of the global trade. Overall, therefore, the SALW flows to this conflict, were more akin to post-Cold War patterns of arms transfers to conflict-complexes. Overall, for much of this period, the provision of covert aid was limited. From the end of the second-world war to the mid-1970s the loose distinctions between blocs, between core and periphery, between supplier tiers, and between military aid to government forces and a variety of flows to insurgents did not rigidly shape access of conflict parties to SALW. This varied by region: in the conflicts in Indo-china the blocdivisions and broad supplier divisions were apparent, but with the superpowers playing a greater role. However, in sub-Saharan Africa the bloc-divisions demonstrated in the legal government-to-government market, and conflicts in Indo-china, were less significant in this phase


with several insurgent groups receiving arms from suppliers in both blocs. The space for this type of arming to occur was to change significantly as bloc divisions at the global level solidified in the next phase. Conflict and covert aid mid-1970s–1989 From the mid-1970s, extra-regional provision of covert aid increased and was dominated by the core. Amid rising levels of intra-state conflict, and within a bipolar global structure that encouraged transfers of SALW to insurgents for political and ideological reasons, the covert aid to insurgent groups fighting against regimes allied to the opposing bloc was used as a tool for inter-bloc competition. Covert aid was also perceived to be a cheap option: some estimates indicate that Soviet military aid to regimes fighting against US-supported insurgents ran at six to eight times the cost of US aid to the insurgents (Kartha, 1999, p. 31). US and Western bloc transfers to conflict US supplies to insurgent forces increased dramatically in the late 1970s as the experiences of the Vietnam War left the US government more reluctant to intervene directly in conflicts. The supply of SALW was a major tool for intervention without risks to US personnel. The United States constructed pipelines to supply arms, predominantly SALW, to insurgent groups such as UNITA in Angola, the Contra’s in Nicaragua and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. The scale of such covert aid was particularly large during the 1980s as the Reagan doctrine increased the use of arms transfers as a foreign policy tool against the perceived vanguards of the ‘evil empire’. The scale assistance varied hugely, with relatively open aid to the Mujahideen running at approximately $670 million worth of arms and equipment annually, dwarfing the more covert support such as the $70 million of arms provided to the Contras in Nicaragua, and the $30 million of arms transferred to UNITA in Angola each year (Muni, 1996, p. 201). Irrespective of the scale of aid, however, the channels through which SALW were transferred were strikingly similar. In each case, a pipeline was constructed and operated by the CIA. This allowed the supply of arms to be in accordance with the aims of the government but not necessarily with officially stated policy. For instance, CIA-run transfers to UNITA continued even after the Clark Amendment of 1976 forbade the supply of arms to the rebel group (Mathiak, 1995, p. 86). Likewise, after the 1984 Boland Amendment, which prohibited the United States from supplying the Contra’s, the CIA used a range of front companies and sources of funds (including payment for arms from Iran in the notorious


Iran-Contra affair), to continue the operation of an arms pipeline to the Contra’s (Klare and Andersen, 1996, pp. 77–78). The extra-regional stages of these CIA pipelines that operated at the extra-regional level were very similar in terms of the sources of arms used, and the channels through which the SALW reached the regional level. Sourcing According to John Stockwell, the former-Chief of the CIA Angola Task Force, the CIA maintained a warehouse of pre-packaged stocks of foreign arms, at San Antonio, Texas, from which covert aid was provided (Stockwell, 1978, pp. 58–59). Weapons for this warehouse were obtained through private dealers, including during the previous phase. For example, in December 1961 Samuel Cummings’ company Interarms, shipped 32 million rounds of Soviet-type small arms ammunition from Finland to San Antonio, purchased by the CIA front company ‘American Firearms Corporation’ (Brogan and Zarca, 1983, pp. 95–96). This sourcing ran counter to the bloc divisions in the SALW market. Soviet-type weapons were largely surplus and license-produced arms acquired from non-bloc second and third-tier sources. For instance, weapons for the Afghan pipeline were purchased predominantly from China, but also included surplus landmines from Egypt, 100,000 rifles from India, and tens of thousands of rifles, mortars and ammunition from Turkey (Roy, 1991, pp. 35–36; Smith, 1995, p. 62; Pirseyedi, 2000, p. 16). Likewise, both the Afghan and Contra pipelines used Soviet-type weapons obtained from Israel, including stocks captured from the Palestinian Liberation organisation (PLO) in Lebanon in the 1982 invasion. These were reportedly obtained by retired Air Force Major General Richard Secord – acting on behalf of the CIA (Naylor, 1995, p. 49; Klare and Andersen, 1996, p. 77). Much sourcing involved contracting private dealers to purchase arms in grey-market transactions, taking advantage of weak points in regulation: large quantities of Soviet-type weapons were purchased by private dealers from the Kommerzielle Koordination, the department of the East German government tasked with acquiring foreign exchange (Brzoska and Pearson, 1994, p. 264). These dealers included the fronts for the CIA assisted by British MI6, who acquired arms for the Afghan pipeline (Smith, 1995, p. 62; Kartha, 1999, p. 62). In a few cases new US weapons and more sophisticated light weapons from Western-bloc allies were supplied, thereby undermining the deniability of transfers. Thus, until 1985, the pipeline to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan provided only Soviet-type weapons. But, in 1986 US-made


Stinger missiles were provided as a result of Congressional pressure to enhance supplies to the beleaguered Mujahideen forces (Roy, 1991, pp. 35–36). Nevertheless, Soviet-type weapons were the dominant source of SALW in CIA pipelines. Transfer to the regional level Arms pipelines in the Cold War used regional client states as conduits for transfers of SALW to insurgent groups. In US pipelines, these regional states were Pakistan, for the Afghan Mujahideen; Zaire, for UNITA in Angola; Honduras and El Salvador for the Contras in Nicaragua; and Thailand for Cambodian groups. In addition to these primary conduits, secondary routes – such as South Africa for UNITA – were also cultivated within the region in order to enhance cover and provide flexibility within the pipeline. The primary mechanism of channelling covert aid into a conflict region was through shipments of military aid to the regional client: additional arms, often far in excess of the actual aid to the governments, were earmarked for the insurgents. For example, Honduras and El Salvador were provided with exponentially greater levels of US military aid on the understanding that the Contra’s in Nicaragua would be supplied; thus between 1983 and 1984 military aid levels to these countries jumped from US$27.5 million to US$76.5 million, and US$33.5 million to US$176.8 million, respectively (Klare and Andersen, pp. 77–79). Likewise, the CIA channelled arms to Zaire on both privately chartered flights and US Air Force transport in which a token amount of aid to the Zairian military was included to make the transfer appear to be one of the regular deliveries of legal military aid to Kinshasa (Stockwell, 1978, p. 59). Additionally, in some cases greater security in covert supplies was obtained by contracting private dealers who then independently subcontracted air-transport companies to ship the arms (Stockwell, 1978, p. 58). Thus, for instance, when the CIA purchased arms for the Mujahideen from China, they were sent directly from China to Pakistan (Roy, 1991, p. 36). Overall, therefore, there was a dominant structure of CIA run pipelines in the Cold War era. (see Diagram 4.1) This was a typical formation of Cold War era pipelines. Other Western bloc suppliers Second-tier Western-bloc suppliers did not play major roles in covert aid to insurgent forces. No covert-aid pipelines were operated solely or primarily by the other western-bloc states such as the United Kingdom


INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

PRIVATE DEALERS Sale Contract

US GOVERNMENT

FOREIGN STOCKS

Sale

CIA

Vintage Surplus

Military aid Charter

US MILITARY TRANSPORT

REGIONAL LEVEL

PRIVATE TRANSPORTERS

Regional Clients

CONFLICT-COMPLEX Insurgents

Diagram 4.1 Extra-regional stages of CIA pipelines during the Cold War

and France. Rather, these states were secondary suppliers within the US-organised covert aid-pipelines. For example, in second-tier western bloc suppliers were occasional sources for the Afghan pipeline, such as after 1986 new western weapons began to be provided, including Franco-German Milan anti-tank rockets, Spanish 120 mm mortars, and British Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles. Nevertheless, these roles of bloc allies were no more significant than the role of second and third-tier sources in the periphery such as Switzerland, Iran, and Saudi Arabia (Stockwell, 1978; Pirseyedi, 2000, p. 16). In addition, some small supplies were provided unilaterally, rather than through US constructed pipelines. According to Olivier Roy (1991, p. 38): ‘France and the United Kingdom cultivated direct contacts with the Mujahideen, and, although it has never been acknowledged, a certain amount of direct military support was given by the two to certain field commanders …’ Nevertheless, this never attained significant levels, providing only secondary supply channels rather than rivalling the CIA pipeline. Thus, overall, US dominance was far more marked in covert aid than in the legal SALW market. Soviet and Eastern bloc transfers to conflict The USSR and its bloc allies supported national liberation movements and the governments they spawned from the 1960s onwards. The USSR supplied substantial amounts of arms to African liberation movements such as the Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in Angola, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, SWAPO


(South-West African People’s Organisation) in Namibia, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. In the late-1970s and 1980s in many arenas of proxy conflict it was the government rather than the insurgent force that professed ideological propinquity with the Soviet Union. Thus, in relation to the conflicts discussed above, the USSR and its bloc allies provided large-scale military aid to the governments of Angola (the MPLA), Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. Soviet support for insurgent groups in this period was provided to the PLO and the FMLN in El Salvador. The nature of the sources and mechanisms of supply used for each were distinct. In most cases arms were channelled through regional and bloc allies (Crozier, 1978; Wilkinson, 1979, pp. 6–7). The PLO were provided with arms and training by the KGB, particularly after the mid-1970s. Soviet and Soviet-sponsored transfers of both MCA and SALW to the PLO included supplies through East Germany, Hungary, and Libya; the creation of Soviet-sponsored bilateral arms supply relationships with Yugoslavia, East Germany, and Hungary; and the supply of SALW by Soviet clients such as Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam (Cline and Alexander, 1984, pp. 49–54). Similarly, the Romanian foreign intelligence agency, Departamentul de Informatii Externe(the DIE) provided the PLO with a limited quantity of weapons as well as intelligence assistance. According to Ion Pacepa, the former acting-head of the DIE, Nicolae Ceausecu once claimed that ‘Moscow is helping the PLO build muscles. I’m feeding its brain’. (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1991, p. 548). Though the evidence is unclear, it has been claimed that the PLO, in turn, acted as a conduit for further Soviet sponsorship of terrorist and insurgent groups, including communist groups in Western Europe, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the FMLN in El Salvador (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1991, p. 548; Klare and Andersen, 1996, p. 83). The FMLN in El Salvador received large quantities of covert aid during their conflict against the US-backed government in the 1980s. In common with US covert aid, and for the same reasons, suppliers in the periphery were used as a source of weapons: large stocks of US-manufactured SALW in Vietnam (abandoned after the war) and Ethiopia (large stocks of US SALW provided as military aid to the government of Ethiopia between 1953 and 1977, were made surplus by supplies of Soviet weapons after 1977 (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 62–171)) were transferred to the FMLN ‘under encouragement’ from the USSR (Klare and Andersen, 1996, pp. 83–84). Also in common with the sourcing of US arms pipelines, a shift occurred after the mid-1980s. While the sources in the periphery were dominant during the early 1980s, after 1985 eastern


European sources increased as the FMLN changed tactics and sought to modernise and standardise its SALW. AKM assault rifles from Hungary and other SALW from North Korea, East Germany, and Yugoslavia became increasingly significant after the mid-1980s. After 1987 much of this modernisation related to the availability of Soviet-standard 7.62 39 mm ammunition, which Cuba manufactured from that time onwards and supplied it to the FMLN (Whelan, 1991). As with US covert aid, Soviet supplies to insurgent groups were conducted through regional clients and other allies. Both Cuba and Nicaragua were accused by the US of providing aid to Latin American insurgent groups, including channelling Soviet-supplied weapons. Cuba was particularly significant in this regard. It had provided arms to the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua before 1979 and the FMLN during the conflict in El Salvador. Cuba also sent a large number of troops to aid the MPLA government in Angola: indeed, some AK-47 assault rifles captured from the FMLN were reportedly used previously by Cuban troops in Angola. Similarly, other Latin American insurgent groups also received arms from Soviet-allies at the behest of the USSR. For instance, anti-Pinochet guerrillas in Chile received some SALW from Vietnam, (Child, 1992, p. 74; Atkins, 1995, pp. 319–320). Chinese transfers to conflict Throughout both early phases the bulk of Chinese covert aid to insurgent groups was provided to mostly to regional clients such as the NLF in South Vietnam (see above) and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Motivated by a desire to prevent becoming encircled by Soviet-allies, the Chinese government sponsored the Khmer Rouge after Cambodia had been invaded by Vietnam in 1978. They received SALW reportedly sufficient for 40,000 fighters in just 5 years between 1979 and 1984 (Gilks and Segal, 1985, pp. 211–212). This aid was channelled through Thailand, with the assistance of the Bangkok government (Eikenberry, 1995, p. 22). Chinese covert aid to extra-regional recipients was limited, with China playing a role as a secondary supplier for insurgent groups, both as a source for the primary patrons and directly. For example, in addition to sales of SALW to the CIA for their Afghan pipeline, China provided aid directly to the Mujahideen because of concerns over corruption in the US run pipeline (Segal, 1997, p. 213; Mathiak and Lumpe, 2000, p. 63. Until the early 1970s Chinese extra-regional covert-aid supply lines occurred through similar mechanisms as the CIA’s later pipelines: the supply of SALW to a regional ally who then transferred them to insurgents in regional states or in Chinese-sponsored training camps in their


territory. Tanzania was a particularly significant ally in this regard, with Chinese arms being delivered there for onward shipment to insurgents in Congo, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Biafran Secessionists in Nigeria. Likewise, in this period, after Mozambique became independent in 1975, it received significant aid from China, some of which was then retransferred to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union ZAPU independence movements in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. (Gilks and Segal, 1985, pp. 39–45). Cold War covert aid as a supplier’s market During the Cold War covert aid was a supplier’s market built on the foundations (and the cracks) of the global legal market and bipolar global divisions. The primary means of accessing international suppliers was by exchanging political goods (often only vague promises of allegiance or pronouncements littered with ideological resonance) with the major bloc oligarchs within the core. Additionally, due to the reciprocal bipolar structures of proxy warfare and resultant covert aid, if an insurgent group were not fighting to remove a client of strategic importance such political goods were hard to come by. Further, recipients of covert aid through these pipelines were largely dependent upon those arms flows, with independent secondary supplies rarely achieving significant scale (see Chapter 8). The existence of apparent cross-bloc transfers to insurgents may seem to be contrary to the argument that covert aid was a suppliers market. However, cross-bloc transfers relate only to the sourcing of covert aid, and were exclusively a function of the co-option of the private SALW trade in grey-market sourcing by the oligarchs’ security services. This suppliers market changed significantly with the end of the Cold War. 1989–Present: post-Cold War covert aid to insurgent forces Covert aid to insurgents has undergone significant changes in the postCold War era. These have been shaped by the structural evolution of the global legal market and associated trends towards the privatisation and commercialisation of SALW trade. The privatisation of extra-regional stages of covert aid in the postCold War era has been facilitated and shaped by developments in the global legal SALW market. In conflicts with a Cold War lineage the covert-aid pipelines from the major extra-regional patrons to insurgents ceased or became privatised in the post-Cold War era. Many new conflicts also emerged. Insurgent groups in both types of conflict have had to obtain arms from other types of channels.


In some cases, such as the US pipelines to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, or UNITA in Angola, the regional players in the pipeline continued to provide arms. In the case of the Afghan pipeline, substantial stockpiles of arms were accumulated by the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the operation of the pipeline, from which it continued to provide arms to its client factions after the United States cut-off its arms aid in 1989 (Hyman, 1992, pp. 247–248). Nevertheless, such stocks were finite and are not present for most cases of post-Cold War conflicts. It has been claimed that covert aid in the post-Cold War era has been provided predominantly by Islamic states and organisations. Thus, Stephanie Neuman (1995, pp. 59–60) claimed that ‘Islamic military assistance to fellow Muslims, however, apparently far exceeds that of other groups both in amount and in geographical reach’. However, this is not supported by the evidence collected for this book. The examples used in this argument relate primarily to intra-regional covert aid (in the case of various supplies by Iran and Sudan); and in another case – flows from Afghanistan to Tajikistan – conflated black market trade with covert aid. Rather, while many insurgents have been supplied with covert aid, the research for this book indicates that it has been provided predominantly by regional rather than extra-regional patrons (see Chapter 6). Completing the privatisation of extra-regional stages of covert-aid processes, the global market has become just the sourcing mechanism for regional covert aid – akin to the flexible private trade and the fuzzy edges of bipolar discipline in Cold War pipelines, but presenting broader opportunities. Fresh stocks of SALW are obtained by regional patrons from extra-regional suppliers in largely legal transactions, rather than being provided in covert aid driven by extra-regional suppliers. These SALW have been sourced from suppliers in all tiers, particularly from first and second tier suppliers with poor regulation and end-user monitoring capacity such as former-Soviet republics and Eastern Europe where export control systems collapsed in the early 1990s, or those with less restrictive standards of export criteria, such as China and North Korea. Significantly, given the reduction in the distinction between suppliers in the core and those in the periphery, a number of other states enter the SALW market on a sporadic basis – and may be used to source arms for conflicts. Thus, for instance, in 2000, 10,000 assault rifles were sourced from Jordan for a complex transfer via Peru to the FARC in Colombia (Rotella, 2000). This type of sourcing mirrors that of covertaid pipelines in the Cold War, but without the necessity of purchasing opposing bloc weapons.


Further, following the changing structures of the global legal trade, the few examples of covert aid to insurgents from extra-regional suppliers reflect the decline of the core-periphery distinction: They are predominantly from suppliers in the former-periphery, such as Libyan aid to the IRA in 1996 (Phythian, 2000, p. 18). The conflicts in the formerYugoslavia were the scene of most cases of extra-regional covert aid in the post-Cold War era. These include Iranian supplies to Bosnian Muslims, and transfers to Bosnian Serbs by the security services of Ukraine and Israel (Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), 2002; Norton-Taylor, 2002). Iranian supplies to Bosnian Muslims in the mid-1990s, in contravention of a UN arms embargo, were provided via Croatia and are estimated to have totalled 14,000 tonnes between 1992 and January 1996 (Phythian, 2000, pp. 37–40). It is often said that the United States actively engaged in supplies to Bosnian Muslims. However, while there is considerable evidence that the United States was involved in other supply lines, and tacitly approved of Iranian supplies, there is no clear evidence of the United States supplying or organising the supply of SALW. The Iranian pipeline is said to have been personally approved by US President Clinton, but did not involve any US financing, aircraft or weapons (Sislin and Pearson, 2001, pp. 21, 40; NIOD, 2002). Stephanie Neuman (1995, p. 60) also claims that Iran was the main donor to the Bosnian Muslims, but that Pakistan, Sudan, and Islamists in Tunisia and Afghanistan also provided military equipment. Only one case of post-Cold War covert aid from an extra-regional patron originated in a core state: the US$9.7 million of US aid to Iraqi antiHussein opposition groups in the late 1990s. This was provided under the Iraq Liberation Act, passed in Congress in 1998, which authorised US$97 million of various forms of assistance (Lumpe, 1999, p. 159). In all other known cases where extra-regional suppliers have been implicated as being involved in covert-aid transfers, they have been in ostensibly legal transfers diverted in supply lines organised from the regional level. This has occurred through legal, and occasional grey-market, mechanisms utilising the global legal trade in much the same way as Cold War pipelines used the periphery and the private trade.

The black and grey markets Does a global black or grey market exist as a distinct system of spread (even if it is symbiotic with the legal trade)? The amorphous image of SALW spread, portrays global illicit markets as a largely post-Cold War


phenomenon – closely associated with globalisation. However, some illicit trade existed throughout the post-Second World War era, and served as a sourcing mechanism for covert aid in the Cold War. The key questions arise of whether these elements of black- and grey-market processes added up to a black market system or grey market system? and how those processes and structures were constructed?. To answer these it is most useful to look at black and grey markets from 1945 to the end of the Cold War, and the post-Cold war era in which the amorphous image tells us that a vibrant global black market was unleashed by the forces of globalisation. The Cold War era Black market Black-market transfers of SALW existed throughout the Cold War period and in the immediate post-Second World War period were a significant channel for arms flows to conflicts, such as the Nigerian civil war. However, for much of the latter Cold War the arms black market was small due to the cheap and easy availability of large-scale covert aid. Further, most black-market processes fell into the black-market category because they were largely unregulated ‘private trade’, rather than contravening specific export control laws and procedures. Many arms trade analysts have claimed that the arms black market peaked in the 1980s as embargoed states such as Iran and North Korea (both embargoed by the United States) and South Africa (under a UN arms embargo) among others obtained large amounts of arms, spare parts and technology in illegal arms deals (Laurance, 1989, pp. 229–232; Karp, 1994, p. 180). For example, the number of illegal exports of arms – of all types – from the United States increased dramatically in the 1980s, with seizures in 1985 of US$74.8 million worth of weapons representing what observers interpret as ‘only the tip of the iceburg’ (Laurance, 1992, pp. 177–179). A range of factors have been suggested in explanation of this increase, such as increased competition and commercialisation of the arms trade, growing roles for private traders, and increasing stocks of more easily available surplus arms (Laurance, 1992, pp. 178–179). Significantly, however, all of these factors were present for SALW long before this apparent zenith of black-market trading. Further, while figures for the value and number of illicit arms exports uncovered by the US government in the 1980s did increase, and some significant embargo busting went on at this time, the scale of black-market SALW transfers does not necessarily follow these trends: indeed, Laurance (1989, pp. 227–228) charts the values of seizures by the US government in the


1980s, but these appear to fluctuate more in line with the number of seizures of weapons technology (ranging between 4 and 22 cases per year) rather than small arms (between 1 and 5 cases per year). Thus, while increasingly substantial in dollar values, and of great concern to major suppliers, the illicit transfer of arms and technology to embargoed destinations during the 1980s does not appear to have been mirrored, or explained, by a growth of a global SALW black market. The high degree to which small arms covert aid was a supplier’s market is, in part, evidence of this lack of a global black market: the apparent, if small, existence of a ‘private market’ might appear to indicate that insurgents that eschewed patronage from Cold War oligarchs could access extra-regional sources of SALW through black-market channels. Significantly, however, in spite of the existence of a private trade, those insurgent groups that deliberately sought to avoid dependence on bloc patrons in the late 1970’s and 1980s, such as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in Ethiopia, and Sendero Luminoso in Peru, were reliant upon local level arming processes and/or regional patrons, and were unable to access any part of the global market directly (see Chapter 8). Similarly, there is very little data indicating a distinct grey market operating during the Cold War era. In response to numerous arms trade scandals in the 1980s many major exporters instituted more stringent export controls, one of the most significant of which was the increased, but by no means universal, requirement for End-user Certificates (EUCs). It has been claimed that this resulted in a transformation of the ‘black market’, requiring that international black-market dealers acquire EUCs either through forgery or, more commonly, through bribing officials in other countries. Thus, in the 1980s, according to Aaron Karp, Paraguay and Kenya were popular choices for the acquisition of spurious EUCs (Karp, 1994, p. 181; Naylor, 1995, p. 14). The necessity of the collusion of state officials in the navigation of legal loopholes or the manipulation of due process is therefore claimed to have resulted in a dramatic decline in the black market, not because of a reduction in the volume of such illicit flows, but by transforming black-market deals into grey-market transfers (Karp, 1994, p. 181). This, however, is an artefact of distinctions between black- and grey-market activities, and a change in the policy structures of SALW spread (see Chapter 2), but does not reflect an overall structural shift allowing the development of a distinct global black- or grey-market system of SALW spread. Nevertheless, during the Cold War, the foundations of black- and grey-market SALW flows were growing. It is the symbiotic relationship


between covert aid and the private SALW trade that reveals an increasing incidence of black-market processes at the global level. This symbiosis took two forms – one at the global level, and one in numerous regions across the globe. First and foremost, at the global level, extra-regional private dealers were a significant source and conduit of arms for covertaid pipelines. Thus, while military aid by the core suppliers ‘crowded out’ the private legal market, covert aid stimulated and shaped the proliferation of private traders that obtained SALW in ostensibly legal transfers and diverted them. This was a process of illicit diversion, rather than reflecting a globally structured illicit market within which arms flowed to conflicts. In the second form, as covert aid, and the conflicts to which supplies were provided, increased throughout the 1980s a greater quantity of highly durable SALW accumulated not just in less well-controlled surplus stockpiles but wholly outside of the control of formal armies. Naylor (1995, p. 16) claims, ‘Hegelian dialectics suggest that at some point quantity accumulates to the point of engendering a qualitative transformation. In the arms market, that critical watershed was passed sometime in the 1980s.’ This accumulation of SALW in ‘illicit’ circulation – held by insurgents and outside of the control of governments – would certainly have reached a high level in the mid-tolate 1980s. Thus, for instance, in some regions this led to the creation of ‘arms bazaars’ in hot-spots or along pipelines in centres of illicit arms trading such as Bangkok, Beirut, and Peshawar. These accumulations, however, were the foundation of regionally rather than globally constructed and operating black markets (see Chapter 6). Indeed, there is no evidence that these stocks fed into extra-regional flows. Thus, while the number and scale of black-market transfers of SALW increased as global average, and the number of arms available for black-market trade increased in many places, this does not appear to have been a function of a global black-market structure with extra-regional reach. The post-Cold War era So far, so good, for the amorphous image: although no global black- or grey-market structures existed or operated autonomously during the Cold war, a range of processes built partial structures and spaces that one might assume could form the foundation of a globalised illicit trade. Further, the post-Cold War trends in the legal market (such as privatisation, loosening of supplier discipline, and large availability of poorly controlled surplus stocks) and covert aid (a de-linking from global divisions and decline in extra-regional provision of covert aid) seem ideally suited to the growth of a global black market by providing ready sources of arms; and by clearing


the pitch – removing the subsidised market of covert aid giving space to a free black market in an era initially characterised by climbing demand from rising levels of intra-state conflict. This sounds like a recipe for the growth of a vibrant global illicit market – whether largely ‘black’ or ‘grey’. In order to assess this, it is necessary to examine the two primary aspects of global SALW spread structures that would form a distinct system of spread: the source and supplier base, and the range of transfer channels. Illicit sources and suppliers The global legal market remains the primary extra-regional source of illicit SALW flows to conflict. However, trends in the legal trade, particularly the growth of surplus stocks and the decline of regulatory capacity in some states, has contributed to the growth of the potential for grey- and black-market sourcing. There may be three forms of black-market sourcing (where arms are acquired wholly illegally). The first is the theft of arms. However, most stolen arms circulate locally and regionally. Even large stocks of stolen arms do not appear to enter extra-regional flow processes. For example, in the post-Cold War era the stocks of some 20–25 million SALW estimated to be held by the Soviet Armed Forces were the primary source of illicit trafficking by Russian military organisations (Berryman, 2000, p. 87). For instance, in 2000 it was estimated that approximately 30,000 SALW went missing from the Russian armed forces stocks each year (Berryman, 2000, p. 94); and the criminal investigation department of the interior ministry exposed 116 criminal gangs that specialised in supplying arms and ammunition from military units and Defence Ministry stocks to the black market (Moscow Agnetstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 2001). However, most of the associated trafficking by military and former-military personnel has been regional, particularly in the Caucusus, although such weapons are believed to have been a significant source for embargo busting transfers to Serbia (Berryman, 2000, p. 95). The second type of black-market sourcing is through unregulated private trade that was a feature of black-market sourcing for covert-aid pipelines. However, there are no known examples of such private trade feeding into extra-regional channels to conflict-complexes. This form of sourcing, then, seems fairly localised, not globalised. The third would involve arms already in illicit circulation: once in illicit hands SALW tend not to return to the legal sphere. As in the Cold War, however, there are no known examples of large stocks of illicit surpluses being recirculated extra-regionally without first returning to state control. Overall, therefore, for each type of black-market sourcing, it is striking


that, in contrast to the legal market; they do not appear to feed into extra-regional flows, and the availability of arms through black-market sourcing is a function of local and regional structure, not globally structured availability. Grey-market sourcing appears more common, but still relatively rare. Industrial-scale ‘grey-market production’ resulting from a collapse of regulatory structures, as discussed in Chapter 3, is relatively rare. Significantly, some analysts point to an increasing trend towards cooperation between arms manufacturers and private dealers engaged in supplying weapons to warring factions or embargoed states (Fernández, 1998, pp. 57–66; Lorenzo, 1998, pp. 93–99). Thus, some producers, such the Chinese state producer NORINCO, are believed to have also been directly engaged in illegal arms trafficking into the United States (Lorenzo, 1998, p. 95). Likewise, in the late 1980s a combination of weakening of regulatory controls and increased corruption by arm suppliers reportedly led to the development of direct links between the Russian SALW manufacturers at Tula and Izhevsk with trading companies in Cyprus and others (Lorenzo, 1998, pp. 96–97). Similarly, A former-Colonel in the Argentine Army, Diego Palleros, in concert with other high-ranking Argentinean government officials, arranged a greymarket shipment of 6,500 tons of Argentinean SALW to the embargoed forces of Croatia between 1991 and 1995 – attempting to use false documentation, which later did not arrive, and then approving the transfer without appropriate documentation (Reuters, 29 July 1998; Agence France Presse, 4 August 1998). Similarly, as noted above, some French supplies to the Rwandan army after the imposition of the UN arms embargo took a grey-market form. Nevertheless, in spite of these cases, the incidence of extra-regional grey-market sourcing and supply appears relatively limited. It is not, as current understandings of SALW spread emphasise, a ubiquitous process in extra-regional aspects of flows to conflicts. Grey-market sourcing more commonly involves accessing and diverting legal stocks through inadequate due process in export regulation. This was particularly a feature in cases where export control systems had effectively collapsed, such as transfers from many former-Eastern bloc states in the early 1990s. However, in terms of discerning the structures of systems of spread, it is important to note that the extra-regional stages of such flows tend to be legal. It seems likely, therefore, that the same processes have altered the structures and operation of both legal transfers and the accessing of legal sources for illicit transfers. Thus, the growth of surplus in the former-Soviet republics is perceived, quite accurately, as contributing more directly to SALW flows into illicit hands than similar surpluses in the United States and Western European


stocks. Western surpluses have been diverted, but on a far lower scale. For instance, while an attempt to export US$12 million of arms from the United States to Croatia failed, some US arms were, nevertheless, found among weapons being trafficked across the German and Austrian borders (Pearson et al., 1992, p. 408). Therefore, while the sourcing of illicit transfers to conflict is largely legal, it is not evenly distributed throughout the legal market. Rather, it is those sectors that operate less stringent controls over SALW, even when full due process is followed, that are sought out by the illicit suppliers. In relation to illicit suppliers, Transnational Criminal Organisations (TCOs), and the networks between them, are the defining feature of the ‘global illicit economy’ (Williams, 1994, p. 97). Some such organisations are engaged in illicit arms trafficking often as part of a web of illicit and legal business activities. For example, the Japanese Yakuza have been involved in arms smuggling into Japan from China (Shelley, 1999, p. 44) while Latin American drug cartels have armed insurgent groups in control of areas of territory in which they grow and process illicit drugs (Dragani, 1998, p. 78). However, most TCOs acquire arms for their own use, and hence use locally available sources rather than long transnational supply lines. Some non-state actors such as diaspora groups have been involved in SALW transfers to insurgents, but these tend to be concentrated at the regional level (Sislin and Pearson, 2001, p. 50). At the extra-regional level the transfer of SALW by such suppliers is not a major feature of arms flows to conflicts although diaspora groups have been a feature of arms flows to the IRA in Northern Ireland or the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo (Hedges, 1998; Joseph, 1999, p. 281; Walker and Laverty, 2000). While generally on a small-scale, some larger flows have occurred: for instance, an American arms smuggler arranged the transfer of over 20 tons of arms from Venezuela and Colombia to the IRA in Northern Ireland. This dealer arranged the transfer in concert with US based members of the IRA (Sheehan, 2000). Islamic foundations in Saudi Arabia funded arms purchases by Bosnian Muslims (Neuman, 1995, p. 60), and Osama Bin Laden is believed to have funded arms purchases from North Korea by the Philippine separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Romero, 2000, p. 1). However, the supply of arms by diaspora groups at the extraregional level is rare. According to a recent study of support for insurgent groups, diaspora support predominantly takes the form of financial assistance, and seldom involves arms transfers (Byman et al., 2001, pp. 41–60). In addition there are some, apparently very rare, cases of terrorist and rebel groups cooperating in extra-regional deals. For instance, FARC in Colombia has links with the IRA in Northern Ireland; and in 2001 the


Spanish terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) reportedly traded stolen explosives for small arms from Hamas (Etxeberri, 2001). Channels SALW flows that involve grey-market or black-market activity do not tend to run directly from the extra-regional level to the conflict-complex level. Rather, they involve regional facilitation. If there is a global black market in SALW one would expect those regional stages to be grey or black, and to be so as a function of global structures. This does not appear to be the case. A range of arms brokers and regional state and non-state actors form a link between the global SALW market and warring factions. Indeed, some arms brokers, such as Victor Bout and Leonid Minin, appear to specialise in the niche market of supplies to conflict. For much of the Cold War era these roles were predominantly subsumed into extra-regional covert-aid pipelines. In many cases the networks of arms brokers that were key to the sourcing patterns of these pipelines have simply moved from supplying extra-regional patrons to supplying regional patrons and insurgent forces (Wood and Peleman, 1999, pp. 7–17). Such channels are not only constructed by skilled specialists but other actors, such as oil and diamond mining corporations, have also facilitated or taken part directly in illicit arms supplies. For example, Elf Acquitaine, the French oil company, allegedly brokered and financed arms transfers to Sassou-Nguesso’s forces in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 (Venter, 1999, p. 12; Wood and Peleman, 1999, p. 13). This might appear to indicate the construction of grey- or black-market channels at the extra-regional level. However, the range of facilitation roles that occur at the regional level are not a function of global structures. Rather, the range of facilitating roles tends to be mixed and moves fluidly between legal, grey and black sectors – depending largely on structures at the regional level (see Chapters 5 and 6). In some exceptional cases non-state actors – like the LTTE and Al Qaida – have accessed international stocks themselves, but this is largely by creating a range of front companies and so forth, and is very rare (see Chapter 8). Thus, the privatisation of key aspects of the organisation of supply channels has also entailed their regionalisation. The remaining extra-regional processes are largely related to sourcing – and this remains primarily legal. A global illicit market? and the question of relative size The amorphous image emphasises that illicit flows of SALW to conflict are a function of a globally constructed illicit arms market. Throughout


the Cold War, however, this was clearly not the case. Extra-regional black-market and grey-market processes were indistinct and grew in a symbiotic relationship with covert aid. They did not form a globally structured market with extra-regional reach but rather operated either at a regional level, or in conjunction with covert aid. While instrumental in flows to conflicts during the Cold War the oft-cited ‘black and grey markets’ lacked the necessary structures to be accessed by conflict protagonists independently of covert aid. The amorphous image of SALW spread, however, is primarily articulated in relation to flows in the post-Cold War era. Some analysts point to the growth of a global illicit economy in parallel with the globalisation of legal trade (Anthony, 1994, p. 34; Castells, 2000). Improved and expanding transport and communications infrastructure has facilitated the growth of commercial interactions across the globe regardless of their legality. These improvements have also facilitated the maintenance of links with members of the same ethnic group living abroad. Many identity based factions, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka or the IRA among numerous others, rely on finances sent by sympathetic or coerced members of a diaspora for a significant proportion of their finances (Chalk, 1999, pp. 82–84). Further, some conflict factions economic interactions may have a global reach, in terms of the markets of developed states in which illicit commodities such as drugs and conflict diamonds are sold. These, however, tend to be organised around regionally constructed illicit networks that spread outwards from the conflict-complexes, or around key source areas such as the ‘Golden Triangle’ and the ‘Golden Crescent’ in the case of drugs trafficking. Thus, direct links between insurgent forces and international markets are rare. The same is true of SALW flows from the extra-regional level, which tend to originate in legal markets that can only be accessed by intermediaries such as brokers or regional states. Duffield (2000, p. 72) claims that ‘Political actors have been able to control local economies and realize their worth through the ability to forge new and flexible relations with liberalized global markets.’ However, for accessing SALW at the extra-regional level these relations with liberalised global market remain predicated upon the ability of warring factions to contract brokers and/or gain the assistance of regional states in order to dupe the legal SALW trade (see Chapter 5). Overall, therefore, the problem of illicit arms transfers to conflicts is one of ‘weak lawmakers’, particularly in relation to enforcement, rather than ‘powerful lawbreakers’ (Karp, 1994). This is certainly the case for


extra-regional aspects of the flow of SALW to conflicts in the post-Cold War era. R.T Naylor (1995, p. 20) has claimed that while it is no longer the operation of this or that individual black market … This does not add up to a monolithic criminal conspiracy. Modern black markets are complex, but they are not integrated into neat monopolies or cartels. If they were, they would be easier to control. Instead of a organizational hierarchy one finds a series of arms-length commercial relationships … The result is that a modern covert arms deal is likely to take place within a matrix of black market transactions. (Emphasis added). In fact in most cases SALW flows to illicit recipients in conflict take place in a matrix of legal, covert, grey, and black-market transactions and facilitating roles. As will be seen in the coming chapters, the construction of this matrix is largely related to the political economy of conflict at the regional and conflict-complex levels. Therefore, in relation to the question of relative size of the black and grey markets at the global level, four points arise: 1. Extra-regional grey-market processes are only an infrequent feature of the sourcing of SALW. 2. Black-market processes tend not to play a significant role in extraregional sourcing. 3. No black or grey-market channels go directly from the extra-regional level to the conflict-complex. 4. The channels of SALW spread that cross levels do not appear to reflect global illicit market structures. In relation to the assertions that the grey market is larger than the black, it is clear that, grey-market processes are more common than black-market processes, but the scale of both appears limited. It is clear that neither rivals the significance of the legal market – even in relation to flows to conflicts. In contrast to the amorphous image, the global political and economic space for black- and grey-market activity exists and appears to have grown, but has not resulted in a globally structured black market capable of supplying arms autonomously of grey or covert state involvement.

Conclusion The amorphous image portrays the flow of SALW to conflict as part of a globalised illicit market populated by nefarious brokers. However, this is


misleading. The dominant global structures that shape both legal and illicit flows to conflicts are the legal market. This is clearly demonstrated by the legal trade, the patterns of covert aid, and the lack of distinct systems of illicit SALW spread; thus, trends in the legal market have shaped the legal flow of SALW to conflicts. The legal market is – in combination with the overall systemic divisions driving it – the dominant structure shaping the mechanisms through which extra-regional stages of covert aid take place. For instance, during the Cold War covert aid was a supplier’s market (in that clients had little opportunity to exercise choice or influence in arms acquisitions) built on the foundations (and the cracks) of the global legal market and bipolar global divisions. Most covert-aid pipelines were constructed in very similar ways – thus reflecting underlying structural features and systemic realities. In the post-Cold War era, extra-regional stages of covert aid are even more clearly rooted within the structures of the global legal trade – as covert aid has become regionalised, and the global market is a sourcing mechanism, with flow processes remaining in the legal sphere until diverted by regional action or facilitation. The scope of black-market and grey-market processes is very limited at the extra-regional level, and – far from being dominated by a globalised illicit market – globalisation appears to have failed to generate a global black-market or grey-market system of spread. As for the central role of arms brokers – either in the ‘illicit market’ of the amorphous image, or on the edges of the structures discerned here, there is little reason to see them as the representatives of illicit globalisation, nor even as the predominant actors in the parts of the global market that supply conflicts. Brokers are, of course, a common element of very many extraregional flows of SALW to conflicts. But it is not obvious that they are most significant nor the most dynamic actors shaping the capacity of actors in conflict to acquire arms. A range of regional actors whose roles and networks are equally, if not more, instrumental to the acquisition of SALW have not received the attention of brokers – yet it is they who are the real key to arming conflict. As will be seen in the next two chapters, these actors and their roles are profoundly shaped by distinct regional political and economic structures and dynamics (and their evolution) that are obscured by the global homogenisation of the amorphous image.


Part III The Regional Level: The Neglected Dimension


5 In Between the Global and the Conflict: Regional Facilitation and the Construction of Networks

The regional level plays two distinct roles within the framework being developed by this book. The first is as an intermediate level between the global level and the conflict-complex in which actors and processes at the regional level play facilitating roles – either facilitating global supplier’s transfers to conflict-complexes, largely through logistical assistance and/or facilitating the accessing of the global market by conflict actors. The second is as a distinct political and economic space populated by a range of possible arms suppliers and potentially encompassing discretely regional structures of SALW availability and spread. Therefore, this Part distinguishes between those flows of small arms that involve three levels of operation (international–regional–conflict-complex) that are addressed here, and those that only involve two (regional – conflict-complex) that are addressed in the next chapter. The central question of this Part is the extent to which the various types of roles played by actors at the regional level, and their combinations and characteristics, are a function of overarching global structures, distinct regional structures and dynamics, or ad-hoc constructions generated and contained along specific supply lines. It asserts and explores the importance of the regional level in shaping the flow of SALW to conflicts. This chapter examines the nature of regional processes and structures that facilitate the flow of SALW from the global level to the conflictcomplex. It is primarily concerned with the nature of these processes and their construction and correlation with each other and factors at other levels in order to discern whether they are shaped by features of a regional political-economy of SALW spread. 121


The concept of pipelines, as outlined in Chapter 2, is particularly significant here: pipelines have been characteristic of extra-regional covert aid, particularly during the Cold War. Such supply lines went through the regional level, within which a range of actors played facilitating roles in the delivery of arms to the client force. In the post-Cold War era, the extra-regional processes of SALW flows to insurgent forces tend to be legal transfers, but similar roles are still played by a range of actors at the regional level. The primary function of these roles is to divert arms from the legal into the illicit sphere. This facilitation of diversion may be provided to the recipient force or to their regional allies. It is commonly attributed to nefarious brokers in the amorphous image, but is often located regionally and conducted by actors, and within structures, that are defined primarily by their regional location rather than as agents of illicit globalisation. SALW flows, and where necessary their diversion, are facilitated by a range of roles that include ● ● ● ●

transhipment and transit; the construction of a veil of legality; the facilitation of financial aspects of SALW flows; the use of regional territory.

The nature and combinations of facilitation roles vary significantly between regions and conflicts. The framework developed in Chapter 2 noted that the characterisations of flow processes as covert, grey, and black are most clearly applicable to particular roles along a supply line, with many supply lines, including pipelines, moving through two or more types at different stages that evolve over time. If SALW spread is shaped by structures this mixture is unlikely to be random. Thus, a key question raised by the framework developed in Chapter 2 is whether the character of facilitation roles correlates with the character of extraregional stages in the supply lines (thereby indicating that regional processes are shaped by broader global structures), or is a reflection of regionally constructed political economy of SALW flows (which may indicate distinct and significant regional structures)? More particularly, the character and correlation of roles is hypothesised as being based in a regional political economy of arms flows that is influenced by extra-regional and conflict-complex level processes. Thus, the following analysis of facilitation roles clarifies the correlations and contingencies of facilitation, between facilitation and other stages of flow, between different facilitation roles, and between facilitation and types of region/regional political economy.

Regional Facilitation and Networks 123

Transhipment and Transit Transhipment and transit (henceforth the term transhipment refers to both the processes) involve the movement of arms through the territory of a state that is not the source, supplier, or recipient of the arms. Contrary to some research on arming of conflict (Sislin, et al., 1998, pp. 399,404) transhipment is one of the most ubiquitous forms of facilitation. It is a form of assistance provided to extra-regional suppliers, regional covertaid patrons, and combatant. It is a feature of some legal transfers, most covert-aid supply lines, and most flows in which regional facilitation is provided to illicit recipients. Transhipment occurs at both the international and regional levels. However, at the extra-regional level it largely takes the form of the movement of shipments through major transport networks, ports, and airports – primarily as a function of regulatory incapacity and deliberate mislabelling of shipments by unscrupulous transport agents and shipping companies. It is this type of transportation and transhipment that has been highlighted in the SALW literature – painting a picture that transhipment occurs through unregulated transport agents, as a component or correlate of the activities of brokers seeking out weak points in global regulation – such as weak states, or states without transit licensing requirements (Wood and Peleman, 1999). In contrast, transhipment at the regional level is often an active and deliberate process involving the direct participation and collusion of regional state and non-state actors as a form of facilitation. In addition to the transportation of arms through a regional state’s territory, regional transhipment may also include the following activities ●

●

●

Arranging the logistics of arms transport or sub-contracting such tasks to other actors within the state. This may be done by the regional state or by private transport brokers. The outsourcing of transportation to private contractors is a common feature of covert-aid supply lines. Escorting arms shipments from the point of entry to the final destination. This is a particularly common feature of high levels of state involvement in arms transhipment. States allowing the use of airfields for refuelling. This may be both extraregional and regional and may or may not occur with the host states knowledge of the nature of the cargo. For example, during the 1980s Liberia provided the United States with refuelling rights at Robertsfield International Airport that were used by American military aircraft delivering arms to southern Zaire for onward shipment to UNITA in Angola in the CIA-run arms pipeline (Africa Confidential, 20 April 1990, p. 5; Huband, 1998, pp. 30–31).


This chapter refers to three types of transhipment in line with the framework outlined earlier: covert-aid transhipment, grey-market transhipment, and black-market transhipment – depending on the nature of the authorisation of the states involved. Covert-aid Transhipment Covert-aid transhipment is conducted principally by a state as aid to the recipient force or the extra-regional patron. Thus, Cold War era covertaid pipelines ran through regional states and included high levels of government involvement in transhipment. Thus, Pakistan was the primary route for the US covert-aid pipeline to the Afghan Mujahideen, Zaire played a similar role in the pipeline for UNITA in Angola, and Thailand was the main route for US arms transfers to the conflict in Cambodia. Likewise, Honduras was a major transhipment point for US aid to the Contras. Honduras also provided shipments of ammunition to the rebels unilaterally when CIA transfers ran low (Klare and Andersen, 1996, p. 78). Indeed many of the regional states that provided transhipment in CIA pipelines had previously, or concurrently, provided covert aid to the recipient faction. In the post-Cold War period the incidence of extra-regionally organised covert aid has declined. However, when it does occur it still tends to be facilitated by covert-aid transhipment. For instance, Iranian supplies to Bosnian Muslims in the mid-1990s were facilitated by covert-aid transhipment by Croatia (NIOD, 2002). Additionally, occasional extraregional transfers to regional covert-aid patrons have been conducted in the knowledge that they would be retransferred to insurgents. For example, US transfers of SALW to Sudanese rebels have been transferred, ostensibly legally, to neighbouring states, such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea with a history of supporting various Sudanese insurgent factions (Africa Confidential, 15 November 1996, p. 1). Overall, therefore, the regional stages of extra-regional covert arms pipelines commonly take the form of covert-aid transhipment by regional patrons of insurgent forces. Covert-aid transhipment occurs through several mechanisms and often creates the foundations for other forms of facilitation. These mechanisms include those listed above and some that are unique such as the laundering of arms through substitution, and, in some cases, organising the distribution of arms to the insurgent factions’ forces. As discussed in the previous chapter, extra-regional covert aid was commonly provided under cover of military aid packages to regional allies. These allies often then substituted some of these weapons for older arms in


their inventories as a means of laundering the aid and as a trade-off for providing covert transhipment. In the CIA pipeline to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the substitution of new for old weapons was also a means of skimming off arms for sale on the black market (Kartha, 1999, p. 104). This substitution mechanism is unique to covert-aid transhipment, largely because it is only states that have sufficient stocks of arms at their disposal. In some cases of the covert-aid transhipment of extra-regional covert aid the regional state has been involved in the distribution of SALW to the recipient force. For example, not wishing to micro-manage the Afghan arms pipeline, the CIA allowed the Pakistani ISI to control the distribution of arms to the various Mujahideen factions. Thus, the ISI were able to exercise a degree of control over the numerous factions in Afghanistan by controlling the distribution of arms to its favoured groups and maintaining a balance with the aim of ensuring that no one faction became strong enough to aid militancy within Pakistan (Rubin, 1995, p. 198). However, this mechanism has been rare: the Mujahideen were composed of numerous different factions that had a common cause, but not a unified structure. In contrast, most other insurgent forces, including recipients of covert aid during the Cold War such as UNITA, the Contras, and others, have been sufficiently unified to have their own internal distribution structures. Some states have provided military escorts for illicit arms shipments. For example, some Ugandan officials are believed to have been directly involved in escorting and storing arms shipments to various groups in the Great Lakes sub-region during the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi (Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1997, pp. 66–68). Likewise, Tanzanian forces played a similar role in some arms flows to the Great Lakes, as did Zairian military officials in arms flows to Rwandan Hutu groups in exile in eastern Zaire after the Rwandan genocide (Human Rights Watch 1995, p.11). While state actors may play a direct role in ensuring arms shipments arrive safely, in many cases covert-aid transhipment has involved considerable outsourcing to private companies. Private transport companies are often contracted to transport the arms. Thus, for example, the transportation of arms in the final stage of the US-Afghan pipeline through Pakistan was contracted out to private trucking companies. These companies developed business relationships with Mujahideen commanders, allowing the latter to export large quantities of drugs. By the end of the 1980s these relationships are claimed to have resulted in the emergence of a ‘powerful transporter mafia’ (Kartha, 1995, p.73).


Similarly, in the late 1990s a plethora of air transport companies arose in Zaire due to the state’s role in the covert transhipment of SALW flows to warring factions in Southern and Central Africa. The Zairian government lay at the heart of such transport operations by contracting the companies, and any cargo companies that refused government contracts involving the transport of arms supplies were reportedly ‘threatened with cancellation of their companies’ registration, confiscation of their assets, and even deportation’ (Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1995, pp. 9–10). Outsourcing within covert-aid transhipment contributes to the foundations of grey- and black-market transhipment operations. In many cases private transporters emerge or expand their activities through profitable contracts with states. Such private transporters may continue to provide their services in grey- and black-market forms. Thus, micro-economies emerge around arms supply lines, contributing to the entrenchment of networks that may evolve into blackor grey-market structures. SALW may become a significant commodity in these micro-economies. For example, it was common for the transhipment states in Cold War era pipelines to skim weapons from covert aid for their own forces or for supply to other client forces in the region. The skimming of arms can be a cheap means of arms acquisition by the transhipment state. For instance, the Croatian government were also able to acquire arms by skimming approximately 30 per cent of weapons from flows for Bosnian Muslims from Iran (Phythian, 2000, p. 38). Further, many stocks of arms skimmed during transhipment are resold on local and regional black markets to other illicit recipients. For instance, the Afghan pipeline was notorious for high levels of leakage, which some estimate involved between 60 and 85 per cent of the weapons transferred through the pipeline (Naylor, 1993, p.19). Weapons were skimmed off at numerous points by the Pakistani intelligence agency and by the private transporters. These weapons were reportedly used to supply other client factions in Southern Asia and on local black markets inside Pakistan both in transit areas and moving to major cities fuelling both rural and urban arms diffusion in Pakistan (Kartha, 1997). Grey- and black-market transhipment Grey-market transhipment occurs when the authorisation of the state is unclear, often involving state officials acting in an official capacity but without appropriate authorisation. It often occurs through ostensibly legal means, but appropriate authorisation may not be given. For example, transhipment may occur in authorised transport such as authorised


flights, but the nature of cargo is misrepresented in order to avoid particular procedures (e.g. by mislabelling cargo as ‘spare parts’ rather than ‘ammunition’). Black-market transhipment, in which transhipment occurs illegally, outside of government control and authorisation (though corrupt officials may be involved), the existence of the shipment is often hidden. It is often difficult to discern whether a transhipment process is black-market or grey-market. For example, Russia has accused the government of Georgia of ‘turning a blind eye’ to the transit of black market weapons shipments to Chechen rebels (Van Hoye and Davis, 2000, p. 5). However, no information is available to determine whether this is grey- or black-market transhipment. Nevertheless, it is clear that grey- and black-market transhipment occur frequently. They are two aspects of the evolution of the regional political economy of facilitation that can stem from these micro-economies. Grey-market transhipment Grey-market transhipment is often a function of facilitation microeconomies. In many cases the micro-economies established during covert-aid transhipment sustain the flow networks. For example, in West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire was a major transhipment point in SALW flows to the NPFL. After the death of the Ivoirian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, some government officials continued the previously covert-aid transhipment in a grey-market form – linked to the export of Liberian conflict goods (Reno, 1996, p. 213; Sesay, 1996, p. 398; Reno, 1997b, p. 501; Berman, 2000, p.16). Likewise, the micro-economies created by the export of conflict commodities may create constituencies of support and networks within regional states that can be utilised for transhipment. For example, the transfer of SALW from Jordan to the FARC in Colombia via Peru involved a range of grey-market facilitation, conducted by Peruvian officials, including the arrangement of delivery by airdrops into FARC controlled areas. These legal flights were arranged by Peruvian officials acting in concert with the then head of Peruvian National Intelligence Service, Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) Valdimiro Montesinos – who was involved in arranging the deal and is also believed to have been involved in the drug trade (El Tiempo (Bogota), 23 August 2000; Madrid EFE, 9 September 2000; Austin, 2001). In some cases grey-market transhipment activities have not been constructed as part of a pipeline to a specific recipient, but rather form part of a broader engagement in arming regional conflicts. For instance, Tanzanian shipping agents reportedly acted in concert with members of


the Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces (TPDF) to arrange and escort arms shipments from Dar Es Salaam to a range of conflict protagonists in Central Africa. The recipients of these arms reportedly included Burundian government forces, Tutsi groups in Burundi, various factions in the Rwandan conflict, and the Ugandan government in 1999 during the DRC conflict (Human Rights Watch, 1997, pp. 69, 89; Post of Zambia, 2 February 1999). Significantly, there appears to be little correlation between the incidence of grey-market transhipment and the character of the extra-regional stages of the supply lines. Grey-market transhipment does not appear to have been used in extra-regional covert-aid pipelines. Rather, in most cases of grey-market transhipment the extra-regional stages have been ostensibly legal transfers diverted by brokers acting on behalf of regional governments or the recipient faction itself. However, this is the dominant character of extra-regional aspects of post-Cold War era flows to conflict, and there is no evidence that this character influences the nature of transhipment used. Rather, the incidence of grey-market transhipment appears to reflect the broader character of the regional political economy of arms flows and facilitation, and particularly the micro-economies associated with the web of grey- and black-market engagement with the export of conflict-commodities (see below). Black-market transhipment While it is often difficult to discern whether transhipment is grey-market or black-market, particularly in regions with vibrant arms black markets, there are clear cases of black-market transhipment. For example, Bangladesh is believed to be a major transhipment point for illicit arms transfers by land and sea in South Asia. This appears to be black-market transhipment centring around the forested border areas and seaports of Cox’s Bazaar and Chittagong flowing to various armed groups in Myanmar and northeast Indian states such as Assam and Manipur (The Dainik Janakantha, Dhaka, 16 July 2000, p. 3). Likewise, black-market transfers of SALW to the KLA in Kosovo included black-market transhipment in flows from Switzerland via Albania, often under cover of shipments of humanitarian aid (Corriere della Serra, 4 May 1999; NISAT database). In these cases, however, transhipment has been part of regional black-market transfers rather than part of a supply line originating at the extra-regional level. In a similar manner to the continuation of covert transhipment networks in a grey-market form, transhipment networks may also shift into the black market – again as a function of the micro-economies of


facilitation. For example, having provided UNITA in Angola with covert aid from and through South Africa prior to 1992, much of the security service infrastructure that arose to organise the transhipment of such flows then moved into the private sector and continued to provide much of UNITA’s logistics and weapons transhipment in the late 1990s. For instance, the South African firm Metex International had an operational base for its aircraft in Zambia’s Ndola airport until it was expelled in relation to allegations that it had been involved in transporting illicitly supplied arms to recipients in the Angolan and DRC conflicts from South Africa via Ndola. Zambia had been a conduit for weapons deliveries to both the Angolan government and UNITA rebels – indicating economically motivated collusion by officials (grey transhipment) or black-market transhipment resulting from poor capacity to control the flow of goods through Ndola airport and the long land border between the two countries (Africa Confidential, 16 April 1999, p. 7; Human Rights Watch, 1999a, p. 15). Much of the shifting of transhipment networks from covert-aid into grey- or black-market is related to the expansion and profitability of the micro-economies around a pipeline – particularly as they become entwined with the export of goods from the conflict-complex. Thus, the above example is related to UNITA’s export of diamonds. Likewise, the transhipment networks previously constructed by the CIA pipeline to the Mujahideen shifted into black-market facilitation through the development of links with drug producers and traffickers in Afghanistan. Similarly, the drug trade in Latin America, the trade in illicit diamonds and timber in West Africa, and the Coltan trade from DRC, have all contributed to the expansion of arms shipment microeconomies and the concomitant construction of grey- and black-market regional political economies of SALW spread. For instance, the infrastructure for arms smuggling in Central America is greatly enhanced by the presence of an estimated 3,000 clandestine airstrips used for drug trafficking (Godnick, 1999, pp. 42–43). In some cases the space for these micro-economies to become entrenched is related to the transborder ethnic networks and associated informal economies which also form a foundation for many regional black-market flows (see Chapter 6). In South Asia, for instance, there are clear ethnic links between arms transhipment areas and the recipient forces. Thus, for example, Tamil Nadu in India has been a transit point for arms flows to the LTTE in Sri Lanka, while Karen rebels in Myanmar have received arms through Thailand in areas with large Karen populations (Brown, 1996, p. 593).


The nature of transhipment Overall, while grey- and black-market transhipment can sustain a supply line, it seems that arms traffickers prefer covert transhipment. This is largely because covert transhipment offers greater security from interception. However, black- and grey-market transhipment is not restricted to state-actors and thus appears to be more adaptable and hence offers sustainability to flow processes. For example, in Zaire when Mobutu was overthrown, the grey-market supply lines to UNITA were effectively cut, and the dominant transit route shifted to CongoBrazzaville (Human Rights Watch, 1999a). In this case it appears that the security of supply lines was more directly threatened by the campaign of the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) in Zaire/DRC in 1997 than it had been by the earlier removal of the covert-aid sanction of the Zairian government. This shifting as a result of declining security of supply lines was repeated later when President Lissouba was overthrown, in October 1997, and the route shifted again to Zambia, where there appears to have been no government collusion in transhipment but some military officials are believed to have links to UNITAs’ diamond trade. It should be noted that the places to which the primary transit routes shifted had been secondary transit routes for some time. Similarly, in the Great Lakes sub-region black and grey transit routes for arms shipments relocated after deteriorating security in eastern Zaire, and the effects of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attacks on cutting road routes through Uganda to the Rwandan government thereby pushing all imports and exports (not just arms) through the longer Tanzanian route (Prunier, 1998, p. 131). Significantly, in terms of the correlations of transhipment, extraregional covert aid is almost always facilitated by covert transhipment. However, covert transhipment is not only a feature of extra-regional covert-aid pipelines. It may also be assistance provided to recipient forces by sympathetic regional governments – usually those that also provide other facilitation assistance. Outside of covert-aid transhipment, whether transhipment is grey- or black-market appears to reflect the dominant character of the political economy of regionally constructed SALW flows to conflicts, rather than the nature of the extra-regional stages of supply; thus, it appears that transhipment is often covert or grey in conflict regions in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, but is largely black-market with some grey-market in conflict-regions in South and South East Asia and Latin America.


The veil of legality: facilitating access to the global legal market In the Cold War era, regional covert transhipment allowed the extra regional stages of covert aid to appear legal. In the post-Cold War era most extra-regional stages of SALW flows to conflicts occur through ostensibly legal channels. In order to access the global legal market most insurgent groups and embargoed governments require assistance from another actor to provide a veil of legality to their illicit acquisitions. This may be provided by regional states who import SALW for onward supply to the faction, in which case the flow is regional covert aid (see Chapter 6). Alternatively, the warring faction may contract a broker to arrange the arms deal. In order for the broker to acquire arms on the legal market, however, they often require EUCs. R. T. Naylor (1995, p. 14) has claimed that obtaining a passable end-user certificate is about as difficult as getting an American gun-dealer’s license, an honor seemingly denied only to convicted serial killers (who can get around that obstacle by applying in the name of their pet dog). Sometimes end-user certificates are completely faked … More commonly the EUCs are real. (Emphasis added) While many EUCs are forged, genuine certificates may also be provided as a form of covert assistance or obtained as a grey-market commodity. In many cases forged EUCs are copies of certificates provided by regional states or officials. For instance, Togolese EUCs provided to facilitate arms transfers to UNITA in Angola included one genuine certificate and numerous forgeries based upon it – 18 forged versions facilitated transfers from Bulgaria and 2 more facilitated transfers from Romania (UN, 2000, pp.11,16).Thus, the provision of an EUC as a form of covert aid or grey-market facilitation can create the capacity of black-market actors to provide a veil of legality to many subsequent flows. Similarly, in July 2000 the embargoed government of Charles Taylor in Liberia acquired 5 million rounds of Ukrainian 7.62 mm ammunition via Côte d’Ivoire in a deal arranged by the broker Leonid Minin, who was close to Taylor and had timber concessions in Liberia, using an apparently authentic EUC signed by Ivoirian President General Robert Gueï (UN 2001d, p. 47). Naylor (1995, p. 14) also claimed that ‘Quick over-the-counter jobs are readily available in Thailand and Pakistan, somewhat more credible


ones come from Nigeria, Bolivia, and Panama, while the best seem to be those originating in Portugal.’ This implies that EUCs are obtained from weak points in the global legal market. However, the framework developed here leads to the hypothesis that EUCs that facilitate illicit flows tend to be from states neighbouring the conflict-complex. Although available information is limited, this does appear to be the case. For instance, after mid-1995 most Chinese shipments of SALW to the Great Lakes sub-region listed Uganda as the end-user, but found their way into the hands of Burundian combatants (Human Rights Watch, 1997, p. 97). Likewise, Chadian EUCs were used for shipments of ammunition to the embargoed government of Sudan from Slovakia, a Peruvian EUC facilitated the transfer of SALW from Jordan to FARC in Colombia, and Bangladeshi EUCs were used in arms purchases by the LTTE from Ukraine (Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 174, 182); and various Burkinabé, Ivoirian, and false Guinean and Nigerian EUCs were used to break the arms embargo on Liberia. It is significant to note that in many cases this facilitation correlates with the provision of covert transhipment. There are, however, some exceptions to the rule of EUCs coming from neighbouring states. These are largely explicable by unique aspects of the flows. For example, while many illicit transfers of arms to UNITA used false Zambian EUCs, other EUCs and documentation were from Togo, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire (Fowler, 2000). Each of these states were an integral part of UNITA’s diamond exports. Indeed, the case of Togolese involvement in facilitating embargo-busting SALW flows to UNITA reveals that the micro-economies that go along with SALW flows, when combined with lucrative war economies in the conflict-complex, can have significant geographical reach. In this case, a Togolese EUC was provided to UNITA brokers as part of deal that also involved covert transhipment and the skimming of 20 per cent of weapons in transit by the Togolese government (Fowler, 2000). This extra-regional veil of legality was a relatively unique aspect of UNITA’s war economy which had strong transnational networks that stretched beyond Angola’s immediate neighbours. Few other insurgents, with the exceptions of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and to a lesser extent, the NPFL in Liberia, have developed such sophisticated far-reaching transnational networks. Conversely, for example, while the FARC in Colombia have also had a very lucrative war economy, this is primarily based upon the drugs trade and linked in with those regional transnational networks, rather than forming a link between the rebels and government officials in a position to provide EUCs (see Chapter 8). Some further exceptions relate to flows in which grey-market suppliers deceived their own export controls. For instance the grey-market


transfer of arms from Argentina to Croatia between 1991 and 1995 was ostensibly destined for Panama, which was part of the same region as the supplier rather than the recipient. In this case, however, an EUC for a legitimate recipient proximate to Croatia was not needed as the weapons were transported on a Croatian owned ship (Reuters, 29 July 1998; Agence France Presse, 4 August 1998). Similarly, in the early 1990s the Bulgarian company KINTEX reportedly supplied arms to Croatia, circumventing Bulgarian controls with forged documents purporting to be from Bolivia (Human Rights Watch, 1999b, p. 12).In this second case the reverse situation was apparent: The supplier was regional and the ostensible end-user was extra-regional. In this case the collusion of the supplier in duping the Bulgarian authorities meant that an extraregional EUC was useable. Thus, the use of EUCs ostensibly from extra-regional states appears to be limited to a few cases with relatively unique circumstances. In addition to using EUCs to access the global legal market, brokers and other actors may also establish front companies that claim to be procurement agents authorised by a state to import arms. Given that there is a strong civilian market for firearms, numerous companies around the world import small arms for sale on domestic retail markets. Similar companies may also be used as a means of accessing the legal market on behalf of illicit recipients. As with EUCs, many of these are regional. For example, the LTTE has reportedly obtained arms through front companies in Phuket (Skehan, 1999), and a front company Pecos Compagne SA – established in Conakry by arms brokers that were closely integrated into Charles Taylor’s shadow networks – purported to be procurement agent for the Guinean military in order to facilitate illicit Liberian arms acquisitions in deals with Croatia, Uganda, and Moldova (UN, 2001d, pp. 56–57). Overall, veils of legality are commonly constructed at the regional level, rather than extra-regionally. The example of Latin America is particularly revealing in this regard. A number of front companies in Paraguay service the regional SALW black market in Latin America (Cucovaz, 1998, p. 38). Additionally, a thriving black market in blank or false EUCs is claimed to operate alongside the arms black market (Klare and Andersen, 1996, pp. 65–67). Indeed, much facilitation in Latin America is black-market rather than covert or grey-market, and the micro-economies of facilitation have been integrated into the broader arms black market. In many regions, particularly those with less well-established black markets, the micro-economies of facilitation are expanded by the role of regional actors in facilitating the financing of arms deals.


The facilitation of the financing of arms deals The facilitation of the financing of extra-regional arms purchases by regional actors may include donating funds and providing conduits for payments for SALW purchases. It also often involves colluding in the war economies and associated exports of a warring faction – which commonly have strong regional dimensions (see Pugh and Cooper, 2004, pp. 25–32). Regional states and non-state actors may provide conflict factions with the financial resources to purchase arms. For instance, the US Department of State (1999) claims that middle eastern terrorist groups receive financial donations from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and numerous militant Islamic groups worldwide. Likewise, Saudi Arabia provided financial aid to the Afghan Mujahideen and then to the Taliban until late 1998 – reported channelled through Red Crescent offices. During the era of the CIA sponsored arms pipeline this money provided an essential stop-gap by allowing the continuation of costly transportation (which cost approximately US$1.5 million per month) when CIA funds ran low. The transport of arms at the regional level in the Afghan pipeline was very expensive amounting to approximately US$ 1.5 million per month, or the equivalent of US$1,100 for one mortar. Later, according to Rubin (1995, p. 197; 1999), Saudi Arabia provided the Taliban with cash and subsidised fuel until late 1998 when such aid was stopped in protest over the Taliban’s failure to expel or curb the activities of Osama Bin Laden. Similarly, there are reports of Egyptian funding for Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and other rebel groups in Sudan (Africa Confidential, 11 September 1992). Non-state actors also donate funds to insurgent groups. Diaspora groups at both the regional and extra-regional levels are often a major source of finances in many cases. For example, according to a confidential NATO report (NATO, 1999, p. 2), arms purchases by the KLA (UCK) in Kosovo were funded by ‘taxing’ diaspora groups in Germany and other European states. Likewise, the LTTE and the IRA have both received a high proportion of their funds from diaspora groups in Canada and the United States respectively. In many cases such donations form only one, relatively small, aspect of the finances of a warring faction. Other forms of facilitating the financing of arms transfers may be motivated by the economic benefits that can be accrued. These contribute to the expansion and entrenchment of facilitation micro-economies. The collusion of states, officials, and non-state actors in the war economies of insurgent factions often provides key opportunities for


financing arms purchases. Regional actors provide insurgent groups and their business allies with access to international markets on which plundered natural resources or other illicit commodities generate hard currency for arms purchases. For example, some Ugandan army officials have been alleged to have illicitly engaged in a range of ‘informal cooperation’ activities with the SPLA, including some involvement in the illicit gold trade (Africa Confidential, 21 July 1995). On a larger scale, the Ivoirian port of San Pedro was particularly important for the NPFL’s exports of natural resources such as timber (Gyan-Apentang, 1993); and Thailand was crucial to the export of timber by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (Global Witness, 1995). Likewise, the regional dimensions of the trade in conflict diamonds and illicit drug trafficking have a strong link with arms flows. For instance, exports of conflict diamonds from UNITA in Angola and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone were highly regionalised – often involving trafficking of diamonds into neighbouring states from which they entered legal export channels – thus forming the key link between warlords and the international diamond market (Global Witness, 1998; Fowler, 2000; Smillie, et al., 2000). Significantly, this regional facilitation provides not only the financial resources with which to pay for SALW purchases, but also generates or maintains the networks through which those weapons flow. SALW often flow through these same networks with the same traffickers exchanging arms for these other commodities. The flow of arms to rebel groups in Liberia and Sierra Leone occurred through networks that had been entrenched and maintained by the export of diamonds, gold, timber, and other resources through regional states (Bourne, 2004). In some regions the war economies of insurgent groups are an integrated part of regional black markets in various commodities. For example, the drug trade and SALW trafficking are intimately related to insurgent groups in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Colombia. Indeed, as claimed by Mark Duffield (2000, p. 75), such war economies ‘are rarely self-sufficient or autarkic after the fashion of traditional nation-state based war economies. On the contrary, through controlling local assets, they are heavily reliant on all forms of external support and supplies’. This is a feature of SALW flows to governments as well as insurgents. For example, the commercial links between the governments of DRC and Zimbabwe have facilitated arms transfers with payments off-set by mining concessions (Shearer, 1999, p. 97). In many cases the networks for the export of conflict-commodities, particularly lootable natural resources, also act as the financial conduits


for the payment for arms deals – with brokers or regional governments facilitating the sale of illicitly acquired commodities and using the proceeds to acquire arms on the legal global market. For instance, in the case of conflict diamonds, UNITA reportedly actively sought out arms dealers willing to take diamonds in exchange for weapons (Fowler, 2000). In other cases financial conduits may also be constructed independently of extractive war economies. This is particularly the case for embargoed government forces. For example, a Bahrain bank was the conduit for a deal between the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan and some arms dealers for French Helicopters (Africa Confidential, 12 May 1995). Likewise, sanctions busting arms imports by the government of Serbia during the war in former Yugoslavia were financed front companies’ bank accounts in Cyprus, whose strict secrecy laws enabled the flow of finance for arms deals (Naylor, 1995, p. 37).

The use of territory Many insurgent factions have rear bases in neighbouring states that serve as safe-havens and training camps. These bases also act as delivery points and cachement areas for arms and ammunition. For instance many insurgent groups use refugee camps in neighbouring states as rear bases, training bases, and recruitment areas. As with the other types of facilitation, the hosting of warring factions may be covert aid, grey-market facilitation (relying on the collusion of state officials in the areas concerned but with ambiguity of overall state approval), or may be a result of a lack of capacity to prevent the use of state territory. In some cases such rear bases are an active form of support from regional states. This is often accompanied by broader assistance such as training. For example, as part of South African aid to the Mozambiquan Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) rebels, bases were established within South Africa (Berman, 1996, p. 48). Likewise, when the former Rwandan government forces and associated militia fled to eastern Zaire in 1994 they were provided with bases for arming, training, recruiting, and launching attacks by Zaire, including Zairian army and gendarmerie bases (Human Rights Watch, 1995, pp. 12–14). Rear bases often serve as secure delivery points for weapons shipments. This often correlates with covert aid or covert transhipment. For example, the Ugandan West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) has had rear bases in Bunia (Zaire) where they received arms shipments from the Sudanese army (Africa Confidential, 13 December 1996, p. 3). Likewise the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) rebels have had bases in southern Sudan where the


government reportedly gave them arms and sanctuary in return for fighting Sudan’s own rebels (Africa Confidential, 21 November 1997, p. 3). The cachement of arms is also a feature of regional facilitation of arms acquisitions by warring factions. The provision of safe storage allows a faction to accumulate weapons in preparation for periods when access to fresh supplies may be limited. Caches in neighbouring states offer a quicker and more reliable source of re-equipping forces without the delays and risks incurred by dependence on fresh imports. Cachement is often an integral part of the process of covert-aid transhipment, such as the storage of CIA supplied arms in Pakistan by the ISI before distribution to the Mujahideen. Likewise, the FMLN had a series of 128 arms caches most of which were within El Salvador, but some were in states that also provided covert transhipment: Honduras (5) and Nicaragua (14) (Wrobel, 1997, p. 138). Such cachement can prove particularly significant during peace processes. For example, President Lissouba of Congo-Brazzaville agreed to host UNITA weapons caches after the 1994 Lusaka peace accords, and to slowly feed the weapons back to UNITA (Demetriou, et al., 2001, p. 44). Likewise, during the disarmament programme in 2001, the RUF in Sierra Leone were believed to have moved many of its caches of arms into neighbouring Liberia (UN, 2001d, p. 28). Rear bases may also provide a secure environment for arranging arms deals, and managing the variety of business deals that create and maintain transnational networks. Overall, in cases of extra-regional covert aid the use of territory is often an integral part of covert transhipment; in other regionally facilitated flows, however, there appears to be little evidence of correlation between the level of collusion of the host state and that in other forms of facilitation.

Conclusions In contrast to current understandings of SALW spread, which emphasise the seeking out of weak points in regulation by brokers at a global level, much facilitation is a function of regional structures and processes – though these are complexly related to both the global level and the conflict-complex. Covert aid usually relies on covert-aid transhipment. Through outsourcing, skimming, and leakage covert transhipment is prone to the generation of micro-economies. These become expanded and entrenched by the return-trade in conflict commodities. Micro-economies lie at the heart of the continuation of transhipment, in grey- or blackmarke form, once the covert state mandate has been removed. Grey- or


black-market transhipment do not appear sufficiently reliable to construct an extra-regional covert-aid supply line; and indeed for extraregional suppliers the contacting of transhipment partners is easier when the regional partner is a state, rather than grey- or black-market actor. However, grey- and black-market transhipment may maintain flow networks established as covert aid. A key type of facilitation in the post-Cold War era is the provision of a veil of legality that allows access to the global market. For this covertaid facilitation is likely to be preferable, but grey- and black-market facilitation may suffice – particularly in sustaining a supply line. Significantly, this is a predominantly regional phenomenon, rather than a function of global weak points in regulation. Indeed, the fact that much facilitation is regional contributes to the picture of SALW spread in which the regional level is important because it contains distinctly regional structures and dynamics. Regional facilitation usually involves a range of roles that may be mixed covert aid, grey-market and black-market: for instance, all types of transhipment may be used in the flow of arms arranged by private brokers from the international level. These brokers, however, often rely on the provision of access to the global legal market by regional states or their officials in the provision of a veil of legality. In many cases covert transhipment and covert-aid provision of a veil of legality are related – coalescing in a broader form of covert facilitation. In most cases, however, the mixed nature of facilitation appears to reflect the broader regional political economy of SALW spread, at least in relation to distinctions between covert aid and other illicit sectors. In particular the mixture reflects the nature of the actors involved in the micro-economies of facilitation which also appear to reflect the nature of the broader regional political economy of SALW spread and, especially, the strength of the regional black market (see Chapter 6). Thus, patterns of regional facilitation appear to indicate the existence and influence of distinct regional structures, rather than being determined by the character of extra-regional stages of flow, or being ad-hoc constructions.

6 Structures and Dynamics of Intra-regional SALW Spread to Conflicts

This chapter examines the existence and construction of distinctly regional legal markets, covert aid, and black and grey markets. The processes and dynamics of each type of flow are examined, and the existence and nature of distinct regional structures of SALW spread is assessed. In particular, a short section examines legal transfers and whether there are distinct regional sub-markets with associated supplier–client patterns, or regional supplies merely follow global patterns.It finds that not only is the global legal market the predominant global structure, but also that the legal market is primarily a global-level construct. This contrasts significantly with covert aid and black and grey markets. In the post-Cold War period, covert aid has become highly regionalised: global sources may be used, but regional states are the dominant patrons. This chapter therefore examines the nature of this regionalisation and the construction of regional covert aid supply lines. Earlier chapters have found that there is no globally structured black or grey markets in SALW. However, we also found that regional facilitation appears to reflect key aspects of the regional political economy of SALW spread: for instance, black-market facilitation networks tend to arise in those regions in which there are large black markets. This chapter analyses the character and construction of two types of black- and grey-market flows and structures: The ant-trade – a ubiquitous phenomenon in which black and grey-market processes move small quantities of SALW across borders – and organised black markets – large and relatively autonomous market structures in which substantial amounts of arms circulate illicitly. A concluding section draws together the findings of this and the previous chapter to reflect upon the importance and implications of the construction of regional aspects of SALW spread. 139


Regional legal SALW flows to conflicts Most SALW transfers to government forces are legal, including those to governments engaged in conflict (see Chapter 8). While most SALW literature takes a global perspective, some of these transfers take place within the regional level in both commercially and politically motivated supplies. Given that the global legal SALW market has become more of a buyers market in the post-Cold War era, states engaged in conflict have greater and more direct access to stocks from a range of suppliers than insurgents. However, they often also have access to a range of regional legal sources, as a result of the broad global diffusion of production capacity and the high level of trade in surplus arms. Therefore, the question arises: Are there regionally constructed legal arms markets that operate as sub-systems of the global market? Two likely answers emerge from the framework and preceding empirical analysis: 1. Patterns of government-to-government transfers to states in conflict broadly follow the global market structure of tiers; and/or 2. Within supplier tiers, the role of small producer and non-producer states is more significant for flows to conflicts within their region than it is in the global trade as a whole. While the available information is limited, an examination of different regions around conflict-complexes yields some interesting results. Regional government-to-government transfers are not as ubiquitous as might be expected, and when they do occur their scale and incidence varies from region to region. Significantly, regardless of the potential for all states to be suppliers of surplus stocks, this variance appears to reflect the tiers of producers in the global SALW market. In those regions of the globe with only limited arms production and supply potential, regional legal transfers play only a sporadic and smallscale role in the flow of SALW to states in conflict. For example, in West Africa, the Nigerian government provided small amounts of arms to the beleaguered Doe government of Liberia in 1990 (Adibe, 1996, p. 19; Barrett, 1997).This supply was motivated by a desire to protect ties between the two countries, and between the two leaders, and also in order to further Nigerian President Babangida’s aspirations for Nigeria’s sub-regional influence (Huband, 1998, pp. 103–104). In Central Africa, Chad allegedly sent arms – including weapons provided by Libya, and Chinese arms from Sudan – to Mobutu’s government forces in the 1996–1997 war in Zaire (Africa Confidential, 20 February 1998), and

Regional Structures and Dynamics 141

Uganda supplied the Burundian government and associated Tutsi militias in 1996 – including landmines and ammunition produced in Uganda (Human Rights Watch 1997, p. 67). In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe supplied indigenously produced ammunition to the Angolan government in the early 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 47). Those regions in the former-periphery of the global SALW trade that have some significant large and medium producers are marked by a greater degree of regional legal transfers. This is particularly apparent in Latin America, where legal transfers of SALW produced in the region are a significant feature of SALW acquisitions by both conflict and nonconflict states. For example, Fabrica Militar De Armas Portatiles ‘Domingo Matheu’ (FMAP) of Argentina has reportedly supplied domestically produced SALW to the armed forces of Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay. Similarly, Uru submachine guns produced in Brazil have allegedly been sold to forces in several Latin American states, and Brazilian produced landmines were reportedly used in the conflict in Nicaragua (Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993, p. 104; Klare and Andersen, 1996, pp. 51–52). Reflecting this significant intra-regional trade, governments engaged in conflict in Latin America have obtained significant quantities of SALW in regional legal transfers: the Colombian government purchased arms from Brazil in 1993, 1996, and 1997, and from Argentina in 1991; and Peru purchased US$25 million of surplus arms, including some light weapons from Nicaragua in 1992.1 Additionally, during the border war between Peru and Ecuador, in February 1995, Ecuador acquired US$2 million worth of rifles from FMAP of Argentina and significant quantities of bombs and ammunition from Industrias Cardoen of Chile (Klare and Andersen, 1996, pp. 52–53). Significantly, however, there is no evidence that governments in conflict rely to any greater or lesser degree on regional suppliers than those not beset by conflict. Less information is available on the legal trade in other conflict regions with large and medium producers. However, it seems likely that the same pattern holds true for South Asia, South East Asia, and the Middle East. In each region some regional government-to-government transfers to states in conflict have taken place. In South Asia, Pakistan has supplied SALW to regional governments engaged in conflict, including Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Philippines (Abel, 2000, p. 95), and to the Taleban in Afghanistan in 1997 (Byman, 2005, p. 195). In Southeast Asia, Myanmar obtained SALW from Singapore in 1998, including a prefabricated SALW and ammunition factory designed and built by Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS) and Israeli consultants, and from Vietnam,


which supplied mortar bombs in 2001(Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 July 1998, p. 140; Kartha, 1999, p. 37; Jane’s Defence Weekly 25 July 2001). Likewise, in the Middle East and North Africa, Sudan has acquired arms from Iran, Libya, Jordan, and Qatar (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Nevertheless, in most cases regional legal transfers were secondary to, or very significantly augmented by, extra-regional legal flows. States engaged in conflict that are proximate to the major suppliers of the former-core of the global SALW trade have received significant quantities of SALW from those sources. Thus, Russia consistently supplied the Tajik government forces with SALW and ammunition during the Tajik civil war in the late 1990s (Conrad, 1999, p. 5; Pirseyedi, 2000, pp. 46–52); the United States is a major supplier to Mexico; and China supplies both MCA and SALW to the governments of Myanmar and Sri Lanka. It is important to note that, in contrast to covert aid to insurgents, regional legal transfers of SALW are not necessarily related primarily to the conflicts, but rather may also reflect supplier’s broader regional political and economic relations within the security-complex: For example, Chinese transfers to Myanmar are related to inter-state relationships and regional constellations of power, rather than directed solely at the Myanmarese endeavours to defeat various anti-government rebel groups (Byman and Cliff, 1999, pp. 14–28; Segal, 1997, p. 213). Some particular types of conflict regions may be exceptions to this broad pattern. In particular, regionalised conflicts – in which multiple small suppliers are involved – may involve lower tier suppliers playing a disproportionately significant role. The regionalised conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, involved numerous large-scale transfers from regional states that are normally, at most, only very small suppliers. In the late 1990s this included the provision of arms and ammunition to the Kabila government by Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad (Bourne, 1999). In this case, the cumulative effect of the involvement of several small suppliers has counter-balanced the limited scale of any particular supplier’s role. Overall, as expected, the scale and incidence of regional governmentto-government transfers varies between regions in line with the position of the suppliers concerned in the global legal market structure. It thus reflects the global distribution of the supplier base, and as such is primarily constructed at the global rather than the regional level. However, within this broad structure, the role of small suppliers appears more marked for supplies to conflicts, and the choice of medium and small suppliers reflects the modalities of political, economic, and security interaction that are the defining features of the regional level. This, therefore, is regionally constructed.


The greater role for small suppliers is somewhat surprising: one would expect governments’ in conflict to turn to the suppliers who are able to deliver large quantities of arms and ammunition at cheap prices, something which commercial sales from small suppliers are unlikely to provide. However, as a function of their regional location – particularly when the region is defined in the terms delineated by the framework being developed – regional states appear more likely to provide arms as military aid because their security and regional influence is affected by conflict. Turning to extra-regional suppliers, regardless of their position in the global market, would often mean paying full price.

The regionalisation of covert aid Regional covert aid has long been a feature of insurgent arming. During the Cold War this was overshadowed by the large extra-regionally organised arms pipelines. Indeed, regional covert aid often ran alongside or fed into these pipelines: thus Honduras provided ammunition to the Contras when supplies in the CIA sponsored pipeline ran low (Klare and Andersen, 1996, p. 78). Other regional covert aid, however, was conducted by states not involved in arms pipelines, thus Argentina provided the Contras with domestically produced SALW and ammunition, in this case using the infrastructure of the CIA pipeline by exporting arms legally to Honduras for onward shipment (Millán, 1986, p. 49; and Ezell, 1984, p. 252). On a larger scale, South Africa was a major supplier of UNITA in Angola, reportedly providing US$80 million worth per year from 1986 to 1992 (Sislin and Pearson, 2001, p. 30); and the primary supplier of RENAMO in Mozambique. Likewise, until 1991, India was a major supplier of arms to the LTTE in Sri Lanka; and throughout the Cold War China engaged in widespread arming of regional insurgent groups. Nevertheless, during the Cold War the predominant role of regional states in SALW flows to insurgents was covert-aid transhipment. In the post-Cold War era, regional covert aid is very common, but varies significantly between regions – as a result of regional dynamics. It is particularly common for conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia (see Table 6.1). In contrast, in some areas – notably the Balkans and Latin America – regional covert aid has only been an occasional feature of SALW flows to conflicts. In the Balkans, during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were unconfirmed reports that members of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) secret service infiltrated the EU monitoring mission and engaged in arms trafficking to Bosnian Muslims in 1996. For example, BND officials were reportedly

Regional Covert Aid to Insurgent Groups in the Post-Cold War Era

144

Table 6.1 Region / Conflict

Non-state actor

Regional covert aid-suppliers

Sources used

Supply lines

Southern Africa Angola

UNITA

South Africa (1976–1994)

International, indigenous, captured

Bilateral – via South African controlled Namibia (until 1991)

Zaire (until 1997)

Mozambique

RENAMO

South Africa (1978–1991)

Zaire provided both dir covert aid and covert transhipment for other flows International, indigenous, captured

Central Africa Burundi

FDD

DRC (2000)

Chad

Goukouni Weddeye rebels

Libya

Rwanda (1990–1994)

RPF

Uganda (1990–1994)

Army stocks

Bilateral – decentralised network

Rwanda (1994–)

Ex-FAR and Interahamwe

Zaire (1994–1997)

State stocks

Within Zaire

Uganda

LRA WNBF HSMF ADF

Sudan (until 2001) Sudan Sudan Zaire (until 1997)

State stocks State stocks State stocks

Zaire (1997–1998)

ADFL

Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola

State stocks State stocks State surplus and national production

Bilateral Bilateral

Democratic Republic of Congo (1998 – Present)

RCD

Rwanda Uganda

Bilateral Bilateral

MNLC

Uganda

Bilateral

Somalia

SNM

Ethiopia (1997)

Bilateral

Sudan

SPLA / NDA alliance of rebels

Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea

State stocks International International

Bilateral transfers and rear bases

NPFL

Libya, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire. (1990– 2001) Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Guinea

International and State Stocks State stocks

Pipeline

Guinea

State stocks possibly some international

Horn of Africa

West Africa Liberia (1989–1997)

ULIMO

Liberia (1999–2003)

LURD

Mali

MFUA

Libya

State stocks

Niger

FLAA

Libya

State Stocks

Bilateral (rear bases); ECOMOG

145

Continued

Table 6.1

Continued Non-state actor


Sources used

Supply lines

Senegal

MFDC

Mauritania

International (Iraq)

Single Transfer Via Guinea Bissau

Sierra Leone

RUF

Libya, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, NPFL / Liberia (1992–2001)

International and State Stocks

Pipeline – NPFL/Liberia

Middle East / North Africa Algeria (1992–)

FIS/AIS

Sudan

Iran

MEK

Iraq (1986–)

Iraq

Kurdish groups

Iran, Turkey, Iraqa Iran (Revolutionary Guard) (1980s–) Syria

Badr Corps (Shia rebels) (1982–) Israel

Various Palestinian groups

Iran, Syria Libya

Lebanon

South Lebanon Army Hizballa

Israel Iran Syria

Bilateral – rear bases

Iran – via Syria – Palestinians; Syria Bilateral

Iran – Via Syria

146

Region / Conflict

Western Sahara

Polisario

Algeria

Taleban

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia

Pakistani State stocks (military depots), pipeline, surplus, international

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan arranged purchase from Ukraine, Covert transhipment and distribution in Pakistan

Northern Alliance

Iran and Russia, China, India Uzbekistan Tajikistan United States

State stocks China (domestic production) Uzbek State stocks Others: International, state stocks

Iran-Russia cooperation. Iranian black-market transhipment through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan

Azerbaijan

Armenian groups in Nagorno Karabakh

Armenia

India

Kashmiri Rebels ULFA

Pakistan

State stocks, ISI – Afghan pipeline

Bilateral

Myanmar/Burma

Various

Thailand (late 1980s–late 1990s)

Sri Lanka

LTTE

India, (until 1991) North Korea, Vietnam

South and Central Asia Afghanistan

Bangladesh

147

Continued

Table 6.1

Continued Non-state actor


Tajikistan

Opposition forces (Uzbek Khujandi Faction)

Uzbekistan

Sources used

Supply lines Bilateral

Southeast Asia Cambodia

Khmer Rouge

China (until 1991)

Philippines

MNLF Revolutionary People’s Army

Malaysia (Sabah) China

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnian muslims

Germany, Slovenia

Russia

Chechen rebels

Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia

Turkey

PKK

Syria, (until 1998) Iraq, Iran

Europe Germany unconfirmed – EU Monitoring mission

Cooperation between Iran and Syria

Note: This table is based on numerous sources related to the conflicts and more general sources including those used throughout this book. In particular, these include: Smith, 1999, Tanter, 1999, pp. 269–274; US Department of State, 1999; Small Arms Survey, 2001 and 2002; Project Ploughshares, 2002; Bourne, 2004; and the NISAT database. Abbreviations: ADF: Allied Democratic Forces; FDD: Forces for the Defence of Democracy; FIS / AIS: Front Islamique du Salut / Armée Islamique du Salut; FLAA: Front de la Liberations de l’Aïr et de l’Azawagh; HSMF: Holy Spirit Mobile Forces; LURD: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy; MEK: Mujahideen e-Khalq; MFDC: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance; MFUA: Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azaouad; MNLC: Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo; MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front; NDA: National Democratic Alliance; PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party; RCD: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie; SNM: Somali National Movement; ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam; ULIMO: United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia. (a) Turkish and Iraqi covert aid to different Kurdish factions relates primarily to their fighting rival Kurdish groups, particularly the PKK. (b) Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p. 149.

148

Region / Conflict


involved in the trafficking of ammunition to the muslim enclave of Bihac, with shipments hidden in boxes containing milk powder (Munich ARD Television Network, 27 February 1997; Smith, 1999; Simunovic, 2000). In Latin America, where many insurgent forces were dependent upon covert aid during the Cold War, has since been characterised by a lack of covert-aid transfers: None of the major rebel groups in major Latin American conflicts have received covert aid: In the early post-Cold War period the FMLN in El Salvador lost most outside covert support by 1990, and rumoured supplies from Nicaragua appear to have been blackand grey-market flows rather than covert aid. Likewise, the FARC in Colombia have received significant quantities of SALW and ammunition from neighbouring states, particularly Venezuela, but such transfers appear to be grey-market transfers rather than covert aid. Regional covert aid represents a form of proxy warfare akin to that pursued by the superpowers during the Cold War. However, economic incentives may be present, particularly once a supply line is established and entwined with the lucrative micro-economies that spread into the region. Regional covert aid to insurgents appears more common than regional military assistance to government forces. This is because a wider range of options are available to support a government, whereas support to insurgents must remain hidden, and supplies of SALW are one of the most covert forms of support. Additionally, insurgent groups generally require greater regional assistance than state forces in order to access large stocks of arms that tend to be most concentrated in the legal sphere (as will be shown below, black markets are able to provide such concentrated and regular supplies in only a few regions). There is significant variation in the scale and frequency of covert aid. Some regional states may only provide small amounts of assistance in one-off transfers. For example Kenya provided some ammunition to RENAMO rebels in Mozambique in the late 1980s (Vines, 1998). Likewise, in 1990 the Mauritanian government received a large amount of weaponry from Iraq, some of which was reportedly retransferred through Guinea-Bissau to the Senegalese MFDC secessionists (Africa Confidential, 23 November 1990, p. 1). Such occasional transfers are usually only a secondary source of SALW for the factions concerned. In other cases regional covert aid has been the primary source of arms, such as Ugandan aid to the RPF (Prunier, 1998). Likewise, in the Middle East, Iraq was the sole supplier to the Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK), and Iran was the predominant patron of the Badr Corps. Indeed, some regional states have provided insurgents with so much assistance, including the majority of arms and ammunition, rear bases, training, logistical support, and others, that they obtained a significant degree of influence over the force.


Thus, South Africa exercised a significant degree of control over RENAMO in Mozambique (Vines, 1996), and Pakistan had significant influence if not control over the Taliban in Afghanistan (Stobdan, 1999). Conversely, in some conflicts a single insurgent group may receive covert aid from numerous patrons through several supply lines. This appears to be the case for various Palestinian groups, ULIMO forces in Liberia, and the PKK in Turkey (Byman et al., 2001, p. 35; Cordesman and Hashim, 1997). While regional covert aid can become large and very significant, no regional covert-aid supplies in the post-Cold War era, with the possible exception of Russian transfers to the Northern Alliance, appear to have reached a scale equivalent that provided through the extra-regional covert pipelines of the Cold War. Sourcing mechanisms of regional covert aid Regional covert-aid patrons have access to a broad range of sources including the global legal SALW market, their own stocks of arms, and their own industrial-scale production. Sourcing by extra-regional covertaid patrons was dominated by concerns about deniability. For most regional providers of covert aid this is less likely to be a major factor in the choice of sources: All three sources offer such plausible deniability to regional patrons because most weapons in their own stocks have been imported; and most industrial-scale production is of weapons designed in first and second tier producers (thus, weapons are not likely to be traceable by their model).2 Thus, the progressive global diffusion of SALW technologies and stocks has enhanced deniability within the system of SALW spread. Further, the proximity of regional suppliers to recipients decreases the potential for the interception and tracing of flows. As a result of these factors, the restrictions placed upon options for sourcing by the need for deniability appear less significant for most regional covert aid. Of the cases of regional covert aid in the post-Cold War era for which information on sourcing could be obtained – as presented in Table 6.1 – one-third included arms recently imported from other countries; over 80 per cent included state stocks; but very few included recently manufactured domestically produced arms and ammunition (though this is likely to be a function of the very limited data available and the blurring of boundaries between types of sources). In many cases a combination of sourcing mechanisms has been used by regional states to supply covert aid. For example, between 1976 and 1986 the South African arms procurement and production agency, ARMSCOR, purchased over 40,000 AK-47 assault rifles and a range of other


SALW for UNITA from a variety of east European sources, such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and others sources such as China (Beri, 2000). Other arms and ammunition for South Africa’s destabilisation policy were from regional stocks acquired through capture in their direct military interventions in Angola and Namibia, particularly in the early stages of sponsorship, and through domestic production in the latter stages (Vines, 1998; Beri, 2000). Import from the global legal SALW market is a ubiquitous source for covert aid. Thus, for example, during the Cold War Cuba imported SALW from Czechoslovakia for their supplies to Latin American insurgent groups (Ezell, 1984, p. 61). It appears that the need for sourcing from the global market is particularly marked for those patrons that provide large quantities of covert aid, often to rebels in several conflict-complexes. These include Uganda, Libya, and Pakistan, though the latter also produces substantial quantities of SALW and ammunition. Extra-regional sourcing, however, has also been used in occasional or one-off transfers of covert aid such as Mauritanian covert aid to the MFDC in Senegal in 1990 using weapons from Iraq. There is little to distinguish the choice of global sources from the hierarchy and structures of the legal trade, particularly that in cheap surplus arms. Due to the legality of the import of SALW by most regional states, such international sourcing does not rely solely upon accessing those suppliers with weak regulatory capacities, or a lack of restraint by licensing authorities.3 For example, in 1992 a Ugandan presidential aide was caught attempting to purchase arms in the United States for retransfer to the Sudanese rebels (Africa Confidential, 11 September 1992, p. 8). Regional sources may also be significant: thus, Pakistani supplies to the Taleban and Iranian, and Russian transfers to the Northern Alliance, were sourced primarily from surplus stocks in Ukraine, Albania, Bulgaria, and others (Kartha, 2000). However, like intra-regional legal transfers, this appears to reflect the structure of the global market rather than a distinct aspect of covert-aid sourcing. Overall, therefore, the use and character of sourcing covert aid through import appears very much to be a simple question of availability and cost. States may provide SALW from their own stocks. This, of course, is primarily dependent upon the availability of weapons in the regional state’s arsenals. For example, Russian supplies of both SALW and MCA to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan have included large quantities of their own surplus weapons. Similarly, the Pakistani ISI accumulated substantial stocks from the CIA Afghan pipeline that were then supplied to other insurgent groups, such as Kashmiri militants, while Zimbabwean


supplies to the ADFL in Zaire in 1997 were primarily composed of surplus arms, originally imported from North Korea, plus some domestically manufactured ammunition (Bourne, 1999, p. 151; Reyntjens, 1999, p. 248). Supplying arms from state stocks may risk detection: such weapons may be identified as coming from the regional patron as they often bear the insignia of the forces of the state. Thus, during the Cold War, Cuban aid to various Latin American groups included more than 20,000 FAL rifles. These weapons bore the Cuban coat of arms that had to be removed by drilling before they could be sent to the insurgents (Ezell, 1984, p. 62). However, practices for the marking of weapons have generally been weak, and a new International Tracing Instrument is yet to be implemented. When state stocks are transferred in covert aid they will often need to be replaced – prompting importation from the global market. Indeed, in protracted provision of covert aid more easily available state stocks are often in the early stages, but patrons resort to importation of cheap surplus weapons later in the supply. Thus, in the early 1990s, an arms pipeline to the NPFL in Liberia, organised by Libya, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, used both state stocks and international sources. This pipeline began sourcing larger quantities of arms from eastern European and, possibly, Chinese sources as the pipeline became larger and more entrenched and linked with the rebels’ lucrative war economy (Bourne, 2004; Reno, 1995, p. 115). Domestic production is a sustainable source of arms for covert aid. There is little specific data on the transfer of newly produced SALW in regional covert aid. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that 30 of the 39 states indicated as having provided some covert aid to an insurgent group have some production capacity. This represents 28.5 per cent of global producers including 3 major producers (100 per cent of tier); 8 large producers (33 per cent of tier); 4 medium producers (14.8 per cent of tier); and significantly, 15 small producers (29 per cent of tier). Nevertheless, given the post-Cold War abundance of surplus stocks, domestic production may not be the cheapest source of arms for providing covert aid. Thus, the decision to provide newly produced arms from a state’s own production capabilities is likely to arise only when there is a specific need for more reliable newer weapons, or a consistent source of ammunition – as it did for the CIA pipelines from around 1986 onwards. For example, South Africa had provided surplus and captured arms to UNITA, but when, in 1983, SWAPO and ANC activity increased, the South African government increased its support of the rebel group by providing higher quality new South African manufactured weapons (Papp, 1993, p. 176). Similarly Cuban aid to the FMLN included domestically produced Soviet-type ammunition after Cuba began its manufacture in 1987 (Whelan, 1991).


Supply lines, networks and micro-economies Cold War extra-regional covert aid tended to be transferred through pipelines organised by intelligence agencies and involving a number of consecutive and co-operative stages that become entrenched over time. In contrast, regional covert-aid transfers can occur bilaterally, without a need for covert-aid transhipment for either logistical or laundering purposes. In theory, this may open up different mechanisms for covert aid, and may involve different correlations between stages of covert aid flows. Extra-regional covert aid during the Cold War was the purview of the intelligence services of the core suppliers. In contrast regional covert aid has been organised both by intelligence agencies and by other branches of the security sector, such as the military forces. For example South African aid to RENAMO was organised by the Directorate of Military Intelligence and Special Forces which ferried arms by numerous air, land, and sea routes and established trade-links with RENAMO for the exchange of arms for ivory and other commodities (Africa Confidential, 21 February 1992, p. 6). Likewise the South African Defence Force (SADF) armed and trained UNITA in Angola (Papp, 1993, p. 170). In many cases regional covert aid has been organised by intelligence agencies. For example, bilateral Pakistani supplies to the Mujahideen and then to the Taliban in Afghanistan were arranged by the ISI which also arranged the transhipment and distribution of US arms supplies to the Mujahideen. Likewise, during the 1980s the Indian RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) organised the training and arming of numerous Tamil groups operating in Sri Lanka (Chalk, 1999, p. 68). In a few cases in the post-Cold War era, covert arming has been conducted by peacekeepers within the conflict-complex. Many conflicts in the post-Cold War era have attracted intervention by regional states either bilaterally or as part of regional peacekeeping forces. Such interventions have occasionally been a channel for supplies of SALW to government forces. This may be a form of covert aid, or of grey-market trading, depending on the degree of authorisation by the regional government. For example, in West Africa ECOMOG forces in Liberia actively supported the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) government forces, including through the provision of arms and ammunition (Howe, 2001, p. 156). Likewise, the Russian dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan provided arms and ammunition to the government forces. This supply reflected the activities of Russian soldiers in the early stages of the conflict: Initially Russian soldiers supplied small arms and ammunition to Tajik government forces on an ad-hoc, grey market, basis. Later, these actions contributed to the covert arms transfers by the Russian government as they mitigated the Russian governments


concerns about supporting the Tajik government (Conrad, 1999, p. 5; Pirseyedi, 2000, pp. 48,55). Nevertheless, while regional interventions and peacekeeping operations are increasingly common, the transfer of arms through this mechanism does not appear to be particularly common. Extra-regional covert aid often involved covert-aid transhipment at the regional level. In regional covert-aid transportation may be conducted directly by the patron’s military. For instance, South African aid to RENAMO was airdropped into Mozambique from South African military aircraft, while aid to UNITA was often transported overland through Namibia, when Namibia was under South African control – though Namibian independence in 1990 forced a change in route (Minter, 1994, p. 190). Similarly the Ethiopian air force reportedly transported 100 tons of ammunition provided by Ethiopia to favoured Somali warlords between January and November 1997 (Xinhua, 4 November 1997); Ugandan transfers of weapons to the RPF in Rwanda occurred within Uganda (RPF forces would cross into Uganda to collect arms from the Ugandan Army), while more regular supplies of ammunition were carried through remote heavily forested small paths in order to avoid being observed (Prunier, 1998, pp. 131–132). In circumstances where geography does not allow for bilateral transfers, regional pipelines are often constructed. For instance, there is evidence of cooperation between Iran and Syria in covert supplies to multiple clients including the PKK in Turkey, Hizbolla in Lebanon, and numerous Palestinian groups; and between the various suppliers providing aid to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Covert-aid transhipment has been a feature of these pipelines including Iranian covert-aid flows through Syria, and the West African arms pipeline to the NPFL in Liberia. Indeed, as with extra-regional covert aid, any transhipment in covert-aid supply lines tends to begin as covert-aid transhipment. One significant exception to the need for covert-aid transhipment appears to be Iranian transfers of SALW to the Northern Alliance which were organised in concert with Russia and transhipped through Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Conrad 1999, p. 6; Pirseyedi, 2000, pp. 22–23). In at least one transfer transhipment appears to have been black-market transhipment: in 1998 heavy weapons and 700 tons of ammunition were disguised as humanitarian aid and, filling 20 railroad cars, were transported by train through those countries. They were intercepted and later returned to Iran (Moscow Interfax, 12 October 1998; Itar Tass, 29 October 1998). It is likely that the sheer scale of this transfer meant that transportation by rail was necessary, and hence that the risks of black-market transhipment were outweighed by the need to


transfer such a large quantity of weapons. Thus, it is likely that this use of unauthorised transhipment in covert aid remains an exception to the rule, even at the regional level. Arms pipelines are, by definition, durable and become entrenched. Hypothetically, the less frequent requirements for pipeline structures at the regional level should generate fewer opportunities for microeconomies to become established and entrench the pipelines. However, networks do become entrenched as a function of micro-economies related to war economy exports and the growth of regional grey- and black-market structures. Further, some key features of the entrenchment of extra-regional covert aid are present for regional covert aid. For instance, the outsourcing of transportation has occurred in bilateral covert aid, such as Pakistani aid to Afghan factions, and regional pipelines, such as the Burkinabé stages in the arms pipeline to the NPFL in Liberia which involved the use of Air Burkina, a private commercial air company (Bourne, 2004). The political motives for supply may also become entrenched as a function of regional reciprocal arming dynamics akin to the actionreaction dynamic of Cold War bipolar divisions that encouraged covert aid. For instance, regionalised conflicts have drawn the majority of regional states into supporting one faction or another, thereby entrenching covert arming within intense regional security dynamics. For example, the conflict in the DRC in the late 1990s involved intervention and arms transfers by Rwanda and Uganda in support of various rebel groups, and by Zimbabwe and Namibia in support of the government. Conflict-complexes may also provide a stage for pursuing regional rivalries. Thus, in the Horn of Africa there is a history of Ethiopia and Eritrea arming rival clans in Somalia (Associated Press, 21 June 1999). Likewise, Pakistani covert aid and covert-aid transhipment for the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s was an integral part of rivalry with India, and some have argued, to a greater extent than it was a proxy war against Moscow (Roy, 1991, p. 4). This pattern continued into the postCold War conflict in Afghanistan with the majority of Afghanistan’s neighbours engaged in covert arming of one side or another: Pakistan continued to provide large amounts of arms to the Taliban, whilst Iran and Russia, perceiving the Taliban to be backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia, were the main suppliers of arms to the Northern Alliance opposition forces (Litavrin, 1999, pp. 231–232). In some regions multiple conflict-complexes neighbour each other and the dynamics of covert arming become entwined. Covert arming dyads, or triads, are a key feature of the flow of SALW to non-state


groups in Central and Eastern Africa, the Horn of Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. The largest and most longevous example of reciprocal arming is the Middle East, where a complex and far reaching web of reciprocal arming dynamics and established relationships and networks mean that the covert arming of non-state groups appears to be the dominant character not only of particular conflicts, but conflict arming in the region as a whole (see Table 6.1). The mutual arming of rebel forces by Uganda and Sudan is particularly illustrative of the types of dynamics that may entrench covert aid: In this case Uganda has supported and supplied the SPLA while the NIF government of Sudan armed various Ugandan rebel groups such as the LRA and the WNBF. On each side much of the motive for this proxy warfare is the reciprocal arming relationship itself. This is often proxy warfare against rebels as well as against regional states; thus SPLA offensives have, on occasions cut supply lines of Ugandan rebels or have carried out direct attacks such as on the WNBF (Africa Confidential, 21 July 1995, p. 3; Africa Confidential, 21 November 1997, p. 3). Likewise the LRA operates from bases in southern Sudan where it received arms and sanctuary from the NIF in return for fighting Sudanese rebels. Sometimes this relationship has extended to joint offensives, such as when the Ugandan army Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) conducted joint operations with the SPLA against LRA camps in Southern Sudan in November 1995 and April 1997 (Africa Confidential, 21 November 1997, p. 3). This pattern has long been a part of the history of the Sudanese conflict: Ethiopian support for Sudanese rebels was the primary motive for the Sudanese government’s provision of facilities for the EPLF (Pool, 1998, pp. 32–33). Similar dynamics have energised covert arming in other regions. Thus, for example, one of the motives for South African support for RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola was the presence of ANC bases in those countries (Minter, 1994, pp. 42, 49–50).

Regional grey and black markets Some grey- and black-market flows operate exclusively within the regional level. Chapter 4 found that there are extra-regional grey- and black-market processes but no globally structured grey or black markets. The questions of the nature of such processes and the existence of such structures also need to be posed at the regional level. This, however, is best achieved within an analysis of more important qualitative distinctions between types of grey- and black-market processes and structures.


Black-market transfers are those that are completely illegal. At the regional level, therefore, they include two distinct types of process: clearly illegal acquisitions from legal stocks – such as through theft; and the circulation of arms that are already within illicit circulation. Grey-market transactions take place in the space between the regulated/authorised legal and covert spheres and the wholly unregulated and illegal black market. Grey-market processes at the regional level may include, the continuation of covert-aid supply lines by officials without a clear (if covert) mandate from the state; and transfers from state stocks including sales to private (often black-market) dealers; and direct cross-border trading. Greymarket processes also include accessing legal trade supplying civilian possession of firearms and the diversion of arms into neighbouring states. For example, the legal domestic market in the United States has been a significant source of weapons for armed groups in Central and Latin America. This phenomenon has been described as the ‘ant-trade’ due to the small scale of individual transfers and their potentially large cumulative effect. However, this descriptive term should not be reserved solely for the accessing of legal markets in neighbouring states, and is used here for any small-scale cross-border SALW flows be they grey-market or black-market. While black- and grey-market mechanisms are a ubiquitous element of SALW flows at the regional level, there is considerable variation in the scale and organisation of regional SALW black or grey markets. Some are capable of sustaining large insurgencies, while others are not. The ant-trade, theoretically, is capable of transferring small quantities at a time, suitable for non-combatant groups, criminals, and some smaller insurgents. While such supplies may also cumulatively feed larger armed groups, they tend to be part of ‘bottom-up arming’ processes (small acquisitions by combatants that are accumulated within factions – see Chapter 7). Conversely, in some regions grey- and black-market mechanisms have supplied large quantities of SALW to warring factions in concentrated arming processes. These flows are based upon more ‘organised’ black and grey markets that are far less ubiquitous. For the purposes of this chapter the terms ‘ant-trade’ and ‘organised’ markets distinguish between these highly linked and symbiotic structures and processes. The characteristics and construction of each is examined in order to discern key structures and dynamics; and their relationships to each other, other structures of flow, and the overall regional political economy of conflict arming. The ant-trade Many countries have some legal domestic trade in small arms, but these are usually only open to citizens or residents of the state concerned, and


not to visitors – thus accessing them requires some level of grey-market activity. Further, most countries have some black market in arms and ammunition – though this may be very small. These form the foundation of the ant-trade. Transfer mechanisms in the ant-trade include the accessing of retail-scale markets in neighbouring states by dealers or combatants; direct cross-border transfers from grey- or black-market suppliers; or may involve longer supply lines such as grey-market transfers to dealers and then to the recipients. These may be direct cross-border transactions or indirect channels originating in non-contiguous regional states. According to current understandings, (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 168), a core dynamic of the ant-trade is that arms move from areas with lax regulation and hence high availability and low prices, to areas with stringent restrictions and hence lower availability of arms and higher prices: A diffusion dynamic of the purist kind. However, as a result of the high level of demand generated by conflict, one would anticipate that regardless of the character of arms regulations in the primary conflictstate, the ant-trade would operate. Indeed, in conflict regions the overall availability of arms – of which legal regulations are but one constitutive factor – is the key foundation of the ant-trade. In many cases there is little distinction between anttrade flows from legal markets and those from black markets. For instance, during the conflicts in the former-Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Slovene and Croatian armed forces obtained arms and ammunition within Austria. These were obtained from both legal markets, due to liberal Austrian gun laws, and from illicit arms markets operating in Austrian forests approximately 50 kilometres from the Slovene border. Such transfers, both to private dealers and members of the republican governments, tended only to be intercepted when they were particularly large. According to James Gow (1991, pp. 3–4): ‘The biggest snag proved to be for those who were clumsy enough to try to bring out 50 items at once without an export licence; the Austrian authorities seized these weapons at customs.’ This ‘snag’ however, affected both sources equally. Retail scale illicit markets have provided for significant levels of anttrade trafficking. Thus, in Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan, the open but unregulated market for arms has been important for warring factions throughout South and Central Asia. Similarly, FARC guerrillas from Colombia are known to cross into Ecuador to purchase weapons and supplies (Associated Press, 2 October 2000); and in West Africa, the MFDC from Senegal have obtained landmines, including locally craftproduced models, in unregulated markets in neighbouring GuineaBissau (Africa Confidential, 23 January 1998, p. 6).


Legal markets may do the same. The availability of arms on the comparatively well regulated (in terms of capacity if not the letter of the law) domestic arms market in the United States, is a major factor in the flow of arms from legal US markets to neighbouring states such as Mexico and Canada, for which the term ‘ant-trade’ was originally coined. For instance, in 2005 a couple were arrested in Brownsville, Texas by US authorities for trying to smuggle 17,650 rounds of ammunition into Mexico. The couple had purchased this ammunition legally in a Wal-Mart supermarket (Montgomery, 2006). In this case it seems that the couple were caught because the unusually large quantity of ammunition raised suspicions, but untold thousands of rounds are likely to follow the same kind of pattern around the world on a regular basis. In common with non-conflict regions, therefore, the web of domestic legal controls over SALW markets is an important aspect of the regional political economy of the ant-trade sector. The central dynamic of diffusion from areas of low regulation to areas of more stringent laws is likely to be ubiquitous. However, in conflict regions it is often overshadowed by cruder distinctions of availability – of which legal distinctions are but one part. Does this mean that grey- and black-market ant-trades are indistinct? Some ant-trade processes are clearly grey-market or clearly black-market: thus in a black-market flow in August 2005, Russian customs officials seized a truck attempting to smuggle small quantities of ammunition into China via Siberia. The truck was loaded with scrap metal, within which 79 armour-piercing 7.62 mm rounds in an old machinegun belt and approximately 50 5.45 mm tracer cartridges were concealed (Ryabinskaya, 2005). Mixed grey- and black-market flows are also common. In particular, grey-market sourcing for black market channels is common (but seldom vice versa). For example, in the late 1990s small arms produced in plants in the Russian arms factories at Tula and Izhevsk were sold to black market dealers by factory employees. Some of these were subsequently transferred to the parties in the conflict in Tajikistan (Litavrin, 1999, p. 234; Pirseyedi, 2000, pp. 57–58). Likewise, in the Caucusus in 2001, the commander of the Georgian battalion of the peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, Major Akaki Keghoshvili, along with other senior officials, was caught with arms and ammunition in boot of a car believed to be on their way to be sold to an arms trader in Gori who would have sold them abroad (BBC, 9 May 2001). The sources of arms are distinct between grey- and black-market processes. Grey-market processes acquire arms from legal stocks, including


legal markets, but also from state stocks. For instance, in the Horn of Africa, when the Mengistu dictatorship in Ethiopia was overthrown in 1991 there was a dramatic increase in weapons flows into northern Kenya as former-conscript soldiers in militias sold their arms for amounts as low as one dollar each (Pérouse de Montclos, 1998). Indeed, larger quantities of arms and ammunition can be directly sourced from the arsenals of the state, thereby depending upon weak stockpile security. For example, in 2000 FARC in Colombia were believed to obtain approximately 90 per cent of their ammunition from grey-market sales by members of the Venezuelan armed forces. (Rojas, 1997; Franco, 2000, p. 87). Black-market supplies have a wider range of options for sourcing arms: including purchasing from grey market suppliers; theft, and others. For instance, in the Balkans, black-market ant-trade recirculates SALW accumulated in illicit circulation into and through Kosovo from Albania and Serbia and Montenegro (Khakee and Florquin, 2003, pp. 28–30). Similarly, illicit craft production feeds black-market ant-trading in many regions. For example, in West Africa vibrant craft production in northern Ghana feeds into a transnational ant-trade black market, while craft manufactured landmines in Guinea-Bissau, and rifles in northern Mali have been significant elements of localised black markets and combatant arming. In the Middle East, craft producers in the Palestinian black market, as well as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have engaged in craft manufacture of hand-grenades and other explosive devices (Boutwell, 2002, pp. 297–298). In South Asia SALW from the famous artisan manufacturers in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) have been widely transferred to factions in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tajikistan; while illicit production in India has also played a similar role in regional arms flows, but to a lesser extent (Siddiqa-Agha, 1996; Litavrin, 1999, pp. 232–233). Conflict and the foundations and construction of the ant-trade Beyond the availability of arms formed by a web regulatory structure, stockpile management and security, and illicit accumulation and production; the ant-trade requires two conditions to flourish. These conditions are features of the political and economic space of regions that create a permissive environment for ant-trade trafficking and are exacerbated by conflict: the strength of the informal economy and the porosity of borders. The informal economy is the foundation of ant-trade trafficking. In informal economies, SALW may be one commodity among many, bartered for clothing, livestock, and other commodities. Informal transborder economies are often founded on transnational ethnic or religious


linkages that form a key part of the regional support for conflict factions. For example, ethnic Diola networks across the Senegal–Guinea Bissau border have been significant in grey- and black-market flows of arms to the MFDC, and back again during the Guinea Bissau conflict of 1998 (Africa Confidential, 23 November 1990, p. 1 and 11 September 1998; Africa Research Bulletin, April 1998, p. 13065). Similarly, the Afghan diaspora in neighbouring states form transnational networks linked to the smuggling of drugs and arms (Rubin, 1999); and illicit supplies of SALW to the KLA in Kosovo were reportedly organised by members of the Albanian diaspora in Switzerland (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 August 2000). Conflict-related refugee flows can also contribute to the expansion of transnational links between warring factions and communities in neighbouring states and the associated informal economic space. As Chabal and Daloz (1999, p. 88) claimed in relation to Africa: ‘The growing internationalisation of domestic [intra-state] violence become instrumentalized in different criminal ways. The movement of vast numbers across borders provides boundless opportunities to expand and consolidate networks throughout the continent.’ For example, the movement of armed elements within groups of refugees from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire contributed to increasing banditry and also stimulated local arms markets (United Nations, 1995; Reno 1999, p. 98). Even long after peace has been established, armed populations throughout which weapons became diffused through major armed conflict may move into neighbouring states, taking their arms with them. For example, Vietnamese illegal immigrants into China have reportedly taken large numbers of weapons with them to sell on arrival (The Straits Times, 14 February 1997). Small-scale exports of all commodities from conflict-complexes are closely linked with the expanding informal economy, and have the potential to increase the scale of the ant-trade: for example, informal cross-border trading was a feature of RENAMO’s pillage based bottomup war economy in Mozambique that depended on regional networks into, and markets within, Swaziland and South Africa (Chingono, 1996, pp. 76–95; McGregor, 1998, pp. 51–52). Likewise, cross-border trade between corrupt Guinean soldiers and the RUF in Sierra Leone occurred in the Guinean border towns of Kissidougou and Faranah where arms and ammunition were exchanged for illicitly mined diamonds (Richards, 1996, p. 50; West Africa, 23–29 October 1995). It is revealing to note that black-market ant-trade occurs not only into but also out from conflict-complexes. For example, in Northern Kenya pastoralist groups have obtained arms across the borders with Uganda,


Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia with dramatic consequences for the intensity of local conflicts and armed crime, such as cattle rustling (Pérouse de Montclos, 1998). Similar cross-border trade occurred from Angolan UNITA and government forces into Namibia, Zambia and Zaire fuelling violent crimes (The Times of Zambia, 25 August 1999; IRIN, 31 August 2000). In this trade weapons were exchanged by under-paid combatants for cattle, in Zambia, and food and clothing, in Namibia (Human Rights Watch, 1999a). In the Middle East M-16 assault rifles originally provided to the South Lebanon Army by Israel have recirculated to Palestinian groups (Boutwell, 2002, p. 300). As with flows into conflicts, such anttrade recirculation is part of the informal trans-border economies of many conflict-complexes. Thus, overall, the construction and expansion of a conflict-complex, and in particular of ‘bottom-up’ war economies (Keen, 1998, p. 12), interacts with and expands the extant transnational informal economy, thereby facilitating a growth in ant-trade trafficking. All forms of ant-trade require the impunity for traffickers/combatants provided by porous borders. In Bangladesh, for example, illicit flows of small arms enter the country from Myanmar and India through numerous remote border crossings (Nation, (Bangladesh) 4 May 2001). Likewise, Tajik opposition fighters were able to acquire arms and ammunition within Afghanistan due to the fluidity of the Tajik-Afghan border (Pirseyedi, 2000, p. 54). In regions where border zones are largely unmonitored actors from conflict-complexes can access arms markets in neighbouring states. Where a region is characterised by weak states, or the collusion, incapacity or nonchalance of regional governments, actors wishing to acquire arms can travel further to access larger stocks. In many cases of the growth of conflict-complexes and the concomitant atrophication of the state borders tend to be among the first areas of territory from which state-control shrinks. Thus, the porosity of borders often increases in periods of conflict thereby further expanding the geographical as well as economic space for black- and grey-market ant-trade. Overall, therefore, the ant-trade is the bottom-up political economy of arming. It may be grey-market, black-market, or mixed. It is not a unitary sector constructed autonomously of the informal trade in other goods, and nor is it directly linked to global markets, legal transfers, or covert aid. Rather, it is the informal trade in arms, dependent upon particular permissive conditions, but largely autonomous of other flow mechanisms or supply sectors. Organised black markets The ant-trade is ubiquitous, and operates in all regions of conflict as well as many non-conflict situations. This trade is often sufficient to supply


small armed groups, be they insurgents, criminals, or civilian militia. However, the role of black and grey markets in supplying larger factions varies considerably between regions. The primary distinction appears to be the presence or lack of an organised black market. Organised black markets have the capacity to engage in large transfers capable of providing the primary or secondary avenues of arming for large factions. In some regions these are the primary supply lines for factions, as in Latin America, while in others, such as South Asia, vibrant organised black markets are overlaid by regional covert aid. The regions with organised black markets include those surrounding conflict-complexes in Central America, South America, South Asia, Central Asia, parts of South-East Asia (particularly around Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar), and to a lesser extent, Southern Africa. It is striking that many of these regions are those areas where covert aid was most prominent during the Cold War, potentially indicating a progressive construction of regional structures of illicit arms accumulation and circulation. In other regions, in which major armed conflicts began in the 1990s, no large organised black market existed with the capacity to supply large insurgent groups in the early stages of the conflicts. The emergence of organised black markets in these regions has been a result of the existence of large conflict-complexes, rather than a primary sector of supply for conflict protagonists therein. These regions include West Africa, particularly around the Mano River Union states (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea); and to a lesser extent Central Africa and the Great Lakes (including conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) in which the foundations of large black markets were laid earlier. Similarly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fragmentation of Yugoslavia have rapidly generated the foundations of large arms black markets in the Caucusus and the Balkans respectively. In most of these cases the evolution of substantial black markets has matured significantly by the early twenty-first century. Regional organised arms black market flows operate through more concentrated supply lines with established networks of dealers and transporters drawing on large stocks of SALW. While the development of large organised black markets has taken place at different times in different regions, the types of processes that have constructed these markets and the structures and dynamics of their operation are remarkably similar: The roots of organised black markets lie in the expansion of the ant-trade and its integration with other aspects of the regional political economy of SALW spread. However, organised black markets are more than expanded ant-trades. Rather, there appears to be a reciprocal relationship between conflict and the establishment of organised black markets.


Expansion of the foundations of the ant-trade The permissive conditions for ant-trade trafficking are also required for larger black- and grey-market supplies. The informal economic space in areas surrounding conflict-complexes is often expanded by conflict and the growth of transnational war economies. The effects of this on the foundations of an organised black market appear significant. Mark Duffield (2001, p. 190) claims that The networks being mobilised, however, those of shadow trade, simultaneously form the basis of everyday life: they lie alongside, intertwine with and, in some cases, duplicate the networks that form the numerous post-adjustment survival strategies keeping millions of people alive. Conflict does, however, place special demands on parallel networks, such as the need to control and export high-value commodities and to link with the grey and criminal networks of the small-arms trade and commodity and money laundering. Yet the networks involved are often the same as those that bring in the clothes, foodstuffs, medical supplies, and manufactured goods for general consumption. While both the ant-trade and organised black markets rely on the expansions of the informal economic space in border-spaces between conflictcomplexes and the regional level, the networks are often different. The transfer of SALW through the same parallel networks as foodstuffs and so forth, remain predominantly ant-trade flows. Larger and more organised black-market flows do not appear to rely on the same transnational crossborder economic networks as informal trading in clothes, livestock, foodstuffs and so forth. Rather they are closely linked with the organised trafficking networks related to regionally-facilitated ‘top-down’ war economies (Keen, 1998), such as those extractive economies related to diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone, timber in Liberia and Cambodia, and productive economies of illicit drugs trade in Afghanistan or Colombia. They are an expansion of the micro-economies of facilitation and covert arming, and predatory extraction and looting in war economies. While these too operate within an unregulated – informal – economic space, they bear little resemblance to more routine informal economies – they are part of the transnational infrastructure shaped by conflict that circumvents regulatory structures and channels illicit goods into global legal and illicit markets – they are often concentrated grey-black networks with a long-reach. Indeed, the networks may be the same as


those facilitating access to global legal sources, but instead drawing on intra-regional grey and black market sources of arms. The necessary creation of a broader and more permissive transnational informal economic space is relatively ubiquitous to conflict regions, yet not all regions have organised SALW black markets. Thus, further conditions are also required for an organised sector to emerge and operate. These further conditions are ●

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the presence of organised networks that can be appropriated; or the capacity to create networks; and the presence and availability of substantial and concentrated stocks of SALW which black market systems of spread can circulate.

These aspects of the development of a discrete organised black market are distinct from the structures and processes of the ant-trade. They are constructed at the regional level, both through the interaction of the conflict-complex with the region, and independently of conflict. The appropriation and creation of organised networks The organised sector may appropriate extant networks, such as covert-aid pipelines, or may generate new networks. The appropriation of covertaid supply lines within the black market is the ultimate fulfilment of micro-economies. Just as regional states have increasingly taken on covert arming roles as extra-regional aid has declined, so corrupt state officials and private actors may take over such supplies once their mandate from the regional government has been removed. This is made possible by the entrenchment of regional supply lines by micro-economies generated by covert aid and top-down war economies. These may become grey- or black-market facilitation networks, as occurred through the development of links between state officials in countries neighbouring Angola and UNITA diamond traffickers facilitating the return trade in arms and other supplies (Fowler, 2000). Alternatively, networks may be appropriated by an emergent organised black market, as with links between Pakistani intelligence agencies, transport companies and drug traffickers which continued arms trafficking in order to pursue their own interests (Kartha, 1998). Likewise, corrupt military officials in Thailand continued to operate SALW supply lines to the Khmer Rouge in the early 1990s, following on from Thailand’s role as a provider of covert transhipment in US and Chinese supplies (Muni, 1996, pp. 200–201). Indeed, although covert-aid facilitation is preferable for the construction of pipeline, grey-market facilitation may suffice to maintain flows.


Thus, for regional pipelines involving several cooperative stages, the shift to grey-market roles may occur in one stage without diminishing the covert-aid character of other stages. For example, in the West African arms pipeline supplying the NPFL in Liberia, grey-market transhipment maintained the Ivoirian stage of the pipeline after President Felix Houphouet-Boigny moved away from supporting Taylor by late 1992, and then after his death in 1994 (Sesay, 1996, p. 398; Reno, 1997b, p. 501). Similarly, in bilateral covert aid, the grey-market may sustain supplies. For example, when F. W. De Klerk came to office in South Africa, in 1989, covert arms flows from South Africa to RENAMO in Mozambique were reduced. However, the networks established continued to operate, apparently through ‘semi-private clandestine networks’ (Minter, 1994, p. 188). The key question here is whether the black market can take on, with reconfiguration and use of grey-market mechanisms at every stage in the pipeline without the need for continued covert government support? Certainly, this appears to have happened in South Asia and Southern Africa where the privatisation of pipelines, stimulated and fed by war economies and the associated micro-economies created options for greyand black-market actors to maintain pipeline networks: in South Asia, after the cessation of official Indian assistance to the LTTE in 1987 in Sri Lanka, arms flows from India are believed to have continued until 1991 through the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Indeed, Tamil Nadu has been the location of much of the LTTE’s regional grey- and black-market support structures (Chalk, 1999, pp. 140–164). Likewise, private actors in South Africa, including private military companies and some of those involved in the supply of arms by Apartheid era South Africa, continued arms transfers to UNITA after the South African government ceased assistance (Africa Confidential, 1 July 1994, p. 1; IRIN, 2 September 1999). This privatisation of pipelines seems unique to the regional level, and no extra-regional pipelines have (or could have) moved so completely into the black- or grey-market. In some conflict-regions, such as those in Latin America and South and Central Asia, supply lines are often constructed within the black market. Again, the construction of these networks is often based upon the expansive transnational structures of war economy trades: The illicit extraction and export of commodities such as diamonds, gold, ivory, timber, or the production and trafficking of illicit drugs generates blackand grey-market networks for the export of such commodities through neighbouring states. In addition to being the primary aspect of facilitation micro-economies, this also attracts criminal organisations that access this trade and arrange return deliveries of SALW, as well as other supplies, particularly from within the region.


It is notable that those regions with the most substantial arms black markets – ‘those in Latin America (particularly around Colombia), and within and around Afghanistan’ – are those in which illicit drugs are the primary commodities of war economy exports. The significant distinction here is that drugs as conflict commodities are exported through networks that remain largely in the black market. In contrast other conflict goods, such as diamonds, gold, and timber, utilise grey and covert networks to launder commodities and provide access to global legal markets on which to sell them (see Bourne, 2001). Similarly, in the Balkans, the regional illicit market is primarily a black market – populated by organised criminal groups rather than a web of covert, grey- and blackmarket activity. As a result of this and the availability of large stocks of arms (see below), the Small Arms Survey (2001, p. 176) claims that ‘The Balkans is one of the few regions in the world where the volume of black market may well rival that of the grey and legal markets combined.’ However, this apparent correlation between wholly illicit war economies and large arms black markets does not appear to reflect a causal relationship affecting the capacity of the black market to create networks for itself – rather each contributes to the construction and expansion of the same illicit economic space. Many regional black markets generate networks capable of supplying multiple clients in multiple conflict-complexes. This is a more efficient structure of flow than generating discrete networks for each client as is often the case for covert aid, or being constrained by partisan loyalties. For example, in the late 1990s Russian organised criminal groups were believed to be involved in the Taliban’s drug trade and were also important arms suppliers for the anti-Taliban forces of Massoud’s faction of the Northern Alliance (Rubin, 1999). Likewise, the black market around Thailand has supplied insurgent and criminal groups in numerous surrounding conflict-complexes: local illicit brokers who buy arms from Karen groups, Cambodian sources, and corrupt Thai military personnel and sell them to the LTTE, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) (Free Aceh Movement) in Indonesia, various insurgents from North-East India, and small Thai muslim gangs (The Jakarta Post, 19 May 2001, Bankok Post, 25 May 2001; Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 June 2001). A unique form of black-market network arises in some conflictregions: rebel axes in which arming relationships between two or more insurgent groups in neighbouring conflict-complexes integrate the infrastructure of illicit arming. One of the most significant rebel axes was that operating in West Africa in the 1990s between the NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone (Bourne, 2004). Similarly, militant groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan have given arms and volunteer


fighters to Chechen rebels (Anand, 2000), while Tajik opposition forces and anti-Taliban forces in neighbouring Afghanistan have supplied each other with arms and ammunition (Conrad, 1999, p. 6; Pirseydi, 2000, pp. 54–56). Such relationships between insurgent factions have also occurred in other regions, but on a smaller scale. For example, in the regionalised conflict in Central Africa, UNITA armed and trained Rwandan and Burundian Hutu rebels inside Zaire in 1997 when those forces were aiding Mobutu’s fight against the advancing ADFL rebels (Human Rights Watch, 1997, p. 64; Human Rights Watch, 1999a). In Latin America, Colombian intelligence agencies have claimed that there is an arms trafficking link between the FARC and the Brazilian armed group the Movement of Landless Workers, revealed by the crash of a plane delivering arms near the border between Brazil and Colombia in February 1999 (Claudia, 2000). The accumulation of arms in illicit circulation and the availability of concentrated stocks One of the key differences between the spread of SALW and that of other types of weapons is that not only do flows cross the non-state threshold, but that weapons accumulate in different legal and illicit sectors. For a trade that is surplus-intensive this is of critical importance. The crucial fact is not just that SALW last a long time, as is often claimed, but that they do so beyond the legal sphere. This lies at the heart of the growth of organised black markets. Organised black markets depend on the availability of concentrated stocks of arms upon which to draw. Significantly, there appears to be a key distinction between the processes that create the availability of SALW that can create an organised black market, and those that are required to sustain one. These are closely bound-up with the history of conflict in a region. Creating organised black-markets: The realisation of ‘latent proliferation’: State collapse, conflict accumulation, and post-conflict recirculation The availability of large and concentrated stocks of arms in illicit circulation depends on the realisation of the ‘latent proliferation’ of SALW contained within the accumulated stocks of state and non-state actors.4 The realisation of the economic value of illicit ‘latent proliferation’ of non-state actors occurs almost exclusively within the black market (unless channelled through a post-conflict DDR process). Additionally, of particular importance for the growth of organised black markets are the wholesale leakages of stocks into illicit circulation that occur when states collapse, and large-scale recirculation of arms in post-conflict situations.


Organised black markets in some regions draw upon the haemorrhaging of legal stocks into illicit circulation in collapsed states. For instance, in the conflicts in the former-Yugoslavia new organised crime groups arose operating from Bulgaria and Albania (Tripodi, 1999). They supplied arms to warring factions, and have continued to do so in recent violence in the Balkans (Nachrichten TV, 28 September 1994; Peleman, 1999, pp. 27–28). These criminal networks were further stimulated by the availability of arms from Albanian stocks, which entered circulation in the 1997 crisis with the looting of up to 95 per cent of state stocks of SALW – including 549,775 weapons, and billions of rounds of ammunition (Holtem et al., 2005, p. 6). Likewise, the collapse of the Soviet Union invigorated the regional SALW black market in the Caucusus. Most cases of state collapse in the post-Cold War era have occurred within conflict-complexes. In such circumstances the haemorrhaging of state stocks may provide a substantial proportion of the factions’ arsenals. During conflict, the demand and acquisitions of these conflict actors restrains the centrifugal vigour of the economic value of leaked stocks, thereby containing their large-scale recirculation until the end of conflict. In periods of lower violence, and after the cessation of conflict, however, these centres of use become centres of trade. In both contexts ant-trade recirculation is common, but in the latter latent proliferation can be more fully realised. The illicit regional arms networks and stocks of arms that sustained conflict often form the foundations of post-conflict regional black markets. Thus, supply lines that fed the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique have channelled large stocks of arms onto the regional black market: for example, Rundu in Namibia was once a UNITA supply point and by 1994 it became a major centre for arms recirculation from both Angolan government and rebel combatants (Africa Confidential, 18 February 1994, p. 6). Likewise, in the early 1990s the ANC reportedly obtained approximately 3,000 AK-47s still packed in gel from a Mozambiquan army officer, and other neighbouring countries, such as Malawi, experienced a significant influx of arms from Mozambiquan actors after the 1992 peace accord (Africa Confidential, 20 March 1992, p. 6; Mponda, 1999). Former-RENAMO rear bases have been used as depots for the associated black-market flows (Vines, 1996; and Smith and Vines, 1997). Similarly, Thailand was a major route of arms to Cambodia and subsequently arms transited in reverse as Thai military officials play a core role in the regional black market, and Thai border towns have become smuggling centres (Kartha, 1998; Skehan, 1999). Likewise, Nanning in China was a staging post for arms transfers into Vietnam and has since seen the return traffic of old weapons (Kartha, 1998).


Organised black markets are particularly significant in those regions in which this phenomenon has been multiplied by the existence of several large conflict-complexes. In Latin America, for example, arms supplied to the three main conflict-complexes in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala) have, in the post-conflict periods, expanded the regional arms black market and coalesced into transregional arms trafficking networks feeding guerrillas in the ongoing conflict in Colombia. For example, violence by the FMLN in El Salvador increased in 1990–1991 when the peace process in Nicaragua led to increased arms flows from demobilising contras and corrupt government soldiers (Child, 1992, p. 131). Subsequently, after the cessation of conflict in El Salvador in 1992, arms from all Central American conflictcomplexes – and insurgent rear bases in the region – formed the basis of larger regional black market flows to other Latin American conflicts further afield. Thus, regional black markets grow by the realisation of latent proliferation in conflict prone regions and are progressively expansive. In addition to conflict-complexes in a region, the regional geography of facilitation – including rear bases, arms caches and covert aid staging points in neighbouring states may also be home to stocks of arms that can be sold on the black market. In particular, covert transhipment of extra-regional covert aid has contributed to the accumulation of blackmarket stocks. Thus, weapons skimmed from the Afghan pipeline by various actors moved to major cities as well as transit areas, stimulating and fuelling both rural and urban arms diffusion in Pakistan (Kartha, 1997). Similarly arms leaking from black-market transhipment have stimulated local black markets in the Seychelles (in transit to Central Africa), and Swaziland (recirculating from Mozambique to South Africa) (Gardien, 1998; Meek, 1999). Sustaining organised black markets: reaggregating diffused stocks and grey-market transactions. While most organised black markets rely on large stocks of arms accumulated in the illicit sphere, such stocks are finite. Organised black markets, therefore, require continued inflows of arms. In such circumstances grey-market mechanisms can be expected to expand to facilitate further diversion into illicit accumulation, and regionally facilitated extraregional transfers may be used to supply black marketeers in the same way that they supply insurgents. SALW may be imported legally by companies ostensibly engaged in legal domestic trade, and are then diverted into organised black markets. Thus, for example, companies in Paraguay and Venezuela have imported small arms from the United States through


legal channels, but diverted the arms into cross-border black market transfers to recipients in Brazil and Colombia respectively. This diversion resulted in the US government banning small arms exports to private companies in those states (Cucovaz, 1998, p. 38; Bonner, 1999). Thus, particularly well-organised black markets may source arms on the global legal market for their own purposes, rather than merely playing facilitating roles for armed factions. This, however, seems relatively rare. More often, further leakage from state stocks within the region appears to be significant in sustaining an organised black market. Drawing on large stocks is a more efficient sourcing mechanism than the reaggregation of diffused stocks. This diffusion is a key reason why illicit arms seldom re-enter legal circulation, rather than there being a significant structural barrier between the legal and illicit spheres. It is also a factor in explaining why illicitly held arms seldom recirculate extra-regionally. While it appears less cost-effective, the reaggregation of diffused stocks has been used in black markets. For example, in Latin America, many SALW from the Central American conflict-complexes were widely diffused throughout society. Organised black market dealers have gained significant profits by reaggregating such diffused weapons, purchasing them in areas where prices are low, and trafficking them to conflict zones where prices are higher. For example, arms purchased by Panamanian black-market dealers from ex-contras in Nicaragua included AK-47 assault rifles bought for between 60 and 100 US dollars each, were sold for between US$600 and US$800. Nevertheless, the amounts of arms involved in most of these shipments were relatively small when compared with most supplies into conflict-complexes. For example one typical case included 34 Kalashnikov rifles, fourteen M-16s, six machine-guns, and 50,000 rounds of ammunition (Otero, 2000). In essence, however, this process is ant-trade sourcing for organised transfers, a mechanism that is capable of contributing to sustaining an organised black market, but not of creating it.

Conclusion: The construction and operation of regional political economies of SALW spread and conflict arming The regional level plays two key roles in the flow of SALW to conflict: the facilitation of extra-regional flows and intra-regional flows. A key question is whether the character and combination of different roles and processes, both in facilitation and intra-regional flows, is an ad-hoc construction for each transfer or each conflict, or whether it reflects distinctly regional structures and dynamics? This has significant


implications for the importance of the regional level, particularly in relation to those structures that must be navigated and dynamics that can be harnessed by conflict actors in their endeavours to acquire SALW. Broadly speaking, regional structures and processes of SALW spread appear to reflect overlapping but distinct structures based on the regional dimensions of the political economy of conflict and broader regional political and economic space as defined in Chapter 2. These structures are revealed by the correlations and distinctions between different aspects of flow processes and between market structures constructed at the regional level. In relation to facilitation, a range of key observations can be made: ●

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Extra-regional covert aid primarily relies on covert transhipment at the regional level. The transhipment of other extra-regional flows, particularly those accessed through a veil of legality, may involve any type of transhipment. The ‘veil of legality’ is provided primarily through the provision of EUCs and associated documentation – largely as covert or grey facilitation. However, this covert or grey facilitation may contribute to the growth of capacity by black-market actors to generate a veil of legality. The veil of legality is a regional construct, not a function of amorphous globalisation. Economic engagement with conflict-protagonists by regional actors generates micro-economies that significantly affect the nature of both flow networks and broader regional political economy of SALW spread.

Overall, the combinations of facilitation roles coalesce into distinct political economies of facilitation that are: Covert-aid facilitation, and mixed facilitation. Covert-aid facilitation offers the greatest security, and correlates significantly with the provision of covert aid through pipelines. Mixed facilitation entails some combination of covert-aid, grey-market and black-market activity. This appears to reflect distinctly regional political economies of SALW spread, rather than correlating or being determined by the extra-regional stages of the SALW flows. This regional political economy is often a web of interactions and distinct networks overlaid and interwoven, in particular, with regional black-market infrastructure. This is revealed, in particular, by the nature and construction of different spread processes and structures at the regional level; and their interaction with both the global and conflict-complex levels.


Regional legal flows – including those to conflicts – broadly reflect the global market structure; but regional small and medium producer states tend to play a greater role than non-regional suppliers within their tier. Thus regional state-to-state transfers do not constitute a distinct sector of flow and availability constructed at the regional level. Regionalised conflicts may be an exception to this, but in most regions while specific transfers may fit within the construction and interactions of a security complex, the broad structure of SALW availability on the legal market is not a predominantly regional construct. Regional covert aid is a common feature of arms flows to insurgent groups in conflict-complexes. Indeed, covert aid has become largely regionalised in the post-Cold War era, though it often reaches out to the global market as a source of SALW. It is not, however, a regionally constructed market, but rather is a specific form of regional interaction with conflict and with the global legal market structure. Cold War extra-regional covert aid was shaped by divisions within the global legal market, and interacted with that structure by sourcing SALW through legal and grey-market transfers with the driving imperative of deniability. In contrast, for regionalised covert aid in the post-Cold War era it is the overall structures of availability rather than divisions within global legal market structures that shape the nature of covert-aid sourcing. Further, while Cold War pipelines were reinforced by global bipolar logic, they became entrenched at the regional level. Regionalised covert aid, however, can take more diverse forms than long sustained pipelines. Yet it still becomes entrenched through the micro-economies linked to conflict trade and political and security dynamics of the security-complex. Micro-economies contribute to the continuation of covert aid and later to the construction or appropriation of transnational networks within organised black markets. Thus, covert aid is not a self-contained system of supply but it is often a crucial aspect of the dynamic, expansive, and progressively evolving nature of the regional political economy of conflict arming. Significantly, therefore, both types of transfers by states (legal and covert aid) do not form distinct sectors of availability and flow, but rather are flow processes and networks. Key distinctions between regions relate primarily to the character of the security complex and regional state engagement with conflict through regionalised conflicts and covert arming dyads. In contrast, black and grey markets exist at the regional level not only as characterisations of processes – as they are at the global level – and concentrated structures of networks – in the case of facilitation – but as discretely constructed systems of availability and spread.


Regional black and grey markets can be divided into the ant-trade and the organised sector. Both share common foundations of transnational informal economic space and permissive conditions of porous borders. The ant-trade is a ubiquitous feature of all conflict-regions, with only limited implications for the regional political economy of SALW spread as a whole. The ant-trade may be grey, black, or mixed. It does not appear to have significant direct links with other structures of legal, covert, or organised black-market flows. Rather it is the informal trade in SALW, founded on transnational informal economies that are not distinct from those that also provide food, clothing, and other goods. Current understandings of disparities in legal frameworks as the primary explanatory framework for ant-trade trafficking obscure the importance of the foundations of the trade in favour of a framework that emphasises the letter of the law over the construction of the informal economic space that surround many conflict-complexes and within which the ant-trade operates. This is affected by conflict and its effects on border spaces. Organised black markets, in contrast, are substantial and complexly constructed structures of unregulated accumulation, availability, and flow. They are predominantly black market structures encompassing black- and grey-market activities. No organised grey market sectors appear to exist – though some supply lines within organised black markets may involve considerable amounts of grey-market activity. Organised black markets have distinct structures that evolve primarily as a result of conflict or state collapse. The informal economy and porous borders facilitate access of black-market traders to clients in neighbouring states. The atrophication of the state, the formal economy, and border control that accompanies the growth of conflict-complexes results in qualitatively different accessibility. This access, however, is not anarchic and amorphous: the trafficking networks and infrastructure created by covert aid or regional facilitation become a key structural element of this access through the regional aspects of war economies and associated entrenchment of micro-economies – thereby forming a web of organised black market transactions and networks. Due to the nature of extractive war economies and associated networks, this web may inhabit an informal economic space but this appears distinct from the routine informal economy that the ant-trade is part of. In order for the organised black market to be constructed and to be autonomous from the global legal market structures, regional illicit sources need to be large, concentrated, and easily available. Thus, regional organised black markets evolve through the construction of this web of networks combined with the accumulation and subsequent


realisation of latent proliferation contained within conflict-complexes. Thus, the tendency of SALW to enter illicit circulation and not return to the legal sphere is both a factor in the construction of an organised black market, and a key feature of its operation. The movement of weapons from one conflict to another – that is claimed to be a common feature of SALW flows – is in fact primarily a function of the construction of regional black markets. The presence and character of an organised black market is the primary distinction between regions – both in terms of the regional political economy of intra-regional flows; and the character of regional facilitation through engagement with war economy exports. The nature of regional engagement with conflict-commodity exports is an integrated part of regional black market infrastructure in most regions where an organised black market exists. In other regions such exports are a critical component of the transnational networks and the mixture of covert grey and black interaction along supply lines that generates microeconomies and constitutes a key foundation of the expansion of the informal and illicit economic space of the region. Regional organised black markets are distinct structures of availability and flow that are interlinked with legal and covert transfer networks, but are separate regional structures of spread. Significantly, none of the major types of regional processes and structures of SALW spread to conflict are mutually exclusive. A high level of covert arming does not preclude significant interaction with regional black markets or legal flows. Likewise, a lack of covert arming, such as in the Colombian conflict-region, has no discernable effect on legal flows to the Colombian government nor black- and grey-market transfers to the FARC rebels. The implications of these complexly constructed and overlaid structures are profound. Overall, they imply that the regional level is much more significant in the nature of SALW spread and flows to conflict than is implied by the amorphous image. For instance, the dynamics of diversion from legal transactions to illicit recipients are not predominantly a function of weak-points in the global web of regulation through the actions of nefarious brokers, or the presence of failed states in the international system, but rather reflect critical elements of distinctly regional political economies of SALW spread. Further, the nature of the construction and operation of these structures implies that the significance and shape of regional processes of SALW flows to conflicts are evolutionary. This evolution is a function of progressive construction of the regional political economy of SALW spread and associated dynamics. It takes


place primarily through ●

●

the interaction of the regional political economy with a particular conflict-complex throughout conflict – particularly in relation to the expansive and constructive influence of micro-economies; and the distinct regional history of arms accumulation and flow and the associated emergence and operation of an organised black market.

In answer to the key question posed above, the longevity and progressive evolution of regional political economies of SALW spread indicates that regional aspects of the spread of SALW are not an ad-hoc construction for each transfer or each conflict, but rather they reflect distinctly regional structures and dynamics. Thus, for example, in the post-Cold War era, in many Latin American conflict regions the regional political economy of arms flows is dominated by illicit economic structures and dynamics: facilitation is primarily black- and grey-market; and so are the regionally contained flows. In contrast, the Middle East seems to have a regional political economy of arms flows to conflicts that is more ‘political’ than any other region. In South and Central Asia both facilitation and flow include covert aid, and a strong organised black market. In West Africa, covert aid and covert facilitation have coexisted, with the latter gradually supplanting the former in the late 1990s (Bourne, 2004). Given that the broader structures of regional political economy of SALW spread are reflected in the characteristics and dynamics of both facilitation and intra-regional flow processes, the question then arises, what determines which of the two roles is played by the regional level? Generally speaking, regional facilitation is essential to most accessing of extra-regional stocks of SALW unless a regional state is willing to supply arms and to import weapons for that purpose. In particular, ●

●

●

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regionally facilitated flows are the primary means of obtaining significant quantities of SALW in regions where covert aid is unavailable and no organised black market exists; conversely, the presence of an organised black market reduces the need for accessing extra-regional stocks through regional facilitation networks; significant grey- and black-market facilitation is possible without an organised black market; but has to be constructed by transnational micro-economies based on war economies; covert aid, both regional and extra-regional, often constructs this infrastructure.


Overall, therefore, regional interaction with conflict-complexes and the global SALW market evolves most significantly though the construction of more longevous structures of accumulation and flow. The regional aspects of spread do not ‘start from scratch’ with the birth of a new conflict-complex, but rather are a function of the stage of evolution of regional spread structures. The regional political economy of conflict arming is expansive: moving from the construction of micro-economies along primary supply lines – in particular covert-aid pipelines – through the creation of transnational infrastructure and to expanding the foundations of regional black-market space. This, combined with the realisation of latent proliferation contained within conflict-complexes, are the two primary dynamics of progressive qualitative shifts in the nature of the regional structures of conflict arming. The capacity to capitalise upon these structures is also a function of key determinants of arming patterns constructed at the conflict-complex level.


Part IV The Conflict-Complex Level and Arming Patterns


7 Arming Conflict from the Bottom-Up: SALW Spread at the Conflict level

The current amorphous image of SALW spread implies that any conflict faction can obtain arms in almost any way it wishes, provided that it has the financial resources to pay for them. However, the framework developed and the empirical analyses in the previous chapters indicate that the construction and type of regional political economy of SALW spread, and its linkages with the political economy of the conflict-complex and warring factions, restrains and channels this potential into qualitatively distinct arming patterns. This Part analyses the arming of conflict at the conflict-complex level. In particular, it discerns and explains the construction of arming patterns and the dynamics of their evolution. It represents the culmination of the development of the framework outlined in Chapter 2 by empirically examining what factors, structures, and dynamics shape a particular faction’s arms acquisitions. It therefore serves two purposes: it outlines the nature of SALW flows within conflict-complexes and it draws together the core aspects of the previous chapters by discerning different patterns of the arming of factions in conflict and how – and where – these are constructed. This chapter completes the examination of structures and dynamics of SALW spread at different levels through an examination of the processes of SALW spread and acquisition patterns that occur largely within the conflict-complex. It begins by outlining the various characteristics of the political and economic space within the conflict-complex and the control thereof by various types of state and non-state actors. On this basis, it then outlines a typology of armed actors and a typology of arms acquisition patterns, with a primary distinction made between ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ modes of arming. The correlation between actor types and arming patterns is then examined throughout the rest of 181


this chapter and the next chapter in order to discern the construction of arming patterns and the importance of the structures and dynamics at the different levels. In particular, this chapter assesses civilian arming processes and their distinctiveness, or lack thereof, from processes of bottom-up arming by conflict factions. It then identifies and assesses the factors and characteristics that are associated with a predominantly ‘bottom-up’ mode of faction arming.

Conflict-complexes and the political economy of conflict actors Conflict-complexes are fragmented political and economic spaces. They evolve throughout conflict – particularly in relation to control over that space and its resources. However, the beginning and end of a conflict do not necessarily mark a break from and return to ‘normal’ divisions of political and economic space. In many ‘weak states’, the fragmented characteristics of the political and economic space in which conflict takes place are also a feature of pre-conflict and post-conflict periods. Violence is not evenly distributed throughout the geographical space of conflict-complexes, but varies between different areas at different times. However, the motives and intensity of violence do not directly imbue a particular faction with the capacity to acquire arms from one source but not another. Rather, the key variables in delineating and examining arming patterns in pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict periods are the control of the territory of the conflict-complex, and the control of the economic space and resources of the conflict-complex. The division of territory among warring factions within the conflictcomplex is a key aspect of the political economy of conflict and of arms acquisitions by those actors: the ‘control’ of territory enhances the security of arms supply lines and it allows the establishment of a war economy to generate funds for arms purchases (Karp, 1993, p. 9). However, in many conflicts, territory is actively contested and ‘control’ passes between factions fluidly. It is useful to distinguish between types of control exercised over territory that act as distinct variables in SALW acquisition patterns. Broadly speaking, both benefits of ‘control’ are facilitated by a lack of enemy control over territory, and are greatly enhanced in cases where the warring faction exercises direct control. Additionally, it is important to distinguish between the control of territory in which factions can operate and organise, and the ‘control’ of borders, ports, and airfields through which conflict-commodities can be exported and SALW and other goods can be imported and can be transferred. Further, in relation

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to the economic space of the conflict-complex and the revenues available to the factions, a lack of enemy control over territory largely limits a faction to the ability to conduct predatory activities against civilian populations with impunity. Greater control is often required for the extraction of natural resources for illicit export. War economies of factions contribute to the capacity of factions to access SALW and ammunition at the regional and international levels by generating revenue and trading networks. War economies represent a distinct type of economic system in which violence is a primary means of production either directly (through theft, pillage etc) or indirectly (by being the means by which a protagonist obtains and controls the resources being traded). In conflicts ostensibly driven by various ethnic, religious, or ideological identities, from northern India, to Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Colombia, violence has become underwritten by war economies. It is often the export of conflict goods, as a function of these war economies, which contributes to the growth of micro-economies at the regional level. Within the economic space of conflict-complexes both conflict factions and individual combatants often engage in predatory activity and illicit and informal trades that form alliances with organised criminal groups or grey-market and legal business networks. A key distinction between types of war economies is that proposed by David Keen (1998, p. 12) between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ economic violence. The former is ‘mobilised by political leaders and entrepreneurs’ while the latter is ‘where violence is actively embraced by “ordinary” people, either civilians or low-ranking soldiers’. This key distinction can be used not only to distinguish between the various economic functions of violence, or the political economies of different conflict-complexes; but also as a crucial element of distinction between armed factions. Conflict factions, both state and non-state, pro-government and rebel, come in many forms. So too does their control and utilisation of the political and economic space of the conflict-complex. Indeed the two are intimately related. Thus, top-down war economies are faction economies (or at least leader’s economies), while bottom-up war economies are combatant (and civilian) violence-based economies. The practice of the former, therefore, is a function of a degree of internal control and organisation while the latter is, to some degree, a function of a lack of control. However, both types of economic activity often coexist within a faction. This distinction in the control and utilisation of part of the fragmented space of the conflict-complex raises key questions


for understanding the nature of SALW spread including ●

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whether, and to what degree, the two types of war economy affect the character of the faction’s arms acquisitions? And, in particular whether it is the revenue (as implied by the amorphous image of illicit arms open to all who can pay) or the networks generated by these economic structures (as implied by the significance of transnational/regional networks and spaces examined earlier) that determines the acquisition pattern?

War economies and territorial control are intimately related and evolve together with the fragmentation and control of the conflict-complex. For example, even in non-conflict states, the retreat of the state from areas of territory is usually paralleled by the emergence of alternative power centres based upon ‘war economies’ (Keen, 1996, p. 14; Reno, 1997a, p. 165). As conflict escalates, the atrophication of the state accelerates as the government withdraws or is pushed out of areas of its territory. Conflict factions (state or rebel) often develop a degree of control over these areas and the nature of this control changes throughout the conflict. Through these processes the characteristics of the warring factions evolve. Thus, R. T. Naylor’s 1993 analysis of the illicit economic operations of guerrilla organisations outlines three stages of development of insurgent groups’ activities. The first involves brief hit and run operations, the second, characteristic of larger more organised factions, is the entrenchment of the faction in society or, more commonly in the post-Cold War era, an area of territory. These he refers to, borrowing terminology from the FMLN in El Salvador, as ‘zones of expansion’. As the presence and operations of the warring faction become more entrenched in these zones they become expanded into ‘zones of control’. Additionally, as Keen (1998, p. 62) warns us, ‘Taking the power of warlords as a given during civil wars may be a mistake. Their influence is not simply possessed, but conferred by their supporters and footsoldiers.’ This support is often bought, either by paying the fighters with the proceeds from top-down economic activity, or by granting the freedom to loot in bottom-up economic violence. While the character of warring factions varies widely both within and between conflicts, and conflict-actors are therefore resistant to categorisation, it is necessary to distinguish between broad types of actors engaged in conflict in order to clarify the relationship between the nature of factions and the conflict-complex, and the character of arms acquisitions. Numerous typologies of conflict factions exist (Clapham, 1998, pp. 6–9; Mackinlay, 2002, p. 43), but these are not defined in ways appropriate to the task of examining SALW acquisitions. Further, within the SALW literature, little delineation of types of non-state actors has


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taken place and has not been applied in examinations of the nature of their arms acquisitions. In the following typology actor types are defined by characteristics that may – hypothetically – make a difference to arming patterns, but not by the features of those arming patterns. It is based upon the nature of factions and their control over the territorial and economic space of conflict-complexes. It is defined independently of arming patterns in order to allow the examination of correlation between these factors and the nature of arms acquisitions. The added advantage of delineating types according to the key features of the political and economic space of conflict-complexes is that it allows for the evolution of armed groups throughout conflict. Typology of conflict protagonists 1. Individual non-combatants. 2. Civilian armed groups include civil defence forces, private security companies, criminal groups, and vigilantes. Some of these groups may be equally, if not more, organised than some conflict factions, but are analysed separately since the dynamics and processes of arms acquisition are hypothetically distinct by virtue of their status as civilians rather than as direct participants in conflict. They tend to be characterised by bottom-up war economies, have no direct control over resources or territory, and have no discernible role in conflict or significant outside support. They may, however, evolve into conflict factions of the following types. 3. Militias, embryonic insurgent forces and small terrorist groups. Characterised by a lack of direct and uncontested control over territory and primarily bottom-up economic structures, these tend to be the smallest organisations, fielding at most a couple of hundred combatants. Most insurgent groups in their formation phase and early stages of activity also lack significant organisational structures (these are henceforth referred to as embryonic insurgents). 4. Warlord-type factions are characterised by some territorial control and a top-down war economy. This middle category of non-state factions represents the greatest number of insurgent movements and militia forces. Warlord type factions are larger and more organised than the embryonic insurgents, but less organised than quasi-state forces. Warlord type factions may grow from embryonic insurgent groups or arise from the fragmentation or disintegration of quasi-state forces. 5. Quasi-state forces are the most organised insurgents. They are characterised by a high degree, a high level of organisation and some of the features of states such as large areas of territory under their control,


and the establishment of state-like institutions within them, and associated broad-based top-down war economies. These factions often represent a de-facto state within a state. Briefly, those insurgent factions that may be characterised as ‘quasi-state’ type factions, for at least some part of the conflict concerned, include the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the EPLF and TPLF in Ethiopia/Eritrea, the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, the NPFL in Liberia throughout the 1990s; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC-RUF) alliance in Sierra Leone in 1997; Hezbollah in Lebanon; Iraqi Kurds; some Palestinian organisations such as the PLO; and FARC in Colombia, because of their effective control over large areas of territory and the political and economic space therein. Al Qaida is also included in this category, not by virtue of territorial control or war economy (though both have been significant for affiliated groups), but because its character as a transnational network has made it what John Mackinlay (2002, pp. 79–92) referred to as a ‘global insurgent force’. 6. States: Actors in possession of juridical sovereignty. This category should not be taken to reflect possession of any other characteristics of control over the conflict-complex. State forces exhibit the full array of political and economic features that insurgent forces do. Through the course of a conflict their forces may decay into warlordtype factions loosely allied to the central government through patronage networks. Such ‘warlordisation’ can also occur prior to conflict, as happened in Sierra Leone, the former-Zaire, and Congo Brazzaville. The key distinction between state forces, including ‘warlordised’ state forces, and insurgent groups, is their possession of internationally recognised juridical sovereignty, regardless of the empirical sovereignty over the political and economic space of the conflict-complex. Sovereignty is, in principle and as indicated in previous chapters, extremely important in the character of the forces’ arms acquisitions. Broadly, the first two types are civilian actors, and the latter three are conflict factions. However, the distinction between civilians and combatants is usually very blurred in practice. Arming patterns and conflict-complex level processes Armed groups in conflict-complexes may acquire SALW directly from extra-regional suppliers, directly from regional suppliers, and indirectly from extra-regional sources through regionally facilitated flows. Additionally, a range of SALW transfer processes occur within


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conflict-complexes. Most of these are self-evident, though their character is often related to particular structures of the political economy of conflict (see below). These are ● ● ● ●

theft and capture; proxy arming of militias and the distribution of SALW to civilians; legal retail markets; local black and grey markets.

The flow and availability of SALW from the international and regional levels has been examined in the previous chapters. However, the differing patterns of acquisition of factions engaged in conflict are not explained solely by reference to the structures, processes, and dynamics of such flows. Rather, it is also necessary to explain the manner in which particular actors gain and maintain access to these different sources and channels. Overall, the various flow processes and types of access constitute two modes of acquisition that are best described as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottomup’. This reflects the similar characterisations of the war economies of factions, but does not assume a strong correlation between the two. ●

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A top-down mode of arming is the acquisition of arms by a faction and their distribution to combatants through an integrated organisational structure. This mode includes large-scale acquisitions, primarily but not exclusively from external sources, such as purchases of arms and the receipt of foreign support. A bottom-up mode of arming is the acquisition through a range of aggregation processes whereby combatants obtain arms for themselves. This occurs primarily from sources within the conflict-complex, through theft, capture, purchase from local markets, and occasionally manufacture, and ant-trade mechanisms from the regional level.

Most factions employ both modes of acquisition simultaneously, but the balance of the two changes as factions evolve throughout the development of the conflict-complex. Within the top-down mode it is useful to distinguish three patterns of arming. Just as analyses of the dependency in supplier–client patterns in the global arms trade helped reveal the structures of MCA acquisition; key distinctions in the dependency of conflict faction’s arms acquisitions relate to the degree of dependency or autonomy of the recipient actor in choosing the types of channels to acquire arms – particularly including the capacity to acquire arms in particular ways, the associated requirements


for regional facilitation, or a dependency on the patronage of a particular supplier. Thus within the top-down category this chapter distinguishes between ‘dependent’, ‘semi-autonomous’, and ‘autonomous’ top-down patterns of SALW acquisition. Autonomous arming means that a recipient has the capacity to access any source and supply channel at any level it chooses without requiring regional facilitation. For the most part this means that they have the capacity to access the global legal market as well as other channels. However, some flows to illicit recipients may also be conducted in this way. This relates to the recipient actor being able to play all facilitating roles itself, rather than relying on regional covert, grey- and black-market networks. Conversely, dependent arming refers to a total reliance on a single supplier/supply channel. This relates only to top-down acquisitions, and dependency within this category varies considerably as a function of the scale of bottom-up arming. The middle category, semi-autonomous arming, is an arming pattern in which either: 1. dependent-type supply lines are used, but dependency is reduced by diversification of suppliers and/or recipients possess a degree of influence, but not control, within the supply process; and/or 2. global markets are accessed, but regional facilitation is required. Thus, the four acquisition patterns – constituted on the basis of the framework and empirical analyses developed here and in previous chapters are ● ● ● ●

bottom-up; dependent top-down; semi-autonomous top-down; autonomous top-down.

This chapter examines the nature of bottom-up arming patterns and their relationship with the evolving structures of SALW availability and spread within the conflict-complex level. Top-down patterns are examined in Chapter 8. Together these two chapters empirically assess the nature and location of the construction of these arming patterns and their correlation with the actor typology – in order to test the importance of key structures and processes of SALW spread for the arming of conflict.


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Civilian arming and bottom-up acquisition patterns Civilian arming and bottom-up arming by conflict factions are primarily constructed at the conflict-complex level. They reflect the characteristics of SALW availability and circulation within the fragmented political and economic space of the conflict-complex. While available information is limited, a provisional analysis is made of how the structures and dynamics of SALW availability and civilian and bottom-up arms acquisition evolve through the pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict periods. One of the key dilemmas in examining civilian arming within conflict-complexes is the blurring of the distinction between combatant and non-combatant in many civil wars (UN, 1999). While overly rigid distinctions between civilians and combatants mask underlying continuities in the character of violence within conflict-complexes, the distinction remains hypothetically useful. For the purposes of analysing arming patterns, rather than reflecting an inadequacy in this distinction, the blurring of actor status is best seen as highlighting fluidity in the relationship between the two types of actors and the related arms acquisitions. Indeed, whether there are any significant distinctions between civilian arming and the bottom-up arming of conflict factions is a key question in discerning structures of SALW spread. Civilian security and arming The majority of firearms in global circulation are believed to be in civilian hands. A global average of around 60 per cent belies significant variation in regional and national proportions (Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 103; and 2003 pp. 66, 81, 90). Only a small proportion of this global civilian ownership is within states that can be considered part of a conflict-complex. Conflict often has a dramatic effect on civilian arming patterns. Conflict exacerbates the insecurity of civilians due to the high rates of civilian casualties and the deliberate targeting of civilians, particularly in predatory violence as part of the bottom-up war economy. In response Civil Defence Forces (CDF) may be created or expanded, Private Security Companies (PSC) hired (by those that can afford them), and individual civilians may arm themselves. The mobilisation of armed civilian groups, such as CDFs, and their arming with more powerful SALW contributes to the militarisation of social structures. Traditional leaderships are often targeted directly by warring factions as part of efforts to undermine enemy control and recruit youth. Thus, in Somalia and Afghanistan, for example, the availability of SALW undermined


traditional clan and tribal leaders. Armed youths were no longer constrained by these elders and the constellations of power within a society shifted (Roy, 1991, p. 56; Abdullah and Muana, 1998, p. 178). Similarly, in Guatemala and Peru, for example, the mobilisation of Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PACs) ‘replaced traditional leadership structures and eroded traditional values’ (Louise, 1995). Thus, civilian arming during conflict is an important, but under-researched, aspect of small arms circulation in conflicts. What effects does conflict have on civilian arming? The structures and dynamics of civilian arming in conflict-complexes represent the baselevel of SALW availability in conflict-complexes. Two types of civilian arming processes can be discerned: 1. ‘normal’ societal acquisition processes of retail-scale trade including both legal and illicit transactions within the conflict-complex and through the regional ant-trade; (henceforth referred to as retail mechanisms); and 2. the arming of civilians from faction’s stocks including deliberate distribution, theft, illicit sale, and the desertion of combatants; (henceforth referred to as diffusion mechanisms). The structures and dynamics of civilian arming evolve throughout conflict. Pre-conflict and non-conflict countries Retail mechanisms are ubiquitous. In most states the legal retail trade is the primary source of arms for civilians. In many cases this extends to powerful automatic and semi automatic weapons sold openly for purposes of self-protection, hunting, and sports-shooting. They are a source of arms used for both legal and illegal purposes, and both for individuals and for more organised civilian groups such as CDFs and PSCs. Likewise illegal or unregulated informal markets may supply a variety of civilians. In most states the illegal trade in weapons runs parallel to the legal trade, and sources weapons from the legal trade, as well as regional ant-trade and craft manufacture. Some diffusion mechanisms are common to both conflict and preconflict situations. Diffusion through grey-market or black-market arms trading within states is common, but generally on a small-scale. In Nigeria, for example, in the late 1990s Ijaw youths engaged in communal violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta were believed to have been armed with rocket launchers, grenades, and assault rifles, by soldiers


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sent to control the violence (Barret, 1997, p. 855). Corrupt members of state forces also sometimes hire out their arms to criminals as has occurred in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique (Smith and Vines, 1997, p. 49; Arrous, 1998). Thefts from government armouries are a feature of illicit domestic markets for both factions and civilians alike. Larger-scale diffusion mechanisms are far less common, and occur in very specific circumstances of state collapse, as in Albania, or in many conflicts. The deliberate distribution of SALW is a diffusion mechanism that occurs in both strong and weak states. The distribution of military type weapons is commonly conducted by governments in countries that practice conscription or maintain reserve-based militaries, such as Switzerland and the former-Yugoslavia (prior to the conflict). In weak states the distribution of arms has been an integral part of the patronage networks that often sustain governments. For example, throughout Afghan history the state has only been able to maintain control by distributing economic largesse and weapons to clan leaders (Bakshi, 1998). Similarly, in Ghana in the early 1980s the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) distributed thousands of AK-47s to civilian cadres and People’s Defence Committees that were in charge of local administration (Musah, 1999, p. 116). Indeed, weapons may be imported for this purpose: during the pre-election political violence in Zimbabwe in 2000, for instance, the Zimbabwean government reportedly imported 21,000 AK-47 assault rifles most of which were, officially at least, destined for the 18,000 strong police force while the remainder were distributed to the ‘war veterans’ (Dougherty, 2000; Walker, 2000). Conflict Conflict, by definition, involves a degree of state atrophication. Thus, diffusion mechanisms are likely to become more significant during periods of conflict. Additionally, the atrophication of the state and the rule of law during conflict blurs the boundaries between legal and illicit retail markets, while the flow of arms from factions to local markets and direct grey- or black-market trading by combatants expands the scale of the retail market – thereby blurring distinctions between retail scale trade and diffusion mechanisms. A common result is a quantitative and qualitative increase of arms in civilian circulation. The effects of conflict on the retail trade are profound. By definition, the atrophication of state control in key areas of the conflict-complex has a deleterious effect on the efficacy of domestic regulation of SALW trade, thereby increasing the space for grey- and black-market circulation. In addition to being a function of state atrophication, the decline


of legal boundaries between legal and illicit arms circulation is often deliberate. Some states have liberalised gun possession laws in order to stimulate civilian arming for similar reasons to the direct distribution of weapons. In Guatemala, for example, the most significant factor driving the spread of SALW throughout society is claimed to have been the domestic gun laws introduced in 1985, which recognised that the state is unable to protect its citizens, and encourages them to arm themselves (Louise, 1998). Likewise, in Colombia, a 1967 law authorising the formation of Autodefensas in rural areas was followed in the late 1970s by the defence minister encouraging civilians to arm themselves, and the justice minister encouraging the same a decade later (García-Peña, 1995, p. 103). The evolution of retail mechanisms through the weakening of arms regulations is exacerbated by hugely expanded accumulations of arms within the conflict-complex, which then leak onto local markets or are sold directly to civilians by combatants. The availability of these weapons changes the nature of domestic illicit markets as the flow of more powerful military-type arms saturates the market, and artisan production is squeezed out of the market. For example, local arms production in Afghanistan flourished in the early 1980s before the Mujahideen obtained significant foreign assistance, but deteriorated after the initiation of large-scale flows of more sophisticated weapons (Litavrin, 1999, p. 233). The greatest impact of conflict upon civilian arming relates to the rapid expansion of diffusion mechanisms. During conflict the deliberate arming of civilians by both governments and insurgents appears more common. This is because of a number of factors: ●

●

the number of armed groups with the capacity to engage in such distribution increases (both governments and insurgents may conduct this activity); the motivations for which actors engage in distribution are particularly acute in times of conflict.

The distribution of arms to civilians is often a form of recruitment, in which armed civilians may become full-time or part-time combatants. SALW have been distributed by governments to civilians in the conflicts in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Tajikistan, and Colombia, among others (see respectively: Star Kampuchea, 28 July 1998; Chachiua, 1999; Pirseyedi, 2000, p. 40; and Toro, 2002). In Cambodia, for instance, weapons imported from China were distributed in the areas with the highest levels of violence. Likewise, in Angola over 500,000 AK47s were estimated to have been distributed to civilians in and around Luanda


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in 1992 (Smith and Vines, 1997, p. 23). The distribution of arms to civilians by warring factions appears particularly common in those conflicts in which faction leaders mobilise combatants by ‘playing the communal card’. For example, in the early stages of the conflict in Liberia, both the NPFL and the government forces distributed small arms to civilians both as part of recruitment and in order to exacerbate communal violence (Ellis, 1995, pp. 167–168). The distribution of arms to civilians in times of violent conflict not only diffuses the means of armed violence throughout a society (or more accurately, particular sectors of society), but can also intensify and diffuse the conflict itself. This contributes significantly to the blurring of distinctions between civilians and combatants. Significantly, during conflict the arming of ethnic militias and CDF-type groups appears more common as a deliberate diffusion mechanism than distribution to individuals. This practice, however, primarily relates to the evolution of such civilian groups into major conflict actors, such as occurred with the CDFs in Sierra Leone, the PACs in Guatemala, and paramilitary groups in Colombia. In one exception, Peruvian Civil Defence Patrols existed in diverse forms and were more independent from the warring factions than CDFs that were raised in other conflicts in Latin America. As a result they were reputedly more effective in reducing levels of violence against civilians (Basombrío, 1999, pp. 217–218). During conflict diffusion is primarily contained within the mobilisation and expansion of conflict factions and civilian militias. This is ‘latent’ diffusion that is realised on a larger scale in post-conflict periods. Post-conflict Peace may bring increased violence. SALW spread lies at the heart of this dichotomy. Post-conflict violence is fuelled by stocks of weapons accumulated during conflict that become diffused, and by continued inflows of SALW. In many conflict-complexes, criminal violence increases in the immediate post-conflict period prompting further civilian mobilisation and arming. In Liberia, Mozambique, South Africa, Mali, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, to name but a handful, violent crime has increased exponentially in the post-conflict phase (Chingono, 1996, p. 141; IISS, 1997; Aning, 1999, p. 347; Chachiua, 1999; McCleary, 1999, pp. 428–429). Additionally, the mobilisation of civil defence forces and ethnic militias has often contributed to the escalation of underlying inter-ethnic conflicts which may continue (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, pp. 260–61). While a peace may be declared, the violence-based structures of power and profit of conflict often remain intact. This includes


the blurred boundaries of the conflict-complex: in many post-conflict situations, where those tasked with enforcing the peace, be they peacekeepers as with ECOMOG in Liberia, or the state itself, as in Central American conflicts, have been unable to control borders, and thus the arms markets that operated across them have undermined disarmament efforts by allowing further influxes of arms (Africa Confidential, 8 October 1993; Child, 1992, p. 128; Aning, 1999, p. 343). The ‘end’ of conflict, therefore, is a key event in the evolution of the social and political economy of armed groups that metamorphose and fragment into criminal groups, mercenaries, private security companies, and armed individuals. Diffusion processes predominate in post-conflict periods. Distribution to civilians may occur for similar reasons as in pre-conflict arming: for instance, in Nicaragua the Sandinista government distributed large numbers of weapons to civilians including approximately 50,000 AK-47s to its militia during the war and a further 20,000 to civilians in the immediate post-conflict period between the February 1990 election and the inauguration of the Chamorro government two months later (Child, 1992, p. 110). However, such distribution appears more unusual in postconflict periods than during conflict. In the post-conflict period the accumulation of SALW within conflictfactions may be reversed or transformed. The reversal of factional accumulation entails the disarmament of faction’s forces before the latent diffusion contained therein is realised. This is usually done through externally supported DDR programmes. However, these seldom retard the diffusion of SALW from factional stocks: factions often hand in only a small amount of their weapons, usually those in the worst condition, while retaining a larger quantity of higher quality weapons either for continued use, for sale, or for caches which can be dug up and used should the peace process prove unsatisfactory to faction leaders or combatants (Kingma, 2000; Faltas et al., 2001). Similarly, in Mali, while the disarmament programme was lauded as a success, the integration of excombatants into a new national force undermined this disarmament: a number of Tuareg ex-combatants were integrated into the new armed forces in line with the peace agreement; but rising post-conflict tensions, including some violent clashes with government-armed Ganda Koi militia, in 1994 led to the disintegration of the ‘integrated’ forces and many Tuaregs decamped back to their rebel bases with their newly acquired arms (Africa Confidential, 12 May 1995, p. 5; UN, 1995; Poulton and Youssouf, 1998, p. 70). Diffusion through the fragmentation of factions is a generic mechanism and occurs in all conflict-complexes to differing degrees. The character


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of this diffusion, however, varies considerably as factions fragment in different ways. Some factions collapse entirely, with individual excombatants returning to their homes or turning to crime. Others may fragment into more organised groups that may become factions in future conflicts, or continue the bottom-up and top-down economic activities they pursued during conflict in the form of criminal groups. Some post-conflict situations see a proliferation of civilian armed groups: For example, many ex-combatants may set themselves up as PSCs. Thus, for example, PSCs have proliferated in post-Apartheid South Africa, post-conflict Guatemala, and numerous others (Bourne, 2002). Such diffusion processes are primarily a change in the status of those in possession of arms rather than a SALW flow process per se. Similar processes of fragmentation, of course, also occur in periods of lower intensity of violence during conflict. For many ex-combatants the arms in their possession are not only tools of their future trade, but also commodities to be sold on local and regional markets, thereby flooding the illicit retail markets. Nevertheless, in the immediate post-conflict period the cascading of arms into societal circulation through the fragmentation of warring factions appears to be the predominant process of civilian arming. Overall, it seems that in times of conflict civilians of all types become integrated into the broad structures of arms circulation between warring factions in conflict-complexes. The same conflict-complex level structures and processes arm both types alike. The progression from preconflict, to conflict, to post-conflict periods can have significant effects on the nature and scale of civilian arming through these mechanisms. Bottom-up arming Bottom-up arming is the acquisition of arms by combatants for themselves and their faction. Characterised by small-scale acquisitions, though often with a significant cumulative effect, the processes of bottom-up arming occur largely within the conflict-complex and through the anttrade. The processes of bottom-up arming include ●

● ● ●

the aggregation of societally diffused stocks from within the conflictcomplex; purchase on local markets; cross-border ant-trade transfers; and theft and capture.

These fall into two primary types: accumulative processes (the aggregation of arms and ammunition from small diffused stocks and retail


mechanisms) and diffusive processes (the leakage or fragmentation of larger stocks). In the limited literature on arms acquisitions by conflict actors, several claims have been made in relation to bottom-up arming: that theft and capture have been a more important mechanism of re-supply to insurgents and embargoed governments than the import of weapons from outside sources (Neuman, 1995, p. 69). Conversely, Sislin and Pearson (2001, p. 395) found that their hypothesis that ‘The most likely mode of acquisition for ethnic groups is domestic procurement’ was not supported by their investigation and expressed surprise at ‘the evident predominance of groups’ arms imports over domestic arms procurement’. The wide range of cases of the acquisition of arms from outside of the conflict-complex indicates that the first claim is inaccurate, while the latter is lacking in specificity. However, it is clear that bottom-up arming processes are a ubiquitous feature of conflict-complexes. Some armed groups appear to have relied solely upon bottom-up processes as their dominant pattern of arming. Drawing on the framework developed throughout the book, the central proposition here is that construction of bottom-up arming patterns is dependent on particular aspects of the political economy of the conflict-complex and the arming faction. As a result, militias and embryonic insurgents tend to operate a predominantly bottom-up mode of acquisition because they lack the foundations of a capacity to arm in a top-down mode. Within bottom-up arming patterns, it seems likely that – due to the evolution of the structures of arms circulation throughout conflict – accumulative processes of bottom-up arming are predominant for embryonic insurgents in pre-conflict and formative periods, and that both accumulative and diffusive processes sustain bottom-up arming modes. Pre-conflict and formative periods Accumulative processes tend to be particularly important to insurgent forces in their formative periods. In Somalia the SNM alliance of clanbased factions received arms from chiefs who had collected weapons from their clans to support the struggle against the Barre regime. Many of these arms had previously been distributed to civilians by the Barre government from the late 1970s onwards in attempts to manipulate clan relations through fuelling localised conflicts (Adam, 1992; Adam, 1995, p. 77; Forberg and Terlinden, 1999, pp. 36, 42). Similarly, in Georgia in the 1990s, various militias were armed with old weapons that had been distributed to civilians during Second World War (Demetriou, 2002, p. 9).


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Indeed, accumulative processes of bottom-up arming are inherent in many factions’ formation processes. Many insurgent groups are formed as alliances of several – already armed – smaller groups, including the Contra’s in Nicaragua, the FMLN in El Salvador, RENAMO in Mozambique, the ADFL in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the SNM in Somalia, the MFUA in Mali, and the FLAA in Niger. Conversely, in some conflicts insurgent factions have emerged through the fragmentation of larger factions, thereby engendering diffusion processes of initial arming. In pre-conflict periods this commonly takes the form of army revolts in which former-military officers constitute much of the initial insurgent force. For example, the Guatemalan insurgency began in the 1960s as an abortive military coup, and the majority of the early guerrilla leadership were former military officers (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, p. 65). Likewise, the 1998 conflict in GuineaBissau began as an army rebellion that was sparked by the dismissal of General Ansumane Mane from the army over allegations of negligence with respect to the smuggling of arms from a military depot to the MFDC in Senegal (Africa Research Bulletin, February 1998; Amnesty International, 1998, p. 3). Similarly, conflicts following the overthrow of a government may also engender diffusion in formation. For example, in Nicaragua, the soldiers of the overthrown Somoza regime formed the Fuerza Democrátia Nicaraguense (FDN) which constituted the core of the Contra forces in Nicaragua (Spalding, 1999, p. 34). Throughout conflict arms circulate through the desertion of military personnel. This may be particularly significant for expanding arms acquisitions in early stages of conflict. For instance, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted entire garrisons of the Afghan army to defect to opposition forces. This, in turn allowed the insurgents to seize hundreds of government outposts and the arms and ammunition therein (Roy, 1991, p. 17). Likewise, many of the anti-Derg forces in Ethiopia benefited from the desertion, with their arms, of entire units of the Ethiopian army, in the wake of a failed coup attempt in 1989 (Keller, 1997, p. 131). Similarly, in a few cases insurgent factions have been composed of soldiers from foreign armies: for instance, much of the 2000 strong initial force of the RPF was largely drawn from Rwandan members of the Ugandan NRA (Prunier, 1998, p. 130). Similarly, in Mali and Niger many Tuareg fighters in MFUA and FLAA had previously served in Libyan President Gadhaffi’s Islamic Legion before returning home with their arms and initiating insurgencies (Africa Confidential, 12 May 1995, p. 5), as had the leadership of the NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone. In all of these cases the regional governments they had previously served


continued to provide SALW through covert aid ( Africa Confidential, 27 September 1991, p. 6; Ellis, 1998b; Prunier, 1998, p. 131). Thus, the formation of insurgent forces typically engenders some form of bottom-up arming. These processes of formation and reconfiguration continue throughout conflicts. They are relatively distinct from the ‘normal’ civilian acquisition processes, and are not acquisition patterns based on the political economy of conflict-complexes, but rather are events that run concomitantly with the construction of a conflict-complex. In addition to accumulative and diffusive bottom-up arming engendered within the formation of insurgent groups, the structures of civilian arms availability outlined above also shape bottom-up arming: legal and illicit domestic markets are often accessed, and small-scale thefts of arms and grey- and black-market transactions within the conflict-complex continue and expand. In Afghanistan, for example, in 1979 the types of arms from captured fighters revealed that in the initial phases of the conflict the Mujahideen relied primarily on what Hyman (1992, p. 135) refers to as ‘traditional sources of supply’. These weapons were mostly old Enfield .303 and poor quality rifles manufactured in Afghanistan and the North West Frontier of Pakistan available on civilian retail markets. Similarly, in West Africa, artisan production has supplied arms for use in criminal and low-level political violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. For instance, in Mali this often involved the modification of ‘traditional’ hunting weapons to fire military ammunition using by fitting gun-barrels manufactured to military specification, which were smuggled in (Neuman, 1995; UN, 1996). Likewise, ‘homemade’ weapons have reportedly been used by conflict factions in Senegal (by the MFDC in its early campaigns), and in Sierra Leone (by civil defence forces such as the Kamajors) (Africa Confidential, 29 June 1990; Riley, 1997, p. 288). Ant-trade flows also feed into the accumulative bottom-up arming processes. While such transfers may occur throughout conflict, they are often particularly significant for the initial arming of factions. In these early periods the same permissive conditions that allow the ant-trade to operate, particularly weak state control over border areas, also facilitate the emergence of factions. Thus, the MFDC secessionist movement also operates within the Casamance area of Senegal, which has long been isolated from the process of state-making in Senegal (Couldon and Cruise O’Brien, 1989, p. 158; Zartman, 1997, p. 34). Likewise, the TPLF was established in 1975 in an area of Tigray where government control was limited (Young, 1998, p. 38); and Nigerien Tuaregs of the FLAA obtained arms from the exiled army of former Chadian President


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Hissene Habré, which was encamped in eastern Niger from late 1990 (Africa Confidential, 24th January 1992, p. 8). Conflict SALW circulate during conflict through diffusion and circulation of arms and combatants among factions. There is a continual circulation of arms between factions as weapons are captured and stolen by all sides. Diffusion processes occur throughout conflict, particularly through the fragmentation of factions – as occurred with the NPFL in Liberia, the SPLA in Sudan, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in Somalia, and the RCD in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to name but a few. However, much bottom-up arming during conflict is sustained primarily by smaller accumulative processes from weapons circulating within the conflict-complex. The bottom-up processes of accumulation and diffusion in formative periods may arm embryonic insurgents, but seldom yield sufficiently regular access to weapons and ammunition to conduct a protracted armed conflict. However, throughout all conflict phases (Pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict) there is a continual circulation of arms between factions through theft and capture and illicit sales. Even for insurgent factions that have secured external supplies of arms in the early phases of conflict, such bottom-up arming may remain significant. For example, the RPF in Rwanda, the NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone, had all secured supply lines early in the conflict, or even prior to the initiation of violence. Nevertheless, these factions continued to obtain stocks within the conflict-complex through theft and capture. The theft and capture of arms by combatants maintains a degree of circulation within the conflict-complex. Much violence by insurgent groups in emergent conflict-complexes takes the form of ‘hit-and-run’ operations on state forces and arsenals in order to obtain SALW. This is usually on ‘softer’ targets in the hinterland of already weak states in which insurgents emerge. In Uganda, for example, the NRA initiated conflict in February 1981 by engaging in hit-and-run operations upon barracks and police posts from which they took arms and ammunition (Ngoga, 1998, pp. 94–95). The theft of arms is a factor in the basic level of arms availability to civilian factions as well as to factions. Thefts from state stocks and resale on local markets often increase during conflict. This is often facilitated by corrupt members of armed groups stealing and selling arms. Thus, the discipline of armed personnel of a faction is a significant factor in the availability of arms through bottom-up processes. Indeed, the propensity for bottom-up arming in the early stages of conflict is


facilitated by the expansion of armed forces. As conflict progresses warring factions, both states and insurgents, develop and expand their forces thereby increasing the scale of arms accumulation within the faction through fresh acquisitions and accumulative arming. This expansion of forces necessitates the development of integrative structures, through training, logistics, and so forth. However, it can also engender parallel disintegrative pressures: the training, discipline, and professionalism of new recruits are often limited, and poorly trained and often unpaid fighters frequently engage in criminal activity. While some insurgent factions, such as the NRA, the EPLF and the TPLF, or the RPF were able to instil and maintain a high level of discipline over their forces, many others, such as the NPFL, and many government forces such as the Sierra Leone Army and Zairian army, were unable to do the same. Battlefield capture, in contrast to theft, is by definition a function of engagements between enemy forces. This indicates that the military strength of the acquiring faction, rather than the laxity of discipline, stockpile security, and weapons leakage, is a major factor of such acquisitions. This is a ubiquitous mechanism, which in some cases has yielded very large stocks of weapons. Significantly, however, the distinction between theft and capture is blurred in many conflicts – largely as a function of economic structures of violence within the conflict-complex. This occurs through inter-factional arms trading, including between ostensibly opposing forces. Bottom-up war economies can shape opportunities for bottom-up arming. In such economies, combatants often engage in predatory violence against civilian populations, stealing goods for sale on the local black market for personal sustenance and enrichment. In some conflicts bottom-up war economies have generated a degree of informal cooperation between the combatants of government and insurgent forces. This cooperation has sometimes included the trading of arms between enemies. Such inter-factional arms trade has been referred to as a ‘sell-game’ a phrase coined in relation to apparent co-operation between the ‘sobelised’ (Soldier by day, rebel by night) Sierra Leone Army and the RUF (Keen, 1995). Here, in a form of co-operative predation, government forces would withdraw from a town, leaving arms and ammunition behind, the rebels would then take control of the town and collect the arms and also extract cash from the civilian population before retreating. Government forces would then reoccupy the town and loot property (that rebels found more difficult to sell) and engage in illegal mining (Keen, 2001, p. 169).


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Similar transfers between warring factions have occurred in many conflict-complexes, including Angola, Cambodia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Sri-Lanka (Naylor, 1993; Keen, 1998, p. 18; Kearney, 2002). For example, according to Sebastian Smith (2001, p. 186), in Chechnya, in addition to regional covert aid and black-market transfers, sales by underpaid Russian soldiers were common and ‘almost any road checkpoint served as a black market’ and ‘there was also a racket in which the Russians simulated battles, pretended to lose weapons in action and sold them to the Chechens’. Such arms circulation is deeply embedded within broader economies relations within conflict. It is fuelled by top-down arms acquisitions. Arms and ammunition have an economic value to the fighters that receive them – a value that can be realised through the bottom-up war economy. This can take various forms, including direct trading between combatants as in Sierra Leone, (Keen,1998, p. 19). In others cases, such as Sudan and Afghanistan, soldiers sold arms and ammunition to local traders that were then purchased by enemy forces. In Afghanistan Mujahideen factions favoured by the Pakistani ISI received greater quantities of US supplied arms than they required. This often resulted in the sale of those arms on local markets, from which lessfavoured factions were able to acquire them. Thus the leakage of arms and the stimulation of local arms markets counteracted the effects of the politicised distribution policies of the ISI. Similarly, the formation of insurgent groups as alliances of smaller groups and militias may also lead to some arms trading amongst combatants. For example, the various militias that composed the SNM in Somalia engaged in arms trading amongst themselves (Forberg and Terlinden, 1999, p. 36). In all these forms, such transfers are founded on bottom-up war economies that are similar in structure and function to the informal cross-border economies that underlie the regional ant-trade. As such, the inter-factional bottomup arms trade is founded on the fragmentation and informalisation of economic space within conflict-complexes, and is a function of cooperative conflict within that space. Thus, there is little to distinguish this trade from the expansion of the arms black market serving civilians.

Post-conflict The predominance of diffusion mechanisms in post-conflict civilian arming is also marked for factional arming. In particular, such processes feed into the arming of factions in new conflicts. Thus, in post-conflict periods not only do factions evolve into criminal groups, militias, and


mercenaries as well as civilian formations; but also one conflict may evolve into another. In some cases this has involved the start of a new conflict amongst former allies. Victorious alliances have subsequently descended into factional violence and civil war in many conflict-complexes including: Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces; Zaire/DRC after the overthrow of Mobutu by the ADFL in 1997; and on a smaller scale in Zimbabwe, Lebanon, Sudan, and Chad (Atlas and Licklider, 1999). This was often the case with the end of independence struggles in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in Southern Africa the Mozambiquan rebel group RENAMO was formed in rear bases in Rhodesia from diverse elements including approximately 2,000 former members of FRELIMO, disaffected by the movement, who had begun caching arms during the independence war (Chingono, 1996, pp. 30, 31, 76). These caches formed the initial arsenal of RENAMO along with aid from Rhodesia. Likewise, in the 1990s continued violence in Nicaragua after the peace process included that conducted by recompas and recontras composed of formerly demobilised combatants. Thus according to Rose Spalding (1999, pp. 46–47): an estimated 300,000 arms were held in the country at the time of Chamorro’s inauguration. Roughly one-third were turned in during the 1990 disarmament process, leaving two-thirds still in private hands or in arms caches scattered in the countryside. Remobilization was an all-too-simple procedure. In each case the arms possessed by the warring factions during the first conflict were their initial arsenal at the start of the second. Thus, in the early stages of one conflict, the character of bottom-up arming inherent in the formation of insurgent groups may be influenced by the existence and reconfiguration of factions from earlier conflicts. Bottom-up arming patterns: correlations and construction With the exception of large-scale theft and capture, the bottom-up arming processes of conflict-factions have no specific and unique processes that are distinct from civilian arming. Significantly, the potential to acquire arms in this way is a function of conflict-complex structures rather than of the control of that political and economic space by the acquiring actor that are defining features in the actor typology. Nevertheless, the operation of a predominantly bottom-up mode of arming does have strong associations with the embryonic insurgent actor type – particularly in the early stages of conflict: accumulative processes and particularly the aggregation of societally diffused stocks and the


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accessing of local markets is a particular feature of the formation of insurgent groups and the associated mobilising dynamics. During conflict, sustained bottom-up arming modes are founded on bottom-up war economies and their interaction with and effects upon local arms markets. Much bottom-up arming occurs primarily through small-scale barter transactions, and is therefore particularly well suited to those factions that are characterised by only a bottom-up war economy. Indeed, bottomup arming reveals some useful lessons about the bottom-up war economy: such economies do not yield concentrated amounts of hard currency or internationally tradable commodities. Rather, through pillage and criminality, they yield other goods that can be traded on the informal markets for second-hand and stolen weapons. Thus, while bottom-up economic activity has no discernible effect upon the faction’s ability to access international stocks through regional alliances. It does, however, contribute to bottom-up arming from sources both within the conflict-complex and the regional ant-trade. The correlation of bottom-up arming patterns and the actor typology varies through time. In particular, the operation of a predominantly bottom-up arming mode correlates less strongly with actor types during conflict than in the pre-conflict period. The reliance upon a bottom-up arming pattern by some insurgents and not by others is not merely a function of arms availability in conflict-complexes as implied by Sislin et al.,’s (1998, p. 395) claim that ‘ethnic groups simply pick up arms readily at hand’. In both pre-conflict and conflict periods, the predominance of bottom-up arming for militias and embryonic insurgents is largely explained by those actors’ lack of the core characteristics that allow the development and continuation of top-down modes of acquisition from external sources (see Chapter 8). A small but significant number of insurgent groups have continued to operate a predominantly bottom-up mode of arming even when their internal characteristics would suggest some capacity for top-down arming. This seems largely related to specific circumstances that do not correlate with the defining features of actor types. The NRA in Uganda in the 1980s, for example, remained primarily reliant on bottom-up mode of acquisition throughout the conflict, largely as a result of the lack of regional and international covert aid or other strategic relationships through which topdown arming patterns could be developed. Thus, the NRA was organised into six units some tasked with recruitment and others with capturing arms through mobile attacks (Ngoga, 1998, pp. 99–100; Katumba-Wamala, 2000, pp. 165–167). Similarly, the MFDC in Senegal, although it received some covert aid from Mauritania, was largely dependent on bottom-up


arming from cross-border ant-trade. In particular it has relied upon weapons smuggled from Guinea-Bissau, including grey-market ant-trade transfers from government stocks and black-market transfers drawing on arms from the independence struggle in the 1960s and 1970s, and crude craft produced arms (Africa Confidential, 12th October 1990; Africa Confidential, 29 June 1990). The reliance of these factions on a bottom-up pattern of arming was largely a function of the lack of an organised regional black market as well as a resource-based top-down war economy and associated networks. Thus, the continued operation of bottom-up arming during conflict is often a function of the constraints imposed upon insurgent arming by the limitations of regional structures. Conversely, some warlord or quasi-state type insurgent groups have maintained a bottom-up arming pattern by choice. This was particularly the case during the Cold War when covert aid from the superpowers was perceived as generating dependency. For example, Sendero Luminoso in Peru were a well-organised faction with quasi-state like control of areas of the Upper Huallaga Valley. They also reportedly had a strategic alliance with narco-traffickers that gave them access to the drug-lords’ arms – though this is hotly contested.1 Nevertheless, their primary arming mode was bottom-up acquisitions from local sources conducted by the lowest ranking members of the organisation (Tarazona-Sevillano, 1990, pp. 55–70). These were largely acquired from stolen or bought from police and military stocks (Naylor, 1993). Likewise the TPLF and EPLF in Ethiopia insisted on self-reliance (Clapham, 1998, p. 10;Pool, 1998, p. 23; Young, 1998, pp. 40, 44). As shown in the previous chapters, in the post-Cold War era these dependency concerns are reduced and the importance of war economy networks has taken primacy over geopolitical determinants at other levels. Thus, in the current era a reliance on bottom-up arming after the initial period of formation tends to reflect a lack of the core characteristics of factions that facilitate topdown arming rather than a deliberate choice.

Conclusion Civilian arming patterns and processes evolve with conflict and are a primary arena of the legacy of conflict arming. While it has only been possible to conduct a basic examination of civilian arming, it appears that conflict has a significant effect on the nature of civilian arming processes as well as their scale. Broadly speaking in pre-conflict periods retail mechanisms are the predominant structures of availability and


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flow to civilians. During conflict the boundaries between retail mechanisms and diffusion processes are blurred. Civilians become integrated into the broad structures of arms circulation between warring factions and these are not distinct from localised faction arming processes. In post-conflict periods diffusion mechanisms predominate. Bottom-up arming processes for factions are ubiquitous and, with the exceptions of large-scale theft and capture, are not distinct from civilian arming. The capacity for factions to acquire arms through bottom-up processes appears to be a function of conflict-complex structures rather than of the control of that political and economic space by the acquiring actor that are defining features in the actor typology. Nevertheless, there does appear to be some correlation between actors of the embryonic insurgent and militia type and the operation of a predominantly bottom-up pattern of arming. Broadly speaking accumulative processes predominate for embryonic insurgents in the early stages of conflict. Bottom-up patterns of arming are sustained by both accumulative and diffusive processes that are closely integrated with bottom-up war economies and their interaction with and effects upon local markets. In the post-Cold War era, a reliance on bottom-up arming after the initial period of formation tends to reflect a lack of the core characteristics of factions that facilitate top-down arming rather than a deliberate choice. Thus, constructed at the conflict-complex level, bottom-up arming is the default option for all conflict-factions.

8 Constructing Top-Down Arming Patterns: Sovereignty, Money, Networks, and the Cumulative Impact of Structures and Dynamics of SALW Spread

This chapter analyses the construction of top-down arming patterns. Top-down arming is the acquisition of SALW, primarily from external sources, by a faction’s leadership that are then distributed through internal organisational structures. In particular this chapter examines the construction of the three patterns of top-down arming, as outlined in Chapter 7: these are dependent; semi-autonomous; and autonomous patterns of top-down arming. In so doing it examines how the different structures and dynamics of SALW spread at the global, regional, and conflict levels interact. It discerns how their characteristics, and those of recipient actors, construct arming patterns, thereby clarifying the importance of sovereignty, money, and networks, in shaping access to arms. In combination with Chapter 7, it completes the picture that SALW spread to conflicts is – in fact – not amorphous, but rather is highly structured. It tackles such questions as: ● ●

●

How are arming patterns constructed? At what level are arming patterns constructed (or what combination of levels)? Is there a non-state threshold in SALW spread to conflicts?

These questions are answered by examining which conflict actors have been characterised by different top-down arming patterns, and discerning which aspects of the political economy of the conflict-complex, 206

Constructing Top-Down Arming Patterns 207

the faction, and the regional and international structures of flow and availability contribute to the degree of dependency or autonomy in their acquisitions. Overall, the identification of key determinants of arming capacity contributes to an understanding of the manner in which acquisition patterns evolve and shift. Thus SALW spread to conflict is found to be both highly structured and highly dynamic. Importantly, however, this chapter does not, and cannot, make overarching judgements on the scale of acquisitions through these arming patterns – as the information available is insufficient for comparative analysis of this aspect of arming. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the core proposition of the amorphous image, that money determines access to arms, is a crucial element in the scale of acquisition within the boundaries of access of these arming patterns – even though it does not construct those boundaries nor – on its own – creates the capacity to move from one arming pattern to another.

Dependent top-down arming The dependent top-down arming pattern is defined by a recipient faction’s top-down arming processes involving the acquisition of SALW from only a single supplier or supply line. For those factions that operate these patterns, the dependency upon that supplier or channel is only mitigated by continued bottom-up arming. If the amorphous image of a free and globalised illicit market with no effective non-state threshold were correct, dependent arming would be rare. Those few rare cases would be readily explicable by Sislin et al.,’s (1998, pp. 396–397) hypothesis that ‘ethnic groups’ arming is constrained primarily by financial resources and shipment safety and their proposition that when importing arms they would be likely to prefer to obtain arms from states rather than private dealers. One would therefore expect a clear correlation with the less sophisticated actor types: the only forces that could be expected to be dependent top-down armers would be militias, CDFs and embryonic insurgents, those lacking in a top-down war economy or secure territories. Dependent armers Most dependent armers have been supplied by politically motivated external suppliers. They include recipients of covert aid from governments, clients in rebel axes, and proxy forces armed by patrons within the conflict-complex. While all dependent armers have been supplied by these types of channels, not all recipients of covert aid or rebel axis


clients are dependent armers. This is partially explained by the nature of regional political economies of arming (see Chapter 6 and discussion of semi-autonomous armers). However, the political economy of the conflict-complex and arming faction also shape the nature and construction of dependent arming. Dependent arming by recipients of covert aid was most clearly demonstrated during the Cold War, when sponsorship was exchanged for ideological/political orientation and accessing it required only a perception of strategic importance of the conflict concerned. For example, the Contras in Nicaragua were dependent on the CIA run arms pipeline through its rear bases in Honduras and El Salvador (Wrobel, 1997, p. 4; Vickers, 1999, p. 392). Likewise, in spite of some minor secondary supplies, the various Mujahideen groups were largely dependent upon the CIA-run Afghan pipelines (Roy, 1991, p. 38; Smith, 1995, p. 62; Thompson and Krishnan, 1999, p. 38). Likewise, most major recipients of international or regional covert aid were dependent upon it at least for particular periods, including UNITA in Angola; the FMLN in El Salvador; RENAMO in Mozambique; the PLO in the 1960s, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka (until the late 1980s). Similarly, in the post-Cold War era of regionalised covert aid many recipients have displayed a high degree of dependence in top-down arming, relying upon single patron or pipeline including several factions in Liberia, the SNM in Somalia, the ex-FAR (former Rwandan government forces) in exile in Zaire; the RPF in Rwanda; the Taleban in Afghanistan; the Badr Corps in Iraq; and the Mujahideen e-Khalq in Iran. Thus dependent arming has been a feature of many conflicts in all regions, at some stage in the conflicts. In many cases dependency in covert aid is at its highest in the early stages of conflict. Such cases include: the NPFL, RUF, and Tuareg groups when in Libyan training camps; ULIMO (a faction in the Liberian civil war) while it was forming in Sierra Leone and Guinea; FARC in Colombia from Cuba (Atkins, 1995, p. 161); the PLO in the early 1960s; and the Afar Democratic Red Sea Front in Eritrea that was created and armed by Ethiopia (Gilkes and Plaut, 1999, p. 42). This dependency is not surprising since it is often in the early periods of conflict that insurgent forces expand and require significant supplies of arms, yet lack the control of the political and economic resources of the conflict-complex required for diversified access to suppliers. Thus, for example, in Rwanda, according to Gérard Prunier (1998, p. 131): ‘The original nucleus of the RPF had carried with it enough ammunition and equipment to last for a few days, possibly weeks, of fighting. But when conflict turned into a protracted war, the Front had to establish channels of supply.’


In this case the supply channels were dominated by decentralised relationships with members of the Ugandan Army. While such insurgent groups may later develop the potential to access other regional and international sources of arms, and hence reduce their dependency, other forces continue to operate a dependent pattern throughout the conflict. In many cases dependency is maintained by a lack of the key conditions required for developing semi-autonomous arming. Dependency in arms acquisitions does not require that the sole supplier be a state. Client forces in rebel axes may also be dependent armers. Thus, the RUF in Sierra Leone was almost entirely dependent for external upon supplies run by and through the NPFL, and later the Taylor government, in Liberia. Similarly, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia obtained arms from the Somali warlord Hussein Mohammed Farah Aydeed in 1998. Aydeed, in turn, received large shipments of arms from Eritrea (Gilkes and Plaut, 1999, p. 42). Similar relationships between forces within conflict-complexes have generated greater dependency – largely as a result of lower access to external networks and the weaker of organisation of the client forces. During conflict warring factions often create other armed forces that are not directly part of their own structure, either as proxy forces in order to fulfil a role that the patron faction cannot, or militia created to supplement the effectiveness of the factions’ own forces (Ero, 2000). The former was seen in Liberia after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in July 1993 when factions continued violence by arming proxy forces in order to fight for control of resource rich areas (Conciliation Resources, 1996, p. 98). The latter includes the training and arming of Kamajor militia by the Sierra Leone government to compensate for the unreliability of the army; the creation and arming of PACs in Guatemala in the 1980s for counter-insurgency purposes (Schirmer, 1998, p. 271; Vickers, 1999, p. 397); the creation and arming of Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi militias by the government of Rwanda prior to the genocide; and the arming of the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and other militias by the Sri Lankan government forces (Human Rights Watch, 2002), to name but a few. Civilian groups such as CDFs may also be the recipients of arms from factions in a dependent pattern. For example, in Afghanistan in the 1980s, militias created throughout the conflict between the government and the Mujahideen were primarily local self-defence forces. For example, the Soviets established an intelligence network in Afghanistan (the Khadamat-e Etela’at-e Dawlati (KHAD)) which recruited ex-Mujahideen: ‘The disaffected fighters were turned into independent militias, which


proved in most areas to be very efficient, not for attacking, but for protecting areas from Mujaheddin encroachment’ (Roy, 1991, p. 21). Regardless of their form or purpose, in most cases such militia begin and remain dependent in any top-down arming processes. The construction of dependent top-down arming Any type of non-state actor has the capacity to be a dependent topdown armer. There are very limited requirements for territorial control and no need for a top-down war economy. The dependency of many insurgent forces in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras has primarily been a function of an inability to develop semi-autonomous patterns, rather than a function of a particular capacity. The relationship between dependent top-down arming and the actor types is complex. Embryonic insurgent groups and militia, if they operate a top-down arming pattern, tend to be dependent armers. However, warlord type and even quasi-state insurgents may also be dependent armers. In these cases dependency is constructed and maintained primarily by the lack of permissive conditions that would allow the development of semi-autonomous arming. These are constructed at the regional level and, particularly in the Cold War era, at the global level. Thus, for example, while the contras in Nicaragua did control some territory, an inability to control border areas in Nicaragua increased their dependence on covert aid, and particularly on their bases in Honduras and Costa Rica, where they were compelled to retreat in order to collect US airdropped supplies (Wrobel, 1997, pp. 11, 16; Vickers, 1999, p. 392). Although regional states also provided some covert aid to the contras, this was conducted through the same pipeline as US aid. However, given the limited scale of the regional black market in this period, and the tighter oligopoly in the global legal market during the Cold War, it is doubtful that a semi-autonomous arming pattern could have been developed even if greater control over border areas were achieved. These complex relationships (beyond clear and simple correlation with the actor typology in Chapter 7), do not imply a significant causal relationship between the development of insurgent organisations and dependent top-down arming. Indeed, there is a ‘chicken and egg’ dimension to dependent arming and the actor typology: Certain characteristics of conflict factions may be a result of top-down arming as well as a requisite capacity for obtaining arms in this way, including internal structures, strong leadership, and enhanced military capabilities. The receipt of covert aid, for example, can solidify the top-down organisational and logistical structures of a faction, particularly when it


includes both arms and training. Thus, prior to US covert aid, UNITA had an ad-hoc arsenal of assorted weapons from various sources that were dispersed to UNITA troops without any coordinated logistical system. The provision of US assistance significantly enhanced the organisational and logistical structures of UNITA (Mathiak, 1995, p. 84). Part of the enhancement of top-down arming relates to the solidification of the position of a faction’s leadership. This is particularly true of warlord factions that rely on the strength and patronage of leaders for their coherence. For example, Charles Taylor’s access to weapons through Libya, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire allowed him to assert his leadership within the NPFL (Ellis, 1998a, p. 161). Likewise, according to Christopher Clapham (1998, p. 16), ‘successive movements in Southern Sudan, for example, have tended to remain united when a single leader could monopolize access to external aid, and to fragment when one could not’. Perhaps the most significant case, however, is that of the various Mujahideen factions and the supply of US covert aid. In this case the functions played by internal logistical and organisational structures of most top-down armers, remained in the hands of the Pakistani intelligence service. The ISI controlled the distribution of covert-aid shipments in a politicised way that reflected and reinforced the fragmentary nature of the numerous factions (Rubin, 1995, p. 198). It also contributed to the dependence of the favoured factions until such time as the regional black market reached a size and level of organisation sufficient to allow diversification of sources and channels. Covert arming often significantly improves the military capabilities of a recipient faction. It improves the quality as well as quantity of weapons in insurgent arsenals. This is particularly true when SALW are provided to insurgent groups that previously operated a bottom-up pattern. One of the most significant elements of this is qualitative enhancement of weaponry that can allow greater protection to trafficking routes and enhance the impunity of actors. For example, in Afghanistan, from 1984 onwards, the weapons used by the insurgents improved substantially due to increasing US support. Old bolt-action rifles, Enfield .303’s capable of firing twenty rounds per minute, were replaced with automatic AK-47 assault rifles with which one fighter became capable of expelling 100 rounds in the same period.1 This, and more sophisticated light weapons, enhanced the range of military activities that the factions could undertake, and also enhanced the security of supply lines from Pakistan (Roy, 1991, p. 19). Thus, when US-manufactured Stinger missiles were first received by Mujahideen factions in 1986, their military capacity was improved to such a degree that, for several years until


counter-measures were used, about half of Afghan airspace was free of Soviet aircrafts. This gave the Mujahideen factions the impunity needed to secure areas of sanctuary, which in turn meant that, according to Olivier Roy (1991, pp. 19–23) ‘their main bases and ordnance were safe from Soviet troops and air forces. Moreover, communications lines from Pakistan became safer and more than 90% of the increasing flood of weapons and ammunitions was able to reach its destination.’2 Similarly, in Nicaragua, the acquisition of surface-to-air missiles by the Contras reportedly resulted in greater freedom to import arms (IISS, 1988, p. 209). Improved organisational, leadership, and military capacities constructed by dependent arming, in turn lay the foundation for the development of embryonic insurgents into warlord or quasi-state factions and hence the generation of a degree of autonomy in top-down arming. Thus, the channels of supply that construct dependent arming patterns also lay the foundations of insurgent capacity to reduce dependency. In theory, of course, dependency may be voluntary: covert aid and the like may provide weapons for free as well as providing training, safe-haven, and other forms of insurgent support. However, the advantages of semiautonomous arming have meant that this has seldom been the case for a sustained period.

Semi-autonomous top-down arming Semi-autonomous top-down arming is an arms acquisition pattern in which dependency is reduced by diversification of suppliers or recipients develop a degree of influence, but not control, within their primary supply lines; or in which global sources are accessed, but regional facilitation is required for this access. Semi-autonomous arming therefore grows from a maturing of dependent arming patterns, or a downgrading from an autonomous arming pattern. It results from either a capacity building process or a loss of a higher level of arming capacity. The examination of regional dimensions of SALW spread indicated that top-down war economies can create micro-economies along supply lines and contribute to the growth of regional capacity to engage in grey- and black-market facilitation. Thus, one would expect almost all semi-autonomous armers to have strong top-down war economies, and sufficient territorial control to allow the maintenance of these economies and to facilitate secure delivery of weapons shipments. In relation to the actor typology, therefore, this implies a strong correlation with warlord insurgents, and some quasistate insurgents. Hypothetically, this should also include embargoed


governments, for whom access to legal transfers is constrained and autonomy is reduced. However, the evidence collected for this book indicates that this is not necessarily the case, and most states retain autonomous patterns even when under embargo (see below). Semi-autonomous armers and supply lines There are two main paths to semi-autonomy: the development of a degree of influence over primary supply lines; and the diversification of supply lines – including to regional and regionally facilitated flows. Some insurgent groups, primarily of the warlord and quasi-state types, have attained a degree of influence within the supply lines that were previously part of dependent top-down arming. This has occurred primarily through the influence of micro-economies, founded on topdown war economies at the conflict-complex level, but operating at the regional level. For example, the NPFL in Liberia attained a degree of autonomy in their arms acquisition patterns as much, if not more, by increasing their influence on the nature and structure of their primary supply line than through the diversification of channels. This occurred largely as a result of the lucrative exports of diamonds, timber, and so forth through the regional arms pipeline – generating micro-economies. Likewise the reverse trade in drugs from Afghan factions to Pakistani business interests through the arms supply networks; and the involvement of Zairians in arms flows to, and diamond flows from, UNITA, each contributed to the development of micro-economies within the primary supply lines, thereby generating economic influence of the recipients over the supply lines which became as significant a dynamic as the preceding political motive of the covert-aid patrons. While dependency upon particular suppliers and channels may be reduced by developing a degree of influence by the recipient faction and its business allies over the regional stages of flow, a greater degree of autonomy can be realised through the diversification of channels and sources. Diversification can be achieved by hiring a broker. Brokers are capable of navigating the global market and diversifying both sources and channels in order to avoid raising suspicion. However, even diversification by accessing the global legal market through brokers still requires significant regional facilitation. This is shaped by the combination of a lucrative top-down war economy with a permissive regional political economy of facilitation and/or organised black markets. Thus, for example, the FARC in Colombia were initially reliant largely on bottom-up acquisitions (Jaramillo, 1995, p. 109). However, by the late 1990s they had established de-facto control over some 40 per cent of Colombia,


including an agreed demilitarised zone of 5,000 square miles (from 1998 until 2002), which incorporated the major drug producing areas (Brown, 2000; Franco, 2000, p. 88–89). The apparent symbiotic relationship between the FARC and drug cartels has been crucial in their capacity to arm the thousands of recruits attracted to the group’s profitable activities. FARC have largely acquired weapons from the regional black market. Additionally, according to some press reports, they have exchanged drugs directly for arms through networks linked with organised criminal groups in Russia, Chechnya, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (Franco, 2000). However, these much vaunted supplies do not appear to be direct global supply lines in which drugs are swapped for arms (Cragin and Hoffman, 2001, p. 68). Rather they are flows paid for with funds generated from the drug trade to acquire arms from extra-regional suppliers. This appears to have been the case in 2000 when FARC received arms from Jordan in a regionally facilitated supply line organised by corrupt officials in Peru (El Tiempo, Bogota, 23 August 2000; Madrid EFE, 9 September 2000). Additionally, the majority of their ammunition reportedly comes from corrupt members of the Venezuelan army in regional grey-market transfers (Rojas, 1997). Similarly, the diversification of acquisition patterns by Afghan factions – previously dependent on ISI patronage from CIA-supplied stocks – was founded on the drug trade in combination with the growth of the regional black market. Thus, according to Litavrin (1999, p. 233) In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a class of arms and drug dealers emerged who were ready to supply weapons to any of the militant groups. By mid-decade these transfers were estimated to constitute over 60 percent of all weapons reaching Afghanistan. Since the production and transportation of small arms and light weapons in Southwest Asia has become a serious business, this trend will be difficult to reverse. Indeed, throughout South and Central Asia, the combination of a regional black market and lucrative top-down war economies based on drug trafficking and other criminality has facilitated large scale SALW purchases by groups such as the ULFA in India, MILF in the Philippines; Tajik opposition groups during the conflict in Tajikistan, and many others (Litavrin, 1999, p. 231; Kartha, 1999, pp. 44, 251–256). This is clearly rooted in war economies and secure control of territory. For example, by the early 1990s, as ULFA’s territory and economic base expanded, particularly into Bangladesh, it was able to access black-market sources from further afield, including Cambodian bazaars (Kartha, 1999, pp. 258–268).


Some insurgent groups receive covert aid from multiple suppliers. While this represents a degree of diversification, as they are not reliant upon a single supplier or channel, the faction itself has little autonomy in its arming processes: it has little capacity to exercise choices in its arming or influence the continuation of supplies. Thus, even in regionalised conflicts where insurgents may be provided with covert aid from several patrons, the financial capacity to purchase arms is often a significant aspect of semi-autonomous arming. For example, in 1997 the ADFL rebels in the then-Zaire were initially aided with arms and troops from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. A significant proportion of its arms and other equipment, however, were acquired from Zimbabwe whose state-owned Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI) provided the ADFL with indigenously manufactured ammunition, surplus army uniforms, rations and boots, and surplus arms acquired from North Korea, the value of which supplies was estimated at between US$40 million and US$200 million (Africa Confidential, 11 April 1997; Public Education Center, 1998). As the ADFL advanced towards Kinshasa it expanded the territory under its control and gained control of gold and diamond mines and an all weather-airport in Bunia, through which they exported natural resources, resulting in a secure source of income that facilitated its arms purchases from ZDI (Reed, 1998, p. 150). Even though attaining a degree of economic and territorial control sufficient to characterise it as a quasi-state faction, this arming remained semi-autonomous as a result of the inability to engage directly with the global legal market (until after becoming the government). The construction of semi-autonomous arming The correlation between semi-autonomous arming patterns and actor types is relatively clear and strong, with warlord and quasi-state insurgents alone being able to operate this pattern. The only militias and embryonic insurgents that have operated a semi-autonomous mode of arming have done so by accessing organised regional black markets; not through micro-economies or facilitated accessing of global markets. Warlord-type and quasi-state insurgents share key characteristics of significant control of territory, and lucrative top-down war economies. However, the reasons for this correlation between some (but not all) warlord-type and quasi-state forces and semi-autonomous arming patterns are complex. Such patterns are constructed by a combination of specific aspects of territorial and economic structures at the conflictcomplex level and their interaction with the regional level.


Territorial control: unopposed access or control? As with the dependent pattern of arming, the security of arms supply lines is crucial for semi-autonomous acquisition processes. However, for semi-autonomous arming such security is not merely dependent on a lack of opposing factions control over borders. Key transportation infrastructure within the conflict-complex, such as ports, airports, and the like must also be secure if they are to be utilised. The secure use of this infrastructure requires a significant degree of control by the warring faction if they are to be used to regularly export goods from the conflictcomplex and receive arms shipments facilitated by regional actors. The significance of the control of entry-points is most clearly demonstrated in the effects on arms flows when such control is lost. For example, in Liberia in 1994 when ULIMO forces evicted Charles Taylor’s NPFL from its headquarters in Gbarnga and gained control of areas close to the border with Côte d’Ivoire, this forced a shift in the route of the main arms pipeline and undermined the NPFL’s war economy exports (West Africa, 17–23 October 1994; Bourne, 2004). Nevertheless, while security of supply lines provided by territorial control is a basic condition of all top-down arming, an increase in the scale or character of that territorial control that provides this security does not significantly explain why some warlord and quasi-state factions are able to develop semi-autonomous arming patterns. Significant differences in territorial control do not appear to correlate strongly with differences in the type of top-down arming. Top-down war economies: revenue or structure? It appears that the existence of a top-down war economy is a precondition for both, the generation of micro-economies and the diversification of channels. This factor alone is capable of explaining the strong correlation of semi-autonomous arming with warlord and quasi-state insurgents. Further, the specific structure of that economy and its associated networks at the regional level, influence the character and degree of autonomy in arms acquisitions. One important question is whether it is the revenue generated or it is the associated networks and economic structures that underwrites the semi-autonomous pattern? While significantly, more detailed research is necessary to fully evaluate this, some preliminary analysis is possible. While money is important, it does not explain the construction of semiautonomous arming. Armed groups with similar revenues do not operate similar arming patterns. For instance, the FARC’s narcotics-related income was estimated at $800 million in 1996 (Chernick, 1999, pp. 166–167), and


reportedly reaches as much as US$1 billion (Curtis and Karacan, 2002). They operate a semi-autonomous pattern related to the regional black market and transnational networks feeding into regionally facilitated flows. Yet some estimates of the annual budget of Basque-separatists ETA in Spain run up to twenty times that value, as high as US$20 billion, (Curtis and Karacan, 2002) but their small arms acquisitions are not more substantial or more autonomous than FARC’s. Conversely, some factions with significant territorial control and large sums of money, and – allegedly – involvement in all aspects of drug production, refining, and smuggling, such as the PKK in Turkey in the 1990s, were only able to operate a diversified arming pattern because of the number of different covert-aid patrons in the region (Brown, 1995, pp. 118–120; Curtis and Karacan, 2002). While some hard-currency, or other means of exchange, are clearly essential for semi-autonomous arming; the capacity of some actors and not others to develop semi-autonomy is not just a function of wealth. The structures of top-down war economy networks appear equally, if not more, important in building semi-autonomous arming patterns. Herein lies the distinction between the arming of warlord and quasistate insurgents: Warlord factions have war economies that feed into regional transnational networks operated by regional allies. Quasi-state war economies may generate a capacity for the faction to play regional roles itself. This, as will be seen below, is the primary reason why a few quasi-state insurgents are able to operate an autonomous arming pattern. It is also a key reason why few embargoed states revert to semiautonomous arming. War economy networks vary considerably in relation to the nature of commodities exported (timber, drugs, diamonds, etc); and the associated linkages with international markets formed by the nexus of those commodities with arms trading. The nature of a faction’s participation in economic activity also varies, especially those that are active in resource rich conflict-complexes, since they may be directly involved in extraction or may ‘tax’ others. In war economies that are not based on natural resource extraction, conflict factions have generated their income from ‘taxing’ humanitarian aid, as in Sudan. However, while such war economies may generate large resources this is not in the form of hard currency (US dollars etc.) and does not easily generate the networks associated with export of high-value goods back through which arms can flow. Conversely, some conflict commodities, such as diamonds, can be exported to legal markets, provided that regional actors and brokers are able to launder them. Others, such as illicit drugs remain within the illicit market. Thus the nature of the commodities being traded, and


the associated requirements for market access, affects the form of the revenue generated, and the types of actors that are incorporated into an insurgent group’s commercial alliances. This is particularly important in relation to the links between export networks and arms supplies. This may be significant with respect to the character of relationships and the necessity for facilitation in the return trade in SALW. Quasi-state factions’ war economies may involve not only the extraction of commodities and their export, but also obtaining revenue by granting concessions to foreign firms. Non-state actors such as Charles Taylor in Liberia, Mohammed Aideed in Somalia, and Laurent Kabila in Zaire/Congo, all attracted foreign investors and mortgaged the rights to natural resources in their territory, thus helping them finance their war machines (Reno, 1999, p. 224; Mwanasali, 2000, p. 148). In many cases the credibility – and hence profitability – of such concessions is linked to the expectation that the faction concerned will eventually gain sovereign control and/or in the first two cases the complete collapse of the state. For instance, Charles Taylor’s NPFL sold large amounts of tropical timber, iron ore, and various other commodities and concessions from early on in the Liberian conflict. This required a sophisticated network of domestic, regional and international commercial interests that underwrote the quasi-private ‘Bong Bank’ that oversaw the export of timber and is believed to have received arms from international suppliers (Reno, 1997b, pp. 499–500). While this sophisticated top-down war economy generated large funds and useful networks, the import of arms was still reliant on regionally facilitated networks. Nevertheless, the broad commodity base and sophistication of the war economy generated a degree of resilience to the foundations of regional microeconomies. Similarly, after losing covert aid from the United States and South Africa, UNITA in Angola was able to purchase substantial amounts of arms in violation of UN sanctions. This was done with illicit diamonds and revenues from diamond sales by utilising a range of networks in which arms dealers that were willing to accept payment in diamonds were actively sought out and channelled arms in regionally facilitated flows (Human Rights Watch, 1994, pp. 39, 57; Fowler, 2000). Thus, while not necessarily leading to autonomous arming, quasi-state insurgents’ ability to acquire arms in a semi-autonomous pattern is likely to be stronger and more resilient than that of warlord-type factions. Overall, the specific character of an insurgent faction’s access to external sources of arms and the character of the transnational illicit alliances that facilitate that access, depend upon on the form of their top-down war economy and the regional political economy of SALW spread and


facilitation. This, in turn, implies that it is the export networks generated by war economies as much as – if not more than – the revenues that conflict trade provides, that construct the potential for semi-autonomous access to arms. This implies that there are significant regional requirements for realising this potential. Regional requirements The Amorphous Image implies that diversification would be predominantly achieved by contracting brokers on the global market. However, actual diversification of arms acquisition channels appears to rely significantly upon regional structures with organised black markets. For example, the lack of an organised regional SALW black market in West Africa in the 1990s made diversification of sources particularly difficult for the NPFL, in spite of their being a quasi-state insurgent group. Conversely, warlord type and even embryonic insurgents in regions with strong organised black markets, such as South Asia, often operate diversified arming. Thus diversification is easier in some regions than in others. The level of territorial control and top-down war economies required for semi-autonomous arming are significantly lower if diversification occurs through the accessing of regional black markets. Organised regional black markets bring with them opportunities for diversification, and lower risk associated with a single supplier. Conversely, in regions without organised black markets, semiautonomous arming is primarily attained by accessing global markets through regional facilitation and the structures and opportunities for diversification must be constructed by the recipient faction through the influence of micro-economies. Thus, as the political and economic space of the regional level evolves through its interaction with the conflictcomplex, the opportunities for semi-autonomous arming increase. Broadly, therefore, it seems that the potential for semi-autonomous arming is constructed at the conflict-complex level, but also that the realisation of this potential depends upon particular aspects of the structures of availability and facilitation at the regional level. Semiautonomous arming is restricted to warlord and quasi-state insurgent groups as a function combination of these requirements at both the conflict-complex and regional levels.

Autonomous top-down arming Autonomous top-down arming is the ability to acquire SALW from all types of sources at all levels without the need for the facilitation of other


actors. The methods of SALW acquisition that contribute to autonomous arming include indigenous production and direct accessing of the global market. In relation to the latter, the predominant channels are legal transfers, but some acquisition processes may be broadly illicit but are not facilitated by other actors as the illicit recipient is capable of playing the facilitation roles itself. Such recipients may still choose to use brokers to help them locate willing suppliers or to navigate the diverse structures and restrictions of global SALW trade. Hypothetically, most state actors should acquire arms in this pattern – as their SALW acquisitions tend to be legal unless they are under an arms embargo. Thus, it is here that the significance of sovereignty, or in the parlance of the analysis of weapons spread in Chapter 2, the non-state threshold, can be examined. Broadly speaking, if the amorphous image were accurate, the role of sovereignty would be minimal, far outweighed by the revenues of the war economy. One would therefore expect that a significant number of non-state actors, albeit only the richest and most sophisticated, would also operate an autonomous arming pattern. Autonomous acquisition processes Autonomous arming patterns imply the capacity to acquire arms in all types of processes, including those associated with dependent and semiautonomous patterns. Further, there are two types of acquisition processes that are inherently autonomous: domestic production, and the accessing of international sources without regional facilitation. The production of SALW and ammunition allows conflict protagonists to acquire arms without facilitation and, in some cases, without the need for external supplies. It is therefore, by definition, an autonomous arming process.3 The information in Table 8.1 indicates that approximately 60 per cent of states engaged in significant internal conflict have had some production capacity prior to and during the conflict. These include 19 states in 28 conflict-complexes in all regions.4 In contrast, very few insurgent forces have, themselves, engaged in any production of SALW, with the exceptions of the FMLN and the LTTE.5 For example, after the cessation of Indian foreign assistance in 1987, the LTTE in Sri Lanka increased the scale of its own production of arms, developing a capacity to produce short-range missiles by 1990 (Chalk, 1999, p. 79). In both cases, however, this production never attained a sufficient level to provide anything more than supplementary arms. Few states and no non-state actors that have been involved in internal conflict have the potential to be entirely self-sufficient in SALW through production. Self-sufficiency would require an ability to produce all


key types of SALW in sufficient quantities to satisfy the demands of heightened violence, particularly for rifles and ammunition. Those states in conflict that have had this capacity include the Russian Federation, India, South Africa, and Israel. In most cases, however, even these states have imported weapons. Many states have expanded the scale of their domestic production during conflicts. Thus, during the Nigerian civil war the government producer, DICON, expanded from one production line (capable of producing 6 million rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition) to three such lines. Likewise, in the 1990s Armenia began production as a result of shortage of arms for use in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Small Arms Survey, 2003, p. 47). This is often done through licensed production. Thus, in 2002, amid rising levels of violence and plans to expand the military and police forces, Indumil (the Colombian state arms manufacturer and importer) announced the doubling of its annual production of Galil rifles (from 25,000 to 50,000) under license from Israel, and the associated 5.56 mm ammunition (from 30 million to 60 million rounds) (Rojas, 2002). Nevertheless, Colombia has continued to import many SALW from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Africa (NISAT). Although the production of SALW is widespread among states in conflict, it is usually one procurement channel among several that comprise the autonomous arming pattern. For example, during the conflicts involving the Georgian government in the early 1990s, the limited domestic production of light weapons accounted for only ten per cent of Rocket Propelled Grenades (which were produced at Factory No. 31 in Georgia), with the vast majority of these and all other types of SALW being supplied from Russian sources (Demetriou, 2002). Domestic production is, however, particularly significant when other methods of autonomous arming are cut-off, such as when the state is under an arms embargo. For example, it was the primary means of embargo busting by the Apartheid-era government of South Africa – using illicitly imported production technology (Landgren, 1989). Yet even in such circumstances, imports often remain significant. The primary aspect of autonomous arming relates to the ability to access extra-regional suppliers and sources, particularly on the global legal market, without requiring regional facilitation. All global legal transfers are seen as being ‘autonomous’ in the sense that any restrictions on acquisitions within this pattern are constructed within the global market as a function of supplier policy and market structure. The key distinction is that autonomous armers can access the global market themselves, whereas other types of top-down arming either cannot


access that market, or require assistance to do so, thereby constraining their arms procurement options. All states that are not under a globally imposed embargo, (i.e. a mandatory UN arms embargo), have been autonomous armers. Almost 90 per cent of state actors engaged in conflict have obtained arms from the global legal market at some point during the conflict. Indeed, as shown in Table 8.1, several of these were also subject to multilateral arms embargoes, which have been applied to approximately one-third of states in conflict, (though not necessarily at the same time as acquiring arms autonomously). In addition to legal acquisitions, some states have also acquired arms from regional black markets and other illicit supply lines. In many cases these acquisitions have been a response to the imposition of UN arms embargoes. Other multilateral embargoes merely serve to shut off a group of suppliers; they do not remove legal access to other sources. In other cases, however, the acquisition of SALW from regional black markets merely demonstrates one of the defining features of autonomous arming: the ability to access any sector of the systems of SALW spread at any time. Such mixed arming processes are most clearly demonstrated in the development of autonomous arming by newly independent former-Soviet

Table 8.1

SALW acquisition by states in conflict

State

Production capacity

Europe Azerbaijan Georgia Russian Federation Turkey Yugoslavia

4:1 No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Middle East Algeria Egypt Iran Iraq

5:1 Yes Yes Yes Yes

Israel Yemen

Yes No

External acquisitions during conflict

Embargoes

Legal Legal, Grey, Black Nonea

OSCE

Legal Covert aid, regional facilitation Legal Legal Legal Legal / Illicit – autonomous and regionally facilitated Legal Legal

UN and EU

Algeria

UN and EU

Continued

223 Table 8.1

Continued

State

Asia Afghanistan (Taleban) Cambodia India Indonesia Myanmar Nepal Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Tajikistan Sub-Saharan Africa Angola

Production capacity

7:3 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 6:14


Embargoes

Legal / Illicit Covert Aid, Black Market Legal Legal Legal Legal Legal Legal Legal Legal Legal, Grey,

UN

EU EU

Black

Nob

Legal

Burundi Chad CongoBrazzaville Democratic Republic of Congo / Zaire

No No No

Legal Legal Legal

No

Ethiopia Eritrea

Yes No

Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda

Yes No No No No No Yes No

Senegal Sierra Leone South Africa

No No Yes

Sudan Uganda

Yes Yes

Legal (Global, Regional and Regionally facilitated) Legal / Illicit Legal / Illicit Autonomous Legal Not known Legal Not Known Legal Legal Legal Legal/Regionally Facilitated illicit continuation Legal Legal Illicit (including technology) Legal Legal

UN (Only UNITA) Regional

EU

UN and EU UN and EU

UN

UN

UN and EU UN EU Continued

224 Arming Conflict: The Proliferation of Small Arms Table 8.1

Continued

State

Production capacity


Americas Colombia El Salvador Guatemala Mexico Nicaragua Peru

6:0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Legal Legal Legal Legal Legal Legal

TOTAL

28:19 (60%)

42 legal (89%)

Embargoes

16 (34%)

a) Although the NISAT database – which draws on UN COMTRADE data – includes data on legal small arms transfers to the Russian Federation, these tend to be small exports of nonmilitary weapons – presumably for civilian use. Russian military and police forces are equipped with domestically produced weapons. b) In 1997 the United States authorised the export of large quantities of ammunition production equipment and parts (NISAT). However, it is not known whether this transfer actually took place, or whether any ammunition was produced for the conflict with UNITA.

republics in the early 1990s. The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of newly independent states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Georgia, among others, was accompanied by large-scale conflict. The governments of these emergent states operated somewhat unusual methods of SALW acquisitions, relying in large part on the arsenals of former-Soviet military personnel stationed on their territory (Albrecht, 2000, pp. 137–138; Berryman, 2000, pp. 87–94). In Tajikistan, for example, pro-government forces were aided by Russian forces stationed in Tajikistan and CIS peacekeepers. These forces provided SALW through covert and grey-market transfers. Additionally, aid from the government of Uzbekistan and blackmarket transfers from Afghanistan contributed to pro-government militias SALW acquisitions (Pirseyedi, 2000, pp. 46–56). Similar processes were seen in Georgia (Demetriou, 2002). Gradually, however, the newly independent Central Asian states began to utilise the global legal market, often through military aid. For example, Turkey and Ukraine provided some weapons to Azerbaijan in 1993 (Albrecht, 2000, p. 137); and China has provided small scale military aid to some Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan (IISS, 2002, p. 173).6 Autonomous arming insurgents? Very few non-state actors have had the capacity to access the global SALW market without the provision of a veil of legality by a regional actor.


Following the framework developed here, the only way to gain such would be by the insurgent force itself playing all roles that are usually associated with regional facilitation. Therefore, one would expect that only the most sophisticated quasi-state insurgent forces, with the most sophisticated war economies and secure territory, would have this capacity. Indeed, it seems that only the most efficient globalisers among the ranks of insurgent and terrorist organisations, such as the LTTE, the PLO, and Al Qaida, have attained a significant degree of autonomy through the ability to play the roles of regional facilitators themselves. The LTTE in Sri Lanka, for example, are a well-organised military force ‘reminiscent of many professional armies’ and have accessed directly extra-regional sources, including the global legal market (Chalk, 1999, pp. 75–77). Their dedicated arms procurement wing, known as the KP Department and headed by Kumaran Pathmanathan, is also highly professionalised and its members are trained in the arts of gunrunning such as document forgery and international shipping and investments. It has had its own front companies and transport networks that have facilitated direct transfers of arms. For instance, in 1994 the LTTE’s front company, Carlton Trading, based in Bangladesh, purchased explosives from Ukraine and transported them to Sri Lanka on an LTTE owned ship (Phythian, 2000, p. 18). Through the use of front companies based in Europe and Africa, and forged EUCs, the LTTE has been able to play all the roles usually associated with regional facilitators and has accessed sources in the former-Soviet Union and the Middle East (Chalk, 1999, p. 80). Significantly, they have their own merchant-shipping network, the Sea Pigeons, which has allowed the LTTE to obtain arms from international sources without the direct collusion of regional actors. They have also operated with a significant degree of autonomy in the regional black market, with operations in Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Singapore, as well as further afield such as South Africa (Chalk, 1999, pp. 79–82; Kartha, 1999, p. 150). Few non-state actors have had the capacity to transport weapons themselves, let alone the capability and expertise to produce forged documentation, arrange illicit deals, and so forth. Few other non-state actors have had the level of control over front companies and strategic partnerships required to provide the veil of legality for themselves. According to Peter Chalk (1999, p. 80) non-state actors that have owned ships have included the IRA and the PLO. However, the ownership of ships used in illicit arms deals is often difficult to clearly ascertain. For instance, there is a lack of clear information on the ownership of the freighter Karine-A involved in an intercepted transfer of 50 tons of


arms to the PLO in January 2002. While some sources, including Israeli government statements, claim PLO ownership of the vessel, other sources, including Lloyds List, indicate private ownership by Iraqi national Abi Mohammed Abass (see Higgins, 2002; Sofia BTA, 7 January 2002; Small Arms Survey, 2002, pp. 93–94). Significantly, even those few insurgent actors that have had these kinds of capacities have primarily operated semi-autonomous type arms acquisition processes with only occasional accessing of the global market. What distinguishes the LTTE from other quasi-state insurgent forces is not the revenue or networks of its war economy, or its territorial control (Jaffna has been controlled at some periods, but not continuously (Mackinlay, 2002, p. 33)), but rather its structure: a transnational network with global reach as well as a terrorist organisation/insurgent force. Similarly, Al Qaida has also been able to acquire some weapons and support equipment in an autonomous pattern. According to Gunaratna (2002, pp. 59–60): Al Qaeda also had a worldwide network of procurement officers, such as US citizen Essam Al-Ridi, Osama’s personal pilot, who obtained communication equipment from Japan; scuba gear and range finders from Britain; satellite phones from Germany; and night vision goggles and scope, video equipment, Barrett .50 calibre sniping rifles and a T-389 plane from America. Thus, the structure of al-Qaida provides it with ostensibly legal representatives capable of purchasing weapons and equipment in extraregional states. This global access was reportedly used in 2000 and 2001 to build links with Russian and Ukrainian mafias to purchase SALW and equipment. However, most of the arming of associated forces occurs through mechanisms shaped by the nature of those insurgent and terrorist organisations concerned. Even in Afghanistan, Al-Qaida’s guerrilla army, the 055 Brigade, was integrated into the Taleban’s Army of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from 1997 to 2001, and was well armed. Many, and possibly most, arms acquisitions have been procured in other ways; most notably from the South Asian black market; and from weapons provided by the Taleban (Gunaratna, 2002, pp. 58–59). Significantly, autonomous supply operations continued in 2001 and 2002 when the US-led forces were engaged in campaigns against Al-Qaida and the Taleban: while apparently possessing SALW in abundance, hitech support equipment continued to be imported (Small Arms Survey, 2003, p. 73). Additionally, Al Qaida is believed to have had a controlling


share in at least 23 merchant ships (Mackinlay, 2002, p. 88). The resilience of its autonomous arming capacity seems to lie in the structure of Al Qaida as a global network which, according to Mackinlay (2002, p. 85), generated resilience to the losses of territory, including drug-producing areas that were integrated into Al Qaida’s war economy. The construction of autonomous arming The predominance of states among autonomous armers, and the absence of states among dependent or semi-autonomous armers, indicates a strong correlation between autonomous arming and state actors. The degree of autonomy obviously varies between states, most significantly in relation to the structures of supplier oligopoly and associated supplier–client patterns constructed at the global level. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental qualitative difference between all states and the majority of non-state actors in relation to the construction of autonomy. While dependent and semi-autonomous top-down arming are significantly related to, and constructed by, the nature of control over the political and economic space of the conflict-complex, this correlation is not strong for the autonomous pattern of top-down arming. Among non-state actors, only quasi-state insurgents have demonstrated autonomy in arms acquisitions. However, only a very small number of quasistate insurgents have this capacity. Indeed, with the unique exceptions of the LTTE and Al Qaida, all other non-state groups, including those with similar features to their organisation, territory, war economy revenues and networks, have not demonstrated autonomy in the full range of processes and requirements for the accessing of extra-regional stocks of SALW without regional facilitation. Almost all states operate an autonomous arming pattern, yet the degree of control of the political and economic space of the conflictcomplex varies widely between states. Even states whose territorial control is atrophied to an enclave surrounding the capital, and whose economic resources are limited, appear capable of acquiring SALW from the global market without the need for regional facilitation. Conversely, non-state actors may have greater control of the political and economic space and resources of the conflict-complex, but be unable to arm autonomously. Nevertheless, the degree of territorial control and the character of war economies are far from irrelevant. As demonstrated by the foundations of the semi-autonomous arming pattern, the control of territory by a conflict-faction facilitates the import of arms and the generation of revenue required for such deals. Thus, while the degree of correlation is weak, the control of entry points remains important.


The character of the war economy of autonomous armers does not fully explain their ability to acquire arms independently of regional facilitation. If the potential for acquiring SALW autonomously were simply a function of the resources of a factions’ war economy, as implied by the amorphous image, one would expect that just as the development of a top-down war economy by insurgent forces enhances their capacity to access regional and international arms suppliers, the opposite effect would be observed for a collapsing state. This, however, does not appear to be the case. While the presence of a top-down war economy is a prerequisite for this pattern of arming, and appears to be a common feature of most state actors, the character of the associated networks and revenue do not explain the ability of only very few quasi-state insurgents to acquire arms autonomously. Neither the profitability of the war economy nor the associated development of regional networks create autonomy in arming. There are, therefore, clear differences not only in the foundations of autonomous arming patterns, but also in their vulnerabilities. This is significant as control of the political and economic resources and space of conflict-complexes evolves through conflict. A decline in the war economy and territorial control of a non-state faction may force a shift from semi-autonomous arming to a dependent top-down or even a bottom-up acquisition pattern. However, similar decay and decline of the control of territory and war economies do not degrade the arming capacity of states to the same degree. Thus, while a quasi-state insurgent force may possess more of the qualities of empirical statehood than the internationally recognised state; this does not translate into an ability to act as a state on the SALW market. For instance, in Liberia, within a few months of invading on Christmas Eve 1989, the NPFL had established control over an estimated 90 per cent of the country, including most areas rich in natural resources and much of the infrastructure for their export (Deng, et al., 1996, p. 199). Natural resources such as timber, rubber, gold, iron ore, and diamonds were plundered and sold on international markets, the revenues (estimated at over US$400 million per year (Duffield, 2000, p. 82)) were reportedly banked in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Switzerland; and yet it was armed through regional covertaid pipeline and was reliant on regional facilitation. In contrast, the government forces were in control of only the capital city, the coffers were fast emptying, and yet the beleaguered Doe government was able to arrange new global arms deals (Bourne, 2004). Thus money, networks, and territory, and even differences in regional political economies of SALW spread, do not explain the construction


of autonomous arming by any kind of state, nor the specificities and vulnerabilities of limited autonomous arming by non-state actors. The primary remaining distinction between these types of forces is that of internationally recognised juridical sovereignty. Thus the non-state threshold, as discussed in Chapter 2, appears to remain relevant to the character of SALW acquisition patterns. This non-state threshold is a ‘glass ceiling’ in arming patterns through which (almost) no non-state actor break and no sovereign state can fall. Sovereignty and autonomy: legality, embargoes and the relevance of the non-state threshold The globalised illicit suppliers that populate the amorphous image are no respecters of legality, so why does the glass ceiling imposed by sovereignty on SALW spread to conflict remain largely in tact? In large part this has been explained by the evidence and analysis stemming from the framework developed in previous chapters, such as the refutation of the existence of a global illicit sector, and the development of an understanding of the requirements for facilitation and their regional construction. Nevertheless, the question remains: How does this glass ceiling function and how have a handful of non-state actors been able to circumvent it? The principal effect of juridical sovereignty is to attribute legality in international transactions to the state. This, therefore, allows direct access to legal supplies for all states unless that legality is temporarily suspended by the imposition of a mandatory UN arms embargo. This is as true of states during conflict as in the non-conflict periods. Thus, the possession of internationally recognised juridical sovereignty confers upon state actors opportunities not present for their potentially better organised and better financed insurgent counter-parts: an ability to engage directly with the global arms market. Of course, brokers are often used by states in these legal transfers. However, in contrast to flows to embargoed governments and insurgent forces, the primary purpose of contracting brokers is to provide assistance in navigating the complexities of the global legal market in order to acquire the required weapons – both SALW and MCA – of a particular kind and for a good price. The significance of sovereignty and associated legality of arms acquisitions is most strongly revealed when a recipient actor either loses or gains it. The loss of juridical sovereignty clearly results in a shift to a less autonomous pattern. For example, when the government of Rwanda was exiled by the RPF its forces, both the ex-FAR army and allied Interahamwe militia, took their arms with them into eastern Zaire. There it continued to expand and arm its forces with SALW from the Zairian


army. It also used its former-sovereign status and international contacts to acquire arms from the international market, but relied heavily on the collusion of regional allies, particular Mobutu’s government in Zaire (Bourne, 1999; SIPRI, 2001, p. 415). In this case, the loss of sovereign status did not dramatically affect the scale of acquisitions, but did affect the recipient’s need for regional facilitation. Conversely, when rebel forces have acquired juridical sovereignty, such as the RPF in Rwanda, the NRA in Uganda, the arming patterns of these governments have immediately become autonomous by virtue of the legality of their transactions. Only in the context of UN arms embargoes, such as on NPFL leader Charles Taylor’s government of Liberia in the late 1990s, has the acquisition of juridical sovereignty not resulted in legal transfers and hence autonomous arming. UN arms embargoes do not remove sovereignty, but should, in principle, negate its advantages in arms acquisitions. Although arms embargoes are often breached, the lack of legality should require embargoed states to operate with a veil of legality – commonly provided by regional facilitation. For example, during the conflicts in the former-Yugoslavia, the UN arms embargo was routinely breached. Many states were implicated in arms trafficking to various sides in the conflict. The Bosnian government received arms from Iran via Croatia, which are estimated to have occurred at a frequency of eight flights per month adding up to approximately 14,000 tonnes of equipment. In other arms procurement operations, however, the Bosnian government operated with a degree of autonomy in its acquisitions. This was achieved because the state was able to play the role of regional facilitators for itself – primarily by operating its own front companies with offices in Moscow, Istanbul, and Budapest. This autonomous network operated prior to the initiation of flows through the Iranian pipeline, and continued to operate on a reduced scale when the pipeline was operational (Phythian, 2000, pp. 38–39). Similarly, embargo busting by the Hussein regime in Iraq occurred in a number of ways. A complex network of middlemen accessed suppliers in Eastern Europe and the former-Soviet Union, and many of the resultant transactions relied upon regional facilitation for the provision of a veil of legality (Weir, 2002). For example, US$800,000 of weapons from the Czech Republic transferred under export licenses for Syria and Yemen were smuggled through Syria to Iraq in February 2002. Within this supply network the Iraqi state was able to play some aspects of facilitating roles itself: the unloading of the first of three shipments on the 23 February at Latakia (Syria) was overseen by an Iraqi intelligence officer, Lt Col Khaled al-Adhani, who also diverted it from its official


destination by road to Iraq, with protection provided by Iraqi, rather than Syrian, military personnel (Weir, 2002). While legal arms shipments to Iraq ceased, trade delegations from supplier states reportedly visited Baghdad in anticipation of future legal deals after the eventual lifting of the embargo (Anthony, 2002, p. 216). Clearly numerous cases of embargo busting by states, such as those above and those by Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, have relied upon regional facilitation for arms acquisition. Nevertheless, while the imposition of embargoes often results in states relying upon regional facilitation, there are sufficient instances of illicit trafficking to state forces to indicate that regional facilitation is not an absolute prerequisite for embargoed states. For instance shipments of arms from Argentina to Croatia using Croatian ships, and a 2001 attempted violation of the arms embargo on Eritrea with weapons from the Czech Republic, was conducted with no regional facilitation but only simple changes made to flight plans (Small Arms Survey, 2002, p. 136). Such embargo busting is not a function of legality, but rather of the capacity for the states concerned to circumvent the requirement for regional facilitation by playing such roles themselves. Such exceptions also help to explain the autonomous capacity of the LTTE. The legality of arms acquisitions does not fully explain the resilience of autonomous arming patterns for even those states that have virtually collapsed, those warlordised states that have very little control of, or ability to exploit, the political and economic space of the conflict-complex. Rather, this is explained by sovereignty generating opportunities to mitigate the effects of limited economic resources on arms acquisitions. Robert Jackson’s (1990) study of weak states’ international relations is revealing here. This study of weak states during the Cold War era paints a picture of governments using juridical sovereignty to claim the benefits of statehood in their international interactions, particularly the receipt of international aid and access to international diplomatic fora, while internally presiding tenuously over undeveloped or privatised ‘quasi-state’ structures. In a sense, therefore, sovereignty is not just a characteristic of state actors that imbues their arms acquisitions with legality, but is a critical commodity in states’ global relationships. In the post-Cold War era of declining military aid from the major suppliers, one would expect that the value of sovereignty as commodity in such international interactions would have declined, thereby reducing the resilience of state’s autonomous arming – yet this does not appear to have happened. So how have states compensated for this change?


William Reno’s (1999, pp. 221–222) study of warlord politics in African states is illuminating in this regard. He concludes that: Sovereignty has remained a resource to seal new political bargains, since it gives private actors access to credit, a place in international forums, legitimation of wholesale privatisation of state assets, immunity from serious outside scrutiny of internal affairs, access to foreign aid, and the capacity to offer more convincing contracts to foreign firms. Thus the possession of juridical sovereignty, as long as it can plausibly be expected to continue, imbues the state with a greater economic credibility in the eyes of arms suppliers, particularly those on the legal market. Sovereign states have the juridical right to mortgage their country’s natural resources to international companies in return for SALW, as the government of Angola has done with its oil reserves (Human Rights Watch, 1994, pp. 39, 57). Juridical sovereignty therefore also conveys legality and credibility onto the war economy trading activities of the state, including those under an arms embargo, while those of insurgent factions remain reliant upon the construction and operation of regional transnational illicit or grey networks. As Duffield (2001, pp. 176–177) claims: juridical sovereignty continues to attract the support of the international community. Not only do Northern governments not wish to see sovereign voids, but juridical states confer legitimacy in relation to the integration of their economies into the global market place. Juridical leaders can sign international contracts and broker recognised deals. Given that the networks used to export such goods often link with those used to import arms, this legality is important. Legal exports and imports tend to flow more directly, more efficiently, and more reliably than they would if forced to operate in the grey arena. Thus, internationally recognised juridical sovereignty is both a commodity and an economic ‘force-multiplier’ for states acquiring arms, including largely atrophied and warlordised states. Significantly, the utility of sovereignty as a commodity and economic force-multiplier has been at the heart of weak and embargoed states strategies for mitigating the limitations of their empirical control. For most states the revenues for arms procurement stem from the formal economy. However, when applied to many weak states, especially those


involved in conflict, the distinction between the formal economy and informal extractive war economy is problematic. Certainly, the shrinkage of the formal economy as a corollary to the broader atrophication of the state, and its acceleration by conflict undermines the state’s resources. For example, in Mozambique, as production of raw materials for export and staple foods decreased the government’s revenue considerably (Chingono, 1996, pp. 73–75; see also Fitzgerald, 2001). Yet, in the post-Cold War era, elite rulers have shown a surprising resilience in terms of their ability to secure revenues from foreign companies and SALW from the global market (Reno, 1997a; Reno, 2000a). In such circumstances weak state rulers have relied not on the whole of the formal economy but on particular sectors. The mortgaging of natural resources and associated establishment of access to transnational and informal economic networks has created what has been referred to as a ‘Shadow State’ ( Chingono, 1996, p.101; Keen, 1998, p. 30; Bayart et al., 1999; Reno, 2000b). In much the same way as top-down extractive war economies are faction-economies of insurgent groups, shadow state war economies are the economies of the elite rulers and their associated praetorian forces (see Bourne, 2002). Shadow states’ war economies operate on the basis of non-bureaucratic structures of personalised power and patronage and are divorced from the public expenditures, revenue collection, and responsibilities of government that are affected by state atrophication during conflict (Reno, 2000b). The modalities of shadow state trading therefore retain economic capacity in spite of the collapse of the formal economy. Developing partnerships, particularly with smaller foreign companies, has allowed shadow states to engage in trade and, in some cases, evade trade sanctions. For example, the exploitation of oil by the Sudanese and Angolan governments has contributed to shadow state trade (Duffield, 2001, p. 198). Thus, the atrophication of the state’s share of the fragmented political and economic space of the conflict-complex does not commensurately degrade the economic capacity of state actors, because the advantages of sovereignty combine with the flexibility of shadow state structures to provide resilience to state resources for arms trading: as Duffield (2001, pp. 176–177) has claimed ‘The shadow economy can make extra resources available to state incumbents; at the same time, shadow operators often need the legitimacy that state institutions can confer.’ In addition to the resilience of revenues for such weak and embargoed states, the formation and operation of networks are central to a shadowstate’s international interactions (see Duffield, 2001, pp.187–201). It is this capacity that is the foundation of the state’s control over the


transnational elements of embargo busting, achieved by integrating shadow partners into the patronage networks of non-bureaucratic state building, which allows them to provide themselves with a veil of legality. Thus, it is on the basis of such shadow state structures, in combination with the legality – that sovereignty provides, that embargoed states and collapsed states are often able to maintain autonomous arming patterns. Both shadow states and autonomous arming insurgents are network warriors – they incorporate transnational networks into their structures.7 The centrality of this feature also helps to explain the otherwise anomalous operation of an autonomous arming pattern by the LTTE and Al Qaida. The ability of these non-state actors to arm autonomously does not replicate normal state-like arms acquisition patterns, but rather their global networking, allows them to play facilitating roles themselves. This echoes the shadow-state structures that generate resilience in autonomous arming for embargoed and almost-collapsed states. Both the LTTE and Al Qaida have sophisticated global networks that form the foundation of broad-based war economies that include both legal and illicit businesses. These generate financial resources, and serve as financial conduits for quasi-legal arms deals. Additionally, both have their own shipping companies used to transport weapons in autonomous acquisitions. Insurgent forces with more lucrative war economies and greater control of the political and economic space of conflict-complexes, yet lacking these global structures, have been unable to access global markets without regional facilitation. Overall, while autonomous arming patterns have minimum foundations constructed at the conflict-complex level, the primary conditions for autonomy are constructed at the international level. In the postCold War era the collapse of opportunities for accessing military aid from major power patrons has been mitigated by the large-scale commercialisation of the global SALW market, and the increasing reach of semi-legal networks originating in shadow states providing access to international stocks of SALW. Sovereignty explains the resilience of autonomous arming by embargoed states. While its utilisation in such circumstances is predicated upon a shadow state or diplomatic trading, sovereigns can trade on anticipated revenues, not just extant wealth. Thus, sovereignty is a force-multiplier to shadow-networks, which do not have to generate micro-economies to construct essential facilitation infrastructure required for embargo busting. Therefore, due to the continued significance of sovereignty in combination with the evolution of the global SALW market, autonomous arming patterns are likely to be more resilient to the erosion of empirical sovereignty than in past eras: the non-state threshold is not fast disappearing.


Conclusion Top-down arming patterns are constructed by combinations and interactions of structures and dynamics at all three levels. However, these combinations of locations are distinct for each pattern; as is the range of characteristics of conflict factions that promote or constrain its development. Thus top-down arming patterns are diverse, and are not dominated or explained by homogenised global amorphous image. They are highly structured and also highly dynamic. This is revealed by the ways in which different actors’ arming patterns change, the structures that shape and are shaped by those change processes, and the surprisingly rigid barriers that constrain their evolution. Dependent top-down arming is open to all types of insurgent factions. Embryonic insurgent groups and militia, if they operate a top-down arming pattern, tend to be dependent top-down armers. However, warlord type and quasi-state insurgents may also be dependent armers – particularly if they are recipients of external covert aid, clients in rebel axes, or proxy militias within the conflict-complex. Overall, dependency in top-down arming is primarily a function of the lack of key requirements for the development of semi-autonomous arming patterns. During the Cold War era dependency was also a function of global level structures and the character of extra-regional covert aid. However, in the post-Cold War era, dependent top-down arming is a function of structures at the conflict-complex and regional levels. As shown throughout this book, the structures at the regional and conflict levels that shape dependent arming patterns are themselves constantly evolving. Thus, one would expect arming patterns to reflect that evolution. Indeed, significantly, in many cases the channels of supply that form dependent arming patterns, such as covert aid or the arming of rebel clients and militias, also contribute to that evolution. They contribute to the foundations of insurgent capacity to enhance its control over the territory and political and economic space and resources of the conflict-complex, and the trajectory of those actors towards becoming a warlord or quasi-state force. Semi-autonomous arming is top-down arming in which recipients have a degree of autonomy in their arms supply relationships, but this autonomy is muted by the continued requirement for regional facilitation. The closest correlation between actor types and arming patterns is found for semi-autonomous arming. Requiring strong territorial control and a top-down war economy, only the more organised warlord and quasi-state insurgent groups can operate this arming pattern. These features of the recipients, and particularly the networks associated with the


top-down war economy, generate a degree of influence in the supply lines as a function of regional micro-economies. Top-down war economies and territorial control also create the foundations for diversification. Overall, therefore, the potential for semi-autonomous arming is constructed at the conflict-complex level, while its realisation is reliant upon particular aspects of the structures of availability and facilitation at the regional level. Importantly, while top-down war economies are essential for semiautonomous arming, the presence of a top-down war economy does not, on its own – or at least not immediately – engender a shift from dependent arming to semi-autonomous patterns. In contrast to the amorphous image, the analysis of semi-autonomous arming reveals that it is the structures of war economies and their export networks as much as their revenues that influences the character of access to SALW. However, the continued expansion of war economies and associated economic networks does not lead to a progression from semi-autonomous arming to autonomous arming. Autonomous arming patterns are those in which the choice of sources, suppliers, and channels used to acquire SALW is not restricted by a need for facilitation. Autonomous armers are able to access the global legal market, even if this is done illicitly. If access to arms were a function of a globalised market in which money was the primary limitation on the nature of arms acquisition – as indicated in the amorphous image – many insurgent groups would operate such a pattern, while many weak and collapsing states would lose the capacity to arm in this way. In contrast to this, most states but very few non-state actors have operated autonomous arming patterns. Those insurgents that have utilised some autonomous-type processes have still primarily acquired arms in other ways. Even the most decayed state forces (except for collapsed states with no government) appear able to access international stocks directly provided that they are not under a UN arms embargo. Thus, almost 90 per cent of state actors have acquired arms legally and autonomously while also being engaged in major armed conflict. Further, even when under embargo states retain greater autonomy than non-state actors. States may maintain autonomy when under embargo as a result of the utility of sovereignty within ‘shadow-state’ networks, rather than open legal markets. The construction of autonomous arming patterns of states is primarily a function of the possession of internationally recognised juridical sovereignty. Significantly, the absence of state actors among the ranks of those that operate other top-down arming patterns indicates that the


possession of sovereignty overrides the effects of variation in empirical sovereignty over the political and economic space of the primary conflict country. Juridical sovereignty is at the heart of the non-state threshold (see Chapter 2). This is not merely a function of legality of arms acquisitions. Even states under a multilateral arms embargo, particularly UN embargoes, have been able to retain autonomy in arms acquisitions by playing all essential facilitation roles themselves. Rather this capacity is also largely related to the value of sovereignty, which allows control over facilitation roles to be constructed through the formation of shadowstate networks rather than as a function of regional micro-economies – upon which most non-state actors must rely. It is the emulation of such structures and capacities – particularly in transportation – that has allowed a few non-state actors to acquire arms through autonomous channels. Thus, among non-state actors the most sophisticated armers do not act like states, they emulate ‘shadow states’ under conditions of a UN arms embargo. None of these actors has operated a predominantly (or any more than occasionally) autonomous arming pattern. Even this occasional autonomy is expensive, difficult to construct, and impossible to maintain. Autonomy given by sovereignty, however, is highly resilient. The costs of arming autonomously are very high for non-state actors, and nil for states. This significance of juridical sovereignty, and the nature of variation among autonomous armers, indicates that autonomy in SALW acquisitions during conflict is constructed at the global level, though still requiring a basic degree of control over the conflict-complex. All understandings of SALW spread to conflict currently emphasise the lack or weakness of a non-state threshold. However, one does exist, it is strong and in spite of broad trends in global and regional structures of SALW spread, it is not significantly weakening. For SALW spread to conflict, juridical sovereignty imposes a ‘glass ceiling’ upon arming patterns through which (almost) no non-state actor break, and no extant state can fall.

9 Conclusion

The aim of this book has been to contribute to better understandings of the nature of SALW spread. When viewed through a reflection on the nature of structures and dynamics of the spread of other weapons – as in Chapter 2 – current understandings of SALW spread are revealed not only as emphasising the relative breadth and complexity of SALW spread, but as framing it in an amorphous image. In particular, the amorphous image implies that there is no non-state threshold in SALW spread, but rather that SALW spread to conflicts is a function of a vast global stock of arms, available in a vibrant globalised illicit market and accessed through a shadowy array of nefarious arms brokers. This amorphous image has been perpetuated in understandings of SALW flows to conflicts, in which access to arms is seen as being determined only by possession of financial resources with which to purchase them. The sense that SALW spread is amorphous and boundless is a reflection of the breadth and relative weakness of the types of structures that shape the spread of other weapons. It is also, however, based on conflation inherent in the lack of application of levels of analysis and some unnecessary conflation in qualitative distinctions. Overall this has led to a homogenised view of the arming of conflict. The amorphous image is inaccurate, it obscures structures and dynamics rather than reflecting their absence. This book has examined the nature of SALW spread by developing a three-level approach that applies key distinctions in order to discern structures and dynamics of the arming of conflict. The three levels developed in Chapter 2, and applied throughout the book, began by defining the conflict-complex level in order to more adequately reflect the fragmented character of the political and economic space of armed actors engaged in conflict – whose acquisitions of SALW are seen as the most concerning. The regional level was then defined 238

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outwards from the conflict-complex (rather than as a sub-division of the global system) in terms related to the ‘security-complex’, while noting its population by non-state actors as well as states. The international level is simply defined as the global system – as structure; and the extraregional processes of flow. This delineation of levels combined with refined definitions and application of key characterisations of ‘covert’, ‘grey’, and ‘black’ market processes and structures, allowed the analysis in this book to discern extant and evolving structures of SALW spread that must be navigated by conflict protagonists; and to analyse the determinants of the capacity to do so. The findings of the application of this framework contrast strongly with the amorphous image. The amorphous image emphasises a lack of structures – but structures are found to exist; it frames SALW spread as a global level process – but both structures and processes are shaped at three levels; the spread of arms to conflicts is presented as relatively homogenous – but actors in conflict display varying arming patterns, that are shaped by these various layers and forms of structures. Thus, the capacity to acquire arms is shaped by different combinations of different structures at different levels that all evolve over time. Therefore, the arming of conflict is highly structured and highly dynamic.

Global structures and extra-regional processes The amorphous image portrays the flow of SALW to conflict as part of a globalised illicit market populated by nefarious brokers. However, this is misleading. The dominant global structures that shape both legal and illicit flows to conflicts are the legal market. This is clearly demonstrated by the legal trade, the patterns of covert aid, and the lack of distinct systems of illicit SALW spread: thus, trends in the legal market have shaped the legal flow of SALW to conflicts. Global level SALW spread processes are the product of development and interaction of structures that have been constructed over time as a function of the evolution of both the source and supplier base, and the distinct global structures and dynamics of global SALW trade. The character of the construction and evolution of both sets of structures has been one of broadening structures, but not in ways that are amorphous or homogenous. The global source base for SALW spread is constantly evolving and has the potential to include the majority of states and very many non-state actors. At least 1085 manufacturers in approximately 105 states produce or have previously produced SALW and ammunition. This production


capacity has spread significantly through licensed production which is commonly portrayed as a north-south diffusion of manufacturing capacity but is found to be a routine element across the hierarchy of producers and throughout all regions. SALW spread is particularly surplus-intensive, but the significance of surplus stocks in the evolution of the global source base varies in a more fluid and transitory way than the more linear spread of production capacity. The global legal trade operates on the basis of this source structure, intertwined with the structures of the global arms trade, but not determined by them. Overall, the broad direction of the construction and evolution of the legal SALW trade has been one of loose and decreasing supplier oligopoly. This has occurred through three phases: Two in the Cold War and then the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War phases the patterns of and restrictions upon supplier behaviour in the MCA trade had a significant spill-over effect upon SALW availability. During the Cold War a structure of core and periphery was present in the legal SALW trade that was not present for other weapons. Contrary to existing understandings, the major producers did not dominate the market, and second tier suppliers within the core did more than ‘squabble over the spoils’ (Small Arms Survey, 2001. p. 15). This structure was more significant than the divisions between the four tiers of large, major, medium, and small producers and was more important for reducing dependency in supplier–client patterns than looser bloc discipline or more limited superpower dominance. In the post-Cold War era this overarching structure has fallen away, but the muted effects of the end of the Cold War on the SALW trade (in comparison to the MCA trade) indicate that the global SALW trade has durable structures, that are constantly evolving according to their own dynamics. Importantly, the predominant global aspects of all SALW flows, including those to conflicts, and including those to illicit recipients, are a function of the global legal trade. The nature of flows to conflicts, on this basis, has evolved dramatically since 1945 but not merely as a function of the evolution of those structures. Extra-regional SALW flows to conflicts in major conflicts during the Cold War were dominated by covert aid by the superpowers. Prior to the mid-1970s recipients engaged in conflict were able to acquire SALW from a range of sources, including significant cross-bloc trading and private trade. However, in the second part of the Cold War era, the flow of SALW to conflict was dominated by covert aid in supplier–client relationships that were tightly controlled. The dominance of the superpowers was more pronounced than in the legal SALW trade, particularly within the Western bloc. During this time

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covert aid was a suppliers market’ (in that clients had little opportunity to exercise choice or influence in top-down arms acquisitions). It was built on the foundations (and the cracks) of the global legal market and bipolar global divisions. Most extra-regional covert aid was run through pipelines that were constructed in very similar ways – thus reflecting underlying structural features and systemic realities that shaped this construction and its evolution – particularly through the 1980s. All extra-regional covert aid operated through cross-bloc and private trade sourcing by security services feeding into pipelines routed through regional states under cover of military aid or through private transport companies. In the post-Cold War era, extra-regional stages of covert aid are even more clearly rooted within the structures of the Global legal trade – as covert aid has become regionalised, the global market is now a sourcing mechanism, with flow processes remaining in the legal sphere until diverted by regional action or facilitation. In contrast to the key tenets of the amorphous image, the primary global structure of SALW spread – including that to conflicts – is not a global illicit market: the scope of black-market and grey-market processes is very limited at the extra-regional level, and – far from being dominated by a globalised illicit market – globalisation appears to have failed to generate a global black market or grey market structures of spread. As for the central role of arms brokers – either in the ‘illicit market’ of the amorphous image, or on the edges of the structures discerned here – they do not appear to be the manifestations of illicit globalisation, nor even the predominant actors in the parts of the global market that supply conflicts. Brokers are, of course, a common element of very many extra-regional flows of SALW to conflicts, but their roles do not make up for limited capacities of arming actors. Their roles do not explain the nature and dynamism of the arming of conflict. A range of regional actors have not received the same attention but their roles and networks are more instrumental to the acquisition of SALW.

Regional facilitation and flow The regional level is of crucial importance to understanding the nature of SALW spread to conflicts. Yet distinct regional political and economic structures and dynamics (and their evolution) are obscured by the global homogenisation of the amorphous image. The regional level plays two key roles in the flow of SALW to conflict: the facilitation of extra-regional flows and intra-regional flows. The framework developed raises and allows us to answer key questions of


whether the character and combination of different roles and processes is an ad-hoc construction for each transfer or each conflict, or whether it reflects distinctly regional structures and dynamics? Broadly speaking, regional facilitation and flows of SALW spread appear to reflect overlapping but distinct structures based on the regional dimensions of the political economy of conflict and broader regional political and economic space. In relation to facilitation, a range of key observations can be made: ●

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Extra-regional covert aid primarily relies on covert transhipment at the regional level. The transhipment of other extra-regional flows, particularly those accessed through a veil of legality, may involve any type of transhipment. The ‘veil of legality’ is provided primarily through the provision of EUCs and associated documentation – largely as covert or grey facilitation. However, this covert or grey facilitation may contribute to the growth of capacity by particular private actors to generate a veil of legality. The veil of legality is a regional construct, not a function of amorphous globalisation. Economic engagement with conflict-protagonists by regional actors generates micro-economies that significantly affect the nature of both flow networks and broader regional political economy of SALW spread.

Most facilitation is mixed covert, grey and black. The mixture of characteristics of different stages and aspects of flows in facilitated flows reflects their foundation in the broader regional political economy of SALW spread. This is often a web of interactions and distinct networks overlaid and interwoven with regional black-market structures. Regional level structures are not just sub-systems of global structures. In fact they are of very different types. There is a strongly structured global legal trade, but no global grey market or black market; almost the opposite is true at the regional level. Regional legal transfers vary in scale and incidence according to the suppliers’ position in the global market, and do not take place in uniquely regional structures, though regional suppliers play a significantly greater role than others within their tier. They seldom play a more marked role in supplies to states than suppliers in higher tiers – with the exception of regionalised conflicts where small regional suppliers may play a disproportionately significant role.

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Covert aid has become regionalised in the post-Cold War era. The sourcing of regional covert aid is primarily determined by the availability of SALW rather than the range of concerns of deniability that preoccupied the organisers of Cold War era extra-regional covert aid. Thus, structures of availability and accumulation within state stocks (latent proliferation) at the regional level and global level structures of availability influence the character and construction, but not the incidence, of regional covert aid. Covert facilitation of war economy exports contributes to the generation of micro-economies even in cases of bilateral covert transfers. These contribute to the continuation of covert aid and the construction or appropriation of transnational networks within organised black markets. Regional covert aid is not a self-contained system of supply but it is often a crucial aspect of the dynamic, expansive, and progressively evolving nature of the regional political economy of conflict arming. In contrast, to the global level, black markets exist at the regional level as discretely constructed sectors of availability and spread. Regional black and grey markets can be divided into the ubiquitous ant-trade and the organised sector. Both share common foundations of transnational informal economic space and permissive conditions of porous borders. The ant-trade is ubiquitous with only limited implications for the regional political economy of SALW spread as a whole. The ant-trade is commonly understood as diffusion dynamised by disparities in legal regulation, but in regions of conflict simpler equations of availability are of greater importance. The foundations of the ant-trade are affected by conflict and its effects on border spaces. Organised black markets are substantial and complexly constructed regional structures of unregulated SALW accumulation, availability, and flow. They are predominantly black market structures encompassing both black-market and grey-market processes. Organised black markets have distinct structures that evolve primarily as a result of conflict or state collapse. The informal economy and porous borders facilitate access of black-market traders to clients in neighbouring states. The atrophication of the state, the formal economy, and border control that accompanies the growth of conflict-complexes results in qualitatively different accessibility. This access, however, is not anarchic and amorphous: the trafficking networks and infrastructure created by covert aid or regional facilitation become a key structural element of this access through the regional aspects of war economies and associated entrenchment of micro-economies – thereby forming a web of organised black market transactions and networks. Regional organised black markets


evolve through the construction of this web of networks combined with the accumulation and subsequent realisation of latent proliferation contained within conflict-complexes. Thus, the tendency of SALW to enter illicit circulation and not return to the legal sphere is both a factor in the construction of an organised black market, and a key feature of its operation. The movement of weapons from one conflict to another – that is claimed to be a common feature of SALW flows – is in fact primarily a function of the construction of regional black markets. Significantly, none of the major types of regional processes and structures of SALW spread to conflict are mutually exclusive. The implications of these complexly constructed and overlaid structures are profound. They imply that the regional level is much more significant in the nature of SALW spread and flows to conflict than is implied by the amorphous image. For instance, the dynamics of diversion from legal transactions to illicit recipients are not predominantly a function of weak-points in the global web of regulation through the actions of nefarious brokers, or the presence of failed states in the international system, but rather reflect critical elements of distinctly regional political economies of SALW spread. Further, the longevity and progressive development of regional political economies of SALW spread indicates that regional aspects of the spread of SALW are not an ad-hoc construction for each transfer or each conflict, but rather they reflect distinctly regional structures and dynamics. It also implies that they, and their roles for particular conflicts and recipients, are evolutionary, in particular: ●

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Regionally facilitated flows are the primary means of obtaining significant quantities of SALW in regions where covert aid is unavailable and no organised black market exists. Conversely, the presence of an organised black market reduces the need for accessing extra-regional stocks through regional facilitation networks. Significant grey and black-market facilitation is possible without an organised black market; but has to be constructed by transnational micro-economies based on war economies. Covert aid, both regional and extra-regional, often constructs this infrastructure.

The capacity to build and capitalise upon these structures is also a function of key factors and facets of arming patterns constructed at the conflict-complex level.

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The construction of conflict SALW acquisition patterns Arming patterns vary. Their construction evolves and occurs at multiple levels concurrently. Almost all, however, operate on a foundation of factors at the conflict-complex level, and in ways not anticipated by the predominant amorphous image. Civilian arming patterns and processes evolve with conflict. During conflict the boundaries between retail mechanisms and diffusion processes blur and civilians become integrated into the broad structures of arms circulation between warring factions and these are not distinct from localised faction arming processes. In post-conflict periods diffusion mechanisms predominate. Bottom-up arming processes for factions are ubiquitous. The capacity for factions to acquire arms through bottom-up processes is a function of conflict-complex structures rather than of the control of that political and economic space by the acquiring actor. Bottom-up arming is the default option for factions in conflict. The operation of a predominantly bottom-up mode of arming is primarily a feature of embryonic insurgents in the early stages of conflict and of militias throughout conflict. Broadly speaking, accumulative processes predominate for embryonic insurgents in the early stages of conflict, while both accumulative and diffusive processes sustain bottom-up modes of arming. Bottom-up arming is intimately related to the bottom-up war economies of factions and their interaction with and effects upon local arms markets. In the post-Cold War era, a reliance on bottom-up arming after the initial period of formation tends to reflect a lack of the core characteristics of factions that facilitate top-down arming rather than a deliberate choice. Top-down arming patterns are constructed by combinations and interactions of structures and dynamics at all three levels. However, these combinations of locations are distinct for each pattern; as is the range of characteristics of conflict factions that promote or constrain its development. Thus top-down arming patterns are diverse, and are not dominated or explained by homogenised global amorphous image. They are highly structured and also highly dynamic. This is revealed by the ways in which different actors arming patterns change, the structures that shape and are shaped by those change processes; and the surprisingly rigid barriers that constrain their evolution. Dependent top-down arming is open to all types of insurgent factions. Embryonic insurgent groups and militia, if they operate a top-down arming pattern, tend to be dependent top-down armers. However, warlord type and quasi-state insurgents may also be dependent armers.


During the Cold War era dependency was also a function of global level structures and the character of extra-regional covert aid. However, in the post-Cold War era, dependent top-down arming is a function of structures at the conflict-complex and regional levels. While dependency in top-down arming is primarily a function of the lack of key capacities required for the development of semi-autonomous arming patterns, in many cases, dependent arming contributes to the growth of that capacity. It enhances an actor’s capacity to control the territory and political and economic space and resources of the conflict-complex, and puts them on a trajectory towards becoming a warlord or quasi-state force with the capacity to arm with a degree of autonomy. Semi-autonomous arming is top-down arming in which recipients have a degree of autonomy in their arms supply relationships, but this is muted by continued requirements for regional facilitation. Founded on strong territorial control and a top-down war economy, only the more organised warlord and quasi-state insurgent groups can operate this arming pattern. The potential for semi-autonomous arming is constructed at the conflict-complex level, while its realisation is reliant upon particular aspects of the structures of availability and facilitation at the regional level – especially micro-economies associated with war economy networks and/or organised regional black markets. Importantly, while top-down war economies are essential for semi-autonomous arming, the presence of a top-down war economy does not, on its own – or at least not directly or immediately – engender a shift from dependent arming to semi-autonomous patterns. In contrast to the amorphous image, the analysis of semi-autonomous arming reveals that it is the structures of war economies and their export networks as much as their revenues that influences the character of access to SALW. Even this is constrained: the continued expansion of war economies and associated economic networks does not lead to a progression from semi-autonomous arming to autonomous arming. Autonomous arming patterns are those in which the choice of sources, suppliers, and channels used to acquire SALW is not restricted by a need for facilitation. Autonomous armers are able to access the global legal market directly, even if this is done illicitly. If access to arms were a function of a globalised market in which money was the primary limitation on the nature of arms acquisition – as indicated in the amorphous image – many insurgent groups would operate such a pattern, while many weak and collapsing states would lose the capacity to arm in this way. In contrast to this, all states but very few non-state actors have operated autonomous arming patterns. Those insurgents that have

Conclusion 247

utilised some autonomous-type processes have still predominantly acquired arms in other ways. Even the most decayed state forces (except for collapsed states with no government) appear able to access international stocks directly provided that they are not under a UN arms embargo. Autonomy is a function of the possession of internationally recognised juridical sovereignty – A clear non-state threshold. This is not merely a function of legality of arms acquisitions, but also the value of sovereignty. Even under conditions of an embargo, sovereignty allows control over facilitation roles to be constructed through the formation of shadow-state networks rather than as a function of the regional micro-economies upon which most non-state actors must rely. It is the emulation of such structures and capacities that has allowed a few nonstate actors to acquire arms through autonomous channels – though only on an occasional basis. Autonomy given by sovereignty, in contrast, is highly resilient. Thus, although all understandings of SALW spread to conflict currently emphasise the lack of a non-state threshold, one does clearly exist and imposes a rigid barrier to the form of arming. The non-state threshold is strong and, in spite of broad trends in global and regional structures of SALW spread, it is not significantly weakening. For SALW spread to conflict, juridical sovereignty imposes a ‘glass ceiling’ upon arming patterns through which (almost) no non-state actor break, and no extant state can fall.

Overall implications The spread of SALW is highly structured and highly dynamic. The amorphous image has been misleading. Without a sense of structure we have lacked a sense of capacity. None of the structures that bound other arming processes are either present, or at least very strong, for SALW. Thus, if our only reference points are those structures and we interpret structures only as absolute barriers rather than things that shape a process – as is inevitable if we simply amend paradigms of proliferation to the study of SALW – then all armed groups act on a level playing field: all arming processes become a matter of choice – constrained effectively only by financial resources. By developing a sense of structure and dynamic, of location and interaction, and of variation in capacity, the arming of conflict can be better understood within the new framework developed here. This new framework image of SALW spread is a profoundly different type of foundation for developing policy response to the problems of the spread of SALW. However, many of the things that would be built upon


such a foundation have been built on the thinner one of the amorphous image. In the current policy frameworks and the normative environment of action on SALW, no key ingredients have been neglected, but some – such as brokering – have been over emphasised and no particular approaches have been abandoned or not tried – regional approaches, multilateral and national processes on key issues are all essential. The policy implications of this new framework currently remain unelaborated. However, it is important to note here that this new framework and its findings do not lend themselves to polemic critiques of the policy terrain of SALW. For instance, the importance of the regional level, does not (and should not be taken to) mean that an emphasis on regional agreements to the exclusion of the improvement of global frameworks would be more effective or appropriate. There is not space here to fully elaborate the potential implications of this new understanding of SALW spread for policy agendas and approaches, nor the implementation of programmes within those frameworks. The policy terrain of SALW issues is a broad one. Though informed by the amorphous image the commendable efforts by many in the international community to tackle SALW are not brought to nought by the inadequacies of that image. Rather, it is hoped that the framework and findings of this book might contribute to the development of more appropriate and effective efforts to tackle the spread of SALW that fuels conflicts by reinforcing – giving structure to – the foundations of expert knowledge that contributed to the building of norms and established SALW as legitimate issue for international concern and action.

Notes 1 Introduction 1. Some definitions include only mortars up to 82 mm. 2. A more detailed review of the sorts of information used in this type of research, the various benefits and risks of that information, and the strategies that can be adopted to mitigate those risks and verify basic information, can be found in Bourne, 2004.

2 Structure and Dynamic in Weapons Spread: The Trade and Proliferation of Weapons in Comparative Perspective 1. Mutimer and Gormley, among others, have both criticised a focus on this determinism (Mutimer, 2000, pp. 60–61; Gormley, 2001, p. 43). 2. These include the five NPT Nuclear Weapons States (The USA, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France) and Non-NPT nuclear weapons states (India, Pakistan, and Israel). At the time of writing North Korea has just tested what it claims to be a nuclear weapon. South Africa is not included as it dismantled its clandestinely produced weapons program in the early 1990s. 3. While a range of bodies of international law have some implications for arms transfers – including international humanitarian law, human rights law, and others – UN arms embargoes are the only explicit and globally applicable legal restrictions. (Gillard, 2000). 4. Additionally, the term grey market has been applied to cases in which there is no clear information on whether or not a transfer has been appropriately authorised. In such cases, greyness relates to the limitations of the researchers’ data. This conflation of what is not clearly known with what is genuinely unclear is potentially very misleading. Throughout this book, cases in which there is inadequate information to judge are not assumed to be grey-market. 5. In relation to this, Duffield (2001, p 163), claims that ‘In this respect, while usually intersecting the institutions of recognised states, the emerging complexes imply political projects that now go beyond conventional forms of territorial, bureaucratic or juridical authority’. 6. N.B. I make no claims of the applicability of these levels to other issues or – necessarily – to provide an adequate framework for exploration of other transnational and international interactions of recent and current conflicts. This framework is an attempt to avoid imposing assumptions, to reduce – as far as it is possible in the scope of this work – those aspects of conceptual frameworks applied to weapons spread of other types that obscure or misshape those structures and dynamics that shape SALW spread. This does not, and cannot, make any claims to resolve or entirely avoid the challenges and 249

250 Notes problems of embedded state centrism (Youngs, 1999); or the perennial issues of distinctions and relationships between states and markets. 7. A more elaborated exploration of the ways in which boundaries of the conflictcomplex level can be drawn, and the possible dilemmas this could raise for analysis, can be found in Bourne (2004). 8. As noted by Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, (1973, p. 340) in addition to geographical proximity ‘social, economic, political and organizational factors are also relevant. Consequently, members of subordinate systems are proximate, but they need not be contiguous’.

3 The Foundations and Construction of Global SALW Trade 1. On average 6.3 million firearms and 21 billion rounds of ammunition were produced every year for the period from 1980 to 1998. This declined to an estimated 4.3 million arms and 15 billion rounds of ammunition produced in 2000. (Small Arms Survey, 2001, p. 13). 2. This estimate includes all 1249 companies in at least 92 states estimated by the Small Arms Survey (2004, p. 9) and earlier estimates as well as numerous other sources. Additionally, and not included in these figures, during the 1980s there were unconfirmed reports of some production in the Republic of Congo (limited production of ammunition for small arms); Ghana (ammunition supposedly with assistance from West Germany); and Tunisia (ammunition with Austrian assistance). (Brzoska, 1986, pp. 271–274). 3. India’s inclusion among the ranks of licensors was through assistance in the construction of the Nepalese ammunition production capacity rather than a formal licensed production agreement. 4. Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) itself has engaged in various co-operative arrangements with arms industries in Britain, Germany, China, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden. See POF website http://www.pofwah.com.pk. 5. It should be noted that the limitations of using the origins of weapons in a state’s inventories as an indicator of supply relationship were mitigated to some extent by carefully excluding obsolete weapons, and cross-referencing with data on surplus transfers. Thus, for example, while many old Portuguese weapons remained in the inventory of the Angolan government in the mid-1980s, these were largely obsolete and had been left there by the colonial power, thus this is not taken as indicative of a supplier – client relationship in the post-colonial period. Nevertheless, this brief examination can only be illustrative. 6. It is not clear at what point in the 1980s this occurred. 7. As noted previously the data in this source does not cover all of the producers in Table 3.1. Therefore, these figures should be seen as indicative of the scale of changes, but are not necessarily accurate. 8. See note 1. 9. The Small Arms Survey (2001, p. 77) estimates that there are currently approximately 226 million government owned military firearms. Given that defence budgets have decreased by over a third in real terms since the late 1980s, (SIPRI, 2006, p. 280) and large-scale reduction in military force levels since the end of the Cold War it is reasonable to estimate that tens of millions of SALW became surplus.

Notes 251

4 Global Structures and SALW Flows to Conflict 1. A UN arms embargo was imposed on South Africa in 1977. This was related to their involvement in conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. (United Nations Sanctions Secretariat, 2000, p. 6). 2. Author’s communication with Colonel M. J. Dent CBE, Commander Joint Support Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF)/Deputy Commander International Military Advisory and Training Team (Sierra Leone), 11 May 2002.

6 Structures and Dynamics of Intra-regional SALW Spread to Conflict 1. SIPRI Yearbooks 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998; and Anthony, 1994. 2. While many states have marking procedures in place that would make weapons from their own stocks or national production more traceable, unless laundered, than imported weapons, in many states these procedures do not exist and weapons may easily be laundered by removing markings. Regardless, systematic tracing of weapons in conflict zones is seldom carried out. In 2005 an international instrument on marking, record-keeping and tracing was agreed, but the time of writing is yet to be tested in tracing conflict flows, and the standards it contains were watered down in important areas (See Bourne et al., 2006). 3. A growing number of supplier states employ some form of assessment of the risk of diversion in their arms export authorisation procedures. This may, hypothetically, affect the choice of sources. A recent study found evidence of only 41 states having some form of explicit diversion risk assessment in their export controls (Bourne et al., 2006, p. 54). 4. The term ‘latent proliferation’ has been used by Joanna Spear (1998) to describe the flow of surplus SALW from state stocks. It is used here to reflect the potential inherent in all accumulated stocks of arms to recirculate.

7 Arming Conflict from the Bottom-Up: SALW Spread at the Conflict Level 1. While some estimate that Sendero earnt US$20 million per year from drug trafficking (Van de Velde, 1996, p. 473), this has been hotly debated (see Naylor, 1993).

8 Constructing Top-Down Arming Patterns: Sovereignty, Money, Networks, and the Cumulative Impact of Structures and Dynamics of SALW Spread 1. Information on rates of fire is often difficult to assess. In most cases a cyclic rate of fire, indicating the number of rounds per minute that could be fired if there were no need to reload. For the AK-47 and its equivalents this is usually in the order of 600 rounds per minute (Clutterbuck, 1990, p. 24; Hogg, 1985).

252 Notes

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

However, given the need to reload, the cyclic rate of fire is potentially misleading. The figure of 100 rounds per minute is taken from an assessment by the Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security (IRSAIS), and is based on a well-trained shooter reloading quickly. The figure of 90 per cent is probably overstated given that much of the leakage of the Afghan arms pipeline occurred prior to its entry into Afghanistan. Nevertheless some significant improvement in the efficiency of the pipeline probably did occur because of the enhanced security from Soviet interception. Theoretically, the manufacture of SALW through licensed production is not entirely autonomous as it often requires continued supplies of weapons components and dual-use materials. However, this remains a restriction imposed within the global market rather than reflecting an inability to access that market – and one that does not appear to have been significant in any states capacity to arm itself this way. Engagement in conflict, for the purposes of this chapter, covers those states with ‘major armed conflict’ or several ‘intermediate’ or ‘minor conflicts’ and including those for which data on casualty levels is ambiguous but likely to be high. Additionally, this includes states that have intervened militarily in regionalised conflict-complexes, but excluding contributions to multi-lateral peacekeeping / peace-enforcement forces. Based on data in PRIO and Uppsala University conflict data project, Conflict List 1946–2001, at http://www.prio. no/cwp/ArmedConflict. Of course some terrorist groups manufacture ‘Improvised Explosive Devices’ (IEDs), but this tends to use commercially available explosives and the like rather than the SALW trade. This was provided in line with Chinese efforts to persecute the Uighur population of Xingjiang province, whom the Beijing government has labelled ‘terrorists’. Kyrgyzstan has a large Uighur population, in addition to facing a Tajik-based insurgent threat. Duffield (2001, pp. 187–201) uses the term ‘network war’. The term network warrior is used here as reference to those conflict factions that are characterised by the incorporation of regional and global networks.

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Index Afghanistan 42, 93, 99, 100, 103, 106–7, 125, 129, 135, 141, 147, 150–1, 153–5, 158, 160, 162, 164, 167–8, 189, 192, 197–8, 201–2, 208–9, 211, 214, 223–6, 252 Mujahideen 42, 99–102, 104, 106, 124–5, 129, 134, 137, 153, 155, 192, 198, 201, 208–9, 211–12 Northern Alliance 150–1, 154–5, 167 Taleban 141, 147, 151, 208, 223, 226 AK-47 35, 66–7, 73, 83, 104, 150, 169, 171, 191–2, 194, 211, 251 Al Qaida 91, 93, 114, 186, 226–7, 234, 258 Albania 58, 63, 77, 128, 151, 160–1, 169, 191 Algeria 33, 59, 63, 80, 97, 146–7, 222 FIS/AIS 146 Ammunition 5, 69, 168 Illicit trafficking 104, 111, 124, 127, 131, 132, 141, 143, 149, 152–4, 158–62, 168, 169, 199, 208, 212, 214 Production 56, 57–61, 62–3, 66, 81, 98, 104, 141, 215, 220, 221, 224, 250 Transfers 78, 84, 91, 96, 100 Amorphous Image 9, 11, 14, 33–4, 35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 47, 50, 51, 52, 79, 85, 88, 107, 108, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 122, 175, 181, 184, 207, 219, 220, 228, 229, 235, 236, 238, 239, 241, 244–8 Angola 80, 90, 93, 99, 129, 141, 151, 165, 169, 183, 192, 201, 215, 218, 223, 232, 233, 250, 251 Liberation war 97 MPLA 102, 103, 104 UNITA 25, 43, 93, 97, 99, 101, 106, 123, 124, 125,129,130,

131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 143, 144, 145, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 162, 165, 166, 168, 169, 208, 211, 213, 218, 223, 224 UNITA Arms Pipeline 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 123, 124, 169 Annan, Kofi 3 Anti-personnel Landmines 5, 6, 29 Ant-Trade 10, 139, 157–65, 169, 171, 174, 187, 190, 195, 198, 201, 203–4, 243 Argentina 59, 63, 73, 78, 82, 133, 141, 143, 231 Armenia 58, 63, 94, 147, 221, 224 Arms embargoes 27, 40, 89, 91, 92–5, 222–4, 229, 230, 231, 237, 249, 258 Arms pipelines 42–3, 95, 99–107, 110, 111, 114, 117, 122–30, 134, 143, 145, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 165, 166, 170, 172, 173, 177, 208, 210, 216, 228, 230, 241, 252 Assimilation 20–2, 24, 25, 34 Aum Shinrikyo 24 Australia 60, 63, 82 Australia Group 28, 33 Austria 57, 63, 65, 78–9, 95, 113, 158, 250 Availability of SALW 4, 8, 17, 23, 24, 27, 34–36, 50, 56, 68–70, 83, 86, 104, 108, 110, 112, 151, 158, 160, 165, 167–9, 173–5, 188–90, 192, 198–9, 203, 205, 207, 219, 236, 240, 243, 246 of Technology 17, 18–20, 80 of Weapons 15–17, 22–7 Azerbaijan 93–4, 147, 221–2, 224 Ballistic Missiles 18–19, 21, 23, 29, 32, 33

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Index Bangladesh 60, 63, 128, 132, 147, 162, 214, 225 Belarus 58, 63 Belgium 57, 63, 65, 71–2, 76, 79–80, 82–3, 85 Biological weapons 18–21, 24, 25, 28, 30–32 Biting the Bullet 7 Black market Conflict-complex 190–202 Definition 40 Global 36–7, 108–17, 241 Regional Ant-trade 156–64, 169, 171, 174, 187, 190, 195, 198, 201, 204, 243 Regional Organised 10, 156, 162–71, 173–6, 213, 219, 243–4 Bolivia 59, 63, 82, 132, 133 Bosnia-Herzegovina 58, 63, 107, 113, 124, 126, 143, 148, 230 Bottom-up Arming 10–11, 157, 181–205, 207, 211, 213, 228, 245 Definition 187 Bout, Victor 85 Brazil 59, 63, 73, 78, 81–2, 85, 90, 141, 168, 171 Brokers 34, 36–9, 41, 51, 85–6, 92, 95, 114–7, 122–3, 128, 131–3, 136–8, 167, 175, 213, 217, 219, 220, 229, 232, 238–9, 241, 244, 248 Policy focus on 6, 86 in Amorphous Image 37–9, 238–9 Bulgaria 58, 63, 73, 76, 80–1, 84, 90, 91, 95, 129–31, 133, 151, 169 Burkina Faso 60, 63, 132, 145–6, 152, 155, 211, 228 Burundi 93, 125, 128, 132, 141, 144, 163, 168, 223 FDD 144 Cambodia 60, 63, 69, 96, 101, 104, 124, 135, 148, 163–4, 167, 169, 192, 201, 214, 223 Khmer Rouge 67, 104, 135, 148, 165 Cameroon 60, 63

271

Canada 57, 63, 92, 134, 159 CFE treaty 69 Chad 132, 140, 142, 144, 198, 202, 223 Chemical Weapons 18–21, 24, 25, 28, 32–3 Chile 59, 63, 95, 104, 141 China 47, 60, 63, 65–8, 71, 73–4, 77, 80, 82, 96–8, 100–1, 104–6, 112–13, 132, 140, 142–3, 147–8, 151, 159, 161, 165, 169, 192, 224, 249–50, 252 CIA Arms Pipelines 97, 99–102, 104, 123–5, 129, 134, 137, 143, 151–2, 208, 214 Civil Defence Forces 90, 185, 189–90, 193, 198, 207, 209 Civilian arming 11, 182, 185, 189–95, 198, 201–2, 204–5, 245 CoCom 30, 75, 84 Colombia 59, 63, 91, 106, 113, 127, 132, 135, 141, 149, 158, 160, 164, 167–8, 170–1, 175, 183, 186, 192–3, 208, 213, 221, 224 FARC 67, 106, 113, 127, 132, 149, 158, 160, 168, 175, 186, 208, 213–14, 216–17 Colt 72 Conflict complex 10–11, 45–51, 69, 91, 98, 102, 111, 114–16, 164–206, 208, 213, 216, 219–20, 227–8, 231, 233–9, 243–5 Definition 45–6 SALW spread within 122, 186–205 Conflict Diamonds 38, 114, 115, 129–30, 132, 135, 136, 161, 164–7, 213, 215, 217–18, 228 Congo Brazzaville (Republic of) 114, 130, 137, 163, 186, 223, 250 Congo, Democratic Republic of 47, 93–4, 105, 128–30, 135, 142, 144–5,155, 163, 197, 199, 202, 218, 223, 231 ADFL 130, 145, 152, 168, 197, 202, 215 RCD 145, 199 See also Zaire

272 Index Cote d’Ivoire 46, 93, 98, 127, 131–2, 135, 145–6, 152, 161, 166, 198, 211, 216, 228 Covert Aid 9–10, 41–2, 52, 88, 92, 95–111, 114–15, 117, 122–39, 143–57, 162–13, 165–7, 170, 172–3, 177, 201, 203, 207–8, 210–13, 215, 217–18, 222, 235, 240–4, 246 Conflict level See Rebel Axes, Militia, Civil Defence Forces Definition 41–2 Global level 95–107 Regional level 143–56 Cox, Robert 17 Croatia 58, 63, 67, 93, 95, 107, 112–13, 124, 126, 133, 158, 230–1 Cruise Missiles 18–21, 23, 28–9, 32–33 Cuba 59, 63, 80, 97, 103–4, 151–2, 208 Cummings, Samuel 72, 100 Cyprus 57, 63, 94, 112, 136 Czech Republic 58, 63, 65, 90, 230–1 Czechoslovakia 65, 73, 76–7, 80, 97–8, 151, 250 Demand 5, 24, 111, 158, 169 Denmark 57, 63, 79 Destruction/disposal of SALW 5, 6, 72 Diaspora 46, 48–9, 113, 115, 134, 161 Diffusion 7, 8, 15–17, 19, 31, 33–4, 66, 70, 126, 140, 150, 158–9, 170–1, 190–5, 197, 199, 201, 205, 240, 243, 245 Disarmament 5, 6, 69, 137, 194, 202 DDR 6, 137, 168, 194, 202 Voluntary weapons collections 5, 6 Diversion 32, 38, 41–2, 69, 95, 107, 110, 112–13, 117, 122, 128, 157, 170–1, 175, 230, 241, 244, 251 Dominican Republic 59, 63, 73 Dual Use Technology 19–20, 22, 24, 31, 252 Duffield, Mark 45, 115, 135, 164, 228, 232, 233, 249, 252

Economic Community of West African States 6, 145, 153, 194 Ecuador 59, 63, 141, 158 Egypt 59, 63, 66, 68, 73, 97, 100, 134, 222 El Salvador 59, 63, 82, 101, 103–4, 137, 149, 170, 184, 193, 197, 208, 224 FMLN 67, 103–4, 137, 149, 152, 170, 184, 197, 208, 220 Embryonic insurgents 185, 196, 199, 202–3, 205, 207, 210, 212, 215, 219, 235, 245 End-User Certificates 109, 131–3, 172, 225, 242 Eritrea 93–4, 109, 124, 145, 155, 186, 208, 209, 223, 231, 258 Estonia 58, 63 Ethiopia 60, 63, 93, 94, 103, 109, 124, 145, 154, 155–6, 160, 162, 186, 197, 204, 208–9, 223, 258, 260–1 EPLF 109, 156, 186, 200, 204 TPLF 109, 186, 198, 200, 204 EU 143, 148 Code of Conduct 32, 84 Embargoes 6, 92–4, 222–3 Export controls 6, 30–2, 75, 84, 85, 95, 106, 108, 109, 112, 132, 251 Extra-regional flows to conflict 50, 67, 69–70, 88–117 Black-market 108–116 Covert aid 95–108 Grey-market 108–116 Legal 88–95 Finland 47, 57, 63, 66, 100 FN-Herstal 22, 65–6, 72, 81, 83 France 57, 63, 65, 72, 75, 79, 83, 94, 98, 102, 112, 114, 136, 242 Front Companies 99–100, 114, 133, 136, 225, 230 G3 66, 82, 97 Georgia 58, 63, 127, 159, 196, 221–2, 224

Index Germany 57, 63, 65–6, 71–3, 76, 79–80, 82–4, 91, 95, 97, 100, 102–4, 113, 134, 143, 148, 221, 226, 250 BND 143 Global level Construction of legal market 55–87 Definition 49 Political structure and arms trade 70–1 Primacy of legal market 10, 117, 139, 239 Globalisation 36, 49, 172, 242 of arms production 20, 83 of illicit trade 36–7, 108, 115, 117, 122, 241, 242 Greece 57, 63 Grey market 7, 9–10, 33, 36–7, 40–2, 52, 88, 94–5, 100, 107–16, 156–76, 183, 187, 190, 204, 214, 224, 241–4, 249 Conflict-complex 40–42 Definition 108–16 Global 156–64, 169, 171, 174, 187, 190, 195, 198, 201, Regional Ant-trade 204, 243 Regional Organised 10, 156, 162–71, 173–6, 213, 219, 243–4 Guatemala 59, 63, 77, 141, 170, 190, 192–3, 195, 197, 209, 224 Guinea 60–1, 63–4, 66, 97, 132–3, 145, 161, 163, 208, 223 Guinea-Bissau 97, 149, 158, 160, 191, 197, 204, 223 Heckler and Koch 66, 72, 81, 83 Honduras 82, 101, 124, 137, 141, 208, 210 Hungary 58, 63, 73, 80, 95, 103–4, 151 Illicit transfers Definitions 39–42 See Black Market, Grey Market, Covert Aid Images of weapons spread 14–17 Impacts (of SALW) Deaths 3–4

273

Direct 3, 4 Indirect 4 India 60, 63, 65, 80, 82, 100, 128, 147, 153, 155, 160, 162, 166–7, 183, 214, 220–1, 223, 249, 250 ULFA 147–8, 214 Indonesia 61, 63, 66, 80, 167, 201, 223 Free Aceh Movement 167 Informal economy 48, 129, 135, 160–2, 164–5, 174–5, 183, 190, 200–1, 203, 233, 243 Insurgent groups See under type (Embryonic, Militia, Warlord, quasi-state) and specific group IRA 103, 107, 113, 115, 134, 225 Iran 59, 63, 66, 73, 78, 85, 99, 100, 102, 106–8, 124, 126, 134, 142, 146–9, 151, 154–5, 208, 222, 230 MEK 146, 148–9 Iraq 59, 63, 66, 78, 81, 93, 95, 107, 146, 148–9, 151, 186, 208, 222, 226, 230–1 Badr Corps 146, 149, 208 Israel 59, 63, 65, 72–3, 78, 80–1, 90–1, 100, 107, 141, 146, 162, 221–2, 226, 249 Italy 57, 63, 65, 76, 79, 82 Japan 61, 63, 85, 113, 226 Jordan 59, 63, 106, 127, 132, 142, 214 Kashmir 147, 151, 160 Kazakhstan 61, 63 Kenya 60, 63, 94, 109, 149, 160–1 KGB 76, 103 Klare, Michael T 7, 16, 35 Kosovo 113, 128, 134, 160, 161 KLA/UCK 113, 161 Krause, Keith 7, 76 Kyrgyzstan 61, 63, 147, 154, 224, 252 Laurance, Edward 4, 108 Lebanon 16, 59, 63, 78, 80, 100, 141, 146–7, 151, 154, 162, 186, 202, 208, 223, 226

274 Index Lebanon – continued Hizballah 146, 154, 186 SLA 146, 162 Legal Market 39–42, 70–87, 92–5 See by Global, regional and conflictcomplex level Levels of Analysis 43–50 Three level approach 9, 12–14, 39, 51, 52, 121, 235, 238–9, 245 Traditional 44 Liberia 46, 93, 123, 127, 131–3, 135, 137, 140, 145–6, 148, 150, 152–5, 161, 163–4, 166–7, 183, 186, 193–4, 197, 199, 208–9, 213, 216, 218, 223, 228, 230–1 LURD 145 NPFL 46, 127, 132, 135, 145–6, 152, 154–5, 166–7, 186, 193, 197, 199–200, 208–9, 211, 213, 216, 218–19, 228, 230 Taylor, Charles 46, 131, 133, 166, 209, 211, 216, 218, 230 ULIMO 145, 148, 150, 208, 216 Libya 29, 33, 59, 63, 97, 103, 107, 140, 142, 144–6, 151–2, 197, 208, 211 Light Weapons (Definition) 4–5 Lithuania 58, 63 Luxembourg 57, 63 M-16 81–2, 91–2, 162, 171 Macedonia 58, 63 Major Conventional Arms 6–7, 18, 21, 23, 25, 29, 33, 70–1, 73–7, 79–84, 86–7, 90, 97–8, 103, 142, 151, 187, 229, 240 Malaysia 61, 63, 82, 148 Mali 80, 145, 160, 193–4, 196–8, 223 MFUA 145, 148, 197 Malta 57, 63 MANPADS 5, 22, 25, 68, 101–2, 211–12 Marking and Tracing 6, 152, 251 Mauritania 146, 149, 151, 203 Methodology 11–13 Mexico 57, 63, 73, 85, 142, 159, 224, 262 Micro-economies 125–9, 132–4, 137–8, 149, 153, 155, 164–6,

172–7, 183, 212–13, 215–16, 218–19, 234, 236–7, 242–4, 246–7 Military Assistance 72, 74–5, 77–8, 84, 89–92, 94, 96–9, 101–4, 110, 124, 143, 224, 231, 234, 241 Militias 16, 26, 45, 90, 136, 141, 160, 163, 185, 187, 193–4, 196, 201, 203, 205, 207, 209–10, 215, 224, 229, 235, 245 Minin, Leonid 85, 114, 131 Moldova 58, 63, 67, 133 Monaco 57, 63 Morocco 59, 63 Mozambique 102, 105, 143–4, 149, 150, 154, 156, 161, 166, 169–70, 191–3, 197, 208, 223, 233 FRELIMO 102, 202 RENAMO 136, 143–4, 149–50, 153–4, 156, 161, 166, 169, 197, 202, 208 Myanmar 61, 63, 72, 93, 128–9, 135, 141–2, 147, 162–3, 223, 225 Nairobi Declaration/Protocol 6 Namibia 60, 63, 103, 142, 144, 151, 154–15, 162, 169 NATO 69, 71, 81, 84, 134 Naylor, R.T 83, 110, 116, 131, 184 Nepal 61, 63, 82, 91, 223, 250 Netherlands 57, 63, 79, 107 Networks 11, 43, 48, 74, 84–5, 90, 94–5, 113–15, 117, 121, 123, 125–39, 144, 149, 153, 155–6, 161, 163–7, 169–70, 172–6, 183–4, 186, 188, 191, 204, 206, 209, 213–14, 216–19, 225–8, 230, 232–7, 241–4, 246–7, 251–2 Network war 252 See also Pipelines, Micro-economies New Wars literature 8, 15, 38 New Zealand 61, 63, 82 NGOs 6, 37 Nicaragua 42, 59, 63, 99, 101, 103–4, 137, 141, 149, 170–1, 193–4, 197, 202, 208, 210, 212, 224 Contras 99–101, 124–5, 143, 170, 197, 202, 208, 210, 212 FSLN 104

Index

275

Niger 145, 197–9, 223 FLAA 145, 197–8 Nigeria 60, 63, 66, 72, 90, 132, 140, 145, 190, 198 Civil War 96–8, 105, 108, 221, 223 Non-state actors 14, 16, 21, 24–6, 33, 37, 39, 43, 45, 48–9, 67, 113–14, 123, 134, 144–8, 155–6, 168, 181, 183–5, 210, 218, 220, 224–5, 227–9, 234, 236–7, 239, 246–7 Non-state threshold 11, 22, 24–7, 34, 36, 44, 51, 168, 206–7, 220, 229, 234, 237–8, 244, 247 North Korea 26, 28, 61, 63, 66, 73, 77–8, 85, 90, 97, 103–4, 106, 108, 113, 147, 152, 215, 249 Norway 57, 63 Nuclear weapons /technology 8, 15, 18–21, 24, 26–28, 32, 249

Philippines 61, 63, 92, 113, 141, 148, 201, 214, 223 Abu Sayyef 92 MILF 113, 214 MNLF 148 Poland 58, 63, 73, 76–7, 80, 151 Policy responses, Structures and norms 6–8, 15, 17, 19, 22, 27–31, 33, 37, 40, 42, 50, 86, 92, 109, 248 Portugal 57, 63, 90, 97–8, 132, 250 Private Military Companies 90, 166 Private Security Companies 26, 85, 185, 189, 194 Production 18 Craft production 66–7, 158, 160, 190, 204 Illicit production 66–8 Licensed production 64–6, 80 Number of producers 56–66 Proliferation Image 16, 33–4

Oil 114, 190, 232–3 Oligopoly 74, 78–86, 210, 227, 240 Oman 59, 63, 66 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 6, 92–3, 222 Organisation of American States 6, 92–3 Organised Crime 6, 113, 167, 169, 183, 214, 226

Quasi-state insurgents 185–6, 204, 210, 212–13, 215–19, 225–8, 231, 235, 245–6

Pacific Islands Forum 6 Pakistan 61, 63, 65–8, 72, 77, 81, 85, 101, 106–7, 124–6, 131, 137, 141, 147, 150–1, 153, 155, 158, 160, 165, 167, 170, 198, 201, 211–13, 223, 249–50 ISI 106, 125–6, 137, 151, 201, 211 Palestine 100, 146, 150, 154, 160, 162, 186 PLO 100, 103, 186, 208, 225–6 Papua New Guinea 61, 64 Paraguay 59, 64, 109, 133, 170 Peru 60, 63, 73, 82, 106, 109, 127, 132, 141, 190, 193, 204, 214, 224, 254, 266 Sendero Luminoso 109, 204, 251

Rebel axes 167, 207, 209, 235 Regional Facilitation 121–38 Transhipment 123–30 Veil of legality 131–4 Financing 134–6 Territory 136–7 See also networks, Micro-economies, and semi-autonomous arming Regional Level Definition 44–9 Regional legal markets 140–3 Regional illicit markets 156–71. See also Black and Grey Markets Regionalisation of Covert Aid 143–56 Regional political economies of SALW 171–7 Reno, William 90, 232 Romania 58, 63, 73, 76, 80, 91, 95, 97, 103, 131, 151 Russia / Russian Federation 47, 58, 63, 65, 82–3, 90, 111–12, 127, 142, 147, 148, 150–1, 153–5, 159, 167, 201, 214, 221–2, 224, 226, 249

276 Index Russia / Russian Federation – continued Chechen conflict 127, 148, 168, 201, 214 Rwanda 93–4, 112, 125, 128, 130, 136, 144–5, 154–5, 163, 168, 197, 199, 208–9, 215, 223, 229–30 FAR 94, 144, 208, 229 Interahamwe 144, 209, 229 RPF 130, 144, 149, 154, 197, 199–200, 208, 229, 230 Saudi Arabia 59, 63, 82, 102, 113, 134, 147–8, 155 Second World War 16, 70–1, 98, 108, 196 Security complexes 47–8, 142, 173, 239 Senegal 97, 223 MFDC 146, 149, 151, 158, 161, 197–8, 203 Shadow state 233–4, 236–7, 247 Sierra Leone 46, 90–1, 94, 135, 137, 145–6, 161, 163–4, 167, 183, 186, 193, 197–201, 208–9, 223, 251 Kamajors 90, 198, 209 RUF 135, 137, 146, 161, 167, 186, 197, 199–200, 208–9 Singapore 61, 63, 65–6, 82, 85, 95, 141, 153, 225 Six-day war 78 Slovakia 58, 63, 132 Slovenia 58, 63, 95, 148, 158 Small Arms (Definition) 4–5 Small Arms Survey 7, 37, 61, 62, 64, 70, 167, 250 Somalia 94, 145, 148, 154–5, 162, 189, 196–7, 199, 201, 208–9, 218 SNM 145, 148, 196–7, 201, 208 Source base 56–70 South Africa 60, 63, 78, 81, 85, 90, 92, 95, 101, 103, 108, 129, 136, 143–4, 150–4, 156, 161, 166, 170, 193, 195, 218, 221, 223, 225, 249, 251 ANC 103, 152, 156, 169 South Korea 61, 63, 85, 97 Southern African Development Community 6

Sovereignty 11, 31, 45, 51, 186, 206, 220, 229–37, 247 Spain 57, 63, 76, 79, 90, 102, 114, 217 Sri Lanka 115, 129, 132, 141–3, 147, 153, 166, 186, 201, 208–9, 220, 223, 225 LTTE 67, 114–15, 129, 132–4, 143, 147, 166–7, 186, 208, 220, 225–7, 231, 234 PLOTE 209 Stability Pact 6 Stages of flows 41–43. See also regional facilitation Stockpile management and security 5, 160 Sudan 60, 64, 66, 72, 81, 90, 94, 106–7, 124, 132, 134, 136–7, 140, 142, 144–6, 151, 156, 162, 183, 199, 201–2, 211, 217, 223, 233 SPLA 134–5, 156, 199 Suppliers 56–70 Core and Periphery 74–82 Regional 86 Tiers of 63 Surplus weapons 5–6, 23, 26, 32, 35, 56, 68–72, 74, 83–5, 90–2, 97, 100, 102–3, 108, 110–13, 140–1, 145, 147, 151–2, 168, 215, 240, 250–1 Sweden 57, 63, 65, 78, 250 Switzerland 57, 63, 65, 78, 102, 128, 161, 191, 228 Syria 59, 64, 81, 134, 146, 148, 154, 230–1 Taiwan 61, 63 Tajikistan 106, 142, 147–8, 153, 159–60, 162, 168, 192, 214, 223, 224 Tanzania 60, 63, 94, 98, 105, 125, 127, 128, 130 Territory (control of) 182–86 Terrorism 3, 24–5, 92, 103, 113–14, 134, 185, 225–6, 252–3 Thailand 61, 63, 66, 72, 82, 89, 96, 101, 104, 124, 129, 131, 135, 147, 163, 165, 167, 169

Index Top-Down Arming 10, 11, 181, 206–37 Defined 187–88 Dependent 11, 188, 207–14, 216, 220, 227, 235–6, 245–6 Semi-autonomous 11, 188, 206, 208–10, 212–19, 226–8, 235–6, 246 Autonomous 11, 188, 206, 212, 217–37, 246–7, 252 Trade Image 16, 17, 31, 33 Transhipment 41, 43, 122–32, 136–8, 143, 147, 153–5, 166, 170, 172, 242 Turkey 58, 63, 73, 84, 85, 100, 146, 148, 150, 154, 217, 222, 224 PKK 148, 150, 154, 217 Type-56 67 Uganda 60, 64, 94, 124–5, 128, 130, 132–3, 135–6, 141, 144–5, 149, 151, 154–6, 161, 186, 197, 199, 203, 209, 215, 223, 230 LRA 136, 144, 156 WNBF 136, 144 Ukraine 58, 63, 90, 107, 131–2, 147, 151, 214, 224–6 UN arms embargoes See Arms Embargoes UN Firearms protocol 6, 32 UN Programme of Action 6, 32 United Arab Emirates 59, 64, 82 United Kingdom 57, 63, 65 , 71–2, 75, 79, 83, 91, 98, 100–2, 221, 249 United States 25, 57, 63, 65, 69, 71–5, 77, 79, 82, 89, 91–2, 96–7, 99, 106–8, 112–13, 123, 134, 142, 147, 151, 155, 157, 159, 170, 218, 221, 224, 249. See also CIA arms pipelines

277

Uruguay 60, 64, 82 Uzbekistan 147–8, 154, 214, 224 Venezuela 60, 63, 113, 149, 160, 170 Vietnam 61, 64, 69, 73, 77, 84, 89, 96–7, 99, 103–4, 141, 147, 161, 169 War economies 132, 134–6, 152, 155, 161–2, 164–7, 174–6, 182–7, 189, 200–1, 203–5, 207, 210, 212–20, 225–8, 232–6, 243–6 Bottom-up 162, 183–5, 189, 200–3, 205, 245 Top-down 164–5, 183, 185–6, 204, 207, 210, 212–19, 228, 235–6, 246 Warlords 45, 135, 154, 184–6, 204, 209–13, 215–19, 231–2, 235, 245–6 Warsaw Treaty Organisation 73, 76 Wassenaar Arrangement 32, 84 Weak, collapsing and failing states 25, 41, 45–6, 123, 162, 168–9, 174, 182, 191, 198–9, 218, 228, 231–4, 236, 243, 246–7 Western Sahara 147 Yakuza 113 Yugoslavia 25, 58, 63, 66, 73, 78, 94–5, 103–4, 107, 136, 151, 158, 163, 169, 191, 222, 230 Zaire, 78, 94, 101, 123–6, 130, 136, 140, 144–5, 152, 162, 168, 186, 202, 208, 215, 218, 223, 229, 230 Mobutu 130, 140, 168, 202, 230. See also Democratic Republic of Congo, CIA pipelines, and UNITA Zimbabwe 47, 60, 64, 105, 135, 141–2, 145, 151, 155, 191, 202, 215

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