The Editor & Publishers have made all efforts to avoid errors or omissions and are not responsible for the consequences, whatsoever of any action taken on the basis of this book. All disputes are subject to the jurisdiction of competent courts in Delhi.
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control b Non-proliferation
ISBN 81-8274-251-3 (Set)
First Edition:2007
O Reserved
First published in India by PENTAGON PRESS A-38, Hauz Khas, New Delhi-110016 (India) Phones: 011-41656996/7/8,41517091 Telefax: 011-41656997 email:
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...
Preface Select List of Acronyms Chronology
Xlll
xvii xxvii
PART I . TEST BAN AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 1. Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Bans Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water Threshold Test Ban Treaty Treaty Between the USA and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
2. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon, NPT Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons
3
3 17 119 124 126
229 229 244 250
252 282 327
vi ---
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation
PART I1 NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, DAMAGE LIABILITY, SAFETY AND PROTECTION 3. Nuclear Accidents and Radiological Emergency: Notification, Assistance and Third Party Liability
391
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
391
4. Civil and Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (as amended) Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
411
5. Nuclear Safety and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention on Nuclear Safety Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
398
41 1 412 41 4 41 5
41 6
419 419 433 447 449
PART I11
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), DEPARTMENT OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS AND THE UN RESOLUTION 6. IAEA: History, Statute, Role and the Road Ahead History of IAEA Related Policy Documents and Treaties International Nuclear Information System Statements of the Director General
477 477
504 504 51 4
Contents 7. Privileges, Immunities and Relationship Agreements of IAEA
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency Agency's Relationship Agreements with Specialized Agencies Agency's Headquarters Agreement with Austria and Related Agreements
8. Safeguards and the Safeguards System of IAEA Agency's Safeguards Agency's Safeguards System Application of the Provisions on Euratom Safeguards Implementation of Safeguards in the Community by IAEA and EURATOM
9. Department for Disarmament Affairs: Role and Structure Terrorism and Disarmament: The Role of the Department for Disarmament Affairs Global Norms for Disarmament are Vital to the Sustainable Development, Quality of Life and Ultimately the Survival of this Planet: Views of the Department for Disarmament Affairs Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs Strengthened Safeguards System: States with Additional Protocols
10. UNSCEAR and UN Resolution Charter of the United Nations United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) UN Resolution 1284
PART IV PEACEFUL NUCLEAR, EXPLOSIONS OPEN SKIES AND HOTLINE 11. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
12. Open Skies Treaty on Open Skies
vii
523
523 534 564
607 607 609 630 649
652 652
653 655 658 661 661
689 691
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation
13. Hotline Hot Line Agreement Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S.of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on Measures to Improve the USA USSR Direct Communications Links Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the US-USSR Direct Communications
785 785
787 791
796
PART V NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES, ANTARCTICA, OUTER SPACE AND SEA-BED 14. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Latin America, South
Pacific, South East Asia, Africa and Mongolia Treaty of Tlateloco Treaty of Rarotonga Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of Pelindaba Cairo Declaration Law of Mongolia on its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status
15. Antarctica, Outer Space and Sea-Bed The Antarctic Treaty Outer Space Treaty Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty
PART VI BALLISTIC MISSILES, NUCLEAR FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMS, DUAL-USE GOODS, TECHNOLOGIES AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 16. Anti-Ballistic and Ballistic Missiles: Limitations, Codes and Launch Notification Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
877
877
Contents
ix
Protocol to the BMD Treaty between USA and USSR Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles The Ballistic Missile Defense Act International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, Conventional Arms, Dual-Use Goods and Technologies INF Treaty The Wassenaar Arrangement
Nuclear Terrorism: Suppression and Prohibition International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism General Assembly Adopts Convention on Nuclear Terrorism which will Open for Signature at Headquarters Nuclear Terrorism Convention U.S. Urges Nations to Sign Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Terrorism
.
PART VII
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, REDUCTION AND STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTION Strategic Arms Limitation Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I Narrative) SALT I1 Treaty Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR Protocol to the Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests
Strategic Arms Reduction Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START I1 Treaty
Strategic Offensive Reduction Text of U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
(SORT)
1140
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation
PART VIII ENVIRONMENT MODIFICATION, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Environmental Modification Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
Chemical and Biological Weapons
1145 1145
1157
Geneva Protocol 1157 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and ox in Weapons and on their Destruction Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) First Chemical Weapons Convention
The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal: Statements, Remarks and Reports Statement by Robert J. Einhorn Senior Adviser, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Before. the House International Relations Committee, October 26,2005 Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, April 5, 2006 The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal, April 26, 2006 A Statement by Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser U.S. Council of Foreign Relations CSR No. 16, June, 2006
PART IX APPENDIX International and Regional Organizations, NGOs, Associations, Networks, Foundations and Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear 'Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Australia Group (AG)
Contents Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) COCOM's Successor Organization Conference on Disarmament (CD) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) European Union (EU) G-8 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Science and Technology Centers (ISTCS) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Newly Independent States (NISI North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Organization of African Unity (OAU) Permanent-5 Efforts for Mid-east Arms Transfer Restraint Preparatory Commission for the OPCW Rio Group South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (PTBT) Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Zangger Committee (ZAC) Glossary Bibliography Index
xi
1369 1371 1373
1375 1376 1378 1379 1382 1388 1389 1391 1391 1392 1393 1393 1395 1396 1399 1400 1400 1402 1403 1403 1405 1406
1407 1408 1411
Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation is a complex subject of immense and abiding global concern for nation states, non-state actors, citizen groups and, not the least, individual citizens. Their concern is from the view point of acquiring first hand knowledge of deliberations involving the United Nations as well as nation states, as also from the perspective of research, referral, critical examination and commentary by interested parties and individuals. The Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation meets the aspirations of all segments of public and private stake holders who are interested in the subject. The Encyclopaedia provides its readers a very comprehensive, one stop, turn key and integrated service by covering the entire gamut of nuclear arms, their proliferation and non-proliferation, nuclear accidents and their management, a holistic view on disarmament, nuclear weapon free zones, ballistic missiles, strategic arms limitation including strategic offensive reductions of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as also the enormously important and path breaking U.S-India Nuclear Deal which is now being processed. Included too are a bouquet of deliberations on nuclear disarmament and connected issues involving international and regional organizations, NGO's, Associations, Networks and Foundations. The lay reader may well ask: why is the subject of such overwhelming interest for the world? We may recall that in 1945, only one nation possessed a nuclear bomb (then called an Atom Bomb). Its usage in quick succession at Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought in a staggering number of horrendous deaths, instant as well as cumulative. The deaths were brought about by the thermal, blast and radiation effects (both initial as well as residual) generated by the blast. It also brought about the end of World War 11. The controversies and complexities surrounding this terrifying weapon, its usage and, far more importantly, its control became matters of immediate universal concern and remain so till date. As other nations followed in the wake
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-prolifera tion
of U.S.A. in mastering nuclear technology, a race began to acquire nuclear power status. Today, we have five officially recognized nuclear weapon states and several other nations who have nuclear war fighting capability both declared as well as of the basement type. The untold destruction caused by nuclear weapons is rivaled by the death and destruction possible by use of biological, bacteriological, chemical and conventional weapons such as nerve gas, microbes, toxins and missiles. Quite understandably then, the world with one voice, is clamouring for phased and eventually complete disarmament over time, under effective international control overseen by the United Nations. It is clearly the world community's Key Result Area. To reverse the prevailing adversarial trends, the United Nations is urgently pursuing a three point agenda: firstly, there is need for reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest levels on nuclear disarmament; secondly, a major international conference needs to be convened to help identify ways of eliminating nuclear damages, and thirdly, there should be an agreement amongst concerned parties before any missile defense system is deployed. Under a new disarmament agenda, the focus of the United Nations will be on : deeper cuts in existing nuclear arsenals; preventing an arms race in outer space; eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons and encouraging all countries possessing nuclear weapons to endorse a No - First - Use policy; halting the use of all unsafe nuclear weapons - usable materials and, ensuring universal membership, without exception, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). To do full justice to its charter, the Encyclopaedia is divided into nine parts which are further sub-divided into twenty four chapters. This structure clearly and cogently brings out all the nuances of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation as also biological, bacteriological, chemical and conventional weapons control. The last part, Part 9, is a reproduction of important Appendices giving out details of deliberations held in various fora on the above subjects, by international and regional organizations, NGO's, Associations, Networks, Foundations and other initiatives taken to promote disarmament. As is usual with a quality Encyclopaedia which covers a wide ranging span of interests, we have added a listing of Acronyms, a Chronology of nuclear and related events and landmarks and a detailed Bibliography to facilitate further reading and research. A brief Index at the end allows quick access to important issues covered in the text. Readers and researchers, in particular in the Indian sub-continent, would be delighted to find comprehensive details of the recently concluded
Preface
xv
USIndia Civil Nuclear Deal which bring out clearly the perceptions of both State Parties on the issue. In the end, the Editor would like to thank Colonel Harjeet Singh (Retd.) of the Indian Army, a respected and senior, large hearted colleague, who opened this window of opportunity for the Editor, and my perceptive and knowledgeable associates in the Pentagon Press, who did all the spade work, user friendly formatting and research. Their unstinted support and help in compiling this Encyclopaedia within the scheduled time period and with excellent production values is acknowledged with a debt of gratitude. I would, nevertheless, be delighted and privileged to receive constructive criticism and suggestions from our esteemed readers to further improve and enhance the quality and utility of this Encyclopaedia. Maj. Gen. R.S. Mehta Place: Chandigarh, India Date: 12 August 2006
AB ABL A/C ACADA ACDA ACE(s) ACPM ACQWeb ACTD AEGIS AERP AICPS AOR ASD ASD(C3I)
ATD ATR ATSD(NCB) AUP AWACS BA
Air Base Airborne Laser Aircraft Automatic Chemical Agent and Detection Alarm Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Area(s) for Capability Enhancementb) Aircrew Protective Mask DoD's Acquisition and Technology Worldwide Web Site Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Navy Shipboard Air Defense System Aircrew Eye/Respiratory Protection Advanced Integrated Collective Protection System Area of Responsibility Assistant Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict) Advanced Technology Demonstration Automatic Target Recognition Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Advanced Unitary Penetrator Airborne Warning and Control System Budget Activity
xviii Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation
BDA BIDS Bio/BIO Blk BM BMDO BW BWC CALIOPE CB ACT CBD CBDCOM CBDP CBIRF CBMS CBNIJ CBPS CBQRF CBSS C2 C3 C31
CDR CENTCOM chem CIA CINC CIPT
Battle Damage Assessment Biological Integrated Detection System Biological Block (as in Block upgrade for a procurement item) Battle Management Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Biological Warfare or Biological Weapons Biological Weapons Convention Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents Chemical Biological Arms Control Technology Chemical and Biological Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Command (Army) Chemical and Biological Defense Program Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force Chemical/BiologicaI Mass Spectrometer Chemical and Biological Non-proliferation Program (DOE) Chemical/Biological Protective Shelter Chemical Biological Quick Reaction Force Chemical/Biological Sentry System Command and Control Command, Control, and Communications Command, Control, Communications a n d Intelligence Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Critical Design Review Central Command chemical Central Intelligence Agency Commander-in-Chief Counterproliferation Integrated Process Team (Air Force)
Select List of Acronyms CJCS CMO
CNS C02
COEA CONOPS CONPLAN CONUS CP CPI ACTD CP2 ACTD
xix
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Central MASINT Office Committee on National Security Carbon Dioxide Cost and Operational Effectiveness Assessment Concept of Operations Concept Plan Continental United States Counterproliferation Ongoing Counterproliferation ACTD Follow-on Counterproliferation Counterforce ACTD Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Counterproliferation Support Program Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Cooperative Threat Reduction. Counterterror Technical Support Chemical Warfare or Chemical Weapons Chemical Weapons Convention Defense Acquisition Board
CPRC CPSP CTBT CTR CTTS CW CWC DAB DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DATSD(NCB)(CP) Deputy for counterproliferation to the ATSD(NCB) DATSD(NCB)(NTP) Deputy for Nuclear Treaty Programs to the ATSD(NCB) DCI Director of Central Intelligence Decon. Decontamination Demo. Demonstration Demonstration and Validation Dem/Val Devel. Development DGP Defense Group on Proliferation (NATO) Dl A Defense Intelligence Agency DIAL Differential Absorption Lidar DIS Distributed Interactive Simulation DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid DoD Department of Defense
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation
DOE DPRK DS-2 DSP DSWA DT DTRG DTSA DUSD(1CP) EDT EEE EMD EMP EOD EPA EUCOM FBI .-
FDA' FEMA FLIR FOPEN FOWG FOX FSU FUE FY FYDP GAN GBU GPS HAARP HASCAL NBC
Department of Energy Democratic Peoples Republic of (North) Korea Standard CW decontamination fluid Defense Support Program (satellite) Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly Defense Nuclear Agency) Development Test Defense Technical Response Group (Navy) Defense Technology Security Administration Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International and Commercial Programs) Engineering Design Review and Test Eastern Equine Encephalitis Engineering and Manufacturing Development Electromagnetic Pulse Explosive Ordnance Disposal Environmental Protection Agency European Command Federal Bureau of Investigation Food and Drug Administration Federal Emergency Management Agency Forward Looking Infrared Foliage Penetration Fiber Optic Wave Guide Designation for the XM93 NBCRS armored vehicle Former Soviet Union First Unit Equipped Fiscal Year Future Years Defense Plan Russian Federal Nuclear Radiation and Safety Authority Guided Bomb Unit Global Positioning System High Altitude Auroral Research Project hazard prediction code
Select List of Acronyms
HDBTDC HEU HPAC HTSF IAEA IBAD IBIS ICAM ICBM IDC IMEA IMS INF Intell. IOC IOTE IPB IPDS IPP IPR IPT IR ITAG
J- 2 J- 3 J- 5 J- 8 JBPDS JBREWS JCAD JCS JMIP JPO-BD
xxi
Hard a n d / o r Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability Highly Enriched Uranium Hazard Prediction and Analysis Code Hard Target Smart Fuze International Atomic Energy Agency Interim Biological Agent Detector Israeli Boost Intercept System Improved Chemical Agent Monitor Intercontinental Ballistic Missile International Data Center (CTBT) Integrated Munitions Effectiveness Analysis International Monitoring System (CTBT) Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty) Intelligence Initial Operating Capability Initial Operational Test and Evaluation Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Iinproved (chemical agent) Point Detector System Initiative for Proliferation Prevention In Process Review Integrated Process (or Product) Team Infrared Inertial Terrain Aided Guidance Joint Staff designator for Intelligence Joint Staff designator for Operations Joint Staff designator for Plans and Policy Joint Staff designator for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Joint Biological Point Detection System Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System Joint Chemical Agent Detector Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Military Intelligence Program Joint Program Office for Biological Defense
xxii Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation JROC JSLIST JSLSCAD JSTARS JTAMDO JTIDS JVAP JWARN JWCA JWCO JWSTP
krn LANTIRN LEAP LIC lidar LLNL LNBCRS LR- BSDS LRIP LTBT MASINT MCTL MDAP MDBIC MDS MEA MEADS MICAD Minatom MoU MPC&A
Joint Requirements Oversight Council Joint Services Lightweight Suit Technology Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization Joint Tactical Information Distribution System Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program Joint Warning and Reporting Network Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan kilometer Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile Low- Intensity Conflict Light Detection and Ranging Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Lightweight Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance System Long Range Biological Standoff Detection System Low Rate Initial Production Limited Test Ban Treaty Measurement and Signature Intelligence Militarily Critical Technologies List Major Defense Acquisition Program Missile Defense Battle Integration Center (Army) Modular Decontamination System Munitions Effectiveness Analysis Medium Extended Air Defense System Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Detector Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia) Memorandum of Understanding Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
Select List of Acronyms xxiii
MRI h4S MSX N-ABLE NATO NBC NBC/M NBCRS NBC NDAA
NDI NEST NFIP NMD NPAC TWG NPC NPRC NPT NRL NSC NSTC NTP NTW
Mutual Reciprocal Inspection Milestone (acquisition) Midcourse Space Experiment (satellite) Non-proliferation Airborne Lidar Experiment North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical weapons and their Means of delivery Reconnaissance System (XM93 FOX armored vehicle) National Defense Authorization Act Non- Developmental Item Nuclear Emergency Search Team National Foreign Intelligence Program National Missile Defense Non-proliferation and Arms Control Technical Working Group Non-proliferation Center Non-proliferation Program Review Committee Non-proliferation Treaty Naval Research Laboratory National Security Council National Science and Technology Council Nuclear Treaty Programs Navy Theater Wide (ship- based ballistic missile defense system) Outside the Continental United States
OCONUS ODATSD(NCB)(CP) Office of the Deputy for Counterproli-feration to ATSD(NCB) O&M Operations and Maintenance Office of Management and Budget OMB OP. OPW ORNL OSD
Operational or operations Operational Planning Workshops Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of the Secretary of Defense
xxiv Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation
OSIA OT PAC (PATRIOT) PACOM U.S. PA& E PATS
On-Site Inspection Agency Operational Test Patriot Advanced Capability Pacific Command Program Analysis and Eyaluation Protection Assessment Test System PDD Presidential Decision Directive PDUSD(A&T/S&TS)Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Tactical Systems (to USD(A&T)) Program Element PE Ph. Phase Program Objective Memorandum POM Planned Product Improvement P31 PrePre- Production Qualification Test PPQT Quarter (fiscal year) Q Radiation Detection, Indication, and Computation Radiac Research and Development R& D Research, Development, Test and Evaluation RDT& E Robotic Excavation Vehicle System REVS Request for Proposals RFP Republic of (South) Korea ROK Remote Ordnance Neutralization System RONS Semi-Automated Imagery Processing ACTD SAIP ACTD (DARPA) Shipboard Automated Liquid (CW) Agent Detector SALAD Small Business Innovation Research SBIR Shipboard Chemical Agent Monitor - Portable SCAMP Specific Emitter Identification SEI Swept Frequency Acoustic Interferometry SFAI Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SLBM Standard Missile - SM Special Operations Command SOCOM Special Operations Forces SOF Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict SO/ LIC Space Command SPACECOM
Select list of Acronyms xxv SR- BSDS S& T
START ST1
STRATCOM TACMS TBMD Tech. Eval. TEU THAAD THEL TIARA TMD TSWG TTBT TUGS TUV TW/AA
UAV UGS UGV UN UNSCOM UOES u . S. USA USAF USCENTCOM USD(A& T) USEUCOM US INTELL USMC USN USPACOM
Short Range Biological Standoff Detection System Science and Technology Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility Strategic Command Tactical Missile System Theater Ballistic Missile Defense technical evaluation Technical Escort Unit (Army) Theater High Altitude Air Defense Tactical High Energy Laser Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Theater Missile Defense Technical Support Working Group Threshold Test Ban Treaty Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor Tactical Unmanned Vehicle Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unattended Ground Sensor Unmanned Ground Vehicle United Nations United Nations Special Commission (Iraq) User Operational Evaluation System United States United States Army United States Air Force Central Command Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) European Command Intelligence United States Marine Corps United States Navy Pacific Command
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 19Non-proliferation
USSOCOM USSPACECOM USSTRATCOM
UV VEE ver VX WBS WEE WMD
Special Operations Command United States Space Command United States Strategic Command Ultraviolet Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis version (software) Designation for a type of Third Generation Chemical Nerve Agent Weapon Borne Sensor Western Equine Encephalitis Weapons of Mass Destruction
Wilhelm Roentgen of Germany, while conducting experiments with cathode rays, accidentally discovers of a new and different kind of ray. These rays were so mysterious that Roentgen named them "x-rays". He received the first Nobel Prize in Physics in 1901 for this discovery. French physicist Antoine Henri Becquerel's experiments led to the discovery of radioactivity. He observed that the element uranium can blacken a photographic plate, although separated from it by glass or black paper. He also observed that the rays that produce the darkening are capable of discharging an electroscope, indicating that the rays possess an electric charge. 1897 J.J. Thomson of Britain discovers the electron, while also studying cathode rays. He received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1906. for this discovery. 1899 Ernest Rutherford discovers two kinds of rays emitting from radium. The first he calls alpha rays; the more penetrating rays he calls beta rays. 1911 The "plum-pudding" is disproved by the gold foil experiment by Ernest Rutherford, when he discovered the nucleus of the atom. Marie Curie receives a second Nobel Prize, this time in Chemistry, for the isolation of Radium and Polonium and for lter investigation of their chemical properties. Niels Bohr publishes theory of atomic structure combining nuclear theory with quantum theory.
xxviii Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation
1915 Albert Einstein publishes the general theory of relativity. The theory proposed that gravity, as well as motion, can affect the intervals of time and of space. Rutherford bombards nitrogen gas with alpha particles and obtained atoms of an oxygen isotope and protons. This transmutation of nitrogen into oxygen was the first artificially induced nuclear reaction.
1920 Rutherford speculates on the existence of the neutron at a lecture to the Royal Society of London. 1925 Werner Heisenberg, Max Born and later Erwin Schrodinger formulate quantum mechanics. Heisenberg is awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1932 for the creation of quantum mechanics. 1927 Werner Heisenberg states the uncertainty principle, which states that it is not possible to simultaneously determine the position and momentum of a particle. Ernest 0. Lawrence conceives idea for the first cyclotron, a device that greatly increased the speed with which protons could be hurled at atomic nuclei. He was awarded the 1939 Nobel Prize in Physics for the invention and development of the cyclotron and for results obtained with it. John Crockcroft and E.T.S. Walton develop a high voltage apparatus ("linear accelerator") for accelerating protons. With this they study nuclear reactions (atomic transmutation) and are awarded the 1951 Nobel Prize in Physics.
Nov.
-
1931 Harold Urey discovers deuterium, a n isotope of hydrogen that contains one proton and one neutron.
Feb.
-
James Chadwick discovers the neutron.
I
I I
I
1932 1933 Apr.
- Max Born, James Franck and many other scientists are compelled to leave their posts at German universities because of their ''Jewish physics".
,
.
Chronology Oct.
xxix
- Leo Szilard recollects that "It occurred to me in October, 1933 that a chain reaction might be set u p if an element could be found that would emit two neutrons when it swallowed one neutron." This idea became a classified British patent in 1935 before fission was discovered. 1934 Frkdkric and Irene Joliot-Curie discover artificial radioactivity. Enrico Fermi irradiates uranium with neutrons. He believes he has produced the first transuranic element, but unknowingly achieves the world's first nuclear fission.
Dec.
Dec. 22
1938 - Fermi receives the Nobel Prize in Physics for the discovery of transuranic elements (actually fission of uranium) and departs for the United States. - Otto Hahn sends a paper to Lise Meitner containing experimental results that are interpreted by Meitner and nephew Otto Frisch as nuclear fission.
1939 - Hahn and his assistant Fritz Strassmann publish their Jan. 6 results. Feb. 11 - Meitner and Frisch publish a theoretical interpretation of the Hahn-Strassmann results as nuclear fission. Jan.-May - Many experiments on uranium fission are conducted by scientists in laboratories around the world. - Szilard, Eugene Wigner, and Edward Teller obtain a letter Aug. 2 from Einstein on the possibility of a uranium weapon; President Roosevelt receives the letter on October 11, 1939 from Alexander Sachs, who was an unofficial adviser to the President. Hans Bethe recognizes that the fusion of hydrogen nuclei to form deuterium releases energy. He suggests that much of the energy output of the Sun results from fusion reactions. He would win the 1967 Nobel Prize in Physics for this effort.
May 3
-
May 19
-
German troops occupy Norway, seizing the world's only heavy-water production plant at Vemork. Frisch and Rudolf Peierls submit a memorandum to the
xxx
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation British government estimating the critical mass of uranium 235 needed for an atomic bomb and urging a bomb research project. German scientists fail to observe neutron multiplication in the reactor in Hamburg. Using the Berkeley cyclotron, Philip Abelson and Edwin McMillan demonstrate that neutrons captured by uranium 238 lead to the creation of Elements 93 and 94, Neptunium and Plutonium. 1941 Based on experiments with a natural uranium reactor, the Germans reject graphite as a moderator. Glenn Seaborg discovers new element (atomic number 94) which they call Plutonium. American physicists confirm that Plutonium is fissionable, thus usable for a bomb. British 'MAUD' Committee reports that a weapon could be made with 22 pounds of pure Uranium 235. President Roosevelt authorizes the Manhattan Engineering District. The secret U.S. project to build an atomic bomb, later to be called the Manhattan Project, is put under the direction of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. 1942 Brigadier General Leslie Groves is put in charge of the Manhattan Project. He recruits J. Robert Oppenheimer as Scientific Director. Construction of a uranium isotope separation plant begins at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Enrico Fermi at the University of Chicago produces the world's first controlled and sustained nuclear fission reaction. 1943 Planning begins for construction of reactors at Hanford, Washington to breed plutonium for a bomb. Oppenheimer moves the bomb development to a secret laboratory located at Los Alamos, New Mexico.
June 3
-
June 15
-
Jan.
-
Feb. 23
-
Mar. 28
-
July
-
Dec. 6
-
Sept. 23
-
Nov. 5
-
Dec. 2
-
Jan.
-
Mar. 15
-
Aug. 26
1944 - Bohr presents his memorandum on intentional control of nuclear weapons to Roosevelt.
Chronology
xxxi
First batch of spent fuel obtained from Hanford reactors. - The ALSOS mission obtains documents which imply that the German's rate of progress toward a bomb had diminished.
Nov. Nov.
-
Jan. Jan. 20 June 11 July 16
- First plutonium reprocessing begins at Hanford. - First uranium 235 separated at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. - The Franck Report is sent to Secretary of War Stimson. - U.S. explodes the world's first atomic bomb, the Trinity test, at Alamogordo, New Mexico. - Little Boy, an uranium bomb, was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. Between 80,000 - 140,000 people are killed. - Fat Man, a plutonium bomb, was dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. About 74,000 people are killed.
Aug. 6 Aug. 9
June 14
-
June 30 July
-
Aug. 1
-
Dec. 25
-
Dec. 31
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Jan. June Aug.
1946 Bernard Baruch presents the Acheson-Lilienthal plan to internationalize atomic energy. It is rejected by the U.S.S.R. First subsurface detonation by U.S. at Bikini Atoll. Demonstrations in Times Square, New York, against nuclear testing. President Harry S. Truman signs the Atomic Energy Act. It purpose is to control the development and production of nuclear weapons and to direct the research and development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union achieves its first nuclear chain reaction in Moscow. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) takes over nuclear weapons program from the Army.
1947 - The United Kingdom authorizes the development of nuclear weapons. - Under the direction of William Penney, the UK begins design of its plutonium bomb. - The United Kingdom builds its first atomic reactor.
Apr., May - U.S. conducts atomic tests, Eniwetok Atoll
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Apr. 4
Aug. 29
Oct. 30
Jan. 27 Jan. 31
Jan. 27
June
1949 - NATO established. - Soviet Union detonates its first atomic bomb, Joe 1, at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. It was a copy of the Fat Man bomb and had a yield of 21 kilotons. - General Advisory Committee of the AEC recommends that the more powerful atomic bombs should be built rather than hydrogen bombs. - Klaus Fuchs confesses that he gave atomic secrets to the Soviets while working at the Manhattan Project. - President Truman announces the decision to proceed with development of the Hydrogen bomb.
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1951 The first nuclear test occurs at the Nevada Test Site. First British nuclear reactor goes critical. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are convicted and sentenced to death for passing information on atomic weapons to the U.S.S.R.
1952 Sept. Oct. 3 Oct. 31
Aug. 12
- A second U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory is established in Livermore, California. - First British atomic bomb, "Hurricane", was tested at Monte Bello Islands, Australia, with a yield of 25 kilotons. - U S . explodes first thermonuclear or fusion device, "Mike", at Eniwetok Atoll. It had a yield of 10.4 megatons.
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G
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First Soviet layercake design bomb exploded on a tower in Siberia. It was not a "true" hydrogen bomb.
1954 Mar. 1 - The first deliverable hydrogen bomb design is tested at Bikini Atoll. "BRAVO" had a yield of 14.8 megatons. Radioactive fallout affects local islanders and a nearby fishing boat. Apr.12 to - Hearings regarding Oppenheimer's loyality cause him to lose his security clearance. May 6
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Chronology xxxiii Sept. 30
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The USS Nautilus, the first American nuclear powered submarine, is launched.
1955 The U.S.S.R. deploys two strategic bombers, Bear and Bison. The United Kingdom announces the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons. - First true fusion device test by the Soviet Union, it had a yield of 1.6 megatons. The development was lead by Andrei Sakharov. 1957 - First British H-bomb exploded at Christmas Island. The yield was between 200 - 300 kilotons. It was less than expected. - The United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency is created. The agency inspects nuclear reactors and plants to ensure they are being run for peaceful purposes. - The Soviet Union announces the successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. - First underground nuclear test, "Rainier", occurs at the Nevada Test Site. It had a yield of '1.7 kilotons. - Britain's first truly successful thermonuclear bomb test. The bomb had a yield of 1.8 megatons. - Fire destroyed the core of a reactor at Britain's Windscale nuclear complex, sending clouds of radioactivity into the atmosphere.
1958 - President Eisenhower signed amendments to the 1954 July 2 U.S. Atomic Energy Act which opened the way to a bilateral agreement between Britain and America on nuclear weapon design information. Nov. 1958 to U.S., U.K.,and U.S.S.R. observe an informal moratorium Sept. 1961 - on nuclear tests.
June 9
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Oct. 31
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1959 The first U.S.Polaris nuclear missile capable submarine enters into service. The U.S. deploys the first operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Atlas D.
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First French nuclear test occurs at Reganne, Algeria, in the Sahara Desert. It had a yield of 60-70kilotons. The United States submarine USS George Washington successfully launches a Polaris missile from under water. USS George Washington and its 16 Polaris Als begin their first patrol. U.S. deploys the Atlas and Titan ICBMs. 1961 U.S. launches the Minuteman I missile. U.S.S.R. resumes nuclear testing. U.S. resumes nuclear testing. U.S.S.R. explodes the world's largest nuclear bomb, with a yield of a 58 megatons. 1962 Project Sedan, a Plowshare Program test, is conducted, formed a 1,280 foot diameter by 320 foot deep crater. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear test turns off street lights in Oahu, Hawaii. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurs. The closest the world has ever come to nuclear war. 1963 The U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign the 'hot line' agreement. Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by the U.S., U.S.S.R. and the U.K., prohibiting tests of nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. 1964 China explodes its first atomic bomb at the Lop Nor test site. It was an uranium 235 implosion fission device named "596" and had a yield of 22 kilotons.
1966 U.S. B-52 bomber crashes near Palomares, Spain with 4 unarmed hydrogen bombs. All four bombs are recovered. First French atomic bomb tested at Muruoa Atoll. U.S. Minuteman ICBM enters service. Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear weapons being placed on any celestial body, or in orbit around the Earth.
Chronology
Feb. 14
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Mar. 30
Treaty of Tlatelolco signed and creates a Latin America nuclear-weapons-free zone. First hydrogen bomb test by the Chinese, with a yield of 3.3 megatons.
1968 - Non-proliferation Treaty opened for additional signatures. - France tests its first hydrogen bomb at Fangataufa Atoll in the South Pacific. It has a yield of 2.6 megatons.
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1969 President Richard M. Nixon announces the decision to deploy a missile defense system called "Safeguard" to protect U.S. ICBM fields from attack. Preliminary Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks take place in Helsinki, Finland.
1970 - Non-Proliferation Treaty enters into force; 100 nations ratify it by 1980. - U.S. deploys the first missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). 1971 - The first Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles are introduced by the U.S.
May 26
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1972 President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, in Moscow. SALT I1 treaty negotiations begin. 1974 India sets off a low-yield device (8 kilotons) under Rajasthan desert. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) is signed in Moscow. It limits nuclear test explosions to under 150 kilotons. President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev sign the Vladivostok Accord, agreeing to limit the number of strategic launchers (2400) and MIRV launchers (1320).
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Mar. 28
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June 29
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1976 Threshold Test Ban Treaty enters into force. President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign the Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE) Treaty.
1977 - United States successfully tests a neutron bomb. The primary lethal effects of a neutron bomb, also known as an enhanced-radiation weapon, come from the radiation damage caused by the neutrons it emits.
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United States cancels development of the neutron bomb.
1979 - Three Mile Island Nuclear Power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania suffers a partial core meltdown. Minimal radioactive material is released. - SALT I1 Treaty is signed in Vienna, Austria, by Brezhnev and President Carter. - A mysterious flash detected by a U.S. VELA satellite (that were deployed in support of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963) was from a clandestine nuclear explosion. Originally, the Carter administration claimed that the event was not the result of a nuclear test. However, it was revealed in 1993 that this event was from a South African nuclear test. - U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan; SALT I1 Treaty removed from consideration from the U.S. Senate. 1980 - The U.S. reports that the light signals recorded over the South Atlantic on September 22, 1979 were probably not from a nuclear explosion. However, information later would indicate that a low yield nuclear test did occur. 1981 - Israeli aircraft destroy Iraq's Osirak reactor. It was thought that it was producing materials for an Iraqi nuclear device. 1982 - Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)begin in Geneva, Switzerland.
1983 President Ronald Reagan announces the United States will embark on a n extensive research a n d development program to examine the feasibility of a missile defense program. The Strategic Defense Initiative is later dubbed "Star Wars."
Mar. 23
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Aug.
1985 The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty - Multilateral agreement among the nations of the South Pacific is signed. - The Soviet Union announces a nuclear testing moratorium.
Apr.
Nov. 28 Dec.
Dec. 8
1986 - Chernobyl nuclear reactor meltdown occurs in the Soviet Union. Massive amounts of radioactive material are released. - The 131st U.S. 8-52 bomber is deployed, exceeding the 130 limit, thus negating the SALT I1 Treaty. - First 10 U.S. 'Peacekeeper' o r MX ICBM becomes operational.
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1987 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It eliminates all land-based missiles with ranges between 300-3,400 miles. 1988 The U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign the Agreement on Notification of Missile Launches.
Oct. 19
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1989 The first Trident SLBM is introduced into service. The final Soviet underground nuclear test occurs at the Semipalatinsk testing site in Kazakhistan. The Berlin Wall falls, as East Germany opens its borders with West Germany, marking the end of the Cold War. 1990 President Bush and President Gorbachev sign new protocols to the Threshold Test Ban treaty. U.S.ratifies the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
xxxviii Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation Sept. 27 Dec. 11
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- The last Pershing I1 missile is removed from West Germany - The Threshold Test Ban Treaty enters into force 1991 - President Bush and President Gorbachev sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).The Treaty calls for the elimination of almost 50 percent of the nuclear warheads carried by ballistic missiles. - Bush signs the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which mandates the Department of Defense develop a missile defense system. Communism falls across Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.). 1992 The START treaty is ratified by the U.S. Senate. Kazakhistan, Ukraine, and Belarus agree in principle to the START treaty. - France officially signs the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Jan. 3
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1993 Bush and President Yeltsin sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 111, which reduces their nations' arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons to 3000-3500 and eliminates all MIRVed land-based missiles over the next 10 years. Prime Minister F.W. de Klerk announced that South Africa had successfully developed nuclear weapons, and then voluntarily destroyed them before signing the NPT in 1991. 1994 Attempts to smuggle nuclear material from C.I.S. are stopped. Secret nuclear testing on humans is revealed by both the U.S. and C.I.S. North Korea is suspected to be building nuclear weapons, they threaten to withdraw from the IAEA.
May 11
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1995 178 nations renew the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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July 2 Dec. 22 Feb. 24
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- China conducts an underground nuclear test. - President Clinton announces a total ban on all U.S. nuclear weapon testing. - France resumes nuclear testing in the South Pacific. A total of six nuclear tests are conducted. 1996 - French President Chirac announces an end to French nuclear tests. - The Treaty of Pelindaba is signed by 49 of the 53 members of the Organization of African Unity. It creates an African nuclear-weapons-free zone. - China conducts a nuclear test at the Lop Nor test site. - United Nations approves the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). - The last of the nuclear warheads stationed in Belarus were finally removed to Russia. 1997 - At least 35 workers are contaminatedwith minor radiation after a fire and explosion occurred at a reprocessing plant at Tokaimura, Japan. - U.S. begins a round of sub-critical nuclear related tests at the Nevada Test Site. - U.S. implodes the last Minuteman I1 missile silo. 1998 - France's National Assembly votes unanimously to ratify the CTBT. - India conducts three underground nuclear tests, its first in 24 years. One of the tests is a thermonuclear weapon. - India conducts two more nuclear tests. - Pakistan conducts five nuclear tests in response to India's nuclear tests. - Pakistan conducts its sixth nuclear weapons test. The explosion is in the 1 to 5 kiloton range. 1999 - President Bill Clinton signs the National Missile Defense act and says threat, cost, technological status of national missile defense and adherence to a renegotiated ARM treaty are the four criteria in rwking his decision to deploy such a system.
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Sept. 30 - An accident at the uranium processing plant at
Oct. 15
Tokaimura, Japan exposes fifty-five workers to radiation. - U.S. Senate fails to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. - First of 150 Minuteman 111 Missile silos destroyed.
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Russia and the Netherlands sign a cooperative agreement for the dismantling of old Russian nuclear warheads and nuclear submarines. The Russian Federation ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 11). The Russian submarine Kursk sinks in the Barent Sea. All 118 crew members are killed. Several bodies are recovered, the exact cause of the sinking is unknown. The last of the reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant are shut down. President George W. Bush moves forward in developing a National Missile Defense system. Russia and China oppose its development Efforts to raise the Russian submarine Kursk begin. Yucca Mountain in Nevada is initially approved to become a storage facility for high level nuclear waste. Terrorists hijack four commercial aircraft. The Pentagon is damaged by one plane, two planes strike the World Trade Center, destroying both towers, and the fourth plane crashes in rural Pennsylvania. The Kursk is raised and brought to port. The United States announces that it will withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.
June 29 Aug.
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- Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty is signed between the U.S. and Russia. Each nation would limited to 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads apiece. - North Korea tells U.S. officials it has developed a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 agreement. - The IAEA says North Korea has disabled surveillance
Oct. 16
Dec. 21
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Chronology
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devices the agency had placed at the five-megawatt Yongbyon research reactor.
2003 - North Korea announces it will withdraw from the Nuclear Jan. 10 Non-Proliferation Treaty. - North Korea announces that it had reactivated its nuclear Feb. 5 facilities and is going ahead with their operation "on a normal footing." - Iran acknowledged for the first time that it had uranium Feb. 9 ore reserves and that it would reprocess the spent fuel. It, however, insisted that the nuclear program was designed solely for civilian use. Feb. 27 - The United States says North Korea has reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. - North Korea backs out of the only remaining legal May 12 obligation blocking its nuclear ambitions, a 1992 pact with South Korea to keep the peninsula free of nuclear weapons. May 14 - Russia's lower house of parliament voted to ratify the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty). - Russia's upper house of parliament voted to ratify the May 29 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty). Ukraine will get $85 million to build a new shield over July 9 Chernobyl to stabilize the old "sarcophagus" covering the gaping hole in reactor No. 4 Aug. 26 - U.N. inspectors have found traces of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium at an Iranian nuclear facility. Aug. 26-29- Six-party talks aimed at ending the standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program take place in China. - Edward Teller, 'father of the H-bomb' dies. Sept. 9 Sept. 25 - The IAEA team in Iran has found additional traces of weapons-grade uranium in Iran. Sept. 26 - Afghanistan Signs, Ratifies Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. - Iran delivered a report to the IAEA to allay international Oct. 29 concern about its nuclear program. Nov. 10 - The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran had acknowledged producing a small a m o u n t of plutonium, a material useable in a nuclear bomb.
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Iran Signs Protocol on Snap UN Nuclear Inspections. Libya has admitted trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. Libya's nuclear weapons program was "much further advanced" than U.S. and British intelligence agencies had thought, and included centrifuges and a uranium-enrichment program, all necessary components in making a nuclear bomb. 2004 U.S.Group to Visit North Korea, tours Yongbyon, the probable location of the plant that is reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods into plutonium. Libya ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Pakistani investigators have concluded that at least two of the country's top nuclear scientists - including Abdul Qadeer Khan, considered the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb - provided unauthorized technical assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s. Pakistan fires A. Q. Khan, the founder of their nuclear program. He is later pardoned by the Pakistani President. Drawings of a nuclear warhead that Libya surrendered as part of its decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction are of 1960s Chinese design, but more likely came from Pakistan. The International Atomic Energy Agency has said Libya managed to produce a small amount of plutonium using technology acquired on the black market. The report did not specify the amount. Six-party talks aimed at ending the standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program take place in China. Libya has agreed to allow the IAEA to perform unannounced inspections of atomic facilities. Pakistan rejects a request to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect his country's nuclear facilities. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found traces of bomb-grade uranium in Iran at sites other than the two already named. India and Pakistan set-up a nuclear 'hotline'.
Talks resume with North Korea over their suspected nuclear weapons program.
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Nov. 28
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- South Korea reveals that it had secretly conducted an experiment more than 20 years ago with traces of plutonium. - Iran pledged to suspend all activities related to plutonium reprocessing and the enrichment of uranium in a deal with the European Union. Iran's nuclear program has been the focus of much international pressure.
- IAEA found evidence of secret nuclear experiments in Egypt that could be used in weapons programs. - North Korea annouces that they are nuclear weapons Jan. 22 state - Canada declines to participate with the U.S. ballistic Feb. 23 missile defense program. - President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin plan Feb. 24 to announce a package of measures today to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. - Iran, Russia sign nuclear fuel agreement that is key to Feb. 28 bringing Tehran's first reactor online by mid-2006. Hans Bethe, Nobel Prize winner and former Head of the Mar. 7 Theoretical Division during the Manhattan Project dies at the age of 98. Mar. 10 - Pakistan acknowledges that A.Q. Khan sold Iran high speed centrifuges for uranium separation. - U.N. Committee approves Nuclear Terrorism Treaty. Apr. 4 - Russia announces the destruction of the final SS-18 Satan July 29 missile launcher. - Iran resumes nuclear activities. July 31 - India and Pakistan announce the establishment of an Aug. 6 emergency nuclear hotline and notification of future missile tests. Aug. 16 - Russia stops use of rail-based missiles. Aug. 24 - Pakistan acknowledges that A.Q. Khan supplied North Korea with centrifuges and their designs. Sept. 19 - The new agreement by North Korea to give up all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. - The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Oct. 7 head Mohamed ElBaradei, win the Nobel Peace Prize.
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Mar. 2 Mar. 20 Mar. 29
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June 21 July 3
July 5
Iran starts converting new uranium batch. Iran admits having nuclear black market data.
Iran rejects a Russian offer to produce nuclear fuel in its plants for Iran, the latest effort to resolve a diplomatic impasse over Tehran's nuclear program. - Iran says nuclear research resumed. - Iran 'resumes' nuclear enrichment. - India and the United States seal a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation pact. - UN Security Council takes u p IAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Programme - UN Security Council President issues a statement on the IAEA1s verification of Iran's nuclear programme - North Korea offers to resume talks if US release frozen North Korean assets origination from a basle in Macau. - Testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee about "The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal" - UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in a n address to University of Tokyo admitted that the NPT faces crisis of compliance and confidence. - IAEA Chief a n d U.S. Secretary of state talk nonproliferation in Washington, including U.S.-India Deal, Iran and new approaches to contain sensitive nuclear technology. - Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran." - UN Secretary General Kofi Annan cites North Korea, Iran in call to strengthen nuclear treaties. - North Korea threatens U.S. with an "annihilating strike and a nuclear war" in response to any U.S. military preemptive strike - North Korea test-fires six missiles including a long-range Taepodong-2 rocket believed capable of reaching Western United States. Taepodong rocket fails after 40 seconds, but US denounces tests as "provocative".
CHAPTER 1
TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONTESTS INTHE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER (1963) Bureau of Arms Control Signed at Moscow August 5, 1963 Entered into force October 10, 1963 Test Ban and General Disarmament The relation of a test ban to other aspects of disarmament was for a time a troubling issue. The initial Soviet proposal of a test ban on May 10, 1955, was part of a comprehensive plan to reduce conventional forces and armaments and to eliminate nuclear weapons. Later that year, in the General Assembly, the Soviet Union advocated a separate test ban. The three Western powers, over the next three years, made discontinuance of tests contingent on progress in other measures of arms control, particularly a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons and safeguards against surprise attack. They insisted that a test ban could not be enforced "in the absence of more general control agreements." In January 1959 the United States and the United Kingdom dropped the linkage between a test ban and other arms control agreements; France, however, did not. The French continued to maintain that until
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there was agreement on nuclear disarmament-including an end to weapons production, reconversion of stocks, and a ban on possession and u s e F r e n c h plans to conduct tests would go forward. The Soviet Union abruptly reversed its position in June 1961, when Premier Khrushchev declared during his meeting with President Kennedy in yienna that the test-ban question must be linked with general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union refused to modify this position until November, when it proposed a separate test ban with no controls whatever, pending agreement on general and complete disarmament. Verification The central and most persistent barrier to a Treaty on cessation of tests, however, was the issue of verifying compliance, of agreeing to establish a system of controls and inspection-particularly with regard to underground explosions-that could guarantee against testing in secret. The Western powers were determined to ensure that no agreement would be vulnerable to clandestine violation. In test-ban negotiations, as well as in other arms control efforts, they considered that it would be dangerous to their security to accept simple pledges without the means of knowing that they would be observed. It was further believed that such pledges would mislead concerned world opinion with illusions of secure progress toward disarmament. Writing to President Eisenhower on October 17, 1956, Premier Bulganin had stated the fundamental Soviet position. "Since any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb cannot, in the present state of scientific knowledge, be produced without being recorded in other countries," there could be an immediate agreement to prohibit tests without any provision for international control. He said: Would not the best guarantee against the violation of such an agreement be the mere fact that secret testing of nuclear weapons is impossible and that consequently a government undertaking the solemn obligation to stop making tests could not violate it without exposing itself to the entire world as the violator of an international agreement? The Western countries were not convinced that existing technology for detecting nuclear explosions was adequate to monitor compliance, or that the mere force of world opinion would provide insurance against violations. In his response, President Eisenhower stated that "to be effective, and not simply a mirage," disarmament plans required systems of inspection and control. And in a public statement a few days later, he said:
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans
5
A simple agreement to stop H-bomb tests cannot be regarded as automatically self-enforcing on the unverified assumption that such tests can instantly and surely be detected. It is true that tests of very large weapons would probably be detected when they occur . . . It is, however, impossible-in my view of the vast Soviet landmass that can screen future tests-to have positive assurance of such detection, except in the case of the largest weapons. On June 14, 1957, the Soviet Union for the first time offered test ban proposals that included international control. The proposals were very general: establishment of an international supervisory commission and control posts, on the basis of reciprocity, on the territories of the three nuclear powers and in the Pacific Ocean area. The Western powers suggested that a group of experts work out the details of a control system, while the delegates considered a temporary test ban in relation to other disarmament measures. The Soviet Union continued to press for an immediate suspension of tests, and the United States for agreement on a control system as a necessary accompanying measure. In March 1958, the Soviet Union announced that it was discontinuing all tests and appealed to the parliaments of other nuclear powers to take similar action. It added, however, that the Soviet Union would "naturally be free" to resume testing if other nuclear powers did not stop their tests. Succeeding Bulganin as Premier, Nikita Khrushchev called on President Eisenhower to end tests. President Eisenhower rejected the proposal, stating that some tests could be conducted "under conditions of secrecy," and renewed the proposal for an experts group to study control problems. After further summit correspondence and diplomatic exchange, Khrushchev agreed to a conference of experts. Meanwhile U.S. and British tests continued. The Geneva Conference of Experts met in July and August 1958, attended by representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. They agreed on the technical characteristics of a control system to monitor a ban on tests in the atmos'phere, under water, and underground. Their report proposed an elaborate network of 170-180 land control posts and 10 shipborne posts, as well as regular and special aircraft flights. It recognized that on-site inspections would be needed to determine whether some seismic events were caused by earthquakes or explosions. The United States and Britain welcomed the experts report and declared their willingness to negotiate an agreement for suspension of
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tests and the establishment of an international control system on the basis of the report. They were prepared to suspend tests for a year from the beginning of negotiations unless the Soviet Union resumed testing. The suspension could continue on a year-to-year basis, provided that the inspection system was installed and functioning, and "satisfactory progress" was being made on major arms-control measures. Premier Khrushchev's response was to attack the United States and U.K.for continuing their tests, and for linking the test ban to other matters. He announced that the Soviet Union was released from its self-imposed pledge. The USSR resumed tests, and the series continued until November 3. The negotiating powers refrained from testing for the next three years. The "moratorium" was marked by several public statements of intent, by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, in varying degrees of specificity and with various caveats. At the end of December 1959,President Eisenhower announced that the United States would no longer consider itself bound by the "voluntary moratorium" but would give advance notice if it decided to resume testing. The Soviet Government stated on August 28 and Premier Khrushchev repeated on December 30, 1959, that the Soviet Union would not resume testing if the Western powers did not. France conducted its first test on February 13, 1960, two more later in the year, and a fourth on April 25, 1961. On May 15, 1961, the Soviet Government stated that if France continued testing, the Soviet Union might be compelled to test. On August 30, 1961, although neither the United States nor the United Kingdom had resumed testing and France had not continued to test, the Soviet Union announced that it would resume testing. It did so on September 1, thus ending the moratorium. The United States resumed testing two weeks later. Throughout the various conferences and exchanges on a test ban, the complexity of the central problem brought successive deadlocks, break-offs, and renewals of discussion, shifts in position, searches for compromise and new approaches, and for new techniques of verifications, and successive suspensions and resumptions of tests. The United States continued to be unwilling to accept the Soviet basic proposition that a test ban could be agreed to and controls instituted subsequently, or to accept indefinite test suspensions that were tantamount to endorsing an uncontrolled prohibition. New data from U.S. underground tests, moreover, had shown that techniques recommended earlier for distinguishing between explosions and earthquakes were less effective than had been believed and that a reliable control system to monitor
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans
7
seismic events that registered under 4.75 on the Richter scale required further research and confirmed the need for on-site inspections. Among the salient points of disagreement on a control system were: The Veto. The Soviet Union initially sought to have all substantive operations of the system subject to veto; the United States insisted that the fact-finding process of inspection, to be effective, must be as automatic as possible. On-Site Inspections. The Soviet Union placed a limit on permitted inspections in its territory, refusing to allow more than three per year. The United States and the United Kingdom held that the number must be determined by scientific fact and detection capability. As new information became available, the United States eventually indicated that it could accept a minimum of seven, but the Soviet Union rejected this quota. There was disagreement, as well, over the size of the area to be inspected, the nationality and composition of inspection teams, and the criteria for identifying events that required inspection. Control Posts. Although the United States and the United Kingdom had originally proposed that the control posts should be internationally owned and operated, they later agreed to national ownership and operation of the posts, as the Soviet Union insisted, with international monitoring and supervision. There were unresolved differences about the number and location of posts and about the number and location of the automatic seismic observation stations ("black boxes") with which it was proposed to supplement them. The Soviet Union also claimed that national control posts and automatic observation devices made any international inspection unnecessary, a position that the United States and the United Kingdom were not willing to accept. The Organization of the Control Commission. In March 1961 the Soviet Union recommended replacing the single administrator of the proposed Control Commission with a "troika," a tripartite administrative council, consisting of one neutral, one Western, and one Communist member (a proposal paralleling the Soviet effort the previous year to replace the U.N. Secretary General with a tripartite commission). This three-headed administration would be able to function even in routine matters only by unanimous agreement, an arrangement that the Western powers argued was unworkable and would make the Control Commission helpless. The Soviet Union eventually abandoned this demand.
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control b Non-proliferation
The effort to achieve a test ban, and to resolve the stubborn issues involved, had been pursued in a wide variety of channels. Successive General Assembly sessions had debated the issue. It had been a major item on the agenda of the U.N. is armament Commission and its Subcommittee of Five (later ten). The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union had engaged in a long tripartite effort -The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests - in almost continuous session in Geneva from October 31, 1958, to January 29, 1962. Under its auspices, three technical working groups of experts had investigated and reported on various aspects of control: one on high altitude tests, another on underground tests, the third on seismic research programs to improve detection capabilities. After the three-power conference adjourned in January 1962, unable to complete the drafting of a Treaty because of the Soviet Unions claim that national means of detection were adequate for all environments, the principal forum for negotiations became the newly formed EighteenNation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) which began its meetings at Geneva under the aegis of the General Assembly in March 1962. On the U.S. side, overall direction of the negotiations was assumed by William C. Foster, first Director of the newly created U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Soviet insistence that the West accept Premier Khrushchevs quota of three annual inspections, however, brought these talks to an impasse. The United States and the United Kingdom, in high-level correspondence with the Soviet Union, then sought to arrange three-power talks. Finally, on June 10, 1963, President Kennedy announced that agreement had been reached to hold three-power meetings on the test ban in Moscow. He also pledged that the United States would not be the first to resume tests in the atmosphere. At this time a shift of Soviet interest to a ban that did not deal with underground tests emerged, although the Soviet Union had rejected an Anglo-American proposal for an agreement of this kind the year before. Premier Khrushchev disclosed this in a speech on July 2, 1963, when he called for an agreement outlawing tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water - environments where both sides agreed their existing verification systems could adequately police a ban. The three-power meetings began on July 15. The long years of discussion had clarified views and greatly reduced areas of disagreement. A Treaty was negotiated within 10 days. It was initialed on July 25 and formally signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963 by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Foreign Minister of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, and the Foreign Minister of the U.K., Lord Home. On
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September 24, after extensive hearings and almost three weeks of floor debate, the Senate consented to ratification of the Treaty by a vote of 80 to 19. It was ratified by President Kennedy on October 7, 1963, and entered into force on October 10 when the three original signatories deposited their instruments of ratification. This is the limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The parties to the Treaty undertook "not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, under water, in outer space, or in any other environment if the explosion would cause radioactive debris to be present outside the borders of the state conducting the explosion. As explained by Acting Secretary of State Ball in a subsequent report to President Kennedy, "The phrase 'any other nuclear explosion' includes explosions for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are prohibited by the Treaty because of the difficulty of differentiating between weapon test explosions and peaceful explosions without additional controls." The Treaty was of unlimited duration. Article I1 notes that any party may propose amendments, and that, if so requested by one-third or more of the state Parties, the Depositary Governments are to convene a conference to consider the amendment. This article stipulates that any amendment must be approved by a majority of Parties, including the three Original Parties. Article 111 opens the Treaty to all state, and most of the countries of the world are Parties to it. The Treaty has not been signed by France and the Peoples Republic of China. In August 1988, six countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela) presented a proposal to the three Depositary Governments to amend the LTBT and to have a special amendment conference to consider this proposal. Their proposal was to extend the LTBTs prohibitions to all environments, transforming the LTBT into a comprehensive test ban. By late March 1989 the Depositary Governments had received the requisite number of requests, in accordance with Article I1 of the Treaty, to convene such a conference for consideration of the proposed amendment. The Conference was held in January 1991. The United States, strongly opposed to using the LTBT as a vehicle for negotiating a comprehensive test ban and made it clear to all participants that it would block any attempt to amend the LTBT by consensus.
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control G. Non-proliferation
TEXT OF THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER Signed at: Moscow August 5, 1963 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate September 24, 1963 Ratified by U.S. President October 7 , 1963 U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow October 10, 1963 Proclaimed by U.S. President October 10, 1963 Entered into force October 10, 1963 The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties," Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of mans environment by radioactive substances, Have agreed as follows:
Article I 1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this sub-paragraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.
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2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in Paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article I1
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for al! Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties. Article I11
1.This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties - the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.
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6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article IV
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance. Article V This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. Done in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three. For the Government of the United States of America
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
DEAN RUSK
SIR DOUGLAS HOME
A. GROMYKO
Limited Test Ban. Treaty: Signature, Ratification and Accession Country
Date of Signature
Date of Deposit1of Ratification
Afghanistan
08/08/63
03/12/64
Algeria
08/14/63
Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas, The
Date of Deposit' of Accession
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans Country
Bangladesh
Belgium Benin Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burma Burundi Byelorussian S.S.R.Z Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China (Taiwan)' Colombia Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire CYprus Czechoslovakia Denmark DominicanRepublic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Ethiopia Fiji Finland Gabon Gambia, The
Date of Signature
Date of Deposit1 of
Date of Deposit1 of
Ratification
Accession
13
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Country
Date of Signature
German Democratic Republic Germany, Federal Republic of
08/08/63
Ghana Greece Guatemala Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq
Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya Korea, Republic of Kuwait Laos Lebanon Liberia Libya Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia
Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius
Date of Deposit1of Ratification 12/30/63
Date of Deposit1 of Accession
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans Country Mexico Mongolia Morocco Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Rwanda San Marino Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syria
Date of Signature
Date of Deposit' of Ratification 12/27/63
Date of Deposit1 of Accession
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Country
Date of Signature
Date of Deposit1of Ratification
Tanzania
09/16/63
02/06/64
Date of Deposit1of ~ccession
Thailand Togo Tonga
07/07/71
Trinidad & Tobago
08/12/63
07/14/64
Tunisia
08/08/63
05/26/65
Turkey
08/09/63
07/08/65
Uganda
08/29/63
03/24/64
Ukrainian S.S.R.2
10/08/63
12/30/63
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
08/05/63
United Kingdom
08/05/63
10/10/63
United States of America
08/05/63
10/10/63
Uruguay
08/12/63
02/25/63
Venezuela
08/16/63
02/22/65
Western Samoa
09/05/63
01/15/65
Yemen Arab Republic (Sanaa)
08/13/63
10/10/63
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of (Aden) Yugoslavia
08/08/63
01/15/64
Zaire
08/08/63
10/28/63
Zambia Total 3 1
2
3 4
1/11/65 108
94
23
Dates given are the earliest dates on which countries signed the agreements or deposited their ratificationsor accessions--whether in Washington, London, Moscow, or New York. In the case of a country that was a dependent territory which became a party through succession, the date given is the date on which the country gave notice that it would continue to be bound by the terms of the agreement. The United States regards the signature and ratification by the ~ ~ e l o r u s s i aS.S.R. n and the Ukrainian S.S.R. as already included under the signature and ratification of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This total does not include actions by the Byelorussian S.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R. (See footnote 2.) Effective January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China.
*Note: Antigua & Barbados, Armenia, Bosnia & Harzegovina, Congo, Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Suriname have also signed and ratified this treaty. Vietnam has signed but not ratified this treaty.
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THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (1974) TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS (AND PROTOCOL THERETO) Signed at Moscow, July 3, 1974 Entered into Force, Dec. 11, 1990 The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), was signed in July 1974. It establishes a nuclear "threshold" by prohibiting tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). The threshold is militarily important since it removes the possibility of testing new or existing nuclear weapons going beyond the fractionalmegaton range. In the 1960s, many tests above 150 kilotons were conducted by both countries. The mutual restraint imposed by the Treaty reduced the explosive force of new nuclear warheads and bombs which could otherwise be tested for weapons systems. Of particular significance was the relationship between explosive power of reliable, tested warheads and first-strike capability. The task of negotiating a comprehensive test ban remained on the agenda of the U.S. Government. In Article I, the parties to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty undertook an obligation to continue negotiations toward that goal. The first proposal for stopping nuclear weapon tests was made in 1955 and the first major negotiations with the Soviet Union for an effectively controlled test ban began in Geneva in 1958. The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests produced no agreement. The problem of working out verification procedures to ensure compliance with a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests in all environments proved to be intractable. The procedures deemed necessary by the United States and the United Kingdom were not acceptable to the Soviet Union. In 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was signed by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. This Treaty prohibits nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The Parties also agreed not to carry out any nuclear weapon test, or any other nuclear explosion, in any other environment -i.e., underground-that would cause radioactive debris to be present beyond the borders of the country in which the explosion took place.
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Underground nuclear explosions were not prohibited by the 1963 Treaty although both in the Treaty preamble and Article I, the LTBT parties pledged to seek "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time... The United States and Soviet Union agreed in the spring of 1974 to pursue the possibilities of further restrictions on nuclear testing. Accordingly, a team of U.S. experts was sent to Moscow for technical talks. Agreement on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was reached during the summit meeting in Moscow in July 1974. The Treaty included a protocol which detailed technical data to be exchanged and which limited weapon testing to specific designated test sites to assist verification. The data to be exchanged included information on the geographical boundaries and geology of the testing areas. Geological data-including such factors as density of rock formation, water saturation, and depth of the water t a b l e a r e useful in verifying test yields because the seismic signal produced by a given underground nuclear explosion varies with these local factors. After an actual test has taken place, the geographic coordinates of the test location are to be furnished to the other party to help in placing the test in the proper geological setting and in assessing the yield. The Treaty also stipulates that data will be exchanged on a certain number of tests for calibration purposes. By establishing the correlation between stated yields of explosions at the specified sites and the seismic signals produced, this exchange improved assessments by both parties of the yields of explosions based primarily on the measurements derived from their seismic instruments. The tests used for calibration purposes may be tests conducted in the past or new tests. Agreement to exchange the detailed data described above represented a significant degree of direct cooperation by the two major nuclear powers in the effort to control nuclear weapons. For the first time, each party agreed to make available to the other data relating to its nuclear weapons test program. The technical problems associated with a yield threshold were recognized by the sides in the spring of 1974. In this context the Soviet Union mentioned the possibility of "mistakes" concerning occasional, minor or unintended breaches. Discussions took place in the autumn of 1974 and in the spring of 1976. The Soviet Union was informed by the United States that the understanding would be included as part of the .'I
public record associated with for advice and consent to ratification by the US Senate. The entire understanding is as follows:
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"Both Parties will make every effort to comply fully with all the provisions of the TTB Treaty. However, there are technical uncertainties associated with predicting the precise yields of nuclear weapon tests. These uncertainties may result in slight, unintended breaches of the 150 kiloton threshold. Therefore, the two sides have discussed this problem and agreed that: (1) one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation of the Treaty; (2) such breaches would be a cause for concern, however, and, at the request of either Party, would be the subject for consultations." The Soviet Union was also informed that though the United States would not consider such a slight, unintentional breach as a violation, it would carefully review such breach to ensure that it is not part.of a general attempt to exceed the confines of the Treaty. The understanding in its entirety was included in the transmittal documents which accompanied the TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty when they were submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on July 29, 1976. Although the TTBT was signed in 1974, it was not sent to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification until July 1976. Submission was held in abeyance until the companion Treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNET) had been negotiated in accordance with Article 111 of the TTBT. For many years, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ratified the TTBT or the PNE Treaty. However, in 1976, each party separately announced its intention to observe the Treaty limit of 150 kilotons, pending ratification. The United States and the Soviet Union began negotiations in November 1987 to reach agreement on additional verification provisions that would make it possible for the United States to ratify the treaties. Agreement on these provisions contained in new protocols was reached in June 1990. The TTBT and PNET entered into force on December 11, 1990. The TTBT verification protocol provides for the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to all tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, as well as seismic monitoring and on-site inspection for all tests having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons.
* * * *
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control t3 Non-proliferation
TEXT OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS Signed at Moscow July 3 , 1974 Ratified December 8, 1990 Entered into force December 11, 1990 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this end, Noting that the adoption of measures for the further limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests would contribute to the achievement of these objectives and would meet the interests of strengthening peace and the further relaxation of international tension, Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning March 31, 1976. 2. Each Party shall limit the number of its underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum. 3. The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests.
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Article I1 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries. Article I11 The provisions of this Treaty do not extend to underground nuclear explosions carried out by the Parties for peaceful purposes. Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties at the earliest possible time. Article IV This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. Article V I. This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years. Unless replaced earlier by an agreement in implementation of the objectives specified in Paragraph 3 of Article I of this Treaty, it shall be extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party notifies the other of its termination no later than six months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. Before the expiration of this period the Parties may, as necessary, hold consultations to consider the situation relevant to the substance of this Treaty and to introduce possible amendments to the text of the Treaty. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control t3 Non-proliferation
3. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States For the Union of Soviet of America: Socialist Republics: RICHARD NIXON The President of the United States of America
L. BREZHNEV General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Confirming the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of July 3, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Convinced of the necessity to ensure effective verification of compliance with the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: SECTION 1.DEFINITIONS For the purposes of this Protocol: 1. The term "test site" means a geographical area for the conduct of underground nuclear weapon tests, specified in Paragraph 1 or in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Section I1 of this Protocol. 2. The term "underground nuclear weapon test," hereinafter "test," means either a single underground nuclear explosion conducted at a test site, or two or more underground nuclear explosions conducted at a test site within an area delineated by a circle having a diameter of two kilometers and conducted within a total period of time of 0.1 second. The yield of a test shall be the aggregate yield of all explosions in the test. 3. The term "explosion" means the release of nuclear energy from an explosive canister.
,
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4. The term "explosive canister" means, with respect to every explosion, the container or covering for one or more nuclear explosives. 5. The term "Testing Party" means the Party conducting a test. 6. The term "Verifying Party" means the Party entitled to carry out, in accordance with this Protocol, activities related to verification of compliance with the Treaty by the Testing Party. 7. The term "Designated Personnel" means personnel appointed by the Verifying Party from among its nationals and included on its list of Designated Personnel, in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, to carry out activities reIated to verification in accordance with this Protocol in the territory of the Testing Party. 8. The term "Transport Personnel" means personnel appointed by the Verifying Party from among its nationals and included on its list of Transport Personnel, in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, to provide transportation for Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party between the territory of the Verifying Party and the point of entry in the territory of the Testing Party. 9. The term "point of entry" means Washington, D.C. (Dulles International Airport), for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel, and Travis Air Force Base, California, for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel and for equipment specified in Section VIII of this Protocol, with respect to the United States of America; and Moscow (Sheremetyevo-2 International Airport) for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel and for equipment specified in Section VIII of this Protocol, and Leningrad (Pulkovo-2 International Airport) for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel, with respect to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Other locations may serve as points of entry for specific tests, as agreed by the Parties. 10. The term "hydrodynamic yield measurement method" means the method whereby the yield of a test is derived from on-site, direct measurement of the properties of the shock wave as a function of time during the hydrodynamic phase of the ground motion produced by the test. 11. The term "seismic yield measurement method" means the method whereby the yield of a test is derived from measurement of parameters of elastic ground motion produced by the test. 12. The term "on-site inspection" means activities carried out by the Verifying Party at the test site of the Testing Party, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, for the purposes of independently obtaining data on conditions under which the test will be conducted and for confirming the validity of data provided by the Testing Party.
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13. The term "emplacement hole" means any drill-hole, shaft, adit or tunnel in which one or more explosive canisters, associated cables, and other equipment are installed for the purposes of conducting a test. 14. The term "end of the emplacement hole" means the reference point established by the Testing Party beyond the planned location of each explosive canister along the axis of the emplacement hole. 15. The term "satellite hole" means any drill-hole, shaft, adit or tunnel in which sensing elements and cables and transducers are installed by the Verifying Party for the purposes of hydrodynamic measurement of the yield of a specific test. 16. The term "standard configuration" means either the standard vertical configuration or the standard horizontal configuration of a test described in Paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol. 17. The term "non-standard configuration" means a configuration of a test different from that described in Paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol. 18. The term "hydrodynamic measurement zone" means a region, the dimensions of which are specified in Paragraph 1 of Section V of this Protocol, within which hydrodynamic yield measurements are carried out.
19. The term "reference test" means a test, identified by the Testing Party as a reference test, that meets the requirements of Paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol. 20. The term "emplacement point" means the point in the emplacement hole that coincides with the center point of an emplaced explosive canister. 21. The term "choke section" means a barrier designed to restrict the flow of energy from an explosive canister. 22. The term "area of a pipe" or "area of a cableway" means the area of the external cross section of that pipe or cableway measured in
a plane perpendicular to the axis of that pipe or cableway at the point within the zone specified in Paragraph 2(c), 3(e), or 3(f) of Section V of this Protocol where its cross section is largest. 23. The term "sensing elements and cables" means switches, cables, and cable segments that provide direct measurement of the position of a shock front as a function of time, and are installed in a satellite hole by the Verifying Party for the purposes of use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 24. The term "transducer" means a device that converts physical properties of a shock wave, such as stress and particle velocity, into a
i:
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans
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recordable signal, and is installed in a satellite hole by the Verifying Party, with associated power supplies, for the purposes of use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, with respect to explosions having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in Paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol. 25. The term "core sample" means an intact cylindrical sample of geologic material having dimensions no less than two centimeters in diameter and two centimeters in length. 26. The term "rock fragment" means a sample of geologic material having an irregular shape and a volume no less than 10 cubic centimeters. 27. The term "geodetic measurements" means the determination of the geometric position of points within tunnels or cavities. 28. The term "Designated Seismic Station" means any one of the seismic stations designated by each Party, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol, at which activities related to verification are carried out in accordance with this Protocol. 29. The term "Bilateral Consultative Commission" means the Commission established in accordance with Section XI of this Protocol. 30. The term "Coordinating Group" means a working group of the Bilateral Consultative Commission that is established for each test with respect to which activities related to verification are carried out. 31. The term "coordinated schedule" means the schedule, including the specific times and durations for carrying out activities related to verification for a specific test, established in the Coordinating Group as specified in Paragraph 12 of Section XI of this Protocol. 32. The term "Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers" means the Centers located in Washington, D.C., and Moscow, established in accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.
SECTION 11.-TEST SITES 1. The test sites for the Parties are: the Nevada Test Site, for the United States of America; and the Northern Test Site (Novaya Zemlya) and the Semipalatinsk Test Site, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, each Party, for each of its test sites, shall provide the other Party with: (a) a precise written description of the boundaries; and (b) a diagram with geographic coordinates of the boundaries to the nearest second, to a scale no smaller than 1:250,000.
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2. Following entry into force of the Treaty, if a Party decides to establish a new test site or to change the boundaries of a test site specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, the description and diagram specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section shall be transmitted to the other Party no less than 12 months prior to the planned date for conducting the first test at the new test site or area of expansion of a previously specified test site. 3. A test site of a Party shall be located only within its territory. All tests shall be conducted solely within test sites specified in Paragraph 1 or in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this Section. 4. For the purposes of the Treaty and this Protocol, all underground nuclear explosions at test sites specified in Paragraph 1 or in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this Section shall be considered underground nuclear weapon tests and shall be subject to all provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.
SECTION 111.-VERIFICATION
MEASURES
1. For purposes of verification of compliance with the Treaty, in addition to using available national technical means, the Verifying Party shall have the right, with respect to tests that are conducted 200 days or more following entry into force of the Treaty: (a) with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to carry out any or all of the verification activities associated with use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with respect to each explosion in the test; (b) with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to carry out any or all of the verification activities associated with use of the seismic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol; and (c) with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons, to carry out any or all of the verification activities associated with on-site inspection, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, with respect to each explosion in the test, except that such activities may be carried out with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons only if the Verifying Party does not use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 2. In addition to the rights specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, for the purposes of building confidence in the implementation of this
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Protocol and improving its national technical means of verification, the Verifying Party shall have the right: (a) if, in each of the five calendar years immediately following entry into force of the Treaty, the Testing Party does not conduct at least two tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with respect to two tests from among those having the highest planned yields that the Testing Party conducts in that calendar year; (b) if, in the sixth calendar year following entry into force of the Treaty and in each calendar year thereafter, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Testing Party does not conduct at least one test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with respect to one test from among those having the highest planned yield that the Testing Party conducts in that calendar year; (c) if, in any calendar year, the Testing Party postpones a test having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less to the following calendar year, after having been notified by the Verifying Party of its intent to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to that test, to use such method with respect to that test in the following calendar year. This right shall be additional to the rights specified in Paragraph l(a) of this Section and in Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph; and (d) in addition to the rights specified in Sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this paragraph, if, in each of the five calendar years beginning with the conduct of the first test by the Testing Party at a new test site, the Testing Party does not conduct at least two tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons at the new test site, the Verifying Party shall have the right to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with respect to two tests from among those having the highest planned yields that the Testing Party conducts at the new test site in that calendar year. 3. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a specific test including more than one explosion, unless the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such a test:
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(a) the distance between the closest points of any two adjacent explosive canisters shall be no less than 50 meters; and (b) the time of each explosion shall be established by the Testing Party so as to permit the carrying out of hydrodynamic yield measurements for each explosion for a distance of no less than 30 meters in the satellite hole closest to the emplacement hole with which it is associated. 4. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a specific test, and if that test is conducted in more than one emplacement hole, the Testing Party shall have the right to conduct that test only if no more than one emplacement hole has characteristics or contains explosive canisters having characteristics differing from those set forth in Paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol with respect to a test of standard configuration, unless the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such a test. 5. The Testing Party shall have the right to conduct a test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons within a time period of less than two seconds of any other test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons only if the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such tests. No test shall be conducted within 15 minutes prior to or following a reference test, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 6. The Testing Party shall have the right to conduct a test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons in a cavity having a volume exceeding 20,000 cubic meters only if the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such a test. 7. The Verifying Party, by notifying the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, shall have the right to require a reference test for this nonstandard test, in order to compare the yields measured through its national technical means for these two associated tests with the yield obtained by carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurement of the reference test. The right of the Verifying Party to a reference test shall be independent of whether or not it actually carries out hydrodynamic yield measurements of the test of non-standard configuration. 8. With respect to the requirement for a reference test: (a) if the Testing Party, at the time it provides notification of a test, identifies that test as a reference test for a future test of non-standard configuration, and if the Verifying Party does not use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with
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respect to the identified reference test, the Verifying Party shall forfeit its right to require a reference test for that test of non-standard configuration and for any subsequent test of non-standard configuration that would be associated with that reference test, if the Testing Party conducts the identified reference test; (b) the Testing Party shall have the right to identify only one test of standard configuration as a reference test not associated with any specific test of non-standard configuration until it has conducted an associated test of non-standard configuration for which this test serves as a reference test, or unless it simultaneously provides notification of the associated test of non-standard configuration; and (c) if the Testing Party, at the time it provides notification of a test of standard configuration, indicates that the test will satisfy a requirement for a reference test for a previously conducted test of non-standard configuration, and if the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party of its intent not to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to that reference test, the Verifying Party shall forfeit its right to require a reference test for the previously conducted test of non-standard configuration. In that case, the Testing Party shall have the right to cancel that reference test. 9. Following notification by the Verifying Party, in accordance with Paragraph 5 of Section IV of this Protocol, of whether or not it intends to carry out any of the activities related to verification for a specific test, and, if so, which activities, the Verifying Party shall forfeit its right to revise that notification unless the Testing Party changes the previously declared location of that test by more than one minute of latitude or longitude or changes the planned yield of a test from 50 kilotons or less to a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons. If the Testing Party makes any such change, the Verifying Party shall have the right to revise its previous notification and to carry out any of the activities specified in Paragraph 1 or 2 of this Section and, if the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification with respect to that test, in accordance with Paragraph 20 of Section IV of this Protocol, the Testing Party shall not conduct the test less than 180 days following the date of the revised notification by the Verifying Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 10. Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, 24 hours a day,
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provided such activities are consistent with the safety requirements of the Testing Party at the test site or Designated Seismic Station. All operations and procedures that require the participation of Designated Personnel and personnel of the Testing Party shall be carried out in accordance with the technical operations and practices at the test site or Designated Seismic Station of the Testing Party, and in this connection: (a) Designated Personnel: (i) shall not interfere with activities of personnel of the Testing Party at the test site or Designated Seismic Station; and (ii) shall be responsible for the working of their equipment, its timely installation and operation, participation in such operations, including dry runs, as the Testing Party may request, and recording of data; and (b) the Testing Party: (i) shall be under no obligation to delay the test because of any malfunction of the equipment of the Verifying Party or inability of Designated Personnel to carry out their functions, unless the Testing Party caused such a situation to arise; and (ii) shall bear full responsibility for the preparation and conduct of the test and shall have exclusive control over it. 11. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification for a specific test, the Testing Party shall have the right to make changes in the timing of its operations related to the conduct of that test, except that the Testing Party shall not make changes in the timing of its operations related to the conduct of that test that would preclude Designated Personnel from carrying out their rights related to verification provided in this Protocol. If the Testing Party notifies the Verifying Party of a change in the timing of its operations that the Verifying Party deems would either preclude or significantly limit the exercise of such rights, the Coordinating Group shall meet at the request of the Representative of the Verifying Party to the Coordinating Group, to consider the change in order to ensure that the rights of the Verifying Party are preserved. If the Coordinating Group cannot agree on a revision to the coordinated schedule that will ensure the rights of both Parties as provided in this Protocol, there shall be no advancement of events within thi coordinated schedule due to such a change. Either Party may request that the Bilateral Consultative Commission consider any such change in timing of
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operations or in the coordinated schedule, in accordance with Paragraph 15 of Section XI of this Protocol.
SECTION 1V.-NOTIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION RELATING TO TESTS 1. Unless otherwise provided in this Protocol, all notifications required by this Protocol shall be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers may also be used, as appropriate, to transmit other information provided in accordance with this Protocol. 2. Not later than the June 1 immediately following entry into force of the Treaty, and not later than June 1 of each year thereafter, each Party shall provide the other Party with the following information on tests that it intends to conduct in the following calendar year: (a) the projected number of tests having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons; (b) the projected number of tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons; and (c) if the number of tests declared in accordance with Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph is less than the number of tests for which rights are specified in Paragraph 2 of Section I11 of this Protocol, whether it intends to conduct a sufficient number of other tests to permit the Verifying Party to exercise fully the rights specified in Paragraph 2 of Section I11 of this Protocol. 3. On the date of entry into force of the Treaty each Party shall provide the other Party with the information specified in Paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of this Section for the remainder of the calendar year in which the Treaty enters into force, and, if the Treaty enters into force after June I, information specified in Paragraph 2 of this Section for the following calendar year. 4. No less than 200 days prior to the planned date of any test with respect to which the Verifying Party has the right to carry out any activity related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the following information to the extent and degree of accuracy available at that time: (a) the planned date of the test and its designation; (b) the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosive canisters; (c) the location of the test, expressed in geographic coordinates to the nearest minute;
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(d) whether the planned yield of the test exceeds 35 kilotons; (e) whether the planned yield of the test exceeds 50 kilotons; (f) if the planned yield is 50 kilotons or less, whether the test is one of the tests with respect to which the Verifying Party has the right to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Section I11 of this Protocol; (g) the planned depth of each emplacement hole to the nearest 10 meters; (h) the type or types of rock in which the test will be conducted, including the depth of the water table; (i) whether the test will be of standard or non-standard configuration; and (j) whether the test will serve as a reference test for: (i) a previously conducted test of non-standard configuration with which such a reference test is associated; (ii) a future test of non-standard configuration for which notification has been provided or is being simultaneously provided in accordance with Paragraph 8(b) of Section I11 of this Protocol; or (iii) a future test of non-standard configuration for which the Testing Party has not yet provided notification. 5. Within 20 days following receipt of information specified in Paragraph 4 of this Section, the Verifying Party shall inform the Testing Party, in a single notification, whether or not it intends to carry out, with respect to this test, any activities related to verification that it has a right to carry out, in accordance with Section I11 of this Protocol, and, if so, whether it intends: (a) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol; (b) to use the seismic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol; and (c) to carry out on-site inspection, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol.
6. Within 30 days following notification by the Verifying Party, in accordance with Paragraph 11 of Section XI of this Protocol, that it requires a reference test for a test of non-standard configuration, the Testing Party shall notify the Verifying Party whether it will meet the requirement for a reference test through: (a) the identification of a previously conducted reference test;
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(b) the identification of a previously conducted test of standard configuration, meeting the requirements for a reference test, with respect to which the Verifying Party carried out hydrodynamic yield measurements; (c) the identification of a previously notified test of standard configuration, meeting the requirements for a reference test, with respect to which the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party of its intent to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements; or
(d) the conduct of a reference test within 12 months of the nonstandard test, whose identification as a reference test will be made in the notification, in accordance with Paragraph 4(j) of this Section. 7. If the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party, no less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the test, with the following information: (a) a description of the geological and geophysical characteristics of the test location, which shall include: the depth of the water table; the stratigraphic column, including the lithologic description of each formation; the estimated physical parameters of the rock, including bulk density, grain density, compressional velocity, porosity, and total water content; and information on any known geophysical discontinuities in the media within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (b) the planned cross-sectional dimensions of each emplacement hole in each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (c) the location and configuration of any known voids larger than one cubic meter within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (d) a description of materials, including their densities, to be used to stem each emplacement hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (el whether it is planned that each emplacement hole will be fully or partially cased, and, if so, a description of materials of this casing; (f) whether it is planned that each satellite hole will be fully or partially cased, and, if so, a description of materials of this casing; (g) a topographic map to a scale no smaller than 1:25,000 and a contour interval of 10 meters or less showing:
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(i) an area with a radius of no less than two kilometers centered on the entrance to each emplacement hole, that shall include the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters centered directly above the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; and (ii) a one-kilometer wide corridor centered on the planned location of the above-ground cables of the Verifying Party; (h) overall drawings showing the external dimensions of each explosive canister and each choke section, and any pipes or cableways passing through a choke section, as well as any other pipes and cableways connected to that explosive canister and located within five meters of that explosive canister; (i) the specific locations, referenced to the entrance to each vertical satellite hole or to the surface location of the entrance to each horizontal emplacement hole, at which individual gas-blocking devices shall be installed if such devices are used on the electrical cables specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol; attd (j) whether the Testing Party will provide satellite communications as specified in Paragraph 13 of Section X of this Protocol for use by Designated Personnel. 8. If the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to use the seismic yield measurement method, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party, no less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the test, with the information specified in Paragraphs 9(a), 9(b), and 9(c) of this Section. 9. If the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to carry out on-site inspection, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party, no less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the test, with the following information: a description of the geological and geophysical characteristics of the test location, which shall include: the depth of the water table; the stratigraphic column, including the lithologic description of each formation; the estimated physical parameters of the rock, including bulk density, grain density, compressional velocity, porosity, and total water content; and information on any known geophysical discontinuities in the media within a radius of 300 meters of the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; the planned cross-sectional dimensions of each emplacement
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hole in the portion within 300 meters of the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; (c) the location and configuration of any known voids larger than 1000 cubic meters within a radius of 300 meters of the planned empIacement point of each explosive canister; (d) whether it is planned that each emplacement hole will be fully or partially cased, and, if so, a description of materials of this casing; (e) a topographic map to a scale no Smaller than 1:25,000 and a contour interval of 10 meters or less showing an area with a radius of no less than two kilometers centered on the entrance to each emplacement hole, that shall include the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters centered directly above the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; and (f) whether the Testing Party will provide satellite communications as specified in Paragraph 13 of Section X of this Protocol for use by Designated Personnel. 10. The Testing Party shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of any change in any information provided in accordance with Paragraph 2, 3, 4(a), 4(c), 4(d), 4(e), 4(f) or 4(j) of this Section, and: (a) if the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, of any change in any information provided in accordance with Paragraph 4(b), 4(g), 4(h), 4(i), 6 or 7 of this Section, or Paragraph 10 of Section XI of this Protocol; (b) if the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol, of any change in any information provided in accordance with Paragraph 4(g), 4(h) or 8 of this Section; and (c) if the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, of any change in any information provided in accordance with Paragraph 4(b), 4(g), 4(h) or 9 of this Section, or Paragraph 10(a) of Section XI of this Protocol. 11. If the Testing Party makes changes in the information specified in Paragraph 4(a), 10(a), 10(b) or 10(c) of this Section related to a
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specific test for which Designated Personnel are present in the territory of the Testing Party, it shall also immediately notify, in writing, the Designated Personnel Team Leader carrying out activities related to verification of that test at the test site and at each Designated Seismic Station of such changes.
12. The Testing Party shall immediately inform the Verifying Party of any change in the timing of its operations related to the conduct of a specific test that affects the coordinated schedule, and if Designated Personnel are present in the territory of the Testing Party, it shall also immediately notify, in writing, the Designated Personnel Team Leader carrying out activities related to verification of that test at the test site and at each Designated Seismic Station. 13. If, in carrying out activities related to verification of a specific test, Designated Personnel are present at the test site or any Designated Seismic Station: (a) no less than 48 hours prior to the initial planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the time for beginning the period of readiness for the test and the planned time of the test, to the nearest second. This and all subsequent notifications shall be referenced to Universal Time Coordinated and to local time at the test site or the Designated Seismic Station; (b) except as otherwise provided in ,this Section, if the Testing Party changes the planned time of the test, it shall immediately notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the new planned time of the test;
(c) the Testing Party shall conduct the test only within a period
of readiness; (dl unless the Parties otherwise agree, the period of readiness shall begin: (i) no less than six days following completion of stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zone of all satellite holes, if verification activities in accordance with Section V of this Protocol are carried out; and (ii) no more than five days prior to the planned date of the test, if verification activities in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol are carried out; (e) the Testing Party may terminate the period of readiness at any time. The Testing Party shall then immediately notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in 'writing, that the period of readiness has been terminated; and
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if the Testing Party terminates the period of readiness or changes the time for beginning the period of readiness, it shall provide notice of the time for beginning a new period of readiness to each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, no less than 12 hours prior to beginning this new period of readiness. 14. Following notification in accordance with Paragraph 13(a) or 13(b) of this Section, the Testing Party, without further notification, may advance the time of the test by no more than five minutes. 15. After the event readiness signal specified in Paragraph lO(b) of Section V of this Protocol has been started: (a) if the Testing Party delays the test and terminates the event readiness signal at least one second prior to the planned time of the test, it may carry out the test, without further notification, at any time within no more than 60 minutes after the planned time of the test, provided it generates a new event readiness signal; and (b) if the Testing Party subsequently delays the test without ending the event readiness signal at least one second prior to the planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall end the event readiness signal and shall not begin a new event readiness signal within 20 minutes following that planned time of the test. The Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the new planned time of the test, at least 10 minutes prior to the beginning of the new event readiness signal for that test. 16. Following notification in accordance with Paragraph 13(a) or 13(b) of this Section, if the test is delayed by more than 60 minutes the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the new planned time of the test no less than 30 minutes prior to the new planned time of the test. 17. During the period of readiness, if a test is delayed by more than three hours from the last notification of the planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the period during which the test will not be conducted. 18. No less than one hour following the test, the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the actual time of the test to the nearest 0.1 second. 19. For each test for which notification has been provided in accordance with Paragraph 4 of this Section, no less than 48 hours prior
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to the initial planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall notify the Verifying Party of the planned time of the test to the nearest one second. If the Testing Party subsequently delays the planned time of the test by more than 24 hours, it shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of the new planned time of the test to the nearest one second. No less than three days following the test, the Testing Party shall notify the Verifying Party of the actual time of the test, referenced to Universal Time Coordinated, to the nearest 0.1 second. 20. The Testing Party shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of a change in the location of a test by more than one minute of latitude or longitude or of a change in the planned yield of a test from 50 kilotons or less to a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons. The Verifying Party shall notify the Testing Party, within 20 days following receipt of notification of such a change in the location or planned yield of the test, whether it intends to carry out for this test any activities related to verification in accordance with Paragraph 9 of Section I11 of this Protocol. If the Verifying Party, in this revised notification, notifies the Testing Party that it intends to carry out any of the activities related to verification that it has a right to carry out in accordance with Section I11 of this Protocol, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the information that it is required to provide in accordance with Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of this Section and Paragraph 10 of Section XI of this Protocol. 21. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables shall not occur less than 90 days after notification of any change in the location of the test by more than one minute of latitude or longitude, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 22. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it does not intend to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements for a specific test, the Testing Party shall have the right to change the configuration of that test from standard to non-standard or vice versa, without notifying the Verifying Party of such change. 23. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements for a specific test, the Testing Party shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of a change in the configuration of that test from standard to non-standard, or vice versa, or of any increase in the number of emplacement holes or explosive canisters of the test. The Verifying Party shall, within five days of notification of any such change, notify the Testing Party whether it will revise its initial notification and whether it deems that this
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change would either preclude or significantly limit the exercise of its rights provided in this Protocol. If so, the Coordinating Group shall immediately meet to consider a revision in the coordinated schedule that will ensure the rights of both Parties provided in this Protocol. If the Parties cannot agree on a revised coordinated schedule within 15 days following notification by the Testing Party of such a change, the date of notification of the change shall be deemed the initial notification of a test in accordance with Paragraph 4 of this Section, and the test shall be conducted no less than 180 days following the date of notification of the change. 24. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out on-site inspection with respect to a specific test, and if the Testing Party notifies the Verifying Party of an increase in the number of explosive canisters or an increase in the number of emplacement holes, the Verifying Party shall, within five days of notification of any such change, notify the Testing Party whether it deems that this change would significantly limit the exercise of its rights provided in this Protocol. If so, the Coordinating Group shall immediately meet to consider a revision in the coordinated schedule that will ensure the rights of both Parties provided in this Protocol. If the Parties cannot agree on a revised coordinated schedule within 15 days following notification by the Verifying Party that it deems that, as a result of such an increase, its rights would be significantly limited, the date of that notification shall be deemed notification by the Verifying Party that it intends to carry out on-site inspection in accordance with Paragraph 5 of this Section, and the test shall be conducted no less than 165 days following the date of such notification. 25. The Verifying Party may at any time, but no later than one year following the test, request from the Testing Party clarification of any point of information provided in accordance with this Section. Such clarification shall be provided in the shortest possible time, but no later than 30 days following receipt of the request.
SECT'ION V. -HYDRODYNAMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT METHOD 1.The hydrodynamic measurement zone is: (a) with respect to a test of standard configuration, described in Paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the cylindrical region 25 meters in diameter whose axis is midway between the axes of the emplacement hole and the satellite hole,
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extending from a point 30 meters below the end of the emplacement hole to a point 100 meters from the end of the emplacement hole in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; or (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the cylindrical region 25 meters in diameter whose axis is midway between the axes of the emplacement hole and the satellite hole, extending from a point 15 meters beyond the end of the emplacement hole to a point 65 meters from the end of the emplacement hole in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; and (b) with respect to a test of non-standard configuration having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the cylindrical region 200 meters in diameter coaxial with the emplacement hole, extending from a point 30 meters below the end of the emplacement hole to a point 100 meters from the center point of the explosive canister in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; or (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the cylindrical region 130 meters in diameter whose axis is coaxial with the emplacement hole, extending from a point 15 meters beyond the end of the emplacement hole to a point 65 meters from the center point of the explosive canister in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole. 2. For the purposes of the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, a test shall be deemed of standard vertical configuration if: (a) each emplacement hole is vertical and cylindrical, and is drilled or excavated with a diameter no greater than four meters; (b) the bottom of each emplacement hole is filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock, to form a plug no less than three meters thick, and the top of this plug of stemming material is the end of the emplacement hole for the explosive canister emplaced farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole; (c) any pipe or cableway connected to an explosive canister passes through a choke section. This choke section is installed on the top of the explosive canister and has the following characteristics:
i
1:
1
'
2.
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diameter of the choke section is no less than that of explosive canister; choke section is no less than one meter thick; sum of the areas of all pipes and cableways within the choke section does not exceed 0.5 square meters; (iv) the area of each pipe or cableway within the choke section does not exceed 0.3 square meters; (v) the part of the choke section in contact with the explosive canister consists of a steel plate having a thickness no less than 0.005 meters; and (vi) the choke section, except for pipes and cableways, is filled, prior to emplacement, with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock, and has a product of density and thickness no less than 250 grams per square centimeter; the length of each explosive canister does not exceed 12 meters and, after an explosive canister is emplaced, the lowest part of the choke section is no more than 12 meters above the end of the emplacement hole; the diameter of each explosive canister does not exceed three meters; each emplacement hole has been drilled or excavated with a diameter, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, no more than one meter greater than the diameter of each explosive canister; or, if an emplacement hole has been cased, the inside diameter of the casing, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, is no more than one meter greater than the diameter of each explosive canister. Within the 15-meter segment above the end of each emplacement hole for each explosive canister, no washouts penetrate more than one meter into the wall of the emplacement hole; all voids in or connected to an emplacement hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, external to: (i) any explosive canister; (ii) any choke sections; (iii) any diagnostic canisters; and (iv) associated cables and pipes are filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock;
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(h) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, all voids greater than 10 cubic meters, external and unconnected to an emplacement hole or a satellite hole, and all voids greater than one cubic meter, within two meters of the wall of a
satellite hole or any part of an explosive canister, are filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; and (i) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, the distance between a satellite hole and any other drilled hole or excavation is no less than the distance between that satellite hole and the emplacement hole with which it is associated. 3. For the purposes of the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, a test shall be deemed of standard horizontal configuration each emplacement hole is horizontal, with an excavated cross section, measured in the plane perpendicular to its axis, no greater than five meters by five meters for the first 65 meters from the end of the emplacement hole for each explosive canister, except that any diagnostic canister associated with it shall occupy, in an emplacement hole, space having a cross section no greater than 3.5 meters by 3.5 meters for the first 50 meters of the emplacement hole from the choke section of each explosive canister in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; the end of each emplacement hole is either:
(i) unsupported native rock, the surface of which is essentially perpendicular to the axis of the emplacement hole; or (ii) the surface of a plug no less than three meters thick, formed of stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; the length of each explosive canister does not exceed 12 meters and, after it is emplaced, the end of the explosive canister farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole is no less than one meter and no more than two meters from the end of the emplacement hole; the cross section of each explosive canister measured in the plane perpendicular to the axis of the emplacement hole does not exceed three meters by three meters; any pipe or cableway connected to an explosive canister and lying entirely within the emplacement hole passes through a
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choke section. This choke section is installed at the end of the explosive canister nearest to the entrance of the emplacement hole and has the following characteristics: (i) the dimensions of the choke section perpendicular to the axis of the emplacement hole are no less than those of the explosive canister; (ii) the choke section is no less than one meter thick; (iii) the sum of the areas of all pipes and cableways within the choke section, plus the sum of the areas of pipes and cableways specified in Sub-paragraph (f) of this paragraph, does not exceed 0.5 square meters; (iv) the area of each pipe or cableway within the choke section does not exceed 0.3 square meters; and (v) the choke section, except for pipes and cableways meeting the requirements of Sub-paragraphs (e)(iii) and (e)(iv) of this paragraph, is filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock, and has a product of density a n d thickness n o less than 250 grams per square centimeter; (f) any pipe or cableway connected to any surface of an explosive canister and not lying entirely within the emplacement hole has the following characteristics: (i) the area of each pipe or cableway within five meters of the explosive canister does not exceed 0.05 square mcters; and (ii) the sum of the areas of all such pipes and cableways within five meters of the explosive canister does not exceed 0.1 square meters; (g) any diagnostic canister connected to the pipes or cableways specified in Sub-paragraph (f) of this paragraph lies entirely outside the hydrodynamic measurement zone; (h) all voids in or connected to an emplacement hole, including any bypass or access tunnels within the hydrodynamic measurement zone, external to: (i) any explosive canister; (ii) any choke sections; (iii) any diagnostic canisters; and (iv) associated cables and pipes are filled with stemming
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material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; (i) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, all voids greater than 10 cubic meters, external a n d unconnected to a n emplacement hole or a satellite hole, and all voids greater than one cubic meter, within two meters of the wall of a satellite hole or any part of an explosive canister, are filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; and (j) within the portion of each hydrodynamic measurement zone extending from the end of the emplacement hole in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole, the distance between a satellite hole and any other tunnel or excavation is no less than the distance between that satellite hole a n d the emplacement hole with which it is associated. 4. With respect to a test of standard configuration, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (a) personnel of the Testing Party, using their own equipment, shall drill or excavate a satellite hole associated with each emplacement hole, at a time of their own choosing. The Testing Party shall have the right to complete drilling or excavation of a satellite hole for a specific test prior to the arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site to carry out activities related to use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method for that test. Each satellite hole shall meet the following requirements: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the axis of the associated satellite hole shall be located 11 meters, plus or minus three meters, from the axis of the emplacement hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If an emplacement hole is horizontal, the axis of the associated satellite hole shall be located 11 meters, plus or minus two meters, from the axis of the emplacement hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, and it may be drilled or excavated either as a single continuous hole or in separate consecutive segments associated with each hydrodynamic measurement zone. The axis of any satellite hole shall be no less than six meters from the wall of any drilled or excavated cavity or hole; (ii) its end shall be no less than 30 meters below the level of the end of the associated vertical emplacement hole
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farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole, or no less than 15 meters beyond the point at which the satellite hole is closest to the end of the associated horizontal emplacement hole farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole; (iii) if it is prepared by drilling, it shall be drilled no less than 0.3 meters and no more than 0.5 meters in diameter. Within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, n o washouts shall penetrate more than one meter into the wall of the hole; and (iv) if it is prepared by excavation, it shall have an excavated cross section, measured in the plane perpendicular to its axis, no greater than 2.5 meters by 2.5 meters within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (b) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe the activities of the personnel of the Testing Party carried out to meet the specifications set forth in Paragraph 2(b) of this Section and, if applicable, set forth in Paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Section. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of the stemming material used to form the plugs specified in Paragraphs 2(b) and 3(b)(ii)of this Section shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention; (c) Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel, directional surveys and geodetic measurements of each satellite hole and emplacement hole prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables; ( d ) equipment specified in Paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be operated by Designated Personnel and shall be installed, in accordance with installation instructions provided in accordance with Paragraph 6(c) of Section VIII of this Protocol, by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel. The location of each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility of the Verifying Party and the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party specified in Paragraph 10(1) of this Section shall be determined by the Testing Party in consultation with the Verifying Party in the
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control t3 Non-proliferation Coordinating Group no less than 90 days prior to the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. Areas for the installation of these facilities, cable supports, and cableways for protection of cables of the Verifying Party, specified in Paragraphs 3(b), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol, shall be prepared by the Testing Party in accordance with requirements agreed upon in the Coordinating Group. Only cables of the Verifying Party shall be installed in these cableways. Designated Personnel shall have access, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, to the cables specified in Paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and to the cableways in which they are installed, at all times. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have access to these cableways only under observation of Designated Personnel; Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own primary electrical power sources to supply electrical power to hydrodynamic equipment specified in Paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol. At the request of the Verifying Party, the Testing Party shall supply electrical power from the standard electrical network of its test site through converters provided by the Verifying Party or, by agreement of the Parties, by the Testing Party; for each test, the only equipment installed in a satellite hole shall be that of the Verifying Party specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(h) of Section VIII of this Protocol. If an emplacement hole is vertical, the end point of the equipment farthest from the entrance to the satellite hole shall be installed no less than 30 meters below the level of the end of the emplacement hole farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole. If an emplacement hole is horizontal, the end point of this equipment shall be installed no less than 15 meters beyond the point at which a satellite hole is closest to the end of the emplacement hole farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole. For each satellite hole, Designated Personnel shall have the right to install no more than six sensing elements and cables, without regard to the number of switches. Personnel of each Party shall have the right to measure the location of the installed sensing elements and cables; Designated Personnel shall have the right to conduct a final directional survey and geodetic measurements of each satellite
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hole upon completion of installation of sensing elements and cables; (h) personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, shall fill all voids in or connected to each satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone with a stemming material agreed upon by the Parties, having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention. The methods and materials used for stemming satellite holes and any hydrodynamic measurement equipment emplacement pipe shall: (i) be consistent with the containment practices of the Testing Party; (ii) be chosen to minimize voids around sensing elements and cables; and (iii) be chosen to avoid damage to the sensing elements and cables; (i) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe the stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of each emplacement hole in accordance with Paragraphs 2(g) and 3(h) of this Section. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retentidn; (j) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each emplacement hole; and (k) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each satellite hole, provided that: (i) sensing elements and cables can be installed as specified in Sub-paragraph (0 of this paragraph; (ii) casing or lining material in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is agreed upon by the Parties; and (iii) casing or lining in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is affixed to the surrounding formation with material agreed upon by the Parties. 5. In preparation for the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of standard configuration, as well
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as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (a) upon their arrival at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, Designated Personnel shall provide the Testing Party with a description of the recording format and the computer program, to enable the Testing Party to read digital data if digital recordings of hydrodynamic data will be made by Designated Personnel; (b) the Testing Party shall provide Designated Personnel upon their arrival at the test site with the results of any studies of core samples and rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole and satellite hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, and the results of logging and geodetic measurements carried out in each emplacement hole, each satellite hole, and any exploratory holes and tunnels, relevant to the geology and geophysics of each hydrodynamic measurement zone, if the Testing Party carried out such studies and measurements; (c) using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, in the emplacement hole and associated satellite hole, caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and depth or distance measurements to determine the dimensions and the relative locations of the emplacement hole and satellite hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (ii) if an emplacement hole is vertical, within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of either the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing Party, of the satellite hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic and television logging; (iii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the emplacement hole and associated satellite hole, as well as in the drilled holes specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph,
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caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and distance measurements to determine the dimensions
and relative location of these holes, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar and acoustic sounding; and (iv) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the drilled holes specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, and within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole, or, at the option of the Testing Party, of the satellite hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, and acoustic logging; (dl all logging data and geometrical measurements obtained by Designated Personnel, in accordance with Sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and a copy of the data shall be provided to personnel of the Testing Party prior to departure from the test site of Designated Personnel who have carried out these measurements. Calibration data shall include information necessary to confirm the sensitivity of logging equipment under the conditions in which it is used; (e) Designated Personnel shall have the right to receive: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, core samples or, at the option of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing Party, from the satellite hole, extracted at no more than 10 depths within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, specified by Designated Personnel. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each depth shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, core samples or, at the option of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing Party, the satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If core samples are extracted from the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation Party, from an excavated satellite hole, they shall be extracted during drilling from each of no more than 10 holes drilled at stations specified by Designated Personnel. The diameter of each drilled hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters and no more than 0.15 meters, and the depth of each hole shall be no more than the diameter of the emplacement hole or satellite hole at this station. Core samples shall be extracted at locations specified by Designated Personnel along each drilled hole. If core samples are extracted from a drilled satellite hole, they shall be extracted by personnel of the Testing Party during the drilling of the satellite hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, at no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel and under their observation. Rock fragments shall be extracted from the emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole at each of no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel. Core samples and rock fragments may be taken from no more than a total of 10 stations. If an emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole is lined at any station specified by Designated Personnel for extracting core samples or rock fragments, personnel of the Testing Party shall enable Designated Personnel to extract core samples or rock fragments at such a station from native rock. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each station shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (f) core samples or rock fragments may be extracted in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph by personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, or by Designated Personnel, at the option of the Testing Party; (g) if personnel of the Testing Party do not extract core samples or rock fragments in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall have the right, using their own equipment, to extract such core samples or rock fragments in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party; (h) if an emplacement hole is vertical, and if the Testing Party, prior to arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site: (i) has cased a total of 20 meters or more of the emplacement hole or the satellite hole within any hydrodynamic
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measurement zone, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out, in the uncased hole, the activities specified in Sub-paragraph (c)(ii) of this paragraph and to receive core samples or rock fragments from the uncased hole, extracted in accordance with Subparagraphs (e), (f), and (g) of this paragraph; or (ii) has cased a total of 20 meters or more of both the emplacement hole and the satellite hole within any hydrodynamic measurement zone, the Testing Party shall provide an uncased hole with respect to which Designated Personnel shall have the same rights as those specified for the emplacement hole and the satellite hole in Subparagraphs (c), (e), (f), and (g) of this paragraph. The axis of this uncased hole shall be within 22 meters of the axes of the emplacement hole and the satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, extract core samples through coring during the drilling of this uncased hole, the diameter of the hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters. If Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, extract core samples from this uncased hole following drilling, the diameter of the uncased hole shall be no less than 0.3 meters; (i) Designated Personnel shall have the right to retain core samples and rock fragments specified in Sub-paragraphs (e), (f), (g), and (h) of this paragraph. Any such core samples or rock fragments shall be prepared in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Parties for shipment to the territory of the Verifying Party; and (j) logging, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and extracting of core samples or rock fragments carried out in accordance with Sub-paragraphs (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) of this paragraph shall begin at times chosen by the Testing Party and specified in the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall have the right, within a period not to exceed 21 days, to carry out logging, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and coring activities, unless the Parties otherwise agree and so specify in the coordinated schedule. The Testing Party shall not emplace any explosive until the activities specified in this paragraph have been completed.
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6 . With respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in Paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (a) personnel of the Testing Party, using their own equipment and at a time of their own choosing, shall drill or excavate up to three satellite holes associated with the emplacement hole. The location of the satellite holes shall be determined in accordance with Paragraph ll(b)(i) of Section XI of this Protocol. The Testing Party shall have the right to complete drilling or excavation of satellite holes for the specific test prior to the arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site for that test. The satellite holes shall meet the following requirements: (i) with respect to the first satellite hole, its length shall be as specified in Paragraph 4(a)(ii) of this Section; (ii) with respect to the second and third satellite holes, if such are required by the Verifying Party, the axis of each satellite hole shall be within three meters of the axis specified by the Verifying Party. Its length shall be specified by the Verifying Party and in no case shall it extend beyond the hydrodynamic measurement zone associated with that explosion; (iii) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, the axis of each satellite hole shall be essentially parallel to the axis of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is vertical, or shall be essentially straight, if the emplacement hole is horizontal. Within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, its axis shall be no less than eight meters from the axis of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is vertical, or no less than 10 meters from the axis of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is horizontal, and no less than six meters from the wall of any drilled or excavated cavity or hole; (iv) with respect to a drilled satellite hole, it shall be drilled no less than 0.3 meters and no more than 0.5 meters in diameter, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, no washouts shall penetrate more than one meter into the wall of the hole; (v) with respect to an excavated satellite hole, it shall have a cross section, measured in the plane perpendicular to its axis, no greater than 2.5 meters by 2.5 meters within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; and
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(vi) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, except for any drilled or excavated cavity or hole, all voids, external and unconnected to any satellite hole, greater than 10 cubic meters in volume, within six meters of the axis of any satellite hole, and all voids greater than one cubic meter in volume, within two meters of the axis of any satellite hole, shall be filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; (b) Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel, directional surveys and geodetic measurements of each satellite hole and emplacement hole prior to the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables and transducers; (c) equipment specified in Paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be operated by Designated Personnel and shall be installed, in accordance with installation instructions provided in accordance with Paragraph 6(c) of Section VIII of this Protocol, by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel. The location of each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility of the Verifying Party and the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party specified in Paragraph 10(1) of this Section shall be determined by the Testing Party in consultation with the Verifying Party in the Coordinating Group no less than 90 days prior to the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. Areas for the installation of these facilities, cable supports, and cableways for protection of cables of the Verifying Party specified in Paragraphs 3(b), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be prepared by the Testing Party in accordance with requirements agreed upon in the Coordinating Group. Only cables of the Verifying Party shall be installed in these cableways. Designated Personnel shall have access, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, to the cables specified in Paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and to the cableways in which they are installed, at all times. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have access to these cableways only under observation of Designated Personnel;
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(d) Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own primary electrical power sources to supply electrical power to hydrodynamic equipment specified in Paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol. At the request of the Verifying Party, the Testing Party shall supply electrical power from the standard electrical network of its test site through converters provided by the Verifying Party or, upon agreement of the Parties, by the Testing Party; (e) for each test, the only equipment installed in each satellite hole shall be that of the Verifying Party specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(h) of Section VIII of this Protocol. This equipment shall be installed in each satellite hole at the locations specified by Designated Personnel. Designated Personnel shall have the right to install in each satellite hole no more than six sensing elements and cables, without regard to the number of switches, and no more than six transducers together with no more than 14 cables for information transmission and power supply. The total number of cables in each satellite hole shall not exceed 20. Personnel of each Party shall have the right to measure the location of the installed sensing elements and cables and transducers; (f) Designated Personnel shall have the right to conduct a final directional survey and geodetic measurements of each satellite hole upon completion of installation of sensing elements and cables and transducers; (g) personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, shall fill all voids in or connected to each satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone with a stemming material agreed upon by the Parties, having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming
material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention. The methods and materials used for stemming satellite holes and any hydrodynamic measurement equipment emplacement pipe shall: (i) be consistent with the containment practices of the Testing Party; (ii) be chosen to minimize voids around sensing elements and cables and transducers; and
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(iii) be chosen to avoid damage to the sensing elements and cables and transducers; (h) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe the stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of each emplacement hole in accordance with Paragraph 9(d) of this Section. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention; (i) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each emplacement hole; and (j) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each satellite hole, provided that: (i) sensing elements and cables and transducers can be installed as specified in Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph; (ii) casing or lining material in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is agreed upon by the Parties; and (iii) casing or lining in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is affixed to the surrounding formation with material agreed upon by the Parties. 7. In preparation for the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in Paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (a) upon their arrival at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables and transducers, Designated Personnel shall provide the Testing Party with a description of the recording format and the computer program, to enable the Testing Party to read digital data if digital recordings of hydrodynamic data will be made by Designated Personnel; (b) the Testing Party shall provide Designated Personnel upon their arrival at the test site with the results of any studies of core samples and rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole and satellite hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, and the results of logging and geodetic measurements carried out in each emplacement hole, each satellite hole, and any exploratory holes and tunnels, relevant
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to the geology and geophysics of each hydrodynamic measurement zone, if the Testing Party carried out such studies and measurements; (c) using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, in the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and depth or distance measurements to determine the dimensions and the relative locations of the emplacement hole and each satellite hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, using, in a nondestructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (ii) if an emplacement hole is vertical, within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic, and television logging; (iii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, as well as in the drilled holes specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and distance measurements to determine the dimensions and relative location of these holes, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids in each hydrodynamic measurement zone using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (iv) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the drilled holes specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, and within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, and acoustic logging; and (v) magnetic surveys, in vertical satellite holes and drilled horizontal satellite holes, to obtain information necessary for the installation and positioning of transducers;
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(d) all logging data and geometrical measurements obtained by Designated Personnel, in accordance with Sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and a copy of the data shall be provided to personnel of the Testing Party prior to departure from the test site of Designated Personnel who have carried out these measurements. Calibration data shall include information necessary to confirm the sensitivity of logging equipment under the conditions in which it is used; (e) Designated Personnel shall have the right to receive: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, core samples or, at the option of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole and from each satellite hole, extracted at no more than 10 depths within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, specified by Designated Personnel. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each depth shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, core samples or, at the q t i o n of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole and each satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If core samples are extracted from the emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole, they shall be extracted during drilling from each of no more than 10 holes drilled at stations specified by Designated Personnel. The diameter of each drilled hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters and no more than 0.15 meters, and the depth of each hole shall be no more than the diameter of the emplacement hole or satellite hole at this station. Core samples shall be extracted at locations specified by Designated Personnel along each drilled hole. If core samples are extracted from a drilled satellite hole, they shall be extracted by personnel of the Testing Party during the drilling of the satellite hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, at no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel and under their observation. Rock fragments shall be extracted from the emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole at each of no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel. Core samples and rock fragments may be taken from no more than a total of 10 stations for each hole.
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(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
If an emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole is lined at any station specified by Designated Personnel for extracting core samples or rock fragments, personnel of the Testing Party shall enable Designated Personnel to extract core samples or rock fragments at such a station from native rock. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each station shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; core samples or rock fragments may be extracted in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph by personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, or by Designated Personnel, at the option of the Testing Party; if personnel of the Testing Party do not extract core samples or rock fragments in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall have the right, using their own equipment, to extract such core samples or rock fragments in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party; if an emplacement hole is vertical, and if the Testing Party, prior to arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site, has cased a total of 20 meters or more of the emplacement hole or any satellite hole within any hydrodynamic measurement zone, and if within 22 meters from this cased hole there is no uncased hole with a diameter no less than 0.3 meters, the Testing Party shall provide an uncased hole for each hole so cased, with respect to which the Verifying Party shall have the same rights as those specified in Sub-paragraphs (c), (e), (f), and (g) of this paragraph. Within each hydrodynamic measurement zone the axis of each uncased hole shall be no less than 11 and no more than 22 meters from such a cased hole. If personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, extract core samples through coring during the drilling of this uncased hole, the diameter of the hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters. If Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, extract core samples from this uncased hole following drilling, the diameter of the uncased hole shall be no less than 0.3 meters; Designated Personnel shall have the right to retain core samples and rock fragments specified in Sub-paragraphs (e), (f), (g), and (h) of this paragraph. Any such core samples or rock fragments shall be prepared in accordance with procedures
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agreed upon by the Parties for shipment to the territory of the Verifying Party; and (j) logging, directional surveys, magnetic surveys, geodetic measurements, and extracting of core samples or rock fragments carried out in accordance with Sub-paragraphs (c), (el, (f), (g), (h), and (i) of this paragraph shall begin at times chosen by the Testing Party and specified in the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall have the right, within a period not to exceed 25 days, to carry out logging, directional surveys, magnetic surveys, geodetic measurements, and coring activities, unless the Parties otherwise agree and so specify in the coordinated schedule. The Testing Party shall not emplace any explosive until the activities specified in this paragraph have been completed. 8. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, and that it requires a reference test in accordance with Paragraph 7 of Section 111 of this Protocol, the Testing Party shall provide for such a reference test for the non-standard test. To serve as a reference test, a test shall: (a) have a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons; (b) be of standard configuration; (c) have a single explosive canister; (d) meet the following spacing criteria: (i) the horizontal separation between the emplacement point of the reference test and each emplacement point of the non-standard test at which any explosive canister or its emplacement conditions differ from those specified for a test of standard configuration shall be no less than 300 meters and no more than 2000 meters; (ii) each explosive canister of the test of non-standard configuration and the explosive canister of the associated reference test shall all be emplaced above the water table or shall all be emplaced below the water table; and (iii) the depth of all emplacement points of the test of nonstandard configuration shall be within 150 meters of the depth of the emplacement point of its associated reference test; and ( e ) be conducted either prior to, or within 12 months following,
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the conduct of the test of non-standard configuration for which it serves as a reference test. 9. Designated Personnel shall have the right: (a) to have access along agreed routes to the location of the test to carry out activities related to use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method; (b) to have access to their equipment associated with the hydrodynamic yield measurement method from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site, until it is transferred to personnel of the Testing Party in accordance with Paragraph 7(i) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless otherwise provided in this Protocol; (c) with respect to a test of standard configuration, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, prior to the lowering of the explosive canister into the emplacement hole, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the entire external structure of that canister and the choke section; to confirm by direct measurement that the choke section conforms to the specifications set forth in Paragraph 2(c) of this Section; to observe continuously the explosive canister and any choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this sub-paragraph, begin; to observe the emplacement of the explosive canister into the emplacement hole and stemming of the emplacement hole from the time the entire explosive canister is last visible above the entrance of the emplacement hole until completion of stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole; to determine by direct measurement the depth of emplacement of the bottom part of any choke section; and to observe the stemming of the entire satellite hole; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, following placement of explosive canisters in the emplacement hole, and prior to the beginning of stemming around explosive canisters, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the entire external structure of each explosive canister; to confirm
by direct measurement that each choke section conforms to the specifications set forth in Paragraph 3(e) of this Section; to observe continuously each explosive canister and each choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this subparagraph, begin, until the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section, or, at the option of the Testing Party, until the explosive canister and choke section are fixed in place with solidified stemming material, in which case, after a period of no more than 24 hours for placement of explosives, to observe the explosive canister, the choke section, and the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section; and to observe the stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole, the stemming of any access or bypass drifts, the stemming of any voids in each hydrodynamic measurement zone connected to the emplacement hole; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; (d) with respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in Paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, prior to the lowering of an explosive canister into the emplacement hole, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the external structure of each canister and each choke section; to confirm by direct measurement that each choke section conforms to any specifications provided by the Testing Party in accordance with Paragraph lO(c)(iii) of Section XI of this Protocol; to observe continuously each explosive canister and each choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this sub-paragraph, begin; to observe the emplacement of each explosive canister into the emplacement hole and stemming of the emplacement hole from the time an entire explosive canister is last visible above the entrance of the emplacement hole until completion of stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole; to determine by direct measurement
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the depth of emplacement of the upper surface of each explosive canister; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, following placement of all explosive canisters in the emplacement hole and prior to the beginning of stemming around the explosive canister, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the entire external structure of each explosive canister; to confirm by direct measurement that each choke section conforms to any specifications provided by the Testing Party in accordance with Paragraph lO(c)(iii) of Section XI of this Protocol; to observe continuously each explosive canister and each choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this sub-paragraph, begin, until the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section, or, at the option of the Testing Party, until the explosive canister and choke section are fixed in place with solidified stemming material, in which case, after a period of no more than 24 hours for placement of explosives, to observe the explosive canister, the choke section, and the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section; to observe the stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole, the stemming of any access or bypass drifts, the stemming of any voids in each hydrodynamic measurement zone connected to the emplacement hole, except those voids and any access or bypass drifts designated by the Testing Party to remain unstemmed in accordance with Paragraph 10(c) of Section XI of this Protocol; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; and (iii) if a test is conducted in a cavity, to measure the shape and volume of the cavity after excavation and once again immediately prior to placement of explosive canisters with explosives or placement of explosives into explosive canisters. After placement of explosive canisters with explosives or placement of explosives into explosive canisters, Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe explosive canisters and to observe the stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the
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emplacement hole and any access or bypass drifts, and of any voids connected to the emplacement hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, except those voids and any access or bypass drifts designated by the Testing Party to remain unstemmed, in accordance with Paragraph 10(c) of Section XI of this Protocol; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; (e) with respect to a test of standard configuration, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to unobstructed visual observation of the entrance to the emplacement hole and associated satellite hole from completion of stemming of the satellite hole and of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to unobstructed visual observation of sensing elements and cables until completion of stemming of each associated satellite hole, and of cables specified in Paragraph 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol until completion of their installation in protective cableways specified in Paragraph 4(d) of this Section, as well as observation of the entrance td the emplacement hole from completion of stemming of each satellite hole and of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; (f) with respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in Paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to unobstructed visual observation of the entrance to the emplacement hole and each satellite hole from completion of stemming of all satellite holes and the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to unobstructed visual observation of the sensing elements and cables and transducers until completion of stemming of all associated satellite holes, and of cables specified in
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control b Non-proliferation Paragraph 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol until completion of their installation in protective cableways specified in Paragraph 6(c) of this Section of the Protocol, as well as the entrance to the emplacement hole from completion of stemming of all satellite holes and the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; (g) to monitor electrically the integrity and performance of?their equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and to observe continuously the cables specified in Paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and the cableways in which they are installed as specified in Paragraphs 4(d) and 6(c) of this Section, from the time emplacement of sensing elements and cables and transducers begins until departure of all personnel from the test location. Following departure of personnel and until reentry of personnel to the test location following the test, Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe remotely, by means of closed-circuit television, the surface area containing their hydrodynamic yield measurement equipment; (h) to monitor electrically the integrity and performance of their equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), 3(d, 3(d), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol from the command and monitoring facility specified in Paragraph 3(e) of Section VIII of this Protocol, from commencement of its use by Designated Personnel until completion of the activities specified in Paragraphs 9(m) and 14(b) of this Section; (i) to transmit from the command and monitoring facility to each hydrodynamic recording facility the commands required for operation of that hydrodynamic recording facility; (j) to use channels provided by the Testing Party within its telemetry system for transmission of information specified in Sub-paragraphs (h), (i), (k), and (1) of this paragraph, if such a system is used at the test site of the Testing Party, or to use for these purposes its own cables, specified in Paragraph 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol; (k) to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements and to record the hydrodynamic data; (1) to transmit- the hydrodynamic yield measurement data from
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each hydrodynamic recording facility to the command and monitoring facility; and (m) to reenter the area containing each hydrodynamic recording facility at the same time as personnel of the Testing Party, and to have access, in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Parties and accompanied by personnel of the Testing Party, to each hydrodynamic recording facility, for the purposes of retrieving and verifying the authenticity of recorded data and assessing the performance of the equipment of the Verifying Party during data recording and transmission. 10. During the carrying out of hydrodynamic yield measurements: (a) the Representative of the Testing Party shall notify, in writing, the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site of the beginning of the period of readiness and the planned time of the test, in accordance with Paragraph 13 of Section IV of this Protocol; (b) the Testing Party shall produce an event readiness signal in the interval from seven to 15 minutes prior to the planned time of the test, as specified by the Verifying Party, with an accuracy of plus or minus 100 milliseconds. The parameters for this signal, produced by the Testing Party, and procedures for its transmission and reception shall be agreed upon by the Parties; (c) Designated Personnel shall have the right to generate, using the trigger conditioner devices approved by the Parties, a timing reference signal using an electromagnetic pulse from their sensing elements and cables. This timing reference signal shall be generated, transmitted, and used by Designated Personnel without intervention by personnel of the Testing Party. For each explosion in a test, the trigger conditioner shall receive signals from one or two hydrodynamic yield measurement cables; (d) Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall have the right to install the trigger conditioner devices. From the time of installation of these devices until the time of the test: (i) Designated Personnel shall have the right to test and monitor the operation of the devices; (ii) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to monitor the operation of the devices and to monitor and record the timing reference signal; and
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(e)
(f) ,
(g)
(h)
(i)
(iii) neither Designated Personnel nor personnel of the Testing Party shall have physical access to the devices, except under observation of personnel of the other Party; the Testing Party shall provide, at the request of the Verifying Party, an electrical pulse corresponding to the nuclear explosion zero-time, with an accuracy of plus or minus one microsecond, for each explosion. The parameters for this signal and procedures for its transmission and reception shall be agreed upon by the Parties; the Testing Party shall have exclusive control over the generation of signals specified in Sub-paragraphs (b) and (el of this paragraph; Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall install in each cable from each satellite hole to a hydrodynamic recording facility an anti-intrusiveness device for interrupting the transmission, from the sensing elements and cables and transducers to the hydrodynamic recording facility of the Verifying Party, of any signal unrelated to hydrodynamic yield measurements. These devices shall be provided by the Testing Party from among those approved by both Parties and shall not interfere with the ability of Designated Personnel to record data required for hydrodynamic yield measurements of each explosion in a test. From the time of installation of these devices until the final dry run, personnel of each Party shall have the right to test and monitor the operation of the devices and to have physical access to them only under observation of personnel of the other Party. Sole control over the triggering of these devices shall be transferred to the Testing Party at the time of departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; each hydrodynamic recording facility shall have an independent grounding loop with an impedance no greater than 10 ohms; the shields of all cables associated with sensing elements and cables and transducers of the Verifying Party shall be grounded: (i) at the input to each hydrodynamic recording facility of the Verifying Party; (ii) at the output of each anti-intrusiveness device; (iii) at the input of each trigger conditioner device; and
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(iv) in those cables associated with sensing elements and cables in which no trigger conditioner device is installed, at the input of the anti-intrusiveness device; grounding of each hydrodynamic recording facility, as well as grounding of cables associated with the sensing elements and cables and transducers of the Verifying Party, shall be carried out by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party. The grounding system of each hydrodynamic recording facility, as well as of cables associated with the sensing elements and cables and transducers shall be under the joint control of the Parties; Designated Personnel shall have the right to install, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, an isolation transformer at the input of each anti-intrusiveness device or trigger conditioner device. From the time of installation of these devices until the time of the test, neither Designated Personnel nor personnel of the Testing Party shall have physical access to these devices, except under observation of personnel of the other Party; the Testing Party shall have the right to install, at a distance of no less than 50 meters from each hydrodynamic recording facility, a facility containing instrumentation for monitoring and recording the timing reference signal, for controlling and monitoring the operation of the anti-intrusiveness devices, and for the transmission of control and trigger signals. Signals between the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party and each hydrodynamic recording facility shall be transmitted over fiber optic cables. The Testing Party shall provide for the installation, in each hydrodynamic recording facility, of terminal devices for converting optical signals into electrical signals produced in accordance with Sub-paragraphs (b) and (e) of this paragraph, and for monitoring the interval of interruption and for monitoring the power supply of the antiintrusiveness device, in accordance with Sub-paragraph (g) of this paragraph. The Verifying Party shall provide for the installation in the facility of the Testing Party of a terminal device for converting an optical signal into aqrelectrical time referencing signal provided in accordance witK Sub-paragraph (d)(ii) of this paragraph. These provided devices shall be installed under observation of personnel of both Parties and sealed by the Party providing the device. The instrumentation
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facilities specified in this sub-paragraph shall be under the exclusive control of the Testing Party; and (m) upon arrival at the test site, Designated Personnel shall provide the Testing Party with a copy of the block diagram of the equipment configuration for hydrodynamic yield measurements for the test together with notification of any changes from the block diagram approved during the familiarization process provided in Paragraph 6(d)(i) of Section VIII of this Protocol. No less than two days prior to the final dry run, Designated Personnel shall notify the Testing Party, in writing, of any additional changes in this block diagram. In the event of any changes in the block diagram, the Testing Party shall have the right, within one day following such notification, to disapprove any changes it finds inconsistent with its non-intrusiveness, containment, safety, or security requirements. Such disapproval shall be provided, in writing, to the Designated Personnel Team Leader, stating the specific reasons for disapproval. Any changes not disapproved shall be deemed accepted. If a change is disapproved, Designated Personnel shall configure the equipment in accordance with the block diagram previously approved in accordance with Paragraph 6(d)(i) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless the Testing Party otherwise agrees. 11. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe use of equipment by Designated Personnel at the test site, with access to each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility of the Verifying Party subject to the following: (a) at any time prior to the test that Designated Personnel are not present in these facilities, these facilities shall be sealed by the seals of both Parties. Seals shall be removed only under observation of personnel of both Parties; (b) prior to the test, except for periods specified in Sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of this paragraph, personnel of the Testing Party may enter these facilities only with the agreement of the Designated Personnel Team Leader and when accompanied by the Team Leader or his designated representative; (c) for the period of two hours prior to the final dry run, and for the period of two hours prior to the time fixed for withdrawal of all personnel to the area designated for occupation during the test, personnel of the Testing Party, not to exceed two, shall have the right to join Designated Personnel in each hydrodynamic recording facility, to observe final preparations of the equipment and to confirm the agreed configuration of
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that equipment. All personnel shall leave the facility together; and (dl for period beginning two hours prior to a test and ending upon completion of the activities specified in Paragraphs 9(m) and 14(b) of this Section, personnel of the Testing Party, not to exceed two, shall have the right to join Designated Personnel in the command and monitoring facility to observe final command and monitoring of the recording equipment and acquisition and duplication of data, and to receive a copy of these data. 12. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs taken by personnel of the Testing Party using photographic cameras of the Testing Party or, at the option of the Testing Party, photographic cameras provided by the Verifying Party. These photographs shall be taken under the following conditions: (a) the Testing Party shall identify those of its personnel who will take photographs; (b) photographs shall be taken at the request and under observation of Designated Personnel. If requested by Designated Personnel, such photographs shall show the size of an object by placing a measuring scale, provided by Designated Personnel, alongside that object during the photographing; (c) Designated Personnel shall determine whether photographs conform to those requested, and, if not, repeat photographs shall be taken; and (d) before completion of any photographed operation related to emplacement, and prior to the time at which an object that is being photographed becomes permanently hidden from view, Designated Personnel shall determine whether requested photographs are adequate. If they are not adequate, before the operation shall proceed additional photographs shall be taken until the Designated Personnel determine that the photographs of that operation are adequate. This photographic process shall be undertaken as expeditiously as possible, and in no case shall the cumulative delay resulting from this process exceed two hours for each of the operations specified in Paragraphs 13(a), 13(b), 13(d), 13(e), and 13(f) of this Section, unless the Parties otherwise agree, except that stemming shall not be interrupted as a result of the photographic process.
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13. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs, taken in accordance with Paragraph 12 of this Section, of the following: (a) the emplacement and installation of equipment associated with the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, including all sensing elements and cables and transducers and their connections, each hydrodynamic recording facility, the command and monitoring facility, anti-intrusiveness devices, and trigger conditioner devices; (b) the stemming of all satellite holes; (c) all choke sections and the exterior of each explosive canister; (d) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the emplacement of each explosive canister and the stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole; (e) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the interior of the emplacement hole within 20 meters of the emplacement point of each installed explosive canister and the stemming of hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole; (f) core samples and rock fragments obtained in accordance with Paragraphs 5(e), 5(0, 5@, 5(h), 7(e), 7(f), 7(g), and 7(h) of this Section, the equipment and activities associated with extracting such samples, as well as the interior of the emplacement hole, if an emplacement hole is horizontal, at the stations where core samples or rock fragments were extracted; and (g) with the agreement of the Testing Party, other activities of Designated Personnel directly related to the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 14. The following procedures shall apply to the recovery and transfer of data: (a) no later than the final dry run, Designated Personnel shall inform personnel of the Testing Party of the procedures for recovering and verifying the authenticity of data and shall advise personnel of the Testing Party, at the time of data recovery, of any changes Designated Personnel make in those procedures and the reasons for such changes; (b) following the test, Designated Personnel, in the presence of personnel of the Testing Party, shall enter the hydrodynamic recording facility and recover all recordings of data taken at the time of the test. Designated Personnel shall prepare two identical copies of such data. Personnel of the Testing Party shall select one of the two identical copies. Designated
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Personnel shall retain the other copy, but no other such data; and (c) following the completion of the activities specified in Paragraph 9(m) of this Section and Sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall leave the hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility at the same time as personnel of the Testing Party. Designated Personnel shall have no further access to their hydrodynamic recording facility, command and monitoring facility, or equipment until these are returned to the Verifying Party in accordance with Paragraph 7(i)(ii) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless the Parties otherwise agree, in which case access by Designated Personnel to their facilities and equipment shall be under observation of personnel of the Testing Party. 15. Designated Personnel shall not be present in areas from which all personnel of the Testing Party have been withdrawn in connection with the test, but shall have the right to reenter those areas, as provided in this Protocol, at the same time as personnel of the Testing Party. 16. All hydrodynamic yield measurement activities shall be carried out in accordance with the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel who will carry out the activities specified in this Section and in Paragraph 7(e) of Section VIII of this Protocol shall arrive at the test site in accordance with the coordinated schedule, but no less than three days prior to the date specified by the Testing Party for the beginning of these activities. 17. The number of Designated Personnel carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurements with respect to a test of standard configuration conducted in a single emplacement hole, without regard to the number of ends of that emplacement hole, as these are specified in Paragraph 3(b) of this Section, shall not exceed, at any time, 35 individuals, and the number of Designated Personnel, at any time, carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurements with respect to a test of non-standard configuration or a test conducted in more than one emplacement hole shall not exceed, at any time, 45 individuals, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Within these totals, the coordinated schedule shall be developed so as to ensure that the number of Designated Personnel for carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurements with respect to a specific test shall not exceed: (a) if a test is of standard configuration, for carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements, other than activities specified in Paragraph 5(j) of this Section, 26
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individuals and, for carrying out activities specified in Paragraph 5(j) of this Section: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, 18 individuals; or (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, 22 individuals; or (b) if a test is of non-standard configuration or is conducted in more than one emplacement hole, for carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements other than activities specified in Paragraph 5(j) or 7(j) of this Section, 35 individuals and, for carrying out activities specified in Paragraph 5(j) or 7(j) of this Section, 26 individuals; and (c) Designated Personnel shall include at least two individuals fluent in the language of the Testing Party.
SECTION V1.-SEISMIC YIELD MEASUREMENT METHOD I. For the purposes of the use of the seismic yield measurement method, the Verifying Party shall have the right to carry out independent seismic measurements at three Designated Seismic Stations in the territory of the Testing Party, in accordance with this Section. Designated Seismic Stations of each Party shall meet the following criteria: (a) be located within its continental territory; (b) each shall have an Lg-wave signal-to-noise ratio not less than nine for any test in its territory having a yield of 150 kilotons. The signal-to-noise ratio shall be defined as one-half of the maximum peak amplitude of the Lg-wave signal divided by the root-mean-square value of the seismic noise in the recording segment immediately preceding the arrival of the P-wave signal and having a duration of no less than one minute. The signals and the noise shall be measured on a vertical component of the recording in the frequency range typical of Lg-waves recorded at the Designated Seismic Station; (c) ensure wide azimuthal coverage of each of its test sites, insofar as permitted by their geographic location; and (dl be chosen from those existing seismic stations that provide earthquake and other seismic event data, including tests, to archives in the territory of the Testing Party, accessible to the Verifying Party. 2. The United States of America designates the following three seismic stations as meeting the criteria specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section: Tulsa, Oklahoma (TUL) (35Q55'N;095Q48'W);Black Hills, South Dakota (RSSD) (44'07'N; 104Q02'W);and Newport, Washington (NEW) 4P16'N; 11 7*07'W).
,t
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3. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics designates the following three seismic stations as meeting the criteria specified in Paragraph 1 of
this Section: Arti (ARU) (56Q26'N;05gQ34'E);Novosibirsk (NVS) (54Q51'N; 083Q16'E); and Obninsk (OBN) (55Q07'N; 036Q34'E). 4. Upon entry into force of the Treaty each Party shall provide the other Party with the following information on each of its Designated Seismic Stations: (a) a site diagram of the station showing the areas assigned for use by Designated Personnel; (b) elevation above mean sea level to the nearest 10 meters; and (c) types of rock on which it is located. 5. The Testing Party shall have the right to replace one or more of its Designated Seismic Stations, provided: (a) the new Designated Seismic Station meets all the criteria specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section; (b) notification of the decision of the Testing Party to select a new Designated Seismic Station, together with the station name and its reference code, the station coordinates to the nearest one minute of geographic latitude and longitude, and the information and site diagram for the new station specified in Paragraph 4 of this Section, is provided to the Verifying Party no less than 90 days prior to the planned date of any test with respect to which the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the seismic yield measurement method and for which this Designated Seismic Station would be used; and (c) seismic data, for the period from entry into force of the Treaty until the new Designated Seismic Station begins use as a Designated Seismic Station, are placed in archives in the territory of the Testing Party, accessible to the Verifying Party. If a Designated Seismic Station is replaced within the first four years following entry into force of the Treaty, seismic data for at least four years of operation of the new Designated Seismic Station shall be placed in archives in the territory of the Testing Party, accessible to the Verifying Party. 6. If any Designated Seismic Station does not meet the criteria specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, the Verifying Party shall have the right to request its replacement with another Designated Seismic Station that meets such criteria. Any request by the Verifying Party for replacement shall state the reasons this Designated Seismic Station does
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not meet the criteria specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, and shall be transmitted to the Testing Party through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. If the Parties are unable to resolve the issue of replacement of a Designated Seismic Station, it shall immediately be referred to the Bilateral Consultative Commission in accordance with Paragraph l(a) of Section XI of this Protocol for resolution. 7. The Testing Party shall bear the costs of replacing any Designated Seismic Station in its territory, including any costs of eliminating the previous Designated Seismic Station and the costs of preparing a new Designated Seismic Station in accordance with Paragraph 6 of this Section. 8. If requested by the Verifying Party, the Testing Party shall provide, according to agreed technical specifications, at each Designated Seismic Station, for the exclusive use of Designated Personnel: (a) a surface vault and pier for the installation of seismic sensors, to be located not less than 100 meters and not more than 200 meters from the seismometers of the Testing Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (b) a borehole for installation of seismic sensors, to be located not less than 100 meters and not more than 200 meters from the seismometers of the Testing Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (c) a working facility with an area not less than 20 square meters, for the installation and operation of equipment by Designated Personnel and situated not less than 75 meters and not more than 125 meters from the seismometers of the Verifying-Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (d) a covered cableway-that will allow Designated Personnel to connect devices in the facilities specified in Sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this paragraph; (e) a facility for the storage of shipping containers and spare parts for the use of Designated Personnel while carrying out their activities at the Designated Seismic Stations; and (f) electrical power from its standard electrical network through converters provided by the Verifying Party or, by agreement of the Parties, by the Testing Party. 9. At each Designated Seismic Station, personnel of the Testing Party shall: (a) have the right to observe the installation and calibration of equipment by Designated Personnel, but at all other times they may be present only at the invitation of the Designated
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Personnel Team Leader and when accompanied by the Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative; not interfere with the activities of Designated Personnel with regard to the installation, calibration, adjustment, and operation of equipment; and provide assistance and logistical support to Designated Personnel in accordance with Paragraph 13 of Section XI of this Protocol, and, by agreement of the Parties, other assistance and logistical support requested by Designated Personnel. 10. In carrying out seismic measurements at the Designated Seismic Stations, Designated Personnel shall have the right to: (a) confirm that the agreed technical specifications for the installation and operation of the equipment have been met during the time periods specified in the coordinated schedule; (b) have access to their equipment from the time of the arrival of Designated Personnel at, and until their departure from, each Designated Seismic Station, unless otherwise provided in this Protocol; (c) install, calibrate, adjust, and continuously operate their equipment; (d) record seismic signals and universal time signals continuously from the time their equipment is installed until two hours after the test, as well as process data to monitor the quality of recorded data and retrieve and copy all recorded data; (e) use their own electrical sources to supply electrical power to their equipment specified in Paragraph 4 of Section VIII of this Protocol; (f) install and operate tamper-detection equipment and observe the cableway and the exterior of the facility in which the seismic sensors are installed; (g) assess the integrity and performance of their equipment and confirm that there has been no interference with seismic measurements and the recording of such measurements; and (h) lock and seal the facilities specified in Paragraphs 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), and 8(e) of this Section with their own seals. 11. The Representative of the Testing Party shall notify, in writing and referenced to Universal Time Coordinated, the Designated Personnel Team Leader at each Designated Seismic Station of the beginning of the period of event readiness and the planned time of the
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test, to the nearest one second, in accordance with Paragraph 13 of Section IV of this Protocol. 12. At each Designated Seismic Station, Designated Personnel shall: (a) upon arrival, provide the Representative of the Testing Party with a description of the recording format and the computer program to enable the Testing Party to read digital data, if digital recordings of data are made; (b) prior to departure, provide the Representative of the Testing Party with the following: (i) a copy of all data recorded by all equipment used by Designated Personnel, on the same medium as that on which these data were recorded; (ii) a graphic representation on a paper medium of the seismic data of the test for a period of time beginning one minute prior to the test and ending 30 minutes following the test; and (iii) the results of the calibration of all seismic equipment, including the amplitude-frequency characteristics of the equipment used to measure and record the seismic data; and (c) prior to their departure, prepare for inspection, storage in accordance with the conditions chosen by the Testing Party, or shipment of their equipment. 13. Designated Personnel shall have the right to acquire photographs of operations and activities related to seismic yield measurement at the Designated Seismic Stations. Photographs shall be taken by personnel of the Testing Party, using their own photographic cameras, or, at the option of the Testing Party, by Designated Personnel using their own photographic cameras. (a) If the Testing Party takes photographs, the following conditions shall be met: (i) the Testing Party shall identify those of its personnel who will take photographs; (ii) photographs shall be taken at the request and under observation of Designated Personnel. If requested by Designated Personnel, such photographs shall show the size of an object being photographed by placing a measuring scale, provided by Designated Personnel, alongside that object during the photographing; and (iii) Designated Personnel shall determine whether
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photographs that were taken conform to those requested, and, if not, repeat photographs shall be taken.
(b) If Designated Personnel take photographs, the following conditions shall be met: (i) the Verifying Party shall identify those of its Designated Personnel who will take photographs; and (ii) photographs shall be taken under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. 14. All activities of Designated Personnel at the Designated Seismic Stations shall be carried out in accordance with the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall arrive at the Designated Seismic Stations in accordance with this schedule, but no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test. Designated Personnel shall depart the Designated Seismic Station within two days following the test. 15. If the planned date of a test is postponed by more than 10 days following receipt of the most recent notification, Designated Personnel shall have the right to leave the Designated Seismic Stations or, if requested by the Representative of the Testing Party, shall depart the Designated Seismic Stations for a mutually agreed location within the territory of the Testing Party or depart the territory of the Testing Party through the point of entry. If Designated Personnel leave the Designated Seismic Stations, they shall have the right to seal their equipment located at the stations. The seals shall not be broken except by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party. Designated Personnel shall have the right to reoccupy the Designated Seismic Stations no less than 72 hours prior to the next planned time of the test. 16. The number of Designated Personnel carrying out seismic measurements at each Designated Seismic Station shall not exceed five. At least one individual fluent in the language of the Testing Party shall be among Designated Personnel at each Designated Seismic Station.
SECTION VIL-ON-SITE
INSPECTION
1. In carrying out on-site inspection, the Verifying Party shall have the right to confirm the validity of the geological, geophysical, and geometrical information provided in accordance with Paragraphs 4 and 9 of Section IV of this Protocol, in accordance with the following procedures: (a) the Testing Party shall provide Designated Personnel, upon
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their arrival at the test site, with the results of any studies of core samples and rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, and the results of logging and geodetic measurements carried out in each emplacement hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, relevant to the geology and geophysics of the emplacement medium, if the Testing Party carried out such studies and measurements; (b) using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, in the emplacement hole, from the end of the hole to the entrance to the hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic, television, and caliper logging, and measurements of the depth and cross section of the emplacement hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of voids, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the holes specified in Sub-paragraph (d)(ii) of this paragraph, and in the emplacement hole in the regions extending from each end of the emplacement hole to a point located 300 meters from the corresponding emplacement point in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic, and caliper logging, and measurements of the length and cross section of the emplacement hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of voids, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (c) all logging and geometrical measurement data obtained by ra~h Designated Personnel in accordance with S ~ b - ~ i r a ~ (b) of this paragraph, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and a copy of these data shall be provided to personnel of the Testing Party prior to the departure from the test site of Designated Personnel who have carried out those measurements. Calibration data shall include information
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needed to confirm the sensitivity of logging equipment under the conditions in which it is used; Designated Personnel shall have the right to receive: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, core samples or rock fragments, at the option of Designated Personnel, extracted from the emplacement hole at 10 depths specified by Designated Personnel, plus one additional depth for every complete 50-meter distance between the uppermost and lowest emplacement points. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each of the specified depths shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, core samples or rock fragments, at the option of Designated Personnel, from the emplacement hole in the regions extending from each end of the emplacement hole to a point located 300 meters from the corresponding emplacement point in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole. Core samples shall be extracted during drilling from each of five holes drilled at stations in the emplacement hole, specified by Designated Personnel. These five stations shall be separated from each other by no less than 15 meters. At each station the hole shall be drilled in a direction specified by Designated Personnel, except that at each station within 65 meters of each emplacement point the Testing Party shall have the right to exclude two 90-degree sectors separated by a sector of 90 degrees. The diameter of each drilled hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters and no more than 0.15 meters, and the depth of each hole shall be no more than the diameter of the emplacement hole at that station. Core samples shall be extracted at locations specified by Designated Personnel along the drilled hole. Rock fragments shall be extracted from the walls of the emplacement hole at five stations specified by Designated Personnel. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each station shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic. centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree. core samples or rock fragments, at the option of Designated Personnel. shall be extracted. in accordance with S u b - ~ a r a e r a ~ h
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation (dl of this paragraph, by personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, or by Designated Personnel, at the option of the Testing Party; (f) if the Testing Party does not extract core samples or rock fragments in accordance with Sub-paragraph (d) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall have the right to do so, using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party; (g) if, prior to arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site, the Testing Party has cased more than a total of 20 meters within any 100-meter segment of a vertical emplacement hole in the region extending from the end of the emplacement hole to a point 300 meters from the planned emplacement point in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole, the Testing Party shall provide an uncased hole with respect to which the Verifying Party shall have the same rights as those specified for an emplacement hole in Sub-paragraphs (b), (d), (e), and (f) of this paragraph. This uncased hole shall be located no more than 50 meters from the emplacement hole and shall have a depth no less than that of the emplacement hole. If personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, extract core samples through coring during the drilling of this uncased hole, the diameter of this hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters. If Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, extract core samples from this uncased hole following drilling, the diameter of this uncased hole shall be no less than 0.3 meters; and (h) Designated Personnel shall have the right to retain core samples and rock fragments specified in Sub-paragraphs (d), (el, (f), and (g) of this paragraph. Any such core samples or rock fragments shall be prepared in accordance with the procedures agreed upon by the Parties for shipment to the territory of the Verifying Party. 2. Designated Personnel shall have the right: (a) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to observe the emplacement of each explosive canister into the emplacement hole from the time the bottom of the canister is last visible above the entrance of the emplacement hole, and to determine by direct measurement the depth of emplacement of the bottom of the canister;
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(b) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to determine by direct measurement the location of each explosive canister in the emplacement hole, and to confirm the presence of at least 10 meters of stemming, as specified in Sub-paragraph (c)(ii) of this paragraph, in any previously stemmed tunnel that had provided access to an explosive canister, using, in a nondestructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (c) to observe stemming of each emplacement hole: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, until a solid concrete plug no less than three meters thick is installed above the explosive canister closest to the entrance to the emplacement hole; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, until access to any explosive canister has been prevented by installation of stemming material for a distance no less than 10 meters, including the installation of a solid concrete plug no less than three meters thick; (d) to have access along agreed routes to the location of the test to carry out activities related to on-site inspection; (e) to have access to their equipment associated with the carrying out of on-site inspection from the time of its transfer to Designated Personnel at the test site, until it is transferred to personnel of the Testing Party in accordance with Paragraph 9(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless otherwise provided in this Protocol; (f) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to have access, for the purpose of visual inspection of the ground surface, to the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters, centered on the entrance to the emplacement hole; and (g) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to have access, for the purpose of visual inspection of the ground surface, to the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters, centered directly above the emplacement point of each explosive canister. 3. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs associated with on-site inspection, which shall be taken in accordance with Paragraph 12 of Section V of this Protocol, of the following: (a) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the emplacement of each explosive canister and the stemming of the emplacement hole specified in Paragraph 2(c)(i) of this Section;
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if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the interior of the emplacement hole within 20 meters of the emplacement point of each explosive canister, and the stemming of the emplacement hole specified in Paragraph 2(c)(ii)of this Section; core samples and rock fragments, extracted in accordance with Paragraphs l(d), l(e), l(f), and l(g) of this Section, the equipment and activities associated with extracting such samples, as well as the interior of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is horizontal, at the stations where core samples and rock fragments were extracted; and with the agreement of the Testing Party, other activities of Designated Personnel directly related to on-site inspection. 4. In no case shall the cumulative delay resulting from the photographic process specified in Paragraph 3 of this Section exceed two hours for each of the operations specified in Paragraph 3 of this Section, unless the Parties otherwise agree, except that stemming shall not be interrupted as a result of the photographic process. 5. All on-site inspection activities shall be carried out in accordance with the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall have the right, within a period not to exceed 15 days, to carry out logging and coring activities specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, unless the Parties otherwise agree and so specify in the coordinated schedule. These activities shall be completed no less than one day prior to the beginning of emplacement of explosives. Upon completion of the activities specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, Designated Personnel shall depart the territory of the Testing Party, except that Designated Personnel who will also participate in the activities specified in Paragraph 2 of this Section shall remain at the test site, if the Parties decide that this is required by the coordinated schedule. Otherwise, Designated Personnel shall depart the territory of the Testing Party or, if agreed by the Parties, they may depart to another point within the territory of the Testing Party. All Designated Personnel who will carry out the activities specified in Paragraph 2 of this Section shall arrive at the test site in accordance with the coordinated schedule, but no less than three days prior to the date specified by the Testing Party for the beginning of these activities. 6. The number of Designated Personnel carrying out the activities specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section shall not exceed 23 at any time. The number of Designated Personnel carrying out activities specified in Paragraphs 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) of this Section shall not exceed five at any time. At least one individual fluent in the language of the Testing Party shall be among Designated Personnel.
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SECTION VII1.-EQUIPMENT 1. Designated Personnel, in carrying out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, shall have the right to bring into the territory of the Testing Party, install, and use: (a) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, part or all of the equipment specified in Paragraph 3 of this Section; (b) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use the seismic yield measurement method, part or all of the equipment specified in Paragraph 4 of this Section; (c) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to carry out on-site inspection, part or all of the equipment specified in Paragraph 5 of this Section; (d) maintenance and support equipment and spare parts necessary for the installation and functioning of equipment of the Verifying Party; (el electrical power supplies, converters, and associated cables; (f) photographic equipment, if the Testing Party does not provide such equipment; (g) locks, seals, and equipment necessary for installing seals of the Verifying Party and checking their integrity; (h) medical and health physics equipment and supplies, personal protective gear, recreational items, and such other items as may be agreed upon by the Parties; (i) office equipment and supplies, including, but not limited to, copying and facsimile machines, and personal computers; (j) closed-circuit television equipment for the purpose of carrying out remote observation by Designated Personnel, in accordance with Paragraph 9(g) of Section V of this Protocol, if the Testing Party does not provide such equipment; and (k) satellite communications equipment, if the Testing Party does not provide satellite communications for Designated Personnel. 2. During the first meeting of the Coordinating Group for a specific test, the Parties shall agree, within 15 days, upon such additional materials, temporary structures, and equipment as may be requested in writing by the Verifying Party and which shall be supplied by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel. Such additional materials, temporary structures, and equipment, with their descriptions and operating instructions, shall be provided to Designated Personnel in accordance with the coordinated schedule.
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3. The list of equipment for the purposes of the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method in accordance with Section V of this Protocol shall include: sensing elements and cables and transducers; electrical cables for transmission of hydrodynamic data from the entrance of each horizontal satellite hole to the entrance of the horizontal emplacement hole with which it is associated; the hydrodynamic recording facilities, with equipment, including computers, for acquiring, recording, and processing data and timing signals, as well as for transmitting and receiving hydrodynamic data and command and monitoring signals between each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility, and the shock mitigation platforms for installing each hydrodynamic recording facility, and with equipment for distributing electrical analogs of the signals arriving from the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party;
trigger conditioner devices for generating a timing reference signal from the electrical cables of the Verifying Party, and terminal devices for converting an optical signal into an electrical signal; the command and monitoring facility, with equipment, including computers, for generating and recording command and monitoring signals, for transmitting and receiving command and monitoring signals between each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility, as well as for retrieving, storing, and processing hydrodynamic data; electrical cables for transmission of hydrodynamic data from the entrance of each vertical satellite hole or from the entrance of each horizontal emplacement hole to the hydrodynamic recording facility of the Verifying Party; electrical cables for the grounding of equipment and for aboveground transmission of electrical power, and electrical and fiber optic cables for above-ground transmission of command and monitoring signals and hydrodynamic data; measuring and calibration instrumentation, support equipment, and equipment for installing and positioning sensing elements and cables and transducers; equipment specified in Paragraph 5 of this Section for
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confirming the characteristics of emplacement holes and satellite holes; and
(j) directional survey and magnetic survey equipment and equipment for determining the distance between emplacement holes and satellite holes, and equipment for detecting voids and determining their relative locations and volumes. 4. The list of equipment for the purposes of the use of the seismic yield measurement method at each Designated Seismic Station in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol shall include: (a) seismic sensors capable of recording ground movements in three orthogonal directions within the frequency range from 0.1 to 10 hertz; (b) equipment for amplifying, filtering, and digitizing the output signals of the seismic sensors; (c) equipment for recording seismic data, and cables for interconnecting the equipment described in this paragraph; (d) equipment for controlling sensors and recorders and for calibrating equipment; (e) means of recording Universal Time Coordinated and referencing the recorded seismic data to it; (f) equipment, including computers, to process data, to monitor the quality of the recorded data, as well as to display, store, and copy data; and (g) equipment, including that using digital algorithms, for assessing the validity of recorded seismic data. 5. The list of equipment for the purposes of carrying out on-site inspection in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol shall include: (a) equipment for obtaining the following logging data: gammagamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, television, acoustic, and caliper, as well as equipment for measuring the depth and cross section of emplacement holes and for measuring the volume of voids; (b) equipment, including computers, for calibrating logging equipment, for monitoring the quality of the recorded data, as well as for recording, displaying, and copying data from logging equipment; (c) equipment for extracting core samples and rock fragments; and
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(d) geologist's field tools and kits, and equipment for the recording of field data. 6. The Testing Party shall have the right, for the purposes of an initial familiarization, to inspect the equipment and every component thereof that the Verifying Party intends to use in carrying out activities related to verification, and thereafter shall have the right to familiarize itself with the equipment and every component thereof that had not previously been provided for this purpose in accordance with this paragraph. For these purposes: (a) the equipment subject to familiarization by the Testing Party shall include: (i) a set of equipment for hydrodynamic yield measurements, specified in Paragraph 3 of this Section; (ii) a set of equipment for seismic yield measurements, specified in Paragraph 4 of this Section; (iii) a set of equipment for on-site inspection, specified in Paragraph 5 of this Section; and (iv) the equipment specified in Paragraphs l(d), l(e), l(0, l(g), l(h), l(i), l(j), and l(k) of this Section; (b) the Verifying Party shall initiate the familiarization process by notifying the Testing Party no less than 30 days prior to the date on which it intends to deliver equipment to the point of entry. This notification shall include a preliminary inventory of the equipment and the planned date of its delivery; (c) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of such equipment, which shall also specify which equipment, in accordance with Paragraph 7(h) of this Section, will be removed from the facilities of the Verifying Party immediately prior to the beginning of the final dry run and immediately prior to the test. At the same time the Verifying Party shall provide instructions on the installation and operation of equipment with functional and technical descriptions and specifications, including electrical diagrams, as well as block diagrams of the system and its components; (d) no more than 45 days following receipt of the equipment, the Testing Party, taking into account the equipment specified for removal in Sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph, shall specify, in writing, to the Verifying Party: (i) the equipment approved by it for use by Designated
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Personnel in accordance with the information provided in accordance with Sub-paragraph (c) of this paragraph; and (ii) the characteristics of any equipment component it finds unacceptable because it is inconsistent with its nonintrusiveness, containment, safety, or security requirements; (e) no more than 50 days following its initial delivery to the point of entry, equipment shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry; and (f) following receipt of the written evaluation provided by the Testing Party in accordance with Sub-paragraph (d)(ii) of this paragraph, the Verifying Party may deliver to the Testing Party, for familiarization in accordance with procedures specified in Sub-paragraphs (b) and ( c ) of this paragraph, modified or replacement equipment to eliminate the unacceptable characteristics specified by the Testing Party, after which the procedures specified in Sub-paragraphs (dl and (el of this paragraph shall be followed with respect to the modified or replacement equipment. 7. The following procedures shall apply to equipment for use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method: (a) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with Sub-paragraph (j) of this paragraph, no less than 60 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall deliver in sealed containers to the point of entry, at its option, either one or two sets of all or part of the equipment specified in Paragraphs l(d), l(e), l(f), l(g), l(h), 1(i), l(k), 3(i), and 3(j) of this Section; (b) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with Sub-paragraph (j) of this paragraph, no less than 45 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall deliver in sealed containers to the point of entry two identical sets of the equipment specified in
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Paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e) of this Section, and, at its option, either one or two sets of the equipment specified in Paragraphs l(j), 3(f), 3(g), and 3(h) of this Section, and, if it has not been delivered in accordance with Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, the equipment specified in Paragraphs l(d), l(e), I(f), I@, l(h), l(i), and l(k) of this Section; (c) these sets of equipment shall have the same components with the same functional and technical descriptions and specifications as the equipment approved by the Testing Party in accordance with Paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section; (d) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment to the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of this equipment, specifying which equipment, in accordance with Sub-paragraph (h) of this paragraph, will be removed from the facilities of the Verifying Party immediately prior to the beginning of the final dry run and immediately prior to the test; (el if the Verifying Party provides two identical sets of equipment: (i) the Testing Party shall choose, at the point of entry, one of the two identical sets of each type of equipment for use by ~ e s i ~ n a t ePersonnel, d with the exception of the equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section, and shall affix its own seals to the sealed containers in which that set of equipment arrived. The set of equipment not chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be subject to inspection by the Testing Party. Seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from equipment chosen by the Testing Party for inspection, in the presence of personnel of both Parties, and thereafter this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party without the presence of Designated Personnel for a period of no more than 30 days, after which time it shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry; (ii) with respect to the equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section, the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, shall remove the seals of the Verifying Party, combine the two sets of equipment, and randomly redistribute the items of each type of such equipment in order to produce two new
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identical sets. The Testing Party shall choose one of these new identical sets for use by Designated Personnel, and both Parties shall affix their own seals to the containers of that set. The set of equipment not chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be subject to inspection by the Testing Party in accordance with procedures specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph; (iii) if the Verifying Party has delivered the equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section with individual gas-blocking devices installed in the cables, Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall cut each cable at points three meters on either side of each gas-blocking device and shall place these gas-blocking devices and their attached cable segments in separate containers. If the Verifying Party delivered this equipment without individual gasblocking devices installed, Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall cut a three-meter segment from each end of each cable and shall place these segments in separate containers. Personnel of each Party, under observation of personnel of the other Party, shall seal these separate containers of cable segments or gas-blocking devices with cable segments. The remainder of this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e)(i) of this paragraph, except that during inspection of this equipment the Testing Party may remove up to 150 meters of cable from the set chosen for inspection, in no more segments than twice the number of cables in that set; the set of equipment not chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be subject to inspection by the Testing Party; (iv) the Testing Party shall ensure protection of the equipment chosen by it for use by Designated Personnel and the sealed containers specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph while they are in its territory, and shall . transport this equipment to the test site in such a manner as to ensure that it is delivered to Designated Personnel in the same condition as that in which it was received by the Testing Party. Prior to shipment to the test site, and from the time of its arrival at the test site until the time
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of its transfer to Designated Personnel, this equipment shall be kept sealed, in storage under conditions agreed upon by the Parties; (v) personnel of the Testing Party shall consult with Designated Personnel regarding plans and schedule of shipment of the equipment no less than 48 hours prior to its shipment. Designated Personnel shall have the right to verify the integrity of their seals, to observe their equipment, and to accompany it from the point of entry to the test site. The equipment specified in Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel for use at the test site no less than 25 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The equipment specified in Sub-paragraph (b)of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at the test site for use no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Personnel of each Party shall remove their seals from the equipment under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party; (vi) seals affixed to the equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), and 3(d) of this Section shall not be removed prior to either the conduct of pressure tests and nondestructive inspections, in accordance with Subparagraphs (e)(vii) and (e)(viii) of this paragraph, or preparation for installation of such equipment, at which time personnel of each Party shall remove their seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party. Thereafter, personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe all activities of Designated Personnel related to this equipment; (vii) the Testing Party shall have the right to conduct pressure tests on the portions of cables with individual gas-
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blocking devices specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph, in accordance with its technical operations and practices and under observation of Designated Personnel, to ensure that the individual gas-blocking devices meet the containment requirements of the Testing Party. These pressure tests shall be conducted at a time specified by the Testing Party, at which time personnel of each Party shall verify the integrity of their seals on the containers specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph and shall remove their seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party. The Testing Party shall also have the right to conduct non-destructive inspections, under observation of Designated Personnel, on the set of cables chosen for use, to ensure that the cables chosen for use are identical in construction to those chosen for inspection. Such non-destructive inspections shall be carried out at a time specified by the Testing Party. All tests and non-destructive inspections related to the containment requirements of the Testing Party shall be completed, and the results communicated to the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date for the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. If all of the individual gas-blocking devices removed from cables in the set chosen for inspection, in accordance with Sub-paragraph (e)(iii)of this paragraph, successfully meet the containment requirements, and if cables chosen for use are found to be identical in construction to those chosen for inspection, then the set chosen for use shall be sealed by the seals of both Parties, which shall not be removed prior to preparation for installation of such equipment. Following the pressure tests, the Testing Party shall have the right to retain the individual gas-blocking devices with their attached cable segments from the set chosen for inspection; (viii) if the Verifying Party delivered the equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section without individual gas-blocking devices installed in the cables, the Testing Party shall have the right to conduct pressure tests, in accordance with its technical operations and practices, to ensure that the gas-blocking properties of these cables meet the containment requirements of the
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Encyclopaedin o f Nuclear Arms Control t3 Non-~roliferation Testing Party. These tests shall be performed under observation of Designated Personnel on the segments of cables specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(iii)of this paragraph as well as on a three-meter segment of each cable of the set chosen for use, removed by Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, from the end of the cable that will extend to the ground surface. These pressure tests shall be conducted at a time specified by the Testing Party, at which time personnel of each Party shall verify the integrity of their seals on the containers specified in Sub-paragraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph, as well as on the containers with the set of equipment chosen for use, specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), and shall remove their seals under observation of personnel of the other Party. All tests related to the containment requirements of the Testing Party shall be completed, and the results communicated to the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date for the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. If all of the cable segments removed from the set chosen for use and the set chosen for inspection meet the containment requirements of the Testing Party, then the set chosen for use shall be sealed by the seals of both Parties, which shall not be removed prior to preparation for installation of such equipment and its use in hydrodynamic yield measurements; and (ix) if, within one day following the completion of testing and non-destructive inspections specified in Subparagraphs (e)(vii) and (e)(viii) of this paragraph, the Verifying Party so requests, the Testing Party shall provide cables that meet its containment requirements. The Testing Party shall deliver these cables to Designated Personnel at the test site no more than two days following the request of the Verifying Party but no less than seven days prior to the planned date for the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (f) if the Verifying Party provides only one set of equipment: (i) upon arrival of the equipment at the point of entry, the seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from this equipment in the presence of personnel of both Parties,
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after which the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect this equipment for no more than 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel; (ii) upon completion of the inspection, the Testing Party shall
transport all approved equipment to the test site and deliver it, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel. The equipment specified in Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel no less than 25 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The equipment specified in Sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at the test site no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (iii) within five days following delivery of equipment to Designated Personnel, the Designated Personnel Team Leader shall certify, in writing, to the Representative of the Testing Party that the equipment delivered to the test site is in working condition or, in the event of damage to the equipment, shall report such damage in writing; (g) upon completion of inspection of the equipment, in accordance with Sub-paragraphs (e)(i) and (f)(i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall inform the Verifying Party, in writing, of any equipment that does not conform to that approved previously in accordance with Paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section and shall specify the non-conforming characteristics of any such equipment or component thereof. Prior to shipment to the test site, in the case of equipment provided in one set, or at the time of delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site of the set of equipment chosen for use, in the case of equipment provided in two sets, the equipment that does not conform to that approved previously shall be removed by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and placed under seals of both Parties in storage at a location chosen by the Testing Party. Any such equipment shall be returned by the Testing Party to Designated Personnel at the point of entry following completion of the activity related to verification for which it was originally provided. Except as
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otherwise provided in this Protocol, equipment approved by the Testing Party shall remain under the exclusive control of Designated Personnel from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site until it is transferred to the Testing Party in accordance with Sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph; (h) immediately prior to the beginning of the final dry run, Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall remove from each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility all items specified in accordance with Paragraph 6(c) of this Section for removal at that time. These items shall be placed under the seals of both Parties and stored at a location chosen by the Testing Party. Upon departure of personnel of both Parties from each hydrodynamic recording facility immediately prior to the test, all remaining maintenance and support equipment and spare parts shall be removed by Designated Personnel, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (i) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect equipment after it has been used for carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements, for a period of 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel. For these purposes: (i) the equipment used for carrying out activities specified in Paragraphs 4(g), 5(c), and 5(f) or 5(g) or 5(h), and 6(b), 6(f), 7(c), and 7(f) or 7(g) or 7(h) of Section V of this Protocol shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all these activities, unless the Parties agree that equipment for any specific activity may be transferred upon completion of that activity; (ii) all other equipment, except that specified in Paragraphs l(e), l(g), l(h), l(i), and l(k) of this Section, shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all activities specified in Paragraphs 9(m) and 14(b) of Section V of this Protocol; (iii) equipment specified in Paragraphs 1(e), I (g), l(h), l(i), and l(k) of this Section shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all activities of Designated Personnel specified in Section V of this Protocol; and (iv) during inspection of equipment specified in Paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of this Section, after it has been used for
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carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements, the Testing Party shall have the right to remove and retain no more than 150 meters of those cables, in no more segments than twice the number of cables in each set, with the exception of the fiber optic cables and the electrical cables for above-ground transmission of electrical power; (j) the Verifying Party shall have the right to store for subsequent use part or all of its equipment in the territory of the Testing Party. Storage shall be under conditions agreed upon by the Parties, at a location chosen by the Testing Party and under its protection; (k) with respect to inventory and shipment or storage of this equipment, the following procedures, at the option of the Verifying Party, shall be applied: (i) upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party for inspection, in accordance with Sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall provide complete inventories of equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped to their territory. These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories. Within five days following completion of inspection of equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at the point of entry, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment; or (ii) within five days following completion of inspection of equipment in accordance with Sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at a location chosen by the Testing Party, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment. Designated Personnel shall examine, inventory, and pack their equipment in containers. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe these activities. Within five days following receipt of their equipment, Designated Personnel shall transfer to the Testing Party
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the packed containers, along with inventories of the equipment to be stored and the equipment to be shipped. These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories. Within 10 days following receipt of the equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall deliver it to the point of entry; and (1) if stored equipment is to be used for activities related to verification of a subsequent test, it shall be subject to further inspection only after such use. The equipment specified in Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be delivered, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel for use at the test site no less than 25 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The equipment specified in Sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph shall be delivered, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel at the test site no later than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 8. The following procedures shall apply to equipment for use of the seismic yield measurement method: (a) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with Sub-paragraph (h) of this paragraph, no less than 45 days prior to the planned date of the test, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall deliver in sealed containers to the point of entry, at its option, either one or two sets of all or part of the equipment specified in Paragraphs l(d), l(e), 103, l(g), I(h), l(i), and 4 of this Section; (b) these sets of equipment shall have the same components with the same functional and technical descriptions and specifications as the equipment approved by the Testing Party in accordance
with Paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section; (c) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment to the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of this equipment; (d) if the Verifying Party provides two identical sets of equipment:
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(i) the Testing Party shall choose, at the point of entry, one of the two identical sets of each type of equipment for use by Designated Personnel, and shall affix its own seals to the sealed containers in which that set of equipment arrived; (ii) the Testing Party shall ensure protection of this equipment while it is in its territory, and shall transport this equipment to the Designated Seismic Stations in such a manner as to ensure that it is delivered to Designated Personnel in the same condition as that in which it was received by the Testing Party. Prior to shipment to the Designated Seismic Stations, and from the time of its arrival at the Designated Seismic Stations until the time of its transfer to Designated Personnel, the set of equipment chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be kept sealed, in storage under conditions agreed upon by the Parties; (iii) personnel of the Testing Party shall consult with Designated Personnel regarding plans and schedule of shipment of the equipment no less than 48 hours prior to its shipment. Designated Personnel shall have the right to verify the integrity of their seals, to observe their equipment, and to accompany it from the point of entry to the Designated Seismic Stations. This equipment shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at Designated Seismic Stations for installation and use no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test. Personnel of each Party shall remove their seals from the equipment under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party; and (iv) seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from equipment chosen by the Testing Party for inspection, in the presence of personnel of both Parties, and thereafter this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party without the presence of Designated Personnel for a period of no more than 30 days, after which time it shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry;
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control b kon-proliferation (e) if the Verifying Party provides only one set of equipment: (i) upon arrival of the equipment at the point of entry, the seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from this equipment in the presence of personnel of both Parties, after which the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect this equipment for no more than 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel; (ii) upon completion of the inspection, the Testing Party shall transport all approved equipment to the Designated Seismic Stations and deliver it, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (iii) within three days following delivery of the equipment to Designated Personnel, the Designated Personnel Team Leader shall certify in writing to the Representative of the Testing Party that the equipment delivered to the Designated Seismic Station is in working condition or, in the event of damage to the equipment, shall report such damage in writing; (f) upon completion of inspection of the equipment, in accordance with Sub-paragraphs (d)(iv) and (e)(i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall inform the Verifying Party, in writing, of any equipment that does not conform to that approved previously in accordance with Paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section .and shall specify the non-conforming characteristics of any such equipment or component thereof. Prior to shipment to the Designated Seismic Station, in the case of equipment provided in one set, or at the time of delivery to Designated Personnel at the Designated Seismic Station of the set of equipment chosen for use, in the case of equipment provided in two sets, the equipment that does not conform to that approved previously shall be removed by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and placed under seals of both Parties in storage at a location chosen by the Testing Party. Any such equipment shall be returned by the Testing Party to Designated Personnel at the point of entry following completion of the activity related to verification for which it was originally provided. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, equipment approved by the Testing Party shall remain under the exclusive control of Designated Personnel from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel
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at a Designated Seismic Station until it is transferred to the Testing Party in accordance with Sub-paragraphs (g) and (j) of this paragraph; (g) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect equipment after it has been used for activities related to seismic yield measurements for a period of 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel. If the Testing Party decides to inspect that equipment, it shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of activities specified in Section VI of this Protocol; (h) the Verifying Party shall have the right to store for subsequent use part or all of its equipment in the territory of the Testing Party. Storage shall be under conditions agreed upon by the Parties, at a location chosen by the Testing Party and under its protection; (i) if the Testing Party inspects the equipment, with respect to inventory and shipment or storage of this equipment, the following procedures, at the option of the Verifying Party, shall be applied: (i) upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party for inspection in accordance with Sub-paragraph (g) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall provide complete inventories of equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped to their territory. These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories. Within five days following completion of inspection of equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at the point of entry, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment; or (ii) within five days following completion of inspection of equipment in accordance with Sub-paragraph (g) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at a location chosen by the Testing Party in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment. Designated Personnel shall examine, inventory, and pack
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their equipment in containers. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe these activities. Within five days following receipt of their equipment, Designated Personnel shall transfer to the Testing Party the packed containers, along with inventories of the equipment to be stored and the equipment to be shipped. These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories. Within 10 days following receipt of equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall deliver it to the point of entry; (j) if the Testing Party chooses not to inspect the equipment upon completion of activities related to seismic yield measurements, Designated Personnel shall prepare the equipment for storage or shipment to their territory prior to departure from the Designated Seismic Station and, upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party, shall provide complete inventories of equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped. These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories. Equipment to be shipped shall be returned to the Verifying Party at the point of entry within 10 days following departure of Designated Personnel from the Designated Seismic Station. Equipment to be stored shall be prepared for storage, in accordance with agreed procedures for the conditions of storage chosen by the Testing Party; and (k) if stored equipment is to be used for activities related to verification of a subsequent test, it shall be subject to further inspection only after such use. This equipment shall be delivered, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel for use at the Designated Seismic Stations no later than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 9. The following procedures shall apply to equipment for carrying out on-site inspection: (a) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with Sub-paragraph (h) of this paragraph, no less than 55 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying
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Party shall deliver in sealed containers to the point of entry, at its option, either one or two sets of all or part of the equipment specified in Paragraphs I (d), 1(e), 1(f), I (g), l(h), l(i), l(k), and 5 of this Section; (b) these sets of equipment shall have the same components with the same functional and technical descriptions and specifications as the equipment approved by the Testing Party in accordance with Paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section; (c) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment to the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of this equipment; (d) if the Verifying Party provides two identical sets of equipment: (i) the Testing Party shall choose, at the point of entry, one of the two identical sets of each type of equipment for use by Designated Personnel, and shall affix its own seals to the sealed containers in which that set of equipment arrived; (ii) the Testing Party shall ensure protection of this equipment while it is in its territory, and shall transport this equipment to the test site in such a manner as to ensure that it is delivered to Designated Personnel in the same condition as that in which it was received by the Testing Party. Prior to shipment to the test site, and from the time of its arrival at the test site until the time of its transfer to Designated Personnel, the set of equipment chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be kept sealed, in storage under condition: agreed upon by the Parties; (iii) personnel of the Testing Party shall consult with Designated Personnel reiarding plans and schedule of shipment of the equipment no less than 48 hours prior to its shipment. Designated Personnel shall have the right to verify the integrity of their seals, to observe their equipment, and to accompany it from the point of entry to the test site. This equipment shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at the test site no less than 20 days before the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Personnel of each Party shall remove their seals from the equipment under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall
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have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party; and (iv) seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from equipment chosen by the Testing Party for inspection, in the presence of personnel of both Parties, and thereafter this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party without the presence of Designated Personnel for a period of no more than 30 days, after which time it shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry; (el if the Verifying Party provides only one set of equipment: (i) upon arrival of the equipment at the point of entry, the seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from this equipment in the presence of personnel of both Parties, after which the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect this equipment for no more than 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel; (ii) upon completion of the inspection, the Testing Party shall transport all approved equipment to the test site and deliver it, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel no less than 20 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (iii) within five days following delivery of equipment to Designated Personnel, the Designated Personnel Team Leader shall certify, in writing, to the Representative of the Testing Party that the equipment delivered to the test site is in working condition or, in the event of damage to the equipment, shall report such damage in writing; (f) upon completion of inspection of the equipment in accordance with Sub-paragraphs (d)(iv) and (e)(i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall inform the Verifying Party, in writing, of any equipment that does not conform to that approved previously in accordance with Paragraph 6(d)(i)of this Section and shall specify the non-conforming characteristics of any such equipment or component thereof. Prior to shipment to the test site, in the case of equipment provided in one set, or at the time of delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site of the set of equipment chosen for use, in the case of equipment provided in two sets, the equipment that does not conform to
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that approved previously shall be removed by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and placed under seals of both Parties in storage at a location chosen by the Testing Party. Any such equipment shall be returned by the Testing Party to Designated Personnel at the point of entry, following completion of the activity related to verification for which it was originally provided. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, equipment approved by the Testing Party shall remain under the exclusive control of Designated Personnel from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site until it is transferred to the Testing Party in accordance with Sub-paragraph (g) of this paragraph; (g) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect equipment after it has been used for carrying out activities related to on-site inspection, for a period of 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel. For these purposes: (i) the equipment used for carrying out activities specified in Paragraphs l(b), l(c), l(e), l(f), l(g), and I (h) bf Section VII of this Protocol shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all these activities, unless the Parties agree that equipment for any specific activity may be transferred upon completion of that activity; and (ii) all other equipment shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all activities of Designated Personnel specified in Section VII of this Protocol; (h) the Verifying Party shall have the right to store for subsequent use part or all of its equipment in the territory of the Testing Party. Storage shall be under conditions agreed by the Parties, at a location chosen by the Testing Party and under its protection; (i) with respect to inventory and shipment or storage of this equipment, the following procedures, at the option of the Verifying Party, shall be applied: (i) upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party for inspection in accordance with Sub-paragraph (g) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall provide complete inventories of equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped to their territory. These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom
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SECTION 1X.-DESIGNATED PERSONNEL AND TRANSPORT PERSONNEL 1. No later than 10 days following entry into force of the Treaty each Party shall provide the other Party with a list of its proposed Designated Personnel who will carry out activities in accordance with this Protocol and a list of its proposed Transport Personnel who will
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provide transportation for these Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party. These lists shall contain name, date of birth, and sex of each individual of its proposed Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel. The list of Designated Personnel shall at no time include more than 300 individuals, and the list of Transport Personnel shall at no time include more than 200 individuals. 2. Each Party shall review the list of Designated Personnel and the list of Transport Personnel proposed by the other Party. If the Party reviewing a list determines that an individual included thereon is acceptable to it, it shall so inform the Party providing the list within 20 days following receipt of the list, and such an individual shall be deemed accepted. If the Party reviewing a list determines that an individual included thereon is not acceptable to it, it shall so inform the Party providing the list of its objection within 20 days following receipt of the list, and such an individual shall be deemed unaccepted and shall be deleted from the list. 3. Each Party may propose the addition or substitution of individuals on its list of Designated Personnel or its list of Transport Personnel at any time, who shall be designated in the same manner as provided in Paragraph 2 of this Section with regard to the initial lists. Annually, no mote than 100 individuals from the list of Designated Personnel shall be subject to substitution. This limitation shall not apply to the replacement of individuals due to permanent physical incapacity or death, or to deletion of an individual from the list of Designated Personnel in accordance with Paragraph 5 of this Section. Replacement of an individual due to permanent physical incapacity, death or deletion from the list shall be accomplished in the same manner as provided in Paragraph 2 of this Section. 4. Following receipt of the initial list of Designated Personnel or the initial list of Transport Personnel or of subsequent changes thereto, the Party receiving such information shall prepare for the issuance of such visas and other documents as may be required to ensure that each individual on the list of Designated ,Personnel or the list of Transport Personnel who has been accepted may enter and remain in its territory for the purpose of carrying out activities in accordance with this Protocol. Such visas and documents shall be provided by the Testing Party only to the individuals whose names are included in the notification provided by the Verifying Party, in accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section X of this Protocol, upon receipt of such notification. Such visas and documents shall be valid for multiple entry throughout the period required for Designated Personnel to carry out their activities related to verification of a specific test.
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5. If a Party determines that an individual included on the list of Designated Personnel or the list of Transport Personnel of the other Party has violated the provisions of this Protocol or has ever committed a criminal offense in its territory, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense, or has ever been expelled from its territory, the Party making such a determination shall notify the other Party of its objection to the continued inclusion of this individual on the list. If at that time this individual is present in the territory of the Party raising the objection, then the other Party shall immediately recall this individual from the territory of the Party raising this objection and immediately thereafter delete that individual from the list of Designated Personnel or from the list of Transport Personnel. 6. Designated Personnel with their personal baggage and equipment of the Verifying Party shall be permitted to enter the territory of the Testing Party at the designated point of entry, to remain in that territory, and to exit that territory through the designated point of entry. 7. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities for the entire period they are in the territory of the Testing Party and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions as Designated Personnel or Transport Personnel: Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961; living and working quarters occupied by Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the quarters of missions and diplomatic agents pursuant to Articles 22 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; archives, documents, papers, and correspondence of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall enjoy the inviolability accorded the archives, documents, papers, and correspondence of missions and diplomatic agents pursuant to Articles 24 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft or other transport vehicles of the Verifying Party shall be inviolable; Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to Paragraphs 1,2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
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on Diplomatic Relations. Immunity from jurisdiction of Designated Personnel or Transport Personnel may be waived by the Verifying Party in those cases in which it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol. Waiver must always be express; (el Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out their activities in accordance with this OProtocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (f) living and working quarters occupied by Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded mission premises pursuant to Article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (g) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the Testing Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations. 8. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit in the territory of the Testing Party. 9. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the Testing Party and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that Party. 10. If the Testing Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in Paragraph 7 of this Section, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.
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SECTION X.-ENTRY, TRANSPORT, FOOD, LODGING, AND PROVISION OF SERVICES FOR DESIGNATED PERSONNEL AND TRANSPORT PERSONNEL 1. The Testing Party shall ensure Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel access to its territory for the purposes of carrying out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, and shall provide these personnel with such other assistance as may be necessary to enable them to carry out these activities. Designated Personnel shall have the right to be present at the test site and at Designated Seismic Stations in the territory of the Testing Party to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol at such times and for such periods as required to carry out these activities. The specific times and periods for carrying out such activities shall be specified in the coordinated schedule. . 2. No less than 20 days prior to the planned date of amval of its Designated Personnel at the point of entry for participation in activities related to verification of a specific test, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party with: (a) a list of the names of the Designated Personnel with their passports and documentation, who will carry out activities related to verification of a specific test; (b) the names of the Designated Personnel Team Leader or Leaders and the names of Designated Personnel who will escort equipment of the Verifying Party to the test site or each Designated Seismic Station; (c) confirmation of the point of entry to be used; (d) the planned date and the estimated time of arrival of these Designated Personnel at the point of entry; and (el the mode of transport to be used. No more than 15 days following receipt of the list and passports and documentation specified in Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall return those passports to the Verifying Party with the visas and all necessary documents specified in Paragraph 4 of Section IX of this Protocol. 3. No less than 20 days prior to the planned date of arrival of Transport Personnel at the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party with the number of Transport Personnel. No less than three days prior to the planned date of arrival of Transport Personnel, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party with a list of the names of those Transport Personnel with their passports and
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documentation. No less than one day prior to the planned date of arrival of Transport Personnel, the Testing Party shall return those passports to the Verifying Party with the visas and all necessary documents specified in Paragraph 4 of Section IX of this Protocol. 4. The number of Designated Personnel present at a test site or Designated Seismic Station to carry out activities related to verification of a specific test shall be governed by the relevant restrictions specified in Sections V, VI, and VII of this Protocol. Designated Personnel shall leave the test site or Designated Seismic Station upon completion of activities related to verification of a specific test as specified in the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel who have been present at the test site for a period of six consecutive weeks or more may be replaced by individuals included on the list submitted in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol. Designated Personnel who have not been present at the test site for a period of six consecutive weeks may be replaced only for reasons of injury, illness, or family emergency, and shall be replaced by individuals included on the list submitted in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol. 5. If a transport aircraft other than a regularly scheduled commercial aircraft is used by the Verifying Party for transportation between the territory of the Verifying Party and the point of entry, its flight path shall be along airways agreed upon by the Parties, and its flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft, including in the remarks section of the flight plan a confirmation that the appropriate clearance has been obtained. The Testing Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for aircraft of the Verifying Party at the point of entry. The Verifying Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing. 6. The Testing Party shall ensure that all necessary clearances or approvals are granted so as to enable Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party to arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival date and time. 7. The Testing Party shall assist Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel and their baggage in passage through customs without undue delay. The Testing Party shall provide transportation between the point of entry and the test site or the Designated Seismic Stations for Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party, so as to enable such personnel to exercise their rights and functions in the time periods provided in this Protocol and specified in the coordinated schedule.
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8. The Testing Party shall have the right to assign its personnel to escort Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel while they are in its territory. 9. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, movement and travel of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel in the territory of the Testing Party, from the time of their arrival at tfie point of entry until their departure from the territory of the Testing Party at the point of entry, shall be subject to the authorization of the Testing Party. 10. During the period Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel are in the territory of the Testing Party, the Testing Party shall provide food, hotel-like living accommodations, working facilities, transportation, and medical services for such personnel, including access to its medical facilities for out-patient treatment and in-patient treatment, and also secure places for storing equipment. If the Verifying Party desires to provide its own food for its Designated Personnel and its Transport Personnel during their stay in the territory of the Testing Party, the Testing Party shall provide such assistance as may be necessary for such food to arrive at the appropriate locations. Designated Personnel shall have the use of a complete kitchen at all times during their stay at the test site and at each Designated Seismic Station. 11. The Verifying Party shall have the right to include among its Designated Personnel a medical specialist, who shall be allowed to bring medications, medical instruments, and portable medical equipment agreed upon by the Parties. If Designated Personnel are treated in a medical facility of the Testing Party, the medical specialist shall have the right to consult on the recommended treatment and monitor the course of medical treatment at all times. The medical specialist of the Verifying Party shall have the right to require the Testing Party to provide emergency evacuation of any individual of the Designated Personnel who is ill or has suffered an accident to a mutually agreed medical facility in the territory of the Testing Party or to the point of entry for emergency medical evacuation by the Verifying Party. Designated Personnel shall have the right to refuse any treatment prescribed by medical personnel of the Testing Party, and in this case the Testing Party shall not be responsible for any consequences of such refusal. Such refusal must always be express. 12. The Testing Party shall provide the Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative at all times access to: (a) telephone communications between the embassy of the Verifying Party in the territory of the Testing Party and the working facilities and living accommodations of Designated
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Personnel at each test site and each Designated Seismic Station; and (b) an international telephone network from their working facilities and living accommodations at each test site and each Designated Seismic Station. 13. The Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative shall have the right to use at all times satellite communications to ensure communications via the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) commercial satellite system, or a system of equivalent performance, between each test site in the territory of the Testing Party and the telephone communications system of the Verifying Party. If the Testing Party does not provide such communications, Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own equipment specified in Paragraph l(k) of Section VIII of this Protocol. In this case, installation and alignment of all such equipment shall be done jointly. All equipment of this system, except the remote control unit, shall be locked and placed under seals of both Parties, and personnel of neither Party shall have access to this equipment except under observation of personnel of the other Party. Only Designated Personnel shall use the remote control unit. If the Verifying Party provides satellite communications equipment, personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right, under observation of Designated Personnel, to make the following modifications provided they do not degrade the quality of the communications: (a) install bandpass filters, to limit the frequency range, in the antenna signal transmission and reception lines; (b) modify the remote control unit to prevent manual tuning; and (c) modify the satellite communications equipment to allow the Testing Party to monitor all transmissions. 14. The Testing Party shall provide the following for use by Designated Personnel: (a) portable radios for communications at the test location; (b) telephones for communications between work areas and between work areas and living quarters of Designated Personnel at the test site or Designated Seismic Stations; and (c) access to Testing Party-controlled vehicle-mounted radios for communications with the test location, work areas, or living quarters while Designated Personnel are in transit at the test site. 15. At the test site and each Designated Seismic Station, Designated
112 Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6. Non-proliferation Personnel shall observe all safety rules and regulations applicable to the personnel of the Testing Party, as well as all those additional restrictions with regard to access and movement as may be established by the Testing Party. Designated Personnel shall have access only to the areas in which they will directly exercise their rights and functions in accordance with Sections V, VI, VII, and VIII of this Protocol. The areas at the test site or the Designated Seismic Station in which Designated Personnel shall have freedom of movement during the conduct of a specific test without the mandatory escort of personnel of the Testing Party shall be marked on the diagrams of the test site or the Designated Seismic Stations provided to the Verifying Party at the first meeting of the Coordinating Group specified in Paragraph 10 of Section XI of this Protocol. In all other cases, the permission of the Representative of the Testing Party, and escort by, personnel of the Testing Party shall be required. 16. Designated Personnel shall not be given or seek access by physical, visual, or technical means to the interior of any explosive canister, to documentary or other information descriptive of the design of an explosive, or to equipment for control and firing of an explosive. The Testing Party shall not locate documentary or other information descriptive of the design of an explosive in such ways as to impede Designated Personnel in carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol. 17. Possession or use by Designated Personnel of firearms, ammunition, or substances containing narcotics, with the exception of those prescribed by a physician, in the territory of the Testing Party is prohibited. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, possession or use by Designated Personnel of the following items is also prohibited at the test site or a Designated Seismic Station: (a) photographic and video recording equipment; (b) radio transmitters or receivers other than those supplied by the Testing Party; (c) sound recorders; (d) teleoptical devices; and (e) personal computers. 18. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol or as may be approved in writing by the Representative of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel are prohibited from removing any of the following items from the test site or a Designated Seismic Station: (a) soil samples;
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plant samples; water and air samples; animals; metal objects; and rock samples or debris. 19. Designated Personnel shall have the right to remove from the territory of the Testing Party all items, including data, obtained in accordance with this Protocol. 20. The Testing Party shall have the right to inspect, in the presence of Designated Personnel, baggage and personal possessions of Designated Personnel upon their entry to or departure from the test site or Designated Seismic Stations. The Testing Party shall also have the right to inspect, in the presence of Designated Personnel, any packages received by Designated Personnel during their stay at the test site or Designated Seismic Stations or prepared for shipment by Designated Personnel from the test site or Designated Seismic Stations. 21. Except as provided in Paragraphs 22, 23, and 24 of this Section or unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall bear all costs of verification activities of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel set forth in the coordinated schedule, including costs for use or consumption of materials, equipment, transportation, food, living and working facilities, medical assistance, communications, and services requested by and provided to the Verifying Party. The Verifying Party shall also bear the costs associated with transport aircraft in accordance with Paragraph 5 of this Section. 22. The Testing Party shall bear all costs related to the preparation of its test sites, Designated Seismic Stations, and equipment storage facilities within its territory for the use of Designated Personnel as provided for in this Protocol. 23. With respect to a test of non-standard configuration: (a) the Testing Party shall bear the costs of the activities specified in Paragraph 6(a) of Section V of this Protocol that are carried out with respect to the second and third satellite holes, if requested by the Verifying Party in accordance with Paragraph 11 of Section XI of this Protocol; and (b) the Testing Party shall bear the costs related to the conduct of a test identified by it as a reference test to satisfy the request of the Verifying Party in accordance with Paragraph 11 of Section XI of this Protocol.
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24. The Testing Party shall bear all costs related to transportation of equipment of the Verifying Party between: (a) the point of entry and the location at which such equipment is subject to familiarization or inspection by the Testing Party in accordance with Section VIII of this Protocol; (b) the location for familiarization or inspection by the Testing Party and the location at which such equipment is returned to the Verifying Party; (c) the location at which such equipment is turned over to the Testing Party for storage and the storage location; and (d) the storage location and the location at which such equipment is returned to the Verifying Party. 25. If the Verifying Party decides not to carry out activities related to verification that it specified in its initial notification, after technical and logistical support for these activities has been agreed upon in the Coordinating Group in accordance with Paragraph 12 of Section XI of this Protocol, the Verifying Party shall reimburse the Testing Party for the costs of such agreed technical and logistical support incurred by the Testing Party prior to receipt of notification that the Verifying Party will not carry out the initially declared activities related to verification.
SECTION XI.-PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION
1. For the purposes of implementation of the Treaty and this Protocol, the Parties shall, immediately following entry into force of the Treaty, establish a Bilateral Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they shall meet, at the request of either Party, to: (a) consider any questions relating to implementation of the Treaty and this Protocol; (b) consider any suggestions for amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol; (c) consider any technical or administrative changes to this Protocol of the nature provided in Paragraph 2, 3, or 4 of this Section; (d) consider any questions relating to compliance with the Treaty and this Protocol; (e) consider any new verification technologies having a bearing on the Treaty or this Protocol; (f) seek agreement on those matters specified in this Protocol as requiring agreement of the Parties; and (g) seek agreement on questions related to costs for verification
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activities and procedures for reciprocal payments of such costs between the Parties. 2. If the Parties determine that the periods of time specified with respect to notifications in Section IV of this Protocol create practical difficulties and do not serve the interest of effective implementation of this Protocol, they may change such periods of time by agreement in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Such agreed changes shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol. 3. If the Parties determine that, in the interest of effective implementation of this Protocol, the arrangements set forth in Section X of this Protocol regarding transportation, lodging, food, and services require modification, the provisions of Section X of this Protocol may be changed by agreement of the Parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Such agreed changes shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol. 4. If the Parties determine that modifications to verification procedures, including modifications resulting from improvements in existing technologies, would enhance effective implementation of the basic aims of the Treaty or this Protocol, they may, in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, agree upon such modifications. Such agreed modifications shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol. 5. The Parties, through consultation, shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, regulations to govern the operations of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 6. For each test with respect to which activities related to verification are carried out in accordance with this Protocol, the Parties shall establish a Coordinating Group of the Bilateral Consultative Commission that shall be responsible for coordinating the activities of the Verifying Party with the activities of the Testing Party. The Bilateral Consultative Commission may, as necessary, establish and amend procedures governing the activities of the Coordinating Group. 7. The Coordinating Group shall operate throughout the entire period of preparing and carrying out activities related to verification of a specific test, until departure of Designated Personnel from the territory of the Testing Party. 8. All members of the Coordinating Group from the Verifying Party shall be drawn from the list of Designated Personnel. The Representative of the Verifying Party to the Coordinating Group shall be the Principal Designated Personnel Team Leader, whose name shall be provided simultaneously with the notification of intent to carry out activities
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related to verification of a specific test. Within 15 days following receipt of this notification, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the name of its Representative to the Coordinating Group. 9. The first meeting of the Coordinating Group shall be convened in the capital of the Testing Party within 25 days following notification by the Verifying Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification of a specific test. Thereafter, the Coordinating Group shall meet at the request of either Party. 10. On the first day of the first meeting of the Coordinating Group, the Testing Party shall present a list, including times and durations, of all activities it intends to carry out that could affect the rights of the Verifying Party provided in this Protocol with respect to activities declared by it and related to verification of a specific test. If the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent: (a) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method or carry out an on-site inspection, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the following information: (i) the number of emplacement holes for the specific test; (ii) with respect to each emplacement hole, whether, for the purposes of this Protocol, the emplacement hole shall be deemed vertical or horizontal; and (iii) the number of explosions included in the test and the location of each planned end of each emplacement hole and of the corresponding planned emplacement point, to the nearest 10 meters; (b) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of standard configuration that includes more than one explosion, the Testing Party shall provide, in addition to the information specified in Sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, the following information: (i) whether any explosion has a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, and, if so, which explosion or explosions; and (ii) whether any explosion has a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons, and, if so, which explosion or explosions; and (c) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration, the Testing Party shall provide the information specified in Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, as well as the following information: (i) a detailed description, including dimensions, of each
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emplacement hole and any access or bypass tunnels connected to each emplacement hole if any portion of an access or bypass tunnel is within the hydrodynamic measurement zone; (ii) the dimensions of each explosive canister and its orientation in the emplacement hole; (iii) the density and dimensions of each choke section; and (iv) the location and configuration of any access or bypass tunnels and any known voids with a volume larger than one cubic meter, within 50 meters of the wall of each emplacement hole within the hydrodynamic measurement zone, and the bulk density of the stemming material if these voids are to be stemmed. 11. Within 15 days following the convening of the first meeting of the Coordinating Group, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party, in the Coordinating Group, with a list of the activities it intends to carry out, as well as those activities provided for in this Protocol that it intends not to carry out. The Verifying Party shall also provide the Testing Party, in the Coordinating Group, with a preliminary statement of its requirements for technical and logistical support for the activities related to verification that it intends to carry out and whether it will require the Testing Party to provide the cables specified in Paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol for its use. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration, the Verifying Party also shall inform the Testing Party: (a) whether it requires a reference test; and (b) whether it will actually carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements of the test of non-standard configuration, and, if so, which measurements, and: (i) the number of satellite holes required and the specific distance and azimuth relative to the emplacement hole of the second and third satellite holes, if such are requested by the Verifying Party and, if the Testing Party is unable to prepare the first satellite hole in accordance with the conditions for such hole in the standard configuration, the distance and azimuth of that satellite hole relative to the emplacement hole; and (ii) in which satellite holes the Verifying Party intends to use transducers and associated power supplies.
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12. Within 10 days following receipt by the Testing Parry of the information specified in Paragraph I1 of this Section, the Parties, in the Coordinating Group, shall develop and agree upon a coordinated schedule, which shall include specific'times and durations for carrying out activities related to verification, ensuring the rights of each Party provided in this Protocol, and taking into account the number of Designated Personnel that will carry out activities related to verification of a specific test in accordance with Sections V, VI, and VII of this Protocol. The coordinated schedule shall reflect those numbers. 13. Agreement of the Representative of each Party to the Coordinating Group shall constitute agreement of the Parties for the purposes of this Protocol with the exception of Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 of Section 111 of this Protocol and Paragraph 2 of Section XI1 of this Protocol. 14. Upon completion of activities related to verification of a specific test, the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site or at each Designated Seismic Station shall prepare a written report, in the language of each Party. The report shall be factual. It shall list activities carried out by Designated Personnel, with dates of their completion, and shall include lists of information, data, photographs, and samples obtained by Designated Personnel or provided by the Testing Party in accordance with this Protocol. The report shall list technical and logistical activities carried out by the Testing Party in support of activities related to verification. The Designated Personnel Team Leader shall include in the report comments on any ambiguities not resolved during the carrying out of activities related to verification. The Representative of the Testing Party may include in the report comments responding to these ambiguities. The Designated Personnel Team Leader shall complete the report prior to the scheduled departure of Designated Personnel from the test site or Designated Seismic Station. The Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party shall each sign the report and retain a copy. 15. If, in the course of implementing activities related to verification of a specific test, in accordance with this Protocol, questions arise requiring prompt resolution, such questions shall be considered by the Coordinating Group. If the Coordinating Group is unable to resolve such questions, they shall immediately be referred to the Bilateral Consultative Commission for resolution.
SECTION XI1.-RELEASE
OF INFORMATION
1. Nothing in the Treaty and this Protocol shall affect the proprietary rights of either Party in information provided by it in accordance with
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the Treaty and this Protocol, or in information that may be disclosed to the other Party or that may become known to the other Party in preparing for or conducting a test. Claims to such proprietary rights, however, shall not impede implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 2. Public release of the information provided in accordance with this Protocol or publication of material using such information may take place only with the agreement of the Testing Party. Public release of the results of observation or measurements made by Designated Personnel may take place only with the agreement of both Parties.
SECTION XII1.-ENTRY
INTO FORCE
This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Done at Washington, in duplicate, this first day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America:
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
President of the United States of America
President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
TREATY BETWEEN THE USA AND USSR ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES Entered into force December 11, 1990 Signed at Washington and Moscow May 28, 1976 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from a desire to implement Article 111 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which calls for the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear
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Weapon Tests, and their determination to observe strictly the provisions of these international agreements, Desiring to assure that underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall not be used for purposes related to nuclear weapons, Desiring that utilization of nuclear energy be directed only toward peaceful purposes, Desiring to develop appropriately cooperation in the field of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. The Parties enter into this Treaty to satisfy the obligations in Article I11 of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and assume additional obligations in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. This Treaty shall govern all underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes conducted by the Parties after March 31, 1976. Article I1 1. For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) "explosion" means any individual or group underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes; (b) "explosive" means any device, mechanism or system for producing an individual explosion; (c) "group explosion" means two or more individual explosions for which the time interval between successive individual explosions does not exceed five seconds and for which the emplacement points of all explosives can be interconnected by straight line segments, each of which joins two emplacement points and each of which does not exceed 40 kilometers. Article I11 1. Each Party, subject to the obligations assumed under this Treaty* and other international agreements, reserves the right to: (a) carry out explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control outside the geographical boundaries of test sites specified under the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests; and (b) carry out, participate or assist in carrying out explosions in
1:
1:
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the territory of another State at the request of such other State. 2. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and further undertakes not to carry out, participate or assist in carrying out anywhere; (a) any individual explosion having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; (b) any group explosion: (1) having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons except in ways that will permit identification of each individual explosion and determination of the yield of each individual explosion in the group in accordance with the provisions of Article IV of and the Protocol to this Treaty; (2) having an aggregate yield exceeding one and one-half megatons; (c) any explosion which does not carry out a peaceful application; (d) any explosion except in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other international agreements entered into by that Party. 3. The question of carrying out any individual explosion having a yield exceeding the yield specified in Paragraph 2(a) of this article will be considered by the Parties at an appropriate time to be agreed.
Article IV 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall: (a) use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law; and (b) provide to the other Party information and access to sites of explosions and furnish assistance in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Protocol to this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with Paragraph l ( a ) of this article, or with the implementation of the provisions of Paragraph l(b) of this article.
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Article V 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Joint Consultative Commission within the framework of which they will: (a) consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries, to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with the means for assuring compliance with the provisions of this Treaty; (d) consider changes in technology or other new circumstances which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; and (e) consider possible amendments to provisions governing underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. 2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Joint Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Article VI 1. The Parties will develop cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit, equality, and reciprocity in various areas related to carrying out underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. 2. The Joint Consultative Commission will facilitate this cooperation by considering specific areas and forms of cooperation which shall be determined by agreement between the Parties in accordance with their constitutional procedures. 3. The Parties will appropriately inform the International Atomic Energy Agency of results of their cooperation in the field of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Article VII
1. Each Party shall continue to promote the development of the international agreement or agreements and procedures provided for in Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and shall provide appropriate assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. 2. Each Party undertakes not to carry out, participate or assist in
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the carrying out of any explosion in the territory of another State unless that State agrees to the implementation in its territory of the implementation observation and procedures contemplated by Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the provisions of Article IV of the Protocol to this Treaty, including the provision by that State of the assistance necessary for such implementation and of the privileges and immunities specified in the Protocol. Article VIII 1.This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years, and it shall be extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party notifies the other of its termination no later than six months prior to its expiration. Before the expiration of this period the Parties may, as necessary, hold consultations to consider the situation relevant to the substance of this Treaty. However, under no circumstances shall either Party be entitled to terminate this Treaty while the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests remains in force. 2. Termination of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests shall entitle either Party to withdraw from this Treaty at any time. 3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification of such amendments. Article IX
1. This Treaty including the Protocol which forms an integral part hereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. 2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at Washington and Moscow, on May 28,1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America:
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
GERALD R. FORD
L.BREZHNEV
The President of the United Stiites of America.
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
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TREATY BETWEEN THE USA AND USSR ON THE
LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, DECEMBER l l , l 9 9 O Entered into force December 11, 1990 Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty - Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this end, Noting that the adoption of measures for the further limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests would contribute to the achievement of these objectives and would meet the interests of strengthening peace and the further relaxation of international tension, Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning March 31, 1976.
2. Each Party shall limit the number of its under ground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum. 3. The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests. Article I1 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the
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provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries. Article I11 The provisions of this Treaty do not extend to underground nuclear explosions carried out by the Parties for peaceful purposes. Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties at the earliest possible time. Article IV This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. Article V 1. This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years. Unless replaced earlier by an agreement in implementation of the objectives specified in Paragraph 3 of Article I of this treaty, it shall be extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party notifies the other of its termination no later than six months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. Before the expiration of this period the Parties may, as necessary, hold consultations to consider the situation relevant to the substance of this Treaty and to introduce possible amendments to the text of the Treaty. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America:
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
RICHARD NIXON
L.BREZHNEV
The President of the United States of America.
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY (1996) Preamble The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties"), Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects, Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements and measures, Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures, Stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament, Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear
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testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment, Affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security, Have agreed as follows: Article I
Basic Obligations 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Article I1
The Organisation A. General Provisions 1.The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to a s "the Organization") to achieve the object and purpose of this Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. 2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization. 3. The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Austria.
128 Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation 4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data Centre. 5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty. States Parties shall consult, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Treaty. 6 . The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Treaty in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Treaty. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this Treaty. 7. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Treaty. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Treaty. 8. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such arrangements, excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in agreements to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for approval. 9. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization. 10. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. 11. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the
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amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
B. The Conference of the States Parties Composition, Procedures and Decision-making
12. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") shall be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 13. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty. 14. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides otherwise. 15. A special session of the Conference shall be convened: (a) When decided by the Conference; (b) When requested by the Executive Council; or (c) When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties. The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the decision of the Conference, the request of the Executive Council, or the attainment of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise in the decision or request. 16. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article VII. 17. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference, in accordance with Article VIII. 18. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise. 19. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next session. 20. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum. 21. Each State Party shall have one vote. 22. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present and voting. Decisions on matters of
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substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. 23. When exercising its function under Paragraph 26 (k), the Conference shall take a decision to add any State to the list of States contained in Annex 1 to this Treaty in accordance with the procedure for decisions on matters of substance set out in Paragraph 22. Notwithstanding Paragraph 22, the Conference shall take decisions on any other change to Annex 1 to this Treaty by consensus. Powers and Functions 24. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with this Treaty. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. 25. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and review compliance with, this Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions. 26. The Conference shall: (a) Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and the annual programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports; (b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with Paragraph 9; (c) Elect the members of the Executive Council; (d) Appoint the Director General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Director General");
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(e) Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter; (f) Consider and review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Treaty. In this context, the Conference may direct the Director General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Treaty to the Conference, to the Executive Council, or to States Parties. In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Treaty; (g) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty a n d to redress a n d remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with Article V; (h) Consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements, arrangements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines a n d a n y other documents developed a n d recommended by the Preparatory Commission; (i) Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by the Executive Council on behalf of the Organization in accordance with Paragraph 38(h); (j) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty; and (k) Update Annex 1 to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accordance with Paragraph 23. C . The Executive Council Composition, Procedures and Decision-making
27. The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council. 28. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution the Executive Council shall comprise: (a) Ten States Parties from Africa;
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Seven States Parties from Eastern Europe; Nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean; Seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia; Ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and (f) Eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex I to this Treaty. Annex I to this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the Conference in accordance with Paragraphs 23 and 26(k). It shall not be subject to amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII. 29. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows: (a) At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled, taking into account political and security interests, by States Parties in that region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of priority determined by each region: (i) Number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System; (ii) Expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and (iii) Contribution to the annual budget of the Organization; (b) One of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter. A State Party designated on this basis may decide to forgo its seat. In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunciation to the Director General, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party following next-in-order according to this subparagraph; and (c) The remaining seats allocated to each geographical region shall
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be filled by States Parties designated from among all the States
Parties in that region by rotation or elections. 30. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the Executive Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 31. Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, except that for the first election of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be elected to hold office until the end of the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in Paragraph 28. 32. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval. 33. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members. 34. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.
35. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. 36. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of all its members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. Powers and Functions 37. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Treaty. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation. 38. The Executive Council shall: (a) Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty; (b) Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;
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(d) Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party; (e) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and budget of the Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty, the report on the performance of its own activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the Conference may request;
(f) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the draft agenda; (g) Examine proposals for changes, on matters of an administrative or technical nature, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto, pursuant to Article VII, and make recommendations to the States Parties regarding their adoption; (h) Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements referred to in Sub-paragraph (i); (i) Approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties and other States; and (j> Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational manuals that may be proposed by the Technical Secretariat. 39. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference. 40. The Executive Council shall: (a) Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Treaty through information exchanges; (b) Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article IV; and (c) Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, on-site inspections in accordance with Article IV. 41. The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party about possible non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse
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of the rights established by this Treaty. In doing so, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures: (a) Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter; (b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference; (c) Make recommendations to the Conference or take action, as appropriate, regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V. D. The Technical Secretariat
42. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification and other functions entrusted to it by this Treaty, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in accordance with this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the International Data Centre. 43. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to verification of compliance with this Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol, include inter alia: (a) Being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the International Monitoring System; (b) Operating the International Data Centre; (c) Routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on International Monitoring System data; (dl Providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring stations; (e) Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties; (f) Receiving requests for on-site inspections and processing them, facilitating Executive Council consideration of such requests, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council; (g) Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding,
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subject to prior approval by the Executive Council, any such agreements or arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or other States; and (h) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of verification under this Treaty. 44. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verification regime, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Treaty or the Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals. 45. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include: (a) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization; (b) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request; (c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and other subsidiary organs; (d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Treaty; and (el Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations. 46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director General. Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of this Treaty. In response the Director General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification. 47. With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the Technical Secretariat shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the International Monitoring System. Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be accorded to all other activities of the Organization.
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48. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive
Council of any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations
with the State Party concerned. 49. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required. The Director General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The first Director General shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission. 50. The Director General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat. 51. The Director General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the Executive Council, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. 52. In the performance of their duties, the Director General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The Director General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an inspection team. 53. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
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E. Privileges and Immunities 54. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions. 55. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the Director General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. 56. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the State Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated. Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with Paragraph 26(h) and (i). 57. Notwithstanding Paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol. Article I11
Na tional lmplementa tion Measures 1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. In particular, it shall take any necessary measures: (a) To prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (b) To prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere under its control; and (c) To prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere. 2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and
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afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under Paragraph 1. 3. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken pursuant to this Article. 4. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon entry into force of the Treaty for it. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties. Article IV Verification
A. General Provisions 1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements:
(a) An International Monitoring System; (b) Consultation and clarification; (4 On-site inspections; and (dl Confidence-building measures. At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty. 2. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification. 3. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate, through its National Authority established pursuant to Article 111, Paragraph 4, with the Organization and with other States Parties to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Treaty by inter alia: (a) Establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification measures and establishing the necessary communication; (b) Providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the International Monitoring System; (c) Participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clarification process;
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(dl Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and (e) Participating, as appropriate, in confidence-building measures. 4. All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities, shall enjoy the equal right of verification and assume the equal obligation to accept verification. 5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States. 6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sensitive installations, activities or locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with Paragraph 5. 7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty. 8. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities. 9. Subject to Paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. 10. The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange of data for scientific purposes. 11. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty. Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in existing provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional sections of the Protocol, in accordance with Article VII, or, if appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals in accordance with Article 11, Paragraph 44. 12. The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange
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relating to technologies used in the verification of this Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to strengthen their national implementation of verification measures and to benefit from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes. 13,The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties for further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Verification Responsibilifies of the Technical Secretariat
14. In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this Treaty and the Protocol, in cooperation with the States Parties the Technical Secretariat shall, for the purpose of this Treaty: (a) Make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products relevant to the verification of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, and to maintain a global communications infrastructure appropriate to this task; (b) Routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle be the focal point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and data processing: (i) Receive and initiate requests for data from the International Monitoring System; (ii) Receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of consultation and clarification, from on-site inspections, and from confidence-building measures; and (iii) Receive other relevant data from States Parties and international organizations in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol; (c) Supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International Monitoring System and its component elements, and of the International Data Centre, in accordance with the relevant operational manuals; (d) Routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring System data according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective international verification of this Treaty and to contribute to the early resolution of compliance concerns; (e) Make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting products, to all States Parties, each State Party taking responsibility for the use of International Monitoring System data in accordance with Article 11, Paragraph 7, and with Paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Article;
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Provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access to all stored data; Store all data, both raw and processed, and reporting products; Coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the International Monitoring System; Coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another State Party; Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring facilities and respective communication means, where such assistance and support are required by the State concerned; Make available to any State Party, upon its request, techniques utilized by the Technical Secretariat and its International Data Centre in compiling, storing, processing, analysing and reporting on data from the verification regime; and Monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the International Monitoring System and of the International Data Centre. 15. The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging the verification responsibilities referred to in Paragraph 14 and detailed in the Protocol shall be elaborated in the relevant
operational manuals. B. The International Monitoring System 16. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and respective means of communication, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the Technical Secretariat. 17. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and operated by the
States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol. 18. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre. Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority. Funding the International Monitoring System 19. For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring
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System and specified in Tables I-A, 2-A, 3 and 4 of Annex 1 to the Protocol, and for their functioning, to the extent that such facilities are agreed by the relevant State and the Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre in accordance with the technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, Paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs of: (a) Establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; (b) Operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities, including facility physical security if appropriate, and application of agreed data authentication procedures; (c) Transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed) to the International Data Centre by the most direct and cost effective means available, including, if necessary, via appropriate communications nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories, analytical facilities or from national data centres; or such data (including samples where appropriate) to laboratory and analytical facilities from monitoring stations; and (d) Analysing samples on behalf of the Organization. 20. For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to the Protocol the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, Paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs only of: (a) Transmitting data to the International Data Centre; (b) Authenticating data from such stations; (c) Upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; (d) If necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty where no appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; and (e) Any other costs related to the provision of data required by the Organization as specified in the relevant operational manuals. 21. The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of its requested selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting products and services, as specified
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in Part I, Section F of the Protocol. The cost of preparation and transmission of any additional data or products shall be met by the requesting State Party. ' 22. The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall contain provisions for meeting these costs. Such provisions may include modalities whereby a State Party meets any of the costs referred to in Paragraphs 19(a) and 20(c) and (d) for facilities which it hosts or for which it is responsible, and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its assessed financial contribution to the Organization. Such a reduction shall not exceed 50 percent of the annual assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but may be spread over successive years. A State Party may share such a reduction with another State Party by agreement or arrangement between themselves and with the concurrence of the Executive Council. The agreements or arrangements referred to in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article 11, Paragraphs 26(h) and 38(i). Changes to the International Monitoring System 23. Any measures referred to in Paragraph 11 affecting the International Monitoring System by means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology shall, when agreed, be incorporated into this Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to Article VII, Paragraphs 1 to 6. 24. The following changes to the International Monitoring System, subject to the agreement of those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an administrative or technical nature pursuant to Article VII, Paragraphs 7 and 8: (a) Changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given monitoring technology; and (b) Changes to other details for particular facilities as reflected in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol (including, inter alia, State responsible for the facility; location; name of facility; type of facility; and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic networks). If the Executive Council recommends, pursuant to Article VII, Paragraph 8(d), that such changes be adopted, it shall as a rule also recommend pursuant to Article VII, Paragraph 8(g), that such changes enter into force upon notification by the Director General of their approval. 25. The Director General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States Parties information and evaluation in accordance with Article
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VII, Paragraph 8 (b), shall include in the case of any proposal made pursuant to Paragraph 24: (a) A technical evaluation of the proposal; (b) A statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal; and (c) A report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal, including indication of their agreement. Temporary Arrangements
26. In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitoring facility specified in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol, or in order to cover other temporary reductions of monitoring coverage, the Director General shall, in consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, and with the approval of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrangements of no more than one year's duration, renewable if necessary by agreement of the Executive Council and of the States directly affected for another year. Such arrangements shall not cause the number of operational facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed the number specified for the relevant network; shall meet as far as possible the technical and operational requirements specified in the operational manual for the relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the Organization. The Director General shall furthermore take steps to rectify the situation and make proposals for its permanent resolution. The Director General shall notify all States Parties of any decision taken pursuant to this paragraph. Cooperating National Facilities
27. States Parties may also separately establish cooperative arrangements with the Organization, in order to make available to the International Data Centre supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the International Monitoring System. 28. Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows: (a) Upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to certify that a given monitoring facility meets the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the authentication of its data. Subject to the agreement of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a facility as a cooperating national facility. The Technical Secretariat shall
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take the steps required to revalidate its certification as appropriate; (b) The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating national facilities and shall distribute it to all States Parties; and (c) The International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating national facilities, if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of facilitating consultation and clarification and the consideration of on-site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that State Party. The conditions under which supplementary data from such facilities are made available, and under which the International Data Centre may request further or expedited reporting, or clarifications, shall be elaborated in the operational manual for the respective monitoring network. C. Consultatior~and Clarification 29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. 30. A State Party that receives a request pursuant to Paragraph 29 directly from another State Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after the request. The requesting and requested States Parties may keep the Executive Council and the Director General informed of the request and the response. 31. A State Party shall have the right to request the Director General to assist in clarifying any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. The Director General shall provide appropriate informtion in the possession of the Technical Secretariat relevant to such a concern. The Director General shall inform the Executive Council of the request and of the information provided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party. 32. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. In such a case, the following shall apply: (a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification
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to the requested State Party through the Director General no later than 24 hours after its receipt; (b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after receipt of the request; (c) The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt; (d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State Party. The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties about any request for clarification pursuant to this paragraph as well as any response provided by the requested State Party. 33. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under Paragraph 32(d) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. At such a meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in accordance with Article V. Request for an On-Site inspection 34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part I1 of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State. 35. The sole purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator. 36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with Paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests. 37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant
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technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistend with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part 11, Paragraph 41 of the Protocol. 38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director General for the latter to begin immediate processing. Follow-up After Submission of an On-Site Inspection Request 39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon receipt of the on-site inspection request.
40. The Director General, after receiving the on-site inspection request, shall acknowledge receipt of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six hours. The Director General shall ascertain that the request meets the requirements specified in Part 11, Paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist the requesting State Party in filing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the request to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties within 24 hours.
41. When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical Secretariat shall begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay. 42. The Director General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring to an inspection area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request. 43. A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to Paragraph 42 shall provide the Director General with explanations and with other relevant information available as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request for clarification, 44. The Director General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the on-site inspection request, shall transmit immediately to the Executive Council any additional information available from the International Monitoring System or provided by any State Party on the event specified in the request, including any clarification provided pursuant to Paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other information from within the Technical Secretariat that the Director General deems relevant or that is requested hy the Executive Council.
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45. Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site inspection request to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in accordance with Paragraph 46. Execu tiue Council Decisions
46. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site inspection request no later than 96 hours after receipt of the request from the requesting State Party. The decision to approve the on-site inspection shall be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council. If the Executive Council does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action on the request shall be taken. 47. No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with Paragraph 46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive Council, through the Director General, a progress inspection report. The continuation of the inspection shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report, decides by a majority of all its members not to continue the inspection. If the Executive Council decides not to continue the inspection, the inspection shall be terminated, and the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part 11, Paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol. 48. In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director General, a proposal to conduct drilling. The Executive Council shall take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours after receipt of the proposal. The decision to approve drilling shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council. 49. The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the Director General, to extend the inspection duration by a maximum of 70 days beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in Part 11, Paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the inspection team considers such an extension essential to enable it to fulfil its mandate. The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in Part 11, Paragraph 69 of the Protocol it intends to carry out during the extension period. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the extension request no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request. The decision to approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council. 50. Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-
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site inspection in accordance with Paragraph 47, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director General, a recommendation to terminate the inspection. Such a recommendation shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the recommendation, decides by a twothirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of the inspection. In case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part 11, Paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol. 51. The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request without voting. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may also participate without voting in any subsequent deliberations of the Executive Council related to the inspection. 52. The Director General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about any decision by and reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the Executive Council pursuant to Paragraphs 46 to 50. Follow-up after Executive Council Approval of an On-Site Inspection
53. An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director General and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection request from the requesting State Party. 54. The Director General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site inspection. The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part 11, Paragraph 42 of the Protocol. 55. The Director General shall notify the inspected State Party of the inspection no less than 24 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with Part 11, Paragraph 43 of the Protocol. The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection 56. Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site inspection on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Pkotocol. However, no State Party shall have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control.
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57. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol, the inspected State Party shall have: (a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Treaty and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate; (b) The right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose .of the inspection; (c) The obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole purpose of determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection, taking into account Sub-paragraph (b) and any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures; ( d ) The obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part 11, Paragraph 88 of the Protocol to conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I; and (e) The obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move within the inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol. Access, in the context of an on-site inspection, means both the physical access of the inspection team and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of inspection activities within, the inspection area. 58. The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the efficient and timely accomplishment of the inspection mandate, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol. Wherever possible, the inspection team shall begin with the least intrusive procedures and then proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to collect sufficient information to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with this Treaty. The inspectors shall seek only the information and data necessary for the purpose of the inspection and shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the inspected State Party. 59. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-site inspection and facilitate its task. 60. If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part 11, Paragraphs 86 to 96 of the Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every reasonable effort in consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Treaty.
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Observer
61. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply: (a) The requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, may send a representative, who shall be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the on-site inspection; (b) The inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or nonacceptance of the proposed observer to the Director General within 12 hours after approval of the on-site inspection by the Executive Council; (c) In case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the observer in accordance with the Protocol; (d) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the inspection report. There shall be no more than three observers from an aggregate of requesting States Parties. Reports of an On-Site Inspection 62. Inspection reports shall contain: (a) A description of the activities conducted by the inspection team; (b) The factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of the inspection; (c) An account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection; (dl A factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the alternative means provided to the team, during the on-site inspection; and (e) Any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspection. Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report. 63. The Director General shall make draft inspection reports available to the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the Director General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The Director General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection report made by the inspected State Party and shall wherever possible
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incorporate them. The Director General shall also annex the comments and explanations provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report. 64. The Director General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the requesting State Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties any results of sample analysis in designated laboratories in accordance with Part 11, Paragraph 104 of the Protocol, relevant data from the International Monitoring System, the assessments of the requesting and inspected States Parties, as well as any other information that the Director General deems relevant. In the case of the progress inspection report referred to in Paragraph 47, the Director General shall transmit the report to the Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that paragraph. 65. The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall review the inspection report and any material provided pursuant to Paragraph 64, and shall address any concerns as to: (a) Whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has occurred; and (b) Whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused. 66. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to Paragraph 65, it shall take the appropriate measures in accordance with Article V. Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests 67. If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspection on the basis that the on-site inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is terminated for the same reasons, the Executive Council shall consider and decide on whether to implement appropriate measures to redress the situation, including the following: (a) Requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any preparations made by the Technical Secretariat; (b) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to request an on-site inspection for a period of time, as determined by the Executive Council; and (c) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive Council for a period of time.
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E. Confidence-building Measures 68. In order to: (a) Contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical explosions; and (b) Assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component networks of the International Monitoring System, each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in implementing relevant measures as set out in Part I11 of the Protocol. Article V Measures t o Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions
1. The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recommendations of the Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in Paragraphs 2 and 3, to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty. 2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise. 3. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with international law. 4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations. Article VI
Settlement Of Disputes
1. Disputes that may arise concerning tlie application or the interpretation of this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
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2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the application or interpretation of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Treaty and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken. 3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that may arise concerning the application or interpretation of this Treaty by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling Ypon the States Parties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice, bringing the matter to the attention of the Conference and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure. 4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article 11, Paragraph 26(j). 5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article 11, Paragraph 38 (h). 6. This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V.
Article VII
Amendments 1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with Paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in Paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in accordance with Paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in Paragraph 8.
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2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment Conferace. 3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director General, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Director General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Director General shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited. 4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment. 5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote. 6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts I and 111 of the Protocol and Annexes I and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with Paragraph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All other provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with Paragraph 8. 8. Proposed changes referred to in Paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures: (a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director General. Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director General. The Director General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary; (b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;
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The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of Paragraph 7. No later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days; If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if .no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation; If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of Paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session; The Director General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph; Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.
Article VIII
Review of the Treaty 1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nudear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate
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amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article VII. 2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be convened with the same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year. Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance. 3. Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the regular annual session of the Conference provided for in Article 11.
Article IX
Duration and Withdrawal 1.This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests. Article X
Status of the Protocol and the Annexes The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol form an integral part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes to the Protocol. Article XI
Signature This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force.
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Article XI1
Ratification This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes. Article XI11
Accession Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter. Article XIV
Entry into Force 1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. 2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification upon the request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in Paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty. 3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in Paragraph 2 or other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force. 4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in Paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in Paragraph 3, as observers. 5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
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Article XV
Reservations The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty. Article XVI
Depositary 1. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession. 2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices. 3. The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States. 4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XVII
Authentic Texts This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
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ANNEX 1
TO THE TREATY LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 11, PARAGRAPH 28 Africa Algeria Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Congo Cote d'Ivoire Djibouti Egypt Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Madagascar
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Eastern Europe Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic
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Estonia Georgia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Ukraine Yugoslavia.
Latin America and the Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Bahamas Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti
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Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela.
Middle East and South Asia Afghanistan Bahrain Bangladesh Bhutan India Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Iraq Israel Jordan Kazakstan Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lebanon Maldives Nepal
Oman Pakistan Qatar Saudi Arabia
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North America and Western Europe Andorra Austria Belgium Canada Cyprus Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Holy See Iceland Ireland Italy Liechtenstein Luxembourg Malta Monaco Netherlands Norway Portugal San Marino Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America..
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The Pacific and the Far East Australia Brunei Darussalam Cambodia China Cook Islands Democratic People's Republic of Korea Fiji Indonesia Japan Kiribati Lao People's Democratic Republic Malaysia
Marshall Islands Micronesia (Federated States of) Mongolia Myanmar Nauru New Zealand Niue Palau Papua New Guinea Philippines Republic of Korea Samoa Singapore Solomon Islands Thailand Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu Viet Nam.
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ANNEX 2 TO THE TREATY
LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XIV List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World", and of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table I of the International Atomic Energy Agency's December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World: Algeria Argentina Australia Austria Bangladesh Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Democratic People's Republic of Korea
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Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Indonesia Iran (Islamic Republic of) Israel Italy
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PROTOCOL TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY PART I.-THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE FUNCTIONS A. General Provisions 1. The International Monitoring System shall comprise monitoring facilities as set out in Article IV, Paragraph 16, and respective means of communication. 2. The monitoring facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System shall consist of those facilities specified in Annex 1 to this Protocol. The International Monitoring System shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals.
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3. The Organization, in accordance with Article 11, shall, in cooperation and consultation with the States Parties, with other States, and with international organizations as appropriate, establish and coordinate the operation and maintenance, and any future agreed modification or development of the International Monitoring System. 4. In accordance with appropriate agreements or arrangements and procedures, a State Party or other State hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for International Monitoring System facilities and the Technical Secretariat shall agree and cooperate in establishing, operating, upgrading, financing, and maintaining monitoring facilities, related certified laboratories and respective means of communication within areas under its jurisdiction or control or elsewhere in conformity with international law. Such cooperation shall be in accordance with the security and authentication requirements and technical specifications contained in the relevant operational manuals. Such a State shall give the Technical Secretariat authority to access a monitoring facility for checking equipment and communication links, and shall agree to make the necessary changes in the equipment and the operational procedures to meet agreed requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall provide to such States appropriate technical assistance as is deemed by the Executive Council to be required for the proper functioning of the facility as part of the International Monitoring System. 5. Modalities for such cooperation between the Organization and States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be set out in agreements or arrangements as appropriate in each case.
B. Seimological Monitoring 6 . Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of seismological data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of primary and auxiliary seismological monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 7. The network of primary stations shall consist of the 50 stations specified in Table 1-A of Annex I to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Uninterrupted data from the primary stations shall be transmitted, directly or through a national data centre, on-line to the International Data Centre.
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8. To supplement the primary network, an auxiliary network of 120 stations shall provide information, directly or through a national data centre, to the International Data Centre upon request. The auxiliary stations to be used are listed in Table I-B of Annex I to this Protocol. The auxiliary stations shall fulfill the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Data from the auxiliary stations may at any time be requested by the International Data Centre and shall be immediately available through on-line computer connections.
C. Radionuclide Monitoring 9. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of data on radionuclides in the atmosphere to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations and certified laboratories. The network shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 10. The network of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere shall comprise an overall network of 80 stations, as specified in Table 2-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol. All stations shall be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant particulate matter in the atmosphere. Forty of these stations shall also be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases upon the entry into force of this Treaty. For this purpose the Conference, at its initial session, shall approve a recommendation by the Preparatory Commission as to which 40 stations from Table 2-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol shall be capable of noble gas monitoring. At its first regular annual session, the Conference shall consider and decide on a plan for implementing noble gas monitoring capability throughout the network. The Director General shall prepare a report to the Conference on the modalities for such implementation. All monitoring stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data. 11. The network of radionuclide monitoring stations shall be supported by laboratories, which shall be certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with the relevant operational manual for the performance, on contract to the Organization and on a fee-for-service basis, of the analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. Laboratories specified in Table 2-8 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and
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appropriately equipped, shall, as required, also be drawn upon by the Technical Secretariat to perform additional analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. With the agreement of the Executive Council, further laboratories may be certified by the Technical Secretariat to perform the routine analysis of samples from manual monitoring stations where necessary. All certified laboratories shall provide the results of such analysis to the International Data Centre, and in so doing shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual on Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data. D. Hydroacoustic Monitoring 12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of hydroacoustic data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of hydroacoustic monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 13. The network of hydroacoustic stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 3 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of six hydrophone and five T-phase stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring and the International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data.
E. Infrasound Monitoring 14. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of infrasound data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of infrasound monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 15. The network of infrasound stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 4 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of 60 stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical an operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Infrasound Monitoring and the International Exchange of Infrasound Data.
F. International Data Centre Functions
16. The International Data Centre shall receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive data from International Monitoring System
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facilities, including the results of analysis conducted at certified laboratories. 17. The procedures and standard event screening criteria to be used by the International Data Centre in carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the production of standard reporting products and for the performance of standard range of services for States Parties, shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre and shall be progressively developed. The procedures and criteria developed initially by the Preparatory Commission shall be approved by the Conference at its initial session.
International Data Centre Standard Products 18. The International Data Centre shall apply on a routine basis automatic processing methods and interactive human analysis to raw International Monitoring System data in order to produce and archive standard International Data Centre products on behalf of all States Parties. These products shall be provided at no cost to States Parties and shall be without prejudice to final judgements with regard to the nature of any event, which shall remain the responsibility of States Parties, and shall include: (a) Integrated lists of all signals detected by the International Monitoring System, as well as standard event lists and bulletins, including the values and associated uncertainties calculated for each event located by the International Data Centre, based on a set of standard parameters; (b) Standard screened event bulletins that result from the application to each event by the International Data Centre of standard event screening criteria, making use of the characterization parameters specified in Annex 2 to this Protocol, with the objective of characterising, highlighting in the standard event bulletin, and thereby screening out, events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or nonnuclear, man-made phenomena. The standard event bulletin shall indicate numerically for each event the degree to which that event meets or does not meet the event screening criteria. In applying standard event screening, the International Data Centre shall use both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable. The International Data Centre shall progressively enhance its technical capabilities as experience is gained in the operatioh of the International Monitoring System;
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(c) Executive summaries, which summarize the data acquired and archived by the International Data Centre, the products of the International Data Centre, and the performance and operational status of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre; and
(d) Extracts or subsets of the standard International Data Centre products specified in Sub-paragraphs (a) to (c), selected according to the request of an individual State Party. 19. The International Data Centre shall carry out, at no cost to States Parties, special studies to provide in-depth, technical review by expert analysis of data from the International Monitoring System, if requested by the Organization or by a State Party, to improve the estimated values for the standard signal and event parameters.
International Data Centre Services to States Parties 20. The International Data Centre shall provide States Parties with open, equal, timely and convenient access to all International Monitoring System data, raw or processed, all International Data Centre products, and all other International Monitoring System data in the archive of the International Data Centre or, through the International Data Centre, of International Monitoring System facilities. The methods for supporting data access and the provision of data shall include the following services: (a) Automatic and regular forwarding to a State Party of the products of the International Data Centre or the selection by the State Party thereof, and, as requested, the selection by the State Party of International Monitoring System data; (b) The provision of the data or products generated in response to ad hoc requests by States Parties for the retrieval from the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System facility archives of data and products, including interactive electronic access to the International Data Centre data base; and (c) Assisting individual States Parties, at their request and at no cost for reasonable efforts, with expert technical analysis of International Monitoring System data and other relevant data provided by the requesting State Party, in order to help the State Party concerned to identify the source of specific events. The output of any such technical analysis shall be considered a product of the requesting State Party, but shall be available to all States Parties. The International Data Centre services specified in Sub-paragraphs
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(a) and (b) shall be made available at no cost to each State Party. The volumes and formats of data shall be set out in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre.
National Event Screening 21. The International Data Centre shall, if requested by a State Party, apply to any of its standard products, on a regular and automatic basis, national event screening criteria established by that State Party, and provide the results of such analysis to that State Party. This service shall be undertaken at no cost to the requesting State Party. The output of such national event screening processes shall be considered a product of the requesting State Party. Technical Assistance 22. The International Data Centre shall, where required, provide technical assistance to individual stat& Parties: (a) In formulating their requirements for selection and screening of data and products; (b) By installing at the International Data Centre, at no cost to a requesting State Party for reasonable efforts, computer algorithms or software provided by that State Party to compute new signal and event parameters that are not included in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre, the output being considered products of the requesting State Party; and (c) By assisting States Parties to develop the capability to receive, process and analyse International Monitoring System data at a national data centre. 23. The International Data Centre shall continuously monitor and report on the operational status of the International Monitoring System facilities, of communications links, and of its own processing systems. It shall provide immediate notification to those responsible should the operational performance of any component fail to meet agreed levels set out in the relevant operational manual. PART 11.-ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS
A. General Provisions 1.The procedures in this Part shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions for on-site inspections set out in Article IV.
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2. The on-site inspection shall be carried out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection request occurred. 3. The area of an on-site inspection shall be continuous and its size shall not exceed 1000 square kilometres. There shall be no linear distance greater than 50 kilometres in any direction. 4. The duration of an on-site inspection shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the approval of the on-site inspection request in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 46, but may be extended by a maximum of 70 days in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 49. 5. If the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate extends to the territory or other place under the jurisdiction or control of more than one State Party, the provisions on on-site inspections shall, as appropriate, apply to each of the States Parties to which the inspection area extends. 6 . In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the territory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the inspection area requires transit through the territory of a State Party other than the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such inspections in accordance with this Protocol. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located shall facilitate the inspection and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to reach the inspection area shall facilitate such transit. 7. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty, the inspected State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. A State Party that has under its jurisdiction or control one or more areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the State on whose territory the inspection area is located of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access. 8. In cases where the inspection area is located on the territory of a State Party but is under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Treaty, the State Party shall take all necessary measures required of an inspected State Party and a State Party on whose territory the
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inspection area is located, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law, to ensure that the on-site inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to the inspection area, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law. 9. The size of the inspection team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the inspection mandate. The total number of members of the inspection team present on the territory of the inspected State Party at any given time, except during the conduct of drilling, shall not exceed 40 persons. No national of the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall be a member of the inspection team. 10. The Director General shall determine the size of the inspection team and select its members from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, taking into account the circumstances of a particular request. 11. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange the amenities necessary for the inspection team, such as communication means, interpretation services, transportation, working space, lodging, meals, and medical care.
12. The inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization, in a reasonably short period of time after conclusion of the inspection, for all expenses, including those mentioned in Paragraphs 11 and 49, related to the stay and functional activities of the inspection team on the territory of the inspected State Party. 13. Procedures for the implementation of on-site inspect~onsshall be detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.
B. Standing Arrangements Designation of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants
14. An inspection team may consist of inspectors and inspection assistants. An on-site inspection shall only be carried out by qualified inspectors specially designated for this function. They may be assisted by specially designated inspection assistants, such as technical and administrative personnel, aircrew and interpreters. 15. Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be nominated for designation by the States Parties or, in the case of staff of the Technical Secretariat, by the Director General, on the basis of their expertise and experience relevant to the purpose and functions of on-site inspections. The nominees shall be approved in advance by the States Parties in accordance with Paragraph 18.
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16. Each State Party, no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall notify the Director General of the names, dates of birth, sex, ranks, qualifications and professional experience of the persons proposed by the State Party for designation as inspectors and inspection assistants. 17. No later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Technical Secretariat shall communicate in writing to all States Parties an initial list of the names, nationalities, dates of birth, sex and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation by the Director General and the States Parties, as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experience. 18. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation. Any inspector or inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State Party, no later than 30 days after acknowledgment of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the reason for the objection. In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in on-site inspection activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party that has declared its non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of objection. 19. Whenever additions or changes to the list of inspectors and inspection assistants are proposed by the Director General or a State Party, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with respect to the initial list. Each State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat if an inspector or inspection assistant nominated by it can no longer fulfil the duties of an inspector or inspection assistant. 20. The Technical Secretariat shall keep the list of inspectors and inspection assistants up to date and notify all States Parties of additions or changes to the list. 21. A State Party requesting an on-site inspection may propose that an inspector from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants serve as its observer in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 61. 22. Subject to Paragraph 23, a State Party shall have the right at any time to object to an inspector or inspection assistant who has already been accepted. It shall notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt of the notification by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm
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receipt of the notification of the objection and inform the objecting and nominating States Parties of the date on which the inspector or inspection assistant shall cease to be designated for that State Party. 23. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek the removal from the inspection team of any of the inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection mandate. 24. The number of inspectors and inspection assistants accepted by a State Party must be sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants. If, in the opinion of the Director General, the non-acceptance by a State Party of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors and inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the purposes of an on-site inspection, the Director General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council. 25. Each inspector included in the list of inspectors and inspection assistants shall receive relevant training. Such training shall be provided by the Technical Secretariat pursuant to the procedures specified in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. The Technical Secretariat shall co-ordinate, in agreement with the States Parties, a schedule of training for the inspectors.
Privileges and Immunities 26. Following acceptance of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants as provided for in Paragraph 18 or as subsequently altered in accordance with Paragraph 19, each State Party shall be obliged to issue, in accordance with its national procedures and upon application by an inspector or inspection assistant, multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other relevant documents to enable each inspector and inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out inspection activities. Each State Party shall issue the necessary visa or travel documents for this purpose no later than 48 hours after receipt of the application or immediately upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry on the territory of the State Party. Such documents shall be valid for as long as is necessary to enable the inspector or inspection assistant to remain on the territory of the inspected State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out the inspection activities. 27. To exercise their functions effectively, members of the inspection team shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i). Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of this Treaty and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and
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immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. (a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961; (b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out inspection activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, Paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, Paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat; (dl Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Treaty and exempt from all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations; (e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (f) The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (g) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected State Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations;
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(h) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions; and (i) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party. 28. When transiting the territory of States Parties other than the inspected State Party, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including records, and samples and approved equipment carried by them, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in Paragraph 27(c) and (d). 29. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party and, to the extent that is
consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. If the inspected State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Protocol, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director General to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. 30. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the Director General in those cases when the Director General is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. Waiver must always be express. 31. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to members of the inspection team pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to Paragraph 27 (dl.
Points of Entry 32. Each State Party shall designate its points of entry and shall supply the required information to the Technical Secretariat no later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection area from at least one point of entry within 24 hours. Locations of points of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical Secretariat. Points of entry may also serve as points of exit.
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33. Each State Party may change its points of entry by giving notice
of such change to the Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical Secretariat receives such notification, to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties. 34. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.
Arrangements for Use of Non-Scheduled Aircraft 35. Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled commercial flights, an inspection team may utilize nonscheduled aircraft. No later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting an inspection team and equipment necessary for inspection. Aircraft routings shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.
Approved Inspection Equipment 36. The Conference, at its initial session, shall consider and approve a list of equipment for use during on-site inspections. Each State Party may submit proposals for the inclusion of equipment in the list. Specifications for the use of the equipment, as detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections, shall take account of safety and confidentiality considerations where such equipment is likely to be used. 37. The equipment for use during on-site inspections shall consist of core equipment for the inspection activities and techniques specified in Paragraph 69 and auxiliary equipment necessary for the effective and timely conduct of on-site inspections. 38. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of approved equipment are available for on-site inspections when required. When required for an on-site inspection, the Technical Secretariat shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained and protected. To facilitate the checking of the equipment at the point of entry by the inspected State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification. 39. Any permanently held equipment shall be in the custody of the
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Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment. 40. As appropriate, the Technical Secretariat shall make arrangements with States Parties to provide equipment mentioned in the list. Such States Parties shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment. C . On-site inspection Request, Inspection Mandate and Notification Of Inspection
On-Site Inspection Request 41. Pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 37, the on-site inspection request shall contain at least the following information: (a) The estimated geographical and vertical coordinates of the location of the event that triggered the request with an indication of the possible margin of error; (b) The proposed boundaries of the area to be inspected, specified on a map and in accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3; (c) The State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the area to be inspected or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State; (dl The probable environment of the event that triggered the request; (el The estimated time of the event that triggered the request, with an indication of the possible margin of error; (f) All data upon which the request is based; (g) The personal details of the proposed observer, if any; and (h) The results of a consultation and clarification process in accordance with Article V, or an explanation, if relevant, of the reasons why such a consultation and clarification process has not been carried out. Inspection Mandate 42. The mandate for an on-site inspection shall contain: (a) The decision of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request; (b) The name of the State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the inspection area or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State;
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(c) The location and boundaries of the inspection area specified
on a map, taking into account all information on which the request was based and all other available technical information, in consultation with the requesting State Party; (d) The planned types of activity of the inspection team in the inspection area; (e) The point of entry to be used by the inspection team; (f) Any transit or basing points, as appropriate; (g) The name of the head of the inspection team; (h) The names of members of the inspection team; (i) The name of the proposed observer, if any; and (j) The list of equipment to be used in the inspection area. If a decision by the Executive Council pursuant to Article IV, Paragraphs 46 to 49, necessitates a modification of the inspection mandate, the Director General may update the mandate with respect to subparagraphs (d), (h) and (j), as appropriate. The Director General shall immediately notify the inspected State Party of any such modification.
Notification of Inspection 43. The notification made by the Director General pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 55 shall include the following information: (a) The inspection mandate; (b) The date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry; (c) The means of arrival at the point of entry; (d) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft; and (e) A list of any equipment which the Director General requests the inspected State Party to make available to the inspection team for use in the inspection area. 44. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the notification by the Director General no later than 12 hours after having received the notification. D. Pre-inspection Activities Entry Into the Territory of the Inspected State Party, Activities at the Point of Entry and Transfer to the inspection Area. 45. The inspected State Party that has been notified of the arrival
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of the inspection team shall ensure the immediate entry of the inspection team into its territory. 46. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used for travel to the point of entry, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the flight of the aircraft from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of that State Party to the point of entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of the flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft. If a military aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall request prior authorization from the inspected State Party to enter its airspace. 47. No less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with Paragraph 46 is approved, so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time. 48. Where necessary, the head of the inspection team and the representative of the inspected State Party shall agree on a basing point and a flight plan from the point of entry to the basing point and, if necessary, to the inspection area. 49. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange parking, security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of entry and, where necessary, at the basing point and at the inspection area. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. This paragraph shall also apply to aircraft used for overflight during the on-site inspection. 50. Subject to Paragraph 51, there shall be no restriction by the inspected State Party on the inspection team bringing approved equipment that is in conformity with the inspection mandate into the territory of that State Party, or on its use in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 51. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the time-frame specified in Paragraph 54, to check in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry that the equipment has been approved and certified in accordance with Paragraph 38. The
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inspected State Party may exclude equipment that is not in conformity with the inspection mandate or that has not been approved and certified in accordance with Paragraph 38. 52. Immediately upon arrival at the point of entry and without prejudice to the time-frame specified in Paragraph 54, the head of the inspection team shall present to the representative of the inspected State Party the inspection mandate and an initial inspection plan prepared by the inspection team specifying the activities to be carried out by it. The inspection team shall be briefed by representatives of the inspected State Party with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate. The briefing shall include relevant natural terrain features, safety and confidentiality issues, and logistical arrangements for the inspection, The inspected State Party may indicate locations within the inspection area that, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection. 53. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall, as appropriate, modify the initial inspection plan, taking into account any comments by the inspected State Party. The modified inspection plan shall be made available to the representative of the inspected State Party. 54. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, the approved equipment specified in Paragraphs 50 and 51 and baggage from the point of entry to the inspection area no later than 36 hours after arrival at the point of entry, if no other timing has been agreed upon within the time-frame specified in Paragraph 57. 55. To confirm that the area to which the inspection team has been transported corresponds to the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate, the inspection team shall have the right to use approved location-finding equipment. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this task.
E. Conduct of Inspections General Rules 56. The inspection team shall discharge its functions in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 57. The inspection team shall begin its inspection activities in the inspection area as soon as possible, but in no case later than 72 hours after arrival at the point of, entry. 58. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to
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ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected State Party and disturbance to the inspection area. 59. In cases where the inspected State Party has been requested, pursuant to Paragraph 43(e) or in the course of the inspection, to make available any equipment for use by the inspection team in the inspection area, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can. 60. During the on-site inspection the inspection team shall have, inter alia: (a) The right to determine how the inspection will proceed, consistent with the inspection mandate and taking into account any steps taken by the inspected State Party consistent with the provisions on managed access; (b) The right to modify the inspection plan, as necessary, to ensure the effective execution of the inspection; (c) The obligation to take into account the recommendations and suggested modifications by the inspected State Party to the inspection plan; (d) The right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that may arise during the inspection; (e) The obligation to use only those techniques specified in Paragraph 69 and to refrain from activities that are not relevant to the purpose of the inspection. The team shall collect and document such facts as are related to the purpose of the inspection, but shall neither seek nor document information that is clearly unrelated thereto. Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall be returned to the inspected State Party; (f) The obligation to take into account and include in its report data and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request, provided by the inspected State Party from the national monitoring networks of the inspected State Party and from other sources; (g) The obligation to provide the inspected State Party, at its request, with copies of the information and data collected in the inspection area; and (h) The obligation to respect the confidentiality and the safety and health regulations of the inspected State Party.
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61. During the on-site inspection the inspected State Party shall have, inter alia: (a) The right to make recommendations at any time to the inspection team regarding possible modification of the inspection plan; (b) The right and the obligation to provide a representative to liaise with the inspection team; (c) The right to have representatives accompany the inspection team during the performance of its duties and observe all inspection activities carried out by the inspection team. This shall not delay or otherwise hinder the inspection team in the exercise of its functions; (d) The right to provide additional information and to request the collection and documentation of additional facts it believes are relevant to the inspection; (e) The right to examine all photographic and measurement products as well as samples and to retain any photographs or parts thereof showing sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. The inspected State Party shall have the right to receive duplicate copies of all photographic and measurement products. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain photographic originals and first-generation photographic products and to put photographs or parts theriof under joint seal within its territory. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own camera operator to take still/video photographs as requested by the inspection team. Otherwise, these functions shall be performed by members of the inspection team; (f) The right to provide the inspection team, from its national monitoring networks and from other sources, with data and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request; and (g) The obligation to provide the inspection team with such clarification as may be necessary to resolve any ambiguities that arise during the inspection.
Communications 62. The members of the inspection team shall have the right at all times during the on-site inspection to communicate with each other and with the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the inspected
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State Party, to the extent that the inspected State Party does not provide them with access to other' telecommunications. Observer 63. In accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 61, the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry or basing point as the inspection team within a reasonable period of the arrival of the inspection team. 64. The observer shall have the right throughout the inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the inspected State Party or, in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself. 65. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the inspection area and to have access to and within the inspection area as granted by the inspected State Party. 66. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the inspection team throughout the inspection. 67. Throughout the inspection, the inspection team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the inspection and the findings. 68. Throughout the inspection, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the inspection team as described in Paragraph 11. All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the inspected State Party shall be borne by the requesting State Party.
Inspection Activities and Techniques 69. The following inspection activities may be conducted and techniques used, in accordance with the provisions on managed access, on collection, handling and analysis of samples, and on overflights: (a) Position finding from the air and at the surface to confirm the boundaries of the inspection area and establish coordinates of locations therein, in support of the inspection activities; (b) Visual observation, video and still photography and multispectral imaging, including infrared measurements, at and below the surface, and from the air, to search for anomalies or artifacts; (c) Measurement of levels of radioactivity above, at and below the surface, using gamma radiation monitoring and energy res,olution analysis from the air, and at or under the surface, to search for and identify radiation anomalies;
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(d) Environmental sampling and analysis of solids, liquids and
gases from above, at and below the surface to detect anomalies; (e) Passive seismological monitoring for aftershocks to localize the search area and facilitate determination of the nature of an event; (f) Resonance seismometry and active seismic surveys to search for and locate underground anomalies, including cavities and rubble zones; (g) Magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground penetrating radar and electrical conductivity measurements at the surface and from the air, as appropriate, to detect anomalies or artifacts; and (h) Drilling to obtain radioactive samples. 70. Up to 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 46, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in Paragraph 69 (a) to (e). Following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with Article IV,Paragraph 47, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in Paragraph 69 (a) to (g). The inspection team shall only conduct drilling after the approval of the Executive Council in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 48. If the inspection team requests an extension of the inspection duration in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 49, it shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in Paragraph 69 it intends to carry out in order to be able to fulfil its mandate. Overflights 71. The inspection team shall have the right to conduct an overflight over the inspection area during the on-site inspection for the purposes of providing the inspection team with a general orientation of the inspection area, narrowing down and optimizing the locations for ground-based inspection and facilitating the collection of factual evidence, using equipment specified in Paragraph 79. 72. The overflight shall be conducted as soon as practically possible. The total duration of the overflight over the inspection area shall be no more than 12 hours. 73. Additional overflights using equipment specified in Paragraphs 79 and 80 may be conducted subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party.
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74. The area to be covered by overflights shall not extend beyond the inspection area. 75. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. Restrictions may relate to the flight altitude, the number of passes and circling, the duration of hovering, the type of aircraft, the number of inspectors on board, and the type of measurements or observations. If the inspection team considers that the restrictions or prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites may impede the fulfilment of its mandate, the inspected State Party shall make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means of inspection. 76. Overflights shall be conducted according to a flight plan duly filed and approved in accordance with aviation rules and regulations of the inspected State Party. Flight safety regulations of the inspected State Party shall be strictly observed throughout all flying operations. 77. During overflights landing should normally be authorized only for purposes of staging or refueling. 78. Overflights shall be conducted at altitudes as requested by the inspection team consistent with the activities to be conducted, visibility conditions, as well as the aviation and the safety regulations of the inspected State Party and its right to protect sensitive information not related to the purposes of the inspection. Overflights shall be conducted up to a maximum altitude of 1500 metres above the surface. 79. For the overflight conducted pursuant to Paragraphs 71 and 72, the following equipment may be used on board the aircraft: (a) Field glasses; (b) Passive location-finding equipment; (c) Video cameras; and (dl Hand-held still cameras. 80. For any additional overflights conducted pursuant to Paragraph 73, inspectors on board the aircraft may also use portable, easily installed equipment for: (a) Multi-spectral (including infrared) imagery; (b) Gamma spectroscopy; and (c) Magnetic field mapping. 81. Overflights shall be conducted with a relatively slow fixed or rotary wing aircraft. The aircraft shall afford a broad, unobstructed view of the surface below.
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82. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own aircraft, pre-equipped as appropriate in accordance with the technical requirements of the relevant operational manual, and crew. Otherwise, the aircraft shall be provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat. 83. If the aircraft is provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat, the inspected State Party shall have the right to check the aircraft to ensure that it is equipped with approved inspection equipment. Such checking shall be completed within the time-frame specified in Paragraph
84. Personnel on board the aircraft shall consist of: (a) The minimum number of flight crew consistent with the safe operation of the aircraft; (b) Up to four members of the inspection team; (c) Up to two representatives of the inspected State Party; (dl An observer, if any, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party; and (e) An interpreter, if necessary. 85. Procedures for the implementation of overflights shall be detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.
Managed Access 86. The inspection team shall have the right to access the inspection area in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 87. The inspected State Party shall provide access within the inspection area in accordance with the time-frame specified in Paragraph 57. 88. Pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 57 and Paragraph 86 above, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall include: (a) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations in accordance with this Protocol; (b) The obligation, when access is restricted within the inspection area, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the inspection mandate through alternative means. Resolving any questions regarding one or more aspects of the inspection shall not delay or interfere with the conduct of the inspection team of other aspects of the inspection; and (c) The right to make the final decision regarding any access of the inspection team, taking into account its obligations under this Treaty and the provisions on managed access.
192 Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control & Non-proliferation 89. Pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 57 (b) and Paragraph 88 (a) above, the inspected State Party shall have the right throughout the inspection area to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection. Such measures may include, inter alia: (a) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment; (b) Restricting measurements of radionuclide activity and nuclear radiation to determining the presence or absence of those types and energies of radiation relevant to the purpose of the inspection; (c) Restricting the taking of or analysing of samples to determining the presence or absence of radioactive or other products relevant to the purpose of the inspection; (d) Managing access to buildings and other structures in accordance with Paragraphs 90 and 91; and (el Declaring restricted-access sites in accordance with Paragraphs 92 to 96. 90. Access to buildings and other structures shall be deferred until after the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 47, except for access to buildings and other structures housing the entrance to a mine, other excavations, or caverns of large volume not otherwise accessible. For such buildings and structures, the inspection team shall have the right only of transit, as directed by the inspected State Party, in order to enter such mines, caverns or other excavations. 91. If, following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with Article IV, Paragraph 47, the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that access to buildings and other structures is necessary to fulfil the inspection mandate and that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside, the inspection team shall have the right to gain access to such buildings or other structures. The head of the inspection team shall request access to a specific building or structure indicating the purpose of such access, the specific number of inspectors, as well as the intended activities. The modalities for access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions, on the access to buildings and other structures. 92. When restricted-access sites are declared pursuant to Paragraph 89 (e), each such site shall be no larger than four square kilometres. The
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inspected State Party has the right to declare up to 50 square kilometers of restricted-access sites. If more than one restricted-access site is declared, each such site shall be separated from any other such site by a minimum distance of 20 metres. Each restricted-access site shall have clearly defined and accessible boundaries.
93. The size, location, and boundaries of restricted-access sites shall be presented to the head of the inspection team no later than the time that the inspection team seeks access to a location that contains all or part of such a site. 94. The inspection team shall have the right to place equipment and take other steps necessary to conduct its inspection up to the boundary of a restricted-access site. 95. The inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually all open places within the restricted-access site from the boundary of the site. 96. The inspection team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the inspection mandate outside the declared restricted-access sites prior to requesting access to such sites. If at any time the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside and that access to a restricted-access site is necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the inspection team shall be granted access to accomplish specific tasks within the site. The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud or otherwise protect sensitive equipment, objects and materials not related to the purpose of the inspection. The number of inspectors shall be kept to the minimum necessary to complete the tasks related to the inspection. The modalities for such access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. Collection, Handling and Analysis of Samples
97. Subject to Paragraphs 86 to 96 and 98 to 100, the inspection team shall have the right to collect and remove relevant samples from the inspection area. 98. Whenever possible, the inspection team shall analyze samples on-site. Representatives of the inspected State Party shall have the right to be present when samples are analyzed on-site. At the request of the inspection team, the inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, provide assistance for the analysis of samples onsite. The inspection team shall have the right to transfer samples for off-site analysis at laboratories designated by the Organization only if
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it demonstrates that the necessary sample analysis can not be performed on-site. 99. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain portions of all samples collected when these samples are analysed and may take duplicate samples. 100. The inspected State Party shall have the right to request that any unused samples or portions thereof be returned. 101. The designated laboratories shall conduct chemical and physical analysis of the samples transferred for off-site analysis. Details of such analysis shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. 102. The Director General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred for off-site analysis is protected. The Director General shall do so in accordance with procedures contained in the Operational Manual fur On-Site Inspections. The Director General shall, in any case: Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling, transport and analysis of samples; Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis; Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these designated laboratories and of mobile analytical equipment and procedures; Monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these laboratories and in relation to mobile equipment and procedures; and Select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations. 103. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analyzed in at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis. The samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat. 104. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis of samples relevant to the purpose of the inspection. Pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 63, the Director General shall transmit any such results promptly to the inspected State Party for comments and thereafter to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties
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and shall include detailed information concerning the equipment and methodology employed by the designated laboratories.
Conduct of Inspections in Areas beyond the Jurisdiction or Control of any State 105. In case of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State, the Director General shall consult with the appropriate States Parties and agree on any transit or basing points to facilitate a speedy arrival of the inspection team in the inspection area. 106. The States Parties on whose territory transit or basing points are located shall, as far as possible, assist in facilitating the inspection, including transporting the inspection team, its baggage and equipment to the inspection area, as well as providing the relevant amenities specified in Paragraph 11. The Organization shall reimburse assisting States Parties for all costs incurred. 107. Subject to the approval of the Executive Council, the Director General may negotiate standing arrangements with States Parties to facilitate assistance in the event of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State. 108. In cases where one or more States Parties have conducted an investigation of an ambiguous event in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State before a request is made for an on-site inspection in that area, any results of such investigation may be taken into account by the Executive Council in its deliberations pursuant to Article IV. Post-Inspection Procedures 109. Upon conclusion of the inspection, the inspection team shall meet with the representative of the inspected State Party to review the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide the representative of the inspected State Party with its preliminary findings in written form according to a standardized format, together with a list of any samples and other material taken from the inspection area pursuant to Paragraph 98. The document shall be signed by the head of the inspection team. In order .to indicate that he or she has taken notice of the contents of the document, the representative of the inspected State Party shall countersign the document. The meeting shall be completed no later than 24 hours after the conclusion of the inspection. Departure 110. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team and the observer shall leave, as soon as possible, the
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territory of the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, equipment and baggage to the point of exit. Unless agreed otherwise by the inspected State Party and the inspection team, the point of exit used shall be the same as the point of entry.
PART 111.-CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 1. Pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 68, each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, provide the Technical Secretariat with notification of any chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a single explosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jurisdiction or control. If possible, such notification shall be provided in advance. Such notification shall include details on location, time, quantity and type of explosive used, as well as on the configuration and intended purpose of the blast. 2. Each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Treaty provide to the Technical Secretariat, and at annual intervals thereafter update, information related to its national use of all other chemical explosions greater than 300 tonnes TNT-equivalent. In particular, the State Party shall seek to advise: (a) The geographic locations of sites where the explosions originate; (b) The nature of activities producing them and the general profile and frequency of such explosions; (c) Any other relevant detail, if available; and to assist the Technical Secretariat in clarifying the origins of any such event detected by the International Monitoring System. 3. A State Party may, on a voluntary and mutually-acceptable basis, invite representatives of the Technical Secretariat or of other States Parties to visit sites within its territory referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2. 4. For the purpose of calibrating the International Monitoring System, States Parties may liaise with the Technical Secretariat to carry out chemical calibration explosions or to provide relevant information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes.
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ANNEX 1
TO THE PRBTOCOL Table 1-A: List of Seismological Stations Comprising the Primary Network #
State
Location
Latitude
Longitude
Type
Responsible for Station 1 Argentina
PLCAPaso Flores
40.7 S
70.6 W
3-C
2
Australia
WRAWarramunga, NT
19.9 S
134.3 E
array
3
Australia
ASARAlice Springs, NT
23.7 S
133.9 E
array
141.6 E
3-C
4
Australia
STKAStephens Creek, SA
31.9 S
5
Australia
MAWMawson, Antarctica
67.6 S
62.9 E
3-C
6
Bolivia
LPAZLa Paz
16.3 S
68.1 W
3-C
7
Brazil
BDFBBrasilia
15.6 S
48.0 W
3-C
8
Canada
ULMCLac d u Bonnet, Man.
50.2 N
95.9 W
3-C
9
Canada
YKACYellowknife,N.W.T.
62.5 N
114.6 W
array
1 0 Canada
SCHSchefferville,Quebec
54.8 N
66.8 W
3-C
1 1 Central African Republic
BGCABangui
05.2 N
18.4 E
3-C
1 2 China
HAIHailar
49.3 N
119.7 E
3-C >array
1 3 China
LZHLanzhou
36.1 N
103.8 E
3-C >array
1 4 Colombia
XSAEl Rosal
04.9 N
74.3 W
3-C
1 5 CBte dlIvoire
DBICDimbroko
06.7 N
04.9 W
3-C
1 6 Egypt 1 7 Finland
LXEGLuxor
26.0 N
33.0 E
array
FINESLa hti
61.4 N
26.1 E
array
18 France
PPTTahiti
17.6 S
149.6 W
3-C
1 9 Germany
GEC2Freyung
48.9 N
13.7 E
array
20
To be determined
To be determined
To be determined
21
Iran (Islamic Republic oO
THRTehran
35.8 N
51.4 E
3-C
22 Japan
MJARMatsushiro
36.5 N
138.2 E
array
2 3 Kazakstan
MAKMakanchi
46.8 N
82.0 E
array
24
KMBOKilimambogo
01.1
s
37.2 E
3-C
25 Mongolia
JAVMJavhlant
48.0 N
106.8 E
3-C >array
26
New Site
To be determined
To be determined
3-C > array
Kenya Niger
To be To be determined determined
198 #
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation State Responsible for Station
Location
Latitude
Longitude
Type
27 Norway
NAOHamar
60.8 N
10.8 E
array
28 Norway
ARAOKarasjok
69.5 N
25.5 E
array
29
PRPKPari
33.7 N
73.3 E
array
Pakistan
30 Paraguay
CPUPVilla Florida
26.3 S
57.3 W
3-C
KSRSWonju
37.5 N
127.9 E
array
To be determined
To bc determined
array
31
Republic of Korea
32
Russian Federa tion
43.7 N
3 3 Russian Federa tion
53.9 N
34
Russian Federa tion
69.0 N
3 5 Russian Federation
59.6 N
36
Russian Federa tion
PET PetropavlovskKamchatskiy
53.1 N
3 7 Russian Federation
USKUssuriysk
44.2 N
38 Saudi Arabia
New Site
39 South Africa
BOSABoshof
28.6 S
25.6 E
3-C
40 Spain
ESDCSonseca
39.7 N
04.0 W
array
41 Thailand
CMTOChiang Mai
18.8 N
99.0 E
array
42
THAThala
35.6 N
08.7 E
3-C
BRTR Belbashi
39.9 N
32.8 E
array
Tunisia
43 Turkey
The array is subject
to relocation at Keskin 44
Turkmenistan
GEYTAlibeck
37.9 N
58.1 E
array
45
Ukraine
AKASGMalin
50.4 N
29.1 E
array
46
U.S.A.
LJTXLajitas, TX
29.3 N
103.7 W
array
47
U.S.A.
MNVMina, NV
38.4 N
118.2 W
array
48 U.S.A.
PIWYPinedale, WY
42.8 N
109.6 W
array
49
ELAKEielson, AK
64.8 N
146.9 W
array
VNDAVanda, Antarctica
77.5 S
161.9 E
3-C
U.S.A.
50 U.S.A.
Key: 3-C > array: indicates that the site could start operations in the International Monitoring System as a three-component station and be upgraded to an array at a later time.
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Table 1-B: List of Seismological Stations Comprising the Auxiliary Network #
State Responsible for Station
1 Argentina
Location
CFA Coronel Fontana
2
Argentina
USHA Ushuaia
3
Armenia
GNI Garni
4
Australia
CTA Charters Towers, QLD
5 Australia
FITZ Fitzroy Crossing, WA
6
Australia
NWAO Narrogin, WA
7
Bangladesh
CHT Chittagong
8
Bolivia
SIVSan Ignacio
9
Botswana
LBTB Lobatse
I0
Brazil
PTGA Pitinga
11
Brazil
RGNB Rio Grande do Norte
1 2 Canada
FRB lqaluit, N.W.T.
13 Canada
DLBC Dease Lake, B.C.
14
Canada
SAD0 Sadowa, Ont.
15
Canada
BBB Bella Bella, B.C.
16
Canada
MBC Mould Bay, N.W.T.
17 Canada
INKInuvik, N.W.T.
Chile
RPN Easter Island
19 Chile
LVC Limon Verde
20 China
BJT Baijiatuan
18
21
China
KMI Kunming
22
China
SSE Sheshan
2 3 China
XANXi'an
24 Cook Islands
RAR Rarotonga
25 Costa Rica
JTSLas Juntas de Abangares
26
Czech Republic VRACVranov
27 Denmark
SFJSondre Stromfjord, Greenland
28
Djibouti
ATDArta Tunnel
29
Egypt
KEGKottamya
30
Ethiopia
FURIFuri
31 Fiji
MSVF Monasavu, Viti Levu
Latitude
Longitude
Type
200 #
32
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control t3 Non-proliferation State Responsible for Station
b c a tion
France
NOU CPort Laguerre,
Latitude
Longitude
Type
22.1 S
166.3 E
3-C
New Caledonia 3 3 France
KOG Kourou, French Guiana
34
BAMBBambay
Gabon
3 5 Germany/
36
South Africa
SANAE Station, Antarctica
Greece
IDIAnogia, Crete
35.3 N
24.9 E
3-C
37 Guatemala
RDGRabir
15.0 N
90.5 W
3-C
38 Iceland
BORGBorgarnes
64.8 N
21.3 W
3-C
39
To be determined
To be determined
40
Indonesia
PACICibinong, Jawa Barat
4 1 Indonesia 42 Indonesia
JAYJayapura, Irian Jaya SWISorong, lrian Jaya PSIParapat, Sumatera
To be determined
0.9 S
To be To be determined determined
131.3 E
3-C
2.7 N
98.9 E
3-C
44 Indonesia
KAPIKappang, Sulawesi Selatan
5.0 S
119.8 E
3-C
45 Indonesia
KUGKupang, Nusatenggara Timur
10.2 S
123.6 E
3-C
46 Iran (Islamic Republic of)
KRMKerman
47
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
MSNMasjed-eSoleyman
48
Israel Israel
MBHEilath PARDParod
34.9 E 35.3 E
3-C array
5 0 Italy
ENASEnna, Sicily
14.3 E
3-C
51 Japan
JNUOhita, Kyushu
130.9 E
3-C
52 Japan
JOWKunigami, Okinawa
128.3 E
3-C
5 3 Japan
JHJHachijojima, Izu Islands
54 Japan
JKAKamikawa-asahi, Hokkaido
142.6 E
3-C
43 Indonesia
49
44.1 N
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans #
State Responsible
Lacation
Latitude
Longitude
201
Type
for Station 55 Japan
JCJ Chichijima, Ogasawara
56 Jordan
-Ashqof
3-C 3-C
BRVK Borovoye
array
58 Kazakstan
KURK Kurchatov
array
59 Kazakstan
AKTOAktyubinsk
3-C
6 0 Kyrgyzstan
AAK Ala-Archa
3-C
6 1 Madagascar
TAN Antananarivo
3-C
62 Mali
KOWA Kowa
3-C
63 Mexico
TEYM Tepich, Yucatan
3-C
TUVM Tuzandepeti, Veracruz
3-C
65 Mexico
LPBMLa Paz, Baja California Sur
3-C
66 Morocco
MDTMidelt
3-C
57
64
Kazakstan
Mexico
TSUMTsumeb
3-C
68 Nepal
EVNEverest
3-C
69 New Zealand
EWZErewhon, South Island
3-C
70 New Zealand
RAORaoul Island
3-C
UPZUrewera, North Island
3-C
67
71
Namibia
New Zealand
array
72 Norway
SPITS Spitsbergen
73 Norway
JMI Jan Mayen
3-C
74 Oman
WSAR Wadi Sarin
3-C
75 Papua New Guinea
PMG Port Moresby
3-C
76 Papua New Guinea 77 Peru
BIAL Bialla
3-C
CAJP Cajamarca
3-C
78 Peru
NNA Nana
3-C
79 Philippines
DAV Davao, Mindanao
3-C
80 Philippines
TGY Tagaytay, Luzon
3-C
81 Romania
MLR Muntele Rosu
3-C
KIRV Kirov
3-C
82
Russian
8 3 Russian Federation 8 4 Russian Federation
KIVO Kislovodsk OBNObninsk
array 3-C
202
#
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-vroliferation State
Location
Latitude
Longitude
Type
Responsible for Station 8 5 Russian Federation 86 Russian Federa tion 87 Russian Federation 8 8 Russian Federa tion 89 Russian Federa tion 90 Russian Federation 91 Russian Federation 92 Russian Federa tion 93 Russian Federation 94 Russian Federation 95 Samoa 96 Saudi Arabia 9 7 Senegal 9 8 Solomon Islands 99 South Africa 100 Sri Lanka 101 Sweden 102 Switzerland
103 Uganda U.K. 105 U.S.A.
104
106 U.S.A.
ARU Arti
3-C
SEY Seymchan
3-C 3-C
YAKYakutsk
3-C
URGUrgal
3-C
3-C TIXITiksi
3-C
~SS~uzhnoSakhalinsk MA2Magadan
3-C 3-C
ZILZilim
3-C
AFIAfiamalu RAYNAr Rayn MBO Mbour HNR Honiara, Guadalcanal SUR Sutherland COC Colombo HPS Hagfors DAVOS Davos
3-C 3-C 3-C 3-C
MBRU Mbarara EKA Eskdalemuir GUM0 Guam, Marianas Islands PMSAPalmer Station, Antarctica
3-C 3-C array 3-C 3-C array 3-C 3-C
107 U.S.A.
TKLTuckaleechee Caverns, TN
3-C
108 U.S.A.
PFCAPiiion Flat, CA
3-C
109 U.S.A.
YBHYreka, CA
3-C
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans
Type
Location
Latitude
110 U.S.A.
KDCKodiak Island, AK
57.8 N
152.5 W
3-C
111 U S A .
ALQAlbuquerque, NM
35.0 N
106.5 W
3-C
112 U.S.A.
ATTU Attu Island, AK
52.8 N
172.7 E
3-C
113 U.S.A.
ELKElko, NV
40.7 N
115.2 W
3-C
114 U.S.A.
SPA South Pole, Antarctica
90.0 S
-
3-C
115 U.S.A.
NEW Newport, WA
48.3 N
117.1 W
3-C
116 U.S.A.
SJG San Juan, PR
18.1 N
66.2 W
3-C
#
State
Longitude
203
Responsible for Station
117 Venezuela
SDV Santo Domingo
8.9 N
70.6 W
3-C
118 Venezuela
PCRV Puerto la Cruz
10.2 N
64.6 W
3-C
119 Zambia
LSZ Lusaka
15.3 S
28.2 E
3-C
120 Zimbabwe
BUL Bulawavo
to be advised to be advised
3-C
Table 2-A: List of Radionuclide Stations #
State
Responsible for Station
1 Argentina 2 Argentina
Buenos Aires Salta
3
Bariloche
Argentina
4 Australia 5 Australia
Mawson, Antarctica
6
Australia
Townsville, QLD
Melbourne, VIC
7
Australia
Macquarie Island
8
Australia
Cocos Islands
9
Australia
Darwin, NT
10 Australia
Perth, WA
11 Brazil
Rio de Janeiro
I 2 Brazil
Recife
1 3 Cameroon
Douala
14 Canada
Vancouver, B.C.
15 Canada
Resolute, N.W.T.
1 6 Canada
Yellowknife, N.W.T.
1 7 Canada
St. John's, N.L.
1 8 Chile
Punta Arenas
19 Chile
Hanga Roa, Easter Island,
20 China
.Beijing
21 China
Lanzhou
Location
Latitude Longitude
204 #
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation State
22 China 23 Cook Islands 24 Ecuador 25
Ethiopia
Responsible for Station
Location
Latitude Longitude
Guangzhou
23.0 N 21.2 s 1.0 S
113.3 E 159.8 W 89.2 W
5.5 N
42.7 E
Rarotonga Isla San Cristbbal, Galiipagos Islands Filtu
26 Fiji
Nadi
18.0 S
177.5 E
27 France 28 France 29 France
Papeete, Tahiti
17.0 S 17.0 N 21.1 S 49.0 S
150.0 W 62.0 W 55.6 E 70.0 E
5.0 N 66.0 S 47.9 N
52.0 W 140.0 E 7.9 E
64.4 N To be determined 35.0 N
21.9 W To be determined 52.0 E
26.5 N 36.3 N 2.0 N 29.0 N 32.5 N 2.6 N
127.9 E 139.0 E 157.0 W
Pointe-A-Pitre, Guadeloupe Rhnion
30 France 31 France
Cayenne, French Guiana
32 France
Dumont d'urville, Antarctica
33 Germany
~chauinsland/~reibur~
34 Iceland
Reykjavik
35 To be determined 36 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 37 Japan 38 Japan 39 Kiribati 40 Kuwait 41 Libya 42 Malaysia
To be determined
Okinawa Takasaki, Gunma
43 Mauritania 44 Mexico
Nouakchott Baja California
N
17.0 W
28.0 N
113.0 W
45 Mongolia
Ulaanbaatar
47.5 N
107.0 E
46 New Zealand 47 New Zealand 48 Niger
Chatham Island
49 Norway
Spitsbergen
176.5 W 173.3 E 13.0 E 16.4 E
50 Panama 51 Papua New Guinea 52 Philippines
Panama City New Hanover
44.0 S 35.1 S 18.0 N 78.2 N 8.9 N 3.0 S
Quezon City
14.5 N
121.0 E
53 Portugal
Ponta Delgada, S o Miguel, Azores
37.4 N
25.4
W
Kirvov
58.6 N
49.4
E
54
Russian
Port-aux-Francais, Kerguelen
Tehran
Kiritimati Kuwait City Misratah Kuala Lumpur
Kaitaia Bilma
18.0
48.0 E 15.0 E 101.5 E
79.6 W 150.0 E
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans #
State
Responsible for Station
55 Russian Federation
Norilsk
56 Russian Federation 57 Russian Federation 58 Russian Federation
Peleduy
59 Russian Federation 60 Russian Federa tion 61 Russian Kamchatskiy
Zalesovo
62 South Africa 63 Sweden 64 Tanzania
Marion Island
65 Thailanq
Bangkok
66 U.K.
BIOT/Chagos Archipelago
67 U.K. 68 U.K.
St. Helena
69 U.K.
Halley, Antarctica
70 U.S.A. 71 U.S.A. 72 U.S.A.
Sacramento, CA Sand Point, AK
73 U.S.A.
Palmer Station, Antarctica Ashland, KS
74 U.S.A.
Bilibino Ussuriysk
PetropavlovskKamchatskiy Dubna
Stockholm Dar es Salaam
Tristan da Cunha
Melbourne, FL
75 U.S.A.
Charlottesville, VA
76 U.S.A.
Salchaket, AK
77 U.S.A. 78 U.S.A. 79 U.S.A.
Wake Island Midway Islands Oahu, HI
80 U.S.A.
Uvi. Guam
Location
205
Latitude Longitude
206
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation Table 2-B: List of Radionuclide Laboratories
State Responsible for Laboratory
#
Name and place of laboratory
Argentina
National Board of Nuclear Regulation, Buenos Aires
Australia
Australian Radiation Laboratory, Melbourne, VIC
Austria
Austrian Research Center, Seibersdorf
Brazil
Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry Rio de Janeiro
Canada
Health Canada, Ottawa, Ont.
China
Beijing
Finland
Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, Helsinki
France
Atomic Energy Commission, Montlhery
Israel
Soreq Nuclear Research Centre, Yavne
Italy
Labortory of the National Agency for the Protection of the Enivironment, Rome
Japan New Zealand
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Tokai, Ibaraki
Russian Federation
Central Radiation Control Laboratory, Ministry of Defense Special Verification Service, Moscow
National Radiation Laboratory, Christchurch
South Africa
Atomic Energy Corporation, Pelindaba
U.K.
AWE Blacknest, Chilton
U.S.A.
McClellan Central Laboratories, Sacramento, CA
Table 3: List of Hydroacoustic Stations #
State
Responsible for
Location
Lutitude
Longitude
Station 1
Australia
Cape Leeuwin,
34.4 S WA
115.1 E
Hydrophone
2
Canada
Queen Charlotte Islands, B.C.
53.3 N
132.5 W
T-phase
3
Chile
Juan Fernhdez Island
33.7 S
78.8 W
Hydrophone
4
France
Crozet Islands
46.5 S
52.2 E
Hydrophone
5
France
Guadeloupe
16.3 N
61.1 W
T-phase
6
Mexico
Clari6n Island
18.2 N
114.6 W
T-phase
7
Portugal
Flores
39.3 N
31.3 W
T-phase
8
U.K.
BIOT/Chagos
7.3 S Archipelago
72.4 E
Hydrophone
9
U.K.
Tristan da Cunha
37.2 S
12.5 W
T-phase
10
U.S.A.
Ascension
8.0 S
14.4 W
Hydrophone
11
U.S.A.
Wake Island
19.3 N
166.6 E
Hvdro~hone
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Bans 207
Table 4: List of Infrasound Stations Location
Latitude
#
State
Responsible for Station
1
Argentina
Paso Flores
70.6 W
2
Argentina
Ushuaia
68.0 W
3
Australia
Davis Base, Antarctica
77.6 E
4
Australia
Narrogin, WA
117.2 E
5
Australia
Hobart, TAS
147.2 E
6
Australia
Cocos Islands
97.0 E
7
Australia
Warramunga, NT
134.3 E
8
Bolivia
La Paz
68.1 W
9
Brazil
Brasilia
48.0 W
10
Canada
Lac d u Bonnet, Man.
95.9 W
11
Cape Verde
Cape Verde Islands
24.0 W
12
Central African Republic
Bangui
18.4 E
13
Chile
Easter Island
27.0 S
109.2 W
14
Chile
Juan Ferndndez Island
33.8 S
80.7 W
15
China
Beijing
40.0 N
116.0 E
16
China
Kunming
25.0 N
102.8 E
17
CBte d'lvoire
Dimbokro
6.7 N
4.9 W
18
Denmark
Dundas, Greenland
76.5 N
68.7 W
19
Djibouti
Djibouti
11.3 N
43.5 E
20
Ecuador
Galdpagos Islands
0.0 N
91.7 W
21
France
Marquesas Islands
10.0 N
140.0 W
22
France
Port LaGuerre, New Caledonia 22.1 S
166.3 E
23
France
Kerguelen
49.2 S
69.1 E
24
France
Tahiti
17.6 S
149.6 W
25
France
Kourou, French Guiana
5.2 N
52.7 W
26
Germany
Freyung
48.9 N
13.7 E
27
Germany
Georg von Neumayer, Antarctica
70.6 S
8.4 W
28
To be determined
To be determined
29
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Tehran
51.4 E
30
Japan
Tsukuba
140.1 E
31
Kazakstan
Aktvubinsk
58.0 E
To be To be determined determined
Longitude
208
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-vroliferation Kenya
Kilmanbogo
Madagascar
Antananarivo
Mongolia
Javhlant
Namibia
Tsumeb
New Zealand Chatham Island
60
Norway
Karasjok
Pakistan
Rahimyar Khan
Palau
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Rabaul
Paraguay
Villa Florida
Portugal
Azores
Russian Federation
Dubna
Russian Federation
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy
Russian Federation
Ussuriysk
Russian Federation
Zalesovo
South Africa
Boshof
Tunisia
Thala
U.K.
Tristan da Cunha
U.K.
Ascension
U.K.
Bermuda
U.K.
BIOTKhagos Archipelago
U.S.A.
Eielson, AK
U.S.A.
Siple Station, Antarctica
U.S.A.
Windless Bight, Antarctica
U.S.A.
Newport, WA
U.S.A.
Pinon Flat, CA
U.S.A.
Midway Islands
U.S.A.
Hawaii, HI
U.S.A.
Wake Island
19.3 N
166.6 W
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans
209
ANNEX 2 THE PROTOCOL List of Characterization Parameters for International Data Centre Standard Event Screening 1. The International Data Centre standard event screening criteria shall be based on the standard event characterization parameters determined during the combined processing of data from all the monitoring technologies in the International Monitoring System. Standard event screening shall make use of both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable. 2. For events detected by the International Monitoring System seismic component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: location of the event; depth of the event; ratio of the magnitude of surface waves to body waves; signal frequency content; spectral ratios of phases; spectral scalloping; first motion of the P-wave; focal mechanism; relative excitation of seismic phases; comparative measures to other events and groups of events; and regional discriminants where applicable. 3. For events detected by the International Monitoring System hydroacoustic component, the following parameters, infer alia, may be used: signal frequency content including corner frequency, wideband energy and mean centre frequency and bandwidth; frequency-dependent duration of signals; spectral ratio; and indications of bubble-pulse signals and bubble-pulse delay. 4. For events detected by the International Monitoring System infrasound component, the following parameters, infer alia, may be used: signal frequency content and dispersion;
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control 6 Non-proliferation
signal duration; and peak amplitude. 5. For events detected by the International Monitoring System radionuclide component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: concentration of background natural and man-made radionuclides; concentration of specific fission and activation products outside normal observations; and ratios of one specific fission and activation product to another.
CTBT RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY September 20, 2996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty The General Assembly, Recalling its Resolution 50/65 of 12 December 1995, in which the Assembly declared its readiness to resume consideration of the item "Comprehensive test-ban treaty", as necessary, before its fifty-first session in order to endorse the text of a comprehensive nuclear-testban treaty, 1. Adopts the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as contained in document A/50/1027; 2. Requests the Secretary General, as depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature, at United Nations Headquarters, at the earliest possible date; 3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Treaty at the earliest possible date; 4. Also requests the Secretary General, as depositary of the Treaty, to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session on the status of signature and ratifications of the Treaty.
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Tesf-Bans
211
RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION Adopted by the States Signatories, November 19, 1996 The States Signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 10 September 1996, Having decided to take all necessary measures to ensure the rapid and effective establishment of the future Comprehensive Nuclear TestBan Treaty Organization, Having decided to this end to establish a Preparatory Commission, 1. Approve the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, as annexed to the present resolution; 2. Request the Secretary General of the United Nations, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 50/245, of 10 September 1996, on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, to provide the services required to initiate the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, including the Meeting of States Signatories and the First Session of the Preparatory Commission.
ANNEX
TEXT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION 1. There is hereby established the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and for preparing for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to that Treaty. 2. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall convene the Commission for its first session as soon as possible, but not later than 60 days after the Treaty has been signed by 50 States. 3. The seat of the Commission shall be at the seat of the future Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control b Non-proliferation
4. The Commission shall be composed of all States which sign the Treaty. Each State Signatory shall have one representative in the Commission, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 5.(a) The costs of the Commission and its activities, including those of the provisional Technical Secretariat, shall be met annually by all States Signatories, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and States Signatories and timing of signature. The Commission and the provisional Technical Secretariat may also benefit from voluntary contributions; (b) A State Signatory which has not discharged in full its financial obligations to the Commission within 365 days of receipt of the request for payment shall have no vote in the Commission, until such payment is received. The Commission may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member; (c) The Commission shall, between the time the Treaty is opened for signature and the conclusion of the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties, use funds provided by the States Signatories to meet the necessary costs arising from its functions and purposes, including the capital investments and operating and maintenance costs to establish and, pending their formal commissioning, to operate provisionally as necessary the International Data Centre and the International Monitoring System networks provided for in the Treaty. The funding by the Commission shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, adjusted to take into account the organizational differences between the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Commission. The Preparatory Commission shall develop the funding procedures in cases not covered by the Treaty. 6..All decisions of the Commission should be taken by consensus. If, notwithstanding the efforts of representatives to achieve consensus, an issue comes up for voting, the Chairman of the Commission shall defer the vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Commission before the end of the period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Commission shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nucleav Ted-Bans
213
and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken by a twothirds majority of the members present and voting. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated a s a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the commission by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. 7. The Commission shall have standing as a n international organization, authority to negotiate and enter into agreements, and such other legal capacity as necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes. 8. The Commission shall: Elect its Chairman and other officers, adopt its rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and establish such committees as it deems useful; Appoint its Executive Secretary; Establish a provisional Technical Secretariat to assist the Commission in its activity and to exercise such functions as the Commission may determine, and appoint the necessary staff in accordance with the principles established for the staff of the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article 11, Paragraph 50, of the Treaty. Only nationals of States Signatories shall be appointed fo the provisional Technical Secretariat; Establish administrative and financial regulations in respect of its own expenditure and accounts, providing for, inter alia: (i) Proper financial control a n d accounting by the Commission; (ii) ~ r e ~ a r d t i oand n approval of periodic financial statements by the Commission; (iii) Independent a u d i t of the Commission's financial statements; (iv) Annual presentation of the audited financial statements to a regular session of the plenary of the States Signatories for formal acceptance.
9. The Commission shall make arrangements for the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties, including the preparation of a draft agenda and draft rules of procedure. 10. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the following tasks concerning the organization and work of the Technical Secretariat and requiring immediate attention after the entry into force of the Treaty:
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Encyclopaedia of Nuclear Arms Control €3 Non-proliferation
(a) Elaboration of a detailed staffing pattern of the Technical Secretariat, including delegation of authority and the process of decision-making; (b) Assessments of personnel requirements; (c) Development of staff rules for recruitment and service conditions; (d) Recruitment and training of technical personnel and support staff; (e) Organization of office and administrative services. 11. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the following tasks on matters of the Organization requiring immediate attention after the entry into force of the Treaty: (a) Preparation of program of work and budget of the first year of activities of the Organization; (b) Preparation of detailed budgetary provisions for the Organization; (c) Preparation of the scale of financial contributions to the Organization; (d) Preparation of administrative and financial regulations for the Organization providing for, inter alia: (i) Proper financial control and accounting by the Organization; (ii) Preparation and approval of periodic financial statements by the Organization; (iii) Independent audit of the Organization's financial statements; (iv) Annual presentation of the audited financial statements to a regular session of the Conference of the States Parties for formal acceptance; (e) Development of arrangements to facilitate the designation and election in accordance with Article 11, Paragraph 29 of the Treaty for the first election of the Executive Council. 12. The Commission shall develop, inter aka, the following draft agreements, arrangements and guidelines for approval by the Conference of the States Parties in accordance with the Treaty and Protocol: (a) Standard model agreements or arrangements, where relevant, to be concluded by the future Organization with States Parties, other States and international organizations;
i
Limited, ~hresholdand
Comprehensive Nuchr Test-Bans 215
(b) Agreements or arrangements negotiated in accordance with the above models by the provisional Technical Secretariat with relevant States, in particular with those prospectively hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for International Monitoring System facilities; (c) The Headquarters Agreement with the Host Country pursuant to Article 11, Paragraph 56, of the Treaty. 13. The Commission shall undertake all necessary preparations to ensure the operationalization of the Treaty's verification regime at entry into force, pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 1, and shall develop appropriate procedures for its operation, presenting a report on the operational readiness of the regime, together with any relevant recommendations, to the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties. 14. The Commission shall supervise and coordinate, in fulfilling the requirements of the Treaty and its Protocol, the development, preparation, technical testing and, pending their formal commissioning, provisional operation as necessary of the International Data Centre and the International Monitoring System, together with assuring appropriate support of the System by certified laboratory facilities and by respective means of communication. Inter alia, the Commission shall: (a) At its second plenary session, taking into consideration all relevant reports, including those prepared in the course of the CTBT negotiation and by the Conference on Disarmament's Group of Scientific Experts: (i) Establish an initial plan for the progressive commissioning of the International Data Centre and the International Monitoring System, and for the implementation of related responsibilities; (ii) Assume responsibility for relevant technical tests, including the work begun under the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test 3, and for the development and management of any arrangements required to provide an uninterrupted transition from such technical tests to the future International Monitoring System; (iii) Constitute appropriate structures for the regular provision to the Commission of expert and integrated technical advice on monitoring, data communications and analysis issues, and for technical supervision of International Monitoring System and International Data Centre implementation;
216
Encyclopaedia of Nuclear A m s Control t3 Non-proliferation (b) Develop in accordance with the Treaty and Protocol, and prepare for adoption by the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties, operational manuals for: (i) Seismological Monitoring; (ii) Radionuclide Monitoring; (iii) Hydroacoustic Monitoring; (iv) Infrasound Monitoring; and (v) The International Data Centre.
15. The Commission shall make all necessary preparations, in fulfilling the requirements of the Treaty and its Protocol, for the support of on-site inspections from the entry into force of the Treaty. It shall, inter alia: (a) Develop and prepare for the approval of the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties: (i) An operational manual containing all appropriate legal, technical and administrative procedures; and (ii) A list of equipment for use during on-site inspections; (b) Develop a programme for the training of inspectors; and (c) Acquire or otherwise make provision for the availability of relevant inspection equipment, including communications equipment, and conduct technical tests of such equipment as necessary. 16. The Commission shall develop guidelines and reporting formats for the implementation of confidence-building measures. 17. An indicative list of verification tasks to be carried out by the Preparatory Commission, as specified in Paragraphs 12 to 16, is attached as the appendix to the present text. 18. The Commission shall: (a) Facilitate the exchange of information between States Signatories concerning legal and administrative measures for the implementation of the Treaty and, if requested by States Signatories, give advice and assistance to them on these matters; (b) Follow the ratification process and, if requested by States Signatories, provide them with legal and technical information and advice about the Treaty in order to facilitate its ratification process; and (c) Prepare such studies, reports and records as it deems necessary.
Limited, Threshold and Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Bans
217
19. The Commission shall prepare a final report on all matters within its mandate for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties. 20. Rights and assets, financial and other obligations and functions of the Commission shall be transferred to the Organization at the first session of the Conference of the States Parties. The Commission shall make recommendations to the Conference of the States Parties on this matter, including on effecting a smooth transition. 21. The Commission shall remain in existence until the conclusion of the first session of the Conference of the States Parties. 22. The 'commission as an international organization, its staff, as well as the delegates of the States Signatories shall be accorded by the Host Country such legal status, privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Commission and the fulfilment of its object and purpose.
APPENDIX INDICATIVE LIST OF VERIFICATION TASKS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION The following indicative list is illustrative of the verification-related tasks the Preparatory Commission might need to undertake in implementing the relevant provisions of the Treaty and of the resolution establishing the Commission. Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 12: Draft agreements, arrangements and guidelines In addition to those items mentioned in the illustrative and explicitly non-exhaustive listing contained in Paragraph 12, the following tasks might also be necessary: Procedures for the conduct of consultation and clarification including for use of data from cooperating national facilities if agreed (Article IV, Paragraphs 27 and 28, and Paragraphs 29 to 33 of the Treaty); Procedures for the Technical Secretariat's monitoring, assessment and reporting on the overall performance of the IMS and the IDC (Article IV, Paragraph 14 (1) of the Treaty); Guidelines for CTBT Organization funding of IMS and OSI activities including for funding of IMS operational and maintenance costs, and for recognition of credit against assessed
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contributions if agreed (Article IV, Paragraphs 19 to 22 of the Treaty); Confidentiality procedures (Article 11, Paragraph 7 and Article IV, Paragraph 8 of the Treaty). For those items already specifically listed under Paragraph 12, it is envisaged that verification agreements or arrangements (either generic model agreements or arrangements, or the draft agreements or arrangements negotiated with States in accordance with these models) would include, pursuant to Part I, Section A of the Protocol to the Treaty: Procedures for specifying a particular State's acceptance pursuant to the CTBT of responsibility for particular monitoring facilities; Responsibilities for operation, maintenance and upgrading in accordance with the Operational Manuals; Procedures to be followed in establishment of new or upgrading of existing facilities, or for more substantive changes to IMS facilities; Procedures for temporary arrangements which might apply (Article IV, Paragraph 26 of the Treaty); Provisions for funding IMS activities and data transmission (Article IV, Paragraph 22 of the Treaty); Assistance to the Organization in inspecting an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State (Part 11, Paragraph 107 of the Protocol to the Treaty); or, Availability of OSI equipment from a State Party, and for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment (Part 11, Paragraph 40 of the Protocol to the Treaty). Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 13: Preparatory Commission Verification Regime Responsibilities The report referred to in this paragraph reflects a negotiating understanding that the task of compiling such a report - implicit in Article 11, Paragraph 26 (h) of the Treaty - would be explicitly mentioned in the resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission. The report and associated recommendations from the Commission will be essential prerequisites for the initial Conference of States Parties to take the steps necessary to formalize the establishment of the IMS and other elements of the Treaty's verification regime. The Preparatory Commission would as a consequence need, inter alia, to:
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Develop recommendations for any changes to the IMS facility lists which experience during the Preparatory Commission may dictate be put to the initial Conference of the States Parties; and Agree on related recommendations, including where relevant recommendations relating to the deployment of particular technologies and aspects thereof such as noble gas (Part I, Paragraph 10 of the Protocol to the Treaty). Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 14: Preparatory Commission IMS preparation responsibilities
This chapeau includes, inter alia, references to the responsibility of the Preparatory Commission for families of tasks related to: The establishment of international communications channels for the transmission and receipt of IMS data and reporting products (Article IV, Paragraph 14 (a) of the Treaty); and Developing procedures and a formal basis for the provisional operation and funding of the provisional IMS. Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 14 (b): development of Operational Manuals
Drafts of all Operational Manuals, approved by the Preparatory Commission, are required to be adopted by the initial Conference of the States Parties (Article 11, Paragraph 26 (h) of the Treaty). The compilation of the Operational Manual for each monitoring technology will require the Preparatory Commission to develop, spell out and approve all necessary technical and operational detail required to ensure the effective operation of the International Monitoring System, inter alia; The technical specifications and operational requirements for the relevant facilities in each global monitoring network (Part I, Paragraphs 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 15, of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the provision of data to the IDC, including transmission formats and modalities (Part I, Paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 12 and 14 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for facility security and for data authentication (Part I, Paragraph 4 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for checking of monitoring facility equipment and communications links by the Technical Secretariat, and for facility certification (including for cooperating national facilities
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Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 14(b)(ii):Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring In addition to the generic points listed above, the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring will require the Preparatory Commission to develop: Procedures for the processing and handling of samples of associated data flowing from monitoring facilities (Part I, Paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Specifications and procedures for the certification and ongoing calibration of laboratories used by the CTBTO in support of the radionuclide monitoring network (Part I, Paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Special procedures for the transmission of samples to certified laboratories, for additional analysis, and for their storage or archiving as appropriate (Part 1, Paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the integration of relevant meteorological data if appropriate (Part I, Paragraph 9 of the Protocol to the Treaty); and, Guidelines for the striking of contracts with specific certified laboratories to provide for fee-for-service analysis of samples (Part I, Paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty). Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 14(b)(iii):Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring In addition to generic points listed above, in order to prepare the Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring, the Preparatory Commission will need to: Develop the different technical specifications and operational requirements for the two different types of facilities envisaged (hydrophone stations and T-phase stations) (Part I, Paragraph 13 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Develop procedures for the storage or archiving IMS data at the monitoring station if so decided.
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Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 14(b)(v):Operational Manual for the International Data Centre In developing the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre and producing its content, the Preparatory Commission will need to: Develop the procedures to be used by the IDC in receiving, collecting, processing, analyzing, reporting on and archiving data from the IMS, and for carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the production of standard reporting products and for the performance of the standard range of services to be offered to States Parties (Part I, Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Protocol to the Treaty and passim); In this context, it will need to give special attention to developing: Agreed standard event screening criteria and related operational procedures and formats in accordance with Protocol provisions (Part I, Paragraphs 17 and 18 (b) of, and Annex 2 to the Protocol to the Treaty); Agreed formats and procedures for assisting States Parties with expert technical analysis (Part I, Paragraph 20 (c) of the Protocol to the Treaty); Specification of the volumes and formats of data services to be provided by the IDC to States Parties at no cost (Part I, Paragraph 20 of the Protocol to the Treaty), and procedures for the recovery of costs from States Parties requesting products or services in excess of these specifications; Guidelines for the establishment of national event screening procedures (Part I, Paragraph 21 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the provision of technical assistance to individual States Parties (Part I, Paragraph 22 of the Protocol to the Treaty); and Procedures for monitoring and reporting on the operational . status of the International Monitoring System (Part I, Paragraph 23 of the Protocol to the Treaty). Preparatory Commission Text Paragraph 15: On-Site Inspection The Treaty and Protocol text are separately explicit that the Operational Manual for OSI and the list of approved inspection equipment must be approved by the Conference of States Parties at its initial session (Part 11, Paragraph 13 of the Protocol to the Treaty,
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Article 11, Paragraph 26(h) of the Treaty and Part 11, Paragraph 36 of the Protocol to the Treaty). In order to compile the Operational Manual for OSI, the Preparatory Commission will in all likelihood need to develop or consider, inter a h : Procedures and formats for the nomination and designation of inspectors and inspection assistants (Part 11, Paragraphs 14 to 25 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the training and qualification of inspectors; Procedures and formats for designating, recording and consulting on points of entry (Part 11, Paragraphs 32 to 34 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for use of non-scheduled aircraft and agreement on routings (Part 11, Paragraph 35 of the Protocol to the Treaty); A list of core and auxiliary inspection equipment and detailed specifications therefor; procedures for documentation, and sealing to authenticate certification of inspection equipment; and procedures to calibrate, maintain, protect and retain custody over the approved inspection equipment (Part 11, Paragraphs 36 to 40 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Formats and communications procedures for OSI requests, mandates and notifications, and procedures for drawing up the inspection mandate (Part 11, Paragraphs 35 and 41 to 43 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the reimbursement of inspected State Party costs associated with OSI (including for the itemization of expenses and of payments) and for other administrative arrangements (Part 11, Paragraphs 11 to 13 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the checking, and if necessary, storing of inspection equipment at point of entry (Part 11, Paragraph 51 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures covering OSI team safety and health, and confidentiality issues (Part 11, Paragraph 60 (h) of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures related to the implementation of the inspected States Parties' rights during the OSI (Part 11, Paragraph 61 of the ~rotocoito the Treaty); Procedures for communications by the inspection team, including for the due approval and certification of
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communications equipment (Part 11, Paragraph 62 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for participation of observers (nomination, acceptance, non-acceptance, and notifications) (Article IV, Paragraph 61 of the Treaty and Part 11, Paragraphs 63 to 68 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for implementation of inspection activities and techniques in the conduct of an OSI (Part 11, Paragraphs 69 and 70 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for overflights and the use of inspection equipment during overflights (Part 11, Paragraphs 71 to 85 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the collection, handling and analysis of samples as per the requirements of the Treaty, including relevant scientific criteria and guidelines (Part 11, Paragraphs 97 to 104 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for the certification of laboratories designated to perform different types of OSI-related analysis (Part 11, Paragraph 102 of the Protocol to the Treaty); Procedures for inspection of areas beyond the jurisdiction or control of any state (Part 11, Paragraphs 105 to 108 of the Protocol to the Treaty); and Formats for OSI team's preliminary findings report (Part 11, Paragraph 109 of the Protocol to the Treaty) and formats and ' procedures for handling the inspection report (Article IV, Paragraphs 62 to 64 of the Treaty).
BACKGROUND OF COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY The Conference on Disarmament (CD) began its substantive negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in January 1994 within the framework of an Ad Hoc Committee established for that purpose. Although the CD had long been involved with the issue of a test-ban, only in 1982 did it establish a subsidiary body on the item. Disagreement over a mandate for that body blocked tangible progress for years. After more than two years of intensive negotiations, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands, presented a final draft treaty to the CD in June 1996. An overwhelming majority of Member States of the CD expressed their
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readiness to support the draft treaty. India, for its part, stated that it could not go along with a consensus on the draft text and its transmittal to the United Nations General Assembly. The main reasons for such a decision, as India pointed out, were related to its strong misgivings about the provision for the entry-into-force of the treaty, which it considered unprecedented in multilaieral practice and running contrary to customary international law, and the failure of the treaty to include a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. As a result, Australia, on 22 August 1996, requested that the General Assembly resume the consideration of agenda Item 65, entitled "Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty" as provided for in Resolution 50/65 of 12 December 1995. For that purpose it also submitted the draft CTBT, identical to that negotiated in the CD, for adoption by the General Assembly. On 10 September, the General Assembly by resolution '(A/RES/50/245) adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and requested the Secretary General of the United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature at the earliest possible date. The Treaty was opened for signature in September 1996. In accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty, it will enter into force after the following 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty have ratified it: Algeria Argentina Australia Austria Bangladesh Belgium Brazil Bulgaria Canada Chile China Colombia Democratic People's Republic of Korea Democratic Republic of the Congo Egypt Finland
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France Germany Hungary India Indonesia Iran (Islamic Republic of) Israel Italy Japan Mexico Netherlands Norway Pakistan Peru Poland Romania Republic of Korea Russian Federation Slovakia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America Vietnam. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear TestBan Treaty Organization (CNTBTO) is an international organization established by the States Signatories to the Treaty on 19 November 1996 and has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The objective of the organization is to achieve the object and purpose of the Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with the Treaty, and to provide
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a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. To this end, the Commission prepares for the entry-into-force of the Treaty and carries out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Treaty, including the establishment of a global verification regime. The Preparatory Commission consists of a plenary body composed of all States signatories to the Treaty and a Provisional Technical Secretariat. Current Status of CTBT Signature & Ratification - 194 (a) No. of States' Participation Total Signed - 176 Not Signed - 18 Total Ratified - 132 Not Ratified - 62 (b) Ratification Done in 2006 1. Anigna & Barbuda - 11 Jan 2006 2. Cameroon - 6 Feb 2006 3. Cape Verde - 1 March 2006 - 7 Feb 2006 4. Suriname - 10 March 2006 5. Vietnam 6. Zambia - 23 Feb 2006 *Note: (i) On 13 March 2006. Vietnam became the 34th Annex I1 State to ratify the CTBT.
(ii) On March 2006, Italy signed the Facility Agreement. (c) No. of Accereditions i.e. official power given to act as delegate to the CTBT Convention based on the approval of the fact related to following the necessary standards set by the Convention: Year No. of Countries Accredited 2002 23 2003 20 30 2004 2005 34 12 2006 *Note: The 12 Accreditations given in 2006 include the following
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Indonesia - 12 Jan 2006 South Africa - 1 Feb 06 Argentina - 8 Feb 06 Portugal - 15 March 06 Yugoslavia - 21 March 06 Phillipines - 22 March 06
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13 April 06
8. Korea - 19 April 06 9. Iran (Islamic Republic of) - 3 May 06 10. Republic of Moldova - 24 May 06 11. PR China - 13 June 06 13. Ethiopea - 16 June 06
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