American Civilization Portrayed in Ancient Confucianism

AMERICAN CIVILIZATION PORTRAYED IN ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM

AMERICAN CIVILIZATION PORTRAYED IN ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM Wei-bin Zhang

Algora Publishing New York

© 2003 by Algora Publishing. All Rights Reserved. www.algora.com No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976) may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the express written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 0-87586-162-8 (softcover) ISBN: 0-87586-163-6 (hardcover) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data: 2002156285 Zhang, Wei-Bin, 1961American civilization portrayed in ancient Confucianism / by Wei-bin Zhang. p. cm. ISBN: 0875861628 — softcover (alk. paper) 0875861636 — hardcover (alk. paper) Includes bibliographical references. 1. United States—Foreign public opinion, Chinese. 2. United States— Civilization—Public opinion. 3. Confucianism—China. 4. Confucianism— Political aspects—China. 5. Public opinion—China. 6. East and West. I. Title. E183.8.C5 Z44 2003 973’.07’2051—21 2002156285

Printed in the United States

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgements

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I. THE AMERICAN CIVILIZATION AND ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 5 The American Civilization in Modern Times

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Ancient Confucianism Created in Open Society

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The Newtonian Vision Versus the I-Ching Vision

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The I Ching Perceived by Nonlinear Science

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The I Ching and Ancient Confucianism

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II. “ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL” VERSUS “ALL MEN ARE BORN EQUAL” “All Men Are Created Equal” in American Civilization

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All Men Are Born Equal in Confucianism

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Separation between Church and State in the United States

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Multiculturalism in the United States

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To Follow the Way in Confucianism

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The American Individualistic Clubism

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Symmetry Relations as Fair Reciprocity in Confucianism

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III. DEMOCRACY AND LAW

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The Sovereignty of the People and Separation of Power in the United States

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The People’s Welfare as the Sole Purpose of the State in Confucianism

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Trust in Law, in the United States

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Trust in Law, in the West, and Rituals and Self-Cultivation in Confucianism 67 Democratic Voting versus Confucian Examination

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Adam Smith’s Rules of Justice and Confucius’ Rules of Propriety

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Ritual-Based Japan Versus Law-Based America

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The Democratization and Americanization of Taiwan after the War

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VII

IV. EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE

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Education in the United States

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Learning in Confucianism

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Knowledge and Equal Opportunity in the United States

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Smith’s and Confucius’ Ideal Man

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Economic Conditions and Ways of Learning

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V. ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND DEVELOPMENT

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Economic Freedom in the United States

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Minimum Government Intervention in Confucianism

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Economic Doctrines by Adam Smith and Confucianism

136

Adam Smith and Confucius’ Attitudes Toward the Great and the Rich

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Economic Growth and Consumption in the United States

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Japan and China — Contrasting Paths to the Modernization of Confucian Manifestations

148

Income Inequalities in the United States

157

Economic Consequences of Social Welfare

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VI. AMERICAN UNIVERSALISM AND RATIONAL CIVILIZATIONS IN THE FUTURE

171

The End of Rational Simplicity

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Freedom in the United States

182

Human Rights in Confucianism

187

Harmony of Rational Civilizations in Confucian Perspectives

192

REFERENCES

205

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Also by Wei-bin Zhang

A Theory of International Trade — Capital, Knowledge and Economic Structures Adam Smith and Confucius — The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Analects An Economic Theory of Cities — Spatial Models of Capital, Knowledge, and Structures Capital and Knowledge — Dynamics of Economic Structures with Non-constant Returns Confucianism and Modernization — Industrialization and Democratization of the Confucian Regions Economic Dynamics — Growth and Development Japan versus China in the Industrial Race Knowledge and Value — Economic Structures with Time and Space Singapore’s Modernization — Westernization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations Synergetic Economics — Time and Change in Nonlinear Economics Industrialization and Democratization in Taiwan (forthcoming)

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS At present time, no people’s innermost core is more misunderstood than that of the Chinese. Therefore, interpreters of the soul of China are needed, if humanity’s coherence is not to be rent asunder. Wilhelm (1856:36)

The idea of writing this book first occurred to me while I was reading The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order by Samuel Huntington (1996), one of the West’s most eminent political scientists. The Clash of Civilizations, basically constructed on the contemporary American vision of the world and partially supported by empirical data, became a national bestseller in the United States. The book, with its broad scope and miscellaneous insights into the complexity of contemporary global politics, has attracted considerable attention from every continent. People of different cultural backgrounds have been variously impressed, intrigued, and perplexed by its central issue: how heterogeneous peoples can cohabitate in the e-connected world. Huntington surmised that civilizations have superseded nations and ideologies as the driving force in global politics after the fall of communism. He also inferred that the central and most dangerous aspect of globalizing politics would be clashes between groups from different civilizations (here we shouldn’t carp about classification problems, although it is curious that his analysis deposits the United States, France and Italy into the same civilization, and Japan and China into different ones). He perceived that the West increasingly brings its civilization into conflict with others — particularly, and particularly intensely, that of China. It is plain that China has a cultural tradition different from that of the West. But Huntington (1996:184) assures us that, in China’s eyes, the Chinese

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College Attrition at American Research Universities civilization is definitely superior to the Western civilization. The present work contends that on this point Huntington was quite mistaken. Without assumption there is no proof, and wrong assumptions logically lead to incorrect conclusions. Huntington’s assumption cannot be substantiated in contemporary China. In fact, what Chinese intellectuals are reading and what students are learning from are, except for works on the Chinese language and literature, products of the Western civilization. An uneducated man tends to have a strong predilection for believing in the superiority of the civilization into which he is born, as he is unable to truly appreciate any other. But it is difficult to imagine how the Chinese who are educated in and are benefiting from the Western civilization could be so lacking in taste and sense as to remain subject to that primitive sentiment. If Huntington’s argument about the Chinese were true, we must conclude that the Chinese race would never be educable — even to the Confucian standard. In contrast to what Huntington envisioned, I hold that the contemporary Chinese mind is characterized by a sense of cultural inferiority to, rather than superiority over, the Western civilization. Almost every contemporary Chinese knows that China as a nation cannot even legally and properly “copy” — not to say deeply appreciate and intellectually interpret — the products of the Western civilization. Even the national ideology of contemporary China, Marxism (which has been wrongly interpreted and misleadingly applied on Chinese cultural soil), is a product of the Western civilization. Confucianism, a genuine product of the Chinese civilization, is rarely read, never mind appreciated and admired, by the Chinese people. In the last two centuries, nothing humiliated the Chinese civilization so sweepingly and profoundly as the national campaigns against Confucianism during the Cultural Revolution. Huntington (1996:20-1) argued that whether or not the West can survive would depend on reaffirming its Western identity. But to identify a concrete symbol without showing its correspondence to the Truth/Way is improper, at least according to ancient Confucianism. Partly due to the limitations of traditional sociology in exploring the complexity of social dynamics and cultural variety, The Clash of Civilizations failed to properly interpret at least some aspects of other civilizations. The provocative book asserted that the world is moving into a period of civilizational collision, in which the primary identification of people will not be ideological but cultural. Global conflict would arise not between socialism and capitalism but among the world’s major cultural groups: Western, Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, and so on. By the way, let’s not

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Preface and Acknowledgements overlook the fact that the conflict between capitalism and communism is a clash, even in terms of principles, within the Western rational civilization. The cold war was a consequence of the development and dissemination of traditional (linear) Western ideas. The division of the world into socialism and capitalism occurred at the unripe stage of rational civilization. In the future, there will be almost no possibility of a global clash between socialism and capitalism on the scale and scope of that in the last century. Any rational civilization has universal as well as exceptional characteristics. Since there is no sophisticated universal rational thought system in this world (even for the economic system, there are only extremely partial and unconnected economic theories), it would be preposterous to deem a particular civilization universal in the ideal/rational sense. However, the rational world is moving into a period of civilizational harmony because rational knowledge has become so sophisticated and so commonly shared among rational civilizations that no particular civilization can identify sufficient reasons to have a conflict with any other rational civilization that could be termed a clash of civilizations. In the last few decades, numerous books have been published about China and the Chinese civilization from Western perspectives. These books portray the Chinese culture through the lens of the Western civilization; but there are only a few books about the Western civilization from Chinese perspectives. If the Confucian civilization were so shallow that it could throw no light on the Western civilization, it would be, at least intellectually, meaningless to conduct such an exercise. This book demonstrates that it is indeed meaningful. By portraying the American civilization (the consummate representative of contemporary Western civilization) in the terms of ancient Confucianism (the highest achievement, in the constructive sense, of political thought in Confucian civilization), we also show that Huntington’s prognostication about clashes between Western and Confucian civilizations is culturally and economically unfounded — because the Confucian principles fundamentally agree with American values, and economic clashes will benefit neither the United States nor China in a knowledge-based and e-connected global economy. As time passes, any fundamental progress in appreciating a civilization has to do with the reinterpretation of basic ideas that have sustained it. This book is actually part of a broad study of Confucianism and its implications for the modernization of the Confucian regions (covering mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Singapore). In Japan versus China in the Industrial Race (Zhang, 1998), issues related to why Japan could so

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College Attrition at American Research Universities rapidly have become industrialized and why China was so slow in its take-off are examined within a broad perspective. It is shown that Japan followed Confucian principles when faced with economic, political, and military challenges from the West, while China stood against the Confucian principles. In Confucianism and Modernization (Zhang, 1999), the Confucian principles are summarized in contemporary terms, and it is shown that the important elements of democracy (except the mass voting processes) can be identified in Confucianism. Instead of voting, China used the examination system to select the right men to govern. In Adam Smith and Confucius (Zhang, 2000), the ethical, social, and economic principles advocated by Adam Smith and Confucius are compared. It is demonstrated that they are similar in principle but different in their “sentimental emphases.” In Singapore’s Modernization (Zhang, 2002), the role of Singapore’s government in economic development and democratization is examined from the perspectives of Confucianism. In particular, the influence of socioeconomic geography on the Chinese Singaporeans’ individual and group behavior and mind is examined. The book analyzes why Singapore, where the government explicitly emphasized Confucian values, is unique among Confucian regions. In Industrialization and Democratization in Taiwan (Zhang, forthcoming in 2003), the rapid democratization of the Chinese community is interpreted in terms of socioeconomic geography, Confucian tradition, and the American influence. The books on Taiwan and Singapore show how different environmental conditions have influenced the modern politics, the mentality, and the economic development of Chinese immigrants. I am deeply indebted to my publisher, Dr. Claudiu A. Secara, for his important comments on many issues addressed in this book. I would like to thank him for his insights and effective cooperation. I take great pleasure in expressing my gratitude to my wife, Gao Xiao, who has been wonderfully supportive of my efforts in writing this book and in all my work here in Beppu City, Japan.

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I. THE AMERICAN CIVILIZATION AND ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM IN AN OPEN SOCIETY The faults of men are characteristic of the class to which they belong. By observing a man’s faults, we may learn what kind of man he is. — Confucius

Examining the most civilized civilization in the light of an ancient Chinese doctrine, Confucianism, might appear incongruous, if not annoying, to the Englishlanguage reader. I would have scoffed at the notion myself as lacking in intellectual taste, if I had not in the last several years made the reverse endeavor — to explore ancient Confucianism in the light of contemporary social and natural sciences. After reading this book, the reader might be convinced (perhaps through a mental process different from that which I experienced) that it is meaningful to view the American civilization through the lens of ancient Confucianism. This deviant travail leads to the recognition of some essential factors that will allow a sustainable convergence of the Confucian civilization towards the Western (more properly, modern rational) model. It will be argued that such a convergence will be an eventual consequence of the development of modern rationality and economic globalization. When portraying the ultimate harmony, I repeatedly stress that the cultural, intellectual, and philosophical convergence is inevitable only since the Western civilization has experienced a revolution in association with the rapid development of nonlinear science and computer science in the last few decades. That is an important emphasis — after all, no significant convergence between the Newtonian Western civilization and I Ching-based Confucian civilization has transpired so far, irrespective of communication between the two civilizations over

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College Attrition at American Research Universities more than two hundred years. The convergent evolution occurs because both their traditional rational world visions have become a special case of the new vision of nature, man, and society. It is under this new vision of science that the two civilizations will converge in a meaningful and sustainable way. Before commencing our adventure, let’s consider the rationale for portraying the American civilization in ancient Confucianism. It will be argued that the American identity is to be found in the most elementary bases of American civilization: liberty and democracy. The classical liberalism on which the United States has been constructed is a political ideology of the Enlightenment tradition rooted in European and Anglo-American philosophers such as John Locke (16321704), Adam Smith (1723-1790), and John Dewey (1859-1952). There is no record of any direct influence of Confucianism on the above thinkers, but works comparing Confucianism with those thinkers have begun to appear nevertheless. For instance, in The Democracy of the Dead — Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China, Hall and Ames (1999) compared Dewey and Confucius in many aspects. By the way, some great Western thinkers, such as Leibniz and Voltaire, showed great interest in Confucianism (e.g., Guy, 1963, Myers, 1982, Mackerras, 1989, Bailey, 1992, Ching and Oxtoby, 1992). In Adam Smith and Confucius, (Zhang 2000) this author has compared the ethical, social, and economic precepts advocated by Smith and Confucius, arguing that they are similar in principle but different in their “sentimental emphases.” Smith and Confucius have similar opinions about the free mind, the ideal man and the common man, human relations among men, the ideal society (one with little government intervention), the great and the rich, the possible role of justice and propriety in maintaining a just society, passions and learning, and influences of the social and intellectual environment on human growth and development. Nevertheless, the sentimental centers in Smith and Confucius’ moral philosophy are different: Smith was more concerned with the nation, while Confucius was more concerned with the family. Smith admired the hero, but Confucius cherished the gentleman-scholar; Smith considered justice the way to maintain social order, but Confucius advocated propriety, education and the doctrine of rectification of names; Smith valued passions, but Confucius underscored education and cultivation; Smith emphasized the importance of fortune (associated with birth), the rich and the great, for maintaining social order, whereas Confucius stressed moral examples; Smith was concerned with national economic growth, while Confucius focused on the welfare of the people; Smith treasured popular arts for the common people’s pleasure, but Confucius treated the arts as a tool for the masses’ moral education and a means of cultivation and

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society leisure for gentlemen; Smith put children at the center of family life, while Confucius stressed taking care of the aged. The recent rapid economic growth of the Confucian regions is a new phenomenon in world economic development. No previous economic growth has been so fast or involved so many people, recently or historically. Japan is the first non-Western country to have become industrialized. Japan’s economic position in the world has changed dramatically since the end of the Second World War. Its economic success was called a miracle in the 1960s and 70s. As discussed in Morishima (1982) and Zhang (1998), Japan’s dynamic path of modernization is much influenced by the combination of multiple factors such as Tokugawa Confucianism, the opportunity offered by the West, and the domestic political and economic timing for modernization. Other Confucian cultural areas that happened to be under positive influences from Western civilization have repeated Japan’s pattern of economic development, so that the Japanese miracle was soon followed by other economic miracles. Four Confucian areas, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, succeeded in rapid industrialization after the Second World War. The common feature of these four regions is that they were colonized before the War. The Japanese brought mass education to Taiwan and Korea, while the British brought free trade and the concept of governing by law to Hong Kong and Singapore. After independence, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore displayed high growth rates in the 1970s and 80s. It has become evident that a main reason for their rapid economic development is that these regions have followed the Confucian principles, under Western influence. THE AMERICAN CIVILIZATION IN MODERN TIMES The ideas born in the first fifty years of America’s independent political life remain relatively unaltered and are as vigorous as ever. Shklar (1998:157)

As World War II was coming to a close, in late 1944, President Roosevelt (1944:405) augured: “At the end of this war this country will have the greatest material power of any Nation in the world. It will be a clean, shining America.” And, indeed, the United States emerged from World War II the most powerful nation in the world, perhaps in all history. The exceptional rise to prosperity and power was bolstered by high technology, hard work, a skilled labor 7

College Attrition at American Research Universities force, opulent raw materials and natural resources. Its history demonstrates that capitalism and democracy can go hand in hand. American economic development has been driven by the capitalist spirit of competition with one another. The capitalist development has been associated with political freedom and democratic participation in government. On the one hand, democracy provides the infrastructure for economic prosperity; on the other hand, economic development enables healthy democracy. Capitalism has perhaps never worked so positively for so many people. The United States has accumulated immense power over nature as well as society: political power to move people to achieve social and economic goals, legal power to punish perceived wrongdoers, intellectual power to properly apply and rapidly create knowledge, and economic power to increase people’s wealth. It is argued that the Americans, unlike the Japanese, are held together only by ideas (Lind, 1996:3). The United States is an “idea-state”; American liberty and democracy are the master variables in the dynamics of American civilization. To be American is to respect and follow the founding principles of human equality, natural rights, civil liberty, democracy, and constitutional government. American liberty is hailed for its central theme of individualism, which is inseparably related to procedural equality (equal rights and equal opportunity). All of these rights equally afforded to all individuals are advocated in the form of human rights, the basic requisites of a free and democratic society. The American civilization was constructed on the basis of ideas and principles from different cultures. The American historian George Bancroft (1855:508) noted: “Italy and Spain, in the persons of Columbus and Isabella, joined together for the great discovery that opened America to emigration and commerce; France contributed to its independence; the search for the origin of the language we speak carries us to India; our religion is from Palestine; of the hymns sung in our churches, some were first heard in Italy, some in the deserts of Arabia, some on the banks of the Euphrates; our arts come from Greece; our jurisprudence from Rome; our maritime code from Russia; England taught us the system of Representative Government; the noble Republic of the United Provinces [the Netherlands] bequeathed to us, in the world of thought, the great idea of the toleration of all opinions; in the world of action, the prolific principle of federal union.” “After a long period in which historians have emphasized the uniqueness of almost everything American,” observed Hudson (1981:3), “it is becoming increasingly clear that the United States can properly be understood only as an integral part of a larger

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society European society.” The language, the tables of weights and measures, the most characteristic proverbs, and most of the nursery rhymes that are used by Americans are inherited from Europe. The concept of trial by jury and the whole structure of the legal system with its guarantees of liberty were exported from Europe. Americans look to the works of European writers, the thought of European philosophers, the music of European composers, and the discoveries of European scientists. In most aspects of religion, literature, law, philosophy, art, or science, American civilization is born from European civilization. By the way, irrespective of Europe’s early creation of the ideal of democracy, “the modern European tradition of governance since the seventeenth century has been authoritarian and, until well into the 19th century, deeply hostile to democratization” (DiNunzio, 1987:vii). American civilization is not a copy of but an improvement on European civilization in the sense that it has absorbed the best parts of European cultures and has attained greater heights in many respects. “It is through art . . .”, Oscar Wilde observed in his candid manner, “that we can shield ourselves from the sordid perils of actual existence.” This book is mostly concerned with positive aspects of American civilization. But the yin-yang vision surmises that if the positive side is strong, the negative side is also strong, so that the organic system is in a dynamic balance. Lipset (1997) cogently demonstrated that the organizing principles and the institutions of the United States include many negative traits that have resulted in income inequality, high crime rates, low levels of electoral participation, and intolerance toward political and ethnic minorities. Arguably, these undesirable phenomena are inherently linked to the norms and behavior of an open democratic society. Nothing is so plain to the world as the social problems such as crime, violence, divorce, and disorder in the United States. Are these negative aspects indispensable byproducts of the American freedom? There is no single linear relationship between individual freedom and personal responsibility. It is reasonable to expect that if individual freedom has no boundary or even direction, people’s sense of duty as citizens and of what is right or wrong may evolve into chaos.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM CREATED IN OPEN SOCIETY

That the reason of man will never be in perfect accordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason does not prove the thought to be chimerical. Kant (1781:199)

Confucianism, initiated in China by Confucius (552-479 BC), is the key to understanding the Chinese way of life. No other doctrine has so deeply influenced the life and thought of Chinese people. It has a long history, a wide range of sub-schools, and an ancient tradition with many dimensions. People have read and interpreted it in various ways, in various times and places. At present, the core of Confucianism is commonly perceived as an ethic — a humanistic and rational view of the world based on relationships within the family and clan, particularly relations of respect for ancestors and obedience to the head of family and clan, loyalty, and benevolence toward one’s inferiors. We will show that the common perception about obedience neglects individualist aspects in ancient Confucianism. By the way, the Chinese had been under nonChinese control from 1644 until the end of World War II; it is no surprise that the Chinese communities, with little education, looked to the nuclear family and the extended family or clan as the center of life under non-Chinese governance. In Confucian tradition, loyalty means following the way and being true to one’s own conscience. Blind obedience to the head of family or the leader of organization is not justified in Confucianism. Family (or extended family) is never treated as the only “calculation center” in Confucianism. The gentleman should be loyal to the truth and justice rather than to a concrete loyalty unit such as (Chinese) familism, (Japanese) groupism, (American) individualism (more accurately, American clubism), regionalism, or nationalism. This attitude is reflected in the following notable saying of Ch’eng Hao (1032-1085), a famous Confucian scholar: “Loyalty and faithfulness are spoken of with reference to man. Essentially, they are concrete principles” (Chan, 1967:540). In the Confucian tradition it is to the principle rather than to a concrete manifestation that one’s mind should be loyal. This characteristic hints at why Confucianism has been able to change its manifestations according to changed historical conditions. In addition to the lack of individualism and the overemphasis on obedience to authority, another popular conception of Confucianism is that it neglects people’s economic welfare. This misrepresentation perhaps comes from the interpretations of Confucianism by scholars of the Sung dynasty, who did not

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society approve of so much as a discussion of profits and economic development. Chen (1911) depicted the common attitude as follows: “Neither Confucius, nor Mencius, nor Tung Chung-shu, nor any great Confucian before the Sung dynasty, has ever said that the common people should not talk about profits. Moreover, the Confucians of the Sung dynasty did not distinguish the public profits from private profits, and left them both out of consideration. This has been a great obstacle to the economic development of China.” By the time China under Manchu control began to communicate with the West, Confucianism had been distorted to such a degree that it only meant to memorize the classics and blindly obey the authorities. Confucianism underwent many changes in the course of history. As an ethical system, it experienced a complicated development process. Shortly before the Ch’in dynasty, Mencius (371-289 BC) and Hsün Tzu (298-238 BC) established two rival schools of thought based on Confucius’ teachings. In the Han period, a variety of cosmological speculations were grafted on. The NeoConfucianists of the Sung period (960-1279) were influenced by Taoism and Buddhism, and gave Confucianism a philosophical impact hitherto unknown. Chang (1963) demonstrates that Confucianism can be portrayed as having gone through four stages: (1) Confucianism as one of many schools in the age of the “Hundred Schools”; (2) Confucianism in the Han Dynasty, as the most privileged and authoritative school; (3) Confucianism as eclipsed by Buddhism and Taoism; and (4) Confucianism reborn as Neo-Confucianism. Confucianists of the different periods may hold different opinions about the same issue. For instance, varied assumptions about human nature have been held since Mencius. Key concepts such as jen have been interpreted in different ways. Before Confucius’ time jen was interpreted as the specific virtue of benevolence. For Confucius jen meant the universal virtue, the basis of all goodness. In the early Han era (206 BC — AD 220) jen was interpreted as love, affection, and living together. Han Yü (768-1279) considered jen as universal love. Neo-Confucianists of the Sung period (960-1279) interpreted jen variously as impartiality, consciousness, unity with Heaven and Earth, the character of love and the principle of the mind. We depict the ramifying dynamics of Confucianism in Figure 1-1. The Master’s thought, like Adam Smith’s Theory of Sentimentals, or Marx’s Capital, lends itself to various interpretations, and it appears that there is an everincreasing gap between Western and Eastern perceptions of Confucianism (Yao, 2000).

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Figure 1.1 An Illustration of the Dynamics of Confucianism over History

H Having analyzed various schools of Confucianism, I encapsulate the major Confucian principles (ethical, political and economic) commonly held by the main schools of Confucianism over history as follows: (1) free will and rationality (which lays the foundation for the Confucian regions to be rational, adaptive and progressive and to accept the sciences with little cultural conflict); (2) natural equality and social inequality (which provides the basis for human equality and social mobility); (3) self-cultivation through education and equal opportunity in education (which is the key factor explaining Chinese people’s social appreciation of knowledge and emphasis on education); (4) the welfare of the people and the benevolence policy (which provides a sustainable basis for the industrialization and democratization of the Confucian regions); (5) a hierarchical social structure supported by talent and merit (which is essential for establishing social order according to virtue, merit and education); (6) a reliance on mutual obligation rather than law in maintaining social justice (which explains why the social negotiation cost is relatively high and the legal cost is relatively low in the Confucian regions); (7) the rectification of names (which will be discussed below; in this context it means that one should only get what one is socially or economically “worthy of”); (8) the dynamic operation of market mechanisms with government intervention (which implies that the two poles of traditional rational economic thought, socialism and capitalism, hold limited appeal to the Confucian mentality); (9) love with different degrees of

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society intensity (which does not promote “inflation of love” in Freud’s term or extreme social welfare in the economic sense); (10) respect for hard work and appreciation of frugality (which are important for sustainable economic development); and (11) an emphasis on social harmony and the justness of rebellion against corrupt governments (see also Zhang, 1999). By Confucianism, in this book, we mean the Confucian doctrines developed by Confucius, Mencius (371-289 BC), and Hsün Tzu (298-238 BC). In analyzing the Confucian views on key aspects of the American civilization, we quote generously and exclusively from these three ancient thinkers. The exclusiveness is not only because these three are the most original and important thinkers in Confucianism, but also because their ideas were constructed in an era when multiple cultures communicated with, learnt from, and emulated each other. They had life experiences in different cultures and served heterogeneous governments. They did not perceive a world controlled by a single government. The world they visualized is characterized by the harmonious co-existence of multiple cultures. In his book On Liberty, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) compared the fall of China and the rise of Europe as follows: “We have a warning example in China — a nation of much talent, and in some respects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs, the work, in some measure, of men to whom even the most enlightened European must accord, under certain limitations, the title of sages and philosophers. . . . On the contrary, they have become stationary . . . They have succeeded beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so industriously working at — in making a people all alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules; and these are the fruits. . . . What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which, when it exists, exists as the effect not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. . . . Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development.” Now China is starting to make progress in the way that Mill had endorsed so many years ago. In fact, what is commonly perceived as Confucianism today is often one of the forms of neo-Confucianism, a version adapted for a closed society with some religious flavor. Neo-Confucianism was developed long after several different countries and cultures had been united into a

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College Attrition at American Research Universities single China. After the unification there was no cultural challenge from neighboring countries until the West opened China’s door via the opium war. NeoConfucianism was developed to serve a united, closed social system with the unchallengeable emperor at the top of the social hierarchy. Actually, the reasons for China’s eventual decline under Neo-Confucianism were explained by Western thinkers long ago. Bondage had been built into Neo-Confucianism in the form of a social immobility that was so fixed that even an undutiful emperor or unreliable father could pretend to his perquisites. It is due to this anti-ancient-Confucian character that this Neo-Confucianism was selected by the Manchu emperors. Regardless of intellectual warnings from and humiliations under the West and Japan, “Chinese anti-Confucian tradition” was continued until the economic reform in 1978. Even today, the practice of mainland China is still politically opposed to the principles of ancient Confucianism. I characterize mainland China in the last century by “individual diligence and national ineffectiveness” — irrespective of the population’s diligence, the efficiency of the national economy as a whole is low. The sum of the parts is not equal to the whole — is even much less than the whole. The Chinese peasant mentality molded under the Manchu control and the cunning of politicians led to the social phenomenon that the product of one person’s brain and effort was utilized to destroy another’s — society was characterized by waste, through “the invisible hand,” as a whole. Perhaps no other race in human history has worked so industriously with so little to show for it. Ancient Chinese wisdom was not utilized for constructive and efficient purposes but was applied by Chinese politicians to stabilize Chinese society, by depriving people of opportunities for education, improvement, and work. When we refer to Confucianism, we mainly are referring to Confucian principles. There is often confusion about Confucian principles and their manifestations, such as actual forms of filial piety, propriety, and ceremony. Confucian philosophical tradition does not hold that there is a unique correspondence between a principle and its manifestations; under varied circumstances, the way a principle should be manifested would necessarily be adjusted. Similarly, the USA and Canada, under the same democratic principles, have designed different institutional structures according to their own conditions (Lipset, 1990, 1996). Aristotle (384-322 BC) recognized different manifestations of the same principle, saying: “There is certainly more than one 14

I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society form . . . of democracy.” Democratic institutions change over time in the same culture and vary between countries in the same time, just as business strategies alter. Similarly, one concrete way can “serve” different thought systems. For example, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is considered the first fullydeveloped natural rights theory consistent with later human rights ideas. However, Locke sought to protect only the rights of propertied European males. He did not consider women, savages, servants, and wage laborers as rightholders (Donnelly, 1999). In the past two centuries, as Donnelly noted, the West has increasingly expanded the recognized subjects of human rights. For instance, the right to vote was accorded only to a small propertied elite in many European countries in the 19th century. Disputes over the rights of working men and women often led to violent conflicts in 19th- and early 20th-century Europe and North America. It has been shown that the basic principles of Confucianism should enable Confucian regions to sustain economic development and to become democratic (Zhang, 2000). But this does not mean that traditional institutional structures and concrete human relations designed under these principles in agricultural economies are suitable for today’s knowledge-based civilization. For instance, the traditional ideal of “the five generations under the same roof” can hardly become an ideal of family life in contemporary industrial economies. Rapid change has enlarged the “generation gaps” so that there is a lack of appreciation and mutual understanding between the different age groups. The basic moral principle that one should take care of one’s children as well as one’s parents remains invariant with time, but the way of caring and the concrete forms taken by these reciprocal relationships may well be different in agricultural and knowledge-based civilizations. To follow the basic principles and to adjust one’s behavior according to the changed environment is a vital character of Confucianism. “The superior man produces his changes as the leopard does when he changes his spots,” says the I Ching; “their beauty become more elegant. Small men change their faces: — they show themselves prepared to follow their ruler.” The “spots,” the traditional manifestations of the Confucian principles, are replaced by the modern democratic manifestations; but the essence of Confucianism remains the same in different seasons.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities THE NEWTONIAN VISION VERSUS THE I-CHING VISION Binary arithmetic, stumbled upon by Shao Yung in his arrangements of the sixty-four hexagrams of the I Ching and brought to consciousness by Leibniz, might be said in a real sense to have been built into the mammalian nervous system long before it was found convenient for the great computing machines of modern man. Joseph Needham

Modern mentality is mathematical. The real breakthrough in Western civilization is the development and application of mathematics. “Up to the distinct emergence of the mathematical,” asserted Heidegger (1993:295), “as a fundamental characteristic of thought, the authoritative truth was considered that of Church and faith. The means for proper knowledge of beings were obtained by a changed way of the interpretation of the sources of revelation, the writ and the tradition of the Church.” For Heidegger, “mathematical” does not mean merely that which pertains to concepts, numbers, relations and patterns, but also to the way something is learned. The mathematical element is crystallized in Newton’s Principia Mathematica. Newton (1642-1727), whose contributions include differential calculus and the laws of classical mechanics, initiated a new vision of the world. The role of Newtonian physics is not limited to how it solves concrete scientific problems; it has been the dominant way of looking at the universe in modern times. Newtonian physics profoundly changed the intellectual approach to nature, man, and society, mainly by being “mathematical.” In modern Western civilization, how subjective and objective worlds are perceived, felt, understood, analyzed, and presented has been generally framed by this mechanistic vision. Its influence is reflected in Western philosophies, natural sciences, and social and economic sciences. Nevertheless, the recent development of the sciences has demonstrated that this traditional vision is not valid across the board. Newtonian physics makes it possible to calculate and thus to determine the dynamics of objects by mathematical equations. Newton himself did not claim that absolute prediction and control were possible; but it is generally accepted that Newtonian mechanics believes in determinism. Newtonian determinism is portrayed by Laplace (1749-1827): “Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated, and the respective positions of the beings which compose it, if, moreover, this intelligence were vast

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in the same formula both the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom; to it nothing would be uncertain, and the future as the past would be present to its eyes.” Laplace tried to prove that the universe functions logically according to the laws of mechanics. At its core, the deterministic credo means that the universe is comparable to the ordered running of a precise clock, in which the present state of things, on the one hand, is simply the consequence of its prior state, and on the other hand, is the cause of its state. Man can use causal relationships to bind together present, past, and future. Consequently, the problem of an exact prognosis is only a matter of recording all the relevant data. According to this view, there is no uncertainty, no chance, no choice, no free will, no freedom in principle. Everything would be predetermined, in principle. Newtonian mechanics does describe many of our daily observations. It was once generally believed that classical Newtonian mechanics is inadequate only in the cases of both very small particles where quantum mechanics is appropriate, and very large bodies, where relativistic mechanics applies. However, the recent development of nonlinear science provides new insights into Newtonian mechanics. In fact, as early as 1890 Henri Poincaré showed that Newton’s laws do not provide a general solution in the case of the interplanetary system of the earth, the moon, and the sun. Although the system contains only three components, which appear to be quite simple, it is actually quite complex. Poincaré realized that systems with a few degrees of freedom, although believed to be deterministic, may exhibit irregular dynamics. He wrote: “ . . . it may happen that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible.” During the past 100 years, Poincaré and his intellectual disciples realized that if a system consisted of a few parts that interacted strongly, it could exhibit unpredictable behavior. For instance, if three planets orbit around one another, even if they are influenced only by the force of gravity, it is impossible to predict the motions for a long period even when their positions and velocities are known with great accuracy. The I Ching is perhaps the most important work in China before Confucius. It was originally a manual of divination, and from it evolved a system of philosophy (Wilhelm, 1970, Hook, 1971, Schoenholtz, 1975, Schönberger, 1979, Liu, 1979, Ruth, 1996). The I Ching is not a religion. It symbolically represents certain patterns of change, and thus can be used to provide a comprehensive method of

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College Attrition at American Research Universities viewing our world and the universe as an organized whole. While it is most easily (and therefore most commonly) used in a superficial and frivolous way, it has been used in China as a source of wisdom for over 3000 years by scholars and the masses alike; and it has garnered attention from great Western thinkers such as Leibniz and Jung. This is not science as practiced by Aristotle, but in essence the system is an artifact documenting the fact that, from a very early time, the Chinese viewed life and the universe as being accessible to human analysis. They believed that there were natural laws that applied consistently and that could be discovered by the mind of man. There is a belief in orderly change and in a universe of meaningful relationships. It is an attempt to grasp the universe by rational means. Without going into a detailed description, suffice it to say that the I Ching is based on trigrams, three-line symbols built of an unbroken line (——) that stands for yang, the universal force of being, man, positive forces, progress, clarity, strength, and light; and a broken line (— —) that represents yin, the universal force of non-being, woman, negative forces, decline, obscurity, weakness, and darkness. Together, yin and yang are used to express the two extremes or poles of universal phenomena. Change, rather than the composition of concrete objects and the physical laws that govern them, is the basis of this ancient attempt to grasp the essence of the world. From the opposite or complementary poles of yin and yang, the I Ching portrays basic stages in the cycle of change. Change takes place in the universe because of the complementary interaction of two fundamental principles. Change is conceived of partly as the continuous transformation of one force into another, and partly as a cycle of complexes of phenomena. Change is subject to the universal law, the way, or Tao. A human being is the joint product of the two poles, man and woman. The universe is created by two prime principles, the universal force of being and the universal force of non-being. Any concept implies its negation. The negation of capitalism is socialism — neither extreme is higher than the other, in the abstract sense. Without its negation, a concept cannot exist. Affirmation and negation are different ways of looking at the same thing. The eight trigrams that can be formed by different combinations of the broken and unbroken lines show the progression of, basically, anything, from one extreme state to its opposite. Thus, they can be used to illustrate the evolutionary process as any condition develops from one extreme to the other, and back.

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society ————— ————— ————— Chien

—— —— —— —— —— —— ————— ————— —— —— ————— —— —— —— —— → Tui → Kan → Kun (the opposite)

To use this pattern to interpret an evolution of organization, we would assign the first, second and third lines to, respectively, the efficiency or human capital of employees, the performance of the organization, and its leadership. The Chien represents the “golden” time of the organization, in which the leadership is entrepreneurial and dutiful, the employees perform well, and the organizational performance is excellent. In the Tui, the leader is satisfied with the performance and begins to lose the so-called entrepreneurial spirit; but the employees are still working properly and organizational performance is still good (because the direction was properly fixed in the first period). In the Kan, the leader becomes incompetent and the employees lose the sense of duty and their quality (skills, etc.) deteriorate. In such a state, organizational performance goes on, as the employees are still performing their routine jobs. Finally, in the Kun, the leader has lost the capacity to lead, and the organization is faced with bankruptcy because of its poor performance. In a similar way, by varied combinations of the eight trigrams, ancient Chinese thinkers attempted to explain different phenomena of man, society, and nature. The trigrams can further be combined in pairs, and that allows for sixtyfour hexagrams. Each component of the Sixty-four Hexagrams has been assigned some meaning by which different yet typical situations or patterns can be determined. The I Ching is not to be read literally, but rather as an expression of abstract ideas. This is a clear outline of a rational approach to a well-ordered and dynamic universe. It is a universe characterized by high variety and constant change. In the Chinese mind, everything in the universe is in a state of flux. Everything is in the process of changing into something else. Changes follow one another in both regular and irregular patterns. Every end is also a beginning. Change does not necessarily occur in every variable between two hexagrams. The one-is-all and all-is-one philosophy is a common heritage of all Chinese philosophical systems. All things are in a state of flux; but they can only change in a certain way. Since there exists some Way controlling changes, it is possible to predict (only certain) future events. Although the I Ching did not move the Chinese

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College Attrition at American Research Universities to create modern science, it has helped the Confucian civilization to sustain the belief in man’s ability to account for natural phenomena by rational means. THE I CHING PERCEIVED BY NONLINEAR SCIENCE Change is “in.” In the last few decades, nonlinear science has replaced the Newtonian mechanics of linearity, stability, and equilibrium at the top of the science agenda in the West and around the world (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, Gleick, 1987, Waldrop, 1992, Peitgen et al., 1992, Mainzer, 1996, Prigogine, 1997, Rescher, 1998). Nonlinear science involves the study of change in complex systems which are characterized by nonlinear interactions between many elements. A complex system may consist of several diverse elements combined in a fashion that is not immediately apparent. The various parts of a system may interact not only among themselves but also with the system as a whole, which in turn affects its constituent parts. The interactions of these elements may render the entire phenomenon more than the sum of its parts. Nonlinear science reveals how such interactions can bring about qualitatively new structures and how the whole is related to and different from its individual components. The study of complexity has been greatly facilitated by the development of high-speed computing technologies. Nonlinear science provides a new vision of evolution: a vision involving the multiple, temporal, unpredictable, and complex. There is a tendency to replace simplicity with complexity and specialism with generality. Concepts such as totality, nonlinearity, self-organization, structural changes, and order and chaos, have found broad and new meanings in the development of this new science. Dynamic systems are considered to resemble the turbulent movement of a liquid, in which varied and relatively stable forms of currents and whirlpools constantly change one another. These changes consist of dynamic processes of selforganization along with the spontaneous formation of increasingly subtle and complicated structures. The accidental nature and the presence of structural changes like catastrophes and bifurcations, which are characteristic of nonlinear systems and whose further trajectory is determined by chance, make the dynamics irreversible, that is, they deprive the evolution process of a time symmetry. The new theory examines the spontaneous formation of new macroscopic structures associated with discontinuous processes. It shows how parts of a system can organize themselves into new structures at certain instability points. This new

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society theory is being applied in areas of study ranging from catastrophes, bifurcations, chaos, and spatial pattern formation to the role of stochastic noise upon structural evolution, fast and slow processes, and relationships between microscopic and macroscopic structures. By the way, it is not new to use mathematics to examine the I Ching structure; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), one of the greatest thinkers of Western civilization, tried it using the binary counting system he invented in 1679. (The binary number system which he first conceived is now the basis of most computer operations.) The hallmark of this newly developed science is an insistence on phenomena of change and on an inherent unpredictability in system evolution. It has helped scientists to correct an outmoded conception of the world and has changed how man views nature, societies, and individuals. It offers scientists a new tool for exploring and modeling the complexity of nature and society. The new techniques and concepts provide powerful methods simulating trajectories of sudden and irreversible change in social and natural systems. The essential ideas underlying the science of complexity have found wide application among a range of scientific disciplines including physics, biology, ecology, psychology, cognitive science, economics, and sociology. We will now turn to discrete dynamics, to show that the new science provides conceptual tools and methodological cues which can be used to illustrate and explore the content and implications of the I Ching. One of the foremost mathematicians of his time and a philosopher of enduring fame, Leibniz wrote original works on subjects as diverse as geometry, biology, geology, theology, metaphysics and statistics. His encounter with the philosophy of Confucianism and the I Ching is the first case of a major Western thinker’s seriously engaging Asian philosophy. After reading the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, he began to consider himself a follower of Confucianism (Cook and Rosemont, 1994). He was enthusiastic about the mathematical implications of the diagrammatic representations of philosophical ideas in the I Ching. He emphasized plurality, diversity, harmony, and a higher-order unity that could be grasped by reason and expressed in a language without ambiguity. He held that the origin of the binary arithmetic which he had invented could be found in the trigrams of the I Ching. The arithmetic we normally use has the base 10. By adding a zero to any number, we multiply it by 10. Leibniz conceived an arithmetic of base 2. In this binary, or dyadic, system by adding a zero to any number we multiply it by only 2. The binary system makes use of only two numbers, 0 and 1, instead of ten, but

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College Attrition at American Research Universities follows the same principle as the decimal system. For instance, the first five numbers in our normal arithmetic (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) appear in the binary arithmetic as 1, 10, 11, 100, 101. Leibniz first published his binary system in a paper entitled as De Progressione Dyadica in 1679. In 1698, one of the Jesuit missionaries in China brought to Leibniz’s notice the hexagrams of the I Ching as offering a parallel to his binary system.1 When Leibniz read copies of Shao Yung’s arrangements of the Sixty-four Hexagrams, he immediately recognized its similarity to his own binary arithmetic. In 1713, in a book called Two Letters on the Binary Number and the Chinese Philosophy, Leibniz claimed that the I Ching was parallel to his own binary code; indeed, he called his invention a “rediscovery” of the principles of the I Ching. But there is more. He conceived this system not only as a purely mathematical scheme but also as a universal calculus. It was supposed to be a language that could help to reconcile the various religious factions in the Europe as well as the nations of Asia and Europe. For Leibniz, binary means the 0-1 state of alternation. He essentially saw the yin and the yang as a binary code. In Chinese thought, the yin and yang are two extremes. However, since the “optimal point” is not necessarily located at an extreme point, the I Ching may be approached more properly by contemporary discrete dynamics than by Leibniz’s binary system. In order to illustrate the concepts of yin and yang in terms of discrete dynamics, first we will consider a one-dimensional map of population growth. Let us assume that the population reproduces at a rate proportional to the size of the current population, and that the growth rate is proportional to the difference between the actual population and the maximal population size which the environment can sustain. If x(t ) is the size of the population at time (or generation) t , then x(t + 1 ) refers to the generation that follows the t th generation, t + 2 means the second generation that follows the t th generation, and so on. We assume that the population dies due to aging or scarcity of resources. If the birth rate proportionality constant is r , while the carrying capacity of the environment is given by a constant F , then the population dynamics can be described as

1.Substituting a zero for each broken line and a 1 for each unbroken line. He placed the zero for the Kun at the beginning of his sequence. The hexagram Po was 1 (as zeros preceding 1 are disregarded), and stood in the first place in his system. The next, Pi, was 10, that is, our usual 2. The procedure may be continued until all the Sixty-four Hexagrams are numbered in his binary system. In his sequence, the last one is Chien, transcribed as 111111, or 63.

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society

x(t + 1) x(t ) =r− x(t ) F . With the transformation x(t ) the Verhulst population model

→ (r − 1) Fx(t ) , the above form leads to

x(t + 1) − x(t ) = ax(t ){1 − x(t )} where a ≡ r − 1 is a parameter that influences the degree of nonlinearity in this equation. The model tells us about the rate at which changes take place. This single-variable difference equation represents the simplest nonlinear dynamical system. It is required that x is normalized in the sense that it varies .

0 ≤ x ≤1

The above model, called the logistic model in the literature of modern sciences and mathematics, has an important history in biology. It serves as the core of a population dynamics model which led May to write his famous article in 1976. In interpreting the I Ching in terms of discrete dynamics, we consider yin = 0 and yang = 1 . The statement that the state variable x lies between the yin and yang means: 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 . There is no explicit solution of the model. If one wants to compute x(t ) from x(0) and the parameter, one has to calculate the model step by step. This chore, requiring many steps, takes only a few seconds with a common computer but perhaps several years to calculate with pencil and paper — and the results will probably be incorrect. Let us say:

x = 0 0 < x < 0.5  x = 0.5 0.5 < x < 1  x = 1

Completely feminine Feminine Equal in gender Masculine Completely masculine

We illustrate the dynamics of the logistic map with a = 4 and x(0) = 0.01 . The system starts to move towards being masculine from the initial feminine state; and then becomes feminine again. The point is that the motion of the system controlled by a simple rule is extremely complicated. If no exogenous force

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College Attrition at American Research Universities stops it, life will be continued with repeated exchanges, not in symmetry but in a chaotic fashion, of female and male domination. Figure 1.2. An Insight into Femininity-Masculinity Dynamics with a=

4

x (t ) 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

20

40

60

80

100

t

This logistic map exhibits all of the types of long-term behavior that can be displayed by a dynamic system: stable and unstable fixed points, periodic orbits, aperiodic trajectories, and chaos. Here, random shocks are not required to produce chaos. One of the fundamental aspects of chaos is that many different possible motions are simultaneously present in the system. A particular manifestation of this is that typically an infinite number of unstable periodic orbits co-exist with the chaotic motion. Because such “chaotic” trajectories are unstable, errors of estimation in parameters or initial conditions, however tiny, will accumulate rapidly into substantial errors of forecast. The characteristic of extreme sensibility to tiny perturbations is known as the butterfly effect. The future behavior of such a chaotic model solution cannot be anticipated from its patterns in the past. The simple one-dimensional map can be used to generally illustrate the Chinese mentality and Chinese world view. According to the I Ching, the essence of the world is dynamic and changing rather than static. Any change is between the two extremes, the yin and the yang. When the system arrives at either of the poles,

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society the system is not at a healthy (desirable or humanistic) state. Although the actual state of the system will be located somewhere between the two poles, this does not mean that it is always possible to predict the state. Change is not necessarily regular. Regular motion and movement towards a fixed (positive or desirable or progressive) direction are possible but not necessarily universal. To illustrate why chaos theory is the key to appreciating the Chinese way of thinking and to understanding the Chinese view of change, from a scientific perspective, we cite another well-known example of chaos. The example is the Lorenz attractor. The Lorenz equations are a quadratic system of autonomous differential equations in three dimensions modeling a three-mode approximation to the motion of a layer of fluid heated from below. The system of equations that Edward N. Lorenz proposed in 1963 is

x' = − 10( x + y ), y ' = 28 x − y − xz, 8z + xy z' = − 3 where ‘ stands for the change rate of a variable as time flows, x, y , and, z

are time-dependent variables. Figure 1.3 shows the corresponding Lorenz attractor. There are two sheets in which trajectories spiral outwards. When the distance from the center of such a spiral becomes larger than some particular threshold, the motion is ejected from the spiral and is attracted by the other spiral, where it again begins to spiral out, and the process is repeated. The motion is not regular. The number of turns that a trajectory spends in one spiral before it jumps to the other is not specified. It may wind around one spiral twice, and then three times around the other, then ten times around the first and so on.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities 20 10 0

Figure 1.3. The Lorenz Attractor

-10 -20

40 30 20 10 0 -10 0 10 20

The Lorenz attractor is dubbed a strange attractor because there are no asymptotically stable equilibria or period orbits in a global attractor that is a compact, connected invariant set. The geometry of the attractor is exceedingly complicated. Like the logistical map, two solutions with close initial data display radically different dynamical behavior. In an earlier work (Zhang 1991, Ch. 6), I found that some urban systems can also be described by the Lorenz equations. The urban model describes an urban system within a metropolitan area. The system under consideration is small, so that its dynamics will have almost no significant impact on the metropolitan area. Businesses and residents are free to choose their location sites either in the urban area or in the outside world. Locational characteristics of the urban system are described by the following three variables:

x (t ) = the output of the urban system at time t ; y (t ) = the number of residents; z (t ) = the land rent.

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society With some proper assumptions about the behavior of businesses and consumers, we establish a dynamic system that can be reduced to the Lorenz equations. Since the urban system exhibits the same behavior given by Figure 1.3, we see that the urban system exhibits the following properties: (1) the temporary path of the three urban variables are time-dependent but are not periodic (or “regular”); (2) the motion does not appear to show a transient phenomenon since, regardless of how long the numerical integration is continued, the trajectory is going to continue to wind around and around without settling down to either periodic or stationary behavior; (3) the topology of the figure is not dependent on the choice of initial conditions or integrating route; and (4) it is impossible to predict the details of how the trajectory will develop over any period other than a very short time interval. Considering the above urban interpretation of the Lorenz equations, we see that even if the government is well informed and is composed of welleducated officials and experts, it is impossible for the government to predict the impact of its own actions, such as tax policy, land policy, and infrastructure policy.

THE I CHING AND ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM Strange as it may sound, the power of mathematics rests on its evasion of all unnecessary thought and on its wonderful saving of mental operations. Ernst Mach (Bell, 1937)

The I Ching emphasizes rationality, but also ascribes a great significance to intuition. Since conscious actions and attitudes are supposed to be related to unconscious motivations, the book is often used to provide intuitive insight into the working of the inner self. In the West, in addition to the binary approach to the I Ching propounded by Leibniz, Jung provided an insightful example of the richness of the I Ching (in quite an opposite sense to Leibniz). Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) had a lifelong interest in the religious and psychological ideas of India, China, and Japan. He recognized the wide gap between Western and Eastern ways of thinking. He become acquainted in the early 1920 with the I Ching, as translated by James Legge, and he carried out a series of experiments with the system. In his autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, he wrote: “I would sit for hours beneath the hundred-year-old pear tree, the I Ching

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College Attrition at American Research Universities beside me, practicing the technique by referring the resultant oracles to one another in interplay of questions and answers. All sorts of undeniably remarkable results emerged — meaningful connections with my own thought processes which I could not explain to myself.” Jung compared his earlier treatment of schizophrenic patients with practice by the I Ching. The way the ancient text looks at the universe, in terms of the correlations of meanings, helped him to create his theory of synchronicity. He found that the I Ching’s answers to his questions were meaningful and often provided a deep insight into the problem at hand. “The science of the I Ching is based,” he said (Clarke, 1997:43), “not on the causality principle but on one which . . . I have tentatively called the synchronistic principle. My researches into the psychology of unconscious processes long ago compelled me to look around for another principle of explanation, since the causality principle seemed to me insufficient to explain certain remarkable manifestations of the unconscious. I found that there are psychic parallelisms which simply cannot be related to each other causally, but must be connected by another kind of principle altogether. This connection seemed to lie essentially in the relative simultaneity of the events, hence the term ‘synchronistic.’” According to Jung, the causality principle holds that the connection between cause and effect is a necessary one; the synchronicity principle asserts that the terms of a meaningful coincidence are connected by simultaneity and meaning. In the synchronicity principle, timing plays a significant role. Through the I Ching, Jung perceived a means of psychological integration. Like Leibniz, who was inspired by the I Ching and Confucianism to take the universe as a whole, Jung drew inspiration from the I Ching about the significance of extending our investigation to a global plane. In his theory, the individual psyche is not an isolated phenomenon but is strongly associated with social, cultural, and political variables. The origins of the I Ching go back to mythical antiquity, and it has occupied the attention of the most eminent scholars of China down to the present day. The book has definitely affected the Chinese conception of the cosmos and of human beings in relation to continuing changes that are foreseeable outcomes of the universal interaction of opposing forces. In The Turning Point, Capra (1982:35) reflected that “The Chinese philosophers saw reality, whose ultimate essence they called Tao, as a process of continual flow and change. In their view all phenomena we observe participate in this cosmic process and are thus intrinsically dynamic. The principal

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society characteristic of the Tao is the cyclical nature of its ceaseless motion; all developments in nature — those in the physical world as well as those in the psychological and social realms — show cyclical patterns. The Chinese gave this idea of cyclical patterns a definite structure by introducing the polar opposites yin and yang, the two poles that set the limits for the cycles of change: ‘The yang having reached its climax retreats in favor of the yin; the yin having reached its climax retreats in favor of the yang.’ In the Chinese view, all manifestations of the Tao are generated by the dynamic interplay of these two archetypal poles, which are associated with images of opposites taken from nature and from social life.” Capra also pointed out that it is difficult for Westerners to fully recognize that the opposites do not belong to different categories but are extreme poles of a single whole. The I Ching was one of the first Confucian classics whose study was authorized by the government. It escaped the book burning of 213 BC, and its fame spread further after 124 BC, when an imperial university was founded for teaching the Confucian scriptures. It shared with the other Confucian classics in the “monopoly” of established doctrine. Confucius, like the I Ching, maintained that all things, including men, stand in certain definite relationships to other things. These relationships are not randomly arranged. There are natural rules dictating the actions of those things. For Confucius, knowledge is by no means a random piling up of miscellaneous facts. There is a coherent, underlying unity. Confucius warned that to learn and to memorize things is not essential. The most important thing is to understand things as a whole. “Am I one who learns many things and keeps them in memory?” once Confucius asked himself. “No, I seek a unity all-pervading.” He treated the world as an organic whole; and at the same time emphasized special (historical) situations. He did not explicitly provide any general rule or principle of behavior, as situations are complicated. He taught that people should consider and understand the impact of their actions rather than memorize fixed rules. Confucius did not urge something for strictly positive or negative reasons. He tried to take account of all possibilities. According to him, the development of anything (in man or in nature) has two extremes. When the development of anything brings it to one pole, a reversal toward the other pole occurs. Everything involves its own negation, as Hegel said. Confucius applied analytical methods rarely used in Western rationality. He posited two extreme forms (like socialism and capitalism, in modern economics) of

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College Attrition at American Research Universities men, which we may call the gentleman and the small man, to illustrate various types of men; and he also used two extreme time points, ancient and contemporary, to follow the dynamics of affairs. In this way, Confucius was able to “measure” how far each man (or each situation) is from the ideal state of the gentleman (or the virtuous situation). In Confucius’ doctrines the concepts of the ancient times and the gentleman both play the role of establishing exact propriety and perfection and serve as the reference points for measuring the “degree of approximation.” His concepts of the gentleman and small man helped him to effectively examine the dynamics of man, even though he did not have modern dynamic analytical methods. We read many paragraphs featuring the gentleman and the small man in The Analects, where he used the two concepts to illustrate how men may change when the environment is different. When the environment is changed, the small man tends to go into moral and spiritual decline, while the superior man tends to do the opposite. Confucius asserted that “The progress of the superior man is upwards; the progress of the mean man is downwards.” This is also applicable to cultures. He used the poles to describe the variety of human behavior. According to Confucius, “The superior man has a dignified ease without pride. The mean man has pride without a dignified ease.” With regard to attitudes of the employer towards the employee, he warned that “The superior man is easy to serve and difficult to please. If you try to please him in any way which is not accordant with right, he will not be pleased. But in his employment of men, he uses them according to their capacity. The mean man is difficult to serve, and easy to please. If you try to please him, though it is in a way which is not accordant with right, he may be pleased. But in his employment of men, he wishes them to be equal in everything.” Confucius (9.8) explicated his analytical method of using two extreme points as follows: “Am I indeed possessed of knowledge? I do not know. But if a mean person, who appears quite empty, asks anything of me, I set it forth from one end to the other, and exhaust it.” By “exhaust it,” he meant that the other cases between the two extremes are included. This I Ching-influenced mind is quite “mathematical.”Similar to the method of locating any practical mind between the gentleman and small man, he used historical times as stand-ins for the ideal and for reality. He held that “In ancient times, men learned with a view to their own improvement. Nowadays, men learn with a view to the approbation of others.” A gentleman’s mind should concentrate on self-cultivation rather than be targeted at temporary benefits. “The men of former times, in the matters of ceremonies and music, were rustics, it is said; while the men of these latter times, in

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I. The American Civilization and Ancient Confucianism in An Open Society ceremonies and music, are accomplished gentlemen. If I have occasion to use those things, I follow the men of former times.” Many other passages in The Analects use ancient and modern times as reference points for discussing dynamic issues related to human affairs. The vision provided by the I Ching is different from the Newtonian. It is impossible to wholly perceive the vision reflected in the I Ching through the vision held by traditional science. That is, the Newtonian vision cannot “convince” the mentality informed by the I Ching. Since the mainstreams of modern Western thought are characterized by the Newtonian vision and Confucianism is influenced by the I Ching, it is almost impossible for the Confucian civilization to fully appreciate the traditional Western civilization, and vice versa. We are living in an epoch — the first time in history — in which the Confucian civilization is mentally and spiritually converging towards the Western civilization. The convergence is not only due to economic and technological advances in the last century, but mainly to the advances of rational thought in the last few decades. One hundred years ago, Chinese thinkers could not be “Westernized” even after they had lived in Western countries, because neither the Western religions nor the Newtonian worldview could fully persuade the rational Confucian (as well as Taoist) mind that the truth had been found. Obviously, Japan was not (that is, not “seriously” or “deeply”) faced with this kind of cultural obstacles to Westernization. Without (commonly accepted) high thought, there will be no meaningful/lasting convergence between the two rational civilizations. We have entered a new millennium, equipped with a higher vision about life and society than any of those that had sustained the past rational civilizations.

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II. “ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL” VERSUS “ALL MEN ARE BORN EQUAL” I do not know any dress of the scholar. Confucius (the Li Chi)

The zenith of a civilization is determined by the ideas and theories that it creates, adapts, applies; but if one observes only the most visible, eccentric aspects of the civilization without appreciating the profundity and sophistication of its attainments, one will perceive its dynamics only superficially. Tocqueville (1835:21) reckoned that the American civilization is the product of two perfectly distinct elements, the spirit of freedom and the spirit of religion. Naked self-interest created the need for religion in American life: Religion provided a great restraining element on the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest. The spirit of freedom and the spirit of religion had often been in conflict in European cultures, while according to his observation they were in cooperative dynamics in the United States. Religion and civil liberty functioned in harmony and lent mutual support. Religion regarded civil liberty as a noble exercise of men’s faculties and the world of politics as a sphere for the free play of intelligence. Freedom did not see religion as the companion of its struggles and triumphs and the divine source of its rights; rather, religions helped the establishment of mores and mores were regarded as the guarantee of the laws. Tocqueville discerned that the real school of republican virtue was the Church. At a time when the education system was not yet developed, religion was the first of America’s political institutions. The Church gave the first lessons in participation in public life.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities For the yin-yang mind, the observation that the United States is the most market-driven and at the same time the most religious nation of modern times is not a paradox (as suggested in Garber and Walkowitz, 1999). The spirit of freedom is cultivated for progressing, advancing; the spirit of religion is maintained for placating, receding. The former fosters fairness; the latter avoids evilness. “ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL” IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION A man can enlarge the principles which he follows; those principles do not enlarge the man. Confucius (15:30)

Since World War II, America has been at the center of the world’s civilizations. It established this position through economic and military superpower as well as by its unconditional belief in the idea of democracy and freedom. This belief (and the relative absence of outside intervention) has enabled the United States to enjoy a long uninterrupted political tradition; the United States holds the oldest functioning democracy and the world’s oldest written constitution. In contrast to China’s politics in modern times, the American tradition has been followed in a more or less straight line. The American social consensus is built on a perception of “freedom” and “equality” as the essence of justice, as reflected in The Declaration of Independence in 1776: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. It should be mentioned that by “All men are created equal” Thomas Jefferson did not mean that human beings were equal in all respects; he meant, fundamentally, political equality — that all human beings possess inherent worth and dignity. The dominant opinion of the United States was articulated by John Adams, the first vice president and second president of the United States, as

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” follows: “That all men have one common nature, is a principle that will now universally prevail, and equal rights and equal duties will in a just sense, I hope, be inferred from it. But equal ranks and equal property can never be inferred from it, any more than equal understanding, agility, vigor or beauty. Equal laws are all that can ever be derived from human equality” (McClosky and Zaller, 1984:80). Liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire are the five terms that Lipset (1997) used to characterize the American creed. In America, as demonstrated by Redenius (1981), the ideal of equality is interpreted differently than in Europe in at least three important respects. First, equality was expected to be achieved in America by moving up rather than leveling down. From its earliest days, the bounty of the United States encouraged the aspirations of the ambitious and opened opportunities for everyone. Second, equality meant individualism rather than collectivism. It is only after the late 19th century that equality has been associated with negative connotations such as sameness, conformity, and homogeneity. The abundance of land, the opportunities for advancement, and the absence of long-established classes explain why Americans disliked a collectivist definition of equality. Finally, equality was not an idea with a precisely defined meaning; mainly, it meant a moral sense that all people are of the same worth and have identical rights. Martin Luther King, Jr. eloquently expressed the American dream for equality in the widely quoted I Have a Dream speech delivered before the Lincoln Memorial on August 28, 1963 (King, 1992:1045): “So I say to you, my friends, that even though we must face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed — we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. . . . I have a dream my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” The United States was not born as a democratic nation. Tocqueville (1835:183) denounced the hypocrisy, saying that: “By abolishing the principle of servitude, the Americans do not make the slaves free.” The original European settlers had brought with them rigid hierarchies of power and the most undemocratic of institutions: slavery and indentured servitude. In 1700 there were only 20,000 Blacks in America, but by the time of the Declaration of Independence that population had been increased to half a million. The proportion of Blacks in the total population was one fifth in 1776, and remained about the same until after the Civil War, when slavery was officially abolished (1861-5). For another hundred years after 1865, they largely served as a lower-castle group working under explicit

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College Attrition at American Research Universities or implicit “Jim Crow” policies, with little opportunity to gain educational and financial resources. Advances made after the war (voting rights, congressional representation) quickly evaporated. Only since the 1960s have Blacks really been given a claim to political equality and economic opportunity. The idea “all men are created equal” took a long time to be realized. ALL MEN ARE BORN EQUAL IN CONFUCIANISM The sage and the common people are the same in kind. Mencius (11:7)

In Confucianism, the ideal of man is the sage; and everyone can become a sage — not through birth or power but through self-improvement and virtue. In Confucian tradition, all men are born naturally equal. “In good years,” noted Mencius (11:7), “the children of the people are most of them good, while in bad years most of them abandon themselves to evil. It is not owing to their natural powers conferred by Heaven that they are thus different. The abandonment is owing to the circumstances through which they allow their minds to be ensnared and drowned in evil. . . . The sage and we are the same in kind.” One is called a decent human being because of one’s exalted accumulation of virtue rather than exalted social status. Since virtue cannot be obtained without rational knowledge, we can show that Confucianism completely agrees with St. Augustine in De Ordine (Ch. 9): “But why is man superior to brute animals, and why is he to be ranked above them? Because he understands what he does. Nothing else ranks me above the brute animal except the fact that I am a rational animal.” “If a person cultivates his will and sense of purpose,” said Hsün Tzu (2:5), “he can take more pride in them than in riches and eminence. If he gives due weight to the Way and what is congruent with it, he will have slight regard for kings and dukes. Absorbed in the examination of his inner self, he will scorn mere external things. A tradition expresses this: The gentleman works external things; the petty man works for external things. Do whatever causes the mind to be serene though it gives the body toil, and whatever causes one’s sense for what is right to develop, though it diminishes the concern for profit.” Asked what it is that makes a man human, Hsün Tzu (5:9) replied, “I say that it lies in his ability to draw boundaries. . . . Even though wild animals have parents and offspring, there is no natural affection between them as between father and son, and though there are male and female of the species, there is no proper separation of sexes. Hence, the proper way of Man lies in nothing other than his ability to draw boundaries.” One is considered a gentleman only if one lives up to high moral standards, regardless of whether one is noble or base by

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” birth. Hsün Tzu (1:3) averred that “The gentleman by birth is not different from other men; he is just good at employing external things.” He also remarked that: “The coming of honor or disgrace must be a reflection of one’s inner power” (1:5), and that “The ancient Kings and sages knew that if, in creating the position of ruler and superior, they did not refine and adorn him, he would prove inadequate to the task of unifying the people; that if he were not made rich and generous, he would be inadequate to act as the pitch pipe for his subordinates; and if he were not made majestic and powerful, he would prove inadequate to proscribe the violent and overcome the cruel. . . . They caused the various classes of people of the world to realize that what they desired and longed for was to be found with them, and this is why their incentives work. They caused them to know that what they dreaded lay with them, and this is the reason their penalties inspired awe. When incentives work and penalties inspire awe, promotion of the worthy can be effected, retirement of the unworthy accomplished, and giving office to the more able and the less able according to their ability can succeed. . . . Goods and commodities will come as easily as water bubbling from an inexhaustible spring” (10:12). With regard to the principles of a king, Hsün Tzu (9:15) instructed: “Those lacking inner power shall be without honored status, those without ability shall be without office, those who lack accomplishment shall go unrewarded, and those who do not transgress shall not be rebuked. In the royal court, none shall occupy positions out of mere good fortune. Among the people, none shall gain a living by mere good fortune.”

It should be noted that a concept called “illiberal democracy” was recently introduced in Pacific Asia to distinguish democracy in the Confucian regions from Western democracy. Disregarding (perhaps unconsciously) the history of slavery and colonization, Bell and Jayasuriya (1995:3) claim that “Western political thinkers generally share a belief that ‘all persons are by nature equal,’ a principle of equal respect for the moral status and intrinsic worth of each person. . . . Needless to say, this principle commitment to equality has been imperfectly applied in practice . . . but at least at the level of theory most Western thinkers since the birth of liberalism in seventeenth century England begin with an assumption that the interests of each member of the community matters, and matters equally — the common doctrine of Judaism and Christianity that we are all equally God’s children — help to explain the takenfor-granted, uncontroversial status of an egalitarian premise.” They also observe that Western social and political systems systematically excluded large numbers of persons from access to political power and a fair share of the benefits of social cooperation; but they attempt to convince the reader that: “in East Asia . . . the moral and political status of each person has traditionally varied both in

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College Attrition at American Research Universities theory and practice in accordance with a person’s unchosen position within a hierarchical family unit.” This is a queer interpretation of Confucianism. According to both Confucianism and Taoism, all persons are by nature equal. No person is born to rule and no person is born to be a slave. Still, no country in human history has emphasized achievement, equality of opportunity, and meritocracy so consistently as the United States. Americans did not accept the idea of rigid hereditary ranks, except in regard to the Black minority until a few decades ago. Social status and rewards are, at least ostensibly, mainly the result of hard work, educational achievement, skill, and ability. Most Americans believe that they have a good chance of improving their standard of living by working hard. This accords with one of the ancient Confucian tenets, that social position is arranged according to the moral attainment and education rather than birth. This principle is stated by Hsün Tzu (9:1) as follows: “Although they be the descendants of kings and dukes or knights and grand officers, if they are incapable of devotedly observing the requirements of ritual and moral principles, they should be relegated to the position of commoners. Although they be the descendants of commoners, if they accumulate culture and study, rectify their character and conduct, and are capable of devotedly observing the requirements of ritual principles and justice, they should be brought to the ranks of a prime minister, knight, or grand officer.” “Men are born equal” is an essential value in ancient Confucianism. According to Mencius (11:6): “It is said in the Book of Poetry: ‘Heaven, in producing mankind, gave them their various facilities and relations with their specific laws. These are the invariable rules of nature for all to hold.” Nevertheless, this does not mean that men should have equal ranks and equal property. Hsün Tzu noted the necessity of social inequalities: “Where the classes of society are equally ranked, there is no proper arrangement of society; where authority is evenly distributed, there is no unity; and where everyone is of like status, none would be willing to serve the other. . . . Two men of equal eminence cannot attain each other; two men of the same low status cannot command each other — such is the norm of Heaven. When power and positions are equally distributed and likes and dislikes are identical, and material goods are inadequate to satisfy all, there is certain to become contention. Such contention is bound to produce civil disorder, and this disorder will result in poverty. . . . There is equality insofar as they are not equal.” Asked about proper governing, Hsün Tzu replied (9:1): “Promote the worthy and capable without regard to seniority; dismiss the unfit and incapable without hesitation; execute the principal evildoers without trying first to instruct them; and

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” transform the common lot men without trying first to rectify them.” There is a consistent emphasis on promoting capable men to important position for the benefit of society in Confucianism. “If men of virtue and ability be not confided in,” argued Mencius (14:13), “a state will become empty and void. Without the rules of propriety and distinctions of right, the high and the low will be thrown into confusion. Without the great principles of government and their various business, — there will not be wealth sufficient for the expenditure.” Thus, in Confucianism all individuals are in some fundamental sense alike and no person possesses greater intrinsic worth than another. The Confucian principles based on natural equality are not in conflict with democratic principles such as popular sovereignty, the right of the people to choose and hold accountable those who rule them, and the inalienable nature of human rights in an essential sense. Freedom cannot become universal until a truly universal idea of freedom can be identified. According to Confucianism, no doctrine can become universal if it is constructed with a personalized God or based on the classification according to birth into master and slave. This belief in the equal worth of all human beings also underlies a profound convergence between the Confucian civilization and the American civilization — in which a personalized God is daily respected but is not politically employed (in the sense of direct involvement in state affairs). Here, we should remark that Confucius greatly “admired” Heaven — he even conceived that Heaven knew what he was doing. SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES To be able to judge of others by what is right in ourselves — this may be called the art of virtue. Confucius (6:30)

Religious differences tend to be a disruptive force in a pluralistic society. One way to maintain social harmony is to protect religion in private life from public interference and at the same to protect public life from religious interference. The English philosopher John Locke (whose Two Treatises on Government influenced the drafting of the Declaration of Independence) exerted a lasting influence upon American political thought in many ways, including by arguing in favor of religious toleration. Locke held that the fear of sedition on the part of religious minorities was without any logical basis. If the state grants religious freedom, he suggested, each religious group enjoying its own form of religious practice and experience will 39

College Attrition at American Research Universities not be against the state. Nevertheless, Locked believed that there must be limits to the degree of religious toleration by the state. Freedom can be permitted only to the extent that such freedom would not destroy the society and the state. For example, a religion that would demand freedom for itself only so that it could seize the government and deny freedom to others ought not be tolerated (Grimes, 1983:55). In addition, no religion should be tolerated if it was so constituted that its adherents became bound to the protection and service of another prince (Locke, 1946:155). He also argued that atheists ought not to be tolerated because they could not be bound by oaths and promises that are essential to all organized society. Locke’s ideas on the separation of the affairs of church and state also influenced the practice in America. He argued that the two would exist in harmony if the state attended to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth and the church to the salvation of the souls. According to the Constitution, the government of the United States is secular; there is no state religion. In fact, the Constitution excludes the legal possibility of a civil religion. As argued by Keily (1999:210), “Americans tend to transfer for a unifying faith, a shareable reverence, onto the landscape or onto secular places and especially buildings associated with persons or events that we can all claim as our own.” School textbooks in the United States, as demonstrated by Vitz (1989), have been almost totally silent on the role that religion plays in American history and society. There are no church taxes in the United States; the churches receive no state support. There are no legal or official religious holidays. The United States has experienced a decline in religious observance and increased secularization partly as a consequence of expanding rational education, industrialization, consumer cultures, self-seeking pleasure principles. As observed by Bloom (1987:56), real religion and knowledge of the Bible have diminished to an almost negligible point, even though respect for “the Sacred” has soared. Nevertheless, compared with other Western countries, Americans are remarkably religious. Surveys indicate that many Americans regard themselves as members of specific religious groups and are very interested in spiritual matters. Americans commonly believe that religion is important in human life. What George Washington said about the significance of religion and morality in 1796 seems still to be commonly believed today (Safire, 1992): “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties 40

II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” of men and citizens. . . . And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”YearsThe Constitution and the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights, 1791) enforce a separation between religion and state. The structure of religious life remained entirely distinct from the political organization. This enabled the United States to easily change laws without destroying the foundations of ancient beliefs. According to the Constitution, “no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.” This firmly establishes equal access to national political power among different religious groups. The First Amendment to the Constitution states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” According to Fischer et al. (1997: 261), the Amendment’s first clause (“the Establishment Clause”) seems to ask that no religious faith receive public support in order to dominate others, and the second clause (“the Free Exercise Clause”) implies that all faiths should be free to strive to maintain themselves, to organize their worship, and to pursue their own religious truths free of public interference. Still, although State is officially separated from Church, the United States has always been faced with controversies over the relations of church and state. Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has explicitly forbidden government from aiding one religion over another or from aiding religion over non-religion. Although belief and formal membership in religious denomination are high, Americans don’t frequently go to religious service. The absence of any civil religion in the US Constitution has led many to assert that there is no civil religion in America; yet from 1960 to 1990, church and synagogue membership increased almost 30 percent and the 21st century began with a “born-again” Christian being elected to the White House. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 2.1 (based on Bennett, 1994:115), due to population growth church and synagogue membership as a percentage of population had actually decreased during the same period. In particular, in 1990, the mainstream protestant churches in the United States lost between one-fifth and one-third of the membership that they claimed in 1965. As estimated by Bennett, only 20% of protestants and 28 percent of catholics attend church in any given week.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Figure 2.1. Church Membership as a Percentage of Population in the United States, 1960-90. 64

Figure 2.1. Church Membership as a Percentage of Population in 63

1965

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the United States, 1960-90. 61

60 Multiculturalism

in the United States

MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES For the men of Wu and men of Yue are enemies; yet if they are acrossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. Sun Tze

Human history is a dynamic process of class struggle and cooperation. Marx’s interpretation of history as class struggle satisfies the need to construct a theory, but it should not be taken seriously as a true description of all human history. Conflict is an intrinsic part of human cooperation. Like cooperation, conflict may lead to constructive and/or destructive consequences. Americans have come together from varied parts of the world. Even for the outsider, Americans may seem more different than alike in their habits and values. In the late 1700s, Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur (1735-1813, who emigrated from France to the American colonies in 1759), recalled one family with an English grandfather and Dutch grandmother, whose son married a French woman and whose own four sons had all married women of different nationalities. According to de Crèvecoeur (Schlesinger, 1998:15), “From this

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” promiscuous breed, that race now called Americans have arisen. . . . He is an American, who leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. . . . Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men.” In terms of ethnic culture, the initial bases of American society were largely British. Over half of the population before 1776 came from British Isles stock. With other early European arrivals, they created a White, Anglo-American, protestant dominant culture (Mauk and Oakland, 1997) that was responsible for establishing many of the political, social, constitutional, and religious institutions. Over two-thirds of US immigration came from Northwestern Europe for most of the 19th century. By the beginning of the 20th century, more and more of the new arrivals were different in appearance and heritage, and that trend has increased dramatically. In the past century families from all over the world have immigrated to the US, and it is estimated that within the next fifty years one in every three US citizens will be a person of non-White heritage (Thornton, 1992). “By the middle of the twenty-first century,” Yinger (1994:35) estimated, “if the present trend continues, the United States will be a truly global society, with slightly over half of primarily European ancestry and nearly half of Latino, African, Asian, and Native American background.” How the United States progresses as a multi-ethnic society will be of critical importance for its own quality of life. Almost all the political and economic fundamental principles that are essential for Western civilization were created in Europe. But in modern times, it is not Europe but the United States that has most effectively applied these principles. The United States does not use a native language and has maintained its modern culture with immigrated (somewhat adjusted) ideologies and religions. An immigrated culture has the advantage of improving the principles, customs, and institutions of the native culture(s) to suit the new reality. Negative aspects can be avoided. There is little resistance to new cultural and institutional construction, and the costs of the destruction of tradition are negligible. The United States is founded upon variations of racial groups and individual character, on a background of large-scale immigration, slavery, and Native-American experiences. The differences of social heritage, institutional habit, mental attitude, and emotional tone and the continuous free crossfertilization among these differences have made the United States dynamic. In

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College Attrition at American Research Universities the Culture and Democracy in the United States, published in 1924, Kallen (1970:4243) asserted: “Within these Many, gathered upon the American scene from the four corners of the earth and taking root and finding nourishment, growth and integrity upon its soil, lies the American One, as poets, painters, musicians and philosophers feel and utter this One. . . . Cultural growth is founded upon Cultural Pluralism. Pluralism is possible only in a democratic society whose institutions encourage individuality in groups, in persons, in temperaments, whose program liberates these individualities and guides them into a fellowship of freedom and cooperation.” He characterized the American gentleman of British stock as being an individualist, speaking an English dialect, interested in getting along, kind, neighborly, not too scrupulous in business. He was “rather elemental in his pleasures, indulgent to his women, unthinkingly devoted to ‘laissez-faire’ in economics and politics, very respectable in private life, tending to liberalism and mysticism in religion, naively credulous of the black arts and the sciences; moved, where his economic interests are unaffected, by formulas rather than ideas, in all matters by preference a ‘booster’ rather than a ‘knocker’” (1970:83). The American gentleman regarded himself the measure and the standard of the Americanism that the newcomer was to attain, based on being heir of the oldest rooted economic settlement and spiritual tradition of the White man in the nation. Presidents of the United States, regardless of their party affiliations, have spoken consistently of an “American Identity” in their inauguration addresses. This common identity emphasizes individual identities as opposed to distinctions based on ethnic and other social categories. Rather than background and biology, presidents have utilized universal belief to create an American identity. “The Principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed,” Franklin D. Roosevelt said in 1943, “is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race and ancestry. A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy” (Schlesinger, 1998:43). Roosevelt identified the nation with the principle. Similarly, when speaking of American citizens’ “primary allegiance to the values America stands for and values we really live by,” the then President Clinton stated, “long before we were so diverse, our nation’s motto was E Pluribus Unum — out of many, we are one. We must be one — as neighbors; as fellow citizens; not separate camps, but family” (Kim, 1999:598). The constant meeting and mixing of cultures has brought about many positive consequences to the American civilization; but it has also fuelled

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” widespread discrimination, exploitation, violent anti-foreign movements, and a constantly renewed debate over equality, opportunity, and national identity. In a recent book on the dynamics of ethnic relationships, Olzak (1992) applied ecological theories of competition and niche overlap to examine instances of ethnic collective action that occurred in American society around the turn of the 19th century. The study analyzes the causes of racial and ethnic confrontations, protests, riots, and attacks in the largest American cities, suggesting that there is a causal dynamics between exclusion and repression in American society. The intensification of ethnic competition generates collective actions by dominant ethnic groups that are designed to maintain their dominance and control. If competition becomes severe, in society, ethnic boundaries will become salient, and ethnic collective action will spontaneously erupt. It is demonstrated that ethnic conflict surges when barriers to ethnic group contact and competition begin to break down. Olzak tested the ideas of niche overlap and ethnic conflict with eventhistory data on 262 ethnic and racial conflicts that occurred in 77 large American cities from 1877 to 1914, and concluded that low levels of ethnic and racial inequality will produce a high rate of ethnic and racial conflict. Low levels of occupational segregation tend to cause higher rates of ethnic conflict. If this theoretical conclusion holds, many countries will be faced with conflicts due to the upward mobility of ethnic minorities. Extreme levels of segregation can be best analyzed as outcomes of ethnic competition. Since extreme segregation reduces the levels of contact and competition, the rate of conflict among groups is lowered. In the United States, declining and low levels of segregation of the foreign-born will raise the rates of both conflict and protest. Competition for jobs during periods when ethnic diversity is rising would incline dominant groups to use organizations to restrain open competition. “These solutions,” Olzak (1992:218) argued, “include passing rules restricting the rights of access to valued resources, as well as violence. In the United States, they sometimes involved reviving old systems of Apartheid, such as . . . disenfranchisement strategies.” For people in different parts of the world who emigrated to the United States, America represented not only the land of opportunity, but of equal opportunity. It promised that anyone, irrespective of racial background and current social and economic situation, could rise in station and achieve wealth and respectability. Over the years, these new Americans have come to hold many things in common. Policymakers and educators have attempted to assimilate

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College Attrition at American Research Universities “foreigners” into their homogeneous vision of American society, establishing the vision of a future in which people share a common identity, a common English language, a common set of democratic ideals, a public life of participation in politics, government, and the economy. Americans have attempted to construct a sense of national identity and unity by binding the ethnically diverse population to significant symbols of being American, such as the flag, the Declaration of Independence, the Liberty Bell, Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and Gettysburg Address, the Constitution, individualism, selfreliance, as well as a sense of “membership” in a superpower and the richest country on the earth. These shared notions have strengthened national loyalty and helped the nation to avoid potentially divisive elements of economic, class, or racial conflicts. The United States deliberately pursues policies to develop a patriotic and unified national culture. It has taken a long time for the United States to establish harmonious interethnic and interracial relations. Since the Reconstruction Era of the late 19th century, when civil rights debates began to reconcile the ideals of individualism and procedural equality, American society has experienced an extraordinary degree of unease, conflict, self-criticism, and mutual criticism (Wilson, 1998). The tendency towards assimilation was strong, especially by the mid-1900s, as the forces of economic growth and nationwide consumer markets shaped a common vision called the American Dream (Fischer, et al., 1997:xii). Americans now share a popular culture created by consumer producers, advertising, and electronic media. If we perceive assimilationism (the “melting pot”) as the yang in American civilization, the yin — pluralism (mosaic, quilt, or salad bowl) — is the other driving force of American dynamics. In the 1950s and 1960s, African Americans moved to assert their social and political rights. They articulated differences as a cultural asset rather than as a racial liability. The Black Civil Rights Movement achieved great successes with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These Acts dramatically expanded legal representation in America. In the 1960s, Mexican Americans began to emphasize their differences from the culture of mainstream. In the latter part of the century, the United States allowed in large numbers of Asian and Latino immigrants and experienced rapid economic globalization and international mobility. “The dominance of racism in American society —,” Foner and Rosenberg (1993:1) declared, “resting upon centuries of federal and state sanction, legal

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” segregation, biological ‘proof’ of ethnic rank, divisive hiring and discriminatory housing, the phobias and fulminations of presidents, the expeditions of the Klan, bias in school curricula, the propaganda in the press, and officially administered doses of hysteria which accompanied the birth of imperialism and the growth of US foreign involvement — is beyond doubt.” Schlesinger (1998:18) reminds us of the history: “As for the nonwhite peoples — those long in America whom the European newcomers overran and massacred, or those others hauled in against their will from Africa and Asia — deeply bred racism put them all, red Americans, black Americans, yellow Americans, brown Americans, well outside the pale. We must face the shameful fact: historically America has been a racist nation, White Americans began as a people so arrogant in convictions of racial superiority that they felt licensed to kill red people, to enslave black ones, and to import yellow and brown people for peon labor. We white Americans have been racist in our laws, in our institutions, in our customs, in our conditioned reflexes, in our souls.” According to Shklar (1995:1), “America has in principle always been democratic, but only in principle.” She also mentioned that the claims for freedom and political equality were played out in counterpoint to chattel slavery, the most extreme form of servitude. The equality of political rights is the first mark of American citizenship; but the ideal was advocated in the presence of its absolute denial. Although American culture overtly rejects hereditary privileges, it has not managed to get beyond them in practice. Shklar (1995:8) noted that “Americans have lived with extreme contradictions for most of their history by being dedicated to political equality as well as to its complete rejection.” It must be remarked that human affairs are relative. Some nonwhite Americans, miserably treated as they were, preferred America because they could enjoy certain rights or opportunities that were not available to them in their native countries. The dynamics between the two poles can never be at stasis. The United States is now, observed Rhea (1997), more diverse and tolerant than ever, yet it is haunted by the threat of ethnic fragmentation. The traditional primacy of the individual has recently been challenged by the claims of ethnic identity and equal group status (Kim, 1999:592). Pluralism uses group identity rather than universal belief as a primary construct of personhood. It distinguishes different groups of persons in terms of social categories such as race, ethnicity, language, and national origin. It is built on the belief that human beings are equal at birth, but their original natures become distorted and corrupted in the process of

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College Attrition at American Research Universities interaction with others (Tsuda, 1986). It tends to emphasize sameness within the group and ask for recognition of what they claim to be natural moral and intellectual claims for group distinctiveness. TO FOLLOW THE WAY IN CONFUCIANISM I doubt whether man can support complete religious independence and entire political liberty at the same time. I am led to think that if he has no faith he must obey, and if he is free he must believe. Tocqueville (1835:236)

A non-bounded great mind either eschews society, taking refuge deep in the mountains like Lao Tze, or struggles in human society, even in a mad fashion, like Nietzsche. A mind that knows neither genuine freedom nor duty cannot even distinguish between proper reciprocity and sheer begging. In her Address to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1988, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher, repeated that phrase: “if he is free he must believe,” in a contemporary fashion. “There is little hope for democracy if the hearts of men and women in democratic societies cannot be touched by a call to something greater than themselves. Political structures, state institutions, collective ideals are not enough. We Parliamentarians can legislate for the rule of law. You the Church can teach the life of faith. When all is said and done, a politician’s role is a humble one.” Rational Confucianism — a doctrine that never asks for faith — repeatedly emphasizes duty (rather than blind obedience); the American civilization, which is free, relies on religion — apparently, Tocqueville would not find that surprising Confucianism is not religion. Nevertheless, there is no sign in ancient Confucianism that religion is intolerable. Leibniz observed, in 1716, “Initially, one may doubt if the Chinese do recognize, or have recognized, spiritual substances. But upon reflection, I believe that they did, although perhaps they did not recognize these substances as separated, and existing quite apart from matter” (Cook and Rosemont, 1994:76). Confucius (2:24), who rarely commented on matters of spirit, did say: “For a man to sacrifice to a spirit which does not belong to him is flattery. To see what is right and not to do it is want of courage.” And when a disciple asked Confucius about serving the spirits of the dead, he replied (11:12): “while you are not able to serve men, how you can serve their spirits?” When the disciple inquired

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” about death, Confucius answered: “While you do not know life, how can you know about death?” Although Confucianism does not propose any personalized God, this does mean that it does not believe in the existence of natural law or creation. “The course of Nature is constant” claimed Hsün Tzu (17:1): “it does not survive because of the actions of a Yao; it does not perish because of the actions of a Jie. If you respond to the constancy of Nature’s course with good government, there will be good fortune; if you respond to it with disorder, there will be misfortune.” “How can glorifying Heaven and contemplating it, be as good as tending its creatures and regulating them?” Hsün Tzu (17:14) asked. “How can obeying Heaven and singing it hymns of praise be better than regulating what Heaven has mandated and using it? How can anxiously watching for the season and awaiting what it brings, be as good as responding to the season and exploiting it? How can depending on things to increase naturally be better than developing their natural capacities so as to transform them? How can contemplating things and expecting them to serve you be as good as administering them so that you do not miss the opportunities that are present? How can brooding over for the origins of things be better than assisting what perfects them? Accordingly, if you can cast aside the concerns proper to Man in order to speculate about what belongs to Heaven, you will miss the essential nature of the myriad things.” Mencius (4:1) averred that “Opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union arising from the accord of Men.” Further, (7:8), “A man must first despise himself, and then others will despise him. A family must destroy itself, and then others will destroy it. A kingdom must first smite itself, and then others will smite it. This is illustrated in the passage of the Tai Jia: ‘When Heaven sends down calamities, it is still possible to escape them. When we occasion the calamities ourselves, it is not possible any longer to live.” Confucianism does not promote faith in a personalized God; and there is no group identity such as racism or nationalism in ancient Confucianism. The lack of a “local identity” was perhaps a consequence of Confucius’ experience of traveling to varied cultures and being employed by different governments, and his rational attitude toward human life. During his lifetime, he observed how different cultures interacted with each other under competitive conditions. The “core identity” of Confucianism is the Way, that is, the truth. No personalized or socialized symbol plays the role of arbitrator of the truth in Confucianism. Confucius (4:16) said, “my doctrine is that of an all-pervading

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College Attrition at American Research Universities unity.” . . . the other disciples asked, “What do his words mean?” The disciple Zeng answered, “The doctrine of our master is to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others — this and nothing more.” Confucius (2:14) asserted: “The superior man is catholic and not partisan. The mean man is a partisan and not catholic.”By the way, it is worth noting that the Chinese had built more than one powerful empire before the heralds of the West sailed into East Asia. Nevertheless, these Chinese empires — except the foreign ones under the Mongols and Manchus — had not adopted extreme expansionist strategies. One may find two factors — economic and ideological — to explain the lack of imperialism. The first has to do with China’s economic geography. Given their traditional transportation technology and their traditional weapons, the empires would not have found economic benefit in expanding beyond a certain size. The second factor is that, when China became strong, Confucianism was the national ideology (under Confucianism, religions are tolerated and practiced but in separation from the sovereignty). Since it does not claim any superiority in spirit or truth and signifies harmonious co-existence of different peoples, Confucianism can hardly be employed to encourage imperialism. The Confucian attitude towards other cultures is best illustrated by the Master’s own saying: “When I walk along with other two others, they may serve me as my teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad qualities and avoid them.” Mencius believed: “The respectful do not despise others. The economical do not plunder others.” THE AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISTIC CLUBISM The superior man is dignified, but does not wrangle. He is sociable, but not partisan. Confucius (15:22)

Man is born to be social — constantly desiring to be served and to serve society. Freedom — heart and mind in harmony with the Nature rather than with human society — in the Taoist style is not suitable for human life in the sustainable sense. Albert Einstein (1879-1955, 1956:129) — expressed this well: “Man can find meaning in life, short and perilous as it is, only through devoting himself to society.” When a man is said to be individualistic, it means that he asserts individuality by independence of thought and action. Individualism has a tendency to lead

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” people to be socially active. Through active social exchanges, one can realize one’s potential of utilizing and being utilized by societies in one’s own most desirable way. Hsün Tzu (10:5) justified the necessity of forming associations with hierarchical structures. “It is the inborn nature of human beings that it is impossible for them not to form societies. If they form a society in which there are no class divisions, strife will develop. If there is strife, then there will be social disorder; if there is social disorder, there will be hardship for all. Hence, a situation in which there are no class divisions is the greatest affliction mankind can have. A situation in which there are class divisions is the most basic benefit under Heaven. And it is the lord of men who is the indispensable element wherewith to ‘arrange the scale’ of the classes of men.” Freud had a similar theory about the origin of communities. “Human life in communities only becomes possible,” he argued (1951:59-60), “when a number of men unite together in strength superior to any single individual and remain united against all single individuals. The strength of this united party is opposed as ‘Right’ against the strength of any individual, which is condemned as ‘brute force.’ The substitution of the power of a united number for the power of a single man is the decisive step toward civilization. The essence of it lies in the circumstance that the members of the community have restricted their possibilities of gratification, whereas the individual recognized no such restriction. The first requisite of culture, therefore, is justice — that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favor of any individual. The further course of cultural development seems to tend toward ensuring that the law shall no longer represent the will of any small body — caste, tribe, section of the population — which may behave like a predatory individual toward other such groups perhaps containing larger numbers. . . . The liberty of the individual is not a benefit of culture. It was greatest before any culture, though indeed it had little value at that time, because the individual was hardly in a position to defend it. . . . The cry for freedom is directed either against particular demands of culture or else against culture itself.” Freud’s argument also implies that people would make associations in varied forms under different circumstances. Based on acute observation and wide conversation with Americans, Alexis de Tocqueville presented a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between character and society in America in the 1830s. In his Democracy in America, he described their mores. He identified family life, religious tradition, and participation in local politics as helping to form the American individual’s character-

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College Attrition at American Research Universities istics that could sustain a wide political community and support the maintenance of free institutions. He warned that some aspects of American individualism might eventually isolate Americans one from another, inducing each citizen to withdraw himself from the mass of his fellows, with a belief that his whole destiny is in his own hands. This form of individualism would lead to personal isolation and undermine public virtue. Modern history has not confirmed his view, although this tendency does appear as one of the strands in the social fabric. Americans have hailed individualism as a desirable social principle. They believe that individualism would liberate men from the Old World and lead them to great accomplishments of their own. American individualism has led Americans to be socially dynamic in the sense that people freely form or break up their own associations according to their own purposes and interests. It is reasonable to observe that the dynamic American reality often lends wealth and social status more conspicuous weight than any other value. “Wealth and privilege . . . ”, observed Manson (1981:80), “have never been greatly resented in the United States but have often stimulated those less fortunate to emulate the successful. Wealthy families have in consequence enjoyed a considerable status and prestige which has often been absent in other societies. Paradoxically, the very great emphasis placed on equality as a fundamental of American society may have produced a great respect for money and for wealth which can still be observed today. Precisely as a result of the stress laid on the need for equality of treatment and of opportunity, Americans were (and are) often more status conscious than those who lived in the more aristocratic societies of Europe.” Recognizing the essence of the American individualistic clubism, we may well appreciate what Brogan (1941:116-7) described a long time ago: “It is only an apparent contradiction in terms to assert that the fundamental democratic and egalitarian character of American life is demonstrated by the ingenuity and persistence shown in inventing marks of difference and symbols of superiority. In a truly class-conscious and castedominated society, the marks of difference are universally recognized even if resented. In America, they must be stressed or they might easily be forgotten, and they must be added to, as the old standards of distinction cease to serve their purpose. Apart from the simple economic criterion of conspicuous display, there are no generally accepted marks of social difference in America.”

Freedom, which is the most deeply held American value, means to be free of arbitrary authority in work, family, and political life. One is not forced to adopt other people’s values, ideas, or styles of life. Freedom also means being left alone by society. But to effectively play, communicate, and trade, man needs organizations. It is in voluntary associations that the American finds his social place. The United States historically has possessed strong communal structures,

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” complex networks of voluntary organizations such as churches, professional societies, charitable institutions, and private organizations such as business schools, universities, hospitals, and firms. Max Weber (1946:310) observed that “In the past and up to the very present, it has been a characteristic precisely of the specifically American democracy that it did not constitute a formless sand heap of individuals, but rather a buzzing complex of strictly exclusive, yet voluntary associations.” The Americans are cooperative and sociable in their companies, voluntary associations, churches, and the like. They are good at creating and operating private organizations. No other people is so skillful at forming (— and abolishing) associations and clubs. “Class consciousness,” observed Lind (1996:141), “weak enough in the United States to begin with, has been almost obliterated by the multiplication of particularistic communal mysticisms subsidized by the very government and white overclass that they purportedly threaten. Far from being revolutionary, identity politics is merely America’s version of the oldest oligarchic trick in the book: divide and rule.” It is worthwhile to describe some manifestations of the American clubism revealed by Jung (1930): The most amazing feature of American life is its boundless publicity. Everyone has to meet everybody else, and they seem to enjoy doing it. To a Central European like myself the lack of distance between people, the absence of hedges and fences round the gardens, the belief in popularity, the gossip columns in the newspapers, the open doors in the houses (from the street one can look right through the sitting room and the adjoining bedroom into the backyard) — all this is more than disgusting; it is directly terrifying. You are immediately swallowed up by a hot and all-engulfing wave of emotional incontinence which knows no restraint. You see it in the eagerness and the hustling of everyday life, in all sorts of enthusiasms such as orgiastic sectarian outbursts, and the violence of collective emotions spreads into everything. It easily goes too far and leads people into situations which individual deliberation would hardly ever have chosen. It has a decidedly flattening influence upon American psychology. You see this particularly in the sex problem as it has developed since the war. There is a marked tendency to promiscuity, which not only shows itself in the frequency of divorce, but more especially still in the younger generation’s peculiar freedom from sex prejudices. . . . As an inevitable consequence, the individual rapport between the sexes will suffer from it. Easy access never calls forth, and therefore never develops, the values of character, because it forestalls any deep mutual understanding. Such an understanding, without which no real love can exist, can only be reached by overcoming all the difficulties that arise from psychological difference between the sexes. Promiscuity paralyzes all these efforts so

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College Attrition at American Research Universities that individual rapport seems quite superfluous. Thus, the more so-called unprejudiced freedom and easy promiscuity prevail, the more love becomes flat; it degenerates into transitory sex interludes.

SYMMETRY RELATIONS AS FAIR RECIPROCITY IN CONFUCIANISM The superior man indeed has to endure want, but the mean man, when he is in want, gives way to unbridled license. Confucius (15:2)

The American culture is characterized by individualistic clubism, the Japanese culture by groupism, and the overseas Chinese culture by familism. These value systems are not religious; they are constructed on rational reciprocity. Nevertheless, manifestations of reciprocity are different among these cultures. Confucianism is commonly perceived by contemporary scholars to have no proper sense of human rights and to have no principle of allowing individual growth. Fukuyama (1995:284) suggested that Confucianism uses duties rather than rights as moral imperatives. He even argues that Confucian duties are not based on prior ethical principles. In contrast to what Fukuyama assumed about Confucianism, de Barry (1998:19) observed: “Many passages affirm Confucius’ belief that a forced or mechanical conformity to the norms of filial duty was not filial piety at all.” Asked whether there was one word which might serve as a rule of practice for all one’s life, Confucius (15:24) replied: “Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.” Reciprocity is the key concept in the construction of social relations in Confucianism. The marked aspect — the symmetry of human relations — of the Confucian reciprocity has been rarely emphasized. The Confucian hierarchy is not unidirectional and asymmetrical, as is often assumed. It is symmetrical in the sense that the inferior obeys the superior (under the condition that the superior is benevolent) and the superior takes cares of the inferior. In particular, if the superior is not benevolent, the inferior will leave the country or defy the order of the superior. Confucius (15:36) set up the following ultimate principle of reciprocity: “Let every man consider virtue as what devolves on himself. He may not yield the performance of it even to his teacher.” When asked what he thought of the principle that injury should be

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II. “All Men Are Created Equal” Versus “All Men Are Born Equal” answered with kindness, Confucius (14:34) answered: “With what then will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness.” The Confucian hierarchy is not characterized by blind submission. In the Confucian tradition, wife is deferential to husband; but she also should reaffirm and remind her husband of the duty of mutual love and caring. Following the superior is repeatedly emphasized by Confucian doctrines, but not blind obedience. The entitlement of father is not only biological, but also social; if a father does not behave properly, he simply loses the entitlement in the dutiful sense. Confucius (4:18) never asked young people to blindly obey their parents: “In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose.” Confucius (12:11) asserted that “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.” He held that the first thing in administering the government is to rectify the names. “If names be not correct,” Confucius (13:3) pointed out, “if language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties, and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore, a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately.” Mencius (12:3) portrayed the Confucian ideal of obedience in the following way: “When the parents’ fault was great, not to have murmured on account of it would have increased the want of natural affection. Where the parent’s fault was small, to have murmured on account of it would have been to act like water which frets and foams about a stone that interrupts its course. To increase the want of natural affection would have been unfilial, and to fret and foam in such a manner would also have been unfilial.” Further, Mencius said (8:3): “When the prince regards his ministers as his hands and feet, his ministers regard their prince as their belly and heart; when he regards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as any other man; when he regards them as the ground or as grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy.” Trust among men, in Confucianism, is built on reciprocity. Hsün Tzu (9:4) described what is the fair reciprocity between the ruler and the ruled: “If the lord of

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College Attrition at American Research Universities men desires to be secure, no policy is as good as evenhanded government and love of the people. If he desires glory, none is as good as exalting ritual principles and treating scholars with strict observance of forms of respect. If he desires to establish his fame and meritorious accomplishments, none is as good as advancing the worthy and bringing the capable into one’s service.” According to Mencius (3:4), “Benevolence brings glory to a prince, and the opposite of it brings disgrace. For the princes of the present day to hate disgrace and yet live complacently doing what is not benevolent, is like hating moisture and yet living in a low situation. If a prince hates disgrace, the best course for him to pursue is to esteem virtue and honor virtuous scholars, giving the worthiest among them places of dignity, and the able offices of trust. . . . Let him clearly digest the principles of his government with legal sanctions, and then even great kingdoms will be constrained to stand in awe of him.” In an open international environment, a practical way to judge a government is by how people “vote with their feet.” Confucius observed: “Good government obtains when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far off are attracted.” In an open society, exercising choice by staying or leaving is a way to enforce freedom. Hsün Tzu (2:6) argues: “If your deportment is respectful and reverent, your heart loyal and faithful, if you use only those methods sanctioned by ritual principles and moral duty, and if your emotional disposition is one of love and humanity, then though you travel throughout the empire, and though you find yourself reduced to living among the barbarians, everyone would consider you to be an honorable person. If you strive to be the first to undertake toilsome and bitter tasks and can leave pleasant and rewarding tasks to others, if you are proper, diligent, sincere, and trustworthy, if you take responsibility and oversee it meticulously, then wherever you travel in the civilized world and though you find yourself reduced to living with the barbarians, everyone would be willing to entrust you with official duties.” If governance were the only factor influencing how people vote with their feet, then according to the Confucian standard, merely by looking at the direction and quality of immigration, one might judge that the United States has been better governed than contemporary China.

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III. DEMOCRACY AND LAW Those who know virtue are few. Confucius (15:4)

In fact, even chaos theory tells us that no one can perfectly know virtue (in the sense of knowing not only the principles but also the consequences of the principles). Whether society should be governed through rules of justice or rules of propriety is a major difference between the Confucian and Western civilizations. In this section, we will compare the two approaches. In a report submitted to the Japanese emperor and read approvingly by General MacArthur, a Japanese officer recorded his feelings towards America at the surrender ceremonies abroad the Missouri. “I raised a question whether it would have been possible for us, had we been victorious, to embrace the vanquished with a similar magnanimity. Clearly it would have been different. . . . Indeed, a distance inexpressible by numbers separates us — America from Japan. After all, we were not beaten on the battlefield by dint of superior arms. We were defeated in the spiritual contest by virtue of a nobler idea. The real issue was moral — beyond all the powers of algebra to compute” (MacArthur, 1964:272-77). Capitalism and democracy — the foundations of the American ethos — constitute a liberal tradition that is fundamental to American morality. They have dominated American civilization from its inception. They evolved side by side, sometimes in harmony, sometimes in conflict. Capitalism means a value system that supports private ownership of the means of production, encourages

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College Attrition at American Research Universities free pursuit of self-interest through competition, and guarantees the right to rewards through efforts. Democracy is based on the notion that all people possess equal worth and have the right to rule themselves. Under democratic institutions, freedom of speech, press, assembly, and worship should be protected and respected. The ruled and ruler are in harmony in the sense that the ruled consent to their rulers and the rulers are accountable to those whom they govern. The rulers have to obey the laws and have no arbitrary authority over the governed, even if the latter are in the minority. Capitalism and democracy share the common values of freedom and individualism, limited government, equality before the law, and rational decision-making. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE AND SEPARATION OF POWER IN THE UNITED STATES When the multitude hates a man, it is necessary to examine the case. When the multitude likes a man, it is necessary to examine the case. Confucius (15:28)

The United States was built on principles which were deemed to be universal. The universal application of these principles meant that all comers might find a home and identify with both global and local identities. Pearl S. Buck (1892-1973), an American writer who was reared by missionary parents in China and whose life experiences lent a vivid immediacy to her novels, including The Good Earth (1931), won the 1938 Nobel Prize for literature. In 1948, reflecting on why she believed America was the world’s hope, Buck remarked (1949:119120): “All the world’s peoples — not the politicians and militarists and the big money-makers, but the peoples — were looking to the United States. They . . . were looking for a statement for humanity. . . . Our Constitution and the Bill of Rights were known around the world. Men hidden in caves and villages in countries ridden by tyrants memorized these documents in order to strengthen their own spirits.” The principle of sovereignty of the people distinguishes America from the Old World. The Founding Fathers considered political parties as factions which are interested in pursuing narrow private interests rather than the people’s interests. They designed a constitutional system to guarantee that no party could gain overwhelming power. The separate and staggered elections required for Senators, Representatives, and the President keep many electoral interests

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III. Democracy and Law divided. The American Constitution, declared by the Continental Congress on September 13, 1788, established a divided form of government with power allocated between the presidency, two houses of Congress, and a federal high court. For instance, over 99% of executive branch workers are hired through competitive examinations required by the Civil Service Act. The President is entitled to nominate the highest officials in the executive branch; but the Senate must approve his appointments. The President is commander-in-chief of the armed services, but only Congress has the power to declare war. In the whole system, no person is allowed to serve more than one branch at the same time. Thus the President, the heads of the executive departments, and federal judges are prohibited from holding seats in Congress. The separation of the branches prevents the concentration of power in any one and encourages competition and cooperation among the branches through a system of checks and balances. According to the Constitution, the principle of federalism is fundamental to the US government: The ultimate power should be shared between the national government and the states. The powers of each are limited by the reservation or delegation of some powers to the other level of government. The people have the right to limit the powers of both. THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE AS THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE STATE IN CONFUCIANISM

The man who is fond of daring and is dissatisfied with poverty, will proceed to insubordination. Confucius (8:10)

The concept of democracy as a form of government was an innovation of the Greek philosophers. It set out on its modern journey in Western society toward the end of the 18th century. Although there were dynamic forces for democratic changes from the beginning of colonial America, democracy had not grown unchallenged on American soil. Democracy was first rejected on the grounds that the poorly educated, the non-English immigrants, and the lower classes were not worthy and would not be able to fulfill the inherent responsibilities. Even when democracy became acceptable, there was a tension between the advocates of individual and representative democracy. Gradually, individual democratic rights based on suffrage and majority gained the upper hand over communitarian democratic ideas (Lipset, 1998:199). Over time, the

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College Attrition at American Research Universities resistance to democracy oscillated, and weakened. Eighteenth-century Americans tolerated slavery; 19th-century Americans tolerated violence and discrimination against immigrants and ethnic minorities; and early 20th-century Americans tolerated the concept of inferiority of women to men. The United States still has problems in the treatment of ethnic minorities, and women, but efforts are constantly made to achieve more equitable arrangements. If by democracy we mean a political system in which free and fair elections with participation by all social groups are regularly held and basic civil and political liberties are respected, the United States can be called democratic only in recent years. By the way, democracy can be manifested in many forms. Even within North America and northern Europe, “One finds,” Lipset (1998:xiii) claims, “presidential, parliamentary, and semipresidential systems of government; federal states and unitary states; monarchies and republic; unicameral legislatures and bicameral legislatures; plurality, majority, and all manner of proportional electoral systems; common law and statutory law; and states with written constitutions and states without.” Nevertheless, all these political systems meet the basic definition of democracy. Confucianism, which was created in an agricultural economy where mass education on today’s broad scale and transportation and communication at today’s speeds were beyond any rational consideration, did not advocate for the sovereignty of the people. In fact, Confucianism had never the idea of the sovereignty of the people. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the people’s welfare could be neglected by the state. Mencius (4:14) taught that “The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest.” Hsün Tzu (27:72) expressed the significance of the people’s welfare in a similar way: “Heaven did not create the people for the sake of the lord; Heaven established the lord for the sake of the people. Hence, in antiquity land was not granted in fiefs of ranked sizes just to give honored position to the feudal lords and for no other purpose. Offices and ranks were not arranged in hierarchical order and provided with suitable titles and emoluments just to give honored status to the grand officers and for no other purpose.” In Confucianism, the people’s welfare is the sole reason for the existence of government and social ranks are arranged to serve the people. According to Hsün Tzu (9:19), “Why can man form a society? I say it is due to the division of society into classes. How can social divisions be transformed into behavior? I say it is because of humans’ sense of morality and justice. Thus, if the sense of

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III. Democracy and Law morality and justice is used to divide society into classes, concord will result.” The Confucian ideal of society is hierarchical; this hierarchical system allows for social mobility according to principles of morality and justice, rather than birth. The sole purpose of government is to improve the welfare of the people. Sustainability of government is determined by whether it delivers to people what they like (democracy can be seen as a way to aggregate the preferences of miscellaneous people). If government does what the people are against, it cannot last long. Mencius (2:1) advised: “If your Majesty now will make pleasure a thing common to the people and yourself, the Imperial sway awaits you.” He reasoned (7:8) that “There is a way to get the empire; — get the people, and the empire is got. There is a way to get the people; — get their hearts, and the people are got. There is a way to get their hearts; — it is simply to collect for what they like, and not to lay on them what they dislike.” The following paragraph illustrates what Mencius (2:2) meant when he said to enjoy as the people enjoy: The king Xuan of Qi, asked, “was it so, that the park of King Wen contained seventy square li?” Mencius replied: “It is so in the records.” Exclaimed the king: “Was it so large as that?” Mencius said: “The people still looked on it as small.” The king added: “My park contains only forty square li, and the people still look on it as large. How is this?” The reply was: “The park of King Wen contains seventy square li, but the grass-cutter, and the fuel-gathers had the privilege of entrance into it; so also had the catchers of pheasants and hares. He shared it with the people, and was it not the reason that they looked on it as small? When I first arrived at the borders of your state, I required about the great prohibitory regulations, before I would venture to enter it; and I heard, that inside the border gates there was a park of forty square li, and that he who killed a deer in it, was held guilty of the same crime as if he had killed a man. Thus those forty square li are a pitfall in the middle of the kingdom. Is it not with reason that the people look upon them as large?” Mencius further argued (2:4): “When superiors of the people do not make enjoyment a thing common to the people and themselves, they do wrong. When a ruler rejoices in the joy of his people, they also rejoice in his joy; when he grieves at the sorrow of his people, they also grieve at his sorrow. A sympathy of joy will pervade the empire, a sympathy of sorrow will do the same — in such a state of things, it cannot be but that the ruler attain to the Imperial dignity.

In Confucianism, the goal of the country is the welfare of the people and there is no absolute arbitrator of the truth. The people’s opinions should be taken into account. Mencius (2:7) advised King Xuan: “When all those about you say: ‘this is a man of talents and worth,’ you may not for that believe it. When

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College Attrition at American Research Universities your great officers all say: “This is a man of talents and virtue,’ neither may you, for that, believe it. When all the people say: ‘This is a man of talents and virtue,’ then examine into the case, and when you find that the man is such, employ him. When all those about you say: ‘this man won’t do,’ don’t listen to them. When your great officers all say: ‘this man won’t do,’ don’t listen to them. When all the people say: ‘this man won’t do,’ then examine into the case, and when you find that the man won’t do, send him away.” The king of Qi attacked Yan and conquered the land. When he asked Mencius whether he should take of possession of it, Mencius (2:10) replied: “If the people of Yan will be pleased with your taking possession of it, then do so. Among the ancients there was one who acted on this principle, namely King Wu. If the people of Yan will not be pleased with your taking possession of it, then do not do so. Among the ancients there was one who acted on this principle, namely King Wen.” TRUST IN LAW, IN THE UNITED STATES In hearing litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary is to cause the people to have no litigations. Confucius (Great Learning)

A society (if it is not trapped in poverty) whose romantic culture allows low transactional costs in the marriage market will tend to experience a high divorce rate and low birth rate. By the same token, a dynamic rational society characterized by law abidance, if it is not exporting likely criminals to other societies, will edge towards a high crime rate. For, enduring reverence for any concrete symbol will lead a rational society to merely use that symbol, superficially, rather than to instruct the mind to profoundly understand it and to enlighten the heart to profoundly appreciate it. The ancient Confucianists, aware of this long-term tendency caused by reliance on concrete symbols, assigned the highest priority of the gentleman to self-cultivation instead of any concrete trust in symbols. This Confucian scheme of constructing civilization on the basis of selfcultivation and propriety failed when it came time to build an industrial civilization because, as Adam Smith properly reasoned, the only sure bulwark of a mobile society is — in place of benevolence — law.

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III. Democracy and Law No society can survive without any kind of trust among its members. The problem is what to trust and with what principles a society makes associations. Trust has recently been studied as a key variable in economic development. A society’s fate is largely determined by what it trusts. The Americans trust law, the Japanese trust group, the Italians and overseas Chinese trust family. Throughout history, rational civilizations have placed their trust in various different concrete symbols. Before and during World War II, the emperor and the state were the primary objects of loyalty in Japan. After the war, Japanese society transferred its loyal center to organizations. The preference of the overseas Chinese was something of a distortion of Confucian values, formed under special historical circumstances: The ultimate loyalty in Confucianism is not family, nor race, nor nation, nor personalized God, but the Way. To judge and value one’s own behavior only according to the family interest is ignoble in Confucianism. Confucius (2:22) emphasized trustworthiness in the following way: “I do not know how a man without trustfulness is to get on. How can a large carriage be made to go without the cross bar for yoking the oxen to, or a small carriage without the arrangement for yoking the horses?” When a disciple asked Confucius about government, Confucius (12:7) replied: “The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler.” When his disciple asked which of the three should be foregone first, if one of these must be dispensed with, Confucius answered, “The military first.” And second, if necessary: “Part with the food. Since olden times, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the state.” He went on to explain (12:14) how to obtain this trust: “The art of governing is to keep its affairs before the mind without weariness, and to practice them with undeviating consistency.” Some typical American traits include restlessness, dislike of restraints, change, action, mobility, the quest for new experiences, self-improvement, a belief in progress, and a belief in law. A main distinction between the American civilization and Confucianism is that the former believes in law, the latter in rituals in maintaining social order. Kallen (1970:51) argued: “The United States . . . has a peculiar anonymity . . . which . . . is formulated in the phrase that the American government is a government of laws, not men.” The United States has a hierarchy of law. The federal Constitution is the supreme legal authority to which all other law must conform. States’ laws must conform to the state constitutions, and the state legal structures must not contravene the US Constitution. The federal Supreme

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Court plays the role of final interpreter of the US Constitution. It hands down decisions on what government activity is permissible on any level, under the Constitution. There is a reverential regard for the legal order among the American people, who commonly believe that the nation benefits from a body of law and a set of legal procedures that are fair and impartial. Americans are proud of their wide civil liberties, the equality of all persons before the law, and the availability of judicial remedies in case of any abuse in the administration of justice. American tradition encourages people to think of justice as a matter of equal opportunities for every individual to pursue whatever he desires under law. Equal opportunities are protected by fair laws and democratic procedures and enforced by equal educational opportunity. In his 1838 address to the Young Men’s Lyceum, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865), the 16th President of the United States (1861-1865), advocated, “Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe that prattles on her lap — let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; — let it be written in Primers, spelling books, and Almanacs; — let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And in short, let it become the political religion of the nation.” It may be noted that, historically, it took a long time for the law to function in the United States. “The life of pioneer, the psychology of the immigrant, the interest of big business,” Kallen (1970:237) observed, “all serve to invest the United States with the temper of lawlessness. This lawlessness is enhanced by the fact that American law is antiquated and thus irrelevant to American life.” Confucius (2:3) had a different view of the value of law as the guide to men’s conduct. “If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good.” And, indeed, the failure of American society to serve many of its citizens in acquiring meaningful values and developing a satisfactory place in society is reflected in the serious problems besetting of crime, suicide, drug abuse, and the rest of the depressingly familiar litany (Wolfe, 1989, Fowler, 1999). Wolfe observed that the word duty has actually faded from the American lexicon. Although duty has never been a core word in the liberal vocabulary, it had retained some importance in the private spheres of liberal societies. Now, it has slipped away everywhere. This passionate focus on oneself has led to some serious long-term consequences. Collier (1991) stated that the concern for the needs of the self which

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III. Democracy and Law gripped most Americans had already damaged the social system. He pointed to many problems of American life in which the heightened selfishness had caused substantial harm. One of these areas is the extent to which American adults have abandoned their children. Because of high divorce rates and the increasing number of children born to unwed mothers, many American children spend at least a portion of their childhoods in single-parent homes. America has experienced an abdication of parental responsibility in a scale unseen in human history. The younger generations are even less well socialized and more self-concerned than the previous generations. Another area of deep concern is that many Americans now hold the opinion that they have a constitutional right to break the law. They believe that the law simply does not apply to them (Kallen, 1970) — they believe that they have a right to live unconstrainedly. Kallen (1970:53) observed that Americans “make more laws and respect fewer than any other people in the world.” (per 10,000)Tocqueville had some sense of this when he argued (1835:236), “Equality, while it brings great benefits to mankind, opens the door . . . to very dangerous instincts. It tends to isolate men from each other so that each thinks only of himself.” Individualism and prosperity inherently tend to erode community, to reduce face-to-face interaction, to detach individuals from participation in civil affairs, to spread and accelerate the recursive process of marriage-divorce-remarriage, to break down rational or religious authority. As the consummate example of a culture in which life is dedicated to one’s self alone, the American civilization has both fascinated and repelled the rest of the world. Figure 3.1, which is based on the data in Bennett (1994:18), shows the total crime rate during the period 1960-1992 in the United States. In 1992 alone, more than 14 million crimes were committed in the United States, which implies that the average total crime per 10,000 people was 566. From 1960 to the early 1990s, the total crime rate per 10,000 had increased by 300. Ninety-nine percent of Americans will be robbed at least once in their lives and 87% will have property stolen at least three times. In particular, the number of violent crimes including murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults increased more than 550% from 1960 to the early 1990s, even though the American population had increased only about 40% during the same period. As reported by US Department of Justice (1992), in 1992, there were 23,760 murders, 109,062 forcible rapes, 672,478 acts of robbery, and 1.1 million cases of aggravated assault. It is estimated that 80% of Americans can expect to be the victim of violent crime at least once in their lives. Fear for personal safety is an ordinary experience for many Americans.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities 600

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Years Figure 3.1. Total Crime Rate per 10,000 in the USA, 1960-1992 400

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Figure 3.1. Total Crime Rate per 10,000 in the USA, 1960-1992 It has been said that one reason for the increase in the crime rate is that, in America, the moral mandate to achieve success exerts pressure to succeed, by fair means if possible and by foul means if necessary. American society has placed a high premium on economic affluence and social ascent without racial or class distinction. The society regards this as appropriate for everyone, irrespective of his conditions. “This leads naturally to the subsidiary theme that success and failure are results wholly of personal qualities,” says Merton (1957:169), “that he who fails has only himself to blame, for the corollary to the concept of the self-made man is the self-unmade man. To the extent that this cultural definition is assimilated by those who have not made their mark, failure represents a double defeat: the manifest defeat of remaining far behind in the race for success and the implicit defeat of not having the capacities and moral stamina needed for success. . . . It is in this cultural setting that, in a significant portion of cases, the threat of defeat motivates men to the use of those tactics, beyond the law or the mores, which promise ‘success.’” Thus, it may be that the American emphasis on individual success tends to lead individuals to commit crimes (Spence, 1985). Bell (1960, 116-7) argued that large-scale crime was a natural by-product of American culture: “The desires satisfied in extra-legal fashion were more than a hunger for the ‘forbidden fruits’ of conventional morality. They also are involved in the complex and ever shifting structure of group, class, and ethnic stratification, which is the warp and

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III. Democracy and Law woof of America’s ‘open’ society, such ‘normal’ goals as independence through a business of one’s own, and such ‘moral’ aspirations as the desire for social advancement and social prestige. For crime, in the language of the sociologists, has a ‘functional’ role in the society, and the urban rackets — the illicit activity organized for continuing profit. . . [are] one of the queer ladders of social mobility in American life.” TRUST IN LAW, IN THE WEST, AND RITUALS AND SELF-CULTIVATION IN CONFUCIANISM The meaning of ritual is to nurture. Hsün Tzu (19:2)

In contrast to Adam Smith, who held that the rules of propriety would not develop a sense of shame, Confucius (2:3) believed that “If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good.” With regard to the functioning of rituals, Confucius (14:41) elaborated: “When rulers love to observe the rules of propriety, the people respond readily to the calls on them for service.” According to Confucius, one cannot become cultivated merely by trusting some external symbol. Man, as distinct from animal, should understand what he trusts. It is through simple trust without understanding and self-cultivation that social evils are spread. According to the Doctrine of the Mean, “Sincerity is that whereby self-completion is effected, and its way is that by which man must direct himself. Sincerity is the end and beginning of things; without sincerity, there would be nothing. On this account, the superior man regards the attainment of sincerity as the most excellent thing. The possessor of sincerity does not merely accomplish the self-completion of himself. With this quality, he completes other men and things also. The completing of himself shows his perfect virtue. The completing of other men and things shows his knowledge. Both these are virtues belonging to nature, and this is the way by which a union is effected of the external and internal.” With regard to the origin of ritual principles, Hsün Tzu (19:1) reasoned: “I say that men are born with desires which, if not satisfied, cannot but lead men to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires men observe no measure

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College Attrition at American Research Universities and apportion things without limits, then it would be impossible for them not to contend over the means to satisfy their desires. Such contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder; so they established the regulations contained within ritual and moral principles in order to apportion things, to nurture the desires of men, and to supply the means for their satisfaction. They so fashioned their regulations that desires should not want for the things which satisfy them and goods would not be exhausted by the desires. In this way the two of them, desires and goods, sustained each other over the course of time. This is the origin of ritual principles.” In addition, Hsün Tzu said (9:20), “From birth all men are capable of forming societies. If a society is formed without social division, strife would result; if there is strife, disorder ensures; if there is disorder, fragmentation results; if there is fragmentation, weakness comes; if there is weakness, it is impossible to triumph over objects. For this reason, humans could not acquire palaces and houses in which to dwell with security. This is precisely why it is unacceptable to neglect ritual and moral principles even for the shortest moment.” In Confucianism, it is believed that government can get the people’s support only by exercising morality and wisdom. “When one by force subdues men,” Mencius (3:3) reasoned, “they do not submit to him in heart. They submit because their strength is not adequate to resist. When one subdues men by virtue, in their hearts’ core they are pleased, and sincerely submit, as did the seventy disciples in their submission to Confucius.” In his discussion on how a person in authority should act in order that he might conduct government, Confucius (20:3) suggested: “Let him honor the five excellent things and banish the four bad things: . . . When the person in authority is beneficent without great expenditure; when he lays tasks on the people without their repining; when he pursues what he desires without being covetous; when he maintains a dignified ease without being proud; when he is majestic without being fierce. . . . When the person in authority makes more beneficial to the people the things from which they naturally derive benefit — is not this being beneficent without great expenditure? When he chooses the labors which are proper, and makes them labor on them, who will repine? When his desires are set on benevolent government, and he realizes it, who will accuse him of covetousness? Whether he has to do with many people or few, or with things great or small, he does not dare to indicate any disrespect — is not this to maintain a dignified ease without any pride? He adjusts his clothes and cap, and throws a dignity into his looks, so

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III. Democracy and Law that, thus dignified, he is looked upon with awe — is not this to be majestic without being fierce?” As for the bad things, “To put the people to death without having instructed them — this is called cruelty. To require from them, suddenly, the full tale of work, without having given them warning — this is called oppression. To issue orders as if without urgency, at first, and, when the time comes, to insist on them with severity — this is called injury. And, generally speaking, to give pay or rewards to men, and yet to do it in a stingy way — this is called acting the part of a mere official.” In The Doctrine of the Mean, Confucius described how the government should administer its affairs:

The administration of government lies in getting proper men. Such men are to be got by means of the ruler’s own character. That character is to be cultivated by his treading in the ways of duty. And the treading those ways of duty is to be cultivated by the cherishing of benevolence. Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honor due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of propriety. When those in inferior situations do not possess the confidence of their superiors, they cannot retain the government of the people. Hence, the sovereign may not neglect the cultivation of his own character. Wishing to cultivate his character, he may not neglect to serve his parents. In order to serve his parents, he may not neglect to acquire knowledge of men. In order to know men, he may not dispense with knowledge of Heaven. The duties of universal obligation are five, and the virtues wherewith they are practiced are three. The duties are those between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those belonging to the intercourse of friends. . . . Knowledge, magnanimity, and energy, these three, are the virtues universally binding. And the means by which they carry the duties into practice is singleness. . . . To be fond of learning is to be near to knowledge. To practice with vigor is to be near to magnanimity. To possess the feeling of shame is to be near to energy. He who knows these three things, knows how to cultivate his own character. Knowing how to cultivate his own character, he knows how to govern other men. Knowing how to govern other men, he knows how to govern the empire with all its States and families. All who have the government of the Empire with its States and families have nine standard rules to follow: — viz., the cultivation of their own characters; the honoring of men of virtue and talents; affection towards their relatives; respect towards the great ministers; kind and considerate treatment of the whole body of offices; dealing with the mass of the people as children; encouraging the resort of all classes of artisans;

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College Attrition at American Research Universities indulgent treatment of men from far away; and the kindly cherishing of the princes of the States.

In the Great Learning, Confucius advocated that “From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of every thing besides.” The cultivation of the ruler’s character would help set forth the duties of universal obligations. Honoring men of virtue and talents enables the ruler to avoid errors of judgment. Showing affection towards relatives enables the ruler to prevent grumbling and resentment. Respecting the great ministers, he can correctly practice governing. The kind and considerate treatment of the whole body of offices earns him the most grateful return of his own courtesies. Dealing with the mass of the people as children leads the people to exhort one another to what is good. By inviting all classes of artisans, his resources for expenditure would be rendered ample. The indulgent treatment of men from far away would encourage them to visit and contribute their knowledge of the world. By kindly cherishing of the princes of the States, he would lead the whole empire to revere. Confucius continued:

Self-adjustment and purification, with careful regulation of his dress, and not making movements contrary to the rules of propriety — this is the way for the ruler to cultivate his person. Discarding slander, and keeping himself from the seductions of beauty; making light of riches, and giving honor to virtue — this is the way for him to encourage men of worth and talent. Giving them places of honor and large emolument, and sharing with them in their likes and dislikes — this is the way for him to encourage his relatives to love him. Giving them numerous offices to discharge their orders and commissions — this is the way for him to encourage the great ministers. According to them a generous confidence, and making their emoluments large — this is the way to encourage the body of offices. Employing them only at the proper times, and making the taxes light — this is the way to encourage the people. By daily examinations and monthly trials, and by making their rations in accordance with their labors — this is the way to encourage the classes of artisans. To escort them on their departure and meet them on their coming; to commend the good among them, and show compassion to the incompetent — this is the way to treat indulgently men from far away. To restore families whose line of succession has been broken, and to revive States that have been extinguished; to reduce to order the States that are in confusion, and support those which are in peril; to have fixed times for their own reception at court, and the reception of their envoys; to send them away after liberal treatment, and welcome their coming with small contributions — this is the way to cherish the princes of the States.

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III. Democracy and Law . . . In all things success depends on prior preparation, and without such prior preparation there is sure to be failure.

Confucius (13:6) held that what is important in governing is personal cultivation and decent behavior: “When a prince’s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed.” Asked how to secure the submission of the people to the ruler, Confucius (2:19) replied: “Advance the upright and set aside the crooked, then the people will submit. Advance the crooked, and set aside the upright, then the people will not submit.” When asked about how to cause the people to reverence their ruler, to be faithful to him, and to motivate themselves, Confucius (2:20) suggested, “Let the ruler preside over the people with gravity — then they will reverence him. Let him be filial and kind to all — then they will be faithful to him. Let him advance the good and teach the incompetent — then they will eagerly seek to be virtuous.” Ji Kang, distressed about the number of thieves in the country, consulted Confucius. “If you, Sir,” replied Confucius (12:18), “were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal.” When Ji Kang asked him what he thought of executing the unprincipled for the good of the principled, in governing the country, Confucius (12:19) answered: “Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good.” Confucius (13:1) asked the government to “Go before the people with your example, and be laborious in their affairs.” Confucianism signifies self-cultivation — a process to cultivate benevolence. To locate benevolent men is to benefit society as a whole via the socalled increasing returns. The Great Learning says: “‘In a State, pecuniary gain is not to be considered prosperity, but its prosperity will be found in righteousness.’ When he who presides over a State or a family makes revenues his chief business, he must be under the influence of some small, mean, man. He may consider this man to be good; but when such a person is employed in the administration of a State or family, calamities from Heaven, and injuries from men, will befall it together.” The following arguments by Mencius (5:4) apply not only to goods markets but also to labor markets: “It is the nature of things to be of unequal quality. Some are twice, some five times, some ten times . . . as valuable as others. If you reduce them all to the same standard, that must throw the empire into 71

College Attrition at American Research Universities confusion. If large shoes and small shoes were of the same price, who would make large ones?” With regard to the “labor market,” Mencius (7:1) explains: “Only the benevolent ought to be in high stations. When a man destitute of benevolence is in a high position, he thereby disseminates his wickedness among all below him. When the prince has no principles by which he examines his administration, and his ministers have no laws by which they keep themselves in the discharge of their duties, in the court, obedience is not paid to principle, and in office obedience is not paid to rule. Superiors violate the laws of righteousness and inferiors violate the penal laws. It is only by a fortunate chance that a kingdom in such a case is preserved. Therefore, it is said: it is not the exterior and interior walls being incomplete, and the supply of weapons offensive and defensive being insufficient, which constitute the calamity of a kingdom. It is not the failure to extend the cultivable area, and the failure to accumulate stores and wealth, which brings rain upon a kingdom. When superiors do not observe the rules of propriety, and inferiors do not learn, then seditious people spring up, and that kingdom will perish in no time.” DEMOCRATIC VOTING VERSUS CONFUCIAN EXAMINATION Not only do we lack any criterion that would permit us to evaluate the perfection of an epoch of metaphysics as compared with any other epoch; the right to this kind of evaluation does not exist . . . Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity. Heidegger (1993: 433)

We have shown that the Confucian ruler is supposed to be virtuous and talented in judgment. This virtue is reflected practically in his ability to experience joy when the people experience joy and to suffer when the people suffer. The ruler is to provide the conditions for the people to live a happy life. It is not difficult to see that the genuine purpose of democratic voting is to elect such a Confucian leader. What is democracy? What is often meant, in modern times, is the procedural definition of democracy. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter (1942) argued that the “classical theory of democracy” — democracy defined in terms of “the will of the people” and “the common good” — is deficient. Instead, he proposed: “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a

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III. Democracy and Law competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Lipset, 1992:6). According to this definition, democracy is a system in which people become leaders by being selected through competitive elections by the people they govern, rather than by birth, wealth, violence, cooptation, appointment, or examination. As far as manifestations of the principles are concerned, the most important difference between Confucian and democratic institutions is the selection process for officials and for heads of various levels of institutions or social groups. Any concrete manifestation of the abstract principle is influenced by the environment. The Confucian practice was to select virtuous and talented candidates through competitive examinations; the democratic practice is to do so through voting by the members of a society. It can be argued that the voting procedure is not necessarily superior to the examination procedure under all social and economic conditions. As will be explained momentarily, this is particularly true with regard to traditional agricultural societies, in which most of people spend their life working the land. The Mandarins who ran China for centuries were chosen by examinations that determined their understanding of the Confucian classics. General intelligence was very important, since human affairs were maintained by situational judgments rather than by law. The Chinese examinations did not test any special technical skills; rather, they tested the candidate’s mastery of literary skills, writing ability, and judgment. Education was secular in nature and was bound to the fixed norm of the orthodox interpretation of the classical authors. The selection process was fair in the sense that anyone who could take the examination had the chance to move up. The game had relatively stable rules: master the classical writings and develop some literary skills. Indeed, this examination system worked remarkably well to provide leaders and administrators for civil service posts throughout traditional China. Aristotle took a different view of social organization. While Confucius did not see any justification for recognizing any class as privileged (or underprivileged) by birth, Aristotle did condone the existence of a supply of slaves; and he could conceive of the existence of a group of more cultivated members, within which special group voting might be conducted. Aristotle argued for democratic voting, based on natural inequality, while Confucius emphasized a competition on the basis of personal merits, unrestricted by class or caste membership. Most of the traditional Chinese population worked the land. Adam Smith (1776) described the farmer’s human capital structure in scathing terms: “The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too

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College Attrition at American Research Universities are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his minds renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a solider. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigor and perseverance, in any other employment than that to which he has been bred.” Since the majority of the population in traditional China was attached to the land, only a tiny minority had the opportunity to receive any education and in any way to qualify themselves to handle the responsibilities of selecting (much less serving as) officials. Under the circumstances, the Confucian examination procedure was certainly more appropriate and, anyway, the vast size of the country and the rudimentary level of communications at that time clearly ruled out any such method as mass voting. We have seen that the goal of the traditional Confucian examination system was similar to that of democratic voting — to select capable leaders who love the people and are loved by the people. Because of the complexity of modern knowledge, and the variety and rapid changes of human preferences in industrialized societies, the traditional Confucian way now seems inadequate to provide suitable leaders for society. For better or worse, it seems inevitable that democratic voting will replace the traditional Confucian practice, even in Confucian regions of the world still seeking to achieve the Confucian goal. Zigong, a disciple, asked Confucius what he thought of a man who was loved by all the people of his village. Confucius (13:24) replied: “We may not for that accord our approval of him.” What he would say of a man who was hated by all the people of his village? “We may not, for that, conclude that he is bad. Better than either of these cases would be that the good in the village love him, and the bad hate him.” Here is the Confucian emphasis on situational judgment (rather than trust in popular opinion). While this is often valid in the most

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III. Democracy and Law modern of contexts, it is even more clearly apt in traditional agrarian societies. Lack of educational opportunity and lack of effective communications among the population necessarily create an inequality in capacity of judgment on political and social affairs. It is difficult to imagine how democracy can operate in a traditional society in a meaningful and sustainable way. Even Aristotle could not have envisioned the concept of democracy in the contemporary sense of one person-one vote. John Stuart Mill, the British philosopher and economist known especially for his interpretations of empiricism and utilitarianism, propounded an elitist alternative to universal suffrage. He urged that voting rights should not be granted to everyone; but that those citizens who were deemed superior in mental qualifications (literacy and arithmetical competence, and a knowledge of geography, world history, and the history and institutions of one’s own country) should have the right to cast extra votes (Mill, 1977). He advocated denying the vote to those who fail to pay taxes or who depend on state aid or private charity for their subsistence, suggesting that these limitations would be more likely than unconditioned majority rule to guarantee moral outcomes. It is worthwhile to mention that Mill was writing at a time when England limited the franchise to male property owners, certainly a minority of its citizens; and it was common in most countries until quite recently to exclude public welfare recipients and other classes from voting, on the grounds that they had not shown themselves to be competent. Arneson (1993:133) demonstrated that one modern implication of Mill’s argument is that introducing democratic political procedures could make it possible for a majority of laborers (lacking a sophisticated education in the humanities) to vote for legislation that favored their own class without necessarily recognizing that it was not consistent with general principles of justice. It can be seen that as far as consequences of judgment are concerned, according to Mill, it is fair to grant voting rights only to a minority of a country’s citizens consisting of trustworthy and well-educated men. ADAM SMITH’S RULES OF JUSTICE AND CONFUCIUS’ RULES OF PROPRIETY When right government prevails in the world, princes of little virtue are submissive to those of great, and those of little worth, to those of great. When bad government prevails in the world, princes of small power are submissive to those of great, and the weak to the strong. Both these cases are the rule of

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Heaven. They who accord with heaven are preserved, and they who rebel against Heaven perish. Mencius (7:7)

Next, we will compare the cultural characteristics of the law-based America and propriety-based Japan. Before making the comparison, we will contrast the opinions on law and propriety held by Adam Smith and Confucius. Whether society should be governed through rules of justice or rules of propriety is a major difference between the Confucian and Western civilizations. Since Confucius lived in a rice economy and Smith in a pre-industrial economy, it is reasonable to expect that they might accept different moral rules in order to maintain social justice. By justice, Smith (1759: 341) meant the observance of a set of legal rules by which each person’s freedom is reasonably secured. He held that justice is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the achievement of full virtue: “Systems of positive law, therefore, though they deserve the greatest authority, as the records of the sentiments of mankind in different ages and nations, yet can never be regarded as accurate systems of the rules of natural justice.” He suggested that the model of moral judgment, in the metaphor of the impartial spectator, establishes a hierarchy of virtues: The virtues derived from the impartial spectator are of the first order, and those derived from obligations to rules of justice are second order or lower order. Smith acknowledged that it is not entirely clear when our actions ought to be determined chiefly or entirely from the rules of justice, and in what circumstances some other sentiment or affection ought to concur. Smith believed that people are not likely to achieve moral excellence, that they have a natural tendency to harm each other, and that society cannot flourish among those who are ready to hurt each other at all times. Still, Smith (1759: 161-2) maintained that men could be made to follow rules of justice: “The regard to those general rules of conduct is what is properly called a sense of duty, . . . the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions.” This implies that first-order virtue is not, in reality, reliable among the majority of mankind. In contrast to Confucius, Smith (1759: 86) held that society might operate well even if each individual is driven only by self-interest, without benevolence: “Society may subsist among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be 76

III. Democracy and Law upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation.” And again, “Beneficence . . . is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it.” For Smith, benevolence — the foundation of Confucius’ moral philosophy — is strictly optional. Conversely, Confucius held that social order and justice are maintained by mutual obligation in terms of virtue and ceremonies, rather than by law, since, as was discussed above, he did not believe that law would make people virtuous. Confucius maintained that ceremony should play a role analogous to that which law plays in a constitutional society. Ceremony is a means of establishing norms, by custom, and is less rigid than law. In Confucian tradition, there are two principle means for enforcing the rules of propriety. First, education to develop virtues such as loyalty, sincerity, good faith, justice, and kindness. Confucius proposes equal opportunity of education for all: “There being instruction, there will be no distinction of classes.” Second, Confucian tradition created the doctrine of the rectification of names to enforce rules of propriety. Confucius thought that it is important for society to maintain the correct correspondence between social symbols (such as money, wealth, and social position) and the meanings that these symbols are supposed to signify. His argument about rectifying names is of central importance to understanding Confucianism: “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things, . . . affairs cannot be carried on to success, . . . proprieties and music will not flourish, . . . punishments will not be properly awarded, [and] . . . the people do not know how to move hand or foot.” Confucius and Smith also differ in their views on class. Smith emphasized birth and fortune in society, and that is an important difference between Smith’s social system and Confucianism. He (1759: 226) argued: “Nature has wisely judged that the distinction of ranks, the peace and order of society, would rest more securely upon the plain and palpable difference of birth and fortune, than upon the invisible and often uncertain difference of wisdom and virtue. The undistinguishing eyes of the great mob of mankind can well enough perceive the former: it is with difficulty that the nice discernment of the wise and the virtuous can sometimes distinguish the latter.” If order is to be maintained mainly through rules of propriety, the government has to be able to make creative and fair judgments according to different situations. In such a society, even a man born into good fortune cannot perform his duty if he is not talented

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College Attrition at American Research Universities and properly educated. On the other hand, if a society is run according to rules of justice, the government can administer its affairs routinely. If the government can secure people’s respect and trust (birth and fortune are obviously helpful in that), it can maintain society. The government that rules by justice has less need to select talented and creative minds. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Smith and Confucius have similar viewpoints about man. They also hold a common view of the goal of social order: the happiness of the people. But when we come to specific aspects related to human relations and society, we find that Smith and Confucius disagree in many respects. Basing his theory on passions (or sympathy) and the rules of justice, Smith concluded that it is in freedom that a harmonious and good society is created. He held that under natural force, society displays a hierarchical structure sustained by subordination. In principle, birth and fortune do not count for much in one’s social positions in traditional Chinese thinking. Confucius argued that the morally preeminent ought to be entitled to high social positions. He advocated universal education and taught that diplomatic and administrative positions should go to those best qualified academically, not socially. Confucius said, “When right principles prevail in the empire, government will not be in the hands of the great officers. When right principles prevail in the empire, there will be no discussions among the common people.” Non-active policy is an ideal state in Confucianism. One may see that Confucius would consider no government intervention as the most perfect state of a nation. Confucius’ attitude towards propriety may be used to illustrate some limitations of Smith’s rules of justice. Rites tend to be observed consistently over time, whereas fashion clearly can change very rapidly. If society is kept in order by the rules of justice and there are no constraints by which to define propriety, people might lose the sense of what is right or wrong. On the other hand, Smith’s attitude towards propriety may be used to illustrate some limitations of Confucius’ rules of propriety (1759: 25): “To act with the most perfect propriety, requires no more than that common and ordinary degree of sensibility or selfcommand which the most worthless of mankind are possessed of, and sometimes even that degree is not necessary.” A society governed by propriety would collapse as it does not have social mechanisms to produce “capable and good citizens” in the long term. Smith implies is that propriety would not create “good citizens”; while the farmer Confucius held that propriety is the main means to do so.

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III. Democracy and Law As I have observed elsewhere (Zhang, 2000), Confucius and Smith might have been influenced by differences in the historical conditions they faced rather than their moral philosophy. They have similar viewpoints with regard to benevolence, the rules of justice, and rules of propriety. Smith chose rules of justice partly because he lived in a mobile and industrializing economy, while Confucius chose rules of propriety partly because he lived in an agricultural economy with low mobility. As mentioned by Gordon (1992:98), once medieval England was safe from foreign invasion, the concept of economic and political liberty began to become prevalent. Having suffered from foreign invasions and control, the English embraced the thought that individuals were born with rights and were born by the law. No one, not even the king, could take away from individuals these rights. The idea of the majesty of the law is today encapsulated in the rule of law. Gordon deemed it “one of the most important of Western concepts, for without it the Western achievements of the 19th century would not have been possible.” The law played an important role in enabling the decent ruler to control foreign lands in a civilized manner. It is not difficult to see that the traditional Confucian way of governing with propriety may not be suitable for a mobile society where multiple cultures co-exist. But Japan has successfully maintained a non-Western industrial economy, built on a concern for propriety — partly because it is not multicultural and has not had to contend with varied (or even conflicting) values. RITUAL-BASED JAPAN VERSUS LAW-BASED AMERICA The superior man thinks of virtue; the small man thinks of comfort. The superior man thinks of sanctions of law; the small man thinks of favors which he may receive. Confucius (4:11)

Trust is important for efficiency of social and economic cooperation. America moves dynamically, through the art of association; Japan through the discipline of grouping; the overseas Chinese communities by constructing family-based networks. Each cultural game is a reflection of a combined manifestation of its philosophy, international environment, spirit, technological and natural resources, and an “aggregated wisdom.” For instance the Japanese group traditionally does not emphasize individual talent but signifies “aggregated energy,” as described by Ozaki (1978): “In Japan, the most important quality of a

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College Attrition at American Research Universities leader is the capacity to harmonize his group and arouse collective enthusiasm among his men. . . . What matters is not whether the top man is the most talented but whether, under his leadership, the group is able to maximize its output. In fact, it is preferable for the boss not to be too bright, sharp witted, and capable. The presence of a man of superhuman ability weakens the raison d’être of his subordinates. Those below him may, in truth, be a bunch of monkeys but, like most of us, they want to feel important. . . . Group dynamics depends not so much upon the superb ability of the leader himself as upon his capacity to pull the best and the most out of everyone in the group. . . . Genuine leadership, like magic, can transform a dull chore or a painful duty into a labor of love. This logic of feeling sustains the dynamism of human organization in Japan.” By the way, let’s remember what Confucius considered a gentleman-like leader: “The superior man is easy to serve and difficult to please. If you try to please him in any way which is not accordant with right, he will not be pleased. But in his employment of men, he uses them according to their capacity. The mean man is difficult to serve, and easy to please. If you try to please him, though it be in a way which is not accordant with right, he may be pleased. But in his employment of men, he wishes them to be equal to everything.” On the other hand, American managers are individualistic. HampdenTurner and Trompenaars (1993:48) observed: “They regard the individual as the basic unit and building block of the enterprise and the origin of all its success. They are also more inner-directed, i.e., they locate the source of the organization’s purpose and direction in the inner convictions of its employees. No culture is as dedicated to making each individual’s dream come true. Americans believe you should ‘make up your own mind’ and ‘do your own thing’ rather than allow yourself to be influenced too much by other people and the external flow of events. Taken together, these are the prime attributes of entrepreneurship: the self-determined individual tenaciously pursuing a personal dream.” In order to compare and appreciate cultures, we have to consider each culture as an organic whole. For instance, Japan could not bear a high divorce rate, with its lifetime employment system and strict gender-based division of labor. In American tradition, when rights and duties are in conflict, men have perfect rights but no perfect duties to their clubs [or, more properly, formal and informal associations] (Fukuyama, 1992). This Anglo-Saxon version of liberty already implies the possibility of weakened communities in the long term. Fukuyama argued that many of the problems of the contemporary American

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III. Democracy and Law family — the high divorce rate, the lack of parental authority, and so on — arise because of this law-based value. American families are not stable because they are based on liberal principles — each member of the family regards himself as a member of a joint stock company, formed for utility rather than built on ties of both duties and love. In many cases, he says, “irrational — looked at from the economic cost-benefit calculation — personal sacrifices” of the members of a family are needed to maintain a stable marriage. It is through this kind of sacrifices that the benefits of strong family life are transmitted across generations. But people who follow the liberal tradition, when the obligations of family become more than what the contractor bargained for, tend to abrogate the terms of the contract. According to Fukuyama, the American clubism held together by enlightened self-interest has a certain weakness with respect to those bound by absolute obligations, like Japan’s lifetime employment system. It should be noted that he wrote the book a decade ago when the Japanese company was exhibiting its strength. Today, Japanese groups held together by obligations are in crisis. It does not seem that members of Japanese groups would sacrifice in order to enjoy benefits from the groupism across generations. In any rational educated society, cost-benefit calculations determine the associational forms in the long term. To see how social phenomena are mutually connected, we compare two typical rational societies, duty-based Japan and law-based America, in Table 3.1 based on Dale (1986:44,51) and Lipset (1997:224). Table 3.1: The Duty-Based versus Law-Based Societies

Japan

America

Community Groupism/life-time employment Verticality/slow process Hierarchy “Kintract” Public Shame/low crime rates Rural-exclusive Duties/less sense of fairness Dependence

Society Individualism/art of association Horizontality/fast change Egalitarianism Contract Private Guilt/high crime rates Urban-cosmopolitan Rights/weak sense of duty Independence

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Particularity-uniqueness Homogeneity Relativism/cultural isolationism Harmony, continuity/imitative Nature/lacking resources Phenomenalism Receptive/reactive Closed/localization

Universality Heterogeneity Absolutism/global imperialism Rupture/creative Artifice/rich resources Abstraction Donative/active Open/globalization

Williams (1960) characterized the American culture by eight traits. “1. American culture is organized around the attempt at active mystery rather than passive acceptance. Into this dimension falls the low tolerance of frustration; the refusal to accept ascetic renunciation; the positive encouragement of desire; the stress on power; the approval of ego-assertion, and so on; 2. It tends to be interested in the external world of things and events, of the palpable and immediate, rather than in the inner experience of meaning and affect. Its genius is manipulative rather than contemplative; 3. Its world-view tends to be open rather than closed: it emphasizes change, flux, movement; its central personality types are adaptive, accessible, and outgoing; 4. In a wide historical and comparative perspective, the culture places its primary faith in rationalism as opposed to traditionalism; it de-emphasizes the past, orients strongly to the future, does not accept things just because they have been done before; 5. Closely related to the above is the dimension of orderliness rather than unsystematic ad hoc acceptance of transitory experience; 6. With conspicuous deviation, a main theme is a universalistic rather than a particularistic ethic; 7. In interpersonal relations, the weight of the value system is on the side of “horizontal” rather than “vertical” emphases: peer-relations, not superordinate-subordinate relations; equality rather than hierarchy; 8. Subject to increased strains and modifications, the received culture emphasizes individual personality rather than group identity and responsibility.” Indeed, Williams mentioned that because of the nature of the issue anyone can think of numerous exceptions to each of these generalized formulations, as well as widespread alternative themes. Of course, cultures evolve over time. Cultural dynamics are characterized not by a smoothly coordinated synergy of parts, a massive coalition of the whole, but by disjointed movements of first one part, then the other. Some parts change very rapidly, while others may be sluggish. Cultural changes do not always occur in order. They exhibit bifurcations and chaos. New orders are born from

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III. Democracy and Law structural changes. Sometimes, cultural movement is well directed, while sometimes it may wander a long time before it is sure what to do. There is no simple progression from traditional to modern, but a twisting, spasmodic, unmethodical movement which turns as often toward repossessing the emotions of the past as disowning them. There is no simple universal formula to describe the curve of cultural changes, as a traditional scientific mind would assume. As globalization is deepened and competition heats up around the world, traditional relationships are under strain. Trust in institutions of all sorts has been in decline in the United States, as observed by Fukuyama (1999: 49). It reached historical lows elsewhere, too, during the 1990s. Lifetime employment — the most effective institution in spawning the Japanese economic miracle — is fading away in Japan. Human relations woven in the American style may be too weak when sturdy, sustainable trust is required; groups wrapped in the Japanese manner may not be flexible enough to face the challenges of a rapidly changing international environment; family-based networks in the overseas Chinese fashion may lack talented and knowledgeable members when knowledge is the key factor for survival in global economies. If a culture emphasizes the bonds of trust and reciprocity inside the family, it tends to emphasize less those bonds outside the family. In the overseas Chinese communities, families are strong and cohesive. Since the Chinese had been under foreign control over some hundred years, it was reasonable not to develop a preference for trusting non-family members. In fact, the “masters” of the Chinese, such as the Manchu, the British, and the Japanese, employed the same strategy “divide and rule.” It might also be worth mentioning that before the 17th century, European society placed as much emphasis on duties as on rights (representing legally protected entitlements of individuals in society). One owed a duty to social institutions or symbols such as one’s lord, to the king, the Church, and to God (Ching, 1998:68). The Confucian civilization has a dynamic vision, viewing society as constantly changeable. This vision of society is organic rather than mechanic. Universal truth or universal law, even if they exist, can hardly be found. This is an important point as we seek to understand the differences between the Western and the Confucian cultures. For instance, Wolferen (1989) finds no universal principle at work in modern Japan: “Concepts of independent, universal truths or immutable religious beliefs, transcending the worldly reality of social dictates and the decrees of power-holders, have of course found their way into Japan, but they have never taken root in any surviving world view.” Similarly, we may describe the

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College Attrition at American Research Universities contemporary rationalized West in the following way: Concepts of universal truths or immutable religious beliefs, transcending the worldly reality of social dictates and the decrees of power-holders, have been created in Western civilization, but they have not taken root in any surviving world view in the modern West. Williams (1996) demonstrates that the failure of Westerners to understand Japanese politics is not a moral but a scientific failing. In this author’s view, Western social sciences have been developed on a linear vision that can hardly explain the complexity of social dynamics (Wallerstein, 1998). Confucianism emphasizes rituals rather than law; of course, this does not mean that society does not need to establish a legal system. The Confucian ideal related to the law and human action was explicated by Hsün Tzu (2:10): “He who acts from a love of the law is a scholar. He who embodies it with a firm sense of purpose is a gentleman. He who has an understanding of it that is acute without limit is a sage. If a man lacks the law, he acts with rash and aimless confusion. If he possesses the law, but has no recognition of what is congruent with it, he nervously looks about, anxiously wondering what to do. Only after he has come to rely on the law and then gone on to penetrate deeply into its application through analogical extension to other categories and types of things does he act with gentle warmth and calm confidence.” Liberty and equality are the two most honored values in the American democratic tradition. American tradition holds that no one has a right to tell another how to live his life and government has no business interfering in the private lives of its citizens. These are fine principles, but in practice they have their pitfalls. In the United States, there is less contact between people today than there was in the past. Increasingly, young people reject marriage, divorce easily, abandon their children, and have few friends. Irrespective of its many benefits, the complex forms of government in the US are often criticized for the arcane and convoluted ways in which power is distributed at all levels. The complexity makes it impossible for the people to understand what is going on in the system. It encourages the growth and power of special interest groups. Many Americans are intolerant of moral perspectives that would permit sexual conduct and lifestyles that are different from their own. Based on contemporary survey data, McClosky and Zaller (1984:55) found that “On issues such as homosexual marriage, pornography, and the censorship of ‘obscene books,’ most members of the mass public continue to hold conventional beliefs about right and wrong, and in these matters, at least, want to limit the personal freedom of

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III. Democracy and Law their fellow Americans.” The traditional mores pertaining to sexual conduct and individual lifestyles seem to have been greatly relaxed in the last two decades. The great change in sexual morality is part of a massive change in the behavior of American society as a whole. The increasing numbers of single mothers and their dependent children are extremely vulnerable economically and socially. In recent years almost 30% of all children have been born out of wedlock. In 1993, over 46% of all families with children headed by a single women lived in poverty; but only 9% of all married-couple families with dependent children lived below the poverty line. Eleven per cent of the mother-only families were poor even though the mother worked full-time year-round (Rodgers, 1996:4). According to Rodgers, motheronly families tend to be poor because: (1) women have low earning potential than men on average; (2) single women with dependent children have high unemployment rates; (3) mother-only families have few income resources; (4) most of these families receive either no support from absent fathers or adequate support; and (5) American public policies do not pay sufficient attention to the families.1 THE DEMOCRATIZATION AND AMERICANIZATION OF TAIWAN AFTER THE WAR We have argued that Confucianism is compatible with modernization in the sense that its essential principles are similar to the principles of a market economy and democracy, and that therefore the Confucian regions can be expected to evolve successfully in that direction. Nevertheless, Confucianism does not hold that things which may be desirable can be achieved in one step. There is an order to social evolution. We will now examine the industrialization and democratization of Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) to illustrate the implications of Confucianism for Westernization/modernization of the Confucian regions overall. In fact, similar democratizing processes may be might identified in other Confucian regions even now. In a Confucian civilization, the relationship between industrialization and democracy is not contingent but is rationally certain, albeit

1.Between 1970 and 1993, the number expanded from 3.8 to 8.7 million. By 1993, almost one of every four American families with children was headed by a woman, compared one in ten in 1960 (the US Bureau of Census, 1995). In 1993, some 17.9 million children lived with only one parent, 87% of them with their mother. The majority of mother-only families resulted from divorce and separation. By the 1990s, about half of all children under eighteen had experienced parental divorce. Moreover, an increasingly large proportion of mother-only families were due to births to unwed women. In 1993, about 36% of all mother-only families were the consequences of out-of-wedlock births. Of the current generation of all American children, more than half will spend some of their childhood in a single-mother household.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities perhaps in a chaotic fashion — first industrialization and widespread education for the masses, under authoritarian regimes, and then democratization. It has long been argued that the mechanism of modern science and technology would lead to liberal democracy. As early as in 1959, Lipset had empirically demonstrated a high correlation among democracy, economic development, and education level. It is beyond scope of this study to construct a theory about industrialization and democracy, but we hold that the trend toward democratization in Taiwan was not merely adventitious once it was on the track of industrialization. Here, by democracy, we mean the type of political arrangement found in North America, Western Europe, and Japan. In all these countries, elections for the top government positions are held frequently and regularly. These elections are characterized by universal participation (which means that almost all adults are allowed to vote and the principle of one person-one vote is adhered to) and by full competition (which means that all citizens are given the freedom of speech, assembly, and so forth and all political forces can compete with each other in the elections on a more or less equal footing). By this definition, Taiwan has become democratic. In his essay Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, published more than two hundred years ago, the British philosopher and historian David Hume (17111776, 1994: 66) observed: In China, there seems to be a pretty considerable stock of politeness and science, which, in the course of so many centuries, might naturally be expected to ripen into something more perfect and finished, than what has yet arisen from them. But CHINA is one vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same manners. The authority of any teacher . . . was propagated easily from one corner of the empire to the other. None had courage to resist the torrent of popular opinion. And posterity was not bold enough to dispute what had been universally received by their ancestors. This seems to be one natural reason, why the sciences have made so slow a progress in that mighty empire.

Hume’s contemplation illustrates why individualistic aspects of Confucianism were not advocated after multiple states were integrated into a single China. Classical Confucianism was created when the area that is China today comprised multiple independent and competing states. Confucius traveled to and worked in some of the foreign states; he had opportunities to observe the traditions, state administration, and the strengths and weaknesses 86

III. Democracy and Law of each. Confucius showed “local” loyalty to the country where he was born; but he was far more concerned with “global identity” than “national identity.” His political thought was concentrated on enabling the harmonious co-existence of differences rather than enforced co-existence of differences. The ancient Confucian principles do agree with democratic principles. But this does not mean that the Chinese had actually respected individualism and established institutions to uphold personal freedoms. One may quote Smith (1776 II: 129) to characterize the traditional Chinese system: “To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose Government is influenced by shopkeepers.” This holds true for contemporary mainland China (and, arguably, some of today’s leading nations), where the situation described by Chu Hsi (1130-1200) is still as valid as it was many hundred years ago: “The way of Confucius had not been put into practice for a single day” (Chan, 1973). To illustrate how a Confucian region can be democratized under Western influence, we describe Taiwan’s industrialization and democratization in a simplified way. Taiwan is separated from mainland China by the Taiwan Strait, about 100 miles off the coast. The first Chinese settlers on Taiwan were landless adventurers and semi-retired pirates. The first Europeans to reach Taiwan were Portuguese navigators, in the early 1600s. They arrived off the coast of Taiwan and named the island “Ilha Formosa” (beautiful island). The Portuguese attempted to make Taiwan a trade center. Soon after establishing a settlement in the north, they were supplanted by the Dutch. The Dutch occupied Taiwan from 1642 to 1662 as a foothold in the China market. It was estimated that when the Dutch arrrived, the Chinese population on the island was 25,000 (Davidson, 1903). Dutch rule ended in 1662 when the Ming loyalist Cheng Ch’eng-kung (called Koxinga in the West) and his army of 25,000 (who represented the last major force still loyal to the Ming dynasty) drove out the Dutch. In 1683, when Cheng’s heirs surrendered to the Ch’ing and Taiwan came under the rule of the Manchu empire as part of Fukien province, the Chinese population on the island was estimated at between 200,000 and 350,000. After 1683, Taiwan became a prefecture (fu) of Fukien Province of the Ch’ing dynasty. Taiwan saw many social uprisings. In the more than 200 years it governed Taiwan, the Manchu government showed little interest in developing the island.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities The Japanese arrived in Taiwan on May 29, 1895, after defeating the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War. Later, at the Cairo Conference of December 1943 and at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, it was determined that, following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Taiwan would be returned to China. As Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) were internationally accepted as governing the Republic of China, it was to KMT forces that the Japanese formally surrendered control of Taiwan on October 25, 1945. The KMT was corrupt and disregarded the people’s basic needs, both on the mainland and the island of Taiwan. The defeat of the KMT government by the communist Red Army taught the KMT leadership a lesson, a lesson that Mencius [1:7] had taught the Chinese more than two thousand years before: “The implementation of a benevolence policy by a prince will suffice for the love and protection of all within the four seas, and if he does not carry it out, he will not be able to protect his wife and children.” The KMT was cognizant that it had been defeated by the communists not because of poor military capacity but because of the corruption within. Having lost their hold on the mainland, by absolute necessity the KMT had to advance economic efficiency and morality in the island or be defeated altogether. Thus, although during the first half of the 20th century Taiwan achieved little growth (at least in per capita terms), and even by the early 1960s the economic conditions and levels of income were not very different from those in African countries (Maddison, 1989:15), it achieved a high growth rate then and maintained it through the 1970s and beyond. From small beginnings, it has become one of the world’s most dynamic exporters of manufactured goods. Its spectacular growth has been brought about largely through increased factor inputs (high domestic and foreign investments, rising participation rates and inter-sectoral transfers of labor (see, for instance, Lasater, 1993, Zhang, 2003). Until the last few years, the Taiwanese economy experienced rapid growth, stable prices, a low employment rate, and relatively equitable income distribution. Instead of foreign debt, Taiwan has accumulated one of the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves. It has experienced structural changes through the stages of import substitution, export promotion, and rapid technological upgrading (Yu, 1999). Its educational record has been exemplary, even when Western nations and many developing countries were becoming increasingly disenchanted with

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III. Democracy and Law education. In 1945, 28.3% of youths attended high school; in 1995, 94.4% did so. In 1945, 11.3% of youths attended colleges and universities; while in 1995, 45.3% did (Kuo, 1999:43). Taiwan has set an example of how a small country can be transformed from an underdeveloped economy into a developed one within a short span of time. When Taiwan was a colony of Japan (1895-1945), a system of universal primary education for grades one through six was instituted. To offer education without class distinction is the basic principle of Confucianism. Since Confucianism had influenced the Japanese educational ideal in modern times, Japanese education could be disseminated in Taiwan with little cultural resistance (Ku, 1997). In modern times, the Japanese have been far more effective in applying Confucian principles than the Chinese (Morishima, 1982, Zhang, 1998). When the Japanese left Taiwan in 1945, Taiwan was one of the most literate populations in Asia. Although the colonial education was limited to elementary level, it introduced scientific and technological education into Taiwan’s school system. After Taiwan was restored to Chinese sovereignty, the government made immense efforts to promote education. By 1950, Taiwan had 1,231 elementary schools, 77 vocational schools, six colleges or junior colleges and one university. It had over one million students attending school at elementary level or above. The ratio of school enrollment to the population of school age in 1950 was 80% for the first level (Wo, 1991). “Let a good man teach the people seven years,” advocates Confucius, “and they may then likewise be employed in war.” One thing that Chiang Kai-shek understood thoroughly was that no victory could be won if the “soldiers,” even in an economic war, were not disciplined. During the first post-war decade, Taiwan saw the widespread provision of basic education, including rural education. Since the KMT had arrived in Taiwan, strengthening education had been its priority. As Taiwan accumulated physical wealth, its commitment of resources to human capital accumulation also expanded. As shown in Table 3.2, based on Wo (1991), education expenditure raised from 2.1% of GNP in 1955 to 3.3 in 1965, then increased to 3.2% in 1975, and reached 5.5% in 1985. Education as a share of total government expenditure also increased, from 11.6% in 1955 to 20.2% in 1985.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Table 3.2. Educational Expenditure (EE) in Taiwan, 1955-85

1 955 EE as a% of TGE EE as a% of GNP

1

1

1

15.1

7.8

0.5

8.2

8.1

2

2.1

2.5

3.3

4.6

4.2

4.7

5.5

2

980

19

1.6

1

975

1

965

1

970

1

960

1

85 1

20.

TGE (Total government expenditures); GNP (Gross national product)

Since the KMT came to Taiwan in 1949, it made every effort to ensure the best educational environment for producing engineers and scientists. By 1997, over 99% of the students were graduating from elementary and junior high school; 85% of the graduates of junior high schools attended academic or vocational high schools; and nearly half of the high school students went on to colleges or universities (Stevenson, 1998). Taiwan’s education system has three levels — primary, secondary, and higher. The secondary level is made up of three years of junior high school and three years of senior high school or senior vocation school. The first nine years of school, six years of primary school and three years of junior high, are free and compulsory. After junior high school, students wishing to continue their education have to take an exam to determine whether they enter a senior high school, a senior vocational school, or a five-year junior college. Table 3.3 provides school attendance rates by level of schooling during the period 1949-88. The table is based on Hermalin et al. (1994:68). Along with government investments in education, school enrollment rates increased between 1952 and 1973. Primary education was almost universal by 1958. Enrollment at the secondary and tertiary levels increased rapidly from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. The sharp increase at the junior high level was associated with the nine-year compulsory schooling initiated in 1968. There was also a sharp increase in the education of women during the same period.

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III. Democracy and Law

Table 3.3. School Attendance Rates by Level of Schooling, 1952-88

19

Primary School (Ages 6-11) 84.0

Junior High (Ages 12-14) 17.1

Senior High (Ages 15-17) 7.7

College (Ages 18-21) 1.5

52 19

94.8

36.9

15.6

3.6

19

96.8

43.5

23.7

8.1

19

98.1

77.3

47.9

21.3

19

99.7

86.0

52.8

23.9

19

99.9

90.6

76.0

30.9

58 64 73 79 88 (the number of students at each level as a percentage of the population in the age group specified)

Taiwan has produced a large pool of well-trained university and technical college graduates. By the 1990s, over 85% of the students had received senior high, technical and vocational schools (Lin, 1998:189). Knowing that Taiwan was unable to provide higher education, the government encouraged students to go abroad for post-graduate studies. The government set up programs to financially support students wishing to study abroad. Major US universities also offered various scholarships, fellowships, assistantships, and loans. In the 1970s, university graduates tended to go to abroad (usually to the US) for advanced degrees and then made careers there. Over 2,000 students left Taiwan each year. In the late 1970s, the number was over 5,000. In 1992 alone, more than 33,000 Taiwanese students and scholars were studying in the US. In 1993-94, the number of Taiwanese students enrolled in US colleges and universities was 37,581 (Tsiang, 1999:251-3). Taiwan’s policy of unrestricted emigration meant that in 1965, of the students leaving to study abroad, only 5% returned. Since the late 1980s, the number of those who returned gradually increased as wage rates in Taiwan became competitive and living conditions were improving. As Taiwan’s economy boomed, new employment opportunities for highly-trained 91

College Attrition at American Research Universities technical people were created. Taiwan’s government made great efforts to recruit this talent for positions in higher education, research institutions, major government programs, and the private sector. The number returning in 1994 was 6,510 (Gold, 1998:55). These expatriate scholars have made significant contributions to Taiwan’s industrialization and democratization. After the late 1980s, science education, scientific instrumentation, and general research in universities rapidly expanded. In early 1993, the ROC president, premier and two thirds (nineteen) of the cabinet-level appointments had PhDs, with eighteen of them, including the president and the premier, obtaining their PhD from American universities (Chiou, 1994). Now, many businesses, industrial, cultural, and political elites in Taiwan are US educated. One might wonder how the KMT, having failed in its efforts to rebuild mainland China from the early 1920s to the late 1940s, could be successful in modernizing Taiwan. Mencius offered advice to King Hui of Liang (who suffered from the shame of being defeated by the Qin and Chu) on how to protect his state; it seems that the KMT eventually interpreted this to guide them in Taiwan. Mencius said: “With a territory which is only a hundred li square, it is possible to attain the Imperial dignity. If your Majesty will indeed dispense a benevolent government to the people, being sparing in the use of punishments and fines, and making the taxes and levies light, so causing that the fields shall be ploughed deep, and the weeding of them be carefully attended to, and that the strong-bodied, during their days of leisure, shall cultivate their filial piety, fraternal respectfulness, sincerity and trustfulness, serving thereby, at home, their fathers and elder brothers, and, abroad, their elders and superiors — you will then have a people who can be employed, with sticks which they have prepared, to oppose the strong mail and sharp weapons of the troops of Qin and Chu. The rulers of those states rob their people of their time, so that they cannot plough and weed their fields, in order to support their parents. . . . Those rulers, as it were, drive their people into pit-falls, or drown them. Your Majesty will go to punish them. In such a case, who will oppose your Majesty? In accordance with this is the saying, ‘The benevolent has no enemy.’” The Kuomintang must have thought that that was a worthy model. Having arrived as refugees, and “foreigners” at that; given the incessant threats from the Chinese Communist Party; and given the lack of resources — basically, nothing but land and forest— the KMT resolved to follow the Confucian way. Taiwan was a small land. The KMT had to contrive its occupation policies to prevent a possible CCP invasion and to procure the support of the native

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III. Democracy and Law Taiwanese. Rather than ruling through military force, the KMT altered its strategy of political and economic means to undermine Beijing and to gain the support of the Chinese people. The KMT set about to raise the standard of living of the Taiwanese people, to improve the quality of their life, and to gradually implement democracy. In the first decades, the emphasis was on education and building the economy; more recently, they have begun to enjoy the luxury of political liberalization. Taiwan offered few obstacles to Chiang’s rule from 1949 until his death in 1975. He consolidated in his hands broad powers to appoint, transfer, and dismiss officials. He commanded the party, army, security agencies, and government. When Chiang Kai-shek first arrived in Taiwan, liberal democracy seemed too risky a system under the circumstances — with a poor and scantlyeducated populace, it might lead to conflict and disunity. The KMT chose to modernize Taiwan in a controlled fashion, moving from an authoritarian state with an emphasis on education, toward democracy. From 1949 to 1987, when martial law was in force, it was illegal to advocate for Taiwan’s independence. During 1950-52, the KMT carried out a fundamental reorganization in order to invigorate the party machine from its state of paralysis in the mainland. During the reorganization period, the KMT reregistered members and purged those considered disloyal, suspected of enemy connections, or found guilty of corruption (Riggs, 1952:38). After the reorganization, the KMT’s power was highly centralized, with a hierarchy of party apparatus dispersed throughout the state structure and society. On June 10, 1951, the Executive Yuan ordered licensing restrictions for newspapers. Taiwan’s policy-making system was highly specified. Each function of the state had a separate office, with an elaborate system for monitoring its responsibility. Competitive national examinations were the main mechanism for recruitment to specialized agencies and bureaus of the state. The specialized bureaucracy was highly competent and effective. Although the KMT limited political participation at the national level, it carefully institutionalized local elections to maintain Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s democratic principles. National politics was dominated by the mainlanders (roughly 15% of the population); while the Taiwanese controlled local and provincial Taiwan politics. Between 1951 and 1965, free elections were held for five provincial assemblies. Those provincial elections continued until 1995, when a pending constitutional reform stipulated revising the provincial government and freezing local elections. By the mid-

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College Attrition at American Research Universities 1960s, local elections for the Taiwan provincial assembly and for lower national units had become routine. Voter participation was high. From the 1950s to 1970s, voter turnouts in the elections of magistrates, mayors, and provincial assembly members were often over 70% (Chou and Nathan, 1987). After 1971, the international environment changed in a way that made it increasingly difficult for the KMT to claim itself to be the only legitimate government of all China. These changes included Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations in 1971; the Nixon-Chou En-lai Shanghai Communiqué in 1972; the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, and the American derecognition of Taiwan in 1979. By the end of the Vietnam War, the US changed its attitude toward the PRC. Now, the US considered friendly relations with the PRC to be a strategic asset in US-Soviet competition. In November 1969, the US Seventh Fleet ended its regular patrol of the Taiwan Straits. In October 1971, the UN General Assembly voted to seat the PRC as the legitimate government of China. Because of the UN vote and trends toward improved US-PRC relations, many nations switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In February 1972, Nixon visited the PRC and met with Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders. The two sides made important statements of policy of Sino-American understanding on the Taiwan issue, on February 28, 1972. In February 1973, the US and the PRC established liaison offices in each other’s capitals. In December 1978, the PRC changed its policy toward Taiwan from “liberation” to “peaceful reunification.” On December 15, 1978, the US and the PRC announced they would exchange diplomatic recognition on January 1, 1979. The US also claimed to terminate diplomatic relations with the ROC. However, the American people and the people of Taiwan would maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official representations and without diplomatic relations. To prevent the PRC from threatening Taiwan, President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) into law on April 10, 1979. The TRA has become the principal legal framework for US-Taiwan relations. The TRA states that the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was based on the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. The TRA also states that the US policy in the Western Pacific is to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the US to protect Taiwan’s security. The perceived crisis of the US derecognition of Taiwan resulted in a decline in support for political liberalization. Having lost the hope of regaining the upper hand in China overall, the KMT launched a naturalization policy by

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III. Democracy and Law recruiting more Taiwanese locals into the state apparatus. The political power of business expanded in the 1970s and 1980s. Large private groups emerged, resulting in increases in the organizational capacities of the private sector. In the late 1970s, there was an increasing demand for sources of political funding. The KMT government tried to establish close relations with the private sector also because the government needed greater business input into policy-making as Taiwan’s economy was shifting toward more complex, capital-intensive, and technology-intensive industries. The barriers separating the KMT from the private sector blurred. The private sector and the government had common interests (Chu, 1994). They recognized the necessity for being actively involved in industrial upgrading. They favored economic growth first with little environmental considerations and preferred economic growth to social welfare spending. They also supported exclusion of organized labor from economic policy-making. The KMT’s reliance on business grew even more intense in the mid-1980s as Taiwan’s democratization was accelerated. The Taiwanese islanders’ distrust towards the mainlanders and Taiwan’s strained relations with the mainland were the key factors leading Taiwan’s politics to be self-organized toward democracy. By the late 1970s, there was a rapid increase in demand for political freedom from the newly formed middle class and a well-educated (American-influenced) public. There was a more open attitude toward the discussion of sensitive political issues on Taiwan. After several electoral victories, by the middle 1970s, non-KMT politicians wanted to organize an opposition political party. In the 1977 local elections, some of nonKMT politicians even publicly termed themselves candidates without affiliation with the KMT. These tangwai politicians won 25 to 30% of the popular vote and gained about 25% of the seats in national by-elections. The KMT’s final authority rested in the hands of its two supreme leaders, Chiang Kai-shek (who ruled 1949-75) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (who ruled 1975-87). By the early 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo had already held the second most powerful position in the hierarchy. They appointed key officials in the party, the government, the military, and the security forces (Tien, 1992). The authoritarian system provided Taiwan with decades of political stability that enabled the government to launch a steady course of economic development. Under their leadership, the structural configuration, and functional relationship of the KMT, the state, and organizations in the ROC political system were essentially corporatist.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities In Taiwan, the beginnings of democratization were engineered under the leadership of the late Chiang Ching-kuo. He ruled Taiwan in a style different from his father. As premier and later as president, he regularly went out among the people, in casual dresses — to schools, factories, hospitals, offices, and fields. He paid more attention to young people and brought officials still in their 30s and early 40s into leading positions. In the late 1970s and 1980s, he began to redefine the KMT’s mission. According to his vision, the KMT was to develop Taiwan as a democratic society that mainland China’s leaders and elite eventually should adopt. He emphasized the strict rectitude of government officials and campaigned actively for honest and efficient government. He quickly discharged corrupt officials. He was respected for his concern with people’s problems and welfare and for his use of people and personal integrity. In 1972, when he became premier, he started the process of Taiwanization of the ruling party and central government. In the years of his presidency, fourteen of the 31 members of the KMT Central Standing Committee were Taiwanese. Chiang Ching-kuo also started recruiting Western-trained Chinese technocrats into positions of power and responsibility in the government and party. A significant number of overseas Chinese experts in the social sciences from the US and other Western countries were appointed to high-ranking posts in Taiwan. The KMT’s ideal was democratic. The ancient ‘Chinese democratic principle’ is reflected in Mencius’ following sayings: “If people generally are not able to enjoy themselves, they condemn their superiors. For them, when they cannot enjoy themselves, to condemn their superiors is wrong, but when superiors of the people do not make enjoyment a thing common to the people and themselves, they also do wrong. When a ruler rejoices in the joy of his people, they also rejoice in his joy; when he grieves at the sorrow of his people, they also grieve at his sorrow. A sympathy of joy will pervade the empire, a sympathy of sorrow will do the same; — in such a state of things, it cannot be but the ruler attain to the Imperial dignity.” In modern times, it is through democratic processes that the people can find a leader who can simultaneously enjoy and sorrow with them. The Confucian criterion for electing politicians help Chinese society to accept Western democratic processes when social and economic structures and preference structures of the people become mature. In the early years in Taiwan, under the KMT leadership the people elected their local leaders and representative bodies for villages, cities, districts, and Taiwan Province. The limited democracy helped the KMT to legitimate its governance of

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III. Democracy and Law Taiwan and made it an effective alternative to China’s communist dictatorship. The KMT helped local elections but without allowing an opposition party to compete with the KMT. The KMT justified such practice as preventing communist subversion, mobilizing society against the Chinese communist regime, and giving Taiwan’s citizens time to learn about democracy and practice it. However, since the late 1970s, Taiwan had become more liberal and become more tolerant about the tangwai opposition. During the 1980s developments in the mainland helped to make democratization in Taiwan politically acceptable. The success of economic reform in the mainland reduced the apparent threat of invasion. This was important for democratization in Taiwan. President Chiang Ching-kuo made many positive contributions to Taiwan’s rapid democratization. In March 1986, he described his new vision as follows (Myers, 1998:31): “Our party advocates practicing the spirit of making our present world a perfect moral order and to carry out our ROC on Taiwan constitution to the mainland to initiate a democratic, constitutional government; do away with dictatorship and class warfare; really implement a way for our people to determine their destiny; return political power to the people; and to make them entirely equal before the law.” He was gradually convinced that democratic reforms were needed to ensure the continuity of the regime after his death. Before his death in 1988, over 70% of KMT membership and over 50% of party and government officials were Taiwanese. The KMT was no longer a party dominated by Chinese from the mainland. It was in the hands of Chinese born and raised on Taiwan. Martial law was abrogated in 1987, allowing political parties to be formed and to compete in elections. The other instruments of dictatorial control were also soon lifted, allowing freedom of assembly, association, and press. The political exiles who had demanded freedom and independence returned from abroad or were released from detention. He broke the taboo on negotiating with the mainland and allowed visits to the mainland on humanitarian grounds. By this time, Taiwan began economic links with the mainland. In 1987, indirect trade was valued at US $1.4 billion (Klintworth, 1995:305). Massive investment in China and the legalization of family visits to relatives in the mainland in 1987 brought a rapid increase in the interaction between these two Chinese societies. President Chiang Ching-kuo died on January 13, 1988. Before his demise, he asked that no member of his family should succeed him. His death ended the Chiang dynasty in ROC history.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Chiang Ching-kuo was succeeded by Vice-President Lee Teng-hui. Lee was a native Taiwanese, born in a village outside Taipei in 1923. He joined the KMT only in 1972. He was educated in Taiwan, Japan, and the US with no previous mainland China experience. After completing high school in Taipei, he was admitted to Kyoto Imperial University in Japan during Taiwan’s Japanese occupation. After the war, he studied agricultural economics at National Taiwan University and then obtained master degree at Iowa State University and a doctorial degree in agricultural economics from Cornell University. His dissertation won the prize of the American Association for Agricultural Economics in 1969. Lee was distinguished by a complete lack of affiliation to any of the numerous factions of mainlander or Taiwanese politicians. He did not have any power base besides his education, ability, the authority of his office, and his popularity with the public. In 1981, he became the governor of Taiwan province. At the conclusion of his term, Chiang selected him as vice president. In the Thirteenth KMT Party Congress in July 1988, Lee was elected Chairman of the KMT, the first Taiwanese to hold that position. Like Lee, almost half of the members had received advanced degrees in the US. By the mid-1980s, the KMT began to change its way of dealing with the tangwai opposition. The KMT began to meet with tangwai leaders and hold discussions with them. The KMT negotiated with opposition leaders and extended its state apparatus to incorporate new political forces. On the other hand, the face-to-face negotiations also meant the KMT’s de facto recognition of the tangwai politicians’ organizational activities. Under such circumstances, the tangwai leaders declared the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) on the eve of the 1986 parliamentary election. Prior to the creation of the DDP, Taiwan had maintained a one-party system for almost four decades. The creation of the DDP in 1986 and scores of other parties since then has categorically changed Taiwan’s party system. The 1986 election turned out to be the first electoral campaign in post-1949 Taiwan in which political dissidents were able to participate as a legal political party. Seven months after this election, martial law was lifted, on July 14, 1987 (Chu, 1994). Tocqueville observed, in 1848: “It is evident to all that a great democratic revolution is going on among us, but all do not look at it in the same light. To some it appears to be novel but accidental; and, as such, they hope it may still be checked; to others it seems irresistible, because it is the most uniform, the most ancient, and the most permanent tendency that is to be found in history.” Democratization and the termination of martial law, in 1987, brought to the

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III. Democracy and Law surface ethnic and social divisions long held in check. Since 1991, it is no longer a crime in Taiwan to advocate independence from the PRC or, conversely, to express support for communism. The DDP was an alliance of the main political dissidents in Taiwan. In January 1989, the ROC’s Legislative Yuan passed the Civil Organization Law, which created an institutional framework within which the DDP and other opposition groups can co-exist and compete with the KMT. In the early years, the DDP was troubled by conflicts among factions within the DDP. Although the DDP supported the eventual independence of Taiwan, it advocated the normalization of relations between Taiwan and the mainland through exchanges and meetings in the short term. Following four decades of rapid economic growth and urbanization, Taiwan’s social structure had become highly differentiated. At the end of the 1980s, more than 60 parties had been established. By the late 1980s, Taiwanese no longer tolerated the authoritarian system and the KMT structure of political subordination of the civil society. In late 1988, KMT and DDP members of the Legislative Yuan fought over several bills such as proposals for the voluntary retirement of senior parliamentarians who had been holding office since 1947, and for the legalization of new political parties. Taiwan’s politics since 1990 has been characterized by the rising of the DDP to power. In the early 1990s, several influential groups competed against each other, e.g., the KMT against the DDP, the Taiwanese against the mainlanders, elected members of representative institutions against technocrats and party cadres. The KMT had successfully ruled Taiwan because of its large and relatively disciplined membership and its strict control over the state and the society. However, after continued economic growth and the expansion of education over four decades, the society was changed. The KMT’s ability to control the society had been significantly weakened by the early 1990s. Once democratization took off, the calculations of different groups influenced its form and speed. Especially, rationally calculated interactions between the DDP and the KMT became increasingly significant for Taiwan’s democratization. In the mid-1970s, the tangwai utilized street actions, squabbles on the legislative floor, US congressional pressure, working through overseas Taiwanese lobbying to bargain for position with the KMT. In the monopolistic position, the KMT considered political concessions the price to pay in exchange for inducing moderation of the opposition (Tien, 1992). In November 1990, DDP radicals formed a Taiwanese Independent Sovereignty Movement Committee to promote Taiwan’s independence. The DDP adopted the name of the Republic of

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Taiwan for the 1991 National Assembly election campaign. The DDP campaigned for an independent Taiwan in the election. However, of the 225 directly elected seats, the KMT won 179 seats, indicating that the idea of an independent Taiwan failed to have wide electoral appeal. In the 1992 elections, the DDP had learnt its lesson and began to call for “one China, one Taiwan,” instead of independence. It had decided to pay more attention to public policy and to play the role of a parliamentary party rather than of a mass movement, in order to achieve its goal of becoming the ruling party. As a campaign strategy it concentrated on issues of corruption in the KMT and the dangers of military rule and of privileges. It also tried to earn popularity by proposing social programs. On the other hand, the KMT targeted its campaign strategy on business groups. The DDP doubled its numbers in the legislature by winning 37 of the 125 contested seats. In the 1992 elections, the DDP’s success at the polls also encouraged it to switch its role from a dissident to a participant in the formulation of the government policy. Just a few years after its foundation, in the autumn of 1986, the party successfully established itself as the island’s major opposition party, at both national and regional levels. In December 1994, the KMT won the posts of governor and major of Kaohsiung, while the DPP candidate became major of Taipei. In the December 1995 Legislative Yuan election, the DDP gained 33.2% of the popular vote. In the December 1995 elections, the KMT’s share of the vote sank to its lowest level ever. The 1996 election was the first direct presidential election in any Chinese entity in recorded Chinese history. On March 23, 1996, Taiwan’s voters went to the polls to decide Taiwan’s president, vice president, and delegates to the National Assembly. The elections in Taiwan in 1994, 1995, and 1996 were interpreted as the final stage of democratization process in Taiwan (Copper, 1998). In a speech delivered at the opening of the 14th National Congress of the KMT on August 16, 1993, President Lee Teng-Hui stated (Hu, 1994: 4): “Today we stand at a turning point in history. Over two thousand years ago, the Chinese had such democratic thoughts as ‘the people rank higher than the nobility’ and ‘the people are the foundation of the state.’ In recent years, we in Taiwan have successfully adopted the Western political philosophy of government of the people, for the people and by the people, and created on Chinese soil the first ever democratic society based on party politics. This achievement, unprecedented in Chinese history, marks the beginning of a new historic era.”

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IV. EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE The evil of men is that they like to be the teachers of others. Mencius (7:23)

Hume said that one of the chief aims of the science of man “is . . . to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials, from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior.” The vitality of a society is the manifestation of knowledge and abilities as well as the values and attitudes of its leaders, public officials, entrepreneurs, engineers, and workers. In the United States there are many academic institutions that can boast of more than a century of scientific discovery and innovation. The US holds vast campuses, the finest and most convenient libraries in the world, laboratories and research centers from which scientists have won the most Nobel Prizes in science. Today, the United States is a global center of learning; students and researchers from Europe, Latin America, and Asia come to the United States to enjoy the most favorable conditions for research and to see and contribute to modern scientific trends. John Dewey (1859-1952), the American philosopher and educator, was a leading exponent of philosophical pragmatism (the main characteristic of American education). He discarded the traditional method of teaching by rote in favor of a broad-based system of practical experience. He began his acclaimed book Democracy and Education with a discussion of education as a necessity of life. A society relies on education to maintain its continuous existence. According to

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Dewey, a static society uses education to preserve established customs, traditions, and behavior; the young are brought up to perform predetermined roles and habits, and are trained to docility and obedience. However, in a progressive democratic society, there are no predetermined roles and habits; what is good for the society is often not even known beforehand. Education is aimed at growth. For Dewey, “growth” is not a fixed end but a process. Education ought to render the student capable of further education. Education should allow children freedom and help them develop active qualities of initiative, independence, and resourcefulness. Dewey did not accept the idea that growth was the unfolding of latent powers from within, nor the formation of such powers from without. He believed that education is the reconstruction of experience, which adds to the meaning of experience and increases one’s ability to direct the course of subsequent experience. (Here, “experience” is interpreted as the interaction of the self with its environment.) For Dewey, growth consists of using the scientific method to solve problems met in reality. American liberalism has long believed in scientific knowledge as the key to solving social and economic problems, and Dewey equates democracy and science. Scientific method is the method whereby men actually solve their problems. Democracy is equal to science in the sense that it is a form of association in which all engage in joint activity to solve common or shared problems. According to Dewey, there is a deeply rooted pre-scientific philosophy that not only separates mind and body, but also holds mind superior to matter. This philosophy is manifested in the traditional distinctions people made between labor and leisure, vocation and culture, practical and intellectual culture. Those distinctions are traditionally embodied in rigidly demarcated, hierarchically stratified social classes and groups and a prohibition of social mobility. Dewey argued that in a truly democratic society, all these vestiges of the pre-scientific must be disposed of — pre-scientific philosophy should be liquidated by eradicating all those social and class distinctions. Education is thus the key to creating a true democracy, since it is through education that people learn how to work together to solve the problems shared by all people. EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES Tocqueville (1835:149) observed that “The passions that stir the Americans most deeply are commercial and not political ones, or rather they carry a trader’s

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IV. Education and Knowledge habits over into the business of politics. They like order, without which affairs do not prosper, and they set an especial value on regularity of mores, which are the foundation of a sound business; they prefer the good sense which creates fortunes to the genius which often dissipates them; their minds, accustomed to definite calculations, are frightened by general ideas; and they hold practice in greater honor than history.” Tocqueville mentioned that the Americans’ method of thought was Cartesian — without their ever having read Descartes. (He also wondered whether the Americans could understand a Pascal, let alone produce one.) For him, Americans were men of rational principles. He saw that the United States was characterized by equality in mentality in the sense that there were few ignorant and few learned individuals, in comparison to other modern countries — at that time, primary education was available to all the population, while higher education was within the reach of hardly anyone. People on the frontier believed that education would be the leveler, leading the way to democratic equality. Thomas Jefferson (who said: “No people can be both ignorant and free,” 1743-1826) and other Founding Fathers held that universal public education was essential to produce the informed citizenry on which a democracy depended. They hoped schooling would discover natural merit in citizens and create an elite to defend the republic from tyranny. By the time of the Civil War, every state had tax-supported, free elementary schools, even though most teachers were not well trained and most children went to school only sporadically, if at all. Most parents still needed their children’s work or wages to sustain family. By 1819, the Supreme Court distinguished between public and private colleges and freed private institutions of higher learning from state control. During the Civil War, the Land Grant College Act started the federal government’s involvement in public higher education, giving each state huge land areas to be used for the benefit of higher education. The Act promoted the higher education of larger numbers of students and called for college-level courses in agriculture, technical and industrial subjects. African Americans and women were first admitted to (certain) colleges before the Civil War. Rapid urbanization, industrialization, and immigration brought about great changes in American education after 1865. Public schools were considered a necessary tool to prepare immigrant (slum) children for a productive future. Assimilation through the schools also became increasingly important as immigrants from many parts of the world arrived in large numbers. The schools were expected to enable these newcomers to rapidly adapt to American life by

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College Attrition at American Research Universities teaching them English, American democracy, and basic skills needed for the workplace. By 1880, almost three-quarters of school-aged children were in school, largely because compulsory school attendance laws had been adopted. Until the mid-1950s, the overt agenda included teaching girls to play a supportive role, Blacks to know their place, Indians to be civilized, and immigrants to be American workers (Mauk and Oakland, 1997:294). The civil rights movement from the mid-1950s began to challenge this hierarchy. The United States attained its superpower position in large measure due to its sophisticated ability to turn knowledge into markets and military advantages. Starting in the 1870s, the Americans established a series of institutions to challenge Europe’s economic, scientific, and technological leadership. These new institutions include research universities such as Johns Hopkins University (founded in 1876) and the University of Chicago (1892), colleges and agricultural stations, specialized institutions of technology, and corporate laboratories. American higher education was greatly expanded after the Second World War. In 1944, Congress passed the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act to ease the return of war veterans to civil life. Under the Act, the federal government paid tuition and living costs for veterans enrolled in programs of higher education and directly funded the expansion of study programs for the first time. Within two years, half the people in college were veterans. By 1971 when the program was completed, nearly 2,500,000 veterans had obtained higher education. By then, higher education had become mass education. As the Cold War had become more intensified, the federal government increased its role in public education. The National Defense Education Act in 1958 encouraged research and university programs in science and technology. The federal government provided money to research institutions and universities and loans to college students. In addition, in 1954, the Supreme Court ended the principle of separate-but-equal educational facilities for Blacks and Whites. One year late, the Court further required that public school districts all over the nation had to present plans for achieving racial balances in their schools. At the beginning of the 20th century, fewer than 5% of America’s eighteen year olds attended college. The United States had only 25,000 faculty and staff and 9,300 graduate students. There were fewer than a thousand colleges and universities; and only 38 institutions offered doctoral degrees. Since then, America’s higher education has been greatly expanded. By the early 1990s, the number of students attending college had grown more than 40-fold; the faculty

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IV. Education and Knowledge was 35 times as large; the number of institutions was multiplied by four; the number of graduates was as many as 160 times in comparison to the number at the beginning of the 20th century (Levine, 1994:xi). Table 4.1 indicates the percentage of the population of selected nations that enters college or university; it does not show graduation rates. The rates in the table refer to net entry to post-secondary college or university for people ages 15 and over. The average rate of all the countries in the table is 30%. The United States enjoys the highest college entrance rate among the selected countries. Table 4.1 University-level Education Rates

United States New Zealand Denmark Austria Turkey

52% 40% 31% 26% 16%

Canada Netherlands Germany Norway Switzerland

49% 34% 27% 25% 15%

United Kingdom France Ireland Hungary

43% 33% 27% 20%

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Database, Table C4.2, Net Entry rates for university-level education (1995)

LEARNING IN CONFUCIANISM Having not and yet affecting to have, empty and yet affecting to be full, straitened and yet affecting to be at ease — it is difficult with such characteristics to have constancy. Confucius (7:26)

We should note that in Confucianism “knowledge” mainly referred to the knowledge of man and society. Although Confucianism provided some visionary views about nature, it was little concerned with the natural sciences. Nevertheless, to understand industrial economies, we need to understand the interdependence of knowledge and economic growth. Economic growth and knowledge production are both driven by technology. Economic growth makes it possible for a society to provide the economic conditions for scientists to conduct research. Without the increasing scale effects of science in economic production, it is almost impossible for a society to support basic education and scientific research on a large scale. Widespread college or university education,

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College Attrition at American Research Universities which implies delayed participation of young people in the labor market, cannot be sustained without economic efficiency on the part of the other members of the society. Economic development demands educated people and education requires an appropriate combination of family values, school systems, university education, a stable social environment, experiments in working methods, and leisure time. Adam Smith (1776) used the story of the pin factory to illustrate the idea that increasing returns are central to the explanation of long-run growth: There is an interdependence between the division of labor and learning by doing; as skill is increased, the worker will concentrate on a special task and thus further increase his skill. Smith also examined the relationship between the division of labor and economic growth. The division of labor is both an effect of economic growth and a cause of further development. As production is increased and the market expanded, new machinery and new divisions of labor will be introduced. Marshall (1920) distinguished between internal and external scale economies and examined the possibility of multiple equilibria. He recognized possible technological and organizational sources of increasing returns to scale that are internal to establishments, business firms and industries. He noted a number of conditions, including greater possibilities for specialization in the provision of intermediate inputs, a finer division of labor, and the more rapid diffusion of innovation among specialized producers and workers. Marshall introduced the notion of an “external economy” to discuss the existence of the equilibrium of a competitive economy in the presence of aggregate increasing returns. He notes that an increase in trade represents a form of external economy when production knowledge cannot be kept secret. Marshall’s argument shows that if knowledge is dependent on economic conditions (e.g., as a country becomes enriched, people get more education), the economy is faced with multiple paths of development and some path may not be “stable.” Schumpeter (1934) argued that dynamic entrepreneurs are the driving forces of economic development: The dynamic competition among entrepreneurs leads to innovation and destroys old equilibria by establishing new combinations. The process of such creative destruction brings about progress in productivity. In an earlier work (1999) this author has shown how varied ideas about dynamic interdependence between economic growth, market structure and knowledge can be integrated within a comprehensive analytical framework.

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IV. Education and Knowledge Confucian tradition believes in the existence of laws governing human life as well as nature. The Great Learning propounds the existence of law in everything: “If we wish to carry our knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the principles of all things we come into contact with, for the intelligent mind of man is certainly formed to know, and there is not a single thing in which its principles do not inhere. But as long as all principles are not investigated, man’s knowledge is incomplete.” This belief in the existence of rational laws may be what enabled Confucian civilization to accept with confidence (once social stability was guaranteed) modern mathematics, modern science and technology, and Western rational thought. Sciences have been universally accepted as “trustworthy explanations” of natural phenomena in the Confucian regions. There is no fixed concrete faith in Confucianism; but Confucius (7:17) advocated lifelong learning: “Learn as if you could not reach your object, and were always fearing also you should lose it.” According to Confucius, “The object of the superior man is truth. Food is not his object. There is ploughing — even in that there is sometimes want. So with learning; emolument may be found in it. The superior man is anxious lest he should not get truth; he is not anxious lest poverty should come upon him.” Confucius (15:39) promoted education for everyone: “There being instruction, there will be no distinction of classes.” Equal opportunity in education and determining social status by effort and by learning are the bases by which equality may be realized among men. Confucius established the first private school in China’s history. He did not advocate teaching without pay; but he did say (7:7), “From the man bringing his bundle of dried flesh for my teaching upwards, I have never refused instruction.” Since knowledge is useful in Confucian society and pupils will economically benefit from their education, teachers who conduct education independent of government should charge pupils. For Confucius (8:12), selfinterest is the basic motive for common people’s behavior: “It is not easy to find a man who has learned for three years without thinking of becoming an official.” Education is a key factor in building national strength and economic development. When Confucius (13:9) went to Wei, he observed, “How numerous are the people!” His disciple asked him what more should be done for the people. Confucius said: “Enrich them.” And what then? “Teach them.” Confucius (13:29-30) emphasized discipline: “Let a good man teach the people seven years, and they may then likewise employed in war. . . . To lead an uninstructed people to war is to throw them away.”

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College Attrition at American Research Universities According to Confucius (4:8), different subjects of learning play varied roles in the mind: “It is by the Odes that the mind is aroused. It is by the Rules of Propriety that the character is established. It is from Music that perfection is received.” According to Confucius, both learning and thinking are significant, for knowledge accumulation and problem solving; and a man must be able to apply what he has learned: “Learning without thought is labor lost; thought without learning is perilous,” and (13:5) “Though a man may be able to recite the three hundred Odes, yet if, when entrusted with a governmental charge, he knows not how to act, or if, when sent to any quarter on a mission, he cannot give his replies unassisted, notwithstanding the extent of his learning, of what practical use is it?” Confucianism is rational. To become human is to behave morally and to learn constantly. Birth, race, and wealth were not considered the key measures of human quality. Confucius, Mencius and Hsün Tzu were born into humble conditions; they had to learn many things just to survive. This may explain the Confucian attitudes towards human life and society. Social environment has a great impact, if it is not absolutely determining, on a man’s thought. In a deep sense, the ancient Greek culture had less democratic elements than ancient Confucianism, even though the former proposed a conception of democracy (distorted as it was, in today’s understanding). If one is born a prince, he may visualize the world in a monopolistic way, assuming social classes to be fixed and all others to be born to serve him; if one has always been served by slaves, one may not spontaneously “recognize” human equality by birth. In Confucianism, to be socially superior means to serve society in the superior way. Confucius (16:9) emphasized learning so much that he classified men according to knowledge: “Those who are born with the possession of knowledge are the highest class of men. Those who learn, and so readily get possession of knowledge, are the next. Those who learn after they meet with difficulties are another class next to these. As to those who meet with difficulties and yet do not learn — they are the lowest of the people.” And he explicitly stated that he never met anyone born with the possession of knowledge. For Confucius, nothing is so important in distinguishing men as learning through education, working, communication, or playing, because he claimed (17:2) that “By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be far apart.” One should seek the truth and endure the consequences. “If a man in the morning hear the right way,” Confucius (2:15) averred, “he may die in the evening without regret.” “If the scholar be not grave,” Confucius (1:8) argued, “he

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IV. Education and Knowledge will not call forth any veneration and his learning will not be solid. Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. Have no friends not equal to yourself. When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them.” Since he held that it is mainly learning that makes men different, it is reasonable (15:30) to constantly emphasize learning and improving: “To have faults and not to reform — this, indeed, should be pronounced having faults.” With regard to the relationship among learning, benevolence, knowledge, sincerity, straightforwardness, boldness, and firmness, Confucius (17:8) revealed: “There is the love of being benevolent without the love of learning — the beclouding here leads to a foolish simplicity. There is the love of knowing without the love of learning — the beclouding here leads to dissipation of mind. There is the love of being sincere without the love of learning — the beclouding here leads to an injurious disregard of consequences. There is the love of straightforwardness without the love of learning — the beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is the love of boldness without love of learning — the beclouding here leads to insubordination. There is the love of firmness without the loving of learning — the beclouding here leads to extravagant conduct.” To effectively employ knowledge, Mencius (8:8) suggested: “Those who keep the Mean, train up those who do not, and those who have abilities, train up those who have not, and hence men rejoice in having fathers and elder brothers who are possessed of virtue and talent. If they who keep the Mean spurn those who do not, and they who have abilities spurn those who have not, then the space between them — those so gifted and ungifted — will not admit an inch.” According to The Great Learning: “‘It is only the truly virtuous man who can love or who can hate others. To see men of worth and not able to raise them to office; to raise them to office, but not so quickly; — this is disrespect. To see bad men and not be able to remove them; to remove them, but not to do so to a distance: — this is weakness. To love those whom men hate, and to those whom men love: — this is to outrage the natural feeling of men. Calamities cannot fail to come down on him who does so.’ Thus, we see that the sovereign has a great course to pursue. He must show entire self-devotion and sincerity to attain it, and by pride and extravagance he will fail of it.” Hsün Tzu (1:1) said that learning should be conducted through selfexamination: “Learning must never be concluded. . . . In broadening his learning, the gentleman each day examines himself so that his awareness will be discerning and his actions without excess.” He recommended (1:8) that “Learning continues until death and only then does it stop. Thus, though the

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College Attrition at American Research Universities methods employed to learn come to a conclusion, the purpose of learning must never, even for an instant, be put aside. Those who undertake learning become men; those who neglect it become as wild beasts.” Hsün Tzu also (1:10) distinguished the attitudes towards learning between the gentleman and the small man: “In antiquity men undertook learning for the sake of selfimprovement; today people undertake learning for the sake of others. The learning of the gentleman is used to refine his character. The learning of the petty man is used like ceremonial offerings of birds and calves.” “When a man’s knowledge is sufficient to attain,” Confucius (15:33) portrayed, “and his virtue is not sufficient to enable him to hold, whatever he may have gained, he will lose again. When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has virtue enough to hold fast, if he cannot govern with dignity, the people will not respect him. When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has virtue enough to hold fast; when he governs also with dignity, yet if he try to move the people contrary to the rules of propriety — full excellence is not reached.” Confucius was neither an optimist nor pessimist. He had a good grasp of man’s limitation as a social being: “Alas! How is the path of the Mean untrodden!” KNOWLEDGE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES The people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it. Confucius (8:9)

The United States is an affluent society and the most powerful country in the world. Education, and science and technology have played the key roles in creating and maintaining its superpower position. Knowledge shaped the world more in the past century than ever before. The technological revolution has transformed the fundamental dimensions of time and space in human life. The productive capacity of the working hour and the spatial extent of social and economic interactions have been increasingly extended as consequences of new scientific discoveries and industrial innovations. New information technology and new organizational techniques have been used to transform parameters such as the speed and flexibility with which products are designed, manufactured and delivered to markets. Increased knowledge in and improved access to literature, the arts, and philosophy have transformed the sensibility of educated men and women alike. The great extent of knowledge and the ease of access to it have profoundly

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IV. Education and Knowledge changed the mechanisms of wealth creation, distribution, consumption, and savings. The main force for change, driven by various technologies, has affected societies throughout the world. Knowledge, and in particular scientific knowledge, has become a major instrument in the rivalry between social classes, races and countries. Current issues in regard to the new world order and world economic growth are closely related to the creation, diffusion and the utilization of knowledge under various cultural and social circumstances over time and space. A new level of complexity of economic dynamics is emerging. America’s history progresses in step with technology, as reflected in the way that American schoolchildren trace American progress through the Franklin stove, Whitney’s cotton gin, Fulton’s steamship, Edison’s electric light, and the Bell telephone. Americans have proved to be highly creative in mathematics, science, technology, medicine, art, literature, and fashion. It is noted that although many American inventors were actually immigrants (who might have been trained elsewhere), their potentials of creativity, entrepreneurial spirits, and “social values” might have been “maximized” only in the American cultural soil. Technology has made the United States the world’s leading producer and consumer. American scientists have won a majority of the Nobel Prizes awarded since World War II. Young Americans have a higher probability of getting a higher education than those of any other nation. American institutions of higher learning offer a great diversity to meet the needs of a vast heterogeneous student population. The United States is now different from what Tocqueville (1835:158) observed: “Anyone trying to find out how enlightened the Anglo-Americans are is liable to see the same phenomenon from two different angles. If his attention is concentrated on the learned, he will be astonished how few they are; but if he counts the uneducated, he will think the Americans the most enlightened people in the world.” He further observed (1835:25) that in the United States, the study of science is pursued in the same spirit as trade, and only matters of immediate and recognized practical application received attention. Knowledge was pursued not for the sake of knowledge, but for the sake of some specified and profitable objectives. This occurred, according to Tocqueville, because there were few rich families in America and everyone had to work at an early age. The Americans could afford to indulge in general education only in the earliest years, and then had to start to work, by the time when curiosity began to meet with intellectual maturity. When one had a taste for study, one had no means for the pursuit; when one had means and time for study, the taste had disappeared.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Tocqueville (1835:25) concluded: “So there is no class in America in which a taste for intellectual pleasures is transmitted with hereditary wealth and leisure and which holds the labors of the mind in esteem.” According to him, there was neither sufficient will nor enough power to engage the pursuit of true scholarship in America. All human knowledge was judged by some middling standard, which most human minds were able to approach. Kallen (1970:237-238) described American education in 1924, saying that it “aims not at truth, but at conformity. In the grade schools it is a regimentation of the mind; in the institutions of the higher learning it is directly a servant of the interests. . . . ‘America has a body and no soul,’ therefore many professors and no scholars.” According to Kallen, education was even worse than law in enabling people to have a fair mind. The immigrant, he suggests, is better treated now than years ago. “He migrates,” asserted Kallen (1970:236) in 1924, “to escape the oppression of the landlord at home only to come under the oppression of the industrialist abroad. He performs the hard and ‘dirty’ work of the country in mine and mill under impossible conditions. When he seeks to improve these conditions he is hounded and denounced. The phase ‘likely to become a public charge’ is held over his head and is used to compel his acquiescence in a condition no better than peonage, without right even to an opinion unacceptable to authority.” Kallen further pointed out that if the immigrant had become domiciled in the United States, he was fortunate if he was not categorized as a racial minority like the Oriental. If he was Oriental and showed any sign of power or competency in competition with the racial majority, he would be subjected to racial discrimination. The law had not been designed to correct racial prejudice. The sociologist C. Wright Mills published his classic, The Power Elite, in 1956 when Americans had won World War II more than a decade ago and the country was prosperous at home and influential abroad. At that time, it was commonly believed that the United States had become a relatively classless and pluralistic society and that power was relatively equally shared by the people through their political parties and public opinion. Mills challenged this view by examining the social backgrounds and career paths of the people in the highest positions in the corporations, the executive branch of the federal government, and the military. He found that almost all the members of this “power elite” were white Christian males, most coming from the upper third of the income and occupational pyramids. By 1978, Wilson argued that because the fate of Black Americans was increasingly determined by their level of education and their

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IV. Education and Knowledge work skills, class had come to be more important in their lives, and that race was not as important as it used to be. Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998) re-examined the issues raised by Mills and further studied the extent to which the power elite has been distributed among gender, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, and social class. They researched the social, educational, and occupational backgrounds of the leaders of the three major institutional hierarchies in postwar America — the corporations, the executive branch of the federal government, and the military. They found some general characteristics of the power elite as follows: (1) The power elite now exhibits considerable diversity in comparison to the 1950s; nevertheless, its core group is still wealthy white Christian males, filtered through a handful of elite schools. (2) High social origins provide a great advantage in obtaining the top position. (3) The newcomers to the power elite have shown that they are willing to adhere to the prevailing values structure and play the “traditional” game. (4) There are now Jews, women, Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans on the boards of the country’s largest corporations; presidential cabinets are very diverse, but women, Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans are still all underrepresented. It is observed that usually it takes at least three generations to rise from the bottom to the top in the United States. Actually, it is difficult to distinguish between race and class in American society. Race and class have tended to play varying roles in complex ways affecting different issues. Also, the interaction of race and class is important up and down the social ladder. As pointed out by Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1991:140), being White and poor had more positive consequences than being Black and poor. Nevertheless, within the middle ranges of corporations and government, a good education had a greater short-term payoff for a Black than for a White person. Lind (1996:1941) pointed out that the contemporary American White class benefits more than middle-class Black and Hispanic Americans from adopting the racial preference policies of multicultural America. SMITH’S AND CONFUCIUS’ IDEAL MAN One can deeply understand a civilization only when one examines the main thought systems that have strongly influenced its evolution. The most influential thinker in modern Western civilization is Adam Smith, while that in

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College Attrition at American Research Universities the Confucian regions is Confucius. Let’s compare what the two thinkers suggested would be the “model man.” Confucius and Smith hold similar viewpoints on fundamental issues about man and society, but the “manifestations” of their general principles are quite different. Smith was baptized on June 5, 1723 at Kirkcaldy, a few miles from Edinburgh, Scotland. Confucius was born in 551 BC in Shantung Province in mainland China. Smith lived in an age when his country was expanding domestically as well as internationally. Adventurous spirits tended to attract positive social consequences. At this time, wealth was being created through the expanding market for trans-Atlantic trade with North America and the Caribbean islands. Confucius lived in a period rent by ongoing wars. There was very little law and order save what each man could enforce by his own strength, his armed followers, or his powers of intrigue. These two great thinkers’ views on some fundamental issues related to man and society are compared in an earlier book by this author. Briefly, they have similar opinions about freedom of the mind, the ideal man and the common man, human relations, the ideal society (one with little government intervention), the great and the rich, the possible role of justice and propriety in maintaining a just society, passions and learning, and the influences of the social and intellectual environment on man. For instance, Confucius’ gentleman is almost identical with Smith’s superior prudent man, even though they employed different “arts of virtue.” Both gave the ideal man similar desirable qualities. The sentimental centers in Smith and Confucius’ moral philosophy are quite different. Smith focused on the nation, Confucius on the family. Both are rational thinkers but they differ when it comes to “practical choice”: the hero versus the gentleman-scholar; justice versus propriety as a way to maintain social order; education versus the doctrine of rectification of names; passions versus education and cultivation; looking to the rich and the great to maintain social order, versus moral examples; national economic growth and wealth accumulation versus the welfare of the people; popular arts for the common people’s happiness or as a tool for the moral education of the masses and means of cultivation and leisure for gentlemen; and privileging the youngest or the oldest members of the family. It is argued that their differences on practical choice are partially due to the fact that Smith and Confucius lived in very different social and economic environments; and, since our contemporary social and economic conditions are much different from what either Smith or Confucius experienced, it is reasonable

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IV. Education and Knowledge to see that their “practical preferences” or “situational judgments” are rarely relevant for modern societies. But their common ideas about the ideal man, the desirable reciprocity in human life, and ideal society have had and will continue to have lasting impacts on the two, Western and Confucian, rational civilizations. Neither Smith nor Confucius thought that there is a universal objective standard that is applicable under all circumstances for different people. Smith noticed multiple standards even within the same mind, not to mention in different minds. He argued (1759:26): “When we are determining the degree of blame or applause which seems due to any action, we very frequently make use of two different standards. The first is the idea of complete propriety and perfection, which. . . no human conduct ever did, or ever can come up to . . . The second is the idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfection, which the actions of the greater part of men commonly arrive at.” In his ethical doctrines Confucius also accepted multiple standards, but in a way different from Smith. In Li Ki, Confucius represented his double standards as follows: “The superior man reasons about theoretical principles from the standpoint of himself, but lays down practical laws from the capacities of the people.” Confucius appreciated neither universal love without distinction, nor egoism. Confucian love is based on human nature and is valued for propriety. Smith held almost the same attitude. According to Confucius, love’s manifestations exhibit a hierarchical structure. Love starts from its (theoretically) most intimate and stable basis — love of one’s parents and the rest of the members of the family. As far as “sympathy” is concerned, Smith (1759:219) recognized a similar hierarchy: “After himself, the members of his own family. . . are naturally the objects of his warmest affections . . . He knows better how every thing is likely affect them, and his sympathy with them is more precise and determinate, than it can be with the greater part of other people.” Confucian tradition and Smith (1759: 138-9) both suggest that love should be cultivated with different degrees of intensity. As far as universal love, Confucius held that only the gentleman is capable of such a sentiment, and Smith rationalized the concentration of affection on specific people as follows: “When the happiness or misery of others, indeed, in no respect depends upon our conduct, . . . we do not always think it so necessary to restrain, either our natural and, perhaps, improper anxiety about our own affairs, or our natural and, perhaps, equally improper indifference about those of other men.”

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Both emphasized emotion in their moral thinking. However, their emphases of sympathy towards family and the country are quite different. For Confucius, filial piety is reciprocal in the sense that parents take care of their children with love and children sincerely respect parents; upon reaching old age, parents will be well taken cared for; and when they pass away, their children should bury them in the proper and respectful way. In comparison to Confucian tradition, Smith’s privilege of sympathy is concentrated on the country. Smith (1759: 227) argued: “The state or sovereignty in which we have been born and educated, and under the protection of which we continue to live, is, in ordinary cases, the greatest society upon whose happiness or misery, our good or bad conduct can have much influence. It is accordingly, by nature, most strongly recommended to us.” Moreover, in contrast to Confucius, Smith (1759: 219) emphasized natural passions towards one’s children rather than one’s parents: “In the eye of nature, it would seem, a child is a more important object than an old man; and excites a much more lively, as well as a much more universal sympathy. It ought to do so. Every thing may be expected, or at least hoped, from the child . . . It is only to the virtuous and humane, that the infirmities of old age are not the objects of contempt and aversion.” Perhaps because he was well aware of the weakness of natural passion towards one’s own parents, Confucius recognized the limitations of natural passions for enforcing filial piety. He said: “The filial piety of nowadays means the support of one’s parents. But dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of support; — without reverence, what is there to distinguish the one support from the other?” Smith was unmarried, while Confucius was married and had children, so that one might have thought that it was Confucius who was in a position to more properly appreciate natural passions for children. It seems likely that Confucius emphasized the somewhat less natural filial piety mainly due to social and economic considerations, rather than natural inclination. As mentioned before, Confucius lived in an age of wars and social chaos. Older persons had no security at all if their children did not take care of them. To strengthen filial piety is a way to increase security for the aged. Even when he emphasized the hierarchy of natural passions, Smith did not deny that in reality what often matters is habitual sympathy; and habitual sympathy would display varied forms when socioeconomic conditions change. Smith (1759: 222-3) argued: “In pastoral countries, and in all countries where the

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IV. Education and Knowledge authority of law is not alone sufficient to give perfect security to every member of the state, all the different branches of the same family commonly choose to live in the neighbourhood of one another. Their association is frequently necessary for their common defence. They are all, from the highest to the lowest, of more or less importance to one another . . . In commercial countries, where the authority of law is always perfectly sufficient to protect the meanest man in the state, the descendants of the same family, having no such motive for keeping together, naturally separate and disperse, as interest or inclination may direct.” From Smith’s above arguments we see why the pre-industrialist Smith and the farmer Confucius proposed different centers of sympathy with regard to one’s parents and children. Both Smith and Confucius greatly appreciated the freedom to feel and think without any constraints. Confucius referred to two forms of the ideal life: the sage (Sheng Jen) and the gentleman (Chun-tzu). The sage is the highest stage of the ideal life. Confucius did not talk much about the sage, perhaps because the ideal is too high even for Confucius himself to be clear. He introduced the intermediate man, the gentleman, between a common man and the sage as the goal for human beings. He dealt extensively with the qualities of the gentleman. The essential metaphor of the moral character of the Analects is the gentleman. Similarly, Smith did not clearly formulate his ideal man; he dealt extensively with the “superior prudent” man. Smith held that it is always possible that the wisest and firmest man’s sympathy, not to mention that of common people, may deviate from that of the impartial spectator. Smith (1759: 148) deemed that “His [the wisest and firmest man’s] own natural feeling of his own distress, his own natural view of his own situation, presses hard upon him, and he cannot, without a very great effort, fix his attention upon that of the impartial spectator,” so that the most perfect man was still not in perfect harmony with the impartial spectator. We now compare Smith’s superior prudent man and Confucius’ gentleman. With regard to what goals a wise and virtuous man should aim for in his life, Smith (1759: 247) asserted that “The wise and virtuous man directs his principal attention to the first standard; the idea of exact propriety and perfection. There exists in the mind of every man, an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his observations upon the character and conduct both of himself and of other people.” Confucius recommended we “Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles, and be moving continually to what is right; — this is the way to exalt one’s virtue.” For Smith, a basic characteristic of the prudent

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College Attrition at American Research Universities man was to study with sincerity. He said (1759: 213): “The prudent man always studies seriously and earnestly to understand whatever he possesses to understand, and not merely to persuade other people that he understands it.” And that characteristic is common in all Confucian schools. Smith’s prudent man does not use deception for personal gain. The Confucian doctrine of the rectification of the names basically illustrates what Smith meant. Smith’s ideal man does not look down on people who are below him, because he knows himself. Confucius suggested that people, whether they are common men or gentlemen, should try to improve themselves by learning from others. Even when a man observes that someone has some shortcomings, he should examine himself within rather than looking down on the other. Confucius never despised anybody because of his social status or birth or economic condition. Smith held that the prudent man is capable of friendship but may not be “social.” “The prudent man,” as Smith (1759: 214) described him, “though not always distinguished by the most exquisite sensibility, is always very capable of friendship . . . He is not always much disposed to general sociality.” Confucius’ principle for friendship is to build it on basis of equality, with faithfulness and sincerity: “Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. Have no friends not equal to yourself.” It may be said that one elementary factor determining a nation’s economic development is its population’s attitude towards work and savings. Both Smith and Confucius greatly admired hard work and frugality. In this, the two thinkers had significant influence on the West and the Confucian regions. Smith and Confucius held that the gentleman is devoted to performing his duty. This does not mean that the gentleman takes on every social responsibility. “The prudent man,” as Smith (1759: 215-216) depicted him, “is not willing to subject himself to any responsibility which his duty does not impose upon him . . . In the bottom of his heart he would prefer the undisturbed enjoyment of secure tranquillity, not only to all the vain splendour of successful ambition, but to the real and solid glory of performing the greatest and most magnanimous actions.” Confucius did not say that the gentleman would find pleasure in carrying out his social responsibilities. His gentleman enjoys mountains, water, poetry and music. He said: “Let the will be set on the path of duty. Let every attainment in what is good be firmly grasped. Let perfect virtue be accorded with. Let relaxation and enjoyment be found in the polite arts.”

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IV. Education and Knowledge For Smith, prudence alone is not sufficient for a man to become superior. He must cultivate many desirable characteristics. In summary, his prudent man: “is the best head joined to the best heart. It is the most perfect wisdom combined with the most perfect virtue” (1759: 216). Similarly, Confucius’ gentleman possesses multiple desirable qualities. In fact, Confucius’ gentleman is a symbolic man who possesses almost imaginary good characteristics. The gentleman should cultivate himself and provide happiness to others. He follows what is natural and right and obeys the ordinances of Heaven. He is social but does not join in clubs for special purposes. He lives a simple, frugal and virtuous life rather than being covetous of money or power. He is peaceful and quiet. He is careful and slow in speech but earnest and quick in action. He studies extensively but always keeps himself under the restraint of virtue. He practices earnestly what he has learned and is constantly seeking good sources of knowledge. Knowledge is to be applied to practical conduct, not used for empty talk and decoration. If he finds the truth, then no matter what conditions he lives in, he should be satisfied. In summary, Smith and Confucius’ perfect men are not supposed to be found in reality; they are models to be used in discussing moral issues. The conceptions of the prudent man in Smith’s moral philosophy and that of the gentleman in Confucius’ are like the mathematical conception of the positive infinite in one-dimensional space: no one knows where it is, even though the mathematician is convinced of its direction and usefulness. The mathematical conception is the consequence of man’s intelligence. The conception is useful, even though it may or may not exist in reality. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND WAYS OF LEARNING My originality . . . is . . . an originality that belongs to the soil, not the seed. . . . Sow a seed in my soil, & it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. Wittgenstein (1998:42)

Anyone who has lived in East Asia (Singapore, for instance) and a Western country (Germany, for instance) could hardly miss observing that Western people enjoy much more leisure than East Asians; but labor productivity (measured in product per unit of work time) in the West is higher than in East Asia. Parents of East Asian students are proud of their sons and daughters for

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College Attrition at American Research Universities studying hard and achieving high exam grades almost without any leisure time. Nevertheless, the net result of East Asia’s learning systems may not be so desirable in comparison to those in the West. If productivity is related to education and learning efficiency (as well as other factors), the East Asians might be twitted for low efficiency in turning knowledge into productivity. One might wonder how people with more leisure — not to an exceeding degree — can be more productive than people who spend their life either in the classroom or in work place. One may also ask whether this difference is due to differences in nature — some kind of racial differentiation — or the learning environment (or simply a stage of economic development at the national scale). As argued below, traditional economics cannot properly answer this question because it treats leisure simply as a source of satisfaction, neglecting to consider it as a way of learning. A young man born into rich family may not need much time for formal education in order to be successful in some fields, such as sales, management, and so on — because he might have mastered the necessary skills through his leisure activities. In particular, as the share of services in the gross national product has continuously increased, know-how acquired through leisure tends to become more useful in economic production. The importance of leisure for an affluent society has been well recognized, even though contemporary economists fail to properly analyze its impact. As Reilly (1974) has pointed out: “It is paradoxical that when man through scientific knowledge has become too efficient in securing with little effort his basic necessities of life, he becomes deadly serious and looks nostalgically at the creative centuries of the past when he still had time and detachment for play and creativity. In this paradox lies the secret of understanding the crisis of Western civilization.” In Essays in Persuasion, Keynes recognized that “for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his . . . permanent problem — how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely and agreeably and well” (Galbraith, 1972:339). In my latest book, I introduced leisure into economic growth theory to provide some insights into the dilemma of leisure and study in contemporary knowledge-based economies (Zhang, 2002a). The theoretical results are important for understanding why countries emphasize different ways of learning. Arguably, at each stage of economic development there may be correspondingly effective means of human capital accumulation. For instance, if

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IV. Education and Knowledge the educational systems of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong had been infused with individualism comparable to European and American individualism, in their initial periods of industrialization, East Asia might not have been able to achieve any economic miracle. On the other hand, if these same countries now fail to adapt their educational systems in order to meet the needs of knowledge-based globalizing economies, development of these economies might not be sustainable.“The growth of mankind,” argued Marshall (1890), “in number, in health and strength, in knowledge, ability, and in richness of character is the end of all our studies.” We observe that human capital may be accumulated through different kinds of human activities and each type of civilization requires a specific form of human capital. In traditional China and the cities of Greece and Rome, education trained the individual to subordinate himself to the collective interests and to become a “fixed” element rather than an autonomous personality in society. Athenian education (intended for the wealthy, not the workers) strove to produce cultivated souls capable of enjoying beauty and the joys of pure speculation. Rome’s educational purpose was to guide children to become men of action, devoted to military glory, indifferent to letters and the arts. In the Middle Ages in Europe, education was all Christian. In modern times, the sciences assume the key place in education. When an economy is industrializing (which should mean taking off from poverty), creative leisure may harm economic growth; while, when the same economy has become highly industrialized, a “proper” increase in creative leisure may benefit the national economy. This implies that it might be reasonable for newly industrialized economies like Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to increase creative leisure in order to sustain economic development. On the contrary, for undeveloped economies such as mainland China (in which “creative leisure” may not effectively grow human capital), increased investment of time and natural resources on education may speed up economic growth. As people become rich and educated and the economy is entering a knowledge-based phase, leisure tends to play an increasingly important role in economic development, as well as adding enjoyment to life. Well-spent leisure can help the labor force develop the following requisite qualities described by Marshall (1890): “To be able to bear in mind many things at a time, to have everything ready when wanted, to act promptly and show resource when anything goes wrong, to accommodate oneself quickly to changes in detail of the work done, to be ready and trustworthy, to have always a reserve of force which will come out in emergency, these are the qualities which make a great industrial

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College Attrition at American Research Universities people. They are not peculiar to any occupations, but are wanted in all.” We hold that, properly used, leisure enables people to accumulate (some aspects of) human capital. In fact, leisure has never been so socially justified in human history as in contemporary industrialized economies. Irrespective of the oft proclaimed decline in the so-called Protestant work ethic, the Western world is economically effective and rich. How can contemporary post-industrial economies be created and maintained by men and women who spend great sums of energies, money and time at play? What is the relationship between economic development and leisure? Will the so-called traditional Asian (Confucian, for instance) values decline in a similar way to the Protestant ethic when East Asian industrial economies become knowledge-based economies? In an earlier work (Zhang, 2001) we presented “Zhang’s Model,” an original model that takes into account three sources of human capital accumulation — learning by producing, learning through education, and learning through leisure — within a single analytical framework. It is argued that production, education and play may perform varied roles in human capital accumulation at different stages of economic development. Although one may play for purposes other than economic (after all, playing has its own purposes or values), great amounts of creative leisure can hardly be sustainable in the long term if it has only a negative impact on economic development. Technology has constantly expanded the vistas of what leisure can offer to us by creating new products and recreational opportunities — with its abundance of complex commodities and services, modern technological society has provided more informal learning opportunities. One has to constantly update one’s knowledge to be a part of the sophisticated and complex human networks and to constantly improve one’s ability to handle complex machines. Moreover, rapid industrialization has broadened the roles of leisure, so that how we spend it has become more central to our self-concept, health, learning, and our economic and spiritual well-being. The pursuit of a “modern” life requires an approach to life that fully integrates working, learning, and playing. For the purposes of the current discussion, we use the term “education” only to refer to “formal education” such as in schools, universities, and other educational institutions. We use the words “play,” “recreation,” and “leisure” interchangeably, even though they may have distinctly different meanings. (“Playing” mainly refers to the leisure activities of individuals. Leisure may include activities like sports, games, travels, or cultural activities that can be

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IV. Education and Knowledge enjoyed along with a few, or a few thousand, other participants or spectators, or may be an intensely solitary experience.) In traditional societies learning is usually conducted through education or training in formal or informal institutions. As societies have increasingly become economically enriched and socially complicated and the playing of “sophisticated games” is no longer a luxury limited to the few, learning through playing may become far more important for social and economic survival than commonly has been recognized. We will not explain the theoretical model in detail, here, because of its technical complexity, but we can discuss some of the insights that may be derived from it. The model shows that in the initial stage of industrialization, when learning-by-producing or (learning by doing) tends to be an effective way to increase the value of the human part of the production equation (“human capital accumulation”), government investment in human capital (except in providing elementary education to every citizen) may not be economically desirable. Possibly the greatest concern of the governments of East Asian economies such as Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China is related to economic growth rates, at least during the initial stages of their rapid industrialization. When the economy has become industrialized and the efficiency of human capital can be increased better through education than through learning by producing, it might be effective for governments to increase its investment in (higher and technical) education. But when the government raises the tax rate in order to expand the education sector, the growth rate may be either increased or reduced due to trade-offs between the various effects on output (less time spent in learning by producing, never mind less time spent actually producing; the relative success of the education sector; and learning through playing). When taxes go up, the labor and capital employed by the production sector will be reduced. Hence, industrial output (which can be used either for consumption or saving) is reduced and at the same time the contribution to human capital growth (which is related to production through learning by doing, education, and “creative leisure”) due to saving is reduced. On the other hand, since the education sector has more money, it employs more teachers and builds more classrooms, and uses more computers and books, which tends to speed up economic growth. But increasing the contribution to economic growth by increasing the investment in education may reduce the possibility of learning by playing, which might have a negative effect on the growth rate. The net effect of such policy changes would be hard to estimate, and would vary depending on the stage and nature of the progressing industrialization.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities If we are concerned with an economy at the initial stage of industrialization, it might be reasonable to assume that human capital accumulation through learning by leisure is negligible. In this case, growth is due to physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation through learning by producing and through learning by education. We may thus argue that if a growth-oriented economy does not have an effective education system at the initial stage of industrialization and it is relatively effective in learning by producing, the economy will grow fastest if the government invests in education as little as possible. As industrialization becomes more advanced and the education sector’s efficiency is improved (for instance, due to the influence of students returned from more advanced countries), the growth rate is sped up if the government increases investment in education. The industrial regions in East Asia have given enthusiastic allegiance to the so-called Confucian values of education, frugality, and hard work. In traditional Confucian education, homogeneity is emphasized in order to maintain order in society. Through education, homogeneity is perpetuated and reinforced by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands. It has been argued that these values have played a positive role for rapid industrialization and widespread education in these regions. The education style in the Confucian regions has often been criticized for not allowing students any time for play and for not stimulating creativity and curiosity. In fact, the requirements of uniformity and learning are emphasized, and this results in the development of the discipline to recognize brilliant new ideas and apply them to down-to-earth applications. In the initial stage of industrialization, diligence and textbook learning can provide payoffs at a stage of national development that precedes the ability for technological innovation. Studying hard and recognizing the primary importance of education are the basic factors for the successes of the East Asian economic miracles. Without “overworked” children and “overly-conformist” adults, the industrialization might not have been carried out so rapidly. The economic history of these regions shows that education with little play can be a very effective way to achieve economic take off. As these economies have become more knowledge-oriented and flexible, they now can further improve and transform the human capital structures of labor in order to meet the need of a knowledge-based global economy. It can be recognized intuitively that an economy may not benefit if its population spends too many resources on formal education. Rather, we argue

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IV. Education and Knowledge that due to the need for new types of workers (as well as consumers), leisure is playing an increasing role in sustainable economic development. As people in industrial economies have become rich and highly educated, their leisure times tend to be spent on healthy and more knowledge-related activities. This means that their leisure activities might play an increasingly positive role in human capital accumulation. This further implies that increases in knowledge through playing would reduce the (relative) importance of formal education. Moreover, as formal education has become more expensive, the relative return from education tends to decline (with other factors fixed). It might thus benefit the nation economically if some of the education time is switched to leisure time. Zhang’s theoretical model explains under what conditions this occurs. Jung (1989: 63) once argued: “Not the artist alone, but every creative individual whatsoever owes all that is greatest in his life to fantasy. The dynamic principle of fantasy is play, a characteristic also of the child, and as such it appears inconsistent with the principle of serious work. But without this playing with fantasy no creative work has every yet come to birth. . . . It is therefore short-sighted to treat fantasy, on account of risky or unacceptable nature, as a thing of little worth. It must not be forgotten that it is just in the imagination that a man’s highest value may lie. I say ‘may’ advisedly, because on the other hand fantasies are also valueless, since in the form of raw material they possess no realizable worth. In order to unearth the treasures they contain they must be developed a stage further. But this development is not achieved by a simple analysis of the fantasy material; a synthesis is also needed by means of a constructive method.” “Play” is necessary for the young generation of Singaporeans, if Singapore to fully join high civilization, although it is worth noting Jung’s contention that a “fantasy-focused” culture may be unable to create any realizable worth. If the time spent on education is reduced, while leisure is increased, the corresponding loss and gain in human capital growth are difficult to calibrate in order to produce a positive net result. However, if no improvements in scale can be effected in the development of human capital by devoting more time to producing or to formal learning, then in the long run it would benefit individuals as well as the national economy if students had more leisure time. The right balance at any given time would be variable. We conclude that when the economy is highly industrialized (which makes people more effective in accumulating human capital through playing) and there is no activity that can drive the system dramatically to change, then it is possible for the economic

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College Attrition at American Research Universities system to perform better by increasing leisure time and reducing formal education time. The model explains the economic reasons of the dynamic manpower policy of some advanced economies. For instance, the Singapore government is currently emphasizing not only the traditional strategy of developing science and technology but also introducing a new strategy of “cultural development” (Zhang, 2002). It seems that Chinese individuals enriched and educated in Singapore are starting to appreciate what Plato advised in The Republic: “Let early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.” Indeed, if learning is “an inferior economic activity,” then the “leisure class” would not commit its heart to lifelong learning. Once again, we should mention the conditions under which Plato and Confucius established their “education models.” For Plato, education was for the rich with leisure; for Confucius education was for everyone (specially the poor, who had no access to “creative leisure”). Nevertheless, Confucius would completely agree with what Plato advised, for he said (Confucius 6:20): “They who know the truth are not equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to those who find pleasure in it.”

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V. ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND DEVELOPMENT Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them. This is a principle universally recognized. Mencius (5:4)

In contrast to Karl Marx, Hegel (1770-1831) held that socioeconomic development is determined by “spirit” (Hegel, 1977, 1991). According to this view, difference in religions and ideologies would lead to different developmental performance. Sharing that opinion, Max Weber (1864-1920) examined the role of culture on industrialization in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904). He argued that capitalism requires both an instinct toward self-aggrandizement and a willingness to channel that instinct into constructive values such as diligent toil at one’s calling, self denial in the private use of capital, investment, sober economic calculation, efficiency, frugality, and scrupulous adherence to contracts. Weber believed that Protestantism was crucial to the development of a climate in which these and other values intrinsic to capitalism could develop. In the spirit of ideological determinism, Weber claimed a deterministic link between the Protestant ethic and Western capitalism. He thus failed to recognize the possibility of a rapid industrialization of non-Western cultures. For instance, he argued that Confucianism stood in the way of modernization like that which had been initiated in Western Europe (Weber, 1905, 1951). The modern history of East Asia challenges that view (e.g., Morishima, 1982, Tu, 1996, Zhang, 1999).

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Even since colonial times, American civil self-identification has been characterized by the dignity of work and of personal achievement, and the contempt for aristocratic idleness (Shklar, 1995). To have the opportunity to work and to be paid properly for one’s work is a social right. American tradition has emphasized this not only because it provided the United States a social symbol to distinguish itself from the corrupt European past, but also because it identified one as a free man rather than slave. From the beginning, America was predominantly Protestant. Many of its business leaders have attributed their economic success to the Protestant ethic in Weber’s terms (McClosky and Zaller, 1984:104). Protestantism was haunted by a fear of man’s sinfulness and the need to enforce strict moral codes that would tame man’s unlimited desires and passions. “The Protestant ethic as a way of life,” illustrated Bell (1996:289), “then, was one of piety, frugality, discipline, prudence, the strenuous devotion to work, and delayed gratification.” Its staunch moralistic orientation, the fear of the Dionysian spirit, and the insistence on subjecting human feelings and passions to rational control have had a lasting impact on American culture. It valued order, strict adherence to principle, and the importance of willpower and self-restraint, and was hostile against unchecked emotion, spontaneity, and playfulness. To work to earn a livelihood was viewed as pleasing to God; work was regarded as a vital component of morality. A virtuous life is characterized by hard work, sobriety, and thriftiness. According to Protestantism, one’s economic achievements could be used as a symbol of one’s moral standing. Artisans, merchants, and entrepreneurs were encouraged to amass large stores of wealth from the zeal and diligence of industry. The Protestants valued wealth not for the pleasures derived from holding it but as evidence of the arduous effort experienced in acquiring it. This process was admired, as it would tame passions, keep one occupied and insulated from immoral temptations, and instill good habits. “There is a combination of virtues,” Cotton (Miller, 1963:42) remarked, “strangely mixed in every lively holy Christian. And that is, Diligence in worldly businesses, and yet deadness to the world; such a mystery as none can read, but they know it.” Weber characterized this admonition to worldly success and stolidity as a doctrine of worldly or active asceticism. The Protestant perspective on the pursuit of wealth had important secular implications for the early stages of industrialization. To work hard and to save as much as possible was a way to stimulate economic growth. The emphasis on fulfillment of one’s contractual duties and obligations and prudence in personal conduct and

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V. Economic Freedom and Development business affairs helped the society to maintain social and economic order and reduce transaction costs among various actors of the economy. The encouragement to channel one’s energies into a form of disciplined economic endeavor played an important role in improving productivity and increasing efficiency of economic performance. Social phenomena seem to be connected in such a way that a one-direction cause-effect analysis may not be enough to change one’s mind if one perceives the phenotype in opposite terms. In this work we argue that the rise of capitalism might not be fully be explained by the Protestant Reformation. There were many other factors. For instance, Tawney (1954) argued that the development of a new social and economic vision among the growing merchant classes had played a key role in the development of capitalism. He held that these merchants exerted a strong influence on the new Protestant churches through their great wealth. They “encouraged” the congregations and ministers to adopt views in which wealth came to be regarded as a divine reward and poverty as a sign of moral delinquency. Rather than proving whether Protestantism determined the development of capitalism or the merchants determined the manifestations of Protestantism, we hold that there were positive interactions between the new Protestant churches and the emerging merchant class. ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to be ashamed of. Confucius (8:13)

The United States is rich in natural resources. Its size and natural resources are important reasons for its rapid economic expansion since the 19th century. American traditions of pragmatism, hard work, and individualism encourage a belief that all things are possible. These traits have been attributed to the influence of Protestant religions (the Protestant work ethic) and the pioneer spirit of early settlers. There have been few restrictions on business ventures. Laissez-faire economic principles dominate. The market mechanism has enabled people to freely pursue their own interests. “The Present-day American republic,” Tocqueville (1835:149) mused, “[is] like companies of

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College Attrition at American Research Universities merchants formed to exploit the empty lands of the New World, and prosperous commerce is their occupation.” He also observed that wealth accumulation was the fundamental motivation of American behavior, mentioning that he had seen no other country that showed such a deep love of money and such a strong scorn for the idea of equality of property. Early Americans were restless and enterprising immigrants largely emanating from the poorer rural and urban classes in Europe. These newcomers had a pragmatic and open mind; the frontier mind was not limited by scarcity of resources or fixed ideas. We would argue that any society with such a relation between population and resource would show a similar love of economic freedom and would cultivate similar virtues. “American economic individualism, American traditional laissez-faire policy,” Kallen (1970:80) explained, “is largely the effect of environment; where nature offers more than enough potential wealth to go round, there is no immediate need for regulating distribution. What poverty and unemployment exist in the United States is the result of unskilled and wasteful social housekeeping, not of any actual natural barrenness. And until the disparity between the economic resources and the population of the United States become equalized, so that the country will attain an approximate economic equilibrium, this is likely to continue to be the case.” American optimism was formed in association with American individualism and other frontier virtues. The founders of the United States advocated individual liberty in all fields. Adam Smith, who argued that resources would be efficiently allocated if citizens pursue their own self-interest and profit-making activities, influenced their philosophy on economic freedom. Wealth is a significant social symbol for success in the American society and is seen as the protector of one’s future. According to Mauk and Oakland (1997), the American civilization may be characterized by three major cultures, which may conflict with each other and operate on levels of idealism or pragmatism. The ethnic culture is built on Native-American civilization, Black slavery, and immigration, which express human diversity. The political culture unites the people under American ideals such as egalitarianism, morality, and patriotism. The economic and consumer culture is driven by corporate and individual competition and encourages the consumption of goods and services. American capitalism rewards individuals with imagination, talent, and industriousness and encourages accumulation of material wealth. The economic and consumer culture is materialistic and practical. Contemporary Americans generally believe in consumption of goods

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V. Economic Freedom and Development and services as a social virtue. Conspicuous consumption is generally encouraged. According to Hughes and Cain (1998:521), we can identify a few principal elements that have sustained the United States’ economic growth. From the beginning, the combination of available arable land and other resources, and an able population, gave Americans a history of unprecedented overall economic growth. Those favorable conditions created a built-in optimism about the future: Commonly, Americans believe that by working hard they will build a good life for themselves. They expect economic advancement. Democratic tradition makes it possible to remove any politician from office if he fails to deliver the economic goods. American optimism has been maintained or even accelerated by social mobility. The United States inherited no identifiable system of class barriers. The founders discouraged giving the “appearance of nobility” and attempted to release the energies of a whole people. People born into poverty dream about getting rich through their own efforts, and society encourages them to make these dreams come true. Money is practically the sole measure of social achievement. This cultural “crassitude” has played a positive role in economic progress. Moreover, a public education system accessible to everybody has put self-improvement theoretically within the reach of every American child. Americans historically have believed in self-reliance and independence. Social services, for instance, have been largely seen as personal matters and the responsibility of the family or individual, rather than of state or federal institutions. Although it has been argued that the provision of essential social services for all should be a national responsibility, of all the major developed economies the United States has consistently been the most conservative about social welfare policy. Americans are sympathetic toward the poor; but the American public does not much like welfare and does not want social policy to be wasteful — and it is generally held that welfare programs tend to reward, support, or encourage indolence or immoral behavior. American society is always ready to accept new ideas and new practices. It is part of American life to consume new products, to enjoy new services, to see whole towns completely or partially abandoned, and to experience the expansion and disappearance of firms. American culture is characterized by a deep love of the new, which leads to instability and change. Nevertheless, instability does not necessarily lead to destruction of the system, as shown by modern nonlinear theory. The endowment of secure

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College Attrition at American Research Universities property rights and traditional respect for the law of contract are the essential instruments for economic progress of a market economy. The United States has a stable legal framework under which people can feel confident in making private estimates of future values; this trust adds motivation to all contractual agreements designed to yield a future return. Irrespective of its short-run chaos and unpredictability, American popular democracy provides long-term political stability in the country. The political stability secures investment and encourages economic growth. MINIMUM GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN CONFUCIANISM Let the people be employed in the way which is tended to secure their ease, and though they be toiled, they will not murmur. Mencius (13:13)

Confucius (7:12) depicted his attitude towards earning a living through work as follows: “If the search for riches is sure to be successful, though I should become a gatekeeper with whip in hand to get them, I will do so. As the search may not be successful, I will follow after that which I love.” Wealth is valuable only if it is obtained by the proper way. Confucius (4:5) said: “Riches and honors are what men desire. If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held. Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be avoided.” And, again, “With coarse rice to eat,” Confucius (7:16) said, “with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow — I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness are to me as a floating cloud.” When asked what was shameful, Confucius (14:1) replied: “When good government prevails in a state, to be thinking only of his salary; and, when bad government prevails, to be thinking, in the same way, only of his salary, this is shameful.” As was demonstrated in an earlier work (Zhang, 2000), Confucius is far more positive about the social and moral implications of wealth than Adam Smith. Confucianism’s view of the relation between wealth and virtue is described in The Great Learning: “Virtue is the root; wealth is the result. If he make the root his secondary object, and the result his primary, he will only wrangle with his people, and teach them rapine. Hence, the accumulation of wealth is the way to scatter the people; and the letting it be scattered among them is the way to collect the people.” To properly govern a state, “there must be reverent attention to

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V. Economic Freedom and Development business, and sincerity; economy in expenditure, and love for men; and the employment of the people at the proper time.” For society to operate effectively, there should be division of labor. The division is based on one’s contribution. “Getting those various articles in exchange for grain,” reasoned Mencius (5:4), “is not oppressive to the potter and the founder, and the potter and the founder in their turn, in exchanging their various articles for grain, are not oppressive to the husbandman. . . . Great men have their proper business, and little men have their proper business. Moreover, in the case of any single individual, whatever articles he can require are ready to his hand, being produced by the various handicraftsmen. If he must first make them for his own use, this way of doing would keep the whole empire running about upon the roads. Hence, there is the saying, ‘Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength. Those who labor with their minds govern others; those who labor with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them.’ This is a principle universally recognized.” In Confucian tradition, the economic welfare of the people is the indicator of the goodness of government. “It never has been,” Mencius (1:7) claimed, “that the rulers of a state where such results were seen — the old wearing silk and eating flesh, and the black-haired people suffering neither from hunger nor cold — did not attain to the Imperial dignity.” According to him (1:3), “The condition in which the people nourish their living and bury their dead without any feeling against any, is the first step of Royal Government.” He (3:5) reasoned that a reign could attain the imperial dignity by practicing a policy of liberty: “If a ruler give honor to men of talents and virtue and employ the able, so that offices shall all be filled by individuals of distinction and mark; — then all the scholars of the empire will be pleased, and wish to stand in his court. If, in the market place of his capital, he levies a ground rent on the shops but does not tax the goods, or enforces the proper regulations without levying a ground rent, — then all the traders of the empire will be pleased, and wish to store their goods in his market place. If, at his frontier passes, there be an inspection of persons, but no taxes charged on goods or other articles, then all the travelers of the empire will be pleasured, and wish to make their tours on his roads. If he requires that the husbandmen give their mutual aid to cultivate the public field, and erect no other taxes from them — then all the husbandmen of the empire will be pleased, and wish to plough in his fields. If from the occupations of the shops in his market place, he does not exact the fine of the individual idler, or of the hamlet’s

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College Attrition at American Research Universities quota of cloth, then all the people of the empire will be pleasured, and wish to come and be his people. If a ruler can truly practice these five things, then the people in the neighboring kingdoms will look up to him as a parent. From the first birth of mankind till now, never has any one led children to attack their parent. Thus such a ruler will not have an enemy in all the empire, and he who has no enemy in the empire is the minister of Heaven. Never has there been a ruler in such a case who did not attain to the Imperial dignity.” In Confucian tradition, a benevolent government minimizes its intervention in people’s business, and an ideal government is one such that that people are not aware of its existence. Confucius (8:18) proclaimed: “How majestic was the manner in which Shun and Yu held possession of the empire, as if it were nothing to them!” People should not be interfered with in their pursuit of selfinterest. As related in Chapter 3, Mencius (1:5) observed that the benevolent ruler allows the people to prosper, and thus earns their loyalty and support. “If your Majesty will indeed . . . [be] sparing in the use of punishments and fines, and making the taxes and levies light, so causing that the fields shall be ploughed deep, and the weeding of them be carefully attended to, and that the strongbodied, during their days of leisure, shall cultivate their filial piety, fraternal respectfulness, sincerity and trustfulness, serving thereby, at home, their fathers and elder brothers, and, abroad, their elders and superiors — you will then have a people who can be employed. . . ” Mencius (13:26) warned against the extreme poles (which would include socialism and capitalism): “The principle of the philosopher Yang was — ‘Each one for himself.’ Though he might have benefited the whole empire by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it. The philosopher Mo loves all equally. If by rubbing smooth his whole body from the crown to the heel, he would have benefited the empire, he would have done it. Zimo holds a medium between these. By holding that medium, he is nearer the right. But by holding it without leaving room for the exigency of circumstances, it becomes like their holding their one point. The reason why I abhor that holding to one point is the injury it does to the way of right principle. It takes up one point and disregards a hundred others.” Hsün Tzu (10:17) also advocated taking less from the people in order to benefit the government: “A policy of ‘not benefiting the people yet taking benefits from them’ provides fewer benefits than that of ‘benefiting from the people only after first having benefited them.’ A policy of ‘using the people but not loving them’ results in fewer achievements than that of ‘using the people only after having demonstrated love for them.’ A policy of ‘benefiting the people and only then

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V. Economic Freedom and Development receiving benefits from them’ produces fewer benefits than that of ‘benefiting the people but receiving no benefits from them.’ A policy of ‘using the people only after having bestowed love on them’ results in less benefit than that of ‘loving the people but making no use of them.’ One who ‘provides benefits but does not take them’ and who ‘loves but does not use them’ will capture the world. One who ‘benefits the people and only then receives benefits from them’ and who ‘uses’ the people only after having first bestowed love on them’ will protect his altars of soil and grain. One who ‘does not benefit the people yet takes benefits from them’ and who ‘uses them but does not love them’ will imperil his nation.” Hsün Tzu (9:5) pointed out that heavy taxation is a way to destroy the country: “One who attends merely to collecting taxes is following a way that invites bandits, fattens his enemies, dooms his own country, and threatens his own survival. Accordingly, the intelligent lord does not treat this path.” He later added (10:4), “If one taxes lightly the cultivated fields and outlying districts, imposes excises uniformly at the border stations and in the marketplace, keeps statistical records to reduce the number of merchants and traders, initiates only rarely projects requiring the labor of the people, and does not take the farmers from their fields except in the off-season, the state will be wealthy. This may be described as ‘allowing the people a generous living through the exercise of government.’” Confucianism does not advocate economic equality; nevertheless, it warns against likely negative consequences brought about by inequalities, especially by poverty. Mencius (8:2) advocated letting “. . . a governor conduct his rule on principles of equal justice. . . . If a governor will try to please everybody, he will find the days not sufficient for his work.” “They are only men of education,” Mencius (1:7) argued, “who without a certain livelihood are able to maintain a fixed heart. As to the people, if they have not a certain livelihood, it follows that they will not have a fixed heart. And if they have not a fixed heart, there is nothing which they will not do, in the way of self-abandonment, of moral deflection, of depravity, and of wild license. When they thus have been involved in crime, to follow them up and punish them — this is to entrap the people.” Confucius (16:1) noted: “I have heard that rulers of states and chiefs of families are not troubled lest their people should be few, but are troubled lest they should not keep their several places; that they are not troubled with fears of poverty, but are troubled with fears of a want of contented repose among the people in their several places. For when the people keep their several places, there will be no poverty; when harmony prevails, there will be no scarcity of people; and when there is such a contented

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College Attrition at American Research Universities repose, there will be no rebellious upsetting. Therefore, if remoter people are not submissive, all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil.” ECONOMIC DOCTRINES BY ADAM SMITH AND CONFUCIANISM The economic principles of American civilization have been strongly influenced by Adam Smith, and two of his many contributions to economics attract the most discussion. The first is his discussion of the role of the division of labor. The second is the concept of the “invisible hand,” an abstract mechanism through which Smith argued that economic order and prosperity can be achieved, i.e., with minimum intervention from the government. Smith is influential mainly due to his ideas about economic liberty. But the idea of economic liberty was not new to China — in theory or in practice (Chen, 1911, Ch’u, 1965, Chao, 1986, Hu, 1988, Brook and Blue, 1999, Deng, 1999). In fact, if the reader had the impression that Confucianism strongly inspired Quesnay, this feeling of déjà vu may not be misplaced. In Chinese tradition the idea that economic agents should freely produce and sell what they want was recognized, and was characterized as non-active policy; this is what Smith termed natural liberty. However, it is also important to mention that Smith and Confucius are quite different in their ways of perceiving the world. Smith is a Newtonian, while Confucius is I Ching-influenced. According to the Newtonian vision, there is a single-patterned society with a unique stable equilibrium. The I Chinginfluenced mind has a different view. Let us consider socialism and capitalism. From the viewpoint of Confucianism, socialism and capitalism should be important ideas for constructing theories and providing insights into actual functions of social and economic systems (according to Confucius, “I set it forth from one end to the other”); but they are not proper ways to characterize actual economies, because the actuality lies between the two extremes. In other words, even if an economic system can achieve socialism (or capitalism), the extreme situation is only momentary and the system will soon move away from it. And as we have seen, in recent years, the socialist economies have collapsed; while governmental intervention in the capitalist economies has been steadily increased.

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V. Economic Freedom and Development This structural transformation between socialism and capitalism is due to the internal mechanisms of social evolution. The socialist collapse is due to enforced stability and what the Confucian might term “femininity” (strengthened yin) in socialism; the steadily increased government intervention in capitalist systems is due to inherent instability and “masculinity” (strengthened yang) in capitalism. Neither the yin nor yang is desirable from the Confucian point of view. Only a mixed economic system is sustainable, with justice, in the long term. However, the desirable degree of mixture is not preset — and this further implies that Keynesian economics should also be temporarily valid. If one reads what Mencius said first about “state planning,” then “market” and finally a “mean way,” as mentioned before, one may gain insight into the Confucian view of social and economic transformations. In fact, as we have pointed out elsewhere, though the traditional Chinese vision of social evolution is in conflict with the Newtonian vision of change, it has a close relationship with the nonlinear dynamic vision. It should be mentioned that irrespective of his insights into various issues concerning economic growth, Adam Smith could not imagine the modern scale and scope of economies and the rapid speeds of transactions of goods, people and information, not to mention the complexity of the scientific community. His points of view about the role of government tend to be invalid in many circumstances. For instance, he assumed the existence of a unique long-run stable economic equilibrium. In fact, the search for a unique, stable equilibrium in a competitive economy was the main concern of theoretical equilibrium economists at least during the 1960s and the 1980s. In such economic systems, it is obvious that government intervention plays no essential role as small changes only result in small consequences. When economic systems are characterized by the existence of a unique equilibrium and stability, politicians’ decisions cannot essentially change the economic structures. Economists such as Ricardo, Marshall, and Pigou recognized the existence of external economies and advocated market correction for the welfare of society. Marxists argued the necessity and efficiency of central planning and public ownership. Another influential socioeconomic thinker is Hayek. He is well known for his unfavorable attitude towards government intervention in economic activities. He argued that the free market constitutes a spontaneous order which has been brought about by the decentralized actions of numerous agents, where the market contains much more information than an individual could even possibly absorb. Through the market the actions and goals of the multiple agents are linked together

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College Attrition at American Research Universities to form an ordered whole. It is through the market that knowledge is created and applied and the complexity of the knowledge economy is kept in order. The knowledge and skills of all the agents in the society can best be utilized if their freedom of action is not restricted and they are not subjected to central control designed to guide social evolution by a centralized authority. That is, the efficiency of the spontaneously-created complex order will be destroyed by governmental intervention. Moreover, the behavior of this dynamic system cannot be predicted because of the complexity of the dynamics of knowledge. The order of a liberal social system can be preserved by guaranteeing the freedom of the individual and only allowing the minimal restrictions upon his spontaneous decisions. Order and freedom are thus concatenated. Although it is beyond the scope of this book to further discuss those conditions under which spontaneous order can be achieved for an open (or isolated) economic system, it should be mentioned that the possible existence of multiple equilibria, catastrophes, chaos and instabilities of competitive systems implies limitations upon and the invalidity of Hayek’s ideas, not to mention the undesirable social consequences that might follow from them, under certain circumstances. Keynes saw flaws in both the free market and in planned economies. He advocated an active role for the government in reducing the severity of the business cycles through proper management of the money supply and proper social policy. He tried to find a “mean way,” recognizing that both rational ideals, socialism and capitalism, would harm rather than benefit mankind as whole. His argument in favor of government intervention is influenced by this broad vision. He provided a theoretical foundation for an enhanced government sector and far stronger interventionalism to replace the laissez-faire philosophy of earlier years. He held that the market economy was efficient in allocating resources at the microeconomic level but that it could not be left to its own devices at the macroeconomic level. A great part of Keynes’ work was motivated by the social and economic problems which dominated the inter-war period. He was concerned with how to formulate economic policies to solve these problems. The General Theory attempted to provide the foundation for an economic policy capable of reducing unemployment. Keynes argued that the decision as to what constitutes a suitable level of investment should not be left in private hands. He held that government intervention in the form of discretionary fiscal and monetary policies could help correct aggregate instability and stabilize the economy at full employment. Using concepts like “investment multiplier,” “propensity to consume” and “liquidity preference,” Keynes showed the necessity and desirability of government

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V. Economic Freedom and Development intervention. According to him, positive fiscal policy is necessary in industrial economies because private investment is inadequate to fill the gap between the total income and total consumption which corresponds to full employment. Keynes’ theory had a revolutionary impact on thinking about government intervention in a market economy. Keynes appreciated the shifting needs of the development of capitalism in the stages before World War I and later. He sought to justify the unequal distribution of wealth inherent in capitalist systems, arguing that since economic conditions of the 19th century required a large sum of individual savings to support fast economic growth, the unequal distribution of wealth was necessary to keep the level of savings high enough to supply the necessary capital. But as economic conditions changed, he noted, high savings rates would prevent capitalist economies from developing quickly, as the priority shifted from high capital investment (boosting production) to high employment (which boosts demand). His idea that employment is determined by effective demand was used to justify large-scale government intervention. If there is a great difference in wealth and income among different classes, the society’s consumption is largely limited. The rich get far more income than they will consume currently, and the poor have too little income to buy certain “necessary” consumption goods. If society can redistribute some money from the rich to the poor through an acceptable form of taxation, he showed, demand for consumption goods will be increased. The Keynesian economic policy can also mitigate some class conflicts created by inequality of wealth distribution. Under certain circumstances, Keynes is correct to argue that the classical theory is misleading and brings about disastrous consequences if it is applied to reality. But the Keynesian policy may become misleading as well, when the timing is off. The government plays a decisive role in social and economic development when the economic system has multiple equilibria (for instance, capitalism and socialism). Although it is obvious that central planning cannot effectively handle a modern socioeconomic system with a large population, this does not imply that the state should not intervene at all. The central and the most difficult aspect of the role of a democratic government lies in determining in what respects and to what degree to intervene in economic and scientific activities. It is obvious that the qualitative and quantitative structure of the population and the distribution of social welfare are interdependent. Government funding for the education of ambitious young people from poor families and for health care and the aged will have different effects on long-run economic development.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Government intervention in education and science may benefit economic growth under various circumstances. For instance, when a country is taking off from a very low level of technology and its companies are technologically not sophisticated enough to take risks supporting R&D activities, it may benefit the country as a whole if the government concentrates its finances and manpower on certain industries. This kind of intervention has, in fact, been adopted in Japan. When a nation is taking off, its young people tend to have high “animal spirits” for action and a strong human desire for knowledge. In this case, if the government can provide scientists with opportunities for training and research, the diffusion of knowledge may further stimulate knowledge accumulation and economic growth. Government decision-making has a significant impact on the distribution of wealth and on incentives to work, to create, to learn and to apply knowledge. Like any sector in society, the government is confronted by cycles of decline and growth, which are largely determined by social and economic circumstances. If the government shows no wisdom when the society needs it, it may drive the entire social system into a low state of economic development among the multiple possible equilibria. History shows many such examples. It is quite a mistake to treat the state as a separate part of society, as liberal economists try to do. The role of the government is changeable as the society as a whole is evolving. The government itself is an important part of the social evolution. Just as individual wisdom is not fixed, neither can the role of the government be. Government intervention in economic activities has gradually increased in the United States. In fact, the government sector, including federal, state, and local workers, is one of the largest industries in terms of the number of employees. ADAM SMITH AND CONFUCIUS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GREAT AND THE RICH Since Adam Smith’s economic doctrine has had such a deep impact on the American civilization, we should perhaps compare his attitude towards the great and the rich with that of Confucius. In fact, the father of modern economics was more negative than Confucius about these classes. Both thinkers held situation-dependent attitudes toward the rich and the great, derogating them in some circumstances and in others justifying the attention and admiration they receive. Confucius and Smith 140

V. Economic Freedom and Development tolerated vanity, deception, and non-essence in human life as naturally as they accepted dignity, the rectification of names, and essence in ideal life. Smith held that two principles, the love of praise and the love of praiseworthiness, might be blended together or separated. A man may perform a praiseworthy action and enjoy the praise which is due to him; in this case, the two principles are blended with each other. At the same time, there are cases where the two principles do not work together. Smith (1759: 117) said: “The first desire [of being approved] could only have made him wish to appear to be fit for society. The second [desire of what ought to be approved of] was necessary in order to render him anxious to be really fit. The first could have promoted him to the affection of virtue, and to the concealment of vice. The second was necessary in order to inspire him with the real love of virtue, and with the real abhorrence of vice.” Confucian tradition emphasizes that praiseworthiness should be manifested in praise in a just social environment. When is praise identified with praiseworthiness, and when is it distinct? We can illustrate this point by describing the requisite conditions for a man to be addressed as a scholar. For Confucius, concepts such as “scholar” are not dependent on social position. He held that “The scholar who cherishes the love of comfort is not fit to be deemed a scholar.” A man is entitled to be considered a scholar by his genuine attitude towards learning and knowledge: his mind has knowledge as its real goal. Confucius asserted that “A scholar, whose mind is set on truth, and who is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, is not fit to be discoursed with.” The Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names, a main institutional means in Confucianism, is one way of “identifying” praise and praiseworthiness. There may be many symbols for respect and admiration in a society, so that there are multiple ways of approaching each of these symbols. One may pursue the study of wisdom and the practice of virtue. One may also pursue wealth and greatness. For Smith, two different characters are presented for our emulation: the one, of proud ambition and ostentatious avidity; the other, of humble modesty and equitable justice. According to Smith (1759: 62), the greater part of humanity would choose the gaudy and glittering as its object of admiration: “They are the wise and the virtuous . . . who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities The great mob of mankind is the admirers and worshippers . . . of wealth and greatness.” There are many ways to become great or rich, even though there are only a few ways to acquire a sophisticated mind. Different types of minds have different attitudes towards the great and the rich. Smith (1759: 50) explained the basic cause for appreciation of the great and the rich as follows: “It is because mankind is disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty.” The spectator’s feelings for the rich, Smith maintained, arise not so much out of the superior ease or pleasure which they enjoy as from the artificial and elegant contrivances for promoting the appearance of this ease or pleasure. For Smith (1759: 183), the attention and approbation are attracted by deception: “The pleasure of wealth and greatness . . . strike the imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow upon it.” According to Smith, the very acts of inventing and perfecting devices associated with the creation of wealth led to the improvement of the sciences and the arts, and these ennoble and embellish human life. Smith argued that it is vanity, not ease or pleasure, which interests most people. It is upon this willingness of man to go along with many of the vicissitudes that may befall the rich and powerful that the distinction of ranks is sustained. For Smith (1759: 181), this deception may be recognized in the last minute of life, in the following way: “It is then, in the last dregs of life, his body wasted with toil and diseases, his mind galled and ruffled by the memory of a thousand injuries and disappointments which he imagined he has met with from the injustice of his enemies, or from the perfidy and ingratitude of his friends, that he begins at last to find that wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquility of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys.” Output per HourConfucius hated nothing more deeply than deception. For Confucius, deception confuses praiseworthiness with praise. Smith held that this particular deception is what makes man industrious and frugal; he holds that for economic and cultural reasons, the pursuit of wealth is a necessary and “beneficial” deception. This psychology of man continually opens investment opportunities and stimulates fruitful ideas. Moreover,

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V. Economic Freedom and Development he deemed (1759: 184-5) that the effect of this deception is to spread prosperity all down the social scale: “They [the rich] consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an indivisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.” Confucianism is not so disparaging about wealth and greatness as Smith is, but in Confucian tradition, they are respectable only when they are obtained in the proper way. Smith demonstrated almost nothing positive about wealth and the desire for wealth in the high moral order in his Theory of Moral Sentiments; but Confucian tradition does not devalue the importance of desires and emotions for individual life and for society. Confucius maintained that the means of satisfying desires is not to eliminate them; nor is it to diminish them; it is rather to guide them into proper channels. Confucius thought that man naturally desires to be great and to be rich. There is nothing wrong with desires in themselves — only, it is wrong to employ unjust means to satisfy one’s desires. Confucius said: “Riches and honors are what men desire. If they cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held. Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. If they cannot be avoided in the proper way, they should not be avoided.” In Confucianism, wealth and honor are respectable when they are associated with virtue; and knowledge accumulation is not only aimed at learning, but may also lead to other rewards. Learning should bring economic and social benefits to these who make the effort to learn, but what the superior man is concerned with is truth. Confucius held that different minds have different attitudes towards virtue and profit: “The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain.” It is obvious that even if one is only concerned with virtue, this does not mean that he has no opportunity to make profits — because there are situations in which

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College Attrition at American Research Universities virtue and profit are not in conflict. Confucius did not decry the concern for wealth accumulation as a mark of inferiority; in fact, he held almost the opposite view. Confucius believed that if society is governed by virtue, it is a shameful matter to be poor. Confucius emphasized that people should show respect to different symbols according to what they stand for. The Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names requires that there should be a correct correspondence between the actuality and the essence that the symbol is supposed to represent. Confucius said: “Therefore having such great virtue [as Shun], it could not but be that he should obtain the throne, that he should obtain those riches, that he should obtain fame, that he should attain to his long life.” To have power usually means to be rich, in Confucian tradition. The association of (just) power with wealth is morally justified in Confucian tradition. This positive attitude towards wealth is different from Adam Smith’s. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES Asked what he thought about the poor man who yet does not flatter, and the rich man who is not proud, Confucius (1:15) replied: “They will do; but they are not equal to him, who, though poor, is yet cheerful, and to him, who, though rich, loves the rules of propriety.” Immediately after the end of its involvement in World War II, in August 1945, the United States emerged as the economic colossus of the entire world. Its superiority in industry, science, and affluence gave its people a feeling that they were living in “the American century.” From World War II until the 1960s, the American economy experienced rapid structural transformation, and the Korean War provided the occasion for a renewed surge of US economic expansion. The war broke out in June 1950. For three years the battle raged, finally coming to a halt by truce. The economic expansion lasted until 1960. By then, the GNP had more than doubled, and real GNP had risen nearly two thirds over the 1945 level (Hughes and Cain, 1998:521). In the 1970s, the American economy suffered from the obsolescence of plant and equipment and the inability to compete in international markets in many areas of traditional American strength. As the industries of other nations began to catch up, they developed superior techniques of production and

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V. Economic Freedom and Development distribution, techniques that directly competed with American industries — whose economic growth slowed. It was widely held that American productivity fell in the late 1970s, both absolutely and in comparison to other countries. The productivity slowdown was caused by the loss of the work ethic, excessive government regulation, low savings rates, little emphasis on science and mathematics in the schools, insufficient investment in communication and transportation infrastructures, and other factors. Nevertheless, this deceleration was short-lived; the growth of per capita income over from 1984 to 1994 was almost 20% faster than the period 1963-1983. In Figure 5.1, based on Hughes and Cain (1998:561), we illustrate the dynamics of business productivity for the period 1960-1994 in the US economy. Productivity is measured in output per paid hour in the entire business sector. The slopes are steeper in 1960-1965 and in 1990-94, implying that the growth rates of productivity are higher during these periods, on average. As shown in the figure, in 1975-80 the average annual rate of increase was only 0.7 for the entire business sector. The growth rate is lower than those for most of the postwar period and lower than the productivity growth figures for American’s major trading partners in Europe and Asia in those years. During the 1980s, productivity increased by a mere 1% annually.

120 110 100 90 80

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Figure 5.1. Indexes of Business Productivity (1977=100, 1960-94)

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Figure 5.2, based on Keister (2000:12), shows the total value of family assets (houses, cars, stocks, bonds, and savings accounts etc.) in the United States during the period 1960-1997. As shown, total assets experienced dramatic increases. In 1960, families owned $6.6 trillion in 1960 in 1990 dollars; by 1980, the number rose to $12.3 trillion; $13.8 trillion in 1990; and by 1997 total assets had grown to $17.5 trillion. For comparison, the mainland China’s GDP in 1990 was only $364 billion.

Total Wealth in Trillions 1990

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Figure 5.2. Total Household Wealth in the United States (trillions of 1990 dollars) Now, let’s look at the dynamics of disposable personal income (DPI). Figure 5.3, based on Hughes and Cain (1998:591), shows the DPI per capita for the period 1960-1994 in the US, measured in 1987 dollars. We see that DPI per capita, in real terms, grew continually between 1960 and 1994. Between 1960 and 1970, real disposable income per capita grew by 36% overall, and between 1970 and 1980, the growth rate was 22%.

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DPI per Capita

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Figure 5.3. Disposable Personal Income (DPI) Per Capita, 1960-1994 McClosky and Zaller (1984:107) argued that “‘At the heart of the doctrine . . . of the Protestant ethic . . . are two normative injunctions: one should work zealously, dutifully, and methodically in order to avoid sin and demonstrate one’s worth; and one should acquire good habits such as frugality, sobriety, humility, and simplicity in conduct in order to demonstrate one’s capacity for self-restrain, self-denial, and devotion to one’s calling and one’s God. As Weber observed, the Protestant ethic provided, in effect, the rationale by which acquisitiveness could be reconciled with restraint.” Most contemporary Americans have an obvious strong desire for leisure, consumption, and pleasure. These values are not those of religious ascetics. Capitalism has destroyed the Protestant ethic by promoting a hedonistic way of life. In a knowledge-based economy, the Dionysian spirit plays a positive role in sustaining economic development, and, in fact, Protestant values would be in conflict with a knowledge economy. Contemporary capitalism cannot sustain economic growth without selling an ever-expanding volume of goods and services. Competitive acquisition has long been an American tradition. Millions of Americans construct their personal identity by dwelling in a certain type of housing, driving a certain type of car, wearing particular designer labels, and ordering the right bottle of wine. That is how they present themselves to society,

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College Attrition at American Research Universities allowing their purchases to inform others about who they really are. In The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), Veblen coined the phrase “conspicuous consumption.” He pointed out that in affluent societies, people establish social position through spending. Men reveal their incomes to the outside world through the conspicuous display of wealth and leisure, and even wives, according to Veblen, are considered largely ornamental and are used to display a man’s finest purchases such as clothes, furs, and jewels. The rich use conspicuous consumption to secure a place in the social hierarchy. Since Veblen published his acclaimed book, economies have been changed dramatically. Increased productivity and output have enabled more people to enter the comfortable middle classes and enjoy substantial discretionary spending. This mass prosperity has led to a tendency towards convergence among consumers’ acquisition and purchasing patterns (Schor, 1998). One might argue that Americans express their individuality, their desire to prevail over their fellows and to better their lives through conspicuous consumption. The individualistic energy of liberal society, which was manifested in entrepreneurship, has been directed into the prodigious consumption of goods and services. While the average American’s buying patterns become more ostentatious, it should be noted that (as demonstrated by Stanley and Danko, 1996), most millionaires in the United States are becoming less showy, living frugal lives, buying used cars and shopping for bargains. They don’t feel any need to let the world know that they can afford to live much better than their neighbors. JAPAN AND CHINA — CONTRASTING PATHS TO THE MODERNIZATION OF CONFUCIAN MANIFESTATIONS After the war . . . the ideological pattern remained exactly as hitherto, with Confucianism (i.e. Japan’s brand of Confucianism) supported by the government as the orthodoxy and Buddhism and Shintoism, the two main heterodoxies, embraced by the people and the Court respectively. Morishima (1982)

Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), the French chemist (who founded modern microbiology, invented the process of pasteurization, and developed vaccines for anthrax, rabies, and chicken cholera), stated that “chance favors only the prepared

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V. Economic Freedom and Development mind.” Similarly, economic development is sustainable only for the prepared country. Confucian philosophical tradition does not hold that there is a unique correspondence between a principle and its manifestations under differing circumstances. In the Confucian tradition it is the essence or principle, rather than a concrete manifestation of it, that one should respect. Specific customs designed, under Confucian principles, for an agricultural economy may not be valid for an open industrial economy; but the principles themselves may be still valid in the new environment. In this sense, traditional studies on Confucianism and its impact on economic development may have limitations in explaining the possible impact of Confucianism on sustainable economic development and (long-term) modernization of the Confucian regions. Specific manifestations of the Confucian principles may have little to do with contemporary reality; but the principles may influence Confucian regions under globalizing civilization. It is our premise that the basic principles of Confucianism should enable the Confucian regions to sustain economic development and to become democratic. This does not mean that traditional institutional structures and concrete pre-existing forms of human relations designed under these principles are suitable for industrial economies. The traditional ideal of “the five generations under the same roof” can hardly become an ideal of family life in contemporary industrial economies. The so-called “generation gaps” imply that there may be a lack of appreciation and mutual understanding among the members, so that living in one household would be undesirable. The moral obligation to take care of one’s children as well as one’s parents remains invariant with time, but the way of caring and the form of reciprocal relationships are changeable when socioeconomic conditions change. To follow the basic principles and to adjust one’s behavior according to the changed environment is an important character of Confucianism. The I Ching states: “The superior man produces his changes as the leopard does when he changes his spots — their beauty becomes more elegant. Small men change their faces: — they show themselves prepared to follow their ruler.” The “spots,” traditional manifestations of the Confucian principles, are replaced by modern democratic manifestations; but the essence of Confucianism remains invariant in different seasons. There is no single force determining economic growth. Political geography, economic geography, spirit, ideology, and cultural values weigh differently in affecting the historical paths of national development. The different factors must

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College Attrition at American Research Universities be given their due. Hegel held that socioeconomic development is determined by spirit. According to this vision, difference in religions and ideologies would lead to different developmental performance. In the spirit of ideological determinism, Max Weber claimed a deterministic link between the Protestant ethic and Western capitalism. However, Weber failed to recognize the possibility of rapid industrialization of non-Western cultures. He held that Confucianism was detrimental to modernization as initiated in Western Europe (Weber, 1905, 1951) and, after analyzing the Chinese culture in his The Religion of China, Weber (1951) concluded: The Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism which has technically and economically been fully developed in the modern culture area.

If we look at Japan and mainland China today, we can see that the great man misjudged in this case. It is not the differences between the Japanese and Chinese cultural traditions that Weber misunderstood; it was his traditional view of the complex dynamics of socioeconomic evolution that limited the validity of his cultural comparison. As modern nonlinear theory demonstrates, in general, there is no single deterministic link between ideology and economic growth as Weber believed. Geography and random environmental factors may also have decisive effects on the actual path of history. In the mid-19th century, Japan and China were agrarian economies and Confucian states, both faced with the threat of being colonized by the Western powers. Yet Japan managed to withstand the Western challenge and succeeded in rapidly beginning its industrialization, while China continued to suffer from the painful processes of dynastic decline and foreign invasions. Before the end of World War II, Japan had become a world power and had developed into a large empire with many colonies; while China suffered domestic political chaos, economic poverty, and foreign invasions. Its defeat in World War II notwithstanding, Japan is currently near the top of the list in terms of per capita GNP in the world and Japanese society is characterized by a post-industrial mentality, while the average Chinese is mired in poverty. China is still in the initial stages of industrialization, despite its recent successful economic reform. How these two countries with similar Confucian cultural backgrounds could have experienced such different paths of socio-economic development in modern times is a challenging question.

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V. Economic Freedom and Development Japan’s modernization is generally said to have begun with what is known as the Meiji Restoration, in 1868. The event overthrew the Tokugawa family, who had held the reins of central government for over 200 years. The revolutionaries claimed the “restoration of imperial rule” to justify their actions, but behind this conservative goal emerged a commitment by the new imperial government to fundamentally change Japan. The restoration of the Meiji emperor brought to power a government which came to define and adopt new goals aimed at the modernization of the country; this was the turning point where an agrarian society was transformed into an industrial one. Japan was rapidly transmuted from a feudal state to a modern, Western-style state in twenty years’ time. Feudalism was abolished in 1868, the independent political and economic powers of the domains were abolished and the status divisions of the Tokugawa system were removed in 1869. A civilian government was formed in 1885, the constitution was adopted in 1889, and the first election of a parliament took place in 1890. The social and legal distinctions between classes were abolished. All Japanese men were equal in the eyes of the law. Japan became a unified and centralized state. A new system of local and national government was set up to replace the traditional han administrations. Conscription into the new national army and navy was instituted and the significance of modern education for establishing a great nation was recognized and acted upon. These changes provided the foundations for pursuing the ideal proposed by some late Tokugawa thinkers: a prosperous country and a strong army. By the turn of the century, economic and military threats by the Western powers had been evaded and important steps were taken in the direction of industrialization. By the outbreak of World War I, rather than being colonized by the West, Japan had defeated both China and Russia and colonized some parts of the mainland of Asia. As far as structural transformation is concerned, the direction of Japan’s economic path appears to have been determined after World War II, but important bases such as a sophisticated bureaucracy, skilled workers, and cultural values for modern education and discipline already had been established. Moreover, the American Occupation helped Japan to speed up its modernization. In the middle of the 19th century, when the West’s influence in East Asia was about to become overwhelming, Japan and China were not far apart ideologically and economically. Both of them used Confucianism as state ideology and the majority of their labor forces were engaged in rice production:

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College Attrition at American Research Universities They were traditional Confucian rice-economies. The mind of a culture is not always capable of changing when the environment places new demands on it or new opportunities before it. Historically, man has improved his ability to cope with his environment through the exchange of techniques and knowledge between cultures. Flexibility of mind may be either a source of strength or a weakness. The timely switch of the Japanese mind towards Western culture and away from Chinese culture proved to be a great strength, while the adoption of Western ideologies such as Marxism among the May Fourth youth generation in China failed to quickly give rise to an industrial China. Mao observed that when heat is applied to a stone and an egg, the fact that a chicken comes from one and nothing from the other is due to their internal structures. Both Japan and China were economically, militarily, and politically weak in the globalizing world in the 19th century. Both China and Japan were challenged by the Western powers; but they reacted in different ways. Japan proved to be by far the more able student of economic modernization. Without a highly adaptive mind, it is difficult to explain how Japan could devise new economic institutions and mobilize resources for the acquisition of new skills and technologies without destroying traditional social structures and values in a violent way. There are two accepted interpretations of China’s slow reaction to Western influences. The first is that the traditional Chinese order, within the limitations of its inherited technology and value system, had become a strongly integrated society over the centuries with institutions that had attained a high degree of sophistication. It could not easily adopt Western ways without a fundamental remaking of the entire social order. The second suggests that China’s political tradition inhibited the growth of a nation state: that China lacked both the public sentiment and the political leadership necessary for a Japan-type rapid “Westernization” with the Japanese ethos. But these two interpretations neglect the importance of racial differences between the Manchu and the Han Chinese in China’s modernization. China was under Manchu control from 1644 to 1911. The introduction of Western technologies and institutions would not have been to the advantage of the Manchus. China had come in contact with the modern technology of Europe even earlier than Japan, but this technology did not become widely used. China, suffering both from internal conflicts and foreign imperialism, resisted change in the 19th century. By the end of the century a few Chinese scholars had indeed realized that China must adopt many Western techniques or be overrun — but their attempt at modernization was rejected by the Manchu ruling class. By that

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V. Economic Freedom and Development time, various forces were slowly changing China; but they could not have introduced and spread modern civilization with the speed and social order that Japan achieved. In fact, from the Opium War until the beginning of recent economic reforms, there had never been a sustainable period of harmony among the various groups in mainland China. During the Qing dynasty, the Manchus (who originated to the northwest) were masters and the majority of the population, Han Chinese, were merely tolerated. The Manchus set themselves apart and above the Chinese, concentrating power in their own hands and alienating the locals. In the early stages of the dynasty, the relationship between the Manchus and the Han were generally harmonious in the sense that the leading group and its subjects received mutual benefits from the division of labor. But the racial conflicts began to be evident as socio-economic conditions began to decline. Modernization would have meant modernizing the military, first and foremost, and if the Manchus had modernized China, the Han Chinese, armed with modern weapons, would hardly have stayed loyal to the regime. The Manchus were faced with a dilemma: modernization would break its grip as the single power holder. In confrontation with the Western powers, it was reasonable for the Manchus to allow the foreigners to come in, rather than to quickly modernize China; thus, the Manchus ended up maintaining their power in a semi-colonial state. The fundamental conflict between the ruling race and the majority of the population made it difficult to develop a national consensus (nationalism) in the country. Sun Yixian described the situations in early 19th century China as follows: “The Chinese people have only family and clan groups; there is no national spirit. . . . [W]e are in fact but a sheet of loose sand. . . . [The r]est of mankind is the carving knife and the serving dish, while we are the fish and the meat.” The Manchus were faced with complicated triangular relationships between the Han Chinese, the Western powers and themselves. The Manchus tended to use the conflicts between the Western powers and China to protect the Manchu race rather than China itself. Such “racial conflicts” were almost nonexistent in Japan. Any conflicts that social and economic changes might have brought about would have occurred within a single race in Japan. Throughout the entire period since the Western powers forced Japan to open up in 1853, virtually every Japanese government had recognized the international threat to the nation’s sovereignty and independence. As a weak nation in the new world order, Japan had to develop a consensus among all camps if it was to become a modern national state and retain its independence. The new government recognized that to build a Japan that was

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College Attrition at American Research Universities rich and powerful like the Western powers, it was necessary to adapt Western technology and institutions. Most political leaders and activities were committed to a policy of building a “rich country and a strong army.” Political power was retrieved from the scattered provincial domains and concentrated in the national government. These nationalist objectives attracted the commitment and support of the population. The common people were called upon and joined willingly in the building of the nation. In the mid-19th century, both Japan and China had to deal with the strong, progressive and aggressive West. Japan had a direct relationship with the West, while the Manchus, the Western powers and the Han Chinese interacted in very complicated ways. China was a more “attractive” international trading partner than Japan. In fact, while China was suffering from the Opium War, no Western power showed much interest in Japan. Under the circumstances, those Japanese educated under Tokugawa Confucianism were able to quickly establish a national consensus and develop nationalism without violent revolution. When faced with the Western powers, Japan had three potential advantages. The first was the traditional Confucian culture which made Japanese people industrious, cooperative and submissive. They could be led to study hard, work hard and save hard in a harmonious social environment. The second advantage was that of the late developer. When Western economies created new industrial technologies and business methods and institutions, Japan could copy the new apparatus without the costs of inventing and developing. (Japan and China shared these two advantages.) Japan took full advantage of the opportunity after the Meiji revolution, while it would take another 100 years for China to fully adapt. The third condition, which would not on the surface appear to be an advantage for Japan, was its lack of natural resources and potential markets. Japan’s poverty might explain why it was not invaded by the West as China was. Moreover, the conflicts which occurred between China and the Western powers may have helped Japan’s ruling class to become aware of the necessity of rapid industrialization (i.e., militarization in the early period of industrialization). The Japanese concept of group is not religious, and is adaptive. The group itself can have varied identifications like family, friends, village, company, region or nation. The essence is not a specific group itself but that idea that the group provides a relatively stable basis for loyalty and devotion. When Japan was faced with challenges from the West, Japanese groupism was redefined in order to protect Japan. In order to adapt the group’s identity to changed situations, scholars produced moral tracts and educational materials stressing the uniqueness of the Japanese people, who had enjoyed imperial rule in an unbroken

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V. Economic Freedom and Development line for generations. The emperor was described as the father of his subjects and the people as the emperor’s children. Filial piety was a paradigm for loyalty to the monarch and to superiors in general. By associating these virtues with the emperor and national polity, they became typically Japanese. This new identity of Japanese national groupism helped Japan pull together to begin its modernization. Once the Japanese had chosen the nation as group identity, and the group’s goal to catch up with the West by learning from it, the hard-working and rational-oriented Japanese would perform splendidly in achieving the group purpose. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan embarked on an effort to create a modern industrial society. This was successfully achieved by imitating European and American technology and institutions. Since then, Japan quickly passed through the painful ideological conflict and society was ready for the extension of technology. Because of the historical differences in the cultural stocks of Japan and China, it is quite reasonable for the Chinese to have developed a mind less adaptive to Western ideas and to have exhibited a little more loyalty to tradition than the Japanese. Cultural loyalty often reduces the speed of learning, because learning from other cultures may require the denial, if not the destruction (of at least some aspects) of one’s own culture. In action, timing is often more important than reasoning. This may be true especially when a society comes to a fork in the road (for instance, the choice between socialism or capitalism). In complicated situations of socio-economic structural change, to miss an opportunity means heavy “punishment” in the long term. Another subtle issue is that the powerful West might, perhaps unconsciously, have allowed Japan to become developed for its own benefit in East Asia while keeping China from entering into international games. A Chinese proverb says: A mountain cannot accommodate two tigers. In global affairs, it means that the world cannot sustain two superpowers in the long term. If the West did not consider Japan capable of becoming a “tiger,” then an industrialized Japan would not be perceived as a threat to the West. Strategically, the rational West would make the “choice” to allow Japan to freely develop as its foothold in East Asia. In 1853, the United States dispatched a naval expedition commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry to “ask” Japan to open a port to American ships. In 1854, the Shogun had to accede, and several ports were opened, allowing the Americans access to food and fuel for commercial ships sailing to and from China and for whaling fleets sent around Japan. Militarily, the Japanese had very few options. They were clearly far behind the West in terms of technology. The

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Tokugawa government opened diplomatic ties with the United States, starting the end of the policy of isolation. This was to be followed by a series of treaties with the various Western powers — treaties similar to the Unequal Treaties which had imposed the Treaty Port system on China earlier. The Meiji Restoration was a turning point for Japan’s modern industrial capitalist economy. The new government increased bureaucratic controls over major aspects of economic life and established a new generation of public industrial enterprises, which were owned and directly managed by the government, in designated sectors and industries. To introduce Western technology and Western-style organization, foreign experts were employed in factories, government offices, and universities, and many public servants were sent abroad to study. The public investment in these activities during 1868-88 was estimated at the equivalent of almost half of the government’s total nonmilitary capital expenditure. Meanwhile, Western capitalists tried to capture the internal Japanese markets by taking over vital industries such as rails, banks, mines, utilities, and telecommunications. In the Qing Dynasty, despite their social respect for Confucian learning, the Manchus were not genuinely interested in knowledge for the sake of the welfare of the majority of the population. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 appeared to represent a great opportunity for China in the remaining half of the 20th century. The nation was essentially united and the central government enjoyed firm authority over and loyalty from its subjects. The one hundred years of foreign special privileges were ended. Racial conflicts did not appear to be a main issue for the moment. China seems to have got what it had so desperately wanted for so long. A national consensus had been formed and the domestic environment was peaceful. It had a common set of values — exterminating foreign exploitation, boosting scientific and technological development as a means of achieving national independence, and enriching people’s economic life and social welfare. These values were a reaction against 100 years of foreign influences and a result of Chinese nationalism. But, irrespective of some efforts at industrialization, China failed to modernize as a nation. As argued in Zhang (1998), a main reason for this failure was that the political power was concentrated in the farmer-poet-strategist Chairman Mao, who was against Confucianism and had no idea of how to manage a modern civilizing society. His political campaigns (during a time when Confucianism was explicitly appreciated in Singapore and Taiwan) against Confucianism are a telling indicator of his mindset. His talent as a poet enabled him to “play with”

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V. Economic Freedom and Development the emotions of the uneducated Chinese masses (who had lived under the Manchu and other foreign masters since the late 1600s); his gift as a military leader and strategist enabled him to annihilate anyone who might become an obstruction. He controlled and de-educated China. The death of Mao brought opportunities for social and economic changes. Deng Xiaoping, whose vision of how to manage the country was formed long before his reemergence, allowed people to pursue economic activities freely while maintaining social order by means of the gun. Economic reform has opened China to the outside world. The “successful transition” from an isolated society to an open one was a crucial process in China’s modernization (or Westernization) and coincides with a new appreciation of ancient Confucianism. The dynamic paths available to the newly open China are chaotic but “bounded” in the future — chaotic in that no one can foresee the actual paths in detail, and bounded in that it would become rationally Confucian as well as adaptive to the Western civilization. INCOME INEQUALITIES IN THE UNITED STATES Extravagance leads to insubordination, and parsimony to meanness. It is better to be mean than to be insubordinate. Confucius (7:36)

It is a matter of fact that human beings are unequal in almost every way. They are different in shape, size, sex, genetic endowments, abilities, sense of humor, ear for music, intelligence, social sensitivity, health, longevity, strength, athletic prowess, and so on. Nevertheless, it is a basic tenet of democracy that humans are of equal worth. This value should be reflected in the economic, social, and political structures of democratic society. In the minds of many, equality has come to be identified with justice and fairness. In Politics (Book V), Aristotle asked: “Now justice is recognized universally as some sort of equality. Justice involves as assignment of things to persons. Equals are entitled to equal things. But here we are met by the important question: equal and unequal in what?” This is not an easy problem. In modern times, the economic reality of many democratic societies is characterized by inequality. Thoreau (1817-1862, 1910:31) asserted: “It is a mistake to suppose that, in a country where the usual evidences of civilisation exist, the condition of a very large body of the inhabitants may not be as degraded as that of savages. I refer to the degraded poor, not, now, to the degraded rich.”

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College Attrition at American Research Universities The conception of social justice is essential for us to judge the general distribution of goods, benefits, wealth, services, political power, and burdens in a society. “A passion for well-being,” Tocqueville (1835:238) observed, “is . . . the most lively of all the emotions aroused or inflamed by equality, and it is a passion shared by all. So this taste for well-being is the most striking and unalterable characteristic of democratic ages.” According to him (1835:101), democratic institutions would develop sentiments of envy among masses, awakening and strengthening the desire for equality without being able to satisfy them entirely. People are taught they will be able to rise to the level of everybody else; but only a few will actually attain all that they feel entitled to. People are motivated to keep trying, but they are often upset by the repeated failures. The principles of capitalism and democracy are the founding values of the American political culture. It has been commonly held that these principles would work in harmony in the sense that democracy always bolsters capitalism by guaranteeing a desirable social and economic environment for material prosperity and capitalism helps democracy to deliver political and social goods to its citizens. However, capitalism encourages everyone to judge people according to individual talents and contribution, while democracy attributes equivalent value to all people. Capitalism established the reward system that encourages individuals to earn and amass as much wealth as possible, while democracy places a value on enabling everyone to gain at least a decent livelihood. From the viewpoint of capitalism, the free market is economically efficient and socially fair; while from that of democracy, popular majorities have the right to override market mechanisms when necessary to alleviate social and economic distress. Tocqueville saw the passion and preoccupation of Americans for equality, which was seen as a legitimate goal that might benefit society, as it tends to elevate the little man to the rank of the great. He also recognized that the human heart also nourishes a spiteful taste for equality, which leads the weak to want to drag the strong down to their level. The latter tendency induces men to prefer equality in servitude to inequality in freedom. Capitalism is primarily concerned with maximizing profit and one’s own utility. On the other hand, the democratic principles advocate for maximizing freedom, equality, and the public good. If capitalism tends to widen the income inequality between the rich and the poor, then it is difficult for a democratic system to provide true equality in opportunity. Nevertheless, “American traditions,” Hofstadter (1972:xxxviii) argued, “also show a strong bias in favor of egalitarian democracy, but it has been a democracy in cupidity, rather than a

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V. Economic Freedom and Development democracy in fraternity.” He showed that capitalism has a strong influence on the United States’ political tradition. According to Hofstadter, the political struggles in American history have often been misleading because the range of vision embraced by the primary contestants in the major parties tended to be bounded by the horizons of property and enterprise. Some economists maintain that inequality normally increases in earlier phases of modern economic growth, then reduced, and increased again later on. This implies that a country seeking economic advancement will first experience growth with increasing inequality. Kuznets (1955) conjectured that something like this may well have happened during the course of economic development in currently advanced economies. In Williamson and Lindert (1980), the dynamics of income inequality in the United States are examined. They show that Kuznets’ hypothesis does hold for the US economy. Income and wealth inequality increased with the beginning of America’s modern economic growth in the early 19th century. Inequality tended to be reduced with the advent of mature capitalist development in the 20th century. In the interim, the US economy experienced extensive inequality for seven decades. The wage structure around 1816 was quite narrow. The difference in the nominal pay for common labor and skilled workers such as engineers, teachers, carpenters, and mechanics rose rapidly between 1816 and 1856. A slight decline in later 19th-century pay ratios was followed by another abrupt increase in difference between the 1890s and 1914. The advantages gained by the skilled groups were maintained and even reinforced through 1916. The United States enjoyed the longest period of shared prosperity in history from the 1940s into the 1970s. During this period, a worker even with limited formal education could earn a middle-class income if he was willing to work hard. However, since the energy price shocks of the 1970s, the American economy began to experience slower growth in productivity and output, and a rise in long-term joblessness. Perhaps the most serious problem has been the widening income gap between the poor and the rich, associated with the slowdown in economic growth. American society proclaims the worth of every human being with equal justice and equal political rights. This conception of equality permits social and economic inequality. Differences in wealth and status are commonly perceived as matters of individual distinction, character, and achievement, rather than inequality per se. Under democracy and fair competition, earned inequalities are justified. Touring the United States in 1831-1832, Tocqueville observed that the men were more equal in wealth and mental endowments than in any other

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College Attrition at American Research Universities country of the world in recorded history. The current situation in the United States seems to be the opposite of what Tocqueville observed. Arthur Okun (1975:1), an economist and former chairman of President Johnson’s Council of Economic Advisers, observed: “Such is the double standard of a capitalist democracy, professing and pursuing an egalitarian political and social system and simultaneously generating gaping disparities in economic well-being.” In 1997, Forbes magazine counted 170 billionaires. Microsoft’s Bill Gate had $40 billion, the investor Warren Buffet, $21 billion, the Dupont family $14 billion, the Rockefeller family $7 billion. At the same time, in 1995 the average American family was worth $45,600. The United States in recent years has experienced economic instability and unemployment. In fact, real wage rates for most Americans have not increased much over the last twenty years. It is generally felt that it will be difficult for the United States to remain competitive in a growing global economy. Many of the serious social problems in the US are fundamentally related to recent economic performance and trends. Changes in information and communications technology, demographic and labor markets, and the globalization of markets have eroded the effectiveness of the policies, institutions, and economic arrangements that had enabled the United States to build enormous industries in the first two-thirds of the last century. The United States is now faced with the paradox of a declining sense of moral obligation and a heightened awareness of distributive justice. Bellah (1999:xix) called the paradox the consequence of contemporary America’s concept of freedom — “freedom to do your own thing.” The recent prosperity in the United States is enjoyed by the rich; most Americans have not benefited from it (Chasin, 1997). Since the late 1970s, the US has experienced substantial rises in wage inequality. By 1993, it reached a peak not seen since the end of the Great Depression. The Census Bureau estimates that the Gini coefficient of family income inequality rose from 0.365 to 0.425 or about 16% between 1979 and 1996. Partially as a consequence of free competition and globalization, the differences between the rich and the poor are growing. In Figure 5.4, based on Table 9.1 in Schmitt (2000:159), we illustrate one standard of wage inequality for the years 1979, 1989, and 1996. The wage ratio is the ratio of a worker in the 90th percentile of the wage distribution to that of a worker in the 10th percentile of the distribution. For men, the ratio increased from 3.67 in 1979 to 4.23 in 1989 and to 4.45 by 1996. For women, the ratio increased from 2.71 in 1979 to 3.85 in 1989 and then to 4.02 by 1996. The figure

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V. Economic Freedom and Development unambiguously shows that earnings inequality jumped among men. The situation among women is more complicated. We see that the level of inequality among women workers was below that of men.

Wage Ratio

4.25 4 Men

3.75 3.5

Women

3.25 3 2.75

Years 1980

1984

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1992

1996

Figure 5.4. Enlarged Wage Differences in the United States, 1979-96 We may argue that the enlarged gaps between the rich and poor are partially due to processes of globalization and rapid technological change. In extensively and intensively connected world markets, workers are confronted with increasing competition from other countries and capital owners can move their wealth easily to wherever the returns appear likely to be the highest. Moreover, modern technology tends to diminish the demand and therefore the wages for low-skilled workers, while pushing up the demand for highlyeducated specialists. Immigration is another important factor that affects income distribution in the United States. Documented immigration to the United States raised the share of foreign-born workers from 4.7% of all workers to about 7.9% in 1990. These immigrants are almost two times more likely than the natives to have less than a high school degree (Borjas, 1994). The increase in the relative supply of less-skilled workers tends to depress wages at the bottom of the pay scale.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Technology, trade, immigration, and other domestic and international conditions are interconnected. Wealth ownership seems to be concentrated in the hands of a small (and ever smaller) minority of the population in the United States (Keister, 2000). Wealth ownership means not only economic benefits and social status, it also confers direct or indirect political influence, for instance through lobbying, private funding of research and policy institutes, and campaign financing (Domhoff, 1990). Enlarged wealth distribution tends to strengthen social conflicts in democratic society since those who have wealth tend not only to maintain that wealth but also to accumulate more, while those who own little tend to acquire less wealth. According to Keister, income and educational attainment inequality are extreme; disparities in the ownership of wealth are probably worse in the United States. Wealth inequality has become more concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1960s. It was estimated that the top 1% of wealth owners enjoyed two-thirds of all increases in household financial wealth, while the bottom 80% actually owned less real financial wealth in 1998 than in 1983. It appears that the United States has surpassed all industrial societies in family wealth inequality (Greenberg, 1986, Wolff, 1995). The United States is faced with the continuing and, recently, escalating problem of poverty. The concept of absolute poverty is commonly defined as the failure to satisfy a minimum standard of nutritional requirement. To the extent that such a failure constrains the physiological and behavioral performance of human beings, it has also had a bearing on the welfare-theoretic notions of “capacities” and “quality of life.” The human body needs energy to perform both internal functions (chemical and mechanical works within the body) and external work on the environment. Bodily functions are maintained by nutritional requirements. Indeed, the problems of defining what constitutes an adequate calorie intake and of measuring what people actually eat lead to differing estimates of the number of persons suffering from hunger in the world. For instance, nutritionists and economists have different ways of defining poverty (e.g., Sen, 1992, Osmani, 1992). In estimating the prevalence of undernourishment in a region, it is common to choose a critical limit reflecting nutritional requirements and then to calculate the percentage of the population falling below the limit. There are no ready-made answers. Modern democracy means political equality of all adult citizens within the regime: all people are equal as persons before the law, and each is possessed of the political rights, permissions, and duties. Everyone is a first-class citizen in a democracy.

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V. Economic Freedom and Development Nevertheless, democracy does not mean that all people must be socially and economically equal. Within democratic regimes, there are inequalities in wealth and power. There are no definite relations between democracy and inequalities. In other words, democracy may either create large or small gaps in income and wealth among different groups. Nevertheless, it is often believed that even when democracy brings greater inequalities, it increases the absolute income of the poor. We now know that reality does not share this belief. It is difficult to define the level of poverty from social and humanistic points of view. The definition itself involves issues about human perception and emotions. To determine how a society should weigh its member’s suffering or happiness is an important issue in understanding the measurement of poverty. It seems that we cannot determine the weight by pure rationality. In practice, the measurement often reflects customs, political conflicts and human perception in general. As early as 1776, Adam Smith recognized the cultural-related character of necessity: “By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but what ever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-laborer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them.” Poverty may be due to various political, economic, psychological, social and cultural reasons at different stages of economic development under different historical conditions. For instance, the reasons for poverty may vary in agricultural, communist, industrial and post-industrial economies. The correlation between levels of national economic development and poverty vary greatly across the globe. Famine may be caused by various factors and the common predicament of mass starvation does not imply any one common fundamental cause. Droughts, floods, general inflationary pressure and sharp recessionary loses of employment can deprive large parts of the population of their basic means of survival. Famines may occur when aggregated production is improved. Issues about poverty cannot be fully understood if the analytical framework does not treat society as a dynamic whole. For example, it is

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College Attrition at American Research Universities impossible to explain the economic mechanisms of poverty in an agricultural economy without genuine dynamics of population and class structures. In addition to production structures and consumption components, population dynamics, capital accumulation, knowledge creation and utilization, institutions and moral codes are vitally important factors in explaining phenomena associated with poverty. Institutions, customs and other cultural factors play an essential role in affecting wealth distribution and poverty (e.g., Brown, 1991, Dasgupta, 1993). Although the United States is the richest nation in the world, a substantial proportion of the American population lives in poverty. In 1993, there were 39.3 million Americans living below the poverty line determined by the federal government. As shown in Figure 5.5 (based on the data in Rodgers, 1996:26), the poverty rate was reduced by almost half between 1959 and 1974. This was mainly due to the economic growth and increasing government expenditures on social welfare programs. Throughout the rest of the 1970s, the poverty rate remained more or less stagnant. Since 1980, the overall poverty rate has increased. According to Rodgers, progress against poverty declined dramatically mainly because (1) the wages of less-skilled workers were reduced in comparison to those of higher-skilled workers; (2) real spending on welfare was reduced; and (3) the proportion of the mother-only families (which are particularly vulnerable to poverty) in all American families was increased.

22 20 18 16 14

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

Figure 5.5. Poverty Rate for Individuals in the United States, 1959-93

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V. Economic Freedom and Development Observing the income inequality and wealth distribution in the US, one might wonder whether this is fair. The word justice actually can be used in a wide variety of ways, so that it tends to be interpreted with a great degree of latitude when referring to concrete phenomena. Modern (mainstream) economics has little to offer about the dynamics of inequalities and poverty. Distribution issues among different social groups are not even a concern of (mainstream) economics. Still, for over a century, liberal social investigators have studied poor people to create a knowledge base for informed social action. Massive amounts of data and an expansion of research techniques related to the causes and consequences of poverty have been accumulated in the US (O’Connor, 2001:1). Nevertheless, poverty remains a fact of life for millions of Americans. Liberal thinkers have referred poverty as a paradox of American prosperity. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL WELFARE Who says of Weisheng Gao that he is right? Someone begged some vinegar of him, and he begged it of a neighbor and gave it to him. Confucius

Many elementary aspects of being poor, such as hunger, inadequate healthcare, unhygienic living conditions, and the stress and strain of precarious living, are related to income and wealth distribution. It would be useful to present schematically the determinants of the income and wealth of particular households or groups of people within a society. A schematic presentation of this kind enables us to differentiate between the contributions of various factors embodied in the social system. It is important to understand the social and economic mechanisms by which the levels of income and wealth of different people are determined. For instance, the aspiration to equality has become widespread in modern times. Different people put different weights on equality in regard to different factors. Income egalitarians require equal incomes among individuals; welfare egalitarians demand equal welfare levels; classical utilitarians look for equal utility for all, and pure libertarians ask for equality with respect to an entire class of rights and liberties. It is not only socialists who have maintained that governments should act to secure a fairer distribution of income and wealth. But it is quite difficult to determine the consequences resulting from such aspirations. What are the economic consequences of altruism? Here, we say that one acts altruistically when one feels and acts as if the welfare of others is an end in itself.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Economists have paid little attention to altruism, perhaps because it is generally believed that egoism is productive while altruism is not. Smith argued that a capitalist, in making an investment which raises the country’s output, is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is not a part of his intention. Smith’s point is that by pursuing his own interest the capitalist frequently promotes that of society more effectively than when he really intends to promote the public good. The impact of altruism on economic growth is situation-dependent. It is known that Malthus (who was concerned with growth in a supply-driven economy) held that altruism might neither benefit the poor nor enrich the rich. He argued that by redistributing income from the rich to the poor, the savings rate of the economy tends to decrease, thus reducing capital accumulation. In contrast to Malthus, Keynes (who was concerned with growth in a demand-driven economy) held that redistribution policy (which may be considered as altruistic behavior) would benefit the poor and would not harm the rich. He argued that by redistributing income, the savings rate of the economy tends to be decreased, thus raising the level of aggregate demand in the economy. The economic performance of the system as a whole will be improved. There are many other studies on the relationships between altruism and efficiency in economic literature. For instance, Kolm (1983) addressed issues related to altruism and economic efficiency, trying to take account of preferences, sentiments, and action within a compact framework. Kolm discussed the logical impossibilities of obtaining altruistic behavior, together with the corresponding attitudes and sentiments, through agreements and exchanges. He tried to provide insights into why the major religious and secular moralities, such as Christianity and socialism, failed to realize altruism, though they advocate altruism while condemning egoism. In an earlier work (Zhang 2002a) we proposed a two-group growth model with altruism. In this approach, altruism is reflected in income transfers from one group to the other. In particular, the model is constructed to provide some insights into the economic mechanisms of welfare economies. Many opinions have been proposed to justify the existence of welfare states. Sugden’s (1984) “conditional cooperation” thesis suggests that people are prepared to contribute their “fair share” to help the needy only if they perceive others to be doing likewise — and as such, some level of compulsory contributions to welfare through the tax system may have advantages over a purely voluntary system. Miller (1988) examined whether it is possible to explain the existence of welfare states in terms of the altruistic concern people generally feel for the welfare of their compatriots. The existence of altruism means that people have the willingness to be taxed to

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V. Economic Freedom and Development provide welfare for others. It can be argued that the welfare of the society is improved by redistribution through the government tax policy because everyone would be happier when some resources are transferred from the well-endowed to the needy. But if people feel altruistic, it is possible for them to make private arrangements to express their altruism through charitable giving. It is argued that the liberal institution is superior to the welfare state in two ways. People can express genuine altruism if they wish, without being forced to do so. People donate the amount of their own choice without being asked. Miller also provided other explanations for the existence of welfare states. For instance, the welfare state may be seen as an insurance scheme taken out by the rich to buy off the discontented poor. The welfare state can also be seen as a device used by the poor, through majority voting, to benefit from income transfers. It has been said that the welfare institution creates a professional class that lives off its proceeds. The welfare state is seen also as a scheme of mutual insurance against remote and often unpredictable events. In this book, we are not concerned with people’s motives and with the belief that they would contract voluntarily into a welfare state. It is obvious that altruism cannot fully explain the existence and scale of tax policy in the welfare states (Zamagni, 1995, Stark, 1995). We see now what would happen to the economic system if the altruist rich transferred his income to the poor. To understand modern socioeconomic evolution, we must understand the dynamics of national growth and differences in the living conditions and wealth between different groups of people. The issues related to economic growth and distribution are the main concerns of classical economists such as Ricardo and Marx. But there are only a few dynamic (mathematical) models considering endogenous savings and income and wealth distribution. Zhang’s model examined a dynamic interdependence of two groups with different productivity and preferences. Assuming that altruism affects income transfers between the two groups, we showed how altruism and differences in preference structures and productivity between the two groups may affect national wealth accumulation, income and wealth distribution, and consumption levels over time. Because the model is technically complicated, we now make a capsule description of the findings of the model. It is shown that, as altruism is strengthened, (i) the altruists’ per capita capital, per capita consumption, and per capita income are reduced; (ii) the altruism-receiving group’s per capita consumption and per capita income may be either reduced or increased; and (iii) the national wealth and income may be either

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College Attrition at American Research Universities increased or decreased. It is well known that steady state values of per capita variables in the neoclassical growth theory are dependent on the propensity to save. When one group transfers incomes to another group, the “aggregated savings” behavior would be changed when the two groups have different propensities to save. This change in savings patterns (due to altruism) may result in increases or decreases of the national output and wealth. We described the case that altruism has no impact on the work incentives and human capital of the altruism-receiving group. But possible influences of altruism are also dependent on the way in which wealth and income are spent. For instance, when the poor receive money from the rich, economic conditions would be different depending on whether the poor spend the received money on education or on food. As mentioned by Keynes, if some labor force is unemployed, then monetary transfers from the rich to the poor would economically benefit the rich as well. Since we assume the full employment of the labor force, to provide insights into the economic mechanism by Keynes we may consider a case that the monetary transfer from the rich to the poor would increase the poor group’s working efficiency. We know what will happen to the two groups’ living conditions when the altruism-receiving group enhances its work efficiency after receiving altruistic contributions from the other group. It is proved that when the altruist group strengthens altruism and the altruism-receiving group increases the work efficiency, then (i) the altruists’ per capita capital, per capita consumption, and per capita income may be either increased or reduced; (ii) the altruism-receiving group’s per capita consumption, and per capita income are increased; and (iii) the national wealth and income are increased. This corresponds to Keynes’ argument. If we assume that altruism makes the poor less efficient (which may be interpreted as Malthus’ assumption), then the national wealth and the altruist group’s wealth are definitely reduced. If the reduction in the altruism-receiving group’s productivity is considerable, we conclude that the altruism-receiving group’s per capita consumption and wealth are reduced. In other words, Malthus’ view that no one would benefit from increased altruism is justified. Zhang’s model provides some insights into how altruism and differences in preference structures and productivity between the two groups affect national wealth accumulation, income and wealth distribution, and consumption levels over time. There are different viewpoints about man’s nature and the interrelations between beliefs and action. It is argued that altruism may not be a preexisting “stock.” For instance, Aristotle held that virtues are neither innate

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V. Economic Freedom and Development nor contrary to nature. But from the sustainable point of view, altruism may be conducted on a large scale in the long term only when altruism has positive consequences not only for the groups on the receiving end but also for the altruist groups. As far as society as a whole is concerned, it seems important to find out what kinds of altruistic behavior would promote the welfare of various individuals and increase the productivity of the society. It is well known that Adam Smith advocated that the government should intervene in a market economy by providing the opportunity of basic education to the people, so that all the social groups would benefit from economic development. It may be held that our analytical results provide insights into the viewpoints held by Smith, Malthus, and Keynes. In Zhang’s model, Smith’s viewpoint can be interpreted to say that “altruism” would benefit all the groups if it were targeted at improving human capital by making education more broadly available. Our analysis may also provide insights into Malthus’ view that altruists may neither benefit the poor nor enrich the rich. Keynes’ view about the government’s redistribution policy and economic growth is a proper example that “social altruism” can be in harmony with economic development and the economic benefits of the different groups. Alfred Marshall (1890:9) held that “The supreme aim of the economist is to discover how this latent asset [being capable of more unselfish service than they generally render] can be developed more quickly and turned to account more wisely.” Zhang’s model shows that there is no unique correspondence between altruism and economic consequences. In other words, altruism may cause either economic benefit or loss, to the altruistic group as well as to the receiving group. The model also provides some conditions under which Hayek was right when arguing, “But the abolition of absolute poverty is not helped by the endeavour to achieve ‘social justice’; in fact, in many of the countries in which absolute poverty is still an acute problem, the concern with ‘social justice’ has become one of the greatest obstacles to the elimination of poverty.” Equality is not a clear-cut concept. It is multifaceted and often ambiguous. It can take different forms and apply to legal, political, moral, and economic domains. A society may have strongly egalitarian attitudes toward some matters and inegalitarian attitudes towards others. The United States still confronts the challenge of how the ideal of equality can be implemented. Government must at least minimally address some of the wreckage associated with capitalism: poverty, unemployment, and pollution. Liberals continue to give primacy to the institutions of private property and marketplace, but they have to face

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College Attrition at American Research Universities challenges that have accumulated as capitalism develops. In the United States, the stress on success and the very modest welfare system impel the unsuccessful, or those without the means to win out legitimately, to violate the rules of the game (Merton, 1957). Although every citizen has now the right to participate equally in the choice of elected representatives, public opinion is divided as to whether individual equality also requires an (relatively) equal distribution of social and economic benefits. If everyone is free to compete economically, it seems to result eventually in social and economic inequalities. If rewards are equalized, disregarding differences in ability and opportunity, society may stall or go into decline. Capitalism and democracy tend to lead to equality in human spirit and greater disparities in economic conditions.

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VI. AMERICAN UNIVERSALISM AND RATIONAL CIVILIZATIONS IN THE FUTURE Instead of noblemen, let us have noble villages of men. If it is necessary, omit one bridge over the river, go round a little there, and throw one arch at least over the darker gulf of ignorance which surrounds us. Thoreau (1910:98)

In On the Origin of Species published in 1859, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) demonstrated that natural selection favors the highest forms of life over the lesser. He referred to this process as “the survival of the fittest,” and suggested that it applies to more than biological entities. According to Darwin, it is due to natural selection that one nation becomes more powerful than another, develops industries, becomes wealthy, and wins colonies. “There is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful progress of the United States,” Darwin noted in admiration (Zincke, 1868:29), “as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection; the more energetic, restless, and courageous men from all parts of Europe having emigrated during the last ten or twelve generations to that great country, and having there succeeded best. . . . All other series of events — as that which resulted in the culture of mind in Greece, and that which resulted in the empire of Rome — only appear to have purpose and value when viewed in connection with, or rather as subsidiary to . . . the great stream of Anglo-Saxon emigration to the west.” In modern times tourists, workers, businessmen and government delegations, not to mention money, services, and goods, are traversing cultural boundaries like a flood. There are books on almost any aspect of any culture written by people from

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College Attrition at American Research Universities different cultural backgrounds. But, in the intellectual world (at least, beyond the mediocre), quantity is not identified with quality. A genuine mutual understanding — which should not be equated with mutual tolerance — is impossible without a mutually agreeable vision. Indeed, cultural communications are difficult, if not impossible, when the parties have different visionary and symbolic frameworks. Although concrete institutions and human networks are changing rapidly in the contemporary world, the systems of values that sustain these systems rarely display sudden changes. The modern history of intellectual communication between the two rational civilizations, the Western and the Confucian, has shown that they still need a common ground for (high) cultural communication. Although he recognized the necessity of constructing a high vision of the world in order for the West and East to culturally communicate and converge, Leibniz (1646-1716) did not, himself, succeed in constructing a convincing vision to bring together the two. The primary value system of Confucian civilization remains Confucianism. In the West, it is well known that Leibniz (1994) recognized the rational character of Confucianism. He stressed: “It would be highly foolish and presumptuous on our part . . . to want to condemn such an ancient [Chinese] doctrine because it does not appear to agree at first glance with our ordinary scholastic notions.” History is a blended consequence of ideas, spirits, and opportunities, each carrying more weight at one time or another. Sometimes thought becomes a dominating force; sometimes spirit is a leading factor; and sometimes opportunity is a manifest reason for historical change. The same ideas were available to them both, but the United States and the United Kingdom experienced different paths in modern times partly because of differences in opportunities. China and Japan held similar traditional ideas and they were confronted with similar challenges more than a hundred years ago, but they experienced divergent paths of modernization (or, more felicitously, Westernization) partly because of differences in national spirit. Great thinkers such as Karl Marx and Max Weber strove to demonstrate a single (manifest) force as determining the historical path of human social evolution. Marx maintained that human nature was only a result of the society in which people lived. Change society, he proposed, and you restructure human nature. Perfect society, and you have the chance to perfect human nature. Marx assumed that the cultural superstructure is determined by the economic and technological structures; he theorized that class relationships under capitalism

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future would eventually lead the working class to organize a revolutionary socialist party. Although various major Marxist theorists anticipated that the United States should be the first country in which socialists would come to power (Lipset, 1997:77), the Russian Revolution came first. And socialism has never been culturally acceptable in the US. The Chinese vision holds that there are at least two manifest forces (or two ideal structures — such as capitalism and socialism, or two elements, or two sides), symbolized by the yin and the yang, simultaneously working in an organic system. Nonlinear science has demonstrated that a nonlinear open dynamic system controlled only by the two, internal and external, forces may exhibit unlimited behavioral patterns of historical development. More importantly, the nonlinear theory mathematically shows that no one is able to forecast the behavior of even a very simple dynamic system. In this work we argue that the nonlinear theory provides the common ground for cultural communication between the Western and Confucian civilizations. In contrast with the Newtonian vision, the nonlinear theory provides a high vision of the world toward which Western and Confucian rational civilizations will converge. Rather than the one-directional cause-effect between culture and economic development, we hold that culture and economic development interact. In general, we presume that economic conditions and ideology are of “parallel” significance in driving socioeconomic dynamics. According to the synergetic approach, one factor (such as ideology) may be “enslaved” by economic conditions during a given period of history. Similarly, economic dynamics may be enslaved by ideology during another period. That is, during some period of history, “economic determinism” is “approximately” valid as the determining factor; during some other period, it would not be misleading to identify “cultural determinism.” If we consider history as a continuous organic whole, there are no permanent masters and slaves between cultural and economic conditions. This infers that neither Weber nor Marx’s explanation of history tells the whole story when we consider history as an organic whole, even though their theories may be sound if we limit our historical study to a specified period. We thus don’t deny the possible validity of Weber’s opinion for a specified historical period. However, we hold that Weber’s argument is not cogent in general. From the synergetic viewpoint (Zhang, 1991), Weber’s theory, like that of Marx, should be a special case of general socioeconomic theory.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Meditating on the nature of man, Kant deemed that he had “discovered two distinct principles; one of which raised him to the study of eternal truths, to the love of justice and moral beauty, to the regions of the intellectual world whose contemplation is the delight of the sage, the other of which lowered him to himself, enslaved him to the empire of the senses, to the passions which are their ministers and through them frustrated all that the first feelings inspired in him.” THE END OF RATIONAL SIMPLICITY The United States took the eagle, Britain the lion, Germany the bear; but ancient China, on the other hand, honored invisible energy more than material force and thus it chose the lofty dragon as its supreme symbol. The dragon portrays power that lies beyond the ordinary animal range. Walter (1994)

We are living in an epoch that is experiencing the end of rational simplicity and the nascent globalization of rational civilization(s). After two centuries of “Newtonian civilization,” mankind is steadily climbing up, in small increments, toward a more sophisticated stage of civilization. The world is at the dawn of a new epoch of rational complexity. The new century will be characterized by global peace — not because man has become less capable of killing man but because mankind is faced with its potential total destruction if it does not achieve global peace. The new age comes partly because of the rapid development of nonlinear science, the computer, and economic globalization. Rapid progress in science and technology has enabled the West to construct a new type of civilization based on freedom and democracy. Traditional sciences, including economics, were developed inside a worldview of linearity, simplicity, and stability. Modern socioeconomic history has shown the limitations of the traditional political economic theories built on this vision, such as Adam Smith’s long-run convergence to a single equilibrium, Ricardo’s comparative advantage in trade, Malthus’ dismal predication of population dynamics, Marx’s theory on class struggle and socialism, and Keynes’ justification of government intervention. “Can capitalism survive?” Schumpeter (1943) asked in the opening of his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. “No,” he averred, “I do not think it can.”

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future According to Schumpeter, there are three processes in a capitalist system. First, the development of the capitalist economy itself undermines the entrepreneurial or innovative function. Schumpeter regards innovative forces as the essential feature of capitalism. However, the bureaucratic administration of large enterprises tends to make innovation a routine matter and to substitute the activities of committees and teams of experts for individual initiative. Secondly, capitalism erodes its own institutional framework by destroying the protective strata — the gentry, small businessmen, farmers, and others and by weakening individual proprietorship in favor of a more diffuse kind of ownership in the modern corporation. Thirdly, capitalism encourages a rational and critical attitude that is eventually turned against its own social system, and this process is greatly assisted by the creation of a large stratum of intellectuals who have a vested interest in social unrest. Schumpeter even predicted that a socialist form of society would inevitably emerge from an equally inevitable decomposition of capitalist society. In fact, in the third edition of the book he modified his prophecy. Schumpeter disclaimed any intention of predicting the future in such a definite way, and positioned the book as an analysis of observable tendencies which might have diverse outcomes, depending on the strength of various forms of resistance and counter tendencies that it would be difficult or impossible to foresee (Heertje, 1981). Fukuyama has recently explored the beginning versus the end of history (1992), trust versus distrust (1995), and destruction and construction of social order (1999). According to the I-Ching vision of the world, the different dynamics are the two sides of the same coin. Because it is possible to identify manifold manifestations of the yin-yang in a dynamic organic system, one may employ various yin-yang poles to give differentiated measures of the same phenomenon. The Chinese concept of change is not unidirectional and one dimensional but is cyclical and multi-dimensional. The progress and decline of society, morality, and civilization are endogenous and, typically, cyclical. In fact, the notion of infinite progress is alien to the traditional concept of change in Chinese tradition. There is an internal force that makes movement return to its starting point. Change is thought to be active in all human groupings as well as in the individual life. It embodies and cradles the soul of the masses and the spirit of the time. Human beings are said to have an inner dynamic biased toward change. The Chinese grasps life not in the state of immobility but in constant change and growth. The I Ching does not give a predetermined destiny, which would limit free will, and does not advise that

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College Attrition at American Research Universities something is definitely going to happen. It is concerned with alternatives and probable consequences of human actions. We can use the I Ching to interpret modern political economic theories, taking socialism and capitalism as the two poles of the rational world. The collapse of socialist economies and the expansion of government intervention in capitalist systems would then be considered a cyclical motion of the yin and the yang. As stated in a previous chapter, Confucianism would consider the two poles as abstract notions that are useful in making an analysis, but would expect reality to fall (or, rather, oscillate) somewhere between the two extremes, so that neither concept would be seen as an actual description of economic reality in any concrete instance, except for possible brief interludes. In other words, even if an economic system can achieve at socialism (capitalism), the extreme situation is only momentary and will soon move away from it. The socialist economies have recently collapsed; government intervention in the capitalist economies has been steadily increased. The structural transformation between socialism and capitalism can be seen as resulting from the internal mechanisms of social evolution, and can be described in Confucian terms. The socialist collapse is due to enforced stability and “femininity” (strengthened “yin”) in socialism; the steadily increased government intervention in capitalist systems is due to the inherent instability and “masculinity” (strengthened “yang”) in capitalism. Neither the yin nor the yang alone is desirable from the humanistic point of view. Only a mixed economic system is sustainable; and there is no one fixed recipe indicating a mixture that would always be best (so that Keynesian economics should also be valid — temporarily). If one reads what Mencius said about state planning, then market, and finally a mean way, one may gain insight into the Confucian mind about social and economic transformations. Mencius begins his criticism, “The principle of the was — ‘Each one for himself.’ . . . The philosopher Mo loves all equally. . . . Zimo holds a medium between these. By holding that medium, he is nearer the right. But by holding it without leaving room for the exigency of circumstances, it becomes like their holding their one point. . . . Yang’s principle . . . does not acknowledge the claims of the sovereign. Mo’s principle . . . does not acknowledge the peculiar affection due to a father. But to acknowledge neither king nor father is to be in the state of a beast. . . . If the principles of Yang and Mo are not stopped, and the principles of Confucius not set forth, then those perverse speakings will delude the people, and stop up the path of benevolence and righteousness. When benevolence

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future and righteousness are stopped up, beasts will be led on to devour men, and men will devour each other. . . . Those who are fleeing from the errors of Mo [socialism — (author’s note)] naturally turn to Yang [capitalism], and those who are fleeing from the errors of Yang naturally turn to orthodoxy [democracy and free markets with government intervention]. When they so turn, they should at once and simply be received.” Modern economic history helps us to recognize the limitations of the principles of the two extremes. Keynesian (mixed) economics, for example, was suitable for the capitalist economies after World War II; but the same economic theory would be harmful in the same economies now. Newtonian science was built on the assumption that objective universal laws exist, which govern all natural phenomena. Once these laws have been ascertained by scientific inquiry, then with any set of conditions at any given moment we can perfectly predict the future, the present, and the past. Influenced by Newtonian science, traditional social scientists dismissed the notion of non-predictability as a cheap evasion. They believed that with sufficient planning, society could be made to follow a given scheme. They gave explicit answers to complicated questions such as the benefits of economic freedom and international trade. But “Both extremes — ” as Walter (1994:19) says, “passionate romantic or cool logician — reveal a paucity of perspective in the West for more than 2,500 years. It has split us into romantic versus classic, liberal versus conservative, left versus right, heart versus head. But it is possible to encompass both poles within a larger, transcendental third stance. This paradigm is cradled in chaos theory, that amazing new science of the 20th century. It reveals the I Ching to be a model of chaos patterning in microcosm. It even connects science to spirit.” Chaos theory (also called the science of complexity) deals with not only those systems that will always have fluctuations about the fixed level of the periodic cycle, but also with systems that appear to be so irregular that it may be difficult to associate them with any underlying stationary or periodic process. There are various potential sources for variations. One is a fluctuating environment. Still, there are mysterious situations in which fluctuations are found even when environmental parameters are maintained at a level as constant as possible and no perturbing influences can be identified. Some mechanisms leading to such endogenous irregularities can be explained with the help of chaos theory.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities We now apply a simple nonlinear mapping to illustrate what chaos theory can reveal. We consider the logistical map xt +1 = ax t (1 − xt ), 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1 . This is a simple mathematical equation which has found wide applications in different fields such as population theory, economics, behavior science, psychology, and natural sciences. Here, we give a novel interpretation of the map. We consider xt as a measurement of income equality among the population at year t . The state of complete equality (or the most desirable state during some given period) among the population is x =1 , and the state of t incomes concentrated in the hands of a single person (or the least desirable state x during some given period) is given by xt = 0 . The greater the variable t , the more equal the income distribution. Thus, the variable 1 − xt measures income inequality among the population. In a capitalist economy, income distribution xt is determined by the market mechanism with some government intervention through taxation and welfare programs. Our economic law of income distribution is given by

xt +1 = a × (1 − xt ), xt where the parameter a is interpreted as the speed of change (towards greater equality). That is,

the equality in the year t + 1 the equality in the year t = the speed of change × the inequality in the year t . We require 0 ≤ a ≤ 4 , which guarantees xt moving between 0 and 1 . If a is large, the society tends to move towards greater equality at high speed. For a given a , the above equation means that the ratio of the equality in the year t + 1 to the equality in the year t is proportionally related to the inequality in the current year. The rule is simple; but the consequences resulting from it are complicated. The following bifurcation map of the logistical map describes the behavioral pattern of income distribution and parameter a . When parameter a takes on values somewhere between 2 and 3, 2 < a < 3 , the map has a single value. When 3 < a < 3.4 , it has two-periodic cycles. When a is larger than 3.6, then chaos appears.

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future If we interpret parameter a as the political power to enforce income equality, we conclude the following. If the society does not have a strong policy to enforce income equality, income distribution will be unequal. As the policy is strengthened, the income distribution becomes more equal. As the policy is further increased, the income distribution becomes periodic (that is, it swings, 1 at regular intervals). Finally, as the distribution policy is reinforced, distributional chaos begins to appear. We conclude that even when the 0.8 government makes income equality its central goal and adopts a policy to enforce equality, the government becomes a force causing the national income distribution to be chaotic. In other words, when the government has a clear and 0.6 strong policy for equality, it is faced with chaotic consequences — the policy only leads to confusion. And if a majority of the population in a matured 0.4 democratic society prefers a chaotic form of distribution to an ordered one with large income gaps between the rich and poor, voters can “force” politicians to make the national income distribution chaotic.

x

0.2

0 2

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Figure 6.1. The Relation between

3.5

a

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a and Income Distribution

The existence of chaos implies that no one can know precisely what will happen in society in the future, except that it will be changing. To illustrate why almost nobody can foresee the consequences of an interventionist policy, let us try to find out what will happen to the chaotic system when it starts from two different but very near states. In Figure 6.2, we consider a case where the government intervention policy is characterized by a = 3.6 . Our current year is 2001. Government analysts want to know the distribution pattern in the future, based on collected data. Since the data could hardly be perfect, it is reasonable to require that one should allow some error in the current distribution estimate. Let us consider the case that the estimated income distribution is 40% and the actual distribution in 2001 is 40.5%. The error in the estimate is only 0.5% — an allowable error for national data. Figure 6.2 shows the dynamics of the distribution with

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x2001 = 0.400 and x2001 = 0.405 over the next 50 years. The two distribution patterns are varied over time.

xt [0.400]

xt [0.405] 　　

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Time　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 (b) x0=0.405 (a) x0=0.400 Figure 6.2 Dynamics with Different Initial Conditions, a=3.6

x [0.400] − x [0.405]

t We calculate the difference t between the path x = 0 . 400 x = 0.405 over 50 years. The 2001 2001 started at and the one at government’s calculation for the income distribution at 2010 and at 2011 is under-estimated 4% and over-estimated 10%, respectively, even though the initial inaccuracy is only 0.5%.

xt [0.400] − xt [0.405]

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-0.1

Figure 6.3 Small Differences at the Beginning Have Great Significance

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future Chaos is called deterministic chaos because chaos is generated by fixed rules which do not themselves involve any elements of change. In principle, the future is completely determined by the past; but in research situations small uncertainties, inescapable due to the minute degrees of measurement entailed in assessing initial conditions, are amplified, with the effect that even though the behavior is predictable in the short term, it is unpredictable over the long haul. Even if a rational rule is simple, it is difficult to foresee its consequences. In fact, simple as the logistic map is, its behavior is so complicated that even a few decades ago the best minds in human history would not have been able to perceive the richness of the map. The above example demonstrates that, even when people follow the same principle, they may reasonably differ in their opinions, even about the same issue. Since consequences are chaotic, people can hardly have the same opinion about the likely consequences of government action. Traditional science provides only a partial, if not wrong, vision of society, teaching that problems always have a unique solution if they are governed by the same principles under similar environments. Modern science shows that there are multiple possible outcomes even if a situation is governed by a simple principle under a similar environment. “Those whose courses are different cannot lay plans for one another.” Confucius was right, but he could have gone farther. In light of chaos (nonlinear) theory, we see that even people whose courses are the same may not lay plans for one another. Mutual understanding is probably impossible. Still, mutual tolerance is a minimum requirement for the harmonious co-habitation of multiple cultures. We may also apply the logistic map to illustrate the ideological reconciliation that is straddling the ideological poles of assimilationism and pluralism in the United States. According to Wolfe (1998), contemporary voices between the two poles occupy the vital center — “Middle America.” Mainstream Americans have attempted to seek moderation, tolerance, accommodation, integration, and balance, as well as even contradiction. In fact, their behavior often appears “chaotic.” For instance, they may bolster bilingual education programs, but only if they are short-lived. They may also support multiculturalism, but under the condition that ethnic identity is subsumed under the common American identity. We may use the following variables to describe this ideological state in society: Pluralism = 0 ; Assimilationism = 1 ; and “Reconciliation Degree”

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= xt , where t stands for year. The variable xt describes how far the society is away from pluralism. If it is equal to zero, it means that the United States is purely pluralist. If it is equal to 1 , the United States is purely assimilationist. In practice, if we classify the American population into assimilationists and x pluralists, we may use t to stand for the percentage of assimilationists in the total American population. The change in the percentage is described by the following logistical mapping: xt +1 = axt (1 − xt ) , where the parameter a characterizes the intensity of reconciliation. This equation may be understood to mean that if there were too many assimilationists, some people would switch and become pluralists, and vice versa. How fast the switching occurs depends on the parameter value. The mapping shows that the system may appear to be chaotic as reconciliation is strengthened beyond a certain degree. FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES In hearing litigations, I am like any other body. What is necessary is to cause the people to have no litigations. Confucius (12:13)

The American civilization has a unique attachment to freedom. American freedom is manifested in several forms of liberty such as political, religious, moral, and economic. Economic freedoms, such as freedom of competition, freedom of exchange between producers and consumers, buyers and sellers, free choice of one’s vocation, free acquisition of rewards for one’s efforts, and free accumulation of wealth, are the key elements in the liberty matrix. The US appreciates freedom not only as a virtue, but also as a source of creativity, efficiency, and entrepreneurship. America was born of modern European civilizations transferred to an environment of opulent natural resources. Her belief in freedom came from the political and intellectual tradition inherited from Great Britain, with its tradition emphasizing the need to limit the power of the British monarchy by governing through the rule of law. The enforcement of this tradition was also due to unlimited economic opportunities. With regard to the idea of political freedom, “American political thought,” claimed Grimes (1983:x), “draws upon ideas that are neither American in origin nor even explicitly political in conception. . . . Puritan political thought is largely derived from the Frenchman John Calvin. American Revolutionary thought consists primarily of the reformation in America of the political thought of the Englishman John Locke. Late

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future nineteenth-century liberalism in America was clearly derived from English theorists such as John Stuart Mill and the classical economists. Social Darwinism came from England to America. . . More recently the thinking of the English economist John Maynard Keynes has found a place in American political thought and practice.” It can be argued that Americans have made few original contributions to political theory, even though they have constructed their own distinctive political institutions. Americans have interpreted, adopted, and modified European political thought to suit America’s situations. Jefferson, as a typical case, was influenced directly by Locke; but Jefferson used Locke with regard to the American situation, which gave Jeffersonian thought a distinction of its own. “I think that nations,” gauged Tocqueville (1835:215), “like men, in their youth almost always give indications of the main features of their destiny.” Seeing how energetically the Anglo-Americans conducted trade, and with an eye to their natural advantages, and their success, he foretold that the United States would become the leading naval power. He believed that America was born to rule the seas — long before that became a reality. America has become far stronger than even Tocqueville envisaged. Nevertheless, the most distinguished value — love of freedom — of the American civilization has remained invariable. “It might be said,” notes Wittgenstein (Wright 1998:12), “that civilization can only have its epic poet in advance. Just as one can only foresee one’s own death and describe it as something lying in the future, not report it as it happens. So it might be said: If you want to see the epic of a whole culture written you will have to seek it in the works of its greatest figures and hence see it at a time when the end of this culture can only be foreseen, for later there is no one there any more to describe it.” Turner (1861-1932) held that the United States developed out of its own experiences and pioneers’ ideals as its frontiers advanced and people steadily conquered and settled the land. Other civilizations learned to love freedom and accept equality among men; the United States was born, according to Turner, with the natural love of freedom. “Never again,” he claimed (1986:261-262), “can such an opportunity come to the sons of men. It was unique.” He also points out that unoccupied and uncultivated wilderness gave men the sense of a fair, blank paper on which to write a new chapter in the story of man’s struggle to construct a higher society. To European immigrants, who were once bound by the chains of social class and custom, the American wilds offered an escape into

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College Attrition at American Research Universities a free life and greater well-being among the bounties of nature — and provided the chance for an indefinite ascent on the scale of social advance. “Oh, how sweet,” Turner (1986:262) cited from a European immigrant in the American forest, “is the quiet of these parts, freed from the troubles and perplexities of woeful Europe.” To European immigrants, America was a land of opportunity, of freedom, of democracy. The bonds of social caste that bound them in their old home no longer constrained them in the new country. The immigrants, of varied backgrounds, preferred liberty to authority, freedom to responsibility, rights to duties. Jung (1875-1961, 1989: 207) asserted: “A conscious capacity for onesidedness is a sign of the highest culture, but involuntary one-sidedness, i.e., the inability to be anything but one-sided, is a sign of barbarism.” Life is a complicated web. The principles of demand and supply work in such a human way that social virtue is often accompanied by evil, and vice versa. Lipset (1997) portrayed the yin-yang dynamics of the American culture, observing that the United States is the most individualistic, religious, optimistic, patriotic, and rights-oriented; it also demonstrates the opposite extremes. America has the highest crime rates; has the most people locked up in jail; has the most lawyers per capita of any country in the world, with high tort and malpractice rates. The percentage of the eligible electorate that actually votes is the lowest among the democratic countries; but America has the highest rate of participation in voluntary organizations. America is still, according to Lipset (1997:26), “the wealthiest in real income terms, the most productive as reflected in worker output, the highest in proportions of people who graduate from or enroll in higher education (post-grade 12) and in postgraduate work (post-grade 16). It is the leader in upward mobility into professional and other high-status and elite occupations, close to the top in terms of commitment to work rather than leisure, but the least egalitarian among developed nations with respect to income distribution, at the bottom as a provider of welfare benefits, the lowest in savings, and the least taxed.” It can be observed that the powers exercised by the institutions of social control have been constrained and the people have developed an ethos that values self-expression over self-control. Americans now place less value than before on what one owes others as a matter of moral obligation, and less value on sacrifice as a moral value. The Americans care less than before for social conformity, respectability, and observing rules. American civilization respects law in the ideal; on the other hand, contemporary US society

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future is often characterized by lawlessness and disrespect for the legal framework. What are more highly valued in America are self-expression, individualism, selfrealization, and personal choice. The cultural attachment to freedom is engraved into institutions. The Constitution emphasizes political stability and the protection of property; the Declaration advocates the ideal of equality. The Constitution provides the foundation for a system of government appropriate to economic freedom. The purpose of the Constitution is stated in its Preamble as: “We the People of the United States in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish the Constitution for the United States of America.” In Article VI, it is claimed that the Constitution is the supreme law of the United States and the Judges in every State should be bound thereby. The Constitution provides a framework for the acquisition, use, and transfer of private property and numerous defenses of property against tampering by any level of government. At the same time, it also provides some safeguards for dissenters and minority groups. It is worth noting that to the framers of the Constitution, liberty was linked to property, not to democracy (Hofstadter, 1972, McClosky and Zaller, 1984:73). In the US, the meanings of freedom have varied as the society evolves. “White settlers,” described Schlesinger (1998:44-5), “had systematically pushed the American Indians back, killed their braves, seized their lands, and sequestered their tribes. They had brought Africans to America to work their plantations and Chinese to build their railroads. They had enunciated glittering generalities of freedom and withheld them from people of color. Their Constitution protected slavery, and their laws made distinctions based on race. Though they eventually emancipated the slaves, they conspired in the reduction of the freedmen to thirdclass citizenship. Their Chinese Exclusion acts culminated in the total prohibition of Asian immigration in the Immigration Act of 1924.” Since World War II, the United States has been the superpower of the world. After the war and especially through the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, the United States had reached a prosperous, egalitarian, democratic pinnacle. Since then, the pendulum seems to be swinging back. In 1940, teachers identified the top problems in America’s public schools as talking out of turn, chewing gum, making noise, running in the halls, cutting in line, dress code infractions, and littering. In 1999, the top concerns identified by teachers were drug 185

College Attrition at American Research Universities abuse, alcohol abuse, pregnancy, suicide, rape, robbery, and assault (Bennett, 1994:9). We can also identify, according to Hughes and Cain (1998:521), a few principal liabilities that may darken the economic future. In recent decades, property rights have been weakened. We can increasingly observe reduced investment in public goods, resistance to technological change, big business, big government, barriers to entrepreneurship; and racism and sexism continue to be felt. Americans have increasingly favored a form of capitalism in which government intervention plays a significant role in the economy. Numerous laws now cover such matters as minimum wages and pension programs, industrial and banking systems, labor relations, employment of minorities, the safety of manufactured products, protection against environmental damage. The laissez-faire economy has been replaced by a more regulated economy. According to the I-Ching vision of society, the positive and the negative are not separate but are opposite sides of the same coin. Despite its globally broadcast social problems, people over the world idolize America and look with admiration at the promise it offers. The American Dream of creating a better life for themselves and their children is commonly cherished in many parts of the world. The American Dream has already driven many tens of millions of people to immigrate to the United States, leaving their homelands and their native histories forever. They have solidified the nation’s commitment to the Dream by hard work and success. Man naturally loves freedom; but this does not mean that men would naturally co-habit in harmony. The love of freedom also refers to men’s tendency to freely use other men, disregarding moral or/and legal constraints. Human history shows that no human society (of large population) can be free in the absolute sense because of this aspect of man’s nature. In response to this necessary limitation, the law of scarcity tells us that man’s desire for freedom has made freedom the most valuable asset in human society. If America is admired and loved, it is, as Grunwald (1976:36) attested, for “its constant, difficult, confused, gallant, and never finished struggle to make freedom possible. One loves America for its accomplishments as well as for its unfinished business — and especially for its knowledge that its business is indeed unfinished.”

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFUCIANISM The Confucian Classics are the chart by which the rulers of China have endeavoured to navigate the ship of state. It is the best chart ever constructed by man, and perhaps not too much to say . . . that its authors may have had in some sense a divine guidance. Smith (1897:314)

“It’s a shame — it’s almost a tragedy,” says Reid (1999: 99), looking back with regret in his Confucius Lives Next Door, “that the Analects are not required reading in the West as well as the East. I say that partly because of the book’s universal appeal: It is one of the greatest collections of ethical wisdom in the history of mankind. Its truths fit the contemporary West as well as they fit the ancient East.” No Confucian intellectual could have ever dreamed of the end of human history because, according to Confucianism, there is neither a certain beginning nor an end of humanity. A civilization may perish, a race may fade away, a country may vanish, a region may be divided, a man must die, but there is no end of human history in any sense as long as man remains on the earth. “Asian values” is a term often used to distinguish a value system in Asian countries from “Western-style” civil and political freedoms (Bauer and Bell, 1999). Since “Asian” includes many divergent value systems, the term comes close to meaning “anything non-Western.” With regard to Confucian values, one key value has been identified: “A scholar, whose mind is set on truth, and who is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, is not fit to be discoursed with.” Mencius (10:3) also indicated what quality should be esteemed in a person: “Friendship should be maintained without any presumptions on the ground of one’s superior age, or station, or the circumstances of his relatives. Friendship with a man is friendship with his virtue, and does not admit of assumptions of superiority.” Confucius advocated duty without neglecting freedom. He asserted (2:12): “The gentleman is not a utensil.” Man is not a machine — he behaves according to his duty as well as righteousness. Confucius (15:18) said: “The superior man in everything considers righteousness to be essential. He performs it according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humanity. He completes it with sincerity.” “Let his words be sincere and truthful,” he advocated (15.6), “and his actions

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College Attrition at American Research Universities honorable and careful — such conduct may be practiced among the rude tribes of the South or the North. If his words be not sincere and truthful, and his actions not honorable and careful, will he, with such conduct, be appreciated even in his neighborhood?”“Asian values” is often seen as emphasizing the family, and social harmony. But Confucianism does not consider the family as the central value of human behavior. In fact, it is only a mean man whose concern is totally tied to the family. “The superior man,” Confucius (4.10) confirmed, “in the world, does not set his mind either for any thing, or against any thing; what is right he will follow.” It is said in the Analects (Confucius, 9:4) that “There were four things from which Confucius was entirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism.” Fukuyama (1995:284) gives a popular view of Confucianism: “An Asian ethical system like Confucianism sets forth its moral imperatives as duties rather than rights. That is, an individual is born into the world with a series of obligations to other people: parents, brothers, government officials, the emperor. Being a moral person, or achieving the status of a gentleman-scholar, depends on the extent to which one is able to carry out those duties. Those duties are not derived from prior ethical principles.” Fukuyama’s interpretations of Confucianism are perhaps based on the Japanese official interpretation and the Manchu official interpretation of Confucianism, rather than the ancient Confucian sources. In order to maintain the Japanese system where social mobility through education was not allowed, Japanese Confucianism disregards the loyalty to one’s conscience that is found in traditional Confucianism. “The Manchu Qing Dynasty,” Yao charges (2000:248), “promoted religious and political Confucianism to an unprecedented high position in history and strengthened the orthodox position of the Cheng-Zhu School on the one hand, and ruthlessly suppressed any new interpretation of Confucian Learning on the other.” The Cheng-Zhu School was employed by the Manchu to justify their political monopoly over the Chinese during the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). In fact, as early as in 1697, Leibniz noted: “The Chinese above all others have attained a higher standard. In a vast multitude of men they have virtually accomplished more than the founders of religious orders among us have achieved within their own narrow ranks. So great is obedience toward superiors and reverence toward elders, so religious, almost, is the relation of children toward parents, that for children to contrive anything violent against their 188

VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future parents, even by word, is almost unheard of, and the perpetrator seems to atone for his actions even as we make a parricide pay for his deed. . . . To us, not enough accustomed to act by reason and rule, these smack of servitude; yet among them, where these duties are made natural by use, they are observed gladly” (Cook and Rosemont, 1994:47). Social and economic conditions have changed. Both the Japanese and Manchu “distorted” interpretations of Confucianism are of no use in any open civilized society in modern times, but genuine Confucianism remains valuable as time passes. This is particularly true for China, which, after suffering decades of war and cruel repression during the Mao period, is entering into an era of competition. Reading some contemporary writings on Confucianism reminds me of something Albert Einstein said (Philosopher-Scientist, Evanston, 1949): “Since the mathematicians have invaded the theory of relativity, I do not understand it myself anymore.” Many contemporary Western as well as (mainland and overseas) Chinese scholars are now concerned with whether Confucian principles are compatible with the principles embedded in the concept of human rights. (Here, by “human rights” we mean rights such as freedom of thought and expression, freedom from arbitrary arrest and torture, and freedom of movement and peaceful assembly, the right to work and receive fair wages, to protect the family, to adequate standards of living, to education, to health care, to self-determination regarding political status and economic, social, and cultural development, and to ethnic and religious minorities’ enjoyment of their own culture, language, and religion) (Twiss, 1998:28). As we have demonstrated in the foregoing chapters, the essence of that which ancient Confucianism advocates is, fundamentally, in agreement with the human rights articulated above. Ancient Confucianism does not posit that one clear way to universal justice can easily be identified. “The empire, its State, and its families,” according to Confucius, “may be perfectly ruled; dignities and emoluments may be declined; naked weapons may be trampled under the feet; — but the course of the Mean cannot be attained to.” In The Doctrine of the Mean, Confucius said: “Perfect is the virtue which is according to the Mean. Rare have they long been among the people, who could practice it!” Confucius also indicated that the path of the truth had not been walked in: “The men of talents and virtue go beyond it, and the worthless do not come up to it. There is no body but eats and drinks. But they are few who can distinguish flavors.” And, “Men all say, ‘We are wise’; but 189

College Attrition at American Research Universities being driven forward and taken in a net, a trap, or a pitfall, they know not how to escape. Men all say, ‘We are wise’; but happening to choose the course of the Mean, they are not able to keep it for a round month.” Mungello (1977) observed, “Confucianism repeatedly blends morality and truths of nature in what a superficial reader of the texts might call a confusion of the two. But confusion hardly applies to the deeper understanding that Confucian philosophy has traditionally borne in relation to its Western counterparts. In Confucianism, morality is melded with the truth of the natural world and blended with the seeking of truth in an individual man. Traditionally, only a moral man was fully entitled to the description of ‘learned.’ Our tendency to scoff at this as nothing more than a mouthed ideal misses a connection that the Chinese were quite clear about and still are. . . . The modern West has seen the rise of technical experts whose expertise is judged quite apart from their qualities as good men; perhaps this is because we have become preoccupied with external knowledge. But when we come to knowledge that involves our inner selves, a dynamic connection emerges between the kind of person we are and what we can know.” Daniel Bell (1996:283) offered a bracing perspective on contemporary capitalism, identifying three pairs of cultural contradictions — the cultural yinyang dynamics of contemporary capitalism. The first is the tension of asceticism and acquisitiveness. Bell proposed that the unbounded drive of capitalism undermines the moral foundations of the original Protestant ethic. Modern capitalism was made possible by the asceticism sanctioned by Calvinist and early Protestant thought. That asceticism valued work as a calling and encouraged savings by the delayed gratification of impulses. Yet, as time passes, acquisitiveness has replaced asceticism — is that a problem? According to Keynesian economics, contemporary capitalism can effectively operate if gratification and instant demand are promoted. The second example is the tension between bourgeois society and modernism. According to Bell (page 283): “Though both were born in the same womb, so to speak — the rejection of the past, the commitment to ceaseless change, and the idea that nothing is sacred — the fratricide was there from the start. Bourgeois society feared modernism in its cultural impulses to explore the tenebrous; modernism despised the cramped character of bourgeois life.” (From the nonlinear socioeconomic point of view, it is possible to explore differences as consequences of rationalization in a linear growth epoch and “chaotic epoch.” The issue is, obviously, very complicated.) Over time, the culture of bourgeois 190

VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future society has been replaced by modernism. The third is the separation of law from morality. This has become increasingly important since the market has become the arbiter of all economic and social relations. In fact, we may find some deep reasons for the conflicts described by Bell. “No culture is ever really complete,” explicated Jung (1989: 73), “for it always swings towards one side or the other. Sometimes the cultural ideal is extraverted, and the chief value then lies with the object and man’s relation to it: sometimes it is introverted, and the chief value lies with subject and his relation to the idea. In the former case, culture takes on a collective character, in the latter an individual one.” Confucius (17:16) depicted the dynamics of mind over generations in the following way: “Anciently, men had three failings, which now perhaps are not to be found. The high-mindedness of antiquity showed itself in a disregard of small things; the high-mindedness of the present day shows itself in wild license. The stern dignity of antiquity showed itself in grave reserve; the stern dignity of the present day shows itself in quarrelsome perverseness. The stupidity of antiquity showed itself in straightforwardness; the stupidity of the present day shows itself in sheer deceit.” Contemporary division of labor and professionalism may result in the situation conjured by Weber (1991): “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart.” As people have been enriched and educated, “marginal values” of spiritual life tend to increase in comparison to material conditions. The dynamics may be especially strong among intellectuals who have grown up in a secure and refined environment — they have the predilection, in their conspicuous consumption, for dreaming dreams removed as far as possible from reality. Bell claimed that acquisitiveness, modernization, and legal mechanisms have come to dominate Western capitalist societies. We argue that until modern times, asceticism, a conservative bent, and moral mechanisms dominated Confucian civilization just as they did Western civilization. Now, modernization of the Confucian civilization would mean moving from the traditional “pole” towards the Western “pole” — neither extreme is perfectly desirable, but the modern one is far more suitable than the traditional one, given modern technology and economic conditions.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities HARMONY OF RATIONAL CIVILIZATIONS IN CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVES He who with a great state serves a small one, delights in Heaven. He who with a small state serves a large one stands in awe of Heaven. He who delights in Heaven, will affect with his love and protection the whole empire. He who stands in awe of Heaven will affect with his love and protection his own kingdom. Mencius (2:3)

A great artist is a man/woman capable of giving different names to the same thing; while a great scientist is a man/woman capable of identifying the same law from different things. Human life is neither purely rational nor purely irrational. Life can be approached only through endless processes of aggregating and disaggregating as life is characterized by particularity in generality and transition in permanence. Confucianism is constructed with the vision that multiple cultures harmoniously co-exist. Confucianism is created for a society of “perfect competition” with fairness, rather than for monopoly with immobility (such as the castle system or system built on the idea of a “superior race”). “Of all the pagan sects known to Europe,” observed Dawson (1964:9), “I know of no people who fell into fewer errors in the early ages of their antiquity than did the Chinese.” The ancient cultural environment of harsh competition among equals enabled ancient Confucianists to conceive a social structure with fair competition and free mobility. Mencius warned, long ago: “The evil of man is that he wants to be a teacher of others.” In the context of the Western civilization, Wallerstein (1999:250) says: “Human arrogance has been humanity’s greatest self-imposed limitation. This, it seems to me, is the message of the story of Adam in the Garden of Eden. We were arrogant in claiming to have received and understood the revelation of God, to know the intent of the gods. We were even more arrogant in asserting that we were capable of arriving at eternal truth through the use of human reason, so fallible a tool. And we have been continuously arrogant in seeking to impose on each other, and with such violence and cruelty, our subjective images of the perfect society.” In Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Fukuyama (1995:11) observed that “the American Problem” is the inability of the US to perceive its own society correctly. Perhaps no society can perceive itself correctly, not only because no thought system is practiced correctly and man can observe nothing

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future correctly without an Idea, but also because the common mind may not be interested in an objective perception about itself at all. Although we may speak of rational civilizations, there is no cultural rationality — just as there is no cultural multiplication table; what is cultural is no longer rational. According to Huntington (1996:21), in the post-Cold War world the most important distinctions among peoples are cultural, but not ideological, political, or economic. Like the dance hall full of girls hunting for husbands and married men hunting for girls, the situation is not symmetrical, even if it looks so. Culture is a complex of multiple dimensions. In reality, cultural differences can be identified anywhere as the need arises. It is important to note that even within the West, the identification of culture is not exogenously fixed. We quote from Ross (1991) to illustrate the matter: All of us have in our minds certain images of the way in which “typical: citizens of the major European nations behave politically. We probably think of a Frenchman as intelligent and volatile, individualistic, disliking authority and regimentation, cynical about sweeping statements of principle, passionately patriotic, but hating his political opponents bitterly because they do not share his assumptions about the framework within which the country’s destinies are to be worked out; we think, therefore, that he has become inured to unstable government. We probably think of an Englishman as sensible and calm, feeling the need to act on principles, devoted to political freedom, lawabiding, content with social inequality, and willing to work in harness with even his bitterest enemy, since all agree on the basic assumptions about the country. He is accustomed to a political stability that is unparalleled elsewhere, but that he takes entirely for granted. We probably think of a German as talented and docile, eager both to exercise authority over others and to have it exercised over him, convinced of his own superiority to all other peoples, disciplined but an easy prey for demagogues with glittering promises, dangerous and given to aggression against others. . . . German culture was mostly shaped by historical understanding, and so too the social scientific models of Wissenschaft within it, from the liberal . . . Weber to the radical Marx and Mannheim. In France, history has shared influence with rational philosophy and positive science, but has continued to shape les sciences humaines since the days of Tocqueville and Comte. England, like America, has been less influenced by historical thinking than the continental countries, but also less swayed than the United States by the model of the natural sciences. Independent disciplines of sociology and political science did not arise to join with economics as a distinctly scientific genre of knowledge; instead economics, philosophy, politics, and history largely retained their nineteenthcentury alliances as university studies.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities For rational civilizations, it is not culture but rational calculations (of material and emotional benefits) that really matter in the long term. The world wars in the last century occurred mainly among the Western countries. These countries are more or less in harmony. Sun Tze observed more than two thousands years ago: “For the men of Wu and men of Yue are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right.” Now a global economy, global environment, global education, global sports, global entertainment, global knowledge and technology, global literature and arts, the global potential destructiveness of national wars, human sentiments and suffering faces of varied races simultaneously watched on globally-connected TVs and computers are bringing the world into the same boat. Huntington held that people identify themselves with cultural groups (such as religious communities, tribes, ethnic groups, nations, and even civilizations) in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. People are involved in politics not only to advance their interests (material benefits) but also to define their identity (emotional benefits). In particular, he tried to convince his global reader of possible clashes between Western and Confucian civilizations. “The West’s universalist pretensions,” Huntington (1996:20) stated in a challenging manner, “increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with . . . China.” As we have demonstrated, his premise is untenable unless the Chinese are entirely impervious to the lessons of ancient Confucianism, not to mention of the modern Western (more properly, modern rational) civilization. Rather, there is every reason to believe that the Confucian civilization is converging with the Western (modern rational) civilization. Indeed, the convergence started long ago. Since the Opium War, the Confucian regions have displayed a regular pattern of economic growth and Westernization. This started in Japan, and then extended to traditionally less-cultivated regions such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Even within mainland China, it began in the south and then extended to other regions. It would be interesting to explore the relations among traditional cultures, their relative openness to ideas and knowledge, economic geography, and the progress of industrialization and Westernization in East Asia, but that is beyond our scope for the moment. Tocqueville (1835:123) protested: “Nothing is more annoying in the ordinary intercourse of life than the irritable patriotism of the Americans. A foreigner will gladly agree to praise much in their country, but he would like to be allowed to

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future criticize something, and that he is absolutely refused.” A similar attitude may be observed among the Chinese Singaporeans. Perhaps it is natural for immigrants to exaggerate the love of their new home. People rely on symbols such as race, ethnicity, birthplace, language, or/and religion for identity. People (like the Chinese, before modern times) who were born into a culture that holds a “monopolistic position” in civilized matters tend to believe in the continued superiority of their culture over others, in terms of abilities, values, institutions, customs, lifestyles. According to the economic principle, the monopolist should interpret the world according to his monopoly position. If he fails to do so, he is a loser. If we apply this principle to cultural behavior (it seems that virtually every race tends to dream of being a monopolist who can charge a high price, and work less, due to his monopolistic position), then nurturing a strong “cultural identity” would seem to be an effective strategy for survival and happiness. Nevertheless, not every culture can have a monopolistic position. The art of life is to know oneself as well as the environment. According to the economic principle, when one’s superiority disappears because of the advent of new competitors, one should interpret and charge the world in a competitor’s fashion. Indeed, it has taken many years of suffering and humiliation for the Chinese to acknowledge, perhaps heartwarmingly for new generations, the nonsuperiority of the Chinese civilization and to accept inspiration from the American civilization as well as from ancient Confucianism. Tocqueville (1835:197) observed: “While the Americans are thus united together by common ideas, they are separated from everybody else by one sentiment, namely, pride.” “In their relations with strangers,” he added (1835:330), “the Americans are impatient of the slightest criticism and insatiable for praise.” When the Americans are not with foreigners, they behave differently. “If thirty American intellectuals are to be believed,” Kallen (1970:233) says, “their country is in a bad way indeed. The picture they draw of civilization in the United States is sad and drab and snappy. Its blacks are so very, very black, and its whites so dirty gray.” At the close of World War II, the United States was producing nearly 50% of the world economy, measured by national product; by 1971, the figure had fallen to less than 30% (White, 1996). Since World War II, many Americans have believed that the United States is the greatest nation on earth — the most democratic, the fairest, the most generous, the most prosperous, and the most powerful. That belief is still justified to a great degree. Today, the United States is still the center of rational civilizations. It is still the world’s largest economy and the single military superpower. Individualism

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College Attrition at American Research Universities is still the core of American liberalism, which believes that a fair society and the basic liberty of the individual can only be attained by an appreciation of equal rights and equal opportunity for all individuals. The American civilization provides an example of the full cultivation of people’s talents and free application of these talents, not only for the White people, but nominally at least also for people of any background — making the United States attractive to different races from almost all parts of the world. Evidently, the United States has taught the Chinese people something about freedom and economic progress. But we should also remember the other side of the learning process. “The notion of what constitutes ‘American,’” observe Mauk and Oakland (1997:4), “has had to be revised over time. This process reflects both a materialistic/practical reality and an idealistic/abstract hope. Racial differences have demonstrably presented the greatest barriers to national unity.” The US political system contains wide scale and constant manipulation of group interests. As demonstrated by Smith (1997), throughout most of US history, lawmakers have structured citizenship in terms of illiberal and undemocratic racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies for political reasons. In The Treaty with China (New York Tribune, August 9, 1868), Mark Twain (1835-1910) related: “In San Francisco, a large part of the most interesting local news in the daily papers consists of gorgeous compliments to the ‘able and efficient’ Officer This and That for arresting Ah Foo, or Ching Wang, or Song Hi for stealing a chicken; but when some white brute breaks an unoffending Chinaman’s head with a brick, the paper does not compliment any officer for arresting the assaulter, for the simple reason that the officer does not make the arrest; the shedding of Chinese blood only makes him laugh; he considers it fun of the most entertaining description. I have seen dogs almost tear helpless Chinamen to pieces in broad daylight in San Francisco, and I have seen hodcarriers who help make Presidents stand around and enjoy the sport. . . . I never saw a Chinaman righted in a court of justice for wrongs thus done him. The California laws do not allow Chinamen to testify against white men.” By the early 20th century, the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 had extended to the ban to all of Asia. If we measure a country’s age by the principles around which its government is currently organized and operated, China is a young country. The United States, according to Commager (1951:109), is “the oldest republic, the oldest democracy, the oldest federal system; it has the oldest written constitution and boasts the oldest of genuine political parties.” In terms of the

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future continuation of a form of government, America has a longer history than China. If the American spirit is characterized as love of freedom, Chinese history after China was unified can be characterized as fear of freedom. This fear is manifested in the brutal repression of demonstrations, like the one at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, in the name of social stability. And what the first emperor in Chinese history and the first Chairman of the People’s Republic of China did after they gained power was to burn books. If one equates Confucian civilization with the behavior of mainland China in the last century, perhaps it is no wonder that the claim has been made that the Chinese will clash with the Americans. The last century was a century of errors, and the Chinese clashed with everyone, even themselves, to the benefit of no one. The Cultural Revolution — an anti-Confucian movement on a national scale — attempted to destroy everything civilized. The history of China in the 20th century can be characterized by a single word: anti-Confucianism. When Huntington was constructing his vision, China was far from a civilized state — even by the ancient Confucian standard. History repeats itself. China now begins to appreciate Confucianism again. There are many indications that the history of China in the 21st century will be Confucian, after the humiliation, suffering, chaos and poverty experienced by the Chinese over the last two hundred years. According to Huntington, religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations. However, China never produced any “profound” religion. The Chinese believe in various world religions but none of them was created in China. According to Huntington’s interpretation, China’s rejectionist policy against the Western civilization in the 19th century was due to China’s image of itself as the Middle Kingdom and a belief in the superiority of Chinese culture to those of all other peoples. In fact, China in the 19th was ruled by the Manchu, who became the masters of the Chinese in 1644 and were to some extent assimilated into the Chinese since then. As described in an earlier chapter, the Manchu venerated the Chinese civilization and rejected the Western civilization for its own racial, rather than national, benefit, as this was seen as the only way for the Manchu to retain control of the country. One may see why the Chinese Communist Party (mainly composed of Han Chinese) would not advocate the superiority of the Chinese culture — the Party itself was actually built on a foreign ideology. Among barbarians, there is no concept of civil marriage; among civilized people, there is no need. Most people waver between the two poles. There are

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College Attrition at American Research Universities evident conflicts of power and material interests among Western and Confucian civilizations. Even within a family of rational societies, there are unlimited possible conflicts due to interests (rather than basic values). The high divorce rates and the harmonious co-existence of women and men in the West show that differences in interests do not necessarily lead to clashes. And the high divorce and high remarriage rates demonstrate the complexity of assimilation and dissimilation of rational human relationships — nevertheless, one does not claim that the American people are exhibiting a clash of civilizations. Cultures are not static. They evolve through innovation, through selfimprovement, through — often gradually, after shameful and disastrous experiences — absorbing and refashioning ideas and ways of life of other cultures. No fixed set of values and strategies is universally valid for all cultures. Humanity prospers only through variety and change. Rational cultures adopt their strategies for survival according to their own situations. After examining Confucianism, we may conclude that the American civilization does not clash with the Confucian civilization with regard to basic values and social principles. Indeed, reality is not controlled by morality and principles of justice alone — national interests are often more important in international relations than the principles of justice. Confucius (4:6) reminds us of the realistic side of man: “I have not seen a person who loved virtue, or one who hated what was not virtuous. He who loved virtue would esteem nothing above it. He who hated what is not virtuous would practice virtue in such a way that he would not allow any thing that is not virtuous to approach his person. Is any one able for one day to apply his strength to virtue? I have not seen the case in which his strength would be insufficient. Should there possibly be any such case, I have not seen it.” The laws of creation and distribution of wealth in knowledge-based global economies are different from those of natural-resources-based economies. Economic costs and benefits are another key dimension by which to examine possible relations of Western and Confucian civilizations. Harmonious coexistence, in the Adam-Smith-Confucian gentleman’s way, between the Western and Confucian civilizations would be mutually beneficial in economic terms. Comparing the basic values of the American civilization and ancient Confucianism, and noting the principles of modern knowledge-based economies, we conclude that neither value factors nor lasting economic incentives exist to propel clashes between the Western and Confucian civilizations in the future.

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future Change and diversity are the essence of life; nevertheless, there is a tendency towards convergence among rational civilizations, as depicted by Tocqueville (1835:332): “Variety is disappearing from the human race; the same ways of behaving, thinking, and feeling are found in every corner of the world.” According to him, convergence happens not only because different peoples are more in touch with each other and are able to copy each other more closely, but because they are, more and more, completely discarding the ideas and feelings peculiar to one caste, profession, or family. They are “all the same getting closer to what is essential in man, and that is everywhere the same. In that way, they grow alike, even without imitating each other.” This tendency towards sameness is strengthened as rational civilizations begin living together in the e-connected global village. Irrespective of globalization, there is no universal social pattern suitable to all cultures. In modern times, it is not necessarily clear that “variety is disappearing,” as Tocqueville feared. There are many factors increasing diversity and differentiation in society and among societies. Referring to “spirit,” in the IChing, sense, it is said that femininity is characterized by differentiating one thing from others with the same essence, masculinity by identifying the essence among multiple things. (This is not about gender, of course, but is an abstract model by which we may analyze life.) Not every human being can stay at the energy-consuming creative top; but everyone can descend to the energy-saving non-creative bottom. It is the masculine nature that makes people seek distinction from others at the cost of endless effort, even life. The feminine side of our nature does not use “masculine strategies” to win the battle, but will drive the whole toward mediocrity. A traditional great man, like a great civilization, can only rest at the place of either being master or being enslaved — otherwise, unconsumed energy perpetually agitates the mind and heart. In this sense, if we do not identify a way for civilizations to reduce conflicts and to annihilate potential clashes of civilizations, mankind is in danger of suffering endless catastrophes (due to “masculine stupidity,” from the feminine perspective!). A human being is grown into maturity by “loving the mother and respecting the father,” or by knowing how and when to use the two kinds of energy. Every rational ideology is a fixed structure of competitiveness and cooperativeness between “femininity” and “masculinity.” Globalization requires a common set of ethical principles among rational civilizations. But according to Confucianism, ethical standards applying to concrete issues are not necessarily universally identical. For instance, democracy is dynamic, but not monolithic.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Democracy is the highest form of institution that men have ever invented to allow a flamboyant operation of the essence of life — change and variety. Democracy, Lipset (1998) demonstrated, takes different forms and follows different trajectories in different national settings. Perhaps, neither barbarian society nor perfect human society is democratic — the former is unable to sustain a meaningful democracy; the latter has no need of democratic institutions. The following example from the Analects (Confucius: 13:18) illustrates how Confucianism makes ethical judgment according to cultural tradition. “The duke of She informed Confucius, saying, ‘Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their fathers have stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact.’ Confucius said, ‘Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father; Uprightness is to be found in this.” Indeed, to steal is wrong; but the “right” way to “punish” it varies among cultures. Let us cite another typical example of the Confucian way of “thinking globally but judging locally.” When his pupil, Zilu, asked about force of character, Confucius replied: “Do you mean the force of character of the South, the force of character of the North, or the force of character which you should cultivate yourself? To show forbearance and gentleness in teaching others; and not to revenge unreasonable conduct: — this is the force of character of Southern regions, and the good man makes it his study. To lie under arms; and meet death without regret; — this is the character of Northern regions, and the forceful make it their study. Therefore, the superior man cultivates a friendly harmony, without being weak. . . . He stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side. . . . When good principles prevail in the government of his country, he does not change from what he was in retirement. . . . When bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course to death without changing.” There are universal principles for the gentleman to follow as well as local principles for the common man to follow. It is through the human sense — which is cultivated through education and selfcultivation — that harmony between the global and the local is achieved. Universal moral education cannot be effectively conducted even among rational civilizations because there is no universal theory — we have only collections of rational theories taught in isolation and conflict. Without a unification of theories, there will be clashes of civilizations because they follow unrelated and

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future even clashing theories. For instance, socialism and capitalism are fit for local states rather than for producing global citizens. Confucius recognized the complexity of social and moral systems, and therefore he counseled learning, self-cultivation, appreciation of others, and toleration allowing for the co-existence of many cultures. In ancient Confucianism, there is no such conception as a “naturally” superior race and superior nation (although a distinction is made between the barbarian and the civilized due to institutions, customs, moral standards), much less a distinction between the slave and the master by birth. We are now living in a complicated e-connected world. Growing globalization will be accompanied by new dynamics of nationalist, ethnic, and linguistic struggles for recognition and survival. Before a new world order is established, loyalties to racial, national, regional, linguistic identities might experience an epoch of rapid change or “rational chaos.” In the Confucian tradition, cultural differences are used as sources of learning, improving, selfexamining, rather than exploited as sources of conflicts. Confucianism values harmony, in an active sense rather than in the sense of sheer toleration. Communication is to benefit and improve oneself through the learning process and self-cultivation. “When I walk along with two others,” said Confucius (7:22), “they may serve me as my teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, and their bad qualities and avoid them.” Confucius never advocated learning without moral sense and friendship without distinction. “There are three friendships,” he said (16:4), “which are advantageous, and three which are injurious. Friendship with the upright; friendship with the sincere; and the friendship with the man of much observation — these are advantageous. Friendship with the man of specious airs; friendship with the insinuatingly soft; and friendship with the glib-tongued — these are injurious.” Confucius (4:1) taught people to learn by foot (international migration, in modern times): “It is virtuous manners which constitute the excellence of a neighborhood. If a man in selecting a residence does not fix on one where such prevails, how can he be wise?” “When we see men of worth,” he advised (4:17), “we should think of equaling them; when we see men of a contrary character, we should turn inwards and examine ourselves.” From the Confucian attitude towards learning and selfcultivation, one might sense why the Confucian civilization is demonstrating such energy under the influence of the Western civilization. If international communications would follow Confucius’ advice, the chances would improve that nations might co-exist in peace and prosperity.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities As the world economy is being globalized at an unprecedented speed, Confucian self-cultivation seems more important than ever. Self-cultivation is the way that morality can be established globally and justice can be spread universally. “The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire,” explained Confucius in The Great Learning, “first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge.” According to Confucianism, there are petty and great societies. “When a man sees good,” portrayed Hsün Tzu (2:1), “being filled with delight, he is sure to preserve it within himself. When he sees what is not good, being filled with sorrowful apprehension, he is certain to search for it within himself. When he finds what is good within himself, with a sense of firm resolve he is sure to cherish its being there. When he sees what is not good within himself, filled with loathing, he must hate that it is there. . . . The petty man is just the opposite. Despite his utter disorderliness, he hates for men to consider him in the wrong; despite his utter unworthiness, he desires that men should consider him worthy. Though his heart is that of tigers and wolves and his behavior like that of wild bears, he nonetheless also despises those who are his malefactors. Intimate with flatters and sycophants, he is estranged from those who would reprove or admonish him.” In The Decline of the West (1918-22), the German philosopher Oswald Spengler argued that civilizations and cultures are subject to the same cycle of growth and decay as human beings. Every civilization has its twilight period during which it preserves the form of its central Idea, but loses the content, the essential spirit. According to Confucianism, no culture can avoid decline without producing respectable men and allocating them to important positions. Confucianism does not deny the possible decline of civilization. Nevertheless, periodic progress is inevitable, as depicted by Mencius (4:13): “It is a rule that a true Imperial sovereign should arise in the course of five hundred years, and that during that time there should be men illustrious in their generation.” The dynamic forces of human nature drive civilization. Deep learning and moral improvement might be “inferior” goods — once man feels secure in comfort, he tends to stop working on his moral improvement and begins to place less value

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VI. American Universalism and Rational Civilizations in the Future on knowledge. Man can become amiable and even morally agreeable but can never become respectable through playfulness and superficial knowledge. Even if the United States might not in the future continue to be as powerful and influential as it is today, its glory can hardly be replaced by any other nation in the future, for the reason given by White (1996:438): “What mattered was what was remembered and emulated, not what was resisted, by nations that progressed, not by ones in decline. What mattered was creation in philosophy, science, agriculture, industry, medicine, art, song, architecture, writing, morality, and chemistry, in which lay something of the immortal that lives on after the civilization itself is gone. For even if America should finally fail, it might pass on as a legacy its techniques of commerce, communication, and democracy to others who valued them, the way it once profited from earlier civilizations. In those connections lie the continuation of human history and the emergence of global civilization.” “The fault-finder will find faults even in paradise,” Thoreau (1910:290) remarked, and many are finding fault with the American civilization. It has been said to be entering its twilight period (Berman, 2000:2); nevertheless, we observe tremendous vitality and activity in the United States. The American civilization, in contrast to the Roman Empire or the Chinese dynasties, has endogenous mechanisms to correct social inequality, to rebalance entitlements, to improve intellectual abilities, and to revitalize spirit before it actually collapses. The reason for this vitality and continuity is that it is built upon freedom. This makes it different from all the other great civilizations in the past. Wallerstein mused (1995:176): “God, it seems, has distributed his blessing to the United States thrice: in the present, in the past, and in the future. I say it seems so, because the ways of God are mysterious, and we cannot pretend to be sure we understand them. The blessings of which I speak are these: in the present, prosperity; in the past, liberty; in the future, equality.” No rational theory yet has been able to predict the future of socioeconomic evolution. People can rarely observe the present accurately. No one can change history, even though history is constantly rewritten. But we should also remember that science is not everything for earthly human life. Science can never ennoble man — but man can ennoble science; only man can ennoble man. The end of science is the honor of the human mind. It is through human creativity, through human efforts that science has been developed. Science even has limitations in making us happy. As Freud reflected in the 1920s (1951:46), “In the last generations man has made extraordinary

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College Attrition at American Research Universities strides in knowledge of the natural sciences and technical applications of them, and has established his dominion over nature in a way never before imagined. The details of this forward progress are universally known: it is unnecessary to enumerate them. Mankind is proud of its exploits and has a right to be. But men are beginning to perceive that all this newly won power over space and time, this conquest of the forces of nature, this fulfillment of age-old longings, has not increased the amount of pleasure they can obtain life, has not made them any happier.” Even while concerned for the future of civilizations, we can draw inspiration from Confucius: “When a man’s knowledge is sufficient to attain, and his virtue is not sufficient to enable him to hold, whatever he may have gained, he will lose again. When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has virtue enough to hold fast, if he cannot govern with dignity, the people will not respect him. When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has virtue enough to hold fast; when he governs also with dignity, yet if he try to move the people contrary to the rules of propriety: — full excellence is not reached.” Wealth and social recognition (power) give man satisfaction but do not necessarily ennoble man. Confucius once declared: “It is all over!” But perhaps it is not — not the end of rational civilization, but only the beginning of a truly humanistic, multi-culturally meaningful, globally peaceful, and (hopefully) nonmediocre, tolerably equal, rational civilization.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Brogan, D. W. (1941:116-7) USA — An Outline of the Country, Its People and Institutions. New York: Oxford University Press. Brown, H. P. (1991) Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Buck, P. S. (1949) American Argument. New York: John Day. Capra, F. (1982) The Turning Point — Science, Society, and the Rising Culture. New York: Simon and Schuster. Chan, W. T. (1973) A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, translated and compiled. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chang, C. (1963) The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. New Haven: College and University Press. Chang, C. Y. (1975) Tao: A New Way of Thinking. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. Chao, K. (1986) Man and Land in Chinese History — An Economic Analysis. California: Standford University Press. Chasin, B. H. (1997) Inequality and Violence in the United States: Casualties of Capitalism. New Jersey: Humanities Press. Ching, J. (1998) Human Rights: A Valid Chinese Concept? in Confucianism and Human Rights, edited by De. Barry, W. T. and Tu, W. M. New York: Columbia University Press. Ching, J. and Oxtoby, W. (1992, eds.) Discovering China: European Interpretations in the Enlightenment. Rochester: University of Rochester Press. Chiou, C. L. (1994) Emerging Taiwanese Identity in the 1990s: Crisis and Transformation, in Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, edited by Klintworth, G. Canberra: Allen & Unwin. Chou, Y. S. and Nathan, A. (1987) Democratising Transition in Taiwan. Asian Survey 27, 27799. Copper, J. F. (1998) Taiwan’s Mid-1990s Elections — Taking the Final Steps to Democracy. London/ Westport. Chu, J. J. (1994) The Rise of Island-China Separatism, in Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s, edited by Klintworth, G. Canberra: Allen & Unwin. Ch’u, T. T. (1965) Law and Society in Traditional China. Taipei: Rainbow-Bridge Book Co. Clarke, J. J. (1997) Oriental Enlightenment — The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought. London: Routledge. Collier, J. L (1991) The Rise of Selfishness in America. New York: Oxford University Press. Commager, H. S. (1951) Living Ideas in America. New York: Harper & Row. Confucius (1992) The Confucian Analects, in The Four Books translated by James Legge and revised and annotated by Zhongde Liu and Zhiye Luo, Hunan: Hunan Publishing House.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Fukuyama, F. (1999) The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. New York: Free Press. Fung, Y. L. (1952) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. I, translated from the Chinese origin by D. Bodde. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fung, Y. L. (1953) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II, translated from the Chinese origin by D. Bodde. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garber, M. and Walkowitz, R. L. (1999) One Nation Under God? Region and American Culture. New York: Routledge. Gleick, J. (1987) Chaos: Making a New Science. New York: Viking. Gordon, J. S. (1992) What We Lost in the Great War, reprinted in Forging American Character II, edited by J. R. M. Wilson, 2000. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. The Great Learning (1992) in The Four Book. Greenberg, E. S. (1986) The American Political System — A Radical Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Grimes, A. P. (1983) American Political Thought. New York: Michigan State University. Grunwald, H. (1976) Loving America. Time, 35-6. Guy, B. (1963) The French Image of China before and after Voltaire. Geneva: Institut Musée Voltaire. Hall, D. L. and Ames, R. T. (1999) The Democracy of the Dead — Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China. Chicago: Open Court. Hampden-Turner, C. and Trompenaars, A. (1993) The Seven Cultures of Capitalism — Value Systems for Creating Wealth in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. New York: Doubleday. Heertje, A. (1981, ed.) Schumpeter’s Vision — Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy After 40 Years. New York: Praeger. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit, translated from the German original by A. V. Miller with analysis of the text and foreword by J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (1991) The Philosophy of History, translated from the German original by J. Sibree. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. Heidegger, M. (1993) Basic Writings of Martin Heidegger, edited by D. F. Krell. San Francisco: Harper. Hermalin, A., Liu, P. K. C., and Freedman, D. (1994) The Social and Economic Transformation of Taiwan, in Social Change and the Family in Taiwan, edited by Thornson, A. and Lin, H. S. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Hofstadter, R. (1972) The American Political Tradition. New York: New Vintage Edition. Hook, D. F. (1971) The I Ching and Mankind. London: Routledge & Kegal Paul.

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College Attrition at American Research Universities Ku, Y. W. (1997) Welfare Capitalism in Taiwan — State, Economy and Social Policy. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Kuo, S. W. Y. (1999) Government Policy in the Taiwanese Development Process: The Past 50 Years, in Taiwan’s Development Experience: Lessons on Roles of Government and Market, edited by Thorbecke, E. and Wan, H. J. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kuznets, S. (1955) Economic Growth and Income Inequality. American Economic Review 45, 1-28. Leibniz, G. W. (1994) Writings on China, translated by D. J. Cook and H. Rosemont. Chicago: Open Court. Levine, A. (1994) Higher Learning in America: 1980-2000. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Lind, M. (1996) The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster. Lipset, S. M. (1959) Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53, 69-105. Lipset, S. M. (1996) American Exceptionalism — A Double-Edged Sword. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Lipset, S. M. (1998, ed.) Democracy in Europe and the Americas. Washington D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. Liu, D. (1979) I Ching Numerology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Locke, J. (1689) Two Treatises of Government. 1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Locke, J. (1946) The Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, edited by J. W. Gough. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lorenz, E. (1963) Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow. Journal of Atmospheric Science. 20, 130141. Lux, K. (1990) Adam Smith’s Mistake — How a Moral Philosopher Invented Economics & Ended Morality. London: Shambhala. MacArthur, D. (1964) Reminiscences. New York:McGraw-Hill. Mackerras, C. (1989) Western Images of China. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Maddidon, A. (1989) The World Economy in the 20th Century. Paris: OECD. Mainzer, K. (1996) Thinking in Complexity — The Complex Dynamics of Matter, Mind, and Mankind, 2nd edition. Berlin: Springer. Malthus, T. R. (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population, in two volumes, the 7th edition, 1967. London: Everyman’s Library. Mason, R. S. (1981) Conspicuous Consumption — A Study of Exceptional Consumer Behavior. Hampshire: Gower Publishing Company Limited.

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