Aid, Peacebuilding and the Resurgence of War: Buying Time in Sri Lanka (Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies)

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Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies Series Editor: Oliver P. Richmond, Professor, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, UK Editorial Board: Roland Bleiker, University of Queensland, Australia; Henry F. Carey, Georgia State University, USA; Costas Constantinou, University of Keele, UK; A.J.R. Groom, University of Kent, UK; Vivienne Jabri, King’s College London, UK; Edward Newman, University of Birmingham, UK; Sorpong Peou, Sophia University, Japan; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, University of Sheffield, UK; Professor Michael Pugh, University of Bradford, UK; Chandra Sriram, University of East London, UK; Ian Taylor, University of St. Andrews, UK; Alison Watson, University of St. Andrews, UK; R.B.J. Walker, University of Victoria, Canada; Andrew Williams, University of St. Andrews, UK.

Titles include: Roland Bleiker AESTHETICS AND WORLD POLITICS Morgan Brigg THE NEW POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION Responding to Difference Susanne Buckley-Zistel CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN UGANDA Remembering after Violence Jason Franks RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM Vivienne Jabri WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF GLOBAL POLITICS James Ker-Lindsay EU ACCESSION AND UN PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS Roger MacGinty NO WAR, NO PEACE The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords Carol McQueen HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SAFETY ZONES Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda Sorpong Peou INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE FOR PEACEBUILDING Cambodia and Beyond Sergei Prozorov UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU The Limits of Integration Oliver P. Richmond THE TRANSFORMATION OF PEACE

Bahar Rumelili CONSTRUCTING REGIONAL COMMUNITY AND ORDER IN EUROPE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA Chandra Lekha Sriram PEACE AS GOVERNANCE Power-Sharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace Negotiations Stephan Stetter WORLD SOCIETY AND THE MIDDLE EAST Reconstructions in Regional Politics

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–4039–9575–9 (hardback) & 978–1–4039–9576–6 (paperback) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Aid, Peacebuilding and the Resurgence of War Buying Time in Sri Lanka Sarah Holt

© Sarah Holt 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identiﬁed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN 978-0-230-24027-8

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This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 20

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

In Memory of My Mother, Morag (1951–2008)

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Contents Lists of Maps, Tables and Figures

ix

Preface

x

Acknowledgements

xi

Glossary

xii

Acronyms

xiii

Introduction: Peacebuilding and War Peacebuilding and peace processes Methodology The outline of the book

1 2 6 15

Chapter 1 Peacebuilding and Economic Recovery Defining peacebuilding The timing of peacebuilding Theories of peacebuilding Peacebuilding since World War II Conclusion

18 18 25 27 36 45

Chapter 2 Sri Lanka’s ‘Liberal’ War Ethnic demography Efforts to resolve the Sri Lankan conflict 1948–2002 A Sri Lankan peace Conclusion

48 48 61 70 75

Chapter 3 The 2002–2006 Sri Lankan Peace Process The Norwegian mediated peace process Peacebuilding as a policy approach in Sri Lanka The practicalities of prioritising economic recovery issues Conclusion

77 77 84 93

Chapter 4 Peacebuilding at the Grassroots Mannar district Before and after the MoU – Mannar’s changing situation Searching for the link between peace and development Conclusion vii

103 106 107 110 128 135

viii Contents

Chapter 5 The Resurgence of War The politics of war The LTTE The Government of Sri Lanka International involvement Return to Mannar A negative peace Conclusion

136 136 141 143 145 150 152 157

Chapter 6 Building Peace or Buying Time? Peacebuilding in theory Peacebuilding in practice What kind of peace? The challenges of transforming a state The prioritisation of economic recovery

159 160 161 162 163 166

Notes

169

Index

216

List of Maps, Tables and Figures Maps Map 1 Map 2

Sri Lanka Mannar District

xvii xviii

Tables Table 2.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 5.1

Rapid Socio-economic Changes in Sri Lanka 1832–1906 Economic Activities of the Population in 1997 Mannar District Populations by Religion 1981 SLMM Ruled Ceasefire Violations 2002–2005

50 108 109 142

Figures Figure 3.1 ‘Sri Lanka strategy Market Outlook’ report published on 2 December 2002 by CLSA, Asia’s leading independent brokerage and investment group Figure 4.1 IDP Returns Mannar 2002–2005 Figure 4.2 Total IDP Returns to Mannar 2002–2005

ix

89

112 113

Preface This book is concerned with how wars end and the role of the external actors in that process. After four years of ceasefire and an internationalised peace process, Sri Lanka saw the resumption in 2006 of bloody hostilities between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This peace process saw the prioritisation of economic recovery and development programmes by both the government and the international community. The outcome was the bloodiest episode in the history of the conflict and the military defeat of the LTTE. Since the 1990s there has been increasing international support for an approach to ending wars through addressing the root causes; an approach commonly described as peacebuilding. This book asks whether the prioritisation of economic recovery issues can help sustain a peacemaking process. This empirical research employs a case-study approach, using primary and secondary material investigating the activities of development actors at the elite and grassroots level. It examines the conceptualisation, theorisation and operationalisation of peacebuilding, and finds peacebuilding to be conceptually vague where there is a significant gap between theory and practice. Having analysed the Sri Lankan conflict and identified the changes necessary for a peaceful end, this books asks why previous efforts to resolve the conflict were unsuccessful and how this most recent peace process differed. Despite the focused attention of international donors and the application of significant funds, the international community was incapable of applying the pressure needed to instigate necessary political reform. Foreign-funded recovery programmes implemented in the war-affected North-west did improve people’s general welfare, and did not touch upon the core-issues of the war, namely issues of rights, political representation and security. The prioritisation of economic recovery issues in Sri Lanka may have resulted in one of Sri Lanka’s most enduring ceasefires; it did not, however, lead to a negotiated settlement.

x

Acknowledgements The impetus for this research came from the people of Sri Lanka. The resilience and optimism that I encountered, in spite of terrible hardship, has provided me with some invaluable perspectives on life. This book is based on research undertaken at the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York. My thanks start with the friends and colleagues from my time there; especially Alp Özerdem, Christine Hamieh, Chrissie Steenkamp, Helen Matheson and Basel Almisshal. Thanks are also due to Andy Williams for his encouragement over the last couple of years. Special thanks must go to Roger Mac Ginty, who continues to be an inspiring mentor. I am very grateful to Iseabail MacLeod for her encyclopaedic knowledge of the English language and help with proofing the final draft. I owe a great debt of thanks to Simon Weatherbed, whose friendship, insight and experience helped me through my fieldwork. I am also grateful for all the assistance I received from Raji and the staff at FORUT Sri Lanka. In Mannar I am eternally grateful to Raga and Nusia Alphonsus, without whom I would probably have met with disaster. Special thanks are also due to the staff at ZOA, Mr Paul Sinclair of CHA, Miss Antonipillar and Paul Master. I was warmly received in Mannar, and I am fortunate that all the people whom I encountered on my visits were willing to indulge my questions, and share their insights. These include officials past and present of the Sri Lankan Government, civil servants, diplomats, those working for NGOs and donors, people from the LTTE, but most of all the people whose lives have been irrevocably changed by this war. The National Library of Scotland has provided me with a very studious environment and an excellent catalogue. I am extremely grateful for the financial help provided to me over the years, from the Economic and Social Research Council, the Gerald Bailey Award and the British International Studies Association. My research would not have been possible without the unconditional support and encouragement of my family: I am thankful to my parents for giving me the confidence to go anywhere; my sister, without whom I could never have completed the research; and my grandmother who has been an ongoing academic inspiration and support.

xi

Glossary bhikkhu cajan eelam Government Agent Grama Sevika goyigamas hartal kachcheri karava kooli Sangha satyagraha Vanni

Buddhist monk palm tree whose leaves are commonly used as a roofing material homeland the chief civil servant of each district village headman high-caste Sinhalese general strike local government administration Sinhalese caste labourer Buddhist order of monks non-violent protest originating from India area controlled by the LTTE

xii

Acronyms ACTC ADB AGA AUSAID CARP CAS CBO CFA CHA CNC COI CP CPA CRC CTC CWC DDR DfID DRC DS ECHO EPDP EPRLF EROS EU FAO FDL FP GA GDP GO GoSL GS GSP GTZ HDI

All Ceylon Tamil Congress Asian Development Bank Assistant Government Agent Australian Agency for International Development Conflict Area Rehabilitation Project Country Assistance Strategy community-based organisation Ceasefire Agreement Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies Ceylon National Congress Commission of Inquiry Communist Party Centre for Policy Alternatives Convention on the Rights of the Child Ceylon Tamil Congress Ceylon Worker’s Congress Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Department for International Development Danish Refugee Council Divisional Secretary European Community Humanitarian Office Eelam People’s Democratic Party Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students European Union Food and Agriculture Organisation Forward Defence Line Federal Party Government Agent Gross Domestic Product Governmental organisation Government of Sri Lanka Grama Sevika Generalised System of Preference German Technical Cooperation Agency Human Development Index xiii

xiv Acronyms

HSZ ICCPR ICRC IDA IDP IFAD IFI IIGEP ILO IMF INGO IOM IPKF ISGA ISPA JHU JVP LSSP LTTE MARR MG MoU MP NECORD NEHRP NEIAP NEPC NERF NFRI NGO NHA ODA OECD ONUSAL P-TOMS PA PDS PLOTE PRS

High Security Zones International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Committee of the Red Cross International Development Association Internally Displaced Person International Fund for Agriculture Development International Financial Institution International Independent Group of Eminent Persons International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund International Non-governmental Organisation International Organisation for Migration Indian Peace Keeping Force Interim Self-Governing Authority Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement Jathika Hela Urumaya Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Lanka Sama Samaja Party Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam Mannar Association for Refugee Rehabilitation Multilateral Group Memorandum of Understanding Member of Parliament North East Community Restoration and Development project North East Housing Reconstruction Programme North East Irrigated Agriculture Project North-East Provincial Council North East Reconstruction Fund Non-food Relief Items Non-governmental Organisation National Housing Authority Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure People’s Alliance Planning and Development Secretariat People’s Liberation Organisation of the Tamil Eelam Poverty Reduction Strategy

Acronyms xv

PSC PSL PTA RDF RDS SCF SDN SIHRN SLA SLAF SLFP SLMC SLMM SMS TELO TNA TNT TRO TUF TULF UAS UF UK UN UNDP UNFPA UNHABITAT UNHCHR UNHCR UNICEF UNP UNRISD UNRRA UNTAC UPFA US USAID USSR

Protracted Social Conflict Populations Services Lanka Prevention of Terrorism Act Rural Development Forum Rural Development Society Save the Children Fund Subcommittee on De-escalation and Normalisation Subcommittee on Immediate Human and Rehabilitations Needs in the North and East Sri Lankan Army Sri Lankan Armed Forces Sri Lankan Freedom Party Sri Lankan Muslim Congress Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission Sinhala Maha Sahba Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation Tamil National Alliance Tamil New Tigers Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation Tamil United Front Tamil United Liberation Front Unified Assistance Scheme United Front United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Population Fund United Nations Human Settlements Programme United Nations High Commission for Human Rights United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United National Party United Nations Research Institute for Social Development United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United People’s Freedom Alliance United States United States Agency for International Development Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

xvi Acronyms

UTHR UXO WB WFP WHO WRDS ZOA

University Teachers for Human Rights Unexploded Ordinance World Bank Group World Food Programme World Health Organisation Women’s Rural Development Zuid Oost Azië (Dutch for South East Asia)

Map 1

Sri Lanka

Map created by Prof. G.H. Peiris, Emeritus Professor of Geography, University of Peradeniya for ICES, Kandy.

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Kilometers

Map 2

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Mannar District

Produced By: Humanitarian Information Center,Sri Lanka

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Indian Ocean

Madhu Mannar Town Manthai West Musalai Nanaddan

Name & P-code of DS Divisions

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Karadikkuli

Navadantaivu

Silavattural

Saviriapuram

Ilantaikkulam

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ANURADHAPURA

•Akattikkulam Periyakunchukkulam• Periyamurippu •

Chinnakkunchukulam

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Pannaiyedduvan

Malavarayankaddaiadampan

•

Pokkarvanni

MADHU

•Palampiddi

VAVUNIYA

• •Vannankulam Nochchikkulam •

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Field study villages

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District HQ

Produced through the generous support of:

© 2005 UN Humanitarian Information Center Sri Lanka

The boundaries and names and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Version:02 Glide no: TS 2004-0001470LKA

Produced By: Humanitarian Information Center Sri Lanka

Production Date: 05 Sep, 2005

Airports: Air Broker Center 1998

Survey Department, Government of Sri Lanka

Data Source:

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Railway Line

Main Road

DS Division Boundary

Legend

Map Locator

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# 202-204, Bauddhaloka Mawatha, Colombo 7, Tel: +94 (11) 2504434 - 5, Fax: +94 (11) 2504433, Email: [email protected] Online: http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka

MUSALAI

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Puliadimoddipulavu

•Akattimurippu •Tandikulam Kondaichchi

••

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Panikkapettankulam

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Kovitkulam Veppankulam

NANADDAN

!

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Periyamadu

•Nakattaivu

MANTHAI WEST

• •Koyitkulam •Vidattaltivu Pallamadu •

Komputukki

• • Vellankulam

• Mundampiddi •Tikali Kurunthankulam Iluppaikkadavai • • Kannaddi •

Thekampuddi

• • Thirukethiswaram •Mantai •Adampan Talladi Puttukadu • Alkaddiveli • Kavllanvaddathalvu • • Thirukesvaram Udaiyadi Vankalai • • Uyilankulam• Manalkulam • Uthuvayankulam • Nanaddan • Madhukari • Puvarasankandal Murunkan•

•• • •Erukkilampiddi Toddaveli • Talvupadu• MANNAR

Pesalai Karisal Tayliankudiyiruppu Olaittoduwai Malivadi

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TalaimannarMullitidal

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D I S T R I C T

Introduction: Peacebuilding and War

As you already know our Motherland has been completely freed from the clutches of separatist terrorism. From now on it is only the laws enacted by this sovereign Parliament that will be in force in every inch of Sri Lanka. – President Mahinda Rajapakse, 19 May 2009 The international tool kit for responding to violent conflict prescribes a quick fix of democratic elections and economic liberalisation, a socalled ‘liberal peace’. This mirrors the system that seems to work so well for the international donors states which provide the dollars and expertise as part of an international approach to peace. These peacebuilding operations and the liberal peace they espouse have come under increasing criticism.1 While these critiques look at a number of cases and rely on secondary data, this book contributes to a body of work that takes a more detailed view, investigating specific operations that have taken place in an individual state experiencing conflict, and assessing the impact of various policy approaches on their peace process.2 While many research projects of this type rely on ex post data, for the purpose of this book primary research was carried out in Sri Lanka while the peace process was ongoing. This provided a unique opportunity to study the impact of peacebuilding activities on the ground. Instead of a peace settlement, the internationalised 2002–2006 peace process ended in a military victory by the Sri Lankan Government over the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Between 2006 and 2009 35,204 people lost their lives, the bloodiest episode in Sri Lanka’s 26-year war.3 Peacebuilding was a policy approach adopted by external agents committed to the peace process, with priority given to economic 1

2 Aid, Peacebuilding and the Resurgence of War

recovery. This book offers an explanation as to why this approach failed. It challenges the assumption that economic recovery can drive a peace process by examining the donor-funded activities in the North and East, and illustrates the risks of the ‘peacebuilding consensus’ that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. It examines the way in which international humanitarian and financial organisations set out to assist states in the transition from war to peace. It aims to improve our understanding of how wars end and of the potential for external engagement, in the form of peacebuilding, to assist in that transition. While a great deal has been written on the topic of peacebuilding and what it should involve,4 the ‘literature suffers badly at times from vagueness and a general failure to distinguish properly between aspiration and reality’.5 Here the case of Sri Lanka is used to explore the gap that exists between policy and practice and challenges the widespread application of a liberal peace model to states in transition. This book is concerned with the concept of peacebuilding and whether it is an effective approach to ending civil wars. It does this by examining it as it applies to the Sri Lankan peace process: investigating the timing of peacebuilding and whether it can take place before the signing of a peace agreement; looks at the impact of the prioritisation of economic recovery strategies on the survival of the peace process; the ability of this approach to deal with typical problems of disillusionment and exclusion; its ability to address the underlying causes of the conflict; the role of the stakeholders in the process; and whether the prioritisation of development strategies as an integral part of a peace processes can act as an exemplar to other societies emerging from ethnonational violence. Sri Lanka ranks as one of South Asia’s oldest democracies, and it liberalised its economy in 1977, suggesting that this state has experienced liberal war rather than liberal peace. The conclusions reached about peacebuilding, the prioritisation of economic recovery, and the relevance of a ‘liberal’ peace to ethnonational conflicts are formed based on primary research undertaken in Sri Lanka between 2001 and 2005.

Peacebuilding and peace processes Many peace initiatives and peace processes prioritised macro-level political, territorial and constitutional change, leaving issues of economic development as an afterthought. The result is often a dysfunctional peace where, after the initial euphoria surrounding the signing of a peace accord, the population at large do not see material advantage in the post-

Introduction: Peacebuilding and War 3

peace accord period. The much vaunted peace dividend rarely appears, or is equally shared. ‘Peacebuilding’ has been the term adopted for an extraordinarily wide range of activities that have aimed to facilitate the transition from war to peace as a state emerges from conflict into a post-accord period. These peacebuilding activities have tended to prioritise security issues and constitutional issues, with a focus on democratic elections while paying scant attention to issues of development and economic recovery. Sri Lanka diverged from this pattern. Peacebuilding is the newest approach to humanitarian intervention in civil conflicts, emerging during the 1990s in response to the recurring humanitarian disasters of the 1980s.6 The theory behind this approach is that, if assistance is provided to a war-torn society, it must be done in a way that addresses the causes of a conflict; simply responding to the symptoms will result in continued vulnerability to disaster. This is a significant problem given that since the end of World War II there have been 240 armed conflicts in 151 locations.7 Until the 1990s the emphasis of humanitarian intervention post-World War II was on providing relief to states and refugees that were experiencing humanitarian disasters. As the decade progressed, peace processes and initiatives became more sophisticated, often reflecting a conscious process of ‘lending and borrowing’ between cases8 and an international interest in democratisation.9 The initial years of the twenty-first century have seen the further honing of peace processes and, significantly, tentative signs of the incorporation of economic development and planning for post-war reconstruction into the peace process itself. In many previous cases (Guatemala being a notable exception), a concentration on security and constitutional matters meant that economic development issues were often overlooked or given a marginal position during peace negotiations. Lotta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen note that 56 civil wars came to an end between 1989 and 2000.10 The sheer amount of conflict terminations would lead us to believe that the world had become a safer place; the evidence, however, seems to point to the contrary. Although peacemakers may have achieved accommodation among political elites, the hiatus created by the signing of a peace agreement often left the general population feeling let down by the peace, when promised peace dividends failed to materialise.11 Many post-peace accord states fail to make positive connections with the global economy. Instead, they often sustain marginal economies, more capable of consuming than producing. Fundamentally, many of the peace accords of the 1990s failed to address the underlying causes of the conflicts and instead ministered to conflict manifestations in the form of political violence, and a dysfunctional


peace.12 Although large-scale group-on-group violence is often managed by ceasefires, a very real peace deficit persists in which sullen populations resent both the peace and the war that preceded it.13 The former Yugoslavia is testament to the simmering resentment of elite-level political accommodations that fail to address adequately issues of economic and political marginalisation.14 A number of works have sought to conceptualise the core constituent parts of peace processes,15 the conditions under which they are likely to succeed,16 and the lessons that can be applied from case to case.17 Some peace initiatives have benefited from appreciably more academic attention than others, with the transition in South Africa and the peace processes in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine attracting most scholarly coverage. Certain issues within peace processes have gained more attention than others. For example, the role of spoiler violence and the potential of international intervention are well served.18 The literature has also shown increasing sensitivity to the issues of ethnocentrism in which western ‘best practice’ does not always travel well.19 Particularly relevant for this book is the literature which focuses on the economic causes of conflict, and whether it is motivated by political ‘grievance’ or economic ‘greed’.20 If economic motivations lie behind many civil wars then there is a strong argument that the targeting of economic grievances should play a key role in any attempt to manage a conflict. Yet in many contemporary conflict management strategies, economic issues are overlooked. The role of economic development strategies as an explicit part of peacemaking processes has not been the focus of academic attention. The adjacent literature on economic development in the post-peace accord period is useful but scant.21 In sum, the aim of this book is to make a genuine contribution to the literature by focusing on a novel aspect of peacemaking that may have potential lessons for other societies emerging from protracted conflict. The Sri Lankan peace process provides us with a case to examine the impact of peacebuilding in practice, where the priority has been on economic recovery. Although there have been United Nations (UN) agencies active in Sri Lanka,22 there has never been a peacekeeping mission, and certainly no specific peacebuilding mission. As such the UN has a weak mandate in Sri Lanka. Although the peacemaking process was supported and facilitated by Norway, there was no third party willing to intervene to help guarantee security and provide peacekeepers. And while many UN agencies are involved in Sri Lanka, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) took the lead in the last peace process along with Japan, raising the bulk of project funding that was provided during


the ceasefire period. From the beginning, economic recovery was promoted as an essential part of the peacemaking process. This approach was made clear when, almost a year and a half into the ceasefire and after the LTTE had pulled out of peace talks, a Donor Conference was held in Tokyo to raise money in support of the Sri Lankan peace process. In the opening of Regaining Sri Lanka, one of three source materials provided at the conference, the Government presented its ‘strategy to meet the economic challenges facing the country’ the Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, made this statement: The peace process has raised the hopes throughout the island that a genuine, lasting peace may be within reach. This is something that would have been difficult to believe as little as a year ago. But these hopes and expectations of the people of Sri Lanka extend beyond peace, to better jobs, greater educational opportunities and a more secure and satisfying life generally. It is increasingly clear that there is a direct, inextricable relationship between building lasting peace and substantially improving economic conditions – and we must succeed in both areas if we are to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Sri Lanka.23 The ‘Bridging’ document provided to the donors went further, proposing that ‘the foundation for improving the economic welfare for [Sri Lanka’s] entire population’: … involves both rehabilitation and reconstruction of the North and East as well as the delivery of the dividend of peace that will create new opportunities for the people of the South.24 What made this peace process unique was that economic development was put forward as the key to peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, and economic recovery was the main thrust of donor activities throughout the ceasefire period. This book focuses on the last Sri Lankan peace process. It began with a unilateral ceasefire declared by the LTTE in December 2001, followed by a Norwegian mediated memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the LTTE and GoSL which set out the terms of an indefinite ceasefire. The Sri Lankan conflict is an ethnonational dispute between Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese. The conflict emerged with the implementation of anti-Tamil legislation in Sri Lanka’s first year of independence and by 1983 it was a full-blown civil war. Between 64,000 and 75,000 Sri Lankans are estimated to have lost their lives in this dispute


and more then one million have left Sri Lanka as a direct result of the conflict. There were six rounds of peace talks in 2003, after which the LTTE pulled out. US$4.5 billion dollars was later pledged at the Tokyo Donor Conference on Reconstruction and Development (June 2003), where the proviso was made that ‘Assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process’.25 In 2004 the security situation began to deteriorate in the East. On Boxing Day 2004 an earthquake on the Pacific Rim created a tsunami wave that devastated a great deal of Sri Lanka’s coastline, killing an estimated 30,000 people. For a short while this diffused tension between the Government and the LTTE, and attention was redirected toward dealing with the aftermath of the tsunami. These tensions quickly resurfaced however and within days both sides were accusing the other of obstructing aid. The failure to establish a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) for delivering aid highlighted the distance between the GoSL and the LTTE.26 Throughout 2005 there were continued disturbances in the East, and between January and November 2006, the government estimated that 3,000 people had lost their lives as a result of the conflict.27 The war escalated throughout 2007 and 2008, reaching its bloody climax on 19 May 2009 with President Rajapakse declaring victory over the LTTE.

Methodology This book addresses what Charles Call and Susan Cook identify as an important ‘conceptual gap for peacebuilding … the one between the elite-focused processes and local level, nonelite [sic] processes’.28 Researchers are increasingly analyzing experiences at the community level, including training in conflict resolution, leadership development in conflict resolution, community dialogue initiatives, and peace conferences and commissions.29 Yet there are practically no efforts to synthesize knowledge about these local-level experiences with elite-level research on peacebuilding. Translating communitylevel experiences to broader national levels may help ensure that national-level policies effectively respond to local realities. Greater integration of elite and nonelite [sic] peacebuilding practice and theory would benefit both.30 Sri Lanka presents an opportunity to examine the extent to which peacebuilding contributed to the development of a peace process and the


success and longevity of that process. This process was studied in real time, and a great deal more evidence was available than if it had been examined as a historical phenomenon. One of the drawbacks of historical research is that informants can reflect on what took place and construct a more or less favourable account of events; what John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty describe as ‘retrospective wisdom’.31 Research was undertaken in Sri Lanka as the peace process continued providing rich contextual information, particularly with regard to popular and affective perceptions of political developments and the peace process. This made it possible to observe the impact of peacebuilding initiatives without having to rely on posthumous non-governmental organisation (NGO) or government reports, where retrospective spin is often crucial in order to secure funding for future projects. Security issues are one important reason why comparatively few research projects are undertaken in conflict zones. Without a peace agreement or any security guarantees, there are limits on free movement with the added problem that access to research sites varies depending on tensions between the warring factions. During this peace process there was no reduction in arms, presenting a highly volatile and sometimes dangerous research environment. Despite these limitations, close examination of this period, in real time, has provided a valuable resource for understanding the challenges of peacebuilding in a war-torn society. The case-study approach Case studies, where the objective is to develop theories that can then be tested on a wider sample, have been used repeatedly in explorative research and this has become one of the primary methods of research in the social sciences.32 The phenomenon that is being studied in this book is the process of peacebuilding, which involves many different activities, influenced by a variety of factors, and actors. In this research a single-embedded case study was chosen. In order to test the hypothesis that the inclusion of economic recovery issues in a peacemaking process can help sustain peace, a case was required that meets three criteria: the first, a peacemaking process robust enough to embark on a process of economic recovery; the second, that economic recovery was integral to that peace process; and the third, that efforts were in fact made to that end. Chapter 3 deals with the first two criteria, establishing that there was a robust peacemaking process and the importance of economic recovery within that process. Chapter 4 examines the implementation of development programmes in the North West of Sri Lanka, in the war-affected Mannar District (the last criterion).


In recognition of the complexity of the situation in Sri Lanka, and other states experiencing intrastate conflict, this research is not attempting to build theories but to shed light on a highly complex and important problem. This research informs the debate on the potential for peacebuilding to address the causes of conflict and its potential to assist in the transition from war to peace, and to test the hypothesis that the inclusion of economic recovery issues in a peacemaking process can help sustain peace. Better understanding of the challenges faced by Sri Lanka has relevance to other ethnically divided states attempting to make the transition from war to peace. The case study approach has proved popular in studies of divided societies, testament to its suitability for the purposes of this study. Stedman et al. used nine different civil wars as case studies in an attempt to better understand the implementation of peace agreements.33 Darby and Mac Ginty used five case studies to ‘explore the transformation from violence to agreement in ethnic conflict’.34 In Fen Hampson’s effort to ‘explore why peace settlements succeed or fail’ five case studies were used.35 Roland Paris used 11 to examine the effectiveness of peacebuilding.36 In Camilla Orjuela’s recent research into the role of civil society in peacebuilding, she used the single case of ‘the ethnically polarized violent conflict of Sri Lanka’, adopting similar methods to this book, using open-ended interviews to gather primary data.37 Statistical analysis has been a useful tool for establishing the similarity and difference between civil wars.38 Through this kind of analysis, it has been possible to identify the correlation between certain factors, such as the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, the length of a conflict, the degree of ethnic polarisation, and the outcome of a civil war. It can then be established whether certain variables might be linked with the success or failure of a peace process, however these broad comparative and qualitative studies reveal little of the intricacies of different cultures and ethnicities, the peculiarities of different institutions, or the agency of individuals and their impact on a peace process. As Barbara Walter comments on her own research: Statistical analysis … is not particularly helpful in building causal theories of civil wars’ resolution. The ideas in this book originate from reading detailed accounts of particular conflicts, not from regression analysis. … although patterns do emerge, important cultural and historical differences cause individuals, governments, and rebel factions to act in ways not predicted by theory. A contextual comparison of individual cases ensures that generalizations made


here are not too sweeping and should help to reveal the limitations of the theory.39 Statistical analysis relies on accurate data which is voluminous enough for conclusions to be made with some degree of certainty. The lack of available secondary statistical data in a conflict setting limits the application of statistical techniques. In Sri Lanka there has not been a census since 1981 making even basic comparison difficult. Statistics generated during war require verification as opposing sides use them to conceal facts or to overstate/understate a problem for the purposes of propaganda.40 This, of course, is not a tactic exclusive to a warring state. For example, whenever a violent encounter took place between the government and the LTTE the reported fatalities differed greatly between the two parties.41 Marie Smyth also points out, that poor statistical data is one of ‘several’ challenges: … faced by researchers operating in violent or volatile societies. A lack of good baseline statistics, particularly those collected by governments, can impede research. Difficulty in assessing such data, inconsistencies in the way that data is collated or difficulties in using such data for internal analysis or international comparisons due to inconsistent categorisation are not infrequently encountered.42 This problem is illustrated by the ‘greed’ versus ‘grievance’ debate. Paul Collier et al. made some strong assertions with regard to the importance of economic greed and its relationship with conflict based on their analysis of a number of datasets.43 Further research using different datasets has come up with contradictory results, while qualitative research has further undermined the assertions of Collier et al.44 Gathering primary statistical data that is reliable and representative is laborious and expensive.45 In Sri Lanka this is compounded by a slow and unreliable postal service, two different national languages, each with their own script, limited Internet access, and an unreliable and dangerous public transport system. The de facto division of Sri Lanka at that time into territory controlled by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state made it more difficult, and at times, impossible.46 This also meant there were no complete data sets in Sri Lanka. This problem had an impact on both the government and aid agencies. For example, in 2001, there were no population statistics for North Vavuniya, which lay in the ‘uncleared’ area, although a survey in 1997 indicated that there were 38,723 permanent residents.47 In divided societies, survey


respondents are often suspicious about the motivations behind a survey.48 Mac Ginty et al. highlight problems of language where particular names or phrases can be innocent to one group, and loaded with political meaning to another.49 Based on the problems of undertaking survey type research, primary information was gathered using qualitative research methods. Interviews and observations are the principal vehicle for primary data collection. While some statistics are used, they have been obtained from secondary sources, and their reliability has been gauged, where possible through observation and interview. One of the key strengths of the case study approach is that it allows the researcher to develop a more probing approach where problems and issues of interest can be investigated in depth. An advantage of the case study approach is its flexibility, allowing the researcher to adapt the research in response to changing conditions within the research environment.50 Fieldwork was conducted over four trips, the first in 2001 before the MoU, the second in 2003, the third in 2004 and a final trip in 2005. A fifth trip was planned for 2006 once the fieldwork had been written up, but this was indefinitely postponed due to the return of violent conflict.51 Elite level interviews were carried out in both 2004 and 2005. Mannar District was chosen to carry out grassroots level research. Situated on the west coast, it was unaffected by the Boxing Day tsunami disaster of 2004 (henceforth Tsunami Disaster), but badly affected by the war. In 2005 the east coast was recovering from this disaster, making it difficult to distinguish between peacebuilding activities and post-tsunami recovery. The northern division of Mannar was controlled by the LTTE allowing comparison of peacebuilding activities in the both government and LTTEcontrolled areas. Without a rail service, proper roads and very limited public transport, Mannar was fairly inaccessible. I did not encounter any other foreigners for the duration of my stay in Mannar, and was warmly received by all those I met during my visit. The research aimed for a better understanding of the challenges of peacebuilding in war situations. The findings of this case study are not necessarily generalisable to other war situations. When researching ‘human behaviour, generalization from one group of people to others, or one institution to another is often suspect – because there are too many elements that are specific to that group or institution’.52 The aim of this research is to increase our understanding of the application of peacebuilding as an approach to dealing with the causes of conflict and the role of economic recovery in this process not to determine causal factors. So the validity of this research relies on its construct validity


and reliability. This means that in the methodology the procedures for data collection are outlined and an awareness of the biases and limitations of the research and efforts to remedy them are considered both in the research design and the process of gathering data. In the following discussion the biases of interpretation and sampling are outlined including: the relationship between the research and the researcher; the limitations of using an interpreter; researching the activities of organisations involved in peacebuilding; and researching in violently divided societies. The ethical considerations of the research are also considered. Research/researcher relationship Unlike experimental type research, where the researcher attempts to control the research setting and context as well as the interaction between the researcher and the researched, it is recognised that the researcher cannot control interactions that take place during the research process. Participants are active agents, able to control aspects of the encounter by withholding or disclosing information. Powerful forces such as governments, project managers, men, parents and the ‘community’ often control information.53 This problem is acute in a conflict situation, where the control of information can have far reaching consequences, and where people are concerned that divulging information or expressing dissent could lead to recriminations. Under certain circumstances the very act of conducting research is a political act.54 Power imbalances between researchers and research participants exist on two levels: real differences associated with access to money, education and other resources, and perceived differences which exist in the minds of those participants who feel that they are inferior, and researchers who give the impression that they are inferior. 55 Perceptions of difference can be reinforced by how we look, something that is difficult to control; in this case the researcher is an obvious (white) outsider. This is accentuated by the fact that in Sri Lanka many of the ‘white’ people who enter the conflict areas are gatekeepers to assistance and have a powerful position with regard to access to resources.56 Women are however often perceived as being less threatening than men.57 These perceptions do not necessarily mean that research undertaken by an ‘outsider’ will be less valid than an ‘insider’; an ‘insider’ will be subject to different constraints within their own society. In a divided society there is a danger that all actors are perceived to be partisan


based on family name, religion or residence. In addition, ‘insiders’ may, in the case of a civil war, expose themselves to danger when attempting to research into the affairs of the ‘other’ and may risk accusations of spying. One local informant explained that he was not trusted by anyone. As a Tamil working for the government, local people think he is a government supporter. In the South he is a Tamil working in the North, so he is an LTTE supporter. He is also a Christian, and therefore not trusted by Buddhists or Hindus.58 An obvious outsider may make a more convincing claim to impartiality and therefore may be in a stronger position to gain access to both sides in a divided society. Regina Scheyvens et al. advocate living outside ‘our comfort zone’ within the community being studied in order to overcome power imbalances which reveal the ‘fallibility’ of the researcher to the local community as they witness the ‘social blunders’ of the researcher while ‘becoming accustomed to [a] foreign environment’.59 As a white outsider, and aware that people might think that I was someone more powerful than I was, I made every effort to allay these perceptions. When researching at the ‘grassroots’ I travelled by scooter or motorbike, immediately differentiating me from foreign aid workers and donors, as they tend to arrive by four-wheel drive vehicle. I stayed in each village over a period of days, again something that foreign NGO workers do not tend to do. A basic command of Tamil enabled me to greet people, and introduce myself in their language and exchange pleasantries. The role of an interpreter There are three languages in common use in Sri Lanka: Tamil, Sinhala and English. Dependence on an interpreter intensifies the division between the ‘outsider’ researcher and the researched.60 Primary data gathered this way is subject to double interpretation, first by the translator, and second by the researcher. Researchers have to ‘reconstruct the experiences of others in their own terms and from their own reference points. This is so whichever method of research is used’.61 Language is an important part of conceptualisation, incorporating values and beliefs, not just a tool or technical label for conveying concepts. It carries accumulated and particular cultural, social and political meanings that cannot simply be read off through the process of translation.62 For this reason Temple advocates that important concepts within a research project have to be debated with the interpreter to ensure that


both the researcher and interpreter understand them in a similar way; an approach adopted in this research. 63 Researching the activities of organisations involved in peacebuilding The agents of peacebuilding, donors and NGOs, are competing for Official Development Assistance (ODA) and will not provide information that will put their organisation in an unfavourable light, nor are they likely to be critical. At the time of the fieldwork, donors were experiencing an overall decline in ODA but expanding humanitarian need in terms of wars and natural disasters, and there existed real competition between organisations.64 While interviews with elites, senior staff within the government, NGOs and donors provide valuable contextual information, it was often the informal relationships nurtured throughout the research period and ‘off the record’ analysis that proved most insightful. ‘Researching in Violently Divided Societies’65 Whilst research for knowledge’s sake is necessary, it is ethically difficult to justify the acquisition of knowledge for knowledge’s sake in situations where lives are being lost. … Improved knowledge about violent societies may not necessarily result in improved responses to the division and violence, yet the desire for such improvement is a motivator for much of the research that is carried out.66 There is justification for researching in areas affected by war, for without sound knowledge of the situation and the multiple and complex factors and issues that affect war and its resolution, the best intentions may result in ineffectual or even detrimental outcomes. There are however a great many challenges to researching in conflict ridden societies which present limitations on that research, in particular access, problems of representation, and therefore generalisation; there are also many ethical considerations.67 To undertake research in war zones, the researcher needs to be opportunistic and lucky; the flimsy nature of these characteristics do not sit comfortably with social scientific research. Often the time available to gather data is limited, which does not ‘allow for exhaustive gathering of quantitative and qualitative information which might have led to more penetrating and complete understanding of the situation’.68 Respondents were justifiably afraid of being openly critical of either the government or the LTTE. Similarly the main providers of assistance


are NGOs and again, respondents did not want to complain about the NGO in case assistance was withdrawn. To allay these fears recording equipment was not used at the local level, and interviews were relaxed and informal. Brief notes were taken, and elaborated upon later. Ethics The ethics of this research fall into three categories: the first that the research should avoid doing harm; the second, that those involved do so with consent; and third that confidentiality is maintained unless stated otherwise.69 The risks involved in terms of harm, consent and confidentiality arise from the research topic and its concern with violent conflict, not with the sensitivity of the subject matter itself. Donald Warwick identifies three types of potential harm in social research: harm to participants, society, and to the researcher and research profession.70 There is a risk that those involved in the research are somehow punished by those in authority for the opinions that they hold. Fear for the security of participants arises from anecdotal evidence that the LTTE had dealt severely with a village where a number of its residents were openly critical to outsiders of the LTTE with regard to the projects that were being undertaken in the village. The remarks made by those within the international donor and NGO organisations, as well as locals, are treated with consideration.71 Risks to the researcher include that of physical danger resulting from the return of war, and the prevalence of armed groups in the North and East. There are increased risks of personal injury due to poor infrastructure, dangerous public transport and risks of infection and disease due to poor sanitation and a lack of health facilities in the North and East. Again awareness of these risks allows the researcher to take some precaution against them. Warwick is concerned with the risk that a researcher could be in danger of prosecution, imprisonment, death or torture for research that is seen as a threat to security.72 There is also potential for harm to the research profession.73 The actions of a researcher may make it difficult for subsequent studies, either through tougher restrictions on research and the movement of researchers by local authorities, people becoming inured to researchers or even having had a bad experience, not wishing to participate in any further research. In an effort to prevent harm arising from the findings of this research, interviews were stored in Sri Lanka without names attached, and all quotes are anonymous. Gaining informed consent has become an important principle of ethical research particularly in bio-medical research. It is however culturally rela-


tive and can be difficult to obtain. In this research the interview carried out with elites, those with an in depth knowledge of the conflict and the peace process, informed consent was dealt with through a formal letter of introduction and an ethics code. In the villages the purpose of the research was explained verbally and a formal introduction made. Every effort was made to avoid sensitive topics and to protect anonymity. The aim of the conversation was to create an understanding of the local situation before and during the peace process with regard to recovery.74 No deception was used and the participant was not coerced in any way to participate.

The outline of the book The book is set out in six chapters. Chapter 1 explains why peacebuilding and economic recovery were central to the approach taken by the Sri Lankan Government and international donors during the 2002–2006 ceasefire. It clarifies the conceptually vague concept of peacebuilding beginning in theory with the work of Johan Galtung, its adoption in policy by the UN and the World Bank and its development in practice from the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe, to UN peacebuilding in the early 1990s, and finally, to the most recent Sri Lankan peace process. Chapter 2 reveals the way in which democracy and economic liberalism underpin the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. It begins with an analysis of the formation of Sri Lanka’s political institutions, its constitution and the establishment of its first government. It then examines anti-Tamil legislation from independence to the outbreak of war, and efforts to ameliorate the political situation. The chapter goes on to describe economic development from independence and the way in which economic liberalisation has exacerbated ethnic tension. It explains the way in which the democratic process has been used to ensure that political power remains within the hands of a small ethnic elite, consolidating their power through economic gains made in a liberalised economy. This chapter provides an outline for the kinds of reform needed to ‘address the roots causes’ of the conflict, the main objective of peacebuilding. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to provide an account of the peace process, its strengths and weaknesses when compared to previous attempts to negotiate a settlement, and the role of peacebuilding and economic recovery. It begins with some background to the peace talks, and how the ceasefire agreement of 2002 was reached. The role of the international community is detailed including Norway’s role, the UN, the


World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Co-Chairs of the 2003 Tokyo Donor Conference. The policy of peacebuilding is explained as it pertained to this peace process, along with the importance of economic recovery. The main assumptions about peace and economic recovery are outlined as they related to Sri Lanka. It argues that a focus on economic recovery provided a soft option for external parties who, despite making declarations that aid must be tied to progress in the peace process, continued to provide funds regardless of increasing levels of violence and political instability. Furthermore, the over-inflated commitments made by the international donors, and the promise of a ‘peace dividend’ raised an expectation that could not be met, further destabilising the peace process. Chapter 4 challenges the assumption that economic recovery at the grassroots links to wider structural issues. An in depth assessment is provided into the impact of recovery programmes in the war-affected North, and why they did not link to the wider peace process. Field research carried out in 2005, three and a half years after the ceasefire began, found that despite the observable impact of millions of dollars in aid, the causes of the conflict remained untouched by considerable local economic recovery. It details the recovery of the Mannar district, bisected by the frontline between the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), providing a comprehensive overview of the main development sectors. The case of Mannar demonstrates that while it was worthwhile on humanitarian grounds to carry out these programmes, the tangible improvements in the district had no impact on the macro-level politician situation and the structural determinants of the conflict. The people of Mannar were no more able to prevent a return to war in 2005, than they were in 2002 when the ceasefire began. Chapter 5 charts Sri Lanka’s return to war. It explores the role of the donors, the government and the LTTE. The post-ceasefire situation in Mannar is described. With a return to the ‘War for Peace’ policy of the late 1990s, the ceasefire, reconstruction of the North and East and the involvement of the international community did not contribute to any intended peacebuilding. The final chapter, Chapter 6 begins by reflecting on the nature of Sri Lankan peacebuilding, the impact of the incorporation of economic recovery strategies on the survival of peace processes, why this approach did not deal with typical problems of disillusionment and exclusion; the inability of the peace process to address the underlying causes of the conflict, the role of stakeholders, and why the prioritisation of


development strategies did not lead to a negotiated settlement. The conclusions are organised around four themes identified in the book. The first is the challenge of clarifying the conceptually vague term ‘peacebuilding’. The second is the sequencing of peacebuilding in relation to other aspects of peace, conflict and transitions and the question of whether it should take place before, during or after peacemaking. The third theme deals with our understanding of what constitutes a peaceful society and the importance of addressing conflict at various levels, political, economic and social, in order to resolve conflict; challenging the application of the ‘liberal peace’ model to post-conflict societies. The fourth is concerned with the overall transformative goal of peacebuilding and the limited results that these kinds of programmes have had.

1 Peacebuilding and Economic Recovery

Since the end of the Cold War international involvement in war and peace has involved a myriad of organisations. These peace operations have engaged in activities that attempt to assist states in the transition from war to peace, activities like the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants (DDR), the promotion and running of elections, providing monitoring and training in human rights, market liberalisation, reconstruction of infrastructure, and efforts to reconcile warring parties. These actions are collectively known as ‘peacebuilding’. This chapter is concerned with why peacebuilding has become a policy response to the non-violent management of conflict, and where economic development lies within this approach. The conceptualisation and theorisation of peacebuilding in this chapter helps explain the approach taken by the international community to the 2002 Sri Lankan peace process, and explains why it resulted in the bloody finale of 2009.

Defining peacebuilding What is peace? This question is an important start in how we understand peacebuilding. During war, peace may come through the eradication of an adversary, a ‘victor’s peace’.1 Peace may only come for some through equal rights and security. Another common conceptualisation of peace seeks a more spiritual ideal, where individuals or groups are at ease with themselves and others. The dictionary defines peace as ‘an absence of war’, yet a state without war can still have oppression, discrimination, civil unrest and the threat of more widespread violence.2 Therefore the absence of war does not necessarily mean that there is peace. Johan Galtung provides a helpful differentiation of peace between 18

Peacebuilding and Economic Recovery 19

‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace.3 He describes an absence of war or direct violence as ‘negative’ peace, whereas during ‘positive’ peace, the ‘structures’ and ‘culture’ that support oppression and increase the likelihood of violent behaviour are overcome.4 The meaning of peace, and its attainment has been a consideration of philosophers from the classical period right up to the present day, from Plato to Foucault. These ‘structures’ and ‘cultures’, referred to by Galtung, have featured in the debates about the nature of peace. Oliver Richmond summarises these debates as having ‘spanned the extremes of war as natural, as pragmatic, or as evil, to peace as idealist and utopian, as engineered, to be attained through pacifism or pacificism, or as unattainable, through limited outcome’.5 When we build peace, which peace do we seek? Whatever the means, the kind of peace that we would strive for is one beyond the mere absence of war, or ‘negative’ peace toward a ‘positive’ peace. In the same way, when trying to determine what peacebuilding is, the discussion invariably focuses on what kind of structures and relationships lend themselves to a peaceful society beyond the mere absence of war. The following discussion will look at the definitions of peacebuilding and try to determine the kind of peace that is being attempted in the peacebuilding experiment, it will look at the dominant theories that underpin peacebuilding as it evolved during the twentieth century up to the present. In terms of a formal definition, peacebuilding, is more ‘described than defined’6 and the only agreement on the subject is that it is not clearly defined.7 As Charles Call and Susan Cook note ‘Widely divergent notions of peacebuilding exist’.8 To add to the confusion the word appears in three forms, peacebuilding, peace building and peacebuilding, and despite the more recent addition of peace making and peace dividend to the Oxford English Dictionary, peacebuilding has yet to be included.9 Definitions of peacebuilding tend to go from the general to the specific; ranging from a normative approach to conflict resolution encompassing every possible endeavour that may bring about sustained peace, to more programme-driven definitions which identify achievable sets of objectives, believed to make peace more likely. Within these definitions of peacebuilding there are trends that emerge based on various theoretical propositions about peace itself. These include political theories emphasising the importance of institutions in providing an infrastructure for peace, economic theories with a more developmental approach and a belief in the importance of financial security for peace, and religious theories that are more people-centred, building on people’s capacity to reconcile and forgive. The broadest definitions


come from theorists in conflict resolution and peace research. What will follow is a representation of some of these definitions moving from the theoretical to the more practical governmental organisation (GO), and non-governmental organisation (NGO) definitions. The term ‘peacebuilding’ was first published in a book by the functionalist David Mitrany in 1966.10 In an essay by Johan Galtung in 1975, it was one of ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’.11 He suggested that peacebuilding was finding the ‘structures that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to war’.12 The essay is theoretical and difficult to précis, but Hugh Miall et al. manage to differentiate between these approaches as: … peacekeeping which aimed ‘to halt and reduce the manifest violence of the conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role’; peacemaking which was ‘directed at reconciling political and strategical attitudes to mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation’ mainly at the elite level; and peacebuilding which addresses ‘the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development’.13 Later, in 1996, Galtung continued with his ideas of structure and peace and his ideas about peacebuilding relate to his thoughts on ‘positive’ peace, where it is the process of identifying and establishing the ‘structure’ and ‘culture’ of peace. Like Galtung, Stephen Ryan defines peacebuilding by contrasting it with peacekeeping and peacemaking: ‘So whereas peace-keeping is about building barriers between warriors, peace-building tries to build bridges between the ordinary people; and whereas peace-making is concerned with elites, peace-building directs it[s] attention at grass-roots work. It wants to transform conflicts from the bottom-up’.14 Ryan argues that peacebuilding can be achieved through ‘Economic development, the build up of mutual trust, the existence of superordinate goals,15 education for mutual understanding and reconciliation and forgiveness can be powerful weapons in the armoury of any peace-builder, particularly if the various strategies can be combined’.16 John Paul Lederach is one of the most prolific proponents of peacebuilding. His experience working in war-torn societies as a peacemaker and Mennonite heritage led him to develop a broader definition of this term: ‘… peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peace-


ful relationships’.17 Like Ryan, Lederach emphasises transforming and cultivating relations between the leading elite and the grassroots. These definitions are not prescriptive, they do not determine the exact nature of peace that is to be built nor do they describe how it would be undertaken. In each case they describe a process of transformation, advocating the importance of structural change. Ryan and Lederach make specific reference to the importance of taking a ‘bottom-up’ approach, and the importance of peaceful relations and reconciliation. In contrast the definitions of donors and humanitarian actors are more programme driven. In 1992 the United Nations (UN) secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, published An Agenda for Peace, and peacebuilding entered the mainstream humanitarian vernacular. Here ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding was one of four pillars of a more holistic approach to peace and security along with ‘preventative diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking’, and ‘peacekeeping’.18 He suggested that post-conflict peacebuilding should be ‘actions to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’, similar to a Galtungian concept of peacebuilding.19 However the report continues, suggesting that in practice, UN peacebuilding would include such activities such as ‘disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring of elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation’.20 This is another broad definition, but it reflects more the ability of the various UN agencies to address particular aspects of peacebuilding.21 The UN definition places the main emphasis on security issues and political restructuring along the lines of a liberal democracy. As one of the largest donors and implementers of humanitarian assistance,22 the UN’s ‘post-conflict’ operations have made the most significant contribution to the practice of peacebuilding, their programmes have included Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia. To that end, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission in 2006, which ‘deals with postconflict peacebuilding – all that is needed to help a country make the transition from war to lasting peace’ because ‘to date, no part of the UN system has been directly responsible for helping countries make the transition from war to lasting peace’.23 The UN’s peace operations have generated a substantial amount of information, and investigation into them has prompted further


definitions of the term. In Roland Paris’ critical analysis of UN ‘peacebuilding missions’, he describes them as those ‘that aim to prevent violence from reigniting after the initial termination of hostilities’.24 The termination of hostilities and peacebuilding are therefore two distinct phases. In Hugh Miall et al.’s exploration of ‘post-settlement peacebuilding’ and the UN’s standard operating procedures, they define peacebuilding as ‘… underpin[ning] the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflictants’.25 Again they view peacebuilding as a post-conflict activity. By 1995, the Supplement published by the UN stressed that peacebuilding is not necessarily a ‘post-conflict’ activity and can be present in any part of a peace process. The UN’s approach to peacebuilding raises the issue of the timing of peacebuilding initiatives. During the 1990s the World Bank also developed its capacity to assist states emerging from war. They saw their post-conflict activities as having ‘two overall objectives: to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social development’.26 And this, the World Bank suggested, could be achieved by ‘investment in key productive sectors’, ‘strengthening government institutions’, ‘restoring law and order, and enabling the organisations of civil society to work effectively’, ‘repair[ing] physical infrastructure’, ‘rebuild[ing] … key social infrastructure’ i.e. schools and hospitals, resettlement of refugees, demobilisation of combatants, the clearing of unexploded ordinance (UXOs), and ‘normaliz[ing] financial borrowing arrangements’.27 The World Bank stated its ‘anti-poverty focus implies a concern with income disparities and exclusion of population groups – two conditions often at the root of civil conflict. But without peace, development is impossible’.28 The World Bank describes, the ‘transition to sustainable peace’ as ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ where the UN calls it peacebuilding. While they are talking of the same thing it may be that the World Bank chose post-conflict reconstruction in order to differentiate its economic activities from the more political ones of the UN, and to underline their historic connection with reconstruction and economic development. Between 1977 and 1997 the Bank provided US$6.2 billion in loans for ‘post-conflict reconstruction’.29 It also provided assistance to post-conflict states in the form of Trust Funds, for ‘economic and sector work, training, research, evaluation and reconstruction’.30 While it differs from the UN approach in its emphasis on economic development, at the same time it promotes ‘strengthening government institu-


tions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organizations of civil society to work effectively’, the foundations of a liberal democracy. By adopting the term post-conflict reconstruction, it clearly identified these transformative activities as necessitating a certain level of security, but they do not stipulate that there needs to be a peace agreement, only ‘there should be a reasonable expectation of continuing relative stability or of a formal cease-fire’.31 The European Union (EU) was a latecomer to the idea of peacebuilding. There are at least two explanations for this. The first is due to the nature of the EU: made of a collection of states, with their own varied development aid and humanitarian strategies, the EU lacked a ‘coherent’ aid strategy.32 The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), was established in 1992 to respond to humanitarian need. In the 1992 annual report on Humanitarian Aid for the European Community it stated: ‘Unlike other forms of international solidarity, humanitarian aid does not seek to transform societies but to help their members through periods of crisis when the old order breaks down’.33 As peacebuilding is essentially a transformative process, and ECHO was the EU’s arm for responding to humanitarian need, then its own terms of reference prevented it from joining the peacebuilding bandwagon. The second reason is during the 1990s, when other donor organisations were beginning to see the importance of linking aid to wider development policy objectives, ‘very little was known [in the EU] about the relevance, the efficiency and the impact of Community aid due to the lack of evaluation. In over 20 years of cooperation in 33 countries in Asia and Latin America … around 2,000 projects were financed but only some 100 evaluation reports were drafted, and half of them did not contain reports from the field’.34 As a latecomer, the EU has recognised many of its programmes fall within the vast array of activities that can be described as peacebuilding, and it therefore ‘provides a considerable contribution to peacebuilding efforts in all regions of the world’.35 From 1998 the EU began to reform its aid and ‘orientate’ it toward the ‘fight against poverty’, and after 9/11 the EU ‘proposed an increase in ODA [Overseas Development Aid] by appealing to the causal relationship that exists between global terrorism, fundamentalism and the desperation caused by poverty and inequality’, where development must be a key component in any credible security strategy.36 It follows therefore that the EU publication Working for Peace, Security and Stability (2005) recognises the threat to European security is unlikely to come from invasion by an outside state, but from ‘terrorism’, ‘weapons


of mass destruction’, ‘regional conflict in neighbouring countries’, ‘state failure’ and ‘organised crime’,37 and therefore: The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order … Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform.38 Although the EU does not refer to peacebuilding in this document it does talk of ‘Building peace through development’ in Africa.39 The EU conflates European security with insecurity in other parts of the world, and its proposal for European security is one that resembles the UN’s peacebuilding project and the World Bank’s ‘transition to sustainable peace’, promoting a liberal democratic model for global security. Many humanitarian organisations have adopted the idea of peacebuilding as a way of implementing humanitarian assistance in support of peace. CARE International, Oxfam, World Vision, CAFOD and a plethora of local NGOs are implementing what they describe as peacebuilding programmes. Again definitions vary based on the organisation’s capacity to influence peace, and upon its projects, ambitions and orientation. Finally, if all of these various activities amount to peacebuilding then we need to recognise peacebuilding is very much a part of any peace process. The peacemaking process involves the representatives of groups in a conflict coming together to decide what changes are necessary for all sides to end violent confrontation; these changes form the terms and conditions of a peace agreement. A peace agreement is then a form of conflict solution, and the implementation of that agreement would amount to conflict resolution. Therefore the activities that take place to implement a peace agreement, which often include DDR, political reform, judicial reform, reconciliation through war crimes trials or truth commissions, repatriation of IDPs and refugees; those activities necessary for transforming the conflict in the direction of peace, can be described as peacebuilding. Within these varied definitions emerge two dominant ways of understanding peacebuilding. At the macro level we see the importance of structural change, or creating the structures within a society necessary for the peaceful management of conflict. At the micro level or grass-


roots, recovery and development programmes are recognised as having the ability to unite warring groups, and transform antagonistic relationships into cooperative ones. Galtung, Ryan and Lederach all emphasise the importance of structural change, with Ryan and Lederach espousing the potential of peacebuilding projects to unite opposing groups, and the importance of taking a grassroots approach. There is no strict or agreed definition for peacebuilding, so based on the preceding discussion, it can be loosely described as any activities undertaken during the period of transition from war to peace, the sum of which amounts to a situation where peace is sustained; and as such, peacebuilding is a process. The broadness of the definitions reviewed reflects what a large and complex problem peacebuilding is trying to span, and the lack of definitional clarity underlines this. For this book peacebuilding will be defined as a process of identification and constructive transformation of the root causes of a conflict in support of establishing positive peace. Peacebuilding, as a process, is very much a subjective approach to peace, whereby the peacebuilder, be it the UN, the World Bank, or an NGO, identifies what it believes to be the root causes of a conflict; structural inequality, cultural prejudice, a prevalence of violence, poverty, and most likely a combination of all of these things, and based on its capacity attempts to implement programmes that will resolve these problems. In the preceding discussion it is clear that although the definitions vary, there is, as Oliver Richmond has noted, a ‘peacebuilding consensus’.40 This consensus has emerged among the institutions and bodies of the West involved in international peace operations, the EU, the UN, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and NGOs; that peace can be established through the institutions of democracy and liberal economics or ‘liberal peace’.41 Therefore the kind of peace many of the peacebuilders are referring to is a ‘liberal peace’. This is of particular relevance to this book, as the activities that have been undertaken in Sri Lanka in support of the current peace process, and even before, have been funded and implemented for the most part by the organisations and donors that take the ‘liberal peace’ view.

The timing of peacebuilding When the UN first identified peacebuilding as part of its ‘more holistic approach to peace and security’ in 1992 it was seen as a post-conflict activity, but this changed by 1995 in the Supplement to An Agenda where this was seen as not necessarily the case.42 Following the 2005


UN World Summit, Resolution 60/180 was adopted by the General Assembly in 2006 to establish a ‘Peacebuilding Commission’ in recognition of ‘the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace’.43 The emphasis throughout this resolution is on ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding. Evidently the UN has changed its mind with regard to the sequencing of peacebuilding activities however it does not stipulate that peacebuilding is a post-accord activity. The World Bank in 1998 saw the potential of peacebuilding before a peace agreement as long as there was ‘continuing relative stability’ in order to start initial programmes.44 Michael Pugh, when ‘conceptualising peacebuilding’ holds the same view: … waiting for a conflict to produce a negotiation process or even a signed peace accord before engaging in the structural transformation of the root causes of that conflict is to risk allowing opportunities for effective peacebuilding to pass by irretrievably. As well, peace accords manufactured at the level of high politics in the absence of the complementary resolution of socio-political grievances underlying the conflict are often highly unstable.45 If peacebuilding is about addressing the root causes of conflict, and transforming the situation of war to one of peace then the research of Barbara Walter is of particular relevance.46 Her research into why ‘combatants choose to walk away from the negotiating table and return to war’ argues that without a ‘credible guarantee’ of their security, combatants will not disarm and demobilise and they will not implement the terms of an agreement.47 Both the UN and the World Bank propose a raft of peacebuilding type measures that involve security issues, economic and governmental reform, and issues of recovery, which might take place before a peace agreement. If, as Walter argues, combatants are unlikely to warrant these transformations without a ‘credible security guarantee’ then there is significant risk in the strategy of embarking on peacebuilding activities without such a guarantee. There are two views on the timing of peacebuilding, one which sees the potential of peacebuilding activities to support the peacemaking process, and another which sees these types of transformative programmes as unlikely to take place in the absence of security guarantees. In Sri Lanka, peacebuilding activities were proposed and undertaken without either a peace agreement, peace negotiations or any security guarantee.


Theories of peacebuilding In the preceding discussion, peacebuilding definitions are based on what appear to be the causes of conflicts. Determining these causes depends on the theoretical leanings of the organisation or individual interested in the problem. As we have seen in the various definitions, these perspectives are political, economic and societal. Through an understanding of the theory behind peacebuilding it is possible to determine the extent to which strategies adopted in Sri Lanka have in fact attempted to address the root causes of the war. There are many theories about what constitutes a peaceful society, and the causes of war. What follows is an introduction to the most dominant theoretical perspectives as they relate to peacebuilding. The political perspective In any transition from conflict to peace, the creation or restoration of some form of legitimate governing authority is paramount. … almost all peace deals between formerly warring parties involve some changes to the apparatus of state via revised arrangements for representative bodies, distribution of powers, territorial structure and the like.48 Politics and the development of the institutions of some form of representative government play an important role in any peacebuilding programme. It is a strongly held view among Western states, the largest donors of development aid and peacebuilding, that liberal democracies, those ‘founded on such individual rights as equality before law, free speech and electing their governments’ are predisposed to peace rather than war.49 A state is democratic when ‘those who govern are selected through contested elections’, the government is responsible ‘either directly to the voter or to a parliament elected by them’, and when the party voted in ‘can take office without being prevented to do so, but equally, they are willing to relinquish power when they are voted out’.50 These conditions rely on an independent judiciary, free speech, franchise and an active civil society. It is these ‘cultural or institutional structures that coincide with democratic governance’ which are the structures for peace referred to in Galtung’s (1975) essay and which form the building blocks of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding, an exercise predominantly funded by so-called ‘liberal democracies’, is greatly influenced by their principles. The definitions


provided by the UN, the World Bank and the EU, demonstrate a commitment to the ‘democratic peace’ thesis. For the EU security can be maintained by ‘Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’,51 for the World Bank through ‘strengthening government institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organizations of civil society to work effectively’52 and for the UN by the ‘monitoring of elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation’.53 This is reflected in practice by the emphasis of UN peace operations on establishing a ‘minimum minimum level of peace … and a basic level of infrastructure’ then rushing to hold elections.54 The ability of the liberal democratic model to deliver a peaceful society has increasingly come into question. While it may be true that ‘well-established [my emphasis] liberal democracies are considerably less likely than any other kind of state to experience civil war’,55 Jack Snyder sought to explain why ‘democratization often causes nationalist conflict’.56 He argues that ‘Before democratization begins, nationalism is usually weak or absent among the broad mass of the population. Popular nationalism typically arises during the earliest stages of democratization, when elites use nationalist appeals to compete for popular support’.57 Citing John Stuart Mill as an example, Ben Reilly points out ‘Some of the greatest political thinkers have argued that stable democracy is possible only in relatively homogeneous societies’.58 He also recognises that ‘Politicians in divided societies face powerful incentives to play the “ethnic card” and campaign along narrow sectarian lines, as this is often a more effective means of mobilising voter support than campaigning on the basis of issues or ideologies’.59 This is an important point for the operationalisation of peacebuilding. If elections have the potential to stir up ethnic hatred, and increase levels of violence, third party interveners like the UN, the EU, World Bank, even the US and its allies, need to exercise caution when rushing toward elections. ‘Good governance’ as a tool of peacebuilding has credence, particularly for established democracies, given the relationship between contested elections and ethnic discord. This is the main thrust of Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar’s argument of Peacebuilding as Politics where ‘the most effective means of self-enforcing peace is to cultivate political processes and institutions that can manage group conflict without violence but with authority and, eventually legitimacy’.60 This is particularly relevant in cases where war has come after the transition


to democracy: Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslav republics, Burundi, Iraq and Rwanda are examples. The risks attached to the pursuit of peace through the establishment of democratic practices, are that they confer legitimacy on a regime. The constituent parts of a liberal peace are ‘democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and global markets and neoliberal development’.61 A democratically elected government can use its popular mandate to treat any challenges to its authority by activists, opposition or minorities as threats to the national integrity. In the absence of the rule of law or respect for human rights, the sovereign state has the authority to use force with none of the checks and balances that would prevent oppression, suppression and possible violent civil unrest. Democracy is only one way of deciding who will govern; on its own it cannot deliver peace. The political perspective is important when conceptualising peacebuilding. The commitment of Western powers to the liberal democratic model means building new political institutions and reform of the old is central to peacebuilding programmes. The relevance of Western models of democracy has been questioned, but this has not stymied their application to post-conflict scenarios. The economic/developmental perspective Two dominant perspectives on the relationship between economics and war and peace have relevance to peacebuilding: the first maintains that a sense of relative deprivation can create social discontent that may result in violence;62 the second, that the economic gains of war motivate combatants to pursue (or continue to pursue) their war aims.63 Poverty is one of a number of causes of conflict. Dan Smith observed in 1993 that ‘Of the 50 poorest Third World countries, 38 are conflict countries. Of the 32 war-torn countries in the Third World, four are among the most prosperous third, 12 are in the middle third and 16 are in the poorest third’.64 Ted Gurr’s published seminal research (1970) on the way in which ‘relative deprivation’ can create conflict that may become violent.65 S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory Hess have shown recession (negative economic growth) can ‘provide the spark for increased probabilities of internal and external conflict’.66 This association between conflict and poverty provides a dual purpose for the poverty reduction strategies of development agencies.67 The question that then arises is how we can eliminate poverty? The answer most often cited has been that a policy of economic growth is the most effective way to reduce poverty.


Economic theories on economic growth and prosperity tend to swing between Adam Smith’s market theory and Friedrich List’s state intervention. Smith’s theory asserts that ‘individuals pursuing their own self interest unintentionally create orderly institutions which … also facilitate the generation of relatively high levels of growth’.68 List’s theory postulates that prosperity requires ‘a powerful government prepared to intervene in the market economy to promote economic projects’.69 International development policy reflects the popularity of these two approaches with the most powerful nation states, predominately those of Western Europe, the US and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). The emphasis of development agents on the importance of economic growth has led to the wide scale application of economic liberalisation strategies with the aim of bringing about increased wealth, and reduced poverty. The main tool for this has been through the provision of loans and grants to ‘developing countries’ by the Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF and the World Bank, tied to economic stabilisation and adjustment programmes. There are widespread misgivings regarding the record of marketisation and civil war. It may be the case that ‘a well-established [my emphasis] market economy is particularly conducive to domestic peace’ due to its economic wealth, however ‘some evidence suggests that marketization has increased, not decreased, civil unrest in a number of countries’.70 E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen explain that these programmes ‘affect the distribution of power within a country’, and that conflict arises when social services are withdrawn from the poorest in that society, and certain groups are seen to benefit from ‘structural measures, such as privatization, price decontrol, and public employment policies’.71 They also argue that the ‘secrecy of the recipient country’s letter of intent, … reduces internal political dialogue and increases the difficulty of implementing the adjustment programme’.72 Despite misgivings as to their potential to contribute to greater instability, liberal economic theories are a dominant part of the peacebuilding discourse. During the late 1990s a new strand of research emerged taking a somewhat different view on the economic causes of conflict. This was due to the ending of the Cold War, and what Mary Kaldor called the ‘new wars’, that had materialised since. These ‘new wars’ ‘involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human


rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals)’.73 David Keen argued these ‘new wars’ were not irrational or anarchic, on the contrary ‘it is the re-ordering of society in particular ways. In wars we see the creation of a new type of political economy, not simply the disruption of the old one’.74 This line of research complements much of the ‘rational choice’ theory of decisionmaking,75 also known as the political economy perspective76 and found favour with the World Bank.77 A great deal was made of a link identified between economic predation and war. In Paul Collier’s chapter ‘Doing Well out of War’ he contends: Conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance. If economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefiting from conflict and that these groups therefore have some interest in initiating and sustaining it. Civil wars create economic opportunities for a minority of actors even as they destroy them for the majority.78 The view that wars are rooted in ‘greed’ as opposed to ‘grievance’ sparked strong debate as the main assertion of this statistical analysis is that the grievances most commonly cited as causal factor in wars, for example political repression and economic inequality, do not have a strong correlation with war. This challenged decades of research into the causes of conflict. The main criticism of the ‘greed’ thesis is it relies heavily on quantitative data, a type of data that is often unreliable and hard to come by in a conflict setting, and does not account for the idiosyncrasies of real world conflicts that have specific ‘historical and politico-economic context’, notwithstanding the actions and motivations of particular individuals and groups.79 More recently the conclusion with regard to this debate is ‘that resources are central in the duration of conflict as well as in its intensity, but grievances and identities, political factors, are still central to understanding the roots and objectives of war’.80 Nafziger and Auvinen, contrary to Collier, find when using an ‘improved dataset on income distribution’ there is a relationship between ‘income inequality and war’.81 The ‘greed’ thesis has provoked further exploration into an alternative approach to peacebuilding through the reduction of the economic benefits of conflict.82 The ‘greed’ thesis has a great deal of relevance to this book on the premise that the promotion of economic recovery was the best way to support the Sri Lankan peace process. The timing of the peace process corresponded with the ascendance of this view particularly with the


World Bank; Paul Collier was Director of the Development Research group at the World Bank from April 1998 to April 2003. In contrast to other peace processes the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank took a prominent role, ‘attempting to stand on the same ground as the diplomats’.83 Religious and philosophical contributions to peacebuilding Where the political scientists and economists (and donors) emphasise the necessity of structural change in order to sustain peace, denominational peace theorists tend to be more people-centred. Rather than focusing entirely on political or economic structures, they look at society and the potential of violence between groups. Religious doctrines have much to say about peace and war, and as David Barash points out, they can be a ‘double-edged sword’, with religious doctrines both inspiring violence and prescribing peace.84 With the Western bias of the two previous approaches to peace, this area provides an opportunity to redress the imbalance somewhat. The Quaker Peace Movement, the Mennonite Conciliations Service and latterly the International Conciliation Service are major contributors to the pacifist non-violent peace discourse. The Quaker and Mennonite faiths share many of the same values and ideas,85 and have both been involved in track-two diplomacy during conflict. There are also smaller localised multi-denominational groups which have attempted to bridge sides during war, led by secular local leaders, as well as priests and holy men. Perhaps the most renowned proponent of non-violence is Mahatma Ghandi whose insight was embedded in the Hindu faith, and whose approach to non-violent expression has inspired other oppressed groups to avoid engaging in direct violence.86 Two writers that have made a considerable contribution to peacebuilding are the Quaker Adam Curle and Mennonite John Paul Lederach.87 Both authors advocate non-violent conflict resolution with an emphasis on mediation, violence reduction, reconciliation and conflict transformation from the ground up. Central to the Quaker conceptualisation of peace is The Quaker Peace Testimony which began in 1660 with a ‘declaration to Charles II’ (King of England) and the assertion war is incompatible with the Kingdom of Christ,88 and has continued up to the present day. Curle was the first chair of Peace Studies at Bradford University, extolling peace through research, conciliation, negotiation, development, education, and civil disobedience and Ghandhian type practices of non-violence.89


Cynthia Sampson makes the point that ‘some aspects of peacebuilding are best understood using concepts and approaches found in religion. In particular, the process associated with reconciliation; confession, repentance, forgiveness, mercy, and conversion based on self-reflection and acceptance of personal responsibility, have emerged from religious, not secular, contexts.’90 Addressing grievances and reconciling communities through economic and political development would require significant long-term engagement and large amounts of aid. In contrast, the transformation of hatred through reflection and forgiveness, which could be encouraged by spiritual leaders, appears a cheaper, and potentially quicker alternative. In the long term this kind of peace would be challenged by economic and political insecurity. Nonetheless, this perspective moves beyond the structural dimensions of peacebuilding and recognises the inherently human aspect of wars.

Conflict resolution and peace studies During the last 50 years the specialisms of conflict resolution and peace studies have made major epistemological contributions to the understanding of conflict.91 More is known now about the different factors that may increase the likelihood of war, and conversely those that might decrease it. Formulising and framing the processes which are necessary for peace is the main strength of this field of study, and much of the terminology which exists on peace, such as peacebuilding itself, has emerged from this field.92 This study of war and peace does not represent one particular theoretical approach, in fact quite the opposite, it highlights the complex and multidisciplinary approach necessary for its comprehension. It is important to differentiate between peace and conflict resolution. Peace does not necessarily mean the resolving of conflict; conflict can and does exist in peaceful societies, but the conflict is managed in a non-violent way. If we accept the aim of peacebuilding as addressing the root causes of conflict, it could be asserted that taken to its nth degree peacebuilding would resolve any inherent conflict, but the equally ambitious objective of bringing about sustained peace would be sufficient. Conflict resolution is not necessarily identical with peace. There is considerable overlap, however, as most notions of peace are based on the absence of war. … Conflict resolution is more than the limited definition of peace. It is more than the absence of war. The parties


are agreeing to respect each other and prepare for living together with one another.93 In effect peacebuilding is conflict resolution. Hugh Miall et al.’s definition of conflict resolution is very similar to the broadest definitions of peacebuilding: ‘Conflict resolution is a more comprehensive term which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed, and resolved’.94 Initially the study of conflict resolution was confined to the study of international relations, and was about symmetric power struggles between states. Following the end of the Cold War, it has been more about resolving internal struggles, often asymmetric as they are between the sovereign state with legitimately use of force, and an internal, and often weaker opposition. By increasing understanding of what creates tension in a society, which might lead to violent confrontation, steps can be taken to resolve tensions through addressing the economic, social, political and personal problems as advocated by the economists, political theorists and religious groups who promote the varied approaches to a peaceful society. Peace studies bring all of these elements together and call it conflict resolution, the practitioners bring it together and call it peacebuilding. … given the varied sources of contemporary conflicts and complex political emergencies, responses are required at different levels. Changes in the context of conflict may depend on international and regional arrangements, conflicts within or over the state may demand structural change at state level, the conflict between parties will still require resolution at the relational level, and cultural change at all levels may be necessary for the transformation of discourses and institutions which sustain and reproduce violence. Greater emphasis is now placed on integrating the levels at which peacebuilding and conflict resolution need to work within affected countries, with particular emphasis on the significance of ‘bottom-up’ processes.95 Peter Wallensteen divides theories on conflict resolution into three general categories: conflict dynamics; needs-based conflict origins; and rational strategic calculations.96 The conflict dynamics thesis sees it ‘as a dynamic phenomenon: one actor is reacting to what another actor is doing, which leads to further action’.97 Theorists that have contributed to this line of thinking include Christopher Mitchell, Pruitt and Rubin and Johan Galtung.98 Galtung’s ‘conflict triangle’ is perhaps


the best-known theory, where two conflicting parties are seen to move along a triangular axis based on their attitudes, behaviour and the incompatibility or conflict itself.99 Theories of conflict resolution based on ‘needs’ follow the view that a group’s inability to meet their needs will lead to frustration and possible violence. An early theorist on this concept was Lewis Coser.100 His research into the Watts riots in California showed ‘that the conflicts as well as the violent actions stem from not being accepted in society, in matters of dignity, political access and power’.101 Edward Azar’s analysis for explaining protracted social conflict (PSC) is another example of a ‘needs’ based understanding of conflict and its resolution where there is a sense that one group is preventing another from fulfilling its basic needs.102 His analysis, which relies heavily on forerunning peace research, demonstrates the multidisciplinary nature of peace research. Where the first two categories see actors within conflict as being at the mercy of other agents and structures, the third category ‘rational strategic calculations’ sees them as ‘rational’, ‘form[ing] their own judgments, mak[ing] their own decisions, pursu[ing] strategies and, thus, initiat[ing] the chain of events that lead to war’.103 William Zartman’s theory of ‘hurting stalemates’ is an example of this kind of theorisation, other contributors include Roger Fisher and William Ury, and Stephan Stedman.104 Paul Collier’s research (mentioned earlier) into the economic rationality of ‘greed’ in a conflict is another example.105 Understanding that poverty alleviation takes more than economic growth, and democracy is more than elections, provides the practitioners with numerous problems that need to be addressed to prevent war and bring about lasting peace. The main point of this approach is there are many factors that need to be addressed. Addressing only one aspect is unlikely to institute peace in a society. This book is particularly interested in the role of economic development in the war-to-peace transition, the theorising of peace research would suggest that economic peacebuilding activities only account for one aspect of a conflict, and on their own would be unlikely to bring about an end. Furthermore peacebuilding, like other grand projects such as development and democratisation, seems to throw up more questions than answers. When is peace sustainable? How long would this process take? When should it start? How much does it cost? Can it work? What is the evidence? Hopefully some of the questions will be answered over time as more peacebuilding programmes mature and some observable results ensue. This book will serve to answer some of these questions in the case of


Sri Lanka. Whatever peacebuilding is in theory, the practice of peacebuilding is another part of the conundrum.

Peacebuilding since World War II Since World War II external actors, in the form of nation states, particularly the US, as well as the UN, the IFIs and NGOs, have responded in an assortment of ways to the challenging environments created by wars and disaster. This experience has had a bearing on peacebuilding in both policy and practice; with some lessons learned and some ignored. Peacebuilding and post-World War II recovery Although Boutros-Ghali popularised the concept of peacebuilding, the UN ‘peacebuilding missions’ were not the first to take on the broader tasks of reconstruction. The Marshall Plan was concerned with the effective recovery of Europe so as to prevent a third European war and was, effectively, a peacebuilding plan. This was a seminal period in the development of peacebuilding, as it was a coherent political strategy designed to address the socio-political needs of a society emerging from violent conflict. Key ideas that emerged from this period continue to have relevance in the post-Cold War era. The Marshall Plan was very different from the punitive reparations, demanded from Germany after World War I and the Treaty of Versailles.106 It accepted ‘the unity of Germany could not be achieved without the unity of Europe, and that the unity of Europe could be approached through technical cooperation in economic matters, rather than bluntly in diplomatic negotiation’.107 The Marshall Plan saw economic recovery as the foundation of political stability.108 It was also inherently political as it was seen as a tool for controlling the spread of the communism in Europe. It was participatory109 in the sense that all 16 European states that would receive assistance were also involved in its planning and implementation.110 The US recognised that if the Plan was to be successful it had to be designed by the Europeans rather than imposed upon them. The main emphasis of the European Recovery Programme (The Marshall Plan) was economic. It was about increasing agricultural and industrial production.111 However, its political and strategic ramifications cannot be overlooked. In David Ellwood’s analysis of European recovery it is clear much of the motivation behind the Marshall Plan was the fear that Europe would become socialist, dominated by the USSR, and America would be deprived of a market for its goods.112 Increased econ-


omic interdependence was one way of unifying states. Scott Parrish argues that until Marshall’s speech113 in 1947 Josef Stalin was willing to collaborate with the Americans as there was much to gain from economic cooperation with the US.114 However, the Soviet interpretation of Marshall’s famous speech was that the US was trying to incorporate the states on its fringe into ‘the capitalist economic system of the West’ and ‘an offensive attempt to subvert Soviet security interests’.115 Given the Marshall Plan’s contribution to worsening relations between the US and USSR, it is possible to regard the Marshall Plan as an incendiary rather than a peacebuilding plan. But, from the point of view of Western Europe and the US, the Marshall Plan was of great benefit in terms of shoring up a capitalist bloc and, although the Cold War brought about the prospect of a nuclear holocaust, the economic benefits paid off. The Marshall Plan had a significant impact on today’s conceptualisation of peacebuilding. It was a Plan that continues to be deemed a success, based on ‘creat[ing] a stable productive Europe, whose economic and security needs would be tied together by market forces and liberalized trade, and guided by strong supranational organizations’.116 The Marshall Plan installed so-called ‘liberal peace’ in Europe, and ‘provided a paradigm for all post-1945 reconstruction efforts until 1990 and has been evoked ever since whenever “reconstruction” is mentioned’.117 It was a departure from past practices, stressing the importance of European integration and socio-economic reconstruction for future stability, avoiding the punitive tone of the Treaty of Versailles. The Marshall Plan was externally funded; money was available in the first few years when Europe was most in need of it. Finally, the European beneficiary states were integral to its planning and implementation, and in this sense it was participatory rather than externally imposed. Post-WWII development aid and nation-building Peacebuilding as a process of transformation is reminiscent of the development and nation-building projects of the post-WWII and Cold War era. The disparity in wealth between the world’s richest and poorest states was particularly evident following WWII and this, David Fieldhouse explains, was due to the over reliance of poorer nations on the export of commodities to more wealthy countries. Fieldhouse argues this made them vulnerable to the recession of the 1920s and WWII.118 It was believed that this problem could be solved if ‘underdeveloped’ states modernised by rationalising their political and economic institutions along similar lines to those in the West.119 Most of the world’s poorest countries were former colonies of the European empires. Although


development assistance was about reducing poverty, there was a real fear particularly among the US foreign-policy makers, that if they did not exert some kind of influence over these countries, then they might become socialist, or worse, come under the control of the USSR; a motivating factor behind the Marshall Plan. Containment of the spread of communism, by providing development assistance and encouraging capitalism was therefore the underlying premise of the Truman Doctrine.120 After WWII the perceived threat of war was international rather than intranational. The system established by the UN’s charter was ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ and through a process of collective action, the nations that comprised its membership were ‘to unite [their] strength to maintain international peace and security’.121 UN peace operations centred on peacekeeping ‘which typically involved the deployment of lightly armed military force to monitor a cease-fire or patrol neutral buffer zones between former combatants’.122 Four reasons for this limited approach were: firstly the UN Charter prohibited intervention in the domestic affairs of member states; secondly the same proviso in the UN Charter meant that member states would not allow the UN to take an expanded role in what were legitimate sovereign responsibilities; thirdly, permanent members of the security council, which included the Cold War rivals, would not sanction any intervention that might ‘threaten’ ‘their strategic interests’; and finally, the ideological differences as to what was the most suitable model of governance, the issue at the heart of the Cold War, made it difficult for the UN to promote one model of post-war state or nation-building.123 The UN charter did not however fetter its members from involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. Development aid was driven by three ‘purposes’: a ‘moral … obligation to help the poor’, a political endeavour ‘to keep or recruit Third World states within imperial and later western or Soviet power blocs’, and to make a ‘contribution to the economic development of underdeveloped countries in the hope and expectation that sufficient injections of capital would enable them, once and for all, to overcome the obstacles in the way of growth and so put them on the road to sustainable development’.124 Development relied on investment in key sectors, and development aid provided the necessary capital that could not be met by domestic savings. This aid came either bilaterally, from a richer state, or as multilateral aid from an IFI. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, set up in 1947, for the purpose of providing loans to the war-torn nations of Europe for reconstruction, became the World Bank and began giving development loans as early


as 1948 to non-European states.125 Although reconstruction of Europe had been inherently political in nature, the Bank’s own Articles of Agreement prohibit it from becoming involved in the ‘political affairs’ of member states.126 From the outset, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) applied liberal conditions to its loans; the World Bank did not until the 1980s.127 Bilateral aid however was tied, either through trade agreements with the donor state and particularly in the case of the US, tied to the process of ‘modernisation’ where the US sought to ‘accelerate’ what they saw was ‘a natural transition towards the creation of a modern, liberal, capitalist state’.128 During the Cold War (1945 to 1990) the USSR and the US ‘forcibly imposed domestic institutions’ on 11 sovereign states.129 Between 1946 and 1992, 53 of the 90 post-colonial states that experienced civil war had received development aid.130 The economic emphasis of development assistance did not deliver in terms of providing a stable society, nor did the nation-building exercises of the superpowers. By the 1990s there was real disenchantment with development: ‘during the 1980s the contribution of developing countries, where two-thirds of humanity live, to the world’s GNP has shrunk by 15 per cent, while the share of the industrial countries, with 20 per cent of the world’s population, has risen to 80 per cent’.131 In 1992 Gustavo Esteva sounded the ‘death knell’ of development, which he said ‘stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape … the outdate monument to an immodest era’.132 The poor results of international development also coincided with an attack on humanitarianism in general.133 There are parallels between the development and nation-building programmes of the Cold-War era and peacebuilding. Firstly, like development aid and nation-building, the recipient state receives funding and technical expertise from an external body or state; secondly, the programmes tend to be top-down in nature, the external body or state determined what programmes would be delivered based on their own historical experience and ideological leanings; and finally, the model of development or nation-building tends to be liberal democratic and involve either the establishment or transformation of existing domestic practices and institutions. There is a significant lesson to be learned from US nation-building: of 15 examples of US-led nation-building efforts between 1900 and 1996, 11 of these states did not have democracy ten years later, and of the four that did, Japan and West Germany both already had advanced public-administrative structures in place and industrialised economies, in Panama there were ‘legitimate leaders who had actually won con-


tested elections before the US-led regime change’ and Grenada only had 92,000 inhabitants.134 Experience of development and nation or statebuilding shows that the transformative aim of most definitions of peacebuilding is not new. External actors have been engaging in these kinds of projects since WWII, with limited success. Disaster management’s influence on the UN’s post-conflict peacebuilding Amartya Sen’s (1976) ‘entitlement approach’ attempted to explain the causes of starvation.135 He proposed that it was not simply lack of food that caused starvation; ‘[a] person starves … because he does not have the ability to command enough food’.136 Sen argued that people’s ability to command food is based on a complex entitlement to trade, production, labour and inheritance, and it is failure to secure these entitlements which produces famine; this idea was further developed by Jane Corbett with her idea of ‘coping strategies’,137 and by Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow with ‘capacities and vulnerabilities’.138 There was a shift in thinking away from trying to predict and explain disasters to understanding the socio-economic reasons for vulnerability to disaster.139 There was increasing recognition that some communities were more vulnerable to disasters than others, namely those that did not have the social or economic security to protect themselves or recover from natural disasters. The famines of the 1980s demonstrated that just providing aid was not enough.140 For example the horrifying media pictures of Sudanese adults and children starving to death in refugee camps in Ethiopia inspired the donation of an enormous amount of Western aid. Unfortunately little was done, or perhaps could be done, at the time to address the root cause of the famine, the Sudanese civil war. At the same time it was apparent that aid was being diverted from those in need, finding its way into the hands of war profiteers, corrupt officials, and assisting with military rather than humanitarian objectives.141 In Michael Pugh’s analysis of disaster management he argues that there have been ‘Two major trends in thinking about disasters since the 1970s which have relevance to peacebuilding’.142 The first is a more ‘human-centric’ approach, a recognition that a disaster cannot be understood without first understanding the structural problems which face the affected population, their poverty and resulting vulnerability to disasters. The second is the ‘complex emergency approach’ which ‘broadened the debates in disaster research to encompass the interrelationship between economic deprivation, environmental degradation, the inabil-


ities and culpabilities of governing elites, and the resort to violence and civil war’.143 This has led to a belief that humanitarian aid must provide both immediate relief and development assistance if future disasters are to be averted. In 1991 a UN General Assembly Resolution suggested that there should be a ‘Continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development’.144 It stated that ‘Emergency assistance must be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development’.145 Although this ‘continuum’ and its sequential connotation of relief followed by development has been challenged, the idea that relief and development need to be linked has been accepted. During the 1990s this concept ‘found [its] way into policy statements of aid agencies outside of the UN’.146 This thinking that assistance needs to address both the immediate needs and long-term development has relevance to both natural and human disasters. If development assistance can address the vulnerability of a population to disaster it can also be used to reduce their vulnerability to conflict, and in many cases vulnerability to violent conflict and disaster have the same causes. The end of the Cold War necessitated a re-think in how the UN should respond to conflict and its peace operations. The concept of linking relief and development would be part of the UN’s new approach to peace and security. In An Agenda for Peace, peacebuilding was seen as assistance that would be ‘supportive of recovery and long-term development’147 and therefore take place following the temporal stages of preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. The preceding activities could take place pre-peace settlement, whereas peacebuilding was a post-peace settlement activity.148 When the World Bank established its Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit in 1997, and later the Post-Conflict Fund, it was in recognition of the fact that in the post-Cold War era, wars were ‘undermining development in a wide range of countries, threatening national and regional stability in some areas and diverting international attention and scarce resources from pressing development problems’.149 In 1998 it acknowledged that its guidance for responding to post-conflict situations came from operational policy ‘originally developed for reconstruction following natural disasters’.150 Peacebuilding and the rise of the NGO Throughout the 1980s and 1990s increasing amounts of aid were transferred from wealthy Northern state to poorer South states through NGOs.151 NGOs are ‘organizations within the aid channel that are institutionally separate from the state apparatus and are non-profit


distributing’.152 Their popularity with donors as implementers of programme aid stems from their on-the-ground presence, particularly where there is limited state presence, during conflict for example. With the NGO at the coalface of international development their potential role as peacebuilders should not be overlooked. Annually, an estimated US$12–14 billion of aid for development and relief is handled by NGOs.153 Hon-Won Jeong recognises the importance of building ‘partnerships with NGOs’ in Approaches to Peacebuilding (2002), which is an ‘organisational imperative’, where the NGO is a ‘subcontractor’ and ‘implementing partner’ for donor funded programmes and has the advantages of greater ‘contact with civil society’ and ‘embedded knowledge of the community’.154 NGOs engage in peacebuilding in two overlapping ways. The first, as implementers of donor-funded reconstruction and development projects. It is common practice for a donor to identify peacebuilding as one of the goals of its engagement in a conflict or post-conflict scenario, funding is then streamed into programmes that aim to address aspects of the conflict, for example DDR, human rights, return of IDPs, reconstruction and development. The donor’s engagement in peacebuilding is explicit through their overall goals, though the projects implemented on the ground by NGOs are unlikely to be called ‘peacebuilding’. Monica Llamazares and Laina Levy make this observation of NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, recognising that ‘Many agencies involved in the reconstruction process [were] implementing programmes that fall under one or more [peacebuilding] categories,155 although not all of them identify peacebuilding as a core aim of their activities’.156 The second way NGOs engage in peacebuilding is through local activities that are ‘supporting local capacities, providing opportunities for dialogue and strengthening coalitions for peace across traditional barriers and conflict divides’.157 These kinds of programmes can contribute to peacebuilding ‘by encouraging increased, meaningful interaction, cooperation and interdependence between all people and groups’.158 The role of NGOs as peacebuilders is one in which they are building bridges between communities and fostering cooperation and reconciliation.159 Where donor-funded programmes are a ‘top-down’ approach to peacebuilding, the positive engagement of donor-funded NGOs within the local community has the potential to provide some ‘grassroots’ or ‘bottom-up’ commitment. Although they may play a direct role in transforming relations between conflicting groups, this book is concerned


with the role of NGOs as the implementers of donor programming, where the aim is to assist in the transition from war to peace through programmes that attempt to address the roots causes of a conflict. Post-Cold War peacebuilding After the Cold War the UN was able to fully engage in two extensive peace operations. In Cambodia the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1993) was the first UN Peacebuilding operation with 18 months and US$3 billion to implement the Paris Peace Agreement.160 It employed ‘15,738 military personnel, 3,224 civilian police officers, 927 administrative personnel, and 426 volunteers’.161 The administrative component established offices in more than 300 locations, recruiting 50,000 local staff, and running 10,000 vehicles.162 With a great deal of money over a short period of time UNTAC, as mandated; assisted with running elections,163 the return of refugees164 and a moratorium on the extraction of natural resources,165 but failed to disarm political parties,166 or make much way with reconstruction167 or run the public administration.168 The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) (1991– 1995) set out to strengthen human rights and support the separation of the military from the state. The strength of its cadre was 380 military observers; eight medical officers; 631 police observers; 140 international civilian staff and 180 local staff.169 ONUSAL spent US$107 million compared to the US$2.8 billion by UNTAC.170 Like Cambodia, the ONUSAL mission had limited success with the reform of the military and the police171 and the electoral process,172 however it did have some success with building the capacity of mechanisms to protect human rights.173 International pressure helped compel the military to remove members that had been involved in war crimes.174 The return of refugees seems to have happened spontaneously, and the downsizing of a previously externally funded military was inevitable, given the end of the Cold War, therefore these successes would probably take place with or without the intervention of the UN. Considering the importance of socio-economic causes of this conflict, they were paid scant attention.175 Where peacebuilding attempted a number of feats including disarmament and institution building in Cambodia and El Salvador, at the same time in Lebanon after the Ta’if Agreement was signed in 1990 there was no UN peace operation. The Ta’if Agreement was implemented by the states of Lebanon and Syria, with Syria maintaining a military presence until 2005, 13 years longer than stipulated in the Agreement.176 The political reforms that were prominent in the Ta’if


Accord, were ignored and left Lebanon open to renewed violent ethnic conflict in 2006. The main emphasis of recovery was the reconstruction of Beirut and other urban centers,177 and this did not protect Lebanon from the destabilising effects of a fully armed Hezbollah and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In the absence of efforts to reconcile the ethnic groups in Lebanon, communities became increasingly factionalised. War did not return to Cambodia, but continued high levels of militarisation, economic liberalisation, corruption, an ineffective judicial process, and political instability has left Cambodia with what can only be described as the conditions of ‘negative’ peace. Today El Salvador is both a poor and violent society, where criminal acts continue with impunity. The significant change however is that human-rights abuses are not perpetrated by the state but by criminal gangs, and against workers by businesses and corporations. In both Cambodia and El Salvador, development issues were left until after the UN mission and involved economic liberalisation. In both cases economic liberalisation is seen to have undermined political reform and entrenched economic inequality.178 Although El Salvador and Cambodia have their problems, they have not seen a return to war unlike Lebanon. While this suggests that external actors have a significant role to play when it comes to supporting the war to peace transition,179 it also shows that peacebuilding requires a broad based approach that involves a combination of activities that address issues of security as well as political and economic reform and reconciliation. Peacebuilding post-9/11 During the 1990s there was a growing ‘radicalisation’ of the development discourse that ‘derives its urgency from a new security framework that regards the modalities of underdevelopment as dangerous’.180 The sense that poverty and underdevelopment were linked to conflict provided a stronger argument for donor funded development activities, beyond the moral imperative of it being ‘the right thing to do’. This sense of the dangerousness of underdevelopment was even more acute following the events of 9/11. With subsequent attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom a well-founded fear emerged in both Europe and the US that instability in other states present a threat to domestic security. This fear is illustrated by the EU publication Working for Peace, Security and Stability where European security is at risk not from other states per se but from insecurity within those states and makes particular reference to ‘terrorism’.181 The US position is made clear in a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) report on the Status


of Presidential Initiatives FY 2004, which begins with the statement ‘The National Security Strategy of the US of America places international development in line with defense and diplomacy as the third pillar of U.S. national security’.182 At the UN World Summit 2005 under the heading of ‘Freedom from Fear’ it was suggested that ‘the world’ could be made ‘safer by improving collective security arrangements’, proposing ‘the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission that would support countries during their transitions from armed conflict to lasting peace and reduce the risks of war’ with ‘initiatives to prevent catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’.183 By placing development alongside security, the transformation of unstable states along the liberal democratic model effectively prioritises peacebuilding as national defence. Peacebuilding projects are rooted in the international interventions of the twentieth century: the post-war reconstruction of Europe after WWII and the Marshall Plan, and the development and nation-building programmes of the Cold-War era. The key difference between peacebuilding and nation-building is that peacebuilding efforts have taken place with the consent of the sovereign state. In both cases there is a belief that the institutions of peace and prosperity can be installed in a state that is unstable. The regime change and ongoing institutional changes in Afghanistan and Iraq are more commonly referred to as ‘nationbuilding’ than peacebuilding.184 Understanding the vulnerability of societies to complex-emergencies from a disaster management perspective has strengthened the concept of addressing root causes of conflict rather than responding to its symptoms with relief aid. More recently, with the end of the Cold War and the ‘victory’ of liberal democracy over communism185 and the threat of terrorism, a ‘peacebuilding consensus’186 has emerged. This answers the question posed at the beginning of this chapter of what ‘kind of peace’ ‘is being attempted in the peacebuilding experiment’? This consensus is that ‘peace is understood to lie in the establishment of reconstructive and transformative processes that culminate in states that mirror the liberal-democratic state’.187

Conclusion This chapter has established the prevalence of peacebuilding as an approach to dealing with war and attempting to institute peace, and has sought to provide some conceptual clarification. Although peacebuilding lacks a precise definition, it is generally recognised as a transformative process necessary for a state to move from war to peace, and


has met wide acceptance within the international institutions that respond to war, peace and development. Peacebuilding is a term born in peace research and conflict resolution theory however its theoretical foundations lie in older traditions of peace theory and ideas of effective governance and economic systems that might lend themselves to peace and prosperity. This is not the first time we have seen this kind of transformative project: throughout the twentieth century efforts have been made to support peace through economic and political change, the most conspicuous being the Marshall Plan after World War II, but these efforts also included the development and nation-building projects of the Cold War. In contrast to nation-building or state-building, peacebuilding takes place with the agreement of parties to a conflict. Peacebuilding has gained from the experiences of humanitarian and development endeavours since WWII. Following the events of 9/11, there is now a conviction that insecurity in other states threatens relatively secure Western states; overseas development and post-war reconstruction have become part of national security. In this chapter two types of peacebuilding have been identified: type one recognises the importance of structural change, or creating the structures within a society necessary for the peaceful management of conflict, this is the peacebuilding of donors; type two is peacebuilding at the micro level or grassroots, where recovery and development programmes as recognised as having the ability to unite warring groups, and transform antagonistic relationships into cooperative ones, this is the peacebuilding of NGOs. Should type-one peacebuilding take place before, during or after peacemaking? The World Bank and UN recommend ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding, where there is a level of security that allows for project implementation, not necessarily a peace agreement. There is an argument for integrating peacebuilding as part of a two-tier peace process, where elite-level peacemaking aims to find a political settlement, while the dividends of recovery and peacebuilding at the grassroots support that process. However, Barbara Walter asserts that combatants will not sanction the changes necessary for type-one peacebuilding until they have security guarantees; without these they will walk away from negotiations. The timing of type-two peacebuilding is not contested as it would be inherent in any kind of project implementation that might bring together two opposing sides, before during or after a conflict or the signing of a peace agreement. What constitutes a peaceful society and what needs to be done to resolve violent conflict? The most dominant approach to type-one


peacebuilding tends to involve the application of a ‘liberal peace’ model despite its evidential incendiary potential; democratisation has been shown to cause ethnic discord and marketisation also creates tension. This is of particular importance to the hypothesis of the book: whether the inclusion of economic recovery issues in a peacemaking process can help sustain peace. For this approach to have relevance to the Sri Lankan conflict, we would need to know whether economic factors are in fact more important than political grievances, a question dealt with in the next chapter. Given the broad scope of peacebuilding and its transformative goal, what are our expectations of its success? Nation-building and development programmes in the past have tried to transform states with limited success. The successes have tended to be in states where previously there had been a well-established public administration system. Nonetheless, vulnerability to both disasters and war persists in many post-conflict countries and clearly there is a need to build structures that lend themselves to peaceful societal relations. There is now an awareness among donors that poverty and instability create the conditions in which terrorism flourishes and this is a greater threat to Western security than that posed by ‘rogue’ states. The Sri Lankan case sheds light on why these transformative programmes have such limited results. This chapter has helped develop an understanding of the meaning and importance of peacebuilding as response to civil wars. The 1990s and first decade of the twenty-first century has seen it come of age, along with the rise in popularity of the argument that economic predation is more closely linked with war than political grievance. This coincided with the start of the 2002 Sri Lankan ceasefire. The next chapter identifies the causes of the Sri Lankan conflict, and the kinds of change necessary to build peace.

2 Sri Lanka’s ‘Liberal’ War

Sri Lanka is one of South Asia’s oldest democracies with 14 general elections since independence and ten presidential elections since 1977. During the 1970s the state transformed from a controlled to a market economy. Yet despite this advancement of a liberal peace, Sri Lanka saw violent civil unrest through the 50s, 60s and 70s and the outbreak of war in 1983. This chapter explains why, tracing the conflict back to the formation of its first political institutions and government. It describes the tensions that emerged between minority Tamils and the Sri Lankan state, and the state’s failure to resolve them. It provides a cautionary tale on the limits of a liberal peace, providing a conflict analysis which outlines ‘the roots causes’ of the conflict, whose remedy is the main objective of peacebuilding. In answer to the question raised in the last chapter of the importance of economic factors in causing the conflict, it seems that they are in fact less important than political grievances. Both democracy and economic liberalism underpin the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.

Ethnic demography Edward Azar’s preconditions for a Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) provide a helpful framework for this conflict analysis.1 Azar argued that ‘If a society is characterized by multicommunal composition, protracted social conflicts are most likely to arise’.2 This he explained was because is a state where there was a ‘historical pattern of rivalry’ and the state is ‘dominated by a single communal group or coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive of the needs of other groups in that society’, ‘Imposed integration or incorporation of distinctive and often conflictual communities into one political entity retards the 48

Sri Lanka’s ‘Liberal’ War 49

nation-building process, strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict’.3 Sri Lanka is ethnically heterogeneous. With its ethnic mix, Sri Lanka’s stability would be determined by its inability to respond to the needs of all its ethnic groups. Sri Lanka has 19.2 million inhabitants, covers an area of 65,610km2 and has a tropical climate.4 In the last complete census carried out in 1981, before the war, the majority of Sri Lankans (74 per cent) were Sinhala-speaking Buddhists, the largest minority (18.2 per cent) Tamilspeaking Hindus, with the remainder mostly Tamil-speaking Muslims (7.4 per cent) and Christians.5 Sri Lanka has a long history of colonisation, first by the Portuguese (1505–1658), then the Dutch (1658–1795), and finally the British (1795–1948). The tip of India, the Tamil Nadu, is home to 62 million Tamil-speaking Hindus;6 hence Sri Lankan affairs are the concern of both Indian domestic and foreign policy. The Tamil population is most concentrated in the northern and eastern provinces. In the remaining provinces in the south and west of Sri Lanka the Sinhalese are very much in the majority. There are more Tamils in the Colombo area (21 per cent) relative to their distribution in the rest of the South; only 9 per cent of the urban population is Tamil in Ratnapura.7 Sri Lankan Muslims predominate in the urban centres of Puttalam and Ampara. In the South only the District of Nuwara Eilya has a Tamil majority constituting 57 per cent of the population, of that 57 per cent, 89 per cent are Tamils of ‘Indian origin’ who work on the plantations.8 State-sponsored colonisation schemes implemented since independence in the Dry Zones of the North and East have altered ethnic distribution. Ethnic disturbances during the 1970s and 1980s created the first internally displaced persons (IDPs). Following anti-Tamil riots in 1977 an estimated 40,000 Tamils who worked in the plantations in the South, fled their homes; 4,750 of them were resettled in the North.9 The riots of July 1983 displaced 75,000 people.10 As the conflict intensified more IDPs were created and Sri Lankan Tamils sought refuge abroad. During the 1990s the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) forced Muslims to leave the areas under their control, many ending up in the western district of Puttalam. The Tamil Diaspora is believed to number around 700,000 people.11 The government estimated that ‘some 800,000 persons were at one point or another internally displaced in areas affected by the conflict comprising some 4 per cent of the population’.12 Since the end of the war in May 2009 Muslims have been returning to the North and East. At the


end of 2003 (the first year of the peace process) the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were around 122,000 refugees outside Sri Lanka and 386,100 IDPs within, 90,217 of whom resided in Government run Welfare Centres.13 The forced movement of ethnic groups has increased ethnic heterogeneity. The roots of animosity between Tamils and Sinhalese Sri Lanka was not ruled as one until British colonists managed to subdue the Kandyan Kingdom in 1817.14 Until the sixteenth century Sinhalese and Tamil kings ruled Sri Lanka; from 1505 the Portuguese colonised the maritime areas, then the Dutch (1658–1795). Some of the most profound changes took place during the British colonial era (1795–1948), beginning with the island’s unification, rapid population growth, an increase in the number of people receiving education, as well as dramatic economic growth (see Table 2.1). Those to benefit most from the education provided by government schools and missionaries were the Tamils in the North, particularly Jaffna15 and the Low Country Sinhalese due to their historically high exposure to Western languages, and Christianity.16 Table 2.1

Rapid Socio-economic Change in Sri Lanka (1832–1906)17

Total Population Population Receiving Education Government Revenue

1834 1,167,700

1906 3,984,085

1832 13,891

1906 276,691

1832 Rs. 1,145,340

1906 Rs. 112,516,014

Under British rule Tamils were brought in from South India to work on the plantations, introducing a large population of Indian Tamils to the traditionally Sinhalese central highlands.18 The Vanni19 and Jaffna peninsula are relatively dry and unproductive in comparison to the more verdant areas further south, as a result many Tamils moved south from Jaffna to take advantage of the opportunities that were available to English speakers in Colombo, the island’s capital and colonial administration.20 Improved access to education coincided with an increased interest in heritage and culture.21 This combined with the highly negative stance adopted by some colonial missionaries against the predominantly Buddhist indigenous culture22 inspired both a Buddhist and Hindu Revival movement.23 A popular Sinhalese ‘mythohistory’24 emerged from which three


points have persisted: the first, that the island belongs to the Sinhalese, the second, ‘that all of their tribulations come from South India in general and from Tamils in particular’, and finally, that the Sinhalese are an Aryan race superior to the Tamils and Moors (Muslims).25 Historically the Buddhist monk (bhikkhu) would devote his life to spiritual enlightenment but during the twentieth century, Buddhist academics called for a more active role of the bhikkhu, servicing lay Buddhists and defending Buddhism from the corrupting influence of Western culture and South India.26 Part of the impetus of the movement came from the westerneducated Sinhala politician who, faced with universal franchise in 1931, scrambled to establish links with the Sinhala electorate and saw Buddhist monks as a useful political instrument.27 By seeking the support of the Sangha (Buddhist clergy), politicians have also had to accept their direct involvement in government. The formation of democracy Sri Lanka was ruled by decree by its British Governor as one unit divided into provinces. A Council of Advisors was set up in 1801 as it was felt that through consultation with the locals the British administration would be ‘giving more satisfaction in the country’.28 Legislative and Executive Councils were later established based on the recommendations of Lord Colebrooke,29 with nominated members from the Low Country Sinhalese, the Kandyan Sinhalese, the Ceylon Tamils of the Northern, Eastern and Western Provinces, Plantation (Indian Tamils) Muslims, Burghers30 and Europeans.31 Over time these council members were elected, however they were still advisors; the Governor maintained primary control over the Colony. With increasing prosperity a number of Sri Lankan associations sprang up demanding more autonomy and increased legislative power.32 The first elected member to the Legislative Council in 1911 was a high-caste Tamil named Ponambalan Ramanathan; the Sinhalese candidate was from the karava caste and the goyigamas (high-caste Sinhalese) would rather vote for a high-caste Tamil than a lower-caste Sinhalese.33 The Sinhalese communities who benefited most from colonial trade were the lowcountry Sinhalese of the west and south coast. This had the effect of shifting the traditional seat of power, from the Kandyan Kingdom of central Sri Lanka, to the maritime areas. This shift meant that some lower-caste Sinhalese began to exceed members of the higher, Kandyan caste, in power and influence.34 The Tamils have a different form of caste system,


with rivalry existing between the two upper castes, the velela and the karaiyars. This issue of caste indicates that before the current minority majority struggle there was already intracommunal conflict. The current conflict, which as the following discussion will show, is firmly rooted in Sri Lanka’s political institutions. However, had Sri Lanka developed a more pluralistic system of governance, would it have been able to subsume caste divisions? In 1919 the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) ‘brought together major Sinhalese and Tamil organizations’ of the English-speaking elite, and its president was a Tamil.35 Although there had been communal representation in the Legislative Council, the 1931 Donoughmore Constitution opted in favour of territorial representation. Left-wing parties emerged in 1935, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP), as well a Sinhalese party, the Sinhala Maha Sahba (SMS) led by Sri Lanka’s future Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. The Ceylon Tamil Congress (CTC) was formed in 1944 and was the first all Tamil party.36 The Soulbury Commission (1944–1945) deliberated over the constitution that would usher in Sri Lankan independence. The CTC campaigned for ‘50/50’ representation on the basis that Tamils would suffer discrimination from a Sinhalese-dominated government’.37 The Soulbury Commission favoured territorial representation, and majoritarian government was guaranteed for Sri Lanka. Before independence, competition between political groups was intraethnic; from 1948 onwards the Sinhalese-dominated government, made possible by the Soulbury Constitution, introduced increasingly populist policies in order to gain votes, appealing to Sinhalese chauvinism. In 1946 the United National Party (UNP), lead by D. S. Senanayake, was formed by members of the CNC, who represented the elite Sri Lankan members of the British Colonial administration. The UNP formed Sri Lanka’s first democratically elected government. D. S. Senanayake’s cabinet consisted of 14 members, including his son and two of his nephews, it: … was a miniature collection of representatives of the highest economic class who had benefited from colonial rule and from plantation and commercial capitalism. The opposition led by the Marxist LSSP, BLP [Bolshevik Leninist Party] and CP, and included, at the beginning, the Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Ceylon Indian Congress, which as a working class organization was allied to the Marxists.38 Satchi Ponnambalam explains that the plantation Tamils elected eight Tamil MPs in the 1947 elections, ‘all belonging to the left-orientated


Ceylon Indian Congress. The Indian Tamils elsewhere voted for Marxist parties and helped the LSSP and CP MPs’.39 These working class Tamils had shown solidarity with their Sinhalese counterparts and their power through strikes in 1939 and ‘the 1946–47 general strike’.40 In the year of independence (1948) the UNP government effectively disenfranchised the Tamils from the plantations by denying them their citizenship, even if they had been in Sri Lanka for many years, even generations.41 This significantly reduced the UNP’s opposition and the power of the trade unions. It was justified along the lines that Indian Tamils were threatening the ‘Ceylonese nation’.42 The Indian-Tamil question As far back as 1939, ‘the Government of Sri Lanka dismissed 2,518 Indian daily-waged workers in government service in pursuance of a drive to “Ceylonize” the country’s labour workforce’.43 Resentment of Indian Tamils came from rural farmers. The ‘appropriation’ of land: by the estates deprived peasants of their use. … Not only were their incomes low, there was also a total lack of state support for peasant agriculture. … The only option open to them was to seek redress from the swiftly growing primary commodity sector. However, by this time, both in plantations and in the incipient urban sector, the market for unskilled labour had already been saturated by Indian immigrants. When the Sinhala peasants found that penetration was not going to be easy, their frustration turned into hatred towards the Indians.44 The Indian Tamils in 1948 amounted to around 11 per cent of the total Sri Lankan population.45 The Sri Lankan economy was almost entirely dependent on the plantation sector and members of the political elite derived their wealth and power from this sector. Disenfranchisement of the Indian Tamils denied them the political means to strive for better pay and conditions. ‘For 60 years, from 1928, the political arithmetic of how many Indians should be granted citizenship rights was a matter of one of the principal debates among Sri Lanka’s political parties.’46 The problem was apparently resolved in 1998 when the UNP presidential candidate, R. Premadasa, in an effort to garner the electoral support of the Indian Tamils, drafted a bill that granted citizenship to the remaining stateless persons.47 Between times, thousands of Indian Tamils lived either as stateless persons without franchise or they were Sri Lankans by ‘registration’ and did not have the same civil rights as Sri Lankans by birth.48 Evidently the bill never came into effect because in October 2003 (the


first year of the peace process) ‘it was estimated there were around 300,000 stateless persons of Indian origin currently living in Sri Lanka, the majority being descendants of persons brought from India to work on the tea plantations by the British colonizers’.49 The treatment of Indian Tamils is the first instance where the Sri Lankan Government used ‘political repression’ to further its dominance, fulfilling yet another of Azar’s preconditions for PSC and setting a bad precedent for a nascent multiethnic society. In the same year (1948) Sri Lanka’s Tamil population made its first call for federalism, with the formation of the Federal Party, which emerged from the CTC. This was a peripheral party at this point as educated Tamils were comfortable articulating their needs in the English-speaking structures of government, and the UNP was a secular party which had Tamil members. The Federal Party’s importance increased as relations between the two ethnic groups deteriorated. The ‘Sinhala Only’ law The UNP achieved two terms in office, and was defeated in 1956 by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, a former UNP member who formed the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1951.50 Bandaranaike left the UNP when he understood that his leadership ambitions would not be realised, when UNP leadership was passed from father to son.51 Where the UNP consisted of the ‘“traditional” English-educated elite’,52 the SLFP represented ‘the newly arisen elite of largely Sinhala-educated rural leaders and purveyors of small commerce, committed to a Buddhist-Sinhala identity’.53 The SLFP appealed to the increasingly dissatisfied Sinhalesespeaking majority, particularly those excluded from the (English-speaking) political elite, for example members of the Sangha and Ayurvedic doctors. Bandaranaike championed the cause of both Tamil and Sinhala as the national languages (against English), then garnered support from the Buddhist bhikkus by enacting the ‘Sinhala Only’ law. This excluded Tamils working in public administration who spoke Tamil and worked in English, freeing posts for the Sinhalese. The day of the bill, a satyagraha54 was staged outside parliament by the Federal Party’s leader S. J. V. Chelvanayakam. The protestors were not protected by the police and were attacked by ‘political bhikkus and supporters of the bill’.55 In response many more Tamils moved toward the Tamil Federal Party. Bandaranaike and Chelvanayakam formed a pact in 1957 to allow Tamil to be the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (or B-C Pact) would have resulted in a federal Sri Lanka.56 When the details of this pact were


announced, the UNP and pro-Sinhalese groups were against it. The proposed Regional Councils Bill allowed for decentralisation of the provinces and could not be tabled.57 Under pressure from a group of bhikkus, who also undertook a satyagraha, Bandaranaike abrogated the Bill, tearing it up in front of them outside his home in April 1958.58 Later that year the Federal Party made its first call for a ‘non-violent struggle’ for the liberation of the Tamils’.59 Ethnic riots ensued with Sinhalese attacking Tamils in Sinhalese majority areas, and Sinhalese properties were damaged in Jaffna.60 In 1958 a second attempt to mollify the Tamils arrived with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, allowing for Tamil to be the medium of instruction in schools and universities and in public service entrance tests (although Tamils would later have to pass a Sinhala proficiency exam).61 It addressed some Tamil concerns however ‘every clause of the act’ was ‘subject to the proviso that it does not conflict with the position of the Sinhalese Language as the Official Language of the country’.62 The enactment of the ‘Sinhala only’ law again maintained the popularity of the government at the expense of minority Tamils; increasing employment opportunities for the Sinhalese and reducing them for Tamils. Allowing rioters to beat Tamil politicians during the satyagraha indicated the government’s disregard for their Tamil peers. This discriminatory law could only be passed because of the Westminster system adopted in the Soulbury Constitution. The failure of both the SLFP and the UNP governments to respond to Tamil grievances at such an early stage made it increasingly likely that some Tamils would become frustrated with political channels and seek more radical solutions; already there was a call for Tamil ‘liberation’. Rivalry between the SLFP and UNP Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959 by a bhikku in an extremist plot, and his widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike acceded to the leadership of the SLFP. Although Mrs Bandaranaike continued to implement the ‘Sinhala only’ law she lost to the UNP’s Dudley Senanayake (D. S. Senanayake’s son) in the 1964 elections. Having won only 66 seats, the UNP was forced into a coalition, this time with the Federal Party. A pact was signed between Dudley Senanayake (the UNP Prime Minister) and Chelvanayakam in 1965 allowing for the administration of the Northern and Eastern provinces in Tamil and the establishment of District Councils. The District Councils fell short of the Federal Party’s demands both in the number of its elected members and its power in


terms of land distribution. The Federal Party withdrew from the coalition in 1968. Sirimavo Bandaranaike was to return in 1970 with a socialist coalition called the United Front (UF).63 Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s election platform was ‘castigating the government’ for its attempted pact with Chelvanayakam, and she ‘cautioned the nation against the dismemberment of Sri Lanka’.64 This in spite of the fact that her husband had done the very same thing in 1957. This practice of criticising the incumbent government for making concessions to the Tamils has been repeated by successive opposition parties, and is often the platform from which they launch their election campaigns. The moment they win, they enter into negotiations with Tamil representatives, and are then subjected to the same criticism. Since independence, no government has been formed without either the SLFP or the UNP. Until 2005, the leadership of the SLFP was retained within the Bandaranaike family. Within the UNP, father was followed by son and then by nephew. The previous Prime Minister, and current leader of the UNP, Ranil Wickremesinghe is the nephew of J. R. Jayawardene, Sri Lanka’s first president who ruled for almost 12 years. ‘Standardization’ in education ‘In 1969–70 the Tamils, mainly in Jaffna and Colombo, constituted 35 per cent of the admissions to the science orientated courses, and in engineering and medical faculties the figure was as high as 45 per cent.’65 The system of ‘standardization in language media’ set up in 1970 limited the number of Tamils entering university, who now had to get a higher aggregate of marks than Sinhalese students in order to gain university entrance. This was compounded by a system developed to enable students from the rural communities greater access to tertiary education, limiting places for Jaffna Tamils in particular. ‘Standardization’ of education and the ‘Sinhala only’ law were successful in reducing the number of Tamils in public service and nurturing a well-founded grievance of discrimination.66 K. M. de Silva argues that it was during this period that the Tamil demand for federalism became one of self-determination and separatism.67 Insurrection in the North and South Dissatisfaction with the government did not rest solely with Tamils. In 1971 there was a violent left-wing uprising in the South by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The JVP was a group of young educated Sinhalese Buddhist whose members came from the poor rural


communities.68 They were dissatisfied with high levels of unemployment and an elitist, socialist government, that was not, by their terms, socialist enough.69 The insurgency was brutally suppressed by the government,70 but its influence was felt in the state reforms that took place during the UF’s term. The state extended its control over the economy, and restricted land ownership. ‘The economy remained stagnant, while inflation reached levels never experienced before in Sri Lanka, and unemployment rose to unprecedented levels.’71 The Sinhalisation of the police and military intensified the sense of isolation felt by Tamils. Being in the minority, it is inevitable that Tamils would be poorly represented in the security forces. In Jaffna civil disobedience against the state and violence created dilemmas for Tamil Police Officers, and increasingly they were regarded as ‘either ineffective or unreliable’ and Sinhalese officers were recruited for these posts.72 Following an attempted coup in 1962 headed by the officer class, who were predominantly Christian, Christians were also purged from the military. Increased centralisation of power meant that employment was increasingly determined by political patronage by the ruling party. High levels of unemployment, discriminatory governmental policies, lack of political representation, Sinhalese dominated police and military, and an increasing sense of Tamil nationalism in the Tamil Nadu, provided a climate which would lead to Sri Lankan Tamil militancy. The drafting of a new constitution in 1972 was an opportunity for Sri Lanka to exert its own form of governance. The new constitution however maintained the position of Sinhala, placing Buddhism at the centre of the Sri Lankan state.73 Although the Soulbury Constitution had instituted territorial representation, it also included a clause that protected minorities against discriminatory legislation; the 1972 constitution did not.74 The new constitution lay in stark contrast to the demands made of it by the Federal Party: … equal constitutional status between the Sinhala and Tamil languages, citizenship rights to the stateless Indian Tamils, a secular state, guarantee of fundamental rights to all citizens, abolition of caste and untouchability, and … decentralisation of the state.75 The Federal Party, the Tamil Congress and the Ceylon Worker’s Congress (CWC) of Indian Tamils joined together to form the Tamil United Front (TUF). While the JVP agitated in the South during the 1970s, Tamil youths became increasingly frustrated with ineffectual political channels and


began to push for more militant solutions. A number of militant Tamil organisations emerged: the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO); the People’s Liberation Organisation of the Tamil Eelam (PLOTE); the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRLF); the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS); and the Tamil New Tigers (TNT).76 In the beginning these groups targeted Tamils who supported the government but ‘during the latter half of the 1970s, the LTTE77 and other Tamil insurgent groups carried out sporadic attacks against Sri Lankan police outposts in the north and east, in addition to targeting moderate Tamil politicians, suspected informants and Sinhalese civilians’.78 Tamil politics were also becoming radicalised and in 1975 the TUF reorganised and became the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) calling for the establishment of a separate Tamil state. The 1976 the Vaddukodai Resolution made by the TULF defined the boundaries of the Tamil Eelam based on an historic Tamil homeland.79 J. R. Jayawardene – liberalisation, oppression and war The UNP led by J. R. Jayawardene won the 1977 election. His government won by an incredible five sixths majority, leaving the SLFP with only eight seats, and the TULF in opposition with 18 seats. Jayawardene established a Presidential Executive and became the first President of Sri Lanka in 1978, with R. Premedasa becoming Prime Minister. Jayawardena tried to address the problem of political instability by introducing proportional representation and an executive presidential system. With a fixed term in office and elected directly by the people it in fact led to authoritarianism. Despite Jayawardene’s election pledges to resolve the conflict with the Tamil community, his actions once in power were to the contrary.80 In opposition the TULF flexed its muscle, claiming that with the entire Tamil vote, they had a mandate for establishing a separate Tamil state.81 This was not appreciated by Jayawardene, whose misuse of Sri Lankan popular history was unbounded and highly provocative.82 In order to suppress the militants, many Tamil youths were detained and tortured.83 The respected Tamil leader, Chelvanayakam, died in 1977, creating a vacuum for more militant and younger Tamils.84 1977 also saw the worst anti-Tamil riots so far. For two weeks from 16 August [1977], Sinhalese thugs and hooligans instigated by the chauvinists, went on the rampage. They attacked Tamils where they found them, killed hundreds of Tamil men, women


and children, burnt Tamil houses and shops and looted Tamil houses in broad day light and later set them ablaze.85 The LTTE was proscribed and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) came into force ‘allowing for the abrogation of many civil rights and aspects of due process’.86 Stanley Tambiah describes the Jayawardene era as ‘The Slide to Authoritarianism and the Politics of Terror’, beginning with the establishment of the presidential system, then the PTA in 1979, in 1982 Jayawardene managed to suspend parliamentary elections and prolong the government’s term in office by a further six years.87 According to Ponnambalam, under the PTA: … where the minister of defence ‘has any reason to believe or suspects that any person is connected with or concerned in any unlawful activity’ [Ponnambalam’s emphasis], he could order that that person be detained incommunicado and without trial for 18 months. It further provided that such an order ‘shall be final and shall not be called into question in any court or tribunal by way of writ or otherwise’.88 Ketheeswaran Loganathan asserted that ‘if there was a single factor that led to the militarization of the Sri Lankan conflict … it was undoubtedly the regime of President J. R. Jayawardene’.89 The demands made by the Sri Lankan minority for rights within the polity were met with increasing repression. Without a political voice, it was almost certain that Sri Lankan Tamils would make violent expressions of dissent. Acts of violence related to this conflict were treated with impunity, setting a dangerous example for increasing levels of violence. Jayawardene’s oppressive regime was also responsible for implementing radical neo-liberal reform of the Sri Lankan economy. Sri Lanka’s relatively favourable record on human development was founded on the advancement of an extensive welfare system. It began during the colonial era, financed by the profits of the plantations, where all Sri Lankans could receive education from ‘kindergarten to university’, free health care and a food subsidy, public utilities and transport.90 ‘During the first two decades of independence (1948–1968) the public expenditure on education, health transport, and food subsidies and public welfare assistance amounted to approximately 40 per cent of total public expenditure or 10–12 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).’91 The impact of this social investment was profound. There was a sharp increase in the number of educated Sri Lankans; between 1946 and 1973 adult literacy increased from 58 to 72 per cent.92 Between 1946 and 1973 infant


mortality dropped from 141 per thousand births to 46, the death rate fell from 20 per thousand to eight, and natural increase rose from 1.7 to 2.5.93 The welfare state was popular among Sri Lankans, though a negative outcome was the practice of ‘rice politics’ where: Promises of more welfare were an easy means of outwitting opposing parties. The practice was widely used by all the major parties and the level of the offer served as a key instrument of competition. There was no recourse whatsoever to the actual feasibility or economic viability of providing such facilities. Once they assumed power, there was, therefore, no option but to starve other development priorities in order to raise funds for welfare measures.94 David Dunham and S. K. Jayasuriya argue that it was these welfare measures that were ‘buying social peace’ and their removal in 1977 through the UNP’s liberalisation of the economy contributed to heightened tension in Sri Lanka.95 They also argue that the neo-liberal reforms which took place from 1977 onwards undermined ‘the role that welfare expenditures had played in maintaining social cohesion and political stability’.96 The neo-liberal reforms are further criticised for their urban bias. Sri Lanka was envisioned as having the potential, through liberalisation, to make the transition from a producer of primary commodities to an industrialised economy. Development loans were provided to link rural areas with international markets via the urban centres. Sri Lanka, with a predominantly rural economy, was afflicted by serious rural poverty, and the emphasis on urban development did nothing to relieve this. This urban development emphasis would only force rural to urban migration, creating urban ‘ghettos’ of underemployment.97 At this time, violent episodes between the Sri Lanka security forces, Sinhalese gangs and Tamil groups mainly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, particularly in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Vavuniya became commonplace.98 Each violent act saw retaliation escalating to the events of 23 July 1983. On 18 May 1983 members of the Sri Lankan army burnt down the Jaffna library. According to one source, on 22 July 1983, three Tamil girls were abducted and raped by the army (resulting in one girl committing suicide), in revenge the LTTE attacked the police and army, resulting in the death of 13 soldiers.99 The bodies were brought to Colombo on 23 July 1983 and mass riots took place against the Colombo


Tamils lasting until 3 August. The riots were organised, targeting both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil homes and businesses. The Sinhalese mobs seemed to be targeting the economic base of the Tamil community – textile and other factories owned by the Tamils were all completely gutted. Armed with voters’ lists, the gangs came in empty trucks in which they carried away the goods looted from Tamil homes – television sets, radios, refrigerators, music systems, jewellery, clocks, clothes.100 The riots of July 1983 are cited as marking the beginning of the civil war.101 Although there were ‘destructive’ anti-Tamil riots in 1958, 1977 and 1981, none were of the magnitude of July 1983.102 Thousands of Tamils were killed, conservative estimates of those displaced vary between 80,000 and 100,000 with many fleeing north to escape the violence against them in the South.103 The economic cost of the riots was thought to amount to around US$300 million.104 What differentiated the 1983 riots was the complicity and involvement of the Armed Forces and Police, and that no effort was made to stop the rioters for 24 hours. When President Jayawardene, eventually made a public statement, he ‘could say only that the riots were “not a product of urban mobs but a mass movement of the generality of the Sinhalese people”. He then asserted: “The time has come to accede to the clamour and national respect of the Sinhalese people”.’105 Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson also writes ‘That it has been suggested that the pogrom had been pre-planned, and that some of the communal-minded ministers in J. R. Jayawardene’s cabinet were involved in launching the assault on innocent civilians throughout the island’.106 On 4 August 1983, at a time when Sri Lankan Tamils most needed reassurances that this kind of violent ethnic discrimination could never happen again, the Sixth Amendment was passed by Jayawardene’s government. It forced all parliamentarians to swear not to directly or indirectly ‘support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka’.107 This effectively ousted the democratically elected TULF Members of Parliament leaving the Tamils without any political representation.

Efforts to resolve the Sri Lankan conflict 1948–2002 Before the war began there were at least two unsuccessful attempts to introduce some kind of devolution, the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam


Pact in 1957, and the pact between Dudley Senanayake and Chelvanayakam in 1965. During the 1970s politicians abandoned any kind of conciliatory overtures to the Tamils and adopted increasingly more populist polices; this, coupled with the violent suppression of Tamil dissent, led to the outbreak of war in 1983. Since 1983, and prior to the 2002–2006 peace process, there were two formal attempts at peace talks; the Thimpu talks (1986–1987) facilitated by India and the signing of Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement (ISPA), and Chandrika Kumaratunga’s (1994–2006) peace talks, with far reaching proposals for devolution. Every effort made since 1948 has failed. In order for the Norwegian-backed peace process to succeed it would have to avoid the pit-falls of past peace efforts. From S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to J. R. Jayawardene Bandaranaike was the first to make an ethnocentric appeal to the Sinhala majority when he promised to establish Sinhala as the national language. Following the enactment of the ‘Sinhala Only’ law, the Federal Party, made four demands: the first, that the constitution be changed to one based on a federal model, creating autonomous Tamil linguistic states; the second, that the Tamil language be restored ‘to its rightful place enjoying parity of status with Sinhalese as an official language of the country’; the third, regarding the Indian Tamil question, to change citizenship laws so that citizenship was determined ‘on the basis of a simple residential test of all persons who have made the country their home’; and fourth, ‘the immediate cessation of colonising the traditionally Tamil-speaking areas with Sinhalese’.108 The Federal Party also stated that ‘Unless the Prime Minister and the Parliament of Ceylon take the necessary steps to constitute a Federal Union of Ceylon’ within a year they would ‘launch Direct Action by non-violent means for the achievement of this objective’.109 The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact was to devolve some power to Tamil majority areas and allow for Tamil to be an official language. But pressure from the Sangha led to the abrogation of the 1958 B-C Pact. At the same time the opposition leader of the UNP, Dudley Senanayake, claimed that the pact ‘would cause “the racial division of Ceylon”. And that it was consequently “an act of treachery on the part of the Prime Minister”’.110 In 1965 Dudley Senanayake resolved to set up District Councils in the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact. Following accusations that it would ‘dismember the country’ made by the opposition parties and bhikkus, Senanayake ‘reneged on the deal’.111 This clamour against devolution or power sharing by oppositions groups and the Sangha has been repeated time and again.


These first attempts to mitigate for the excesses of majoritarian ethnocentric government illuminate three important aspects of the Sri Lankan conflict that make it difficult to resolve. The first is the problem of spoilers; the Sangha and opposition groups proved highly effective in undermining these first attempts at addressing minority concerns. The second is the problem of asymmetry; with the constitution guaranteeing a Sinhalese government, the ethnic card could be played without any political consequence. The third is credibility; by reneging on agreements, the government set an early precedent of mistrust among Tamils. The most striking characteristic of internal conflict is its asymmetry: one party (government) is strong and the other (insurgents) is weak. … The government has legitimacy, sovereignty, allies, armies and access to resources. The insurgents have to fight for all of these.112 The asymmetry between the government and Tamil groups was such that both Sirimavo Bandaranaike and J. R. Jayawardene could ride roughshod over minorities. Neil DeVotta describes Mrs Bandaranaike as the most ‘blatantly anti-Tamil’ leader, ‘strictly’ enforcing ‘Sinhala only’, banning the import of Tamil literature and films from India, and then restricting educational opportunities for Tamils.113 Jayawardene’s ‘conflation’ of the Tamil demand for self-determination and increasing militancy, with terrorism only served to harden the divide between Tamils and Sinhalese and hasten war.114 This was institutionalised in the PTA in 1979, and the proscription of the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups in 1978. Yet the JVP, a Sinhalese insurgency, was not proscribed until 1983 despite being involved in ‘skirmishes’ since 1971.115 Its proscription was felt necessary only once it began to provide a credible political threat to the UNP having ‘performed well in local and presidential elections’.116 Indian involvement Stephen Ryan makes the observation that ‘States that have close affective links with ethnic groups in another state will often not remain indifferent to the fate of the groups’.117 With a sizeable Tamil population in India it would not be politically expedient to ignore the predicament of Sri Lankan Tamils. Despite the problem of the stateless Indian Tamils, the anti-Tamil laws in education and language, and sporadic anti-Tamil rioting, the Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu were careful to stay ‘within the parameters of Indian central government policy towards Sri Lanka’.118 Sankaran Krishna explains that during the time of Indira Gandhi


(1966–1977 and 1980–1984), this meant avoiding provoking her as she had a ‘penchant to unseat Congress state governments on any pretext’.119 Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi were two of the world’s first female Prime Ministers, both with socialist governments, and relations between Sri Lanka and India were ‘excellent’.120 This deteriorated with J. R. Jayawardene, who provoked Mrs Gandhi by making overtures to the West.121 During this time India was dealing with separatist struggles in Assam, Kashmir and the Punjab. In 1983 many Tamils fled to Tamil Nadu and India was fearful of a ‘resurgence’ of nationalism there.122 Martha Crenshaw suggests that in Mrs Gandhi’s mind: Covert support for the Tamil opposition seemed the best way of controlling the extremists, gaining leverage over the Sri Lankan government, maintaining the loyalty of political allies who could keep the Congress (I) Party in power, and forestalling eruptions of Tamil nationalism that might threaten the integrity of India.123 Indian involvement was motivated by the need to manage nationalist elements within federal India, and exerting control over a smaller neighbour within its regional sphere.124 By arming and training Tamil dissidents, India altered the power balance between the dissidents and the government. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984 by a Sikh bodyguard affiliated to a Punjabi militant group whom she had provided with covert support.125 Her son Rajiv Gandhi’s succession brought with it a more conciliatory tone and an attempt at peacemaking, facilitating the Thimpu talks in 1986–1987. Throughout this process however, Mr Gandhi continued to allow and support the training of Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu, with as many as 20,000 combatants receiving military training by 1987.126 The Thimpu Talks involved India, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the more moderate TULF127 as well as Tamil guerrilla hardliners, the LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, EPRLF. The Tamil parties walked out of these talks following ‘fresh atrocities unleashed by the Sri Lankan armed forces’.128 Discussions went on throughout 1986 and into 1987 between the GoSL and the TULF. The GoSL under Jayawardene put forward a new set of proposals for devolved power. These proposals did not meet the aspirations of Tamil hardliners, who wanted a separate


state. And this was unacceptable to the opposition as Trincomalee (a strategically significant harbour) would be under Tamil control.129 Furthermore, the TULF, as a political movement did not have the clout to negotiate on behalf of Tamil paramilitaries. Meanwhile parties in Tamil Nadu insisted that discussions had to involve the LTTE.130 While the LTTE was probably the strongest militant groups, it was not the only group fighting for Sri Lankan Tamils. And mistrust of the government by Tamil groups was not unfounded given that while the government negotiated, it built up its military capability and attacked Tamil civilians. So early indications were that neither party was ready for peace. Krishna points out that these talks served to highlight the gulf between the two parties.131 When India offered to mediate and guarantee a Sri Lankan peace agreement in July 1987, it came with the veiled threat of further involvement if it was not accepted.132 The Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement (ISPA) was signed between the GoSL and India on 29 July 1987 in the absence of any Tamil parties. The Agreement sought to satisfy the LTTE demand for Eelam (homeland) through the temporary merging of the northern and eastern provinces into one administrative unit.133 The terms of the Agreement stipulated a referendum be held in the multiethnic Eastern provinces (where Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims live) to decide whether they wanted to be part of an integrated, super-province.134 It would then be administered by the North-East Provincial Council (NEPC) which would have an elected executive authority, consisting of a board of ministers presided over by a Chief Minster, overseen by a governor appointed by the President.135 The NEPC was the facility for devolved power to the North and East, however authority over land settlement and the maintenance of law and order, two critical Tamil issues due to fears of colonisation and the Sinhalese dominated police and army, were maintained by the GoSL.136 Furthermore, the governor could override the NEPC.137 The 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution was the institutional outcome of the Thimpu Talks and the ISPA, devolving power to the ‘new’ provincial councils.138 This proposed political solution to the conflict was widely criticised at the time as being inadequate.139 … a number of clauses in the amended constitution allowed for the blocking of substantive devolution. … Perhaps the greatest obstacle to practical devolution was the first phrase of the Reserved List which provided for ‘National Policy on all Subjects and Functions’


to be determined by Parliament. This phrase completely undermined powers apparently devolved to the provinces.140 The ISPA and the 13th amendment to the constitution did not address the grievances of the Tamils. Within days of signing the ISPA, an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) arrived to implement the Agreement. For the Indian intervention to succeed, it had to be a legitimate peacemaker and peacekeeper. In practice, the most successful interventions have been conducted under UN authority. … Without a Security Council resolution, the only way a peacekeeping force can be legitimized is by a request from a government or a regional organization. … Such justifications mean, however that peacekeeping forces are likely to be seen as partisan.141 The presence of Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil fuelled Sinhalese chauvinist fears of Indian domination, eliciting a violent backlash; following the signing of the Accord, two days of rioting ensued, with the Sangha and JVP calling it a ‘betrayal’.142 Through the arming and training of Tamil militant groups, India had intensified the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamils, even before the ‘peacekeeping’ mission was envisioned: Until 1983, the Tamil youth insurgency had been a hit-and-run operation, consisting of sporadic, though occasionally quite deadly, strikes by a very small group of guerrillas against police stations, government offices and military camps. By 1986, thousands of highly trained and well-equipped Tamil fighters effectively controlled large tracts of the northern and eastern provinces.143 Rajiv Gandhi’s efforts to mediate between the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil militants may have been well intentioned, particularly when India was partly responsible for heightened violence between the two. India’s continued training of Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu undermined these good intentions. India was not a legitimate mediator or peacekeeper as both parties viewed it with mistrust; the GoSL feared its hegemonic intentions,144 and India would not allow the establishment of a separate Tamil state.145 Meanwhile Rajiv Gandhi was faced with domestic problems of his own: defeat in a number of state elections; criticism over unfulfilled


election promises; continued unrest in the Punjab; and a major corruption scandal which had created a split within the Congress Party.146 It has been suggested that the ISPA was a useful smokescreen, drawing attention away from these problems.147 The day before the Agreement was signed, The Times (London) reported that the Commission set up to investigate the corruption claims was a ‘cover-up’.148 The signing of the ISPA was trumpeted in India as a major diplomatic coup,149 outside India the praise was more muted.150 It certainly deflected attention from the woes of the Congress Party as India became embroiled in the disastrous peacekeeping operation. Dissatisfied with the political agreement, and without being signatory, the Tamil militants were to voluntarily surrender their weapons to the IPKF within 72 hours.151 The IPKF did not disarm Tamil rebels, and the LTTE used the Indian intervention as an opportunity to assassinate their rivals. India did not keep accurate records of the number of Tamils they had trained and did not know the scale of the task for which they had subscribed.152 The IPKF’s proven bias in favour of Tamils in mixed areas resulted in the expulsion of the Madrasi Regiment from Trincomalee.153 India also forced its will on various political arrangements, further fuelling both Tamil and Sinhalese resentment of India’s interference.154 The original short-term remit of the IPKF of disarming the Tamil militants and keeping peace in the North and East of the Island, had given way to a policy of waging war on the LTTE, with the net result that the entire Tamil population was increasingly being drawn into the theatre of war.155 While India became entrenched in a war with the LTTE, the GoSL brutally suppressed another JVP insurgency with an estimated death toll of between 40,000 and 60,000.156 ‘Just as the Indians had sought to use the LTTE as a lever against Jayawardene in the period 1983 to 1987, Premadasa [UNP Prime Minister] armed them against the IPKF in the early 1990s to humiliate Rajiv Gandhi and oust the IPKF.’157 When the IPKF finally left Sri Lanka, the LTTE took over their camps and hardware, and were now stronger than ever. Mrs Gandhi’s covert support of Tamil militants is not unlike US support for the Contras in Nicaragua, while Rajiv Gandhi sought international recognition for India as a regional power, as well as personal recognition as a statesman, through the drafting and implementation of the ISPA. Rajiv Gandhi’s intervention in Sri Lankan affairs was given the


nod by the other powerful states.158 William Zartman’s observation rings true in the case of Sri Lanka particularly with regard to India’s involvement: Structurally, internal conflict is marked by asymmetry, a characteristic generally considered unconducive to negotiation and attempts to redress symmetry only further complicate negotiations and dynamics.159 It also confirms Ryan’s thesis that external involvement by a state in internal conflicts is often ‘destructive’.160 LTTE expansion When the Sixth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution was passed by Jayawardene’s government and the TULF were forced to resign from government, ‘leadership of the Tamil movement fell to Veluppillai Prabhakaran and his Tamil Liberation Tigers, and he seized the opportunity to establish a leadership in Tamil areas’.161 As mentioned earlier there have been a number of Tamil militant organisations, the most notorious being PLOTE, TELO, EPRLF and EROS, all of whom have engaged in internecine rivalry supplying intelligence to the GoSL and the IPKF in return for money and weapons.162 Before the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord, the GoSL no longer controlled Jaffna, with the Sri Lankan military ‘confined to camps’.163 As India withdrew from Sri Lanka, the LTTE took over the IPKF’s bases. The LTTE now had de facto control of Jaffna and began running the area under its control as a quasi-state policed by LTTE cadre and levying taxes.164 In 1986 Prabhakaran outlined his vision of Tamil Eelam as having a ‘socialist government; there will be only one party supported by all the people’.165 The University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR) briefing from 1992 catalogues the brutal LTTE regime where thousands of Tamils were taken prisoner, held in inhumane conditions and subjected to routine torture for alleged membership of rival Tamil organisations or for complicity with the IPKF.166 Many Sri Lankan Tamils fled overseas to escape mistreatment by both the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. The LTTE became a fearsome organisation with both a military and political wing, backed by a sizeable diaspora that was able to provide significant financial support. Mangala Moonesinghe Committee Following India’s withdrawal a Parliamentary Select Committee was established in August 1991 known as the Mangala Moonesinghe Select


Committee after its SLFP chairman. The task of its 45 members was to solve three key areas of conflict: to bring about the devolution of the Northern and Eastern provinces; to prevent the disintegration of the nation; and to achieve peace and stability, and use the reduced military expenditure to promote growth and development.167 Its deliberations and consultation stretched between August 1991 and December 1992, during which time Tamil parties insisted that the Northern and Eastern provinces must be merged, while Sinhalese parties were opposed to this, and Muslims parties wanted ‘sufficient safeguards for their interests’.168 Neither Tamils nor Sinhalese parties were willing to move from these positions and inevitably the Committee failed, for with 45 members it ‘was too large to do any meaningful business. The political parties did not prepare working papers nor were there any technical experts to guide the committee on specific issues.’169 The Indian intervention and the Mangala Moonesinghe Committee all took place under the administration of the UNP. In 1994 the UNP lost both the general and presidential elections to the Bandaranaike family and the SLFP, with mother (former Prime Minister 1960–1965 and 1970–1977) and daughter taking the positions of Prime Minister and President respectively. The Kumaratunga initiative Chandrika Kumaratunga, the daughter of S. W. R. D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, became the leader of the People’s Alliance (PA) in August 1994; a centre-left coalition of nine parties and the SLFP. In November 1993, 15 days before the presidential election, the UNP candidate was assassinated; Chandrika went on to win the presidency with a landslide 62 per cent of the vote.170 Having negotiated a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement beginning 8 January 1995, Chandrika attempted to inspire confidence through reducing restrictions on the movement of goods into the LTTE controlled areas. The ceasefire was short lived and the LTTE unilaterally resumed hostilities on 19 April 1995.171 This rebuttal caught the government on the back foot, and what ensued was the GoSL’s ‘War for Peace’ strategy. The aim of this strategy was ‘to isolate the rebels politically by appealing directly to Tamil public opinion while increasing military pressure on Tiger strongholds’.172 Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu described Chandrika’s proposals for devolution as ‘unprecedented’ in the history of attempts to resolve the ethnic conflict.173 This federal type structure did not however meet the LTTE’s separatist demands.174 There were also a number of shortcomings, for example a provision for a ‘Supreme Council, which would represent the interests of the Buddhist clergy at the highest level and could not be abolished without


a two-thirds parliamentary majority and public referendum’ meant ‘All governments would be obliged to consult this council on an ill-defined and potentially broad range of issues’.175 Predictably the Sinhala Buddhist reactionaries’ response was that the proposals would divide the country and pave the way for secession.176 Any devolution would require constitutional changes, and this necessitated the support of the opposition in order to pass with a two-thirds majority. UNP, JVP and Maha Sangha criticism was so vociferous that the PA abandoned the draft.177 The UNP leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe ‘succumbed to the extremists and insisted that his party would never support any legislation without the approval of Buddhist religious authorities’.178 Meanwhile, the ‘War for Peace’ raged on.179 Sri Lanka had evaded peace since the anti-Tamil riots of the 1950s. Any new peace process would need to avoid the mistakes of the past. A new Sri Lankan peace process would have to manage the spoiling tactics of hardline members of the Sangha, the political opposition and the LTTE; it would need to deal with the asymmetry between the politically weak Tamils and the strong government; the government would need to demonstrate its commitment to peace and any deals made with the LTTE and Tamil groups; and finally any third-party engagement would need to be seen as impartial and legitimate.

A Sri Lankan peace Ethnic heterogeneity has provided a tempting opportunity for intragroup vote-seeking, where politicians have played on historic prejudices to gain power. Rather than try to reduce levels of violence, the government has allowed attacks against the Tamil minority and used repressive methods to suppress dissent. The violence met out by the LTTE and the government did not result in economic sanctions, and the LTTE received weapons and training from India, as well as financial support for the Tamil Diaspora. The Sri Lankan state has bought weapons and training from abroad, despite its unacceptable human-rights record. If we return to the theories of peace, which underpin peacebuilding, there are three thematic areas that seem to provide the root causes of conflict, and these are economic, political and societal. At the core of the Sri Lanka conflict are recurring political, economic and societal practices which shed light on the frustrations of the last Sri Lankan peace process.


Political development There are two persistent political issues that continue to thwart attempts to build peace: the Sri Lankan Constitution and partisan politics. At the heart of the Sri Lankan political system is a constitution that does not recognise the rights of minorities, placing the majority ethnic group at its centre. Ironically, the move to proportional representation in 1978, did not result in the formation of broad based coalitions, but to unstable coalitions between one of the two main parties and minority hardline Sinhalese groups.180 This system accounts for the antagonistic way that the two main parties jostle for power, and the divisive political practices that undermine attempts to negotiate a peace settlement. The disenfranchise of Tamils of Indian Origin, ‘Sinhala Only’ and the ‘standardization in education’ policy were successful in winning Sinhalese votes. Without a constitution that protects minorities, Tamil or Muslim, ethnicity will be exploited by vote seeking politicians. Where populist politics has created policies that discriminate against minority groups, the pursuit of power by the two dominant parties, the UNP and SLFP, has prevented any accommodation with the Tamils. When the government has attempted to negotiate an agreement with Tamil parties, the opposition has undermined them. Furthermore, Sri Lankan politics are corrupt with ‘Nepotism and cronyism’ determining ‘political appointments’, and grand corruption particularly in the public procurement process, and when establishing business operations particularly those involving foreign investors.181 ‘Small-value petty bribery’ is used to ‘facilitate public service delivery’ and ‘politics appears as a serious business and profession, rarely driven by a sense of civic duty and consciousness’.182 Once in power, politicians exploit the state apparatus to their own ends. This provides an incentive for opposition parties to undermine the ruling party, irrespective of its national importance. For those politicians motivated by personal gain, a successful peace process might reduce their chances of getting into power. Political instability created by frequent general and presidential elections undermines any peace efforts. The inability to form a peace coalition is a problem that would have to be overcome if a peace settlement was to be brokered between the government and the LTTE. Although Sri Lanka has regular elections, irregularities are commonplace, such as tampering with ballot boxes, removing voters from voter registers, impersonation of voters, intimidation of voters, and the murder of political opponents.183 While it is a relatively mature democracy, with 14 general elections since 1948, and ten presidential elections since 1977, it has all of the political problems mentioned above.


It is a prime example that the orthodoxy of instituting democracy, a common post-conflict peacebuilding activity, is not a guarantee of peace and stability. Democracy has provided the foundations for Sri Lanka’s long and violent civil war. Bad governance is at the heart of the Sri Lankan conflict. Peacebuilding requires the instigation of profound political reform that allows for a plural, secular form of government. Human development and the Sri Lankan economy Given Sri Lanka’s long run war it ranks more favourably than expected in the world’s Human Development Index (HDI) (2009), 102 out of 175, and achieves higher than anticipated human development when related to its GDP.184 However, Sri Lanka has fallen three places since 2004 and 11 since 1998. Without the 10 per cent of Sri Lankans who live in the Northern and Eastern provinces, the HDI is hardly an accurate reflection of development in Sri Lanka, particularly when so much infrastructure and human resources have been destroyed in the North and East.185 Yet despite this glaring omission, development statistics do illustrate the core problems that underlie the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, showing the unequal way in which resources are distributed and the influence of ethnic politics on that distribution. In the South the four wealthiest districts are Gampaha, Colombo, Nuwara Eliya and then Kalutara. Gampaha is where the bulk of industry is situated, Colombo is the state capital, Kalutara was traditionally a rubber-producing area and has since expanded into leisure and tourism. Gampaha and Kalutara flank Colombo; Gampaha to the North and Kalutara to the South. Nuwara Eliya’s wealth derives from agriculture in general and tea production in particular. Despite being ranked third in terms of per capita GDP Nuwara Eliya is the poorest district in Southern Sri Lanka with 31 per cent of people living in poverty.186 Nuwara Eliya has the lowest life expectancy, high levels of illiteracy and the lowest number of hospital births in Sri Lanka.187 Nuwara Eliya is the only district in Southern Sri Lanka where Tamils are in the majority. In the 1981 census the Tamil population stood at 60.8 per cent, with 47.3 per cent Indian Tamils. According to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report, Nuwara Eliya performs badly in terms of life expectancy because ‘education attainment, access to health services and living conditions among estate sector plantation workers have been lower than the general average for the country’.188 In contrast, Kandy has the second lowest per capita GDP, yet it also has low levels of poverty; 17 per cent of Kandians live in poverty, which compares favourably to the 31 per cent in Nuwara


Eliya.189 The three wealthiest districts of Gampaha, Colombo and Kalutara are the only districts that have less poverty than Kandy. This, the report explains, is ‘attributed to a relatively extensive electricity network and wider social provisioning to deliver access to clean water and safe sanitation’.190 Kandy is the beating heart of Sinhala nationalism, the home of the last Sri Lankan King, and the Temple of the Tooth (whose Order protects the relic of Buddha’s tooth). Due to the importance of Sinhala ‘mythohistory’ in Sri Lankan politics, the welfare of Kandyians is key to the maintenance of power at the centre. Sri Lankan development if full of contradictions: low income does not guarantee poverty; high income does not guarantee wealth. The UNDP report attempts an overly simplistic explanation: The differences in the patterns of human development and human poverty between districts appears to be based partly on geographical location. The networks of physical infrastructure in electricity, roads, communication, pipe-borne waste, and sewage disposal, have the Colombo district as their hub. As these facilities radiate outwards for Colombo, the extent and coverage and quality of services delivered tends to deteriorate. In consequence, districts located relatively far away from Colombo have weak social provisioning for infrastructure and suffer high levels of human poverty.191 What are the political consequences of such uneven distribution? Or put another way; is the uneven distribution of resources in Sri Lanka a consequence of its politics? In a democracy, voters in outlying districts disgruntled with their relative poverty and poor public services aim their dissatisfaction at the Colombo-based government. This puts the two uprising of the JVP into context. For the minority groups whose patronage provides no political gain, the situation will be all the more bleak. These include the Muslim majority areas in the West and the Tamil majority areas of the North and East, as well as Nuwara Eliya in the South. Sri Lanka’s ethnic politics play out in the economic policies adopted since independence.192 Once in government, Sri Lankan politicians use the machinery of state to maintain power and influence by granting contracts and concessions to friends and family; delivering kickbacks to their supporters.193 Liberal economic reforms increased hardship among the poorest citizens and increased tension between the ethnic groups. Urban development reinforced rural poverty and contributed to urban ghettoisation. If economic liberalisation and development really does have the potential to lift Sri Lankans out of poverty (as its


advocates insist), it will not happen without reform of the government apparatus and a crack down on corruption and cronyism. Sri Lanka’s disappointing economic performance during the past 50 years or so, has nothing to do with its economic policies per se, but is really a sequel to the inability of the Sri Lankan rulers to marry these policies with appropriate political strategies. Political mismanagement, more than anything, manifested itself in unsuitable and incompetent handling of the socio-ethnic factors which, in turn, resulted in a sub-optimum or zero contribution from one or more of the ethnic communities. Moreover, it also led to under – or non-utilisation of resources at regional levels. Even the available resources, as the country slowly but steadily slipped into a civil war, could not be fully committed to development purposes.194 If, as the hypothesis of this book states, the inclusion of economic recovery in a peacemaking process can help sustain peace, we would anticipate that economic issues would play a significant role in causing the Sri Lankan conflict. It seems that development issues, certainly the current uneven distribution of human development and wealth came as a result of the ethnic conflict, and has been further compounded by the cost of war. The cost of the war between 1983 to 1996, determined by the admirable effort of Nisha Arunatilake et al., amounts to a staggering US$20.6 billion (in 1996 prices).195 These costs include: the direct costs of Government military expenditure; the LTTE’s military expenditure; the expenditure by the GoSL on relief services; lost infrastructure; lost income due to foregone public investment; reduced tourist arrivals; lost foreign investments; lost income due to displacement; lost human capital as a result of death and injury; and the loss of output of the war-affected Northern Province. An end to war would bring about economic recovery, but would that recovery be widespread enough to overcome any sense of relative deprivation given the apparent disparities that exist as a result of corruption and vote-seeking political practices? A danger lies in pumping money into a system that will only serve to increase the economic disparity between rich and poor. Cultural and social aspects of the conflict Violence in Sri Lanka has permeated all levels of society from the bhikkus and Sangha, to the routine use of torture, and roadside assassinations carried out by paramilitary groups. Intercommunal rioting occurs regularly and with impunity; Sinhalese have attacked Tamils who in turn have


attacked Muslims. The media repeatedly fuels ethnic hatred, pandering to those who speak only one of the Sri Lankan languages.196 In the Knowledge Attitudes Practices Survey on the Sri Lankan Peace Process (KAPS) undertaken by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) in 2002 at the beginning of the last peace process 64 per cent of ‘the Sinhala majority disapprove[d] of virtually all of the possible peace proposals about which they were asked’.197 In general both the Tamil and Muslim communities were enthusiastic about a negotiated settlement, and the majority of Sri Lankans would have accepted a peace agreement if it involved some form of federalism and equal rights for all ethnic groups, however 30 per cent of the Sinhalese community surveyed said they would actively protest against such an agreement.198 40 per cent of those surveyed said ‘they do not have any friends among other ethnic groups’ and ‘30% of citizens [said] they never [had] contact with members of other groups’.199 In a report on journalism in Sri Lanka it was found that from 1 to 14 June 2004 ‘Sinhala press coverage [of the peace process and all related issues] was generally biased and inflammatory. Seventy-four of the articles appearing in the Sinhala media were found to be either one sided or inflammatory with only 47 articles reporting one opinion’ and ‘Political opinions critical of the LTTE were not reported in any of the Tamil newspapers’.200 As the Sri Lankan conflict dragged on, Sri Lanka’s ethnic communities have become increasingly segregated. Reconciling ethnic groups is critical to any peace process; this includes the Sinhalese dominated state with Tamils, and prosecuting crimes committed by all parties. John Cockell proposes six basic categories of preconditions for protracted social conflict and Sri Lanka meets them all: … the breakdown and paralysis of a contested political process; the polarization of social divisions around communal identity (ethnic, religious, tribal) lines; the systematic violation of human rights and endemic personal insecurity; the presence of different economic underdevelopment, deprivation, and possible resource scarcity; the militarization of political action and the availability of small arms; and the presence of regional and/or international support for one or more conflict actors.201

Conclusion Sri Lanka’s colonial history, the formation of its political system, the existence of caste tensions, politically expedient policies of exclusion,


patronage, poor fiscal management, state repression, a partisan political culture, and a society permeated by violence have contributed to what is unquestionably a protracted social conflict. Sri Lanka’s politics and economics are intrinsically linked, and little has been done to reduce animosity and mistrust between the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka would require a whole raft of reform starting with the political system at the heart of the conflict, dealing with the inequality and structural poverty that has resulted from populist forms of governance, and a huge effort to increase cohesion between the ethnic communities. This book is interested in how a state experiencing civil conflict makes the transition from war to peace, and whether the inclusion of economic recovery issues in a peacemaking process can help sustain peace. From the preceding discussion it would seem that Sri Lanka’s economic problems result from political mismanagement. Sri Lanka is in a vicious circle where politicians have improved the opportunities for the voting majority by reducing them for the ethnic minorities. Having created this conflict, they have exacerbated it by reducing political space available to Tamils making it difficult to redress the imbalance. In economic terms, one-fifth of the population contributes less to the economy, further impacting on Sri Lanka’s economic ability. The war made the economic situation worse, wasting precious human and physical resources. The Sri Lankan case calls into question the ‘peacebuilding consensus’ and the idea of creating a ‘liberal peace’. Poorly applied, the ‘liberal peace’ model appears to provide the structures of war rather than peace. Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka would require radical reform of existing illiberal structures, and reconciling the Sinhala majority with Tamil-speaking minorities. The challenge for international donor organisations committed to the concept of peacebuilding is how they can influence a democratically elected government and encourage the reform of the structures that brought it to power, while continuing to respect its sovereignty. Although it is evident that economic issues did not cause the Sri Lankan conflict, there was plainly support for the idea that the promise of economic recovery might provide an end to the Gordian knot. With the abrogation of the ceasefire agreement in 2008 and a military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 the question now is why that approach failed?

3 The 2002–2006 Sri Lankan Peace Process

After 54 years of trying to settle the Sri Lankan conflict the Norwegianmediated ceasefire of 2002 presented an opportunity to begin constructive peace negotiations. This peace process would need to address genuine Tamil grievances: legislation that discriminates against Tamils, Indian Tamil citizenship, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), and Sinhala domination of the police and armed forces. It would also need to build trust between the state and the minorities. A new peace process would have to accommodate spoilers, which include the political opposition, radical members of the Sangha, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and overcome the asymmetry of the Tamils versus the democratically elected government. To determine whether the inclusion of economic recovery issues in a peacemaking process can help sustain peace this case needs to meet three criteria: the first that there was a peace process robust enough to embark on a process of economic recovery; the second, that economic recovery was integral to that peace process; and the third, that efforts were in fact made to that end. This chapter examines the 2002–2006 peace process and establishes the prominence of peacebuilding and economic recovery.

The Norwegian mediated peace process The peace process began with optimism as a result of two factors: Norway had emerged as a credible third-party mediator and Sri Lanka reached what could be described as a ‘hurting stalemate’.1 Norway was seen as a legitimate peacemaker; with no geostrategic position toward Sri Lanka, it had what Christopher Mitchell describes as ‘outsider-neutral’ status.2 77


Norwegian engagement was based on the international credibility won through peacemaking rather than dominance in South Asia.3 Taking the first place in the Human Development Index (HDI), Norway did not need to secure any of Sri Lanka’s natural resources. Norway compared favourably to India who was an ‘insider-partial’ peacemaker. With 62 million Tamils, the possibility of an independent Tamil state on India’s doorstep posed a threat to its own national integrity. India would want to take a more domineering role given its own geostrategic concerns, and the importance of shoring up its position vis-à-vis other world powers. As part of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) a Scandinavian and European Union (EU) staffed Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was set up ‘to take immediate action on any complaints made by either Party to the Agreement, and to enquire into and assist the Parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with such complaints’.4 The SLMM, as an impartial observer, strengthened the ceasefire by investigating violations. Although the SLMM was not a peacekeeping force and did not provide any kind of security guarantee, by monitoring the ceasefire, the parties to the agreement had a greater incentive to abide by it. Norway’s involvement in the conflict came at a time when both sides were struggling to sustain the war. It had reached what William Zartman might describe as a ‘ripe’ moment: Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they grab onto proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive.5 Although the government continued to increase expenditure on military training and hardware in 2000, it was having problems both recruiting and keeping military personnel.6 Fighting continued throughout 2000–2001 with the LTTE managing to overrun several army camps. In 2001, in addition to regaining the Elephant’s Pass (an important causeway attaching the Jaffna Peninsula to the mainland) the LTTE also attacked the International Airport in Colombo, decimating half the stateowned airline, Air Lanka, and eight military planes.7 Despite the war, the economy always managed to grow, with the exception of 2001, when it contracted by 1.5 per cent.8 This may have

The 2002–2006 Sri Lankan Peace Process 79

been as a result of the global economic slowdown at that time, but it was exacerbated by ‘poor economic management, drought, power shortages, and acts of terrorism’, and the considerable proportion of government funds dedicated to the military which in 2000 amounted to US$1 billion (17 per cent of the annual budget) and a 2001 budget deficit of 10.9 per cent.9 Since India had withdrawn support to the LTTE in the 1980s, they had developed an elaborate fundraising and arms procurement network, taking advantage of the large Tamil Diaspora.10 This was severely curtailed as a result of America’s ‘War on Terror’ after the attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11. While the LTTE’s position was weakened, so too was the Government’s. President Chandrika Kumaratunga had lost 13 of her MPs to the United National Party (UNP), and a ‘no confidence’ vote was scheduled for October; she dissolved parliament the day before the vote and set the date for a general election in December.11 This paved the way for a UNP general election victory in December 2001 and Ranil Wickremesinghe, became Prime Minister; the first time the prime minister and president were from different parties. Prior to the announcement of the ceasefire Norway provided a channel of communication between the LTTE and the GoSL. The LTTE stated they would only agree to talks if they were de-proscribed. This was unacceptable to Mrs Kumaratunga, but not to Sri Lanka’s new Prime Minister. After the election, the LTTE unilaterally declared a ceasefire and this was ratified with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in February 2002. Negotiations – the 2002–2003 peace talks Between the signing of the MoU in February 2002 and the beginning of the peace talks in September 2002, both parties aired their misgivings. The first major event was a press conference in April 2002 held in the Vanni (the area controlled by the LTTE) by the LTTE leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, his negotiator, Anton Balasingham and the head of the Political Wing, Tamilchelvan.12 Prabhakaran reiterated the importance of de-proscription as well as the importance of establishing an interim administration. At this early stage he made a radical proclamation, that the LTTE was willing to reconsider its separatist goal; a major departure from what it had been fighting for since the 1970s. Prabhakaran said however that a political solution to the conflict would only be acceptable as long as it acknowledged three core principles; the concepts of Tamil Homeland, Tamil Nationhood, and the right of the Tamil people to self-determination.13 The Sri Lankan


Muslim Congress (SLMC) made a deal with the LTTE over the repatriation of Muslims to Jaffna and the North as well as the return of property to Muslims that had been taken by the LTTE. The leader of the Indian Tamils agreed to support the LTTE in its pursuit of self-determination.14 Over the summer both Wickremesinghe and Kumaratunga made statements about the importance of the unity of Sri Lanka, and refused to support the concept of an ‘interim administration’ run by the LTTE. Wickremesinghe rejected the concept of a ‘Tamil Homeland’.15 Norway had to work hard to get both sides to come together for peace talks.16 Despite these initial difficulties the first round of talks was held in Thailand (16–18 September 2002). A softly-softly approach was taken with the negotiations, starting with the problems that all parties could agree upon, and then moving to the more contentious core issues.17 All parties agreed on the immediate priority of easing the situation of the war-affected North and East. Therefore a joint task force for humanitarian and reconstruction activities was needed. In the second round (31 October–3 November 2002) three subcommittees were set up: the Subcommittee on Immediate Human and Rehabilitations Needs in the North and East (SIHRN); the Subcommittee on De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN); and the Subcommittee on Political Matters. SIHRN would be a: Joint Task Force [that would] constitute a partnership between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and [would] have responsibility for the identification, financing and monitoring of urgent humanitarian and reconstruction activities in the north and east.18 A joint committee established with representatives of both the GoSL and the LTTE sits well with the bridge-building, type-two concept of peacebuilding discussed in Chapter 1, where the committee would see the coming together of the two opposing sides motivated by the common goal of humanitarian aid and reconstruction. During round three in Oslo (2–5 December 2002) the issue of gender was raised, and perhaps the most significant statement of the entire peace talks was made: Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-


speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.19 During the fourth round (6–9 January 2003) the importance of ‘tangible improvements to the daily lives of people’ was again seen as ‘underpinning’ political progress.20 The resettlement of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was raised and further action agreed upon. The North East Reconstruction Fund (NERF) established at the Oslo Peace Support Meeting in November 2002 (worth US$70 million) was to be administered by the World Bank.21 NERF would fund the activities identified by SIHRN, and offices were set up in Killinochchi, the administrative centre of the Vanni. The idea that ‘tangible improvements to the daily lives of people’ would ‘underpin’ political progress was a core approach to this peace process, and demonstrated early commitment to the importance of economic recovery issues in this peacemaking process. By the fifth round (7–8 February 2003) there were growing security concerns over the activities of the Sea Tigers, the LTTE naval operation. For the first time human rights were discussed, in particular the use of child combatants by the LTTE.22 During round six (18–21 March 2003) there were further security concerns and pledges were made to abide better by the ceasefire agreement. It was also recognised that they would have to start looking into the more difficult issues of devising a federal solution to the conflict, the so-called ‘core issues’, and this would take place in round seven. The core issues according to Jayadeva Uyangoda were: a constitutional framework of powersharing; the extent as well as the units of powersharing; the degree of autonomy to the North and East in comparison with other regions; safeguards for local minorities; centre-regional relations; the accommodation and demobilisation of the LTTE cadre and administration; human rights and security guarantees; and transnational agreements.23 Finally the peace talk’s human rights expert, Ian Martin, was to draft a Declaration of Human Rights, devise a human rights training programme for the LTTE and GoSL security and government personnel, and write proposals to strengthen the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka.24 During the first four rounds of talks all parties agreed that it was important to improve the situation of the war-torn areas of the North and East. These activities would then help create support for the more political process of finding a negotiated solution to the war. International support for the peace process materialised at the Oslo Peace


Support Meeting (25 November 2002) to the sum of US$70 million and later the World Bank pledged a further US$800 million in its Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The newly formed SIHRN announced at the Oslo meeting that ‘Both Parties recognise that unless the people urgently experience practical benefits from the process much that has been gained [from the initial ceasefire period] can be lost’.25 At the end of the meeting it was declared that: Resolution of the ethnic conflict will remove the main barrier to sustained economic growth and social progress in Sri Lanka. It is in this perspective that we pledge to provide assistance to meet the immediate needs and priorities identified at this meeting, so that assistance may be given island-wide, when and where it is most needed, thereby directly promoting the peace process.26 By allowing the recovery of the North and East the government would, it was hoped, be establishing trust in Tamil majority areas. There was a sense that there needed to be some kind of ‘peace dividend’ in order for the peace process to succeed, both in the North and East and islandwide. Spoiling the peace talks While track-one level peace talks were taking place, Sri Lankan politics continued apace. The JVP was highly critical of the peace process. Characteristically, the Sangha ‘vehemently opposed the concessions being granted to the Tamils and argued that the peace process would undermine Sri Lanka’s status as an exclusive state-protected and promoted Buddhist state’.27 The CFA and peace talks were very much Wickremesinghe’s peace process, and the usual UNP/SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) rivalry began to resurface. Kumaratunga was reportedly ‘ill informed of developments in the peace process’.28 There was open personal animosity between Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe.29 One year after the general election, the President had the power to dissolve parliament. In November 2003, while Wickremesinghe was in a meeting in Washington D.C., Kumaratunga took control of the ministries of Defence, the Interior and Media. In January 2004 she formed the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) with the JVP and dissolved parliament in February, announcing the date of the next general election as 2 April 2004. The UPFA won the 2004 elections by a slim majority and invited Mahinda Rajapakse to be Prime Minister. This ruined any chance of returning to


peace talks as firstly, the government negotiators would have changed, and secondly, the UPFA would not recognise the LTTE as the ‘sole representatives of the Tamil people’.30 The PA had also been highly critical of the Norwegian-brokered peace talks; even going so far as to accuse Norway of being ‘partial’.31 The LTTE’s withdrawal from the talks One of the main reasons given for the LTTE’s withdrawal from the seventh round of peace talks in April 2003 in Thailand was their exclusion from a pre-donor conference meeting held in Washington D.C. As members of a US proscribed organisation, the LTTE delegates were ineligible for visas. They argued it was a deliberate move to exclude them from the peace process. This being a seemingly petty reason for withdrawal, they also stressed the main reason was the ‘absence of significant progress in alleviating the hardships of the people caused by the war’.32 Rajat Ganguly suggests that the LTTE’s withdrawal was in fact and attempt to pressurise the government to leave the High Security Zones (HSZs) so they would regain control of Jaffna.33 The government’s proposals for an interim administration in July 2003 were countered by the LTTE’s for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). These proposals were ‘the first official proposals by the LTTE on any aspect of a political settlement of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka’.34 They proposed that the ISGA be composed of members appointed by the LTTE, GoSL and Muslims from the Northeast, stipulating that the LTTE have an ‘absolute majority’, in recognition of the fact that ‘the LTTE exercises effective control and jurisdiction over the majority of the NorthEast area of the island of Sri Lanka’.35 The proposals provoked greater unease among nationalists that the LTTE was determined to ‘break-up’ Sri Lanka.36 The UNP government, the SLFP (within the People’s Alliance coalition) agreed that although their ideas for an interim administration were completely different, they were still willing to continue negotiations, formal discussions however never resumed.37 SIHRN would have been an interim administration of sorts as it was a joint committee, but in order for it to be effective it needed funds. The NERF set up at the Oslo Peace Support Meeting required both parties to come to an agreement over its dispersal in order for it to be activated, according to the World Bank, this never happened.38 Without funds SIHRN had no role. These peace talks did mark a departure from previous negotiations. There was a willingness to negotiate on both sides, with the government de-proscribing the LTTE, the agreement in Oslo to explore a federal solution, and the discussions regarding an interim administration. The deal


made between the SLMC and the LTTE, before the peace talks, over the repatriation of Muslims to the North and East and the return of property was also significant. Norway was a more legitimate third-party, having been invited to arbitrate and not having any hegemonic agenda. Although the two main antagonists were represented as was Norway and there was one representative from the SLMC, the absence of an aid close to the president was a grave omission. The problem of spoilers remained, this time in the form of the SLFP President Kumaratunga and the usual minority hard-line groups constituting radical members of the Sangha and the JVP. The very fact that both the LTTE and representatives from the Muslim community were present is a marked improvement on the 1987 Indo-Lankan Peace Accord negotiations, and during Kumaratunga’s peace initiative there were no talks as such. Although the parties agreed on a number of topics, the only agreement that appears to have been acted upon was that of the importance of ‘tangible improvements’ in the North and East. This highlights a new and important aspect to this process, which involved the engagement of the international community in economic recovery and the concurrence by all parties on this matter was significant in the peacemaking process.

Peacebuilding as a policy approach in Sri Lanka This most recent Sri Lankan peace process was more robust than its predecessors. The CFA and the presence of the SLMM provided a level of security that allowed for the implementation of projects that might strengthen or assist in the transition from war to peace and an opportunity to engage in peacebuilding type activities. Peacebuilding before the CFA In a paper written by Arve Ofstad, the former UN Resident Coordinator 1995–1998, he ‘analys[ed] the strategies applied in Sri Lanka by donors during that period’.39 He identified four sets of issues confronted by donors: … how the volume as well as the orientation of the program can influence a peace process; whether development efforts can be undertaken in rebel controlled territories; and how an early rehabilitation program can affect the long-term process.40 In terms of what the book identifies as type-one, structural peacebuilding, there was a conscious attempt to address ‘what was considered to be


the root causes of the conflict’ which included ‘reforms in the education sector, language reforms, and decentralization with support for economic activities in the north and east on a non-discriminatory basis’.41 He notes that: While all donor countries claimed to promote a peaceful solution to the war in Sri Lanka, it was primarily Sweden and subsequently Norway that most clearly expressed that they were aiming to reorient their whole aid program as support to a movement toward peace. This approach provided active support to the government’s efforts to create a national consensus for its political proposals. It also included pro-active support for other programs and policies that were seen as positive contributions, such as education and language reforms, human rights and peace organizations, judicial reforms, and rehabilitation and development in conflict-affected areas. These donors also balanced their support for peace promotion with other programs for poverty reduction and employment generation similar to the ‘comprehensive approach’.42 No donor, however, became involved in addressing other ‘root’ causes such as discriminatory recruitment and employment opportunities in the public sector and state-owned enterprises; the special position given to Buddhism in the Constitution; what was regarded by Tamils as Sinhala ‘colonization’ of noninhabited [sic] areas in the east considered part of the Tamil ‘homelands’; or the Sinhala dominance in the police and military forces.43 Donors funded some rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in war-affected government-controlled areas with the view that they might ‘contribute positively to a peace process’, and this took place in Jaffna as early as 1997 although it was suspended in 2000 due to increased fighting.44 The World Bank’s North East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP) began in 2000 and entered a second phase due to end in 2010. The UNHCR also funded the resettlement of IDP families in Vavuniya and Mannar (government controlled areas) from Welfare Centres (IDP camps) to ‘resettlement villages’, providing better security and privacy for IDP families.45 Humanitarian programmes were funded in the LTTEcontrolled areas but bilateral donors were unwilling to negotiate directly with the LTTE and would not implement development programmes.46 The most typical [aid policy] issue raised in any country at war is whether and to what extent the total aid provided direct or indirect


support to the government’s war efforts. … in line with the international discourse on aid to countries in conflict, many [Sri Lankan] donors were equally concerned about whether and to what extent the actual contents of the aid programs would positively influence and support efforts towards a peace process.47 Between 1994 and 1999, aid policy options were ‘necessarily shaped by government policies and strategies’.48 The government therefore restricted the activities of aid organisations in the Vanni area, with military and security concerns coming before humanitarian.49 Ofstad identified four types of donor policy approach which varied from: a ‘human-rights’ approach, restricting development funding due to the poor human-rights record; the ‘comprehensive’ approach taken by the UN which provided development support to the Government as well as humanitarian support to the North and East; and the ‘pro-active’ approach taken by Sweden and Norway which aimed to promote peace. The fourth, and perhaps the most significant approach, as it was the one adopted by the largest Sri Lankan donors, was that of the ‘traditional development agency’; here he is talking of Japan, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank: Their approach was to practically disregard the war and provide development assistance as if the war did not exist, except to avoid all conflict affected areas in the north and east for security and political reasons. This approach was presented as being neutral in relation to the conflict issues, but it disregarded the need for balanced development and extraordinary measures in the conflict-affected areas. In this way, the approach was clearly government-friendly, with indirect and passive support to the government’s overall strategy.50 The government strategy at that time was ‘War for Peace’ and both the Government and the LTTE were committing serious human-rights violations. Ofstad’s paper makes it clear that some donors were interested in type-one peacebuilding, where the emphasis was on structural change, or creating the structures within a society necessary for the peaceful management of conflict. Ofstad describes donors as wanting to contribute to programmes that ‘would positively influence and support efforts towards a peace process’,51 which could also include type-two or ‘bridge-building’ approaches to peacebuilding. Ofstad noted that with the exception of Norway and Sweden ‘it is doubtful that any donor


agency produced a sophisticated analysis of how different aid programs and activities might actually influence the prospects of a peace process’.52 The idea that funding rehabilitation activities in the North and East might ‘contribute positively to a peace process’ is one that held throughout the 2002–2006 peace process and which will be investigated in greater detail in the next chapter.53 Ultimately, it was the GoSL that decided the type of programmes that would be undertaken and the largest donors, Japan and the international financial institutions (IFIs), supported the government’s strategy. Economic recovery – the Government’s position In the general election leading up to the 2002 MoU, the UNP manifesto called for ‘a New Economic Future’ and promised ‘Benefits of Economic Development for All’.54 The UNP pledged to bring about economic recovery, and its ‘primary objective’ was to end the war. This, they argued, would be brought about through a negotiated settlement with the LTTE and by establishing ‘an interim administration for the Northern and Eastern provinces’.55 Recovery would come through a ‘massive Development Programme’ that would divide the country into ‘Economic Zones’ with commissions to promote ‘trade, industry, tourism and agricultural projects’.56 Following the UNP’s victory on 5 December 2001, and following attacks by the LTTE seven days later, the LTTE announced a unilateral ceasefire on 19 December 2001 and the government reciprocated on 21 December 2001, allowing the flow of previously banned goods into LTTE controlled areas.57 The PA’s ‘War for Peace’ strategy did not allow for negotiation with the LTTE. The new government provided an opportunity for dialogue. There was a neo-liberal flare to the new peace process. With the economy near collapse, the argument was mooted that peace had economic consequences that would benefit everyone. The UNP’s election campaign was backed by ‘Big Business’, which was concerned that the strategy of ‘War for Peace’ was damaging its interests in the long run.58 The capitalist class had not until that point taken an interest in pressing for an end to the war. Sunil Bastian explained this was because although they had lost the market for their goods in the North, this was ‘compensated by the new opportunities generated by the post-77 liberalised economic regime’.59 The servicing of wars creates employment opportunities for poor people as well as lucrative contracts for the mercantile classes. It was not until the economic costs of the ‘War for Peace’ began to be felt on the Southern economy, compounded with the attack on Colombo Airport and therefore tourism,


that business started to feel the damage of the conflict.60 The role of business in the peace process was even mentioned by Vidar Helgesen, Norwegian Secretary of State, in his opening address to the Peace Talks: The days and months and years ahead will present new and mounting challenges for both leaders and their delegations. But standing behind them are some formidable forces for peace. Recent opinion polls indicate that more than 80% of the population shares the parties’ desire to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. This is to no little extent a result of the impressive activism of the civil society and the business community. In too many conflicts around the world, we see economic forces fuelling violent conflict. In Sri Lanka today, business leaders are in the forefront of the popular support for peace, recognizing that the path to peace and the path to prosperity is one and the same.61 The end of war would increase security, which is good for investment, growth and development. Confidence in the peace process was to be instilled through attempts to establish more ‘normal’ conditions in Colombo, which had received the brunt of terrorist attacks, and also in the war-affected communities particularly in the North and East. The removal of checkpoints in Colombo and elsewhere,62 and the suspension of the ‘pass system’63 allowed for freer movement of people and goods, two conditions necessary for any functioning economy. These measures were to build confidence and to ensure that both sides would come to the negotiating table. Placing economic recovery as an incentive for peace set the tone for the forthcoming peace talks, and the activities funded by donors thereafter. This was in keeping with one of the theoretical foundations of peacebuilding, linking economic development and peace (as discussed in Chapter 1). The concept of a peace dividend appealed to voters, the international community and investors. The optimism at this time is captured with the cartoon on the front of a research report produced by CLSA, Asia’s leading independent brokerage and investment group (Figure 3.1). The report’s title is ‘Peace Dividends: Reconciliation and the roads to riches’ and shows a white dove dropping moneybag bombs on Sri Lanka. Economic recovery – a donor perspective While mediation and the negotiations involved Norway and some Sri Lankan elites, the ‘day-to-day’ aspect of the peace process were the


Figure 3.1 ‘Sri Lanka strategy Market Outlook’ report published on 2 December 2002 by CLSA, Asia’s leading independent brokerage and investment group64

recovery and rehabilitation activities, the so-called ‘peace dividend’ and the more political activities of human rights protection and the demobilisation of child combatants.65 Norway saw these activities as being part of a ‘two parallel track’ process, where peace talks would go


on with peacebuilding activities taking place simultaneously. In order for people to feel the benefit of the peace process, they needed to see positive change, and this would come through economic development activities.66 Despite the LTTE pulling out of the seventh round of talks, the Tokyo Donor Conference took place in June 2003 without the LTTE. The amount proffered by the donor countries and international organisations present came to a cumulative estimated amount ‘in excess of US$4.5 billion over the four-year period, 2003–2006’.67 They insisted ‘Assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo’.68 This condition was articulated in the ‘Tokyo Declaration’ and was the strongest position taken by the international donor community throughout the entire peace process. The commitments made at Tokyo were based on three papers; Needs Assessment of the North and East (Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara), another needs assessment relating to the districts bordering the North and East (Puttalam, Polonnaruwa, Anuradhapura and Moneragala) prepared by the World Bank, the ADB, the UN and SIHRN, and the ‘government’ document, Regaining Sri Lanka, relating more to the South.69 Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu identified their importance, stating that ‘the future of Sri Lanka’s political and economic development was underpinned by these two documents’.70 The ‘Bridging’ document provided for the donors presented a summary of these recovery plans and was quite explicit in its introduction with regards to the link between the economy and the conflict: There is deep and persistent poverty throughout the country. Despite economic growth of 4 to 5 percent for decades, the high levels of unemployment that created the conditions that spawned conflict and social unrest have been largely unchanged since 1960.71 Regaining Sri Lanka was the Government’s ‘economic framework’ to ‘provide the necessary economic foundation in building a lasting peace and significantly improving the economic welfare of all’ Sri Lankans.72 Both The World Bank’s CAS and Regaining Sri Lanka promoted economic growth as the mainstay of Sri Lankan recovery. Regaining Sri Lanka was divided into two parts: the first described a ‘Vision for Growth’, while the second outlined Sri Lanka’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).


Regaining Sri Lanka is a vast document of some 222 pages. Within this document there is one short section, six pages in total, which deals with ‘Reducing Conflict Related Poverty’ and relates to resolving the conflict. In these pages the importance of ‘Peace’ is proposed as ‘the Key’ and in this regard the government planned a three-pronged approach: ‘negotiation of a political settlement’; ‘advancement of a political and constitutional framework that fulfils the aspirations of all’; and ‘expediting development in war-torn areas’.73 Having identified ‘peace’, ‘more effective relief for victims of the ethnic conflict’, ‘fostering rehabilitation’, finally the report highlights the importance of ‘investing in social harmony’.74 This one page of the document addresses some of the main grievances of this conflict, and makes surprisingly little of them. In regard to the problems of discrimination in terms of language and education, the paper says: ‘The Government is cognizant of the harm done by discriminatory policies and has taken measures to correct these biases’, it then says in a footnote ‘The 1987 amendment to the Constitution made both Sinhala and Tamil official languages, and the 1977 university quota system is now weighted more equitably’.75 Later in the paper it admits: ‘The Constitution provides for equality in the use of Sinhala and Tamil, but these provisions need to be more rigorously enforced’.76 The government then resolves to promote ‘multiethnic (multi-language) schools’,77 to review certain textbooks which ‘contain material that may be considered biased in terms of their treatment of ethnicity, religion and other identities’ and makes a commitment not to open any ‘new’ ethnically segregated schools or teacher education institutes’.78 ‘Translation from one language to another is recognized as having a significant social and political function’, and the paper acknowledges that ‘The dearth of trained and competent court interpreters causes significant delays in court proceedings’.79 It then proposes to ‘expand and upgrade’ the Translator Services and to ‘increase the number of trained court interpreters to address this problem’.80 There is no mention of language or ethnicity as it pertains to the security sector. The paper makes the observation that ‘Reconciliation initiatives tend to be disparate and disjointed’, and it identifies the important role of ‘NGOs, CBOs and the private sector’, positively noting the private sector slogan ‘Sri Lanka First’.81 It then goes on to say the ‘Government is firmly committed to combating discrimination in all its forms and to fostering a process of ethnic reconciliation’.82 The one practical suggestion toward that end is the proposed prompt issue of identity cards to


IDPs. It also insists that ‘Better protection will be offered to all citizens against human rights abuse’.83 The overarching trust of Regaining Sri Lanka is the achievement of economic growth through the implementation of its PRS. PRSs were introduced in 1999 by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as ‘a new form of conditionality to access’ ‘lending and debt relief under the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative’.84 Although the World Bank and IMF stress that the drafting of a PRS is a participatory process, led by the stakeholder, the PRS is a World Bank/IMF tool.85 The World Bank is one of the largest donors in Sri Lanka and its PRS tool was the basis for the Sri Lankan Government’s recovery strategy. The difference between PRS and previous Bretton Woods strategies is the recognition that: … it is not possible to separate issues of achieving growth from the overall pattern of social progress and distribution: economic opportunities for the poor will only expand where there are improvements along the complementary dimensions of increased empowerment and security of the poor.86 The World Bank’s CAS of US$800 million, was to ‘support implementation of the country’s PRS’87 and identified three dominant themes of potential programming which fit within the view stated above: peace, growth and equity. First, a return to peace and restoration of domestic security are critical to create a framework for sustainable poverty reduction and growth and ensure that the fiscal burden remains tolerable. It is also important towards ensuring that the most vulnerable poor groups – i.e., the displaced and those in conflict-affected areas – are reached. Secondly, economic growth is the main instrument for achieving prosperity and creating more resources for distribution. Finally, ensuring a balance/ equity within the society is essential, especially with deep pockets of poverty existing in the South and North East.88 The preceding discussion demonstrates that economic recovery was indeed integral to the peace process. Aid emerged as the main tool for promoting the peace process through recognising the importance of providing assistance ‘when and where it is most needed, thereby directly promoting the peace process’,89 a continuation of the position taken by some donors before the MoU. This peace dividend would be realised through economic growth that would come as a result of the ceasefire, peace process and, implementation of the PRS and the rehabilitation of the North and


East. Aid was also provided as an economic incentive for continued progress in the peace process to the sum of US$4.5 billion. The donors therefore envisaged a link between, peace and development, while recognising the humanitarian imperative of alleviating the suffering of those in the war-affected areas, as well as the potential to use aid as leverage in the peace process.

The practicalities of prioritising economic recovery issues The UNP promise of a peace dividend helped sweep them into power in the 2001 general elections, and aid emerged during the peace talks as the main tool for promoting the peace process. This approach had three major short-comings: the first, in the short-term the UNP could not achieve a significant peace dividend in the South; the second, the technical and bureaucratic difficulties of implementing foreign funded projects in the North and East were to undermine the peace dividend in the North; finally, without progress in the peace process the donors did not withhold funds negating any leverage it might have had. Although aid was not withheld, it did not materialise in the large amounts promised at Tokyo either, further reducing the impact of the peace dividend and the Tokyo Declaration itself. The problem of the peace dividend in the South In a state with high levels of poverty, where the state is the largest employer and corruption is endemic, the UNP election promise of the ‘Benefits of Economic Development for All’ was a risky strategy.90 Nonetheless, the promise of a peace dividend was effective in delivering a UNP victory in the 2001 general election: The UNP won 109 of the 225 seats (45.6% of the vote) and the PA obtained 77 seats (37.2%). The JVP secured 16 seats (9.1%) and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) won 15 seats (3.9%). Political analysts considered that the margin of victory for the UNP and its allies would have been much wider had the election been free and fair.91 The Norwegian Ambassador pointed out, that without direct war-related damage, it was difficult to explain the concept of a peace dividend to people in the South: You shouldn’t forget either that many people in the South of Sri Lanka, with the exception of Colombo, where the civil strife or the conflict was very much brought into people’s daily lives, but in


other parts, in the rural south, apart from families with children in the armed forces, it didn’t affect you. It did affect people in the way that if there hadn’t been war in this country the standard of living would be quite a bit higher. But that is a very difficult concept to explain to people. You can’t really explain that to people in a way that makes sense to them. So, for them, the conflict is remote.92 The South had not suffered economically in the same way as the North and East, particularly as ‘the economy managed to expand on average by 5 per cent per annum from 1983 to 2000, mainly due to sectors such as tea, ready-made garments, worker remittances, etc., which were unaffected by the war’.93 Although the South was affected by poverty and the loss of young men, it did not suffer the economic blockade of the North and East nor the damage of aerial bombardment, landmines, and direct combat. Despite the war, the economy of the South grew favourably.94 Saman Kelegama explains that the peace dividend in the South was undermined by three factors. The first, that the IMF Structural Adjustment package, which had been initiated by the PA government, and ‘salvaged’ by the UNP necessitated: ‘… depoliticizing and better targeting of the poverty alleviation programme (Samurdhi allowance); increasing utility charges; cutting fertilizer and petroleum subsidies; introducing a new VAT (value added tax) tax system; and freezing public sector recruitment and downsizing the workforce in public enterprises’.95 The aid needed to ‘cushion’ these adjustments ‘did not materialize on the scale expected’ and ‘there was no dividend for rural households in the South’.96 The second factor: rather than spending money, the adjustments required ‘expenditure restraint … Defence costs did not fall significantly despite the end of hostilities, barely resulting in any savings for capital expenditure, and the insignificant defence savings were absorbed by the costs of refugee rehabilitation, leaving capital expenditures on rural infrastructure to take the brunt of the expenditure cuts. Fiscal tightening through expenditure restraint therefore occurred at precisely the time when the public finances should have been orientated to building peace.’97 And the third factor: the political instability created by ‘the uneasy cohabitation between the president and the prime minister, together with fears that the LTTE could resume hostilities, resulted in the private sector adopting a waitand-see attitude which deterred investment in risky and long-term projects, precisely the investment needed to create jobs. Unemployment was compounded by cutbacks in public-sector employment. Consequently, there was little economic dividend for the South.’98


Southerners were easily disaffected with the peace process, and were under the impression that all the assistance was going to the North and to Tamils; an impression fuelled by the Sinhala press. A survey carried out by the International Federation of Journalists in June 2004 ‘looked at how the peace process and all related issues were covered in 422 news items (132 English, 166 Sinhala and 144 Tamil)’.99 Their findings were ‘that coverage of the conflict and the peace process was one sided, inflammatory and often only quoted one source, especially in the Sinhala and Tamil newspapers’.100 There was ‘much greater coverage of the peace process’ in the Tamil Press (72 articles).101 On a positive note, they found ‘that stories featured on the front page were generally more positive about the peace process’, but ‘Sinhala press coverage was generally biased and inflammatory’. ‘Seventy-four of the articles appearing in the Sinhala media were found to be either one sided or inflammatory, with only 47 articles reporting more than one opinion’.102 This perception that all the money was going to the North and East was something that the government was well aware of. This is the reason why two documents were presented at the Tokyo Donor Conference, the Assessment of Needs for the North and East, and Regaining Sri Lanka. As a former secretary to Ranil Wickremesinghe pointed out: Two documents were going to happen because there was the problem that if funding [was] only for the North East there would have been a knee jerk reaction in the South and the whole peace process would have gone for a six. They were being very hostile; ‘What about our needs?’. These things were constantly coming up. ‘Why special treatment for the North East?’ People had realised that the North East was devastated. But the media was constantly going ‘what about us?’, ‘what about Hambantota, what about Gampha?’, an so on.103 The reality was that two thirds of the money proposed for Sri Lankan recovery was intended for the South.104 Kumaratunga’s actions in November 2003 illustrate the chronic instability of Sri Lankan politics. The dissolved parliament was out of session between February and April 2004. These elections were the third since 2000. With only two years in government Wickremesinghe did not have time to make good his election promises, and his defeat was widely attributed to the disillusion felt by voters in the South of the lack of the much vaunted peace dividend.105 Wickremesinghe’s defeat directly impacted the peace talks because dialogue was between


representatives of the UNP and the LTTE. It was also a surprise to the international community, as one senior member of a donor organisation commented on the election result, that the donors did not: understand many of the dynamics of the conflict. … The elections: many of our colleagues thought that there was not another solution, that Ranil would win the elections. How he will not win? He’s the peace man. Quite obviously he would not win because he was not offering fertilisers.106 The UNP defeat also undermined the World Bank’s CAS. The UPFA approach to growth ‘differed significantly from those of the prior administration’.107 While growth came as a result of the ceasefire and increased productivity in the North and East, the UPFA increased public sector employment.108 The problems with the peace dividend in the North The first high profile project was the repair and demining of the A9 Kandy to Jaffna road, reopened in April 2002.109 For the first time in 12 years people and goods were able to pass relatively freely through the LTTE-controlled area.110 The money for the project came from the international purse and from ‘several finished road projects elsewhere in the country that dated from before the Ceasefire Agreement’.111 With more normal movement of goods and people within and between the Government and LTTE-controlled areas, and greater opportunities for employment and commerce, the peace dividend was more keenly felt in the North and East than in the South. The situation was so dire in the North and East, the cessation of hostilities alone would have a significant impact. The CFA and the end of the economic blockade made it possible for rehabilitation work to begin in war-affected areas. Between 2002 and 2003, aid to Sri Lanka doubled.112 This aid came in as relief items for returning refugees and IDPs and development assistance for the reconstruction of infrastructure, roads, power lines, irrigation tanks, schools and hospitals. The ADB’s North East Community Restoration and Development project (NECORD) spent US$19.3 million between 2002 and the end of 2004 on rehabilitation projects in the war-affected areas.113 While the World Bank’s North East Irrigated Agriculture Project, starting in 2000, spent US$34.2 million on NEIAP I114 and later released a further US$64.7 million in credit for NEIAP II which started in 2004.115 Implementation was slow, even after the MoU. Although it was easier to spend donor money with an official bilateral ceasefire, it was not easy


to spend money. The process of obtaining donors funds is slow, and requires detailed project proposals. One organisation may be seeking funds for its project from a number of different donors with different funding procedures. The foreign agencies, both the World Bank and ADB have very long drawn out procedures through which they fund projects. … Before you take contracts you go to get several offers in, and you have to take several offers and send paper to Colombo, then to Manila and back to Colombo.116 The bulk of donor money goes directly to the government, and is then disbursed through the appropriate government ministries, adding further layers of delay and bureaucracy. The World Bank funds intended for the LTTE-controlled provinces went from donor to government and then to the North East Provincial Council (NEPC).117 The projects managed by the government and NEPC were dogged by inefficiency. In the North and East government structures were eroded by two decades of war, with few staff and limited facilities. The government did try to overcome this bottleneck by allowing retired employees of the NEPC to return to their posts.118 The LTTE’s Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS) complained that the NEPC was slow, and through this initiative the government was ‘keeping the old guards who obey orders instead of getting new energy’.119 Many parts of the North and East had been without electricity or telephones since the 1980s.120 The LTTE also hampered project implementation. It ran its own civil administration with a police force, border guards, environmental protection officers as well as their fighting cadre. The LTTE ran health facilities, a university, and trained its doctors. In Killinochchi, the administrative centre of the Vanni, there was the PDS as well as a Peace Secretariat. Both the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)121 and the PDS were able to build large administrative buildings in Killinochchi after the MoU. The LTTE tried to increase their legitimacy through the development of all the paraphernalia of a quasi-state in an effort to show the people of the Vanni they were meeting their needs. They took a central role in all of the rehabilitation activities in the Vanni and nothing happened without their prior agreement.122 All INGOs liaised with the PDS, whose Secretary General was the head of the Political Wing, the late Mr Tamilchelvan (who also attended the peace talks). This created a number of difficulties for NGOs and donors working in the Vanni. NGOs that fell foul of the


LTTE were unable to complete or even start projects, while donors whose governments proscribed the LTTE had legal problems when funding Vanni projects.123 Most NGOs working in the Vanni were staffed by Tamils. Tamils who were viewed as having gone against the LTTE were condemned to death for treason.124 International donors and NGOs had to be careful not to put their staff or their organisations at odds with them. In addition to the complexities of working with the LTTE, all goods coming into the Vanni came through a government checkpoint and then through an LTTE checkpoint where a tax was levied.125 This added further financial burden on any commercial activities and cost to rehabilitation programmes. The LTTE was known to wave taxes in favour of donor-funded projects, as it recognised their benefit to local recovery, but the process of achieving this could be bureaucratic and slow. Both the PDS and the TRO recognised that donors could not give money to a non-state actor and this, they added, provided further impetus for their proposals for an ISGA.126 As one donor explained, the problem was that ‘The government is actually borrowing the money and it is the government who has to repay it. We can’t say they do the agreement but we hand everything over to the LTTE. The government definitely says we want to have a say in it, but the LTTE says yes this is the paramount element of autonomy’127 SIHRN would have been a mechanism that may have sped up the recovery process, but without agreement over NERF there were no funds available. At the district level, in the government-controlled areas, the Government Agent (GA) allocated areas to specific NGOs. These NGOs then carried out their own needs assessments and sought funding, with the approval of the GA, from donors to implement an array of projects; reconstructing homes, building latrines, rebuilding schools and health facilities, roads etc. Having designed the project, and found funding, the NGO would then implement the project through a local community-based organisation (CBO) often mobilised by the NGO.128 It was not uncommon for an NGO to be reaching the end of a project’s cycle without having broken ground.129 The risk then was that money had to be returned, and the NGO would then have difficulty getting funding later on. We used to say ‘report to us’. ‘If you have any problems, tell us, and then maybe you need extension.’ It is true that when there are delays also we are very inflexible to make extensions. Because as a policy we have many difficulties to get an extension approved by our headquarters. We don’t want to drag the financial allocations and they want to close their financial books. Again we come to the internal


dynamics of each donor that are not the best support for implementation. We have the problem of financial management of big institutions that are themselves being audited by other bodies and other member states. … Is it possible to be more flexible? How do you bring together the donors? It’s complicated.130 The war interrupted the education of thousands of children in the North and East and, without schools or tertiary training facilities, it was difficult to find skilled labourers to work on the large-scale projects necessary for ‘normalisation’. In areas like Vanni and in some other areas, where the local capacity has been depleted there is a necessity for a demand for outsiders to come and do a project. Because the contractors, they have their own delays, they have to come all the way from the South, and the lack of infrastructure, this increased in the tender budget and such things. We are also looking to build up the capacity of local contractors.131 Although there is underemployment in the South, skilled workers were unwilling to come and work in the North and East. This, the PDS explained, was due to ‘fear’ and ‘some paranoia among the southerners [that] anytime the hostilities [might] come up again’.132 The NGOs responded by providing local training in masonry and carpentry, in addition to other capacity building projects. The time taken to train skilled labourers added further delays to rehabilitation work. The project-approval time of the donors, the many layers of bureaucracy of the donors, the government, the LTTE, and NGOs, taxes and a lack of skilled tradesmen and women meant that there was an extended period of time between project identification and implementation. It took a few years for minimal recovery to take place in the North and East, and donors and NGOs struggled to make the transition from a relief model to development.133 Aid as leverage Funds from international donors continued to be spent despite their being no ‘substantial and parallel progress in the peace process’.134 In 2004 both the TRO and the PDS believed that the US$4.5 billion remained untouched in the hands of the donors.135 But as one donor explained: The US$4.5 billion [raised at the Tokyo Donor Conference] was in fact a meaningless figure, as many of these conferences are; it’s more


PR [public relations] than anything else, both for the government and the donors. There was never a break down … of what that figure meant in practice in terms of what was already in the pipeline and would come anyway, what would be developed anyway, what extra would be pledged, what was the timeline, it was a whole mishmash of stuff.136 While Japan offered US$1 billion at Tokyo, that included monies they were already giving for the Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project.137 This project cost US$332.7 million138 and therefore amounted to more than 33 per cent of the US$1 billion Tokyo pledge. By 2004: The rational being used in the Northeast, at least by the big donors, the World Bank, Japan, ADB is that [their projects were] humanitarian assistance, basic services, and infrastructure and therefore should not be tied anyway to conditions set by politicians, unless those physical conditions prevent you from working, like a war.139 Even if the donors wanted to, they could not withhold aid. As one donor explained the reason was due to the: … internal dynamics of the donors, each one has its own problems, budgetary problems. Each one of them has internal budgetary challenges so they disburse what they have received. These internal dynamics make it difficult to withdraw suddenly a 10 million Euro project which you have already prepared. We are not flexible enough to really measure in order to link it to current disbursements in the field. Basically what we are doing is to continue to work as [long as the] progress [is] satisfactory.140 In practice with no peace talks since 2003, an unstable government in the South and a split in the LTTE with a faction now under the control of former LTTE Colonel Karuna, by June 2004 the donor’s application of the Tokyo Declaration: was left intentionally very vague. Everybody interpreted it in their own way. … There is a clause inserted in all new projects since Tokyo that if there isn’t substantive progress then further dispersals can be withdraw. In practice that would have been applied if


there was a general outbreak in hostilities. So far there hasn’t been.141 When the peace talks stalled in April 2003, the money pledged at Tokyo was the only leverage that the international community had to influence the parties to continue to ‘make progress’. As some of the monies had already been pledged, the US$4.5 billion was in reality less impressive, and as the donors could not withhold programmed aid, its withdrawal was not a realistic threat. When asked what the government would do if the international donors were to withhold aid, the Secretary of the Triple-R Ministry immediately replied: ‘We won’t repay our loans. They give loans, they get the money’.142 The Tokyo Declaration limited the disbursal of additional funds. Tying aid to a weak peace process limited the chance of an impressive peace dividend in both the North and South. The Tsunami Disaster further reduced the influence of the donors.143 A great deal of money was pledged for Sri Lankan recovery. The Government even remarked ‘that the international community has extended unprecedented levels of support and assistance for relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in the tsunami affected areas’.144 In 2004, before the tsunami, total foreign aid disbursement was US$805 million, in 2005 ‘Approximately US$1,590 million’ was ‘pledged by the development partners for Tsunami recovery activities’ and ‘around US$1,375 million’ was committed by May 2005.145 And as the Country Director for the World Bank in Sri Lanka, Peter Harrold, pointed out, this ‘substantially’ changed ‘the aid landscape’ and ‘The threat of withholding aid in an “over-aided” environment’ would ‘have very little effect’.146 There was an attempt by the donors to encourage the LTTE and the GoSL to work together through the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) for delivering aid.147 Both the JVP and the Sangha opposed P-TOMS; the JVP threatened to destabilise the government by quitting the UPFA coalition, while the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) member of parliament and Buddhist monk Ven. Dr. Omalpe Sobhita Thera staged ‘a death fast’.148 The P-TOMS was eventually endorsed by both parties, but was never operational.149 The monk broke his fast, but the JVP did pull out of the UPFA.150 No war no peace We also tried to point out that this is not a conflict at peace, this is a conflict at ceasefire – trying to get peace. This is something that people sometimes forget or did forget in the early stages of the peace


process. Not in the North and East where the war had been so real for such a long time. It might have been that here in the South its easier to lose sight of the fact that the CFA is not the peace agreement yet.151 Without a peace agreement, it was difficult to take a holistic approach to the issues of the conflict. Yet for the international donors and organisations involved in Sri Lanka, peacebuilding was still an explicit policy approach. While the World Bank claimed to be ‘Stabilizing Peace through Reconstruction’,152 the Multilateral Group (MG)153 which represented all Sri Lanka’s major donor agencies, set out on the first page of their document Preparing for Transition in Sri Lanka (2004) that Sri Lanka was in a ‘transition period … in which simultaneous attention is given to emergency/humanitarian activities as these wind down, transition-specific activities are undertaken, and gradually normal development activities become dominant’.154 They also maintained that ‘peace building is the UN’s overarching aim in transition’, ‘when external assistance is most crucial in supporting and underpinning still fragile cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equality’.155 Having identified its role as one that engages with peace, the MG outlined a number of ‘thematic areas’ and ‘crosscutting concerns’, which it planned to incorporate into existing programmes, while planning new programmes and advocating new approaches. These addressed the ‘root cause’ problems in ‘human security’, ‘revitalisation of social infrastructure’, ‘revitalisation of economic infrastructure’, ‘restoration of livelihoods and opportunities’, and ‘governance and capacity development’.156 Under ‘Governance and Capacity Development’ the document states in its introduction that as there was no agreement on future governance structures (i.e. a peace agreement) ‘the MG envisages to focus on the development of human resource capacity rather than institutions that are yet to be defined’.157 This meant that the MG could not engage in attempts to reform existing governance structures without a peace agreement in place. ‘Reconciliation and Social Cohesion’ was recognised as a ‘crosscutting concern’, it was asserted that ‘the many activities outlined in the document, will help to facilitate the transition from a society often divided against itself to one where all citizens have a vital, inter-dependent role to play in building a peaceful, prosperous Sri Lanka’.158 Simply, reconciliation and social cohesion would be a by-product of implementing these programmes. The only thematic area which they directly related to peace was the ‘Revitalisation of Economic Infrastructure’ where the ‘restoration of the


infrastructure facilities (roads, ports, power, irrigation and water and sanitation) contributed directly to the peace dividend, and confidence building measures of the peace process’.159 This document was a plan, and the MG was in a similar position in 2004 as the donors in the late 1990s where, although peacebuilding was a policy approach and the donors would have liked to engage with all kinds of ‘cross-cutting’ issues, they were restricted in what they could do as a result of ongoing political instability. Donor funds and the implementation of their programmes by NGOs can only take place when they are sanctioned by the sovereign state.

Conclusion The most recent Sri Lankan peace process was different from those that had gone before. In the first instance, there was a willingness to negotiate on both sides absent from previous peace processes; both sides agreed to discuss a solution based on a federal Sri Lanka. Where international intervention by India had been viewed with suspicion by Sri Lanka, Norwegian mediation was impartial, and the MoU and presence of the SLMM provided a basic level of security. In this respect it meets the first criterion offered at the beginning of the chapter, that there was a peace process robust enough to undertake economic recovery programmes. Type-one, structural peacebuilding was a policy approach of the UN and international donors before the ceasefire, and this policy continued during the peace process. It was however limited by the Government war strategy and security arrangements. While peacebuilding in Sri Lanka would require structural reform particularly with regard to its political institutions, the government focused its recovery strategy, Regaining Sri Lanka, on economic liberalisation and growth. Although it recognised the importance of ‘empowering the poor and strengthening governance’ scant attention was paid to the conflict itself and the issues of language, education and reconciliation. Economic recovery provided a new aspect to this peace process. It was seen as having the potential to provide an essential peace dividend that would benefit all Sri Lankans and help promote the peace process. The promise of donor funding became a weapon in the arsenal of the international community that could be used to coerce the two sides to continue negotiations. The money offered at Tokyo, which was the only leverage at the disposal of Norway and the international community, was neither a carrot nor a stick. Political instability and the


stalling of the peace talks prevented the expeditious implementation of the promised ‘peace dividend’, while the threat of withholding ‘pledged’ aid was ‘meaningless’ and was not taken seriously by the GoSL nor did it have any bearing on subsequent actions of the GoSL and LTTE. By 2004 the donors were funding the same types of development and rehabilitation projects as before the MoU, except with increased spending due to improved security resulting from the CFA. Neither approach had any impact on the internal mechanics of the conflict, which continued to propel Sri Lanka along a course of violent conflict. In Sri Lanka the causes of the conflict are political, economic and social. The overarching emphasis of the activities of the government and donorfunded projects were economic, while the political causes of the conflict were to be addressed by the peacemaking process. The systemic problems enshrined in Sri Lanka’s parliamentary system allowed for the rivalry between two main political parties to destabilise the peacemaking process. The inability of the UNP to deliver a peace dividend to the South in two years was exploited by the SLFP coalition to regain control of Parliament. The promise of increased funds to Sri Lanka and the threat of withholding these funds did nothing to persuade either the LTTE or the GoSL to continue negotiations. This attempt to encourage the peacemaking process was not helped by the fact that the sum promised included previous commitments, and donors had no mechanism to withhold funds in the pipeline. Rather than sustain the peacemaking process, the prioritisation of economic recovery may have weakened it. While the peace process was certainly more robust that its predecessors, in hindsight its was not as strong as it seemed. There is plenty of evidence that peacebuilding and economic recovery was integral to this peace process, the second criterion. This donor approach was supposed to strengthen it, delivering tangible improvements to people’s daily lives. Ironically, it seems that it worked to the contrary, weakening it further. Given the relationship between the states poor economic performance, and its civil war, if Sri Lanka was not stable enough to initiate political reform, it would not be able to change its economic situation either. The Sri Lankan peace process of 2002–2006 did deliver growth, but evaded equity and peace. The World Bank’s PRS was the backbone of the Government’s recovery strategy and the US$800 million made available by the Bank for that purpose made it one of the largest donors. It is important to ask whether these funds influenced the way in which the government and the donors approached the ‘day-to-day’ aspect of the peace process, and whether the prioritisation of political and social issues may have more success at sustaining the peace process? Encouraging


equity and peace is evidently much more difficult than growth. Sri Lanka seems to confirm the misgivings about a ‘liberal peace’. It illustrates just how difficult it is to undertake the kind of transformative process envisaged in peacebuilding theory, particularly in the absence of a peace agreement. This chapter has looked at the elite-level process of governments, donors and peace talks, but what of the impact that this has had at the grassroots, the beneficiaries of these policies and programmes? Chapter 4 looks at the impact of the development and rehabilitation strategy in the war-affected areas since the 2002 MoU, where there has been some success. Why did improvements at the local level not influence the elite?

4 Peacebuilding at the Grassroots

In Sri Lanka, economic recovery was identified as having the potential to sustain the peace process. While the conflict is inherently political, it is evident that the donors hoped the promise of large amounts of aid during the peace process would encourage the negotiation of a political settlement, while the peace dividend would guarantee support at the grassroots. Meanwhile, joint mechanisms for the delivery of foreignfunded reconstruction and rehabilitation would bring the Government of Sri Lankan (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) together and establishing more normal conditions in the North and East, building trust between the Government and the Tamil population. The last chapter presented three criteria that would be necessary in this case to determine whether the inclusion of economic recovery issues in a peacemaking process could help sustain peace. The first was that there was a robust peace process and the second that peacebuilding and economic recovery were integral to this peace process. This chapter addresses the third criterion that efforts were in fact made to that end. Where the last chapter focused on donor policy and the elite approach to peacebuilding and the peace process, here a grassroots perspective is sought, examining the results of peacebuilding type activities implemented in the Mannar District. It challenges the assumed link between economic recovery and peace. The idea that donor-funded programmes would promote the peace process and underpin the political negotiations suggests that the activities in Mannar would somehow link to the elite level peace process. This chapter explains why this was not the case. It begins by providing an overview of Mannar, its geography, economy and population, and what happened in Mannar during the war. Field research1 was carried out over nine weeks (26 April to 29 June 2005) to discover what changes had taken place since the 2002 Memorandum 106

Peacebuilding at the Grassroots 107

of Understanding (MoU) resulting from foreign-funded assistance programmes.2 This chapter determines the extent to which there was ‘tangible’ improvement to the lives of the people of Mannar. It provides a comprehensive overview of the main development sectors: displacement; housing; education; health; infrastructure; agriculture; fishing; industrial processing; transportation and human rights. The chapter establishes whether there is a link between development activities and peace. Finally, the chapter returns to the themes outlined in Chapter 1, asking what kind of peacebuilding took place in Mannar, what it tells us about the timing of peacebuilding, how it applies to our understanding of a ‘liberal peace’ and the ability of peacebuilding to transform a society at war?

Mannar district Before the MoU, gaining access to the Mannar area was difficult for outsiders. Entry to the district required a government-issued pass that granted passage through checkpoints. Only foreigners carrying out essential humanitarian work were allowed into the LTTE-controlled areas.3 The result is that very little empirical research could be undertaken in the area. It was difficult to corroborate field data through secondary sources as the local government administration ran a skeleton staff and was unable to keep accurate records and the last census was carried out in 1981. Although the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and World Bank continued to produce development indicators throughout the war period, they were unreliable as they were compiled without data from the war-affected districts.4 This chapter covers the main development sectors, illustrated with information gathered in Mannar from the beneficiaries of foreign-funded projects, civil servants, teachers, priests and NGO workers from the District. The ‘Mannar Plan’ produced in 2004 by the Ministry for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (Triple-R Ministry), renamed as the Ministry for Nation Building and Development, provides one of the few sources of baseline data for this research.5 Geography, economy and population Mannar District lies on the western side of the Northern Province, covering an area of 2,002km2, approximately 3 per cent of Sri Lanka.6 The District is administered from Mannar Town, situated on Mannar Island, which is connected to the mainland by a causeway. It is divided into five smaller administrative divisions, Mannar, Nanaddan, Musali, Manthai West and Madhu. Located in the dry zone, Mannar is a region ‘characterized by high


temperatures and low rainfall’.7 Topographically it is flat with no highland areas.8 The coastal areas are typically saline and are unsuited to cultivation; the main industry in these areas is fishing.9 Further inland, soil is suitable for paddy (unthreshed rice), perennial crops (cashew, coconut and palmyrah) and highland crops (onions, groundnuts, chillies).10 It is possible to have two paddy harvests, one following the rainy seasons, the Maha (September–March) and the second Yala (April– August) using artificial irrigation lakes called ‘tanks’. In 1985 88 per cent of the District had forest cover; as a result of poor resource management and the conflict this was reduced to 50 per cent.11 The main industries are agriculture and fishing, with the government as the next largest employer (see Table 4.1).12 As a result of internal displacement and the migration of families to India and other Western states the population fell from 106,235 in 1981, 0.7 per cent of the total Sri Lankan population, to 99,456 in 2004.14 Mannar is an area where most of the people are Christian; in 1981 41 per cent were Catholic, with an equal number of Hindus and Muslims, around 28 per cent (see Table 4.2). In 1990 the LTTE expelled the entire Muslim population from the District, the reason why there were only 583 families in Musali in 1997 (see Table 4.1). Table 4.1

Economic Activities of the Population in 199713 Number of Families

D. S. Division

Agriculture

Fisheries

Government

Labour

Other

Mannar Nanaddan Musali Madhu Mathai West

1,912 1,725 80 975 3,579

3,773 529 50 82 3,005

880 540 48 162 600

1,803 887 390 325 400

195 225 15 6,916 609

Total

8,289

7,437

2,230

3,805

7,960

Mannar is approximately 18 kilometres by sea from India. Thalaimannar at the northern tip of Mannar Island was an important Sri Lankan trading point, with goods and passengers travelling to and from India. Although the port facilities were destroyed, it continued to be an important entry point for smuggled goods, jewellery and saris from India, as well as drugs and refugees.15 Before the war there were ice factories, rice mills, fertiliser and grain stores, salterns,16 and fish processing plants, all since destroyed.

Peacebuilding at the Grassroots 109 Table 4.2

Mannar District Populations by Religion 1981

Buddhist Hindu Muslim Catholic Other Christians Other Total

3,363 28,885 29,161 43,633 1,056 137 106,235

Source: Sri Lanka Census 1981

Civil strife17 Mannar escaped the riots of 1983, but in 1984 an army vehicle exploded after hitting a landmine in the Manthai area. The army then ran ‘amok’ through the streets of Mannar burning shops and shooting people. In the Tamil majority areas of Vavuniya and Killinochchi, there were similar problems, and people fled to Mannar in an attempt to escape the violence. The Catholic Church had some success persuading the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) and the LTTE to avoid certain areas where people were seeking refuge. But in 1985 a Catholic priest was killed, and a new military confrontation began between the LTTE and the SLAF. People then started fleeing to India in fishing boats. Mannar became a point of transit for people leaving for India and schools, colleges and convents filled up with internally displaced persons (IDPs).18 The number of people arriving in Mannar put a strain on local resources, there were no humanitarian organisations at that time. The local kachcheri (local government administration) was unable to cope, with many of its staff having left due to the fighting. The LTTE blew up the bridge to Mannar Island in 1987 and from then until 1990 they controlled Mannar Island. The SLAF built a camp close to the Island and shelled it from the mainland. Along with Mannar Bridge, the railway and roads from Mannar to Vavuniya and Mannar to Puttalam and Colombo, were destroyed. The only way to get supplies on the island was by sea, and travel on the mainland was extremely limited. In 1990 the LTTE expelled all the Muslims from the areas under its control. Around the same time the Sri Lankan Army managed to regain Mannar Island. The SLAF launched a large military offensive in February 1997 to open the Madawachchiya-Mannar road; around 10,000 people were displaced. Later attempts to open up a route to Jaffna (under government control but without land access) resulted in further displacement


and fighting in the north of Mannar. Madhu Church has a highly revered Catholic Shrine and became a destination for those fleeing the conflict. More than 30 people were killed in 1999 when an SLAF tank fired a shell into the church.19 As a frontline area, Mannar experienced regular violent confrontations between the LTTE and the SLAF. Every family in the District was affected; fleeing at some time to escape the fighting, some having lost all their possessions, many lost their homes, and their livelihoods. Children growing up between 1983 and 2002 had their education interrupted. Family members were killed by both the LTTE and the SLAF. People were arbitrarily detained, tortured and executed. The Danish Refugee Council described Mannar in 2000 as follows: Large areas of the northern part of the District at present falls within LTTE occupied areas (uncleared areas) and are exposed to ongoing, armed confrontations. The same areas suffered great damage when the armed forces attacked LTTE positions in the mid1990s. In these areas there are great needs for relief, but at present no possibility of engaging in rehabilitation activities in a larger scale. When that time comes, there will first of all be a need for physical rehabilitation, as much of the infrastructure and village facilities have been destroyed by shelling or from many years of neglect. Additionally, there will be a need to restore people’s livelihoods, socially, economically and otherwise.20

Before and after the MoU – Mannar’s changing situation Displacement At the time of the ceasefire more than half of the total population were displaced with around a quarter of them living in Welfare Centres (IDP camps).21 While some stayed with friends and family or rented accommodation, many left for India, living in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu, and others were confined to camps locally. During periods of violence people fled to public buildings, churches, temples, schools, and colleges and these became the euphemistic ‘Welfare Centres’. The GoSL did recognise its responsibility to look after these people who are, after all, Sri Lankan citizens. Despite this commitment the conditions in the Welfare Centres have been deplorable. In terms of shelter, Welfare Centres provided inadequate long-term accommodation for people; cramped conditions, overcrowding, and


high rates of rape, indecent assault and teenage pregnancy prevailed.22 Most of the residents had been displaced many times, and some had been confined in the camps for more than ten years. They required passes to exit the camps, and had to return by nightfall. Army camps were ‘frequently located close to residential areas or welfare centres’, and in Mannar they were used as ‘human shields’.23 In October 2001 some 30 to 40 per cent of displaced children were not attending school.24 Water and sanitation was a problem, with regular outbreaks of dysentery and diarrhoea.25 Where there were latrines, there was not enough water to flush them; people had to defecated in the surrounding area, resulting in the contamination of rainwater and wells.26 They suffered from acute health problems due to limited health facilities in the Vanni, poor sanitation and the need for passes to exit the camps in government-controlled areas.27 In 2001 nearly all IDPs were eligible for food rations, but only half of them were actual recipients.28 Malnutrition was common and almost a quarter of all the children were underweight.29 The Army restricted food deliveries into the Vanni and the World Food Programme (WFP) noted that severe food shortages were faced by IDPs, particularly in that area.30 Around 30,000 IDPs returned during the first three years of the ceasefire (see Figure 4.1). The terrible conditions in which they lived meant that even before the MoU, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was trying to find a ‘durable solution’ to their situation. As early as 2000, the UNHCR and the government started to resettle families from the Welfare Centres into IDP ‘villages’, where there was space for people to build their own cajan31 shelter and some privacy.32 As soon as families felt it was safe to return to their own homes, they did so spontaneously.33 The circumstances for Sri Lankan Tamils in India were poor. After the LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991,34 their situation deteriorated further. One 16 year-old female respondent said: We went to India for one and a half years. We stayed in a camp but we were afraid. People were sexually abused and kidnapped for their eyes and kidneys. I was kidnapped when I was small, but some relations saw me one day and took me back.35 Many stayed in camps, and as the majority were fishing folk or farmers, it was very difficult for them to earn a living. When the ceasefire

112 Aid, Peacebuilding and the Resurgence of War Figure 4.1

IDP Returns Mannar 2002–2005

35,000 30,000

IDP Returns

25,000 20,000 Total IDP Returns 15,000 10,000 5,000

20 02 /2 0 Fe 03 b0 Ap 3 r-0 Ju 3 nAu 03 gO 03 ct D 03 ec Fe 03 b0 Ap 4 r-0 Ju 4 nAu 04 gO 04 ct D 04 ec Fe 04 b0 Ap 5 r-0 Ju 5 nAu 05 gO 05 ct D 05 ec -0 5

0

Time

Source: UNHCR and Ministry of Nation Building and Development, ‘Statistical Summary as at 31 December 2005 Refugees and Internally Displaced Repatriation and Returns to and within Sri Lanka’, UNHCR December 2005.36

announcement was made, people began making the dangerous crossing37 from India to Mannar without assistance from UNHCR or any other body (see Figure 4.2). We lived in Murungan but girls were raped by the Army on the road, so we fled to India in 1990. After the ceasefire I returned with my daughter to visit my mother who was sick and staying in Vavuniya. When I arrived she was already dead. This year my wife sold all our possessions and took a boat to come, but she was caught by the Indian Navy. They took everything from her. She is still in India. We are hoping UNHCR will bring her in January [2006].38 Families returning to their original settlements were eligible for help under the Unified Assistance Scheme (UAS). Those whose homes lay within the High Security Zones (HSZs) of the LTTE and SLAF could not return, and a number of solutions were sought for them. Some families remained in Welfare Centres while others resettled in new locations, where they were given land tenure, owned their own homes and property, and were able to farm. This was the situation in Madhukari.

Peacebuilding at the Grassroots 113 Figure 4.2

Total IDP Returns to Mannar 2002–2005

35,000 30,000

IDP Returns

25,000 20,000

Total IDP Returns Total Returns from India

15,000 10,000 5,000

20 02 /2 0 Fe 03 bAp 03 rJu 03 nAu 03 gO 03 ct D -03 ec Fe -03 bAp 04 rJu 04 nAu 04 gO 04 ct D -04 ec Fe -04 bAp 05 rJu 05 n Au -05 gO 05 ct D -05 ec -0 5

0

Time

Source: UNHCR and Ministry of Nation Building & Development, op. cit.

In 2000 Madhukari was a small village of 31 families.39 They were subsistence farmers and hunters, living in cajan shelters; typical of most small rural communities. The men would hunt animals that they could eat or sell. In 1999 the Rural Development Forum (RDF), a Sri Lankan NGO had constructed two wells. With no road linking the village to Nanaddan, they were fairly isolated from Mannar’s more urban administrative centres. Madhukari is situation on the alluvial plain of the Arriavu River with soil suited to paddy and highland crop cultivation. With the exception of the 31 families already settled in Madhukari, the land was mostly uninhabited scrub, overgrown with vegetation and without services. With freshwater, unoccupied land, and a secondary school about six kilometres away, Madhukari was identified as a suitable location for long term IDPs. Between 2000 and 2001 the original 31 families plus an additional 44 families from the surrounding area, who did not have their own land, were given one and a half acres and help to build their own homes and latrines.40 In 2001, 100 families were relocated from welfare centres in Vavuniya and provided with a one-room home, latrine and one acre of land.41 In 2003/2004 another 150 families were relocated who were landless IDPs, they were provided with one acre of


land and a two-bedroom house.42 In Chinnavalayankaddu the entire village was displaced due to heavy fighting between the SLAF and the LTTE in 1999 and relocated to Madhu Church, returning after the ceasefire. None of the Muslim families returned after the MoU, although a number did return temporarily for the paddy harvest.43 Musali was a Muslim majority district, and while the Muslim families from Saviriapuram had not returned, the Christian and Hindu families did.44 There were six Welfare Centres in Mannar in 2005, with a total of 2,799 inhabitants, 90 per cent less that at the beginning of the ceasefire.45 Public buildings returned to their original purpose and Welfare Centres were developed along the lines of the IDP villages, as part of the ‘durable solutions’ programme. Without land they had to rely on labour work to earn money and were economically very vulnerable.46 Having been one of the largest IDP camps, the Madhu church site had only one or two families still living there in 2005, and the church and grounds were fully restored. Between 2002 and my field visit (June 2005) almost 31,175 people returned to Mannar. In 2005 there were still 25,897 IDPs in Mannar, but only half as many as in 2002. Housing Nearly all the homes in Mannar were either ‘partly’ or ‘fully’ damaged by the war (95 per cent).47 Around 70 per cent of these households had a monthly income of less than a dollar a day (Rs2,500 approximated US$25 per month).48 Under the UAS, families whose homes had been damaged were eligible for a grant to help them ‘acquire basic tools, inputs and temporary shelter to restart productive livelihood’.49 Initially the grant was Rs15,000 (US$150) with an additional Rs50,000 (US$500) to help with the repair or reconstruction of their home.50 Usually a family received the first instalment of Rs15,000 but few ever received the full amount.51 The amount for a destroyed house increased to Rs110,000 (US$1,100) in 2002. Once the World Bank committed to supporting this programme in 2004 it became the North East Housing Reconstruction Programme (NEHRP), and the amount increased to Rs150,000 (US$1,500) for 400 square feet and following the December 2004 Tsunami Disaster, and wider consideration of the costs of reconstructing a house, Rs250,000 (US$2,500) for 500 square feet and a latrine.52 To qualify beneficiaries needed a monthly income of less than Rs2,500 (US$25), be permanently resettled and have land title.53 By June 2005, 988 beneficiaries in Mannar had received between them Rs23,120,000 an average of Rs23,380; a great deal less than the Rs250,000 promised under the UAS, and 11,627 were still awaiting payment.54


In the three villages chosen for this research the type of shelter varied a great deal, and was constrained by local factors. In Madhukari there were three phases of house building.55 For the first 75 houses, the core project was funded by Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID), psychosocial support was funded by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), agrarian support by the WFP, UNHCR funded latrines, the National Housing Authority (NHA) provided Rs25,000 for constructing the house, and the project was implemented by ZOA Refugee Care. This programme started in 2000 and began before the MoU. Construction was possible at such a low price due to the input of free labour. For the second phase one hundred families were relocated from Sivarapurampuram Welfare Centre in Vavuniya in 2001. The impetus for this project came from the infamous Vavuniya MP, Douglas Dervanandan.56 The World Bank funded these houses and the NHA implemented the project, paying contractors to build the one hundred houses and latrines to the sum of Rs50,000. ZOA supported these families with psychosocial programmes. These houses were built to a very poor standard, with only one room and an open veranda. The latrines were built with plastic pans that quickly became stained and scratched and in every household the roof of the latrine had come off. People from this scheme were very unhappy with their new homes.57 In the third phase under the same World Bank programme, Shelter for Life, an American International NonGovernmental Organisation (INGO) implemented the construction of a further 175 houses. These houses were well constructed with two rooms, an enclosed veranda and a latrine at the cost of Rs150,000. The families in this project were, for the most part, satisfied with their homes. In Chinnavalayankaddu, in the Vanni, families received Rs25,000 to help with the cost of constructing a cajan shelter and were provided with materials to construct their own latrines.58 The village had been caught between the LTTE and SLAF and entirely destroyed. The village was littered with ammunition boxes and, although the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) had demined it, people kept finding UXOs (unexploded ordinance) in their fields. Work had not yet begun on the construction of permanent shelters, although the local NGO, Mannar Association for Refugee Rehabilitation (MARR), the Grama Sevika (GS) (Village Headman) and a representative from the World Bank had already carried out a survey of the village to identify the first round of families that would be provided with new homes. Saviriapuram had an altogether different situation.59 One of the conditions of the donors was that a permanent shelter could not be


constructed unless the beneficiary had land tenure. In Saviriapuram most of the land belonged to the Catholic Church. According to the principal of the local school only ten families in the village had land, leaving 120 without.60 Privately-owned land belonged to Muslims, who had not returned to the village, and the government had only allocated new land to 20 families.61 Sewa Lanka managed to secure funding from European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) to provide tin sheeting for the traditional adobe shelters, but without tenure the construction of permanent shelters was not possible. The Catholic Church would not hand over the land to the local families but would, at some point in the future, build houses for these families themselves; this understandably created resentment.62 Education In 2004 the Mannar Plan reported that of the 112 schools in Mannar, 19 were temporarily closed and seven had been displaced; 18 schools were completely destroyed and 78 were without electricity.63 The student teacher ratio in 1997 was 39.7 to 1, while the national average was 24 to 1. Mannar’s schools were 492 teachers short of the necessary 1,261.64 There were no tertiary education facilities in Mannar. Substantial damages [sic] have been caused to the infrastructural facilities such as school buildings, classrooms, science laboratories, libraries, school furniture, toilets and urinals, water supply and playgrounds. Further, most of the instruments and equipments [sic] too had been damaged or lost.65 During the ceasefire period around 175 new teachers started working in the Mannar District, three schools reopened and 75 per cent of the schools were at a satisfactory level.66 However in 2005 they were still short of 173 teachers, and there were no laboratory technicians making it difficult to teach A-Level science properly.67 At that time there were 112 children below the age of 14 (the mandatory age of school attendance) not attending school.68 Around 20–30 per cent of children did not return after 14 to do their O-Levels or A-Levels.69 In 2005 there were no plans for the creation of any tertiary education facilities and of the 1,002 students sitting their A-Levels, only 124 would get places in University under the national quota system.70 Access to education greatly improved in all three of the villages. Schools were renovated, latrines and wells were provided, as were new teachers, and volunteer teachers. All of the schools received new equipment like books, tables, and chairs.


In Madhukari before the MoU there was no road and children were not going to school; by 2005 it had a pre-school, a primary school and the nearest secondary school was a 30-minute bus ride or a 40-minute bicycle ride along the newly constructed road (using local labour and foreign funds).71 In Chinnavalayankaddu there had been one teacher teaching all subjects up to grade 5, the school building had no well and no toilet facilities, in 2005 there were 11 teachers teaching up to O-Level, and a new building with a well and toilets.72 In Saviriapuram, a new school had just opened.73 In each village there were not enough classrooms or teachers to teach all of the students. In Chinnavalayankaddu children were studying under the trees and the GS explained that ‘rain comes, and wind blows the books away’ and ‘when the sun comes sometimes it’s too hot to study’.74 The teachers generally came from outside the village and there was no accommodation provided for them.75 Most teachers did not want to stay in remote areas, particularly in the Vanni and did not intend to stay long term, they relied upon volunteers from the village, often local girls who have passed their A-Levels. It was difficult for these girls to get training due to the lack of a tertiary college in the District, and they had to travel and be far from home. Nonetheless most children could now sit their O-Levels and A-Levels, but it required them to travel long distances by bicycle or bus (where available). Although educational facilities were still inadequate, there was plenty of evidence of a significant improvement in access to education during the ceasefire period. Health In the previous two decades no new hospitals were built in the Mannar District and every health facility was damaged during the war.76 According to the Mannar Plan, out of 21 health facilities only 14 were functioning in 2004. Of the 711 health workers required to run the health system there were only 288 available amounting to a 68 per cent shortage. In addition to ‘an acute shortage of human resources’ there were also acute shortages of ‘bed strength [sic], laboratory and diagnostic services, necessary equipments [sic], vehicles and ambulances’.77 At the district’s base hospital in Mannar Town there were no consultants or medical officers available other than a surgeon and an anaesthetist. The hospital also needed medical wards, clinic rooms, an intensive care unit, a laboratory, radiology equipment, a dental unit, an auditorium, a health education unit and a medical record unit.78 In the three district hospitals, Murunkan had ‘one medical officer’, ‘no pharmacist’ or ‘M.L.T. [medical laboratory technician]’, Adampan was completely destroyed and Talaimannar was


run by ‘one RMO [responsible medical officer]’ with ‘no Medical Officer, Nursing Officer, Pharmacist, Dispenser [or] M.L.T’.79 Although it is not mentioned in the Triple-R Ministry report, lack of electricity severely hindered provision of health care. Little improved with regard to health in the three villages. In Madhukari one lady explained that her family had to travel to Murungan Hospital to get treatment for minor problems; this would take 3–4 hours by bicycle. For major problems they would go to Mannar.80 She also mentioned that sometimes the doctors asked for payment, which she ‘didn’t like’; in Sri Lanka medical treatment is supposed to be free at the point of entry.81 Another man spoke of not being able to get the treatment he needed in Mannar for an abscess and having to travel to Colombo.82 With this injury he could not work, and as a kooli labourer he was unable to raise the funds to make the trip.83 A blind woman did not have enough money to make the trip to Anhuradpura to see an eye doctor.84 In the Madhu Division, the only doctor in the area had left four months earlier.85 People had to travel to Mannar or Murungan hospital. The checkpoint between the government and the LTTE-controlled area closed at 4 p.m., and health volunteers managed medical emergencies that happened during the night.86 The Assistant Government Agent (AGA) of the Madhu division explained that doctors were not prepared to come and work in a ‘backward’ area.87 The LTTE proposed that they would open a ‘Taleban’88 hospital, staffed by LTTE trained medics and run by the Tamil Eelam Health Service.89 In June 2005 in Saviriapuram a new health facility had been built, but was yet to open as there were no staff, and no electricity.90 Infrastructure Unlike other parts of Sri Lanka, there were no road signs, pavements or road markings on Mannar’s roads. In 2004, of the 205.5 kilometres of trunk and main roads, 70 per cent (147.3 kilometres) needed rehabilitation work.91 This included remetalling, reconstructing culverts and drains, and rebuilding bridges. The causeway that links Mannar Island and Mannar town to the mainland was about 70 years old ‘and some sections [were] about to collapse’, while the bridge that connects the causeway to the town is a Bailey bridge that could only carry ten tonnes.92 The railway bridge was destroyed in 1990 and was not rebuilt.93 Electrification of Mannar stood at 15 per cent compared to the national average of 45 per cent.94 There was no electricity in the LTTE-controlled area, with the exception of the local vicinity of Madhu Church. There were seven water schemes in Mannar and only two of them were functioning. Pipe-borne water services were only available for 27 per cent of the


population.95 There were no wastewater or sewerage-treatment facilities in the whole district.96 Those dwellings with latrines had pit latrines and used well water. ‘Unsealed septic tanks and soak pits, usage of pit latrines in the densely populated town area and intrusion of petro-chemicals from petrol sheds, workshops, service stations, garages etc. pollute the ground water sources.’97 In 2005 the improvement of roads was evident in all three divisions. New roads and bridges were built, significantly reducing travel times to the administrative centres of Mannar and Vavuniya. Those villages assisted in the reconstruction of a road were now more easily accessible, and NGOs responsible for projects generally had better access. In all three villages the villagers carried out the labour required to link the village to the main road.98 In Madhukari, a new road was built linking the village to Nanaddan.99 Since the ceasefire, two bridges had been repaired in Chinnavalayankaddu, with funding from the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and roads had been rebuilt and repaired using World Bank funds,100 and a new road was proposed at a cost of Rs3 million by the UNDP.101 The labour work was done by the village organisations, the Farmers Organisation and the Sports Club, with work supervised by MARR and World Vision.102 A World Bank-funded culvert bridge was being constructed making it possible to cross the local river during the rainy season, linking the village to the Mullaitivu District.103 In June 2005 there were no plans to restore the railway and no scheduled work to upgrade the bridge or causeway to Mannar Island. An electrification scheme in Musali, funded by the World Bank’s Conflict Area Rehabilitation Project (CARP) project was in progress but was incomplete in June 2005.104 There were regular power outages in Mannar Town, and no electricity in Madhu with the exception of Madhu Church.105 None of the three villages had electricity. There was a project by the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) to provide solar panels to homes in some areas, paid off in monthly instalments by the homeowner.106 None of the villages had pipe-borne water.107 In Saviriapuram, wells could not be sunk, as the water was saline, unsuitable for drinking or cultivation. Drinking water was brought by tractor and then bought from the Women’s Rural Development Society (WRDS) in a project set up by Sewa Lanka.108 In Madhukari water was a serious issue for every beneficiary interviewed. People bathe by the wells; the water is also used for drinking, cooking, and cultivation. As most of the families had arrived since the MoU, they were not comfortable sharing with strangers. In Chinnavalayankaddu, at least one in every family was originally from the


village, and people were not as worried about sharing wells.109 Families in Madhukari with a well on their property were using the water to cultivate highland crops and this provided an additional source of income to paddy cultivation and labour work.110 Both ZOA staff and the GS explained that there was not enough water locally for every family to have their own well. During the dry season salty water travels up the river and if too much water is extracted, the well water becomes saline.111 Some kind of water scheme was required to provide an equitable source for cultivation and personal use. In 2005 all three villages had problems with their latrines, or a lack thereof. In Madhukari ECHO funded the construction of latrines. In Chinnavalayankaddu the latrine project was implemented by MARR. In Saviriapuram there was a problem with land tenure, and not all the households had a latrine. There was no sewerage system, water treatment or septic tanks in any of the villages. In Madhukari, a lack of wells meant that people did not have enough water to flush their latrines. In Chinnavalayankaddu, again lack of water limited latrine use, which meant that latrines were not a priority for many families. This resulted in such slow implementation of the latrine project that funds had to be returned.112 Lack of water was an issue in Saviriapuram, and at a community meeting in Saviriapuram the Divisional Secretary (DS) complained that: People are using toilets for different purposes; some leave cement bags in them, others are using it as a shrine with pictures of the Virgin Mary, some keep hens in their toilet, all because there is no water in the village.113 Agriculture Mannar’s primary economic activity is agriculture; 70 per cent of families were employed in this sector. Paddy is the main cash crop. There are 23,060 hectares available in the district for paddy cultivation. During the 1980s 15,000 hectares of land were cultivated during the Maha growing season, this declined to 5,000 hectares during the 1990s as a result of the war, and did increase to 11,241 hectares by 2002/2003.114 By 2004 ‘10,500 hectares of paddy land [had] been abandoned due to lack of accessibility, presence of mines, displacement of people and restrictions on resettlement in security zones’.115 There are no perennial rivers in the District; on average the rivers flow for about six months in the year.116 Major, medium and minor tanks are used to hold water and to irrigate the land so there is paddy production during both the Maha and Yala; they also provide water for


domestic purposes. The largest of these tanks is Giant tank, which has the potential to irrigate 24,438 acres of land.117 The irrigable land that surrounds Giant tank lay within the frontline area of the SLAF and LTTE; as a result only 40 per cent of this land was in use.118 There are 11 major and medium tanks that irrigate 36,613 acres and 353 minor tanks irrigating 6,053 acres.119 Most of the tanks had not been maintained over the last 20 years and fell into disrepair; some tank beds reverted to jungle, ‘spills, sluices and other structures [were] badly damaged’, and channels choked with weeds.120 This resulted in much water being wasted. Thousands of hectares of perennial crops were destroyed during the war; over 2,157 hectares of cashew trees, 2,000 acres of coconut plantation and 1,000 acres of coconut trees, and an estimated one million palmyrah trees.121 Restrictions on the movement of people and goods made agricultural inputs like fertiliser and pesticide both expensive and difficult to obtain, limiting the access of farmers and traders to more lucrative markets in the unaffected south, particularly Colombo. Damage to roads made transportation slow and costly.122 A great deal of highly productive land in the HSZs could not be farmed.123 In 2004 ‘Most of the assets of [the] Department of Agriculture were damaged and many key positions [were] vacant’.124 Livestock rearing also suffered: The recent conflict has led to a decline in the livestock industry … mainly due to displacement of farming population, loss of livestock, loss and damage to assets incurred by the farmers, non-availability of inputs, poor marketing of livestock, poor veterinary services, and lack of access to credit.125 Between 1981 and 2002 the number of cattle dropped from 32,394 to 24,426 (25 per cent) and the number of buffalo from 2,007 to 1,707 (15 per cent).126 The ceasefire had an immediate impact on agriculture in Mannar. Paddy production increased from 29,039 tonnes in 2001/2002 by around 64 per cent (47,827 tonnes) in 2002/2003 during the Maha season, with 2004/2005 producing another bumper crop of 50,133 tonnes (73 per cent increase).127 Milk production grew exponentially from 14,642 litres in 2001 to 462,246 in 2004.128 The World Bank began funding the North East Irrigated Agriculture Project (NEIAP) in 2000 and by 2004/2005 a further 6,145 hectares of additional land was being cultivated.129 In both Madhukari and Chinnavalayankaddu the economy relied on agriculture as the primary source of income; families were growing


paddy and many were cultivating highland crops.130 ZOA provided seedlings such as coconut trees, banana saplings, and papaya trees in Madhukari131 and CARE International had helped one family establish a banana plantation in Chinnavalayankaddu.132 Tank repair was taking place in Chinnavalayankaddu during the field study period. The AGA explained that labour work for the project was being carried out by the Farmer’s Organisation, but it was behind schedule due to interruptions caused by the rainy season and the lack of skilled labour.133 After the ceasefire, the bumper Maha crops created problems; with so much paddy produced it was difficult to obtain a good price. In Chinnavalayankaddu households used the revolving loan, established by MARR, to buy seed and fertiliser. The loan was not revolving and one explanation given was that they could not sell the paddy for a price that would pay off the loan.134 Although the roads were being improved and transportation was easier, it was difficult to gain access to markets as most households only had a bicycle. Without storage facilities and with a paucity of mills, people were keeping the paddy in their homes where it was liable to waste through spills and being eaten by chickens and vermin.135 It was ironic that local schools were receiving imported rice, provided by the WFP, from Pakistan and the United States.136 CARE International in particular was focusing on agriculture, teaching farmers new land management techniques and methods of food processing that increased the profitability of their produce.137 Marketing and transport were the problems most often cited by families that prevented them from making the most from their industry. These problems were particularly acute in Chinnavalayankaddu with taxation on goods at the LTTE checkpoint, and the high cost of transport as there was no bus service and no one in the village owned a motorbike. With motorised transport it takes at least four hours to reach the markets of Mannar town or Vavuniya. Vavuniya is only 15 kilometres from Chinnavalayankaddu, but the road was closed in 2005 due to the war; instead of taking 45 minutes by pushbike, Vavuniya was more than 85 kilometres by road.138 Fishing In the coastal divisions of Mannar and Musali around half the population relied on fishing for their livelihood.139 Before the CFA the security forces put restrictions on the movement of fishermen, their equipment, and period of time when fishing was allowed. Fishermen were not allowed to go more than three miles from the shore; they could not fish at night and had to resort to traditional methods of fishing due to the restrictions on boat engine size (eight horsepower outboard motor).140


This was very frustrating for Mannar fishermen, as boats from India would fish their waters while they had to remain on land. Shelling destroyed fishing equipment and many fishermen fled with their families to India in their boats and abandoned them when they returned. In 1982 9,745 metric tonnes of fish were landed, falling to 1,225 in 1992 and recovering somewhat to 4,758 in 2001.141 Restrictions on fishing reduced the productivity of the fishing sector. Lifting them had an immediate impact on productivity, with fish landings increasing from 4,758 metric tonnes in 2001 to 6,083 in 2002, and 8,049 in 2004.142 The economy of Saviriapuram is entirely reliant on fishing as the fresh water is salty and unsuitable for agriculture. In June 2005 it was possible to make between Rs400 and Rs1,000 per day.143 The local fishermen caught fish and sold it to traders for Rs40 a kilo, traders then took the fish in a refrigerated van to Colombo and sold it for between Rs100 and Rs200.144 Donor money paid for new fishing equipment, nets, boats, and a fisherman’s rest house was built in the neighbouring town of Arripu.145 Industrial processing and commerce With the two main industries in Mannar being agriculture and fishing, the industrial processing plants have almost exclusively been involved with these two activities. According to the Triple-R Ministry’s ‘Mannar Plan’, there are two salterns at Mannar and Chemmani belonging to Manthai Salt Limited; although they were in production in 2004, they were badly damaged and need to be renovated.146 The fishmeal factory and fish-canning factory were both defunct.147 All of the rice mills were out of operation, and out of seven weaving centres only one was functioning in 2004.148 There was a ‘Lack of facilities to collect milk from remoter areas’ and no facilities available for the chilling, preservation or processing of milk.149 In addition many small businesses were closed as a result of war damage.150 In June 2005 there remained a lack of industrial processing centres, although salt production had increased from 1,773.30 metric tonnes in 2001 to 2,090.70 in 2002, and 2,157.40 in 2004.151 There was a small rice threshing machine in Madhukari, but not enough facilities to process the thousands of metric tonnes produced in the District. A lack of storage meant that families in Chinnavalayankaddu were keeping sacks of paddy in their homes.152 Although people salted and dried their fish in Saviriapuram, industrial fish processing had not been developed since the MoU.153 Dairy production was a local affair without any refrigeration or pasteurising centres. Many small businesses had sprung up selling small


items like soap, shampoo, kerosene, biscuits, soda and sweets; there were shops in all three of the villages included in this study. In Madhukari, the family who owned a shop and eatery in the village said they had taken out a Rs30,000 loan to set up the shop but were struggling to pay it back as people were not buying much food from them, mostly people came to buy small things like sweets and betel154 leaf.155 The shopkeeper in Chinnavalayankaddu complained that his business suffered from the high price of fuel and having to pay additional taxes to the LTTE on entry to the Vanni.156 In Madhukari there was also a business making pots.157 Transport The railway was destroyed in 1990. In 2004 most of the road network was in a very poor state of repair with broken culverts and bridges. Before 1990 33 buses operated on 110 routes generating an average daily collection of Rs50,000 (US$500).158 In 2004, there were ‘31 very old buses and 13 new buses, 15 [were] subject to frequent repairs and [could not] be relied upon, no long distance routes [were] run due to the unreliability of the buses and for the same reason services [were] often cancelled’.159 ‘50% of the earned revenue [was] spent on repairs of old buses.’160 Without a railway, Mannar continued in 2005 to be remote from the economic activities of the rest of Sri Lanka. Road improvements had reduced the travel time by hours to major centres like Vavuniya and Mannar town. In Saviriapuram the journey time to Murungan was reduced by one hour following the reconstruction of the road.161 The bus system was still dilapidated, but the routes ran regularly in the government-controlled area without the interruptions of checkpoints and huge potholes from before the ceasefire. In Chinnavalayankaddu there were no bus services and people travelled mostly by pushbike or motorbike.162 A private bus route was running from Mannar to Colombo which took between eight and ten hours, however the accident rate was very high with crashes and fatalities a regular occurrence.163 Human rights Before the CFA, in addition to restrictions on movement, free expression and association, there were restrictions on the movement of food and other essential items. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) many people were detained without trial; and there were many incidences of extra-judicial killing, political assassination, and torture. People were raped and tortured in police or army custody. The recruitment of children by the LTTE was commonplace along with the abduc-


tion of adults. In general, there was a lack of judicial processes and little respect for law,164 the UN human rights conventions, signed by the Sri Lankan government,165 or the Geneva Conventions.166 From the many cases of human-rights abuse in the North, it is difficult to ascertain those that took place in the Mannar District. The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) reported seven cases from the District in 2001; there were three cases of arrest and torture followed by subsequent release without charge, two cases of gang rape and torture, and another case of arrest, torture and subsequent death by strangulation.167 There were many more unreported cases. Mannar did not have an official channel for the reporting of human rights violations; members of the Mannar Citizen’s Committee, made up of volunteers mainly from the Catholic Church and local professionals from all religions, would notify the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of any situation brought to their attention.168 The Mannar Citizen’s Committee was subjected to harassment and intimidation.169 Even after the CFA, Sinhalese police officers did not speak Tamil, making it difficult for Tamils to report crimes; any paperwork or reporting was produced in Sinhala. Unless the victim or victim’s family could speak or write Sinhala, it was nearly impossible for them to seek any kind of recourse through the police. Before the ceasefire, if Tamils wanted to travel in the governmentcontrolled area, they required a pass.170 The issue of a pass required the production of a national identity card, birth certificate, a letter confirming residential status from the GS, and a letter from the police. In was common for people to have abandoned all of their personal documents during flight. A person could not travel south without a sponsor and passes had to be renewed frequently; some passes were granted for as little as a few hours, to a few days.171 Following the MoU, the pass system was reduced and many checkpoints were opened; immediately there was a positive impact on the lives of those living in the Mannar District. People were freer to pursue their livelihoods, access markets, education and health facilities. Restrictions remained on the movement of people between the LTTE and government-controlled areas, and the LTTE extracted taxes at the checkpoint. One of the Catholic priests at Madhu Church explained that once a month he had to make the long journey to Killinochchi (the town of LTTE central administration), to get permission and a tax exemption in order to bring building materials and food items necessary for the Church. He said others, like businesses and NGOs have to pay.172 Before the arrival of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the Mannar Citizens Committee would notify the ICRC if a person was abducted,


disappeared or mistreated. The SLMM were able to carry out more accurate reporting as people thought that, as an international body, the SLMM might be able to help them.173 SLMM’s reports speak for themselves; between 1 January 2002 and 30 December 2002, there were 1,047 ceasefire violations, 995 were ruled as violations committed by the LTTE and 52 by the GoSL.174 These are startling figures when compared to the situation before the MoU. On the part of the government, there were no cases of torture or abduction; the highest number of violations was harassment. The LTTE committed 676 violations of the CFA through the recruitment of children, and 141 violations through the abduction of adults.175 These figures continued in a similar vein throughout the ceasefire period. Although the SLMM did make many investigations it was not in their remit to take action. One respondent spoke of a relative, in his early 20s, abducted by the LTTE. While the LTTE claimed they had released him, it was clear this was not the case. The respondent reported this to the SLMM who claimed they could not intervene, as this was not part of their remit, and his file was closed. The LTTE admitted (unofficially) that what they had done was wrong but they would not release him; he eventually escaped. I said to SLMM, ‘Why we are going to backward village and raising human rights if there is no response on the top?’ ‘What is the point raising awareness on rights and things like that?’ Finally he ran away from the LTTE camp. This happened in my family. He has lost his education and everything. We don’t know what they [the LTTE] will do. A lot of families have been through this too. He’s at home for the last 6 or 7 months, we don’t want to send him outside, we still have a fear that they can do what ever they want. First time we have evidence, because of that but now I don’t know. That is the reality, feeling fear. … When SLMM they realised ‘this is not under our MOU and because of that we are closing this file’ … Finally what has helped him? He ran away. Motorbike and bus and all my money and finally I have achieved nothing.176 In Mannar the LTTE continued to recruit children and ran pro-LTTE rallies in schools. One girl explained that she joined the LTTE after a quarrel with her mother. The LTTE had made presentations at their school telling them that ‘they had to get the Tamil land off the government’.177 The family reported this to the SLMM and because she was only 14 they arranged for her return.178 In Mannar Save the Children Fund (SCF) worked with families supporting the return of their children from the LTTE.179 The


LTTE were going to schools and showing children videos and promotional material and arranging marches. The schools had no option but to allow these rallies. Children were encouraged to join the LTTE in this way. They also joined for socio-economic reasons, coming from lowincome families, attracted by the promise of food, shelter and training. Returning children were given non-food relief items (NFRI), food, clothes, and bicycles so they could go to school or receive vocational training. They were helped with the costs of accommodation and travel, and should they choose vocational training they were provided with the tools necessary to work in their chosen trade.180 The LTTE sent children home who had disciplinary problems or were sick. After returning to their families, children were known to go back to the LTTE. One reason for this was that having returned, they were mocked by members of their village for being weak and not good enough for the LTTE.181 Other families were reported to have sent their child to another village to stay with relatives, and then claimed they had joined the LTTE in the hope that SCF or another ‘institution’ might provide help.182 The UNICEF programme set up with the TRO and SCF was notoriously unsuccessful. ‘Between the signing of the ceasefire agreement and November 2004, UNICEF documented 3,516 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE, with the largest number taking place in Batticaloa district in the East.’183 One father in the Vanni said that he had 12 children and one of them had joined the LTTE and was killed in the early 1990s. He complained that he had received no compensation for the loss of his son and was being asked to give up another child, something he was unwilling to do.184 In the week prior to visiting Chinnavalayankaddu, two children had been recruited ‘while walking down the road’.185 Cadre from the LTTE Political Wing were camping in the pre-school building, which had been built with donor funds since the MoU.186 In addition to the problems of abduction and child recruitment, people were not free to move in and out of the LTTE-controlled areas. The army and the police continued to be staffed by ethnic Sinhalese. In Mannar Town one police officer spoke Tamil, making it difficult for local people to report crimes. Inevitably, people went to NGOs when they had a problem rather than the local police or government. The ceasefire agreement had a tremendous impact on the lives of the people of Mannar. Immediately it provided the security for people to earn a living and seek an education. In the three villages, Madhukari, Chinnavalayankaddu and Saviriapuram, there was considerable change since the CFA. The end of the ‘pass system’, and the reconstruction of


roads enabled people to return to their homes and villages and continue with their livelihoods. Inputs of machinery, tools and training raised the productivity of fishing and farming, and better roads improved access to markets. In each village access to education was significantly better with new teachers and buildings. Considering how dire the situation had been before the MoU, people’s circumstances had greatly improved. Although Mannar did experience rehabilitation, it was not development. In 2005, most of the district was without electricity, pipe-borne water or wastewater treatment. Without agricultural storage facilities people were unable to get a good price for their grain and with no processing plants there were limited opportunities to add value to their industry. The lack of a peace agreement undoubtedly limited progress in the district. In 2005 there were still HSZs, and as a result around 3,000 people were in Welfare Centres. The situation of Chinnavalayankaddu in the Vanni contrasted with the other villages. People were still living in cajan houses, there were no medical officers in the Madhu division, no public transport and no metalled roads. While there had been major improvements to the school there was still a shortage of classrooms and teachers. This ‘no war no peace’ situation overshadowed the human rights situation. Human-rights violations persisted, but the perpetrators changed. The abduction (or forced recruitment) of adults and children by the LTTE indicated that the LTTE were confident that hostilities would resume. Despite these limitations there was an unquestionable peace dividend in Mannar.

Searching for the link between peace and development In Chapter 1, two approaches to peacebuilding were identified, typeone structural peacebuilding, and type-two bridge-building peacebuilding. Ideally Sri Lankan donors wanted to engage in structural peacebuilding,187 but ultimately they were limited by the lack of a peace agreement. The most conspicuous aspect of their support that remained in 2005 was the continued rehabilitation and reconstruction of the North and East in the hope that it would promote the peace process. So the question is how this approach linked to the wider peace process. Here we return to the questions raised in Chapter 1. What kind of peacebuilding took place in Mannar? What does it tells us about the timing of peacebuilding? How does it apply to our understanding of a ‘liberal peace’ and the ability of peacebuilding to transform a society at war?


Rehabilitation not peacebuilding The activities taking place in Mannar led to the rehabilitation of infrastructure and facilities. There was not however any kind of structural change. The repair of tanks, roads, school and hospitals could not protect the inhabitants from a return to war. There was a sense among the donors that while some activities ‘directly’ supported the peace process, others did so ‘indirectly’.188 Direct support would be to ‘the peace secretariat’, ‘human rights work’, or the ‘UNICEF action plan to help children affected by the conflict reenter a normal society, not just for child soldiers’. Indirect support was the repair of infrastructure: You can say well the A9 for example is being rebuilt. If that is for the peace process; I would say yes. That’s the road going from Kandy to Jaffna. That was probably the road of death in the conflict. If you fly over it you can see that it is beautiful. You can drive now from Kandy to Jaffna, people can go anywhere; I mean just the whole phenomenon. Other parts of the island, for people it’s terribly important; and there is traffic. And that you can say is an indirect way of doing that.189 Despite the evidence that the people of Mannar benefited from the ceasefire, they were still powerless to influence the structures of the LTTE and the GoSL. During the general election of 2004, Tamils in the North and East were only permitted by the LTTE to vote for the Tamil National Alliance (TNA),190 an amalgamation of a number of Tamil parties under LTTE-control. Nonetheless, the Final Report by the European Union Election Observer Mission concluded that: … the 2004 elections were largely conducted in a democratic manner, apart from the North and the East. If the election results in the North and East had been a critical factor in determining who formed the government, it would have raised questions about the legitimacy of the final outcome.191 Even if all Tamils in the North and East came out in favour of the United National Party (UNP), they still would not have won. In the 2004 election Tamils could not vote freely, but had they, they could not affect the outcome of the election. In the 2005 presidential election the LTTE enforced a boycott, and again Tamils were prevented from exercising their franchise.


In Mannar, when questioned on what they would do if war returned, most responded that they would seek refuge in Madhu Church, a small number said they might join the LTTE. Even the elites within Mannar society said they had no influence on the LTTE or the GoSL. When a Mannar Citizen’s Committee member was asked what he would do he said: ‘You would appeal to an international body. We are helpless in dealing with these people’.192 The GS of Chinnavalayankaddu also put his faith in outsiders, he believed that if there was a real threat of war, the US, Japan or Norway would negotiate. ‘It is impossible for people from here. Who will listen to our ideas?’193 Although people wanted a negotiated settlement, they had no way of preventing war. The power to resume hostilities lay in the hands of the GoSL and the LTTE. Reconciliation through normalisation There was a sense that recovery activities in the North and East would build peace by establishing normal relationships between the local population and government structures; type-two peacebuilding. There were also ‘Peacebuilding’ projects that aimed to reduce conflict and raise peace awareness in the district. The extent that rehabilitation projects did reconcile the local population with the government was limited by the way donors fund projects through NGOs. While ‘peacebuilding’ projects seemed to be targeted toward reducing conflict within a community rather than building bridges between Tamil and Sinhalese groups. In Mannar the DS worked with the GA and NGOs to manage recovery programmes, however the actual work was implemented by NGOs. If a household needed assistance, although they may well have gone to their GS, the delivery of assistance would come from the NGO rather than the local government. This increased the sense among the local community that the government did not help them. Local corruption did not help. For example, in order for an NGO to assist with the building of a permanent structure, such as a house or latrine, the beneficiary needed land title. Donor projects have a timelimited funding cycle, and delays with local government required some NGOs to ‘pay’ the local administration in order to speed up the process of issuing a title.194 Some NGO employees benefited personally from project funds by arranging fraudulent invoices when purchasing goods and services. The trader would receive payment, and therefore business, while the NGO worker kept the difference.195 This practice could range from payment of an auto-rickshaw journey to the purchase of


relief items, or materials for reconstruction. This corruption had a physical impact on recovery by reducing the funds available for project implementation; it also undermined the relationship between the beneficiaries, local government structures and the NGOs. There was an internationally funded ‘peacebuilding’ programme established in Mannar in February 2002 to reduce conflict at the local level called Peace and Reconciliation Resources. This programme created ‘peace committees’ that were taught techniques to resolve local problems, and prevent them from escalating into disputes that could spark renewed violent conflict in the area. These committees were necessary as the Sinhalese dominated security services were incapable of dealing with local disputes. In Mannar if an argument broke out between two parties, the police and army were unlikely to intervene for fear that should someone get hurt, the anger and blame would be redirected at the police, and would become a Tamil versus Sinhalese/government conflict. When a grenade was thrown into the LTTE office in Mannar Town in a built-up residential area, although the army was less than one hundred metres away, no one from the police or army came to investigate.196 Finally the SLMM made enquiries and not the army or the police. The small coverage of these peace committees limited their ability to address existing tensions between Tamils and the state, nor could they address the imbalance of the Sinhalese police force and army. The need for peace committees resulted from an underlying cause of the conflict; the Sinhalese dominated police force and legislature provided few avenues to peacefully resolve conflicts. There was a peace committee in Saviriapuram, but it only met when encouraged by the peacebuilding NGO, and not independently. Another ‘peacebuilding’ programme was the ‘Peace Awareness’ workshops run by the Consortium of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) with local-Catholic priests. At the workshop I attended, all participants were women with one exception, and had received sewing training in a project delivered by MARR in Nanaddan. The participants were asked to introduce themselves and to say what they thought the meaning of peace was. The participants were later shown, with the aid of a piece of string, that in order to go in one direction, all those holding the string would need to compromise. The impact of this project was limited given that these women were more likely to be affected by the war than to propagate it.197 This peace awareness project was promoting peaceful personal relationships that could be nurtured through the family and home, it was difficult to see how it linked to the structural problems perpetuating the war.


‘Promoting’ peace in the North and East The donors at the Oslo Peace Support Meeting ‘pledge[d] to provide assistance to meet the immediate needs and priorities identified at this meeting, so that assistance may be given island-wide, when and where it is most needed, thereby directly promoting the peace process’.198 In Tokyo ‘The Conference note[d] the importance of urgent humanitarian assistance as well as medium to long-term assistance to rebuild the conflict-affected areas in the North and East, and to assist in the development of the entire country’ and ‘the importance of bringing tangible dividends of peace to all the people of Sri Lanka’.199 The rehabilitation of the North and East did not address any of the structural causes of the conflict, and it was limited in the way its implementation reconciled the local population with the Government. The expectation still remained that it would promote the peace process. On balance ‘promoting’ the peace process in North and East was perhaps less significant than other factors in the South when it came to maintaining momentum in the peace process. People from the North and East would support any attempt at a negotiated settlement, having direct experience of violent conflict, arbitrary arrest, detention, execution, abduction, displacement, aerial bombardment, and landmines. For them any cessation of hostilities was welcome. The hundreds of thousands of Tamils who fled the country indicate that there were many who did not want to stay in Sri Lanka, and who were not willing to lose their lives for a separate state. This observation is borne out by the Centre for Policy Alternatives survey of 2004: The more directly Sri Lankans have experienced the conflict, first or second-hand, the more likely they are to support a compromise peace agreement. They also express much higher peace protest potential. While virtually all Tamils and Muslims have suffered directly as a consequence of the war, a sizable minority of Sinhalese, especially those in the southern provinces, have little no [sic] direct experience with the conflict and as a result are much less supportive of a compromise peace agreement.200 The inhabitants of the villages included in this study had an acute understanding of the costs of war; none of the families interviewed were unaffected and many had suffered a great deal. All the families interviewed were supportive of the peace process and did not want to see a resumption of hostilities. The hope among many was that work carried out in the North and East would make people feel they were better off at


peace than at war, but even if people did not want a return to war, what could they do to prevent it? ‘Greed’ or ‘grievance’ If the theory holds that economic greed has a stronger relationship with conflict than political grievances, then the rehabilitation activities in the Mannar district would need to provide an economic disincentive to war. When asked in 2005 whether people in Mannar thought the war would return, those from middle-income backgrounds, NGO workers, teachers, priest and civil servants, were confident that peace would stay. They said that everyone had benefited from peace, including the government and the LTTE. They argued that neither party would be willing to lose the gains that had come since the ceasefire. The villagers were not so confident. They all were unsure of the peace and worried that war would return. This sense of insecurity could be observed in the reluctance of families to ‘finish’ their homes; people did not spend money on plastering, decorating or furnishing their homes for fear of displacement. A person working for Sewa Lanka in Saviriapuram said: ‘We didn’t complete our house because of fear’. It was quite clear that the peace dividend in Mannar was much greater for the educated middle-class that for those relying on agriculture or fishing. The rehabilitation of Mannar required a fully staffed public administration, teachers, doctors and health workers. The implementation of donor-funded projects required NGOs and their full-time local employees. At the village level, most people displaced had returned to destroyed homes and were subsisting through farming and fishing. While some homes had been rebuilt and new homes had been constructed in the government-controlled area, in the Chinnavalayankaddu, people were still living in temporary cajan homes. At the time of the field research no household had electricity. Fear of a return to war at the village level was not baseless. During the field-study period there was an ongoing dispute in the Tamil town of Trincomalee over the erection of a statue of Buddha at the town’s main bus station.201 A man in Batticaloa was killed and others injured when a police officer fired into the air, as families were protesting against an army checkpoint which had been erected by their school.202 In Mannar, the LTTE called regular hartals,203 closing down all schools and businesses.204 Non-observance of a hartal was regarded by the LTTE as defiance, and on one occasion Mannar had an extra day of hartal as punishment.205 One family reported that the SLAF had started to make nightly visits to their village, as it had been before the MoU and they


were afraid. The two LTTE offices in Mannar were attacked with grenades and gunfire one evening.206 Along the Mannar Vavuniya road the army began to build up bunkers and strengthen their camps.207 The LTTE announced at that time that they would welcome former demobilised members to rejoin, and if they had dependents, they would give them a monthly salary of Rs10,000; equivalent to a teacher’s salary.208 In the past, LTTE cadres were volunteers. In each village, the LTTE told people that they must be prepared for war and the LTTE could not continue negotiations with the government. The constant climate of fear and uncertainty provided a persuasive argument for joining the LTTE. Yet despite the offer of remuneration, and the continued threat of war, only one family interviewed said they would join the LTTE. When pressed further, the respondent admitted that he would not join immediately, but only if the SLAF started attacking the LTTE. In response to the suggestion that the LTTE war effort would probably benefit more if its renewed cadre were prepared and trained, the interviewee said that he had a home and family to look after.209 The need to recruit children and abduct adults suggested that the LTTE was experiencing difficulty finding new recruitments, and that perhaps the ceasefire and the tangible improvements in peoples lives offered an alternative to war. However another respondent pointed out that: ‘Sometimes people are against the LTTE, but if war comes all are behind the LTTE’.210 The timing of peacebuilding The recovery activities that took place in Mannar cannot really be described as peacebuilding. The rehabilitation of infrastructure and the resettlement of IDPs was a necessary humanitarian endeavour, but none of the structural causes of the conflict were addressed during that time. In the last chapter we saw how the prioritisation of economic recovery during the peacemaking process weakened the peace process. Here we see that there is no evidence of local recovery linking to any wider structural issues. Barbara Walter’s position seems to be confirmed that combatants will walk away from peace negotiations when there is no ‘credible security guarantee’.211 A ‘liberal peace’ Despite the improvement in the Mannar District as a result of the ceasefire and the economic support provided by the international donors, democratic elections led to the formation of a government that was against the Norwegian-led peace process. Economic improvements for


Mannar’s middle class nurtured a sense of confidence in the peace process, while the activities of the LTTE and the Army at the village level had the opposite effect. The concept of a ‘liberal peace’ does not seem to apply to the people of Mannar. The outcome of the 2005 elections was the victory of a party in favour of a military solution to the confrontation with the LTTE; this was the outcome of Sri Lanka’s democratic process.

Conclusion In Sri Lanka the donors wanted to promote the peace process by providing economic assistance that would deliver a peace dividend to the whole Island. Having tied assistance to progress in the peace process, the donors were caught in a trap. They could neither withhold aid, nor could they provide an increase that might deliver a more significant peace dividend. The result of this approach may not have impressed voters in the South, but in Mannar there was a tangible peace dividend. The problem with the prioritisation of economic recovery was that while reconstruction took place in the North and East, and development in the South, nothing changed with regard to the political structures that perpetuated the conflict. If peacebuilding is about the transformation of the root causes of a conflict in support of establishing positive peace, then the activities in the North and East were not peacebuilding. If peacebuilding has the potential to build bridges between opposing sides in a conflict, then again, the donor-funded activities in Mannar could not be described as peacebuilding. The prioritisation of economic recovery issues undermined the peace process in the South, while the people in the North had no effect on the continuation of the peace process or the return to war. The findings from the fieldwork in Mannar provide a unique insight in the policy discussion regarding peacebuilding and the idea that through the prioritisation of economic recovery, donors can in fact promote peace. The large amount of money spent on the North and East delivered disappointing results. Implementation was slow and the many layers of bureaucracy as well as corruption limited the physical impact of those funds. Peacebuilding was unsuccessful in Mannar because it did not actually take place. The reason why transformative programmes advocated by peacebuilding theorists have such limited results, in the case of Mannar, is because donors were not in a position to implement them. Sri Lanka’s illiberal structures are protected by its democracy and liberalised economy. This fieldwork illustrates that there is a chasm between policy and implementation.

5 The Resurgence of War

At the time of the ceasefire and in comparison to some other states with major armed conflicts, Sri Lanka seemed both open to international involvement and safe for international staff. Sri Lanka has a long history of international interest in its conflict, with development actors working nationwide, and humanitarian organisations relieving the suffering of the war-affected communities of the North and East. Norway’s relatively impartial facilitation of the 2002 peace process contrasted positively with India’s bungled efforts in the early 90s; and this time the ceasefire would have external monitors. The ceasefire agreement came at a time when the ‘international community’ had arrived at a consensus about how it should respond to violent conflict, and the favourable situation allowed them to experiment with the prioritisation of economic recovery, led by the international financial institutions (IFIs). The result of this peace process was the bloodiest episode in Sri Lanka’s 26-year war. This chapter charts the return to war and describes the post-ceasefire situation in Mannar. The internationalised peace process and the reconstruction of the North and East did nothing to limit the excesses of Eelam War IV.

The politics of war Given the very political roots of this conflict, the decision by the international community to prioritise economic recovery during the peace process is difficult to explain. It is less so once you consider the popularity of the ‘greed’ thesis among the IFIs at that time, as discussed in Chapter 1. It is also far easier to spend aid dollars on tangible investments in infrastructure and reconstruction, than trying to coerce politicians into sharing power, and expediting political reform. The Sri 136

The Resurgence of War 137

Lankan ceasefire presented an opportunity to experiment with the efficacy of this position. An ‘uneasy’ cohabitation The opportunity that allowed for the 2002 ceasefire agreement was the historic occasion of the posts of president and prime minister being held by both main political parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP). It also presented the first major hurdle to negotiations. When Kumaratunga came to power in 1994, she arrived on a peace ticket. Her proposals for devolution of the North and East were vehemently opposed by the UNP. After the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) resumed hostilities in 1995, the President’s ‘war for peace’ strategy made peace talks virtually impossible. The UNP Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, was able to enter into a dialogue with the LTTE, but given the open hostility between Prime Minster and President, and the historic rivalry of their parties, it was unlikely that they would form a peace coalition. A few days before the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was signed (17 February 2002), the President ‘lambasted the prime minister, accusing him of being a pawn in the hands of the LTTE and stressing the point she [would] never allow him to betray the nation’.1 It was already clear in March 2002 that she would not cooperate over the peace process, with her warning that she could use the power of the presidential executive to dissolve parliament as early as December 2002. At this stage the President was already looking toward the ultra-leftwing and extremist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) for a possible coalition to contest the next elections. The JVP was responsible for killing her husband, Vijaya Kuramatunga, in 1998.2 Her willingness to form a coalition with them shows lengths that politicians will go in order to form government. Despite having made ‘unprecedented’3 devolution proposals herself in 1995, she was now unwilling for the government to enter into talks with the LTTE.4 The JVP position was that the LTTE had to be defeated militarily. Following its withdrawal from the peace talks in September 2003, the LTTE offered proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). They provoked a highly negative reaction in the South. Upset continued when President Kumaratunga took control of the ministries of Defence, the Interior and Media in November. In January 2004 she formed the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) with the JVP and dissolved parliament. The result of the 2004 general election was a hung parliament. While UPFA won the most seats, they were not in a position to form government due to the system of proportional representation,


and even before the result was called the UNP and SLFP were courting smaller parties. The UNP was in fact predicted to win the election.5 However the LTTE would not allow any party other than the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) to campaign in the North and East, using murder and intimidation as a warning to them.6 The TNA secured 22 seats; both the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) and the UNP obtained one seat each in Jaffna and the Vanni respectively7 The TNA was formed to contest the 2001 general election; an umbrella for the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), under the auspices of the LTTE. With 22 seats the TNA could take a decisive role in government, and its tacit support of the UNP would have been important if they had been in a position to form a ruling coalition. Overall the UNP actually won more seats than the SLFP, 67 seats to 62; the JVP won 36 pushing the result to 105 seats to the UPFA.8 The President’s choice of prime minister was Lakshman Kadirgamar,9 but after concerted pressure from Mahinda Rajapakse and other groups including the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a party of Buddhist monks, the President appointed Rajapakse on the agreement that he would resign after four months following a change to the constitution and the abolishment of the presidential executive.10 The Karuna split In March, prior to the April 2004 elections, a split emerged within the LTTE. This ensued following the refusal by the LTTE commander of the Eastern Province, Karuna, of a request by central command in Kilinochchi for the transfer of 1,000 cadres to the North. In his refusal Karuna cited a number of grievances: that despite ‘disproportionately high contributions towards the LTTE secessionist efforts … [the East] tended to be neglected in the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts initiated’ after the 2001 ceasefire; that senior staff from the East had been overlooked in key appointment in the Vanni; that the ‘northern leaders … enjoyed a life of luxury, grabbing the material benefits that accrued from the flow of foreign aid for the development of the warravaged areas’; and that child conscription, political assassinations, extortion and violence was ‘the work of those from the north operating in the eastern province under the direction of Pottu Amman, the chief of the Tiger Intelligence Unit, independently of Karuna and (implicitly) with the approval of Prabhakaran’.11


The split made it much more difficult for negotiations to resume. In the first instance, the LTTE could no longer claim to be the ‘sole representatives of the Tamil people’; a position they had claimed for sometime, which they believed gave them legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Tamil people. If Karuna maintained control of the East, then it would prove more difficult to merge the North and East, the geographic locus of the ‘historic Tamil Homeland’. Karuna also insisted that the Eastern TNA candidates ‘sever their links with the Vanni high command and … discard their campaign platform of devolution of political power to the Tamils in a unified north-east’.12 This weakened the LTTE’s power in parliament. The number of killings in the East soared throughout 2004 and 2005.13 It was apparent that the government was allowing, and possibly assisting Karuna and his men to attack the LTTE in the East.14 The Sunday Leader reported in March 2005 that Karuna’s men had been ‘operating from a camp at Thivichchenei, in the Polonnarauwa District for the last seven months’ in the government-controlled area.15 The belief that the government was aiding Karuna was reinforced when Joseph Pararajasingham, the Vice-president of the TULF and the only TNA MP to reject Karuna’s request to separate from the LTTE, was killed.16 He was murdered on 25 December 2005 in a church in Batticaloa where there ‘was a heavy security presence in the area and the killers could not have got away without the help of the security forces personnel’.17 Peace talks were held in Geneva in February and October of 2006; however they took place with the backdrop of continuing violence in the East and North and, with both sides accusing the other of escalating the conflict, were unlikely ever to amount to a peace settlement.18 The Sangha Initially there was wide support for the peace process, even among some monks.19 However, following a broadcast in April 2002 by the late LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran, indicating that the LTTE had not given up its claims on a separate state, a statement was issued by the Federation of Buddhist Organisations that they were now against the peace process.20 The discourse that emerged from members of the Sangha during 2002 had eight common themes: 1. ‘the conflict is due to terrorism’; 2. ‘the LTTE is a terrorist organization’; 3. ‘the right[s] of the Sinhalese should be protected for resettlement in Jaffna (including new Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim settlements


4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

in Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi)’ as well as the ‘rights of fishermen’; ‘Norway has supported Tamil Terrorism’; they ‘oppose talks with LTTE’; ‘there is justifiable distrust of and revulsion against the acts of Velupillai Prabaharan who does not represent all Tamils’; ‘separatism and even a federal state are undesirable (possibility of invasion by a Tamil State)’; and, ‘the solution is the eradication of terrorism’.21

Bikkhus (Buddhist monks) formed the JHU in 2004 prior to the general election. Their ‘12-point election manifesto, and the central theme dealt with establishing a dharmarajya or righteous state. It called for maintaining the extant unitary structure and governing the island according to Buddhist principles so the Buddhist community’s rights were protected.’22 With this in mind, the JHU supported waging war against the LTTE.23 This goes against the core teaching of the Buddhist tradition that ‘considers war and conflict as evil and teaches how individuals can transcend the universal tendency to engage in conflict, debates, disputes and war’.24 Traditionally the SLFP had courted the Sinhala nationalists. The JHU’s success in the election forced the SLFP to make overtures to them. Given this and the JVP’s position on a military solution to the conflict the UPFA would find any accommodation of LTTE demands impossible. This was highlighted following the Tsunami Disaster. During the talks over establishing a joint mechanism for the delivery of tsunami aid the JHU Member of Parliament (MP), Venerable Doctor Omalpe Sobhita Thera staged a fast unto death.25 The Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) was later endorsed but never operational, the UPFA lost the support of the JHU and the JVP quit the coalition destabilising the government.26 Mahinda Rajapkse Prime Minister Rajapakse did not resign after four months and contested the 2005 presidential elections. In his manifesto, Mahinda Chinthana,27 he made his position clear in regard to the peace process and a possible return to war, stating that the UNP Government ‘entered into the ceasefire agreement … in much haste and in a short-sighted manner without consultations’.28 Agreements were reached at various international fora without reference to the people of the country. Attempts were made to foist such agreements on the people of our country while the Liberation Tigers


of the Tamil Eelam did not abide by such agreements. … Notwithstanding such failures, there are certain persons who are still advocating that we follow the same old path. If this unfortunate process continues, it is very likely that some of those persons who are today following a democratic and non-violent course of action, may also be driven to violence at a future date.29 Rajapakse and the UPFA regained the support of the JHU and JVP by making a formal agreement with these parties on a number of significant policy issues, it would: ‘safeguard’ the unitary state, a concept of profound importance to the bhikkus; reject the LTTE’s ISGA proposals and quit P-TOMS; revise the CFA; ‘abandon/reverse certain processes associated with economic liberalisation’ and limit ‘government sponsorship of social welfare’, and ‘reorient Sri Lanka’s foreign policy – implicitly, reduce the subservience to western donors of aid’.30 The government’s decision not to have polling stations in the Vanni31 significantly reduced the number of people who could vote, as did the LTTE boycott of the presidential elections. In the Vanni ‘only 34% of more than 250,000 registered voters turned out; 78% voted for Wickremesinghe compared to 20% voting for Rajapakse’.32 In Jaffna voter turnout was less than 2 per cent and only one vote was cast in Killinochchi33 William Mishler et al. claim ‘a reasonable estimate is that Wickremesinghe would have received 220,000 extra votes in Jaffna alone, plus almost 200,000 more votes in Batticaloa, Trincomalee, and Vanni combined. Those votes would have been more than enough to overtake Rajapakse’s 180,000 margin, so reversing the outcome.’34

The LTTE Little was done by the LTTE to comfort hardliners. The ISGA proposals were a ‘blueprint for a separate state’, and would be unacceptable to any government.35 The number of ceasefire violations recorded by the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) attributed to the LTTE greatly exceeded those of the government and overwhelmingly they involved the abduction of adults and the forced recruitment of children (see Table 5.1). This would indicate they were preparing to resume hostilities. Throughout the ceasefire period they continued to build the paraphernalia of state, building administrative buildings, carefully choosing their police and border police uniforms, trying to prove to the outside world that they could run an autonomous state.36 This fanned the flames of Buddhist groups who would not countenance the break up of the state.


Chandra Sriram offers a number of explanations as to why the LTTE withdrew from the talks: the first that Prabhakaran was unhappy with federalist concessions made by the LTTE ideologue, Anton Balasingham, during the Peace Talks; the second, that ‘rifts within the LTTE’ weakened their position, and they only wanted to negotiate from a position of strength; and the third, that the constraints placed on them by the application of norms of human rights and democracy would limit their control over the North and East.37 A Bulletin released by the Jaffna-based University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR(J)) in 2005 on political killings noted that ‘Months before violence in eastern Sri Lanka grew so acute that even the most optimistic reading pointed to the possibility of war; assassination of the LTTE’s perceived opponents was already a daily affair’.38 Killing moderate Tamils that might prove popular in a non-war situation would support the view that the LTTE were afraid of losing control in peacetime. A major question faced by the organisation was the fate of Prabhakaran. He was wanted in India to face charges for the assas-

Table 5.1

SLMM Ruled Ceasefire Violations 2002–200539 2002 LTTE

Hostile acts against the civilian population Torture Intimidation

2003

GOSL

LTTE

2004

GOSL

LTTE

2005

GOSL

LTTE GOSL

21

4

25

4

6

1

3

3

6

0

2

0

2

0

3

0

13

1

8

6

14

0

15

0

Abduction of adults

141

1

191

2

155

0

107

0

Abduction of children

1

0

27

0

56

0

128

0

19

6

14

0

1

0

3

0

Harassment

60

23

104

18

61

4

23

22

Child recruitment

676

0

593

0

346

0

188

0

Forced recruitment of adults

0

0

8

0

19

0

5

0

Total Violations40

995

52

1113

49

845

20

576

43

Extortion


sination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Given the leader cult that had developed within the LTTE, it would be unacceptable to them to hand him over to the Indian authorities. It was evident in Mannar in 2005 (see Chapter 4) that the Government and the LTTE were squaring up for a new war. A report published in 2006 by Human Rights Watch on Funding the ‘Final War’ reported on ‘LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora’.41 In 2005 they began fundraising in the UK and Canada. Representatives of the LTTE were demanding sums as large as CA$20,000 and asking people to take out personal and business loans based on their assets and financial circumstance. They were told that if they did not provide, they would find their movements limited in the North and East, should they wish to return or visit relatives. There was also the threat of further action against them and their families back in Sri Lanka, with a family in Canada reporting that their house was vandalised following their refusal to provide funds.42 The actions of the LTTE clearly indicate that this organisation was bent on resuming hostilities. Rather than mollify hardliners, they poured oil on the flames; making excessive ISGA proposals, actively recruiting through abduction and child recruitment, assassinating their political rivals and aggressively fundraising for a ‘final war’. This behaviour seems a default response by an organisation born in conflict, and unable to reform to democratic norms.

The Government of Sri Lanka While the LTTE’s actions indicate that they were keen to pursue a military solution, those of the state did little to reconcile the Tamil population. Nothing was done during the ceasefire period to address any of long-standing grievances concerned with language and education. As the situation in Mannar testified, while there were improvements in terms of reconstruction, their citizen’s right to justice, education and health care were still limited, even in government-controlled areas. While it could be argued that these enduring structural problems would take time to address, there were opportunities during the ceasefire period when the government could foster goodwill through justice for Tamil victims of egregious crimes. These opportunities were not taken, and bolstered the claims by the LTTE that there could only be one final military solution. In 2002 five people, two of whom were police officers, were sentenced to death for the massacre of 27 Tamil youths detained at the Bindunuwewa detention facility in October 2000. In 2005 the Sri Lankan Supreme Court acquitted all five citing a lack of evidence.43 This was despite there


being ‘approximately 60 police officers stationed around the camp, [and] not a single officer arrested any member of the attacking crowd. Subsequent independent investigations revealed that not only did the police not do anything to prevent or stop the killings, but some police officers also participated in the attack’.44 They were young people who had surrendered ‘none of whom had been charged with any offence’.45 The state’s failure to protect Tamils and its reluctance to prosecute representatives of the state are well illustrated in Bruce Matthews article on the Commission of Inquiry (COI) set up by Rajapakse in November 2006.46 This commission came in response to international concern for the human rights situation following the murder of 17 local staff from the French Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) Action Contre La Faim in Muttur, East Sri Lanka in August 2006. Legitimacy was conferred on this Commission by pairing it with an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP); 11 people from different states including representatives from each of the Tokyo donor co-chair states; one of whom was Matthews. Within the first month, and throughout the year of its existence the IIGEP had a number of concerns that were included in its reports and subsequently ignored: They include the lack of independence of the COI from state interference (particularly the Attorney General’s47 Department); insufficient funding; an ineffective procedure for investigation and inquiries by part-time commissioners, state lawyers and police; the recurrent absence of independent criminal investigations; a lack of political, prosecutorial and judicial will to come to grips with the trial of state actors in human rights abuses; inadequacies of the prevalent criminal law; and the commission’s curious reluctance to implement its powers.48 As early as August 2007 the IIGEP had already ‘decided it was wasting its time on a human-rights advisory project which was evidently not being taken seriously by the government of Sri Lanka, which had appointed it in the first place’.49 IIGEP ended its engagement in April 2008. The four reasons cited by Matthews for its resignation were: one, the slowness of proceedings, which only quicken after the threat to leave in November 2007; two, the absence of ‘a viable Victim and Witness Protection Plan’; three, the local rejection of a UN Human Rights Commission, and its ‘portray[al] in the state-controlled media as part of an international conspiracy to undermine the government’; and four, the IIGEP ‘never had full access to the documentation that the COI had’.50


International involvement The political climate in Sri Lanka post-Wickremesinghe did not favour international engagement. The coalition formed by the SLFP with the JHU and JVP was overtly hostile towards Norway, foreign donors and NGOs. Both parties in the peace process, the Government and the LTTE were extremely wary of the implications of foreign involvement. For the Government the concern was over sovereignty, through the loss of control of the North and East to the LTTE, but also from ‘international actors taking on supervisory roles in national affairs’.51 The LTTE feared being rushed into an agreement that did not meet their demands, denying them administrative power in the North and East.52 The role of Norway As early as November 2002 the President along with her foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, issued a statement which claimed that ‘the role of the Norwegian government has been unjustifiably enlarged and that it is no longer visibly impartial, as between the LTTE and other legitimate interest groups in Sri Lanka. The Norwegian government seems more concerned with arranging an outcome of the talks that can be pronounced a “success” for the UNF and the LTTE rather than with the long-term interests of Sri Lanka and its people’.53 This claim of partiality rumbled on throughout the ceasefire period.54 Norway was forced to refute numerous allegations of aiding and abetting the LTTE. The state-owned Daily News published an assortment of accusations: in one interview with Karuna, he was reported as saying that the LTTE had given money to Eric Solheim, the Norwegian peace envoy, to help him buy a house in Oslo and he in turn gave 16 million Kroner to Anton Balasingham, as well as advising Prabhakaran on how to govern in the future. It also claimed that Norway had bought a six-foot television for Prabhakaran so he could watch films.55 In April 2007 The Sunday Times and the Daily News published an article where a Norwegian NGO called the ‘Norwegians Against Terrorism’ claimed that Norway was supporting the LTTE.56 The Daily News reported in 2008 that the Norwegians had arranged for Prabhakaran ‘to go and live safely in Eritrea’.57 In 2009 The Island ran a story that Norway brokered a deal allowing the LTTE to buy Chinese weapons in Eritrea.58 The Government ended Norway’s role as peace broker in April 2009, not long before the LTTE’s May 2009 defeat. The main criticism of Norway, and the international donors is that ‘the EU States and the Scandinavian countries, […] got confused


between critical engagement that allows for assistance and censure of the LTTE and appeasement that seeks to keep the LTTE in the peace process at all costs’.59 Any legitimising of the LTTE, its de-proscription, its engagement in talks would be objectionable to those who were against a negotiated settlement. This criticism however became more widespread as the LTTE appeared to be tightening its grip on Tamils in the North and East. This was evident through abductions, assassinations and child recruitment, as well as compulsory hartals and the enforcement of the boycott of the elections of 2004 and 2005. Norway’s inability to persuade or compel the LTTE to respect some basic norms of human rights and free speech lead to this accusation. Crackdown on NGOs and foreigners As the conduits of aid from donors, NGOs have taken on two roles in regard to peacebuilding. The first has been as the implementers of foreign-funded recovery projects, which as discussed, have been viewed as supporting peacemaking through ‘tangible’ improvement to people’s daily lives. Peacebuilding has also been carried out through funding NGOs that engage directly with peace, attempting to counter military solutions to the conflict and broaden support for a negotiated settlement. Western donors have also sought to fund ‘civil society’ projects alongside development projects through NGOs, which seek to promote or strengthen democracy and transform conflict through grassroots mobilisation. This has been problematic for the government, the LTTE and nationalist groups. With access to foreign funds, development NGOs are viewed with both resentment and suspicion. Those working for NGOs are often better paid than their peers working as civil servants. There is also latitude for NGO workers to benefit personally from their employment within foreign-funded organisations. For the government and for the LTTE, civil-society projects present a challenge to their sovereignty. Foreign funding creates the first obstacle for peace organisations. In Sri Lanka the largely English-speaking, Colombo-based peace organisations have been criticised as representing foreign interests and lacking popular support.60 Funding for these groups is unlikely to come from the state, given that ‘An active civil society is seen to promote political participation and the articulation of group-based interests, to be able to counterweight the power of the state, hold governments accountable, as well as to create a democratic culture’.61 In a state where many people are living on low incomes, voluntary donations tend to go to local temple or church societies.


Peace organisations tend to have a friend or foe status, which changes with the government’s position on the conflict. Following Kumaratunga’s landslide victory in 1994 on the promise of negotiating a settlement, the National Peace Council was established in 1995 and the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) in 1996, two well-known, Colombobased, English-speaking peace NGOs. The profile of both of these organisations increased during the 2002–2006 ceasefire; they have however come under increasing attack since the return to war.62 Their advocacy of a negotiated settlement put them in conflict with hardline nationalist groups, and therefore the government, due to the coalitions formed between the SLFP and the JHU and JVP. While there is a natural tension between the state and NGOs, the colossal influx of NGOs after the tsunami and obvious misappropriation of funds led to more widespread criticism.63 Furthermore there was plenty of evidence of corruption among the NGOs, as observed in Mannar in Chapter 4. A Select Committee of Parliament was established in August 2005 ‘for the Investigations of the Operations of NonGovernmental Organisations and their Impact’. The terms of reference of this committee were to: ‘identify the manner in which the functioning of such NGOO [sic] has impinged upon the sovereignty and have adversely affected the national and social wellbeing of the country’.64 These terms of reference effectively dictated the outcome of any investigation. Accusations of corruption by NGOs sit within the wider context of corruption nationwide. Transparency International reported that around US$500 million donated to the Sri Lankan state to deal with the Tsunami Disaster had not been spent three years after the disaster, and the auditing was vague and inaccurate, with the government claiming to have built 99,497 houses, ‘exceeding the total requirement of 98,525 houses’.65 However in Muttur, in the Eastern province, ‘only 422 houses were built through donor and owner driven housing construction programs in place of 1249 houses destroyed’.66 As Basil Fernando points out on his analysis of the interim report by the select committee published in 2008: The very enterprise will be one that begins with absurd notions and can have only absurd results. Unfortunately, that is what this report is all about. It tries to address the possible abuse of funds by NGOs while ignoring and allowing the abuse of funds by all state agencies and all public sector institutions. This is like trying to catch a three inch sprat with a shark net thereby leaving


all the big fish free; it is like trying to catch an ant in a jungle of corruption.67 In 2007 Norbert Ropers of the Berghof Foundation, an NGO specialising in conflict resolution, was unable to renew his visa and the Foundation closed its offices on 31 July 2007. The government objected to the Foundation’s promotion of a federal structure to the conflict, and its engagement with the LTTE.68 In February 2008 the foreign executive director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Rama Mani had her visa revoked. Rama Mani was accused of advocating for the UN principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ to be applied to the case of Sri Lanka.69 Donor position on increased violence and human rights While we are not privy to the diplomatic communications between the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Conference, the Government and the LTTE, their public statements are remarkably moderate. Following a month of fighting in the East between Tamil forces backed by the Government and the LTTE on 30 May 2006 the Co-Chairs [of the Tokyo Conference] called ‘on both parties to take immediate steps to reverse the deteriorating situation and put the country back on the road to peace’… ‘failure to take such steps [would] diminish international support’.70 The Sunday Leader reported a ‘top level diplomatic source’ as saying the Co-Chairs would ‘withdraw from Sri Lanka’s peace process unless the government and the LTTE recommit to the agreements reached during peace talks from 2002 including the Ceasefire Agreement’.71 Again in August, following daily attacks with thousands fleeing and hundreds being killed, the Co-Chairs ‘call[ed] on the GOSL [Government of Sri Lanka] and the LTTE to cease hostilities immediately and return to the negotiating table’.72 Following further fighting, the massacre of 17 aid workers from a French NGO and a clampdown on foreign aid workers, the Co-Chairs issued a statement on 12 September 2006 saying ‘Failure to cease hostilities, pursue a political solution, respect Human Rights and protect Humanitarian Space could lead the international community to diminish its support’.73 The Government was recalcitrant in its response to increasing international pressure on human rights.74 This was due to three factors: the first was the involvement of the donors in the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’. In response to an article reporting a ‘diplomatic spat’ between the US and the Sri Lankan state over a 2008 US State Department75 report criticising the human-rights situation, one reader comments: Isn’t it hilarious that the country which is detaining thousands of people illegally in Guantanamo Bay to accuse Sri Lanka for violating


human rights? And the same country which kidnaps people in global scale [sic] through the process known as ‘rendition’ to accuse Sri Lankan government of kidnapping people! And the country whose intelligence service use ‘waterboarding’ to get terrorist suspects to confess crimes they had never done, accuses Sri Lankan government of torturing people! What nonsense is this? US continues to commit crimes against humanity in the name of ‘fight against global terrorism’ and when Sri Lanka fights to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, they call it HR violation!76 While the donors cried foul on human rights violations and the resumption of war, they did not have a clean record themselves. This hypocrisy bolstered nationalist support for a military solution to the conflict. The second factor was that as the Government became increasingly frustrated with the Co-Chairs, they were able to turn to Pakistan and China for military support.77 Minister of Enterprise Development, Dr. Sarath Amunugama told The Sunday Times FT [Financial Times, Colombo] that the pattern of donor assistance was changing rapidly and emerging economies such as Sri Lanka do not have to depend ‘too much’ on large donors, who impose restrictions. ‘Our development partners in the forefront now are Japan, China, India, Eastern European countries such as Hungary and the European Union [EU]. The pattern of development assistance is changing. We do not have to go behind the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB) who are posing conditions,’ he said.78 The third was that during the last three years of the conflict ‘Britain and other EU countries sold military equipment worth millions of pounds to the Sri Lankan Government’ with Britain ‘approv[ing] commercial sales of more than £13.6 million … including armoured vehicles, machinegun components and semiautomatic pistols, according to official records’.79 An increased role for China In a lecture given by the SLFPs Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, in China in 2004 he describes the relationship between Sri Lanka and China as ‘benign and sincere’: China has never sought to influence the domestic politics of Sri Lanka … with no ulterior motives for befriending Sri Lanka. She has never tried to dominate, undermine or destabilize Sri Lanka. She has come to our rescue with timely assistance on several occasions when


there were threats to Sri Lanka’s national security and territorial integrity. And even on those occasions China never tried to strike a quick bargain in a crisis. There have been no strings attached to China aid. … In more recent times Sri Lanka has in a modest way been of assistance to China in international fora especially in the field of human rights where Sri Lanka, taking the view that China is being unfairly treated in certain quarters, has been her steadfast ally.80 In 2008 it was reported that China had ‘increased aid almost five times to [US]$1 billion, replacing Japan as the largest donor’.81 China is secretive about its aid, given both the prevalence of poverty in its own state and ongoing economic and strategic concerns.82 However India believed that China had donated Jian-7 fighter jets, and persuaded Pakistan to train Sri Lankan pilots, and despite Pakistan’s own economic difficulties, to give Sri Lanka US$100 million worth of military assistance.83 In a statement made shortly after the GoSL announced victory over the LTTE, Lt. General Shantha Kottegoda confirmed this in an article in The Sunday Leader: ‘Why it was possible to win the war this time as against previous times… ? … China and Pakistan gave their fullest support to the Sri Lankan Government by way of weapons etc.’84 In June 200785 a Chinese firm began work on a US$1 billion port in Hambantota, on the southern coast, which would be ‘used as a refuelling and docking station for its navy’.86 China needs a base in Sri Lanka to protect the tankers bringing oil from Saudi Arabia.

Return to Mannar There was plenty of evidence in 2005 that foreign-funded rehabilitation activities in the Mannar District had led to significant improvement in people’s daily lives. Yet this neither protected nor prevented the return to war. Throughout the second half of 2005 and the first six months of 2006, life in Mannar was marked by a series of confrontations between the LTTE and the Navy, including grenade attacks on Navy and Police security positions, and a number of attacks on civilians, allegedly by SL Navy personnel. The worst attack of 2005 happened on the 100 Houses Housing Scheme on 23–24 December in which 11 homes were burned down and four people were burned to death. In June 2006 a family of four were killed in their home in Vankalai; the children, aged seven and nine, were raped, hung from the rafters and disembowelled.87


On 17 June 2006, following a clash between the LTTE and the Navy, men on motorbikes came to the Church of Our Lady of Victories in Pesalai. The church was rebuilt during the ceasefire. A grenade was rolled along the floor into the church, killing one 75-year-old woman and injuring 47 others. Four fishermen were then lined up on the beach and shot through the mouth; a fifth was killed and burned in his boat, another escaped with serious injuries. ‘39 boats and 45 wadiyas88 were destroyed in the incident, and people estimate that their losses exceed 50 million rupees.’89 The people in Pesalai said that the attackers were ‘wearing shorts and blue t-shirts and had a cloth wrapped around their face to mask their identity’.90 The clothes they were wearing were identified as Sri Lankan ‘military civvies’.91 The Sunday Times (Colombo) reported that the government team sent to investigate, which included President Mahinda Rajapakse’s brother Basil, was unable ‘to proceed to Pesalai [which] led to arrangements being made for fishermen’s society members and leading citizens in Pesalai to come over to the Navy camp’.92 This negated any chance of the investigation having an impartial outcome. The areas between Arripu and Silvaturrai, which included the village of Saviriapuram, were ‘liberated’ by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) in September 2007. Around 5,000 people fled to Nanaddan and 13 people were killed when their van drove over a Claymore mine.93 The SLA said that people would not be able to return to the area until February 2008 when ‘essential infrastructure is in place’.94 Return did not happen until February 2010. Madhukari was under the influence of LTTE until September 2008, and young people were forced to join the LTTE; as a result many people fled the area. The Sri Lankan forces often visited the village.95 Having ‘liberated’ the East at considerable human cost during 2006, March 2007 saw the SLA launch an attack to try and move north into the Madhu Division.96 The crossing between the Vanni (area controlled by the LTTE) and the Government-controlled area on the Madhu Road, the Uyilankulam Forward Defence Line (FDL), closed on 3 September 2007.97 The worst fighting was along the FDL, placing all the families in that area at risk.98 Families from the Madhu area who fled to Madhu church were forced by the LTTE to go to the Manthai West Division, remaining within the Vanni.99 In the final stages of the war they were forced north to a 2km by 1.5km ‘safe zone’ in Karaithuraipatru division of the Mulaittivu District.100 The SLAF continued shelling101 until Prabhakaran and other senior LTTE cadre were killed on 18 May and the government declared victory on 19 May 2009.102


Most of the people who were trapped in Karaithuraipatru ended up in Vavuniya in Menik Farm. By December 2007 there were 23,105 IDPs in Mannar. The Mannar Citizens’ Committee reported in July 2007 that due to the insecurity there was lack of fertilisers and irrigation, and paddy cultivation had been disrupted. They anticipated a ‘hike’ in the price of rice.103 They also reported that a pass system was in operation, which only permitted fishing between the hours of 06:00 and 18:00, banning fishing at night, the time when most fish are caught.104 South Asians for Human Rights reported in June 2007 that the SLA prohibited the transportation of goods, in vehicles registered in Mannar or the North, from travelling south. All goods had to be unloaded and then reloaded into vehicles registered in the South. Conversely, all vehicles arriving from the South had to unload into vehicles registered in the North. This process took between four to six hours, spoiling fresh goods and resulting in ‘an abnormal price hike on essential items that are transported from the south to Mannar’.105 TamilNet reported in June 2007 that the ‘Vegetable business’ in Mannar ‘collapsed’.106 The SLA also placed a restriction on fuel, and ‘Kerosene and diesels oil shortages have adversely impacted upon the fishing industry’.107 Throughout the year there were many civilian deaths as a result of shelling and mines. People were abducted by ‘unidentified gunmen’ and bodies recovered showing evidence of torture.108

A negative peace Eight days after Rajapakse announced victory over the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government claimed another: a United Nations resolution was passed that congratulated Sri Lanka on its triumph over the LTTE, recognising the government’s ‘commitment … to provide access as may be appropriate [my emphasis] to international humanitarian agencies in order to ensure humanitarian assistance to the population affected by the past conflict’.109 Twenty-nine countries including China, India and Pakistan endorsed this resolution.110 Those who voted against included the Co-Chairs with the exception of Japan, which abstained.111 A vote was passed in favour of a ‘no action request by Cuba’ on amendments to the resolution to include ‘the necessity that Sri Lanka provide unhindered access to humanitarian assistance, … the need for Sri Lanka to set up an independent investigation into human rights violations and to prosecute the perpetrators’, or any provision for ‘follow-up, contrary to all other special session outcomes’.112 This UN resolution endorsed the treatment received by Tamils since the war.


After the war the 270,000 people caught up in the final onslaught were interred in camps.113 ‘The largest of the IDP camps, Menik Farm in Vavuniya District, [held] just over 220,000 people, making it Sri Lanka’s second biggest town and the largest IDP site in the world.’114 They only began releasing people in December 2009; as of March 2010 there were still 81,919 people housed in temporary camps.115 The government’s argument for detaining so many people was that it had to screen them to find suspected Tamil Tigers and around 11,000 people including 550 children were separated and placed in ‘rehabilitation’ centres.116 They have been held in incommunicado, without being given reasons for their arrest, or access to an independent judicial authority, legal counsel or family members.117 The UTHR(J) report Protecting Crime by Criminalising an Entire Populace provides a chilling account of the screening process.118 The evidence suggests that the government has gone to great lengths to prevent people reporting what happened in the final stages of the war, in order to avoid prosecution of war crimes. One of the main accusations is that the SLAF knowingly shelled civilians. The UTHR(J) report that people have been detained in horrific and intimidating conditions under the pretence of ‘screening’. People’s access to NGOs and foreigners has been limited to those who would not decry the conditions. Intimidation and maltreatment frightened people from reporting either the situation in the Vanni at the end of the war, or that of the camps. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was not allowed to evacuate the injured during the heaviest period of shelling, and they estimate that 400 people were left to die at Mullivaykkal Hospital on the East Coast. ‘The admission and removal of Vanni survivors from [Vavuniya Hospital] was done entirely by the Army and the doctors had no control over it. “Missing” from the wards had become so “normal” that the doctors dared not raise questions.119 Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), who were not allowed into the Vanni, treated hundreds of patients with shrapnel wounds. “On the 21st April, in just one 36-hour period, more than 400 patients were treated for life-threatening conditions in Vavuniya hospital. In total, from February to the end of June, almost 4,000 war wounded had major surgical interventions in this hospital”.’120 Lauren Cooney of MSF said: It’s really quite indescribable actually: the situation’s been quite overwhelming and for all of us – in fact many of us are very experienced in emergencies and it’s really, for us, some of the worst things


that we’ve seen really, to see this big movement of people and to see the level of distress that they feel.121 The UTHR(J) said that screening was not systematic: harassment was used to extort money, while senior LTTE members appear to have been allowed to leave; female LTTE-cadres were shipped out of the camps at night in ambulances and returned in the morning;122 families have been isolated and removed from their village groups to prevent them sharing stories; former LTTE-cadre, dressed in hoods, have been transported to camps and villages in white vans to identify people; medical officers have been sacked for speaking out and civil servants have been tortured and killed without investigation.123 The reality for many members of the LTTE fighting cadre is that they were conscripts; men, women and children forced into joining, even kidnapped. That they should be imprisoned without any legal recourse is a continuation by the Government of the abuse they suffered by the LTTE. Since winning the war, President Rajapakse has consolidated his power. Following the UPFA’s victory in the presidential elections, the candidate for the opposition, General Sarath Fonseka, was arrested and charged under military law for entering politics while in uniform.124 In the government formed since the April 2010 General Election, two of the President’s brothers continue in the cabinet, with Gotabaya as Minister of Defence, and Basil as Minister of Economic Development. Chamal Rajapaksa was the Minister for Ports and Aviation, and is now the Parliamentary Speaker. Press freedom has diminished significantly during Rajapakse’s presidency. The best-known case being the murder of Lasantha Wickremetunga, the editor of The Sunday Leader newspaper on 8 January 2009. Since the January 2010 presidential elections journalists have been arrested, harassed, assaulted and disappeared, the government has blocked news websites, and a Swiss journalist, Karin Wenger, was expelled after challenging the President on human rights.125 A glimmer of hope came in May 2010, when J. S. Tissainayagam, sentenced to 20 years of hard labour in August 2009 for criticising the government’s military campaign, received a pardoned. This was timed to mark the one-year anniversary of US President Barack Obama’s address on World Press Freedom Day, when he mentioned his case when talking of the ‘hundreds … each year who face intimidation, censorship, and arbitrary arrest – guilty of nothing more than a passion for truth and a tenacious belief that a free society depends on an informed citizenry’.126


The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a US$2.5 billion stand-by loan in July 2009.127 The UK and US had stalled the loan at the beginning of the year in an attempt to pressurise the government to stop hostilities rather than continue with its onslaught in the North.128 The loan was based on an agreement that the government would cut its budget deficit to 6 per cent in 2010 from 7 per cent in 2009. The deficit increased in 2009 to 9.7 per cent.129 This enlarged budget deficit is not surprising given that Rajapakse was unlikely to initiate any spending cuts until after the UPFA had secured the presidential and parliamentary elections. The government would need to cut fuel subsidies, and given the soaring levels of inflation, any further price rises would not help the Government’s election campaign. In February 2010 the EU decided to suspend its Generalised System of Preference (GSP130). The Commission has completed a thorough investigation into the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and in particular whether Sri Lanka is living up to the commitments it made to respect international human rights standards when it became a beneficiary of the European Union’s GSP+ trade incentive scheme which provides for additional trade bene-fits. The report comes to the conclusion that there are significant shortcomings in this area and that Sri Lanka is in breach of its GSP+ commitments.131 The government refused to participate in their investigation because it ‘had not accepted the process of GSP+ investigation and a request for experts to visit Sri Lanka as a matter of principle, as it was felt inappropriate and unnecessary and the Government was not willing to compromise on its sovereignty’.132 These trade benefits are worth around US$135 million.133 In the same month the IMF decided to delay the third payment on its US$2.6 billion loan due to the large deficit, waiting until the government had delivered its new budget.134 In April 2010 Iran agreed to loan US$105 million for a rural electrification project.135 Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, a lawyer and well-known activist from the CPA received a threat on 20 August 2009 that if the European Union ended the GSP he would be killed. CPA posted an advert defending their position, explaining that they did not want it suspended and had advocated that the government should meet the human-rights conventions to which they had agreed when signing the agreement with the EU.136 The Island posted its response in an


editorial entitled ‘Saving Dr Saravanamuttu’ justifying the position of those who made the threat, and illustrating the resentment of peace NGOs: What we gather from the advertisement in question is Dr. Saravanamuttu has come under threat from someone who wants the GSP Plus facility renewed. There are millions of people who need it including those in the garment industry and it is not possible to pin the blame on anyone. Even the British retailers have spoken in favour of extending Sri Lanka’s GSP Plus! As such, it may be argued that the best way to protect Dr. Saravanamuttu’s life is to prove beyond any doubt that he and his NGO are for the renewal of GSP Plus. Why should he risk his life for what he has not done?137 It continues: The advertisement says, ‘As reiterated by the CPA, its position is that GSP Plus benefits MUST be renewed, and that Sri Lanka should use the opportunity to also strengthen its human rights protection framework by complying with international and national law’. Unfortunately, in this country the NGO sector has lost its credibility because some of them have collaborated with the LTTE and carried out an anti-national campaign. Even the good NGOs and INGOs driven by altruism and are [sic] rendering yeoman service to mankind have come to be viewed with suspicion because of an errant few. Therefore, the CPA may not be able to convince the public not well disposed towards NGOs that it is for the renewal of GSP Plus with the help of a mere statement to that effect. Something more needs to be done.138 On the 14 March 2010 Lankan News Web139 reported that Saravanamuttu was at the top of a list compiled by Government intelligence units of activists ranked in order of their ‘level of decent’.140 In Mannar, after the war ended things slowly started picking up.141 The road opened along the coast from Puttalam to Mannar in January 2010 improving trade from Mannar. Fishermen were now able to trade, and trucks could use the coast road to transport fresh fish. By January 2010 most of the roads were open and people in the North could travel to any part of the country. People from Manthai West returned to find that most of their homes had only bricks remaining with no roofs. In Chinnavalayankadu all the houses had again been completely des-


troyed. When the war broke out, no further progress could continue with development work. The difficult issue is that some people don’t have access to the things they need to get started and it will be a long haul. The weakest people are not getting the support they need. The stronger are uplifting again quickly. Jaffna is booming. The Tamils from Colombo are returning to Jaffna and money is coming in from the Diaspora. In the North people have gone back to Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts on the west side of the A9 and are clearing their compounds; there is no major assistance yet for economic recovery. Temporary shelter and dry rations are provided by IOM142 and WFP143 respectively. They are fixing their houses with what is left behind. The fishing industry is picking up and people are getting a better price but a lack of boats/canoes and fishing gear is a major constraint. There are no fishing restrictions, except around government installations. In terms of health care, more is available, and education is building up and has reached acceptable levels in the North except in the newly resettling areas of the Vanni. Things are worse than they were in 2005, but the opportunities are greater. … There is no major immediate benefit from the end of the war, only that they can sleep in peace; only one set of guns to deal with. Recovery has been most noticeable among the middle classes, who are optimistic about the future. There shouldn’t be another armed conflict for another ten years or so even if the Tamil concerns are not addressed. Overall people are optimistic; they want to get on with their lives.144

Conclusion Sri Lankan politics propelled it along a course of war. The spoils of politics are so great it seems that the political parties will do anything to win. In terms of votes cast, had the Tamils been allowed to vote freely, it is likely that the UNP would have won the elections in 2004 and 2005. In order to form a government, the SLFP had to form a coalition with hardliners bent on a military defeat of the LTTE. Karuna’s departure from the LTTE, and his collusion with the government undermined efforts to restart peace negotiations. The causes of this conflict are political. The outcome of the Sri Lankan political system and the practices of the state are cronyism and corruption,


limited press freedom, and economic instability. Without political reform, this is a state destined for ongoing insecurity. The impotency of the international community in the face of the return to war was marked. Their condemnation of increasing levels of violence was muted, and criticism of human rights appeared hypocritical given the US and UK involvement in extraordinary rendition, torture and detention of terror suspects. The position of the donor states in favour of a negotiated settlement was greatly undermined by a number of EU states continuing to sell weapons to the Government. When the CoChairs eventually began to reduce their financial support, China stepped in. The money and effort spent on the rehabilitation and recovery of the North and East during the peace process did not link in any way to either elite-level negotiations or the political structures of the government or LTTE. The beneficiaries of these activities, the people of the North and East have been terrorised by both the LTTE and the Government.

6 Building Peace or Buying Time?

Recurrent violent conflict undermines the human development of millions: what takes decades to build, can take seconds to destroy. The challenge is to find an effective way of engaging with states to assist in the transition from war to peace. This is the main problem that this book has addressed. It has investigated the post-Cold War policy of peacebuilding where international donors assist war-affected states to rebuild and develop in such a way that war will not recur. While helping other states in this transition is morally the right thing to do, there is now a sense among donors, particularly since 9/11, that the instability created by protracted civil wars poses a real threat to their own. In Sri Lanka, during the Norwegian-negotiated ceasefire, peacebuilding was the overarching policy approach adopted by the main donor organisations. The peace process was unusual because the donors took a prominent role, prioritising economic recovery issues in the hope that a peace dividend would encourage widespread support for a negotiated settlement. The aim of this book has been to make a genuine contribution to the literature on peace and the ending of civil wars using primary fieldbased research to focus on a novel aspect of peacemaking: the prioritisation of economic recovery during a peace process. The lessons from the Sri Lankan case are relevant to other societies emerging from protracted conflict. The conclusions of this book are organised around the debates identified in the book. The first is the challenge of clarifying the conceptually vague term ‘peacebuilding’, and the question of whether it should take place before, during or after peacemaking. The second is the question of the kind of peace we are trying to build, is it a ‘liberal’ peace or something else? The third theme is concerned with the overall transformative goal of peacebuilding and the limited results that such 159


programmes have. The book ends by reflecting on the issues raised in the introduction: the effect of the prioritisation of economic recovery on the survival of the peace process; the ability of the peace process to deal with typical problems of disillusionment and exclusion; its ability to address the underlying causes of the conflict; the role of the stakeholders in the process; and whether the prioritisation of development strategies as an integral part of a peace processes can act as an exemplar to other societies emerging from ethnonational violence.

Peacebuilding in theory Peacebuilding is an established approach to assisting states in the transition from war to peace. There are two types of peacebuilding, and this has caused confusion. The peacebuilding of the major donors, for example the United Nations (UN), and the European Union, advocates macro-level structural change; activities that might transform the root causes of a conflict in support of establishing positive peace. Peacebuilding is then an overarching approach, which translates into a broad array of activities, dealing with issues of security, reconciliation, political reform, reconstruction and development. These activities are usually set out in the terms of a peace agreement. Although there are many programmes that involve type-one peacebuilding, it is unusual for them to be referred to as peacebuilding. Projects in which peacebuilding is in the title tend to be type-two peacebuilding, where the aim is to reconcile communities and build bridges between opposing groups. This book is concerned with type-one, structural peacebuilding, the type that relates to the transformation of the structural causes of a conflict toward peace. Peacebuilding is similar to other transformative projects that have taken place since World War II. The Marshall Plan set out to transform post-war Europe and ‘create a stable productive Europe, whose economic and security needs would be tied together by market forces and liberalized trade, and guided by strong supranational organizations’.1 Development aid has been used to promote economic growth in poor states by encouraging them to rationalise their political and economic institutions along similar lines to those in the West.2 The Cold War-era nation-building projects ‘imposed domestic institutions’ on 11 sovereign states.3 Generally these transformative projects have had little success. Where they have tended to work is in states where there are pre-existing and fairly well-developed public administrative systems. Initially, peacebuilding, like development, was justified on the grounds that it is morally the right thing to do; now overseas development, post-war reconstruction

Building Peace or Buying Time? 161

and peacebuilding are part of national security. This is part of a wider trend in the discourse where development aid has become securitised.4

Peacebuilding in practice Sri Lankan peacebuilding requires a broad-based reform process, starting with the political system. Populist politics, discrimination and cronyism have created gross inequality and structural poverty. Amendments have been made to the constitution on language and employment, but they have never been properly applied. Given the years of ethnic conflict an enormous effort is needed to increase cohesion between the ethnic communities and encourage reconciliation. Over the years a number of proposals were put together that met many of concerns of the Tamils, but the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) took a maximalist view, seeking total control over Tamils in the North and East. Now that they have been defeated, we have to ask what would motivate the government to share power and protect minorities? The UN considers the following list as peacebuilding activities: ‘disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring of elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation’;5 but the only activity that the UN carried out in Sri Lanka was the return of refugees. The World Bank sees its role in transition as ‘strengthening government institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organizations of civil society to work effectively, ‘repair[ing] physical infrastructure’, ‘rebuild[ing]… key social infrastructure’ i.e. schools and hospitals, resettlement of refugees, demobilisation of combatants, the clearing of unexploded ordinance (UXOs), and ‘normaliz[ing] financial borrowing arrangements’.6 Again the World Bank was only engaged in activities that supported reconstruction and return, those aspects such as strengthening government institutions and restoring law and order were avoided. The donor-funded activities that took place before during and after the Norwegian-brokered ceasefire were not peacebuilding. The limitations on peacebuilding resulting from the lack of a peace agreement were the main impetus for prioritising economic recovery. The donors were relying on a peace dividend created by the redevelopment in the North and East and development in the South to ‘promote’ the peace process. This would then encourage continued negotiation, which might have then led to a comprehensive peace agreement. This approach was


reinforced by the pledge of US$4.5 billion by the donors at Tokyo and the ‘Tokyo Declaration’ linking these funds to continued progress in the peace process.7 After the peace talks stalled in 2003, the commitment and ‘Declaration’ did not provide adequate incentive to encourage the parties of the LTTE and the GoSL to resume negotiations. The Co-Chairs were unable to embark on peacebuilding activities because they were not invited by the government to do so. A state will not willingly give up any of its sovereignty to an outside body. The situation in Sri Lanka makes it clear, without a signed peace agreement and when there is a functioning, democratically elected state, it is unlikely that external agents will be permitted to engage in peacebuilding activities.

What kind of peace? The peacebuilding programmes of the major multilateral organisations coalesce around the idea of a ‘liberal peace’ model, and what Oliver Richmond calls the ‘peacebuilding consensus’.8 A ‘liberal’ peace is one founded on ‘democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and global markets and neoliberal development’.9 As a result one of the main objectives of an externally supported peace operation is to hold elections and this is problematic. The risks attached to the pursuit of peace through the establishment of democratic practices are that they confer legitimacy on a regime. A democratically elected government can use its popular mandate to treat any challenges to its authority by activists, opposition or minorities as threats to its sovereignty. In the absence of the rule of law or respect for human rights, the sovereign state has the authority to use force with none of the checks and balances that would prevent oppression, suppression and possible violent civil unrest. Democracy is one way of deciding who will govern; it is not a panacea for a peaceful society. Sri Lanka demonstrates the way in which democracy and liberal economic policy increase the likelihood for war. Sri Lanka held its first democratic elections in 1948, and began the process of liberalising its economy in 1977. The ethnic conflict began in July 1983. Antagonism between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils was institutionalised in a democratic process that guaranteed Sinhalese political domination. The republican constitution and proportional representation allowed for an excessively powerful presidential executive and proportional representation that sees mainstream parties courting extremists in order to win power. The result is that, more than half a century later, even though Tamils in the North and East were prevented from participating freely in the 2004 general election, the European Union Election Observer Commission endorsed the outcome


because they were not ‘a critical factor in determining who formed the government’.10 Regular elections, universal franchise, a liberalised economy and the ratification of all key human-rights conventions11 have created the structures of war. Democracy has validated a corrupt and nationalistic regime. Economic liberalisation has allowed the elite to take advantage of a loosely regulated economy and accrue enormous wealth and power. Given that the external enforcement of human-rights conventions ‘tends to be minimal or nonexistent’,12 it has to be enforced internally by members of its civil society. The members of Sri Lankan civil society who challenge the state on its human rights are threatened and murdered with impunity. There’s the rub: most peacebuilding programmes start by establishing a level of security that allows elections to be held in a free and fair way. Once the elections have taken place, a legitimate democratically elected government is in place to take on the task of running the post-conflict state. What if it uses its popular mandate to discriminate against its detractors, and reward its friends? There is now a structure in place that can enshrine the conditions of civil unrest. Sri Lankan rulers have cherry-picked some of the structures of a ‘liberal’ peace to mask a distinctly illiberal state.

The challenges of transforming a state The objective of external engagement in the Sri Lankan conflict was to assist in the transition from war to peace, or peacebuilding. This project is not dissimilar to other transformative projects such as ‘modernisation’, ‘development’ and ‘nation-building’, all well known for their disappointing results. Given that Sri Lanka already had most of the structures commonly associated with a liberal peace, this project reached an impasse before it had begun. A democratically elected government with the legitimate use of force was being asked to negotiate with a proscribed terrorist organisation to decide how the existing structures, which serve the Government well, should be reformed. Given the inherent imbalance between the two the role taken by the international community, in the guise of Norway and the Co-Chairs, was to maintain diplomatic pressure and provide an economic incentive to keep this process on track, taking the view that a negotiated settlement was better than the alterative, and military victory or defeat. There are a number of reasons why the Co-Chairs did not get the outcome they wanted. The first was the decision to prioritise economic


recovery. The Sri Lankan economy did grow throughout the ceasefire period, but the lack of any political or economic reform meant that the benefits of that growth were not widespread. Voters in the South did not experience the promised peace dividend, and lost confidence in the peace process, while those who did in the North could not vote and had no influence upon its continuation. Having decided that the promise of large amounts of aid would provide an incentive for the two sides to continue negotiations, the Co-Chairs between them raised US$4.5 billion. The sum raised was inflated and based on a combination of new funds as well as funds that had already been committed for ongoing development projects. If the Co-Chairs were convinced that US$4.5 billion was the price of peace, perhaps the whole amount should have been raised. This undermined the group’s leverage. The Tokyo Declaration tied aid disbursement to progress in the peace process. The Co-Chairs were now caught in a paradoxical situation where financial aid was seen as a way of encouraging popular support for the peace process, but as it floundered they were now obliged to withhold that support. With no mechanism to stop aid, it continued despite increased levels of violence, making the Co-Chairs look weak. When aid was diminished, this reduced the effect of any potential peace dividend, further reinforcing the view in the South that there was little to be gained from negotiations. Having come to power on the promise of defeating the LTTE, the Government became frustrated with the Co-Chairs. At this point China was willing to provide aid and weapons, and encouraged Pakistan to help the Sri Lankan Government. Not wanting to allow China too much influence over its neighbour, India also supported Sri Lanka. China and India’s involvement in the conflict provides a relatively unknown dimension as to how states assist in the transition from war to peace. Where western donors publicise their aid commitments through the Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD), China’s aid is a state secret. We need to ask whether China, who already has an established development role in post-conflict states in Africa,13 holds the same views on peacebuilding and ‘liberal peace’. We of course know the answer, given China’s willingness to provide military aid to Sri Lanka, and its decisive role in the Government’s victory over the LTTE. And we also need to question some of the Co-Chairs views on this, given their willingness to sell weapons to Sri Lanka during the last three years of the war. There are two ways that external agents can attempt to transform a state. One is through coercion; through the use of force: the agent invades the country, takes over the public administration and remodels


it. This is akin to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The second is to bribe the state, offering an economic incentive to those in power to change their public administration and reward that change with cash and loans. The approach taken in Sri Lanka was to try and bribe the state to negotiate with the LTTE and reform the machinery of state so that it protects minorities from majority excess. There are a few lessons to be learned. Firstly if, as the adage goes, ‘everyone has their price’, and if that price was US$4.5 billion, then perhaps including ongoing development funding with new funds was a mistake. Secondly, having decided to take this approach there then needed to be a mechanism in place that allowed the donors to reward the parties for progress and penalise them for failure. The Co-Chairs were able to reward but not to penalise. Thirdly, they needed to agree on what they meant by progress. In this case, when the peace process stalled, aid could not be withheld. As the security situation deteriorated, the Co-Chairs challenged the Government on its human-rights record, the Government responded with the discourse used to support the ‘war on terror’. Finally, some of the Co-Chairs disregarded the main principle that the parties to the conflict should negotiate a settlement, and were willing to sell weapons to the government. Broadly speaking, if donors are to work together on promoting the peaceful resolution of armed conflict, then a joint mechanism is required for delivering aid as well as some kind of agreement regarding the treatment of suspected terrorists and the sale of weapons. The Sri Lankan case illustrates the way in which sovereignty and human rights continue to be problematic under international law. The resolution of the UN Human Rights Council’s eleventh session S-11/1 on assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human rights, begins by reaffirming the principles ‘of non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States’ and ‘respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Sri Lanka and its sovereign rights to protect its citizens and to combat terrorism’.14 It congratulates the state, ‘Welcoming the liberation by the Government of Sri Lanka of tens of thousands of its citizens that were kept by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against their will as hostages, as well as the efforts by the Government to ensure the safety and security of all Sri Lankans and to bring permanent peace to the country’.15 It then ‘Acknowledges the commitment of the Government of Sri Lanka to provide access as may be appropriate to international humanitarian agencies’.16 This UN resolution endorses the military victory of the Government over the LTTE, yet it was established ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.17 The state’s ‘sovereign rights to protect


its citizens and to combat terrorism’ resulted in thousands of deaths and mass displacement, yet the state does not need to allow full access to international humanitarian agencies. The UN member states that endorsed this resolution have effectively reduced the evidence available for any future investigation into war crimes, by sanctioning the state’s right to limit access to the affected population. As incongruous as it sounds, the UN Human Rights Council is being used to block the protection of human rights. Given the rise of China, India, and Iran as rival donors for states at war, and the manner in which the institutions of the UN are being used to prevent investigation of war crimes and human-rights violations, the burden of encouraging peace through negotiation sits all the more heavily on coalitions like the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference. In the future, will we see more states adopting the Sri Lankan model; seeking non-traditional donors as a way to insulate themselves from the scrutiny of western donor states?

The prioritisation of economic recovery The 2002–2006 Sri Lankan ceasefire provided a unique opportunity to explore the possibility of driving peace through economic recovery. There are some important lessons that can be learned from this failed peace process. What was the impact of incorporating economic recovery strategies on the survival of peace process? By promising economic recovery expectations were raised in the South of a peace dividend and improved living conditions. This could not be achieved overnight, and the austerity measures adopted in the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy meant that in real terms the voters in the South were worse off after the ceasefire than they were before. The power enshrined in the Presidential Executive, allowed Mrs Kumaratunga to dissolve parliament after the UNP had served only two years in office. The lack of a peace dividend increased support for the opposition, undermining the UNP’s chance of winning the election. The SLFP, having been so critical of the Norwegian-led peace process, could not then restart negotiations with the LTTE. This brings us to the second issue: was the peace processes able to deal with the typical problems of disillusionment and exclusion? The very purpose of prioritising economic recovery was an attempt to respond to these very problems. The failure of the UNP to deliver a ‘New Economic Future’ inevitably led to disillusionment. With a tradition of animosity between the UNP and SLFP, particularly between Wickremesinghe and Kumaratunga, the SLFP were quick to capitalise on any frustration felt by


voters. The track-one peace negotiations were so exclusive that even the President claimed to be uninformed. Little was done to reconcile the North with the South, the elite-level peace negotiations stalled before any of the contentious issues were raised, and the peace dividend failed to materialise. Despite early recognition that this peace process would have to deal with these typical problems, it addressed neither. Ultimately the incorporation of economic recovery strategies destabilised this peace process. Did the peace process manage to address the underlying causes of the conflict? The peace process did not come anywhere near to addressing the causes of the conflict. The peace talks did not even reach the ‘core issues’, and the bulk of programme funding was spent on recovery projects in the North and East, and not on anything that related to governance or the rule of law. Any consensus established during the talks centred on the importance of economic recovery. There never seemed to be any recognition that economic issues resulted from political problems and not the other way round. The prominence of international development actors did not prove an advantage in this peace process. Without a strong UN mandate, or any external commitment to guarantee security the Tokyo Declaration was the strongest position taken by the international community toward ending the civil war. Their inability to translate the Declaration into anything meaningful would indicate that at this time pro-development constituencies are not in a position to take a lead role in peacemaking; more is required from peacemakers than an insubstantial commitment to conditional aid. A short discussion paper co-authored by Peter Harrold, the former World Bank Country Director for Sri Lanka, noted in 2006 that ‘The application of peace conditionalities was a new development but did not have the desired outcomes mainly because of an inflated view of the importance of aid’.18 If development partners are to work more effectively in or on conflict they must develop a more realistic assessment of their role and impacts. By attempting to stand on the same ground as the diplomats, aid agencies have not been playing to their comparative advantages.19 It is evident that the Sri Lankan approach of making the prioritisation of development strategies an integral part of the peace process does not provide us with an exemplar to other societies emerging from ethnonational violence. The economic woes of a state that has or continues to experience ethnonational violence are entwined with the political


and societal manifestations of that conflict. The Sri Lankan case suggests that the prioritisation of development strategies does not provide a shortcut to peace. This book strengthens the view that peacebuilding needs to take a holistic view. Western donors are now competing in an open market where recipients are shopping for the best aid package. With growing populations and energy needs, competition for resources is increasing between fully industrialised and emerging economies. It may be that after so many years of hand-wringing among donors and NGOs over best practice and how to prevent recurring violent conflict, aid is quickly reverting to its Cold War function as a tool for consensus building among economic blocs. International relations that guarantee a ready supply of primary commodities may be more important than good intentions and concern for human rights. How do states make the transition from war to peace? Perhaps we need to ask China.

Notes

Introduction: Peacebuilding and War 1 See for example R. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); D. Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building (London: Pluto Press, 2006); M. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War (London: Polity, 2007); and Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001); R. Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); R. Mac Ginty and O. Richmond (eds) ‘Myth or reality: The liberal peace and post-conflict reconstruction’, Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2007) pp. 491–497. 2 R. Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace: Chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 418 (2006) pp. 27–49; M. Moran, and M. Pitcher, ‘The “basket case” and the “poster child”: Explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004) pp. 501–519; I. Maoz, ‘Peace building in violent conflict: Israeli-Palestinian post-Oslo people-to-people activities’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2004) pp. 563–574. 3 South Asian Intelligence Review, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/ shrilanka/database/annual_casualties.htm, date accessed 8 March 2010. 4 See for example: H. Jeong (ed.) Approaches to Peacebuilding (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) pp. 171–196; E. Cousens and C. Kumar (eds) Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); J. Goodhand and D. Hulme, ‘From wars to complex political emergencies: Understanding conflict and peace-building in the new world disorder’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1999) pp. 13–26; J. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington D.C.: United States Institution of Peace Press, 1995); K. Kumar (ed.) Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997); and C. Crocker and F. Hampson, ‘Making peace settlements work’, Foreign Policy, No. 104 (1996), pp. 54–71. 5 W. Knight, ‘Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2003) p. 260. 6 The recurrent cycles of civil conflict and war-induced famine in the Horn of Africa during the 1980s highlighted the inadequacy of the typical international response to humanitarian disasters. See in particular J. Macrae and A. Zwi (eds) War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books in association with Save the Children (UK), 1994) pp. 111–124. 7 L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen, ‘Armed conflicts, 1946–2008’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46, No. 4 (2009) p. 577. 169

170 Notes 8 J. Darby, ‘Borrowing and lending in peace processes’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds) Contemporary Peacemaking (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp. 245–255. 9 B. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); O. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) pp. 85–124; R. Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997) pp. 54–89. 10 M. Sollenberg and P. Wallensteen, ‘Armed conflict 1989–2000’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2001) pp. 629–644. 11 S. Stedman, ‘Introduction’, in S. Stedman, D. Rothchild and E. Cousens (eds) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002) pp. 1–40. 12 J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty, ‘Introduction: What peace? What process?’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds) op. cit., pp. 3–5. 13 Ibid., p. 5. 14 D. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (London: Pluto, 1999). 15 C. Arnson (ed.) Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds) The Management of Peace Processes (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000); J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds), op. cit. 16 F. Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington DC: USIP Press, 1996). See also B. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 17 C. Crocker, F. Hampson and P. Aall (eds) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington DC: USIP Press, 1999). 18 S. Stedman, ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997) pp. 5–53; P. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002). 19 R. Poulton and I. Youssouf, A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1998). 20 P. Collier, ‘The political economy of ethnicity’, paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington DC, 1998); P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, ‘Greed, and grievance in civil war’, World Bank Research Paper (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001); P. Collier, The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press and World Bank, 2003). 21 S. Forman and S. Patrick, Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); S. Woodward, ‘Economic priorities for successful peace implementation’, in S. Stedman, D. Rothchild and E. Cousens (eds) op. cit., pp. 183–214. 22 UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) (United Nations Development Programme) UNDP and (World Health Organisation) WHO are all active in Sri Lanka. 23 ‘Preface from the Prime Minister’, in Government of Sri Lanka, ‘Regaining Sri Lanka: Vision and strategy for accelerated development’ (December 2002) (page not numbered).

Notes 171 24 CHA, ‘Building the foundation for peace and economic growth: Setting national priorities’ (Colombo: CHA, 2003), p. 2. Paper prepared for the Tokyo Donor Conference 2003. 25 Tokyo Donor Conference, ‘Tokyo declaration on reconstruction and development’, 10 June 2003. 26 BBC News, ‘Analysis: Politics and the tsunami’, 21 December 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4548832.stm, date accessed 6 November 2005. 27 BBC News, ‘Rebel targets “hit” in Sri Lanka’, 1 November 2006. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/6104970.stm, date accessed 7 November 2006. 28 C. Call and S. Cook, ‘On democratization and peacebuilding’, Global Governance, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003) p. 241. 29 Call and Cook cite J. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: US. Institute of Peace, 1997) and L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz (eds) Peacebuilding: A Field Guide (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 30 C. Call and E. Cook, op. cit., p. 241. 31 R. Mac Ginty and J. Darby, ‘Introduction’, in R. Mac Ginty and J. Darby (eds) The Management of Peace Processes (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000) p. 12. 32 R. Yin, op. cit., p. xiii. 33 S. Stedman, D. Rothschild and E. Cousens (eds) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 34 R. Mac Ginty and J. Darby (eds) op. cit., 2000, p. 10. 35 F. Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington DC: USIPP, 1996). 36 R. Paris, op. cit., 2004. 37 C. Orjuela, ‘Building peace in Sri Lanka: A role for civil society?’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2003) pp. 195–212. 38 The following authors have undertaken substantial quantitative research into post-World War II conflicts: M. Doyle and N. Sambanis, ‘International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2000) pp. 779–801; M. Marshall and T. Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, SelfDetermination Movements and Democracy (Maryland: CIDCM, 2003); R. Licklider, ‘The consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1994–1994’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (1995) pp. 681–690. 39 B. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002) p. 16. 40 R. Mac Ginty, R. Wilford, L. Dowds and G. Robinson, ‘Consenting adults: The principle of consent and Northern Ireland’s constitutional future’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2001) p. 484. 41 Take for example in June 2007 Daily News (Colombo) reported that ‘Five LTTE cadres were killed and several others injured in a confrontation with the Security Forces in Narakamulla, Thoppigala’, and ‘Three soldiers suffered minor injuries and were admitted to Maha Oya hospital’. Daily News

172 Notes

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44

45

46

47 48

49 50

(Colombo), ‘Five terrorists killed, weapons recovered’, 8 June 2007. Tamilnet, the only broadcaster reporting from the North and East, and therefore heavily censored by the LTTE, reported on the same story that ‘11 Sri Lankan troopers were airlifted to Polonnaruwa hospital, 2 more were being sent from Batticaloa and another two admitted at Maha Oya hospital’ with no mention of any LTTE fatalities. Tamilnet, ‘Stiff resistance to SLA assault in Batticaloa, 16 troopers wounded’, 8 June 2007. http://www.tamilnet. com/art.html?catid=13&artid=22415, date accessed 14 June 2007. M. Smyth, ‘Introduction’, in M. Smyth and G. Robinson (eds) Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues (London: Pluto Press, 2001) p. 9. See P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, op. cit., 2001 and P. Collier, ‘Doing well out of war’, in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) pp. 91–112. See K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). Nafziger and Auvinen used different data sets and drew different conclusions to Collier. E. Nafziger and J. Auvinen, Economic Development, Inequality and War: Humanitarian Emergencies in Developing Countries (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003). Elizabeth Picard’s research on Lebanon finds that causes of the war cannot be explained solely through economic predation: ‘Though economic analysis and rational choice theory throw new light on a conflict too often described as a “war of cultures”, these approaches do not diminish the importance of the war’s subjective dimensions of creed, such as identity, faith and group solidarity’. E. Picard, ‘Trafficking, rents, and diaspora in the Lebanese war’, in C. Arnson and I. Zartman (eds) Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005) pp. 23–51. Hoinville and Jowell estimated in 1977 that in order to survey 1,000 people in the UK it takes at least six months, and this included using 20 interviewers to carry out the survey. G. Hoinville and R. Jowell, Survey Research Practice (London: Gower, 1977) cited in C. Robson, Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) p. 122. During the initial study period in 2001, access to the ‘uncleared’ areas was denied to foreigners unless they were undertaking humanitarian work. It was unusual for local humanitarian staff to be granted access, as it was possible that they might assist the LTTE. The author was not granted access to this area. In 2006 access to the Vanni was denied to all foreigners and remains at the time of writing 2010. The Situation Report for 31 January 2001 population information is taken from the report produced by the Vavuniya District Government Office. M. Orkin, ‘The politics and problematics of survey research: Political attitudes during the transition to democracy in South Africa’, American Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1998) pp. 201–222 cited in R. Mac Ginty et al., op. cit., p. 483. Ibid., p. 483. They also cite problems of timing, ‘the level of cognitive burden’, survey respondents appearing more moderate to pollsters. C. Robson, op. cit., p. 148.

Notes 173 51 See for example: BBC News, ‘Sri Lanka monitors hit by blast’, 14 January 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4612972.stm, date accessed 16 January 2006). On 17 June 2006 in Pesalai, a few miles outside of Mannar Town, which I visited on a number of occasions in 2005, a group of men killed one woman and injured 47 others who were taking refuge in the church. They then went to the beach where they lined up and shot four fishermen in the mouth, they killed another and burned his remains in a fishing boat. They injured another man who escaped. They also burned the fishing boats. This followed a clash between the LTTE Sea Tigers and the Sri Lankan Navy that morning in waters just off Pesalai. Centre for Policy Alternatives, ‘Fact finding mission to Pesalai – 28th June 2006’, 28 June 2006. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ AMMF-6RDDZA?OpenDocument (12 September 2006). 52 B. Gillham, Case Study Research Methods (London: Continuum, 2000) p. 6. 53 H. Nast, ‘Opening remarks on “Women in the Field”’, Professional Geographer, Vol. 46 (1994) pp. 54–66. 54 M. Smyth and J. Darby, ‘Does research make any difference? The case of Northern Ireland’, in M. Smyth and G. Robinson (eds) op. cit., pp. 34–54. 55 R. Scheyvens, B. Nowak and H. Scheyvens, ‘Ethical issues’, in R. Scheyvens and D. Storey, Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide (London: Sage Publications, 2003) p. 149. 56 M. Gilkes had a similar experience researching in Vietnam. As a female, white, and British, she was seen as a ‘researcher whose research was perceived as a means to “international” money for female survivors of the conflict – despite numerous, and repeated explanations that [she] was only a student’. M. Gilkes, ‘Travelling light?’, in H. Brown, M. Gilkes and A. Kaloski-Naylor, White? Women: Critical Perspectives on Race and Gender (York: Raw Nerve Books, 1999) p. 86. See also B. Temple, ‘Watch your tongue: Issues in translation and cross-cultural research’, Sociology, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1997) pp. 607–618. 57 S. Devreaux and J. Hoddinott, ‘The context of fieldwork’, in S. Devreaux and J. Hoddinott (eds) Fieldwork in Developing Countries (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) p. 18 cited ibid., p. 151. 58 Pers. comm., Mannar, 9 May 2005. 59 R. Scheyvens et al., op. cit., p. 151. 60 B. Temple, op. cit. (1997) pp. 607–618; B. Temple and R. Edwards, ‘Interpreters/translators and cross-language research: Reflexivity and border crossings’, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2002) Article 1. http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/1_2Final/html/temple. html, date accessed 24 April 2010. 61 Ibid., p. 609. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 ‘Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, aid as a share of donor countries’ wealth remained stable at around half the UN’s target of 0.7%. Since then, however, the proportion has declined, reaching an all time low of 0.22% of gross national income (GNI) in 2000. … this represents a decline in real terms between 1992 and 2000 of some US$8 bn, or around 12%.’ J. Randel and T. German, ‘Trends in the financing of humanitarian assistance’, in J. Macrae,

174 Notes The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action, HPG Report (ODI, 2002) p. 19. It should be noted that while Western donors may have been reducing their ODA, there were other sources such as Saudi Arabia and Iran which compensated. The title of M. Smyth and G. Robinson’s book, op. cit. Ibid., p. 4. S. Barakat, M. Chard, T. Jacoby and W. Lume, ‘The composite approach: Research in the context of war and armed conflict’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2002) pp. 992–994. Ibid., p. 993. See M. Israel and I. Hay, Research Ethics for Social Scientists: Between Ethical Conduct and Regulatory Compliance (London: Sage Publications, 2006); I. Gregory, Ethics in Research (London: Continuum, 2003); and T. Beauchamp, R. Faden, R. Wallace and L. Walters (eds) Ethical Issues in Social Science Research (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982) pp. 101–124. D. Warwick, ‘Types of harm in social research’, in T. Beauchamp, R. Faden, R. Wallace and L. Walters (eds) op. cit., pp. 101–124. In March 2005 the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) demanded that the World Bank withdraw a statement made by Peter Harrold, the Country Representative of the World Bank in Sri Lanka, in an article published in the Sunday Times (Colombo) which they believed undermined the sovereignty of the country; if the statement was not, they recommended that he should be removed. The Daily News reported that there were ‘posters on the walls of Colombo and the suburbs calling for Peter Harrold’s expulsion from Sri Lanka’. Daily News, ‘Harrold gets a mauling in our arena’, 12 March 2005. D. Warwick, op. cit., p. 118. Ibid., pp. 119–120. Scheyvens et al. highlight this issue. R. Scheyvens et al., op. cit., p. 114.

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5 6

Peacebuilding and Economic Recovery

A peace won through military victory, where the victor exercises its power over the vanquished. ‘Peace’ ‘… freedom from war: cessation of war’. G. Davidson, M. Seaton and J. Simpson (eds) Chambers Concise Dictionary (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Limited, 1990) p. 716. J. Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage, 1996). For a discussion of this see H. Miall, O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) pp. 43–44. O. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) pp. 23–24. M. Pugh, The Challenge of Peacebuilding: The Disaster Relief Model (Plymouth: International Papers, University of Plymouth, 2001) p. 2. See also J. Cockell, ‘Peacebuilding and human security: Frameworks for international responses

Notes 175

7

8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21

22

to internal conflict’, in P. Wallensteen, Preventing Violent Conflicts (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1998 Report No. 48). The following authors all hold this view: W. Andy Knight, ‘Evaluating recent trends in peacebuilding research’, International Relations of the AsianPacific, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003) pp. 241–266; P. White and L. Cliffe, ‘Matching response to context in complex political emergencies: “Relief”, “development”, “peace-building” or something in-between?’, Disasters, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2000) pp. 314–342; and C. David, ‘Does peacebuilding build peace? Liberal (mis)steps in the peace process’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1999) pp. 25–41. C. Call and E. Cook, ‘On democratization and peacebuilding’, Global Governance, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), pp. 235–236. C. Soanes and A. Stevenson (eds) Concise Oxford English Dictionary (eleventh edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 1052–1053. S. Peou, International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding: Cambodia and Beyond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) p. 1. J. Galtung, ‘Three approaches to peace: Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding’, in J. Galtung and C. Ejlers, Peace War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research (Oslo: IPRI, 1975) pp. 282–304. Ibid., p. 236. J. Galtung, in H. Miall et al., op. cit., p. 187. S. Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (second edition) (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995) p. 129. This is a theory that hostility between groups can be overcome through ‘getting the groups to engage in cooperative acts for common ends which they would not obtain on their own’. Ibid., p. 138. Ibid., p. 151. J. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington D.C.: USIPP, 1997) p. 20. B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: With the New Supplement and Related UN Documents (New York: United Nations, 1995) p. 11. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid. For example UN peacekeepers take responsibility for ‘disarmament’ and ‘restoration of order’, while the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has responsibility for repatriation of refugees. E. Cousens, ‘Introduction’, in E. Cousens and C. Kumar (eds) Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) pp. 5–8. The UN’s budget for 2008–2009 was approximately US$4.2 billion. The amount available for peacebuilding is unclear as many UN activities could be described as such. The Department of Political Affairs has a subprogramme on prevention, control and resolution of conflicts with a budget of $25,471,900 (around 19 per cent of the total annual budget) which ‘will promote more effective and cohesive action to help prevent, control and resolve conflicts and to address post-conflict peacebuilding challenges’. UN General Assembly, ‘Presenting $4.2 Billion Budget for 2008–2009 to Assembly’s Fifth Committee’, http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2007/gaab3818.doc.htm, date accessed 2 December 2006.

176 Notes 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33

34 35

36 37

38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45

UN Peacebuilding Commission, ‘Questions and answers on the UN peacebuilding commission’, http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/questions. htm, date accessed 2 November 2006. R. Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997) p. 54. Miall et al., op. cit., p. 22. World Bank, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1998) p. 4. Ibid., pp. 4–5. Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 3. Marjorie Lister, The European Union and the South (London: Routledge, 1997) p. 1 argues that ‘Europe has developed a complex web of external relations but no common foreign policy’. She points out (in 2000, before expansion) that ‘the EU operates an aid programme which overlaps with those of its member states. The member states subscribe to common development objectives in the Treaty of Maastricht, but not to a common competence to execute them. EU aid is thus a sixteenth aid programme, supplementing or complementing those of the fifteen EU member states.’ Ibid., p. 128. Commission of the European Communities, Humanitarian Aid from the European Community Annual Report 1992 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1993) p. 5. J. Sanahuja, The Dilemma of the European Union’s Development Policies (Madrid: Peace Research Center, 2004) p. 3. See also M. Lister, op. cit., pp. 125–129. UN, ‘Support to peacebuilding: Examples of EU action’ (UN: Brussels, 2005), http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5015_en.htm, date accessed 12 September 2007. J. Sanajuya, op. cit., p. 7. European Union, Working for Peace, Security and Stability – European Union in the World (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union, 2005) pp. 6–7. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 9. O. Richmond, op. cit., pp. 85–124. See M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001); R. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); R. Mac Ginty, No Peace, No War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) pp. 33–57, and O. Richmond, op. cit. All identify significant shortcomings with the blanket application of liberal peace to post-war scenarios. B. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 11. UN General Assembly Resolution 60/180, 2005. World Bank, op. cit., p. 8. M. Pugh, ‘Conceptualising peacebuilding: Human security and sustainable peace’, in M. Pugh, Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 2000) pp. 18–19.

Notes 177 46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54 55

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57 58 59 60 61 62 63

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65 66

B. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002). Ibid., p. 4. B. Reilly, ‘Democratic validation’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty, Contemporary Peacemaking (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p. 174. M. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and world politics’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 3 (1986) pp. 1151–1169. A. Prezeworski, M. Alvarez, J. Cheibub and F. Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in the World, 1950–1991, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 14–17. European Union, Working for Peace, Security and Stability – European Union in the World, op. cit., pp. 6–7. World Bank, Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank, op. cit., p. 4. B. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 11. B. Reilly, op. cit. (2003) p. 175. R. Paris, op. cit. (2004) p. 44 cites H. Hegre, T. Ellingsen, S. Gates and N. Gleditsch, ‘Towards a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change and civil war, 1816–1992’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1 (2001) pp. 33–48. J. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc, 2000) p. 16. See also D. Horowitz, ‘Democracy in divided societies’, in L. Diamond and F. Platter (eds) Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 35–55. Ibid., p. 32. B. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 1. Ibid., p. 4. E. Cousens and C. Kumar, op. cit., p. 12. O. Richmond and J. Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) p. 4. T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970). P. Collier, The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press and World Bank, 2003); P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2001); P. Collier ‘Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy’, in C. Crocker, F. Hampson and P. Aall (eds) Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2001) pp. 143–162; and P. Collier, ‘Doing well out of war’, in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) pp. 91–112. D. Smith, ‘Dynamics of contemporary conflict: Consequences for development strategies’, in N. Græger and D. Smith (eds) Environment, Poverty, Conflict, PRIO Report, no. 2/94 (Oslo: PRIO, 1994) p. 59. T. Gurr, op. cit. S. Blomberg and G. Hess, ‘The temporal links between conflict and economic activity’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2002) p. 74.

178 Notes 67

68 69

70

71

72 73 74

75

76

77

78

See United Nations Development Program (UNDP) website page on ‘poverty reduction’ http://www.undp.org/poverty/, date accessed 28 November 2006. The UK’s Department for International Development’s (DfID) ‘easy guide to “eliminating world poverty”’ http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ wp2006intro/index. html, date accessed 28 November 2006. The World Bank’s own tag line is ‘working for a world free of poverty’ which can be seen at the home page of the World Bank’s website http://www.worldbank.org (28 November 2006). ‘The IMF is an organization of 184 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty [my emphasis].’ http://www.imf.org, date accessed 28 November 2006. D. Snook, Global Transition (London: Macmillan, 1999) p. 126. M. Blaug, Great Economists before Keynes: An Introduction to the Lives and Works of One Hundred Economists of the Past (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1986) pp. 129–131 in ibid., p. 127. Roland Paris (op. cit., pp. 45–46) points to research carried out by J. Walton and D. Sneddon, Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1994). Paris also cites another nine studies published during the 1990s which have ‘described the apparently destabilising effects of liberal economic adjustment policies’. E. Nafziger and J. Auvinen, Economic Development, Inequality and War: Humanitarian Emergencies in Developing Countries (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2003) pp. 101–102 cites C. Mills, ‘Structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa’, Economic Development Institute Policy Seminar, Report No. 18 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1989). Ibid. M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) p. 2. D. Keen, 1998 in J. Goodhand and D. Hulme, op. cit., p. 19. See also D. Keen, ‘Incentives and disincentives for violence’, in M. Berdal and D. Malone, op. cit., pp. 19–42. Rational choice theory’s fundamental proposition is that ‘people are rational, self-interested, opportunistic, maximisers’ Larmour (1990) in M. Turner and D. Hulme, Governance, Administration and Development: Making the State Word (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997) p. 66. J. Goodhand and D. Hulme, ‘From wars to complex political emergencies: Understanding conflict and peace-building in the new world disorder’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1999) pp. 19–20. Goodhand and Hulme attribute much of this discussion to Mark Duffield, David Keen and Alex de Waal. ‘In 1999, in recognition of the devastating economic consequences of violence in developing countries, the World Bank launched a large research program in the Development Economics Research Group (DEC-RG) to study “The economics of civil war, crime and violence.” The project was comanaged by Paul Collier, director (DECRG), and Ibrahim Elbadawi, lead economist (DECRG).’ World Bank http://econ.worldbank.org/external/ default/main?menuPK=477971&pagePK=64168176&piPK=64168140&the SitePK=477960#economics_of_civil_war, date accessed 1 November 2006. P. Collier, op. cit. (2000) p. 91.

Notes 179 79

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84 85 86 87

88 89 90

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

99 100 101 102

M. Berger, ‘From nation-building to state-building: The geopolitics of development, the nation-state system and the changing global order’, Third World Quarterly (2006), Vol. 27, No. 5, p. 13 cites K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). C. Arnson, ‘The political economy of war: Situating the debate’, in C. Arnson and I. Zartman (eds) Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005) p. 12. E. Nafziger and J. Auvinen, op. cit., p. 99. See P. Collier, op. cit., 2003 and P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, op. cit. A remark made by the Sri Lanka Country Director of the World Bank of that time, Peter Harrold in P. Harrold and S. Sardesai, ‘The dynamics of conflict, development assistance and peace-building: Sri Lanka 2000–05’, Social Development Notes, No. 23 (World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2006) p. 3. D. Barash (ed.) Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 199. H. Miall et al., op. cit., p. 56. Ibid., p. 41. J. Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington D.C.: United States Institution of Peace Press, 1995). J. Rowntree, The Quaker Peace Testimony: An Anthology (Revised by H. Ford) (London: Friends’ Peace Committee, 1949) p. 7. A. Curle, Making Peace (London: Tavistock, 1971) pp. 173–176. C. Sampson, ‘Religion and peacebuilding’, in I. Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds) Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1997) pp. 273–361. Miall et al., op. cit., p. 1. Peacebuilding was coined by Galtung, a self appointed ‘founder of modern peace studies’. P. Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution (London: Macmillan, 2002) p. 10. Miall et al., op. cit., p. 21. Ibid., pp. 15–16. P. Wallensteen, op. cit. (2002) p. 34. Ibid., p. 34. C. Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1981); D. Pruitt and J. Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation and Settlement (New York: Random House, 1986); and J. Galtung, op. cit. (1996). Ibid. L. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956). P. Wallensteen, op. cit. (2002) p. 39. E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990).

180 Notes 103 104

105 106

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108 109

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111 112 113

114

115 116

117 118 119 120

121 122

P. Wallesteen, op. cit. (2002) p. 44. I. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); R. Fisher and W. Ury, Getting to Yes (Boston MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); and S. Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974–80 (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991). P. Collier, op. cit. See Andrew William’s chapter on ‘Reparations’, in A. Williams, Liberalism and War: The Victors and the Vanquished (London: Routledge, 2006) pp. 71–95. This revelation Kindleberger credits to Walt Rostow who was the Assistant Chief in the US Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs. C. Kindleberger, Marshal Plan Days (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) p. 27. Ibid., p. 34. ‘Participation’ in the current humanitarian discourse usually means a ‘people-centre’ or ‘grassroots’ approach, involving the local community in planning and implementation. In the Marshall Plan it was at the state level and elite led. In total, 16 countries were involved in the drafting of a scheme for the recovery of Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. M. Hogan, The Marshal Plan: America Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) p. 60. I. Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited: The European Recovery Program in Economic Perspective (London: Greenwood Press, 1983) pp. 19–20. D. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe America and Postwar Reconstruction (London: Longman, 1992). A speech given by the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, at Harvard University introducing to the US ideas of a European Recovery Plan; hence the Marshall Plan. S. Parrish, The Turn Toward Confrontation: The Soviet Reaction to the Marshall Plan, 1947 (Washington D.C.: Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1994). Ibid., p. 4. Andrew Williams quotes from the papers of the American Governor, Lehman, who administered the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (active between 1942 and 1946). A. Williams, op. cit., p. 114. The quote is made on page 121. Ibid., p. 122. D. Fieldhouse, The West and the Third World: Trade, Colonialism, Dependence and Development (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999) p. 36. M. Turner and D. Hulme, op. cit., pp. 4–6. G. Esteva, ‘Development’, in Wolfgang Sachs (ed.) The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power (London: Zed Books, 1992) p. 6. The Truman Doctrine was US President Truman’s (1945–1953) policy of Soviet containment. United Nations, ‘Preamble’, UN Charter. R. Paris, op. cit. (2004) p. 13.

Notes 181 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131

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135 136 137 138 139 140

141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149

Ibid., p. 15. D. Fieldhouse, op. cit., p. 235. The Bank provided its first non-European loans to Chile for the development of electrical power in 1948. R. Paris, op. cit. (2004) p. 30. Ibid., p. 29. M. Latham, ‘Redirecting the revolution? The USA and the failure of nationbuilding in South Vietnam’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006) p. 28. J. Owen, ‘The foreign imposition of domestic institutions’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002) pp. 388–389. A. Henderson and D. Singer ‘Civil war in the post-colonial world, 1946–92’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2000) pp. 275–296. W. Sachs, ‘The need for the home perspective’, in M. Rahnema and V. Bawtree (eds) The Post-Development Reader (London: Zed Books, 1997) p. 290 refers to W. Kuhne, ‘Deutschland vor neuen Herausforderungen in den Nord-Sud Beziehungen’, Aus Politik Und Seitgeschichte, Supplement to Das Parlament, No. 46 (1991) p. 6. G. Esteva, op. cit., p. 4. J. Macrae, ‘The death of humanitarianism?: An anatomy of the attack’, Disasters, Vol. 22, Issue 4 (1998) pp. 309–331. M. Pei and S. Kaspar, Lessons for the Past: The American Record on Nation Building (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No. 24, 2003) pp. 3–4. A. Sen, ‘Famines and failures of exchange entitlements’, Economic and Political Weekly (1976) No. 11, Special Number. A. Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) p. 45. J. Corbett, ‘Famine and household coping strategies’, World Development, Vol. 16, No. 9 (1988) pp. 1009–1012. M. Anderson and P. Woodrow, Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989). Authors on this subject include Ken Hewitt, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davies and Ben Wisner. D. Keen, ‘The functions of famine in southwestern Sudan: Implications for relief’, in J. Macrae and A. Zwi (eds) War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books in association with Save the Children (UK), 1994) pp. 111–124. Ibid. M. Pugh, op. cit. (2001) p. 12. R. Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action (London: Pinter, 1987) p. 6 in Ibid., p. 14. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, 1991 (para. 40). Ibid. P. White and L. Cliffe, op. cit. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, op. cit. See H. Miall et al., op. cit., pp. 185–215 for further discussion of ‘postsettlement peacebuilding’. World Bank, The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1998) p. 1.

182 Notes 150 151

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Ibid., p. xi. See for example: I. Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire – NonProfit Organisations and International Development (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995); D. Hulme and M. Edwards (eds) NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997); and T. Tvedt, Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats: NGOs and Foreign Aid (Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998). T. Tvedt, op. cit., p. 12. A. Rogerson, A. Hewitt and D. Waldenberg, The International Aid System 2005–2010: Forces For and Against Change, Working Paper 235 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004) p. 5. http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp235.pdf, date accessed 13 November 2006. H. Jeong and D. Last, ‘Operational issues for peacebuilding: Organisational imperatives’, in H. Jeong (ed.) Approaches to Peacebuilding (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) pp. 188–194. These categories include ‘physical security’, ‘economic reconstruction’, ‘human rights’, ‘institutional/civil capacity building’, ‘governance and democratic development’. M. Llamazares and L. Levy, NGOs and Peacebuilding in Kosovo, Working Paper 13 (Bradford: Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2003) p. 12. Ibid., p. 12. M. Lange and M. Quinn, Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges (London: International Alert, 2003) p. 13. S. O’Reilly, ‘The Contribution of Community Development to Peacebuilding: World Vision’s Area Development’ (World Vision UK, November 1998) p. 10. http://www.worldvision.org.uk/upload/pdf/Peace_ADP.pdf, page accessed 27 October 2003. This approach fits the peacebuilding projects studied by Ifat Maoz in the Middle East. I. Maoz, ‘An experiment in peace: Reconciliation-aimed workshops of Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian youth’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 6 (2000) p. 722. UNRISD, Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1993). http://www. unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1 ab/2f0008467c7d3ebc80256b67005b6556/$FILE/dp48.pdf#search=%222.8% 20billion%20UNTAC%20Cambodia%22, data accessed 24 April 2010. F. Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) p. 194. N. Warner, ‘Cambodia: Lessons of the UNTAC for future peacekeeping operations’, paper presented to the International Seminar, UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Canberra: 21–24 March 1993) p. 3 quoted in K. Clements and R. Ward, Building International Community (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994) p. 39. M. Doyle, ‘Authority and elections in Cambodia’, in M. Doyle, I. Johnstone and R. Orr, Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 151–152. F. Hampson, op. cit., p. 195; S. Lithgow, ‘Cambodia’, in K. Clements and R. Ward, Building International Community (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994) p. 50; S. Peou, ‘Implementing Cambodia’s peace agreement’, in

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S. Stedman, D. Rothschild and E. Cousens (eds) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) p. 507. A. Griffith, Conflict and Resolution: Peace-building through the Ballot Box in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Cambodia (Oxford: New Cherwell Press, 1998) pp. 237–238. E. Kato, ‘Quick impacts, slow rehabilitation in Cambodia’, in M. Doyle et al., op. cit., p. 195. S. Lithgow, op. cit., p. 40. M. Doyle, ‘War and peace in Cambodia’, in B. Walter and J. Snyder (eds) Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) p. 188; S. Lithgow, op. cit., p. 52; S. Peou, op. cit., p. 508. This is the conclusion of all analyses consulted for this section. United Nations, ‘El Salvador – ONUSAL’, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/ Missions/onusal.htm, date accessed 24 April 2010. Ibid. For an illustrative account of the difficulties faced in reforming the police in El Salvador see C. Call, Ibid., pp. 399–402. See also G. Costa, ‘Demilitarizing public security: Lessons from El Salvador’, in M. Studmeister (ed.) El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001) pp. 20–26. K. Walter and P. Williams, ‘The military and democratization in El Salvador’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993) p. 67 cited in F. Hampson, op. cit., p. 145. C. Call, ‘Assessing El Salvador’s transition from civil war to peace’, in Stedman et al., op. cit., pp. 393–396. D. McCormick, ‘From peacekeeping to peacebuilding: Restructuring military and police institutions in El Salvador’, in M. Doyle et al., op. cit., p. 293 refers to The New York Times, 6 and 7 January 1993. G. del Castillo, ‘The arms-for-land deal in El Salvador’, in M. Doyle et al., op. cit., p. 356. The Ta’if Accord. T. Najem, Lebanon’s Renaissance: The Political Economy of Reconstruction (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2000). A. de Soto and G. del Castillo, ‘Obstacles to peacebuilding in El Salvador’, Foreign Policy, Issue 94 (Spring 1994) pp. 69–83. This is the conclusion from M. Doyle and N. Sambanis, ‘International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2000) pp. 779–801. M. Duffield, op. cit., p. 22. European Union, Working for Peace, Security and Stability – European Union in the World, op. cit., pp. 6–7. USAID, Status of Presidential Initiatives FY 2004 (Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, 2005) p. iii. http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/ presidential_initiative/status_fy04.pdf, date accessed 19 September 2006. United Nations, ‘The 2005 World Summit: An overview’ (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2005). http://www.un.org/ga/documents/ overview2005summit.pdf, date accessed 19 September 2006. See N. Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004); L. Jones and D. Klingner,

184 Notes

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‘Learning from the Philippine occupation: Nation-building and institutional development in Iraq and other high security risk nations’, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2005) pp. 145–156; F. Fukuyama, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006). See F. Fukuyama, ‘The end of history?’, The National Interest (Summer, 1989) pp. 3–18. O. Richmond, op. cit., pp. 85–123. See also O. Richmond, ‘UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2004) pp. 83–101. Ibid., p. 87.

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13 14 15

Sri Lanka’s ‘Liberal’ War

E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990). Ibid., p. 7. Ibid. Credit is due to Oliver Ramsbotham’s efforts to highlight the ‘originality and significance of Azar’s approach’. O. Ramsbotham ‘The analysis of protracted social conflict: A tribute to Edward Azar’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2005) p. 109. World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2004). The World Bank reports Sri Lanka’s population in 2003 as 19,193,000, http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html, date accessed 8 February 2005. Sri Lankan census 1981 quoted in S. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy (London: I.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd, 1986) p. 4. Indian Census 2001, http://164.100.167.45/census/religion.aspx, date accessed 8 February 2005. Sri Lankan Census, 2001, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/census2001/database/index.asp, date accessed 1 November 2006. Ibid. Many India Tamils have lived in Sri Lanka for generations. S. Poonambalam, Sri Lanka: The National Question and the Tamil Liberation Struggle (London: Zed Books, 1983) p. 223. Ibid., p. 225. R. Cheran, ‘Diaspora circulation and transnationalism as agents for change in the post conflict zones of Sri Lanka’ (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2004), http://www.berghof-foundation.lk/publications/diaspora. pdf, date accessed 20 February 2005. Associated Press, ‘Tiny Sri Lanka has 800,000 refugees’, 13 June 2001 quoted in UNHCR, ‘Background paper on refugees and asylum seekers from Sri Lanka’ (Geneva: UNHCR, 2004) p. 50. Ibid., p. 51. K. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2003) p. 235. Jack Eller credits the success of the American Missionary Society established in 1813 in ‘educating Jaffna Tamils in English, so much so that

Notes 185

16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26

27 28 29 30

31 32

33 34 35

Tamils began to outdistance Sinhalese in their command in the language and therefore in their preparedness for service in colonial administrative posts’. J. Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002) p. 120. Ibid., p. 100. See also K. de Silva, op. cit., pp. 122–129. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 1988) p. 5. ‘From 1871 to 1881, during the coffee boom, 24,000 Indians per year were brought to Sri Lanka, and during the tea boom from 1891 to 1900, 34,000 annually, adding 10 percent to the population of the island.’ During the rubber boom of 1923–1928 ‘immigration averaged 60,000’. J. Eller, op. cit., pp. 99–100. Tamil populated North. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, op. cit., p. 5. D. Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994) pp. 21–36. The missionaries viewed Buddhism and Hinduism as ‘idolatrous’, ‘heathen’ and ‘satanic’. Ibid., pp. 11–15. S. Jayaweera, ‘The ethnic conflict and Sinhala consciousness’, in A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation & Reconciliation, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, No. 5 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001) p. 8. The nineteenth century Buddhist revival is well served in Eller’s chapter on Sri Lanka, see particularly pages 109–119. See also S. Tambiah, op. cit., and D. Little, op. cit. Eller credits Tambiah (op. cit.) for coining this term. J. Eller, op. cit. Ibid., p. 107. C. de Silva and T. Bartholomeusz, ‘The role of the Sangha in the reconciliation process’, A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation & Reconciliation, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, No. 16 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001) p. 4. Ibid., pp. 3–4. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, op. cit., p. 1 quotes a despatch from the British Secretary of State in 1801. Colbrooke visited Sri Lanka in 1831 producing the Colbrooke Cameron Report. The Colbrooke reforms were implemented in 1833. Burghers are Sri Lankans descended from the first Portuguese colonists, although Burgher is sometimes used to describe Sri Lankans of mixed parentage i.e. someone with Sri Lankan and European parents. Ibid., p. 4. Jeyaratnam Wilson talks of a ‘new political awareness of the élites of both the two major communities. Their activities were directed against the imperial ruler, and consisted essentially of demands for a modicum of constitutional reform.’ A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2000) p. 41. S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., pp. 48–49. J. Eller, op. cit., pp. 98–100. Ibid., p. 121.

186 Notes 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59

60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68

According to Bullion, the first all Tamil party emerged as early as 1922, a result of a ‘rupture along ethnic lines’ of the CNC called the Tamil Mahajana Sabha. A. Bullion, India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis 1976–1994 (London: Pinter, 1995) p. 16. Ibid., p. 123. S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 74. Ibid., p. 78. Ibid., p. 77. K. Bush, The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read Between the Lines (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p. 76. Ibid., p. 76. P. Ghosh, Ethnicity Versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2003) p. 228. V. Nithiyanandam, ‘Ethnic politics and Third World development: Some lessons from Sri Lanka’s experience’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2000) p. 287. K. de Silva, op. cit., p. 275. Ibid., p. 275. P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 234. Ibid., pp. 227–235. See also K. de Silva, op. cit., pp. 272–296. UNHCR, op. cit., p. 47. D. S. Senanayake was succeeded by his son, Dudley Senanayake who won the election with the UNP in 1952 only to resign in 1953 after a one day general strike. Sir John Kotelawala (D. S. Senanayake’s nephew) replaced Dudley Senanayake. S. Jayaweera, op. cit., p. 6. S. Tambiah, op. cit., p. 68. Ibid., p. 82. Satyagraha emerged during India’s independence struggle as a peaceful protest. Traditionally the police protected the protestors. S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 105. J. Eller, op. cit., p. 129. P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 79. Ibid., p. 80. Ibid. P. Ghosh cites K. Loganathan, Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict (Colombo: Centre for Policy Research and Analyses, 1996) p. 26. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid. P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 81 cites K. Loganathan, op. cit., pp. 28–29. The UF was a coalition of the SLFP, the left-wing Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP). K. Loganathan, Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict (Colombo: Centre for Policy Research and Analyses, 1996) p. 38 quoted in P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 86. K. de Silva, op. cit., p. 131. See N. Nithiyanandam, op. cit., p. 294. Ibid., p. 126. Ibid., p. 541.

Notes 187 69 70 71 72 73

74 75 76

77 78 79 80

81 82

83

84 85 86 87 88 89

90 91 92

Ibid., pp. 541–542. See ibid., p. 542; S. Tambiah, op. cit., p. 14; and, S. Ponnanbalam, op. cit., p. 157. K. de Silva, op. cit., p. 137. Ibid., pp. 140–143. ‘Article 6 stated: “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly its shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism.”’ S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 164. K. de Silva, op. cit., p. 129. P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 86. P. Chalk ‘The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam insurgency’, in R. Ganguly and I. Macduff (eds) Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (London: Sage, 2003) p. 130. The LTTE emerged from the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). P. Chalk, op. cit., p. 130. S. Ponnanbalam, op. cit., pp. 185–186. In the UNP election manifesto they pledged to ‘take all possible steps to remedy the grievances in such fields as (1) Education (2) Colonization (3) Use of Tamil Language (4) Employment in the Public and Semi-Public Corporations’. Quoted in S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 190. K. de Silva, op. cit. (1998), p. 162. J. Eller, op. cit., pp. 134–136. Jayawardene referred to himself as the 193rd Sri Lankan head of state harkening to Sri Lanka’s ancient history of Sinhalese Kings. ‘Since Jayawardene came into power four years ago, a system of what his critics call “State Terrorism” has brought an Ulster-style situation in the Tamil-majority areas of the North and East … Hundreds have been detained without charge or trial. This year at least 156 Tamil youths have been detained and tortured, then released. Thirty-five are still held at Colombo’s Panagoda Army Camp. Human rights workers, Sinhalese as well as Tamil, told me that the most favoured tortures are hanging prisoners upside down on heaps of burning chillies, and inserting needles under their finger nails.’ S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 210 cites The Observer (London), 20 September 1981. J. Eller, op. cit., p. 136. S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 194. J. Eller, op. cit., p. 137. S. Tambiah, op. cit., pp. 38–39. S. Ponnambalam, op. cit., p. 202. Presentation of Mr Kethesh Loganathan at Centre for Policy Alternatives & Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, conference on ‘Peace and development: The road to Tokyo’, 26th–27th April 2003, Colombo. L. Jayasuriya, Welfarism and Politics in Sri Lanka: Experience of a Third World State (Perth: University of Western Australia, 2000) p. 16. Ibid., p. 9. P. Isenamen, ‘Basic needs: The case of Sri Lanka’, World Development, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1980) pp. 237–258 quoted in D. Snodgass, ‘Economic development of Sri Lanka’, in I. Rotberg (ed.) Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 91.

188 Notes 93 Ibid., p. 91. 94 V. Nithiyanandam, op. cit., p. 293. 95 D. Dunham and S. Jayasuriya, ‘Equity, growth and insurrection: Liberalization and the welfare debate in contemporary Sri Lanka’, Oxford Developmental Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2000) p. 97. 96 Ibid., p. 107. 97 These observations were made by K. Loganathan, Interview, Colombo, 24 July 2004. 98 S. Ponnanbalam, op. cit., pp. 203–225. 99 Ibid., p. 225. 100 A. Patrap, Island of Blood: Frontline Reports from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and other South Asian Flashpoints (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2001) p. 53. 101 SIPRI cites 1983 as the first year to exceed over one thousand war related fatalities. 102 S. Tambiah, op. cit., pp. 13–33. 103 Figures taken from S. Tambiah, ibid., pp. 22–23. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid., p. 27. 106 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, op. cit. (2000) p. 113. 107 An extract from the Sixth Amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution quoted in J. Eller, op. cit., p. 138. 108 P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 77. 109 Ibid. 110 N. DeVotta, ‘Illiberalism and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002), p. 88 cites Ceylon Daily News, ‘Pact a racial division of Ceylon, Says Dudley’, 12 August 1957. 111 Ibid., p. 89. 112 I. Zartman, ‘Dynamics and constraints in negotiations in internal conflicts’, in I. Zartman (ed.) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995) p. 9. 113 Ibid., p. 89. 114 S. Nadarajah and D. Sriskandarajah, ‘Liberation struggle or terrorism? The politics of naming the LTTE’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005) pp. 87–100. 115 K. Stokke, ‘Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism as colonial political projects from “above”, 1948–1983’, Political Geography, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1998) p. 101. 116 S. Nadarajah and D. Sriskandarajah, op. cit., p. 91. 117 S. Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, Second Edition (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) p. 63. 118 S. Krishna, ‘India’s role in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict’, in A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation & Reconciliation, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, No. 3 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001) p. 3. 119 Ibid., p. 4. 120 Ibid., p. 3. 121 These overtures included requesting military and financial assistance as well as offering military bases to foreign powers other than India.

Notes 189

122

123 124

125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138

139 140 141

142 143 144 145

A. Bullion, op. cit., p. 78; S. Krishna, op. cit., p. 4; A. Shastri, ‘Government policy and ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka’, in M. Brown and S. Ganguly (eds) Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) p. 150. M. Crenshaw, ‘Democracy, commitment problems and managing ethnic violence: The case of India in Sri Lanka’, in D. Rapoport (ed.) The Democratic Experience and Political Violence (London: Frank Cass, 2001) pp. 139–140. Ibid., p. 139. Sumatra Bose explains that after 1983, the Sinhalese government was ‘furiously expanding its armed forces from an assortment of countries perceived to be hostile to Indian interests including Pakistan, China, South Africa, and Israel, not to mention a shadowy firm of professional mercenaries operating out of the Channel Islands’. S. Bose, ‘Flawed mediation, chaotic implementation: 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka peace agreement’, in S. Stedman, D. Rothchild and E. Cousens (eds) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) pp. 633–634. S. Krishna, op. cit., p. 6. P. Chalk, op. cit., p. 131. TULF, in contrast to the other mentioned organisations, is a political rather than paramilitary organisation. P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 110. Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., pp. 122–123. S. Krishna, op. cit. A. Bullion, op. cit., pp. 60–63. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, 1987, Clause 2.2. Ibid., Clause 2.3. S. Bose, op. cit., 2003, p. 641. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, 1987, Clause 2.10. S. Bose refers to the issue of land settlement, Ibid., p. 641. Ibid., p. 641. R. Edrisinha, ‘Trying times: Constitutional attempts to resolve the armed conflict’, in J. Armon and L. Philipson (eds) Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka (London: Accord, 1998). S. Bose, op. cit., p. 642. See A. Bullion for Tamil and Sinhalese reactions to the Accord, op. cit., pp. 110–115. R. Edrisinha, op. cit., p. 1. R. Cooper and M. Berdal, ‘Outside intervention in ethnic conflicts’, in M. Brown (ed.) Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 181–205, p. 199. A. Bullion, op. cit., cites The Independent newspaper, p. 110. Ibid., p. 634. A. Bullion, op. cit., p. 104 and p. 113. S. Krishna, op. cit., p. 7. S. Bose quotes Rajiv Ghandi as saying ‘India wants a settlement across the table within the constitutional framework of Sri Lanka. We will not support the Eelam concept’. India Today, ‘Rajiv Gandhi, interview’, 30 June 1987. op. cit., p. 637.

190 Notes 146 147

148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158

159 160 161 162 163

164 165 166

167 168 169 170 171

M. Crenshaw, op. cit., p. 141. S. Bose, op. cit., pp. 638–639; M. Crenshaw, op. cit., p. 141 cites J. Manor, ‘Politics: Ambiguity, disillusionment, and ferment’, in M. Marshall, Bouton [sic] and P. Oldenburg (eds) India Briefing, 1988 (Boulder: Westerview, 1988) pp. 19–21. And K. de Silva and S. Samarasinghe (eds) Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict (London: Pinter, 1993) p. 127. The Times (London), ‘Gandhi accused of arranging cover-up: Inquiry into Indian corruption’, 28 July 1987. Bullion cites India Today, ‘High stakes gamble’, 15 December 1987 in A. Bullion, op. cit., p. 110. The Times (London) ‘Sri Lanka’s chance for peace’, 29 July 1987. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, 1987, Clause 2.9. A. Bullion, op. cit., pp. 122–124. Ibid., pp. 124–126. Ibid., p. 125. Ibid., p. 129. N. DeVotta, op. cit., p. 92. S. Krishna, op. cit., pp. 12–13. The same assertion is made by R. Edrisinha, op. cit. and P. Chalk, op. cit., p. 133. When Sri Lanka sought external support against India following the Indian air-drop of humanitarian supplies to Jaffna, none was forthcoming. S. Krishna, op. cit., p. 9. According to Bullion ‘The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia had all earlier signalled to Jayewardene and Rajiv Gandhi that they regarded the civil war as a conflict to be settled on a bilateral basis between India and Sri Lanka’, op. cit., p. 155. Bullion cites U. Phadnis, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage, 1990) p. 109. I. Zartman, op. cit., p. 3. S. Ryan, op. cit., p. 66. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, op. cit. (2000) p. 114. Ibid., pp. 126–130. R. Gunaratna, ‘International Dimensions of the Sri Lankan Conflict: Threat and Response’, in A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation & Reconciliation, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, No. 27 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001) p. 5. A. Chandrakanthan, ‘Eelam Tamil nationalism: An inside view’, in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, op. cit. (2000) p. 167. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, op. cit., p. 132. UTHR(J) ‘Briefing No 1: Human rights and the issues of war and peace’, August 1992. http://www.uthr.org/Briefings/Briefing1.htm#_Toc516680639, date accessed 21 March 2005. P. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 142. Ibid., pp. 142–143. Ibid., p. 146. The Times (London), ‘Sri Lanka cancels Tamil talks after suicide blast’, 25 October 1994. P. Saravanamuttu, ‘Sri Lanka – The intractability of ethnic conflict’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p. 204. The Times, ‘Tamil attack on navy leaves 11 sailors dead’, 20 April 1995.

Notes 191 172 173 174 175 176 177

178 179

180 181

182 183

184

185

186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196

The Times (London), ‘Colombo prepares to give Tamils regional self-rule Sri Lanka’, 4 August 1995. P. Saravanamuttu, op. cit., p. 202. Toronto Star, ‘Tamils reject Sri Lankan peace plan’, 13 August 1995. R. Edrisinha, op. cit., p. 4. P. Ghosh, op. cit., pp. 201–214. BBC News, ‘Set back for Sri Lanka peace hopes’, 8 August 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/870753.stm, date accessed 14 March 2005. The Times of India, ‘Lanka delays constitution vote’, 9 August 2000. N. DeVotta, op. cit., p. 92. The Report of the Special Rapport from the UN Commission on Human Rights provides a detailed description of just how serious the war situation was in Sri Lanka in the years prior to the 2002 ceasefire. United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/61 – Addendum – Visit to Sri Lanka’ (Geneva: United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1998). C. Sriram, Peace as Governance: Powersharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace Negotiations (Houdmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p. 75. USAID, ‘Anti-corruption needs assessment in Sri Lanka’ (Burlington, VT: ARD, 2006), pp. 1–2. http://www.ard-acp.com/resource/link/16/11_Sri_ Lanka_ACP_Assessment_Report__Final_.pdf, date accessed 30 October 2006. Ibid. See for example Law & Society Trust, Presidential Election 1999 People’s Choice? A Report on the Presidential Election of Sri Lanka (Colombo: Law & Society Trust, 2000). Nithiyanandam notes that ‘Certain key regions of the country remain truncated from the rest making a mockery of national-level economic statistics’, V. Nithiyanandam, op. cit., p. 303. In 2003 the estimated population of the Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullativu, Batticaloa and Tricomallee stood around two million. Department of Census and Statistics, Mid-Year Population/Vital Statistics by District (Colombo: Government of Sri Lanka, 2003). UNDP, National Human Development Report 1998 Regional Dimensions of Human Development: Sri Lanka 1998 (Colombo: UNDP Sri Lanka) p. 30. Ibid. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 39. V. Nithiyanandam, op. cit., pp. 283–311. USAID, op. cit. V. Nithiyanandam, op. cit., p. 285. N. Arunatilake, S. Jayasuriya and S. Kelegama, ‘The economic costs of the war in Sri Lanka’, World Development, Vol. 29, No. 9 (2001) p. 1495. FIJ, ‘On the road to peace reporting conflict and ethnic diversity: A research report on good journalism practice in Sri Lanka’ (USIP/IFJ in association

192 Notes

197 198 199 200 201

with CPA Sri Lanka) p. 8. http://www.cpalanka.org/research_papers/Road_ to_peace_English.pdf, date accessed 30 October 2006. KAPS, ‘For the sake of a just and lasting peace’, Draft Final Report (Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2003) p. 34. Ibid. Ibid., p. 23. USIP/IFJ, op. cit., pp. 8–11. J. Cockell, ‘Human security and preventative action strategies’, in E. Newman and O. Richmond (eds) The United Nations and Human Security (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001) p. 23.

Chapter 3

The 2002–2006 Sri Lankan Peace Process

1 See I. Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1995). 2 Mitchell introduces the debate of whether an ‘outsider-neutral’ versus ‘insider-partial’ mediator is most suitable when dealing with warring factions. He concludes, as is so often the case with civil wars, that ‘there are circumstances in which one rather than the other is more likely to be successful, while the reverse is true in other circumstances’. C. Mitchell, ‘Mediation and the ending of conflict’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p. 81. 3 A. Bullion, ‘Norway and the peace process in Sri Lanka’, Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 3. (2001) p. 77. 4 Agreement on a Ceasefire Between the Government of The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. 5 I. Zartman, ‘The timing of peace initiative: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty, op. cit., p. 19. 6 A. Bullion, op. cit., 2001, p. 71. 7 The Economist, ‘The Tigers pounce’, 28 July 2001. 8 S. Samarasinghe, ‘Sri Lanka: Economy’, in J. O’Brien (ed.) South Asia 2007 (fourth edition) (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 510. 9 Ibid., pp. 510–511. 10 P. Chalk, ‘The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam Insurgency’, in R. Ganguly and I. Macduff (eds) Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (London: Sage, 2003) pp. 140–150. 11 K. de Silva, ‘Sri Lanka: History’, in J. O’Brien (ed.) op. cit., p. 503. 12 This was Prabhakaran’s first public outing in 20 years. 13 J. Uyangoda, ‘Peace in Sri Lanka: Prospects after Prabhakaran’s media conference’, in J. Uyangoda and M. Perera (eds) Sri Lanka’s Peace Process 2002 (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 2003) pp. 19–24. These three points were identified during the Thimpu Talks during the 1980s; a precursor to the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord. 14 R. Ganguly, ‘Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict: At a crossroads between war and peace’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2004) p. 909. 15 Ibid., p. 909. 16 Ibid., p. 910.

Notes 193 17 ‘Both parties expressed their resolve to address the full range of issues pertaining to a lasting political settlement of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, fully realizing that this can best be achieved by pursuing a step-by-step approach to the negotiation process.’ Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the Royal Norwegian Government: Sri Lanka peace talks’, 19 September 2002. 18 Ibid. 19 The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the Royal Norwegian Government: Parties have decided to explore political solution founded on internal self-determination based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka’, Oslo, 5 December 2002. 20 The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the Royal Norwegian Government: Accelerated action on resettlement and humanitarian action, progress on human rights’, Oslo, 9 January 2002. 21 WB News Release, ‘World Bank establishes Sri Lanka reconstruction fund’, 20 March 2003; Daily News, ‘North East reconstruction fund from World Bank’, 21 March 2003. 22 The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the Royal Norwegian Government: Press release’, Oslo, 8 February 2002. 23 J. Uyangoda, ‘Negotiations for dialogue’, in J. Uyangoda and M. Perera (eds) Sri Lanka’s Peace Process 2002 (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 2003) p. 64. 24 The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the Royal Norwegian Government: Consolidation of the ceasefire top priority, Sri Lanka monitoring mission to be strengthened’, Oslo, 21 March 2002. 25 SIRHN, ‘Joint appeal’, Oslo Peace Support Meeting 25 November 2002. http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/RRR/Appeal/Appeal.asp, date accessed 8 March 2005. 26 ‘Declaration in support of the peace process in Sri Lanka’, Oslo Peace Support Meeting, 25 November 2002. http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/ insidepages/Internationalsuppoer/OsloMeeting/Declaration.asp, date accessed 8 March 2005. 27 R. Ganguly, op. cit., p. 911. 28 S. Hattotuwa, ‘Overview of the Peace Process in Sri Lanka 2002–2003’, paper presented at the conference on Strengthening Cooperation and Security in Asia Post 9/11 by the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 1–3 July 2003, Dhaka, Bangladesh, p. 10. 29 For example, in an interview with Time Magazine in 2004, the interviewer asked Mrs Kumaratunga: ‘Where did all this animosity start?’ and she replied ‘In the genes of Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe. You can write that down’. Time Magazine, ‘Politics is a terrible game: Kumaratunga interview’, 22 March 2004. 30 The LTTE have for some time been making the claim that they are the sole representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamils. As early as June 1987 the LTTE had asked the Indian government to ‘to recognize the L.T.T.E. as the sole representative of the Tamil people and Prabakaran as their leader’. R. Hoole The Broken Palmyra: The Tamil Crisis in Sri Lanka – An Inside (Claremont, CA: Sri Lanka Studies Institute, 1990). See also R. Gunaratna, ‘International dimensions of the Sri Lankan conflict: Threat and response’,

194 Notes

31

32 33 34

35

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52

in A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation & Reconciliation, Marga Monograph Series on Ethnic Reconciliation, No. 27 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001) p. 3. ‘The main opposition party in Sri Lanka has criticised the current peace process – calling the Norwegian mediators partial and accusing the UK and America of planning to reward terrorism.’ BBC News, ‘Sri Lanka peace moves attacked’, 15 November 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/ south_asia/2480637.stm, date accessed 1 December 2007. S. Hattotuwa, op. cit. R. Ganguly, op. cit., p. 911. T. Ferdinands, K. Rupesinghe, P. Saravanmuttu, J. Uyangoda and N. Ropers, The Sri Lanka Peace Process at Crossroads: Lessons, Opportunities and Ideas for Principled Negotiations & Conflict Transformation (Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives, Foundation for Co-Existence, Initiative for Political and Conflict Transformation, Social Scientists Association, Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies Sri Lanka Office, 2004) p. 18. ‘The proposal by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on behalf of the Tamil people for an agreement to establish an interim self-governing authority for the northeast of the island of Sri Lanka’, http://www.peaceinsrilanka. org/peace2005/Insidepage/Proposals/Proposals.asp, date accessed 19 January 2006. The Sunday Observer (Colombo), ‘JVP goes East for awakening’, 5 September 2005. T. Ferdinands et al., op. cit., p. 19. Interview, Donor, Colombo, 20 June 2005. A. Ofstad, ‘Countries in violent conflict and aid strategies: The case of Sri Lanka’, World Development, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2002) p. 165. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 170–171. Ibid., p. 168. Ibid., p. 171. Ibid., pp. 172–173. A lull in 2000 allowed UNHCR to relocate some families from Welfare Centres. They did this with the help of NGOs. These ‘resettlement villages’ were observed by the author in Vavunyia in 2001. This relocation is reported in UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Mid-Year Progress Report 2001 – South Asia’, http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3e6e16220.pdf, date accessed 28 October 2006. A. Ofstad, op. cit., pp. 175–176. Ibid., p. 167. Ibid., p. 166. Ibid., p. 166. Ibid., p. 167. Ibid., p. 167. Ibid., p. 170. The United Kingdom (UK) government spent almost €56 million between 1997 and 2001 on peacebuilding projects in Sri Lanka. In a review of these projects in 2003, Ofstad’s observations are confirmed. The report concluded that ‘the UK did not have a peacebuilding strategy as such’ and ‘that confusion over terms such as peacebuilding and conflict

Notes 195

53 54 55 56 57 58

59 60

61

62 63

64 65 66 67

68

prevention, and lack of consistency in using policy markers, can lead to under estimating the extent of the UK government’s efforts in this area’. S. Lawry-White, ‘Review of the UK government approach to peacebuilding and synthesis of lessons learned from UK government funded peacebuilding projects 1997–2002’, August 2003, commissioned by the Evaluation Department of the United Kingdom department for International Development for the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding conducted with the Evaluation Departments of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. 3–10. A. Ofstad, op. cit., pp. 172–173. UNP, ‘UNP manifesto 2001’ (Colombo: UNP, 2001). Ibid. Ibid. Sunday Times (Colombo), ‘Embargo relaxed as truce begins’, 23 December 2001. S. Bastian, ‘The economics of peace’, in Towards Peace in Sri Lanka, ORF Series on Contemporary South Asia (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2002) pp. 53–56. Eric Solheim also mentioned business as being a constituent for peace in his opening speech at the beginning of the peace talks. S. Bastian, op. cit., p. 54. Few people from the South go to the North. One informant noted that when in Colombo people did not know Mannar was not linked by rail. The railway line in the North West was destroyed in the 1980s. Before the ceasefire the only way there was a 16-hour journey by road to Puttalam and then by boat to Mannar. After the MoU it was possible to make the journey by bus, halving the journey time. Mr Vidar Helgesen, Secretary of State, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Address at the inaugural session of the Sri Lankan peace talks’, Sattahip. Thailand, 16 September 2002. www.peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/Archive/September/16VidarSpeech.asp, date accessed 27 November 2007. The Island, ‘Govt. says 173 check points removed’, 11 April 2002. The Island, ‘More than 40 Black Tigers already in government areas? Intelligence agencies ineffective without powers to arrest LTTE suspects’, 24 March 2002. N. Krishnan, Sri Lanka Strategy Market Outlook: Peace Dividends and the Road to Riches (Hong Kong: CLSA, 2002) p. 23. Interview, Norwegian Ambassador, Colombo, 22 June 2004. Ibid. Tokyo Donor Conference, ‘Tokyo declaration on reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka’, 10 June 2003. http://www.peaceinsrilanka. com/insidepages/Internationalsuppoer/TokyoDonor/TokyoDec100603.as, date accessed 8 March 2005. Ibid. At Oslo the parties had to agreed to ‘explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka’, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement of the

196 Notes

69

70

71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

85 86 87

88

89 90 91 92 93

94

Royal Norwegian Government’ (Oslo), 5 December 2002. http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/Pressrelease/RNG/RNG5thDec.asp, 8 March 2005. Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, ‘Building a foundation for peace and economic growth: Setting national priorities’, paper prepared for the Tokyo Donor Conference (Colombo: CHA, 2003). P. Saravanamuttu quoted in CPA and Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, ‘Peace and development: The road to Tokyo’, 26–27 April 2003, p. 2. Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, op. cit., p. 1. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s preface to Regaining Sri Lanka. Government of Sri Lanka, ‘Regaining Sri Lanka: Vision and strategy for accelerated development’ (December 2002), page without number. Ibid., p. 47. Ibid., pp. 47–53. Ibid., p. 52. Ibid., p. 53. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 52. Ibid., p. 52. Ibid., p. 53. L. Cabral, ‘Poverty reduction strategies and rural productive sectors: What have we learnt, what else do we need to ask’, Natural Resources Perspectives 100 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006) p. 1. The World Bank and IMF, ‘Building poverty reduction strategies in developing countries’, 22 September 1999. Ibid., p. 5. The World Bank, ‘Country assistance strategy progress report for the democratic and socialist republic of Sri Lanka’, Report No. 34054-LK, 6 January 2006, p. 2. The World Bank, ‘Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation to the Executive Directors on a country assistance strategy of the World Bank group for the democratic and socialist republic of Sri Lanka’, Report No. 25413-CE, 23 April 2003, p. i. ‘Declaration in support of the peace process in Sri Lanka’, Oslo Peace Support Meeting, 25 November 2002. UNP, ‘UNP manifesto 2001’ (Colombo: UNP, 2001). K. de Silva, op. cit., p. 530. Interview, Norwegian Ambassador, op. cit. S. Kelegama, ‘Transforming conflict with an economic dividend the Sri Lankan experience’, Research Paper No. 2005/48, UN-WIDER (August 2005) paper originally prepared for the WIDER conference on Making Peace Work, 4–5 June 2004. http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/ rps2005/rp2005-48.pdf, date accessed 2 November 2006. S. Bastian, op. cit., p. 54.

Notes 197 95 96 97 98 99

100 101 102 103 104 105

106 107

108 109 110 111 112

113 114

115

116 117

Ibid., p. 5. Ibid. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 6. J. Park and S. Deshapriya, On the Road to Peace: Reporting Conflict and Ethnic Diversity: A Research Report on Good Journalism Practice in Sri Lanka (Brussels: International Federation of Journalists and United States Institute of Peace (USIP)) p. 8. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Interview, Former UNP Civil Servant/Advisor, Colombo, Interview, 3 July 2004. Ibid. The Daily Mirror commented in July 2004 ‘that the expectation of a large peace dividend is truly high and Ranil’s inability to share this gain during his tenure with the poor caused him dearly at the April 2nd election’. Daily Mirror (Colombo), ‘UPFA and UNF should co-habit’, 7 July 2004. The BBC reported after the UPFA’s election win that ‘Many voters have also complained that, despite two years of ceasefire, they have not seen any peace dividend, with the cost of living constantly rising’. BBC News, ‘President wins Sri Lanka election Sunday’, 4 April 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/world/south_asia/3596227.stm, date accessed 29 November 2007. Interview, donor, Colombo, 24 July 2004. The World Bank, ‘Country assistance strategy progress report for the democratic and socialist republic of Sri Lanka’, Report No. 34054-LK, 6 January 2006, p. 3. Ibid., p. 3. The Independent, ‘Tamil Tigers swap guns for politics as ceasefire holds’, 9 April 2002. Times of India, ‘Lanka’s highway to northern peninsula opens’, 8 April 2002. Interview, donor, Colombo, 21 June 2005. Aid to Sri Lanka increased from US$344 million in 2002, to US$672 million in 2003. From ‘Aid at a glance: Sri Lanka’, OECD website, http://www1.oecd.org/ scripts/cde/viewbase.asp?dbname=cde_dac, date accessed 21 September 2005. ‘Summarized status report NECORD’, NECORD website, http://www. necord.org/1progress/progress.htm, date accessed 21 September 2005. ‘North-east irrigated agriculture project’, World Bank website, http://web. worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230 &theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P058070, date accessed 22 September 2005. ‘World Bank extends support for rebuilding Sri Lanka’s conflict-affected communities’, World Bank website, http://www.worldbank.lk/WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/SRILANKAEXTN/0,,contentMD K:20217033~menuPK:287049~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK: 233047,00.html, date accessed 22 September 2005. Interview, Former UNP civil servant/advisor, op. cit. World Bank, ‘World Bank country director clarifies position on World Bank aid to north east Sri Lanka’, 7 March 2005. http://www.worldbank.

198 Notes

118 119 120 121 122

123

124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143

lk/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/SRILANKA EXTN/0,,contentMDK:20383332~menuPK:287050~pagePK:141137~piPK: 141127~theSitePK:233047,00.html, date accessed 18 January 2006. Interview, Former UNP civil servant/advisor, op. cit. Interview PDS, Killinochchi, 29 June 2004. Observed by the author. The humanitarian arm of the LTTE. See for example V. Cuthbert, ‘Civil society development versus the peace dividend: International aid in the Wanni’, Disasters, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005) pp. 38–57. The World University Service Canada (WUSC) planned to implement training projects in the Vanni during the ceasefire period. WUSC receives funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Canada had proscribed the LTTE, so the project could not go ahead as WUSC would be working with the LTTE. Interview, NGO, Colombo, 27 June 2004. Observed by the author. Interview, TRO, Killinochchi, 28 June 2004. Interview PDS, Killinochchi, op. cit. Interview, donor, Colombo, 19 July 2004. Observed by the author. This situation was widely reported to the author by almost all the NGOs consulted during the field study period. Interview, donor, Colombo, 24 July 2004. Interview PDS, Killinochchi, op. cit. Ibid. Interview, donor, Colombo, 19 July 2004. Tokyo Donor Conference, ‘Tokyo declaration on reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka’, 10 June 2003. http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/Internationalsuppoer/TokyoDonor/TokyoDec100603.asp, date accessed 8 March 2005. Interview, TRO, op. cit. Interview, PDS, op. cit. Interview, donor, Colombo, 21 June 2004. Interview, former UNP civil servant/advisor, op. cit. The Upper Kotmale Hydropower Project. http://www.ukhp.lk/funding.htm, date accessed 4 October 2007. Interview, donor, Colombo, 21 June 2004. Interview, multilateral donor, Colombo, 22 June 2004. Interview, Colombo, 21 June 2004. Mr. M. S. Jayasinghe, Secretary, Triple-R Ministry, Colombo, 22 July 2004. ‘Figures indicate a dead and missing figure of over 38,900. The [number] of Families [sic] affected is around 234,000 which is nearly one million persons. 114,000 houses and private buildings completely destroyed or partially damaged. 176 schools fully or partially destroyed. 435km of roads and 23 bridges damaged. 160km of railway track, 35 main and 34 sub railway stations and 10 bridges destroyed. 600 km of low voltage lines, 50 km of medium voltage lines and 6,500km of power service lines were destroyed. 222,660 households lost access to electricity.’ Task Force for Relief, ‘Initial post-tsunami recovery phase results and challenges’,

Notes 199

144

145 146

147 148

149

150 151 152 153

154

155 156 157 158 159

Sri Lanka Development Forum 2005, Back Ground Papers, 16–17 May 2005, p. 2. Ministry of Finance and Planning, ‘Donor support, pledges, commitments and expenditure – The process’, Back Ground Paper for the Sri Lanka Development Forum 2005, op. cit., p. 34. Ibid., p. 36. P. Harrold and S. Sardesai, ‘The dynamics of conflict, development assistance and peace-building: Sri Lanka 2000–05’, Social Development Notes, No. 23 (2006), Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank, p. 3. BBC News, ‘Analysis: Politics and the tsunami’, 21 December 2005. http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4548832.stm, date accessed 6 November 2005. Daily News (Colombo), ‘No final decision on P-TOMS sans consultations with Maha Nayakas – President’, 11 June 2005. The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘Monks ready to cross the line of democracy’, 12 June 2005. Shortly after its’ signing, P-TOMS was suspended pending judicial review. On 15 July 2005 the Supreme Court ruled there was nothing unlawful about the arrangement. Daily News (Colombo), ‘No legal barrier to pact with LTTE’, 2 August 2005. However a further application was submitted which was due to be heard on 22 November 2005, at this hearing the ‘new government was taking steps to enforce a National Disaster Management Council Act’, and it was ‘redundant’. Daily News (Colombo), ‘P-TOMS redundant under proposed new Act – H.L.’, 22 November 2005. The Sunday Leader, ‘JVP jumps ship as economy plummets’, 19 June 2005. Interview, Norwegian Ambassador, op. cit. The World Bank, Sri Lanka and the World Bank: Working for Development Results (Colombo: World Bank, 2005). Consisting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Bank Group (WB), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organisation (WHO). The Multilateral Group, Preparing for Transition in Sri Lanka: A Contribution from the Multilateral Group, Draft, 1 June 2004, p. 5. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/SriLanka/hosting/unsl/english/inpages/publications_ resources/doc/preparing_transition_srilanka.pdf, date accessed 20 July 2006. Ibid., p. i. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 21.

Chapter 4

Peacebuilding at the Grassroots

1 Research methodology, including the justification for the choice of Mannar as the principal local level case study, is outlined in Chapter 1.

200 Notes 2 Much of the material included in this chapter is sourced from primary research. This included four trips to Sri Lanka, the first in 2001 before the MoU, one in 2003, another in 2004, culminating in nine weeks of field research in the Mannar District. 3 During fieldwork for my Master Degree (2000–2001) I was not granted access to the LTTE-controlled area, and permission to travel around the Vavuniya District, another frontline district, was authorised based on my affiliation with an INGO. 4 The Multilateral Group’s document Preparing for Transition in Sri Lanka highlights the problem of ‘the lack of data particularly in the conflictaffected areas’ as ‘a critical problem that needs addressing’. The Multilateral Group, Preparing for Transition in Sri Lanka: A Contribution from the Multilateral Group, Draft, 1 June 2004, p. 7. ihttp://www.humanitarianinfo.org/SriLanka/hosting/unsl/english/inpages/publications_resources/doc/ preparing_transition_srilanka.pdf, date accessed 20 July 2006. 5 Ministry of Relief Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Development Framework for the Mannar District 2004 (Triple-R Ministry: Colombo, 2004) p. v. 6 Ibid., p. xv. 7 Ibid., p. 57. 8 Observed by the author. 9 Observed by the author. 10 Ministry of Relief Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, op. cit., p. 57. 11 Ibid., p. 5. 12 Ibid., p. 12. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., p. 6. 15 The Hindu, ‘Smuggling rampant on Tamil Nadu coast’, 16 April 2007. 16 A method of salt production. 17 This account of the war in Mannar has been formed through discussions with local people from the Mannar area. 18 See also ‘DRC Sri Lanka 2000–2003: Annex 3’, May 2000, pp. 51–52 quoted in The Global IDP Database, ‘Profile of internal displacement: Sri Lanka’ (Geneva: The Global IDP Database, 2002) p. 60. 19 Tamilnet, ‘37 killed at Madhu church’, 21 November 1999. http://www. tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=4230, date accessed 4 April 2006. 20 Global IDP Database, op. cit., p. 61. 21 Ibid., p. 42. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., p. 84. 24 Ibid., p. 137 25 Ibid., pp. 102–107. 26 Ibid., pp. 98–109. 27 Ibid., pp. 92–102. 28 Ibid., p. 109. 29 Ibid., p. 91. 30 Ibid., p. 109. 31 A traditional home that has mud walls and a roof thatched with leaves from the cajan palm tree.

Notes 201 32 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR mid-year progress report 2001 – Sri Lanka’ (UNHCR, Geneva, 2001) p. 165. 33 Of the 18,712 IDPs who returned between January 2002 and December 2005, 13,294 were ‘spontaneous’ returns, without assistance from UNHCR. Only 30 per cent received UNHCR assistance. UNHCR & Ministry of Nation Building and Development, ‘Statistical summary refugees and internally displaced repatriation and returns to and within Sri Lanka 31 December 2005’, http://www.internal-displacement.org/ 8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/5B1691E01F49EF1D802570B70059 FA8D/$file/STATS_DEC.pdf, date accessed 21 April 2005. 34 The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi has been attributed to the LTTE. 35 Interview, Family 2, Pariyagaman, 18 May 2005. 36 http://www.unhcr.lk/Maps%20and%20Stats/Stats%20and%20Maps/ Statistical%20Summary/Stats%20December%2005.pdf, date accessed 13 April 2006. 37 There have been multiple reports of people drowning when their boats capsized, being robbed and left on sand banks without food or water, and arrested, detained and mistreated by the Indian and Sri Lankan navy for making the illegal crossing. TamilNet, ‘Four returning refugees drown’, 2 June 2002. TamilNet, ‘Bodies wash ashore in Mannar’, 8 May 2003. TamilNet, ‘SLN arrests returning Sri Lankan Tamil refugees’, 21 September 2003. TamilNet, ‘Sri Lankan Tamil refugees rescued in Mannar Sea’, 23 June 2004. TamilNet, ‘UNHCR urged to organize boat service to refugees in India’, 2 August 2004. TamilNet, ‘Refugees abandoned on mid sea sandbank’, 8 August 2004. TamilNet, ‘Human skeleton washed ashore in Mannar’, 26 August 2004. TamilNet, ‘Kachchaithivu stranded refugees rescued’, 10 September 2004. 38 Interview, Family 8, Madhukari, 8 June 2005. 39 This account of Madhukari was provided by staff from the ZOA Office, Mannar and Madhukari. 40 Interview, ZOA Officer, Mannar, 4 June 2005. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Interview, Family 25, Chinnavalayankaddu, 16 June 2005. 44 Interview, Sewa Lanka Officer, Saviriapuram, 19 June 2005. 45 UNHCR and Ministry of Nation Building and Development, ‘Statistical summary as at 31 December 2005 refugees and internally displaced repatriation and returns to and within Sri Lanka’, p. 8. http://www.unhcr.lk/Maps%20 and%20Stats/Stats%20and%20Maps/Statistical%20Summary/Stats%20 December%2005.pdf, date accessed 13 April 2006. 46 In both IDP camps I visited in the government controlled area and the Vanni, the IDPs did not own land. 47 Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., p. 51. 48 Ibid. 49 UNHCR, ‘Durable solutions progress report no. 8: The bulletin of the United Nations inter-agency IDP working group 28 November 2002’ (UNHCR, 2002) p. 3. http://www.unhcr.lk/Publications/Durable%20Solutions/DS% 208.pdf, date accessed 16 April 2006. 50 Ibid.

202 Notes 51 A claim made to the author by several households during the field study period. 52 NEHRP Presentation, Workshop on Housing, Colombo, 26 May 2005. 53 Ibid. 54 North East Provincial Council, ‘North East emergency reconstruction programme progress as on 30th June 2005’ (NEPC, 2005). 55 This description of housing in Madhukari is based on accounts by ZOA staff and project beneficiaries, as well as observations by the author between 6 and 10 June 2005. 56 Douglas Dervanandan is the leader of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), a Tamil party supportive of the government and renowned for its paramilitary tactics. Dervanandan survived the 14th suicide attack against him in December 2007. 57 Families 6, 7 (both interviewed on 7 June 2005) and 14 (interviewed on 9 June 2005) in Madhukari all complained about their houses. 58 This description of housing in Chinnavalayankaddu is based on accounts by MARR staff, and project beneficiaries, as well as observed by the author between 14 and 17 June 2005. 59 This description of housing in Saviriapuram is based on accounts by Sewa Lanka staff, and beneficiaries and observed by the author between 19 and 24 June 2005. 60 Interview, School Principle, Saviriapuram, 24 June 2005. 61 Ibid. 62 The Catholic Church was concerned that returning land to the local families might result in them selling their property to non-Catholic Christian families, and this would have a negative impact on the Church and Church membership. 63 Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., pp. 21–22. 64 Ibid., p. 23. 65 Ibid., p. 23. 66 Interview, Zonal Director of Education, Mannar Town, 3 June 2005. 67 Ibid. 68 Various reasons were given: some of the children had special needs that were not catered for; some of the children were working; others lived too far from school; some parents did not regard school as important, while other children were ‘difficult’. Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Interview, ZOA Programme Manager, Mannar Town, 11 June 2005. 72 Interview, School Principle, Chinnavalayankaddu, 15 June 2005. 73 Interview, School Principle, Saviriapuram, 24 June 2005. 74 Interview, GS Chinnavalayankaddu, AGA Office, Madhu, 15 June 2005. 75 The male teachers were accommodated in one of the classrooms, and a cajan shelter was provided for the female volunteer. 76 Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., pp. 38–40. 77 Ibid., p. 38. 78 Ibid., p. 46. 79 Ibid. 80 Interview, Family 5, Madhukari, 7 June 2005.

Notes 203 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

Ibid. Interview, Family 1, Village close to Vankalai, 17 May 2005. Ibid. Interview, Family 7, Madhukari, 7 June 2005. AGA, AGA Office, Madhu, 15 June 2005. Ibid. Ibid. The local name for an LTTE administered and staffed medical facility. AGA, AGA Office, Madhu, op. cit. Interview, DS, DS Office, Musali, 23 June 2005. Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., p. 134. Ibid., pp. 136–140. Observed by the author. Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., p. 143. Ibid., p. 149. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. Interview, ZOA Programme Manager, 6 June 2005. Interview, MARR Programme Manager, op. cit. 99 Observed by the author. 100 Interview, MARR Programme Manager, Mannar Town, op. cit. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. Interview, WRDS President, Chinnavalayankaddu, 15 June 2005. 103 Observed by the author. 104 Observed by the author. 105 Observed by the author. 106 Interview, Beneficiary, 22 June 2005. 107 Observed by the author. 108 Interview, Sewa Lanka Officer, Saviriapuram, op. cit. 109 Because the entire village had been displaced many people had formed relationships with people from outside the village. 110 Observed by author and verified in beneficiary interviews carried out in Madhukari. 111 Interview, ZOA Officer, Madhukari, 10 June 2005. Interview, Grama Sevika, Madhukari, 10 June 2005. 112 Interview, GS Chinnavalayankaddu, AGA Office, Madhu, op. cit. Interview, WRDS President, Chinnavalayankaddu, op. cit. 113 Community Meeting, Saviriapuram, 23 June 2005. 114 Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., p. 59. 115 Ibid., p. 65. 116 Ibid., p. 180. 117 Ibid., p. 109. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid., pp. 108–110. 120 Ibid., pp. 110–111. 121 Ibid., p. 64. 122 Ibid., p. 77. 123 Ibid., p. 66. 124 Ibid., pp. 76–77.

204 Notes 125 126 127 128 129 130

131 132 133 134 135 136 137

138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145

146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154

155 156 157 158

Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 82. Department of Agriculture, Mannar. Data supplied by the Mannar GA. Department of Animal Production and Health, Mannar and Murungan. Data supplied by the Mannar GA. Department of Agriculture, op. cit. Of the 11 families interviewed in Chinnavalayankaddu, nine families relied entirely on agriculture, the remaining two, one man was a mason, and the other owned a shop. In Madhukari of the 12 families interviewed only one family ran a shop, the rest were farming and also working as kooli labourers. Interview, ZOA Programme Manager, op. cit. Confirmed by interviewees in Madhukari. Interview, CARE Programme Manager, Mannar Town, 09 May 2005. Interview, Family 29, Chinnavalayankaddu, 17 June 2005. Interview, AGA, AGA Office, Madhu, op. cit. Interview, Family 18, Chinnavalayankaddu, 14 June 2005. Observed by the author. Observed by the author. Interview, CARE Programme Manager, Mannar Town, op. cit. I interviewed two families in the Madhu Division who had received banana trees, the first was in the village of Chinnavalayankaddu, another lives in Chinnapandiviolan, close to Madhu Church. Interview, School Principle, Chinnavalayankaddu, op. cit. Tripe-R Ministry, op. cit., p. 89. Ibid., p. 90. Ibid., p. 92. Department of Fisheries, Mannar. Data supplied by the Mannar GA. Interview, Sewa Lanka Officer, Saviriapuram, op. cit. Ibid. This issue was one of the main issues raised at a community meeting attended by the author during the evening of 23 June 2005. Interview, Sewa Lanka Officer, Saviriapuram, op. cit. The construction of a new fisherman’s rest house was noted at the community meeting mention in the preceding footnote. Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., pp. 122–123. Ibid., p. 123. Ibid. Ibid., p. 85. Ibid. Manthai Salt Ltd. Data supplied by the Mannar GA. Observed by the author. Observed by the author. Betel leaf (known as paan in India) is chewed with bettle nut and lime (alkaline) to form a paste in the mouth. It is chewed usually after meals in the same way as tobacco products, and is harmful. Interview, Family 7, Madhukari, 7 June 2005. Interview, Family 27, Chinnayalayankaddu, 17 June 2005. Observed by the author. Triple-R Ministry, op. cit., p. 153.

Notes 205 159 160 161 162 163 164

165

166 167

168 169 170

171

Ibid. Ibid. Interview, School Principal, Saviriapuram, op. cit. Observed by the author. Experienced by the author. United Nations Economic and Social Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/61 – Addendum – Visit to Sri Lanka’ (United Nations Commission on Human Rights: Geneva, 1998) pp. 16–17. ‘Sri Lanka has signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Sri Lanka acceded to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in January 1994. It is legally bound to implement the human rights safeguards required by these treaties, including respect for the right to life (article 6 of the ICCPR) and the right not to be tortured (article 7 of the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture). Article 4 of the ICCPR clearly states that both rights need to be upheld at all times, even “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”. In addition, Sri Lanka is also a State party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In October 1997, Sri Lanka became a party to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, Sri Lanka is not a party to the Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.’ Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., pp. 14–15. UNHCRH, ‘UN Special Rapporteur Report on Torture 2002: Section on Sri Lanka, 17 December 2002’ (Geneva: UNHCRH, 2002). http://srilanka. ahrchk.net/legal_reform/mainfile.php/0102/21/, date accessed 19 April 2006. Interview, Member of the Mannar Citizen’s Committee, Mannar Town, 3 June 2005. TamilNet, ‘Fear rules Mannar’, 2 May 2001. http://www.tamilnet.com/ art.html?catid=13&artid=5979, date accessed 11 April 2006. ‘The 14 different passes available to Tamils usually range from a few hours to three months, and queuing for them can take several hours. Often people are not given passes at all, or they must wait for months, even if they urgently need to go south for example for medical reasons since most medicines are unavailable in the North. Having on one’s person a pass and a national identity card is essential. Being without them can lead to inconvenience at the least and “disappearance” at the worst.’ Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), ‘Restricting freedom of movement: The “pass system”’ (2000) referred to in Global IDP Database, Profile of Internal Displacement Sri Lanka (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project, 2002) pp. 77–78. Interview, School Principal, Chinnavalayankaddu Madhu, 15 June 2005.

206 Notes 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183

184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197

198

199

200

201

Interview, Priest, Madhu Church, Madhu, 15 June 2005. Interview, Mannar Citizen’s Committee Member, Mannar, 3 June 2005. SLMM, ‘Summary of recorded complaints and violations from All Districts’, 2002. www.slmm.lk, date accessed 11 April 2005. Ibid. Interview, Mannar, 2 June 2005. Interview, Former Child Soldier, Vankalai, 17 May 2005. Ibid. Interview, Save the Children Project Manager, Mannar Town, 12 May 2005. Ibid. The interviewee explained that in the past children were sent home if they were not strong enough for the LTTE. Ibid. Ibid. Human Rights Watch, Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Human Rights Watch, November 2004, Vol. 16, No. 13) p. 15. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/srilanka1104/, date accessed 5 May 2006. Interview, Family 23, 16 June 2005. Anonymous. Observed by the author. The Multilateral Group, op. cit., p. i. Interview, Norwegian Ambassador, Colombo, 22 June 2004. Ibid. European Union Election Observer Mission, ‘Sri Lanka Parliamentary Elections 2 April 2004, Final Report’ (European Union, 2004) p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Interview, Member of the Mannar Citizen’s Committee, 3 June 2005. Interview, GS Chinnayalayankaddu, AGA Office, Madhu, op. cit. This was confirmed by a number of NGO workers. Interview, NGO employee, Mannar, 1 May 2004. Observed by the author. ‘Women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed element.’ UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (S/RES/1325), 31 October 2000. ‘Declaration in Support of the Peace Process in Sri Lanka’, Oslo Peace Support Meeting, 25 November 2002. http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/ insidepages/Internationalsuppoer/OsloMeeting/Declaration.asp, date accessed 8 March 2005. Tokyo Donor Conference, ‘Tokyo Declaration on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka’, 10 June 2003. http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/ insidepages/Internationalsuppoer/TokyoDonor/TokyoDec100603.asp, date accessed 8 March 2005. Centre for Policy Alternatives, Knowledge Attitudes Practices Survey on the Sri Lankan Peace Process: Potential for Peace (Colombo: CPA, 2004) p. 6. Daily News (Colombo), ‘Religious structure in Trincomalee town unauthorised construction’, 1 June 2005.

Notes 207 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211

TamilNet, ‘Troops fire on Valaichenai protestors, 1 killed’, 9 May 2005. A non-violent form of protest common in South Asia where businesses and public services close. TamilNet, ‘Northeast shuts down over checkpoint gunfire’, 10 May 2005. TamilNet, ‘Hartal paralyzes NorthEast’, 3 June 2005. Observed by the author. TamilNet, ‘Mannar LTTE offices come under attack’, 18 June 2005. Observed by the author. Observed by the author. Interview, Nanaddan School, Nanaddan, 10 June 2005. Interview, Family 25, Chinnayalayankaddu, 16 June 2005. Interview, School Principal, Chinnavalayankaddu, op. cit. B. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Chapter 5

The Resurgence of War

1 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘Presidential manoeuvre that back-fired and the UNF offensive’, 24 February 2002. 2 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘Consorting with Vijaya’s killers’, 28 March 2004. 3 P. Saravanamuttu, ‘Sri Lanka – The intractability of ethnic conflict’, in J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds) The Management of Peace Processes (London: Palgrave, 2000) p. 204. 4 Her resolve may have been hardened by the loss of an eye following a suicide attack during the 2000 presidential elections. 5 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘How the UNF will pip the post’, 28 March 2004. 6 European Union Election Observer Mission, ‘Sri Lanka parliamentary elections 2 April 2004, final report’ (European Union, 2004) p. 58. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Lakshman Kadirgamar was killed by an LTTE sniper in August 2005. 10 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘PM stakes and the war setting’, 11 April 2004. 11 G. Peiris, Twilight of the Tigers: Peace Efforts and Power Struggles in Sri Lanka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 155. 12 Ibid., p. 165. 13 Human Rights Watch, ‘Sri Lanka: Killings highlight weaknesses in ceasefire’, 11 February 2005., http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/11/slanka10162.htm, date accessed 21 September 2005. 14 Human Rights Watch, ‘Complicit in crime: State collusion in abductions and child recruitment by the Karuna Group’, Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2007). http://hrw.org/reports/2007/srilanka0107/srilanka0107web. pdf, date accessed 25 October 2007. 15 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘Karuna camp in govt. controlled area’, 20 March 2006. 16 G. Peiris, op. cit., p. 165.

208 Notes 17 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘A dead end peace process and a President all at sea’, 22 January 2006. In September 2007 Karuna arrived in the United Kingdom on a genuine Sri Lankan diplomatic passport, he was subsequently jailed for identity fraud. Reuters, ‘UK jails ex-S. Lanka Tiger Karuna for ID fraud’, 25 January 2008. http://uk.reuters.com/article/ idUKL2519855520080125, date accessed 26 April 2010. 18 Reuters, ‘Push for peace in Sri Lanka ahead of crucial talks’, 15 October 2006. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/DEL154206.htm, date accessed 23 April 2010. Bloomberg, ‘Sri Lanka peace talks with rebels collapse in Geneva (Update2)’, 30 October 2006. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ news?pid=20601080&sid=aNE9WpUBGRKU&refer=asia, date accessed 23 April 2010. 19 Daily News (Colombo), ‘Mahanayake Theras urge support for peace process’, 5 June 2002. 20 The Island (Colombo), ‘Mahanayake urged not to meet ‘sovereignty offenders’, 18 April 2002. 21 C. de Silva, ‘Response to Venerable Akuratiye Nanda’s paper “An analysis of statements Issued by the Mahanayakas on the North-East problem of Sri Lanka”’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 10 (2003). http://www.buddhistethics.org/10/silva-sri-lanka-conf.html#n3, date accessed 5 March 2010. 22 N. DeVotta and J. Stone, ‘Jathika Hela Urumaya and Ethno-religious Politics in Sri Lanka, Pacific Affaires, Vol. 81, No. 1 (2008), p. 39. 23 Ibid., p. 48. 24 P. Premasiri, ‘A “righteous war”, in Buddhism’, in M. Deegalle (ed.) Buddhism, Conflict and Violence in Modern Sri Lanka (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) p. 79. 25 Daily News (Colombo), ‘No final decision on P-TOMS sans consultations with Maha Nayakas – President’, 11 June 2005. The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘Monks ready to cross the line of democracy’, 12th June 2005. 26 The Sunday Leader, ‘JVP jumps ship as economy plummets’, 19 June 2005. 27 Meaning ‘Mahinda’s vision’. 28 M. Rajapakse, ‘Mahinda Chinthana: Towards a new Sri Lanka’, Presidential Election 2005. http://mcg.mpi.gov.lk/info_in/mahinda_ chintana_eng.pdf, date accessed 12 September 2007. 29 Ibid. 30 G. Peiris, op. cit., p. 197. 31 This is understandable given the total control by the LTTE of the Vanni. 32 W. Mishler, S. Finkel and P. Peiris, ‘The 2005 presidential and 2004 parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka’, Electoral Studies, Vol. 26 (2007), p. 208. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., p. 209. 35 Chandra Lekha Sriram quotes from an interview with Professor Bertram Bastiampillai (Colombo, 8 July 2005) in Peace as Governance: Power-Sharing, Armed Groups and Contemporary Peace Negotiations (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p. 83. 36 Observed by the author. 37 Ibid., p. 82. 38 UTHR(J), ‘Political killings and rituals of unreality: Information bulletin no. 38’, 21 July 2005. http://www.uthr.org/bulletins/bul38.htm#_Toc135544187, date accessed 11 March 2010.

Notes 209 39 SLMM, ‘Complaints and violations’. http://www.slmm.lk, date accessed 11 April 2006. 40 The total violations includes all possible violations under the categories of ‘Non CFA’, ‘Offensive Military Operations’, ‘Freedom of Movement’, ‘Separation of Forces’, ‘Measure to Restore Normalcy’, and ‘Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission’. 41 Human Rights Watch, ‘Funding the “final war”: Intimidation and extortion in the Tamil Diaspora’, 14 March 2006. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 2006/03/14/funding-final-war-2, date accessed 14 March 2010. 42 Ibid., p. 9. 43 Daily News (Colombo), ‘All four accused acquitted’, 28 May 2005. 44 Human Rights News, ‘Sri Lanka: Failure of justice for victims of massacre’, 2 June 2005. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/02/slanka11064.htm, date accessed 6 December 2006. 45 UTHR(J), ‘The curse of impunity, Part I, Bindunuwewa, the thin end of the wedge of impunity: Special report no: 19’, 12 June 2005. http://www. uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport19.htm, date accessed 12 March 2010. 46 B. Matthews, ‘International engagement in human rights situations in Sri Lanka’, Pacific Affaires, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Winter 2009/2010) p. 581. 47 A political appointment. 48 B. Matthews, op. cit., p. 589. 49 Ibid., p. 593. 50 Ibid. 51 M. Raheem and K. Loganathan, ‘Internationalisation of the Sri Lankan Peace process’, Background Paper for the Conference on ‘International dimensions of the peace process in Sri Lanka’, Centre for Policy Alternations (CPA), Colombo, 8–9 July 2005, p. 7. 52 Ibid. 53 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘Pot boilers and peace’, 24 November 2002. 54 See an article from Lakshman Kadirgamar in the Daily News (Colombo) ‘The courage for peace’ (Colombo), 29 June 2005. 55 Daily News (Colombo), ‘Norway gave money to the LTTE: Karuna’, 27 November 2006. 56 The Sunday Times (Colombo), ‘Norway helping LTTE, says Norwegians against terrorism founder’, 21 April 2007. This NGO was reported to have only one member. 57 The Daily News (Colombo), ‘Norwegian embassy clarifies’, 7 February 2008. 58 The Island (Colombo), ‘Norway, Solheim helped establish LTTE-Eritrea links for arms deals’, 28 September 2009. 59 M. Raheem and K. Loganathan, op. cit., p. 19. 60 C. Orjuela, The Identity Politics of Peacebuilding: Civil Society in War-torn Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2008) p. 235. 61 C. Orjuela, ‘Dilemmas of civil society aid: Donors, NGOs and the quest for peace in Sri Lanka’, Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005) p. 3. 62 BBC News, ‘Alarm over S Lanka “rights abuse”, 14 March 2010. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/8566946.stm, date accessed 14 March 2010.

210 Notes 63 G. Cooper, ‘Aid groups in Sri Lanka tackle “fat cat” image’, 29 May 2007. http://www.alertnet.org/db/blogs/30708/2007/04/29-115751-1.htm. 64 Terms of Reference for the Investigations of the Operations of NonGovernmental Organisations and their Impact. http://www.parliament.lk/ committees/ListCommReport.do?comID=COMM1016, date accessed 18 March 2010. 65 Transparency International Sri Lanka, ‘Three years after the Tsunami’, 25 December 2007. http://www.tisrilanka.org/pub/pp/pdf/pr_25_dec_07_ tyat.pdf, date accessed 18 March 2010, p. 2. 66 Ibid. 67 B. Fernando, ‘Sri Lanka: The interim report of the parliamentary committee on NGOs is flawed from the point of view of policy, science and law’, Asian Human Rights Commission, 12 December 2008. http://www.ahrchk. net/statements/mainfile.php/2008statements/1807/, date accessed 18 March 2010. 68 The Island (Colombo), ‘Constitutional ministry seeks federal solutions’, 26 February 2009. 69 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘R2P – a bogey or real threat?’, 17 February 2008. 70 Utenricksdepartment, ‘The Tokyo co-chairs appeal to Sri Lanka to pull back from crisis’, 30 May 2006. http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/ nyheter/2006/the-tokyo-co-chairs-appeal-to-sri-lanka-.html?id=419656, date accessed 31 August 2009. 71 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘The co-chairs to pull out unless govt.delivers on Oslo deal’, 4 June 2006. 72 U.S Department of State, ‘Sri Lanka co-chairs call for immediate cessation of hostilities’, 11 August 2006. http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/ 70312.htm, date accessed 20 July 2009. 73 Norway (The Official Site), ‘Statement by the Sri Lanka co-chairs’, 13 September 2006. http://www.eu-norway.org/misc/print.aspx?article= {9cc85a3d-7251-4d1f-8201-4d81a4f8de, date accessed 4 August 2009. 74 ‘Sri Lanka’s militaristic government said on Friday it had hauled in the envoys of countries calling for UN human rights monitoring of the island’s increasingly dirty war with Tamil separatists.’ A. Jayasinghe (Agence FrancePresse), ‘Sri Lanka clashes with diplomats over rights demands’, 14 December 2007. http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SSHN-79VD3C?OpenDocument &rc=3&emid=ACOS-635PHK, date accessed 29 December 2007. See also S. Gardner (Reuters), ‘Rights abuses in focus at Sri Lanka donor Oslo meet’, 25 June 2007. And A. Perera (Inter Press Service News Agency), ‘Sri Lanka: Donor threats unlikely to stop war machine’, 2 February 2007. http://ipsnews. net/print.asp?idnews= 36418, date accessed 29 December 2007. 75 US Department of State, ‘2008 human rights report: Sri Lanka’, 25 February 2009. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119140.htm, date accessed 24 April 2010. 76 Lanka Business Online, ‘Diplomatic spat: Sri Lanka, U.S. in rode over human rights report’, 14 March 2008. http://www.lankabusinessonline. com/fullstory.php?newsID=1513520302&no_view=1&SEARCH_TERM=33, date accessed 22 April 2010.

Notes 211 77 ‘Unmindful of India’s opposition to Sri Lanka turning to Pakistan and China for military hardware to bolster its offensive against the Tamil Tigers, Colombo has recently inked several significant defence agreements with Beijing.’ IANS, ‘Sri Lanka turns to Pakistan, China for military needs’, 2 June 2007. http://in. news. yahoo.com/070602/43/6gkgo.html, date accessed 29 December 2007. 78 Sunday Times (Colombo), ‘Development assistance pattern changing’, 4 February 2007. 79 The Times (London), ‘Britain sold weapons to help Sri Lankan army defeat Tamil Tigers’, 2 June 2009. 80 The Daily News (Colombo), ‘China as a global power: Lecture delivered by Lakshman Kadirgamar’, 28 December 2004, 15 January 2005. 81 The Times of India, ‘India upset with China over Sri Lanka crisis’, 26 April 2008. 82 ‘China continues to regard the details of its aid program as a state secret and publishes no annual reports.’ F. Hanson, ‘Policy brief. China: Stumbling through the Pacific’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, July 2009, p. 3. http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/China_stumbling_through_the_ Pacific.pdf, date accessed 21 April 2010. 83 Ibid. 84 The Sunday Leader (Colombo), ‘I would not have done any different’, 24 May 2009. 85 World Cargo News Online, ‘Hambantota work starts’, June 2007. http://www. worldcargonews.com/htm/n20070722.354939.htm, date accessed 22 April 2010. 86 The Times (London), ‘Chinese billions in Sri Lanka fund battle against Tamil Tigers’, 2 May 2009. 87 Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), ‘Fact finding mission to Pesalai – 28th June 2006’, 28 June 2006. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ AMMF-6RDDZA?OpenDocument, date accessed 12 September 2006. 88 A fisherman’s hut. 89 Centre for Policy Alternatives, ‘Fact finding mission to Pesalai’, op. cit. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 The Sunday Times (Colombo), ‘Top govt. team provides immediate relief for Mannar victims’, 25 June 2006. 93 SLMM, ‘SLMM weekly monitoring report’, 27 August–2 September 2007. http://www.slmm.lk/W_Report/SLMM%20Weekly%20Report%2027%20August %20-%2002%20September%202007.pdf, date accessed 29 December 2007. 94 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ‘Sri Lanka: Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara situation report #105’, 20 December 2007. 95 Phone Interview, INGO, Mannar, 31 January 2010. 96 SLMM, ‘SLMM weekly monitoring report’, 19–26 March 2007. http://www. slmm.lk/W_Report/SLMM%20Weekly%20Report%2019-26% 20March.pdf, date accessed 29 December 2007. 97 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, ‘Sri Lanka: Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara & Jaffna situation report #96’, 18 October 2007. 98 ‘The worst violence was in the Mannar district just south of rebel-held territory’. Guardian Unlimited, ‘Dozens dead as Sri Lankan fighting escalates’, 3 December 2007.

212 Notes 99 Centre for Policy Alternatives, ‘Mannar field mission’, November 2007, pp. 2–8. 100 The Sunday Leader, ‘At least 378 killed and 1,122 injured in shelling and bombing’, 17 May 2009. 101 The Government denies this. 102 Government of Sri Lanka, ‘Terrorism defeated: Writ of Parliament now throughout Sri Lanka – President’, 19 May 2009. http://www.priu.gov.lk/ news_update/Current_Affairs/ca200905/20090519terrorism_defeated.htm, date accessed 9 July 2009. 103 Mannar Citizens’ Committee, ‘Situation report’ 5 July 2007. http://www. medico-international.de/en/projects/srilanka/watch/ 20070505mannar.pdf, date accessed 29 December 2007. 104 Ibid., p. 1. 105 South Asians for Human Rights, ‘Report on the Fact finding mission to the north & east of Sri Lanka to assess the state of the displaced persons’, August 2007, p. 35. 106 TamilNet, ‘Vegetable business collapses in Mannar’, 13 June 2007. http://www. tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=22462, date accessed 29 December 2007. 107 Mannar Citizens’ Committee, op. cit. 108 South Asians for Human Rights, op. cit., pp. 32–33. See also Centre for Policy Alternatives, ‘Mannar field mission’, November 2007, p. 3 and Mannar Citizens’ Committee, op. cit., p. 2. 109 UN Human Rights Council, ‘11th special session of the Human Rights Council: “The human rights situation in Sri Lanka” – Tuesday 26 and 27 May 2009, Resolution ‘S-11/1 Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human rights’, 27 May 2009. http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/11/index.htm, date accessed 24 April 2010. 110 Those for it were: Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Uruguay, and Zambia. 111 Those against: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 112 United Nations News & Media, ‘Human Rights Council adopts resolution on assistance to Sri Lanka in promotion and protection of human rights’, 27 May 2009. http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/ (httpNewsByYear_ en)/CC9888146BC8CE01C12575C3005D82FF?OpenDocument, date accessed 24 April 2010. 113 Forced Migration Review, ‘Sri Lanka: A question of rights’, issue 33, September 2009, p. 4. http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR33/FMR33.pdf, date accessed 23 April 2010. 114 Ibid. 115 Joint Humanitarian Update, ‘North East Sri Lanka Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya and Trincomalee districts report #22’, March 2010. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka_hpsl/Files/Situation %20Reports/ Joint%20Humanitarian%20Update/LKRN041_100312-100326-SL-IA-SitrepsExternal-Joint_Humanitarian_Update-22.pdf. 116 Human Rights Watch, ‘Legal limbo: The uncertain fate of detained LTTE suspects in Sri Lanka’, 2 February 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 2010/02/02/legal-limbo-0, date accessed 25 April 2010.

Notes 213 117 118

119 120

121 122

123 124

125

126

127

128

Ibid. UTHR(J), ‘Special report no: 34, Let them speak, part VI, protecting crime by criminalising an entire populace, 13th December 2009. http://www.uthr. org/SpecialReports/Special%20rep34/Uthr-sp.rp34part6.htm, date accessed 23 April 2010. Ibid. Medicins Sans Frontieres, ‘Transcript, Sri Lanka: A “quite indescribable” scene after war ends, interview with MSF Emergency Coordinator Lauren Cooney’, 3 June 2009. http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm? id=3651&cat=transcript, date accessed 25 April 2009. Ibid. There have been many reports that the SLAF have raped Tamils during this war, see for example: Amnesty International, ‘Sri Lanka: Rape in custody’, 28 January 2002. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA37/001/2002, date accessed 25 April 2010. While the government have argued that this is propaganda the repatriation in 2007 of 105 Sri Lankan peacekeepers from Haiti after allegations of sexual exploitation, provides outside confirmation of this. ‘The Sunday Times [Colombo] learned that the UN Security Council is conducting an open investigation to probe alleged involvement of the peacekeepers in the running of six brothels, trafficking of sex workers to other countries and production of child pornography’. The Sunday Times (Colombo), ‘Court martial for guilty peacekeepers’, 11 November 2007. See also Channel 4 News, ‘Grim scenes at Sri Lankan camps’, 5 May 2009. http:// www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/grim+ scenes+at+sri+lankan+camps+/3126257, date accessed 25 April 2010. UTHR(J), op. cit., 2009. BBC News, ‘General Fonseka appears before Sri Lanka military court’, 16 March 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8569405.stm, date accessed 25 April 2010. Chandana Sirimalwatte, editor of the Iridia Lanka newspaper was arrested in January 2010. Armed men surrounded the offices of Lanka E News, one of a number of blocked websites, and their cartoonist, Prageeth Eknalogoda, ‘has been missing since leaving his office two days before the election’. Ravi Abeywickrama, of ‘the state-controlled TV broadcaster Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation, was assaulted’ after signing a joint letter condemning the states misuse of the state-media; ‘at least seven other employees who also signed the letter have been suspended or dismissed’. Human Rights Watch, ‘End harassment, attacks on journalists post-election crackdown feared’, 29 January 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/29/srilanka-end-harassment-attacks-journalists, date accessed 25 April 2010. The White House, ‘Statement by President Obama to mark World Press Freedom Day’, 1 May 2009. http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/ May/20090501140311eaifas0.4609273.html?CP.rss=true, date accessed 1 May 2010. IMF, ‘Press release: IMF announces staff-level agreement with Sri Lanka on US$2.5 billion stand-by arrangement’, No. 09/265, 20 July 2009. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09265.htm, date accessed 26 April 2009. The Times (London), ‘IMF approves controversial $2.5bn Sri Lanka loan’, 25 July 2009.

214 Notes 129

130

131 132 133

134

135

136 137 138 139

140

141 142 143 144

Bloomberg Businessweek, ‘Fitch may lower Sri Lanka’s debt rating on widening deficit’, 24 March 2010. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-24/ fitch-may-lower-sri-lanka-s-debt-rating-on-widening-deficit.html, date accessed 28 April 2010. ‘“GSP+” is common shorthand for the “special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance” which is one of three nonreciprocal, preferential import regimes for developing countries under the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).’ European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, ‘Press release: Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) Brussels Commission statement on Sri Lanka GSP+ report’, 20 October 2009. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index. cfm?id=466, date accessed 13 November 2009. Ibid. Quoting the Sri Lankan Ambassador to EU, Aryasinha. The Daily News (Colombo), ‘GSP+ puts Europe in quandary too’, 3 October 2009. BBC News, ‘EU punishes Sri Lanka over rights’, 16 February 2010. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/8518054.stm, date accessed 16 February 2010. Reuters, ‘Sri Lanka rupee falls amid IMF loan delay; shares gain’, 25 February 2010. http://in.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idINSGE61O0HI20100225, date accessed 26 April 2010. Colombo Page, ‘Iranian aid for rural electrification program in Sri Lanka’, 24 April 2010. http://www.colombopage.com/archive_10/Apr1272091287CH.php, date accessed 30 April 2010. http://www.cpalanka.org/page.php?id=0&pubid=601&key=9bdd5f06c 37bdab66735ca41a9457925, date accessed 25 April 2010. The Island, ‘Editorial: Saving Dr Saravanamuttu’, 17 September 2009. Ibid. Lanka News Web, ‘State intelligence units list journalists supportive of the opposition and NGOs Saravanamuttu and Weliamuna top in the list’, 3 March 2010. http://www.lankanewsweb.com/news/EN_2010_03_02_ 012.html, date accessed 23 April 2010. BBC News, ‘Alarm over S Lanka “rights abuse”, 14 March 2010. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/8566946.stm, date accessed 14 March 2010. The following account is from a phone interview with a senior NGO employee. Phone Interview, INGO, Colombo, 31 January 2010. International Organisation for Migration. World Food Program. Phone Interview, INGO, Colombo, op. cit.

Chapter 6

Building Peace or Buying Time?

1 Andrew Williams quotes from the papers of the American Governor, Lehman, who administered the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (active between 1942 and 1946). A. Williams, Liberalism and War: The Victors and the Vanquished (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 114. The quote is made on page 121.

Notes 215 2 M. Turner and D. Hulme, Governance, Administration & Development: Making the State Work (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997) pp. 4–6. 3 J. Owen, ‘The foreign imposition of domestic institutions’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002) pp. 388–389. 4 See M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books, 2001) and N. Cooper, ‘Picking out the pieces of the liberal peaces: Representations of conflict economies and the implications for policy’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2005) pp. 463–478. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 7 ‘Declaration in support of the peace process in Sri Lanka’, Oslo Peace Support Meeting, 25 November 2002. http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/ Internationalsuppoer/OsloMeeting/Declaration.asp, date accessed 8 March 2005. 8 O. Richmond, ‘UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2004) pp. 83–101. 9 O. Richmond and J. Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) p. 4. 10 European Union Election Observer Mission, ‘Sri Lanka parliamentary elections 2 April 2004, final report’ (European Union, 2004) p. 2. 11 Sri Lanka has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War. 12 O. Hathaway, ‘The cost of commitment’, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 5 (2003) p. 1834. 13 See for example D. Large, ‘China’s Sudan engagement: Changing northern and southern political trajectories in peace and war, The China Quarterly, No. 199 (2009) pp. 610–626. 14 UN Human Rights Council, ‘11th special session of the Human Rights Council: “The human rights situation in Sri Lanka”’ – Tuesday 26 and 27 May 2009, Resolution ‘S-11/1 Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human rights’, 27 May 2009. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/ specialsession/11/index.htm, date accessed 24 April 2010. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 United Nations, ‘Preamble’, UN Charter. 18 P. Harrold and S. Sardesai, ‘The dynamics of conflict, development assistance and peace-building: Sri Lanka 2000–05’, Social Development Notes, No. 23 (World Bank Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, 2006) p. 2. 19 Ibid., p. 3.

Index 100 Houses Housing Scheme, 150 abductions by government forces, 142 by LTTE, 126, 141, 142 see also disappearances, forced recruitment Action Contre La Faim, 144 ADB Asian Development Bank, 4, 96, 97, 100, 149 agriculture, 108, 120–122, 123 aid, conditionality, 92, 99–101, 149, 167 see Tokyo Declaration delivery of see P-TOMS development, 37–39 disbursement, 101 as leverage, 93, 99–101 post-9/11, 41 An Agenda for Peace, 21, 25, 41 asymmetry of conflict parties, 63, 68 Azar, E., 35, 48 Balasingham, Anton, 79, 142, 145 Bandaranaike Family see Bandaranaike, Sirmavo, Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D., Kumartunga, Chandrika Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (B-C Pact), 54, 61 Bandaranaike, Sirimavo, 55–56, 63–64 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D., 52, 54–55, 61, 62 bhikkus, 51, 54, 55, 62, 141 see also Bhuddist monks Buddhist clergy, 69 see Sangha Bhuddist monks, 51, 101, 138, 139 see also bhikkus Boutros-Ghali, B., 21 break-up of Sri Lanka, 83, 141 Bretton Woods, 30, 92 see also IMF International Monetary Fund, World Bank

Cambodia, 43–44 capacity building, 99 CAS Country Assistance Strategy, 82, 92, 96 caste, 51–52 Catholic Church land tenure, 116 peace arbiters, 109 Catholics, 108, 109 CBO Community-Based Organisations, 98 see also FO Farmers Organisation, WRDS Rural Development Society Ceasefire Agreements 1995, 69 2001, unilateral, 5 2002, bilateral, 76, 78, 79, 137 see MoU Memorandum of Understanding CFA Ceasefire Agreement see also MoU Memorandum of Understanding ceasefire violations, 126 cessation of hostilities see Ceasefire Agreements Ceylonisation, 53 Chelvanayakam, S. J. V., 54, 55, 56, 58 see also BandaranaikeChelvanayakam Pact, Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact child recruitment, 127, 143 China, 149–150, 152, 164 Chinnavalayankaddu, 114, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121–122, 123, 124, 127, 128 civil society, 8, 88, 146, 163 CNC Ceylon National Congress, 52 Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference, 148–149, 152, 163–166 COI Commission of Inquiry, 144

216

Index 217 Cold War, 36–39 Collier, P., 9, 31 Collier, Paul, 32, 35 colonisation, British, 49, 50, 52, 59 Dutch, 49, 50 Portuguese, 49, 50 state sponsored, 49, 65 complex emergencies approach, 40 conflict resolution, 33–35 constitution, 1972, 57 1987 Amendment, 91 Donoughmore, 52 Sixth Amendment, 61, 68 Soulbury, 52 Thirteenth Amendment, 65, 66 core-issues, 81 corruption Government, 71, 74, 147 local-Government, 130 NGO, 130, 147–148 Coser, L., 35 cost, of riots, 61 of war, 74, 94 coup, 57 Cousens, E., 28 CPA Centre for Policy Alternatives, 75, 155–156 cronyism see corruption Curle, Adam, 32 CWC Ceylon Workers Congress, 57 democracy, 27–29 Sri Lankan, 51–52 democratic peace thesis, 28 Dervanandan, Douglas, 115 devolution, 61–62, 65, 69 see also federalism, powersharing diaspora, 49, 68, 79, 143 disappearances, 125 of journalists, 154 see also missing displacement, 108, 109, 110–114 donors, 5–6, 21, 42–43, 85–105, 129–130, 135, 145–150, 159–168 Dunham, D., 60

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office, 23 economic development, 38–39 economic growth, 29, 90, 92 economic liberalisation, 44 Sri Lankan, 58, 60, 73, 163 education, 50, 56, 99, 109, 116–117 quota system, 91, 116 see Standardization in Education Eelam, 65, 68 elections general, 71 2001, 79, 87, 93 2004, 129, 137 2010, 154 presidential, 71 1993, 69 2005, 140–141 2010, 154 El Salvador, 43–44 entitlements approach, 58 EPDP Eelam People’s Democratic Party, 138 see also Dervanandan, Douglas EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front, 64, 68 EROS Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students, 58, 68 ethnic riots 1958, 55 1977, 49, 58 1983, 49, 60–61 EU European Union, 23, 149, 160 European Recovery Programme see Marshall Plan European Union Election Observer Mission, 162 executive, presidential, 58, 138, 162, 166 external assistance see donors FDL Forward Defence Line, 151 federalism, 54, 56, 69, 81, 140, 142, 148 see also devolution, powersharing final war, 143 fishing, 108, 122–123, 128 restrictions on, 123, 152, 157 FO Farmers Organisation, 119, 122

218 Index Fonseka, General Sarath, 154 forced recruitment, 128, 141 FP Federal Party, 54–57 fraud see corruption free movement, limits on, 7, 69, 88, 96, 121, 124, 125, 127 see also pass system fishing, restrictions on, 122 Galtung, J., 20 Gandhi, Indira, 63–64 Gandhi, Rajiv, 64–66, 111 Ghandi, Mahatma, 32 greed thesis, 4, 31, 35, 133, 136 grievance thesis, 4, 31, 133 GSP Generalised System of Preference, 155–156 Gurr, T., 29 hartal, 133 health, 117–118 HSZ High Security Zones, 83, 112 housing, 114–115 human development, 59, 72–74 human rights abduction, 126–128, 141, 142 arbitrary arrest, 125, 153, 154 arbitrary detention, 58, 59, 110, 143, 153 violations, 124–126, 142, 148–149, 152–155 hurting stalemate, 77 IDP camps, 114, 153 see also Madhu Church, Menik Farm, Welfare Centres IDP internally displaced persons, 49–50, 85, 110–114, 152, 153 IIGEP International Independent Group of Eminent Persons, 144 IMF International Monetary Fund, 30, 39, 92, 94, 155 India, 49, 51, 62, 63–68 Indian Tamils, 49, 50–54, 80 industrial processing, 123 dairy, 123 fish processing, 123 mills, 123 salt, 108, 123

infrastructure, 73, 118–120, 129 electricity, 73, 97, 116, 118–119, 133 irrigation, 85, 120–121 railways, 118, 119 roads, 117–122, 124, 128, 129 sewerage, 111 tanks see irrigation waste water treatment, 111, 119 water, 73, 111, 118–121 interim administration, 79–80, 83, 87 internal displacement see displacement International Bank for Reconstruction and Development see World Bank international donors see donors intimidation, by Government forces, 153 by the LTTE, 138, 143 of the Mannar Citizen’s Committee, 125 of the press, 154 of the Tamil Diaspora, 143 of voters, 71 IPKF India Peacekeeping Force, 66–68 Iran, 155 ISGA Interim Self-Governing Authority proposals, 83 ISPA Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement, 62, 65–68 Japan, 4, 86 Jayasuriya, S. K., 60 Jayawardene, J. R., 58–62, 64 JHU Jathika Hela Urumaya, 101, 138, 140–141 journalism see media journalists, 154, 172 JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, 56–57, 63, 67, 82, 93, 101, 137–138, 140–141 Kadirgamar, Lakshman, 138, 145, 149 Kaldor, M., 30 Karaithuraipatru, 151–152 Karuna, Colonel, 100, 138–139, 145 Keen, D., 31 Kelegama, S., 94 Kumar, C., 28

Index 219 Kumaratunga, Chandrika, 62, 69–70, 79–80, 82–84, 95, 137–138, 166 landmines, 94, 132 see also mines land tenure, 116, 120 language, 10, 12, 54–57, 75, 91, 125 legislation see Sinhala Only Law, Standardisation in Language Media, Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act Lebanon, 43–44 Lederach, J. P., 20, 32 liberal economic reform see economic liberalisation liberal peace, 1, 25, 29, 47, 76, 105, 134–135, 162–164 List, F., 30 loans to LTTE, 143 personal, 124 revolving, 122 to Sri Lanka, 101, 155 World Bank/IMF, 22, 30, 38–39 Loganathan, K., 59 LTTE Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam, 1, 49, 58, 59, 65–68, 69–70, 78–79, 109–110, 133–134, 137–138, 141–143, 145–146, 151 after the war, 154 expansion, 68 human rights, 124–128 leader see Prabhakaran, Veluppillai and the peace talks, 79–81, 83–84, 129 split see Karuna, Colonel LTTE-controlled area, 85, 96–98 see also Vanni Madhu Church, 110, 114, 130 Madhukari, 113, 115, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 151 Maha Sangha, 70 Mahinda Chinthana, 140 Mangala Moonesinghe Committee, 68–69

Mani, Rama, 148 manifesto, JHU, 140 UNP, 87 UPFA see Mahinda Chinthana Mannar Citizen’s Committee, 125, 130 Mannar District, 106–135, 150–152 Mannar Plan, 107 MARR Mannar Association for Refugee Rehabilitation, 115 Marshall Plan, 36–38, 160 massacres, see Action Contre La Faim Bindunuwewa, 143 Matthews, B., 144 media, 75, 95 see also press freedom Ministry of, 82 Sinhala, 75, 95 state-controlled, 144 Tamil, 95 mediation, 32 see peacemaking Indian, 65–66 Norwegian, 4–5, 77–84 Menik Farm, 152, 153 Mennonite Conciliations Service, 32 MG Multilateral Group, 102–103 militancy, Sinhalese, 74 see JVP Tamil, 58, 64, 68 Mill, J. S., 28 mines, 120, 152 see also landmines, UXOs unexploded ordinance minority rights, 57, 71, 76 misappropriation of funds see corruption missing, 153 modernisation, 39 MoU Memorandum of Understanding, abrogation of, 76 signing of, 5, 79 movement, restrictions on, 69, 121, 122, 124, 125 see also pass system Muslims, 49, 51, 69, 75, 80, 84, 108, 109

220 Index nation-building, 37–40 NECORD North East Community Restoration and Development project, 96 Needs Assessment for the North and East, 90, 95 NEIAP North East Irrigated Agriculture Project, 85, 96, 121 neo-liberal reform see economic liberalisation NEPC North-East Provincial Council, 65, 97 nepotism see corruption NERF North East Reconstruction Fund, 81, 83 new wars, 30–31 NGO non-governmental organisations, 41–43, 130, 146–148 NHA National Housing Authority, 115 normalisation, 88, 99, 130–131 Norway, 77–79, 83–88, 145–146, 163–165 NPC National Peace Council, 147 Nuwara Eliya, 49, 72–73 Ofstad, A., 84–87 ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, 43 Oslo Peace Support Meeting, 81–83, 132 Pakistan, 149–150, 152 PA People’s Alliance, 69–70 paramilitaries see militancy Pararajasingham, Joseph, 139 Paris, R., 8, 22 pass system, 88, 125, 127, 152 PDS Planning and Development Secretariat, 97–99 peace, 18–19 negative, 18–19, 44, 152–157 positive, 18–19 victor’s, 18 peace agreement see ISPA peacebuilding, consensus, 25, 45, 76, 162 definition, 19–25

NGO, 24 post-9/11, 62–63 post-conflict, 21–23 post-settlement, 22 timing of, 25–26 type-one, 46, 84–87, 128–130, 160–161 type-two, 46, 80, 128, 130–131, 160–161 peace dividend, 88–89, 92–99, 101–104, 128, 133, 135, 164–168 peacemaking, 20–22, 24 see peace process, mediation peace process, 2–8, 77–105, 132–133, 136–158, 159–168 Peace Secretariat, 97, 129 peace studies, 33–36 peace talks 2003, 6, 79–84, 95–96 2006, 139 Thimpu Talks, 62, 64–65 Pesalai see war crimes Plantations, 59 Plantation Tamils, 50 see Indian Tamils PLOTE People’s Liberation Organisation of the Tamil Eelam, 58, 64 political economy, 31 poverty, 29–32, 72–74, 88–99, 166 powersharing, 81 see also devolution, federalism, NEPC, Regional Councils Bill Prabhakaran, Vellupillai, 68, 79, 138, 139, 142, 145, 151 Premadasa, R., 53, 67 press see media press freedom, 154 proportional representation, 58, 71, 137–138, 162 protest, non-violent, 55, 62 see also hartal, satyagraha PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy, 92–93, 104 PSC protracted social conflict, 35, 48, 54 see Azar, E. PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act, 59, 124

Index 221 P-TOMS Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, 6, 101, 140–141 Pugh, M., 26, 40 Quaker Peace Movement, 32 Quaker Peace Testimony, 32 Rajapakse, Basil, 151, 154 Rajapakse, Chamal, 154 Rajapakse, Gotabaya, 154 Rajapakse, Mahinda, 1, 6, 82, 138, 140–141, 144, 154–155 rape, 125 by Government forces, 60, 112, 124, 150, 154 in IDP camps, 111 rational choice theory, 31 rational strategic calculations, 34–35 reconciliation, 32–33, 91, 102, 130–133 see also normalisation refugees, 50, 81, 161 Regaining Sri Lanka, 5, 90–92, 95 Regional Councils Bill, 55 rehabilitation, 80, 84–85, 87, 96–99, 110–128, 129–130 Reilly, B., 28 revival, 50 Buddhist, 50–51 Hindu, 50 revolving loans see loans rice politics, 60 Richmond, O., 19, 25 ripe moment, 78 Ropers, Norbert, 148 Ryan, S., 20, 63, 68 Sangha, 51, 62–63, 66, 70, 82, 84, 101, 139 Saravanamuttu, Paikiasothy, 155–156 satyagraha, 54, 55 Saviriapuram, 114, 115–116, 120, 123, 124, 133, 151 Sen, A., 40 Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, 56, 62 Senanayake, D. S., 52 Senanayake, Dudley, 55, 62

Sewa Lanka, 116, 119 shelter see housing SIHRN Subcommittee on Immediate Human and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East, 80, 81, 82, 83, 98 Sinhala Only Law, 54–55 Sixth Amendment see constitution SLA Sri Lankan Army, 151–152 SLAF Sri Lankan Armed Forces, 109–110 SLFP Sri Lankan Freedom Party, 54–56, 69, 138, 140, 166 SLMC Sri Lankan Muslim Congress, 79–80, 84 SLMM Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, 78, 125–126, 142 Smith, Adam, 30 Smith, D., 29 Snyder, J., 28 Solheim, Eric, 145 Soulbury Commission, 52 spoilers, 63, 84 standardization in education, 56, 71 standardization in language media, 57 statelessness see Indian Tamils structural adjustment, 30, 94 Tamil Diaspora see Diaspora Ta’if Agreement, 43 Tamilchelvan, 79, 97 Tamil Homeland see Eelam Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, 55 Tamil militancy see militancy Tamil Nadu, 49, 63–66 Tamils of Indian Origin see Indian Tamils taxation, by the LTTE, 98, 124, 125 TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organsiation, 58 Thimpu Talks, 62, 64, 65 Thirteenth Amendment see constitution TNA Tamil National Alliance, 93, 129, 138, 139 TNT Tamil New Tigers, 58 Tokyo Declaration, 90, 100–101, 164, 167

222 Index Tokyo Donor Conference, 95 torture, of Tamils by Government forces, 58, 110, 124, 125, 142, 152, 154 of Tamils by the LTTE, 68, 110, 142 by US/UK, 158 see also rape transport, 124 TRO Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation, 97, 98, 99, 119, 127 Tsunami Disaster, 6, 10, 101, 140, 147 TUF Tamil United Front, 57, 58 TULF Tamil United Liberation Front, 58, 61, 64–65, 68, 138, 139 UAS Unified Assistance Scheme, 112, 114, 115 UF United Front, 56 UK United Kingdom, 149, 155 UN Charter, 38 UN Human Rights Council Resolution Session S-11/1, 165 UN Peacebuilding Commission, 21, 26, 45 UN United Nations, 4, 21–22, 25–26, 28, 38, 40–41, 43–44, 152, 160, 161, 165–166 uncleared area see LTTE-Controlled Area, Vanni UNHCHR United High Commission for Human Rights, 125 UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund, 127 UNP United National Party, 52–53, 55–56, 60, 69, 79, 87–88, 93–94, 137–138, 166 UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 43

UPFA United People’s Freedom Alliance, 82, 83, 96, 137–138, 140, 141, 154 manifesto see Mahina Chinthana US United States, 37–39, 44–45, 148–149 USAID, 44 UTHR University Teachers for Human Rights, 68, 153–154 UXOs unexploded ordinance, 22, 115, 161 Vaddukodai Resolution, 58 Vankalai see war crimes Vanni, 50, 97–99 see also LTTEcontrolled area Walter, B., 8, 26, 46, 134 war crimes, 100 Houses Housing Scheme, 150 Action Contre La Faim, 144 Bindunuwewa, 143 Karaithuraipatru, 151–152 Vankalai, 150 Pesalai, 151 War for Peace, 69, 86–87 War on Terror, 148–149, 165 Welfare Centres, 50, 85, 110–114 see also IDP camps welfare state, 59–60 Wickremetunga, Lasantha, 154 Wickremesinghe, Ranil, 70, 79, 80, 82, 95, 137, 141, 166 World Bank, 4, 22–23, 26, 30–32, 38–39, 41, 81, 82, 85, 90, 92, 96–97, 100–102, 104, 114–115, 119, 121, 161, 167 WRDS Rural Development Society, 119 Zartman, W., 35, 68, 78 ZOA Refugee Care, 115, 120, 122

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