Advances in Psychology Volume 53 A History of Psychology in Metascientific Perspective

A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY IN METASCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE T IN PSYCHOLOGY 53 Editors: G. E. STELMACH P. A. VROON NORT...

Author: Madsen K. B.

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A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY IN METASCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE

T

IN PSYCHOLOGY 53 Editors:

G. E. STELMACH

P. A. VROON

NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK .OXFORD .TOKYO

A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY IN METASCIENTIFlC PERSPECTIVE

K. B. MADSEN The Royal Danish School of Educational Studies Copenhagen, Denmark

1988

NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK .OXFORD .TOKYO

ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS B.V., 1988 All rights reserved. N o part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN: 0 444 70433 7

Thisvolume was originally published in Danish under the title: Psykologiens Historie ividenskabsteoretisk Perspectiv (Bind 1:Tiden indtil ca. 1945, Bind 2:Tiden efterca. 1945) by Gyldendal, Copenhagen, 1986

Publishers: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS B.V. P.O. Box 1991 1000B Z Amsterdam The Netherlands

Soledistributorsfor the U.S.A.and Canada: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. 5ZVdnderbilt Avenue NewYork, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A.

Illustrations: Arne Stjernholm Madsen The author gratefully acknowledges the support given by the National Danish Research Foundation

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

This book is dedicated to: Henry A. Murray, Harvard University, for his contribution to the integration of psychology, and to: Joseph R. Royce, University of Alberta, Edmonton, for his contribution to the establishment of theoretical psychology.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Preface

This book combines two fields of interest: the history of science and the theory, or philosophy, of science (metascience).Among American and European psychologists the interest in both these fields is increasing, as is made manifest by the establishment of international 'societies' and journals devoted to these themes. In my book I seek to integrate these two fields by writing a history of psychology in which the main emphasis is placed upon a metascientific analysis of the production of fourteen psychologists selected from different periods in the history of psychology. These analyses are incorporated in a historical context, every period or 'school' being discussed in the first part of the chapter about the period or school concerned (e.g. Chap. 7: 'Psychoanalysis'). Thereafter follows a section comprising a metascientific analysis of 1-3 chief works from the respective period or school. For the metascientific analysis of the chief works I have employed a metascientific descriptive system, or 'systematology', which I have developed during more than 30 years of work devoted to comparative, metascientific studies of about fifty psychological theories. The results of these studies have been published in my books ,,Theories of Motivation" (1959,4th ed. 1968) and ,,Modern Theories of Motivation" (1974), which latter has also appeared in Spanish, Czech and Polish editions. The above-mentioned analyses of chief works are also used for verifying T.S. Kuhn's much debated theory about the 'revolutionary' development of the sciences. I have revised Kuhn's theory, and shown that it can be applied to the history of psychology. Thus, in the Kuhnian sense psychology may be said to have had two 'normal periods' and two 'periods of crisis' leading to school formation. These periods are the subject matter for the main part of the book (chapters 4-12 incl.). The three first chapters are the introductory chapters presenting the metascientific system, which is used in the rest of the book.

viii

Preface

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Colleagues in Scandinavia and abroad have read the

chapters about their special fields: Johs. Witt-Hunsen (philosophy of science, University of Copenhagen), S4ren Kjiirup (philosophy of science, University of Roskilde), Kursten Schnuck (philosophy of education, The Royal Danish School of Education), Reinter Jensen (psychoanalysis, The Royal Danish School of Education), Simo K@ppe (psychoanalysis, University of Copenhagen), Carl Lesche (psychoanalysis, Stockholm), Huns Sjiibuck (psychoanalysis, University of Lund), Huns Vejleskuv (developmental psychology, The Royal Danish School of Education), Joseph R . Royce (Theoretical Psychology, University of Alberta, Edmonton), and Mario Bunge (philosophy of science, McGill University, Montreal), who has also inspired me to the figures in chapter 3. Without making these colleagues responsible I thank them for their critical and inspiring comments. August, 9th 1987,

K.B. Mudsen Laboratory of General Psychology, The Royal Danish School of Educational Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark.

Contents

Preface

vii

1 . Which type of 'history'? 1 Externalism contra intemalism Individual contra society 7 A possibility of synthesis 10

2

2 . An integrative metatheory

13

The evolution of science 14 The structure of scientific theories 26 The history of psychology in outline 62 Appendix: Systematological taxonomy 65

3 . The philosophical prehistory of psychology Psycho-physical theories 72 Theories of knowledge 84 The philosophy of modem times 88 Conclusive survey and comparison 103

4.

Classical experimental psychology

109

The history of the scientific community: The establishment of psychology 110 The production of the scientific community: Wundt's and James' theories 132

5 . Gestalt psychology

165

The history of the Gestalt psychologists 166 The Gestalt psychologist's production: Kohler's theory 174

71

Contents

X

6 . Reflexology and classical behaviorism

193

The history of the behavioral psychologists 193 The production of the behavioral psychologists: Pavlov's, Watson's and Hull's theories 206

7 . Psychoanalysis

259

The history of the psychoanalysts 260 Freud's production 274

8 . The psychology of the integration period

331

The history of the scientific community: The period of integration 332 The integrating psychologists' production: Lewin's, Murray's and Tolman's theories 346

9 . Humanistic psychology

403

The humanistic psychologists 407 Maslow's production 415

10. Marxist psychology

443

The Marxist psychology 443 Leontyev's production 453

1 1. Contemporary behaviorism

477

The history of the behaviorists 443 Skinner's Production 485

12. Mainstream psychology

505

The history of mainstream psychology 506 A selected mainstream psychologist: Royce's theory 549

Retrospective and prospective postscript

571

In retrospect: The historical development of psychology 571 Prospects: The future development of psychology 576

References Index 595

579

Chapter 1

WHICH TYPE OF 'HISTORY'?

INTRODUCTION. Before commencing a history of psychology it would be use-

ful to provide the reader with a background enabling him or her to understand the special problems connected with such a presentation of the evolution of a science. There are, in fact, many different conceptions of what constitutes 'science' and 'scientific evolution', and which factors determine this evolution. Accordingly, there are also many different types of histories of science. This chapter, therefore, will be concerned with these different types and provide grounds for selecting a particular one. First of all, let us consider the grounds for at all concerning ourselves with the history of science.

W h y study the history of psychology? Probably many people - also students of psychology - do not immediately understand why it is necessary to study the history of a discipline. For young people in particular it is the current situation and the future development of research that has their interest. But if we immerse ourselves in the study of the development of a discipline we soon discover that there are many problems and solutions to these (in the form of theories) that we cannot understand without knowledge of the context in which the problems arise. This is because scientific problems have arisen in many ways. The problems may be practical, i.e. they may arise during the course of the researcher's practical work in nature or society. Where psychology is concerned the problems have been of the follow-

2

Which type of 'History'?

ing type: How does one treat people with psychological illnesses? How does one help pupils with learning and reading difficulties? How does one see to it that people are satisfied with their work? In the history of psychology, practically determined problems like these have been instrumental in founding the professions and specialized fields of psychology. And other problems of a like nature have influenced the development of the discipline. But there are also many 'theoretical' problems that arise as the result of research itself, and, as a discipline becomes established and reaches a certain stage of development, the majority of a researcher's problems will consist of problems of this type. The solution of such theoretical problems results in new theories that may find application in the solution of practical problems. But these new theories will also become the starting-point for the new theoretical discussions and empirical research connected with testing the theories. In solving these problems, once again new theories will arise together with the new problems resulting therefrom - and so on. It is specifically these problems that are much easier to understand if we know their historical background. An appreciation of history is even more necessary when studying a discipline - like psychology - which is divided into 'schools' or 'movements'; because a scientific school consists of a body of researchers who have adopted some particular solution or theory, whereas others may have formed schools around other theories. A theoretical conflict like this can only be understood in a historical context. Thus it is useful to know the history of a discipline, and for the deeper understanding of a science like psychology it is essential.

Externalism contra internalism THE PROBLEM. In writing the history of science it is necessary to consider the

question as to whether the evolution of science is determined by internal or external factors. In answering this question we obtain, on the one hand, internalist historiography and, on the other, externalist historiography. Let us examine the arguments for these two types of historiography before making up our minds.

Externalism contra internalism

3

Internalist historiography This is the traditional type of historiography. Here the evolution of science is presented as exclusively determined by internal factors, i.e. the problems pertaining to the discipline, its methods and research results, which are often systematized into theories. Development follows an internal 'logic' or 'dialectics', i.e. a theory occasions criticism and demands verification by way of empirical research, thus resulting in a new theory. The new theory may be conceived in two ways: a) as a further development or generalization of the older theory, b) or as an antithesis of the original thesis. These two opposing theories - thesis and antithesis - may later be replaced by a theory integrating the opposities in a synthesis. This new theory may in turn acquire its opposite, its antithesis, which is then replaced by a new synthesis. This second mode of description is called the dialectical spiral: thesisantithesis-synthesis. According to this conception of history, scientific evolution follows an internal dialectics. This dialectical version of internalist historiography is inspired by Hegel's philosophy of history. In psychological historiography one more frequently encounters the former version, in which the development is described as a more continuous, logical development. It is more usual in internalist historiography to attach a greater or lesser significance to important researchers. Such is the case in Edward G. Borning's classical work on the history of psychology: ,,A History of Experimental Psychology" (1950), and to an even greater extent in Robert I . Watson's ,,The Great Psychologists" (2nd edition, 1969). Internalist historiography often builds on the detailed work of researchers who, in their original research, concentrate exclusively on the biographical study of the lives and intellectual development, including scientific work, of a single or a few important researchers. This form of biographical history of science may happen to coincide with another metascientific discipline: the psychology of research and researchers, also known as the psychology of science. We have an example of the latter in Howard Gruber's ,,Darwin on Man" (1974). The book's subtitle indicates that it is a study in scientific creativity. It is chiefly based on a thorough study of Darwin's notebooks, and the exposition is inspired by Piaget's theory regarding cognitive development. Thus a study of this type can contribute both to the history and the psychology of science.

4


Let us now turn to another type of history of science.

Externalist historiography This type of history of science is based on the conception that it is the external factors in the social and cultural context that determine the evolution of science. Since science in its turn can have repercussions on society and culture, we might in this case speak of an external dialectics. Among the external factors there is the additional possibility of stressing economic factors, other societalfactors (political, military) or culturalfactors (such as philosophical theories, political ideologies, religions, art, etc.). External histories of science emphasizing the effect of economic factors on scientific evolution have in particular been inspired by Marx's historical materialism.

External histories of science have also inspired the establishment of another metascientific discipline, i.e. the sociology of science, which studies science as a social phenomenon with the aid of sociological methods and theories. This overlapping between externalist historiography of science and the sociology of science may be seen in its developmental stage in the works of the pioneer Robert K . Merton, who started with an historical dissertation on ,,Science, Technology and Society in 17th Century England" (1938) and later wrote ,,The Sociology of Science" (1973). The same combination of external history and sociology may also be found in the classical work on empirical scientific research: J.B. Bernal's ,,The Social Functions of Science" (1939). As examples of attempts to introduce an external history of psychology, J. Ben-David and R. Collins (1966) and A. Buss (1975) may be mentioned. A well-known history of psychology, Henrik Misiak's and Virginia S . Sexton's ,,History of Psychology" (1966), is more external than most American histories of psychology. Another example of an external and Marxist history of psychology is S. Jaeger's and I . Stumble's ,,Genese der psychologie" (1977).

Externalism and Internalism The externalist theory underlying the history of science has arisen in the form of an antithesis of the originally universal, internalist historiography of science. The question now is whether a synthesis of these opposing theories is possible.

Externalism contra internalism

5

Several historiographers and metascientists have stressed that the problem as regards external and internal determinants is not a question of an either-or but of a both-and - precisely like other classical opposites such as inheritanceenvironment. This is emphasized both by Lars-Christer Hyden (see Hyden, 1981) and by Helge Kragh and Stig Andur Pedersen (see Kragh and Pedersen, 1981). These authors also emphasize that these sets of factors supplement each other in such a way that the external factors largely determine the 'broad lines' or macrodevelopment of science, whereas the internal factors determine the microdevelopment of science. Before we finally decide whether a synthesis of externalist and internalist theories of history is possible we shall consider another problem pertaining to the history of science, i.e. the problem concerning the individual and society. In other words, is scientific evolution created by individual researchers or is it created by society and its culture?

Individual con tra s oc ie ty THE PROBLEM. Clearly this problem about the individual contra society is con-

nected with the previous problem about external contra internal determining factors in the evolution of science. In the following we shall study this in more detail.

The researcher We have already seen that internalist historiography often - though not necessarily always - concentrates on important creative persons in the history of science. As mentioned above, this biographical historiography overlaps with the psychology of science. But these disciplines are not completely coincident. Apart from a difference in methods - historical and psychological respectively - there is also a difference in interests. Whereas biographical historical research is, in a truly humanistic sense, idiographic, i.e. interested in the individual as a unique personality, the psychology of science is not merely interested in individual persons but seeks, in a natural scientific sense, nomothetic knowledge, i.e. knowledge about general features, relations or rules pertaining to researchers - their talents and personal characteristics in relation to

6


other groups such as artists and philosophers, etc. Moreover, it is interested in the psychology of the research process as a special form of cognitive process together with its driving force or 'motivation'. As an example of the psychology of science we can take Abraham Maslow's ,,The Psychology of Science" (1966). In this Maslow propounds the theory that science is created by single individuals - researchers - who may cooperate to a greater or lesser extent. Their place in this collaboration is determined by their special abilities as experimentalists, theoreticians, historians or organizers, etc. A researcher's scientific production is furthered or inhibited by his personality structure. According to Maslow's theory, a healthy, mature and 'self-actualizing' person is creative, whereas a neurotic person is inhibited in his creativity by 'stiffness' and by his confidence in what is already known and established together with the accompanying anxiety for new ideas and discoveries, etc. Maslow founds his theory on lengthy interviews and other biographical studies of famous, creative personalities in the fields of art and science, including several researchers. Apart from these ideas relating to the psychology of science Maslow deals in his book with more general considerations relating to metascience or the philosophy of science; we shall not deal with these here but in a later chapter. Here it is sufficient to stress that Maslow directly polemizes against the conception of science as a 'super-individual' institution or organization controlled by its own laws. This 'psychologistic' theory of science appears, amongst other places, in the following quotation (from Maslow, 1954, p. 1.): ,,A psychological interpretation of science starts with a clear recognition that science is a human product rather than an autonomous, non-human 'thing' in itself with its own built-in rules. The origin of science is to be found in human motives; its goals are human goals, and it is created, renewed and maintained by human beings. Its laws, organization and evolution are founded not only on the nature of that reality it discovers, but also on the personality of the human being who is making the discovery". It is obvious from the quotation that Maslow regards science to be a phenomenon or activity that takes place on the individual level. He directly warns us against regarding science as something 'superhuman'. But by this he does not mean something that exists on the 'societal level' but on an 'intermediate level', i.e. that of the society of researchers to which we shall now turn.

Individual contra society

7

Before doing so, however, it is necessary to mention a modem representation of the psychology of science which is based on known psychological methods (tests) and deals, furthermore, especially with psychologists. This is Richard W . Coan's ,,Psychologists: Personal and Theoretical Pathways" (see Coan, 1979). This work is founded on comprehensive questionnaire-type investigations by several hundred psychologists. A factor analysis of the results was undertaken, and correlations between theoretical orientation and cognitive style as well as demographic and life historical variables were found. The results were also related to the historical development of psychology (see also Kimble, 1984).

The scientific community As opposed to Maslow there are many modem metascientists who maintain that

'science' is indeed a phenomenon that exists on an 'intermediate level' between the individual and society - the level on which groups and organizations are to be found. The scientific community as such consists of informal groups of researchers, more formal research institutions and research organizations as well as loosely organized schools, movements and research traditions. The 'sub-systems' that make up the scientific community - groups of researchers, research organizations, etc. - consist in their turn of other sub-systems or 'elements' in the form of individual researchers. And the entire scientific community is itself a sub-system under the greater system, society itself, which comprises other sub-systems such as commercial enterprises, social systems, educational institutions and administrative institutions, etc. The scientific community may be distinguished from the other sub-systems in society by virtue of its goal: the production of knowledge. In accordance with the latter system theoretical conception, science may thus be defined as a system whose function and aim is to produce and systematize knowledge. In Scandinavia a system theoretical conception of science has been formulated in particular by the Swedish metascientist Hdkon Tiirnebohm (Tomebohm 1973); but, more informally, a system theoretical view of science is also contained in theories propounded by a number of modem science historians and metascientists. This is particularly true of a number of English and American theoreticians whose theories are collectively termed ,,Radical Science". These include Zmre Lakatos, (see Lakatos, 1978), Norwood Russell Hanson (see Hanson, 1957), Paul Feyerabend (see Feyerabend, 1977), Stephen Toulmen (see Toulmen, 1953) and Thomas S. Kuhn (see Kuhn, 1962). These meta-

8


scientists are all 'pupils' of, but are all more or less in opposition to Karl Popper. Of those mentioned, Kuhn in particular has propounded a very much discussed theory about the evolution of the sciences. According to Kuhn's theory, science is regarded as an activity that takes place in a more or less autonomous scientific community, which follows its own laws', norms and evaluations. We shall return in due course to Kuhn's theory, the main features of which are described in the following chapter. In the meantime we shall examine the next level in the system hierarchy. Society and cultures As already mentioned, the scientific community is part of - is a 'sub-system' in - the society which contains it. National societies in their turn may be regarded as sub-systems in somewhat more comprehensive though very loosely organized systems designated culture groups. For example, the European and North American societies constitute one culture group, 'Western culture', which has a common historical origin and a sense of community as regards language, philosophy, art and religion. The so-called 'modem science' and technology is especially developed in this culture group, whereas other culture groups (Indian, Chinese, Arabic) have developed other sides of culture (especially philosophy and religion). There exists a still more comprehensive 'super-system' of which all culture groups form a part, i.e. 'mankind. This in its turn is a sub-system in a global system known as the 'bio-sphere', which comprises all ecological systems on this globe, including mankind. We have already mentioned in a previous section (see p. 4) that the relation between society and science is an object of study for the sociology of science. This field is also a particular object of study for an external history of science. As previously mentioned, however, the latter may also study the relation between science and culture as such. We obtain, then, a history of science which is cultural historical or based on 'the history of ideas', as for example the comprehensive account of the evolution of science in Chinese culture written by J. Needham (see Needham, 1956). As an example of the history of psychology, Gardner Murphy's ,,Asian Psychology" (Murphy, 1969) may be mentioned. For the sake of completeness it is necessary to mention that in principle an external history of science could also be written on the lowest system level' -

Individual contra society

9

the level of the individual. This would then be an historical account of the environmental conditions (societal, cultural) in which specific researchers grew up. This externalist historiography would become a supplement to the psychology of researchers - a psychology which would also be able to investigate the influence of internal factors (which in this case would possibly be genetic factors determinant for the development of researchers). We shall return to the relation between the history of science and the other metascientific disciplines in a later section. In the meantime we shall summarize the various possible types of history of science presented in this chapter.

Fig. I . I . Classification schema.


10

A possibility of synthesis A combination of the two dimensions

In this chapter we have provided an outline of the various 'dimensions' in which the various types of history of science may be placed. One of the dimensions - an externalist contra internalist theory of history is not a clear example of a continuous dimension because it consists of two opposing theories of history. These may be regarded as a thesis (an internalist theory of history) and an antithesis (an externalist theory of history) with an 'intermediate form', or synthesis, whereby both internal and external factors determine the development of science. But we find no clear formulation of this type of synthesis between two opposites until we reach the second dimension. We called the second dimension, which may be used for the classification of theories of history, individual contra society. This, however, is a clear and continuous dimension, i.e. the system theoretical dimension consisting of the system levels: individual-group-organization-society-culture.(For the sake of completeness we could mention that the bottommost part of this system dimension consists of organism (=individual), organs, cells, molecules, atoms and sub-atomic particles. However, this part of the 'system-hierarch y' has no relevance for our theme: the history of science and metascience.). This dimension provides the possibility of describing the following types of history of science: the biographical history of science, the history of the scientific community (including the history of research traditions and schools), the social-economic history of science (including the development of science under changing economic and social conditions) and the cultural history of science (including the development of science in different cultures). The two classification dimensions can be 'crossed or combined to form a classification table (see Fig. 1.1). As the table shows, it is in particular 'the diagonal' that can be filled out with the historiography of science as such. It also shows, as previously mentioned, that externalist historiography has been especially concerned with the socio-economic history of science and internalist historiography with the biographical history of science. The table also illustrates that the history of the scientific community may be regarded as the possible synthesis between exter-

A possibility of synthesis

I1

nal and internal histories of science. In other words, the history of the scientific community makes a good point of departure of a history of science that aspires to a synthesis between the different types of history of science. Therefore it will also be the starting-point for this book's presentation of the history of psychology. This starting-point will be formulated as a metatheory in Chapter 2; but prior to that this chapter will conclude with an outline of the connection between the various metascientific disciplines we have touched upon in this chapter.

Metascience The history of science is one among several disciplines which have the sciences as their object of research. These sciences can be collectively termed metascience. The eldest of these disciplines is the history of science and the philosophy ofscience. These may be distinguished from one another by their methods (respectively historical method and philosophical thinking) and by their level of abstraction. 1.e. the history of science is to be found on the relatively concrete level of empirical studies, whereas the philosophy of science is to be found on the highest level of philosophical abstraction - to which we shall shortly return. On the same concrete empirical level as the history of science are to be found the psychology of science and the sociology of science; these, as we have seen, overlap one another (Fig. 1.2). The psychology and the sociology of science have as their common borderlands the social psychology of science. Moreover, the history and the psychology of science have as their common borderland the biographical history of science. Apart from these three disciplines and their borderlands there may also be other empirical metadisciplines, such as the economics of science. All these empirical metadisciplines mentioned above may collectively be termed empirical science research, which is more or less identical with the term 'the science of science' created by Bernal and others. But in the years following the Second World War a new discipline - 'the theory of science', or metatheory - has been differentiated between, on the one hand, the empirical metadisciplines and, on the other, the philosophy of science. Unfortunately the terms 'theory of science' and 'philosophy of science' are still often used indiscriminately and frequently synonymously. But the following definitions might be suggested: The theory of science, or 'metatheory' in a broad sense, is a descriptive theory about science formulated in such a way


12

Philosophy of Science

Metatheory (Wissenschaftstheorie)

---Fig. I .2. Diagram illustrating the interrelations between direrent metascientific disciplines. The philosophy of science constitutes the body of thought concerning the fundamental problems capable of inspiring the creation of hypotheses and theories about science - i.e. metatheory. This theory can be tested empirically under the various disciplines of scientific research: I ) the history of science; 2 ) the psychology of science; 3 ) the sociology of science together with some some borderline disciplines, i.e. the biography of science (between 1 and 2), the socio-psychology of science (between 2 and 3 ) and the geography of science (between I and 3); and systematology. that it may be verijied empirically. It may be subdivided into metatheory in a narrow sense, which is theory about (scientific) theories, and methodology, which is theory about scientific methods of research. The philosophy of science is a philosophical discipline about the basic philosophical (epistemological, ontological, etc.) problems of science. The statements of the philosophy of science are not empirically verifiable - amongst other reasons, because some of them are normative, i.e. prescriptive and not descriptive. Thus, according to this definition, much of what is termed 'methodology' belongs to the philosophy of science. Thus we obtain a hierarchy of disciplines termed metascience, all of which have science as their object. These consist of the philosophical discipline, the philosophy of science; the theoretical discipline, theory of science (including metatheory and methodology); and the empirical disciplines, the history of science, the sociology of science and the psychology of science (see Fig. 1.2).

Chapter 2

AN INTEGRATIVE METATHEORY

INTRODUCTION. The purpose of this book is to present a history of psychology based, as far as possible, on a metatheory constituting a synthesis of the different theories about the evolution of science. Thus, in the first chapter we compared the different types of historiography of science and found that a history of science with its point of departure in the history of the scientific community provides the greatest possibility for integration. As mentioned, in the years following the Second World War a number of metatheories have appeared with their empirical basis in descriptions of the history of the scientific community. The most well-known of these historically orientated metascientists are Norwood Russel Hanson, Imre Lakatos and Thomas S . Kuhn. Amongst these, Kuhn's theory in particular has been met with great interest and given rise to much discussion. This chapter, therefore, will provide an account of Kuhn's theory, which deals especially with the evolution ofthe sciences (and may therefore be regarded as a 'dynamic' or 'historical' theory of science). On the other hand, it does not deal at any length with the structure or 'logic' of science, so we shall supplement Kuhn's theory with a theory about the structure of science, especially that of scientific theories, i.e. me tatheory proper. These two theories about the growth and structure of science will be applied in the remainder of the book when describing the history of psychology *

An integrative metatheory

14

The evolution of science Kuhn's production Thomas S. Kuhn was born in 1922 and originally studied physics. He became interested, however, in the history and philosophy of science, and has for many years held a professorate in the history of science at Princetown University in the U.S.A. His book ,,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", published in 1962, aroused great interest, and was later translated into a number of foreign languages. In addition, Kuhn has written a number of articles which have been collected into a book (see Kuhn, 1977). The most striking thing about Kuhn's theory about the evolution of the sciences was that he broke with the then current theory about the continuous development of the sciences and maintained that the sciences develop discontinuously, in the manner of a 'revolution'. Thus, evolution consists in the replacement by one another of qualitively different phases. The two phases or periods we shall discuss in the following section are normal scientific periods and periods of crisis. Prior to this we shall draw attention to another striking and much-discussed feature of Kuhn's theory: that the evolution of science is not exclusively determined by rational factors. Scientific evolution does not just consist of a logical development stimulated by 'the love of research', curiosity or any other motivation for acquiring and developing knowledge. But it is influenced by other forms of motivation (group pressure, group competitiveness, etc.) which will be dealt with in the following.

Normal scientific periods NORMAL SCIENCE. Kuhn maintains that it is only in the normal scientific periods that science evolves in accordance with the most common conception, which maintains that science evolves continuously by way of a steady accumulation of knowledge. The continuous development in the normal scientific periods is determined by the fact that the work of the scientific community is controlled by a common set of stearing preconditions which Kuhn calls a paradigm.

The evolution of science

1.5

THE CONCEPT OF PARADIGM.This basic concept in Kuhn's theory has not been precisely defined and, according to his critics, Kuhn has used the term 'paradigm' in many - 22 - different senses. Kuhn himself maintains in a postscript to the 2nd edition of his book, which was published in 1970, that he alternates between two senses of the word, a narrow and a broad. The narrow, linguistic sense of 'paradigm' is inodel example'. When used by Kuhn it is the term for a model example for a scientific community. In other words, it concerns those scientists whose research has become a model example for other scientists. In the history of physics the names of Galileo, Newton and Einstein are often mentioned. In the history of psychology such names as Freud, Pavlov, Piaget and Skinner could be mentioned as model examples. Thus, scientific paradigms would be those people upon whom the scientific community models itself, and who are described in the introductory textbooks for new students. A model example of this type e.g. Pavlov - can contain the following components: (a) an empirical research result (e.g. Pavlov's discovery of the conditioned reflex). (b) a method used in the discovery (e.g. the particular experimental procedure employed by Pavlov and subsequently termed 'classical conditioning'). (c) a theory for explaining the observed phenomenon (e.g. Pavlov's theory about all learning as neural association). (d) an 'underlying' or 'embracing' philosophy, which is frequently more or less implicit and therefore not explicitly formulated (e.g. Pavlov's scientific materialism). DISCIPLINARY MATRIX. With the latter component we reach the second or broad sense of the term 'paradigm', as 'disciplinary matrix'. Kuhn introduces this term in the above-mentionedpostscript to the 2nd edition of his book, and motivates its choice thus (p. 182, Kuhn, 1970): ,,....'disciplinary' because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a professional discipline; 'matrix' because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further specification". The elements referred to in the above quotations are the following: (a) Symbolic generalizations: These comprise formulations, which may be logical or mathematical formulas or short, verbal formulations. In some cases they may be regarded as formulations of 'laws of nature', but in other cases they should sooner be regarded as definitions of the concepts

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into the formulation. The members of the scientific community often learn these symbolic formulations in their student days. (b) Metaphysical components of the paradigm: These Kuhn regards as the models shared by the scientific community. Examples of such models are the atomic models of the physicists or - in the field of psychology Pavlov's reflex model and Freud's topographical, or structural, model of the psyche. These models may be regarded ontologically, and interpreted as schematic representations of global structure or elements. But they may also be regarded heuristically and interpreted as problem-solving instruments in research. (c) Values: These constitute a very important element of the disciplinary matrix, but at the same time that element which most frequently remains implicit. When formulated explicitly, values usually take the form of criteria for evaluating theories or methods. E.g. theories should preferably be consistent, simple and plausible; methods employed in the natural sciences should allow for the possibility of making quantitative predictions. 'Social benefit' constitutes one example of the most discussed values in the scientific community - or in society as a whole. (d) Exemplars: This element is equivalent to the 'paradigm' in its narrowest sense (i.e. meaning model example). Thus, it is tantamount to the concrete examples of research presented to students in their textbooks as ideal prototypes for research. In the following we shall use the word 'paradigm' in its broadest sense: as equivalent to 'disciplinary matrix' (including model examples). A paradigm may be shared by greater or lesser sections of the scientific community. Some of its elements - e.g. values - may be shared by the whole of the scientific community, whereas others - symbolic generalizations, models and exemplars may be shared only by those who practise one particular discipline (e.g. by all physicists or psychologists). And some elements of the disciplinary matrix may be shared only by specialists within a particular field (e.g. atomic physics or motivation psychology), or by members of a 'school' or movement.


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THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF NORMAL SCIENCE. In normal

scientific periods a paradigm (disciplinary matrix) has both advantages and disadvantages. 1. The especial advantage of a common paradigm in the normal period is that it helps foster collaboration within the scientific community in solving scientific problems. The members of the scientific community are unanimous about values, metaphysical and other philosophical preconditions as well as about the chief hypotheses of which a theory is built up. So the researcher is able to concentrate on detail problems: 1. The formulation of subordinate hypotheses that extend the scope of the theory. 2. The verification of the theory by way of empirical research.

In the normal scientific period, problem-solving may be compared with solving a jig-saw puzzle. The disciplinary matrix corresponds to the jig-saw puzzle's box together with the inspiring picture on the cover, whereas the individual hypotheses and the empirical research correspond to the pieces that merely have to be put in the right place. Thus, the researchers have the advantage of knowing they are working on a problem that can be solved, if only they spend the necessary time and energy on it. In another work (Kuhn, 1977), Kuhn employs concepts from psychology and maintains that the thinking in the normal period is convergent. 2. The disadvantages of the joint paradigm, however, are that the accepted common 'framework' within which the problem-solving takes place feels restrictive, and hinders the truly creative problem-solving known as divergent thinking. The 'unsolvable' problems are thus allowed to remain, and the normal period appears productive in comparison, because so many results are achieved in the way of detail problem solving. But eventually the many unsolved problems cause such great dissatisfaction with the paradigm that it can no longer be accepted as a common disciplinary matrix. This marks the end of a normal period and the start of a period of crisis.

Periods of crisis 1ST PHASE: THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANOMALY. Often a state of crisis arises

with the discovery of what Kuhn calls an 'anomaly'.This is a phenomenon that the theories and hypotheses based on a particular paradigm are unable to

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explain. In the history of psychology, such an anomaly is Pavlov's discovery of the conditioned reflex in his experiments on dogs. According to the accepted theory of that time - which Pavlov himself had helped to develop - dogs were only supposed to secrete saliva when they had food in their mouths, because it is a natural reflex in all mammals that the presence of food in the mouth stimulates the secretion of saliva. But we know that Pavlov's dogs also secreted saliva when they heard sounds connected with their feeding (e.g. the sound of their keeper's or his assistant's footsteps in the corridor outside the laboratory). This was the anomaly that prompted Pavlov's famous research into conditioned reflexes; because this saliva1 secretion could not be explained with the help of the physiological paradigm on which Pavlov's work was based. According to Kuhn, the first reaction to the discovery af an anomaly is that its existence is doubted. When researchers hear or read about an anomaly they often try to 'explain it away', i.e. there must be an error somewhere. Many researchers try to confirm the error by repeating the experiment or investigation that led to the anomaly's discovery. Eventually more and more discover in this way that the existence of the anomaly cannot be doubted or explained away. Herewith begins the serious doubt about the hitherto accepted paradigm. Perhaps the paradigm has already been subjected to doubt on account of a steadily increasing number of unsolved problems; in this case the discovery of the anomaly merely becomes the event that finally leads to the rejection of the paradigm. With this the period of crisis is well underway. 2ND PHASE: TRIAL AND ERROR. Having finally rejected the common disci-

plinary matrix that has united its members, the scientific community undergoes a period of uncertainty and seeks a new disciplinary matrix. Since there is no longer any paradigm to stear this search, it acquires the character of trial and error. This somewhat haphazard and tentative process takes place not only on the empirical but on the theoretical level. Empirically, the researchers try out new methods, or methods not based on the old paradigm. Theoretically, they try out new theories that may be more speculative (and therefore with less empirical foundation) than in the normal period. They may even modify the formal requirements for the elaboration of theories valid during the normal period. The theories are then no longer mathematically formulated deductive systems but verbal explanations in outline.


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During the theoretical trial-and-error stage some researchers may go so far as to philosophize over the basis of their discipline, both as regards metaphysics, the philosophy of science and human values. Great 'paradigm-creators' - like Einstein, for instance - have described their debt to bygone philosophers whom they have studied during their search for a new paradigm. The result of this empirical, theoretical and philosophical period of trial and error is the appearance of a new paradigm. That is why periods of crisis must be regarded as the most creative in the evolution of the sciences. when all the researchers within one discipline become dissatisfied with the old paradigm and many have been searching - independently of one another - for a new paradigm, several proposals for this will often materialize. Thus the period of crisis enters its third and final stage. 3RD PHASE: FORMATION OF SCHOOLS. During this phase of the crisis the members of the scientific community assemble into various groups centered around the proposals for a new paradigm. A disciplinary sub-group of this type, which is able to collaborate in adopting one among several alternative paradigms, is called a school or movement. As a rule a school arises around a paradigm-creator, who functions as a leader. This may be spread over a large geographical area, i.e. the school may comprise researchers in a particular discipline spread all over the world. Since several schools may arise at one and the same time centered around the different proposals for a paradigm, the schools will become competitive. According to Kuhn, competition between schools is an important (perhaps the most important) driving force in the evolution of the sciences. This is an extremely positive evaluation of the disputes between schools; but they may also have a negative effect, probably mostly affecting the individual researcher who takes up a stance outside the prevailing school. In a small country, where there may only be room for one school, this may mean his or her exclusion from relevant posts. Thus, for the individual researcher, the fight between schools may affect the very economic basis of his or her existence. But for the scientific community as a whole, competition between schools is tantamount to a testing of the fertility of alternate paradigms. In this competition, sooner or later one paradigm will emerge victorious. The period of crisis is thereby at an end, and a (gradual) transition to a new normal period ensues.

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4TH PHASE: REALIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION. The victory of one

paradigm marks the realization of a scientific revolution. But before a new normal period can become properly established, what Kuhn calls ,,moppingup-work" have to be done. These mopping-up operations consist chiefly of two things. To start with, the relevant textbooks have to be re-written in accordance with the new paradigm. The results of a great deal of empirical research and many proven hypotheses will of course remain. But, with the help of the new paradigm, a re-structuring takes place: the hypotheses are revised and a number of entirely new ones come into being, so that the complete set of hypotheses appears in the form of a new theory. This new theory is then used as a new explanation for empirical data, including the anomaly which precipitated the crisis in the first place by showing up the shortcomings of the old paradigm. Kuhn attaches great importance to textbooks, because they introduce the students to the disciplinary matrix that unites all the researchers during a normal period. At the start of a normal period the argumentation for the new paradigm will be quite detailed, but gradually the existence of other paradigms is almost forgotten and the accepted paradigm is regarded as the only possible 'scientific' paradigm. Gradually its presentation in the textbooks becomes less a matter of argument and more that of dogmatic indoctrination. Thereafter the history of the discipline is re-written in accordance with the new paradigm. This paradigm gradually becomes regarded as the only correct way of viewing the discipline and the world. The discipline's historiographers therefore tend to see the historical development of the entire discipline as if it were stearing towards the newly accepted paradigm's view of the discipline and the world. In so doing, they are not deliberately distorting history, but are providing a new interpretation of the previous history of the discipline. It is its historical presentations which, together with its textbooks, structurize the entire discipline in accordance with the newly accepted disciplinary matrix. The normal period is equivatent to the structuralized periods of the sciences, whereas the periods of crisis are the creative periods. According to Kuhn, however, the 'essential tension' in the development of the sciences is the tension between the normal periods conservative tendency (convergent thinking) and the revolutionary tendency (divergent thinking) of the period of crisis (cf. the title and article of the same name in Kuhn, 1977).


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The Characteristics and Criticism of Kuhn CHARACTERISTICS. Kuhn himself characterizes his own theory by comparing it with Darwin's theory about the evolution of species. Both theories describe and explain this development as resulting from the competition (or struggle) between variants (of respectively animal species and paradigms). And both theories involve the selection of the most suitable (species or paradigms), which are able to survive competition. Neither in Kuhn's nor in Darwin's theory is it easy to predict which of the competitors will win in the long run, but usually the theories can afterwards explain why a particular competitor won. Kuhn emphasizes, however, that it is not always possible to explain a particular paradigm's victory as part of a purely rational (or logical) development of the sciences. Naturally, in order to win in the competition, a paradigm must be able to explain both the anomaly and all the other phenomena within the field of research. But that is not sufficient, because usually all the competing paradigms are able to explain all the relevant phenomena. In many cases it may even look as if the victory has been determined by the champion of the winning paradigm's superior skill in 'propagandering' for his paradigm, and later, by his superior qualities as a leader - of the group that adopted the paradigm. In other words, what determines a paradigm's victory is not merely the cognitive motives (like the need for information and for this to incorporate a rational system), but also the social motives (like the need to belong to a group and for a dominant position within it). It is these social motives that constitute the strong driving force in the competition between the schools which, according to Kuhn, is so vital for the development of the sciences. These social motives are also responsible for the fact that science is a collective rather than an individual product. It is the scientific community rather than the individual researcher that is the producer of science. Kuhn's theory of science is socio-psychologically oriented. This is explicitly evident from the following quotation from Kuhn (1977, p.XXX): ,,I have tried to insist, instead, that though science is practised by individuals, scientific knowledge is intrinsically a group product and that neither its peculiar efficacy nor the manner in which it develops will be understood without reference to the special nature of the groups that produce it". Kuhn also stresses another similarity between his theory and Darwin's: both theories have ceased to explain evolution teleologically as striving towards a predetermined goal. Instead, they explain evolution causally as the result of interacting causes and conditions. In the case of Darwin this means that he

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ceased to explain biological evolution as if its goal were to arrive at superior species such as man. Previous theories regarding biological evolution explained it as a realization of 'the Creator's plan': to produce man as the supreme form of being. Correspondingly, Kuhn has ceased to explain the evolution of the sciences as if its goal were to arrive at 'the objective truth'; because 'the objective truth' can only be defined with the help of the prevailing paradigm of the age. Thus the conception of objective or scientific truth changes with the development of science, and in a normal period the definition of the objective truth will not be identical with that of researchers in previous normal periods. And in periods of crisis when schools are being formed, the scientific community will in fact be divided among itself owing to the disparant paradigms and the disparant definitions of 'science' and 'scientific or objective truth'. Thus Kuhn's theory of science may be said to be extremely relativistic. Together with the 'irrational' (socio-psychological) features, it is this feature of Kuhn's theory that has provoked the strongest criticism. THE CRITICISM. Kuhn's theory has been criticized from several sides, first and

foremost by philosophers of science and internalist historians of science inspired by the philosophy of Karl Popper. This criticism has been formulated in a symposium in which Kuhn himself participated and was able to reply to his critics (See Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). Here the criticism was especially directed at the two above-mentionedfeatures: irrationalism and relativism. As their first point of criticism, the Popperanians maintained that Kuhn's theory did not take sufficient heed of the rational nature of science, i.e. its elaboration of logically coherent theories and the logical argumentation for the truth of these theories on the basis of critical, empirical testing. According to the Popperanians it is difficult, if we accept Kuhn's theory, to distinguish between science on the one hand and ideology, metaphysics and pseudo-science on the other. Kuhn's reply to this criticism was that it is difficult to agree upon a definition of science, which is vastly different from other cultural activities and products. Kuhn does not think it possible to provide an adequate explanation of the evolution of the sciences exclusively by paying attention - like Popper and other philosophers of science - to 'the logic of scientific discovery' (cf. the title


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of Popper's chief work from 1959); according to Kuhn it is also necessary to take 'the psychology of scientific discovery' into account. The Popperanians' second point of criticism was Kuhn's relativism, which rendered every description of scientific evolution or growth impossible (cf. the title of the above-mentioned syrfiposium issued by Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). Since the changing paradigms did not contain evaluative criteria and norms that were universally acceptable, it would not be possible to judge whether the changes brought about by scientific revolutions in fact constituted a development. Kuhn's reply to this criticism was that this relativism may have been exaggerated in his main work (Kuhn, 1962). In the postscript to the 2nd edition he writes that development does not indeed move towards the objective truth but away from inadequate paradigms, and that the new paradigms (and the theories developed from them) constitute better problem-solving instruments than the old theories. Apart from this criticism from the Popperanians, Kuhn has also been subjected to criticism from philosophers of science and by externalist historians of science inspired by the philosophy of Karl Marx. Here too the criticism is directed at the same two features: irrationalism and relativism. But the grounds on which this criticism is based are naturally quite different. To Marxists, these two features of Kuhn's metatheory reveal that Kuhn is an idealist who does not believe in the existence of an objective reality independent of our cognition. This criticism may be found in the Danish metascientist, Uffe-Juel Jensen (see Juel-Jensen, 1973). But it is unjustified, because - as pointed out by Stig Andur Pedersen and Helge Kragh (see Kragh and Pedersen, 1981) - Kuhn himself writes the following: ,,Practising in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction. Again, that is not to say that they can see anything they please. Both are looking at the world, and what they look at has not changed." (Kuhn, 1962, p. 150) Other Marxists consider Kuhn to be a dialectical materialist. There is in fact a certain similarity between Kuhn's theory and the French Marxist theory of science (see especially Althusser, 1975). Kuhn has been criticized by externalist historians of science for not taking into account the influence of external factors on the evolution of the sciences. Kuhn refutes this criticism by saying that the importance of external and internal factors varies according to the different phases of development. External

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factors have the greatest influence in situations of crisis, whereas in normal periods development is largely conditioned by internal factors, because then the scientific community is more isolated from the remainder of society (Kuhn, 1977). THE FINAL EVALUATION. None of the above criticisms is so serious as to

necessitate the rejection of Kuhn as a good point of departure for an integrated account of the history of psychology. It is especially important to emphasize that in the following account Kuhn's theory is regarded as a schematic representalion or 'model', which, incidentally, is quite in accordance with Kuhn's own attitude. This also means that in presenting the history of psychology we must be prepared to adapt, amend and supplement Kuhn's theory. This history of science can thus be regarded as a concrete test of Kuhn's theory. There is especially one supplement to Kuhn's theory that should be mentioned immediately: his theory is first and foremost a theory about the evolution of the sciences, but it is sadly lacking as a theory about the structure of scientific theories. Thus, in the following section, Kuhn's theory will be supplemented with a metatheory proper (in its narrow sense as a theory about scientific theories). This metatheory has been developed in connection with a comparative study of about fifty psychological theories representing various psychological schools during the period covering approximately 1930-1980 (see Madsen, 1959, 1974 and 1975). This helps to counteract a weakness inherent in Kuhn's theory, i.e. he maintains that theories associated with disparant paradigms are incommensurable because they make use of different 'languages'. On the basis of the above comparative metatheoretical studies it is our opinion that Kuhn exaggerates the disparancy between paradigms. It is in fact possible to compare theories associated with the paradigms of various schools, but this naturally demands a common scientific 'language', an overriding metatheoretical taxonomy developed for the comparison of theories. For the sake of completeness it should be mentioned that Kuhn has subsequently admitted that a 'translation' from one paradigm to the other is possible. He adds: ,,That is what the historian of science regularly does (or should) when dealing with out-of-date scientific theories" (p. 202. Kuhn, 1970). And so that is what has been done in developing the metatheory to be presented in the following.


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The structure of scientific theories Introduction: A metatheory in outline A history of science requires that we are not only able to compare the theories of different periods, but to compare different theories produced by different schools within the same period. Thus, we shall present here a metatheory which has been developed on the basis of comparative studies of psychological theories. Since 'metatheory' means a 'theory about theories', we must start with a definition of the word 'theory'. In this book the word 'theory' will be used in two senses, defined as follows: 1. In a narrow sense a 'theory' is defined as tantamount to a set of hypotheses with the associated model. 2. In a broad sense a 'theory' is defined as tantamount to a complete, scientific text containing a hierarchically ordered structure of words and sentences: a. a set of philosophical statements (theses) called meta-theses; b. a set of explanatory or hermeneutical statements called hypotheses, which are frequently formulated in relation to a model; c. a set of descriptive statements called data-theses. These three sets of theses constitute three 'strata' or levels of discourse. These three levels of discourse are distinguished first and foremost by their degree of abstraction, the data-theses being the most concrete and the meta-theses the most abstract. The difference in level of abstraction is only a matter of degree but, since there are also other differences between the three strata, in practice it is possible to draw a sharp line between these levels of discourse on account of: 1. the activity or process of which the theses are a product; 2. the linguistic category used in the theses; 3. the purpose (or function) of the theses.

We shall examine these three subdivisions in the following: I. THE PROCESSES. The three levels of discourse are products of three different

processes:

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An integrative metatheory (1) The empirical or data-stratum is a product of empirical research, which

may consist of systematic observations, tests or experiments, but which in all cases utilizes that process psychologists call perception. (2) The theory or hypothetical stratum is a product of theoretical thinking. This activity makes particular use of the process known in psychology as convergent (goal-directed) thinking. Naturally this process may also be involved in the planning of empirical research, as well as in connection with the empirical or data-stratum. However, it is mostly characteristic of the hypothetical stratum. (3) The philosophical or meta-stratum is a product of philosophical thinking, which to a greater extent than theoretical thinking involves the process known in psychology as divergent (creative, intuitive) thinking. As will be noticed, it is not possible to make any clear distinctions on the basis of the activities produced, but when collated with the following it becomes possible in practice. 2. LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES. Broadly speaking, three different linguistic cate-

gories are used to describe the three strata: (1) The data-stratum consists exclusively of purely descriptive statements, or data-theses. They may be concrete or abstract to a varying degree, but purely descriptive language is used even in the most abstract data-theses. ( 2 ) The hypothetical stratum consists of propositions, or hypotheses, formulated in descriptive language in which transempirical or hypothetical terms appear. These are words that transcend the empirical level by referring to unobserved processes and structures - possibly to constructed explanatory concepts. Therefore the language cannot be called 'descriptive', even if, from a purely linguistic point of view, it is descriptive language. Instead, the term 'transempirical-descriptive language' might be employed. (3) The meta-stratum consists of statements, or meta-theses, which, linguistically speaking, are somewhat mixed. These are philosophical theses about the world as a whole or about part of it (e.g. man); they resemble hypotheses and thus make use of transempirical-descriptivelanguage. But whereas philosophical theses are not formulated sufficiently precisely that they may be tested empirically, scientific hypotheses are verifiable - or ought to be, according to many modem philosophers of science.


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Apart from philosophical theses about the world, the meta-stratum also contains some epistemological,metatheoretical, and methodological statements about science. These latter statements may be formulated as arguments for the way in which theories (in the narrow sense) are constructed and the way in which empirical research is carried out. But these meta-theses can also be formulated explicitly as norms or precepts for 'correct' theory construction and 'correct' empirical methods. Precepts of this types make use of prescriptive language. This may be distinguished fro descriptive language by the fact that prescriptive language contains 'ought-sentences', whereas descriptive language exclusively contains 'is-sentences'. ,,A scientific theory ought to be in the form of a hypothetical-deductive system", and ,,Psychological method ought to be experimental" are examples of such precepts. But a precept can of course by formulated implicitly by using 'is-sentences', as, for example: ,,The best scientific method is experimental". But its purpose is still to prescribe. We have hereby reach the third and last criterion for distinguishing between the three levels of discourse. 3. THE PURPOSE (FUNCTION). The three levels of discourse are also distinguishable by each having its own purpose or function: (1) The purpose of the data-stratum is to present data, i.e. information or knowledge. Data-theses may consist of both isolated, specific information (descriptions of single observations) and general information (descriptions of general interconnections or relations). ( 2 ) The purpose of the hypothetical stratum is to systematize information either in the form of explanations formulating causal or functional relations or in the form of interpretations, which create coherent intentions or meanings. ( 3 ) The purpose of the meta-stratum is to create a basis for understanding, a conceptual framework, a 'disciplinary matrix' or 'metamodels' for the other two levels of discourse, where meta-model represents here an extremely general or abstract model of the world with the associated scientific and philosophical precepts for exploring it. This meta-model may exist unconsciously in the mind of the researchers, because it has for a long time not been explicitly formulated. This may not occur until a state of crisis arises. But irrespective of whether the meta-model is implicitly or explicitly formulated, it has a stearing effect on both theory-making and empirical research.

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Fig. 2.1

It would appear from the latter that the meaning of 'metastratum', 'meta-thesis' and 'meta-model' overlaps with that of Kuhn's 'paradigm' when defined as 'disciplinary matrix'. Kuhn also speaks of 'metaphysical models' and 'values', which are practically identical with our 'meta-model'. But apart from that, Kuhn's 'disciplinary matrix' also contains components from what we have called the hypothetical stratum, i.e. Kuhn's 'heuristic models' and his 'symbolic generalizations'. So Kuhn's 'disciplinary matrix' is equivalent to our 'metalevel' as well as to part of our 'hypothetical stratum'. A SUMMARY OF THE THREE STRATA. We are now able to summarize the latter account of the three levels of discourse in scientific texts. We can do this by means of a diagram combining the three criteria of classification (see Fig. 2.1). This schematic classification can be supplemented with a diagram (Fig. 2.2), which is a graphic model of our metatheory. In the following we shall give


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a more detailed account of the three strata, finishing with a section about the theory as a whole.

Fig. 2.2

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The Meta-Stratum INTRODUCTION. We shall start with an account of the meta-stratum, because that is regarded as the overall, stearing stratum and partially determinate in formulating the other two levels of discourse. The theses in the data-stratum are also partially determined by the observed facts. Thus the data-stratum may have a correcting feedback of influence on the hypothetical stratum and (in the long run) on the meta-stratum. The overall stearing function of the latter is changed and, following the re-formulation of the hypothetical and data strata, a new correction takes place. This interaction between the overall philosophical stearing and the rectifying empirical research lies at the heart of scientific growth. As previously mentioned, the theses of the meta-stratum can be divided into two categories: 1. Meta-theses about the world ('Weltanschauung', metaphysics or ontology), and 2. Meta-theses about science (conception and philosophy of science).

There are also interconnections between these two categories of meta-theses, but the ontological theses will be discussed first, because they often (implictly) determine those relating to the philosophy of science. ONTOLOGICAL META-THESES. This part of the meta-stratum is often implicit or only partially formulated owing to the predominance for several decades of a particular philosophy of science - logical positivism. This maintained that 'metaphysics' was unscientific (or simply meaningless), and consequently these problems were not dealt with by psychologists or others influenced by logical positivism. However, even during this period psychologists naturally possessed a 'Weltanschauung' that had a stearing influence on their theory-making and research, even if they may not have been conscious of it and therefore did not articulate it explicitly. The most important part (implicit or explicit) of the psychologists' 'Weltanschauung' is their conception of man. It was precisely in this respect that Maslow maintained (Maslow, 1966) that psychologists lacked self-awareness, and so this aspect of philosophy could not be criticized and revised. But since the possibility of constant criticism is an essential prerequisite for the development of the sciences, it is important that


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all philosophical preconceptions are made conscious and formulated explicitly. Thus, in the following comparative study of theories, their explicit or implicit 'Weltanschauung' will be incorporated. In order to undertake a systematic comparison of different psychological theories we require a classification system of the various ontological meta-theses. This classification system, or 'systernatology' (Madsen 1979, constitutes an important part of our comparative meta-theory and includes, among others, the following three classifications: I. CONCEPTION OF MAN. A preliminary classification of the conception of man

consists of a subdivision into: a. a biological conception of man, which regards man solely or largely as a product of the biological development of the species. b. a social conception of man, which regards man solely or largely as a product of the development of society. c. a humanistic conception of man, which regards man solely or largely as a product of the culture he himself creates. It is also possible to regard the above three categories as part of a continuum extending from a biological to a social and humanistic conception of man. 2. PSYCHO-PHYSICALTHEORY. A very important part of the conception of man

and of the world as a whole is the part that deals with the relation between 'mind' and 'body' or, more precisely: 'consciousness' and 'brain'. This is one of the oldest philosophical problems and has been called 'the riddle of the universe'. During the course of time many philosophical theories have been propounded in order to help solve this problem, and during the last few decades the problem has also begun to interest brain physiologists and psychologists among them, R.S. Sperry, who won the Nobel prize for medicine in 1981. In the next chapter about the development of philosophy some of these theories about the psycho-physical problem will be examined. Here it is sufficient to classify the different psycho-physical theories; these may be regarded as vanants that can be placed on a sliding scale (see Fig. 2.3).

M

I Fig. 2.3

E

D

H

I

I

I

I

I

I

S I

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The extreme positions on the sliding scale representing psychophysical theories are: a. Materialism: Everything in the world - including human 'consciousness' is regarded as matter or material 'substance'. b. Spiritualism: Everything in the world - including 'the human body' - is regarded as spiritual substance. The middle positions on the psycho-physical dimension consist of three variants of c. Dualism: The world is regarded as consisting of both material and spiritual substance.

In human beings the two substance are manifested as the body (with brain) and consciousness. The relation between the two substances may be that of c.( 1) Interactionism c.( 2 ) Parallelism (Synchronism) c.(3) Identity. In this case dualism is reduced to a (neutral) monism, since the two substances are regarded as two aspects of the same neutral substance or kind of reality. Finally, there are some intermediate stances between the extreme outer positions and the middle positions: d. Epiphenomenalism: 'Consciousness' is regarded as consisting of bi-phenomena determined by brain processes. e. Hyperphenomenalism (or 'Animism'): Material substances (including brain prbcesses) are regarded as bi-phenomena determined by the spirit. It can be difficult to place all the psycho-physical theories on one sliding scale. Of those so far discussed, it is especially difficult to determine the correct position of the indentity theory. In addition there are some other psychophysical theories which have not yet been mentioned: f.

Panpsychism: Everything in the world is conceived of as more or less 'living' and 'conscious' objects. Primitive conceptions of the world do not distinguish so sharply between inorganic objects, living organisms and conscious persons. Everything is regarded as more or less 'animated'; hence the term 'panpsychism'.


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In contrast to panpsychism other theories regard the world as differentiated in the form of several 'strata' or 'worlds'; hence the term 'pluralism': g. Pluralism: The world is regarded as consisting of more than two qualitatively different levels of development or 'part-worlds'. An example of this is Popper's 'trialism', which distinguishes between the physical, mental and cultural (objective-spiritual) worlds (see Popper and Eccles, 1977). Another variant of pluralism is the modem system-theory. According to this theory everything in the world may be regarded as 'systems', i.e. wholes consisting of elements and their mutual relations. The 'elements' in a system may be regarded as a 'sub- system', which itself consists of elements, etc. For example, man may be regarded as a system consisting of organs, which all consist of cells consisting of molecules, which themselves consist of atoms, which are composed of sub-atomic particles, etc. The original system may also be regarded as an element in a super-system. Here, man may be regarded as an element in a group, which may be regarded as an element in an organization, which itself may be regarded as an element in a society, a culture group, etc. An important hypothesis in the system theory maintains that there exist 'system properties' which are only to be found in the system as a whole and not in its elements. Examples of such system properties (or system states) are 'life' and 'consciousness', and these are to be found in systems of a fair degree of complexity. 'Life' appears in monocellular and polycellular organisms but not in the molecules of which the cells consist. 'Consciousness' appears in complicated organisms with a central nervous system but not in the individual organs, cells and molecules. Thus a system property like 'life' or 'consciousness' arises in an interplay between the elements of the system and its environment. 'Consciousness' can therefore be regarded as a state that arises in an interplay between the central nervous system and other organs (especially the sensory organs, endocrine glands and muscles) or between the system, man, and the surrounding super-system (society and culture), of which language itself constitutes a particularly important component. There are several exponents of this system theory among modem philosophers and psychologists (see Berthalanffy, 1975, Bunge, 1979, Laszlo, 1972, Piaget, 1972 and Pribram, 1971). Together with the other psycho-physical theories, system theory and panpsychism have been entered into a diagram representing the logical structure of the development of the psycho-physical theories. But it should be

34


emphasized that the logical structure of the development does not correspond chronologicallywith the historical development (see Fig 2.4).

A L

Neutral Monism

I

E .a Materialism

Epiphenomenalism

Animism

Spiritualism

I InteractionismI

t Fig. 2.4

Let us now return to the final point in the description of the conception of man. 3. HUMAN FREEDOM OF ACTION. It has always been an important question in philosophical discussions and theories about man as to whether human action is free or causally determined. These two opposing viewpoints are termed determinism and indeterminism. But here too there are some intermediate points of view - in fact two variants as far as determinism is concerned


35

a.

mechanical determinism: Actions are determined 'linearly' by a single cause. b. dialectical or dynamic determinism: Actions are determined by a set of interacting causes.

There is, in addition, a modem variant of indeterminism: c. probabilism: Actions are random, but they can be calculated with the help of statistical (stochastic) rules. As opposed to this, d classical indeterminism maintains that actions are free (determined by a 'free will') and unpredictable. This concludes the examination of the ontological part of the meta-stratum; we shall now return to that part relating to the philosophy of science. PHILOSOPHICAL META-THESES CrHE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE). The formulation of meta-theses is more frequently explicit than is the case with ontological meta-theses; and the closer we reach the bottom of the abstraction hierarchy the more this applies. The most abstract of these philosophical theses are the epistemological theses that are often implicit in modem psychological theories. Meta-theoretical theses, on the other hand, are more frequently formulated explicitly, and in modem psychological theories methodological theses are nearly always formulated explicitly. These will be examined in the above order. I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL THESES. During the course of time two epistemological problems with particular relevance to the philosophy of science have been discussed the origin of cognition and its relation to reality. a. The origin of cognition. The two main theories propounded about this problem are: (1) Empiricism: The origin of cognition is 'experience' or observation. ( 2 ) Rationalism. The origin of cognition is rational thinking.

In modem European philosophy many epistemological theories have also been propounded in the way of combinations or syntheses of these two main theories. In this century such examples include the 'logical empiricism' of the Vienna Circle and Popper's 'critical rationalism' which, as the terms convey, are syntheses placing greatest weight on respectively empiricism and rational-

36


ism, though modified so as to include elements of respectively rationalism and empiricism. In Oriental philosophy there is also a third main epistemological theory:

( 3 ) Intuitionism: The origin of cognition is 'intuition', which is holistic in type. In intuitive cognition it is difficult to specify the separate stages in a logical sequence (as in rational thinking), or the sense data on which it is founded (as in observation). Even if this form of cognition is difficult to define or describe, it nevertheless plays a hitherto underestimated part in cognition. It is interesting to note that modem neuropsychologists maintain that intuition is largely a function of the right (= non-dominant) half of the cerebrum, whereas rational thinking is largely a function of the left (= dominant) half. It would appear that Oriental philosophy has given greater priority to the function of the right half of the brain, whereas European philosophy has somewhat unilaterally given priority to the function of the left half. b. The relation of cognition to reality. This problem can be formulated as follows: Does reality exist independently of our knowledge of it? If such 'objective reality' exists, to what extent can man arrive at 'true' or 'objective' knowledge? There are naturally several epistemological theories that attempt to answer this question. They can also be placed on a sliding scale that comprises two extreme positions and some intermediate positions that might be regarded as attempts to form a synthesis: (1) Realism: An objective reality exists independently of human existence and

cognition. (a) Man can achieve completely objective or true knowledge of reality (so-called 'naive realism'). (b) Man can achieve cognition that is influenced by his own sense organs and brain and his entire 'cognitive system' (so-called 'critical realism'). To this epistemological theory belong the hypotheses about the primary and secondary sense qualities (respectively form, size and weight, etc. and colour, taste and smell), and about the subjectivity of the secondary sense qualities.


37

( 2 ) Idealism: There exists no objective reality independent of the cognizing person's consciousness. It should be noted that in the philosophical debate these two theories of cognition are often correlated with the two extreme ontological theories, materialism and spiritualism. It is particularly common among Marxist philosophers and psychologists to identify 'realism' with 'materialism'. Even though there may often be a positive connection between materialism and realism on the one hand and idealism and spiritualism on the other, this connection is not logically necessary. There may in fact be 'spiritualist realists' who maintain that reality is spiritual though it consists independently of man's cognition; thus it is necessary to distinguish between the relation of cognition to reality and to its psycho-physical state. Finally, there is also an intermediate position between realism and idealism, namely: (3) Instrumentalism (or 'Pragmatism'): Here there exists an objective reality independent of human existence and cognition, but we cannot arrive at absolutely true objective knowledge (even the primary sense qualities may be dependent on the subject), for 'truth' is pragmatic knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is useful or practical in the determination of our actions. Let us now turn to the next level of abstraction among philosophical theses. 2. META-THEORETICAL THESES. Whereas epistemological theories deal with

human cognition in general, meta-theoretical and methodological theses deal exclusively with scientific cognition. Metatheoretical theses deal with problems concerning the construction, structure and function of scientific theories (= hypothesis systems). Among the numerous meta-theoretical problems, we shall concentrate here on the problem of the function (or purpose) of theories. Explicit arguments or precepts are often formulated about this problem, and these precepts or norms relating to the purpose of theories are formulated as 'ideals of science'. During the course of time many meta-theories about the purpose of scientific theories have been propounded. In psychology especially three have played a part: Allport's use of the classical classification into 'nomothetic' and 'idiographic' theories (Allport, 1937); Maslow's classification into 'controlling' and 'taoistic' sciences (Maslow, 1966); and Habermas's classification of the sciences into 'naturalistic', 'hermeneutical' and 'critical' (Habermas 1968). The following represents a synthesis of these different metatheories in the form of three ideals of science:

38


a. The nomothetic ideal: This ideal of science is modelled on physics, where one attempts to discover and formulate general 'laws of nature' (nomos = 'law') which, from a meta-theoretical point of view, may be regarded as extremely probable hypotheses. With the help of these laws physical phenomena may be explained and predicted. This has gradually become universally accepted as an ideal of all natural sciences, though logical empiricism maintains that the nomothetic ideal ought to apply to all sciences including the social sciences and the humanities. Since the birth of psychology as an independent science the nomothetic ideal has also been accepted by most psychologists. b. The herrneneutic ideal: This ideal of science is modelled on the traditional exegetic sciences, theology, law and philology; here the attempt is made to understand the texts or, if they cannot immediately be understood, to create an understanding by way of an interpretation. ('Hermeneutics' means the technique of interpretation). This interpretation may be based on some explicit principles of interpretation, which may be conceived as meta theses. These principles are designed to ensure that interpretation is as objective (i.e. intersubjectively acceptable) as possible. Apart from knowledge of the principles of interpretation, researchers must also possess a certain background for understanding - the so-called pre-understanding (Vorverstehen). This background for understanding is broadened with each increase in understanding to which interpretation contributes, and this extends the possibility of new interpretations. The resulting growth in understanding is called the 'hermeneutic spiral'. The technique of interpretation has been taken over from the exegetic sciences by the humanities, including the 'sciences' of art and literature. Interpretation has also been utilized in some branches of psychology; psychoanalysis in particular has made use of the interpretation of dreams on the basis of the principles of interpretation advanced, amongst others, by Freud in his 'Interpretation of Dreams'. The difference between interpretation and explanation appears to be, that whereas explanation creates causal (functional) relations, interpretation creates meaningful (intentional) relations. However, both interpretation and explanation are alike in purporting to create coherence or system in our knowledge (total information).

The evolution of science c.

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The idiographic ideal: This ideal of science is also modelled on the humanities, where many have for a long time regarded the goal of research to be descriptions of individual cases as unique. This is particularly the case where historical research and biographically oriented disciplines like the history of literature or art history are concerned. G.W. Allport has emphasized (in Allport, 1937) that the psychology of personality also ought to have an idiographic ideal in order to supplement the hitherto dominating nomothetic ideal.

Thus with these three ideals of science we have covered the two ideals advocated by Allport (i.e. the nomothetic and the idiographic), which roughly correspond to those of Maslow (i.e. the controlling and the Taoistic). With the fust two we have also covered two of the three ideals adopted by Habermas and the Frankfurter School (the natural scientific and the hermeneutic), but we lack Habermas's third ideal, i.e. the 'critical ideal of science.' This latter is modelled on Karl Marx's political economy. According to this ideal it is the purpose of science - especially of the social sciences - to criticize social conditions, institutions and ideologies, and thereby to make possible human emancipation. Psychology has also been said to possess such a function. The Frankfurter School in particular has maintained that psychoanalysis has a critical and emancipatory function of this type (see Lesche and Stjernholm Madsen, 1976, and Radnitzsky, 1968). Thus, psychoanalysis would appear to be both nomothetical, hermeneutical and critical. This will be discussed in greater detail later. But we do not regard the Frankfurter School's critical ideal of science in the same light as the other three, because we regard these three ideals of science (the nomothetic, the hermeneutic and the idiographic) as ideals (norms, precepts) for the systematization and research-promoting function of theories. The critical ideal of science concerns, on the other hand, the practical application of scientific theories, and for this purpose other goals than the emancipatory may be included, e.g. adaptation to society, the promotion of health, selfactualization, etc. These will be dealt with later. We have thereby reached the lowest level of abstraction in the philosophical part of the meta-stratum. 3. METHODOLOGICAL THESES. In psychological works these metatheses are

often formulated explicitly. In its journals the American Psychological Association requires the formulation of methodological principles. Method-

40


ological theses are concerned with two problems: the choice of methods and the choice of descriptive or data language. a. Research methods. Ever since psychology became an independent discipline the experiment has been regarded as the best scientific method. But at approximately the same time as Wundt founded the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig (1879), Francis Galton developed the test method in England. This method has since acquired just as great an importance for psychology as the experiment - especially in the practical application of psychology. The test method can be regarded as a variant of the experiment. In the classical experiment the procedure is to vary one of the independent variables - the experimental variable (e.g. the strength of a specific stimulus) while the remaining independent variables are kept constant (in so far as it is possible to control them). Thereafter the variations in the dependent variable (behaviour, physiological or verbal reactions) are observed and possibly measured; whereupon the functional, or causal, relation between the independent and the dependent variables may be formulated in a hypothesis or a general data-thesis. In the test method, however, all the independent variables, i.e. the entire situation, is kept constant, and the experimental persons become the variable. When different persons in the same (test) situation react differently, it may be concluded that the differences in reaction are caused by differences in the psychical structure - regarded as a system of 'intervening variables'. And it is precisely this set of hypothetical personality variables (including the intelligence factor) we are interested in studying with the test method (see Fig. 2.5). Additionally, an intermediate form has been developed between the classical 'univariate' experimental method and the test method, i.e. the multivariate experiment. This method may be distinguished from the classical method by the fact that several, possibly all, the independent variables are varied at one and the same time. This helps to illuminate the interplay, or interaction, between the independent variables. This interaction is difficult to register in the classical laboratory experiment, the validity of whose results is therefore limited when applied out side the laboratory under so-called 'natural' conditions. The lack of control over

41


\n Intervening

/

!

Personality

Fig. 2.5. Graphic model of the test method, regarded as a variant of the experiment: Here it is the experimental person who is the experimental variable, since the test situation is kept constant, whereas the persons change and, through differences in their behaviour (test performance), reveal differences in their personality structure (including intelligence factors). the independent variables is replaced in the multivariate method by statistical methods. It must be emphasized, moreover, that different possibilities arise also in the test method with regard to control and statistical treatment. One can broadly distinguish between questionnaire tests and projective tests. Questionnaires do not as a rule provide much possibility for variation in the experimental persons' answers, whereas the projective test - e.g. the Rorschack test - provides the possibility of many or almost unlimited answers. It is therefore easier to treat questionnaire tests quantitatively than projective tests. Thus, it is possible to classify the above methods according to the degree of control and possibilities for quantification. The classical experiment has the highest degree of control, thereafter the multivariate method followed by the questionnaire, whereas projective tests are, as methods, the least subject to control and the most difficult to quantify. But psychology also employs methods that are even more difficult to control or quantify. These methods can roughly be called qualitative methods, and include the so-called 'clinical methods' and 'field observations'. 'Clinical methods' often consist of interviews, which can be more or less structured or controlled. 'Field observations' are observations of persons in such natural, everyday situations as children playing in a kinder-

42


garten. These qualitative methods may be placed on our sliding scale beside projective tests. Methodological theses found in psychological texts are often formulated as arguments for prefemng one method as opposed to another in a specific research project. Closely connected with these methodological arguments or precepts in psychological texts, there often appear arguments or precepts for choosing descriptive or data language. b. Data language. In the history of psychology the problem as to which descriptive or data language is preferable is a much debated question. Two different data languages in particular have been discussed, not least by logical empiricists: a public (objective, physicalist) behavioural language and a private (subjective,phenomenologist)language based on experience. Naturally the discussion of these data languages is closely connected with the discussion of the definition of the psychological object: behavioural science or phenomenology, which is itself connected with psychologists' preferred theories about the psycho-physical problem. Some psychological schools have advocated the exclusive use of behavioural language, whereas other schools have advocated phenomenological language. However, certain schools and psychologists have been liberal in their use of both data languages. Finally, it should be mentioned that public data language may be divided into a 'molar' behavioural language, and a Snolecular'physiological language. The latter is used, for example, in connection with physiological measurements such as electroencephalography (EEG). In principle a corresponding subdivision of private, phenomenological language into a molar and a molecularphenomenalist data language could also be undertaken, and has in fact been at tempted by a single school (the Gestalt psychologists). But it is naturally much more difficult to carry through this distinction in practice, so we shall conclude by making use of a tripartite classiJicationof psychological data: 1. Phenomenological data. 2. Behavioural data 3. Physiological data.


43

We have hereby dealt with the main contents of the meta-stratum in scientific texts and shall proceed with the next level of abstraction.

The Hypothetical Stratum INTRODUCTION. The hypothetical stratum forms the central part of a scientific text. It is equivalent to 'theory' in its narrowest sense, meaning hypothesissystem. Like every other system, it is a whole consisting of elements which themselves consist of elements, etc. The hypothesis-system consists of hypotheses; these consist of several propositions which are themselves made up of words (or other symbols). Among these the so-called hypothetical terms are the most important. Here they will be dealt with in the reverse order: first the hypothetical terms, then the hypothetical statements and, finally, the hypothesis-system. HYPOTHETICAL TERMS.Hypothetical terms are words that transcend the

empirical level by referring to unobserved phenomena (processes, structures) or to constructed explanatory concepts. These hypothetical terms can therefore appear in a proposition or sequence of propositions in which all the other significant words are descriptive and consequently refer to something observable. In psychology the observable may be independent variables (e.g. situation stimuli) or dependent variables (e.g. behavioural or verbal reactions). The purpose of introducing hypothetical terms is to create coherence - especially functional, or causal, relations. This is done by placing the hypothetical terms in such a way as to refer to the missing intervening link. In psychology these links are often called 'intervening variables'. Attempts have also been made to distinguish between 'intervening variables' and 'hypothetical constructs'. The difference is supposed to be that intervening variables are purely empirical, operationally defined, terms referring to intervening links, whereas hypothetical constructs are terms which have a 'surplus meaning' over and above the empirically definable meaning. But this distinction has not been generally accepted by psychologists, because it is difficult to make a sharp distinction. All hypothetical terms have to some extent a surplus meaning, and so 'intervening variables' and 'hypothetical constructs' will together be designated hypothetical variables, meaning the variables (processes, structures) to which hypothetical terms refer.

44


We shall refrain here from referring to the long-standing discussion between American psychologists about the application of hypothetical terms, but refer the reader to the literature concerning psychological metatheory (e.g. Madsen, 1975). In order to enable us at a later stage to compare psychological theories precisely and systematically, we shall now introduce some ways of classifying hypothetical terms. The first classification is concerned with the different surplus meanings of hypothetical terms. 1. The ontological reference of hypothetical terms. Hypothetical terms may

refer in various ways to intervening, hypothetical variables. The differences in the mode of reference are determined by our background knowledge of the intervening variable and of our preconceived metamodel. Seen in this light, psychology possesses three categories of hypothetical terms: a. Mentalistic, hypothetical terms (Hm-terms) that refer to the intervening variables as processes or structures in 'consciousness', the 'mind' or the 'psyche', or mentalistic variables of the same type. This is how we normally explain human actions. b. Organismic, hypothetical terms (Ho-terms) that refer to the intervening variables as processes and structures in the brain or organism as a whole. These may therefore be termed 'physiological' or organismic variables, and are used as such in many psychological theories. c. Constructive, hypothetical terms (Hc-terms) that refer to the intervening variables as processes or structures consisting of thought constructs formed by analogy with other known systems. To these belong the terms from many psychological theories treating of man as a complicated system that handles information like a computer. Freud's first model - the so-called 'lens model' belongs to this category, but also hypothetical terms that are defined operationally and have very little surplus meaning ('intervening variables' in a narrow sense). The types of hypothetical terms a psychologist chooses or prefers to operate with are, as previously mentioned, largely determined by the meta-model, especially by the ontological part of the meta-stratum.


45

Mentalistic, hypothetical terms (Hm-terms) are often chosen by psychologists whose meta-model is (implicitly or explicitly) a dualistic, hyperphenomenalist or spiritualist type of psychophysical theory. Organismic, hypothetical terms (Ho-terms) are often chosen by psychologists whose ontology is materialist and epiphenomenalist or possibly neutral monistic. Constructive, hypothetical terms (Hc-terms) are often chosen by psychologists whose ontology is pluralistic or neutral monistic. Thus, these terms have also been called 'neutral hypothetical terms'. It should be emphasized, however, that this 'choice' of hypothetical terms need not be a conscious choice on the part of the psychologist who is constructing a theory. It may often be the unconscious preference of a psychologist who is unaware of his ontological basis. This basis is unconscious and implicit, and may in fact manifest itself clearest (though indirectly) according to which kind of ontological surplus meaning becomes attributed to the hypothetical terms. We shall now return to other classifications of hypothetical terms according to which variables they refer to:

2. The existential form of the hypothetical variables. As previously mentioned, the word 'hypotheticalvariable' is used to designate the intervening link to which the hypothetical terms refer. These intervening links may assume various 'forms', and this facilitates a classification of the hypothetical terms according to the existentialform of the variable: a Process-terms refer to processes consisting of a series of changes in a system (such as the conscious organism). In psychology they refer to processes like perception, thinking, planning, motivation and emotions, etc. b. Structure-terms refer to various structures in a system (such as the conscious organism). In psychology it may be intelligence factors, personality variables, memory factors (including acquired skills and knowledge), etc. These structures are permanent for a certain period of time, unlike processes, which can be extremely brief in duration (lasting only a fraction of second). But during the course of a life-time structures also alter as the result of processes relating to learning, maturing and other forms of development. Therefore it is theoretically possible to regard

46

An integrative metatheory everything as undergoing change, i.e. as processes. But in psychology it is practically possible and appropriate to describe and explain a specific person's actions and experiences by refemng to the person's structure at a particular time and to the processes going on inside him. We shall therefore uphold this classification in the following comparisons of theories. In certain cases it may also be appropriate to work with an intermediate form between processes and structures, i.e. states. These may be regarded as very slow processes (lasting several days).

3. The function of hypothetical variables. Hypothetical variables may have various functions (or effects). For many years psychology has operated with a classification of hypothetical variables which subdivides them according to two different functions: a. Dynamic variables are variables (both processes and structures) that are activating, motivating or have the effect of mobilizing energy, especially such factors as 'needs', 'drives', 'motives' and 'emotions'. b. Directive variables are variables that have a controlling, organizing or regulating effect. These include cognitive processes and structures in the broadest sense, i.e. 'perception', 'thinking', 'concepts', 'memory' and 'intelligence'. It has been found appropriate also in this classification to operate with an intermediate form: c. Vector-variables are combined dynamic-directive variables, i.e. processes and structures that are both activating and controlling. An example of such are the 'instincts' of the classical instinct theory (though not those of the ethological theory, where they are only controlling). The two classifications of hypothetical variables according to their form of existence and function can be crossed or combined. We then obtain a classification diagram as shown in Fig. 2.6. The three classifications of hypothetical terms are important instruments for describing and comparing psychological theories; this will be undertaken in subsequent chapters. We shall now return to the hypotheses - the propositions into which hypothetical terms enter as an important element.


47

Fig. 2.6. The classification diagram of hypothetical variables. The diagram is

used to illuminate comparisons of hypothetical variables obtainedfrom various theories (in this case Hull's and Atkinson's theories). It appears from the diagram that two pairs of variables are identical, i.e. sEr and Tendency as well as K and Incentive. D has a different origin from K , and the remaining variables are dissimilar, either with respect to their effect or their ontological form. SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESES. The word 'hypothesis' means underlying assumption or presupposition, and the function of scientific hypotheses is in fact to constitute the basis of scientific explanations or interpretations (c.f. the classification of ideals of science). In other words, the function of hypotheses is to constitute the basis of systematizations of the scientific knowledge that is formulated more concretely in the descriptions or data-theses of the datastratum. Thus, hypotheses are more abstract and general than even the most abstract data-theses. Abstract, because hypotheses are in fact transempirical, i.e. go beyond the empirical level in their content of hypothetical terms. General, because one hypothesis can be used to deduce several data-theses, each containing descriptions of a more concrete nature (information, knowledge). Scientific hypotheses are distinguishable from meta-theses, especially philosophical hypotheses about the world (Weltanschauung', ontology), by the

48


fact that they are more precisely and exactly formulated, in such a way as to render them testable. Altogether, we can characterize scientific hypotheses as more abstract and general than data-theses, and as more testable than metatheses. In comparison with the non-scientific knowledge of everyday life, scientific hypotheses may be said to be more general and more exact. It should be emphasized, however, that even though scientific knowledge (formulated as hypotheses) is the most general and exact knowledge we have, it is not absolutely and 'eternally' valid. Scientific knowledge consists of hypotheses that can be refuted on the basis of a test showing them to be incommensurable with descriptions of reality. Even the most general and tested hypotheses, the so-called 'laws of nature', are in principle provisionally accepted hypotheses - approximations to the absolute truth. This degree of approximation to the 'absolute truth' is often expressed by the word probability, in the sense meaning 'verisimilitude'. Following these more general characteristics of scientific hypotheses, we shall briefly study what we regard to be the most appropriate of the classifications of hypotheses to be found in the subsequent chapters' comparisons of psychological theories (More detailed classifications are to be found in Madsen, 1975). We shall study two classifications of hypotheses - an ontological and a metatheoretical.

I. Ontological classification. Scientific hypotheses can be classified ontologically as existential, functional and historical hypotheses. a. Existential hypotheses are hypotheses that postulate the existence of some kind of hypothetical structure or process, which thereafter enters into some functional or historical hypotheses seeking to explain something observable. Examples of these are Freud's hypotheses about the unconscious and the preconscious systems in the 'lens model', as well as his later hypotheses like that of the Id, Ego and Super-ego in the structural model of the personality. Existential hypotheses may also take the form of definitions. b. Functional hypotheses are hypotheses that postulate an effect or function of some hypothetical structure. If formulated more precisely, functional hypotheses often postulate afunctional relation between one

49


- or several - hypothetical variables that appear as intervening links between some independent variables, or stimuli, and some dependent variables, or reactions (behaviour and/or verbal reactions). It should be noted that the term Lfunctionaf relations' is used here to ,designate both causal relations, which are 100% determined, as well as stochastic relations, with a probability of less than 100%. Thus, functional hypotheses can be represented here in symbolic form as: S+H-+R or in more complicated cases as:

S

+(H2 t)Hi)

R

where the double-arrow indicates the interaction between the hypothetical variables. The following 'frustration-aggression-hypothesis' elaborated by the so-called Yale group serves as an illustrative example (see Dollard et al., 1939): S(frustration) + H(aggression) + R(aggressive behaviour) or in a more complicated edition: S(frustration) + (H(aggression) ++H(fear))

+ R(?)

where it is uncertain whether the behaviour will become manifest as open aggression, because the aggression-motive comes into conflict with fear, which may eventually suppress the aggression entirely. Functional hypotheses constitute the most important category of hypotheses in general psychology, whereas the next category, that of historical hypotheses, plays a greater role in developmental psychology, including the development of personality. c. Historical hypotheses are hypotheses dealing with the historical development of a system, e.g. the conscious organism, a subsystem, or a structure, e.g. the development of 'intelligence'. Thus, in psychology these will mostly be ontogenetic hypotheses about the development of the human psyche, but they may also be phylogenetic hypotheses about the psychic development of the species. Well-known examples of historical hypotheses in psychology include Freud's hypotheses about psycho-sexual development, Piaget's hypotheses

50


about cognitive development, and Leontiev's hypotheses about the phylogenetical development of the psyche, all of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. We have hereby reached the second important classification of hypotheses: 2. Metatheoretical classification. Metatheoretically speaking, there are two categories of scientific hypotheses: theoretical and empirical. The easiest way to illustrate this is by applying this classification to functional hypotheses (though in principle it can also be applied to existential and historical hypotheses). a. Theoretical hypotheses are hypotheses that exclusively contain hypothetical terms (though naturally also 'syntactic' words like 'and, 'is' and 'caused by', etc., which are necessary for the formulation of the propositions). Using the standard symbolism, theoretical hypotheses can be reproduced as H-H-hypotheses. An example hereof is the previously mentioned hypothesis about the interaction between aggression and fear, but Freud's hypotheses about the interaction of the Id, the Ego and the Super-ego could also be mentioned. In other words, theoretical hypotheses deal exclusively with a constructed model, or with a system of hypothetical variables that intervenes in the functional relation between independent and dependent variables. Theoretical hypotheses postulate the existence of constructs or hypothetical variables of this type, or else they deal with the functional interrelations between them, or with their development as such. On the other hand, theoretical hypotheses do not formulate the relations between hypothetical variables and the 'surrounding' empirical variables. Theoretical hypotheses remain, as it were, 'inside the model'. Obviously, these theoretical hypotheses cannot stand alone if they are to fulfil the need for testability, because they create no connection with the observable part of the world. This must be accomplished by empirical hypotheses. b. Empirical hypotheses are hypotheses in which at least one significant word is a descriptive term that refers to an independent or dependent variable (or other observable phenomena). Using the standard symbolism, empirical hypotheses can be reproduced as S - H -

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hypotheses or H-R-hypotheses. Examples of these are the previously mentioned parts of the 'frustation-aggression-hypothesis':

S + (frustration) + (H(aggression) t)H(fear)) (H(aggression)t)H(fear))

+R

As illustrated above, an empirical hypothesis always contains in addition at

least one hypothetical term, otherwise it would not, according to our defnition, be a hypothesis. Using our terminology, propositions that formulate relations solely between descriptive terms are general data-theses, which we shall consider more closely under the data-stratum. Finally, we must emphasize that many people employ the word 'hypothesis' in a wider sense to include general data-theses, which are formulated prior to one of the observations described by the data-thesis. These could be called 'predictive hypotheses' as opposed to the 'explanatory hypotheses' we have hitherto been dealing with. After these classifications of hypotheses we shall return to the hypothesissystem as a whole. THE HYPOTHESIS-SYSTEM.The purpose of the hypothesis-system is, as previously mentioned, to systematize the information obtained from empirical research. In accordance with the ideal of science, this systematization may consist of nomothetic explanation or hermeneutical interpretation. (The third ideal of science, the idiographic, does not strictly speaking need a hypothesissystem, because its sole purpose is to describe individual cases). Here we shall concentrate on problems relating to nomothetic explanation, because by far the majority of psychological theories during the past century have been based on a nomothetic ideal of science. Nomothetic explanation can be organized in two different ways: in the form of deductive explanations or modelexplanations. 1. Deductive explanatory systems. These explanations are also called 'sub-

sumptive explanations', because we explain the individual case - e.g. a specific action - by viewing it as part of a greater context. In other words, we 'cover' single cases with a general 'law' (this may be a general data-thesis or a hypothesis). The explanation is called 'deductive' because it is set forth as a logically constructed deductive system of the type we are familiar with in geometry. In the simple cases there are only two premises:

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1. Premise: the general thesis. 2. Premise: some necessary conditions 3. Conclusion: the descriptive thesis to be explained To take an example from psychology, we use 'the law of effect' (also called 'the reinforcement principle') as the first premise. This 'law' can be formulated as an 'empirical law' or general data-thesis as follows: 'Reinforcement increases the frequency of specific behaviour'. Here 'reinforcement' means the giving of a reward. A necessary condition for the effect of reinforcement is that the organism (the experimental subject) is motivated for reinforcement. Should the motivation be hunger, then the reinforcement has to be food. If this is given, the experimental animal will repeat the behaviour that led to the reward (e.g. to run a particular way through a labyrinth). In the end this repetition of the reinforced behaviour results in increased learning (of the behaviour) on the part of the subject. The above explanation may be schematically represented as follows: 1. Premise:

reinforcement increases the frequency of the behaviour. 2. Premise: the experimental animal is motivated for the reinforcement 3. Conclusion: the experimental animal repeats (and learns) the reinforced behaviour. The next step in the deductive explanation is that the general thesis applied (hypothesis or data-thesis) is derived by deduction from a system of hypotheses - a theory in the narrow sense. Thus, the above law of effect has been derived from a deductive system consisting of 17 'postulates' (overall hypotheses) and 133 theorems (data-theses) constituting C.L. Hull's theory (see Hull 1943, 1952). This is one of the most well-known examples of deductive theories in psychology; it consists largely of mathematical formulae and is quantifiable. Deductive explanatory systems were hailed by the logical empiricists as ideal scientific explanations. A 'standard account' of their explanatory theory is given by C.G. Hempel (see Hempel, 1964). But since the 1960s another explanatory type has been scientifically accepted and used to a greater extent in psychology. 2. Model explanations. The most frequently employed mode of explanation in pre-scientific cognition consists of analogy explanations, i.e. something


53

unknown is explained by analogy with something already known. These appear in the metaphors and 'parables' of speech. In psychology too there are many examples of such verbal analogies. Among the best known is William James' 'stream of consciousness' and Sigmund Freud's 'iceberg analogy', in which the unconscious and conscious parts of the psyche are compared with the part of the iceberg that is respectively below and above the surface of the water. Analogy explanations were also used in the form of models at an early stage of the natural sciences. A famous physicist, Lord Kelvin, maintained that he was not satisfied with an explanation of a physical phenomenon before he had constructed a model of the phenomenal field. The first physical models were the three-dimensional, material models we are all familiar with from the collection of physical models in schools, including the globe and the model of the solar system. To begin with, models of this type were also used in atomic physics, such as the well-known solar-system models of the structure of the atom. But after the First World War problems arose in atomic physics that could not be explained using visual models. At the same time logical empiricism developed a theory of science that stressed the importance of hypothetical, deductive systems as ideal scientific explanations. During this period visual models were regarded as mere pedagogical aids. After the Second World War, however, a scientific revolution took place. The amval of electronic computers provided quite new possibilities for producing models. To start with, many psychologists used the computer, or 'electronic brain', as it was in fact called, as a model analogous with the human brain. Later, however, it became more customary to use the computer's programmes as models of the processes going on in the brain when receiving and handling information. In the so-called simulation experiments, problemsolving and learning in animals and people were simulated with the help of computers. If there was a satisfactory accordance between the performance of the computer and that of the experimental subjects, the computer's programme - not its 'hardware' - was regarded to be a simulation model of the psychical processes. Simulation models of this type have been used a great deal in psychology and the social sciences, where they will possibly acquire the same importance as the telescope had in its day for astronomy, and the microscope for biology. Apart from the complicated simulation models, the use of the computer has also led to the application of graphic models in the form of diagrams for describing and explaining processes.

54


Finally, the popularity of the model as concept has led to our speaking of mathematical models; i.e. formulae or formula-systems are now regarded as explanatory systems. With this extension or generalization of the concept of a model we have in fact obtained a synthesis of the two hitherto conflicting types of explanation, because the deductive explanation (including mathematical formula-systems) may be regarded as a special case of an analogy-model-explanation. It now becomes necessary, however, to provide a precise and general definition comprising all the abovementioned types of models: A 'model' may be defined as equivalent to a system that is constructed in order to provide a schematic description andlor explanation of another system's structure and processes. The contents of this definition can be illustrated with a diagram (see Fig. 2.7). In close connection with this definition there are two classifications of models that are partially contained in the previous description. a. Classification of models according to their degree of abstraction: (1) Material, 3-dimensional models (e.g. the globe). (2) Graphic, 2-dimensional models (e.g. a map). (3) Simulation models (computer programs). (4) Mathematical models (symbolic systems), b. Classification of models according to their purpose (function): (1) Descriptive models: models purporting to provide a schematic descriptive representation of a system or section of the world. These models really belong to the data-stratum. The so-called 'black-boxmodels' belong to this category, since they do not contain transempirical variables. (2) Explanatory models: models purporting to provide an explanation incorporating hypothetical (transempirical) variables. These models clearly belong to the hypothetical stratum. According to the ontological status of the hypothetical variables employed, this category can be subdivided into: (a) Constructive models employing Hc-terms (= hypothetical terms referring to pure thought constructs), i.e. H-terms with 'neutral

55


Meta-stratum Hypothetical stratum

Schematic

representation

-+

Brain model

Data-stratum

Concrete System

Theory with model

Fig. 2.7. Drawing representing the relation between model and experimental object (in this case, the brain). The diagram illustrates that the brain model is a schematic representation of the actual brain {here, an atomical section). The diagram also shows that the model is part of the whole theory {especially of the hypothetical stratum).

surplus meaning' (cf. the previously introduced classification of H-terms). (b) Physiological models employing Ho-terms (= hypothetical terms with physiological surplus meaning). (c) Mentalistic models employing Hm-terms (= hypothetical terms with mentalistic surplus meaning). ( 3 ) Meta-models: models belonging to the meta-stratum, where they may be formulated as (largely ontological) meta-theses but are frequently implicit 'global models'. The function of these models is to provide a background of understanding and a framework for the governing


56

presuppositions. This forms an important part of Kuhn's concept of a paradigm. In the following, whenever we use the word 'model' without specifying which type, it should be taken to mean 'explanatory model'. Finally, it should be emphasized that both the descriptive and the explanatory models (but not the meta-models) may be used as predictions, i.e. descrip tive theses about phenomena that have not yet been observed. Thus, 'predictions' may well consist of past phenomena, e.g. hitherto unregistered phenomena from the history of an individual (so-called 'post-dictions'), though they usually consist of future phenomena. Predictions are regarded as an important application of an explanatory system. With predictions we have hereby reached the next level of abstraction in the scientific text. The Data-Stratum INTRODUCTION. The data-stratum is the most concrete part of the scientific

text. But even within the stratum itself there are different degrees of abstraction, and thus it is possible to subdivide it into several 'sub-strata'. For practical reasons we shall suffice by subdividing the data-stratum into two levels: the most abstract and the most concrete. These will be dealt with separately with a view to subsequent comparisons of theories. THE ABSTRACT DATA-STRATUM. This part of the scientific text contains the

most abstract and general descriptive propositions - the general data-theses. These propositions contain exclusively abstract, descriptive terms (D-terms) together with the necessary syntactical words, though with no hypothetical terms. It may be difficult, however, to distinguish between the most abstract Dterms and H-terms. In the final event this rests on how the terms are defined. According to definition, D-terms refer to observable variables, as for example the terms contained in the above-mentioned Frustration-Aggression-hypothesis. 'Frustration' is a term often used to designate all situations that block or hinder an individual's goaldirected behaviour; here it is an abstract D-term. But in some theories 'frustration' is used to designate the state of the organism arising as the result of blocks and suchlike; here 'frustration' is used as a hypothetical term. Such is also the case with the term 'aggression': it may be

57


applied to aggressive behaviour and is then an abstract D-term; but it can also be applied to the aggression motive, in which case it is an H-term. The examples illustrate that we cannot immediately tell whether a word is a D-term or an H-term but are obliged to read the explicit definitions or, for lack of these, the complete text, in order to come to a decision. Unfortunately many psychological texts are full of such ambiguous terms. Thus, having decided whether a term is a D-term or an H-term, we can determine whether a general proposition is a hypothesis or an abstract datathesis. Abstract data-theses are concerned with empirical relations between empirical variables. In psychology there are especially two kinds of relations: 'functional relations' and 'correlations'.

1. Functional relations. These are relations between independent and dependent variables, i.e. between specific stimuli and their responses (behavioural or verbal). If, in the functional relation, an intervening hypothetical variable is used to explain the causal relation, the propositions are hypotheses. But some psychological theories contain general data-theses dealing with the functional relation between independent and dependent variables. Expressed symbolically, this data-theses have the general form: S +R. Once more we can take as our example ,,Frustration causes aggressive behaviour"; or symbolically:

S

(frustration) + R(aggressive behaviour)

In many cases the formulation of the same functional relation is reversed, i.e. ,,Aggressive behaviour is conditioned (or a function of) frustration" as follows: Aggressive behaviour = f(frustration) The latter version is slightly more cautious, because the possibility of error contained in the first formulation has been excluded, i.e. that which arises when aggressive behaviour is blocked (and 'concealed') as the result of the interaction of fear with the aggression motive. This may be illustrated once again by the abovementioned S(frustration) + (H(aggression) t)H(fear))

+ R(?)

58


The moment of uncertainty indicated in this formulation is avoided with the 'backwards formulation', because - according to this theory, though not all psychological theories - the equation 'aggressive behaviour = f(frustration)' is always valid. 2. Correlations: These consist of relations between two or more dependent variables, i.e. between two types of behaviour, such as test performances. Symbolically, therefore,these relations can be formulated as: R-R-relations.

It can be shown, for example, that there is a close relation between the performance in a specific type of intelligence test and the performances in a mathematical test. The relation can be calculated statistically and expressed numerically by the so-called correlation coefficient, which varies from -1 to + l . The last figure indicates complete coincidence, whereas the first indicates the complete opposite: high performance in one test correlated with low performance in the other. Most of the correlation coefficients of interest to psychologists lie between 0.50 and 1.OO. The correlation coefficient is therefore an expression of potential relations, but says nothing about a determinist causal relation. It is often the case that two correlated R-variables can be explained as effects of the same hypothetical variable, e.g. a general intelligence factor may be the cause of both good intelligence-test performances and good mathematical performances. THE CONCRETE DATA-STRATUM. This part of the text contains the concrete description of specific observations known as specific data-theses. It may consist of a detailed description of an experimental person's behaviour in an experimental or test situation: e.g., ,,sitting restlessly on the chair, the experimental subject blushed when presented with table IX in the Rorschack test". In this case the description contains behavioural data. Other specific datatheses contain phenomenological data or physiological data. The argumentation for the use of specific categories of psychological data belongs itself to the meta-stratum of the text, specifically under the methodological principles. But here an interesting metatheoretical problem presents itself. The logical empiricists called these specific data-theses 'protocol sentences', because they are the type of sentence that may be recorded in the


59

experimental protocols. These philosophers maintained that such protocol sentences could be tested with 100% certainty, and thus that theories ought to be able to be built on absolutely true protocol sentences. But most metascientists have now abandoned this logical empiricist theory of science. Modem metascience does not regard science as built up 'from the bottom' but rather 'from above' - from the meta-stratum. It is the meta-stratum that governs the formation of the hypothesis-stratum and the methods for collecting the data that is then used in the revision of the hypotheses, or still better: Science has arisen and developed in an interaction between philosophy and the empirical facts (see Fig. 2.2, and also the discussion about 'protocol sentences' in Madsen, 1975).

Theories as Wholes Finally, we shall discuss some possible descriptions of the scientific theory as a whole. Variations in complete texts. As previously mentioned, we have defined a complete scientific text as a system (structure) consisting of meta-theses, hypotheses and data-theses. Different scientific texts may vary accordingly with regard to the relative number of the three categories of theses. In other words, some texts have a metastratum relatively full of philosophical (ontological and scientific) assumptions. Other scientific texts have a relatively full hypothetical stratum, and still other scientific texts have a relatively full data-stratum. The relative number of theses from the three levels of abstraction can be calculated and expressed as a relation between three percentages, 'the M-H-D-ratio' (see Madsen, 1974 and 1975). This variation in the relative proportions of the three categories of texts can in extreme cases comprise three types of text, which are not complete, but incomplete texts consisting of only one text stratum. Incomplete scientific texts. We obtain in this way three sub-categories of incomplete, scientific texts: 1. Empirical research reports: These are texts that largely contain data-theses, i.e. possibly an explicitly formulated hypothesis and a few methodological arguments. These types of texts are very common in psychological journals, and many research reports in the field of applied psychology belong to this category. 2. Theoretical discourses: These are texts containing largely hypotheses and models. In some cases there may be a few meta-theses - especially rneta-

60


theoretical arguments about the construction and function of theories. There may of course be a few data-theses in support of the theory (= hypothesis-system), and possibly a few predictions regarding observations capable of testing (verifying or falsifying) the hypothesis-system. These types of texts also appear in psychology, but chiefly in the form of books less frequently as articles in psychological journals. 3 . Philosophical discourses. These are texts containing largely meta-theses. In psychology there have in particular been a number of texts concerned with the philosophy of science and comprising metatheoretical and methodological argumentation as well as a few epistemological considerations. In psychology such philosophical discourses have seldom included ontological problems except in periods of crisis. Philosophical discourses are most frequently to be found as introductory chapters to complete, scientific texts, but they also appear as independent accounts in book form or as articles in journals. The introduction of the term 'incomplete' scientific texts side by side with complete scientific texts necessitates the common denominator 'scientific production', in order to be able to refer to a researcher's or scientific community's total production of scientific texts, whether they be complete or incomplete. THE TESTABILITY OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES. Given the three categories of

incomplete scientific texts, the problem naturally arises as to how to distinguish scientific texts from other texts. A delimitation like this naturally depends on both the ideal of science and the definition of 'science'. The problem is probably greatest as far as theoretical texts are concerned, because most people have no doubt about empirical research reports being 'scientific' (providing certain requirements as regards quality are fulfilled); purely philosophical texts are likewise unproblematic, because they are not considered scientific unless they enter into relations with theoretical and empirical texts. On the other hand, it is more difficult to reach agreement about a criterion for determining whether theoretical texts are scientific. The criterion most capable of gathering supporters among modern metascientists and researchers in various disciplines is probably the criterion of testability. It was advanced by the logical empiricists as a principle of verification, whereas Popper proposed an even more demanding principle of falsification. Kuhn, Bunge


61

and many other metascientists advocated a more liberal criterion of testability: scientific theories (= hypothesis- systems) should be capable of being tested empirically and thereby falsified andlor verified. If 'empirical testing' was regarded so liberally as to include 'practical experience', this criterion might even win acceptance among Marxist theoreticians (see, for example, Mao 1978). If we accept testability as a criterion for delimiting scientific, theoretical texts, the possession of an exact 'yardstick' or quantitative estimation of the testability of theories (= hypothesis-systems) becomes important. In our opinion we have discovered such a quantitative method of estimation in connection with a comparative study of psychological theories (see Madsen 1959, 1974 and 1975). The method consists of determining and expressing the testability of a theory numerically - as the so-called 'Hypothesis Quotient'. This quotient is based on the proportionate relation between theoretical and empirical hypotheses (cf. the aforementioned classification of hypotheses). Employing the customary symbolism for theoretical hypotheses (H-Hhypotheses) and empirical hypotheses (S-H- and H-R-hypotheses), we arrive at the following formula for calculating the Hypothesis Quotient:

In the light of what has already been said, it should be clear that a hypothesissystem needs at least one empirical hypothesis in order to be able to test the hypothesis-system empirically; and the more empirical hypotheses a hypothesis-system contains, the more testable the theory: i.e the lower the H.Q.,the more testable the theory. We have calculated the Hypothesis Quotient for 36 psychological theories and found a variation from 0.00 (Skinner's theory) to 2.00 (Freud's theory). The H.Q.'s of known theories will be discussed under the history of the development of psychology. A comprehensive table is to be found after the Appendix. This concludes the account of the most important points contained in the comparative metatheory, or systematology, to be used in the following history. For practical reasons the meta-theory has been summarized in schematic form in the Appendix; this is available to the reader as a 'check-list' when studying the subsequent descriptions and comparisons of theories.

An integrative me tatheory

62

The history of psychology in outline INTRODUCTION. In this chapter we have presented an integrated metatheory.

This has consisted of two parts: 1. Kuhn's theory about the development of the sciences, which has been chosen as an optimum compromise - a possible synthesis of both internalist and externalist historiography, and of biographical or individuallyorientated and social historical or societally-orientatedhistoriography. 2. A comparative metatheory, termed a systematology, and developed in order to be able to analyse, describe and compare psychological theories from different periods and schools.

In the following account these two metatheories will come to supplement one another in the following way: The arrangement of the book, especially its subdivision into periods and into the history of the respective scientific communities during these various periods, will be based on Kuhn's theory. As a supplement to this, the systematological metatheory will be used to describe the scientific production, both in normal periods and in periods of crisis during which the scientific production of alternative schools differs. Thus we shall employ the term 'scientijk production' as a common denominator for a researcher's or a scientific community's total production of scientific texts - both incomplete and complete. The total scientific production can be described with the help of the systematological metatheory's three levels of discourse - the Meta-, Hypothetical and Data-strata, and of the possible classifications already introduced under each separate stratum. It will thereby be possible to describe and compare the total production of the different researchers and scientific communitites in the same way as we analyse and describe an individual text. Therefore, unlike Kuhn, we shall be attaching great importance to comparisons of the productions of the different periods and schook

The history of psychology in outline

63

Periods in the History of Psychology THE APPLICATION OF KUHN. In order to be able to apply Kuhn's theory to the

development of a discipline, there must exist at least one normal period during which scientists are agreed upon a single paradigm (= disciplinary matrix), because this, for Kuhn, is the criterion for determing whether a discipline at all is a 'science'. It is our opinion that there have been two normal periods in the development of psychology: 1. The period of 'classical experimental psychology': c. 1860 - c. 1900. 2. The period of 'integrated psychology': c. 1933 - c. 1960. In addition there have been two periods of crisis: 1. The first period of school formation c. 1900 - c. 1933. 2. The second period of school formation c. 1960 But it should be stressed that this division into periods is not generally accepted in psychological historiography, amongst other reasons because Kuhn's theory was not applied to the history of psychology until 1970 (Madsen). Discussion is still taking place as to whether Kuhn's theory can at all be applied to the history of psychology, because no normal period is supposed to have existed. Discussion of this type also took place at the 22nd International Congress of Psychologists in Leipzig, 1980; here also other psychologists supported the application of Kuhn (see the congress report). The History of Psychology (according to Kuhn's Model): Actual Behaviorism The Main Stream Classical ? . Experimental Psychology Psychoanalysis 1860

1900

1933

Period

1945

.

Marxistic Psychology Humanistic Psychology

1960

b

Fig. 2.8. Diagram showing the development of psychology and its various schools in accordance with Kuhn's theory: a normal period is followed by a period of crisis with formation of schools and so on.


64

In the following account Kuhn's theory will be regarded as the basis for a descriptive model of the development of psychology; this may be illustrated by means of a diagram (see Fig. 2.8). Naturally this model is not meant to be regarded as the 'absolute truth' but rather as an appropriate way of structuralizing this history of psychology. Further arguments in support of its use will be presented during the course of the book. The chapters After having accounted for the arrangement of this historical account, the present chapter will be concluded by a survey of the remaining chapters (see also the more detailed list of contents). Thus, we shall start with a survey of the 'prehistory' of psychology as part of philosophy and end with an account of the history of the present mainstream in psychology. The following chapters will therefore be: Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter

3: 4 5: 6:

7: 8: 9: 10: 11: 12:

The philosophical prehistory of psychology Classical experimental psychology Gestalt psychology Reflexology and classical behaviourism Psychoanalysis The psychology of the integration period Humanistic psychology Marxist psychology Contemporary behaviourism 'Mainstream' psychology

Systematological taxonomi

65

Appendix: Systematological taxonomy A comparative-metatheoretical descriptive system INTRODUCTION. This contains a summary in outline of Chapter 2, which dealt with a metatheory, developed in connection with a comparative study of psychological theories. 1. Definition: 'Metatheory' = Theory about theories'. 2. Definition: Theory' (in a broad sense) = a complete scientific text consisting of three levels of discourse: the Meta-stratum, the Hypothetical stratum and the Data-stratum. I. THE META-STRATUM The meta-stratum' is that part of the text containing 'meta-theses': philosophical propositions about the theory's preassumptions. 1.1 Ontological meta-theses (or the 'meta-model'): 1.1.1. The Conception of Man' (CM), i.e. theses about man's being or origin. Examples: 1. Biological CM 2. SocialCM 3. HumanisticCM 1.1.2 'Weltanschauung' - especially theories about the psycho-physical problem (see Fig. 2.4). Examples: 1. Panpsychism 2. Dualism: Interactionism 3. Dualism: Parallelism 4. Epiphenomenalism 5. Hyperphenomenalism 6. Monism: Materialism 7. Monism: Spiritualism 8. Monism: Identity theory 9. Pluralism 1.1.3. 'Weltanschauung' - especially the problem of causality. Examples: 1. Mechanical determinism 2. Dialectical (dynamic) determinism 3. Probabilism (theory of probability) 4. Indeterminism ('free will').

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1.2. Philosophical meta-theses (philosophy of science) 1.2.1. Epistemological theses: 1.2.1.1. The origin of cognition: 1. Empiricism 2. Rationalism 3. Intuitionism 1.2.1.2. Cognition's relation to reality: 1. Realism: naive and critical 2. Instrumentalism (Pragmatism) 3. Idealism 1.2.2. Metatheoretical theses: These theses may be normative (prescriptive) 'ideals of science' (IS). 1. Nomothetic (natural scientific) IS 2. Hermeneutic IS 3. Idiographic IS 1.2.3. Methodological theses: These theses can also be normative: 1.2.3.1. Empirical methods 1. Experimental method: 1. Univariate experiments 2. Multivariate experiments 2. Test methods: 1. Ability tests, Achievement tests and Personality Questionnaires 2. Projective tests 3. Qualitative methods: 1. Interviews 2. Field observations 1.2.3.2. Data-language 1. Private, phenomenlogical language 2. Public behavioural language 3. Public physiological language


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2. THE HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM 'The hypothetical stratum' = that part of the text which contains hypotheses and

(explanatory) models. The H-stratum is equivalent to 'theory' in the narrow sense. Hypotheses contain: 2.1. Hypothetical terms 'H-terms' = words that refer to transempirical (= hypothetical) variables: i.e. unobserved processes and structures or constructed concepts of explanation. Classifications: 2.1.1. Ontological reference ('surplus meaning'): 1. Hm-terms: Mentalistic reference 2. Ho-terms: Organismic (physiological) reference 3. Hc-terms: 'neutral' reference (to Constructs) 2.1.2 Existential form: 1. Process-variable 2. Structure-variable 2.1.3. Function (effect): 1. Dynamic variables 2. Directive variables 3. Vector-variables 2.2. Hypotheses 'Hypotheses' = bases for explanations or interpretations. Transempirical, but testable. 2.2.1. Ontological classification: 1. Existential hypotheses 2. Functional hypotheses 3. Historical hypotheses 2.2.2. Metatheoretical classification: 1. Theoretical hypotheses: H-H-hypotheses 2. Empirical hypotheses 1. S-H-hypotheses 2. H-R-hypotheses 2.3. Hypothesis-System Hypotheses constitute a more or less organized system the purpose of which is to systematize the empirical information by way of explanations or interpretations.Explanations may be classified as:

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2.3.1. Deductive (subsumptive) explanatory systems Explanation by way of 'syllogisms' and other logical systems. Examples: 1. Premise: General (hypo- or data-) thesis 2. Premise: Necessary conditions Conclusion: Specific data-thesis 2.3.2. Analogous explanatory systems: Explanation by way of analogies as metaphores (in everyday life) or models (in science). A 'model' = a system constructed in order to provide a schematic description and/or explanation of another system. 2.3.2.1. Classification according to degree of abstraction: 1. Material, 3-dimensional models 2. Graphic, 2-dimensional models 2. Simulation models 4. Mathematical models 2.3.2.2. Classification according to purpose: 1. Descriptive models: Black-box models 2. Explanatory models: 1. Constructive (S-Hc-R-) models 2. Physiological (S-Ho-R-) models 3. Mentalistic (S-Hm-R-) models 3. Meta-models: 'World models', background for understanding 3. THE DATA-STRATUM

The 'data-stratum' = that part of the text which contains general and specific data-theses (descriptive propositions) as well as descriptive classifications.. 3.1. Abstract data-stratum: Abstract,general data-theses dealing with general, empirical relations. 3.1.1. Functional (S-R-)relations 3.1.2. Correlations (R-R-) relations 3.2. Concrete data-stratum: Concrete, specific data-theses (previous 'protocol sentences'): 3.2.1. Phenomenological data-theses


69

3.2.2. Behavioural data-theses 3.2.3. Physiological data-theses 4. TEXT AS WHOLES

4.1. Complete scientific texts: These contain all three levels of discourse (M-, H-, D-level), but in varying proportions expressed by the 'M-H-D-ratio'. 4.2. Incomplete scientific texts: 4.2.1. Empirical research reports 4.2.2. Theoretical discourses 4.2.3. Philosophical discourses 4.3. Scientific production: A researcher's - or a scientific community's - total production of scientific texts. 4.4. Testability of scientijic - specijically theoretical - texts: Quantitative estimation by means of the 'Hypothesis Quotient':

5. METASCENTIFIC CONCEPTS (THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE)

A clarification of Kuhn's concepts with the help of the Systematological Taxonomy: 5.1. 'Paradigm': 1. 'Meta-paradigm': Common Meta-stratum in a research group's production. 2. 'Theory-paradigm' Common Hypothetical stratum in a research group's production. 5.2. 'Schools' 1. 'Macroschool' A scientific community with common Meta-paradigm.. 2. 'Microschool' A scientific community with common Meta-paradigm + Theoryparadigm. 5.3. 'Normal period' A period in which the scientific community constitutes one Macroschool (possibly subdivided into two or more Microschools).

70


5.4. Period of crisis A period in which the scientific community is subdivided into two or more 'Macroschools'.

Skinner

0.00 0.09 0.11 Tinbergen: Hebb: 0.13 Maslow 0.13 Watson: 0.13 Duffy: 0.14 McCleUand: 0.14 0.20 Miller I: Leontyev: 0.23 Pribram: 0.29 Bindra: 0.30 Kohler: 0.30 Atldnson & Birch: 0.33 Freud (Erroneous actions): 0.33 Pavlov: 0.33 Hull: 0.36 (0.30) Berlyne: 0.38

cam1

Brown McDougak Lewin: Konorsky: Woodworth: Freud (Dreams): MiUer 0): Munay: James: Wundt: Freud (Neuroses) Young: Festinger: Arkinson: Allport: Freud (Anxiety): Tolman: Freud (Topographical t.)

0.38 0.43 0.50 (0.57) 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.60 0.60 (0.71) 0.60 0.67 0.71 0.82 0.84 0.86 1 .oo 1.20 1.43 (1.50) 2.00

Tabel 1:Some psychologists (Atkinson. Freud and Miller) have produced several theories. In other cases (Hull, Lewin, Murray and Tolrnan) the H.Q. is calculated for two different reconstructions of the same theory.

Chapter 3

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PREHISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION. ,Psychology has a short history but a long past". This pro-

nouncement (by the German psychologist H. Ebbinghaus) refers to the fact that psychology has a history of one hundred years as an independent science but of a thousand years as a part of philosophy. In this book, we cannot of course examine its entire philosophical past, which extends right back to Aristotle in European, and to Buddha in Indian, philosophy; but we shall briefly survey the development of philosophy respecting two problems extremely relevant to psychology. To start with, we shall survey the development of philosophy as far as it relates to the psycho-physical problem, because this problem is closely connected with psychology's most fundamental ontological problem: what is the 'psyche', 'mind' or 'consciousness'? And how are psychological phenomena related to physical or somatic ones? In other words, what is the relation between 'consciousness' and 'brain'? This is a fundamental problem for psychology, because it concerns the definition of psychology's object of research. Thereafter we shall outline the development of the theory of knowledge, especially the historical development of epistemological theories about the fundamental question of the origin ofknowledge. This problem is relevant to psychology as well as to other sciences, because it is fundamental for the entire conception of science and thereby for the question as to which kind of science psychology ought to be.

72

The philosophical prehistory of psychology

Psycho-physical theories INTRODU(XI0N. The problem of the relation between consciousness and brain is a modem edition of the age-old philosophical problem of the relation between soul and body - the 'psycho-physical problem'. This problem, which has been called 'the riddle of the universe', has occupied Western philosophers from the time of Ancient Greece and, earlier still, the same problem has also formed part of Indian philosophy as well as the philosophies and religions of other cultures. Ever since psychology arose as an independent science over a hundred years ago this problem has also concerned psychologists. During the last few decades it has been taken up anew on account of the results achieved by physiological research into brain function. It would be carrying things too far to provide a historical survey of the various philosophical theories concerning the psychophysical problem. Moreover, the chief categories of psycho-physical theories already made their appearance in the philosophy of antiquity. Since then they have constantly been appearing in new versions and variations, and even after the Second World War nearly all the main types have been represented. Although this account is not intended to be chronological, an attempt will be made to reproduce the development of the psychophysical theories in diagrammatic form (see fig. 2.4. in chapter 2).

of most 'primitive' peoples incorporate a philosophy about the relation between psychical and physical phenomena - between 'soul' and 'body'. In this primitive philosophy man is most frequently regarded as a whole that can best be described as 'a living and animated body'. According to this primitive theory there is no sharp distinction between 'life' and 'soul'. Everything living is animated, and the 'soul' is usually equated with 'vital force'. Nor is there a sharp division between living, organic nature and non-living, inorganic nature, or 'matter'. Everything in the world is to a greater or lesser extent regarded as living and animated; the whole world is a great living and animated organism. This philosophy may therefore be termed 'panpsychism', since the psychical forces are regarded as present overall in nature. HOLISTIC PHILOSOPHY (PANPSYCHISM).The religions

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Psycho-physical theories

It proved readily possible to combine this holistic theory with observations and thoughts concerning death. Death was regarded as a separation between 'body' and 'soul' (or vital force) - which otherwise constituted a whole. The 'soul', however, was regarded as an 'airy', less tangible 'body', which could continue some kind of independent existence following its separation from the body. But even if 'soul' and 'body' could be separated in this primitive holistic theory, they were not regarded as fundamental, essentially different, types of existence. DUALISM. In European philosophy the sharp conceptual distinction between

'soul' and 'body' did not take place until the Renaissance and the birth of modem physics. Owing to the success of mechanics in connection with the construction of machines, it became popular among philosophers to regard the bodies of animals and people as complicated reflex-machines comparable with the mechanical dolls already built at that time. According to this philosophy, the difference between these robots and people is that man consists of both a 'material body' and a 'spiritual soul'. Whereas the body consists of matter possessing extension in space, the soul consists of a spiritual substance capable of thinking. Interactionism (Dualism)

i ' ; Consciousness

Fig.3.1. Descartes (1596-1656), Eccles, S p e w , Penfeld.

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When 'body' and 'soul' were thus defined as two such essentially different types of existence, the problem arose as to how they could at all be interrelated. This formulation, for which the French philosopher Rene Descartes (15961656) is responsible, became the point of departure for all subsequent European philosophies concerning the psycho-physical problem. Descartes' own theory for solving this problem has been termed the dualistic theory of interaction. He presumes that the spiritual, thinking 'soul' interacts with the body, and that this interaction takes place in the brain. According to Descartes' theory, the action of the brain processes, acted upon in their turn by external or internal stimuli, takes place at a central point in the brain - the so-called 'pineal body'. These brain processes give rise to mental processes - such as perceiving the surroundings, taking stock of the situation and willing an action. Willing has a reciprocal action on the brain, which then brings about the appropriate action (see fig. 3.1). It was this reciprocal causal relation between the material brain and the spiritual soul that became problematic with the growth of modem science. In particular, many philosophers and scientists were unable to understand how mental processes could have an effect on brain processes. Nevertheless, a variant of the dualistic theory of interaction has been propounded in modem times by Sir John Eccles, winner of the Nobel prize for physiology, in co-operation with the famous British philosopher Karl Popper (see Popper and Eccles 1977). According to their theory, interaction takes place between consciousness and the brain in the dominating (usually left) half of the cerebrum, where the centre for the apprehension and processing of language is situated. Complicated processes are taking place in the brain continuously; these are caused by a complicated interplay of stimuli from the surroundings, impulses from within the organism, and processes in the remaining centres of the brain. Consciousness is conceived of as having the ability to influence this complicated process in the same way as a magnetic field can effect an electric current. In Eccles' and Popper's theory the causal relation is of a more complicated, field theoretical nature than in Descartes' 'cogwheel mechanism' theory. Therefore, according to them, this modem theory of interaction is compatible with modem science (see fig. 3.2).

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Psycho-physical theories Trialism

Consciousness

Brain

/--Fig. 3.2. Popper's theory about the three worlds. PARALLELISM. Because of the difficulty of explaining the interaction between

psychical and physical phenomena, some of Descartes' successors, among them the German philosopher Leibnitz (1646-1716), formulated another variant of dualism. Psychical and physical phenomena were regarded as two sets of processes, running parallel with, though without effecting, one another. In other words, brain processes and conscious experiences are simultaneous and 'synchronized'. The simultaneousness is not an indication of the interaction of these two sets of phenomena, but is merely the result of their accidental or willed (on the part of the Creator) synchrony - like two clocks that are set going at the same moment and always register the same time. This form of dualism therefore allowed brain physiologists and psychologists to investigate each his own set of phenomena - independently of one another. Parallelism was therefore popular along the first experimental psychologists, because it provided a philosophical basis for the independence of their science (see fig. 3.3).

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The philosophical prehistory of psychology Parallelism

Synchronism

Fig. 3.3. Leibniz (1646-1716), Jung, Wundt. MATERIALISM. Already in antiquity a theory was developed as a reaction against panpsychism (and later against dualism) by, amongst others, Democritus and Epicurus. This is known as 'materialism', because it recognizes solely the existence of material substance, or matter, and implies that the existence of the brain and its processes is recognized, whereas that of consciousness is not. Materialism is also strongly represented in modern philosophy, and in psychology it appears as radical behaviorism. This psychological theory purports to investigate behaviour alone, and refuses to recognize the existence of consciousness - or at any rate of its scientific relevance (see fig. 3.4). Materialism The whole world ISmaterial

Fig. 3.4. Democritus (470-360 B.C.). Radical Eehaviourisu, and some modern philosophers.

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EPIPHENOMENALISM.A less radical variant of the materialist psychophysical theory is that of 'epiphenomenalism';this recognizes the existence of consciousness, though converts it into a by- (= epi-) phenomenon. Only the brain processes enter into the causal relation between the stimuli of the surroundings and the behaviour of the individual. The phenomena of consciousness are conditioned by the brain processes, but have no reciprocal effect on them. Unlike materialism, then, the existence of consciousness is recognized but, unlike the dualistic theory of interaction, the reciprocal action on the brain is not recognized. Epiphenomenalism could be regarded as a 'part interaction theory'. In the next section we shall hear about another such theory' (see fig. 3.5). Epiphenomenaiism

f\ Consciousness

a Brain

Fig. 3.5. Epiphenomenalism, Pavlov, Huxley.

HYPERPHENOMENALISM. This theory is to be found particularly in Indian

philosophy, e.g. in Buddha's philosophy (563-483 B.C.), but also in early Greek philosophy in Plato (427-347 B.C.). It regards spiritual phenomena as the most important element of life, whereas the material world is merely 'maya', a kind of chimera or illusion. In a modem version of this theory the brain is regarded as an 'instrument', which is affected by the spiritual world or cosmic consciousness in the same way as a TV-set is affected by electromagnetic waves. Thus the processes taking place in the brain (or the TV-set) are largely caused by something coming from outside (even though the suucture of the brain naturally also affects the consciousness of the individual).

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But the brain has no reciprocal effect on the psyche. 'Consciousness' is therefore something that arises in an interplay between the brain of the individual and the spiritual component of the world, which latter may also be regarded as a 'cosmic consciousness' or 'cosmic soul'. This theory is to be found in the so-called 'transpersonalpsychology', the chief representatives of which include the American Charles Tart (see Tart 1975a, 1975b). (see fig. 3.6). Animism

Fig. 3.6. Buddha (563-483 B.C.), Plato (427-347B.C.), C. Tart,McDougall. IDEALISM. (Spiritualism, Phenomenalism).The direct opposite of materialism

is often called 'idealism'. But it would be more apt to call it 'spiritualism', because it is the philosophy that maintains that everything in existence is spiritual or consists of 'spiritual elements'. A well-known representative of this philosophy is G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). An extremely radical variant of this philosophy is to be found in Berkeley (1684-1753). He maintains that the only thing we can observe with certainty is our own consciousness. Therefore he calls this theory 'phenomenalism'.But it is also possible to think of other people also existing as consciousnesses,and Berkeley was of the opinion that all consciousnesses existed as elements in a 'superconsciousness', or God (see fig. 3.7).


79 Spiritualism (Idealism)

0 The whole world IS spiritual

Consciousness

Fig. 3.7. Berkeley (1684-1753), Vasubandhu (c. 300-400 A.D.)

In the philosophical - and especially the ideological - debate the four theories mentioned above are frequently divided broadly into 'materialism' contra 'idealism', where epiphenomenalism is regarded as materialism and hyperphenomenalism, as idealism. Here dualism too is often regarded as idealism, whereas the next form of psycho-physical theory is often (erroneously) regarded as a 'materialist' theory. THE IDENTITY THEORY. (Neutral Monism). This theory constitutes the first attempt at a synthesis of materialism and spiritualism (whereas parallelism may often be regarded as a transitional form between dualism and the identity theory (see Fig. 2.4). It appeared in Greek antiquity in the philosophy of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and was formulated in modem times by the Dutch philosopher Spinoza (1632-1677). He maintained that mind and matter were two aspects of the same 'neutral' reality. Thus the theory has come to be known as the 'double-aspect-theory'. Spinoza compared it with the observation of a hollow sphere from within and without. It is the same sphere, even though it looks like two different things. In the same way brain and consciousness are identical. It is basically the same reality we observe, though from two different viewpoints - an objective and a subjective - or with two different sets of methods. Thus, there is no such thing as two different forms of existence - mind and matter - but there exists only one form of existence or reality, which is neither material or spiritual but 'neutral'. Consequently the theory is also known as 'neutral monism'(see fig. 3.8). Under this name the theory of identity was subsequently proposed by the famous British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), who founded the so-called neo-positivism or 'logical empiricism'. This theory acquired great


Fig. 3.8. Spinoza (1632-1677).

influence especially in the Anglo-Saxon world and became the dominating theory among a whole generation of American psychologists (from c. 1930 - c. 1970) (see fig. 3.9 and 3.10). SYSTEM PHILOSOPHIES. This term is used as a common denominator for a number of philosophies and theories which, historically speaking, have developed independently of one another, but nevertheless share the same content. These include dialectical materialism (especially Engels' 'Dialectics of Nature'), French structuralism (to which the psychologist Jean Piaget has contributed) as well as American cybernetics (Norbert Wiener), information theory and general system theory (developed by the biologist Ludvig von BertalanfJEl). According to system philosophy, the world is in a continuous state of development, and this development has produced things, objects or 'systems', which are becoming more and more complicated, i.e. atoms, molecules, crystals, unicellular organisms, plants, animals, people, societies and cultures. Therefore, the world may be regarded as consisting of systems at different levels of development, and 'systems theory' may also be called 'pluralism'.

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Fig. 3.9. Russell, Spinoza (2), Murray. A 'system is a whole consisting of elements that are organized (structuralized) in a particular way. For example, a human being is a system con-

sisting of organs (brain, nervous system, muscles, etc.). These organs consist of cells, which consist in their turn of molecules, which are composed of atoms. Each system m y be regarded as an element of a larger (super-) system. E.g. people are elements of groups (families, working parties), which are elements of organizations (fms, institutions, etc.), which are elements of socieNeutral Monism Theory about a central state..

identical

brain

Fig. 3.10. Feigls theory, Rubinstein's dialectical 'materialism'.

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Cultural Systems

C

Social systems

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I

B

-.z z -6 w

I

t

I

b

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The biological world Organic systems

e

E

A

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0 C

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The psychological world Conscious persons

Q

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t The physical world Physio-chemicalsystems

Fig. 3.1 1. Bertalanffy,Lazzlo, Pribram. ties (e.g. Danish society), which constitute a cultural group (e.g. Western culture) (see f i g . 3.11). A system can possess properties (states) that are not to be found in its elements. For example, 'life' is a system property that appears in cells and organisms though not in the molecules and atoms of which they are composed. Living systems (plants, animals, people) are self-regulating (complicated machines are likewise), and they are self-propagating (which machines are not). 'Consciousness' is a system property (state) which appears in complicated organisms possessing a nervous system (i.e. in higher animals and human beings). Consciousness is a further development of the self-regulation to be found in all living systems. This further development consists in the conscious organism (especially man) becoming controlled, not merely by 'pre-progammed' processes (like reflexes and instincts), but also by 'plastic', self-modifying stearing processes (like thinking. problem-solving and planning). In human beings these plastic stearing processes have developed into self-reflection or self-awareness, which presumably are not to be found in other animal species (perhaps with the exception of the higher apes), because it presupposes a language (see Hildebrandt 1981).


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A system property cannot be explained exclusively with the help of knowl-

edge about the system's elements; but the explanation must also incorporate the interplay or interaction between the elements as well as the interaction between the whole system and the super-system into which the system enters as element.

Fig. 3.12. Consciousnessas a system property.

For example, 'consciousness'cannot be explained solely with the help of knowledge about the brain processes. Such knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient, because consciousness may well be caused or determined by the brain processes, but it is also determined by the interplay between the brain and

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The philosophical prehistoly of psychology

the organisms's remaining organs, especially the sense organs, the muscular system and the endocrine gland system. Moreover, consciousness is also determined by the individual's interaction with its surroundings, especially with other people, the society as such and its culture. Of the cultural elements, language is of especially great importance for human consciousness - so great, that Marx spoke of consciousness as 'internalized language' (i.e. language the individual uses when talking inwardly to himself). Thus, like all system properties, consciousness is determined both by factors 'from below', i.e. organic processes, especially brain processes, and by factors 'from above', i.e. social and cultural factors, and especially language. Therefore consciousness can only be understood and explained completely by incorporating biological as well as social and cultural factors in the explanation (see Fig. 3.12).

Theories of knowledge INTRODUCTION. As mentioned in the introduction, this section of the chapter

will consist of an account of the historical development of the theory of knowledge. The pre-Kantian period, until c. 1800, will be roughly divided into 'Rationalism' and 'Empiricism', but from Kant onwards the account will be a bit more detailed, because it deals with theories of knowledge that are contemporary with the birth of psychology and its development as an independent science. Naturally, slight overlapping between the accounts of psycho-physical theories and theories of knowledge cannot be avoided.

Rationalism 'Rationalism' is the theory that man's knowledge of existence is largely - or exclusively - a result of thinking or 'reason' ('ratio'). This theory of knowledge originated already with Plato in Greek antiquity. It was the dominating theory throughout the entire Middle Ages and has also played a part in the philosophy of modem times, where it has been represented chiefly by the great 'system-builders', such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz. Here we shall give a brief account of Descartes' philosophy, because - for a

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rationalist theory - it is the most typical. Descartes' problem was to find some maxims or principles that could be regarded as certain or absolutely true, after modem science had shown that it was no longer possible to believe in all the inherited religious dogmas. It was in fact possible to doubt everything, but Descartes did not end up in a skeptical rejection of the possibility of attaining true knowledge or cognition. He realized that doubt itself was 'proof enough ofthe fact that man existed as a doubting or thinking being, hence his famous statement: ,,Cogit0 ergo sum" (,,I think, therefore I am"). Descartes had thereby found a maxim that could not be doubted but must necessarily be 'selfevident' or true. He thought he would be able to use this maxim as a basis for discovering other 'self-evidently' true maxims, because it should be possible to regard all other maxims that were 'self-evidently' true to him as absolutely true basic principles. The subjective (self-evident) nature of this evidence did not appear to worry him, and he rapidly found a number of principles that were just as self-evidently true as ,,cogito ergo sum", such as the existence of matter and of God, etc. On the basis of these self-evidently true maxims he built up his entire philosophical system which, as previously mentioned, included his dualistic interaction hypothesis regarding the relation between the material, spatially extended 'body' and the thinking 'soul'. His system also allowed for a belief in the existence of God and could easily be reconciled with Catholicism. Descartes' philosophy had thereby developed from skepticism into an almost dogmatic rationalism. The impression we have is essentially that of a man who is more motivated by a search for certainty that by an interest in the development of ofnew knowledge. This seems to apply to quite a number of philosophers and also some scientists. (This theory has been proposed, amongst others, by Maslow (1966) and Radnitzky (1968)).

Em p ir i cis m 'Empiricism'is the theory that human knowledge is largely - or exclusively - a result of sense-impressions, observations, tests or 'experiences' (empiri). This theory of knowledge had already been propounded in Greek antiquity by Aristotle, though not in such an extreme form. He also attributed some importance to thinking (and founded logic as a discipline); but for him it was always necessary to start with or build upon 'experience' or observations, and thinking ought not to conflict with this experience. Thus Aristotle's conception very closely approximated that of the majority of scientists today. In addition he founded or systematized most of the sciences, both physics and biology as

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well as psychology. To a large extent he built not only on the experience of philosophers, but on that of others, including fishermen, sailors and farmers. He maintained that he could usually trust their observations, though not their 'conclusions', i.e. their thinking. On the other hand, Aristotle and the other philosophers of antiquity did not make use of actual experiments. The first person to make use of this type of planned and controlled observation was Galilei in the sixteenth century. This was concurrent with the revival - following the predominantly dogmatic rationalism of the Middle Ages - of an empirical philosophy, the chief representatives of which were the British philosophers: Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. The most consistent of these was probably David Hume, who lived in the eighteenth century. Like the other empiricists, he was mostly interested in discovering the psychological foundation of our understanding, and on this basis he criticized all the theories and concepts that make up our common inheritance. Like all the other empiricists, he rejected the theory about 'innate ideas' (e.g. ideas - or concepts, as we now call them , of 'God', 'causation', 'justice' and 'good', etc.). The theory about innate ideas goes right back to Pluto, but already Aristotle compared the ruling part of the soul with an empty, unwritten slate on which everything that comes from the senses (impressions and ideas) is written down. Hume and the other British empiricists undertook thoroughgoing observations of themselves ('introspection').On this basis Hume maintained that only two kinds of phenomena were to be found in the 'soul' or 'mind': primary sense impressions and simple affections as well as secondary representations, concepts or 'ideas' that are derived from previous sense impressions. On the other hand, he maintained that he was unable by way of introspection to discover any 'soul', or Self that was the bearer of these psychical elements. Nothing was to be found other than 'bundles' of internal sense impressions and ideas. Nor were external objects other than 'bundles' of external sense impressions. In other words, neither soul' nor 'body' existed in any other way than 'bundles' of sense impressions or ideas. Hume's psycho-physical theory is somewhat reminiscent of Berkeley's, but since he does not concern himself with God, it appears to be a more neutral type of monism. Another important problem, that of causation, was subjected to a similar critical analysis on a psychological basis. Hume maintained that the relation

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between cause and effect is of a purely psychological nature. On the basis of previous experiences we form an 'association' or 'habit' connecting 'cause' with 'effect'; but there is no such thing as a 'cosmic glue' (as it was subsequently termed) conjoining cause and effect. If we have frequently experienced that phenomenon A is followed by phenomenon B, we expect B to follow whenever A appears. Thus, there exist only elements or phenomena and the associations between them, and the fundamental laws of psychology are in fact laws of association. Hume also criticized other time-honoured ideas and institutions, including those of religion, morality and government. On the basis of his skeptical empiricism he attacked all types of absolutism and dogmatism in favour of tolerance and liberalism. Whereas rationalism in Descartes and the others easily degenerated into a philosophical, religious and political dogmatism, we might say that Hume's empiricism (as opposed to Aristotle's) developed into a skepticism relating to all knowledge - also scientific knowledge.

Kant's Criticism After rationalism and empiricism had developed side by side from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, a philosophy appeared at the end of the eighteenth century which criticized them both as being one-sided and extreme. It was the German philosopher Immanuel Kant who propounded a theory of knowledge that became known as 'Criticism', because his chief works begin with the word 'Critique', e.g. ,,Critique of Pure Reason" (178 1). As the title of his chief work suggests, Kant's philosophy contains a criticism of rationalism; but it also contains a criticism of empiricism. As opposed to the rationalists he declares that there exist no 'innate ideas' about God, the soul, causation and justice, etc., but that our 'soul' understands experience by way of mental forms of 'intuition' ('Anschauung'),such as 'space' and 'time', and general concepts or 'categories',such as 'cause-and-effect' and 'substanceand-accident'. Thus, to us, the outside world and its objects - the thing in itself ('Das Ding an sich') - is unknowable; we are obliged to form our knowledge of this matter by way of our inherited forms of intuition and categories. Knowledge may indeed by based on sensations, but these areformed and ordered in accordance with our innate categories of thought - a theory that is reminiscent of gestalt psychology and Piaget's theory.


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It would not be incorrect to say that Kant's criticism lies closer as a theory of knowledge to rationalism than empiricism. It is also significant that his favourite science was mathematics and mechanics, whereas psychology was not even regarded as a potential science. After Kant's attempt at synthesis, nineteenth century philosophy produced still new versions of rationalist and empiricist theories of knowledge.

The philosophy of modern times INTRODUCTION. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nearly all philosophers have taken the philosophy of Kant as their point of departure. If we regard Kant's philosophy as a synthesis of the rationalist, metaphysical systembuilding and the empiricist, critical philosophy of modern times, we might regard Kant's synthesis as having been replaced by two new opposing philosophies - rationalist 'Romanticism' and empirical 'Naturalism'. Apart from these two main schools, there are a number of philosophers who cannot easily be fitted into this classification. After the First World War there were again some new attempts to form a synthesis: Logical Empiricism and Critical Rationalism (Popper) as well as the Frankfurter School and System Philosophy. These will be briefly summarized in the following.

Rationalist phi I oso ph y INTRODUCTION. It is unusual in the history of philosophy to speak of nine-

teenth century 'rationalist philosophy'. On the other hand, we speak of 'Romanticism' as a philosophical and literary movement with its chief exponents, J.G. Fichte (1762-1854), Friederich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1841). But seen from a purely epistemological point of view, this movement is just as rationalist as the period of rationalist, metaphysical system-building in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The main difference between the metaphysical system-builders and the romantic philosophers is that the historical evolution of mankind is incorporated in the philosophical system-building. Here we shall only deal with one of

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the rationalist romantics, i.e. Hegel, although mention will at the same time be made of Marx; he is in many ways a pupil of Hegel and almost as rationalist, although his philosophy cannot by any means be termed 'romantic'. G.W.F.HEGEL (1770-1831). Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel was in his latter

years professor of philosophy at the university of Berlin and had a great influence on the development of German philosophy. Hegel's ontology takes as its point of departure the philosophy of Kant, but he reduces the significance of the transcendental world, 'das Ding an sich', to such an extent that only the manifest world - the phenomena - is left. Thus, what we have here is a consistent spiritualist ontology, although it may be distinguished from Berkeley's philosophy as follows: In Berkeley, the individual 'minds' or 'spirits' constitute the primary, true Being, whereas the overriding 'super-mind' (= God) is only of secondary importance. But in Hegel the primary form of Being is the World Spirit' or 'the Absolute', of which the individual spirits form less significant components. Therefore Hegel's philosophy is often termed 'objective spiritualism'. It is sometimes termed 'objective idealism', but epistemologically speaking, it is rather a form of realism, because there nevertheless exists an objective spiritual world, i.e. one that is independent of the knowing subject. However, the chief characteristic of Hegel's philosophy is that he maintains that existence as a whole, or the World Spirit, develops according to some 'logical laws' called 'dialectics'. The term 'dialectics' itself may be found in Plato's dialogues, but the 'laws of dialectics' are not identical with the 'laws of logic' - neither in classical nor modem times. The latter consist of formal logic (that which deals with rules or norms for thought, or rather, deduction), whereas Hegel's dialectics is an ontological or 'world' logic' dealing with the evolution of the world spirit. But a very important element of Hegel's - and later Marxs - dialectical philosophy is that the 'laws' of cognition (thought)are identical with the laws of existence. It is therefore one of the most consistently rationalist theories of knowledge in existence, and its peculiar identity or synthesis of ontology and epistemology has given Hegel's philosophy the name of 'panlogism'. This dialectical 'law of movement', or rather, 'law of evolution' applies not only to the evolution of nature but also to the historical evolution of humanity. In this evolutionary process nations - and not individuals - form the

Po


units that may come into conflict with one another, as in the case of war. From such conflicts new and larger nations arise, and the development of society and its culture is also a product of this dialectical evolution. The contradictions constantly creating new syntheses; these in their turn create new contradictions and syntheses, and so on, throughout all history. It was particularly Hegel's dialectical philosophy of history that influenced Marx. KARL M A R X (1818-1883). Marx was born in Trier in Germany. He studied law, followed by philosophy in Berlin, where he was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Hegel. Marx later became more interested in politics and economy, and his political activity eventually forced him to leave Germany; he lived the last 30-40 years of his life in exile, mostly in London, where he he entered into a close collaboration with Friederich Engels (1820-1895). Apart from his political work, Marx's most important contribution was to political economy and economic history, especially in his chief work 'Das Kapital'. His importance for the social sciences may be compared with that of Copernicus and Newton for the natural sciences. But, as a philosopher, Marx was not in fact so original; he took over Hegel's dialectical philosophy, which he merely 'turned upside-down'. By this, Marx implied that he replaced Hegel's spiritualist ontology with a materialist ontology. Thus, the philosophical basis of Marx's political and social scientific work was called 'dialectical materialism'. Marx's use of the word 'material' is usually confined to the field of economics, i.e. production. According to him, this forms the basis of the entire development of society and its institutions and culture. The culture of a given society - including its religion, philosophy, science and art - constitutes a 'superstructure'determined by its economic basis. As a social scientist, Marx is not particularly interested in the psycho-physical problem, The closest he comes to formulating a hypothesis about this is in the famous fifteen statements from the Preface to ,,Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie" (1859), which he himself calls ,,the guiding thread for my studies"'(i.e. in our terminology they belong to the meta-stratum of Marx's production, and not the hypothetical stratum, or 'theory' in its narrow sense). Here, amongst other things, it states that:


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,,The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general". ,,It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness". Engels later developed a theory about the the evolution of nature - the socalled Dialectics of Nature, in the light of which Lenin formulated the so-called 'reflection theory' of consciousness. This is both an epistemology and an ontology, but it is a neutral monistic ontology rather than a materialist ontology in the traditional sense. In a later chapter we shall examine the reflection theory as formulated by the leading Russian psychologist, A. Rubinstein; this had a great influence on Soviet and other Marxist psychology. Marx's epistemology forms a continuation of Hegel's dialectical rationalism. The 'dialectical laws' are regarded by Marx - and by Engels, Lenin and other subsequent supporters - as both 'laws of cognition' (i.e. logic) and 'evolutionary laws' of nature and society. But, coupled with the materialist 'inversion' of Hegel's dialectics, Marx's epistemology also incorporates a pragmatic element: the criterion for the truth of theoretical knowledge is its practical application. Therefore Marx's epistemology is probably best regarded as a synthesis of rationalism and empiricism (pragmatism). Naturally this materialist formulation of dialectics also has a great influence on Marx's philosophy of history - the so-called 'historical materialism', which we shall briefly summarize. According to historical materialism - precisely as in Hegel and, previousIy, Heraciitus - it is the contradictions (conflict, contest) that constitute the driving force of historical evolution. But, unlike Hegel, it is not the struggle between national states but the struggle between different social classes, i.e. the class struggle, that is the driving force of historical evolution. In this process different types of society replace one another in succession, i.e. 'tribal society', 'slave society', 'feudal society', 'capitalist society' and 'communist society'. The latter society is 'classless', and thereby the possibility of conflict - the driving force for further development - disappears. With this, the perfect society - the 'millenium' - comes into being, and all further evolution is rendered unnecessary. Marx's philosophy of history differs in this point from Hegel's, which regards the evolutionary process as eternal. But ever since it appeared, Marx's philosophy has acquired increasing importance because of the current political development. Dialectical materialism is the official State philosophy in the

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Soviet Union and all the East European countries, and China too has officially adopted a variant of this philosophy. In addition, Marxism has had a great influence on many political parties and individuals in the capitalist countries. In numbers of followers - and also in other ways - Marxism may be compared with the great world religions, Christianity, Islam and Buddhism.

Em p i ri cist phi I os oph y INTRODUCTION. As previously mentioned, empiricist philosophy has a long

tradition in British philosophy. It has predominated ever since the end of the Middle Ages, and still predominates in various forms also in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But during the latter period empiricist philosophy has also been represented in continental Europe, particularly in France and Austria. We shall start here by discussing British, and then continental, empiricist philosophy. BRITISH EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY. The most important British philosopher

during this period is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). He was the son of James Mill, a professor of philosophy, and as the result of his upbringing he became an 'infant prodigy' able to discuss the works of Plato with his father long before normal school age. However, John Stuart Mill's ethics was mostly influenced by that of Jeremy Bentham (1748-32), who had elaborated an ethics based on happiness or utility known as utilitarianism. which is a modem version of the hedonistic ethics of Greek antiquity (especially that of Epicurus). The basic ethical principle of utilitarianism was the greatest happiness principle, which prescribes that you should so act, that the rule on which you act provides the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. As formulated by J.S. Mill, this ethics had a great influence on the philosophy and politics of the time. Nevertheless, the chief importance of Mills is probably his epistemological work: ,A System of Logic"'( 1843). This work deals especially with so-called 'inductive logic': Mills maintained that induction is the most important scientific method in all the sciences - including mathematics. By means of induction our perceptions are generalized in the form of mathematical propositions and 'laws of nature'.


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Mathematical propositions may be distinguished from the laws of nature and other generalizations solely because they are the most general and wellestablished. On the basis of such generalizations we can undertake deductions, which may then be used as explanations and predictions. Mill thought that the inductive-deductive method ought to be used in all the sciences, including the social sciences and the humanities. Another important British philosopher from this period is Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). He maintains that the main task of philosophy is to systematize the knowledge produced by the individual sciences. Thus, philosophy should not 'go beyond' - or 'behind' - empirical knowledge, because the unknowable - the 'riddle of the universe' - belongs to the field of religion. Consequently, Spencer systematizes the entire knowledge of his time (in his chief work, ,,A System of Synthetic Philosophy", 1862-1896) on the basis of the concept of evolution. He maintains that all evolution - astronomical as well as geological, biological, psychological and social - incorporates a process that actively creates a balance between differentiation and integration. Thus, evolution consists of an increasing differentiation while still maintaining an integrated system. When this balance can no longer be maintained, the system breaks up and a new process of evolution may start. Spencer published his evolutionary principles prior to the publication of Darwin's theory about ,.The Origin of Species" in 1859. But his ten-volume work naturally incorporated some of Darwin's as well as other scientific theories already known at that time. CONTINENTAL, EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY. Simultaneously with the publication of Mill's chief work in England (1843), a corresponding work appeared in France, i.e. ,,Cours de la philosophie positive" ( 1 839- 1842), by Auguste Comte (1798-1857). In this Comte presented an empiricist philosophy he termed 'Positivism', which he describes as the last of three stages in the intellectual development of mankind: 1. The 'theological'stage, in which everything is explained in terms of magic or the supernatural. Here a development takes place from a primitive belief in spirits by way of polytheism to monotheism. 2. The 'metaphysical' stage, in which everything is explained in terms of hypothetical concepts derived by speculation. These concepts may in some cases refer to supernatural or likewise unknowable factors, and in other, to

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The philosophical prehistory ofpsychology

something empirically knowable though expressed as yet by way of vague, equivocal and unprecise concepts. 3. The 'positive' stage, in which all cognition consists of the description of factual phenomena ('positive facts'). Apart from the description of individual phenomena, or data, positive cognition may also include the description of the constant relations between the phenomena observed. These 'constant relations' are identical with what we otherwise call 'laws of nature', but Comte emphasizes that the wish to discover 'forces' or other 'causes' of the constant relations underlying empirical generalizations should be dismissed as 'metaphysics'. Explanation in 'positive' philosophy and science should consist only of deduction based on empirical generalizations. In connection with his theory about the three stages of intellectual development, Comte also provided a classification of all the sciences in order of increasing complexity: 1. Mathematics 6. Sociology

- 2.Astronomy - 3. Physics - 4.

Chemistry - 5. Biology -

As we may notice, psychology is not included in this classification, for Comte was of the opinion that the psychology of his time was founded exclusively on introspection and lacked experimentation. He also thought that biology and sociology in combination would cover all subjects relating to psychology. Finally, two philosophizing natural scientists should be mentioned: R . Avenarius, whose chief work was ,,Kritik der reinen Erfahrung" (1890), and Ernst Mach, chiefly known for his ,,Analyse der Empfindungen" (1886). These works put forward an empiricist philosophy called 'Empirocriticism', which maintains that all scientific knowledge is based on sense impressions or sense data. These latter represent immediately given reality, which is thus neither material or mental but neutral monistic. Sense data form the foundation of the quantitative constructions of physics and the natural sciences, as well as the more qualitative constructions of psychology. Thus the scientific world - 'the world picture' - is merely a construction founded on sense data, and this construction ought to be as simple or 'economic' as possible.


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Empiro-criticism constituted a transitional stage prior to 'logical empiricism', which will be discussed later. It was subsequently subjected to a sharp criticism by Lenin in his only philosophical work (see Favrholdt, 1978). OTHER PHILOSOPHERS. As previously mentioned, there are a number of nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophers who cannot be classified either under rationalist romanticism or under empirical naturalism. These include well-known philosophers like Schopenhauer (1788)-1860), Nietzsche (18441900),Henri Bergson (1859-1940) and Sbren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Their philosophy will not be dealt with here, because their importance lies in the field of ethics and the philosophy of life rather than in the philosophy of science. Their (especially Kierkegaard's) importance for psychology will be discussed in connection with the relevant schools. We shall therefore return to philosophical development in the twentieth century.

Twentieth century integrating philosophies. INTRODUCTION. Since the First World War some philosophies have developed in reaction to those of the eighteenth century. Here we shall concentrate on some philosophical movements especially relevant to the philosophy of science, which thereby possess an indirect influence on the way in which psychologists view their science. These include Logical Empiricism, Oxford Philosophy, Critical Rationalism, the Frankjiurter School and System Philosophy. Here we shall not discuss Phenomenology (Husserl), Existentialism and American Pragmatism, but return to them in connection with the psychological schools for which they have had a special significance. LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. As its name suggests, this philosophy is a variant of empiricism, which seeks to modify it by integrating it with rationalism, i.e. it is a 'rationalist empiricism'; it is also known as 'logical positivism' or 'neo-positivism'. The movement was started by a circle of philosophers who used to meet in Vienna after the First World War - hence its name, 'the Vienna Circle'. It was founded by Moritz Schlick (1882-1936),and among the most well known of its participants were Otto Neurath (1882-1945) and Rudoff Carnap (1891-1970), who subsequently emigrated to America where they collected many supporters. Philosophical circles inspired by logical empiricism were also created in

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other European university cities. The most famous of these was the Berlin group that included Huns Reichenback (1891-1953) and Carl Gustav Hempel (born 1905), both of whom likewise emigrated to the USA at the end of the thirties. Some important exponents of logical empiricism in Scandinavia include JQrgen Jorgensen, Copenhagen (1894-1969), Arne Ncess, Oslo (1912-), and Eino Kaila, Helsinki (1890-1963). All the above philosophers were inspired by the British philosopher Bertrund Russell (1872-1970), and in particular by his chief work ,Qrincipia Muthematicu", which he published in 1910 together with A.N. Whitehead. Russell's and Whitehead's book, which was instrumental in forming a school, consists of a metascientific analysis of mathematics and logic as sciences. This analysis became a prototype for subsequent metascientific analyses of other sciences. We shall briefly summarize the main points of logical empiricism. Logical empiricists rejected ontology and metaphysics, which - like August Comte - they regarded as valueless or even meaningless. Knowledge of the world ought to be acquired exclusively through the sciences, and philosophy ought not to consist of speculative systembuilding but of a logical analysis of the m i m s and presuppositions of the sciences. But despite this negative attitude towards ontology and metaphysics, the logical empiricists themselves naturally adhered to an ontology, most frequently implicit. This consisted of a further development of the neutral monism expounded by Ernst Mach. It was formulated explicitly by Bertrand Russell as follows: ,,While physics has been making matter less material, psychology has been making mind less mental......Thus from both ends physics and psychology have been approaching each other, and making more possible the doctrine of 'neutral monism'......I think that both mind and matter are merely convenient ways of grouping events." (see Russell, 1948, p. 861). Thus, for Spinoza's 'two attributes' - mind and body - Russell substitutes two categories, or 'convenient ways of grouping events'. Another logical empiricist, Rudolph Carnap, maintained that the relation between mind and matter is a relation between two descriptive or data languages: a phenomenological and a physicalist. During the first period of logic empiricism it was argued that phenomenological data language was the most reliable form of descriptive language, whereas in the later period (from the middle of the


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1930's) physicalist data language was regarded as the most suitable for intersubjective control and communication. Thus both Russell and Carnap convert the ontological problem of the relation between mind and matter into an epistemological problem about the relation between two sets of concepts or 'languages'. We shall now, therefore, examine the epistemology of logical empiricism. As its name implies, this is primarily an empiricist theory of knowledge where scientific knowledge is based on observations, both initial and control observations. Initial observations may be made at random, but control observations must be systematic and include experiments. Between the initial and the control observations a rationalist form of cognition occurs - the logical element, which preferably consists of the creation of a hypothetical deductive theory. This is built up like a deductive system in mathematics (e.g. Euclids geometry), although it differs to the extent that the axioms of the deductive system consist of hypotheses, or 'postulates' about some aspect of reality. From these postulates some subordinate propositions or 'theorems' are derived, and from these in their turn some concrete, descriptive propositions - the so-called protocol statements - are derived. Their 'truth' (i.e. their accordance with the facts or observations) can easily be controlled. If they are found to tally with the facts, or observations, the postulates are then (indirectly) verified. Logical empiricism maintains that statements (hypotheses) and theories (hypothetical deductive systems) must be verijiable if they are to be recognized as scientific. If, on the other hand, they are falsified, they must be rejected. Logical empiricism maintains that it will be possible in future to build up all scientific knowledge into one great hypothetical deductive system founded on the hypotheses of physics. It will be possible in time to deduce all other scientific hypotheses from - or 'reduce' them to - the hypotheses of physics, which has already taken place to a considerable extent in chemistry. This is termed physicalist unified science'. We have dwelt relatively long on logical empiricism because this philosophy of science entirely predominated the 1940s and 1950's in the USA, precisely at the time when American psychology was in a period of rapid development and had a great influence on international psychology. The following philosophies have also been greatly influenced by logical empiricism.

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OXFORD PHILOSOPHY. This school is a variant of logical empiricism. It was

founded by Bertrand Russell's pupil, the Austrian philosopher Ludvig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who lived for the latter part of his life (from 1939) in Oxford. His first book, 'Tractatus' (1921), is regarded as one of the major works of logical empiricism but, while at Oxford, Wittgenstein changed his philosophy. Although he did not himself publish anything further, after his death his lectures were published under the title ,,Philosophical Investigations" (1953). What Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy have in common is his conception of analysis as the task ofphilosophy. But in his first work this analysis consisted of a logical analysis of all philosophical problems arising from the misuse of language. He regarded language as an imperfect logical system - a model of the world. But in his later philosophy language is regarded as a set of 'word games'; these we learn in childhood while assimilating the language. The task of philosophy is still 'linguisticanalysis', but now sooner an analysis of everyday speech and its application in everyday communication. It is especially here - and in philosophical discussion - that problems may arise, because in everyday speech language is used incorrectly. Many Oxford philosophers were more interested in moral philosophy and the philosophy of the social sciences than in the philosophy of science. Of great psychological interest is ,,The Concept of Mind" (1949), the principal work of Gilbert Ryle (born 1900). Here he maintains that the psychophysical problem - like all other unsolved philosophical problems - has arisen with 'the misuse of language', especially as the result of a 'category-mistake'. 'Mind' and 'body' belong to two different categories. 'Body' is the term for a concrete, observable object, whereas 'mind' is the dispositions pertaining to the body. These dispositions manifest themselves in specific actions or behaviour in specific situations. For example, 'aggressivity' is a disposition that manifests itself as aggressive (destructive, violent) behaviour in frustrating situations. Ryle's psycho-physical theory is often called 'logical behaviorism' (as opposed to 'psychological behaviorism', which was founded by Watson and further developed by Skinner). CRITICAL RATIONALISM. This philosophical school was founded by Karl

Popper (born 1902), who was born and brought up in Vienna, where he be-


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came closely connected with the 'Vienna Circle'. However, his first work, ,,Logik der Forschung" (1934), which appeared in an English edition (,&Logic of Discovery") in 1959, contained a criticism of logical empiricism. During the Second World War Popper lived in New Zealand, where he wrote some social and philosophical works in criticism of Nazism and Communism. After the war he became a professor in London, where he wrote a large number of works that had an important bearing on the philosophy of science after the war. As opposed to the logical empiricists, Popper explicitly formulated his ontology, a detailed account of which is to be found in a book he wrote together with the neuro-physiologist John Eccles (see Popper and Eccles, 1977). This is a form of pluralism, and maintains the existence of 'three worlds' (see fig. 3.2). 1. The physical world (including the organic world). 2. The mental world (the individual minds). 3. The cultural world, consisting of philosophical and scientific theories, religious systems, artistic and other 'intellectual products'. There is presumed to be an interaction taking place between these three worlds. Like logical empiricism, Popper's theory of knowledge or philosophy of science is a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism. But in Popper's philosophy the main emphasis is laid on rationalism, as intimated by the name 'critical rationalism'. Popper maintains that cognition starts with the elaboration of hypotheses. These may be based on observations, but new hypotheses may just as frequently be occasioned by older theories. From the hypotheses observation statements are deduced, and these may be verified or falsified. In his criticism of logical empiricism, Popper maintains that verification constitutes no sure proof, because verification presents no guarantee that the hypothesis may not be falsified at a later date. Therefore scientific research ought to consist of attempts to falsify already formulated hypotheses. Those hypotheses that cannot be falsified can be accepted until such time as they are falsified. According to Popper's falsification criterion, scientific theories ought to consist of sets of not-yet-falsified, but falsifiable, hypotheses. On the basis of this criterion Popper maintained that Marx's, Freud's and Darwin's theories are not scientific theories. On the contrary, they are 'metaphysical research programmes'. Popper's philosophy of science has influenced Kuhn, N.R. Hanson, Zmre Lakatos and other contemporary philosophers and historians of science.

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THE FRANKFURTER SCHOOL. This school arose at the 'Institut fur sozial-

forschung', which was founded in 1923 and, from 1930, led by M a x Horkheimer (1895-1973). In the 30s his colleagues were Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898-198 ) and Eric Fromm (1900-1981). but they all three emigrated to the USA in 1940. There they had an important influence on a critical social philosophy known as 'Freudo-Marxism', which sought to integrate both Marx's and Freud's theories. This will be dealt with in a later chapter on Marxist psychology. After the Second World War the Institute resumed its development of 'critical philosophy', as the Frankfurter school is often called. Its chief protagonist in the 60s and 7 0 s was Jiirgen Habermas (born 1929). He developed a theory of knowledge about three different types of sciences, each with its own ideal of science (see Habermas, 1968): 1. Empiro-analytical sciences, which have as their ideal the natural sciences, thereby regard description, explanation and prediction as the tasks of the sciences. The underlying societal 'Cognitive interest' is technological application. 2. Historical-hermeneutical sciences, which have as their ideal the classical, philological exegetic sciences, and thereby regard the tasks of the sciences to be interpretation and understanding.The cognitive interest is the understanding of people from different cultures and periods of history. 3. Critical social sciences, which have as their ideal Marx's 'Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie', and thereby regard the task of the sciences to be analysis and criticism of social phenomena. The cognitive interest is emuncipation from the relations of power and dependency in society.

On the basis of this theory of knowledge, Habermas criticized 'positivism' (logical empiricism, Oxford philosophy and critical rationalism) as wishing to 'totalize' the natural scientific ideal of science and force itself upon the humanities as well as the critical social sciences. Probably most harm has been done to new sciences, such as psychology and sociology. In the chapter on psychoanalysis we shall examine the conception of psychoanalysis as a science that unites all three ideals of science (see Lesche and Madsen, 1976, Radnitzky, 1968, and Slater, 1977).


I01

SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY. The above philosophical movements arose in a 'school'

(a university) in a specific town (Vienna, Oxford, London and Frankfurt) and the philosophy subsequently spread to other countries. As opposed to this, 'System philosophy' is the collective term for some theories and philosophies that have arisen simultaneously in different countries and within different sciences. Information theory, which is a mathematical theory about information and communication developed by Shannon and Weaver, arose in the 40's in USA. The same period saw the birth of cybernetics - a theory about stearing processes in complex, self-regulating systems, such as machines, living organisms, organizations and societies - which was developed by Norbert Wiener. During the 3 0 s the biologist Ludvig von Bertalanm started to elaborate a socalled 'general system theory', which, like cybernetics, is a theory about 'systems' at all 'levels': physical, chemical, biological, psychological as well as sociological and cultural. We have briefly accounted for the main points in this theory in Chapter 2 and the first part of Chapter 3 when dealing with the psycho-physical theories (see Bertalanffy, 1975). This general system theory has many points in common with structuralism, which arose in Switzerland as a linguistic theory elaborated by Ferdinand de Saussure, and was further developed by the American, A. Chomsky. This same philosophy was subsequently applied by C. Levi-Strauss to cultural anthropology. Finally, it was applied to psychology by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piage?, whom we shall discuss later in the book. He maintained that structuralism - and the same applied to system theory - can be regarded as both a (pluralist) ontology and a metascience. But it can also be regarded exclusively as a metascience. As ontology, system philosophy must be supplemented by some kind of evolutionary theory. In Popper we find that the different worlds are a product of an 'emergent' (or creative) evolution, which creates ever more complicated 'systems' (physical, biological, psychological, social and cultural) in which the 'system level' contains qualitatively new properties. This emergent evolutionary theory has much in common with the dialectical evolutionary theory as formulated by Hegel and Marx. Friederich Engel's 'Dialectics of Nature' has especially marked points of similarity with emergent evolutionary theory. This is presumably an essential reason why system philosophy is regarded by many Marxist philosophers as a further development of dialectical materialism. This applies to Soviet philosophers (see Blauberg et al., 1977) as well as East German philosophers (see Heidlmann et al., 1977 and Bergmann et al., 1977).

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Thus, as ontology, system philosophy is very likely to become a synthesis between 'dialectical' and 'positivist' philosophy'. But as metascience too, system philosophy has a greater chance of becoming an 'integrated philosophy'. It is regarded by many - including Wiener and Bertalanffy - as a (semi-)formalmetatheory, which can be used in the analysis and comparison of different sciences, but also in interdisciplinary co-operation (see, for example, Laszlo, 1972). System philosophy does not, like logical empiricism, attempt in such co-operation to 'reduce' all the sciences to physics. Neither does it attempt, like some Marxist philosophers, to 'reduce' all the social sciences and the humanities (including psychology) to economy. But system philosophy recognizes the independent existence of every science, since each and every established science has its #systemlevel' and associated systems as its field of research. Thus, biology has living organisms as its field of re~~

Sciences

System levels

Cultural sciences ('humanities') Social sciences Organizational theory Social psychology Psychology Biology Biochemistry Chemistry Atom physics

Cultures Societies Organizations Groups Persons Organisms and cells Molecules Molecules Atoms and elementary particles

Table 3.1. Survey about the different categories of systems in the World and about the sciences, which have them as researh objects.

search, while psychology has conscious persons - just as other sciences have their own systems as objects of study (see table 3.1). This mutual delimitation of the sciences in relation to each of their system levels safeguards the autonomy of the sciences. Interdisciplinary co-operation between autonomous sciences is promoted by system philosophy's conception


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of determinism: Systems on one system level are determined by systems on a higher as well as a lower level in the system hierarchy. In other words, system philosophy recognizes determination both from 'above' and 'below' in the system hierarchy. For example, 'consciousness' is regarded as a system property determined both by biological conditions (especially the brain, senses, muscles and endocrine system) and by social and cultural conditions - especially language. System philosophy has had an important influence on psychology since the Second World War. We have already mentioned Piaget (who used the term 'structuralism', see Piaget, 1972). Piaget was influenced by part of the German Gestalt psychology, which will be discussed in a later chapter. But system philosophy has also had a very important influence on American psychology; for example, in the classic work by G.A. Miller, E. Galanter and K. Pribram: ,,Plans and the Structure of Behavior" (1960). CONCLUSION. Before we conclude this chapter with a survey of the develop-

ment of philosophy and a comparison of different philosophies, it must be reemphasized that this account has naturally had to be extremely selective. To obtain a more detailed insight in the development of philosophy it is necessary to turn to more comprehensivehistories of philosophy as well as to histories of psychology comprising the history of philosophy (see Faucher, 1979, Murphy, 1968, Watson, 1963).

Conclusive survey and comparison Survey The theory of knowledge has been used to form the structural basis of the above account as far as modern and recent times are concerned - especially the opposition between rationalism and empiricism. We could also have used the same basis for structuring the philosophies of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, in which case it would have been obvious that the epistemological development of European philosophy has consisted of a dialectical interaction between ra-

tionalism and empiricism: In the initialphase (c. 600-400 B.C.) the epistemological position is not yet clearly differentiated, since the main interest lies in ontology. However, in

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Athenian Philosophy the opposition between Pluto's rationalism and Aristotle's moderate empiricism becomes established. Epistemologically speaking, Medieval philosophy consists of an integration or synthesis of Plato's rationalism, Aristotle's empiricism and Christian dogma. In the first half of the Middle Ages, with Augustine as chief protagonist, Plato's philosophy dominates the synthesis, but in the latter half it is Aristotle's philosophy as formulated by Thomas Aquinus that dominates. In 'Modem Times' (c. 1500-c. 1800) we have again a conflict between rationalist, metaphysical 'system-builders' and empiricist, 'critical' philosophers. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the opposing philosophies are once again integrated - this time in the form of Kant's Critique. But in the nineteenth century this unity is disrupted in the opposition between rationalist Romanticism and Marxism on the one hand and empiricist Naturalism and Positivism on the other. In the philosophical schools of the twentieth century an attempt has been made to integrate these opposing philosophies. Logical Empiricism and Critical Rationalism in particular attempt a direct synthesis of rationalism and empiricism, whereas the Franyurter School and System Philosophy also incorporate Marxism in their attempts to systematize. This dialectical development can be summarized in a diagram (see Fig. 3.13). In this survey we have especially concentrated on the epistemological problem of the origin of cognition as a characteristic feature in the development of philosophy, but we could just as well have chosen the relation ofcognition to reality. Philosophical development would then have been manifested as a dialectical interaction between Realism and Idealism. Finally, we could have chosen the psycho-physcial problem as the ontological basis for characterizing the development of philosophy, and this would be tantamount to an interaction between Materialism and Spiritualism. These different points of departure would not give rise to precisely the same 'dialectical spirals', but they would probably have manifested a certain similarity, as appears from the following comparison.

Conclusive survey and comparison

105

Critical Rationalism Logical Empiricism

Marx

Comte Mill

Hegel Kant Leibniz

Berkeley

Spinoza

Hume

Hobbes Descartes

Locke Bacon

Thomas Aquinas Augustine

Plato

Aristotele

Greek Philosophy of Nature Rationalism

Synthesis

Empircism

Fig.3.13. The development of the theory of knowledge.

Comparisons The following comparisons are based on the classifications of various philosophies. In order to facilitate the comparisons the classifications will be one-dimensional. This naturally involves a simplification, which is particularly apparent in the first classification of ontological theories relating to psychology. It has been previously shown in Chapters 2 and 3 (Fig. 2.4) that psycho-physical theories can be classified with the help of a two-dimensional diagram illustrating the dialectical development. But they can also be summarized one-dimensionally, as we shall do here in order to facilitate the comparison between classifications of theories of knowledge about the origin of cognition and its relation to reality.


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Before examining these classifications, we must point out that only the most important names in Asiatic and European philosophy can be included (see classifications diagrams, Fig. 3.14). If we examine these three diagrams it is not easy to find any connection between the three classifications. The only thing that strikes one is that the distribution of names in the diagrams tends towards the middle. There are relatively few in either extremity. (Though it must be admitted that this result could to some extent be determined by a subjective factor in the form of the personality and 'cognitive style' of those who have undertaken the classification). But even for the few extreme philosophers in the 'wings', there do not appear to be any grounds for postulating a simple connection between ontological and epistemological theories.

Materialism DemocritUS

Epicurus Hobbes MarX?

Epi-pheno-

Neutral*

menalism

Monism

Lfal-x?

Vedic Philosophy Taoism Zen Buddhism

[onic Philosophers Heraklitus AriSt0tele

Spinoza Leibniz?

Hume Mach Russell Popper

Dualism** 3escartes xibniz ake?

Animism

spiritua,ism

Vedic Philosophy? Buddhism Pythago-

Plat0 Plotinusus Augustine Thomas Aquinas

Vasubandhu Berkeley Hegel

Fig. 3.14. Psychophysical theories. * Neutral Monism incl. Panpsychism and Pluralism. **Dualism comprises Interactionism and Parallelism.

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Conclusive survey and comparison

Empiricism

H a

Synthesis of Rationa. lism and Empiricism Ionic Philosophers Democritus Epicurus Aristotele Augustine Thomas Aquinas Kant Mach

Locke Berkeley Comte

Marx Russell

Rationalism

I

Intuitionism Vedic Philosophy Taoism Buddhism Zen Buddhism Vasubandhu

Pythagoraens Plato Plotinus Heraclitus Descartes Spinoza Leibniz Hobbes Hegel

Popper

sig. 3.15. Theories about the origin of cognition. ~~

Vedic Philosophy Taoism Zen-Buddhism Ionic Philosophers Heraclitus Pythagoraens Democri tus Plato Aristotele Epicurus Plotinus Augustine Thomas Aquinas Descartes Hobbes spin022 Leibniz Locke HUme Hegel

Idealism

Instrumentalism

Realism Kant Mach

Vasubandhu Berkeley

Marx Russell Popper

Fig. 3.15. Theories about the relation of cognition to reality.


Chapter 4

CLASSICAL EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION. Chapter 3 dealt with the history of philosophy right up to the

present day. Although we pointed out in this chapter the problems and theories that are relevant to psychology, no mention was made of the historical fact that psychology was established as an independent science during the second half of the nineteenth century. This event constitutes the main theme of this chapter. This and the following chapters will be subdivided into two main sections in accordance with the structural layout of the metascientific theory in Chapter 2: 1) The first section consists of an account of the history of the scientific community. It is argued that classical experimental psychology constitutes the first normal period in the history of psychology. 2) The second section consists of an account of the scientific community’s production, arranged according to the same descriptive system, or ‘systematological taxonomy ’, we employed in the comparative metatheoretical studies in Chapter 2 (see Appendix to Chap. 2).


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The history of the scientific community: The establishment of psychology The establishment of a science HOW DOES A SCIENCE COME INTO BEING? The question as to how a science

comes into being is an interesting problem for both the history, philosophy and theory of science as well as for other metascientific disciplines. Like most sciences, psychology established itself as a science following a long period during which it formed part of philosophy. The problem is therefore to find the cause and most important preconditions of this process of 'severance' and 'establishment'. A comparative study of the origin of various sciences on their emancipation from philosophy might be of considerable general interest; it might even help to clear up the fundamental questions as to 'What is a science?' and 'How may a science be distinguished from philosophy and other cultural phenomena?' Since we have no knowledge of the existence of such a comparative historical study, we shall go another way about it. In accordance with the view of science represented in this book (and by its subtitle), we shall start with a metascientific hypothesis and then seek to verify it with the help of historical data relating to the establishment of psychology. This metascientific hypothesis will be formulated on the basis of a metatheoretical thesis (or norm) in accordance with the conception of the interrelations of metascientific disciplines contained in Chapter 1 (see also Fig. 1.2). The overriding metatheoretical thesis is the 'criterion of testability', which is a synthesis of the 'verification' of logical empiricism and Popper's 'falsification principle' (cf. Chap. 3). The 'criterion of testability' may be formulated as follows: Scientific hypotheses and theories (= hypothesis-systems) ought to be empirically testable. 1.e. there ought to exist empirical methods capable of yielding data off such a type that an accordance between the hypothesis and the data may be regarded as an (interim) verification, whereas a lack of accordance may be regarded as a falsification (which should occasion the rejection or reformulation of the hypothesis). In its widest possible sense the term 'empirical methods' may be taken to include the practical application of the hypothesis (or theory), in which case the criterion of testability would

The establishment of psychology

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presumably be acceptable not only to logical empiricists and (Popper's) critical rationalists, but to dialectical materialists. With our point of departure in this metatheoretical norm - the criterion of testability - we can present the following metascientific hypothesis: A science is established when, on its emancipation from philosophy, there are one (or more) methods capable of yielding data necessary for the empirical testing of one or more hypotheses relating to the respective science's object (field) of research. We shall call this metascientific hypothesis the 'method-hypothesis'; it may be applied to the establishment of sciences on their severance from philosophy, such as has been the case with psychology. It should be borne in mind, however, that some sciences have probably arisen in a different manner - not as the result of their emancipation from philosophy but as the result of the demands of practical life. We shall return to this mode of establishment in connection with the birth of psychoanalysis (see Chap. 7). But practical life may also have an effect on the establishment of sciences that become divorced from philosophy. This may account for the development of the technical aids that enter into the methods that directly occasion the birth of a new science. We need only mention the telescope and the microscope in order to realize the significance of technical aids in the discovery of new methods for the empirical testing of scientific theories. There is thus an interaction between tehcnology and science: technological inventions may become the material foundation of new scientific methods, and scientific research results and theories may form the basis of new techniques, which in their turn may contribute towards new methods, etc. HOW DID THE OLDER SCIENCES COME INTO BEING? We shall now start to test our 'method-hypothesis' by examining the birth of the older sciences on their emancipation from philosophy. At the time of the Renaissance (c. 1500), apart from philosophy, only mathematics, astronomy and medicine existed in their own right. In all three cases their birth was determined by the demands of practical life: mathematics, and especially geometry, arose from the practice of surveying; astronomy arose as the result of calculations relating to the calendar; and the science of medicine arose from the practical treatment of illness. Mathematics was the only one of these three that had developed into what we might term a modern science. Unlike other sciences, however, mathematics is a purely formal science unrelated to the real world but consisting exclusively of 'man-made', ab-

I I2

Classical experimentalpsychology

stract conceptual systems. Therefore the testability criterion and the methodhypothesis cannot be applied either to mathematics or to logic, which latter is now regarded too as an independent formal science. The testability criterion and the method-hypothesiscan only be applied to sciences proper dealing with concrete systems, such as physical, biological, psychological, social and cultural systems. Astronomy and medicine are now regarded as proper sciences, but at the time of the Renaissance they were not yet regarded as sciences in the modem sense. They consisted of a mixture of practical techniques and philosophical theories which were not empirically testable. Astronomy consisted of calendar calculations combined with astrology, whereas medicine consisted of medical (and surgical) treatment combined with philosophy (and 'alchemy). Astronomy and medicine did not become sciences in the modem sense until after the Renaissance, at a time when many new sciencescame into being. Physics was the first science proper that came into being during Renaissance times, and it has subsequently satisfied the testability criterium required of any modern science. The birth of physics is comppatible with our 'methodhypothesis', since it became established when Galilei discovered the experimental method. It is generally recognized among historians of science that it was Galilei's introduction of the experimental method together with the associated use of measurements and mathematical formulae that helped to emancipate physics from 'metaphysics' and philosophy as such. This basic science thereby became established, and its theories and empirical results could later be used to help establish astronomy as a modem science. This establishment was further aided by the invention of the telescope, which facilitated more accurate and repetitive observations, which thereby replaced the experimental method. From physics, the quantified experimental method spread to chemistry, which was established as an independent science in the modem sense in the seventeenth century, when it became divorced from philosophical 'alchemy'. Alchemy possessed an old experimental tradition, but this had not been sufficient to develop alchemy into a science in the modern sense, because it consisted of metaphysical speculations rather than testable theories.


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In the nineteenth century the experimental method spread to biology, and physiology in particular became established as an independent science in the modem sense. With physiology we approach the field of psychological research, and the dividing-line between physiology and psychology was actually transgressed with the carrying out of experiments relating to the physiology of the sense organs. We have now seen that the method-hypothesis is confirmed as regards the natural sciences; these all became independent sciences on the introduction of the experimental method. We shall now proceed to the application of the method-hypothesis to the birth of psychology as an independent science.

The establishment of psychology THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EXPERIMENT INTO PSYCHOLOGY. As previously

mentioned, the experimental method first crossed the boundary into psychology when we commenced physiological experiments on the sense organs. These experiments were performed both by physicists and physiologists (or medical researchers). The most important of these 'physicist-physiologists' in the first half of the nineteenth cnetury was Ludvig von Helmholtz (1821-1894). He was Professor of Physiology in Konigsberg and later in Heidelberg, and he finally became Professor of Physics in Berlin. He became famous for formulating The Law of the Conservation of Energy, and later for measuring the speed of the nerve impulse. He also invented the opthalmoscope, which made it possible for him to carry out direct observations of the human eye. This became the methodological basis for his sensational studies of the physiology of the eye, as described, for example, in his principal work ,,Handbuch der physiologischen Optik" (published in three volumes 1856-1866). Some years later he also wrote a small book about the physiology of hearing. During the course of these physiological experiments on the sensory organs he also encountered psychological problems. Thus he became interested in the conception of colour and further developed a theory of colour vision originally put forward by Thomas Young. According to this, there are three types of receptors in the retina of the eye, each of which is sensitive to different wave-lengths. These give rise when stimulated to processes in the brain that determine the experience of red, green and blue. These are the three elementary colours, and all other colours are

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mixtures of them. In connection with this theory Helmholtz also put forward a theory regarding colourblindedness. Thus, by putting forward experimentally based psychological theories of sense perception, Helmholtz thereby helped to prove that psychological hypotheses can be tested empirically. His considerable prestige as an experimental scientist was greatly instrumental in creating a possitive view of psychology as an experimental science. Helmholtz also had an indirect influence on the establishment of psychology through his pupils Weber, Fechner and Wundt. WEBER'S AND FECHNER'S 'LAW. During the course of his physiological experiments on the sensory organs, Helmholtz's pupil E.H. Weber (1795-1858) discovered a law subsequently known as 'Weber's' law. This states that the relation between the strength of a stimulus ( S ) and its noticeable increase (AS) is constant (K), i.e.

According to the systematological taxonomy contained in Chapter 2 and its Appendix, this 'law' may be classified as a general data-thesis, since it expresses the empirically demonstrable relationship between two empirical variables ( S and AS). The formula does not attempt to explain this relation with the help of hypothetical variables. Weber's law had a bearing on the development of psychology, because it became the point of departure for Fechner's experimental psychology. GUSTAV THEODOR FECHNER (1801- 1887) studied medicine in Leipzig and later

became Professor of Physics at the University. Throughout a number of years he was prevented from carrying out experiments on account of a serious eye disease, and during this period he became very interested in philosophy - especially in the psycho-physical problem. He was inspired by Spinoza's identity theory, which he subsequently developed into a complete holistic philosophy (see Fechner, 1905). He was, moreover, a great admirer of Helmholtz's experiments, and planned to undertake experiments to test his psychophysical theory. He commenceded these experiments around 1850, and in 1860 he completed his chief work ,,Elemente der Psycho-physik", which is regarded as the first purely experimental psychological work.


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As the title indicates, he regards his work as establishing a science relating to the psycho-physical problem. This science derived its first theoretical inspiration from philosophy, though it became a science 'proper' (with testable methods) on its employment of the experimental method as used in physiology. Fechner elaborated several experimental methodological variants or procedures that are still used in perception psychology. He also became known for his modification of 'Weber's law'. This 'law', later known as 'Fechner's law', was formulated as follows:

R = f(l0g S)K where 'R' is the 'conscious reaction' or 'verbal response', 'S' the 'stimulus' and 'K' a constant. (In German versions of this formula the letters R and S are frequently exchanged, because R in German stands for 'Reitz' and S for 'Senzation'). Thus Fechner succeeded in finding a quantitative, mathematical formulation of a relation incorporating a psychological, dependent variable (i.e. a verbal report of experience data). 'Fechner's law' may therefore be classified as a general data-thesis, since it formulates the functional relation between an independent S-variable and an dependent R-variable. But this classification is naturally only correct if 'experiences'are regarded as data and not as intervening hypothetical variables. This interpretation of 'experiences' and thereby the classification of 'Fechner's law' builds on the fact that Fechner was able to establish a psychological scale of measurement, where 'zero' represents (the experience of) a just noticeable or perceptible stimulus, i.e. the 'threshold stimulus. And the unit of measurement on the scale represents the just noticeable difference Q.n.d.) between (the experience of) two stimuli. This possibility of introducing measurement and quantification as well as mathemaficalformlae in connection with psychological experiments constituted Fechner's 'proof or supposition that psychology would become a science modelled on already established natural sciences. Many people - including Immanual Kant - had maintained that 'mthematization'ought to be an important perhaps the most important -feature of a 'science' compared with other forms of knowledge (religion, philosophy, ideology and everyday knowledge). In this book, however, we take it for granted that the definitive criterion for a science is its empirical testability. There are many examples of philosophies (e.g. the Pythagorean school) or 'pseudoscientific systems' (e.g.

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'astrology') which are mathematisized but not generally accepted as sciences (because their theories are not empirically testable). But even though mathematization is not the most important feature in the development of a science, it is a significant (heuristic) feature that inspires to further research. So we may conclude that, with his 'law' and his ,,Elemente der Psycho-physic", Fechner has provided an important contribution to the establishment of psychology as an independent science, and can therefore be regarded as one of the Lfounders of psychology.' We shall hear about another one in the next section.

Wundt's Laboratory in Leipzig INTRODUCTION.The 'method-hypothesis'postulates that it is the introduction of an empirical method that determines the establishment of a science on its emancipation from philosophy, and we have seen above how the experimental method was transferred by Helmholz, Weber and Fechner to the field of psychology. But the introduction of a specific, empirical method is only a necessary, and not a suficient, condition for the establishment of a science. Several conditions must be satisfied if a new science is to be organized as an independent discipline at a university, i.e. the establishment of a scientific environment - specifically, a laboratory containing apparatus as well as the provision of textbooks and journals. All these conditions for the establishment of psychology as a discipline were created by Wilhelm Wundt, who was therefore called 'the true founder of psychology' (In comparison, Fechner was more a source of 'inspiration'). WILHELM WUNDT (1832-1920). Wundt started by studying medicine, like so

many other pioneers in the history of psychology. After obtaining his medical degree he studied physiology, and he was for some years Helmholz's assistant in Heidelberg. Here he also wrote an important textbook, ,,Grundziige der physiologischen Psychofogie", which was issued in two volumes in 1873 and 1874. This book later appeared in many editions and translations, and has had a great influence on the establishment of the experimental method - also called 'physiological psychology' by Wundt in order to distinguish it from philosophical psychology. After publishing this book Wundt taught philosophy for a year in Zurich, and in 1875 he became Professor of Philosophy in Leipzig, where he remained


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until his death. No independent chair of 'psychology' or 'experimental psychology' was established during his lifetime, and the discipline continued to remain for many years a part of philosophy as far as the organization of the university was concerned. But Wundt fitted out four rooms for 'experimental psychological exercises', which therefore became the world's first psychological laboratory. Since this laboratory was already fitted out according to Wundt's requirements when he became Professor, 1875 should really be reckoned as the 'year of establishment'. But 1879 is more often given as the year of its establishment, because this was the year when the first students of psychology were enrolled. (This was also the year that marked the jubilee celebrations 100 years afterwards at the 22nd International Congress for Psychology in Leipzig, which were delayed one year and held in 1980 in order to fit in with the four-yearly congress periods). The existence of the laboratory was not officially recognized by the university authorities until many years later. By that time it had been visited by students from all over Germany and other European countries and even America. Among the first students was the Dane, Alfred Lehman. Like many of the other students, he returned home after some years of study and founded a laboratory at his own University of Copenhagen in 1886. This is therefore one of the oldest psychological laboratories in the world (see Table 4.1). Thus, Wundt not only founded the first laboratory but was also indirectly responsible for founding a great number of laboratories in many different countries. Wundt was especially important by virtue of his inspiring work as a teacher. We have already mentioned his textbook ('Grundzuge'), which, with its organization and systematization of the psychological knowledge of his time, had a great influence on the development of the discipline. Apart from his textbook, Wundt wrote a great many other psychological works, some of which were in several volumes. He is one of the most productive persons in the history of psychology, with a production list of over 500 books, articles and other minor works. Finally, in 188 1, Wundt founded ,,Philosophische Studien ", a jounral which, as the name implies, was also open to philosophical writings, but right from the start it contained a preponderance of articles on experimental psychology and - in 1903 - it was re-named ,,Psychologishe Studien". Wundt not only wrote books and papers on experimental psychology, but he also wrote on psychological subjects to which experimental methods did not

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List of the first psychological laboratories Location

Name of the founder

Year

Leipzig Harvard (U.S.A.) Gottingen John Hopkins (U.S.A.) Groningen Rom Berlin Kazan (U.S.S.R.) Copenhagen Pennsylvania Munchen Toronto Sorbonne Louvain Cornell Geneve Yale Princeton Chicago Graz St. Petersborg Wurzburg Cambridge London Krakow Bruxelles

W. Wundt W. James G.E. Muller G.S. Hall J.F. Heymans G. Sergi H. Ebbinghaus V. Bekhterev A. Lehmann J. McK. Cattell C. Stumpf J.M. Baldwin T. Ribot D. Mercier J.R. Angell T. Flournoy G.T. Ladd J.M. Baldwin J.R. Angell & J. Dewey A. Meinong V. Bekhterev 0.Kulpe W.H.R. Rivers C.E. Spearman W. Heinrich G. Dwelshouvers

1875 (or 1879) 1875 1881 1883 1883 1885 1886 1886 1886 1888 1889 1889 1889 1891 1891 1892 1892 1893 1893-94 1894 1895 1896 1897 1897 1897 1897

Table 4.1. From 1886 about 2 or more new laboratories were established every year. Therefor the list only presents the most important laboratories to show the development and the geographical distribution (ref. Misiak and Sexton, 1966).

yet apply. He collected this non-experimental psychology under the term ,,Folk Psychology", and this became the title of a 10-volume book that was published between1900and1920.


I19

We shall deal with the contents of Wundt's production together with that of other psychologists in the main section of this chapter, 'The production of the scientific community'. But in the meantime we shall deal with the foundation of expenmental psychology in other parts of Germany and in other countries.

Other German laboratories G.E.m L E R IN G O n I N G E N . As shown in Table 4.1, another German laboratory was founded in Gottingen by G.E. Miiller (1850-1934)in 1881. Miiller was very interested in experiments within all the psychological fields then current. He worked upon colour perception, and also improved Ebbinghaus's methodology as regards experiments on memory (to be dealt with in the next section). Muller was a clever, inspiring teacher who attracted so many students from Germany and from abroad that Gottingen became the next favourite after Leipzig. Among the foreign students were David Katz and Edgar Rubin, who both had a great influence on the development of psychology in Scandinavia. EBBINGHAUS IN BERLIN. A third laboratory was founded in Berlin by Herman Ebbinghaus (1850-1909). Apart from founding a laboratory and writing a much-used book on psychology, Ebbinghaus became known especially for his original experiments concerned with learning, remembering and forgetting, published in 1885 as ,,Uber das Gedachtnis". This book became renowned for having forced a 'psychological barrier', which consisted of the uncertainty as to whether the experimental method could be applied to processes such as learning, remembering and thinking. Many of the first experimental psychologists - among them, Wundt - thought that the experimental method could be used for testing 'simple mental processes' such as sensation, perception, reaction time and associations. On reading Fechner's book, Ebbinghaus became interested in experimental psychology and decided to investigate memory. He was not interested in the process of learning itself, but in investigating the dependence of remembering and forgetting upon learning. In order to arrive at some quantitative laws, he constructed his own experimental material which could be used for measuring both learning as performance and the subsequent repetition of what had been learnt. This experimental material consisted of the so-called 'nonsense syllables'l*. These were constructed of two consonants with one vowel in between

*

The notes are collected after each chapter.

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(e.g. 'rip', 'sip', 'rap', 'mum', etc.). From these he subtracted all the syllables that were either words or frequently occumng prefixes and suffixes; the syllables thereby became quite nonsensical and he thus avoided the uncontrolled source of error that consisted of some more commonly occumng words or syllables being easier to learn than others. Thus, he obtained some uniform experimental material that could be varied according to difficulty by constructing chains of syllables of various lengths. The stimulus material could thereby be measured. The repetition performance could likewise be measured according to the number of syllables reproduced, and this in its turn became a measurement of memory. Using this experimental technique Ebbinghaus produced numerous results, including his famous 'forgetting' graph, which has for a long time been able to survive adverse criticism and inspire many psychological experiments. Ebbinghaus later wrote a very popular textbook of psychology, and in 1886 he founded a psychological laboratory in Berlin. STUMPF IN MUNICH. Carl Stumpf (1848-1939) founded a laboratory in Munich in 1889, but he later moved to Berlin, where he held a professorate for many years. His importance lies in two different fields. Firstly, he wrote a book, ,,Tonpsychologie", which was published in two volumes in 1883 and 1890 and was the first major work on the psychology of hearing since Helmholtz. Secondly, Stumpf became renowned as a teacher, his conception of 'mind' and psychology being different from that of Wundt. His more 'holistic', ontological metascientific theory was especially inspired by Franz Brentuno, of whom we shall hear in connection with the conclusion of the first normal period. Amongst others, Stumpf influenced two students who later became known as pioneers within the field of Gestalt pscyhology, i.e. Kurt KofJka and Wolfgang Kohler. OTHER GERMAN LABORATORIES. Here we shall suffice with mentioning that

during this period psychological laboratories were founded by Ebbinghaus in Bresluu (1894), to which he moved from Berlin. In 1896 a laboratory was also founded in Wurzburg by Otto Kiilpe, but its importance lay chiefly in connection with experimental psychology's 'period


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of dissolution', to which we shall return after having accounted for the establishment of psychology in other countries.

Psychology in England THE IMPORTANCE OF DARWIN. British psychology has a different background

than that of German pscyhology. As mentioned in Chapter 3, British philosophy has always been dominated by empiricism. The chief exponents of empirical philosophy, Locke, Hume and J.S. Mill, had a great influence on the establishment of psychology as a science - also in Germany, where Helmholtz, Wundt and others were more inspired by British empirical philosophy than by German rationalistic philosophy. Another British tradition is the evolutionary doctrine. In Chapter 3 we also mentioned Herbert Spencer, whose evolutionary philosophy appeared almost simultaneously with Darwin's evolutionary theory. Charles Darwin (1809-1888) had not only have a great influence on the development of biology but also on that of psychology - perhaps especially in England and the U.S.A. Darwin's most famous works, ,,The Origin of Species" (1859) and ,,The Descent of Man'' (187 I), had a considerable indirect influence on the development of psychology by helping to form the biological conception of man most favoured by psychologists. We saw in Chapter 2 that the conception of man forms part of the 'Meta-model'. But Darwin himself also contributed directly to the development of psychology with his ,,The Ewression of the Emotions in Man and Animal" (1872). With this book Darwin laid the foundation of comparative psychology, which has later acquired an important new variation in Ethology. Darwin's evolutionary theory introduced some important concepts of explanation into psychology, i.e. 'instinct', 'development' and 'adaptation',all of which also became important for general (human) psychology. Darwin was not an experimentalist but made use of systematic, compurutive observations. Thus, his theories are empirically based, even though Popper has maintained that they are not testable and are therefore not, according to Popper's criterion, scientific theories but 'metaphysical research programmes'. FRANCIS GALTON (1822-1911). Galton was Darwin's second cousin, and his importance for psychology was in transferring biological evolutionary thinking to the field of psychology. Galton was an extremely talented man. His intelli-

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gence quotient (I.Q.) has been assessed by a psychologist specializing in highly intelligent persons at around 200! In comparison, Darwin's has been assessed at around 130. This is very interesting, because it shows that factors other than intelligence must be involved where famous achievements are concerned; motivation and personality factors probably play just as great a part. It is at any rate a fact that, whereas Darwin concentrated throughout his long life on one great problem - the evolution of the species - Galton's work encompassed a great many sciences, including geography, meterology, criminology, genetics and anthropology. It was his interest in anthropology and genetics that led to his study of individual differences and the distribution of psychological faculties in the population. The methods he developed for these studies subsequently acquired great importance for psychology, and he introduced them in such works as ,,Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development" (1883) and ,,Hereditary Genius" (1896). The most important are the following: 1. The questionnaire, used by Galton, amongst other things, for investigating people's 'imaginative faculties'. 2. Psychometric methods, which were first used at an 'anthropometric laboratory set up in connection with the International Health Exhibition in London in 1884. Here not only height, weight and muscular strength were measured, but also sensory discrimination, reaction times and associations. The first permanent psycho logical laboratory was founded in 1897 at Cambridge University by William H.R. Rivers. The same year a laboratory was founded at the University of London by Charles E. Spearman (1863-1945), who carried on Galton's work on test psychology and statistics. 3. Statistical Methods, which were developed in connection with the treatment of these data. Among the statistical methods Galton discovered were distribution curves and correllation. Galton was also the leader of a project that started in 1903 with the object of developing and standardizing ability tests. This eventually led to the establishment of the world's frrst school psychological counselling ofice (Cyril Burt in London). Thus Galton greatly influenced the establishment of psychology in England. In the history of international psychology his particular importance lies


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in the establishment of test psychology, which was to acquire just as great an influence on the development of psychology as that of experimental psychology. The test method acquired especial importance in the field of practical applied psychology, whereas the experimental method was of greater importance for psychology as a basic science.

Psychology in the U.S.A. WILLIAM JAMES (1 842-1910). American psychology was equally influenced by

German experimental psychology and by the more biologically orientated British test psychology. The person chiefly responsible for establishing psychology as an independent science in the U.S.A. was WilliamJames. He graduated as a doctor because he was interested in physiology. For the same reason he visited Helmholtz in Heidelberg, where he also met Wundt, who was at that time Helmholtz's assistant. Later - in 1875 - he visited Wundt in Leipzig, after which he returned home to Harvard University where he established a practice laboratory to be used in connection with his lectures on physiology and psychology. The Harvard laboratory was therefore founded in the same year as Wundt's laboratory (1875), but for the first few years of its existence it was not very important, because James himself was not particularly interested in experimentation. However, he realized the importance of the experimental method for psychology and, in 1892, he sent for a young German psychologist, Hugo Miinsterberg (1863-1916). The latter took over the laboratory, which became one of psychological importance. William James became renowned in American psychology as a teacher (with title Professor of Psychology from 1889) and writer of textbooks. His textbook of psychology, ,,Principles of Psychology", which was published in two volumes in 1890, is reckoned by many as a major psychological work. (A more detailed analysis of this work is to be found in the second main section of this chapter). In 1892, he published a shorter edition, ,,Psychology: Briefer Course", which was used as a textbook at many American colleges and universities. He also wrote a psychology book for teachers entitled ,,Talks to Teachers" (1899), thereby helping to found pedagogical psychology. During his latter years James became Professor of Philosophy, and his chief contribution to this discipline was that of ,,Pragmatism'' (1907). The title of this book is at the same time the name of an American philosophical school founded by C.A. Pierce; apart from James its followers also numbered John

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Dewey, who later became known as a teacher. Pragmatism is an empirical philosophy that regards knowledge as a biological function designed to guide our actions, Its programme may be expressed popuarly as 'the true is the useful'. In other words, the truth of a theory is determined by its practical utility. This American philosophy has the pragmatic criterion of truth in common with Marxist philosophy (see Chapter 3). Pragmatism also had a great influence on the development of American psychology, because pragmatic philosophy could easily be combined with the evolutionary doctrine imported from England. Generally speaking, knowledge and consciousness were regarded as biological functions designed to govern the behaviour of men and animals so as to enable them to adapt themselves to their surrounding and survive in the struggle for existence. It was chiefly through his textbooks, with their pragmatic and biological evolutionary elements, that W. James helped to found and develop American psychology.

The practical organizer of American psychology was Granville Stanley Hull. He commenced by studying theology, but his special interest in philosophy took him to Harvard, where W. James was teaching. This directed Hall's interest towards the 'new' psychology, and in 1879-1881 he studied with Wundt in Leipzig, where he obtained his doctorate. He returned to the U.S.A. and became a lecturer and then Professor of Psychology at the John Hopkins University. Here, in 1883, he founded the first active psychological laboratory in the U.S.A., which acquired great importance for the training of a number of American psychologists. It was also of great organizational importance for the establishment of psychology that Hall established the American Journal ofPsychology (1887), which still exists today. Moreover, in 1890 Hall became a co-founder of the American Psychological Association. This was the world's first professional organization of psychologists, and it is still the biggest. Later, Hall became 'president' of the newly established Clark University, where psychology too became a subject for study. It was as president of Clark University that Hall invited Freud and Jung to the U.S.A. where, at a symposium in 1909, they introduced psychoanalysis. Hall also contributed towards the latter's establishment in the U.S.A. by translating Freud's ,,General Intoduction to Psychoanalysis" into American.

G.S. HALL (1844-1924).


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Apart from all this administrative and organizational work Hall also found time to initiate and lead research projects and to write several books, Inspired by Darwin's evolutionary doctrine, he became especially interested in developmental psychology. He also introduced the questionnaire and persuaded a number of teachers and parents to answer questions regarding their children's development. Thus, Hall also contributed to a greater interest in developmental pscyhology among American teachers. J.M. CA'ITELL (1860-1944). Another practical organizor of American psychol-

ogy was James McKenn Cattell, a co-founder of the American Psychological Association as well as of several journals. He studied under Wundt for three years in Leipzig. where he obtained his doctorate for a dissertation on reactiontime. Afterwards he spent two years in England under Galton, who greatly stimulated his interest in psychology. In 1888, on his return to the U.S.A., he became the first American Professor of Psychology at Pennsylvania University, where he founded a psychological laboratory. In 1891 he moved to Columbia University in New York, where he also founded an important laboratory. Here he became an inspiring teacher until, in 1917, he was dismissed on account of his declared pacificism and public criticism of America's entry into the First World War. In 1921, in New York, he established the Psychological Corporation, a company which develops psychological tests and undertakes psychological investigations on order for business concerns. Cattell had a great influence on the establishment of psychology as an independent science, and he was instrumental in creating the extremely favourable attitude towards the practical applications of psychology that has helped both to raise its status and to provide better economic conditions for psychology in the U.S.A. than in any other country. OTHER AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGISTS. There were naturally many other psy-

chologists whose initiative helped to establish psychology as an independent science in America. Here we shall briefly mention James Mark Baldwin (18611934), who established a psychological laboratory in Toronto (1889), which thus became the first in Canada. Later he founded a laboratory at Princetown University (1893). He wrote several books, including the first ,,History of Psychology" (1913). George Trumbull Ladd (1842-1921) founded a laboratory at Yale University (1892) and wrote the first psychological textbook ,,Elements of Physiological Psychology" (1887), which was greatly influenced by Wundt's

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famous book, Finally, we should mention Edward Bradford Titchener (18671927), whose teaching and most important books belong to the last period of experimental psychology (from c. 19oO-c. 1914), which will be dealt with in a later section. At the turn of the century there were about 40 psychological laboratories at American universities. Several psychological journals had also been founded, such as the American Journal of Psychology (1887),Pedagogical Seminary (1891), Psychological Review (1894). Psychological Index (1894) and Psychological Monographs (1894), and several more were established during the first decade of the twentieth century several. During the first decade of the American Psychological Association it had 127 members. This all goes to show that psychology had not only been established as an independent discipline at American universities but had also acquired a relatively high status among adademic disciplines in the U.S.A.

Psychology in France INTRODUCTION. French psychology differs from both German and AngloAmerican psychology. In France psychiatry was the great source of inspiration behind the establishment of psychology as an independent discipline, while in Germany it was physiology and in England (and America), evolutionary biology (and pragmatism). The leading French psychiatrists will be dealt with in connection with the history of psychoanalysis. Despite this leaning towards psychiatry in France, psychological laboratories were also established. THEODULE RIBOT (1839-1916). The first laboratory was established by Ribot in

1889 at the Sorbonne in Paris. Although Ribot was only the formal leader of the laboratory for a few years, he was of great importance to psychology as a teacher and author. Not only did his books serve to introduce English and German psychology into France, but he also wrote about such psychopathological themes as disturbances of memory and personality. ALFRED BINET (1857-1911). The actual leader of the first French laboratory

was Alfred Binet. He also founded the first French psychological journal


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L'Anne'e Psychologique in 1895. Binet was especially interested in the psychology of thinking and wrote two books on this subject. As the result of his experimental studies the Paris educational bodies asked him to create an intelligence test that could be used at an early age in order to distinguish backward pupils and place them in special classes. The first intelligence test was published in 1905 and later revised by Binet and his colleague Simon in 1908 and 1911. This first practicable ihtelligence test was later copied by many others. It consisted of a series of questions to be put to the experimental subject. The answers were then compared with the average answers for a specific age group, and this 'average' was called the 'mental age'. The mental age of an individual could then be compared with his or her actual chronological age. Later a German psychologist, William Stern, proposed that the mental age (M.A.) should be divided by the chronological age (C.A.) in order to arrive at the individual's 'intelligence quotient'. In practice this quotient was multiplied by 100: I.Q. =x loo C.A.

Binet regarded the intelligence of the individual as consisting of the general ability to think out the answer to problems. At the same time as Binet, Spearman was working in London on the development of an entirely different intelligence test based on 'factor analysis'. This is a statistical method of reckoning the relative involvement of different 'factors' - e.g. intelligence factors - in a specific test performance. PIERRE JANET (1859-1947). The peculiar French combination of expenmental psychology and psychopathology was established by Janet, who was both a philosopher and a doctor by profession. He became Professor at the Sorbonne and wrote altogether sixteen books, which have been translated into many languages and deal mainly with neuroses (especially hysteria) and psychotherapy. Janet maintains that the normal healthy personality is integrated to form a whole, or synthesis. If the integrating processes are weakened, different forms of dissociated personalities arise - the neuroses and psychoses.

The establishment of psychology in other countries SWITZERLAND. The first psychological laboratory in Switzerland was established in Geneva in 1892 by Theodore Flournov (1854-1920). He was succeeded by Edourd Claparede (1873-1940), a co-founder of the journal

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Archives de Psychologie (1901). He also founded an institute of psychology and pedagogy, the 'J.J. Rousseau Institute'. Later this became famous in connection with Piaget's research, which will be dealt with in one of the following chapters. ITALY. The first psychological laboratory in Italy was established in 1885 by

Guiseppe Sergi (1841-1936) at the University of Rome. A psychological journal Rivista Psicologia was founded in 1896 by C.G. Ferrari and Augusta Tamburini. The most famous Italian psychologist from the first period is Maria Montessori (1870-1952). After having qualified as a doctor, she studied psychology and pedagogy in Rome followed by a study of backward and other mentally retarded children. On the basis of these studies, she developed the pedagogic method known as the 'Montessori method', which is now also applied to normal children - mostly at the kindergarten stage - all over the world. Her chief works are 'The Montessori Method' (1912) and 'The Advanced Montessori Method' ( 1917). RUSSIA. Vladimir M . Bekhterev (1857- 1927) founded the first psychological laboratory in Russia, where the famous physiologist Zvan M. Sechenov (18291905) had previously argued for the establishment of an 'objective, physiological psychology'. Bekhterev studied thereafter under Charcot in France and, for a whole year (1885-1886), under Wundt in Leipzig. After becoming Professor of Psychiatry in Kazan in 1886, he founded the first Russian psychological laboratory. Later he moved to St Petersborg, where, in 1895, he founded the second Russian laboratory for psychology. In 1895 he also founded a 'Russian Society for Normal and abnormal Psychology' and a journal for 'Psychiatry, Neuropathology and Experimental Psychology'. Bekhterev gradually developed his own form of psychology, which he called 'Objective Psychology'. This was also the title of a threevolume work, published from 1907-1910 and translated into the chief European languages. Later he called his system 'Reflexology', which became the title of a work published in 1917 and translated into English. It was through this book that Pavlov's research became known; this will be dealt with later. OTHER COUNTRIES. Apart from the countries mentioned, during the period up till 1900 psychological laboratories were also founded in many other counties.


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In 1886 Alfred Lehman founded a laboratory in Denmark, which was therefore the first psychological laboratory in Scandinavia. In Belgium psychological laboratories were founded by D . Mercier in 1891 at the University of Louvain, and in Brussels in 1897 by G . Dwelshauvers. In Holland a laboratory was founded in 1893 in Groningen by J.F. Heymans. In Austria a laboratory was founded in 1894 in Graz by A. Meinong. In Poland W . Heinrich founded a laboratory in 1897 in Crakow. Even as remote a country as Japan acquired a psychological laboratory, which was founded in 1903 by M. Matsumoto. By far the majority of these laboratory-founders had studied under Wundt. It was therefore Wundt's conception of experimental psychology that dominated until around 1900.

The conclusive phase of the establishment period THE W R Z B U R G E R SCHOOL. During the pioneer period of classical experi-

mental psychology until around 1900 when the frst laboratories were established, there was general agreement concerning psychology's 'paradigm' (= disciplinary matrix). The next main section of the chapter will be devoted to a detailed account of the production of the scientific community, so it will be sufficient here to sum up the characteristics of the paradigm during the pioneer period, i.e. it was universally agreed that 'psychology' was the science of consciousness and that its best method was experimental introspection. But this universal agreement began to break up around 1900, and 'schools' with different conceptions of psychology than Wundt were formed. Here psychology's object of research and its methods came under discussion, and the ensuing disagreement led to the splitting up of classical experimental psychology into many different schools with extremely diverging paradigms. The period from around 1900 until the First World War may therefore be regard as a 'transitional period'. The scientific community became more and more dissatisfied with the paradigm for classical experimental psychology, and after the First World War it totally disrupted into new schools each with its own paradigm. The most important school during this transitional period was the Wiirzburger School, which existed at the University of Wurzburg in Germany from around 1900 until 1914. Here a laboratory was founded in 1896 by Oswuld Kiilpe (1862-1915). Kulpe had studied under G.E. Miiller in Gottingen, after which he became Wundt's assistant in Leipzig from 1886-1894. He had also been inspired by Ebbinghaus who, with his research into memory, had

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shown that the experimental method could be applied to other than the most simple psychical processes. Kiilpe wished to continue along these lines with an experimental study of the most complicated psychical processes, namely those of thinking. Kiilpe inspired a number of students, and later assistants, to start investigating this field. Among the Wiirzburger School's first members the most well-known are K . Marbe (1869-1953), H.J. Wart (1879-1925), N . Ach (18711946) and Karl Biihler (1879-1963), who collaborated in Wiirzburg until about 1909, when Kiilpe moved to Bonn and the others dispersed and became professors of psychology elsewhere. The Wiirburger School's results were controversial, in that they maintained the existence of abstract 'thoughts' unaccompanied by any image. These 'imageless thoughts' were not to be found among what Wundt regarded as the elements of consciousness, i.e. sensations, images and feelings. So this constituted a newly discovered content of consciousness that was dificult to observe by way of introspection, and which created doubt as to the certainty of this method. Moreover, with their experiments on thinking the Wurzburgers had discovered some factors of which the experimental subject was unconscious even though they determined his thought processes. N. Ach called these 'determining tendencies', others called them 'attitudes' or suchlike, but all were agreed upon the existence of unconsciousfactors determining conscious processes. Thus, doubts arose as to &heusefulness of defining 'psychology' as 'the science of consciousness'. At any rate the Wiirzburger School was dissatisfied with Wundt's conception of 'consciousness' as identical with its 'contents', which are observable by way of introspection. This meant that it was just as important to study the processes orfunctions of consciousness. The dispute between Wundt and the Wiirzburgers about the conception of psychology's methods and field of study spread to other countries, in particular the U.S.A. STRUCTURALISM CONTRA FUNCTIONALISM. We have previously seen that leading American psychologists like James, Hall and Cattell were all more interested in studying the function of consciousness on account of their having been influenced by evolutional biology and pragmatism. However, it was particularly one American school that took functionalist psychology under its wing, i.e. the laboratory that had been founded at the University of Chicago in


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1893-1894 by J.R. Angell and John Dewey (1859-1952). In 1896 Dewey wrote a paper on ,,The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" (in Psychological Review), which formulated functionalist as opposed to 'structuralist' psychology' - as Wundt's system was called in the U.S.A. The main representative of 'structuralism' in the U.S.A. was Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927) - an Englishman who had studied under Wundt. After his studies in Leipzig he went to Cornell University, where a laboratory had been founded in 1891 by Angell (who later moved to Chicago). At this laboratory Titchener organized the teaching of experimental psychology entirely on Wundt's lines. 1.e. psychology ought, by way of introspection, to study the 'structure', or rather elements, of consciousness, which consisted of sensations, images and feelings. All states and processes of consciousness were formed as a synthesis of these elements. Any explanations as regards consciousness had to be based on the physiology of the brain, because Titchener - like Wundt - accepted a parallelistic (or possibly neutral monistic) theory of the psycho-phsycial relation (to be dealt with in the next main section). Titchener defended this structuralist psychology in many articles and books in the face of the increasing popularity of functionalist psychology. In the dispute about 'imageless thoughts' Titchener naturally took Wundt's part against both the Wiirzburger and the Chicago schools, at which latter Woodworth, amongst others, had obtained similar results. Soon Titchener remained as the only representative of structuralist psychology, and on his death this too died out. But the discussion about the reliability of the introspective method had called the paradigm of classical experimental psychology into serious doubt. In the U S Afunctionalist psychology paved the way for behaviorist psychology - amongst other reasons, because Angell's and Dewey's successor, Harvey A. Carr (1873-1954) was chiefly interested in comparative psychology. In Germany the Wiirzerburger School paved the way for Gestalt psychology. But behaviorism and Gestalt psychology belong to the next period - the first true period of school formation, to be dealt with in the following chapters. First we shall conclude this chapter with an account of the production of the scientific community.

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The production of the scientific community: The theory of the classical e xp e r im e n ta 1 psych o 1og is ts INTRODUCTION. This section will deal with the production of the scientific

community - in this case, that of the classical experimental psychologists. For this account we shall use the same method used in the comparative study of psychological theories (Madsen, 1959 and 1974), which consists of a metatheoretical analysis followed by a systematic reconstruction. The analysis follows the 'systematological taxonomy' contained in Chapter 2 and its Appendix. The systematic reconstruction consists of an account of the results of the metatheoretical analysis in which the researcher's production is treated as one continuous text (= theory in the widest sense) comprising three levels of discourse: the Meta-, Hypothetical and Data-strata. As point of departure for this systematic reconstruction the researcher's most systematic account of his theory (in the widest sense) has been chosen and - wherever possible - co-operation with the researcher. In some cases it has not been possible to treat a researcher's production as one theory, because such great changes (or development) have taken place during his or her lifetime as to necessitate its being regarded as two or more theories (see Madsen, 1974). When this method is applied to the production of an entire scientific community, we have for practical reasons (the purpose and size of the book) to restrict oursleves to an analysis and reconstruction of the major paradigm-creat-

ing works of the paradigm-creators. Thus, this chapter will primarily be concerned with a metatheoretical analysis and systematic reconstruction of Wilhelm Wundt: ,,Grundzuge der Physiologischen Psychologie ", which in the 1874 edition (Leipzig: Verlag von Engelman) consists of one 870-page volume. This book has appeared in several editions and,if this were not beyond the scope of this book, it might be of historical interest to study the changes that have subsequently been made. Thus, as a supplement to Wundt we shall analyse and reconstruct William James: ,,Principles of Psychology", which was published in two volumes, each of 700 pages (London: MacMillan, (1890). This book has had a great influence on

The production of the scientific community

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American psychology as regards creating a paradigm, and American psychology has become more important internationally speaking than German psychology . Having compared these two major paradigm-creating works we shall discuss whether the differences between them are so great that they cannot be said to belong under the same 'paradigm' (in the widest sense). This is important if we are to determine whether 'classical experimental psychology' should be regarded as one scientific community, or rather as several scientific communities (or school formations) during the same period. I.e., whether we should reckon classical experimental psychology as constituting the first normal period in the history of psychology. But first we shall examine the selected major works according to the systematological taxonomy.

The Meta-Stratum ONTOLOGICAL

META-THESES. Here we are concerned with the

Weltanschauung' of classical experimental psychology: the conception of man, the psycho-physical problem and the question of determinism. 1. The conception of man. Classical experimental psychology's conception of man is biological. Perhaps this is expressed most explicitly in the definitions of psychology that introduce both of the major works selected. Wundt defines 'psychology' as the science of the manifestations of life seen from within as opposed to physiology, which views them from without (Wundt, 1874, p.l)2; whereas James defines 'psychology' as the science of the mental life closely connected with the physiology of the brain (James, 1890, p.l,5)3 & 4. Thus, both paradigm-creators clearly regard psychology's object of study to be closely related to that of physiology, though with the following difference - that James is more interested in biology (in the widest sense), and especially the evolutionary doctrine, than Wundt. But Wundt's conception of man must none the less be regarded as biological. 2. The psycho-physical theory. Both paradigm-creators provide a relatively full account of the psycho-physical problem. Wundt deals with this problem in the closing chapter of his book, where he maintains that the 'soul' or 'consciousness' consists of the internal manifestations of the life processes of the central nervous system (Wundt, 1874, p.

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858)s. He calls this thesis the ,,Princip der durchgangigen Wechselwirkung zwichen Seele und Leib", and he regards it as an empirically founded principle, i.e. as a general data-thesis (according to the systematological taxonomy). He states that during the course of time this 'interaction thesis' has been the object of various metaphysical (ontological) interpretations, which he proceeds to discuss. He rejects both Descartes' interaction theory as well as Leibnitz's parallelism. Materialism and 'idealism' (= spiritualism) is also rejected (Wundt, 1874, p. 862, see also Rappard, 1980)6. Thus it appears that Wundt's psycho-physical theory is a version of neutral monism approximating the 'double-aspect' theory: Physiological processes in the central nervous system and psychical processes are two aspects of the same set of 'life processes'. It should be noted, however, that Wundt uses the words 'Seele' and 'Beswusstein' indiscriminately, although if he wishes to refer specifically to empirical data he uses 'Bewusstsein', whereas more loosely and in philosophical discussions he uses 'Seele'. Somewhat the same applies to James. James's book (1890) contains a similar psycho-physical theory, discussed particularly in Chapter VI under the title ,,The Mind-Stuff Theory". Here he writes that consciousness corresponds with, or is parallel to, the total activity of the brain (James, 1890, pp. 177 & 182)7 & 8 This would appear to indicate that James formulates his psychophysical theory, like Wundt, as a (double-aspect) version of neutral monism. But it must be admitted that even in the above quotation James calls his theory 'empirical parallelism'; however, the difference between 'parellelism' and neutral monism is viry slight. Thus we note that the two paradigm-creators adhere to roughly the same psycho-physical theory, i.e. a version of neutral monism. And both regard their formulations as 'empirical laws' or 'empirically verifiable hypotheses' not as ontological meta-theses. But this is probably connected with the fact that they are both of them supporters of that time's most dominating philosophy of science - positivism - about which we shall hear in a later section.

3. Determinism. Both the major works chosen contain a full account of 'Will' as a psychological phenomenon, and include a discussion of the problem of 'free will' contra determinism.


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In Wundt (1874, p. 834) there is a complete chapter (Chap. 21) devoted to ,,Reflex- und Willkurbewegungen"9. Here his discussion of determisism is based partly on psychological, introspective observations, and partly on an account of various philosophical theories of determinism contra indeterminism (Wundt, 1974, p. 838)lO. This chapter seems to indicate that Wundt thinks a deterministic theory can be upheld also in psychology provided we reckon with two types of causes: external, physiological and internal, psychological. In contrast with this, James (1890) is not so categorical. He too devotes an entire chapter (Chapter 26) of well over 100 pages to the subject, including a section on ,,The Question of 'Free Will". Here James maintains that in the sciences, including psychology, we have to choose a determinist principle, whereas in ethics it is necessary to uphold an indeterminist principle (James, 1890, vol. 11, pp. 572,573 & 576)11 & 12 8~13. James's conception can possibly be charaterized as pragmatic in the sense that he views determinism as a methodological principle or norm, rather than an ontological thesis about the organization of the world. In conclusion we can summarize this section on ontological theses as follows: The two paradigm-creators, Wundt and James, are in agreement as regards a biological conception of man, a neutral-monistic theory about the psychophysical relation, and determinism as an ontological (Wundt) or methodological (James)principle, In other words, Wundt and James use the same metamodel. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. This section is concerned with metatheses relating

to the theory of knowledge, metatheory and methodology. 1. Epistemological theses. The two paradigm-creators have not formulated their theory of knowledge explicitly, neither as concerns the origin of nor its relation to reality. It would not be difficult to incorporate their theory of knowledge in the systematologicalclassification, though only on the basis of a general impression of the book, without documentation in the form of numerous quotations. The two paradigm-creators' theories on the origin of knowledge must both be regarded as predominantly empirical, although James's theory of knowledge is possibly more moderate. In his final chapter James (1890) discusses the origin of the various sciences, and here he counters the British empiricists' - in-

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including J.S. Mill's - extreme theory that all knowledge, including mathematics and logic, consists of induction based on observations. James's position approximates the later theory of logical empiricism (cf. Chap. 3 ) , i.e. a rationalistempirical theory of knowledge (James, 1890, vol. 11, p. 644)14. The two paradigm-creators' theory about the relation of knowledge to reality may be classified as versions of critical realism. 2. Methodological theses. Concerning the ideal of science, both paradigm-creators are explicit in their formulation of a nomothetic (natural scientific) ideal of science. It would be natural to expect this, since it is precisely the introduction of the ideal of natural science (with the experimental method as its essential method) that established psychology as an independent science. Wundt's primary indication of the ideal of natural science is his use of the term 'physiologischen Psychologie'. He also refers to the subject in the introductory chapter, where psychology is placed between the natural sciences and the humanities (Wundt, 1874, p.4)15. Wundt introduces a distinction among the natural sciences between 'natural history' and 'physics'; while 'natural history', forms the purely descriptive part of natural science, 'physics', forms the explanatory part. Wundt maintains that a major part of psychology, which he calls 'Vokerpsychologie', still consists of natural history, whereas physiological psychology constitutes explanatory psychology, i.e. true nomothetic psychology. Already in the preface James writes (p. V):

,,I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book". It should be noted, however, that whenever James speaks of 'natural science' he does so in order to distinguish it from philosophy (and especially metaphysics). He does not discuss the possibility that psychology might be a different kind of science than the natural sciences, e.g. that psychology might be a hermeneutical, interpretative or an idiographic, descriptive science. James does not mention these other types of sciences and ideals, but only philosophy and natural science. Thus there is no doubt that both James's and Wundt's ideal of science is nomothetic (natural scientific). This is also confirmed by their treatment of methodological problems.


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3. Methodological theses. These theses deal partly with methodological prescriptions and partly with dota-language. 3.1. Methodological prescripts. The two paradigm-creators treat this part of the meta-strata very differently. In James (1890) Vol. I, the whole of Chapter VII deals exclusively with ,,The Methods and Snares of Psychology" (pp. 183-198 ), whereas in Wundt (1874) there is not a single chapter or section deding with methods as such, and not even a reference to methods, experiments and suchlike in the register. Wundt, on the other hand, deais with problems of method in connection with specific subjects, and in conjunction with these - e.g. psychophysical measurements - the treatment is much more thoroughgoing than anything in James (1890). Nor is there any doubt that Wundt regards experimentation as the best method for natural scientific ('physiological') psychology (Wundt, 1874, pp 2-3)16. As mentioned above, in James (1890) there is a more comprehensive treatment of methodological problems in Vol I, Chapter VII. Here he discusses introspection's sources of error as well as its combination with the experimental method (James, 1890. pp. 183 & 191)17 & 18 He recognizes the experiment as a scientific method, but maintains that it has not yet been possible to apply it to the most important problems of psychology (James, 1890, p. 193)19. Finally, James also mentions the comparative method as a supplement to introspection and experimentation. He recognizes not only the study of animals' 'instincts' as belonging to this category but also the study of infants and other individuals from whom one cannot expect introspection. He also regards the questionnaireas belonging to the comparative method. 3.2. Data-language. Both paradigm-creators express themselves relatively clearly regarding psychology's data. Already on the first page of his ,,Einleitung" Wundt (1874) describes psychology as the study of internal data as opposed to physiology, which is the study of external data. But despite this, Wundt thinks that psychology ought to utilize both private ('internal') and public ('external') data (Wundt, 1874, p. 2p. James also expresses himself explicitly regarding psychology's data, and it is ciear from such statements that James regards the data of psychology to be both public ('physical, physiological') and private ('states of consciousness') (James, 1890, p. VI)21

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Finally, we can conclude this section about James's and Wundt's philosophy of science by stating that both contain an empiricist and moderately realistic theory of knowledge, both contain a nomothetic (natural scientific) ideal of science, and both advocate experimental introspection and the utilization of both private and public data.

Meta-theses - Conclusion. Hereafter we can summarize the comparison of the two paradigm-creators' meta-theses - ontological and meta-scientific - by ascertaining that there is a very great similarity - almost identity - between the two psychologists' meta-strata. The Hypothetical Stratum INTRODUCTION. Before proceeding with an analysis and comparison of the

two paradigm-creators' hypothetical strata, we have to decide whether such a hypothetical stratum - comprising hypothetical terms, hypotheses and explanatory models - in fact exists. This question must be raised first and foremost because the two accounts are from a period when it was not customary to distinguish sharply between three levels of discourse (M-, H- and D-strata). Classic positivists distinguished between 'science' and 'philosophy' (metaphysics), but in science no such sharp distinction was made between theory and empiri, because all science was regarded as empirical (as opposed to philosophy, which was speculative). The presence of a meta-stratum was probably accepted, because the philosophical presuppositions of science were regarded as 'metaphysics' (or possibly epistemology). But in scientific discourse itself no sharp distinction was made between theory (hypotheses) and empiri (data-theses). This distinction did not become common until after the introduction of logical empiricism and Popper's critical rationalism. The other reason for querying the existence of a hypothetical stratum is that it is very difficult to decide whether 'consciousness' and its relevant terms belong in fact to the hypothetical stratum or to the data-stratum, because although many of these terms refer to data, they refer to data of a private nature. So in purely introspective psychology, it was (perhaps) unnecessary to distinguish between hypotheses and data-theses because they were all descriptions (i.e. data-theses) of mental phenomena. Consequently it remained a purely descriptive psychology. But psychology became an independent science precisely


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on the introduction of the experimental method; and (as a rule) this method presupposed the existence of an experimenter observing an experimental subject under various experimental conditions. The experimental subject's reaction to these includes a verbal report of his experiences. In so doing he publishes data, which now become public instead of private. And the appearance of these public data can only be explained by assuming the existence in the experimental subject of a consciousness that cannot directly be observed, since other

people's minds (experiences) are in principle unobservable, and the terms that refer to them are thus in principle hypothetical (transempirical). This applies to both of the paradigmcreators' psychology. A third reason for discussing the presence of a hypothetical stratum is that both Wundt and James incorporate the relation between mental phenomena and the state of the central nervous system. (cf. their definitions of psychology under the discussion of the conception of man). True enough, both of them regard this connection between brain and mind as an empirically determinable correlation. But for the reasons mentioned above, this must remain a hypothesis, though (possibly) an empirically testable hypothesis. Thus we may conclude that classical experimental psychology (as represented by Wundt and James) made use of hypothetical terms (i.e. various terms

relating to consciousness) which were contained in eqlanatory statements, or hypotheses. And so the two paradigmcreators' discourse contains a 'hypothetical stratum' (as defined in the systematological taxonomy). The following will therefore include a systematic reconstruction of Wundt's and James's hypothetical strata, though in a relatively more concise form than in the previous account of their meta-strata. For pedagogical reasons we shall deal with each one separately, because the two paradigm-creators present their works in different ways. Whereas Wundt proceeds from 'elements' to 'the whole' (to form a synthesis), James proceeds from 'the whole', or stream of consciousness', to 'the elements'. Before accounting for their data-strata, we shall follow up the successive accounts of the two hypothetical strata with a comparison. WUNDTS HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. As previously mentioned, Wundt's dis-

course is built up 'from the bottom', i.e. he proceeds from the elements to the whole. This is clearly apparent from the list of contents, which starts with the nervous system and deals thereafter with impressions and images and the interaction thereof, and concludes with movement.

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Classical ewerimental psychology

In accordance with this structure, which reflects Wundt's model of consciousness, it would be logical to start by examining his hypothetical terms, which refer to the elements of consciousness, and to deal thereafter with the explanatory hypotheses that refer to consciousness as a whole. 1. Wundt's hypothetical terms. Wundt's hypothetical variables are elements of consciousness and consist of two main categories, 'Empfindungen' and 'Vorstellungen'. 1.1. Empfindungen. This constitutes the primary hypothetical variable in Wundt's theory, and corresponds to 'sense-impressions' or simply 'impressions' (Wundt, 1874, pp. 273-74)22. There are three aspects concerned with 'impressions': 1) Intensify, or the strength of the impressions, which is determined by that of the stimulus; 2) quality, or the properties of the impressions, which are determined by the type of stimulus, e.g. light (colour), sound, smell, taste, touch or pain, etc; 3 ) quality of feeling ('Gefiihlston'), a quality especially connected with the impressions that originate in internal organs ('sinliches Gefiihl', 'Organgefiihl). But the quality of feeling may in principle be associated with all impressions - also those whose origin is external. The two opposing qualities of feeling arepleasure and displeasure. Later we shall examine the relation of the qualitites of feeling to intensity and quality. 1.2. Vorstellungen. This hypothetical term corresponds to 'images' (Wundt, 1874, p.464)23. Images may be classified according to their relation to reality as: 1) ,,Wahrnehmungen oder Anschauungen", or perceptual images'; 2 ) ,,Einbildungs- oder Phantazievorstellung", which comprise both recollective and imaginary images. The classifications are founded on the origin of images in peripheral or central stimuli. But common to all images is the fact that they are reproduced impressions (Wundt, 1874, p. 465)24. Therefore, like impressions, images can be classified according to the type of stimuli contained in sensory, auditory and other images, etc. Apart from these 'simple images' there are also complex images composed of elements from several sensory fields as well as general images, which may almost be compared with 'image-schemes' and are filled up with various simple images refemng to the same class of objects that make their appearance in con-


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sciousness. (Thus Wundt maintains indirectly that no unobservable, abstract 'thoughts' exist, but only observable, simple impressions, which may represent something abstract and general). Just as the quality of feeling is associated with impressions, feelings are also bound up with the interrelations of images. Wundt calls these aesthetic feelings. Apart from aesthetic feelings, Wundt also takes into accountfeelings connecting images and movement, and introduces them in Chapter 20 under the heading Gemuthsbewegungen. These are divided into emotions and drives ('Triebe'), and cause respectively expressive movements and actions (Wundt, 1874, p. 800)*5. To sum up, we may regard Wundt's hypothetical variables (his 'psychic elements') as consisting of impressions (including pleasure and displeasure), images associated with aesthetic feelings, as well as emotions and drives (Triebe). We shall follow up this account of Wundt's hypothetical terms with a metatheoretical classification according to the 'systematological taxonomy' described in the Appendix to Chapter 2. A classification according to the ontological reference (or 'surplus meaning') of the hypothetical terms is relatively easy, since all Wundt's hypothetical terms have a mentalistic reference (= Hm-terms), since they refer to a 'consciousness' directly observable by the individual concerned. Consequently, they are private Data-terms when they refer to the observing subject's own consciousness and mentalistic hypothetical (transempirical) terms when they refer generally to the consciousnessof others. A classification according to the existential form of the hypothetical variables is somewhat difficult. Hypothetical terms such as 'impression', 'image' and 'feelings', refer directly to structures (or 'contents'), but the same terms also refer indirectly to the processes producing these contents. Wundt does nevertheless use some special hypothetical terms to describe the most important processes, in particular attentiveness, perception and apperception, which are closely related. I.e., 'perception' and 'apperception' consist of imagery (as process) accompanied by various degrees of attentiveness or consciousness (Wundt, 1974, p. 717)26 It is characteristic for Wundt's psychology that he concentrates on the contents or structure of consciousness, while processes receive relatively little

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attention. Herein lies the justification for the term structural psychology, which Wundt's psychology was subsequently called. A classification of the hypothetical variables according to function is also difficult, amongst other reasons, because the processes are seldom designated explicitly. But, broadly speaking, both impressions and images are directive variables, while the associated qualities of feeling are dynamic variables. Possibly only the hypothetical variable, drive (Trieb), is a vector-variable. But every complex state of consciousness, with its content of impressions, images and qualities of feeling, must also be a vector-variable. We shall now turn from the elements to the contexts into which they enter. 2. Wundt's hypotheses. The most important of Wundt's hypotheses are functional hypotheses, although naturally other types of hypothesis (existential and historical, see the Appendix to Chap. 2) also occur. Here we shall reproduce some important functional hypotheses: first some S-H hypotheses, thereafter some H-H hypotheses and, finally, some H-R hypotheses: 2.1. S - H hypotheses. The most important S-H- hypothesis is 'WeberFechner's law' or, as Wundt called it, das psychophysiche Grundgesetz. He provides it with various verbal and mathematical formulations (e.g. Wundt, 1874, p. 304)27. Formulated mathematically, the 'psycho-physical law' appears as:

E=ClogR where E stands for 'Empfindung' (impression), C is a constant dependent on the modality (sensory field) and R stands for 'Reizstiirke' (stimulus intensity). In Wundt's theory the psycho-physical law must be classified as a S-H hypothesis, since we have already classified 'Empfindung' as a h y ~ ~ t h e ~ term ~caZ (Hm-term). Should 'E' be regarded as a private experience-datum, or as a verbal report and thereby as a public behavioral datum, the 'psycho-physical law' would be an 'empirical law' or functional relation (S-R relation). However, we cosider the first classification to be the best as far as Wundt's theory is concerned, whereas the second classification (as a general data-thesis) is the best where Fechner's exposition is concerned. Another important hypothesis is Wundt's hypothesis about the relation between the quality of feeling and the stimulus intensity. Wundt has never ex-


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+ I

Positive Hedonic Value Indifference

Stimulus intensity

Negative Hedonic Value

Fig. 4.1. Wundt's curve from 1874 showing the relationship between stimulus intensity and sensational quality

pressed this in concise form, but it may be briefly reproduced as follows from Wundt, (1874), pp. 431-435: ,,Up to a certain point the feeling of pleasure increases with the intensity of the stimulus, whereafter the former decreases until, with the strongest stimuli, the feeling of pleasure becomes that of displeasure." Nor has Wundt expressed this hypothesis mathematically, but he has represented it geometrically by means of a curve (see Fig. 4.1). We have chosen this more recent edition of the curve, because it is clearly more illustrative than Wundt's own. Berlyne has put forward a neuropsychological theory in explanation of Wundt's curve (see Berlyne and Madsen, 1973). It might also be possible to derive other S-H hypotheses from Wundt's curve, but the former is the most important. We shall now turn to: 2.2. H-H hypotheses. The most important H-H hypotheses in Wundt's theory are those concerning 'der Synthese der Empfindungen' and 'der Associationen der Vorstellungen'. Wundt does not elaborate further upon the synthesis of impressions into images but concentrates on the hypotheses of association (Wundt, 1874, p.787)2*. These include in particular the two 'classical' forms

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of association: 'association by rememberance' and 'association by contiguity', which were formulated already by Aristotle (Wundt, 1874, p. 788)29. We shall now turn to: 2.3. H-R hypotheses: We have already touched upon the connection between consciousness and movement when presenting Wundt's theory: Wundt (1874) contains two chapters about movements, which are subdivided into: 1. Expressive movements, which are caused by emotions. 2. Volitional movements, which are caused by drives. 3. Reflex movement caused by external stimuli, which is converted into muscular movement by way of physiological processes in the central nervous system. Thus, only the first two above-mentioned forms of movement (behaviour, action) are caused by hypothetical variables (i.e. emotion and drive). Consequently, there are two important H-R hypotheses concerning the relation between respectively emotion and expressive movement, and drive and volitional movement. Finally, it should be emphasized that despite the term 'volitional movement' (Willkurbewegungen) Wundt does not explicitly formulate a special 'element of will' over and above impressions, images and feelings. The initiation of volitional movements is explained as a high degree of apperception relating to images of movement. We might say that volitional movements are directed by the relevant images of movement, and that they are activated dynamically by the relevant drives. Expressive movements are likewise directed by images and activated by emotions. Using the normal S-H-R symbols, we can summarize and systematically reconstruct the most important (functional) hypotheses in Wundt's theory as follows: 1. S (Reiz) x C + H (Empfindung) 2. S (Intensitiit) + H (Gefiilston) 3. H (Empf.l+ Empf.2 + Empf.n) + H (Vorstellung) 4. H (Vorstel1ung)Al)+ H (Vorstellung A2) 5. H (Vorstellung A) + H (Vorstellung B) 6. H (Vorstellung x Affecte) + R (Ausdrucksbewegungen)


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Fig. 4.2. A graphical model of Wundt’s theory. * E = Empfindung.

7. H (Vorstellung x Triebe) + R (Willkiirbewegungen) 8. S (Reiz) + H (Perception) + H (Apperception) H (Bewegungs-Vorstellung) + R (Bewegung) This last hypothesis can be subdivided into:

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8a. S + H (Perception) 8b. H (Perception) + H (Apperception) + H (Bewegungs-Vorstellung) 8c. H (Bewegungs-Vorstellung)+ R (Bewegung) 3. Wundt's Hypothetical system (model).Wundt (1874) contains no deductive system of hypotheses. The above hypotheses are derived from scattered statements to be found in the text There is very seldom anything in the way of an explicitly formulated hypothesis - at the most a passage in italics, but not even that in every case as far as the above hypotheses are concerned. (Thus this systematic reconstruction naturally contains an element of uncertainty). Nor are there to be found any diagrams or more abstract explanatory models such as mathematical models (apart from the mathematical formulation of the psycho-physical law). The only model we have found consists of the verbal metaphor used in connection with the explanation of apperception, which is conceived of as analagous with the field of vision. In order to facilitate comparisons between Wundt's and other theories to be analysed in the following, the systematic reconstruction of hypotheses 1 to 8 has been converted into a diagram (see Fig. 4.2). Before proceeding with Wundt's data-stratum, we shall turn to the hypothetical stratum in James (1890). JAMES'S HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. Whereas the list of contents in Wundt

(1874) made it clear that the discourse was built up from the bottom, in James (1890) the structure is not quite so clear. The book consists of chapters that have been written over a number of years and published in various journals. The style is longwinded, and much space - whole chapters - has been devoted to philosohical and theoretical discussions as well as practical (especially pedagogical) references. But it is possible nevertheless to undertake a systematic reconstruction which proceeds 'from above downwards', i.e. from the whole to the elements. 1. James5 Hypothetical System (Model): James's book contains many explicitly

formulated hypotheses, but they are not organized into a deductive system. On the other hand, James makes use of an explanation by analogy in the form of a verbal model (metaphor): consciousness is regarded as a stream of thoughts or states of consciousness, usually called 'the stream of thoughts', since 'thought'


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is used very broadly to cover all states of consciousness (James, 1890, p. 239)30). This 'stream of consciousness' possesses some holistic properties, which in system theoretical terminology would be termed 'system properties'. These include 'constant change', as well as 'continuity' and 'selectivity' (James, 1890, p. 225)31. The stream of consciousness has as its central element the Self. Chapter X deals exclusively with this subject, and a major part of it concerns 'the empirical self or me'. This is further divided into: 1) the material self (body, clothes, etc.) 2) the social self (social position, etc.) 3) the spiritual self (psychic dispositions, etc.). James maintains that there are a number of 'instinctive impulses' that may be termed 'self-seeking'. This results in what may be termed 'self-estimation'. James also provides a detailed description of split personalities as known from psychopathology in the forms of various 'memory structures' in the same person, or from totally different 'personalities' in the same persons 'obsessions and mediums'. This is beyond the scope of this book, however, and we shall now return to: 2. James's Hypotheses. According to the systematological taxonomy, the previous statement regarding 'the stream of consciousness' and 'the Self as a whole may be regarded as existential hypotheses. But apart from these holistic, existential hypotheses, James (1890) contains a number offunctional hypotheses relating to the function or processes of consciousness. In accordance with the way in which James himself disposes his book we shall deal first with: 2.1. Attention. It is characteristic for James that he does not define attention explicitly, but formulatesfunctional hypotheses, some of which are physiologically explanatory. These consist of the adjustment of the sensory organs and the preparation of the brain centres concerned with the attentive process (James, 1890, Vol. I, p. 434)32. This 'attentive act' is therefore a hypothetical variable. It is caused by various independent S-variables, such as: 1. Intense or sudden stimuli, 2. Instinctive stimuli,

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Classical experimental psychology 3. Stimuli related by experience to stimulus-types 1. and 2. James calls these 'motives of attention'. 4. Images, which are either 'interesting' in themselves or related to interesting images. Even though they are introspective (private) data, images are H-variables (hypothetical elements or processes) rather than S-variables.

According to James, the 'attentive acts' have an effect on: 1. the perceptory process, which enables the person to perceive clearer,

discriminates better, etc., 2. the memory, which enables the person to remember better, and also 3. shorten the reaction time. To sum up, we can reformulate as follows the hypotheses in the systematological taxonomy that deal with attention: 1. S (strong, sudden) + H (attentive act). 2. S (instinctive) + H (attentive act). 3. S (learned) + H (attentive act). 4. H (interesting images) + H (attentive act). 5. H (learned, interesting images) + H (attentive act). 6. H (attentive act + H (optimal perception). 7. H (attentive act) + H (optimal memory). 8. H (attentive act) + R (rapid reaction).

We shall now proceed with the next fundamental process: 2.2. Association. In Vol. I, Chapter XIV, James deals with the classical laws of association: 'the law of contiguity', 'the law of resemblance' and 'the law of contrast'. But James shows that only the first law, the law of contiguity, is a primary law of association, while the others are secondary or derived (James, 1890, p. 561133. We can reproduce James's physiological formulation of the law of contiguity as follows: 'If two elementary brain processes have been active simultaneously or immediately following upon one another, one of them will subsequently be able to arouse the other' (James, 1890, p. 566)34. Thus we can now reformulate this physiological edition of the law of continguity as follows:


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9. H (thoughtbrain process) + H (thoughtbrain process). James connects association with the next process to be dealt with here: 2.3. Memory. This process is dealt with in Vol. I, Chapter XVI. It consists of two components, retention and reproduction, both explained in terms of brain physiology (James, 1890, pp. 653 & 655)35 Memories can naturally be recalled on the perception of external stimuli, or by other images. Thus James's hypotheses regarding memory can be reformulated as follows: 10. S (stimuli) + H (reproduction of images) 11. H (Image A) + H (reproduction of Image B). From these cognitive processes we shall now turn to processes resulting in movements or actions. 2.4. Instincts. This type of action is dealt with in James (1890), Vol I, Chapter XXIV. Here James also attempts a physiological explanation of instincts, which are regarded as complex reflexes (James, 1890, Vol. 11, pp. 383-84)36. James maintains that instincts play a great part in human behaviour, where in particular they function as a basis for the further development of more complex habitual actions (James, 1890, Vol. 11, p. 441)37. From the above it appears that James deals with genetic hypotheses. However, it will be sufficient here to reformulate the functional hypothesis: 12. S (specific stimuli) + H (instinct-structure) + R (instinctive). 2.5. Emotions. James published an original theory about these processes in 'Mind in 1884. In the following year the Danish physiologist Curl Lunge published a corresponding theory, so the theory is often known as 'James-Lange's theory'. James formulated the theory briefly, in Chapter XXV, that 'feelings' are impressions of corporeal reactions to stimuli (James, 1890, p. 449)3*. We can reformulate his functional hypothesis thus: 13. S (environment) + S (organic state) + H (emotion) + R (emotional). Finally, we shall deal with the process of: 2.6. Volition. James discusses the Will' in Chapter XXVI. Here he briefly introduces his 'ideokinesthetic theory' by stating that kinesthetic images produce movements if they are sufficiently intense (James, 1890, Vol. 11, p. 526)39.

I50


According to the above, Wundt's and James's theories of volition are in some respects similar. Both agree that attention is an important factor, but James is more explicit in his formulation of the role of kinesthetic images. We shall reformulate the hypotheses as follows: 14. H (attention x kinesthetic idea) +R (volitional movements)

We have hereby concluded the systematic reconstruction of James's hypotheses. To facilitate a comparison with Wundt we shall assemble all the hypotheses below, before proceeding to discuss hypothetical terms: 1. S (strong, suddenly) 3 H (attentive act) 2. S (instinctive + H (attentiveact) 3. S (learned) -+ H (attentive act) 4. H (interesting images) + H (attentive act) 5. H (learned, interesting images) + H (attentive act) 6. H (attentive act) + H (optimal perception) 7. H (attentive act) + H (optimal memory) 8. H (attentive act) + R (rapid reaction) 9. H (thoughtbrain process A) + H (thougharain process B) 10. S (stimuli) H (reproduction of thought) 11. H (thought A) + H (reproduction of thought B) 12. S (specific stimuli) + H (instinctive structure) + R (instinctive) 13. S (environment)+ S (organic state) + H (emotion) + R (emotional) 14. H (attention x kinesthetic idea) + R (volitional). 3. JAMES'S HYPOTHETICAL TERMS. Over and above the hypothetical terms reproduced above, which designate processes such as 'attention', 'memory', 'instinct', 'emotion' and 'volition', hyothetical terms used to designate elements of consciousness (which we regard as hypothetical variables) may also be found. The most frequently used (and in a very wide sense) is 'thought' and 'feelings'. But 'sensation' and 'imagination' are also introduced in separate chapters (James, 1890, Vol. 11, pp. 3 & 40)40 & 41. In conclusion we shall systematically classify the hypothetical terms (and corresponding hypothetical variables), commencing with a classification of the hypothetical terms according to their ontological reference.


1.51

Fig.4.3. A graphical model of James' theory. This is somewhat more difficult than in the case of Wundt, where they were clearly Hm-terms. Most of James's hypothetical terms are also obvious Hm-terms. 'Thought', 'feelings', 'imagination' etc. are terms with a mentalistic reference. But many of them - especially 'association' and 'emotion' - are defined by James as closely related to brain- and other physiological processes (in

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a neutral monistic sense, two aspects of the same phenomenon). So their reference is not purely mentalistic, but sooner combined mentalistic-physiological. Thereafter we shall classify the hypothetical variables according to their existentialform. Here there is a marked difference between Wundt and James. In Wundt most of the hypothetical variables are structures (or 'content'-variables), while by far the majority of James's hypothetical variables are processes. Some of James's variables - e.g. 'thought' and 'sensations' - are terms applied both to structures (particularly elements of consciousness) and processes. This is why the term [functionalpsychology' is ofen applied to James's theory. and 'structural psychology' to Wundt's(here a better term would probably be 'elementaristic psychology'). Finally, we can classify hypothetic variables according to function. Variables like 'association', 'imagination' and 'perception' are purely directive variables, whereas 'attention', 'instinct', 'emotion' and 'will' are combined directive and dynamic variables - so-called vector-variables. There are no purely dynamic variables (with the possible exception of 'emotion'). In order to facilitate a comparison with Wundt and others we have converted the systematic reconstruction of James's theory into a diagram (see Fig. 4.3). After this analysis and comparison of Wundt's and James's hypothetical strata we shall turn to the empirical parts of these discourses, i.e. to their datastrata. The Data-Stratum WUNDT'S DATA-STRATUM. A considerable part of Wundt's text deals with empirical data. In particular he provides many precise results of experimental research and mathematical formulations of Fechner's 'psychophysical law' and reaction times. But since Fechner's law has been interpreted as an S-H-hypothesis - and not as an empirical functional relation - the text contains no other general data-theses. In addition Wundt provides many methodological descriptions and descriptions of apparatus; these belong to the data-stratum (as opposed to methodological prescripts, which belong to the meta-stratum). JAMES'S DATA-STRATUM. James's text also contains a fair number of empirical

data. The empirical results nearly all consist of references to Wundt's, Fechner's, Ebbinghaus's and other German psychologists' experiments. The only


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American experimental psychologist mentioned is James McKeen Cattell. In addition there are a number of references to psychopathological investigations - especally to those of the French psychologist, Pierre Janet. Finally, James refers to some results of general biological research - especially to Darwin. We shall conclude by mentioning that James's text also includes a number of practical prescripts, or pragmu-theses - especially pedagogical instructions.

The Text as a Whole WUNDTS TEXT. There is no doubt that, according to our systematological tax-

onomy, Wundt's book (1874) must be regarded as a complete scientiBc text, since it contains both meta-stratum, hypothetical stratum and data-stratum. On the other hand he makes no clear distinction between the three levels of discourse. The meta-stratum is largely contained in the introductory and closing chapters, and in other demarcated sections. But the hypothetical and data strata are to be found side by side in the remainder of the book. Thus it is difficult to calculate the relative incidence of the three strata - the so-called M-H-D-ratio (see the Appendix). On the other hand it is possible to calculate the the Hypothesis Quotient (H.Q.), and hence the testability of Wundt's theory. On the basis of the systematic reformulation of Wundt's hypotheses (see p. 146) we can reckon the number of hypotheses in each of the three categories as follows: 4 H-H-hypotheses (nos. 3 , 4 , 5 and 8b) 3 S-H-hypotheses (nos. 1 , 2 and 8a) 3 H-R-hypotheses (nos. 6 , 7 and 8c)

These figures may then be inserted in the formula: H.Q =

C[(S-H)

+ (H-R)] - 3

4 - 0,67 + 3

This H.Q. of 0.67 is relatively high (cf. the H.Q. table, Chap. 2). But in all fairness it must be admitted that it applies only to the structure in the systematically reconstructed theory, and this only contains the most important hypotheses, whereas some more specific hypothese about the separate sensory fields have been omitted. Were these to be reformulated and included in the calculation, the H.Q. would be considerably lower. Wundt's theory must unquestionably be regarded as testable.


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JAMES'S TEXT.This is also a complete scientific text containing all three levels

of discourse. These too are not sharply divided - in fact even less so than in Wundt, this being due to the many philosophical discussions to be found in nearly all the chapters of the book, almost all of which contain both a hypothetical stratum and a data-stratum. Thus it is not possible to calculate a M-H-D-ratio here either. But on the basis of the systematic reconstruction of the most important hypotheses in James's theory (see p. 152), we can reckon the number of hypotheses in each of the three categories as follows:

6 H-H-hypotheses (nos. 4,5,6,7,9 and 11) 6 S-H-hypotheses (nos. 1,2,3,10,12a and 13a) 4 H-R-hypotheses (nos. 8,12b, 13b and 14) As may be seen from the above enumeration, we have subdivided hypotheses

12 and 13, which are S-H-R hypotheses, into S-H-hypotheses (12a and 13a) and H-R-hypotheses (12b and 13b). We can now insert these figures in the formula:

James's H.Q. is seen to be less than Wundt's. But here too only the most important hypotheses enter into the systematic reconstruction on which the calculation of the H.Q. is based. However, probably fewer hypotheses have been omitted in calculating James's than in calculating Wundt's H.Q. So we may conclude that for both theories, the 'true'H.Q.is roughly the same and both theories are testable. If we could measure the 'degree of quantification' for both Wundt's and James's theories, Wundt's would probably turn out to be the greater. We have hereby concluded the metatheoretical analysis and comparison of the two paradigm-creators' theories, but there still remains an important metascientific and historical scientific problem.

The Same Paradigm? THE PROBLEM. This consists in determining whether Wundt's and James's text 'belongs to' or presupposes the same paradigm. It is necessary to solve this

The production of the scientijk community

I55

problem if we are to determine whether the period merits the metascientific status of a normal period. This in its turn is important if we are to decide whether psychology conforms to Kuhn's definition of a 'science', which presupposes the existence of at least one normal period. This problem is difficult to solve on the basis of Kuhn's own theory, because his paradigm-concept is so vague and ambiguous. Thus we shall render the 'paradigm'-concept more precise by re-defining it in accordance with the systematologicalmetatheory and relating it to the three levels of discourse: the meta-stratum, the hypothetical stratum and the data-stratum. On this basis we shall subdivide Kuhn's concept of aparadigm in the widest sense of the word (= disciplinary matrix) as follows: 1. The meta-paradigm' is defined as identical with the 'metastratum', which includes meta-theses of both a metascientific and an ontological nature (= the 'meta-model'L Compared with Kuhn's own definition of the disciplinary matrix in Chapter 2, (p. 17) we find the following in Kuhn's own definition: 1) 'the metaphysical part' of the paradigm (= the 'meta-model' of the systematology), 2) 'values', which may be regarded as almost identical with the metatheoretical norms of the systematology, and 3) 'exemplars', which are almost identical with the systematology's rnetatheoretical and methodological prescripts. 2. The theory-paradigm' is defined as equal to the 'hypothetical stratum, especially the explanatory model and the overriding hypotheses. Compared with Kuhn's 'disciplinary matrix', this becomes almost identical with 'symbolic generalization'.

On the basis of these re-definitions of the paradigm-concept we can now formulate more precise definitions of the concepts of 'school' and 'normal period'. 'Schools' (movements) can be subdivided into 'macroschools' and 'microschools' : 1. A 'macroschool'is a scientific community whose members all use the same meta-paradigm. 2. A 'microschool' is a scientific community whose members all use both the same meta-paradigm and the same theory-paradigm.

According to the above definitions a macroschool can be subdivided into microschools, all sharing the same meta-paradigm; but every microschool has its own theory-paradigm. On this basis we can define 'normal period' as follows:

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A 'normal period' is a period in the development of a science in which the entire scientiJic community concerned uses the same me fa-paradigm and thus constitutes one comprehensive macro-school. This may be subdivided into microschools each with its own theory-paradigm and still be reckoned as a 'normal period'.

Having arrived at this precise definition of the concepts, we can now return to the question as to whether classical experimental psychology constitutes a normal period in the development of psychology. A NORMAL PERIOD? With the aid of

the concepts introduced we think it possible to show that the period of classical experimental psychology c. 1875-1900 was a normal period, because in their paradigm-creating major w o r k the two paradigm-creators, Wundt and James, formulated almost identical me fa-theses. The two most important components of the meta-stratum are identical: in both of them the ontological mefamodel is a neutral monistic psycho-physical theory and the meta-theory is the nomothetic ideal of science. On the other hand, Wundt and James may be said to have created two different theory-paradigms within the meta-paradigm of classical experimental psychology. Wundt's overriding hypothesis and explanatory model explains 'consciousness' as a synthesis of elements. Wundt's theory-paradigm may therefore be called elementaristic (or structuralistic)psychology. James's overriding hypothesis and explanatory model explains 'consciousness' as a dynamic totality of processes. James's may thus be called dynamic holistic (possibly functionalist)psychology. We can therefore sustain the conclusion that the main period of classical experimental psychology c. 1875-1900constituted a normal period (with one scientific community united in their adoption of one paradigm). But after c. 1900, as mentioned in the first part of the chapter, a period of crisis commenced in which disputes occurred between Wundt's elementaristic school and the Wiirzburger school's more functionalist 'act-psychology' This school was not inspired by W. James's psychology but rather by Brentano's actpsychology, which later came - via the Wurzburger school - to inspire Gestalt psychology (to be dealt with in Chapter 5 ) .


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In America there was a similar dispute between the Chicago school's functionalist psychology and the Wundtian elementarism as represented in the U.S.A. by Titchener. This dispute led, amongst other things, to the creation of Behaviorism, which we shall discuss in Chapter 6. But we can conclude this chapter as follows: 1. If we accept the meta-theory employed as well as the concepts used for describing the production of a scientific community, and 2. if we also accept the fact that Wundt and James are the two representative paradigm-creators in the period of classical experimental psycholgy, together with 3. the above meta-theoretical analysis, systematic reconstruction and comparison of Wundt's and James's paradigm-creatingmajor works 4. if we accept these three points - we have to conclude that Wundt and James use the same meta-paradigm. Consequently, the classi cal experimental psychologists together constitute one great macroschool without competitors, and the main period of classical experimental psychology (c. 18751900)constitutes a normulperiod.

Notes

1

It has later been shown that the syllables are seldom entirely 'nonsensical', but it is now possible to measure the degree of meaning for each separate syllable - and in relation to each separate experimental subject.

2

,,Das vorliegende Werk gibt durch seinen Titel schon zu erkennen, dass es den Versuch macht Zwei Wissenschaften in Verbindung zu bringen, die, obgleich sie sich beide fast mit einem und demselben Gegenstande, niihmlich vorzugsweise mit dem menschlichen Leben, beshhaftigen, doch lange Zeit verschiedene Wege gewandelt sind. Die Physiofogie gibt uber jene Lebenserscheinungen Aufschluss, welche sich durch unsere ausseren Sinne warhnehmen lassen. In der Psychofogie schaut der Mensch sich selbst

158


gleichsam von innen an und sich den Zusammenhang derjenigen Vorgange zu erkl&en, welche ihm diese innere Beobachtung darbietet." ,,Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and their conditions. The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like;" ,,Our first conclusion, then, is that a certain amount of brainphysiology must be presupposed or included in Psychology." ,,Mit zureichender sicherheit lasst sich wohl der Satz als begriindet ansehen, dass nichts in unserm Bewusstsein ereignet wass nicht in bestimmten physiologischen Vorgangen seine korperliche Grundlage fhde." ,,In ihrem innerem Sein ist sie eine ahnliche Einheit wie fur die aussere auffassung der leibliche Organismus, und die durchgangige Wechselwirkung zwischen Seele und Leib fuhrt notwendig zu der Vorstellung, dass die Seele das innere Sein der namlichen Einheit ist, die wir ausserlich als den zu ihr gehiirigen Leib ausschauen. An die herrschenden Organe des Leibnes, die Centralorgane des Nervensystems, sind auch die Ausserungen der Seele gebunden." ,,The consciousness, which is itself an integral thing not made of parts, 'corresponds' to the entire activity of the brain, whatever that may be at the moment. This is a way of expressing the relation of mind and brain from which I shall not depart during the remainder of the book, because it expresses the bare phenomenal fact with no hypothesis,....." ,,we must .....ask ourselves whether, after all, the ascertainment of a blank unmediated correspondence, term for term, of the succession of states of consciousness with the succession of total brain-processes, be not the simplest psychophysic formula, and the last word of a psychology which contents itself with verifiable laws, and seeks only to be clear and to avoid unsafe hypotheses. Such a mere admission of the empirical parallelism will then appear the wisest course." ,,Fur die psychologische Unterscheidung der Willkiir- und Reflexbewegungen liegt nach allem diesen der entscheidende Punkt nicht darin, dass


159

die letzeren aus einem ursachlichen Zusammenhange folgen, dessen die ersteren entbehrten. Vielmehr erscheint nur die Art der Causalitat hier und dort als eine verschiedene. Wiihrend der Reflex lediglich auf dem physiologischen Mechanismus beruht, geht der Wille aus innem, psychologischen Bestimmungsgriinden hervor." 10 ,,Aus diesem Grunde hat jede consequente Welt auffassung zum Determinismus gefiihrt, and zvar muss sie, sobald sie die Welt als eine aussere und als eine innere anerkennt, denselben in einer doppelten Form annehmen: die willkiirliche Handlung muss inbegriffen sein in dem Naturmechanismus, der sie nach Kategorie der Ursache herbeifiihrt, und der Willenimpuls muss hervorgehen aus psychologischen Griinden, die nach Kategorie des Zwechs ihn bestimmen." 1 1 ,,My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly psychological grounds." 12 ,,The present writer does this for the alternative of freedom, but since the grounds of his opinion are ethical rather than psychological, he prefers to exclude them fiom the present book." 13 ,,Science, however, must be constantly reminded that her purposes are not

the only purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which she has use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped in a wider order, on which she has no claims at all." 14

,,I shall now in what follows call all propositions which express time- and space-relations empirical propositions, and I shall give the name of rational propositions to all propositions which express the results of a comparison."

15 ,,Die Psychologie nimmt zwischen der Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften

eine mittere Stellung ein. Den ersteren ist sie deshalb verwandt, weil fur das innere und aussere Geschehen insoweit ubereinstimmende Untersuchungs- und Erklhngsprincipen zur anwendung kommen, als dies der Begriff des Geschehens uberhaupt mit sich bringt. Fur die Geisteswissenschaften bildet sie die grundlegende Lehre." 16

,,Die psychologische Selbstbeobachtunggeht Hand und Hand mit Methoden der Experimentalphysiologie, und aus der Anwendung dieser auf jene haben sich als ein eigener Zweig der Experimentalforschung die psycho-


160 ~

17 18

19

20

21

22

_

_

_

_

_

~

physischen Methoden entwickelt. Will man auf die Eigentumlichkeit der Methode das Hauptgewicht legen, so lasst daher unsere Wissenschaft als Experimentalpsychologie von der Gewohnlichen, rein auf rein Selbstbeobachtung gegriindeten Seelenlehre sich unterscheiden." ,,Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always." ,,... state our general conclusion that introspection is diflcult and fallible, and that dificulty is simply that of all observation of whatever kind." ,,It must be said that in some of these fields the results have as yet borne little theoretic fruit commensurate with the great labor expended in their acquisition. But facts are facts, and if we only get enough of them they are sure to combine. New ground will from year to year be broken, and theoretic results will grow, Meanwhile the experimental method has quite changed the face of the science so far as the latter is a record of more work done." ,,Somit weisen wir unserer Wissenschaft die Aufgabe zu: erstlich diejenigen Lebensvorgange zu erforschen, welche, zwischen ausserer und innerer Erfahrung in der Mittle stehend, die gleichzeitige Anwendung beider Beobachtungsmethoden, der aussern und der innern, erforderich machen, und zweitens von beider Undersuchung dieses Gebietes gewonnenen Gesichtspunkten aus die Gesammtheit der Lebensvorgsjlge zu beleuchten und auf solche Weise wo moglich eine Totalauffassung des menschlichen Seins zu vermitteln." ,,Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and feelings, and ( 2 ) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which (3) they know." ,,Als urspriinglichen Inhalt des Bewusstseins betrachten wir also stets die reine Empfindung. Sie ist das Element, aus welchem alle andem Producte des Bewusstseins hervorgehen. An jeder Empfindung konnen wir aber Intensitat, Qualitat und Gefihlston oder sinnliches GejZhl unterscheiden."


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23

,,Unter einer Vorstellung verstehen wir der gelaufichen Wortbedeutung nach das in unserm Bewusstsein erzeugte Bild eines Gegenstandes."

24

,,Die Vorstellung ist im Vergleich mit der Empfindung ein zusammengesetztes. Sie enthalt Empfindungen als ihre Bestandtheile. ...Die Empfindung ist der urspriinglichste Inhalt des Bewusstseins, dem keine andern psychischen Acte vorausgehen. Die Vorstellung dagegen entspringt aus einfacheren Vorgangen, namlich aus den Empfindungen, die sich nach bestimmten psychologischen Gesetzen zu Vorstellungen vereinigen."

25

,,Die Gefiihle, die aus dem Einfluss der Empfindungen und Vorstellungen auf das Bewusstein hervorgehen, wirken zuriick auf den Verlauf unserer Vorstellungen. Diese Ruckwirkungen nennen wir Gemuthsbewegungen. Sie zerfallen in Affecte und Triebe. Entweder kann namlich ein Eindruck unmittelbar durch das ihm anhaftende Gefuhl unser Inneres bewegen: dann entsteht der Affect. Oder er kann irgend ein aussere oder ein innerer, psychischer Reiz eine bewegung bestimmter Gefulhle hinwirkt: dann entsteht der Trieb. Man koMte also den Affect eine Gemuthsbewegung durch zukunftige GefuNe nennen." (And later, p. 801) ...,,Affect und T t e b stehen in naher Beziehung zu den ausseren Bewegungen. Der Affect reflectirt sich in ausdrucks bewegungen, der Trieb in solchen Handlungen, welche die Verwirklichung des Gefuhls erstreben."

26 ,,Indem das Bewusstsein in der Synthese der Empfindungen und in der

Associationen der Vorstellungen sich selbst als ein thatiges erfasst, entsteht jene Ausserung desselben, welche wir Aufmerksamkeit nennen. ...Diese Eigenschaft I%st sich durch die Vergleichung mit dem Blickfeld des Auges einigermassen verdeutlichen, indem man dabei von jener bildlichen ausdrucksweise Gebrauch macht, welche das Bewusstsein ein inneres Sehen nennt. Sagen wir von den in einem gegebenen Moment gegenwktigen Vorstellung, sie befaden sich in Blickfeld des Bewusstsein, so kann man denjenigen Theil des letzteren, welchem die Aufmerksamkeit zugekehrt ist, als den inneren Blickpunkt bezeichnen. Den Eintritt einer Vorstellung in das innere Blickfeld wollen wir die Perception, ihren Einhitt in den Blickpunkt die Apperception nennen."

162


,,Es lasst sich daher dem psychophysichen Grundgesetz der mathematischen Ausdruck geben: die Empfindung ist proportional dem Logarithmus des Reizes." 28 ,,Indem sich friihere Sinnesvorstellungen anscheinend spontan in unserm Bewusstsein erneuern, folgen sie dabei bestimmten Regeln der gegenseitigen Verbindung. Reproduction und Association stehen auf diese Weise in inniger Beziehung. Sie sind im Grunde eine und dieselbe Thatsache von verschiedenen Standpunkten aus betrachtet. Bei der Reproduction haben wir das Hervortreten einer Vorstellung in das Bewusstsein, bei der Association ihren Zusammenhang mit einem Vorausgegangenen Erinnerungsbild oder Sinneseindruck im Auge. Jedenfalls in der Mehrzal der Falle erweist sich die Association als der Grund der Reproduction." 29 ,,l. dass jede Vorstellung geneigt ist, einer ihr uhnliche in's Bewusstsein zu rufen, und 2. dass eine Vorstellung sich besonders leicht mit solchen associirt, mit denen sie haufig verbunden gewesen ist, sei es in Folge raumliches Coexistenz, sei es durch die regelmassige Ordnung in einer Zeitreihe."

27

30

,,Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as "chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life."

31

,, 1) Every thought tends to be a part of a personal consciousness. 2) Within each personal consciousnessthought is always changing. 3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensible and continuous. 4) It always appears to deal with objects independently of itself. 5 ) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects - chooses from among them, in a word - all the while."

32

,,The Intimate Nature of the Attentive Process. We have now a sufficient number of facts to warrant our considering this more recondite question.

The production of the scientijlc community

163

And the two physiological processes, of which we have got a glimpse, immediately suggest themselves as possibly forming in combination a complete reply. I mean 1. The accommodation or adjustment of the sensory organs; and 2. The anticipatory preparation from within of the ideational centres concerned with the object to which the attention is paid." Later, on the same page, James writes: ,,So that on the whole we may confidently conclude that the two processes of sensorial adjustment and ideational preparation probably coexist in all our concrete attentive acts." 33

,,...objects once experienced together tend to become associated in the imagination, so that when any one of them is thought of, the others are likely to be thought of also, in the same order of sequence or existence as before." .... ,,since it expresses merely a phenomenon of mental habit, the most natural way of accounting for it is as a result of the laws of habit in the nervous system; in other words, it is to ascribe it to a physiological cause."

34

,,Let us then assume as the basis of all our subsequent reasoning this law: When two elementary brain-processes have been active together or in immediate succession, one of them, on reoccurring, tends to propagate its excitement into the other."

35 ,,l. The retention of the remembered fact;

2. Its reminiscence, recollection, reproduction or recall. Now the cause both of retention and of recollection is the law of habit in the nervous system, working as it does in the 'association' of ideas." Later, p. 655, James formulates it thus: ,,The retention of n, it will be oserved, is no mysterious storing up of an 'idea' in an unconscious state. It is not a fact of the mental order at all. It is a purely physical phenomenon, a morphological feature, the presence of these 'paths', namely, in the finest recesses of the brain's tissue. The recall or recollection, on the other hand, is a psychophysical phenomenon, with both a bodily and a mental side." 36

,,The strict physiological way of interpreting the facts leads to a clearer result. The actions we call instinctive all conform to the general rejlext type; they are called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animal's body or at a distance in his environment."

164

31


,,It will be observed that no other mammal, not even the monkey, shows so large an array. In a perfectly-rounded development, every one of these instincts would start a habit toward certain objects and inhibit a habit toward certain others."

38

,,My theory ... is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion."

39

,,We may then lay it down for certain that every representation ofa movement awakens in some degree the actual movement which is its object, and awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from doing so by an antagonistic representation present simultaneously in the mind."

40

,,From the physiological point of view both sensations and perception differ from 'thought' (in the narrower sense of the word) in the fact that nerve-currents in from the periphery are involved in their production."

41

,,In common cases of imagination it would seem more natural to suppose that the seat of the process is purely cerebral, and that the sense organ is left out."

Chapter 5

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction to the period Chapter 4 dealt with classical experimental psychology, and demonstrated that it was a 'normal period' (in the Kuhnian sense), i.e. the first normal period of psychology, lasting from c. 1875 to c. 1900. From c. 1900 until the First World War a crisis ensued, resulting in the formation of two 'microschools' the Wiirzburger and the Chicago schools - which criticized the paradigm of classical experimental psychology. Around the First World War this dissatisfaction grew, resulting in the formation of some 'new macroschools'; these were based on the above microschools and possessed some entirely new, revolutionary paradigms. From the Wiirzburger and the Chicago schools arose respectively Gestalt Psychology and Behaviorism. But two other macroschools - Rejlenology and Psychoanalysis - had already arisen parallel with this development around 1900. The birth of these two macroschools is entirely in accordance with Kuhn's theory: in the light of increasing dissatisfaction with the prevailing paradigm the discovery of abnomalies initiates the creation of new meta-paradigms, which act as gatheringpoints for new macroschools. Thus, after the First World War there were at least four macroschools Psychoanalysis, Gestalt Psychology, Behaviorism and Rejlexology - as well as some macroschools of lesser importance, which will be discussed in connection with the four main schools. The field of psychoanalysis also comprised some microschools; these will be discussed in more detail in connection with psychoanalysis (Chapter 7).

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The competition between the schools reached its peak during the period c. 1920 to c. 1933. After the Nazi takeover of power in Germany increasing numbers of German and Austrian psychologists left the country, including many Gestalt psychologists and psychoanalysts. Sooner or later many of them reached the U.S.A.; here personal contact was established between members of the different schools, which came to influence one another. After the Second World War this resulted in the formation a new integrating psychology, and this eventually formed the second normal period of psychology, which will be dealt with in Chapter 8. We have chosen to discuss the four macroschools in the light of their increasing dissociation from classical experimental psychology. Accordingly, we shall start with Gestalt Psychology, which was created by M. Wertheimer around 1910-12, dealing thereafter with other 'holistic' psychologists. In the following chapter we shall discuss Reflexology and Behaviorism under the common denominator 'behavioral psychology'. Reflexology was a Russian school started by J.P. Pavlov around 1900; it later came to influence Behaviorism, which was created by John B. Watson in the U.S.A. around 1912-13. The birth of Behaviorism had nevertheless been 'prepared' by other American behavioral psychologists, especially E.L. Thordike, who will therefore be discussed in the same chapter. Finally, in Chapter 7, we shall deal with the most revolutionary of the new macroschools: Psychoanalysis, which was created by Sigmund Freud at the end of the 1890s. This chapter has been divided into two main section, the first of which will deal with the history of the scientific community (in this case, that of the Gestalt psichologists) and the second, with its production (in this case, the Gestalt psychological production).

The History of the Gestalt Psychologists INTRODUCTION. Max Wertheimer is generally regarded as the founder of

Gestalt psychology. It was not long, however, before he received the support of two slightly younger colleagues, Wolfsang Kiihler and Kurt Koffka. These three men formed the famous triumvirate which launched Gestalt psychology

The history of the Gestalt psychologists

167

in Germany and later introduced it into America. But, apart from the triumvirate and other members of the 'Gestalt school' proper, there were also other schools and individuals with 'related' theories. Collectively, these will be termed holistic psychologists and discussed later in this main section.

The Gestalt school M A X WERTHEIMER (1880-1943). The founder of Gestalt psychology was born in Prague in 1880. He studied law and philosophy at the University of Prague, where he attended lectures by the philosopher and psychologist Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932). The latter had put forward a theory about the perception of 'wholes'. According to Ehrenfels, these consisted of something apart from and more than the summation of their elements. Elements are sense impressions - e.g. the notes of which a melody is composed. But they also constitute a 'whole' - e.g. a melody - and thus possess a quality of wholeness, a 'Gestalt quality'. It is this Gestalt quality we recognize when a melody is transposed into a different key, whereby all the elements, the notes, are changed, whereas the whole, or Gestalt quality, is retained. This theory provided the inspiration for Wertheimer's subsequent formulation of the Gestalt theory. From Prague, Wertheimer moved to Berlin, where he studied under Curl Stump$ The latter was one of the founders of a laboratory that was somewhat influenced by Bretano's 'act-psychology', and was therefore critical of Wundt (see Chapter 4).From Berlin, Wertheimer moved to Wurzburg, where he studied under Otto Kiilpe, who, as we have mentioned, was critical of Wundt's element psychology. In Wurzburg Wertheimer obtained his doctorate. In 1910, while travelling through Germany on holiday, Wertheimer suddenly broke his journey in Frankfurt, stopping at a toyshop to purchase a stroboscope - an instrument capable of transforming a series of pictures into 'living pictures'. Wertheimer quickly found a hotel and, with the aid of this instrument, he began to test a hypothesis he had been working on in the train. After this preliminary test he visited the University of Frankfurt, where a previous asistant from Berlin, Friederich Schumann, was now a professor. The latter provided him with a tachistoscope, which is an apparatus capable of exposing visual stimuli (e.g. pictures) at various frequencies, including such minute frequencies as 1/1000 sec. This has been used extensively for perception experiments. Wertheimer was allowed to remain in Frankfurt, working as a university lecturer. His first experimental subjects were Schumann's assi-

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Gestalt psychology

Fig. 5.1. Facesfor illustration of the concept of Gestalt.

stants, Kiihler and Koffka, who had moved to Frankfurt after their studies in Berlin. After experimenting on the experience of movement for a year, Wertheimer explained to his two experimental subjects the purpose of the tests and the underlying hypothesis. Ever since this conversation in 1911 the three men collaborated in the establishment of Gestalt psychology. The experimental report was published the following year in Zeitschrift fur Psychologie (see Wertheimer, 1912). so 1912 is often regarded as the official date of the foundation of Gestalt psychology. The experiment consisted in replacing a given visual stimulus - e.g. a perpendicular, rod-shaped figure - with a different one - e.g. a horizontal, rodshaped figure - at a suitable tempo. To the expenmental subject, the rod appears to bend and he experiences movement. Wertheimer called these experiences 'Phi-phenomena', and these were in fact the anomalies that initiated the formation of the Gestalt school. Wertheimer was able with his experiment to demonstrate that Wundt's explanation - that the movement experienced was caused by movements of the eye - was invalid. He was also able to refute Ehrenfel's theory, which likened the 'Gestalt quality'to a form of 'secondary element', which, together with the primary elements, or individual sense impressions, form a whole. Wertheimer's own theory posited that in our conscious experience the whole is primary, while 'elements' are the result of further analysis. Consciousness is not as Wundt maintained - a synthesis of elements, but a 'whole' in which it is possible to diferentiate the components by means of analysis. (See Fig. 5.1). According to Watson, Wertheimer's article about the experiments with Phi-phenomena inspired other psychologists to undertake over 100 experiments during the following 30 years (see Watson, 1963).


169

Later, from 1916 to 1929, Wertheimer became an assistant professor in Berlin, whereafter he was appointed Professor in Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933, when he was forced to emigrate to America. Throughout his years in Germany Wertheimer continued his experiments in perception psychology, and from the results he derived various 'Gestalt laws'. The experiments were published as articles in various journals, but Wertheimer was not interested in publishing his Gestalt psychology in the form of a book; he left that to Kohler and Koffka. Wertheimer's greatest contribution was his meticulously planned and executed experiments, as well as his inspiring teaching. Moreover, in 1921 Wertheimer started a journal for Gestalt psychology entitled ,,PsychologischeForschung". Wertheimer continued his experiments and teaching until, in 1933, the Nazi persecution of the Jews forced him to emigrate to the U.S.A. Here he was appointed to 'The New School of Social Research' in New York City - a gathering-point for many European immigrants. Koffka had already emigrated to the U.S.A. in 1927, while Kohler did not arrive until 1935. After his anival in the U.S.A. Wertheimer continued his work on the manuscript for a book. In this he applied Gestalt psychological theory to creative (productive) thinking. Wertheimer based some of his studies on some conversations with Albert Einstein regarding the manner in which Einstein had created his theory of relativity (see Wertheimer, 1945). Later, an enlarged edition of the book was published by his son Michael Wertheimer, also a psychologist (see Wertheimer, 1959). WOLFGANG KOHLER (1887-1967). Kohler became the Gestalt school's leading theoretician. He was born in Reval, Esthonia, studied physics in Berlin under Max Planck and then psychology under Stumpf. After obtaining his doctorate in 1909, he became Schumann's assistant in Frankfurt as well as Wertheimer's experimental subject and collaborator. In 1913 he went to Tenerife, where the Prussian Academy of Science was conducting some experiments on apes. Kohler stayed here for some years during the First World War, carrying out the experiments on chimpanzees that later made him famous. These showed that apes were able to solve complicated problems like using a stick to grab hold of a banana placed outside their cage. The most intelligent apes could, if necessary, combine two sticks to form one long one. They could also pile boxes one on top of the other in order to reach a banana attached to the ceiling. Some could even solve intricate problems involving the use of both tools, construction and roundabout methods. Kohler maintained that

I 70

Gestalt psychology

problem-solving consisted not of random attempts, or uial-and-error, as previous maintained by the American psychologist E.L. Thorndike (see Chapter 6). The chimpanzees manifested an insight that enabled them, by weighing up the situation beforehand, to solve a problem without undue trial-and-error. This was the first Gestalt psychological description and explanation of thought processes. Kohler's book was publishe in Germany in 1917 and in English in 1927 (see Kohler, 1927). In 1920 Kohler published a book entitled ,,Die phyzischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationaren Zustand" wherein he demonstrated that the physical world contained wholes, or Gestalts. (This may be termed a 'precursor' of system theory, cf. Chapter 2). Kohler also propounded his own psychophysical theory of isomorphy (i.e. structural similarity) between the physical surroundings, physiological brain processes and psychical processes. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter. Kohler extended Gestalt theory in this book to form an all-encompassing philosophy. In 1922 Kohler was appointed Professor in Berlin (after Stumpf). In 1929, after having delivered some visiting lectures at American universities Kohler wrote the first systematic account of Gestalt Psychology in English in 1929. It was published later in an extended and revised edition (see KohIer, 1947), which will be analysed in the following section. In 1935 Kohler emigrated to the U.S.A., where he became a professor at Swarthmore College. Here he continued his experiments, and wrote several articles and two books: ,,The Place of Value in a World of Facts", 1938, and Jynamics in Psychology ", 1940. Kohler was later honoured by the American Psychologicai Association with its 'Distinguished Contribution Award' in 1956.

KURT KOFFKA (1886-1941). Koffka was born in Berlin, where he studied under Stumpf,obtaining his doctorate in 1908. Thereafter he moved to Frankfurt together with Kohler, and became Wertheimer's assistant and collaborator. From 191 1-27 Koffka was appointed to the University of Giesen. During the same period he gave visiting lectures at American universities, and in 1927 he emigrated to the U.S.A., where he became a professor at Smith College. Koffka was the first to apply Gestalt theory to developmental psychology. This he presented in a book, which was translated into English in 1924 under


171

the title ,,The Growth of the Mind".Development is described herein as a combined product of hereditarily- determined maturing and environmentally-determined learning. Later Koffka wrote an important textbook, ,,Principles of Gestalt Psychology" (see Koffka, 1935), which had a great bearing on the development of Gestalt psychology in the U.S.A. GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY IN THE U S A . Gestalt psychology had a mixed recep-

tion in the U.S.A. The Gestalt psychologists themselves helped to create antagonism by their strong criticism of American psychology. Unfortunately, the criticism was to start with entirely unjustified, because it was directed against Titchener's version of classical experimental psychology. When it was pointed out to the Gestalt psychological 'triumvirate' that this form of psychology had died out with Titchener in 1927, they directed an equally sharp criticism at behaviorist psychology for being just as elementaristic as Wundt's and Titchener's. Since Behaviorism had a very strong position in American psychology, this criticism helped to isolate Gestalt psychology for some length of time. After the Second World War, however, the general attitude towards Gestalt psychology became more positive. The fruitfulness of Gestalt theory as applied to cognitive psychology (sensation, perception, thinking, etc.) became recognized. It was especially KoNer - who lived the longest - who won respect for Gestalt psychology, not least on account of his interest in neuropsychology, and in particular the cerebral processes connected with perception. However, it was Kurt Lewin, a pupil of the 'triumvirate' who had arrived in the U.S.A. in the middle of the 30s, who won the greatest acceptance among American psychologists. His contribution will be discussed in a later chapter, though, because its chief bearing is upon 'integrating psychology'. Another immigrant was the neurophysiologist Kurt Goldstein, who had been influenced at an early stage by the Gestalt psychologists. After his arrival in the U.S.A. he wrote a book ,,The Organism" (1939), which later had some influence on 'humanist psychology' (see Goldstein, 1939 and 1963). Among the most important of the American psychologists inspired by Gestalt psychology are Fritz Heider, Mary Henle, Solomon Asch and Rudolf Arnheim.

Other Holistic psychologists INTRODUCTION. Simultaneously with the formation and development of the

Gestalt psychological school, there were other psychologists who developed similar theories. These might be more or less sympathetically disposed towards

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Gestalt psychologists, although their theories were often divergent. It is difficult to find a term to cover them all, so we have chosen the term 'holistic psychologists' as denoting their holistic ontology. This is encompasing enough to include Gestalt psychologists in the restrictive sense. The above psychologists could also be termed phenomenological psychologists, because they all make use of phenomenological methods. But among phenomenological psychologists only the minority have been inspired by the phenomenological philosophy founded by Edmund Husserl ( 1859-1938), a pupil of Brentano. We shall therefore postpone a discussion of Husserl's philosophy to a later chapter, because it has acquired renewed importance in connection with existentialist psychology of the 60s and 70s. Here we shall suffice with mentioning some psychologists who, though holistic and phenomenological, do not belong to the Gestalt school. DAVID KATZ (1884-1954). Katz studied chiefly in Gottingen under G.E. Miiller

(see Chapter 4), where he obtained his doctorate in 1906. Thereafter he became Muller's assistant until 1919, when he became Professor in Rostock. When the Nazis took over power in 1933 he was obliged to leave Germany and, after spending some years in England, he was appointed Professor at the University of Stockholm. Katz first became known for his phenomenological investigations of touch and colour perception. These were presented in two books, "Der Aufbau der Tastwelt" (1925) and ,,Der Aufbau der Farbwelt" (1930). The latter was translated into English under the title ,,The World of Color" (1935). Later he also wrote a book about ,,Gestalt Psychology" (see Katz, 1950). However, Katz was also interested in general psychological themes and was the author of a ,,ComparativePsychology". The Danish psychologist Rubin studied in Gottingen at the same time as Katz. Rubin became internationally known among psychologists for his thesis ,,Visually Experienced Figures", which was published in 1915 and translated into German in 1921. It was in this thesis that Rubin published the results of his experiments onfigures and ground. A visual field - or any other perceptual field, for that matter - is structured into a figure seen against a background, the figure being remembered and recognized better than the background. Many psychologists - whether or not they belong to the

EDGAR RUBIN (1886-1951).


173

Gestalt school - have stressed the 'figure-ground relationship' as constituting the most basic Gestalt phenomenon. Rubin was a professor of psychology at the University of Copenhagen from the death of Alfred Lehman in 1921 until his own in 1951. FELIX KRUGER (1874-1948). Kriiger was a pupil of Wundt and eventually took

over his professorate in Leipzig. He called his psychology ,,Ganzheit psychologie". It differed from Gestalt psychology (in its most restrictive sense) chiefly on account of its early incorporation of developmental psychology and personality psychology within a holistic theory. WILHELM STERN (1871-1938). From 1916 to 1933 Stem was Professor and

leader of the Psychological Institute at Hamburg University. Here he developed an all-round, holistic and humanist psychology centred around personality. His chief work, ,,Person und Sache", was published in 3 volumes in respectively 1906, 1918 and 1924. In connection with this Stem developed diflerentialpsychology (concerned with individual differences). He also 'invented' the intelligence quotient. In 1907 Stem founded both a laboratory and a journal for appliedpsychology, but - with the Nazi takeover in 1933 - Stem had to relinquish his post and emigrate to the U.S.A., where he became attached to Duke University. ALBERT EDOUARD MICHOTTE (1881-1965). Michotte studied in Leipzig and Wiirzburg and became a professor at the University of Louvain in Belgium from 1905-1946. His most famous investigations were concerned with the experience of causality. Michotte regarded the experience of causality as a primary holistic phenomenon on a par with the experience of movement, figureand-ground and other Gestalt phenomena. The results are described in a book published in 1946 and subsequently translated into English under the title ,,Perception of Causality", (1 963). CONCLUSION. With these latter psychologists, the history of Gestalt psychol-

ogy's scientific community is concluded, the most important psychologists of the Gestalt school or those possessing similar theories having been discussed. The next section will provide a more systematic, meta-theoretical account of the Gestalt psychologists' production.

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The Gestalt Psychologists' Production INTRODUCTION.We have chosen in this section Wolfgang Kohler's ,,Gestalt Psychology" in the revised edition from 1947 as representative of the Gestalt psychologists' production (see Kohler, 1947), mainly because Kohler (as previously mentioned) is Gestalt psychology's chief theoretician. He is also that member of the 'triumvirate' who lived the longest and consequently had the greatest influence on the dissemination of Gestalt psychology in the U.S.A. The above book constitutes Kohler's most systematic account of Gestalt psychology. Another possible choice would have been Koffka's ,,Principles of Gestalt Psychology" from 1935, but the revised edition of Kohler's book is the most recent comprehensive and systematic account of Gestalt psychology to be written by the 'founding triumvirate'. As previously mentioned, Wertheimer did not write a book about Gestalt psychology, his only book dealing exclusively with thought processes (see Wertheimer, 1945). Gestalt psychology contained no microschools, because the other holistic-phenomenologicalpsychologists mentioned in the first main section of this chapter did not constitute a scientific community with a common paradigm, and thus were neither macroschools nor microschools but separate individuals with a fair portion of the paradigm - especially the meta-stratum - in common with the Gestalt psychologists. We shall concentrate, therefore, on the production of the Gestalt psychologists, choosing Kohler's ,,Gestalt Psychology" as example. The 1947 edition of ,,Gestalt Psychology" consists of altogether 369 pages, distributed in the folIowing chapters:

IA I1 111 IV V VI VII VIII

A Discussion of Behaviorism. Psychology as a Young Science. A Criticism of Introspection. Dynamics as opposed to Machine Theory. Sensory Organization. The Characteristicsof Organized Entities. Behavior. Association.

The Gestalt psychologists' production IX

X

175

Recall. Insight.

It will be seen from some of the chapter headings that the book contains much criticism of older introspective psychology and American Behaviorism, though in association with this there is also a full account of Kohler's own meta-theses, to which we shall now turn.

Gesta It Psyc hol og y 's Meta -stra tu m ONTOLOGY. Kohler was at his most explicit when he formulated Gestalt psy-

chology's conception of science, but his book also contains a number of explicit ontological references. 1 . The Conception of man. This philosophical presupposition is not formulated explicitly, presumably because here Kohler does not differ either from classical experimental psychology or American Behaviorism; Gestalt psychology has in common with these the same biological conception of mun. Although not formulated explicitly, the remainder of the text makes it clear that Gestalt psychology presupposes a biological conception of man. 2. The Psycho-physical theory. On the other hand, Kohler's book deals extensively with this ontological aspect. His psycho- physical theory constitutes an original conmbution with its so-called 'isomorphic theory', which postulates 'isomorphy' (i.e. identity in form or structure) between brain processes and those of consciousness (often called 'direct experiences') (see Kohler, 1947, pp. 61,61 & 344)1,2 cQ 3. Isomorphic theory is somewhat difficult to classify, especially as to whether it is neutral-monistic or parallelistic. As maintained by Popper (see Popper and Eccles, 1977), there may be very little difference between these two psycho-physical theories. Kohler's use of the words 'structurally identical' in the first two quotations could be interpreted as expressing a neutral-monistic identity theory. But the distinction between 'experiences' and 'the processes which underlie these experiences' (see note 3) could be interpreted as parallelistic. There is a third possibility, however: Kohler's isomorphic theory could be regarded as a kind of pluralist system theory. This interpretation fits with Kohler's account of 'dynamic theory' as opposed to 'machine theory', to which we shall return in connection with the hypothetical stratum. 3. The problem of determinism. Kohler presupposes determinism (as opposed to both 'free-will' indeterminism and probabalism). But he introduces a

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distinction between dynamic and mechanistic (or topographical) determinism (Kohler, 1947, p. 108)4. Kohler maintains that this distinction does not enter into 'mechanical' theories such as those of behaviorism and classical psychology. These only reckon with one form of determinism - mechanist determinism - though, according to Kohler, dynamic determinism is also very important in psychology. We shall return to 'dynamic theory' in connection with Kohler's main hypotheses and model, but first we shall analyse his philosophy of science. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Kohler's book contains many metascientific for-

mulations, but most of them are critical of behaviorism and experimental psychology. The few positive ones mostly apply to epistemological and metatheoretical formulations, although there are also a few positive methodological formulations. 1. Epistemology. As mentioned, no explicitly formulated epistemological meta-theses have been found, although it is nevertheless possible to classify Kohler's epistemology on the basis of numerous implicit formulations (e.g. Kohler, 1947, pp. 7 & 27)5 As far as the origin of cognition is concerned, Kohler's theory may be termed empirical rationalism (or rationalist empiricism) as in the case of most natural scientific theories. Kohler's theory of the relation of cognition to reality is a form of critical realism: reality exists independently of our cognition, though not as we immediately experience it. Kohler expresses this critical realism in Gestalt psychological terms by way of an extended isomorphic principle. 1.e. Isomorphy exists between the structure of the surroundings and that of the brain processes resulting thereof, and between the structure of the brain processes and that of conscious processes. In short: The structure of the surroundings + the structure of the brain processes +the structure of experience. However, Kohler himself realizes that this extended isomorphic principle does not apply in all cases, though in sufficiently many cases to render it biologically purposeful (Kohler, 1947, p. 163)6. We shall return later to the importance of this epistemological isomorphic principle for Gestalt psychology's theory of perception.

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177

2. Metatheory. It appears quite clearly from Kohler's discourse that he presupposes and accepts a nomothetical (natural scientijk) ideal of science. He frequently refere to physics as a model for psychology, and in many places he makes use of personal experience gained during his first student years, when in fact he studied physics (Kohler, 1947, p. 32)7. 3. Methodology. Just like the classical experimental psychologists, KoNer also appears to define 'psychology' as the 'science of direct human experience' (a formal, explicitly formulated definition has not been found). Kohler maintains that other people's conscious experiences ('direct experiences') can be perceived via their behaviour. 1.e. their experience and their behaviour are isomorphic in the same manner as the observer's perception of their behaviour and the observer's experience are isomorphic. We shall return to this 'social perception theory' under the hypothetical stratum. Regarding the definition of psychology and all ontological and metatheoretical meta-theses hitherto, there is a great similarity between Gestalt psychology and classical experimental psychology. But here the similarity ends: the methodological theses in Gestalt psychology differ essentially from those of classical experimental psychology. The lack of accordance does not, however, apply to psychology's data language. Like that of classical experimental psychology, the data language of Gestalt psychology is largely a phenomenological data language, i.e. a language that describes experience data ('direct experiences'). But the lack of accordance between Gestalt psychologists and classical experimental psychologists amounts chiefly to the question of method (or model of consciousness, which we shall examine later). Kohler devotes Chapter I11 entirely to a criticism of the classical introspective method (Kohler, 1947, p. 70)*. Characteristic of the introspective method is its analysis and separation of the products of experience and leaming processes ('meaning' and suchlike) from elementary sense impressions ('sensations' or 'empfindungen', as Wundt calls them). As opposed to this, the Gestalt psychological method, like the introspective method, is closely linked with an overall hypothesis or model of consciousness. When formulated, this hypothesis states that the organism reacts to the pattern of stimuli to which it is exposed, and that this reaction constitutes a total process which is experienced as a sensory 'whole' (Kohler, 1947, p. 103)9. In conclusion it should be noted that Kohler does not, when discussing the Gestalt psychological method, employ the words 'phenomenological method.

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Gestalt psychology

Such terms as 'phenomenological' are not to be found in the register, occumng in fact only once in the text. Thus, to sum up, Gestalt psychological meta-theses incorporate the following: a biological view of man; a parallelistic, neutralmonistic or possibly pluralist psycho-physical theory; a determinist meta-model; an empirico-rationalist and critico-realist epistemology; a nomothetic ideal of science and a holistic-descriptive experimental method.

The Gestalt psychologists' hypothetical stratum INTRODUCTION. In Kohler's discourse the hypothetical stratum and the datastratum are not strictly segregated. They are largely to be found in the last seven chapters, while the meta-stratum is contained in the first three chapters and in the form of scattered remarks in the remaining chapters. It would be in accordance both with Kohler's own account and Gestalt psychological meta-principles to procede 'from above downwards', i.e. to start with the hypothetical system (including the explanatory model and the overriding hypothesis), analysing thereafter the remaining hypotheses and the hypothetical terms contained therein. THE HYPOTHESIS-SYSTEM. Ostensibly, the hypothesis-systemin Gestalt psy-

chology takes the form of verbal analogies. In Kohler no formal deductive system of hypotheses (formulae)is to be found, and the separate hypotheses are not formulated explicitly but are found implicitly in the text. Nor are there any diagrams or other types of formalized, abstract models. But Kohler's verbal analogies are clear and precise, because they refer to physical systems and models. The transition from Kohler's meta-model (a dynamic or field-theoretical contra a mechanistic 'Weltanschauung') to the explanatory model is therefore gradual. Kohler formulates this transition from meta-model to explanatory model in Chapter IV: ,,Dynamics as Opposed to Machine Theory". Here he states that in physical systems there are two sets of determining factors - topographical (structural) and dynamic (Kohler, 1947, p. 107)lO. Kohler maintains that 'machine theories' only include the topographical factors. In psychology this applies both to behaviorism and classical experimental psychology ('Introspectionism'), both of which presuppose a 'machine


I79

theory' as far as the function of the nervous system is concerned. Kohler, on the other hand, maintains that Gestalt psychology accentuates the dynamic factors involved in determining the nervous system's processes and their 'parallel' or 'identical' conscious processes (Kohler, 1947, p. 132)11. Thus Kohler argues that dynamic or field-theoretical explanatory concepts and models are useful not only in physics but especially in physiology and psychology. He then proceeds to summarize these dynamic explanatory concepts in the form of one single concept of 'Organization'. In Kohler's discourse this word designates the fundamental, dynamic, psycho-physiological processes controlling all the more specific psycho-physiological processes. This, of course, is a hypothetical variable and will later be subjected to a meta-theoretical analysis. But in Kohler's theory the general status of this hypothetical variable as an overall explanatory concept appears, for example, from his criticism of the 'stimulus-response formula'. On p. 165 he concludes: ,,The right psychological formula is therefore: pattern of stimulation - organization - response to the products of organization". This 'psychological formula' may be regarded as Gestalt psychology's overriding hypothesis. It may be interpreted as a psychological hypothesis, or testable formulation of a meta-thesis, i.e. the isomorphic principle. Therefore we shall formulate it explicitly as the first hypothesis in our systematic reconstruction of Kohler's theory: 1ST HYPOTHESIS: Stimulation from the surroundings initiates psychophysio-

logical processes that cause in their turn experiences and behavior. The stimulation patterns further the organization of the psycho-physiological processes, and these in their turnfurther holistic experiences and reactions. Employing the notation of the systernatological taxonomy, this may be formulated briefly as: 1st Hypothesis: S (stimulation patterns) -+ H (organizing psycho-physiological

processes) + R (holistic experiences and reactions).

Here we may observe that the 'intervening' hypothetical processes are called 'psycho-physiological processes', thus indicating that they are 'neutral, hypothetical processes' (physiological processes identical with conscious processes). At the same time 'conscious experiences' are regarded as data, which, in con-

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180

junction with behavioral data, represent the dependent variable. All this is in accordance with Kohler's neutral-monistic psycho-physical theory. We shall now examine the subordinate hypotheses in Kohler's theory: THE HYPOTHESES. Just like classical experimental psychology, Gestalt psychology started with the investigation of perception. But gradually it extended its field of research to include all cognitive processes. At an early stage Kohler carried out the famous experiments on problem-solving in chimpanzees, and Wertheimer also wrote a book on 'productive thinking'. Kohler's ,,Gestalt Psychology" deals with themes such as 'perception', 'association', 'recall' and 'insight' (see list of chapters, p. 176). He also touches on motivation (Kohler, 1947, pp. 300-301). In this section we shall extract and reformulate the hypotheses relating to these processes. It is characteristic of Gestalt psychology that perception (sensory organization) is the fundamental process upon which all the other cognitive processes are dependent (Kohler, 1947, p. 199)12. This implicit hypothesis may be reformulated as follows: 2NDHYPOTHESIS: The dynamic state of the nervous system determines

sensory organization.

Employing the usual symbolism, this may be formulated as follows: 2nd Hypnothesis. H (nerve dynamics) + H (sensory organization).

This hypothesis is at the same time a refutation of all other theories purporting to explain perception 'empirically', i.e. as a result of previous learning, as did classical experimental psychology in particular. Gestalt psychology, on the other hand, regards sensory organization as resulting in the formation of wholes, and primarily the latter's subsequently acquired 'meaning' or 'sense', etc. (Kohler, 1947, p. 139)13. The implicit hypothesis contained in many passages in Kohler's book may be reformulated explicitly: 3RD HYPOTHESIS: Sensory organization determines the experience of per-

ceptual wholes. These can acquire 'meaning' by association.

In the symbolic version:

The Gestalt psychologists' production 3rd Hypothesis: H (sensory organization) (associative 'meaning').

181

+H

(perceptual wholes)

+H

These three hypotheses are used by Kohler in order to explain the well-known 'Gestalt laws' , such as 'the principle of similarity', 'the principle of proximity' and 'the principle of the good Gestalt', etc. and to explain common optical or geometrical illusions. We shall return to these in connection with the datastratum. Kohler also uses Gestalt psychological hypotheses about 'sensory organization' to explain how people undertand each other's consciousnesses by way of their external behavior. This theory of 'social perception' is contained in Chapter VII: ,,Behavior", and may be summarized as follows: ,,If A observes B, then A will experience B's behavior as perceptual wholes in the form of goal-directed actions and expressions of A's state of being. This experience has a structural similarity (is isomorphic) with the observed person's conscious experiences." The hypothesis pertaining to social perception may be reformulated as follows: 4THHYPOTHESIS: On account of the isomorphy between a person's con-

sciousness and behavioral expression, the behavior of another person (0)causes isomorphic psycho-physiological processes in the observer (S), which provide an experience of 0's behavioral expression together with his conscious experiences.

Expressed symbolically, where 'I' stands for 'isomorphic with': 4th Hypothesis: S (0's consciousness I behavior) + H (psychophysiological process in S) + R (S's experience of 0 s behavior and consciousness). A similar, original and experimentally documented theory was put forward by the Danish psychologist Frunz From (see From, 1953). We shall now procede with Kohler's hypotheses relating to other psychophysiological processes, the next of which, Association, will be dealt with in Chapter VIII. In Gestalt psychology, association is not regarded as the creation of connections (in the brain and/or consciousness) between isolated elements, but rather as the product of an organized process which leaves behind it a memory trace constituting a whole (Gestalt) (Kohler, 1947, pp. 270-271)14.

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182

Kohler maintains that this also applies to the learning of nonsense syllables, which was classical experimental psychology's favourite example as regards the formation of associations (see p. 271, Kohler, 1947)lS. Kohler subsequently generalized this hypothesis to apply to all learning processes (Kohler, 1947, p. 278)16. This may be summarized in a hypothesis: 5TH HYPOTHESIS: Organizing psycho-physiological processes leave behind

(memory) traces. These traces are called 'associations'. In symbolic form:

5th Hypothesis: H (organizingprocesses) + H (memory traces, 'associations'). Closely connected with the Gestalt psychological hypothesis relating to association are the hypotheses about reproduction, or 'recollection' and 'recall' presented by Kohler in Chapter IX: ,,Recall". Here he maintains that reproduction occurs when current organizing psycho-physiologicalprocesses have a certain similarity with already established memory traces (Kohler, 1947, p. 289)17 We can reformulate this as an explicit hypothesis: 6TH HYPOTHESIS: Current psycho-physiological processes, possibly determined by a current stimulus pattern, can activate a memory

trace and thereby reactivate the psycho-physiological processes determined by this memory trace. This reactivation of memory traces is called 'reproduction'. It results in the re-experience of previously experienced situations ('recollections') andlor the accomplishment of previously learnt reactions (habits, knowledge, skills). In the symbolically shortened version:

6th Hypothesis: S (stimulus pattern) + H (psycho-physiologicalprocess) + H (reactivation of memory traces) + R (recall, reproduction). In the books final chapter (X) Kohler deals with 'insight'. This is not, as might be expected of the author of the 'Mentality of Apes', an account of the psychology of thinking and problem-solving.The chapter consists largely of a critical discussion of David Hume's famous analysis of the concept of causation. Kohler maintains that we experience causation (determination), and he calls this expe-


183

rience 'insight'. This process is necessary for intelligent problem-solving (as opposed to mal-and-error). He asserts that people can have an insight not only in external connections but also in internal, motivational connections (Kohler, 1947, p. 342)1*. Here the term is used solely descriptively. However, 'insight' is also used by Gestalt psychologists to explain problem-solving. In accordance with their 'dyanamic' theory, 'insight' consists of a re-organization of an already organized perceptual field and/or memory traces. It can be summarized to form a hypothesis (though not as a concentrate of the formulations in Kohler, 1947, but of those to be found in other of Kohler's books and in those of other Gestalt psychologists). 7TH HYPOTHESIS: In problem-solving situations the perception of the situa-

tion may in some cases result in a reorganization of the perceptual field and possibly of previously established memory traces. This reorganization, which is called 'insight', results in eficient and intelligent, problem-solving behavior.

In the symbolic version: 7th Hypothesis: S (problem situation) -+ H (perceptual organization)

+H

(activation of traces) + H (reorganization of perceptual field and/or memory traces) -+ R (problem solving behavior).

Kohler does not deal systematically with emotions and motivation, though he touches on the theme in Chapter IX: ,,Recall". Here he puts forward a hypothesis that is elaborated further in Kurt Lewin's theory, to be dealt with in Chapter 8 of this book. The hypothesis presupposes that actions are not caused by 'drives' or 'instincts' with their 'seat' in the organism. According to Kohler, actions are caused by a field of force containing 'vectors' that arise when the individual experiences the state of the organism, or 'needs', together with the objects in the surroundings capable of satisfying them. According to the isomorphic principle, there is a field of force in the brain corresponding to this experience (Kohler, 1947, pp. 300 & 301)19. This may be summarized in the form of a motivational hypothesis: 8TH HYPOTHESIS: The perception of the state of the organism (its needs, etc.)

and of the relevant objects in its surroundings ('needssatisfers') gives rise to a psycho-physiological field of

184

Gestalt psychology force containing a vector which drives the individual in the direction of the needs- satis$er. Formulated symbolically:

8th Hypothesis: S (the organism's state and needs-satisfying objects) + H (psycho-physiological vectors) + R (goal-directed action).

We have hereby concluded the systematic reformulation of Kohler's hypotheses, which, to facilitate comparison, will be represented in diagrammatic form (see Fig. 5.2). Before we proceed with the analysis of the hypothetical terms, we shall undertake a classification of the hypotheses in accordance with the systematological taxonomy (see Appendix). These are all functional hypotheses. They may be classified into theoretical and empirical hypotheses, all the S-H-R hypotheses being subdivided into a) a S-H-hypothesis and b) a H-R-hypothesis. We then obtain the following result: 1. Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Hypotheses nos. 2,3 & 5 = in all 3 2. Empirical hypotheses: a. S-H hypotheses: Hypotheses nos. la, 4a, 6a, 7a & 8a = in all 5 b. H-R hypotheses: Hypotheses nos. lb, 4b, 6b, 7b, 8b = in all 5 THE HYPOTHETICAL TERMS.The most important hypothetical terms in Koh-

ler's theory are to be found in all the hitherto formulated hypotheses, i.e. 'organization','sensory organization', 'reproduction' ('recall'), 'memory traces', 'insight','dynamic','vector' and lfield offorce'. In this section we shall carry out a metatheoretical classification in accordance with the 'systematic taxonomy' in the Appendix. 1. Ontological reference. It would be consistent with our classification of Kohler's psycho-physiological theory - the isomorphic theory - as neutralmonistic, to classify his hypothetical terms as Hc-terms, i.e. hypothetical terms with a 'neutral' ontological reference to constructed explanatory concepts (hypothetical constructions).


185

Table 5.1

Traditionally, some of the terms employed - 'insight' and possibly 'association' - have a mentalistic surplus meaning, but, to judge from his discourse (and, to be hoped, from the given quotations), he appears to use these together with all the other hypothetical terms - in connection with some 'neutral' processes appearing simultaneously as physiological brain processes and mental processes. 2 . Existential form. It is characteristic of Kohler's 'dynamic' theory that nearly all the hypothetical terms refer to (hypothetical) processes. Only a single term - 'memory traces' - refers to a more permanent structure. 3. Function. It is also characteristic of Kohler's and other Gestalt psychologists' predominating interest in cognitive processes that most of the hypothetical terms refer to directive variables. Some terms - 'vector', 'field of force' and 'dynamic' - refer to vector-variables, but none of these to purely dynamic variables (since a 'dynamic state' itself is something that inevitably results in sensory organization). 4.Combined classification. The last two classificationscan be combined in the form of a classification diagram (see Table 5.1).

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Gestalt psychology

The Gestalt Psychologists' Data-stratum THE ABSTRACT DATA-STRATUM. This part of a discourse contains eSpKidly

general data-theses - in Kohler's discourse particularly the numerous examples of Gestalt 'laws' o r 'principles'. As previously mentioned, the classification of a thesis as hypothesis or datathesis depends on whether its most important terms are classified as hypothetical or descriptive. The 'Gestalt laws' deal with all functional relations between the stimulation pattern and the conscious ('direct experience') thereof. As previously indicated, we have found it most correct on the basis of the metatheoretical analysis of Kohler's discourse to classify 'direct experience' as phenomenological data, which in Kohler's theory are co-ordinate with behavioral data. Thus, in Kohler's theory, 'direct experience' may be regarded, like behavior, as a kind of R-variable, and the 'Gestalt laws' are 'S-R-laws' or functional relations between independent and dependent variables. This interpretation of Kohler's theory is in accordance with the classification of his hypothetical terms as neutral Hc-terms, which in its turn is compatible with the classification of his isomorphic theory as neutral monistic (or pluralist). However, Kohler's theory is not always consistent in this respect, i.e. the word 'perceptual' is applied both to neutral, psycho-physiological perceptual processes and to the products of perception ('experiences'). As we know, there exist numerous Gestalt laws, but Kohler mentions only the most well-known of them, as formulated by Wertheiemer. One of these is 'the principle of proximity', which may be formulated as follows: 1ST DATA-ThSIS: Proximity in the stimulus pattern furthers (sensory organi-

zation and its effect on) the experience of composite wholes. The bracketed phrase stands for the intervening hypothetical variable, while the first and last parts of the sentence constitute respectively the S-variable and the R-variable. Thus the underlined part of the sentence is an 'S-R-law', i.e. a general data-thesis. A second Gestalt law, mentioned by Kohler, was formulated by Rubin as follows: 2ND DATA-THESIS: The stimulus pattern determines the experience of the

figure-ground. This experience may change spontaneously without alterations in the stimulus pattern.


187

Fig.5.2. A graphical modei of Kohler's theory. Kohler also quotes the second important data-thesis ('law') found by Rubin: 3RD DATA-THESIS: When a stimulus pattern is experienced as figure and ground, thefigure will later be recognized (though not the ground).

Finally, Kohler mentions the law of 'transposition':

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Gestalt psychology

4TH DATA-THESIS: If a stimulus pattern is experienced as a structure (set of

relations), this structure will be recognized even if the stimulus pattern were to consist of new stimulus elements. The classical example is that of melodies that are recognizable in other keys because, even though the separate notes are altered, the relations between them are preserved. Another classical example consists of Kohler's own experiments with chickens; these reacted to the difference between shades of grey but not to different shades of grey as such. All the data-theses ('Gestalt laws') formulated above may be explained with the help of the previously formulated hypotheses relating to sensory organization and reproduction. This is intimated in the first law by the insertion of 'organization' as an explanatory link, whereas it is omitted in the other laws. THE CONCRETE DATA-STRATUM. This part of the discourse contains descrip-

tions of observations (including experiments) as well as descriptions of methods (whereas the arguments or prescripts for methods belong to the meta-stratum). There is mention in Kohler's discourse of his own experiments, including those on chimpanzees and chickens, as well as Wertheimer's classical experiments relating to the Gestalt laws. M. Hertz's animal experiments and the neuropsychological investigations undertaken by Gelb and Goldstein are referred to, as well as Edgar Rubin's classical figure-and-ground experiments. Other animal expedments by K . Lashley are mentioned, and K . Lewin's and his pupils' research is discussed in connection with reproduction. Apart from these famous experiments, Kohler refers to a number of lesser known experiments confirming Gestalt psychology's hypotheses. Mention of these experiments - together with numerous references to everyday observations - is to be found scattered in the chapters about Gestalt psychological hypotheses. Thus, even though the discourse makes no clear distinction between the hypothetical stratum and the data-stratum, the data-stratum is relatively comprehensive. We have thereby arrived at a description of 'The theory as a whole'.


189

The Theory as a Whole THE COMPLETENESS OF THE DISCOURSE. It appears from the above that

Kohler's text is a complete scientific theory, since it contains both meta- and hypothetical strata as well as data-stratum. True enough, the three strata are not clearly separated, so it is difficult to calculate the relative appearance of the three strata (the so-called M-H-D-ratio), but we can roughly say that the first 3 chapters - about 100 pages in all (see list of chapters, p. 174) - constitute the discourse's meta-stratum, whereas the remaining 7 chapters - about 260 pages in all - constitute the combined data- and hypothetical strata. THE THEORY'S TESTABILITY. We are now able on the basis of the classification

of the systematically reformulated hypotheses (page 184) to calculate the Hypothesis Quotient as an indication of the theory's testability: H.Q =

Cm-w --+ (H-R)]-5 + 5 -0.30

C[(S-H)

When compared with the table of calculated Hypothesis Quotients in Chapter 2, p. ,the H. Q. of Kohler's theory appears to be slightly below average, This indicates that Kohler's theory has a fair degree of testability.

Notes

,,Experienced order in space is always structurally identical with a functional order in the distribution of underlying brain processes." ,, ._.experienced order in time is always structurally identical with a functional order in the sequence of correlated brain processes."

,, ... the principle of isomorphism, i.e. the thesis that our experiences and the processes which underlie these experiences have the same structure". ,,We assume that, in all systems with which we are concerned, processes are strictly determined by factors of some kind. But we must always re-

190

Gestalt psychology

member that systems vary tremendously as to the relative influence of limiting topographical conditions, on the one hand, and dynamic factors, on the other." (p. 7) ,,About the organism, just as about other physical things, we know merely by a process of inference or construction". (p. 27) ,,Even the most abstract concepts of physics, such as that of entropy, can have no meaning without a reference, in direct though it may be, to certain direct experiences" (p. 27). ,,It is quite true that organization often forms continuous wholes and groups of separate members when no corresponding physical units exist. But when contrasted with the larger number of cases in which organization gives a picture of objective facts, this disadvantage will rightly be regarded as negligible." ,,I am also fully aware of the fact that sciences often believe and postulate where epistomology may have its doubts. But from this point of view I can, of course, also believe that others have direct experiences. The decisive point is that it serves to make my work simpler and more productive. I feel the more justified in this attitude since I find that my work in physics is also founded in direct experience: that in this science the assumption of direct experience in others is made as a matter of course, and that, therefore the enormous superiority of physics over psychology cannot derive from any difference in this respect." ,,Now, meaning in this sense depends upon personal biogrpahy. It represents a somewhat accidental trait of our experience. In psychology, we must therefore try to ignore it and to focus only on the actual sensations. The procedure by which this is achieved is called introspection." ,,By no means do we admit, however, tha this isolation of local facts represents a more 'normal' state of affairs. Rather, if in objective experience observations are taken at their face value, our fundamental assumptions about the processes underying such experience must be sharply opposed to the premises of Introspectionism and Behaviorism. Our view will be that, instead of reacting to local stimuli by local and mutually independent


I91

events, the organism responds to the pattern of stimuli to which it is exposed; and that this answer is a unitary process, a functional whole, which gives, in experience, a sensory scene rather than a mosaic of local sensations." 10

,,In a physical system events are determined by two sorts of factors. In the first class belong the forces and other factors inherent in the processes of the system. These we will call the dynamic determinants of its fate. In the second class we have characteristics of the system which subject its processes to restricting conditions. Such determinants we will call top0 graphical factors."

11

,,Dynamic self-distribution in this sense is the kind of function which Gestalt Psychology believes to be essential in neurological and psychological theory."

12

,,From our present point of view, however, sensory organization appears as a primary fact which arises from the elementary dynamics of the nervous system."

13 ,,Gestalt Psychology claims that it is precisely the original segregation of

circumscribed wholes which makes it possibIe for the sensory world to appear so utterly imbued with meaning for the adult; for, in its gradual entrance into the sensory field, meaning follows the times drawn by natural organization; it usually enters into segregated wholes." 14

,,According to our thesis, association loses its character as a special and independent theoretical concept. It becomes a name for the fact that organized processes leave traces in which the organization of these processes is more or less adequately preserved."

15

,,I also acknowledge the fact that sometimes, as in the case of nonsense material, a particular attitude of the subject is needed if an association is to be established. But, as we have seen before, everything points to the thesis that this attitude is one of active organization."

16 ,,For learning, in the sense in which the term has been used in this chapter,

amounts to association, and, if we are right, association is an after-effect of organization.

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Gestalt psychology

17

,,Association is necessary for recall, and association presupposes a sufficient degree of unification in the sense of organization. Recall, on the other hand, can occur only if the process which is now given resembles some region within the organized trace of the whole experience."

18

,, ... the term insight refers to experienced dynamics in the emtional and motivational fields no less than to experienced determination in intellectual situations."

19

(p. 300) ,,In Gestalt Psychology the various directed attitudes of the self are not interpreted as 'instincts' which reside in the self per se. Rather they are regarded as vectors, which depend both upon the self and upon given objects, or more pre cisely, upon the relation which obtains at the time between the characteristics of the former and those of the latter." (p. 301) ,,In fact, we are inclined to assume that when the self feels in one way or another referred to an object there actually is a field of force in the brain, which extends from the processes corresponding to the self to those corresponding to the object."

Chapter 6

REFLEXOLOGY AND CLASSICAL BEHAVIORISM

In this chapter we shall deal with another macroschool, Behaviorism, which arose in the U.S.A. though was later influenced by Russian Rejlexology as created by Bekhterev and Pavlov, whom we shall therefore discuss first. Behaviorism was also inspired by an American pioneer in behavioral psychology, Edward Lee Thorndike; since he started work at the same time as Pavlov just before the turn of the century, we shall deal with him before Behaviorism proper. All these men may collectively be termed 'behavioral psychologists'As previously, we shall commence this chapter with the history of the scientific community of behaviorists and then deal with their production.

The history of behavioral psychologists Russian behavioral psychology V.M. BEKHTEREV (1857-1927). Previously - in Chapter 4

-

we mentioned Bekhterev as being a pupil of Wundt and founder of the first psychological laboratory in Russia (in Kazan, 1886). Later be went to St. Petersburg, where he founded another laboratory in 1895. Here he possibily had contact with Pavlov, which may be partly responsible for his becoming dissatisfied with Wundt's introspective psychology and becoming an adherent of 'objective psychology'. The latter was also the title of his first three-volume work, which was published in 1907-10. In 1913 it was translated into French and German,

194

Reflexology and classical behaviorism

and later it appeared in various English editions under the title ,,General Principles of Reflexology" (1932). In all these books Bekhterev elaborated his independent version of an 'objective psychology' or 'Reflexology', which integrated the results of Pavlov's experiments on conditioned reflexes; but, unlike Pavlov, he experimented with human subjects. In particular Bekhterev studied motor reflexes (amongst others, blink-reflexes) whereas Pavlov worked almost exclusively with secretory reflexes - salivary reflexes in dogs. Bekhterev's importance for behavioral psychology was his demonstration of the application of Pavlovian methods to human beings, and he published a comprehensive and systematic account of this long before Pavlov himself did. Thus it was partly through Bekhterev's books that Pavlov became known in the U.S.A. IVAN PETROVICH PAVLOV (1849-1936). Pavlov's initial studies took place at a local seminary, but in 1870 he went to St. Petersburg to study physiology and medicine. After having obtained his medical degree he continued his scientific studies at the St. Petersburg Academy and on various study tours in Germany. In 1890 he was appointed professor at the Academy, where he continued his studies on the physiology of digestion. During the course of these studies he discovered the secretory nerve that controls the secretion of saliva, and developed an experimental technique which consisted of extracting the saliva by way of a glass tube operated into the salivary duct, whereby it was possible to measure the secretion of saliva much more accurately. In 1904 Pavlov became one of the first Nobel Prizewinners in Medicine for his studies of the physiology of digestion. But at that time he was already hard at work on his experiments on conditioned reflexes, and these became his most important contribution to science. This new research into conditioned reflexes commenced with a genuine 'anomafy'in the Kuhnian sense; i.e., during the course of his experiments on digestion Pavlov discovered that the secretion of saliva was not only precipitated by the 'innate' stimulus - the presence of food in the mouth - but also by visual impressions and sounds associated with feeding (e.g. the sound of the assistant's footsteps in the passage prior to feeding). For classical physiology, which can only explain the innate reflexes set in action from the time of birth

The history of behavioral psychologists

195

by biologically significant stimuli (e.g. the presence of food in the mouth initiates the secretion of saliva), this constituted an anomaly. Pavlov recognized here the development of a 'psychological reflex', as he first called it (1898-99). Later he called such reflexes conditioned reflexes, because they arose and functioned under certain conditions. (Many years later he re-named them 'signal reflexes'). After the discovery of this anomaly Pavlov was very much in doubt as to whether he should continue his experiments on digestion or whether he should investigate this newly discovered anomaly. This for Pavlov amounted to a personal crisis, because he knew that many of his colleagues would not regard his field of research as 'true' (natural) science, but as psychology. But Pavlov nevertheless determined to investigate these conditioned reflexes. Most probably this decision was influenced by his teacher Ivan M . Sechenov (1829-1905), who had shown it possible to explain the activity of the brain as a complicated reflex activity. At any rate Pavlov regarded his research as brain physiology, because the creation of conditioned reflexes implied the activity of the cerebral cortex. Not until the end of his life did Pavlov look upon his research as a contribution to 'objectivepsychology'. The psychological importance of Pavlov's research on conditioned reflexes became increasingly clear to himself and others as his research provided new insight into complicated forms of human behavior. Here we shall suffice with mentioning the most important of these: 1. The discovery of 'conditioning of the higher order'. On the basis of one conditioned reflex a second one may be formed. If, for example, a conditioned reflex (of 'the first order') has been created by setting a metronome going immediately prior to the biological 'innate' or 'unconditioned' stimulus (food in the mouth) it is possible afterwards to create a new conditioned reflex (of 'the second order') by presenting a new stimulus - e.g. a geometrical figure - immediately before the already established, conditioned stimulus (the tick of the metronome). Thus it is possible to continue to create conditioned reflexes of an even higher order. With dogs, however, Pavlov was unable to get further than the third order, but he thought that in humans he would be able to create reflexes of a still higher order. Pavlov saw in this the possibility of explaining all human behavior as the result of conditioning.

2. The discovery of 'experimental neuroses'. Pavlov discovered that situations involving learning could prove difficult for the experimental animal. If a dog had learnt to distinguish between a circle and an elipse with axes 8:9, he found

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that an increase in difficulty (by make the ellipse even more like a circle) would make the dog behave 'nervously' in the experimental situation and forget what it had learnt. Pavlov compared this reaction with a neurotic reaction, and maintained that all neuroses arise under similar conditions (too difficult tasks, conflicts between stimuli, etc.). 3. The discovery of 'types'. Pavlov discovered that he could divide his expenmental dogs into two types according to their behavior in the conditioning experiments. At first he called these types 'weak' and 'strong'. This division into types was subsequently compared - e.g. by the English psychologist H . J . Eysenck - with the well-known division into 'introverts' and 'extroverts'. Both in Russian and other psychology this has become the basis of aphysiologically based, psychological typology. 4. Language as a second signal system. In his latter years Pavlov realized that

language could be regarded as a system of conditioned reflexes. I.e., the words of which it consists can be regarded as conditioned stimuli of a higher, more general or abstract nature, and verbal reactions can likewise be regarded as conditioned reactions of a higher order. Thus, language consists of a second system of 'signals' existing side by side with the ordinary conditioned reflexes that constitute the 'first signal system'. The second signal system, language, is confined to human beings. With this extension of Pavlov's theory it became possible to encompass man's abstract thinking within behavioral psychology.

The results of Pavlov's research were published in lectures held at congresses and in articles in various journals. Pavlov himself did not collect and publish his lectures on 'conditioned reflexes' until much later - under the title ,,Conditioned Reflexes" (see Pavlov, 1927). Later on numerous collections of articles were published (see Pavlov 1928 and 1941), and summaries of his ,,Wednesday seminars" were published posthumously (see Pavlov, 1955). It was in this latter publication that the idea of language as the second signal system was introduced. The publication of Pavlov's lectures in English initiated a 'Pavlov renaissance' in the western world. Several American psychologists have reported that it was their reading of Pavlov that either created their interest in psychology or gave them a special interest in the psychology of learning (see, for ex-


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ample, the biographies of Hull, Hebb and Skinner in the series: ,,History of Psychology through Autobiographies"). Thus it was American psychologists who had the highest regard for Pavlov during his life-time. In the Soviet Union, however, although supported by the State his reception during his life-time was more cool. But some years after his death - on the centenary of his birth - it became recognized that Pavlov's theory formed 'the missing link' between the natural sciences and the Marxist school of social sciences. The government and the Party therefore urged psychologists to resume the study of Pavlov's theory and to apply it to Soviet psychology, and during the following decade it became the point of departure and foundation for Soviet psychologists, nearly all of whom were operating with the Pavlovian paradigm. But after the Stalinist period - and its personality-cult - came to an end, other Soviet psychologists came to the fore. This will be dealt with more fully in the chapter on ,,Marxist Psychology". In his latter years Pavlov recognized that he was not the first to have initiated objective behavioral psychology. This was the American psychologist E.L. Thorndike, whom we shall discuss below.

Thorndike's behavioral psychology THORNDIKE'S LIFE AND CAREER. Edward Lee Thorndike was born in 1874.

His commenced his psychological studies under William James at Harvard, where, inspired by Darwin and the British school, he concentrated right from the start on comparative psychology . Thorndike was one of the first to perform laboratory experiments on animals; previously he had largely depended on 'field observations'. His first experiments were performed on chickens in the cellar at James's home, but later he was offered a job as Cattell's assistant at Columbia University in New York. Here Thorndike was able to continue his experiments with other animal species, including cats and apes. He obtained his doctorate for a thesis on ,,Animal Intelligence" in 1898. Influenced by Cattell, Thorndike became interested in applied psychology, especially educational psychology, of which he is regarded by Americans as the founder, and was subsequently appointed professor at Teachers College, Columbia University. Here he continued his experiments concerned with learning processes on human subjects, and later he constructed some intelligence tests. Thorndike's numerous works include ,,Educational Psychology" (1903), ,,The Fundamentals of Learning" (1932) and ,,Selected Writings from a Connexionist's Psychol-

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ogy" (1949). Thorndike died in 1949 after an extremely productive life (his published works are listed at over 500). THORNDIKE'S PRODUCTION. Thorndike's most important psychological pro-

duction is concerned with learning processes. As mentioned above, he conducted many experiments on learning in animals and summarized the reults under the descriptive concept, trail-and-error a term he uses to characterize the learning process as they occur, for example, in his most well-known experiment with cats in a 'puzzle box'. Here the cat is put in a box with a door capable of being opened from the the inside by way of some special kind of mechanism which may be changed from experiment to experiment. The cat is hungry and a fish is placed outside the box. The cat becomes very active, at first scratching and biting around the door and later all over the cage. Sooner or later this trial-and error is terminated by the opening mechanism being 'accidentally' set into operation, enabling the at to get out and eat the fish. Provided the opening mechanism remains in the same place, each time the experiment is repeated the process takes shorter and shorter time. Eventually the cat makes the correct movement straight away, and all wrong or superfluous movements are eliminated. Thorndike compares the development of the individual itself through learning with the development of the species. In both cases it takes place by means of selection, i.e. the choice of what is 'most suitable' (respectively the correct action and the most adaptive individual). In both cases selection takes place on the basis of a variation (respectively variant behavior elicited by the existing motivation and genetic mutation). Thorndike's active, selective 'response learning' may be distinguished from Pavlov's passive 'stimulus learning', which was demonstrated experimentally roughly at the same time. Since then psychologists of learning have discussed whether it is possibIe to 'reduce' all learning to a one simple form. Some have tried to explain all learning as 'response' or 'instrumental' learning, while others have tried to explain all learning as 'stimulus learning' or 'classical conditioning'. Still others have maintained that both forms of learning should be accepted as fundamental, or that the differences are solely a product of the experimental procedures. (It should also be mentioned that psychologists such as Tolman have stressed an entirely different and third form of


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learning - cognitive learning reminiscent of the 'insight' of the Gestalt psychologists). Corresponding to the first-mentioned descriptions of learning, there are two expfanations (hypotheses, 'laws', or 'principles'). Pavlov's stimulus- or signal-learning (as he himself called it in his latter years) can be explained by the principle of contiguity, which is mentioned in Chapter 4 as the new term for the old 'law of contigual association'. In the new behavioral version it is assumed that association is between nerve centres (not between elements of consciousness). That is why Thorndike preferred the term 'connexion' to 'association', calling his own theory 'Connexionism'. In Thorndike's theory the principle of contiguity appears in a version known as 'the law of exercise' or 'the law of use and disuse'). Thorndike explained his own selective response, or instrumental, learning according to the well-known Law of Effect. This is probably the most discussed and interpreted 'law' of psychology, and the one most subjected to experiments. It has probably acquired greater importance than Fechner's famous psycho-physical law. Thorndike formulated the 'Law of Effect' for the first time in ,,Elements of Psychology" (1905), p. 203 (here after Woodworth, 1964): ,,Any act which in a given situation produces satisfaction becomes associated with that situation, so that when the situation recurs the act is more likely than before to recur also. Conversely, any act which in a given situation produces discomfort becomes disassociated from the situation, so that when the situation recurs the act is less likely than before to recur." Later Thorndike formulated the Law of Effect in such a way that only the positive half was retained whereas the negative half was dispensed with. At the same time the Law of Exercise was restricted, exercises lacking any positive (satisfying) effect being regarded as devoid of educational effect. According to this formulation, Thorndike explains learning with the help of a hypothetical variable, i.e. the individual's satisfaction. Later this became the object of much discussion, especially among more 'orthodox' behaviorists, because Thorndike's use of hypothetical terms with mentalistic reference (Hmterms) such as 'satisfaction' and 'discomfort' came into conflict with their paradigm. Thorndike himself replied to this criticism by defining these terms operationally, i.e. 'satisfaction' was defined as a state in which the organism does everything to achieve and nothing to avoid. He was thereby well on his

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way to reformulating the Law of Effect as an empirical functional relation, as it was subsequently reformulated by Skinner. On the other hand, another psychologist C.L. Hull extended the Law of Effect with a complete hypothesis-system, which we shall examine in a later section. Thus Thomdike has had an influence on the psychology of learning processes comparable with that of Pavlov.

Classical Be havi or i sm INTRODUCTION. The behavioral psychology hitherto discussed - Russian Re-

flexology and Thomdike's Connexionism - may collectively be termed 'prebehaviorist behavioral psychology'. We shall now discuss 'Classical Behaviorism', which flourished from the First World War until about 1930, when it was replaced by various forms of 'NeoBehaviorism', which we shall discuss later. JOHN BROADUS WATSON (1878-1958). Classical Behaviorism was created by

John B. Watson, who was born in 1878. His university education began at the age of sixteen, and as a 22-year-old he attended Chicago University as a 'graduate student' in philosophy. He lost interest in philosophy, however, while attending Dewey's lectures and began to interest himself instead in James R. Angell's lectures. He also studied neurology and animal psychology. After obtaining his doctorate in 1903 Watson became Angell's assistant and, inspired by Thorndike and others, he resumed the comparative psychological experiments on white rats and apes. He was among the first to introduce the maze experiment into psychology. In 1908 Watson was appointed professor at John Hopkins University in Baltimore, where he established a laboratory for animal psychology. In his experiments with animals Watson was influenced by the British comparative psychologist C. LLoyd Morgan (1852-1936), who had formulated a methodological norm often known as 'Morgan's Canon'. This norm prescribes that animal behavior should not to be explained in terms of 'higher' mental processes such as thinking if it is at all possible to explain the same behavior in terms of simpler mental processes - or even completely without the assumption of mental processes. Thomdike too adopted this norm. But Watson began to feel that the norm ought also to be used in psychological research and theories about people. Their behavior too could and ought to be explained without


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reference to mental proceses, consciousness and suchlike. Only the observable situation, observable behavior, and possibly also physiological processes, ought to be incorporated in psychological descriptions and explanations. Thus the norm which, by Morgan, was used to exclude anthropomorphical explanations in animal psychology was extended by Watson to apply to human psychology, which was henceforth to be a science of behavior. Only hereby was it possible to overcome all the shortcomings and faults connected with classical experimental psychology, with its introspective method and its eternal discussion about the existence of psychic elements such as unobservable thoughts.

Thus, in Watson, Morgan's research methodological norm developed into the behaviorist paradigm. In 1912 Watson held some visiting lectures on his paradigm at Columbia University in New York. The folowing year he published his paradigm in sketch form as an article in Psychological Review; the following is taken from the introduction: ,,Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his effort to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation" (see Watson, 1913). The following year, in 1914, a book ,,Behavior: An introduction to comparative psychology" was published in which Watson had the opportunity of elaborating his paradigm with empirical examples taken from comparative psychology. In 1915 Watson was elected President of The American Psychological Association (APA). This shows how quick American psychologists were to accept Watson's paradigm. In his traditional speech as future President of APA, he mentioned for the f r s t time Pavfov's research and theory, about which he had recently read in the German and French translations of Bekhterev. In 1919 his inspiration from Pavlov via Bekhterev became converted into a research project on the establishment of conditioned emotional reactions in infants. It was in this project that the famous experiment with the 11-month old

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Albert took place. At the start of the experiment Albert displayed no fear of a white rat, but like all infants he reacted in fear to sudden loud sounds (e.g. the sound of a hammer against a metal rod). Thus, sudden loud sounds were unconditioned stimuli eliciting fear. To begin with, a white rat constituted a 'neutral' stimulus, but it became converted during the experiment into a conditioned stimulus eliciting fear simply by showing Albert the rat and thereafter striking the hammer on the steel rod (behind his back). After some repetitions of the 'contiguity' between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli the conditioned stimulus alone (the white rat) became capable of eliciting fear: Albert appeared startled and crawled away crying. Later Watson demonstrated the transferability of this reaction to simular stimuli, such as a white rabbit, a dog, a fur-coat and a mask of Father Christ-

mas. Thus Watson demonstrated with his experiments that the emotional reactions of humans could be altered by conditioning. The same year as these classical experiments were camed out Watson's book ,,Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist" was published (see Watson, 1919). This book is reckoned as Watson's most systematic and general psychological work. It appeared in revised versions in 1924 and 1929. In 1920 Watson was forced to resign his professorate on the grounds that his divorce and subsequent marriage to the assistant in the 'Albert experiments', Rosalie Raynor, had caused a sensation in the press. He was subsequently employed in an advertising firm and eventually became successful in that field. From 1920 to 1930 Watson continued to give visiting and popular lectures in various places, including the New School for Social Research in New York. These lectures were collected in the book Behaviorism, which was published in 1925 and revised in 1930 (see Watson, 1930). During that period Watson also wrote a popular book on the ,,Psychological Care of the Infant Child" (1928). After 1930 Watson did not contribute any further to the development of psychology, but devoted his work entirely to advertising until his retirement. He died in 1958. We shall analyse Watson's production in more detail in the second main section of this chapter.


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OTHER CLASSICAL BEHAVIORISTS. Contemporary with Watson there were a

great many American psychologists who were more or less influenced by his paradigm. Here we shall briefly mention the most important of these: EDWIN BISSELL HOLT (1 873-1946) was Professor at Harvard and, later, Princeton. His most important work in this connection is ,,Animal Drive and the Learning Process" (193 l), which consists of a physiologically based account of motivation, learning and development. MAX MEYER (1878-19 ) wrote at an early date (1911) a book on ,,The Fundamental Laws of Behavior", which anticipated to a considerable extent Watson's paradigm. Meyer was, moreover, a pupil of Carl Stumpf (see Chapter 4). Meyer's own pupil: ALBERT PAUL WEISS (1879-1931) argued in his principal work ,,A Theoretical Basis for Human Behavior" (1925) for a behaviorist 'bio-social' psychology. He also started a research project concerned with behavioral development in infants. WALTER S. HUNTER (1889-1954) is especially known for his experiments on 'delayed reaction', which demonstrated some basic processes in learning and memory. But among these Classical Behaviorists Watson was both the paradigmcreator and the dynamic leader.

Neo - Be ha v i or ist s INTRODUCTION. A distinction is normally made between 'Classical Behaviorism' and 'Neo-Behaviorism'. Classical Behaviorism is the school that accepted Watson's paradigm. It reached its peak around the same time as Watson's work (as a psychologist), i.e. c. 1913 to c. 1930. Around 1930 the behaviorist paradigm was altered so much that people began to speak of Neo-Behaviorism. However, this was still 'behavioral psychology', so Neo-Behaviorists belong to the same macro-school as both the Classical Behaviorists and Thorndike and the Russian Reflexologists. But the change in the paradigm is sufficient to merit the creation of a behaviorial psychological micro-school. 'NEO-BEHAVIORISM. This term may be applied to a great many different psychologists, the most important of whom are Edvard C. Tolman, Clark L. Hull and B.F. Skinner. In this chapter we shall deal only with Hull, because Tolman, who largely contributed to integrating psychology, is discussed in Chapter 8,

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and Skinner, who created the paradigm for a specific school known as 'Radical Behaviorism', is dealt with in a later chapter. Apart from Hull, this chapter will also deal with another American psychologist, E.R. Guthrie. CLARC LEONARD HULL (1884-1952). The American psychologist Clark L. Hull is a very important psychologist - perhaps one of the most important after the great pioneers, Freud and Pavlov. His chief contribution was the development of a general theory of behavior, which was more precise and systematic than any previous theory. However, Hull entered this field of psychology relatively later. Hull was born in 1884. He grew up on a small farm and obtained very little schooling, though eventually he studied at one of the lesser universities, where he qualified as a mining engineer. Shortly after his first appointment he became a victim of infantile paralysis, which took him two years to get over and left him with a permanent handicap, forcing him to choose a different occupation. After giving it plenty of thought he decided to take up psychology, because that profession satisfied his three conditions: 1) that it should have something to do with philosophy, 2) that it should provide the possibility of inventing and using experimental apparatus, and 3) that it should be a young and rapidly developing discipline, thus giving him a chance to influence its course. In order to study psychology he entered a larger university (Michigan), where he obtained his Ph. D. for a thesis concerned with concept formation. Here he undertook experiments using Chinese written characters, which the experimental subjects had to classify in various ways. Hull was thereafter appointed assistant professor in psychology at the University of Wisconsin, where he had to teach whatever subjects his professor (J. Jastron) wanted him to. Apart from a course in experimental psychology, which had always interested him, he had to teach test psychology. Here he adopted Thurstone'sfactor analytical method and wrote a book on it (,,Aptitude Testing", 1928), at the same time constructing an apparatus for the calculation of correlation coefficients. Later he was put to teach medical students psychology, and this gave him the opportunity of experimenting on hypnosis, about which he also wrote a book (,,Hypnosis and Suggestibility", 1933).


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After Pavlov's books were translated into English at the end of the 2 0 s Hull became very interested in the psychology of learning processes. At this time (1929) he was appointed Professor at Yale University, where he became the leadel: of the psychological department of a newly created, interdisciplinary, social scientific Institute of 'HumanRelations'. Here he had a great influence on his pupils, K.W. Spence, N.E. Miller, O.H. Mowrer, John Dollard and others. It was in this fruitful research environment that Hull developed his theory, which gradually became more and more comprehensive. Hull's theory may be characterized as an integration of Thorndike's 'trial-and-error' and Pavlov's 'conditioning'. With Pavlov's experiments and explanations as his point of departure, Hull demonstrated that classical conditioning can be explained with the help of Thorndike's Law of E'ect. Afterwards Hull converted this 'law' - or rather, hypothesis - into a precise and systematic theory, which made use of Tolman's conceptual framework with its 'intervening variables' or 'symbolic constructions', as Hull often called them. These constructions were arranged to form a deductive system consisting of fundamental hypotheses, or 'postulates' (17 in all) and some logically derived, subordinate 'theorems' (1 33 in all). A great many of these postulates and theorems could be formulated as mathematical functions. Hull set forth and explained his system of postulates in ,,Principles of Behavior" (1943), which he subsequently revised as ,,Essentials of Behavior" (1951). The derivation of the 133 theorems is to be found in ,,A Behavior System" (1952). It was Hull's intention to write a third work dealing with social behavior, but he died in 1952 while reading the proofs of what became his last work. One of Hull's colleagues wrote in his necrology that, to judge from the number of references to his works in the psychological production of the preceding decade alone, he was by far the most influential psychologist of his generation. An extremely thorough, metatheoretical analysis of Hull's theory was undertaken by Sigmund Koch (see Koch, 1954), while a comparative analysis is contained in Madsen (1959). EDWIN RAY GUTHRIE (1886-1960). Guthrie worked relatively independently of either Watson or Hull and Tolman. His most important contribution is an extremely consistently worked-out theory of learning, which he applied to psychotherapy in his book ,,The Psychology of Human Conflict" (1938).

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Guthrie's theory of learning is founded exclusively on the principle of contiguity. He rejects the Law of Effect as a hypothetical explanation of learning, regarding it to be a description (general data-thesis) of the motivational effect of reinforcement on performance. Guthrie explains learning exclusively as the establishment of of an association between stimulus and reaction. And this establishment takes place once and for all. Even though it appears as if learning nevertheless demands practice and repetition, Guthrie explains this by stating that a situation consists of a complicated set of stimuli which need not necessarily all be present every time the situation is repeated. Thus, every new repetition of the situation will establish associations between a new stimulus and the same reaction and, with each repetition, it becomes increasingly probable that a situation will elicit the same reaction. Although it appears as if learning may be motivated by the anticipated reward (reinforcement), Guthrie's explanation is that the reinforcing stimulus is usually the last to make its appearance in a learning situation, because it causes the experimental subject to execute the correct reaction, thereby concluding the trial-and-error period of the learning situation. Thus the reinforcing (rewarding) stimulus will (nearly) always be the last one to elicit a reaction. The association is thereby established and left undisturbed, so that next time the reinforcing stimulus will elicit the correct reaction immediately. CONCLUSION. With Hull and Guthrie we have now reached the ~ O ' Swhich , is precisely the period during which the competition between various schools gave way to their mutual influence and resulted in an 'integrating psychology'. This will be discussed in Chapter 8, but in the meantime we shall analyse and compare the paradigm-creating production of the behavioral psychologists.

The production of the behavioral psychologists INTRODUCTION. In this section we shall analyse and compare works written by representatives of the three above-mentioned microschools belonging to behavioral psychology's macroschool.

The production of the behavioral psychologists

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Pavlov is chosen as representing Russian Reflexology. We shall analyse his only systematic account of his theory, i.e. ,,Conditioned Reflexes" from 1927. All his other publications consist of 'collections' of lectures and articles in book form, and are therefore less suitable as representative of this paradigm. Watson is chosen as representing Classical Behaviorism. We shall analyse his last systematic account of this theory, i.e. the revised edition from 1930 of his ,,Behaviorism".Another possibility would have been his ,Qsychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist" (3rd edition, 1929), but for practical reasons we have chosen the former. Hull is chosen as representing so-called Neo-Behaviorism. We shall analyse his two major works, ,,Principles of Behavior" from 1943 and ,A Behavior System" from 1952; together these constitute the most complete and systematic account of Hull's theory. Since the three psychologists belong to the same macroschool - that of behavioral psychology - we shall undertake a 'parallel', comparative analysis of the production of all three psychologists. Thus, first we shall examine their meta-stratum, then their hypothetical and data strata and, finally, the theories as a whole (as in Chapter IV about classical experimental psychology). Since we have to deal with three theories and four books of altogether 1500 pages, it has been necessary to economize with the quotations.

The Behavioral Psychologists' Meta-Stratum ONTOLOGY. None of the three theories contains any clear formulations of their ontological meta-theses - amongst other reaons, because all of them belong to a period and a school in which the philosophy of science was largely 'anti-metaphysical', or positivist. But it is possible nevertheless to reconstruct the main features of the ontological meta-theses. 1. The conception of man. All three behavioral psychologists have a biological conception of man. No explicit formulations of this have been found in Pavlov, but the sub-title of the book, ,,An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex" indicates that it concerns the physiology of the brain. Furthermore, although dogs are used as experimental animals, the theory is assumed to be valid also for human beings (the final chapter deals with its human applications). In Watson the biological conception of man is conspicuous, amongst other things in the already quoted introduction to the behaviorist 'manifesto' (see p. 201 of this book), in which he says: ,,The Behaviorist, in his effort to get a

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unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute." There are even many explicit formulations in which the conception of man is a mechanist one (e.g. Watson, 1930, p. 268)l.In Hull too formulations of a biological conception of man are to be found (Hull, 1952, p.4)2. 2. The psycho-physical theory. The three behavioral psychologists are also very sparing with their formulations of psycho-physical theses. In Pavfov nothing of this nature has been found, but he has been criticized by Marxists in the 20's and 30s for 'passive materialism' as opposed to the Marxist 'active materialism'. According to the classification of psycho-physical theories contained in the Appendix to Chapter 2), Pavlov's psycho-physical theory most closely approximates 'epi-phenomenalism' (see Pavlov, 1927, p. 410)3. He maintains that 'the field of consciousness' is determined by brain processes (a 'sythesizing activity'); this must indicate epi-phenomenalism, since all 'interaction' in the form of feed-back from consciousness to the brain process is excluded in the rest of the book. In Watson too there are no explicit formulations of a psychophysical theory, but the discourse as a whole seems to presuppose a materialist theory (Watson, 1930, p. 2)4. Hull too provides no explicit formulations of his psychophysical theory, but some sections of his book appear to indicate the presupposition of a materialist theory (e.g. Hull, 1952, p. 347)s. Hull is more positive about introspection than Watson, however, and his use of neutral, hypothetical terms (which we shall examine later) could also be interpreted as pertaining to a neutral monistic theory. 3. Determinism. All three behavioral psychologists are more explicit in their treatment of this problem. Pavlov's standpoint is that of classical causal-determinism:it is clear that he regards the entire conception of a reflex as a neuro-physiologicalversion of causal determinism. 'Stimulus' and 'reaction' are neuro-physiological forms of 'cause' and 'effect'. Watson too explicitly expresses a classical causal-determinist view, as appears from the previously mentioned example of an almost mechanist conception of man (Watson, 1930, p. 183)6. Hull, as the last of the three, underwent a development, In his 'miniature theories' from the 30s he is still in principle causaldeterminist (Hull, 1932)7.


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Later - in Hull (1943) and Hull (1952) - he presupposes the existence of a random variation in the organism's processes and reactions (Hull, 1953, pp. 11-12)8. This view of the organism as manifesting random variations in its reactions indicates that in Hull causal determinism has been replaced by probabilism (see Appendix). We shall now return to the behavioral psychologists' philosophy of science. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. The three behavioral psychologists are more explicit in their formulations of metatheoretical theses. This applies particularly to Hull, whose book from 1943 has two chapters on respectively ,,The Nature of Scientific Theory" and ,,Introduction to an Objective Theory of Behavior". 1. Epistemology: 1.1. The origin of knowledge: Concerning this point, however, the three theories are not very explicit. Pavlov is clearly an empiricist. He is often quoted for a remark made in one of his important 'Wednesday seminars' that 'one must bow to Mr Fact'. His empiricism is so moderate, however, that he recognizes the importance of hypothetical explanations and is conscious of his own use of hypothetical terms. Watson emphasizes time and time again the importance of experiments,but his empiricism is also rather moderate (Watson, 1930, p. 19)9. Watson mentions the importance of hypotheses, but this is probably in the sense 'temporary explanations', not as 'transempirical explanations' (as we use 'hypotheses' here). But nevertheless it is perfectly permissible to call Watson's empiricism 'slightly moderated empiricism'. Hull's theory of knowledge resembles the logical empiricist (neo-positivist) version of rationalist empiricism. Hull is probably that American psychologist who most consciously tried to realize the epistemolgy (and metatheories)) of the logical empiricists. This is to be found especially in Chapter I, ,,The Nature of Scientific Theory", which constitutes a precise formulation of the epistemology and metatheory of the logical empiricists (see, for example, Hull, 1942, p. 14)10. Hull is at the same time that psychologist who has come closest to realizing the ideal of science to which we shall return later.

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1.2. The relation ofknowledge to reality: There are no explicit formulations of this relation in any of the three behavioral psychologists' works. But their discourse reveals implicitly that they are all critical realists (like most natural scientists).

2. Metatheory: The three behavioral psychologists all have an explicitly formulated nomothetic (natural scientific) ideal of science. Pavlov mentions in his historical introduction that Thorndike was the first to start an 'objective' (natural scientific) psychology. Although Pavlov started his research at the same time as Thorndike (1898), he had no knowledge of Thorndike's research until much later. According to Pavlov, however, American (behaviorist) psychology differs from his own in that Pavlov bases his 'objective'psychology on physiology (Pavlov, 1927, p. 4)11. Watson contains many explicit formulations of the nomothetic ideal of science (Watson, 1930, p. 11)12. Moreover, Watson's main criticism of classical ('introspective') psychology is that the introspective method constitutes an obstacle to its becoming a natural science. Hull's nomothetic ideal of science appears from the extract already quoted, but he emphasizes also in other places that many American psychologists regard the behavioral and social sciences as 'genuine natural sciences' (e.g. p. 400 in Hull, 1943)13. 3. Methodology: The three behavioral psychologists agree that experiments ought to constitute the preferred method in psychology. Pavlov argues in a section in ,,Lecture 11" on ,,Technical Methods" for his choice of secretorial reactions as dependent variables (Pavlov, 1927, pp. 1718)14. He writes that the secretory reaction permits extremely accurate measurement and does not so easily lead to anthropomorphic interpretations. Watson (1930) contains many detailed descriptions of experimental methods, but no fundamental arguments in favour of experiments or prescripts as far as methodology is concerned. However, in an earlier book, Watson's account of the experimental method is largely at the same time an account of the methodology of classical conditioning (Watson, 1929, p. 26)15. Hull contains no formulations of methodological prescripts or arguments for specific empirical methods. Hull describes many experiments, but his pre-


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scriptive (or normative) formulations apply exclusively to the creation of theories. The three behavioral psychologists are also (mostly) in agreement about employing exclusively behaviorist data-language. Pavlov largely used behavioral data supplemented with physiological data, but naturally no experience-data,since he experimented solely with dogs. Watson contains many explicit formulations prescribing or arguing for the use of a behaviorist data-language (Watson, 1930, p.2)16. He maintains that the object of psychological study is behavior, because 'consciousness' is not a precise or usable concept. This constitutes at the same time a repudiation of experience-data. It should be noted, however, that Watson defines 'behavior' so broadly that it also includes linguistic utterances (Watson, 1930, P. 6) 17. Watson rejects the criticism of Behaviorism as 'musclephysiology', and quite clearly introspective experience-dataare regarded as linguistic utterances (Watson, 1930, p. 15)1*. Hull has no arguments or prescripts for using solely behaviorist data-language. He simply takes it for granted that psychology - or at least his form of psychology - is behavioral psychology. It appears also from the titles of both books, ("Principles of Behavior" and ,,A Behavior System") that he has chosen to study behavior. Hull writes (in Hull, 1952, p. 345)19 that introspective reports can be used as temporary formulations, which may subsequently be replaced by symbolic constructions. The 'symbolic constructions' mentioned here is Hull's term for hypothetical terms, which he uses instead of a direct description of the experimental subject's consciousness. We shall return to this when discussing the hypothetical stratum, but prior to that we shall summarize what has been said about the meta-stratum. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY. The above analysis of the meta-stratum in the pro-

duction of the three behavioral psychologists can best be summarized in the form of a table, for this facilitates a comparison of the meta-theses contained in the three discourses (see Table 6.1). The above table illustrates that the three behavioral psychologists have the same conception of man, a slightly different (though related) psycho-physical theory, the same view of determinism (though with the exception that Hull's has become modernized), the same theory of knowledge (both as regards the origin of knowledge and its relation to reality), the same ideal of science, and the same methodology (as regards both methods and data-language).

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L

s

d


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Even though the meta-strata of the three behavioral psychologists are not completely identical, it must be reasonable to conclude that the three behavioral psychologists have a common meta-paradigm, and therefore belong to the same macroschool (according to the definitions employed here). We shall now compare the three hypothetical strata.

The behavioral psychologists' hypothetical strata INTRODUCTION. The structure of the hypothetical stratum in the three behav-

ioral psychologists differs to such an extent that it is more useful to analyse and reconstruct each one separately. We shall deal with them in chronological order: Pavlov, Watson and then Hull. PAVLOV'S HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. Pavlov's discourse is predominantly

descriptive. But among the descriptions of experiments and their results there are some scattered hypothetical explanations (as well as the metatheoretical considerations we have already dealt with). We shall deal with the hypothetical stratum 'from above downwards': the hypothesis-system as a whole followed by the hypotheses and the hypothetical terms. 1. The hypothesis-system. Pavlov's book contains no formalized hypothesissystem: neither a deductive system of hypotheses (or formulae) nor diagrams or more abstract models. Only the most primitive form of model is to be found: a verbally formulated analogy. With Sechenov as model, Pavlov employs a reflex model of the brain. This model explains the brain processes by analogy with the familiar spinal reflexes. Pavlov maintains (in Lecture XXII) that biological experiments can be performed on three levels: 1) biochemical, 2) cell-physiological, and 3) complex organ-physiological. The three levels might be regarded as an early form of system-theoreticalpluralism (see Chap. 2 and its Appendix). Pavlov himself chose to work on the organphysiologicallevel with the brain as ovemding organ. It is possible to work on every level with hypothetical explanatory concepts that refer to a lower level. The further explanation of these hypothetical variables is therefore referred to the lower system level. Thus, in the case of Pavlov, the ovemding hypothetical terms are 'excitation' and 'inhibition' (Pavlov, 1927, pp. 377-378)20. These fundamental processes are regarded as hypothetical variables requiring no further explanation or formal, explicit definition. They are defined merely implicitly through their use in explanations. Here we may briefly define them as follows: 'excitation' is a hypothetical

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term signifying an activating process in the brain cells, while 'inhibition' is a hypothetical term signifying an inhibitive process in the brain cells. Pavlov regards inhibition as a necessary protection of the brain cells against total fatigue. Accordingly, Pavlov regards sleep as a general inhibition of the entire brain, and hypnosis as an inhibition of the cerebral cortex. Other forms of inhibition are more limited in their dissemination. Apart from these two fundamental processes, Pavlov makes use of two other hypothetical processes in his explanations: 'irradiation' and 'concentration'. 'Irradiation' may be explicitly defined as a hypothetical term signifying a dissemination of excitation or inhibition throughout the cerebral cortex. Pavlov's account of the nature of irradiation is not very clear; he seems to imply that it does not necessarily follow the anatomically determined nerve-paths but can spread independently of these over the entire cerebral cortex. 'Concentration' may be explicitly defined as a hypothetical term signifying a limitation of excitation or inhibition to a well-defined area of the cerebral cortex. Pavlov explains with the help of these concepts both the formation of 'signal (conditioned) reflexes' and the extinction of established signal reflexes. He also explains the formation of conditioned reflexes of a higher order as constituting a generalization and differentiation (Pavlov, 1927, p, 385)21. It is as if Pavlov thinks that the most strongly excited area of the cerebral cortex 'attracts' excitation from less strongly excited areas (see Pavlov, 1927, p. 385)2*. The most strongly excited area will most frequently comprise the centres excited by the unconditioned reflex, since the latter is biologically important (related to the vital needs of the organism), whereas the weaker excitation is conditioned by a 'neutral' stimulus, which has to begin with only produced an orientation refex. Thus the conditioned association or connection is formed in the cerebral cortex between centres for the 'neutral' stimulus (which becomes the conditioned stimulus) and the centres for the uconditioned stimulus. We can reformulate the overriding hypotheses in Pavlov's theory as follows: HYPOTHESIS A: In simultaneous or coincident stimulation of two different

centres in the cerebral cortex a conditioned connection (CC) isformed between the centre for the conditioned stimulus (CS) and the centre for the unconditioned stimulus (UCS).


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The other important hypothesis can be reformulated as follows: HYPOTHESIS B: If the conditioned stimulus (CS) is repeated without being fol-

lowed by the unconditioned stimulus an inhibition of the conditioning connection (CC) takes place and no conditioned reaction (CR)results. In other words, reinforcement in the way of the repetition of concidences between CS and UCS are necessary for maintaining the conditioned connection (CC). Following this analysis of the explanatory system and the ovemding hypotheses we shall now analyse the subordinate hypotheses:

2. The hypotheses. On examining the two overriding hypotheses in Pavlov's theory more closely we find that they can be reformulated into a number of more specific hypotheses. According to the systematological taxonomy, the ovemding hypothesis is a combination of a 'histoncar hypothesis (about the development of the conditioned connection) and some functional hypotheses. The historical hypothesis may be reformulated into a number of functional hypotheses, each set fof which explains the process taking place at various stages of the formation (learning) of the conditioned reflex. In the following we shall undertake a systematic reconstruction of Pavlov's theory, while formulating the hypothetical process in each of four situations. 1) the frst experimental situation, 2) the second (or later) experimental situation, 3) a later experimental situation in which the reflex is well-established, and 4) an attempt at reinforcement. We shall also formulate hypotheses about 5 ) conditioning of a higher order, 6) generalization and 7) discrimination. Using the accustomed systematological notation, we shall also introduce a distinction between the hypothetical variable termed the 'conditioned connection' (CC) and the empirical variable termed the 'conditioned reaction' (CR). These two variables will replace the ambiguous term, 'conditioned reflex'. We then obtain the following set of hypotheses (see fig. 6.1): 1st situation: 1. S(CS)+H(CS) 2. H (CS) +H (OR) 3. H (OR) +R (OR)

4. S (UCS) +H (UCS)

5. H(UCS)+H(UR) 6. H(UR)+R(UR)

The above reconstruction shows that two hypothetical processes and two observable reactions - i.e. the orientation reaction (OR), which is provoked by the neutral (later conditioned) stimulus) and the unconditioned reaction (UR), e.g. salivary secretion, which is provoked by the unconditioned stimulus (UCS)

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- occur simultaneously or in rapid succession. With repetition, the original orientation reaction to the conditioned stimulus (indicated in the following with brackets) becomes limited. Additionally, the centre for the unconditioned stimulus (H(UCS)) 'attracts' excitation from the centre for the conditioned stimulus (H(CS)),and the second situation will contain the following set of hypotheses: 2nd situation: 1. S (CS) + H (CS) 2. H (CS) +H (OR) 3. H (CS) +H (UCS)

4. H(UCS)+H(UR) 5. [H (OR) + H (UR)] +R (0+ UR)

It may be seen from the above that the centre for the orientation reaction (H (OR)) is slightly excited, and this produces a reaction consisting of a combination of the orientation reaction and the original unconditioned reaction (indicated as R (0+ UR)). In the next situation the orientation reaction has almost completely disappeared, leaving only the so-called conditioned reaction (CR): 3rd situation: 1. S (CS) +H (CS) 2. H (CS) +H (UCS)

3. H(UCS)+H(UR) 4. H(UR)+R(CR)

The rapid, more automatic course of the process is indicated by the reaction signified by hypotheses 6 in the first situation to 4 in the third. A reconstruction of the ovemding hypothesis concerning the function of reinforcement may be added as follows: 4 . Reinforcement and extinction: 1. S (CS + UCS) + H (conditionedconnection) +R (CR) 2. S (CS + UCS) + H (inhibition of CC)

In the last case (hypothesis 4.2) it is assumed that CS has been used several times in succession without being followed by UCS, which leads to the extinction of CR (by the inhibition of CC). For the sake of completion a systematic reconstruction of Pavlov's theory should also contain a hypothesis about the learning of conditioned reflexes of a higher order:


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5. CR of a higher order: 1. s (CSB + CSA) +H (CSB) 2. H (CSB)+H (CSA) 3. H (CSA) + H (CRA) 4. H (CRd) +R (CRA) As may be seen from the above, it is assumed that a CC has already been established, so that CSA (e.g. an auditory stimulus) elicits a conditioned reaction (CRA).By repeating the coincidence between CSAand a new conditioned stimulus CSB (e.g. a visual stimulus) a new CC is formed, so that CSB elicits CRA. It is possible on the basis of this conditioned reflex of the 'second order' to form conditioned reflexes of the third or even higher order. Closely connected with conditioning of the higher order is simple generalization, in which new conditioned reflexes are formed spontaneously by irraditation from the conditioned stimulus employed to other conditioned stimuli from the same sensory field. If, for example, a metronome set at 100 beats per minute produces a conditioned reaction (e.g. salivary secretion), one set at 80 or 120 beats per minute will produce the same conditioned reaction. This may be formulated as follows:

6. Generalization: 1. S (CSA1) +H (CCA)+R (CRA) 2. S (CSm) +H (CCA) +R (CRA) But, as we know, experimental animals like dogs (and of course humans) can learn to differentiate between stimuli. If the sound of a metronome set at 100 beats per minute is increased in volume, while the sound of those ticking at other tempi (e.g. 90 or 110) is not increased in volume, these other reflexes created spontaneously by generalization - will rapidly become extinct. The explanation according to Pavlov's theory is that the spontaneous irradiation of excitation is followed by an inhibition of the same irradiation, whereby excitations are concentrated around the centre for the strengthened CS. Systematically reconstructed, this would appear as follows:

7 .Discrimination: 1. S (CSA1) +H (CCA)+R (CRA) 2. S (CSm) +H (CCA) +R (CRA) 3. S [(CSAI)+ (UCR)] +H (CCA) +R (CRd 4. S [(CSm) + (UCR)] + H (inhibition of CCA)

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The first two hypotheses shown above may be seen to be identical with the hypotheses undergoing generalization. They are followed by hypothesis No. 3, which indicates a strengthening of the original conditioned stimulus (CSAi), and by hypothesis No. 4,which indicates the extinction of other stimuli from the same sensory field (e.g. CSAZ). The last hypotheses we shall mention are connected with Pavlov's introduction of a division into types. His experiments with dogs soon led him to take regard of individual differences in their nervous systems, These differences led initially to a broad classification of the nervous systems into respectively 'strong' and 'weak' types, the difference being explained as resulting from an interplay between excitation and inhibition. These latter are extreme types and many intermediate types are to be found. Practically speaking, the types may be divided into: 1) extremely strong (excitative) 2) moderately strong (excitative) 3) moderately weak (inhibitive) 4) extremely weak (inhibitive)

Pavlov compared this division into four types with the classical doctrine ofthe four temperaments, the sanguine temperament corresponding to type 1). the choleric to type 2), the phlegmatic to type 3 ) and the melancholic to type 4). Pavlov elaborated his type theory further in later works and, following the 'Pavlovization' in 1950, it has been used considerably by Soviet and East European psychologists . Even the Western psychologist H.J. Eysenck was inspired by Pavlov's type theory to construct a neuropsychological theory about ,,Introversion contra Extraversion" (see Eysenck, 1967). Pavlov's type theory can be incorporated in the same systematic reconstruction we have undertaken in previous cases as follows: A 'type' consists of a set of hypothetical variables which, in the form of innate dispositions, affects the functions of excitation and inhibition. Thus, type differences will be incorporated into the theory's hypotheses by inserting in all the hypotheses the interaction between these hypothetical structures and the hypothetical processes. We can indicate this here by elaborating the concept of type in a reconstructed formulation of the two ovemding hypotheses, where interaction is symbolized by an 'x I:


1. situation

2. situation

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Pavlovs Theory

\

Fig. 6.1.a. Graphical model of Pavlow’s theory (1st and 2nd experimentul situation).

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3. situation

Pavlovs Theory

4. rltuation Reinfwcement

Fig. 6.1.b. Graphical model of Pavlow's theory (3rd and 4th experimental situation).


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Hypothesis A. S (CS + UCS) -+ H [(CC) x (type)] -+ R (CR) Hypothesis B: S (CS t UCS) +H [(CC) x (type)] Correspondingly, the concept of type should be inserted in all the other reformulated hypotheses as a hypothetic variable (structure) that interacts with the other hypothetical variables (processes). We cannot undertake this here, however, through lack of space, but the above example should presumably give us a good idea of the complexity of Pavlov's theory. Before we go further we shall summarize Pavlov's hypothesis with the aid of a diagram (see Fig. 6.1). We shall conclude t h s section about Pavlov's hypotheses with the customary class@cation according to the systematological taxonomy (see Appendix). First we must remember that the kistorical hypotheses are already converted intofunctional hypotheses. These may be classified into theoretical and empirical hypotheses (see Appendix), subdividing each S-H-R-hypothesis as usual into a S-H-hypothesis (denoted by an 'a') and a H-R-hypothesis (denoted by a 'b). The numbers of the hypotheses refer to the subdivision employed, e.g. hypotheses about 'discrimination' being numbered 7.1 - 7.4. 1. Theoretical (H-H-) hypotheses: 1.2; 1.5; 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 3.2; 3.3; 5.2; 5.3 = 9 2. Empirical hypotheses: 2.1. S-H-hypotheses: A.a; B; 1.1; 1.4; 2.1; 3.1; 4.la; 4.2; 5.1; 6.la; 6.2a; 7.la; 7.2a; 7.3a; 7.4 = 15 2.2. H-R-hypotheses: Ab; 1.3; 1.6; 2.5; 3.4; 4.lb; 5.4; 6.lb; 6.2b; 7.lb; 7.2b; 7.3b = 12 Following this analysis and reconstruction of Pavlov's hypotheses we shall now proceed with an analysis of the hypothetical terms employed.

3. Hypothetical terms: As appears from the previous section, the most important hypothetical terms are 'Excitation', 'Inhibition', 'Irradiation' and 'Concentration', as well as 'Association' (which in the previous reconstruction we called 'Conditioned Connection' after Hilgard and Bower, 1966) and 'Type'. Clearly these hypothetical terms must be classified as Ho-terms: hypothetical terms with an organismic (physiological) reference. Perhaps there is more reason to emphasize that Pavlov's explanatory concepts are hypothetical

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(transempirical) and not empirical (physiological)variables, and that Pavlov is conscious of employing in his explanations some hypothetical variables which he 'borrows' from a lower system level. The classification of the hypothetical variables according to existential form and function is illustrated by the following classification scheme:

This classification concludes the analysis and reconstruction of Pavlov's hypothetical stratum. Before turning to his data-stratum, we shall examine the hypothetical strata in Watson's and Hull's theories. WATSON'S HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. In the first place we have to ask ourselves whether there at all exists a set of hypotheses in Watson's theory, because Watson's empiricism might lead us to expect that his theory was built up solely of general data-theses. A more detailed metatheoretical analysis reveals, however, that this is not the case. Watson's theory contains a number of hypotheses and hypothetical terms, which we shall analyse in the following after first having dealt with the hypothesis system.

1. The hypothesis system. Like Pavlov, Watson has no formalized hypothesis system, neither deductive system nor abstract models. The nearest approach to


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this is a number of diagrams concerning thought and personality. The latter is regarded as a whole, which is composed of certain elements, i.e. 'habits' ('habit systems'), which are themselves built up of elements, i.e. conditioned reflexes. Watson procedes in his text from elements to the whole, but to facilitate a comparison with other behavioral psychologists this reconstruction will procede from the whole to the elements. Personality is treated according to Watson's mode of description in the final chapter. Here he defines the concept as 'the end product of habit systems.' (Watson, 1930, p. 27)23. In an accompanying diagram (Fig. 23, p. 275) he describes the development of personality from birth to adulthood. He shows in a cross-section what a randomly selected person 'consists of, i.e. a number of co-ordinate habit systems, which in the case in question consist of: shoemaking (his profession), a religious habit system, a national habit system, a marital habit system, a parental habit system, an arithmetical habit system, general information, an emotional habit system (especially fear), a personal habit system (clothes, 'maners', etc) and leisure habits. As may be seen from the above, there is no question of the personality entering into a hierarchically organized system of habit systems, but rather into an unstructured, co-ordinate organization of habits. This can be reformulated into an ovemding hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS A: The human personality is a system of co-ordinate habit systems resultingfrom a development (particularly learning processes).

To judge from this hypothesis about 'personality' - and its implicit definition, the latter appears to be a product of learning processes, precisely in the same way as its elements, i.e. habit systems. Using the systematological notation, Hypothesis A can be stated as follows:

Hypothesis A: H [Habit system1 + Habit system 2 ... + Habit system nl + H [(Personality)] The central concept in Watson's theory, 'habit system', is represented as a whole consisting of certain elements, i.e. conditioned reflexes (Watson, 1930, p. 207)24. Watson maintains that all behavior, apart from some simple innate reflexes, is a product of learning (conditioning, habit formation). Apparently innate behavior like 'instincts' is also a product of learning, which merely starts at a very early age (Watson, 1930, p. lOO)25. Watson does not go into much detail about the organization of habit systems. But, in connection with verbal habits, he presents 'the old standard habit

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diagram' (Fig. 20, p. 258), which shows habit formation as being the establishment of a 'chain' of conditioned reflexes in which kinaesthetic stimuli from reacting muscles turn into conditioned stimuli for the next reaction. Thus, we can summarize and formulate the latter in a second overriding hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS B : Habit systems are systems ('chains') of conditioned reflexes

that have been integrated through learning into a whole. Learning (conditioning and habit formation) starts before birth and continues throughout the whole of life. Using the systematologicalnotation:

Hypothesis B: H [conditioned reflex1 + conditioned reflex2 ... + conditioned reflex,] + H (habit system) Hypothesis B shows that the basic element in Watson's theory consists of conditioned reflexes. Watson uses this term chiefly descriptively about observable behavior, since he uses 'reflex' as a synonym for 'reaction' or 'response'. But he also uses the term 'conditioned reflex' hypothetically when referring to the hypothetical structure presumed to exist in the central nervous system, though without, like Pavlov, going into further detail. We shall therefore reconstruct this part of Watson's discourse into a third overriding hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS C: Certain reflex structures are to be found in humans and animals already at birth (in the central nervous system). With the activation of specific unconditioneii stimuli these structures can give rise to innate unconditioned reflexes, which, as the result of conditioning, can be changed into conditioned refex structures. These latter can thereafter be activated by new, conditioned stimuli, thus giving rise to conditioned reactions. Using the systematologicalnotation:

Hypothesis C: 1. S (UCS) + H (innatereflex structures) + R (UR) 2. S (CS + UCS) + H (transformation of reflex structures) + R (VR) 3. S (CS)-) H (conditioned reflex structures) + R (CR) We shall now examine the more specific hypotheses in Watson's theory:


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2. The hypotheses. According to Watson's theory human behavior can be classified into three categories of 'habits': 2.1. Manual habits (see Chapter IX, Watson, 1930). These comprise not merely manual skills in the restricted sense (like grasping an objects with the hand and manipulating it in various ways), but also movements of the arms and legs and the body as a whole. Thus Watson regards motion as the result of learning. Later he deals with more complicated skills such as cycling or driving a car, as well as the professional skills acquired by some form of professional training or education. Watson's discourse contains no special hypotheses about manual habits (apart from the overriding hypotheses B and C). But it should be noted that the word habit is used in two different senses. The term 'habit' is applied both to observed habit-like behavior and to the hypothetical structure called the 'habit system' or 'organization'. This can be reformulated as a hypothesis: I ST HYPOTHESIS: Manual, habit-like behavior is controlled by an acquired, manual habit structure (chain reflex) which is activated by a situation's relevant stimuli.

Using the sytematological notation: Zst

hypothesis: S (situation) + H (manual habit structure) + R (manual habitlike behavior)

2.2. Emotional habits are also called 'visceral habits', in order to stress which parts of the organism are especially significant in this form of reaction. Watson presents his theory of emotions in two chapters (Chapters VII and VIII). First he puts forward the thesis that there are three innate emotional reactions: 'fear', 'rage' and 'love' (Watson, 1930, p. 152)*6. These are the only reactions, apart from some other simple, innate reflexes, that Watson accepts as being 'innate' and not acquired by learning. As mentioned, in Chapters V and VI he in fact argues against the existence of innate 'instincts'. The actual specification as to which stimuli elicit these reactions together with a detailed description of the reactions themselves belong to the data-stratum. It should be noted that here too Watson uses the terms 'emotion', 'fear', 'rage' and 'love' in two senses: to denote both observable emotional behavior (including visceral reactions, which

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are in principle observable) and the hypothetical, emotional structure that is activated by the relevant stimuli. This hypothetical structure may either be innate or result from conditioning, as Watson has shown in his classical experiments, which will be mentioned in connection with the data-stratum. We can reformulate this into two hypotheses: 2 N D HYPOTHESIS:In humans certain hypothetical, emotional structures

{'dispositions') are present porn birth; these m y be activated by spec@c, unconditioned stimuli, thereby causing some specific, unconditioned emotional reactions of which visceral reactions alwaysform an essential part. Using the systematologicalnotation:

2nd hypothesis: S (UCS) + H (emotional structure) + R (visceral UCR) There is a corresponding hypothesis about conditioned emotions: 3RD HYPOTHESIS: Conditioning can give rise to conditioned, emotional structures enabling new conditioned stimuli to produce emotional {visceral) reactions. Using the systematologicalnotation:

3rd hypothesis: 1. S (CS + UCS) -+ H (emotionialstructure) -+ R (visceral Urn) 2. S (CS) + H (emotional,conditioned structure) +R (visceral CR) Watson has himself contributed to the research in this field with his classical experiments with Little Albert, to which we shall return when dealing with the data-stratum. But Watson has also put forward some original hypotheses about thought, which belongs to the next category of habits. 2.3. Verbal habits are dealt with in two chapters (Chapters IX and X), which also include Watson's theory about thought. He introduces this theory by asserting that what psychologists have hitherto called thought is nothing other than the individual's talking to himself (Watson, 1930, pp. 238 & 239)27. In other words, thought is defined as 'internal {or implicit) speech'. It appears from the text that Watson is himself aware that this is in fact a hypothesis (theory).

The production of the behavioralpsychologists

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Later Watson takes up the problem of whether, for example, deaf mutes can 'think' without 'implicit' (subvocal) speech. He solves this problem by postulating that we can think with the whole of our body (Watson, 1930, p. 266)28. Watson accompanies this account with a series of diagrams, and on the basis of both text and diagrams we can formulate Watson's theory of thought as follows: 4TH HYPOTHESIS: The problem situations (i.e. situations with stimuli that can-

not be altered by an already appropriated conditioned reaction or habitual action) activate verbal as well as manual and visceral habit systems. These three sets of habit systems function simultaneously - though are able to dominate by turn until the problem situation is transformed. Usually the activity concludes with a verbal reaction. Using the systematological notation:

4th hypothesis: S (problem) + H (the organism's habit systems) + R (successive and /or simultaneous verbal, manual and visceral reactions). After this systematic reconstruction of Watson's theory we shall undertake the usual classification in accordance with the sytematological taxonomy (see Appendix). But prior to this the theory's hypotheses will be reconstructed in the form of a diagram (see Fig. 6.2). It is characteristic of Watson's hypotheses - and to some extent of Pavlov's - that they are combinations of historical and functional hypotheses: they are mostly concerned with the functional relations between 1) independent, 2) hypothetical and 3) dependent variables, but one effect of these functional relations is that the implicated hypothetical structures ('reflexes', 'habits', etc.) may alter within a relatively short time (from day to day), and this alteration is relatively permanent. If 'reinforced' at suitable intervals, this structure may indeed remain permanent. It is in fact characteristic of learning processes (unlike maturation processes), that alterations in hypothetical structures are conditioned by the organism's reactions to the concrete situation. This is also why we have been able to reformulate both Pavlov's and Watson's hypotheses into functional hypotheses. These may be further subdivided into theoretical and empirical hypotheses as follows:

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ReJexology and classical behaviorism

Fig. 6.2 Graphical model of Watson3 theory.

1. Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): A; B = 2 2. Empicial hypotheses: 2.1. S-H hypotheses: Cla; C2a; C3a; la; 2a; 3.la; 3.2a; 4a = 8 2.2. H-R hypotheses: Clb; C2b; C3b; lb; 2b; 3.lb; 3.2b; 4b = 8


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3. Hypothetical terms. Finally, we shall classify Watson's hypothetical terms in accordance with the systematological taxonomy (see Appendix). It is slightly more difficult to classify Watson's hypothetical terms according to their ontological reference than in the case of Pavlov, because Watson does not refer so frequently as Pavlov to the physiology of the central nervous system. Although Watson may have had a more physiological approach in his previous books, including ,,Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist" (3rd edition, 1929), this is clearly less so in his ,,Behaviorism" (possibly because it is a more popular work). But even though Watson refers less frequently to the central nervous system and does not very often explain psychological phenomena in terms of central structures and processes, he is clearly thinking in physiological concepts. This appears explicitly from his mode of designating the various habits according to the organs chiefly implicated, i.e. manual habits, visceral (= emotional) habits and 'laryngeal' (= verbal) habits. So we shall nevertheless conclude these deliberations by classifying Watson's hypothetical terms as Ho-terms, i.e. hypothetical terms with an organismic reference. The classification of the hypothetical variables according to existential form and function is represented in the following diagram:

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From the paradigm-creator of Classical Behaviorism we shall now turn to one of the chief exponents of Neo-Behaviorism. HULLS HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. In this section we shall undertake a metatheoretical analysis and reconstruction of the hypothetical stratum in Hull's chief works: ,,Principles of Behavior" (1943) and ,,A Behavior System" (1952). Here too we shall commence with the whole.

1. The hypothesis system. As a psychological hypothesis system, Hull's is the mostformally developed of the three, and at the same time fairly generally applicable. The two works mentioned above cover the entire spectrum of general psychology, Thus, the subtitle of ,,A Behavior System" is ,,An introduction to a behavior theory concerning the individual organism". A third work, planned but never written, was to deal with social behavior. The hypothesis system's high degree of formal development is revealed by its being precisely formulated in the nature of a deductive system of hypotheses, and frequently as mathematical equations. Thus Hull's theory is both systematic and precise, and thereby the closest towards realizing the logical empirism's ideal of science. In the most recent edition (Hull, 1952) the deductive hypothesis system consists of:

17 'postulates' (i.e. overriding hypotheses) 15 'corollaries' (i.e. secondary hypotheses) 133 'theorems' (i.e. derived hypotheses or data-theses). Of these hypotheses (and data-theses), some consist of two or more co-ordinate theses; thus there are in all '178 formal theoretical propositions' (Hull, 1952, p. 35 1). Even though the hypothesis system constitutes a deductive system, no formal, logical 'proof is to be found that the secondary hypotheses and theorems are derived with 'logical necessity' from the 17 postulates. A formal proof of this kind is to be found only in the last of Hull's series of 'miniature systems' (A Mathematico-DeductiveTheory of Rote Learning, 1940) which constituted the forerunners of his general system (1943). This work contained the 17 postulates and a number of 'corollaries', and these were revised several times before


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the publication of the final (1952) edition, to which the 133 theorems were also added. Since we have here an extremely systematic and precise theory, it should scarcely be necessary to undertake the customary systematic reconstruction, being sufficient to reproduce Hull's postulates, corollaries and theorems. But in order to facilitate comparison with other theories we have chosen the following procedure: In this section we shall present (and reformulate) the two most important hypotheses, and in the next section we shall present the most important of the remaining hypotheses, all of which will be taken from Hull (1952). We shall not, for lack of space, quote the 133 theorems. The most important hypothesis among Hull's 17 postulates formulates the functional relation between the most important hypothetical variables determining acquired behavior. These hypothetical variables together produce the hypothetical variable that directly determines behavior. In h s chief works Hull calls this variable 'reaction potential', but in the original miniature systems Hull employs the term 'excitatory potential' (having Pavlov's most important hypothetical term in mind). Thus Hull expresses this symbolically as 'sER', where 'E' stands for 'excitatory potential' and the associated 'S' and 'R' are there to remind his readers that all hypothetical variables are 'intervening variables' between stimuli and reactions. Hull did not himself adhere to this rule and did not apply S and R to all symbols for hypothetical terms. Therefore in the following we shall include the 'index letters' ( S and R) in the quotations, though not (always) in the reformulations, as is also the case with Hull's closest colleague, Kenneth W. Spence. The reaction potentiality is defined implicitly in Hull's ,,Postulate VIII" (Hull, 1952, p. 7)29. Here we shall reformulate this postulate as the first overriding hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS A: Acquired behavior is at a given stage of the learning process

determined by an excitation potentiality ( E ) , which, under constant conditioning, is a product of the following synergic variables: ( I ) Drive (D), which operates during the learning process, ( 2 ) the dynamism of the signaling stimulus trace (V),(3)the incentive reinforcement (K), and ( 4 ) the strength of the habit (sHR), such that $R = D x V x K x ~ H R . Using the systematological notation:

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Hypothesis A: H (D x V x K x sHR) +H (sEd The implicated hypothetical variable will be defined in more detail in connection with the following hypotheses. Prior to this, however, we shall formulate an overriding hypothesis about 'innate' behavior, which forms together with acquired behavior the main categories of behavior. This latter is ,,Postulate I" (see Hull, 1952, p. 3 3 0 . This may be reformulated as the second overriding hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS B: Organisms are in possession at birth of some receptoreffector connections (sUR),which, in the presence of both stimulation ( S ) and drive (D), have the possibility of producing a hierarchy of reactions, which either singly or in combination are more likely to fuljil a need than would be the case with a random selection of reactions produced as the result of other combinations of stimuli and drives.

Using the systematologicalnotation:

Hypothesis B: S (stimuli) + H (Dx SUR)-+ R (hierarchy of reactions) We shall now proceed to the other postulates and corollaries:

2. The hypotheses. From the remaining hypotheses in Hull's system we shall only include in the systematic reconstruction those we consider as most representative of the system as a whole. For lack of space, we shall not quote the postulates and corollaries, for which the reader should refer to Hull (1952) p. 574. We shall suffice by quoting them indirectly and then reformulating them in the systematological notation: As appears from the two overriding hypotheses, all behavior is either innate or acquired. According to Hull's theory the latter category is by far the most important. The learning process follows Thorndike's 'law of effect', which Hull has reformulated in Postulate 111. We shall reproduce the latter here as: IST HYPOTHESIS:Primary reinforcement. ,,When an effector-activity ( R ) is closely connected with a stimulus impulse ( S ) (or the 'trace' of a stimulus) and


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this connection is closely connected with a rapid reduction of motivational stimuli-impulses, this will result in the increased possibility ( P ) of the stimulus producing this reaction". Using the systematological notation:

1st Hypothesis: Primary reinforcement. 1.1. S (stimulus A) + H (motivation) + R (reaction A) 1.2. S (feedback from RA) +H (reduced motivation) 1.3. H (reduced motivation) -+ H (trace of SA produces increased P for

Rd) Closely associated with this hypothesis about primary reinforcement is one concerning secondary reinforcement formulated as Corollary I1 (see Hull, 1952). This we shall reproduce as follows: 2ND HYPOTHESIS: Secondary reinforcement: I f a stimulation repeatedly oc-

curs in connection with a primary or secondary reinforcement, this stimulation will acquire a tendency to operate as a reinforcement. Using the systematological notation:

2nd Hypothesis: Secondary reinforcement. 2.1. S (UCS) + H (motivation) +RA 2.2. S (feedback from RA) + H (reduced motivation) 2.3. H (reduced motivation) + H (increased P for RA) 2.4. S (CS + UCS) +H (reduced motivation) 2.5. S (CS) + H (reduced motivation) + H (increased P for RA) Following these two hypothese about primary and secondary reinforcement it is logical to reformulate the hypothesis about habit formation formulated as ,,Postulate IV" in Hull's system (see Hull, 1952). This may be reproduced freely as follows: 3RD HYPOTHESIS: The Law of Habit Formation (sHR): If reinforcements follow upon one another at regular intervals, where everything else remains constant, a habit ( H ) will be formed. The strength of this habit will increase as a positive growth function, which is dependent on the number (N)of reinforced learning attempts, such that H = I-10~o.0305N.

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Using the systematological notation: 3rd Hypothesis: Habit formation ( ~ H R )S: (number of reinforcements) + H (increase in habit strength)

The formulation of this hypothesis has undergone changes as Hull's system has developed in the course of time. In Hull (1943) it was formulated as Postulate 4 (p. 178). Here several other factors were included over and above the number of reinforcements assumed to have an effect on the habit strength: 1) The amount of need fulfilment. 2) The temporal relation between the reinforcement and the habit reaction, since any delay in the reinforcement decreases its effect. 3) The presence of the conditioned stimulus in relation to the reaction.

Later Hull changed the hypothesis system so that only N was direcly determinant for the habit formation, whereas the other variables were without direct effect on the habit formation itself, having instead an effect on the motivation variable, to which we shall return in the next hypotheses. As it appears in the overriding hypothesis A, the excitatory potential is determined by a product (indicated by a multiplication sign) of several synergent variables. Of these, habit strength has been defined implicitly in the 3rd Hypothesis. We shall proceed by defining another important variable, drive (D), which is implicitly defined in Postulate V (see Hull, 1952). However, this postulate has been formulated so as almost exclusively to concern the hunger-drive, because that is the most frequent drive used in learning experiments on animals, and it is possible here to formulate the functional relations quantitatively. Here we shall therefore undertake a reformulation, which consists of a more generally applicable formulation of a hypothesis about primary motivation (on the other hand, we shall have to refrain from precise, quantitative formulations of functional relations). The reformulation seeks as far as possible to cover the more liberal use of motivation hypotheses as found in Hull's colleagues (e.g. K.W. Spence, N.E. Miller, J. Dollard, etc.) We obtain, then, the following hypothesis:


235

4TH HYPOTHESIS: Primary Motivation: Primary motivation consists of a cen-

tral drive state ( D ) , which is conditioned by an afferent driveimpulse. The drive-impulse may either be determined by a peripheral state of need in the organism or by an external drive-stimulus, which may be conditioned or unconditioned. Using the systematological notation:

4th Hypothesis: Primary Motivation. 4.1. S (need) + H (drive-impulse) H (Drive) 4.2. S (drive-stimuli) + H (drive-impulse) + H (Drive) Closely associated with primary motivation is of course secondary motivation. This form of motivation is dealt with in Hull's hypothesis system as Corollary I (see Hull, 1952). We shall reformulate it here as a hypothesis about secondary motivation:

5TH HYPOTHESIS: Secondary Motivation. If a neutral stimulus regularly appears to be associated with a primary motivation, the neutral stimulus will acquire a motivational effect (become a conditioned drive-stimulus). Using the systematological notation:

5th Hypothesis: Secondary Motivation. 5.1. S (neutral + Sd/need) + H (Drive) 5.2. S ('neutral' (conditioned)) + (Drive) Here our reformulation of Hull's hypothesis about secondary motivation has been inspired by Hilgard's extremely thorough analysis (see Hilgard, 2nd edition, 1956). The hypotheses about primary and secondary motivation formulated above have dealt especially with the origin of motivation. But Hull's system also includes hypotheses about the strength of the motivation. He has essentially two hypotheses, one of which is included in the above-mentioned ,,Postulate V",and deals with drive strength as a function of need strength. But, as mentioned, the formulation of the hypothesis is closely connected with the hungerdrive. Here we shall suffice with a generalized reformulation as follows:

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6TH HYPOTHESIS: Strength of the Drive. The strength of the central drive-state

is dependent on the strength of the peripheral need or the strength of the peripheral drive-stimulus. Using the systematological notation:

6th Hypothesis: Drive-Strength. S (strength of need) + H (strength of drive-impulse) + H (strength of drive-state) However, Hull has also formulated the dependency of motivation on external stimuli as a special independent hypothetical variable, 'incentive motivation'. In the ovemding Hypothesis A (= Postulate VIII) incentive motivation is symbolized with the letter ' K (after K.W. Spence, who was especially important for this part of Hull's theory). 'Incentive motivation' is also dealt with in ,,Postulate VII" (see Hull, 1952). This deals with the dependence of 'incentive motivation' on the type of reward used - in particular food. We shall suffice here with a reformulation of the general part of the hypothesis.

7TH HYPOTHESIS: Incentive Motivation. Incentive motivation is a central motivation variable, which is dependent on the type of reward used ('reinforcer') its quantity as well as its quality. Using the systematic notation:

7th Hypothesis: Incentive Motivation. S (reward) + H (incentive motivation) It signifies a lack of continuity in Hull's hypothetical system that 'incentive motivation' is not placed in direct relation to secondary motivation and drivestimuli. This may be due to the relatively late appearance of this concept in his book ,,A Behavior System", which was completed shortly before his death (without his having managed to read the proofs). We now lack only one of the hypothetical variables entering into the production of the excitatory potential, i.e. the 'stimulus dynamics' (see Hypothesis A). This variable is defined in ,,Postulate VI" (see Hull, 1952), which we shall reformulate as follows:


237

8TH HYPOTHHESIS:The Dynamics of the Stimulus-Instensity. The 'dynamics of the stimulus-intensity' is a central variable that enters into the determination of the excitatory potential. The stimulus-intensity dynamics (V) is determined by the peripheral stimulus-intensity in accordance with the following formula: V - 1-10 -0.44 t o g s . Using the systematological notation:

8th Hypothesis: Stimulus-Intensity's Dynamics. S (intensity) + H (Stimulus Dynamics) We have now reformulated all the hypotheses about the hypothetical variables entering into the determination of the excitatory potential. Among the remaining hypothetical variables in Hull's system we shall limit ourselves to stressing a variable - a kind of negative motivation - termed the 'inhibitory potential', which, together with corollaries IX, X and XI, is contained in ,,Postulate IX" (see Hull, 1952). We shall reformulate them here as follows:

( R ) occurs it leaves behind it in the organism a central, negative motivational state, the 'inhibitory potential' (IR), which reduces the excitatory potential. This inhibitory potential is dependent on the amount of work in each reaction and the number of reactions. In time the inhibitory potential disappears spontaneously, provided there occurs no conditioning of the inhibitory potential (conditioned inhibition, SIR) in relation to one of the situation's stimuli. 9TH HYPOTHESIS: Inhibitory Potential. Every time a reaction

Using the sytematological notation:

9th Hypothesis: Inhibitory Potential (IR) 9.1. S (feedback from R) + H (inhibitory potential, IR) 9.2. H (IR) + H (reduction of excitatory potential) 9.3. S (amount of work in R) + H (IR) 9.4. S (number of R) +H (IR) 9.5. S (time) + H (reduction of IR) 9.6. S (neutral + feedback from R) + H (IR) 9.7. S (neutral) + H (SIR) Finally we shall reformulate the hypotheses that relate the excitatory potential functionally with the behavior. In ,,Postulates XIV, XV and XVI" (see Hull,

238


1952)Hull formulates the relations as three measurable aspects of the behavior. We shall reformulate them as follows: lOTH HYPOTHESIS: Behavior Variable (R). The excitatory potential determines the following measurable aspects of the behavior: I ) the latent period str (the interval between S and the beginning of R), 2) the number of reactions unaccompanied by reinforcement and 3) the amplitude (A) of the galvanic skin reflex (GSR) in accordance with the following formulae: E = 2.845 ( ~ t r ) ' ' . ~ ~ ~ E = 0.02492 A E = 4.0 (1 - 10 -'.O1 lo") + 0.46 (with total reinforcement) E = 0.1225 X 10 -0.0647n)+ 2.1 14 (with distributed reinforcement)

Using the systematologicalnotation: 10th Hypothesis: Behavior Variable ( R ) 10.1. H (excitatory potential (E)) + R (latent period) 10.2. H (E) + R (amplitude) 10.3. H (E) + R (number of reactions without reinforcement)

With these hypotheses we have reformulated the most important postulates and corollaries in Hull's system. The remainder would mostly appear to be of 'technical' importance. Before classifying the hypothesis, we shall summarize the contents of the hypotheses diagrammatically (see Fig. 6.3.). The systematological classification of Hull's hypotheses makes it clear that he has formulated all his hypotheses asfunctional hypotheses. The hypotheses that deal with learning processes - and thereby with development over a certain period of time - are also formulated as functional hypotheses. Hull has always done what we, in the previous sections, have done with Pavlov's and Watson's hypotheses, converting historical hypotheses into functional hypotheses. We can therefore proceed with the second classification of hypotheses into theoretical and empirical hypotheses. 1. Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): A; 1.3; 2.3; 2.5b; 4.lb; 4.2b; 6.b; 9.2: = 8


Fig.6.3 Graphical model of HullS theory. 2. Ernpiristic hypotheses 2. 2.1. S-H-hypotheses: B.a; 1.la; 1.2.; 2.la; 2.2; 2.4; 2.5a; 3; 4.la; 4.2a; 5.1; 5.2; 6a; 7; 8; 9.1; 9.3; 9.4; 9.5; 9.6; 9.7 = 21 2.2. H-R-hypotheses: Bb; 1.lb; 2.lb; 10.1; 10.2; 10.3 = 6

239

240


After this final classification of the hypotheses we shall proceed with the next stage in the mettheoretical analysis. 3. Hypothetical terms. Hull has been directly inspired by E.C. Tolman to use 'intervening variables', which he introduces in Hull, 1943, pp. 21-22. The conclusion of this discussion is accompanied by a single diagram (Fig. on p. 22 of Hull, 1943)31, which can be reproduced as follows: A - f + (X)- f + B Thus it is clear that Hull argues for the use of 'intervening variables', as long as they are empirically 'anchored'. He also uses other terms like 'hypothetical constructs', 'symbolic constructs' and 'theoretical constructs'. These are introduced and used in such a way that according to our systematological classification they should be regarded as hypothetical terms with neutral ontological reference, i.e. they are ffc-termsreferring to constructions. These terms are 'neutral' as regards 'surplus meaning', many of them lacking any other meaning than what they acquire by way of the implicit definition given of their functional relation. Hull has furthermore sought to avoid surplus meaning by using neutral symbols, so these are probably the nearest approach to 'inter-


241

vening variables' in the restrictive sense meaning hypothetical variables without surplus meaning. But in the systematological taxonomy we have classed them together with terms with neutral surplus meaning. With or without surplus meaning, they are clearly constructions. The two other classifictions according to existential form and function are shown in the table above. We have hereby completed the metatheoretical analysis of Hull's hypothetical stratum and shall now return to the data-stratum in all three theories.

The B e ha v i ora I Psycho I og i sts' Data -Strata PAVLOV'S DATA-STRATUM. A relatively large part of the discourse in Pavlov

(1927) belongs to the data-stratum. In accordance with the systematological taxonomy (see Appendix) we shall start with:

I . The abstract data-stratum. This includes especially general datatheses about 'empirical laws' (S-Rand R-Rrelations). In Pavlov's case the most important general data-theses are the following: 1. 'The Law of Coincidence': According to Pavlov, the coincidence (or contiguity) between conditioned stimulus CS and unconditioned stimulus UCS is the necessary condition for the formation of a conditioned reaction (CR), 1.e.:

(CS+ UCS)+CR Pavlov undertook countless experiments concerning the temporal relation between CS and UCS,but that is beyond the scope of this book. It is worth mentioning, however, that the optimal interval between CS and UCS is about a half second. 2. The Law of Reinforcement': According to Pavlov, it is a necessary condition for the maintainance of a conditioned connection (CC)and thereby the occurrence of a conditioned reaction (CR)that CS is followed at intervals by UCS,i.e.:

cs (+ UCS)+CR where the brackets indicate that UCS does not necessarily follow after CS,but only occasionally. Pavlov calls this presentation of UCS reinforcement, which in his theory is therefore an abstract descriptive term (as opposed to Thorndike's and Hull's use of the term 'reinforcment' concerning a hypotheti-

RefIexology and classical behaviorism

242

cal variable, namely 'motivational reduction'). We have previously gone into Pavlov's explanation of 'extinction' as resulting from inhibition. 3. The Law of Generalization: According to Pavlov there occurs an automatic (spontaneous, natural) dissemination or generalization of CS along the stimulus-dimension to which CS belongs. We have discussed this previously under the formulation of hypotheses, but it can be formulated as a general datathesis as follows:

CSI +cR

cs2 +cR cs3 +cR where CS1-3 belong to the same stimulus-dimension(e.g. metronome beats in different tempi or 'round figures' like circles and elipses). On the other hand, the opposite process, discrimination, demands the formulation of hypotheses, because discrimination results from an interplay between the irradiation (of the excitation) and its concentration due to an opposing inhibition. It is these discrimination experiments that make it possible to make use of Pavlov's theory and methods when determining how well animals and infants perceive. Since they cannot yet talk they are obliged to indicate their sensory discrimination by way of another acquired reaction: discrimination. For Pavlov, discrimination experiments also became the point of departure for the investigation of experimental neuroses and the psychiatric application of the theory he was engaged in during his latter years. The general data-thesis in this field could be formulated as follows: conflicts between stimuli or very strong stimuli can cause 'nervous behavior'. Likewise, it was on these generalization and discrimination experiments that Pavlov based his conception of language (and thought) as a (second) signal system. But this was in the last year of his life, after the publication of ,,ConditionedReflexes" (1927). 2. The concrete data-stratum. Pavlov's discourse is full of descriptions of experiments, including descriptions of the methods and apparatus employed and measurements of S-variables and R-variables. In nearly all the experiments the R-variable employed is the secretion of saliva. The results of the experiments are often reproduced as experimental records in table form. There are seldom


243

Conditioned stimulus applied during 30 seconds

Experiment of 4th August, 1914. 4.10 p.m. 4.22 ,, 4.31 ,, 4.55 ,,

I

Circle

salivary Secretion in drops during 30 seconds

I

4 3 ellipse Cile

1.10 p.m. 1.27 ,, 2.6 ., 2.16 ,, 2.30 ,, 2.48 ,,

Circle

3.20 p.m. 3.31 ,, 3.54 ,( 4.9 ,*

Circle

2 8 10 1 6 8

9:8 ellipse Circle

4 7 8 9

9:8 ellipse Circle

9 3 8 8 3

Circle 2 1 ellipse Circle

2.17 p.m. 2.47 ,, 3.8 ,, 3.22 ,, 3.46 ,,

4 6 0 4

2:1 ellipse

13th November, 1914. 10.55 a.m. 11.5 ,, 11.30 ,, 11.44 ,,

10

I

2:1 ellipse Circle

I

7 0 C

J

Fig. 6.4. Table with data from Pavlov's experiment with experimental neurosis after Pavlov (1927) s. 292. Notice the breakdown of discrimination between ellipse and circle the 17th September, 1914.

any general descriptions supplemented with graphs, or any statistical analyses of the data. As an example we shall reproduce here the record of the first ex-


244

penment dealing with a neurosis (see Fig. 6.4., which is a reproduction of the table on p. 292, Pavlov, 1927). The table shows that on 17 September 1914 the experimental dog cannot distinguish between a circle and an ellipse, because the ellipse is almost circular in diameter. WATSON'S DATA-STRATUM. Watson (1930) contains many descriptions of ex-

periments and references to everyday observations. There are also a number of more general empirical formulations. 1. The abstract data-stratum. Especially in connection with his chapter about psychological methods (Chapter 11), Watson has a number of formulations of general data-theses about 'conditioning', which he chiefly regards as an experimental (and practically applicable} procedure for the control (manipulation} of behavior. Unlike Pavlov, Watson appears here to regard conditioning as something capable of altering both stimulus and reaction. In other words, Watson does not not make a sharp distinction between 'classical' conditioning (or 'stimulus substitution') and 'instrumental' conditioning or 'reaction substitution' (Watson, 1930, pp. 25-26)32. At the same time it must be stressed that Watson does not have any true explanation of conditioning. He mentions neither Pavlov's 'Law of Coincidence' nor Thorndike's 'Law of Effect'. In one place he explains the formation of habits as systems of conditioned reflexes in terms of frequency and recency (Watson, 1930, p. 205)32, This explanation almost amounts to a learning of habits by trial-and-error. But later (p. 207)33, he puts forward the hypothesis we have already mentioned, that habits consist of conditioned reflexes (see Hypothesis B). But he is almost inclined to give up the idea of a true (hypothetical) explanation of conditioned reflexes (Watson, 1930, p. 209)34. He suffices with formulating a data-thesis, which can be reproduced as follows:

Sy +R Sx + ? (no reaction) Sx+Sy+R

Sx +R

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This is Watson's most fundamental, general data-thesis, which is used in an (empirical) explanation of conditioning. If compared with our reformulation of Watson's Hypothesis C, the Hypothesis C is seen to contain as its only hypothetical (transempirical) term, 'innate reflex structures', which are changed by conditioning into 'conditioned reflex structures'. The hypothetical (transempirical) presuppositions are here so minimal that Watson himself - and most psychologists - are prone to confuse them with empirical presuppositions ('facts'). Apart from this general data-thesis about conditioning as such, there are also some general data-theses about innate emotional reactions formulated on the basis of Watson's original research. These data-theses deal with the functional relations between the unconditioned stimuli that produce unconditioned emotional relations from birth (Watson, 1930, p. 164)35. These general datatheses can be reproduced as follows:

ucs: 1. 2. 3.

b

Loud sounds + loss of support Obstruction of movements Stroking of the skin

UR:

fright reaction angry reaction positive reaction

According to Watson's hypotheses, it is on the basis of these innate, unconditioned emotional reactions that all other conditioned emotional reactions are formed. Watson carried out an investigation that was supposed to demonstrate how jealousy arises. He concludes the investigation with the following diagram, p. 194:

cs: Sight (or sound) of love object being tampered or interfered with.

b

(U+C)R

Stiffening of whole body, clenching of hands, reddening and then blackening of face pronounced breathing, fighting, verbal recrimination, etc.

Apart from these general data-theses Watson's discourse contains formulations of the type we call elsewhere 'pragma-theses'= descriptions and prescriptions concerning practice (see ,,Systematology", 1975). These are mainly prescnptions for bringing up children, and lie beyond the scope of this book (Watson, 1930, p. 183)36.

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2. The concrete data-stratum. Watson's discourse contains descriptions of many experimental investigations undertaken by other psychologists, including Pavlov, Bechterew, and Mary C. Jones, who has chiefly investigated the emotional development of children. But it also contains descriptions of his own classical experiments on the emotional reactions of children (including the famous Albert and a couple of his own children). We shall now turn to: HULL'S DATA-STRATUM: Like that of Pavlov and Watson, Hull's discourse

contains a relatively great number of data-theses: 1. The abstract data-stratum. Hull's general data-theses are formulated like

theorems, but not all the theorems are general data-theses, since many of them contain hypothetical terms and, according to the systematological taxonomy, are therefore hypotheses (like all of Hull's postulates and corollaries). A more detailed analysis of the 133 theorems (of which many are divided into several theses) shows that 90 theorems are general data-theses and 43 theorems are hypotheses (though formulated in such a way as to facilitate empirical testing)37. Since there are (at least) 90 general data-theses in Hull's discourse, it would impossible to quote them all here. But in order to give the reader an impression of which empirical fields Hull's theory covers, we shall quote the chapter headings from Hull (1952): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Introductory Considerations. Simple Trail-and-Error Learning. Discrimination Learning. Behavior and the Molar Stimulus Trace. Fractional Antedating Goal Reactions. Simple Behavior chains. Learning within the Individual Behavior Link. Behavior in Relation to Objects in Space. Multidirectional Maze Learning. The Problem-Solving Assembly of Behavioral Segments. Value, Valuation and Behavior Theory. Concluding Considerations.


247

As these chapter headings reveal, Hull deals with all types of acquired behavior from simple trial-and-error to intelligent problemsolving. Even 'valuation' is dealt with, it being placed on a par with the excitatory potential. Hull has himself produced a very interesting survey of the status of his theory with regard to 'truth value' or ('validity'). He says in ,,The Test of a Sound Theory" that his theory consists of altogether 178 formal theoretical statements. Of these, 123 have, either wholely or partially, been dealt with empirically. Of the empirically tested statements, 86% have been confirmed, 11% have been confirmed with a margin of uncertainty, and 1% have been falsified (Hull, 1952, pp. 35 1-52)38.That it has been possible to produce such a precise status of the theory's validity is probably unique among psychological theories (and perhaps even other scientific theories). 2. The concrete data-stratum. Hull's discourse contains a great deal of experimental data in the form of tables and graphs. Many of the experiments have been performed in co-operation with Hull or under his leadership. Thus, the biggest chapter (S), ,,Behavior in Relation to Objects in Space", is largely based on Neal E. Miller's theory and on the experiments he carried out together with another of Hull's colleagues, Judson S. Brown. Both of the latter have subsequently produced their own theories, to a great extent inspired by Hull. Since this also applies to many other of his past colleagues, Hull's theory m y be counted among the most heuristic in the sense that it stimulated research and theory development. In this respect Hull has probably only been superceded in the history of psychology by 'the three giants', Pavlov, Piaget, and Freud, about whom we shall hear in the next chapter. But first we shall conclude this chapter by considering the theories as a whole.

The Theories as a Whole THE COMPLETENESS OF THE TEXT. The discourses of all three behavioral psychologists may be classified as complete scientific texts, since they contain all three levels of discourse: meta-stratum, hypothetical stratum and data-stratum. We have not calculated the distribution of the three strata percentwise, but it could be summed up as follows:

Pavfov:

A relatively full data-stratum, a somewhat smaller hypothetical stratum and even smaller meta-stratum.


248

Watson: Hull:

The percentage is approximately the same for each stratum (since the meta-stratum contains many polemical sequences). A relatively full hypothetical stratum, though also a full metastratum and a full data-stratum.

This is, as mentioned, only an estimate, for the 'M-H-D ratio' has not been calculated. A certain amount of difficulty lies in the face that the three levels of discourse are not clearly separated; the data-stratum in particular is distributed throughout the text in all three cases. THE TESTABILITY OF THE THEORIES. It has been possible in this case to calcu-

late the testability of the theories - or rather, the Hypothesis Quotient, which may be regarded as a quantitative expression of testability. In this - as in all other cases - the calculation of the H.Q. is based on the systematic reconstructions of the theories (see respectively pp. 223,230 and 240). Thus: Pavlov's

Hypothesis Quotient is:

H. Q. =

Y,(H-H) + (H-R)] - 15 + 12 =0.33

C[(S-H)

Watson's Hypothesis Quotient is:

2 H. Q. =-= 0.13 8 + 8

Hull's

Hypothesis Quotient is:

H. Q. =--21

8

+ 6-Oa30

In Hull's case the H.Q. has previously been calculated on the basis of a different reconstruction. i.e. a special selection of the theory's motivation hypotheses. This reconstruction also gave an H.Q. = 0.30 (see Madsen, 1959). Furthermore, the H.Q. has also been calculated with the help of a computer programme developed by the psychologist Svend Jgrgensen. In this case Hull's system of postulates and corollaries were not reformulated, but all the postulates and corollaries were included and prepared for computerization. This gave an H.Q. = 0.36 (see Madsen, 1974).


249

Conclusive Comparison INTRODUCTION. We have already compared the three behavioral psycholo-

gists' meta-strata and found them sufficiently alike to conclude that they contain the same meta-paradigm and therefore belong to the same macroschool. Thus we can conclude by comparing the three psychologists' hypothetical strata and data-strata. THE HYPOTHETICAL STRATA. Both Pavlov's and Watson's hypothesis systems

are alike in not possessing a high degree of formalization; they contain, for the most, implicit hypotheses and thus constitute draft theories. As opposed to this, Hull's hypotheses constitute the most formally developed hypothesis system in psychology possessing any degree of generality. The hypothetical terms used by Pavlov and Watson are Ho-terms. In Pavlov in particular, the organismic (physiological) reference is explicit and very prominent, though it is a bit less so in Watson, who in this respect approaches Hull, who uses Hc-terms with neutral (or no) ontological reference. The overriding hypothetical terms in Pavlov are 'conditioned reflexes'; in Watson they are 'conditioned reflexes' and 'habit systems'; and in Hull, 'habits' (fl~ and ) various motivation variables (D, K and JR). Thus Hull's theory contains the most complex hypotheses, which deal with interaction between the various hypothetical variables. THE DATA-STRATUM. Here we shall compare the 'laws' of learning in all three

theories. They are - or can be - formulated as general datatheses. Pavlov's 'principle of learning', which he calls the principle of coincidence, is as follows:

Coincidence between the unconditioned and the conditioned stimulus is a necessary conditionfor learning (i.e. the formation of conditioned connections manifesting themselves by way of conditioned reactions). Watson does not explicitly formulate a principle of learning for conditioned reflexes, but seems to presuppose a principle of contiguity (as some American psychologists prefer to call it). But for the learning of habits Watson explicitly stresses a 'principle of frequency and recency':

The mostfrequent andlor the last stimulus will have the greatest possibility of producing a habit reaction. Hull formulated his learning principle, the principle of reinforcement as a postulate (No. IV) and thus it is formally speaking a hypothesis; but the hypo-

250


thesis formulates the functional relation between an S-variable (number of reinforcements) and an H-variable (habit strength, sHr), which could quite well be replaced by some directly observable R-variables (e.g. the number of reactions without reinforcement, cf. the analysis of Hull). With such a reformulation the principle of reinforcement would become a general data-thesis (the so-called 'empirical Law of Effect', which is to be found in some of Hull's colleagues (e,g, K.W. Spence) as well as in Skinner. It is therefore reasonable to compare Hull's learning principle, the principle of reinforcement, with Pavlov's and Watson's principle of contiguity. CONCLUSION.We can conclude this comparison of the three behavioral psychologists as follows: They use the same meta-paradigm and therefore belong to the same macroschool, but they use different theoryparadigms and therefore belong to different microschools.


251

Notes

1

,,In the next and final chapter, on personality, we shall try to put man completely together and look at him as a complicated, going, organic machine."

2

,,It may be added that most of these postulates have been based on the behavior of lower organisms, in particular the rat, in the belief that the behavior of all mammals operates to the same primary laws."

3

,,Though the actual synthesizing activity may not enter our field of consciousness the synthesis may nevertheless take place, and under favourable conditions it may enter the field of consciousness as a link already formed, seeming to originate spontaneously."

4

,,The behaviorist, ...., holds, further, that belief in the existence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and magic."

5

,, ... The organism is regarded as a completely automatic entity; that in our approach to behavior theory there is no entelechy, no disembodied mind, soul, or spirit which in some ways tells the various parts of the body to cooperate behaviorally to attain successful adaption, i.e. how to achieve survival."

6

,,You have already grasped the notion that the behaviorist is a strict determinist ..."

7

,, ... that it is not unreasonable to hope for the isolation of both primary and secondary behavioral laws which will hold within a narrow margin of error for averages secured from carefully controlled empirical conditions."

8

reaction potential (sER) ,,Postulate XII. Behavioral Oscillation (~OR).A.A oscillates from moment to moment, the distribution of behavioral oscillation (sOR) deviating slightly from the Gaussian probability form in being

252


leptokurtic with B2 at about 4.0; i.e. the distribution is represented by the equation

9

,,Experimental technique, the accumulation of facts by that technique, occasional tentative consolidation of these facts into a theory or an hypothesis describe our procedure in science.Judged upon this basis, behaviorism is a true natural science."

10

,,Modern science has two inseparable components - the empirical and the theoretical. The empirical component is concerned primarily with observation, the theoretical component is concerned with the interpretation and explanation of observation. A natural event is explained when it can be derived as a theorem by a process of reasoning from (1) a knowledge of the relevant natural conditions antedating it, and (2) one or more relevant principles called postulates. Clusters or families of theorems are generated, and theorems are often employed in the derivation of other theorems; thus is developed a logical hierarchy resembling that found in ordinary geometry. A hierarchy of interrelated families of theorems, all derived from the same set of consistent postulates, constitutes a scientific system."

11

,,It will be more natural that experimental investigation of the physiological activities of the hemispheres should lay a solid foundation for a future true science of psychology; such a course is more likely to lead to the advancement of this branch of natural science.

12

,,Behaviorism, ..., is, then, a natural science that takes the whole field of human adjustments as its own. Its closest scientific companion is physiology."

13

,,One reason for optimism in this respect lies in the increasing tendency, at least among Americans, to regard the 'social' or behavioral sciences as genuine natural sciences rather than Geistes wissenschaft."

14

(p. 17) ,,The secretory reflex presents many important advantages for our purpose. It allows of an extremely accurate measurement of the intensity


253

of reflex activity, ..." (p. 18) ,,Again, a very important point in favour of the secretory reflexes is the much smaller tendency to interpret them in an anthropomorphic fashion - i.e. in 'terms of subjective analogy'." 15

,,Progress in any science can be measured by the extent to which apparatus and improved methods of observation have been employed."

16

,,Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds that the subject matter of human psychology is the behavior of the human being. Behaviorism claims that consciousness is neither a definite nor a usable concept."

17 ,,We can observe behavior

- what the organism does or says. And let us point out at once: that saying is doing - that is behaving."

18

19

,,Let me emphasize again that the behaviorist is primarily interested in the behavior of the whole man." ,,Consequently, introspective reports concerning international conditions

are useful for rough qualitative purposes; nevertheless they become inadequate wherever primary quantitative laws are in the process of systematic formulation or precise validation. Fortunately, as we have tried to show above, in the formulation of natural laws it is not necessary to depend on such unsatisfactory evidence. We can utilize symbolic constructs." 20 ,,In this research we were not concerned with the ultimate nature of excita-

tion and inhibition as such. We took them as two fundamental properties, the two most important manifestations of activity, of the living nervous elements." ,,It is highly probably that excitation and inhibition, the two functions of the nervous cell which are so intimately interwoven nd which so constantly supersede each other may, fundamentally, represent only different phases of one and the same physicochemical process." 21

,,The fundamental mechanism of development of a conditioned reflex depends upon excitation of some definite point in the cortex coincidently with a more intense excitation of some other point, probably also of the cortex, which leads to a connection being formed between these two points; and reversely, if such a coincident stimulation of these points is not repeated for a long time the path becomes obliterated and the connection disrupted."

22 ,,In any case it appears that the cells predominantly excited at a given time

become foci attracting to themselves the nervous impulses aroused by new

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stimuli - impulses which on repetition tend to follow the same path and so to establish conditioned reflexes. 23

,,Personality is the sum of activities that can be discovered by actual observation of behavior over a long enough time to give reliable information. In other words, personality is but the end product of habit systems. Our procedure in studying personality is the making and plotting of a cross section of the activity stream."

24 ,,The relationship, theoretically, between the simplest cases of the condi-

tioned responses we have studied and the more complicated, integrated, spaced and timed habit responses we are considering, seems to me to be quite simple. It is the relationship apparently of part to whole - that is, the conditioned reflex is the unit out of which the whole habit is formed. In other words, when a complicated habit is completely analyzed, each unit of the habit is a conditioned reflex." 25

,, ... habit formation starts in all probability in embryonic life and that even in the human young, environment shapes behavior so quickly that all of the older ideas about what types of behavior are inherited and what are learned break down."

26

,,I feel reasonably sure that there are three different forms of emotional response $at can be called out at birth by three sets of stimuli. For convenience we may call them 'fear', 'rage' and 'love'."

21

(p. 238) ,,The behaviorist advances the view that what the psychologists have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves. The evidence for this view is admittedly largely theoretical but it is the one theory so far advanced which explains thought in terms of natural science." (p. 239). ,,My theory does hold that the muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsible for implicit or internal speech (thought)."

28

,,I should like to say here emphatically that whenever the individual is thinking, the whole of his bodily organization is at work (implicitly) - even though the final solution shall be spoken, written or subvocally expressed verbal formulation. In other words, from the moment the thinking problem is set for the individual (by the situation he is in) activity is aroused


255

that may lead finally to adjustment. Sometimes the activity goes on in terms of (1) implicit manual organization, more frequently in terms of (2) implicit verbal organization; sometimes in terms of (3) implicit (or even overt) visceral organization. If (1) or (3) dominates, thinking takes place without words". 29 ,,Postulate VIII. The Constitution of Reaction Potential (sER): The reaction potential (sER) of a bit of learned behavior at any given stage of learning, where conditions of learning are constant throughout learning and response evocation, is determined (1) by the drive (D) operating during the learned process multiplied (2) by the dynamism of the signaling stimulus trace (Vl), (3) by the incentive reinforcement (K), and (4) by the habit strength (sHR), i.e., SER= D x V1 X K X SHR." 30

,,Postulate I: Unlearned Stimulus-response Connections ( ~ U R )Organisms : at birth possess receptor-effector connections (sUR) which under combined stimulation ( S ) and drive (D) have the potentiality of evoking a hierarchy of responses that either individually or in combination are more likely to terminate a need than would be a random selection from the reactions resulting From other stimulus and drive combination."

31

,,Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of a relatively simple case of an intervening variable (X) not directly observable but functionally related (f) to the antecedent event (A) and to the consequent event (B), both A and B directly observable. When an intervening variable is thus securely anchored to observables on both sides it can be safely employed in scientific theory."

32

(p. 25) ,,The conditioning of responses is just as important as the conditioning of stimuli." (p. 26). ,,From a laboratory standpoint there is ultimately no fundamental difference between a conditioned stimulus and a conditioned response."

33

,,I have hied to explain on what we may call afrequency and recency basis, why the one movement finally persists whereas all the rest die away."

34

,,Even though we cannot 'explain' a conditioned reflex, we have by analysis reduced to simpler terms a complicated process which we have neither

256


~~

been able to solve, nor, apparently, to begin experimentation upon. I believe we can now turn our formulation over to the physioloical chemist for solution. The problem we leave with him is: ,,Stimulus X will not call out reaction R, stimulus Y will call out reaction R (unconditioned reflex); but when stimulus X is presented first and then Y (which does call out R) is presented shortly thereafter, X will (in time) call out R. In other words stimulus X becomes substitutable for Y ."" 35,,

36

... we find that certain types of stimuli - loud sounds and removal of sup-

ports - produce a certain general type of response, namely, momentarily checking of breath, a start of the whole body, crying, marked visceral response, etc.; that another type of stimulus - holding or restraint - produces crying with wide open mouth, prolonged holding of breath, marked changes in circulation and other visceral changes; that a third stimulus stroking the skin, especially in sex-sensitive areas - produces smiling, changes in respiration, cessation of crying, cooing, gurgling, erection and other visceral changes." ,,You have already grasped the notion that the behaviorist is a strict determinist - the child or adult has to do what he does do. The only way he can be made to act differently is first to untrain him and then to retrain him."

37 As examples of the two categories we shall present the readers with two

theorems from the same field ('behavior in space'): The following theorems are to be found in Hull (1952) p. 219: ,,Theorem 53: Organisms capable of distance reception and compound trial-and-error learning will display adient behavior which is highly generalized in respect to both direction and distance." On the same page is to be found Theorem 54, which is identical with Theorem 53 with the exception of one word: 'adient' is replaced with 'abient'. These words mean respectively behavior that 'draws near' or 'withdraws'. Later, on p. 222, we find two other theorems on the same theme: ,,Theorem 55: Adient-behavior will display a relatively weak reaction potential when the organism is far from the object, which will grow progressively stronger as the object is approached, the strength of the reaction


257

potential being a negative growth function of the distance of the organism from the object.

Theorem 56: Abient behavior will display its maximum reaction potential close to the object, but this will decrease as a negative growth function of the distance of the organism from the object." As may be seen, the two last theorems (55 and 56) contain the hypothetical term 'reaction potential', and are thus hypotheses (according to the systematologicaltaxonomy). On the other hand, theorem 53 does not contain any hypothetical terms and is thus (together with the corresponding theorem 54) a general data-thesis. But the examples also show that the two hypothetical theorems, 55 and 56, are easy to test empirically, because they may contain one hypothetical variable (sER) which can directly be measured in behavior (latency period, amplitude or the number of reactions without reinforcement, cf. our reformulated hypothesis No. 10). 38 ,,The results of the validity tables of all the ten chapters thus scored were then combined. Of the 178 formal theoretical propositions contained in the volume, 93, or 52 per cent, were judged as having empirical evidence bearing on their validity (+), and 30, or 17 per cent, were judged as possessing approximate or indirect empirical evidence (+) as to their validity. Fiftyfive, or 31 per cent, of the 178 theoretical propositions were judged as not covered by known relevant empirical evidence. Of the 123 propositions wholly and partially covered by empirical evidence, 106, or 86 per cent, were judged as substantially validated; 14, or 11 per cent, were judged as probably valid, though with considerable uncertainty, and one proposition (related to the Weber-Fechner Law), or about 1 per cent, was judged as definitely invalid."


~

Chapter 7

PSYCHOANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION. Psychoanalysis is one of the schools which was formed around the turn of the century. It was founded by Sigmund Freud, who obtained his first followers in Vienna at the beginning of the 1900s. Some of the original disciples broke away and founded their own microschools. The most famous of these were Alfred Adler and Curl Gustuv Jung. Apart from them we shall discuss a number of Freud's other famous pupils. For lack of a better term, 'psychoanalysis' will be applied specifically to the macroschool that was founded by Freud. The term 'depth psychology' could possibly have been used as common denominator both for this macroschool and the microschools that developed out of Freud's psychoanalysis. But each has since acquired its own special name, so presumably it will not create any misunderstandings if 'psychoanalysis' is used to denote the entire macroschool that was organized by Freud as well as that part of it (the microschool) which continued to use both the meta-paradigm and the theoryparadigm created by Freud. As in the other chapters the first part will deal with the history of the psychoanalytical scientific community, and the second part with the production of the psychoanalysts (which for practical reasons will consist exclusively of Freud's own production).

Psychoanalysis

260

The history of the psychoanalysts Freud's Life and Work INTRODUCTION. Freud is presumably the psychologist who has been written about more than any other, so the interested reader may be referred to a large number of biographies apart from Freud's own autobiography (see, for example, Jones, 1953-57; Andkjar Olsen and K@ppe,1987; Schur, 1972; Sjoback and Westerlund, 1977; Sulloway, 1979). There will only be room here for a selection of facts relating to 1) Freud's childhood, 2) Freud's studies and education, 3) The establishment of psychoanalysis in the 1890s, and 4) The period until the Second World War. FREUD'S CHILDHOOD. Sigmund Freud was born in 1856 in the town of Freiberg, then in Czechoslovakia, where his father was a wool dealer. As the result of an economic crisis and an upsurge of Czech nationalism and antisemitism, Freud's father, who was Jewish, fled in 1859 to Vienna. Freud was the first-born child of his father's third marriage. Freud's father was then forty and his mother only twenty. Thus he had older brothers and sisters from his father's previous marriages and later also younger ones. In many respects, Freud, as first-born son, received preferential treatment according to the traditions, and especially the Jewish ones, of that time; and, despite his father's deprived circumstances, Freud attended a secondary school, where he became very interested in literature and languages. FREUD'S STUDIES AND EDUCATION. Freud was very keen to continue his hu-

manist studies; but for economic reasons he chose to study medicine, which he commenced in 1873 at the age of seventeen. During the entire period of his studies and throughout the rest of his life he kept up his general interest in philosophy, history, archeology, literature and the natural sciences. Thus, while still studying, he attended Franz Brentano's philosophical lectures, and later he translated some of John S l u m Miff's works into German. Already in his third year of studies, apart from his general interest in various subjects other than medicine, Freud also engaged in scientific research. Thus he carried out neuroanatomical and microscopic investigations while acting as assistant to the fa-

The history of the psychoanalysts

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mous physiologist Ernst Briicke. He would like to have continued his physiological research, but Brucke had no means of obtaining a university post for him and advised him to become a general practitioner. So from 1882-85 Freud carried out his clinical studies at the hospital in Vienna, where he received an all-round clinical training. But Freud was chiefly interested in neurology and psychiatry, which subjects were taught by Professor Theodor Meynert - one of the doctors who regarded psychological illnesses to be organic diseases of the brain. In 1885 Freud acquired the title of 'privatdozent' at the university and also a travel grant to France. Here Freud came to study under the famous neurologist J.M. Charcot in Paris, where he stayed during the winter of 1885-86. Charcot was very interested in hysteria, which he treated with hypnosis. Freud became very taken with Charcot's psychological conception of hysteria, and he translated Charcot's lectures into German. Perhaps it was his acquaintance with hypnosis - amd especially with so-called post-hypnotic suggestion - that gave Freud his first inkling of the importance of the unconscious. When Freud returned to Vienna he set up practice as a specialist in neurology. At the same time he married Martha Bernays, to whom he had been engaged for four years and with whom he had carried on an extremely intense correspondence. During the following years six children were born to them, of whom the youngest, Anna Freud, also became a psychoanalyst. During his first years as practising specialist Freud also worked as a neurologist at a children's hospital, and in time he became a recognized expert on aphasia, on which he wrote both an article and a book. Freud began to make use of hypnosis and suggestion in his private practice when treating neurotic patients, especially after a period of intense collaboration with an older colleague, Josef Breuer (18421925). The latter had also used another psycho-therapeutic method which he called 'catharsis'.This method consisted of the patient tatking himself out of his symptoms. Breuer had been successful with this method especially in the treatment of a patient later known as 'Anna 0.' Together, Breuer and Freud developed the first theory of neuroses. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. Breuer's and Freud's frst theory

of the neuroses, with particular regard to hysteria, was inspired by Charcot, P. Janet and G.T. Fechner. The theory presupposes the existence of two systems of consciousness: a normal wakeful system of consciousness and a dream system. These systems are localized in different areas of the brain. The two alter-

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Psychoanalysis

nating states of consciousness normally correspond to the wakeful state and to sleep, but in hysteria dream consciousness - often in the form of daydreams may predominate also in the wakeful state. According to Freud's and Breuer's theory, this abnormal state arises as the result of a 'trauma' - a violent event causing hyperstimulation of the psychical system, which reacts in some cases with a attack of hysterics, though in other cases it may create personality changes in the form of a dichotomy between normal and dream consciousness. Freud's and Breuer's theory was presented in the book Jtudien iiber Hysterie", which was published in 1895. At that time many differences had arisen between Breuer and Freud, and their collaboration ceased altogether in 1895. The conflict was chiefly due to their disagreement about the nature of the 'trauma'. Freud maintained that it was always of a sexual nature, whereas Breuer rejected this. On the other hand it was supported by a new collaborator, who was Freud's 'pen friend' throughout the period 1887-1902. The latter was a Berlin doctor, Wilhelm Fliess (1858-1928). He was generally interested in and conversant with the natural sciences. So Freud discussed all his theoretical problems with Fliess by letter. Fortunately, Freud's letters to Fliess have been preserved, and in 1950 they were published. They illuminate the birth and development of Freud's ideas during this period. Among the letters to Fliess a manuscript was discovered which was published together with the letters under the English title ,,The Project" (1950). In this ,,Project" Freud puts forwards a 'neuropsychological theory', in which he identifies psychological processes with brain processes. In this neurophysiological version 'ideas' and their mutual 'association' become nerve cells and paths. 'Affects' or 'feelings' become nervous energy. Apart from external stimulation Freud now reckoned with the internal stimulation that arises from the needs of the organism. In this neuropsychological system internal stimulation became instinctual drives. Freud added to this a developmental theory, i.e. that the individual reacts from birth with the so-called primary processes steering processes in which emotionally charged reminiscences and fantasies predominate. Later the individual learns to react with the so-called secondary processes, i.e. steering processes in which rational thinking predominates. As appears from the above description, this ,,Project" contains nearly all the important hypotheses in Freud's subsequent theories apart from the theory of the unconscious system.


263

Freud also incorporated his theory of the neuroses in this general neuropsychological theory. The neurotic reaction (attacks, symptoms, etc.) could be regarded as a regression to more primitive, primary processes after the growing child had already developed the secondary processes. This regression to a more primitive form of steering was in fact a defence against emotionally charged memories of traumatic events in early childhood. In subsequent letters to Fliess Freud also puts forward his hypothesis concerning memory, i.e. that some memories arise so early that the individual has not yet acquired a language that can be associated with them. These memories therefore consist entirely of reproductions of the original sense impressions of the objects and persons which are to be found in the surrounding world and which enter into specific events and situations. These memories constitute the so-called object-representations. When the individual has learnt a language these will be supplemented with word-representations. These two sets of representationss are depositied in two psychlcal systems: the oldest system with object-representationsis called the unconscious and the subsequently developed system with word-representations is called the pre-conscious. This system is directy connected with consciousness, and so pre-conscious word-representations can easily become conscious, whereas unconscious object-representations can only become conscious via the pre-conscious. With his hypotheses about the unconscious and the preconscious systems Freud formulated all the hypotheses entering into psychoanalytical theory during the period from around 1900 until the First World War. But during this period Freud had also developed the psychoanalytical method. First of all, he employed, as mentioned, hypnosis and suggestion. But since not all patients could be hypnotized, he also used Breuer's cathartic method. During the 1890's Freud developed this method into the psychoanalytical method proper, which consisted of an analysis of free fancies or associations. These associations might take dreams as their point of departure. The psychoanalytical method turned out to be more effective in the treatment of neurotic patients than previous methods. By way of analysis the patient obtained increased self-insight (the unconscious became 'raised to consciousness'), at the same time as an emotional reaction took place. Eventually the insight coupled with the reaction resulted in the patient's emancipation from the purposeless neurotic reaction fields. Thus it appears that psychoanalytical method is at one and the same time a method of observation and a therapeutic method.

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Psychoanalysis

Before proceeding with a description of the continued development of psychoanalysis, we shall briefly summarize the most important points regarding the establishment ofpsychoanalysis: Just like other schools, and in accordance with Kuhn's theory, psychoanalysis started with the discovery of an anomaly. In this case the anomaly consisted of neurotic symptoms. These could not be explained satisfactorily either by classical, neuropathological psychiatry or by classical experimental psychology. It was primarily in order to explain hysterical - and subsequently other neurotic symptoms - that Freud developed his theory. This psychoanalytical theory was gradually developed into a general psychological theory. The birth of psychoanalysis may be distinguished from that of other schools, however, by the fact that the anomaly consisted essentially of apractical problem, i.e. how does one cure neuroses? Therefore a development of a method of treatment - the psychanalytical method - had to develop side by side with the development of psychoanalytical theory. Since psychoanalytical method is at the same time an observational method, the method-hypothesisput forward in Chapter 4 is also substantiated, i.e. that a science is established when, on its emancipation from philosophy, a method is found for testing its theories. Psychoanalysis may therefore be regarded a the science about the unconscious psychical system. Psychoanalytical method may be regarded as a method for analysing (observing) unconscious psychical processes and structures. Thus, with the development of the psychoanalytical method it became possible to test theories about the unconscious which had previously been a part of philosophy (and perhaps of the general knowledge of human nature). THE PERIOD FROM C. 1900 UNTIL THE FIRST WORLD WAR. Following the es-

tablishment of his psychoanalytical theory and method Freud wrote his first major work ,,The Interpretation of Dreams", which was published in 1900. (In the following the English titles refer to the ,Standard Edition", which comprises all Freud's preserved writings together with detailed notes, many of which are the result of discussions between the translators and Freud himself. These notes have later been transferred to the German Jtudien ausgabe", (see the bibliography). In ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" Freud presented his entire psychological theory together with the famous 'lens model' of the psychical apparatus,


265

which consists of three systems: the unconscious, the pre-conscious and the conscious. Both theory and model were used for interpreting and explaining dreams. Freud had become interested in dreams because so many of his patients had told him quite spontaneously about their nightly dreams. Freud discovered that these were an excellent point of departure for psychoanalytical treatment, and they could be explained with the help of the same general psychological theory that had been developed primarily in order to explain neuroses. Later Freud discovered that his theory could also be used to interpret and explain everyday slips of the tongue and erroneous actions. These were therefore dealt with in the book ,,The Psychopathology of Everyday Life", which was published in 1901. Later Freud demonstrated that even jokes could be analysed (interpreted and explained) with the help of his general theory, and he wrote the book , P e r Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten", which was published in 1905. ,,Three Essays on Sexuality" was also published in the same year. With these books Freud gradually became known. He also acquired many patients; he usually had about 9-10 patients a day (taking about an hour each). In 1902 he also became 'professor extraordinarius' at the university. Although this job was unpaid, it not only gave him prestige (and thereby more patients) but also contact via his lectures with budding doctors and other university graduates. Some doctors applied to him for training. The theoretical part of this training took part in connection with a weekly discussion nicknamed the 'Wednesday club, which started in 1902. Among the first participants were Alfred Adler and Wilhelm Stekel. The Wednesday club may be said to be the first formal organization of the psychoanalytical research (and therapeutic) community. It grew fast and obtained more Vienese members, and in 1907 the group was extended to include members from Switzerland, of whom the most famous were Carl Gustav Jung, Karl Abraham and Ludvig Binswanger. Thereafter psychoanalytical associations modelled on the Vienna association were created also in Zurich, Berlin, London and Budapest. A meeting was held for psychoanalysts and their sympathizers in Salzburg in 1908. This was later known as 'The First International Psychoanalytical Congress', and followed by a similar congress in Nurenberg in 1910. In the meantime Freud, Jung and Sandor Ferenczi were invited in 1909 to hold a series of lectures in the USA, and a symposium was held at Clark University, organized by its president, Stanley Hall (see Chapter 4). Here Freud

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Psychoanalysis

was enthusiastically received by many outstanding American psychologists, among them, William James. Freud mentions in his autobiography that for him it constituted a great personal encouragement to meet this recognition. In 1910, at the second international congress, an International Psychoanulytical Association was formed. This was based in Zurich, with Jung as its first president. At the same time he started a journal, Zentrulblattfur Psychoanalyse, with Adler and Wilhelm Stekel as editors. After this congress a certain amount of rivalry started up between the various groups, especially between the associations in Vienna and Zurich. In 1911 Adler broke with Freud and formed his own association for 'free psychoanalysis'. We shall return later to Adler's theory and his creation of a microschool known as 'Individual Psychology'. In 1912 it also came to a breach between Freud and Jung, with the result that Jung resigned his presidency of the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1914 and formed his own ,,Society for Analytical Psychology". We shall also return to Jung and his work later on. In both these case the official reason for the breach was that Freud would not tolerate any refusal to recognize the fundamental significance of the sexual drive. For Freud it was tremendously important to recognize the importance of the sexual drive both for the development of personality and for the development of the neuroses. This formed an essential part of psychoanalysis's theory-paradigm and a qualification for becoming a members of the microschool constituted by the international community of psychoanalysts. Therefore Freud wrote a great many theoretical - so-called 'metapsychological' - articles in the years following the breach with Adler and Jung. Amongst other things, he elaborated his theory ofthe drives with its distinction between the reproductive or sexual drives and the self-preservative, or egodrives. The First World War made it very difficult to get the articles published and not all of them were printed - in fact Freud destroyed some of them himself because he thought they had become out-dated. Apart from these theoretical articles, during the war Freud also had an opportunity of presenting a comprehensive survey of psychoanalysis in some lectures he held at Vienna University in the winters of 1915-16 and 1916-17. They were published in 1917 under the title ,,Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis". They are regarded as the best introduction to psychoanalysis, since Freud was both an ex-


267

tremely good lecturer and a good writer. In these lectures he presents the theory of psychoanalysis in relation to erroneous actions and slips of the tongue, to dreams and the neuroses. He chose this order for pedagogical reasons, even though the historical development of the theories was the reverse. THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS. After the war contacts were resumed and co-operation within the International Psychoanalytical Association continued. The Englishman Ernest Jones (1879-1958) was for many years President of the International Association, and was largely responsible for the dissemination of psychoanalysis in Great Britain and America. Jones had been a close friend of Freud since 1907, and later he was given access to all his private letters, so that he was able to write the most comprehensive and well-documented biography of Freud. This was issued in three volumes, in 1953, 1955 and 1957, but subsequently published in a shortened one-volume edition (see Jones, 1961). Freud was generally interested in international collaboration, and it is worth mentioning Freud was actively engaged in establishing an international psychoanalytical publishers. But later Freud was forced to withdraw from active international collaboration, including congresses, on account of increasing ill-health. He was found to be suffering from cancer of the jaw, for which he was operated altogether thirty-three times during the last sixteen years of his life, Freud was treated by the doctor Max Schur, who later also followed Freud to London. Schur has written a book about Freud's latter years, which includes an account of Freud's attitude towards illness and death (see Schur, 1972). But Freud continued to have patients and did not cut down his working hours until his very last years. At the same time he found time to write, and he continued to add to his already voluminous production right until he died. After the war Freud, who at that time was in his late sixties, started work on an extensive revision of psychanalytical theory. In 1920 ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle" was published, which included some changes in his theory of the drives. The previous distinction between the sexual drives and the ego-drives was now abolished, both being collectively categorized as life drives or 'Eros'. As a parallel to the life drives Freud introduced a new concept, namely the 'death drive', or 'Thanatos', which comprised all destructive drives, both outwardly directed aggression and inwardly directed self-destruction. However, there were many psychoanalysts who could not accept this new theory of the drives, or possibly only in a modified version

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Psychoanalysis

in which the 'death drive' was merely regarded as an outwardly directed agressive drive. In 1923 came ,,The Ego and the Id", which contained a new model of the structure of the personality or 'psychical system'. This model was to replace the 'lens model', whose three systems - the unconscious, the pre-conscious and the conscious - were replaced by the three systems of the new model: the 'id ('das Es'), the' ego' ('Ich') and the 'super-ego' (Uber-Ich'). The new model's three systems are only partly coincident with those of the old model; but we shall discuss these personality models in more detail in the second part of the chapter under the meta-theoretical analysis of Freud's theory. The new model of the psychical system, often called 'the structural model' became further elaborated in the next theoretical discourse ,,Hemmung, symptom und Angst", which was published in 1926. In this 'anxiety' (or fear) acquired a theoretical status which placed anxiety almost on a par with the two primary instincts. Anxiety was now regarded as the cause of the 'defence mechanisms', which were able, when put into action, to produce neurotic symptoms. Previously Freud had regarded anxiety as a 'bi-product' of a frustrated (unsatisfied) sexual drive. This new contribution to the development of psychoanalytical theory was later summarized in ,,New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis", which was published in 1933. These new lectures assumed an acquaintanceship with the first introductory lectures from 1917, since they dealt exclusively with revisions of and additions to psychoanalytical theory. Later (in 1938) Freud started to write an entirely new, comparatively popular, account of psychoanalysis, but unfortunately it was not completed before his death. But the completed chapters are absolutely worth reading and were published posthumously under the title ,,Abriss der Psychounaiyse". During the last years of his life Freud also wrote some works in which psychoanalysis is applied in an analysis of cultural and social phenomena and of well-known persons. These include ,,Civilization, and its Discontents", which was published in 1930, and ,,Moses and Monotheism" which was published in the last year of Freud's life. These years were not only marked by illness and personal sorrows but also by the political events. When Hitler came to power in 1933 the persecution of the Jews started in earnest. Freud's works were publically burnt on a bonfire in Berlin. Many Jewish psychoanalysts emigrated


269

to America. Many had already found their way there when it became generally known that psychoanalysis was very popular in the USA, and that the structure of the American health service favourized the type of private practice psychoanalysists themselves preferred. During the thirties, with the emigration of so many well-known psychoanalysts to America, this country became the centre for psychoanalysis (as well as for psychology in general). In 1938, when the Nazis occupied Austria, Freud was put under house arrest. In the meantime his friends were planning to get him to London, and this succeeded after the intervention of Roosewelt (influenced by an American ambassador who had been analysed by Freud). Freud arrived in London during the summer of 1938, followed by his daughter, Anna Freud, and the doctor Max Schur. They came to live in the London suburb of Hampstead, where Freud continued his written production right until the end. Freud would not take any analgesics during his long illness, because he wanted to be able to think clearly while working. But, according to an old agreement between Freud, Anna Freud and Max Schur, Freud was to have a sufficiently strong dose of morphine when he himself asked for it. This occurred on 23rd September 1939, when Freud died according to his own wish. Anna Freud remained living in the house in Hampstead. During the war Anna Freud was very active in the treatment of children with 'war-neuroses', and after the war she converted the house together with some of the neighouring ones into a psychoanalytical clinic for children, where she led the training of analysts and the research that took part in connection with the treatment. Anna Freud also contributed to the theoretical development of psychoanalysis with a book on ,,The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence", which was published in 1936.

Other Psych oanaI y sts INTRODUCTION. In this section we shall deal with other important members of the psychoanalytical community. To start with we shall deal with the two pupils who broke with Freud at an early date and founded their own microschools, namely A d f e r and Jung. After that we shall mention other subsequent 'revisionists' and, finally, Freud's 'orthodox' successors. ALFRED ADLER AND 'INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY'. Adler, as mentioned, was

one of the first members of Freud's 'Wednesday club'. He was born in Vienna in 1870 and trained as a doctor. He was active in the organization of the psy-

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choanalytical community and became editor of the first psychoanalytical journal. He also contributed to the theoretical development of psychoanalysis with the theory about inferiority feelings, which was first presented in ,,Studie uber Minderwertigkeit der Organe und die seelische Kompensation", (1 907). To start with Freud recognized this theory as constituting an important conmbution to psychoanalysis, but later a conflict arose between Freud and Adler, because Adler maintained that the selfpreservation drive was the most important human drive, and feelings of inferiority, the essential cause of neurosis. Freud, on the other hand, maintained that the sexual drive was the most important drive, and that sexual frustration was the fundamental cause of all neuroses. This hypothesis was such an essential part of psychoanalysis' theoryparadigm that Freud would not recognize any departures from this as constituting psychoanalysis, So he pressed Adler into resigning from the psychoanalytical association, whereafter Adler formed his own association for 'free psychoanalysis', which he later called Individual Psychology. Adler further extended the theory about feelings of inferiority and self-assertion, and maintained that during the first five years of its life the child develops a special life-sole, which later determines consciousness and behaviour. This natural urge to compensate for feelings of inferiority may result in overcompensation and possibly neurotic symptoms. But naturally the compensatory urge may also result in a healthy and socially adapted development. The individual psychological therapy consists in analysing the life-style through the family relations of childhood, together with interests and aversions, occupation and leisure pursuits. Since Adler did not regard repressed sexual traumas as the cause of neurosis, his analysis had no need to penetrate so deeply into unconscious, repressed memories. Therefore this form of therapy is not so time-demanding as classical psychoanalysis. Individual psychological therapy is maintained to be especially suitable for children. Adler visited America in 1926 and 1927, and in 1932 he became Professor of 'Medical Psychology' at Long Island University in the USA. He died in 1937. But his daughter, Alexandre, and his son, Kurt Adler, helped to further 'individual psychology' in the USA. C.G. JUNG AND ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Freud regarded Jung as the most

talented of his pupils, and so Jung was chosen as the first President of the Inter-


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national Psychoanalytical Society. Jung also turned out to be the most original and most productive of Freud's pupils. His collected works have been published in various English editions (see Jung, 1962-76). Jung has also written a very personal and deep-boring autobiography: ,,Memories, Dreams, Reflections'' (English edition, 1963). He was born in 1875, the son of a Protestant pastor. After completing his medical studies he specialized in psychiatry. Thereafter he served under the famous psychiatrist, Eugen Bleuler, who created the concept of schizophrenia. Together with Bleuler and his colleague Karl Abraham, Jung founded a psychoanalytical association in Zurich. At this point Jung was already known for his creation of a 'word-association' test, which reveals 'complexes', i.e. ideas with strong emotional connotations. The complexes manifested themselves during the test in the form of a long reaction-time, misunderstandings of the stimulus-word and psycho-galvanic skin reflexes (GSR). At an early stage Jung developed his theory about psychological types. The fundamental category in this type-theory is the personality dimension 'introvert contra extrovert', which we have already mentioned in connection with Pavlov, who applied the terms: 'weak contra strong nervous system'. As we know, this personality dimension is applied in the modem factor-analytical psychology of personality, and especially by H J . Eysenck (see Eysenck, 1967) and R.B. Cattell (see Cattell, 1965 and 1977). In Jung's type-theory this personality dimension is combined with four psychological functions: perception, thought, intuition and emotion. This gives rise to altogether eight types (perceiving introvert, perceiving extravert, thinking extravert, etc.). Under the influence of Freud, Jung developed his theory of the unconscious. According to this theory the unconscious consists of two layers: 1) the personal unconscious, which - like Freud's corresponding concept - comprises personal memories, which cannot be transferred to consciousness, and 2) the collective unconscious, which includes 'the memories of the human species' in the form of the so-called 'archetypes'. These can best be compared with a kind of instinctive, cognitive schemata, i.e. schemata for perception, ideas and thoughts typical of the species. These archetypes are not only revealed in dreams, hallucinations and symptoms, but also in myths as well as in religious and artistic symbols. Freud refused to recognize the collective unconsciousness, and still less, that Jung used Freud's term 'libido' in a different sense. This was what Freud

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termed the sexual drive - later the energy of the life drives. But in Jung the term 'libido' was applied to a general psychical energy, or life-force. This theoretical disharmony led to the breach between Freud and Jung in 1912-14, whereafter Jung formed his own association for analytical psychology. Freud's subsequent references to Jung were always tinged with bitterness, whereas Jung recognized Freud's great importance and almost regarded his analytical psychology as a supplement to Freud's theory. Thus, Jung maintains that psychoanalytical theory is applicable to people in the first half of their lives (childhood, youth, establishment of the family), whereas his own theory is especially applicable to the latter half of life, in which people try to realize themselves as individuals, to understand themselves and their position in life, the 'meaning' and 'goal' of life, etc. Thus, comparatively speaking, Jung not only undertook analyses and therapy of his patients, but also, to a greater extent than Freud, analyses of culture, religion, philosophy and myths, etc. He was especially interested in the alchemy of the European Middle Ages and in oriental philosophies and religions. Because of his broad interest in 'spiritual systems', Jung had a great influence on modem humanistic psychology, which became interested in 'self-realization', and in transpersonal psychology, which studies higher states of consciousness. Jung died in 1961, but his theories were taken up again with renewed and increasing interest in the 70s in connection with the above-mentioned development of humanistic and transpersonal psychology. OTHER EARLY 'REVISIONISTS. For the sake of completion we should briefly

mention two psychoanalysts who broke with Freud quite early on and went their own ways, though without obtaining as many followers as Adler and Jung, who came to form microschools. OTTO RANK (1884-1939) was among Freud's first pupils. He wrote about the significance of the birth trauma. To start with, Freud was positive, and in his subsquent theory of anxiety from 1926 he integrated the birth trauma as a prototype anxiety-producing situation. But when Rank maintained the birth trauma to be the cause of neurosis, and advocated a simplified therapy by way of an immediate analysis of the patient's repressed birth anxiety, this naturally caused a break with Freud.


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WILHELM REICH (1897-1957) was a German psychoanalyst who elaborated

a theory about 'character' (see ,,Character Analysis", 1933), which viewed character as 'psychical armour'. Reich tried to integrate this extremely simpified theory with Marxism, since he regarded psychoanalysis and Marxism as two theories able to supplement one another, each of them dealing with its own field (respectively the individual and society). Reich's attempt was not very successful, since he was excluded both from the international association of psychoanalysts and from the German communist party. On account of Nazism Reich had to leave Germany, staying one year in Denmark and Norway before travelling on to the USA. Here he developed the extremely speculative 'orgon theory', which maintains that the release of muscular tension gave forth a biophysical energy called 'orgon energy' (because this occurred mostly during orgasm). When Reich subsequently began to base the treatment of cancer patients on this theory he was charged according to American law with being a quack, for he was not a qualified doctor. Later he was (declared to be) insane and died in an American state penitentiary. His theories nevertheless gained some followers among Scandinavian psychologists and psychiatrists, though with the exclusion of the extremely speculative orgon theory. THE NEO-FREUDIANS. This is a group or microschool which broke especially

with Freud's biological conception of man and substituted a conception of man as product of society. The most famous of these are Karen Homey and Eric Fromm. KAREN HORNEY (1885-1935) was originally a German psychoanalyst who worked at the psychoanalytical institute in Berlin. On account of Nazism she emigrated to the USA, where she worked at the psychoanalytical institutes in Chicago and New York. In the USA Homey gained understanding of the importance of social and cultural factors for both the normal and the neurotic development of personality. Thus, therapy should not concentrate on the sexual traumas of childhood alone, but also on the social situation of the adult patient. Horney has written several books, and these have been translated into many languages, especially her ,,New Ways in Psychoanalysis" (1949). ERIC FROMM (1900-1981)was educated in Germany, where he was attached to the Institute for Social Sciences at Frankfurt University, later known as the 'Frankfurter School'. Fromm too sought to integrate psychoanalysis and Marxism, which in accordance with the Frankfurter philosophy he regarded as 'critical sciences', or sciences whose purpose it is to criticize social phenomena

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with a view to object of achieving emancipation. Fromm emigrated during the 30s to the USA; he later resided for many years in Mexico, but finally returned to Europe, dying in Switzerland. Fromm's most famous work is probably ,,Fear of Freedom" (1942), in which he analyses the psychological background of Nazism. One of his last great works was ,,The Anatomy of Human Destruction" (1973), in which he puts forward a theory of aggression. Fromm was also interested in analysing religion, e.g. in ,,Psychoanalysis and Religion", and many of his books have been translated into several languages. EGO-PSYCHOLOGISTS.Finally, we must mention a group of psychoanalysts - a

microschool - who may be viewed as Freud's 'orthodox' successors. All of them have concentrated on the further development of the psychoanalytical theory of the ego, and so they can be collectively termed 'ego-psychologists'. We have already mentioned Anna Freud, who may be regarded as belonging to this school. Another prominent ego-psychologist is Heinz Hartmann (born 1894), whose first major work was ,Jch-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem", published in German in 1939 and in English in 1958. Among other prominent ego-psychologists Ernst Kris (1901-1957) and David Rapaport (1911-1961) could be mentioned. Some people also include Erik H . Erikson (born 1902), whose most well-known work from 1950 deals with the ego-development of the child under various social conditions. With the ego-psychological microschool we have reached the next period in the history of psychology (after the Second World War), which we shall deal with in Chapter 8. But first we shall analyse Freud's production.

Freud's production INTRODUCTION. In the previous section we have dealt with the history of the psychoanalytical community. From this it appeared that Freud was very interested in demarcating psychoanalysis's paradigm. He regarded it an important hypothesis in psychoanalysis's theory-paradigm that the sexual drive was the most important drive in the normal as well as the neurotic development of

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personality. Those pupils who proposed other ovemding hypotheses - as for exsmple Adler and Jung - were either excluded or resigned voluntarily from the international psychoanalytical community, in some cases even forming their own theoryparadigms and microschools. But it is usually accepted that they still belong to the psychoanalytical macroschool and share its metaparadigm. It could be interesting to undertake a meta-theoretical analysis and comparison of the production of Adler, Jung and other 'revisionists' in order to test whether they really share the same meta-paradigm. But for various reasons, including shortage of space, we must suffice with an analysis and reconstruction of Freud's production, refemng interested readers to other specific histories of psychoanalysis and its school formation (see Munroe, 1955). A meta-theoretical analysis of Freud's production is more difficult than that of the other meta-theoretical analyses we have undertaken (both here and in Madsen, 1959, 1974) for reason that Freud only produced a systematic account half-way through his copious production (namely ,,Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis", 1917). Unfortunately he did not manage to complete the ,,Outline" or ,,Abriss" which he was working on at the time of his death. This account may in any case have been too brief or popular to constitute a satisfactory foundation for a meta-theoreticalanalysis. Consequently, for lack of a representative, systematic account we are obliged to incorporate the whole of Freud's production in this meta-theoretical analysis. Since Freud's production is extensive (comprising 24 volumes of about 500 pages in the English Standard Edition), it is a big job to undertake such an analysis, and the description of the analysis and the results of the reconstruction must be more concentrated in form, if the chapter on psychoanalysis is not to be disproportionately long. The interested reader may be referred to some of the many extensive scientific accounts relating to Freud and psychoanalysis (see Arlow and Brenner, 1964; Colby, 1955; Peterfreund, 1971; Gill, 1963; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1954; Lesche and Madsen, 1976; Nagera, 1969; Andkjaer Olsen and Koppe, 1988; Rapaport, 1960; Sandler et al., 1975; Sherwood, 1969; Sjoback, 1973). We shall follow the usual disposition in the systematological taxonomy (see Appendix).

Freud's Meta-stratum INTRODUCTION. Freud's meta-theses are to be found spread over his entire production, but there are especially many to be found in the so-called 'meta-

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psychological papers'. Freud used the term 'meta-psychology' for the first time in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess (letter No. 41, 1896, see Freud, S.E.), but he did not define the term until two years afterwards in a letter to Fliess (No. 84, 1898), in which he proposed applying the term 'meta-psychology' to that part of psychology which 'leads behind consciousness'l. Later he introduced the meta-psychological concepts 'topographical', 'dynamic' and 'economic' (see S.E., Vol. 14, p. 181)2 It appears from his proposed definitions that Freud applies the term metapsychology to the accounts which transcend the empirical ('lead behind consciousness') and uses transempirical (hypothetical)terms from one of the three categories he introduces, ('topographical', 'dynamic' and 'economic'). We shall return to these later. The term 'meta-psychology' has presumably been formed by analogy with 'metaphysics'. These meta-psychological accounts also turn out to include meta-theses of a scientijk nature. The above-mentioned classification of possible 'description' (or rather explanations) into topographical, dynamic and economic is in itself a meta-theoretical classification. It corresponds to the metatheoretcial classifications employed in the systematological taxonomy as follows: 1. 'Topic', 'topographical' or 'structural' are used to denote transempirical descriptions of the (ontological or hypothetical) structures entering into the psychical system. To these, therefore, belong the descriptions of Freud's two famous models of 'the psychical apparatus'. 2. 'Dynamic' is used to denote transempirical (ontological or hypothetical) descriptions of the processes taking place in the psychical system. To these belongs Freud's theory about 'primary and secondary processes', to which we shall return later. 3. 'Economic' is used to denote transempirical (ontological or hypothetical) descriptions of energy states and changes in the psychical system. To these possibly belongs Freud's theory of the drives.

If we compare this meta-psychological classification with the classifications of hypothetical variables in the systemtological taxonomy, we find the following:

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1. A classification according to existentialform into structures and processes

in also to be found in Freud's classification, since the first category - topic, topographical or structural - corresponds to the structures in the systematology, whereas the two other categories refer to the processes. 2. A classification according to function into dynamic, directive and vector variables, is not clearly expressed in Freud's writings. 'Economic' refers to energy and energy changes, thus corresponding to the systematology's dynamic variables; while meta-psychology's 'dynamic' view encompasses all variables, dynamic, directive and vector alike. It is possible - like Olsen and Kgppe (1982) - to create a certain clarity by viewing meta-psychology's dynamic aspect as covering exclusively 'primary processes' and 'secondary processes'. These two process-categories most closely approximate the systematology's directive variables - the primary processes, and possibly the secondary, have at any rate a dynamic constituent and thus constitute combined vector variables. In other words: meta-psychology's 'dynamic' concepts almost correspond to the systematology's directive process-variables, whereas meta-psychology's 'economic'concepts almost correspond to the systematology's dynamic process variables. The difference between the meta-psychological and systematological classifications

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may be further clarified by converting Freud's concepts into the customary table (see Table 7.1 p. 277). We shall discuss the classification of the hypothetical variables in more detail in connection with the hypothetical stratum. Until now we have allowed the question as to whether Freud's meta-psychological concepts and formulations are ontological or hypothetical remain open. The only thing to be derived explicitly from Freud's own definition is that the meta-psychological concepts and theses are transempirical ('lead behind consciousness'), as Freud expresses it in the definition referred to). But, strictly speaking, the term 'transempirical' covers both hypotheses and ontological meta-theses, the difference between these being that hypotheses are empirically testable. However, a careful metatheoretical analysis, to which we shall refer later, shows that Freud's 'meta-psychology' contains both ontological and philosophical meta-theses as well as testable hypotheses and explanatory models. In accordance with the systematological taxonomy we shall first of all deal with the ontological meta-theses and thereafter with the philosophical metatheses. Freud's explanatory models and hypotheses will be dealt with in the following section about the hypothetical stratum. ONTOLOGICAL ETA-THESES. It is possible on the basis of Freud's scattered remarks to reconstruct his ontological meta-theses about: 1) the conception of man, 2) psycho-physical relations, and 3) the problem of determinism.

1. The conception of man. Like the natural scientists of his time Freud pos-

sesses a biological conception of man, which is influenced by evolutionary theory (Lamarck, Darwin and Spencer). There are no brief formulations to be found in the first part of Freud's production, but, underlying the entire theory of the drives in ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920) is a biological developmental philosophy which accounts for the development from inorganic matter via organic life to unconscious and consciouspsyche3. 2. Psycho-physical theory. It has been difficult for the various authors who have written about Freud's theories to agree as to which psycho-physical theory Freud held. This is partly due to the lack of explicit formulations in ac-

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cepted philosophical terminology, and possibly also to the changes he made in his theory during its long period of development. Freud (and Breuer) shared the materialist 'Weltanschauung' of their time (which, as far as the psycho-physical problem is concerned, should rather be classified as an epiphenomenalism). Later Freud abandoned purely neurophysiological explanations and formulated his explanations with the help of (hypothetical) psychological terms. As a result, some people have classified Freud's psycho-physical theory as dualism (see e.g. Lesche and Madsen, 1976). Others, on the contrary, have viewed Freud's theory as an example of neutral monism - especially in Gilbert Ryle's version (see Ryle, 1949). This view was also maintained by the philosopher Nils Egmont Christensen (see Christensen, 1961). Finally, Ole AndkjRr Olsen and Simo K@ppeinterpreted Freud's psychophysical theory on the basis of three qualitively different 'levels of discourse': 1. The biophysical level: The organism and its nervous system. 2. The level of psychical quantities: The unconscious (in the widest sense, i.e. what Freud calls 'the descriptive unconsciousness', which we shall discuss later). 3. The level of psychical qualities: Consciousness. This interpretation in terms of levels puts Freud's psycho-physical theory into the same class as various modern pluralistic theories (e.g. Popper and Eccles, 1977) as well as system theory. It also proves very fruitful in Olsen and Kprppe's account (see Olsen and Kprppe, 1982).

Of the various interpretations of Freud's psycho-physical theory I have most sympathy for the latter (the pluralistic level-theory), but it has not been possible to find any instances in which Freud discusses psycho-physical relations in accordance with the theory of levels. On the other hand, there is a fairly clear example of a neutral-monistic theory in Freud's account of 'the lens model' in Chaper 7 of ,,The Interpretation of Dreams". Here he writes in the introduction that the 'mental apparatus' is also known to us in the form of an anatomical 'preparation', or rather, organ (i.e. the brain). But this he chooses to disregard, subsequently describing it as a lens system (photograhic apparatus or microscope)4. This derives from the fact that Freud regards the brain ('the anatomical preparation') as being identical with the mental apparatus (regarded as analo

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gous to a lens system). This interpretation of Freud's theory as an identity theory must be seen in the light of the fact that in ,,Project for a Scientific Psychology" from 1895 Freud's discourse was couched in neuro-physiological concepts which were structurally identical with the lens model. This suggests that since he has so easily been able to 're-write'neurophysiological'language' as psychological 'language' Freud has regarded the brain and the 'mental apparatus' as identical. Furthermore Freud refers on the same page to Fechner, who, as mentioned in Chapter 4, professed an identity theory (or 'parallelistic theory'). Early in his production Freud employed the term 'psyho-physical parallelism'. In 'practice' the difference between these two theories is very slight, as Popper pointed out (in Popper and Eccles, 1977). Thus we must conclude that in ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" Freud presupposed a neutral monistic identity theory as far as the psycho-physical problem is concerned. A careful meta-theoretical analysis of Freud's later metapsychological writings (e.g. ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), ,,The Ego and the Id" (1923) and ,,Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926) has not been able to reveal any explicit or impicit accounts of a psycho-physical theory. So we must uphold the classification of Freud's psycho-physical theory as an identity theory. This conclusion does not need to conflict with the interpretation in terms of levels put forward by Olsen and [email protected] two of the levels are psychical while one is physical. In other words, Freud's lens model is regarded as a model of the 'mental apparatus', which comprises both the level of psychical quantities (= the unconscious) as well as the level of psychic qualities (= consciousness). Freud's psycho-physical theory relates these two levels in the psyche (= the mental apparatus) with the physical level (= the brain). On the whole it is possible to regard a psycho-physical theory like, for example, the identity theory, as the preliminary stage of a more comprehensive 'Weltanschauung' like a pluralistic *multi-level'theory.

3. The problem of determinism. Whereas it was difficult to determine which psycho-physical theory Freud held, it is much-easier to characterize Freud's ontology as causal determinist. Psychoanalysis came into being and developed

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at a time when all natural sciences were assumed to be causal determinist. At that time there existed no other acceptable 'Weltanschauung' capable of being combined with a natural scientific ideal. 'Free-will indeterminism' was not acceptable for a natural science, and it was only after the First World War that probabilism became known and accepted in atomic physics. Since Freud was educated in the natural sciences, and - as we shall see later - retained a natural scientific ideal of science during the whole of his life, he had necessarily to presuppose causal determinism. Perhaps this is most clearly expressed in ,,The Psychopathology of Everyday Life" (1904), in which he mes to show that even seemingly chance slips of the tongue and erroneous actions are determined. One has merely to take unconscious motives into account in order to reveal psychical functions to be causal determinists. The aim of psychoanalytical theory is of course to emancipate by way of self-insight ('to make the unconscious conscious'). This aim apparently conflicts with smct causal determinism, but only apparently so. It could also be expressed as follows: self-insight also becomes a determining factor among the many other conscious and unconscious causes of behaviour. Finally, it should be stressed that Freud's form of determinism is not the simple mechanist but the more complex dialectical (dynamic) form of determinism. Psychoanalysis always takes into account a complicated interplay between several external and internal causes; the internal causes too may conflict with one another, so that the action is the result of opposing (conscious and unconscious) 'driving forces'. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. In this section we shall analyse Freud's 1) epistemology, 2) metatheory and 3) methodology: 1. FREUD'S EPISTEMOLOGY. Freud deals with the two epistemological problems - the origin of cognition and cognition's relation to reality (see Appendix) as one. He seems, as pointed out by Rapaport (1960), to have accepted Kant's attempt at a synthesis of the classical epistemological theories. Kant maintained that our cognition is a synthesis of perception and thought, which latter is determined by our innate forms of perception and categories of thought. This cognition is incapable of revealing the reality behind the phenomena ('das Ding an sich) to be in fact independent of our cognition, but Kant assumes the existence of an independent, objective reality (cf. Chapter 3)6.

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It appears from this that Freud's epistemology is instrumentalist (pragmatic) in character, and is far from being a naive realism and an idealism. This instrumentalism was already to be found in his important work ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" from 1900, in which he writes in connection with the introduction of the lens model that such a model of the psychical apparatus had not previously been put forward, but he regards it as scientifically permissable so long as one does not mistake 'the scaffolding for the building' (i.e. the model for reality)7. Freud expresses here an instrumentalist philosophy of science which stresses the heuristic value of model construction ('the scaffolding'), at the same time as it reminds us that a model is only a schematized construction, a rough hypothesis, which should not be mistaken for reality itself. Freud stuck to this instrumentalist conception coupled with a fruitful distance to his own models ('the coolness of our judgement') throughout his entire life. This may be seen especially in his creativeness as regards new models and in his undogmatic attitude towards the models themselves. 2. FREUD'S METATHEORY. Freud's entire production shows very clearly that he adhered throughout his life to a nomothetic (natural scientific) ideal of science. This was a product of his medical training, which, in accordance with the scientific ideals of his time, regarded physics and chemistry as models for physiology and its application to medicine. The natural scientific ideal finds expression in the originally unpublished manuscript ,,Project for a Scientific Psychology" from 1895, the word 'scientific' meaning here 'natural scientific'. Later, phrases like 'psychoanalysis and the other natural sciences' are to be found in other of his writings, showing that Freud himself regarded psychoanalysis to be a natural science. Even in Freud's last, incomplete work ,,An Outline" (1940) one finds an explicit expression for a natural scientific ideal8. It appears clearly from this work that Freud regarded psychoanalysis to be a natural science with a special connection with biology. So there cannot be any doubt that Freud always adhered to a nomothetic ideal of science. Later we shall see that Freud also tried to realize the nomothetic idea of science by producing models and hypotheses about the psychical 'apparatus' as an explanation of consciousness and behaviour.

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But apart from nomothetic explanations Freud also 'practices' hermeneutic

interpretaions, but without oflcially (explicitly) putting forward a hermeneutic ideal of science. This has been stressed by philosophers like the German K.0.Apel (see Apel, 1973) and the Frenchman P . Ricouer (see Ricouer, 1969). Apel has shown especially that psychoanalysis is a science that integrates both hermeneutic and nomothetic sciences. According to Carl Lesche and Ellen Stjernholm Madsen the integration of the two ideals of science proceeds as a dialectical interaction in the following manner (see Fig. 7.1, which has been borrowed from Lesche and Madsen, 1976): The process consisting of psychoanalysis and the associated therapy starts as a diafogue between the analyst and the client, or patient. This dialogue will for a time create understanding on the part of the analyst of the client's psychical processes, because the analyst has a certain pre-understanding (which is based on a common language, common experience, common conception of rationality and psychoanalytical knowledge on the part of the analyst). The analyst's understanding is formulated as a hypothesis about the client's conscious and unconscious psychical processes. This hypothesis forms the basis for the analyst's continued interpretation and understanding. At some point or other, however, the analyst may happen not to understand the client. For example, the case in point may be a dream the patient has related and which the analyst is unable to understand. The analyst then attempts to switch to a nomothetic explanation. This explanation builds on psychoanalytical theory, which theory resembles natural scientific theories in structure, but is nevertheless different from the theories of physics, for example. Therefore it is called a 'quasi-naturalistic theory'. On the basis of the psychanalytical theory a hypothesis of a general nature (a nomothetic hypothesis) is put forward. This may, for example, be a hypothesis about the incidence and development of a dream. In the actual psychoanalytical process this nomothetic hypothesis must be applied to the concrete development of the client's personality. This is done by way of a historical expfanation of the client's life history. On the basis of this historical hypothesis the analyst provides an interpretation of the client's discourse - e.g. his account of the dream. This results in increased insight on the part of the client, and also contributes to the client's emancipation. The interpretation furthermore results in a continuation of the dialogue until a new incomprehensible point in the conversation is reached. Then the analyst has once again to switch to a nomo-

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thetic explanation, which can later be converted into an interpretation. Thus, according to this metatheoretical conception of psychoanalysis, the psychoanalytical process consists of such a continuous dialectical interaction between two levels, or phases, consisting of hermeneutic interpretation and nomothetic {quasi-naturalistic) explanations. In this way psychoanalysis may be regarded as a science that integrates two ideals of science: the nomothetic and the hermeneutic. Since the analytical process results in self-insight and emancipation, one could say that psychoanalysis also integrates the third of the Frankfurter school's ideals of science - the critical. K.-0. Apel considers that in this point psychoanalysis could function as a model for other social and humanistic sciences. 3. FREUD'S METHODOLOGY. According to the systematological taxonomy, this

comprises both empirical methods and data-language. 3.1. Psychoanalytical method, as previously mentioned, consists of a special combination of observational and terapeutic methods. We have already discussed the method as observational method in connection with the discussion of psychoanalysis as a combined nomothetic and hermeneutic science (see the previous section about the ideal of science). Later, under the data-stratum, we shall discuss the practical problems concerned with the method as therapeutic method, so we shall suffice here with a classification of psychoanalytical method in accordance with the systematological taxonomy. It should be classified as a qualitative method, almost an interview method, although it has a certain similarity with field observation. Finally, psychoanalysis also has points of similarity with the experiment, since it is traditionally carried out in a standard manner - at any rate by psychoanalysts who are members of the international psychoanalytical community. 3.2. The data-language of psychoanalysis may be viewed and classified in different ways depending on which ideal of science one attributes to Freud. American psychoanalytical theoreticians like Rapaport ( 1959) and Frenkel-Brunswik (1954) maintain that psychoanalysis uses public behavioral language - like American psychology in general. Thus the client's speech is regarded as 'verbal behaviour'. On the other hand, hermeneutically-oriented philosophers (Apel, Radnitzky and Ricoeur; see also Lesche and Madsen, 1976) maintain that the client's speech is meaningful language which, according to the hermeneutic ideal of science, is essentially different from behaviour. Meaningful language

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can be subjected to interpretation if not immediately understood. If it remains incomprehensible even after interpretation, then it is not meaningful language but verbal behaviour, which can be subjected to explanation. But irrespective of whether it is viewed as meaningful language or verbal behaviour, according to the systematological taxonomy it must be classified as private phenomenological data made publically accessible by means of verbalization. Freud himself is not concerned with precisely that classification problem. But he emphasizes several times that psychoanalytical method is superior to the introspection of classical psychology, which latter fails especially where unconscious processes are concemed9. In the light of the above we may conclude this section on methodology as follows: psychoanalytical method is a unique psychological method, which nevertheless has points of similarity with other psychological methods. Its peculiarity is that it produces private phenomenological data as well as public behavioral data capable of being made the object of hermeneutic interpretation as well as nomothetic explanation. SUMMARY OF THE META-STRATUM. We may conclude the metatheoretical

analysis of the meta-stratum in Freud's production as follows: Freud's metamodel (ontology)is characterized by a biological conception of man, a neutralmonistic (possibly parallelist) psychophysical theory and determinism. Freud's philosophy of science is characterized by a 'Kantian' (instrumentalist) epistemology, and a nomothetic ideal of science, which is supplemented with a hermeneutic praxis by way of the unique psychoanalytical method.

Freud's Hypothetical St raturn INTRODUCTION. The hypothesis-system. It is especially difficult to undertake a metatheoretical analysis and reconstruction of Freud's hypothetical stratum, because he did not produce one but several theories (= sets of hypotheses). These theories are of a different date, since they cover about fifty years of production. Some of the oldest have therefore been revised or replaced by new theories without any attempt at systematization on the part of Freud (apart from the ,,Introductory Lectures" from 1917 supplemented by those from 1932, and ,,An Outline" from 1939). Moreover, Freud's theories possess dif-

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ferent degree of abstraction; some of them - the so-called 'metapsychological' theories - contain almost exclusively purely theoretical hypotheses, while others contain relatively more empirical hypotheses. It can therefore be advantageous to undertake a systematological reconstruction of Freud's theoretical production, such that Freud's theories may be regarded as a hierarchical system consisting of several levels of abstraction. 1. The most abstract theories are the metapsychological theories about psychical topography or structure. To these belong especially the lens model from ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900), which was later (1923) replaced by the 'structural' theory about the Id, the Ego and the Super-ego. 2. The intermediate level of abstraction is composed of theories aboutpsychical economy and dynamics. To these belong the theory of the drives, the theory of anxiety and the theory about primary and secondary processes. 3. The least abstract level of theories is that which contains relatively many empirical hypotheses. To these belong theories about erroneous actions, dreams, neuroses and psycho-sexual development. It is these theories that are the oldest. (See fig. 7.2.) In the following we shall deal with Freud's hypothetical stratum in the above order, finally undertaking the usual systematological analysis of the most important hypothetical terms used in Freud's theories. THE STRUCTURAL THEORIES. These theories are the most abstract,

'metapsychological' theories. They consist especially of two theories from respectively 1900 and 1923, which we shall first discuss separately and then compare. On the other hand we cannot include a metatheoretical analysis of the model in ,,The Project" (1985), but refer readers to the extremely detailed analysis undertaken by Pribram and Gill (1976). 1. THE TOPOGRAPHICALTHEORY (1900). This theory about 'the psychical apparatus' was presented in Chapter 7 of ,,The Interpretation of Dreams", which features the so-called 'lens model'. The psychical apparatus is regarded as analogous to a lens system (e.g. a camera or a microscope) in which the lenses correspond to the three systems of the psychical apparatus: 1) the unconscious system (Ucs), 2) the pre-conscious system (Pcs) and 3) the conscious system (Cs). In the graphic model (see Fig. 7.3) the perceptual system (Pcpt) is indicated as constituting the 'entrance' to the entire psychical apparatus, and the motor system (M) as constituting its exit,

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I Philosophy of science:

Ontology: 1. Identity theory 2. Biological conception of man 3. Determinism (dynamic)

1. Kantian Epistemology 2. Nomothetic and hermeneutic ideals of science 3. Psychoanalyticalmethod

Topographical theory Lens model

Structural theory Id, Ego, Super Ego

I B3

B, Energy-anddrive-theory

B2

c,

c,

c 3

Theory about erroneous actions and slips of the tongue

Dream theory

Neurosis theory

Anxiety theory

Theory about primary and secundary processes

Data-theses:

Pragmu-theses:

Life histories, dream examples, etc.

Therapeutical prescripts I

Fig. 7.2. Suivey of Freud's theories. Theory A and B constitute the Metapsychology.

the apparatus as a whole consisting of a complicated sort of 'reflex arc'. Finally, nearest to the perceptual system some recollection or memory traces (Mnem, Mnem') are indicated. As the graphic model demonstrates, the conscious system (Cs) is not indicated, and according to an added footnote this is unnecessary, because Cs is equal to the perceptual system (Pcpt). But in one of the letters to Fliess (6.12.1896)Freud included in a very rough sketch both the perceptual system (Pcpt) on the extreme left and the conscious system (Cs) on the extreme right, though not the motor system. Freud has aparently been in doubt, possibly be-

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cause the graphic model was not intended to indicate consciousness as quality, but to consist exclusively of an analogy model of the structure of the psychical system. Furthermore, in the first verbal representation of the model, Freud indicates that the psychic localization corresponds to the localization of the socalled 'ideal' or fictive images common to models of optic systems. Moreover, Freud did not need a separate localization of the perceptual (Pcpt) and conscious (Cs) systems as far as an explanation of dream processes was concerned. This will appear from the following systematic reconstruction of the partially implicit hypotheses which can be derived explicitly from Freud's textlo. But first a brief summary of Freud's text that introduces the lens model. Psychical processes in the waken state proceed as a rule from the percpetual system via the subsystems of the psychical system to the motor system, which precipitates action. Nightdreaming is hallucinatory perception resulting from a process in the psychical system which starts in the perceptual system or in the unconscious system and proceeds through all the subsystems to the pre-conscious system, which then resists any further admittance to the motor system, so that the process is obliged to proceed 'backwards' through the subsystems to end in the perceptual system. This text may be reconstructed in 9 symbolically formulated hypotheses as followsll: 1. Hypothesis: S (external) + H (Perception) 2. Hypothesis: H (Perception) -+ H (Memoryl) 3. Hypothesis: H (Memoryl) + H (Memory2) 4. Hypothesis: S (internal) -+ H (Unconscious motives) 5. Hypothesis: H (Ucs. motives) -+ H (Preconscious system) 6. Hypothesis: H (Pcs. repression) + H (Memory2) Pcpt Mnem Mnem'

ucs

Pcs

Fig. 7.3 FreudS lens model: The psychical lapparatus' portrayed as analogous to u lens system like a microscope (dter ,,The Interpretation of Dreams", 1900).

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7. Hypothesis: H (Memoryz) + H (Memoryl) 8. Hypothesis: H (Memoryl) + H (HallucinatoryPcpt.) 9. Hypothesis: H (Perception) + R (Verbal report) The topographical theory with the lens model was employed by Freud from 1900 until 1923, when he put forward a new theory. 2. THE STRUCTURAL THEORY(1923).This theory was presented systematically in ,,The Ego and the Id', although there had been inklings of it during the preceding years. Later, even the graphic model was revised, acquiring the following appearance in ,,New Introductory Lectures" from 1932 (see Fig. 7.4). The development of the graphic model itself is discussed and reproduced in Andk j m Olsen and K#ppe (1988). As the graphic model indicates, the psychical system consists of three subsystems (or structures): the 'ego' (Ich), the 'super-ego' (Uber-Ich) and the 'id' (das Es). These subsystems are defined relatively briefly and precisely in ,,An Outline''12. The definitions will be concentrated even further in the following refor-

mulated definitions: The psychical system (or personality) consists of three subsystems:

pcpt-cs

@e-conscioL

Pcpt.-"-

f: ... ,...

tn

\--kunconscious

I

Fig. 7.4. The structural theory: the psychical system concist of 3 structures: Id, Ego and Super-ego. Thefigure presents two versions of the graphical model from 1932 and from 1923.

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1. The id is the biologically determined (inherited, innate) structure, whose function is unconscious and consists of transforming corporeal needs into psychical drives. The id is the psychical system's most important energy reservoir. 2. The ego is a structure which is developed fi-om the id. The ego's function is to control the individual's actions by means of conscious and unconscious cognitive processes in such a way that the individual survives and acquires optimum satisfaction of his needs. 3. The super-ego is a structure which is developed under the influence of the environment (especially the parents). Its function is to pass conscious and unconscious moral evaluation and judgement, and it causes the ego to repress or regulate the drives with the help of defence mechanisms. Popularly speaking, the three subsystems may be defined thus: 1. Id = 'drives' 2. Ego = 'reason' 3. Super-ego = 'conscience' Continuing these reformulations we are now able to reformulate the overrid-

ing hypothesis in the structural theory: Human behaviour (which includes normal actions and psychopathological symptoms) is the result of the interplay between the more or less conflicting subsystems ofthe psychical system, during which the ego steers behaviour, at the same time paying attention to the id's drives, the super-ego's moral demands and the concrete situation. Through lack of space we shall refrain from systematically reconstructing the structural theory, because it does not appear in such a short and precise form as the topographical theory. 3. COMPARISON. Superficially speaking it might appear as if the difference between the two structural theories were purely terminological, since they both operate with three systems. Thus the 'id' would be a substitute for the 'unconscious' system, the 'ego' for the 'pre-conscious' and 'conscious' systems, while the 'super-ego' would correspond to the 'censor', which Freud later introduced into the topographical system between the unconscious and pre-conscious systems. However, it is not quite as simple as that. A very clearly set out comparison between the two structural ('topic') theories is to be found in Andkjzr Olsen and Kgppe (1981), who have summarized the comparisons in a diagram reproduced here as Fig. 7.5.

The physical-biological level

The level of the psychical quantities

m The Somatic

The repressed

The repressing

Word-representations

The level of the psychical qualities

The Conscious

m

u

Tabel 7.5.Comparison of Freud's two topographic (structural) theories (adapted after A n d h r Olsen and Simo K@ppe (1988) by permission).

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The diagram indicates that the structural theory differs from the topographical theory in introducing the super-ego. This has a repressive function and thus constitutes the direct cause of the conflict between the ego and the id. Both repressed representations and object-representations are localized in the id, and both of them have difficulty in becoming conscious. The same applies to the repressing representations which, together with the repressed representations and the object-representations constitute the 'dynamic unconscious'. As opposed to these three groups of dynamic unconscious 'representations', wordrepresentations can easily become conscious. All these groups of 'representations' ought really to be called memory traces (brain traces, engrams), because the word 'representation' (German = Vorstellungen) normally implies something conscious. But Freud was not consistent in his use of terminology in this field. A more comprehensive comparison is to be found in Arlow and Brenner: ,,Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory" from 1964. Here the following likenesses between the two structural theories are listed. 1. Both theories deal with the structure of the psychical system. 2. Therefore both theories need to be supplemented with other theories about the function (in metapsychological terminology, 'dynamics' and 'economy') of the psychical system. 3. Unconsciousprocesses appear in both theories. 4. Conflicts play a big part in both theories. Arlov and Brenner indicate the following differences between the structural theory ('S.T.') from 1923 and the topographical theory ('T.T.') from 1900: 1.

The classflcation principle: a) In 'T.T.' the principle of classification is 'conscious versus unconscious', and the psychical 'apparatus' therefore comes to include three systems: an unconscious system, a conscious system as well as a 'partially conscious' or pre-conscious system. b) In 'S.T.' the principle of classification is the possibilities for conflict, and the psychical system therefore comes to include three systems: two conflict-creating systems - the id and the super-ego as well as a conflict-reducing system - the ego.

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Freud realized that the latter principle of classification (the possibilities for conflict) had greater importance for explanation than the former (conscious versus unconscious). 2. The genetic view: The development of the psychical systems plays a greater role in 'S.T.' than in 'T.T.'. The genetic view becomes just as important in the end as the three other metapsychological views (structural, economic and dynamic). The two comparisons referred to have been especially concerned with the psychological content of the theories. We shall therefore supplement them with a metatheoretical comparison of the theories'form. Both theories explain with the help of analogy models presented in the form of graphic models. In the first theory ('T.T.' from 1900) the psychical system (or 'apparatus', as it is significantly called at that time) is regarded as analogous to a physical system (a lens system). In the second theory ('S.T.' from 1923) the psychical system is regarded as analogous to a biological system. The latter is particularly noticeable in the first introduction in ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), where Freud compares the psychical system with a ,,vesicle of a substance that is susceptible to stimulation"~3. From the following pages in Freud' account it appears that the abovementioned 'vesicle' is compared with a foetus in its very first stage or with a monocellular organism. But Freud makes no attempt to discuss the further differentiation of this 'vesicle' in ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle". This appears in ,,The Ego and the Id" (from 1923) in connection with the presentation of the graphic modell4. This presentation clearly indicates that Freud has conceived of a biological analogy to the psychical system, as even the graphic model shows - especially the version from 1923. Common to both of Freud's structural theories is his deliberately intended instrumentalist metatheory regarding analogy explanations with the aid of models. This is manifest in several places in his production - especially in connection with his presentation of graphic models. Freud's instrumentalist metatheory implies a conscious use of analogies in explanations,together with a deliberate differentiation between the analogy itselfand the graphic model. (Moreover, Freud used many analogies apart from

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the two formulated in graphic models). Finally, Freud's instrumentalist metatheory becomes manifest in his undogmatic, tolerant attitude to the models. They are not viewed as absolutely true representations of a field of reality ('the mind'), but as conscious schematizations of the psychical system. Therefore the two structural models can be used side by side, each having its own advantage. The lens model is more suitable for explaining dreams, whereas the structural model is better for explaining the development and function of the personality. This comparison of the two structural theories should really have included Freud's neuro-psychological model in ,,The Project", since many psychologists maintain that this model contains the 'hidden model' which Freud himself had constantly in mind when formulating the other models. Moreover, Karl Pribram, a modem neuropsychologist, has maintained that it is Freud's most valuable and testable theory (see Pribram and Gill, 1976). But, for lack of space, we must refrain from dealing with ,,The Project" here. As previously mentioned, a complete psychoanalytical explanation demands not only a structural but an 'economic'and dynamic explanation. This is to be found in the next level of abstraction in Freud's theories, where we shall first of all deal with the drive theory. THE DRIVE-THEORY. This theory contains a combination of economic and dy-

namic views, the 'economic' aspect in the psychoanalytical theories being the energy concept that became associated with the drive concept. Previously the energy concept was directly associated with other concepts. Therefore we shall start by accounting briefly for the energy-concept and then deal with the drive concept, the drive classifications and the drive hypotheses. 1. The concept of energy. Here we shall give a brief survey of the development of the energy concept in FreudS theories: 1.1. 'Psychical energy' = 'affective energy': In the period up till 1895, during his collaboration with Breuer, 'psychical energy' was identified with affective energy. This energy arose especially as the result of external stimulation. If this was very violent, an accumulation of energy could take place which had to be abreacted in the interests of psychical health. If the accumulation of affective energy was so great that it could not be abreacted, the situation be-

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came what was called traumatic, and this could result in the development of a neurosis. 1.2. 'Psychical energy' = 'nervous energy': In the ,,Project" from 1895 'psychical energy' was identified with nervous energy, which was envisaged almost as quanta of excitation (by analogy with electrical charges). 1.3. 'Psychical energy' = 'drive energy'. From 1900-1926 'psychical energy' was identified with drive energy. 1.4. 'Psychical energy' = drive energy + 'bound energy'. From 1926 'psychical energy' was subdivided into mobile energy (= 'drive energy') and bound energy (= 'Besetzung' or 'cathexis', i.e. energy bound to 'representations' (or memory traces) as well as defensive and controlling structuresl5. In addition, the use of the energy concept has been widely discussed among psychoanalytical theoreticians. Peterfreund (197 1) entirely dismisses the concept as vitalist. Rapaport, on the other hand, is less negative, comparing psychical energy (in Rapaport, 1959, p. 52) with the energy in a computer controlling a fully automaticized factory. This analogy with information theory appears fruitful and quite in keeping with the 'system thinking' associated with both of Freud's structural theories. We shall hereby turn from the energy-economicaspects to the dynamic aspects, which are dealt with together with the drive theory as well as in other theories about psychical processes. 2. Definition of the drive concept. The concept of drive was not introduced explicitly into Freud's theories until 1905, when it appeared in ,,Three Essays on Sexuality". Later (in 1915) it was further amplified in ,,Instincts and their Vicissitudes". Finally, the drive theory was thoroughly revised in 1920 in ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle". In 1915 Freud defines 'drives' (or 'instincts') thus:

,,...'instinct' appears to us a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind" (S.E., Vol 14, p.121) ,,By the pressure [Drang] of an instinct we understand its motor factor, its amount of force or the measure of the demand for work which it represents" (S.E., Vol. 14, p.122).

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,,The aim [Ziel] of an instinct is in every instance satisfaction, which can only be obtained by removing the state of stimulation at the source of the instinct." (S.E., Vol. 14, p. 122) ,,The object [Objekt] of an instinct is the thing in regard to which or through which the instinct is able to achieve its aim" (S.E., Vol, 14, p. 122). ,,By the source [Quelle] of an instinct is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an instinct " (S.E., Vol. 14, p. 123). On the basis of these definitions we can undertake a metatheoretical comparison between Freud's drive concept and the drive concept used in American neo-behaviorist motivational psychology, especially as formulated in Hull's theory (cf. Chapter 6). The first thing to be stressed is the similarity: Both Freud's and Hull's drive concepts are hypothetical variables, a distinction being made between the empirical, independent variable - 'need' - and the 'intervening', hypothetical variable - 'drive'. Even though Freud does not use terminology with hypothetical variables, etc. he makes it quite clear that drives are not directly observable. In the (private) conscious drives are solely manifest as feelings of pleasure and displeasure. In Hull, drive is one of the explicitly defined hypothetical terms ('theoretical constructs'). The diference between the two drive concepts is especially the following: whereas in the systematological taxonomy Hull's 'drive' is a process-variable with a purely dynamic function, Freud's 'trieb' is also a process-variable, but with a combined dynamic and directive function, i.e. a 'vector-variable'. This may be derived from the fact that the object of the drive enters as a component into the definition of drives, which are thus - per definition - directed towards a goal. Furthermore, one has to bear in mind that the German word 'Trieb', used by Freud, was unfortunately translated into English as 'instinct' right from the start, whereas 'drive' would have been a better translation. With the advent of ethology (Lorenz and Tinbergen) the concept of instinct has completely changed its meaning to that of innate 'steering mechanisms' typical of the species, so it has become especially misleading to use 'instinct' instead of 'drive'. American psychoanalytical theoreticians have been clear about this unfortunate usage of the word 'instinct' for a long time, and it is now common for 'Trieb to be translated as 'drive' in American psychoanalytical works. In some cases (e.g. Rapaport) 'instinctual drive' is used in order to distinguish be-

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tween the psychoanalytical and the neo-behaviorist concept of 'drive', which we have already discussed. But the English ,,Standard Edition" of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud still employs the term 'instinct'. After this discussion of Freud's definitions of the drive concept we shall deal with the various classifications of drives. 3. Drive class@cations. Freud made use of various classifications of the drives. In thefirst period of the drive theory (c. 1900-1915) Freud used the following classification:

1) Ego-drives (or 'self-preservation drives'); 2) Sexual drives (or 'libido'). With ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle" in 1920 Freud introduced a new classification: 1) 'Life drives' or 'Eros' (= libido + ego-drives); 2) 'Death drives' or 'Thanatos' (the destructive part of the previous sexual drives and ego-drives). Freud's introduction of the death drive (Thanatos) was the result of both philosophical and theoretical deliberations and clinical observations. The philosophical deliberations consist of a speculative philosophy about the origin, development and destruction of life as the result of a complicated interplay of conflicting life drives and death drives. The theoretical deliberations consist of a new explanation of masochism and sadism, which, according to Freud, is better explained on the basis of an assumed destructive drive combined with the sexual drive. The clinical observations consist especially of the discovery of the repetition-compulsion, i.e. the compulsive repetition of unpleasant representations and/or actions, which are found in normal as well as neurotic persons. Many of Freud's disciples, however, have never been able to accept the philosophical speculation about the origin of life, and have not therefore been able to accept the concept of the 'death drive'. They maintain that the theoretical demands and clinical observations are together only sufficient to justify a less speculative concept - the 'destructive drive' or 'aggressive drive'.

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We have thereby reached the last point in the drive theory:

4.Drive hypotheses. The overriding hypothesis in Freud's (biological) drive theory is a so-called 'constancy' or 'homeostasis hypothesis'. Freud describes this most concisely in ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle" from 1920 (S.E., Vol. 18, p. 57): ,,For it traces the origin of an instinct to a need to restore an earlier state of things". This hypothesis also applies to the death drive, whose goal is to re-establish the 'earlier state' existing before life - i.e. a return to the inanimate, 'dead' nature. But Freud propounded this homeostasis-hypothesisin ,,Instincts and their Vicissitudes" already in 1915 (incidentally, the same year as it was propounded and named by the American physiologist W.B. Cannon). Thus Freud writes in ,,Instincts and their Vicissitudes" (Metapsychology, 1, p. 125) that the nervous system is an apparatus whose function is to maintain excitation at the lowest possible levell6. In these writings from 1915 and 1920, without applying the term 'homeostasis' or 'constancy', Freud clearly formulated an ovemding homeostasishypothesis in his drive theory. This hypothesis was also the overriding hypothesis in most of the theories of motivation in the period from c. 1930 to c. 1950. Later, other overriding motivation hypotheses have been produced as possible alternative explanations (see Madsen, 1959, 1973, 1974, 1975). Apart from this hypothesis we must suffice here by drawing attention to the hypothesis about the dominating role of the sexual drive in the development of personality. Freud himself has stressed this hypothesis as being central to psychoanalytical theory - so central that it is vital for the psychoanalytical 'theory- paradigm', and thereby determinant for whether a theory belongs to the Freudian 'microschool' within the depth psychological macroschool. Interested readers are referred to the voluminous literature on this subject (e.g. with point of departure in Andkjar Olsen and Koppe, 1988). We shall now return to a theory which is closely related to the drive theory in Freud's total system of theories.

a new anxiety-theory in ,,Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" in 1926. With this theory the concept of 'anxiety' acquired a status within the psychology of motivation, which places 'anxiety' side by side with the drives.

THE THEORY OF ANXIETY. Freud put forward

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Psychoanalysis

Before 1926 'anxiety' was explained as an affect which arises as the result of an unsuccessful repression of the sexual drive. One can also express it thus: 'anxiety' is caused by defence mechanisms,which are aimed at the sexual drives but do not achieve their (complete) repression. In other words: 'anxiety = f (failed defence). In this new theory the causal relation between anxiety and defence becomes reversed, anxiety being the cause of defence. 'Anxiety' is now defined as an affective state consisting of an increase in excitation which is experienced as unpleasant,and which results in motor impulses as well as physiological processesll. We shall undertake a systematic reconstruction of the anxiety theory's hypotheses, which cannot - for lack of space - be documented here with quotations (see also Fig. 7.6.) Anxiety is caused by situations characterized by excessive stimulation, the so-called traumatic situations, the prototype of which is birth; but it can also be caused by other situations of infantile helplessness. Later on, anxiety is caused by dangerous situations, including signals (i.e. threats) of a coming situation. Examples of danger signals are: absence of the mother, loss of love, threat of castration, super-ego threats, etc. As the examples show, the 'threats' change according to age. The effects of anxiety are primarily physiological reactions like rapid breathing and crying, which is able to attract the mother. Later, anxiety manifests itself by way of flight, safety precautions and defence. We have now described the causes of anxiety (independent S-variables) and its effects (dependent variables), to which latter 'experience' also belongs, because it has to be verbalized in order to be made 'public'. We shall now turn to 'anxiety itself as an internal hypothetical process-variable (see Fig. 7.6). The model shows that anxiety is a state that is localized in the ego. This affective state is either caused directly by stimuli from traumatic situations or indirectly by the anticipation of perceived threats. Moreover, anxiety may also be caused by strong drive-impulses from the id. This is called 'neurotic anxiety'. But anxiety can also, as the model shows, be caused by 'punitive' impulsesfrom the super-ego. It is then called 'conscience anxiety' or 'guilt'. Anxiety caused by external stimuli from traumatic or threatening situations is called 'real anxiety' (or 'fear').

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Fig. 7.6,A graphical reconstruction of Freud's theory of anxieryfrom 1926.

Finally, the graphic model shows that anxiety causes internal 'defence mechanisms'.Like anxiety itself, these are hypothetical variables which result in a blocking of the stimuli or a distortion of perception (for defence mechanisms, see Sjoback, 1973 and 1984).

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The model also shows that anxiety functions as a form of motivation, and here the theory greatly ressembles the neo-behaviorist theory of anxiety, especially that of N . E . Miller and John Dollard (see Miller and Dollard, 1950). Finally, we shall summarize the theory of anxiety by way of some symbolic reformulations which, togeher with the graphic model, constitute the systematic reconstruction. 1. Hypothesis: S (trauma) + H (anxiety) 2. Hypothesis: S (threat) + H (perception) 3. Hypothesis: H (perception) + H (anticipation) 4. Hypothesis: H (anticipation) + H (anxiety) 5. Hypothesis: H (anxiety) + H (defence) 6. Hypothesis: H (defence) + H (distortion of perception) 7. Hypothesis: H (drives) + H (perception) 8. Hypothesis: H (S.E. aggression) + H (perception) 9. Hypothesis: H (anxiety) + R (flight) 10. Hypothesis: H (anxiety) 4R (verbal expressions of anxiety) 11. Hypothesis: H (anxiety) + R (organic processes).

After this reconstruction of Freud's theory of anxiety we shall now return to his third theory in the 'intermediate level of abstraction'. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESSES. Drives and anxiety belong to that category of processes which in the systematological taxonomy is (largely) termed dynamic processes. They may in some cases possess an element of directive effect and thus be termed 'vector-variables'.We shall now turn to the second main category which in the systematological taxonomy is termed directive processes and in psychology, often 'cognitive processes'. Of these, only secondary processes are purely directive, cognitive processes, whereas primary processes are a combination of dynamic processes and primitive directive processes containing also drives and aflects as well as more primitive cognitive processes like recollection andfantasy. We shall deal first with the processes and then with the 'principles' (the 'pleasure principle' and the 'reality principle') Freud posits as applying to these processes.

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1. Primary and secondary processes. Freud introduced the concepts 'primary processes' and 'secondary processes' already in his ,,Project for a Scientific Psychology" from 1895. Here, these concepts played a central part in the structure of the theory, whereas the remaining theoretical concepts - the structural (topographical)concepts as well as drives and affects - played a subordinate part in the same ,,Project". Later (in ,,Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning", 191l), Freud writes that the unconscious psychical processes are primary processes and ruled by the pleasure principle. Dreams at night are examples of primary processes18. From this it appears that Freud identifies primary processes with unconscious processes. But also dreams - which are not, after all, solely unconscious appear to be primary processes. Finally, Freud says later in the same work that fantasy in the form of 'daydreams' is a primary process. As a typical example of secondary processes Freud mentions the process of thinking. In the same paper he writes that the process of thinking arises when the overt motor action is delayed. The thinking process is an 'experimental kind of action' which demands less energy than an overt action. The thinking process takes place especially with the help of word-representationslg. (See Henle, 1984). On the basis of the above quotations we are now able to reformulate Freud's theory about primary and secondary processes as follows:

1st Hypothesis: External stimuli and impulses due to internal needs cause primary dynamic processes, affects and drives, which pass directly through the psychical system to the motor system, where they instigate movement. These primary processes may be unconscious.

2nd Hypothesis: Later in development the primary processes may be supplemented with memory representations, which direct the dynamic processes in such a way that the movements become organized into purposeful actions directed at the drive-object. If a drive-object cannot be found, the dynamic processes may result in substitute satisfactionfantasies. 3rd Hypothesis. Still later in development the dynamic processes may precipitate secondary thinking processes, which are psychical 'experimental actions' carried out with small amounts of bound, psychical energy. These think-

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ing processes may cause a change in reality in a direction which is more satisfying as regards needs. Using the customary symbolic reformulation, the three hypotheses appear in the following form: 1st Hypothesis: S (external and internal) + H (dynamic processes) + R (reaction) 2nd Hypothesis: S (external and internal) + H (dynamic processes) + H (representations)-+ R (goal-directed) 3rd Hypothesis: S (external and internal) + H (dynamic processes) + H (thinking processes) + R (problem-solving). 2. PLEASURE AND REALITY PRINCIPLES. In the first quotation about primary

processes Freud mentioned the so-called 'pleasure principle'. Later in the same paper he mentions the so-called 'reality Principle'. These principles apply to respectively primary and secondary processes. Later he are also maintained they were applicable to respectively the id, where the primary processes take place, and the ego, where the secondary processes take place. Like Freud's other concepts, the principles have a history: During his collaboration with Breuer, Freud took over the principle of constancy as formulated by G.T. Fechner. viz., the organism, the nervous system and the psychical system endeavour to maintain a constant level of tension. In ,,The Project" from 1895, Freud reformulated the principle and called it the 'principle of neuronal inertia', which maintains that the neurones endeavour to get rid of nervous energyzo. The two principles mentioned were replaced in ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" in 1900 by slightly new principles designated the 'unpleasure principle' and the 'reality principle'. Later the 'unpleasure principle' was re-named the 'pleasure principle' (cf. the paper from 1911 on ,,Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning"). Finally, in 1920 in ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle", Freud added a third principle ' the 'Nirvana principle', because it is applied to the death drive's endeavour to re-establish the inorganic state via death. Thus, all three principles are to be found in ,,Beyond the Pleasure Principle"21.

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As this quotation illustrates, Freud applies two of the principles to the drives and the third one to the influence of the external world on the psychical system. Thus, since Freud applies these principles to primary and secondary processes, only to apply them thereafter to the ego-drives, the id-drives and the 'external world', they may be summarized as follows: The principles are overriding, general hypotheses about the function of the psychical system. We can reformulate them on this basis as follows: 1. 'The pleasure principle': The primary processes of the psychical system, which take place in the id and are set in action by the life drives, have a tendency to strive to obtain pleasure (satisfaction) and to avoid pain. 2. 'TheNirvana principle'. The primary processes of the psychical system, which take place in the id and are set in action by the death drives, have a tendency to destroy life (the individual's own and/or others' lives). 3. 'The reality principle'. The secondary processes of the psychical system, which take place in the ego and are set in action by stimuli from external reality, have a tendency in the long run to achieve optimum pleasure (satisfaction) by way of adaption to the surroundings. We can undertake the customary systematological reformulation of the hypotheses as follows:

1. 'Pleasure principle': H (life drive) + H (primary processes) + H (maximum pleasure) 2. 'Nirvana principle': H (death drive) + H (primary processes) + R (destructive) 3. 'Reality principle': S (surroundings) + H (secondary processes) 3 H (optimum pleasure) It may be seen from this reconstruction that the 'principles' are mainly theoretical hypotheses. But despite their metatheoretical status as the most general, abstract, overriding hypotheses in Freud's system, the three principles do not lack empirical foundation. Thus, the latest arrival, the Nirvana principle, is based on numerous observations of repetition-compulsion, partly in children's play and partly in dreams, in which the individual seems to repeat unpleasant experiences tinged with anxiety. Repetition-compulsion can therefore be formulated as a general data-thesis.

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Presumably the pleasure principle could also be reformulated as a general data-thesis, since it has been compared with the law of effect (see Miller and Dollard, 1950). As mentioned in Chapter 6, the law of effect can be reformulated as the 'empirical law of effect' or the 'principle of reinforcement': 'Reinforcement (= rewards) increases the frequency of the reinforced behaviour'. We shall now return to the least abstract level in the hypothetical stratum: ERRONEOUS ACTIONS, DREAMS AND NEUROSES. The least abstract level in the

hypothetical stratum contains the theories with the most empirical hypotheses. These are the theories about erroneous actions, dreams and neuroses, which we shall deal with collectively on the basis of Freud's ,Jntroductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" from 1917. For pedagogical reasons Freud chooses to proceed in the reverse historical order. Erroneous actions and slips of the tongue are the easiest to 'see through, and so are dealt with first. Thereafter he deals with dreams, which are more complicated and, finally, with neuroses, which were his initial objects of investigation,but which prove to be the most difficult phenomena to explain. Freud bases his account of all three sets of phenomena on clinical observations and largely proceeds inductively. Many examples of slips of the tongue, dreams and neurotic symptoms are given, and a great many classifications of the phenomena are undertaken. This all belongs to the datastratum. But already when providing an explanation of erroneous actions Freud introduces his conflict model, which is elaborated in conjunction with the explanations of dreams and, later, of neuroses. The conflict model constitutes a transitionalform between the topographical and the structural theories. This may be seen from the fact that Freud uses the hypothetical terms from the topographical theory (amongst others, the 'unconscious system', the pre-conscious system' and the 'conscious system', etc.) But in constructing the explanations Freud anticipates the structural theory, in which conflict is the ovemding principle of classification. The 'id' and the 'super-ego' are the conflict-creating systems, whereas the 'ego' is the conflict-reducing system, and causes the conflict- reducing hypotheticalprocesses and behaviour. To these belong erroneous actions and slips of the tongue as well as dream and neurotic symptom. In the following we shall illustrate the use of the conflict model with point of

307

Freud's production

Motive

Reaction

Erroneous

Unconscious Motive

-------------

Reaction

Fig. 7.7. Diagram of the occurence of erroneous actions.

departure in C. Lesche's and E. Stjernholm Madsen's account (Lesche and Madsen, 1976). 1 . Erroneous actions. The use of the conflict model in explaining bingled actions and slips of the tongue appears from the following model (see Fig. 7.7). One of Freud's own cases may be used as an example: An Austrian president is to open Parliament and makes the following remark: ,,Honored Sirs! I announce the presence of so and so many gentlemen, and therefore declare the session as 'closed"'! This slip of the tongue is a conflict-reducing resultant, which may be regarded as a compromise between the intended outcome of the conscious motive - to declare the meeting open - and the unintended outcome of the unconscious motive - to prevent the meeting from taking place. The President became very quickly conscious of this unconscious motive, because, when asked, he admitted that he had never wished the meeting to take place because some extremely unpleasant negotiations were pending. In other cases it is not quite so easy to render the unconscious motive conscious, because it has been repressed by the ego's defence mechanisms. But Freud maintains that in principle all slips of the tongue and other erroneous actions (incl. those concerned with reading, writing and lapses of memory) can be explained on the basis of the conflict model.

2. Dreams. The conflict model can also be applied to dreams. Here, however, it is only a simple wish-ful'lling dream which can be explained with the help of the same simple model, as appears from the diagram (see Fig. 7.8)

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-t Disturbing lmpuls

-------------

Simple b Wish-fulfilling Dream I

I

Arouse to Action

Fig. 7.8.Diagram of simple wish-fulfilling dream.

An example of a simple wish-fulfilling dream is the famous 'alarum-clock dream'. In a dream the ring of the alarum-clock is turned into the chime of church bells, the sound of sleigh-bells or other sounds which fail to wake the sleeping person. Thus, a simple wish-fulfilling dream is the conflict-reducing resultant of two conflict-creating motives: the sleep motive, which solely wishes to preserve undisturbed sleep, and the disturbing impulse, whch solely wishes to rouse the sleeper to action. The conflict between the two motives results in a compromise: the person dreams that he is carrying out the action. Thus the dream provides a replacement satisfaction in hallucinatory form and thereby preserves sleep. This is Freud's principal explanation of dreams, which has to be further elaborated in the case of more complicated dreams. In the example given the disturbing impulse was an external stimulus (the ring of the alarum-clock), but it can equally well be an internaZ stimulation (e.g. from a full bladder). But disturbance of sleep can also result from an unconscious motive, which stems from a drive like the sexual or the destructive drives. This drive has come into conflict with the moral demands of the superego, and therefore the motive of the action has become unconscious through repression. In this case censorship has been applied to the simple wish-fulfilling dream, which remains latent (unconscious),where 'censorship' is the activity of the super-ego'. (Freud used the term 'censor' in the 'transitional model', but not yet the term 'super-ego'). The censor influences the conflict-reducing process so that it does not stop at a simple wish-fulfilling dream. It is subjected

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309

Motive to Sleep

z

q z G Conflict

Disturbing

Undisturbed Sleep

o

r

Simple kDream

Censorship Dream

4-60.

Disguised Dream

Censorship Dream

4 7 1 Anxiety Dream

Arouse to

Fig. 7.9.Diagram of the occurrence of more complicated dreams as a conversion of simple wish-fuljilling dreams.

to 'dream-work, which is converted by way of various forms of distortion and symbolic 'disguise' into a disguised wish-fulfilling dream. If this disguised wish is morally acceptable to the super-ego, it turns into the manifest dream, i.e. the dream the person is conscious of on waking and which can be told, for example, to the psychoanalyst (see Fig. 7.9) But the latent wish may have contained uconscious motives which are so much in conflict with the super-ego's moral demands that the super-ego 'punishes' the ego with anxiety (cf. the theory of anxiety). The dream-work continues by converting the disguised wish into a nightmare (see Fig. 7.9)

Super-Ego

Super-Ego

1. Conflict

ID

Solution Unstable Balance

2. Conflict

ID

Fig. 7.10.Diagram of the development of neurosis.

Neurotic Symptoms

310

Psychoanalysis

3. Neuroses. The development of neuroses and neurotic symptoms can also be explained with the help of the simplified conflict model (see Fig. 7.10). It appears from the figure that we are now using the terms from the structural theory: the id, the ego and the super-ego, the reason being that these permanent structures now enter into the explanation of neurotic symptoms. Unlike erroneous actions and dreams it is not sufficient to incorporate concrete processes, but also necessary to incorporate the development of the personality. Pycho-neurotic development starts in the first year of life with a traumatic conflict between the id and the super-ego. According to Freud's theory of the neuroses, the original neurosis-creating conflict is always a conflict between the sexual drive (localized in the id) and the repressive processes of the superego. The repression of the sexual drie in the first years of a child's life is caused by the fact that its first sexual drive impulses are directed towards its parents, whose moral prohibitions and injunctions are incorporated in the personality as the super-egoprecisely during these childhood years. It would be going too far here to reproduce Freud's theory about normal sexual development, which traverses the familiar stages: the oral, the anal and the phallic (which overlaps the 'Oedipal development') as well as the latent period and the genital stage. Each stage has its sexual objects and special circumstances regarding the sexual drive. But a traumatic conflict canfix development at a specific stage. This fixed psycho-sexual development may result in that the person finding it difficult to resolve subsequent conflicts. The person is in a relatively unstable balance because of having to use a relatively great deal of energy on repression after the initial conflict. If he or she encounters similar conflicts between the id and the super-ego at a later date there is not sufficient energy to solve the new conflicts in the normal fashion. Part of the conflict-creating energy is abreacted in the form of neurotic symptoms, which can thus be regarded as substitute satisfactory reactions 22. Neurotic symptoms function as a substitute satisfaction like dreams and erroneous actions. So neurotic symptoms can also be said to have a 'meaning' or 'purpose' - like slips of the tongue and dreams. This meaning can be found by way of an interpretation which corresponds to dream-interpretation. The 'meaning' ('purpose') expresses the unconscious motive, which stems from the depression of a drive.

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311

Thus the interpretation of neurotic symptoms as well as that of dreams and erroneous actions constitutes a methodological precondition for finding the causes of the neurotic development, dreams and erroneous actions - and then formulating an explanation of these phenomena. This dialectical interplay between hermeneutic intepretation and nomothetic explanation is precisely the synthesis peculiar to psychoanalysis that was discussed when analysing the meta-stratum of Freud's production. We shall conclude here by summarizing this section on slips of the tongue, dreams and neurotic synptoms by reformulating the implicit hypotheses of the conflict model: Erroneous actions: 1. Hypothesis: S (external) + H (conscious motive) 2. Hypothesis: S (external + internal) + H (unconscious motive) 3. Hypothesis: H (conscious motive) t)H (unconscious motive) 4. Hypothesis: H (internal conflict) -) R (erroneous actions) Dream theory: 1. Hypothesis: S (internal) +H (sleep motive) 2. Hypothesis: S (internal + external) + H (disturbing motive) 3. Hypothesis: H (sleep motive) w H (disturbing motive) 4. Hypothesis: H (internal conflict) + R (manifest wish-fulfilling dream) 5 . Hypothesis: H (latent wish-fulfilling dream) tj H (censor) 6. Hypothesis: H (internal conflict) -+ R (manifest, disguised dream) 7. Hypothesis: H (latent, disguised dream) +j H (censor) 8. Hypothesis: H (internal conflict) +R (manifest nightmare) Neurosis theory: 1. Hypothesis: S (internal, ti) 3 H (Id) 2. Hypothesis: S (external, ti) + H (Ego) 3. Hypothesis: S (external, ti) +H (Super-ego) 4. Hypothesis: H (S.E.) tjH (Id) 5. Hypothesis: H (Id x S.E.) + H (Ego) 6. Hypothesis: H (ego affected by conflict) -+ H ('fixed' Ego) 7. Hypothesis: S (internal, t2)+ H (Id) 8. Hypothesis: S (external, t2)+ H (fixed Ego) 9. Hypothesis: S (external, t2) + H (S.E.) 10. Hypothesis: H (S.E.) t)H (Id)

312

Psychoanalysis

11. Hypothesis: H (S.E. x Id) t)H (fixed Ego) 12. Hypothesis: H (fixed ego, affected by conflict) -) R (neurotic reactions) Times of the two conflicts associated with the external and internal stimuli are indicated above by 'ti' and 't2'.

FREUD'S HYPOTHETICAL TERMS. Before proceeding with the data-stratum we shall conclude the account of the hypothetical stratum with the classification of Freud's use of hypothetical terms in accordance with the systematological taxonomy (cf. Appendix). 1. Ontological reference. All Freud's hypothetical terms refer to hypothetical constructs, and should therefore be termed He-terms in the systematological taxonomy. The only exceptions are the hypothetical terms used in ,,The Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1893, where these are hypothetical terms with a physiological ('organismic') reference, i.e. Ho-terms. Against classifying Freud's hyothetical terms as Hc-terms it could be argued that some of the words used - like 'representation', 'wishes' and 'affect' refer to mental processes, and are therefore Hm-terms. But it is quite clear that in Freud's production from ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" in 1900 to his final work ,,An Outline" in 1939 he uses hypothetical terms with reference to a 'neutral' construction - and not with reference to conscious experiences or neurophysiological processes. So we must conclude that according to their ontological reference ('surplus meaning') it would be most correct to classify Freud's H-terms as Hc-terms.

2. Form and function. We shall combine the two classifications of hypothetical variables according to existential form and function (effect) in one classification schema. The reason why both id and drives are classified as 'vectorvariables' is that drives have a 'built-in goal', a 'drive' incorporating per definition its object (cf. the section on drive theory) as one of its constituent components. Thus, in Freud's theory, 'drive' is a vector-variable, whereas in neo-behaviorist motivational psychology 'drive' is a purely dynamic variable.

Freud's production

313

Since the id is the structure in which the drives are initially localized, it must be consistent also to place the id under vector-variable. The primary processes contain, as mentioned, both drive and affect components apart from primitive cognitive processes. Therefore they too are vector-variables. On the other hand, the secondary processes - especially the thinking processes - are purely directive variables. Finally, energy (in the systematoogical taxonomy) is a clear example of a dynamic variable, whereas in metapsychological terminology energy is an 'economic' concept.

Freud's Dat a-stratum THE ABSTRACT DATA-STRATUM. Freud's production contains very few gen-

eral data-theses. We have previously mentioned the 'principle of repetitioncompulsion', which constitutes a general formulation of clinical observations. This underlies the formulation of the N i r v a ~ p r ~ n c i p lwhich e, in the systematological taxonomy is a hypothesis. We have also mentioned that the pleasure principle was classified as a hypothesis, but it was possible to convert it into a genera datathesis (like the corresponding principle in behaviorist psychology, the law of effect, which can be formulated as a hypothesis as well as a general data-thesis.

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Psychoanalysis

Apart from these few general data-theses Freud's production contains many classifications of, for example, erroneous actions, dreams and neurotic symptoms. Such classifications contain definitions of abstract, descriptive terms (e.g. 'wish-fulfilling dreams', 'disguised dreams', 'nightmares', 'hysterical symptoms', 'obsessional symptoms', etc.). According to the systematological taxonomy, such descriptive terms also belong to the abstract datastratum. It would be going too far here to reproduce these classifications in detail. On the other hand, we shall discuss other types of sentences, which also belong to the abstract data-stratum, i.e. the so-called 'pragmu-theses'. This is a common denominator for both prescripts and descriptions of praxis, which was introduced in ,,Systematology" in 1975. Since psychoanalysis also includes psychotherapy, in Freud's production there are quite a number of papers, passages and scattered sentences which describe psychoanalytical praxis, or prescribe how psychoanalytical therapy ought to be be conducted. (Thus, among the eleven volumes in the German ,,Studienausgabe" of Freud's texts there is one volume entitled ,,Schriften zur Behandlungstechnik"). It is customary in philosophy to distinguish sharply between 'descriptions' and 'prescripts'. Thus, there are sentences which are respectively descriptive and prescriptive. Linguistically speaking, the difference is clear to see, because in descriptive sentences the verb 'is' is used, whereas in prescriptive sentences the verb 'ought' is used. Whereas descriptive language is used in scientific discourse and in some philosophical - especially ontological - discourse,prescriptive language is used particularly in ethical, some epistemological, metatheoretical and methodological discourse. Finally, prescriptive language is used also in technological as well as prescripts for daily practice (for craftsmen, etc.). Kuhn (Kuhn, 1973) has stressed that the traditional difference between descriptions and prescripts is undefinable and not a question of principle. It is possible to describe methods - e.g. scientific or technological methods - in such a way that the effectivity of the methodist appears explicit. Such explicit descriptions of effective methods will thereafter function as implicit prescripts ('norms' or 'rules'). Therefore in ,,Sytematology" (1975) the term 'pragmathesis' has been introduced as a common denominator for both descriptions of praxis and prescripts for praxis.

Freud's production

315

Pragma-theses, as mentioned, may appear in both practical prescripts and technological prescripts. Practical and technological prescripts are similar in that they both contain a reference to using a specific method (or means) according to a specific point of departure (U) in order to achieve a specific goal (M) (see Fig. 7.1 1). The difference between a 'craft' and 'technology' is chiefly that the justifications for prescripts are different: in a craft prescripts are referred to and justified according to practical experience, whereas in technology prescripts are justified by referring to a scientific theory whose hypotheses are able to explain the situation the pragmatheses are dealing with (see Fig. 7.1 1). Moreover, the figure shows that it is also possible to justify the goal by referring to the scientific theory's meta-stratum, which contains evaluative suppositions (see Fig. 7.1 1). According to this account there is no doubt that psychoanalytical therapy is a technology, psychoanalytical prescripts being justified by reference to psychoanalytical theory. For a more detailed discussion of psychotherapeutic problems, readers may be referred to Band 1 1 in Freud's ,,Studienausgabe", Lesche and Madsen (1976), Andkjax Olsen and KGppe, 1981 and other@. To sum up, the most important psychoanalytical pragma-theses can be reformulated as follows: 1. The goal ofpsychoanalytical therapy is to develop (strengthen) the client's ego. 2. Psychoanalytical therapy can be used for neurotics (though at present not for psychotics). 3. The psychoanalytical, therapeutic method consists chiefly of making use of 'free associations', which, when interpreted, increase the client's self-insight. 4. In addition, the transference situation is used for 're-educating' the client's ego. Following this reconstruction of psychoanalytical pragma-theses we can conclude this metatheoretical analysis of the abstract part of the data-stratum by stressing that psychoanalysis is unique among psychological theories in that its main method is both observational and therapeutic. In other words, the data which form both the point of departure and the testable basis of the theory are derived from the clinical observations connected with psychotherapy. We have thereby arrived at the concrete data-stratum.

316

Psychoanalysis

Fig. 7.1I . Graphical model of the dialectical relationship between theory andpraxis. The theory influences the execution of that praxis, which results again will adjust the theory.

THE CONCRETE DATA-STRATUM. In Freud's production the concrete

datastratum consists chiefly of the many clinical case-histories that are scattered throughout Freud's production. Some of these consist of long essays in which the life-history and treatment of the clients is described very

Freud's production

317

thoroughly. Thus the famous ,,Zwei Kinderneurosen", ,,Der kleine Hans" (from 1919) and ,,Der Wolfsmann" (from 1918), together constitute a volume (Bd VIII) of about 250 pages in the German Studienausgabe. Case-histories have also been gathered in two other volumes (Bd. VI and Bd. VII). Apart from the latter there are many other partially described cases in ,,Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis" (1917) and other general accounts. Apart from case-histories, the concrete data-stratum also consists of a number of examples of dreams in ,,The Interpretations of Dreams" (1900) and ,,Lectures" (1917), and examples of erroneous actions and slips ofthe tongue in ,,Lectures" and ,,The Psychopathology of Everyday Life" (1901). Thus Freud's production contains ample empirical material (= concrete descriptions = specific data-theses). But this material contains no experimental reports. This was probably one of the reasons why Freud encountered so much skepsis among classical experimental psychologists and, later, among behavioral psychologists and Gestalt psychologists, who all have a nomothetic ideal of science with the experiment as the chosen method. Perhaps it is precisely for this reason that there have been many attempts to test Freud's theory experimentally. Thus, tests of this type have been reviewed in books by Paul Kline (see Kline, 1981, 1984) in which about 1000 experimental tests of Freud's theory have been examined, and S . Fisher and R . Greenberg (see Fisher and Greenberg, 1977, 1985) in which 1900 such tests have been examined. The conclusions drawn in these two books are that most psychoanalytical theory has been confirmed by way of such critical empirical tests (see Contemporary Psychology, 1982, Vol. 27, p. 680). See also publications from the 'percept-genetic-personality'- especially Westerlund and Smith (1983), Hentschel, Smith and Draguns (1986).

The Text as a Whole THE COMPLETENESS OF THE DISCOURSE. It appears from the above that

Freud's production contains all three levels of discourse and is thus, according to the systematological taxonomy (see Appendix), a 'complete scientific discourse'. It is difficult to calculate the respective proportions of meta-, hypothetical and data-strata on account of the magnitude of the production (24 volumes) and its organization, the three levels of discourse being represented in almost all of Freud's texts. But it is possible to make a rough estimate of thc relative distribution of the three levels of discourse with the help of the German Studienausgabe (which was published by S . Fischers Verlag in

318

P~ch~a~lysis

Frankfurt 1969-1975). This edition consists of 11 volumes in which the contents are arranged systematically - in contrast with the English Standard Edition, in which the contents are arranged chronologically. It is possible from the title to gain an impression of the distribution of the contents: Vorlesungen (1917 and 1933). Band I: Band 11: Die Traumdeutung (1900). Band 111: Psychologie des Unbewussten (contains various metapsychological writings from 191 1-1938. Band IV: Psychologische Schriften (contains various psychological writings, among which ,,Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten" (from 1905) is the most well-known. Band V: Sexualleben (includes various writings on the psychology of sexuality, among which ,,Three Essays on Sexuality" (from 1905) is the most well-known. Band VI: Hysterie und Angst. Band VII: Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion. Band VIII: Zwei Kinderneurosen. The contents of the three latter volumes have already been discussed. They consist of case-histories and special studies of various types of neuroses. Band IX: Fragen der GesellschaftKJrsprunge der Religion (contains essays on the use of psychoanalysis in eplaining social and cultural phenomena, including ,,Mass Psychology and Ego-analysis" (1921), ,,Totem and Taboo" (1912-13), ,,Civilization and its Discontents" (1930) and ,,Moses and Monotheism" (1939) etc. BandX: Bildende Kunst und Litteratur (contains essays on the use of psychoanalysis in explaining art and literature, including essays on Leonard0 da Vinci (1910), Michelangelo (1914) and Dostoyevsky (1928). Band XI: Erganzungsband: Schriften zur Behandlungstecknik, which has already been mentioned. On the basis of this list of contents it is possible to distribute Freud's production roughly into three levels of discourse as follows:

Freud's production

319

The meta-stratum is contained in texts in volumes I, I1 and especially 111, but naturally also in scattered remarks in the other volumes. The hypothetical stratum is contained especially in volumes IV, V, IX and X as well as in the three volumes already mentioned, but naturally also in scattered remarks in the other volumes. The data-stratum is contained especially in volumes VI, VII, VIII and the Ergannzungsband, but naturally also in many remarks in the other volumes. If we accept this rough estimate, we may conclude that Freud's total production is more or less equally distributed between the three levels of discourse. THE TESTABILITY OF FREUD'S THEORIES. We shall conclude this

metatheoretical analysis of Freud's production by calculating the hypothesis quotient (H.Q.) for some of Freud's theories on the basis of the systematic reconstructions already undertaken. Unfortunately it is necessary for practical reasons to concentrate on only a few of the theories, but the reconstruction covers theories from all the three levels of abstraction into which Freud's production has been divided. Thus, in our opinion the H. Q. may be regarded as a quantitative estimate of the testability of Freud's theories. 1. The topographical theory. The reconstructed hypotheses (see p. 291) can be classified as follows:

Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Hypotheses 2 , 3 , 5 , 6 , 7 and 8. In all: 6 hypotheses. Empirical hypotheses: S-H-hypotheses: Nos. 1 and 4. In all: 2. H-R-hypotheses: No. 9. In all: 1 . On the basis of this classification the H.Q. may be calculated as follows:

This is a high H.Q. - the highest we have encountered so far (see table in Chapter 2). Since a high H.Q. means a low testability, we must conclude that the testability of the topographical theory is relatively low (though is nevertheless testable), But we must remember that the topographical theory - together with the structural theory - is the most abstract of Freud's theories. And its testabi-

320

Psychoanalysis

lity must be seen in relation to the remaining theories, which are subordinate to it. We have not (yet) reconstructed the structural theory, but shall proceed to the next level of abstraction, from which we have also reconstructed a theory. 2. The anxiety theory. We have also undertaken a systematologicalreconstruction of Freud's theory of anxiety from 1926. In this case we have not been able to document the hypotheses chosen with the help of quotations from the text, but on the basis of the reformulated hypotheses (see p. 304) we can undertake the following classification:

Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Hypotheses 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 and 8. In all: 6. Empirical hypotheses: S-H-hypotheses:Nos. 1 and 2. In all: 2 H-R-hypotheses:Nos. 9, 10 and 11. In all: 3

On the basis of this classification we can calculate the H.Q. as follows: 6

H.Q=--2 + 3 - 1.2 It may be seen that the H.Q. for the anxiety theory is slightly less than the H.Q. for the topographical theory. This is in accordance with the fact that the anxiety theory belongs to a lower theoretical layer of abstraction in Freud's total production, And one would therefore expect the anxiety theory to be more testable than the topographical theory. We shall now turn to the lowest level of abstraction containing the most empirical theories (we shall refrain from calculating the H.Q. for the theories about primary and secondary processes, because the number of reconstructed hypotheses is so small that the degree of uncertainty in the calculation itself would be too great). 3. The erroneous actions theory. We undertook a systematic reconstruction of Freud's theory about erroneous actions and slips of the tongue as presented in ,,Lectures". On the basis of the reconstruction (see p. 313) we can undertake the following classification:

Freud's production

32 1

Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Hypothesis No. 3. In all: 1 Empirical hypotheses: S-H-hypotheses:Nos. 1 and 2. In all: 2 H-R-hypotheses: No. 4.In all: 1. On the basis of this classification we can calculate the H.Q. for the erroneous action theory as follows: 1 H.Q =-2 + 1 -- 0.33

This H. Q. is relatively low (cf. table in Chapter 2). There are, indeed, very few hypotheses in the reconstruction, but we nevertheless believe that this low H.Q. shows that the erroneous action theory has a high degree of testability.

4.The dream theory. Likewise, on the basis of ,,Lectures" - i.e. and not ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" - we undertook a systematic reconstruction of the dream theory (see p. 313) On this basis we can undertake the following classification:

Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Hypotheses Nos. 3 , 5 and 7. In all: 3. Empirical hypotheses: S-H-hypotheses:Nos. 1 and 2. In all: 2. H-R-hypotheses: Nos. 4 , 6 and 8. In all: 3. On the basis of this classification we can calculate the H.Q. for the dream theory as follows: 3 H.Q = 2 + 3 -- 0.60

It appears that the H.Q. for the dream theory (in ,,Lectures") is slightly higher than the H.Q. for the erroneous actions theory. But had we calculated the H.Q. for the theory about the wish-fulfilling dream separately the figure would have been exactly the same as for the theory about erroneous actions, since it is the same simple conflict model that is used. But even with a H.Q. of 0.60 the dream theory may be said to have a fairly high degree of testability.

5 . The neurose theory. The neurose theory, as presented in ,,Lectures", hm also been reconstructed (see p. 313), and on this basis we can reconstruct the following classification:

Psychoanalysis

322

Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Hypotheses Nos. 4,5,6, 10 and 11. In all: 5. Empirical hypotheses: S-H-hypotheses:Nos. 1,2,3,7,8 and 9. In all: 6. H-R-hypotheses: Hypothesis No. 12. In all: 1. On the basis of this classification we can calculate the H.Q. for the neurose theory (in ,,L,ectures") as follows: 5

H.Q = - 0.71 6 + 1-

It appears that the H.Q. for the neurose theory is slightly higher than the H.Q. for the dream theory, but both H.Q.'s are nevertheless of the same magnitude as many other psychological theories (see table in Chapter 2). Thus the neurose theory may also be said to have a relatively high degree of testability. 6. To sum up: The calculation of Hypothesis Quotients confirms our division of Freud's production into three levels of abstraction: The extremely abstract, structural ('metapsychological') theories, of which the topographical theory has an H.Q. of 2.00. The less abstract, economic-dynamic theories, of which the new anxiety theory has an H.Q. of 1.20. The most concrete, empirically applicable theories, of which the erroneous action theory has an H.Q. of 0.33, the dream theory, an H.Q. of 0.60 and the neurose theory, an H.Q. of 0.7 1. These three H.Q.'s are of the same magnitude as most psychological theories. Thus, we may conclude that Freud's theories as a whole are testable, and on this basis we can reject Popper's well-known assertion that Freud's theories are not 'scientific' (= testable) theories. Thus, the conclusion of this metatheoretical analysis of the theories' testability can be compared with the previously mentioned empirical testing of Freud's theories, which largely turned out positively. CONCLUSION AS REGARDS FREUD. The previous section has dealt with the estimated testability of Freud's theories (expressed in terms of their H.Q.) and their truth value (measured by means of empirical investigations). In both cases we concluded that both the testability and the truth value are of the same

Freud's production

323

magnitude as other psychological theories largely built on an experimental foundation. We still lack a quantitative estimate (or measure of) Freud's theories' heuristic value, i.e. of their [fruitfulness' as regards stimulating research both

within and outside psychology as well as their practical application. But, given a quantitative estimate of the heuristic value of scientific theories, Freud's theories would doubtless rank the higest among psychological theories.

Notes All quotations are from ,,The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud" (abbr. S.E.), The Hogarth Press, London.

*

,,I am going to ask you seriously whether I should use the term 'meta-psychology' for my psychology which leads behind consciousness" (S.E., Vol 1, p. 274).

2

,,I propose that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a metapsychological presentation" (S.E., Vol. 14, p. 181).

3

,, ... then we shall be compelled to say that 'the aim of all life is death' and, looking backwards, that 'inanimate things existed before living ones"' (S.E., Vol. 18, p. 38).

4

,,I shall entirely disregard the fact that the mental apparatus with which we are here concerned is also known to us in the form of an anatomical preparation, and I shall carefully avoid the temptation to determine psychical locality in any anatomical fashion. I shall remain upon psychological

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ground, and I propose simply to follow the suggestion that we should picture the instrument which carries out our mental functions as resembling a compound microscope or photographic apparatus, or something of the kind. On that basis, psychical locality will correspond to a point inside the apparatus at which one of the preliminary stages of an image comes into being. In the microscope and telescope, as we know, these occur in part on ideal points, regions in which no tangible component of the apparatus is situated." (S.E., Vol5, p. 536). 5

,,The general conclusion that emerges from the previous individual discussions may be stated in the following terms. Certain shortcomings in our psychical functioning - whose common characteristics will in a moment be defined more closely - and certain seemingly unintentional performances prove, if psychoanalytic methods of investigation are applied to them, to have valid motives and to be determined by motives unknown to consciousness." (S.E., Vol. 6, p. 239).

6

,,In our science, as in the others, the problem is the same: behind the attributes (i.e. qualities) of the object under investigation which are directly given to our perception, we have to discover something which is more independent of the particular receptive capacities of our sense organs and which approximates more closely to what may be supposed to be the real state of affairs. We have no hope of our being able to reach the latter itself, ... " (S.E., Vol. 23, p. 196). ,,Reality will always remain 'unknowable'. The yield brought to light by scientific work from our primary sense perceptions will consist in an insight into connections and interdependencies which are present in the external world, which can somehow or other be reliably reproduced or reflected in the internal world of our thought, and the knowledge of which enables us to 'understand' something in the external world, to foresee it and possibly to alter it. Our procedure in psychoanalysis is exactly similar." (S.E., Vol. 23, p. 196).

7

,.So far as I know, the experiment has not hitherto been made of using this method of dissection in order to investigate the way in which the mental instrument is put together, and I can see no harm in it. We are justified, in

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325

my view, in giving free rein to our speculations so long as we retain the coolness of our judgement and do not mistake the scaffolding for the building." (S.E., Vol. 5, p. 536). 8

,,We assume, as the other natural sciences have taught us to expect, that in mental life some kind of energy is at work ... " (S.E., Vol. 23, p. 163). ,,The phenomena with which we have to deal do not belong to psychology alone, they have an organic and biological side as well, and accordingly in the course of our efforts at building up psychoanalysis we have also made some important biological discoveries and have not been able to avoid framing new biological hypotheses." (S.E., Vol. 23, p. 195).

9

,,The data of conscious self-perception, which were alone at its disposal, have proved themselves in every respect inadequate to fathom the profusion and complexity of the processes of the mind ... " (S.E., Vol. 23, p. 196). ,,The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by data of consciousness as is the external world by the communications of our sense organs." (S.E., Vol. 5 , p. 163).

10

The following quotations are all taken from ,,The Interpretation of Dreams" (S.E., Vol. 5): 1) ,,The first thing that strikes us is that this apparatus, compounded of Psi-systems, has a sense of direction. All our psychical activity starts from stimuli (whether internal or external) and ends in innervations" (p. 537). 2) ,,We shall suppose that a system in the very front of the apparatus receives the perceptual stimuli but retains no trace of them and thus has no memory, while behind it lies a second system which transforms the momentary excitations of the first system into permanent traces" (p. 538). 3) ,,The first of these Mnem, systems will naturally contain the record of association in respect of simultaneity in time; while the same perceptual material will be arranged in the later systems in respect to other kinds of coincidence, so that one of these later systems, for instance, will record relations of similarity, and so on with the others" (p. 539).

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Psychoanalysis

4) ,,But when we consider the dreamwish, we shall find that the motive force for producing dreams is supplied by the Ucs; and owing to this latter factor we shall take the unconscious system as the starting point of dream formation" (pp. 541-42). 5 ) ,,The only way in which we can describe what happens in hallucinatory dreams is by saying that the excitation moves in a backward direction. Instead of being transmitted towards the motor end of the apparatus it moves towards the sensory end and finally reaches the perceptual system" (p. 542). 6) ,,According to our schematic picture, these relations are contained not in thefirst Mnem. systems but in later ones; and in case of regression they would necessarily lose any means of expression except in perceptual images. In regression the fabric of the dream-thought is resolved into its raw material" (p. 543). 11

These 9 explicit hypotheses are reformulated on the basis of the implicit hypotheses in the 6 quotations as follows: the 1st quotation contains hypotheses 1.4 and 9; the 2nd quotation contains hypothesis 2; the 3rd quotation contains hypothesis 3; the 4th quotation contains hypothesis 5 , the 5th quotation contains hypotheses 6 and 7; the 6th quotation contains hypothesis 8.

12

,,To the oldest of these mental processes or agencies we give the name of Id. It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution - above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate in the somatic organization and which find their first mental exVol. 23, p. 145). pression in the id in forms unknown to us." (S.E., ,,The other agency of the mind, which we appear to know the best and in which we recognize ourselves the most easily - what is known as the ego - was developed out of the cortical layer of the id, which, being adapted for the reception and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact with the external world ... Its psychological function consists in raising th processes in the id to a higher dynamic level (perhaps by transforming freely mobile into bound energy, such as correspond to the pre-conscious condition), its constructive fuction consists in interpolating, between the demand made by an

Freud's production

32 7

instinct and the action that satisfies it, the activity of thought which, after taking its bearings in the present and assessing earlier experiences, endeavours by means of experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the course of action proposed." (S.E., Vol. 23, pp. 198-99). ,,The long period of childhood, during which the growing human being lived in dependence upon his parents, leaves behind it a precipitate, which forms within his ego a special agency in which this parental influence is prolonged. It has received the name of super-ego. In so far as the super-ego is differentiated from the ego or opposed to it, it constitutes a third force which the ego must take into account. An action by the ego is as it should be if it satisfies simultaneously the demands of the id, of the super-ego and of reality, that is to say if it is able to reconcile their demands with one another." (S.E., Vol. 23, p. 146). 13 ,,Let us picture a living organism in its most simplified possible form as an

undifferentiated vesicle of a substance that is susceptible to stimulation. Then the surface turned towards the external world will from its very situation be differentiated and will serve as an organ for receiving stimuli.'' (S.E., Vol. 18, p. 26). 14

,,We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus, the Pcpt. system. If we make an effort to represent this pictorially, we may add that the ego does not completely envelop the id, but only does so to the extent to which the system Pcpt. forms its [the Ego's] surface, more or less as the germinal disc rests upon the ovum." (S.E., Vol. 19, p. 24).

15

,,We assume, as the other natural sciences have led up to expect, that in mental life some kind of energy is at work; .... We seem to recognize that nervous or psychical energy exists in two forms, one freely mobile and the other, by contrast, bound ... " (S.E., Vol. 23, pp. 163-64).

16 ,,The nervous system is an apparatus which has the function of getting rid

of the stimuli that reach it or reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which, if it were feasible, would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition." (S.E., Vol. 14, p. 120). 17

,,Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety" (1926) (S.E., Vol. 20): ,,Anxiety, that is in the fHst place something felt. We call it an affective state, al-

though we are equally ignorant of what an affect is. As a feeling, anxiety has a very marked character of unpleasure." (p. 132). ,,The analysis of the anxiety state therefore reveals the existence of: (1) a specific unpleasurable quality, (2) efferent or discharge phenomena, and (3) the perception of these." (pp. 132-33). ,,In the psychology which is founded on psycho-analysis we have become accustomed to taking as our starting-point the unconscious mental processes, with the peculiarities of which we have become acquainted through analysis. We consider these to be older, primary processes, the residues of a phase of development in which they were the only kind of mental processes. The governing purpose obeyed by these primary processes is easy to recognize; it is described as the pleasure-unpleasure [Lust-Unlust] principle, or more shortly, the pleasure principle. These processes strive towards gaining pleasure; psychical activity draws back from any event which might arouse unpleasure. (Here we have repression). Our dreams at night and our waking tendency to tear ourselves away from distressing impressions are remnants of the dominance of this principle and proofs of its power." (S.E., Vol. 12, pp. 218-19). 19 ,,Restraint upon motor discharge (upon action), which then became necessary, was provided by means of the processes of thinking, which was developed from the presentation of ideas. Thinking was endowed with characteristics which made it possible for the mental apparatus to tolerate an increased tension of stimulus while the process of discharge was postponed. It is essentially an experimental kind of acting, accompanied by displacement of relatively small quantities of cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them. For this purpose the conversion of freely displaceable cathexes into 'bound' cathexes was necessary, and this was brought about by means of raising the level of the whole cathetic process. It is probable that thinking was orginally unconscious in so far as it went beyond mere ideational presentations and was directed to the relations between impressions of objects, and that it did not acquire further qualities, perceptible to consciousness, until it became connected with verbal residues." (S.E., Vol. 12, p. 221).

18

Freud's production

329

20

,,Starting from this consideration, it was possible to lay down a basic principle of neuronal activity in relation to Q, which promised to be highly enlightening, since it appeared to compromise the entire function. This is the principle of neuronal inertia: that neurones tend to divest themselves of Q. On this basis the structure and development as well as the function [of neurones] are to be understood." (S.E., Vol. 1, p. 296).

21

In ,,The Economic Problem of Masochism" Freud formulates this as follows: ,,In this way we obtain a small but interesting set of connections. The Nirvana principle expresses the trend of the death instinct; a e pleasure principle represents the demands of the libido; and the modification of the latter principle, the reality principle, represents the influence of the external world." (S.E., Vol. 19, p. 160).

22

,,We might extend our thesis and say that symptoms aim either at a sexual satisfaction or at fending it off, and that on the whole the positive, wishfulfilling character prevails in hysteria and the negative, ascetic one in obsessional neurosis." (S.E., Vol, 16, p. 301).

23

,,According to our hypothesis it is the ego's task to meet the demands of the three dependent relations - to reality, to the id and to the super-ego - and nevertheless at the same time to preserve its own organization and maintain its own autonomy. The necessary conditions for the pathological states under discussion can only be a relative or absolute weakening of the ego which makes the fulfilment of its tasks impossible." (S.E., Vol. 23, p. ,,Our plan of cure is based upon these discoveries. The ego is weakened by the internal conflict; we must go to its help." (S.E., Vol, 23, p. 173). ,,Thus we discover that we must renounce the idea of trying our plan of cure upon psychotics - renounce it for ever, perhaps, or only for the time being, till we have found some other plan better adapted for them. There is, however, another class of psychological patients who clearly resemble the psychotics very closely, the immense numbers of sufferers from severe neuroses. ... Their ego, however, has proved more resistant and has become less disorganized. ... We will confine our interest to them and see how far and by what means we are able to 'cure' them." (S.E., Vol. 23, p. 173-74).


Chapter 8

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTEGRATION PERIOD

INTRODUCTION. The development we are about to discuss has been touched upon several times in the previous chapters concerning the creation of the first schools of psychology, i.e. that representatives of the various schools came into contact with one another - especially in America. This contact, together with the opportunity for subsequent collaboration, resulted in a gradual integration of the separate schools into one macroschool - constituting the second normal period of psychology. This tendency towards integration had both external and internal causes. The external causes were essentially the political events that took place during the 3 0 s and 40s. Those will be dealt with in the first part of this chapter dealing with 'the history of the scientific community'. The internal causes consisted of the production of specific psychologists, which integrated elements from the paradigms of the various schools. These will be briefly mentioned in the first part of the chapter and discussed in greater detail in the second part, which deals with 'the production of the scientific community'. In addition, we shall conclude the second part with a discussion of the problem as to whether this integrating psychology developed into an integrated psychology that constituted a macroschool and thereby a normal period.

332

The psychology of the integration period

The history of the scientific community: The period of integration External causes of the integration INTRODUCTION. The history of the scientific community does not, of course,

develop independently of the history of society as such. But there has been a great variation in this dependence throughout the course of history. From its establishment in the 1870s until the 1930s the scientific community of psychologists developed relatively independently of the rest of society. But after Hitler's seizure of power in 1933 the development of the psychological community has been greatly dependent on that of society as a whole. This external influence took place in two phases: to begin with the political events in Germany caused various German and Central European psychologists to emigrate, and these frequently came into subsequent personal contact with American psychologists. Thereafter the Second World War was instrumental in causing an increase in collaboration between psychologists in solving practical problems. PERSONAL CONTACTS. It has been asserted that Hitler is the person who has

had the greatest (indirect) influence on the history of psychology. Naturally he also had an (indirect) influence on the history of other sciences, quite apart from his enormous influence on the lives of millions of people. But Hitler's special importance respecting the history of psychology is closely connected with the fact that it was in Germany that psychology first became established as an independent science (cf. Chapter 4), and that two of the three psychological macroschools had their origin in German-speaking - and subsequently German-occupied - countries. Gestalt psychology had its origin in Germany itself (see Chapter 5). As mentioned in Chapter 7, psychoanalysis originated in Austria and had its first supporters in German-speaking countries. On the other hand, behavioral psychology - as mentioned in Chapter 6 - originated in Russia and the USA and obtained most of its supporters among American psychologists. Hitler's seizure of power had an additional influence on the history of psychology because relatively many of the leading Gestalt psychologists and psychoanalysts were Jews who were directly persecuted by the Nazis. Freud's

The history of the scientfic community: The period of integration

333

books were publicly burnt at one of the biggest autos-da-fe staged by Hitler in Berlin. After the Nazi occupation of Austria in March 1938, Freud - as mentioned in Chapter 7 - was put under house arrest, and it was not until Mussolini and Roosevelt intervened that he was allowed to leave for London. We have already mentioned - in Chapter 5 - that Wertheimer, Kohler and Koffka were Jews and that they emigrated to the USA, but a similar fate was suffered by many other well-known - and not so well-known - psychoanalysts and Gestalt psychologists. Because they were Jews or political opponents of Nazism they were forced to emigrate from Germany and other German-occupied countries. Via Engand or Scandinavia they often ended up in America. In the USA many of the leading psychoanalysts and Gestalt psychologists were appointed to universities and colleges. Here they often became colleagues of American (behaviorist) psychologists, and thereby came into personal contact with one another. For example, relatively many European psychologists were assembled for a shorter or longer period at the New School of Social Research, which is situated on Fifth Avenue in New York in an area frequented by academics and artists. It was at the New School that Watson held his popular lectures after he lost his professorate. Thus, the New School became a center for a meeting between European and American psychologists. The personal contact between members of different schools naturally helped to foster the reciprocal influence of their paradigms and thereby to prepare for an integration proper. For personal dialogues are often better able than written debates to elucidate the similarities and differences in metatheories and meta-paradigms existing between the supporters of the various schools. Moreover, a personal dialogue is able to reveal what are merely apparent differences (and similarities) between paradigms. Apparent differences (and similarities) are due to differences in linguistic usage or terminology. For example, psychologists may use different terms - like 'need' and 'drive' - about the same phenomenon, or they may use the same term - e.g. 'need' - about different phenomena. PRACTICAL COLLABORATION. In a collaboration on practical problems di-

verging meta- and theoryparadigms are 'put to the test', and the practical consequences of a theory and empirical predictions resulting therefrom are discovered. Some psychologists even think that the practical application constitutes a test of the theory's truth value'; others, that the practical application is

334


an 'operational definition' of the hypothetical terms contained in the theory. Even in this more moderate case practical collaboration is useful for an integrated development. During the Second World War many American and immigrant European psychologists were engaged in solving a great number of practical problems both in the armed forces and on the 'home front'. As the result of mobilization psychological tests were needed as an aid in the selection and appropriate deployment of military staff. All conscripts were subjected to an intelligence test, and those chosen for especially demanding jobs, such as pilots and officers, were tested very thoroughly. Some of the tests used had been developed in conjunction with the large-scale research and development project initiated by the Harward Psychological Clinic, under the leadership of Henry Murray and inspired by psychoanalysis. We shall hear more about Murray later. Apart from psychological testing connected with their selection, the military personnel were also in need of training and education, and here both behaviorist learning psychology and Gestalt psychology's perception and cognition psychology found their application. If we take the selection and education of pilots as a practical psychological problem, the Americans, for example, were disturbed by the fact that an extremely large percentage of the pilots crashed while still training, and never became operational. Therefore the selection of pilots began to be based on an extensive test programme, which included both medical investigations and psychological tests. The budding pilots were thereupon subjected to a revised and more effective education and training founded on psychological theories and research results. After the introduction of this psychologically based selection and education the percentage of crashed pilots was reduced to a fraction of the previously high 'crash per cent'. This and other results of the application of psychology gave psychologists a high prestige in American society. POST-WARDEVELOPMENT. The practical collaboration during the Second world War had two important consequences for the development of psychology in the USA: 1. The scientific community became willing to co-operate in research and in the integration of theories.

The history of the scientific community: The period of integration

335

Integration may not have been complete to the extent that there was now only one macroschool. But at least the members of the various schools began to respect one another, and to regard the previous macroschools as the origin of psychological disciplines or sub-disciplines which supplement rather than compete with one another. Thus, behavioral psychology could be regarded as the start of learning psychology, Gestalt psychology as the start of cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis as the start of personality psychology and its application in clinical psychology. In the next main section we shall return to the integrating paradigm that became common in American psychology during the 40's and 5 0 s . 2. Psychology became greatly respected in American society. In the USA it acquired a status comparable with that of the natural sciences. To judge from the number of students and researchers and the total number of grants, psychology became one of the most important disciplines in American universities and colleges. The increased economic support created good conditions for basic research at the universities, and American business concerns became interested in appointing psychologists for applied research. The increase in research enabled psychology to maintain the prestige gained during the Second World War. This meant that psychologists became very much in demand. Many were appointed to universities and firms. The increased demand stimulated an interest in improving the education of psychologists at American universities. As a result the membership of the American Psychological Association (A.P.A.) rose considerably during the postwar years. Just after the war the American Association of Applied Psychology became incorporated in A.P.A., which thus became the joint association for scientific and professional psychology. It now had well over 4000 members, who were subdivided into 18 'divisions', each of which handled the interests of an academic psychological subdiscipline (e.g. experimental psychology, developmental psychology, etc.) or a professional discipline (e.g. clinical psychology, industrial psychology or school psychology, etc.) Clinical psychology eventually became by far the biggest professional discipline in the USA. Over a third of American psychologists are educated or operate as clinical psychologists. The membership of A.P.A. rose after the war from around 4000 in 1945 to 24,000 in 1966, and 100,000 in 1986. A.P.A. then had 24 'divisions' and

336


published many different psychological journals. In 1986 there were 44 'divisions' and about 50 such periodicals. This growth in American psychology continued right into the next period, which we shall hear about later. INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Until now we have focussed exclusively on American psychology, because it is completely dominating in the period from 1933 until around 1960. Germanpsychology was dominating in the period of classical experimental psychology, but became weak and divided during the first period of school formation (c. 1900-1933). After Hitler's seizure of power, experimental psychology - especially Gestalt psychology - and psychoanalysis were completely abolished at German universities. A whole generation of leading psychologists emigrated, especially to the USA, and so there were none left to carry on psychology after the Second World War. Thus, a period of 15-20 years passed before it was possible to educate a new generation of psychologists and re-establish the psychological laboratories. Not until around 1960 did psychology begin to recover from the aftermath of the Nazi time and the Second World War. Now German psychologists are respected again in international psychology, but American psychology has retained its leading position. Psychology has had a similar development in other European countries during this period, although it deteriorated less than in Germany. The war and in many countries, the German occupation - has restricted the development of psychology, and in many countries the education of psychologists at universities did not get going until after the Second World War. Thus, American psychology has had a great influence on European and - subsequently - Asiatic psychology, which developed during the post-war years with American psychology as its chief source of inspiration and paradigm-creator. International collaboration between psychologists was resumed after the Second World War. The most noteworthy collaboration consisted in the organization of international congresses. These started already in 1889, when the first international psychology congress was held in Paris with about 200 participants. Since then they have been held every three - and later 4 - years, though interrupted by the two World Wars (see Table 8.1). Apart from these congresses on 'scientific' psychology, congresses devoted to uppliedpsychology have been held at varying intervals ever since1 920 - al-


337

Table 8.1. Time and place for the international congresses after 2nd World war, arranged by the International Union of Psychological Science. 1. Paris 1889 2. London 1892 3. Miinchen 1896 4. Paris1900 5. Rom1905 6. Gen6ve 1989 7. Oxford 1923 8. Groningen 1926

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

New Haven 1929 Copenhagen 1932 Paris 1937 Edinburgh 1948 Stockholm 1951 Montreal 1954 Bruxelles 1957 BOM 1960

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24,

Washington D.C. 1963 Moscow 1966 London 1969 Tokyo 1972 Paris1976 Leipzig 1980 Acapulco (Mexico) 1984 Sydney 1988

though in recent times at four-yearly intervals and staggered in relation to the scientific congresses (see Table 8.2). These congresses are now organized by two international organizations. The eldest is the International Association of Applied Psychology, which was founded in 1927. After the Second World War, in 1951, the International Union of Scientific Psychology was founded, and later re-christened the International Union of Psychological Science. Despite the difference in names there is not a great difference between the two forms of congress, since their programmes are very similar and the participants are for the most part the same. But whereas the International Association of Applied Psychology is composed of individual members, the Intemational Union of Psychological Science is composed of national psychological associations, such as the American and the Danish associations. Apart from these two international psychological associations, organized collaboration also takes place regionally in the form of congresses and journals, etc., as, for example, the Inter-American and Scandinavian congresses and journals. The development of psychology in various countries has been dealt with in books by, amongst others, Henryk Misiak and Virginia S . Sexton (see Misiak and Sexton, 1966, and Sexton and Misiak, 1976). Table 8.2. Time and place for the international congresses in applied psychology, arranged by the International Association of Applied Psychology. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Gen6ve 1920 Barcelona 1921 Milan01922 Paris 1927 Utrecht 1928 Barcelona 1930 Moscow 1931

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Praha1934 Bern 1949 Goteborg 1951 Paris 1953 London 1955 Rom1958 Copenhagen 1961

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Ljubljana 1964 Amsterdam 1968 Liege 1971 Montreal 1974 Miinchen 1978 Edinburgh 1982 21. Jerusalem 1986

338


Internal Causes of Integration INTRODUCTION. So far, we have dealt with the external causes of the integration of psychology and the growth of the scientific community from 1933 until c. 1960. But the integration also had its infernal causes: psychologists felt that the splitting up of psychology into competing schools was unsatisfactory, and so they were determined to integrate psychology into one science. Most probably various university psychology teachers sought to create a unity in their teaching in order to help their students obtain a better overall view and understanding of the interrelationsbetween the various schools of psychology. These psychology teachers were able to obtain inspiration and help from a number of works by psychologists who had consciously attempted to integrate the diverging paradigms of the various schools into one psychological paradigm. We have chosen here to deal with four psychologists who may be said to have had the greatest influence on the process of integration, i.e. Woodworth, Tolman, Lewin and Murray. The following will consist of a brief account of their lives (on the basis of their self-biographies in 'The History of Psychology through Autobiographies') and production (see the bibliography). In the second part of the chapter we shall undertake the customary comparative analysis of three of these psychologists' production. ROBERT S. WOODWORTH (1869-1962). Woodworth is one of the most respected American psychologists, as revealed by the various culminating points of his career. Thus, he has been called the Dean of American Psychology and the greatest and most influential teacher of psychology America has ever had. The latter may well refer to the sheer fact that Woodworth taught psychology for altogether 70 years! At the same time he wrote a number of greatly respected and frequently translated textbooks, in which he clearly revealed himself as an integrator and organizer of psychological knowledge. Woodworth was born in New England in 1869, the son of a priest whose third wife, Woodworths mother, taught mathematics and mental philosophy at college. He chose to follow in his mother's footsteps rather than in his father's. At first he attended Amherst College, where he had a philosopher teacher who was very interested in psychology. He also studied mathematics and taught this subject for four years in secondary schools and college. Thereafter he re-


339

sumed his university studies at Harvard, where the influence of William James and Stanley Hall diverted his interest in philosophy in the direction of modern psychology. As part of his psychological studies Woodworth also began to study physiology. This took him to England, where he became assistant to Sherrington. He also married an English girl, and thus would probably have remained in British physiology had not J . McKeen Cattell invited him to Columbia in 1903, where he remained the rest of his life. Here a fellow student of his, E.L. Thorndike, became his colleague, and together they performed some experiments on the transfer of training. Woodworth subsequently undertook many experiments - often in co-operation with his students. But he published only a few of these experimental investigations, which - like his teaching - covered all fields of psychology. During the First World War he was involved in the elaboration of a test called the Personal Data Sheet for the armed forces. But apart from these scattered empirical investigations and his actual teaching, Woodworth' greatest influence was through his numerous textbooks for students at all levels. One of his first significant books was Dynamic Psychology from 1918. In this he formally founded motivational psychology or 'motivology', as he called it. This was at the time of the 'instinct controversy', and Woodworth proposed the introduction of two new explanatory concepts - i.e. drive and mechanism to replace the devaluated concept of instinct. He thereby laid the foundation for a distinction between the two functions: the dynamic or activating ('drive') and the steering or directive ('mechanism'). The drive-concept was subsequently 'adopted' by Tolman and thereby introduced into American learning psychology, where the drive-concept was further elaborated in Hull's and his colleagues' theory. Forty years after the publication of Dynamic Psychology he issued a revised edition entitled Dynamics of Behavior (1958), in which presented a so-called behavior-primacy-theory in competition with the previously dominating need-primacy-theory. With the advent of this behavior-primacytheory the almost ninety-year-old Woodworth became included among the modem theoreticians responsible for intrinsic-motivation-theories which were also of great educational interest. (A metatheoretical analysis of Woodworth's theory is to be found in Madsen, 1974). Another important textbook was Psychology: a Study of Mental Life, which came out in 1921. In this book he supplemented Watson's formula (S-R) with an intermediate link (0),representing the organism. Thus the extended psychological formula became:


340 S-0-R

With this he had again anticipated a later development in psychological theorybuilding, exemplified in particular by Tolman's intervening variables. In his first-mentioned book from 1958 Woodworth also extended the psychological formula with a further link (retro-flux, or R,) representing the modem concept of feedback. The formula now became: S-0-R-R,

With this formula he had presented a fairly comprehensive scheme or metatheory for a complete psychological theory. Woodworth's third major work was his Contemporary Schools of Psychology, which came out in 1931. Subsequent enlarged editions were published in 1948 and 1964 (the latter in conjunction with Mary Sheehan). The latter provides an account of the history of psychology with emphasis on its theoretical development. With Contemporary Schools - like his remaining textbooks he helped to integrate the opposing schools, systems and theories in an extremely harmonious and balanced fashion that has earned him great respect. Woodworth's greatest contribution, however, is his Experimental Psychology, which was published in 1938 and subsequently revised several times. He accomplished the feat of writing a handbook of almost 1000 pages singlehanded. He was so widely-read that he was able to cover the whole field of experimental psychology satisfactorily in one book. Furthermore, unlike similar works, this book was both organized and integrated. This remarkable and highly estimated feat will scarcely be repeated by other psychologists, because - apart from talent - Woodworth was in possession of a strong constitution which enabled him to carry on a productive career for more than 70 years. None other than he has been able to follow the development of psychology right from its infancy until the 1960's. EDWARD TOLMAN (1886- 1959). The American psychologist Edward Chase

Tolman has had an especially important influence on psychology on account of his metatheoretical studies. His influence on American psychology lasted for 34 decades, his metatheory creating a broad and fertile conceptual framework, which proved suitable for integrating the various schools into one entity.


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Tolman was born in 1886 in Massachusets, the son of a prosperous manufacturer, who sent both him and his brother to the Massachusets Institute of Technology. Here he obtained a degree in electrochemistry. His interests lay more in philosophy, however, and he transferred to Harward University, where his interest in psychology was aroused - amongst other things, by Yerke's teaching, for which Watson's newly published book on comparative psychology was used. He decided thereafter to study psychology, because it was 'a nice compromise between philosophy and science'. It was therefore natural that he became especially interested in the philosophical and metascientific problems of psychology. In 1912 Tolman studied for a period in Giesen, Germany, where he met Koffka and became interested for the first time in Gestalt psychology. In 1915 he obtained his Ph.D. and was appointed to Northwestern University as a teacher of psychology. He was later dismissed on account of some pacifistic writings which he published during the First World War (Later, during the Second World War, he wrote an interesting motivational psychological analysis: 'Drives toward War', 1942). He himself maintains that, like other features of his personality, his pacifistic stance was influenced by his mother, who was a Quaker. In 1918 he moved to Berkeley, part of the University of California. where he remained for the rest of his life (amongst other reasons, because he liked the climate). At Berkeley he started something that was new at that time, i.e. teaching in comparative psychology. He constructed some mazes and personally canied out a number of maze experiments on rats, at the same time inspiring some of his students to invent further maze experiments. At a certain point he maintained that all fundamental psychological situations could be researched with the aid of maze tests on rats, and dedicated his chief work, 'Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men' (1932), to 'M.N.A.' (the white rat). Thus Tolman made use of the maze in order to test his own and others' theories, and it was on the basis of such tests that he maintained that rats' learning processes consisted in the formation of 'cognitive maps' rather than S-R-connections. It was also on the basis of maze tests on so-called 'latent learning' that Tolman questioned the important role played by reinforcement in learning processes, as advocated by Hull. The interest in the maze experiments, however, was the only thing Tolman had in common with Watson's original behaviorism. Tolman preserved only

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the external 'conceptual framework': the definition of psychology as 'behavioral science' and the demand for an empirical 'anchorage' of the theory with the help of operationalistic definitions of theoretical concepts. But the content of Tolman's theory was much more marked by Gestalt psychology especially by K. Lewin's theory; later psychoanalytical concepts were also introduced (especially in 'A Psychological Model', 1951). On the other hand, he was not interested in physiological explanations like Pavlov, Watson and the other original behaviorists. He did not think psychology could be reduced to or be based on physiology, but considered it to be a completely independent science, which - like physics - was obliged to construct its theories from the 'bottom' up (i.e. from behavioral data). Thus Tolman was the first to introduce the metatheoretical concept, 'intervening variables', as a designation for processes and factors constituting the unobserved intermediary link between the independent variables contained in the situation and the dependent variable, behavior. He himself regarded these 'intervening variables' as hypothetical constructions. When a subsequent attempt was made to introduce a distinction between purely formal 'intervening variables' and 'hypothetical constructs' proper, Tolman maintained: 'I do not agree that there are two separate kinds of theoretical concepts.' Later, he re-christened this system of several hypothetical variables 'a model' (e.g. in 'A Psychological Model', 1951). Tolman was not the first psychologist to use hypothetical constructions or 'models' - Freud already did so in 1900, and Woodworth came with similar thoughts in 1921. But Tolman was the first psychologist to develop a 'theory about theories' - i.e. a mefatheory - which became generally recognized by a whole generation of psychologists. .. Among the most important adherents of Tolman's constructive metatheory was Hull, who applied it to the construction of his hypothetical-deductivesystem. Unlike Hull, Tolman never developed a systematic or exact theory; he still continued to produce new sketches or drafts for theories without trying to formalize them. He himself comments that theory-making amused him, and that 'the theory, though loose, has been fertile, perhaps fertile primarily because loose.'


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KURT LEWIN (1890-1947). The German-American psychologist Kurt Lewin is

one of psychology's great 'bridge-builders', since he more than anyone else contributed towards the integration of Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis and behaviorism. He was born in 1890 in Prussia, and studied psychology in Berlin, where he obtained his Ph.D. in 1914 under Wertheimer, the founder of Gestalt psychology. But, unlike Wertheimer and the other leading Gestalt psychologists, Kohler and Kojjkz, Lewin was not only interested in perception and cognitive processes, but especially in 'Handlungs- und Affektpsychologie', as motivational psychology was then called. Lewin took his point of departure in N. Ach's theory about 'determining tendencies', which were proposed as a supplement to the 'associations' of classical psychology. Ach regarded 'determining tendencies' and 'associations' as collateral concepts, and he measured the strength of a determining tendency (such as task acceptances, decision making, etc.) by having them compete with an association (the strength of which could be 'measured' by the number of repetitions that had been necessary for establishing the association). Lewin, on the other hand, regarded determining tendencies as the 'dynamics' that were a necessary precondition for producing an action. The action could possibly be 'steered' by 'associations' regarded as purely 'mechanical' (in contrast to the 'dynamic' needs). Later, Lewin related the determining tendencies to biological needs, calling the determining tendencies 'quasi-needs'. He thereby placed special emphasis on similarity: both 'genuine' biological needs as well as 'quasi-needs' (determining tendencies) produce a state of psychical excitation, and it is that, as well as our cognitive processes, which determines our actions. Thus a 'dynamic' aspect was hereby introduced into psychology at roughly the same time as Freud's 'Trieb-concept' was introduced into psychoanalysis. But, unlike Freud, Lewin was an experimental psychologist. As a private teacher and, later, a professor in Berlin, he inspired many of his students and assistants to experiment with 'quasi-needs', which were easier to control experimentally than genuine, biological needs. To this period belong the well-known experiments on uncompleted tasks (Zeigarnik), surrogate satisfaction, demand-level, etc. Following Hitler's seizure of power Lewin emigrated to America, where he quickly had some of his German articles translated and assembled under the title 'Dynamic Theory of Personality' (1935). Thereafter he started on the formal development of his theory. Lewin was a great believer in what Tolman

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called a 'constructive theory': a theory which explains with the help of hypothetical constructions - or 'models', as he subsequently called them. Lewin derived his concepts from topology - a geometrical discipline he thought most suitable for describing the 'experienced or 'psychical world' ('Life-space'), which determines behavior. The 'Principles of Topological Psychology' (1936) may be regarded as Lewin's attempts to reproduce or represent the phenomenologically observed object with the help of precise, geometrical concepts. Since he subsequently developed this theory in order to be able to explain and predict behavior, he had to introduce vector variables from mathematics. With the help of this concept he produced an exact and systematic account of 'Psychological Forces' (1938). According to Lewin, psychical forces are determined by the state of excitation in the person as well as the experienced surroundings, and so it is possible to regard this place of interacting factors as a 'field. This concept was taken from physics, and Lewin eventually termed his theory a 'field-theory'. This may be viewed as tantamount to extending the Gestalt concept to include not only perception and cognitive processes but also the structure and dynamics of personality. Lewin was not only interested in the formal elaboration of his theory but in its application. He had been attached for a number of years to Iowa University's Child Welfare Institute, where his theory became used for developmental psychological investigations (including the well-known investigations of 'frustration, regression and aggression'). During the Second World War he was greatly interested in his theory's socio-psychological applications. As the result of his experiments concerning the leadership of boys' clubs in New York he became attached to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where, until his death in 1947, he instigated both 'action research' and experimental 'group dynamics'. His socio-psychological articles have been collected in 'Resolving Social Conflicts' (1947), and more theoretical papers in 'Field Theory in the Social Sciences' (195 1). The Americans regard Lewin as the founder of experimental social psychology, and modern 'sensitivity training' may be viewed as an offshoot of Lewin's work. Lewin was an all-round psychologist with many talents: he contributed to the integration of the psychological schools and applied his 'field-theory' to many different spheres - both theoretical and practical. He has been severely


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criticized for 'misusing topology' and for an all too loose connection between theory and empirical data. But, despite that, his theory-making has served as an extremely fruitful source of inspiration for empirical research and its practical application. He has in an uncommon degree shown that 'nothing is so practical as a good theory.'

HENRY A. MURRAY (born 1893). Murray's 'personology' is regarded as constituting a 'bridge' between clinical method and psychoanalytical theory on the one hand and experimental method and 'academic' psychology on the other. Murray's theory has therefore proved extremely fruitful for the integration of psychology. It is the product of a creative personality with an extremely allround background, as his life-history will show. Murray was born in 1893 in New York and graduated in history from Harvard University. Four years afterwards he became a doctor of medicine at Columbia University, obtaining an M.A. in biology the following year. After serving for two years as an intern he did two years of research in embryology. He then transferred to England, and studied biochemistry at Cambridge University, where he obtained his Ph.D. While in England he became interested in differences of personality among scientists. Since he found the best possible basis for an understanding of these differences in Jung's 'Psychological Types' he went to Zurich, where during the course of several weeks' conversations with Jung - he developed an interest in psychoanalysis. On returning to the USA in 1927 he became an instructor in psychology at Harvard, and the following year he became the director of the 'Psychological Clinic' founded by Morton Prince. At the same time as commencing his own personal psychoanalysis, Murray inspired and led psychology's first great team-work, which resulted in 'Explorations in Personality' (1938), to which Murray himself contributed the entire theory and the projective test 'T.A.T.'. During the Second World War he served as a military psychologist, specializing in the selection of men for particularly demanding tasks. When Murray returned to Harward he became Professor of Clinical Psychology and continued to inspire many young psychologists (also Danish ones). During these years his analysis of Herman Melville's authorship (especially 'Moby Dick') earned him great respect. In 1963 Murray retired, but he has continued both to


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write and to revise his original theory. He expresses his regrets that these revisions are not so well-known as 'Explorationsin Personality'. In Murray's 'intellectual self-biography' (in S. Koch (Ed.): 'Psychology - a Study of a Science', Vol3,1959), he himself summarizes his experiences and mentions his sources of inspiration as follows: From the study of history he has learnt respect for continuity also in the life-history of the individual. From his medical training he has learnt clinical method and team-work, while from his embryological and biochemical research he has learnt experimental method and the biological foundation of the development of the organism. Finally, from psychoanalysis he has learnt, via Jung, the theoretical basis of the whole of his work. Apart from Jung and Freud, whom he admired most of all, he mentions important, positive influences from the following: Darwin, Whitehead, McDougall, K. Lewin, Tolman, Kluckhohn and Parsons. Thus, all this goes to form the background of Murray' fruitful synthesis.

The integrating psychologists ' production INTRODUCTION. For this section we have chosen the production of Tolman,

Lewin and Murray, and this will be subjected to the customary metatheoretical analysis and comparison. (Woodworth's production has been analyzed in Madsen, 1974). According to our metatheoretical hypothesis, the production of these three psychologists has a common meta-stratum, and so, as in previous cases, we shall deal with their meta-stratum collectively, and their hypothetical and data-strata separately. Separate analyses of the three theories are to be found in Madsen (1959).

The Integrating Meta-Stratum ONTOLOGICAL h4ETA-THESES. We shall compare the three theories' 1) conception of man, 2) psycho-physical theory and 3) conception of determinism.

I. The conception of man. All three psychologists have a biological conception of man.

The integrating psychologist's production

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This is most clearly apparent in Tolman, who dedicates his chief work (Tolman, 1932) to 'M.N.A.', which stands for Mus Norvegicus Albinus - i.e. the white rat, which was his favourite experimental animal. This biological view of man is especially marked in an article (The Determiners of Behavior at a Choice Point, Psychological Review, 1938, quoted here from 'Collected Papers', 1951). Here he concludes that anything of any importance in psychology can be investigated by way of experiments with rats in labyrinths. We have not found any correspondingly clear, explicit formulations of a biological conception of man in Lewin and Murray, but there is no doubt that both of them possess a biological - rather than a sociological or humanistic - conception of man, even though they experiment exclusively with human subjects (p. )I.

2 . The psycho-physical theory. The three theories are not equally explicit in formulating their theory about the psycho-physical problem. Tolman comes closest to an explicit formulation in Tolman (1932). p.3, in which he writes that 'mental processes' are hypothetical, inner determinants of behavior2. This, and Tolman's entire production, may be interpreted as expressing a neutral monistic theory about the psycho-physical problem. In Lewin too we find formulations which can be interpreted as expressing a neutral monistic theory. In Lewin (1938) he writes on p. 38 about the central hypothetical construction, 'psychological forces', that they may be regarded as 'biological forces' that govern the brain3. Thus it is clear that Lewin identifies psychological forces with physiological processes in the brain. An expression of a neutral-monistic theory is to be found even clearer in Murray - here in its 'double-aspect version'. Thus Murray writes (in Murray et al. 1938) p. 494, that he and his colleagues have adopted that version of the 'double-aspect hypothesis' which maintains that every conscious process is the subjective aspect of brain processes, but not all brain proceses have a conscious correllate. And the concept of 'consciousness' itself is clearly defined operationally (pp. 113-114), consciousness being the subjective state that is capable of being verbalizeds. Thus we may conclude that all three integrating psychologists operate with a neutral-monistic theory of identity.

3. The problem of determinism. The three integrating psychologists also vary according to the amount of explicit formulations about the problem of determinism, but their texts appear to contain more or less the same conception of the problem of causality.

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On this question Tolman writes (in Tolman, 1932, p. 422) that in future psychology may - like physics - have to adopt a form of probabilism, but this Tolman emphasizes - is not identical with 'metaphysical' indeterminism ('free will')6. This shows that Tolman was prepared already in 1932 for the possibility of psychology coming to terms with probabtism, but that he thought he would for the time being be able to maintain a determinism. Lewin was very much interested in the problem of determinism. Thus, he has a large section on ,,The Conflict between Aristotelian and Galilean Modes of Thought in Contemporary Psychology" in Lewin (1935). He also deals with the subject in Lewin (1936). We can reproduce Lewin's theory as follows: In contrast to 'classical Aristotelian' science, 'modern Galilean' science treats of both the general law and the particular, concrete example in a causaldeterminist manner. A causal explanation of the particular has simply to contain both the general law (nomothetic hypothesis) as well as concrete data concerning both the actual situation and the concrete individual whose behavior is to be explained by the general law. Thus, in psychology we are not compelled to operate with general laws which only apply to the average of a group. Apart from this, Lewin also introduces a distinction between historical and systematic explanations. In psychology historical explanations apply to the development of individuals that results in the concrete personality structure at any time. Systematic explanations apply to explanationsof the concrete behavior in the conciete situation into which the concrete personality structure of the person enters. Lewin maintains that these two types of explanation are often confused in psychological - especially psychoanalytical - explanations. For example, it is not unusual for the behavior of an adult to be explained in terms of a childhood situation. These ought to be separated, so that the complete explanation consists of two stages: first a systematic explanation of the concrete behavior on the basis of the concrete personality structure and present situation, and then a historical explanation of the concrete individual's personality growth. Thus, it may be seen that Lewin's theory presupposes a consistent causal-determinism. Murray is not very explicit in his treatment of the problem of determinism, but in several places his account presupposes a moderate determinism


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(Murray, 1938, p. 43)7. Murray must therefore - like Lewin and Tolman - be classified as a determinist.

In conclusion, we can say in respect of the three integrating psychologists' ontological meta-theses, that they all manifest a biological conception of mun, a neutral-monistic psycho-physical theory and a deterministic Weltanschauung'. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. This section will deal with the three theories' epis-

temology, meta-theory and methodology.

1. Epistemological theses. In accordance with the systematologicaltaxonomy, we shall first deal with the three theories' meta-theses with respect to the origin of knowledge and the relation between knowledge and reality. 1.1. The origin of knowledge. The three theories presuppose a combination of empiricism and rationalism. We have not found an explicit formulation in Tolman, but it is clear that he practises a rationalistic empiricism. Lewin, however, clearly manifests a rationalistic empiricism (or empiricist rationalism) (see Lewin, 1953, p. 241)8, where he maintains that psychology can just as little as other sciences dispense with theory if it is to me more than a mere collection and description of facts. But the theories have to be 'empirical theories'. On the same subject Murray writes (Murray, 1938, p.1 l)9 that there must be a suitable balance between speculation and detailed measurements. In a young science like psychology bold speculations are especially useful. It appears from this that Murray too is an empirical rationalist - perhaps even more rationalistic than Lewin. Thus, one might say of the three theories, that while Tolman is a rationalistic empiricist, Murray is an empirical rationalist and Lewin is equally empiricist and rationalist. This is only a rough estimation, of course, the most essential thing being that all three integrating psychologists also Tolmun - recognize the necessity of both rational theory-making and empirical research. 1.2. Knowledge's relation to reality. None of the three theories take an extreme view of this question - they manifest neither extreme realism or extreme idealism, adopting, rather, a 'middle stance' - or synthesis - between realism and idealism, i.e. the epistemology known as pragmatism or instrumentalism (cf. Appendix). Tolman is the most explicit in his formulations, declaring himself (Tolman, 1932, p. 430) to be a pragmatistlo. As we shall see later, this episte-

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mology is quite in accordance with his hypotheses about cognition as the creation of 'cognitive maps'. Lewin may also be termed a pragmatist or instrumentalist. He has become famous for the slogan, 'there is nothing so practical as a good theory'. This is to be found in a discussion on 'Problems of Research in Social Psychology' in Lewin (1952), p. 16911. Lewin's production bears witness to the fact that he himself has conformed to the norm for the integration of theoretical research and applied research presented here. He has also been described in a biography as 'The Practical Theorist' (see Marrow, 1969). In Murray it has not been possible to find any explicit formulations of an instrumentalist epistemology,but on the basis of a study of Murray's total production we may conclude that Murray's - as well as Tolman's and Lewin's epistemology is pragmatic (instrumentalist), and not an extreme realism or idealism. 2. Metatheoretical theses. In accordance with the systematological taxonomy we shall concentrate here on the ideal of science presupposed by the three psychologists. Tolman clearly possesses a nomothetic (natural scientific)ideal of science. This appears in many places (see Tolman, 1932, p. 424)12, in which he maintains that it is the task of the sciences to formulate a number of functional relations which can be used for prediction and control. It is precisely this 'technical' - or instrumentalist - 'cognitive interest', which characterizes the natural scientific ideal of science according to the Frankfurter school. Lewin strongly advocates the nomothetic ideal of science. It is precisely this he means when he speaks of 'Galilean science' as opposed to 'Aristotelian science', to which we have alluded several times. Thus, Chapter I of Lewin (1935) is entirely devoted to this subject. He also deals with the subject in the introductory chapters of Lewin, 1936 (table 1, p. 9)13. Here he operates with three epoques in the development of psychology, each with its own goal: 1. The speculative epoque, in which the goal is to 'discover the 'essence' of things.


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2. The descriptive epoque, in which the goal is to describe the facts as precisely as possible. 3. The constructive epoque, in which the goal is to discover laws and predict individual cases. This is a clear formulation of the nomothetic ideal of science. It has scarcely been more clearly formulated or consistently practised by anyone previously in the history of psychology. Murray and his colleagues have also had a nomothetic ideal of science. This appears explicitly already in the 'Preface' on p. ix of Murray (1938), where it says amongst other things that the object is both to formulate general psychological laws and understand particular cases.14. Thus it is clear that Murray and his colleagues were able to collaborate on the basis of a nomothetic ideal of science. But they also mention psychoanalysis as a model ('paradigm' in the narrow, Kuhnian, sense). In Chapter 7 we showed that Freud explicitly accepted the nomothetic ideal of science, but that in practice he also operated with a hermeneutic ideal of science. We have not been able to find explicit expressions for such an ideal of science in Murray and his colleagues, but it is clear that they used methods - e.g. as projective tests which demanded interpretations. So they have practised hermeneutics like Freud in his 'Interpretation of Dreams'. Thus we can conclude this section on metatheory by saying that the three integrating psychologists all explicitly accept a nomothetic ideal of science, while Murray and his colleagues operate in addition with hermeneutic interpretations.

3. Methodological theses. In accordance with the systematological taxonomy we shall now deal with the integrating psychologists' empirical methods as well as their data-language. 3.1. Empirical methods. Tolman and Lewin make use exclusively of experimental method, which is well in accordance with their nomothetic ideal of science. But they do not argue for their methods in terms of principles, nor do they have any methodological prescripts. On the other hand, they provide many descriptions of the methods used. Thus, Tolman provides a detailed description of the experimental apparatus, especially the mazes. According to the systematological taxonomy, however, such descriptions belong to the datastratum.

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Apart from experiments, Murray and his colleagues use tests and clinical methods; these will be discussed under the data-stratum. Murray does not argue on the basis of principles either, and nor does he have any methodological prescripts - possibly because Murray's and his colleagues' book is chiefly concerned with a method-testing study. 3.2. Data-language. Tolman is probably the most one-sided - and therefore least integrating - of the three when arguing in support of a specific data-language. He argues strongly in favour of applying psychology solely to the study and description of behavioral data. Thus he writes already on p. 2 in Tolman (1932): ,,The motives which lead to the assertion of a behaviorism are simple. All that can ever actually be observed in fellow human beings and in the lower animals is behavior." However, we must add that Tolman rejects Watson's 'molecular behaviorism', which defines behavior as muscle movements, introducing instead his molar behaviorism. Thus, on p. 7 (in Tolman, 1932), he writes that behavior is a total phenomenon ('molar' or 'emergent' phenomenon), which is more than the sum of its elementsls. This definition of molar behavior, in which Tolman maintains that molar behavior is 'more than and different from the sum of its psychological parts', clearly reveals the influence of Gestalt psychology. And he also anticipates modem system theory by maintaining that behavior 'is an 'emergent' phenomenon with descriptive and defining properties of its own'. This system-theoretical conception is even more manifest in a paper on 'Physiology, Psychology and Sociology' (to be found in 'Collected Papers' from 195 1). In this paper he defines them clearly as three independent sciences which are on three different levels. Psychology is no more dependent on physiology than on sociology. According to Tolman (1932), this molar definition of behavior makes it unnecessary for psychologists to incorporatephysiological data (p. 4 16)16. Not only does Tolman (1932) minimize the importance of physiological data but he rejects the importance of phenomenological or introspective data (p. 235) 17.


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Thus, Tolman regards linguistic utterances (which mediate introspective data) to be a form of molar behavior. Therefore psychology can suffice with behavioral data. Lewin writes very little about the data-language of psychology, but in several places in the text (e.g. p. 61 in Lewin, 1952) it is evident that Lewin regards behavioral data as psychology's most important datal*. In other places he writes that physiological data are not nearly so important for psychology as social data. Thus Lewin (1952) has the same attitude to physiological data as Tolman, though stressing on the other hand the importance of social data for psychology (p. 150)19. In other places the 'subjective psychological world of the individual' is also discussed, but nowhere in Lewin's production is there any mention of subjective data collected by 'introspection' or the 'phenomenological method'. Lewin seems entirely to have accepted behaviorism's definition of 'psychology' as 'the science about behavior', and - like Tolman - Lewin refers to the individual's 'subjective world', 'consciousness', or suchlike, in the form of hypothetical constructions like 'life-space', 'fields' or 'perceived environment'. Thus, whereas Tolman and Lewin explicitly favourize behavioral data, Murray (1938) has a more generally integrating attitude towards psychology's data-language, and fully recognizes the significance of private phenomenological language (p. 47)20. On the other hand, Murray and his colleagues also recognize the importance of behavioral data because they are objective and interdisciplinary. But Murray and his colleagues also recognize the importance of physiological data. Thus, they localize their most important hypothetical variables incl. 'regnant processes' - to the brain, since this provides the possibility of integrating physiological data with behavioral and phenomenological data (p. 73p.

In conclusion, as far as the methodological theses of the integrating psychologists are concerned, Tolman and Lewin favourize experimental method whereas Murray and his colleagues employ both experimental method as well as clinical and test-type methods. Tolman and Lewin go in exclusively for behavioral data, whereas Murray and his colleagues stress the importance of behavioral, physiological and phenomonological data. To sum up the meta-theses of the philosophy of science: The three integrating psychologists have roughly the same epistemology (empiricist rd-

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tionalism; pragmatism),the same metatheory (nomothetic ideal of science) and the same methodology, although Murray's and his colleagues' choice of methods and data-language is wider than that of Tolman and Lewin, which is confined to experimental method and behaviorist data-language. Conclusion regarding the meta-stratum. We have previously been able to conclude that in principle the ontological meta-theses of the integrating psychologists are the same. Since we have also concluded that the philosophy of science's meta-theses are also the same (apart from the fact that Murray and his colleagues have a wider choice of methods), we are now able to conclude that in principle the metastrata in the integrating psychologists' production are identical. This conclusion implies that the integrating psychologists have had a common meta-paradigm. This must again imply that the integrating psychologists have been paradigm-creators for a macroschool. This macroschool - that of integrating psychology - has constituted the second normal period of psychology: integrating psychology. We shall bring further arguments in support of this statement at the end of the chapter, after having dealt with the three psychologists' hypothetical strata and data-strata as well as their theories as a whole.

The integrating hypothetical stratum INTRODUCTION. Like the previous chapters in which the production of several

psychologists has been analysed as a whole (Chapter 4 and 6),we shall deal with each of the three integrating psychologists' hypothetical strata in turn. TOLMAN'S HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. Tolman's production comprises several draft 'theories' ( = hypothetical strata in the narrow sense of the word). The most comprehensive and elaborate theories are to be found in 'Purposive Behavior' (1932), in 'A Psychological Model' (in Parsons and Shils, 1951) and in 'Principles of Purposive Behavior' (in S . Koch, 1959). Of these we shall choose 'A Psychological Model' as the most systematic and at the same time the most representative of Tolman's entire production. As the title suggests Tolman sets forth here an explanatory model for psychological phenomena (= behavior). We can therefore start with the whole -


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the hypothetical system - and then proceed with the elements: the hypotheses and the hypothetical terms.

1 . The hypothesis-system. All Tolman's draft theories have been constructed according to the meta-model: 'Independent Variables +Intervening Variables +Dependent Variables'. When this meta-model is applied to psychology it can be converted into an overriding hypothesis: Behaviour is a function of a system of hypothetical processes and structures, which again are a function of independent, empirical variables. It was precisely Tolman who taught American psychologists the use of this meta-model, and he himself used it consistently throughout his entire production. This is clearly manifest in his numerous graphic models - not least in the general model to be found on pages 286 and 287 in Tolman (1951), reconstructed here as Fig. 8.1. Tolman himself compares the two modes of explanation - deductive explanation and explanation by analogy - in his last paper (Tolman, 1959), in which he states (p. 97)22 that he has not followed Hull's example in constructing a deductive system, but has preferred sketchlike theories in which explanations have often been supported by graphic models. These graphic models may be viewed as Tolman's own 'cognitive maps' of psychology's field. The model from 1951 very much ressembles Lewin's models: Tolman himself admits the influence of Lewin in a footnote on p. 136 in Tolman (1959), where he writes: 'I have been tremendously influenced by Lewin'23. But Tolman's entire production appears to indicate that he does not (like Lewin) regard graphic models as mathematical (geometrical) aids in a deducfive explanation, but rather as heuristic and pedagogic aids in analogy-explanations. From the hypothesis-system as a whole we shall now turn to the individual hypotheses. 2. The hypotheses. In none of his draft theories has Tolman explicitly formulated a system of hypotheses. We shall therefore reconstruct his hypotheses on the basis of the graphic model (Fig. 8.1). In this diagram Tolman has himself represented the implicit hypotheses in the form of arrows, i.e. 'IV postulated causal connections (indicated by arrows)'. Following the diagram we shall first reformulate the hypotheses about the functional relations between independent variables and intervening variables (see Fig. 8.1):


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Fig. 8.1. A reconstruction of TolmanS model from 1951. ISTHYPOTHESIS: The stimulus situation (S.S.) causes changes in the need-

system (N.S.).

Reformulated symbolically: 1st hypothesis: S(S.S.)

-)

H(N.S.).


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As the model shows (Fig. 8.1), the 'need system' consists of a general need called 'libido' and a number of specific needs. 2ND HYPOTHESIS: The stimulus situations (S.S.) causes changes in the belief

value matrix (B.V.M.). Reformulated symbolically: 2nd hypothesis: S(S.S.) + H(B.V.M.).

As the model shows (Fig. 8.1.), the belief-value matrix is a system of hypothetical variables which represent the individual's expectations that specific means will lead to specific goals, and that the achievement of these goals will change a negative, unsatisfactory state into a positive, satisfactory state. As an example Tolman uses hunger, which is converted into satiation by choosing between different restaurants, and thereafter choosing between various dishes. The belief-value matrix corresponds to 'expectations' and 'meansreadiness' in other versions of Tolman's theories. In proceeding with the reconstruction we obtain the next explicit formulation: 3RD HYPOTHESIS: The stimulus situation (S.S.) causes changes in the immediate behavior space (I.B.S.). Reformulated symbolically: 3rd hypothesis: S(S.S.) + H(1.B.S.)

As the model shows (Fig. 8.1.), the immediate behavior space is a system of hypothetical variables, which are the person's - the behaving selfs (B.S.) cognitive representation of himself in the situation together with its means and goals possessing 'value' or 'valence', as it is called. Tolman's 'behavior space' largely corresponds to Lewin's 'life space', as we shall see later. Proceeding with the systematic reconstruction, we shall now explicitly formulate the next hypothesis on the basis of the model: 4TH HYPOTHESIS: Conditions of drive arousal or satiation causes changes in the need system (N.S.). Reformulated symbolically: 4th hypothesis: S(drive) + H(N.S.)

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Here it should be stressed that Tolman applies the term 'drive' to the peripheral, empirical, observable state in the organism, and the term 'need' to the central hypothetical variable representing motivation. This terminology is the reverse of Hull's (see Chapter 6) and Freud's (Chapter 7), who apply 'need' and 'drive' ('trieb') to the central variable. We shall see later that Murray also uses the term 'need' in the same way as Tolman. The next explicit formulation is: 5TH HYPOTHESIS: Heredity, age, sex, drugs and endocrines (H.A.S.D.E.)

causes individual differences in capacity and temperamental traits (C.T.T.) . Reformulated symbolically: 5th hypothesis: S(H.A.S.D.E.) + H(C.T.T.) It should be noted, however, that in all his draft theories Tolman has included individual dispositions (here 'C.T.T.') among his hypothetical variables, but, like in this draft, he has not elaborated this part of the theory very thoroughly. After these hypotheses about the functional relations between independent variables and intervening variables we shall proceed with the reconstruction of hypotheses about the interrelations of these hypothetical variables, starting with the hypotheses about the effect of the individual dispositions (C.T.T.) on other hypothetical variables. 6TH HYPOTHESIS: Capacity and temperamental traits (C.T.T.) causes individ-

ual differences in the need system (N.S.). Reformulated symbolically: 6th hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) + H(N.S.) 7TH HYPOTHESIS: Capacity and temperamental traits (C.T.T.) causes individ-

ual differences in the belief-value matrix (B.V.M.) Reformulated symbolically: 7th hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) + H(B.V.M.) 8TH HYPOTHESIS: Capacity and temperamental traits (C.T.T.) causes individ-

ual diflerences in the immediate behavior space (Z.B.S.).


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Reformulated symbolically: 8th hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) + H(1.B.S.) 9TH HYPOTHESIS: Capacity and temperamental traits (C.T.T.) causes individ-

ual differences in locomotion. Reformulated symbolically: 9th hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) + H(1ocomotion) 'Locomotion' is a hypothetical variable which should not be confused with observable behavior directly caused by locomotion. Tolman defines locomotion as 'a selection from perceived immediately possible behaviors' (p. 299). Thus, it is the person's cognitive representation (possibly conscious experience) of subsequent or simultaneously executed behavior. To continue the reconstruction, the next explicit formulation is as follows: lOTH HYPOTHESIS: The need system (N.S.) causes changes in the beliefvalue

matrix (B.V.M.). In particular, changes in the need system cause changes in deprivation and gratification - and the related values. Reformulated symbolically: 10th hypothesis: H(N.S.) + H(B.V.M.). But the belief-value matrix always effects the need system when deprivation is replaced by gratification, as indicated by the stippled arrow in the model (Fig. 8.1). We shall formulate that explicitly as follows: llTH HYPOTHESIS:The belief-value matrix (B.V.M.) causes changes in the

need system (N.S.). Reformulated symbolically: 1lth hypothesis: H(B.V.M.) + H(N.S.) The next hypothesis deals with the functional relation between belief-value matrix and immediate behavior space. 12TH HYPOTHESIS: The belief-value matrix (B.V.M.) causes changes in the

immediate behavior space (I.B.S.). The belief-value matrix affects particularly the conditions of the behaving self and the perceived valences of the objects concerned.

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Reformulated symbolically: 12th hypothesis: H(B.V.M.) + H(1.B.S.) As previously mentioned, the immediate behavior space determines the hypo-

thetical variable which represents the perceived (or imagined) behavior called 'locomotion'. This can be explicitly formulated as follows: 13TH HYPOTHESIS: The immediate behavior (I.B.S.) space causes the perceived

(or imagined) locomotion.

13th hypothesis: H(1.B.S.) + H(1ocomotion) The experienced (perceived or imagined) locomotion has a reciprocal influence on the individual's experience of the whole situation (the immediate behavior space), and this in turn affects the beliefvalue matrix, as indicated by the stippled arrow in the model (Fig. 8.1). However, a more permanent change in the belief-value matrix usually requires that the individual has not only experienced behavior but has actually carried out a specific action. Because the results of the behavior (action) determine the permanent changes in the belief-value matrix, which are called 'learning'. We shall formulate this explicitly as follows: 14TH HYPOTHESIS: Locomotion (and behavior) causes changes in the immediate behaviour space (I.B.S.)and permanent changes (i.e. learning) in the belief-value matrix (B.V.M.)

Reformulated symbolically: 14th hypothesis: H(1ocomotion) + H(1.S.B.) + H(B.V.M.) Finally, we must formulate explicitly the last hypothesis concerning locomotion as the cause of the concrete, observable behavior (action). 15TH HYPOTHESIS:

Locomotion causes the observable behavior (action).

Reformulated symbolically: 15th hypothesis: H(1ocomotion) -+ R(action)


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We have hereby completed a systematic reconstruction of Tolman's 'Psychological Model' from 1951 (In Madsen, 1959, there is another systematic reconstruction which focusses upon Tolman's motivationhypotheses).

We shall now return to the smallest elements in the theory.

3. Hypothetical terms. As we know, Tolman refers to hypothetical terms as 'intervening variables'. But he stresses that his 'intervening variables' are sooner 'hypothetical constructs' in the narrow sense of the word24. Tolman has divided (see Tolman, 1951) his 'hypothetical constructs' (or 'intervening variables') into three categories according to their 'surplus meaning' (cf. the systematological taxonomy). He designates these three classes of constructs 'neurophysiological', 'phenomenological' and 'sui generis' (corresponding to the systematological taxonomy's Ho-, Hm- and Hc-terms). Tolman himself stresses that his own hypothetical variables belong to the latter category, i.e. Tolman's hypothetical terms are all Hc-terms (constructs with a 'neutral' reference). The two other classifications of hypothetical variables according to form and function can be combined in the above classification schema. We shall now return to Kurt Lewin's hypothetical stratum.

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LEWINS HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. Kurt Lewin's theory is also constructed

in such a way that we can start with the whole and then proceed with the elements: 1. The hypothesis-system. It is difficult to decide whether Lewin's mode of explanation is deductive or analogous. He proceeds mathematically with the help of the geometrical discipline topology and a specially developed mathematical discipline called hodology (see Lewin, 1938). But only in one single place does he construct a truly deductive hypothesis-system, which is nevertheless restricted to an explanation of the famous experiments by B. Zeigarnik. This deductive system is to be found in the paper 'Formalization and Progress in Psychology' from 1940, which was reprinted in the collection 'Field Theory' from 1952(p. 18). But in the remainder of Lewin's production mathematical formulae or verbally formulated hypotheses are not organized in a deductive system. Nor does Lewin use an explanatory model, but on the other hand his mathematical account consists of geometrical - especially topological - diagrams, which may be regarded as graphic 'model language'. Thus, in conclusion we might say that Lewin's mode of explanation consists of a synthesis of deductive explanation and explanation by analogy with the aid of models. (Cf. the discussion of types of explanation in Chapter 2). Lewin's most systematic account of his theory was at the same time his last. This consisted of a chapter in Leonard Carmichael (ed.): 'Manual of Child Psychology' from 1946 entitled 'Behavior and Development as a Function of the Total Situation', and was reprinted in Lewin (1951). We have chosen to analyse this account of Lewin's theory here because it provides the best foundation for a systematic reconstruction of his hypothetical stratum. (A systematic reconstruction which focusses on Lewin's motivation-hypotheses is to be found in Madsen, 1959). 2 . The hypotheses. Since Lewin has very few explicit formulations of hypotheses that are capable of being quoted or systematicized,we have chosen to summarize the theory briefly before reformulating the most important hypotheses.


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2.1. Summary ofthe content of Lewin's theory. It is somewhat difficult to present an analysis of Lewin's theory, because its field-theoretical nature renders it more suitable for a purely descriptive account. However, so as to make it possible to compare it with other theories we shall make the attempt. Lewin himself maintains that the most fundamental psychological laws are expressed in the formula: B = f(P,E) where behavior (B) is a function (f) of or caused by the person (P) and the environment (E). It is important to understand, however, that Lewin's division of the psychological field of causality ('lifespace') into surroundings and person does not corresponds to the division into S-variables and H-variables employed in this book.

The theory's H-variables. In Lewin's theory all H-variables are comprised by the term 'lifespace', which in turn is divided into two mutually dependent groups, person (P) and environment (E). The person is a system of peripheral and central regions. The peripheral regions corresponds to the individual's sensory and motor systems. The central region consists of the individual's systems of need and tension. These comprise both tension systems which are determined by genuine biological needs and tension systems which are determined by 'quasi-needs', i.e. all 'adjustments' (sets), 'intentions' or 'determining tendencies' like task acceptance, resolution, decisionmaking, expectation and suchlike. The tension systems are reduced in strength by the satisfaction of needs, task-solving and other forms of release. There is a great individual difference with regard to the number of tension systems, and likewise with regard to the rigidness or flexibility of their boundaries. There exist differentiated and undifferentiated persons just as there exist rigid and flexible persons. Furthermore, these factors are influenced by age, children generally having fewer tension systems with flexible boundaries, whereas adults generally have more tension systems with more rigid boundaries. An example of the use of Lewin's description of personality is the comparison between normal and retarded children and between normal adults and compulsive neurotics. Retarded children have a less undifferentiated personality structure and at the same time a more rigid structure than normal children of the same age. Many traits in their behavior can be explained on this basis. The normal adult is more undifferentiated than the child, and the compulsive neurotic has additionally a very rigid personality structure.

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The environment (E) is the term for another group of H-variables (despite the name they must not be confused with S-variables - this is not a question of the empirically ascertainableenvironment but of the individual's conception or experience of the environment). The environment is structured in a variable number of regions. The individual's structuring and restructuring of his environment is identical with the individual's cognitive processes (conception and thinking etc.). Thus, the solution of a problem often consists in a restructuring of the experienced (hypothetical)environment. Some of the regions of the environment possess a positive (attractive) and some a negative (respulsive) 'valence' or value. Thus 'valence' is a hypothetical variable determined partly by the objective properties of the goal objects (Svariables) and partly by the state of tension. For example, the valence of food is determined by the physiological nourishment value of the food and its tastiness. But if the individual has no tension system that is determined by hunger, for him food has no positive valence, and if he is oversatiated with food, it may even have a negative one. The complicated dependence of valencies on both goal-objects and tension systems (needs) is a good example of the field-theoretical nature of the theory. The valences determine a third group of hypothetical environment variables, i.e. psychological forces. Psychological forces (F) are hypothetical variables whose strength is dependent on the strength of the valences (Va) (and therefore indirectly on the strength ( f ) of the states of tension) as well as on the distance (e) between the individual (P) and the goal-object (G), which may be expressed as follows by one of Lewin's many formulae:

from which is appears that the strength of the force is directly proportional to the strength of the valence and indirectly proportional to the distance. The direction of the force is determined by the individual's position in relation to the goal-object and by the nature of the valence. Positive valences determine forces that are directed towards the goal-object, whereas negative valences determine forces that are directed away from the goal-object (in the latter case one would not normally speak of a goal-object). If the individual is exposed to oppositely directed forces of roughly the same strength, the situation is one of conflict. Lewin has dealt with such con-


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flict situations in detail - especially those arising from the use of punishment and rewards.

The theory's S-variables. In Lewin's theory there are only two clases of true S variables (independent, empirical variables). One of these classes is called 'goal-objects', which are all objects affecting the individual's state of need (satisfactionor unsatisfaction). Examples of these are food, water, sexual partners, progeny, persons or things constituting a threat or source of damage, social institutions of various kinds, etc. The second group is called 'needs', which are the individual's inner state of biological equilibrium, or lack of it. Examples of these are hunger, thirst, sexual needs, etc. Lewin calls biological needs 'true needs'. There is, however, very little explicit description of the S-variables to be found in Lewin's theory. Survey of the theory. Lewin's entire 'lifespace' is regarded as a complicated set of H-variables. Thus, not only the 'person' (P) but the 'environment' (E) may be regarded as a hypothetical construct, which may be described as the individual's experience of his environment, its structure, valences and 'forces'. 2.2. Reformulation of the hypotheses. In accordance with this summary we are now able to formulate explicitly the most important hypotheses to be found in Lewin's theory. The ovemding hypotheses are: 1STHYPOTHESIS:

Behaviour (and development) is a function of the lifespace (Lsp),which consists of the person (P) and the psychological environment (E),where B = f(P,E) = (Lsp).

In the systematology no distinction is made between the 'backwards' and 'forwards' formulation of functional relations, both of them being regarded as variants of a probabilistic functional relation. In the systematological notation it can therefore be reformulated as follows: 1st hypothesis:

H(Lsp) + R(behavior)

It should be noted that the whole of the 'lifespace' consists of hypothetical variables, i.e. also 'the psychological environment' (E), which is the person's perception and cognitive representation of the factual, objectively given, situation. Lewin's formula, B = f(P,E), resembles, but is not identical with Tolman's formula, R = f(O,S), since in Tolman S refers to independent variables. According to Lewin, the direct determinator (cause) of behavior is 'locomotion', which is perception and the cognitive representation of behavior,


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like 'locomotion' in Tolman's theory. This can be reformulated as the reconstruction's second hypothesis: 2ND HYPNOTHESIS: Locomotion causes behavior.

Reformulated symbolically: 2nd hypothesis:

H(1ocomotion) + R(behavior).

This second hypothesis is a special case, which may be subsumed under the 1st hypothesis. The next hypothesis may be reconstructed as follows:

3RD HYPOTHESIS:

A force field causes locomotion.

Reformulated symbolically: 3rd hypothesis:

H(force field ) + H(1ocomotion)

Lewin has borrowed the concept of 'force field' from the field theories of physics (especially the electro-magnetic field theory), which have served as models for Lewin's own 'psychological field theory'. A psychological force field is a collection of forces which directs the person's locomotion towards the forces' resultant. This in turn is directed towards and determined by what Lewin calls the 'valence' or value of the goal-objects, or goal-activities. This may be formulated as the next hypothesis: 4TH HYPOTHESIS:

The direction and strength of the resultantforce ( F ) is determined by the valence (Va) of the goal ( G ) and the distance (e) between the person and the goal (G), where

Vac Fp,G= f eP,G

Thus the formula shows that the force directing the person towards the goal (F P,G) is directly proportional to the valence of the goal-object (Va(G)) and indirecty proportional to the distance (e) between the person and the goal-object. Reformulated symbolically: 4th hypothesis:

H(valence) + H(force)

The 4th hypothesis shows that the person's localization in relation to that of the goal-object is of importance both in relation to the direction and strength of the


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forces. The position of the person and the goal-object is determined by the cognitive structure of the psychological environment (E). The cognitive shucture may be more or less differentiated into regions. Moreover, it may be divided into regions according to 'levels of reality', e.g. the level of reality in everyday life, play, fantasy, etc. This appears from Lewin's Fig. 38 from p. 246 in Lewin (195 1). We can summarize this in the form of an explicit hypothesis.

5TH HYPOTHESIS:

The cognitive structure of the psychological environment ( E ) determines the positions of the person ( P ) and the goal objectts) (G).

Reformulated symbolically: 5th hypothesis:

H(cognitive structure) + H(positions of P and G ) .

The five first hypotheses can be found as explicit formulations in Lewin's production, especially in Lewin (1936, 1938 and 1951). But there are no explicit formulations to be found of the dependence of the psychological environment (E) on independent variables. Lewin has in fact been strongly criticized by American psychologists because his theory's hypothetical variables are only related to the independent variables and not to the independent variables. The theory is said to be 'response-inferred. But we can find many impicit formulations of these relations, which we shall bring here as explicit hypotheses. To start with we shall formulate excplicitly a hypothesis about the relation between the perception of the environmental situation and the cognitive structure of its psychic representation (E). 6TH HYPOTHESIS:

Stimuli from the present situation determine the perception of the situation, which in turn determines the cognitive structure of the psychical representation of the situation (E).


S(situation)

H(perception) + H(cognitive structure of

El. For Lewin - and the earlier Gestalt psychologists (cf. Chapter 5 ) - there is no fundamental difference between perception and learning processes. Learning processes are merely repetitions of perception, which result in a further


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differentiation of the cognitive structure. This will be formulted as the next explicit hypothesis: ~ T HYPOTHESIS: H

Repetitions (C)of the stimulus situation determine perceptual learning, which results in further differentiation of the cognitive structure of E . Reformulated symbolically:

7th hypothesis:

C S(situation) + H(perceptua1learning) + H(differentiation of E)

Lewin - like the Gestalt psychologists - regards thinking as a restructuring of the cognitive structure of E. This thinking and restructuring is caused by problem situations, i.e. situations in which the direct 'path' does not lead to the goal the individual is motivated to reach. The 'direct path' comprises all innate or previously learned behavior that has previously been effective but is no longer so in the situation concerned. This thereby becomes a problem situation, and may be formulated as the next explicit hypothesis: 8TH HYPOTHESIS:

A problem situation determines thinking which results in the reconstruction of the cognitive structure of E .


S(prob1em) + H(thinking) + H(reconsmction of E).

With this explicit formulation of some implicit hypotheses we have reconstruced that part of Lewin's theory which deals with the psychological representation of the environment (E), although not the other part of the hypothetical variables, i.e. the person (P). The person is also structured into regions. These regions can be divided into inner, central regions and outer, peripheral regions. The latter corresponds to - are representations of - the senso-motor system. The central regions in the person correspond to the need system in Tolman. These central regions may be in states of tension, which are caused by peripheral need situations in the biological organism. These 'true' biological states of need may be regarded as independent variables, which determine the hypothetical variables, or 'tensions'. These may also be determined by 'intentions', however, which is the common denominator for processes like decisions, task


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Fig, 8.2. Graphic model of Lewin's theory.

acceptance, adjustments (sets) etc., which Lewin calls 'quasi-needs'. These intentions are hypothetical variables, which are dependent on the independent variables, or biological needs. Tensions determine in turn the previously mentioned valences, which determine forces, locomotion and behavior. We have thereby completed the system of hypotheses, which we shall now formulate explicitly as follows:


370 9TH HYPOTHESIS:

Biological needs determine tension in the central regions of the person (P). These tensions may be caused directly or with an intention ('quasi-need') as intervening variable.


S(need) + H(intention) + H(tension).

1 0 " HYPOTHESIS:

Tensions determine the strength of valences, which are also dependent on some qualities of the goal-object.


a) S(goal object) + H(valence) b) H(tension) + H(valence).

For the sake of comparison we have summarized Lewin's hypotheses in the form of a graphic model. It is constructed in the same way as Lewin's numerous topographical diagrams, but Lewin himself - unlike Tolman - has no graphic model capable of summarizing his entire theory (see Fig. 8.2). 3. The hypothetical terms: Lewin frequently stresses - in the same way as Tolman - that his theory is a constructive theory. By 'constructive theory' Lewin means a theory consisting of 'constructive concepts' as opposed to 'classificatory or abstractive concepts'. In Lewin's terminology the latter cover both 1 ) abstract, descriptive terms and 2) hypothetical terms with physiological or mentalistic surplus meaning (i.e. Ho- and Hm-terms in the systematological taxonomy). On the other hand Lewin's 'constructive concepts' are identical with the Hc-terms in the systematological taxonomy. The classification of Lewin's hypothetical variables according to the other two categories - effect and form - are shown in the table (next page), We have hereby concluded the analysis and reconstruction of Lewin's hypothetical stratum and shall now turn to that of Murray. MURRRAY'S HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. Murray's employs the deductive

mode of explanation, although it has not been systematically formulated ('axiomatized) as a deductive system, as in Hull, but rather as a sketch for a deductive explanatory system.


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1 . The hypothesis-system. The sketch for a hypothesis system consists of a number of 'Proposals for a Theory of Personality' (Chapter I1 in Murray, 1938). These 'proposals' are reasonably precisely formulated meta-theses and hypotheses as well as precise definitions of hypothetical terms and important abstract descriptive terms. These hypotheses need only be arranged in order of importance to constitute a deductive system. Since Murray's hypothesis system contains no graphic models either, it is difficult to provide a brief summary of the hypothesis system as a whole. The reason for this lack is that Murray and his colleagues more or less implicitly accepted Freud's model of the personality. The most important concept in Murray's theory is 'Regnancy', which is defined as follows (Murray, 1938, p. 748): ,,Regnancy = a dynamically organized temporal segment of brain processes"25. 2. The hypotheses. As previously mentioned, there are a great number of explicit and impicit hypotheses to be found in the chapter ,,Proposals for a Theory of Personality" in Murray (1938). We shall now formulate the most important of these hypotheses explicitly (see also Madsen, 1959). We have already mentioned that the most important, ovemding hypothetic variable in Murray's theory is 'regnancy', and we have quoted the explicit


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definition from the 'Glossary' in Murray's book p. 748 (see above). Therefore we can now reformulate the first hypothesis as follows: 1ST HYPOTHESIS:

A11 behavior and all subjective data are manifestations of regnant processes, but not all regnant processes have subjective manifestations.

Reformulated symbolically: 1st hypothesis:

H(regnant processes) + R(subject databehavior).

The most important of the regnant processes in Murray's and his colleagues' theory are the hypothetical variables called 'needs'. These manifest themselves subjectively as wishes and decisions, and objectively as (instrumental) behavior, which converts unsatisfying start situations into satifying final situations. We can quote here from Murray's fuller definition of 'need as follows: ,,'Need' is a construct (a convenient fiction or hypothetical concept), which stands for a force (the physico-chemical nature of which is unknown) in the brain region, a force which organizes perception, apperception, intellection, conation and action in such a way as to transform in a certain direction an existing, unsatisfying situation"(Murray, 1938, pp. 123-24)26. The numerous impicit hypotheses about 'need' can be formulated explicitly as follows: 2ND HYPOTHESIS:

'Needs' are regnant processes, which determine wishes and decisions as well as instrumental behavior.

Refomulated symbolically: 2nd hypothesis:

H(need) + R(verba1ized wishes/instrumental behavior)

Murray classifies need in many ways, the most important of which is the classification according to its origin into 'viscerogene' (primary) and 'psychogene' (secondary)needs, which have their origin in respectively visceral processes in the organs of the body and psychic processes. We can formulate this explicitly as the two next hypotheses: 3RD HYPOTHESIS:

Viserogenic needs are determined by stimuli from visceral processes or by stimuli from the external situation.


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Reformulated symbolically: 3RD HYPOTHESIS: 4TH HYPOTHESIS:

S(intemal/extemal) + H(viscerogenic need)

Psychogenic needs are determined by 'beta-press' (i.e. the personS perception of the situation).


H(beta-press) + H(psychogenic need).

In the fourth hypothesis we have introduced Murray's concept of 'press', which can be divided into 'alpha-press' or 'beta-press'. 'Alpha-press' is the term for an independent variable - the objective situation which affects the individual. 'Beta-press', on the other hand, is the individual's perception and cognitive representation of the objective situation ('alpha-press'). This can be formulated as the next hypothesis: 5TH HYPOTHfZSIS:

The objective situation - or 'alpha-press' - causes the individualS perception of the situation - or 'beta-press'.


S(alpha-press) + H(beta-press).

The central hypothetical variable, 'need', determines other hypothetical variables, amongst others the so-called 'affections'.These can be divided into 'pleasure' and 'unpleasure', which are dependent on respectively the satisfaction and origin of the needs. This can be formulated in two parallel hypotheses: HYPOTHESIS 6A:

Initially, needs determine unpleasurable aflection.

HYPOTHESIS 6B:

When satisfed, needs determine pleasurable affections.

Reformulated symbolically: 6a: H(need, beginning) + H(unpleasurab1eaffections). 6b: H(need, satisfaction) + H(pleasurab1e affections). Apart from affection, 'needs' also cause other changes in the actual perceptual and cognitive processes (including fantasies). This can be reformulated explicitly in the next hypothesis:


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7TH HYPOTHESIS: Needs co-determine the cognitive processes (perception,

thinking, memory, fantasy) in such a way that the cognitive processes direct behavior towards need-satisfying goals. Reformulated symbolically: 7th hypothesis:

H(need) + H(cognitive processes) + Rfgoal-directed).

The above hypotheses have dealt with the origin of the needs (their functional relations to independent variables) and with the functional relations of the needs to other hypothetical variables or to the dependent variable, behavior. We still lack a couple of explicit formulations of hypotheses to complete the reconstruction. One of these deals with the situation in which a need arises where the relevant goal-objects are absent: 8TH HYPOTHESIS:

fn situations without satisfying goal-objects the needs determine exploratory behavior which has some probability offinding relevant goal-objects.


S(no goal-objects) vior).

+ H(need) + R(exp1oratory beha-

The other missing hypothesis deals with the situation in which the individual does not succeed in finding satisfying goal-objects. In this case the needs cause substitute satisfying fantasies. 9TH HYPOTHESIS: In situations in which it is impossible to find satisfying

goal-objects the needs determine substitute satisfiing fantasies. Reformulated symbolically: 9th hypothesis:

S(no god-objects) +H(need)

H(substitute fantasies).

Finally, since individual differences play a great part in Murray's theory, we must include a hypothesis about the cause of individual differences in the frequency and intensity of the needs.


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lOTH HYPOTHESIS: There exist individual differences with regard to fre-

quency, intensity and duration of the different needs. The factors determining these individual differences are mainly: a. innate (possibly genetic) factors, which directly determine the difference. b. innate (possibly genetic) differences in 'abilities', which determine individual differences in the needs. c. social, cultural and other differences in the early environmental factors (the 'alpha-press'), which determine individual differences in needs. Reformulated symbolically: 10th hypothesis: 1Oa: S(innate factors) + H(individua1 differences in needs) lob: H(differences in abilities) -+ H(differences in needs) 1Oc: S(environmental factors) -+ H(differences in needs) We have hereby concluded the systematic reconstruction of Murray's theory as presented in 'Explorations in Personality' (see also fig. 8.3.). Later versions of Murray's theory will not be analysed here, because in this book we are chiefly interested in major, paradigm-creating works. (Later versions are analysed in Madsen (1959, 4th edition, 1968). We shall conclude this section with an analysis of the most important hypothetical terms:

3. Hypothetical terms: The most important hypothetical terms in Murray's theory are 'regnancy', 'need', 'beta-press', 'affections', cognitive processes', 'fantasies', etc. It is rather difficult to classify Murray's hypothetical terms with regard to their ontological reference (or surplus meaning). Murray's hypothetical terms all refer to hypothetical variables, which are localized explicitly in the brain. (See the definition of 'regnancy' and 'need'). This might imply their classification as Ho-terms (H-terms with 'organismic reference'). But many of Murray's terms also refer explicitly to private (or 'subjective') data, which might imply their classification as Hm-terms (H-terms with 'mentalistic' reference). It would be most correct, however, to classify them as Hc-terms (H-terms with 'neutral' reference to hypothetical constructs). Moreover, it appears explicitly from the first lines in the quoted definition of 'need' (see p. 374) and from other definitions that Murray himself regards his chief theoretical concepts as hypothetical constructs.

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Fig. 8.3. Graphic model of Murray's theory.

The two other classifications according to form and efSect (see Appendix) are most interesting as far as the chief concept 'need' is concerned. Murray is ambiguous in his use of the term 'need, applying it not only to processes (see the definition) but to a permanent structure (disposition), or 'personality factor', which determines the individual differences in the personality. Practically


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speaking, it is as much personality factors as 'needs' that play the biggest part when applying Murray's and his colleagues' psychology of personality. Murray himself (1938) is aware of the fact that he and his colleagues use the term in two different senses (p. 61)27. With regard to the effect of the hypothetical variable 'need' , the term refers to a hypothetical variable with combined dynamic and directive effects, i.e. to a vector-variable. This appears, for example, from the quoted definition in which the word 'force' is used in the very definition of 'need'. Moreover, according to Lewin's analysis, the concept of 'force' is a typical example of a vectorvariable, because 'force' has both intensity and direction. Since Murray's concept of need has had a great influence on subsequent psychology of personality, we shall compare it with Hull's concept of drive, which has had a corresponding influence on the psychology of learning processes. Both terms are Hc-terms. Whereas Hull's 'drive' is exclusively a processvariable, Murray's 'need' is both a process- and a structurevariable. Whereas Hull's 'drive' is a purely dynamic variable, Murray's 'need' is a vector-vanable. This comparison becomes clearer when they are placed in the customary combined classification schema. Finally, it should be noted that Hull too uses the term 'need', though exclusively about an empirical, independent variable, which determines the hypo-

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thetical variable 'drive'. Moreover, in his 1951 theory Tolman used the term 'need in the same sense as Murray, while in other editions of his theory (1932 and 1959)he used the term 'drive' in this same sense.

The Integrated Data-stratum INTRODUCTION.The following will consist of an analysis and systematic reconstruction of the data-stratum in the three integrating psychologists' production. TOLMAN'S DATA-STRATUM. Previously, under the meta-stratum, we have

discussed Tolman's argumentation for the use of experiments (especially with animals) and for using behavioral data. Therefore in this section we shall concentrate on the most important of those results of general, empirical research which can be formulated as general data-theses. 1. Tolman's first general data-thesis: about the part played by rewards in learning: There is a functional relation between rewards and an increase or improvement of the performance in a learning process. This general, empirical research result is derived from Tolman's and his colleagues' numerous experiments on so-called 'latent learning'. We shall briefly discuss here one of the typical experiments. The experiment comprised three groups of rats, all motivated by hunger, which had to find their way out of a maze. As is frequently the case, the first group were rewarded for their behavior with food on reaching their goal. The second group were never rewarded. The third group received no reward to start with, but after some (10) days this group was also rewarded. The results of the experiment is shown graphically in Fig 8.4. As the graphs show, the rewarded group learnt their way out of the maze quite quickly, while the second, unrewarded, group appeared not to learn anything. Like the second group, the third group did not seem to learn anything for the first few days, but when rewarding was introduced on the 11th day, it appeared that the animals had after all learnt something during the first days but were not motivated to make use of this until rewarded.


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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Days

Fig. 8.4. Tolman's experiment with latent learning.

Tolman explains these general data-theses with the help of his hypothesis about 'latent learning', which states that learning is a hypothetical change in the hypothetical variables determining behavior. Learning is not determined by motivation and rewards, but by other factors. On the other hand, performance is dependent on motivation and rewards. Thus, learning may take place though remain latent until the individual has been motivated by rewards to use and manifest this learning by changes in performance. Thus Tolman is directly opposed to the 'law of effect' that is strongly advocated by his contemporary, C.L. Hull (cf. Chapter 6). This dispute about the law of effect led to a great number of experiments and discussions between Tolman's supporters on the

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one hand and Hull's on the other. This is one of the best examples from the history of psychology of competition between schools increasing the productivity of research. Tolman was also in disagreement with Hull as regards the type or 'nature' of the hypothetical changes that took place during the learning. Unlike Hull and many others, Tolman maintained that the result of a learning process is not the formation of associations or connections between stimuli and reactions - i.e. not a 'S-R-learning' - but the formation of some hypothetical variables of a cognitive nature, which can best be described as mental or cognitive 'maps'. These cognitive maps are created and differentiated to an increasing extent during the learning process. As an example of Tolman's and his colleagues' experiments on the creation of cognitive maps, we have chosen a maze experiment, which is shown in Fig. 8.5. The results of these experiments can be summarized in a general data-thesis: 2. Tolman's second general data-thesis about 'cognitive maps'. The behavior of rats in complicated mazes is not a case of trial-and-error but of a systematic exploration of the possibilities. This systematic exploratory behavior can be explained by the hypothesis about the creation of 'cognitive maps'. The two formulated general data-theses summarize the main results of Tolman's extensive experiments with rats in mazes. We shall now return to the data-stratum of the second integrating psychologist. LEWIN'S DATA-STRATUM. The following will consist of a brief survey of Kurt

Lewin's empirical research results. The account can scarcely avoid comprising also the hypothetical terms and hypotheses Lewin had developed in order to explain the results of his empirical research, but we shall attempt nevertheless to concentrate on general data-theses. In Lewin's production there is an extremely fruitful interplay between theory (= hypotheses) and empiri. We shall illustrate this by first describing some experiments which were carried out before the theory had taken the shape as described under the hypothetical stratum. These experiments were largely envisaged as a criticism of the older 'association theory'. Thereafter we


Block B -

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381

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Alley 1

1

Alley 3

Block C

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Fig. 8.5. Tolman's experiment with 'cognitive maps'. The figure represents a labyrinth. The rats learned to select pathway no. 2 , when pathway no. I was blocked at A. If pathwar no. 2 also was blocked at C, then the rats selected pathway no. 3. One day pathway no. 3 was blocked at B , after which the rats immediately used pathway no. 3 without trying pathway no. 2. shall describe some later experiments, which were inspired by Lewin's theory as it developed after the initial experiments. 1. The original experiments. At the turn of the century some research was undertaken which gradually led to a revision of the then current association theory (cf. Chapter 4).The German psychologist Narzis Ach in particular had carried out some experiments which were intended to show that, apart from associations, there existed so-called 'determining tendencies' which determined

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the cognitive processes. His experiments enabled him to confront these two factors with one another and thereby to 'measure' the intensity of the determining tendencies. The associations were formed by making the experimental subject repeat strings of words containing pairs of nonsense syllables, so that when subsequently presented with the first syllable in each pair he or she could respond with the other syllable. The determining tendencies were created by presenting the experimental subject with a specific task, e.g. responding to the presentation of one nonsense syllable by a second syllable which rhymed with the first. If the syllables used for these tasks also entered into the creation of associations, it was thereby became possible to confront association with task tendencies. If, instead of rhyming, the experimental subject responded by naming another syllable from the original experiment, then association, according to Ach, was stronger than task tendency. The association intensity could be measured by the number of repetitions used in the learning process. It was then possible to obtain an indirect measure of the intensity of the task tendency by confronting it with the associations and finding the association tendency that was equivalent to a task tendency. K. Lewin further elaborated these experiments in an extremely shrewd manner and came to the conclusion that associations could not be compared with determining tendencies because associations, unlike determining tendencies, are not dynamic in character. One of the most surprising tests consisted in the experimental persons initially learning a number of pairs of syllables and then being told to say whatever occurred to them when presented with the first syllable. In this case they never mentioned the other associated syllable belonging to the pair, but a number of other words. Only if they were told to reproduce the associated syllables did they do so - and then quite faultlessly. On the basis of his experiments Lewin maintained that the experimental subjects only reproduce the associations they have formed when they are so inclined, having been given reproduction as a specific task. Thus, apart from other task tendencies (e.g. rhyming, exchanging letters in nonsense syllables, etc.), there is a special task inclination, which one might call a reproduction tendency. Thus the determining tendencies include both task tendencies and reproduction tendencies. At a later stage Lewin classified intentions and decisions as determining tendencies. Determining tendencies are alone in determining


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cognitive processes and conscious mental life as a whole. Associations only play a part if already initiated by a reproduction tendency. Later on, Lewin compares determining tendencies with biological needs for nourishment, sex and suchlike, maintaining that they ressemble biological needs in their being psychological drives, although they differ in respect of their origin. Therefore in subsequent papers Lewin calls determining tendencies 'quasi-needs' as opposed to 'true needs' (caused by physiological processes), since they are caused by inclinations, task acceptance, reproduction tendency, intentions, decisions and expectations, etc. 2. The later experiments. As previously mentioned, Lewin's empirical research in the USA was concentrated on two particular fields: child psychology and social psychology. We shall describe this research in the folowing two sections: 2.1. Child psychological research. The following amounts to a very brief survey. 1. Punishment and reward. In an extremely interesting paper on 'Punishment and rewarding' (in 'Dynamic Theory of Personality'), Lewin tried to show what can be derived from his theory as regards the use of punishment and reward in teaching and upbringing. Lewin does not mention any special experiments, but the descriptions of behavior derived from the theory in situations involving punishment and reward are in good accordance with ordinary observations, and provide both continuity and an acceptable explanation. First and foremost Lewin shows that, according to his theory, children are best motivated by a concrete, spontaneous interest in the teaching subject, because they then seek to overcome all obstacles with the greatest amount of energy. Educationally speaking, this is effective, since obstacles may consist of problems of a pedagogic nature which the child has to learn to solve. If the child is motivated by punishment and reward, however, it always creates a situation of conflict. Thus rewards can be used in two ways: 1) The promise of a reward may motivate a child to stop striving for a positive goal. One has then created a conflict situation of the following kind:

The double positive conflict.

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Even if the conflict here is between two positive valences, the conflict situation is itself unpleasant, and the subject tries to resolve it speedily. For the educator, of course, it is a question of making sure that the valence of the reward is so great that the corresponding force becomes the stronger and determinines the behavior. If, however, another obstacle or difficulty arises, a new force will come to oppose that of the reward, which may destroy the outcome for the educator. Thus it does not take very much to destroy the outcome if the subject is motivated by interest in a reward, because it is a conflict situation in the first place. 2) The promise of a reward may motivate a child to carry out an action for which it was negatively motivated in the first place. In this case the following type of conflict situation is created:

The positive-negative conflict.

One of the drawbacks of this situation is that it may tempt the child to avoid the unpleasant work and obtain the reward by 'cheating'. Thus, the educator has to take measures to control the work. Punishment can also be used in two ways: 1) The threat of punishment may motivate a child to avoid doing something it was positively motivated for in the first place. A conflict situation is created, which much resembles the above:

The positive-negative conflict. A form of control is needed here too in order to safeguard against circumven-

tion or cheating. 2) The threat of punishment may motivate a child to carry out an action it was negatively motivated for in the first place. Here a conflict situation of the following type is created:

The double-negative conflict.


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Since this concift situation is doubly unpIeasant, the educator must safeguard himself against a 'flight from the field' by instituting measures of control, whereby the situation acquires the following character:

The double-negative conflict.

It is extremely difficult, however, to prevent the type of flight from the field which amounts to a flight into fantasy (daydreaming). Apart from this unfortunate outcome, educationally speaking, the situation has the following consequences: a) the child may fight against the barrier and the educator who has created the situation and the barrier; b) if the pressure by way of threats on the part of the educator is sufficiently strong the tension created will result in emotionally disturbed behavior. If this type of teaching situation becomes chronic, the natural consequence is either open hostility between the child and the educator and/or chronic emotional (neurotic) disturbances. Thus, in a type of education that sets out to achieve, amongst other things, mental health, it is advisable to confine motivation to an interest in the subject, possibly combined with a subsiduary reward, and to avoid punishment on account of its long-term consequences as far as mental hygiene is concerned.

2. Apart from these investigations into punishment and reward Lewin and his colleagues have also used children in their experiments on substitute-activity (in 'Dynamic Theory of Personality'). According to Lewin's theory, tension systems (needs) are to a greater or lesser degree interconnected, being dependent amongst other things on the rigidity of the boundaries. If a tension system cannot be resolved by way of an action, because this is interrupted, it can be resolved to some extent by way of substitute-activity. Lewin and his colleagues have investigated the preconditions for this substitute solution in a number of detailed experiments in which mostly children were used as experimental subjects. They were given various tasks, after which they were presented with some new ones. After having completed these they were again presented with the original tasks, which they were invited to resume. The more interest they invested in the original task, the less value they found the second (substitute) task to have had. Thus, the percentage of non-resumption is also a measure of the substitute-value of a secondary task. The most important results were as follows:

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a. The difficulty of the task. The substitute-value of the secondary task (substitute-action)was greater the more difficult the task. E.g. when the original task was to model a dog in plasticine, if the second task was easier (to model a snake) the substitute-value was less (non-resumption= 15%) than in the case of a more difficult animal (70%). b. The intelligence of the subject. In the mentally retarded the structure of the personality is more rigid and the boundaries between tension systems more firm than in normal persons. Therefore in substitute-experiments they will tend to react according to an all-or-nothing-law. If the substitute task ressembles the original task (so that the same tension system is implicated), it will have a much higher substitute-value for retarded than for normal children of the same age. If, on the other hand, the substitute-task is very different from the original task (and thus two quite different tension systems are implicated), it will have less substitute-value for retarded than for normal children. (See, in addition, Lewin's article 'On Feeble-mindedness' in 'Dynamic Theory of Personality'). c. The reality of the task. If the substitute-activity is less realistic than the original one it will as a rule have less substitute-value. E.g. to describe what one would do with an interrupted building task is less realistic and has less substitute-value than resuming the task with a different type of material. The whole of this series of investigations into the value of substitute-activities took its point of departure in an experiment by one of Lewin's colleagues, Ovsiankina, who showed that task acceptance created a tension system (quasineed) which 'sought release in the resumption of an interrupted task. 3. Other experiments. Among other 'classical' experiments from Lewin's school the following may be mentioned: a. Zeigarnik's experiment, which shows that interrupted tasks are remembered better than completed tasks. The experimental subjects remembered about twice as many interrupted tasks as completed ones. b. Hoppe's and others' experiments on the level of aspiration, which showed that the experimental subjects' level of aspiration (i.e. their expectation regarding their own future performance) is dependent upon previous success and fiasco both as regards similar tasks or tasks in general.


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2.3. Socio-psychological research. As previously mentioned, Lewin's theory has also been applied to social psychology. Some of the results have been collected in a book entitled 'Field Theory in Social Science'. We shall suffice here with providing a short account of some of the most important results: 1. Behavior during puberty in the light of social psychology. Lewin has tried to explain behavior during puberty as a sociopsychological phenomenon (as opposed to the customary physiological explanation of puberty). He assumes the following basic hypotheses: a. during puberty the adolescent may be regarded as a person moving from one life situation to another, with the associated extension of the lifespace and ignorance of the new region; b. the adolescent occupies a 'marginal position' between two groups - the adults' and the children's; c. the extension of the lifespace includes a change in the adolescents' bodies. From these fundamental hypotheses about the adolescent during puberty the following description of behavior may be derived (and thereby explained):

a. The youth's shyness, sensitiveness and aggression. b. A more or less permanent conflict between intentions,judgements and attitudes belonging to the two groups. c. Emotional tension as a result of the conflict. d. A tendency to radical and changing intentions and reactions. Thus, according to Lewin, all these features of the adolescent's behavior are not only side-effects of the physiological changes in the adolescent's organism but also, for the major part, effects of the adolescent's social position. 2. Group dynamics. Two of Lewin's colleagues, Lippitt and White, have undertaken experiments with boys' clubs, which were organized and led in different ways. The leaders had learnt three 'roles': as respectively 'authoritarian', 'democratic' and 'laissez-faire' leader types. The authoritarian leader planned and decided everything and was disinterested in any closer contact with the group members. The democratic leader did the planning together with the group members and came with proposals, but these were put to the vote. The 'laissez-faire' leader was passive and left everything to the group members. The behavior and productivity of the group members was studied very closely. There was a great deal of aggression both in the authoritarian and in the 'laissez-faire' club - more concealed in the former and more open in the

388


latter. On the other hand, there was no aggression in the democratic group, where productivity was also the greatest and the percentage of voluntary continuation of membership likewise. This experiment was one of the first to illustrate the importance of democratic leadership and co-operation for the satisfaction and productivity of group members. h4URRAYS DATA-STRATUM. It is not possible, for two reasons, to formulate

general data-theses summarizing the results of Murray's and his colleagues' empirical research. , Firstly, the number of experimental subjects is too small (50) and the group is too specialized (college students) to be able to generalize. Murray (1938) himself has explicitly recognized this (p. 16)28. The other reason why we are unable to reformulate general datatheses when reconstructing Murray's theory is that Murray's and his colleagues' production is first and foremost a study of the development and testing of methods. Therefore we shall briefly describe here the different methods employed by Murray and his colleagues. The descriptions of methods are chiefly to be found in Chapter VI of 'Procedures', which is over 200 pages and written by Murray and his twentyseven colleagues. The methods used can be classified as experimental methods, tests and clinical methods. We shall suffice here with describing the methods by referring to the headings of the chapter's relevent sections. 1. Experimental methods. To this category belong: 1.1. ,,The Experimental Study of Repressions"(by Saul Rosenzweig). 1.2. ,,Violation of Prohibitions" (by Donald W. MacKinnon). 1.3. ,,Sensorimotor Learning" (Walter C. Langer). 1.4. ,Emotional Conditioning Test" (by Carl E. Smith and Kenneth Di-

ven). 1.5. ,,The Experimental Measurement of Types of Reaction to Frustration'' (by Saul Rosenzweig). 1.6. ,,Social Interaction" (by Maria Richers-Ovsiankina).


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With regard to the effectivity of experimental methods Murray concluded that the creation of experimentally realistic situations constituted the most promising methodological development (p. 729)29. 2. Test methods. To this category belong: 2.1. ,,Predictions and Sentiments Test" (by Karl Kunze). This is a questionnaire test. 2.2. ,,Questionnaires" (by H.A. Murray), which is divided into three sections with over 200 items, together 'covering' all the hypothetical personality variables. 2.3. ,,Ability Test" (by Ruth T. Petersen and E. Inglis). 2.4. ,,Aesthetic Appreciation Test" (By Kenneth Diven). 2.5. ,,Hypnotic Test" (by R.W. White). 2.6. ,,Level of Aspiration Test" (by Jerome D. Frank). 2.7. ,,Memory of Failure Test" (by E.H. Throwbridge). 2.8. ,,Thematic Apperception Test" (by Christiana D. Morgan and H.A. Murray). This is probably the most original methodological development to be found in ,,Explorationsin Personality". 2.9. ,,Imaginal Productivity Tests" (by D.R. Wheeler). 2.10. ,,Musical Reverie Test" (by Karl Kunze). 2.1 1. ,,Dramatic Production Test" (by Erik Homburger (Erikson)). 2.12. ,,Rorschach Test" (by S.J. Beck).

With regard to test methods, Murray concluded (p. 728) that projective tests gave the most significant datam. Clinical methods. This category comprises in particular interviews on various themes: 3.1. ,,Conference" (by H.A. Murray). 3.2. ,,Autobiography" (by H.A. Murray). 3.3. ,,Family Relations and Childhood Memories" (by H. Schudder Mekeel) 3.4. ,,Sexual Development" (by W.G. Barrett). 3.5. ,,Present Dilemmas" (by Memll Moore). 3.6. ,,Conversations" (by Eleanor C. Jones). 3.7. ,,Observations of Experiments and Post-Experimental Interviews" (by R.N. Sanford). An attempt has been made to make the clinical methods more objective by ensuring that several interviewers were present at most of the interview sessions. 3.


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Apart from descriptions of methods, Murray's data-stratum also includes some concrete data about a single, specially selected experimental subject. This is described in Chapter VII: 'The Case of Eamst' (c. 100 pages). Also this chapter is written jointly by Murray's collaborators, and concerns 'Earnst'k reactions to the different interviews, tests and experiments. Murray and his collaborators possess similar material relating to all fifty experimental subjects investigated, which indicates what an impressive amount of material they collected. But it is nevertheless the creation of new methods that has won Murray a permanent place in the history of psychology, as appears from the numerous evaluations of Murray's work over forty years later. See, for example, Schneidman (198 1).

The Texts as a Whole THE COMPLETENESS OF THE TEXTS. In accordance with the systematological taxonomy (see Appendix), we shall examine in this section the three psycholo-

gistis' texts as regards their completeness, In other words, we shall investigate the relation between the three levels of discourse. Murray's and his colleagues' text is the easiest to analyse in this respect, because we have chosen a single book from Murray's total production, i.e. 'Explorations in Personality' (1938). This book contains all three levels of discourse. It is even relatively easy to make a quantitative estimate of their interrelations - the so-called 'M/H/D-ratio'. Thus, the book's chapters may roughly be classified under the three levels of discourse as folows: The meta-stratum is largely to be found in the Chapter I: Introduction (written by Murray) - in all, 35 pages. The hypothetical stratum is largely to be found in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, also written by Murray. These chapters include: Chapter 2: 'proposals for a Theory of Personality' - in all, 107 pages. Chapter 3: 'Variables of Personality' - in all, 100 pages. Chapter 5: 'Childhood Events' - in all, 116 pages. The data-stratum is largely to be found in Chapters 6 and 7, which are written by all the collaborators: Chapter 6: 'Procedures!' - in all, 206 pages, and Chapter 7: 'The Case of Eamst' - in all, 99 pages.


391

Apart from the chapters mentioned there are two further chapters which are rather more difficult to place under the three strata: Chapter 4: 'Judgement of Personality', which is written jointly by R. Wolf and H.A Murray. This chapter includes both methodological argumentation,which belongs to the meta-stratum, and description of method, which belongs to the data-stratum. The chapter comprises in all 40 pages, which may be roughly divided between the two strata. Chapter 8: 'Conclusions' is written by Murray. The 40 pages can be divided almost equally between the M-, H- and D-strata. This rough distrubution of the number of pages contained by the three levels of discourse provides the following figures: 1. The meta-stratum: 35(Chapter 1) + 20 pages (half of Chapter 4) + 13 pages (a third of Chapter 8). In all 68pages. 2. The hypothetical stratum: 107 pages (Chapter 2) + 100 pages (Chapter 3) + 116 pages (Chapter 5 ) + 13 pages (a third of Chapter 8). In all 336pages. 3. The data-stratum: 206 pages (Chapter 6) + 99 pages (Chapter 7) + 20 pages (half of Chapter 4) + 13 pages ( a third of Chapter 8). In all 338 pages. On the basis of this rough clasification we can calculate the percentage distribution of the discourse on the three levels as follows: M-stratum:

68 x 100 742 = 9,2%

H-stratum:

336 x 100 = 45,6% 742

D-stratum:

338 x 100 = 45,6% 742

These calculations provide the following MIHID/-ratio= 9/45/46.This distrubution of the three levels of discourse closely approaches the average M/H/Dratio, 18/43/39, of eleven theories calculated in Madsen (1975). It is more difficult to calculate a similar M/H/D-ratio for Tolman's and Lewin's production, because it is distributed in several books and articles, but I would not expect them to deviate much from that of Murray. Possibly the meta-stratum is slightly more and the data-stratum slightly less extensive in Tolman's and Lewin's production than in Murray's.


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THE TESTABILITY OF THE THEORIES:H.Q. In this section we shall calculate

the hypothesis quotient for the three integrating psychologists' theories on the basis of the systematic reconstructions of the theories' hypotheses undertaken earlier in this chapter. In order to facilitate the comparison we shall list the hypotheses here, reformulated symbolically. 1. Tolman's reformulated hypotheses: 1. Hypothesis: S(S.S.) + H(N.S.) 2. Hypothesis: S(S.S.) + H(B.V.M.) 3. Hypothesis: S(S.S.)+H(J.B.S.) 4. Hypothesis: S(drive) + H(N.S.) 5. Hypothesis: S(H.A.S.D.E.) + H(C.T.T.) 6. Hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) + H(N.S.) 7. Hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) + H(B.V.M.) 8. Hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) 3 H(J.B.S.) 9. Hypothesis: H(C.T.T.) + H(1ocomotion) 10. Hypothesis: H(N.S.) +H(B.V.M.) 11. Hypothesis: H(B.V.M.) + H(N.S.) 12. Hypothesis: H(B.V.M.) + H(J.B.S.) 13. Hypothesis: H(J.B.S.) 3 H(1ocomotion) 14. Hypothesis: H(1ocomotion) + H(J.B.S.) -+ H(B.V.M.) 15. Hypothesis: H(1ocomotion) +R(action).

On the basis of this reconstruction these reformulated hypotheses may be classified as follows: 1. Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Nos. 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 = in all, 9 hypotheses. 2. Empirical hypotheses: a. S-H-hypotheses: Nos. 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5= in all, 5 hypotheses. b. H-R-hypotheses: No. 15 = in all, 1 hypothesis.

On the basis of this classification the hypothesis quotient can be calculated as follows: H.Q =

~(H-H) C[(S-H) + (H-R)]

---9 -5 +

1

-

1,5


393

This H.Q. closely approaches a previous H.Q. of 1.43, which was calculated on the basis of a reconstruction of Tolman's theory of motivation. 2. Lewin's reformulated hypotheses: 1. Hypothesis: H(1ifespace) + R(behavior) 2. Hypothesis: H(1ocomotion)+ R(behavior) 3. Hypothesis: H(force field) + H(1ocomotion) 4. Hypothesis: H(valence) + H(force field) 5. Hypothesis: H(cognitive structure) + H(position of P and G) 6. Hypothesis: S(situstion)+ H(perception) + H(cognitive structure) 7. Hypothesis: S(!&uation) +H(perceptuallearmng) +H(diffaentiatianofE) 8. Hypothesis: S(prob1em)-+ H(thinking) + H(reconstruction of E) 9. Hypothesis: S(need) + H(intention) + H(tension) 10a. Hypothesis: S(goal object) + H(valence) lob. Hypothesis: H(tension) + H(valence)

On the basis of this reconstruction the hypotheses may be classified as follows: 1. Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): Nos. 3 , 4 , 5 , 10b =in all, 4 hypotheses 2. Empirical hypotheses: a. S-H-hypotheses:Nos. 6,7,8,9,10a = in all, 5 hypotheses b. H-R-hypotheses:Nos. 1,2 = in all, 2 hypotheses

On the basis of this classification the hypothesis quotient may be calculated as follows: 4

H.Q. = --

+

-0.57

This H.Q. is slightly different from the previous H.Q. of 0.50, which was reckoned on the basis of a reconstruction of Lewin's theory of motivation. 3. Murray's reformulated hypotheses: 1. Hypothesis: H(regnant processes) + R(subjective and objective data) 2. Hypothesis: H(need) 3 R(verba1ized wishesbnstrumental behavior) 3. Hypothesis: S(internal/external)+ H(viserogenic need) 4. Hypothesis: H(beta press) + H(psychogenic need) 5. Hypothesis: S(alpha press) + H(beta press) 6a. Hypothesis: H(need, beginning) + H(unp1easurableeffects)


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6b. 7a. 7b. 8a. 8b. 9a. 9b. 10a. lob.

Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: Hypothesis: 1Oc. Hypothesis:

H(need, satisfaction) + H(pleasurab1e effects) H(need) + H(cognitive processes) H(cognitive processes) + R(goal directed) S(no goal object) 3 H(need) H(need) + R(exp1oratory) S(no goal object) +H(need) H(need) +H(substitute fantasies) S(innate factors) + H(ind. diff. in needs) H(different abilities) + H(different needs) S(environmenta1factors) + H(ind. diff. in needs)

These reformulated hypotheses may be classified as follows: 1. Theoretical hypotheses (H-H):

Nos. 4,6a, 6b, 7a, 9b, lob = in all, 6 hypotheses 2. Empirical hypotheses: a. S-H-hypotheses:Nos. 3,5,8a, 9a, lOa, 1Oc = in all, 6 hypotheses b. H-R-hypotheses:Nos. 1,2,7b, 8b = in all,4 hypotheses On the basis of this classification we can calculate the hypothesis quotient as follows: 6

H.Q.= --+ - 0.60 This H.Q. is somewhat lower than the previously calculated H.Q. of 0.71, which was based on a reconstruction of Murray's theory of motivation. Thus, to conclude this section we can say that Lewin's and Murray's theories are the most testable theories (with the lowest H.Q. they are approximately the average for the theories tested), whereas Tolman's theory is the feast testable (with a relatively high H.Q.). This result may appear somewhat surprising, since one would generally expect a theory largely based on laboratory experiments with rats to be the most testable, and theories based on experiments, tests and interviews to be more speculative and less empirically testable. But the H.Q.is a measure of the theories' (= Hypothesis-systemS) quantity of transempirical terms - not of the number or type of descriptive data. A theory with a high H.Q. may be associated with relatively many data, whereas a theory with a low H.Q. may be associated with comparatively few concrete data.


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Integrating Psychology: A Normal Period? INTRODUCTION: We shall conclude this chapter on integrating psychology by answering the question as to whether it constituted a normalperiod in the sense defined in Chapter 4 (see also Appendix). But we must first decide whether it may be termed a macroschool. A MACROSCHOOL? According to the definitions introduced in Chapter 4 (see also Appendix), a 'macroschool' is a scientific community with a common meta-paradigm (= a common set of meta-theses). The above analysis of Tolman's, Lewin's and Murray's production will have shown that the three psychologists' meta-theses are roughly identical. In addition, the three psychologists were acquainted with each other's production. It is espcially clear that Kurt Lewin has influenced both Tolman's and Murray's production. Moreover, some of Murray's colleagues had previously collaborated with Lewin previously, during his Berlin period. So it is fairly conclusive that the integrat-

ing psychologists and their colleagues constituted a macroschool. A NORMAL PERIOD? If we accept the fact that the integrating psychologists constituted a macroschool, we must then ask whether this macroschool comprised all psychologists, and whether the integrating psychology was therefore a normal period. One cannot of course profess to know about all psychologists, but only about all known and important psychologists who have influenced psychology's paradigm. There were also 'dissidents' who rejected the integrat-

ing metaparadigm. These were first and foremost psychoanalysts, who continued to practise their profession. But this group can best be described as aprofession - a group of practitioners and not a scientific community proper. Research inspired by the psychoanalytical paradigm was carried on by Murray and his colleagues, whose paradigm was not purely psychoanalytical but integrating. There were also other researchers and practising psychologists with divergent views, who later became known as paradigm-creators, but during the period of integration (c. 1940-1960) they did not form schools. The most famous of these are B.F. Skinner and Abraham Maslow. During this period they researched and wrote books based on divergent paradigms, but they did not become paradigm-creators or form schools until the period after 1960, which will be dealt with in a following chapter. Thus, all in all, it is reasonable to conclude that integrating psychology formed a *normalperiod' in the development of psychology to just as great an


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extent as classical experimental psychology did in its time. This could of course be contested, but it is safe to say that both normulperiods - plus the intervening period of school formation - may be regarded as descriptive models of the development of psychology.

Notes

,,Let me close, now, with a final confession of faith. I believe that everything important in psychology (except perhaps such matters as the building up of a superego, that is, everything save such matters as involve society and words) can be investigated in essence through the continued experimental and theoretical analysis of the determiners of rat behavior at a choice point in a maze." ,,'Mental processes' are for the behaviorists, naught but inferred determinants of behavior, which ultimately are deducible from behavior. Behavior and these inferred determinants are both objectively defined types of entity." ,,In case one should prefer to speak of 'physiological' forces rather than psychological ones we would not mind such terminology, although it might be misleading. The reality of psychological forces is the same as that of the 'biological' forces governing the brain.'' ,,We have adopted the version of the double-aspect hypothesis which states that every conscious process is the subjective aspect of some regnant brain process, but that not every regnant process has a conscious correlate."

,.By consciousness we mean introspective or, more accurately, immediately-retrospective awareness..". According to this convenient pragmatic criterion, consciousness depends upon verbalization."


397

6

,,And, even should it finally turn out, on a basis of further experiments, that there is for the behavior of organisms, just as for the behavior of electrons, some principle of ultimate indeterminateness (i.e., a kind of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle), this need not lead us to assume or suppose any metaphysically 'other' as 'butting in' to the course of organic nature. The finding of such an uncertainty principle would, to be sure, mean important and exciting things. It would mean that we must talk in terms of probabilites, of statistical averages, rather than in terms of unique individual cases. It would not mean, or at any rate would not need to mean, however, any metaphysical bifurcation or dualism - any breakdown in the possibility of final deterministic, descriptions per se.

7

,,Life is an irreversible sequence of non-identical events. Some of these changes, however, occur in a predictable lawful manner." And on page 39 he writes: ".., at every moment, an organism is within an environment, which largely determines its behavior."..

8

,,Without theories it is impossible in psychology, as in any other science, to proceed beyond the mere collection and description of facts which have no predictive value." And on page 242 he writes: ,,Psychology has never avoided, nor can it avoid, theory, but it can try to eliminate those speculative theories which are frequently introduced without clear intent or in a hidden way, and try instead to make use of openly stated empirical theories."

9

,, - a common theory and a common language is for psychology an urgent requisite". And on page 21: ,,Now, at every stage in the growth of science there is, it seems, an appropriate balance between broad speculation and detailed measurement. For instance, in the infancy of a very complex science - and surely psychology is young and complicated - a few mastering generalizations can be more effective in advancing knowledge than a mass of carefully compiled data."

-

10 ,,In conclusion, it seems we ask the philosopher - that we are asserting, are

we not, a pragmatism? For we are asserting that all human knowlege, including physics, purposive behaviorism, and our own present remarks, are but resultant of, and limited by, human behavioral needs and human behavioral capacities. Outside reality is for us human beings that which our


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11

12

limited biological needs and our limited biological capacities find it to be..". But what outside reality may be, in and for itself, abstracted from all human behavioral needs and all human behavioral capacities, we do not, cannot, and need not know." ,,The greatest handicap of applied psychology has been the fact that, without proper theoretical help, it had to follow the costly, inefficient, and limited method of ma1 and error. Many psychologists working today in an applied field are keenly aware of the need for close cooperation between theoretical and applied psychology. This can be accomplished in psychology, as it has been accomplished in physics, if the theorist does not look toward applied problems with highbrow aversion or with a fear of social problems, and if the applied psychologist realizes that there is nothing so practical as a good theory." ,,In the building up of the present system we have attempted to do for psychological phenomena what the other sciences have done for physical phenomena. We have attempted to reduce the former to a series of functional relationships by virtue of which it is possible to predict and control." ('Aristotelian') Epoch: Goal: To discover the essence of things and the cause behind all occurrence."

13 ,,l. Speculative

,,2. Descriptive Epoch: Goal: To collect as many facts as possible and to describe them exactly."

14

,,3. Constructive ('Galilean') Epoch: Goal: To discover laws. To predict individual cases." ,,The purpose of the entire procedure was to place at the disposal of each experimenter a wealth of information about his subjects and thus to assist him in interpreting his results and aniving at generally valid psychological laws. This was our initial intent,.." Later, on p. 33, Murray writes about his 'personology' and its relation to other traditions: ,,In short, then, we might say that our work is the natural child of the deep, significant, metaphorical, provocative and questionable speculations of psycho-analysis and


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the precise, systematic, statistic, trivial and artificial methods of academic personology." 15

,,.". behavior as such, is more than and different from the sum of its psychological parts. Behavior, as such, is an 'emergent' phenomenon that has descriptive and defining properties of its own. And we shall designate this latter as the molar definition of behavior..". It is this second, or molar, conception that is to be defended in the present treatise."

16

,,.". our task, as psychologists is the collecting and ordering of the molar behavior facts per se. And this task can, in large part, be performed in relative ignorance of both physiology and neurology."

17

,,.". it seems to have been this possession of speech, by man, which misled the earlier psychologists into the erroneous ass umption that 'introspection' accomplishes something sui generis.". And he conludes the chapter (p. 244) with the following: ,,In short, the dicta of 'introspection' present to the listener nothing which, theoretically at least, cannot be conveyed by other more gross forms of behavior."

18 ,,Field theory as any scientific approach to psychology is 'behavioristic' if

this means the tendency to provide 'operational definitions' (testable symptoms) for the concept used." 19

,,.". social facts are equally or even more important for psycho logy than the so-called 'physiological facts'.''. ,,Also, the so-called 'subjective psychological world' of the individual, his life-space, is influenced in a much earlier stage by social facts and social relations than anyone would have expected a few decades ago."

20

,,The need to describe and explain varieties of inner experience decided the original, and, I predict, will establish the final orientation of psychology." But, on the other hand (e.g. p. 54), Murray and his colleagues recognize the importance of behavioral data: ".. it seems better to begin with objective behavioural facts, for by so doing we align ourselves with scientists in other fields, and, what is more, shall be on f m e r ground, for it is easier to agree about objective facts than about subjective facts."

21

,,An activity in the brain has been conceptualized because it is the regnant processes in this region which we, as psychologists, must ultimately attempt to formulate. If we do not, we shall never bring together into one

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conceptual scheme the facts of behaviour, the facts of brain physiology and pathology and the facts of consciousness." 22

,,Apparently, I have no scientific superego which urges me to be mathematical, deductive, and axiomatic."

23 ,,The theory to be presented here will then be quite frankly one which

develops (by various analogies drawn from simple physics and mechanics, from Lewin's 'topological and vector' psychology, and from common experience) a sui generis model." 24

,,And intervening variables, as I conceive them, will have in part the properties of hypothetical constructs and not merely be in tervening mathematical quantities. However, the surplus meanings of my intervening variables which make them into hypothetical constructs are not at this stage primarily neurophysiological, as it is suggested by MacCorquodale and Meehl that they should be, but are derived rather from intuition, common experience, a little sophomoric neurology, and my own phenomenology."

25

,,Thus, as we see it, regnancies are the resultants of external press, of freshly aroused emotional needs (Id), of conscious intentions (Ego), of acceptedcultural standards (Superego) and of customary modes of behaviour (habit system) in varying proportions. The relative strength of these influences determines what tendencies will be objectified."

26

,A need is a construct (a convenient fiction or hypothetical concept) which

stands for a force (the physico-chemical nature of which is unknown) in the brain region, a force which organizes perception, apperception, intellection, conation and action in such a way as to transform in a certain direction an existing, unsatisfying situation. A need is sometimes provoked directly by internal processes of a certain kind (viscerogenic, endocrino genic, thalamicogenic) arising in the course of vital sequences, but more frequently (when in a state of readiness) by the occurrence of one of a few commonly effective kinds of press (or by anticipatory images of such press). Thus, it manifests itself by leading the organism to search for or to avoid encountering, or when encountered, to attend and respond to certain kinds of press. It may even engender illusory perceptions and delusory


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apperceptions (projection of its imaged press into unsuitable objects). Each need is characteristically accompanied by a particular feeling or emotion and tends to use certain modes (sub-needs or actions) to further its trend. It may be weak or intense, momentary or enduring. But usually it persists and gives rise to s certain course of overt behavior (or fantasy), which (if the organism is competent and external opposition not insurmountable) changes the initiating circumstance in such a way as to bring about an end situation which stills (appeases or satisfies) the organism." 27

,,We have not found that any confusion arises when we use 'need' at one time to refer to a temporary happening and at another to refer to a more or less consistent trait of personality."

28

,,Limitation in the number and variety of subjects. This becomes a confining factor if an experimenter expects to generalize his conclusions. It is always hazardous to apply what is discovered under certain conditions at a certain time with certain subjects to other conditions, times and subjects. Due to the preliminary nature of our studies we have not ventured to do this."

29

,,Among our other techniques, those in which the subject was presented with similes of everyday situations gave the greatest promise of further development. I refer particularly to the sessions which tested emotional conditioning, level of aspiration, reactions to frustration, many of which were suggested by the work of Lewin and his associates."

30 ,,Of our technical procedures the series that were termed Projection Tests

(p. 529), which were designed to evoke imagery and fantasy, brought to light the most significant data."


Chapter 9

HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction to the Period NEW PERIOD OF CRISIS. In chapter 8 we accounted for 'The Period of Integration' in the history of psychology. This period started around 1933 and had its heyday from around 1945 until 1960. The question as to whether 'integrating'

psychology', with Woodworth, Tolman, Lewin and Murray in the lead, succeeded in becoming an 'integrated psychology' was also discussed. There were a number of psychologists who, unlike the majority, never adopted the integrating paradigm. In fact some of these non-integrating psychologists became leaders of new schools which began to establish themselves at the beginning of the 1960's. The first formally organized school was that of humanistic psychology, and in 1962 the ,,Association of Humanistic Psychology" was founded, with Abraham Maslow as its first president. This was followed by the more or less formal organization of other schools, including 'Contemporary Behaviorism', 'Marxistic Psychology', and 'Main-stream Psychology', which will be dealt with in the following chapters. In this chapter we shall first consider the causes of the crisis and the subsequent school formation before proceeding to give an account of the history of humanistic psychology. EXTERNAL CAUSES. As we saw in Chapter 8, the tendency towards integration

in psychology was caused, externally, by political events, i.e. Hitler's seizure of power and the Second World War, and this was also the case as regards the second period of school formation. The 'escalation' of the Vietnam War was by far the most important cause, many Americans having come to regard this war as 'meaningless'. Some years previously, in 1957, the launching of the first

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Humanistic psychology

satellite, the Russian 'Sputnik', provoked the so-called 'Sputnik crisis', which constituted the first serious undermining of the American national self-confidence. The subsequent space race and, not least, the Vietnam War brought about a 'crisis of values' in American society. Those values, ideals and norms Americans had previously believed in and fought for now became the object of doubt and criticism. This resulted in the formation of a number of movements for creating a better society and culture. Among these the Hippy-movement, with its introvert pacifism ('Make Love not War') inspired by Indian philosophy, is probably the best known. But numerous other, more active and extravert, movements also arose, such as the militant 'Black Power' movement and the non-violent civil rights movement modelled on Ghandi's policy of nonviolence and led by Martin Luther King. A number of 'communities' and experimental societies inspired by various ideologies were also created. The national crisis in values became manifest or resulted in a great many personal, existential crises on an individual level. In many cases these resulted in suicide or drug abuse. A number of new synthetic psychodelic drugs like LSD or psilocybin had recently come on to the market, and many people - including psychologists and psychiatrists - experimented with them without really knowing their long-term effects. Thus, at the hternational Congress for Applied Psychology in Copenhagen in 1961 the author Aldous Huxley and the psychologist Timothy Leary lectured on the use of psychodelic drugs for evoking 'visions' and 'peak-experiences'. This official recommendation together with the crisis in values resulted in many young people using drugs for solving their personal, existential problems. Many of these youngsters became drug abusers or adicts, and the use of drug adicts and other persons with existential problems constituted a challenge for psychology - especially humanistic psychology. Simultaneously with the American crisis of values and the civic rights movement, political events of a more revolutionary nature were taking place in other parts of the world. Probably the most important of these was the Chinese 'cultural revolution', which had an influence on the youth and student revolts in many countries, including the U.S.A. These revolutionary events were frequently inspired by Marxist ideology, which therefore experienced a renaissance among the youth of Western Europe - not least among students. This increased interest in Marxist philosophy led to numerous attempts by critical

Introduction to the period

405

professionals to create a Marxist paradigm for all the sciences, in particular the social and cultural sciences. In the case of psychology this led to the establishment of one or several schools of Marxistpsychology, which will be described in the following chapter. Apart from the these political events some other conditions within society ought to be mentioned, which contributed to the external causes of school formation in psychology. The Great Powers' arms race as well as numerous local and regional wars have increased thefear ofwar - especially the fear of a nuclear war. Added to which came the energy crisis and pollution. All this was instrumental in changing the public view of science. Faced with a negative, almost anti-scientific attitude, the sciences were obliged to meet the challenge and prove their practical use and 'relevance for society'. As far as psychology was concerned, this challenge was taken up by Marxist psychology and especially by radical behaviorism. Thus, B.F. Skinner wrote a sensational book entitled ,,Beyond Freedom and Dignity" (1972), which supplemented his previous novel about a Utopian society, ,,Walden Two" (1948). The above-mentionedpolitical events and changes in society constituted the most important external causes of psychology's second crisis and period of school formation. But there were of course some internal cases, to which we shall now turn. INTERNALCAUSES. The internal causes may be collectively described as an increasing dissatisfaction with the current paradigm. This dissatisfaction was to be found especially on the part of those who had never accepted the integration paradigm. But because of the effect of the external causes on the scientific community, these dissatisfied psychologists obtained more and more followers. According to Kuhn's theory (cf. Chapter 2), the chief causes of crisis and subsequent school formation are the so-called anomalies, or phenomena which cannot be explained on the basis of the current paradigm. In the first period of school formation we noticed that the three main schools started each with its own specific anomaly: behavioral psychology with Pavlov's discovery of the conditioned reflex, Gestalt psychology with the so-called 'Gestalt phenomena', and psychoanalysis with neurotic symptoms. But an anomaly serves merely as a provoking factor - the last straw that break's the camel's back. Anomalies always operate against a background of accumulated dissatisfaction with the current paradigm in the scientific

406


community. During the second period of school formation the anomalies were possibly not so much products of empirical research (as Pavlov's and Gestalt psychology's anomalies at any rate were) as challenges from without (like Freud's anomaly). This applies particularly to humanistic psychology and Marxist psychology. As already mentioned under external causes, the decisive challenge humanistic psychology had to meet was the feeling of meaninglessness coupled with the crisis in values. Existential problems of this type could not be explained or treated satisfactorily on the basis of the current paradigm, which was never acepted by A.H. Maslow and the other founders of the school. Not even the original Freudian analysis could deal with these types of phenomena. According to Maslow, this was a 'neurosis psychology' which ought to be supplemented with a 'health psychology' (Eu-psychology), which we shall deal with shortly. For Marxist psychology the challenge consisted of bringing psychology's paradigm in accordance with Marxist ideology. Perhaps one might say that man's dependence on society constituted the anomaly. Current psychology regarded man as a biologically determined individual, whereas Marxist psychology had a special interest in explaining man's 'socialization'. The Marxist psychological paradigm was first formulated in the Soviet Union by Vygotsky, Rubinstein, Luria and Leontyev, about whom we shall hear in the following chapter on 'Marxist Psychology'. To radical behaviorism it was the nomothetic ideal of science that constituted the challenge. During the entire period of integration Skinner had dissociated himself from integrating psychology, and with the formation of humanistic psychology his criticism of this and all other psychology became still greater. Skinner's arguments in favour of an 'experimental behavioral analysis' were greatly substantiated by the practical application of his research results in programmed teaching and behavioral therapy. We shall return to this in Chapter 11 on 'Contemporary Behaviorism'. Before proceeding with the history of humanistic psychology we should mention that during this period of school formation many psychologists continued to work with the paradigm of integrating psychology. They constituted a major part of the scientific community, which we shall term 'Mainstream' - a macroschool possessing integrating psychology as its common meta-paradigm,

Introduction to the period

407

though divided into microschools each concentrating on a specialized field. We shall examine this school in a later chapter on 'Mainstream Psychology'.

The h uman istic psychologists The Development of Humanistic Psychology INSPIRATION. As mentioned above, during the 1950's psychologists became increasingly dissatisfied with the paradigm of integrating psychology. Some of them had never accepted this paradigm and kept at a critical distance. Nor were they able to accept logical empiricism or other types of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy of science, which predominated during the period of integration especially in the U.S.A, which took the lead as far as psychology was concerned during this period. These outsiders were more interested in other schools of philosophy; these had existed for some time, though had been unable to compete with the analytical schools (logical empiricism, Oxford philosophy, pragmatism, etc.), which especially attracted those interested in the natural sciences. Not until society underwent the changes mentioned above under 'external causes' did these alternative philosophies begin to make an impact among psychologists, social researchers and humanists. From Europe came existential philosophy, chiefly represented by S . Kierkegaard, M.Heidegger, L. Binswanger, K. Jaspers and J.P. Sartre. These philosophers were not interested in the philosophy of science, nor in the philosophy of nature (ontology, metaphysics) but largely in the philosophy of values (the philosophy of life, moral philosophy, etc.) Thus it was man's existential problems - a meaningful contra a meaningless existence, life contra death, the correct conduct of life (morality, ethics) and other problems connected with the philosophy of life - that interested them. Existentialism frequently went hand in hand with phenomenological philosophy, which originated with E. Husserl. This philosophy was to a great extent a philosophy of knowledge, which maintained that a form of intuition, or 'Wesensschau', is the most fundamental type of knowledge. In Chapter 5 , we learnt that the Gestalt psychologists stressed the importance of this holistically oriented, phenomenological cognition as opposed to a more analytical type of introspection. This combination of existentialist philosophy of life and phenomenological method inspired many European and American psychiatrists and psychologists - especially

408


clinical psychologists. Among the existentialist philosophers mentioned above, Binswanger and Jaspers were themselves psychiamsts. In the U.S.A., apart from existentialism, a second alternative philosophy made itself felt. This was Zen-Buddhism, which Americans had become acquainted with in Japan during the Second World War and the Korea War. Originally coming from China, this Japanese philosophy had had a great influence in Japan for many centuries. It arose in China during the first few centuries A.D. as the result of an integration of Buddhism, which came from India, with Taoism, which was an ancient Chinese philosophy of nature. At the heart of Zen is the idea that man can achieve insight, both in himself and in existence itself through meditation ('Zen' in Japanese). This philosophy will be further discussed in connection with Maslow's production, which is more inspired by Zen than by existentialism. These two philosophies have nevertheless a great deal in common, and it was this philosophy which became the source of inspiration behind the formation of humanistic psychology's paradigm. We can therefore conclude this section with a brief description of this paradigm especially the meta-paradigm - which we shall describe in more detail in the last part of the chapter in which Maslow's production is analysed. Humanistic psychology's epistemology is intuitionistic (inspired by phenomenology or oriental philosophy). The ideal of science is hermeneutic - although there is no direct reference to the Frankfurter School's theory of the ideals of science. Consequently its methodology is chiefly devoted to phenomological and clinical methods as well as interviews and biographical studies. Humanistic psychology's conception of man is dynamic-holistic: man is a whole - the person is a 'Gestalt' - that cannot be reduced to elements and functions; and this personal wholeness is under constant development - also throughout adult life. The psycho-physical theory is often implicit, though approximating a theory of identity. Conceptions vary as regards the problem of determinism: existentialist psychologists proper assert the freedom of the will (indeterminism) and maintain that man develops his personality by way of free choice. Other humanistic psychologists are not indeterminists,maintaining that the development of personality starts with a 'biological core'.

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THE ORGANISATION OF THE SCHOOL. Humanistic psychology's paradigm was first formulated in Abraham Maslow: ,,Motivation and Personality", first published in 1954. During the following years Maslow collected a circle of followers, who sought to organize humanistic psychology on a more formal basis. This resulted in the establishment of a journal and an organized school of humanistic psychology. In 1961 the Journal of Humanistic Psychology was started, with A J . Sutich as editor. Since then four numbers have been issued every year. In 1962 the same circle of psychologists founded the Association for Humanistic Psychology with Maslow as its first president. This organization later became responsible for the publication of the ,,Journal of Humanistic Psychology" and for the arrangement of annual meetings. During the 60's humanistic psychology spread all over America, and in 1970 the International Associationfor Humanistic Psychology, with Charlotte Biihler as president, was founded (Maslow had died just before). This international organization was founded in connection with the first international conference on humanistic psychology, which was held in Amsterdam in August 1970. Since then several national and regional organizations for humanistic psychology have been founded - also in Scandinavia. In the U.S.A. university institutes devoted to the teaching of and research in humanistic psychology have also been created. The first was in San Francisco, the headquarters of the A.H.P. Finally, a ,,Division for Humanistic Psychology" was created within the American Psychological Association, which (in November 1986) had altogether forty-four such 'divisions', representing as a rule scientific subdisciplines or professional groupings, but also occasionally new school formation. In conclusion, humanistic psychology is probably the most thoroughly organized school during the second period of school formation, although for the sake of completeness we should mention that a Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry (with Adrian van Kaam as editor) has existed ever since 1961. But no corresponding existentialist microschool has been formally organized within the humanistic macroschool. Existentialism is a 'movement' rather than an organized school. We shall now account briefly for the persons who inspired and organized humanistic psychology.

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Some Humanistic Psychologists INTRODUCTION. This section will contain a short biography of the most important humanistic psychologists. Many of them belonged to the circle around Maslow, who founded both the journal and the Association of Humanistic Psychology. In addition there were a number of European psychologists who were not necessarily members of A.H.P., but who were usually described as - and possibly regarded themselves as - humanistic or existentialist psychologists (between which we shall make no distinction). The circle around Maslow included such names as Charlotte Biihler, Andreas Angyal, Roberto Assagioli, Kurt Goldstein, Aldous Huxley, Sidney M. Jourard, Antony J. Sutich, James F.T. Bugental, Victor Frankl, Arthur Koestler, Stanley Krippner, Floyd W. Matson, Rollo May, Henry A. Murray, and Carl Rogers. It will be seen from the list that not all the initiators were professional or scientifically trained psychologists. Two of them - Arthur Koestler and Aldous Huxley - were well-known authors. We shall concentrate here on giving a short biographical account of a few chosen humanistic (or existentialist) psychologists who have become internationally known on account of their production. But first we shall briefly account for the 'forerunners' of humanistic psychology * THE 'FORERUNNERS' OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY. As previously men-

tioned, this century saw the birth of a European existentialist philosophy inspired by the works of S@en Kierkegaard and founded by Martin Heidegger. Two of Heidegger's famous pupils were K . Jaspers and L. Binswanger. Binswanger was originally the pupil of Freud. These philosophers and psychiatrists may be described as the original founders of a true existentialist, clinical psychology. Apart from these, we must refer especially to the Dutch psychologist F.J.J. Buytendijk, who combined existentialism proper with the phenomenological method inspired by Husserl and the Gestalt psychologists. Buytendijk's works were translated into English and became widely known in America after the Second World War. Here, after 1933, the theologican and philosopher Paul Tillich, who introduced existentialist philosophy into the U.S.A., also practised.

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During this same period oriental philosophy reached America, headed by the Japanese Zen-philosopher D.T. Suzuki and the American Allan Watts. Apart from these two groups of philosophers some of the GermanAmerican Gestalt psychologists may also be described as forerunners. These include Kurt Lewin, whom we dealt with in Chapter 8 on 'Integrating Psychology', and the neuropsychologistKurt Goldstein, who was inspired by Gestalt psychology. Goldstein's focussing upon the concept of self-actualization, which he regarded as man's most important motivation, had a great influence on Maslow. Finally, we should mention Gordon W . Allport, who had been trying for a long time to win recognition for an idiographic psychology of personality inspired amongst other things by W . Stern's 'Personalism' - and later, by existentialism. The latter psychoanalysts were all direct forerunners of Maslow and his circle, whose biography we shall sketch below. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW (1908-1970) was born in 1908 of Jewish parents. His

mother in particular was orthodox and extremely dogmatic. During puberty he dissociated himself from Judaism, describing himself thereafter as 'confessionless'. During his college years he became interested in cultural anthropology as well as psychology. As a result of his interest in the former, Maslow, at the age of twenty-two, spent a summer with the Blackfoot Indians in Canada. But he was too much of a family man to be satisfied with this type of life in the long run, and he gave up anthropology in favour of his other interest, psychology. During his college years his teachers had included several famous psychologists. Amonst other things, he was for a couple of years an assistant to Edward L. Thorndike, who is reckoned as one of the most important classical behaviorist psychologists. Maslow was also taught by the subsequently so famous C.L. Hull, who directly responsible for Maslow's interest in animal experiments. It was under the leadership of H.F. Harlow that Maslow carried out his experiments with apes; later he became interested in studying their social relations, especially that of dominance and subjection. These experiments with apes led to an interest in studying the question of dominance in human beings, and to the construction of a test offemininity contra masculinity.

412


During these years - the end of the 30s - Maslow met a number of famous European psychologists in New York. These were either immigrants or had fled to the U.S.A. on account of Hitler's pogrom, and included psychoanalysts like Erich Fromm and Karen Horney, and Gestalt psychologists like M . Wertheimer, W . Kiihler and K . KO@. As a result of their influence coupled with the increasing threat of war Maslow became less interested in experimental, behaviorist psychology, and more in clinical, psychoanalytic psychology. During the war Maslow worked as a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist, writing at the same time a book on clinical psychology (see Maslow and Mittelman, 1941). Clinical psychology continued to be Maslow's most important source of empirical material. But he gradually became more and more dissatisfied with psychoanalytical 'neurose-psychology', as he called it, and thought it should be supplemented with a 'psychology of health' ('Eu-psychology'), which would deal mainly with healthy, mature people - those he later called 'self-actualizing' people. Maslow was thereby well on the way towards creating the theory of motivation and personality which we shall describe here. This theory became a central part of American 'humanistic psychology', of which Maslow was a co-founder; he regarded it as an alternative to behaviorist and psychoanalyticalpsychology, which he had experienced as being unsatisfactory in the long run. CHARLOTTE BUHLER (1893-1974). Charlotte Buhler was born in Austria,

where, at an early age, she married her teacher, the psychologist Karl Buhler (see Chapter 4). At first she became known independently as a developmental psychologist, especially for her construction, together with H. Herzer, of some developmental tests for small children, which were translated into several languages. She began to interest herself in the full course of human development, and wrote: , p e r menschliche Lebenslauf als psychologisches Problem" (1933). In the middle of the 30s, Karl and Charlotte Buhler emigrated to the U.S.A. on account of Nazism. They settled in California, where Charlotte Buhler worked as a psychotherapist and became acquainted with humanistic psychology. Charlotte Buhler became the president of the Association of Humanistic Psychology after Maslow's death in the early summer of 1970. She also became president of the first international congress for humanistic psychology in Amsterdam in 1970. Her books include an ,,Introduction to Humanistic Psychol-

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ogy", 1972, which she wrote together with Melanie Allen. Unlike Maslow, Charlotte Buhler retained a more natural scientific conception of science. (See Madsen, 1974). CARL ROGERS (1902-1987). Rogers was one of the pioneers of humanistic psy-

chology, his first major work on ,,Client Centered Therapy" appearing already in 1951. Here Rogers describes his therapeutic principles, which consist of non-conducted conversations with the client, who thereby acquires great selfinsight and a greater chance of solving his own personal problems. Later Rogers extended his therapy to include group-therapy (the so-called encounter-groups). Roger's method is phenomenological, and his theory of personality is a phenomenological theory about 'the self and its development. Maslow refers to Roger's clinical experience in support of his own theory on self-actualization. ROLL0 MAY (born 1905). May has played an important part as promoter of ex-

istentialist philosophy and its integration with humanistic psychology. His chief work deals with anxiety (see May, 1951). VICTOR E. FRANKL (born 1905). Frankl was born in Ausma and was Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Vienna. During the Second World War he spent several years in a concentration camp. As the result of this experience (see Frankl, 1959) he developed a theory and form of therapy known as fogotherupy. The name refers to the great importance of meaning (logos) in life, and to the fact that therapy must consist in helping the client to discover the meaning of his own life. Frankl's theory is presented in ,,Man's Search for Meaning" (1970). Here Frankl argues that current psychology lacks a spiritual dimension, which exists in addition to the biological and psychological dimensions well known to psychologists. The first, or biological, dimension describes and explains human behavior purely biologically, as is the case with behaviorism. The second, or psychological, dimension explains human behavior with the aid of hypothetical constructs like cognitive processes, motivation and suchlike. According to Frankl, Freud's theory of the Id, the Ego and the SuperEgo is an example of the latter. The third, spiritual or noologicul, dimension interprets human experience and actions with the help of philosophical concepts like 'meaning', 'will to freedom', 'guilt and responsibility'and 'suffering'. Frankl regards his theory and therapy as necessary supplements to

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necessary supplements to behavioristic and psychoanalytical theories or therapy types. RONALD D. LAING (born 1927). This British psychiatrist has criticized current

psychiatry so strongly that he has been dubbed an 'antipsychiatrist'. His theory about ,,The Divided Self' (1970) stresses that schizophreniaand schizophrenic (schizoid) personality trends are a natural ('normal') reaction to modern society, which is 'sick', i.e. anti-human, reificatory and alienating. TRANSPERSONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Finally, we should mention that the human-

istic psychology that has often called itself 'the Third Force in Psychology' has given birth to a new movement known as 'the Fourth Force'. This is not really a new school, since it has the same paradigm as humanistic psychology, but a new subdiscipline within psychology, i.e. the study of changed states of consciousness; this arose in the ~ O ' S inspired , amongst other things by Maslow's studies of 'peak-experiences'. These changed or 'higher' states of consciousness may arise spontaneously or be deliberately provoked by the help of meditation or psychodelic drugs. Common to both is the fact that the person goes beyond (transcends) his customary limits, and so this discipline is now often called 'TranspersonalPsychology'. It has also incorporated the earlier parapsychology within its field of study. One of the chief representatives of this new discipline is the American psychologist Charles T . Tart, who has issued two composite works (see Tart 1969 and 1975) on the subject as well as a book entitled ,,States of Consciousness" (1975). In this discipline the inspiration from oriental philosophers (especially Yoga and Zen) is very prominent. Stanley Krippner is a humanistic psychologist with a previous interest in parapsychology. He has carried out experiments on the telepathic effect of dreams, and has written on it in ,,Song of the Siren" (1975). An attempt at a synthesis of Zen Buddism and Behaviorism ('Zen-Behaviorism') is to be found in Daniel Shapiro: ,,Precision Nirvana" (1978).

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Maslo w 's production Introducion to Maslow As previously mentioned, Maslow was the organizor and paradigm-creator of

humanistic psychology. It is therefore natural that we should choose here to undertake a metatheoretical analysis of Maslow's production. We shall make a selection of those works Maslow himself regarded as his chief works, refemng otherwise to the bibliography. Maslow's chief work is ,,Motivation and Personality" (1954), part of which had previously been published in the form of articles. The second edition was issued in 1970. Although the text had not been revised, a lengthy new foreword had been provided, in which Maslow accounted for the various changes of view he had arrived at in the meantime. As the title suggests, the book included Maslow's theory about the development and make-up of personality and the driving forces behind actions. It is in this book that Maslow presents his wellknown theory about 'the pyramid of needs' described in more detail in the section about Maslow's theory of motivation. The second book to be included in this account is his ,,Psychology ofScience" (1966). This consists of a series of Maslow's lectures on his conception of science, which is decidely humanistic-psychological. The third book is ,,Religions, Values and Peak Experiences" (1964). In this book Maslow puts forward his theory about the origin of religions. The founders of the great religions had experienced so-called 'peak-experiences'; Maslow used this term to designate all great and impressive experiences - the ecstacy of the mystics, 'revelations', inspirations, profound experiences of nature, etc. It is the content and value of these experiences which they attempt to pass on to other people. Finally, we should mention Maslow's Jupsychian Management" ( 1963, which contains his contribution to the theory of management.

The Meta-stratum in Maslow's Production 1. MASLOWS ONTOLOGY 1.O INTRODUCTION. Maslow has strongly emphasized that a researcher's

'Weltanschauung' puts its stamp on his conception of science, his theory-making and his empirical research. As far as psychology is concerned, in particular

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the conception of man is the most relevant part of the 'Weltansschauung'. Maslow's arguments can be briefly reproduced as follows: 1. All psychologists have a particular conception of man, which puts its stamp on their theory-making and research. This conception of man may not be conscious on the part of the researcher, however, because he may have failed to react critically towards previous 'indoctrination'. 2. It is important that the psychologist is made aware of his conception of man, and that it is formulated explicitly, for only thereby can it be made the object of critical discussions and eventual revision. It is necessary for the fruitful development of the sciences that everything - philosophical presuppositions, as well as hypotheses and data - can be criticized and revised. But it is most frequently the philosophical presuppositions, the view of science and the 'Weltansschauung' that are not raised to consciousness and explicitly formulated, and thus are not criticized and revised. In this way unformulated philosophical presuppositions acquire the effect of unscientific dogmas. Maslow's example of an unformulated and often unconscious conception of man as far as psychologists are concerned is the Darwinist, biological conception of man, common to almost all psychologists since the end of the last century. This view of man has been dominating for such a long time that psychologists have forgotten that alternative views do in fact exist. It has thereby been instrumental in steering psychological research and theory-formation without psychologists being aware of it. For instance, most (especially American) psychologists have implicitly presupposed that the results of experiments with animals are capable of throwing light on human psychology. Thus Maslow's conception of man should be termed 'humanistic' in the sense that man is viewed as a species that diflers essentially - and not just slightly - from other species. Maslow shares this view with other humanistic and existentialist psychologists. But he differs from other humanistic psychologists in that he derives his inspiration not from European existentialist philosophy (Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, etc.) but from oriental philosophy - in particular Taoism and Zen Buddhism. Zen-Buddhism. It is very difficult to provide a brief account of Zen, because it is a philosophy (or religion) without dogmas or holy writings. The essential elements of Zen are reputed to go back to Buddha's attempts to communicate

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his own insights to his disciples without the use of words. Zen - like Taoism consists in learning to live here and now, or, alternatively, in learning to give up 'selfishness'and allow one's consciousness to enter into a wider context. As mentioned, Zen cannot, on principle, be communicated through words, but preferably through personal contact from teacher to pupil. But should we nevertheless wish to communicate by way of words, poetry and metaphors are more suitable than our hitherto use of philosophical terms and everyday speech. 1.1. MASLOWS CONCEPTION OF MAN: Summary. The latter was an attempt to

describe the conception of man contained in Zen, which has been the source behind since it has inspired Maslow's conception of man - that of man as a being that is constantly growing and developing. Even in adult life man continues to develop his personality, his potentialities and his talents. This development enables us in the end to have ecstatic experiences - so-called peak-experiences consisting of both religious/mystical experiences and experiences of inspiration and creative joy, etc. We shall return to 'self-actualization' and 'peak-experiences' later in this chapter. Before we turn to Maslow's view of science we must deal with his attitude to the psycho-physical problem. 1.2. THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM. In formulating his conception of man and his 'Weltanschauung'Maslow nas explicitly stated his attitude to the problem whole contra part. Here he goes in for an 'organismic'or 'holistic' view of the world as opposed to a 'mechanical' or 'atomistic' one. In association with this he also supports a 'dynamic'view of the world as opposed to a 'static' one. On the other hand, nowhere in his production does Maslow deal explicitly with the problem as to which 'material', 'substance' or 'elements' life consists of.

Maslow$ philosophy of the psycho-physical problem. Since Maslow has not expressed himself explicitly with regard to this problem, we shall have to arrive at his philosophy through a study of his discourse. Thus, in comparison, this is largely a question of an interpretation. Since Maslow's general attitude is holistic - and he formulates this explicitly in several places - we may conclude that Maslow also regards Man as a psycho-physical whole. In other words, his 'Weltanschauung' must therefore be a neutral monism or theory of identio.

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However, we can also interpret Maslow's 'Weltanschauung' in a different way: in several places Maslow makes use of phenomenological descriptions of experiences, and he frequently explains with the help of mentalistic concepts like 'thoughts', 'feelings' and 'wishes', etc. familiar to us from everyday psychological explanations. Such explanations imply a dualism, in which consciousness or psychical processes interact with corporeal processes in the brain. Perhaps we could even maintain that Maslow's dualism 'lists' to the idealistic (or spiritualistic) side. The spiritual (psychical) side of life is the more important, as in the philosophies of Plato andt Buddha. Had Maslow been familiar with Popper's 'trialism' or other forms of pluralism, he might well have expressed his support. It would at any rate have been in accordance with his holism, which closely approaches a modem system theory or structuralism and is almost pluralistic in its attitude to the psycho-physical problem. Thus, there are three or four possible interpretations of Maslow's philosophy of the psycho-physical problem. But Maslow is not the only one whose 'Weltanschauung' is difficult to characterize with the help of known philosophical classifications. We shall now turn to another unclarified question with regard to Maslow's 'We1tanschauung'. 1.3. THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY. Associated with the conception of man is the question as to whether human behavior (actions) is causally determined, or whether it is under the control of the free will. Here Maslow states quite clearly and precisely in ,,Motivation and Personality" (1954), p. 55, that ,,all behavior is determined'. This is an explicit formulation of a deterministic view, and it has been neither modified nor refuted in the long preface to the second edition in 1970, in which Maslow mentions which points he would have revised had he had the possibility of doing so. The reason why one might have expected a revision was that during the intervening years Maslow had been 'flirting' with existentialism, and existentialism is as a rule indeterministic, i.e. it maintains that human actions are steered by a free will and are not (always) causally determined. When reviewing European existentialism, Maslow does not say anything explicitly either for or against its indeterminism.

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Maslow's view could possibly be interpreted as a compromise, i.e. human actions are self-determined, in that they are largely determined by 'the self, i.e. by the structure of the personality - including the system of needs - and relatively little by external circumstances, or stimuli from the concrete situation. This self-determination makes itself increasingly felt the more mature the person is. We have now concluded the account of Maslow's ontology and shall turn to the other main part of his philosophy: the philosophy of science, which is much more clearly formulated. 2. MASLOWS PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE INTRODUCTION. Maslow's philosophy of science is fully described in his book

,,Psychology of Science" (1966), and also in the introductory chapters to ,,Motivation and Personality" (1 954, 1970). His view of science comprises both a general theory of knowledge and a theory of science - or more precisely, a 'metatheory' - and, finally, a methodology. We shall deal with these in the order mentioned. 2.0. MASLOWS THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. Maslow argues for a combination of

intuition, empiri and rational thought. With reference to oriental philosophy especialy Taoism and Zen - he maintains that psychology primarily builds on intuition. The practising psychologist ought not least to call upon his intuitive knowledge in order to arrive at a general view of the people he is trying to help. Intuition may also give rise to ideas capable of being formulated as hypotheses. But if these hypotheses are to be scientifically acceptible or become fruitful theory, they must be formulated with the help of rational thought as a coherent system capable of being tested empirically. We have thereby arrived at Maslow's theory of science in the restricted sense. 2.1. MASLOWS METATHEORY. Maslow and the humanistic psychologists were

opposed to a one-sided physicalist vew of science. Psychology should not (exclusively) copy the natural sciences, as was especially the case with American behaviorism and to some extent also psychoanalysis (see, however, Lesche and Madsen, 1976), but rather the humaniora. Maslow was not acquainted with the Frankfurter school's theory of science, which did not even become wellknown in Europe until after the 'student revolt' of 1968, even though it had

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existed ever since the 30s. But by stressing the importance of intuition in understanding other people, Maslow most closely approached the hermeneutic ideal of science. In other respects Maslow's view of science may be termed 'psychological' or perhaps rather 'psychologistic'. In other words, Maslow atempts to explain and understand 'science' as a purely psychological phenomenon, and entirely overlooks, or at any rate underestimates, science's social and historical aspects. Maslow is in fact opposed to the conception of science which converts it into a 'superhuman' phenomenon - a social and cultural institution that develops according to its own laws. On the contrary, Maslow emphasizes that science is a human activity characterized by the individual personality of the researcher. Thus, in ,,Motivation and Personality", Chapter 1, p. 1, he writes: ,,A psychological interpretation of science begins with the acute realization that science is a human creation, rather than an autonomous, nonhuman, or per se 'thing' with intrinsic rules of its own. Its origins are in human motives, its goals are human goals, and it is created, renewed, and maintained by human beings. Its laws, organizations, and articulations rest not only on the nature of the reality that it discovers, but also on the nature of the human nature that does the discovering." Among the motives for research Maslow indicates in the above quotation, he stresses some that facilitate and some that inhibit research. Research is set going and facilitated by motives like the 'need for knowledge' and the 'need for understanding'. But it is inhibited by motives like 'the need for security', which may counteract the acceptance of new research results and new theories that conflict with established theories. Research is facilitated by the need for knowledge and understanding, because this facilitates problem centering, whereas the need for security facilitates not only means centering but certain 'pathologies of cognition' like the compulsive need for certainty, for premature generalization, denial of ignorance, denial of doubt and intolerance of ambiguity, etc. Maslow stresses not only the importance of motivation for research but also the importance of the researche's abilities. Thus he stresses that the growth of science requires people with abilities for theoretical as well as empirical (including experimental) investigations; it demands in addition the historical

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scholar, the philosophical system builder, the organizer and those with the ability to write, etc. All these different abilities are seldom to be found in one person. Some are largely theoreticians, other experimenters, etc. But the growth of science demands all types of work, and consequently demands different types of personality, each with its specific ability structure, and it would be wrong to favourize one type alone. Thus Maslow's view of the researcher's personality - and especially of his personal abilities - is all-round, open and tolerant. The same applies to Maslow's attitude to the methods we shall deal with in the next section. 2.2. MASLOWS METHODOLOGY. In his own research Maslow has successfully used all known psychological methods. Most of all he stresses the value of clinical methods, which here comprise both interviews as well as the study of biographies and other production. Thus it would probably be correct to call them humanistic or hermeneutic methods, especially when they are applied to the interpretation of speech, writing and other production, as well as the entire life-history of healthy, mature and self-actualizingpersons. Maslow calls these methods 'a gold mine for psychology'. There is a second problem connected with the choice of methods, i.e. in which data-language should the observations be formulated? Maslow is open and tolerant as regards this question too. Although he recommends commencing with descriptions in phenomenological data-language especially in new and complicated fields of research. Eventually, as a field becomes better researched, behavioristic datalanguage with its greater possibility for quantitative formulations may be used. Thus Maslow is not opposed to behavioristic and other 'natural scientific' psychology as long as it is not onesided. His aim in establishing a humanistic psychology was to supplement the more one-sided American psychology with a psychology able to research, desribe and explain or interpret man's most complicated and special human acitivites - like his creative work in religion, philosophy, art, science and technology as well as social and cultural life on the whole.

The Hypothetical Stratum in Maslow's Production INTRODUCTION. In this section we shall examine the hypothetical stratum in Maslow's production, or 'theory' in the restrictive sense of the word. We shall concentrate on the most important part of his theory - Maslow's motivation theory, and thereafter examine his personality fheory, which includes his the-

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ory about the 'selfactualizing' person. But before we commence an analysis of Maslow's theory it would be appropriate to review his theory of human personality. Human behavior has two sides or aspects, which can be studied individually, but always appear together. One of these is the instrumental aspect, i.e. the action itself. This is initiated and driven by the individual's needs, and steered by both his cognitive processes and his perception of the actual situation, his thoughts connected with the solving of possible problems and his plan of action. The needs and the cognitive processes lead sooner or later to the accomplishment of the action, the initiating needs thus being satisfied. Secondly, human behavior also has an expressive aspect, whereby the individual expresses his personality and abilities. Different individuals may carry out the same instrumental action - e.g. solve examination questions, complete a psychological test, write a paper, lay out a garden, build a house, etc. - but the expressive aspect of the action will vary from person to person. The interplay between the needs, the personality features and ability structure is shown in the diagram, Fig. 9.1. MASLOWS MOTIVATION THEORY: INTRODUCTION. Maslow's motivation

theory is the most systematic and clearly formulated part of his entire theory. It is also the part which has become the most known and applied. Maslow's motivation theory is described in ,,Motivation and Personality", but before presenting his theory he formulates some underlying 'principles'. These are almost metaitheses, and thus not hypotheses, for which reason we shall discuss them here - before the hypotheses. Maslow's first principle for the construction of a motivation theory is the humanistic principle, with its built-in requirement that a motivation theory ought to be anthroprocentric rather than animalcentric, as has been the case with a great deal of American motivation psychology. Maslow maintains in accordance hereby that it is wrong to regard hunger as the most typical motive (need) in humans - perhaps even in animals. Thus it is also critical of experimental American motivation psychology (See Maslow, 1954, p. 27)1. The second principle is the health-psychical or 'eupsychian'principle, with its built-in requirement that motivation theory should be able to explain motivation in the healthy and mature personality as well as in the unhealthy or crip-

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Fig. 9.1. Graphical representation of Maslows theory.

pled. This principle therefore contains a criticism of psychoanalysis, which, according to Maslow, concentrates solely on neurotic persons. Freud's 'neurosis psychology' ought, according to Maslow, to be supplemented with a health psychology (see Maslow, 1954, p. 33)2. A third principle states that a motivation theory ought to deal with both unconscious and conscious motives, because unconscious motives are tantamount to basic needs, whereas conscious motives are often merely concerned

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with satisfying basic needs. Thus this principle is in accordance with Freud's motivation theory (See Maslow, 1954, p. 22)3. Maslow's principles for the construction of a motivation theory also include a classificationprinciple, but this is best dealt with in connection with the fundamental concept in his motivation theory, the concept of 'need. Maslow uses the term 'need' in the same sense as Murray, but without any precise definition. In Maslow the nearest approach we can find to a definition of need is contained in the following passage (,,Motivation and Personality", p. 22): ,,It is characteristic of this deeper analysis that it will always lead ultimately to certain goals or needs behind which we cannot go; that is to certain need-satisfactions that seem to be ends in themselves and seem not to need any further justification or demonstration. These needs have the particular quality in the average person of not being seen directly very often but of being more often a kind of conceptual derivation from the multiplicity of specific conscious desires. In other words, then, the study of motivation must be in part the study of the ultimate human goals or desires or needs." This definition indicates that 'need is a hypothetical concept. The quotation also shows that it is the conscious wishes (though also the not explicitly mentioned - behavior) that are observable. These can be observed by introspection (self-observation) and described in phenomenological datalanguage. We can therefore say that the need-concept in Maslow is a phenomenological or mentalistic explanatory concept. Thus Maslow's use of mentalistic, hypothetical concepts is in accordance with a dualistic or possibly spiritualistic philosophy of the psycho-physical problem. The quotation does not make it clear whether 'need' in Maslow comprises both processes and structures. But his discourse generally makes this quite clear. Needs are permanent (unobservable) structures in which activating processes take place at intervals. Maslow calls a need that is currently in action a 'motiuator'.So on this point his terminology is fairly precise. That also applies to his classification of needs, to which we shall now turn. But before this it would be appropriate to summarize this section by reconstructing Maslow's definition of a need:

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'Need' is a hypothetical term for ,,central structures in which dynamic (activating) processes take place at intervals. Apart from this activating effect the processes also have a steering effect." Thus 'need' is an H,-term, which stands for a vector variable that is both structure and process. MASLOWS NEED-CLASSIFICATIONS.Maslow is an opponent of detailed classifications of 'needs' (or other motivation concepts). He believes that it entirely depends on definitions and delimitations of concepts as to how detailed a list of needs becomes. This may comprise anything from one to a million needs (See Maslow, 1954, pp. 25-26)4. Thus, he introduces a very rough classification based on a hypothesis about the hierarchial relation between needs; we shall return to this later. According to this classification human needs may be divided into five classes comparable with the strata in a pyramid:

1. Physiological or organic needs: the needs for food, water, sex and protection against cold, heat, pain and discomfort. The satisfaction of these needs is vital for the individual.

2. Safety needs: the need for security, stability and protection, and for structure, order and regularity, etc. 3. Affiliative needs: the need for love, friendship and affiliation with one or more groups.

4.Esteem needs: the needs for achievement and prestige. 5. Self-actualization needs: the need to actualize the potentialities (abilities and dispositions), both innate and acquired. According to Maslow, these are the most important human needs, because they constitute the driving force behind the growth of every individual's personality. Closely associated with - or included among - the selfactualizing needs are the needsfor knowledge and understanding and the aesthetic needs. Thus we could say that the intellectual needs (for knowledge and understanding) and the aesthetic needs (for creation and enjoyment of beauty) form part of man's realization of his potential. But these needs will vary according to the individual's personality and abilities. Maslow calls all these needs 'basic' or 'instinctoid', implying thereby that they are hereditary and determined by the species, like instincts in animals.

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(For a neuro-psychologicalexplanation of Maslow's need system, see Madsen, 1975b). On the other hand Maslow makes another absolute distinction between what he calls 'growth needs' and 'deficiencyneeds'. 'Growth needs' is another term for self-actualization needs; they are the driving forces behind the individual's (psychical) growth and development. They are sometimes known as 'meta-needs',because their satisfaction depends on all the other needs having been (more or less) satisfied. 'Deficiencyneeds' is a common term for all the other needs in the system a term which implies that they arise as motivating processes whenever the organism/individual lacks something, e.g. food, water, security, or contact. etc. As soon as this lack is remedied, the needs are satisfied, equilibrium is reestablished, and the motivating process ceases. These needs are also called 'homeostatic' because they arise as the motivating process when 'homeostatis' is disturbed, and they cease - as process, not as structure - as soon as equilibrium is re-established. In contrast, the self-actualization needs are 'insatiable'; they can never be satisfied, and they act as motivating processes as soon as the other needs - deficiency needs - no longer dominate the individual. MASLOWS MOTIVATION HYPOTHESES.In Maslow's general theory, it is the hypotheses dealing with motivation that are the clearest and most precisely formulated. The most important motivation hypothesis in Maslow is the hypothesis about the need hierarchy, which can be reproduced as follows: In all people there exists a system of innate (hereditary) needs, which are organized in a hierarchy according to their prepotency. In this hierarchy the organic needs are the strongest, and these are followed in order of strength by the safety needs, aflliative needs, esteem needs and,finally, by the self-actualization needs (See Maslow, 1954, pp. 35-38)5. This hypothesis implies that unsatisfied organic needs like hunger or thirst will dominate the individual'sconsciousness and behavior. If one is hungry and thirsty it is difficult to think of anything else until this need has been satisfied. When the need is satified it ceases to be a 'motivator'. Thereafter a higher need - a safety need - may become motivating and dominate consciousness and behavior until it is satisfied, whereafter a still higher need - e.g. an affiliative need - becomes motivating. This continues until all the deficiency needs are

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Fig. 9.2. Graphical representation of Maslow's need-hierarchy.

satisfied; the individual is then motivated with self-actualization needs to develop and utilize his talents for creative work. But this growth- or meta-dominated activity is interrupted now and again by lower deficiency needs arising as the result of another deficiency. This may be hunger or thirst or other organic needs, which arise at intervals because the life processes themselves need a constant supply of nourishment, etc., or a safety need, which arises because the external situation bodes of danger or insecurity. Finally, it may also be an

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affiliative or esteem need, which becomes so strong that it dominates the indi. vidual's consciousness and behavior. For, according to the hierarchy hypothesis, a lower need in the hierarchy will always be stronger and more dominating than a higher need. We can summarize this hierarchy hypothesis in a diagram (Fig. 9.2). There are nevertheless a couple of exceptions from the hierarchy hypothesis, which are formulated in two other hypotheses. One of these is the multi-motivation-hypothesis, which can be formulated as follows: Human behavior is often motivated by several needs, which are satisfied simultaneously through the same instrumental behavior (See Maslow, 1954, p. 536.

A good example of this is the individual who satisfies his self-actualization needs in his daily work, because the work develops and utilizes this individual's abilities and other potentialities. Through his work the individual may also be able to assert himself as being clever at his job, so that his esteem needs are also satisfied. The work may also provide possibilities for contact with other people, so that the affiliative needs are also satisfied. Finally, the work may contribute directly or indirectly, via the money so earnt, towards satisfying the individual's organic needs, such as food, clothing and dwelling, or safety needs, such as economic security. In such a case no conflict arises between the various strata in the need system. Another important exception from the hierarchy system is formulated as follows in the hypothesis aboutfunctional autonomy: A higher need may acquire functional autonomy (or independence) in relation to lower needs, and thus counteract their dominance and dissolve the hierarchy system (See Maslow, 1954, p. 72)7. We have a good example of this in the artist or researcher who throughout his life is so devoted to his work that the satisfaction of other needs is entirely neglected, or the organic needs are only satified to the extent that survival is ensured. Even though examples of this are chiefly to be found in myths or in anecdotes about famous artists and researchers, there are also more everyday examples - e.g. all forms of interest may achieve status as higher, autonomous needs and thereby become functionally independent of lower needs (For functional autonomy, see Allport, 1937, 1961 and Woodworth, 1918,1958).

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These three hypotheses are the most important ones in Maslow's motivational theory. The remaining hypotheses will be discussed in conjunction with the reconstruction of the three hitherto mentioned. MASLOWS THEORY OF PERSONALITY: INTRODUCTION. As mentioned in the introduction to this section Maslow's motivational theory is part of his general theory of personality, which we shall now examine. To start with, we shall discuss Maslow's general theory of personality and thereafter his theory about self-actualizingpersons. THE STRUCTURE OF PERSONALITY. According to Maslow's theory the need

system is the most important part of the personality structure. It is the processes in the need system - i.e. the activating needs or 'motivators' - that constitute the personality's inherent driving forces (dynamics). But there are also structures which contribute to the steering of the person's behavior, as shown in the diagram, Fig. 9.1. Especially a person's abilities and other personality factors are what Maslow calls a 'personality syndrome'. He has taken over the term 'syndrome' from medicine, where it means an organized pattern or complex of symptoms in an illness. A 'personality syndrome' may be defined accordingly as a system of personality factors that is characteristic of a certain person. A personality syndrome may show up in a person's consciousness (ideas, thoughts, wishes, etc.) or in - especially the expressive aspect of - behavior. Thus, different individuals can be described according to their most characteristic personality syndrome@)(See Maslow, 1954, p.303)8. But persons can also be described according to which need level dominates their behavior. Some people are mostly occupied in satisfying their organic needs. This is the case with many people in the underdeveloped countries, but also with the poorest people in the industrial countries. In organized welfare societies, such as the Scandinavian countries, there ought not to be any people living at this level. But there may be a few people living at the next level. At the next level people are mostly occupied in satisfying their safety needs. They may have lived for some time at the level of organic needs and be afraid of coming to suffer again from hunger and other needs; so they use a great deal of time and energy in securing their future. This is the case with certain 'primitive' cultures which have managed to survive despite unfavourable conditions. But there are certainly many people in the industrial countries who live at this level in times of unemployment, etc. There may also

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be people who have become 'neuroticallyfimted' at this needs level on account

of frustrating experiences during their upbringing, and have thus developed a 'neurotic,insatiable need for security'. In the same way people living at the next level of needs may use all their time and energy in satisfying their afiliative needs. These may be divided into two sub-goups: 1. People who have reached a stage of development in which the two lowest layers of needs are satisfied, so that the affiliative needs may now make themselves felt until they in their turn are satisfied, and the individual can develop further providing the external conditions allow it. 2. People who on account of frustrations have become 'neurotically fixated at this level and suffer from a neurotic and insatiable need for contact. They may irritate their fellows to the extent that they become less affiliated than they otherwise would have done. This becomes a 'vicious circle': they need more contact with others, but behave in such a way that they acquire less, after which they need still more, etc.

Finally there are people who live at the self-actualization level. We shall deal with these self-actualizingpeople in a later section; but we must emphasize here that this is not a question of neurotic fixation at this level, for the simple reason that it is the highest level; the individual cannot attain any higher level but is constantly developing at the same one. Thus it appears that Maslow's needs pyramid can also be used in personality theory for describing the level of development in different persons, which, together with the description of their personality syndrome(s) helps to characterize their personality. The use of the needs pyramid in describing the development of personality is an outcome of Maslow's hypotheses about development. These may be formulated as follows: Both in phylogenetic development (the development of the species) and ontogenetic development (the development of the individual) the higher needs have appeared at a later stage (See Maslow, 1954, pp. 80-81)9. In other words: both the species and the individual move upwards in the needs pyramid during the course of their development. Only the human species attains the highest - self-actualization- level of needs, and only a small minor-

Maslow's production

431

ity have the chance to develop so far, even though all people are born with the need structure for selfactualization. We shall go further into self-actualization in the next section, but before that we must stress that the needs pyramid can also be used to describe the level of development of different societies and cultures. The ideal society is that which provides the greatest number of people with the conditions for satisfying their needs for self-actualization;this presupposes that the remaining needs are adequately satisfied. Karl Marx formulated this societal ideal in his early works, in which he had a needs theory that roughly resembled Maslow's (See Heller, 1978). This formulation of an ideal for society - ,,the maximum satisfaction of a maximum number of needs in a maximum number of people" - is the nearest Maslow ever comes to formulating his view of society. It appeared indirectly to constitute a criticism of American society, because the latter only provides a small percentage with the possibility of self-actualization. SELF-ACTUALIZING PEOPLE. Self-actualizing people are those who have

developed to the extent that they are living at the highest level of needs and using most of their time and energy in satisfying their needs for self-actualization. This imples that they are occupied in doing creative work, which develops and makes use of their talents. As we have previously shown, Maslow regards self-actualizing persons almost per definition as psychologically healthy. For neuroses or other psychological ills would fixate the personality structure at a lower needs level, so that the individual cannot reach the highest needs level without undergoing either psychotherapy or undergoing corresponding changes in personality in some other way. Maslow's description of self-actualizing persons contains a number of points in which they differ from persons whose development has stopped at a lower needs level. We shall mention the most important of them here:

1. The conception of reality and the relation to reality is more effective and more balanced in self-actualizingpersons than in others. 2. The acceptance of one's self and others is present to a greater extent in selfactualizing persons than in others.

3. Spontaneity and naturalness is present to a greater extent in self-actualizing persons than in others.

432


4. Problem centering is more characteristic of the problem-solving of selfactualizing persons than means centering is. 5. Self-reliance and independence of the surrounding culture together with an

active and critical attitude towards its norms is characteristic of the self-actualizing person. 6. Briskness in conceiving and evaluating life's repeated experiences is present to a greater extent in self-actualizing persons than in others.

7 . The feeling of solidarity with others is present to a greater extent in selfactualizing persons than in others. Thus, selfactualizing persons are not 'selfish' or egoistic persons who are only interested in satisfying their own needs, On the contrary: they develop and make use of their abilities in the interests of the community. 8. Inter-personal relations are thus often better in self-actualizing persons than in others.

9. A democratic personality structure appears to a greater extent in selfactualizing persons than in others, where one frequently finds examples of an authoritarian or 'fascist' personality structure characterized by an aggressive attitude towards all minorities, i.e. racism, sexism, religious or political fanaticism, etc. 10. A sense ofhumour of the 'philosophical', non-aggressive type is more often to be found in self-actualizing persons than in others. 11. Creativity is a very important quality in self-actualizing persons, who are not handicapped by neurotic fixations. This is more frequently the case in people whose development has stopped at a lower needs level on account of external, social deficiencies, and who have less time and energy for creative work than self-actualizingpersons. These latter have satisfied all but their self-actualization needs, which are the particular driving forces behind creative activity. 12. The integration ofopposites, so that they form a synthesis is particularly characteristic of self-actualizing persons, as opposed to others, who often dichotomize the world into such concepts as goodbad, ChristianPagan, socialistbourgeois, positivist/Marxist,stupid/intelligent, masculine/feminine, etc. In

Maslow's production

433

contrast, selfactualizing persons see the apparent opposites as the extreme points on a scale containing many intermediate forms; and the extremes will often supplement or complement one another so as to form a synthesis. It is this integration of opposites - or 'synthesis of anti-theses' - which is symbolized in the old Yin-Yang symbol - the symbol of Taoism. 13. 'Peak-experiences'(mystical, ecstatic experiences) appear more frequently in self-actualizing persons than in others. This, together with creativity, is probably the most important characteristic of self-actualizing persons. It is not possible to deal here with Maslow's 'transpersonal theory' under peak-experiences and religion (see Madsen, 1981).

The qualities mentioned together constitute the personality syndrome characteristic of self-actualizingpersons (see Maslow, 1954, pp. 98-100). When studying this list of personality traits in our culture we find that they are all evaluated positively. A person possessing all these qualities is said to be an ideal person. We might therefore ask whether such self-actualizing persons do in fact exist. Maslow considers they do. We shall leave the question as to how many until later, at which time we shall also stress that for practical purposes there is some sense in studying self-actualizing persons, however few, because they can serve as ideals or norms for upbringing, etc. RECONSTRUCTION OF HYPOTHESES.We shall conclude this section about the

hypothetical stratum with a systematic reconstruction of Maslow's hypotheses (especially concerned with motivation). 1. The multi-determination hypothesis: Behavior is determined by many interacting hypothetical variables: the need system, personality syndromes, abilities, cognitive processes and impluses to action (see Fig. 9.1). 2. The activation hypothesis: The activation of behavior is determined by one or more unsatisfied needs. 3. The need system hypothesis: Unsatisfied needs are determined by external and internal stimuli and by interaction with other of the need system's unsatisfied needs. 4. The hierarchy hypothesis: a) The interaction of the unsatified needs is determined by the inborn need system, which is organized as a hierarchy or prepotency with the physiological needs as the most prepotent, followed by the safety, the affiliative, the esteem and the self-actualization needs.

434


b) When an unsatisfied need has been satisfied (gratified) for a period, it no longer determines behavior, which is determined instead by a higher (less prepotent) unsatisfied need, and so on, until the indiviual's behavior is completely determined by self-actualization needs (see Maslow, 1954, p. 46)lO). C) The seEf-actualization hypothesis: When all lower deficiency needs are satisfied, then the individual's behavior will be completely determined by the higest growth or meta-needs for self-actualization (see Maslow, 1854, p. 46) 11). Functional autonomy: A higher need may acquire functional d) autonomy (or independence) in relation to lower needs, and thus counteract their dominance. 5. The gratification hypothesis: The satisfaction or gratification of a need results in a restructuring of the cognitive processes (perception, attention, thinking, memory, etc.). 6. The origin hypothesis: All the need system's needs (incl. the self-actualization needs) are 'basic', i.e. determined by heredity and maturation, and are thus unlearned. These motivational hypotheses can also be reformulated in partially symbolic form, using the following signs: arrows indicating facilitatory influences, doubles arrows indicating interaction, and a -I, which indicates inhibitory influences. Plus and minus signs are used for respectively satified and unsatisfied needs. For the other abbreviations, see Fig. 9.2. The reformulations read as follows: [H(need) t)H(pers.syndr.) t)H(cog.proc.) t)H(imp.)] -+ R H(n&+) + R(dynamic) S(int. + ext.) + [H(needl+)+Hneed 2+)1 [H(phys.need+) -IH(safe.need)+) -I H(aff.need+) -I H(est.needt) -I H(S.A.need+)] +R(instr.phys.) Hypothesis 4 b [H(phys.need+)-IH(safe.need+) -I H(aff.need+) -I H(est.need+) -I H(S.A.need+)] + R(instr.safe.)

Hypothesis 1 : Hypothesis 2 : Hypothesis 3 : Hypothesis 4a:

Maslow's production

435

Hypothesis 4c: [H(phys.need+)+ H(safe.need+) + H(aff.need+) + H(est.need+) + H(S.A.need+)] + R(se1f-actualization) Hypothesis 4d: [H(est.need+) -I H(phys.need+) -I H(safe.need+) -I H(aff.need+) -I H(S.A.need+)] + R(instr.esteem.) Hypothesis 5 : H(gratification) + H(cog.proc.) Hypothesis 6 : S(heredity) + H(need system) On the basis of the symbolic reformulation of Maslow's motivation hypotheses we can classify the hypotheses as follows: 1. Theoretical (H-H) hypotheses: Hypothesis No 5 = 1 hypothesis 2. Empirical hypotheses: a. S-H-hypotheses: Nos. 3 & 6 = 2 hypotheses b. H-R-hypotheses: Nos. 1,2,4a, 4b, 4c and 4d = 6 hypotheses.

We shall return to this classification when calculating the hypothesis quotient.

The data-stratum in Maslow's production INTRODUCTION. In this section we shall deal with the empirical foundation for

Maslow's theory, or data-stratum. This will be divided into two sections dealing with: 1)Methods and concrete data and 2) General empirical results. We should bear in mind that in Maslow's own account these themes are not separated. Not even the three types of discourse are clearly separated (excepting to a limited extent in ,,Motivation and Personality"). METHODS AND CONCRETE DATA. In the section on the meta-stratum we dealt

with Maslow's principles and arguments for employing specific methods and a specific data-language; such principles and arguments form part of the underlying assumptions and are therefore logically connected with his philosophy as such. We stressed that Maslow personally has employed all types of methods, though especially advocates 'clinical', or rather, hermeneutic methods. Maslow has likewise used both phenomenological and behavioristic data-language, though advocates the use of phenomenological data-language in accordance with his intuitionistic epistemology and holistic 'Weltanschauung'.

436


We can already conclude that Maslow's methodological principles and arguments on the meta-level and his actual empirical use of methods and data are in complete agreement. In dealing with Maslow's theory we are not interested in his early work but solely in his chief work: the psychology of motivation and personality, including his theory about self-actualizationand peak-experiences. Maslow's general theory of motivation and personality (excluding for the time being his self-actualizationtheory) is not based on experiments but on the intuitive knowledge he acquired throughout many years as a clinical psychologist. Maslow refers to this again and again, but very rarely to experiments or tests, in which case he usually refers to the experiments and tests of others. Maslow expresses this directly in a completely different context (,,Eupsychian Management", p. 53): ,,My work on motivations came from the clinic, from a study of neurotic people". Thus, there is no empirical material available from experiments or tests, in fact no objective or quantitative data at all; nor are there any systematic investigations obtainable from therapy, such as in the case of Roger's tape recordings. Maslow's motivation and personality theory builds entirely on his own clinical experience, which is never precisely formulated in a data-language. The situation is somewhat different as regards his theory about self-actualization and peak experiences. Here too the methods employed are largely clinical, or rather, hermeneutic, since they consist chiefly of interviews of contemporary self-actualizing persons as well as biographical studies of the life histories and production of live or dead persons. But in this case Maslow provides a description of methods and data, so that it is possible to undertake a critical evaluation of his empirical results. According to Maslow himself the investigation is best described in ,,Motivation and Personality", where, on p. 150, he alludes to the criterion used in the selection of the 'experimental' persons or 'cases': ,,This criterion implies also gratification, past or present, of the basic needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect, and selfrespect, and of the cognitive needs for knowledge and for understanding, or in a few cases, conquest of these needs. This is to say that all subjects felt safe and unanxious, accepted, loved and loving, respect-worthy and respected, and that they had worked out their philosophical, religious, or axiological bearings. It is still an open question as

Maslow's production

437

to whether this basic gratification is a sufficient or only a prerequisite condition of self-actualization." Maslow mentions only briefly which methods he used for the selection of selfactualizing persons according to the above criterion. He attempted several tests - including the Rorchach test - though mostly resorted to interviews. After applying these methods, the following persons were chosen according to the criterion as examples of self-actualizing persons (p. 153): ,,The subjects have been divided into the following categories: Cases: 7 fairly and highly probable contemporaries (interviewed) 2 fairly sure historical figures (Lincoln in his last years and Thomas Jefferson) 7 highly probable public and historical figures (Einstein, Eleanor Roosevelt, Jane Addams, William James, Schweitzer, Aldous Huxley and Spinoza). Partial Cases: 5 contemporaries who fairly certainly fall short somewhat but who can yet be used for study. Potential or Possible Cases: Cases suggested or studied by others: G.W. Carver, Eugene V. Debs, Thomas Eakins, Fritz Kreisler, Goethe, Pablo Casals, Martin Buber, Danilo Dolci, Arthur E. Morgan, John Keats, David Hilbert, Arthur Waley, D.T. Suzuki, Adlai Stevenson, Sholom Aleichem, Robert Browning, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Frederick Douglas, Joseph Schumpeter, Bob Benchley, Ida Tarbell, Harriet Tibman, George Washington, Karl Muenzinger, Joseph Haydn, Camille Pissarro, Edward Bibring, George William Russell (A. E.), Pierre Renoir, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Peter Kropotkin, John Altgeld, Thomas More, Edward Bellamy, Benjamin Franklin, John Muir, Walt Whitman." Thus we have now a full description of the criterion for selection, the names of the subjects and an indication of the methods used, but few or no concrete data concerning the results of the investigation itself. These are to be found rather in Maslow's extremely general formulations about self-actualizing persons, to which we shall return in the next section. Maslow is quite clear that his investigation of self-actualizing persons is open to criticism. He writes about this on pp. 55-56 in ,,Eupsychican Management": ,,There were many things wrong with the sampling, so many in fact that it must be considered to be, in the classical sense anyway, a bad or poor or inadequate experiment." Maslow continues:

438


,,The main support for this theory - and, of course, there's plenty of this support - has come mostly from psychotherapists like Rogers and Fromm." These quotations show that Maslow himself is aware of the extremely criticisable, empirical foundation for his theory. This foundation is so badly described and vaguely formulated that we can even ask whether Maslow's theory is a scientific theory at all. We shall answer this question later in the chapter. GENERAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS. We have seen that Maslow's production is

very sparing with regard to concrete data and descriptions of methods. But it contains many general formulations of research results (and hypotheses) as regards motivation, self-actualizingpersons and peakexperiences. However, it is possible to criticize these formulations on two counts. Firstly, it is difficult to ascertain on which basis Maslow undertakes his general formulations. Since there are only very few descriptions of concrete data, it is difficult to see whether the general and abstract formulations are derivable logically from these data. It would be entirely in accordance with Maslow's intuitionistic theory of knowledge and his view of science if the general formulations were not built on an empirical basis from 'the bottom up', as it were, but produced [from the top' as a result of both the steering philosophical assumptions and the theory (= hypothetical stratum). The other criticizable point is directly connected with the first: it is difficult to decide whether Maslow's general formulations are general descriptions based on concrete data, i.e. 'data-theses', or whether they are hypotheses. It can be difficult to distinguish between general data-theses and hypotheses because it is not always possible to decide whether the abstract words in the theoretical formulations are used hypotheticalIy or descriptively. If the word 'self-actualization' is to be understood and used descriptively, i.e. at the data-level, one might envisage a descriptive definition of 'self-actualizing persons' by referring to the number of points scored from one (or more) tests, i.e. an 'operational definition'. Maslow has never provided such a definition. But to call 'self-actualizing persons' a descriptive term may nevertheless be defensible, if we were to regard all the above-mentioned characteristics as contributing to a description of self-actualizing persons.

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439

We can also regard 'self-actualizing' as a hypothetical term. (The words 'self-actualizing needs' are clearly hypothetical, refering to some not directly observable structures and processes). If we examine Maslow's statements about self-actualizing persons, we find that he emphasizes that 'the view of reality' is more effective and balanced in self-actualizing persons than in others. Here the term 'view of reality' refers to a not directly observable process (like 'perception', 'cognition' and 'motivation'), and must therefore be a hypothesis. If, on the contrary, Maslow's statement had contained a number of descriptive terms, of which 'view of reality' could have been a common denominator, it could be termed a general datathesis - but that is not the case. Similarly, other statements about self-actualizing persons, such as their 'acceptance' of themselves and others and their 'spontaneity', must be regarded as hypotheses. Here it is a question of statements which could be characterized as data-theses had Maslow provided a sketch for an operational definition or even a definition containing qualitative and descriptive words. But no attempt has been made, and therefore we must regard these statements as hypothetical, and call them hypotheses. As we have seen, some of the general statements in Maslow's theory are general data-theses, and are mostly formulated in phenomenological data-Ianguage. Moreover, some of his hypotheses could be reformulated into general data-theses, had only an operational definition of the most important concepts been provided - or even the outline of a qualitative, descriptive definition. Thus the possibilities for using Maslow's theory in practice exist. In fact Maslow's theory has been used especially in education, psychotherapy and industrial management. However, further details of this lie beyond the scope of this book (see Madsen, 1981).

Maslow's Production as a Whole THE PRODUCTION'S COMPLETENESS. In this section we shall investigate Maslow's production as a whole, commencing with its 'completeness'. All three levels of discourse are represented in Maslow's production, which we have analysed above. Thus, according to the systematological taxonomy, i t constitutes a complete scientific production. But the three levels of discourse are not equally distributed, as the following calculation (from Madsen, 1974) of the M-H-D-ratio helps to clarify:


440

M = 45.7%; H = 36.6%; D = 17.7%, i.e. the M-H-D-ratio= 46:37:18 This is an unusual distribution for modern psychological theories, for in Maslow's discourse the meta-stratum is the biggest and the datastratum the smallest. Normally in a modern psychological text the percentage distribution is lowest on the M-level(5-15%), the rest more or less equally distributed between the H- and the D-levels (see table on p. 448 in Madsen, 1974). THE TESTABILITY OF THE THEORY.On the basis of the above classification of

hypotheses in Maslow's theory (see p. 437) we can calculate the hypothesis quotient as follows: H.Q =

Y,(H-H)

&(S-H)

+ (H-R)]

--

1

-2 +6

= 0.13

This H.Q. is rather low, which shows that Maslows theory has afairly high degree of testability. This result may seem surprising to most readers of Maslow's production, which gives the immediate impression of being extremely speculative, the M-H-D-ratio seeming to c o n f m this. The relatively low H.Q. can nevertheless be explained as follows: 1. The theory itself (i.e. the hypothesis-system) is in fact formulated so that it is testable, especially as regards the motivation theory, which we have included here solely in the reconstruction of the theory and the calculation of the H.Q. Thus, there is a testable account of the hypothetical stratum as well as a fairly comprehensive philosophical account of Maslow's conception of man and view of science. 2. The calculated H.Q. builds on our reconstruction of Maslow's hypotheses, which have required greater precision in this case than in most of the other theories that have been reconstructed with a view to calculating the H.Q. Thus the basisfor calculating Maslow's H.Q. contains a greater degree of uncertainty than in other theories.

But despite this uncertainty the low H.Q. can be interpreted as a quantitative estimation of Maslow's theory being just as testable as most other psychological theories. This may be confirmed by the historical fact that in recent years a number of empirical, quantitative investigations designed for testing Maslow's

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441

theory have been published (e.g. in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology). Moreover, as mentioned above, his motivation theory has been used a great deal in education, industrial management and psychotherapy.

Notes

1

,, ... motivation theory must be anthropocentric rather than animalcentric."

2

,,Any theory of motivation that is worthy of attention must deal with the highest capacities of the healthy and strong man as well as with the defensive manoeuvres of crippled spirits" (p. 33).

3

,,We may thus assert that sound motivation theory cannot possibly afford to neglect the unconscious life."

4

A corollary to this principle states (p. 25) that: ,,We should give up the attempt once and for all to make atomistic lists of drives or needs. For several reasons such lists are theoretically absurd." Maslow continues later on the same page (pp. 25-26): ,,Too many of the listings that we now have available have combined indiscriminately needs at various levels of magnification. With such a confusion it is understandable that some lists should contain three or four needs and other contain hundreds of needs. If we wished, we could have such a list of drives contain any where from one to one million drives, depending entirely on the specificity of analysis."

5

,,If all the needs are unsatisfied, and the organism is then dominated by the physiological needs, all other needs may become simply nonexistent or be pushed into the background" (p. 37) ... ,,At once other (and higher) needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still higher) needs emerge, and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency." (p. 38).

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,, ... most behavior is overdetermined or multimotivated." ...,,Not all behavior is determined by the basic needs. We might even say that not all be-

havior is motivated. There are many determinants of behavior other than motives. ... ,,Some behavior is highly motivated, other behavior is only weakly motivated. Some is not motivated at all (but all behavior is determined)." ,,Although it is generally m e that we move to higher need levels after gratification of the lower needs, it yet remains an observable phenomenon that once having attained these higher need levels and the values and tastes that go with them they may become autonomous, no longer depending on lower need gratifications." ,,Our preliminary definition of a personality syndrome is that it is a structured, organized complex of apparently diverse specifities (behaviors, thoughts, impulses to action, perceptions, etc.) which, however, when studied carefully and validly are found to have a common unity that may be phrased variously as a similar dynamic meaning, expression, 'flavor', function, or purpose.''

,,Our main hypothesis is that human urges or basic needs alone may be innately given to at least some appreciable degree. The pertinent behavior or ability, cognition or affection need not also be innate, but may be (by our hypothesis) learned, canalized, or expressive. - This is to say that the hereditary component of basic needs may be seen as simple conative lack, tied to no intrinsic goal-achieving behavior, as blind, directionless demands like Freud's id impulses."

Chapter 10

MARXIST PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION. In the previous chapter we noted that humanistic psychology developed largely in America - though it was inspired by European philosophers and had prominent European representatives (Frankl, Laing). Unlike this, Marxist philosophy is largely a European phenomenon; it was inspired by Marx's philosophy, and initially developed in the Soviet Union. After the Second World War Marxist psychology spread to the other East European countries; after the youth and student revolt of the 1960s, however, a new Marxist 'wave' also arose in Western Europe. This led to an increasing interest in Marxist philosophy in many fields; within psychology a Marxist psychology developed under the influence of Soviet psychology. In the first part of this chapter we shall therefore examine the development of Marxist psychology in the Soviet Union followed by its development in other countries. In the second part we shall examine a paradigm-creating work which may be regarded as an integration of various trends within Soviet psychology and at the same time as an inspiration for Marxist psychology in Western Europe.

The Marxist Psychology Marxist Psychology in the Soviet Union THE FIRSTPERIOD (c. 1920-30). Shortly after the communist revolution in 1917 and the end of the First World War many attempts were made to develop a Marxist psychology in the Soviet Union.

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444

The Berlin school: Synthesis of West psychology and Leontyev

-

West cognitive psychology

-

The Hannover school: Synthesis of Marx and Freud

Leontyev: Synthesisof Vygotsky and Rubinstein The biological and cultural historical evolution of the psyche.

Vygotsky: Mat. historical psychology

Historical materialism

Freud

-

Rubinstein: Synthesis of Lenin and Pavlov

Lenin: reflection theory

Pavlov: Theory of conditioned reflex

Fig. 10.1. Review of marxisficpsychology.

The leading psychologist during this period was K.N. Kornilov (1879-1957). Alluding to the fact that the object of psychological research consisted of reactions, he called his version of Marxist psychology 'Reactology'. Thus Marxist psychology differed from both contemporary behaviorist psychology which was concerned with reflexes (innate and conditioned) - and classical, introspective psychology, which was concerned with consciousness. With this concept of 'reaction' Kornilov sought to integrate the biologically oriented re-

The Marxist psychology

445

flexes with the social and cultural aspects characterizing the contents of consciousness (see Kornilov, 1930). The methods used for research were objective - particularly reaction studies and tests. These methods were also used in applied psychology - especially in educational and industrial psychology. From 1923 Kornilov became the leader of the Institute of Experimental Psychology at the University of Moscow and, from 1928, the editor of the first Russian journal of psychology.

THE SECOND PERIOD (c. 1930-50). After the publication of Lenin's ,,Philosophical Notebooks" in 1930 Kornilov's Reactology and in particular his test psychology underwent a great deal of criticism. A decree issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1936 forbade this testing as nonMarxistic. During the 30s and the 40's psychology stagnated. The most generally recognized psychologist during this period was SL. Rubinsrein (1889-1960), who wrote some much-used textbooks on general psychology.

THE THIRD PERIOD (c. 1950-1960). After the Second World War the natural sciences in the Soviet needed a national face-lift. As part of this 'scientific rearmament' the Central Committee of the Communist Party pointed at Puvlov as a possible renewer of Russian psychology and physiology. This occurred during his centenary year, and in 1950 a week-long conference was held, in which the Soviet Academy of Science discussed whether Pavlov's research and theory would be a suitable basis for psychology, physiology and psychiatry. This resulted in a national decree that Pavlov's theory was to constitute the official basis - or, in other words, the state-authorized paradigm - of psychology, and led to a great deal of empirical research, inspired in particular by Pavlov's lectures in his 'Wednesday seminars' which were held during the latter years of his life. The themes included studies of language and thought (inspired by Pavlov's idea of language as the 'second signal system'), studies of individual differences (inspired by Pavlov's theory of types) and psychopathological studies (inspired by Pavlov's experimental neuroses). During this period of Pavlovization Rubinstein wrote an important philosophical work entitled ,,Being and Consciousness" (1957). This presented a synthesis of Pavlov's theory and Lenin's 'reflection theory'. The conditioned reflex was viewed as the 'prototype' of the brain's reflective activity, which,

446

Marxist psychology

according to Lenin, was equal to consciousness. Since the 1930s Lenin's theory has become the favoured Marxist theory about the psycho-physical problem. Lenin's theory was at the same time an epistemology: 'Reflection' represents the cognition and consciousness of the objectively existing surrounding world, and fhis reflection is afunction ofthe brain (or identical with certain brain processes). Rubinstein's synthesis of Pavlov and Lenin had an important influence on the psychology of the ensuing period. THE FOURTH PERIOD (after 1960). After the 'personality cult' of Pavlov and

others had died down other movements within Marxist psychology began to make themselves felt; amongst these the so-called 'cultural history school' predominated during the course of the 1970s. This school already started in the 20's; it was founded by L.S. Vygotsky (1896-1934), who, despite his untimely death, managed to have several famous pupils (incl. Luria and Leontyev). He was the first to employ Marx's theory about the importance of work for the development of human cultures. It was not man's biological adaptation to nature that makes him stand apart from the rest of the animal kingdom, but his productive work. Productive work differs from other behavior in that it 1) involves the use of tools, and 2) is socially organized. Vygotsky's special contribution was his realization of the importance ofthe linguistic sign as a social and culturally determined tool. It is by acquiring the instrumental function of linguistic signs that children develop into adult human beings. By means of language children acquire social norms and cultural values, and through the use of language mental processes are transformed from 'involuntary' processes into 'voluntary' ones, and language becomes part of the conscious control of human activity. Initially, children's actions are controlled by the speech of adults, later they begin to talk to themselves - 'egocentric speech' - and, finally, they become able to control their own behaviour by way of 'inner speech (thought). Vygotsky disagreed with Piaget about the relation between language and thought (see Vygotsky 1971,1974). After Vygotsky's untimely death his pupils carried on his work. The best known example of this cultural historical school's research is what was subsequently published by A.R. Luria and subsequently translated into English un-


447

der the title ,,Cognitive Development: its Cultural and Social Foundation" (1977). This book brings an account of the research results of a 'psychological expedition' undertaken under Luria's leadership though inspired by Vygotsky. This expedition was to a remote part of the Soviet Union (Usbekistan) and took place at the beginning of the 30s. The farmers living there were still largely illiterate shepherds. In addition there were a few mechanized agricultural communes as well as a few student teachers. Thus three levels of education were represented, and these were investigated with the help of experiments and informal tests (resembling Piaget's 'clinical experiments'). This investigation clearly showed that the level of education effected mental proceses like perception (the classification of colours and forms), abstraction and generalization, reasoning and task performance as well as self-insight and self-judgement. Therefore for the cultural historical school this constituted a clear proof of the dependence of consciousness on linguistic development (education and culture). Presumably because of the strong criticism of test psychology and other non-Marxist psychology which was widespread precisely during this period, the results were not published until Luria published them in the 1970's. In the meantime, however, A.R. Luria (1902-1977) became chiefly known for his neuropsychofogicaf research. On account of his reserch into patients with brain damage he put forward a theory about brain fuiiction and a test system for investigating patients with brain damage. Luria's theory about brain function is almost system theoretical in type, since he regards the different cerebral processes as functions in different system levels (see Luria, 1966). Luria became the Russian psychologist who, after Pavlov, was best known in the western world through translations of several of his books (see also Madsen, 1974). Another famous pupil of Vytotsky was A.N. Leontyev (1903-1979). Not only did he carry on the cultural historical school's theory but he integrated it with Rubinstein's synthesis of Pavlov and Lenin. Thus Leontyev functions as the great synthesizer in Marxist psychology (see survey. Fig. 10.1). His works have been selected for a more detailed metatheoretical analysis, so we shall suffice here with a brief account. Leontyev's theory deals with the evolution of the psyche. The 'psyche' consists of reflection (= consciousness),and governs behavior. This takes place in several stages:

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1. The elementary, sensory psyche, which consists of the representation

(reflection) of sensory qualities. This appears in all organisms that are capable of being 'conditioned (by classical conditioning). 2. The perceptive psyche, which consists of the reflection of objects. This may appear in organisms that have developed a cerebral cortex. 3. The intellectual psyche, which consists of an organization of actions into two functions: a preparatory and an executive. This appears in organisms with developed 'areas of association' in the cerebral cortex. 4. H u m n consciousness, which is to be found in three stages and demands the development of speech centres in the brain together with a developed society. 4.1. Primitive human consciousness 4.2. Class society's consciousness 4.3. Socialistic consciousness With the appearance of human consciousness the biological evolution of the psyche is replaced by a cultural historical evolution. Leontyev's developmental theory will be studied in more detail in conjunction with an analysis of his production. After Leontyev's death the most prominent members of the cultural historical schools have been P.J. Galperin, D.B. Elkonin, V.V. Davydov and N.F. Talysina. Finally, we shall briefly mention another Soviet school - the Georgian. The leader of this school was D.N. Usnadse (1886-1950). He studied psychology under Wundt in Leipzig and experimented with perception. On the basis of these experiments he introduced the explanatory concept of set. This is a state or a set of processes in the organism that are conditioned partly by the external situation (as conceived by the organism) and partly by the organism's needs. Set has most frequently an unconscious effect on conscious processes and behavior. Thus 'set' is a hypothetical variable, and forms an explanatory link between situation and needs on the one hand and consciousness and behavior on the other. Usnadse acquired a number of pupils, who carried on the Georgian school of psychology, but not until after the Second World War did it enter into a dialogue with the remainder of Soviet psychology. (Usnadse's psychology has been thoroughly dealt with in Eigil Nilsen's ,,Usnadse and the Georgian School of Psychology" - an unpublished dissertation).


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Finally, we shall mentioned some Soviet psychologists who, although not directly associated with the dominating cultural historical school, are nevertheless pupils of Pavlov:

B.M. Teplov (1896-1965) was a pioneer in the field of differential psychology, which was developed on the basis of Pavlov's type theory.

P.K. Anokhin was the most prominent of those psychologists who developed general psychology on the basis of Pavlov's theory. Another famous Pavlov pupil is E.N. Sokolov, who has presented a theory of 'attentiveness' and 'curiosity'. In this theory he regards 'reflection' as the formation of neural models of the surrounding objects (see Madsen, 1974). Finally, we should mention Bluma V. Zeigarnik (born 1900), who is one of K. Lewin's pupils, and has become known for her experiments on the effect of unfinished tasks on the memory (the 'Zeigamik-effect'). In the Soviet Union she has made a name in the field of experimental psychopathology. In addition, B.F. Lomov contributed in particular to the development of industrial psychology in the Soviet Union, as well as to the organization of psychology and international collaboration. (A more detailed account of Soviet psychology may be found in Sexton and Missiak, 1976 and in Mammen, 1983).

East European Psychology INTRODUCTION. Ever since the Second World War the East European coun-

tries have been strongly influenced by the Soviet Union, also as far as the development of psychology is concerned. We shall now account briefly for the work of a few selected East European psychologists. POLAND. The first Polish psychological laboratory was established by K .

Twardowski (1866-1938) in 1901 at the university in Lwow. The second laboratory was established by W. Heinrich (1869-1957) in 1903 at Jagiellon University in Crakow (which is Poland's oldest university and one of the oldest in Europe, founded in the 14th century). The third laboratory was established at Warsaw University in 1910 by E . Abrohamowski (1869-1918). Later on laboratories were established at the universities in Poznan and Lublin. After the Second World War the institutions that had been destroyed were re-built and new psychological laboratories installed. In Poland too psychology

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became 'Pavlovized. At an early stage - before the American psychologists - J . Konorski (1903-1973), an internationally known pupil of Pavlov, introduced a distinction between 'classical' (respondent) conditioning and instrumental (operant) conditioning. He put forward a comprehensive theory containing a neuro-psychological explanation of perception, learning processes and motivation in his best known major work ,,The Integrative Activity and the Brain" (see Konorski, 1967, and an analysis in Madsen, 1974). Following the period of Pavlovization endeavours were made in Poland too to develop psychology on a Marxist basis, with T. Tomaszewski as one of the leaders. M . Choynowski worked on the development of psychometrical tests, A. Lewicki (1909-1973) and J . Reykowski were concerned with clinical psychology, while W. Szewczuk the best known industrial psychologist. EAST GERMANY (DDR). Psychology has an old tradition in the DDR on account

of the University of Leipzig and Wundt's laboratory and so in 1980 the International Psychological Congress was held in Leipzig on the centenary of Wundt's founding of the first laboratory. The chief promoter of the congress was the East German psychologist Felix von Klix. His own field of research is also representative of the special interest of East German psychologists in a cognitive psychology inspired by information theory, cybernetics and system theory. CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The development of psychology in this centrally placed

European country has taken on the same pattern as in other European countries until the Second World War. Psychological laboratories and institutes were established at the universities, and many institutes for applied psychological disciplines like clinical psychology, educational psychology and industrial psychol ogy were established. This development, with its main emphasis on applied psychology, continued also after the Second World War. At the same time general psychology underwent a development similar to that of the other East European countries, with the Soviet Union as model. After the war came a period of 'Pavlovization' and Marxist reorientation of psychology. In 1967 an Institute of Psychology was established under the Czechoslovakian Academy of Science. This came to play a great part in the development of general psychology under the


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leadership of Professor Joseph Lindhardt. Its major interests were the learning process and cognitive psychology, and Lindhardt organized international conferences on these themes every fourth year from 1969. Not only the Soviet Union and the East European countries attended but the West European countries and the USA. As in other East European countries, cognitive psychology is greatly inspired by information theory, cybernetics and system theory, and computer simulation is a method commonly used. HUNGARY. Psychology in Hungary developed on similar lines, but the development of Marxist psychology in Hungary has been influenced by the so-called Budapest School. This is an interdisciplinary school founded by the philosopher Georg Lukriks (1885-1971). The school's main interest has been concerned with studies and criticism of the development of society under a socialist regime. Other members of the school include Mihaly Vajda, Gyorgy Markus, Maria Markus, Andreas Hegedus and Ference Feher. Together with Lukics, they have contributed to a collective work, translated into German as Individuum und Praxis. (See Lukics et. al. 1975). Of more central psychological importance are Agnes Heller's studies of the concept of need in Marx's production, in which 'need' is dealt with very sporadically and often in self-contradictory statements. It is interesting that in Marx's early works a suggestion of a needs theory is to be found resembling that of Abraham Maslow. (see Chapter 9).

West European Marxist Psychology INTRODUCTION. As previously mentioned, there has been a great interest in Marxist psychology in Western Europe ever since the youth revolt of 1968. Especially two Marxist 'microschools' have come to the fore: the 'Hannover' and 'Berlin' schools.

The Hannover school. This school may be regarded as a further development of the Frankfurter school, since it integrates Marxist philosophy and social scientific theory with psychoanalytical theory. The integration consists in particular of a so-called 'critical theory of socialization', i.e. socialization (upbringing) consists of a development by the mother (and later by other members of the family) of the child's personality (its ego and super-ego) via

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language. This socialization will naturally be influenced by the structure of the society concerned, its working conditions and norms. In a capitalist society socialization contributes to the 'alienization' of the work relation and a commercialization of human relations. One of the leading psychologists in the Hannover school is Alfred Lorenzer, who has produced a largely hermeneutical and critical version of psychoanalysis. (See Lorenzer, 1975). Other members of the school include Peter Briickner (see Briickner, 1975), Helmuth Dahmer (see Dahmer, 1975) and Th. Ziehe (see Ziehe, 1975). In connection with the Hannover school it is interesting to note that in America there has been a a great deal of interest in another development of the Frankfurter school's integration of Freud and Marx, for which Herbert Marcuse was responsible. His writings have had a similar influence on the student revolt in American universities. The Berlin school. This school was orginally created by psychologists from the Institute of Psychology at Freies Universitat in West Berlin. The members of the group call themselves 'critical psychologists', and it is characteristic for them that they spend a lot of time criticizing other psychologists - not just bourgeois, capitalist psychologists but also the Hannover and other Marxist schools. The main representative of the school is Klaus Holzkump; in Holzkamp (1979) he emphasizes that critical psychology is based on the cultural historical school's psychology, especially Leontyev's theory. He argues in support of the thesis that, unlike Marxist psychology, traditional (bourgeois) pSychology lacks unequivocal criteria for evaluating the epistemological value of theories. But, despite that, he criticizes another Marxist microschool, the Hannover school, just as much as bourgeois Other well-known members of the Berlin school include Ute HolzkumpOsterkump and Frigga Huug. Together with Holzkamp they have contributed to a collection of articles: ,,Critical Psychology", edited by Ole Dreier (see Dreier, 1979).

Finally, we should mention the French Marxist Lucien S h e , who most closely approaches critical psychology even though he is not so negative towards psychoanalysis. S6ve is mostly known for his major work ,,Marxism and the Theory of Personality" (1978). In this he presents a theory of personality extracted


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from the scattered statements to be found in Marx's works, i.e. that the basic element of personality is composed of the actions that come to make up a life history (biography), which is then identical with 'personality' (cf. Murray's personology, Chapter 8). As previously mentioned, the Berlin school is partly based on Leontyev's theory, which we shall deal with in the next section.

Leon ty e v 's Production INTRODUCTION. As already mentioned, A.N. Leontyev's theory is an original

synthesis of Vygotsky's cultural historical school and Rubinstein's integration of Pavlov's reflex theory and Lenin's theory of reflection. Since Leontyev's theory is therefore a synthesis of very important tendencies in Soviet Marxist psychology, it has been 'paradigm-creating' for much of Western Marxist psychology. That is why we have chosen to undertake a metatheoretical analysis of Leontyev's production as representative of Marxist psychology. We have chosen the following two books from Leontyev's production: 1. ,,Problems of the Development of the Mind', published in English in the Soviet Union in 1981 (see Leontyev, 1981). The book contains Leontyev's selected theses, which reflect the main lines in his theoretical and experimental research (cf. p. 435). The writings included originate from all the periods of Leontyev's productive life (from the end of the 20s until his death in 1979). The title of the book will be referred to in brief as ,,Development".

2. ,,Activity, Consciousness and Personality", published in the USA in 1978 (see Leontyev, 1978). The title will be referred to in brief as ,,Activity". Leon tyev's Meta-S traturn ONTOLOGICAL META-THESES. In Leontyev's production the ontological metatheses (about the conception of man, the psycho-physical problem and determinism) are all derived from Marxist philosophy (dialectical materialism).

1. The conception of man. The Marxist conception of man is social historical, i.e. man is regarded primarily as a social product rather than a biological one.

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Social development goes hand in hand with society's historical development (hence the term 'social-historical') and may be formulated briefly as follows: consciousness is a product of society, which is itself the result of a historical development (see ,,Activity", p. 60, and ,,Development", p. 221)l. Leontyev distinguishes between the 'psyche' and 'consciousness'. We shall examine this distinction more closely later on. It is sufficient here to emphasize that 'consciousness' is the special human form of 'psyche'. Thus, according to Leontyev's theory, it is consciousness that is a product of society and its historical development, whereas the psyche as such is a product of biological, phylogenetical evolution.

2. The psycho-physical theory. Since Marx was primarily a philosopher and a social scientist, he was not so interested in the psycho-physical problem as to develop an explicit, systematic theory about it. This Lenin did, however - in his philosophical writings (see Lenin 1964, Favrholt 1978 and Rubinstein 1976). The so-called 'reflection theory' has become generally accepted as the philosophical foundation of Soviet psychology. Lenin's theory is briefly discussed by Leontyev in ,,Activity" (p. 29-30)2. Briefly, Lenin regards the reflection of the surroundings as a property of matter which assumes its highest form in man. Marxist philosophy is usually termed 'materialistic'. However, it appears from the above that Lenin's theory of reflection is not a mechanistic materialism that denies the existence of the psyche, but rather a 'pan-psychism' (cf. Chapter 3 and the Appendix), since the psyche is defined as an immanent property of matter(which is equivalent to the whole world). A more precise formulation of Lenin's psycho-physical theory is found in Rubinstein, which - as appears in ,,Activity" (p. 68)3 - Leontyev accepts. A closer study of Rubinstein's book ,,Being and Consciousness" also confirms that his psycho-physical theory is a neutral monistic identity theory, since he identifies the psyche with cerebral processes. Leontyev's production shows that he gradually came to adopt what amounts to a system theoretical view. This is particularly apparent in ,,Activity", which was his last book. Here he writes in several places about the different system levels, e.g. on p. 1414, where man is placed on three system levels:

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1) The biological ('organism') 2) The psychological ('subject for activity'), and 3) The social historical (as 'social being')

This clearly expresses a system-theoreticalpluralism. If this interpretation is correct, we find in Marxist philosophy and psychology an interesting development of the psycho-physical theory from Lenin's pan-psychism via Rubinstein's identity theory to Leontyev's systemtheoretical pluralism. This development corresponds to a development along the mid-line in the graphic model, Fig. 2.4, in Chapter 2, and represents a confirmation of the model's heuristic value as well as an emphasis on the term 'dialectical' in 'dialectical materialism. Marxists have always stressed the difference between dialectical materialism and ordinary mechanistic materialism. Our analysis confirms that dialectical philosophy is a holistic philosophy (panpsychism -- identity theory -- system-theoretical pluralism). It is also confirmed by the prevalence of system theory in the East European countries (see Blauberg et al, 1977, and Heidtmann et al, 1977).

3. Determinism. Marxist philosophy is deterministic. But here too the term 'dialectical' is important, because it distinguishes dialectical determinism from mechanical determinism. Mechanical determinism only reckons with a oneway causal relation, whereas dialectical determnism reckons with an interaction between variables. That is why cybernetics, with its 'feedback', as well as other complicated steering mechanisms could be used by Marxists. META-THESES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Marxist philosophy also in-

cludes a set of epistemological, meta-theoretical and methodological metatheses, which are used in Marxist psychology. 1. Epistemological theses. 1.1. The origin of cognition: Marxism has a special pragmatic theory about this problem consisting of an integration of rationalism and empiricism. This is also accepted by Leontyev, who writes in ,,Activity" (p. 12-13)s that Marx's theory maintains human praxis to be the basis and controller of human cognition. This pragmatic theory of knowledge is possibly the chief inspiration for Leontyev's - and the entire cultural historical school's - theory about the development of the psyche.

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1.2. Cognition's relation to realily: Marxist philosophy also has a characteris-

tic theory about this problem, i.e. a realist theory of knowledge (Marxists often call this 'materialistic'). It has not been possible to find any explicit formulations of this theory; the closest Leontyev comes to this is in connection with a discussion of the nature of reflection, i.e. in ,,Activity" (p. 36)6, where he writes that perception finds its object in the external objective world. 2. Metatheoretical theses. Like the rest of Soviet psychology - Marxist and non-Marxist alike - Leontyev possesses a nomothetic ideal of science. It is this that distinguishes Soviet psychology from West European Marxist psychology, which - inspired by the Frankfurter school - has a hermeneutic ideal of science (the Hannover school) or a critical ideal of science (the Berlin school). Leontyev's entire production shows that he models his theories on the natural sciences, often expressing this explicitly (e.g. in ,,Development", p.53)7. Leontyev succeeds, moreover, in finding epistemological grounds for (scientific) explanation with the help of models, deriving the concept of 'model' from Lenin's concept of reflection. Thus Leontyev regards all the products of reflection (sensory, perceptual and conceptual) as models (see ,,Activity", p. 32)8. With this interpretation of 'reflection' and 'model', Leontyev brings to light a consistent connection between epistemological and metatheoretical presuppositions (meta-theses). A corresponding theory is also to be found in Sokolov (see Sokolov, 1963, and an analysis in Madsen, 1974).

3. Methodological meta-theses. Leontyev's adoption of the nomothetic ideal of science is also revealed in his preference for experimental method. As regards the latter, however, there are no explicit arguments or prescriptions to be found in Leontyev's production; but we shall examine his experiments more closely in connection with the data-stratum. Nor has Leontyev expressed any arguments or principles for employing a specific data-language. In fact, as far as people are concerned, he uses all kinds of data: behavioral, physiological and developmental biological as well as phenomenological. The only fundamental argument concerns precisely the choice of people and not animals as experimental objects. Thus, Leontyev writes in ,,Develop-

Leontyev's production

457

ment" (p. 54)9 that he chose human experimental objects because they - and only they - can react with subjective (private) data. It is interesting to note that Leontyev regards the subjective criterion - individual experiences - as the most important criterion for the presence of mind. He may be distinguished thereby from the behaviorist school. CONCLUSION.We may summarize Leontyev's meta-theses as follows: a socialhistorical conception of man; a system-theoretical psychophysical theory; dialectical determinism; a pragmatic and realist theory of knowledge; a nomothetic meta-theory and an experimental methodology.

Leontyev's Hypothetical Stratum INTRODUCTION. In the following systematic reconstruction of Leontyev's theory we shall integrate the two theories in ,,Development" and ,,Activity" in such a way that the the hypotheses about activity, consciousness and personality are subsumed under the hypotheses about the evolution of the psyche; ,,Activity" is mostly concerned with human consciousness, which is the final stage in the evolution of the psyche. In all other respects the usual procedure will be followed (see Appendix), since it is an advantage here to deal with the whole (the hypothesis system) first and then the elements (the hypotheses and the hypothetical terms). LEONTYEV'S HYPOTHESIS-SYSTEM.Leontyev does not systematically formulate a hypothetical-deductive system. Nor are there any graphic models; but for the sake of comparison with other theories, we have constructed a diagram on the basis of Leontyev's own discourse. (see Fig. 10.2). Leontyev's theory is recognizable in draft form in ,,Development" (p. 272)10, in which he writes that the psyche arises as part of the life processes. These, therefore, have both a biological and a social-historical development, each with its own laws. These biological and socio-historical 'laws' are formulated as hypotheses in the next section. LEONTYEV'S HYPOTHESES. As previously mentioned, the psyche undergoes four stages: 1) the sensory psyche, 2) the perceptive psyche, 3) the intellectual psyche and 4) the human psyche (or consciousness), which undergoes three further sub-stages.

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According to Leontyev, development proceeds are follows: 1. The appearance of matter and lifeless objects. 2. The development of living organisms. 2.1. Pre-psychic life. 2.2. Psychic life.

It is naturally 'psychic life' that is the object of psychology, and so a definition of this and a hypothesis about the origin of psychic life is important. We find both of these expressed implicitly in a passage from ,,Development" (p. 48)11, in which it states that the 'psyche' consists of the life processes 'reflecting' the surroundings. They arise as the result of the development of the biological species. Reflection in the elementary psyche consists of sensitivity. This sensitivity forms the basis for the creation of conditioned reflexes. Therefore, according to Leontyev, we can maintain that signallfunction - the creation and function of conditioned reflexes - is the criterion for the presence of the elementary psyche. Thus the elementary psyche has an important function is controlling behavior by reflecting sensory qualities. We can reformulate this as follows: FIRST (HISTORICAL) HYPOTHESIS: The elementary, sensory psyche originated when the physiological conditions were present for the creation of conditioned reflexes. The function (effect) of the sensory psyche is signal-control of behavior via reflection of sensory qualities.

Accordingly, this is a historical and not a functional hypothesis (cf. the systematological taxonomy, see Appendix). Therefore it cannot simply be converted into the customary S-H-R symbols, but only if we can generalize from 'stimuli' ( S ) to all empirically observable independent variables ('IV') and likewise generalize from 'Reaction' (R) to all empirically observable dependent variables ('DV). This enables us to cany out the clazsification of purely theoretical and partially empirical hypotheses, which provide the basis for calculating the hypothesis quotient. Thus we can now reformulate the first hypothesis as follows:

Leontyev's production 1st Hypothesis:

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S(1V) (physiologicalconditions) + H(sensory psyche) + R(DV) (signal-controlled behavior)

The next stage in the development of the psyche is the perceptive psyche. Leontyev writes in ,,Development" (p. 175)12 that the function of the perceptive psyche is to reflect objects and not just properties (sensory qualities). In ,,Development" (p. 176)13 Leontyev writes that the conditions for the origin of the perceptive psyche arise simultaneously with the development of the distant senses (primarily of vision) and a forebrain with a cerebral cortex. This takes place phylogenetically with the emergence of reptiles. Thus the conditions for the development of the perceptive psyche are the presence of the special senses and the ceberal cortex. This may be summarized as follows: SECOND (HISTORICAL) HYPOTHESIS: The perceptive psyche arises with the

evolution of the special senses (sight and hearing) and the cerebral cortex. The function of the perceptive psyche is the reflection of objects and the associated control of behavior. Reformulated symbolically: 2nd Hypothesis:

S(1V) (special senses + cortex) + H(perceptive psyche) + R(DV) (object-oriented behavior)

The third stage in the development of the psyche is the intellectuulpsyche. The characteristic of the intellectual psyche is that activity consists of two different operations: preparation and accomplishment (,,Development", p. 192)14. It is the former that provides the possibility for the development of thought, and also involves the control of behavior in relation to the objects in a given situation. Leontyev exemplifies his description of this stage by refemng to Kohler's chimpanzee experiments. Leontyev writes in ,,Development" (p. 193)15 that this stage depends on the further development of the cerebral cortex and especially of the frontal lobe. We can reformulate this as follows: THIRD (HISTORICAL)HYPOTHESIS: The intellectual psyche arose with the de-

velopment of the frontal lobe of the cerebral cortex. Its function is to organize activity into preparatory and accomplishing phases. The preparatory phase m a y be purely intellectual in character (e.g. thought).

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Reformulated symbolically:

3rd Hypothesis:

S(IV) (frontal lobe) + H(preparatory thought) + H(accomp1ishmentcontrol) + R(DV) (problem-solving behavior).

The fourth stage in the evolution of the psyche is the development of the human psyche or 'consciousness', as it may now be termed. The prerequisites for the emergence of consciousness are both biological, i.e. the development of speech centres in the brain and, in particular, social and historical. It is the emergence of tools that transforms the activity into work. Moreover, it is the development of language that makes communication and co-operation possible. This also allows for the division of labour. The preparatory activity that emerged already with the development of the intellectual psyche can now be transformed into intellectual work, while the accomplishing activity is transformed into manual labour (see ,,Development", p. 220-221)16. As previously mentioned, there are sub-stages in the evolution of the human psyche, or consciousness. The first stage is called primitive consciousness (,Development", p. 232)17. The physiological preconditions for the the origin of primitive consciousness consist of the evolution of speech centres in the brain which make verbal communication possible. The social preconditions consist of the development of a society based on co-operation and the use of tools. Co-operation (e.g. in hunting) is facilitated by verbal communication. We can summarize this section about the origin of primitive consciousness in the FOURTH (HISTORICAL) HYPOTHESIS: The human psyche - consciousness -

arose with the development of speech centres in the brain and with the arrival of a society based on work involving the use of tools. The function of primitive consciousness is to mediate co-operation via language used as a means of communication. Reformulated symbolically:

4th Hypothesis:

S(1V) (speech centre + tools) +H(conscious reflection) + H(conscious planning) + R@V) (linguistically controlled work).


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According to Leontyev, there are two further stages in the development of the human psyche: ,,Class societal consciousness" and ,,Socialistic consciousness". Generally speaking, this further development is solely determined by that of society. Man has not developed biologically speaking since the development of primitive human consciousness, which presumably arose concurrently with the first primitive people (see ,,Development", p. 269)18. ,,Class societal consciousness" is determined by the division of labour and private ownership, which cause 'alienation' in man. This helps to bring about a socialistic society and a 'socialistic consciousness' (,,Development", p. 269). According to Leontyev, this emerges in the struggle against 'alienation' and internal conflicts resulting from the division of labour and class society. We shall now summarize the development of the two final stages of consciousness class consciousness and socialistic consciousnessas follows: FIFTH (HISTORICAL) HYPOTHESIS: The further development of society into

class society and then into socialistic society causes the development of human consciousness into 'class consciousness' and Socialistic consciousness'. The function of these stages of consciousness is to reflect and plan more specialized labour. Reformulated symbolically:

5th Hypothesis:

S(1V) (societal development) + H(conscious reflection) + H(conscious planning) + R(DV) (linguistically controlled division of labour).

The five historical hypotheses represent a concentrated, systematic reconstruction of Leontyev's theory of the development of the psyche. We have so far only reconstructed its phylogenetical development; Leontyev describes its ontogenetic development in a chapter in ,,Development". We shall now supplement the analysis and reconstruction of the theory in ,,Development" with the theory in ,,Activity". Here we can suffice with a single hypothesis, which deals with the relation between activity, needs and objects. Leontyev sketches this in ,,Activity" (p. 62)19, showing that the organism always requires the presence of needs to initiate activity. Furthermore, it requires external objects that are reflected in consciousness in the form of motives; these steer activity towards the need-gratifying object. We can reformulate this as follows:

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SIXTH (FUNCTIONEL) HYPOTHESIS: Activity is determined by the needsstate in

the organism and the goal-objects in the surroundings. The goal-object's rejlection in consciousness is designated 'the motive'. The need activates the organism into action, and the motive steers the action towards the needs-satisfying goal-objects.

Formulated symbolically:

6th Hypothesis: a) S(need) + H(activation) b) S(object) + H(motive) c) H(activation + motive) + R(goal-directed action) With these hypotheses, reproduced in diagrammatic form in Fig. 10.2, we have now extracted and reconstructed the most important hypotheses in Leontyev's theory of development and activity. Before we proceed with an analysis of the hypothetical terms employed, we shall undertake a metatheoretical classifcation ofthe hypotheses, subdividing, as usual, each S-H-R hypothesis into an S H-hypothesis and an H-R-hypothesis. Thus only hypotheses with two intervening H-variables will contain H-H-hypotheses, and the classification is as follows: 1. Theoretical hypotheses: 3b; 4b; 5b = in all 3 hypotheses.

2. Empirical hypotheses: a. S-H-hypotheses: la; 2a; 3a; 4a; 5a; 6a; 6b = in all 7 hypotheses. b. H-R-hypotheses: lb; 2b; 3c; 4c; 5c; 6c = in all 6 hypotheses. LEONTYEV'S

HYPOTHETICAL TERMS. We shall now undertake a

metatheoretical analysis of Leontyev's most important hypothetical terms in accordance with the sytematological taxonomy (see Appendix). The most important term in Leontyev's - and Soviet psychology in general - is 'activity'. Leontyev provides a precise definition of this term in ,,Activity" (p. 50)20, from which it appears that 'activity' is a hypothetical term referring to a process - or rather system of processes - which is steered by reflection, and which reveals itself as objectively observable by way of goal-directed behavior


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Fig. 10.2. Graphical representation of Leontyev's theory.

(actions). The entire discourse points towards activity being an H-term with a neutral reference (surplus meaning), i.e. an H,-term (cf. Appendix). Another important term is 'need', an implicit definition of which is to be found in ,,Activity" (p. 53)21, where it appears that Leontyev uses the term 'need'in two senses:

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Marxist psychology

1. 'Need]'= an activating state in the organism. This is a descriptive term, 'need' in this sense referring to an observable state in the organism (outside the brain), i.e. an independent variable. 2. 'Need2' = a directive process in the psyche. In this case 'need' is a hypothetical term, largely with a neutral reference, i.e. an H,.term referring to an intervening hypothetical variable.

It is unfortunate that Leontyev does not use two different terms for the two different variables - the activating, observable state and the directive, hypothetical process. This would have been natural, since he makes a similar distinction between 'object' and 'motive'. This appears from a quotation from ,,Activity" (p. 62), which implicitly contains the 6th hypothesis in our reconstruction. Here Leontyev uses the two terms as follows: 1. 'Object' = an object which stimulates the organism's sensory organs. This is therefore a descriptive term which refers to an independent variable. 2. 'Motive' = a directive process in the psyche, which reflects the object as need-gratifying, It is a hypothetical term with a neutral reference, i.e. an Hcterm ,which refers to an intervening, hypothetical variable.

There is no clear distinction in Leontyev's discourse between 'motive' and 'need2, or the hypothetical version. Therefore in the 6th hypothesis we have used 'needl' in the descriptive version and 'motive' instead of 'need2' in the hypothetical version. Finally, we must draw attention to yet another hypothetical term, i.e. 'emotion',which Leontyev appears to use as designating a state accompanying activity in connection with motivated action (see ,,Activity", p. 12022). This accompanying state is at the same time an extra activating state (the 'mechanism' of its movement). Emotion must therefore be regarded as a hypothetical term with a neutral reference, i.e. a Hc-term . After having analysed the most important hypothetical terms in Leontyev's theory we shall finally undertake a classijication according to form and effect by way of the customary schema. It appears from the schema that the only structure-variable is the 'psyche', which we have placed here because we regard it as the structure whose pres-


465

ence conditions 'activity'.Had we analysed Leontyev's concept of 'personality', which he deals with also in ,,Activity, Consciousness and Personality" we would presumably have placed it in the same column as shown. Since we have found no documentation in the text for the position of these two concepts we have placed question-marks. We have hereby concluded the analysis and reconstruction of the hypothesis-stratum in Leontyev's production. Before proceeding with the data-stratum in accordance with the systematological taxonomy, we can summarize the analysis of the hypothesis stratum by classifying the implicit explanatory model, on the basis of the H-terms used, as a constructive explanatory model, i.e. a S-Hc-R-model.

Leontyev's Data-Stratum INTRODUCTION. Of the two books we have chosen from Leontyev's produc-

tion, ,,Activity" contains almost no descriptions of empirical investigations, whereas ,,Development" contains full descriptions of the experiments of both Leontyev and others. Thus, it is ,,Development" that contains material for an analysis and reconstruction of the data-stratum. THE ABSTRACT DATA-STRATUM. Leontyev's empirical resarch was largely concerned with the development of the psyche, and his most original research

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Marxist psychology

was especially concerned with the origin of the elementary sensory psyche. His experiments with people will be referred to in the next section, so we shall concentrate here on the general data-theses. Before reformulating these data-theses, however, it is necessary to refer very briefly to Leontyev's experiment, which amounted to a classical conditioning experiment using people as subjects. For the unconditioned stimulus an electric shock was used, while a beam of green light on the subject's hand was employed as conditioned stimulus or signal, To begin with the subject was not sensitive to the effect of the beam on the skin, which was to act as the signal proper. But after having been made aware of the possible stimulus the subject was able to demonstrate an appropriate reaction. The subject thereby became sensitive to the new stimulus, which could act as signal in the conditioning experiment. Leontyev himself summarizes the results of many experiments in ,,Development" (p. 67)23, and we can reformulate these in concentrated form as Leontyev's IST GENERAL DATA-THESIS: The presence of an oriented reaction is a necessary condition for the development of sensitivity towards a new stimulus, which thereafter canfunction as u signal.

The remaining data-theses deal with the following stages in the development of the psyche. But here Leontyev builds largely on the empirical material of others. Various experiments on animals show that mammals inevitably react towards objects - not just towards individual sensory qualities. The experiments also show that diflerentiufionand generalization are necessary conditions for an object-oriented reaction (see ,,Development", p. 180-182)24. This can be formulated as Leontyev's 2ND GENERAL DATA-THESIS: The development of difleerentiated and generalized reactions is a necessary condition for the development of objectoriented reactions. The third stage in the development of the psyche, the intellectual psyche, is largely illustrated by Kohler's chimpanzee experiments. Leontyev summarizes the description of the general experimental results in ,,Development" (p. 18485)25, in which he names three criteria for the intellectual psyche:


467

1) the sudden occurrence of insight, 2 ) repetitions in a new experiment without 'trial-and-error', 3) the transfer of shrewd problem-solving to entirely new situations with different conditions. We can summarize this as Leontyev's 3RD GENERAL DATA-THESIS: The absence of trial-and-error and the transfer

to new situations as well as the combination of preparatory and implemental operations are necessary conditionsfor the appearance of intellectualproblemsolving behavior. In describing the development of the fourth stage - the human psyche or consciousness - Leontyev refers to a number of experiments and also to Marx's theory of social development, which we have mentioned in connection with the 4th and 5th hypotheses. Thus it is sufficient here to summarize the most important observable conditions for human social behavior as Leontyev's 4TH GENERAL DATA-THESIS: The emergence of tools and language is a neces-

sary conditionfor co-operation. 5TH GENERAL DATA-THESIS: The development of society is a necessary condi-

tionfor the division of labour. As we see, the formulation of these five general data-theses corresponds with that of the five hypotheses, though with the important difference that data-theses do not contain hypothetical (transempirical) terms. THE CONCRETE DATA-STRATUM. We shall deal here with the specific data-

theses describing the concrete empirical observation on which Leontyev builds his theory. 1. Experimental data. Leontyev's own data originate, as mentioned, from experiments on adult subjects, the aim of which was to demonstrate that sensitivity - the criterion for primitive, the sensory psyche - can be developed in adults. The experiments were inspired by observations of the blind and the deaf, who appear to develop a sensitivty towards respectively light and vibrations. The experiments were constructed as classical conditioning experiments. On the basis of an innate reflex - with electric shocks as unconditioned stimulus and an avoidance-reaction as innate reaction - a conditioned reflex was developed, with the effect of a beam of green light on the skin acting as conditioned

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Marxist psychology

stimulus, or signal. The experiments showed that the subjects did not at first react to the effect of the beam on the skin of the hand, or rather, their reactions were so arbitrary that they could not be explained by signal learning. It was therefore necessary to instruct them in advance that a coming beam of light might have a slight effect on the skin. Once having provoked this reaction, the subjects became sensitive to the beam of light on the skin, and this could now function as a signal for the conditioned reflex. In Leontyev's ,,Development" there are many descriptions of the experimental procedure, the experimental apparatus (e.g. in Fig. 1, p. 60 and Fig. 5 , p. 72) and the reactions of the subjects. Very few subjects were used (from one to ten), but literally hundreds of experiments were performed on each subject. The experimental data may be divided into two categories: 1. Behavioral data: the description of the subject's behavior. 2. Phenomenlogical (Leontyev calls it 'subjective') data: the subject's verbal report.

As previously mentioned, 'subjective' data are regarded as important criteria

for sensitivity (= primitive psyche).

2. Historical developmental data. Apart from experimental data from experiments with human subjects, Leontyev also collected historical developmental data. These can be divided into two categories: 1. Biological developmental data obtained from the description of observations and animal experiments on various stages of the phylogenetical scale. These data are naturally concerned with the first three stages in the development of the psyche (sensory, perceptive and intellectual psyche). 2. Historical data obtained from descriptions of the historical development of human societies and cultures. There are very few direct descriptions of historical investigations, however, but instead, summaries and quotations from Marx's and Engels' theories about the development of society. In conclusion, Leontyev's data-stratum may be characterized as extremely abundant - especially in vastly different types of concrete data: biological observations, psychological experiments and social-historical observations. The

Leonryev's production

469

several levels on which he works emphasizes the sysfem-theoretical nature of Leontyev's theory.

The Production as a Whole THE COMPLETENESSOF THE TEXT. As described above, ,,Development" con-

stitutes a complefe scientijic text, all three strata being represented more or less equally. Since the book is composed of various papers, smaller articles and congressional lectures, the three levels are not systematically organized into M, H and D- strata. But the discourse is very precisely formulated. 'Activity' is not to the same extent a complete scientific text, since the data-stratum is (almost) lacking. But here the data- and hypothetical strata are more systematically arranged and at the same same precisely formulated. THE TESTABILITY OF THE THEORY. The immediate impression we get on reading Leontyev's text is that it is empirically well-documented. This immediate impression is also confirmed when we investigate the theory's testability. On the basis of the above classification of hypotheses we can calculate the hypothesis quotient (H.Q.), which provides a quantitative estimate of the theory's testability. This classification reveals altogether 3 H-H-hypotheses, 7 S-H-hypotheses and 6 H-R-hypotheses. Inserting these figures in the formula for the hypothesis quotient, we thus obtain:

H.Q =

Ym-w X[(S-H) + (H-R)]

-- 3 = 0.23 -7 + 6

This is a relatively low H. Q. (cf. table in Chapter 2), and a low H.Q. is indicative of a high degree of testability. If one could measure the degree of influence on the development of psychology as such, it would most probably show that Leontyev's production has greatly influenced the development of - especially Marxist - psychology since the Second World War.

470

Marxist psychology

In Leontyev we find this briefly expressed in ,,Activity" (p.60): ,,Consciousness is originated by society; it is produced.", and likewise in ,,Development" (p. 221): ,, ... it is clear that their psyche and consciousness also changes qualitatively in the course of socio-historical development." ,,It is known that Lenin considered reflection as a property already incorporated in the ,,foundation of the very edifice of material", which at a determined degree of development, and particularly at the level of highly organized living material, assumes the form of sensing, perception and, in man, also the form of theoretical thought, concept." ,,The relationship of the psychic and the physiological is considered in many psychological works. In connection with the study of higher nervous activity it is theoretically explained in greatest detail by S.L. Rubinstein, who developed the idea that the physiological and the psychic are one and the same and specifically a reflexive, reflecting activity, but considered from various angles, and that its psychological investigation is a logical continuation of its physiological investigation." ,,With no difficulty we isolate various levels of the study of man: the biological level on which he appears as a physical, natural being, the psychological level on which he appears as a subject of life activity, and finally, the social level on which he appears as realizing objective social relations, the social historical process. The existence of these levels poses a problem about internal relationship that connects the psychological level with the biological and the social." Leontyev solves the problem mentioned on p. 142 as follows: ,,The whole principle on which interlevel relations depend consists of the fact that the available higher level always becomes dominant, but it cannot be realized except with the help of low-lying levels and it is thus dependent on them." ,,A profound revolution brought about by Marx in the theory of cognition is the idea that human practice is the basis for human cognition; practice is that process in the course of whose development cognitive problems arise, human perceptions and thoughts originate and develop, and which at the same time contains in itself criteria of the adequacy and truth of know-


471

ledge. Marx says that man must prove truth, activity and power and the universality of his thought through practice." 6

,,Like the activity of the touching hand, all perceptive activity finds the object there where it really is - in the external world, in objective space and time."

7

In ,,Development" (p. 53) Leontyev writes about his own theory: ,Just as with any scientific thesis that is the result of purely theoretical analysis, the fate of our hypothesis will be determined by how far it is able to serve as the basis for experimental research that can disprove it or concretize it and develop it further."

8

,,As is known, the concept of the model has received very wide acceptance and use in very different meanings. For further consideration of our problem, however, we may use the simplest and least refined, that is to say, its definition. We call such a system (multitude) a model, the elements of which are found to be similar (homomorphic, isomorphic) to elements of another system (the modeled). It is absolutely evident that under such a broad definition of model the sensory image is, of course, also included."

9

,,It was necessary first of all to choose between the two principle lines open to the researcher: viz. investigation of genetic material, i.e. animals (especially animals at the lowest stages of biological evolution), and direct investigation of man. ..." ,,Nevertheless,we pursued this second line. The main argument in its favour was the, so to say, historical one: the traditional posing of the problem called for use of the subjective criterion in order to establish the facts of sensitivity, and that requirement, of course, precluded the possibility of experiments on animals."

10

,prom the standpoint of this approach to the psyche, the real history of its evolution emerges as the history of the development of a 'split' in the formerly simple unity of life, the beginning of which gave rise to the primitive psyche of the animals, and which ultimately found full expression in man's conscious life. The history is, as we have seen, a reflection of the history of the evolution of life itself and is governed by its general laws: at the stages of biological development by the laws of biological evolution, and at the stages of historical development by socio-historical laws."

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Marxist psychology

11

,, ... we have found that there are two principal, qualitatively different forms of life. One, the simplest, can be called pre-psychic life. The other is life associated with reflection of the properties of reality in their objective connections and relations, life mediated by sensation. ..." ,,The psyche and psychic activity thus function for us not as something added to life, but as a singular form of manifestation of life that necessarily arises in the course of its evolution."

12

,,The next stage after that of the elementary sensory psyche, the second stage of evolution, can be called that of the perceptive psyche. It has the capacity to reflect external, objective reality already in the form of a reflection of things rather than in the form of separate elementary sensations evoked by separate properties or a combination of properties."

13

,,The rise and development of a perceptive psyche in animals were governed by several essential anatomical and physiological changes. The main one was the development and change of role of distant sense organs (i.e. ones operational at a distance), primarily of vision. .,." ,,That became possible because of the simultaneously occurring restructuring of the central nervous system and the formation of a forebrain, and then a cerebral cortex (for the first time in reptiles)."

14

,,When we pass to the third, highest stage of animals' evolution we thus observe a new complication in the structure of activity. The activity previously merged in a single process is now differentiated into two phases, one of preparation and one of accomplishment. The existence of a preparatory phase also constitutes a characteristic feature of intellectual behavior."

15

,,The origin and evolution of animals' intellect has its anatomical and physiological basis in a further development of the cerebral cortex and its functions. ...The new thing that distinguishes the brain of higher mammals from that of lower animals is the relatively much greater place occupied by the frontal lobe, ... ''

16

,,In considering the conditions for the transition from the preconscious psyche of animals to the consciousness of man, we have found certain features that characterize the peculiarities of this higher form of psychic re-


4 73

flection." ,,We have seen that consciousness can only arise when man's relation to nature has become mediated by his labour connection with other men. Consciousness is precisely from the beginning a social product." ,,We have seen, furthermore, that consciousness became possible only in conditions of active influencing of nature, i.e. in conditions of labour activity by means of tools which is at the same time the practical form of human consciousness as well. Consciousness is consequently a form of active, comprehending reflection." ,,We have seen that consciousness is possible only given the existence of language, which arises simultaneously with it in the course of labour." 17

When we speak of primitive consciousness we have something else in mind, namely man's consciousness in the initital stages of society's development when, already possessing primitive tools, they waged a point struggle against nature, when they had common labour, common ownership of the means of production, and common ownership of its product, when consequently, there was, as yet, no social division of labour and private property relation, and no exploitation of man by man."

18

Leontyev summarizes this in ,,Development" (p. 269): ,,So men's consciousness evolves psychologically, changing qualitatively, so that its old features die out and new ones take their place. At the dawn of human society man's consciousness reached the stage of its primitive formation; only the subsequent development of the social division of labour, of exchange and forms of property, led to the evolution of its inner structure; at the same time, however, it made it limited and contradictory; a new time has arrived - a time of new relations giving rise to a new consciousness in man, and it is still difficult for us to imagine the whole vastness of the outlook for its future growth."

19

,,The main thing that distinguishes one activity from another, however, is the difference of their objects. It is exactly the object of an activity that gives it a determined direction. According to the terminology I have proposed, the object of an activity is its true motive. It is understood that the motive may be either material or ideal, either present in perception or existing only in the imagination or thought. The main thing is that behind ac-

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Marxist psychology ~~

tivity there should always be a need, that it should always answer one need or another." 20 ,,Activity is a molar, not an additive unit of the life of the psychical, material subject. In a narrower sense, that is, mediated by psychic reflection, the real function of which is that it orients the subject in the objective world. In other words, activity is not a reaction and not a totality of reactions but a system that has structure, its own internal reactions and transformations, its own development." 21 ,,In the psychology of needs it is necessary from the very beginning to proceed from the following fundamental distinction: the distinction of need as an internal condition, as one of the necessary precursors of activity, and need as that which directs and regulates concrete activity of the subject in an objective environment." Leontyev continues on p. 54: ,,In the first place, need appears only as a condition of need of the organism and is in itself not capable of evoking any kind of positively directed activity; its function is limited to the activation of appropriate biological function and general excitation of the motor sphere apparent in nondirected seeking movements. Only as a result of its 'meeting' with an object that answers it does it fvst become capable of directing and regulating activity." 22 ,,Emotions are not subordinated to activity but appear to be its result and the 'mechanism' of its movement. ... Emotions fulfill the functions of internal signals, internal in the sense that they do not appear directly as psychic reflection of objective activity itself. The special feature of emotions is that they reflect relationship between motives (needs) and success, or the possibility of success, of realizing the action of the subject that responds to these motives. ... Thus they appear as a result of actualization of a motive (need), and before a rational evaluation by the subject of his activity." 23

,,The main conclusion, from the angle of our main problem, stemming from the objective observations and the subjective testimony, is that subjects' correct reactions to the effect of light on the skin of the hand are only possible when the subject is oriented on the sensations arising within him."


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24

About the development of the perceptive psyche, Leontyev writes in ,,Development" (p. 180): ,,During the transition to the stage of perceptive psyche the sensory form of the fixing of experience also changes qualitatively. Sense representations in animals is still a matter of dispute. A vast number of facts, however, convincingly indicate that animals have representations." And later, on p. 182: ,,The main change in the processes of differentiation and generalization during the transition to a perceptive psyche is expressed in the rise in animals of differentiation and generalization of the images of things."

25

,,Thus, while operations are formed slowly at a lower stage of evolution, by way of many trials during which successful movements are gradually fixed, and other unnecessary movements are gradually inhibited, and fade out, in the case of apes we observe first a period of complete failure - many attempts not leading to accomplishment of the activity, and then suddenly, as it were, the finding of an operation that almost immediately leads to success. That is the first characteristic feature of the intellectual activity of animals." ,,A second characteristic feature is that when an experiment is repeated once more, the operation concerned is reproduced, in spite of its having been performed only once, i.e. the ape solves a similar problem already without any preliminary trials." ,,A third feature of this activity is that the solution found for a problem is very easily transferred by the ape to other conditions only similar to those in which the given solution was first found. ..." ,, ... These facts show that anthropoid apes are capable of uniting two different operations into a single unit."


Chapter 11

CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIORISM

INTRODUCTION. In this chapter we shall describe the development of a third macroschool, Contemporary Behaviorism. It consists of a few microschools, the most important of which is Skinner's Radical Behaviorism and Bandura's Cognitive Behaviorism, both of which will be discussed in detail in the first part of the chapter. The second part will consist of a metatheoretical analysis of Skinner's production.

The History of the Behaviorists SURVEY. Previously, in Chapter 6, we have described the birth and subsequent development of Behaviorism. 'Classical' Behaviorism was created by J.B. Watson and inspired by Pavlov and Russian reflexology. This consisted largely of descripfive S-R-psychology together with a few eqlanations frequently containing hypothetical terms with physiological surplus meaning (Ho-terms). This classical behaviorism had its heyday from the start of the First World War until around 1930. It was then replaced by so-called Neo-Behaviorism, the chief representatives of which were Tolman and Hull. Since Tolman also contributed to 'integrating psychology' he was discussed in Chapter 8 (whereas Hull was discussed in Chapter 6). Neo-Behaviorism was a constructive explanatory psychology, which employed constructive hypothetical terms (Hc-terms). Simultaneously with the heyday of Neo-Behaviorism (c. 1930-1950) arose the beginnings of Radical Behaviorism as exemplified by Skinner's classical work ,,The Behavior of Organisms" from 1938. But during the period of inte-

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Contemporary behaviorism

gration (the 40s and 50s) Skinner was fairly isolated and gained no real influence until the end of the 50s, when he began to collect a great many supporters and to form a school, 'Radical Behaviorism', which we shall discuss in the following section. The early 60s also saw the start of Bandura's 'Cognitive Behaviorism', which will be discussed in a following section. Thus, from around 1960 we have an extremely active and productive macroschool, 'Contemporary Behaviorism', which consists of at least two microschools. Contemporary Behaviorism therefore constitutes the third phase in the history of Behaviorism. After the first period of Classical Behaviorism (c. 1912 - c. 1930) and the second period of Neo-Behaviorism (c. 1930 - c. 1950) we now have the third period, Contemporary Behaviorism, from c. 1960. Skinner's Radical Behaviorism SKINNERS BIOGRAPHY.Skinner has written a fairly detailed autobiography in

three volumes (see Skinner 1976, 1979 and 1983), from which it appears that Buurhus Frederic Skinner was born in 1904 in Pennsylvania. After his college education he attempted a career as a writer, though later abandoned it. At a later stage, however, he wrote a novel about a Utopian society, ,,Walden Two" (1948), organized according to Skinner's principles. Thereafter he studied psychology at Harvard University and started a series of experiments on rats, which resulted in a number of articles in scientific journals during the 30s. The main contents of these articles were collected in Skinner's first book, ,,The Behavior of Organisms" (1938), in which he proposed a new distinction between two types of conditioning, 'type S' and 'type R , which were later termed 'respondent conditioning' and 'operant conditioning'. These two types corresponded respectively to Pavlov's 'classical' conditioning and Thorndike's instrumental 'trial-and-error'. The distinction between these two types of conditioning were proposed at the same time by the Polish psychologist J. Konorski (see Madsen, 1974). Skinner strongly emphasized the difference between the two types of conditioning: whereas respondent conditioning is a stimulus-response type of learning with contiguity (proximity in time and space) as its most important condition, operant conditioning is a type of learning in which behavior is reinforced and formed by the consequences thereof in accordance with the law ofeflect.

The history of the behaviorists

479

In 1936, following his studies at Harvard, Skinner was appointed Professor at the University of Minnesota, where he remained until the end of the Second World War. During the war he was engaged in a research project that was to demonstrate the practical applications of operant conditioning. Doves were trained to guide a missile towards military targets, having been trained in advance in a 'Skinner box' - an apparatus in which they were 'reinforced' (rewarded with food) when they pecked at a board in the presence of 'discriminative stimuli' (signals). After this basic training the doves were placed in the nose of a model of a missile which was moved as if it had been fired. They pecked at a board in order to retain the missile's military target (e.g. a warship) within the fore sight in the missile's transparent 'nose'. The project demonstrated the efficiency of operant conditioning, but the war ended before it could be put into practice. After the war Skinner was appointed Professor at Indiana University. He remained there for two years (1945-47) before moving to Harvard University, where he remained until his retirement. After being appointed Professor at Harvard Skinner wrote his first Utopian novel ,,Walden Two", in which he fictively employed operant conditioning in order to organize a Utopian society - a self-supporting commune almost like an Israelian Kibbutz. Herein child education was also organized according to the principles of operant conditioning. The book attracted very little attention until much later, when Skinner wrote his sensational debate book ,,Beyond Freedom and Dignity" (1971). Skinner's ideas then became the source of inspiration for many experimental societies or communes. During the 1950's Skinner began to apply the results of his animal experiments to human psychology. In 1953 he published the general account ,,Science and Human Behavior", which is a complete account of psychology organized according to the principles of behaviorism, whereafter he published a book about ,,Verbal Behavior" (1957). As the title indicates, this is a psychological description of language in terms of behavior, and of the learning of linguistic behavior. The book was greatly debated after having been reviewed by the well-known linguistic philosopher, N . Chomsky, who was subsequently backed up by the cognitive psychologists. Also during the 1950's Skinner began to apply the principles of operant conditioning to education. He built a teaching machine and developed the socalled 'programmed teaching'. This was first described in an article in 'Science' (see Skinner, 1958), and thereafter - together with J.A. Holland - he wrote a

480


textbook of programmed psychology entitled ,,The Analysis of Behavior" (1961). Later came a book about the ,,Technology of Teaching" (1968). At the same time he began to apply the principles of operant conditioning in behavior therapy or 'behavior modification',as Skinner's supporters preferred to call it. Finally, also during the 1950s, Skinner concluded a large-scale research project concerning 'Schedules of Reinforcement' (see Ferster and Skinner, 1957). This project arose from a 'chance' observation: Skinner noticed that the mechanism in the Skinner box, designed to supply food as reinforcement, had broken down. But despite the lack of reinforcement the experimental animals continued to react. He therefore started to investigate 'partial reinforcement', which he envisaged as occurring most frequentIy in natural surroundings, where the 'continuous reinforcement' provided by the laboratory was not always forthcoming. The results of this research showed that the effects of conditioning on the learning process take longer to come about with partial reinforcement than with continuous reinforcement, but after the initial learning (conditioning) has been going on for some time the partially reinforced behavior is much more resistant to extinction than continuously reinforced behavior. Skinner continued his research and production during the 60s and 70s. Apart from the above-mentioned works about teaching technology (Skinner, 1968),during this period Skinner wrote two theoretical books: ,,Contingencies of Reinforcement" (1969) and ,,About Behaviorism" (1974). Together with the general account ,,Science and Human Behavior" (1953), these two theoretical works will be subjected to a metatheoretical analysis in the second part of the chapter. THE ORGANIZATION OF RADICAL BEHAVIORISM. Skinner's production dur-

ing the 1950s attracted so much attention among psychologists that his works became paradigm-creating for a school Skinner himself termed 'Radical Behaviorism'. Another, more officially employed term is 'ExperimentalAnalysis ofBehavior' and, accordingly, in 1958 the ,,Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior" was started. This was followed about ten years later by the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis".


481

Apart from these two journals Radical Behaviorism is also formally organized in ,,Division 25 of the American Psychological Association" known as ,,The Division for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior". This school is one of the most active and productive schools in the current period of school formation. But, despite its success in empirical research and practical application, rival microschools within Contemporary Behaviorism have been created, as appears from the following.

Bandur a's Cognitive Behavior ism BANDURAS LIFE AND PRODUCTION. Albert Bandura, born 1925, is at present Professor of Psychology at Standford University in California. Together with Richard Walters he wrote ,,Social Learning and Personality Development" (1963). In this book the authors presented their research results and their theory of 'observational learning'. After some children had seen a grown-up person behave aggressively towards a doll in television programme, the children were allowed to play in a room containing, amongst other things, a similar doll. These same children, who had observed aggressive behavior in a 'model', displayed more aggression towards the doll than those from a control group who had not observed the aggressive behavior. Bandura subsequently developed this theory in a number of books: ,,Principles of Behavior Modification" (1969), ,,Psychological Modelling" (197 l), ,,Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis" (1973) ,,A Social Learning Theory" (1977) and ,,Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory" (1986). The latter titles indicate that Bandura himself calls his theory 'Social Learning Theory', but other have also called it 'Observational Learning Theory'. Finally, the term 'Cognitive Behaviorism' has been employed, because Bandura's theory differs from Skinner's Radical Behaviorism in explaining learning and behavior with the help of (hypothetical)cognitive processes. BANDURAS COGNITIVE BEHAVIORISM. Bandura's theory differs from Skinner's in the following two ways as regards the meta-stratum: Firstly, Bandura explicitly demonstrates a type of determinism which he calls 'reciprocal determinism': The person (P), the surroundings (E) and behavior (B) enter into a reciprocal interaction:


482

P

But this reciprocal interaction is regarded explicitly as probabilistic, as is the case with Skinner. Secondly, Bandura explicitly propounds a metatheory implying the use of hypothetical variables in the form of cognitive processes, These cognitive processes are regarded as symbolic representation in the form of thoughts and ideas and are represented with a P in the formula for reciprocal determinism. The use of hypothetical variables represents the greatest difference from Skinner's theory, which does not explicitly - though perhaps implicitly - employ hypothetical variables. We can therefore discuss whether Skinner's Behaviorism and Bandura's Cognitive Behaviorism possess a common metaparadigm and thus belong to the same macroschool. Since it has not, unfortunately, been possible to undertake a thorough metatheoretical analysis of Bandura's production we shall have to let this question rest. The hypothetical stratum in Bandura's theory can be presented on the basis of C.J. Holland's and A. Kobasigawa's analysis and reconstruction (in Gazda and Corsine, 1980), where Bandura's theory is reconstructed in the form of 11 propositions (all hypotheses). The latter may be reproduced as follows: 1. Much of human learning is cognitive. 2. One major source of human learning is response consequences. Three types of consequences are mentioned: 1) information, 2) motivation, and 3 ) reinforcement. 3. A second major source of learning is through observation.

It is stressed that four processes enter into 'observational learning': 1) attention, 2) retention, 3 ) motor reproduction, and 4) motivation. All four processes must be present in order for observational learning to take place. This is described more fully in the following 'propositions':

4. The attentive process is influenced by the model, the observer, and the incentive conditions. 5. The retentional process is aided by coding and rehearsal.


483

6. The motor reproductive process involves images and thoughts to guide overt performance. 7. The motivational process is influenced by 1) external reinforcement, 2) vicarious reinforcement, and/or 3) self-reinforcement.

It is precisely with this extension of the concept of reinforcement that Bandura's theory may be distinguished from Skinner's - and others' - reinforcement theory. Vicarious reinforcement and self-reinforcement can only act via cognitive processes, which thereby become necessary links in Bandura's theory. 8. Response information in observational learning is conveyed through physical demonstration, words, or pictures. 9. Exposure to a model may produce different effects. Especially three effects are mentioned: 1. 'The observational learning effect' consists of the emergence of a new reaction, possibly a combination of already learnt components. 2. The second effect consists of the inhibition or disinhibition of already learnt reactions. These opposing effects are especially observable in respectively the punishment and rewarding of the model. 3. 'Social facilitation' is the effect of the observation of a model on the observer - here an increase in the possibility of an already learnt, prepared reaction - and it differs from disinhibition in the absence of any fear to dispel. 10. Observational learning is a major source of rules or principles.

This process, known as 'abstract modeling', forms amongst other things the basis for learning the grammatical rules of language. This type of observational learning may in the end be applied to all cognitive processes. 11. Observational learning is a major source of creative behavior. The 10th and 1lth hypotheses together provide an explanation for creativity in art, literature and other cultural activity. According to Holland and Kobasigawa, they should constitute the essence of Bandura's theory. For the sake of comparison we have reproduced Bandura's theory in the form of a graphic model (see Fig. 11.1)

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Fig. 11.1. Graphical representation of Banduras theory.

Bandura's theory builds on numerous data from empirical investigations. These include the 'classical' experiments with children watching films or TV and many other experiments with people and animals. Bandura's theory has inspired much empirical research, and its practical application covers especially upbringing, education and therapy, which we cannot go into here.


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Thus Bandura's cognitive behaviorism has developed into an important school within the field of contemporary behaviorism. OTHER BEHAVIORISTS? For the sake of completion we should mention that

there are a number of psychologists who call themselves 'behaviorists' without belonging to Skinner's or Bandura's (micro-?)schools (see Mogens Brun, 1986). These psychologists operate especially within the applied field of behavior therapy (or behavior modification). The most well-known behavior therapist outside of the two above-mentioned (micro-)schools is Joseph Wolpe. He was born in South Africa, though has lived for many years in Great Britain, where he is one of the leading figures in behavioral therapy along with the psychologist H.J. Eysenck (see Chapter 12). Wolpe bases his therapy on Pavlov's conditioning, as his first major work ,Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition" (1958) indicates. His subsequent works include ,,The Practice of Behavior Therapy" (1969). Today behavior therapy is an important competitor to psychoanalysis, client-oriented therapy and other kinds of psychotherapy. Finally, we should mention Arthur W. Staats's 'Social Behaviorism', which is propounded in the book of the same title (see Stats, 1975).

Skinner's Production INTRODUCTION. Skinner is without doubt a most important paradigm-creator

and a leading figure within contemporary behaviorism. So there is every good reason for selecting his production for metatheoretical analysis. We have already mentioned the most important books in his extensive production, and amongst these we shall select three for metatheoretical analysis: 1. ,,Science and Human Behavior" (1953), because it is the first general pre-

sentation of radical-behaviorist psychology. This book has been analysed previously in Madsen (1953). 2. ,,Contingencies of Reinforcement" (1969). The sub-title of this book is ,,A Theoretical Analysis", indicating that the work is perhaps especially suitable for metatheoretical analysis.

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3. ,,About Behaviorism" (1974), which Skinner himself terms an account of the philosophy of behaviorism. Thus this book too is especially suitable for metatheoretical analysis. These books will hereafter be called respectively 'Skinner, 1953', 'Skinner, 1969' and 'Skinner, 1974'.

The Meta-Stratum in Skinner's Production ONTOLOGICAL META-THESES. In this section we shall analyse the metatheses

concerned with 1) the conception of man, 2) psycho-physical theory and 3) the problem of determinism. 1. The conception of man. Regarding this, Skinner writes (in Skinner, 1974,

e.g. p. 207)l that man is first and foremost a biological system, an organism, and - for the behaviorist - nothing more than that. This is clearly an expression of a biological conception of man. 2. Psycho-physical theory. Regarding this problem, Skinner writes (in Skinner, 1974, e.g. p. 21 1) %hat there is only one (physical) world, including that part of it to be found beneath the skin. Our verbal reactions are acquired reactions to changes in the physical world inside and outside the skin. This is clearly an expression of a materialistic, psycho-physical theory. 3. Determinism. Regarding this problem, Skinner expresses in several places (e.g. Skinner, 1974, p. 189)3 a moderate determinism. But he also explicitly formulates statements of a more probabilistic nature (see e.g. Skinner, 1974, s. 226)4. On this account we consider it most correct to regard Skinner's ontology as probabilism. META-THESES RELATING TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. In this section we

shall analyse Skinner's epistemological, metatheoretical and methodological meta-theses. 1. Theory of knowledge. We have not found any texts in Skinner, 1974, explicitly expressing his theory about the origin ofcognition. On the other hand he writes (in Skinner, 1969, p. 228)5, that the scientific analysis of behavior

Skinner's production

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during the past fifty years has produced an empirical epistemology on an empirical basis. Behavioral science also includes the behavior of the scientists. It is clear that Skinner accepts an empirical theory of knowledge, and is further of the opinion that is can be based on empirical experience gained from the development of the science of behavior itself. The other epistemological problem about the relation of cognition to reality is only touched upon once (in Skinner, 1974, p. 144)6. Here he writes that knowledge or cognition is 'subjective' in the sense that is concerns a subject's behavior. But knowledge is objective in the sense that it deals with an objectively existing world. This is clearly an expression of a realistic philosophy.

2. Meta-theory. Skinner has several explicit formulations regarding the ideal of science. Thus, he writes (in Skinner, 1974, p.176)7 that behavioral science is a branch of biology that seeks to make predictions and to control behavior. This is clearly an expression of the nomothetic ideal of science to be found throughout Skinner's production. It is also characteristic of Skinner that, in accordance with this ideal of science, he emphasizes the value of the technological application of the sciences. Thus, he writes (in Skinner, 1974, p. 231)s that a 'behavioral technology' constitutes precisely the necessary supplement to physical and biological technology, which has far from solved all the problems of mankind and even created some new ones (see Skinner, 1974, p. 251)9. The frequent use of the expression 'behavioral technology' together with the book-title ,,Technology of Teaching" also shows that Skinner possesses a markedly natural scientific-technological ideal of science.

3. Methodology. On this point too, Skinner has some extremely consistent and radical views. His radical view of behaviorism is especially marked in his conception of introspection and the treatment of the inner, private world (see Skinner, 1974, pp. 14,31,52,215 and 217-218)lo. We shall briefly reformulate his methodological (and metatheoretical) meta-theses as follows: 1. Introspection is a spontaneousfeeling or observation of the state of the organism inside the skin. It consists of private though physico-physiological data.

488


2. At some future date physiology will be able to replace this private, and therefore uncertain, knowledge about the nervous system. But empirical 'laws' about behavior will still be valid.

3. It is unprofitable to replace the lack of knowledge with models of the nervous system - a 'conceptual nervous system' - or models of the 'psyche'. Apart from these methodological arguments for studying behavior and regarding private, introspective reports as behavior, there are no methodological arguments to be found about method and data-language in Skinner, 1974. But there is no doubt that Skinner prefers experimental method and behavioral data. CONCLUSION. We can now conclude the analysis of the meta-stratum in Skin-

ner's production by recapitulating radical behaviorism's most important metatheses: a biological conception of man, a materialistic and probabilistic ontology, an empirical and realistic theory of knowledge, a nomothetic ideal of science and behavioristic methodology.

Skinner's Hypothetical Stratum INTRODUCTION. Does Skinner's production at all contain a hypothetical stra-

tum? There is every good reason for discussing this problem, because Skinner has always been extremely skeptical about the use of hypothetical constructions. This appears also in Skinner, 1974, pp. 217-218, in which he cautions against the use of models, neurophysiological and others, because they distract attention from what is essential: behavior and its 'history'. We can start by ascertaining that the most frequently used explanatory concepts in Skinner's production are: 1) 'contingencies of survival', also called 'genetic endowment', and 2) 'contingencies of reinforcement'. The question now is whether these explanatory terms are hypothetical terms. Both genetic endowment and contingencies of reinforcement are in principle observable variables. But when they are used as explanations of the behavior of concrete individuals, these terms will often cover over something unobservable (though in principle observable). An individual's genetic endowment can be observed e.g. indirectly by way of his genealogy, which is furthermore a part of the developmental history of the species, its phylogenesis. Likewise, it may be pos-


489

sible in principle to observe all the contingencies of reinforcement to which an individual has been exposed during the course of his 'environmental history'. But in practice it will often be the case that many items in his environmental history will remain obscure. In other words, the environmental history and the geneaology ofen have to be reconstructed. So Skinner's explanations with the help of 'genetic endowment' and 'contingencies of reinforcement' are possibly not so much explanations by way of hypothetical constructions but explanations by way of partially hypothetical re-constructions. Additionally, there is one term that is entirely hypothetical - a construction - and consequently not just a reconstruction. This will be discussed in the next section. HYPOTHETICAL TERMS. A term frequently used in Skinner's production is

'probability'.This may naturally be used as a mathematico-statistical concept and defined, for example, as relativefrequency. Thus when Skinner speaks of a behavior's probability it may simply be its 'relative frequency'. But Skinner has also used the term in a different way (e.g. in Skinner, 1953, p.62)11. Here he explicitly maintains that 'probability of response' can replace frequently used terms such as 'tendencies', 'dispositions' and 'habit-strength. But he emphasizes that 'we never observe probability as such'. This is very convincing evidence for Skinner's use of 'probability' where other psychologists use 'tendency' and suchlike, and for maintaining that 'probability' refers to an unobservable variable and is therefore per definition a hypothetical term. Skinner prefers this term to other similar hypothetical terms ('tendency', 'habitstrength, etc.), because probability can be defined operationally by the frequency of the reactionl2. Therefore in the next section we shall place the hypothetical variable in a greater functional context, formulated as hypotheses; but prior to that we shall classify 'probability' in accordance with the systematological taxonomy (cf. Appendix). It is clear from the above that 'probability' is a hypothetical term. It is somewhat difficult to determine its ontological reference, though it refers neither to physiological or mentalistic variables. It is either a hypothetical construction with a neutral surplus meaning or a pure intervening variable without surplus meaning - probably the latter. But because of the gradual transition and difficulty in distinguishing between these two categories, we have characterized them in the systematological taxonomy as Hc-terms.

490


It is also difficult to classify 'probability' in relation to two other classifications, precisely because of the extremely abstract nature of the term. It is therefore almost necessary to choose 'the middle position' in both classifications. Thus, as regards the variable's effect, 'probability' must be classified as a vector variable and as regards itsform, probability must be classified as both structure (disposition) and process, or perhaps even more precisely: as a permanent state that renders the subject susceptible to certain types of behavior. Finally, we should mention that Skinner also uses another hypothetical term, i.e. 'drive' (Skinner, 1953, p. 144)13. Here the term is used for summarizing in a purposeful manner the results of 'deprivation', 'satiation' and other 'operations' affecting the probability of the behavior. It is clear that 'drive' is a hypothetical term referring to an intervening variable (later on in the same book Skinner calls it an 'intervening state'). But since Skinner does not in any case use this term, but prefers the descriptive terms 'deprivation' and 'satiation', we shall not incorporate them in the following reconstruction of Skinner's hypotheses. THE HYPOTHESES. It is well known that already in 1938 Skinner distinguished

between two types of behavior: respondent behavior and operant behavior. They accompany two different kinds of learning processes: 'classical' or respondent conditioning and operant conditioning. Later he added a third type: operant discrimination. Thus there are three categories of acquired behavior: 1) respondent, 2) operant and 3) operant discrimination (Skinner, 1953, pp. 65 and 125)14. But these acquired types of behavior presuppose the existence of innate types of behavior, which Skinner increasingly focussed on during the course of time. They are dealt with thoroughly in Skinner, 1974, Chapter 3 of which deals entirely with 'Innate Behavior'. This comprises especially innate refexes and instinctive behavior. Skinner is nevertheless reluctant to accept instinctive behavior as a special category. But we certainly have to add a fourth category of behavior to the three already mentioned, namely innate reactions, which is a common denominator for reflexes and instinctive behavior. According to Skinner, with these four categories it should be possible to describe and explain all human behavior. Skinner's production makes it plain that all complicated behavior from perception via thinking and language to so-


491

cial behavior can be explained with the help of four categories. So in the following we shall reconstruct Skinner's theory in the form of a number of hypotheses, all derived from the three books analysed. We shall start with a hypothesis about the development of innate reactions: 1ST HYPOTHESIS: In animals and humans phylogenetic development with its 'contingencies of survival' has developed innate 'reaction probabilities' (=

'reflex mechanisms'), which have as their function (effect) the production of vital, rejlexional reactions. In the following, Skinner's 'probability of reaction' will be abbreviated as 'Pr', where it stands for what is usually termed 'reflex mechanism'. Since it is a historical hypothesis we shall use S(1V) as an abbreviation of all independent variables (including stimuli), as we did with the reconstruction of Leontyev's theory (Chapter X). Symbolically reformulated we obtain:

1st Hypothesis:

S(1V) (contingencies of survival) + H(Pr) + R(reflexiona1 behavior)

The next hypothesis will deal with respondent behavior and 'classical' conditioning. 2ND HYPOTHESIS: If a neutral (conditioned) stimulus (CS) appears together with an unconditioned (reinforcing) stimulus (UCS), the neutral stimulus alone will thereafter be able to increase the probability of reaction so much that the original (reflexional) reaction appears.

Symbolically reformulated: 2nd Hypothesis: 1) S(CS) + S(UCS) + H(Pr) +R(reflex) 2) S(CS) + H ( h ) +R(reflex)

The next hypothesis will naturally deal with operant behavior and conditioning, but it necessary to start with a definition and classification of 'Reinforcement'.

Definition: A 'reinforcer' is an object or event, which increases the probability of reaction. This appears as an increase in the frequency of reactions of the same type.

492


Classification: 'Reinforcers' may be classified as 1) unconditioned or 'innate' and 2) conditioned. The effect of unconditioned reinforcers has been produced as the result of the phylogenetic development. The effect of the conditioned reinforcers has been produced as the result of a conditioning. Reinforcers may also be classified as 1)positive reinforcers, which reinforce when entering into a situation, and 2) negative reinforcers, which reinforce when absent from a situation.

We can now formulate the next hypothesis as follows: 3. HYPOTHESIS: Ifa reaction ('operant') is followed by a reinforcer, it will in-

crease the probability (Pr) of the operant concerned.

Formulated symbolically: 3. Hypothesis:

1) R(operant) + S(reinforcer) 2) S(reinforcer) + H(Pr)

Thus, we have classified a 'reinforcer' as an independent S-variable,because it affects the intervening hypothetic variable, or probability of reaction. The next hypothesis deals with discrimination. Here too it is purposeful to precede this with a definition. Definition: A 'discriminative stimulus' (Sd) is a stimulus which functions as a 'sign'that an operant reaction will now be followed by a reinforcer. A discriminative stimulus does not elicit an operant reaction, which is simply 'emitted', but increases the probability of an operant reaction. We shall formulate this as follows: 4TH HYPOTHESIS:A 'discriminative stimulus' (Sd) increases the probability of

an operant reaction (Pr) ifit appears together with a reinforcer.

Reformulated symbolically: 4th Hypothesis: 1) S(Sd) + H(Pr) + R(operant) + S(reinforcer) 2) S(Sd) + H(increased Pr)

For the sake of completion we shall also include a hypothesis about the effect of 'deprivation' and 'satiation'.

Skinner’s production

493

Fig. 11.2. Graphical representation of Skinner’s theory. 5TH HYPOTHESIS: The degree of ‘deprivation’ v . ’satiation’ (depr./sat.)aflects

the probability of reaction (Pr).

Formulated symbolically: 5th Hypothesis: S(depr./sat.) + H(Pr)

494


With these five hypotheses the most important implicit hypotheses in Skinner's theory should have been formulated. For the sake of comparison with other theories Skinner's theory has been reconstructed as a graphic model (Fig. 11.2). To conclude this section we shall undertake the customary metatheoretical Classification of hypotheses, subdividing all S-H-R-hypothesesinto S-H and HR- hypotheses: 1. Theoretical hypotheses (H-H): 0 hypotheses 2. Empirical hypotheses: a. S-H: la; 2.la; 2.2a; 3b; 4.la; 4.2; 5 =in all 7 hypotheses b. H-R: lb; 2.lb; 2.2b; 4.lb; = 4 hypotheses The remarkable thing about the result of this classification is the absence of theoretical hypotheses. But this is in good accordance with Skinner's metatheory. THE HYPOTHESIS-SYSTEM. During the analysis of the meta-stratum we have ascertained that Skinner does not use any explanatory models, arguing on principle against the use of such models and against any kind of hypothetical constructions. But in the previous sections we have seen that he does in fact use at least one hypothetical term - an Hc-term - which refers to an intervening variable without surplus meaning, namely the 'probability of reaction'. As a result, Skinner's text does in fact contain (implicit) hypothesis. We might also ask whether it also contains a hypothesis-system - e.g. a deductive system of ovemding and subordinate hypotheses. Regarding the value of a deductive hypothesis-system Skinner writes ( in the preface to Skinner, 1969, pp. ix and xi)l5 that hypotheses can be used with respect to micro-phenomena ) (atoms, etc.) or mega-phenomena (the entire universe, galaxies, etc.), but should not be used with respect to observable macro-phenomena like behavior. So psychology has no use for the hypothetico-deductive method. Thus Skinner opposes the use of the hypothetico-deductive method in psychology, and on this point he fully adheres in practice to his own meta-theses. There is in fact no hypothesis-system i Skinner's production, not even explicitly formulated hypotheses. The impIicit hypotheses we have derived


495

form Skinner's production and formulated explicitly in the previous section are scattered about in the text and do not in any manner compose a system. But, on the other hand, Skinner's formulation is very precise and his discourse on the whole very consistent, so it is not difficult to undertake an explicit, systematic reconstruction of the hypotheses as in the last section. And this reconstruction - as well as Skinner's own production - shows that Skinner's mode of explanation is deductive (or 'sumptive' - cf. the systematological taxonomy), though it is merely in sketchform and not systematized. However, in his production Skinner places chief emphasis on the data-stratum, to which we shall now turn.

Skinner's Data-Stratum INTRODUCTION. In the following we shall undertake an analysis and recon-

struction of the data-stratum in Skinner's production. It is by far the greatest part of Skinner's production, but there are not many metatheoretical problems connected with the data-stratum as with the hypothetical stratum, so this part of the chapter will be relatively short. In accordance with the systematological taxonomy we shall start by dealing with abstract and thereafter the concrete data-stratum. THE ABSTRACT DATA-STRATLJh4. Here we shall concentrate especially on the

general data-theses in Skinner's production. The most important of these deals with the Schedules of Reinforcement, which Skinner has anived at through his countless experiments. A more extensive account is given in the book of the same title, which he wrote together with C.B. Ferster in 1957; a short summary is to be found in Skinner, 1969 (pp.24-25)16. On the basis of this summary and especially of Skinner, 1953, we shall briefly formulate the most important schedules in the form of functional S-R-relations:A given schedule's organization of reinforcement is regarded as an independent (S-) variable and the operant behavior as a dependent (R-) variable.

I . General Data-thesis: Fixed interval reinforcement causes stable behavior (i.e. behavior it is difJicult to 'extinguish').

Briefly:S(fixed interval) + R(stab1e)

2. General Data-thesis: A fixed ratio reinforcement causes a relatively frequent reaction. Briefly:S(fixed ratio) + R(high frequency)

496


3. General Data-thesis: Variable interval reinforcement causes extremely stable behavior. Briefly: S(variab1einterval) + R(high stability) 4. General Data-thesis: Variable ratio reinforcement causes highfrequency and stability of behavior.

Briefly: S(variab1e ratio) + R(stable, high frequency). The four reformulated general data-theses deal with the four basic schedules of reinforcement, which may furthermore be mixed or combined. But there is a fifth basic schedule which is not mentioned in the section concerned. Whereas the four schedules mentioned are all intermittent schedules, there is also a continuous schedule, i.e. a schedule which administers reinforcement every time the individual has reacted (as opposed to the intermittent schedule, which does not administer reinforcement every time but only at intervals or according to a fixed ratio). The continuous schedule is especially effective during the learning or acquisition of a reaction, whereas the intermittent schedules are especially effective when maintaining a reaction. We shall formulate this as follows: 5 . General Data-thesis: Continuous reinforcement brings about the rapid learning of a reaction (i.e.an increasing reaction rate). Briefly: S(continuous reinforcement) + R(increasing reaction rate). For the sake of completion we must also include the formulation of an important data-thesis about the 'shaping' of behavior. This can be formulated (on the basis of Skinner, 1953, p 92)17 as follows: 6. General Data-thesis: Reinforcement successively approximated to the final goal brings about th extremely rapid learning of a reaction (i.e.an increasing reaction rate). Briefly: S(successive approximation)+ R(increasing reaction rate).

Skinner applies especially the last data-thesis in his remarkable demonstrations, in which he makes a dove carry out a desired reaction (e.g. bowing three times to the public) after only a few minutes.


497

All the above data-theses can be formulated as pragma-theses, which form the basis for the practical application of Skinner's data-theses in education (especially programmed teaching) and behavior therapy. The latter two theses could, for example, be formulated in one pragma-thesis as follows: Pragma-thesis: If rapid, faultless learning is desired, successively approximated and continuous reinforcement should be used until the desired standard ('terminal behavior') is achieved.

It is too much here to go into the practical applications of Skinner's research results, but we shall briefly mention that in all the above books Skinner himself applies his research results to practical problems and matters pertaining to society. Thus, in connection with the various schedules of reinforcement he discusses the different systems of payment used in industry and other parts of society. 'Fixed interval reinforcement' is like 'payment per hour', while 'fixed ratio reinforcement' is like 'piecework' and 'variable ratio reinforcement' is like 'gambling'. THE CONCRETE DATA-STRATUM. Skinner's empirical research consists ex-

clusively of experiments with animals (first rats, later doves) in the so-called 'Skinner-box'. This is an apparatus in which the experimental animals can react 'operatively' by pecking at a board or pressing a pedal, whereby - according to fixed intervals or ratio - a reinforcement is given (often food). The animals can also be subjected to discriminative stimuli. The apparatus has been built from the start for the automatic registration of behavior. After the discovery of computers many Skinner-boxes have been constructed in such a way that they do not merely automatically register but also automatically control the experiment with the help of computers. For this reason Skinner has produced not only thousands but millions of data. His data are cumulative registrations of reactions directly manifesting the 'response rate'. The latter is Skinner's most important behavioral datum, because it is a direct measure of the reaction's 'probability'. Skinner has been criticized - amongst others, by N.E. Miller - for having restricted the possible behavior of his experimental animals and only registering the response rate. On the other hand, it is precisely this that makes it possible to acquire so many data in a single experiment.


498

The Production as a Whole THE COMPLETENESS OF THE TEXT. As a whole Skinner's production is a complete scientific production containing meta-, hypothetical and data-strata. But naturally there are variations from book to book. The three books analysed here also vary. Thus Skinner, 1953, contains all three levels of discourse, although - in accordance with Skinner's meta-theory - the hypothetical stratum is relatively sparse. In Skinner, 1969, particularly the meta- and hypothetical strata are represented, the data-stratum by only a few examples. In Skinner, 1974, the meta-stratum dominates to an even greater extent, which is in accordance with the fact that Skinner regards 'Behaviorism' as the philosophy of behavioral science. THE TESTABILITY OF SKINNERS THEORY. On the basis of the above classifi-

cation of the reconstructed hypotheses we can calculate the hypothesis quotient (H.Q.) as a quantitative estimate of the theory's testability: H.Q =

A-C[(S-H)

+ (H-R)] - 7

0

+4

= 0.0

As may be seen, the H.Q. is the lowest possible, which means that the testability is the highest possible. This result is unlikely to surprise those psychologists who are cogniscent with Skinner's production and especially his radical, empirical philosophy of science. Skinner is presumably the most radical empiricist in psychology since the Second World War, but at the same time - and connected with this - also the psychologist who has personally produced the greatest number of empirical research results that are capable of practical application.


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Notes

,,The question is not whether the human species has a genetic endowment but how it is to be analysed. It begins and remains a biological system, and the behavioristic position is that it is nothing more than that." ,,The puzzling question of how a physical event causes a mental event, which in turn causes a physical event, remains to be answered or dismissed as unanswerable." Skinner himself chooses to answer this on p. 220 of the same book as follows: ,,No special kind of mind stuff is assumed. A physical world generates both physical action and the physical conditions within the body to which a person responds when a verbal community arranges the necessary contingencies."

,,A scientific analysis of behavior must, I believe, assume that a person's behavior is controlled by his genetic and environmental histories rather than by the person himself as an initiating, creative agent; but no part of the behavioristic position has raised more violent objections. We cannot prove, of course, that human behavior as a whole is fully determined, but the proposition becomes more plausible as facts accumulate, and I believe that a point has been reached at which its implications must be seriously considered." ,,Both prediction and control are inherent in operant conditioning, but the notion is always probabilistic, and we may deal with a probability when action is not taken place." ,,In the fifty years since a behavioristic philosophy was first stated, facts and principles bearing on the basic issues have steadily accumulated. For one thing, a scientific analysis of behavior has yielded a sort of empirical epistemology. The subject matter of a science of behavior includes the behavior of scientists and other knowers. The techniques available to such a

500


science give an empirical theory of knowledge certain advantages over theories derived from philosophy and logic." ,,Knowledge is subjective in the trivial sense of being the behavior of a subject, but the environment, past or present, which determines the behavior lies outside the behaving person." ,,As in other sciences, we often lack the information necessary for prediction and control and must be satisfied with interpret action, but our interpretations will have the support of the prediction and control which have been possible under other conditions." ,,The experimental analysis of behavior is a rigorous, extensive and rapidly advancing branch of biology, ..." ,,When we say that science and technology have created more problems than they have solved, we mean physical and biological science and technology. It does not follow that a technology of behavior will mean further trouble. On the contrary, it may be just what is needed to salvage the other contributions. We cannot say that a science of behavior has failed, for it has scarcely been tried." 10 Skinner touches upon this in several places in Skinner, 1974, e.g. p. 3 1 : ,,A behavioristic analysis does not question the practical usefulness of reports of the inner world that is felt and introspectively observed. They are clues (1) to past behavior and the conditions affecting it, (2) to current behavior and the conditions affecting it, and (3) to conditions related to future behavior." And later, on p. 52: ,,A person may feel or otherwise observe some of the conditions associated with the probability that he will behave in a given way." And on p. 215: ,,The physiologist of the future will tell us all what can be known about what is happening inside the behaving organism. His account will be an important advance over a behavioral analysis, because the latter is necessarily 'historical' - that is to say, it is confined to functional relations showing temporal gaps. Something is done today which affects the behavior of an organism tomorrow. No matter how clearly that fact can be established, a step is missing, and we must wait for the physiologist to supply it. He will be able to show how an organism is


501

changed when exposed to contingencies of reinforcement and why the changed organism then behaves in a different way, possibly at a much later date. What he discovers cannot invalidate the laws of a science of behavior, but it will make the picture of human action more nearly complete." About an alternative to the physiological explanation of behavior, Skinner writes on p. 217-18: ,,Another way of dealing with inference is to give it respect ability by converting it into an explicit model or system. ... Such a model or system could apply to either the mental or physical worlds or even to both, and the problem of dualism therefore seems to be avoided. Will a model of the nervous system not serve until physiology is more advanced? I believe the answer is no. The study of the conceptual nervous system is largely concerned with those 'thought processes' discussed in Chapter 7, which, as we have seen, are real enough at the level of behavior but merely questionable metaphors when moved inside. And like the study of consciousness or the real nervous system, a model or system continues to turn attention inward, away from a genetic and personal history." 11

In Skinner, 1953, the following is to be found on p. 62: ,,To get at the core of Thorndike's Law of Effect, we need to clarify the notion of 'probability of response'. This is an extremely important concept; unfortunately it is also a difficult one. In discussing human behavior, we often refer to 'tendencies' or 'predispositions' to behave in particular ways. Almost every theory of behavior uses such terms as 'excitatory potential', 'habit strength' or 'determining tendency'. But how do we observe tendency? And how can we measure one? ..." ,,It is a great advantage to suppose instead that the probabiiify that a response will occur ranges continuously between these all-or-none extremes. .." ,,The everyday expressions which carry the notion of probability, tendency, or predisposition describe the frequencies with which bits of behavior occur. We never observe a probability as such."

12

The above analysis and interpretation of Skinner's use of hypothetical terms has been 'approved' by Skinner himself in a personal letter to the author.

13

,,A need or want could simply be redefined as a condition from deprivation, and characterized by a special probability of response. Since it is difficult to lay the ghosts which hover about these older terms, there is a cer-

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14


tain advantage in using a term which has fewer connotations. 'Drive' is sometimes used. A drive need not be thought of as mental or physiological. The term is simply a convenient way of referring to the effects of deprivation and satiation and other operations which later the probability of behavior in more or less the same way. It is convenient because it deals with many cases at once." From Skinner, 1953, p. 65: ,,The term 'learning' may profitably be saved in its traditional sense to describe the reasortment of responses in a complex situation. Terms for the process of stamping in may be borrowed from Pavlov's analysis of the conditioned reflex. Pavlov himself called all events which strengthened behavior 'reinforcement' and all the resulting changes 'conditioning.' In the Pavlovian experiments, however, a reinforcer is paired with a stimulus; whereas in operant behavior it is contingent upon a response. Operant reinforcement is therefore a separate process and requires a separate analysis. In both cases, the strengthening of behavior which results from reinforcement is appropriately called 'conditioning.' In operant conditioning we 'strengthen' an operant in the sense of making a response more probable or, in actual fact, more frequent. In Pavlovian or 'respondent' conditioning we simply increase the magnitude of the response elicited by the conditioned stimulus and shorten the time which elapses between stimulus and response. (We note, incidentally, that these two cases exhaust the possibilities: an organism is conditioned when a reinforcer [ l ] accompanies another stimulus or [2] follows upon the organism's own behavior." From Skinner, 1953 p. 125: ,,The environment is so constructed that certain things tend to happen together. The organism is so constructed that its behavior changes when it comes into contact with such an environment. There are three principal cases. (1) Certain events like the color and taste of ripe fruit - tend to occur together. Respondent conditioning is the corresponding effect upon behavior. (2) Certain activities of the organism effect certain changes in the environment. Operant conditioning is the corresponding effect upon behavior. (3) Certain events are the occasions upon which certain actions effect certain changes in the environment. Operant discrimination is the corresponding


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corresponding effect upon behavior. As a result of these processes, the organism which finds itself in a novel environment eventually comes to behave in an efficient way. The result could not be achieved by inherited mechanisms because the environment is not sufficiently constant from one generation to another." 15

From Skinner, 1969, p. ix: ,,When a subject matter is very large (for example, the universe as a whole) or very small (for example, subatomic particles) or for any reason inaccessible, we cannot manipulate variables or observe effects as we should like to do. We therefore make tentative or hypothetical statements about them, deduce theorems which refer to accessible states of affairs, and by checking the theorems c o n f m or refute our hypotheses." And he continues on p. xi: ,,Behavior is one of those subject matters which do not call for hypothetico-deductive variables. Both behavior itself and most of the variables of which it is a function are usually conspicuous. ... If hypotheses commonly appear in the study of behavior, it is only because the investigator has turned his attention to inaccessible events - some of them fictitious, others irrelevant."

16

,,Schedules of reinforcement". Reinforcement may be scheduled in many ways. Each schedule, with given values of the parameters, generates a characteristic performance.

a.

Fixed interval. A response is reinforced only when it occurs after the passage of a period of time (for example, five minutes). Another period begins immediately after reinforcement.

b. Afixed ratio. Every n'th response is reinforced.

c. Variable interval or ratio. The interval or number in a. and b. need not be fixed but may vary over a given range around some average value. d. Multiple schedules. One schedule is in force in the presence of one stimulus, a different schedule in the presence of another stimulus. For example, a fixed interval prevails when the key is red, and a variable issues when the key is green. (A characteristic performance is obtained under each stimulus). e. DifSerential reinforcement of rate of responding. A response is reinforced only if it follows the preceding response after a specified interval of time

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17


(DRL) or before the end of a given interval (DRH). In DRL the interval might be, for example, 3 minutes, in DRH, one half second." ,,By reinforcing a series of successive approximations we bring a rare response to a very high probability in a short time."

Chapter 12

MAINSTREAM PSYCHOLOGY

INTRODUCTION. The three schools we have just described - Humanistic Psychology, Marxist Psychology and Contemporary Behaviorism - are the most important schools in the second period of school formation after 1960. But the psychological scientific community is not solely composed of the members of these three schools. To judge from the production and lectures associated with international congresses, they possibly do not even constitute a majority. Thus there is a large group of psychologists who do not belong to any of the above three schools, which we may call 'Mainstream'. This majority group does not regard itself as an organized school or trend within contemporary psychology, with its own paradigm, but rather as the exponents and developers of integrating psychology. Even so, for the purposes of history we may treat it as a 'macroschool' side by side with the three other organized macroschools. This main group consists of extremely different sub-groups, four of which we intend to discuss. These sub-groups can be regarded as four 'microschools' possessing a common meta-paradigm though different theory-paradigms, but it is also possible - and perhaps more correct - to regard these four sub-groups as professional groups specializing in four separate psychological disciplines. The subdivision has not come about as the result of a contraversy as regards the paradigm: for the sub-groups do in fact agree about the meta- paradigm, which is the same as that of the integrating psychologists. We shall deal with this in the second part of the chapter. Nor do they disagree about the theory-paradigm, as is usually the case with microschools. They are merely interested in different fields of psychology, each of them concentrating on different fields of research, with the result that their theories deal with entirely different subjects. The first professional group is interested in the psychology of learning, and has carried on the research started by Pavlov and the American behavior-

Mainstream psychology

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ists (see Chapter 6). The post-War members of this group include especially

D.O.Hebb and his pupils as well as D.E. Berlyne and N.E. Miller, etc. whom we shall discuss in a following section. The second professional group is interested in motivational psychology, and has carried on the research that was inspired by Freud and other psychoanalysts (see Chapter 7) as well as the synthesiscreatorH.A. Murray (see Chapter 8). Members of this group include especially D . McClelland and J . W. Atkinson, etc., whom we shall discuss in a following section. The third professional group is concerned with personality psychology. It is a large and extremely varied field which differs widely as regards both theory and methodology. Members of this group include the factor analytical psychologists, R.B. Cattell and H J . Eysenck, whom we shall discuss in a following section. The fourth professional group is composed of those psychologists interested in cognitive psychology who have continued to research the problems first examined by classical experimental psychology and Gestalt psychology. The chief representative of this group is Jean Piaget, but an increasing number of American psychologists have joined the group, including J.S. Bruner, Georg A. Miller and Karl Pribram, whom we shall discuss in a following section. In the first part of this chapter we shall account for the history of these professional groups, and in the second part we shall analyse a major work selected from their production.

The History of Mainstream Psychology TheHistory of the Psychologists of Learning INTRODUCTION. We have previously heard that chiefly behavioral psychologists have been interested in the psychology of learning (see Chapter 6). Pavlov and the American behaviorists regarded learning processes (learning proper and memory) as the most important processes underlying animal and human behavior. We have also heard that there have been different theories as to the 'nature' and 'causes' of learning processes. These may be summarized briefly here as follows:

The history of mainstream psychology

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1. Contiguity theories: These are theories that maintain that contiguity (approximation in time and space) is the most important cause of or condition for learning, and that the 'nature'of the learning process consists in the formation of 'associations' or 'connections' between stimuli and reactions. The chief exponents of these theories are Pavlov, Watson and Guthrie (see Chapter 6 ) .

2. Effect theories: These theories ressemble the above in that the 'nature'of the learning process consists in the formation of S-R-connections, but they differ as regards the cause of learning, maintaining instead that it is the effect of the reactions (behavior) that can have a reinforcing effect on functioning S-R-connections. The chief exponents of these theories are Thorndike and Hull together with their pupils (especially N.E. Miller). This group of psychologists has also been interested in motivation on account of its connection with reinforcement. 3. Cognitive theories: According to these theories, the 'nature' of the learning process consists in the formation of 'cognitive structures' (Tolman: 'cognitive maps'). Thus they differ entirely from the two previous groups of theories, which maintain that learning results in the formation of S-R-connections. Cognitive theories are not as specific as regards the causes of the learning process, regarding neither continguity nor effect as the most important causes. The main exponents of these theories were the Gestalt psychologists and Tolman. The subdivision into three types of learning processes described above took place during the first period of school formation. During the period of integration and the second period of school formation various attempts to synthesize the three theories have taken place. In Chapter 11 we saw that Skinner postulated the existence of two fundamentally different learning processes: respondent ('classical') conditioning and operant ('instrumental') conditioning. This synthesis was strongly criticized by Hull's pupil N.E. Miller, about whom we shall hear in a following section. Another synthesis was postulated by D.O. Hebb, who tried to integrate both of the connnectionist (contiguity and effect) theories with the cognitive theory. Hebb maintains that learning in animals and humans has evolved. It starts with a simple sensory-motor learning (combining respondent and operant conditioning). This type of learning occurs most frequently in the earliest stage of life (e.g. the first 2-3 years in humans); later it only takes place during the acquisition of new skills. The other type of learning process is complicated cognitive

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learning, which occurs later in life. Hebb explains learning in terms of neuropsychology as follows: simple sensory-motor learning leads to the production of memory traces, or engrams; these, according to Hebb, consist of neurone patterns, or 'cell-assemblies'. But in cognitive learning a temporal and spatial combination of these neurone patterns into more complicated patterns takes place, and these form the basis of cognitive processes. Hebb's theory is probably the most original theory within the psychology of learning in the 5 0 s . Therefore we shall briefly describe Hebb's history in the following. He inspired many younger psychologists to undertake neuropsychological research into learning and motivational psychology (which is difficult to separate),and we shall hear about some of these pupils below. D.O. HEBB (1904-85). The Canadian psychologist Donald Olding Hebb was born

in 1904. He obtained his B.A. at McGill University in Montreal and thereafter left the university in order to become an author. He read Freud and became interested in psychology, whereafter he entered the university again and took his M.A. examination. Here he read Pavlov, who seemed to him to explain many of the interesting phenomena demonstrated by Freud. So he decided to specialize in 'physiological psychology' and attended to Lashley in Chicago, where he obtained his Ph. D. He then returned to Montreal and was appointed to McGill University, where he later became Professor of Psychology. During the first years of his appointment he was greatly influenced by his colleague, the neurologist W. Penfield's famous research results with patients undergoing brain operations. Hebb carried out a number of experiments with chimpanzees, especially as regards their 'irrational' fright reactions. In 1949 his book ,,Organization of Behavior - A Neuropsychological Approach" - appeared, and aroused great interest. In this he argued very convincingly for a resumption of the connection with physiology, which Tolman and Skinner had to some extent interrupted. Hebb was of the opinion that the results of the research into brain physiology during the past few decades had justified a renewed interest in physiology, but he maintained, with increasing fervour, that this was not an attempt to 'reduce' psychology to physiology, but to construct a physiologically inspired 'model' in order to facilitate greater co-operation between psychologists and physiologists.


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In his 1949e theory learning processes played a great part - also in perception. Not until later - with the discovery of the function of the reticular system - did motivation also come to play a part in the theory. Hebb was not interested in formalizing his theory, but in empirical research and its application. He inspired several young psychologists to take up physiologically oriented psychology. The most well-known of these is Olds, who discovered the reinforcing function of the septal region of the brain, and Berlyne, who developed a theory about curiosity and thought. (An analysis of Hebb's theory is to be found in Madsen, 1959). JAMES OLDS. In 1954 one of Hebbs pupils, James Olds, discovered a so-called

'reinforcment' or 'reward' centre in the septal region, which is part of the limbic system in the brain. Under full narcosis he implanted micro-electrodes in different regions of the brain in rats, thereby enabling him to stimulate these regions intracranially. The pronounced reinforcing effect of this stimulation in the septal region was manifested by the experimental animal repeating the appropriate action as rapidly as possible. Human subjects have later experienced intracranial stimulation in the reinforcement centre as extremely pleasurable, for which reason this has been termed the 'pleasure centre'. Later Olds also discovered a negative reinforcement or 'punishment' centre in the limbic system, which blocks the function of the reinforcement centre. Finally, a secondary, positive reinforcement centre has been found, which blocks the negative reinforcement centre. (A detailed account is to be found in Olds, 1973). NEAL E. MILLER (born 1909). Miller was originally a pupil of Hull and worked

in the so-called Yale group (see Chapter 6). During the first part of his career he worked on the application of a simplified edition of Hull's theory, writing at the same time three important books: In 1939 came ,,Frustration and Aggression", written by members of the Yale group (see Dollard et al, 1939) and containing a theory of aggression inspired by Freud's original theory of aggression. In 1941 came ,,Social Learning and Imitation", which he wrote together with John Dollard (see Miller and Dollard, 1941). This book contains the results of experiments with animals and humans to show that imitation is learnt by way of reinforcement. In 1950 came ,,Personality and Psychotherapy" - a work he wrote together with John Dollard, who was a trained psychoanalyst. This book attempts to

510


synthesize psychoanalysis and the theory of learning. During this entire period Miller had been working with a simplified ('liberalized') version of Hull's theory, but in 1950 the book was supplemented with Miller's original theory about conflicts, which is to be found in an extremely formalized edition (see Miller, 1959). During the 1950s Miller became interested in neuropsychology and began to experiment with intracranial stimulation. In 1954 (the same year as Olds discovered the 'reward centre') he discovered a 'punishment centre' in the brain, but later he also experimented with the reinforcement centre. Since intracranial stimulation is an extremely rapid type of reinforcement, Miller thought of using it for the control and alteration of autonomously steered processes (blood pressure, blood circulation, temperature regulation and EEG activity, etc.). He was thereby able to demonstrate that autonomously controlled processes can also be altered via reinforcement. Thus in Miller's opinion is is unnecessary to assume - like Skinner - the existence of a different type of learning process - respondent conditioning. Miller continued his research on the reinforcement of autonomous processes and demonstrated that it could be applied to the explanation and treatment of psychosomatic illnesses. It has now become a special field of research called 'bio-feedback' (see Miller, 1971, and an analysis of Miller's theory in Madsen, 1974). D.E. BERLYNE (1924-1976). Daniel Ellis Berlyne was born in England, where he obtained his first university education. After having served in the British army during the Second World War he went to the USA, receiving a doctorate at Yale University under Hull. He also studied in Geneva with Jean Piaget and in the Soviet Union. In 1955 he was appointed Professor at the University of Toronto. He then became inspired by Hebb's neuropsychology,especially the latter's emphasis on the importance of the reticular activating system (RAS) for motivational psychology. Thereafter Berlyne did some research in 'motivation and reinforcement', published the book ,,Conflict, Arousal and Curiosity" (1960) followed by a book on thought processes (1963, at the same time continuing his experiments in motivational psychology. He gradually became more and more interested in the motivation underlying aesthetic enjoyment (see Berlyne, 1971), and inspired much research in so-called 'Intrinsic


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Motivation'. Therefore, despite his untimely death, he not only left a considerable production but succeeded in inspiring others. This appears from the commemorative volume ,,Advances in Intrinsic Motivation and Aesthetics", which was published by a group of pupils and colleagues (see Day, 1981). Berlyne himself presents a good example of the difficulties met with when trying to separate these professional groups, because he could with equal right be counted among motivational psychologists. Finally, we shall refer to a manual in the psychology of learning, which has become a standard work ever since the first edition, i.e. E.R. Hilgard ,,Theories of Learning" (1948 and after).

TheHistory of the Motivational Psychologists THE BACKGROUND FOR MOTIVATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Not until after the

Second World War did motivational psychology develop into an independent discipline. This was marked, amongst other things, by the start of the wellknown ,,Nebraska Symposium on Motivation" in 1953 and the appearance of several textbooks on the subject at the end of the 1950s. But motivational psychology has its roots in three other discipines, namely 1) instinct psychology, 2) personality psychology and 3) the psychology of learning. 1. INSTINCT PSYCHOLOGY. After Darwin's theory was adopted by psycholo-

gists it became customary to explain human behavior in the same way as that of animals, i.e. on an instinctual basis. This concept goes far back in history and has been used to explain animal behavior that could not be explained in terms of reason, which was reserved for human beings. Thus instincts were hypothetical constructs whose origin or function was usually allowed to remain inexplicable, but which were regarded as innate and part of the inherited biological make-up of the species. Instincts were used not only as a substitute for reason or intelligence, but also as an explanation of the driving forces behind behavior. Therefore instincts became H-variables and were accredited with dynamic as well as directive functions. This also applies to the first systematic instinct theoretician, the BritishAmerican psychologist W. McDougall, who presented his instinct theory in ,,Introduction to Social Psychology" (1908). Here instinct is defined a a disposition affecting not only perception and cognitive processes but emotions and

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impulses to act. McDougaIl listed eighteen instincts - though later reduced this number to twelve. Since this classical concept of instinct contained everything necessary in order to explain animal and human behavior, it became extremely popular and was therefore also abused. No attempts were made to define the concept of instinct operationally according to its S-variable or its origin. An instinct was solely defined according to the R-variable it was able to explain. Thus there was a great risk of ad hoc or pseudo-explanations, especially if instincts were freely discovered according to need. Mc Dougall did not succumb to this temptation, since he only listed a comparitively limited number of instincts, but others - especially non-psychologists - later began to apply the concept of instinct in an entirely unrestricted and uncontrollable manner. For example, in the 20s one sociologist listed over fourteen thousand instincts, all of which were to be found in literature. As a natural result of this, the concept of instinct fell into discredit among psychologists. Later on, however, it was taken up again by modern animals psychologists - the so-called 'etologists' - who were pupils of the Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz. Lorenz propounded an instinct theory which later became systematized (in 1951) by the Dutch-English N. Tinbergen. According to this etological theory, an instinct is a set of hierarchically organized, innate releasing mechanisms (IRM) with an exclusively steering function. The driving force - according to Tinbergen - is constituted by the motivating factors, which consist partly of internal and partly of external stimuli. Etologists have tried to explain the origin of the instincts by way of an evolutionary biological theory, and have thus avoided the use of a pseudo-explanatory concept. 2. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY. At the same time as the concept of instinct fell into discredit Freud presented his theory about 'Trieb' (1915). Unfortunately this term was translated as 'instinct' in the first English and American translations. In Freud's theory the word 'Trieb is applied to a psychological force comprising the necessary energy for behavior; but 'Trieb also comprises per definition those steering mechanisms directed towards the goals and objects relevant to the specific 'Trieb'. Thus Freud's Trieb-concept is not merely a dynamic H-variable but a so-called vector-variable. But Freud used


513

only two Trieb-concepts, i.e. libido and aggression, and so could not be accused of resorting to pseudo-explanations,but rather to oversimplified explanations. On this point Murray radically altered Freud's theory: he used the world 'need', which was nonetheless defined as a hypothetical force with both dynamic and directive effects, and increased the number of hypothetical variables to about forty such 'needs'. These H-variables were used in order to explain the dynamics underlying human behavior; though also to describe differences between people, since Murray assumed the existence of individual differences in the dispositions conditioning the intensity of a particular person's need. Thus, with Murray's theory, 'need' became both a personality factor, or disposition, and a dynamic and directive process, or state (cf. Chapter 8). Murray's pupils McClelland and Atkinson developed models of a single 'need', i.e. 'the need for achievement'. But at the same time they altered the terminology. Atkinson differentiated the concept of 'need' to comprise the following: T = (M x E X I), where T is a tendency to act, which is a product of a personal disposition called 'motive' (M), a process or state called 'expectation' (E) and a second process or state called 'incentive' (I). Whereas 'expectation' is largely a cognitive and directive H-variable, 'incentive' is largely an activating H-variable which is dependent on the stimulating value of the goal object. Thus we see that Atkinson has defined the need concept as consisting of a disposition (M), a dynamic process (I) and a directive process (E). Parallel with this theoretical development of the concept of motivation in personality psychology a development was taking place within the psychology of learning, as we shall now describe. 3. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING. When the concept of instinct fell into discredit, Woodworth proposed a new concept - that of 'drive'. This functioned exclusively as a driving force - not as a steering mechanism. Tolman introduced the concept of drive into the psychology of learning, but Hull was the first to arive at a precise definition. According to Hull's theory, 'drive' (D) is a general activating process or state, i.e. a dynamic H-variable. The corresponding steering mechanism is habit or 'habit-strength' (sHr). Later, Hull was inspired by K.W.Spence to introduce yet another motivation variable - that of 'incentive-motivation' (K). This H-variable is dependent on the value of the goal object or reward, whereas 'drive' is dependent on a state of 'need' in an organ outside the nervous system. As we know, this and other H-variables to-

514


gether give rise to an action tendency or reaction potential (sEr) according to the formula: s E =~f(sHR X D x K). If we compare this formula with Atkinson's we can clearly see the resemblance: Hull's SER corresponds to Atkinson's T, and Hull's SHR more or less corresponds to Atkinson's M, whose origin, however, is not defined. Likewise, Hull's K corresponds to Atkinson's I. On the other hand, Atkinson has nothing to correspond with Hull's D, and Hull has nothing to correspond with Atkinson's E (except perhaps SHR, which is both disposition and process). This comparison shows that, despite the differences in terminology, there is a great accordance between the two sets of motivation concepts, which have undergone a parallel development within the two disciplines, the psychologies of learning and personality. The greatest concrete difference is the emphasis Hull places on 'drive', which is dependent on biological 'needs', whereas Atkinson places great emphasis on 'expectation', which is dependent on cognitive processes. This difference in the theories can be explained on the basis of their psychological historical origin in respectively learning experiments with animals and the testing of human subjects. Since the Second World War tremendous development has taken place within motivational psychology regarding the creation of physiological hypotheses. For example, the general, activating 'drive' has become identified with 'arousal', which is the term for the activating state in the so-called reticular arousal system (RAS), whose function was discvoered in 1949 by physiologists. Its importance for motivational psychology has been stressed by Hebb and his pupil D.E. Berlyne in the latter's theory about curiosity (1960). The historical connection between the development of motivational psychology with that of the other disciplines is reproduced here in Fig. 12.1. DIFFERENT THEORIES OF MOTIVATION. During the course of time many (at least fifty) theories of motivation have been proposed. However, as regards their content of basic hypotheses, they may be regarded as variants of four or five hypothetical systems, and represented as four models. 1. THE HOMEOSTASIS MODEL. This model - an equilibrium model - was pro-

posed at roughly the same time by Freud and the American physiologist Walter B . Cannon. In 1915 Cannon applied the concept homeostasis to biological


515

Survey of the main theoreticians in motivational psykology The dates indicate major works.

Fig. 12.1: Survey of the chief theoreticians in motivational psychology. The dates indicate major works.

equilibrium or equilibrium in the internal environment (a concept Cannon took from the French physiologist Claude Bernard). Examples of homeostasis include the balance of respectively nutrition, fluids and temperature. Thus a body temperature of 37 C is essential for our survival. Should the temperature diverge (especially rise) from the normal, then we are ill; and if the various regulating processes do not succeed in re-establishing this equilibrium we die. With slight alterations in the temperature of the external environment, automatic reflexive regdating processes are set in action. We sweat if it is hot, and the sweat cools the body; or we shake when it is cold, which produces heat. If the reflexive regulating processes are not sufficient to re-establish equilibrium, behavior of a certain type is initiated. In hot weather we may seek a cooler place or take a cold bath, and in cold weather we may put more clothes on or heat up the house. The appropriate reflexive regulating processes and behavior are initiated when other types of balance, e.g. hunger and thirst, are disturbed. In the same year - 1915 - Freud presented his drive theory, according to which drives arise as the result of strong internal stimulation from the various

516


organs of the body. This stimulation creates a tension in the psychic apparatus which, by way of various internal processes and external actions, seeks to reduce the tension and re-establish equilibrium. Thus, in both these theories a state of biological unbalance determines behavior whose function or effect is to re-establish equilibrium. Thus, behavior - which had become the object of psychological research - acquired an extremely important role in all biological adaptation. This helped to popularize the homeostasis model among psychologists, and it became most widespread in Hull's version of the need-drive theory. In the latter, need - or 'conditions of drive' - was defined as a disturbance of the biological balance in some organ. Need could be a state of lack (e.g. hunger) or of surplus (e.g. a need to empty). The need arouses a hypothetical, general activating state in the brain - a 'drive'. Together with the acquired nervous mechanisms - and other hypothetical processes - the drive organizes behavior. As a rule this will reduce or satisfy the need - e.g. by procurring food and eating it. Thereby the biological balance is restored until disturbed by new needs. In Hull's theory this was additionally combined with a hypothesis positing that it is the need-reduction and resulting drive-reduction that functions as a reinforcement of the activating habit mechanisms. The popularity of the homeostasis model led to its extensive use - and eventually abuse as the explanation of all behavior. Not only all primary organic needs and drive functions were explained in terms of equilibrium, but curiosity and social types of motivation were explained on the basis of primary homeostatic needs. But the dissatisfaction with the homeostasis model arose at the same time as its popularity and abuse culminated. Many people had been dissatisfied for a long time with the practice of regarding curiosity, for example, as an acquired drive, and in the first Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (1953) H.F. Harlow argued convincingly on an experimental basis that curiosity was a primary drive. His famous experiment with aritifical ape-mothers constitutes another proof that contact is not a secondary motivation variable based on hunger, but a primary motivation determined by external stimuli. But at the same time another source had revealed that not even the most typical homeostatic types of motivation - like hunger - could be explained exclusively on the basis of the homeostasis model, thus making it possible for other models to compete with it (see Fig. 12.2).


517

Fig. 12.2: The four basic motivation models (homeostasis, incentive, cognitive, activity). 2. THE HEDONISTIC INCENTIVE MODEL. While te homeostasis model was at its peak the American psychologist P.T. Young undertook a number of experiments on food-preference in rats. The results showed that rats preferred certain types of tasty though not necessarily need-gratifying food (e.g. sacharine was preferred to other types of need-gratifying foods). In other words, tastiness may be more motivating than need. Young developed this into a hedonistic

518


theory, which maintains that affective activation is an important motivating variable side by side with needs and drives - whose existence Young did not deny. According to Young, affective activation can vary from hedonistic positive (comfort, pleasure) to hedonistic negative (discomfort, unpleasure). Young himself calls his theory objective hedonism, since pleasure-unpleasure is not defined according to subjective, phenomenological but objective behavioral criteria. Hedonism, which maintains that human beings strive to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure, had its origin in Greek Antiquity - e.g. Epicurus - and was taken up in modem times, by J. Bentham and Stuart Mill. But in our century psychologists have largely rejected it because it lacks a biological or behavioral foundation (an exception, however, being Freud's 'pleasure principle', see Chapter 7). Simultaneously with Young, etologists also maintained that certain stimuli primarily arouse approach or avoidance behavior (without the involvement of needs). Inspired by Young and the etologists, a hedonistic theory was also formulated by David McClelland: certain S-variablesprimarily evoke positive affective activation, whereas other S-variables evoke negative affective activation. According to McClelland, this is because small deviations from the organism's adaptation level create positive affective activation. On the basis of these affective activations various motives are learnt which, according to McClelland, are acquired expectations about changes in the affective state. In common with the above-mentioned hedonistic theories, these presuppose that certain external stimuli - e.g. specific types of food, sex-appealing stimuli and suchlike - primarily have an activating effect, though an internal state of equilibrium - a need - does not necessarily exist. Thus the essential difference between these two models is that whereas in the homeostasis model, the driving forces - the motivation - are largely internal in origin, in the hedonistic model they are largely external. We have yet to mention a variant of the hedonistic model. This too presupposes external motivative factors, both primary and secondary. Whereas the motivating effect of the primary factors is devoid of learning processes, that of the secondary factors results from a learning process (possibly classical conditioning). In this variant the external motivating factors are called incentives, and may be defined as independent variables (S-variables) with a dynamic effect. One of the main supporters of this incentive theory is K.W.Spence.


519

Spence, who was Hull's closest colleague, persuaded Hull to supplement his original homeostasis theory with a hedonist incentive hypothesis. Another example of a pure incentive theory is that of John W. Atkinson, which develops ideas derived from McClelland as well as Lewin and Tolman. The theory's main hypothesis is represented by the formula: R = f(T) = f(M x E x I), cf. the reference to Atkinson on p. 515. Atkinson furthermore assumes that all behavior is the result of a conflict between two or more tendencies. Thus, performance-oriented behavior (Rp) is the result of two tendencies: the tendency to achieve success (Ts) and the tendency to avoid failure (Taf). Each of these tendencies is a product of the three previously mentioned variables. Thus, we have R, = f(Ts + Taf)= (Ms x ESx Is)+(Maf x Ef x If). Of importance in performative behavior is the relative strength of Ms, the success motive, and Maf, the avoidance of failure motive. In some people Ms is greater than Maf. They will seek out moderately difficult tasks, for here Es x IS is the greatest; whereas persons in whom Maf is greater than M, will seek out very easy or very difficult tasks. Later on Atkinson developed the theory into an extremely formal, mathematical theory (especially in J.W. Atkinson and D. Birch: ,,Dynamics of Action" (1970), see Fig. 12.2). 3. THE COGNITIVE MODEL. During the course of time a number of theories have been put forward possessing a common cognitive model as their chief content. According to this model cognitive processes have a dynamic effect apart from the directive effect they have as cognitive processes. To1man"s theory was extremely cognitive-oriented, but also extremely mixed. A clear and consistently elaborated cognitive motivation theory was subsequently put forward by the American Leon Festinger in his book ,,A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance" (1957). According to this theory, cognitive elements (i.e. sense impressions, ideas, concepts, information, knowledge, belief, etc.) may be either consonant (i.e. in harmony or mutual agreement) or dissonant (i.e. conflicting or at variance). Dissonance contains - or causes - a motivating state, which seeks to reduce the dissonance. This may occur in many ways: people can alter their behavior, or alter other concrete conditions; but they can also alter their cognitive elements, such as rationalization, distortions, suppression or repression of cognitive elements. Festinger's theory has proved applicable to many fields, first and foremost to the socio-psychologicalfield (such as advertising, religious movements, etc.), but in recent years also to educational psychology (such as the distribution of rewards). Other theories - e.g. those of

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Mainstreampsychology

Guilford, J. McHunt, Nuttin, Pribram and Piaget - maintain that cognitive processes have their own intrinsic motivation. This implies that it is the interest in - and enjoyment connected with - problem-solving itself that makes people think and solve problems, without needs or any extrinsic motivation necessarily being involved. These theories thereby approach the next category (see Fig. 12.2). 4. THE ACTIVITY-MOTIVATION-MODEL. In 1958 the pioneer of motivational

psychology, R.S. Woodworth (see Chapter 8), who introduced the concept of drive in 1918, put forward a new, original and consistent theory of motivation, which he called a 'behavior primacy theory'. This was proposed as an alternative to the previously dominating 'need primacy theories', such as Freud's, Hull's and other homeostasis theories. Woodworth maintains that the most important primary motivation variables are not S-variables - neither internal needs nor external incentives - but R-variables: behavior and its retroactive effect on the central (hypothetical)processes. People and other organisms have a fundamental motive (need, drive) for activity, which can consequently be gratifying in itself without other needs or drives - such as hunger - necessarily being involved. In accordance with this fundamental motivational hypothesis, Woodworth maintains that people have a fundamental motive for making use of their behavioral potential - their abilities and talents. Just as a muscle or any other organ needs to function, every central structure - ability, talent - also has an intrinsic motive for being used. Thus Woodworths theory may be regarded as a generalization of the theory of intrinsic motivation, which should not only include cognitive but all types of processes and behavior. With his instrinsic, activity-motivation-model Woodworth approaches the so-called 'humanistic' motivational theories, which maintain that mature adults possess peculiarly human types of motivation, whereby they may be distinguished from children and animals (Woodworth, 1958). Other psychologists who have adopted an activity model include D.E. Berlyne, D.O. Hebb and Duane Schulz (see Fig 12.2). 5. INTEGRATION OF THE MOTIVATION MODELS. When accounting for the

four models it was said that some theories involve two or even more models. E.g. Hull's theory was originally a homeostasis theory, though supplemented with an incentive hypothesis, and Atkinson's theory is an incentive theory con-


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The Cognitive Model and the Activity Model

1960

The Incentive Model

1940

The Homeostatic Model

I Reflexology

4

1920

1900

The InstinctTheory

Internal

Determinants of Behavior

External

Fig. 12.3: The 'dialectic spiral' used to describe the development of the theme, internal and external causes of behavior, in motivational psychology.

taining some cognitive elements. Here we should mention a theory which contains elements from several models, perhaps all of them. In 1960 the Canadian psychologist D.E. Berlyne presented a theory about curiosity, which was later developed to include the experience of art. This theory may be regarded as a synthesis of the four models (see Madsen, 1974 and 1975). The actual course of development in the history of motivational psychology may be regarded as a 'dialectical spiral' in which thesis-antithesis-synthesis-new antithesis etc. replace one another. Here the opposition between thesis

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and antithesis constitutes a hypothesis about the causes of behavior. In some theories internal, while in other theories external, factors are maintained to be the essential cause of behavior. This traces a historical course, starting with the classical instinct theory, which stresses internal factors (innate instinct mechanisms), and followed by the antithesis, reflexology and behaviorism, which stresses external factors (stimuli). These are then folowed by the fvst synthesis, the equilibrium model, which emphasizes both internal and external factors, though attaches greatest importance to internal factors (needs). This is then replaced by the incentive model, which attaches greatest importance to external factors (incentives) and, finally, by the activity model (including the cognitive model), which attaches greatest importance to internal factors (cognitive processes, intrinsic motivation). This schematic account (model) of the development of motivational psychology has been reproduced in the diagram (see Fig. 12.3). MOTIVATIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS. in the following section we shall provide

some biographical and bibliographical data about a few chosen motivational psychologists. WILLIAM MCDOUGALL (1871-1938) was a British-Americanpsychologist who

wrote several important books, the most famous of which is probably his ,,An Introduction to Social Psychology", published for the first time in 1908 and subsequently issued in more than thirty editions. It is that McDougall presents his classical instinct theory, which explains human personality and behavior including social behavior - as a product of a number of innate 'instincts'that are both driving forces (motivation variables) and steering mechanisms. The number of instincts was reduced throughout the various editions from eighteen to twelve. Apart from instincts McDougall also used 'sentiment'as an explanatory concept. This was defined as a system of instincts possessing a cognitive element. Thus, a person could be characterized by a smaller number of sentiments. The instinct theory was considerably revised in his last book ,,The Energies of Men" (1933). In this book the concept of instinct is replaced by that of 'propensity', which is an innate motivation variable not necessarily coupled with an innate steering mechanism. In humans and higher mammals the steering mechanisms will often be acquired (e.g. conditioned reflexes, habits


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and skills). McDougall wrote several other books, and a metatheoretical analysis is to be found in Madsen, 1959. McDougall had a direct influence on Murray (whom we discussed in Chapter 8) and R.B. Cattell, whom we shall discuss under personality psychologists. DAVID C. MCCLELLAND (born 1917) is a pupil of Murray and was also Profes-

sor at Harvard. He took his point of departure in Murray's theory and methods. Regarding theory, McClelland confined himself to the study of a single motivation variable selected from Murray's forty needs, i.e. the achievement need, or rather, motive. Instead of employing the concept of need (which he abbreviated as 'n'), he used the term 'motive', which was defined as 'an expectation of change in the affective state'. Later the definition was changed to 'motive' = ,,an affectively loaded associative network". As the definitions indicate, McClelland's theory is largely a hedonistic incentive theory, though somewhat cognitively oriented. In other respects McClelland was not interested in formulating the theory (the hypothesis-system) so much as in empirical research and the practical application of its results in education and management. As far as merhod is concerned, McClelland developed Murray's ,,Thematic Apperception Test" into a group test. He and his colleagues could thereby obtain many data from many experimental subjects in a relatively short time. Since McClelland was initially only interested in the achievement motive, he could suffice with four pictures instead of the twenty to be found in Murray's TAT. Later on McClelland also began to investigate the power motive and the affiliation motive. The test was then increased to six pictures, and each picture was presented for only a few seconds to the subjects, who then had five minutes in which to write a story to fit the picture. Thus the test takes altogether only thirty minutes. McClelland and his colleagues standardized the test procedure and tested its reliability, which was approx. r = 0.95. At a later stage McClelland developed a data treatment procedure which enabled a computer to analyse the subjects' stories and allocate points for the presence of 'motivationally relevant fantasies'. McClelland also tested TATS validity, and found by means of ingeniously devised experiments with subjects in extremely realistic situations that the validity was about 0.80. E.g. the fear motive was tested on soldiers taking part in an exercise in which nuclear bombs were exploded above ground. The

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soldiers were stationed at various distances from the site of the explosion (from 3.6 - 100 km) and were asked to write stories at various times in relation to the explosion (some immediately following the explosion, at a distance of 3.6 km, with the mushroom cloud arching over their heads). These methodological studies are to be found together with the theory in McClelland's, Atkinson's, Clark's and Lowell's book ,,The Achievement Motive" (see McClelland, 1953). Later on McClelland became particularly interested in the application of his research results. He wrote ,,The Achieving Society" (1961), in which he applies method and theory to historical material and demonstrates the close connection between ideology, upbringing, development of personality and economic growth. A society boasting an ideology that values initiative and energy will bring up its citizens to be self-reliant, thus fostering the development of the achievement motive, which in turn fosters economic growth in society. McClelland's theory is a psychological extension of a sociological theory originally presented by the German sociologist Max Weber. Subsequently, as the result of experiments on adult persons participating in residential courses, McClelland demonstrated that the achievement motive can be permanently developed in adult persons (see McClelland and Winter, 1969). McClelland wrote many books other than those mentioned here (a metatheoretical analysis may be found in Madsen, 1959, and an account of McClellands research results and their practical application in Madsen, 1975). JOHN W. ATKINSON (born 1923) originally collaborated with McClelland on his major methodological work (McClelland, 1953). Later he became Profes-

sor at Michigan University in Ann Arbor, and was especially concerned with developing the applied theory into a general theory of human motivation. This was first presented in a textbook ,,An Introduction to Motivation" (1964). Later it was extended and published as ,A Theory of Achievement Motivation" which contained updated research results (see Atkinson and Feather, 1966). Finally, Atkinson developed an extremely formal, mathematical theory: ,,The Dynamics of Action" (see Atkinson and Birch, 1970). This is probably the hitherto most systematic and formalized theory of motivation. Moreover it attempts to integrate aspects from Freud, Lewin, Murray and other theories. Atkinson and his colleagues later incorporated computer-simulation in their


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theoretical work. A course of action is simulated on a computer; the programme steering the process then contains the most important features of the theory's explanatory model, and simulation is therefore regarded as a test of the theory (see Atkinson and Raynor, 1974). An analysis of Atkinson's theory is contained in Madsen, 1974). See also Brown and Veroff (1986). OTHER MOTIVATIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS. Naturally there are other

psychologists than those mentioned above who have contributed to the development of motivational psychology. Some of the psychologists of learning, e.g. Berlyne, Miller and Konorsky, are just as deserving of mention. Likewise, a few personality psychologists have also contributed to the development of motivational psychology. The synthesiscreator R.S. Woodworth, who was discussed in detail in Chapter 8, might also be classed as a motivational psychologist. However, there is one psychologist in particular who may have helped to divorce motivational psychology from the psychologies of learning and personality, i.e. P.T. Young. He is the first to have written a book actually entitled 'motivation', i.e. ,,The Motivation of Behavior" (1936). This book presents the results of considerable experimental research, organized according to a 'multiaspect view'. Young carried out some interesting experiments on foodpreference in rats, and this helped to make the incentive theory a worthy alternative to the need-drive theory. Later on he summarized these and other research results in a new monograph: ,,Motivation and Emotion"( 1961). Among European psychologists we shall suffice by mentioning three who have made a special contribution to the development of motivational psychology. HEINZ HECKHAUSEN (born 1926), who was a lecturer in Munster, professor at Ruhr University in Bochum and is now a professor in Munich. His chief concern has been the development, both experimental and theoretical, of McClelland's and Atkinsons's motivational psychology. His first book dealt with the achievement motive (see Heckhausen, 1963). He has subsequently written a great many articles as well as books. The most important of these is a textbook ,,Motivation und Handlung" (1980). Heckhausen's theory has taken on a more cognitive aspect than is the case with McClelland'sand Atkinson's theories.

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HANS THOMAE (born 1915), Professor of Psychology in Bonn, BRD, has con-

tributed towards the development of motivational psychology in publishing the first big manual of psychology. For example, he has edited Volume 2, entitled ,,Motivation", in the great German ,,Handbuch der Psychologie" in 12 volumes (see Thomae, 1965). Thomae himself has written the metatheoretical and some of the theoretical chapters in this over 900-page manual. Other contributors include R. Bergius, O.M. Evert, H. Feger, W.D. Frolich, C.F. Graumann, H. Heckhausen, U. Lehr, P. Leyhausen, F. Merz, A. Mitscherlich, E. Mittenecker, H. Schmidtke, H. Vogel and F. Weinert. JOSEPH NU'ITIN (born 1909). Finally, we should mention the Belgian psychol-

ogist J.R. Nuttin, one of whose books - ,,Reward and Punishment in Human Learning" (1968) - has been translated into American. This book contains a theory - 'the relational theory of needs' - which synthesizes the homeostasis, incentive and cognitive models. (A metatheoretical analysis is contained in Madsen, 1974). Finally, we shall refer to Cofer's and Appley's survey of motivational psychology: ,,Motivation" (1964); this supplements the above-mentioned works by Heckhausen, 1980, Thomae, 1965, and Madsen, 1959,1974.

The History of the Personality Psychologists INTRODUCTION. Personality psychology covers a wider area than that of the other specialized fields with whose history we are dealing here. It may in fact be regarded as the general integrating subdiscipline psychology, since it attempts to integrate the research of the remaining disciplines into psychological processes into a general theory about the individual personality as a functional system. Therefore nearly all the existing schools of psychology have at some time during the development of personality psychology contributed a personality theory. First and foremost, all the most important members of the school of psychoanalysis - from Freud, Jung and Adler to Erikson - have contributed a psychoanalytically-oriented or psycho-dynamic personality theory. Murray, with whom we dealt in Chapter 8, may also be regarded as a psycho-dynamic psychologist. Since this movement has already been dealt with in comparative de-


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tail we shall not discuss it here, even though it may have made the most important contribution to modern personality psychology and its application in clinical psychology. Gestalt psychologists were not in the same way interested in personality psychology, but concentrated on cognitive psychology. But the synthesis-creator Kurt Lewin, who originally belonged to Gestalt psychology, contributed greatly to the development of motivational and personality psychology as well as social psychology. We have dealt with his 'field theory' fairly thoroughly in Chapter 8, however, so we shall not go further into it here. Behaviorists - classical behaviorists as well as neo-behaviorists and contemporary behaviorists - have had little interest in personality psychology (with the exception of Dollard & Miller, 1950 and A.W. Staats, 1975). Of the contemporary schools, the humanistic (and existentialist)has had the most interest in personality psychology. Since we have already dealt with this school - especially Maslow's theory - in Chapter 9, we shall not go further into it here. Outside all the established schools, though closest to the humanistic school, was the American psychologist Gordon W. Allport (1 897- 1967), who was Professor at Harvard University. His major work ,,Personality" (1937) had a great influence on the development of personality psychology. In this work he argued in support of an idiographic conception of personality psychology (see Chapter 2). He was influenced, amongst others, by W. Stern, though later partly by existentialist philosophy, as manifested by the new edition of his chief work, now entitled ,,Pattern and Growth of Personality" (1961). Allport was extremely all-round in his use of methods: amongst other things, he stressed the value of studying personal documents (letters, diaries, etc.). His theory is a socalled 'trait' theory: personality is regarded as a set of more or less organized, hypothetical variables called 'traits' (qualities, factors, variables). They manifest themselves as individual differences in behavior (a metatheoretical analysis is contained in Madsen, 1959). Finally, we must mention a group of Scandinavian personality psychologists under the leadership of Professor Gudmund Smith (born 1920) of Lund University, Sweden. He has been working on an extremely original synthesis of experimental method and psychoanalytically inspired theory. The method consists of perception experiments with a tachistoscope: the perception of 'afterimages' and the perception of ambiguous pictures of this type entering into projective tests. These experiments provide the basis for finding the perceptual

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genesis: the development of a perceptual product. This in turn forms the basis for studying important personality variables, such as defence mechanisms. This 'percept-genetic personality psychology' has proved to be very fruitful in clinical psychology. Major works on the subject include G. Smith and Ulf Kragh: ,,Percept-genetic Analysis" (1970), Smith et al: ,,Visual After-effects and the Individual as an Adaptive System" (1972), Smith and Hentschel: ,,Experimentelle Personlichkeitspsychologie" (1980) and, finally, Smith (1986). (A metatheoretical analysis is contained in Lauritsen and Madsen, 1982). All the above schools and individuals have inspired the development of personality psychology. In addition, there is a special personality psychological tradition, which we shall deal with in the next section. FACTOR ANALYTIC PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY. This personality psychol-

ogy has a long tradition, going right back to the British psychologist Francis Galton (discussed in Chapter 4), who founded test psychology and statistics at the same time as Wundt laid the foundation for experimental psychology. His pupil Charles E. Spearman (1863-1945) founded the statistical method termed factor analysis. He applied it himself in intelligecne research, and this tradition was carried on by the British and American psychologists: P.E. Vernon, L.L. Thurstone and J.P. Guilford. But factor analysis has also found application in personality psychology. It was Spearman's pupil, the British psychologist Raymond B. Cattell (born 1905), who founded factor analytic personality psychology. Later Cattell moved to the USA, and he is now in Hawaii. Cattell has been very productive, has written a great many books and constructed several hundred tests. His interests do not only lie in tests and statistical methods, however, but also in the development of psychological theory, and he has created an extremely comprehensive and formalized personality theory. Cattell's theory is analysed in Madsen, 1959,1974 and 1977. The other important factor analytic personality psychologist is Huns Jiirgen Eysenck, born 1916 in Germany. He moved during the Hitler period to London, where he studied psychology and later became a professor attached to the Department of Psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital. Eysenck's production is very extensive; he has written or edited over twenty books, which reveal a development that takes place in three stages.


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During the first stage Eysenck practised a purely descriptive personality psychology on a factor analytic basis. On the basis of tests and experiments he discovered a great number of personality factors, which may vary in strength in different people. On further analysis he discovered that these factors could be traced back to (or explained on the basis of) two overriding personality factors. ZnfroversionlExtrouersionis one of the factors (or 'dimensions') which vary in different people; Jung had already dealt with this dimension in his 'Psychological Types', and other psychologists have produced many variants of this during the course of time. The other variable factor is NeuroticismlEmotiona1Stability. These two dimensions can be established as a coordinate system with whose help it is possible to describe a given personality. Eysenck's chief work during this period was ,,Dimensions of Personality" (1947 and later editions). During the second stage Eysenck related his descriptive system to the theories of Puulou and Hull. He found that Pavlov had described the same introvert v. extrovert dimension in his 'weak and strong types of nervous system'. Thus, there existed a connection between 'type' and the facility whereby a person could be affected by classical conditioning. One of his chief works from this period is ,,Experiments in Motivation" (1964). It was also during this period that Eysenck became interested in behavioral therapy as an application of Pavlov's theory. During the third stage Eysenck became interested in biological and especially neurophysiological explanations of personality factors. This is to be found especially in his chief work from this period ,,The Biological Basis of Behavior" (1967). Eysenck still operates with two overriding personality factors (dimensions): intro-/extroversion and neuroticism, but relates them now to the function of the brain. Intro-/extroversion is regarded as a genetic factor which affects the cerebral cortex and the function of the reticular activation system, and thus determines individual differences in the course of cognitive processes. Differences in brain function are responsible for differences in behavior, both in test situations and those of everyday life. Neuroticism v. emotional stability is likewise regarded as a genetic factor affecting the 'visceral brain' (the limbic system and hypothesis), and thus causing individual differences in the course of emotional and motivational processes. Differences in brain function are responsible for individual differences in behavior, both in test situations and those of everyday life.

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Eysenck's theory has been reconstructed in a graphic model in Madsen, 1974, which also contains a metatheoretical analysis of Eysencks theory. During recent years Eysenck has become extremely interested in the metatheory of psychology, seeking to integrate differential personality psychology with general, experimental psychology. His ideas on this subject have been presented in Berlyne and Madsen (1973) and in ,,Annals of Theoretical Psychology", Vol. 3 (1985). See also Eysenck, H.J. and Eysenck, M.W.(1985). The connection between factor analytic personality psychology and theoretical psychology also appears from a new work on factor analytic psychology, i.e. Joseph Royce and Arnold Powell: ,,Theory of Personality and Individual Differences: Factors, Systems and Processes" (1983). Joseph Royce has written a great many books, but is best known as the founder of ,,The Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology" at the University of Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. This centre has meant a great deal for the development of theoretical psychology. Royce also established, and is now the chief editor of, the new international journal, ,,Annals of Theoretical Psychology", published by Plenum Press. ,,Theoretical Psychology" may be defined as 'the metascientific study of psychological theories and their associated problems'. Royce's and Powell's theory will be analysed in the final section of this chapter. Finally, mention must be made of an all-round standard work on personality theory, Hull and Lindzey: ,,Theories of Personality" (1957 and subsequent editions).

The History of the Cognitive Psychologists INTRODUCTION. The history of cognitive psychology is just as long as that of psychology. Classical experimental psychology, headed by Wundt, was especially occupied with perception (which is a cognitive process in the widest sense). Later Ebbinghaus became interested in learning, memory and forgetting. During the period of school formation it was only the Gestalt psychologists who were interested in cognitive psychology, particularly perception and thinking, whereas behavioral psychology was solely occupied with the psychology of learning (which is not usually regarded as cognitive psychology, even though there is some overlapping). Psychoanalysis was chiefly occupied


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with personality and its drives, even though Freud also constructed theories about memory, thinking and, not least, fantasies (see Henle, 1984). During the period of integration there was not much interest in cognitive psychology. The most important contribution towards its development came from Jean Piaget, who was inspired by Gestalt psychology. We shall therefore deal with Piaget in the next section and other later (contemporary) cognitive psychologits in a subsequent section. JEAN PIAGET (1896-1980). The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, who was Pro-

fessor in Geneva, originally studied biology, but began thereafter to interest himself in psychology, especially in cognitive processes and their development. He started writing in the twenties and was productive right until the end. Altogether he wrote around forty books, but the quality of his production is equally remarkable; it is probably the most original within cognitive psychology, and Piaget's importance for the development of psychology equals that of Freud and Pavlov. We shall therefore discuss it in comparative detail, though not in so much detail as that of Freud and Pavlov, because Piaget's production has not been subjected to the same thorough metatheoretical analysis. According to the usual procedure, we shall deal first of all with Piaget's meta-stratum, and then the hypothetical stratum followed by the data-stratum. 1. META-STRATUM. Piaget has not been interested in formulating his ontologi-

cal meta-theses explicitly. But it goes without saying that he has a biological conception of man, even though man differs essentially from other animal species by virtue of the development and function of language, whereby Piaget's conception of man approaches a social and humanistic conception. Furthermore, his psycho-physiological theory is presumably system theoretical pluralism, because Piaget is one of the chief representatives of systems theory (designated 'structuralist'). According to this theory, 'consciousness' is a systems property constituting an independent level between the biological and social levels (cf. Chapter 2). Finally, Piaget's ontology is deterministic, perhaps almost probablistic. Piaget has been much more interested in explicitly formulating his metatheses pertaining to the philosophy of science, and especially his theory of knowledge, which he calls 'genetic epistemology'. Piaget intends with this concept to emphasize that 'epistemology' is the science of 'knowlege' - everyday knowledge as well as scientific. For Piaget, 'epistemology' is much broader

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than the 'theory of knowledge' normally is for philosophers, and his genetic epistemology closely approaches what we call 'metascience'. Piaget's emphasis on collaboration between different scientists and their methods in the study of (scientific) knowledge makes this especially apparent. Thus, not only logical and formal but historical, sociological and psychological methods should be used in the study of knowledge. Piaget formulates this in his introduction to ,,Genetic Epistemology" (1970), in which he writes (p. 1): ,,Genetic Epistemology attempts to explain knowledge, and in particular scientific knowledge, on the basis of history, its sociogenesis, and especially the psychological origins of the notions and operations upon which it is based." Piaget does not wish to reduce epistemology to cognitive psychology, however, because psychology cannot deal with the problem of objective validity. Therefore a collaboration between various categories of researchers is necessary. In ,,Psychology and Epistemology" (1972 , p. 61) Piaget writes: ,,Thus, genetic epistemology's first rule is a rule regarding collaboration: since the task consists of studying how cognition develops, it is a question in every single case of establishing teamwork between psychologists who study the development as such, logicians who formalize this development's separate stages or temporary states of equilibrium, and specialists in the specific science." As the above quotation indicates, the term 'genetic epistemology' has a double meaning: 1. 'Genetic' refers to genetic methods, i.e. the methods of history and developmental psychology. 2. 'Genetic' also refers to the fact that 'knowledge' is a process, something that is always undergoing change or development, and never a finished product.

This also applies to scientific knowledge, to which we shall now turn. It is characteristic of Piaget that he throws light on a large number of general but also more specific questions of an epistemological and metascientific nature with the help of experiments concerning cognitive development, which latter is regarded as analagous to the development of the sciences. Examples of these include the concepts of causality, probabiity, space, time and number, etc.


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Here we can only touch upon the most general problem of the origin and nature of knowledge. On the basis of his genetic-psychologicalexperiments Piaget criticizes the classical theories of knowledge, especially empiricism, which he regards as a 'myth' that has stood in the way of objective investigations. Classical empiricism - especially the British school of philosophy - is criticized for having built on speculative psychology, which confers an all too passive, solely registering, role on the knowing subject. This is entirely misleading, since empiricism is only (approximate with) one kind of 'experience'. According to Piaget, we have fwo kinds of experience: physical ([figurative')and logico-mathematical ('operative'). About these he writes (in Piaget, 1972 ,p. 50): ,,Figurative experience corresponds to the classical conception of experience: it consists in handling things in order to build up knowledge through abstraction from the things themselves. Operative experience also consists of handling things, though in such a way as to derive knowledge from the action and not from the things themselves." But even physical experience is not in accordance with classical empiricism. Piaget mentions a great many experiments of a more radical nature than even Gestalt psychology, which was also critical of empiricism. Piaget summed up the results of these experiments in the following (Piaget, 1972 , p. 47): ,,Thus we can draw two conclusions from these results. Firstly, cognition never originates solely from sense impressions and perception, but additionally from action and operative patterns at different stages of development, and neither of these can be reduced to pure perception. Secondly, perception itself never consists of a simple interaction of sense impressions, but involves an active organization involving choice and pre-conclusions, and this is due to the organized influence of actions or operations on perception." To judge from the above, Piaget's epistemology almost approahces a pragmatic epistemology, which also stresses the importance of actions. But in American - and possibly also Marxist - pragmatism it is especially practical action - what Piaget calls 'figurative experience' - that is stressed; whereas in Piaget's epistemology the so-called 'operations' play just as great a part. Piaget himself defines this concept as follows (in Piaget, 1972 ,p. 26): ,,Operations consist of actions that are internalized and co-ordinated, total structures (reversible, etc,) ... " Thus 'operations' are Piaget's term for 'thinking' - particularly logical or rational thinking.

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On account of the importance Piaget attaches to 'operations', his epistemology approaches that of rationalism. However, he dissociates himself from pure rationalism - also in a modem version like that of the linguist N . Chomsky. Piaget repudiates, for example, the notion that language and thinking are based on innate, static structures. For Piaget's own research shows that cognitive structures ('schemata') are constantly developing; into this development enter growth and maturation processes interacting with learning processes, which are dependent on the constant interaction between the individual and its surroundings. But it is very difficult to characterize Piaget's 'genetic epistemology' with the aid of 'classical' philosophical epistemologies like 'empiricism', 'rationalism' and 'pragmatism', or combinations of these, i.e. 'pragmatic rationalism' or 'rationalist pragmatism'. Therefore 'dialectical pragmatism' - as suggested by Hans Vejleskov - is possibly the best term for Piaget's epistemology. But to classify his epistemology would really be contrary to Piaget's own attitude. He expresses this as follows (Piaget, 1972, p. 76): ,,Often only a name is needed before the most open research method is converted into a philosophy among many others before the reader's very eyes." And it is Piaget's precise wish to turn epistemology into a science - a metascience building especially on genetic method. 2. THE HYPOTHETICAL STRATUM. In the following we shall briefly describe Piaget's theory, starting with its hypothetical terms, and followed by its most important hypotheses about the stages of cognitive development.

2.1. The theory's H-terms. According to Piaget's theory human actions are governed by cognitive structures that he calls 'schemata'. These cognitive schemata condition both the course of informing and that of steering processes in the narrow sense (= 'plans' in Miller's, Galanther's and Pribram's theory). The cognitive schemata are developed through the individual's adaptation to the environment. According to Piaget this adaptation takes place by way of two different processes: 'assimilation' and 'accommodation'. Assimilation is Piaget's term for the process whereby new observations (experience) are absorbed and incorporated in existing cognitive schemata.


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Accommodation is Piaget's term for the process that results in changes in the existing cognitive schemata. E.g. changes may consist of the formation of new, more comprehensivecognitive schemata. According to Piaget, man strives towards a suitable balance between assimilation and accommodation. This striving towards balance or equilibrium is, according to Piaget, the most important driving force behind cognitive development. Apart from this type of motivation, development is also conditioned by learning. Both of these processes - assimilation and accommodation may be regarded as types of 'learning' (when the word is used in a sense wide enough to include not only conditioning and the learning of skills but also intellectual learning). But cognitive development is not only conditioned by motivation and environmentally-affected learning but also by genetically determined maturation. According to Piaget, this appears from the fact that cognitive development transverses a number of stages or phases which are identical in all human beings irrespective of societal or cultural conditions or other environmental factors. These environmental factors can only increase or decrease the rate of development, but not the order in which the qualitively different stages occur.

2.2. Stages of cognitive development. These stages appear in the cognitive development of all children, and therefore we shall briefly describe them here.

1. The sensory-motor stage (0-2 years). The child is born with some innate ('pre-programmed') structures generally called reflexes (or instinct mechanisms), On this basis a number of sensory-motor schemata are developed during the fist two years of life. These schemata govern the individual's actions by way of a co-ordination of various sense impressions and muscle movements, as well as a co-ordination of the muscle movements themselves. These sensorymotor schemata are developed by way of the above-mentioned processes: assimilation to already existing schemata, and accommodation to new, more comprehensive and differentiated schemata. The sensory-motor schemata form the starting-point for the cognitive schemata of the following stages. 2. The pre-operational stage (from around 2 to 6-7 years). At the age of two ideas and language begin to play a part for the child in getting to know the world and controlling its behavior. Thus, cognitive processes begin to play an increasing part in the latter. The child thinks about the information received (sense impressions) and thinks before it acts. This thinking is conditioned by

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the presence of cognitive schemata which are continually being developed through assimilation and accommodation. At this stage thinking is characterized by its 'egocentricity' and 'intuitveness'. a. Ego-centric thought is thought that takes its starting-point in the child's own situation and regards the phenomena from the individual's perspective, without being able to distance itself from that startingpoint or perspective as in the case of older children or adults. Piaget has illustrated this development experimentally by showing the subject a mountain landscape modelled in papmache. From eight photographs taken from different angles the subject is asked to select the photo taken from the subject's own angle. Thereafter he or she should be able to point out photos corresponding to other given angles whose positions are marked by dolls. Children under the age of six cannot normally manage this test, whereas shildren over the age of eight can. b. Intuitive thinking is thinking that cannot take place in the same 'logical' manner as more rational thinking. It is more figurative. Intuitive thinking can be just as fruitful and creative as rational thinking, and it also plays a large part in child development and adults. Artists and creative scientists are prone to think intuitively. But intuitive thinking lacks the possibility rational thinking has of afterwards 'proving' its correctness (its logicality and consistency). Rational thinking does not appear until the next stage. 3. The concrete-operational stage (6-7 years to 11-13 years). In this stage children think in terms of logical action. Piaget prefers the term 'operationut, because it indicates that 'thinking' may be regarded as internalized action. 'Thinking', according to Piaget, is action on an internal, 'abstract' level. During this stage thinking is still very much associated with concrete operations, however, and is therefore called the concrete-operational stage. Not until the next stage (after 11-12 years) is the child able to think abstractly or formally. But even though concrete-operational thinking is bound up with concrete actions, in this stage thinking is nevertheless 'logical' (= consistent, systematic) in contrast with the pre-operational stage. This consistency of thought means that the child no longer thinks egocentrically, but 'decentrally' (it can regard situations from several 'centres' or points of view). Moreover, it means that the child can order and classify in a systematic manner. Finally, concrete-operational thinking enables the child to form invariant concepts, or stable,


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cognitive schemata. These are revealed by the child's being able to do Piaget's 'classical' 'conservation tests' and will be dealt with later under the data-seatum. This test reveals that children normally have invariant concepts of number and quantity at the age of six or seven, and invariant concepts of weight and volume at the age of eight or nine. The transition from pre-operational to concrete-operational thinking has interested educationalists, because it coincides with the transfer from kindergarten to school. In order to make the most of school the child must be able to think concrete-operationally. 4. The formal-operational stage (1 1-13 years and older). Children and adults continue to think concrete-operationally, but from eleven to thirteen years of age this cognitive process is supplemented with abstract orfurmal-operational thinking. As the term implies, older children and adults are then able to separate themselves in thought from the concrete situation and its associated praxis and undertake abstractions, and to work with possibilities side by side with facts. Being able to work with abstractions and possibilities enables one to construct hypotheses, or assumptions and presuppositions about possibilities and possible relations (e.g. causal relationships). From formulated hypotheses one can deduce - i.e. logically derive - conclusions. These conclusions are statements that are capable of being tested as regards their accordance with observations of the concrete situation. If the conclusion agrees with 'reality' (i.e. the observed facts), then the statement concerned is true; if there is no accordance between statement and 'reality', then the statement is false. Such a test of a deduced statement therefore amounts to an indirect test of the hypothesis that constituted the starting-point or precondition for the thought process. If the deduced statement is false, then the hypothesis is falsified and must be rejected or reformulated. This type of thinking is called hypothetico-deductive thinking. It may appear in children after eleven to thirteen years of age when they have reached the formal-operative stage, and it is an important type of thinking in adults - especially in connection with scientific research. Many modern philosophers of science regard hypothetico-deductive thinking as science's most important method.

Thus, Piaget's theory about cognitive development provides a complete description of the development of 'thinking' (= cognitive processes) from birth to maturity (see Vejleskov, 1973 and Bjerg and Vejleskov, 1977).

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Fig. 12.4: Experiment with pearls on the constancy of objects. Two small glass phials, A1 and A2, which are identical with regard to form and size, arefilled with the same number of pearls. The child is clear that both phials contain an exactly identical number of pearls, because they themselves have been allowed tofill them by placing one pearl in phial A1 with one hand, at the same time placing another pearl in phial A2 with the other hand. Thereafter the contents of phial A1 are poured into another phial, B, which has a different shape. Glass A2 is allowed to remain untouched and serves as a comparison. Children aged 4-5 believe that the number of pearls has changed, even though they are sure that no pearls have been removed or added. If the new glass is tall and narrow, they insist either that it contains more pearls than before, 'because it is taller', or else that it contains fewer pearls, 'because it is narrower'. In either case they all insist that everything is changed.

It must be stressed, however, that not all older children and adults reach the highest - or formal-operative - stage of hypotheticodeductive thinking; for this development presupposes that the environment (society, cultural coditions) provides the facilities for operating with abstract formulations in linguistic and especially written - form. In other words: the appearance of hypotheticodeductive thinking to a great extent presupposes 'theoretical' or 'formal' teaching.


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3. THE DATA-STRATUM. Piaget's research was a fruitful combination of ex-

periments, tests and informal conversations with the subjects (hence the method

is often called 'clinical experiments'). It was the same method Luria used in his investigations into ,,Cognitive Development: its Cultural and Social Foundation" (cf. Chapter 10). We shall provide, as an example, one of Piaget's most well-known experiments (see Figs. 12.4 and 12.5 with texts). Piaget undertook many experiments of this type. These have been checked in many different societies and cultures in order to decide whether the above stages of cognitive development are culturally or biologially determined. In the beginning Piaget's theories met with a great deal of criticism, but after the Second World War they have to an increasing extent become accepted. Surveys and analyses of Piaget's production are to be found in Flavell, 1963, and Vejleskov, 1977. AMERICAN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGISTS. Even though Piaget is the giant of

cognitive psychology there are many other psychologists who have contributed to the development of cognitive psychology since the Second World War. J.S. BRUNER (born 1915). One of the leading cognition psychologists is Jerome

S . Bruner, who held a professorate at Harvard University. During the forties he was one of the leading figures within the new perception psychology (known as 'the New Look' after the prevailing ladies' fashion of that time). This perception psychology studied the relation between perception and motivation, or motivated perception. In the 'classical' experiments Bruner and his colleague C. Goodman demonstrated that poor children overestimated the size of coins. The supposed explanation was that their unsatisfied needs, and therefore high estimation of money, caused them to overestimate the size of coins as shown in a tachystoscope. Later the experiment was strongly criticized, but it nonetheless inspired a great deal of research which also incorporated the effect of fear and defence mechanisms on perception (see Bruner and Goodman, 1947). Later Bruner became interested in thinking and problem-solving. He and his colleagues discovered various 'sfrategies'incorporated in problem-solving, and different people had different preferences as regards strategy (see Bruner, Goodman and Austin, 1956).

540


Flg. 12.5: The pearl experiment in a different version. The child is shown the two differently-shaped glass phials A and B right from the start, and is asked to place a pearl in each phial in turn, using the right hand for one phial and the left hand for the other. So long as the number of pearls is quite small, the child believes that the two heaps of pearls are identical.But as soon as the columns become too dissimilar the child is reluctant to believe that the heaps are identical - even though the numbers are still the same. Thus the initial thinking operation is banished by the distractive effect of observation.

During the sixties Bruner was to some extent influenced by Piaget and had the opportunity of co-operating with him while studying in Geneva. Bruner thereafter wrote a book about cognitive development (see Bruner et al, 1966). ULRICH NEISSER. Another leading American cognitive psychologist is Ulrich

Neisser, whose chief work is ,,Cognitive Psychology" (1967). In this he claims to have been influenced by Bruner and by an older work: F.C. Barlett's ,,Remembering" (1932). He has also been influenced by information theory, with which we shall deal in the following. Neisser himself summarized his theory in concentrated form as follows (Neisser, 1967, pp. 301-302): ,,At this point, it may be appropriate to review the speculative hypotheses that have been advanced. (1) Stored information consists of traces of previous constructive mental (or overt) actions. (2) The primary processes is a multiple activity, somewhat analogous to parallel processing in computers, which con-


541

structs crudely formed 'thoughts' or 'ideas', on the basis of stored informtion. Its functions are similar to those of the preattentive processes in vision and hearing. Its products are only fleetingly conscious, unless they undergo elaboration by secondary processes. (3) The secondary processes of directed thought and deliberated recall are like focal attention in vision. They are serial in character, and construct ideas and images which are determined partly by stored information, partly by the preliminary organization of the primary processes, and partly by wishes and expectations. (4) The executive control of thinking in the secondary processes is carried out by a system analogous to the executive routine of a computer program. It is not necessary to postulate a homonculus to account for the directed character of thought. ( 5 ) The secondary processes themselves are mostly acquired through experience in the same way that all other memories - which also represent earlier processes - are acquired. (6) Failures to recall information which is actually in storage are like failures to notice something in the visual field, or failures to hear something that has been said: the executive processes of recall may be directed elsewhere, either deliberately or because of a misguided strategy of search; they may also lack the necessary constructive abilities altogether." As this long quotation shows, entering into some of these hypotheses about cognitive processes are hypothetical constructions analagous to computer programmes. This inspiration from computers and information theory is central for a whole group of cognitive psychologists, about whom we shall now hear. INFORMATION THEORY AND PSYCHOLOGY. A new group of psychologists

within the field of cognitive psychology has emerged after having been inspired by the growth of computers and the associated scientific theories - especially information theory and cybernetics. A classical work in this field is Georg A. Miller, Eugene Galanter and Karl H . Pribram: ,,Plans and the Structure of Behavior" (1960). In this book the chief concept 'plan' is defined as follows (p. 16): ,,A plan is for an organism essentially the same as a program for a computer, ... Thus, we are reasonably confident that 'program' could be substituted everywhere for 'plan' in the following pages." Later the authors introduced their 'smallest edition' of a 'plan': in other words, their molecular unit which was to replace the concept of 'reflex' in physiology and psychology. They write on p. 26:

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,,The interpretation toward which the argument moves is one that has been called the 'cybernetic hypothesis', namely, that the fundamental building block of the nervous sytem is the feed-back loop." And on p. 27: ,,Obviously, the reflex is not the unit we should use as the elements of behavior: the unit should be the feed-back loop itself, If we think of the Test-Operate-Test-Exit unit - for convenience we shall call it a TOTE unit as we do of the reflex arc, in purely anatomical terms, it may describe reflexes, but little else. That is to say, the reflex should be recognized as only one of many possible actualizations of a TOTE pattern. The next task is to generalize the TOTE unit so that it will be useful in a majority - hopefully in all - of the behavioral descriptions we shall need to make." As an illustration of the TOTE unit the authors provide the following diagram (see Fig. 12.6).

I

PI

(Incongruity)

Operate

Fig. 12.6: Test-Operate-Test-Exit model The authors discuss thereafter what this TOTE unit is thought to mediate, and come to the result that the TOTE unit is a structure in which energy, information and control may be planted. These three concepts belong on differ-


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ent levels of abstraction. Thus, although it is the same process, it may be regarded as 'energy' when describing the organism as a bioIogica1 system, or as the transformation of 'information' and 'control' when the organism is regarded as a selfgoveming system of data treatment. The authors therefore regard the TOTE unit and the 'plans' as hypothetical constructions whereby they are able to explain behavior. The following example illustrates the authors' theory: The simplest type of plan controls a skill, such as knocking a nail in. This apparently simple skill consists, according to this theory, of the following processes: To start with, a piece of wood - e.g. a plank - is 'tested to see whether the head of a nail is protruding from it or whether it is already flush with the wood. If the head is protruding the hammer is raised to strike. After this 'operation' has been completed the wood is tested again to see if the head lies flush with the surface. If not, then a new operation (tap with the hammer) and a new

___+

Test Nail

b

(down)

I

Strike

]

Fig. 12.7: The above diagram shows the plan that is supposed to steer a job like hammering a nail into a plank. Here the plan is divided into two simple operative phases. Thus the system can be extended indefinitely like a 'Chinese nest of boxes'. The advantage of the theory is first seen when explaining extremely complicated solutions to problems, planning, etc. (After Miller, Galanter and Prihram: Plans and the Structure of Behavior, 1960).

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test is carried out until the result is in accordance with the behaviorcontrolling plan: to hammer a nail into a wooden plank. The simple 'plan' in this theory replaces the concept of reflex in older psychological theories. It consists of the following phases: Testing + Operation + Testing +Exit, where 'testing' may be the testing of the nail's position, and the 'operation' may consist of knocking the head of the nail with a hammer, whereafter the nail is 'tested again to see if it lies flush. If this is not so, the process is repeated until the plan is executed and we leave ('exit') the nail concerned, possibly in order to proceed with the next one. This simple procedure is called a TOTE unit after the first letters of the respective phases. TOTE is a typical cybernetically- inspired concept, 'feedback being an element of control. But even this comparatively simple action - to knock a nail in a piece of wood is more complicated than described above. The movement of the ham-

Fig. 12.8: The TOTE-model, used in language construction. The sentnces are coupled together according to a general plan is not included in the figure. Each separate sentence is constructed affording to a sentence plan, which demands at least a noun and a verb, but which can contain several parts (direct and indirect objects, etc). Each word is contructed according to a word plan, which indicates the correct spelling of the individual words,


545

mer consists of two phases: raising and striking. These two movements enter into a hierarchical system, as illustrated in Fig. 12.7. On the face of it this theory appears to convert a simple skill into something more complicated than 'chains of (conditioned) reflexes', which is how traditional theory regards skills. But we must also take into account the fact that the theory can also explain far more complicated behavior like problemsolving and planning, which involve the use of language and other symbols. These complicated cognitive processes can also be explained as hierarchically arranged TOTE units, so that we achieve a certain degree of 'theoretical economy'. We can explain the production of language - both spoken and written - with the help of the TOTE model as follows: When writing, the spelling of a word is being tested all the time (more or less consciously) by comparison with acquired 'word-shemata'. If there is a mistake in a written word we correct it, or else we proceed to the next word. The production of sentences occurs in a similar manner: every written sentence is tested by comparison with a 'sentence-schema'. In its 'smallest edition' this may constitute a demand that a sentence should consist of 'a noun + a verb'. The sentences may consist of several parts (direct object, indirect object, etc.). If the written sentence is in accordance with the sentence schema we proceed to the next sentence - or else we correct it and test again, etc. (SeeFig. 12.8). The plan - or the TOTE-schema - which controls sentence production, is a hierarchical plan. It contains, as partial plans, the TOTE schemata for the separate words in the same manner as shown in the example with the hammer and nail. And we can proceed upwards in the hierarchy, since the sentences are linked together according to grammatical rules. These rules enter into the test part of a TOTE schema in which the single sentences form a complicated hierarchy. Thus, according to the theory, grammar consists entirely of a hierarchical system of plans in which the separate parts are TOTE units. This system controls the production of language. Naturally we are not aware of this control - except in difficult cases. Therefore most adults will not experience TOTE units when speaking their mother tongue, dthough they may sometimes do so when writing. And they will naturally experience it more frequently when speaking foreign languages in which they lack fluency.

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Thus, there exists an extremely complicated hierarchical system of steering plans which have to be learnt by each child in its first year of life. The American linguist N . Chomsky has put forward the theory that the learning of grammar is facilitated by the presence of an innate 'depth grammar', which is common to all human beings and every language. Thus all known grammars are merely variants of this depth grammar, which controls the learning of the mother tongue's grammar, and later that of other languages. We have thereby arrived at an interesting concept in Miller's, Galanter's and Pribram's theory: plans exist for the forming of plans. These overriding, steering plans they call 'meta-plans',which correspond to the 'cognitive strategies' in the theories of other researchers. The above-mentioned 'depth grammar' may therefore be regarded as an innate meta-plan. But in all other respects meta-plans, like other plans, are the results of both learning and the experience of previous problem-solving, In their final chapter the authors discuss the relation between their own theory and the theory and practical experience of contemporary neurophysiology. Karl H . Pribram has mainly been responsible for this chapter, since he was originally trained as a neurologist. He has subsequently elaborated a 'multi-level' account in which psychological problems are treated on several levels: biochemical, neurophysiological and psychological (with models). Here one of the models used is the hologram, which is a three-dimensional 'picture' produced with laser beams. This model, which has attracted a great deal of attention - also outside psychological circles - is reproduced in Pribram's chief work: ,,The Languages of the Brain" (1971), which is analysed in a chapter in Madsen (1974). EUROPEAN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGISTS. Finally, we must emphasize that

even though computer-simulationand information theoretical models have become very popular in cognitive psychology - not only in America but in Europe - this is not the only type of cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychologists who do not make use of computer simulation and information theory models include the Norwegian psychologists Kjell Rdheim and Per Saugstad (see Rfieim, 1974), some of whose experiments with problem-solving have frequently been mentioned in international psychological literature.


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These psychologists have in particular investigated the relation between previous experience and problem-solving. In one of their experiments the subjects were asked to solve a problem that consisted in moving some marbles from one container to another. Picking up the marbles one by one with the fingers and transferring them from one container to the other was not permitted. But there was a newspaper and some string lying on a table. The newspaper could be rolled up to form a cylinder and held in place with the string. With the help of this cylinder the marbles could then be rolled from one container over into the other. The subjects had previously been subjected to a test to see which functions various objects - including newspapers - could be used for. Some of the subjects had mentioned that a newspaper could be used as a cylinder, a cone, etc., whereas others did not mention this function in connection with a newspaper. The difference between the results of the two groups of subjects turned out to be appreciable: considerably more subjects had solved the problem in the group that appeared to be aware of the fact that a newspaper could be used as a cylinder than in the other group that was not immediately aware of this function. The difference was too great to be put down to chance but was statistically 'significant'. The ability to state the potential functions of an object may be conditioned by the subject's previous experience of this object; but the immediate awareness of an object's functions need not be conditioned solely by previous experience; it can also be determined by the subject's ability to think. In his thesis RAheim touches upon the relation between experience (the results of previously acquired learning) and intelligence, which is most frequently regarded as a largely genetically determined ability - or rather, set of abilities or intelligence factors. He also touches upon the difference between intelligence in the more traditional sense and creativity. This difference manifests itself as two different ways of thinking: Convergent thinking is thinking that takes place when solving a problem for which there is only one proper answer. Classical intelligence tests comprise almost exclusively problems that test convergent thinking. Divergent thinking is thinking that takes place when there are many solutions to a problem or many possible ways of using an object. Divergent thinking enters into more recent creativity tests, because creating something new demands the ability to imagine many different possibilities. Finally we can mention a Scandinavian work about perception by the Finnish psychologist Kai von Fieandt and the Danish psychologist Z.K.Moust-

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guard, which has become a standard work on this subject (see Fieandt and Moustgaard, 1977).

CONCLUSION. We have now examined the development of the four subdisciplines: the psychology of learning, motivational psychology, personality psychology and cognitive psychology. These four groups comprise what we usually term general psychology. But there naturally exist other psychological disciplines than general psychology, and in particular two 'basic disciplines': 1) developmental psychology, which to some extent overlaps general psychology (Piaget is both a developmental and a general, cognitive psychologist), and 2 ) differential psychology, which studies the individual differences that are 'ignored' by general psychology, which is exclusively interested in general 'laws' regarding consciousness and behavior. Differential psychology overlaps the general psychological discipline known as personality psychology. Factor analytic psychology is not least a type of differential psychology. Apart from the three theoretical basic disciplines - general psycholgoy, developmental and differential psychology - there are also some borderline disciplines, in which psychology overlaps adjacent sciences, and some applied disciplines in which psychology is used in practice. A survey of all these disciplines is given below:

Survey of Psychological Disciplines 1. Theoretical basic disciplines

1. General psychology: 1. Meta-disciplines: systematic, metatheory, methodology, history, etc. 2. Motivational psychology: motives (needs, drives) and emotions 3. Psychology of learning: learning, memory and forgetting 4. Cognitive psychology: perception, thinking, fantasy, etc. 2. Differential psychology: 1. Intelligence-and-abilityresarch 2. Parts of personality psychology 3. Developmental psychology (child psychology, personality development, etc.)


549

2. Borderline disciplines 1. Biological: 1. Physiological psychology 2. Animal psychology (etology and comparative psychology) 2. Social: 1. Social psychology 2. Ethnopsychology 3. Economic psychology 4. Political psychology 3. Humanistic: 1. Historical-biographical psychology 2. Psychology of literature 3. Psychology of art and music 4. Linguistic psychology 5. Psychology of religion 6. Psychology of science

3. Applied disciplines 1. Educational psychology 2. Clinical psychology 3. Industrial psychology: industrial psychology, psychotechnology, the psychology of sales and advertising 4. Military psychology 5. Criminal psychology: witness psychology and prison psychology 6. Traffic psychology.

The Mainstream Psychologists' Production An Integrating Theory INTRODUCTION. In order to illustrate the mainstream psycholgists' production

we had originally planned to analyse a theory from each of the disciplines already discussed: 1) The psychology of learning (e.g. Berlyne) 2) Motivational psychology (e.g. Atkinson) 3) Personality psychology (e.g. Cattell)

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4) Cognitive psychology (e.g. Pribram)

But through lack of space we have chosen instead to analyse a single theory as representative of the production of the entire group, and to refer interested readers to Madsen (1974). which contains, amongst other things, an analysis of the above mainstream theories. We have chosen to analyse Joseph R. Royce and Arnold Powetl's ,,Theory of Personality and Individual Differences: Factors, Systems and Processes" (1983) because this theory not only deals with personality psychology but also with themes connected with motivational and cognitive psychology. Royce and Powell integrate all these fields with the help of two theories, i.e. systems theory and information theory. The latter are semi-formal, interdisciplinary theories suitable for both interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary synthesis formation. In Royce and Powell's account these theories are combined withfactor analysis, which unites the empirical basis for the theories. However, the empirical results of the authors' 30-40 years' research is dealt with only briefly in this book, where reference is made to countless other publications by Royce and his colleagues. Thus, the metatheoretical analysis will be relatively sparing as regards the data-stratum in comparison with the other strata.

The Meta-stratum INTRODUCTION. Royce's and Powell's book (henceforth referred to as 'R. &

P., 1983') is divided systematically into three parts:

,,The Conceptual Framework of the Theory", which comprises a brief presentation of the theory (Chapter 1) together with a detailed treatment of metatheory (Chapters 2 and 3), in which Royce's long-standing interest in this theme is noticable. ,,The Structure, Function and Development of the Basic Systems of Personality". Here the function and development of the separate personality systems are dealt with in four chapters. ,,Integrative Processes", which deals in five chapters with the integrating processes that unite the six sub-systems into a whole. The six sub-systems are the sensory, motor, cognitive and affective systems together with the value-system and the 'style'-system. ,,Conclusion" which comprises only a single chapter (Chapter 13).

The mainstream psychologists' production

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After this brief presentation of its contents we shall proceed with the books metatheoretical analysis proper. ONTOLOGICAL META-THESES. Here, according to the systematic taxonomy, we shall deal with the autors' meta-theses relating to their conception of man, the psychophysical problem and the problem of determinism. 1. The conception of man. R. & P.'s theory presupposes an integration of the biological, social and humanistic conceptions of man. In accordance with their pluralist ('multi-level') systems theory, man is seen as a being that is descnbable and explanable on the basis of several scientific 'points of view', or on several levels. Thus man may be regarded as an open system that transforms outwardly-coming matter and energy into information, which is then converted into outwardly directed energy in the form of behavior. But man may also be viewed as a system bent on creating 'meaning' in life and transforming 'values' into action (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. p. 31)l.

2. Psycho-physical theory. R. & P. deal with this ontological theory explicitly, making use of the analogy of the computer: 'hardware is what we mean by body and the program is the equivalent of the mind.' In other words, the transformation of matter and energy is a bodily process, whereas the transformation and processing of information is a psychical process (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. pp. 34-35)2.

3. The problem of determinism. R. & P. also deal with this ontological problem, maintaining that causal determinism is a fundamental element of scientific explanation. But simple one-way causality is no longer sufficient, and must be supplemented with factor analysis's 'multivariant' determinism and information theory's teleological goalsteering via cybernetic feedback-mechanisms (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. p. 31)3. Extremely complicated systems must practically speaking be regarded as indetermist, so R. & P.'s ontology could most appropriately be termed a probablism. ETA-THESES RELATING TO THE PHLOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. The epistemological, metatheoretical and methodological theses, which together with the ontological theses form the preconditions for R. & P.'s theory, will be dealt with here according to the systematological taxonomy.

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1. Epistemology. The epistemological problems are also discussed explicitly in R. & P., 1983, which provides a concentrated account of the problems that are dealt with in greater detail by Royce in his contribution to the Nebraska Symposium in 1976. R. & P. discuss two alternatives to logical empiricism, namely realism (in various versions: naive, critical and Popper's version), and what they call 'theory-loaded constructivism'. They prefer the latter, in which: 1. all observations are 'theory-loaded, no observations are 'neutral'; 2. both basic theoretical concepts and whole theories are constructions; 3. one chooses between competitive theories primarily on the basis of philosophical and theoretical arguments, and only secondarily on the basis of empirical evidence. R. & P. maintain this 'theoryloaded constructivism' to be the most adequate for psychology in its present stage of development (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. p. 2l)4. Thus, in accordance with the systematological taxonomy, R. & P.'s epistemology should be regarded as largely rationalist and instrumentalist epistemology. 2. Meta-theory. R. & P. do not explicitly argue for a nomothetic ideal of science, but this appears indirectly to be what they prefer, since they argue explicitly for the use of systems theory, information theory and factor analysis, all of which have their origin in the natural sciences and mathematics. First and foremost they advocate the use of systems theory in psychology, because this theory originated as an interdisciplinary integrating theory and thus can help to integrate the fragmented psychology. Moreover, with its origin in computer science, cybernetics and biology (L. von Bertalanffy), systems theory is suitable for dealing with complex, self-regulating and goal-directed systems (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. pp. 261-261)s. Information theory supplements systems theory because it is largely constructed to deal with processes - especially informationtransforming processes - whereas systems theory is largely constructed to deal with structures (= systems), especially hierarchically organized structures. Thus an integration of systems theory and information theory is especially applicable to psychology; it is concerned with multidimensional, hierarchically organized systems (persons) in which information-transforming is taking place (according to R. & P.


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not only cognitive but also affective - or motivational - processes may be viewed as information-transforming). Factor analysis is combined with systems and information theory because it is suitable for creating hypothetical constructions on the basis of empirical data (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. p. 33)6. We have now arrived at the methodological theses in R. & P.'s theory.

3. Methodology. R. & P. argue explicitly forfactor analysis as psychological method. They maintain that it combines both empirical and statistical inventiveness. It is one of the few examples of a psychological method that has been exported to other sciences - both natural and social sciences (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. p. 22)7. In addition, R. & P. advocate the combination of factor analysis with the experimental manipulation of factors as practised in a great many of Royce's and his colleagues' investigations. For example, they have combined factor analysis with investigations of the effect of brain damage, drugs, electro-shock, 'maternal stimulation' and stress, etc. (see R. & P., 1983, e.g. p. 44)8. Whereas there are explicit meta-theses about empirical methods, there are no explicit arguments for the choice of data-language. But it appears from the methodology chosen (experiments and tests which are then factor-analysed) that the data-languagemust be behaviorist.

The Hypothetical Stratum INTRODUCTION. As mentioned, the hypothetical stratum is covered in great detail, since it constitutes most of the book's 290 pages. There is a brief, systematic presentation of the theory in Chapter 1, pp. 10-17. The main contents are further concentrated in a graphic model (Fig. 1.1) and a table (Table 1.l), which we shall use in the following account. The subsequent analysis and reconstruction of R. & P.'s theory solely concerns this ovemding model, which constitutes an extremely abstract theory whose degree of abstraction approximates Freud's structural theories (cf. Chapter 7). But as opposed to the chapter on Freud, here lack of space obliges us to omit a corresponding analysis of the more concrete, empirically related models in R. & P., 1983.

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Fig. 12.9: Simplified reconstruction of RoyceS personality model.

The hypothetical system. There is no explicit formulation of a deductive system of hypotheses. On the other hand there is a wealth of graphic models, of which we shall reconstruct the first - ovemding - model (Fig. 1.1 in R. 8z P., p. 13), used here as Fig. 12.9.

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The mainstream psychologists' production SYSTEM LEVELS

Suprasystem

Self-organizing or integrative

Leaming-adaptive or transformational

Controlled-process, or transductional (Encoding - and decoding)

DEFINITIONS

Integrative personality (the total psychological system) is a hierarchical organization of systems, subsystems, and traits that transduce, transform, and integrate information. STYLE

VALUE

A multidimensional, hierarchical system that integrates and modulates information by coordinating cognition and affect, and by selecting particular modes of processing.

A multidimensional, hierarchical system that integrates and modulates information by coordinating cognition and affect to achieve specifiable goals, by satisfying specified needes, or by selecting specifiable information content.

COGNITION

AFFECT

A multidimensional, hierarchical system that transforms psychological information in order to identify environmental invariants.

A multidimensional, hierarchical system that transforms psychological information in order to attain optimal arousal states.

SENSORY

MOTOR

A multidimensional, hierarchical system that transduces physical energy into psychological information.

A multidimensional, hierarchical system that transduces psychological information into physical energy.

Table 12.1: RoyceS definitions of personality systems (reproduced here from Royce and Powell, 1983,p.ll). The graphic model represents 'personality' (or the 'total psychological system') as a hierarchically organized 'suprasystem' consisting of six systems, each with its own function. See the definitions in Table 1.1. (from R. & P. p. l l ) , reproduced here as Table 12.1. The separate systems and subsystems with their components and elements are dealt with in the following section about hypotheses and hypothetical terms. We shall deal first with the general psychological hypotheses and then with the diferentiul-psychological hypotheses.

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The hypotheses. 'General Hypotheses'. R. & P. do not explicitly formulate any of the theory's most important general psychological hypotheses. These are represented implicitly by the model's arrows, which indicatethe functional relations between the systems. We can therefore undertake a systematic reconstruction of the theory by formulating these implicit hypotheses explicitly. In addition we shall reproduce (almost word for word) the explicit definitions of these systems, which are to be found in Table 12.1. In the reconstruction we shall follow the model and table from R. & P., reproducing them hierarchically from above downwards in order to stress that personality is a hierarchically organized system. 1. Definition: 'Personality' - or the total psychological system - is a hierarchical organization of systems, subsystems and traits that transduce, transform and integrate information. 2. Definition: 'Style' is a multidimensional, hierarchical system that integrates and modulates information by co-ordinating cognition and affect and by selecting particular modes of processing. 3. Definition: 'Value' is a multidimensional, hierarchical system that integrates and modulates information by co-ordinating cognition and affect in order to achieve specifiable goals, by satisfying special needs, or by selecting specifiable information content. 4. Definition: 'Cognition' is a multidimensional, hierarchical system that transforms psychological information in order to identib invariants in the environment. 5 . Definition: 'Affect' is a multidimensional, hierarchical system that transforms psychological information in order to attain optimal arousal states. 6 . Definition: 'The sensory system' is a multidimensional, hierarchical system that transduces physical energy into psychological information. 7 . Definition: 'The motor system' is a multidimensional, hierarchical system that transduces psychological information into physical energy.

It appears from the above definitions that they implicitly contain existential hypotheses, since they postulate the existence of hypothetical systems (cf. the systematological taxonomy). Thefunctional hypotheses may be found, as men-


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tioned, in the graphic model, and we shall formulate them explicitly in the following:

Physical energy from the environment affects the sensory system, which transduces energy into spatially andlor temporally organized information. The information is then transferred to the affective or cognitive systems, which interact with the sensory system. This complicated hypothesis may be divided into a number of simpler hypotheses, which can be reformulated symbolically, reciprocal action being symbolized by a double arrow ( t)): 1st HYPOTHESIS:

la. S(input) + H(sensory processes) 1b. H(sensory processes) t)H(cognitive processes) lc. H(sensory processes) + H(affective processes).

The motor system receives information from the cognitive and affective systems, which is then organized spatially andlor temporally. The information is transduced into physical energy as behavior. This complicated hypothesis can be reformulated symbolically in the following simple hypotheses:

2nd HYPOTHESIS:

2a. H(cognitive processes) + H(motor activity) 2b. H(affective processes) t)H(motor activity) 2c. H(motor activity) + R(behavior). 3rd HYPOTHESIS: The cognitive system receives information from the sensory

system, which then undergoes perceptual andlor conceptual andlor symbolic treatment. The cognitive system also interacts with the affective, style and value systems. The cognitive system also acts upon the motor system. This complicated hypothesis can be reformulated symbolically into the following hypotheses: 3a. 3b. 3c. 3d. 3e.

H(sensory processes) t)H(cognitive processes) H(cognitive processes) + H(affective processes) H(cognitive processes) t)H(sty1e system) H(cognitive processes) + H(value system) H(cognitive processes) + H(motor activity).


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The affective system receives information from the sensory system. The information regulates the organismS state of arousal, which may be more or less emotionally stable and independent and more or less introvert or extrovert. The affective system interacts with the cognitive, value and style systems. The affective system also acts upon the motor system. This complicated hypothesis may be reformulated symbolically as follows:

4th HYPOTHESIS:

4a. H(sensory processes) + H(affective processes) 4b. H(affective processes) t)H(cognitive processes) 4c. H(affective processes) t)H(sty1e system) 4d. H(affective processes) t)H(value system) 4e. H(affective processes) t)H(motor activity) 5th HYPOTHESIS: The style system receives information from the cognitive

system and the affective system. This information is integrated in accordance with a specific, individual cognitive style: empirical, rational or metaphorical. The style system also interacts with the value system and the overriding personality system. This complicated hypothesis can be reformulated symbolically as follows: 5a. 5b. 5c. 5d.

H(sty1e system) t)H(cognitive system) H(sty1e system) t)H(affective system) H(sty1e system) t)H(value system) H(sty1e system) t)H(personality system).

6th HYPOTHESIS: The value system receives informationfrom the cognitive and

the afective systems. This information is integrated in accordance with three overriding value orientations: 'intrinsic', selj-oriented and social. The value system also interacts with the style system and the overriding personality system. This hypothesis can be reformulated symbolically as follows: 6a. H(value system) t)H(sty1e system) 6b. H(value system) t)H(cognitive system) 6c. H(value system) t)H(affective system) 6d. H(value system) t)H(personality system)


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7th HYPOTHESIS: 'Personality system' - or the total psychical system receives information from the cognitive system and acts upon the affective system. It also interacts with the style and value systems. The information received is integrated in accordance with the individual's world view, self-image and life style into a personal meaning or signijicance. This hypothesis can be reformulated symbolically as follows:

7a. 7b. 7c. 7d.

H(cognitive system) + H(psychical system) H(psychical system) t)H(sty1e system) H(psychical system) t)H(value system) H(psychical system) + H(affective system)

We have now concluded the reconstruction of the implicit, functional and general psychological hypotheses, which are indicated in R. & P.'s graphic model by arrows. The hypotheses are directly concerned with the functional relations between the personality's six systems and the overriding psychological suprasystem. But the graphic model also shows that each system contains some subsystems (e.g. 'spatiality' and 'temporality' in the sensory and motor systems). These subsystems indicate possible individual variations in the six systems (+ the overriding system). In other words, the subsystems are identical with personality dimensions - derived by way of factor analysis as factors of a higher (often 3rd) order. We shall now turn to this extremely important part of R. & P.'s theory.

Hypotheses: Differential-psychological hypotheses. We shall suffice here with mentioning the most important personality dimensions without undertaking a systematic reconstruction proper, and proceed upwards from the bottom of the system (cf. the graphic model). 1. The sensory and motor systems' personality dimensions: 'Spatiality' and Temporality'. These two terms (like all terms for subsystems in R. & P.'s theory) have a double meaning: a) They designate the way in which sensory and motor activity is organized. Thus 'spatiality' and 'temporality' designate two ways in which the psychical system organizes incoming and outgoing information. Certain types of information - especially visual information - is mainly organized spatially, while other types of sensory information - especially auditive information - is mainly organized temporarily. Likewise, the motor system organizes the incoming information spatially and/or temporarily into

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'programmes' for movements; b) 'Spatiality' and 'temporality' also designate individual differences in the organization of these processes. Some persons chiefly organize spatially, other chiefly temporally. This is based on the factor analysis of extensive test results, which are dealt with in R. & P., 1983, Chapter

4. 2. The cognitive system's personality dimensions: 'Perceptualization', 'Conceptualization' and 'Symbolization', which are terms for general cognitive processes as well as individual differences in the course of cognitive processes. Factor analysis of extensive test results have shown that some persons largely utilize perception, others conceptualization,and others symbolization or intuition (i.e. creative, artistic representation of ideas and objects). These three processes and personality dimensions are also 3rd order factors in a hierarchy of 2nd and 1st order factors well-known from intelligence research. They are dealt with in Chapter 5 and in R. & P., 1983.

3. The affective system's personality dimensions: 'Emotional Stability', 'Emotional Independence' and 'IntroversionlExtroversion, which are terms for three personality dimensions especially well-known from H.J. Eysenck's theory. 'Emotional stability' is identical with Eysenck's 3rd order factor: 'neuroticism'. This factor is related to processes in the limbic system ('limbic arousal'). 'Introversion v. extroversion' is identical with Eysenck's 3rd order factor of the same name. It is related to 'reticular arousal', which has a bearing on the excitation and inhibition of the cerebral cortex. It is probably the most investigated personality dimension, and is also to be found in Catell's factor analytical theory. 'Emotional independence' is identical with Eysenck's 3rd order factor 'psychotism', whereas R. & P. prefer terms not derived from psychopathology (like 'psychotism' and 'neuroticism'). This factor is not related to localized neural, though possibly to hormonal, processes. The affective factors are also organized in a hierarchy of 2nd and 1st order factors, which are described in more detail in Chapter 5 and in R. & P., 1983.

4. The style system's personality dimensions. 'Rational Style', 'Empirical Style' and 'Metaphorical Style'. These three personality factors may be regarded as structures affecting the course of the cognitive and affective processes. The individual differences come about when one of the three style structures dominates in a given individual's personality system and integrates


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the cognitive and affective processes in a manner characteristic of the individual style, The empirical style largely uses perception for cognitive information processing, while the affective processes are spontaneous and impulsive. The rational style largely uses 'conceptualizing' for cognitive information processing and optimization of arousal 1evel.The metaphorical style largely makes use of symbolizing cognitive processes and frequently experiences 'physiognomic' sensory qualities in the environment (i.e. forms, colours and sounds, which are regarded as 'living' and possibly as expressions of human feeling). Each of these three personality dimensions is at the summit of a hierarchy of 2nd and 1st order factors, which are described in more detail in R. & P., 1983, Chapter 6. 5 . The value system's personality dimensions: Activity-oriented ('intrinsic'), self-oriented and social-oriented orientation. These three personality factors may be regarded as structurs affecting the content (or goal-direction) of the course of cognitive and affective processes. The individual differences come about when one of the three value-orientations dominates in a given individual's personality system and integrates the cognitive and affective processes in order to achieve a specific goal: the satisfying of affective needs or cognitive interests. Social value-orientation is directed towards the satisfaction of various social needs (such as contact, recognition, etc.) and interests (such as social conditions, social welfare work, etc.). Self-oriented value-orientation is directed towards the satisfaction of selfassertive needs (such as aggression, power, etc.) and interests (such as politcs). Activity-oriented (intrinsic) value-orientation is directed towards the satisfaction of 'intrinsic' needs (such as achievement, cognitive structuring and order, intellectual understanding, etc.) as well as intrinsic interests (such as science, art, etc.). The three value-orientations are 3rd order factors, each of which is at the summit of a hierarchy of 2nd and 1st order factors. The affective 1st order factors are equivalent to Murray's needs (cf. Chapter 8), and the cognitive 1st order factors are equivalent to the interests found in ,,Strong Vocational Interest Schedule" and ,,Kuder Core Interests".

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R. & P. also posited a hypothesis (at the end of Chapter 6) about the relation between value-orientations and the above mentioned cognitive and affective personality dimensions. Social value-orientation should correlate with extraversion and perceptual abilities. Self-orientation should correlate with emotional stability and symbolization. Activity-orientation should correlate with emotional independence and conceptualization. But we must bear in mind that there are as yet only few empirical investigations to support this hypothesis. 6. The integrating psychical system's personality dimensions: World view', 'Self-image' and 'Life Style'. These three personality dimensions may be regarded as overriding structures that integrate the interaction and external activity of the six personality systems. As the graphic model (Fig. 1.1. in R. & P.) indicates, 'world views' interact with the style system, and 'life style' interacts with the value system, while 'self-image' is a product of the above two systems acting together. We shall describe the three ovemding personality dimensions separately: 1) World view' is defined by R. & P. as ,,an individual's organized set of personal cognitions that constitute a model or image of reality" (R. & P., 1983, p. 197)9. R. & P. classify world views according to the cognitive processes and the following cognitive styles: a) 'Empiricism' is the world view that is a product of empirical cognitive style in which perception is the predominating cognitive process. b) 'Rationalism' is the world view that is a product of rational cognitive style in which conceptualization is the predominating cognitive process. c) 'Metaphorism' is the world view that is a product of metaphorical cognitive style in which symbolization is the predominating cognitive process. R. & P. maintain that the three cultural institutions - science, art and religion - are dominated by these three cognitive styles. Thus, a) Science is a combination of rationalism and empiricism (perhaps with an emphasis on the latter) and as 'truth' or the possibility of verification as its cognitive goal.


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b) Art is dominated by metaphorism and has fertility as its goal. c) Religion is dominated by a combination of metaphorism and rationalism and has 'existential value' as its goal. R. & P. have also found variations in cognitive style in different scientific disciplines, and we shall return to this under the data-stratum. We shall now turn to the second ovemding integrating personality dimension: 2 ) 'Life style' or 'philosophy of life' is the ovemding structure that interacts with the value system and influences both the affective system directly and the motor system indirectly. Life style is therefore an overriding 'programme' for steering the individual's actions and the course of his life. R. & P. divide life philosophies into three classes: a) 'Altruism' is the life style that is dominated by social value orientation and has beneficence or welfare as its goal. b) 'Individualism' is the life style that is dominated by self-oriented value orientation and has self-actualization as its goal. c) 'Icarism' is the life style that is dominated by activity-oriented value orientation and has mastery as its goal. We have thereby arrived at the last ovemding integrating personality dimension: 3 ) 'Self-conception'is the ovemding integrating structure that is a product of the interaction between the style and value systems, and ultimately steers of the entire psychical system. Here there are again three main classes of self-conceptions, which are connected with the previously mentioned style and value orientations: a) The 'conceptually achieving self-conception' takes its origin in a combination of rational cognitive style and activity-oriented (intrinsic) value orientation. The individual's ultimate goal is mastery. b) The 'phenomenal-interactive self-conception' takes its origin in a combination of empirical cognitive style and social value orientation. The individual's ultimate goal is social congruence . c) The transcendentally-ascendent self- conception takes its origin in a combination of metaphorical, cognitive style and self-oriented value orientation. The individual's ultimate goal is 'spiritual' self-development.

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Fig. 12.10. Representation of RoyceS model of ,,The Self" (Self-Nexus).

The three overriding personality dimensions - world view, life style and self-conception - determine the individual's 'personal meaning', which is defined as follows (R. & P., 1983, p. 234): ,,Thus, personal meaning refers to an individual's view of the world, life, and self - the views one has on the big questions, such as the nature of reality and being, questions of origin and destiny, what is worth living and dying for, and who one really is." Finally, R. & P.'s theory contains some (implicit) hypotheses and a graphic model about 'the selfnexus' (see R. & P., 1983, Fig. 10.3, p 223), which is reproduced here as Fig. 12.10. This 'self nexus' is the overriding steering system in the integrated psychical system. As indicated, its main function is decision-control. This process is affected by 'personification' and 'evaluation', both of which are components of self-conception. In addition, decisioncontrol is affected by input and output strategies, also called 'dynamisms'. These comprise 'defence mechanisms' in a psychoanalytical sense as well as other control mechanisms. The self-nexus system is functionally related to all the other personality systems, thus steering the individual's entire internal activity and outward action. Since the graphic


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model of the 'self nexus' (Fig. 12.10) supplements the general model (Fig. 12.9), we shall now undertake an explicit formulation of the functional hypotheses contained in this model: 8th HYPOTHESIS: The six personality systems - especially the cognitive and the

affective systems - act upon a felf-nexussystem' whose chief function is decision-control. This self-nexus system acts reciprocally on the six personality systems - especially the affective and motor systems. This complex hypothesis may be reformulated symbolically as the following simple hypotheses: 8a. H(cognition and affect) + H(se1f-nexus) 8b. H(se1f-nexus)3 H(affect and motor function) For lack of space, we cannot reconstruct here the implicit hypotheses about the processes and factors inherent in the self-nexus, but must refer readers to Chapter 10, pp. 222-224 in R. & P., 1983. We thereby arrive at the next point in the systematological analysis: a metatheoretical analysis of the hypothetical terms used.

Hypothetical terms. All the terms that enter into the eight reformulated hypotheses are hypothetical terms (with the exception of 'input' and 'output', which represent empirical, independent and dependent variables). All the hypothetical terms used refer to 'neutral' hypothetical constructs and are therefore Hc-terms. Most of the hypothetical terms in R. & P.'s theory refer to 'systems', which may be regarded both as structures and processes. E.g. the cognitive and affective systems are structures in which processes are taking place. But some of the hypothetical terms refer directly to processes (e.g. 'perceiving', 'conceptualizing' and 'symbolizing') and only indirectly to the structures that condition the individual variations (which in factor analysis are thus 'personality factors' or 'dimensions'). On the other hand, some hypothetical terms refer directly to structures or 'factors' (e.g. 'emotional stability', 'emotional independence' and 'introversiordextroversion') and only indirectly to processes. The hypothetical terms' double reference is a direct result of R. & P.'s integration of systems theory, which is largely structure-oriented, with information theory, which is largely process-oriented.

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Most of the hypothetical terms in R. & P.'s theory refer to vector-variables, which have a combined dynamic and directive effect. However, some terms refer to pure dynamic variables (e.g. the affective system) and others to pure directive variables (e.g. the cognitive system). For the sake of consistency, however, we might say that the widespread use of the concept of 'information' indicates that all hypothetical terms in R . & P.'s theory should be regarded as referring to directive variables. This is also in accordance with their psychophysical theory: the computer-analogy, which identifies the 'psyche' with information-transforming processes (and structures). According to this psychophysical theory, 'energy' - and thereby dynamic variables - is something that refers to the biological system, or organism in a restricted sense. We have hereby concluded the analysis of the hypothetical stratum in R. & P.'s theory and shall now turn to the next stratum.

The Data-stratum INTRODUCTION. As mentioned in the introduction, R. & P. have chosen to omit an account of the numerous empirical investigations - especially tests and experiments - constituting the theory's empirical basis. Reference is merely made - presumably from lack of space - to Royce's and his colleagues' numerous investigations. Scattered in the text - especially in the chapter about genetic and environmental determinants of development - some general data have been formulated. But we shall suffice here by giving a single example of the research results to which R. & P. (1983) have referred in most detail. EXAMPLES OF DATA. The empirical investigation to which Royce's text refers

in most detail is the 'psycho-epistemological profile' (PEP), which has been used in many investigations and several times been revised. The psycho-epistemological profile (PEP) has been developed in order to test people's cognitive style and world view ('epistemology'). It measures the extent to which the individual is dominated by empiricism, rationalism or metaphorism. The following general data-theses are presented in a summary on p. 198-199: 1. The test-retest reliability's coefficient is c. 0.80-0.90. 2. The test's validity is elucidated by testing various professional groups:


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a) empiricism is the predominating 'epistemology' in students of chemistry and biology; b) rationalism is the predominating 'epistemology' in students of mathematics and physics; c) metaphorism is the predominating 'epistemology' in students of music and drama. The quantitative test results - 'test scores' - are statistically significant. From the data-stratum we shall now turn to the theory as a whole.

The Theory as a Whole THE COMPLETENESS OF THE TEXT. Finally, we shall analyse R. & P.'s theory

as a whole. Following the systematological taxonomy, we shall start by evaluating the completeness of the text. R. & P.'s theory must be deemed a complete scientific discourse, since all three strata are represented. Although the datastratum is only briefly accounted for, the hypothetical stratum is well-represented, and the metastratum is discussed in more detail than is customary in psychological theories. This reflects Royce's long-standing interest in theoretical psychology. THE TESTABILITY OF THE THEORY.At first sight R. & P.'s theory may seem

to be empirically well-founded, since it contains many references both to Royce's and his colleagues' empirical research and to the research of others. This cannot, however, be confirmed by calculating the hypothesis quotient of the reconstructed theory. As mentioned, only the most abstract part of the theory is reproduced in the graphic model we have used when formulating the eight hypotheses explicitly. The model has the same degree of abstraction as Freud's 'meta-psychological' models (incl. the lens and structural models). If we were to calculate the H.Q. fpr R. & P.'s theory it would be an even greater figure than for Freud's lens model, in which the H.Q. = 2.0. But it would be unfair to do so, because the model used represents only the apex of an entire 'theory-pyramid', which we had to refrain from reconstructing here from lack of space. It would, however, be possible to calculate the H.Q., since there are in fact two empirical hypotheses capable of relating the entire system of theoretical hypotheses to an independent variable ('input') and a dependent variable ('output'). Thus the theory is in principle a testable scientific theory - and not just a speculative philosophical theory. It is even related to an unusually large

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amount of data material, even though the latter has not been presented in this book. Finally, we must emphasize that the theory's high degree of abstraction is connected with the fact that R. & P.'s theory closely approaches a semi-formal meta-psychological theory, which integrates two other semi-formal theories systems theory and information theory - with a mathematicized method like factor analysis (for 'semi-formal' theories, see Madsen, 1985). Thus, the theory is the most integrating psychological theory among the fifty or so theories hitherto subjected to a metatheoretical analysis in accordance with the systematological taxonomy.

Notes 1

,,As described in Chapter 1, individuality theory confronts both ends of the continuum we have been discussing. For example, at the lowest level of integrative personality, we are concerned with those characteristics of the individual related to the transduction of matter-energy into information. At the other extreme, when concerned with the integrative, or selforganizing, aspects of personality, we are clearly focused on the problem of meaning and how individuals proceed to create it in their lives."

2

,,Whatever the eventual nature of mind, we see the processing of energy and matter as the key to what is meant by body and the processing of information as the key to what is meant by mind. 'To illustrate, consider the analogy of the computer. Following this analogy, the hardware is what we mean by body and the program is the equivalent of mind."

3

,,The challenge to univariate determination is particularly potent from factor theory, which is based on the assumption of multi variate determination. But a further challenge to a simplicist conception of causality also arises from the teleological purposivism of cyberneticfeedback-information theory."


569

4

,,The argument is that theory-laden constructivism is the most adequate metatheory available for science, and that this state of affairs has implications for psychology, the most obvious one being 'that scientific advancement is more dependent upon theory construction per se than was heretofore realized'.

5

,,To conclude our discussion on the role of systems and informationprocessing models, we want to emphasize the possible importance of further development of systems concepts in psychology. Systems theory has not been seriously applied in psychological research and theorizing, although it has been applied in most other sciences. Our developments in individuality theory should serve to illustrate the value of such applications and provide a model for future developments. We think such attempts must be made if the field is to begin building bridges across the chasms that divide and fragment psychological science. We think systems theory, with its emphasis on dealing with complexity, its cross-disciplinary history, and its sophisticated development in conjunction with computer systems are important reasons for exploring systems models further. We hope that individuality theory provides another reason for doing so."

6

,,The relevant point we make in Chapter 3 is that factor analysis is not capable of generating a viable theoretical structure all by itself. Thus, the factor model is limited to generating an inventory of potentially useful theoretical constructs, which can then be used in an appropriate conceptual framework. We are taking systems and information theory as our general paradigm for encompassing the constructs produced by the factor model, which means, for example, that when the factor analysts identify an in variant higher-order factor they may be identifying a subsystem."

7

,,..., factor analysis provides a way for inductively generating potentially useful theoretical constructs in complex domains where observables are confusedly interrelated."

8

,,The external strategy involves experimental manipulation of factors - the effect of such variables as brain damage (Mos, Lukaweski, & Royce, 1977; Royce, Yeudall, & Bock, 1976), electric shock and drugs (Satinder, Royce, & Yeudall, 1970), maternal stimulation (Poley & Royce, 1970), early stress (Mos, Royce, & Poley, 1973), and the effect of light (Mos, Vriend,

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Vriend, & Poley, 1974), and height (Royce & Poley, 1976) via the usual laboratory techniques. In both strategies the ultimate goal is to establish the boundary conditions or the range of effectiveness for each factorially identified unknown." 9

,,Our problem is to account for differences in world view, where world view is defined as an individual's organized set of personal cognitions that constitute a model or image of reality."

RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE POSTSCRIPT

INTRODUCTION. Finally, in this section we shall try to provide 1) a retrospec-

tive survey of the international history of psychology as presented in the previous twelve chapters, and 2) a prospective picture of psychology's future development.

In Retrospect: The Historical Development of Psychology INTRODUCTION. The following will consist of a summary of the history of psychology as presented here with the aid of a revised version of Kuhn's theory. Since this is a summary, in describing a period or a school's 'meta-paradigm' we shall concentrate on the conceptions of Man and science, since these may be said to be its two most important components. In addition, we shall briefly characterize the 'theory-paradigm' of the period or school.

Classical experimental psychology INTRODUCTION. As described in Chapter 4,psychology was established as an independent science with Fechner's book ,,Elemente der Psychophysic" and Wundt's founding of the laboratory in Leipzig. This marked the introduction of the first normal period in the history of psychology. The analysis and comparison of the two paradigm-creating major works, Wundt's ,,Grundzuge" and W . James ,,Principles" showed that they possessed a common meta-paradigm

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though different theoryparadigms. Thus they constituted the paradigms for two microschools within classical psychology's macroschool. THE CLASSICAL META-PARADIGM.Classical experimental psychology's meta-

paradigm consisted of a biological, neutral-monistic and deterministic conception of man combined with a natural scientific, nomothetic and experimental conception of science. The object of psychological research was consciousness. This meta-paradigm was common to the two paradigm-creaters, whose schools were therefore microschools within the same macroschool. The period thereby constitutes a normal period.

Wundt's theory-paradigm. As mentioned, on the hypothetical level Wundt's and James' theories were different, and so they constituted two microschools, each with its theory-paradigm. Wundt's theory-paradigm was characterized as structuralist, but ought rather to be called elementalist, since 'consciousness' is regarded as the sum of the elements of consciousness. James's theory-paradigm. Unlike the latter, James's theory-paradigm may be characterized as holistic or functional, consciousness being regarded as a totality of mental processes or functions. Thus, apart from the meta-paradigm, the two microschools were in agreement that psychology's object of research was consciousness, although their conceptions of it differed.

The first period of school formation INTRODUCTION. Around the turn of the century the contrast between the two microschools increased both in Europe and America. This led to a division into macroschools, the most important of which were described in each chapter. GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY. This macroschool was described in Chapter 5 . Its meta-paradigm consisted of a biological, neutral-monistic and deterministic conception of man combined with a naturalistic (nomothetic) and experimentalist view of science. The object of psychological research was consciousness, which was regarded holistically. There were no true microschools within

In retrospect: The historical development of psychology

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Gestalt psychology. Kiihler's production was analysed metatheoretically as representative of the school. BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY. This macroschool was described in Chapter 6. Its

meta-paradigm consisted of a biological, largely materialistic conception of man and a natural scientific, experimentalist view of science. The object of psychological research was behavior. Behavioral psychology consisted of three microschools, each with its own theory-paradigm. Pavlov's 'reflexology' was a physiologically explanative S O-R psychology. Watson's classical behaviorism was a largely descriptive S-Rpsychology. Hull's neo-behaviorism was a constructively explanative S-H-Rpsychology. The production of these three psychologists was analysed metatheoretically and then compared. PSYCHOANALYSIS. This macroshcool was described in Chapter 7. Its metaparadigm consisted of a biological, neutral-monistic and deterministic conception of man combined with a naturalistic (nomothetic) and hermeneutical-clinical view of science. The object of psychoanalytical research was the entire psychic system (personality) with emphasis on unconscious structures and processes. There were several microschools: Freud's psychoanalysis, Jung 's 'analytical psychology' and Adler's 'individual psychology'. But only Freud's production was analysed metatheoretically.

Integrating psychology INTRODUCTION. The political development (Hitler's assumption of power and the Second World War) resulted in increased contact and collaboration between the above three schools of psychology in the USA, and led to integrating tendencies in the psychological scientific community. This gave rise to a new macroschool - that of integrating psychology - and the period from around 1945-1960 became psychology's second normal period, which was described in Chapter 8. THE ETA-PARADIGM. The meta-paradigm of integrating psychology con-

sisted of a biologically, neutral-monistic, deterministic conception of man combined with a naturalistic (nomothetic)view of science with a methodological 'pluralism' (experiments, tests and clinical methods). The object of psy-

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chological research was behavior, which was defined so broadly as to include verbalized experiences. THEORY-PARADIGMS.During the integrating period there were several theory-paradigms, though they all presupposed the same common metaparadigm. The folowing theories were analysed metatheoretically and then compared: Tolman's neo-behavioristic psychology, which used neutral, hypothetical constructs in order to explain behavior; i.e. a S-H-R psychology, and mainly focussed on the psychology of learning. Lewin's Gestalt psychologically-inspired 'field-theory', which also used neutral hypothetical constructs (S-H-R-theory) and initially focussed on motivational psychology; later his theory was extended to include personality psychology and social psychology. Murray's psychoanalytically-inspired 'personology', which used neutral hypothetical constructs (S-H-R-theory) in order to explain the entire development of personality. Apart from these three psychologists, R.S. Woodworth made a major contribution to the integration of psychology.

The second period of school formation INTRODUCTION. Around 1960 a new period of crisis began and new schools

were formed. The political events (the Vietnam War and the 'youth revolt') had a direct influence on this development. Several schools arose, and a chapter was devoted to each of them. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY. With Maslow in the lead, a new school was

formed with a new meta-paradigm. It consists of a humanistic, neutral-monistic (?) and 'self-deterministic' conception of man combined with a humanistic (hermeneutical and idiographic) view of science with qualitative methods. The object of psychological research is the whole personality - including consciousness. Maslow's production was analysed metatheoretically in Chapter 9. MARXIST PSYCHOLOGY. In the Soviet Union a Marxist psychology was devel-

oped with Vygotsky, Rubinstein, Luria and Leontjev as the paradigm-creators.

In retrospect: The historical development of psychology

575

The Marxist meta-paradigm consists of a social, neutral-monistic (?) and deterministic conception of man combined with a naturalistic (nomothetic) and experimentalist view of science. The object of psychological research is the 'psychical system' or 'psyche', which includes 'consciousness'. At the end of the 1960's Marxist microschools were formed in Western Europe, the most important of which is 'critical psychology' (the Berlin school) and the 'FreudoMarxist' Hannover school. Leontjev's production was analysed as the chief representative of Marxist psychology. CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIORISM. This school, which was described in Chapter

11, is inspired by Skinner. Its meta-paradigm is a biological, materialistic, deterministic conception of man combined with a naturalistic (nomthetic) and experimentalist view of science. The object of research is behavior. Skinner's own theory-paradigm is a descriptive S-R-psychology.But other behaviorist microschools have been developed that explain behavior with the help of 'cognitive processes' and other hypothetical variables, i.e. a S-H-Rtheory. A. Bandura is the chief representative of so-called 'cognitive behaviorism'. Skinner's production was analysed metatheoretically in Chapter 11. MAINSTREAM PSYCHOLOGY. This is not a true school formation, but consists of contemporary psychologists, most of whom continue psychology under integrating psychology's paradigm (see above). The group is subdivided according to specialized psychological subdisciplines.

The psychology of learning is especialy inspired by early and contemporary behaviorist psychology. Its chief representatives are N.E. Miller and D . E . Berlyne. Motivational psychology is especially inspired by psychoanalysis and the psychology of learning. Its chief representatives are J.W. Atkinson and D . C . McClelland. Personality Psychology is inspired to some extent by psychoanalysis and further more by factor analytic method. Its chief representatives are R . B . Cattell, H.J. Eysenck and J.R. Royce. Cognitive psychology is inspired byy Gestalt psychology. Its chief representatives are J. Piaget, J . Bruner and K.H. Pribram. Mainstream psychology's historical development is described in Chapter 12, where Royce's production is analysed metatheoretically.


576

Prospects: The Future Development of Psych ology INTRODUCTION. In this last section we shall venture to predict the future development of psychology as it appears in the midle of the 1980s on the basis of

its historical development hitherto.

Prediction: the new meta-paradigm We foresee that during the course of a few years - possibly already in the 1990s - the present period of school formation will be replaced by a new normal period, which will gather the psychological community around a new common meta-paradigm. With a fair degree of certainty we foresee that this new common paradigm will be as follows: 1. Ontology 1.1 Conception of man: an integrated biological-socio-humanisticconception

of man. Man will be regarded as a complicated biological being whose socialization has a greater influence on his development than is the case with other biological organisms. Language and other forms of culture likewise have a special influence on his mental development (cf. Royce Powell, 1983, and Leontjev). 1.2 Psycho-hysical theory: The 'psyche' will be regarded as a hierarchical information-transformingsystem. The world will be regarded as a pluralistic, multilevel system, in which the psychical system is interposed between the biological and socio-cultural systems (cf. Royce & Powell, 1983, as well as Leontjev, Piaget and Pnbram, etc.). 1.3 The problem of determinism: a probabilistic theory will predominate.

4

2. The philosohy of science 2.1 Epistemology: a pluralistic, empiricist, rationalistic and intuitionistic epistemology with the main emphasis on rationalism (cf. Royce & Powell, 1983). 2.2 Meta-theory. The ideal of science will be characterized by systems theory.

Each science must develop in order to suit the ontological level of its object of research.

Prospects: Thefuture development 0s psychology

577

2.3 Methodology: As far as psychology is concerned, systems theory will involve a methodological pluralism with the use of experimental as well as psycho-metrical (especially factor analytical) and qualitive ('clinical') methods (cf. Royce & Powell, 1983).

Grounds for the prediction The grounds for proclaiming the emergence of a new meta-paradigm based on systems and information theory may be found in the already perceivable tendencies within the present second period of school formation. These are probably most conspicuous in mainstream psychology, where Royce's and Powell's theory may be viewed as typical and 'progressive'. But the dominance of cognitive psychology (Piaget, etc.) and 'cognitivistic psychology' in other disciplines also points in this direction - as exemplified by Bandura's cognitive psychology of learning, cognitive motivational psychology (e.g. Berlyne) and information- and systems-theoretical personality psychology (especially Royce and Powell, 1983 and Gardner, 1987). Furthermore, tendencies in other contemporary school formations point towards an information- and systems-theoretical meta-paradigm, especially Marxist psychology, as represented by Leontjev. These tendencies may also be found in the 'holistic' meta-paradigm of humanistic psychology. As mentioned, contemporary behaviorism with its 'cognitive behaviorism' also contains cognitive tendencies. But it is the development of mainstream psychology in particular that points towards information- and systems-theoretical psychology. The remaining contemporary school formations may well develop into psychological disciplines during the next period of integration (as in the case of the three schools that became integrated during the first period of integration). Humanistic psychology would then become 'Transpersonal Psychology' (about states of consciousness), contemporary behaviorism would become the psychology of learning (used in behavior modification) and Marxist psychology would become the theory of development and socialization. All in all, to judge from the concrete historical development, there are reasonable grounds for predicting that the next generation of psychologists will unite in researching 'the psychic system' on the basis of an informationand systems-theoretical paradigm. This prediction is not particularly daring, since this development - of which Royce and Powell constitute a good example - is already in progress.


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Radnitsky ,G.: Contemporary Schools of Metascience. Kgbenhavn: Scandinavian University Books, 2. udgave, 1970 Rapaport, D.: Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory. New York: International University Press, 1960 Rappard, H.V.: A Monistic Interpretation of Wundt's Psychology. Psychological Research, Vol. 42, 123-134, 1980 Reich, W.: Die Funktion des Orgasmus. 1942 Ricoeur, P.: Freud and Philosophy: Essay on Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969 Royce, J. R. and Powell, A.: Theory of Personal and Individual Differences: Factors, Systems and Processes. Englewood-Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, 1983 Rubin, E.: Synsoplevede Figurer. Kfibenhavn: Gyldendal, 1915 Rubinstein, S. L.: Sein und Bewusstsein. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 7. Auflage, 1973. Orig. 1957 Russel, B.: History of Western Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin, 1962 Ryle, G.: The Concept of Mind. London: Huthinson, 1949 RAheim, K.: Problem Solving and Intelligence. Bergen: 1961 Sandler, J., Dare, C. og Holder, A.: Psychoanalysens Grunnbegreper. Oslo: Norsk Gyldendal, 1975 Schuhr, M.: Freud: Living and Dying. New Yok: International University Press, 1972 Skve, L.: Marxism and the Theory of Human Personality. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975 Sexton, S. V. and Misiak, H.(eds.): Psychology Around the World. Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Publ., 1976 Shapiro, D.: Precision Nirvana. Englewood-Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978 Sharfstein, B. (ed.): Philosophy East, Philosophy West. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978 Sherwood, M.: The Logic of Explantation in Psychoanalytic. New York: Academic Press, 1969 Silva, P. de: Buddhist and Freudian Psychology. Sri Lanka: Lake House Investments, 1973

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Wertheimer, M.: Experimentelle Studien uber das Sehen von Bewegung. I: Zeitschrqt fur Psychologi, 1912, Vol. 61, p. 161-265 Wertheimer, M. Productive Thinking. New York: Harper, 1945. Enlarged edition by Michael Wertheimer. New York: Harper, 1959 Witt-Hansen, J.: Den antikke Filosofs Historie. Kgbenhavn: Munksgaard, 1964 Witt-Hansen, J.: Historisk Materialisme. K@benhavn:Berlingske, 1973 Witt-Hansen, J.: Filosoji. Kgbenhavn: Gyldendal, 1985 Wolman, B.B.: Logic of Science in Psychoanalysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984 Wolpe, J. Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958 Woodworth, R,S.: Dynamic Psychology. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918 Woodworth, R,S.: Psychology: A Study of Mental Life. New York: Henry Holt, 1921 Woodworth, R,S.: Experimental Psychology. New York: Henry Holt, 1938 Woodworth, R,S.: Dynamics of Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958 Woodworth, R.S.and Sheehan, Mary: Contemporary Schools of Psychology. New York: Ronald Press, 3rd ed., 1964 Wundt, W. Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologie. Leipzig: Verlag von W. Engelman, 1874 Vygotsky, L.S. Thought and Language. Cambridge, M.A.: M.I.T. Press, 1986 Young, P. Th.: Motivation of Behavior. New York: Wiley, 1936 Young, P. Th.: Motivation and Emotion. New York: Wiley, 1961 Yu-lan, F. A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. New York: Free Press, 1966


Index

For the convenience of the reader this index is very concentrated: Each name or term is usually only referred to once - being the page with most information of the name or term. Names of authors, whose work is referred to, but not mentioned, are not indexed.

accomodation 534 activity-motivation-model520 activity-oriented value-orientation 561 Adler, Alfred 269 affective system 558 Albert 202 Allport, Gordon W. 527 American Psychological Association 335 analytical psychology 270 Anokhin, P. K. 449 anomaly 17,194 applied disciplines 549 archetypes 27 1 Aristotelian science 350 Aristotle 79,86 arousal 5 14 assimilation 534 Atkinson, John W. 524,519 Bandura, Albert 48 1 Bandura's model 484 behavior modification 480 behavioral psychologists 193

behaviorism 193 classical 477 cognitive 48 1 contemporary 478 neo-behaviorism 477 radical 478,480 behaviorists, other 485 Bekhterev, Vladimir M. 130, 193 Berkeley 78 Berlyne, D.E. 5 10 Berlin school 452 Bemnffy, Ludwig von 80 Binet, Alfred 128 bio-feedback 5 10 biographical historiography 5 biographical history of science 10 birth trauma 272 borderline disciplines 549 Brentano, Franz 260 Breuer, Josef 261 Bruner, J.S.539 Buddha 77 Buhler, Charlotte 412 Cannon, Walter B. 5 14 Cattell, James McKenn 126

596

Cattell,.RaymondB. 528 Charcot, J.M. 261 Chicago school 133 classifications of models 57 cognitive learning 199 cognitive maps 380 cognitive model 5 19 cognitive psychology 506,530 cognitive strategies 546 cognitive structures 534 cognitive system 557 cognitive theories 507 complexes 27 1 Comte, Auguste 94 conceptualization 560 concrete-operational stage 536 conditioning, operant 478 conditioning, respondent 478 contiguity theories 507 convergent thinking 547 conception of man 33,416 conditioned emotional reactions 201 conditioned reflexes 195 connexionism 199 consciousness82 constructive term 47 contiguity 199 correlations 6 1 criterion of testability 110 critical philosophy 101 critical psychologists 452 critical rationalism 99 criticism 22, 88 cultural history of science 10 cultural history school 446

Index

cybernetic hypothesis 542 cybernetics 80, 102,541 Czechoslovak psychology 450 Darwin, Charles 122 data language 44,97 data-stratum 59, 186 deductive explanatory systems 55 Democritus 76 depth grammar 546 Descartes, Rene 74,85 descriptive language 27 desriptive models 58 determining tendencies 38 1 determinism 37 developmental psychology 548 dialectical materialism 80,91 dialectical philosophy 90 dialectical spiral 3,521 dialectics 90 dialectics of nature 102 differential psychology 548 directive variables 49 discrimination492 disciplinary matrix 15 divergent thinking 547 double positive conflict 383 double-aspect-theory79 double negative conflict 385 drive 513 drive and mechanism 339 dualism 73 dynamic 276 dynamic variables 49

Index East European psychology 449 East German psychology DDRpsychology 450 Ebbinghaus, Herman 120 Eccles, John 74 economic 276 effect theories 507 emotional independence 560 emotional stability 560 empirical hypotheses 54 empirical research reports 63 empirical style 560 empiricism 38,86 empirocriticism 95 Engels, Friederich 91 epiphenomenalism 77 epistemological theses 37 Erikson, Erik H. 274 Eros 298 ethologists 5 12 evolution of science 14 existential hypotheses 5 1 existential philosophy 407 experiment 42 Experimental Analysis of Behavior 480 experimental introspection 131 experimental neuroses 195 explanatory models 58 externalist historiography 4 Eysenck, Hans Jiirgen 528 factor analysis 528,553 factor analytic personality psychology 528 Fechner, Gustav Theodor 114 Fechner's law 115

597

feed-back loop 542 Festinger, Leon 5 19 Fieandt, Kai von 547 field-theory 344 Fliess, Wilhelm 262 formal-operational stage 537 fourth force 414 Frankfurter school 101 Frankl, Victor E. 413 Freud's methodology 285 Freud, Anna 269 Freud, Sigmund 259 metastratum 275 concept of energy 295 drive concept 297 drive-theory 295 epistemology 28 1 graphic models 294 hermeneutic interpretations 283 homeostasis hypothesis 299 H. Q. 321 hypothesis-system 286 interpretation of dreams 264 lens model 289 metatheory 282 ontological meta-theses 278 philosophy of science 281 theory of anxiety 299 Fromm, Eric 273 functional autonomy 428 functional hypotheses 52 functional relations 60 functionalism 132 functionalist psychology 132 Galanter, Eugene 54 1 Galilean science 350

Index

598

Galton, Francis 123,528 general psychology 548 general system theory 80, 102 genetic epistemology 531 Gestalt laws 181,186 Gestalt psychological method 177 Gestalt psychology 165 Gestalt school 167 Georgian school 448 Goldstein, Kurt 171 group dynamics 387 Guthrie, Edwin Ray 205 H. Q. 61,70 Habermas, Jurgen 101 Hall, G. S.125 Hannover school 45 1 Harlow, H.F. 516 Hartmann, Heinz 274 Hebb, D.O. 508 Heckhausen, Heinz 525 hedonism 5 18 hedonistic model 5 17 Hegel, G. W. F. 78,90 Heller, Agnes 45 1 Helmholtz, Ludvig von 113 hermeneutic ideal 40 Hilgard, D.E. 5 11 historical hypotheses 52 historical materialism 92 history of ideas 8 history of the scientific community 10 Hitler 332 holistic psychologists 167, 171

hologram 546 Holt, Edwin Bissell203 Holtzkamp, Klaus 452 homeostasis model 514 Horney, Karen 273 Hull, Clarc Leonard 204 data-stratum 246 H. Q. 248 hypothetical stratum 230 metastratum 207 model 239 humanistic psychology 407 Association for Humanistic Psychology 409 'Forerunners' of humanistic Psychology 410 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 409

paradigm 408 Hume, David 87 Hungarian psychology 45 1 Hunter, Walter S . 203 Husserl, Edmund 172 hyperphenomenalism 77 hypotheses 180 hypothesis quotient 65,70 hypothesis-system54 hypothetic system 178 hypothetical construct 46 hypothetical stratum 45 hypothetical terms 46 hypothetical variables 46 hypothetico-deductive thinking 537

I. Q. 129

Index idalism 37,78 ideals of science 40, 101 identity theory 79 idiographic ideal 41 incentive model 5 17 incentives 5 18 index 560 individual psychology 270 inferiority feelings 270 information 102 information theory 541,552 innate reactions 49 1 instinct psychology 5 11 instrumental learning 198 instrumentalism 39 integrating psychologists' metaparadigm 354 integrating psychology 395 intelligence quotient 128 intelligence test 128 interactionism 73 internalist historiography 3 international congresses 336 international psychology 336 intervening variables 46,342 intrinsic model 520 intrinsic-motivation-theories339 introversiodextroversion 529, 560 intuitionism 38 isomorphic principle 176 isomorphic theory 175 James, William 124 data-stratum 156 H. Q. 157 hypotheses 150 hypothetical stratum 149

599

hypothetical system (model) 149 hypothetical terms 153 meta-stratum 133 text 157 Janet, Pierre 129 Jones, Ernest 267 Jung, C.G.270 Kant, Immanuel88 Katz, David 172 Klix, Felix von 450 Koffka, Kurt 170 Konorski, J. 450 Kornilov, K. N. 444 Kragh, Ulf 528 Krippner, Stanley 414 Kriiger, Felix 173 Kuhn, Thomas, S. 14 Kohler, Wolfgang 169, 175, 176 data-stratum 186 H. Q. 189 hypothetical stratum 178 meta-stratum 175 model 187 Kulpe, Oswald 131 Laing, Ronald D. 414 latent learning 379 laws of nature 5 1 Lehman, Alfred 118 Leibnitz 75 lens model 264,287 Lenin 445 Lenin's theory 446 Leontyev, A. N. 447,453 data-stratum 465 general data-theses 466

600

H. Q.469 hypotheses 457 hypothesis- system 457 hypothetical stratum 457 hypothetical terms 462 meta-stratum 453 model 463 ontology 453 philosophy of science 455 production 453 production as a whole 469 specific data-theses 467 theory testability 469 levels of discourse 30 Lewin, Kurt 343 data-stratum 380 H. Q. 393 hypotheses 362 hypothesis-system362 hypothetical stratum 362 hypothetical terms 370 model 369 ontological meta-theses 346 philosophy of science 349 libido 27 1,298 life-stile270,563 Lindhardt, Joseph 45 1 linguistic categories 27 logical empiricism 96 logical positivism 96 logotherapy 4 13 Lomov, B. F. 449 Lorenz, Konrad 5 12 Lorenzer, Alfred 452

Index Luk&s, Georg 45 1 Luria, A. R. 446 M-H-D-ratio 63,391 macroschool 73,159 mainstream psychology 505 Marx, Karl 91,431 Marxist Psychology 443 East Europe 449 review 444 Soviet Union 443 West Europe 45 1 Maslow, Abraham H. 6,411 concrete data 435 data-stratum 435 empirical results 438 H. Q. 440 hypotheses 433 hypothetical stratum 421 M-H-D-ratio439 meta-stratum 4 15 methods 435 model 423 model of the need-hierarchy 427 motivation hypotheses 426 motivation theory 422 ontology 415 philosophy of science 419 production 415 theory of personality 429 testability 440 materialism 76 May, Rollo 413 maze experiment 200 McClelland, David C. 523

Index McDougall, William 5 11,522 mentalistic term 47 meta-models 59 meta-paradigm 73, 158 meta-plans 546 meta-psychology 276 meta-stratum 32, 175 behavioral psychologists 207 meta-theoretical theses 39 metaphorical style 560 metascience 11 metatheory 11 method-hypothesis 111 methodological theses 42 Meyer, Max 203 Michotte, A.E. 173 microschool 73, 159 Mill, John Stuart 93 Miller, Georg A. 541 Miller, Neal E. 509 model 57 model explanations 56 modelling 483 molar behaviorism 352 molecular behaviorism 352 Montessori, Maria 129 Morgan, C. Lloyd 200 motivated perception 539 motivation models 5 17 motivational psychology 506,5 11 motor system 557 Moustgaard, I.K. 548 multi-motivation-hypothesis428 Murray, H. A. 345 data-stratum 388 H. Q. 394 hypotheses 37 1

601

hypothesis-system 37 1 hypothetical stratum 370 model 376 ontological meta-theses 346 philosophy of science 349 hypothetical terms 375 Muller, C. G. 120 Munsterberg, Hugo 124 Nanis, Ach 381 Neisser, Ulrich 540 neo-behaviorists 203 neo-positivism 96 neutral monism 79 new period of crisis 403 external causes 403 internal causes 405 new school of social research 333 nomothetic ideal 40 normal period 73,159 Nuttin, Joseph 526 observational learning 482 Olds, James 509 ontological meta-theses 32, 135 ontology 175 operant behavior 49 1 operant conditioning 490 organismic term 47 organization 179 Oxford philosophy 98 panpsychism 72 paradigm 15 parallelism 75 Pavlov, Ivan Petrovich 194 data-stratum 24 1

602 H. Q. 248 hypothetical stratum 2 13 meta-stratum 207 model 219-220 Pavlovization 445 peak-experiences 433 perceptual genesis 527 period of crisis 17,74 period of integration external causes 332 internal causes 338 personal contacts 332 practical collaboration 333 personal meaning 564 personality psychology 506,526 personality system 559 personology 345 phenomenalism78 phenomenologicalphilosophy 407 Phi-phenomena 168 philosophical discourses 63 philosophy of life 563 philosophy of science 12,37,137, 176,531 Piaget, Jean 531 Piaget's hypothetical stratum 534 data-stratum 539 hypothetical terms 534 meta-stratum 531 Plat0 77 pleasure principle 304 pluralism 8 1 Polish psychology 449 Popper, Karl 22,74 positive-negativeconflict 384

Index

positivism 94 post-war development 334 Powell, Arnold 530,550 see Royce, J.R. pragmatism 125 pre-operational stage 535 prescriptive language 28 Pribram, Karl H. 541,546 primary processes 302 probabilism 37 process-terms 48 programmed teaching 479 prospects 576 protocol sentences 62 Psychical energy 295 psycho-epistemologicalprofile 566 psycho-physical theories 72 psycho-physical theory 33 psychoanalysis, establishment 264 psychoanalytic theory-paradigm 299 psychoanalytical method 285 psychological disciplines 548 psychological field theory 366 psychological journals 127 psychological laboratories 119 psychological types 27 1 Psychologische Forschung 169 psychologists of learning 506 psychology of learning 505 punishment centre 5 10 punishment and reward 383 qualitative methods 44 Rank, Otto 272

Index

rational style 560 rationalism 38,85 realism 39 reality principle 304 reciprocal determinism 48 1 reflexology 193 Reich, Wilhelm 273 reinforcement centre 509 reinforcer 491 research methods 42 respondent behavior 49 1 respondent conditioning 490 response learning 198 reticular arousal system ( U S ) 5 14 retrospect 571 reward centre 509 Ribot, Theodule 128 Rogers, Carl 413 romanticism 89 Royce, Joseph R. 530 data-stratum 566 differential hypotheses 559 general hypotheses 556 hypothesis-system 554 hypothetical stratum 553 hypothetical terms 565 meta-stratum 550 ontology 55 1 personality model 554 philosophy of science 55 1 theory testability 567 Rubin, Edgar 172 Rubinstein, S.L. 445 Russell, Bertrand 80,97 Ryle, Gilbert 99 RAheim, Kjell546

603

Saugstad, Per 546 schedules of reinforcement 480,495 schemata 534 schools 19 science of consciousness 131 scientific community 7 scientific hypotheses 50 scientific production 66 scientific revolution 20 Sechenov, Ivan M. 195 secondary processes 302 self-actualizingpeople 43 1 self-conception 563 self-nexus 564 self-oriented value-orientation 561 self-reinforcement483 semi-formal theories 568 sensory system 557 sensory-motorstage 535 sentiment 522 shaping of behavior 496 signal reflexes 195 Skinner, B. F. 478 data-stratum 495 empirical research 497 general data-theses 495 H. Q. 498 hypotheses 490 hypothesis-system494 meta-stratum 486 model 493 ontology 486 philosophy of science 486 pragma-thesis 497 production 485 theory

604

testability 498 Skinner-box 497 Smith, Gudmund 527 social-economichistory of science 10 social value-orientation 56 1 Sokolov, E. N. 449 specific data-theses 62 spatiality 560 Spencer, Herbert 94 spinoza 79 spiritualism 78 Staats, Arthur, W. 485 Stem, Wilhelm 173 stimulus learning 198 structural model 268,276 structural theory 290 structuralism 80, 102, 132 structuralist psychology 132 structure-terms 48 Stumpf, Carl 121 style system 558 substitute-activity385 surplus meaning 46 symbolization 560 system philosophy 80,101 system-theory 35,552 systematological taxonomy 69 systematology 12 Seve, Lucien 452 Taoism 408 Tart, Charles T. 414 TAT 523 temporality 560 Teplov, B. M. 449

Index

test method 42 test-operate-test-exit unit 542 testability 64 Thanatos 298 thematic apperception test 523 theoretical basic disciplines 548 theoretical discourses 63 theoretical hypotheses 53 theories of motivation 5 14 theory 26 theory of science 11 theory-loaded constructivism 552 theory-paradigm 73, 159 third force 414 Thomae, Hans 526 Thomdike, Edward Lee 197 Tinbergen, N. 5 12 Titchener, Edward Bradford 132 Tolman, Edward 340 data-stratum 378 H. Q. 392 hypotheses 355 hypothesis-system 355 hypothetical stratum 354 hypothetical terms 361 model 356 ontological meta-theses 346 philosophy of science 349 topographical theory 287 topological principles 344 total psychical system 559 TOTE unit 542 trail-and-error 198 transempirical-descriptivelanguage 27

Index transpersonal psychology 4 14 trialism 75 types 196 types of history 1 types of history of science 10 Usnadse, D. N. 448 value system 558 vector-variables 49 vicarious reinforcement 483 Vygotsky, L. S. 446 Watson, John Broadus 200 data-stratum 244 H. Q. 248 hypothetical stratum 222 meta-stratum 207 model 228 Weber, E. H. 114 Weber's law 114 Weber-Fechner's law 144 Weiss, Albert Paul 203

605

Wertheimer, Max 167 Wittgenstein, Ludvig 98 Wolpe, Joseph 485 Woodworth, R. S. 338,520 World view 562 Wundt, Wilhelm 116 data-stratum 152 H. Q. 154 hypotheses 144 hypothetical stratum 141 hypothetical system (model) 149 hypothetical terms 142 meta-stratum 133 text 156 theory-paradigm 160 Wiirtsburger School 131 Young, P.T. 525 Zeigamik, Bluma V. 362,449 Zeigarnik-effect 449 Zen-Buddhism 408,416


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Advances in Psychology Volume 53 A History of Psychology in Metascientific Perspective

Advances in Psychology Volume 40 Current Issues in Theoretical Psychology

Trends in Mathematical Psychology: Advances in Psychology

Advances in Psychology Volume 20 Trends in Mathematical Psychology

Advances in Psychology Volume 66 A History of Great Ideas in Abnormal Psychology

Advances in Psychology Volume 66 A History of Great Ideas in Abnormal Psychology

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Advances in Psychology Research Volume 57

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Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 3

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