A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa

a concise introduction to the philosophy oFnicholASoFcusa

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a concise introduction to the philosophy of nicholas of cusa By jasper hopkins

univecsity of minnesou ppess, minneApolis

Copyright ©1978 by the University of Minnesota. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Published by the University of Minnesota Press, 2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, and published in Canada by Burns & MacEachern Limited, Don Mills, Ontario Library of Congress Cataloging In Publication Data Hopkins, Jasper. A concise introduction to the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa. Includes English and Latin versions of Nicholas' Trialogus de possest. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Nicolaus Cusanus, Cardinal, 1401-1464.1. Nicolaus Cusanus, Cardinal, 1401-1464. Trialogus de possest. Latin & English. II. Title. 765.N54H66 189 78-16802 ISBN 0-8166-0877-6

The Latin version of Trialogus de possest is reprinted from Renate Steiger, ed. and trans., Trialogus de possest. Dreiergesprdch uber das Konnen-Ist (1973); the diagram on p. 83 is from Elisabeth Bohnenstaedt, trans., Vom Konnen-Sein. Vom Gipfel der Betrachtung (1947). Permission for both reprintings was granted by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg.

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pRe&ce

For a long time I kept wondering how best to introduce my students to the thought of Nicholas of Cusa. Like nearly everyone else, I supposed that I ought to begin where Nicholas began: viz., with De Docta Ignorantia, his first and his most important philosophical work. Yet, I found myself unable to get a grip on this treatise, given the number of Latin passages in which the argument seemed to me either implausible or unintelligible. Moreover, the students themselves were hampered by the necessity ofrelying upon Germain Heron's English translation, which does not do justice to Nicholas's reasoning. For example, in Book II, Chapter 4 Heron renders "contracte infinitus" as "relatively infinite." And in I, 24 he takes the sentence "Licet 'unitas' videatur propinquius nomen maximi, tamen adhuc a vero nomine maximi, quod est ipsum maximum, distat per infinitum" to mean "Though 'unity' seems the more appropriate title for the Maximum, yet it falls infinitely short of the Maximum's true name, which is The Maximum." After much study, I finally came to recognize that the dialogue De Possest provides the easiest access to Nicholas's basic ideas. Written in 1460, four years before his death, it presents in streamlined fashion not only his views about v

vi

Preface

docta ignorantia, via negativa, and coincidentia oppositorum but also his teachings on (1) the universe's relationship to the absolutely Maximum, (2) the metaphysical role of mathematical symbolism, and (3) the attainability of the mystical vision of God. I hope that not only my own students of medieval philosophy but also the general student of Renaissance history will indeed find in De Possest a helpful guide to Nicholas's speculative reasoning. The best approach for the beginning student will be to read the dialogue itself before turning to the more encompassing introduction, which is more suited to advanced students and to scholars. In presenting an overview of Nicholas's thought, I could not bring myself to withhold analysis —lest by oversimplifying I should mislead, as do so many of the summaries found in even the better textbooks on the history of philosophy. The critical edition of the Latin dialogue was edited by Renate Steiger on behalf of the Heidelberg Academy of Letters, which granted permission for the present reprinting. In the preface to her admirable German translation of the edited text Dr. Steiger remarks: "An manchen Stellen Hess sich jedoch . . . die Interpretation nicht gam zuruckhalten."1 I confess that I cannot echo this statement. For it seems to me to be not the exception but the rule that translation and interpretation proceed pari passu, as I illustrate at length (though in another context) in my bookAnselm of Canterbury: Volume IV: Hermeneutical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm.2 In the spirit of close translation, though, I deemed it advisable to use brackets as a signal that I added words whose correlates are only implied in the Latin text. I adopted this procedure mainly as an aid to those readers who will want to compare the English translation with the text itself. Nevertheless, let no one wrongly suppose that these bracketed words and phrases are the only places where "interpretation" occurs. My thoughts on Nicholas of Cusa date from 1973-74, when I was spending a sabbatical year in Paris as a fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, for whose assis-

Preface

vii

tance I am grateful. A travel grant from the University of Minnesota made possible my visit, during the summer of 1977, to the Cusanus Institute at the University of Mainz and to the Cusanus Library at Bernkastel-Kues. I express appreciation to Rudolf Haubst, Hermann Schnarr, and Rektor Moritz —all of whom received me cordially. I also wish to thank the staff of the Wilson Library at the University of Minnesota—especially Joan Fagerlie, Erika Linke, Jacqueline Smith, and Douglas White, who helped secure many of the works needed for this study. I am obliged to Peter Petzling for calling to my attention several articles I might otherwise have failed to read. Finally, I am indebted to Sandra Menssen, who typed the manuscript and who, with Richard Hogan, Pat Kaluza, and Carol Such, assisted in proofreading. Jasper Hopkins Philosophy Department University of Minnesota

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contents

CHRONOLOGY OF NICHOLAS'S MAJOR WORKS

INTRODUCTION

3

ABBREVIATIONS

45

BIBLIOGRAPHY

47

TRIALOGUS DE POSSEST 6

ON ACTUALIZED-POSSIBILITY

NOTES

157

INDEX

181

62

63

xi

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chRonoloqy of nicholass major? woRks

[Extracted from Rudolf Haubst, "Nikolaus von Kues," Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche, 7 (1962), 989-90] 1432-33

De Concordantia Catholica

1440

De Docta Ignorantia

1442-43 1444-45

De Coniecturis De Deo Abscondito (1444) De Quaerendo Deum (1445) De Filiatione Dei (1445) De Data Patris Luminum (Eleven mathematical writings) Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus

1445-46 1445-59 1446 1447 1449 1450

1453

De Genesi Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae Idiota de Sapientia Idiota de Mente Idiota de Staticis Experiment!* De Pace Fidei De Visione Dei XI

Chronology

xii 1458 1459

De Beryllo De Aequalitate De Principio

1460 1461

De Possest Cribratio Alkorani

1461-62 1462-63

DeLiNonAliud De Venatione Sapientiae

1463

De Ludo Globi Compendium

1464

De Apice Theoriae

A concise introduction to the philosophy

ofnicholasof CUSA

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intRo6uction

I Nikolaus Krebs (1401-64) was born in the town of Cues, situated on the Moselle River. Later called Nycolaus Cancer de Coesse, Nicolaus de Cusa, and Nicolaus Cusanus, 1 he received his early education from the Brothers of the Common Life at Deventer in Holland, where he was exposed to such pietistic and mystical themes as are expressed in The Imitation of Christ, attributed to Thomas a Kempis. In 1416 he entered the University of Heidelberg, thus coming under the influence of Scholastic philosophy and theology. After a year and a half, he left Heidelberg for Padua, where he studied some mathematics and physics but mainly canon law, receiving his doctor decretorum in 1423. Following a sojourn in Rome, he returned to Germany in 1425 for a year's study of theology at the University of Cologne. During the next decade he was engaged in various pursuits as a canon lawyer and was sent to Constantinople in 143 7 by the minority party of the Council of Basel.2 The purpose of this mission was to invite the Greeks to attend, at Ferrara, Italy, a council which would discuss the reunification of the Greek and the 3

4

Introduction

Roman churches. Though the council was nominally a success, no substantive or lasting reunification resulted. In 1438 Nicholas, fearing a new schism within the Western Church, made his break with the Conciliar Movement complete by joining in full support of the papal party. Ten years later—and partly in appreciation of his support—he was named, by Pope Nicholas V, cardinal of the titular Church of St. Peter in Chains. Two years thereafter the same pope named him bishop of Brixen (i.e., Bressanone) in South Tyrol. His attempts at reform led to clashes with Archduke Sigismund, making his last years as bishop not only unpleasant but even fearful. In 1464, during the month of August, he died at Todi in Umbria. Nicholas's life spans the period of the Great Schism, the burnings of John Huss and Joan of Arc, the continuation of the Inquisition, and the fall of Constantinople. The final success of the tumultuous Council of Constance (1414-18) — success in ending the strife between three different claimants to the papacy—made a deep impact upon him. In De Concordantia Catholica (1432-33) he advocates that the pope be regarded as responsible to such a council. The desire for unitas ecclesiae, as evidenced in his early work, is paralleled by the doctrine of unitas complicans, which is set forth in the major philosophical effort De Docta Ignorantia (1440). Though in the name of unitas ecclesiae he came to abandon his conciliar theory, he never saw a need to modify his philosophical view about the nature of God as unitas complicans, or Enfolding Oneness. Thus his philosophical position, though differently illustrated from one work to another, does not substantially change. As a Renaissance man, Nicholas reaches out to investigate mathematics, astronomy, cosmology, and ecclesiastical polity, as well as philosophy and theology. In each of these areas he makes a contribution which, viewed historically, is distinctive—irrespective of the assessment of its inherent merits. (E.g., in mathematics he presents a "proof" that any circle can be squared.) On the philosophical front, his originality is not to be mislabeled as novelty: he is not wholly

Introduction

5

the source of his own ideas; yet he is original in his use of these other sources, chief among whom is Pseudo-Dionysius (whom he lauds in De Li Non Aliud 14 [29:22] as "the greatest of the theologians"). For instance, in The Divine Names Dionysius alludes to the possibility of knowing God through ignorance. (St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, Algazel, and Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus also employed comparable expressions). In Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae 4 Nicholas denies that he borrowed the idea of acquired ignorance from "Dionysium aut quemquam theologorum verorum" and insists that "desuper conceptum recepi." Whether or not he was initially influenced by Dionysius's version of docta ignorantia, the development of this theme —once struck upon—was certainly carried out in the light of'Dionysius's writings. One reason for God's being called unknowable is, Nicholas teaches, that He is considered to be beyond all opposition; and He is beyond all opposition because (in one sense) He is not other than anything which can be.5 This last idea, Nicholas admits, was in fact suggested to him by Dionysius.6 Because of Nicholas's explicit references in his own texts and because of his comments in the margins of other texts found in his library, his sources are easy to determine. Vansteenberghe, Lenz, and Hommes all came to roughly the same conclusions about these sources: viz., that aside from Pseudo-Dionysius, the primary influences derive from Proclus, Erigena, and Augustine. 7 Thus T. Whittaker leads us astray with his verdict that neither Cusanus nor Bruno nor Spinoza can have read Erigena, whose great work De Divisione Naturae was sentenced to destruction by Pope Honorius III in 1225, and did not come to light again through a single copy till 1681.8 For in the Apologia9 Nicholas urges that Erigena be read. And this exhortation certainly suggests that he himself had studied De Divisione Naturae. He is also influenced in varying ways by Plato, Aristotle, Maximus the Confessor, Thierry

6

Introduction

of Chartres, Anselm of Canterbury, Hugh of St. Victor, Robert Grosseteste,Thomas Callus, Albert the Great, PseudoHermes Trismegistus, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lull, and Meister Eckhart, among others. For instance, he accepts the Aristotelian-Thomistic distinction between four kinds of causes,10 as well as the distinction between the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual soul.11 He also cites with approval Anselm's statement in De Conceptu Virginali 18: "Decebat, ut eapuritate, qua maior sub Deo intelligi nequit, virgo niteret, cut purissimus Dei aeterni filius pro filio ita dan merebatur ut esset communis etDeiet Virginis filius."12 And he endorses a portion of Anselm's theory of atonement: Homo ad vitam creatus non restituitur, si non ad similitudinem angelorum, in quibus nullum est peccatum, provehitur. Quod facere non potest nisi praecedente Integra satisfactione, quam esse opportet, ut aliquid Deo detur, quod debitum non sit et superet omne, quod Deus non est. Peccare est Deum exhonare, quod facere homo non deberet, etiam si cuncta, quae Deus non sunt, perire deberent. Utique ratio exigit et veritas immutabilis, ut, qui peccat, reddat Deo aliquid pro honore ablato maius quam sit hoc, pro quo ilium exhonare non debuit. Quod humana natura sola non habebat nee sine satisfactione ad finem et regnum pervenire potuit.13 On the other hand, the importance of some of the influences on Nicholas has been exaggerated. For instance, Pierre Duhem claims that in De Docta Ignorantia Nicholas plagiarizes Thierry of Chartres's De Sex Dierum Operibus— that parts of the former are simply bad summaries of the latter.14 But this judgment needs more focusing. For one thing, Nicholas's writings bear a closer resemblance to Thierry's Commentary on Boethius than to his De Sex Dierum Operibus. But even so, Nicholas's appropriation of such terminology as "forma essendi," "fieri potest," "entitas omnium rerum," "aequalitas essendi," as well as his pivotal use of

Introduction

7

Exodus 3:14, hardly constitutes plagiarism15 of Thierry's system. (And only such plagiarism would render Nicholas worthy of reproach.) Nicholas does adopt some of Thierry's ideas: But he organizes them in a way that makes the whole of his position different from Thierry's. For example, he refers to God the Father as unitas, God the Son as aequalitas, and God the Holy Spirit as conexio unitatis et aequalitatis —just as does Thierry in Lectiones in Boethii Librum. 16 But it would be wrong to maintain that he simply takes over Thierry's doctrine of the Trinity. In De Possest the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius, Proclus, Erigena, and Augustine is both abundant and patent. Nicholas stands in the history of philosophy as a continuer of some aspects of the rich and variegated Neoplatonic tradition. Yet he is no mere synthesizer of his predecessors, even though he appropriates their terminology and utilizes their motifs. Perhaps there is no better illustration of this fact than in De Possest 73-74. Following the Christian Neoplatonic tradition, Nicholas teaches that God is beyond being and not-being. But at the same time, in the spirit of Meister Eckhart, he qualifies this doctrine by adding that God is Being itself and that in God "not-being is every thing which is possible to be." So if there is a sense in which not-being is subsequent to God, there is also a sense in which in God not-being is God. This latter sense becomes an essential aspect of the broader view that God is the union of posse and esse — a view spelled out in some detail throughout De Possest. II

The speculative and highly metaphysical character of Nicholas's writings render them especially difficult to comprehend. Much of the trouble arises from the fact that they veer from the method and the style of medieval Scholasticism. Whereas Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and the others pay careful attention to articulating philosophical and theological arguments, Nicholas advances considerations so sweeping that they can scarcely be called arguments. And even the few argument-approximations which

8

Introduction

he manages to formulate depend upon considerations—oftentimes considerations of analogy—which do not successfully support his metaphysical conclusions. In particular, he nowhere shows himself seriously interested in the question of whether God's existence is demonstrable. He neither discusses the issue in detail nor takes an explicit stance toward the "proofs" given by his predecessors. In the quasi-dialogue De Pace Fidei, where he aims to show that wisdom is God, he must first establish its independent and singular existence. But his attempt to do so is not philosophically serious. "If, then," [said the Greek] "you all love wisdom, do you not presuppose that this wisdom exists?" They all proclaimed at once that no one doubted the existence of wisdom. The Word added: "There can be only one wisdom. For if it were possible for there to be more than one wisdom, then these several would have to exist from one wisdom; for prior to all plurality there is unity." 17 Similarly, in De Docta Ignorantia I, 6, which proposes some considerations about the existence of the absolutely Maximum, or God, Nicholas does not reason rigorously. In fact, it is difficult even to state his reasoning accurately. According to Armand Maurer, Cusa offered several a priori proofs for the existence of the absolute maximum, or God. The first argued that the finite is inconceivable without the infinite. What is finite and limited has a beginning and an end, so that there must be a being to which it owes its existence and in which it will have its end. This being is either finite or infinite. If it is finite, then it has its beginning and end in another being. This leads either to an infinite series of actually existing finite beings, which is impossible, or to an infinite being which is the beginning and end of all finite beings. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary that there be an infinite being, or absolute maximum.

Introduction

9

The second proof argued that the absolute truth about the absolute maximum can be stated in three propositions: It either is or is not. It is and it is not. It neither is nor is not. These exhaust all the possibilities, so that one of them must be the absolute truth. Hence there is an absolute truth, and this is what is meant by the absolute maximum.18 But Maurer's articulation of these "proofs" does not correspond to Nicholas's text.19 As Maurer represents the first argument, it proceeds more coherently than it does in the text; by contrast, his representation of the second argument introduces a textually unwarranted imprecision. Specifically, Maurer wrongly incorporates into Nicholas's "first"argument the proposition that the finite is inconceivable without the infinite. For the argument contends that the finite cannot exist without the infinite — not that it cannot be conceived without the infinite. 220 Moreover, the argument does not utilize the premise that an infinite series of actually existing finite beings is impossible. Rather, Nicholas says simply: "It is not possible to proceed to infinity in beginnings and causes."21 By comparison, the "second" argument nowhere claims that what is meant by the absolute truth is the absolute Maximum. Maurer is not clear about the sense of "meant" in his statement that "there is an absolute truth, and this is what is meant by the absolute maximum." Presumably, he is not suggesting that for Nicholas the expression "absolute truth" is identical in meaning with the expression "absolute maximum." (For this would make nonsense of the argument.) But is he suggesting that, on Nicholas's view, when we refer to the absolute truth we are referring to the absolutely Maximum? If so, he is on unsafe ground. For although Nicholas is claiming that the greatest truth is identical with the absolutely Maximum, he nowhere exhibits the belief that in referring to the one we necessarily mean to be referring to the other. (The morning star is identical with the evening star; but in referring to the former we do not necessarily mean to be referring to the latter.) But perhaps all Maurer intends by "this is what is meant by the absolute

10

Introduction

maximum" is "this is identical with the absolute maximum." If so, he is expressing himself misleadingly. Whatever his intention, he introduces into Nicholas's reasoning an imprecision which in one way or another detracts from its structure and movement. In last analysis, each of Nicholas's two lines of argument is incomplete. In the one case, he takes no pains to argue for his identification of the greatest truth with the absolutely Maximum; nor does he articulate any criteria for determining what is to count as the greatest truth ; nor does he make any attempt to supply a premise to the effect that a proposition can be most greatly true only if the greatest truth exists independently of it. In the other case, he assumes without discussion that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in beginnings and causes. Unlike Thomas, he makes no effort to distinguish, within his line of consideration, between a series in essential subordination and a series in accidental subordination, between an ontological regress and a temporal regress. In short, Nicholas does not take seriously the project of demonstrating the existence of God. Yet he could not fail to realize—given his familiarity with the Thomist-ScotistOckhamist controversy —what would be involved in formulating such a demonstration. Accordingly, it is misleading to call his a priori considerations proofs of the existence of God. For this label implies that he does take the eristic enterprise seriously— that he intends to provide conclusive arguments. In fact, however, he aims only at giving Hinweise, or indicators. For the most part, Nicholas's other argument-approximations are, likewise, either inconclusive or specious. For example, his considerations in De Docta Ignorantia I, 4 do not suffice to establish that the absolutely Maximum is identical with the absolutely Minimum: Since the absolutely Maximum is all that which can be, it is altogether actual. And just as there cannot be anything greater, so for the same reason there cannot be anything lesser, since it is all that which can be. But the Minimum is that than which there cannot be a

Introduction

11

lesser. And since the Maximum is of this kind, it is evident that the Minimum coincides with the Maximum. If viewed as eristic, the reasoning here is question-begging. For if the absolutely Maximum exists and is everything which can be, then we might well infer that the Minimum is not among the things which can be —or that if the Minimum is among the things which can be, then the Maximum is not to be identified, unqualifiedly, with everything which can be. Yet here and elsewhere we must be cautious about specifying Nicholas's objectives. Otherwise, we may take him to be attempting to establish that the absolutely Maximum is identical with the Minimum. But, in reality, he is endeavoring only to render plausible his notion that the absolutely Maximum is beyond all opposition and all otherness. That is, he does not use the preceding passage to prove that God is beyond all opposition; rather, he uses it as a step toward claiming that God is beyond all opposition. For he knows that the "argument" can be "controverted" by anyone who insists upon an unrelenting application of the principle of noncontradiction. 22 Nicholas is best understood as proceeding much as Spinoza later did when he offered his "proof" that substance is singular and exists per se. Strictly speaking, Spinoza's proof is not a proof, since what is shown is only what is implicit in the disputed assumption. But, then, Spinoza realized this fact about his reasoning—as Nicholas realized the corresponding fact about his. Neither of the two would be troubled by the accusation of begging the question. For each would regard whoever leveled the charge as having misunderstood the intent of the enterprise. On the other hand, there are passages in which Nicholas does make outright mistakes of inference, as judged by the ordinary canons of reasoning.223 (Nicholas himself does not reject the application of these canons except where they conflict with his doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum in Deo.) One such faulty inference occurs in De Possest 27: Cardinal: Only the Beginning—because it is Actualizedpossibility itself—is not able to be what it is not.

12

Introduction Bernard: This is clear. For example if the Beginning were able not-to-be, it would not-be, since it is what it is able to be. John: Therefore, it is Absolute Necessity, since it is not able not to be. Cardinal: Your statement is correct. For how would the Beginning be able not to be, seeing that in it notbeing is [identical with] it?

But, of course, from "B is not able to be what it is not" and "B is not nonexistent" it does not follow, soundly, that "B is not able to be nonexistent." For existent is not what B is but that B is; and nonexistent is not what B is not but that B is not. To make matters worse, Nicholas does not always take the time to clarify fully his cryptic or startling utterances-, and his not doing so conduces to his being misunderstood. Thus the casual reader may have difficulty with the assertion, in De Coniecturis II, 14 (143:7-8), that "homo enim deus est, sed non absolute, quoniam homo; humanus est igitur deus": "Man is God, but not in an unrestricted sense, for he is man; he is therefore a human God." Similarly, unless one reads closely, it may be difficult to grasp the significance of De Visione Dei 12, where God is said to be created as well as creating. Likewise, even Nicholas's expression of his grand theme, the coincidence of opposites, fosters confusion. For sometimes he asserts that in God all opposites 24 coincide (in quo coincidunt opposita)24 and sometimes he states that God is beyond the coincidence of contradictories (ultra coincidentiam contradictoriorum). 25 Moreover, in teaching that all things —opposites or not—are present in God,26 that God is all things,27 that God is present in all things,28 he lays himself open to the charge of pantheism. Indeed, during his lifetime this charge was brought against him by John Wenck, professor of theology at the University of Heidelberg.29 Although Wenck was undiscerning in taking Nicholas to be teaching that omnia cum Deo coincidunt, Nicholas had done little in DeDocta Ignorantia to anticipate

Introduction

13

and forestall this pantheistic construal of his assertion that Dem est omnia, i.e., that Deus est omnia complicative. His clarification came nine years later in Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, his response to Wenck. The very phrase "docta ignorantia" suffers from a prima facie ambiguity: does it mean an ignorance that is erudite or an ignorance that must be acquired—or both? Certainly, Nicholas believes that an individual who possesses this ignorance is in this respect wiser than an individual who does not. ° Nonetheless, the expressions "scientia ignorantiae" and "doctrina ignorantiae" suggest that "docta ignorantia"— which is sometimes also called "sacra ignorantia" —is an ignorance which one must acquire, or learn.31 Accordingly, the phrase makes best sense when viewed in the light of Nicholas's teaching about the via negativa. In another vein, a number of Nicholas's statements appear, prima facie, to be unintelligible. The most noteworthy —and, ironically, the best known—is his assertion that God is a sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. This statement, elicited from De Ludo Globi II and De Docta Ignorantia II, 1232 is not original with Nicholas but derives from Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus's "Book of the Twenty-four Philosophers," a compilation of the late twelfth or the early thirteenth century. Nicholas, however, seems to have borrowed this formula from Meister Eckhart, who uses it in no less than six places.34 Yet Eckhart's statement—already bizarre in its attempt to express the doctrine of divine omnipresence —becomes all the more bizarre in the mouth of Nicholas, who comes to declare that even the machina mundi has its center everywhere and its circumference nowhere. Not only is it unclear what sense it would make to apply this rubric to the mechanism of the world, but the reason offered in support of so applying the rubric is itself unintelligible: viz., that God is the world's center and circumference —God, who is present everywhere and nowhere.355 But the sense in which God, an immaterial being, could be the world's center and circumference is never successfully elucidated.36

14

Introduction

What makes Nicholas's ideas still more difficult to grasp, and what sets him still further apart from his Scholastic predecessors, is his loose terminology. Vansteenberghe speaks of "les repetitions, le manque d'ordre logique, les variations dans le vocabulaire." 377 And Jaspers judges: "Er schreibt durchweg kein einfaches, klares und strenges Latein."3K Sometimes Nicholas refers to God as "actus omnis posse" and sometimes as "actualitas omnis potentiae," without really distinguishing between "actus" and "actualitas" or between "posse" and "potential 399 Nor does he hesitate to use "posse" in place of "possibilitas."'*0 Similarly, he feels free to interchange "notitia" and "scientia,"41 "nominamus" and "vocamus," 422 "esse" and "actus." 43 "Entitas" sometimes indicates esse generally and sometimes ipsum esse, i.e., God. 44 Moreover, God is called, indiscriminately, (1) esse omnis esse, (2) entitas omnis esse, and (3) ens entium.45 "Subsistere" does not regularly mean "to exist independently rather than in another."46 Sentences such as "Quare maximum absolute cum sit omne id quod esse potest, est penitus in actu" are inexcusably ambiguous.477 And sentences such as "Et dico nunc nobis constare deum ante actualitatem, quae distinguitur a potentia, et ante possibilitatem, quae distinguitur ab actu, esse ipsum simplex mundi principium"48 represent the abandonment of the Scholastic quest for precise i 49 terminology. Any number of commentators have erroneously pictured Nicholas as teaching that the universe is without spatial limitation.50 And others have misconceived his relationship to his predecessors and his successors. Thus Kurt Flasch alleges that Nicholas's absolutely Maximum is to be identified with the God of Anselm.51 But this claim is altogether misguided. For the God of Anselm is neither the coincidence of opposites nor the actuality of all possibility. Nor does Anselm's expression "es quiddam mains quam cogitari possit" play the same role in Proslogion 15 as it does in Nicholas's context of scientia ignorantiae.52 Finally, it is completely wrong of Flasch to write: "Was in D. ign. 1 6 . . . steht, ist eine originelle Wiederaufnahme des Proslogionbeweises, seine ,,

I

t

'

,

'

•

) »41

4 i

•

Introduction

15

Transposition indas cusanischeKoinzidenzdenken." Nicholas's argument may be "'originell" but it is certainly not a "Wiederaufnahme des Proslogionbeweises." For the structure of Anselm's logic —though not of Nicholas's —is a reductio ad absurdum. Where this structure is not preserved, there is not any restatement of the Proslogion proof. Flasch, however, is not the only one who makes mistakes in comparing Anselm and Nicholas. D. J. B. Hawkins comments: "Nicholas has already defined God in the Anselmian manner as that than which there can be nothing greater."54 But for two reasons this comment is flagrantly wrong. First, Anselm repeatedly and plainly uses the formula "that than which nothing greater can be thought"; and second, this formula does not function for him as a definition of the word "God."55 With regard to his successors, Nicholas has been hailed as 5 in some respects a precursor of Copernicus,56 Bruno, 57 58 59 60 61 Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. Yet most of these claims have been exaggerated, as, in general, has been the attempt to represent him as "the first modern thinker." Cassirer, for instance, believes that this rubric is fitting because, as he says vaguely, Nicholas's "first step consists in asking not about God, but about the possibility of knowledge about God."62 However, the same observation could be aptly made about the first step taken by Moses Maimonides and by Thomas Aquinas, neither of whom would be mistaken for modern philosophers. All in all, the writings of Nicolaus Cusanus display a perturbing impenetrability which has militated against their being enthusiastically received by the Anglo-Saxon philosophical community. But among Anglo-Saxon philosophers, few have made any real effort to rethink the thoughts of this original and partly bizarre Renaissance mind. Unfortunately, many of the English-speaking translators and commentators upon whom the Anglo-Saxon community has depended have greatly added to our woes. Ironically, the commentators who heap upon Nicholas the most lavish praise are often the very ones who are the most undiscerning about the significance

16

Introduction

and the soundness of his main ideas. It behooves us to reexamine, briefly, these major themes—doing so partly in the light of the dialogue De Possest. This reexamination will not unturn any deep points hitherto unnoticed. But it may help with the task of identifying the genuine trouble spots in Nicholas 's philosophy, as well as with the goal of determining what there is of lasting importance. Ill

Many of Nicholas's central doctrines emerge in conjunction with his reading of Scripture. The doctrine of acquired ignorance is associated with I Corinthians 3:19: "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." The doctrine that God is all things is correlated with I Corinthians 15:28: "that God may be all in all." The doctrine of the mystical vision is developed against the backdrop of II Corinthians 12:3-4: "I know such a man (whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not: God knoweth): That he was caught up into paradise and heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter." And the via negativa is propounded in connection with Ephesians 1:21, which teaches that God is "above all principality and power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come." Indeed, Nicholas teaches that insofar as the existence and the nature of God can be apprehended through symbolisms, they must be grasped by the route indicated in Romans 1:20, a verse which he construes as: "The invisible things of Him, including His eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the creation of the world, by means of understanding created things." Intermingled with considerations of faith, Nicholas's reasoning in De Possest is no more rigorous than it was in De Docta Ignorantia, written twenty years earlier. He regards the sensible world as finite, and therefore as existing from another (ab alio), since it cannot fix its own limits. But this other-from-which-the-world-exists exists from itself (a se), since it is the Creating Power and since only what is created

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exists from another. Because it exists from itself, it is eternal. And thus it is also invisible; for were it visible, it would be temporal.64 Here a number of questions occur to us. Cannot the sensible world be finite in spatial extent without existing ab alio? Can it not be uncreated and everlasting? Instead of dealing with these issues along philosophical lines, Nicholas simply begs a number of philosophical issues by invoking the creator/ creation distinction. This move manifests that he does not aim to formulate an apologetic on behalf of a theistic metaphysic but intends only to detail, informally, certain features of his own version of such a metaphysic. In De Possest he more or less takes the existence of God as nonproblematical and seeks to explain how it is that we can mount up to God on the basis of the visible world. The route he chooses to follow is based upon the distinction between actuality and possibility. We know, he reminds us, that every existing thing is able to be that which it actually is. From this consideration we are led (he believes) to reflect upon actuality itself, in whose absence (he presumes) a thing cannot actually be what it is —any more than a white thing can be white in the absence of whiteness. So if anything actually exists, it must be the case that actuality exists. But if actuality exists, it is able to exist; for what is unable to exist does not exist. Moreover, it would not be able, or possible, to exist in the absense of possibility; for without possibility nothing is possible. So if actuality is able, or possible, to exist, then it must be the case that possibility actually exists. Yet the one cannot be prior or posterior to the other. For how could possibility exist without actuality —or actuality, without possibility? Nicholas seems to hold that although whiteness does not 65 exist independently of objects which happen to be white, possibility itself does exist independently of everything which comes to be actual. For if it did not, then (he supposes) none of these things would be possible to exist before they actually existed. Indeed, on Nicholas's view, possibility itself exists eternally; and since it is not prior to actuality itself,

18

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the latter also exists eternally. This eternal union of possibility and actuality Nicholas calls God. So God is distinct from every other being by virtue of the fact that He alone is the actuality of all possibility; He alone is, actually, everything of which "is able to be" can be predicated truly. This understanding of God gives rise to three additional points. 1. Since God is actually all that is possible to be, He cannot be other than He is. Accordingly, then, He is also actually all that He can be, whereas no other existing thing is ever all that it can be.66 For example, although the sun is able to be what it is, it is not actually all that it is able to be. For it is possible for the sun to be brighter, or hotter, or larger, than it is. Importantly, Nicholas does not here distinguish potentia qua potentiality from possibilities qua possibility. In accordance with such a distinction, someone might contend: the sun has no potency for a greater brightness, heat, or size; therefore, the sun cannot actually become brighter, hotter, or larger than it now is; still it is (logically) possible for the sun to have these characteristics. By contrast, Nicholas in De Possest is not operating with an Aristotelian notion of potency. Rather, according to his view, anything (other than God) can become anything else (other than God), since God Himself has the power "to turn any created thing into any other created thing." 67 In short, Nicholas's use of "posse," "potentia," and "possibilitas" must usually be construed as indifferent and as invoking no systematic distinction between potentiality (in the metaphysical Aristotelian sense) and possibility (in the logical and empirical senses). 2. Having become clear about the meaning of "poss£,"we are now in a position to determine the appropriate translations for the neologism "Possest," which Nicholas comes to use as a name for God. As an abbreviation for "Posse est" and in the context of Nicholas's writings, the word is used with the literal meaning "Possibility exists," or "Possibility is actual." So God, as Possest, is Existent-possibility, Actualized possibility, the Actual-existence-of-possibility. These construals are confirmed by De Venatione Sapientiae, Chap. 13 ("Solus deus est possest, quia est actu quod esse potest":

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"God alone is Possest, because He is actually what is able to be") and De Quaerendo Deum 46:1 ("O quantum est deus noster, qui est actus omnis potentiate": "O how great is our God, who is the actuality of every possibility!"). 3. The awareness that God is Possest provides a rule for conceiving of Him in more detail. For example, suppose that on the basis of the beauty of created things I say that God is beautiful; and suppose I know that God is so beautiful that He is a beauty which is everything it is able to be. Then, I know that God lacks nothing of the beauty of the whole world. And I know that all creatable beauty is only a certain disproportionate likeness to that Beauty (1) which is actually the possibility of the existence of all beauty and (2) which is not able to be different from what it is, since it is what it is able to be. The case is similar concerning the good and life and other things. . . . It is important to emphasize the phrase "disproportionate likeness," since Nicholas never abandons his earlier statement, in De Docta Ignorantia, to the effect that between the finite and the infinte there is no proportionality.69 This leads him to view the traditional names for God—"Creator," "Justice," "Goodness," etc. —as terms whose meanings are elicited from human experience.70 Through employing these terms, we cannot reach beyond our ignorance to apprehend the true nature of God. Like Pseudo-Dionysius, Nicholas emphasizes the via negativa, which teaches that God cannot be known either in this life or in the next.71 Hence the rule provided by the consideration that God is Possest is not intended to furnish us with statements which adequately characterize the nature of Divine Being. Nicholas does declare that the name "Possest" has a "simple signification which through a symbolism, and in accordance with your human concept, leads an inquirer to some kind of positive assertion about God."72 Yet these positive assertions serve not to remove ignorance but to inculcate it, to teach us the extent to which it is necessary.

20

Introduction This name leads the one-who-is-speculating beyond all the senses, all reason, and all intellect unto a mystical vision, where there is an end to the ascent of all cognitive power and where there is the beginning of the revelation of the unknown God. For, having left all things behind, the seeker-after-truth ascends beyond himself and discerns that he still does not have any greater access to the invisible God, who remains invisible to him. (For God is not seen by means of any light from the seeker's own reason.) At this point the seeker awaits, with the most devout longing, the omnipotent Sun—expecting that when darkness is banished by its rising, he will be illuminated, so that he will see the invisible [God] to the extent that God will manifest Himself.73

So, then, God "remains completely unknown to all who seek Him by way of reason and intellect." Yet, though He surpasses all understanding, He will be seen by believers—seen 74 mystically—in the next life. In De Possest Nicholas at least appears to be more agnostic than he was in De Docta Ignorantia, where he maintained that some propositions from negative theology are less inadequate than others. "It is truer," he said there, "that God is not a stone than that He is not life or intelligence —truer that He is not drunkenness than that He is not virtue."75 Yet we cannot know that God is more unlike x than y unless we also know that He is more like y than x. Once the via negativa is formulated in terms of "more unlike x and less unlike y," it can no longer be kept distinct from the via positiva. In De Docta Ignorantia Nicholas recognizes this point and thus hastens to add: "The affirmation which says that God is intelligence and life is truer than [the affirmation which says that He is] earth or stone or body." But in teaching that the one affirmation is truer than the others, Nicholas appears inconsistent in also teaching that there is no proportion between God and man. 76 Over and over again Nicholas has recourse to symbolism. As we move farther and farther in time away from his early work De Docta Ignorantia, this symbolism becomes less and

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less exclusively mathematical. In De Possest he appeals not only to the mathematical illustration of a top turning with infinite velocity but equally to linguistic considerations associated with the Latin words "m" and "possest." Although these symbolisms never enable us to mount up successfully toward understanding the nature of Divine Being, they do purport to bring us to the point of discerning how inescapably ignorant of God our intellect must be. And, allegedly, this realization can become a stepping stone to the visio dei. For even if we comprehend disproportionately the goodness of God, our striving to emulate this goodness —to the extent that we do apprehend it —opens the door to the possibility of mystical encounter. 77 Nicholas's use of the via negativa can be elaborated only in the light of his doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum.This doctrine is expressed in three alternative but equivalent formulas: (1) in God all opposites coincide;78 (2) God is above (prior to) all opposition;79 (3) God is beyond the coincidence of opposites.80 Thus Nicholas can say that (1) in God notbeing is everything which is possible to be,81 (2) God is beyond (prior to) being and not-being,82 and (3) God is beyond the coincidence of being and not-being. Similarly, in God there is no distinction between motion and rest; for maximal motion (which God is) is indistinguishable from rest. Nicho las illustrates this point by means of the aforementioned motion of a top. The faster the top spins, the more it seems to be at rest. If it could spin with infinite velocity, it would be at rest. But since God is both maximal and minimal motion, He may be said to be more movable than any other movable thing, as well as being said to be immovable and immutable. 85 For neither description informs us positively about the unnameable and unknowable nature of God, who transcends the distinction between motion and rest. Likewise, God is beyond the distinction between activity and passivity,86 oneness and plurality, 87 time and eternity.88 Though we call Him the "Eternal One,"this name is no more adequate for signifying His nature than is the name "Being." For He exists so far beyond the opposition between time

22

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and eternity that the whole of what we call His eternity is at once present at every point of what we regard as time. 89 Because God is beyond all such conceptual and empirical distinctions, Nicholas goes beyond saying that we cannot form an adequate concept of Him, Instead, he says tout court: we cannot form a concept of Him. "For, assuredly, God is not able to be conceived unless all that is able to be conceived is actually conceived."90 And this conception is impossible for us to form. Sometimes Nicholas speaks, paradoxically, of the "inconceivable concept of God."91 But this is simply his way of saying that God infinitely exceeds every conceivable thing. Hence "the more an intellect understands the degree to which the concept of God is unformable, the greater this intellect is," states the Abbot in De Possest. And the dialogue continues: Cardinal: Your statement is correct, Abbot. And so, whoever supposes that he has apprehended God, knows that this [belief] results from the deficiency and meagerness of his intellect. Bernard: Therefore, the one who knows that he is unable to know is the more learned. Cardinal: All, even the most brilliant, will have to say this. Bernard: When I consider that we are unable to conceive of any thing as it is able to be conceived, it is clear to me that God is not able to be conceived.92 Because we can have no concept of God, God is ineffable.93 But how is it intelligible for Nicholas to affirm that God exists, if the concept of God is unformable? If God is inconceivable, ineffable, and unapprehendable intellectually, we cannot even know that He is one in nature. Nicholas goes beyond the traditional Anselmian distinction between apprehending and comprehending God's nature. (This distinction underlies Anselm's statement in Proslogion 15 to the effect that God is something greater than can be conceived, i.e., than can be comprehended.) For Nicholas does not even

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allow that God's nature can be apprehended. Hence, to say that God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, merciful, etc., is not to signify analogically some truth about God. Indeed, as we have seen, there is not—on Nicholas's view—any analogy between the finite and the infinite. So the names of God's attributes are all names which are infinitely removed from the possibility of signifying God's being. The human intellect can, therefore, approach God only through likenesses, symbols, riddles, enigmas, mysteries —in short, through a glass darkly. Yet Nicholas does believe that some of these likenesses and symbols are more appropriate than others. And this belief suggests that in spite of his extreme language, he does not regard God as unqualifiedly inconceivable. For if he did, he would have no basis for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate symbols. Moreover, he does claim that God is (1) Actualized-possibility, (2) Being itself, (3) that than which a greater cannot be thought, 94 (4) that which is greater than can be thought, 95 and (5) that in which opposites coincide. And these claims are intelligible only in conjunction with the further claim that God is in some respect conceivable. Assuredly, then, for Nicholas, there is a qualified sense in which we can form a concept of God, even though there is also another sense in which we cannot. This latter sense we have seen to be illustrated by his statement (in De Possest) that since God is actually every possibility, He is not able to be conceived "unless all that is able to be conceived is actually conceived."96 If God is infinite possibility — as Nicholas considers Him to be —we can no more think each of these infinite possibilities than we can enumerate the infinite series of natural numbers. In this respect we cannot conceive of God as He is. Accordingly, when Nicholas says that God is ineffable, he means that He is ineffable in Himself.97 And when he says that God is not nameable, he means that no name from human discourse can conceivably befit God's being.998 On the other hand, even though we cannot actually think an infinite number of possibilities, we

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Introduction

can conceive of there being such an infinity (just as we can conceive of there being an infinity of natural numbers). If God is taken to be this infinite number of possibilities, then in some respect we do conceive of Him in conceiving that the possibilities are infinite. That is, although we cannot construct a concept of God, we can state the rule for how it is to be constructed. There is a sense in which we may be said to conceive of God by way of understanding the rule for conceiving of Him. So Nicholas's point is becoming clearer. In saying that we cannot conceive of God because He is the actuality of infinite possibility, Nicholas means only that we have no positive (i.e., constructible) conception of God —not that we have no negative (i.e., unconstructible but rule-governed) conception of Him. Indeed, how could we conceive of Him positively? —if to do so required conceiving of something which exists in a sense not opposed to not-existing, something which is alive in a sense not opposed to not being alive, something which is one in a sense not opposed to not being one, something which is merciful in a sense not opposed to not being merciful, something which is sun in a sense not opposed to not being sun, and so on. Though we can indeed conceive that something —call it God —transcends these distinctions, we cannot conceive, positively, of what it is like for anything to transcend them, of what it is like for anything to be God. Accordingly, we can conceive of God only in the sense of conceiving that He is not finite; but we cannot in any fuller sense conceive of what it is like for Him to be infinite. So this point is part of what Nicholas is expressing when he refers to God as negatively infinite. Finally, although Nicholas holds that (positively speaking) God is humanly inconceivable, he neither says nor believes that God is inconceivable to Himself. On the contrary: only Actualized-possibility can conceive and comprehend Actualized-possibility." Nicholas's point about Being itself is similar to his point about Actualized-possibility: viz., in calling God Being itself we are saying that He is neither a finite being nor like a finite being—without, however, saying positively what He is.1100

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Likewise, in saying that God is greater than can be conceived, we mean that He is unlike any known or conceivable finite thing. So, according to Nicholas's theory, a negative conception of an infinite being is not really deemed worthy of being called a conception. And this is why he states that the concept of God is unformable. Nicholas's confusing statements about the inconceivability and unknowability of God have led some commentators to regard his views as incoherent.101 They reason as if along the following three lines: First, if our conception of God is wholly negative —as the doctrine of acquired ignorance teaches —then although we do have some conception of Him, we cannot veridically conceive of Him as this rather than that. Indeed, God will be conceived as transcending our understanding of every distinction, even the distinction between finitude and infinitude. 102 And thus, even to say that He is not finite will not be tantamount to saying "He is this rather than that." As a result, Nicholas has no basis for urging us to love and to worship God. For if we cannot conceive of what God is—but instead can conceive only that He is not any such characteristic as we can apprehend—we have no basis for either loving Him or hating Him, for either worshiping Him or defying Him.103 Second, if our conception of God is wholly negative, there is no basis for regarding one symbolism as more appropriate than another, since each of the symbolisms will be "blind." Yet Nicholas teaches, inconsistently, that some symbolisms are better than others. Third, exclusive adherence to the via negativa renders unintelligible Nicholas's doctrine that "all . . . names which ascribe infinity to God attempt to show by the method of supereminence His inapprehensibility."104 The doctrine of supereminence implies that when we assert,for example, that God is not merciful, we mean that He is more than merciful in any sense of "merciful" which we can understand. But this state-

26

Introduction ment will be unintelligible, as will the entire via supereminentiae. For the via supereminentiae makes sense only in connection with the doctrine of analogia entis. That is, apart from there being some proportionality between God and man, no human being will be able to conceive, at all accurately, of what it is like for God to be more than humanly merciful. Thus, for some human being—a medieval monk, say —to assert that God is more than merciful will be for him to assert what he cannot conceive at all accurately, i.e., for him to assert either what is unintelligible to him or else what is totally misconceived by him. If for either of these reasons his concept of God as this rather than that is totally inadequate and is known to be totally inadequate —a knowledge which is possible, according to the doctrine of acquired ignorance—then he will know that he cannot at all adequately conceive of God's attributes. This knowledge undermines the supposed legitimacy of the via supereminentiae.

On closer scrutiny, however, the foregoing charge of incoherence does an injustice to Nicholas's reasoning—if only by failing to take account of its self-consciously paradoxical and dialectical character. On the one hand, as we have seen,Nicholas asserts that God's nature cannot be known as it is in itself.105 To find this assertion we need look no further than De Possest 10, where Bernard says: "Neither the name ["greatness"] nor the fact [of greatness], nor any of the characteristics applicable to created magnitude are fittingly predicated of God, since these are infinitely different from God. And presumably this [point] holds true not only for greatness but also for whatever is predicated truly of created things." On the other hand, Nicholas again and again refers to God as endless, powerful, good, etc.; and he regards this practice as more fitting than that of referring to Him as ending, powerless, evil, and so on. For example, on the basis of the beauty of created things he sanctions (in De Possest 10) speaking of God as beautiful—even though, presumably, he would not find it appropriate, on the basis of the lack cf beauty of

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some created things, to speak of Him as ugly. Thus it is true both that some words whose meanings are drawn from human experience are more fittingly predicated of God and that no word whose meaning is drawn from human experience is fittingly predicated of God. In short, the particular ways in which we ought to conceive of God, if we are to be true to the Christian tradition, are not ways in which God can be truly conceived. This fact gives rise to Nicholas's paradoxical language. In De Possest an instance of this language is found in the statement that God "reveals Himself in every creature as the triune, most true, and most congruent Exemplar—and as surpassing infinitely all sensible, imaginable, 106 and intellectual knowledge which inheres in images."10 But how can God reveal Himself in every creature if He infinitely surpasses all knowledge derived from images? How can the invisible things of God —for example, His eternity, power, and divinity—be clearly seen on the basis of the created world107 108 if we see them only through a symbolism1 and if this symbolism is infinitely removed from signifying the nature of God as it is in itself? Or how can God be "understood incomprehensibly"?—as the title of De Docta Ignorantia I, 4 indicates regarding Him. In last analysis, Nicholas's predilection for paradoxical expression must not here mislead us, for his view is not, after all, self-contradictory. Indeed, he consistently teaches that though God is unknowable and inconceivable per se, nonetheless in relation to us it is fitting that He be conceived in accordance with the words of Christ and the theological doctrines derivable from them—in short, as if His mercy, justice, eternity, power, and so on, were analogous to our concepts of them. In the end, then, he must not be held to the literalness of his statement in De Docta Ignorantia I, 26, which teaches that some propositions from negative theology are truer than others. For what he means is that some of them are to be regarded as if they were truer than the others —or better, are to be regarded as truer to what the incarnate God taught us about Himself. Thus, ultimately, Nicholas is left in the theologically awkward position of maintaining

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that Deus revelatus in no way resembles Deus absconditus. We may now be led to wonder about the justifiability of the word "revelatus." For would it not be more fully consistent to speak of God as presenting Himself, rather than as revealing Himself, to us?

IV Insofar as God is Actualized-possibility, he is distinct from every other being (for these other beings are such that some of their possibilities are never actualized). Yet Nicholas also declares that God is all things and that in God all things are God.109 By this formula, however, he does not mean that God is identical with the sum total of objects which constitute the created world. (Indeed, as stated earlier, he manages to avoid pantheism.)110 As enfolded in God (complicata), all things are God; but as unfolded in the created world (explicata), these very things are the world.111 For example, God may be said to be sun. But He is not the sensible sun which was created by (i.e., unfolded from) Him. He is rather a sun which is all that it can be. That is, He is a sun so great that it cannot be greater, so small that it cannot be smaller, so everywhere that it cannot be elsewhere —in short, a sun which is "all things, so that it is not able to be anything other than it is."112 But if God is a sun which is all other things, what sense does it make to call Him sun? In fact, Nicholas seems to suggest that it does not matter what we call God as long as what we call Him is conceived to be all that it can be, i.e., insofar as we remove its limitations. Thus God is not sun insofar as sun is distinct from moon.113 Rather, He is sun insofar as sun is not distinct from moon, insofar as it is unqualified Being itself. Similarly, if in God all things are God, it is misleading to continue to refer to them plurally as all things; for in God there is said to be no composition.114 In God nothing is thought to remain individuated as itself.115 So when Nicholas states that "in the Eternal God any given being is both God and all things,"116 he means that in God there is only God—undivided Oneness. And when all created things are

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said to emanate117 or unfold from God, Nicholas is expressing the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.118 Before their creation, created things exist only in God —but in God only qua God. Nicholas states explicitly that "God's creative power is not exhausted in His creation."119 This statement means that there are possibilities for created things which will never be realized in created things. Nonetheless, in God these very possibilities are actualized, since God is the actualization of all possibility. However, as actualized in God these possibilities are God; for they are indistinguishable from His omnipotence, which is indistinguishable from His essence. So Nicholas's language—presented in the (partly Pseudo-Dionysian) formula that "in all things He is all things, in nothing He is nothing, and in Him all things and nothing are Himself" —is radically misleading. For the way in which, in God, all things are God makes it almost unintelligible to keep referring to them, in the plural, as all things; and yet Nicholas retains the plural reference when he claims that these things exist actually in God. (To say that they exist actually in God has the sound of suggesting that they exist as their finite selves in God — something which Nicholas, in fact, denies.) Moreover, it seems paradoxical to affirm both that in God all things are God and, at the same time, that all predicates derived from human experience are to be denied of God.120 Is it, indeed, coherent to assert (1) that all possible things are actual in God, (2) that God is, actually, all possible things, and (3) that God is no one of these things? Well, these statements can be made coherent provided 3 is construed as meaning that God is no one of these things without being all the others as well, so that no one name or predicate expresses His nature. (And this, after all, is Nicholas's thesis.) Still, we are left with the problem posed by the language of plurality. A final gloss is perhaps required. When Nicholas maintains that God is the actualization of all possibilities, he means that God is actually everything which any thing can possibly be. He does not mean that God is everything which is expressible by completing the proposition "It is possible that. . . ." For example, it would not accord with his theory to assert

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that since it is possible that it will rain tomorrow at 3:00 PM., God is the possibility that it will rain tomorrow at 3 :00 PM. Nonetheless, he would assent to the statement that God is a rain drop, in the sense that He is every thing which a rain drop is able to be. (This claim corresponds to his claim that God is sun, moon, etc., in the qualified sense indicated earlier in this section.) So, at times, Nicholas's theories seem more paradoxical than they are, even though at other times they are more paradoxical than they seem.

V In terms of the history of science many of Nicholas's views about the earth and the universe have been thought to be of special importance. Some of these views, e.g., that there may well be life on other planets, are easily graspable. Others, e.g., the view that the universe is privatively infinite, are more difficult to interpret. Nicholas is one of the first to maintain that the earth is in motion, though he is not clear about what kind of motion this is. In De Docta Ignorantia II, 12 he calls it circular—though not perfectly circular—motion. In the judgment of Koyre "it is neither the daily rotation [of the earth] around its axis, nor the annual revolution around the sun, but a kind of loose orbital gyration around a vaguely determined and constantly shifting center."121 Indeed, the earth is said to have no center, i.e., no exact center. For since the earth is not a perfect sphere, there cannot be found an exact point equidistant from every point on the circumference. Likewise, the heavens have no fixed poles; and the sphere of fixed stars moves.122 The universe, or world —which comprises everything except God—is itself without a center. Not even the earth is to be regarded as its center, though it seems to us more central than the other planets.123 It would be an exaggeration to claim, in any serious sense, that Nicholas's theory about the earth's movement anticipates Copernicus's.124 (For Nicholas's view is stated vaguely and without detail, rather than systematically and fully; moreover, it is a part of an abstruse metaphysic rather than

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of an empirical scientific theory.) But it would be an outright mistake to claim that his view of the infinite universe anticipates Bruno's. (For, in last analysis, Nicholas's universe is finite.) 125 Regarding the universe, Nicholas makes a number of statements, which, on the surface, appear contradictory: (1) that the universe is (privatively) infinite;126 (2) that the universe is neither finite nor infinite; 127 (3) that the infinity of the universe is limited by finitude.128 These statements are reconciled in the following way: God is unlimited in the sense that He is the actualization of all possibility, and the number of possibilities is infinite.129 This infinity Nicholas calls negative infinity; and he ascribes it exclusively to God. Accordingly, God is said to be the enfolding not only of all things which at some time come to exist in the universe but also of all not-existing-but-possibly-existing things of the universe.130 The universe itself cannot be infinite in this sense, for it is never all that it can be—let alone all that can possibly be. When the universe is said to be privatively infinite, or a limited infinity, or neither finite nor infinite, all these expressions are intended tobe interchangeable. They all indicate that the universe is not limited in space by anything physically outside its dimensions. (Sometimes Nicholas expresses this point (1) misleadingly, by saying that the universe has no circumference, or (2) "nonsensically," by suggesting that God is the circumference of the universe.) 1 1 In this sense, something spatial is deemed to be limited only if it is limited by some other spatial thing. But the universe is composed of whatever spatial objects there are. Hence there is not any thing external to it which fixes its bounds. Accordingly, it is unlimited by anything else. (This kind of unlimitedness is what Nicholas has in mind when he calls the universe infinitum privative.)1 2 On the other hand, the universe is not infinite in extent; and so, it is limited with respect to itself. (This limitedness is what he has in mind when he calls the universe infinitas contracta.) In short, the universe is finite but (externally) unbounded. In being unbounded it is unlike every other finite thing, i.e., it is unlike every object within the universe.

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In one respect, then, the universe is a maximum: viz., considered in itself it cannot be greater than it is. Nicholas's argument for this conclusion is bizarre: The universe cannot be greater than it is. This results from a lack. For possibility or matter does not extend beyond itself. For to say that the universe is able always to be actually greater is the same as saying that possible being passes over into actually infinite being. But this latter [occurrence] is impossible. For infinite actuality—which is absolute eternity and which is the actualized possibility-of-existing of everything—cannot originate from possibility.133 Therefore, with respect to God's infinite power, which isunlimitable, the universe is able to be greater; nevertheless, because the possibility-of-existing or matter, which is not actually extendable unto infinity, opposes, the universe is not able to be greater. And so, the universe is unlimited, since it is not the case that something greater than the universe—something in relation to which the universe is limited—is actually positable. And hence the universe is privatively infinite. 1134 Here Nicholas should not, tout simplement, identify matter with possibility. For the universe is not merely matter: it is formed matter. And there is no a priori reason why—where there is already motion—formed matter cannot extend itself farther and farther, though never actually extending ad infinitum. Nicholas seems to regard planetary motion and the motion of the sidereal sphere as motion of fixed orbit, even though it be imperfectly circular motion. Yet whatever empirical reason he might suppose he has for denying that the universe expands, the a priori reason he presents is, by itself, insufficient to warrant his inference about a greater greatness of the universe.135

VI Nicholas's teaching on universals has long been the subject of controversy. In De Docta Ignorantia II, 6 he writes:

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Universals do not exist actually, except in a contracted manner. Indeed, in this respect the Peripatetics speak the truth [when they say] that universals have no actual existence apart from things. For only what is particular exists actually. In the particular, universals are — in a contracted manner —the particular. Nevertheless, in the order of nature universals have a certain universal being which can be contracted through a particular. Before their contraction they have actual existence, in the natural order, only as a contractible universal which exists not in itself but in that which is actual. (By comparison, a point, a line, and a surface precede — in this order of progression —the object in which they exist only actually.) For because the universe exists actually only in a contracted way, so all universals [exist actually only in a contracted way]. Universals are not merely rational entities, even though they have no actual existence apart from particulars. By comparison, even though both a line and a surface do not exist apart from a material object, they are not thereby merely rational entities; for they are present in a material object, just as universals are present in particulars. Nevertheless, by means of abstracting, the intellect brings it about that universals exist apart from things. To be sure, the abstraction is a rational entity, since absolute being cannot befit universals. For the altogether absolute universal is God.136 Many interpreters 137 have taken this passage as endorsing what has been called moderate, or Aristotelian, realism. In this light, they also tend to construe the following statement from De Docta Ignorantia III, 1 as advancing the theory that universals have extramental reality even though they do not exist separately from particulars: "Non autem subsistunt genera nisi contracte in speciebus, neque species nisi in individuis quae solum actu exsistunt": "Genera exist only in species and only as contracted; and species exist only in individuals, which alone exist actually." However, Josef Koch appears to believe that in De Coniecturis Nicholas criticizes

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these realistic tendencies and moves closer to a version of nominalism.138 Yet Koch does not offer us any details about this quasi-nominalism. Moreover, inD^ Coniecturis Nicholas himself does not deal systematically with the question of the ontological status of universals. In fact, even Koch must resort to an argument from silence: Nicholas, it seems clear to Koch, here criticizes himself "indem er die game Konzeption stillschweigend aufgibt": "by silently giving up the whole conception."139 But, of course, such an appeal to silence does not really serve to show that Nicholas did indeed abandon his earlier position. In the absence of any explicit or implied subsequent renunciation, by Nicholas, of his doctrine in De Docta Ignorantia, we are justified in believing that he is something of an "Aristotelian realist." Nonetheless, this label will be misleading if it leads us to overlook such non-Aristotelian statements as: (1) "God is the altogether absolute universal" 1140 and (2) "Only the particular exists actually; in it, and qua contracted, 141 universals are the particular." Now, God is the Absolute Universal in the sense that He is present in all things. We have already seen that (according to Nicholas) "God is not in the sun sun and in the moon moon but is that which is sun and moon without plurality and diversity."142 Accordingly, God is both universal being and universal form. (In fact, Nicholas calls Him the universal Form-of-being.)143 In this respect, God's absolute universality differs from the being of universals. For Nicholas teaches that whereas in the sun God is not the sun, the universals in any particular are that particular; for example, in Socrates humanity is Socrates, and in Plato it is Plato; yet, in itself, humanity is neither Socrates nor Plato. 144 But humanity does not actually exist in itself but exists only in Socrates, Plato, and all other human beings. In another sense, humanity —which is a form — exists also in God. For God is the Exemplar of human beings, i.e., is human being per se.145 For He is the Form-ofall-forms, in which every form exists more truly than it does in matter. 146

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Finally, Nicholas teaches that the intellect abstracts from the individuated universal —i.e., from the set of objective similarities which characterize particulars of the same species —in order to form a universal concept. These concepts are then said to resemble the individuated universal; and on the basis of this resemblance we are said to be able to know particular objects.1 7 In the intellect universals are the intellect,148 just as in a material object they are that material object and in God they are God. As Nicholas puts it: In a stone all is stone, in a vegetative soul all is vegetative soul, in life all is life, in sensibility all is sensibility, in sight all is sight, in hearing all is hearing, in imagination all is imagination, in reason all is reason, in understanding all is understanding, in God all is God.149 So Nicholas does not mean that one cannot distinguish a universal concept from the intellect in which it is present. Rather, he means that in the intellect the concept has intellectual being—just as (1) in Socrates humanity has Socratic being and (2) in God the form of human beings has divine being. However, in the case of God, whom we conceive to be without composition: to say that an exemplar has divine being is tantamount to saying that it is identical with the divine essence and is "not really" distinguishable therefrom. By contrast, humanity in Socrates is "really" distinguishable from Socrates. For Socrates has humanity—without being humanity itself. So when Nicholas says "In Socrates humanity is Socrates," this is not a straightforward statement of identity. For it does not commit him to claiming either that humanity is Socrates or that Socrates is humanity but commits him to claiming only that Socrates is human —i.e., has humanity. It is important to emphasize that Nicholas does not say that humanity is Socrates. Rather, he says that in Socrates humanity is Socrates. But for him to say this is not for him to say very much. For he seems to regard it as a truism that whatever is in Socrates is, qua in Socrates, Socrates.

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Nicholas's statements about universals are, on the whole, distressingly imprecise. He makes no important contribution to either the articulation or the solution of the philosophical puzzle. The same sort of imprecision accompanies his discussion of such other topics as the relation between whole and part. We are told that although the hand is not actually the eye, in the eye the hand is the eye.150 Nicholas supports this perplexing claim by reasoning that the eye is immediately in the man (in homine) and that the whole of the man is in each of his members.Thus the hand-qua-part-of-the-whole is in the eye, even though in the eye it is no longer hand-qua-hand. Ironically, Nicholas thinks of himself as having seen more clearly than Anaxagoras the depth of the truth that "Everything is everything."151 The doctrine of quodlibet in quolibet is, in fact, closely associated with the view about the relationship between God and the universe. According to this view, the universe —as unfolded from God —is a contracted, or restricted maximum. That is, it is a "finite maximum" in the sense that it is "privatively infinite." Nicholas now resorts to a comparison: as God 152 is in the universe, so the universe is in each given thing.15 (Moreover, on the basis of the fact that God is the actuality of all things, the universe is said to be in God; and because God is in the universe, which is in each given thing, God is 153 said to be in each given thing.)15 The universe is in each individual thing because each individual thing is a contraction, or particularization, of the entire universe.154 "Just as humanity is neither Socrates nor Plato but in Socrates is Socrates and in Plato is Plato, so is the universe in relation to all things."155 That is, "although the universe is neither the sun nor the moon," for example, "nevertheless in the sun it is the sun, and in the moon it is the moon."156 The doctrine that the universe —i.e., every existing thing except for God —is in the sun, and in the sun is the sun, is reminiscent of the doctrine that the hand is in the eye, and in the eye is the eye. Unfortunately, Nicholas is unsuccessful in rendering either of these doctrines philosophically intelligible. De Possest improves upon De Docta Ignorantia by omit-

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ting such topics as the immediately foregoing. In a sense, De Possest is a more pedagogical work. For in developing the single theme that God is Possest, it thereby also unfolds the other major philosophical themes of De Docta Ignorantia — without, however, digressing to those philosophical issues with which De Docta Ignorantia does not deal adequately. A final clarification is now necessary. Nicholas is sometimes interpreted as teaching that just as each thing in the universe is a contraction of the universe, so the universe is the contraction of God. Frederick Copleston, for instance, tells us that "in phrases which recall to mind the doctrine of John Scotus Erigena Nicholas explains that the world is a theophany;a 'contraction'of the divine being."157 Copleston bases this interpretation upon De Docta Ignorantia II, 4 (116:17-19): "Est enim dens quiditas absoluta mundi seu universi. Universum vero est ipsa quiditas contracta" — a passage which he understands to mean "that God is the absolute essence of the world or universe, and that the universe is that very essence in a state of 'contraction.' "158 But, in fact, the expression "absolute essence in a state of contraction" would be self-contradictory, as Nicholas uses these terms: absolute essence is never in a state of contraction; and a contracted essence can neither be, nor become, absolute. When we look at the entire Latin text of II, 4 we see that "ipsa quiditas" in the foregoing passage is not a substitute for "absoluta quiditas"— i.e., Nicholas is not saying "absoluta quiditas contracta." In the context of II, 4 a more accurate translation would be: "For God is the Absolute Quiddity of the world, or universe. But the universe is contracted quiddity." 159 Nowhere does Nicholas teach that the universe is the contraction of God. Although God is maximum absolutum and the universe is a maximum contractum, nevertheless maximum contractum is not maximum absolutum contractum. Similarly, although God is the quidditas absoluta of the world and although omne actu exsistens in deo est, quia ipse actus omnium,160 the world is not deus contractus, notcontractio

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del. As we saw earlier, however, Nicholas does sometimes refer to man as "a human God," just as he also refers to God as created.161 But in last analysis, even though the universe is unfolded from God, it is not God unfolded; it is the image (or appearance) of God, not the contracted essence of God (even though God is the absolute essence of the universe). In still other words: the universe is not the contracted being of God but is the contracted reflection (resplendentia) of God's being. This distinction is crucial. For the reflection of God's being is not God's being—whether contractedly or otherwise. Thus the problem Nicholas is left with is not the problem of pantheism; rather, it is that of rendering compatible the claim that the universe is imago, apparitio, resplendentia dei and the claim that nulla proportio inter infinitum et finitum cadit. His attempted solution, we have seen, relies heavily upon the notion of videre aenigmatice et symbolice.

VII Since every individual thing is to a greater or a lesser degree a contraction of the universe: the question arises, Is some individual thing the most perfect contraction of the universe? Nicholas regards human nature as elevated above all the works of God and as slightly lower than the angels.1 2 If elevated into a union with the Absolute Maximum, human nature will become the fullness-of-perfection for each and every thing.163 This union of the human and the divine constitutes the God-man, who is both absolute and contracted, 1164 without being a contraction of the Absolute. Since the God-man, viz., Christ, is complete fullness: if we possess Him through faith, we possess all things.165 Thus we are justified not through ourselves but through faith in Christ. Nicholas conjoins with his notion of justification by faith a modified Anselmian theory of atonement, 1166 in accordance with which the God-man is said to make satisfaction for man's sin. Since human nature is a microcosm of creation: in any human being's turning toward God creation itself can be said to return to God, from whom it emanated. Yet this return is

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most complete with regard to that human being who is the perfectio universi. For in Christ the finite and the infinite come together in the same person, so that in this person God and the perfection of the universe are one. As Cassirer notes, this idea has at times "been so little understood that the attempt has been made to sever it from the whole of Cusanus' philosophy, considering it an arbitrary 'theological' appendix rooted in a purely dogmatic interest. But excisions of this sort . . . cannot be made in Cusanus' doctrine without tearing apart its whole inner constitution, without destroying its characteristic intellectual structure."1 7 Similarly, the philosophical ramifications of the thesis that God is Possest cannot be separated from the theological doctrine of the Trinity. For, according to Nicholas, the Father is Possibility, the Son is Actuality, and the Holy Spirit is the Union of both. And just as there cannot be Absolute Possibility without Absolute Actuality, so there is always the Union of the two. In speaking of God as both trine and one, however, Nicholas does not mean to imply that He is numerically one or numerically three: The First Beginning is triune-prior-to-all-number. And if you cannot conceive of the fact that it is prior to number, the reason is that your intellect conceives of nothing without a number. Nevertheless, your intellect sees that that-which-it-cannot-conceive cannot be denied beyond conception; and it believes [what it cannot conceive].Therefore, just as [it believes] that God is great without a combination of quantities, so [it believes] that He is three without number or discrete quantity. And just as it believes that God is great and ascribes magnitude to Him, so it believes that He is three and ascribes number to Him.168 In De Li Non Aliud 5 Nicholas speaks of the threeness of God in still other terms: viz., Unity, Equality, and Union. He even goes so far as to intimate that these names are "more precise" than the Scriptural names "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit."169 Still, none of them disclose to us, as He is, the Unnameable God.

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So in spite of all his interest in mathematics and metaphysics, Nicholas can still consider philosophy to be the handmaiden of theology, as the conclusion of De Possest testifies: Unless by His own light He expels the darkness and reveals Himself, He remains completely unknown to all who seek Him by way of reason and intellect. But He does not abandon those who seek Him in deepest faith, surest hope, and the most fervent possible desire—i.e., [those who seek Him] by that way which we were taught by our only master, Christ, the Son of God, the living way, the sole revealer of His own father (who is our omnipotent Creator). Therefore, all the statements we have made aim only at [making] us understand that our Creator surpasses all understanding. The vision of His countenance (a vision which alone brings happiness) is promised to us believers by the Son of God, who is Truth itself—provided that by following Him we hold to the way which has been disclosed to us by word and deed. In the Cusanian scheme, our acquaintance with God comes not through intellectualizing and philosophizing but through the revelation of Christ. Nicholas is persuaded that this revelation will occur in the future vision-of-Christ, which is promised to all believers. But he is equally persuaded that, in part, it has already occurred in the event of incarnation — an event recorded in Scripture so that, like the disciples, we too might behold the viam nobis verbo et facto patefactam. Now, theology rather than philosophy draws its doctrines from what it regards as revelation. In the name of theology Nicholas feels the need to make plausible these doctrines, e.g., the doctrine of the Trinity, by providing mathematical and linguistic illustrations. In turn, some of the same illustrations serve to elucidate, philosophically, the relation between actual being and possible being, motion and rest, time and eternity, abstract form and form-in-matter. Thus the example of the top enlightens us not only regarding the statements of the theologians (to wit, that "God is more movable than

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any other movable thing," etc.)170 but also regarding the statements of the cosmologists (e.g., that "the heavens are moved by a forward motion from east to west and at the same time by a reverse motion from west to east").171 Similarly, the symbolism of possest instructs us not only about the all-powerful Beginning (viz., God)172 but also about the nature of physical motion.173

Conclusion We now see that Nicholas's distinctive contribution to the history of western philosophy arises from the inimitable way in which he blends the theological, ontological, cosmological, and mathematical —all in the service of devotio Christi. Having rejected the disciplined method of the Scholastics, he gives himself over to the spirit of speculation. His via speculativa is not always a via intelligibilis. But believing, as he does, that there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite, he is intent upon maintaining that the nature of Infinite Being is philosophically unknowable. This position can best be appreciated, if at all, by contrasting it with Spinoza's opposing verdict that God is knowable only philosophically. In breaking away from William of Ockham and the via moderna generally, Nicholas becomes a forerunner of the dialectical tendencies in later German philosophy. His penchant for paradoxical expression parallels his insistence upon the religious need for mystical vision, in which the principle of noncontradiction becomes transcended. Those portions of his philosophy which border upon metaphor often aim to excite the imagination, so that it may more readily soar beyond the confines of mere sensory reproduction. To divorce his philosophy from its religious context is necessarily to distort it. For to view his emphasis upon the dialectical independently of his emphasis upon the mystical inevitably leads to mistaking the former for incoherence and the latter for Schwarmerei. If we should not overrate the philosophical importance of the writings of the man from Cusa, neither should we under-

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rate their creative imaginativeness. Within the tradition of Christian Neoplatonism these works are no less significant than were those of Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scotus Erigena. The metaphysical use made of the notion of infinity is rich with suggestiveness. (1) As infinite number is not a number but is an endless number of numbers, so Infinite Being is not a being but is the pure being of every being; therefore, since it is not differentiated or restricted (contractum) but is the Sustainer of everything differentiated and restricted, it cannot be described but can only be symbolized. (2) Infinite Being is the being not only of actual mundane beings but also of possible, nonactual mundane beings; therefore, it is the being of not-being. (3) Infinite Being is, per se, the actualization of every possibility; therefore, in it being and not-being coincide. (4) Infinite Being is the transcendent resolution of all opposites; therefore, it cannot be apprehended discursively but can only be encountered mystically. (5) As an infinite line is present as a whole in every finite line, so Infinite Being is present in every finite being; therefore, all beings have the same being, so that one being differs from another only with respect to its degree of determination or contraction, rather than absolutely. (6) As infinite number is collectively every number (of the unending series), so Infinite Being is substantially every being; therefore, every being is in every other being, since Infinite Being is present in every finite thing. Such "metaphysical gyrations," though not really Cusa's, illustrate the spirit of speculation which is characteristic of his thought. His overall enterprise gives witness to an enduring aspiration within the Neoplatonic tradition: viz., to take seriously the notion of infinity. After the waning of this tradition, thinkers such as Spinoza and Hegel continued to build their own respective philosophies around reformulations of this very notion. In the history of philosophy there are many ironies. One of them is surely that the epithet "the God-intoxicated philosopher" has come to be applied to Baruch Spinoza rather than to Nicolaus Cusanus. For the intellectual love of God —an

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ideal generated, in part, by Spinoza's concept of God as unresponsive to human prayer—scarcely approximates ecstatic intoxication. By contrast, desiderium devotissimum, which motivates Cusanus's daily prayer to deus invisibilis, leads him to proclaim that "amor Dei cum intelligentia conditus inebriat mentem": "the love-of-God, made firm by understanding, intoxicates the mind."174 On Nicholas's view, amor Dei ought always to be strengthened by intelligentia. In his quest of intelligentia Nicholas seldom has recourse to rationes 175 necessariae, as did Anselm of Canterbury. 17 Instead, he seeks to awaken insight by presenting a series of illustrations like that of the top in De Possest and that of the bowling game in De Ludo Globi. He does not mistake these illustrations for compelling arguments. And he expects of his reader the wisdom to discern between those contexts in which such arguments are possible and those in which only intuition will avail.

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ABBRevutions

Apologia DAWB

DI DP MFCG NA NC NCMM SHA W

Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Vortrdge itndSchriften. Heft 97: Nikolaus von Kues. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1965. De Docta Ignorantia De Possest Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeitrage der Cusanus-Gesellschaft (ed. Rudolf Haubst) De Li Non Aliud Nicolb da Cusa. Florence: Sansoni, 1962. Nicolb Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno. Florence: Sansoni, 1970. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Heidelberg: Winter. 45

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BlBllOQRAphy

I. Works by Nicholas

A. Major Latin Editions Strasburg edition of 1488. (New reprinting in two volumes, ed. Paul Wilpert. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966, 1967.) Paris edition of 1514. (New Reprinting in three volumes. Frankfurt: Minerva GmbH., 1962.) Heidelberg Academy of Letters edition. Leipzig/Hamburg: Meine 1932-present. (Many of these texts are republished by Meiner in the series Nikolaus von Kues, Schriften in deutscher Ubersetzung.)

B. English Translations The Idiot. Trans, anonymously 1650; preface by W. R. Dennes 1940. San Francisco: California State Library (Sutro Branch), 1940. (Occasional papers; Reprint series No. 19; mimeographed.) Of Learned Ignorance. Trans. Germain Heron with an introduction by D. J. B. Hawkins. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954. The Single Eye, Entituled the Vision of God. Trans. Giles Randall. London: Streater, 1646. The Transalpine Thinkers: Selected Readings from Cusanus to Suarez (vol. II of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Herman Shapiro and Arturo B. Fallico). New York: Modern Library, 1969. (Contains a translation, by the editors, of De Docta Ignorantia I, 1-12.) Unity and Reform: Selected Writings of Nicholas de Cusa. Ed. John P. Dolan. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 47

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1962. (Contains G. Heron's translation of Book 3 of Learned Ignorance, most of E. Sailer's translation of The Vision of God, and Dolan's translation of De Sapientia, De Pace Fidei, andDeStaticis Experimentis. Dolan's translations are based upon the Basel edition of 1565, which, though adding several mathematical treatises, reproduces the Paris edition.) The Vision of God. Trans. Emma G. Salter with an introduction by Evelyn Underbill. New York: Dutton, 1928. II. Selected Works on Nicholas Alvarez-Gomez, Mariano. "Die Frage nach Gott bei Nikolaus von Kues,"AfFCG 5 (1965), 63-85. . Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unendlichen bei Nikolaus von Kues (vol. 10 in the series: Epimeleia. Beitrage zur Philosophic, ed. Helmut Kuhn et al.). Munich: Pustet, 1968. Bado, Walter. "What is God? An Essay on Learned Ignorance,"Modern Schoolman, 42 (November 1964), 3-32. Baeumker, Clemens. "Das pseudo-hermetische 'Buch der vierundzwanzig Meister' (Liber XXIV philosophorum). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neupythagoreismus und Neuplatonismus im Mittelalter" in Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 25 (1928), 194-214. (Includes the Latin text.) Baur, Ludwig von. Cusanus-Texte. III. Marginalien. 1. Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps. Dionysius im Lichte der Zitate und Randbemerkungen des Cusanus. SHAW, 1941. Beierwaltes, Werner. "Cusanus and Proklos. Zum neuplatonischen Ursprung des non aliud," NCMM, pp. 137-40. Bertalanffy, Ludwig von, ed. Nikolaus von Kues. Munich: Miiller, 1928. Bett, Henry, Nicholas of Cusa. London: Methuen, 1932. Biechler, James E. The Religious Language of Nicholas of Cusa. Missoula, Montana: American Academy of Religion and Scholars Press, 1975. Billinger, Martin. Das Philosophiscbe in den Excitationen des Nicolaus von Cues (vol. 32 of Beitrage zur Philosophie). Heidelberg: Winter, 1938. Blumenberg, Hans. Aspekte der Epochenschwelle: Cusaner und Nolaner. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976. Bond, H. Lawrence. "Nicholas of Cusa and the Reconstruction of Theology: The Centrality of Christology in the Coincidence of Opposites," pp. 81-94 in George H. Shriver, ed., Contemporary Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition. Essays in Honor of Ray C. Petry. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974. Bonetti, Aldo. La ricerca metafisica nel pensiero di Nicolo Cusano. Brescia: Paideia, 1973. Bormann, Karl, "Zur Frage nach der Seinserkenntnis in dem wahrscheinlich letzten philosophisch-theologischen Werk des Nikolaus

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von Kues, dem 'Compendium,' "Archiv fur GescbichtederPhilosophic, 50(1968), 181-88. "Die Koordinierung der Erkenntnisstufen (descensus und ascensus) bei Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 62-85. Bredow, Gerda von. "Der spielende Philosoph. Betrachtungen zu Nikolaus von Kues' 'De possest,' " Vierteljahresscbrift fur wissenschaftliche Padagogik (Bochum), 32, (1956), 108-15. "Gott der Nichtandere. Erwagungen zur Interpretation der cusanischen Philosophic," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 73 (1965), 15-22, "Die Bedeutung des Minimum in der Coincidentia Oppositorum," JVCMM, pp. 357-66. Briintrup, Alfons. Kbnnen und Sein. Der Zusammenhang der Spdtschriften des Nikolaus von Kues. Munich: Pustet, 1973. Bufo, Giuseppe. Nicolas de Cues: ou la metaphysique de la finitude. Paris; Editions Seghers, 1964. Burgevin, Frederick H. Cribratio Alchorani: Nicholas Cusanus's Criticism of the Koran in the Light of His Philosophy of Religion.New York: Vantage Press, 1969. Caramella, Santino, "Unita ideale e coincidenza reale degli oppositi nel pensiero ni Nicolo da Cusa," NC, pp. 17-28. "U problema di una logica trascendente neH'ultima fase del pensiero di Nicola Cusano," NCMM, pp. 367-73. Cassirer, Ernst. The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. Trans. Mario Domandi. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963. Clemens, F. J. Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa. Bonn: Wittmann, 1847. Colomer, Eusebio. Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Hull (vol. 2 in the series; Quetten und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Paul Wilpert). Berlin: de Gruyter, 1961. "Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Llull. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung," NC, pp. 125-45. (This article summarizes Colomer's book on the same topic.) "Die Erkenntnismetaphysik des Nikolaus von Kues im Hinblick auf die Moglichkeit der Gotteserkenntnis," MFCG, 11 (1975), 204-23. Cranz, F. E. "St. Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa in the Tradition of Western Christian Thought," Speculum, 28 (April 1953), 297-316. "The Transmutation of Platonism in the Development of Nicolaus Cusanus and of Martin Luther," NCMM, pp. 73-102. Dangelmayr, Siegfried. Gotteserkenntnis und Gottesbegriff in den philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (vol. 54 in the series: Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung). Meisenheim: Main, 1969. "Anselm and Cusanus. Prolegomena zu einem Strukturvergleich ihres Denkens," Analecta Anselmiana, 3 (1972), 112-40,

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Danzer, Robert. "Cusanus-Bibliographie,Fortsetzung(1961 bis 1964), und Nachtrage,"MFCG, 3 (1963), 223-37. Duclow, Donald F. "Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena, Nicholas of Cusa: An Approach to the Hermeneutic of the Divine Names," International Philosophical Quarterly, 12 (June 1972), 260-78. "Gregory of Nyssa and Nicholas of Cusa: Infinity, Anthropology, and the Via Negativa,"Downside Review, 92 (April 1974), 102-8. Duhem, Pierre. "Thierry de Chartres et Nicolas de Cues," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 3 (July 1909), 525-31. Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci: ceux qu'il a lus et ceux qui I'ont lu. Vol. 2. Paris, de Nobele, 1955. (See "Nicholas de Cues et Leonard de Vinci," pp. 99-279.) Le systeme dumonde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platan a Copernic. Vol. 10. Paris: Hermann, 1959. (See "Nicolas de Cues," pp. 247-347.) Dupre, Wilhelm. 'Von der dreifachen Bedeutung der 'Docta Ignorantia' bei Nikolaus von Kues," Wissenschaft und Weltbild (SeptemberDecember 1962), 264-76. "Die Ideeeiner neuen Logik bei Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 4(1964), 357-74. "Nikolaus von Kues und die Idee der christlichen Philosophic," Philosophischesjahrbuch, 73 (1965), 23-32. "Apriorismus oder Kausaldenken nach der cusanischen Auffassungvon der Gotteserkenntnis,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 168-94. Falckenberg, Richard. Grundzuge der Philosophic desNicolaus Cusanus mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Lehre vom Erkennen. Breslau: Koebner 1880 (reprinted Minerva GmbH, 1968). Feigl, M. "Vom incomprehensibiliter inquirere Gottes im 1. Buch von De docta ignorantia des Nikolaus von Cues," Divus Thomas, 22 (September 1944), 321-38. Flasch, Kurt.Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues. Problemgeschichtliche Stellung und systematische Bedeutung. Leiden: Brill, 1973. Frantzki, Ekkehard. Nikolaus von Kues und das Problem der absoluten Subjektivitat (vol. 92 in the series: Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung). Meisenheim: Hain, 1972. Fuehrer, Mark L. "The Principle ofContractio in Nicholas of Cusa's Philosophical View of Man," Downside Review, 93 (October 1975), 289-96. Gabriel, Leo. "II pensiero dialettico in Cusano e in Hegel," Filosofia, 39,537-47. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Nikolaus von Kues im modernen Denken," NCMM, pp. 39-48.

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Gandillac, Maurice de. La philosophic de Nicolas de Cues. Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1942. (Reworked by Gandillac and translated into German by Karl Fleischmann as Nikolaus von Cues. Studien zu seiner Philosophic und philosophischen Weltanschauung. Diisseldorf: Schwann, 1953.) Gawlick, Giinter, "Zur Nachwirkung Cusanischer Ideen im siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhundert,"NCMM, pp. 225-39. Giacon, Carlo, "II 'De ignota Litteratura' di Giovanni Wenck," NC, pp.63-74. "II 'possest' del Cusano e le dottrine aristotelico-tomistiche dell'atto e potenza e dell'essenza ed esistenza,"NCMAl, pp. 37584. Goldammer, Kurt. "Nicolausvon Cues und die Uberwindung des geozentrischenWeltbildes,"pp. 25^1 inAlte Probleme-Neue Ansdtze. Drei Vortrage von Fritz Krafft, Kurt Goldammer, Annemarie Wettley. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965. Grass, Nikolaus, ed. Cusanus Gedachtnisschrift (im Auftrag der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultat der Universitat Innsbruck). Innsbruck: Universitatsverlag. 1970. Grell, Heinrich. "Mathematischer Symbolismus und Unendlichkeitsdenken bei Nikolaus von Kues," DAWB pp. 32-41. Hagemann, Ludwig. Der Kur'an in Verstdndnis und Kritik bei Nikolaus von Kues. Bin Beitrag zur Erhellung islamisch-christlicher Geschichte. Frankfurt: Knecht, 1976. Harries, Karsten, "Cusanus and the Platonic Idea," New Scholasticism, 37 (April 1963), 188-203. "The Infinite Sphere. Comments on the History of a Metaphor," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (January 1975), 5-15. Hasse, Karl P. Nikolaus von Kues (vol. II in the series: Die Religion der Klassiker, ed. Gustav Pfannrmiller). Berlin: Protestantischer Schriftenvertrieb, 1913. Haubst, Rudolf. Das Bild des Einen undDreieinen Gottes in der Welt nach Nikolaus von Kues (vol. 4 in the series; Trierer tbeologische Studien. Trier: Paulinus, 1952. Die Christologie des Nikolaus von Kues. Freiburg: Herder, 1956. "Nikolaus von Kues als theologischer Denker," Trierer theologische Zeitschrift, 68 (1959), 129-45. "Nikolaus v. Kues," Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche, 7 (1962), 988-91. "Nikolaus von Kues und die Analogia Ends," pp. 686-95 in Paul Wilpert, ed. Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung (Vortrage des II. Internationalen Kongresses fur mittelalterliche Philosophic, Koln, 31. August-6. September 1961) Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963.

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"Die leitenden Gedanken und Motive der cusanischen Theologie," AJFCG, 4 (1964), 257-77. Vom Sinn der Menschwerdung: "Cur Deus homo. "Munich: Hueber, 1969. "Theologie in der Philosophic — Philosophic in der Theologie des Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 233-60. " 'Am Nichtteilnehmbaren teilhaben'. Zu einem Leitsatz der cusanischen 'Einheitsmetaphysik' und Geistphilosophie," pp. 12-22 in Norbert Fischer et al., eds., Alte Fragen und neue Wege des Denkens (Festschrift fur Josef Stallmach). Bonn: Bouvier, 1977. ed. Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeitrage der CusanusGesellschaft. Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald. Vol. 1 (1961, 1st ed.; 1968, 2nd ed.); Vol 2 (1962); Vol. 3 (1963); Vol.4 (1964); Vol. 5 (1965); Vol. 6 (1967); Vol. 7 (1969); Vol. 8 (1970); Vol. 9 (1971); Vol. 10(1973); Vol. 11 (1975). Hay, W. H. "Nicolaus Cusanus: The Structure of His Philosophy," Philosophical Review, 61 (January 1952), 14-25. Heinz-Mohr, Gerd. Das Werk des Nicolaus Cusanus. Eine bibliophile Einfiihrung. Cologne: Wienand, 1963. Herold, Norbert.Menschliche Perspektive und Wahrheit. ZurDeutung der Subjektivitdt in den philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues. Munster: Aschendorff, 1975. Hirschberger, Johannes. "Das Platon-Bild bei Nikolaus von Kues," NCAfM.pp. 113-35. "Das Prinzip der Inkommensurabilitat bei Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 39-54. Hoffman, Ernst. Cusanus-Studien. I. Das Universum des Nikolaus von Cues. SHAW, 1930. "Nikolaus von Cues als Philosoph," introduction to the German translation of Idiota de Sapientia by E. Bohnenstadt. Hamburg: Meiner, 1936. Nikolaus von Cues. Zwei Vortrage. Heidelberg: Kerle, 1947. Hoffmann, Ernst, and Raymond Klibansky, eds. Cusanus-Texte. I. Predigten. 1. "Dies Sanctificatus" vom Jahre 1439. SHAW, 1929. Hoffmann, Fritz. "Nominalistische Vorlaufer fur die Erkenntnisproblematik bei Nikolaus von Kues,"MFCG, 11 (1975), 125-59. Hofmann, Joseph E. Die Quellen der Cusanischen Matkematik I: Ramon Lulls Kreisquadratur. SHAW. 1942. "Mutmassungen u'ber das friiheste mathematische Wissen des Nikolaus von Kues," MFCG, 5 (1965), 98-133. "Sinnund Bedeutung der wichtigstenmathematischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues," NCMM, pp. 385-98. Hommes, Jakob.DzV philosophische Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Kusanus

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in ihren Grundlehren. Munich: Philosophische Fakultat (University of Munich), 1926. Honecker, Martin. Nikolaus von Cues und die griechische Spracbe. SHAW, 1938. Der Name des Nikolaus von Cues in zeitgenossischer Etymologie. SHAW, 1940. Hummel, Charles. Nicolaus Cusanus. Das Individualitdtsprinzip in seiner Philosophie. Bern: Haupt, n. d. Jacobi, Klaus. Die Methode der cusanischen Philosophie. Munich: Alber, 1969. Jansen, Bernhard."ZumNicolaus-Cusanus-Problem.Einmethodischer Versuch," pp. 267-87 in Abhandlungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie (vol. 1 of Philosophia Perennis. Abhandlungen zu ihrer Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, ed. F. J. von Rintelen). Regensburg: Habbel, 1930. Jaspers, Karl. Nikolaus Cusanus. Munich: Piper, 1964. Kanitz-Huber, Elsi. Die Coincidentia Oppositorum als Grenzbegriff. Biberach: Biberacher Verlagsdruckerei Dr. Hutter, 1954. Klaus, Georg. "Das Prinzip der coincidentia oppositorum und der logische und dialektische Widerspruch/'D^lVVB, pp. 23-31. Kleinen, Hans, and Robert Danzer. "Cusanus-Bibliographie (19201961),"MFCG, 1 (1968, 2nd ed.), 95-126. Klibansky, Raymond. "Copernic et Nicolas de Cues," pp. 225-35 in Leonard de Vinci et I'experience scientifique au seizieme siecle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. Koch, Josef. Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues (Heft 16 of Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Forschung des Landes NordrheinWestfalen). Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956. "Augustinischer und dionysischer Neuplatonismus und dasMittelalter,"/Cawf-SfM^w,48 (1956-57), 117-33. "Zur Analogielehre Meister Eckharts," pp. 327-350 in Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1959. "Der Sinn des zweiten Hauptwerkes des Nikolaus von Kues de coniecturis,"NC, pp. 101-23. "Nicholas of Cusa," pp. 449-52 in New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 10. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. ed. Cusanus-Texte. Predigten. 2./5. Vier Predigten im Geiste Eckharts. SHAW, 1937. Koyre, Alexandre. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. New York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1958. Lai, Tyrone. "Nicholas of Cusa and the Finite Universe, "Journal of the History of Philosophy, 11 (April 1973), 161-67. Lenz, Joseph. Die docta ignorantia oder die mystische Gotteserkennt-

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nis des Nikolaus Cusanus in ihren philosophischen Grundlagen (Heft 3 of Abhandlungen zur Philosophic und Psychologic der Religion, ed. Georg Wunderle). Wiirzburg: Becker, 1923. Lewicki, Joannes B. De Cardinalis Nicolai Cusani Pantheismo. Miinster: Theissing, 1873. Liaci, Maria T. "Accent! spinoziani nel 'De dato patris luminum' del Cusano?"IVC, pp. 217-42. Liddell, Anna F. "The Significance of the Doctrine of the Incarnation in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," pp. 126-31 in Actes du Xleme congres international de philosophic. Vol. 11. Amsterdam-. North Holland Publishing, 1953. Lotz, J. B. "Das Sein bei Thomas von Aquin im Hinblick auf die 'coincidentia oppositorum' des Nikolaus von Kues," pp. 3-11 in Alte Fragen und neue Wege des Denkens (Festschrift fur Josef Stallmach). Bonn: Bouvier, 1977. Lu'bke, Anton. Nikolaus von Kues. Kirchenfurst zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Munich: Callwey, 1968. McTighe, Thomas P. "The Meaning of the Couple, ComplicatioExplicatio in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 32 (1958), 206-14. "Nicholas of Cusa as a Forerunner of Modern Science," pp. 619-22 in Actes du dixieme congres international d'histoire des sciences. Vol. I. Paris: Hermann, 1964. "Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz's Principle of Indiscernibility,"Modem Schoolman, 42 (November 1964), 33-46. -—. "Nicholas of Cusa's Theory of Science and Its Metaphysical Background," NCMM, pp. 317-38. Mahnke, Dietrich. Unendliche Sphare und Allmittelpunkt. Beitrage zur Genealogie der mathematischen Mystik (vol. 23 in the series: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte). Halle: Niemeyer, 1937. Martin, Vincent, "The Dialectical Process in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," Laval theologique et philosophique, 5 (1949), 21368. Martinez Gomez, Luis. "From the Names of God to the Name of God: Nicholas of Cusa," International Philosophical Quarterly, 5 (February 1965), 80-102. Marx, J. compiler. Verzeichnis der Handschriften-Sammlung des Hospitals zu Cues bei Bemkastel a./Mosel. Trier, 1905 (reprinted Frankfurt: Minerva GmbH, 1966). Maurer, Armand A. "Nicholas of Cusa," pp. 496-98 in Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 5. New York: Macmillanand Free Press, 1967. Mennicken, Peter. Nikolaus von Kues (Miteiner Abhandlungvon Else Hocks). Trier, Cusanus-Verlag, 1950.

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Metzke, Erwin. "Nicolaus von Cues und Hegel. Ein Beitragzum Problem derphilosophischenTheologie,"Kaw£-S£wcfew, 48 (1956-57), 216-34. Meurers, Joseph. "Nikolaus von Kues und die Entwicklung des astronomischen Weltbildes,"A4FCG, 4 (1964), 395-419. Meuthen, Erich. Nikolaus von Kues, 1401-1464: Skizze einer Biographic. 2nd ed. Munster: Aschendorff, 1967. Oedinger, K. "Idiota de sapientia. Platonisches und anti-platonisches Denken bei Nikolaus von Cues," Tijdschrift voor Philosophic, 17 (1955), 690-98. Peters, Johannes, "Grenze und Uberstieg in der Philosophic des Nikolaus von Cues," Symposion. Jahrbuch fur Philosophic, 4 (1955), 91-215. Platzeck, Erhard-W. "Randbemerkungen zur via antiqua und via moderna im Spatmittelalter," MFCG, 6 (1967), 35-50. Poppel, Karl G. Die Docta Ignorantia des Nikolaus Cusanus als Bildungsprinzip. Eine padagogische Untersuchung iiber den Begriff des Wissens und Nichtwissens (Heft 6 of Grundfragen der Padagogik.) Freiburg, Lambertus, 1956. Ranft, Joseph. Schopfer und Geschopf nach Kardinal Nikolaus von Cusa. Ein Beitrag zur Wurdigung des Kardinals alsMystiker. Wiirzburg: St. Rita, 1924. Reding, Marcel. Die Aktualitat des Nikolaus Cusanus in seinen Grundgedanken. Berlin: Morus-Verlag, 1964. Rice, Eugene F. "Nicholas of Cusa's Idea of Wisdom," Traditio, 13 (1957), 345-68. Ritter, Joachim. Docta Ignorantia: die Theorie des Nichtwissens bei Nicolaus Cusanus. Leipzig: Tuebner, 1927. "Die Stellung des Nicolaus von Cues in der Philosophiegeschichte. Grundsatzliche Probleme der neueren Cusanus-Forschung," Blatter fur Deutsche Philosophic, 13 (1939), 111-55. Rogner, Hildegund. Die Bewegung des Erkennens und das Sein in der Philosophic des Nik'olaus von Cues. Heidelberg: Winter, 1937. Rompe, Robert, and Hans-Jiirgen Treder. "Nikolaus von Kues als Naturforscher,"D^4WB, pp. 15-22. Rotta, Paolo. Nicolb Cusano. Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1942. Santinello, Giovanni. // pensiero di Nicolb Cusano nella sua prospettiva estetica. Padova: Liviana, 1958. Schanz, Paul. Der Cardinal Nicolaus von Cusa als Mathematiker. Wiesbaden: Sandig oHG., 1967 (reprint of 1872 edition). Schmitt, Paul. "Das Urbild in der Philosophic des Nicolaus de Cusa," Eranos-Jahrbuch (Zurich), 18 (1950), 291-321. Schnarr, Hermann. Mo di essendi. Interpretationen zu den Schriften De docta ignorantia, De coniecturis, und De venatione sapientiae von Nikolaus von Kues. Munster: Aschendorff, 1973.

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Schneider, Gerhard. Gott—das Nichtandere. Untersuchungen zum metaphysischen Grunde bei Nikolaus von Kues. Miinster: Aschendorff, 1970. Schultz, Rudolf. Die Staatsphilosophie des Nikolaus von Kues. Meisenheim: Hain, 1948. Seidlmayer, Michael. "Nikolaus von Cues und der Humanismus,"pp. 75-106 in his Wege und Wandlungen des Humanismus. Studien zu seinenpolitischen, ethischen, religiosen Problemen. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1965. " 'Una religio in rituum varietate.' Zur Religionsauffassung des Nikolaus von Cues," pp. 215-72 in his Wege und Wandlungen des Humanismus. Studien zu seinen politischen, ethischen, religiosen Problemen. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1965. Senger, Hans G. "Zur Frage nach einer philosophischen Ethik des Nikolaus von Kues," Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 33 (1970), 525,110-22. Die Philosophic des Nikolaus von Kues vor dem Jahr 1440. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung einer Philosophic in der Friihzeit des Nikolaus (1430-1440). Munster: Aschendorff, 1971. Sigmund, Paul E. Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963. Stallmach, Josef. "Das 'Nichtandere' als Begriff des Absoluten. Zur Auswertung der mystischen Theologie des Pseudo-Dionysius durch Cusanus," pp. 329-35 in Universitas (Festschrift fur Bischof Dr. Albert Stohr). 2 vols. Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald, I (1960). Zusammenfall der Gegensatze. Das Prinzip der Dialektik bei Nikolaus von Kues. Trier: Paulinus, 1960. "Sein und das Konnen-selbst bei Nicolaus von Cues," pp. 407-21 in Parusia. Studien zur Philosophic und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus (Festgabe fur Johannes Hirschberger). Frankfurt: Minerva GmbH, 1965. "Zusamr"»nfall der Gegensatze. Das Prinzip der Dialektik bei Nikolaus von Kues," MFCG, 1 (1968, 2nd ed.), 52-75. "Das Absolute und die Dialektik bei Cusanus im Vergleich zu Hegel," NCMM, pp. 241-55. Theill-Wunder, Hella. Die archaische Verborgenheit. Die philosophischen Wurzeln der negativen Theologie. Munich: Fink, 1970. (See "Ausblick: Nikolaus von Cues," pp. 166-95.) Traut, Wolfgang, and Manfred Zacher. "Cusanus-Bibliographie, 2. Fortsetzung (1964-1967) und Nachtrage,"MFCG, 6 (1967), 178202. Uebinger, Johannes. Die Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Cusanus. Munster: Schoningh, 1888. Vansteenberghe, Edmond. Autour de la Docte Ignorance. Une controverse sur la Theologie mystique au XVe siecle (vol. 14 of

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on actualized -possibility tRiAloqus 6e possest

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pRAenotan6A 1. Where, for clarification, words from the Latin text are inserted into the translation, the following rule is employed: When the Latin term is noted exactly as it appears in the Latin text, parentheses are used; when the case endings of nouns are transformed to the nominative, brackets are used. 2. The numbering of the Psalms accords with the Douay Version and, in parentheses, with the King James Version. 3. Quotation marks are employed when Nicholas mentions a word rather than uses it. On occasion, however, he both mentions and uses a word in the same sentence. In such cases the word is italicized in the translation. (E.g., 65:3-4: "Therefore, being which is Being itself names for us the Form of forms.") N.B. In some passages italics are used solely for emphasis. 4. At De Possest 18 the diagram in the Latin text is found in the margin of Codex Cusanus 219. The corresponding diagram in the English text is taken from p. 109 of the notes which accompany Elisabeth Bohnenstaedt's German translation (Vom Kbnnen-Sein. Vom Gipfel der Betrachtung, published by Felix Meiner Verlag, 1947) and is reproduced with the permission of the publisher. 5. The occasional appearance of brackets in the Latin text indicates words or syllables which Renate Steiger believes should be deleted, though they occur in Codex Cusanus 219. 6. The paragraph and sentence beginnings of the English translation do not always coincide with those in the printed Latin text. But a comparison of the printed Latin text with Codex Cusanus 219 will show that these beginning points are discretionary. 7. When words such as "beginning," "being," "truth," "absolute," "wisdom," "form," etc., refer to God, they are capitalized. 8. The numbers in the left-hand margins of the Latin text of De Possest correspond to the folio numbers of De Possest in the Paris edition of the Opera Omnia. The numbers in the right-hand margins of the Latin text were assigned by Renate Steiger to indicate section and line. 61

tmaloqus 6e possest

1

Ed. Paris. 1 fol. 174«

BERNARDUS: Cum nobis concedatur colloquendi cardinalem dudum optata facultas nee sibi sit onerosum conceptum diu pensatum propalare, velis, peto, mi abba Johannes, aliqua ex tuis studiis ipsum excitandi gratia proponere. Provocatus indubie grata nobis reserabit.

JOHANNES: Audivit iam ante me saepissime. Si quid moveris tu, ipse scilicet citius occurret, cum te placido vultu respiciat et diligat. Nee deero, si sic iudicabis. Accedamus igitur propius ad ignem. Ecce ipsum in sella tuis desideriis 10 placere paratum. CARDINALIS: Accedite. Frigus solito intensius nos artat et excusat, si igni consederimus. BERN: Cum tempus sic urgeat, proni sumus tuis iussis parere. CARD: Aliqua inter vos versatur forte dubitatio, cum sitis solliciti. Facite me studiorum vestrorum participem. IOH: Dubia utique habemus, quae tu speramus dissolves. Si placet, Bernardus movebit. CARD: Placet. 20 BERN: Incidi in stadium epistulae Pauli apostoli ad Roma-2 nos et legi, quomodo deus manifestat hominibus ea, quae eis de ipso nota sunt. Ait autem hoc fieri hoc modo: »Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas.« Istius modi elucidationem a te audire exposcimus. CARD: Quis melius sensum Pauli quam Paulus exprimeret? Invisibilia alibi ait aeterna esse. Temporalia imagines

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on actualized-possibility

BERNARD: The long-desired opportunity to converse with the Cardinal has been granted us; and it is not troublesome to him to divulge a long-pondered concept. So I ask you, Abbot John, if you would, to set forth some [points] from your studies, in order to motivate a response from him. Once he is stimulated, surely he will disclose to us gratifying [teachings]. JOHN: He has listened to me very often already. If you start the discussion, he will undoubtedly respond more quickly, since he looks upon you favorably and esteems you highly. I will remain present if you consent. So let us draw nearer to the fire. Here is the Cardinal, seated and ready to accommodate your wishes. CARDINAL: Come near. The cold, which is more severe than usual, presses us close together and excuses us if we sit together around the fire. BERNARD: Since the season thus presses us, we are readily disposed to comply with your request. CARDINAL: Perhaps some uncertainty is troubling you both, for you are agitated. Let me share in your pursuits. JOHN: Yes, we have doubts which we hope you will clear up. If it is all right, Bernard will commence.

2

CARDINAL: Fine.

BERNARD:2 I happened to be studying the epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Romans, and I read that God manifests to human beings the things which they know about Him. But the Apostle states that this [revelation] occurs in the following manner: "The invisible things of Him, including His eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the creation of the world, by means of understanding created things." We ask to hear from you an elucidation of this mode [of revelation] . CARDINAL: Who can express Paul's meaning better than Paul? Elsewhere he says that the invisible things are eternal. 63

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sunt aeternorum. Ideo si ea quae facta sunt intelliguntur, invisibilia dei conspiciuntur, uti sunt sempiternitas, virtus 10 eius et divinitas. Ita a creatura mundi fit dei manifestatio. BERN: Miramur abbas et ego quod invisibilia conspiciuntur. CARD: Conspiciuntur invisibiliter, sicut intellectus invisibilem veritatem, quae latet sub littera, quando intelligit quae legit invisibiliter videt. Dico invisibiliter hoc est mentaliter, cum aliter invisibilis veritas, quae est obiectum intellectus, videri nequeat. BERN: Quomodo autem a visibili creatura mundi elicitur 3 haec visio? CARD: Id, quod video sensibiliter, scio ex se non esse. Sicut enim sensus nihil a se discernit, sed habet discretionem a superior! virtute, sic et sensibile a se non est, sed est ab altiore virtute. Ideo apostolus dicebat »a creatura mundi«, ut a visibili mundo tamquam creatura ad creator em elevemur. Quando igitur videndo sensibile intelligo ipsum a quadam altiori virtute esse, cum sit finitum, quod a se esse nequit — quomodo enim finitum sibi ipsi terminum 10 posuisset? —, tune virtutem, a qua est, non possum nisi invisibilem et aeternam conspicere. Virtus enim creativa non potest intelligi nisi aeterna. Nam quomodo esset ab alia virtute, nisi foret creata? Sempiterna igitur est virtus, per quam mundi exstat creatura, ideo invisibilis. »Quae enim videntur, temporalia sunt.« Et haec est ipsa omni creaturae invisibilis divinitas.

BERN: Forte hoc sic est ut clare ostendis. Videtur tamen 4 Paulum parum per hoc aperire de dei desideratissima notitia. CARD: Immo non pauca sed maxima. Dixit enim: »Invisibilia« ipsius dei »a creatura mundi intellecta conspiciuntur«,

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Temporal things are images of eternal things. Thus, if created things are understood, the invisible things of God are seen clearly—for example, His eternity, power, and divinity. Hence the manifestation of God occurs from the creation of the world. BERNARD: The Abbot and I find it strange that invisible things are seen. CARDINAL: They are seen invisibly—just as when the intellect understands what it reads, it invisibly sees the invisible truth which is hidden behind the writing. I say "invisibly" (i.e., "mentally") because the invisible truth, which is the object of the intellect, cannot be seen in any other way. BERNARD: But how is this seeing elicited from the visible 3 mundane creation? CARDINAL:! know that what I see perceptibly does not exist from itself. For just as the sense [of sight] does not discriminate anything by itself but owes its discriminating to a higher power, so too what is perceptible does not exist from itself but exists from a higher power. The Apostle said "from the creation of the world" because from the visible world as creature we are elevated to the Creator. Therefore, when in seeing what is perceptible I understand that it exists from a higher power (since it is finite, and a finite thing cannot exist from itself; for how could what is finite have set its own limit?), then I can only regard as invisible and eternal this Power from which it exists. For the Creative Power can be understood only as eternal. For unless it were created, how would it exist from another power? Accordingly, the Power through which the mundane creation exists is eternal — and hence invisible, for "the things which are seen are temporal."5 And this Power is the invisible Divinity of all creation. 4 BERNARD: Perhaps [Paul's meaning] is such as you clearly indicate it to be. Nevertheless, through this [passage] Paul seems to disclose very little about the most coveted knowledge of God. CARDINAL: On the contrary. [He discloses] very many things, not just a few. For he said: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen from understanding the mundane crea-

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noil quod invisibilia dei sint quid aliud quam deus invisibilis, sed quia plura in creatura mundi sunt visibilia, quorum quodlibet sua adaequata ratione id est quod est, ideo de qualibet visibili creatura docet ad cuiuslibet invisibile principium ascendendum.

BERN: Intelligimus competenter ista, quomodo a creatu- 10 175r ris in citamur, ut earum rationes aeternas in principio conspiciamus. Hoc potuisset sic clare per apostolum dici, si aliud non intendebat. Quod si aliquid dicere proposuit fecundius deum apprehendere gliscenti rogamus aperiri. CARD: Arbitror quod multa valde etiam altissima et mihi 5 abscondita. Sed quae nunc conicio haec sunt: Docere nos voluit apostolus, quomodo in deo ilia invisibiliter apprehendere poterimus, quae in creatura videmus. Omnis enim creatura actu exsistens utique esse potest. Quod enim esse non potest, non est. Unde non-esse non est creatura. Si enim est creatura, utique est. Creare etiam cum sit ex non-esse ad esse producere, utique clare ostendit ipsum non-esse nequaquam creaturam. Neque hoc parvum est apprehendisse. 10 Dico autem consequenter: Cum omne exsistens possit 6 esse id quod est actu, hinc actualitatem conspicimus absolutam, per quam quae actu sunt id sunt quod sunt. Sicut cum alba videmus visibili oculo, albedinem intellectualiter intuemur, sine qua album non est album. Cum igitur actualitas sit actu, utique et ipsa potest esse, cum impossibile esse non sit. Nee potest ipsa absoluta possibilitas aliud esse a posse, sicut nee absoluta actualitas aliud ab actu. Nee potest ipsa iam dicta possibilitas prior esse actualitate quemadmodum dicimus aliquam potentiam praecedere actum. 10 Nam quomodo prodisset in actum nisi per actualitatem?Posse

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tion." [He did] not [mean this in the sense] that the invisible things of God are something other than the invisible God. Rather, [he said it] because in the mundane creation many things are visible; and any one of them, by virtue of the form [ratio] to which it corresponds, is what it is. And so, Paul teaches that we must mount up from any given visible creature to its invisible Beginning.6 BERNARD: We duly understand all this—viz., how we are aroused by created things so that we may behold their eternal forms in their Beginning. This point could have been stated just this clearly by the Apostle if he meant nothing else. But if he intended to say something more fully to one ardent with the desire to apprehend God, we ask that it be disclosed. 5 CARDINAL:! think that very many [of these] things are also very deep and lie hidden from me. But what I now believe is the following: The Apostle wanted to teach us how we can invisibly apprehend in God those things which we see in the creation. Assuredly, every actually existing created thing is able to exist; for what is not able to exist does not exist. So then, not-being is not a created thing; for if it were a created thing, assuredly it would exist.7 Moreover, since to create is to bring forth from not-being to being, assuredly [the Apostle] indicates clearly that not-being is in no respect a created thing. And to have apprehended this point is no small matter. 6 But I add consistently: From the fact that every existing thing is able to be that which it actually is,8 we perceive absolute actuality, through which the things that actually exist are what they are. (By comparison, when with the visible eye we see white things, we intellectually behold whiteness, without which a white thing would not be white.) Therefore, since actuality actually exists: assuredly it is also able to exist, because what is impossible to exist does not exist. Now, absolute possibility is not able to be anything other than possibility, even as absolute actuality [is] not [able to be] anything other than actuality.9 This possibility which was just now mentioned [viz., absolute possibility] is not able to exist prior to actuality—unlike the case where we say that some particular possibility precedes it actualization. For how would [absolute possibility] have become actual except

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enim fieri si se ipsum ad actum produceret, esset actu antequam actu esset. Possibilitas ergo absoluta, de qua loquimur, per quam ea quae actu sunt actu esse possunt, non praecedit actualitatem neque etiam sequitur. Quomodo enim actualitas esse posset possibilitate non exsistente? Coaeterna ergo sunt absoluta potentia et actus et utriusque nexus. Neque plura sunt aeterna, sed sic sunt aeterna quod ipsa aeternitas. Videnturne vobis haec sic aut aliter se habere?

BERN: Utique mens dissentire nequit. 20 IOH: Quasi dum solem intueor, negare nequeo ipsum superlucidum; sic ista tuo ductu clarissima intueor. Exspecto autem quod more tuo magna ex his inferas.

CARD: Satis mihi est, si vestro iudicio non aberro. Per- 7 gam ergo hac via ad quae festino. Nominabo autem hanc quam sic videmus aeternitatem deum gloriosum. Et dico nunc nobis constare deum ante actualitatem, quae distinguitur a potentia, et ante possibilitatem, quae distinguitur ab actu, esse ipsum simplex mundi principium. Omnia autem quae post ipsum sunt cum distinctione potentiae et actus, ita ut solus deus id sit quod esse potest, nequaquam autem quaecumque creatura, cum potentia et actus non sint idem nisi in principio. 10

BERN: Siste, pater, parumper et dubium declara. Quomodo dicis deum id esse quod esse potest? Videtur enim hoc de sole et luna et terra et alio quolibet pariformiter dici posse. CARD: Loquor in absolutis et generalissimis terminis, quasi dicerem: Cum potentia et actus sint idem in deo, tune deus omne id est actu, de quo posse esse potest verificari. Nihil enim esse potest, quod deus actu non sit. Hoc facile videt quisque attendens absolutam potentiam coincidere cum

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through actuality? If the possibility-of-being-made10 made itself actually exist, it would actually exist before it actually existed. Therefore, absolute possibility, about which we are speaking and through which those things that actually exist are able actually to exist, does not precede actuality. Nor does it succeed actuality; for how would actuality be able to exist if possibility did not exist? Therefore, absolute possibility, actuality, and the union of the two are coeternal. They are not more than one eternal thing; rather, they are eternal in such way that they are Eternity itself.11 Do these matters seem to the two of you to be thus or to be otherwise? BERNARD: Surely, no rational being can disagree [with these points] . JOHN: Just as while I am gazing at the sun I cannot deny that it is radiant, so by your guidance I see these [points] very clearly. But I am expecting you, in your own way, to derive important conclusions from them. 7 CARDINAL:! will be satisfied if I do not veer from your judgment. So I will continue along this route toward the conclusions to which I am hastening. Now, I will call this Eternity which we thus see the glorious God. And I say that it is now evident to us that God is the simple Beginning of the world; He exists before actuality that is distinct from possibility and before possibility that is distinct from actuality. But all things that exist after Him exist with their possibility and their actuality distinct. And hence God alone is what (He) is able to be;12 but no creature whatsoever [is what (it) is able to be], since possibility and actuality are identical only in the Beginning. 8 BERNARD: Stop for a moment, Father, and clarify a doubtful point. In what sense do you mean that God is what (He) is able to be? For it seems that this can be said in like manner about the sun, the moon, the earth, and any other thing.113 CARDINAL:! am speaking in absolute and very general terms —as if I were saying: "Since possibility and actuality are identical in God, God is —actually —everything of which 'is able to be' can be predicated truly." For anything-whichGod-is-not-actually is not able to be. (This point is easily recognized by anyone who takes account of the fact that

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actu. Secus de sole. Nam licet sol sit actu id quod est, non 10 tamen id quod esse potest. Aliter enim esse potest quam actu sit. BERN: Prosequere, pater. Nam certum est nullam creaturam esse actu omne id quod esse potest, cum dei potentia creativa non sit evacuata in ipsius creatione, quin possit de lapide suscitare hominem et adicere seu diminuere cuiusque quantitatem et generaliter omnem creaturam in aliam et aliam vertere. CARD: Recte dicis. Cum igitur haec sic se habeant, quod deus sit absoluta potentia et actus atque utriusque nexus 20 et ideo sit actu omne possibile esse, patet ipsum complicite esse omnia. Omnia enim, quae quocumque modo sunt aut esse possunt, in ipso principio complicantur, et quaecumque creata sunt aut creabuntur, explicantur ab ipso, in quo complicite sunt. IOH: Quamvis haec a te pluries audiverim, numquam 9 tamen nisi magna visa sunt et mihi difficillima. Ideo ne pigriteris respondere: An velis dicere creaturas, quae per decem praedicamenta significantur, puta substantia, quanti175V tas, | qualitas et alia, in deo esse? CARD: Volo dicere omnia ilia complicite in deo esse deus sicut explicite in creatura mundi sunt mundus. IOH: Igitur deus est magnus. CARD: Utique est magnus; sed sic magnus quod magnitude quae est omne id quod esse potest. Nam non est ma- 10 gnus magnitudine quae maior esse potest aut magnitudine quae dividi et minui potest quemadmodum creata quantitas, quae non est id quod esse potest. BERN: Si ergo deus est magnus magnitudine quae id est quod esse potest et — ut dicis — quae maior esse non potest et quae minor esse non potest, tune deus est magnitude maxima pariter et minima.

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absolute possibility coincides with actuality.) However, the case of the sun is different. For although the sun is actually what it is, it is not what it is able to be. For the sun is able to be different from what it actually is. BERNARD: Proceed, Father. For, assuredly, no created thing is actually all that it is able to be. For God's creative power is not exhausted in His creation. And thus it is not the case that He is unable to produce a human being from a stone and to increase or decrease each thing's size and, in general, to turn any created thing into any other created thing.14 CARDINAL: You speak correctly. Therefore, since the facts of the matter are such that God is Absolute Possibility, is Actuality, and is the Union of the two (and so He is actually every possible being): clearly, He is all things, in the sense of enfolding all things. For everything that in any way either exists or can exist is enfolded in this Beginning. And whatever either has been created or will be created is unfolded from Him, in whom it is enfolded. 9 JOHN: Although I have frequently heard you make these statements, they have never seemed to be anything except momentous and very difficult for me.15 So do not be reluctant to give an answer: Do you wish to say that created things, which are signified by means of the ten categories (viz., substance, quantity, quality, and the others), exist in God? CARDINAL: I want to say that as-enfolded-in-God all these things are God; similarly, as-unfolded-in-the-created-world they are the world.16 JOHN: God, then, is great. CARDINAL: Yes, He is great. But He is great in such way that He is greatness which is everything it is able to be. For He is not great by virtue of a greatness which is able to be greater, or by virtue of a greatness which is able to be divided and diminished. [In this respect, He is not] like created quantity, which is not what it is able to be. BERNARD: If, then, God is great by virtue of a greatness which is what it is able to be and which (as you say) is unable to be greater and unable to be lesser, then God is maximal and minimal greatness, alike.

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CARD: Utique non errat dicens deum magnitudinem absolute maximam pariter et minimam; quod non est aliud dicere quam infinitam et impartibilem, quae est omnis 20 magnitudinis finitae veritas et mensura. Quomodo enim foret maior alicui quae sic est maxima quod et minima? Seu quomodo minor alicui quae sic est minima quod maxima? Aut quomodo non est omnis magnitudinis essendi aequalitas quae omne id est actu quod esse potest? Utique essendi aequalitas esse potest.

BERN: Grata sunt haec. Sed sicut video, nee nomen nee 10 res nee quicquam omnium, quae creatae magnitudini conveniunt, convenienter de deo dicuntur, cum differant per infinitum. Et fortassis non solum in magnitudine hoc verum, sed in omnibus quae de creaturis verificantur. CARD: Recte concipis, Bernarde. Et hoc ipsum apostolus insinuat, cum faceret inter ilia quae in creaturis attinguntur et in deo differentiam uti est inter visibilia et invisibilia, quae utique in infinitum distare affirmamus. IOH: Quantum capio, in his paucis multa valde continen- 10 tur. Nam si dico ex pulchritudine creaturarum deum pulehrum et scio quod deus est ita pulcher quod pulchritude quae est omne id quod esse potest, scio nihil pulchri totius mundi deficere deo ac quod omnis quae potest creari pulchritudo non est nisi quaedam similitude improportionalis ad illam quae actu est omnis essendi possibilitas pulchritudinis, quae non potest esse aliter quam est, cum sit id quod esse potest. Ita de bono, de vita et aliis, sic et de motu. Nullus enim motus est in fine seu id quod esse potest nisi qui deo convenit, qui est motus maximus pariter et 20 minimus seu quietissimus. Et ita mihi videris dicere. Sed haesito, an in simili convenienter dici possit deum esse solem aut caelum sive hominem aut aliud tale.

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CARDINAL: Assuredly there is no error in one's saying that God is absolutely maximal and absolutely minimal greatness, alike. [To say] this is to say nothing other than that He is infinite and indivisible greatness —a greatness which is the measure and the truth of every finite magnitude. For how could a [greatness] that is the maximal [greatness] in such way that it is also the minimal [greatness] be any greater?17 Or how could a [greatness] that is the minimal [greatness] in such a way that it is the maximal [greatness] be any lesser? Or how can [a greatness] that is actually everything it is able to be fail to be the equality of being of every magnitude? Surely, it is able to be the equality of being of [every magnitude]. 18 10 BERNARD: These [teachings] are gratifying. Yet it seems to me that neither the name ["greatness"] nor the fact [of greatness] nor any of the characteristics applicable to created magnitude are fittingly predicated of God, since these are infinitely different from God. And presumably this [point] holds true not only for greatness but also for whatever is predicated truly of created things. CARDINAL: You are thinking correctly, Bernard. In fact, the Apostle implied this very point. For analogous to the difference between visible things and invisible things, [two sets of things] which we assert to be infinitely different from each other, he differentiated between what is apprehended in the case of created things and what is apprehended in the case of God. JOHN: As far as I can tell, very many [truths] are contained in these few [statements]. For example, suppose that on the basis of the beauty of created things I say that God is beautiful; and suppose I know that God is so beautiful that He is a beauty which is everything it is able to be. Then, I know that God lacks nothing of the beauty of the whole world. And I know that all creatable beauty is only a certain disproportionate likeness to that Beauty (1) which is actually the possibility of the existence of all beauty and (2) which is not able to be different from what it is, since it is what it is able to be. The case is similar concerning the good and life and other things—just as it is also similar concerning motion. For no motion is at rest or is what it is able to be—except for the motion which befits God, who is not only maximal motion but also minimal motion (i.e., motion which is most at rest). Indeed, you seem to me to be making this claim.

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CARD: Non est vocabulis insistendum. Nam si dicitur 11 deum esse solem, utique si intelligitur hoc sane de sole qui est omne id actu quod esse potest, tune clare videtur istum solem non esse aliquid simile ad ilium. Hie enim sol sensibilis dum est in oriente, non est in qualibet parte caeli, ubi esse posset, neque est maximus pariter et minimus, ut non possit esse nee maior nee minor, neque est undique et ubilibet, ut non possit esse alibi quam est, neque est omnia, ut non possit esse aliud quam est, et ita de reliquis. Sic quidem de omnibus creaturis pariformiter. Non refert igitur 10 quomodo deum nomines, dummodo terminos sic ad posse esse intellectualiter transferas.

BERN: Intelligo te dicere velle deum esse omnia, ut non 12 possit esse aliud quam est. Quomodo hoc capit intellectus? CARD: Utique hoc firmissime asserendum. Deo enim nil omnium abest quod universaliter et absolute esse potest, quia est ipsum esse, quod entitas potentiae et actus. Sed dum est omnia in omnibus, sic est omnia quod non plus unum quam aliud, quoniam non est sic unum quod non aliud. BERN: Cave, ne tibi ipsi contradicas. Aiebas enim parum ante deum non esse solem, modo asseris ipsum omnia. 10 CARD: Immo dicebam ipsum solem; sed non modo essendi quo hie sol est, qui non est quod esse potest. Qui enim est id quod esse potest, utique solare esse sibi non deficit; sed habet ipsum meliori essendi modo quia perfectissimo et divino. Sicut essentia manus verius esse habet in anima quam in manu, cum in anima sit vita et manus mor176'' tua non sit manus, ita de toto corpore et singulis memlbris: ita se habet universum ad deum, excepto quod deus non

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Yet I am uncertain whether in similar fashion we can fittingly say that God is sun or sky or man or any other such thing. 11 CARDINAL: We must not insist upon the words. For example, suppose we say that God is sun. If, as is correct, we construe this [statement] as [a statement] about a sun which is actually all it is able to be, then we see clearly that this sun is not at all like the sensible sun. For while the sensible sun is in the East, it is not in any other part of the sky where it is able to be. [Moreover, none of the following statements are true of the sensible sun:] "It is maximal and minimal, alike, so that it is not able to be either greater or lesser"; "It is everywhere and anywhere, so that it is not able to be elsewhere than it is"; "It is all things, so that it is not able to be anything other than it is" —and so on. With all the other created things the case is similar. Hence it does not matter what name you give to God, provided that in the foregoing manner you mentally remove the limits with respect to its possible being. 12 BERNARD: I take you to mean that God is all things, so that He is not able to be anything other than He is.19 How can the intellect grasp this [doctrine] ? CARDINAL: Indeed, this [doctrine] must be affirmed most steadfastly. For God does not fail to be anything at all which is at all possible to be. For He is the very being—that is, the entitas — of possibility and of actuality.20 But although He is all things in all things,21 He is all things in such way that He is not one thing more than another; for He is not one thing in such way that He is no other thing. BERNARD: Beware lest you contradict yourself. For a moment ago you denied that God is sun; and now you are asserting that He is all things. CARDINAL: On the contrary! I affirmed that God is sunthough [He is] not [sun] in the same way as is the visible sun, which is not what it is able to be. For, assuredly, He who is what (He) is able to be does not fail to have solar being; rather, He has it in a better way, because [He has it] in a divine and most perfect way. The essence of a hand exists more truly in the soul than in the hand, since the life is in the soul and since a lifeless hand is not a hand. (The same point can be made about the whole body and its individual members.) Now, the universe is related to God in away comparable to this —except for its not being the case that God is the soul of the world in the

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est anima mundi sicut anima hominis anima est, nee forma alicuius, sed omnibus forma, quia causa efficiens, formalis 20 seu exemplaris et finalis. BERN: Vultne Johannes evangelista dicere omnia sic in 13 deo esse vitam sicut de manu dixisti et anima? CARD: Arbitror vitam ibi veritatem et vivacitatem dicere. Nam cum non sint res nisi per formam formentur, tune formae in forma formarum verius et vivacius esse habent quam in materia. Res enim non est, nisi sit vera et suo modo viva. Quo cessante esse desinit. Ideo verius est in forma formarum quam in se. Ibi enim est vera et viva. IOH: Optime nos instruis, pater. Videtur mihi ex uno te omnia elicere. Deus ergo est omnia, ut non possit esse 10 aliud. Ita est undique, ut non possit esse alibi. Ita est omnium adaequatissima mensura, ut non possit esse aequalior. Sic de forma et specie et cunctis. Nee est hac via difficile videre deum esse absolutum ab omni oppositione et quomodo ea, quae nobis videntur opposita, in ipso sunt idem et quomodo affirmationi in ipso non opponitur negatio et quaeque talia.

CARD: Cepisti, abba, propositi radicem et vides hanc 14 contemplationem per multos sermones inexplicabilem brevissimo verbo complicari. Esto enim quod aliqua dictio significet simplicissimo significato quantum hoc complexum 'posse est', scilicet quod ipsum posse sit. Et quia quod est actu est, ideo posse esse est tantum quantum posse esse actu. Puta vocetur possest. Omnia in illo utique complicantur, et est dei satis propinquum nomen secundum humanum de eo conceptum. Est enim nomen omnium et singulorum nominum atque nullius pariter. Ideo dum deus sui 10 vellet notitiam primo revelare, dicebat: »Ego« sum »deus

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way that the soul of a man is a soul. Nor is God the Form merely of some thing; rather, He is the Form for all things, since He is the efficient, the formal (or the exemplary), and the final cause. 13 BERNARD: Doesn't John the Evangelist22 want to say —in a way comparable to your statement about the hand and the soul—that in God all things are life? CARDINAL: I think that "life" there means "truth" and "vitality." For since things do not exist unless they are formed through a form, forms exist more truly and more vitally in the Form of forms than in matter. For a thing does not exist unless it is true and, in its own way, alive. When it ceases to be true and alive, it ceases to exist. And so, it exists more truly in the Form of forms than in itself; for in the Form of forms it is true and alive. JOHN: You teach us excellently, Father. You seem to me to elicit all things from one thing. God, then, is all things, so that He is not able to be anything else. He is so present everywhere that He is not able to be present anywhere else. He is to such an extent the most congruent measure of all things that He is not able to be a more equal measure. The same points can be made about form and species and all other things. In this way it is not difficult to see that God is free of all opposition, and to see how those things which seem to us to be opposites are identical in Him, how in Him negation is not opposed to affirmation, and [so on for] every such thing. 14 CARDINAL: Abbot, you have grasped the root of the matter; and you see that this thought, which cannot be explicated by means of many words, is enfolded in a very short word. For let us agree that [there is a single] word [which] signifies by a very simple signification as much as [is signified by] the compound expression "Possibility exists" ("posse est")— meaning that possibility itself exists. Now, because what exists exists actually: the possibility-to-be exists insofar as the possibility-to-be is actual. Suppose we call this possest [Actualized-possibility] .23 All things are enfolded in it [i.e., in Actualized-possibility]; and "Actualized-possibility" is a sufficiently approximate name for God, according to our human concept of Him. For it is equally the name (1) of all names, (2) of each distinct name, and (3) of no name. And so, when God willed to first reveal knowledge of Himself,

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omnipotens«, id est sum actus omnis potentiae. Et alibi: »Ego sum qui sum.« Nam ipse est qui est. Quae enim nondum sunt id quod esse aut intelligi possunt, de illis absolutum esse non verificatur. Habet autem Graecus: Ego sum entitas, ubi nos: »Ego sum qui sum.« Est enim forma essendi seu forma omnis formabilis formae. Creatura autem, quae non est quod esse potest, non est simpliciter. Solus deus perfecte et complete est.

Ducit ergo hoc nomen speculantem super omnem sen- 15 sum, rationem et intellectum in mysticam visionem, ubi est finis ascensus omnis cognitivae virtutis et revelationis incogniti dei initium. Quando enim supra se ipsum omnibus relictis ascenderit veritatis inquisitor et reperit se amplius non habere accessum ad invisibilem deum, qui sibi manet invisibilis, cum nulla luce rationis suae videatur, tune exspectat devotissimo desiderio solem ilium omnipotentem et per sui ipsius ortum pulsa caligine illuminari, ut invisibilem tantum videat quantum se ipsum manifestaverit. Sic intelli- 10 go apostolum deum a creatura mundi intellecta, puta quando ipsum mundum creaturam intelligimus et mundum transcendentes creatorem ipsius inquirimus, se manifestare ipsum ut creatorem suum summa formata fide quaerentibus.

IOH: Quorsum nos vehis, pater, mundanos supra mundum! Indulgebis, ut te praesente cum Bernardo colloquar. Di- 16 cito, vir zelose, an quae dicta sunt cepisti? BERN: Spero aliquid saltern, licet parum. IOH: Quomodo intelligis in possest omnia complicari? BERN: Quia posse simpliciter dictum est omne posse. Unde si viderem omne posse esse actu, utique nihil restaret

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He said:24 "I am God almighty" —i.e., "I am the actuality of every possibility." And elsewhere25 [He said] : "I am Iwho-am," since He is He-who-is. ("Being"26 in an unqualified sense is not predicated truly of those things which are not yet (1) what they are able to be or (2) what they are able to be conceived [to be] .)27 However, the Greek has "I am Being itself,"28 where we [have] "I am I-who-am." For He is the Form of being, or the Form of every formable form. But the creation, which is not what it is able to be, does not exist in an unqualified sense of "exist." God alone exists perfectly and completely. 15 Accordingly, this name ["possest"] leads the one-who-isspeculating beyond all the senses, all reason, and all intellect unto a mystical vision, where there is the end of the ascent of all cognitive power and where there is the beginning of the revelation of the unknown God. For, having left all things behind, the seeker-after-truth ascends beyond himself and discerns that he still does not have any greater access to the invisible God, who remains invisible to him. (For God is not seen by means of any light from the seeker's own reason.) At this point the seeker awaits, with the most devout longing, the omnipotent Sun —expecting that when darkness is banished by its rising, he will be illuminated, so that he will see the invisible [God] to the extent that God will manifest Himself. This is how I construe the Apostle's claim that from the mundane creation's having been understood —i.e., when we apprehend the world as created being and, transcending the world, seek its Creator —God manifests Himself to those who with most deeply formed faith seek Him as their own Creator. JOHN: How far beyond the world you convey us mundane 16 [creatures], Father! You will indulge my conversing with Bernard while you are present. Tell me, zealous man, whether you have understood what has been said. BERNARD: Although little, at least something, I hope. JOHN: As you understand the matter, how can it be the case that all things are enfolded in Actualized-possibility? BERNARD: Because by "possibility" in an unqualified sense, every possibility is meant. Hence, if I were to understand that every possibility is actual, [I would understand that] nothing more would be left over. For if anything were

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amplius. Si enim aliud aliquid restaret, utique hoc esse posset; ita non restaret, sed prius non fuisset eomprehensum. IOH: Recte dicis. Nam si non est posse esse, nihil est, et 10 si est, omnia id sunt quod sunt in ipso et extra ipsum nihil. Omnia igitur quae facta sunt in ipso ab aeterno necesse est fuisse. Quod enim faetum est, in posse esse semper fuit, sine quo faetum est nihil. Patet possest omnia esse et ambire, cum nihil aut sit aut possit fieri, quod non includatur. In ipso ergo omnia sunt et moventur et id sunt quod sunt quicquid sunt. Sed quomodo intelligis ascendentem supra se ipsum con- 17 stitui oportere? 176V BERN: Quia nullo graldu cognitionis attingitur. Sensus enim nihil non-quantum attingit. Sic nee imaginatio. Simplex enim et quod non possit esse maius aut minus vel mediari aut duplicari nullo sensu nee etiam per quamcumque subtilissimam attingitur phantasiam. Nee altissimus intellectus concipere potest infinitum interminum et unum quod omnia atque ipsum, ubi non est oppositionis diversitas. Nisi enim intellectus se intelligibili assimilet, non intel- 10 ligit, cum intelligere sit assimilare et intelligibilia se ipso seu intellectualiter mensurare. Quod in eo, quod est id quod esse potest, non est possibile; nam immensurabile utique est, cum non possit esse maius. Quomodo ergo per intellectum, qui numquam est adeo magnus quin possit esse maior, intelligi posset. IOH: Profundius quam credideram dicta patris nostri subintrasti. Et hoc ultimum certum me facit oportere ascendentem omnia linquere, etiam suum intellectum transcendere, cum virtus inflnita per terminatam capi non possit. 20 CARD: Gaudeo de vestro profectu ac quod iis locutus sum,

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left over, surely this thing would be possible to exist. And so it would not be left over but would simply have been unrecognized at first. JOHN: You speak correctly. For if the possibility-to-be does not exist, then nothing exists; on the other hand, if the possibility-to-be does exist, then all things are-what-they-are in it, and nothing [remains] outside it. Therefore, necessarily, all created things have existed in it from eternity. For whatwas-created always existed in the possibility-to-be, in whose absence nothing was created. Clearly, Actualized-possibility is all things and includes all things; for nothing which is not included [in it] either exists or is able to be made.29 Therefore, in it all things exist and have their movement and are what they are (regardless of what they are). But, as you understand the matter, how can it be the case that the one who ascends must be situated beyond himself? BERNARD: Because no grade of knowing attains [this height]. For example, the senses do not make contact with anything which does not have quantity. Neither does the imagination. For what is simple and what cannot be greater or lesser, or cannot be halved or doubled, is not reached by any of the senses — nor even through any very acute power-ofimagination. Nor can the most penetrating intellect conceive the infinite, boundless, and one thing which is both all things and the thing in which there is no diversity of opposition. For unless the intellect becomes like the [putatively] intelligible object, it does not understand [it]; for to understand is to become-like and is to measure by means of the intellect (i.e., conceptually) the intelligible objects. But this [measurement] is not possible in the case of that which is what (it) is able to be. For, assuredly, it is immeasurable, since [it is so great that] it cannot be greater. Therefore, how could it be understood through the intellect, which is never so great that it cannot be greater? JOHN: You have penetrated more deeply than I had supposed into the statements of our father. Indeed, this last point makes me certain that the one who ascends must leave behind all things and must transcend even his own intellect, since Infinite Power cannot be grasped by a finite power. CARDINAL: I am happy with your progress and happy that

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qui pro suo captu dicta magnificant. BERN: Quamvis constet mihi omnibus diebus meis con- 18 templationis cibum posse ex praemissis elicere et sermones multiplicare et semper proficere, optamus tamen aliquo sensibili phantasmate manuduci, maxime quomodo aeternum est omnia simul et in nunc aeternitatis tota, ut ipso phantasmate relicto salientes supra omnia sensibilia elevemur. CARD: Conabor. Et recipio omnibus nobis etiam in praxi notum trochi ludum puerorum: Proicit puer trochum et proiciendo simul ipsum retrahit cum chorda circumligata. Et quanto potentior est fortitude brachii, tanto citius cir- 10 cumvolvitur trochus, adeo quod videatur, dum est in maiori motu, stare et quiescere, et dicunt pueri ipsum tune quiescere. Describamus ergo circulum b c, qui super a circumvolvatur quasi superior circulus trochi, et sit alius circulus d e fixus:

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I have spoken to those who, by virtue of their comprehension, enlarge upon what has been said. BERNARD: It is evident to me that from the aforesaid [teachings I] can, all my life long, draw food for thought and can discourse at length [about them] and can continually make progress [with respect to understanding them]. Nevertheless, we desire to be led by a sensible image —especially [regarding the questions] how Eternal [Being] is all things at once and how the whole of eternity is within the present moment —so that when we leap forth, having left this image behind, we may be elevated above all sensible things. CARDINAL: I shall try [to show you such an image]. I will take [the example] of boys [playing with] a top —a game known to us all, even in practical terms. A boy pitches out a top; and as he does so, he pulls it back with the string which is wound around it. The greater the strength of his arm, the faster the top is made to rotate —until it seems (while it is moving at the faster speed) to be motionless and at rest. Indeed, boys speak of it as then at rest. So let us describe a circle, b c, which is being rotated about a point a as would the upper circle of a top; and let there be another fixed circle, d e\

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Nonne quanto velocius mobilis circumrotatur, tanto videtur minus moveri? BERN: Videtur certe, et hoc vidimus pueri. CARD: Esto ergo quod posse moveri in ipso sit actu, 19 scilicet ut moveatur actu quantum est possibile: Nonne tune penitus quiesceret? BERN: Nulla successio posset notari ex repentina velocitate. Ita utique motus deprehendi nequiret successione cessante. IOH: Quando motus foret infinitae velocitatis, b et c puneta in eodem puncto temporis forent cum d puncto circuli fixi sine eo quod alter punctus scilicet b prius tempore fuisset quam c, aliter non esset maximus et infinitus mo- 10 tus, et tamen non esset motus sed quies, quia nullo tempore ilia puncta de d fixo recederent. CARD: Recte ais, abba. Maximus ergo motus esset simul et minimus et nullus. BERN: Ita necessario videtur. CARD: Nonne quemadmodum b c puncta opposita eo casu forent semper cum d, ita semper etiam cum opposite eius scilicet e? IOH: Necessario. CARD: Nonne etiam omnia intermedia puncta circuli b c 20 similiter? IOH: Similiter. CARD: Totus ergo circulus etiamsi maximus foret, in omni nunc simul foret cum puncto d, etiamsi d punctus minimus foret, et non solum in d et e, sed in omni puncto circuli de. IOH: Ita foret. CARD: Satis sit ergo hoc phantasmate posse aenigmatice aliqualiter videri, quomodo si b c circulus sit ut aeternitas et alius d e tempus, non repugnare aeternitatem simul totam 30 esse in quolibet puncto temporis et deum principium et finem simul esse totum in omnibus et quaelibet talia.

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Is it not true that the faster the movable circle is rotated, the less it seems to be moved? BERNARD: It certainly seems true. And, as boys, [this is how] we saw it. CARDINAL: Suppose, then, that the possibility-to-be-moved is actual in it; i.e., suppose that the top is actually being moved as fast as possible. In that case, would it not be completely motionless? BERNARD: Because of the rapid velocity, no change-ofstate could be observed. And so, indeed, the motion could not be detected, since the change-of-state would have ceased. JOHN: Since the motion would be of infinite velocity, points b and c would be temporally present together at * point d of the fixed circle—without its being the case that point b was temporally prior to point c. (For if b were temporally prior to c, the motion would not be maximal and infinite.) And yet, there would not be motion but would be rest, since at no time would points b and c move away from the fixed point d. CARDINAL: You speak correctly, Abbot. Hence the maximal motion would at the same time also be minimal motion and no motion. BERNARD: This seems to be necessarily so. CARDINAL: In that case, just as the opposite points b and c would be always at point d, would they not always also be at the opposite point from d, viz., at e? JOHN: Necessarily. CARDINAL: Would this not likewise hold true for all the intermediate points of the circle be"? JOHN: Yes, likewise. CARDINAL: Therefore, the whole of the circle (even if the circle were maximal in size) would at every instant be simultaneously present at point d (even if point d were minimal in size). And [the whole of the circle would be] not only at d and e but also at every other point of the circle d e. JOHN: So it would. CARDINAL: Let it suffice, then, thatby means of this image and symbolically we are somehow able to see that (if the circle b c were illustrative of eternity and the circle d e were illustrative of time)32 [the following propositions] are not self-contradictory: "that eternity as a whole is at once present at every point of time"; "that God as the Beginning and the End 33 is at once and as a whole present in all things"; [and so on for] whatever other such propositions.

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BERN: Video adhuc unum utique magnum. 20 IOH: Quid hoc? BERN: In deo hie distantia nequaquam distare. Nam d e 177r distant per diametrum circuli, cuius sunt opposita punjcta; sed non in deo. Veniente enim b ad d est simul et cum e. Ita omnia, quae in tempore distant in hoc mundo, sunt in praesentia coram deo, et quae distant opposite sunt ibi coniuncte, et quae hie diversa ibi idem. IOH : Haec certe notanda, ut intelligamus deum supra omnem differentiam, varietatem, alteritatem, tempus, locum et 10 oppositionem esse. CARD: lam intelligetis facilius, quomodo concordabitis 21 theologos, quorum alter dicit sapientiam quae deus omni mobili mobiliorem et verbum velociter currere et omnia penetrare atque a fine ad finem pertingere atque ad omnia progredi. Alius vero dicit primum principium fixum immobile stare in quiete, licet det omnia moveri, quidam quod simul stat et progreditur, et adhuc alii quod neque stat neque movetur. Ita quidam dicunt ipsum generaliter in omni loco, alii particulariter in quolibet, alii utrumque, alii nullum. Haec et his similia facilius per hoc speculare me- 10 dium capiuntur, licet infinite melius haec omnia sint in deo ipse deus simplex, quam per dictum paradigma etiam per cuiuscumque altissimum saltum.

BERN: Immo etiam de aeternis rerum rationibus, quae in 22 rebus aliae et aliae atque differentes sunt, etiam pariformiter videtur eas in deo non esse varias. Nam etsi circuli b c puncta concipiantur rationes rerum seu ideae, non tamen sunt plura, cum totus circulus et punctus sint idem. Quando enim b est cum d, totus circulus est cum d et omnes

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BERNARD: I see one further very important [lesson]. JOHN: What is it? BERNARD: Things which are separated for us are not at all separated in God. For example, d and e are separated by that diameter of the circle of which they are opposite points. But [there is] no [such separation] in God; for when b comes to d, it is at the same time also at e. Similarly, all the things which are separated in time in our world are in the present before God. And all the things which [in our world] are separated as opposites exist conjointly in God. And all the things which here are different are there identical. JOHN: These [facts] must certainly be noted, so that we may understand that God is beyond all difference, variation, otherness, time, space, and opposition. CARDINAL: Now both of you will more readily understand how you will [be able] to harmonize the [statements of] the theologians. One of them says that Wisdom (which is God) 34 is more movable than any other movable thing and that 35 5 [Wisdom's] Word runs swiftly and pervades all things and stretches from end to end36 and moves toward all things. But another of them says that the First Beginning is fixed and immovable and that it remains at rest, even though it causes all other things to be moved. Others say that it is at once at rest and in motion; and still others say that it is neither at rest nor moved. Accordingly, some state that God is generally in every place; others state that He is particularly in some given place; others state that He is both; and [still] others [state] that He is neither. These [teachings], and [teachings] similar to them, are more easily understood through the mirrorlike medium [of our example]. Nevertheless, in God all these things are the simple God Himself in an infinitely better way than [is discernible] —even by means of anyone's highest leap—through the aforementioned example. BERNARD: Indeed, even regarding the eternal forms of things, which in things are different from one another: we also see, in like manner, that in God these are not different [from one another]; For even if the points of circle b c are viewed as [illustrative of] the forms (or ideas) of things, still they are not more than one point, since a point and the whole circle are identical. For when b is at d\ the whole circle is at d,

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eius puncti stint unus punctus, licet videantur esse plura, quando ad d e temporis circulum et eius puncta respicimus. CARD: Multum acceditis ad theologiam illam latissimam 23 pariter et concisam. Possemus adhuc plura in hoc trochi motu pulcherrima venari, scilicet quomodo puer volens trochum mortuum seu sine motu facere vivum sui conceptus similitudinem sibi imprimit per inventum sui intellectus ingenium et motu manuum recto pariter et obliquo seu pulsionis pariter et attractionis imprimit sibi motum supra naturam trochi, cum non haberet nisi motum versus centrum uti grave: facit ipsum circulariter moveri ut caelum. Et hie spiritus movens adest trocho invisibiliter diu aut parum 10 secundum impressionem communicatae virtutis. Quo desinente volvere trochum revertitur uti erat prius ad motum versus centrum. Nonne hie est similitude creatoris spiritum vitae dare non-vivo volentis? Uti enim praeordinavit dare, ita medio motus caeli, qui sunt instrumenta exsecutionis voluntatis eius, moventur motu recto ab oriente ad occasum et cum hoc reversionis de occasu ad orientem simul, ut sciunt astrologi, et spiritus vitae ex zodiaco animali impressus movet vitaliter id, quod de sua natura vita caruit, et vivificat quamdiu spiritus durat, deinde revertitur in terram 20 suam. Talia, quae tamen non sunt praesentis speculationis, et plura valde significantur in hoc ludo puerorum. Haec sic cursim rememorata sint, ut consideretis quomodo etiam in arte puerorum relucet natura et in ipsa deus, quodque sapientes mundi qui hoc ponderarunt veriores assecuti sunt de scibilibus coniecturas.

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and all its points are one point —even though they appear to be many when we look at circle d e ([which is illustrative] of time) and at its points. CARDINAL: Both of you are coming quite close to the theology which is concise and most extensive, alike. We could pursue still many other very appealing [illustrations] regarding this motion of the top—e.g., (1) how a boy who wants to enliven a dead top (i.e., a top without motion) impresses upon it a likeness of his thought by means of a device conjured up from his intellect; and (2) how by both the forward and the backward motion of his hands (i.e., by the motion of both thrusting and pulling) he impresses upon the top a movement over and above the top's nature. For the top, as a heavy thing, had only a motion toward the center [of the earth. But the boy] causes the top to be moved in a circular fashion, as is the sky. Moreover, this moving power (spiritus movens) is invisibly present to the top for a long or a short time, depending upon the impression of the imparted force. When this [power] stops turning the top, the top reverts (just as was its original state) to motion toward the center [of the earth]. Is this not a likeness of the Creator, who wills to give the spirit-of-life [spiritus vitae] to what is not alive? For just as He foreordained it to be done, so by means of motion the heavens (which are instruments of His executing will) are moved by a forward motion from east to west and at the same time by a reverse motion from west to east (as the astrologers are aware).37 And the spirit-of-life, impressed from the living zodiac, enlivens that which of its own nature lacks life; and it enlivens as long as the spirit lasts; and then this thing returns to its earth. Such points (which do not, however, pertain to the present investigation), along with many others, are especially signified in [the example of] this boys'-game. They have been recalled in this cursory way so that you may observe (1) that even in a boys' device nature shines forth (and in nature God) and (2) that the wise men of the world who pondered this [matter] have attained unto the truer conjectures about what is knowable.

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BERN: Ago tibi immensas gratias, pater optime, quoniam 24 177V multa dubia et quae videbantur impossibi|lia hoc aptissimo trochi aenigmate facta sunt mihi non solum credibilia sed necessaria. CARD: Qui sibi de deo conceptual simplicem facit quasi significati huius compositi vocabuli possest, multa sibi prius difficilia citius capit. Nam si quis se ad lineam convertit et applicat ipsum possest, ut videat possest lineale, hoc est ut videat lineam illud esse actu quod esse potest et omne id esse quod lineam fieri posse intelligit, utique ex sola ilia 10 ratione quia est possest ipsam videt lineam maximam pariter et minimam. Nam cum sit id quod esse potest, non potest esse maior: sic videtur maxima, nee minor: sic videtur minima. Et quia est id quod linea fieri potest, ipsa est terminus omnium superficierum. Sic et terminus figurae triangularis, quadrangularis et omnium polygoniarum et omnium circulorum et figurarum omnium, quae fieri possunt ex linea sive recta sive curva, et omnium figurarum exemplar simplex, verissimum et adaequatissimum et aequalitas in se omnes habens et per se omnia figurans. Et ita unica 20 figura omnium figurabilium linealiter et ratio una atque causa omnium quantumcumque variarum figurarum.

In hoc aenigmate vides quomodo si possest applicatur 25 ad aliquod nominatum, [quomodo] fit aenigma ad ascendendum ad innominabile, sicut de linea per possest pervenisti ad indivisibilem lineam supra opposita exsistentem, quae est omnia et nihil omnium lineabilium. Et non est tune linea, quae per nos linea nominatur, sed est supra omne nomen lineabilium. Quia possest absolute consideratum sine applicatione ad aliquod nominatum te aliqualiter ducit aenigmatice ad omnipotentem, ut ibi videas omne quod

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BERNARD: I thank you immensely, excellent Father, because by this very fitting symbolism38 of the top many things which were uncertain and which seemed to be impossible have not merely been made plausible to me but [have] even [been shown to be] necessary. CARDINAL: Whoever forms for himself the simple conception of God as He is signified by the composite word "possest" grasps more readily many things which previously were difficult for him. For example, suppose that someone turns his attention to a line and applies [to it the concept] actualizedpossibility, so that he views the line's possibility as actualized (i.e., so that he sees the line to be actually that which it is able to be—sees it to be everything he understands that a line can become). Surely, from the sole consideration that the line is actualized-possibility, he recognizes that the line is maximal and minimal alike. For since the line is what it is able to be: it cannot be greater, and thus it is seen to be maximal; nor can it be lesser, and thus it is seen to be minimal. And because it is what a line is able to become, it is the boundary line of all surfaces. Thus it is the boundary line of triangular shape, of rectangular shape, of all polygons, of all circles, of all figures which can be made from a line (whether a straight line or a curved line). It is the simple, the truest, and the most congruent exemplar of all figures. It is equality which contains all [figures] in itself and which configures all things through itself. And so, there is one Figure for all linearly configurable things; and there is one Form and Cause of all different figures, regardless of how many different figures there are. In this symbolism you see how if [the concept of] actualized-possibility is applied to something named, [this concept] becomes a symbolism for ascending to what is unnameable (just as by means of [the concept of] acutalized-possibility you came from a line to an indivisible line existing above opposites, a line which is both everything and nothing of all things capable of linearity; it is no longer a line which is given the name "line" by us-, rather, it is beyond every name for things capable of linearity). For [the notion of] actualized-possibility, considered in itself and without application to anything named, somehow by way of a symbolism leads you to the Almighty. As a result, you there behold all the things which you understand to be able to be, and to be

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esse ac fieri posse intelligis supra omne nomen, quo id quod 10 potest esse est nominabile, immo supra ipsum esse et nonesse omni modo, quo ilia intelligi possunt. Nam non-esse cum possit esse per omnipotentem, utique est actu, quia absolutum posse est actu in omnipotente. Si enim ex nonesse potest aliquid fieri quacumque potentia, utique in infinita potentia complicatur. Non esse ergo ibi est omnia esse. Ideo omnis creatura, quae potest de non-esse in esse perduci, ibi est ubi posse est esse et est ipsum possest.

Ex quo te elevare poteris, ut supra esse et non-esse omnia 26 ineffabiliter, aenigmatice tamen, videas, quae de non-esse per actu esse omnia in esse veniunt. Et ubi hoc vides, verissime et discretissime nullum nomen nominabile per nos invenis. Illi enim principio non convenit nee nomen unitatis seu singularitatis nee pluralitatis aut multitudinis nee aliud quodcumque nomen per nos nominabile seu intelligibile, cum esse et non-esse ibi sibi non contradicant nee alia quaecumque opposita aut discretionem affirmantia vel negantia. Eius enim nomen est nomen nominum et non 10 plus singulare singulorum quam universale simul omnium et nullius.

BERN: Intelligo te dicere quomodo hoc nomen composi- 27 turn possest de posse et esse unitum habet simplex significatum iuxta tuum humanum conceptum ducentem aenigmatice inquisitorem ad aliqualem de deo positivam assertionem. Et capis posse absolutum prout complicat omne posse supra actionem et passionem, supra posse facere et posse fieri. Et concipis ipsum posse actu esse. Hoc autem esse quod actu est omne posse esse dicis, id est absolutum. Et ita vis dicere quod ubi omne posse actu est, ibi pervenitur ad primum omnipotens principium. Non haesito quin 10

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able to be made —behold them above every name by which what-is-able-to-be is nameable. Indeed, [you behold them] above being and not-being (in whatsoever manner being and not-being can be conceived). For since not-being is able to exist through the Almighty, assuredly it is actual,39 since absolute possibility is actual in the Almighty. For if some thing is able to be made from not-being by some power, assuredly this thing is enfolded within Infinite Power. Hence, there, notbeing is being everything. And so, every creature which is able to be brought from not-being intobeing (1) exists there, where to-be-able-[to-be] is to-be, and (2) is Actualized-possibility itself. From this point you will be able to elevate yourself so that, though ineffably and through a symbolism, you will behold above being and not-being all the things which —from not-being and through Being-which-is-actually-all-things ° — come into being. And where you behold this [sight] you find no name which can be named by us with complete truth and complete distinctness. For neither the name "oneness" nor "singularity" nor "plurality" nor "multitude" nor any other name which is nameable or understandable by us befits that Beginning. For there being and not-being do not contradict each other; nor do any other opposites which either affirm or deny a distinct state of affairs. For the name of this Beginning is the name of names; it is no more a singular name for individual things than it is a universal name for both everything and nothing. BERNARD: I understand you to be speaking of how the composite name "possest" ("actualized-possibility"), compounded from "posse" and "esse," has a simple signification which through a symbolism, and in accordance with your human concept, leads an inquirer to some kind of positive assertion about God. Moreover, you understand Absolute Possibility (insofar as it enfolds all possibility) to be above activity and passivity, above the possibility-to-make and the possibility-to-be-made. And you conceive of this [Absolute] Possibility as actually existing. But you say that this Beingwhich-is-actual is every possibility (i.e., Absolute [Possibility] ). And so you want to say that where every possibility is actual, there we arrive at the first all-powerful Beginning. I do not doubt that all things are enfolded in this Beginning which encompasses all the things which in any way are able

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omnia in illo complicentur principio, quod omnia quae quocumque modo possunt esse in se habet. Nescio si bene dico. CARD: Optime. Principium igitur suam vim omnipotentem in nullo quod esse potest evacuat. Ideo nulla creatura est possest. Quare omnis creatura potest esse quod non est. Solum principium quia est ipsum possest, non potest esse quod non est. BERN: Clarum est hoc. Si enim principium posset non esse, non esset, cum sit quod esse potest. IOH: Est igitur absoluta necessitas, cum non possit non 20 esse. 178r CARD: Recte dicis. | Nam quomodo posset non esse, quando non-esse in ipso sit ipsum. IOH: Mirabilis deus, in quo non-esse est essendi necessitas.

BERN: Quia mundus potuit creari, semper ergo fuit ipsius 28 essendi possibilitas. Sed essendi possibilitas in sensibilibus materia dicitur. Fuit igitur semper materia. Et quia numquam creata, igitur increata. Quare principium aeternum. IOH: Non videtur procedere hoc tuum argumentum. Nam increata possibilitas est ipsum possest. Unde quod mundus ab aeterno potuit creari, est quia possest est aeternitas. Non est igitur verum aliud requiri ad hoc quod possibilitas essendi mundum sit aeterna nisi quia possest est possest, quae est unica ratio omnium modorum essendi. 10

CARD: Abbas bene dicit. Nam si posse fieri non habet 29 initium, hoc ideo est, quia possest est sine initio. Praesupponit enim posse fieri absolutum posse, quod cum actu convertitur, sine quo impossibile est quicquam fieri posse. Quod si absolutum posse indigeret alio, scilicet materia sine qua nihil posset, non esset ipsum possest. Quod enim hominis posse facere requirat materiam quae possit fieri,

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to be. [Yet] I am not certain whether my statements are correct. CARDINAL: Perfectly correct.Therefore, the Beginning does not exhaust its omnipotent power in anything which (it) is able to be. And so no created thing is Actualized-possibility. Therefore, every created thing is able to be what it is not. Only the Beginning —because it is Actualized-possibility itself—is not able to be what it is not. BERNARD: This is clear. For example, if the Beginning were able not-to-be, it would not-be, since it is what it is able to be. JOHN: Therefore, it is Absolute Necessity, since it is not able not to be. CARDINAL: Your statement is correct. For how would the Beginning be able not to be, seeing that in it not-being is [identical with] it? JOHN: Wonderful is God, in whom not-being is necessityof-being. BERNARD: Because the world was able to be created, there was always the possibility of its being. But with perceptible things, matter is said to be the possibility-of-being. Therefore, there was always matter. And because matter was never created, it is uncreated. Hence, it is the eternal Beginning. JOHN: This argument of yours does not seem to proceed [correctly]. For uncreated possibility is Actualized-possibility itself. Therefore, the fact that the world was, from eternity, able to be created is due to the fact that Actualized-possibility is eternity. Hence the following is true: in order for the possibility-of-there-being-a-world to be eternal, nothing else is required except that Actualized-possibility be Actualizedpossibility. This principle is a unitary principle for all modes of being. CARDINAL: The Abbot speaks rightly. For if the possibilityof-being-made does not have a beginning, it is because Actualized-possibility is without a beginning. For the possibilityof-being-made presupposes Absolute Possibility, which is coincident with actuality (quod cum actu convertitur) and without which it is impossible that anything be able to be made. But if Absolute Possibility were to need something else—viz., matter, without which it would be powerlessthen Absolute Possibility would not be Actualized-possibility itself. For example, a man's ability-to-make requires material which is able to be made. (The reason is that [a man's ability]

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(est)quia non est ipsum possest, in quo facere et fieri sunt ipsum posse. Hoc enim posse quod de facere verificatur est idem posse quod de fieri verificatur. 10 BERN: Difficile est mihi hoc capere. CARD: Quando attendis in deo non-esse esse ipsum possest, capies. Nam si in posse facere non-esse coincidit, utique et posse fieri coincidit. Ac si tu fores auctor libri quern scribis, in posse tuo active, scilicet in ipso scribere librum, complicaretur ipsum posse passivum, scilicet ipsum scribi ipsius libri, quia non-esse libri in tuo posse esse haberet.

IOH: Maxima sunt quae aperis, pater. Nam omnia in poss- 30 est sunt et videntur ut in sua causa et ratione, licet nullus intellectus capere possit ipsum nisi qui est ipsum. CARD: Intellectus noster quia non est ipsum possest — non enim est actu quod esse potest; maior igitur et perfectior semper esse potest —, ideo ipsum possest licet a remotis videat, non capit. Solum ipsum possest se intelligit et in se omnia, quoniam in possest omnia complicantur. IOH: Bene considero quomodo omnia de possest negantur, quando nullum omnium quae nominari possunt sit 10 ipsum, cum possit esse id quod non est. Ideo quantitas non est. Quantitas enim cum possit esse id quod non est, non est possest. Puta potest esse maior quam est aut aliud quam est; sed non sic possest, cui nee maioritas quae esse potest aut quicquam quod esse potest deest. Ipsum enim posse est actu perfectissimum.

Sed nunc subiunge quaeso, postquam ille superadmira- 31 bilis deus noster nullo quamvis etiam altissimo ascensu naturaliter videri possit aliter quam in aenigmate, ubi potius posse videri quam visio attingitur et in caliginem umbrosam

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is not Actualized-possibility itself, in which making and beingmade are possibility itself.) For the possibility which is predicated truly of making is the same possibility which is predicated truly of being-made. BERNARD: It is difficult for me to grasp this point. CARDINAL: You will understand when you consider the fact that in God not-being is Actualized-possibility itself. For if not-being coincides with the possibility-to-make, assuredly the possibility-to-be-made coincides with the possibility-to-make. For example, if you were the author of a book which you were writing: in your active ability, viz., in the ability to write the book, would be enfolded a passive ability, viz., the ability of the book's being written; for the book's not-being would exist in your ability. JOHN: The things you disclose are very important, Father. For all things are, and are seen to be, in Actualized-possibility as in their own Cause and Form [ratio]. Yet no intellect except that intellect which is Actualized-possibility can grasp Actualized-possibility. CARDINAL: Our intellect is not Actualized-possibility itself. (For our intellect is not actually what it is able to be; and so, it is always able to be greater and more perfect.) Therefore, it does not grasp Actualized-possibility itself, even though it glimpses it from afar. Only Actualized-possibility itself understands itself and, in itself, all things—since all things are enfolded in Actualized-possibility. JOHN: I see clearly how all things are denied of Actualizedpossibility —since of all the things which can be named, none of them are Actualized-possibility; for [each of them] is able to be what it is not. Thus Actualized-possibility is not quantity ; for since quantity is able to be what it is not, it is not Actualized-possibility. For example, quantity is able to be greater than it is or something other than it is. But this is not the case with Actualized-possibility, which lacks neither a greater magnitude which it is able to be nor anything at all which it is able to be; for possibility itself is actually the completest possibility. But now answer my further question. Since that superwonderful God of ours cannot by any ascent—even the highest ascent—naturally be viewed except through a symbolism: when the possibility of being seen (rather than the actual seeing) is attained and the seeker arrives at the shadowy

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pervenit inquisitor: quomodo ergo demum ille qui manet semper invisibilis videatur? CARD: Nisi posse videri deducatur in actum per ipsum qui est actualitas omnis potentiae per sui ipsius ostensionem, non videbitur. Est enim deus occultus et absconditus ab oculis omnium sapientum, sed revelat se parvulis seu 10 humilibus, quibus dat gratiam. Est unus ostensor, magister scilicet lesus Christus. Ille in se ostendit patrem, ut qui eum meruerit videre qui est films, videat et patrem. IOH: Forte vis dicere, quod pater illis ostenditur, in quibus 32 Christus per fidem habitat. CARD: Non potest Christus per fidem habitare in aliquo, nisi habeat spiritum veritatis, qui docet omnia. Diffunditur enim spiritus Christi per Christiformem et est spiritus caritatis, qui non est de hoc mundo, nee mundus ipsum capere potest, sed Christiformis qui mundum transiliit. Hie spiritus, qui stultam facit mundi sapientiam, est illius regni, ubi »videtur deus deorum in Sion«. Est enim virtus illuminativa nati caeci, qui per fidem visum acquirit. Neque dici potest 10 quomodo hoc fiat. Quis enim dicere posset hoc? Nee qui ex non-vidente factus est videns. Multis enim quaestionibus interrogabatur illuminatus, sed artem qua Christus eum 178V fecit videntem nee scilvit nee dicere potuit. Sed bene dixit ipsum facere potuisse sibi, quia credidit fieri posse videns ab ipso, et hanc fidem respiciens noluit ipsam irritam esse. Nemo enim umquam in ipso confidens derelictus est. Postquam enim homo est desperatus de se ipso, ita quod se tamquam infirmum et penitus impotentem ad desiderati apprehensionem certus est, convertit se ad arnatum suum, 20

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dimness, how is it that, at last, He-who-remains-ever-invisible is seen? CARDINAL: He will not be seen unless the possibility-to-beseen is actualized by Him who is the actuality of every possibility—actualized by means of His self-revelation. For God is concealed and hidden from the eyes of all the wise; but He reveals Himself to, and gives grace to, those who are small, or humble. 41 There is one Revealer, viz., the Teacher Jesus Christ. In His own self He reveals the Father, so that anyone who attains the sight of He-who-is-Son sees the Father also.42 JOHN : Perhaps you mean that the Father is shown to those in whom Christ dwells through faith.43 CARDINAL: Christ cannot dwell in anyone through faith unless [this person] has the spirit-of-truth, which teaches all things.44 For the spirit of Christ is imparted through one who is Christlike. It is the spirit-of-love, which is not of this world. This spirit can be understood not by the world but by someone Christlike who has transcended45 the world. This 46 spirit, which renders foolish the wisdom of the world, is of that kingdom where the God of gods is seen in Zion.47 For this spirit is the enlightening power of one who is born blind and who acquires sight through faith. But we cannot say how this happens. For who could explain it? Not even the one who was transformed from not-seeing into seeing! For he who received sight was questioned with many questions; but he neither knew nor could state the art by which Christ restored his sight.48 Rather, he rightly said that Christ had been able to do [this] for him because he believed that he was able to be given sight by Christ. And Christ, seeing his faith, was unwilling for it to be ineffectual; for no one who trusts in Christ is ever abandoned [by Him]. For after a man has despaired of himself—so that he is certain that he is as someone infirm and completely helpless with respect to obtaining what he desires —he turns to his Beloved and,

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indubia fide promissioni Christ! inhaerens, et pulsat oratione devotissima, credens non posse derelinqui, si non cessaverit pulsare Christum, qui suis nihil negat. Indubie assequetur quaesitum. Apparebit enim Christus dei verbum et manifestabit se illi et cum patre suo ad ipsum veniet et mansionem faciet, ut videri possit. BERN: Capio te dicere velle quod viva fides, caritate scili- 33 cet formata quae facit quern Christiformem, ilia implet defectum naturae et stringit quodammodo deum, ut quicquid in nomine Christi petierit assiduus orator, impetret. Confortatur ex spiritu fidei concepto in spiritu nostro ipse spiritus noster secundum mensuram fidei, sicut spiritus visivus oculi caeci nati tenebrosus et impotens spiritu fidei Christi sanatus et confortatus sibi prius invisibile vidit.

CARD: Ilia est suprema unici salvatoris nostri Christi doctrina, ipsum, qui est verbum dei per quod deus fecit et 10 saecula, omnia adimplere quae natura negat in eo, qui ipsum ut verbum dei indubitata fide recipit, ut credens in ea fide, in qua est Christus, potens sit ad omnia medio verbi in eo per fidem habitantis. Sicuti aliqua in hoc mundo medio humanae artis fieri 34 videmus per eos, qui artem habent in anima sua studio acquisitam, ita quod ars est in ipsis recepta et manens et verbum docens et imperans ea quae artis sunt, sic et ars divina, quae firmissima fide acquisita est in spiritu nostro, est verbum dei docens et imperans ea quae artis creativae et omnipotentis exsistunt. Et sicut non potest indispositus artista operari ea quae artis sunt, ita nee indispositus fidelis. Dispositio autem fidelis volentis deum videre, quae necessario

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clinging to the promise of Christ by sure faith, he importunes in most devout prayer, believing that he cannot be cast away if he does not cease to implore Christ, who denies nothing to His own. Without doubt, he will obtain what is sought. For Christ, the Word of God, will appear, and will manifest Himself to him, and will come to him with His Father, and will make His dwelling,49 so that He can be seen. BERNARD: I take you to mean that living faith (i.e., faith formed by love), which makes someone Christlike, fills the defect of nature and somehow "constrains" God, so that the fervent petitioner obtains whatever he asks for in the name of Christ. According to the measure of its faith, our spirit is strengthened as a result of the spirit-of-faith which is conceived in it—just as, when healed and strengthened by the spirit of faith in Christ, the dark and powerless visual spirit of the eye of the one-born-blind sees what previously was invisible to it. CARDINAL: This is the supreme teaching of Christ, our only savior: viz., that He Himself, who is the Word of God, through which God created the world, provides all the things which nature lacks —provides them in him who with unwavering faith receives Christ as the Word of God, so that he, believing by the faith in which Christ is present, can do all things by means of the Word dwelling in him through faith. In this world we see that some things are made by means of a human art and by the agency of those who have in their soul the art they have learned. Thus, the art is received in them and remains; and it is a word which teaches and governs those things which belong to the art. Similarly, the divine art, which is acquired in our mind [spiritus] by very firm faith, is the word of God which teaches and governs those things which belong to the creative and omnipotent art. And just as the artist who is untrained cannot do those things which belong to the art, so neither can the believer who is unprepared. Now, purity of heart is the preparation which is necessarily required of the believer who wills to see God.

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requiritur, est munditia cordis. Illi enim beati sunt et deum 10 videbunt, ut verbum fidei Christi nostri nos docet. BERN: Vellem de praemissis adhuc clarius si fieri posset 35 informari. CARD: Arbitror necessarium quod qui videre deum cupit, ipsum quantum potest desideret. Oportet enim quod posse desiderare ipsius perficiatur, ut sic actu tantum ferveat desiderium quantum desiderare potest. Hoc quidem desiderium est vivus amor, quo deum quaerens ipsum ex toto corde, ex tota anima, hoc est ex omnibus viribus suis, quantum scilicet potest, diligat. Quod quidem desiderium nemo habet nisi qui Christum ut dei filium ita diligit sicut Chri- 10 stus ipsum, in quo utique per fidem Christus habitat, ita ut dicere possit se spiritum Christi habere. IOH: Intelligo fidem superare naturam et non esse deum 36 alia fide visibilem quam fide Christi. Qui cum sit verbum dei omnipotentis et ars creativa, dum spiritui nostro ipsum per fidem recipienti illabitur, super naturam elevat in sui consortium spiritum nostrum, qui non haesitat propter inhabitantem in eo spiritum Christi et eius virtute supra omnia ut verbum imperiale ferri.

BERN: Utique in verbo imperative cunctipotentis, qui dicit et facta sunt, ipsa omnipotentia, quae deus creator et pater omnium est, revelatur, neque in alio aliquo quam in suo 10 verbo potest revelari. Cui igitur hoc verbum se manifestat, in ipso utique ut in filio pater ostenditur. Sed stupor est ingens hominem posse per fidem ad verbum omnipotentis ascendere. CARD: Legimus aliquos subito artem verbi linguarum 37 dono sancti spiritus recepisse, ita ut de ignorantibus subito facti sint scientes genera linguarum. Et haec vis non erat nisi participatio verbi divinae artis. Illi tamen non habuerunt

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For[men-such-as]-these are blessed and shall see God, as the word-of-faith of our Christ teaches us.50 BERNARD: I would like to be taught still more clearly about these points if possible. CARDINAL:! deem it necessary that anyone who desires to see God desire Him as much as he can. For his ability-todesire must be perfected, so that his desire actually glows as intensely as it can. Indeed, this desire is the vital love by which the one who seeks God loves Him with his whole heart, his whole soul —i.e., with all his might, i.e., as much as he can.51 Indeed, no one has this desire except one who loves Christ as the Son of God (even as Christ loves him). Assuredly, Christ dwells in this [person] through faith, 552 so that he can say that he has the spirit of Christ. JOHN: I understand that faith surpasses nature and that God is not visible by means of any other faith than faith in Christ. Since Christ is the Word of the omnipotent God and is the Creative Art: when He enters into our mind [spiritus], which receives Him by faith, He elevates our mind above nature into fellowship with Him. On account of, and by the power of, the spirit-of-Christ which dwells in it, our mind does not hesitate to be raised above all things, as is the Imperial Word. BERNARD: Assuredly, Omnipotence itself—which God, the creator and the father of all things, is —is revealed in the commanding Word of the Almighty, who speaks and it is done.53 Nor can Omnipotence itself be revealed in anything other than in its Word. Therefore, to whomever this Word manifests itself, [to him] the Father is shown in the Word, just as in the Son. Yet how greatly amazing it is that man is able to ascend by faith to the Word of the Almighty. CARDINAL: We see it written 54 that by the gift of the Holy Spirit some [persons] suddenly received the art of speaking in tongues, so that they were suddenly transformed from unknowing to knowing [different] kinds of tongues. This power was nothing other than participation in the divine art of speaking. Nonetheless, these [persons] had only human

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scientiam nisi humanam, sed super hominem subito per infusionem acquisitam. Alii non solum linguarum sed doctorum peritiam receperunt, alii virtutem miraculorum. Et haec certa sunt. Fideles enim a principio cum fide viva 179f talem spiritum receperunt, ut certi | essent fidem tantae virtutis esse. Et sic si plantari debuit expediebat, non modo 10 post eius receptionem, ut non quaerat signa sed sit pura et simplex. Hie spiritus per fideles receptus quamvis cum mensura, 38 tamen est spiritus Christi participator nos certos faciens quod quando in nobis habitaret integer spiritus Christi, ultimum felicitatis assecuti essemus, scilicet potestatem verbi dei per quod omnia, scilicet nostrae creationis scientiam. Felicitas enim ultima, quae est visio intellectualis ipsius cunctipotentis, estadimpletio illius desiderii nostri quo onines scire desideramus. Nisi igiturad scientiam dei quamundum creavit pervenerimus, non quietatur spiritus. Semper enim restabit scientia scientiarum, quamdiu illam non attin- 10 git. Et haec scientia est verbi dei notitia, quia verbum dei est conceptus sui et universi. Qui enim non pervenerit ad hunc conceptum, neque ad scientiam dei attinget neque se ipsum cognoscet. Non enim potest se causatum cognoscere causa ignorata. Ideo hie intellectus cum sit omnia ignorans, intellectualiter in »umbra mortis« perpetua egestate tristabitur.

IOH: Incidit mihi videre fidem esse videre deum. BERN: Quomodo? IOH: Nam fides est invisibilium et aeternorum. Videre ergo fidem est videre invisibile, aeternum seu deum nostrum.

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knowledge; but it was acquired suddenly by a transcendent infusion. Some of them received not only a knowledge of tongues but also a knowledge of the doctors [of the Church]; others received the power of miracles. Now, these things [which we read] are certain. Indeed, from the beginning [these] believers received, together with living faith, such a spirit—so that they would be certain that faith is of such great power. And such was expedient if faith was to be planted. But it does not occur now, after faith has been received, so that faith does not seek signs but is pure and simple. Although this spirit is received by believers in measured degree,55 it is a participant in the spirit of Christ. And it makes us certain that if the whole spirit of Christ had dwelt in us, we would have obtained the highest degree of happiness, viz., the power of the Word of God (through which Word all things exist), i.e., a knowledge of our creation. For the highest degree of happiness—viz., the intellectual vision of the Almighty—is the fulfillment of that desire of ours whereby we all desire to know. Therefore, unless we arrive at the knowledge of God—viz., the knowledge by which he created the world —our mind (spiritus) will not be at rest.56 For as long as the mind does not attain to this knowledge, it will not attain to complete knowledge (scientia scientiarum).This knowledge is the knowledge of God's Word; for the Word of God is the Concept both of itself and of the universe. Indeed, anyone who does not arrive at this Concept will not attain to a knowledge of God and will not know himself. For what is caused cannot know itself if the cause remains unknown. And so, since this intellect does not know all things, it will grieve intellectually in the shadow of death with eternal deprivation. JOHN: It occurs to me that to see faith is to see God. BERNARD: How SO? JOHN: Well, faith is directed toward invisible and eternal things.57 Hence, to see faith is to see the Invisible and Eternal One, viz., our God.

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CARD: Non es parvum verbum locutus, mi abba. In Christiano vero non est nisi Christus: in hoc mundo per fidem, in alio per veritatem. Quando igitur Christianus Christum videre quaerens facialiter linquet omnia quae huius mundi sunt, ut iis subtractis quae non sinebant Christum, qui de hoc mundo non est, sicuti est videri, in eo raptu fidelis in 10 se sine aenigmate Christum videt, quia se a mundo absolutum qui est Christiformis videt. Non ergo nisi fidem videt, quae sibi facta est visibilis per denudationem mundialium et sui ipsius facialem ostensionem.

BERN: Haec certe meo iudicio magna sunt valde et quam 40 breviter atque clare a te dicta. Vellem tamen adhuc aliquid a te, pater, audire de sacratissima trinitate, ut de omnibus maximis aliquo a te sic audito mihi ipsi aliqualem praestare possem devotam consolationem. CARD: Semper varie multa dici posse, licet insufficientissime, haec quae praemisi et quae in variis libellis meis legisti ostendunt. Multis enim valde et saepissime profundissimis meditationibus mecum habitis diligentissimeque quaesitis antiquorum scriptis repperi ultimam atque altissi- 10 mam de deo considerationem esse interminam seu infinitam seu excedentem omnem conceptum. Omne enim cuius conceptus est aliquis, utique in conceptu clauditur. Deus autem id omne excedit. Nam conceptus de deo est conceptus seu verbum absolutum in se omne conceptibile complicans, et hie non est conceptibilis in alio. Omne enim in alio aliter est. Nihil enim per intellectum actu concipitur ut concipi posset. Per altiorem enim intellectum melius conciperetur. Solus per se seu absolutus conceptus est actu omnis con-

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CARDINAL: You have made an important statement, Abbot. In the Christian there is only Christ. In this world [Christ is in the Christian] through faith; in the other world [He will be in the Christian] through truth. Therefore, when the Christian who is seeking to see Christ face to face leaves behind all the things which are out of this world (for example, after the removal of those things which were not permitting Christ — who is not of this world —to be seen as He is): in this rapture the believer sees Christ in his own self apart from a symbolism. For he who is Christlike sees himself, free from the world. Therefore, he sees only faith, which has been made visible to him by the stripping away of worldly things and by the face-to-face revealing of his own self. BERNARD: In my judgment these points are surely very significant. How concisely and clearly you have put them! Nevertheless, Father, I would still like to hear from you something about the most sacred Trinity, so that after having thus heard from you something about all the most important points, I may be able to provide myself with some sort of devout consolation. CARDINAL: The points which I have set forth above and which you have read in various of my short treatises show that in various ways many things can always be said, although most inadequately. For after having very often held very many exceedingly deep meditations with myself, and after having very carefully sought out the writings of the ancients, I have ascertained that the ultimate and deepest contemplation of God is boundless, infinite, and in excess of every concept. For, assuredly, every thing of which there is a concept is encompased by [that] concept. But God exceeds all this. For the concept of God is [an absolute] Concept, or an absolute Word, which enfolds within itself everything which can be conceived; but it is not conceivable in anything else. For everything [which exists] in something other than itself exists differently. 58 For it is not the case that anything is actually conceived by the intellect as it could be conceived. For it could be better conceived by a higher intellect. Only the per se, or absolute, Concept is actually every conceivable

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ceptibilis conceptus. Sed noster conceptus, qui non est per 20 se seu absolutus conceptus sed alicuius conceptus, ideo per se conceptum non concipit, cum ille non sit plus unius quam alterius, cum sit absolutus. Ideo istum infinibilem et interminabilem seu inconcepti- 41 bilem dei conceptum ob suam infinitatem etiam dicimus necessario ineffabilem. Verbum enim illud nullo nomine seu termino finiri seu diffiniri per nos potest, cum concipi nequeat. Sic neque ipsum nominamus unum nee trinum nee alio quocumque nomine, cum omnem conceptum unius et trini et cuiuscumque nominabilis excedat, sed ab eo removemus omne omnium conceptibilium nomen, cum excellat. IOH: Quanto igitur intellectus intelligit conceptum dei 10 minus formabilem, tanto maior est, ut mihi videtur. CARD: Recte dicis, abba. Ideo quicumque putat apprehendisse ipsum, sciat hoc ex defectu et parvitate sui intellectus evenire. BERN: Doctior igitur est sciens se scire non posse. CARD: Hoc necessario omnes illuminatissimi etiam dicent. BERN: Dum considero nihil concipi per nos posse uti est 179V conceptibile, clare mi|hi constat deum concipi non posse, qui concipi utique non potest nisi omnis conceptibilitas actu concipiatur. 20 CARD: Scimus quod omnis numerabilis proportio diametri 42 ad costam est inattingibilis, cum nulli duo numeri dari possent, qui praecise sic se habeant. Sed quibuscumque datis habitude eorum est aut maior aut minor quam diametri ad costam, et quibuscumque datis possunt dari numeri propin-

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concept. But our concept—which is not the per se, or absolute, Concept but is the concept of some thing—does not conceive of the per se Concept. For the latter is the Concept no more of one thing than of another, since it is absolute. And so this unlimitable and unboundable, or inconceivable, concept of God we must also call ineffable, because of its infinity. For by no name or term can we limit or define that Word, since it cannot be conceived. Thus we do not give God the name "one" or "three" or call Him by any other name whatsoever; for He exceeds every concept of one or of three or of whatsoever nameable thing. Rather, we remove from God every name for any conceivable thing, since He excels [every conceivable thing]. JOHN: So then, the more an intellect understands the degree to which the concept of God is unformable, the greater this intellect is, it seems to me. CARDINAL: Your statement is correct, Abbot. And so, whoever supposes that he has apprehended God, knows that this [belief] results from the deficiency and meagerness of his intellect. BERNARD: Therefore, the one who knows that he is unable to know is the more learned. CARDINAL: All, even the most brilliant, will have to say this. BERNARD: When I consider that we are unable to conceive of any thing as it is able to be conceived, it is clear to me that God is not able to be conceived. For, assuredly, God is not able to be conceived unless all that is able to be conceived is actually conceived. CARDINAL: We know that we cannot obtain any numerical proportion between the diagonal and the side [of a square], since no two numbers can be exhibited which are related to each other in precisely this way.59 Given any [two numbers], the relationship between them is either greater or lesser than the relationship between the diameter and the side. And given any [two numbers, two other] numbers can be found which

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quiores illi habitudini. Et ita videtur possibilis, sed actu numquam datur ilia possibilitas. Actus autem esset praecisio, ita quod numeri praecise se sic haberent. Ratio est: Quia nisi numerus detur qui nee par nee impar, non erit quaesitus. Omnis autem numerus quem nos concipimus 10 necessario est par vel impar et non simul; ideo deficimus. Videmus tamen quod apud ilium conceptum qui concipit nobis impossibile praecisio exsistit. Sic dicere nos oportet quod noster conceptus non potest proportionem ipsius posse et ipsius esse attingere, cum nullum medium commune habeamus per quod attingamus habitudinem, cum posse sit infinitum et indeterminatum et actus finitus et terminatus, inter quae non cadit medium. Sed videmus ilia in deo esse indistincta, et ideo est supra nostrum conceptum.

BERN: Cum omne quod per nos scitur non sciatur sicut 20 sciri potest — potest enim melius sciri —, sola scientia dei, ubi omne posse est actu, est perfecta et praecisa. IOH: Nonne, Bernarde, verissimum est bis duo esse quat- 43 tuor et omnem triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis? BERN: Immo. IOH: Non est igitur verum quod nostra scientia non attingat praecisam veritatem. CARD: Oportet ut consideretur id quod dicitur. Nam in mathematicis quae ex nostra ratione procedunt et nobis experimur inesse sicut in suo principio per nos ut nostra seu rationis entia sciuntur praecise, scilicet praecisione tali ratio- 10 nali a qua prodeunt, sicut realia sciuntur praecise praecisione divina a qua in esse procedunt. Et non sunt ilia mathematicalia neque quid neque quale sed notionalia a ratione nostra elicita, sine quibus non posset in suum opus procedere, scilicet aedificare, mensurare et cetera. Sed opera

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are closer to the relation in question. Hence, although it seems possible [that there are two precise numbers], this possibility is never actually exhibited. (But the actualization would be the precise proportion, so that the numbers would be related in this precise way.) The reason is that unless there is exhibited a number which is neither even nor odd, it will not be the number in question. But every number which we conceive is, necessarily, even or odd (but not both). And so we fail [to find the desired number]. However, we see that precision is present in that concept which expresses what is impossible for us [to conceive]. Thus we have to say that our concept cannot attain to the proportion between this possibility and this actuality. 60 For we have no common medium by which to attain to the relationship, since the possibility is infinite and indeterminate, whereas the actuality is finite and determined; and between these there is no middle ground. But we see that these [viz., possibility and actuality] are not distinct in God. And so, He is above our concept. BERNARD: Since it is not the case that anything known by us is known as it can be known (for it can be better known): only a knowledge of God, in whom every possibility actually exists, is perfect and precise. JOHN: Isn't it altogether true, Bernard, that twice two is four and that every triangle has three angles, which are equal to two right angles? BERNARD: Indeed. JOHN: Therefore, it is not true that our knowledge does not attain to the precise truth. CARDINAL: We must examine what is being said. For with mathematical [entities], which proceed from our reason and which we experience to be in us as in their source [principium}: they are known by us as our entities and as rational entities; [and they are known] precisely, by our reason's precision, from which they proceed. (In a similar way, real things (realia)61 are known precisely, by the divine [intellect's] precision, from which they proceed into being.) These mathematical [entities] are neither an essence (quid) nor a quality (quale}; rather they are notional entities elicited from our reason. Without these notional entities reason could not proceed with its work, e.g., with building, measuring, and so on. But the divine works, which proceed from the divine

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divina, quae ex divino intellectu procedunt, manent nobis uti sunt praecise incognita, et si quid cognoscimus de illis, per assimilationem figurae ad formam coniecturamur. Unde omnium operum dei nulla est praecisa cognitio nisi apud eum qui ipsa operatur. Et si quam de ipsis habemus noti- 20 tiam, illam ex aenigmate et speculo cognitae mathematicae elicimus: sicut formam quae dat esse a figura quae dat esse in mathematicis. Sicut figura trianguli dat esse triangulo, ita forma seu species humana dat esse homini. Figuram trianguli cognoscimus, cum sit imaginabilis, formam humanam non, cum non sit imaginabilis nee sit quanta quantitate discreta seu continua. Omne autem, quod non cadit sub multitudine nee magnitudine, non potest nee concipi nee imaginari nee de eo phantasma fieri; sic nee praecise intelligi. Oportet enim omnem intelligentem phantasmata 30 speculari. Ideo de his potius 'quia est' quam 'quid est' attingitur.

BERN: Si igitur recte consideraverimus, nihil certi habe- 44 mus in nostra scientia nisi nostram mathematicam, et ilia est aenigma ad venationem operum dei. Ideo magni viri si aliquid magni locuti sunt, illud in similitudine mathematicae fundarunt: ut illud quod species se habent ut numeri et sensitivum in rationali sicut trigonum in tetragono et talia multa. CARD: Bene dicis. Ideo hie sic dixerim, ut sciatis quod si illam theologiam Christianorum deum esse unum et trinum in aenigmate videre volumus, recurrere nos possumus ad 10 principium mathematicae: illud utique est unum pariter et trinum. Videmus enim quantitatem, sine qua non est mathematica, esse discretam, cuius principium est unum, et con-

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intellect, remain unknown to us precisely as they are. If we know something about them, we surmise it by likening a figure to a form. Hence there is no precise knowledge of any of God's works, except on the part of God, who does all these works. If we have any knowledge of them, we derive it from the symbolism and the mirror of [our] mathematical knowledge —even as with mathematical [entities] we [derive] a form-which-gives-being from a figure which gives being. [For example,] just as the figure of a triangle gives being to the triangle, so the human form, or species, gives being to a man. We are acquainted with the figure of a triangle since it is imaginable; but we are not acquainted with the human form, since it is not imaginable and does not have quantity (whether the quantity be discrete quantity or a combination of quantities). Now, anything which does not admit of multitude or magnitude cannot be either conceived or imagined, and no image of it can be fashioned. Hence it cannot be understood precisely. (For every one who understands must behold images.) And so, we apprehend that it is, rather than apprehending what it is. BERNARD: So if we rightly consider [the matter, we recognize that] we have no certain knowledge except mathematical knowledge. And this latter is a symbolism for searching into the works of God. Thus, if great men have said anything important, they base it upon a mathematical likeness —for example, that species are related to one another as are numbers, that the sensitive is in the rational as a triangle is in a quadrangle, and many other such comparisons. CARDINAL: Your statement is correct. And so, let me speak here in such way that both of you will know [the following]: if we want to see by means of a symbolism that Christian theological doctrine that God is one and three, we can have recourse to the beginning (principium)6262 of mathematics. Assuredly, this beginning is both one and three alike. For we see that quantity—without which there is no mathematics —is both a discrete quantity, whose beginning is one, and a

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tinuam, cuius principium est trinum. Nee sunt duo principia mathematicae, sed unum quod et trinum. BERN: Capio bene quoad discretam quantitatem unum principium, sed non quoad continuam trinum. CARD: Prima figura quantitatis continuae est trigonus, in quam aliae figurae resolvuntur, quod ostendit ipsam esse 180r primam. Tetragonus in trigonos resolvitur. Sed trigonus 20 non potest resolvi in duorum angulorum aut unius anguli figuram. Quare patet primum principium mathematicae esse unitrinum. BERN: Si igitur viderem principium mathematicae in sua 45 puritate, utique sine pluralitate ipsum viderem unitrinum. Principium enim est ante alteritatem et pluralitatem et tale, quod omnia principiata quando in simplex resolvuntur, ad ipsum terminantur. CARD: Optime. Sed attende: Ut principium videatur, necesse est abstrahi simplex, sine quo nihil principiatorum esse potest. Si igitur simplex, sine quo nee numerus nee figura esse potest, est id quod non est plus unum quam trinum et ita unum quod trinum et non est trinum ex 10 numero, cum numerus sit principiatum, sed trinum ut sit perfectum principium omnium, ita in aenigmate videtur deus unitrinus ut sit perfectissimum principium omnium. IOH: Sine numero dicis eum trinum. Nonne tres personae 46 sunt ex ternario numero tres personae? CARD: Nequaquam. Quia numerus quern tu conspicis dum hoc dicis est mathematicus et ex mente nostra elicitus, cuius principium est unitas. Sed trinitas in deo non est ab alio principio, sed est principium. BERN: Utique trinitas in principio est principium et non est a numero, qui non potest esse ante principium. »Omnis«

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combination of quantities, whose beginning is three. But there are not two beginnings of mathematics; rather there is one beginning which is also three. BERNARD: As concerns discrete quantity, I understand well the one beginning; but as concerns a combination of quantities, I do not understand the trine beginning. CARDINAL: The first figure [composed] of a combination of quantities is a triangle, to which the other figures are reducible—a fact which shows that it is the first. A quadrangle is reducible to a triangle. But a triangle cannot be reduced to a figure of two angles or of one angle. Therefore, it is evident that the first beginning of mathematics is triune. BERNARD: So if I were to see the beginning of mathematics in its purity, assuredly I would see it to be triune without plurality. For the beginning is prior to otherness and plurality, and is such that when all the things which are originated are reduced to the simple (simplex), they end at this beginning. CARDINAL: Perfectly correct. But consider [the foil owing]: to see the beginning, it is necessary that the simple (simplex) be abstracted. For none of the things which are originated can exist without the simple. Therefore, if the simple, without which neither number nor figure is able to exist, is that which is no more one than three and is one in such way that it is three and is not three in number—since number is something originated —but is three in such way that it is the perfect beginning of all things: then, in a symbolism, God is seen to be triune in such way that He is the most perfect Beginning of all things. JOHN: You say that God is three but not numerically three. Are not the three persons numerically three persons? CARDINAL: Not at all. For the number which you view when you say this, is a mathematical number and is derived from our mind; and the beginning of this number [three] is oneness. But with God, trinity does not exist from any other beginning; rather, it is the Beginning. BERNARD: Assuredly, in [this] Beginning the trinity /'sthe Beginning and does not exist from number, which cannot

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enim »multitudinis unitas est principium«. Si igitur trinitas in divinis esset numerus, et principiata a se ipsa esset. 10 CARD: Vides igitur primum principium unitrinum ante omnem numerum. Et si non potes hoc concipere quod sit ante numerum, hoc est ideo quia tuus intellectus sine numero nihil concipit. Id tamen, quod concipere nequit, videt supra conceptum negari non posse et credit. Sicut igitur deum magnum sine quantitate continua, ita trinum sine quantitate discreta seu numero. Et sicut credit deum magnum sibi attribuendo magnitudinem, ita credit trinum sibi attribuendo numerationem. IOH: Intelligo nos consideratione creaturarum habita crea- 47 torem unitrinum affirmare, qui — ut praedictum est — in se manet omni modo dicendi ineffabilis. CARD: Recte ais. Nam sine potentia et actu atque utriusque nexu non est nee esse potest quicquam. Si enim aliquid horum deficeret, non esset. Quomodo enim esset si esse non posset? Et quomodo esset si actu non esset, cum esse sit actus? Et si posset esse et non esset, quomodo esset? Oportet igitur utriusque nexum esse. Et posse esse et actu esse et nexus non sunt alia et alia. Sunt enim eiusdem essentiae, 10 cum non faciant nisi unum et idem. Rosa in potentia et rosa in actu et rosa in potentia et actu est eadem et non alia et diversa, licet posse et actus et nexus non verificentur de se invicem sicut de rosa.

BERN: Bene capio non posse negari dum mente rosam video me unitrinam videre. Nam ipsam video in posse. Si enim posse de ea negaretur, utique non posset esse. Video ipsam in esse. Si enim esse de ea negaretur, quomodo esset?

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exist before the Beginning. (For oneness is the beginning of all multitude.) Therefore, if in God trinity were number, it would be originated from itself. CARDINAL: You see, then, that the First Beginning is triuneprior-to-all-number. And if you cannot conceive of the fact that it is prior to number, the reason is that your intellect conceives of nothing without a number. Nevertheless, your intellect sees that that-which-it-cannot-conceive cannot be denied beyond conception; and it believes [what it cannot conceive]. Therefore, just as [it believes] that God is great without a combination of quantities, so [it believes] that He is three without number or discrete quantity. And just as it believes that God is great and ascribes magnitude to Him, so it believes that He is three and ascribes number to Him. JOHN: I see that on the basis of the examination which we have made of creatures we affirm that the Creator is triune, even though (as was said) in Himself He remains ineffable with respect to every mode of discourse. CARDINAL: What you say is correct. For without possibility and actuality and the union of the two there is not, and cannot be, anything. For if something lacked these, it would not exist. For how would it exist if it were not possible to exist? And how would it exist if it did not actually exist (since existence is actuality)? And if it were possible to exist but it did not exist, in what sense would it exist? (Therefore, it is necessary that there be the union of possibility and actuality.) The possibility-to-exist, actually existing, and the union of the two are not other than one another. Indeed, they are of the same essence, since they constitute only one and the same thing.63 [For example, consider a rose.] The possible rose, the actual rose, and the possible rose which is actual are not different roses from one another but are the same rose—even though possibility, actuality, and their union are not predicated truly of one another as they are of a rose. BERNARD: I understand well that [the following] cannot be denied: when with my mind I see a rose, I see a triune rose. (1) For I see the possible rose. (For if possibility were denied of the rose, assuredly the rose would not be possible to exist.) (2) I [also] see the existing rose. (For if existence were denied of it, how is it that it would exist?) (3) And I

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Et video ipsam in nexu utriusque. Negate enim utriusque nexu non esset actu, cum nihil sit actu nisi possit esse et 20 sit; ab his enim procedit actualis exsistentia. Sic video unitrinam rosam ab unitrino principio. Hoc 48 autem principium in omnibus relucere video, cum nullum sit principiatum non unitrinum. Sed omnia principiata video nihil esse principii, licet omnia sint in ipso ut in causa et ratione. Deus igitur non est ut rosa unitrina. Nihil enim habet aeternum principium a principiato, sed est unitrinitas absoluta, a qua omnia unitrina id sunt quod sunt. IOH: Mini similiter ut tibi, Bernarde, videtur. Nee alius est deus a quo est rosa in potentia, alius a quo in esse et alius a quo in nexu utriusque, cum non sit alia rosa quae 10 est in posse et alia quae in esse et alia quae in nexu, sed unitrina. Sed cum Christiani dicant aliam esse personam ipsius absoluti posse, quam nominamus patrem omnipotentem, et aliam ipsius esse, quam quia est ipsius posse nominamus filium patris, et aliam utriusque nexum, quam spiritum vocamus, cum naturalis amor sit nexus spiritalis patris et filii: has personales differentias quomodo in aenigmate videre debeam, non capio.

CARD: Bene dicis, abba, aliam esse personam patris, aliam 49 180V filii, aliam spiritus sancti in divinis propter infinitae perfectionis trinitatem. Non tamen est alia persona patris per aliquam alteritatem, cum omnem alteritatem supergrediatur benedicta trinitas, quae non est ab alio, sed per se est id quod est. Ideo pater non est aliud a filio propter identitatem essentiae et naturae, sed non est filius. Non per nonesse pater non est filius, cum ante omne non-esse sit deus unitrinus, sed quia esse praesupponit posse, cum nihil sit

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see the possible and the existing rose in union. (For if the union of the two were denied [of the rose], the rose would not actually exist, since nothing actually exists unless it is possible to exist and does exist. For actual existence proceeds from these two.) Thus I see a triune rose from a triune Beginning. However, I see that this Beginning is manifest in all things, since nothing which is originated fails to be triune. But I see that none of the things which have been originated are a part of this Beginning, even though all things exist in it as in their Cause and Form. Therefore, God is not [triune] as a rose is triune. For an eternal Beginning has nothing from what is originated; rather, it is absolute Triunity, from which all triune things are what they are. JOHN: [This point] seems to me the same as it seems to you, Bernard. God from whom there is the possible rose, God from whom there is the existing rose, and God from whom there is the rose which is the union of the two are not different gods. For the possible rose, the existing rose, and the rose which is the union of the two are not different roses but are a triune rose. Now, Christians distinguish the following persons: (1) the person of Absolute Possibility itself, whom we call the omnipotent Father; (2) the person of Existence itself, whom —because He is of possibility itself—we call the Son of the Father-, (3) the person who is the Union of both and whom we call the Spirit, since natural love is the spiritual union of the Father and the Son. Although [Christians make these distinctions], I do not discern how I am supposed to see these differences of person by means of a symbolism. CARDINAL: On account of the infinitely perfect Trinity in God, you are right, Abbot, in saying that the person of the Father, the person of the Son, and the person of the Holy Spirit are distinct. Nevertheless, the person of the Father is not distinct by virtue of any otherness; for the blessed Trinity, which is not from anyone else but which through itself is what it is, transcends all otherness. And so, on account of the identity of essence (or of nature) the Father is not something other than the Son; yet the Father is not the Son. That the Father is not the Son is not on account of not-being; for God is triune prior to all not-being. Rather, the reason is that existence presupposes possibility (since it is not the case

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nisi possit a quo est, posse vero nihil praesupponit, cum 10 posse sit aeternitas. Ideo cum videam deum qui non praesupponat sui principium et videam deum praesupponentem sui principium et videam deum procedentem ab utroque et non videam tres deos sed unitatem deitatis in trinitate, id quod sic video distincte in indistincta deitate verius et perfectius esse non dubito quam ego videam. Ideo sicut video ipsum absolutum posse in aeternitate esse aeternitatem et non video ipsum esse in aeternitate ipsius posse nisi ab ipso posse, sic credo ipsum posse aeternum habere hypostasim et esse per se et de ipso deo patre, qui est per se, generari 20 deum, qui sit omne id quod est ab ipsa omnipotentia patris, ut sit filius omnipotentiae, id scilicet sit quod pater possit: omnipotens sit de absoluto posse seu omnipotente. A quibus procedat omnipotentiae et omnipotentis nexus. Video deum aeternaliter et eundem deum de deo aeternaliter ac eundem deum ab utroque aeternaliter procedentem. Sed quia subtilius sancti hoc viderunt quam nos, satis sit nos ad hoc devenisse quod sicut perfectio principii deposcit quod sit unum, ita deposcit veraciter quod sit trinum.

Non esset enim unitas naturalis et perfectissima, nisi in 50 se haberet omnia quae ad perfectissimum principium sunt necessaria, quae per trinitatem exprimuntur. Neque trinitas esset perfecta, nisi esset una quae unitas. Non enim unitas quae de deo dicitur est mathematica, sed est vera et viva omnia complicans. Nee trinitas est mathematica, sed vivaciter correlativa. Unitrina enim vita est, sine qua non est laetitia sempiterna et perfectio suprema. Unde de essentia perfectissimae vitae est, quod sit perfectissime unitrina, ut

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that anything exists unless there is possibility, from which it exists) but possibility presupposes nothing (since possibility is eternity). And so, since I see (1) God who does not presuppose a beginning for Himself, (2) God who does presuppose a beginning for Himself, and (3) God who proceeds from both of these—and yet I do not see three gods but see oneness-of-deity in trinity— I do not doubt that that which I see thus distinctly in the deity-without-distinctions exists more truly and more perfectly than I see. And so, just as I see that eternal Absolute Possibility is eternity and that the eternal Existence of Absolute Possibility is only from Absolute Possibility, so I believe that eternal Possibility has distinct being [bypostasis] and exists per se. And [I believe that] from God the Father, who exists per se, is begotten God who from the omnipotence of the Father is all that He is. Thus He is the Son of Omnipotence, i.e., He is that which the Father can. He is the Almighty from Absolute Possibility (i.e., from the Almighty). From these [two] proceeds the Union of Omnipotence and the Almighty. I see (1) God [existing] eternally, (2) the same God [existing] eternally from God, and (3) the same God proceeding eternally from them both. But because the saints have seen this more clearly than we, 64 it is enough that we have come to the point [of seeing] that just as the perfection of the Beginning requires that it be one, so it truly requires that it be three. For the oneness would not be natural and most perfect if it did not have within itself all the things necessary for the most perfect Beginning—which necessary things are represented in terms of trinity. Nor would the trinity be perfect if it were not one trinity which is oneness. For the oneness which is predicated of God is not a mathematical oneness but is a true and living oneness which enfolds all things. And the trinity [which is predicated of God] is not a mathematical trinity but a trinity of vitally reciprocal relations. For life, without which there is no eternal joy and no supreme perfection, is triune. Hence it is of the essence of the most perfect Life that it be most perfectly triune, so that the

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posse vivere sit adeo omnipotens, quod de se sui ipsius 10 generet vitam. A quibus procedit spiritus amoris et laetitia sempiterna. IOH: Quaeso parum audiri, si forte aliquid de his altis 51 percepi. Et ad possest me converto. Cum omne quod est non sit nisi id quod potest esse, possest video omnium formabilium formam verissimam et adaequatissimam. Sed in omni re video posse, esse et utriusque nexum, sine quibus impossible est ipsam esse, et ilia video in qualibet re sic esse quod perfectius esse possunt. Ideo ubi haec sunt adeo perfecta quod perfectius esse nequeunt, ut in possest, ibi video omnium exsistentium unitrinum principium. In perfectione igitur primi principii necesse est omnium principia- 10 bilium esse perfectionem. Quae si maior concipi posset, utique non esset perfectio principii sed principiati.

CARD: Ita oportet quod humanus intellectus, qui primum principium sibi absconditum uti est capere nequit, ex principiatis intellects — ut Paulus nos instruit — videat. Oportet ergo, si posse debet esse perfectissimum, quod in ipso sit esse et utriusque nexus. Sic si esse debet esse perfectissimum, oportet quod in ipso sit posse et utriusque nexus. Et si nexus debet esse perfectissimus, oportet in ipso esse posse et actum sen esse. Haec ergo videmus necessario in20 perfectissimo unitrino principio, licet quomodo haec se habeant, omnem intellectum exsuperet.

BERN: Audi quaeso me, si huius tui dicti habeo intellec- 52 turn. Et converto me ad motum. In essentia enim illius video primo posse et ab illo generari actum atque ab utroque procedere movere, qui est nexus ipsius posse et actus. Omnis autem motus qui concipi potest non est sicut esse potest

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Possibility-to-live is so omnipotent that from itself it begets a Life of its own. From these [two] proceeds eternal Joy and the Spirit of love. JOHN: I ask to be heard a little, as to whether I have discerned something about these deep matters. I turn to [the concept of] actualized-possibility. Since everything which 65 exists is only that which is able to be, 5 I see that Actualizedpossibility is the truest and most congruent Form of all things formable. Now, in every thing, I see possibility, existence, and the union of the two; without these it is impossible for any thing to exist. Moreover, I see that they are present in any given thing in such way that they are able to exist more perfectly. And so, where they are so perfect that they cannot exist more perfectly— as in Actualized-possibility —there I see the triune Beginning of all existing things. Therefore, in the perfection of the First Beginning it is necessary that there be present the perfection of all things which can have a beginning. If this perfection could be conceived to be greater, then assuredly it would be the perfection not of the Beginning66 but of what is originated. CARDINAL: So the human intellect, which is unable to grasp the First Beginning as it is, must see this Beginning—which is hidden from it —on the basis of having understood originated things, as Paul teaches us.67 Hence, if possibility is to be the most perfect possibility, it is necessary that there be in it existence and the union of possibility and existence. Likewise, if existence is to be the most perfect existence, it is necessary that there be in it possibility and the union of possibility and existence. And if [this] union is to be the most perfect union, it is necessary that there be in it possibility and actuality, or existence. Therefore, necessarily, we see these68 in the most perfect triune Beginning, although in what manner they are there present surpasses all understanding. BERNARD: Listen to me, I ask, as to whether I understand your speech. I turn to [the topic of] motion. For in the essence of motion I see, first of all, possibility; and [I see that] from possibility actuality is begotten, and from these two there proceeds motion, which is the union of possibility and actuality. Yet no motion which can be conceived is as motion can be.

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motus, quia potest esse tardior et velocior motus, et ideo in posse ipsius non est actus et nexus utriusque, quando non movetur actus sicut potest moveri. Sed si motus esset id quod esse potest, tune in posse foret actus et nexus aequaliter. Quantum posset tantum in posse esset actu. Et talis 10 181r esset utriusque nexus. Ita de esse et nexu. Sed hie motus non intelligeretur. Narn cum esset id quod esse potest motus, utique neque maior neque minor esse posset et ita foret maximus pariter et minimus, velocissimus pariter et tardissimus seu quietissimus. Et quia foret motus cui quies non opponitur, ideo sublata oppositione nomen motus sibi non competeret, immo non plus foret motus quam nonmotus, licet foret exemplar, forma, mensura et veritas omnis motus.

Motus autem qui intelligitur, cui quies opponitur, ille 53 intelligitur, quia terminatur quiete ei opposita, et concipitur per finitum conceptum. Quando igitur intelligitur hunc conceptum de motu non esse conceptum motus qui id est quod esse potest, licet qualis ille sit intelligi nequeat, dimisso motu qui sciri potest convertit se mens ad videndum motum qui sciri nequit et non quaerit ipsum nee per nomen nee conceptum nee scientiam, immo per omnium quae de motu sciuntur ignorantiam. Scit enim se nequaquam ilium motum videre, quamdiu aliquid horum manet. Tune ad 10 non-esse motus pertingens propius ad quaesitum ascendit, id enim quod se tune supra esse et non-esse ipsius motus offert taliter quod quid sit penitus ignorat, quia est supra omne nomen. Ibi ignorantia est perfecta scientia, ubi non-

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For a motion is able to be both slower and faster; and so, in the possibility of the motion, actuality and the union of possibility and actuality are not present, since the actual motion is not moved as it is able to be moved.69 But if the motion [actually] were what it is able to be, then in [its] possibility there would be (in equal measure) actuality and the union [of possibility and actuality]. The motion would actually be as much as it could possibly be. And such [motion] would be the union of possibility and actuality. (The same would hold true for actuality and this union.) 70 But this "motion" would not be understood. For since it would be [all] that which motion is able to be, assuredly it would be able to be neither greater nor lesser; and so, it would be maximal motion and minimal motion, alike, and the fastest motion and the slowest motion (i.e., motion which is most at rest), alike. And because it would be motion to which rest is not opposed: in the absence of this opposition, the name "motion" would not befit it. Indeed, it would no more be motion than notmotion, although it would be the exemplar, form, measure, and truth of all motion. However, motion which is understood and which is the opposite of rest is understood because it is limited by rest, which is opposed to it, and because it is conceived by means of a finite concept. Therefore, when we understand that this concept of motion is not the concept of that motion which is what it is able to be (though we cannot understand what kind of motion the latter is): after the mind has dismissed the motion which can be known, it turns toward seeing the motion which cannot be known. The mind does not seek it through either a name, a concept, or knowledge. Rather, [it seeks it] through an ignorance of all the things known about motion. (For the mind knows that it will not at all see that motion as long as any of these things remain.) Upon attaining to the not-being of motion, the mind then mounts up nearer to what is sought. For then that which [is] above the being and the not-being of motion offers itself in such way that the mind does not at all know what it is, since it is above every

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esse est essendi necessitas, ubi ineffabile est nomen omnium nominabilium. Haec sic ex tuis dictis — nescio si bene — collegi. CARD: Abunde animum applicasti. IOH: Quantum tradi potest doctrina ignorantiae illius quae 54 ad ineffabile pergit, videtur dictum. Sed adiciam aliquod mei conceptus speculum. Nam licet aenigmata multa nos ducant, sine quibus ad incognitum deum non habemus accedendi modum — oportet enim ad aliquod cognitum respicere incognitum quaerentem —, tamen in minimis principia maxime relucent. Capio igitur abbreviatum verbum concisum valde puta IN. Dico: Si volo intrare divinas contemplationes, per ipsum IN, cum nihil possit intrari nisi per ipsum IN, intrare conabor. Primo ad figuram eius ad- 10 verto quomodo est ex tribus aequalibus lineis quasi unitrinum et quomodo I et N per spiritum conexionis nectuntur. In ipso enim IN est primo I, deinde N et utriusque nexus, ut sit una simplex dictio IN I et N et utriusque nexu consistens. Nihil simplicius I. Nulla littera figurari potest sine ilia simplici linea, ut sit principium omnium. N primo omnium ex simplicissimo I in se ducto generatur. Nee N littera est bis I littera, sed ex I semel in se ducta, ut sit una littera. In N enim est I explicatum. Unde si I additur ad N, non plus vocis habetur. lam enim erat in N eius virtus. 20 N enim non consonat ipsi E quasi N sit EN, sed ipsi I ut sit IN, ut sciunt illi, qui Graecarum litterarum peritiam habent. Nexus igitur utriusque naturalissimus est. Figura igitur unitrini principii conveniens ipsius IN videtur. Deinde

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name. Where not-being is the necessity-to-be, and where the name of all things nameable is ineffable, there ignorance is perfect knowledge. From your statements I have gathered these [points] in this way —whether correctly or not, I do not know. CARDINAL: You have paid careful attention. JOHN: [Bernard] is seen to have illustrated the extent to which instruction in the ignorance that leads to the Ineffable can be given. But let me add an image from my own thinking. Many symbolisms guide us. (Without them we can have no means of approaching the unknown God; for the one who seeks what is unknown must look at something known.) Nevertheless, the beginnings in the least significant things are the most illuminating. Therefore, I take a very short71 and very concise word: viz., "in." And I say: If I want to enter into (intrare) contemplating the Divine, I shall try to enter by means of in, since nothing can be entered except by means of in. First, with respect to the formation of "in," I notice (a) that "in" is composed of three equal lines,72 as if it were triune, and (b) that "i" and "n" are conjoined through a uniting power (per spiritum conexionis). For in "in" there is first "i," then "n" and the union of the two, so that there is one simple expression "in," consisting of "i" and "n" and their union. Nothing is simpler than "i." No letter can be shaped without this simple line; thus "i" is the beginning of all [letters]. Of all [letters]"n" is generated first—[being generated] from the very simple "i," which has been reduplicated. Yet the letter "n" is not twice the letter "i" but is from the letter "i," reduplicated once, so that there is one letter. For in "in" "i" is unfolded. Hence, if "i" is added to "n," no additional sound occurs. For the efficacy of "i" was already in "n." For "n" is not consonant with "e" (as if "n" were "en" but with "i" (so that it is "in"). This fact is known by those who are familiar with Greek letters. Therefore, the union of "i" and "n" is very natural. Hence the figure "in" seems to be appropriate for the triune Beginning.

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adverto quomodo est primo I, scilicet principium. Ex quo N, ubi se I primo manifestat. N enim est notitia, nomen seu relatio potentiae ipsius I principii. Deinde considero quomodo per IN intratur in deum et 55 omnia. Nam omnia quae nominari possunt nihil nisi IN in se continent. Si enim IN non esset, nihil in se omnia continerent et vacua penitus forent. Dum enim intueor in substantiam, video ipsum IN substantiatum, si in caelum caelestiatum, si in locum locatum, si in quantum quantincatum, si in quale qualificatum, et ita de omnibus quae dici possunt. Quare in termino est terminatum, in fine finitum, in altero alteratum. Si vero video ipsum IN ante omne nomen, utique nee terminatum nee finitum nee aliquod 10 esse video omnium quae nominari possunt. Quaecumque vero video in IN, video ineffabilitatem intrasse. Nam si video finem aut terminum in IN, non possum amplius ipsum nominare aut finem aut terminum. Transivit enim in IN, quod nee est finis nee terminus. Unde secundum hoc vide181V retur mu|tasse nomen in oppositum, ut nominetur terminus in IN interminus seu non-terminus. Et quia IN, quod omnia implet et sine quo omnia sunt vacua, inest et immanet, integrat et informat, ideo est perfectio omnis rei, omnis termini et omnis finis et omnium. Patet IN plus esse quam finis aut 20 terminus, ut finis in IN non desinat esse finis, sed sit valde finis et finis in fine seu finis finium, ut non vocetur finis, quia non finitur omni fine, sed excedit. Sic enim omnia quando in absolute videntur fiunt ineffabilia. IN igitur in suo simplicissimo significato complicat simul affirmationem et negationem, quasi I sit ita et N sit non, quae in IN conectantur. IN enim dum adicitur aliis dictionibus, aut est affirmatio aut negatio, in se vero utriusque complicatio.

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Next, I notice that first there is "i," i.e., the beginning. From this beginning [comes] "n," in which "i" first manifests itself. For "n" is the knowledge and the name73 of the potentiality of the "i," [its] beginning. Next, I consider that through in one enters into God and all things. For all things which can be named contain in themselves nothing except in. For if there were not in, all things would contain nothing in themselves and would be entirely empty. For when I look at (intueor in) a substance, I see in substantiated; if [I look] at the sky, [I see in] made celestial; if [I look] at a place, [I see in] situated; if [Hook] at a quantity, [I see in] quantified; if [I look] at a quality, [I see in] qualified; and so on for all the things which can be spoken of. Therefore, in a boundary in is bounded; in a limit it is limited; in an other it is made other. But if I see in prior to every name, then assuredly I see it not to be bounded or limited or any of the things which can be named. Whatever things I see in in, I see them to have entered into ineffability. For example, if I see a limit or a boundary in in, I can no longer call it by the name "limit" or "boundary." For it has passed over into in, which is neither a limit nor a boundary. Hence, in accordance with this fact, the name is seen to have changed into its opposite. Thus, in in a boundary is given the name "boundlessness" (interminus) or "nonboundary." Now, in (which fills all things and without which all things are empty) is present in all things, is immanent in all things, completes all things, and informs all things.74 Therefore, it is the perfection of every thing (omnis rei), of every boundary, of every limit, and of everything (omnium). Clearly, in is more than a limit or a boundary. Thus, in in a limit does not cease to be a limit; rather, it is all the more a limit. It is a limit within a limit (or a limit of limits), so that it is not called a limit, since it is not limited by any limit but rather surpasses [every limit]. In this way all things become ineffable when viewed absolutely. Therefore, in its very simple signification "in" enfolds affirmation and negation together —as if "i" were "yes" and "n" were "no" and these were conjoined in "in." For when "in" is added to other expressions, it is either an affirmation or a negation;75 but in itself it enfolds both.

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IN igitur videtur conveniens speculum relucentiae divi- 56 nae theologiae, quoniam »in omnibus est omnia, in nihilo nihil« et omnia in ipso ipsum. De hoc IN in se ineffabili quis quae dici possent explicaret nisi ille cuius loqui est perfectum cum sit possest? Solum enim verbum quod est elocutio omnium dicibilium hoc potest. CARD: Subtiliter considerasti, pater abba, et satis est fecundum aenigma tuum, quoniam in spiritum ducit. Nam quae in deo sunt nemo scit nisi spiritus dei sicut quae in homine spiritus hominis. Ipsum igitur IN est aenigma spiri- 10 tus omnia scrutantis. Sed qui per ipsum IN maiestatem dei intrare nititur, ut perscrutator opprimitur a gloria. Non enim IN ipsum quod notatur et intelligitur est lumen illuminans incomprehensibilitatis ipsius deitatis in se ipsa absolutae ostensionem, sed IN et omnia nomina, quae infinitatem deo attribuunt, eius incomprehensibilitatem nituntur ostendere per supereminentiam.

BERN: Quoniam abbas per verbum breve et concisum se 57 intrasse in profunda ostendit, ne ego nil dicendo videar in vacuum tot alta audisse, dicam quoddam aenigma non reiciendum in ipso possest: Video E simplicem vocalem unitrinam. Nam est vocalis ipsius possE, ipsius Esse et nExus utriusque. Vocalitas eius utique simplicissima est trina. Et ut refertur ad possE non refertur ad esse et ut refertur ad Esse non refertur ad posse et ita ut refertur ad nExum utriusque non refertur nee ad posse nee ad esse sed nExum. Has igitur relationes in ipso E inconfusas et quamlibet per 10 se veram et perfectam video non esse tres vocales seu vocalitates sed unam simplicissimam et indivisibilem vocalita-

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Therefore, "in" is seen to be a suitable image for illuminating divine theology. For in all things, in is all things; in nothing, 76 it is nothing; and in in, everything is in.1 Who could set forth what could be said about this in, which is ineffable in itself? Who but Him whose Speaking is perfect since it is Actualized-possibility! For only the Word which is the Expression of all things expressible can [express] this. CARDINAL: Your reflection has been subtle, Father Abbot; and your symbolism is sufficiently suggestive, since it leads unto the spirit (in spiritum). For no one except the spirit of God knows the things which are in God77 —even as [no one except] the spirit of man [knows] the things which are in man. Therefore, "in" is a symbolism of the spirit which searches all things.78 But anyone who, as an investigator, attempts to enter into the majesty of God by means of in is overwhelmed by glory.79 For the in which is seen and understood is not the light which illumines the manifestation of the inapprehensibility of the absolute deity in itself; rather, both "in" and all the other names which ascribe infinity to God attempt to show by the method of supereminence His inapprehensibility.80 BERNARD: Since by a short and concise word the Abbot shows that he has entered into profound matters: lest by saying nothing I seem to have heard in vain so many deep points, let me mention a symbolism in [the word] "possest" — a symbolism which ought not to be rejected. I see that the "e" is a simple triune vowel. For it is a vowel of "posse," of "esse," and of the union of both. Assuredly, the very simple vocalization of "e" is trine: insofar as "e" relates to "posse," it does not relate to "esse"; insofar as it relates to "esse," it does not relate to "posse"; and insofar as it relates to the union of both, it does not relate solely to "posse" or solely to "esse" but to their union. Therefore, with "e," I see that these unconfused relations —each of which is true and perfect by itself— are not three vowels, or vocalizations, but are one most simple and indivisible vocalization. So when I mentally

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tern. Cum igitur haec sic mente contemplor, magnum mihi praebet haec aenigmatica visio fidei orthodoxae argumentum, ut deum unitrinum simplicissimum credam principium esse in mundo aliquali similitudine licet remotissima ut vocalitas ipsius E in possest, a quo mundus habet quod potest esse et quod est et conexionem utriusque. Sicut enim probatur vocalitatem E dare omnia ipsi possest, quoniam E sublato penitus desinit esse dictio significativa, sic 20 deo sublato mundus penitus desineret. Nee opus video ut de hac aenigmatis assimilativa proprietate plura dicam, cum vos ipsi melius me applicare possitis.

CARD: Laudo aenigma tuum, Bernarde, utique aptum 58 proposito. Sed aenigmatum nullus est finis, cum nullum sit adeo propinquum quin semper possit esse propinquius. Solus dei films est »figura substantiae« patris, quia est quicquid esse potest. Forma dei patris non potest esse aut verier aut perfectior, cum sit possest. BERN: Si adhuc de aenigmatibus dicenda tibi aliqua post multa et varia in opusculis et sermonibus tuis tacta occurrunt, adicias. Nam intellectum abunde ad theologiam manuducunt. 10 CARD: Placet. Quoniam plurimum difficile est videre quomodo unum omnia quod essentialiter in omnibus, ad hoc quaerantur clariora aenigmata. Cuius tamen in libello Iconae satis conveniens ponitur aenigma. Sicut enim deus omnia et singula simul videt, cuius videre est esse, ita ipse omnia et singula simul est. Homo enim simul et semel in aures omnium et singulorum ipsum audientium verburn immittit. Sic deus, cuius loqui est creare, simul omnia et singula creat. Et cum verbum dei sit deus, ideo deus in omnibus et singulis est creaturis. De quo in dicto Iconae 20 libello latius.

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contemplate these matters in this way, this symbolic viewing of orthodox faith furnishes me with a strong consideration (magnum argumentum) for believing that God, who is the triune and most simple Beginning, is in the world in something like the way (although the dissimilarity is very great) that the vocalization of "e" is in [the utterance] "possest." From possest [i.e., from Actualized-possibility] the world has (1) what it is able to be, (2) what it is, and (3) the union of these two. Just as it has been established that the vocalization of "e" gives all things to "possest" (since if "e" is removed, "possest" altogether ceases to be a significative expression), so if God were removed, the world would altogether cease to be. I see no need to say more about the analogical character of the symbolism; for the two of you can apply [the symbolism] better than [can] I. CARDINAL:! praise your symbolism, Bernard. Surely it suits our topic. But there is no end of symbolisms, since no symbolism is so close that there cannot always be a closer one. Only the Son of God is the image (figura) of the substance of the Father,81 because the Son is whatever is able to be. The Form of God the Father82 is not able to be either truer or more perfect, since it is Actualized-possibility (possest). BERNARD: If after the many and the diverse points touched upon in your treatises and sermons, there still remain some points you ought to make about symbolisms, then add [them here]. For they [will] amply lead the intellect to theology. CARDINAL: Agreed. Because it is very difficult to see how one thing which is essentially in all things is all things, let more lucid symbolisms be sought for this purpose. However, a suitable-enough symbolism for this is set forth in the treatise On Image.83 Just as God (whose seeing is being) sees at once all things and each distinct thing, so He is at once all things and each distinct thing. Now, a man once and at once infuses the same word into the ears of all, and of each, of his listeners. Similarly, God, whose speaking is creating, creates at once all things and each distinct thing; and since the Word of God is God, God is in all creatures and in each distinct creature. In the aforementioned treatise, On Image, [I have spoken] in more detail about this point.

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Sed quomodo deus in se absolute consideratus sit actus 59 182* omnis posse seu forma simlplicissima simul et infinitissima, non video aenigma intellectuale propinquius quam si pono lineam infinitam. Declaravi enim in libello Doctae ignorantiae illam si dabilis esset actum esse omnis posse lineae, scilicet terminum omnium per lineam terminabilium et adaequatissimum omnium figurarum lineabilium exemplar. Sic necesse est se habere absolutam entitatem seu formam. Absoluta enim est interminata et infinita. Quare est cuiuslibet terminatae et finitae adaequatissimum exemplar, cum 10 nulli sit aut maior aut minor. Deum autem esse absolutum necesse est, cum praecedat omne non-esse et per consequens omnem alteritatem et contractionem. Ideo nulli alter vel diversus, licet nihil ad eius aequalitatem accedere possit, cum omnia alia sint altera et finita. Unde cum deo nihil sit impossibile, oportet per ea quae in hoc mundo sunt impossibilia nos ad ipsum respicere, apud quern impossibilitas est necessitas. Sicut infinitas in hoc mundo actu est impossibilis, sic magnitudo cuius non est finis est necessitas ilia, quae non-ens seu nihil ut sit necessitat. 20

Adhuc mathematice aenigmatizando considera, quomodo 60 summa aequalitas quantitatum ipsas ab omni pluralitate absolvit. Puta si concipis circuli a centro ad circumferentiam lineas ut describitur in pavimento, videntur esse aequales, sed non sunt propter pavimenti fluxibilitatem et materiam, ita quod nulla est alteri praecise similis, ut in Docta ignorantia ostenditur. Sed dum intellectualiter circulus in se consideratur, lineae multae in pavimento non possunt ibi esse aliae et aliae, quia causa alteritatis cessat scilicet materia. Sic nee sunt plures. Sicut igitur de lineis dictum est, 10 ita de omni quanto scilicet superficie et corpore. Quando

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But I see no closer intellectual symbolism for how, considered absolutely in Himself, God is the actuality of every possibility (or at once the most simple and the most infinite Form) than if I posit an infinite line. For in the treatise Learned Ignorance I stated that an infinite line (if it could be posited) is the actuality of a line's every possibility —i.e., is the boundary of all things which can be bounded by a line and is the most congruent exemplar of all figures capable of linearity. Thus it is necessary that an infinite line have absolute being and absolute form. (For absolute [being or form] is boundless and infinite.) Therefore, an infinite line is the most congruent exemplar of any given bounded and limited line, since it is equal to every line. But it is necessary that God be absolute, since He precedes all not-being and, consequently, all otherness and contractedness. And so, He is not an other or an opposite for anything else— even though nothing else can approach to equality with Him, since all other things are an other [for something else] and are limited.84 Hence, since nothing is impossible for God,85 we should look for Him (in whom impossibility is necessity) in those things which are impossible in this world. Just as in this world infinity is actually impossible, so endless magnitude is the necessity which necessitates the existence of not-being, or nothing. Still symbolizing mathematically, consider how the supreme equality of quantities frees them from all plurality. For example, if you take the case of the lines from the center to the circumference of a circle, as the circle is described in a floor: they seem to be equal but are not, because of both the changing character and the material of the floor. Thus no line is equal to the other —as is shown in Learned Ignorance.86 But when the mind considers the circle-in-itself, the many lines in the floor cannot (in the circle considered in itself) be other than one another, since the cause-of-otherness —viz., matter —is not operative. And so, the lines are not many. Therefore, what has been said about the lines can be said about everything which has quantity —e.g., about a surface and about a material object. So (1) when I see that one

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igitur video in pavimento unam superficiem terminari figuru circulari, et aequalem superficiem figura triangulari terminari et aequalem figura hexagonali et ita de omnibus signabilibus figuris et post haec considero plures videri superficies illas aequales ob subiectum aliud et aliud, in quo aliter et aliter describuntur, abstraho igitur mentaliter a subiecto et video quomodo prius una et eadem superficies fuit mihi alia et alia visa, quia vidi in alio et alio loco et subiecto. Et deinde adverto quod una et eadem superficies 20 est circulus, est trigonus, est hexagonus et omnis figura, qua superficies figurari et terminari potest.

Per hoc aenigma entitatem ab hoc et illo absolutam video 61 actu esse omnium et singulorum entium essendi formam quomodocumque formabilem, non quidem similitudinarie et mathematice, sed verissime et forma [bi] liter, quod et vitaliter dici potest. Et hoc aenigma mihi placet. Nam eandem superficiem posse esse circularem et rectilinealem et polygoniam et eius praxim nuper ostendi. Esto igitur quod possibile esse ponatur actu esse, uti in theologicis fatendum est, utique tune aenigma clarius dirigit. Quare secundum mathematicae perfectam comprehensionem ad theolo- 10 giam aenigma propinquius fieri posse arbitror. Et haec de hoc nunc sic dicta sint.

IOH: Timeo ne importunus videar et taediosus, alioquin 62 adhuc informari peterem. CARD: Petite ambo. Nam hae collocutiones nequaquam me fatigant, sed apprime delectant. Ideo si quid restat, cum alio forte tempore minus otii detur mihi, nequaquam nunc indulgete. IOH: Inter innumera quae audire vellem est unum praecipue quomodo hanc omnipotentem formam negative melius attingimus, quae dicitur super omne esse et non-esse videri.

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surface in a floor is bounded by a circular figure and that an equal surface is bounded by a triangular figure and [another] equal [surface] by a hexagonal figure (and so on for all nameable figures) and (2) when thereafter I consider that these equal surfaces appear plural on account of the distinct subjects [i.e., the distinct parts of the floor] in which they are distinctly described: I mentally abstract from the subjects, and I see how one and the same surface could have seemed to me to be distinct surfaces since I saw it in distinct places and in distinct subjects [i.e., distinct parts of the floor].87 Thereupon, I observe that one and the same surface is a circle, a triangle, a hexagon, and every figure by which a surface can be shaped and bounded. By the foregoing symbolism I see that being itself, which is freed from particular determinations, is actually a form (howsoever formable) of the being of all beings and of each distinct being. [This form is the form-of-being] not mathematically and figuratively but most truly and in a way capable of being formed (or, as we can also say, in a vital way). This symbolism pleases me. For I have just shown that the same surface is able to be circular, rectilinear, polygonal; and I have given an example of this. Assume, then, that we posit the actual existence of possible being—as should be done in matters theological. Assuredly, the symbolism just [given] guides [us] quite clearly. Therefore, I think that in accordance with an accurate understanding of mathematics a quite close symbolism can be made for theology. Let it suffice that we have said these things about this [matter]. JOHN: I am afraid of appearing troublesome and wearisome. Otherwise I would ask to be taught still further. CARDINAL: Both of you, keep asking. For these discussions do not at all tire me but delight me immensely. And so, if anything remains [to be asked], do not at all be indulgent [with me] now; for on another occasion I will perhaps have less leisure. JOHN: Among the innumerable things which I would like to learn is one thing in particular: viz., how is it that negatively we better attain to this omnipotent Form, which is said to appear above all being and not-being.

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CARD: Oportet, abba, praesupponere quae alias a me 10 audisti: tres esse speculativas inquisitiones. Infima est physica, quae circa naturam versatur et considerat formas inabstractas, quae subsunt motui. Nam forma in materia est natura et ideo inabstracta est atque in alio, ideo aliter. Secundum igitur instabilitatem materiae continue movetur seu alteratur. Et hanc inquirit anima sensibus et ratione.

Alia est speculatio circa formam penitus absolutam et 63 stabilem, quae est divina et est ab omni alteritate abstracta, ideo aeterna sine omni motu et variatione. Et hanc formam quaerit anima per se sine phantasmate supra omnem intelli182v gentiam et discilplinam per supremam sui ipsius acutiem et simplicitatem, quae intellectualitas a quibusdam dicitur. Estque media speculatio circa inabstractas formas tamen stabiles, quae mathematica dicitur. Considerat enim circulum, qui non est a subiecto seu omni materia intelligibili abstractus sed bene a materia corporali et instabili. Non 10 enim considerat circulum ut in pavimento corruptibili sed ut in sua ratione seu diffinitione. Et vocatur speculatio ilia mathesis seu disciplina. Traditur enim via disciplmae. Et utitur anima in huius inquisitione intellectu cum imaginatione. De his alias.

Nunc autem de absoluta forma theologizantes dicimus, 64 quoniam ipsa primarie dat esse. Omnis enim forma adveniens materiae dat ei esse et nomen. Ut cum figura Platonis advenit aeri, dat aeri esse et nomen statuae. Sed quia omnes formae inabstractae, quae sine materia non subsistunt nisi notionaliter, proprie non dant esse, sed ex ipsarum cum materia conexione surgit esse, ideo necesse est quod sit

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CARDINAL: We need to presuppose, Abbot, what you have heard from me on another occasion: viz., that there are three theoretical investigations. 1. The lowest [of these three] is physics, which centers on nature and examines inabstract forms which are subject to change. For nature is form-in-matter; and so form-inmatter is not abstract and is in something other than itself; and hence it [exists] in different ways. Therefore, it is continually being changed, or altered, in accordance with the instability of the material. The soul, by the senses and by reason, investigates this [type of] form. 2. Another theoretical investigation is the investigation of the Form which is completely abstract [absoluta] and completely stable —which is divine and is free of all otherness and so is eternal and without any change or variation. The soul, by itself and without images, investigates this Form. [The soul seeks it] beyond all understanding and learning —by its own highest acumen and simplicity, which some [persons] call intellectuality. 3. There is also a theoretical investigation which is in between [these two]. It deals with inabstract forms which are, however, stable. (This investigation is called mathematics.) For example, it deals with a circle which, although it is free from corporeal and unstable material, is not free from every subject and from all intelligible material. For it does not deal with a circle as it is in a corruptible floor but [deals with it] as it is in the concept or the definition which belongs to the investigation. And this theoretical investigation is called mathesis or disciplma [i.e., learning]. For it is passed on by way of learning. And in investigating it, the soul uses the intellect together with the imagination. [I have written] elsewhere about these points.88 At the moment, however, we are theologizing and discoursing about abstract (absoluta} Form, since it primarily imparts existence. Indeed, every form which comes to matter gives to matter both existence and a name. For example, when the figure of Plato comes to bronze, it gives to the bronze the existence of a statue and the name "statue." But, properly speaking, no inabstract forms —which can only be conceived to exist without matter—impart existence; rather, existence arises out of the union of these forms with matter. Therefore, it is necessary that there be a completely abstract

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forma penitus abstracta per se subsistens sine cuiuscumque indigentia, quae det materiae possibilitatem essendi et formae ei advenienti actualitatem et utriusque conexioni rei 10 exsistentiam. Formae igitur quanto magis indigent subiecto seu materia ut subsistant actu, utique debiliores et materialiores sunt et magis naturam subiecti imitantur et ideo minus perfectae. Quanto vero minus indigent subiecto, formaliores, stabiliores et perfectiores exsistunt. Oportet igitur quod forma quae penitus nullo alio indiget quoniam infinitae perfectionis in se omnium formarum formabilium complicet perfectiones, quoniam est actu ipse essendi thesaurus a quo emanant omnia quae sunt, quemadmodum ipsa ab aeterno in thesauro sapientiae concepta vel reposita sunt. 20 Refert Moyses deum dixisse: Ego sum entitas, quod re- 65 peritur in libris nostris translatum — ut praedictum est —: »Ego sum qui sum.« Esse igitur quod entitas nominat nobis formarum formam. Nulli dabili formae convenit esse quod entitas nisi illi penitus abstractae et adeo perfectae quod ab omni indigentia sit libera. Potest igitur omnis forma esse perfectior quae non est absoluta entitas. Esse autem quod entitas est perfectio omnis esse et ideo omnium formarum complicatio. Unde nisi ipsa entitas daret omnibus formis esse formativum, nequaquam haberent. In omnibus igitur 10 est divina essentia quae entitas absoluta dans omnibus esse tale quale habent. Cum autem omnia bonum appetant et nihil appetibilius ipso esse, quod de suo thesauro utique Optimo emanare facit entitas absoluta, ideo deum quern entitatem nominamus solum bonum dicimus, quia ab ipso optimum donum nobis gratissimum, nostrum scilicet proprium esse, recipimus. Quaerimus autem fontem nostri esse videre per omnes 66

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Form which exists through itself, which is in need of nothing else, and which imparts (a) to matter the possibility of existing, (b) to the form present in the matter actuality, and (c) to the union of these two existence as a thing. Assuredly, then, the more the forms need a subject or a material in order actually to exist: the weaker and the more material they are and the more they imitate the nature of [this] subject, and so the less perfect they are. But the less they need a subject: the more formal, stable, and perfect they are. Therefore, it is necessary for the Form which does not at all need any other thing (since this Form is of infinite perfection) to enfold within itself the perfection of all the forms of formable things. For it is actually the Repository-of-being from which all existing things emanate —even as from eternity they have been conceived, or placed, in the Repository-of-wisdom.89 Moses reports that God said: "I am Being itself."90 As was previously mentioned, 91 this statement is found translated in our books as "I am I-who-am." Therefore, being which is Being itself names for us the Form of forms. Being which is Being itself befits no positable form except that Form which is completely abstract and is so perfect that it is free from all need. Therefore, every form which is not Absolute Being itself can be more perfect. But being which is Being itself is the perfection of all being and, hence, the enfolding of all forms. Wherefore, unless Being itself were to impart forming being to all forms, forms would not at all have forming being. Therefore, Divine Being, which is Absolute Being itself, is present in all things, giving to all of them such being as they have. But since all things desire the good and since nothing is more desirable than being (which Absolute Being itself causes to emanate from its own perfect repository): we say that God —to whom we give the name "Being itself"—is the only good. For from Him we receive a perfect gift, most pleasing to us: viz., our own being. But by all the means possible for us we seek to see the fount of our being.

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nobis possibiles modos et reperimus per negativam nos verius iter carpere, cum sit incomprehensibilis quern quaerimus et infinitus. Ut igitur tibi nune dicam quae a me exigis, de negativa recipiamus negativam scilicet non-esse, quae omnium negationum prima videtur. Nonne negativa ilia praesupponit et negat? IOH: Utique praesupponit esse et negat esse. CARD: Id igitur esse quod praesupponit ante negationem est. 10 IOH: Utique sic est necesse secundum nostrum intelligendi modum. CARD: Esse igitur quod negatio praesupponit utique aeternum est. Est enim ante non-esse, et esse id quod negat post non-esse est initiatum, IOH: Necesse videtur. CARD: Negatio igitur quae cadit super esse negat esse 67 illud sic nominatum esse praesuppositum, quod non est aliud dicere nisi quod esse post non-esse nequaquam est esse aeternum et ineffabile. IOH: Negare ista nequeo. CARD: Sic verius video deum quam mundum. Nam non video mundum nisi cum non-esse et negative, ac si dicerem: Mundum video non esse deum. Deum autem video ante non-esse; ideo nullum esse de ipso negatur. Esse igitur ipsius est omne esse omnium quae sunt aut esse quoquo- 10 modo possunt. Hoc nulla alia via absque phantasmate simplicius et verius videri potest. Per negativam enim praesuppositum ipsum, quod non-esse antecedit, entitatem omnis esse in aeternitate simplici intuitu vides, a quo omne quod non-esse sequitur negas. IOH: Intelligo ipsum praesuppositum esse in negatione necessario antecedere non-esse, alias utique nihil esset. Quis enim non-esse in esse produxisset? Non ipsum non-

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And we discover that by negation we pursue the truer way, since He whom we seek is inapprehensible and infinite. So, in order that I may now tell you the things you asked me concerning negation, let us take the negation which seems to be the first of all negations: viz., "not-being." Doesn't this negation both presuppose and deny? JOHN-. Assuredly, it presupposes being and denies being. CARDINAL: Then, that being which it presupposes is prior to the negation. JOHN: In accordance with our mode of understanding, this [inference] is undoubtedly necessary. CARDINAL: Therefore, [that] being which the negation presupposes is undoubtedly eternal; for it is prior to not-being. And that being which the negation denies is originated posterior to not-being. JOHN: It seems necessary. CARDINAL: Therefore, the negation which besets being92 denies that there is this "presupposed being" (as it is called). [To make] this [statement] is to say only: "being which is posterior to not-being is not at all eternal, ineffable being." JOHN: I cannot deny these points. CARDINAL: Hence I see God more truly than [I see] the world. For I see the world only with reference to not-being and by way of negation—as if I were to say: "I see that the world is not God." However, I see God prior to [any reference to] not-being; and so, no being is denied of Him. Therefore, His being is the complete being of all the things which either are or in any way can be. We cannot (without images) see this fact more simply and more truly by any other way [than negation]. For through the negation ["not-being"] you see—by a simple intuition from which you exclude everything subsequent to not-being—that the presupposed [being], which precedes not-being, is the eternal being itself of all being.9 JOHN: I understand that the being presupposed in the negation necessarily precedes not-being; for otherwise it is not the case that anything would exist. For who would have brought not-being into being? Not-being itself [could] not

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esse, quando non praesupponeret esse a quo produceretur. 183' Si | igitur aliquid esse affirmamus, necesse est id quod dicis 20 esse verissimum. CARD: Bene infers, abba. Tu autem vides aliqua esse, 68 caelum scilicet et terrain et mare et cetera. Vides autem unum non esse aliud, et ita ilia vides post non-esse. Vides igitur ilia de aeterno esse post non-esse hoc esse quod sunt. Cum enim praecedat ipsa aeternitas non-esse, quod se in esse producere nequit, necesse est omnia per aeternum esse de non-esse seu non exstantibus produci. Aeternum igitur esse est necessitas essendi omnibus. IOH: Pater, dicito clarius si potes quomodo omnia in aeterno esse videre queam. 10 CARD: Si sol in eo quod est foret etiam eo ipso omnia quae non est, tune utique foret ante non-esse et ita sol et omnia, quia nihil de ipso negari posset. IOH: Admitto. Sed me conturbat conceptus solis, qui est terminatus. CARD: luves te igitur et respice in ipsum esse solis et deinde tolle li 'solis' et omnem inabstractionem, removendo sic negativam: tune de eo vides nihil negari. Quando enim vides quod esse solis non est esse lunae, hoc evenit quia vides esse inabstractum et sic contractum et limitatum 20 quod ideo solare dicitur. Si igitur aufers terminum et videas esse interminum seu eterminum sive aeternum, utique tune vides ipsum ante non-esse.

IOH: Quodlibet igitur esse sic video in deo aeterno deum 69 et omnia esse. CARD: Ita est. Nam cum deus aeternus omnia de nonesse producat, nisi ipse actu esset omnium et singulorum esse, quomodo de non-esse produceret?

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[have done so], since it would not presuppose being, from which it would be brought forth. Therefore, if we affirm that something exists, then it is necessary that your claim be completely true. CARDINAL: Your inference is correct, Abbot. Now, you see that some things do exist: e.g., the sky, the earth, the sea, and so on. But you see that the one is not the other; and so, you see these in their posteriority to not-being. Therefore, you see that [the following is true]: (1) from Eternal Being and (2) posterior to not-being, these things are what they are. For since Eternity itself precedes not-being, which cannot bring itself into being: it is necessary that all things be brought forth from not-being (i.e., from what does not exist) by Eternal Being. Therefore, for all things, Eternal Being is Necessity-of-being. JOHN-. If you can, Father, state more clearly how I can see all things in Eternal Being. CARDINAL-. If in its essence the sun were also thereby all the things it is not, then assuredly it would be prior to notbeing and so [would be] both sun and all things, since nothing could be denied of it. JOHN: I grant it. But the concept of the sun—a sun which is finite —confuses me. CARDINAL: Assist yourself, then, and look at the very being of the sun. Next, remove (1) [the determination] of the sun and (2) everything which is not abstract—thereby removing [all] negation.94 You now see that nothing is denied of the sun's being. For when you see that the being of the sun is not the being of the moon, this [recognition] occurs because you see being which is inabstract and is contracted and limited in such way that it is called solar. Therefore, if you remove the boundary and see Boundless (interminum seu eterminum) or Eternal Being, then you undoubtedly see it in its priority to not-being. JOHN: In this way, then I see that in the Eternal God any given being is both God and all things. CARDINAL: So it is. For since the Eternal God brings forth all things from not-being: unless He were actually the being of all things and of each distinct thing, how is it that He would bring [them] forth from not-being?

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IOH: Haec igitur vera sunt quae sancti asserunt. Aiunt enim deum esse quantum sine quantitate, qualem sine qualitate et ita de omnibus. CARD: Sic dicunt. Sed dicito tu quomodo illud intelligas. IOH: Intelligo ipsum omnium quae videmus veritatem ab- 10 solutam. Ideo oportet de contracto contractionem negare, ut absolutum pertingamus. In visibili namque quantitate attendo quomodo est vera quantitas. Veritatem igitur eius, per quam vera est, in absoluto inspicere attempto et video ipsam esse quantitatem sine tali quantitate quam vidi post non-esse sic et sic terminatam et limitatam, quae per hoc nomen 'quantitas' designatur.

Oportet igitur me citra non-esse relinquere omnia ea, per 70 quae quantitas est potius quantitas quam omnia. Et ita nomen, diffinitionem, figuram et omnia, quae omni sensu, imaginatione et intellectu de quantitate apprehenduntur, abicio, ut sic perveniam ad non-esse huius quantitatis. Deinde respicio in aeternam eius quod prius videram causam et rationem. Quae etsi sit ineffabilis ante omne nomen, tamen ipsam aeternitatem quantitatem sine quantitate nomino, quia ratio et veritas nominabilis quantitatis. Ratio autem quanti non est quanta, sic nee veritas seu aeternitas, 10 sicut nee ratio temporis est temporalis sed aeterna.

CARD: Gaudeo haec a te audisse. Nee haec quae dixisti 71 cuiquam mira videbuntur, qui experitur in se quomodo calor in regione sensibilium est sine calore in regione virtuturn cognoscitivarum magis abstractarum. Calor cum calore est in sensu ubi calor sentitur, sed in imaginatione sive intellectu sine calore attingitur. Ita de omnibus quae sensu attinguntur pariformiter dicendum. Odor enim sine odore et dulce sine dulcedine et sonus sine sono et ita de singulis.

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JOHN: Hence the things said95 by the saints are true. For they say that God is quantitative [e.g., great] without quantity, qualitative [e.g., good] without quality, and so on for all [the other categories]. CARDINAL:So they say. But tell [me] how you construe this [statement of theirs]. JOHN: I understand that God is the absolute truth of all the things we see. Hence it is necessary [for us] to negate the contractedness of what is contracted, in order that we may attain to the Absolute. For, indeed, I observe how there is true quantity in visible quantity. Therefore, I attempt to behold in the Absolute the truth of this [true quantity] — the truth through which this true quantity is true. And I see that this truth is a quantity distinct from the kind of quantity which, being bounded and limited in such and such ways, I saw after not-being and which is designated by the name "quantity." Therefore, I have to leave behind, on this side of not-being, all those things through which quantity is quantity rather than being all things. And so, I cast aside the name, the definition, the shape, and all the things apprehended of quantity by means of all sense, imagination, and intellect— so that in this way I may arrive at the not-being of this quantity. Thereupon, I behold the eternal Cause and Form of that which I saw at first. Although this eternal Cause or Form is ineffable and prior to every name, nevertheless I call this Eternity by the name "Quantity without quantity"; for it is the Form and the Truth of nameable quantity. But the form of a quantity is not itself quantitative. Likewise, the truth and the eternity [of a quantity] are not [quantitative] —even as the from of time is not temporal but is eternal. CARDINAL:! arn happy to have heard these things from you. The points you have made will not seem surprising to anyone who experiences for himself how heat-in-the-domainof-sensible-things is devoid of heat in the domain of the more abstract cognitive powers. In the senses, where heat is sensed, heat-which-is-not-devoid-of-heat is present; but in the imagination or in the intellect heat-without-heat is touched upon. A similar point must be made about all the things with which the senses make contact. For example, [in the imagination or in the intellect there is contact with] a fragrance without fragrance, a sweet without sweetness, a sound without sound, and likewise for each distinct thing. Therefore, just as things

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Sicut igitur quae sensibiliter sunt in sensu insensibiliter sunt in intellectu, quia in eo non sunt sensibiliter sed intellec- 10 tualiter et intellectus, sic omnia quae sunt mundialiter in mundo sunt immundialiter in deo, quia ibi sunt divine et deus. Ita temporalia intemporaliter quia aeterne et corruptibilia incorruptibiliter, materialia immaterialitcr ct plura impluraliter et numerata innumerabiliter, composita incomposite, et ita de omnibus. Quod totum non est aliud nisi quod omnia sunt in suo proprio et adaequatissimo aeterno esse sine omni substantial! aut accidental! differentia discretissime ipsa simplicissima aeternitas.

BERN: Audivi utique alta lucide resolvi. Ex quibus elicio 72 munduni post non-esse initiatum ideo Graece dici pulchrum cosmon, quia est ab ineffabili aeterna pulchritudine, quae est ante non-esse. Et nomen id negat ipsum esse ipsam pulehritudinem ineffabilem. Affirmat tamen esse illius imaginem, cuius ineffabilis est veritas. Quid igitur est mundus nisi invisibilis dei apparitio? Quid deus nisi visibilium in183V visibilitas, uti apostolus in | verbo in principio nostrae collocutionis praemisso innuit? Mundus igitur revelat suum creatorem, ut cognoscatur, immo incognoscibilis deus se 10 mundo in speculo et aenigmate cognoscibiliter ostendit, ut bene dicebat apostolus apud deum non esse est et non sed est tantum. Vivorum regio, quae est in aeternitate ante nonesse, aliquantulum mihi incipit ex dictis quia est apparere atque quale sit istud magnum chaos, de quo Christus loquitur quod est inter incolas immortalitatis aeternae et eos qui inhabitant infernum, ac quod Christus magister noster ignorantiam tollens et viam ad immortalitatis aeternitatem nos docens omnia supplebit, quae nos aeternae illius immortalitatis incapaces reddunt. 20

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which are present sensibly in the senses are present insensibly in the intellect (for in the intellect they are present not sensibily but intellectually and are the intellect), so all things which are present mundanely in the world are present nonmundanely in God (for in God they are present divinely and are God). Similarly, temporal things [are present in God] nontemporally, for [they are present] eternally; and corruptible things incorruptibly; material things immaterially; and plural things nonplurally; numbered things nonnumerically; composite things noncompositely; and similarly for all things. [To say] all this is [to say] nothing other than that all things —in their own most congruent eternal being, without any substantial or accidental differences —are most clearly most simple Eternity itself. BERNARD: Assuredly, I have heard deep matters being clearly resolved. From these points I infer that for the following reason the world, which was originated posterior to not-being, is said in Greek to be a beautiful cosmos-, it is [derived] from the ineffable, eternal Beauty, which is prior to not-being. Now, the name "cosmos" denies that the world is ineffable Beauty itself. But it affirms that [the world] is the image of that [Beauty] whose truth is ineffable. What, then, is the world except the appearance of the invisible God? What is God except the invisibility of visible things —as the Apostle says in the verse96 set forth at the beginning of our discussion. Hence the world reveals its Creator, so that He is known. Or better: the unknowable God reveals Himself knowably to the world in imagery and symbolism (for example, when the Apostle rightly said that with God there is not both Yes and No but is only Yes).97 From what has been stated, the domain-of-living-things which is eternal and prior to notbeing begins to appear to me a bit. [I begin to see] that it is and [to see] what kind of thing is that great chaos about which Christ says that it exists between the inhabitants of eternal immortality and the inhabitants of Hell.98 And [I begin to see] that Christ our teacher—who removes [our] ignorance and teaches us the way to an eternity of immortality —will repair all [the infirmities] which render us incapable of this eternal immortality.

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Nunc satis erit tanta dixisse, quae si placet epilogando 73 concludas. CARD: Forte sic tempus fieri postulat. Movistis ex Pauli summi theologi sententia quomodo ex creatura mundi intellecta conspiciuntur invisibilia dei. Diximus mente ilia creatoris sempiternam virtutem et invisibilem divinitatem conspici, quae mundum creaturam intelligit. Non est enim possibile creaturam intelligi emanasse a creatore, nisi videatur in invisibili virtute seu potestate eius ipsam aeternaliter fuisse. Oportet omnia creabilia actu in eius potestate 10 esse, lit ipse sit formarum omnium perfectissima forma. Oportet ipsum omnia esse quae esse possunt, ut sit verissima formalis seu exemplaris causa. Oportet ipsum in se habere omnium formabilium conceptum et ration em. Oportet ipsum esse supra omnem oppositionem. Nam in ipso non potest esse alteritas, cum sit ante non-esse. Si enim post non-esse esset, non esset creator sed creatura de non-esse producta. In ipso igitur non-esse est omne quod esse potest. Ideo de nullo alio creat, sed ex se, cum sit omne quod esse potest.

Et quando ipsum conati sumus super esse et non-esse 74 videre, non potuimus intelligere quomodo foret visibilis qui est super omne simplex et compositum, super omne singulare et plurale, super omnem terminum et infinitatem, totaliter undique et nullibi, omniformis pariter et nulliformis et penitus ineffabilis, in omnibus omnia, in nullo nihil et omnia et nihil in ipso ipse, integre, indivise in quolibet quantumcumque parvo et simul in nullo omnium. Qui se in omni creatura ostendit unitrinum exemplar verissimum et adaequatissimum, omnem sensibilem, imaginabilem et intellec- 10 tualem phantasmatibus inhaerentem in infinitum excedentem cognitionem, cum his cognitionibus nihil incorporeum et spirituale attingatur, sed altissimo et ab omnibus phantasmatibus absolute intellectu omnibus transcensis ut nihil

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It will now suffice that [we] have spoken of so many things. If you will, bring them to a conclusion by adding an epilogue, CARDINAL: Perhaps time requires that we conclude in this way. The two of you set out from the supreme theologian Paul's statement about how the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the mundane creation's having been understood. We said that the eternal power and the invisible divinity of the Creator are seen by that mind which understands the world to be a created thing. For only if the created thing is seen to have been eternally present in the Creator's invisible power [virtus seu potestas] can it be understood to have emanated from the Creator. It is necessary that every creatable thing exist actually in the Creator's power—so that, consequently, He is the most perfect Form (forma) of all forms. It is necessary that the Creator be all the things which are possible to be—so that, consequently, He is the truest formal (or truest exemplary) Cause. It is necessary that the Creator have within Himself the Concept and the Form [ratio] of all formable things. It is necessary that the Creator be above all opposition. For in Him there cannot be otherness, since He is prior to not-being For if He were posterior to notbeing, He would not be the Creator but would be a creature, brought forth from not-being. Therefore, in Him not-being is everything which is possible to be. And so, He creates not from any other, but from Himself; for He is everything which is possible to be. And when we attempted to see Him beyond being and not-being, we were unable to understand how He could be visible. For He is beyond everything simple and everything composite, beyond everything singular and everything plural, beyond every limit and all unlimitedness; He is completely everywhere and not at all anywhere; He is of every form and of no form, alike; He is completely ineffable; in all things He is all things, in nothing He is nothing, and in Him all things and nothing are Himself;99 He is wholly and indivisibly present in any given thing (no matter how small) and, at the same time, is present in no thing at all. He reveals Himself in every creature as the triune, most true, and most congruent Exemplar—and as surpassing infinitely all sensible, imaginable, and intellectual knowledge which inheres in images. For by these ways of knowing, nothing incorporeal and spiritual is attained to. Rather, this unintelligible [Reality] is encountered by the loftiest intellect—freed from all images—when all things have

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omnium quae sunt reperitur inintelligibilis ignoranter seu inintelligibiliter in umbra seu tenebra sive incognite. Ubi videtur in caligine et nescitur, quae substantia aut quae res aut quid entium sit, uti res, in quo coincidunt opposita, scilicet motus et quies simul, non ut duo, sed supra dualitatem et alteritatem. Haec visio in tenebra est, ubi occulta- 20 tur ipse deus absconditus ab oculis omnium sapientum. Et nisi sua luce pellat tenebram et se manifestet, manet 75 omnibus ipsum via rationis et intelligentiae quaerentibus penitus incognitus. Sed non deserit quaerentes ipsum summa fide et spe certissima atque fervidissimo quantum fieri potest desiderio, scilicet via ilia quam nos docuit magister unicus Christus dei films, viva via, solus ostensor patris sui, creatoris nostri omnipotentis. Quaecumque igitur per nos dicta sunt non ad aliud tendunt quam ut intelligamus ipsum omnem intellectum excedere. Cuius facialis visio quae sola felicitat nobis fidelibus per veritatem ipsam dei filium 10 promittitur, si viam nobis verbo et facto patefactam ipsum sequendo tenuerimus. Quod nobis ipse dominus noster lesus Christus concedat semper benedictus. Amen.

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been transcended. He is encountered—unlike any other existing thing — ignorantly, or unintelligibly, in a shadow or in darkness or unknowingly. [He is encountered] where He is seen in darkness and where it is not known what substance, what thing, or what being He is. [He is encountered] as a thing in which opposites coincide (e.g., motion and rest, together) —not as two but as above duality and otherness. This vision occurs in darkness, where the hidden God is concealed from the eyes of all the wise. Moreover, unless by His own light He expels the darkness and reveals Himself, He remains completely unknown to all who seek Him by way of reason and intellect. But He does not abandon those who seek Him in deepest faith, surest hope, and the most fervent possible desire —i.e., [those who seek Him] by that way which we were taught by our only master, Christ, the Son of God, the living way, the sole revealer of His own father (who is our omnipotent Creator). Therefore, all the statements we have made aim only at [making] us understand that our Creator surpasses all understanding. The vision of His countenance (a vision which alone brings happiness) is promised to us believers by the Son of God, who is Truth itself—provided that by following Him we hold to the way which has been disclosed to us by word and deed. May our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, blessed forever, grant this [steadfastness] to us. Amen.100

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notes

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notes

All references to Nicholas's works are to the Latin texts—specifically to the following texts in the following editions: A. Heidelberg Academy Edition: De Coniecturis, De Deo Abscondito, De Data Patris Luminum, Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, Idiota de Mente, De Pace Fidei, De Li Non A Hud. B. Heidelberg Academy Edition as found in the Latin-German edition of Felix MeinerVerlag'sPhilosophischeBibliothek: De Docta Ignorantia, De Possest, De Venatione Sapientiae. C. Strasburg Edition as reprinted by W. de Gruyter: De Visione Dei, De Ludo Globi. For some treatises the reference indicates book and chapter; for others, section and line; for still others, page and line. Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when they consult the particular Latin text. (All references to De Possest are either by section or by section and line.) Preface 1. "In many places, however, interpretation could not be completely withheld." See p. vii of NicolausdeCusa, Trialogusdepossest. Dreiergesprach uberdas Konnen-Ist, trans. Renate Steiger (Hamburg: Meiner, 1973). N. B. The lines of the Latin text as printed in this Latin-German edition differ in length from the lines of the Heidelberg Academy edition. Accordingly, the line numbers in the two Latin texts do not correspond exactly. The Latin text reproduced for the present English edition was reprinted—with a few minor corrections—from the LatinGerman edition. 157

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2. Jasper Hopkins, Anselm of Canterbury: Volume IV: Hermeneutical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm (New York: Mellen Press, 1976). N. B. In punctuating the English translation of De Possest I made a small number of changes in relation to the printed Latin text. For example, at 66:13-15 I construed "Esse igitur quod negatio praesupponitutique aeternum est. Estenim ante non-esse, et esse id quod negat post non-esse est initiatum" as if it were "Esse igitur quod negatio praesupponitutique aeternum est; est enim ante non-esse. Et esse id quod negat post non-esse est initiatum." Even such minute changes—allowed by the unprinted Latin manuscript—represent an interpretive recasting of emphasis.

Introduction 1. On the other variants of Nicholas's name, see the second edition of Erich Meuthen's Nikolausvon Kues, 1401 -1464: Skizze einer Biographic, 2nd ed. (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1967), p. 5. 2. His mission was approved by Pope Eugenius IV. Edmond Vansteenberghe writes: Ce n'est pas le pape, en effet, qui envoya Nicolas a Constantinople en recompense de sa defection, mais bien la minorite du concile: les documents le prouvent; et a plusieurs reprises Nicolas lui-meme a affirme, sans etre jamais contredit, qu'il fit le voyage d'Orient sur 1'ordre du cardinal de Saint-Pierre. La verite est que son depart pour 1'Italie ne signifiait pas encore une rupture complete avec Bale: il laissait, en proie aux passions et a la violence, une assemblee oil 1'on n'avail plus que faire de sa science et de sa calme raison; mais il ne lui paraissait pas encore impossible que la minorite, lasaniorpars, a laquelle il adherait, s'accrut assez pour devenir preponderate, et il pouvait esperer que Cesarini, comme celui-ci 1'esperait lui-meme, reussirait a ramener les peres vers la seul voie qu'il croyait compatible avec la vie de 1'Eglise: celle de 1'union au pape."Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues (Paris, 1920; reprinted Frankfurt: Minerva GmbH, 1963), pp. 63-64. See also Meuthen, Nikolaus von Kues, p. 49. 3. See (1) Paul E. Sigmund's discussion on pp. 246-49 of his fine work Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); (2) Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, p. 414; (3) Clemens Baeumker, "Das Pseudohermetische 'Buch der vierundzwanzig Meister' (Liber XXIV philosophorum). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neupythagoreismus und Neuplatonismus im Mittelalter," in Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 25 (1928), p. 214. 4.Pp.12-13. 5.NA 6(13:28-30). 6.NA 1 (5:13-14). 7. Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, pp. 409-40. Joseph Lenz, Die docta ignorantia oder die mystiche Gotteserkennt-

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nis des Nicolaus disarms in ihren philosophischen Grundlagen (Wiirzburg: Becker, 1923), pp. 101-29. Jakob Hommes,Diephilosophische Gotteslehre des Nikolaus Kusanus in ihren Grundlehren (Munich: Philosophische Fakultat, 1926), pp. 10-11. 8.T. Whittaker, "Nicholas of Cusa," Mind, 34 (October 1925), 436. 9. P. 21. Cf. pp. 29-30. 10. DeLudo Globi 48. 11. Cf. De Ludo Globi 3 7 and 40. 12. "It was fitting that the Virgin shine forth with that purity than which a greater cannot be conceived except for God's. To her was fittingly given the most pure Son of the eternal God—given in such way that He was the son of God and of the Virgin." Sermo 6: "Respexit Humilitatem,"p. 105 (13:6-9) of vol. 16, fascicle 2 of the Heidelberg Academy's Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia. Nicholas does not attempt to quote Anselm's text exactly. 13. "Man, who was created unto life, is not restored unless he is elevated to the likeness of the angels in whom there is no sin. This cannot occur unless there is complete antecedent satisfaction. For this satisfaction to occur, it is necessary that something be given to God which is not owed and which surpasses all that is not God. To sin is to dishonor God—something which man ought not to do even if all that is not God were bound to perish [as a result of man's not sinning]. Assuredly, reason and immutable truth require that the one who sins pay to God, in place of the stolen honor, something greater than that for which he ought not to have dishonored God. Human nature, by itself, did not have this [payment]; and without satisfaction human nature was unable to attain the goal and the kingdom." Sermo 3 = "Hoc Facite," pp. 44-45 (6:7-21) of vol. 16, fascicle 1, Opera Omnia. But note Nicholas's adaptation of another portion of Anselm's theory: Sermo 1: "In Principio Erat Verbum,"p. 18(23: 22-31) of vol. 16, fascicle 1, Opera Omnia. 14. Pierre Duhem, "Thierry de Chartres et Nicolas de Cues," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 3 (July 1909), 525-31. See also vol. 10, pp. 269-72 of Duhem's Le systeme du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platan a Copernic (Paris-. Hermann, 1959). 15. Vansteenberghe (Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, p. 411, n. 7) is certainly correct in saying: "En tout cas, Cusa ne presente pas sa theorie comme originale, mats plutot comme quasi classique, et ily a quelque exageration a parler id de 'plagiat'." 16. N. Haring, ed., Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971), p. 218. Duhem is not aware of this passage. But p. 529 of his article implies that had he known about it, he would have regarded it as strengthening his case.

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17. De Pace Fidei, Chap. 4. 18. Armand Maurer, "Nicholas of Cusa,," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967), p. 497. Nicholas uses interchangeably the phrases "maximum absolutum," "maximum absolute," and "maximum simpliciter." 19. In DI I, 6 Nicholas writes: "Moreover, nothing could exist if the unqualifiedly Maximum did not exist. For since everything nonmaximal is finite, it is also originated. But, necessarily, it will exist from another. Otherwise—i.e., if it existed from itself— it would have existed when it did not exist. Now, as is obviously the rule, it is not possible to proceed to infinity in beginnings and causes. So it will be the case that the unqualifiedly Maximum exists, without which nothing can exist. . . . "Moreover, the greatest truth is the absolutely Maximum. Therefore, either (1) it is most greatly true that the unqualifiedly Maximum either exists or does not exist, or (2) [it is most greatly true that it] both exists and does not exist, or (3) [it is most greatly true that it] neither exists nor does not exist. Now, no more [alternatives] can be either asserted or thought. No matter which one of them you say to be most greatly true, my point is made. For I have the greatest truth, which is the unqualifiedly Maximum." N. B. Alternative 3 might be construed as differing from alternative 2 in spite of the fact that "neither p nor not-p'' is logically equivalent to "both p and not-p." For if one claims, as Nicholas does, that God transcends the distinction between existence and nonexistence, one might regard 3 as true but 2 as self-contradictory. (Nicholas, however, seems to regard both 2 and 3 as true.) 20. According to Nicholas, the sense in which the finite cannot be conceived without conceiving of the infinite is the following: an argument can be given which shows that the finite cannot exist without the infinite; and so, on the basis of the argument, the finite cannot be understood to exist without the infinite. In another vein, it is of course true that the finite cannot be conceived as finite without conceiving of the nonfinite. But this is not Nicholas's point in I, 6. 21. In the opening paragraph of DI I, 6 Nicholas does say that an actually infinite progression of greater and greater beings is not possible. And elsewhere (II, 1; cf. DP 59) he does claim that matter is not actually extendable ad infmitum. But these propositions do not enter into the proof which Maurer is attempting to recapitulate. 22. Note his criticism of the Aristotelians for rejecting —in the name of the principle of noncontradition —the doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum. Apologia 6:7-12. 23. In places, Nicholas contradicts himself. FrederickH. Burgevin (Cibratio Alchorani: Nicholas Cusanus 's Criticism of the Koran in the Light of His Philosophy of Religion [New York: Vantage Press, 1969],

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pp. 30-31) cites the ways in which his statements about the purpose of the Koran are inconsistent. 24. DP 74:18. See also De Coniecturis II, 1 (78:13-14) and De Venatione Sapientiae 22 (67:3-4). 25. De Visione Dei, chap. 9 (at the end). 26. Apologia 27:1-5. DIII, 5, (118:3-4). 27. Apologia 28:18; 29:4-5. DP 12:1-15. Cf. DP 72:7-9. 28. DI II, 5 (117:5-7). DP 74. 29. Wenck's text was edited by E. Vansteenberghe under the tide Le "De Ignota Litteratura" de Jean Wenck de Herrenberg contre Nicolas de Cuse, vol. 8, Heft 6 (1910) of Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters (Munster: Aschendorff, 1912). 30. De Deo Abscondito 2:4-5. DP 41:15. DI I, 1 (4:16). 31. These phrases occur respectively in Apologia 3:5; DI I, 2 (5:3); I, 2 (8 = 9); I, 17 (51:3). Note the use of "docti" in DI I, 3 (10:21). Duhem's translation of the phrase "De Docta Ignorantia" as "L 'ignorance savante" represents, in last analysis, a wrong emphasis. See vol. 10 of his Le systeme du monde (Paris: Hermann, 1959), pp. 251-52,272, 279, et passim. 32. De Ludo Globi II (84). DI II, 12 (162:15-17). 33. See p. 208 of Baeumker's "Das pseudo-hermetische 'Buch der vierundzwanzig Meister.'" Also note pp. 147, n. 2, and pp. 172-73 of Dietrich Mahnke's Unendliche Sphdre und Allmittelpunkt (Halle: Niemeyer, 1937), and pp. 141-44 (especially p. 141, n.49) of Herbert Wackerzapp's Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts auf die ersten philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (1440-1450), in Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters, vol. 39 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1962). 34. Wackerzapp, Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts, p. 141, n. 49. 35. DI II, 12. See Karsten Harries's attempt to make sense out of these formulas. "The Infinite Sphere: Comments on the History of a Metaphor," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (January 1975), 5-15. 36. Other examples of prima facie unintelligible statements are found throughout Nicholas's writings: e.g., DP 59: "Sicut infinitas in hoc mundo actu est impossibilis, sic magnitude cuius non est finis est necessitas ilia, quae non-ens seu nihil ut sit necessitat"•. "Just as in this world infinity is actually impossible, so endless magnitude is the necessity which necessitates the existence of not-being, or nothing." Or, again, DI II, 3 (110:11-12): "Non restat nisi dicere, quod pluralitas rerum exoriatur eo, quod deus est in nihilo": "There remains only to say that the plurality of things arises from the fact that God is in nothing." Of course, a la rigueur, some sense can be assigned to these statements. For instance, if "endless magnitude" is taken to refer to God

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and if "not-being" is taken to refer to the world, considered apart from God, we can construe the first statement as: "Just as in the world infinity is actually impossible, so Infinity is the Necessity which produces the world." 37. ". . . the repetitions, the lack of logical order, the variations in the vocabulary." Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, p. 277. 38. "He does not at all write simple, clear, and exact Latin." Karl Jaspers, Nikolaus Cusanus (Munich: Piper, 1964), p. 20. 39. Cf. DP 1 4 : 1 2 ; 3 1 : 8 ; 59:1

-2.

40.DP6:7-8. 41. Cf. DP 38:11 with 38:13. 42. Cf. DP 48 = 14-15 with 48:16. 43. See DP 52:8-11 and 47:7-8. 44. See n. 20 of the English translation of DP. 45. Cf. Sermo "Ubi est qui natus est rex Judaeontm," printed in Cusanus-Texte. VierPredigten im Geiste Eckharts, ed. J. Koch (Heidelberg: Winter, 1937); DP 67:13-14;D7 II, 7 (130:14-15). Cf. the last part of n. 20 of the English translation of DP. 46. N. B. DP 64:11-14. 4 7 . D / I . 4 (11:13-15). 48. DP 7:3-6. 49. Nicholas's commentators and translators have not always been the best guides for helping us make our way amid the foregoing difficulties. For example, Henry Bett, in his study Nicholas of Cusa, misleadingly entitles one chapter "The Coincidence of Contraries," in spite of his awareness that opposita include contradictoria as well as contraria. ([London: Methuen, 1932], p. 122. Note also Vansteenberghe's phrases "la coincidence des contraires," "I'union des contraires" in Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues, pp. 299, 414. Likewise, D. J. B. Hawkins repeatedly uses the expression "the reconcilation of contraries" in his introduction to Germain Heron's English translation of Dl [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954].) Similarly, Belt's translation of "complicatio" as "aggregate" and of "explicatio" as "evolution" leads him to maintain, unhelpfully, that for Nicholas "God is ... the aggregate (complicatio) of all things, as the essential and eternal ground of their being. Things are the evolution (explicatio) of God, as the finite, multiple, differentiated development of what is grounded in Him. . . . " (Nicholas of Cusa, p. 132. In Idiota de Mente 9 [119:2] Nicholas does say "evolutionem, id est explicationem." But in Dl II, 4 [116:3] he chooses "emanatio " as a substitute for "explicatio.'' Still "explicatio" should not generally be translated either as "evolution" or as "emanation.") By comparison, Emma G. Salter's sanctioning of the words "identity" and "otherness" as occasional translations of "complicatio"

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and "explicatio" is equally unrevealing. (See the note on p. xxv of her English translation of De Visione Dei [New York: Dutton, 1928].) Moreover, H. Lawrence Bond wrongly claims that the literal translation of "possest" is "he-who-is-all-that-is-able-to-be." (See p. 92 of "Nicholas of Cusa and the Reconstruction of Theology: The Centrality of Christology in the Coincidence of Opposites," in G. H. Shriver, ed., Contemporary Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition. Essays in Honor of Ray C. Petry [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1974].) And Germain Heron's translation of the treatise De Docta Ignorantia is inadequate at almost every crucial point, as a close examination of, say I, 4 and 6 will readily reveal. Waiving such a close scrutiny, we may catch the spirit of Heron's translation by noticing that he renders the title of I, 4 — "Maximum absolutum incomprehensibiliter intelligitur, cum quo minimum coincidit" — as "The Absolute Maximum is Known but Not Understood. Maximum and Minimum are Synonymous." Yet the Latin title makes no distinction between being known and being understood; nor does it mention synonymy. Heron has no grasp of Nicholas's reasoning. 50. E.g., Sigmund, Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought, p. 257. E.g., Ludwig von Bertalanffy, ed., Nikolaus von Kues (Munich: Miiller, 1928), In Metaphysik der Neuzeit (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1929), p. 13, Heinz Heimsoeth gives the same mistaken interpretation of Nicholas's teaching regarding the infinity of the universe —as does Raymond Klibansky, "Copernic et Nicolas de Cues," in Leonard de Vinci et I'experience scientifique au seizieme siecle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), p. 228, For a corrective see Tyrone Lai's "Nicholas of Cusa and the Finite Universe," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 11 (April 1973), 16167. 51. Kurt Flasch, Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues. Problemgescbichtliche Stellungundsystematische Bedeutung(Leiden-. Brill, 1973), p. 161. 52. In De Venatione Sapientiae 26 (77:6-7), Nicholas alludes favorably to Anselm's statement, cited as "deum esse mains, quam concipi possit." 53. "What is present in De Docta Ignorantia 1,6 . . . is an original restatement of the Proslogion proof, its transference into the Cusanian theory of coincidence." Flasch, Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues, p. 165. 54. See p. xviii of D. J. B. Hawkins's introduction to Germain Heron's English translation of DI. 55. A different kind of error is perpetrated by John P. Dolan, who remarks: "As with Anselm and Eckhart . . . the question that Cusa proposes to answer is not whether God exists. In his writings he rather attempts to enrich the concept of God. . . ." (Unity and Reform: Selected Writings of Nicholas de Cusa [South Bend, Ind.:

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University of Notre Dame Press, 1962], p. 44.) Although there has been much debate in recent years about Anselm's intent in the Proslogion, the prevailing view —against Karl Barth, Anselm Stolz, et al. —appears to be that Anselm did intend to demonstrate the existence of God. See J. Hopkins, (1) A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), chap. 3; (2) Anselm of Canterbury: Volume IV: Hermeneutical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm (New York: Mellen Press, 1976), chap. 4; (3) "On Understanding and Preunderstanding St. Anselm," The New Scholasticism, 52 (Spring 1978), 243-60. 56. Dolan, Unity and Reform, p. 3. J. Koch, Nikolaus von Cues: Zwei Vortrage (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1947), 48-49. Klibansky, "Copernic et Nicolas de Cues," pp. 229ff. 57. F. J. Clemens, Giordano Bruno undNicolaus von Cusa (Bonn: Wittmann, 1847). See pp. 134ff. Also see Helene Vedrine, "L'influence de Nicolas de Cues sur Giordano Bruno," NCMM, pp. 211-23. 58. Maurice de Gandillac, La Philosophie de Nicolas de Cues (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1942), p. 448. 59. Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario Domani (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), p. 42. Bett, Nicholas of Cusa, p. 139. Robert Zimmermann ("Der Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus als Vorlaufer Leibnitzens," in Sitzungsberichte derKaiserlichenAkademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Classe, 8 [Vienna, 1852], 306-28) notes parallels between the thought of Cusa and of Leibniz; but he does not claim that the former influenced the latter. For a truer perspective see Thomas P. McTighe, "Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz's Principle of IndiscernibiVity," Modern Schoolman, 42 (November 1964), 33-46. 60. Dolan, Unity and Reform, p. 4. (Dolan's citation of Gilson in n. 4 is inaccurate. Nonetheless, Dolan appears to endorse the point that Nicholas is a precursor of Kant.) Josef Koch, Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956), pp.47-48. 61. F. Copleston,/! History of Philosophy, vol. 3 (London: Burns and Gates, 1960), p. 245. Erwin Metzke, "Nikolaus von Cues und Hegel. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der philosophischen Theologie," Kant-Studien, 48 (1956-57), 216-34. 62. Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, p. 10. 63. Even those who are usually discerning sometimes make overstatements in Nicholas's favor—as does A. Maurer, who speaks of Nicholas as "mastering all the scientific, philosophical, and theological knowledge of his time."Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1964, second printing), p. 310. 64. II Cor. 4:18. See DP 3.

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65. Regarding Nicholas's doctrine of universals, see the discussion in Section VI of the Introduction. 66. See DP 11 and n. 12 of the English translation of DP. Paul Wilpert discerns this point clearly in his article "Das Problem der coincidentia oppositorum in der Philosophic desNikolaus von Cues," pp. 39-55 in J. Koch, ed., Humanismus, Mystik, und Kunst in der Welt des Mittelalters (Leiden: Brill, 1953). Both Kurt Flasch's rejection of this point and his attendant criticism of Wilpert are misguided. (Note Flasch, Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues, pp. 168-74.)

67. DP 8. 68. DP 10. 69. "Proportionem vero inter infinitum et finitum cadere non posse nemo dubitat." II, 2 (102:4-5). Note also I, 3 (9:4-5). Rudolf Haubst defends the view that Nicholas does not altogether repudiate the Thomist doctrine of analogy. See his "Nikolaus von Kues und die Analogia Entis," pp. 686-95 in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung, ed. Paul Wilpert (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963). 7 0 . D / I , 24. 71. See DI I, 26 (88:16-17). Note De Li Non Aliud 8 (18:3-5). Paul Wilpert, in his translation of NA, 2nd ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1976), p. 171, n. 12, claims that Cusanus values negative theology as little as positive theology— preferring mystical theology, which surmounts both. However, all things considered, Wilpert's claim is greatly exaggerated. For like Dionysius, Nicholas does prefer negative theology to positive theology; and even with respect to the via mystica he regards God as remaining inconceivable. Moreover, as he seems aware, to assert that in God affirmation and negation coincide—as the via mystica does —is to deny that in God there is affirmation and to deny that there is negation. Now, this denial is part of the via negativa. The via mystica advocates the possibility of a nonconceptual approach to God. But as soon as this approach attempts to articulate the Reality encountered, it must do so either negatively or positively — the former being the better route. Thus the following excerpt from Nicholas's letter to the abbot and the monks of Tegernsee in 1453 should not be overemphasized: "Since negative [theology] removes without positing anything, God will not be seen in an unveiled way by means of it; for God will not be found to be but rather [will be found] not to be. And if He is sought by way of affirmation, He will be found only through images and in a veiled way but not at all in an unveiled way. However, in most places Dionysius taught theology by means of this disjunction: viz., that we approach God either affirmatively or negatively. But in the book where he wants to display mystical and secret theology in a way possible, he leaps beyond this disjunction unto a uniting

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and a coincidence, or a most simple union. This [union] is not a sideby-side conjunction but is vertically beyond all removing and positing — where removing coincides with positing, and negation with affirmation." See p. 114 of Edmond Vansteenberghe's Autour de la Docte Ignorance. Une controverse sur la Theologie mystique au XVs siecle (Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, vol. 14 [Munster: Aschendorff, 1915]). 72. DP 27. 73.DP 15. 74. DP 75. Nicholas's notion of visio mystica stands in contrast to others' emphasis upon unio mystica. 75.011,26 (89:4-6). 76. Cf. the last paragraph of Section III of present Introduction. 77. De Visione Dei 4 (10:15-18). 78. DP 20 and 74. 79. DP 20 and 73. 80. De Visione Dei 9 (37:10-11). Apologia 15:14-15. 81. DP 73. 82. DP 25, 62, and 74. 83. Nicholas would say this, but nowhere does, as far as I know. Only by referring to the doctrine of coincidence can we resolve a prima facie discrepancy in Nicholas's statements about creation. On the one hand, he teaches that created things are produced de non esse: from not-being. And, on the other hand, he maintains that God creates ex se: from Himself (DP 73 ; re creation ex nihilo, see DP 26 and 68). But how are these two statements reconcilable? That Nicholas mentions them both in the same passage suggests that he finds no incompatibility. In creating ex nihilo God creates ex se simply because "in Him not-being is everything which is possible to be." That is, in God "not-being is being everything" (DP 25); for in God there is no distinction between being and not-being. Accordingly, there is no difference, thinks Nicholas, in saying that God creates ex nihilo and in saying that He creates de nullo alio sed ex se. In short, God creates from nothing in the sense that He creates from nothing other than from Himself. N. B. Apologia 28:18-19: "Neque est verum, si Deus est omne, quod est, quod propterea non creaverit omnia de nihilo." 84. By "minimal motion" Nicholas means rest. 85. DP 21. 86. DP 27. 87. DP 26 and 74. N. B. NA 10 (23:1-2) and DP 41-.5, where even the predicate "one" is said to be inapplicable to God. 88. DP 19. 89.Ibid. 90. DP 41. 91.Ibid.

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92.Ibid. 93. Ibid. DIl, 26 (87:1). Apologia 9:3-10. 94. Apologia 8:15-16. 95. De Venatione Sapientiae 26 (77:6-7). 96. DP 41. 97. DP 47. In DP 74 Nicholas goes so far as to call God unintelligible. 98. DP 26. 99. DP 30. 100. Cf. the discussion —toward the beginning of Section IV of the Introduction—about the sense in which God is said to be sun. 101. For example, K. Oedinger ("Idiota de sapientia. Platonisches und anti-platonisches Denken bei Nikolaus von Cues," Tijdschrift voor Philosophic, 17 [1955], 690-98) considers Nicholas's affirmation that God is entitas, unitas, actualitas, exemplaritas, etc., as blatantly inconsistent ith his denial of the knowability of God. 102. DP 74. 103. W. P Alston makes a similar point against Tillich: "If beingitself does not admit of any characterization as this rather than that, there is no ground for considering one sort of attitude or feeling more appropriate to it than another." See "Tillich's Conception of a Religious Symbol," pp. 18-19 in S. Hook, ed., Religious Experience and Truth: A Symposium (New York: New York University Press, 1961). 104. DP 56. Cf. DP 12:12-15. Also note De Visione Dei 12 (50: 8-9): "Non es igitur creator: sedplusquam creator in infinitum. . . ." 105. Note the importance of the words "perse" in D I l , I I (30:8). Also note NA 13 (28:28-30). 106. DP 74. For another example see R. Haubst, " 'Am Nichtteilnehmbaren teilhaben'. Zu einem Leitsatz der cusanischen 'Einheitsmetaphysik' und Geistphilosophie," pp. 12-22 in Norbert Fischer et al., eds., Alte I''ragen und neue Wege des Denkens (Bonn: Bouvier, 1977). 107. DP 2. 108. DI I, 11 (30:4-7). 109.DP 1 2 : l - 1 5 ; 9 : 6 - 7 . C f . D / I , 16 (43:15);II, 3 (111:13-14). Although Nicholas maintains that God is all things, he nowhere states that all things are God. Instead, he repeatedly says that in God all things are God. Mark L. Fuehrer's mistaken claim that for Nicholas "everything is, in fact, God himself" stems from his mistranslation of 1)1 I, 22 (69:3-4). See "The Principle of Contractio in Nicholas of Cusa's Philosophical View of Man," Downside Review, 93 (October 1975), 290. Fuehrer also wrongly ascribes to Plato the view that "Socrates exists as Socrates by participating in the universal 'Socrates' " (p. 294). 110. Note DI II, 3 (11():4-5): "If you consider things apart from Him [i.e., God], they are nothing-just as number apart from oneness

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[is nothing]. If you consider Him apart from things, He exists and the things are nothing." (Contrast Hegel's statement that ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott.) Passages such as the following, however, do convey the impression of pantheism: "What, then, is the world except the appearance of the invisible God? What is God except the invisibility of visible things . . . ?" (DP 72:7-9). Nicholas has often been referred to as a pantheistic thinker. See, for example, Bertalanffy, ed., Nikolaus von Kues, p. 21. 111. DP9-.6-7. Seen. 153. 112. DP 11. 113. DP 68. 114. Apologia 27:3-4. 115. "Temporal things [are present in God] nontemporally, for [they are present] eternally; and corruptible things incorruptibly; material things immaterially; and plural things nonplurally; numbered things nonnumerically; composite things noncompositely; and similarly for all things "(DP 71). In DP 74 Nicholas says that God is beyond both everything simple and everything composite. 116. DP 69. 117. DP 65 and 73. 118. See DP 26, 68, and 73. 119.DPS. 120. Cf. DP 9 with DP 30. 121. Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (New York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1958), p. 15. 122. D7 II, 11. 1 2 3 . D / I I , 12. 124. Kurt Goldammer is certainly correct in maintaining that "geocentrism is not at all clearly rejected, since the question of the physical middle point remains completely open in Cusa" and that "not the slightest trace of a heliocentric system is to be found." See p. 30 of "Nicolaus von Cues und die Uberwindungdesgeozentrischen Weltbildes," pp. 25-41 inAlte Probleme-Neue Ansatze. Drei Vortrage von Fritz Krafft, Kurt Goldammer, Annemarie Wettley (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965). Also note A. Koyre, The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus-Kepler-Rorelli, trans. R. E. W. Maddison (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), p. 72. 125. See especially the last part of D/ II, 8. 126. DI II, 1 (97:18-19). 127. Dl II, 1 (97:5-6). 128. DI II, 4 (114:10-15). 129. DI II, 8. 130. DI I, 21 (65:1-8). 131. DI I, 21 (64:11-16).

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132. DI II, 1 (97:18-19). For the subsequent phrase "infinitas contracta" see II, 4 (113:13). 133. In DI II, 8 Nicholas maintains that only God is infinite actuality. 134.D/II, l.Cf. II, 5. 135. As for time, Nicholas's view is Augustinian: the world has no temporal beginning, for time began with the world. De Ludo Globi 18. 136. By "contracted" Nicholas means "restricted" or "limited" or "determinate" in some respect or to some degree. At the end of DI II, 4, he says: "Contractio means contraction to [i.e., restriction by] something, so as to be this or that." 137. See p. 238 of E. W. Platzeck's review of J. Koch and W. Happ's German translation of De Coniecturis: inMFCG, 10 (1973). Note Mariano Alvarez-Gomez, Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unendlichen bei Nikolaus von Kues (Munich: Pustet, 1968), p. 157. Also note p. 225 of Rudolf Haubst.Oze Christologie des Nikolaus von Kues (Freiburg: Herder, 1956). 138. See Koch's discussion at the end of Platzeck's article "Randbemerkungen zur via antiqua und via moderna im Spatmittelalter," MFCG,6 (1967), 35-50. See also p. 31, n. 55 of Koch's Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues. 139. Koch, Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues, p. 31, n. 55. 140. DI 11,6 (125:19-20). 141.0/11,6 (125:4-5). Cf. II, 3 (111:14-15). 142.0/11,4(115:14-16). 143. De Data Patris Luminum 2 (98:9). Cf. DP 14:16-17. 144.0/11,4 (115:1-19). 145. De Visione Dei 9 (33-34). 146. DP 13. 147. DI II, 6 (126:8-10, 14-16). Cf. Idiota deMente 2 (65). 148.0/11,6 (126:1-4). 149. DI II, 5 (119:15-19). 150. DI II, 5 (121:4-13). 151. See the opening sentences of DI II, 5. A detailed discussion and critique of Nicholas's doctrine of quodlibet in quolibet is found at the end of Vincent Martin's "The Dialectical Process in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," Laval tbeologique et philosophique, 5 (1949), 213-68. 152. Cf. Dill, 5 (118). 153. Ibid. There are two different senses in which the universe is said to be in God. In one sense it is enfolded in God ontologically prior to creation; in another sense, it is in God even though it has been unfolded from Him in creation. The latter sense is expressed

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most clearly in DI II, 5, (118:3-8): "Omne autem actu exsistens in deo est, quid ipse est actus omnium. Actus autem est perfectio et finis potentiae. Unde cum universum in quolibet actu exsistenti sit contractum, patet deum, qui est in universo, esse in quolibet et quodlibet actu exsistens immediate in deo, sicut universum." ("Every actually existing thing is in God because God is the actuality of all things. Now, actuality is the perfection and the goal of possibility. Hence, since the universe is contracted in each actually existing thing: it is evident that God, who is in the universe, is in each thing and that each actually existing thing is immediately in God—just as is the universe.") Similarly, the latter sense is the one which corresponds to DI III, 4 (204:15-19): "Hinc deus, ut est in omnibus, non est secundum gradus in ipsis quasi se gradatim et particulariter communicando. Omnia autem sine diversitate graduali esse non possunt; quapropter in deo sunt secundum se cum graduum diversitate."("Hence God, insofar as He is in all things, is not in them according to degrees—as if communicating Himself by degrees and by parts. However, none of these things can be without a difference of degrees; therefore, they are in God according to themselves with a difference of degrees.") As enfolded in God, all things are God rather than themselves (DP 9); that is, in God (sense 1) they exist as God (ut deus) rather than as themselves (secundum se). But even as unfolded from God, they exist in God (sense 2), while also existing according to themselves. (Cf. DP 13 :7-8: "Idea [res] verius est in forma formarum quam in se.") We must be careful not to claim, as do some interpreters, that for Nicholas things exist in God as themselves and exist outside God as other than themselves. For as enfolded in God, things do not exist as themselves; and outside God (i.e., as created), some things do exist in themselves and as themselves (in contrast to existing in another finite thing and as other than themselves). See the references given in n. 58 of the translation of DP. In a strict sense, however, no thing can be said to exist outside God. Accordingly, God is said to exist in (and of) Himself; but everything in the world exists by participation in God, rather than existing in (and of) itself. See DI I, 17(50:9-51:11);!, 17 (48:3); II, 7 (130: 15). DI II, 2 (103:9) shows that Nicholas sometimes uses the expression "per se et in se" instead of merely saying "in se" or "per se." 154. Dill, 5 (118:1-2). 155.0711,4 (115:17-19). 156. DI II, 4 (115:13-14. See also 115:15-19). 157. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. Ill (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1953), p. 239. Also note p. 242. Perhaps Copleston is also misled by the following passage in DI II, 2 (101:6-ll): "Inquantum enim ipsa creatura est esse del, nemo dubi-

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tat esse aeternitatem. Inquantum igitur cadit sub tempore, non est a deo, qui est aeternus. Quis igitur intelligit creaturam ab aeterno et cum hoc temporaliter esse? Non potuit enim creatura in esse ipso in aeternitate non esse. . . . " (Copleston does not cite this passage.) Nicholas teaches that as enfolded in God creatures are God. This statement (misleadingly) suggests that all things exist in God as their finite selves. (But this is not what he means. See Dl I, 24 [77:1-7].) Copleston might mistakenly want to interpret the passage in II, 2 as teaching that as unfolded from God the creation is God's being. (But cf. the passage in II, 2 with the statement in II, 8 [140:1-3] : "Unde cum possibilitas absoluta sit deus, si mundum consideramus ut in ipsa est, tune est ut in deo et est ipsa aeternitas.") Seen. 153. Copleston's mistake is shared by many others, including Vincent Martin ("The Dialectical Process in the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa," pp. 249, 252, 263, 266), Mark L. Fuehrer ("The Principle of Contractio in Nicholas of Cusa's Philosophical View of Man,"p. 294), and Mariano Alvarez-Gomez (Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unendlichen bei Nikolaus von Kues, p. 143). Martin also wrongly teaches that, for Nicholas, "God is the material cause from which all the creatures proceed" (p. 248). N. B. Apologia 26:10-25; 33:23-25. 158. Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol. Ill, p. 239. 159. In general, Nicholas's use of "ipse" is extremely casual; often "ipse" need not even be translated. Cf. Paul Wilpert's translation of the passage in question: "Gott ist ndmlich das absolute Wesen der Welt, d. h. des Alls. Das Allaberist eingeschranktes Wesen." Nikolaus von Kues, Die belehrte Unwissenheit. Buch H. Trans. Paul Wilpert (Hamburg: Meiner, 1967), p. 37. Note DI II, 4 (115:10) where instead of stating that the universe is "ipsa quiditas contracta," Nicholas says merely that it is "quiditas contracta." 160. "Everything which actually exists is in God because God is the actuality of all things." DI II, 5 (118:3-4). 161. See p. 12. Similarly, Nicholas calls man a created God (deus creatus) and a God manque (deus occasionatus). See DI II, 2 (104:3, 6). 162. Cf. Heb.2:7. 163.07111,3(198). 164. DI III, 2 (192:4-9). 165. DI III, 7 (220:2-3). 166. See n. 13. 167. Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, p. 38. 168. DP 46. 169. NA 5 (13:4-10). Cf. DI I 9 (26:12-14). 170. DP 21. 171. DP 23.

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172. DP 27. 173. DP 52. \74.Sermo 8 (See vol. 16, fascicle 2 of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia [Hamburg: Meiner, 1973], p. 158, lines 14-15). The expression "desiderium devotissimum" occurs in DP 15. 175. Yet, notice Nicholas's request—reminiscent of Anselm — to his interlocutors at the beginning of NA: "I shall speak and converse with you, Ferdinand, [but only] on the following condition: viz., that unless you are compelled by reason, you will reject as unimportant everything you will hear from me." Regarding the distinction between ratio (reason) and intellectus (intellect, understanding), as operations of the soul: Nicholas's view changes. In De Coniecturis a number of distinctions are made —one of which is that whereas ratio adheres to the principle of noncontradiction, intellectus (which is said to be the unity of ratio) attains unto the coincidence of opposites. (This view is also later hinted at in Apologia 15:8-16; 28:15-17.) There are different orders of intellects — the human intellect being the lowest, and being joined to the body through the intermediary of reason. However, no order of finite intellect—but rather only ipse divinus absolutissimus intellectus—can attain the ineffable and most precise truth. In DI no uniform distinction is made between ratio and intellectus. A distinction seems not at all to be present in Book I, to be only hinted at in Book II, and to appear explicitly for the first time in Book III. (See Hermann Schnarr, Modi essendi. Interpretationen zu den Schriften De docta ignorantia, De coniecturis, und De venatione sapientiae von Nikolaus von Kues [Miinster: Aschendorff, 1973], pp. 45-48.) In DI II, 2 (100:9-10) we are told that noster intellectus nequit transilire contradictoria-. that our intellect cannot leap beyond contradictions. But in De Coniecturis I, 6 (25:13-15) the intellect is said to enfold opposites. In DP Nicholas sometimes tacitly distinguishes between reason and intellect (as at 15:2) and sometimes uses "intellectus" in the accustomed way (viz., as signifying the soul's power to understand a concept). There is no better example of Nicholas's fluctuating terminology.

On Actualized-possibility 1. The incipit reads: "Here begins the dialogue (dialogus) on Actualized-possibility—a dialogue of the most reverend father-in-Christ, Lord Nicholas of Cusa, cardinal of St. Peter in Chains. There are three discussants." 2. Codex Cusanus 219 here has "Johannes" instead of "Bernardus." But Codex Monacensis Latinus 7338 contains the obviously correct reading.

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3. Rom. 1:20 One difficulty with the Latin version of this text is that the antecedent of "intellecta" is uncertain. Another is that "a creatura mundi" may be construed temporally. Nicholas here takes "intellecta" with "ea," though later he takes it with "creatura." He always construes "a creatura mundi" nontemporally. See 3:6; 4:3-4; 15:10-ll;51:14-15-,73 : 4-5. 4. II Cor. 4:18. 5. Ibid.

6. "Beginning" is one of the names for God. See Rev. 22:1 3. 7. In this passage Nicholas implies that not-being does not exist. Later, however, he maintains that not-being does exist. (See 25:1216. Cf. 27:22-23; 29:12-13; 59:18-20 ; 67:18; 73:18.) These passages are not contradictory. For although not-being exists in God, it does not exist as an object in the world: it is not a created thing. At times, however, Nicholas does tend to reify not-being. Note NA 7 (15:2630): "If Not-other ceased, all the things it precedes would immediately cease. And so, not only the actuality and the possibility of the beings which Not-other precedes would cease but so also would the notbeing and the nothing of these beings." 8. Although a created thing is able to be that which it actually is, it is not actually that which it is able to be —as Nicholas explains in DPS. 9. I.e., absolute possibility is pure possibility; and absolute actuality is pure actuality. Nicholas does not make any systematic distinction between possibilitas, potentia, potestas, posse —nor between actualitas, actus, and esse. 10. Nicholas contrasts the expression "posse fieri" with the expression "posse facere" (e.g., 27:6-7; 29:7) and with the expression "posse esse" (e.g., 24:12-14). It may be translated in a variety of ways: e.g., "to be able to be made," "to be able to be done," "to be able to become," "to be possible to be made," "the possibility to be made," and so on. See also 24:10; 28:1 -29:10. At 29:1 "posse fieri" is associated with "posse creari" (28:1, 7). At 35:1 Nicholas uses "si fieri posset" in the sense of "if possible"; and at 75:4-5 he uses "quantum fieri potest" in the sense of "as much as possible." As a rule, however, he does not in this dialogue use "posse fieri" to mean simply "to be possible." 11. Eternity itself is God. Possibility, Actuality, and their Union are the members of the Trinity. 12. (1) Sometimes Nicholas says that God is everything which is able to be; (2) sometimes he suggests that God is everything which He is able to be;and (3) sometimes—as in the present passage—what he says may be construed either way, since neither the text nor the context eliminates the ambiguity. As examples of /, note 73:12 and 8:6-7 ("It is necessary that the Creator be all the things which are possible to be. . . ." "Since possibility and actuality are identical

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in God, God is—actually—everything of which 'is able to be' can be predicated truly.") As examples of 2, note 27:18-19 and 30:14-15 ("For example, if the Beginning were able not-to-be, it would not-be, since it is what it is able to be." "This is not the case with Actualizedpossibility, which lacks neither a greater magnitude which it is able to be nor anything at all which it is able to be. . . .") As examples of 3, note the above passage and 12:12-13 ("For, assuredly, He who is what (He) is able to be does not fail to have solar being. . . .") Parentheses around "He" are meant to signal the ambiguity of the reading. The ambiguity of the Latin confuses Bernard, who asks for clarification. That God is actually everything that can possibly be entails that He is actually everything that He (or anything else) can possibly be. His possibilities are possibility itself. To say that God is everything that He can be is to say that He cannot be anything other than He is. This latter point is made by Nicholas at 12:1-2, as well as throughout his work NA. N. B. Matt. 19:26. Mark 10:27; 14:36. Luke 18:27. With God, states Scripture, all things are possible —even what is impossible with men. 13. I.e., we can say that the sun, etc., is what it is able to be. 14. See Luke 3:8 and 12:25. 15. "Mihi" here goes with "difficillima." Cf. 24:6-7. 16. Alternative translation: "J want to say that implicitly-in-God all these things are God, even as explicitly-in-the-created-world they are the world." 17. Literally: "For to a greatness (alicui) which is maximal in such way that it is also minimal, how would there be greater [greatness]?" N. B. Nicholas's three questions parallel his immediately preceding three assertions: viz., that God is absolutely maximal greatness, absolutely minimal greatness, and a greatness which is the measure and the truth of every finite magnitude. 18. Alternative translation: "Or how can a greatness that is actually everything it is able to be fail to be congruent with every magnitude?" Here and elsewhere in the translation "greatness" and "magnitude" are used as equivalent English renderings for "magnitude." 19. Cf. notes 8 and 12. 20. "Entitas" may be rendered either as "being" or as "being itself," depending upon the context. Throughout this treatise I use the latter rendering, since "entitas" is being used to refer to God.Ewtitas (qua God) is ipsum esse, forma formarum, essendi forma, perfectio omnis esse et idea omnium formarum complicatio.N. B. 14:1516;61:l-2;65.-l-16. Also see De Venatione Sapientiae,chap. 24 and D / I , 8. Cf. Thierry of Chartres, Commentum Super Boethii Librum de Trinitate II, 21, (in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres

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and His School, ed. Nikolaus M. Haring (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971), p. 75. Like Pseudo-Dionysius and Meister Eckhart, Nicholas refers to God as the being of all being ("entitas omnis esse," "esse omnis esse"). See DP 67:13-14 and Sermo "Ubi est qui natus est rex ludaeorum," printed in Cusanus-Texte. Vier Predigten im Geiste Eckharts, ed. J Koch (Heidelberg: Winter, 1937), p. 102, line 9. 21. This expression is repeated at 56:2-3 and 74:6-7. NA 14 indicates explicitly that the formula is borrowed from Pseudo-Dionysius (not to mention I Cor. 15:28). God is "all in all," teaches Nicholas, in the sense that He is being itself, which is present in every finite being. God is "nothing in nothing" (Or, as Dionysius says, "not anything in anything") in the sense that He is none of the finite beings. In Apologia 17:17-18 Nicholas, again following Dionysius, states his point as follows: "God is the being of all things in such way that He is, nevertheless, none of all things." Finally, Proposition 5 in the appendix to NA affirms that God is both the Being of being and the Not-being of not-being. Therefore, "God is nothing in nothing" also means, for Nicholas, that God is the very not-being of nothing. Cf. Proposition 7. 22. Cf. John 1:3-4. 23. Alternative reading for "possest": the-actual-existence-ofpossibility. 24. Gen. 17:1. 25. Exod. 3:14. 26. "Esse" may here be translated either as "being" or as "existence.'^^ n. 20. 27. Cf. St. Anselm, Proslogion 22. 28. The Septuagint has '£70!; etjiu o &v. 29.See n. 10. 30. Acts 17:28. 31. "Cum d puncto" is used interchangeably with "in d puncto." Note the meanings of "cum" and "in" at 19 = 24-25 and 22:6. Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 22: "Unde si usus loquendi admitteret, convenientius did videretur esse cum loco vel tempore quam in loco vel tempore." 32. Interestingly, Nicholas uses the moving circle to illustrate eternity and the fixed circle to illustrate time. This procedure reverses the usual pattern of analogy, which likens the eternal to the fixed and unmoving. 33. Cf. Rev. 22:13. 34. Wisd.7:24. 35.Cf.Ps. 147:15. 36. Cf. Wisd.8:l. 37. The sun appears to revolve around the earth from east to west (i.e., "with the firmament") once every day. At the same time, the

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sun actually moves among the stars from west to east (i.e., "counter to the firmament"), making one complete circuit of the heavens in a year. Because the sun changes its position in the heavens constantly at a uniform rate, it requires a few more minutes than do the stars to complete its daily apparent revolution about the earth. A similar effect is generally true for the planets as well. 38. Nicholas uses "aenigma" in the sense of a "symbolism." Cf. I Cor. 13:12. 39. See n. 7. 40. I.e., through God. 41. Matt. 11:25. 42. John 14:9. 43.Eph. 3:17. 44. John 14:17,26. 45. John 16:33.1 John 5:4-5. 46. I Cor. 1:20. 47. Ps. 83:8 (84:7) 48. Note the story about the blind man in John 9. 49. John 14:23. 50. Matt. 5:8. 51. Cf. Luke 10:27. 52. Eph. 3:17. 53. Ps. 32:9 ( 3 3 = 9 ) . 54. Acts 2:4. 55. Cf. Eph. 4:7. 56. In this sentence Nicholas uses "knowledge" in two different senses: (1) our knowledge of God; (2) the knowledge by which God created the world. In the present passage he implies that in the next life believers will attain to the intellectual vision of God insofar as they will attain to the vision of Christ. However, they will never attain to the knowledge of God as He is in Himself. Cf. DP 40-41 and D / I , 26 (18:16-17). 57.Heb. 11:1. II Cor. 4:18. 58. Cf. 62:14. See also De Coniecturis I, 11 (54:6-23). God cannot exist differently than He does exist, since all possibilities are actual in Him. Nor can He (acceptably) be conceived to be otherwise than He is. 59. See De Coniecturis 11, 1 (76:11 -18). Cf.Nicholas's Die mathematischen Schriften, Germ, trans. Josepha Hofmann (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), p. 30. This example is also found in Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 2 (983a!5 ff.). 60. Here Nicholas uses "ipsius posse" and "ipsius esse" in place of "illius possibilitatis" and "illius actus." (Cf. 42:7;42:14-15; 42: 16-17.) I therefore rendered "esse" as "actuality." 61. Realia are contrasted with rationis entia. 62. Nicholas uses the notion of mathematical beginning as a basis

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for inferring truths about God, who is "the most perfect Beginning of all things" (45 = 13). 63. In Section 48 Nicholas (through John) identifies the Father as absolute possibility, the Son as existence (or actuality), and the Holy Spirit as the union of possibility and actuality. Thus, in the passage about the rose, he formulates a symbolism which he will subsequently use to elucidate the doctrine of the Trinity. For the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are of the same essence. 64.1 Cor. 13:12. 65. Earlier, Nicholas denied that the sun is that which it is able to be (8:10-11). In the present passage he asserts that every existing thing, including the sun, is only that which is able to be. That is, it is one of the many things which are possible to be, even though it is not everything which it is able to be. 66. The Beginning has no beginning. That is, God is unoriginated. 67. Rom. 1:20. Seen. 3. 68. Viz., possibility, actuality, and their union. 69. Because the possibility and the actuality do not coincide, Nicholas says that actuality is not present in the possibility. However, both possibility and actuality are present in the motion. 70. I.e., in the existence would be possibility and the union; and in the union would be possibility and existence. Note the previous speech of the Cardinal. 71. Re translation of "abbrevtatum": cf. 54:7-8 with 57:1. 72. In the handwritten ms. (Codex Cusanus 219) the word "in" appears as three strokes, with a light connecting line which forms the letter "n". It is not set off—e.g., by enlargment or by spacing—from the other words of the manuscript. Moreover, Nicholas adopts no convention for distinguishing using the word from mentioning it. (Similarly, the ms. does not capitalize or in any way set off the "e" in "posse," "esse" or "nexus" — as occurs in section 57 of the printed text.) 73. "Name" here translates "nomen sen relatio." For "relatio" here also means name. 74. Nicholas here uses words beginning with "in": "inest," "immanet," "integral," "informat," 75. For example, "in" operates as a negative when prefixed to words such as "comprehensible" and "competent." But it has a positive force when prefixed to words such as "form" and "fuse." 76. Seen. 21. 77.ICor. 2:11. 78.1 Cor. 2:10. 79. Prov. 25:27. 80. The way of supereminence is illustrated by Nicholas's example of in -. "Clearly, in is more than a limit or a boundary. Thus, in in a limit does not cease to be a limit; rather, it is all the more a

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limit. It is a limit within a limit (or a limit of limits), so that it is not called a limit, since it is not limited by any limit but rather surpasses [every limit]" (55:20-23). 81.Cf.Heb. 1:3. 82. God the Son is the Form of God the Father. In his next speech the Cardinal calls the Godhead "the most simple and the most infinite Form." 83. This is another name for Nicholas's work De Visione Dei. The subsequent example about seeing and being corresponds to the discussion in De Visione Dei, chap. 10. 84. In NA Nicholas expands upon this point. 85. Matt. 19:26. 86. Cf. Dill, 1 (92:1-4). 87. See Nikolaus von Cues, Die mathematischen Schriften, especially pp. 41,123,140-50. Nicholas "shows" how different planegeometrical figures can be equal to one another. 88. Idiota de Mente 7 (77:9-20) and 8 (82:1-7). 89. Cf. Col. 2:3. 90.Exod. 3:14. Seen. 20. 91. 14:13. 92. In his discussion of negation Nicholas does not clearly distinguish between using a word to mention itself and using a word to mention something other than itself. 93. God is the presupposed Being, the eternal Being of all being. 94. Nicholas here shows that he regards determination as negation. The principle "omnis determinatio est negatio" is a pillar of negative theology. 95. E.g., Augustine in De Trinitate 5.1.2. 96. Rom. 1:20. 97. II Cor. 1:19. Nicholas uses this enigmatic verse as an example of a symbolism. 98. Luke 16:26. 99. Seen. 21. 100. The explicit reads: "Praise be to God. The end of the trialogue—or, more truly, of the guiding star —held by the most wise and most reverend father, Lord Nicholas of Cusa (presbyter of the Holy Roman Church, cardinal of the titular Church of St. Peter in Chains) with his two friends, Lord Bernard, chancellor of the archbishop of Salzburg, and John Andrea Vigevius, abbot of the monastery of St. Justine of Sezadium."

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Absolutely Maximum, 8-11, 14, 160nl9 Acquired ignorance, doctrine of, see "Docta ignorantia" Aenigma, 176n38 Albert the Great, 6 Algazel, 5 Alston, W. P., 167nl03 Analogia entis, 26 Anaxagoras, 36 Anselm of Canterbury: Nicholas compared with,6,14-15, 22, 38,43,159n73,163n52, 172n/75 works: De Conceptu Virginali, 6 -, Proslogion, 14, 15, 22,163-64n55 Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, 5, 13,172nl75, 175n21 Aquinas, Thomas: Nicholas compared with, 6, 7, 10, 15, 165n69 Aristotle, 5, 33, 34, 176n5P Atonement, doctrine of, 6, 38 Augustine, 5, 7, 169nl35

Earth, Karl, !63-64n55 Being and not-being, 7, 21, 67, 93-97 passim, 135, 143-49, passim, 151,160nl 9,161 n 36, I66n83, 173n7, I75n21 Bertalanffy, Ludwigvon, 163n50 Bett, Henry, \62r\49 Bonaventure, Saint, 5 Bond, H. Lawrence, 162-63n49 "Book of the Twenty-four Philosophers," 13 Brothers of the Common Life, 3 Bruno, Giordano, 15,30 Burgevin, Frederick H., I60n23 Cassirer, Ernst, 15, 39 Christ: as revelation of God, 27, 40,99-107, 149, 153, 176n56; and theory of atonement, 38; as part of Trinity, 39-40,119-23, 177n6J;as image of substance of God, 133 Church of St. Peter in Chains, 4 Coincidentia oppositorum, doc-

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Index

trine of, 11-12, 21-22, 160n22 Conciliar Movement, 4 Contraction, 33, 37-38, \69nl36 Copernicus, 15, 30 Copleston, Frederick, 37, 17071nl57 I Corinthians, 16, 175n2/ II Corinthians, 16 Council of Basel, 3 Council of Constance, 4 Cusanus, Nicolaus, see Nicholas De Conceptu Virginali, 6 De Concordantia Catholica, 5 De Coniecturis, 12, 33-34, 172n775,176n5# De Divisione Naturae, 5 De Docta Ignorantia, 14, 30, 162-63n49: doctrine of unitas complicans in, 4; and influence of Thierry of Chartres, 6 -7; "proof" of God in, 8-10; method and style of, 8-11; discussion of absolutely Maximum in, 1011; and charge of pantheism, 12-13; use of symbolism in, 13, 135; meaning of title, 13, 27; compared with De Possest, 16, 19-21, 36-37; and proportionality between finite and infinite, 19; discussion of negative theology in, 20, 27; teachings on universals in, 32-37 passim; and distinction between ratio and intellectus, 172n/ 75 De Icona, 133 De LiNon Aliud, 5, 39,172n7 75, 173-74n/2,175n21,178n84 De Ludo Globi, 13,43 De Pace Fidei, 8 De Possest: sources for, 7; discussion of teachings on God in, 7, 16-30, 39, 41; discus-

sion of theme of God as possest, 7, 17-19, 23-24, 2830 passim, 39, 41; method and style of, 11-12, 16; doctrine of via negativa in, 16, 20-28; compared with De Docta Ignorantia, 16, 19-21, 36-37; and "proof" of God, 17; use of symbolism in, 21, 40-41, 43; teachings on universals in, 36-37; and philosophy as handmaiden of theology, 40; and distinction between ratio and intellectus, \72nl 75. See also "Possest"; Symbolism De Quaerendo Deum, 19 De Venatione Sapientiae, 18, 163n52 De Visione Dei, 12, I78n83 Divine Names, The, 5 "Docta ignorantia," 5, 13, 27 Dolan, John P., 163-64n55, 164n60 Duhem, Pierre, 6, 159nl6, I61n3/ Eckhart, Meister, 6, 13, 163n55, 174-75n20 Enfolding Oneness, 4 Ephesians 1:21, 16 Erigena, John Scotus: Nicholas compared with, 5, 7, 37, 42 works: De Divisione Naturae, 5 "Esse," 14, 173n9, 175n26, 176n60, 177n72 Eugenius IV, Pope, 158n2 Exodus 3:14, 1 Faith, doctrine of, 16, 38, 99107 Flasch, Kurt, 14-15, 165n66 Fuehrer, Mark L., 167nl09,17071nl57

Index Callus, Thomas, 6 God: as inconceivable and unknowable, 5, 19-28 passim, 41, 81, 97,107-9,151-53, 165-66n71, I67nl01, 176n56; discussion of teachings on, in De Possest, 7, 16-30, 39, 41; as Actualizedpossibility (Possest), 7, 17-19, 23-24,28-30,31,39,41,6779,93, 123; Nicholas's "proof" of, 8-10, 17, 16364n55; as absolutely Maximum, 8-11, 14,160nl9;coincidence of opposites in, 11, 12,21-22,23,42,77,87,151, 153, I66n83; as all things, 12,16, 28-30, 69-81 passim, 151,167n/09 ; as beyond the coincidence of contradictories, 12, 21; as created as well as creating, 12, 38; as sphere and circumference of world, 13,31; names for, 14, 19,21,23-24,28,93,173n6, 174-75n20;and the created world, 16-17, 28-30, 34-38, 63, 71-77 passim, 151-53, I66n83,I67nl09, 168n/15, 169-70n/5J,170-71nl57, 174nl6; man's seeking of, 16,19-21,23, 27,38,4041,79-81,97-107,127, 151-53, 176n56; as Being itself, 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 7 9 , 141, 143,174-75n20,175n2J, 178nP3 ; revelation of, 2728,40,63-69,79,99107,149,151-53,176n56 ; as Absolute Universal, 34. See also Via negativa Goldammer, Kurt, 168nl24 Grosseteste, Robert, 6 Haubst, Rudolf, 165n69 Hawkins, D. ]. B., 15, \62n49

183

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 15,42, 167-68nl/0 Heimsoeth, Heinz, 163n50 Heron, Germain, 162-63n49 Holy Spirit, 39, 103, 119-23, 177n6J Hommes, Jakob, 5 Hugh of St. Victor, 6 Idiota de Mente, I62r\49 Imitation of Christ, The, 3 Incarnation, 40 Infinity, notion of, 42 Intellectus,43, I72nl75 Jaspers, Karl, 14 John the Evangelist, 77 Kant, Immanuel, 15, 164n60 Klibansky, Raymond, 163n50 Koch, Josef, 33, 34 Koran, 160n23 Koyre, A., 30 Krebs, Nikolaus, see Nicholas Lai, Tyrone, 163n50 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 15,164n59 Lenz,Joseph,5 Lull, Raymond, 6 Maimonides, Moses, 15 Man: nature of, 12, 34, 36, 3839, 171nl6l; as seeker of God, 16, 19-21,23,27, 38, 40-41, 79-81,97-107, 127, 151-53,176n56 Martin, Vincent, 170-71ni57 Mathematics, 139, 178nS7: Nicholas's contribution to, 4; Nicholas's symbolic use of, 21, 39-40,42, 109-23, 135-37,176-77n62 Maurer, Armand, 8-10, 160n2l, 164n6J Maximus the Confessor, 5

184

Index

Motion, 73 : Nicholas's symbolic use of, 21,40-41,83-89,12327; of the earth and universe, 30,32,40-41 Mystical vision, doctrine of, 16, 20,21,41,79, 107,16566n7/, 166n74 Negative theology, see Via negativa Neoplatonism, 7, 42 Nicholas, variants of name, 3 ; life of, 3 -4; compared with Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus, 5,6, 13 ; sources for, 5-7; compared with PseudoDionysius, 5,7,19, 42,16566n71,174-75n20, 175n27; compared with Erigena, 5 , 7 , 37, 42; compared with Augustine, 5, 7, 169nI35; compared with Aristotle, 5, 33, 34, 176n59; compared with Aquinas,6, 7, 10, 15, 165n69; compared with Eckhart,6, 13, !63-64n55, 17475n20; compared with Anselm,6, 14-15, 22, 38,43, 159n73,163n52, 172n/75; method and style of writings of, 7-16, 41, 172nl75; compared with William of Ockham, 7, 41; and "proof" of God, 8-10, 17, 163-64n55; compared with Spinoza, 11, 15,41,42; doctrines of and reading of scripture, 16-28; major themes in writings of, 16-41; teachings on universals, 32-38 works: Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, 5, 13, 172nl75, 175n21 ;De Concordantia Catholica, 5;De Coniecturis, 12,33-34,172nJ 75,176n5S; De Icona, 133 ; De Li Non

Aliud, 5, 39, 172n/75, 17374n/2,175n21,178nS4; De Ludo Globi, 13,43-,De Pace Fidei, 8;De Quaerendo Deum, 19; De Venatione Sapientiae, 18, !63n52;D